[Senate Hearing 110-201]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-201, Pt. 1
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2008
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1547
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
__________
PART 1
MILITARY POSTURE
ARMY POSTURE
AIR FORCE POSTURE
COMBATANT COMMANDERS
NAVY POSTURE
WHETHER THE ARMY AND MARINE CORPS ARE PROPERLY SIZED, ORGANIZED, AND
EQUIPPED
COMBATANT COMMANDERS
CENTRAL COMMAND
EUROPEAN COMMAND
__________
FEBRUARY 6; MARCH 15, 20, 22, 29; APRIL 17, 24; MAY 3, 17, 2007
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
----------
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Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN WARNER, Virginia,
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
EVAN BAYH, Indiana LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN CORNYN, Texas
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Michael V. Kostiw, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Military Posture
february 6, 2007
Page
Gates, Hon. Robert M., Secretary of Defense; Accompanied by Hon.
Tina W. Jonas, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)........ 4
Pace, Gen. Peter, USMC, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.......... 9
Posture of the United States Army
march 15, 2007
Geren, Hon. Preston M., ``Pete'' III, Acting Secretary of the
Army........................................................... 116
Schoomaker, GEN Peter J., USA, Chief of Staff, United States
Army; Accompanied by LTG James J. Lovelace, USA, Deputy Chief
of Staff, U.S. Army; LTG Clyde A. Vaughn, ARNG, Director, Army
National Guard; LTG Jack C. Stultz, USAR, Commanding General,
U.S. Army Reserve Command; and LTC Coll S. Haddon, USA, Deputy
Director, Operations Program Manager, Future Combat Systems,
Brigade Combat Team............................................ 182
Posture of the United States Air Force
march 20, 2007
Moseley, Gen. T. Michael, USAF, Chief of Staff, United States Air
Force.......................................................... 291
Wynne, Hon. Michael W., Secretary of the Air Force............... 342
United States Southern Command, United States Northern Command, and
United States Joint Forces Command
march 22, 2007
Keating, ADM Timothy J., USN, Commander, United States Northern
Command/Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command.... 454
Smith, Gen. Lance L., USAF, Commander, United States Joint Forces
Command/North Atlantic Treaty Organization Supreme Allied
Commander for Transformation................................... 463
Stavridis, ADM James G., USN, Commander, United States Southern
Command........................................................ 475
Posture of the United States Navy
march 29, 2007
Winter, Hon. Donald C., Secretary of the Navy.................... 541
Mullen, ADM Michael G., USN, Chief of Naval Operations........... 696
Conway, Gen. James T., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps...... 726
Whether the Army and Marine Corps are Properly Sized, Organized, and
Equipped to Respond to the Most Likely Missions over the Next Two
Decades While Retaining Adequate Capability to Respond to all
Contingencies Along the Spectrum of Combat
april 17, 2007
McCaffrey, GEN Barry R., USA (Ret.), President, BR McCaffrey
Associates, LLC................................................ 810
Korb, Dr. Lawrence J., Senior Fellow, Center for American
Progress....................................................... 816
Scales, MG Robert H., Jr., USA (Ret.), President, Colgen, Inc.... 824
Krepinevich, Dr. Andrew F., Jr., President, Center for Strategic
and Budgetary Assessments...................................... 830
United States Pacific Command, United States Forces-Korea, and United
States Special Operations Command
april 24, 2007
Keating, ADM Timothy J., USN, Commander, United States Pacific
Command........................................................ 891
Bell, GEN Burwell B., III, USA, Commander, United Nations Command
and Republic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command
Commander, United States Forces-Korea.......................... 905
Olson, VADM Eric T., USN, Deputy Commander, United States Special
Operations Command............................................. 920
United States Central Command
may 3, 2007
Fallon, ADM William J., USN, Commander, United States Central
Command........................................................ 1015
United States European Command
may 17, 2007
Craddock, GEN Bantz J., USA, Commander, United States European
Command, and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.................. 1072
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2008
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TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
MILITARY POSTURE
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy, Byrd,
Lieberman, Reed, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh,
Clinton, Pryor, Webb, McCaskill, McCain, Warner, Inhofe,
Sessions, Collins, Ensign, Chambliss, Graham, Dole, Cornyn,
Thune, and Martinez.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearing clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, minority
counsel; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Evelyn
N. Farkas, professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse,
professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff
member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J.
Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Michael J.
McCord, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan,
counsel; and Michael J. Noblet, research assistant.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member;
Derek J. Maurer, professional staff member; David M. Morriss,
minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff
member; Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member; Lynn F.
Rusten, professional staff member; Sean G. Stackley,
professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff
member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: David G. Collins, Fletcher L.
Cork, and Jessica L. Kingston.
Committee members' assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
Caroline Tess, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce
and Benjamin Rinaker, assistants to Senator Ben Nelson; Todd
Rosenblum, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant
to Senator Clinton; Lauren Henry, assistant to Senator Pryor;
Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Nichole M.
Distefano, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Sandra Luff,
assistant to Senator Warner; Arch Galloway II, assistant to
Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator Collins;
D'Arcy Grisier, assistant to Senator Ensign; Clyde A. Taylor
IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Adam G. Brake, assistant to
Senator Graham; Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole;
Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; and Stuart
C. Mallory and Bob Taylor, assistants to Senator Thune.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
meets this morning to receive the testimony from Secretary of
Defense, Robert Gates; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General Peter Pace; and the Comptroller of the Department of
Defense, Tina Jonas.
The subject is the President's fiscal year 2008 budget
request for the Department of Defense (DOD), including both the
so-called base budget of $481 billion and the additional $141
billion requested for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In
addition, our witnesses will present the $93 billion
supplemental that is being submitted for the rest of fiscal
year 2007 for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which is in
addition to the $70 billion so-called bridge supplemental for
fiscal year 2007 that Congress provided last fall.
I want to welcome all of our witnesses this morning.
Secretary Gates, we know that most of the work of putting this
budget together took place before you took office, and we
understand if you turn to the Comptroller to answer, perhaps,
more questions than usual this year. However, some of the most
significant proposals contained in this budget and the
supplemental reflect administration decisions that were made in
the past month, such as the proposal to surge additional troops
to Iraq this year and the proposal to seek a large permanent
increase in the size of the Army and Marine Corps. These are
key decisions which you, Mr. Secretary, were intimately
involved.
I appreciate the effort that all of you made to submit a
budget that includes the full year's cost of continuing
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This was in compliance with
a provision in last year's National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA). It is a step forward, in terms of both budget honesty
and proper oversight, and I'm pleased that, through the
leadership of Senators McCain and Byrd, and others, that we
have gotten to this point.
I hope we're now moving to an era of real transparency of
the financial costs of these operations. That still leaves us
plenty of other work to do on the policy underlying these costs
and, as the reports of the Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction remind us, on the contracting and spending of
these funds. Making it clear how much we spend and what we plan
to spend it for is an essential part of congressional oversight
and accountability to the taxpayer.
One of the benefits of seeing the full cost of the defense
program proposed in this budget is that it brings home the
enormous growth in defense spending we've seen in this
administration. The fiscal year 2008 base budget is 30 percent
larger than the defense budget that President Bush inherited in
2001, and that's in constant dollars. When the cost of
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are included, the defense
budget is now 60 percent larger than it was then, yet it is
difficult to see how we, as a Nation, are more secure.
Nowhere are the costs of this administration's policies
more vivid than in the budget request before us today for
operations in Iraq. Our Nation has already made an investment
of over $330 billion and a sacrifice of over 3,000 lives lost
and 22,000 wounded in Iraq. But this has not brought us the
secure and stable Iraq that we all wish to see.
This morning, the administration is presenting to Congress
and the American people a request to invest an additional $174
billion in a more robust version of that same Iraq policy for
the balance of 2007 and 2008. That would bring the total
invested in military costs in Iraq to $505 billion by the end
of fiscal year 2008.
The costs of our policy in Iraq are not limited to those
enormous sums of money, all of which are borrowed, by the way.
The heavy deployment of our forces to Iraq has increased the
stress on our force and reduces the ability of our military to
train for, and react to, challenges in other parts of the
world, if need be. The proposed surge of at least 21,500
additional forces to Iraq will worsen that stress.
There are other aspects of this request for funds in Iraq
and Afghanistan that are of concern. The request for over a
billion dollars of military construction funds in Iraq and
Afghanistan implies that a long-term presence may be
envisioned.
Secretary Gates, a month ago Senator McCain and I wrote to
you expressing our concern that the directive issued by Deputy
Secretary England in late October meant that the rules for what
would be allowed in future supplemental requests were being
relaxed. We wrote to you, urging that ``a supplemental should
be limited to expenditures that are directly required in
connection with ongoing military operations.'' It appears that
our concerns were well-founded.
Last fall, we were told that reset requirements for fiscal
year 2007 would reach about $23 billion, including a
significant one-time catchup for costs the Army was not able to
get the administration to request in 2006, but we were told
that recurring costs would be lower after that. Instead, we now
see those costs balloon up to $37 billion a year, including the
purchase of large numbers of aircraft that do not appear to
meet the definition of emergency spending and which won't be
delivered for years.
Finally, in a rather marked change of position for this
administration, the budget proposes to add 92,000 Active-Duty
Army and Marine Corps personnel to the force over the next 5
years, an increase of almost 14 percent in the size of our
ground forces. This proposed increase is substantially larger
than increases proposed by Senator Jack Reed and others over
the past several years, that the DOD had opposed. The
Department estimates the 5-year cost of this increase at $95
billion from fiscal years 2008 to 2012, and there are
additional costs in fiscal year 2007, as well. An increase of
this size will require us to either permanently increase the
size of the defense budget or cut back on weapons programs to
offset the cost of these additional personnel. Once adopted,
such increases are not easily undone, especially once we invest
in the equipment and facilities to support these new units.
We all understand the stress on our forces in Iraq, but
only some of these additional people would be trained and ready
to help relieve that stress in the next year or 2. Therefore,
it is important that we understand exactly what these
additional personnel are needed for in the long-term that was
not foreseen in the Quadrennial Defense Review submitted a year
ago that rejected such increases. Do we intend to stay in Iraq
for years to come? Does the administration think the long war
with terrorism is going to be won with large ground forces
operating in foreign nations?
Our men and women in uniform are risking their lives
representing our Nation around the world. All of us support
them. We appreciate their hard work and the sacrifices that
they and their families make. We owe it to them to give them
the tools to succeed, but we also have a duty to them and all
of America's taxpayers to approve only those funding requests
that we believe are necessary and appropriate.
Let me call on Senator Warner. I know that Senator McCain
is on his way, but--Senator Warner?
Senator Warner. That's correct. Let's proceed with the
testimony. At such time as he gets here, he'll make his opening
remarks.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Secretary Gates?
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. GATES, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE;
ACCOMPANIED BY HON. TINA W. JONAS, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(COMPTROLLER)
Secretary Gates. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I thank the
committee, first of all, for all you have done over the years
to support our military for many years, and I appreciate the
opportunity to provide an overview of the way ahead at the DOD
through the budgets being proposed this week.
First, the President's fiscal year 2008 defense budget,
which includes the base budget request and the fiscal year 2008
global war on terror request; and, second, the fiscal year 2007
emergency supplemental appropriation request to fund war-
related costs for the remainder of the fiscal year. We have
provided a more detailed statement--opening statement for the
record, and I'll just be very brief here.
Joining me today is General Pete Pace, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Tina Jonas, the Comptroller of the
DOD.
In summary, the budget being requested by the President
will make the strategic investments necessary to modernize and
recapitalize key capabilities in the Armed Forces, sustain the
All-Volunteer Military by reducing stress on the force and
improving the quality of life for our troops and their
families, improve readiness through additional training and
maintenance and by resetting forces following their overseas
deployment, and fund U.S. military operations in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and elsewhere, in the ongoing campaign against
violent jihadist networks around the globe.
I believe it is important to consider these budget requests
in some historical context, as there has been, understandably,
sticker shock at their combined price tags, more than $700
billion. But consider that at about 4 percent of America's
gross domestic product (GDP), the amount of money the United
States is projected to spend on defense this year is actually a
smaller percentage of GDP than when I left government 14 years
ago, following the end of the Cold War, and a significantly
smaller percentage than during previous times of war, such as
Vietnam and Korea.
Since 1993, with a defense budget that is a smaller
relative share of our national wealth, the world has gotten
more complicated and arguably more dangerous. In addition to
fighting the global war on terror, we also face the danger
posed by Iran and North Korea's nuclear ambitions and the
threat they pose not only to their neighbors, but globally,
because of their record of proliferation; the uncertain paths
of Russia and China, which are both pursuing sophisticated
military modernization programs; and a range of other potential
flashpoints and challenges. In this strategic environment, the
resources we devote to defense should be at the level to
adequately meet those challenges.
Someone once said that experience is that marvelous thing
that enables you to recognize a mistake when you make it again.
Five times over the past 90 years, the United States has either
slashed defense spending or disarmed outright in the mistaken
belief that the nature of man or the behavior of nations had
somehow changed, or that we would no longer need capable, well-
funded military forces on hand to confront threats to our
Nation's interests and security. Each time, we have paid a
price.
The costs of defending the Nation undoubtedly are high. The
only thing costlier, ultimately, would be to fail to commit the
resources necessary to defend our interests around the world
and failure--and to fail to prepare for the inevitable threats
of the future.
Before closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this
opportunity to announce something that is not referenced in my
statement that was submitted yesterday, but that I wanted to
bring to the committee's attention.
The President has decided to stand up a new unified
combatant command, Africa Command (AFRICOM), to oversee
security cooperation, building partnership capability, defense
support to nonmilitary missions, and, if directed, military
operations on the African continent. This command will enable
us to have a more effective and integrated approach than the
current arrangement of dividing Africa between Central Command
(CENTCOM) and European Command (EUCOM), an outdated arrangement
left over from the Cold War. This Department will consult
closely with Congress and work with our European and African
allies to implement this effort.
We look forward to taking your questions.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Gates follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Robert M. Gates
Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and members of the committee: I thank
the committee for all you have done to support our military these many
years, and I appreciate the opportunity to provide an overview of the
way ahead at the Department of Defense (DOD) through the budgets being
proposed this week: First, the President's fiscal year 2008 defense
budget, which includes the base budget request and the fiscal year 2008
global war on terror request; and second, the fiscal year 2007
Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Request to fund war-related costs
for the remainder of this fiscal year.
I believe it is important to consider these budget requests in some
historical context as there has been, understandably, sticker shock at
their combined price tags--more than $700 billion in total.
But, consider that at about 4 percent of America's Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), the amount of money the United States is expected to
spend on defense this year is actually a smaller percentage of GDP than
when I left government 14 years ago following the end of the Cold War--
and a significantly smaller percentage than during previous times of
war, such as Vietnam and Korea.
Since 1993, with a defense budget that is a smaller relative share
of our national wealth, the world has gotten more complicated, and
arguably more dangerous. In addition to fighting the global war on
terror, we also face:
The danger posed by Iran and North Korea's nuclear
ambitions, and the threat they pose not only to their
neighbors, but globally, because of their record of
proliferation.
The uncertain paths of China and Russia, which are
both pursuing sophisticated military modernization programs;
and
A range of other potential flashpoints and challenges.
In this strategic environment, the resources we devote to
defense should be at the level to adequately meet those
challenges.
Someone once said that ``Experience is that marvelous thing that
enables you to recognize a mistake when you make it again.''
Five times over the past 90 years the United States has either
slashed defense spending or disarmed outright in the mistaken belief
that the nature of man or behavior of nations had somehow changed, or
that we would no longer need capable, well funded military forces on
hand to confront threats to our Nation's interests and security. Each
time we have paid a price.
The costs of defending our Nation are high. The only thing
costlier, ultimately, would be to fail to commit the resources
necessary to defend our interests around the world, and to fail to
prepare for the inevitable threats of the future.
fiscal year 2008 base budget
The President's fiscal year 2008 base budget request of $481.4
billion is an increase of 11.3 percent over the projected enacted level
of fiscal year 2007, and provides the resources needed to man,
organize, train, and equip the Armed Forces of the United States. This
budget continues efforts to reform and transform our military
establishment to be more agile, adaptive, and expeditionary to deal
with a range of both conventional and irregular threats.
Some military leaders have argued that while our forces can support
current operations in the war on terror, these operations are
increasing risks associated with being called on to undertake a major
conventional conflict elsewhere around the world. This budget provides
additional resources to mitigate those risks.
The fiscal year 2008 base budget includes increases of about $16.8
billion over last year for investments in additional training,
equipment repair and replacement, and intelligence and support. It
provides increases in combat training rotations, sustains air crew
training, and increases ship steaming days.
increase ground forces
Despite significant improvements in the way our military is
organized and operated, the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan
have put stress on parts of our Nation's ground forces.
Last month, the President called for an increase in the permanent
active end strength of the Army and Marine Corps of some 92,000 troops
by fiscal year 2012. The base budget request adds $12.1 billion to
increase ground forces in the next fiscal year, which will consist of
7,000 additional soldiers and 5,000 additional marines.
Special Operations Forces, who have come to play an essential and
unique role in operations against terrorist networks, will also grow by
5,575 troops between fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008.
strategic investments--modernization
The base budget invests $177 billion in procurement and research
and development that includes major investments in the next generation
of technologies. The major weapons systems include:
Future Combat System ($3.7 billion)--The first
comprehensive modernization program for the Army in a
generation.
Joint Strike Fighter ($6.1 billion)--This next
generation strike aircraft has variants for the Air Force, the
Navy, and the Marine Corps. Eight international partners are
contributing to the JSF's development and production.
F-22A ($4.6 billion)--Twenty additional aircraft will
be procured in fiscal year 2008.
Shipbuilding ($14.4 billion)--The increase of $3.2
billion over last year is primarily for the next generation
aircraft carrier, the CVN-21, and the LPD-17 amphibious
transport ship. The long-term goal is a 313-ship Navy by 2020.
Missile Defense
I have believed since the Reagan administration that if we can
develop a missile defense capability, it would be a mistake for us not
to do so. There are many countries that either have or are developing
ballistic missiles, and there are at least two or three others--
including North Korea--that are developing longer-range systems. We
also have an obligation to our allies, some of whom have signed on as
partners in this effort. DOD is proceeding with formal negotiations
with Poland and the Czech Republic on establishing a European missile
site. The missile defense program funded by this request will continue
to test our capability against more complex and realistic scenarios. I
urge the committee to approve the full $9.9 billion requested for the
missile defense and Patriot missile programs.
Space Capabilities
The recent test of an anti-satellite weapon by China underscored
the need to continue to develop capabilities in space. The policy of
the U.S. Government in this area remains consistent with the
longstanding principles that were established during the Eisenhower
administration, such as the right of free passage and the use of space
for peaceful purposes. Space programs are essential to the U.S.
military's communications, surveillance, and reconnaissance
capabilities. The base budget requests about $6.0 billion to continue
the development and fielding of systems that will maintain U.S.
supremacy while ensuring unfettered, reliable, and secure access to
space.
Recapitalization
A major challenge facing our military is that several key
capabilities are aging and long overdue for being replaced. The prime
example is the Air Force KC-135 tanker fleet, which averages 45 years
per plane. It is becoming more expensive to maintain and less reliable
to operate. The Air Force has resumed a transparent and competitive
replacement program to recapitalize this fleet with the KC-X aircraft.
The KC-X will be able to carry cargo and passengers and will be
equipped with defensive systems. It is the U.S. Transportation
Command's and the Air Force's top acquisition and recapitalization
priority.
quality of life--sustaining the all-volunteer force
Our Nation is fortunate that so many talented and patriotic young
people have stepped forward to serve, and that so many of them have
chosen to continue to serve.
In December, all active branches of the U.S. military exceeded
their recruiting goals, with particularly strong showings by the Army
and Marine Corps. The fiscal year 2008 request includes $4.0 billion
for recruiting and retention to ensure that the military continues to
attract and retain the people we need to grow the ground forces and
defend the interests of the United States.
We will continue to support the All-Volunteer Force and their
families through a variety of programs and initiatives. The budget
includes:
$38.7 billion for health care for both Active-Duty and
retired servicemembers;
$15 billion for Basic Allowance for Housing to ensure
that, on average, troops are not forced to incur out-of-pocket
costs to pay for housing;
$2.9 billion to improve barracks and family housing
and privatize an additional 2,870 new family units; and
$2.1 billion for a 3-percent pay increase for military
members.
In addition, recently announced changes in the way the military
uses and employs the Reserves and National Guard should allow for a
less frequent and more predictable mobilization schedule for our
citizen soldiers.
Combined with other initiatives to better organize, manage, and
take care of the force, these recent changes should mean that in the
future our troops should be deployed or mobilized less often, for
shorter periods of time, and with more predictability and a better
quality of life for themselves and their families.
train and equip authorities
Operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere have shown the
critical importance of building the capacity and capability of partners
and allies to better secure and govern their own countries.
In recent years we have struggled to overcome the patchwork of
authorities and regulations that were put in place during a very
different era--the Cold War--to confront a notably different set of
threats and challenges.
The administration has, with congressional support, taken some
innovative steps to overcome these impediments. A significant
breakthrough was the section 1206 authority that allows the DOD and
State Department to more rapidly and effectively train and equip
partner military forces. In the fiscal year 2008 base budget, we are
seeking dedicated funding of $500 million to use this authority. I
would ask for a serious, collaborative effort with Congress to develop
the right interagency funding mechanisms and authorities to meet
critical national security needs.
global war on terror requests
The President's two war-related requests are the fiscal year 2007
Emergency Supplemental request for $93.4 billion, and the fiscal year
2008 global war on terror request for $141.7 billion.
The fiscal year 2007 Supplemental Request is in addition to the $70
billion that has already been appropriated for war-related costs in
this fiscal year. If these additional funds are delayed, the military
will be forced to engage in costly and counterproductive reprogramming
actions starting this spring to make up the shortfall. Timely enaction
of the fiscal year 2007 supplemental is critical to ensuring our troops
in the field have the resources they need.
The additional U.S. ground and naval forces being sent to the Iraq
theater are projected to cost $5.6 billion. This total includes funding
for personnel costs, supplies, spare parts, contractor support, and
transportation.
The fiscal year 2008 global war on terror request complies with
Congress's direction to include the costs of ongoing operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan in the annual DOD budget. Given the uncertainty of
projecting the cost of operations so far in the future, the funds
sought for the fiscal year 2008 global war on terror request are
generally based on a straight-line projection of current costs for Iraq
and Afghanistan.
The war-related requests include $39.3 billion in the fiscal year
2007 supplemental and $70.6 billion in the fiscal year 2008 global war
on terror request to provide the incremental pay, supplies,
transportation, maintenance, and logistical support to conduct military
operations.
Reconstitution
The fiscal year 2007 supplemental requests $13.9 billion--and the
fiscal year 2008 global war on terror request $37.6 billion--to
reconstitute our Nation's Armed Forces--in particular, to refit the
ground forces, the Army and Marine Corps, who have borne the brunt of
combat in both human and material terms. These funds will go to repair
or replace equipment that has been destroyed, damaged, or stressed in
the current conflict.
All Army units deployed, or about to deploy, for missions overseas
are fully trained and equipped, often with additional gear for their
particular mission. In an expeditionary, rotational force one can
expect that units returning from their deployment will decline to a
lower readiness level as personnel turn over and equipment is repaired
or replaced. The $13.6 billion in reset funds in the fiscal year 2008
global war on terror request for the U.S. Army will go a long way
towards raising the readiness levels across the force.
Force Protection
The war-related requests include $10.4 billion in the fiscal year
2007 Supplemental, and $15.2 billion in the fiscal year 2008 global war
on terror request for investments in new technologies to better protect
our troops from an agile and adaptive enemy. Programs being funded
would include a new generation of body armor, vehicles that can better
withstand the blasts from improved explosive devises (IEDs), and
electronic devices that interrupt the enemy's ability to attack U.S.
forces. Within this force protection category, the fiscal year 2007
supplemental includes $2.4 billion and the fiscal year 2008 global war
on terror includes $4.0 billion to counter and defeat the threat posed
by IEDs.
Afghan/Iraqi Security Forces
The fiscal year 2007 supplemental requests $9.7 billion, and the
fiscal year 2008 global war on terror requests $4.7 billion, to stand
up capable military and police forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The bulk of these funds are going to train and equip Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF) to assume the lead in operations
throughout Afghanistan. As of last month, some 88,000 have been trained
and equipped, an increase of 31,000 from the previous year.
The $5.9 billion for the ANSF in the fiscal year 2007 Supplemental
is a substantial increase over previous years' appropriations. It
reflects the urgent priority of countering increased activity by the
Taliban, al Qaeda, and narcotics traffickers to destabilize and
undermine the new democracy in Afghanistan. These funds will
significantly upgrade the capability of Afghan forces to conduct
independent counterinsurgency operations.
In Iraq, more than 300,000 soldiers and police have been trained
and equipped, and are in charge of more than 60 percent of Iraqi
territory and more than 65 percent of that country's population. They
have assumed full security responsibility for 3 out of Iraq's 18
provinces and are scheduled to take over more territory over the course
of the year. These Iraqi troops, though far from perfect, have shown
that they can perform with distinction when properly led and supported.
Iraqi forces will be in the lead during operations to secure Baghdad's
violent neighborhoods. By significantly increasing and improving the
embedding program, Iraqi forces will operate with more and better
coalition support than they had in the past.
Non-Military Assistance
Success in the kinds of conflicts our military finds itself in
today--in Iraq, or elsewhere--cannot be achieved by military means
alone. The President's strategy for Iraq hinges on key programs and
additional resources to improve local governance, delivery of public
services, and quality of life--to get angry young men off the street
and into jobs where they will be less susceptible to the appeals of
insurgents or militia groups.
Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds are a relatively
small piece of the war-related budgets--$456 million in the fiscal year
2007 supplemental, and $977 million in the fiscal year 2008 global war
on terror request. But because they can be dispensed quickly and
applied directly to local needs, they have had a tremendous impact--far
beyond the dollar value--on the ability of our troops to succeed in
Iraq and Afghanistan. By building trust and confidence in coalition
forces, these CERP projects increase the flow of intelligence to
commanders in the field and help turn local Iraqis and Afghans against
insurgents and terrorists.
conclusion
With the assistance and the counsel of Congress, I believe we have
the opportunity to do right by our troops and the sacrifices that they
and their families have made these past few years. That means we must
make the difficult choices and commit the necessary resources to not
only prevail in the current conflicts in which they are engaged, but to
be prepared to take on the threats that they, their children, and our
Nation may face in the future.
Chairman Levin. General Pace?
STATEMENT OF GEN. PETER PACE, USMC, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF
General Pace. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
thank you very much, sir, for this opportunity to be with you
today.
If I may ask, Mr. Chairman, that my written statement be
made part of the record.
Chairman Levin. It will be.
General Pace. I would like to, on behalf of all of us in
uniform, thank this committee and the Members of Congress for
your strong bipartisan support, and especially for the trips
that you make to the region and to the hospitals. Your visits
make a difference.
I'd like to thank our troops and their families. They are
just magnificent, both when they serve overseas and with their
families here at home. We owe them a great debt of gratitude,
and I am proud to represent them in front of you this morning.
I'd also like to thank the employers of our National Guard
and Reserve. We could not be doing what we're doing without the
National Guard and Reserve. These military members are key
parts of our team, and we recognize that they are also key
parts of business teams from where they come, and we appreciate
the employers' patience and support as they perform their
duties for the Nation.
As you look out across the globe for the next 12 months or
so, it's hard to see where the demand is going to diminish.
Without predicting, you can take a lap around the globe, start
with Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen,
Somalia, Sudan, Colombia, Venezuela, Philippines, Indonesia,
Malaysia, North Korea, and back around to Pakistan. I'm sure I
missed a few, but there are multiple challenges out there for
our Armed Forces, which, to me, solidifies the need for more
troops, as has already been mentioned, and the opportunity, in
the mid-grade levels and mid-grade enlisted--to be able to
expand those groups, because they're the ones we depend on
heavily to help train and equip our partners. We need to look
at how we have authorized our military and our Department of
State (DOS) to work with our partners and find those
impediments to effective and efficient assistance, and work
with Congress to overcome them.
We should also look at the expeditionary capabilities of
other parts of our Government, other than the U.S. military, to
see what the impediments are there that we might be able to
employ more efficiently all the powers of national government
and not just your military.
Lastly, we should take a good hard look at our interagency
effectiveness, take a look at, for example, the empowerment
that the Goldwater-Nichols Act gave us in jointness in the
military, and see which, if any, of those kinds of ideas would
help us be more effective and efficient in the way we operate
in interagency here in and across the planet.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you, again, for this
opportunity, and I'll look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Pace follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Peter Pace, USMC
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and distinguished members of the
committee, it is my privilege to report to you on the posture of the
U.S. Armed Forces. On behalf of 2.4 million Active-Duty, Guard, and
Reserve soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and our families, thank you
for your continued support. Your visits to troops in Iraq, Afghanistan,
and beyond; comfort to the wounded; and funding for transformation,
recapitalization, pay and benefits are deeply appreciated.
America's military is the world's finest, due in large measure to
the patriotic sacrifices of our Nation's servicemembers. I want to
thank them and their families for all they have done, and continue to
do, to maintain our freedom. For the first time, America's All-
Volunteer Force is fighting a long term war with a significant
commitment of combat forces. Our troops are serving with extraordinary
dedication and distinction. They are an inspiration to us all and I am
honored to represent them here today.
Winning the war on terrorism is and will remain our number one
priority. At the same time, we will continue to transform our Armed
Forces, strengthen joint warfighting capabilities, and improve the
quality-of-life of our servicemembers and their families.
strategic environment
My biennial National Military Strategy Risk Assessment was recently
submitted to Congress. That classified document and the Secretary of
Defense's plan for mitigating risk depict the challenges we face around
the globe and discuss how we will overcome them. Sustained deployments,
equipment utilization, and operational tempo each impart risk from a
military perspective. The current heavy demand for ground, sea, and air
capabilities is not likely to dissipate in the immediate future.
As stated in my assessment, our Armed Forces stand ready to protect
the homeland, prevent conflict, and prevail over adversaries. These
missions present simultaneous and interrelated challenges of varying
intensity, immediacy, and danger.
America's Armed Forces are in our sixth year of sustained combat
operations. We are fighting sectarian violence, insurgency, and
terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan. Al Qaeda and its allies threaten the
safety of our homeland and our overseas partners--threats made more
alarming by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We face
other threats and challenges as well:
Iran sponsors operations in Lebanon and Iraq that are
destabilizing those governments. In addition, Iran's drive to
enrich uranium highlights its desire to assert greater
influence in a region of vital interest to our Nation.
North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons and
associated missile technologies poses another strategic
challenge. The launch of multiple ballistic missiles on the
Fourth of July 2006 coupled with the apparent successful
detonation of a nuclear device in October 2006 undermines
counterproliferation efforts, threatens many, and could provoke
a regional arms race.
China's military build-up continues unabated, to
include offensive strike missiles, expanded sea and air control
capabilities, antisatellite systems, cyberattack technologies,
and an increasingly capable Navy and Air Force.
Pakistan requires continued international support to
maintain stability. Given its possession of nuclear weapons and
pivotal location, a stable government in Pakistan is critical
to guard against transnational terrorism and ease tensions with
neighboring India.
The Abu Sayaf Group in the southern Philippines and al
Qaeda's partner Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia threaten
international maritime security in strategic waterways.
Narcoterrorists in Latin America destabilize
societies, harm nations, and hold American citizens hostage.
The governments of Venezuela and Cuba are openly anti-
U.S. Together, they actively seek to create alignments to
oppose us throughout the region.
Succession questions in Cuba may lead to mass
migration.
Political and humanitarian challenges in Africa are
myriad, including the specter of growing instability, genocide,
civil war, and safe havens for terrorists.
Given the breadth of these challenges, their complexity, and their
potential long duration, we must increase our overall capacity in order
to reduce strategic risk. The proposed fiscal year 2008 budget, the
fiscal year 2007 supplemental, and the fiscal year 2008 global war on
terrorism request match resources to these tasks. These budget requests
represent a significant investment, but that investment is
approximately 3.9 percent of our gross national product--relatively
modest in historic terms.
win the war on terrorism
We must prevail in the global war on terrorism. Sustaining
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, while maintaining readiness to
respond to new contingencies around the globe, is a heavy burden for
our current force structure. Nearly a million American men and women in
uniform have deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, and more than 400,000
have been deployed more than once. Presently, more than 200,000 troops
are deployed to the Central Command area of responsibility; another
210,000 are elsewhere overseas. Most of our Army Brigade Combat Teams
and their Marine Corps regiment equivalents receive only 1 year at
their home station before deploying again--and that year is spent
actively preparing to redeploy overseas to fight. We will have 20
Brigade/Regimental Combat Teams deployed to Iraq, with another 3 in
Afghanistan, 1 in Korea, and 1 in Kosovo. This drives our units to
operate at about a 1:1 ``deployed:at-home'' ratio--which is about half
the time we believe is necessary to sustain readiness for the long-
term.
To accomplish our missions in Iraq and Afghanistan and remain
prepared for other challenges, the President and Secretary of Defense
have announced a number of personnel initiatives. These include the
increase of force structure for the Army and Marine Corps, and policy
changes to the way we mobilize our Reserve Component. The Army and
Marine Corps are both focused on using this added troop strength to
grow their operational forces. We are committed to building an active
Army of 48 Brigade Combat Teams. That is an increase from a previous
goal of 42. For the Marine Corps, we are adding one Regimental Combat
Team. The Army is also civilianizing military positions, cutting its
non-operational force structure, and reallocating those manpower
savings to combat units. The Marine Corps is also implementing policy
to ensure all marines have the opportunity to serve in a combat zone.
Approximately 38,000 individual augmentees have deployed to
headquarters such as Multi-National Force-Iraq, the International
Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, and U.S. Central Command.
Nearly 13,000 others have helped train Afghan and Iraqi forces. Most of
these positions are filled by mid-grade leaders normally serving in
operational units. Increased manning in these mid-grade ranks, to
include the Army's request for an additional 2,852 field grade
officers, will fill requirements without undermining combat units.
Our weapons, equipment, and supplies have been reduced by combat
loss and consumption in Iraq and Afghanistan during the past 5\1/2\
years. We have also used significant resources in disaster relief
operations responding to the Asian Tsunami, Hurricane Katrina, and
Pakistan's earthquake. The fiscal year 2007 supplemental and fiscal
year 2008 global war on terrorism request include a total of $51.5
billion to reconstitute our Joint Forces. While it will take some time
for newly authorized troops to become available for deployment and for
reconstitution of equipment to take effect, our men and women in
uniform are grateful for the much needed additional manpower and
resources that are on the way.
The challenges we face are not ours alone; they threaten many
others. Working with partners improves our ability to defeat terrorist
networks and increases regional stability and security. Our regional
security cooperation efforts in Latin America, particularly in Colombia
where great progress is occurring, help local militaries protect
democratic governments and build partnership capacity to counter
terrorist, narcotic, and other illicit activity. In the Far East, our
support for Southeast Asia maritime security in the Strait of Malacca
and the Sulu and Sulawesi Seas helps fight terrorist and criminal
activity. Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa and the Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Initiative deter terrorist activity, provide
humanitarian assistance, and improve the ability of African countries
to foster security within their own borders. We are establishing a new
unified command for Africa to better integrate U.S. interagency efforts
and partner with other nations and international organizations.
Boosting the capability of other countries' forces and providing
direct action support to commanders in the field requires that we
expand our irregular warfare capabilities. Irregular warfare includes
long duration unconventional warfare, counterterrorism,
counterinsurgency, clandestine operations, and military support for
stabilization and reconstruction. Our Special Operations units perform
these missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and deploy to approximately 40
other countries around the world. To answer these demands, we are
expanding the size of our Special Operations Forces and we have
established the Marine Special Operations Command. We are also moving
forward with the Global Special Operations Force Posture plan that will
maximize the number of Special Operations Units forward deployed.
In addition to physical battlefields, the global war on terrorism
has a significant information component. Our enemies use propaganda to
deliver their message and justify their actions. We counter the enemy's
efforts most effectively when our actions and words reinforce America's
strategic goals and national ideals. We deny our foes success in
mobilizing sympathizers when local and global audiences understand the
enemy's true intent. The Joint Staff, the combatant commands, and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense are working together to ensure
greater consistency and timeliness in our strategic communication
efforts.
At its most basic level, winning the war on terrorism means
defending our homeland. To better protect the United States from direct
attack, our Armed Forces are working closely with civilian leadership
in Federal, State, and local governments to provide an effective
response in time of crisis. The Navy and Coast Guard are strengthening
maritime domain awareness. The Air Force maintains surveillance and
interceptor alerts to provide air sovereignty protection. The Army is
investing in expanded biological weapons detection equipment and
vaccines. We are continuing to increase the capability of our Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosive Consequence
Management Response Forces and seeking more resources to better respond
to multiple events in different locations. Contingency plans are
continually refined so that the Armed Forces are prepared to assist
civil authorities in the event of another terrorist attack. We are
creating additional weapons of mass destruction response teams.
Moreover, we are working with coalition partners, through intelligence
sharing, coordinated planning, and agreements such as the Proliferation
Security Initiative to prevent the spread of weapons of mass
destruction.
Additionally, your Armed Forces are prepared to assist in
responding to natural disasters. In such events, we would provide
support in the form of manpower, logistics, transportation,
communications, and planning, just as we did following the devastation
of Hurricane Katrina. Likewise, military planners are focused on the
dangers of a possible global Pandemic Influenza, to ensure our
readiness to execute military missions and support civil authorities.
accelerate transformation
The evolving diverse threats to our Nation make it imperative that
we adapt and innovate. Transformation is a continual effort to
significantly increase our ability to deter and defeat America's foes.
It is an ongoing process of rethinking our doctrine and operational
concepts; fashioning professional education and training to meet new
challenges; restructuring our organizations and business practices to
be more agile; improving our personnel policies; adapting our planning
systems to be more responsive; reforming our acquisition and budget
processes; and harnessing advanced technology. It is not an end state.
It is a mindset and a culture that encourages innovation and fresh
thinking.
We need a dramatic leap forward in our relationship with
interagency and international partners. Today's many challenges--
conventional, insurgency, terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction--require that our Armed Forces work closely with
our civilian government counterparts and multinational partners. Much
like Goldwater-Nichols accomplished for our Armed Forces two decades
ago, we should assess what new or revised authorities are needed to
enhance interagency coordination, and build a more joint and integrated
process. To increase our Government's overall effectiveness in the war
on terrorism, we must improve three areas.
First, we must improve our ability to build partnership capacity.
Our struggle against violent extremists requires that we fight people
who hide in countries with whom we are not at war. In many cases, the
best way to do this is by augmenting the capacity of those countries to
defeat terrorism and increase stability--helping them overcome problems
within their borders and eliminate terrorist safe havens. Legislation
proposed by the Department of Defense and Department of State, the
Building Global Partnerships Act, extends and expands past enacted
1206, 1207, and 1208 authorities for educating, training, and equipping
foreign forces for counterterrorism and stability operations. In
addition, an interagency National Security Initiative Fund, to better
invest in countering terrorism with other countries is required. In a
time when national security priorities require integrated action by
multiple government agencies, resource sharing and coordination among
departments is essential. Authorization for a National Security
Initiative Fund, under congressional oversight and managed jointly by
the Departments of State and Defense, will provide us with needed
flexibility. Such a fund will be instrumental in harnessing resources
across agencies to address changed circumstances and policies, and will
complement congressionally granted transfer authority and emergency
supplemental appropriations.
Second, we need greater expeditionary capabilities in U.S.
Government civilian agencies for stabilization and reconstruction
operations. Our civilian agencies are underresourced to meet the
requirements of the 21 century. Greater investment in these agencies is
required if they are to be more effective in the global war on
terrorism. To increase their expeditionary capability, the President
has proposed the creation of a Civilian Reserve Corps for the State
Department. We strongly support this initiative to boost our Nation's
capability to deploy civilian expertise in tandem with our military.
Third, we must enhance interagency effectiveness. Just as the
Goldwater-Nichols Act established a system of incentives and
requirements to foster jointness among military officers, we need to
find ways inside of our Government to encourage interagency expertise.
Rewarding interagency education, interagency experiences, interagency
collaboration, and interagency planning will facilitate better synergy
between departments. We can go beyond the education we provide our
military and civil servant professionals by transforming our National
Defense University into a National Security University. We can build on
the success of interagency centers such as the National
Counterterrorism Center and Joint Interagency Coordination Groups at
the combatant commands--which increase our operational effectiveness
while providing personnel with interagency experience. We can increase
planning capacity in civilian agencies. We can improve our planning,
coordination, and operational execution through interagency exercises.
Shared deliberate and crisis planning capacity among our interagency
partners will improve our Nation's readiness for operations, and better
integrate our Nation's diplomatic, military, intelligence, information,
and economic instruments to forestall and address crises.
Strengthen Joint Warfighting
To win the war and continue the process of transformation, we are
strengthening our joint warfighting capabilities. By employing our
Service branches in a joint manner, we leverage their complementary
capabilities. We can and should, however, go beyond our current level
of jointness by moving from an interoperable force to an interdependent
force. We have already had some successes. For instance, naval aviation
is now responsible for all airborne electronic warfare. Air Force
Unmanned Aircraft Systems provide key intelligence for all Services.
Moreover, Navy and Air Force security, communications, and logistics
elements fill joint requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Combatant commanders have identified shortfalls in our persistent
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, such as
shortages of platforms, sensors, and processing infrastructure. To
better support our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
needs, we are budgeting for more capacity. We are also refining
integration between our unmanned assets, human intelligence operations,
and our analysis capabilities--improving all.
Warfighter demands for satellite platforms and related terminal
programs continue to grow as we field more bandwidth-intensive systems,
deploy to austere locations, and connect more tactical users to our
Global Information Grid. To meet our requirements for beyond-line-of-
sight and reachback communications, we must maintain military satellite
communications launch schedules, leverage commercial capabilities,
pursue efficiencies, and continue research and development initiatives.
America and our friends around the globe are increasingly dependent
on networked communications systems to store, modify, and exchange
data. Interruption of our access to cyberspace could significantly
damage national defense and civil society. The Armed Forces' new cyber
strategy sets a course that calls for the development of new
organizations, intellectual capital, and greater interagency
coordination. To ensure unity of effort, U.S. Strategic Command's Joint
Task Force--Global Network Operations is working with the combatant
commands, the Services, and the interagency to strengthen and integrate
defensive and offensive cyber capabilities. We are reviewing the
authorities and responsibilities required for dealing with cyberspace
threats, particularly as they apply to our relationship with other U.S.
Government agencies. Changes in authority and policy must ensure that
the entire U.S. Government is able to meet current and emerging
threats.
We must also enhance our capability to engage targets globally and
rapidly to strengthen strategic deterrence and response. We are
developing conventional long-range strike capability, improving missile
defense, and modernizing our national command and control. These
efforts will ensure our strategic deterrence capabilities remain
relevant.
improve the quality of life of our servicemembers and our families
Our men and women in uniform are our most precious resource. We
must continue to ensure their welfare and that of their families. The
most advanced ship, aircraft, or weapon system is useless without
motivated and well-trained people. Every day, our soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines serve our Nation with distinction. We do well to
honor their service by providing for them and their loved ones.
As of the submission of this statement, the fiscal year 2007
military construction, quality of life, and veteran's affairs
appropriation is being considered for funding by a House Joint
Resolution. Congressional approval of the proposed resolution without
amendment will cause a $3.1 billion shortfall in the Base Realignment
and Closure (BRAC) appropriation. This shortfall will jeopardize our
ability to complete BRAC actions within statutory deadlines and create
negative effects on the movement of our troops and their families in
support of our global defense posture restructuring.
Predictability of deployments for all servicemembers is a key
factor to quality of life. Sustainable force rotation policies are
needed to spread the burden across the Active and Reserve components.
Greater mobilization predictability for Reserve component members, and
their families and employers is required. To accomplish this, the
Secretary of Defense has established a new Total Force Policy. The
mobilization of Reserve component forces will be managed on a unit,
instead of an individual, basis--and with a goal of one year maximum
mobilization, followed by 5 years at home. This predictability will
improve the quality of life in our National Guard and Reserve while
fostering greater unit cohesion. Stop Loss for both Active-Duty and
Reserve Forces will be minimized.
To our families, protecting our troops in combat is the most
important measure of quality of life. All DOD personnel in Iraq and
Afghanistan have state-of-the-art body armor. As technology improves we
are procuring the next generation of body armor. Likewise, thanks to
your continued support, currently all of our tactical vehicles that
operate off forward operating bases in Central Command's area of
responsibility have armor protection. We are purchasing vehicles
explicitly designed from the wheels up to limit Improvised Explosive
Device damage. To further counter Improvised Explosive Devices, we
established the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization.
Teaming with private industry, we continue to make progress in this
vital endeavor.
Providing for our troops and their families also means caring for
our wounded. Our military medical system saves lives everyday--and
helps them heal here at home. The efforts of our medical professionals
and recent advances in medicine, technology, and rehabilitation
techniques make a huge difference. Injury survivability rates are at a
historic high--nearly 9 in 10 of all wounded troops survive, many of
whom would have died in past conflicts. We are also working to address
the effects of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. Many injuries have a
profound impact on troops and their families, and our health care
system is dedicated to doing everything possible to bring them back to
duty, if they wish--or, through our Military Severely Injured Center
and the Services' wounded warrior programs, help our wounded return to
society empowered to make a positive difference.
conclusion
I testify before you today with tremendous pride in the performance
of your Armed Forces. Some are in combat. Others stand guard. All are
at war helping deter attacks on our Nation and allies.
Like World War II did for the Greatest Generation, this war will
define this generation, and our troops are doing an extraordinary job.
They serve this Nation superbly, willingly, and unflinchingly--
volunteers all. The sacrifices they and their families bear for our
entire Nation warrant our deepest gratitude. Like so many who have gone
before them, their heroism is awe inspiring. It is an honor to serve
alongside them.
Thank you for your support.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, General.
Ms. Jonas?
Ms. Jonas. I have nothing for the record, sir, and I'll be
glad to answer questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Let's have a 8-minute round for our first round.
General, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General
Schoomaker, has expressed some real concern about our readiness
situation, particularly the readiness of our nondeployed ground
forces. Are you concerned?
Secretary Gates. Sir, I am concerned. We have had this
discussion with the Chiefs multiple times. I'm satisfied that
the amount of money in the budget, about $51 billion, give or
take a little bit over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP),
addresses the need for reconstitution of the force. We also are
taking a look at the training time available, and that's why
the increased size of the force would really help. Mr.
Chairman, right now our Army units are about 1 year out and 1
year back, and then 1 year out again. In that 1 year that
they're back, they get a little bit of leave, some family time,
and then they retrain to go back to either Afghanistan or Iraq.
Therefore, they do not have the opportunity that they would
normally have on our 2-year cycle to train for the combined
arms that they may be required to execute elsewhere in the
world. So, there's a collection of things out there that can be
mitigated by the budget that's before us.
Chairman Levin. There recently was an article in the
Washington Post that indicated that plans to surge additional
U.S. forces into Iraq are placing an unacceptable strain on the
Army's capability to provide deploying units with required
equipment. The DOD Inspector General (IG) released a report on
January 25 indicating that troops in the theater are already
experiencing shortages of force-protection equipment,
electronic countermeasure devices, crew-served weapons, and
communications equipment.
There's also some anecdotal evidence of problems. The San
Francisco Chronicle reported on Sunday that the 1st Brigade of
the 3rd Infantry Division had so little time between
deployments to Iraq that they had to cram more than a year's
worth of training into 4 months.
Can you give us assurance that troops arriving in the
theater are going to be fully equipped and trained before they
enter combat in Iraq?
General Pace. Sir, the short answer to your question is,
yes, sir. I had a discussion, as recently as yesterday, with
General Conway, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and General
Schoomaker and General Cody, the Chief of Staff and the Vice
Chief of the Army, and they are looking at the deployment plan
to get the additional troops to Iraq. The timeline that our
troops are on will allow us to fully man, train, and equip the
units before they deploy to Iraq. There's one area that is not
going to be 100-percent equipment, and that has to deal with
the uparmored Humvees and some of the armored trucks. We have
about 41,000-plus armored vehicles in theater. There's a small
delta that that number will not be able to cover all of the
troops that are deploying. But the mandate from General Casey
is, and will remain, that no one will leave operating bases
unless they are in properly uparmored Humvees. So, we do have a
delta there. That will be closed by July of this year. But
that's the only place, sir, where the troops will not have the
equipment before they deploy.
Chairman Levin. Why should they be deployed before they
have that equipment?
General Pace. Sir, they'll be able to have about 98 percent
of the vehicles that are required. There's a small delta. The
commanders on the ground have talked with the Chief of Staff of
the Army and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and have
agreed that they will be able to share the assets on the ground
so that no soldier or marine will leave the compound without
proper protection.
Chairman Levin. I thank you.
Secretary Gates, although it's been suggested that we will
be able to----
[Audience interruption.]
Ma'am, if you'd be seated, we would appreciate it.
Although it has been suggested, Secretary Gates, that we be
able to measure Iraqi performance on their commitments, the new
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq indicates that
bringing down the level of violence in Baghdad could take more
than a year and a half, and that's if things go better than
expected. How long are you planning for the increased number of
U.S. troops to be deployed? How much funding are you requesting
and planning to request for this increase? Very specifically,
is it true that there are no dollars for the surge in the
fiscal year 2008 request?
Secretary Gates. The answer to your last question is yes,
Mr. Chairman, there is no money in there for the surge.
Chairman Levin. Starting October 1.
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. As I testified earlier, I think
those of us involved in the decisionmaking process anticipated
that this reinforcement would take months, not 18 months to 2
years. As we've indicated, the fiscal year 2008 global war on
terror request is basically a straight-line projection of our
costs in fiscal year 2007, based on 140,000 troops in Iraq and
20,000 troops in Afghanistan.
Chairman Levin. But is the bottom line, because of the time
limitation that you are assuming in your budget, that the surge
will not last longer than September 30?
Secretary Gates. Well, we are----
Chairman Levin. In terms of budgeting.
Secretary Gates. We are basically--in the budget, there is
no assumption to that effect, but we have allowed as----
Chairman Levin. There is no assumption to what effect?
Secretary Gates. That the reinforcement lasts beyond the
end of this year.
Chairman Levin. The fiscal year.
Secretary Gates. This fiscal year. But we have allowed as
how the fiscal year 2008 global war on terror request is a
straight-line projection that probably will need to be
adjusted, one way or the other, depending on events on the
ground.
Chairman Levin. All right, thank you. General Casey, at his
confirmation hearing, said that two of the three Iraqi brigade
headquarters and four of the seven battalions which the Iraqis
have promised have arrived in Baghdad. He said that they're in
the range of only 55- to 65-percent strength. Is that
acceptable?
Secretary Gates. When I was asked this at a press
conference last Friday, I said no, that 55 percent wasn't good
enough.
Chairman Levin. Now, we do have off-ramps, I understand, in
the brigades as they arrive, so that each month we'll make a
decision--in the next few months--as to whether the next
month's arrival should continue. Is that accurate?
Secretary Gates. All of the brigades that are part of the
reinforcement have orders to deploy. As I indicated in an
earlier testimony, there will be the opportunity to evaluate
the situation on the ground, and the commander on the ground
will evaluate the situation, in terms of whether all those
forces ultimately are needed or deploy.
Chairman Levin. Now, is one of the reasons they might not
be utilized, although the current order exists, is because the
Iraqis have not come through with their committed forces? Could
that be a reason not to proceed with those--actual utilization
of the forces? Could that be?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. I've testified several times
that I believe that the performance of the Iraqis is absolutely
critical to the success of this operation.
Chairman Levin. Now, is that going to be left to General
Petraeus, that decision, or is that going to be ultimately
yours and the President's?
Secretary Gates. That decision, sir, I think, would
ultimately be the President's. It would clearly be informed by
the recommendations of the commander in the field, the Chiefs,
and myself.
Chairman Levin. I want to be really clear here that you are
leaving open the possibility that troops, even though there is
an order to deploy them, may not be, in fact, utilized, and
that decision will be made month to month, and could be based
on whether or not the Iraqis come through with their committed
troops. I want to be real clear on that.
Secretary Gates. Trying to be equally clear, I would say
that we will have a continuing evaluation going on, in terms of
the Iraqis' performance, but the troops are, at this point, all
under orders to deploy.
Chairman Levin. All right. In terms of Iraqi performance, I
want to get the word ``could'' and ``would'' and ``should''
straight here--I think it ``should'' be--you're not testifying
on a ``should.'' I'm asking you on the ``could'' word. Could
the failure, if it happens, of Iraq to provide the troops
committed--could that be a factor as to whether or not troops--
although currently ordered to deploy, are, in fact, utilized?
Could that be a factor?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
My time is up. Senator Warner?
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We welcome our guests today. It's a very difficult task to
try and do the budgetary calculations for the most uncertain
future that faces our military. In my first view of it, you've
done as well as you could under the circumstances.
I would like to follow on to the Chairman's question about
the readiness of the Iraqi army. Three hundred and twenty
thousand is the overall figure, of army and police, that the
United States have been training. It's interesting, the quote
is, ``The Iraqi security forces are 2\1/2\ years into 3\1/2\-
year development process.'' So, it takes us from 2\1/2\ to 3\1/
2\ years to train these forces? I have never, in my
recollection, heard those types of estimates given to this
committee heretofore. Furthermore, the equipment that they will
need--which of you witnesses--the general?--could respond--on
the status of the equipment--because some months ago, when I
was chairman of the committee, I think Senator Levin and I sent
a series of letters urging that we expedite the equipping of
the Iraqi forces so they could become a more viable partner in
this conflict. What's your understanding of the status of that
equipping?
General Pace. Sir, the original 328,000 Iraqi army and
police that were due to be trained and equipped by the end of
December 2006 have, in fact, been trained and equipped. What
has been added to that is up to 362,000 in addition, by Prime
Minister Maliki, to be trained during 2007 and what we had
already planned to do, which was, in 2007, train their
logistics elements. So, I'm not--I guess if you do the math,
it's 2\1/2\ years plus 1 year--probably 2\1/2\ years of
training to date plus 1 year of training in 2007, but the
328,000 that were supposed to be done has been done, and the
new add for 2007 will be done in 2007.
Senator Warner. So, generally speaking, can you make the
statement that the Iraqi troops that are going to be engaged in
the Baghdad campaign, as enunciated by the President on January
20, are trained and equipped adequately.
General Pace. Yes, sir, I can.
Senator Warner. It's interesting that it takes 2\1/2\ years
to train the Iraqi forces. If you look at the NIE that was just
issued, ``nonetheless, the term `civil war' accurately
describes key elements of the Iraqi conflict, including
hardening ethnosectarian identities, a sea of change in the
character of the violence, ethnosectarian mobilization, and
population displacements.'' Really, there's so many definitions
of the different types of individuals striking at the coalition
forces, and principally the United States, they haven't had
2\1/2\ years of training, yet they're fighting, I would say,
somewhat effectively. So, I've just never been able to
comprehend why we've put 2\1/2\ years into training an Iraqi
force, when these people, almost overnight, train themselves,
equip themselves, and are becoming formidable combatants.
General Pace. Sir, the 2\1/2\ years is done, as of December
2006, for the first 328,000. We had to recruit and form up into
units, learned lessons along the way about some of the recruits
not being loyal to the central government, but being loyal to
sects, and having then to be brought offline and retrained. To
properly man, train, and equip an army, sir, is different than
training somebody to take an artillery shell and plant it on
the side of the road and be effective.
Sir, there have been no effective attacks of enemy units on
any coalition forces. Where they are effective is in the
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and it does not take 2\1/
2\ years to train somebody how to build and deploy an IED.
Senator Warner. Right, and the snipers have been very
effective.
General Pace. Some of their snipers have been very
effective, sir, and they've received weapons from outside the
country that have helped in that effectiveness, that's true.
Senator Warner. We witnessed here what was described as one
of the largest explosions ever experienced in the history of
this conflict, when that marketplace was hit and some 150
killed and some several hundred seriously wounded. Give us your
own feeling about the progression by which this polyglot of
enemies that are coming against us--whether it's sectarian
violence or all of these phrases I've never seen before--
ethnosectarian mobilization, so forth--what is the status of
their weaponry? Is it not improving? Are our forces now subject
to similar risk associated with this bombing that took 150
lives? It seems to me that was a truck loaded with some type of
explosives. Can you give us a degree of the increasing risk due
to the weaponry that is now facing--or in the hands of these
polyglot of people coming after us?
General Pace. Sure. Let me give you some information about
the IEDs, if I may, sir, and I'll see if that answers your
question.
First of all, the number of IEDs that has been emplaced has
doubled over the course of the last year. The equipment that we
have provided, thanks to Congress, to our troops, plus, the
tactics, techniques, and procedures that we use against them,
plus the jammers and the like that we provide, technology wise,
have resulted in much fewer of those explosions and having less
casualties against our troops. But, the increase in the number,
despite the decrease in their effectiveness, has resulted in
about a sustained level of casualties from IEDs.
The basic material for an IED is ammunition. So far, we
have cleared 430,000 tons of ammunition from over 15,000 sites
in Iraq. The amount of ammunition available is incredible. You
add that to the new explosively formed projectiles, which are a
much more deadly form, that are coming into Iraq from Iran, and
the combination has maintained the level of casualties, despite
the fact that we have been more effective against each
explosion.
Senator Warner. Secretary Gates, I've supported the
President in his conclusion that we cannot let the Iraq
sovereign nation, which we have had so much of our sacrifice to
achieve, be lost, and that it must be this government and any
successive government, supported so that that country can
continue to exercise, as best it can, the reins of sovereignty.
Yet recently, people have described the surge operation--
and I quote are, ``the last chance,'' or ``the last best
chance.'' To me, that type of rhetoric is inviting almost--it's
a timetable for the Baghdad operation, ``If it doesn't succeed,
it was our last chance.'' I have to believe that we're thinking
beyond the Baghdad operation, and if it doesn't meet all of its
goals, we still have to, if we're going to stick with the
President, say that we have to come up with some formulation to
see that we can continue to try and help this government and
the people of Iraq maintain their sovereignty. Am I correct?
[Audience interruption.]
Chairman Levin. Excuse me. Excuse me, ma'am. Please sit
down.
Senator Warner. Is this our last chance in your judgment?
Secretary Gates. It is not the last chance. I think
everyone agrees that--or most people agree that it would be a
serious consequence for this country and for the region were we
to leave Iraq in chaos. Clearly, part of the debate, if I
understand it correctly, that is going on, is, how best do you
incentivize the Iraqi Government to take responsibility for the
future of their own country, and in a way that allows us, over
some period of time, to draw down our forces, because they have
performed and have accepted responsibility for their country? I
think that if this operation were not to succeed--and we
clearly are hoping it will succeed, planning for it to succeed,
allocating the resources for it to succeed--but I would tell
you that I think I would be irresponsible if I weren't thinking
about what the alternatives might be if that didn't happen. But
we are planning for its success.
Senator Warner. I certainly hope it is successful. I just
have my thoughts about this operation, as we stated in the
resolution I've drawn up, to put greater and greater emphasis
on the Iraqis taking the lead. We've trained 300,000-plus of
these individuals, and now is the time for them to show that
that training can enable them to take the brunt, the major
portion, of this Iraqi Baghdad operation, and perhaps we don't
need to reach the level of troops that are forecast by the
President, some 20,000 additional. Then, there's a subsidiary
question raised by various budget authorities, If the 21,500 is
all, are there not other supplemental troops that have to
accompany those troops, and, therefore, the figure is bigger
than 21,500?
Secretary Gates. The----
Chairman Levin. The gentleman's time has expired, and we
also have a quorum, if we could just, before we call on Senator
Kennedy.
[Recess.]
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, the witness was about to
answer the question I posed as to whether or not the 21,500
needs to be increased by an additional group of soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and marines, to provide the infrastructure.
Secretary Gates. Each of the brigades that is included in
the 21,500 has inherent in it combat support elements that the
number of 21,500 might go up modestly or go down modestly,
depending on the requirements on the ground.
General Pace, do you want to add anything to that?
General Pace. Yes, sir. The bulk of the combat support--
combat service support will be provided by the units that are
already there or inherent in the units that are going. There
may be some unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) support needed and
some military police support needed. But, as the Secretary
said, it would be a modest amount, perhaps within 10 percent,
plus or minus, of that number.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much.
Thank you for your service.
Just to go back to this issue about the number of troops,
because it seems to me we have the President's surge and then
sort of a hidden surge. The President said, ``We'll have a
little over 20,000 more troops.'' Then, the next day, DOD said,
``Other combat support may be deployed.'' Then, we have the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) that talks about the
additional troops indicating that it could go as high as
48,000. It could go from 35,000 to 48,000. So, that is the
question we're having. The American people want to know,
honestly, what the numbers are going to be. We can have our
differences of whether we're for surge or against the surge,
but we ought to know what are going to be the numbers that
we're talking about. The President mentions one figure; CBO has
figures that go double that if they're going to be deployed;
the DOD itself said ``other combat support may be deployed.''
Obviously, they understand whether they're going to be
deployed. This is the concern that the American people have.
Are they getting the facts? Are they getting the true numbers
on this? What can you do to help them out so that they will
understand what will be the total numbers?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. Very fair question.
First of all, one of the reasons for the cost difference
between the CBO and our own cost is that they project the cost
through the end of fiscal year 2009. Our cost projection is
through the end of fiscal year 2007.
Second, as we've just been discussing, we think that the
figure--the five brigades that are being put forward as part of
this reinforcement are comprised approximately of 21,500. Most
of them have the combat support. Frankly, I don't know what
CBO's assumptions were that would allow them to more than
double that number, where you would have more than one combat
support person for each person being deployed. But, as the
Chairman and I were just saying, we think that the number is
going to be around 21,500. It could be a little more, it could
be a little less, but it would not be more than 10 percent more
than the 21,500--10 to 15 percent.
Senator Kennedy. I'd rather keep moving along, but they say
over the past few years the DOD's practices has been to deploy
about 9,500 personnel per combat brigade to arrive, including
about 4,000 combat troops and 5,500 support troops. So, they're
looking at the past deployment schedules. I'm less interested
in just the figures, the costs for the purposes of this
discussion, but the total number of troops, because I think we
ought to understand whether it's going to be at the 20,000 that
the President said or whether, as CBO has estimated, in the
past, could be considerably higher. So, what should we conclude
now, finally, would be if we could get the numbers so that we
all understand what we're dealing it with?
General Pace. Sir, if I may.
Senator Kennedy. Sure.
General Pace. If you do the pure math today, and they talk
about 9,500, that's probably a fair number to point to based on
the troops on the ground; however, the folks that are in that
9,500 are--have additional capacity to handle the additional
support needed for the troops that are coming in. So, when you
add the 21,500 additional troops, which may or may not be that
exact number, you're going to need no more than another 2,000,
2,500 troops on the ground to do the additional wrench-turning,
food delivery, and UAVs, military police, and the like. But
within 10 to 15 percent, sir, at max.
Senator Kennedy. All right. So, we're looking at somewhat--
approximately 25,000.
Senator Levin went through this article in the San
Francisco Chronicle. I hope you'll have an opportunity to look
through it, because it's rather particular in the areas of
training. But it talks about--``this is talking about the 1st
Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division had only a few days to learn how
to fire new rifles. They are deployed to Iraq for the third
time. They had no access to the heavily armored vehicles
they'll be using in Iraq, so they're trained in a handful of
old military trucks instead. Some soldiers were assigned to the
brigade so late, they had no time to train in the United States
at all. Instead of the year-long training recommended prior to
deployment, they prepared for war during the 2 weeks they spend
in Kuwait en route to Anbar, Iraq's deadliest province.''
Then, towards the end, it talks about the--``it also leaves
the troops in the United States to train on equipment that is
often completely different from the gear they'll use in Iraq.
The 2-7 battalion had to train on obsolete models of Humvees
that are no longer used in Iraq,'' said Chrissman, the
battalion commander. ``We trained with a smaller set of
equipment. I'll admit, that presented some challenges,''
Chrissman told the Chronicle before his unit for Iraq. ``The 2-
7 had no time to train at Fort Irwin, California's Mojave
Desert, where Arabic-speaking roleplayers and trainers simulate
conditions and battle Iraqi insurgents. Instead, they conducted
a 3-week exercise in a forest of towering pines and oaks hung
with Spanish moss outside the division base at Fort Stewart,
Georgia. Such deficiencies decrease the level of troop
readiness.''
So, perhaps you can--if you'd give us at least your chance
to--review that article, General Pace, and give us a response?
General Pace. Certainly, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
The unit was placed on a condensed timeline in order to meet surge
requirements. The training pace was accelerated but soldiers were not
deployed unless they were ready. The commander makes the determination
as to whether his/her unit is ready to deploy. The Chief of Staff of
the Army will not allow troops to deploy unless they are properly
trained, manned, and equipped. As far as training locations that were
addressed in the article, it was a conscious decision not to send the
brigade to the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin,
California. The command determined training at home station would allow
more time to train/focus on specific mission essential tasks versus
using valuable time deploying the unit to and from the NTC. Everything
was done to set the conditions during home station training to prepare
for deployment to Iraq.
The unit did not have the uparmored M1114 high mobility
multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) to train-on at home station;
instead, they used a different version of the HMMWV (or Humvee). The
unit will fall-in on the uparmored version of the Humvee once they
arrive in theater. The uparmored vehicles are left in theater because
of the real world mission need, so the access to these vehicles is very
limited for units to train on at their home station. Training
accomplished at home station fully enabled personnel to rapidly adjust
to the uparmored Humvee in theater before operational employment.
General Pace. If I may, sir, just because those families
need to know.
Senator Kennedy. Yes, sure, please.
General Pace. The Chief of Staff of the Army, the
Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Joint Chiefs are
steadfast that we are not going to deploy troops until they are
properly trained, manned, and equipped. The timeline that these
brigades are on allows us to do just that. It is true that the
best armed vehicles we have are currently in Iraq, and that's
what the troops will fall in on. Therefore, some of the
vehicles that they are training up here in the States are not
the exact model of Humvee that they'll be falling in on. So,
they'll be falling in on better equipment, but that does not
preclude them from training properly, sir.
Senator Kennedy. Now, just on the training equipment and
the fact that you have some deficit that's going to be finished
in the next few months, are you talking about those V-shaped
hulls, the Mine-Resistant Ambush (MRAP) vehicle, which is V-
shaped underneath, for practical purposes, which has been more
effective in reducing casualties? There have been other
articles about whether all of the military personnel that are
going out on patrol are going to have that equipment. Is this
the vehicle that you were describing earlier, when you were
talking about the shortages of equipment?
General Pace. That is not the vehicle, sir. Senator, as we
go along, we learn what works and what does not work. The V-
shaped bottom is more effective and is now in the request for
the supplemental budget, and in the main budget to be able to
buy into the future. The vehicles I'm talking about are the
vehicles, right now, that are providing protection for our
troops on the ground. The uparmored Humvees that are factory-
made, have been very effective against the roadside bombs. It
is those current vehicles, of which there will be a small
shortage, that will be covered by not letting our troops go
anyplace without them.
Senator Kennedy. General, my time is going to be up. On the
V-shaped hull, which, as you just mentioned, are by far the
most effective. By your own testimony, how long will it be
before the troops in the field are going to have really the
very best in terms of equipment and the V-shaped hull? How long
will it take for them to have that equipment?
General Pace. Sir, I need to take that for the record,
because I do not know the industrial line, how quickly it can
produce.
[The information referred to follows:]
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles are currently in
use in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. MRAPs are
primarily being used in theater for clearing vehicle routes of
improvised explosive devices to ensure other armored vehicles are less
likely to encounter them. MRAP vehicles are moving to theater as fast
as the assembly line can produce them.
Senator Kennedy. But you're going to do it as fast as
possible, and that you've given the green light to go ahead and
produce as many as they can as quick as they can and get them
over there as fast as they can?
General Pace. Well----
Senator Kennedy. Would that be an overstatement?
General Pace.--sir, I need to get back to you for the
record.
Senator Kennedy. All right.
General Pace. I do not know what the requirement is. I
don't have that in my head.
[The information referred to follows:]
The ability to get these vehicles to the troops is limited by the
current manufacturers' ability to produce the vehicles. The Army and
Marine Corps are working together to alleviate the manufacturing
bottleneck by initiating a larger open competition for new mine
resistant ambush protected type vehicle contracts. An evaluation of
nine different vehicles, including some currently in use, is underway
and is scheduled for completion in May 2007. At that time, based on the
performance and the capability to meet accelerated fielding timelines,
contracts will be awarded. Multiple vehicles may be chosen to get more
of this level of protection to the troops as quick as possible.
Senator Kennedy. All right.
General Pace. I don't know how long it will take industry.
But I can tell you, sir, that just like the small-arms
protective inserts for our body armor, as our industry produces
new and better equipment, this Congress has provided the
funding to allow us to procure it as quickly as possible. I
will get you the specific answer on the vehicle.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much.
Secretary Gates. Senator, I might just add, on this MRAP
vehicle that you referred to, which I've been told is the best
of these new vehicles, it is my understanding that the plant in
South Carolina that produces these is operating at full
capacity, and we have put out bids for eight additional
companies to provide demonstration models of a similar vehicle,
to see if we can increase the production as we go along.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you.
Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Kennedy.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Gates, I would like to say I appreciate the fact
that this budget that has been sent over is far more realistic
than those in the past, as this committee has urged over the
course of this war, rather than by emergency supplementals. I
think it gives us a chance to more carefully scrutinize the
requests for the funding of our obligations, both in Iraq and
Afghanistan. So, I would like to say thank you for this new
revised process.
Senator Byrd. Me, too.
Senator McCain. Whenever Senator Byrd agrees, it is a good
thing. [Laughter.]
Recent reports, Secretary Gates, indicate that Iraqi army
units are showing up in Baghdad significantly under strength.
Is that accurate? If so, is it of concern to you?
Secretary Gates. I received a report the end of last week
that one of the Iraqi brigades had showed up at 55-percent
strength, and I told reporters at a press roundtable at the
Pentagon that that wasn't good enough. I learned in a report
from General Casey yesterday that, in fact, they have showed up
at 60 percent, and that 25 percent were on leave to either take
their pay back home or to protect their home base. So, he felt
that the level of turnout for the brigade, in his opinion, and
I don't think I'm misquoting him--was better than expected.
Senator McCain. Senator Levin and I requested the so-called
benchmarks that were laid out a long time ago, which we were
unable to obtain. Some of those benchmarks were achieved, as we
noted, but a number of those were not. Are you seeing any signs
now that the Iraqi Government is taking the necessary measures
that we have all sought for the last several years: revenue-
sharing, provincial elections, and sufficient commitment of the
Iraqi military? Have you gotten an assessment of how you regard
the performance of the Iraqi Government and military here in
the last several weeks?
Secretary Gates. Yesterday was to be the start of the
Baghdad operation, and it's probably going to slip a few days,
and it's probably going to be a rolling implementation. What I
have asked for, and I have learned is already being addressed--
is to put together a more sophisticated checklist or matrix of
these benchmarks and what our expectations are and what the
performance is, so that in the weeks to come, we can evaluate
this. My hope is that the detailed approach will be available
to us literally within a matter of days so that we can begin
measuring against our expectations and the Iraqi Government's
commitments.
As we've talked before, the military commitments are going
to be the ones where we can evaluate performance first. Are
they showing up? What numbers are they showing up in? Are they
going into all neighborhoods? and so on. The political and
economic benchmarks, in terms of the Iraqis paying--putting up
their own money, getting elections, authorizing a provincial
elections law, a hydrocarbons law, and so on, will probably
take a little longer--but, in my opinion, we ought to be in a
position to provide regular briefings to you all on that,
beginning fairly soon.
Senator McCain. I think it would be very helpful if you
would keep us up to speed on that matrix that you are setting
up. It has been somewhat frustrating to us in the past that we
have not been able to have access to specific benchmarks or
specific progress, or lack of. So, I thank you for that.
Do we have enough troops going into Afghanistan? Everybody
says it is going to be a very hot spring, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir, I've extended a brigade of the
10th Mountain Division by 120 days. We will be surging in
another brigade from the 82nd Airborne, which was scheduled to
be in there, is coming in. So, we will be up about 3,200
troops. We have met the request of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) commander, and the need for additional
forces. There is a requirement outstanding for additional
trainers, and I will be going to a NATO ministerial tomorrow
afternoon, and one of my requests of those folks, and one of
the issues that I'll be pressing very hard, is that they meet
the commitments that they made at Riga, and help us out in
this.
Senator McCain. I think if you talk to General Jones, which
a lot of us do, the former head of NATO, who we have the
greatest respect for, our allies are not only not sufficiently
assisting us in troops, but in rules of engagement, helping in
setting up the judicial system, and the training of police. I
hope that in this meeting that we can talk in a straightforward
manner to our NATO allies, that we need a lot more from them
than we're getting, not only rules of engagement for the
troops, but also in various commitments they have made, such as
assistance in setting up a judiciary, et cetera.
General Pace, in his testimony, General Casey stated he
requested two Army brigades to help quell the violence in
Baghdad, versus the five brigades. He also said that the
previous policy had not failed, that he thought it was
succeeding. How do you explain the discrepancy between what
General Casey requested and the President's plan?
General Pace. Sir, what General Casey requested was about
4,000 additional marines for al Anbar and 2 brigades for
Baghdad, for a total of about 3 brigade equivalents. When we
looked at that, back here amongst the Joint Chiefs, and we had
a dialogue here in Washington and back down with General Casey
and General Abizaid, we recommended an increase of the total
number committed to ensure that the commanders on the ground
had not only what they asked for immediately, but had
additional troops to be able to take care of unforeseen
problems. When we said that we thought we should put six
brigades total into the pipeline instead of the three, both
General Abizaid and General Casey were happy to have those
additional troops, even though they did not ask for them up
front.
Senator McCain. How do you explain the testimony of General
Casey, who said that the present strategy, which you said we
are not winning and we are not losing, others have said the
past strategies have failed, that is why we are changing it. In
General Casey's testimony, he said that he thought it was
succeeding. How do you reconcile those two points of view,
General Pace?
General Pace. Sir, I cannot speak for General Casey.
Senator McCain. I am telling you what his testimony was.
General Pace. Yes, sir. I can tell you that General Casey,
in July, was the person who came forward to the Joint Chiefs
and said that he could not go down below 15 brigades, as he
projected he would do at one time, and then that started us
all--General Casey, the Joint Chiefs, and General Abizaid--into
the review that led to his requesting to go up from 15 to 18,
and us recommending going beyond that. Clearly, from my
perspective, where we were, and where we were supposed to be,
were not the same place. Continuing on the track that we were
on was not going to provide success, and we needed to have a
different plan to get there. That we did, collectively, with
General Casey, General Abizaid, the Joint Chiefs, and with the
group here in Washington.
Senator McCain. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, but I still find
it hard to reconcile General Casey's continued assertion that
the previous strategy was working, this in contravention of the
view of most any observer, and at the same time, we are now
going to put him in charge of the training and equipping
responsibilities, for this new strategy. All this, when
obviously he believes the old one was just fine.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Byrd.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary, General Pace, I
voted not to go into Iraq. Everybody knows it. I was against
it. Everybody knows that. There's nothing new about that. But
we're there.
General Pace, Secretary Gates, how much longer do you think
the United States is going to be in Iraq before we begin to
bring our people home? How much longer are you planning for?
Secretary Gates. Mr. Chairman, as you say, it's hard to
make any kind of a real prediction, especially where our
adversaries have a vote. But it seems to me that if the plan to
quiet Baghdad is successful, and the Iraqis step up, as I was
discussing with Senator Warner, accept their responsibilities
and assume leadership and successfully assume the leadership in
trying to establish order and then beginning their political--
or further carrying out their political reconciliation process,
I would hope that we would be able to begin drawing down our
troops later this year. If we have to look at other alternative
strategies, then that would depend on what those strategies
might be. But as I say, and as you say, it's a very difficult
question to answer with any precision, because it so depends on
what's going on, on the ground.
[Audience interruption.]
Senator Byrd. Excuse me.
Chairman Levin. Ma'am, you're going to need to sit down.
You're going to need to sit down and not interrupt. You're
going to not be allowed to interrupt again. I'm afraid that
we're going to have to ask you to leave or we're going to have
to remove you now.
Senator Byrd. Right. Now, we mean business.
Now, Mr. Secretary, would you, again--I don't believe you
answered my question. Perhaps you can't. When do you think we
can, I guess, begin to bring our troops home?
Secretary Gates. If the circumstances on the ground permit,
Senator, I would hope later this year.
Senator Byrd. I hope so. I don't believe we will, but I
hope so. What is the cost of this war, thus far? Just if you
can state within reason.
Ms. Jonas. Mr. Chairman, thank you, the cost so far that
Congress has appropriated is $452 billion in supplementals and
another $3 billion in the base budget, we include Operation
Noble Eagle in those costs. As the Secretary has stated, we're
asking for additional funds here today.
Senator Byrd. Those are supplementals?
Ms. Jonas. Yes, sir.
Senator Byrd. What is the cost, thus far?
Ms. Jonas. So far, what we refer to as ``obligations,''
sir, $372 billion, of which $276 billion is for Iraq.
Senator Byrd. Iraq.
Ms. Jonas. Operation Iraqi Freedom, sir.
Senator Byrd. Very well. Can you give us some idea as to
how much longer we're going to have our men over there? Do you
have some projected cost estimate of having our people there?
The cost in dead and wounded, as of now? We can probably get
that from the newspapers, but do you have it?
Ms. Jonas. Sir, I can only give you what we have in terms
of our expenditures for DOD, which I just articulated, and what
we're projecting for the remainder of this year, in terms of
funding that will be required, approximately $93 billion for
2007, and then we're projecting, for fiscal year 2008, for the
entire year, about $141.7 billion, sir.
Senator Byrd. That's 2007 and 2008.
Ms. Jonas. Yes, sir.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Secretary, do you want to add anything to
that? This is going to go beyond that. Surely you're projecting
some estimates for that eventuality.
Secretary Gates. I think the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), Mr. Chairman, has put $50 billion in the budget
for fiscal year 2009 as part of their longer-term plan. I don't
know of any allocations beyond fiscal year 2009.
Senator Byrd. No allocations. I don't know whether we're
beginning to understand what we're talking about or not. What
do you see, as far as the cost is concerned, what it is now for
the military operations and so on there, and what it's
anticipated to be over the foreseeable future? How long do you
see this war going on?
Secretary Gates. Sir, I think that there's very likely to
be at least some American presence in Iraq for a number of
years. We obviously don't seek any permanent bases, but there's
going to be some need for forces. But my hope would be that,
over the longer-term, that it would be a fraction of what we
have there now.
Senator Byrd. A fraction of what?
Secretary Gates. Of the force that we have there now, sir.
Senator Byrd. My time is up. But I don't think we ought to
have gone into Iraq. I said that to begin with. We are there. I
don't see any end to it. So, I just anticipate that 5 years
from now, or 10, my successor--I guess in 10 years there will
be a successor--he won't be on this committee, because he'll be
a new man. But somebody's going to be asking, ``I see where
Senator Byrd said thus and so, and asked thus and so. How much
longer, Mr. Secretary''--you may not be Secretary--``how much
longer are we going to be in Iraq?'' This is a question that
will be asked again, and it will reverberate down through the
halls of Congress and the ages. How much longer do you think
we'll be in Iraq? Number one. Number two, what is the cost now,
and what's it going to be? I wouldn't want to be in your chair,
but I would have some idea that Senator Byrd's going to ask
questions like that. How much longer is this war going on in
Iraq? Of course, you can't foresee every eventuality, but how
much longer, at the present rate, do you think we'll be there?
Secretary Gates. I would hope that, if our operations are
successful this year, that we would be able to begin drawing
down our forces toward the end of the year.
Senator Byrd. Right. That's what you said earlier. My
time's up?
Chairman Levin. Yes, thank you.
Senator Byrd. My time is up. I can understand why it takes
him about 2 minutes to ask a question, the same question that I
could ask in 6 minutes. [Gesturing towards Chairman Levin.]
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Byrd.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, Mr. Chairman, there are several members of
this committee that are also on the Environment and Public
Works Committee. We're having a very significant meeting right
now at the same time in the same building, so we'll be coming
in and out.
Mr. Secretary, you said, during your opening statement,
there was something that was not in your printed statement, and
it kind of went by me a little bit too fast, but I think it's
good news. Are you saying that we're now making progress
toward--well, Africa's been divided between EUCOM and CENTCOM
now for--and I've been complaining about it for about 10 years.
Are they talking about, now, a new AFRICOM that you think is
working into the process?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. We're moving to stand it up.
Senator Inhofe. That's very, very good news now, I wanted
to make sure everyone heard what you said.
You also said--and I looked it up in your opening
statement; I kind of like this one--it said, ``Experience is
that marvelous thing that enables you to recognize a mistake
when you make it again.'' It reminds me a little bit of going
back to the 1990s, when there was this euphoric attitude that
the Cold War is over and we no longer need a military, and we
started drawing down. I went back and checked, and found that
more than once every month during that entire period of time, I
was on the Senate floor saying that we will regret that it
happened.
So, I'd like to get into something that others haven't
talked about yet, and it goes back to, many years ago, when the
first confirmation hearing of Secretary Rumsfeld, when I made
the observation that we all try to look into the future 10
years or so and determine, what are our needs going to be? The
American people have always expected that we would be number
one in all of our equipment, in our abilities, that, when we
send our kids into battle, that we have the very best, whether
it's an artillery piece, strike vehicles, lift capability, and
all of that. So, we have these hearings. I go back to my days
in the House, on the House Armed Services Committee. I can
recall, in 1994, we had someone testify that in 10 years we
would no longer need ground troops.
So, I guess what I'm saying, General Pace, is that you have
a lot of smart generals around that are going to try to guess
what in the lead time that we have right now for--preparing for
10 years from now--what are our needs going to be? As smart as
the generals are, they're going to be wrong. The only answer to
this, as I said to Secretary Rumsfeld during that confirmation
hearing, is, What's the answer to this? He, from memory, drew
upon some facts that I didn't know he had, because he didn't
know I was going to ask it. He said, ``If you'll take the
entire 20th century for 100 years, the average amount spent on
defense as related to GDP was 5.7 percent. That's in wartime,
peacetime. That is the average. At that time--this is right
after the drawdown of the 1990s, it was down to 2.9 percent.''
I said, where do you think it should be? He said, at that time,
maybe around 5 percent.
In anticipating coming into this job, Secretary Gates--and
you and I talked, the day before it was even announced that you
were going to be in there; we talked about this--have you given
thought as to where we should be? Right now, we are at 3.8
percent, which I think is totally inadequate, and where we
should be looking into the future, in terms of the
prioritization of military, you can express it anyway you want,
percentage of GDP or any other way?
Secretary Gates. I think that the historical figure of
about 5 percent probably is on an ongoing basis, I think, is a
good one. I would tell you that, in my experience in
government, from the mid-1960s to the early 1990s, if you were
to graph American defense spending, it would look a little bit
like the electrocardiogram on a fibrillating heart. I think
what's as important as the amount is the predictability of it--
being able to know that you can invest today, knowing that you
will be able to maintain a level of investment over a period of
a decade or more. So, you don't have to try and rush to get
things done in a hurry because you're scared to death that the
defense budget will be cut badly the next year or 2 years
later. I was in the position of having invested almost $1
billion of the taxpayers' money in a very sensitive program
before, and having to kill it because the money wasn't there to
finish it.
Senator Inhofe. Well, and we understand we're here----
Secretary Gates. The reliability, I think, is as important
as the amount.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. We're here today talking about the
crisis we're currently in but I just want to get us thinking,
in the future, as to where we should be. General Pace, you and
I have talked about this. We talked about the fact that General
Jumper came down, in the late 1990s, and admitted that some of
our strike vehicles weren't as good as the--I think it was SU-
35s that were on the market by the Russians at that time, which
is totally unacceptable to the American people. They don't know
that this is the case.
Now, in this brief period of time, one of the major
concerns I have--and it doesn't necessarily fit into this
discussion of the 2008 budget, but in a way it does, because
we're talking about the inadequacy of funding the military
construction under the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC). To
go back--this last BRAC round, I remember that I was opposed to
it, having one more BRAC round, and it was a very close vote,
but we went ahead and had it. The comment that I made is, yes,
we know we're going to save money in the future, but it's going
to cost money for the next 5 or 6 years. It always costs more
money when you go into closing bases and that type of thing.
Well, we went ahead and had it, maybe we were right on
projecting that $20 billion will be saved, in the long run, but
right now we are $3.1 billion short in the 2007 budget. Now, I
think this is a real crisis right now, and I'd like to get the
response from both of you. Let's start with you, General Pace,
as to what do you think is the consequence of not adequately
funding our BRAC process for this last round?
General Pace. Sir, the continuing resolution has resulted
in the money made available in fiscal year 2007 being $3.1
billion less than was projected. Therefore, absent that money,
we will not be able to meet the statutory requirements to
complete the BRAC process by the end of the period that was
allowed. Immediately, it means that the kinds of things that we
need to do for our families that we're trying to move back from
Germany, for example, back to the United States, that the
housing, the schools, the hospitals, all the infrastructure
that needs to be built on the bases here isn't going to happen,
so we are in jeopardy of not abiding by the law, which is,
``get it done within a certain time period,'' because we don't
have the funding to be able to do that.
Senator Inhofe. What kind of an effect would this have on
individuals out there considering whether or not to re-enlist,
looking down the road, after the promises that have been made
to them?
General Pace. Sir, I don't know that it would have a direct
impact on that piece, because I don't know what they'd actually
be able to----
Senator Inhofe. That may be true.
General Pace.--think through the BRAC part.
Senator Inhofe. Any comments on that, Secretary Gates?
Secretary Gates. I know that, if I recall correctly, one
piece of that $3.1 billion is $300 million in housing
allowances. So, as General Pace is indicating, to help the
military pay for their housing. I will say that I paid a
courtesy call on both the Republican and Democratic leadership
of the Senate last week, and we discussed this, and they
expressed concern, and indicated a willingness to try and do
something about it.
Senator Inhofe. I really think we're going to need to do
that. I looked, and it's not in the supplemental. So, I'd like
to have your prioritizing that as much as you could.
Lastly, on the reset, we've talked about that a little bit.
I had an occasion to go to Texas, in both Red River and Corpus
Christi, and look at the problems that we're having down there
right now, and--where do you think we are on that, on our reset
of the Army, General Pace?
General Pace. Sir, the funding that is proposed in this
budget, and in the supplementals, will allow us to use the
capacities of our depots, to the maximum extent possible. If
you were to stop creating any more damage to any more vehicles
right now, if the war stopped today----
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
General Pace.--we'd have about 2 more years of about $14 to
$15 billion for the Army and about $3 billion per year for the
Marine Corps, for them to work off their backload of repair of
equipment that would then begin.
Senator Inhofe. Those lines are still long out there today,
and it's very much of a concern.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I want to ask you a question on the
reliability of the Iraqi army. When you were in front of our
committee last January, I asked you, ``how long would it take
you to make a determination that things were working out as in
the President's plan so that you would know that this was the
right thing to do?'' At the time, you said, ``about 2 months.''
I said, ``well then, come March, I'm going to be asking you
that question.'' In the meantime, a senior officer on the Joint
Staff has testified in another committee--and this is a senior
officer with significant military experience in Iraq, and I'm
about to repeat is unclassified--and he said that, of about the
325,000 army and police in Iraq, that 130,000 are army that are
trained and equipped, and, of them, about 65,000 are nationally
recruited, as opposed to being recruited in areas that they
would not want to move out of. So, you have 65,000. He said of
those 65,000, he expected about 30,000 of them would be in
Baghdad.
Now, I come back to my initial question that I've asked in
every one of these hearings in three committees--Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, Armed Services Committee, and the
Foreign Relations Committee--regarding the reliability of those
troops. I would like your perspective now, as opposed to when
we talked to you in January, on that reliability, particularly
in light of what you said today, that you expect 60 percent of
troops are reporting in Baghdad, and you also said today that
25 percent of those troops are going to be on leave. Bring us
up-to-date.
Secretary Gates. That information was on one brigade that
General Casey had reported to me on, in terms of accounting for
85 percent of their soldiers. At this early stage, it's still
very impressionistic, and I would say that--I think that
General Casey's words have been, ``So far, so good.'' There
have been some cases where the Iraqis have been very aggressive
and out in front and doing exactly what we want them to do.
There have been some cases where they haven't fought so well.
They fought very well in this attack in the south, where they
took out this Shiite group, with many hundreds of casualties on
the part of the Shiite. It was an entrenched group, and we
brought in some air support and so on. It sounded to me like
the kind of operation we were hoping would actually happen,
where they do the ground fighting, the bulk of the ground
fighting, and we provide some additional combat support.
So, I would say, based here, right at the very beginning,
and really only as they are beginning to flow into Baghdad, on
balance, they're probably doing okay. But you will always find
instances where they aren't performing. There will always be a
patrol or something, I think, where our soldiers will say they
were disappointed. But maybe General Pace has a little broader
perspective than I do.
General Pace. Just two things to add to that, sir, if I
may, in addition to Najaf. One is the Ashura Holy Day, which
was January 30, where millions of pilgrims visit the holy
mosques, went off without any incidents at all, all of that
being handled by the Iraqi army and the Iraqi police. In years
gone by, there have been bombings and the like. So, they did a
very, very credible job there. In addition, the Iraqi commander
in Baghdad, Lieutenant General Aboud, has assembled his team
together, and is showing very, very balanced approach to Sunni/
Shiite neighborhoods. So, the initial indications--not to be
giddy about, but the initial indications on the execution of
the Iraqi piece of Baghdad, on the military part, are
promising.
Senator Bill Nelson. So, he's screening to screen out the
criminals? He's screening out those who would support the
militia that's inside the Iraqi army? Is that what's happening
with those Iraqi troops that are going in to Baghdad?
General Pace. Sir, what's happening right now is, they are
flowing into Baghdad on the timeline that they're supposed to
be flowing in. Two brigades are there now, the third brigade is
arriving as we speak. So, it'll be a little while longer before
full operations begin. But in those instances, so far, where we
have had the opportunity to go against Shiite criminals and
Sunni criminals, he has been very balanced in his approach to
that.
Senator Bill Nelson. I'm asking this because this senior
military official that testified on this unclassified material
said, of those troops showing up in Baghdad, he expects 80
percent of them to be reliable. Therefore, 20 percent are going
to be unreliable. If that's true--and I don't know what's true;
I'm the one who keeps asking the questions about reliability--
if the President's plan is predicated on the reliability of the
Iraqi troops, when we go in to clear, before we hold, with more
Iraqi troops than American troops, then they have to be
reliable. I'm trying to get my hands around this question, are
they reliable or not?
Secretary Gates. Senator, I think that's the question we
all have, and I think that we've talked here a lot about. We're
going to have to see how it actually plays out on the ground.
People have their theories about how this is going to work and
how many are reliable, and this, that, and the other thing, and
we have a mutual interest in an honest evaluation of how these
guys are doing, because it's our kids that are there at risk. I
probably shouldn't say ``kids,'' but it's our men and women out
there----
Senator Bill Nelson. I understand.
Secretary Gates.--who are the front lines. As I was
mentioning earlier to Senator McCain, we are trying to put
together a fairly complete checklist, matrix, whatever you want
to call it, of how to evaluate these guys as we go forward and
how the Iraqis are doing, because so much depends on their
performance in so many different areas. I think that, as I
indicated, it's probably premature, but, in a certain period of
time, when we have enough data to begin to be able to come up
and brief you all and your House colleagues every couple of
weeks on how we think they're doing.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I'll just say, in
conclusion, that what bothers me is this, if the President's
plan--and Senator Warner is nodding his head, because we've
talked about this--is predicated on the reliability of the
Iraqi troops, and yet no one has a handle as to whether or not
they're reliable until we see them in action, that doesn't
sound to me to be the good way to implement a plan.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
General, just last week, at a hearing before the Commission
on National Guard and Reserves, the National Guard Bureau
Chief, Lieutenant General Steve Blum, stated that 88 percent of
the National Guard forces that have returned from Iraq and
Afghanistan are, ``very poorly equipped'' today in the Army
National Guard. He also went on to say that the Air Guard, for
the first time in 30 years, has 45 percent of its units with
less than a C-2 readiness rating because of lack of equipment.
He further testified that 9 out of every 10 Army National Guard
units that are not serving in Iraq and Afghanistan have less
than half the equipment that is needed to respond to domestic
crises. The general went on to estimate that it would take $40
billion to bring the National Guard up to an acceptable level
of readiness. As the ranking member of the Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs Committee, I'm very concerned about
the ability of the National Guard to respond to a domestic
crisis, whether it's a hurricane, an ice storm, or a terrorist
attack on our homeland.
The budget does not appear to have anywhere close to the
amount of money that General Blum has estimated is necessary to
restore the equipment levels to an acceptable readiness level.
Could you comment on the adequacy of the budget and also the
impact on the National Guard's ability to respond to domestic
missions?
General Pace. Yes, ma'am. It is absolutely true that, as
both Active-Duty and National Guard and Reserve units go over
to Iraq and Afghanistan, that the equipment they take over
there with them that is not damaged is left behind for the
units that are coming in. That just makes good management
sense, so we're not shipping the same kinds of equipment back
and forth by sea all the time. We have about 40 percent of our
inventory of equipment either currently deployed or in the
depots for repair. That means, almost by definition, then, that
the units that are home are going to have about 60 percent or
less of their equipment today.
The budget includes some $51 billion over the FYDP for
reconstitution, and the Army specifically has focused $21
billion in their budget to flesh out the needs of the National
Guard and Reserve. The only number you used, ma'am, that I
can't talk to is the $40 billion, because I do know, because
I've talked to General Blum about this, that the Army National
Guard leadership, including General Blum, is very comfortable
with the $21 billion that have been allocated to flesh out the
equipment that's missing in the National Guard, plus the money
that's been allocated to refurbish the things that have been
damaged. So, from the equipment standpoint, I believe that all
of their concerns are addressed in this budget. With regard to
responding, we were able to very quickly, in the response to
Hurricane Katrina, have 70,000 troops into Louisiana and the
Gulf region; about 50,000 of those were National Guard and
Reserve, the other 20,000 were Active-Duty. The Governors have,
amongst themselves, agreed on how to share troops and share
equipment so that, as we approach things like the hurricane
season, we have worked through the details of who would
respond, what equipment they would have.
The other piece of this that is working right now, and is
very important, is, the Department of Homeland Security, under
Secretary Chertoff, is looking at natural disasters and manmade
disasters. What capacities does the Nation need? Of those
capacities that we need, what exists right now, and where are
the gaps? Of the gaps, what should the Nation look to their
military for, so that we can properly fund those?
The other piece that's very important is a new force-
generation model that calls for 1-year deployed and 5 years at
home, as a goal for our National Guard and Reserve,
automatically puts those units into a system that ensures that
their manning, their training, and their equipment are all
properly addressed as they come up toward--as they get closer
to their deployment window.
So, there are several things ongoing, ma'am, that I think
mitigate the factors that you mentioned.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Secretary Gates. Senator, I might just add, very quickly on
this, that there is, in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental and
fiscal year 2008 global war on terror, together, something like
$8.8 billion for equipment for the National Guard,
specifically. Between fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2013, we
will invest $36 billion strictly in the National Guard for
equipment. I've also been assured by both the Chief of Staff of
the Army and the head of the National Guard Bureau that they
have surveyed the National Guard units, the National Guard in
the eight States that are susceptible to hurricanes, and
those--and the National Guard in those States have 100 percent
of the equipment they need in order to be able to respond in
the event of a disaster.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
I would note that this testimony was given by General Blum
just last week, and the $40 billion is a direct quote from his
testimony. He breaks it down as $24 billion for the Army Guard
and 13.8 billion for the Air National Guard. So, I would ask
that you get back to me on that specific issue.
[The information referred to follows:]
The $40 billion figure mentioned by General Blum includes all
shortfalls across the Army and Air Guard, to include operation and
maintenance, personnel, and equipping costs. According to General Blum,
the Army shortfall is $24 billion and is fairly consistent with the
Army's documented shortfall. At the time he released the information,
the Army had programmed $21.1 billion against that shortfall. With the
release of the fiscal year 2008 budget, the funding programmed from
2008-2013 is $36.7 billion, which addresses their shortfalls and
continues to address modernization.
Senator Collins. I appreciate the explanation you both have
given.
General, I'd now like to switch to the issue of
shipbuilding. It would be very rare for me to go through a
budget hearing without bringing up shipbuilding at least once.
[Laughter.]
While I'm still concerned about the adequacy of the
shipbuilding budget, I do commend you for continuing to
progress toward the Chief of Naval Operations' goal.
Development is progressing well, as you're aware, on the guided
missile destroyer, or DDG-1000. We talk a lot about the
advantages of the DDG-1000, in terms of increased firepower,
the greatly reduced profile on radars, the electric propulsion
system, but something that isn't discussed as often is the far
smaller crew size that the ship is going to be operating with.
Could you discuss the positive impact on the budget of being
able to operate a destroyer of this size with a far smaller
crew size than is required for the DDG today?
General Pace. Yes, ma'am. Just one ship will be manned at
about half the crew that a current-day destroyer requires, so
all that that implies, as far as training, family support,
housing, medical, retirement, as you add all that up, that's an
enormous savings over time, when you multiply it times the
number of ships that are involved. So, I applaud the Navy, not
only in the way that they have reduced the size of the ships,
but in the way that they have redesigned the Navy's tempo so
that we can surge when we need to and have many more of our
ships readily available to the Nation when it's needed and when
we don't know that they're going to be needed.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you--Senator Collins, thank you.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service for our men and
women at home and abroad.
Mr. Secretary, you've heard a lot about the surge and the
concerns that have been raised. At your nomination hearing, I
asked about the consequences if the Iraqis don't step forward
as a result of the President's decision to surge the forces in
Baghdad. It's one of the reasons I've been pushing benchmarks
for more than 2 years, so that we have a way to measure
progress. It appears that we're in the process now of being
able to do that. If, in spite of all the best efforts, the
Iraqis can't take the lead, they can't quell the violence in
their neighborhoods, I think you've said it isn't necessarily
the consequence that we're going to withdraw or leave Iraq, it
just means that we'll have to make another plan. General Casey
said, about that question, that it's a political judgment that
we would work with the government. So, I guess what I'd like to
ask you, because you're in a policymaking position, and you
have to make political judgments as well, what are the
consequences? What are the consequences if the Iraqi military
doesn't show up, if the Iraqi Government doesn't create an oil
agreement, doesn't work to protect the rights of the minority,
and fails to hold up their end of the bargain? What are the
consequences to that? Because that's not simply a military plan
that has to be readjusted. It goes way beyond the military. It
is now a question of whether they are an adequate partner in
this process. The question is, what do they want to do?
Secretary Gates. I think what we have to bear in mind is
there has often been, at these hearings, a long list of broken
promises by the Iraqi Government. I think it is useful to
maintain some perspective that none of these guys were in
government a year ago. Most of them were in opposition, some of
them were in jail, some of them were in exile. They're trying
to do something that's never been done in the history of their
country before. So, frankly, I think sometimes their failure to
fulfill their commitments is more a question of capacity than
it is will. It is clear that Prime Minister Maliki intends to
fulfill the commitments that he's made. It's clear he wants
Iraq to be in charge of this operation. If the Iraqi----
Senator Ben Nelson. Well, excuse me----
Secretary Gates. If the----
Senator Ben Nelson. Is it really that clear? Because he,
and some of his members of his government have raised questions
about whether more U.S. troops were desirable or whether it was
going to be an Iraqi military operation in Baghdad.
Secretary Gates. No, that's absolutely right. I think that
his original hope had been that this would be an entirely Iraqi
operation, and it was when his military people began talking
with our military people, that they, in essence, persuaded him
that the Iraqis perhaps weren't ready to do it all by
themselves, just like we had to provide air support in this one
other attack that just happened last week. So, he has, I think,
grudgingly accepted having U.S. support, where he wanted to do
it all by themselves. We don't want them to fail.
So, I think that they have the desire and the intent to
make this work. I think what remains to be seen is whether they
have the capacity to do it. If they can't make it work--we're
planning on them fulfilling their commitments, and if they
can't, then, as I have said, I think we have to revisit our
strategy.
Senator Ben Nelson. Is it a military strategy or is it a
political strategy?
Secretary Gates. I think it's both. The part that I feel
that I have to take personal responsibility for is the military
part of it.
Senator Ben Nelson. Could you see any set of circumstances
under which you might suggest, if this fails and there is not
the capability, that you might recommend we withdraw?
Secretary Gates. I think that a precipitous withdrawal by
the United----
Senator Ben Nelson. I don't mean precipitous, I mean, would
you recommend that we withdraw, not in a precipitous fashion,
but in a structured withdrawal scenario?
Secretary Gates. I can see--I can envision--I hate to get
into hypotheticals----
Senator Ben Nelson. I know.
Secretary Gates.--at this point, but I certainly see
circumstances in which we would, first of all, reposition our
forces, try and move them out of harm's way as much as
possible, and then see where we go from there.
Senator Ben Nelson. Isn't it true that the President said
something to the effect, to Prime Minister Maliki, that we're
not there forever?
Secretary Gates. Absolutely.
Senator Ben Nelson. All right.
General Pace, I'm concerned about force protection, given
what happened at Karbala. We happened to lose an Nebraskan in
that effort, and I just received, while we were sitting here,
notification that we just lost another Nebraskan whose sister's
in the Army National Guard and brother is in Active-Duty. So,
it's very personal, as it is for all of us, because we're all
experiencing these losses. The question of force protection,
really, doesn't that rise to a higher level if we're going to
be positioned with the Iraqi forces in Baghdad to quell the
violence? How will this work? Will there be one of ours out on
point, as well as another Iraqi on point? What kind of unified
command, or what kind of dual command, exists? It's true, we're
not going to be just supporting behind the scenes, we're going
to be out front. Isn't that correct?
General Pace. Sir, we will not be out front by plan. What's
planned is for each of the nine districts in Baghdad to have a
Iraqi brigade. Co-located with that Iraqi brigade, teamed up
with that brigade, would be a U.S. battalion. The Iraqis would
be the ones going door to door, knocking on doors, doing the
census work, doing the kinds of work that would put them out in
front for the first part of a, if it develops, firefight. Our
troops would be available to backstop them and to bring in the
kind of fire support we bring in. But it would not be one Iraqi
and one U.S. soldier. In the Iraqi units that are forward, we
have our embedded trainers, some 30 or 40 groups will be
traveling with them, but they would not be walking point. The
Iraqis would be.
Your point about the attack on Karbala is very important,
Senator, and that is, that was a very sophisticated event. We
are in the middle of investigating how that happened, where the
equipment came from, how they got to be looking, as much as
they did, like----
Senator Ben Nelson. There could be complicity with Iraqi
government and/or military forces, couldn't that be the case,
as well?
General Pace. It's possible, sir, but it doesn't look like
that. It looks like this is a very well-designed operation by
insurgents who had equipment that made them look like U.S. or
coalition forces, that got them that close to that checkpoint.
But that's still an ongoing investigation.
Senator Ben Nelson. There is a concern about force
protection for our troops that would be embedded. If they came
upon, I think, as Senator Levin said, in talking--in one of the
other hearings--if they met up with thousands of people in the
street, I think we would not want them to have to depend on
whether 60 percent of the Iraqi forces stayed and 40 percent
left or some other significant departure occurred, because it
would put them in harm's way in a way that we wouldn't expect
it and we wouldn't want it. Is that correct?
General Pace. Sir, we have taken precautions to ensure
that, regardless of what happens on the battlefield, our guys
and gals are ready. Those folks who are embedded with the
battalions, instead of being 10 to 12, are going to be about 30
to 40. A good number of those additional 30 to 40 are folks
carrying rifles to ensure that our cell of U.S. folks can
protect itself regardless of the event. Immediately behind them
is the reinforcing unit of our U.S. battalion that's there to
help the Iraqis, but is also there as a quick-reaction force to
go help our folks. We have this thing lined up in a way that
does not guarantee that U.S. troops will not get into harm's
way, but it does guarantee that, if they are in harm's way,
that they'll be properly armed, protected, and have lots of
U.S. response available to them.
Senator Ben Nelson. So, we shouldn't expect another Karbala
incident, is that fair?
General Pace. Two different things, sir. One is units in
the attack, which is what I've been talking about; the other,
in Karbala, was a stationary point to which insurgents, with
vehicles that looked like coalition vehicles, with people
inside wearing uniforms that looked like coalition uniforms,
were able to approach that checkpoint. A totally different
environment. But, again, that's under investigation to see what
broke down, what are the lessons, so it doesn't reoccur.
Senator Ben Nelson. Okay, thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Dole.
Senator Dole. Secretary Gates, would you give us your views
on the need for follow-on legislation similar in nature to the
Goldwater-Nichols Act, building on that legislation, but
involving all relevant departments and agencies? I'm assuming
that you agree with the need for such legislation, but what
steps could you initiate, what steps should Congress begin, in
order to move this discussion forward? I'd appreciate both you
and General Pace responding to this question.
Secretary Gates. I've spent a lot of time working these
problems, including almost 9 years, under four different
Presidents, on the National Security Council, and just, sort
of, the predicate for your question is that there are a lot of
folks in the DOD who wonder where the rest of the Government is
in this war, and our DOS friends sometimes, I think, wonder the
same thing.
There is clearly a need for greater interagency
collaboration, and some of the legislation that we will be
proposing for building the capacity of our partner nations that
requires collaboration between the DOD and the DOS and other
parts of the Government, their legislation can help us, where
we can provide money from the DOD, perhaps to the DOS, to help
train and equip some partner in Africa or someplace else, in
terms of counterterrorism, that sort of thing.
The concern that I have--and I know that General Pace has
referred to the need for Goldwater-Nichols for the rest of the
executive branch, and I would never disagree with the chairman,
except that what made Goldwater-Nichols work for the DOD was,
at the end of the day, there was one person making the
decisions, and that was the Secretary of Defense. So, those who
didn't want to play ball eventually all had to answer to the
same person. That's much harder where you have a dozen or 15
Cabinet Secretaries. In effect, the President becomes the
action officer, if you will.
I'm not quite sure what the right answer is, but what I
know is that, as we look at these Provincial Reconstruction
Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, Iraq, and where we're deploying
elsewhere--where there's a need not just for State and Defense,
but Agriculture, and so on, there is a need, somehow, for an
interagency empowerment that requires these agencies to provide
the personnel that are necessary to do the job. Whether that's
something that the President does through an executive order or
a directive, or whether there is some way legislation can
enable that, I'm not sure. Frankly, I'm not optimistic that
legislation is the answer. But there's clearly a need for there
to be a greater ability to transfer funds and people and
establish partnerships among the different parts of the
Government, the executive branch, than now exists.
Senator Dole. General Pace?
General Pace. Senator, the Secretary and I have not had a
chance to have a discussion about this, but, as it turns out,
we are not at all in disagreement. I am not at all certain that
it requires enactment of some kind of legislation. What I am
certain of is that there are lessons to be learned from the
Goldwater-Nichols Act. The things that created joint tasks
forces, might there be something there that gets at what the
Secretary just said about some way to have someone below the
President of the United States empowered in the interagency
process to make things happen? Might we reward things like we
have in the joint world, such as tours between departments or
individuals who volunteer to go overseas and serve their
country in more dangerous locations? Are there ways that we can
train ourselves, interagencywise, for better planning efforts?
You can take every piece of Goldwater-Nichols, and we should,
and see whether or not it applies prospectively to the
interagency process, and then, if it does, do we need a law or
do we need just executive decision? What is it that would allow
us to get on about doing that business? Goldwater-Nichols has
been so empowering to the military that something like it would
be enormously effective for the rest of our Government.
Secretary Gates. I would just lay down one marker. I would
not give the National Security Council staff an operational
role in managing the Government. Every time the President has
done that, it's spelled trouble.
Senator Dole. Thank you, both, for your answers, and I look
forward to working with you in this respect.
Secretary Gates, we briefly discussed at your nomination
hearing the need for further improvements in the DOD financial
management systems. In the time that you have been there, have
you had an opportunity to look at this further, in terms of
increased transparency, the need for accountability of dollars
spent? As you have looked at it, if you've had an opportunity
to really get into this one, what do you think the next steps
would be? It's a very serious issue.
Secretary Gates. Senator, in all honesty, I haven't had a
chance to get into it, but I'm sure that Ms. Jonas would be in
a position to answer your question.
Senator Dole. Thank you.
Ms. Jonas. Senator, thank you for the question. As you may
know, we've been pretty hard at work at trying to obtain a
clean audit opinion on the DOD's books. We have implemented an
extensive program, called the Financial Improvement and Audit
Readiness Program. To date, we have our line items on the
balance sheet, we have about 15 percent of our assets, about
$215 billion, that receive a clean opinion, and close to a
trillion in assets that would receive a clean opinion. So,
that's one part of the equation. The other part of it, in
getting toward our 11 material weaknesses, is really deploying
systems, financial systems, that will help us be able to trace
all those transactions. We're working very hard at that. We
have an extensive plan on that, called the Enterprise
Transition Plan, and we've testified before some of the
subcommittees here on that.
So, we're working very hard at it. It's a very difficult
problem, largely because of the systems. But we appreciate
Congress's interest in it, and we hope we're making progress.
Senator Dole. Thank you.
Secretary Gates, Afghanistan now accounts for more than 90
percent of the global opium supply. Since your confirmation
hearing, let me ask, have you had the opportunity to look more
closely at this issue? On the importance of undercutting the
drug trade in Afghanistan, what must we do to effectively deny
the Taliban the support of the population and the great revenue
that they realize from the opium trade?
Secretary Gates. Senator, I raised this problem with
President Karzai when I was in Afghanistan a couple of weeks
ago. He admitted that they had made a terrible mistake, that,
in the first year, they basically bought the crop from the
farmers, and, lo and behold, the next year, a lot more people
were planting poppies, in the hope that it would be bought by
the government.
Our eradication efforts, with our NATO allies, have been
stymied by the inability to get agreement on both aerial and
ground spraying. We are going to continue to pursue that with
the Afghans. Part of the problem with the money aspect of it is
certainly not that the farmers get it, but that it fuels the
Taliban and it fuels corruption. I told President Karzai that
it corrodes the entire fabric of the state, and that if they
don't get some kind of a handle on it, they're going to have a
problem. The good news is that the economy is growing enough
that opium is--or the poppies are becoming a smaller percentage
of the GDP. But that doesn't mean there's less opium out there
available. Most of it goes to the Europeans.
All I can tell you is that the counternarcotics initiative
is going to be part of the agenda at the NATO Defense Ministers
meeting the end of this week. We intend to pursue it. We know
it's important. It's important not only because of the drug
aspect of it, but because of what I just said, in terms of its
impact both on the Taliban and on official corruption. So, we
will be pursuing it with our allies. To be honest, some of our
allies have had the lead in this, and it hasn't gone quite as
far as we would have hoped.
Senator Dole. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Dole.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. General Pace, Secretary Gates, and Ms. Jonas.
Secretary Gates, on January 11, you announced a permanent
end strength of the Active-Duty Army would go up 65,000 over
the next 5 years, beginning with 37,000 troops in fiscal year
2008. It's my understanding that only 7,000 troops are being
paid for in this base budget. Is that correct?
Secretary Gates. There is a small amount--I'll try to
answer, and then ask Ms. Jonas, I think there's a small amount
in the fiscal year 2007 emergency supplemental, just to get
started, in terms of facilities and so on. The troops will be
recruited at a rate of 7,000 a year for 5 years. So, the
funding for the base budget in fiscal year 2008, as I
understand it, is for the first tranche of the 7,000 of the
final 35,000.
Ms. Jonas. Yes, Senator Reed, just to clarify, there's
$12.1 billion in the base budget for the increase of 7,000 Army
and 5,000 Marines, and that carries through the FYDP. The
additional amount we have been carrying in the supplementals,
36,000 Army and 9,000 Marines. That will appear in the 2007
supplemental and also in the fiscal year 2008 global war on
terror, which this committee will have. But it all becomes
permanent in the 2009, every part of that. So, but----
Chairman Levin. Could you just----
Ms. Jonas. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. I think some know what global war on terror
means, but----
Ms. Jonas. I'm sorry----
Chairman Levin.--why don't you explain for the record.
Ms. Jonas. Yes, I'm sorry. The global war on terror
request. So, we have the full-year request that we're asking
for from this committee, of $141.7 billion. Included in that is
a portion of the over strength of 36,000 and the 9,000.
Senator Reed. So that the request this year in this budget
is the 7,000 additional soldiers.
Ms. Jonas. The 5,000 marines.
Senator Reed. 5,000 marines.
Ms. Jonas. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. In the 2009 budget?
Ms. Jonas. Yes.
Senator Reed. The request will be for how many forces?
Ms. Jonas. You will have the 7,000 Army, 5,000 Marines; in
addition, the over strength that had been carried in the
supplemental, of 36,000 Army and 9,000 Marines, will be
included in the base. So, it will all become permanent.
Senator Reed. So that you pull it out of the supplemental,
put it in. That gets us to the point, where are we with respect
to the increase in the Army? Are we going to 7,000 additional
troops?
We are carrying troops on the Army roles now in the
supplemental, about 30,000-plus?
Ms. Jonas. 36,000, sir.
Senator Reed. 36,000 troops. The increase that the
Secretary talked about was an additional, roughly, 37,000
troops, correct?
Ms. Jonas. There are two pieces.
Senator Reed. Yes.
Ms. Jonas. The 36,000 in the over strength for the Army
which is carried in the supplemental, and that the Secretary
just talked to you is an additional 7,000 Army.
Senator Reed. Right.
Ms. Jonas. For--yes, okay.
Senator Reed. Fiscal year 2009.
Ms. Jonas. Yes.
Senator Reed. 36,000 troops that are in the supplemental
roll into the baseline budget.
Ms. Jonas. Yes, sir. Yes, Senator.
Senator Reed. 7,000 plus 7,000 troops that are carried
forward--new troops that carry forward from this 2008 budget.
Ms. Jonas. Right.
Senator Reed. Plus another 7,000 troops that will be
recruited, is that correct?
Ms. Jonas. There's only one 7,000.
Senator Reed. Okay. So, that's----
Ms. Jonas. We'd be happy to provide you a chart of all
this, sir----
Senator Reed. So, at the end of 2009, we have plus-42,000
troops that are in the budget, regular Army troops.
Ms. Jonas. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. I'm just trying to understand how that
equates with an increase of 65,000 over 5 years, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Gates. We're starting with 482,000 as the Army
base. An additional 30,000 were authorized in an earlier
supplemental. That would take the Army to 512,000. Beginning in
fiscal year 2008, we will begin recruiting 7,000 a year for 5
years. That will take the Army to 547,000 in a 5-year period.
Beginning in fiscal year 2008, the 35,000.
Senator Reed. So, the 5 years really is that it's--it's not
7,000 a year, it's maintaining a plus-7,000 over 5 years.
Secretary Gates. Yes, it's the 30,000 that has been made
permanent from the supplemental, plus 7,000 a year for 5 years,
so a total of 65,000.
Senator Reed. What are the chances of that transfer being
delayed again, as it has been over the last several--Mr.
Secretary, many on this committee have urged that that
supplemental increase in forces that's paid by the supplemental
should be in the permanent budget. Once again, that decision
was not made. In lieu of that, there was a 7,000 increment in
the baseline budget, I think. My concern, obviously, is that
every time we come up to this tough budget decision, which
takes money from other Services, potentially, or at least
raises the bottom line of the Service, we tend to punt, as we
are doing this time.
Secretary Gates. Senator, this is an issue that I had some
feelings about before I ever was asked to take this job, and I
feel strongly about it. I will tell you, it'll be in the budget
as long as I'm Secretary.
Senator Reed. I hope so, Mr. Secretary.
This is another issue of, the numbers. As I understand it--
and, Ms. Jonas, you can correct me--the budget includes $142
billion for spending related to operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Ms. Jonas. That's for 2008, yes, sir.
Senator Reed. For fiscal year 2008.
Ms. Jonas. Yes.
Senator Reed. Plus a $93 billion supplemental for those
related costs?
Ms. Jonas. That's correct, in fiscal year 2007.
Senator Reed. For a total in this budget, going forward, up
until September 2008, costs related to Iraq and Afghanistan of
about, if I do the math correctly, roughly $230 billion?
Ms. Jonas. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. That's correct? You're showing a projection
of war costs in the following budget, in fiscal year 2009, of
$50 billion?
Ms. Jonas. Yes, sir. That was OMB's decision to do that.
Senator Reed. So, we go from $230 billion thats already on
the table, and suddenly we go from $230 to $50 billion? How
realistic is that assumption?
Ms. Jonas. Sir, we were asked to do the best we could, gave
our best judgment as to what we would require in fiscal year
2008, and I think, as the Secretary has indicated, we're sure
that the conditions will change, and that will be subject to
some adjustment. I think we would be far less precise about
predicting out in fiscal year 2009.
Senator Reed. Frankly, if you looked at the level of
spending--estimates in actual spending, it's always been up,
not down. So, if I were a betting guy, I'd bet that it's not--
if it's $243 billion in this budget cycle, and it's not $50
billion, it's probably $240-plus billion. Was that decision
made by OMB to provide room for permanent tax cuts and for
projected paper savings on the deficit?
Ms. Jonas. Sir, I don't know, I've had no conversations
with OMB about that.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, have you had any
conversations?
Secretary Gates. No.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, did you give them a number of
projected spending for the follow-on budget?
Secretary Gates. Not that I'm aware of.
Ms. Jonas. No. No, sir.
Senator Reed. So, this $50 billion is a fiction that has
been agreed to by OMB.
Ms. Jonas. What we have provided, sir, is--we've been
asked, as provided in section 1008 of the NDAA, was to try do
our best to give you a good projection, with detail to the
budget. We believe we've done that for fiscal year 2008. I
think that would be very difficult to do for fiscal year 2009
with a detailed justification for fiscal year 2009.
Senator Reed. I don't know, but General, I would have
presumed that you have force-structure plans and a campaign
plan that stretches out at least through 2009 into 2010. Is
that fair?
General Pace. Sir, the----
Senator Reed. Rotation of troops and forces, at least
conditional.
General Pace. The force structure from fiscal year 2009 on
is going to be in the budget as----
Senator Reed. No, I'm talking about your projected force
structure in Iraq and Afghanistan. Do you have a campaign plan
that goes beyond September 1, 2008?
General Pace. Do not have a campaign plan, sir, but if--for
planning purposes, as we answer questions about what the
future's going to hold, we are saying that what we have
committed now is what we use to plan to. Not that we're saying
that that's a decision, but what we have is what we have.
Trying to argue it's going to go up or go down makes no more
sense than having it stay stable----
Senator Reed. All right, so----
General Pace.--so we have it stay stable.
Senator Reed. So, for operational planning purposes, you're
looking at roughly 140,000 troops in Iraq, and yet, the
budget----
General Pace. No, for funding--I'm sorry, sir.
Senator Reed. No, what are you looking at, past September
of fiscal year 2008?
General Pace. For funding purposes, we project straight
line, so we have a base, off of which to go up or down, sir.
That's as simple as it gets.
Senator Reed. How many troops do you have projected to be
in Iraq October 2008 and November 2008?
General Pace. Sir, do not have a projection of troops, per
se. Have a projection of continuing to spend about $7 billion a
month----
Senator Reed. Okay.
General Pace.--on the war. It's a fine point, but it----
Senator Reed. If I do the math, $7 billion a month is about
$84 billion, and that's a little more than $50 billion.
General Pace. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. So, there seems to be a huge disconnect
between your plans and what OBM is showing as the cost.
General Pace. Projection, if I could just--projection, sir,
not plan.
Senator Reed. Okay.
My time's expired. Thank you.
Senator Lieberman. [presiding]. In the absence of Senator
Levin, who's had to leave the room for a while, I thank Senator
Reed and call now on Senator Thune. [Audience interruption.]
Ma'am, we're going to ask you to please be quiet or we will
have to remove you from the room. Will the Capitol Police there
please take action so Senator Thune can proceed with his
questions. Thank you.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you for your service. Mr. Secretary, thank
you for your testimony today, as well, and for giving us an
idea about where the DOD tends to go with the budget in the
upcoming years.
Secretary Gates, I know that it's difficult, with the ever-
changing situation on the ground, to get accurate estimates and
knowing what future costs of operations in Iraq and the global
war on terror, I'm sure, is no easy task and very difficult to
predict. You stated in your testimony, however, that in fiscal
year 2007, the emergency supplemental request is $93.4 billion
and that that's all--and $70 billion you add to that in 2007,
that's already been appropriated, brings the total war-related
cost to about $163.4 billion for fiscal year 2007. The fiscal
year 2008 global war on terror request is $141.7 billion, or
$21.7 billion less than the fiscal year 2007 request. So I
guess my question is, how do you explain a 13 percent decrease
in the global war on terror request for fiscal year 2008 when,
in fact, we're increasing troop strength and support in the
region?
Secretary Gates. I don't have the figure for the enacted
fiscal year 2007 budget, but I know that, for the supplemental,
we have $34.4 billion budgeted for operations. So, of the $93.4
billion in the supplemental, $34.4 billion is actually for
operations, and then the rest if reset and readiness, force
protection, and so on. In the fiscal year 2008 global war on
terror budget, of that $141.7 billion, about $65.7 billion is
budgeted for operations. So, I don't know what the enacted
figure was for 2007, but if you look at the difference between
the fiscal year 2008 global war on terror budget and the fiscal
year 2007 supplemental, it's almost twice as much in fiscal
year 2008. Maybe Ms. Jonas could actually shed a little light
on this subject.
Senator Thune. Ms. Jonas, could you respond to that?
Ms. Jonas. Okay. Thank you, Senator. [Laughter.]
For 2008, if you looked in our operations costs, you'd come
to a total of about $69.9 billion, if Congress acts favorably
on our request. What we've asked for----
Senator Thune. So $69 billion, you said?
Ms. Jonas. $69.9 billion for operations, if Congress
appropriates what we're putting before them now. In fiscal year
2008, what we project is about $70.6 billion for operations.
Your differences, the reasons that you're going to have
differences are in policy--some of the policy changes. For
example, your security forces numbers will go down. We project
about $12.9 billion for security forces for fiscal year 2007,
going down to $4.7 billion in fiscal year 2008. Then the pieces
that we've been discussing here with regard to enhancing the
forces, including the $5.6 billion for the reinforcement or
plus-up, and we also have included in the 2007 an acceleration
of two brigade combat teams and one regimental combat team. So,
there are a few differences there.
Senator Thune. When you said ``security force,'' which
security are you referring to?
Ms. Jonas. The Iraq and Afghan security forces.
Senator Thune. So, we're assuming----
Ms. Jonas. The training funds.
Senator Thune.--that's going to go down a lot once
they're----
Ms. Jonas. Yes, sir.
Secretary Gates. Actually, there's an imbalance in fiscal
year 2008. The Afghans are actually getting quite a bit more
than the Iraqis are.
Senator Thune. Okay.
General Pace, you had mentioned in your testimony that the
global war on terror request includes a total of $51.5 billion
to reconstitute our joint forces. This ground may have been
plowed already, but I'd be interested in knowing what portion
of that request is going to go to National Guard and Reserve
units to improve warfighting readiness, and, second, to repair
or replace equipment that has been lost or damaged in combat.
General Pace. Senator, if I may ask Ms. Jonas to answer
this specific question, because I know them--the macro number,
and I don't want to misstate. I know that there's $21 billion
going to the National Guard and Reserve, but that's on top of
some $15 billion that's already been spent, so that adds up to
$36 billion. Rather than start doing pluses and minuses,
perhaps I can get a precise answer from her.
Senator Thune. Okay.
Ms. Jonas. Thank you, Senator.
In total, for the base budget for the Army National Guard
and the Air Guard, over the fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year
2013 period, we have about $27.2 billion budgeted. In the
fiscal year 2007 supplemental for the Army Guard, we have
another billion, and for the fiscal year 2008 global war on
terror, we have--meaning the request that's before you for
fiscal year 2008 global war on terror, another $2.7 billion. On
the reset costs, we had appropriated to us in title IX about
$23.6 billion, and we're requesting in this supplemental
another $13.9 billion. So, that would bring the total cost to
about $37.6 billion for fiscal year 2007. Then, as we've
discussed here, we've basically have about a $38 billion--$37.6
billion also in reset for fiscal year 2008 in the global war on
terror.
Senator Thune. A follow-up question to that, does
reconstituting the force include replacing weapons systems lost
in combat with next-generation-technology weapons systems? Is
that contemplated?
Ms. Jonas. Senator, we have, in the past, upgraded, for
example, helicopters, when certain helicopters have been lost
in combat, we have replaced them with the V-22. One of the
items in this supplemental, there are two Joint Strike
Fighters, which I know is of some concern to some Members of
Congress. The Air Force was asking for those replacements for
three F-16s that have been lost in combat, and their concern is
that we don't have an open production line for the F-16s. There
is a foreign military sales open line, but we understand that
that decision will have to be made by Congress.
Senator Thune. So, the answer is yes, at least to some
level.
Ms. Jonas. Yes, sir.
Senator Thune. Okay.
Secretary Gates, the Army and the Marine Corps both are, as
we all know, in a state of transition, both with regard to
doctrine and equipment. In your testimony, you had mentioned
that we'll spend about 4 percent of our GDP on defense, and
that that is a lower percentage than what we've spent during
other times of conflict. If you look back--and I have some data
going back from 1940 on--in World War II, we were spending over
a third of our GDP, and throughout other periods in history,
including from the Cold War and post-Cold War period, we were
spending considerably more than that. That dropped off in the
mid/late 1990s. But at a 4-percent-of-GDP investment in our
military, will the Army and the Marine Corps have enough
funding to, one, fight the war on terror, two, meet
recapitalization requirements, and, three, be able to
transition to new weapons systems, like the Army's future
combat system, without having to make cutbacks to the program?
Secretary Gates. Senator, my understanding is that--and I'm
not quite sure what percentage of GDP the budget you have in
front of you for fiscal year 2008 represents, but enactment of
the three pieces before you--the fiscal year 2008 base budget,
the fiscal year 2008 global war on terror piece, and the fiscal
year 2007 emergency supplemental--would meet all those needs,
yes, sir--and I'm not quite sure what percentage of GDP the
budget you have in front of you for fiscal year 2008
represents, but enactment of the three pieces before you--the
fiscal year 2008 base budget, the fiscal year 2008 global war
on terror piece, and the fiscal year 2007 emergency
supplemental--would meet all those needs, yes, sir.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you. Thanks to the panel.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Thune.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Gates, do you know, or perhaps you would maybe
want to defer this to Ms. Jonas, what percentage of the fiscal
year 2006 money that was spent by DOD was spent competitively?
Ms. Jonas. Senator, we'd have to get back to you. I don't
have that at my disposal here, but we've be happy to get that
for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Department of Defense (DOD) reported 62.4 percent of total contract
dollars were competitively awarded in 2006. Dollars awarded by another
agency on DOD's behalf are not included in these calculations (see
Note).
Note: Our procurement database has a degree of reporting
inaccuracy and there are differences of opinion as to how to measure
competition. For example, DOD traditionally has considered orders made
utilizing the Federal Supply Schedules as competitive. Others argue we
should not consider these awards as competitive.
Senator McCaskill. What percent of the money that the DOD
spent in fiscal year 2006 was spent through interagency
contracts?
Ms. Jonas. Again, I would have to ask our acquisition,
technology, and logistics (AT&L) folks to help with that. We
could certainly get that for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
In fiscal year 2006, approximately 6 to 7 percent of Department of
Defense funds were spent through interagency contracts.
Senator McCaskill. How much money was spent on sole-source
contracts?
Ms. Jonas. I'd have to again, I'd defer to our AT&L folks,
they would have that data. I'm glad to provide that for the
record.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Department of Defense (DOD) reported that 37.6 percent of total
contract dollars awarded by DOD in 2006 were not competed (see Note).
23.2 percent of dollars were attributed specifically to
actions citing the Competition in Contracting Act ``only one
source'' authority.
6.1 percent of dollars were justified by other statutory
exceptions to competition.
2.1 percent of dollars were follow-on actions to prior
competitions that are placed with a particular contractor to
continue or augment a specific competed program.
6.2 percent of dollars were awards to Government activities,
mandated by international agreements, authorized by statute, or
were brand name purchases for resale in commissaries and
exchanges.
Note: Our procurement database has a degree of reporting
inaccuracy and there arc differences of opinion as to how to measure
competition. For example, DOD traditionally has considered orders made
utilizing the Federal Supply Schedules as competitive. Others argue we
should not consider these awards as competitive.
Senator McCaskill. Okay. The other one that I have
specifically is how many Antideficiency Act (ADA) violations
have been found on behalf of monies--personnel working for the
Government, either in the DOD or in other agencies, in spending
DOD dollars?
Ms. Jonas. The overall figures would probably be held by
OMB. I could get, for the record--we do review the
antideficiency cases as a routine, and we try to make sure that
people who violate those rules are held accountable for that. I
can get you the specific number of cases for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator McCaskill. I would like, from your office, the
numbers as to how many have been referred, how many
investigations have been done, the average length of time those
investigations have taken, and what has happened as an end
result of those investigations. I'm particularly interested in
how many are reversed with accounting entries. When we have
expenditures in one fiscal year that is actually monies that
were supposed to be spent in another fiscal year, and when
they've been found out, someone has gone back in and reversed
the accounting industry to cure it.
Ms. Jonas. Okay. I'm unaware of that. I will tell you this,
that we vigorously investigate these cases. I take them very
seriously. I'd be happy to provide that data to you.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator McCaskill. Okay. Further, have you had an
opportunity to review the IG's report on interagency
contracting that we have received here on this committee?
Ms. Jonas. I have seen the data on that, yes.
Senator McCaskill. Have you had a chance to review the
Acquisition Advisory Panel's report--the independent advisory
panel that has worked for 22 months and taken over 7,000 pages
of testimony--concerning the way the DOD buys stuff?
Ms. Jonas. I have not. I will say that the acquisition and
procurement responsibilities are part of the AT&L section of
the DOD. But I'd be happy to get with Ken Krieg about this as a
concern. I know you've had AT&L witnesses up here, and we
support your efforts there.
Senator McCaskill. Frankly, I think it should be a concern
for General Pace and Secretary Gates, and not just a
department. It may surprise you to know that that Acquisition
Advisory Panel says that you're not going to be able to give me
the percentage of competitive spending, because it said, ``We
can't tell, even, how much of the money that's being spent
through interagency contracts is being spent competitively.''
What they have been able to tell is, in the years of fiscal
years 2005 and 2004, that over $100 billion was being spent
noncompetitively through the DOD. Does that sound--and that's
without knowing how much of the interagency contracts are being
spent noncompetitively.
Ms. Jonas. Yes, I can't confirm that. What I can say is
that the Defense Contract Audit Agency, which does report to
me, evaluates about $320 billion of defense spending annually.
Last year, they did over 35,000--actually 35,610 audits to try
to help the DOD make sure that contracts are done correctly,
according to the Federal Acquisition Regulations. I think they
do a very good job. They recovered about $2.3 billion last year
in potential costs to the Government. So, I appreciate your
concern, and we will get back to you on that.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Department of Defense (DOD) reported 62.4 percent of total
contract dollars were competitively awarded in 2006. Dollars awarded on
DOD's behalf, by other agencies, are not included in these
calculations. In fiscal year 2006, approximately 6-7 percent of DOD
funds were spent through interagency contracts.
As to whether these interagency contracts are competitive: our
procurement database has a degree of reporting inaccuracy, and there
are differences of opinion as to how to measure competition. For
example, with regard to DOD funds spent through interagency contracts,
the Department traditionally has considered orders made utilizing the
Federal Supply Schedules to be competitive awards.
Senator McCaskill. I have to tell you that, as somebody
who's been auditing for a while, these reports I just referred
to are absolutely stunning in terms of the news they deliver.
If you think those 35,000 audits are, in fact, delivering--it's
hard for me to believe that, if we have that percentage of our
dollars being spent noncompetitively.
Let me ask you specifically about the issue of
noncompetitiveness. When we evaluate competing contracts at the
DOD--and, Secretary Gates, you may want to address this--for
example, when Quick Kill was selected by the Future Combat
System (FCS) for the system that was supposed to repel rocket-
propelled grenades, a third of the members on that evaluation
team worked for the company that received the contract. I would
be curious as to whether or not that is common. Do we allow the
companies that want to build these systems to be the ones to
pick who gets to build the systems?
Secretary Gates. Doesn't sound right to me, Senator.
Senator McCaskill. That is a--and I noticed that the FCS in
this budget has gone from several hundred million dollars to
$3.7 billion. Is that correct?
Secretary Gates. I think it's up $300 million.
Ms. Jonas. Right. Senator, last year, I believe it was $3.4
billion, and the increase this year is $300 million.
Senator McCaskill. Okay. So, this system is $3.7 billion,
and we know that a $70 million contract within there was given
when the team that was making the technical specs and making
the recommendations was--the huge chunk of it was, in fact,
from the company that got the bid.
I would be interested--Secretary Gates, would you have any
problem in--or you may want to take time to answer this--in
deciding that, from here on out, the companies that are
participating in trying to win these bids can no longer be part
of the team that decides who wins the bids?
Secretary Gates. I would--in principle, I think that sounds
right. I would like to look into it, myself, and find out what
the circumstances were. The only circumstance I can think of
would be that there's some kind of a rare technical skill that
may not exist someplace else. Let me look into it. But, in
principle, I think that sounds right.
[The information referred to follows:]
The standard Future Combat Systems (FCS) business model for
selecting subcontracted efforts was used to select a developer for
active protection systems. As the FCS prime contractor, Boeing has
responsibility for selection of its subcontractors. Quick Kill was
subsequently identified as a materiel solution to satisfy part of this
requirement. Army has responsibility for oversight of the contractor's
evaluation process and concurrence in the contractor's final selection
decision. Boeing selected Raytheon from among three competitors as the
best qualified to develop a robust, detailed active protection system
architecture for manned ground vehicles. This effort is to be performed
as a second tier subcontract in support of BAE, the first tier
subcontractor that has responsibility to integrate hit avoidance
capabilities into FCS. No employee of Raytheon participated in the
source selection for the active protection system architecture
developer. Following its selection of Raytheon, Boeing directed BAE to
award a subcontract to Raytheon. The first task for Raytheon under its
subcontract was to conduct a trade study to determine components to be
used to satisfy the performance requirements in the architecture.
Raytheon performed this study with oversight from Boeing, BAE, and the
Army to ensure that appropriate processes were followed, the technical
conclusions of the trade study were supported by the findings included
in the trade study, and industry had fair and equitable participation.
The Quick Kill system was identified as the FCS solution for the
current force under the trade study. The trade study team consisted of
30 members, including 8 members from Raytheon.
Senator McCaskill. I especially hope that--Secretary Gates,
that you and General Pace will take time to read the IG's
report on the interagency contracting. I'll tell you one of
things that stuck out in my mind, and that was the use of
operational monies to build things and the use of service
contracts to lease space. Let me hone in, because I know I
don't have a lot of time--on the one example that I think is so
egregious, and that is, to build a building--this is for the
Materiel Command at the Fort in Virginia. They used operational
money through General Services Administration to build a
building. Now, I thought, well, this is obviously going to be a
little, small building. If they are going around the
requirements of military contracting to build a building, this
is probably a small trailer or a modular unit. This building is
230,000 square feet and houses over 1,400 civilian and military
personnel.
Now, I ran into the Secretary of the Army in the hallway
the other day, and I told him that I may not be his favorite
new member of the Armed Services Committee because of my focus
in this area. I mentioned this building to him, and he looked
at me with a perfectly straight face and said, ``Well, that's a
temporary building.'' Now, I have to tell you, where I come
from, a 230,000-square-foot building isn't temporary, that's
pretty permanent. I would like to find out who's responsible
for making that decision and why in the world, if we know why
we need that kind of space for civilian and military personnel,
would it be justified that--we're not talking about an
emergency, in terms of something going on in Iraq, we're not
talking about getting armor to our men and women in the field,
we're talking about housing personnel. I would like a better
answer than I've received so far as to who's responsible for
this and what is going to be done to hold them accountable.
Thank you. My time's up.
Chairman Levin [presiding]. Senator, we're going to join
you in that request. There wasn't an answer to your question,
but it seems to me, Mr. Secretary, that the issues here are
similar to the ones that we raised at lunch with you yesterday
on this contracting and this offloading, which we used to call
using other agencies' contracts, and that you really do need to
get some answers for the record here on the number of questions
which have been raised here.
Senator McCaskill has a background here which is truly
important and vital to us, and we're grateful that she's
focusing on an area where we've spent a lot of time, but
without, obviously, having the success which we need to have.
So, I want to thank her, but I also want to, if you would,
because of the way that last question was phrased, for the
record, give us much more material in an effort to respond to
the points that were raised.
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir, we will.
[The information referred to follows:]
I cannot comment or provide the requested details at this time due
to an ongoing investigation of a potential violation of the Anti-
Deficiency Act. The Department will be happy to brief the committee
once the investigation is complete.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your continued service to our
country. We can't overstate how much we appreciate and value
that service.
To both Secretary Gates and General Pace, you mention in
your statements that the DOD is changing the way it looks at
the employment of the National Guard and Reserve. Certainly,
nobody can question that, over the last decade and a half, we
have changed the way that we employ and deploy the National
Guard and Reserve. We have made a number of changes in quality-
of-life benefits for our National Guard and Reserve, and if
we're going to continue to be able to attract and retain the
National Guard and Reserve, particularly in light of the way we
intend to use them in the future, I think we have to continue
to look at changing the benefits that are available to them,
even though we will never, and should never, make it on an
equal basis with the Active-Duty Force.
I've had an amendment, for the last 3 years on the NDAA,
that seeks to lower the retirement age for the National Guard
and Reserve. It's the number-one issue now of the National
Guard and Reserve, from a quality-of-life standpoint. Can you
tell me what, if any, consideration has been given to that
particular issue in this budget? Was there any discussion
whatsoever about that as you prepared these numbers?
Secretary Gates. This is a new issue to me, Senator. Let me
ask Ms. Jonas.
Ms. Jonas. I can get back to you, sir, on that.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Department has consistently opposed efforts to lower the
retirement age for Guard and Reserve personnel due to the adverse
impact it would have on controlling TRICARE costs. I have made Dr.
David Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), aware
of your concerns, and he would be happy to discuss this matter with you
in greater detail.
Senator Chambliss. Okay. We have added that amendment to
the NDAA for the last 3 years, and it is critically important
that we address it, and I'm amazed that it hasn't reached your
level, Ms. Jonas.
There are several States, of which Georgia is one, that, as
a result of the BRAC, are going to see an influx of new troops
coming in. We have about 10,000 new troops coming to Fort
Benning alone with the movement of the Armor School from Fort
Knox. As a result of that, the school systems that serve Fort
Benning are going to have a critical shortage of space to be
able to house the students that are going to be coming in. Now,
I understand that not all of the 10,000 new troops will be
coming in 1 month or maybe even 1 year, but we have been
dialoging with the DOD on providing some funding to assist
these school systems, in Georgia and the other States, with
respect to the infrastructure that's needed to house those
students.
As best we can tell, there's about $2.4 million in the
defense budget that is to be used for that. I'd like to ask you
where that stands, what consideration is given to it, and do
you think that's adequate to meet the needs that we're going to
have here?
Ms. Jonas. Sir, are you speaking of the impact aid?
Senator Chambliss. No, I'm not speaking of impact aid.
Ms. Jonas. Okay.
Senator Chambliss. This is a different issue altogether.
Ms. Jonas. Okay. I'll take a look at what we have in the
budget. The $2.4 million sounds right. We'll get back to you on
that specific piece.
[The information referred to follows:]
In fiscal year 2008, the Department has budgeted $2.4 million to
ease the transition of military dependent students from attendance at
DOD schools to attendance at local educational agencies consistent with
section 574(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2007. The Department of Defense Dependents' Education (DODDE) will
use these funds to share educational expertise and experience with
school districts impacted by large influxes of students because of base
closures, global rebasing, and force restructuring. The fiscal year
2008 funds will be used to do initial assessments of school district
needs and to begin developing partnerships with the affected school
systems.
The DODDE will first consider school districts that will be most
impacted by force structure changes. Next, the DODDE will consider
school districts that ask for educational assistance. Based on DODDE's
record of building instructional programs that consistently produce
students whose test scores are above average, the DODDE will offer
educational enhancements and strategies to affected school systems to
help them build instructional programs similar to those in DODDE
schools.
Senator Chambliss. All right. I'd like to know whether or
not that's going to be an annual budgeted item for some period
of time. If so, what's the length of time.
Ms. Jonas. I can check with the folks who are responsible
for that in the building and get back to you. I don't have any
understanding of where that is right now, but if it's in the
budget, the $2.4 million, I would guess it would be a
continuing item.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Department will request additional funds in subsequent years as
the troops and their families move and there is a need for such
efforts. The goal is to ensure that the Department provides a high
quality educational program to all military dependents regardless of
where they live.
Senator Chambliss. Okay. With respect to the operating
tempo (OPTEMPO) we've seen in the Active-Duty Force, certainly
there's no question we have seen an increase there, but, by the
same token, with the fact that we have been wearing out the
equipment that we're using in theater, the fact that we've had
to change a lot of the equipment, the OPTEMPO at our depots has
also increased significantly.
Now, I note that there's a $51.5 billion figure in this
budget for reconstituting our forces, and there's about a $4.7
billion increase going to our depots. Because of the fact that
we have seen that OPTEMPO at the depots increase, can you tell
me what the thought process is, relative to whether or not
we're going to be able to handle this surge in-house, or do we
intend to contract more out, and what impact, again, does the
DOD anticipate with respect to that ongoing surge at our
military depots?
Ms. Jonas. Senator, we have about $11 billion in the base
budget for depot maintenance, and my understanding is that we
project that they'll be operating at about 64 percent of
capacity. So, my own understanding, and what I've been told, is
that we should be able to handle the additional surge.
Senator Chambliss. Do you intend to handle it in-house, or
is there going to be a significant increase in contracting out?
Ms. Jonas. I wouldn't anticipate that. Of course, we'd
follow the law, which requires the 50 percent. So, I can get
back to you, for the record, on that, but I'm sure that we
would use the in-house capacity as we can.
[The information referred to follows:]
We'd use a combination of organic (in-house) and commercial based
on the type of equipment being repaired. By law, no more than 50
percent of the funds made available to the Department for depot
maintenance may be used to contract for performance by non-Federal
Government personnel. As workload demand increases, production output
will also have to increase so equipment can be cycled back to the
operating forces in a timely fashion. To accomplish this will require
repair work done at a mix of organic and commercial activities based on
the type of equipment that will need to be repaired. In April of each
year, the Department submits a report to Congress showing the
percentage of workload achieved organically and commercially for the
prior year, and the percentage of workload planned for the execution
year and beyond. This report will factor in supplemental funds for
depot maintenance activities. Preliminary data supporting that report
show the workload split by Military Service and Defense Agency is
roughly 50 percent organic and 50 percent commercial.
Senator Chambliss. The other issue, relative to depots,
General Pace, you may be aware that at Marine Corps Logistics
Base in Albany, we have done a lot of work for the Army, as
well as for the National Guard. The cross-servicing issue is
going to be critically important, particularly from an in-house
standpoint. Has any consideration been given to the fact that
we need to increase that cross-service work at our depots?
General Pace. Sir, the short answer is yes, sir, and that's
why, as you mentioned, you see what you do at Albany. As Ms.
Jonas mentioned, the capacity of our depots is projected to be
at about 54 percent, so there is the opportunity for more
cross-servicing. But if I can take a second to just thank the
great folks at Albany, because they have been doing fabulous
work for us, and they deserve our thanks.
Senator Chambliss. You're exactly right. If there is any
legislative action that's necessary, obviously I hope, as we go
through this budget process, you'll give us an indication of
what legislation may be needed.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks, to the three witnesses, excellent testimony.
General Pace, let me start with a specific question for
you. I've been alarmed, and I'm sure you have, too, over the
last 2 weeks, that four American helicopters, three military,
one private contractor, have gone down. Apparently now there is
a conclusion, tentative or otherwise, that those were not
accidents, they were shot down. I presume this means that enemy
forces have achieved some higher level of capability with
shoulder-fired missiles. Am I right about that? What are your
conclusions about it? Where do you think that weaponry is
coming from? Obviously, we suspect that maybe--I suspect it may
be from Iran; maybe it's not. What are we going to do about it?
General Pace. Senator, first, you're right, all four have
been accredited to enemy fire. Second, each of those
investigations, as you would expect, is under a detailed
investigation to figure out what they were doing at the time,
how they were doing it, the tactics, techniques, and
procedures. To my knowledge--I'll have to check this for the
record, but, to my knowledge, each of those was shot down by
small arms, not by missiles.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Senator Lieberman. Interesting.
General Pace. At this point in time, I do not know whether
or not it is the law of averages that caught up with us or if
there had been a change in tactics, techniques, and procedures
on the part of the enemy, which is what the investigations will
do.
Regardless of what the answer is to that particular
question, the commanders on the ground have gone to--not safety
stand-down, but stand-downs designed to share the information
about the shoot-downs so that the pilots that continue to fly
those aircraft have the latest information we have, and, as the
investigations unfold, we'll make sure that it gets put into
our training.
Senator Lieberman. Could you indicate for the record what
kind of protection systems those aircraft have on them? Is
there something more than can be acquired for them if we come
to a conclusion that the enemy forces have obtained more
sophisticated capabilities to shoot down our helicopters?
General Pace. I will, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
The survivability and protection of rotary wing aircraft has been
an ongoing issue since their advent in combat operations during the
1940s. Through the Korean War, the Vietnam conflict, and the ongoing
series of low and high intensity conflicts since then, helicopter
losses or damage in combat continue to be an issue. The reality which
cannot be avoided is that any slow moving, noisy, and relatively soft
vehicle operating in close proximity to the ground and hostile ground
forces is an inviting target for a wide range of weapons, be they man
portable or carried by vehicles or other aircraft. Because Blackwater
Corporation helicopters are utilized for contracted security and are
beyond the oversight of the U.S. military, the responses to this
question will only address protection systems for U.S. military
aircraft.
All tactical helicopters are equipped with a suite of Aircraft
Survivability Systems (ASE) designed for each aircraft while performing
their unique missions. ASE can be categorized in the three areas of
aircraft signature reduction, situational awareness, and active
countermeasures. To aid in signature reduction, all tactical
helicopters are painted with non-reflective infrared absorbing paint.
AH-64 Apache aircraft also have exhaust suppression that reduces the
infrared signature and aids in the effectiveness of the AN/ALQ-144A
infrared radar missile jammer on the aircraft. For situational
awareness, all tactical helicopters are equipped with electronic
systems that alert the aircrew of radar activity and laser activity.
For active countermeasures when masking terrain is not available or
time is unavailable for the aircrew to maneuver out of threat range,
infrared radar threats can be jammed by the AN/ALQ-144A system.
Additionally, radar threats can be decoyed by the M-130 system and
associated chaff dispenser. There is little doubt that the significant
ballistic tolerance to 7.62mm and 23mm weapons designed into the UH-60
Blackhawk, the AH-64 Apache aircraft, and subsequent designs has had a
large impact on fleet survivability and saved many lives.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks.
Secretary Gates, let me go to something you said in your
opening statement, I thought quite a remarkable statement, and
we should not let it go, at least unrepeated, which is that,
``In December, all active branches of the U.S. military
exceeded their recruiting goals, with particularly strong
showings by the Army and Marine Corps,'' who are obviously
bearing the largest burden of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan.
How about retention? How are we doing on retention?
Secretary Gates. Senator, they're meeting all of their
goals on retention. The one area that the Army and the Navy
believe is a temporary shortfall is in mid-level enlisted. Let
me just check to make sure I get it right. It's E-5s and E-6s
in the Army, where the retention is about 84 percent of their
goal; and E-4s and E-5s in the Navy, which is about 89 percent
of their goal. In some respects, the Navy figure is a part of
their restructuring of their force, of their manpower, and the
Army is confident that it will meet its goal. But, in truth--
and General Pace may want to say something--there's a lot out
there in the press and elsewhere about the stress on the force
and that the Army is broken and so on. In many respects--I'm
told by all of the Chiefs that the best measure of the morale
of the force is, in fact, in the retention numbers, and the
retention numbers are excellent. That's looking back over the
past year, which has been a pretty tough year for them. But I
don't know, the General may want to add something.
Senator Lieberman. I think it's a good point. That's a
market test--and I use the word respectfully--of the morale of
the forces, whether they want to stay in. I welcome your
comments, General Pace, also whether you're at all alarmed
about the slight drop below the goals in those mid-level
positions. Obviously, those are people we would want to keep at
100 percent.
General Pace. Sir, the only thing I would add would be that
this strong retention is something we should not assume, that--
--
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Pace.--we need to continually check ourselves for:
(a) the missions we're assigning our troops, and (b) how well
we're taking care of them. One of the strong points of this
budget is the request for funding to increase the size of the
Army and increase the size of the Marine Corps. Soldiers and
marines know that that will take some time to deliver, but they
know that help is on the way. Just knowing that Congress and
the leadership understands the need for these forces goes a
long way in the value of service for them.
Senator Lieberman. Good point.
Secretary Gates. Getting back to these dwell periods that
are goals of 1 year deployed, 2 years at home for the Active-
Duty Force, and 1 year deployed and 5 years back home, is also
very important for retention and for their families. That's
another reason why we changed the mobilization rules, in terms
of how we're going to do this in the future. It'll take us a
little while to get to where we need to be on that, but, again,
they're both signs that things are going to get better.
Senator Lieberman. I thank you for that.
I want to talk about the overall budget, generally. As you
point out, there's good news and challenging news, which is
that the President is recommending an 11.3 percent increase in
spending over the projected enacted level for fiscal year 2007.
That's for next year. Overall, as you've indicated, the budget
in the fiscal year 2008 will still be 3.8 percent,
approximately--a little less than 4 percent of GDP, which is
below not only the average, but certainly way below when we've
been at war. If you look--and I honestly think that we are
underfunding some needs we have. I think the Army needs more,
and the National Guard needs more. I think we're heading
rapidly to a 274-ship Navy. We're flat-funding research and
development. If you look at the President's budget, it seems to
me that one of the consequences of the 11.3 percent increase is
that we're really squeezing some critical domestic programs.
I'm about to say something that is, fortunately for you,
outside of your orbit of responsibility, and this committee's.
I think we have to start thinking about a war on terrorism tax.
People keep saying that we're not asking a sacrifice of anybody
but our military in this war, and some civilians who are
working on it. When you put together the DOD budgets with
homeland security budgets, we need to ask people to help us in
a way that they know, when they pay more, will go for their
security.
But I want to ask, having said that, this question. Though
I'd support more funding, I think we ought to aspire to go up
to the 5 percent of GDP for the military and security at a time
of war such as we're in. We obviously have to be able to
convince our constituents and each other that you're spending
the money we're giving you efficiently. Senator McCaskill's
questions were excellent. I want to ask you a different kind of
question.
Critics will say--and it's started already on this budget--
that the DOD is still carrying on some outmoded, Cold War,
major arms-systems programs that we really don't need anymore.
If we stop them, it could save billions of dollars. I know
that's a large question. I suppose, during the Service
hearings, we'll come back and ask more specifically. But what
would you say, when someone comes up and asks you whether--
you're asking for this increase after you've squeezed
everything you could out of the budget that you have?
Secretary Gates. As the chairman generously noted at the
beginning of the hearing, I didn't put together most of this
budget. [Laughter.]
Senator Lieberman. You get a 1-year pass.
Secretary Gates. But I'll tell you that I had three
concerns when I was asked to do this job. One was whether the
National Guard--whether the Army and the Marine Corps were the
right size. The second was whether we were asking too much of
the National Guard. The third was whether we were buying large
systems that were more tied to Cold War needs than future
needs. To be honest, I haven't gotten into it much. What little
I have, I've been persuaded that the requirements make sense.
But I think--I owe you an honest answer that I haven't really
had the opportunity to satisfy myself as to the answer to your
question, and that's clearly on my agenda. But let me ask
General Pace his view.
General Pace. Sir, as a taxpayer, I have to believe that
there's money out there that's not being well spent. What's
been visible in the process, as it's identified in the process,
is changed. So, I feel good about the intent and the vigor with
which those who are responsible for providing recommendations
go after efficiencies. The Army, for example, has canceled more
than 100 programs. But I'd be wrong to sit here and say that
there wasn't more out there to be found. I can say: when found,
we'll work with it, but that's about as far as I can go, sir.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate your answer, General Pace.
I appreciate yours, Secretary Gates. We'll look forward, as you
go on--as we go on this journey together, to hearing your
evaluations of the spending of the DOD.
Thanks very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would just note, for our perspective, an interesting
couple of editorials in the Washington Times about the overall
rate of defense spending, which is high compared to recent
years in real-dollar terms, but they note that, as of today,
we're at 4.4 percent of GDP committed to defense and 19.6
percent of our budget--total budget committed to defense.
That's up a little from the time--at least as a percentage of
budget. I think we got as low as 16 percent of the budget being
committed to defense, and now, in this period of war, since
September 11, we are up to 19 percent. But also, I would note
that as a percentage of the GDP during Korea, we spent not 4
percent on defense, as we do today, but 14.2 percent. During
Vietnam, it was 9.5 percent of GDP that we spent on that war,
more than twice what the current rate is for this war. During
the peak of Reagan's time there, when we were not in a state of
active war, it was 6.2 percent of GDP. That number has
continued to fall to 4 percent. During Reagan's period, 28
percent of the budget went to defense, not 19 percent.
That gives us some perspective, I think, on where we are,
although I have to tell you, you're going to have oversight,
dollars are going to be tough to come by. This Senator is going
to ask tough questions, other Senators are going to ask tough
questions. We have to be sure we're not, even in this period of
hostilities and soldiers at risk, wasting a dime. Just not
wanting to do it.
One of the things that troubled me, General Pace, is
interagency support for the military. I know there's a lot of
reasons for the difficulties that we've had. I'm just very
uneasy about it, for several reasons. One is, under our plan,
other agencies are expected to do things. In other words, when
we develop a plan for Iraq in reconstruction and law and
agriculture, we expect these other agencies to produce. That
was the original plan. However, they're not really producing
well at all, and it's falling on the DOD. For example, are you
familiar with the DOS memorandum of January 25, 2007, to
William Marriott, Executive Secretary, the Office of the DOD?
General Pace. I am, sir. That's the one requesting
assistance for the PRTs.
Senator Sessions. I find it--yes--very troubling, because
my understanding was that the DOS would organize other agencies
and produce PRTs, which are critical to a peaceful and
prosperous Iraq, at least they have been in our plans. They had
to be deployed rapidly. But my understanding is that the DOD,
the military, your soldiers, are overwhelmingly providing the
resources to operate those, and not these other agencies. Could
you give us a factual rundown on how that's developing?
Secretary Gates. Maybe I could, Senator, since I've gotten
involved in this, personally. Let me say a word, and then
invite General Pace to comment.
If you were troubled by the memo, that was mild compared to
my reaction when I saw it, because, out of 129 positions that
were being requested, I think 120 or 121 were being requested
from the DOD for the PRTs, and for a period of 9 months to a
year, which was contrary to my understanding.
I've talked with Secretary Rice about this, personally, and
I've been assured that the memo did not accurately reflect what
their request to us is. They are asking for some help, but for
a period of 30 to 60 days, or 60 to 90 days, while they recruit
people from other parts of the Government, get them the right
clearances, and so on; and, also, perhaps, up to 6 months to
enable them to get contractors, who will have to be cleared and
go through various procedures and so on. So, it's still a big
number. Compared to the number of forces we have over there,
it's a modest number. It's important to us to make sure that
these PRTs work. Even with the shorter timelines that Secretary
Rice has assured me are the case, it is illustrative of the
problem that you were talking about, and that Senator Dole
discussed earlier, in terms of the difficulty of getting other
agencies to provide people on a timely basis. It's one of the
reasons behind the idea of this Civilian Reserve Corps that
people who could be called on short notice to do this. But
these PRTs are critically important in both Iraq and
Afghanistan, and having the civilians who can come in behind
our military forces and do that, so that it isn't just our
National Guard civic affairs officers and people like that who
have to do it, is really important. We're happy to help in the
short-term, but it's a government problem.
General Pace. Sir, this is not at all a fingerpointing
exercise, this is about the current status of our Government to
be able to respond, and it goes to the expeditionary nature, or
lack thereof, of most of the departments in the government--
understandably, based on the kind of wars we've faced in the
past. This is totally different. If we're going to be able to
prevent having to send thousands of troops, we need to be able
to get folks over to be able to help with judiciary systems, be
able to help with engineering, be able to help with electricity
and the like, before a country devolves into a state where the
terrorists can find a home. Because of that, and because of our
current state, leads to the DOD asking us for this short-term
help, which includes, as you see on the list, everything from
engineers to folks who know how to manage governments to----
Senator Sessions. Veterinarians.
General Pace.--veterinarians, a whole----
Senator Sessions. Public health advisors.
General Pace.--yes, sir--a whole list of individuals who--
reasonably, we should expect the U.S. Government to provide
from other than the U.S. military. So, my recommendation would
be, sir, that we embrace this as a problem that needs to be
fixed, that we take a look at who's able to deploy now, and
who's not, and that we devise a plan for our Government that
allows us to deploy. By the way, if we're going to ask Mr.
Pace, from Department of Treasury, to go someplace, does he
have the same benefits that General Pace has when I deploy? Is
my family going to be taken care of? Is my medical going to be
taken care of? If I get killed serving my country, will there
be insurance? There's a whole list of things that we should
take a look at, that we do for our military, that we are not
currently doing for our civilians, and then help close that
gap, because this will not be won militarily. Security can be
provided militarily, but we're going to prevail in the war on
terrorism through all the other kinds of capacities that are on
that list, and the U.S. military is not the best instrument to
do that.
Senator Sessions. Secretary Gates and General Pace, either
one of you, it seems to me that if we created, within all these
agencies, certain designated slots--and maybe this is what the
President's thinking about--that were called ``expeditionary
slots,'' and, if you didn't want those jobs, you didn't take
them, but, if you took them, perhaps you have better pay and
you had to do some extra training, maybe with the military, so
that you could be deployable to tough areas of the globe, where
you may not have running water, and you may have to live in
substandard housing, and you may have to be at risk, and you
may be in some danger, and that people would voluntarily sign
up for that, and they, then, wouldn't be able to object if
called upon to go. Is something like that possible?
Secretary Gates. I think so, Senator. I think that this is
a matter of sufficient importance to both Congress and the
executive branch, that this is an area where we, speaking for
the DOD, because we obviously are the most affected by it,
would be very happy to work with both you all and others in the
executive branch to see if, together, we can figure out a way
to solve this problem.
Senator Sessions. Do you have any other ideas or thoughts
about it?
Secretary Gates. We talked about a few, with Senator Dole,
in terms of whether there's some additional authorities that
need to be given to the executive branch, in terms of being
able to shift money from one Department to another. In other
words, there are some of these things, where, frankly, if DOS,
the Department of Treasury, or the Department of Agriculture
had the people, we'd rather be able to transfer some of our
money to them to help pay for it rather than send a soldier to
do the job. So, there may be other options like that. But I
think the first thing to do is--for a group of people to sit
down and start putting together some options of how you'd go at
this problem.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Following that up, can you report back to
us on what effort will be made, along the lines that Senator
Sessions has suggested?
Secretary Gates. Sure.
Chairman Levin. Could you take that up at the Cabinet
meeting?
Secretary Gates. Sure.
[The information referred to follows:]
Department of Defense (DOD) civilian employees have a long history
of providing key supporting roles in accompanying the military on
deployments around the globe. Current strategies rely on a mix of
military members, DOD civilian employees, and contractor employees to
ensure success. The DOD monies for civilian employees could be emulated
by other agencies, and I will raise that issue at the cabinet level.
Title 10, U.S.C., section 1580, authorizes the Secretary of Defense
to designate as Emergency-Essential (E-E) any employee whose position
provides immediate and continuing support for combat operations or
support for maintenance and repair of combat essential systems of the
Armed Forces, and whose duties must be performed in a combat zone after
the evacuation of nonessential personnel from the zone in connection
with a war, a national emergency declared by Congress or the President,
or the commencement of combat operations of the Armed Forces in the
zone. E-E employees are deployed to or retained in the zone as needed
to support the operations.
Generally, such E-E positions are designated in advance of hiring.
As a result, when employees are hired for these positions, they
understand the terms and conditions of their assignment. Current DOD
policies regulate this authority, requiring E-E employees to sign an
agreement to deploy or remain in place as the situation dictates. When
positions are designated E-E subsequent to a hiring action based upon
an emergent requirement for immediate and continuing support of combat
operations, current DOD policy provides for advance notice to an
employee, and the opportunity to seek volunteers for the position. When
volunteers are not available to meet the requirement, DOD has the
authority to compel the assignment of the DOD civilian to the E-E
requirement.
Prior to their deployment assignments, civilian employees undergo
readiness processing and instruction, including specialized in-country
training. For example, as part of their pre-deployment processing, DOD
employees assigned to Iraq Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
receive the following:
Department of State at the Foreign Service Institute--
training on interagency engagement in the PRT effort;
Department of State Foreign Area Counter Threat--training
designed to prepare employees entering areas of a higher risk/
danger for terrorist activities;
Army CONUS Replacement Center Pre-deployment Readiness
Processing--provides medical screening, outfitting, equipment
training, and validation of documentation prior to deployment;
and
National Coordinating Team--specialized in-country training
on cultural and role awareness.
The Department has been successful in enhancing benefits and
incentives for deployed civilians. Many of these resulted from
legislation while others required policy changes. The provisions of S.
2600 (introduced by Senator Warner in April 2006), were incorporated
into the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, Global
War on Terror and Hurricane Recovery Act 2006 (Public Law 109-234,
section 1603). This provision authorized the Secretary of Defense to
provide the same allowances, benefits, and gratuities which were
currently provided to members of the Department of State Foreign
Service who were serving the United States Government in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The attached paper summarizes the allowances, benefits,
and gratuities available for those civilian employees deployed to Iraq.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Sessions. I know Senator Levin has expressed some
concern about this also, and maybe it's something we could
facilitate, if you'll help us.
Secretary Gates. This is an area of some real opportunity.
The President raised it with the Cabinet yesterday, of the need
for others to step up.
Chairman Levin. If Senator Bayh would yield for just 1
minute, Senator Warner would bring us up-to-date on some
legislation we passed in this area.
Senator Warner. This very issue was before the committee,
and I solicited views of all the Cabinet officers, came back
and wrote a bill, the bill passed, as to how to do these
things. I know the President held a Cabinet meeting, was very
assertive in the need to get done what you've described. So, I
guess we have to go back and dig the corpse up and start all
over again. [Laughter.]
But we tried, on this committee, to do the very things that
our colleagues said.
Chairman Levin. We did it under Senator Warner's
leadership, and perhaps you could bring us up-to-date as to
what it led to.
Secretary Gates. Yes. We'll find out.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, thank you.
Thank you Senator Bayh.
Senator Bayh. Thank you.
Thank you all for your time today. I have one comment and
three quick questions I hope we'll be able to get through.
Mr. Secretary, I'd like to start by thanking you for your
prompt response to the request that Senator Clinton and I
submitted to you following our visit to Afghanistan. This was a
country from which we were attacked. Many of us feel that it
has been under-resourced, and we are at a critical juncture,
and we need to step up to try and make sure that events there
go in a better direction. So, adding the additional troops and
other resources, we think, is vitally important.
One thing I would like to ask you to follow up on--I think
General Pace mentioned this in his submitted testimony, and we
heard this very clearly from both our military commanders and
our intelligence officials--there still aren't the Predator
assets that we need to make the most of our opportunities
there. This is a weapons system that kills terrorists in real
time, and 6 years into this thing, it's somewhat mindboggling
to me why we still don't have enough of those assets deployed
in the hands of our commanders. So, I hope you'll follow up on
that and tell us what we can do to rectify that situation.
Secretary Gates. I would just comment, this is an area that
I did look into, because they do seem so valuable to me. I
heard plenty, in both Iraq and in Afghanistan, about the need
for them. What I'm told is that the pipeline for production is
completely full and out for several years. I think that there
has been a reluctance--not knowing how long this war was going
to go on, a reluctance to expand capacity at the factory. I
think we now need to revisit that and look at it.
Senator Bayh. I hope you will.
There seems to be some--and I don't want to run out my time
or my three questions, Ms. Jonas. Maybe we can follow up
later--there seems to be, at least on the part of some of our
people who have handled these kind of issues before, that
perhaps on the private side they say the pipeline is full, but
some things can done to expand the pipeline. Let's follow up on
that.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Department of Defense (DOD) continues to explore all available
means to accelerate the delivery of MQ-1 Predator unmanned aircraft
systems (UAS) Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) to the Commander U.S. Central
Command. In 2005, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council validated a
Quadrennial Defense Review requirement for 21 MQ-1 Predator CAPs of 24
hours per day, 7 days per week operations. The Air Force, using Air
Combat Command (ACC), Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), and
Air National Guard (ANG) crews, currently provides 12 CAPs in Central
Command's area of responsibility. The current Air Force plan is to grow
available Predator CAPs to 16 by the end of fiscal year 2008 and 21 by
the first quarter of fiscal year 2010.
Aircraft production is not a limiting factor. In 2006, the Defense
Contract Management Agency (DCMA) completed an industrial capacity
assessment of General Atomics Aeronautical systems (GA), the
manufacturer of the MQ-1B Predator, MQ-9 Reaper, and Army's MQ-1C
Warrior. DCMA confirmed GA has excess production capacity to meet all
planned procurements identified in the FY08 President's Budget.
The most significant issue in expanding available Predator CAPs is
training enough qualified crews to operate Predator. Last year, the Air
Force trained 120 aircrews (with each crew consisting of one pilot and
one sensor operator) to meet Predator crew requirements. Even though
we've doubled aircrew training capacity in the last year and a half,
the Air Force is taking action to further increase Predator crew
production.
The Air Force recently enacted several key changes to Predator
pilot tour assignment policy: all tour assignments (in-place and new)
are now 36 months in duration as measured from the qualification
training completion date, adding approximately 4 months to the typical
tour length--effectively freezing all in-place Predator pilots until
spring 2008. Additional tour policy changes include requiring a 24-
month time on station payback for any Predator pilot accepting an
instructor assignment. We will also begin immediately accepting
volunteers for extended or repeat Predator tours. The Air Force plan
increases crew training to match aircraft production.
General Pace. Yes, sir.
Senator Bayh. Vitally important.
My three questions. First, following up on a couple of
comments by my colleagues. Senator Nelson, from Florida, asked
you about the reliability of Iraqi troops. I'd like to ask you
about the reliability of the Iraqi political leadership. I
think we all acknowledge that no matter what we do, how long we
stay, how much we spend, how many of our brave forces die, this
is not going to go well if they don't have the political will
to get the job done. I think, Mr. Secretary, you mentioned
that, in your opinion, it was clear that Maliki intends to
fulfill his commitments. I'd like to ask you what are the
reasons for your optimism there? Some of us are a little bit
more skeptical, when you look at things like: he posted, on the
presidential Web site last October a series of what they called
benchmarks, which they have either not adhered to or, to me,
looked like the path of least resistance, not some of the hard
things that need to be done.
Then, you look at what he said, apparently, to the
President last November in Amman, and he said to Senator
Clinton and myself, just a few weeks ago, which was his
preferred course of action in Baghdad was for us to arm his
forces more heavily and for us to get out of the way. He's
reluctantly come around to supporting this surge, but it was
clear from reading between the lines, that wasn't his
preference.
You look at some of the constraints that have been put on
us of our ability to act in the past, why do you have
confidence in the political leadership of the Iraqis to get
this done?
Secretary Gates. What I said, Senator Bayh, was that I
believe that he had the intent to follow through on these
commitments. I think that at times, they lack the capacity to
follow through.
Senator Bayh. Could I just interject for a second here? I
always listen to what people say. I think a better indication
of someone's intent is what they do. We have a series of
actions here which belie what he said. Which leads me to be a
little more skeptical.
Secretary Gates. I think that's one of the reasons why, as
we've discussed, it's so important to put together--and, as I
mentioned at the beginning of the hearing, a matrix or a
checklist that basically allows us to measure progress here
with this Baghdad plan. The first thing that we will be able to
measure is military performance. Are the brigades showing up on
time? Are they fully staffed, and so on?--so we can tell
whether the intent has led to the action. The answer, so far,
from General Casey, is, ``So far, so good.''
Senator Bayh. As we've discussed before, there's a military
component to this and there's a political component to this,
and some of those steps, in the hands of the politicians, are
going to need to be taken if we're going to deal with the root
causes of the insurgency, not just its superficial
manifestations.
So, that gets me to my second question, which is following
up on something Senator Ben Nelson said, which was--and I never
think we got to his question--the consequences. Senator Clinton
has been very good on this. We can measure progress, but, if
there aren't specific consequences for failure to make the
decisions necessary to achieve that progress, this is not going
to work very well.
So, here's my question. It seems to me, for the last
several years we've pursued the theory of reassuring them,
telling them we're standing by them to try and boost their
confidence so the political leaders will feel secure enough to
take some of the difficult steps that need to be taken. That
hasn't worked real well. Some of us have concluded that there
need to be some specific adverse consequences for them if they
don't start doing the right thing, making some of the hard
decisions. What will those specific consequences for their
failure to act be under this plan?
Secretary Gates. If they fail to act, as General Petraeus
told you in his testimony during his confirmation hearing,
first, obviously, we're going to try and persuade them to do
what they promised to do, but then there is always the
potential of withholding assistance or of changing our approach
over there, in terms of how we interact with that government.
The President has said that Americans' patience is not
unlimited. We've said from the very beginning, the success of
this strategy is dependent entirely on the Iraqis' willingness
to fulfill the commitments that they've made to us. If they
don't fulfill those commitments, then we clearly have to change
what we're doing.
Senator Bayh. Many of us have concluded, Mr. Secretary,
that the moment of truth has arrived, and we have to have a
pretty direct dialogue with them and actually lay out some
specific consequences that will matter to them so that they
will know very clearly the price of their failure to perform.
It's only human nature for people to take the path of least
resistance. What we have to do is convince them that that path
is not one that they can follow any longer. You'd think it
would be in their own self-interest, but that doesn't seem to
have worked. So, specific things, like cutting off resources to
them and other things that will matter--many of us have
concluded there needs to be a wake-up call here. I hope it will
be something more than vague public statements, because that
doesn't seem to have worked very well, to date.
Secretary Gates. No, I agree with that.
Senator Bayh. My final question has to do with what we're
doing in Iraq and how that might affect the larger strategic
picture with regard to Iran. We've been told that the Iranians,
in the short run, really like the fact that we're bogged down
in Iraq, that we're being bled both literally and financially
there, because we can't offer the kind of credible, deterrent
to them that they would fear. In the longer term, what they
would like to see is an Iraq dominated by the Shiite, closely
allied to Iran, that that's their short-term and their long-
term interest. But, in the long-term, they also fear a real
Sunni/Shiite split across the Islamic world, because that might
operate as a constraint to their ambitions.
Our policy seems to have the current state of affairs in
Iraq, suits their purposes. We are bogged down there. Might it
not be in our interest, vis-a-vis Iran, to say, ``Look, if the
Iraqis don't do the right thing here to give us any chance of
success, we will begin to extricate ourselves.'' That takes
away their short-run objective, which is bogging us down, and
it confronts them with their long-term fear, which is a real
Shiite/Sunni split.
So, my question, Mr. Secretary, might it not be that the
path that some of us have recommended to them, which is saying
to them, ``Look, if you don't get this right, we are going to
begin to leave,'' gives us a better chance to constrain Iran in
the long run, because it removes their short-term objective, it
confronts them with their long-term fear. They will never do
anything in our best interest, but they might conclude that
greater stability in Iraq is in their best interest and begin
to behave more responsibly there.
Secretary Gates. Senator, it seems to me that--in essence,
that the debate here on the Hill is not about the war on
terror, and is not about taking on our adversaries. At the end
of the day, it has seemed to me that it is more about, how best
do you incentivize the Iraqi Government to take responsibility
for their own government and their own people so that we can
leave? There is clearly a difference of view, in terms of how
you do that, how you incentivize that government.
I would say that doing it--giving the President's effort a
try does not foreclose them being able to do the other.
Senator Bayh. My time is expired, Mr. Secretary, but my
point is that having specific timelines, real benchmarks for
progress, and real adverse consequences for not doing those
things that we could reasonably expect them do, not only
incentivizes the Iraqis, but, if they fail, might then
incentivize the Iranians to behave more responsibly.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Bayh.
One factual issue, if I could, Senator. Senator Bayh, your
reference to that Web site, there is some suggestion that that
was removed from the Web site. The benchmarks, to the extent
that they existed--Senator McCain and I have written to
Secretary Rice asking if, in fact, they were removed from the
Web site. If so, why? So, that's a new development there, which
I know you'd be interested in, given your line of questions.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I guess we'll talk about the budget maybe a little bit in
the 8 minutes, but we'll pick up where my good friend Senator
Bayh left off, because I think this is the heart and soul of
where we're at as a Congress, where we're at as a Nation.
One of the concerns I have is that whatever we do here,
particularly in a nonbinding fashion, may incentivize our
enemies. Are you concerned about that?
Secretary Gates. Sir, I think that, from time immemorial,
that if you think that your adversary is divided, it is a
source of strength. I would say that there's unfortunately a
history of our enemies misunderstanding our robust debate in a
democracy for weakness that actually wasn't there. I think that
as I just suggested, that there is no division and no
irresolution and no weakness in this Government, including
Congress, in terms of taking on terrorism, taking on our
adversaries. So, I hope that our adversaries don't
misunderstand this robust debate as being a sign of weakness. I
think it's a sign of strength.
Senator Graham. Mr. Secretary, with all due respect, one, I
think you're doing an outstanding job with an incredibly
difficult hand being dealt, but if we did put--some of our
former colleagues are suggesting, of pulling out 50,000 troops
in the next 3 months. I am no foreign policy expert or military
expert, but if I was an al Qaeda member, I would say, ``Aha.''
Do you think it would be wise for us to withdraw 50,000 troops
in Iraq in the next 3 to 4 months?
Secretary Gates. No, sir, I don't. That's because I don't
envision the situation on the ground improving to that----
Senator Graham. Do you think it would be wise to tell our
enemy, ``This war is over January 2009, no matter what''?
Secretary Gates. I think we have said, all along, that
having any kind of timeline is probably a mistake.
Senator Graham. Well, see, that's the point. The point is
that the American public is genuinely frustrated, because it
hasn't gone as well as we'd like. How old is the Maliki
government? How many years old is it?
Secretary Gates. I think it's just about a year old.
Senator Graham. It's about 9 months old, and to the
American public, as imperfect as the Maliki government is, it's
a heck of a lot better than anybody else in town. Whether it
succeeds or fails is eventually up to them, but I am convinced
that no politician in anyone's history, including ours, could
bring about democracy with this level of violence in Iraq. Do
you agree that the level of violence in Baghdad, and Iraq in
general, is counterproductive to political reconciliation, at
this point?
Secretary Gates. Certainly, Senator.
Senator Graham. As to this idea that the pathway to success
and peace in Iraq runs through Tehran and Damascus, to me, is
just naive, at best. I think the Syrians and the Iranians are
united around one fact and one event, ``We're not going to let
a democracy emerge in Iraq, because it's a threat to our own
dictatorships.'' Do you agree with that?
Secretary Gates. I've always believed, Senator, in the line
of Frederick the Great, that negotiations without arms are like
notes without instruments.
Senator Graham. The reason that Syria is funding Hezbollah
in Lebanon is not because they desire a Shiite-dominated
Lebanon, they just fear democracy. If you're a dictator, a
police state in Syria, your worst nightmare is not a
dysfunctional Iraq, it's men and women getting together of
different religious backgrounds, picking their own leaders. If
you're a religious theocrat in Iran who wants to dominate the
region through a Shiite theocracy that has no other place for
any other religion, your biggest fear is: the Sunnis, the
Kurds, and the Shiites in Iraq will actually live together in
peace.
So, this idea that we're going to go to Tehran and
Damascus, and all of a sudden they're going to buy into a
democracy in Iraq, is crazy. The only thing they're going to
buy into, in my opinion, is a resolve by the United States
that's unquestionable. We're in one of the biggest conflicts in
the history of our Nation. Do you agree with that, General
Pace? The war on terror?
General Pace. This is a defining moment for our Nation,
like World War II was for that generation.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with that, Secretary Gates?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. So, here we are in one of the most defining
moments in the history of the United States, and our spending
on defense is below 4 percent of GDP.
If everything works well with the surge, will we have an
overwhelming force in Iraq to deal with the insurgency, General
Pace? If we get every troop we can muster, will it still be
overwhelming?
General Pace. Let me make sure I'm hearing the question
right. Our troops plus the Iraqi troops----
Senator Graham. If everything works perfectly, would it
come to the Powell Doctrine that we finally have, in Iraq, an
overwhelming force to deal with the insurgency?
General Pace. I cannot say yes to that, because the
insurgency is different than the Powell Doctrine applied to
conventional forces.
Senator Graham. Will we have enough to meet the
counterinsurgency doctrine of General Petraeus?
General Pace. In pure math terms, no, sir. In terms of what
is needed on the ground to get the job done, yes, sir, meaning
that their talk about 50 to 1--or whatever it is to 1--that you
need to quell a generic insurgency--we helped in El Salvador
with 55, and that turned out the way we wanted it to, and we
have 140,000 in Iraq, and that has not yet turned out the way
we want it to. So, I'm just being careful not to say yes or no
to precise math.
Senator Graham. I understand. I guess I would just conclude
with this whole budget debate in how to get the Iraqis to do
better. I would like them to do better. I believe, over time,
they will. But, if you're asking somebody, in 8 months, to
solve a 1,400-year-old religious dispute, bring people together
who have suffered under a dictatorship for 30 years,
reconstruct an economy that was raped by a dictator, that's a
pretty tall order. I am willing to give not only this new
strategy a chance, I am willing to do whatever it takes to make
sure we don't have a failed state in Iraq.
Secretary Gates, is there any doubt in your mind that if we
lose in Iraq, it becomes a failed state, that the war on terror
suffers, and that we will be going back to the Middle East with
a bigger war on our hands?
Secretary Gates. If Iraq were to fall into chaos, I think
those things would happen.
Senator Graham. So, to my colleagues, we can't have 535
commanders in chief, and we can't have 535 Secretaries of
State. I hope we can muster the political will, at least for a
few more months, to give what I think is a reasonable
opportunity a chance to succeed. The elections are going to
come, everybody's going to be held accountable politically for
their positions, but what happens in Iraq is so much bigger
than the 2008 election for anybody here, that I hope we don't
lose sight of the big picture.
This budget is, in my opinion, lean for the needs of this
country at one of its most critical times, and if you need more
money, spend what you have wisely, but never hesitate to ask
for more.
General Pace. Senator, may I give you a more complete
answer on the overwhelming force?
Senator Graham. Yes, sir.
General Pace. Thank you.
This isn't only about force, which is why ``overwhelming''
doesn't make the equation. It's about a three-legged stool:
security, good governance, and good economy. The security plan
that is laid out, with the forces that are allocated to it, is
going to be sufficient to do that leg of the stool, but no size
force, no matter how defined as ``overwhelming,'' will be
sufficient absent the other two legs of the stool. I think
that's a better answer to your question.
Senator Graham. I totally agree. I would say the biggest
mistake we have made--and I may be completely wrong--about
Iraq, is we've always done it on the cheap, that we have never
put in place, after the fall of Baghdad, the overwhelming force
that would have kept the country intact. I don't want to
compound those mistakes again.
Thank you for your testimony.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you very much for your service and
your patience. I'm grateful to each and every one of you for
the work you do.
It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that we have a number of
extremely important issues before the committee that have been
highlighted by various members. We have the budget, which is
going to deserve, and need, a lot more scrutiny. We've heard a
lot of talk about the percentage of GDP in comparison to the
percentage of GDP in other wars and conflicts. I might also
add, the taxation rates were considerably different during
those conflicts, as well. We are not paying for the military
that we want, nor are we paying adequately for the global war
on terrorism. So, this budget is going to have to be
scrutinized, but we're going to be faced with the dilemma of
whether we are adequately funding our troops and whether we
will pay for adequately funding our troops.
Second, we continue to have questions about how we ensure
American troops are trained and equipped, something that I've
raised in a series of our hearings with General Petraeus,
Admiral Fallon, and others--General Casey, most recently--and I
think you can hear, Secretary Gates, we're still not satisfied.
Both you and General Pace have responded to questions, starting
with the chairman's from the very beginning of this hearing,
but there remains a considerable amount of anecdotal evidence
about shortages. I will be reading the IG's report later this
afternoon, but, from the reports that we have received, it
appears that there was a lack of cooperation, perhaps, with
appropriate officials in DOD and the chain of command in trying
to get to the bottom of whether or not we have adequate
training and equipping of our troops. So, this will continue to
be an issue that I and others will pursue.
We also have heard about the need to enlist the entire
government to participate effectively in the war on terrorism,
and, as Senator Warner said--I can remember when he was on the
floor, introducing his bill and speaking about it--we actually
have made a stab at this. I think it's fair to say none of us
are either fully aware of, or satisfied with, what direction it
has taken us. I think Senator Sessions' suggestions are really
serious ones that should be carefully considered by the
administration.
Senator Warner. Senator, if you'd yield.
Senator Clinton. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. I have here the reference to legislation
and you cosponsored that legislation.
Senator Clinton. Yes, I did.
Senator Warner.--together with Senator Lugar and myself.
Senator Clinton. That's exactly right. We did, under
Senator Warner's leadership, pass that legislation, but it's
clear that none of us has a handle on what, if anything, has
been done to implement it. So, we really do wish to have some
additional information and feedback on that.
We've also begun to examine--and I appreciate very much
Senator McCaskill's lead on this--the way our Government has
outsourced so much of the work of preparing and defending our
Nation to private contractors who may be neither cost-effective
nor free of conflict. I think this will be a very important
issue for this Congress that we will be exploring, and, again,
looking for assistance from you.
Finally, your words, Secretary Gates, ``how we best
incentivize the Iraqi Government,'' there are those who think
that the era of carrots has to end, that we've been, in effect,
ignored by giving them a blank check and the blood and treasure
of our Nation, especially the lives of our young men and women
and the injured that have come home with such grievous wounds,
and we don't believe that's an effective way to get their
attention. This part of the world, which you have studied--you
were certainly part of the Iraq Study Group before being asked
to be Secretary of Defense, you know very well that--I'm not
sure carrots are part of the diet. So, I think that many of us
have been searching for more effective ways that can get the
attention not only of the nominal Iraqi government, but of the
sources that support it.
To that end, in addition to our concerns about the attack
on Karbala and what that meant--and I appreciate General Pace
referencing the likelihood that it was well-organized
insurgents, which I translate to be Sunni elements--we also are
concerned about the Mahdi army militia obtaining not only
trained men who we have trained, but also equipment. A recent
article on February 2, from McClatchy newspapers, titled
``Mahdi Army Gains Strength Through Unwitting Aid of U.S.,''
and ``The U.S. military drive to train and equip Iraq's
security forces has unwittingly strengthened Sadr and his
militia.''
These are deep concerns to us, and we don't believe that
we, at least speaking for myself, see much change in the
testimony we hear, in the plans that are being implemented, as
to how we're going to get a handle on these very serious
challenges.
But, Mr. Secretary, I want to change direction just
somewhat abruptly, because I want to ask you about a letter
that, on January 16, along with 21 of my colleagues, including
several members of this committee, sent to President Bush
asking for an explanation of what Plan B steps he was
considering with respect to Darfur, including possible punitive
military action, such as a no-fly zone or blockade of Port
Sudan. Obviously, we are facing, once again, the repeated and
blatant violations of numerous cease-fires, peace agreements,
and U.N. obligations by the government of President Bashir.
It is worth noting, I think, that this does not need to be
a no-fly zone on the scale of what we formerly ran over Iraq,
but could be accomplished with a significantly smaller outlay
of resources by directing punitive strikes against Sudanese
planes known to have taken part in illegal bombing missions in
Darfur.
I've made this suggestion on several occasions to our NATO
commander in the past, and to others within the administration,
and I'd like to ask you if you have been instructed by the
President to begin planning or preparing any such measure, and
whether or not you would look into that, if you have not yet
been asked to do so.
Secretary Gates. I have not been asked to. I would defer to
General Pace, in terms of whether the Joint Chiefs have done
any contingency planning along those lines. I'm certainly
willing to pursue it.
Senator Clinton. General Pace?
General Pace. Have not been asked to do that, ma'am.
Senator Clinton. I think that, obviously, from the
perspective of many of us, the ongoing genocide in Darfur and
the blatant refusal by the Sudanese Government to act has been
deeply concerning. We have about 7,000 African Union (AU)
troops there. They are the sole line of defense for the
hundreds of thousand civilians facing genocide. Twenty million
dollars was included in the 2007 Defense Appropriations Bill to
provide assistance to these troops. They are obviously woefully
underfunded, they don't have logistics support, they have no
airlift capacity. I understand the DOS, which has been
administering all U.S. funding going to the AU troops, has
requested that this new $20 million be transferred to them. Is
your office considering that request? Do you have an opinion,
as the Secretary of Defense, whether that meets our desire,
having put this into the DOD appropriations rather than DOS
appropriations?
Secretary Gates. This is the first I've heard of it,
Senator. I'll have to look into it.
[The information referred to follows:]
We are aware of this requirement. My staff has prepared the
transfer documentation, which should be signed shortly.
These funds were specifically designated within the Defense
Appropriations Bill to support peacekeeping operations in Sudan. In the
future, these funds should be placed within the Department of State's
appropriations.
Senator Clinton. Thank you.
Finally, Mr. Secretary, the Defense Appropriations Bill for
Fiscal Year 2007 contains a provision I sponsored requiring the
DOD to submit a detailed report on the DOD's role in assisting
the parties to implement the Darfur Peace Agreement of May 5,
2006. The report is envisioned to contain information on issues
of critical importance to stabilizing Darfur, such as an
assessment of assets that the U.S. military and NATO are able
to offer the AU mission in Sudan and any efforts made by the
DOD to leverage troop contributions from other countries to
serve in the proposed hybrid AU/U.N. peacekeeping mission for
Darfur. This report was supposed to be available no later than
January 15, 2007. That was 90 days after enactment of the bill,
as of October 17, 2006. May I ask you, Mr. Secretary, if you
know the status of this report?
Secretary Gates. No, ma'am, and I'll find out.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Darfur Peace
Agreement that is contained within the Defense Appropriations Act, 2007
(Public Law 109-289) requires coordination with the Department of State
and that is presently ongoing. The report should be ready shortly.
We have offered up to 11 staff officers to the Africa Union (AU) to
assist them with Africa Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) operations; the
AU accepted 6. Difficulties in obtaining Sudanese visas resulted in
only two officers being able to work at the AMIS Headquarters in Al
Fashir. The other four officers are presently waiting in Djibouti for
permission from the Government of Sudan to enter the country.
Senator Clinton. I would appreciate it being promptly
delivered to me and to this committee.
Secretary Gates. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Clinton. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Clinton.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I share Senator Clinton's concerns about conditions in
Darfur, and yesterday the Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on
Human Rights, had a hearing on the humanitarian crisis
occurring there.
I'm struck that when I visited Iraq in July 2003/August
2003, we had an opportunity to stand on the edge of mass grave
sites where Saddam had reportedly killed as many as 400,000 of
his countrymen. I guess my question, since obviously, Iraq is
on all of our minds--is, if you, General Pace, could tell us
what sort of humanitarian crisis do you think we could
anticipate if, in fact, the United States Government cut off
funds to support our military efforts in Iraq or if we
precipitously pulled out? What kind of humanitarian crisis
would you anticipate?
General Pace. Sir, as best I can tell, from a military
standpoint, that the current Iraqi army and police would not
have the strength to do all the work that they need to do, to
keep sectarian violence quelled. Therefore, I believe that,
based on that, the numbers of killed and murdered because of
sectarian violence would spike.
Senator Cornyn. Would you anticipate that if, in fact, it
appeared that the Shiite in Iran were taking advantage of that
lack of order, and the sectarian violence did spike, that that
might cause other nations, principally Sunni-majority nations,
to get very directly involved, in a military way, to defend the
Sunni minority in Iraq?
General Pace. Sir, I think an Iraq that was clearly
disintegrating would be of great concern to all the neighbors,
and they would all try to find ways to influence their concerns
inside of Iraq.
Senator Cornyn. Secretary Gates, I think there was a
question earlier asked to you about if we left a destabilized
Iraq and it descended into either a regional conflict of the
kind that General Pace and I are talking about, whether it
would, in all likelihood, necessitate our return, to try to
salvage a chaotic regional situation. Is that your testimony?
Secretary Gates. I would say that that certainly is one
possible outcome, particularly if other regional states became
involved.
Senator Cornyn. I'd like to ask, Mr. Secretary, a question
about the appropriation bill that we'll be considering here
very soon. I know Senator Inhofe asked you about the issue of
the BRAC Commission issue. The Senate will soon consider an
appropriation bill, sometimes called a continuing resolution,
but I think it's really more of an omnibus appropriation bill,
that will cut $3.1 billion from the DOD account for BRAC. I'm
strongly opposed to that, but, unfortunately, we're being told
that, in all likelihood, this bill will come to the floor with
no opportunity to offer any amendments and merely be given an
up or down vote on the bill without any amendments. Texas has
approximately $750 million in BRAC funding that will be in
jeopardy if, in fact, this transpires. Can you tell me how this
$3.1 billion deficit will impact the DOD's ability to fund
military construction projects that will help our military men
and women and their families?
Secretary Gates. It will, Senator, make it impossible for
us to meet the statutory deadline for the completion of BRAC.
It will have a direct impact on facilities being built at the
receiving end of units that are being consolidated to new
locations. I think there is about $300 million in the $3.1
billion for housing allowances for the troops. So, there is a
huge impact, frankly, on us. As I had indicated, I think that--
I mentioned this to leadership here in the Senate, and I think
there's a real understanding of the magnitude of the problem
and a willingness to consider some alternatives. One
possibility is adding it to the fiscal year 2007 emergency
supplemental. That really is an issue for the Senate--for
Congress to decide. But clearly that $3.1 billion is very
important to our troops and to us.
Senator Cornyn. I agree with you that it's very important.
I would just say that adding it to the supplemental will
basically mean that there will be no offset and that, in
essence, Congress will get to spend that $3.1 billion on other
things, and not the BRAC construction that was originally
intended.
Can you tell me, Secretary Gates, since we have an All-
Volunteer Military, nobody is required to serve in the military
involuntarily, would this sort of denial of funding for our
troops and their families have any impact, in terms of our
ability to not only recruit, but also to retain our volunteer
troops, in your opinion?
Secretary Gates. Let me give you a brief answer. General
Pace is probably in a better position to answer the question
than I am. But, I think, clearly the troops feel strongly about
fulfilling our commitments to them. We're asking a lot of them,
particularly units that have been extended, people who are
being deployed early, or mobilized and deployed early, so we
are asking a lot. I think that when it comes to things,
particularly that affect their homes and their families, that
they feel pretty strongly about that. Retention is not a
problem for us, at this point, as we talked about earlier, but
clearly somebody's decision whether or not to remain in the
military is impacted by these kinds of things. But I also
wouldn't underestimate their loyalty and their willingness to
put up with temporary hardships--particularly if they saw it as
temporary. But let me ask the General.
Senator Cornyn. General Pace, would you care to add to
that?
General Pace. Sir, hard to draw a straight line between
$3.1 billion less in BRAC and X-percent change in retention.
Congress has been very good at making sure we've have the
resources we've needed to support our troops. Certainly,
though, as troops come home--if they're not able to come home
because the facilities aren't there, or if they come home and
the facilities aren't done, that certainly impacts their vision
of whether or not they are being adequately taken care of. But,
sir, to draw a straight line between those two, I think, is a
bit of a stretch.
Senator Cornyn. I understand. Of course, we're not just
talking about recruiting and retaining the current level of our
end strength. We're also talking about growing that end
strength by a large number. But my impression would be that
anything we can do to make their lives better and to fulfill
our commitments is a good thing. Anything we do to disappoint
their expectations or to not live up to our commitments, in
terms of how we treat them, is a bad thing. Maybe I look at it
too simplistically.
General Pace. No, I agree with that, sir.
Senator Cornyn. In closing, let me just ask for one brief
comment. Secretary Gates, then General Pace, China's new
demonstrated ability to destroy U.S. satellites in a low-earth
orbit raises a lot of questions about whether we're doing
enough to counter such threats and maintain our freedom of
action in space. I realize we're in an open session here, and
several of us have attended a closed session where some of this
has been discussed, but in this open session would you comment
on your strategic assessment, to the extent you can, of the
recent Chinese anti-satellite test (ASAT) and what you believe
the DOD--and whether you believe the DOD is doing enough
towards countering those threats at this time? Secretary Gates
and then General Pace.
Secretary Gates. First of all, I think that the Chinese
ASAT test is very troubling. Perhaps what is as troubling as
the technical achievement is how one interprets it as a part of
their own strategic outlook and how they would anticipate using
that kind of a capability in the event of a conflict, and the
consequences for us of that. This is one of those areas where
I've received some very preliminary kinds of briefings, in
terms of our capabilities, but, since I'm not sure enough of my
ground to know what's classified and what's not, let me ask
General Pace if he can thread that needle.
General Pace. Sir, first of all, very worrisome, capacity
on behalf of the Chinese. A threat, sir, is defined two ways:
one, capacity; and, two, intent. There's no belief, on my part
right now, that the Chinese intend to use this capacity anytime
soon. On the other hand, it is a unique capacity in the world,
and we need to, in a very separate conversation, take a look
at: Where are we with regard to that capacity? Where should we
be? If there is a gap, how we close it? That is something that
deserves very close attention, sir.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Senator Cornyn, thank you.
I think we'll try another round of, maybe, 3 minutes.
Senator Warner. How about 4?
Chairman Levin. Three and a half minutes. [Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. Senator Warner and I always are going to
split the difference somehow. We'll try 4 minutes.
Mr. Secretary, the President, last year, said, ``that the
presence of the United States will be in Iraq, so long as the
Government of Iraq asks us to be in Iraq.'' Sounded mighty
open-ended. Is that still our policy, that we're going to be
there as long as the government asks us to be there?
Secretary Gates. We certainly have no desire for permanent
bases in Iraq, but I think that there clearly is going to be a
prolonged need for U.S. military assistance over some period of
years, but I think it would be a very small fraction of the
number of forces that we have there now.
Chairman Levin. Is our presence left up to the Iraqis, or
do we make the decision?
Secretary Gates. We will make that decision, sir.
Chairman Levin. You made reference to the word
``incentivize,'' and the Iraq Study Group said that incentive
is necessary on the Iraqis to take the political action, and
that--in the absence, in their words, of such incentive, the
Iraqi Government might continue to delay taking those difficult
actions. So, would you agree that there needs to be an
incentive if the Iraqis are going to be taking difficult
political decisions?
Secretary Gates. To pick up on a point that others have
made, I think the Iraqis need to know that there are
consequences for failing to follow through on their commitments
in this reinforcement.
Chairman Levin. Is that what you mean by ``incentivize''?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. It's both carrots and sticks. It
works both ways.
Chairman Levin. Yes. But the incentives, the sticks, have
to be there. The argument, as you pointed out, is, what will
incentivize the Iraqi government?
Secretary Gates. Exactly.
Chairman Levin. Would you agree that, whatever the level of
troops, that, in the absence of a political settlement by the
Iraqis, we're not going to see the violence reduced or ended?
Secretary Gates. I think we cannot succeed in Iraq without
a political settlement.
Chairman Levin. By the Iraqis.
Secretary Gates. By the Iraqis.
Chairman Levin. Success means the reduction or end of
violence.
Secretary Gates. Correct, an Iraq that basically is able to
govern itself.
Chairman Levin. Which means that we avoid, or we end, the
current level of violence. Would that be fair?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Now, there's been certain circumstances,
which were set forth by some of the questions a few moments
ago, where you said that the violence would likely spike if
those circumstances existed, such as a precipitous withdrawal
of American troops. My question is, will we be able to see a
reduction of that violence, an avoidance of spikes, unless
there is a political settlement in Iraq? In other words, is
this settlement the absolutely essential ingredient in there
being a end of violence or avoidance of the spikes?
Secretary Gates. I think so, yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. All right. Now, I just want to outline,
it's a nightmare scenario. General, I want to ask you about
this. We're putting troops in 30 joint security locations in
Baghdad. I'd like to know what are the rules of engagement if
there is a major civil disturbance--10,000 Iraqis, in anger,
come to one of those locations, they're angry, whatever
triggers it--could be a number of things--we don't know what
can trigger it; we saw what happened in Mogadishu--what are the
rules of engagement now if that happens? Let's say, unarmed,
but approaching one of these sites in a violent way so that our
troops feel like there could be a violent end to themselves
unless they take action--what do they do in that circumstance?
What are the rules of engagement?
General Pace. Sir, the rules of engagement are going to be
what they have been and will continue to be, which is: our
servicemembers, feeling threatened, are authorized to take
whatever measures they must to protect themselves and those
around them.
Chairman Levin. That includes----
General Pace. Having said that, sir, if they have the
ability to, if these are unarmed people--but they're
threatening--disengage and move back away from that point,
that's what we would expect them to do. We're not expecting
them to take on unarmed civilians. You're asking a hypothetical
question.
Chairman Levin. That's correct.
General Pace. Fundamentally, and most important for our
troops to know today and tomorrow, is that we expect them to
defend themselves, and we would support them if they defend
themselves. Inside of that construct, then, we expect them to
take reasonable measures to not escalate something--as you
pointed out, the crowd being unarmed.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Gates, I like the way you have a long-range
approach to this situation. Nevertheless, we're faced with a
short-term debate here. I speak ``short-term,'' in the next few
days, whenever it occurs. You said, ``If they fail to act''--in
other words, consistent with certain benchmarks--``we will
change our course.'' I agree with you, just how best to do this
is to incentivize the Iraqi people. So, it seems to me there's
a careful balance here that we have to be guarded against. No
matter how strong we all feel, there has to be benchmarks, if
we pile up too many benchmarks and ask for too much, we might
topple this government. There is a risk of that. We don't know
how fragile this thing is. Then, what takes its place? So, I
would hope, as we look at this very critical issue of
benchmarks, that it's you and the DOD, together with the
Secretary of State and perhaps others, that carefully begin to
strike the balance of how hard we push on certain benchmarks,
for fear that we could dislodge this government. Do you agree
with that?
Secretary Gates. Senator, I agree, but I have this
perspective. I think the Iraqi government knows what it needs
to do and what our expectations are. I think, now what we need
to focus on, first of all, it's initially, certainly in the
first instance, up to General Petraeus to keep the pressure on,
in terms of them fulfilling--and our Ambassador--their
commitments. But I think the other thing that we need to do
here in Washington is something that I spoke about earlier to
Senator McCain, and then later, we need to evaluate how they're
doing against the commitments that they've made.
Senator Warner. I agree with all of what you say.
Secretary Gates. We need to do it on an ongoing basis with
some understanding that this isn't going to be like D-Day, it's
going to unfold probably over a period of time, but, overall,
are they doing--and a brigade is certainly going to show up
later than we expected, but if it shows up within a few days,
maybe that's good enough. We'll need to make a qualitative, as
well as a quantitative, evaluation of how they're doing against
their commitments.
Senator Warner. I support everything you say, but I just
want to throw out a caution. There is a fragility to this
situation, and----
Secretary Gates. Right.
Senator Warner.--we'd better know what happens--if this one
fails, what comes up in its place.
Second, on a procurement item, this committee worked very
hard on the Joint Strike Fighter. We have good support across
the board here. We have adequate funding. But there's a
question of whether to not the DOD wants to revisit this issue
of going forward with two engines. If we have but a single
engine, then we're, in effect, giving a sole-source contract to
one contractor which could amount to $100 billion. I've
calculated that out. Do you know anything about the budget as
it relates to that engine, as to whether or not you're going to
pursue a single engine now, reverse what Congress has asked you
to do?
Secretary Gates. I know there was an issue last year, but,
to be honest, I'm not sure about this year's budget.
Senator Warner. Ms. Jonas, do you wish to comment?
Ms. Jonas. Yes, Senator, appreciate the question. This
budget does not include funds for the second engine. The DOD
had evaluated that, and continues to evaluate the need for a
second engine, but I believe that the savings that the DOD
believes that it could get by----
Senator Warner. Canceling.
Ms. Jonas.--not doing it was about $1.8 billion. But we'll
be happy to work with you on this, sir.
Senator Warner. Well, I'm going to ask you, Mr. Secretary,
to look at that.
Ms. Jonas. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. We, on this committee, invested a lot of
time in it, and I really think the importance of that fighter
and the credibility of the United States to have a joint
program which involves a number of countries, some of which
want to use other than the one engine--they want to look at
both. Would you just commit to look at it?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Department assessed all aspects of the F-35 Lightning II Joint
Strike Fighter program in preparation for this year's budget
submission. The Department continues to believe the risks associated
with a single source engine program are manageable and do not outweigh
the investment required to fund a competitive alternative engine. The
three congressionally-directed engine studies have now completed. The
conclusions, while supportive of competition in general, are consistent
with the Department's initial findings that the expected savings from
competition do not outweigh the investment costs.
The F-35 international partners support the overall direction the
program is headed, as evidenced by all eight partners signing the
Production, Sustainment, and Follow-on Development Memorandum of
Understanding.
Senator Warner. Thank you very much.
General, we were greeted in the paper this morning with the
following: ``An Iraqi general took charge''--repeat--``An Iraqi
general took charge of the security operation in Baghdad.''
Now, I understand what that is. We have now, I think, gotten in
place a general that has a high degree of confidence with
General Casey and presumably General Abizaid. Is that correct?
General Pace. Sir, it is.
Senator Warner. But when they say ``take charge,'' we have
a dual command there, do we not?
General Pace. We have a single chain of command for U.S.
troops.
Senator Warner. For U.S. troops.
General Pace. There's a single chain of command for Iraqi
troops and there is a mechanism between the commanders to work
collaboratively together, pared down to the battalion and
brigade level, to be able to provide support--U.S. supporting
Iraqi troops.
Senator Warner. But some of us are concerned as to how that
might work; when we get down to company level, whether or not
two company commanders or two platoon commanders, one Iraqi,
one American, get into a quarrel, what do we do. Now, I
understand you're going to look at that very carefully, and you
have a high degree of confidence that this system can work, is
that it?
General Pace. Sir, I have a high degree of confidence that
the U.S. officers in the chain of command understand from whom
they take their orders and what they're supposed to do.
Senator Warner. But if that's in conflict with what the
Iraqis want to do, who resolves the conflict?
General Pace. Sir, there's a mechanism for that. If it's
immediately on the ground and there's a disagreement, then the
U.S. commander will simply just not do whatever it is that the
Iraqi commanders ask them to do.
Senator Warner. Well, I hope it works. I repeat that, I
hope it works.
General Pace. It is not as clean as we would like, sir,
that's for sure.
Senator Warner. No, it's not. I don't know of a precedent
in our contemporary military history where we've engaged in
such a duality of command as this.
General Pace. Yes, sir. Our troops, though, will not have a
duality of command; they will have a single command.
Senator Warner. I understand. All right.
On the intelligence, reading through the stories this
morning--and it just--the story of the American GI trying to
carry out these orders in the face of this polyglot or
diversity of people who are angry and--whatever reason it is.
To what extent do we have to give that GI, that platoon, or
that squad down there, sufficient intelligence and efficient--
sufficient language capability to go in on this daunting task
of, in the crowded slums and communities, trying to sort out
whom to shoot at and whom to help?
General Pace. Sir, in the operations where we have the
lead, which is mostly with our Special Operations Forces, the
intelligence that's developed and provided is very good, and
has led to the killing and capturing of high-value targets.
Senator Warner. All right. So, you can tell us it's
adequate, then, in your judgment.
General Pace. Sir, the rest of my answer, if I may, because
your question is very important. With regard to the troops on
the ground in Baghdad, that's why it's important to have the
Iraqi troops in front, because it'll be the Iraqi citizens and
Iraqi human intelligence that will provide to Iraqis the
ability. We do not have enough troops who have the kind of
language capacity and cultural understanding to take the lead
in those regards. We can provide support to them. So, from the
standpoint of conventional force, Iraqis in the lead, us
supporting. But as far as the high-value targets, our
intelligence is what we use.
Senator Warner. I thank you for that, because my resolution
just simply says we should put greater reliance on the Iraqi
forces and less need for perhaps 21,000 troops.
General Pace. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. But that'll come to pass. We just give the
best judgment we can to the President.
Lastly, Secretary Gates, you quite correctly pointed out
that this program in Baghdad has three parts--a diplomatic
part, an economic part, and a military part--and you very
cautiously stayed in your lane and addressed the military part.
But it's essential that all these parts converge at the same
time. You've committed to this committee that you will keep us
informed with regard to the success or the lack of success with
this program as it goes forward, but do we have in place, Mr.
Chairman, a similar commitment from the DOS and other areas of
the Federal Government as to whether or not the other two
components are going to keep pace with the military? I suggest,
Mr. Chairman, we look at some means by which to get reports,
comparable to that which Secretary Gates said he'll give this
committee, from others who are responsible for the economic and
diplomatic.
So, I just close out by saying I think it's terribly
important, and I hope it does not fail, but if it does, I just
don't want the military to take the blame because of the
shortfall of the other two parts.
So, I thank the Chair.
Secretary Gates. Senator?
Senator Warner. Yes?
Secretary Gates. One thing that we might look at is seeing
if--when we make a presentation to you all, that it's vetted on
an interagency basis so that we give you the information on
each of the elements that are involved.
Senator Warner. Mr. Secretary, I think that's very wise.
Therefore, to constitute the panels, Mr. Chairman, as they come
before the committee, with representatives from the other. I
think that's an excellent way to approach it.
I thank you, again. We've had a very good hearing, and I
wish you well.
Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Before I call on Senator Sessions, on that
last point is the matrix you referred to just a DOD matrix, or
is that going to be joint with other agencies?
Secretary Gates. Mr. Chairman, the package that I saw a few
days ago had a piece being done by the DOD, another piece was
being done interagency, and, frankly, the whole thing--and a
part being done by the Joint Staff--and I think the whole
thing, right now, is still a work in progress. I'm not quite
sure how it's going to look. It also was short-term, medium-
term, and long-term.
Chairman Levin. Just wondering, while Senator Warner is
still here, that may help address the issue that you very
effectively raised.
Senator Warner. Yes.
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Which is, if the matrix that you referred
to is a multi-agency matrix, that may, at least, go some
distance in addressing Senator Warner's point.
Senator Warner. That would give us the benefit of cross-
examination.
Chairman Levin. Right. That's correct. I'm very glad that
you raised this question. Also, will you be giving us a copy of
the matrix that you're working on?
Secretary Gates. I see no reason not to. My notion would be
that if we came up here and briefed, every 2 or 3 weeks, that
there might be some charts that we could present or something.
Chairman Levin. If you can give us an answer to that, that
document, which you call a checklist or a matrix--whatever that
document is, you will share that with us every couple of weeks,
just brief it to us.
Secretary Gates. Sure.
Chairman Levin. That would be helpful.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. With regard to the BRAC process that
Senator Cornyn asked about, I think it's a very important
issue. As I understand it, the John Warner NDAA for Fiscal Year
2007, had $5.6 billion, really crucial money, to fund the
realignment of our bases, fund people coming back from foreign
bases in Europe, Korea, and other places, and to provide the
housing and support they need. So, this is a 55-percent
reduction that we now see that has occurred this year under the
new leadership here in the Senate. What I want to mention to
you, Secretary Gates, and why this is painful to us, is because
that money was spent on social projects or other projects,
nondefense projects, essentially, and we have to have it. So,
now we're going to be reduced to putting it into the
supplemental, which will raise the supplemental and will shift
more debt to our children and grandchildren, because the
supplemental is unpaid-for and whereas, before, it was paid for
within our budget. So, it increases the debt by that much. Do
you understand the difficulties that we face there?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. Now, General Pace, there's been some
interest in how to improve the Iraqi army and military. Are we
being too slow to equip them with more capable equipment?
What's your theory about the rate we're on, do we need to
accelerate that? Do we need just to give them the equipment and
try to make sure that--and won't that help them be more
effective?
General Pace. Sir, the goal which was attained, as of
December 2006, was to have 328,000 army and police manned,
trained, and equipped, and the equipping was done to about the
98 percent level. Added to that for fiscal year 2007 has been
an increase up to 362,000, and the money for that is being
provided partially by us and partially from Prime Minister
Maliki's budget for his government. So, everything we were
supposed to do by the end of 2006, we did. The additional delta
is now being provided for, both in this budget and primarily
from the Iraqi budget, to buy the equipment for the increased
number of troops they wanted to have.
Senator Sessions. I'm thinking about vehicles, armaments,
more modern weapons, or better movement capability, that kind
of thing. Should we do more there? Wouldn't that be a step
toward improving their morale and their self-confidence and
their capability to respond to attacks on their units?
General Pace. Sir, let me take that for the record, because
we designed the equipment in 2006 to be delivered. We've now
had some experience with the units operating with it, and I do
not know whether or not that experience has led us to believe
that there's some other kind of equipment that ought to be
delivered. So, if I may, let me check with the folks in theater
and find out, because I just don't know.
[The information referred to follows:]
System capabilities:
Mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) will replace uparmored
HMMWVs in theater but MRAPs are not HMMVW replacements. Additional MRAP
vehicles will be used in theater to augment current levels of
protection. Three categories of MRAP provide the improved protection
and enable our forces to survive underbody and other forms of attack.
CAT I - Mine Resistant Utility Vehicle for urban combat patrol
operations; CAT II - Larger Joint EOD Rapid Response Vehicle for multi-
mission operations such as convoy lead, troop transport, ambulance,
EOD, and combat engineering; CAT III--Buffalo; mine/improvised
explosive device clearance operations. Mine detection vehicle--MRAPs
can reduce the number of vehicles required to perform a mission.
For example, 9 MRAPs may take the place of 12 HMMWVs.
The validated joint requirement on 6 February 07 was 6,738 vehicles
(3,700-USMC, 2,500-USA, 538-USN).
Senator Sessions. Secretary Gates, one final question. With
regard to Korea and Iran and their missile program, are there
any indications that you're aware that would indicate we should
reduce our plans to build a missile defense system capable of
defending against potential attacks from those countries, or
other rogue nations, for that matter?
Secretary Gates. No, sir.
Senator Sessions. Fact, it would seem that they've stepped
up their efforts rather publicly to achieve missile strike
capability against the United States.
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
We thank all of our witnesses for their testimony. It was a
very helpful, very useful hearing. I'm sorry it went on so
late, but it was better than having a recess and coming back,
we hope.
We stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
justification for navy and air force aircraft purchases with emergency
funding
1. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, in the fiscal year 2007
supplemental and the fiscal year 2008 Global War on Terrorism Emergency
requests the Department of Defense (DOD) is requesting $5.3 billion for
the purchase of new manned aircraft for the Departments of the Navy and
the Air Force. Please provide a full justification for the purchase of
each of these aircraft as follows:
For aircraft requested to replace a combat loss, the
type of aircraft lost in combat and the date and location of
the loss.
For new aircraft that are not being requested to
replace a combat loss, the justification should include, for
each new aircraft to be purchased, the aircraft type or model
to be replaced, the expected service life (in flight hours) of
that aircraft, the total hours flown on that aircraft, and the
number of those total flying hours that were charged to
Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom.
Dr. Gates. The following chart lists the Air Force aircraft loss
during contingency operations and replaced either in the fiscal year
supplemental request, fiscal year 2008 supplemental request, or
replaced by fiscal year 2006 global war on terror or prior funds.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
science and technology
2. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, this 2008 request reduces your
investment in science and technology (S&T) programs by over $500
million in constant dollars with respect to the 2007 budget request and
over $2.5 billion relative to 2007 appropriations. It represents only
2.2 percent of the total DOD budget, far short of the goal of 3 percent
investment in innovative S&T programs. These programs are investing in
industry, universities, and our defense laboratories to develop next
generation capabilities for the military.
What effect will this severe reduction have on the Department's
ability to support the Nation's technology base and to develop needed
capabilities to meet future threats? Please provide the committee with
a list of research and technology areas where additional funding could
be used well to support the development of needed next generation
capabilities.
Dr. Gates. The level of S&T funding requested in the fiscal year
2008 President's budget request (PBR) appears to be lower than the
Department's fiscal year 2007 request due to the realignment of $316
million of Air Force Special Programs funding from the Budget Activity
3 to other non-S&T accounts. There was no real impact to the Air Force
S&T program since the $316 million was used to fund small projects that
were not managed by the Air Force S&T community. If a funding
adjustment of $316 million is made to the fiscal year 2007 PBR, then
the fiscal year 2008 request is 2.1 percent lower than the adjusted
fiscal year 2007 request, in constant dollars. The Department's request
for S&T is still very high in historical terms. The seven highest
requests for S&T, in constant dollars, have occurred in the last seven
years. We have looked hard at all DOD investments, and had to fund the
priorities within the Department. The same is true in portfolios like
S&T. Within S&T, we believe we have funded the highest priority items.
hydrogen technology and infrastructure
3. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, what investments are you making
in this budget to move DOD towards the adoption of hydrogen as a
logistics fuel--for example, in the development of hydrogen vehicle
technologies, hydrogen storage systems, and in the development and
installation of hydrogen infrastructure--such as production or
distribution systems?
Dr. Gates. The DOD investments in hydrogen technology and
infrastructure are focused on furthering DOD's experience with
hydrogen. In the near-term we are working with the Department of Energy
as an ``early adopter'' where hydrogen shows potential for benefiting
DOD industrial and non-tactical operations. For example, we are
piloting the replacement of lead acid batteries with hydrogen fuel
cells in forklifts used by DOD warehouses. Fuel cell forklifts provide
important productivity improvements and reduce environmental impact
while advancing the fuel cell technology. Establishing hydrogen fueling
stations that are available to the public as well as the DOD is also
helping to meet the Energy Policy Act and the President's Executive
order to reduce petroleum consumption. We have considerable work to do
before we will understand the requirements for using hydrogen as
mobility fuel. We are partnering with the Services, Department of
Energy, and Department of Transportation on all of the hydrogen work so
that DOD's investments complements the ongoing work across the
Government. The fiscal year 2008 budget request supports this effort.
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is requesting $0.4 million and $1.5
million in fiscal year 2009 to fund the continued program development
of the DOD Roadmap and Strategy for Hydrogen. The fiscal year 2008
phase of the program also supports the development of synthetic fuel
specifications with industry and finalization of the schedule in
preparation of the initial deployment of a limited hydrogen technology
and infrastructure capability. The military Services also have S&T
investments on tactical use of hydrogen--primarily for man-pack
applications.
training and equipping of afghan forces
4. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, in your written testimony, you
indicate that as of the end of January some 88,000 Afghanistan National
Security Forces (ANSF) have been trained and equipped, an increase of
31,000 over the previous year. Please provide a breakout of the total
number of ANSF in terms of how many are Afghan National Army (ANA) and
how many are Afghan National Police (ANP).
Dr. Gates. There currently are 32,300 ANA and 61,100 ANP personnel
trained and equipped.
5. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, according to a November 2006
report issued jointly by the Inspectors General of the DOD and
Department of State, the Combined Security Transition Command
Afghanistan (CSTC-A) established new criteria for reporting readiness
of the ANP to plan, execute, and sustain independent law enforcement
operations. As of last month, how many ANP personnel met these
readiness criteria?
Dr. Gates. No ANP personnel currently meet the readiness criteria
to conduct, plan, execute, and sustain independent law enforcement
operations. One ANP battalion is capable of planning, executing, and
sustaining law enforcement operations with coalition support. Funds
requested for the ANP in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental request and
the fiscal year 2008 global war on terror request will be used to train
and equip the ANP to operate independently.
6. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, did the CSTC-A also establish
new criteria for reporting the readiness of the ANA? If so, as of last
month, now many ANA personnel met these readiness criteria?
Dr. Gates. The CSTC-A did not change its criteria for reporting
readiness of the ANA. CSTC-A now is training and equipping the ANA to
conduct fully independent operations. In the past, CSTC-A was training
and equipping the ANA to lead operations with coalition support.
No ANA units are able to plan, execute, and sustain independent
counterinsurgency operations at the battalion level. Thirteen
battalions are capable of planning, executing, and sustaining
operations with coalition support. Funds requested for the ANA in the
fiscal year 2007 supplemental request and the fiscal year 2008 global
war on terror request will be used to train and equip the ANA to
operate independently.
quadrennial defense review
7. Senator Levin. General Pace, the Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) submitted to Congress in February 2006 called for no increase in
the size of the Active Army or the Marine Corps, and called for a
reduction in the size of the Army National Guard. The fiscal year 2008
budget request proposes to increase the end strength of all three above
both the current levels and the levels that were determined by the QDR
to be sufficient to execute the National Military Strategy. Has the
National Military Strategy been changed since the QDR was submitted?
General Pace. The National Military Strategy has not changed.
However, my assessment of the risk in executing that strategy in the
current and foreseeable strategic operating environment has changed.
America faces increasingly complex and dangerous threats, resulting in
increased risk. Sustaining operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, while
maintaining readiness to respond to new contingencies around the globe,
is a challenge with our current force structure. While we are fully
ready to respond to any new contingency, we would rely more heavily on
less precise munitions and the length of time necessary to succeed
would be longer than we would like. The increases in Army and Marine
Corps active end strength proposed by the budget are consistent with
this need to increase our overall capacity and will reduce strategic
risk.
8. Senator Levin. General Pace, given these substantial changes,
does the QDR still represent the position of the DOD?
General Pace. Yes, the QDR and the fiscal year 2008 budget reflect
our priorities. The QDR represented a snapshot in time of the overall
strategy; the report itself noted that we must continuously reassess
and apply lessons learned if it is to be successful. It recognizes that
the strategic environment is not static, and that we must continue to
transform along a continuum that reflects our best understanding of a
changing world. The focus areas of the QDR (defeating terrorist
networks, defending the Homeland in depth, shaping the choices of
countries at strategic crossroads, and preventing hostile states and
non-state actors from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction)
are still relevant. Additionally, the Secretary of Defense has
established five priorities for the DOD. These priorities are:
increasing end strength, resetting the force, operationalizing our
Reserve component, strategic modernization, and transformation.
9. Senator Levin. General Pace, what is the detailed rationale for
these proposed increases?
General Pace. My biennial National Military Strategy Risk
Assessment was recently submitted to Congress. This assessment and the
Secretary of Defense's plan for mitigating risk depict the challenges
we face around the globe and discuss how we will overcome them.
Sustained deployments, equipment utilization, and operational tempo
each impart risk from a military perspective. The current heavy demand
for ground, sea, and air capabilities is unlikely to dissipate in the
immediate future.
As stated in my assessment, our Armed Forces stand ready to protect
the Homeland, prevent conflict, and prevail over adversaries. These
missions present simultaneous and interrelated challenges of varying
intensity, immediacy, and danger.
America's Armed Forces are in our sixth year of sustained combat
operations. We are fighting sectarian violence, insurgency, and
terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan. Al Qaeda and its allies threaten the
safety of our Homeland and our overseas partners--threats made more
alarming by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We face
additional threats and growing challenges in other regions of the world
where we are currently unable to provide the military support desired
by our allies and combatant commanders to meet their presence,
training, and deterrence objectives.
Given the breadth of these challenges, their complexity, and their
probable long duration, we must increase our overall military capacity
to reduce strategic risk. Sustaining operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, while maintaining readiness to respond to new
contingencies around the globe is a heavy burden for our current force
structure. Presently, more than 200,000 troops are deployed to the U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR); another 210,000
are elsewhere overseas. The size of our Army and Marine Corps is not
large enough to accommodate these multiple missions in the long-term.
Currently, most of our Army Brigade Combat Teams and their Marine Corps
regiment equivalents are experiencing only 1 year or less at their home
station before deploying again--and that year is largely spent actively
preparing to redeploy overseas to fight.
Currently, we have at least 20 Brigade/Regimental Combat Teams
deployed to Iraq, with another three in Afghanistan, one in Korea, and
one in Kosovo. This operational tempo drives our units to operate at
close to a 1:1 ``deployed:at-home'' ratio--which is approximately half
the time necessary to sustain enduring readiness. This year at ``home''
is usually spent training for missions relevant to Operations Iraqi
Freedom or Enduring Freedom and not on the full scope of reset and
retrain requirements needed to meet global threats. Additionally, this
usually intense pre-deployment training takes time away from families
during the year at ``home''.
The current rotation requirements conflict with our policy goal--
which is to deploy Active Duty individuals for 1 year and then provide
2 years at home; our policy for the Reserve component is to deploy
individuals for 1 year and then provide 5 years at home. Because the
forces are deployed in a wide variety of places, especially in Iraq, we
have had to break that commitment. The minimal time our troops spend
with their families between deployments has induced significant stress
on our forces. In addition, their inability to train for the full range
of missions has decreased readiness and increased associated risk.
The Army and Marine Corps are both focused on using this added
troop strength to mitigate current, serious shortfalls and ensure their
operational forces are balanced across the range of military
capabilities that will continue to be in high demand for the duration
of the long war. These forces will enhance the combat capability of the
United States, reduce stress on deployable personnel and units, and
provide the necessary forces for success in the long war.
paying for end strength increases
10. Senator Levin. General Pace, do you support the proposed
increases in Army and Marine Corps end strength regardless of how they
are paid for, or only if the entire cost of these additional personnel
are added to the DOD topline?
General Pace. Given the complex strategic environment that we
expect to face, we must increase the overall capacity of our forces to
reduce risk. Specifically, to accomplish our missions in Iraq and
Afghanistan and remain prepared for other challenges, we must increase
the ground force structure of the Army and Marine Corps. Growing our
ground forces is a top priority that reduces the risk to the execution
of our National Military Strategy. The ground force increase initiative
will compete for resources such that the overall DOD budget provides
funding for a strategic approach that includes this effort along with
operations, modernization, and personnel.
11. Senator Levin. General Pace, I understand that DOD estimates
the additional cost at about $95 billion over 5 years. Are you willing
to cut modernization or other programs to make room for the significant
increase in personnel and operating costs that these additional
personnel would entail?
General Pace. The ground force increase initiative will compete for
resources such that the overall DOD budget provides funding for a
strategic approach that includes this effort along with operations,
modernization, and personnel.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy
joint strike fighter
12. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Gates, last year, one of the most
contentious issues in Congress was the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
alternate engine program. The Department had decided to terminate the
General Electric/Rolls Royce engine and rely solely on the Pratt &
Whitney engine that is a derivative of the F-22 engine. I understand
that DOD is again proposing to terminate the JSF alternate engine
program. Why would the Department again propose this alternative? Have
you completed all the life cycle cost analyses and other reviews
required by Congress that were so notably absent from last year's
deliberations?
Dr. Gates. The three congressionally-directed independent analyses
are due by March 15, 2007. The Department believes it is prudent to
await the results of these studies prior to making new investments in a
second engine source for the F-35.
university research
13. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Gates, as you are well aware
university research has been the engine that has developed a vast array
of military capabilities that we depend upon today. Capabilities that
we take for granted--such as radar, stealth, and robotics--all were
developed only with significant contributions from the academic
community. You recently served on a National Academy of Sciences
committee that produced a report called ``Rising Above the Gathering
Storm'' that noted ``The Federal Government should increase our
investment in long-term basic research . . . by 10 percent annually
over the next 7 years. It should place special emphasis on . . . basic
research conducted by the DOD.'' The 2008 budget request falls well
short of this goal, and in fact reduces investments in the critical
University Research Initiatives program run by each of the military
Services. What is your view of the value of university research in the
overall S&T investment plan of the DOD?
Dr. Gates. For the past half century DOD has invested in
fundamental research in the physical sciences and engineering. A
significant amount of that research has been conducted at our Nation's
universities. Today's warfighter enjoys technological superiority as a
consequence of the application of that investment to defense systems.
In my most recent position as the President of Texas A&M University, I
was privileged to lead an organization proficient in executing basic
research. As a result of that experience future DOD 6.1 budgets will
reflect a strong commitment to university research.
14. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Gates, how is this reduced
investment in university research and minor overall increase in basic
research consistent with the conclusions you reached in the National
Academy of Sciences study?
Dr. Gates. My personal experience in government, my tenure in
academia, membership on the ``Gathering Storm'' committee and numerous
other National Research Council Boards provide a basis for reviewing
DOD basic research levels. However, I remain mindful of the many
factors and urgent considerations that will attend all DOD budget
decisions in the future. I expect to weigh, carefully, the full
spectrum of demands on defense budget dollars, factoring in the long-
term needs of the Defense Department, as set by future funding levels
for basic research.
patriot
15. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Gates, we just received the fiscal
year 2007 supplemental along with the fiscal year 2008 budget. My
understanding is that the Department approved the Army's request to
include funds in the supplemental for upgrading the remainder of the
Patriot fleet to Configuration 3, thereby making every Patriot launcher
in the Army capable of firing our most advanced missile, the PAC-3.
Unfortunately, the administration (OMB) denied this request and removed
Patriot upgrade funds from the supplemental. The President even
mentioned in his speech to the Nation on January 10, 2007 that he
ordered more Patriots to the Middle East to reassure our friends and
allies. Obviously, Patriot is a very important defensive weapon system
in the global war on terror and our combatant commanders need the most
capable Patriot systems to defend our forces. I further understand that
the Army did not request funding for these upgrades in the fiscal year
2008 budget. What is the Department's, and the Army's, plan to fund the
remaining upgrades to make all of the Patriots Configuration 3?
Dr. Gates. The Army will address the PAC 3 upgrades through the
normal budget process since the supplemental request was not supported.
16. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Gates, it is my understanding that
the Army conducted an internal Mission Area Assessment to review the
types and quantities of capabilities they required for air and missile
defense against global requirements. That assessment came to the
conclusion that Patriot remains the cornerstone of our current
capabilities to protect our troops and coalition allies. The assessment
also concluded that the current Patriot force required three battalions
to be upgraded to the latest Configuration 3 capable of using the most
capable interceptor missile the PAC-3. How is the Army and the
Department addressing the upgrade of these three battalions which is
nearly one-third the force to PAC-3 capability? What is the funding
plan and the schedule to which you are working to address this
capability shortfall?
Dr. Gates. The Army will address the PAC 3 upgrades through the
normal budget process since the supplemental request was not supported.
The Chief of Staff of the Army directed these upgrades to be complete
by fiscal year 2009. The Army is unable to meet this timeline unless
funding is available by June 2007. If funding is not provided, a 2- to
3-year delay in fielding the PAC 3 capability will result.
17. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Gates, it is my understanding that
the Patriot air and missile defense system is considered by the DOD to
be a ``High Demand/Low Density'' resource and that almost all our
combatant commanders see Patriot critical to their war plans. How is
the Army and the Department addressing the fact that nearly one-third
of the Patriot 10 battalion force is not capable of employing the
latest hit-to-kill Patriot PAC-3 missile because required ground
equipment upgrades have not been funded? When does the Department
intend to fix this problem?
Dr. Gates. The Army will address the PAC 3 upgrades through the
normal budget process since the supplemental request was not supported.
A 2- to 3-year delay in fielding the PAC-3 capability is the result.
18. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Gates, recent press stories indicate
the Army has determined the need to activate two additional Patriot
battalions raising the force from 10 current battalions to 12. How and
by what means does the Department intend to activate these two
battalions and what will it do to equip these two plus three existing
battalions incapable of firing the PAC-3 missile to that configuration?
Dr. Gates. The Army currently has 10 PAC-3 battalions and 3 PAC-2
battalions. The Army assessed a need, due to ongoing commitments of the
Patriot force, for two additional PAC-3 battalions. This addition to
the force, coupled with modernization of the PAC-2 units to PAC 3,
would pure-fleet the Army with 15 PAC-3 battalions. Fifteen battalions
are essential to meeting combatant commander's requirements, meeting
rotational objectives for soldiers and families, and continuing
transformation.
Funding to support the additional two battalions will be included
as part of the ``Grow the Army'' effort.
19. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Gates, the Department testified in
the past as to the critical need for the PAC-3 missile to protect our
troops and coalition partners from weapons of mass destruction (WMD);
yet more than a third of the planned Patriot force structure is
incapable of using that missile because the ground equipment has not
been modified. What is the Department doing to address this critical
force protection shortfall for our troops?
Dr. Gates. The Army currently has 10 PAC-3 battalions and 3 PAC-2
battalions. The Army is deploying or has deployed its most advanced
Patriot systems to Southwest Asia and Southeast Asia to protect forward
deployed troops and coalition partners. The Army maintains PAC-3 units
ready to deploy in case the need arise. The next opportunity to address
the upgrade of units to PAC-3 to support overseas rotations is during
the normal budget process.
20. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Gates, why is the Department
procuring in excess of 108 PAC-3 missiles annually while they fail to
program funding to modify the Patriot ground equipment systems to use
the missile? It appears this acquisition strategy is flawed. We buy the
missiles while only upgrading two thirds of the systems to use it.
Which combatant commanders won't receive PAC-3 capable units in their
force flow when they need them?
Dr. Gates. The Army has deployed its most advanced PAC-3 capable
units to combatant commanders in Southwest Asia and Southeast Asia. The
acquisition strategy of procuring in excess of 108 PAC-3 missiles
allows us to meet the PAC-3 missile requirements of our combatant
commanders in these regions more rapidly. The Army prioritizes
distribution of available PAC-3 units to meet COCOM requirements and
maintains PAC-3 units ready to deploy in case they are needed by any
combatant commander.
defense accounting
21. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Gates, when confronted by this
committee during his confirmation hearings to become Secretary of
Defense, Donald Rumsfeld admitted that the Department had lost track of
over $2 trillion and said it would take a few years to get the
Pentagon's books in order. The DOD now comes before Congress asking for
another half trillion dollars. Is the DOD now ready for a full and
complete audit of its books?
Dr. Gates. The Department has significantly increased the accuracy
and validity of its financial information since 1999, and reduced the
undocumented accounting entries problem by $63 billion in 2005 alone,
with an overall reduction of 86 percent from $2.3 trillion in 1999.
Although the Department is not ready for a complete audit of its
books, it has made and continues to make significant progress toward
that goal. For fiscal year 2006, it received unqualified (``clean'')
audit opinions on 15 percent of its assets and 49 percent of its
liabilities. In addition, it received a qualified opinion on 6 percent
of its assets and 28 percent of its liabilities. Finally, it received
favorable audit results on three accounts at the Department level,
i.e., Appropriations Received, Federal Employees Compensation Act
Liabilities, and Investments.
Although there are a number of initiatives to move us toward our
goal of a clean audit opinion on all of the Department's statements,
the two most significant are contained within its Financial Improvement
and Audit Readiness and the Enterprise Transition Plans.
The Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness Plan focuses the
Department's efforts for improving business processes, internal
controls, and resolving material weaknesses. The September 2006 plan
projects that by 2011 the Department will have unqualified opinions on
72 percent of its assets and 79 percent of its liabilities.
The Enterprise Transition Plan details the schedules, milestones,
and costs for 106 key transformational programs and initiatives across
the Department of which 44 impact financial improvement and audit
readiness.
medical free electron laser program
22. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Gates, the Medical Free Electron
Laser (MFEL) program has been around for many years. It is a world-
recognized national resource that is dedicated to developing new
medical diagnostics and treatments for our young men and women in the
military, especially for injuries associated with combat casualty. For
example, a unique system to diagnose and treat burns is in use today to
care for our injured soldiers. I was one of eight Senators who recently
sent a letter to Deputy Secretary Gordon England in support of the
program. We asked the Department to increase the funding for the MFEL
program so that the program would continue to have the needed
resources. In fact, Congress has increased the requested budget time
after time because this program is a model for the way successful
medical interventions that benefit our troops, should be developed. But
instead of increasing the funding for the program, it was zeroed out. I
cannot understand why such a valuable medical program, which directly
helps our wounded warriors, was so abruptly terminated. This action has
the potential to stop in its tracks all the impending interventions
which are primed to give us treatments for leishmaniasis (Baghdad
boil), nerve and blood vessel bonding, novel wound healing, smart
needles, miniature endoscopes, and field-deployable diagnostic tools--
just to name a few. What is the reasoning behind the decision to cut
the funding for this proven program?
Dr. Gates. The Department's Military Health System will continue to
benefit from the contributions that the MFEL program has made to
diagnosis and treatment of battlefield-related and civilian medical
problems. I recognize the history of congressional support for this
program and especially by Senator Kennedy's recognition of the
Department's achievements in its management and execution. This
confidence was well-placed, and the citizens of our country--both in
and out of uniform--have benefited.
With your encouragement and support we have pushed laser medicine
into general medical use in U.S. domestic health care. After 22 years
and almost $400 million, I believe it is time for the MFEL program to
transition to a more broadly competitive research environment. Program
performers and their ideas are ready to compete for support by the
Department of Health and Human Services and other sources that invest
in a broad set of health care challenges. This is not to say that the
Department has no further interest in the promise of this technology.
We expect current MFEL centers and other qualified entities to compete
for funding under DOD Broad Agency Announcements for medical S&T
focused on combat casualty care and infectious diseases.
In research, as in procurement, the Department must make careful
investment choices that reflect its understanding of both experience
and likely needs. The MFEL program has long been a part of our research
portfolio but we now have higher priorities in general and,
specifically, higher human-centered priorities. Fortunately, the choice
regarding the MFEL program is made easier by this program's maturity
and readiness for expanded competition.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
weapons systems acquisitions
23. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates and General Pace, according to
an October 2006 study by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), CBO
projects that ``the demand for defense resources averages about $492
billion annually (in 2007 dollars) . . . [but, when] . . . factoring in
the potential risk of higher-than-anticipated costs raises the
projected long-term demand for defense funding to an annual average of
about $560 billion. . . .'' This is $80 billion more than the
Department's base budget for fiscal year 2008. CBO indicated that part
of the increase is based on weapon systems currently under development
and the fact that these systems usually have cost overruns.
While this study gives me great concern, one area that I am
extremely troubled by is the fact that many of these weapon systems on
order are having delays and cost overruns. These delays not only hurt
our men and women in the Armed Forces, but also hurt the American
people. What is the DOD doing to ensure that unwanted delays and cost
overruns are being addressed?
Dr. Gates. The Defense acquisition business is about managing risk,
and the Department is committed to ensuring that Defense acquisition
programs have predicable and achievable cost, schedule, and performance
outcomes.
In order to satisfy warfighting needs within cost and schedule, we
need to continually identify and manage risk. We've found that as
programs slide farther in time, it becomes more difficult to hold
requirements and funding stable enough to mitigate or even sustain
risk. We are focusing a great deal of effort on reforming our three
primary decision processes: acquisition, requirements, and funding. Our
plan is to integrate, synchronize, and focus on output, such that
relevant data is both transparent and readily available to senior
decisionmakers, appropriate performance metrics are developed and
applied, and continuous improvement is assured. We've had some early
success by putting into practice a Concept Decision methodology,
identifying specific capabilities for portfolio management, and
implementing capital budgeting for selected programs. These reforms
have been generally well-received. We find that success is more likely
where stakeholder organizations--and specifically the people who will
implement the practice--both support the reform's objective and are
involved in implementation. We remain focused on fulfilling warfighting
needs within cost and schedule.
General Pace. I share your concerns and I have taken measures to
address unwanted delays and cost overruns. These measures include
revisions to existing policies, pilot projects that provide greater
inclusion of all stakeholders in the acquisition process, a systems-
based approach to fielding new capabilities, and the establishment of
early tripwires to identify potential problem areas.
The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), as an advisory
body to the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Acquisition Executive
(DAE), has increased consideration of cost, schedule, and technology
readiness in addition to the performance information that was
previously evaluated. The pending revision of the governing instruction
(CJCS 3170.01) mandates that the timeframe of required capabilities be
incorporated into the analysis and development of the program
acquisition strategy. This approach will allow the JROC to make better
recommendations to the DAE on the initiation, continuation,
modification, or cancellation of acquisition programs.
Additionally, the Joint Staff is participating in a series of OSD-
led pilots on a tri-chaired concept decision process that will evaluate
the needs and the resources required earlier in the development of a
capability. Resources will then be committed based on the maturity of
the proposed solutions. This concept decision approach is designed to
permit early and regular trade-offs between cost, schedule, and
performance among alternative approaches within capability areas,
increase confidence and decrease risk through early program definition,
and decrease acquisition risk through early senior leadership
engagement (including Service Chiefs) in corporate investment
decisions.
We are also addressing affordability earlier in the JROC process
with a systems-based approach. This requires sponsors to describe the
desired capability in the context of a family of systems. This change
enables better definition of the system inter-relationships,
dependencies, and synchronization with complimentary systems. We are
also requiring sponsors to assess the technology readiness and identify
the top cost drivers.
The JROC directs programs to return when program cost exceeds 10
percent of the approved acquisition baseline to get ahead of potential
Nunn-McCurdy breaches. The JROC can then act early to adjust
requirements while favorable alternatives still exist and before
options for successful resolution become increasingly limited. The JROC
will have a stronger role in the approval process of rebaselining
acquisition programs--ensuring all requirements are still valid under
proposed changes in cost and schedule parameters.
budget requests
24. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, you said that you would listen
to the Service Chiefs and other military officers about matters that
affect the Services. However, in an article I read in the Los Angeles
Times, Army Chief of Staff General Schoomaker did not agree with the
administration's budget request for the Army and he made a point to
ensure that the administration understood that he was not pleased with
the request. In doing so, the Army was provided more funding. However,
it is my understanding that some of the other Service Chiefs were not
pleased that their Services were not provided more money because they
``were being penalized for playing by the rules.''
I am a bit concerned by the article because we, in Congress, and
the American people have been told time and time again that should the
Services need more funding, equipment, personnel, et cetera, that they
would get it. However, now it seems that there is an unspoken process
that has certain rules that must be played. Could you enlighten us on
this matter?
Dr. Gates. Our Government has a very open and transparent process
for deciding military Service needs for more funding, equipment,
personnel, et cetera. Resources, however, are not unlimited. The
administration evaluates and funds the highest priorities of the
military department to ensure that U.S. Forces have what they need to
accomplish their military mission. Congress plays a major role in this
process since it controls much of the process through its
constitutional responsibility for military appropriations.
25. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, now that we have seen the
budget request and supplemental request, I am concerned by reports that
are indicating that more money will be necessary to meet the strategic
needs outlined by the DOD. Do you believe that the missions outlined by
the Pentagon may be unrealistic to achieve with the current budget
request and supplemental?
Dr. Gates. I believe that the missions assigned to the DOD are
realistic, if circumstances change, the Department will reassess our
budget estimates and that the current budget request and supplemental
are sufficient to support those missions.
defense acquisition
26. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, I am very supportive of making
sure that our troops have everything they need to perform their
mission, including the latest and best technology. However, we have
recently received two audit reports on DOD contracting that have some
very disturbing findings. The first was Government Accountability
Office (GAO) report GAO-07-20, titled, ``Defense Acquisitions, Tailored
Approach Needed to Improve Service Acquisition Outcomes'' dated
November 2006. The second report is DOD Inspector General (IG) report
D-2007-044, titled, ``Fiscal Year 2005 DOD Purchases Made Through the
Department of the Interior,'' dated January 16, 2007. These reports
highlight significant weaknesses in DOD's contract management and
oversight.
Specific problems identified by the DOD IG include a finding that
both DOD and the Department of the Interior (DOI) did not comply with
laws and regulations. Specific examples of problems found include:
DOD used DOI contracting officials who did not
adequately document and support that the prices paid were fair
and reasonable. Also, competition was not usually obtained.
Therefore, DOD has no assurance that it is obtaining best value
for its purchases.
The Southwest Acquisition Branch contracting officer
granted contract-ordering authority to a DOD employee who
issued $135 million in contract awards without having a
contracting officer warrant.
The Counterintelligence Field Activity did not follow
the required procedures for obtaining leased office space in
the National Capital Region. The Counterintelligence Field
Activity, through GovWorks, obtained a 10-year, $100 million
lease that violates a myriad of laws including potential
violations of the Antideficiency Act. The contracting process
also circumvented the required congressional review for leases
of this size. The lease may have cost the Counterintelligence
Field Activity up to $2.7 million annually more than if leased
through the General Services Administration (GSA).
The DOD internal controls over management of
appropriated funds were not adequate.
Similarly, GAO found significant problems with DOD contracting
concluding that
``Over the past 10 years, DOD has seen large growth in the
acquisition of services, to the point where the value of these
acquisitions exceeds the value of major weapon systems. To a
large extent, this growth has not been a managed outcome.
Congress, concerned over these rapid increases, has directed
DOD to take several actions to promote more oversight and
discipline in service acquisition. DOD has taken action, but
action has not necessarily equated to progress. At this point,
DOD is not in a good position to say where service acquisition
is today in terms of outcomes, where it wants service
acquisition to be in the next few years, or how to get there.
This makes it difficult to set the context within which
individual organizations can make informed judgments on service
acquisition transactions.''
What basis can you give me for confirming to the American people
that DOD is ensuring that they get the best value possible for their
tax dollars?
Dr. Gates. Since 2005, the DOD leadership and the DOD IG have been
working very closely with the DOI, the GSA, and other assisting
agencies regarding the proper policies and procedures that should apply
when the Department utilizes other agencies to contract for goods and
services for the Department. Obviously our goal is to ensure that the
Department is getting the best value for the American taxpayer and the
right products and services for our warfighters. We are focused on
ensuring that when we utilize interagency acquisitions to meet
Department needs, not only are they done properly--in accordance with
statute, regulation, and policy--but that our actions are fundamentally
sound from a business point of view. We have addressed identified
deficiencies in a series of policy memoranda, dating back to 2003,
issued by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics (AT&L); the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); and
the Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, on such
topics as, ``Proper Use of Non-DOD Contracts,'' ``Non-Economy Act
Orders,'' ``Use of Federal Supply Schedule and Market Research,''
``Contracts for Services,'' ``Advance Payments to Non-DOD Federal
Agencies for Interagency Acquisitions,'' and ``Leasing Office Space.''
The Department recently signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with
both the GSA and the DOI to ensure that all parties understand that DOD
acquisition and funding policies will be observed when DOD funds are
transferred to other agencies. Each MOA individually addresses, in a
corresponding action plan, specific actions the Department and the
corresponding assisting agency are taking to correct known
deficiencies. All relevant information related to the Department's use
of Interagency Acquisitions, including the MOAs, policy memoranda, and
audits are available on the Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy
Web site at: http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/specificpolicy/index.htm.
27. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, what steps are you taking to
eliminate or minimize the effects of the systemic weaknesses identified
in these reports?
Dr. Gates The Department takes these issues very seriously and has
elevated them to the highest levels of management attention. We are
taking a number of steps to respond to recent congressional direction
and to eliminate the systemic weaknesses identified in these and other
reports. These include:
I. In section 812 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2006, Congress directed the Department to
establish and implement a management structure for the
acquisition of services. The Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics issued a policy
memorandum on October 2, 2006, implementing the requirements of
section 812 by providing updated policy for DOD's acquisition
of services, and by requiring all DOD components to establish
and implement a management structure for the acquisition of
services, based on dollar values.
II. The Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition
Policy, in conjunction with the Senior Procurement Executives
of the military departments, DLA, and Defense Contract
Management Agency, is developing a new, comprehensive DOD-wide
architecture for the acquisition of services. Basic tenets of
the architecture include:
(1) Maximum use of competition.
(2) Use of acknowledged best practices.
(3) Appropriate application of performance-based
approaches.
(4) Enhanced contract performance management
supported by: early identification of appropriate
performance metrics, quality assurance or written
surveillance plans included in the contract,
appointment of properly trained contracting officer
representatives, enhanced application of past
performance information, and strategic approach to
achieving Department socio-economic goals.
III. DOD, in conjunction with the GAO and the Office of
Management and Budget's Office of Federal Procurement Policy,
has established the DOD Improvement Plan for the GAO High Risk
Area Contract Management, with action items specifically
targeted at systemic weaknesses identified in these and other
reports. We have made significant progress in completing these
action items, which are at the tactical level, and we are in
the process of establishing a follow-on plan that is oriented
to implementing the strategic DOD-wide architecture for
acquiring services.
28. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, DOD's acquisition workforce has
gradually been reduced over the last decade while DOD has significantly
increased its reliance on contract services support. Considering the
findings of these two reports, can you tell me if DOD's civilian
workforce is sufficiently staffed to properly process contracts and to
maintain appropriate oversight of those contracts? If yes, how? If not,
why not?
Dr. Gates. The DOD acquisition workforce has been impacted by
downsizing and, since September 11, by the need for updated skills and
new mission challenges. With the growth in contracting for services, we
are re-assessing all of our acquisition oversight processes to improve
acquisition outcomes. For example, the Under Secretary of Defense for
AT&L has established a management structure, to include defined roles
and responsibilities, for the review and approval of the Services'
acquisitions. The Under Secretary took this action to ensure that the
Services' acquisition is improved in compliance with statutes, policy,
and other requirements.
In addition to contract oversight, we continue to expand our
training infrastructure and available training resources to provide the
acquisition workforce with better knowledge sharing tools and Web-based
performance support resources. Although we are very successful today
with hiring and high retention, we will face significant challenges as
the highly experienced Baby Boomer generation departs the workforce.
Approximately 78 percent of our current acquisition workforce is in the
Baby Boomer generation. We must address recruiting replacements from a
smaller national workforce. We are working hard on many fronts to
ensure we have the right acquisition capability now and into the
future.
In June 2006, we published both the DOD Civilian Human Capital
Strategic Plan (HCSP) and the AT&L HCSP. Meanwhile, the AT&L Workforce
Senior Steering Board has been working aggressively to position the DOD
to be successful in the future. The Board has met three times since May
2006, and it is now planning to meet quarterly to develop and implement
strategies for identifying capability gaps and for improving the
effectiveness of the acquisition workforce. The Under Secretary
deployed a joint competency management initiative in October 2006 in
alignment with the QDR, the DOD Human Capital Strategy, the AT&L HCSP,
and the AT&L Implementation Plan. This initiative is expected to update
and assess acquisition competencies for 12 functional communities
within the DOD acquisition workforce. Each update will identify
behaviors and underlying knowledge, skills, and abilities for
successful performance.
We have made significant progress in the development of competency
models for program management, life cycle logistics, and contracting.
Between now and June 2008, the Department will begin pilot workforce
assessments for program management and life cycle logistics. In the
fourth quarter of fiscal year 2008 it will commence a DOD-wide
assessment of the contracting workforce. These competency assessments
will help our senior leaders to reallocate resources, target
recruitment, improve retention strategies, and expand education and
training resources.
The combination of our competency assessment initiative and other
leadership actions to address workforce quality and capability will
allow us to more accurately assess and address staffing sufficiency. We
have the right sense of urgency, and I am confident we will shape the
acquisition workforce in an intelligent manner.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
atlantic security
29. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Gates, senior DOD civilian and
military leaders have previously noted the importance of having a
second nuclear aircraft carrier port on the Atlantic coast. Do you
believe that two Atlantic ports will reduce the risk to our carrier
fleet by dispersing our carriers and necessary support facilities? Does
this budget account for that?
Dr. Gates. The retirement of the U.S.S. John F. Kennedy (CV 67) in
March 2007 leaves Naval Station, Mayport without an aircraft carrier
and will reduce overall carrier inventory to 11. In January 2006 the
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) directed the Commander, U.S. Fleet
Forces Command (CFFC) to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) that will examine 13 alternatives for best utilizing the
facilities and capabilities of Naval Station Mayport after the
retirement of CV 67. The options being evaluated by the Navy include:
The capacity to homeport of one or more large
amphibious ships, such as an LHA or LHD;
The capacity to homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft
carrier (CVN);
The capacity to serve as a dispersal location but not
a homeport for a CVN;
The capacity to homeport additional surface combatants
(cruisers andlor destroyers [CRUDES]);
Seven different combinations of the above;
The homeporting of an Amphibious Ready Group (LHA or
LHD, LPD, LSD);
No Action.
The Navy is being both environmentally and fiscally responsible
awaiting the conclusion of the EIS in January 2009 before making any
decisions regarding Mayport and the issue of two carrier ports on the
east coast.
The EIS process will be deliberate, balanced, and take into account
aspects essential for our east coast naval forces. The Navy will take
the time to ensure that all aspects of the decision, including national
security requirements, total cost, impact on sailors and their
families, and the effect on local economies, have been evaluated fully.
Any corresponding programming of execution funds, if required, will
occur after the final Record of Decision in January 2009.
drilling oil in gulf of mexico
30. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Gates, I have successfully
fought the expansion of oil drilling in the Gulf of Mexico in order to
protect restricted military training areas. What is your position on
oil drilling east of the military mission line in the Gulf of Mexico,
where important military testing and training activities take place?
Dr. Gates. The DOD supports the national goal of exploration and
development of offshore energy resources, and understands that the
administration's outer continental shelf oil and gas leasing program is
critical to the Nation's energy security, economic stability, and
national defense.
The DOD, the DOI, and affected States have worked together
successfully for many years to ensure unrestricted access to critical
military testing and training areas, whle enabling oil and gas
exploration in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. Through
this relationship, we have been able to maintain the proper balance
between our Nation's energy and national security goals. The current
program proposal for the eastern Gulf of Mexico does not propose oil
and gas exploration and leasing in areas used for military testing and
training, and excludes from exploration and leasing those areas east of
the Military Mission Line used by the DOD for testing and training. We
support this proposal. Drilling structures and associated development
in those areas east of the Military Mission Line would be incompatible
with military activities, such as missile flights, low-flying aircraft,
weapons testing, and training.
space situational awareness
31. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Gates, most of the senior
leaders in the Air Force and the U.S. Strategic Command have indicated
that increased Space Situational Awareness (SSA) is one of the highest
priorities for space spending. The Air Force budget request for SSA
increases from $121.7 million in fiscal year 2007 to $187.8 million in
fiscal year 2008. However, there is apparently no funding to upgrade
the aging radars that track space objects. Is there any money in the
fiscal year 2008 budget to upgrade these radars or otherwise improve
the ability of the United States to improve SSA?
Secretary Gates. In the fiscal year 2008 budget, the Air Force has
requested $216.6 million to maintain and improve its array of SSA
capabilities, which provide timely detection, tracking and
characterization of objects in space. The Air Force is fully funding
the replacement of aging components in the Air Force Space Surveillance
System (AFSSS) radar in order to maintain its viability. Likewise, the
fiscal year 2008 budget request supports the service life extension
effort on the Eglin phased array radar to allow continued operations
through fiscal year 2015. The Air Force is also upgrading the Haystack
X-band radar to a higher frequency (W-band) imaging capability which
will improve the ability to provide detailed characterization of
smaller space objects.
The fiscal year 2008 budget also supports investment in next
generation SSA programs. One such system is the Space Fence, a new SSA
radar which will replace the aging AFSSS with a multiple-ground-site
system and provide a capability to detect and track smaller space
objects. Additionally, the Space Based Space Surveillance (SBSS)
program will continue building a new optical sensing satellite to
provide frequent observations of space objects in, or traveling to,
geosynchronous orbits. Finally, the Air Force is improving the ability
to integrate and assess SSA data on shorter timelines by developing a
replacement for the current Space Defense Operations Center computer.
test and evaluation
32. Senator Bill Nelson. Ms. Jonas, last summer, there was a budget
decision to reduce funds for Air Force test and evaluation and to close
some test labs in Florida, New Mexico, and California. How did the DOD
come to the decision to try to reduce our test and evaluation?
Ms. Jonas. The Department did not reduce the funding for the Air
Force test and evaluation program and has not made a final decision on
closing labs in Florida, New Mexico, and California. Many times during
budget preparation internal discussions occur on how the Department
might best optimize our resources and operations. The Department
continues to review the DOD lab structure and will comply with
congressional direction to provide an analysis of any proposed
realignments.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Evan Bayh
printed circuit boards
33. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates, the National Research Council
recently released a report that identified printed circuit board
technology as critical in nearly every weapons system. The report
concluded that the ability of the domestic printed circuit board
industry to innovate and manufacture printed circuit boards in a secure
environment is diminishing. What actions are you taking and investments
are you making with this budget to ensure that DOD has a reliable and
trusted supply of printed circuit boards for future and legacy systems
and to ensure necessary innovation in the design and manufacture of
this critical technology?
Dr. Gates. The Department requested and received appropriated funds
from Congress in fiscal year 2007 for logistics research and
development of printed circuit board technologies and demonstrations.
Included in this appropriation was funding for the preservation of
access to reliable printed circuit board manufacturing in the United
States. One of our centerpiece efforts is the DLA sponsorship of
logistics research and development technology demonstrations under an
Emerging Critical Interconnection Technology (ECIT) program. The ECIT
program is providing the means for DLA to support organic printed
circuit board centers at the Naval Surface Warfare Center and the
Warner Robins Air Logistics Center. The increased support for these
printed circuit board centers is intended to address the Department's
continuing printed circuit board requirements. In addition, the
Department has formed a task force of stakeholders and subject matter
experts to identify and evaluate ongoing and possible future actions
for protecting access to trusted and reliable printed circuit boards.
The formation of the taskforce was directed in the John Warner National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2007. The NDAA also
directed a congressional reporting requirement on implementing the
recommendations of the National Research Council Committee on
Manufacturing Trends in Printed Circuit Board Technology. The report is
due in July 2007 and will address in greater detail current and future
actions the Department is taking in this area. This report will help
inform future budget and program decisions on circuit board technology.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
homeland defense
34. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates and General Pace, since
September 11, the DOD has acknowledged an expanded role and mission for
its forces in the Homeland--both to defend against external threats and
to provide support to civil authorities. In light of the strains placed
on our military manpower and material due to our commitments in Iraq
and Afghanistan, do you believe the DOD is fully prepared to provide
the support to civil authorities that the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) is expecting of the DOD under the most extreme planning
scenarios (such as the detonation of a nuclear device or multiple
terrorist attacks)?
Dr. Gates and General Pace. The DOD stands ready to provide all
available resources to fulfill our roles and responsibilities
identified in existing Federal plans such as the National Response Plan
and the National Implementation Plan for Pandemic Influenza--one of the
15 National Planning Scenarios. As the interagency planning effort
based on the 15 National Planning Scenarios matures, DOD will be
actively engaged to fill shortfalls in the Federal response
capabilities.
DOD is currently developing plans that address the 15 National
Planning Scenarios and has advocated that other Federal departments and
agencies do the same. Detailed advance planning such as this will
identify those local, State, or Federal capabilities and/or resource
gaps that DOD may be called upon to fill.
DOD stands ready to assist our interagency partners with their
planning efforts. DOD is providing planners to the DHS's Incident
Management Planning Team and providing training allocations at our
institutions that train DOD planners.
missile defense
35. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates and General Pace, Admiral
Fallon, Commander of Pacific Command--and soon to be Commander of
CENTCOM, has told this committee that our missile defense capabilities
need to pace the threat. Likewise, General Craddock, Commander of U.S.
European Command, has told this committee that ``rogue states in the
Middle East and Southwest Asia possess a current ballistic missile
capability that threatens a major portion of Europe.'' In light of
these comments by the combatant commanders, do you agree that the DOD
should accord a priority to the successful testing and fielding of the
current generation of ballistic missile defense capabilities in numbers
sufficient to stay ahead of the growing threat?
Dr. Gates. Testing and fielding BMD capabilities to defeat the real
and growing ballistic missile threat has been and remains a priority
for DOD.
In 2002, the President directed us to develop and deploy, at the
earliest possible date, ballistic missile defenses drawing upon the
best technologies available. In 2004, we began fielding land- and sea-
based interceptors and radars. These systems were available to defend
the U.S. Homeland if necessary during the North Korean test launches in
2006. We will continue to build our interceptor inventories to counter
the growing threat while we test and improve our current capabilities.
General Pace. The current threat will grow and is growing in sheer
numbers as existing ballistic missile capabilities are spread around
the world as we have seen. Increasing the quantity and deployment of
current ballistic missile capabilities can address the proliferation
challenge. While more inventory is important, the continued
development, integration, and test of missile defense technologies will
yield capabilities that will mitigate the risk posed by future, more
sophisticated threats.
The advancements we have made since 2004, utilizing the Missile
Defense Agency's unique capability-based acquisition approach which
implements an integrated development, test, and fielding strategy, gave
us the flexibility we needed to respond to the recent, near-term threat
posed by North Korea. We want to be as ready and as confident, if not
more so, against future threats as we were then.
prompt global strike
36. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates and General Pace, the 2001
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) stated the need to provide the President
with a broad array of nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to bolster
deterrence and defense against the new threats we face today. One such
recommendation was the development of long-range, conventionally armed
strike systems, also known as ``prompt global strike'' capabilities.
The 2006 QDR reinforced this recommendation. Yet 5 years since the NPR
we seem to be without a viable prompt global strike system under
development. Please explain the strategic requirement for prompt global
strike capabilities and summarize current plans to acquire such
capabilities.
Dr. Gates and General Pace. As the 2006 National Security Strategy
notes, the new security environment differs radically from that of the
Cold War and requires new approaches to international diplomacy,
deterrence, and defense. In particular, deterrence can no longer rely
on a one-size-fits-all approach, but must be tailored to address a wide
range of threats including the prospect of WMD acquisition or use by
both state and non-state actors. In this new security environment,
crises can quickly develop to threaten U.S. national interests. Such
crises could occur in areas that are beyond the range of existing U.S.
forces, or in heavily defended areas that cannot be penetrated by
existing systems without jeopardizing mission success or putting U.S.
lives at risk. Today, however, nuclear-armed ballistic missiles are the
only means the United States possesses for striking virtually anywhere
in the world promptly (within minutes to hours from the time of a
presidential decision). The President must be afforded a broader range
of options to strike time-sensitive, high-value targets, including the
conventional capability for worldwide, prompt response.
Current plans for a prompt Global Strike capability consist of:
Development of Conventional Trident Modification to
provide a non-nuclear prompt Global Strike capability from
existing SSBNs;
Conversion of ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to
guided missile submarines (SSGNs) armed with conventional
Tomahawk cruise missiles to provide a prompt Global Strike
capability in scenarios where SSGNs are on station within range
of a target; and
Deployment of the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff
Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER), with a range of over 500
nautical miles and capability for loitering and transmitting
imagery to planners, to provide a prompt Global Strike
capability in scenarios where U.S. aircraft are within range of
a target.
The 2006 QDR recommended the Conventional Trident as the best near-
term, low-cost, low-risk technical solution for acquiring a prompt
Global Strike capability. DOD has requested $175 million in fiscal year
2008 to begin modifying 24 D5 Trident missiles to Conventional Tridents
by removing their nuclear warheads and replacing them with up to four
conventional warheads per missile. IOC would be within 2 years of full-
funding. For the longer-term, the Navy, Air Force, and Army are
studying concepts for advanced prompt Global Strike systems that use a
combination of ballistic missiles and hypersonic reentry systems to
maneuver or extend range. These systems involve technological
challenges and are years away from providing operational capability.
Once fielded, however, these systems would provide a range of effects
against a wider spectrum of targets, and a greater number of options
for decisionmakers. Finally, non-kinetic systems, including information
operations, are also envisioned as part of the suite of prompt Global
Strike capabilities. The Prompt Global Strike Report to Congress for
Fiscal Year 2006 and the Conventional Trident Modification Report to
Congress of 1 February 2007, provide expanded discussion on the need
for prompt Global Strike, Conventional Trident, and follow-on
capabilities.
threats to u.s. space capabilities
37. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates and General Pace, China's newly
demonstrated ability to destroy U.S. satellites in low earth orbit
raises the question of whether the United States is doing enough to
counter such threats and maintain its freedom of action in space. The
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2006 required the DOD to assess whether the
Department is allocating sufficient resources to the space control
mission. While the report is classified, it can be said that the DOD
understands there are areas where additional effort is needed. What is
your strategic assessment of the recent Chinese anti-satellite test and
do you believe the DOD is devoting sufficient resources toward
countering such threats?
Dr. Gates and General Pace. The Chinese ASAT test represents a
threat to the United States' superiority in space and the Department is
paying close attention to its continued development, as we are for all
threats to our space systems. With this emerging threat, we are
increasing our priority on space protection and reconstitution efforts.
Improvements are being made to our SSA and our ability to automate
attack detection and characterization of ASAT and other threats. We are
also developing the Operationally Responsive Space program to enhance
our augmentation and reconstitution capabilities. The fiscal year 2008
budget request will allow us to meet the milestones necessary to field
new capabilities required to ensure our freedom to operate in space. We
are continuing to evaluate the necessity/opportunity to accelerate
capabilities as threats mature.
This year, the Department has submitted to Congress several space
control programs on the Unfunded Priority List. This additional funding
would enable us to accelerate delivery of critical space protection
capabilities such as the Rapid Attack Identification, Detection, and
Reporting System (RAIDRS), the SBSS system, and Self-Awareness Space
Situational Awareness (SASSA).
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
defense contracts for the f-22a
38. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Gates, the Department has
requested approximately $4.6 billion for F-22As in fiscal year 2008
based on a multi-year procurement (MYP) plan. However, a multi-year
contract has not been entered into yet, although it is authorized in
the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007. Is it appropriate for the Department to
request funding for a multi-year contract that has not yet been entered
into?
Dr. Gates. It is appropriate to request funding for a MYP contract
that has not yet been entered into. If the President's budget had not
requested funding needed for the F-22 MYP, the Department could not
make the certifications required by Section 134 of the John Warner NDAA
for Fiscal Year 2007, Public Law 109-364 (NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007),
10 U.S.C. 2306b and 10 U.S.C. 2306b(i)(l)(A). The NDAA for Fiscal Year
2007 and the DOD Appropriations Act, 2007, Public Law 109-289, approved
MYP of the F-22 and associated engines beginning in fiscal year 2007.
The Department plans to exercise the MYP authority provided by these
statutes and plans to award the MYP contracts for the aircraft and
engines in the August 2007 timeframe after providing the required
certification. Prior to contract award, the Department must comply with
the multiyear criteria set forth in 10 U.S.C. 2306b. The Secretary's
certification must validate that there is a reasonable expectation
throughout the contemplated contract period that the Secretary of the
Air Force will request funding for the contract at the level required
to avoid contract cancellation. Additionally, 10 U.S.C. 2306b(i)(l)(A)
requires the Secretary to certify that the current Future Years Defense
Program fully funds the support costs associated with the multiyear
program already authorized by law. The fiscal year 2008 President's
budget submission must include the funds needed for the MYP before the
Secretary can complete the required certifications and execute the MYP
contracts. The Department will comply with the law relating to the MYP
contract award, and we will work with this committee and the entire
Congress to provide sufficient information to permit Congress to act
prudently to promote our national security needs.
39. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Gates, is the Air Force on track
to meet all the conditions required by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007 by
30 days prior to award of the multi-year contract?
Dr. Gates. The Air Force is on track to award the F-22A MYP
contracts in August 2007. The Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and his staff are working very
closely with the Air Force on all of the requirements which must be
satisfied before award of the F-22 MYP contracts. We share the Air
Force's goal to award the MYP contracts in the August 2007 timefiame.
We are currently on track to complete contract negotiations and make
the certifications required by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007, section
134, and 10 U.S.C. 2306b(i)(l)(A) in July 2007, to permit contract
award in August 2007. In addition, the NDAA requires the Secretary
provide for a federally funded research and development center cost
report on the MYP savings to be submitted no later than 30 days prior
to contract award. The Department commissioned RAND to complete the
required report which is on schedule to be delivered in July 2007.
40. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Gates, can you explain why the
Secretary of Defense did not certify the savings related to the
proposed F-22A multi-year contract prior to submission of the fiscal
year 2008 President's budget?
Dr. Gates. Section 134 of the John Warner NDAA for Fiscal Year
2007, Public Law 109-364, requires certification to the 10 U.S.C. 2306b
criteria at least 30 days prior to award of the MYP contracts. The
Department plans to exercise the MYP authority provided in the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2007 and the Defense Appropriation Act for F-22 beginning
in fiscal year 2007. The fiscal year 2008 President's budget submission
includes the funding needed for the MYP. The Department will comply
with the law relating to the certification requirement, including the
verification of savings. We anticipate the contract award in the August
2007 timefiarne. We will comply with that congressional mandate, and
the Department will work with this committee and the entire Congress to
provide sufficient information to permit this Congress to act prudently
to promote our national security needs.
air force c-130 and c-130j
41. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Gates, the Air Force is requesting
authority to retire 24 C-130Es in fiscal year 2008. The fiscal year
2008 budget also requests funding for 9 C-130Js, the fiscal year 2008
global war on terror request requests funding for 17 C-130Js, and the
fiscal year 2007 supplemental requests funding for 5 C-130Js. Please
explain the request to retire older model C-130s, rather than repair or
upgrade them, in favor of purchasing new C-130Js. Is the Department's
request in this regard based on an analysis of what is most cost
effective in the long-term, or based on a desire to replace older, less
capable aircraft with more modern, reliable, and capable new aircraft?
Dr. Gates. The 24 C-130E retirements are not directly related to
the 31 C-130Js requested. The planned 24 C-130E retirements are a fleet
management and cost avoidance measure to retire the least capable, most
problematic C-130s in the Air Force fleet. In recent analysis, the
required cost to bring these C-130Es to viable status (approximately
$26.9 million per aircraft) will only delay future issues relating to
aircraft structural integrity (i.e. outer wings, empennage, et cetera)
The nine C-130Js in the fiscal year 2008 budget are the last aircraft
in the MYP stated to assist in the recapitalization of the C-130E fleet
supporting EUCOM. The 5 C-130Js in the fiscal year 2007 global war on
terror and 5 of the 17 C-130Js in the fiscal year 2008 global war on
terror are supporting replacement of 12 C-130H2s given to SOCOM to
support their Combat Loss Recapitalization (CLR) efforts. Seven of the
remaining 12 C-130Js in the fiscal year 2008 global war on terror are
to support an overstressed fleet which, if continued to fly under
current operations tempo, will accelerate problems plaguing existing
fleet, such as center and outer wing structures. Three of the remaining
five C-130Js are for replacement due to non-combat loss. The last two
C-130Js are to support MC-130 recapitalization efforts.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
C-13OJs Funding Purpose
------------------------------------------------------------------------
9............................... 2008 President's C-130J MYP
budget.
5............................... 2007 global war on Replacement to
terror. support 12 C-130s
given to SOCOM
for CLR
5............................... 2008 global war on Replacement to
terror. support 12 C-130s
given to SOCOM
for CLR
7............................... 2008 global war on Alleviate stressed
terror. fleet due to
overfly
supporting global
war on terror
3............................... 2008 global war on Replacement for
terror. non-combat losses
2............................... 2008 global war on Support MC-130
terror. recapitalization
effort
------------------------------------------------------------------------
42. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Gates, please explain the
relationship between the numbers of C-130s the Air Force needs with the
number of Joint Cargo Aircraft the Air Force and Army intend to
purchase.
Dr. Gates. The Mobility Capabilities Study (MCS) identified 395 C-
130s is the lowest point in a range of acceptable risk the Air Force
needs to support the National Military Strategy with intratheater
airlift. Air Mobility Command (AMC) forecasted the number of usable C-
130s in the fleet will drop below the 395 threshold by 2011. Until we
are able to recapitalize our aging C-130s, the Air Force must retain
its oldest aircraft longer than planned to keep the intratheater force
structure above 395. The Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA), C-130Js, and
center wing box (CWB) repaired C-103s are all candidates to fill the
shortfall in meeting the intratheater capabilities identified in the
MCS. RAND had just completed a Functional Solutions Analysis (in draft
now) that preliminarily concluded, ``no viable non materiel solution
was found that can delay the need for C-130 recapitalization more than
a few years.'' As the next step, an Intratheater Fleet Mix Analysis let
by RAND will begin soon and we anticipate these study results as early
as December 2007. These study results should provide details about the
optimum mix of JCAs and C-130s needed to preserve our intratheater lift
capabilities at acceptable levels of risk.
base realignment and closure
43. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Gates and General Pace, as a
result of the Department's Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process,
tens of thousands of military personnel, and their families, will be
relocating to new bases in CONUS. The Conference Report accompanying
the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007, states:
The committee understands that the number of personnel and
dependents who will be relocated as a result of the 2005 BRAC
round, in concert with global rebasing, may well be
unprecedented in the history of our country. The committee
finds it alarming that neither the DOD nor the Department of
Education appears, at this point, to have taken seriously the
impact these relocations will have on local communities and, in
particular, local school districts. The committee believes it
is premature to assign specific cost sharing formulas regarding
what costs should be paid by Federal, State, or local
governments. However, the committee believes the Department
needs to carefully consider this and other issues as it
develops a comprehensive plan for addressing the off-base
impacts of BRAC and assorted other personnel movements.
As a supplement to the report directed in the NDAA for Fiscal Year
2006, the committee directs the DOD, in coordination with the
Department of Education, to report to the Committees on Armed Services
of the Senate and the House of Representatives every 6 months in
relation to their plans to work with State and local education agencies
to accommodate the growth in local school districts resulting from BRAC
and assorted troop movements, to include: specific recommendations
regarding cost sharing; grants and matching grants; planning grants; as
well as specific recommendations from the DOD's Office of Economic
Adjustment related to how local communities can prepare for and raise
resources to accommodate the large influx of school students they
expect as a result of DOD initiated actions.
I understand the Department's fiscal year 2008 budget request
provides $2.4 million in start-up costs to begin developing educational
partnerships with local school systems impacted by base closures,
global rebasing, and force restructuring; and that the purpose of these
partnerships is to ease the transition of military dependent children
from DOD Education Activity (DODEA) schools to stateside schools.
Please explain the types of initiatives and projects these
``educational partnerships'' include.
Dr. Gates and General Pace. The $2.4 million requested in the DODEA
fiscal year 2008 budget is in direct response to section 574(d) of the
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007, wherein Congress directed the Secretary to
ease the transition of military dependent students from attendance at
DOD schools to attendance at local educational agencies (LEAs). These
funds will not go toward school system infrastructure, but will be used
to share DODEA educational expertise and experience with school
districts impacted by large influxes of students resulting from base
closures, global rebasing, and force restructuring. The $2.4 million
for fiscal year 2008 will be used to do initial assessments of school
districts' needs, and to begin developing partnerships with the
affected school systems.
Through educational partnerships, the Department will work to
increase the academic performance of K-12 students in partner schools
and districts, and increase the opportunities and successes in foreign
language courses in grades K-12. Below are descriptions of the types of
programs and projects the Department plans to offer impacted school
systems:
a. High Quality Educational Program. This program seeks to
increase the academic performance of students through the
alignment of curriculum, instruction, assessment, and program
evaluation to promote data-driven decision making; outline
processes for ongoing program review; and maintain an effective
communication program so all military families are aware of
educational opportunities that are available to them. This
program also provides opportunities for DODEA and the LEA to
further enhance school administrator and teacher leadership
through joint training, mentorship programs, and collaborative
exchanges.
b. High School Program. This program seeks to add rigor to
the high school program through enhanced offerings, highly
trained teachers, and by facilitating student participation and
success in the following assessments: Preliminary Scholastic
Assessment Test, Scholastic Assessment Test or American College
Test, Advanced Placement, International Baccalaureate, and End-
of-Course Exams.
c. Academic Support. This program specifically provides
transitioning students with continuity across school systems,
and opportunities to access and complete courses not available
locally.
d. Social/Emotional Support. This program addresses the
unique needs of military dependents who may have a parent
deployed in a war zone; have lost a parent or have one with a
severe injury; have moved frequently during their early
academic careers; or have encountered other situations not
experienced by their non-military sponsored classmates. DODEA
will work to increase the participation rates of students and
their sponsors/parents in programs implemented to address the
unique needs of military families (summer school in high
deployment locations, after-school academic and co-curricular
programs, et cetera) in partner schools and districts.
e. Educator Placement. This program provides opportunities
for DODEA educators to become employed in locations serving
large military populations, thus sharing their expertise in
working with military children and their families.
f. President's Foreign Language Initiative. This program
provides ongoing support for the President's Foreign Language
Initiative where DODEA is working to increase the number and
levels of foreign language proficiency of K-12 students in its
schools. DODEA will provide its expertise to plan and guide
implementation of foreign language programs (especially in
Mandarin Chinese and Arabic) in LEAs.
44. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Gates and General Pace, is the
Department's intent for this to be an annual funding request, or is it
only for fiscal year 2008?
Dr. Gates and General Pace. Global rebasing, force restructuring,
and unique requirements for military dependents will continue to affect
DOD even after base closures occur. To accommodate the impact of these
issues, this will be an annual funding request. The amount will vary as
troops move and LEAs request assistance.
45. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Gates and General Pace, is the
Department considering other cost sharing initiatives to assist local
school systems, and does the Department have additional plans for
working collaboratively with other Federal agencies and local/State
education agencies to ensure that military children have access to
sufficient educational resources and facilities when they arrive at one
of the new, highly impacted installations? If so, please explain the
extent of these cost sharing initiatives and plans.
Dr. Gates and General Pace. The Department encourages LEAs to work
with the Department of Education which has information that enables
communities to understand and access opportunities to expand their
range of choices (public, private, and charter). These choices include
funding and financing alternatives designed to supplement traditional
construction financing arranged through county and State government
resources. Federal programs provide excess property, funding to assist
LEAs secure favorable rates on loans, and grants to assist LEAs with
facility repair and refurbishment. Many States have already considered
alternative funding for construction, along with alternatives to
traditional school facilities, to contend with capacity requirements.
Additionally, the Department is partnering with national
associations representing State governments to obtain support. For
example, the Department is working with the Council of State
Governments to establish an interstate compact, which is designed to
ameliorate differences in school systems ranging from differing age
requirements to start kindergarten through varying requirements to
graduate from high school.
The Department recently hosted the ``Department of Defense
Conference on Education for Military-Connected Communities'' for 17 of
the most heavily impacted military communities to share information
from a range of experts who have experience with educational
facilities, financing, and funding. The after action report is
available online at www.militarystudent.org.
Finally, part of the plan to assist schools includes utilizing the
expertise of DODEA, which has developed successful practices to educate
military children. Congress extended the DODEA charter to share this
expertise and experience with LEAs. Such resources include 20
exportable component programs that include foreign language curriculum
and support, access to virtual/distance learning technology
capabilities and related applications, teacher training, and high
quality teaching and learning programs.
president's state of the union
46. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Gates and General Pace, in his
State of the Union address, President Bush proposed the development of
a Civilian Reserve Corps. DOD is already relying on the deployment of
civilians to support contingency operations, and is looking at
strategies to create a more expeditionary workforce. How is the support
of DOD civilian deployment accounted for in the budget, and what
policies and initiatives are in development to enhance the Department's
ability to attract and mobilize the civilian workforce in support of
the global war on terrorism?
Dr. Gates and General Pace. The Department primarily funds support
for civilian deployments through global war on terror. The Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the global war on terror,
and Hurricane Recovery Act of 2006, contained a provision that
authorized the Secretary of Defense to match the benefits offered to
Defense civilian employees to those offered by the State Department for
its employees in the Foreign Service. These benefits include a
provision to provide a death benefit equivalent to 1 year of an
employee's salary for those serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
Department also offers its deploying civilians the option of enrolling
in life insurance, specific training related to the area of deployment,
and rest and recuperation trips out of contingency zones. We are
grateful to Congress for continuing to waive the limitations on the
amount of premium pay that may be paid to a Federal civilian employee
while the employee performs work in an overseas location that is in the
AOR of the Commander, U.S. CENTCOM, and in direct support of, or
directly related to, a military operation or operation in response to a
declared emergency.
[Whereupon, at 1:30 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2008
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 15, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:41 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh, Pryor, Webb,
McCaskill, Warner, Inhofe, Collins, Chambliss, Thune, and
Martinez.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Gabriella Eisen,
professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional
staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member;
Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J.
Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Michael J.
McCord, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan,
counsel; and Michael J. Noblet, research assistant.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; Paul C. Hutton IV, research assistant; Gregory T.
Kiley, professional staff member; Derek J. Maurer, minority
counsel; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L.
Niemeyer, professional staff member; Sean G. Stackley,
professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff
member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Kevin A.
Cronin, and Micah H. Harris.
Committee members' assistants present: Frederick M. Downey,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to
Senator Reed; Darcie Tokioka, assistant to Senator Akaka;
Caroline Tess, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce,
assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Todd Rosenblum, assistant to
Senator Bayh; Lauren Henry, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon
I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Stephen C. Hedger and
Jason D. Rauch, assistants to Senator McCaskill; John A.
Bonsell and Jeremy Shull, assistants to Senator Inhofe; Mark J.
Winter, assistant to Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV,
assistant to Senator Chambliss; Lindsey Neas, assistant to
Senator Dole; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator
Cornyn; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; and John L.
Goetchius and Brian W. Walsh, assistants to Senator Martinez.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. Today Secretary
Geren testifies for the first time in his new capacity as
Acting Secretary of the Army. General Schoomaker testifies for
probably the last time as Chief of Staff. I say probably
because, although there are no current plans to invite you
again before your change of command, General, we obviously
don't know when issues affecting the Army today may necessitate
your appearance before the committee before that change of
command.
We welcome you both. We again want to give special thanks
to you, General, for your decades of service to the Nation and
especially for your willingness to answer the call from
retirement to lead the Army over the last 4 years during this
time of war. We wish you the best of luck in all of your future
endeavors and again our gratitude to you for your special
service coming out of retirement.
We also want to welcome our visiting soldiers, representing
the Active Army, the Army Reserve, and the National Guard, and
we thank you for your service and all those that you represent
in uniform.
This is indeed an Army at war. The Army has been engaged in
Afghanistan for over 5 years, will soon be entering its fifth
year of war in Iraq. None of the administration's rosier
predictions have come true, I am afraid, but with this surge
the number of soldiers engaged in Iraq will approach previously
high level marks. Some Army units are on or entering their
third year of Afghanistan or Iraq service and some individual
soldiers are on their fourth.
While individual Americans may differ in their opinions
about these operations, especially about Iraq, all Americans
recognize and honor the bravery, the self-sacrifice, the
devotion to duty of our soldiers and their families, indeed
that of all of our military personnel and their families. For
those of us in Congress, no matter how we voted on authorizing
the war, whether we have been critics or supporters of the
handling of the war, we are determined to see that our troops
and their families are supported in every possible way. That
determination unifies this Nation, unifies Congress. We're
going to support our troops and their families.
We were dismayed to learn that the Army did not meet its
obligation to provide for the proper care of injured and
wounded soldiers recuperating at Walter Reed Army Medical
Center. The concerns expressed by the soldiers in medical hold
and holdover status at Walter Reed are more than about physical
conditions of the buildings. The bureaucracy is often mind-
numbing in its roadblocks and delays. For example, the Army's
physical disability evaluation process is in disarray. Soldiers
are frustrated because they don't understand the process, they
don't understand why it takes months and months to get a
disability rating, they don't understand why their disability
ratings are so low when compared to disability ratings awarded
by the Veterans Administration (VA).
The recent Army Inspector General (IG) report describes a
system which is dysfunctional, does not clearly give our
wounded soldiers the treatment that they deserve, and which our
laws require. We are committed to shaking up this system so
that our soldiers will get a fair and a prompt disability
rating.
The heaviest burden in this war has fallen on the Army.
Although it appeared somewhat fashionable to question the
relevance of ground forces prior to September 11, that can
hardly be the case now. The reality of warfare in the 21st
century demands both the high intensity force on force combat
as characterized in the early weeks of the Iraq war and the
grinding, all-encompassing stability and support and
counterinsurgency operations of the last few years.
Almost all types of warfare require, in Army parlance,
boots on the ground. They require an Army that is optimally
organized, trained, and equipped for anything we might ask it
to do. The challenge for the Army, for this Nation, and for
this Congress is sustaining an Army fully engaged in current
operations while also modernizing and transforming that Army to
meet future threats. This hearing will help us understand what
needs to be done to ensure an Army that is ready for all of its
potential missions, both today and in the future.
With respect to current operations, in order to sustain the
necessary higher readiness levels in our deployed forces the
readiness of our non-deployed forces has declined. Most of
those units are not ready, the non-deployed force units.
Consequently, getting these units fully equipped and trained
for their rotation to Iraq or Afghanistan or other places is
that much more difficult and risky. It substantially increases
the risk that this Nation faces should those forces be required
to respond to other full-spectrum requirements of the National
Military Strategy.
The President's plan to plus-up U.S. forces in Iraq with an
additional five Army brigade combat teams (BCTs) and a still-
evolving combat support commitment puts pressure on an already
strained readiness situation. This morning we look forward to
an update on the preparation of this plus-up force so that we
can be assured that these units will be fully trained and fully
equipped before they deploy.
Long before the President announced his new strategy in
Iraq, military leaders raised questions about the Nation's
readiness to deal with other contingencies in a world which has
many dangers and uncertainties. In testimony to this committee
just last month, General Schoomaker was direct in his concern
for the strategic depth of our Army and its readiness. He was
clear in his apprehensions about the short- and long-term risks
resulting from the lower readiness levels of our non-deployed
forces.
In a marked change of position for the Defense Department,
the Army is proposing this year to increase its Active Duty end
strength by 65,000 soldiers to 547,000 over the next 5 years.
As we enter year 5 of the Iraq war, the proposed increases come
late and are substantially larger than increases proposed by
Senators on this committee over the past several years,
proposals that the Defense Department previously opposed.
We all understand the stress on our forces in Iraq, but few
of these proposed additional soldiers, if any, would be trained
and ready in time to help relieve that stress. Therefore it is
important that we understand why additional personnel of this
magnitude are needed in the long-term when that need was not
foreseen by the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that
rejected such force increases. How did the Army arrive at
547,000 as the appropriate size of its Active Force? Do these
numbers reflect more what can be achieved rather than what
should be achieved? Is the Department of Defense (DOD)
committed to funding this proposed increase or does the Army
intend to identify offsets within its own budget to grow the
additional forces and, if so, at what cost to transformation,
modernization, and future readiness?
The administration's proposal to increase the permanent end
strength and structure of the Army is welcome, although late.
Had we started in earnest to grow the Army even 4 years ago,
our forces today would be less stressed and more ready.
We must guard against merely creating a larger version of a
less ready force. Army plans for expansion must be
comprehensive, detailed, and fully resourced. Congress must
understand what is needed to bring our ground forces to the
levels of strength and readiness necessary to avoid the
unacceptable risks and readiness shortfalls that exist today
and to modernize our Army to meet our national security
requirements into the future.
Finally, through this hearing we would like to know the
impact of the Iraq surge on the Army, including the National
Guard and Reserve.
Senator Warner.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I
will put a statement in this morning's record on behalf of the
ranking member, Senator McCain.
[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain
Thank you, Chairman Levin. I join you in welcoming our witnesses
here today.
Secretary Geren, welcome. You have been in this job for only a few
days, but I would like to commend you on your years in public service
that date to 1989, when you took a seat in the United States House of
Representatives, representing the 12th Congressional District in Texas,
for 4 terms. After returning to the private sector, you joined the
Department of Defense in September 2001 to serve as Special Assistant
to the Defense Secretary. In July 2005, President Bush appointed you as
the Acting Secretary of the Air Force until November 2005 and you
assumed the post as Under Secretary of the Army in February 2006.
Mr. Chairman, I would particularly like to welcome General
Schoomaker--to what will likely be his last appearance before the
committee.
General Schoomaker, I join my colleagues in recognizing decades of
selfless service that started at the end of the Vietnam War and
included participation in Operation Desert One in Iran; Urgent Fury in
Grenada; Just Cause in Panama; Desert Storm in Southwest Asia; Uphold
Democracy in Haiti; and many other worldwide joint contingency
operations as a commander of Special Forces units. I would like to
principally acknowledge your last assignment as the 35th Chief of Staff
of the Army. Your return to Active Duty from retirement was a
remarkable act of selfless service and devotion to duty. Our Nation has
benefited greatly from your professionalism, especially during one of
the most challenging chapters in the history of this country. In times
of enormous uncertainty and high operational tempo, you stayed focus on
the mission and guided the Army with a steady hand.
America has been engaged in this long war against global extremists
since the September 11 attacks, and then in combat operations, first
against the Taliban beginning in October 2001, and then in a military
campaign to oust Saddam in March 2003. It has been a joint service
endeavor from the start, but the Army, Marine Corps, and our special
forces who have borne a larger share of the combat. Since September 11,
over 750,000 Active, Guard, and Reserve soldiers have been, at one
time, deployed overseas in support of the war on terror, primarily in
the Central Command area of operations. They are all volunteers who
have served unselfishly and with great bravery, distinction, and
devotion to duty.
While the Army is fighting two land campaigns, it must also
transform its structure and capabilities to meet future challenges;
sustain the All-Volunteer Force; and cope effectively with the
increasing level of stress that our soldiers and their families are
weathering. We have a great Army--but, it has been under enormous
strain. General Schoomaker, in December 2006, in testimony before the
Commission on the National Guard and Reserves you warned that the
Active-Duty Army ``will break'' under the strain of today's war-zone
rotations. This is an area of vital concern to the committee.
At today's hearing, the witnesses will be asked about: the Army's
readiness; the proposed growth in the Army end strength; Army progress
towards modular conversion; balancing the current structure between the
Active and Reserve Forces; mobilization policies; the Army's request
for multi-procurement authority for the Army Chinook helicopter, Abrams
tanks, and Bradley upgrades; the Army's commitment to resource the
National Guard's role as an operational force and the States' homeland
defense and civil support missions; the Future Combat Systems program;
the investment in Army aircraft; and Army plans to remedy conditions
found to exist in the Army Medical Command.
In the fiscal year 2008 budget request of $130 billion, the Army,
along with the other Services, presented long lists of priorities that
were left without funding. I am concerned about the size of the
unfunded requirements lists which were submitted with the fiscal year
2008 budget. The Army's fiscal year 2008 budget request is $20 billion
more than the 2007 request, and the fiscal year 2007 supplemental
request increased by $49 billion, and yet the Army's 2008 unfunded
requirements list increased by almost $3 billion.
In closing, people are the Army's most valuable resource. More than
30 years ago, General Creighton Abrams, the 26th Chief of Staff of the
Army, said, ``The Army is people.'' These are America's sons and
daughters who, each and every day, put themselves in harm's way
prosecuting the long war against global extremists--away from those
they love and often on multiple tours. Finally, I would like to
recognize, with our most sincere gratitude, the Army families who have
sacrificed so much, especially those who have lost loved ones, and
those who are caring for those wounded in service to our Nation.
I look forward to today's testimony. Senator Levin.
Senator Warner. I would just like to add my personal
observations here, first to our long-time associate here,
Secretary Geren. My recollection is you came to the DOD 6 years
ago; would that be correct?
Mr. Geren. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. In that period of time you have had six
different jobs, is that right?
Mr. Geren. Just four, sir.
Senator Warner. Four. You have currently been in the Army
secretariat as Under Secretary now for a year and we are
fortunate that you are available to take on this assignment as
the acting until such time as the Secretary and the President
make their determination for a successor. Now, I would hope
that they would consider you among the candidates. I think it
would be well deserving. I just offer that because you bring an
unusual experience of having been a part of the Congress of the
United States, which, as we can see by this hearing this
morning, an understanding of Congress and an ability to work
with them, which you have displayed in all of your assignments,
is very, very key to the position of being a Service Secretary.
So I wish you well, my good friend.
Mr. Geren. Thank you, sir. I appreciate your kind words.
Senator Warner. General Schoomaker, my distinguished
colleague here, the chairman, has reviewed your record, but I
would just like to add. It is extraordinary. You joined the
Army in the closing period of Vietnam, and you and I have
talked about that period and your recollections of the Army at
that time and how everything you have done is to avoid any
repetition of what you witnessed in that very stressful
situation post-Vietnam when transitioning from the draft to the
All-Volunteer Army and how hard you have fought to keep the
All-Volunteer Army concept viable and working, I can say I
think you have achieved in large measure.
But in that period since the closing year of the Vietnam
War when you joined the United States Army, you participated in
Operation Desert 1 in Iran, Urgent Fury--these are military
combat operations--Urgent Fury in Grenada, Just Cause in
Panama, Desert Storm in Southwest Asia, Uphold Democracy in
Haiti, and many other worldwide joint contingency operations as
commander of Special Forces units; and now your last
assignment, as the 35th Chief of Staff of the United States
Army. I would say without reservation, well done, sir.
Now, in the final weeks that you have or whatever period it
may be, we are going to have to look to you to give us the
guidance here in Congress to make sure that we can continue the
modernization of the Army and the transformation initiated on
your watch.
I have always been an admirer of the force with which you
speak and you have spoken out very forcefully on these
situations. Let me call your attention to December 2006, just
last December, testimony before the Commission on the National
Guard and Reserves. You warned that the Active-Duty Army,
``will break,'' under the strain of today's war zone rotations.
This is an area of vital concern to this committee and I
hope today you will continue without reservation to express
your personal opinions. Sometimes we get lost in all these
carefully prepared statements by staff. No disrespect to staff,
but every now and then when you just look us straight in the
eye and tell us as it is, drawing on all of that incredible
experience that you have rendered in uniform on behalf of the
United States Army and this Nation. Well done, sir.
General Schoomaker. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner, so much.
Secretary Geren.
STATEMENT OF HON. PRESTON M. ``PETE'' GEREN III, ACTING
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
Mr. Geren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, and
members of the committee. It is truly an honor to be before you
today representing your United States Army.
Senator, if I could, I am here to talk about our budget and
our posture statement, but I would like to speak to the Walter
Reed issue. You raised it in your remarks. You said the
response of Congress was dismay. I can assure you in the Army
the dismay was profound. Part of the Army ethos is we will
never leave a fallen comrade. That is part of the heart and
soul of every soldier in uniform and every civilian that serves
in the Army, and what happened at Walter Reed violated that
principle, and I can assure you that this Army is committed to
making sure that it does not happen again and we are taking
steps to ensure that it does not.
I would like to talk about that in a little more detail,
though. There is really, the issue that brought some of the
problems to light, which was a facilities and the treatment of
one outpatient area, but as we have studied this, in fact as we
studied it over the past year, we have learned that the system
has need of great reform, as you noted in your remarks.
But in order to address the immediate challenges, I would
like to tell you what we have done. The infamous Building 18,
there is not a single soldier left in Building 18. Every one of
those soldiers has been moved out to the Abrams Barracks on the
Walter Reed campus. Those are barracks that are appropriate to
serve these fine soldiers. They are up-to-date, they are
modern. They have computers in them. They have telephones,
televisions in them, and they are getting the treatment that
they deserve in those quarters.
We have also taken some steps and I think the most
important step we have taken is personnel changes, new
leadership at Walter Reed, leadership that is charged and feels
deeply this responsibility and going to act on it. We happen to
have another General Schoomaker out there, General Eric
Schoomaker, the Chief's brother. He was appointed in the
position as commander of Walter Reed on a Friday afternoon. He
was there within hours on the ground with his command sergeant
major, and she went to every single room where these soldiers
were going to be quartered. That kind of commitment to these
soldiers was evidenced from the very beginning.
We have also created a new office that did not exist
before. It is a brigadier general. It is a deputy commanding
general at Walter Reed, and this general's job is going to be
the bureaucracy-buster. In your opening remarks you alluded to
the mind-numbing bureaucracy that so many of these soldiers are
trapped in. I agree with you, and the job of this general--he
is a one-star general, he is a combat veteran. He took this job
with enthusiasm. In fact, he was there the next morning after
he was notified of his assignment and he is working his full-
time deployment to Walter Reed right now. But he shares your
commitment and he will be our bureaucracy-buster.
We have also established a new Wounded Warrior Transition
Brigade, an O-6 colonel in charge of it, and it has a command
sergeant major by the name of Sergeant Major Hartless. He
happens to be a combat veteran himself, a severely wounded
veteran. He was at Walter Reed and I can tell you from day one
his commitment to these soldiers was demonstrated and
heartfelt, and he is going to be their advocate. He is going to
work with them and make sure that they have the leadership they
deserve.
Long-term, we are creating a one-stop soldier family and
assistance center out there to make sure a soldier knows where
to go and where he can get the assistance he deserves. We are
creating a wounded warrior and family hotline that will be up
and operational March 19, 2007, and this is going to come into
the Army headquarters; it is not going to be staffed at a low
level. This is going to come up, so we make sure that we hear
from the grassroots people who can get something done.
We have a team of experts, and Vice Chief of Staff General
Richard A. Cody, USA, is heading up an action plan--a team of
experts that is going to every single major medical facility,
going to report back to the Vice Chief of Staff and to me
within 30 days. We have a similar team that is going to examine
all the community-based health care organizations that are out
there serving our Reserve component soldiers who are assigned
to recover and rehabilitate closer to their homes. The Vice
Chief of Staff has a teleconferencing initiative where he meets
by secure video teleconferencing system with the hospital
commanders regularly, hears what their needs are, and we are
creating a formal patient advocacy program.
You also mentioned the DOD IG. The IG began his work a year
ago, his report very timely, and the Army leadership is
embracing that report and we are working to update the Army
regulations. As he has noted there, the timeliness standards
were not up to standard. Training standards needed updating,
quality controls, automated systems. I have already met with
Major General Gale S. Pollock, USA, Acting Surgeon General, and
this is her top priority and she is working with that, and the
IG is going to remain engaged to make sure we get it done.
We also have the issue that has come up and some of your
colleagues have raised, appropriate and timely pay to these
wounded warriors. We are reviewing that system and making sure
we do everything we can to make sure they get paid on time and
get the benefits they deserve.
Senator, again the dismay that we experience as an Army,
the pain that this institution felt when we let wounded
warriors down, I can assure you is profound, it is heartfelt,
and our soldiers are moving out. There are going to be long-
term fixes proposed. Congress will be working these.
Legislation has already been proposed. The President has
proposed commissions under the able leadership of former
Senator Robert J. Dole, and former Secretary of Health and
Human Services, Donna E. Shalala.
We have internal investigations under way. We have to look
at the overall system. But I can assure you we are not waiting
on those policy decisions. We are moving out to the extent we
can and we are going to be a part of the long-term solution as
well.
Two weeks ago the last combat veteran of World War I died.
He was 109 years old. That gives you a sense of the kind of
challenge we have ahead of us. We live longer today than we did
then. We have severely-wounded warriors that are surviving
wounds they would not have survived in the past, and we as a
Nation have to make up our minds that we are going to step up
and meet their needs, and I can assure you your Army is
committed to doing our part.
Let me turn now to the posture statement. Our budget lives
up, I believe, to our commitment to soldiers and their
families. They are our priority. I know they are this
committee's priority. Let me say at the beginning, thank you
for the support you have given the Army over the decades, over
the centuries frankly. The soldier has no better friend than
this committee and we thank you for that.
Our top priority is meeting the needs of the soldiers and
their families. There are 130,000 soldiers in combat, soon to
be 150,000. They are the best-trained, best-led, best-equipped
soldiers we have ever put in the field, and this budget is
going to ensure that we continue to be able to provide that
kind of combat-trained soldier in the field.
This budget also assures that we are going to have a
quality of life for our soldiers that matches the quality of
their service. This has a 3 percent pay raise in it. It has
base operating support and facilities sustainment, restoration,
and modernization at 90 percent.
Four years ago, the operating account for the facilities
was 40 percent lower than it is now. We are making a commitment
to soldiers and their families to make sure that they have the
quality of life that they deserve.
We are putting a heavy burden on the soldiers, it is well
known, but a heavier burden on the families, and all of you who
work so closely with our soldiers and their families, you
appreciate the stress on those families, and this investment is
an investment in those families.
The stress on the force is obviously the war. But even
without the war this is an extraordinarily busy Army. We are
working through the Active component and the Reserve component
rebalancing. We are undertaking the modularity initiative. We
are adding end strength, 65,000 in the Active, 8,000 in the
Reserve, and 1,000 in the Guard. The reset and modernization
and business transformation--we are asking a lot of our
soldiers and families, and this budget makes those investments.
Another point that I would like to make is this budget
represents an investment in the total force, one Army, Active,
Guard, and Reserve. They train as one and they fight as one.
Our budget from 2005 to 2013 has a $36 billion investment in
the Guard equipment, $36 billion, unprecedented. Sixty-five
percent of all of our new trucks are going to the Guard. Forty
percent of our new helicopters are going to the Guard and
Reserve. The Guard and Reserve are no longer part of the
strategic Reserve. The Guard and Reserve are part of the
operational force and this budget and this Program Objective
Memorandum (POM) reflects that.
Force protection. This makes a continuing investment in
force protection and we commend this committee for its
leadership in this area, but this continues to ensure that we
have the best equipped and best protected soldiers.
Let me mention one thing in closing. We have a supplemental
and Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) funding before you
today to communicate to you the urgency of moving that
supplemental and moving that BRAC funding on time. We
experienced last summer a delay and the impact on soldiers and
their families and our training opportunities was serious. I
just urge Congress to help us meet our financing needs by
getting our supplemental to the President, to us, by late
April.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity to
address the committee and I stand ready to answer questions.
Pardon me, let me say one thing about my colleague to the left.
There is little I could add to what you and Senator Warner said
about Pete Schoomaker. But I would say, having worked with him
fairly closely for the last couple years, he is a leader of
extraordinary ability. I think that when history looks at the
last 4 years that he served it will note that Pete Schoomaker
was one of the great leaders in our United States Army. The
work before this, how he helped make the Special Forces that we
have today and how he has transformed the force right now--
extraordinary leader.
Yesterday Pete Schoomaker said to me, he recalled a country
music song. He said: I would rather have 10 minutes in the
saddle than a lifetime in the stands. Well, he has had a
lifetime in the saddle and he claims that he is heading for the
stands now. I do not believe it. I will believe it when he sees
it--when we all see it.
Pete Schoomaker, thank you for your service to our Army.
Thank you for your service to our soldiers. A great American.
Thank you very much, chief.
[The 2007 Army Posture Statement follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Levin. Secretary, thank you so much for your
commitment to the troops that you laid out relative to the
Walter Reed, so-called, type problem, which is much broader
than Walter Reed, for your other comments about the needs of
the Army, and for your comments about General Schoomaker. Thank
you for all of that.
General Schoomaker.
STATEMENT OF GEN PETER J. SCHOOMAKER, USA, CHIEF OF STAFF,
UNITED STATES ARMY; ACCOMPANIED BY LTG JAMES J. LOVELACE, USA,
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY; LTG CLYDE A. VAUGHN, ARNG,
DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD; LTG JACK C. STULTZ, USAR,
COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY RESERVE COMMAND; AND LTC COLL S.
HADDON, USA, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OPERATIONS PROGRAM MANAGER,
FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS, BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM
General Schoomaker. Sir, thank you very much. Mr. Chairman,
distinguished members of the committee: Chairman Levin, thanks
very much for your kind words. Pete, thanks very much. I could
not be prouder of the United States Army and the young men and
women that are in it, and it has been a distinct privilege to
be able to be associated once again with these young people.
I am not going to provide a long opening statement because
I want to introduce these soldiers, but also because I would
like to associate myself officially with your statement that
you just read. I think that I could not make a better opening
statement than the one that you just did and I hope that we
continue to achieve the support out of this committee that we
have enjoyed over the 4 years of my tenure, because I think it
is important.
I would like to introduce these three soldiers that
represent our young men and women. They do represent each of
the components. The first one is Staff Sergeant David W. Hatton
from Macon, Georgia. He is a member of the Georgia Army
National Guard. He deployed to Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom
3 as a military police squad leader in the headquarters company
of the 48th BCT serving out of Camp Stryker in Baghdad.
Staff Sergeant Hatton and his squad provided security for
explosive ordnance disposal personnel for destroying improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) detected by patrols, and on one such
mission Staff Sergeant Hatton was injured in an IED strike.
Although injured, he continued to set the example for courage
in the face of adversity as he resumed leading his squad and
was then given added responsibility for providing security for
other logistics convoys delivering supplies to the forward
operations base (FOBs) and camps throughout Iraq.
Staff Sergeant Hatton conducted more than 250 combat
patrols from May 2005 through May 2006, and for his leadership
and courage he has been awarded the Purple Heart Medal, the
Bronz Star Medal, and the Army Commendation Medal with the V
Device for Valor. Staff Sergeant Hatton. [Applause.]
From our Army Reserve, Sergeant First Class Robert Groff. A
native of Bartonville, Illinois, he currently works as a
recruiter in Peoria, Illinois. As a soldier on Active, Guard,
or Reserve status, Sergeant First Class Groff also represents a
critical aspect of what our Reserve component soldiers provide,
full-time support to enable our Guard and Reserve units to
sustain a high operational tempo to support both their
mobilization and recruiting activities.
I have invited Sergeant First Class Groff to be here today
because from February 2004 through February 2005 he served as a
platoon sergeant in the 724th Transportation Company during
Operation Iraqi Freedom 2. On 9 April 2004, Sergeant First
Class Groff was the assistant commander for a critical fuel
convoy. The ground convoy consisted of 42 personnel and 26
vehicles, manned largely by civilian drivers, with soldiers
providing security and command and control. Of the 26 vehicles,
17 were fuel tankers, each loaded with 7,500 gallons of JP-8
jet fuel.
Sergeant First Class Groff was responsible to ensure that
the convoy stayed together and that each vehicle made the
proper turns. Although inherently dangerous, the convoy should
have been a routine mission. Instead it became one of the
largest enemy ambushes in the history of Operation Iraqi
Freedom. Over a 4.5 mile stretch of the convoy route, an enemy
force of 200 to 300 insurgents armed with small arms, heavy
machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and mortars,
augmented by IEDs along the street, sat waiting for the convoy
to enter into the kill zone.
Within minutes, the convoy was ambushed and the convoy
commander was among the first casualties, leaving Sergeant
First Class Groff in charge and at the rear of a now very
intense firefight. Several vehicles were disabled or destroyed,
including a number of fuel tankers, leaving the vehicle crews
and passengers stranded in the kill zone.
Sergeant First Class Groff acted quickly and decisively,
ordering his driver to enter the kill zone and move to the
front of the convoy. He then exposed himself to further danger
by proceeding slowly in order to check the disabled and burning
vehicles for personnel left behind. Under fire, he proceeded to
extract ten personnel, two soldiers and eight civilians, who
would have otherwise been killed or captured by an overwhelming
enemy force.
As a result of his actions, he was awarded the Bronze Star
Medal with V Device for Valor. However, I am told that an
official effort is under way to have his Bronze Star upgraded
to the Silver Star. [Applause.]
Finally, Sergeant Christopher Fernandez, a native of
Tucson, Arizona, an Active Duty soldier, an artilleryman
assigned to the fires brigade of the Fourth Infantry Division.
Sergeant Fernandez was deployed most recently as the
noncommissioned officer (NCO) in charge of the personnel
security detachment responsible for protecting the command
group.
In that role, he led more than 200 highly successful escort
missions in the Multi-National Division Bravo area of
operations. Like many of our soldiers, Sergeant Fernandez owes
much of his knowledge to previous training and real life
experience. Nearly 3 years ago, then Private Fernandez played a
pivotal role in protecting the lives of his fellow First
Cavalry Division soldiers when their convoy was suddenly and
violently struck by an IED and immediately came under attack by
small arms and automatic weapons.
On the night of 5 May 2004, the three-vehicle convoy with
soldiers from the 21st Field Artillery was returning to base
after a night of dismounted patrols in a Baghdad neighborhood.
The blast from the IED left two of the convoy's three vehicles
disabled in the kill zone. They were dangerously exposed and
receiving heavy volumes of enemy fire.
With complete disregard for his own safety and in order to
protect the occupants of the disabled vehicles and prevent the
enemy from employing RPGs, Private Fernandez took up an
unprotected position in front of his vehicle. He provided
suppressive fires with the squad automatic weapon. After
expending all of his ammunition and without prompting or
hesitation, Private Fernandez ran through the enemy fire to
retrieve a second machine gun from one of the disabled
vehicles. He then shouldered the machine gun and, despite the
fact that it did not have protective hand rails because it was
a vehicle-mounted machine gun, he continued firing. Private
Fernandez eventually suffered burns to his hands from the
machine gun's unguarded barrel, but his efforts allowed the
casualty recovery team to move the wounded to an operational
vehicle without further loss of life.
For his heroic and selfless deeds that night, Sergeant
Fernandez was awarded the Silver Star Medal and the Combat
Action Badge. He has subsequently earned the Bronze Star Medal.
However, the thing that he would probably tell you he is most
proud of is the work that he does in San Antonio in the Fort
Hood community, where he actively volunteers to serve our
wounded warriors and their families. [Applause.]
These three soldiers epitomize why I am so absolutely proud
of the young men and women that serve with us.
I would like to very quickly show some things that our
Future Combat System (FCS) is now providing, spinouts, to help
these soldiers as they put their boots on the ground. If you
will notice the screen up here, we will run the little robot
out. This robot represents--we have several hundred of these
deployed right now in Iraq. These are the kind of things you
can throw into a building, run down into a cave, run along a
route, find wires. As you can see, it has a camera on it. Turn
it around. It can climb stairs with a 12-inch rise.
These in fact are in Iraq today and are part of the
spinouts that we are doing out of our FCS program. Turn that
thing around to show the members.
Chairman Levin. You said this can climb stairs?
General Schoomaker. It can climb stairs with a 12-inch
rise. There is a larger version of this that we have several
hundred of them now in Iraq.
Then on the table over here to my left--and what is
interesting is, because of the communications systems now that
we have and because we are building the FCS around a very
robust transport system, communications, information system,
all of this is available all the way from the top of the chain
all the way down to the lowest tactical level in terms of these
pictures and the other sensors.
The same is true with these unattended ground sensors on my
left here. These sensors also connect into the same bandwidth
and they provide acoustic or seismic or aural kinds of sensors,
to include infrared, electro-optical, and the rest, and also
allow us now to cover ground, where you do not have to put
soldiers on the ground and you can watch things, like where
people may be implanting IEDs or where you have cleared a piece
of urban terrain and need to watch it and all this.
Again, this is part of this network that we are building
and part of the spinouts. It is in the first spinout, as a
matter of fact, of our FCS.
Finally, you see this little thing that looks like a beer
can down here. You start it like you would start a lawnmower,
but that thing is an unattended aerial vehicle that a soldier
can carry. That thing will fly and hover, so that you can hover
up on top of a building or you can hover in a space and stare
at things.
Chairman Levin. Which are you pointing to now, because
there is a number of items there.
Senator Warner. It is that rather large beer can that he
referred to.
Chairman Levin. Yes, because I never saw a beer can that
looked quite like that. I have seen a few in my life, too.
[Laughter.]
General Schoomaker. Maybe it is more like a beer mug. But
you saw he picked it up with one hand and carried it out there.
Chairman Levin. That flies? That can fly and it is mobile,
easily carried?
General Schoomaker. This thing can be carried with a
soldier. He starts it and it will fly and hover. So you can sit
and stare at something, which is a lot different than having to
orchestrate orbits. Again, there is a larger version of this as
well that of course has more station time, and you can put all
kinds of sensors on it. You can also put on there such things
that, like laser designation. It has global position system on
it. So you can direct fires, precision fires with this kind of
thing.
Chairman Levin. Is that deployed now?
General Schoomaker. This will be. This will be deployed.
There are 50 units with the 25th Infantry Division and they
will be deploying with these things. They will be the first
unit that will deploy with this level of unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV).
Mr. Geren. The signal comes out and hooks up into the
network, so it does not just go to a single soldier; all levels
will be able to use it. It is situational awareness all the way
from the company level up to the brigade level.
General Schoomaker. So all of these enter the network and
all of them are available. This is what now allows very agile
units with a great deal of precision, a great deal of
lethality, to now operate in this irregular warfare
environment. This is not Cold War stuff. This is stuff that
takes a very lethal force and extends it into the irregular
warfare arena in a way that is very, very important to us.
So when people talk about the FCS and we tell them that the
most important things we are doing in that is this
communications system that is associated with it and the
spinouts of technology that we are putting on our current
units--this is not something way down the road. This is
something that is helping our units today as we transform the
Army.
So I wanted to show that because it is this kind of
technology coupled with these kinds of young men and women that
make such a difference and are so important as we go forward in
the future.
So with that, sir, I would like to close. Again, I thank
you very, very much for your kind words. The one thing I would
like to say about the Walter Reed situation that needs to be
reinforced is that the medical professionals associated in Army
medicine, we must never forget that these are great heroes out
there and that they are performing every day in ways that--I am
talking about the doctors and the nurses and the clinical
technicians that are taking care of our wounded warriors. I
would hope that as we fix the system, which needs to be fixed,
that we recognize that these people 24-7 are operating and
performing heroic efforts in support of our soldiers.
So thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, General.
Senator Warner. One question on these. Chief, what is the
vulnerability and the battlefield survivability of these units?
You must have some estimate of that.
General Schoomaker. These things basically can be
destroyed. They are throw-away kinds of things. They are not
armored. Their survivability has to do with the ability to
maneuver them and to hide them and this kind of thing. For
instance, these sensors, these are all prototype sensors, but
these would all be camouflaged, some of them being fake rocks
and trees and things like that.
Chairman Levin. The UAV, though, is not a prototype. That
is being deployed.
General Schoomaker. These are prototypes.
Chairman Levin. Okay.
General, thank you, and again thank you for introducing the
soldiers. We share your pride in them. We share your gratitude
for their work, their bravery, their patriotism. They
represent, of course, their own courage, but as well the
courage of their buddies, their families that support them. I
know that everybody in the country who could have heard just
about what your heroics were would join that applause that you
received from the committee. So we thank you. We join your
Chief in thanking you.
Secretary Geren, on the Army--we will have 8-minute rounds,
by the way.
The Army posture statement points out that the defense
budget allocation by Service has changed very little over time,
with the Air Force and the Navy around 30 percent and the Army
around 25 percent. Since the Army is manpower intensive and
personnel costs eat up a large part of its budget, only 25
percent of the Army's budget goes toward research, development,
and acquisition, as compared to 38 percent in the Navy and 43
percent in the Air Force.
The Army's overall share of the DOD investment dollar is
only 17 percent as compared to 33 percent for the Navy and 35
percent for the Air Force. As a result, the Army has been
unable to invest in capabilities that are needed to sustain a
rising operational tempo and to prepare for emerging threats.
That is according to the Army posture statement.
Now, Secretary Geren, have you discussed this with the
Secretary of Defense, this problem? If so, what is his
response?
Mr. Geren. Sir, over the last year we have been working
with the Secretary of Defense and working with the Office of
Management and Budget and working hand-in-glove on developing
the Army budget. It has been a process that has involved a good
deal of give and take. The percentages are important, but we
are very manpower intensive, obviously, and so we are always
going to have a disproportionate share of our budget in
manpower. But the Secretary certainly understands our need for
modernization and supports the FCS, which is our primary
modernization investment.
Over the POM we are going to be able to make the investment
in FCS and in our modernization that our plan requires. The
readiness issues and many of the other investments, we have to
look more broadly at the benefit to the Army. But we are
rebalancing the active component and the Reserve component. We
are moving people from low demand positions to high demand
positions. We are doing a better job of utilizing the Guard and
Reserve. We are making a greater investment in the Guard and
Reserve.
So overall we are, the Army is stepping up to meet the
challenge. But we understand that in time of war particularly
the difficulty of making the modernization investment. Over the
history of this country, we often have neglected modernization
in time of war. We are trying to make sure we do not make that
mistake this time, sir.
Chairman Levin. There is a discrepancy here which your own
posture statement points out. General, have you talked about
the specific effects of that funding discrepancy with the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and what does he say about it? How
will this discrepancy be addressed?
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir, I have. I have testified over
the last several years in terms of my concerns about our
funding profiles. My personal belief is the Nation can afford
to raise the top line of defense and that we should not do this
on the backs of the Navy and the Air Force. That is exactly the
discussion I have had with the other chiefs.
We need a strong Navy and Air Force and Marine Corps. But I
do believe the Army has been traditionally underfunded and that
we find ourself always trying to catch up. It is just the way
that it works.
My view has been that this is not just about dollars; it is
about readiness. I know that you have had several readiness
hearings and I have personally spoken with you and the ranking
member about my readiness concerns and strategic depth. But I
have had those conversations in spades with the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense, both the previous
Secretary of Defense and the current one.
Chairman Levin. General, you submitted a list of unfunded
requirements which total over $10 billion. The top two unfunded
requirements in your 2008 list are $2.25 billion for mine-
resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) armored vehicles and $207
million for aviation survivability equipment. I am just
wondering whether or not those items were requested for your
budget and did the Office of the Secretary of Defense turn them
down, and if so why?
General Schoomaker. The MRAP vehicle, that requirement came
in after the budget was closed and so it was included--we asked
for it--in the supplemental.
Chairman Levin. It is in the supplemental?
General Schoomaker. We did, we asked for it in the
supplemental.
Chairman Levin. The other one?
General Schoomaker. We are funded only partially in the
supplemental for that. The aircraft survivability equipment is
part of the effort that we had in the Comanche cancellation and
what we are asking for there is to accelerate it. The answer is
yes, we did request that.
Mr. Geren. Sir, if I can just make sure we are clear on
that. In the supplemental we have approximately $770 million
requested for the MRAPs, for 700 MRAPs, not that full amount
that you read on there, just to be clear, make sure the record
is clear.
Chairman Levin. You got $700 million of the total $2.25
billion which is needed for it. So it is only one-third funded
in the supplemental?
General Schoomaker. Sir, those vehicles are a million
dollars apiece, not just for the vehicle but for 1 year of
contracted logistics service and basically a turnkey operation.
So our current funding provides us about 700 vehicles.
Chairman Levin. But it is still one-third of the
requirement, is that correct?
General Schoomaker. That is correct.
Mr. Geren. I have had a discussion with the Deputy
Secretary on that very point. We have production issues. These
are not in production yet. We will enter into contract this
summer. As we identify additional requirements and also examine
the production capacity, he is going to work with us to
identify reprogramming and ensure that we are able to buy and
work towards meeting the total requirement.
Chairman Levin. Is the constraint here then production
capability or is it financial?
Mr. Geren. We do not have a line up and going at this
point, so we are projecting into the future.
Chairman Levin. Is this as many of those vehicles as can be
produced? Does that $700 million cover all that can be
produced, or is it a financial deal?
Mr. Geren. I could not answer that right now, but I would
expect that we would have a difficult time spending all of that
money between now and the fall considering where we stand in
relation to that production line. It is a joint program with
the Marines. We will be entering into a contract soon. But you
have the uncertainty of predicting when the production will
come off the line, and that is what I discussed with the Deputy
Secretary. As we understand better the production capacity, we
want to revisit this issue.
General Schoomaker. Sir, if I could add to that. I think we
owe you an answer for the record with some specifics, but my
information is that this is a matter of funding, not capacity
for some of these vehicles.
Chairman Levin. We need to know that fact, is it a funding
issue or is it a capacity issue. If you would let us know for
the record. Check it out, because this is an area where we have
been determined that we are going to provide whatever is
needed. This is an area we have taken an awful lot of losses.
[The information referred to follows:]
The maximum production capability for Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected (MRAP) systems is a function of funding amounts, the timing
of funding, each individual firm's production capacities, the complex
interrelationships and interdependence of the prime and subcontractors,
and the distribution of vehicles between the four Services and Special
Operations Command. Given the number of unknowns, the Army believes the
440 vehicle per month estimate to be reasonable and achievable.
The Army's intent is to limit the number of manufacturers and
thereby ease the burden on theater to train, utilize, and maintain
MRAP. Our estimates are based on using a portion of the capacity from
two of the larger manufacturers. If enough manufactures make it through
testing and the other Services do not order through the same
manufacturers as the Army, production capacity should be greater. If
only a few manufacturers are able to produce the systems, then
production will likely be lower.
Chairman Levin. General or Secretary, either one. Let me in
fact address this to the Secretary first. Everybody understands
that a disability rating of 30 percent or more results in
medical retirement and eligibility for military health care for
the member and his family, the wounded member and his family,
and that a rating of less than 30 percent results in separation
pay and eligibility for care for the member, but not for the
family, from the VA.
What we do not understand and what the soldiers do not
understand is why the disability ratings from the Army are so
much lower than disability ratings awarded by the VA and, for
that matter, so much lower in terms of the percentage that
reach that 30 percent threshold than the Air Force. I
understand that the Army awards disability ratings of 30
percent or higher in only about 4 percent of the cases of our
wounded troops, while the Air Force awards 30 percent or higher
in about 25 percent of its cases. So it is about six times as
many percentagewise.
What is the explanation for the disparity in the disability
ratings awarded by the Army compared to the VA and the Air
Force?
Mr. Geren. That 4 percent that you cited, Mr. Chairman,
understates actual numbers of disability ratings that qualify
for medical retirement. We have a category where a soldier goes
into a hold position. If you add that category in, we get up
into the low 20s.
But the fundamental question that you ask, is this system
fair, is it right, is it up-to-date, does it meet the needs of
the soldier today, why is it different from the VA? Both
systems in my opinion are out-of-date. Both systems do not
reflect many of the types of threats and the injuries and the
illnesses that soldiers experience today and also what we are
able to do for those soldiers long-term.
Part of our charge both in the Army and as an
administration is to examine those and look at our disability
rating. I would not stand here and try to defend it. I think it
is out-of-date. I think it has not been looked at for a very
long time, and that is one of the charges that we have taken on
as an Army, to review that system and make sure that it
reflects the needs of soldiers and their families. I do not
believe it does right now.
Chairman Levin. Are you saying that over 20 percent then of
the Army disability ratings end up at 30 percent or more so
that they are eligible then for a medical retirement?
Mr. Geren. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. That figure is not 4 percent, but it is
over 20?
Mr. Geren. 4 percent understates it.
Chairman Levin. But it is over 20 that are eligible----
Mr. Geren. Yes, sir. I believe the number is 21 percent,
but I will get it for you for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
The 4 percent figure and disparity with the other Services comes
from the following quotation from the February 25, 2007, Washington
Post Magazine, ``The Defense Department reports that the Army, which
handles more than half of the military's disability cases, put less
than 4 percent of the 10,460 active duty soldiers and reservists it
evaluated last year on permanent disability retirement and less than 15
percent on the temporary list. (Temporary retirees undergo periodic
reassessments of their conditions for as much as 5 years before a final
decision.) By comparison, the Navy (including the Marine Corps) retired
about 35 percent of its injured, temporarily or permanently, and the
Air Force about 24 percent the Defense Department says.'' Although not
stated in the article, these Department of Defense figures are from
fiscal year 2006 only.
Approximately 19 percent (4 percent plus 15 percent mentioned
above) is the appropriate Army disability retirement figure to compare
to Navy and Air Force. Further refinement of the Army disability
retirements: fiscal year 2006--18.7 percent and fiscal year 2007
through February 28, 2007--21.36 percent.
Chairman Levin. That are medically retired, not discharged;
medically retired?
Mr. Geren. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Mr. Geren. Let me confirm that for the record, but that is
within a percentage point or two.
Chairman Levin. Then we also need the explanation as to why
the VA is significantly higher than that.
Mr. Geren. They have a totally different rating system.
They look at different criteria, different issues. That is
also, it does not make sense to a soldier. It is confusing. We
have to rationalize those two systems and bring them----
Chairman Levin. This committee is going to be making that
effort with our Veterans Committee. We are going to have joint
hearings. We are going to attempt to see what the reasons are
for those discrepancies between the VA and the military,
because it is incomprehensible to our troops. It sounds unfair.
It probably is unfair. We are going to do everything we can
from the congressional side to eliminate the delays, which is
one big problem we are determined to in any event going to
correct, but also the conflicts between the approaches taken
between the VA and the military in terms of what that
disability rating is. We are going to work on both of those
jointly, both those issues, the long delays as well as the
discrepancies between VA and military disability ratings. We
are going to work on those jointly with our Veterans Committee.
Mr. Geren. We welcome the opportunity to work with you.
Just real quickly, the Army rating system rates their ability
to serve in the Army and VA aims at a different evaluation
entirely. We are looking, can the soldier continue to serve,
and it is a different approach.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, the Committee on Environment
and Public Works is having a hearing and I am going to now
yield to the ranking member of that committee such that he can
join his hearing upstairs.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Warner. I have made this
request of you several times and you are always so generous to
do this, and I appreciate it.
I hope, Mr. Chairman, that maybe we can get together with
some of the other chairmen and try to avoid some of these
conflicts. It is very difficult to deal with.
Let me say to both Petes here, you are great guys and you
came in and served at a most difficult time. We all know that.
You have both conventional and unconventional types of
conflicts, resetting, retraining. Of the 92,000 increases in
ground forces, you have 65,000 in the Army. You are going to
have to put that together, transform the Army through the BRAC
process that is underfunded right now, and modernize the FCS.
We have talked about these things, and you two have done a
great job under the most difficult of circumstances and I
compliment you. If this is your last hearing, General
Schoomaker, thank you so much for coming out of retirement and
helping us along.
Last year when the supplemental was delayed, General Cody
came over and several others and talked about how serious it
was. A week ago when the Democrats came out with their $124
billion supplemental plans, that both increases spending and
sets limits on the war and the upcoming war supplemental and
sets the stage for withdrawal from Iraq--now, I am going to
read the Army's posture statement and I want you to listen
carefully: ``Full, timely, and predictable funding of the
Army's budget request and supplemental appropriations will
ensure the Army is ready, fully manned, trained, equipped to
sustain the full range of its global commitments and to achieve
victory in the war on terror.''
Now, I would like to know right now in advance, not when it
is too late, not when we find out that we are getting down to
the wire, not when we have to be looking at the possibility of
not being able to pay widows benefits or having reenlistment
bonuses shelved for a period of time. Just imagine what the New
York Times would do with something like that.
So before that happens, I would like to have each one of
you, maybe starting with you, Mr. Secretary: In this
supplemental, if it gets delayed in a similar fashion as last
year's, what are the consequences? Now is the time to be very
bold about answering that question.
Mr. Geren. Thank you, Senator. We do not have to imagine
what would happen if the supplemental is delayed. We
experienced it last summer and the impact on the soldiers and
on training and on soldiers' families was significant. Last
summer we had to lay off temporary workers. We had to lay off
contract workers. We had to cut back on recreation
opportunities for children in the summer. We had to reduce a
wide range of services, and we also had to cut back on many
essential contracts on programs that were supporting
procurement and refit operations around the country.
So we had to slow everything down. We had to start
reprogramming. In the words of Dick Cody, we had to do a lot of
dumb things in order to make sure that we had the resources for
the soldiers that are on the front line. I have a list of
specific actions that we took last summer. Those were draconian
actions. They affected a lot of folks. But it was necessary in
order to meet the obligation to the 130,000 troops on the
ground, and if this slides into the summer again we are going
to be faced with those same kind of decisions. We are going to
have to pull those same levers and we are going to have to----
Senator Inhofe. Is it overreacting for me to say--and
General Schoomaker, I would like to have your answer, too--that
it could infringe upon widows benefits and reenlistment
bonuses? It could get that serious; could it?
General Schoomaker. Sir, again going back to last year, the
answer is yes. It impacted a lot of things. Of course, the
place that we have to go is to our personnel accounts to help
fund the kind of things we need to do to operate. That is how
you have to reprogram.
So if you take last year as an example, a fiscal year runs
from October 1 to September 30. Last year we received our base
funding and the first increment of the supplemental after
Christmas, 3 months into the fiscal year, and we received the
second piece of the supplemental for the war at the end of
June. So we had to take great draconian measures.
This year, through the help of this committee and others,
we received our reset funding in time for the fiscal year to
start and we have obligated that money and are on a great roll.
But if you take a look at--we still do not have a veterans
bill. We do not have our BRAC and we do not have our military
construction bill, and we are 6 months into the year right now.
So on top of that, a delay in getting the supplemental,
which we must have by April--we have to have it in April.
Otherwise we will have to start doing the kind of lever-pulling
that we did last year.
Senator Inhofe. I did not mean to cut you off, Secretary
Geren. But I think I have the drift of the seriousness of this.
Let me ask you another question for both of you here, I
would say primarily you, General Schoomaker. In terms of a
program that is going to have benchmarks and time lines, we
have heard from General Peter Pace, we have heard from General
David H. Petraeus, and Lieutenant General Raymond T. Odierno,
and I think that they feel, and they have made the statement,
that if you give them a road map it is not to our benefit. But
the argument is always, what other ways do we have to hold, to
apply pressure to the Iraqis, to tell them that they have to
come forward in doing this.
I personally disagree with both time lines and benchmarks,
but I would like to hear your comments about that, General
Schoomaker.
General Schoomaker. Sir, that is, quite frankly, a little
bit out of my lane, although at the strategic level as a member
of the Joint Chiefs we do discuss strategy.
Senator Inhofe. They have already expressed themselves on
this and you are the only military at the table right now, so
go ahead.
General Schoomaker. Right. So I would have to associate
myself with their assessment, because they are very close to
it. My day-to-day life is looking forward several years trying
to make sure that we have the resources to be able to support
people like General Odierno and General Petraeus and others.
Senator Inhofe. One last thing, because I do not want to go
over my time. The Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon (NLOS-C) and the FCS
is still on the Spinout 1. I have taken a lot of time going out
and looking at it, seeing why this is so necessary. I went to
Fort Lewis, I say to my friend Senator Warner, Fort Lewis,
Washington, when they were actually working on this and rode in
it at that time and observed it, then went over to Mosul the
day that it arrived over there and saw it in action.
The chief complaint about that, of course, it was supposed
to be self-propelled and it is not self-propelled. Obviously
the first step of the NLOS-1 on the FCS is. Are we seriously
looking at filling that requirement and eventually putting the
NLOS-C in the Stryker Brigade?
General Schoomaker. I do not know about putting it in
Stryker. It is the lead vehicle in our FCS.
Senator Inhofe. That answers the question. Thank you very
much. I appreciate it. I would hope, Mr. Secretary, that we
will have a chance to talk in the future because this is a very
serious thing looking down the road. The propensity right now,
with all the problems we have, is let us put out the current
fires without preparing for the future, and this is an area I
think it is very important that we attend to, the FCS.
Thank you, Senator Warner, for giving me your time.
Senator Warner. Senator Reed, I think it's your turn.
Senator Reed. Thanks very much.
Secretary Geren, welcome. It is good to see you as a
colleague and friend from the House of Representatives, now as
the acting Secretary. Good luck.
General Schoomaker, thank you for your service, courageous
service over many, many years.
General Schoomaker. Thank you, sir.
Senator Reed. Looking forward to getting back in that
pickup truck, I think.
Shortly, I believe that the Army is going to have to
generate nine brigades of Reserve component forces for the
sustainment operation in Iraq. When is that notice going to
come down to these units, or it already has? General
Schoomaker?
General Schoomaker. I missed right at the tail end. What
is--
Senator Reed. My understanding is that the current surge is
being supported by regular component forces, but that within 6
months you are going to have to generate up to nine brigades of
Reserve component forces for Iraq. When are you prepared to
notify those forces? What is the strain on the Reserve
component, since they have been through the mill a couple of
times? Their equipment status is poor. I think you have seen
all the reports.
Can you give me an update on that situation?
General Schoomaker. Under the current rules as approved now
by Secretary Gates, under the new mobilization deal our
intention is to alert units 1 year prior to their mobilization
date. So Reserve component brigades that you are describing--
and I cannot attest to nine of them, but I do know we have
several--they should get 1 year alert, and we should get
focused attention on those brigades prior to mobilization, and
their mobilization time should be limited to 1 year.
Senator Reed. To sustain, though, the increase in forces--
right now we have a plus-up of about 30,000 forces in Iraq. The
first tranche is regular forces----
General Schoomaker. The first two brigades have gone.
Senator Reed.--extending people. My understanding, though,
is that at some point very quickly you have to get additional
Reserve Forces in. Are you saying that you will not deploy
Reserve Forces into Iraq unless they have 1 year's notice?
General Schoomaker. No. I was talking specifically about
BCTs. Obviously, during this transition period there are
smaller units of the Reserve component, both Guard and Reserve,
that have less notice than that; talk about detachments,
companies, in some cases battalions. But the transition we are
moving to is that Reserve component units under the new
mobilization criteria should receive a year's alert and get the
focused attention I am talking about.
Senator Reed. I think that is a very sensible approach. But
I am just wondering in terms of the manpower that you are going
to need to sustain. Again, General Odierno now is talking about
this operation stretching into next February or March. You are
going to need brigade-sized units and I cannot understand how
you are going to get them unless you bring in National Guard
and Reserve component brigades.
General Schoomaker. It is absolutely essential that we have
National Guard and Army Reserve units to help us meet this
demand.
Senator Reed. Well then, I would think these notices would
go out immediately if you are going to give them a year's
notice and training opportunities. Is that fair?
General Schoomaker. It is fair, and notices are going out,
and in some cases people are getting less than a year's notice.
But what I am saying is as we transition through it, once this
thing gets in balance, our intention is to give people a year's
alert.
Senator Reed. When do you think you will reach the point
where you are on a steady state year-to-year notice? Not right
away?
General Schoomaker. No. No, I think--in fact, the G3 is
here. I do not know if you have an estimate. Where is he?
Senator Reed. General Lovelace?
General Lovelace. Sir, we are more than 18 months out.
Senator Reed. So in the intervening 18 months we are going
to be notifying at some point upwards of nine brigades of
National Guard with short timeframes?
General Lovelace. Sir, I am like the Chief; I cannot
testify to the number nine. I do not have that. Several is the
current number. We are giving them more notification--we are
giving as much notification as we can. We are trying to get to
a year, just like the Chief said. We have recently held a
sourcing conference for what is, in fiscal year 2008, to begin
to attempt to understand, to identify those units, in order to
be able to notify them, like the Chief said, in this
transitional period.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
There is another issue that is I think a reflection of the
great operational tempo that the Army is serving, the increase
in promotion rates to cover the shortfall in company grade
officers, which I think you are acutely aware of. One of the
first signs that the organization is showing stress is that
company-grade officers, E-6s, E-7s, the good ones start
leaving.
Are you concerned that these promotion rates are beginning
to pick up, that we cannot maintain the same level of quality
that we have over the last several years?
General Schoomaker. First of all, of course we are
concerned when we see good people leaving the Army. But I have
a different perspective on this perhaps. We started combat
operations in both Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) back in 2001 with a shortage of
captains. The reason we had a shortage of captains was because
we underassessed lieutenants when we drew the Army down to only
40 percent of the size that it was in the Cold War.
So one of the ways that you have to do that is you have to
cut off the numbers of lieutenants you bring in. Of course,
that bubble then goes through the system. So we started the
fight short of company-grade officers. Those shortage of
captains is now a shortage of majors, because 5 years has gone
by and we have moved into that.
Second, we are now growing the Army bigger, and of course
as we grow it bigger we now have an additional I think about
8,000 requirements for captains and majors. So we stared in the
hole, we have a bigger threshold to jump, and so we have this.
The acceleration of promotion--for instance, to major, we
moved the promotion date from 11 years time in service to 10
years time in service. That is consistent with what the other
Services are doing. We were promoting a little bit slower. But
I will remind you that during the Vietnam period we were
promoting some people to major with 5, 5\1/2\ years. We were
promoting people to captain with 2 years.
Senator Reed. That might be my point.
General Schoomaker. Yes, and we do not want to go there. We
were making staff sergeants in 6 months. We do not want to do
that.
So I think that the fact that we are promoting captains now
at 38 months of service, which is over 3\1/2\ years of service,
and the fact that we are promoting majors at 10 years, my view
is this is realistic. I think it is a necessary move. But I do
not think it is anywhere near being a crisis. I think it is the
appropriate thing to do and proper management.
Senator Reed. Do you see this as a trend, though, that if
it continues to accelerate will cause problems?
General Schoomaker. I think that if we started approaching
the kind of things we had to do in the Vietnam War it would be
a big problem. I would never advise that we do that. I think
that would be very, very dangerous. But I think that what we
are doing right now is appropriate.
Senator Reed. Can you give us a feel for the status of
equipment in the prepositioned stocks, particularly in
conjunction with the surge?
General Schoomaker. I could tell you that the--in an
unclassified sense, and you know I have testified in closed
hearings--that without the prepositioned stocks we would not
have been able to meet the surge requirement. So we have used a
certain percentage of them. It will take us 2 years to rebuild
those stocks. That is part of my concern about our strategic
depth. So unless you want to go to a closed session, I think I
probably ought to leave it about there.
Senator Reed. Just a final question which may or may not be
appropriate here. That is, does this budget contain the
resources to replenish those stocks in a 2-year time?
General Schoomaker. It contains some of the resources to
start that replenishment.
Senator Reed. But not all?
General Schoomaker. In fact, let me----
General Lovelace. Not all of it, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to first deal with this issue of Walter Reed. I am
going to read what I understand was testimony given yesterday
before the Senate Appropriations Committee. In a hearing
yesterday before the Senate Appropriations Defense
Subcommittee, General Schoomaker, you are represented as
saying, ``Rather than reopening BRAC and changing the decision
on Walter Reed, we need to make sure that Walter Reed is fully
operational, able to deliver 100 percent quality care up until
the moment that the Bethesda Center and the Belvoir Center are
open and ongoing.'' You went on to note that not all the
facilities currently available at Walter Reed will be
duplicated at Bethesda.
Now, here is where I have communicated my views to the
Secretary of Defense. I think it would not be wise to try and
alter BRAC by pulling Walter Reed out. The BRAC process--and
Senator Levin and I in our 29 years here have seen it all. All
five of them we worked on together. To the best of my
knowledge, we have never gone back and altered a BRAC decision,
because Walter Reed is certainly a very important issue to
address by Congress working with DOD. But if we do make a
substantial change by eliminating Walter Reed or so forth in
BRAC, it could provide a precedent for other Members to bring
forth their problems at home, which may not be as serious as
Walter Reed, but in the view of their States and those Members
of Congress it could be.
So what is the best thing to do? It seems to me we could
look at what I call a stay of the date, simply make the most
modest modification, just saying we will not try and meet the
dates, or put in some contingency to make certain that the
Bethesda and Belvoir objectives are up and running so there can
be a seamless turnover of Walter Reed's responsibilities to
those two institutions.
I am going to try and work with DOD and others in Congress
to see whether or not that can be done. So it would be just a
minor modification in my judgment, while in some sense it would
be precedent-setting. It seems to me this situation drives the
requirement to do it that way.
Then at the same time, take such steps to accelerate the
funding provided by Congress for both Bethesda and Belvoir such
that those projects can hopefully be advanced in their startup
time and then move forward. So I do not necessarily put this in
the form of a question, but I would simply ask both of our
witnesses today to frankly give me your comments on the
approach that I have outlined.
Mr. Geren. Senator Warner, I think it makes great sense.
having lived through three of those BRACs myself, I appreciate
the intensity of emotion associated with those decisions, how
hard they are. We have to make sure--and the Army and DOD and
Congress are all committed to make sure--that our soldiers and
their families receive the best quality care, whatever we need
to do to make sure that happens--accelerate Bethesda,
accelerate Belvoir. Get it done, but make sure that we do not
stop delivering quality care before those open, and make sure
that there is a seamless transition between the Walter Reed
facility and the two new facilities.
But I agree with you, reopening BRAC would be a dangerous
precedent and not only impact what we have done in this BRAC,
but I think make future realignments and closings very
difficult for our Congress to ever consider again. So I agree
with you, sir.
Senator Warner. Do you wish to add a word, Chief?
General Schoomaker. Sir, since you quoted me----
Senator Warner. Did I quote you accurately? I want to make
sure.
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir, I think so. What I meant by
that quote, I was glad to hear--I was not recommending
reopening BRAC. I do not think that is a smart idea.
Senator Warner. No, I am not saying you did.
General Schoomaker. No, my concern is that we are
underfunded in BRAC and that we are not right now currently
replicating--we do not have the funding to replicate some of
the things that are at Walter Reed.
Senator Warner. That is troublesome. For instance, what is
it, the pathologic center?
General Schoomaker. There is that. There are things like
the Mologne House, the Fisher House, barracks for soldiers.
There are lots of things that need to be done. So what my
statement was intended to do was to say exactly what you have
said, and that is we need to accelerate the build at Belvoir
and accelerate the build out at Bethesda. Until those things
are in place and we can make a seamless transition, we should
not underfund Walter Reed. We should not be in a retrograde
motion at Walter Reed, because there are lots of unknowns in
this long war we are in and Walter Reed is essential to provide
the care to our wounded warriors that we need. That was what my
concern was and I am sorry that I was not more clear.
Senator Warner. No, I was not suggesting you were not
clear. But I just picked that out because what I would like to
ask of the Secretary is that we work together. Now, there may
be others that are going to be participating. But I am going to
take the initiative and see what I can do to provide both
legislative actions.
But I agree with the Chief. Walter Reed has to be fully
operational up until there is a turnkey type of transfer from
Walter Reed to this new bifurcated sort of Bethesda and Belvoir
situation. Now, no shovel has gone in the ground at Belvoir. So
that gives you some idea of how quickly we have to move. I do
not look at this simply because I am privileged to represent
that region of Belvoir. I am doing this in the interest of our
Defense Department and particularly the Army.
But this is the direction in which I am going to move.
Secretary Geren, I think my staff and your legislative team,
the great team you have, are working this. But I wonder if you
could give it your own personal attention as we go along.
Mr. Geren. I assure you that I will, Senator.
Senator Warner. I thank you very much.
Senator Reed and others talked about the readiness issue.
Was there any further comment you might wish to make, because I
keep going back to your comment about what will it take to
prevent the breaking of the Army. That we have to do. I think
you put us on alert. Do we have the steps in place so that that
statement which you made just 3 months ago--that was before the
surge, the surge was finalized. It may well be that you were in
the process, and I hope you were, in the planning process for
the surge. But that statement ranks right up there with old Shy
Meyer's statement, we have a hollow Army.
So what can we do to prevent that breaking that you
referred to? Are those steps in place today?
General Schoomaker. Sir, the----
Senator Warner. This is the greatest army in the world.
General Schoomaker. It is. The Army we fielded is the
greatest we have ever fielded and I think it is the greatest in
the world. But we are paying a price at home, providing the
equipment at the rates that we are, and we are turning the Army
too fast.
If you go back to the QDR, in normal times we ought to have
one increment of deployment for three increments of dwell. When
you go to a surge situation, it should be two increments of
dwell for every increment of deployment. We are now at one
increment of dwell for one increment of deployment. That is not
sustainable. I have said this now for quite some time. It is
not sustainable to do that for a long time and that is why we
have to have the Guard and Reserve, the operational Reserve,
more readily available to sustain this deal.
Now, that means that they are going to have to deploy more
frequently than what we would like the normal situation to be,
with 5, in some cases 6, years of dwell for an increment of
deployment. So any way you cut it, if we need to use the force
at the speed that we are using this force and we are going to
train the force to perform the missions we are asking them to
do, then what we give up is the recuperation period, the
respite with family, and the rest of it.
This is where I have deep concerns. I know we are training
and equipping and leading these forces correctly for what they
are doing. But I am concerned about the back side price that is
being paid.
I am on the supply side of this equation. I do not have
control of the demand side of it, and if the demand is going to
be where it is then we are going to need a significantly larger
Army. Again, I go back and say that the Army is about 40
percent the size it was during the Cold War and it is being
used at 300, 400 percent of the rate that it was, and we still
have people, even in the DOD, that say that we do not have
needs for boots on the ground and that there is going to be a
day when we are not going to have to have an Army and all that
stuff. I just think it is ludicrous.
Senator Warner. You point out quite accurately that, while
you are on the supply side and you do not have control over the
operating requirements, but you have on your desk a requirement
to do 21,500 plus another, what is it, about 5,000 individuals?
What is that add-on?
General Schoomaker. It is continuing to evolve. So it could
get bigger.
Senator Warner. It even could get bigger above the 5,000?
In your professional judgment, can you meet that?
General Schoomaker. With National Guard and Reserve. We
would need National Guard and Reserve to meet that and we will
meet it. But again, I was concerned before the surge with the
strategic depth of the Army and the resourcing of the Army, and
of course with additional things it deepens my concerns. I have
already testified that we have used our prepositioned stocks,
which is a concern for me. That has a lot to do with our
strategic agility.
Senator Warner. All right. But you are on record you feel
you can meet it.
General Schoomaker. Sir, we will meet the surge as we know
it right now. But sustainment of that is going to continue to
be a challenge.
Senator Warner. Lastly, and I do not say this by way of
criticism of any Member of Congress, but there has been a lot
of publicity about a formulation which would go to some
criteria by which the President is going to have to certify
that each of the units that you as a supplier are providing to
the operators are fully trained and fully equipped, and I am
not sure to whose standards. I would be hopeful that Congress
is not going to set the standards, but that the DOD and
specifically the Department of the Army is going to set the
standard.
Do you have any comment on how, if that formulation--and I
hope it will not become law--but should it become law, what
problems it would cause you?
General Schoomaker. I think, first of all, only we can
determine what standards are required to meet things. I need to
remind everybody that we have a requirement to be a full-
spectrum force, but once we get a requirement for, let us say,
a brigade and they tell us what they are going to use that
brigade for, that is what we focus our training on. So we are
sure that the brigades and the other units that we are sending,
that they ask for, and they tell us what it is they want them
to do, we are sure that we train them and equip them to do the
mission.
Now, the problem is if they want units to do something
different, and we have seen in the past, especially with some
of our Reserve component units, where they have been asked for
to do one thing and they have re-missioned them over there,
where there has been difficulties in the re-missioning process.
So I think we are working through that. I am very confident
that we are sending trained and equipped and well-led units.
But again, what I am concerned about is the depth we have
and what it is costing us to be able to sustain that. Again, I
will tell you a surge in my view means that it is a temporary--
--
Senator Warner. I do not know what your definition of
temporary is. This original surge was characterized to those of
us in Congress as perhaps a couple of months, and then slowly
with Odierno and now Petraeus this thing looks like it is going
to be maintained at full tempo once you reach the 21,500 plus
the add-ons through the end of this calendar year. Would that
be correct?
General Schoomaker. I think that is in discussion. Again, I
want to go back. In my view there is a difference between a
surge and a plus-up. A surge in my view is a temporary
condition, whether it is 4 months, 6 months, 8 months, but
there is a plan to come off of that. A plus-up, which means you
are raising up to another level that is going to be expected to
be sustained, is a whole different story. My view is this is
not a plus-up.
Senator Warner. You are operating it as it is on a surge
basis.
General Schoomaker. I am operating on the belief it is a
surge basis.
Senator Warner. Which means we will have some terminal end
where you do not have to maintain this?
General Schoomaker. That is my understanding.
Senator Warner. That could be what duration?
General Schoomaker. Sir, that is in discussion. Right now
my understanding is somewhere between August and the end of the
year.
Senator Warner. That is pretty indefinite.
Thank you. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank you, Mr. Secretary and General, for being
here. This hearing is of particular importance and interest to
me as chairman of the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management
Support, and I am very concerned with ensuring that our
military has everything it needs to be able to respond whenever
our Nation calls. We all are trying to do the same.
I believe the Army's posture statement outlines many of the
challenges the Army faces in transforming itself into an Army
that is ready to deal with and carry out the missions of
support for our Nation in the 21st century. The briefings we
have had already on it are very compelling and I look forward
to carrying that out.
But General Schoomaker, in the posture statement it says,
``Changes are needed to eliminate unintended constraints on
programs such as the Commander's Emergency Response Program
(CERP), the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), and
the administering security cooperation and assistance programs,
as well as furnishing humanitarian assistance.''
Can you elaborate on what these changes are being referred
to, whether these changes will be in the Defense Department
policies, and are they changes that may require congressional
action?
General Schoomaker. Sir, I think it is well-accepted that
all of us have been saying that this war is not going to be won
militarily; it is going to be won in political and in a hearts
and minds way by changing the nature of life for people. One of
the most important tools that commanders have in this war both
in Afghanistan and in Iraq has to do with their ability to
influence the local population through things like the CERP
funds, to be able to put people to work, to be able to get
projects that make a difference in the towns, villages, and
people's lives. I think that is well accepted, that people now
understand that this is a very, very important tool.
So all that was is reinforcement of this notion. I think
that we need to continue to enable our commanders out there to
have tools beyond bullets coming out of the end of the gun, but
actually changing people's lives in a way that would bring them
over and establish the kind of stability and security that is
required for governance to take hold and to return to normalcy.
So that is what that statement is intended to do. My belief
is that the DOD understands this very well and that certainly
the commanders on the ground understand it.
Senator Akaka. Secretary and General, I am pleased to see
that the Army is trying to achieve targeted efficiencies
through management reform, acquisition reform, comprehensive
redesign of the organization and business processes that
generate, deploy, and reset forces, consolidation of bases and
activities, military to civilian conversion programs, and
performance measurement enhancements.
Again as chairman of the Readiness and Management Support
Subcommittee, I have been concerned about the problems in DOD's
acquisition program. DOD's IG and the Government Accountability
Office have identified significant problems, and we call those
high risks, with DOD's acquisition program that has led to
significant waste of taxpayer dollars.
Mr. Secretary and General, can you please elaborate on the
efficiencies you are targeting for acquisition and how you are
intending to achieve these efficiencies? Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Geren. There are many challenges in the field of
acquisition. We have seen the acquisition budget increase 254
percent over the last 5 years. It has put an extraordinary
strain on our dedicated professionals in that area. We also
have an aging workforce in that area. We have 34 percent are
eligible to retire, 20 percent are expected to retire. It is an
area that Secretary Harvey focused on a great deal of his time.
It is not just an Army issue. It is across the DOD. Under
Secretary Krieg has just delivered a report to Congress on
defense acquisition transformation.
It is going to be something that all the Services are going
to work together. I believe former Secretary of the Army, Dr.
Francis J. Harvey, made great advances in that area with his
Lean 6 Sigma and other transformation, get the depots working
better, get the acquisition workforce working better. But we
have a lot of work to do in that area. We have to make
investment in people. We have to make investment in training,
make sure that we have the high performing and agile and
ethical workforce. That is our commitment going in. We have to
have cost-effective logistics support. We have to have improved
governance and decisionmaking.
Again, this was a focus of Dr. Harvey. We made steps
forward. The DOD is going to work together on this issue and I
can assure you it will remain a high priority for me and the
DOD as we move into--it is a big challenge, though. We are
asking a lot of that acquisition workforce, just as we are a
lot of our soldiers, and we are going to have to make
investments in them to ensure that they are able to do the job.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
General, would you comment on that?
General Schoomaker. Sir, I think Secretary Geren has
answered very well. I would just reinforce one thing. If you
are frustrated with bureaucracy, the acquisition community is
one of the places that can take you right over the top. I do
not know of a bureaucracy that is worse. I do not know of a
system that is built on risk avoidance. It will not, under the
current method of doing business, be able to keep up with the
demands of this century. It is not agile enough, it is not
focused enough.
So I agree with Secretary Geren. I think we have made great
progress in this regard and I think that the transformation is
absolutely essential.
Senator Akaka. In the early 1970s the Army was reorganized
so that the regular Army could not conduct an extended campaign
without mobilizing the Guard and Reserve. This was asked by
Senator Reed as well. It is not clear, however, that the
Defense Department leadership at the time anticipated the kind
of protracted conflict we are facing today with the global war
on terror.
Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, will the Army,
looking at the 21st century, be more reliant on National Guard
and Reserves to meet its global commitments? Also, have we
reduced our capability to deal with threats and natural
disasters at home by being so reliant on the National Guard and
the Reserve to support national interests abroad?
Mr. Geren. The role of the Guard and Reserve has changed
from being a strategic Reserve to part of the operational
force. It is a total force now. We train as one, we fight as
one. A third of the combat veterans of OIF and OEF have come
out of the Guard and Reserve. So unquestionably they are part
of the total force today, and this budget reflects that--$38
billion worth of investment in equipment for the Guard over 5
years.
We are making a large investment in aviation modernization
for the Guard and Reserve. The Light Utility Helicopter and the
Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter that we are purchasing, 40
percent of those are going into the Guard. Sixty-five percent
of all our medium and heavy trucks are going into the Guard.
So part of this is making up for underinvestment in the
past, but part of it is just recognizing the role that the
Guard plays now, the Guard and Reserve play, and will continue
to play. We will not be able to meet our global commitments
without having them part of the operational Reserve.
You raise the issue of domestic crises, whether it is
hurricanes, floods, or another terrorist attack. The Guard has
left some of its equipment behind in theater, some of its best
equipment. Part of the refit money that you gave us last
summer, $2 billion of that, is going to replace that equipment
for the Guard.
We also have under way, and we did it last year in
anticipation of the hurricane season and we are doing it right
now, working with the The Adjutants General (TAGs) and working
with the governors to assess what the needs are, anticipating
the hurricane and storm season. The Active Army and the Reserve
are going to provide resources, provide people, provide
transportation. We looked first across the Gulf States and then
the States that go up the east coast, but we are looking ahead,
we are planning ahead, to make sure that, just as we are
looking for the Guard to be part of everything we do around the
world, we are going to stand in support of them in meeting
domestic crises as well, looking ahead, planning together.
But bottom line, they are part of the operational force
now. The total force is a reality and our budget reflects that,
sir.
General Schoomaker. Sir, I think Secretary Geren said it
very well, but I would just like to simplify this whole thing.
The Army is 40 percent of what it was in the Cold War. Today 55
percent of the total Army is Guard and Reserve, over 50
percent. So if we are going to operate at 300 percent of what
we used to operate on when we had an Army that was 60 bigger,
it is unreasonable to not expect 55 percent of the total force
not to participate.
So it is out of necessity that the Guard and Reserve, both
for operations outside the United States as well as operations
inside the United States in homeland security, homeland
defense, are going to be called on more than they have in the
past. I think it is that simple.
Senator Akaka. I thank you both for your responses. General
Schoomaker, I want to say that you have done such a great job
for our country and God bless you and your family.
General Schoomaker. Thank you very much.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Senator Lieberman [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Schoomaker, let me also thank you for your
extraordinary service to our country and wish you well in a
well-deserved retirement. We will see how long this retirement
lasts.
To soldiers who are here, thank you so much for the
extraordinary work you do day in and day out to keep our
country safe and strong and secure.
Secretary Geren, welcome and good to see you again, and we
look forward to working with you again in your new
responsibilities.
General Schoomaker, the 2007 Army Posture Statement
identifies a set of core objectives which the Army must
achieve, one of which is to modernize by accelerating the
fielding of advanced technologies to our soldiers today. This
objective requires funding for the Army's FCS, as you mentioned
earlier, which is a critical investment program that will
protect troops and enhance combat effectiveness.
I want to point out there was a February 2007 Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) report, I guess you would call it, that
developed various budget options for altering Federal spending.
One of the options presented in that report was--and this is a
copy of the report--was to cancel the Future Combat Program and
invest more in existing heavier combat vehicles that have a
proven track record.
Now, since the Army must continue to sustain their current
mission while transforming at the same time to meet future
challenges, could you just explain why cancelling or delaying
the FCS program would be such a mistake?
General Schoomaker. Sir, I would be glad to. First of all,
it is prohibitively expensive to take the current force and
carry it into the future for another 40 or 50 years or even 25
years.
Second, the kinds of threats that we are facing and the
kinds of systems that we are facing, we must put these new
technologies on these systems to be able to survive these kind
of threats, and we must have the kinds of capabilities, some of
which are demonstrated here, to be able to enhance the human
dimension of war to meet the kind of irregular challenges that
we face as well as the future conventional challenges.
So I would tell you it is both an issue of affordability
and it is an issue of necessity. We do not manufacture tanks
and Bradleys any more. What we are doing is remanufacturing the
hull. We are taking old hulls and upgrading them. But we are
going to run into a point that this is just financially
unattainable, to do this any more.
So I think in the long run the FCS is not only a more
effective solution, but it is also the most affordable solution
to the kind of things that we have to do. It is the first
modernization program we have had in what, 40 years, for the
United States Army.
Senator Thune. Of course, we all know and anybody who has
visited Walter Reed knows very well that most of the injuries
that our soldiers are sustaining, the guys who are coming back
wounded are IED-related. That unmanned ground vehicle, that
unit that you had rolling around out here today, is that
currently being used? Can it be used to detect or to trip those
IEDs before personnel come in or our convoys come in?
It seems to me that if that thing is effective at doing
that, we ought to be using it.
General Schoomaker. Sir, we have several hundred of these
deployed right now, the smaller ones going into buildings and
in caves and wells and things and larger ones that are doing
precisely what you said. Of course, these things are becoming
more sophisticated and are absolutely essential to provide the
stand-off that we need to deal with--and again, it goes back
to, this is FCS technology.
Senator Thune. I know it is a part of FCS. I guess the
reason I ask the question is you mentioned they are deployed
over there, but specifically with regard to the IED threat, if
that is an effective counter to that.
One just more broader philosophical question. The Services
have to balance near-term requirements with long-term
investments and ongoing operations with military modernization.
When faced with the budgetary constraints, oftentimes you are
forced to spend on today's forces rather than invest in
tomorrow's. I do not believe that we can afford to take another
procurement holiday, so how do you recommend that the Army
balance their immediate needs against those long-term
modernization needs?
General Schoomaker. From my perspective, I think that's
exactly the program that we presented. What we are doing is we
are bringing our current force into the future and we are
augmenting it with future capabilities like this that we are
bringing down into the force, and we are actually transforming
ourselves as we fight by bringing the current to the future and
pulling some of the future back on top of the current.
I know that sounds a little bit strange, but this is not
peacetime and this is not a time that we can afford to run an
old system up to some kind of a point of then introducing
comprehensively new systems. These things have to be brought in
as we fight.
So I think we have presented a program that does precisely
what you are saying, and this is the most dramatic
transformation that this Army has been through, quite frankly,
since World War II, and we are doing it in a very accelerated
fashion. Of course, our experiences that we have in combat are
helping us focus and giving us the sense of urgency that is
required to do this.
Senator Thune. Secretary Geren, I appreciated your comments
about the expansive investment in the National Guard, the Army
National Guard. We all had our TAGs in town last week and we
all heard the stories about the wear and tear on equipment. I
am just wondering maybe if you could give me a little bit of
perspective. You talked about $38 billion over 5 years for
equipment, and how that compares with previous investment, what
the sort of trend line has been there, because they do--and
General Schoomaker, you mentioned that 55 percent of the total
Army is Guard and Reserve. We are riding those guys hard, our
Guard units across this country and in my State of South
Dakota, and everybody is feeling the consequences of that.
So could you just give me a little bit, put in perspective
the $38 billion in equipment that you are talking about and how
that compares?
Mr. Geren. I am not able to give you an historical trend
line, but I know that as a general principle we have
underfunded the investment in the Guard and the Reserve. The
Guard had many, to use the words of the Chief, holes in the
yard, had many of the units that did not have the equipment
that they needed, and we are working now to fill those backlogs
and equipment needs and invest into the future so that they
have the same kind of equipment, they are able to train and
fight just as the Active Duty is.
As I mentioned, we are not limiting it to any area. It is
aviation modernization, they are going to participate in that.
Trucks; the modernization of the tanks and the Bradley fleets
in the Guard is actually going to get accomplished before the
active component. It is going to finish in 2011.
We are making up for lack of investment in the past. We are
reorganizing. We are also, when you look at the nature of the
Guard force as we are moving forward, moving more from heavy
combat into combat service and combat support, more versatile
Guard units that will not only be able to help us around the
world, but also be able to better help us here at home.
General Schoomaker. Sir, I think, rough order of magnitude,
the level of funding from 2005 to 2013 for the Guard and
Reserve is an order of magnitude about five over historical
levels, about five times. If you take a look, one of the
important things to understand is we complete the total
transformation of the Army out by 2019. So from what, 2013 to
2019, there is another $52 billion. Inside that $52 billion is
another $24 billion required for Guard and Reserve to complete
their transformation out there.
My view is what we ought to be looking at is how much of
that can we accelerate to the left. How much of that can we
pull closer to where we are, not only for the Guard and
Reserve, but for the active Force, to complete this
transformation more quickly.
Senator Thune. I appreciate again your testimony and your
service. I would share your view that we have to do better on
the top line, and I think that the telling in your
presentation, this chart, which I think is always very telling,
about percentage of gross domestic product that we spend on the
military. Relative to times throughout our history whenever we
have been at war, we are spending less today than we ever have.
We have a lot more needs, as you have pointed out. So I share
your view on that and look forward to working with you to
address that.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin [presiding]: Thank you, Senator Thune.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First let me express my respect for both of you and
certainly acknowledge that the action on the part of the Army
as it relates to Walter Reed has embraced accountability, and
especially the very difficult decisions in terms of change of
leadership. I want to express how pleased I am with that and
thank you for it.
I want to ask some questions also about the FCS. One of the
things that I have learned is that there is an issue in terms
of the manned ground vehicles, the weight; that the original
plans for that had a weight at a certain level and now we are
contemplating that weight going as high as 24 tons.
My question to you today is if the plans all along had been
to transport with the C-130s and that if now you are
contemplating using the C-17s because of the efficiencies that
would be gained and in terms of how much you would be--in terms
of the type of runways you could use and how many you could
move, what I am concerned about is it does not appear to me
that the Army has expressed this to the Air Force.
We are getting ready to take the C-17s off line and it
seems to me that if we are going to need the C-17s, if we are
going to rely on FCS in the future--and I think the rationale
you have expressed, General, is certainly valid--then why would
we not at this point be going, whoa, whoa, whoa, we need the C-
17 as it relates to the future of FCS?
General Schoomaker. We do need the C-17 as it relates to
the future FCS, because one of the reasons we used C-130 sizing
constructs is so that we could get three of these systems on a
C-17. That is the whole point. Currently, one C-17 can only
carry one system of that current heavy armor.
We have expressed our requirements and, quite frankly,
General Norton A. Schwartz, USAF, out at Transportation
Command, who is responsible for all this in terms of managing
the C-17s, C-5s, and the strategic deployability issues, has
been working with the Air Force about what he views his
requirements to be. The discussions that I have been involved
in, I think that they are adequately being addressed and that
people do understand what the--it is not just purely an Air
Force-Army discussion. There is a discussion of the owner of
these systems, which is U.S. Transportation Command, that
enters. They feel that they are building sufficient C-17s to
meet the requirement.
Senator McCaskill. But you know they are going to shut it
down. They are in the process of shutting down these lines and
not going to build any more C-17s. That is the plan, which is
what I am confused about.
General Schoomaker. Again, the planners for all of this--
first of all, the FCS reduces the requirement for the numbers
of aircraft. Today we have a higher requirement if we are going
to air transport our systems. What General Schwartz has looked
at is the combination of C-5 modernization, C-17s, and the
other systems that they are talking about, to include what the
future tanker is going to be and what its cargo capabilities
will be.
So I have listened to these discussions ad nauseam and I
think that the people are putting their arms around what the
total requirement is for armed forces. I would also state that
we also move the preponderance of our stuff by sea, so we have
equal concerns in terms of fast shipping to be able to move our
units, et cetera. So I am confident that the right people are
working this and I am not uncomfortable with where we are.
Senator McCaskill. Okay. What I would hate to see is us
coming back in one of these hearings in a couple of years and
saying, after the line has been shut down and the costs
associated with that, that we, the taxpayer, are going to pay
again to start that line because we must have the C-17 to
transport the FCS.
General Schoomaker. I would hate to see that, too. But I
believe the proper conversations are going on and I will leave
it to the transporters to determine. They know what our
requirement is.
Senator McCaskill. Okay.
The next question I would have for you, if you were going
to decide, both of you, in terms of making a recommendation as
to contracting processes as it relates to troop support in
Iraq, not just reconstruction but troop support, would you
think that we should look at a single unified contracting
entity to coordinate all the contracting in the theater? Or do
you think we should expand the jurisdiction of the Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction to perform that
function?
Mr. Geren. I would have to look at that proposal with
greater detail before I could offer you a recommendation on it.
I can tell you, though, the way we operate as an Army or as a
military, we depend on contractor support. When we downsized
the military, we found ourselves in the position where we are
not able to deploy without depending upon contractor support.
Transportation, food, laundry, so many of the support services,
we have moved into the support role of contractors, including
much of security.
So that is going to be, continue to be, part of the present
and the future for your military. It also enables us to move
more soldiers from tail to tooth and put them in warfighting
roles rather than in support roles. But as far as your specific
question about how to best manage that, I would like to get
back with you for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
I agree with having a single unified entity responsible for
coordinating Department of Defense (DOD) contracting in Iraq. The
Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), has coordinating authority
over all supporting DOD contracting organizations, and the Joint
Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan provides unity of contracting
effort for the combined/joint operations areas Iraq and Afghanistan.
In addition, the DOD is establishing new procedures aimed at
improving coordination with contracting offices in a combatant command
to verify whether contemplated acquisitions requiring performance in,
or delivery to, the theater of operations will duplicate or conflict
with existing work and whether economies of scope/schedule can be
leveraged from existing contracts.
Although the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
(SIGIR) has a crucial role in the oversight of those contracts
obligating Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds, it is not the only
organization providing oversight of contracting in Iraq. There have
been nearly 200 major audits, reviews, or assessments of contracting
activities in Iraq by the various oversight agencies. In addition to
the SIGIR, the Government Accountability Office, Department of Defense
Inspector General, Defense Contract Management Agency, Defense Contract
Audit Agency, and the Army Audit Agency also have oversight of DOD
contracting in Iraq.
Senator McCaskill. I really would like your thoughts on
that, because it seems to me that we need to do one or the
other. We need to either have a single unified contracting
entity for all of the support in Iraq or we need to expand the
IG that is over there now looking at reconstruction to be able
to look at this area also. I certainly would respect your
opinion on that in terms of what you think would be most
efficient and effective in terms of changing some of the things
to avoid some of the serious, serious inefficiencies and
problems we have had with some of these contracting practices.
Mr. Geren. I know your background. You could offer us great
expertise in this area and we look forward to working with you.
Senator McCaskill. More auditors everywhere. Auditors,
auditors. [Laughter.]
Mr. Geren. I tell you, the LOGCAP contract, which has been
much in the news and criticized by many people, the concept
goes back to the early 1990s. Recognizing that we were going to
limit many of those capabilities within the military and wanted
to be able to look at the outside to be able to surge and
support the military wherever we needed to go, whenever we
needed it, we currently have that LOGCAP contract under
negotiation right now, under source selection. Rather than
having one contractor going forward, we are going to have
three, so we do not put so much burden on a single LOGCAP
contractor to support the military. So that is one of the
changes that has been made going forward from this point. We
are in the source selection now and we will be making the
decision soon. I think that that will help address some of the
issues that have come up over the last couple years.
Thank you, Senator.
Senator McCaskill. I have had an opportunity to look in
some detail at the Army physical disability evaluation system
inspection that was done by the IG. But I have to tell you, I
do not know how many people are going to read this whole thing.
I would be curious, General, as to whether or not you would
comment on that. I was able to go through here and find the
bottom line, a bottom line slide, and to some extent in the
executive summary.
But at some point in time, these products need to be
consumed, and it is tough, tough reading to get through this
thing. This is really important stuff. This is it. This is why
these bureaucracies have frozen these families into a level of
stress that we just simply cannot accept for our wounded and
their loved ones.
I am curious, how many people do you think in the Army have
read this entire document, besides the people in the IG's
office that wrote it and reviewed it?
General Schoomaker. First of all, that document is the
result of Secretary Harvey directing a year ago----
Senator McCaskill. Right, in April 2006.
General Schoomaker. April 2006, because of--and things have
been getting fixed as we go along. So I do not know how many
people are going to read it, but I can tell you the right
people are going to read it. We have Tiger Teams on top of this
thing. What I believe is that that will only be a piece of what
we will find as we go through it. Because of the nature of what
started that, I think we are going to find lots of things that
we need to work on.
One of the things I think we already testified to is, title
10, which is what DOD operates under, has a different set of
criteria than title 38, which is what the VA operates under,
and I understand Social Security is in even different. So this
really is going to require strategic level transformation and
it is going to have to be driven all the way down into
something that is coherent, because I believe that the
fundamental distrust and frustration that people have in this
business, compensation system, is as fundamental as the
differences in compensation tables and all the kinds of stuff
that are extraordinarily difficult to read, and it leads one to
believe--I mean, if the VA can give 70 percent for something
that DOD gives 40 percent for, there is a fundamental problem
here in terms of people's confidence that this is a system that
works.
So I think that that is only going to be one piece of it,
and I think a lot of people are going to read this and that
they are going to be the people that need to read it so that
the leadership can change it.
Senator McCaskill. I hope that there will be some attempt
to simplify some of the information that is contained in this
report. Make sure the Physical Evaluation Board Liaison
Officers (PEBLOs) read it systemwide. The PEBLOs need to read
this. The people that are working, the doctor who signs the
narrative summary and it takes 2\1/2\ weeks for it to go across
the hall. The person responsible for getting that narrative
summary across the hall needs to read this.
I just think the nature of this document makes it tougher,
and probably I should be having this conversation with the DOD
IG. But I think that to pull out parts of it and simplify it
and make it in a very consumable product for the people in the
system, and then maybe they would realize that their part of
the system may be part of the problem.
General Schoomaker. I think that is a point very well
taken.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you very much. Thank you both.
Mr. Geren. Let me just mention one thing in response to
that. We are going to work to make this system work better and
that is long-term. But in the short-term, there is--and you
address it in the legislation you propose--really no substitute
for having effective patient advocates for these soldiers that
are in rehab and getting treated. We are not going to wait
until that bureaucracy is fixed to stand up for these soldiers.
The command sergeant major that works for them, this colonel
that is going to head up this brigade, and this new position
that was just created, a deputy commanding general at Walter
Reed, a one-star general, his job is going to be bureaucracy-
buster. We are not going to wait for the final fix. These
soldiers are going to have an advocate in that command sergeant
major, are going to have an advocate in that colonel, and going
to have an advocate at the top of the system, this deputy
commanding general that is going to be working directly for
Major General Eric B. Schoomaker, USA, and make sure that they
are represented effectively and that their needs are met today,
not weeks from now, years from now, or decades from now when
this whole system is fixed.
Senator McCaskill. I think that is great. I tell you what
would really, you would get some--I would be clicking my heels
if you could fix some of this stuff before all these
commissions even finish meeting, because I have a feeling that
might take a while.
Mr. Geren. We did put some fixes in place and some of them
are ones that you called for in your legislation. I would like
to get with you and brief you and show you on the ground the
things that we have already taken. In fact, your 800 line, we
are going to have an 800 line up and operational by March 19.
Senator McCaskill. Congratulations. That is great news.
Chairman Levin. We welcome your assurance earlier in the
hearing that you are not waiting for those panels. As Senator
McCaskill says, that is not what your intent is. You are making
these changes as soon as you possibly can and you are not going
to delay them for any report of any of the panels which are
going to be appointed.
Mr. Geren. Changes have already been made. They are being
made as we sit here today and they are going to continue, I
assure you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. Senator McCaskill, thank you.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, let me echo the sentiments of my colleagues in
thanking you for your service to our country. Pete, you and I
go back to our early days, my early days in the House and our
service together in the House Armed Services Committee, and you
have once again stepped in to fill a position in a time of
crisis and, on behalf of all of us, we thank you for your great
service.
General, we are sorry to see you moving on, but you also
stepped forward in a very critical time in the history of our
country and when you were called by the Secretary to put that
uniform on once again you did not hesitate. So we thank you for
your great service.
I cannot tell you how much I appreciate your recognizing
these three men you brought with you this morning. One of them
happens to be a good friend of mine, Staff Sergeant David
Hatton. He is a great Georgian, but most importantly he is a
great American, and I have seen him operate in theater as well
as out of theater, and he represents everything that is great
about America.
I am proud of all those members of the 48th Brigade, but
folks like Staff Sergeant Hatton just exemplify why we have to
continue to equip and train the National Guard and our Reserves
so that they are a seamless operation with our Active-Duty
Force. Under your leadership, we have certainly seen that
continued and it is a true statement more so today than ever
before that there is a seamless transition when they are thrown
into combat together.
Gentlemen, you mentioned in your written statement that you
are in the process of rebalancing and redistributing forces
within the active, Guard, and Reserve components to create the
right mix of high-demand units in each of our Active Duty and
Reserve components. Specifically, you are focusing on the units
and the skills that are in the greatest demand, including
infantry, engineer, military police, intelligence, civil
affairs, and psychological operations, just to name a few of
them.
My question is that if I am a member of the Guard or
Reserve who happens to be in one of those high-demand career
fields, such as civil affairs or military police, and my
position or unit gets shifted to Active Duty, what happens to
me? Where do I go as a member of the Guard or Reserve in that
instance?
General Schoomaker. We are building greater capacity, both
Active and Reserve component, in those kinds of things that you
are talking about. However, there are some people that may
require reclassification. In other words, on the Active side,
we have reduced certain capabilities to increase others within
the different components. We have had to reclassify soldiers,
put them into another career field and do that. We have done
some of that same thing in the Reserve components.
Senator Chambliss. So does that Guard or Reserve member get
a choice then as to where he is redirected?
General Schoomaker. To a certain extent, yes, sir, in terms
of--and I probably ought to have Clyde Vaughn or Jack Schultz
talk about it a little bit, because I think they each have
different challenges in that regard. Part of what they are
doing as they are transforming both the Guard and Reserve is
looking at what the relationships of this unit against the
demographics are and how they are reassociating units in a
better way in terms of how to sustain and retain the soldiers
that way.
I do not know if--where are you at?
General Vaughn. Down here, sir.
General Schoomaker. There you are. Go ahead.
General Vaughn. Sir, with regard to high usage and military
police (MPs)--we are all picking up a lot of MPs--what we are
doing is, what we did some time back----
Chairman Levin. May I suggest you get to a mike.
General Vaughn. Yes, sir.
What we did some time back with BCTs--there was a great
discussion about what the requirement was. What our requirement
was for was a lot of infantry forces along with the engineers
and MPs, as you so well pointed out. So we went through a
transition to move this into maneuver enhancement brigades,
which actually makes it a more usable organization for our
States. We will end up keeping actually more infantry
battalions. We will grow MPs, we will grow engineers.
There is some turbidity associated with modularity in terms
of our combat forces and there will have to be some retraining
that goes with that. But in the end soldiers will have an
adjustment period. If they have to switch to another military
occupational specialty, they will be offered the chance to go
outside of the 50 miles. But we try to keep them within the 50
miles. I think that overall what we are trying to do is to keep
the turbulence down the best we can in the Army National Guard
and the Army at a time of great turbulence just by design. So I
hope we are trying to work through that in the best possible
manner.
Senator Chambliss. I think you are smart to try to make
sure that in these high-demand fields we take advantage of the
capabilities of each of these individuals and their respective
professionals in the private sector. Obviously we are doing
that and we do not want to lose that capability.
Gentlemen, in your written statement you discuss your
recruiting and your retention metrics for 2006 as well as
recent years. What you say in your statement reflects what I
have been hearing myself, which is that although you have not
necessarily met every goal every year, the recruiting and
retention remain strong across the Army.
First I would like to commend you for that because I think
it is a reflection of the great leadership that we have seen in
the Army, and even as hard as we are working soldiers today,
that they still want to sign up and resign up to be a part of
the Army is a great testimony to that leadership.
In particular I think it is important to note that the
retention rate for soldiers in the Guard and Reserve components
that are deployed is higher than those who have not, which is
amazing in some respects. But it is truly a testimony to the
type of people that we have serving in our military today.
Now, I have introduced a bill in the Senate which would
lower the age at which Guard and Reserve members can retire by
3 months for every 90 days they spend on Active Duty in support
of a contingency operation. One of the reasons I have
structured that bill the way I have is to incentivize mid-
career personnel who are being deployed and stand to be
deployed again to stay in the Service by giving them an
additional incentive.
Some observers of the military personnel system have noted
that two unknowns related to how the current operations tempo
is affecting our military are, number one, the long-term effect
it will have on Guard and Reserve recruiting, and two, the
effect multiple deployments will have on Guard and Reserve
reenlistment. I would like for you to comment on what you think
the long-term effect on multiple deployments will have on
Reserve components, and are you seeing any trends in that area
that cause you concern and what are some of the leading
indicators that may indicate that we are having a problem or
may not indicate that we are having a problem there?
Mr. Geren. Let me first mention your legislation. I have
reviewed your legislation. Across the Service--Active, Guard,
and Reserve--we are looking at the retention issue and
obviously recruiting as well, what type of incentives we need
to build into the system to make sure that we do recruit and
retain, some the force overall and some targeted specialties.
As we work to--it will be an evolving process. We will continue
to change the incentive packages both in regard to retirement
and compensation and other career choices. That will change as
the needs of the Service change and also as the recruiting
challenges change. But your legislation is something we are
reviewing as part of this package.
As far as recruiting overall, you noted correctly we have
enjoyed tremendous success. We have met in the active component
our recruiting goals 21 straight months, and we have seen that
the soldiers who have deployed have reenlisted at a higher rate
than those who have not. So the commitment of the soldiers has
been inspiring, the commitment of the soldiers and their
families.
But we recognize over the coming years as we ask more and
more of the force, as the force ages, we are going to have to
do things to keep up with these recruiting challenges. Up until
now we have been successful. I would like to just congratulate
the Guard for one of the most innovative recruiting
initiatives. They have turned every guardsman into a recruiter.
Remember about a year ago when folks were speculating that the
Guard would not meet its 350,000-person goal? They are going to
do that soon. They have had tremendous success with that
program and both the Reserve and the active Duty are looking at
and going to school on what the Guard has done and what they
have accomplished.
So we recognize the challenge here. We recognize as we have
more deployments, we are an All-Volunteer Force in a long war.
We have never had an All-Volunteer Force in modern times fight
a war of this length. It poses some challenges that we have not
addressed before. But we have soldiers that are willing to step
up to the line and we have leaders that continue to adapt the
system to make sure we meet the needs of these soldiers and
their families.
Senator Chambliss. Let me just say too, General Schoomaker,
I have the same concern that Senator McCaskill does about the
C-17 issue. We are flying that airplane today at 150 percent of
projected mission rates, and shutting that line down is going
to be a terrible mistake that we will regret. I just hope we
are going to be able to figure out some way to make sure that
that does not happen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, good to see you. General, I not only thank
you for your service, but I wish you godspeed and, to
paraphrase another former general, I doubt that you are going
to fade away. I think we are going to be hearing from you a
good bit in the future.
I would like to thank you and your staff also for the
meetings that were arranged for me earlier this week. We had a
great series of presentations with General Richard A. Cody,
USA, and Major General Stephen Speakes, USA, which was really
good for me as a former Assistant Secretary of Defense, where I
was working with the Army every day on these force structure
issues and this sort of thing to get up to speed on Army
reorganization, streamlining the divisional structure,
uniformity in terms of falling in on other people's gear when
you are rotating in and out. Also, the streamlining of the
Guard and Reserve missions, which have been mentioned here, and
the hard work that has gone in to find compatibility with local
needs of the different States, those sorts of things--just a
tremendous amount of really forward thinking, and I would
congratulate you and all your staff on that.
General Schoomaker. Sir, thanks for taking, investing the
time.
Senator Webb. I would like to say something else I think
that is really vitally important right now in the way that we
are addressing this whole series of issues that spun out of
Walter Reed. You made a comment which I think is really
important in terms of the public understanding, and I would
encourage the other Army leadership to be pretty
straightforward in explaining it. That goes to the different
nature historically in disability evaluations.
It is one thing--we want the system to work better, no
question about that. At the same time, there has been a
different methodology over the years between what DOD looks at
and what the VA looks at. I will give you a classic example,
two brothers who are both good friends of mine. One is Colonel
John McKay, former marine. He and I were wounded in the same
bunker complex, although at different times. Had his eye shot
out, could not even wear an artificial eye, shattered his
sinus, busted his jaw. He fought to stay on Active Duty for 29
years and was successful in doing that. When he retired from
the Marine Corps, the Marine Corps gave him zero disability
because they said: You are fit for duty; you returned to duty.
He went over to the VA and got a very high percentage.
His brother did the same thing. His brother was a
helicopter crew chief in Vietnam, was wounded badly, took
shrapnel in his back, lost his patella. But he went from the
hospital and returned to Vietnam and did another tour. He got
back out and the Marine Corps gave him zero disability. They
said: You are fit for duty; you returned to your unit. He
walked across the street to the VA and got 60 percent.
There may be a way that we can match these two disability
evaluation systems and we certainly want to work to move toward
fairness. But at the same time, I hope that the leadership in
the military will help the American public understand that
these have historically been two different systems.
I have one concern in this budget and I raised it with you
personally before, and it is the end strength build. I think
the great challenge for the Army is going to be to justify the
build with the prospect of troop levels in Iraq being reduced.
I know you build your manpower to the requirements and these
are your requirements. At the same time, we all know what
manpower does. It is probably two-thirds of your budget when
you get into recruiting, training, deploying, retiring, caring
for people, caring for dependents, dependent schools, all those
sorts of things. It is very, very costly. We are very manpower-
intensive. We are the most manpower-intensive DOD budget in the
world. That is why our budget looks so high when you put it
next to China.
When Secretary Gates was before us I asked him this
question. He said to me that there would be what he called off-
ramps built into the plan, given possible force structure
reductions. I am wondering if that is actually in your planning
phase or how you are looking at justifying the builds?
General Schoomaker. The answer is no, it is not. My view is
that would be a bad mistake, for this Nation to again reduce
the United States Army. I do not think we should reduce the
Army, I do not think we should reduce the Marine Corps, and I
do not think we should reduce our Special Operations Forces.
Senator Webb. No one is saying we should reduce the size of
the Army. What I am saying is, in justifying the build in your
end strength, your challenge is to justify the build in the
environment in which we may be reducing force structure in
Iraq. No one is saying to reduce the actual size. It is in
terms of justifying the growth of the Army. That is the matrix
in which you are going to be asked to do it.
General Schoomaker. I know of no off-ramping that is going
on. I think that we have taken a conservative look at how large
the Army should be. I think the future is going to justify even
a larger Army than we are currently building, because I do not
believe that we are going to see as we go into this century the
kind of reduction in requirement that some people hope for, and
``hope'' is the proper word.
My view is that it is important that we pull this end
strength growth inside the base budget, which all of it does
come in starting in 2009. This year's budget, you see 7,000 of
it coming inside, and I believe that what we are going to have
to do is stay on course here and that the future is going to
inform us on whether we have this about right or not.
I am concerned about whether or not we have enough going
towards building the institutional part of the Army that is
required, because I think that is fundamental to some of these
problems we have in things like training and at Walter Reed and
other kinds of things. The Army right now of all the Services
has the smallest percentage of its personnel end strength
committed to the institution.
Senator Webb. My instinct is to agree with you. I want to
be able to justify that support based on numbers. But I did, I
think as you and I discussed, I spent an entire year back in
the 1980s analyzing Army force structure at the request of
Secretary Weinberger. At that time the active-Duty Army was
761,000.
General Schoomaker. Much larger.
Senator Webb. The bottom line justification after talking
to Army force structure people was that, given the functions
around the world, they have changed in some measure, but that
12 divisions was about as low as the Army could afford to go if
we are going to keep our place around the world.
General Schoomaker. But you remember that the expectation
of the Army's deployment was nothing compared to what we are
experiencing.
Senator Webb. True. We had 200,000 people in Germany at the
time, arguably deployed, but not operational as they are now.
General Schoomaker. That is correct. Living with their
families, with basic quality of life, et cetera. We are talking
about an Army that is operating at an extraordinary rate, and I
think that this is not an anomaly. Now, there are a lot of
people talking differently, but I hope that we do not find
ourselves back into a position that we find ourselves needing
an Army and Marine Corps and Special Operating Forces (SOF)
again and we find ourselves back down at the bottom of the
ramp.
By the way, I go back to remembering when we were taking
down SOF. When I first got into SOF many years ago, it was on
the decline.
Senator Webb. I remember that time.
General Schoomaker. There was only three Special Forces
groups left. It's just our nature, and I think what we ought to
do is get informed about our nature and we ought to counter it,
because it is a cycle.
Senator Webb. I appreciate your comments. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, you pointed out this morning that 55 percent of
our total force is now Guard and Reserve, if I understood you
correctly; is that correct?
General Schoomaker. That is correct, yes, ma'am.
Senator Collins. That certainly explains to me why we have
what I consider to be an overreliance on our Guard and Reserve.
Are you comfortable with that proportion? If you were designing
the total force from scratch today or had a magic wand, what
proportion would be Guard and Reserve?
General Schoomaker. I would be much more comfortable if
there was something more on the order of 60 percent Active and
40 percent Reserve. I think our Active Force is too small. I
think we are doing the right thing now in building this active
Force. Again, if we are going to maintain this level of balance
then we are going to have to invest in the Guard and Reserve to
make sure that they are effective as an operational Reserve,
which I think we are doing.
Senator Collins. I was really surprised that more than a
majority of the force was Guard and Reserve, and that seems
like an issue this committee should really take a hard look at
in terms of whether we have the right force structure and
whether we are asking too much of our Guard and Reserve.
General Schoomaker. If I could be so bold, since this might
be my last hearing----
Senator Collins. That is why I am asking.
General Schoomaker.--and it might not, but there is a lot
more political constituency for Guard and Reserve, and I
believe it was not taken down proportionately because of the
political clout that the Guard and Reserve has as opposed to an
Active Force. So there is no military rhyme or reason for us to
be where we are. It has to do with the politics. I think that
what we need to do is we need to get ourselves organized for
the realities of the future and we ought to balance ourselves
in such a way that is commensurate with how we are going to use
these forces.
Senator Collins. Since I chair, or used to chair rather,
the Homeland Security Committee, I am also very aware of the
role that the Guard plays in responding to natural disasters
and other emergencies. I am just concerned about how much we
are asking the Guard to do.
General Schoomaker. Ma'am, if I could just say something
here. I am a big fan of the Guard and Reserve.
Senator Collins. As am I.
General Schoomaker. I think that in this century that we
had better have an effective Guard and Reserve, not only to
reinforce us operationally away, but we better get better at
our homeland security, homeland defense issues. I do believe
that we are on borrowed time when it comes to what is going on
in this century.
Senator Collins. I certainly agree with you.
I want to switch to a different issue and ask both of you
to comment on the next question. All of us have seen how the
advances in military medicine, the extraordinary treatment on
the battlefield, have allowed far more of our injured troops to
survive than in other conflicts. But in the last week I have
met with constituents, including a neurologist, who have
expressed to me significant concern about the increased number
of traumatic brain injury (TBI) cases and whether they are
being caught and screened.
This neurologist from Maine in particular told me of a
soldier who came to him who had been diagnosed with post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and that was not the problem
at all. He had a TBI that had been missed.
I also met with some other experts from Maine. I have had
letters from constituents who have expertise in dealing with
these injuries, and they are expressing a pattern that I am
seeing here, a common concern that some of our troops are being
diagnosed as just having--not ``just,'' because it is serious
as well, but as having PTSD, when in fact they have a TBI.
They explained to me that that is an injury that can be a
silent killer if it is misdiagnosed. Many of these individuals
have advocated that every servicemember should be screened for
TBI upon their return from deployment, as well as at
separation.
General, I am going to ask you to comment first. Should we
be doing more in this area? Are we providing sufficient
funding? I am very concerned about this. It is coming up from
people whom I really respect and who are giving me actual cases
of Maine soldiers with brain injury who are misdiagnosed.
General Schoomaker. I think I share your concern. I will
tell you, of course I am not an expert on this, but my brother
is commander at Walter Reed now and he has been my brother for
a long time and he has been informing me about his concerns
about the things we do not know about this and how it is
emerging now, the body of knowledge is increasing on it. It is
very confusing.
I will tell you, yesterday I happened to be at one of our
regional medical centers looking at, just checking things out
and talking to the leaders and stuff. I will not name which one
this is, but there was a soldier there that had been diagnosed
with PTSD that never deployed. So we are finding--one would
say, how could this be? The fact of the matter is there are all
kinds of traumatic things that can occur in life that have
these kinds of symptoms. Of course, when we have a soldier that
is on Active Duty with this, whether it is Guard, Reserve, or
an Active soldier, we have a responsibility to treat it
regardless of the cost.
So I think this is an area that has not been well-
understood, that because of this we are now learning a lot
more. I believe your concerns are valid, that we must explore
this and must make sure that we understand, because this is a
readiness issue. If these effects are delayed effects, there is
no commander that wants to have somebody with these kinds of
problems committed back in another rotation into combat. That
is not what any logical commander would want.
So if we do not understand how to measure it and we do not
know what it looks like and these things have delayed effects,
then we have to get smarter pretty quick here because of the
nature of how we are operating.
Senator Collins. Secretary Geren.
Mr. Geren. On that same point, does our disability system
accurately reflect that injury and anticipate the impact of
that injury later in that soldier's life? Those are issues we
have to examine. The Surgeon General has appointed a task
force, with the southeast medical commander, to look at TBI
specifically. But there is much we have to learn about that.
You also mentioned PTSD. We now estimate 10 to 15 percent
of all of our soldiers that are coming back from deployment are
experiencing some degree of PTSD. These are two issues that we
are concentrating on, have deep concerns about, certainly share
your concerns. But I would be the first to tell you we have a
lot to learn in that area. When you think about it, the issues
are varied as well. It is not just medical, not just clinical.
But just as in civilian life, people are reluctant to come
forward and deal with psychological or emotional problems. The
culture is the same in the Army, maybe more so. There is a
reluctance to admit you have a problem in that area.
We now have a predeployment and postdeployment assessment,
a mental health assessment for all of our soldiers. We are
making headway in that area, but we have a ways to go. The
long-term look at the disability system is going to have to
look at these areas and make sure we are capturing the needs of
the soldiers now and the needs of the soldiers long-term. I do
not think right now we could say that we are doing that
effectively.
Senator Collins. I agree. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks, Mr. Secretary, General Schoomaker. Thank you very
much to the impressive group behind you, I might say. Thanks
for your service to our country at a very challenging time. In
fairness, thanks to Secretary Harvey in absentia for the great
job that he did.
General Schoomaker, I join everybody in wishing you well in
the next chapter. It has been a real honor to get to know you.
You have been in my opinion a very strong leader in the Army.
You have also been a uniquely persistent and I think effective
advocate for the Army, both within Congress and within the
Pentagon. That is really very important for the Army and for
our country.
I want to just say a word about the last subject before I
go to some questions about Walter Reed. I do not want to spend
my time on a question, but I think I am going to put a letter
to you, Mr. Secretary, maybe to the Surgeon General. At the
hearing we had about the Walter Reed problems on this
committee, I raised the question about whether we should take a
second look at the BRAC decision about Walter Reed. I do not
have a conclusion about it, but here is the question that I
want to raise. I wonder whether there was adequate attention
paid by the BRAC to the demands on our health care, our
military health care system, that will be generated now and in
the years ahead as a result of the very high level of activity
of engagement that the Army will have in the war we are in with
radical Islam, which is not going to end any time soon.
It just seems to me that, notwithstanding the horrific,
embarrassing conditions of Building 18, that some of the
buildings out there are state-of-the-art. It could well be that
it still makes sense to move them all to different places and
build some new stuff, but I am thinking really more in terms of
demands on the system and whether this is the right moment. I
am not talking about not doing anything up at Bethesda, but
whether this is the right moment to close down that facility as
we see a lot more demand coming along.
I am not going to ask you to answer that right now. I will
send you a letter on it.
Those thanks I offered for your service----
Senator Warner. Senator, would you--before you joined us
here, I raised that question. This is on my time. We will not
take yours.
I suggest--I am trying to work through, and I would enjoy
your advice on it, a system by which recognizing Walter Reed is
currently playing a vital role and recognizing there is some
uncertainty about when Bethesda through additional construction
and funding can take part of Walter Reed and a new hospital--
and a spade has not even been put in the ground down at Fort
Belvoir--that Congress look at staying the timetable of the
closure of Walter Reed and, as the Chief of Staff and the
Secretary said, maintaining the quality of care with funds
until there is a perfect meshing of the gear wheels as Walter
Reed goes out and the other two medical centers come on line.
So that is what we are looking at now.
Senator Lieberman. Senator Warner, I think that is a very
good proposal and I would support it. Here is the question. I
go beyond that. I would like somebody who is much more of an
expert on this than I am to make some projections about what
the demands on the Army's medical system are going to be for
the next 25, 30 years, and to decide whether, assuming a
seamless transition, the new facilities that are contemplated
are going to be enough to handle it, so that we do not look
back and say, why the heck did we close some of those buildings
at Walter Reed; they were just state-of-the-art. Besides we
need the space.
This is a non-expert question I am asking. That is why I am
going to ask it of the experts. But in either case, I think
your idea is an excellent idea.
Mr. Geren. If I could just add one point.
Senator Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. Geren. This is addressing the need in the short-term.
General Eric Schoomaker, the head of Walter Reed, one of the
initiatives he has already undertaken in the short time he has
been there is to look across the system outside of Walter Reed
and where the services can be performed elsewhere in the
medical system, make sure we are utilizing the capacity
elsewhere as well. That kind of a look at the system I think is
overdue, and I applaud General Schoomaker for looking out
across the system and making sure that we are utilizing all of
our capacity as best we can, making sure that we continue at
Walter Reed to provide the highest quality care. I assure you
he is committed to that.
But he has undertaken a review and tasked his staff to look
at other options to make sure that we use all the resources to
meet all of our soldiers' needs and do not let any area go
underutilized.
Senator Lieberman. That is encouraging news and I
appreciate it.
When I thanked you earlier for the tremendous job you and
your whole leadership team have done in the Army under
difficult circumstances, I really mean it and I mean it in part
because of what you two have said here today--and General, you
have said it for quite a while now--which is that this is a
classic where demands are going way up on the Army and to a
certain extent supply has not gone up commensurately. By that I
mean I believe the Army, as you do, is underfunded and
understaffed, and it has been quite remarkable we have been
able to do what you have been able to do. But this cannot go on
the way it has been.
As you come to the end of this career, assuming that no one
convinces you to come back out of retirement, you said a few
times that you do not think the current increase in end
strength to 547,000--which incidentally does not happen until
fiscal year 2013--that that is not enough, and that is my
suspicion.
Assuming for a moment that the money is not an issue, how
high would you take the end strength of the Army?
General Schoomaker. Well, sir, first of all, let me say
that, remember the 30,000 that we have been growing is a down
payment on the 74,000 that we are talking about.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Schoomaker. Our estimates were that we probably,
our conservative estimates in the past, were we probably ought
to see an active end strength somewhere around 565,000,
something like that. But my concern really goes back to the
institutional thing that I was talking to Senator Webb about. I
worry that we have taken too much risk in the important aspects
of the Army, like the medical system, like the education and
training system, the kinds of things that support and are so
important to the Army, because we have taken a lot of
efficiencies there and I worry we have overreached a little.
Senator Lieberman. Talk a little bit more, get down a
little deeper into that, because that was the next question I
was going to ask you. The institutional Army is, except in a
moment of great unexpected public attention like the Walter
Reed situation, is the part of the Army that nobody really sees
or generally sees outside of the Army. So what is happening and
why is it happening? Who are we talking about?
General Schoomaker. We are talking about all of the
business side of the Army. We are talking about drill sergeants
and instructors and teachers and people that support
maintenance, all of the kinds of things that happen. I am not
just talking about headquarters now. I am talking about people
who make--they are the people down in the engine room of the
Army, that keep the--as an example, and this is--each of the
Services is different and it is not fair to mirror image
because they are not mirror images of each other. But the Navy
and the Air Force, almost 50 percent of their structure is in
the institution.
Senator Lieberman. The Army?
General Schoomaker. We are down, we have gone from about 31
percent. We are on a move down I think to around 27 percent.
Senator Lieberman. Much too low in your opinion?
General Schoomaker. It is too low. So when you take a look
at Walter Reed--I was talking yesterday; as I said, I was at a
medical center. We have lots of soldiers now that are being
supervised by civilians. I am not sure that is the smartest way
to develop our medical personnel through the system, not just
because of the technical thing, but because of the leadership
side and because of the professional development aspect of it.
So I applaud what we have done to move soldiers into the
operational force, but we may be on a path of overreaching in
terms of what is smart for the long-term.
Senator Lieberman. That is what I was going to ask you.
Maybe it is self-evident. Is the institutional Army down in
percentage because you have had to take soldiers out of the
institutional Army into the operational Army?
General Schoomaker. Yes. Part of our program of trying to
grow the Army in this time of war is to move civilians into
positions that civilians can do that does not require a soldier
totally to do. We just have to be careful with that. I am not
suggesting it is not the right thing to do, but we have to be
careful how far we go with that. There may be a couple areas
where we have overreached a little.
I am concerned about Training and Doctrine Command as an
example, which is where we train and educate our force.
Senator Lieberman. Yes, exactly.
General Schoomaker. It is a very, very important part of
what we do. The Medical Command is another. Our institutions--
part of the situation we had at Walter Reed is a direct result
of the A-76 study and the garrison that is out there. All of
our installations out there are run by garrisons. That is part
of the institutional Army. It is not part of the operational
Army. Somebody has to repair the roof and fix the plumbing and
mow the grass and all the kinds of things you have to do so
that we do not have these soldiers coming out of the
battlefield and running lawnmowers and then going back to the
battlefield. We have to train them and have them go.
So that is the kind of thing I am talking about, and I
think we may be on the path of overreaching just a little bit
there.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you very much for your words. I
hope they resonate and echo throughout the years ahead and I
wish you well and your family well. Thank you.
General Schoomaker. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
On the issue that Senator Lieberman raised and was talking
to Senator Warner about, you have indicated that the new head
of Walter Reed, General Schoomaker, is doing a study of the
utilization of all of our medical facilities. I am wondering,
who is doing this review?
Mr. Geren. It is not a study. He actually instructed his
staff to look to put patients where you have facilities that
are underutilized; actually an operational decision, not a
study, but to identify opportunities so we could make sure we
could continue to meet the needs at Walter Reed and use
capacity elsewhere.
Chairman Levin. Who is going to be doing this review of the
timing and the need for Walter Reed, whether or not we should
reconsider? Is there someone who has the responsibility inside
the Army to be taking another look at the Walter Reed BRAC
issue plus the need issue which Senator Lieberman raises, the
timing issue which Senator Warner raises? Is that
responsibility assigned to somebody?
Mr. Geren. There is a task force and the Army is
represented on it. It is a joint task force that looks at all
the issues, the planning for the new facility.
Chairman Levin. No, not just that. But there is a new issue
that has been raised, should we reconsider at least the timing,
but maybe even the total desirability of the Walter Reed
closing decision? Obviously we ought to be very careful because
it is a BRAC issue and it is decided and once you reopen that
issue all hell breaks loose in terms of a lot of other BRAC
decisions which would like to be reviewed by some people.
But my question is, is there such a review going on of, the
review of Walter Reed's closing, both in terms of desirability
and timing to do the seamless approach that Senator Warner
talked about and the need issue which Senator Lieberman has
raised? Is that assigned to somebody?
Mr. Geren. At this point the decision is to proceed with
BRAC. Dr. Robert M. Gates has focused on this personally and I
have been at meetings with Dr. Gates and discussed this. We do
not want to reopen BRAC. We want to make sure that Bethesda and
Belvoir are done and done on time or sooner and make sure that
we maintain the quality at Walter Reed up until that point.
That is the commitment of the DOD.
Chairman Levin. I think what you better do at a minimum is
to get to this Mr. Chairman a letter telling us how that
seamless transition is supposed to--what is the current plan,
what is the capacity of Walter Reed, how is that capacity going
to be handled seamlessly if we proceed on the course that we
are on. Can you get us some kind of an overview of that so we
have something specific, at least as a starting point?
Mr. Geren. I will, Mr. Chairman.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Military Health System (MHS) Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC) 2005 actions in the National Capital Region (NCR) include the
realignment of Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) to the Walter
Reed National Military Medical Center (WRNMMC) in Bethesda, MD; a new
community hospital at Fort Belvoir, VA; and closure of the WRAMC main
post.
WRNMMC will be a combination of new construction and partial
renovation of the existing National Naval Medical Center. As currently
planned, construction at Bethesda will start in March 2008.
Establishing the new Fort Belvoir community hospital will involve all
new construction and will start in January 2008.
At Bethesda, prior to initiation of construction, there will be a
transition plan ensuring continuation of services and capacity
throughout the duration of the project. This transition plan will
likely involve use of ``swing space'' on the Bethesda campus, plus the
potential need to consolidate clinical service(s) or support functions
at WRAMC while portions of NNMC are under construction.
In October 2010, construction of the new medical facilities will be
complete. In mid-to-late fiscal year 2011, there will be a final
transition from WRAMC to WRNMMC, plus a transition from WRAMC to the
new Fort Belvoir community hospital. These late fiscal year 2011
transitions will be part of closing the WRAMC main post.
The transition plan at WRNMMC will be tightly linked to the
construction schedule. The design effort for the WRNMMC is not
sufficiently advanced to provide a construction schedule. Once a
sequence of construction is established, then NCR planners will develop
a parallel transition plan that migrates/moves services and functions
such that NCA multi-service market maintains clinical capability and
throughput. It is anticipated the transition plan will be completed
late in calendar year 2007.
In keeping with Joint Commission requirements, the transition
planning will include specific attention to facility related life-
safety issues, infection control, and robust clinical case management
to ensure no disruption in continuity of care. Transition planning will
focus on aggregation of projects to minimize number and duration of
moves. When physical movement of a service is necessary, the transition
site will have all amenities required for patients and families. In
addition to these non-negotiable clinical tenets, the transition plan
will include a vigorous communications plan providing:
Advance notice of move
Education and training about new sites or pathways
Trained support staff to assist patients and families
with transition related issues/concerns
On May 25, 2007, the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved the
Acceleration/Enhanced Scope initiatives at WRNMMC and the new Fort
Belvoir community hospital. The Acceleration/Enhanced Scope initiative
at WRNMMC will simplify transition planning as the functions necessary
to accomplish high acuity inpatient care will have optimal adjacencies,
be consolidated at one location in the NCR, and include family support
services.
Chairman Levin. I have two questions. I know Senator Warner
has a couple. On FCSs, General, the Army recently adjusted the
FCS program and deleted 2 of the 18 planned systems, deferring
two more, and taking $3.4 billion out of the program over the
fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2013 POM years. Were there
problems with the program or was that a budgetary decision?
General Schoomaker. Sir, we were cut over. Over the last
several years we have been getting cut a little bit each year.
So what we are trying to do is set our priorities and keep it
within executability.
Chairman Levin. So that was a budget issue.
Another medical question which has arisen recently has to
do with reports that the Third Infantry Division (I.D.) has
changed the medical profiles of soldiers who have medical
conditions so that they could be sent to Iraq as part of the
Third I.D.'s accelerated deployment to support the surge. Did
the Third Infantry Division change the medical profiles of the
Third I.D. soldiers so that they would be deployable?
Mr. Geren. Sir, I am aware of those allegations and
concerns. Major General Rick Lynch, the commander, has
conducted a commander's inquiry into those allegations. I have
requested that commander's inquiry. I have not received it yet.
We take any allegation of that seriously, as did the commanding
general on sight, and the commander's inquiry is completed and
I have requested to have it sent to me and I will review it and
share the results with you.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Department of the Army Inspector General conducted a thorough
inquiry into this matter. The issue that soldiers with medical profiles
assigned to the 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division (3rd BCT, 3 ID) were
reevaluated and their physical profiles improperly changed was found in
only 1 instance of the 75 cases reviewed.
Of the 75 soldiers assigned to the 3rd BCT who were reevaluated by
medical personnel in February 2007 at the direction of the commander,
only one soldier's profile was improperly changed, allowing that
soldier to be deployed in March 2007. That soldier had a permanent P3
profile that was improperly changed. When the soldier continued to have
medical issues, he was reevaluated in theater and redeployed to Fort
Benning, GA, on April 9, 2007.
This soldier's medical profile was improperly changed from ``P3''
(a permanent profile indicating one or medical conditions or physical
defects that may require significant limitations) to ``P2'' (some
medical condition or physical defect that may require activity
limitations) and was subsequently deployed. However, the evidence
indicated that the soldier's ``P3'' profile was changed to ``P2''
because the reviewing physician mistakenly believed that the ``P3''
profile had not been properly approved by two profiling officers, one
of whom was a physician approving authority, as required by AR 40-501.
Evidence also indicated that the profiles of five other 3rd BCT
soldiers were properly changed from ``P3'' to ``P2''. These changes
were authorized because these profiles had not been properly approved
by two authorized physicians as required. After being reviewed, these
profiles were properly changed and these soldiers deployed. Five other
soldiers had their profiles changed from ``P2'' to ``P3'' and those
soldiers did not deploy. The profiles of the remaining 64 soldiers
under review were not changed. Evidence indicated that 34 of the
soldiers whose profiles were reviewed actually deployed.
The issue that commanders and leaders improperly ordered soldiers
to perform duties and functions in violation of their physical profiles
was not founded. In several cases, soldiers presumed that they could
not be deployed to Iraq because of their temporary profiles and that
deployment, in and of itself, would violate their profiles. AR 40-501,
Standards of Medical Fitness, states that properly processed medical
profiles do not, in and of themselves, determine a soldier's
deployability. Rather, a medical profile is a recommendation from a
medical professional. The decision to deploy a soldier remains with the
commander. For example, a soldier with a properly processed profile
could be assigned to serve in an administrative role. In most cases, a
soldier could perform that duty, within the limits recommended by his
or her profile, at his or her home station, or deployed. Although a
commander that is responsible for accomplishing a wartime mission would
likely want to deploy with as many of his or her soldiers as possible,
no evidence suggested that 3rd BCT commanders tried or intended to
compromise the medical welfare of their soldiers. Rather, the evidence
reflected that soldiers were deployed and assigned duties and functions
within their physical limitations and consistent with their profiles.
If the soldiers had received properly authorized P3 or P4 profiles they
could not have been deployed until their profiles were referred and
reviewed by a Military Occupational Specially Medical Retention Board
or the soldiers had been processed through the Physical Disability
Evaluation System and found to be fit.
The issue that 3rd BCT, 3ID soldiers were intimidated and harassed
in retaliation for informing Salon.com about their unit's deployment of
soldiers who had physical profiles was not rounded. Evidence does not
indicate soldiers were the subject of retribution for contacting the
media. Nor is there evidence to indicate that the soldiers' chain of
command pursued or threatened any acts of reprisal in retaliation for
the soldiers' communications with the media.
Chairman Levin. You do agree, though, that it would be
inappropriate for an Army unit to change a soldier's medical
profile to qualify that soldier for deployment to a combat
zone? Would you agree with that?
Mr. Geren. Yes, sir, if that was the motivation, yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. If that was the case.
Mr. Geren. Circumstances may change and the profile may
change, but as far as if that is the motivation, absolutely,
sir.
Chairman Levin. For that purpose it would be improper?
Mr. Geren. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Senator Warner.
Mr. Geren. Mr. Chairman, could I correct the record on one
point? I said 21 percent earlier. I was passed a note: It was
19 percent, not 21 percent.
Chairman Levin. Thank you for that correction.
Mr. Geren. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. Chairman Levin, this has been a very good
hearing and we are going to do our best to support the Army in
every respect with its request. But we should close out in a
recognition of the Army family, the support system that is
probably the most important of all. We saw examples in the
distressing chapter of Walter Reed where families were often
filling the gap in many respects.
I just want to get the assurance from both of you that this
budget keeps in place, as best you can, those family systems
whereby they can step in and help their uniformed member of
that family in all types of circumstances.
Mr. Geren. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. Is that correct?
Mr. Geren. It does. The commitment of the Army is to ensure
that we maintain the quality of life and we give the families
what they deserve. The strain the families are under right now,
it is humbling to consider it, and I can assure you that is our
commitment, sir.
General Schoomaker. I tell you, sir, we still need to get
that military construction budget and the BRAC, because we have
quality of life issues in there, we have child care centers in
there, and all kinds of things that are part of that issue that
you are talking about.
Senator Warner. I hope that will be forthcoming. Not to
point fingers at anyone here in Congress, those issues so far
as I know are being addressed by our leadership to try and have
those funds which are badly needed forthcoming. You are under
that impression?
Chairman Levin. Yes.
Senator Warner. Thank you, gentlemen, very much. Your
staff, the very impressive support team you have here today.
Chairman Levin. Just one clarification. General, you talked
about the definition of the surge and contrasting it with
something which was----
Senator Warner. Plus-up.
Chairman Levin. Plus-up, as you call it. You indicated a
surge--a surge, as it is characterized, there has to be a plan
to come off of that surge. You indicated that it was your
understanding that the plan would be somewhere between August
and the end of the year to come off the surge. Is that an
understanding which is shared by the Secretary of Defense?
General Schoomaker. Sir, I cannot speak for the Secretary
of Defense, but it is certainly that which has been discussed
by the Chiefs.
Chairman Levin. They understand that? Do all the Chiefs
understand that?
General Schoomaker. We understand that--our belief is that
a surge is different than a plus-up. The timing is going to be
dependent upon the commander on the ground in Iraq and the rest
of it. But in our view, a surge is different than a plus-up.
Chairman Levin. Is there a shared feeling that that would
mean somewhere between August and the end of the year, as you
feel?
General Schoomaker. That is my personal belief. Now, what I
have understood----
Chairman Levin. Not necessarily?
General Schoomaker. I have not had anybody tell me that is
the official----
Chairman Levin. Or that that is shared by the other Chiefs?
General Schoomaker. Sir, I could not speak for the other
Chiefs.
Chairman Levin. How about the Chairman?
General Schoomaker. Nor could I speak for him. That is
certainly my understanding of my conversations with the
Chairman. Whether or not he agrees with that----
Chairman Levin. Is it your understanding that that is his
understanding or you just do not have any understanding about
that? Is it your understanding that that is also his
understanding, or you just do not have----
General Schoomaker. He heard me say that. I have not heard
him make a decision or a conclusion or do anything definitive
with it. I think that--and I am talking about the Chairman and
the Secretary of Defense, in conversation with the Central
Command Commander and General Petraeus on the ground, and I
think this is an issue here. My understanding was that that was
the ballpark that we were talking about.
Chairman Levin. Have you heard anything different from the
Chairman?
General Schoomaker. I have heard no decision.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, in view of the seriousness of
the question, which both of us raised, perhaps we should
collaborate on a letter to have this clarified, because it is,
I think, extremely important to all, not only to Congress but
to the DOD as it is carrying forth with this plan of the surge
now.
Chairman Levin. I do agree with that.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I wanted to come back, General, just for one last question
about the end strength of the Army, because we got off on a
discussion about the institutional Army, which was important.
Look, my concern is that, with what we are facing around the
world, that we are going to get to a point where our military
strategy is going to be determined by a shortage of personnel,
not by what is the best military strategy.
I agree with you that the idea that the high-tech equipment
is enough and we can use a smaller Army--with the conflict we
are facing now, with the enemy we are facing now, if I might
quote your straight talk, it is ludicrous.
So I want to give you a chance, since this is your last
appearance before us, to leave us with a goal. When I asked you
what you thought the end strength of the Army should be, you
said, I believe you said, a minimum or a conservative estimate
would be 565,000.
General Schoomaker. Active.
Senator Lieberman. Active, exactly. What should our goal be
beyond the minimum, beyond the conservative estimate, for what
the Active Army should be in the years ahead?
General Schoomaker. Sir, I think you almost have to go back
and think of this in kind of a generic context. Strategy is the
application of ends, ways, and means.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Schoomaker. You and I have had this conversation
before.
Senator Lieberman. Yes, we have.
General Schoomaker. There are people that are very loose
with talking about what the end state is and how we are going
to get there, but very few people want to sign up to what it
costs you, the means to get there. My view is we have a
strategy right now that is outstripping the means to execute it
and to sustain it. I think our current tempo of operations
exceeds what the QDR said that our strategy was going to be and
I believe that our resources up to this point have undershot
even what the QDR said they are supposed to be.
Senator Lieberman. Well said.
General Schoomaker. So I think what we have to do is take a
look at what do we believe the demand is going to be on this
force, the joint force, into the future and, looking at that
demand, how are we going to sustain that? Again, I go back to
what--the QDR rule said that in normal times a soldier, sailor,
airman, or marine on Active Duty should have three increments
of dwell for every increment of deployed. We agreed that a
surge was going to two increments of dwell for every increment
deployed.
We are now operating at one to one and going short of that.
That is not sustainable. So what it says is the strategy is not
resourced or the equation is not balanced in the strategy.
Therefore, I think that what we have to do is say, what is the
demand, and do the equation back and figure out what means are
required.
Now, the reality is we may come up with a number that is
unaffordable, which means you have to change what end state you
want to go to, or you have to come up with a different way of
getting to the end state that you want.
Senator Lieberman. Or you have to decide that the end state
is important enough that you have to find a way to afford it.
General Schoomaker. So then you get into the old, what I
have talked in front of this committee many times about before
as George Marshall said in the middle of World War II: Before
the war, I had all the time in the world and no money; and now
here I am in the middle of World War II and I have all kinds of
resources and no time.
So we put soldiers ashore 3 years after the Germans invaded
Poland, without rifles. Every tank we put ashore in North
Africa was knocked out. Patton landed with training ammunition.
It is well-documented. This Nation has always gone to war
short, because we get into the roller coaster. We are always
late to need and therefore we pay a huge premium to get ready,
and we are always late to need.
Body armor. The United States Army when I came on board, we
were manufacturing body armor at the rate of about 1,200 sets a
month. It was going to take over 40 years to put body armor on
the entire United States Army. We were manufacturing some 34
up-armored Humvees. I mean, hell, there was less than 500 of
them in the entire Army. We had a requirement for only 235 of
them in Iraq. Today we have a demand of over 15,000 up-armored
Humvees in Iraq and we have been through all kinds of
iterations of getting there. Now we are going to MRAP.
So what I am saying is we are acting very consistent with
our past. I believe we ought to educate ourselves. We ought to
look at what we are paying, what we can afford to pay, what our
strategy requires, and we ought to resource it. We ought to
quit trying to go on the cheap and we ought to quit worrying
about what the traditional pie has been and who gets what, and
we ought to talk about what this Nation's priorities and what
our affordability is.
I have been very consistent in the last 4 years talking
this way. I believe we have made some progress, but I still
think that we are undershooting the obvious. This is a very
dangerous time. This Nation is at great risk for an enemy that
we are not accustomed to fighting. We are adapting to that
enemy. This is not the Cold War and the Soviet Union any more,
and we are at risk here at home and we are going to have to
deal with an enemy that is fighting in an irregular fashion,
and even our other potential foes are now looking at these
irregular techniques to incorporate into their conventional
forces. We are going to see this in the future. It is not going
to go away.
Yet, in our own Department we still hear people talking
that when this is over we are going to go back down to normal.
There is no normal. This is the new normal. So I hate to be--I
am sorry to be pedantic on this, but I really do believe this
is real. I really do believe that we must take a very strong
look at how we should balance this and we ought to talk about
what strategy really is, the application of ends, ways, and
means, and we ought to figure out whether our appetite is
affordable or whether we are going to reduce our appetite to
our checkbook or whether we are going to come up with different
ways of doing business.
But we have to come to grips with this.
Senator Lieberman. That is a very wise statement built on
experience, and it should be heard as a clarion call because
the appetite here we are talking about is national security. If
this is a long war, which I believe it is, which we are all
calling it, we are not, to use your appropriate word,
resourcing to fight that war.
Also, the enemy we are facing is not going to be taken out
with a lot of high tech equipment alone. This enemy will be
defeated with personnel, with people.
So I hope we can live up to, in the years ahead, to the
charge and challenge that you leave us with, and every now and
then we will expect you to come back and shout a little more to
make sure we are.
General Schoomaker. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. I think you also, though, would agree that
it is not just a matter of adequacy of resources; it is a
matter of where those resources and how those resources are
allocated against a very different type of an enemy. It is not
necessarily a larger amount, by the way. It may be. So we have
to do it. But it also may be a very different way of allocating
resources in terms of where we put our focus for a totally
different kind of an enemy, for a much longer kind of a
conflict.
Senator Bill Nelson, I am going to not only call on you as
our last questioner, but I am also going to ask you to close
because I must leave. Senator Nelson.
Thank you both, gentlemen, again.
Senator Bill Nelson [presiding]. Mr. Chairman, adjusting to
the new normal, maybe we ought to be listening to our generals,
such as General Shinseki with regard to the occupation, and
retired General Garner with regard to the disbanding of the
Iraqi army once we were in.
It is most revealing that in your comments about the
equipment in adjusting to this new normal--it is not normal
that mammas and daddies would be calling me in the early part
of the war saying that their sons and daughters did not have
the body armor, and that when the Florida National Guard got
there that they did not have the kind of body armor that the
other troops had. That is not normal.
So it must be very frustrating to you as the Chief of Staff
to have to deal with those kind of shortages.
General Schoomaker. Sir, I would say that it is not right,
but it has been consistent and normal with the way we have done
business in the past, and it is not right. We should not
continue to do business that way and we are not. We are
resourcing the Guard and Reserve. We are resourcing the Active
Force and we have asked for what we need and we are moving very
fast.
But quite frankly, my view is we should have started this
fight resourced the way we are trying to get resourced now.
Senator Bill Nelson. Amen to that.
General Schoomaker. Which I think is your point.
Mr. Geren. The differences that you refer to regarding the
Guard, there were clear differences. They were not organized
the same, they were not equipped the same, and they did not
train the same. But our commitment now is to organize, train,
and equip. It is one Army--Active, Guard, and Reserve--and we
are making a significant investment to make sure that the Guard
has the same kind of equipment that the Active-Duty does, over
2005-2013 spending nearly $37 billion on Guard equipment alone,
both modernization in aviation and in ground equipment.
So the goal of this budget and this Department is to make
sure they are organized, trained, and equipped the same, they
are all one Army, best-led, best-trained, best-equipped Army we
can put in the field.
Senator Bill Nelson. Four years ago, as you said, they were
not organized, equipped, or trained the same. Yet they were
asked to do the same mission as the Active-Duty Forces.
General Schoomaker. That is correct.
Senator Bill Nelson. I want to ask you about recruiting.
Your comments?
General Schoomaker. We had the best year in 9 years in the
Active Force and the best year in 13 years in the National
Guard last year. We are on track again this year to have a very
good recruiting year and meet our goals. I think it is
extraordinary that 6 years into a wartime period that we are
getting some very good young men and women that are stepping
forward to do this. I think it is heartening.
Senator Bill Nelson. How about the Reserves?
General Schoomaker. The Army Reserves did about--Jack?
General Stultz. Twenty-five percent higher than the year
prior.
General Schoomaker. Twenty-five percent higher than the
year prior. They are still challenged a little bit more, but
part of their challenge is that the primary source of Army
Reserve soldiers is soldiers leaving Active-Duty, is one of
their biggest. Of course, we are growing the Active Force and
it really challenges the Army Reserve in that regard.
Senator Bill Nelson. So the Army Reserves are meeting their
goals in recruiting?
Mr. Geren. They are not. The Army Reserve has fallen a
little short. Active and Guard both are exceeding their goals
in recruiting. They are all three exceeding their goals in
retention. The Army Reserve I believe was at 90 percent last
month--90 percent for recruiting, so 600 short of our goal.
Senator Bill Nelson. So with regard to the Active Forces
and the Guard, according to the last couple of years of
recruiting it is going to meet our goals for not only keeping
the force structure that we have, but increasing the force
structure?
General Schoomaker. That is correct.
Senator Bill Nelson. That is a good report. What do you
have to do about the Reserves to get them up?
General Schoomaker. I will let the Chief of the Army
Reserves talk about what he is doing, because he is pretty
sharp and he is working hard.
General Stultz. Yes, sir, and I happen to come from
Florida.
The Army Reserve right now, sir, we are about 600 short.
Last year we recruited 25,000 soldiers. The year before we
recruited 19,000. So we are on an upward slope of increasing.
This year we have increased above what the 25,000--now we are
saying we need about 28,000 to keep growing. What we are going
to do is we are learning from the Guard and the Guard is saying
that their strength is getting their soldiers to go out and
recruit within their own communities. We are community-based.
So we are taking that lesson and we are incorporating what
Clyde Vaughn has already started and we are going out in our
communities.
But the other thing we are doing is, our soldiers are
citizen soldiers and so what I have done is I have started
talking to the employers of America and I have talked to police
forces, I have talked to police departments in Florida, New
York, California, Arizona. They are having a hard time filling
their ranks. I have said: Why do we not work together? When I
recruit a soldier, I am looking for a 17- to 24-year-old drug-
free physically fit high-aptitude soldier. The chief of police
in Queens, NY, I had a conversation with him 3 weeks ago, he
said: I am looking for the same guy. I said: Then why do we not
work together? Why do I not go into a high school and a kid
says, I want to be in law enforcement, I will say: Join the
Army Reserve and I can give you a job; where do you want to
live?
Schneider Trucking, J.B. Hunt Trucking are looking for
truck drivers. I have truck drivers. Why do I not become an
enabler to employment. So that I think is the key to success,
is take our citizen soldiers and help our employers of America
grow in terms of their strength by the quality of their
workforce by hiring our soldiers. That is going to be the key
to, I think, making our numbers in the future.
We are going to make our numbers. I am not worried about
that. The quality of the force we are getting right now is
better than we have ever had before. When I go to Iraq and I
promote two young E-4s to E-5, one of which has a master's in
financial planning, one of which is a young lady that just got
a bachelor's in molecular biology, the quality of that force is
enormously greater than where we were in 1979 when I joined the
Army Reserve.
So we are going to make our numbers, but we are going to go
to school on what the Army Guard is doing in learn from them.
Senator Bill Nelson. General Schoomaker, we have had
upwards of 40 percent of the total force in Iraq is Guard and
Reserve. As you project in the future, what percent of that
force will be Guard and Reserve?
General Schoomaker. I think we peaked during, what was it,
2005?
General Lovelace. 2004.
General Schoomaker. 2004, where we were up approaching 40
percent. I think now we are talking about being in the 20, 25
percent. Where are we going to?
General Lovelace. It is going to be about 30 percent.
General Schoomaker. Thirty percent.
General Lovelace. We dropped down to 20 percent and then
it, with the new mobilization policy it's pushing back up to 30
percent.
General Schoomaker. So we were moving to 20 percent. With
the new mobilization policy we will be approaching 30 percent
again. We are looking at shorter mobilization periods, which
means that what we will be doing is turning--actually, three
rotations become four rotations because of the new mobilization
policy.
Senator Bill Nelson. General, since you were here last week
on the issue of the hospitals, I have gone to one of the TBI
hospitals, the one in Tampa. They are doing a very good job.
They have an old facility that needs upgrading. They are
crowded and especially so since so much of the care is often
with a family member that is there with them. Their facilities
are considerably crowded compared, for example, in the same
hospital to the spinal cord injury unit, which also is having a
great deal of success.
I would call that to the attention of the Secretary as
well, even though that is a VA hospital. As a result of last
week's hearing, we see that we have to have the coordination
and the cooperation between the two. I think those attempts are
happening.
But on the very day that I was there, which was Monday, we
had another example of where a soldier at first on Active Duty
and then released, had gotten bounced around in the system.
This calls for greater cooperation. So that this particular
soldier had been sent to another VA hospital and basically they
said, ``we cannot help you,'' but nobody was there to tell him:
``What you need to do is get to the Tampa hospital, to the TBI
unit,'' and make him an appointment.
It took that soldier calling his Senator in order for that
to happen, and then once it did he is now getting the care, but
delayed care. So we are going to have to confront that over and
over.
The other thing that we are going to have to confront is
that Active-Duty soldiers are not being told that they can get
treatment in private facilities; if the military hospitals and/
or the coordination with the VA hospitals is not occurring,
that they have the ability under their insurance system to get
care in private facilities, and they are not being told that.
Now, that is directly Active-Duty, Mr. Secretary, and I would
implore you to try to get that communication out into the
organization.
Thank you. The meeting is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
growth of the army
1. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, last year the Department of
Defense (DOD) presented to Congress a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
that asserted that the National Military Strategy could be executed at
low-to-moderate risk by holding the Active Duty manning levels of the
Army at pre-Iraq war levels of 482,400. It further asserted the Army
National Guard (ARNG) should be reduced from 350,000 to 333,000. The
Department abandoned its position on the Army Guard within days of
releasing the QDR. Now, 1 year later, the Department is proposing to
increase the size of the total Army: the Active-Duty Army to 547,400,
the ARNG to 358,200, and the Army Reserve to 206,000. What has changed,
if anything, in the National Military Strategy since the QDR was
submitted to warrant the proposed growth in the Army?
General Schoomaker. There has not been a change in the National
Military Strategy nor the QDR Force Planning Construct that has driven
the Army to request an increase in its end strength. During QDR 2006,
the Army was tasked with building 70 brigade combat teams (BCTs) (42
Active component (AC), 28 ARNG) to meet the strategic challenges that
threatened the Nation, while building supporting force structure that
would enable the Army to shift its balance away from our traditional
focus. This 70-BCT force relied on predictable, assured access to the
Reserve component (RC) that would generate 18-19 BCTs per Army Force
Generation (ARFORGEN) rotation once all conversions were completed in
fiscal year 2013. However, current global demand on the Army has
exceeded our capacity to provide forces within the ARFORGEN construct,
compounded by the years of insufficient modernization investments. To
meet the global demand for the long war and to provide strategic depth
to the Nation, the Army proposed a plan to grow end strength across all
three components to increase operating force capabilities, with modest
increases in the Institutional Army and Individuals Account to retain
structure needed to effectively recruit, train, and support the growth
in the operating force. The proposed end-strength growth will provide
the Army with 76 BCTs (48 AC, 28 ARNG) and over 200 multi-functional
and functional support brigades. These 76 BCTs, and the additional
Combat Support Brigade (Maneuver Enhancement) with supporting tactical
combat formations, will generate 22-23 BCTs at a surge rotation rate
(1:2 in the Active and 1:4 in the ARNG) by fiscal year 2013.
2. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, if the strategy has not
changed, then in your view, did the DOD incorrectly assess the forces
necessary to implement that strategy in the QDR?
General Schoomaker. QDR 2006 was a collaborative effort between the
Services, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) to define the strategy to meet future war requirements. QDR 2006
also provided insights for the Joint Staff and the Services to do
additional analysis based on the effects of Phase IV/V (Stability/
Enabling Civil Authorities) operations on the joint force, and the
means for building partnership capacity through the combatant
commanders' security cooperation plans. The force assessments and
associated resourcing decisions for Army forces supported that
strategy. The challenge is that since QDR 2006 the sustained
requirements for the Global Force Demand now exceed that strategy. OSD
has acknowledged that capabilities shortfall and provided support to
the Army's proposed plan to increase capabilities to mitigate the risk
associated with that shortfall gap.
3. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, on what basis is the growth
of the Army justified?
General Schoomaker. A key objective of the proposed growth in the
Army is to increase capabilities and improve readiness for both current
and future challenges. This proposed growth reflects clear recognition
on the part of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and Congress
that we expect persistent conflict for the long war and need to build
strategic depth. We know from our national experience that this is a
time consuming process dependent upon an investment in manning,
equipping, training, and caring for our people. Likewise, this growth
will depend upon our capacity to build and maintain the infrastructure
needed to recruit, train, and sustain these forces. Coming out of QDR
2006, the Army was building toward 70 BCTs (42 AC, 28 ARNG) to provide
18-19 BCTs per annual ARFORGEN rotation. To maintain the momentum of
transformation while meeting the operational demands of the war on
terror, the AC was growing by 30,000 with the temporary authority by
Congress. Since QDR 2006, the global demand has exceeded that capacity.
The Army is now seeking permanent growth to provide strategic depth and
meet global demands of the long war. The proposed growth in the Army
will provide 76 BCTs (48 AC, 28 ARNG) and over 200 support brigades
with assured and predicted access to the RCs. Under surge rotation
rates of 1:2 in the Active and 1:4 in the ARNG, the Army will be able
to provide 22-23 BCTs per rotation when we include the Combat Support
Brigade (Maneuver Enhancement) with its organic combat capabilities.
This increase in Army rotational depth and capacity also will expand
our ability to support requirements outside of the war of terror,
participate in multi-national exercises, and peacekeeping operations
around the world. This proposed growth will improve the Army's ability
to meet the increasing global force demand and reduce stress across the
force.
4. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, what will be the impact on
organizational structure, including the operational and institutional
parts of the Army, and on the manning, training, and equipping of the
force, including transformation to the Future Combat Systems (FCS)?
General Schoomaker. The proposed growth increases capabilities in
the operating force and Institutional Army across all three components
to include additional combat brigades, the reduction of high demand/low
density capability shortfalls, and the addition of needed combat
support and combat service support units. Under the growth plan, by
fiscal year 2013, the Army's end-strength will increase in the AC to
547,400; in the ARNG to 358,200; and in the Army Reserve to 206,000.
The total end strength increase of 74,200, along with the rebalancing
of force capabilities within the RC, will grow the operating force by
over 80,000 spaces and reduce the military strength in the
Institutional Army to 80,000 vice the 75,000 spaces as previously
programmed. As we grow the Army we must retain an adequate
Institutional Army capability to generate and sustain the force. One of
the Army's strengths is its investment in formal training and
development of leaders. Additionally, the ability of the Army to
maintain and rest our forces for future contingencies is largely
resident in the Institutional Army. In order to recruit, train, and
care for soldiers and their families, the capacity of the Institutional
Army must be preserved and strengthened. Under the proposed plan, the
Army will complete organizing, manning, and training by fiscal year
2013; equipping of the BCTs by fiscal year 2015; and equipping of the
multi-functional and functional support brigades by fiscal year 2019.
The plan is synchronized with the transformation timeline for the FCS.
supplemental request criteria
5. Senator Levin. Secretary Geren, many of the funding requests for
Army equipment appear to be distributed arbitrarily between the fiscal
year 2008 regular budget request and the 2007 and 2008 global war on
terror supplemental requests. What criteria have you used to determine
what equipment is appropriate to include in the 2007 and 2008
supplemental requests as opposed to the regular fiscal year 2008 budget
request?
Mr. Geren. Many lines of equipment have been requested in both the
regular (base) budget request and the supplemental requests. While
these requests may appear to be arbitrarily spread across the 2007 and
2008 supplemental requests and 2008 base budget, they are in fact not
arbitrary.
The OSD establishes the criteria for supplemental funding requests.
In short, this guidance is that emergency supplemental requests must
address the incremental costs above the baseline funding needed to
support specific forces and capabilities required to execute Operation
Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Jump Start.
Therefore a single line of equipment may be found in both the base
budget and the supplemental requests depending on the nature of the
requirement. If the requirement is for normal replacement of equipment
or a programmed fielding, then the request is in the base budget. If
the requirement is an incremental increase resulting from the ongoing
global war on terror, or the acceleration of a capability required for
global war on terror, then the request will be in the supplemental even
though the same line item may be found in the base budget.
force protection technologies
6. Senator Levin. Secretary Geren, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 included language strengthening
the role of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)
with respect to the testing of force protection technologies. This
includes direction to the Services to ensure that the DOT&E is made
aware of all ongoing force protection technology development and
acquisition programs. How are you working with DOT&E on the testing of
force protection technologies?
Mr. Geren. The Army will work with DOT&E with a view toward
adequate testing and analysis of systems to ensure safety-of-use and to
demonstrate the capabilities and limitations of materiel delivered to
warfighters. Army will comply with DOT&E's April 9, 2007 request for
support on force protection equipment and non-lethal weapons to ensure
the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines get the very best test and
evaluation on the force protection systems the Department provides.
7. Senator Levin. Secretary Geren, what processes have been
established to comply with the congressional directive on notifying
DOT&E of Army force protection programs?
Mr. Geren. On April 9, 2007, the Director of DOT&E issued a
directive to the secretaries of the military departments requiring each
to identify and submit a list of all force protection and non-lethal
weapons programs as part of the established process for preparing the
annual OSD Test and Evaluation Oversight List. In response to this
directive, the Army has directed all program executive offices to
provide a consolidated list of their programs that meet the criteria
for force protection and nonlethal weapons identified within the
directive for submittal to DOT&E.
collaboration with israeli defense forces
8. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, I understand that the Israeli
Defense Forces (IDF) are currently developing and evaluating a vehicle-
based active protection system to defend against rocket-propelled
grenades and other threats. I also understand that the Army is
attempting to develop similar systems. Are there any formal data
exchange agreements or cooperative activities between the Army and IDF
to better understand each other's technologies, capabilities, testing,
collateral damage, or integration issues or the planned use of the
active protection systems?
General Schoomaker. The Army does not have any formal data exchange
agreements with the IDF that cover active protection systems. With
respect to cooperative activities, the Army participates in a
Technology Round Table with the Israel Ministry of Defense and conducts
staff talks with the IDF. Within these fora the Israelis have kept the
Army current on the development of their active protection systems.
deploying soldiers with medical conditions to iraq
9. Senator Levin. Secretary Geren, the committee has received
reports that state that the 3rd Infantry Division changed medical
profiles of soldiers with medical conditions so that they could be sent
to Iraq as part of the 3rd Infantry Division's accelerated deployment
to support the surge. Both you and General Schoomaker testified that it
would be improper to change a medical profile for the sole purpose of
making a soldier deployable. You also indicated that a commander's
inquiry was being conducted. Who is conducting the investigation for
the Army?
Mr. Geren. On March 13, 2007, the U.S. Army Forces Command
(FORSCOM) Inspector General (IG) received an Inspector General Action
Request from the Department of the Army IG (DAIG). The FORSCOM IG
opened a case on March 13, 2007, and initiated an inquiry. DAIG will
retain oversight of the inquiry.
10. Senator Levin. Secretary Geren, will the investigation include
interviews of the soldiers identified to the Army as having their
profiles changed?
Mr. Geren. Yes. DAIG conducted witness interviews of the soldiers
identified as having their profiles changed. DAIG provided to FORSCOM
IG audio files of six witness interviews conducted at Fort Benning, GA,
on March 15-16, 2007. FORSCOM IG summarized the sworn testimony and
DAIG provided verbatim transcripts of the sworn statements. The
summarizations and transcripts will serve as exhibits of evidence in
the Report of Investigative Inquiry (ROII).
11. Senator Levin. Secretary Geren, has your investigation
determined whether the 3rd Infantry Division downgraded medical
profiles of 3rd Infantry Division soldiers so they could be deployed to
Iraq?
Mr. Geren. The ROII is ongoing and FORSCOM IG will submit the
completed ROII to DAIG upon completion; at which time we can better
answer this question.
12. Senator Levin. Secretary Geren, do you know whether other Army
units are changing soldiers' medical profiles to qualify more soldiers
for deployment to a combat zone?
Mr. Geren. There have not been any identified complaints at this
level of other Army units changing soldiers' profiles to qualify more
soldiers for deployment to a combat zone.
13. Senator Levin. Secretary Geren, please provide a copy of the
report of investigation to the Senate Armed Services Committee for the
record.
Mr. Geren. DAIG will submit a completed report to the Senate Armed
Services Committee once it has been finalized.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
comanche
14. Senator Reed. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, when the
Comanche program was terminated in 2003, the Army and Congress agreed
to reinvest the entire program funding into Army aviation
modernization. How is the revised aviation strategy being executed?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The Army terminated the Comanche
program in order to make funding available for restructuring Army
aviation to reflect current and anticipated needs; increase aircraft
survivability, sustainability, and operability; divest programs that no
longer meet the needs of the changing operational environment; and
extend aviation capabilities. The Comanche program reinvestment
strategy modernizes Army aviation by accelerating development and
procurement of Aircraft Survivability Equipment, Apache engines Block
III conversions, Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters, Light Utility
Helicopters, UH-60 Black Hawks, CH-47 Chinooks, and Future Cargo
Aircraft (now called Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA)). Reallocating Comanche
funding also included investment in the common cockpit, fly-by-wire,
aviation munitions, and investment in Army Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
(UAV) requirements. Funding for Army aviation programs is being
executed in accordance with the Army Modernization Plan. All funds
resulting from the termination of Comanche remain within Army aviation
to fix deficiencies.
15. Senator Reed. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, how much
money was transferred and for what purposes?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. A total of $14.7 billion became
available from the Comanche termination which was reinvested in order
to train, sustain, and equip Army aviation.
unmanned aerial vehicle programs
16. Senator Reed. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, the Army
Warrior UAV system is currently being developed and procured to provide
direct support at the division level and below. Other systems are also
being deployed today to serve in direct support for Army tactical
operations. What is the status of the Warrior program?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The Army Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC)-approved Extended Range/Multi-Purpose (ER/MP)
Warrior Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) program continues its success in
system development and demonstration (SDD) of the acquisition system.
The critical design review was completed in October 2006 and the design
readiness review followed with completion on December 21, 2006. The
milestone decision authority gave approval to proceed with the
production of SDD hardware, with air vehicle deliveries to begin in
October 2007. The hardware includes the One System Ground Control
Station that is interoperable with other Army unmanned aircraft and
common with the Navy/Marine Corps Shadow systems. The Product Manager
continues activities in preparation for the limited user test scheduled
to occur May-June 2008, prior to milestone C decision and low rate
initial production contract award.
17. Senator Reed. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, the Air
Force has continued with its procurement of the Predator UAV system,
also being used in Iraq and Afghanistan. How are the acquisition
strategies and battlefield use of the two platforms coordinated between
the Army and Air Force?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. Acquisition Strategies: The
Predator UAV is a legacy advanced concept technology demonstration
system, while the Army JROC-approved ER/MP Warrior UAS is an
acquisition program. On November 8, 2006, Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics requested the
Army and Air Force collaborate on the Warrior and Predator programs to
improve acquisition efficiency and provide better capability to our
warfighters. A memorandum of agreement was drafted and the concept was
endorsed by both Services. On January 23, 2007, the Chief of Staff, Air
Force (CSAF) procured two Army Warrior air vehicles to determine the
applicability for meeting future Air Force requirements. On March 5,
2007, the CSAF requested to be executive agent within DOD for Medium-
High Altitude UAS. Due to the Air Force's executive agency activities,
collaboration efforts ceased and have not resumed.
Battlefield Coordination: The Air Force uses a method of strategic
satellite ``reach back'' for operational control and UAS mission
execution. These UAS missions are flown via satellite from Nellis Air
Force Base. The Army operates its UAS within a division's battle space
in direct support to commanders on the ground. Army UAS missions are
planned, coordinated, and executed from start to finish from the same
location as the supported ground commander. Air Force flies pre-planned
mission sets with limited ability to respond to re-tasking while the
Army conducts dynamic and responsive missions with on demand re-tasking
capability as required to support the ground fight. Both Army and Air
Force UAS missions are coordinated through the air coordination order
and air tasking order and are under positive air traffic control.
18. Senator Reed. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, should we
have a single Service, such as the Army, serving as executive agent for
both platforms?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The Army does not support a
single Service executive agent for medium and high-altitude UAVs. The
Army recommends the OSD uphold the 2005 decision to use the Joint UAS
Materiel Review Board (JUAS MRB) and the Joint UAS Center of Excellence
(JUAS COE) in lieu of a single Service executive agent. The JUAS MRB
and the JUAS COE can and will work and achieve the Air Force's
executive agency goals. With full support, these organizations will
enable full joint Service buy-in and resolution of issues.
Additionally, to continue the research and development of UAS and meet
the DOD's UAS requirements, we must create an environment of
competition within industry. Competition promotes innovation,
challenges industry to achieve a higher level of technological
achievement, and spurs investment. The Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and
Special Operations Forces have all benefited from competitively
selected solutions and are already sharing UAS training, logistics, and
systems development in three formal programs. The DOD should continue
on its present course of developing inclusive, synergistic
complementary capabilities to fuse the contributions of each Service.
science and technology
19. Senator Reed. General Schoomaker, you showed a number of
technologies here today that are the result of investments in science
and technology (S&T). But your fiscal year 2008 budget request reduced
S&T investment by over $1 billion with respect to fiscal year 2007
appropriations and is even below the fiscal year 2007 original budget
request. Do you think we are risking not developing the next generation
of technologies like the ones you showed us with this low request?
General Schoomaker. Despite the demands of the ongoing global war
on terrorism, the Army has been able to maintain its S&T investment at
over $1.7 billion for each of the past two budget requests. We believe
this level of investment is sufficient to support our acquisition
priorities consistent with our broad resource demands.
20. Senator Reed. General Schoomaker, what areas of S&T investment
do you think this committee should consider adding funds to as we look
at your budget request?
General Schoomaker. The area of force protection technologies
continues to be our top priority investment and has shown promise in
providing innovative solutions for platform and soldier protection.
bradley reactive armor tiles
21. Senator Reed. General Schoomaker, what is your assessment of
the effectiveness of Bradley Reactive Armor Tiles (BRAT) in dealing
with current and future battlefield threats?
General Schoomaker. The BRAT A2 tile defeats the current threat and
is adequate against the projected near-term threat. A reactive tile
technology improvement that is being tested now is expected to improve
BRAT capability against the anticipated evolution of that threat.
Active protective systems under development, combined with BRAT, also
counter the projected anti-tank guided missile threat in the near- and
mid-term.
22. Senator Reed. General Schoomaker, is the current budget request
sufficient to continue the development and fielding of this equipment?
General Schoomaker. Overall, yes. To date, BRAT fielding has been
funded with supplemental dollars and congressional additions to the
Bradley budget modernization line; there were no dollars for BRAT in
the base budget. We have sufficient BRAT procured to buy-out production
for the next year, but we anticipate a delay in reaching the Army
Acquisition Objective (AAO) due to redirecting funds for ``belly''
armor in Iraq. The Army will mitigate this shortfall by modifying the
base budget request (expected in the President's budget requests for
2009-2013) to ensure the AAO for BRAT is achieved. In regard to funding
current BRAT technology development, efforts are on track and should
result in some common reactive materiel solutions.
alternative landmine technologies
23. Senator Reed. General Schoomaker, the Army has invested
resources in the development of advanced mine warfare systems--
including Spider and the Intelligent Munitions Systems. Army
requirements currently dictate that a deployed system have the ability
to be operated in a ``target activation'' mode. Many experts and public
citizens are advocating the banning of weapons systems that utilize
this ``target activation'' mode and would require the Army to only use
systems in a ``man-in-the-loop'' mode. What is the basis for the Army
requirement for a ``target activation'' mode in the systems?
General Schoomaker. The basis for the Army requirement for a
``target activation'' mode in the Spider System resides in the Joint
Requirement Oversight Council-approved Spider Capabilities Procurement
Document, dated March 10, 2006. The basis for the Army requirement for
a ``target activation'' mode in the Intelligent Munitions System (IMS)
resides in the Future Combat System (FCS) Operational Requirements
Document, dated December 16, 2005, Army Requirements Oversight Council
Validated Change 2.
The Spider/IMS military tactics, techniques, procedures, and self-
destruct/self-deactivation features will ensure that the target
activation capability is not abused or does not result in
indiscriminate effects. A field of Spider/IMS munitions is always under
the control and observation of U.S. forces. If autonomous operation is
permitted by the mission rules of engagement (and if autonomous
operation was enabled during set-up of the munitions field), the
operator decides whether the presence of hostile forces require
autonomous operation. The operator can revert back to man-in-the-loop
control of the field at any time. When operating autonomously, Spider/
IMS munitions will initiate a self-destruct/self-deactivation timer to
prevent creating a residual hazard to civilians.
24. Senator Reed. General Schoomaker, what technologies (sensors,
data fusion, communications, munitions, others) would need to be
developed in order to have systems operated in the ``person-in-the-
loop'' mode provide the same capability as those operated in the
``target activation'' mode?
General Schoomaker. Generally speaking, adding a ``person-in-the-
loop'' increases system complexity, cost, and response time between the
sensor and the decisionmaker. Automated sensor systems are pursued to
specifically reduce these cost drivers. Even with a ``person-in-the-
loop'' the greatest unknown in response activations to a threat is how
to validate intent of subject(s) of interest. With a ``person-in-the-
loop,'' the most critical technologies to maintain relevant response
times are those that enable networks, communications, and decision
tools.
joint improvised explosive device defeat organization
25. Senator Reed. Secretary Geren, how are Army research,
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) efforts coordinated with the
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Office (JIEDDO)?
Mr. Geren. In April 2006 the Army created the Army Asymmetric
Warfare Office (AAWO) within the Army's Operations Directorate. One of
the primary missions of the AAWO is to be the Army's link to the
JIEDDO. The AAWO IED defeat division executes this mission by
coordinating all Service IED defeat actions to validate, prioritize,
integrate, and synchronize potential IED defeat initiatives. An
important component of this effort is ensuring Army RDT&E efforts are
coordinated, synchronized, and supportive of JIEDDO efforts. The AAWO
consolidates Army input from the Army Research, Development, and
Engineering Command, the Army Test and Evaluation Command, and the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,
Logistics, and Technology to represent the Army position on multiple
JIEDDO research working groups, and as a voting member on JIEDDO review
and funding boards. Each of the Army RDT&E entities also provides
direct support to JIEDDO for their respective areas such as assessments
and recommendations on technology, testing, and evaluations, and
technology development.
rand arroyo center
26. Senator Reed. Secretary Geren, how much of the work of the RAND
Arroyo Center in fiscal year 2006 was in direct support of Army
activities related to the global war on terror?
Mr. Geren. Out of 55 total RAND studies conducted during fiscal
year 2006, only 2 were specifically devoted to the global war on
terror: they are the Continuing Military Operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq, Comprehensive Data Collection and Defining the Behaviors of
Adaptive Enemies--Theory to Tools.
army laboratory issues
27. Senator Reed. Secretary Geren, in August 2006, six of the
directors of Army laboratories wrote a letter to the OSD expressing a
number of concerns regarding the state of the in-house laboratory
system. Please review this letter and indicate whether you share these
concerns and endorse some or all of the directors' proposed remedies.
Mr. Geren. The Army recognizes the importance of having a highly
competent workforce performing research and development. The Army
recognizes the concerns of the laboratory directors regarding changes
from the current S&T reinvention laboratory authorities as they
transition to the National Security Personnel System. The Army is
reviewing the laboratory directors' recommendations to assess their
potential efficacy and feasibility.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
mine resistant ambush protected vehicles
28. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, is the
amount of the Army's funding request for Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected Vehicles (MRAPs) limited by budget concerns, or by production
capacity?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The Army requires full funding,
or $2.8 billion, in April 2007 to begin fielding by October 2007. If
the funding is received, we can field the initial 2,500 vehicles by May
2008. The exact number of MRAP vehicles to be procured hinges on the
testing and performance of the initial MRAP vehicles. The next
increment of funding is needed by October 2007 to buy beyond our
initial request. Production capacity is dependant upon several factors,
but we believe it supports our procurement plans to ramp up to 440
vehicles per month.
29. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, what is
the total requirement for MRAPs?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The Army will initially buy up to
2,500 MRAP vehicles while maintaining the flexibility to buy up to
17,770 vehicles. Incremental procurement will be based on theater
commanders' performance assessment of the initial vehicles.
30. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, how many
MRAPs are funded in the current request?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The fiscal year 2007 main
supplemental request and fiscal year 2007 supplemental amendment
provide for an expected 706 vehicles. We will have firm quantities once
the Army down-selects to the chosen vehicles to be procured. If our
fiscal year 2007 funding requirement--to include the $1.999 billion
unfunded requirement--is resourced, we can procure about 2,500 MRAP
vehicles. The Army will continue to work with the OSD to request and
obtain this required funding.
shortage of resources in modernizing equipment
31. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, the
posture statement states the challenges the Army must overcome to
modernize its equipment. Specifically, 80 percent of its budget is
committed to sustaining people, maintaining vital infrastructure, and
preparing equipment for combat deployment. This limits the Army's
ability to fund investment accounts. Given the significant commonality
between the equipment needs of the Army, and that of the Marine Corps,
what have you done to leverage your resources with the Navy to fund
investment accounts for modernization of equipment, such as the FCS
development?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The Army and Marine Corps have
been engaged in leveraging service resources to fund investment
accounts for modernization of equipment, such as the FCS development.
The Army and Marine Corps established the Army and Marine Corps Board
(AMCB) in October 2003. Co-chaired by the Army G-8 and the Marine Corps
Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources, charter membership
includes the service leadership responsible for requirements, concepts,
and acquisition. There are also non-charter member-participants from
other Services, staff agencies, the United Kingdom (or ``UK'', a
coalition participant since January 2004), and Australia (requested
selected participation in June 2006).
AMCB's mission is to identify, develop, review, and resolve issues
with Army and Marine Corps concepts, capabilities, and service-approved
requirements and programs to pursue potential joint warfighting
interoperability and material solutions that provide a single ``DOTML-
PF''--Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and
Education, Personnel and Facilities--solution in order to save service
costs in RDT&E and gain economies of scale through large order
quantities. AMCB reviews address Army and Marine Corps-focused issues
emerging from: the previous programming cycle; OSD reviews; and new
internal and external initiatives or issues supporting current
operations. Since its inception, the AMCB membership has addressed such
issues as the Joint High Speed Vessel, Rapid Fielding Initiative, Army
Operational Needs Statements, Marine Corps Universal Needs Statement,
Army and Marine Corps Blue Force Tracking/Command and Control
Convergence, UAVs (an expanded AMCB venue to include commanders in
chief, allies, all Services, and the Coast Guard), Coalition Combat
Identification, Aircraft Commonality, Tactical Wheeled Vehicle
Strategy, and the MRAPs. Future issues scheduled for AMCB review are:
Soldier as a System, Biometrics, and High Capacity Communications
Capability.
moral waivers, personnel shortages, and policy toward gay and lesbian
servicemembers
32. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, in your
posture statement, you state that attracting and retaining high quality
people is one of the Army's core objectives. There have been numerous
media reports about how the Army has increased the number of waivers it
has given to new recruits who have criminal records. At the same time,
we continue to discharge quality soldiers who happen to be gay
(although the numbers of people discharged for being gay has dropped by
50 percent since September 11). Many of the discharged soldiers have
had critical skills, such as Arabic speakers and other linguists,
intelligence experts, and medical personnel. The Washington Post
recently reported that in 2005 alone, 49 medical workers were
discharged. Given the significant recruiting challenges the Army faces
as it continues to grow, and given that Army regulations already
address the appropriate conduct of troops both on and off duty, do you
think it would be appropriate to consider the discontinuation of the
``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' policy for the military?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. Although there has been an
increase in the number of moral waivers granted over the past 4 years
(fiscal years 2003-2006), the increase is reflective and consistent
with the increase in civil convictions nationwide. A majority of
enlistees who were granted moral waivers committed the offenses in
question while a juvenile and have had no subsequent legal problems.
The Army does not anticipate negative trends resulting from their
enlistment or adverse impacts on the overall quality or capability of
the force at this time.
The Army's policy on homosexuals implements DOD policy. DOD policy
implements Federal law. Specifically, the DOD policy and Army policy
flow from section 654 of title 10, U.S.C. Section 654 pertains to all
branches of the Armed Forces and makes several findings with regard to
homosexuals serving in the Armed Forces. As a result, any discussion of
homosexuals in the Armed Forces must start with the congressional
findings and involve all branches of the Armed Forces. Under this
provision, the Army does not and will not ask a servicemember about his
or her sexual orientation, nor is a servicemember required to tell
anyone in uniform their sexual orientation. Further, the Army is bound,
both ethically and by law, to prohibit harassment and takes appropriate
punitive actions against those found guilty of harassment of any kind.
33. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, can you
explain why the military could not simply rely on regulations covering
military conduct?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The Army's policy on homosexuals
implements DOD policy. DOD policy implements Federal law. Specifically,
the DOD policy and Army policy flow from section 654 of title 10,
U.S.C. Section 654 pertains to all branches of the Armed Forces and
makes several findings with regard to homosexuals serving in the Armed
Forces. As a result, any discussion of homosexuals in the Armed Forces
must start with the congressional findings and involve all branches of
the Armed Forces. Under this provision, the Army does not and will not
ask a servicemember about his or her sexual orientation, nor is a
servicemember required to tell anyone in uniform their sexual
orientation. Further, the Army is bound, both ethically and by law, to
prohibit harassment and takes appropriate punitive actions against
those found guilty of harassment of any kind.
acquisition activities
34. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, the Army
posture statement states that one of the strategies to meet the core
objectives is to accelerate the Army's efforts to transform and
modernize. The need to ``develop FCS, new aviation systems, and over
300 advanced technologies and systems'' is specifically cited. With the
Army's budget being significantly increased to meet its increased
demands, resets, and modernization, I am concerned about the Army's
ability to manage the additional acquisition dollars. Numerous problems
with DOD's acquisition activities have come to light recently,
including improper use of sole-sourcing contracts and outsourcing of
contract processing to other agencies It seems possible that the DOD
acquisition workforce is understaffed. What steps are you taking to
make sure that these problems are addressed, and that the Army's
acquisition dollars are spent wisely?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. Growing the Army accelerates the
pace of systems production while increasing the numbers of systems
produced. Such activity requires collateral growth in the
infrastructure that supports the acquisition of systems ranging from
individual equipment to complex weapons systems that equip soldiers and
units. Effective acquisition management of these systems is the
responsibility of the program executive officers (PEOs).
Current acquisition policy and procedures permit the flexibility
for the PEO to develop and document the acquisition strategy that is in
the best interest of the Army. We require the PEO or designee to
carefully review and certify the use of any non-DOD contract vehicle
over $100,000 and to fully justify the use of sole source procurements
with approvals by the appropriate procurement officials.
There has been an increase in procurement funds between 2006 and
2007, most notably attributable to the $8.5 billion for reset
requirements resulting from the global war on terror. To manage these
additional resources, specific accountability measures were emplaced
throughout the Army Secretariat and Army Staff to track the execution
of the resources against requirements and outcomes with the results
reported to us as the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff, Army.
The PEOs provide monthly updates on the obligation of the dollars and
commensurate weapon systems and equipment produced, which are
integrated into the Army's reporting process.
Accordingly, the Army acquisition workforce and Army acquisition
corps are experiencing unprecedented workload in support of the global
war on terror, which impact all Army acquisition organizations and a
majority of the acquisition career fields. We recognized that our
staffing levels may be inadequate to provide the requisite execution,
oversight, and fiduciary responsibility for recent increases in
funding. In order to relieve some of the stress on our PEOs and their
respective project and product managers, the Army Acquisition Executive
delegated authority to hire up to 110 percent of the respective PEO's
authorized manpower to ensure they have the necessary staff to meet the
warfighter's demands. We will also be conducting a functional
organizational analysis of several acquisition organizations to ensure
the organizations have the right structure to achieve mission success.
The Army remains confident that appropriate oversight and execution
of our programs supporting modernization and transformation are
occurring at all levels.
army national guard and reserves
35. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, during
the early 1970s, the Army was reorganized so that the Regular Army
could not conduct an extended campaign without mobilizing the Guard and
Reserves. It is not clear, however, that the Defense Department
leadership at that time anticipated the kind of protracted conflict we
are facing today with the global war on terror, with an Army that is
comprised of 55 percent National Guard and Reserves. With the current
Army organization, is the Army too reliant on the National Guard to
meet its global commitments? In other words, are we fighting a
sustained war with a peacetime organization?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The Army Generation (ARFORGEN)
model, which is designed to supply a steady flow of ready forces,
integrates the complementary Active and Reserve component capabilities.
With ARFORGEN and sufficient resources, the Army will continue to field
the best led, equipped, manned, and trained cohesive units. Once
ARFORGEN is in place and generating a steady flow of ready forces, our
models indicate that to maintain a 1 year at home to 2 years deployed
ratio, and a 1 year deployed and 5 years home for the Reserve and
National Guard, the Army could sustain a long-duration deployment of
170,000 soldiers in any given time period.
36. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, since
our Army force structure consists of 55 percent National Guard and
Reserves to 45 percent Active Duty, have we reduced our capability to
deal with threats and natural disasters at home by relying on the
National Guard to provide extended support to our national interests
abroad?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. Army National Guard (ARNG) and
Army Reserve contributions to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have
affected the readiness of units at home. Still, important efforts are
underway to increase and to improve response and support to incidents
in the Homeland. We are investing approximately $36 billion in ARNG
equipment from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2013. The majority of
this equipment will have utility for both domestic and warfighting
missions. In the short-term, the States have negotiated Emergency
Management Assistance Compacts to provide capabilities to each other if
requested. Although the Army is taking risk with equipment procurement,
all components working in concert will support the ARNG in its mission
of aiding and assisting the States in responding to domestic
emergencies and homeland defense missions. The Army is taking
significant steps to address ARNG equipment requirements, and the
fiscal year 2008 budget fully funded the ARNG's requirements.
37. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, according to press reports,
the head of the National Guard Bureau, General Blum, testified before
the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves on January 31 that
the Guard needs a total of $40 billion to get their equipment up to
``an acceptable level of readiness.'' How would you assess General
Blum's $40 billion unfunded requirement list, if you are familiar with
it?
General Schoomaker. The $40 billion figure mentioned by General
Blum includes all shortfalls across the Army and Air Guard, to include
operation and maintenance, personnel, and equipping costs. According to
General Blum, the Army shortfall is $24 billion and is fairly
consistent with our documented shortfall. At the time he released the
information, the Army had programmed $21.1 billion against that
shortfall. With the release of the fiscal year 2008 budget, the funding
programmed from 2008-2013 is $36.7 billion, which addresses their
shortfalls and continues to address modernization.
38. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, how much of that is funded
in the current Army Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)?
General Schoomaker. The $40 billion figure mentioned by General
Blum includes all shortfalls across the Army and Air Guard, to include
operation and maintenance, personnel, and equipping costs. According to
General Blum, the Army shortfall is $24 billion and is fairly
consistent with our documented shortfall. At the time he released the
information, the Army had programmed $21.1 billion against that
shortfall. With the release of the fiscal year 2008 budget, the funding
programmed from 2008-2013 is $36.7 billion, which addresses their
shortfalls and continues to address modernization.
39. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, in your view, if there are
not sufficient funds to address every equipping shortfall in the
National Guard structure, should the priority be on equipment that is
useful for the homeland defense and disaster response mission, or on
equipment that is useful only for combat missions?
General Schoomaker. We are committed to resourcing the ARNG
consistent with its roles as both an operational military force and as
the first responder for homeland defense and civil support at the State
level. Indeed, our ultimate goal is to equip the ARNG to full Active
component-like structure. This would be accomplished both through the
procurement of new equipment from the industrial base and by providing
current on-hand equipment from the active inventory. We have made
significant progress towards this goal since 2005, particularly in the
areas of aviation, armor, and transportation. But we still have a long
way to go, and we will need Congress's continued support in the future
if we hope to remain on track.
In terms of the total acquisition cost of equipment for the ARNG, I
would like to say two things: First, that as a result of our most
recent Army equipping and reuse conference in the first quarter of
fiscal year 2007, we have identified approximately $10.6 billion of
equipment for distribution to the ARNG between 2007 and the first
quarter of fiscal year 2009. The intent is to help ensure that every
ARNG unit deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan has the best equipment
available, and that those remaining at home will be adequately equipped
to respond to homeland defense and security missions as necessary.
The second thing I can say is that the Army has programmed $36.8
billion for new equipment procurement for the ARNG from fiscal year
2005 to fiscal year 2013. While we acknowledge that this will still
leave equipping holes to fill across the Army beyond 2013, we think
this approach strikes the best balance between the competing needs of
the Army as a whole and the total funding available. It also brings the
ARNG to an equipping level that allows it to better manage risk in
terms of cross-leveling equipment to deploying units while still
maintaining the capability to mobilize, train, and respond to homeland
defense and security missions.
islamic radicalism
40. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, I find
it interesting that one of the reasons cited in the posture statement
for the complexity of the threat is the ``growing disparities among
`haves' and `have-nots' in the international order, compounded by
feelings of hopelessness and despair, which are creating fertile ground
to sow the seeds of hatred and radicalism.'' Is it not possible that
the U.S. actions, such as the invasion of Iraq, could be perceived by
some in the Middle East as U.S. expansion into the Middle East?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. This question would be better
addressed by the combatant commander.
41. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, would
not this also potentially sow the seeds of hatred and radicalism from
those who resent our presence in their land? If so, would you suggest
we take steps to mitigate both of these underlying causes of
radicalism, and if so, how?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. This question would be better
addressed by the combatant commander.
army troop levels and overall size of ground forces
42. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, the Army is proposing to add
7,000 soldiers per year through 2011, and 1,000 more in 2012, for a
total increase of 65,000. Yet the DOD FYDP for fiscal years 2008 to
2013 shows the Army's budget peaking in 2009, flattening out at that
level in 2010, in real terms, and then declining--again in real terms
correcting for inflation--for 3 straight years in 2011, 2012, and 2013.
How does the Army plan to grow the force while shrinking your budget?
Mr. Geren. Funding peaks identified in 2008, 2009, and 2010 are for
the equipment and military construction needs of the new growth. In
fiscal years 2011 and 2012, funds remain in the Army program for
military construction projects and procurement of equipment, but at a
vastly lower figure. The front-loading of funds to military
construction projects and procurement items ensures that sufficient
facilities and equipment are available as the increase in soldiers
occurs through the years. The first fiscal year where there are no
funds programmed for military construction projects or equipment is
2013, when operations and support and family housing operations
comprise 100 percent of the projected costs.
43. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, what are
you planning to cut back on to pay for these additional people?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. There appears to be no need to
reduce any other programs or capabilities to pay for additional end
strength. Though we are assessing the need in relation to current pay
rates and personnel grades, we believe adequate resources have been
programmed to support the necessary equipment and facilities in the
near-term and to sustain the personnel and training costs in the
future.
The augmentation of ground forces was a DOD-supported decision.
This decision was accompanied by sufficient funds to support the
procurement, military construction, personnel, and operation and
maintenance funding necessary to support such an end strength increase.
The Department did not request the Services reduce or eliminate current
mission capabilities to support this increase. With the support of DOD,
there are no plans to cut back existing programs to pay for this troop
strength increase.
44. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, do you support the proposed
increases in Army end strength regardless of how they are paid for, or
only if the entire cost of these additional personnel are added to the
Army topline to reflect an increase in your Service's budget?
General Schoomaker. The size and resourcing of the Army is not a
question of cost, but rather national priorities. Given the Army's
current funding levels, our Army cannot afford to internally resource
such end strength increases without breaking our ability to field a
properly trained, manned, and equipped force to meet the Nation's
needs.
45. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, are you willing to cut
modernization or other programs in your budget to make room for the
significant increase in personnel and operating costs that these
additional personnel would entail?
General Schoomaker. Though we are assessing current pay rates and
personnel grades, the Army allocation appears to take the additional
personnel into account so no reductions are necessary. It is critical
that the Army not mortgage its future by reducing modernization
programs to pay for current bills. Our current program strikes a
balance between resourcing the current force while preparing for the
future. Maintaining a ready Army now and in the future is a matter of
national will and commitment, not an affordability issue.
training space and infrastructure
46. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, the Army is in the process of
moving three brigades from Europe to the United States over the next
few years. Once those brigades are relocated, you will have excess
capacity at your training center in Germany, but not enough capacity at
your training centers in the United States, at Fort Irwin and Fort
Polk. Given that the training and basing infrastructure are already in
place to support additional forces in Germany, and noting that Germans
were not asking us to leave (contrary to the situation the Marines have
in Okinawa, for example), is the Army considering basing any of the
additional six brigades you are seeking in Germany?
Mr. Geren. The Army enjoys a strong reputation and friendly
relationship with Germany, developed over years of Army presence. Under
Integrated Global Posture and Basing Strategy (IGPBS) the Army has made
many difficult decisions in order to strategically posture our forces
to meet global commitments. As a result, the Army decided to return
three brigades from Europe to continental United States (CONUS)
beginning in fiscal year 2007 and finishing in fiscal year 2011.
However, the Army is considering a full range of options for stationing
the new BCTs, but any decision regarding force levels in Europe must be
made in close cooperation with the combatant commander's input. In
addition, the Army will carefully weigh the benefit of existing
infrastructure in Europe to ensure the Army remains trained and ready
to deploy. The range and training land capacity and capability in
Germany is sufficient to meet the current training demand. The Army
will optimize and adapt the training assets in Germany to meet the
future needs of assigned and rotational units. However, there remains a
significant Army presence in Europe, which includes a Stryker BCT and
an Airborne BCT.
47. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, have you made any irrevocable
decisions to return property in Germany that would preclude basing
forces there?
Mr. Geren. Property that has been returned to the Federal Republic
of Germany can be reacquired through the accommodation program request
procedures outlined in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Status of Forces Agreement, Supplementary Agreements. Reacquiring land
would be dependent upon its availability. Property that was sold,
deconstructed, or reoccupied by someone other than the United States
after its return to the Federal Republic of Germany's control would be
unavailable for reacquisition. Property still retained by U.S. Forces
may accommodate potential Grow the Force organizations and would not
have to be reacquired from the Federal Republic of Germany. Most fiscal
year 2006 and fiscal year 2007 released property remains under Federal
Republic of Germany control so would likely be available, if needed.
48. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, how would you assess the
strategic case for basing one or more of these additional six brigades
in Germany or elsewhere in Europe, in terms of both U.S.-only combat
training and ability to deploy, but also cooperative training with our
NATO allies on missions such as the International Security Assistance
Force One in Afghanistan?
General Schoomaker. The Army remains cognizant of the changes to
the strategic landscape; and its requirement to maintain flexibility in
defending emerging global threats. We have reviewed the impact of Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) and the IGPBS, and specifically the
decisions of maintaining or returning brigades from Europe. Any
decision regarding force levels in Europe must be made in close
cooperation with the combatant commander's input. Cooperative training
with our NATO allies remains an important factor in any decision. In
addition the Army will carefully weigh the benefit of existing
infrastructure in Europe to ensure the Army remains trained and ready
to deploy. U.S. forces continue to demonstrate the ability to operate
along side its allies in Afghanistan and Iraq regardless of their home
station.
combat ready troop levels
49. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, I think we all agree with
the Army's core objective of growing the All-Volunteer Force through
the recruiting and retention of high quality people in order to expand
the deployable pool of troops to meet the Army's global commitments.
This committee has been told by the Army and the Secretary of Defense
that it has sufficient troops to meet current commitments, including
the escalations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now, however, there have been
reports that the Army has been re-evaluating troops who have been
declared unfit for duty and reclassifying them as ready to deploy. They
have then been almost immediately deployed to Iraq. In particular,
media reports specifically state that the Army is deploying troops with
serious injuries and other medical problems, including soldiers that
doctors have previously said are medically unfit for battle. Some of
the soldiers are reportedly too injured to wear their body armor,
according to their medical records. The reports I have seen indicated
that this reclassification of troops occurred for a unit of the Army's
3rd Infantry Division at Fort Benning. Can you please comment on the
accuracy of these reports? Please indicate if the Army is straining to
meet the levels of combat ready troops necessary to support the surge.
General Schoomaker. Our forces are stretched. The Army is currently
too small. In order to meet the demands of the current operational
environment and prepare for other potential contingencies we must
increase end strength. Congress has approved growth of 65,000 soldiers
in the Active component, 8,200 soldiers in the ARNG, and 1,000 in the
U.S. Army Reserve. However, it will take time to recruit and retain the
soldiers to meet these increased authorizations. The plan to grow the
Army will go a long way towards alleviating strains on the Army and
demands of future missions. Growing the Army will allow soldiers to
remain at home at least 12 months between deployments. This will also
allow more training for other potential scenarios. This is the best way
to reduce the strain on the force.
50. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, the posture statement
repeatedly refers to the need for the Army to provide ``boots on the
ground'' for the war on terror. It states that our Nation will be
involved in a long struggle of continuous, evolving conflict. Given the
level of uncertainty in the global war on terror, how can we be sure we
have ``right-sized'' our forces?
General Schoomaker. The Army was sized post-QDR to reflect the
lessons learned from the global war on terrorism and to achieve
strategic depth necessary to sustain increasing global commitments. The
Grow the Army Plan was informed by QDR decisions, operational
availability studies, current operational demands, combatant commander
requests, and other DOD initiatives (e.g., homeland defense and
building partnership capacity). Under the plan, the Army will grow all
three components to build requisite rotational capacity available
through recurrent, assured, predictable access to the Reserve
components. The most recent analysis concluded the minimum size of the
force to be 563,000 in the Active Army; 358,000 in the ARNG; and
206,000 in the U.S. Army Reserve. In coordination with OSD, the Army
has programmed for growth at 547,400 Active; 358,200 in the ARNG; and
206,000 in the U.S. Army Reserve. This growth increases BCT surge
capacity (1 year deployed, 2 years at home for the Active component,
and 1 year deployed and 4 years at home for the Reserve component) from
18-19 BCTs to 21-22 BCTs with up to 2 additional Maneuver Enhancement
Brigades per rotation. This growth will improve Active component dwell
by fiscal year 2013 with recurrent, assured access to the Reserve
component. Additionally, the growth and rebalance of capabilities will
reduce high demand/low density shortfalls and increase combat, combat
support, and combat service support capacity in air defense, engineer,
explosive ordnance disposal, medical, military police, military
intelligence, transportation, and maintenance. However, the growth
numbers are not without risk due to continuing demands for additional
operating force and Institutional Army capabilities. We will continue
to evaluate the impacts of global force demands on the balance and mix
of capabilities across all three components to ensure we have ``right-
sized'' the force within our resources.
51. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, please explain how the
recommended end strength increases for the Army were determined.
General Schoomaker. The Army analyzed the increasing Global Force
demand required for the long war and the imperative to build strategic
depth. To provide 20-21 BCTs at a rotation rate of 1:2 in the Active
component and 1:5 in the Reserve components, the Army proposed a growth
plan identifying the need for additional BCTs, along with growth in
combat support and combat service support units to meet sustained
operational demands and minimize high demand, low density capability
shortfalls. Additionally, the Army reviewed the balance of capabilities
within each component and across the three components to build the
right force mix in the operating force. Finally, the Army identified
reducing the military strength in the Institutional Army to 80,000 vice
the 75,000 spaces as previously programmed to ensure its ability to
man, equip, train, and station the increase in the operating force. The
resulting plan proposed a total increase of 74,200 end strength (65,000
in the Active component, 8,200 in the ARNG, and 1,000 in the Army
Reserve).
52. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, the surge of 21,500
additional troops to Iraq that the President has proposed would be
accomplished by extending some units that are there now, and
accelerating the deployment of units that would ordinarily have
deployed much later this year as part of the next rotation. Are you
concerned that this will cause a problem several months down the road
for the next rotation?
General Schoomaker. There are impacts on the upcoming rotation. The
five BCTs that form the plus-up all had their deployment timelines
accelerated. This acceleration resulted in modifications to training
schedules. In order to extend the plus-up through February 2008, a full
12 months, the Army will be required to extend another 10 BCTs in
theater. The plus-up could require a number of units to redeploy to
Iraq and Afghanistan with less than 12 months of dwell time in the
United States without employing other measures.
53. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, what steps is the Army
taking to identify, train, and equip the units that will have to fill
in, several months from now, to cover the gaps this surge would create
in your previous plan for preparing and deploying units to Iraq?
General Schoomaker. In order the meet the plus-up, the OSD and the
Joint Staff will have to use a combination of unit extensions
(extending units in Iraq and Afghanistan beyond their 12 month
rotation) and early deployments (sending units to Iraq and Afghanistan
with less than 12 months at home). However, the Army will continue to
only send units that are trained and ready for combat operations.
Additionally, we are sensitive to and supportive of the challenges that
face our forces as they accelerate manning, equipping, and training
requirements to support the plus-up. Every deploying unit will be
manned to no less than 100 percent of their authorized strength, they
will be equipped with the most modern equipment available to the Army,
and each will complete intensive training that will begin with a focus
on individual and small unit (squad through platoon level training) and
progress to company and battalion level collective training. Lastly,
every unit will complete a BCT-level mission rehearsal exercise focused
on counterinsurgency operations.
54. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, the main rationale presented
to Congress thus far for increasing your Active-Duty end strengths is
that it would allow your Active-Duty Forces to spend 2 months back home
for every 1 month deployed. It is impossible to assess whether or not
these proposed end strength increases would achieve this goal by
looking at your personnel levels in isolation. One also needs an
assumption about how many of them would be deployed. How many soldiers
could be deployed at the QDR force structure levels of 482,400 in order
to live within this 1-to-2 ratio of time deployed to time at home?
General Schoomaker. The ARFORGEN model would provide a steady
supply of ready units, rely on assured access to the Reserve component,
careful management of time deployed to time at home, and balanced
demand across the Army. Once ARFORGEN is in place and generating a
steady flow of ready forces, our models indicate that to maintain a 1
year at home to 2 years deployed ratio, the Army could sustain a long-
duration deployment of 170,000 soldiers in any given time period.
ARFORGEN has not yet been implemented because the current demand for
forces in Iraq and Afghanistan far exceeds the available supply of
fully manned and equipped units.
55. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, how many more Active-Duty
Forces could be deployed on a continuous basis, using the same
assumptions on dwell time, if you were to add the 65,000 soldiers as
you are proposing?
General Schoomaker. Under the ARFORGEN construct, at a rotation
rate of 1:2 for Active Forces, the Army will be able to deploy a total
of 20 to 21 BCTs per rotation cycle, an increase in capacity of 2 to 3
BCTs. Once we achieve programmed growth levels of 547,000 in the Active
component, 358,200 in the ARNG, and 206,000 in the Army Reserve by
fiscal year 2013, the Army will be able to generate a total of 165,000
soldiers per rotation (115,000 Active, 35,000 ARNG, and 15,000 Army
Reserve).
56. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, do you believe, based on our
experience to date, that ground forces will be necessary and effective
in combating terrorism around the world in the coming years?
General Schoomaker. Yes, the Army will be effective in combating
terrorism around the world in the coming years. The Army's experience
to date is that ground forces provide an effective, necessary, and
essential capability in combating terrorists. The Army's modular force
structure builds BCTs that are prepared to conduct a full-spectrum of
operations, from force on force action to stability and support
operations to homeland defense operations.
57. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, to what extent is this the
justification for your proposed end strength increases?
General Schoomaker. The justification for the proposed end strength
increases is based on more than the immediate mission of combating
terrorism. Our Army's forces are postured to counter a wide spectrum of
threats over the next 2 to 3 decades. To do this, the Army continues to
responsibly use the funding provided by Congress to meet its title 10
responsibilities of providing an Army that supports the Nation's
interests, and meets the requirements of the National Military
Strategy. The end strength increase ensures the Army's flexibility to
respond to an evolving global security environment.
58. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, do you believe that extended
deployments of ground forces to other nations should be our primary
method of combating terrorism?
General Schoomaker. The Army's experience to date is that ground
forces provide an effective, necessary, and essential capability in
combating terrorists. The Army's modular force structure builds BCTs
that are prepared to conduct a full-spectrum of operations, from force
on force action to stability and support operations to homeland defense
operations.
Since combating terrorism is often conducted in the minds of
people, the employment of ground forces is one of many methods of
combating terrorism. For example, strategic communications is also an
effective tool in combating terrorism. The U.S. Government may allocate
resources to security cooperation and security assistance so that
partner nations can, as may be required, both secure themselves and
contribute to coalition efforts. However, the Army must continue an
active role in both security and stability operations and retain the
capability to respond to a range of challenges.
59. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, last year the QDR asserted
that the National Military Strategy could be executed at low-to-
moderate risk by holding the Active Duty manning levels of the Army at
the pre-Iraq war levels of 482,400. It further asserted the ARNG should
be reduced from 350,000 to 333,000. Now, 1 year later, the Department
is proposing to increase the size of the Active-Duty Army to 547,400
and the ARNG to 358,200. To your knowledge, has the National Military
Strategy been changed since the QDR was submitted?
General Schoomaker. There has not been a change in the National
Military Strategy nor the QDR Force Planning Construct that has driven
the Army to request an increase in its end strength. During QDR 2006,
the Army was tasked with building 70 BCTs (42 Active component, 28
ARNG) to meet the strategic challenges that threatened the Nation,
while building supporting force structure that would enable the Army to
shift its balance away from our traditional focus. This 70-BCT force
relied on predictable, assured access to the Reserve component that
would generate 18-19 BCTs per ARFORGEN rotation once all conversions
were completed in fiscal year 2013. However, current global demand on
the Army has exceeded our capacity to provide forces within the
ARFORGEN construct, compounded by the years of insufficient
modernization investments. To meet the global demand for the long war
and to provide strategic depth to the Nation, the Army proposed a plan
to grow end strength across all three components to increase operating
force capabilities, with modest increases in the Institutional Army and
Individuals Account to retain structure needed to effectively recruit,
train, and support the growth in the operating force. The proposed end
strength growth will provide the Army with 76 BCTs (48 Active
component, 28 ARNG) and over 200 multi-functional and functional
support brigades. These 76 BCTs, and the additional Combat Support
Brigade (Maneuver Enhancement) with supporting tactical combat
formations, will generate 22-23 BCTs at a surge rotation rate (1:2 in
the Active and 1:4 in the ARNG) by fiscal year 2013.
60. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, if the strategy has not
changed, then in your view, did the DOD incorrectly assess the forces
necessary to implement that strategy in the QDR?
General Schoomaker. QDR 2006 was a collaborative effort between the
Services, the Joint Staff, and OSD to define the strategy to meet
future war requirements. QDR 2006 also provided insights for the Joint
Staff and the Services to do additional analysis based on the effects
of Phase IV/V (Stability/Enabling Civil Authorities) operations on the
Joint Force, and the means for building partnership capacity through
the combatant commanders' security cooperation plans. The force
assessments and associated resourcing decisions for Army forces
supported that strategy. The challenge is that since QDR 2006 the
sustained requirements for the Global Force Demand now exceed that
strategy. OSD has acknowledged that capabilities shortfall and provided
support to the Army's proposed plan to increase capabilities to
mitigate the risk associated with that shortfall gap.
61. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, the number of forces
deployed in Iraq today is fairly similar to the number there a year ago
when the QDR was released. Do you believe a change in assumptions about
how long our forces would be in Iraq explains this change in the
Department's position?
General Schoomaker. The number of troops on the ground is primarily
determined by the military requirements of the commanders in Iraq. The
QDR expressed the priority mission for the DOD is the war on terror,
and that remains as true today as it was last year when the QDR was
released. As the QDR indicated, we want to better utilize an indirect
approach for defeating the terrorist threat in Iraq. This approach
requires building the capability of Iraqi security forces to stand on
their own. Until that is achieved, our continued security and stability
operations will allow the necessary governance in Iraq.
readiness
62. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, last year you made a
presentation to the House Armed Services Committee on the Army's
readiness situation in closed session that many of our colleagues found
very disturbing. You presented those same charts to Senator Warner and
I at a later date. Yet last August, about a month after your hearing
with the House, when Secretary Rumsfeld and General Pace met with us,
they were not willing to agree that the Army had a readiness problem.
General Pace told us, ``to try to have a discussion that just lays out
exactly precisely what readiness ratings are lends itself to
misinterpretation and misunderstanding.'' The readiness reporting
system has been around for a long time. Although we receive those
reports in Congress in support of our constitutional responsibilities,
those reports were not designed for us. They were designed for the
decisionmakers inside the military--they were designed for you and
General Pace. It causes confusion and concern when, nearly
simultaneously, you tell Congress the Army has readiness problems and
General Pace disputes that idea. Do the Army and the DOD leadership in
the OSD and the Joint Staff have a common understanding of the Army's
readiness situation today?
General Schoomaker. The soldiers we have deployed into current
theaters of operation are the best-trained, best-equipped, and best-led
we have ever fielded. As I have explained in recent testimony,
including last year's testimony before the House Armed Services
Committee, our immediate challenge lies in the readiness of our
nondeployed forces. I am greatly encouraged by the recent actions of
Congress, the President, and the Secretary of Defense which reflect
clear recognition of the compelling need to rectify our current
situation. The Army needs your continued support to restore the
necessary strategic depth so that we can respond decisively to
potential strategic contingencies. I look forward to working with this
Congress to enhance the readiness and strategic depth of our Army.
63. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, last fall Congress provided
an additional $17.1 billion in equipment repair and replacement funds--
known as ``reset''--to the Army. What impact will those additional
funds have on your readiness levels?
General Schoomaker. The additional $17.1 billion will address the
decline in the readiness of our on-hand equipment and allow the Army to
return existing equipment back to units in combat ready condition.
Because reset is focused on replacing, repairing, and recapitalizing
equipment, it has limited impact on equipment shortfalls.
64. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, how much of an improvement
do you expect, and how soon?
General Schoomaker. Reset funding includes replacement of battle
losses--primarily helicopters--and replacement of Reserve component
equipment diverted to support theater requirements--primarily trucks
and radios. The major systems will begin arriving in early fiscal year
2008 and continue for several more years afterward.
65. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, what impact will this
additional ``surge'' of forces to Iraq proposed by the President have
on the readiness of your forces to fulfill all their global
commitments?
General Schoomaker. The Army still retains the capability to
respond to all of its global commitments. However, the Army is
stressed, and response timelines are increasing as much of the Army is
focused on Iraq and Afghanistan. The continued support of Congress in
funding the Army will help to alleviate the stress on the Army. The
Army is resourced with budget and wartime supplemental funding to
execute the current OIF/OEF fight. However, additional funding is
required to implement the full strategy outlined in the 2006 QDR.
66. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, were these risks discussed
and debated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as part of the
administration's decisionmaking process?
General Schoomaker. Yes. The Chairman of the Joint Chief's
classified risk assessment, provided to Congress in January, addresses
the risks discussed and debated among the Joint Chiefs.
67. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, to what extent will the
requirement to pull additional equipment forward to Iraq cancel the
benefits of the additional reset funds Congress provided last fall,
which were designed to make more equipment available for our
nondeployed forces to train with?
General Schoomaker. The troop plus-up has had a modest impact on
both fiscal years 2007 and 2008 reset plans, but not in the manner you
mention. Three BCTs that were planned to begin reset in the fourth
quarter of fiscal year 2007 will be delayed until the first quarter of
fiscal year 2008. Further, the plus-up increases reset requirements in
fiscal year 2008 by two BCTs. This represents a total increased
requirement in fiscal year 2008 of five BCTs.
The goal of reset is to restore returning units to a desired level
of combat capability commensurate with full spectrum operations and
potential future mission requirements. Reset is only one of several
means to increase the equipment available to non-deployed units. The
others include: moving equipment between units to meet training
requirements prior to deployment; filling requirements from new
production; and requesting additional funding to purchase needed
equipment.
68. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, some analysts point out that
your conversion of Army brigades to a modular format with more combat
elements per brigade automatically reduces your readiness levels by
spreading the existing amount of available equipment over a larger
number of reporting units, and that this reduced readiness will
therefore exist until a significant amount of new equipment is
delivered. Is that accurate, in your view?
General Schoomaker. Attributing reduced readiness across the force
to modular conversion is not accurate. We have been experiencing
decreases in readiness since fiscal year 2002 but modular conversion
did not start until fiscal year 2005, at which point only 6 percent of
the force was converted. Currently, 32 percent of the force has
converted to the organizational design. So modular conversion is not
the primary reason for decreasing overall readiness, it is the pre-
existing shortage of unit equipment or what I call ``holes in the
force,'' the subsequent cross-leveling to fill those holes, equipment
left in theater, and replacement of outdated equipment.
Currently, the Army is only resourced through base budget and
wartime supplemental funding to execute the current OEF/OIF fight.
Resources continue to fall short of the level necessary to implement
the full strategy outlined in the 2005 QDR. The Army outlined specific
areas of risk in the recent Chairman's Risk Assessment submitted with
the President's budget in February 2007. Had the Army been funded to
requested levels in recent years, and had endorsed policies that
assured access to all of our capability, we would be in a better
strategic posture today.
Recent decisions to expand the Army reflect the clear recognition
of the dangers we face and the strain that 5 years of sustained demand
has placed on our All-Volunteer Force. We remain committed to
generating whole, cohesive units that are fully manned, trained, and
equipped--that are fully ready for the challenges they will face. This
will require a national commitment to sustain predictable resourcing
over time and to build our force in a balanced, coordinated fashion,
while providing adequately for the needs of our All Volunteer soldiers
and their families.
The Army's transformation is improving our ability to support
protracted campaigns by increasing the depth, breadth, and the overall
capacity of our force. We are converting to more versatile and more
capable modular formations while balancing the size and capabilities of
our Active and Reserve components, and stabilizing our force. Your
continued support is helping to fix our ``holes in the force.'' I ask
you to increase your support for this effort as we work to break the
historical cycle of unpreparedness.
69. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, does your ``modular force''
conversion make your readiness look worse than it is?
General Schoomaker. The resources that Congress has invested in the
Army have greatly increased the capabilities of our Army. Today,
brigades, the building blocks of our strategy, have enhanced and
embedded battlefield enablers that greatly increase their effectiveness
across the spectrum of military operations. In building these
formations we have documented these units focusing on the true go to
war requirements based on current and future military operations. We
have not ``gamed'' our requirements process for political or budgetary
expediency; instead we have deliberately developed formations based on
real world feedback from our deployed units and combatant commander
requirements. The resources granted the Army are being consumed by
several demands and should be viewed as a cumulative and combined
effect. Although the transformation to the Army Modular Force has
impacted some units by creating artificial dips in equipment on-hand
readiness rates, this is a marginal driver. One of the most significant
reasons for lowered equipment on-hand readiness rates can be traced to
equipment left behind to fill theatre provided equipment stocks. In-
theater equipment demands are above and beyond MTOE and require re-
deploying units to leave their equipment behind to equip follow-on
forces. We cannot ignore the $56 billion equipment shortfalls in the
Army prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF).
Additionally, the concentration of personnel and equipment in
theatre greatly magnifies those shortfalls when spread across the
remaining nondeployed force. High operational tempo, as experienced in
OIF/OEF, causes un-forecasted equipment fatigue creating a large pool
for depot-level repair and further creating a maintenance burden in-
theater. This is further compounded by battle damaged equipment.
Finally, full, timely, and predictable funding is required to ensure
Army units are fully manned, equipped, and trained to sustain the full
range of global commitments in the war on terror.
walter reed army medical center and base realignment and closure
70. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, a bill has been introduced in
the House to repeal the closure of the Walter Reed Army Medical Center
mandated by the 2005 base closure round. In your opinion, would this be
a wise move?
Mr. Geren. No. Reversing the current Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC) recommendations for Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC)
would not address the need for significant modernization and renovation
at Dewitt Army Community Hospital at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and
establishing the Walter Reed National Military Medical Center at
Bethesda, Maryland, nor would it account for the changing demographic
of health consumers. As the Army implements the BRActive component law
by building a new hospital at Fort Belvoir and significantly expanding
the hospital at Bethesda, we will be better equipped to provide world-
class health care for soldiers, veterans, and their families well into
the future.
71. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, is it realistic to think we can
reopen one BRActive component decision, in this case Walter Reed,
without reopening other BRActive component decisions that are related
to Walter Reed, such as Fort Belvoir, or even reopening the entire
BRActive component round?
Mr. Geren. The Department opposes any amendment that would alter
the approved recommendations of the 2005 BRActive component Commission.
Legislating a specific change to a BRActive component Commission
recommendation would adversely affect the integrity of the BRActive
component 2005 process.
72. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, do you believe keeping Walter
Reed open is the best way to provide the quality medical care our
servicemembers deserve?
Mr. Geren. No. Renovations required to update the hospital at WRAMC
would be costly and disruptive to the care of patients as portions of
the hospital would have to be closed for protracted periods. Such
renovations would have the unintended effect of interrupting the
medical system's ability to provide care to the same number of patients
it handles at the present time. Building a new hospital with greater
capacity and capability at Fort Belvoir and making significant
enhancements to Walter Reed National Military Medical Center at
Bethesda, MD, will significantly improve the quality of care for all
beneficiaries.
73. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, do you believe keeping Walter
Reed open is the best solution to the recent problems there?
Mr. Geren. No. The recently identified problems are being
addressed. We are drafting an Army Action Plan to use as our blueprint
for successfully fixing the problems we have identified. The solutions
identified at Walter Reed will be transferred to the new sites, to
ensure that the Army provides world-class inpatient care and outpatient
support services.
74. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, do you believe we can close
Walter Reed in 2011 and still maintain the capacity we need to treat
wounded soldiers at Bethesda or other locations?
Mr. Geren. Yes. The Department developed a business plan with input
from physicians, medical support personnel, architects, and engineers.
The plans were formally coordinated with the Navy, Air Force, Medical
Joint Cross Service Group, and TRICARE Management Activity and the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs). All
concurred that the scope and cost of the projects in the business plan
addressed capabilities and facilities requirements at the designated
receiving locations.
75. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, because the President decided
late in the process to propose an increase in the Army's end strength,
the budget was submitted with essentially a $2 billion placeholder, or
blank check, in the military construction accounts because no locations
had been selected for basing these additional personnel, in particular
the six additional infantry brigades the Army wants. I do not believe
Congress will sign a $2 billion blank check. When do the Army and DOD
leadership plan to make a decision on where you propose to base these
forces?
Mr. Geren. The fiscal year 2008 budget request supports the recent
decisions to grow the Army for combat and combat support units. The
Army is currently conducting thorough analyses for locations to station
the six new BCTs using the BRActive component ``best military value''
process, which includes the opportunity to solicit public comment and
interface with the local communities which may be affected by these
actions.
76. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, these basing decisions would
rival the largest moves in the 2005 BRActive component round. That was
an open process, with the data comparing the attributes of various
bases available to everyone. What process does the Army envision using
in making and defending these decisions?
Mr. Geren. The Army is currently conducting our analysis and
modeling of the possible BCT locations using the BRActive component
``best military value'' decision support framework. Additionally, the
Army intents to integrate the data collected from the Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) in order to have the opportunity
to assess the input and comments of local affected communities. In the
end, the combination of the data collected from the PEIS combined
together with the analysis from the decision support framework will
provide the bases of our selection for the new BCTs.
77. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, how do you plan to consult with
Congress on these basing decisions?
Mr. Geren. The Army will not make its decision regarding the
stationing locations of the new BCTs until we have completed our
analysis and modeling using the BRActive component ``best military
value'' decision support framework. Additionally, the Army intends to
consider the impacts identified in the PEIS in order to have the
opportunity to assess the input and comments of local affected
communities. In the end, the combination of the data collected from the
PEIS combined together with the analysis from the decision support
framework will provide the bases of our selection for the new BCTs.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
reconstitution of army prepositioned stock
78. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, the
surge in troops and the requirements to create new brigades have caused
a significant drawdown on Army prepositioned equipment stocks (APS).
These stocks are important to our strategic flexibility. How do you
plan to reconstitute those stocks?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. Since the first Gulf War, the APS
program has expanded from its European-centric, Cold War origins to the
array of global capabilities reached prior to the start of OIF. At the
start of OIF, APS stocks afloat at Diego Garcia and ground-based in
Southwest Asia, were drawn to equip units that conducted the initial
assault to Baghdad. What remained in APS in the spring of 2003 is very
similar to what we have today, though the equipment sets remaining are
filled to a much higher level and of a modular design and with more
modern equipment. Over the past 4 years, the assets used in the initial
operations in Iraq were reconstituted in a manner that provided the
maximum operational flexibility and strategic responsiveness.
The Army will reconstitute its APS capabilities. They will be
reconstituted in a manner that provides the maximum level of strategic
flexibility and operational agility. Based on the availability of
resources (requested funding and equipment returned for reset), the
U.S. Army Materiel Command anticipates it will take approximately 18-24
months to reset an APS set. The Army`s APS Strategy 2013 articulates
the afloat and ashore equipment required to meet the future
responsiveness needs of the combatant commanders.
Once the current operational and equipping tempo stabilizes, the
Army will develop an executable timeline within available resources to
reset its APS sets according to the APS Strategy 2013.
The Army could not have met the requirements of this most recent
surge without APS. With the continued support of Congress to fully
resource equipment, the Army will be able to return equipment to pre-
positioned stocks as it becomes available from new production, repair,
and recapitalization.
79. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, does
that reconstitution involve waiting for the surge in forces in Iraq and
Afghanistan to end? If so, what are your plans if the surge is actually
a plus-up, and doesn't end for the foreseeable future?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. Regardless of whether the plus-up
remains in effect for the foreseeable future or not, the Army is
committed to fully equipping all its organizations. The Army went into
global war on terror with an equipping shortfall that has been
magnified by consumption of equipment in OIF and OEF and growth through
modularity. Additionally, the recently approved growth of the Army will
result in higher overall equipping requirements. Overall Army equipment
requirements will be addressed through procurement and reset/
recapitalization of current equipment funded through a combination of
base budget and supplemental monies, as appropriate.
APS is an important strategic asset that enables both the strategic
responsiveness and the operational agility of our Army. As such, we
have begun efforts to reestablish our most critical strategic
capabilities, those that support force reception, and will continue to
increase our prepositioned capabilities until we meet the level
articulated in APS Strategy 2013. This strategy addresses both afloat
and ashore equipment sets and is designed to meet the future
responsiveness needs of the combatant commanders.
Once the current operational and equipping tempo stabilizes, the
Army will develop an executable timeline within available resources to
reset its APS sets according to the APS Strategy 2013.
Without APS, the Army would not have been able to meet the
requirements of the current surge, and with the continued support of
Congress to fully resource the administration's budget request for Army
equipment, the Army will be able to return equipment to pre-positioned
stocks as it becomes available from new production, repair, and
recapitalization.
readiness of nondeployed units
80. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, part of
the readiness problems for nondeployed units involved not having enough
of the equipment they are supposed to have. If, in fact, the missing
gear is not waiting to go through the depots or it is deployed to Iraq
or Afghanistan, how do you plan to improve the availability of
equipment for our nondeployed units?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. If unit equipping requirements do
not change significantly over 2008-2013, the Army estimates that there
are sufficient resources in the program (including the fiscal year 2007
main supplemental, and fiscal year 2008 global war on terrorism
requests) to procure all modified table of organization and equipment
(MTOE) requirements for all BCTs by fiscal year 2013 and all MTOE
requirements for support brigades by fiscal year 2017. Any additional
resources received or applied above the program years, fiscal year 2007
supplemental, or fiscal year 2008 global war on terror requests would
accelerate fulfilling these requirements.
81. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, are you
planning to buy more of the missing equipment?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. As stated previously, the Army's
program for 2008-2013, plus fiscal year 2007 main supplemental and
fiscal year 2008 global war on terrorism requests, will procure the
MTOE equipment needed for all Army BCTs and support brigades by fiscal
year 2017. This does not include the $13-14 billion a year, plus at
least 2 years after the cessation of operations, the Army will need to
reset its current forces.
82. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, is the
procurement of equipment to replace that which is missing in the budget
request? If not, is it in your unfunded requirements list?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. At the conclusion of the Army's
programming process for 2008-2013, it realized that all critical
requirements and essential needs for equipment for these years could
not be met with the allocated resources. At that time, the Army
generated its critical unfunded requirements list and forwarded a
portion of these requirements, specifically those requirements for
deployers and next-to-deploy units, through the OSD to Congress as part
of the fiscal year 2007 main supplemental request. The Army also
forwarded a subset of these requirements--specifically those
requirements for deployers and next-to-deploy units that were not
included in these requests--in its Unfunded Requirements List requested
by Congress. To the extent that these unfunded requirements remain,
they will be shifted to subsequent years for possible funding.
walter reed army medical center
83. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, Major
General Pollack, Acting Surgeon General, has directed that for the next
30 days, only soldiers with major amputations and critical needs whose
unit is assigned east of the Mississippi will be accepted from theater
for care at Walter Reed. Other severely injured patients will be sent
to military treatment facilities elsewhere in the United States. Is
this a rational response to the problems of outpatient treatment at
Walter Reed? Or, is it recognition that it is time to reexamine the
fundamental soundness of the Army policy that causes hundreds of
patients to be brought to Walter Reed directly from the theater, and
keeps them there until the physical disability evaluation system is
exhausted?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. This policy allows for proper
distribution of patients throughout our Army Medical Treatment
Facilities (MTFs). The primary criteria for medically regulating
soldiers to specific MTFs are the soldier's medical requirements.
Unless medically contraindicated, all Active component soldiers are
regulated to the MTF that supports their unit of assignment. All
mobilized/demobilized Reserve component, as well as Active component
soldiers assigned to Reserve component deployed units, are regulated to
the closest MTF having geographical area of responsibility for their
mobilization/demobilization site. A revision of this policy is
currently being staffed that will allow the soldiers to be more
involved with their treatment location. If the capacity and capability
exist, the soldier can be moved to the MTF nearest the location
providing an adequate support structure, (i.e. family or other support
systems).
support to army families
84. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren, our military forces cannot be
sustained without tangible support to military families--programs for
children and youth; morale, welfare, and recreation; educational and
employment assistance to spouses. Are the resources provided in this
budget keeping pace with the growing demand for services, and will
they, as the Army grows?
Mr. Geren. The Army is working hard to ensure that these programs
keep pace with the demands for services. These programs are essential
to sustain the All-Volunteer Force and provide our soldiers and
families a quality of life that is commensurate with the duties they
are asked to perform. As the Army grows, we will adjust resources to
address these family needs. While plans to grow the Army are not yet
finalized, we are confident that adequate funding for these programs is
contained in the Army's request.
future combat system acquisition
85. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren, since the inception of the FCS
program, the Senate Armed Services Committee has exercised its
authority to ensure that it meets the needs of the Army and the Nation.
To protect taxpayers, the committee required the Army to revise the
contract under the Federal Acquisitions Regulations and convert it into
a proper military procurement contract, after the Army had inexplicably
procured this system-of-systems as a commercial item. In the last
year's Defense Authorization Act, the committee included language
requiring that the Secretary submit a comprehensive report upon
completing preliminary design review to determine if the program should
be restructured and called for an independent cost estimate for the
program. The Army restructured FCS in January 2007. Program adjustments
include deferring two classes of UAVs, eliminating the IMS, and
deferring two types of armed robotic vehicles. The Army has also pushed
back the anticipated date for fielding FCS-equipped brigades. Army
officials have stated that the program adjustments do not compromise
the systems' capabilities. How can four unmanned systems that have been
previously described as critical, be eliminated without losing combat
capability?
Mr. Geren. The Army continuously evaluates FCS program technical
and cost metrics. The congressional funding cuts in fiscal year 2005-
2007 required the program to make an adjustment to some of its key
milestones. Based on the assessment of the technical maturity of these
unmanned platforms as well as anticipated average unit production cost,
a decision was made to defer these systems until such time as the
technology is more mature. To compensate for the BCT unmanned system
reduction, an increase to the quantities of other unmanned systems, as
well as adjustments in individual system requirements, has been
addressed. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is
continuously assessing the FCS BCT capabilities under multiple
scenarios with various mixes of platform systems, quantities, and force
sizes to ensure that the capabilities meet the operational requirements
documents (ORD) requirements.
86. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren, does the Army have a plan to
reevaluate the FCS program to see if the remaining 14 systems can be
consolidated or have their functions consolidated to reduce costs while
maintaining the program's original operational capabilities?
Mr. Geren. The Army is undergoing the fiscal year 2007 and fiscal
years 2008-2013 FCS program adjustment and has no additional plans at
this time to consolidate functionality for the 14 systems. The FCS BCT
utilizes each of the systems as an integrated fighting force following
approved future fighting doctrine concepts while maintaining its
survivability and lethality. U.S. Army TRADOC continually reviews the
FCS BCT capabilities, and doctrinal concepts to ensure that the
operational requirements are still valid.
87. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren, the Joint Tactical Radio
System Ground Mobile Radio (JTRS-GMR) is a key component of the FCS
manned ground vehicle development. What is the status of that program?
Mr. Geren. Your question has been forwarded to the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics, for appropriate response. Specifically, this program is
managed by the JTRS-Joint Program Executive Office.
88. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren, operations in Afghanistan have
demonstrated the utility of light infantry. What benefit would FCS
bring to such units?
Mr. Geren. Light infantry is a former label used to distinguish
between mounted and dismounted forces. Today we simply use infantry.
Before the modular conversion, formations formerly labeled as light
infantry lacked mobility and firepower. Modular infantry BCTs address
some of these capability gaps, but formations still have limitations in
individual and unit protection, situational awareness, and
communications on the move, down to the lowest level. FCS addresses
these shortfalls within FCS BCTs and within modular BCTs that receive
selected FCS capabilities.
For example, unmanned systems connected to the formations via the
advanced integrated network will perform many more of the dangerous and
dirty tasks soldiers perform today. Larger territory is covered with
aerial and ground sensors. Unmanned aerial and ground sensors increase
survivability and force protect from ambushes and raids. The ability to
employ a wider range of precision fires increases infantry lethality
while minimizing collateral damage. Infantry forces have great utility
and the most flexibility across the spectrum of conflict including
irregular warfare and operations in complex terrain like cities and
mountains. Irregular warfare is normally of long duration, against
adversaries who deliberately seek to avoid accepted rules in the
conduct of war. This includes, but is not limited to, unconventional
warfare, guerrilla warfare, counter-guerrilla warfare, subversion,
sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted
recovery. Irregular warfare normally requires the support of the
population. FCS BCTs are optimally configured for irregular warfare
where information is the premium asset. The working design for FCS BCTs
has the same number of infantry squads as today's modular infantry BCT,
and due to the effectiveness of the FCS BCT, we have less total
soldiers than a current heavy BCT with a much greater number of
infantrymen in squads.
multiyear procurements
89. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren, I understand that the Army
proposes to procure Chinook helicopters, the Abrams M1A2 Systems
Enhancement Package upgrades, and M2A3/M3A3 Bradley upgrades, under a
multiyear contract. Do these proposed procurements comply with all of
the requirements of the Federal multiyear procurement statute, title
10, U.S.C., section 2306b?
Mr. Geren. Yes. The Army is aware of the six conditions which must
be met prior to the award of a multiyear procurement contract. The
procedures and notifications to Congress IAW title 10, U.S.C. 2306(B)
(Statutory) and DFARS 217.172 (Regulatory) will be followed and
executed when appropriate. At this time, the six conditions required by
the statute have been satisfied and are documented in the P-Forms and
the multiyear exhibits with one caveat. The stability of funding for
both the Abrams and Bradley MYP assumes a significant amount of global
war on terror funding will be provided to the Army in fiscal year 2008.
The remaining MYP years for both Abrams and Bradley Fighting Vehicle
Systems (BFVS) will be funded in the base program. The Army will
address the remaining certification requirements at the appropriate
time.
90. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren, will the expected savings
obtained from the proposed multiyear procurements be ``substantial''
(as opposed to executing under a series of annual contracts) within the
meaning of the statute?
Mr. Geren. Yes, for Chinook helicopters, the Abrams M1A2 Systems
Enhancement Package upgrades, and M2A3/M3A3 Bradley upgrades.
Chinook Helicopters
The Multiyear Procurement Criteria Exhibits that were submitted
with the President's budget indicate that the anticipated savings
resulting from the requested multiyear contract would be $173 million,
or slightly more than 4 percent of the total contract price. This was a
conservative government estimate that was based on the information
available to the program office at the time the exhibits were prepared.
Since the submission of the President's budget, the program office
has begun the early stages of alpha discussions and continues to refine
the estimate. Currently the anticipated savings are estimated to be
between 5 and 6 percent of the total contract price.
Abrams M1A2SEP and M2A3/M3A3 Bradley Upgrades
The MYP for the Abrams M1A2 SEP tank would begin in third quarter
of fiscal year 2008 for a period of 5 years with a total estimated
savings of $178 million, or approximately 10 percent ($300,000 per
vehicle) and an MYP contract for the BFVS/BFIST would begin in third
quarter of fiscal year 2008 for a period of 4 years with a total
estimated savings of $131 million, or approximately 5 percent ($135,000
per vehicle).
91. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren, will these multiyear contracts
contain ``re-opener'' provisions? If so, please describe.
Mr. Geren. For the Chinook it has not yet been determined if the
multiyear contract will contain ``re-opener'' provisions. The program
office is in the early stages of alpha discussions, as the anticipated
contract award is not until December 2007. These provisions have been
employed in some Army aircraft multiyear contracts in the past, but at
this time neither the Government nor Boeing have identified a risk area
that would require a ``re-opener'' provision. The issue will be
considered as negotiations progress.
For the Abrams M1A2SEP and M2A3/M3A3 Bradley upgrades, there is
currently no plan to have any ``re-opener'' provisions concerning the
prime contractors. The program office has not begun contract
negotiations at this time since the anticipated contract award will not
occur until 3rd quarter fiscal year 2008. However, it is possible that
during contract negotiations some major ``subcontractors'' may have
``re-opener'' provisions included in their contracts.
92. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren, with respect to each of these
multiyear procurement proposals, does the Army intend to obligate funds
in an amount necessary to fully fund termination liability with respect
to the advance buy or economic order quantities, as well as
cancellation ceiling liability? If so, what are those values? If not,
why not?
Mr. Geren. The Army typically covers multiyear cancellation ceiling
by using current year funding in the event of a cancellation. If a
multiyear contract were cancelled, the termination liability would be
paid for with a portion of the funding originally budgeted for that
year's multiyear increment. MYP termination requires the commitment of
the Army to set aside the necessary funding to cover the cancellation
ceiling amount.
Chinook Helicopters
Yes. The Chinook funding plan identifies a $90 million funded
cancellation ceiling in the second year of the contract, which is
reduced by $30 million per year for each subsequent year of the
contract.
Abrams M1A2SEP and M2A3/M3A3 Bradley Upgrades
The Abrams and BFVS MYP exhibits represent the Government's initial
cost estimate only. Therefore, the exact cancellation ceiling amount
will not be determined until the contractor proposals are received and
negotiated. The PM HBCT has developed an initial estimate of the
maximum termination liability based upon cancellation of all remaining
years beyond the year of termination.
[In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Program
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bradley.................................................... $145.0
Abrams..................................................... 111.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
joint cargo aircraft
93. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren, contrary to guidance from the
congressional defense authorizing committees in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, the Army continues efforts to
acquire JCA. To quote last year's bill: ``The Air Force's LCA would
provide intratheater lift mission support for the U.S. Transportation
Command (USTRANSCOM) which is the distribution process owner for the
DOD. The conferees note that intratheater lift using fixed-wing
aircraft is performed most efficiently when it is coordinated by
USTRANSCOM.'' Fixed-wing cargo delivery has been included in the roles
and missions of the Air Force. What is your view of the proper roles
and missions for the Army and Air Force in intratheater lift?
Mr. Geren. The Army and the Air Force have partnered to shape
complementary capability requirements for the JCA program. A Joint
Army/Air Force JCA program provides for a balance between the
operational efficiencies of common-use, centrally-managed intratheater
airlift assets, and the tactical response and effectiveness gained from
service operated assets. USTRANSCOM coordinates intratheater
distribution through Joint Deployment and Distribution Operations
Centers (JDDOCs). Both the Army and Air Force JCA operations will be
visible to the JDDOC, allowing TRANSCOM to impact the distribution
process. The Air Force will use the JCA to supplement the existing C-
130 intratheater airlift fleet, allowing for greater efficiencies for
hauling smaller loads. The Army will use the JCA to focus on time-
sensitive mission-critical resupply and key personnel transport at the
tactical level--the last tactical mile. The Army will use the JCA to
replace three less capable and aging Army airframes (C-23, C-26, and
some C-12s) with more capable cargo platforms while simultaneously
modernizing the Reserve components. The Army JCA will also relieve a
portion of the logistical burden currently carried by the CH-47. These
logistical operations are costly, maintenance intensive, and serve to
reduce the availability of CH-47 aircraft for tactical missions.
94. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren, in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, the Senate Armed Services
Committee restricted the purchase of this aircraft until two critical
studies, the JCS Intratheater Lift Capabilities Study Phase 1 and AMC's
Mobility Roadmap, are complete. What is the status of these reports?
Mr. Geren. The ITLCS study was a follow on to the Mobility
Capabilities Study (MCS). ITLCS built on MCS intratheater lift insights
and determined the preferred mix of lift platforms to accomplish
intratheater lift at the operational level in support of the Defense
Strategy in the 2012 program of record; the study was approved on March
27, 2007. The insights from ITLCS determined that JCA would be well-
suited for lower volume standard terminal arrival routes; however, that
more analysis would be needed to assess intratheater tactical airlift
(the last tactical mile) requirements. This analysis is being executed
by a combination of the Joint Intratheater Distribution Assessment
(JITDA), an addendum to the JCA Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), and an
Air Force Intratheater Airlift AoA. The JITDA goal, being led by the
Joint Staff, is to conduct theater distribution assessments to
determine required joint distribution capabilities to the point of
effect, typically at the BCT level.
operational readiness
95. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, to what extent have you
evaluated whether units are ready and trained to respond to operations
other than Iraq or Afghanistan?
General Schoomaker. More than 4,500 commanders report their
readiness monthly. Readiness reporting requires commanders to assess
their status against the mission their unit is organized/designed to
perform, against any assigned missions. We place great value on
commander assessments of their unit's readiness and these reports are
reviewed in great detail with appropriate follow-on action at the
Headquarters, Department of the Army level. Quarterly, the Army
assesses its ability to provide trained and ready forces to the
combatant commanders. These two levels of assessment allow the Army to
measure its ability to respond to challenges throughout the world.
96. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, what, if any, impact have
the large supplemental appropriations had on the readiness of Army
units since operations in Iraq and Afghanistan began? When do you
project that the funds will begin to have an impact on readiness?
General Schoomaker. These resources have enabled us to increase
readiness for counter-insurgency operations for the current fight but
not increase readiness of the force overall. From fiscal year 2003 to
2006, the Army has received over $200 billion in supplemental funding.
Of these funds, $162 billion (79 percent) have gone to operations and
support costs, which enabled us to support the conflict in Afghanistan
and Iraq. Another $29 billion (15 percent) was allocated and executed
in investment accounts to support specific in-theater requirements,
force protection, and infrastructure. Of the remaining funds, $10
billion was allocated for the modularity initiative, and only $4
billion (2 percent) addressed Army equipment shortfalls, which directly
affect readiness. Supplemental funding does not put us on a robust path
to filling shortages that exist in the Army, which impact readiness.
97. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, in light of recent plans to
increase end strength, do you have the capacity in terms of trainers,
facilities, et cetera, to train a larger force, and if not, have you
begun planning for the increased end strength from this perspective?
General Schoomaker. Army will require additional military and
civilian authorizations to support both the Active component and
Reserve component training capacity. These additional authorizations
will ensure that the training base can fully support the Army's
increase in end strength through initial military training (IMT),
functional training, and professional military education requirements.
We may also require additional investment in facilities and equipment
and these requirements are being assessed now.
In the near-term, the combat training centers (CTC) have the
capability to meet essential training requirements of deploying units,
to include the additional six BCTs called to support the global war on
terrorism. However, as the Army grows, the CTC program, in its current
state, will not be able to support all training events envisioned in
ARFORGEN training strategies. With 76 BCTs, the Army's worldwide annual
maneuver CTC (MCTC) throughput capability requirement for Active
component and Army National (ARNG) BCTs and one U.S. Army Special
Operations Command rotation will be 38 to 40 rotations annually at
objective ARFORGEN. The current MCTC capability of 33-36 rotations
annually depends on establishing an exportable training capability
(ETC) in CONUS and at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC)
by fiscal year 2010. Because the current MCTC capacity will not be able
to meet throughput requirements at objective ARFORGEN, the Army is
currently assessing whether to establish a second CONUS ETC in the next
Program Objective Memorandum cycle.
We have also analyzed training ammunition requirements. Increasing
the Army force structure will increase training ammunition requirements
approximately 7 percent annually. We do not anticipate any significant
issues with the current ammunition industrial base to increase
production to support potential training requirement increases.
Finally, we are analyzing the training support systems at
installations. There is an ongoing study, initiated in late November
2006, to look at the Army's inventory of ranges, facilities, equipment,
and other requirements necessary to support training a larger Army. The
results of this study will be complete by mid-summer 2006.
98. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, to what extent have you
analyzed the implications of increasing end strength in terms of
maintaining overall readiness while growing the force?
General Schoomaker. During the Army's plan to grow the force, the
impact on manning, equipping, training, sustaining, and stationing the
growth in the force to minimize the impact on readiness, while meeting
current operational demands, was considered. The analysis of the
required increase in capabilities to meet global force demands and the
need to ensure the right force mix across all three components resulted
in a timeline for the plan that builds a balance of combat, combat
support, and combat service support capabilities in the operating force
between fiscal years 2008-2013. Additionally, the impacts on the
Institutional Army were evaluated and the results incorporated into the
plan ensuring adequate capacity to generate and sustain the Operational
Force. Finally, the funding to implement the plan, along with
maintaining the Army's current transformation plan and operational
requirements, was evaluated and integrated in the program and budget
review process. The resulting Grow the Army Plan has been incorporated
in current initiatives under the AFORGEN construct to maintain
readiness of the units deployed to meet the Global Force demand.
99. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, what are your specific
recommendations as to how to reduce the impact of high operations tempo
operations on both near- and long-term readiness and modernization
programs?
General Schoomaker. The Army is resourced with budget and wartime
supplemental funding to execute the current OIF/OEF fight. Resources
continue to fall short of the level necessary to implement the full
strategy outlined in the 2005 QDR. Long-term fixes are primary
objectives of ongoing efforts toward force modernization and
transformation coupled with the Grow the Army initiative. Each is a
years-long effort with substantial funding requirements. Current
projections are that, with sufficient reliable funding, we can meet
operational requirements and execute the National Military Strategy by
2013.
In the interim, the Army continues to maximize available resources
to ensure units in theater are fully manned, trained, and equipped to
execute their missions. Critical to this near-term readiness is
ensuring sufficient reset time for redeploying units to ensure
personnel and equipment recovery can be completed prior to beginning
collective training efforts for the next assigned mission. The Army
recently enacted policy mandating that units have a minimum of 12
months dwell time between deployments. Priority of personnel is to
these units preparing to deploy. The goal is for every BCT to deploy to
theater at 95 percent strength or better. Near-term equipment fixes
include the forward repair activities: reset and recapitalization. The
Army consistently meets equipment readiness standards due to
supplemental funding supporting these programs. The Army is maximizing
the use of Army pre-positioned stocks and is sustaining unit equipment
availability and readiness with the help of supplemental funding. There
still exists shortfalls in equipment fill and levels of modernization,
training (both institutional and unit), and sustainment throughout all
components of the Army. This impacts our strategic depth and
flexibility to address unforeseen challenges.
readiness of the total army
100. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, your testimony before the
Commission on the National Guard and Reserves in December 2006 was
instrumental in bringing about change to the previous OSD policy
regarding redeployment of soldiers of the National Guard and Reserve
for deployments in excess of 24 months. You stated then that ``the Army
is incapable of generating and sustaining the required forces to wage
the global war on terror without its components--Active, Guard and
Reserve--surging together.'' You indicated that the Active-Duty Army
``will break'' under the strain of war-zone rotations without change,
and Secretary Gates changed the policy. In 2004, however, you used your
``rain barrel'' analogy to argue against added end strength and to make
the point that the Army was incapable of making good use of its Reserve
manpower. Please explain to us whether and how the rain barrel was
emptied.
General Schoomaker. The purpose of the ``rain barrel'' analogy was
not to portray a degree of ``emptiness.'' Rather, it was used to show
how operating force capabilities would be increased over time by
rebalancing existing structure within the Army's approved end strength.
Under our original plan, and with the support of Congress, Active
component end strength would increase temporarily by 30,000 to allow
that rebalance as we transformed the force to modular designs while
meeting the operational demands of the war on terror. At the end of
that transformation period we would have increased the Active component
operating force from a baseline of 315,000 in fiscal year 2004 to
355,000 by fiscal year 2011. Along with assured and predicted access to
the Reserve components, the plan would have reduced stress in high
demand capabilities, redistributed soldiers to ensure the right mix
between our operational and institutional forces, and increased overall
force effectiveness and readiness. The challenge since QDR 2006 is the
increasing global force demand required by the long war. With demand
exceeding resources and with limited access to Reserve component forces
under previous mobilization policies, the impact on Army force
capabilities was creating ``emptiness'' in the Army's capacity to meet
that growing demand. The Army's proposed growth, along with new
mobilization policies, will allow us to curtail that drain on capacity
and build additional capability to retain the barrel at a safe level.
101. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, when did you first realize
that adhering to the 482,400 end strength mandated by Secretary
Rumsfeld was unsustainable?
General Schoomaker. During my testimony to the Commission on
National Guard and Reserves in December 2006, I first proposed growing
the size of the Army as a course of action. I did not come to this
conclusion without first being convinced that all other feasible
alternatives had been exhausted. Even with 482,400 soldiers in the
Active component, the Army was growing 30,000 temporarily to meet
operational demands. Additionally, the Reserve components have become
an integral part of the deployed Operational Force. The Army depends on
recurrent access to the Reserve component to ensure integrity of the
force and to maintain a reasonable dwell time under the ARFORGEN
construct. Over the last 5 years, and, in particular since QDR 2006,
the increasing strategic demand of deployed combat brigades and other
supporting units is placing a strain on the Army's All-Volunteer Force,
now being tested for the first time in an extended period of conflict.
The dwell time between deployments for Active Duty units is less than
the goal of 2 years, and in certain high demand/low density units, the
dwell time is less than a year. Further, since almost all Reserve
component units already have been partially or completely mobilized in
support of the global war on terrorism, current mobilization policies
and practices require the Army to rely on individual volunteers from
those units. All this runs counter to the military necessity of
deploying trained, ready, and cohesive units to meet operational
demands. The realization is that we needed to make the temporary growth
permanent and build additional capacity across all three components. If
today's global demand is indicative of the future demand on our Army to
provide combatant commanders with a wide range of forces and
capabilities to prevail in the war on terror, to sustain our global
commitments, and to build effective multinational coalitions, then we
must build today to meet these challenges in the future.
102. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, what is your assessment
today of the personnel readiness of the Active Army? What will it take
to prevent ``breaking'' the Army as you warned about just 3 months ago?
General Schoomaker. The foundation of personnel readiness in the
Active Army is sustaining the All-Volunteer Force. The Army has
continued to achieve its retention mission for the past 9 years. The
Active Army is ahead of its year-to-date recruiting goal and expects to
meet its goal for fiscal year 2007. The recruiting environment will
remain challenging. With continued congressional support of new
authorities and funding, the Army will meet accession and retention
goals. To avoid ``breaking the Army,'' the Army is accelerating its end
strength growth. This will decrease stress on soldiers and families and
meet future demands. The Army consistently monitors the quality of life
for soldiers and families and adjusts programs to ensure the All-
Volunteer Force is sustained.
military equipment
103. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, with
the Army surging larger numbers of troops to Iraq, and given the
difficulties in meeting equipment requirements for troops already
deployed, how will the Army cope with the requirement to equip these
additional units?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. First and most importantly, we do
not compromise our standards in force protection for deploying units,
and the Army has and will continue to meet the requirements of
deploying forces, including those involved in the surge. The impact of
sustaining equipment is felt in nondeployed units. For instance, the
Army is moving UAH between units to ensure pre-deployment training
requirements are met at home station, while units in theater are
provided the quantities of UAHs required to perform their missions. The
Army is addressing this problem by:
(1) using reset to repair, replace, and recapitalize
equipment;
(2) moving equipment between units to meet training
requirements prior to deployment;
(3) filling requirements from new production; and
(4) requesting additional funding to purchase needed
equipment.
104. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, how
will this affect already low levels of nondeploying unit readiness?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The current level of demand,
combined with resource shortfalls, forces the Army to continually shift
resources from nondeployed forces to sustain those currently in the
fight. The pace of current operations and our commitment to fully man,
train, and equip our deploying forces for their assigned missions
leaves holes in the readiness of our next to deploy units. After years
of insufficient investment in the Army, many of our units were under-
equipped and not ready for deployment, especially in our Reserve units.
The low readiness of our nondeployed force impacts our strategic
flexibility and depth. This practice increases risk in our ability to
perform other critical missions. Through base and supplemental
appropriations--we have addressed many of our equipment shortfalls.
Supplemental appropriations, however, have not enabled the Army to
recover, as they are intended to pay for the costs of war, principally
through the purchase of consumable supplies and the replacement of
battle losses.
105. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, how
will this affect Army capability to respond to crises in other areas of
the world?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. There are sufficient nondeployed
units to respond to another major conflict, but the readiness of those
units may result in longer timelines and increased risk in achieving
mission success. For homeland defense missions and consequence
management, there are a specified number of forces tasked and
maintained in a high state of readiness to respond.
106. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, given
steady trends over the last 2 to 3 years of decreasing levels of
equipment readiness among nondeployed units, what specific equipment
readiness areas are of the most concern to you?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. Due to theatre requirements, some
equipment is unavailable for units to train with prior to deployment.
The most common shortfall occurs with force protection equipment, where
equipping solutions are developed to meet specific theatre threats, and
production of these items go straight into theatre to meet demand.
These items include: uparmored HMMWVs and medium and heavy trucks,
armored security vehicles, the RG-31, Buffalo, Husky, Cougar, Counter-
Rocket, Artillery and Mortar and Counter Remote Controlled IED Warfare
devices. Additionally, kits designed for standard Army equipment to
increase survivability are also provided only in theatre. These include
the Bradley and Tank Urban Survivability Kits, Frag Kits, Bradley
Reactive Armor, and Surface-Launched Air-Targeted Armor for Strykers.
Some new standard Army equipment is being sent directly to theatre as
well, with little to none remaining for training units. These items
include Profiler, Chemical Biological Protective Shelters, Command Post
of the Future, Tactical Water Purification Systems, and Forward Area
Water Point Supply Systems. There are also items that are only fielded
in limited quantities due to new production (a force feasibility review
reduced number), most importantly Thermal Weapon Sights.
107. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, how
has this trend affected your ability to train and equip your deploying
units?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. First and most importantly, we do
not compromise our standards in force protection for deploying units,
and the Army has, and will continue to meet, the equipping requirements
of deploying forces, including those involved in the plus-up.
The impact of sustaining equipment is felt in non-deployed units.
For instance, the Army is moving Up-armored High Mobility Multipurpose
Wheeled Vehicles (UAH) between units to ensure pre-deployment training
requirements are met at home station, while units in theater are
provided the quantities of UAHs required to perform their missions. The
Army is addressing this problem by: (1) using reset to repair, replace,
and recapitalize equipment; (2) moving equipment between units to meet
training requirements prior to deployment; (3) filling requirements
from new production; and (4) requesting additional funding to purchase
needed equipment.
108. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, how do
reset efforts address these problems?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. Reset prevents further erosion of
readiness of the force and restores equipment to a desired level of
combat capability commensurate with a unit's future mission. The $17.1
billion provides the resources to replace, repair, and recapitalize
equipment for 24 BCTs and support units. Contracts to replace battle
losses are being put in place during fiscal year 2007, but most of the
equipment will not be delivered to the Army until fiscal year 2008.
The reset funding will meet the requirements to properly equip our
deploying forces, but will not `fix' all equipment shortfalls or
equipment still committed overseas in support of OIF and OEF.
109. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, given
the surge in troop levels, how will the larger troop levels impact
requirements to rotate equipment from overseas theaters back to the
United States for reset?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The troop plus-up has a modest
impact on both fiscal years 2007 and 2008 reset plans. Three BCTs that
were planned to begin reset in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2007
will be delayed until the first quarter of fiscal year 2008. Further,
the plus-up also increases reset requirements in fiscal year 2008 by
two BCTs. This represents a total increased requirement in fiscal year
2008 of five BCTs.
110. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, if
these rotations cannot occur, how will this impact Service plans to
execute the funds allocated for reset in fiscal year 2007 and requested
in fiscal year 2008?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. To manage the reset process, the
Army has established a Reset Task Force comprised of staff elements
throughout the Army Staff. While the Reset Task Force has made some
adjustments due to extension of units in theater and equipment swaps
between units, we are still on a glide path to fully execute our fiscal
year 2007 reset program. Current assessments as a result of the plus-up
in theater have identified an increase of five BCTs to the fiscal year
2008 reset plan.
The fiscal year 2008 global war on terrorism budget request was
made prior to the current plus-up of forces in theater. The Reset Task
Force, in coordination with other staff elements, is currently in the
process of revalidating the fiscal year 2008 reset requirement and will
make adjustments as necessary.
corrosion prevention and mitigation
111. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) previously reported that
corrosion has significant impacts on the cost, readiness, and safety of
military equipment. Corrosion prevention is considered to be the most
cost effective way to reduce corrosion and its effects on DOD
equipment. We understand that DOD and the Services are not doing as
much as they can in incorporating corrosion prevention planning in many
of our newest and most expensive weapons systems, despite considerable
guidance calling for this planning. What are the challenges to having
more effective corrosion prevention planning and what efforts have been
taken or are planned to overcome these challenges?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The Corrosion Prevention and
Control (CPC) program has not been funded to develop and execute a plan
to reduce the cost of corrosion on Army materiel.
The immediate challenge to having more effective corrosion
prevention planning is funding. The CPC program submitted a fiscal
years 2008-2013 Program Objective Memorandum request of $32 million,
$88 million, $90 million, $29 million, and $108 million. Although $180
million of that requirement was validated, we have not received funding
for the program.
If the CPC program was funded we could execute the plan to reduce
the cost of corrosion on Army materiel. The planned efforts to overcome
these challenges include: 1) conduct more comprehensive corrosion
prevention planning during equipment design, 2) obtain statistically
significant data that identifies corrosion failure on equipment at the
parts level, 3) obtain research funding to develop design improvements
for fielded systems, and 4) obtain Army OMA funding to implement state-
of-the-art preventive maintenance and repair solutions.
These are the impediments that prevent the Army from improving
corrosion resistance for Army systems.
sheltering equipment
112. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, Army propositioning
equipment in Kuwait is not under shelter, because the buildings that
were supposed to provide that shelter have been taken for offices for
U.S. forces stationed there. GAO has reported that this lack of shelter
invites corrosion and contributes to decreased readiness levels. What
actions have been taken to provide more shelters for Army equipment?
General Schoomaker. Most available storage at Camp Arifjan has been
diverted for other OIF purposes. Other Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS)
construction projects are either not prioritized, funded, or have other
(e.g., host nation) issues. A plan for cost-effective shelters and
facilities for all APS equipment is under evaluation by the U.S. Army
Materiel Command. The funding identified from this evaluation will be
requested under MCA projects in the fiscal years 2010-2015 Program
Objective Memorandum.
Currently, APS-5 unit sets have been issued and are employed
supporting the plus-up operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Use of APS-5
has repeatedly illustrated the value of the APS strategy. Prior to this
recent full APS-5 draw, portions have repeatedly been drawn and
subsequently reset since 2002. A testament to the high operational
readiness of the APS sets occurred during the August 2006 draw when
members of the supported task force commented that the equipment drawn
from APS was better than their own unit equipment. Upon completion of
the current missions the Army will reconstitute and reset APS to
support the APS Strategy 2013 restoring the strategic and operational
responsiveness required by the combatant commands.
Contingency planning for APS shelter is an ongoing and dynamic
process. For example, in APS-4 (Northeast Asia), once the new
maintenance facility is finished in 2007, the humidity controlled
warehouse currently being used for maintenance will be converted to
provide 50,000 square feet of controlled humidity storage.
113. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, has the Army done a cost-
effectiveness study for acquiring more shelters and if it has, what are
the results of the study?
General Schoomaker. The Army has not done a specific cost-
effectiveness study for APS shelters, but relies on other similar
studies and findings to support APS storage requirements. The June 14,
2006, GAO report, Additional Measures to Reduce Corrosion of
Prepostitioned Military Assets Could Achieve Cost Savings, noted the
Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center study that found the return on
investment for controlled humidity preservation storage of equipment to
be 8:1 over 10 years. Mean time between failure for electronics
improved by 30 percent and cyclic maintenance time was reduced by 50
percent.
Presently, all APS watercraft are supported by controlled humidity
preservation systems, when not undergoing repairs/modifications or on-
condition-cyclic-maintenance. Part of the APS facility requirement plan
is to prioritize construction of APS storage shelters for the critical
equipment items that are of high dollar value, reduce expensive
maintenance cycles, require controlled humidity for corrosion
prevention, and where readiness rates are increased.
114. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, are there any plans to
acquire sheltering for the rest of the equipment and if not, why?
General Schoomaker. Presently, requirements for APS facilities
(storage, maintenance, and other) are being evaluated as part of the
comprehensive implementation plan for APS Strategy 2013. The employment
of APS equipment follows the shift in focus for the combatant
commanders as potential theater threats increase or decrease over time.
The APS facility strategy is to develop unit set, operational
project, and sustainment stock maintenance facilities and storage
(controlled humidity) capabilities at strategic locations and sites
that support contingency and operations worldwide. The goal is to have
a fully coordinated ``end-state'' for APS facilities that can be
executable with major construction funding and leveraging partner
nation funding where feasible. The comprehensive facility plan aligned
to the APS Strategy 2013 mission and structure will provide ready
equipment to Army and Joint force execution authorities.
national guard
115. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, the
ARNG has been stretched to meet its State and Federal missions. The
Guard has been neither well-resourced nor, according to the Army staff,
retained a high level of readiness. Experts in and out of uniform
report that the National Guard currently faces a severe shortage of
available equipment in the United States. Should the National Guard
adopt an equipment modernization program to meet its own unique needs?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. At this time, the Army has no
plan to initiate an equipment modernization program devoted to
requirements found only in the National Guard. The Army uses an
integrated and synchronized requirements and resourcing process to
ensure that Army forces are manned, trained, and equipped for their
mission requirements. Additionally, the ARNG annually receives National
Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA) funds directly from
Congress to address its own unique needs.
Furthermore, the ARNG leadership is a participant in the Army's
cyclic requirements and resourcing meetings--such as the Army Campaign
Plan, the Army Resource and Requirement Board, the Army Requirements
Oversight Council, the Army System Acquisition Review Council, the Army
Modular Force General Officer Steering Committee, the Army Equipping
and Reuse Conference, and the Senior Review Group.
The Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the Director of the ARNG
have access to the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army
to provide input and address issues and decisions affecting the
organization, manning, equipping, training, and resourcing of the ARNG.
Since the beginning of the global war on terror, the Department of
the Army has significantly increased funding for ARNG equipment. We
have allocated $36 billion over the fiscal years 2005-2013 period to
equip and modernize the ARNG. This funding will bring the ARNG to 77
percent equipment on hand by fiscal year 2014. The Army goal is to
equip all components to 100 percent of the Active component standard.
If the current funding stream progresses beyond the fiscal years 2008-
2013 POM, this goal could potentially be achieved by 2020.
116. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, what
role should the Guard play in homeland defense?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. In its non-Federalized status,
the National Guard is controlled by the Governor of the State or
territory, and as such it works for the Governor, but also supports the
combatant commander--U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), U.S. Southern
Command (SOUTHCOM), or U.S. Pacific Command, as specified in the
supporting plans to that combatant command. In this case, the National
Guard Bureau works with the combatant command to ensure their homeland
defense plans facilitate achievement of unity of effort.
In its Federalized status, the National Guard is controlled by the
President, and as such it accomplishes homeland defense missions given
to it by the combatant commander.
117. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, does
the ARNG have the equipment and readiness to fill this role?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. As you are aware, the ARNG is
experiencing serious equipping and readiness challenges. These
challenges stem from decades of the ARNG being postured as a strategic
Reserve. In that capacity, the Army accepted a certain amount of risk.
The Guard was funded at levels appropriate for a strategic Reserve and
fully equipped and trained when mobilized for their Federal mission.
Currently, the ARNG is engaged in a demanding and complex transition to
an Operational Force. The Guard's equipping and readiness shortfalls
have been exacerbated by the global war on terror, high operational
tempo, and the cross-leveling of equipment.
While the ARNG has a diminished capability to respond to domestic
emergencies, I am confident they have the capacity required to respond
to all contingencies. LTG Blum, Chief National Guard Bureau, has stated
that the issue is not whether the Guard will respond, it is about the
time it will take to respond. The Guard's response time hinges on
getting the right mix of people, equipment, and supplies to the right
place on time.
The Army and Congress have worked tirelessly to ensure the ARNG's
equipment requirements are programmed. We are investing approximately
$36 billion in ARNG equipment from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year
2013. The majority of this equipment will have utility for both
domestic and warfighting missions. In the short-term, the States have
negotiated Emergency Management Assistance Compacts to provide
capabilities to each other, if requested. Although the Army is strapped
for equipment, all components working in concert will support the ARNG
in its mission of aiding and assisting the States in responding to
domestic emergencies and homeland defense missions.
118. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, the
Army's Stryker BCT concept has been suggested as a model by which to
equip Guard units. I understand that such a unit exists in the
Pennsylvania National Guard already. Are there plans to role out more
Guard Stryker units?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The mission of the Stryker was to
fulfill an immediate requirement in the Army's transformation process
to equip a strategically and operationally deployable brigade capable
of rapid movement anywhere in the world in a combat ready
configuration. The armored wheeled vehicle is designed to enable the
Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) to maneuver easily in close and
urban terrain while providing protection in open terrain.
The Stryker is an excellent multi-functional platform that is a
good fit within the ARNG brigade structure. However, the Army has not
validated or programmed any additional requirements for the ARNG beyond
the one Stryker brigade stationed in the Pennsylvania National Guard.
119. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, the
Commission on the Guard and Reserves has recommended that the Chief of
the National Guard Bureau be a four-star general and that the Commander
or Deputy Commander of U.S. NORTHCOM should be an officer of the
National Guard. Do you agree with those recommendations?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The National Guard plays play a
critical role as warfighters abroad defending our Nation and as the
military first-responder at home when disaster strikes. The Army
leadership recognizes this dual role as central to the National Guard's
place in our Army. The Guard comprises about one third of our total
force and National Guard soldiers in their local communities form the
Army's strongest, most direct link to the American people. The Guard's
expertise, versatility, and connectedness make it a force of choice in
almost any situation where the Nation calls on its military Services.
The Army has a vital interest in ensuring that the National Guard is
trained and equipped to the same level as Active component units.
The current Joint Chiefs of Staff structure has sustained the Army
and the ARNG for many decades and that structure has ensured that the
ARNG was always manned, trained, and equipped for all assigned
missions. We do not support a change to the current structure that
would add a four-star National Guard officer to it. With regard to the
possibility of a National Guard officer being the Deputy Commander of
NORTHCOM, we fully support and advise the Secretary of Defense to
appoint the most qualified officers into combatant commander and deputy
commander positions; there is no reason a National Guard officer could
not perform in that capacity.
120. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, what
about making the Chief of the National Guard Bureau a member of the
JCS?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The proposed change is not
necessary. It would confuse command and control relationships and line
of authorities that the Department has formed over the past 20 years
since Goldwater-Nichols was enacted. The Chief of the National Guard
Bureau (CNGB) plays a very important role, but he does not have
responsibilities for organizing, manning, training, and equipping
forces or for corresponding budget and programming responsibilities.
All of those functions reside with the Army. While those areas are not
his primary responsibilities, he does provide input for integration
into all of them. The CNGB has unfettered access to every key official
in the DOD and the Army.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has two assistants; one
for the National Guard and one for the Reserve, and they participant in
matters affecting the Reserve component. The National Guard Bureau
assigns the Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for
National Guard Matters (ACJCS NGM) and that assistant gives advice to
the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense on National Guard matters on
a permanent basis. The ACJCS NGM is responsible for providing the
Chairman with information, advice, and counsel on matters concerning
the National Guard. It also enhances and facilitates Reserve component
utilization. Any actions that could affect these responsibilities or
any issues that could impact the Reserve component must be coordinated
through the ACJCS NGM.
121. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, what
is your view about necessary changes, if any, to the duties of the
Chief of the National Guard Bureau?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The proposed change to the duties
of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau is not necessary. It would
confuse command and control relationships and line of authorities that
the Department has formed over the past 20 years since Goldwater-
Nichols was enacted. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB)
plays a very important role, but does not have responsibilities for
organizing, manning, training, and equipping forces or for
corresponding budget and programming responsibilities. All of those
functions reside with the Army. While those areas are not his primary
responsibilities, he does provide input for integration into all of
them. The CNGB has unfettered access to every key official in the DOD
and the Army.
detainee treatment and interrogation training
122. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, the
Detainee Treatment Act directed that ``No person in the custody or
under the effective control of the DOD or under detention in a DOD
facility shall be subject to any treatment or technique of
interrogation not authorized by and listed in the United States Army
Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation.'' In September 2006, the
Army released the revised manual. How would you assess the training on
the new field manual?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The new field manual, FM 2-22.3,
Human Intelligence Collector Operations, has been seamlessly integrated
into Army training. Current training is adequate.
Combat arms maneuver brigades and associated combat service support
units normally conduct a CTC rotation prior to deployment.
Interrogation training at the CTCs incorporates FM 2-22.3.
In October 2006, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAIC) deployed
a mobile training team to the Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of
Operations and trained all senior interrogators on the differences
between the superseded Field Manual 34-52, Interrogation, and FM 2-
22.3.
The USAIC, in conjunction with the Army G-2 and U.S. Army Forces
Command, executes mobile training teams for units preparing for
deployments, to update and reinforce their training. Training is
tailored per unit request and addresses FM 2-22.3.
The USAIC has also revised the Programs of Instruction for
institutional or classroom training to incorporate lessons learned and
reflect the expanded doctrinal guidance contained in FM 2-22.3 and the
provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act.
123. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, what
safeguards has the Army established to ensure that detainee abuse at
Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib will not be repeated?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The Army is committed to ensuring
all of its soldiers live up to the Army values and the law of war,
regardless of the environment or circumstances, and we are equally
committed to ensuring that those responsible for detainee abuse are
held accountable. The Army has established a wide range of safeguards
to minimize the chance of detainee abuse incidents occurring in the
future. The Army will also continue to aggressively investigate every
credible allegation of detainee abuse to fix accountability where
appropriate.
The criminals who carried out detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib have
been held accountable. There have been no substantiated cases of
detainee abuse by soldiers at Guantanamo.
The Army has incorporated detainee operations lessons learned into
training guidance, CTC rotations, training support products, and
updated institutional training Programs of Instruction. Several
comprehensive training support packages which cover the full spectrum
of detainee operations were distributed. We continue to provide mobile
training teams focused on detainee operations for predeployment
training and post deployment in theater training. The Army also
provides detainee operations training for sister Service units, as
required.
Our policy never allowed for detainee abuse. We continue to address
and provide detailed procedures for reporting and investigating even
suspected abuse. The Abu Ghraib abuses were first reported by a
soldier. Army leaders involved in theater detainee operations work
closely with the International Red Cross to ensure they have required
accessed to detainees and facilities. We also created new force
structure which greatly enhances detainee operations capability.
As executive agent for administration of DOD detainee operations
policy we work across DOD to ensure results of reports and periodic
inspections and assessments are analyzed across the policy, doctrine,
organization, training, material, leader development, personnel, and
facilities spectrum to ensure not only the best conditions, based on
military necessity, for detainees, but for our service men and women as
well. The all-Service FM 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector
Operations, was released in September 2006 and the Army is currently
staffing the revised all-Service policy, AR 190-8, Detainee Operations.
124. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, is
detainee treatment sufficiently incorporated into courses of
instruction at our military schools at all levels?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. Current detainee treatment
training is sufficient and provides instruction and practical
application of principles and policy at all levels of soldier and
leader responsibility. Changes continue to be made to Programs of
Instruction (POI) from initial military training to Professional
Military Education courses based on a wide range of lessons learned.
Specific changes as a result of detainee operations lessons learned
have been extensive. The U.S. Army TRADOC has updated and published
three field manuals (FMs), FM 6-22, Army Leadership; FM 2-22.3, HUMINT
Collector Operations; and FM 3-19.17, Military Working Dogs; one
interim manual, FMI 3-63.6, Command and Control of Detainee Operations;
six student texts related to detainee operations; six training support
packages for detainee operations; and the Center for Army Lessons
Learned (CALL) Handbook No. 06-17, Detainee Operations at the Point of
Capture, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, which was published in
May 2006.
Individual Entry Training (IET) including basic training and one
unit station training (OSUT) provides all new soldiers with Law of Land
Warfare/Rules of Engagement. IET soldiers conduct 43 hours of specific
detainee operations instruction (roughly 50 percent academic and 50
percent hands on practical exercises) including the use of role players
and an 8-hour detainee operations facility culminating exercise.
Basic Officer Leader Course conducts training on detainee
operations. Additionally, Officer Intermediate Level Education (ILE)
was updated in Academic Year 2004-05 to cover detainee operations. ILE
students have the opportunity to enroll in electives covering detainee
operations in depth.
The U.S. Army Military Police School incorporates the humane
treatment of detainees, pursuant to the internationally accepted
protocols of the Geneva and Hague Conventions, at all levels of soldier
and leader responsibility from IET to battalion and brigade pre-command
courses. The MP School also recently opened a mock internment facility.
The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School (USAIC&S) has revised
programs of instruction to incorporate lessons learned and reflects
expanded doctrinal guidance contained in FM 2-22.3, Human Intelligence
Collector Operations, and the provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act
of 2005. USAIC&S has revised and expanded the Human Intelligence
Collector Course to 18 weeks with 3 days of lecture and practical
exercises.
USAIC has deployed a mobile training team to the CENTCOM Area of
Operations where they trained and certified all senior interrogators on
the restricted technique and the differences between the superseded
Field Manual 34-52, Interrogation, and FM 2-22.3.
counterinsurgency
125. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, counterinsurgency
operations, conducted at the squad and platoon level in populated urban
areas, stress cultural, language, and human intelligence skills over
technological resources. How will the Army improve these capabilities?
General Schoomaker. A counterinsurgency campaign is a mix of
offensive, defensive, and stability operations conducted along multiple
lines of operations. It requires soldiers to employ a mix of familiar
combat tasks and skills more often associated with nonmilitary
agencies. The balance between them depends on the local situation.
Achieving this balance is not easy. It requires leaders at all levels
to adjust their approach constantly. They must ensure that their
soldiers are ready to be greeted with either a handshake or a hand
grenade while taking on missions only infrequently practiced until
recently at our CTCs. Soldiers are expected to be nation builders as
well as warriors. They must be prepared to help reestablish
institutions and local security forces and assist in rebuilding
infrastructure and basic services. They must be able to facilitate
establishing local governance and the rule of law. The list of such
tasks is long; performing them involves extensive coordination and
cooperation with many intergovernmental, host-nation, and international
agencies. We are focused on ensuring our institutional organizations
(TRADOC schools, centers of excellence, and training centers) provide
our soldiers the requisite skills to execute our current
counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq and Afghanistan while simultaneously
maintaining skills across the full spectrum of combat operations.
congressional earmarks in army science and technology programs
126. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren, defense S&T funding lines are
some of the most heavily earmarked accounts in the defense budget. A
rough analysis of top-line figures shows that--setting aside the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency which has not traditionally
been earmarked--the DOD's basic and applied research funding is
approximately 40 percent earmarked. I am interested in receiving more
detailed information from the Department and each of the Services about
the extent and execution--including the military utility--of these
earmarks. Could you please provide a breakout of the Army fiscal year
2007 S&T funding between requested programs and congressional earmarks?
Mr. Geren. Yes. The Army had $1.2 billion in earmarks in fiscal
year 2007 to the requested budget of $1.7 billion, a 40 percent
increase over the request. This level of congressional earmarks has
increased steadily over the past few years. In fiscal year 2003 the
earmarks to S&T totaled $749 million. Our experience and assessments
have shown that the majority of these earmarks have had marginal to no
military utility. The additional appropriation funding has imposed more
workload on S&T managers, principal investigators, and contracting
offices. See Attachment.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
127. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren, could you include any
evaluations you have done of the military utility of these projects?
Mr. Geren. Our experience and assessments have shown that the
majority of these earmarks have had marginal to no military utility.
128. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren, does receiving your funding
for basic and applied research in such a heavily earmarked fashion
interfere with the Army's ability to conduct a coherent research and
development program which meets the Army's technology needs?
Mr. Geren. Yes. The additional earmark workload on S&T managers,
principal investigators, contracting offices, and resource managers
reduces the time available to manage the core programs that are vital
to developing technologies that could enable new warfighting
capabilities. Further, many of the earmarked efforts fund development
of technology that is inconsistent with the Army's acquisition and
warfighting investment strategies.
urban combat, cultural awareness, and counterinsurgency
129. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, we are conducting
counterinsurgency operations in a city of 6 million people, currently
rife with sectarian discord. Can you describe the pre-deployment
training that the brigades deploying to this operation receive?
General Schoomaker. A unit's training strategy is focused on its
assigned mission and culminates in a mission rehearsal exercise
specifically designed to challenge soldiers and leaders with situations
and conditions similar to those they will face when deployed. Training
scenarios created for mission rehearsal exercises require units to
execute complex operations involving multiple missions and requiring
unit personnel to cope with rapidly changing circumstances. The
training environment created for mission rehearsal exercises prepares
units to operate in Iraq and Afghanistan, to include realistic convoy
live-fire events, simulated IEDs, emphasis on detainee operations,
dealing with large numbers of civilians in villages and towns for urban
operations, cultural awareness training, use of interpreters, response
to media on the battlefield, emphasis on information operations,
increase medical training and medical rules of engagement,
synchronizing medical and logistical task forces with the unit,
counter-insurgency operations, greater use of Army Special Operations
Forces, and greater use of UAVs. Rigorous mission rehearsal exercises
are indispensable to preparing units for deployment, especially when
redeploying within a year. Continued congressional support of Army
supplemental funding requests is essential for the Army to adequately
replicate the contemporary operational environment for mission
rehearsal exercises.
130. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, what is the Army doing to
improve the cultural awareness of its soldiers and leaders in general?
General Schoomaker. Cultural training is in the curricula of IMT,
for both officer and enlisted soldiers. The most important training
conducted in each are the field exercises that challenge soldiers to
apply what they learn in a realistic setting. The U.S. Army Accessions
Command (USAAC) has woven cultural challenges into the fabric of the
training environment so that outcomes are realistic and influenced by
the use of appropriate tactics.
The Army has established a TRADOC Culture Center (TCC), at Fort
Huachuca, Arizona, to provide support to operational units and
professional military education. The efforts of the TCC and the Defense
Language Institute Foreign Language Center at Monterey, California, are
closely coordinated. Culture and language are inherently linked and
both organizations regularly coordinate training strategies and
schedules to reduce redundancy, and ensure complimentary instructions.
Almost one-third of the education provided at the Command and
General Staff College (CGSC) involves improving the student's cultural
and regional awareness. The current educational programs and ongoing
initiatives in the areas of cultural awareness, language training, and
regional studies address Joint Professional Military Educational
objectives and the 2005 Defense Language Transformation Roadmap. The
International Military Student program allows students to interact with
officers from approximately 90 different countries and each student is
required to take a regional or religion course elective. The CGSC, in
collaboration with the Defense Language Institute, requires a language
elective for students identified for assignments in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Additionally, officers selected for Military Transition
Teams in Iraq receive required language coursework in Iraqi Arabic.
The CTCs are considered the cornerstones of Army training
readiness. The CTCs further that reputation by providing the most
realistic training feasible for units scheduled for deployment. The
training is focused specifically on the area of operation where the
unit will eventually deploy. To enhance a unit's level of cultural
competency, the training received in this seminar is sequentially and
progressively built upon with additional cultural awareness training
and culminates during the mission rehearsal exercise.
After action reports are a critical component of all CTC training.
Feedback from units in theater suggests the training the unit received
at the CTCs helped to prepare them for eventual operations in theater.
131. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, was the urban combat
training adequate?
General Schoomaker. Yes, the urban combat training afforded each
brigade prior to deployment prepares soldiers for urban operations and
to deal with large numbers of civilians in villages and towns. The Army
has an extensive inventory of urban training facilities resulting from
investments made in the 1980s. More recently, as part of a
comprehensive overhaul of urban training, the Army has been investing
in urban training facilities since 2002. The strategy to modernize
urban training facilities began as a study conducted by the U.S. Army
TRADOC that recommended a minimum, standardized set of facilities to
enable rigorous, realistic live training in an urban environment. The
study showed that each combat brigade should have home-station access
to a shoot house, an urban assault course, and a ``capstone'' training
facility called a Combined Arms Collective Training Facility (CACTF).
The CACTF is a small village-like cluster of 12-28 robust building
shells that enable units to develop and hone urban combat skills.
Generally, units at company level and below train at home station using
a shoot house, urban assault course, and CACTF. Brigade-level training
in urban operations takes place at the CTCs. In cases where full MILCON
projects are not practical or available, the Army uses inexpensive, low
maintenance, pre-fabricated training facilities that support many of
the critical tasks that lead to urban operations proficiency. Overall,
the Army has a sound, deliberate, and economical program to achieve the
number of urban training facilities that are needed by fiscal year
2013.
132. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, does the Army have
sufficient facilities to train for urban combat?
General Schoomaker. The Army has an extensive inventory of urban
training facilities resulting from investments made in the 1980s. More
recently, as part of a comprehensive overhaul of urban training, the
Army has been investing in urban training facilities since 2002. The
strategy to modernize urban training facilities began as a study
conducted by the U.S. Army TRADOC that recommended a minimum,
standardized set of facilities to enable rigorous, realistic live
training in an urban environment. The study showed that each combat
brigade should have home-station access to a shoot house, an urban
assault course, and a ``capstone'' training facility called a CACTF.
The CACTF is a small village-like cluster of 12-28 robust building
shells that enable units to develop and hone urban combat skills.
Generally, units at company level and below train at home station using
a shoot house, urban assault course, and CACTF. Brigade-level training
in urban operations takes place at the CTCs. In cases where full
military construction projects are not practical or available, the Army
uses inexpensive, low maintenance, pre-fabricated training facilities
that support many of the critical tasks that lead to urban operations
proficiency. Overall, the Army has a sound, deliberate, and economical
program to achieve the number of urban training facilities that are
needed by fiscal year 2013.
soldier-to-soldier combat identification system
133. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, are we near fielding a
soldier-to-soldier combat identification system that could be central
to reducing incidents of fratricide?
General Schoomaker. Yes. We have fielded several solutions that
reduce the risk of soldier-to-soldier fratricide. The Army currently
fields glow tape patches to all soldiers. The new Army Advanced Combat
Uniform has built in shoulder glow tape patches with cover flaps that
aid in identification at night when a soldier is using night vision
devices. Additionally, the camouflage helmet covers have button holes
that allow Soldier Combat Identification Helmet Marking System to be
inserted on the helmet and there are 1-inch square glow tape patches
for additional uniform attachment for friendly force marking and
identification. The Joint Combat Identification Marking System (JCIMS)
includes a Soldier Dismounted Combat Identification Marking System
(DCIMS)--a helmet cover that provides a negative thermal image when
seen through thermal devices. The DCIMS is under consideration for
deployment. There are 230 Land Warrior (LW) and 133 Mounted Warrior
(MW) systems being deployed with the 4th Battalion, and the 9th
Infantry Battalion under the 4th Stryker BCT. Both LW and MW systems
provide enhanced soldier Situational Awareness (SA) along with
networked communications. The results of this deployment will be looked
at closely for its impact on the operational environment, to include
anti-fratricide. Currently, this program is unfunded beyond 2007.
Additionally, with very limited funds, we are currently engaged in
several research related areas relative to soldier anti-fratricide:
a. The Integrated Battlespace-Combat SA System program is in
its final stage investigating Position Navigation and Geometric
Pairing to provide more accurate soldier positions in urban
environments.
b. Radio-based combat identification where there is a soldier
based query (radio frequency or laser based) of a region (or
individual) and a radio response is under investigation with
limited funding through fiscal year 2008. Additionally, the
examination of rifle-mounted active radio frequency tags is
underway.
c. We continue to improve range and resolution of existing
sensors and optics. We have been leveraging limited funding
resources under a Phase I Small Business Innovation Research
project and have proposals submitted into the Defense
Acquisition Challenge Program to leverage and accelerate this
range identification technology to the soldier in the field.
Ideally, a soldier should be able to identify a potential
target at 1.5 times the maximum effective range of his weapon.
officer attrition
134. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, for the last few years,
Army leaders have testified that retention of soldiers is strong both
in the Active component and Reserve component. We're hearing now
reports about an exodus of company grade officers who have reached the
end of their obligated service and, effectively, 100 percent selections
for promotion to captain, major, and lieutenant colonel. Some military
analysts worry that the rush to promote officers may be lowering the
overall quality of the officer corps. What can you tell us about mid-
grade and junior officer attrition?
General Schoomaker. The Army Competitive Category (ACC) mid-grade
officers serving in the rank of major have a 10-year historical average
attrition rate of 5.9 percent. The projected ACC major attrition rate
for fiscal year 2007 is below average at 5.0 percent. The ACC company-
grade historical average attrition rate following the drawdown period
and prior to September 11, 2001 (fiscal years 1995-2001) was 9.0
percent. The ACC company-grade average attrition rate from fiscal years
2004-2006 was 8.3 percent. The projected ACC company-grade attrition
rate for fiscal year 2007 is 8.5 percent which is slightly up from 8.1
percent in fiscal year 2006. The attached chart provides specific
numbers for company/field grade losses.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
135. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, what were the rates of
promotion to major and lieutenant colonel last year?
General Schoomaker. There were two promotion boards during fiscal
year 2006 for the rank of major due to reducing the pin-on time to
major from 11 to 10 years in service. The promotion rate for majors in
the primary zone in April 2006 was 97.1 percent. The promotion rate for
majors in the primary zone in September 2006 was 98.0 percent. The
promotion rate for lieutenant colonels in the primary zone for fiscal
year 2006 was 90.9 percent.
136. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, is this something that
concerns you?
General Schoomaker. Promotion rates reflect the needs of the Army.
The Army is committed to maintaining a quality force and will not
compromise its standards for promotion selection.
137. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, while the ARFORGEN process
may serve to identify units and personnel who will deploy to Iraq and
Afghanistan, do you believe career officers and NCOs in general are
ready in all respects for repeated tours of duty in the war zone?
General Schoomaker. Yes, career officers and NCOs are more ready
for repeated deployments than ever before. Army leaders understand that
the Army is engaged in this prolonged war that will continue for
sometime. These leaders have made a conscious decision to continue to
serve their country and through experience of previous deployments,
lessons learned, pre-deployment training, the latest equipment, and an
increased emphasis on ensuring families are taken care of; our leaders
are ready.
The Army does everything it can to ensure our soldiers and leaders
are prepared for the environment they will encounter in theater. As our
leaders go on more deployments, they gain more experience. They gain a
richer understanding of the culture and other challenges faced in this
region. Understanding the culture and being able to interact with the
people and their leaders (mayors, police, and local army) makes a
significant difference in our success in counterinsurgency war.
Experience counts for a lot in readiness.
Mission and theater focused training is executed through a series
of key training events prior to deployment. Commanders use this
training program to continuously assess and validate their units'
readiness for the assigned mission. This training includes but is not
limited to:
Mission-focused individual, battlestaff, and collective
training at home station.
Battle command training seminars for BCTs.
A CTC supported maneuver mission rehearsal exercise for BCTs.
Collective training event(s) for non-BCT units.
A full regimen of final preparatory training in Kuwait before
moving into combat.
Prior to deployment, individual soldiers are trained in warrior
tasks and battle drills, counter-IED, anti-terrorism awareness, media
awareness, specific first aid tasks, combat life saving, detainee
operations, basic language, and short-range marksmanship. Leaders must
also be proficient in cultural awareness, interpreter operations,
convoy operations, urban operations, risk management, traffic control
supervision, and counter-IED (leader response).
compensation for insufficient dwell time
138. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, in
January, when announcing changes to policies affecting deployments of
soldiers, Secretary Gates stated that the Department would offer
financial compensation for those whose ``dwell time,'' or time at home
station, did not meet certain prescribed standards. What is your
understanding of the status of that pay policy change?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. In January the Secretary of
Defense announced new force utilization goals and directed a
compensation program be developed. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
the Service Chiefs of Staff, and Service Secretaries have been working
with the OSD in developing a program that is flexible and meets the
needs of each Service. At this time, a final program has not been
developed.
139. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, do you
think that soldiers should be compensated with additional payments
every time an operational necessity requires deployment of additional
troops?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. With the nature of today's
expeditionary force we think it is important to recognize the changing
global environment and increased pace of operations our soldiers are
experiencing throughout their career. The global war on terrorism will
be a long fight and soldiers can expect to be engaged in that fight
potentially over the course of their career. It may very well be time
to use a compensation program that rewards the experience gained in
multiple deployments or mobilizations and provides an incentive to
volunteer for duty with a deploying unit. A tool tailored to achieve
these goals would be predictable, and recognizes the dedication and
commitment our soldiers display.
140. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, do you
think this ``sweetener'' to repeal of the 24-month policy is necessary?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The Army in coordination with the
other Services and the OSD is prepared to address any additional
actions necessary to ensure we are capable of meeting our operational
mission. Should that mean developing new policies in support of
utilization of total force goals, then we would certainly consider all
available resources and alternatives to accomplish these goals.
contractors on the battlefield
141. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, more
and more of the DOD's maintenance and support functions are outsourced.
These ``contractor logistics support'' agreements have resulted in the
deployment and employment of civilian contractors in combat areas. What
problems have emerged for the Department as a result of increased
numbers of contractors on the battlefield?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. Accounting for the number of
contractors on the battlefield emerged as a significant challenge
because there was no single personnel system used by all Services and
even within the Services, tactical-level personnel systems use by the
military either did not accept data on contractors or those systems did
not feed into operational personnel systems.
In January 2007, the Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational
Tracker (SPOT) was designated by the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD (P&R)) in coordination with
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology
and Logistics (OUSD (AT&L)) as the Joint Solution required by DOD
Instruction 3020.41. This tracker is essentially a joint database to
provide visibility over all contractor support to deployed forces,
including a summary of services or capabilities provided and by-name
accountability of contractors. On January 29, 2007, the Army published
an All Army Activity message directing the use of SPOT and DOD is
preparing a joint-level directive for its use as the designated
enterprise system. In addition, an update to Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement Clause 252.225-7040 has been approved
specifically naming SPOT for use in all Department contracts when
contractors accompany the U.S. Armed Forces.
Prior to the January 2007, designation of SPOT as the Department
contractor personnel tracking system, the Department initiated the
requirement for U.S. CENTCOM to conduct quarterly contractor census in
2005. Census numbers reside with the Office of the Assistant Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Program Support, where they are received
on a quarterly basis.
The goal for the Department and Coalition Force Land Component
Command (CFLCC) was to gain total accountability over contractor
personnel deployed and contractor capabilities resident within Iraq. A
total of 128,888 contractor personnel in Iraq were reported in the most
recent April 2007 census. The next quarterly census will provide the
number of contractors in every country CFLCC conducts operations, to
include Afghanistan. The DOD, Department of State, and U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) have held a number of meetings the
past few months to discuss whether State and USAID can also incorporate
the SPOT system into their contract management process. The three
agencies are currently exploring technical and logistical issues with
using a common database for all three agencies.
142. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, do you
support the DOD's initiative to review 300,000 DOD positions which
could result in shifting logistics billets and other functions, such as
civil affairs, away from uniformed personnel and into the civil service
and private sector for potential outsourcing?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. DOD Instruction (DODI) 1100.22,
Guidance for Determining Workforce Mix, implements DOD policy for
determining the appropriate mix of military, civilian, and private
sector manpower. The guidance specifies the criteria for designating
DOD activities for military, civilian, or private sector performance.
The policy designates activities for military performance when military
incumbency is required by law, executive order, treaty, or other
international agreements; for command and control of crisis situations;
to maintain combat readiness or esprit de corps; to mitigate
operational risk; when unique military knowledge or skill are required
for successful completion of duties; or to maintain sufficient military
manpower for rotation, career progression, or wartime assignments. In
April 2007 the Army completed an annual inventory of inherently
governmental and commercial activities. All military billets were
evaluated with the DODI 1100.22 manpower mix criteria. All military
billets in the Operational Force were coded for military performance.
The 300,000 figure was simply based on an analysis performed in 1998 of
military occupational specialties mapped to civilian skills. It is the
number of military billets initially identified for review for possible
conversion. Military positions are not identified for conversion if
they are required for reasons stated above or if sufficient numbers of
fully trained and qualified civilians are not available to perform the
duties.
143. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, the
extraordinary number of civilian contractors performing what were
previously military duties, like security, has raised public concerns.
Do commanders on the ground have sufficient oversight of civilian
contractors who support them?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. Within the last 20 years, Army
functions traditionally performed by soldiers have migrated to
contractors. Examples of such functions include services for security
guards, food service/dining facilities, and information technology (IT)
automation. Motor pools, as well as soldier mechanics, are vanishing,
and vehicle maintenance is being performed via service contracts and
vehicle leasing (with maintenance performed by the contractor). All of
these contracts require verification of services performed by a
Government Contracting Officer's Representative (COR).
The Army does not have enough contracting officers/contract
administrators to provide the required level of contract administration
on large contracts. These acquisition professionals are attempting to
meet daily contract mission requirements and training the ever changing
CORs who are normally in theater on deployments ranging anywhere from 4
months to 1 year. On occasion, this has resulted in CORs who are not
adequately trained to perform surveillance on their respective
contracts.
The number of unit-level COR personnel is normally adequate for the
large contracts, but the high turnover of personnel in theater presents
a constant challenge of training/appointing new CORs. Many have not
completed the formal COR course offered by the Defense Acquisition
University (DAU). Additionally, some COR duties require unique skill
sets and training. For example, military occupational specialty, 92G
(Food Service Specialist) is tracked and managed separately to ensure
that a sufficient quantity of trained personnel are available to
provide oversight for important dining facility contracts. Another
problem is that being appointed as a COR in a unit is often an
additional duty and is not normally someone's major function or sole
position. This has resulted in COR duties not being given the attention
they deserve which can impede performance. To help remedy this concern,
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Policy and Procurement
issued a policy memorandum on February 9, 2007, titled ``Contract
Administration and Surveillance for Service Contracts'' to all Army
contracting offices. This policy memorandum requires the appointment of
properly trained CORs, the preparation of Quality Assurance
Surveillance Plans (QASPs), and requires COR's contributions to be
included in their annual performance reviews in accordance with DOD
policy.
144. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, does
the Army have sufficient numbers of contracting officers, including in
the field, to properly oversee the execution of contracts?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. Currently, there are 5,563
contract specialists/contracting officers within the Army of which over
500 are in non-contracting offices. This number is expected to decrease
to 3,472 by 2011. This projected loss is due to retirement and
attrition (migration to private industry, BRActive component actions,
regional hiring difficulties due to lack of PCS funding, et cetera).
Since 1995, the workforce numbers have decreased by 53 percent, while
the workload actions have increased by 278 percent. The decrease in
career field 1102s has resulted in a lack of contract administration
(which has been validated by several outside audits), and a lack of
contract planning. New hires (1102s) of 418 per year would result in 0
percent growth over the next 5 years and new hires (1102s) of 529 per
year would result in 10 percent growth over the next 5 years.
The shortage is particularly severe for the Army's population of
285 military contracting officers who support operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The Army, along with the other military services, has been
unable to provide the total number of Level II and III certified
military contracting officers requested by commanders in Iraq and
Afghanistan. This shortage is also evident within the Defense Contract
Management Agency which, on a few occasions, was forced to turn down
requests from the Army for the administration for theater support
contracts citing a lack of resources.
The small number of civilian and military contracting personnel is
compounded by the fact that the contracting career field requires
several years of training and experience to develop the business acumen
necessary to craft contract arrangements and to negotiate the best
interests of the United States Government when dealing with industry.
Moreover, losses of senior contracting personnel result in fewer
experienced trainers to acclimate and mentor the increasingly junior
workforce in the business of Army contracting.
145. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, will
an FCS-equipped brigade be able to maintain itself in the field without
attached civilian contractors?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The Program Manager, FCS intends
to comply with the maintenance concept outlined by the FCS ORD, which
does not require the use of contractor personnel below the Corps/
Division level except for scheduled services and unique troubleshooting
situations. All field maintenance will be performed by the crew (80
percent) and the combat repair team mechanics (20 percent).
gap in army chemical and biological unit preparedness
146. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker,
according to a January 2007 report by the GAO, ``most Army units tasked
with providing chemical and biological defense support are not
adequately staffed, equipped, or trained to perform their missions.''
The report goes on to say that as of March 2006, ``most of the Army's
chemical companies, particularly in the National Guard and Reserve,
were reporting the two lowest states of readiness measured by the
Army's Unit Status Reporting System.'' Moreover, ``Army chemical
companies reporting the lowest levels of readiness doubled from 2000 to
2006.'' Finally, the GAO reports that ``the absence of a plan to
address the personnel and equipment shortfalls that are primarily
responsible for these readiness problems makes it unclear whether and
when these problems will be corrected.'' Would chemical and biological
defense not be available in the event of a mass casualty weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) attack at home?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. Chemical and biological defense
would be available in the event of a WMD attack at home. The Army has
completed certification of 45 of 55 WMD Civil Support Teams (CST) in
the National Guard of each state and territory. Additionally, the
National Guard is providing one of the three planned chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear explosive consequence management
forces for domestic emergencies.
To improve training and equipping, the U.S. Army Chemical School
provides training on increased emphasis of full spectrum chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear explosive (CBRNE) hazards and
operations and emergency response competencies. Additionally, new
equipment, the Joint Service Transportable Decontamination System-Small
Scale, will provide operational and thorough decontamination of
equipment, aircraft, facilities, shelters, surface areas, and terrain.
When fielded, the system will replace existing decontamination systems
and provide enhanced decontamination capabilities for chemical units.
147. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, would
you comment on GAO's assessment and, if it is correct, explain how the
Army plans to restore the readiness levels of these important chem-bio
units?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The GAO assessment is generally
accurate. To improve readiness assessments, in October 2006, the Army
implemented the Defense Readiness Reporting System-Army (DRRS-A). Among
other improvements, this system will allow commanders to evaluate their
unit's ability to execute defined mission essential tasks (METs). Such
METs are being identified and incorporated for units with homeland
defense missions. This will allow the Army greater visibility on
chemical units' ability to support the Joint Force Commander executing
WMD related homeland defense missions. Additionally, the U.S. Army
Chemical School provides training on increased emphasis of full
spectrum CBRNE hazards and operations and emergency response
competencies. Finally, new equipment, the Joint Service Transportable
Decontamination System-Small Scale, will provide operational and
thorough decontamination of equipment, aircraft, facilities, shelters,
surface areas, and terrain. When fielded, the system will replace
existing decontamination systems and provide enhanced decontamination
capabilities for chemical units.
funds for the sustainment of army facilities
148. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, in your testimony to our
committee last week about out-patient care at Walter Reed Army Medical
Center, you responded to a question about the causes of the deplorable
conditions at Building 18 by noting that historically in the Army ``You
can find years where we are funding maintenance at less than 50 percent
of what was required.'' In fiscal year 2008, the Army has proposed a
budget that only funds 86 percent of facility sustainment requirement,
as opposed to the 100 percent goal established by the DOD. My concern
is that this chronic underfunding of facility sustainment accounts has
resulted in similar deteriorated facility conditions in barracks and
working facilities around the Army. What is your assessment of the
general condition of living facilities for our soldiers?
General Schoomaker. Each year since 2002, the Army's Installation
Status Report has reported a steady improvement in the quality of
enlisted unaccompanied personal housing throughout the Army. From
fiscal year 2005 to 2006, the percentage of barrack spaces receiving
the lowest ratings decreased from 33 to 26 percent. These improvements
are a direct result of the Army barracks modernization program that has
been steadily improving barracks quality. Barracks continue to be a top
priority in the overall facilities sustainment funding strategy.
In fiscal year 2005, the Barracks Improvement Program was executed
to correct life, health, and safety deficiencies in 339 permanent party
barracks and improve the living conditions for 40,000 soldier spaces.
In fiscal year 2006, the Training Barracks Improvement Program executed
40 projects to correct life, health, and safety deficiencies in 148
trainee barracks and improve the living conditions for 80,000 soldiers
in trainee barracks world wide. That program is continuing today. In
fiscal year 2007, the Army funded the Training Barracks Upgrade
Program, which will modernize 19 barracks facilities this year.
149. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, in your view, are we
spending enough money on facilities to ensure our soldiers have safe
and adequate facilities to live and work? If not, is the Army committed
in fiscal years 2007 and 2008 to making adjustments in the operations
and maintenance accounts to increase funding for barracks and other
critical facilities?
General Schoomaker. Our soldiers have safe and adequate facilities
to live and work, but we are not able to spend as much money on their
facilities as we would like due to the numerous competing initiatives
for scarce resources while also at war. In fiscal year 2006, the Active
component stopped migrating facility sustainment dollars to Base
Operations Support that had prevailed for many years. Our goal is to
also end this practice in the Reserve components as well. Nonetheless,
decades of underfunding facility sustainment have taken its toll, and
we have much work to do to bring facilities up to where they should be.
In fiscal year 2008, the Army is requesting 86 percent of the OSD
Facilities Sustainment Model, but is committed to achieve 90 percent
through efficiencies. Where year-end execution permits, we will shift
funding to critical facilities.
facility requirements for ``grow the force''
150. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren, the President's budget
request for fiscal year 2008 includes an authorization for military
construction of $1.6 billion as the first installment of a multi-year
program to provide facilities and barracks for an additional 65,000
soldiers over the next 5 years. Very little detail is provided in the
budget request beyond this statement. Since we do not historically
offer vague authorizations for these type of investments, when will the
Army come forward with details about the proposed locations of these
forces, the specific facility projects required, and an estimate of the
total investment required to support the increase in force structure?
Mr. Geren. The Army will provide budget details by the end of March
2007 for the fiscal year 2008 projects. After gathering and analyzing a
full set of data to support stationing decisions this fall, the Army
expects to provide proposed locations of forces by the end of the year.
151. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren, how will your planning for
the increase in force structure affect current plans for the Army's
transformation to modular brigades, the Defense BRActive component
Round, and the Global Posture Review?
Mr. Geren. The Army is executing a tightly-woven, operationally-
synchronized stationing plan that integrates BRActive component, Global
Defense Posture Realignment (GDPR), and Modular Transformation to
posture the force for the long war, consolidate institutional functions
to improve effectiveness, provide infrastructure necessary to grow the
force, while meeting the high rotational demand for forces. While
growing the force will increase operational capability and bring
additive requirements, BRActive component, GDPR, and Modular
Transformation will remain critical to fighting the global war on
terrorism, ensuring soldier and family quality of life, and meeting the
increased operational demands for the Army.
152. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren, do you anticipate a need to
reevaluate past decisions related to the reductions of installations
and Army presence in Europe or Korea?
Mr. Geren. The Army will conduct analysis and modeling using the
BRActive component ``best military value'' to evaluate installations
for their capacity to station, train, and provide quality of life for
the increased forces associated with Army growth. The growth initiative
will rely on existing facilities and installations in Europe and Korea
to support increased forces and will not require revisiting past
reductions of installations and Army presence in Europe and Korea.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
realignment of department of defense supply and storage functions
153. Senator Sessions. Secretary Geren, on February 9, 2007, the
Under Secretary of Defense, Kenneth Krieg, directed the Army and the
Director of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to reach an agreement
regarding realignment of the DOD supply and storage functions. This
mandate instructed the Army and the DLA to reach an agreement within 45
days. Many of us are concerned that a transition at this time is
detrimental to the efficiency of the Army during the reset process. Is
this assumption correct? If so, would you explain the Army's position
on this issue?
Mr. Geren. The realignment of supply, storage, and distribution
functions at Army maintenance depots should not be detrimental to the
efficiency of the Army during the reset process. The realignment
requires an ``in-place'' transfer of functions and personnel to DLA,
which means the same function will continue being performed, by the
same workers, and in the same locations. Mr. Krieg's mandate required
resolving differences between the Army and DLA on which specific
functions should transfer, and to do so in 45 days. The actual transfer
of these functions is not currently planned to occur until fiscal year
2011.
154. Senator Sessions. Secretary Geren, would a delay in the
implementation of this policy until after the immediate challenge of
the reset are completed address the Army's concerns on this issue?
Mr. Geren. A delay in the implementation of this functional
realignment is unnecessary because the Army feels that there will be no
impacts on efficiency during the reset process. Additionally,
implementation of this realignment at Army depots is not scheduled to
occur until fiscal year 2011.
155. Senator Sessions. Secretary Geren, how does the surge in Iraq
impact the reset plan?
Mr. Geren. The surge will result in a requirement to reset more
equipment in fiscal year 2008 than originally planned. The Army's
organic depots have ramped up their civilian and contractor workforce
to reduce the previous year maintenance backlogs and to execute the
current year reset requirements. The Army's depots are postured to
accomplish the additional equipment reset requirements that will
generate due to the surge.
air force as the executive agency for medium and high-altitude unmanned
aerial vehicles
156. Senator Sessions. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, the
recent March 5 letter from the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General
Moseley, indicates the Air Force's interest in being the executive
agency for medium and high-altitude UAVs. However, I am aware of the
Army's well-established interest in the continuation of research and
development of UAVs. What is the Army's position regarding this issue?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The Army does not support a
single Service executive agent for medium and high-altitude UAVs. The
Army recommends the OSD uphold the 2005 decision to use the JUAS MRB
and the JUAS COE in lieu of a single Service executive agent. The JUAS
MRB and the JUAS COE can and will work and achieve the Air Force's
executive agency goals. With full support, these organizations will
enable full joint Service buy-in and resolution of issues.
Additionally, to continue the research and development of UAS and meet
the DOD's UAS requirements, we must create an environment of
competition within industry. Competition promotes innovation,
challenges industry to achieve a higher level of technological
achievement, and spurs investment. The Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and
Special Operations Forces have all benefited from competitively
selected solutions and are already sharing UAS training, logistics, and
systems development in three formal programs. The DOD should continue
on its present course of developing inclusive, synergistic
complementary capabilities to fuse the contributions of each Service.
157. Senator Sessions. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, can
the Air Force effectively control medium- and high-altitude UAVs, and
provide timely support to the warfighter?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. Four years of combat operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan reinforce the need to maximize all elements of
combat power at the tactical level. The Army and Marine Corps have
demonstrated the decisive benefits of employing UAS at the tactical
level in concert with other air and ground systems to enable greater
lethality, while reducing fratricide and collateral damage. Examples
include: Warrior Alpha, Shadow, Raven, Apache, Kiowa, Aerial
Reconnaissance Multi-System, and Constant Hawk. These systems need to
remain in the tactical formations where they are most useful to our
warfighters. The UASs perform distinct and unique roles and missions
for the Services depending on their echelon and purpose of employment.
Operations at the tactical level of war, in a distributed and
dispersed non-contiguous environment, demand responsive UAS capability
at division, brigade and battalion levels. Tactical-echelon battle
captains are responsible for integrating all types of Army multi-
mission UAS systems to fully enable combat missions such as
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Target Acquisition,
communications relay, and manned-unmanned teaming with weaponized
systems.
At the strategic and operational levels of war, Joint and Theater
Commanders shape the battlespace through deliberate planning afforded
by time. As the Air Force memo explains, the UAS contribution at this
level can be allocated to supporting activities such as ISR.
158. Senator Sessions. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, do
you believe the Army's interests will be fully represented if the Air
Force is the executive agency of this program?
Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The Army does not believe that
the Army's UAS requirements will be fully represented if the Air Force
is the executive agency for this program. The Army therefore recommends
the OSD uphold the 2005 decision to use the JUAS MRB and the JUAS COE
in lieu of a single Service executive agent. The JUAS MRB and the JUAS
COE can and will work and achieve the Air Force's executive agency
goals. With full support, these organizations will enable full joint
service buy-in and resolution of issues.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mel Martinez
funding the army end strength increase
159. Senator Martinez. Secretary Geren, I was pleased to see the
President propose an end strength increase for the Army (65,000 Active
Duty soldier increase over 5 years) and I fully support that increase.
Can you estimate how much will the first installment of that increase
(7,000 troops) cost for fiscal year 2008 and how much it will cost over
time?
Mr. Geren. The incremental cost for the first installment of 7,000
soldiers totals $630.4 million for pay and allowances. The estimated
cost of pay and allowances for the 65,000 increase through fiscal year
2013 is $24.7 billion.
160. Senator Martinez. Secretary Geren, will this be funded from
the Army's top line--or will the Army budget be increased to fund the
increase?
Mr. Geren. The Army budget received an increase to its topline to
fund the pay and allowances to support the Active Army's end strength
growth through fiscal year 2013.
readiness of army reserve and army national guard force forces
161. Senator Martinez. Secretary Geren, I am concerned about the
state of both the Army Reserve and the ARNG. They must be properly
resourced and that is a challenge in a constrained budget environment.
The demands on both the Guard and Army Reserves have greatly expanded
since September 11. The National Guard is deploying worldwide at a
demanding pace, while playing an absolutely critical role in assisting
our States meet their homeland security and natural disaster
requirements. We know that this deployment pace means that we are
incurring increasing risk. I know the Army is undergoing a shift of how
the Reserve components are structured--our Reserve and ARNG Forces are
being severely tested. Are there more legislative and/or policy changes
needed in the way we can structure, resource, and use our Guard or
Reserves?
Mr. Geren. The Army is committed to resourcing the Reserve
component at 100 percent of their documented authorizations with
available resources. The Army has just finished a collaborative
reorganization of the Active component and Reserve component to meet
the operational needs of a nation at war and to posture ourselves to
meet the future security needs of America. Additionally, the Army is
implementing recent policy changes from the OSD to redefine the use of
the Reserve component. Both the Army reorganization and the Defense
policy changes will provide an Army ready to answer the requirements of
this Nation. We are currently working to identify future training and
equipping requirements for the Reserve component.
162. Senator Martinez. Secretary Geren, I also understand that in
an effort to reduce mobilization time and enhance preparation for
combat deployments, more National Guard and Reserve training will be
done at home station--before they get to a mobilization center. Does
this fiscal year 2008 budget request include sufficient funding for
State Adjutants General to do this home station training?
Mr. Geren. The DOD recently revised its policy with respect to the
mobilization of ARNG and Reserve Forces for service in contingency
operations. Previously, ARNG units would spend 18 months or longer in a
mobilized status in order to serve approximately 12 months of boots-on-
the-ground in theater. The extra 6 months or more of mobilized time was
consumed primarily by individual and collective training that took
place at the mobilization station prior to overseas deployment. The
policy change now limits the mobilized time to no more than 12 months
per specific contingency operation.
The Army supports what is allocated in the fiscal year 2008
President's budget. The new mobilization policy was enacted after the
submission of the President's budget; therefore, the ARNG pre-
mobilization training requirements were not included. Current fiscal
year 2008 budget funding levels allow National Guard units to achieve
the minimal training requirement for a peacetime force. This is a risk
that is no longer acceptable for an Operational Force. Resourcing for
pre-mobilization training is essential to ensure trained and ready
units prior to official mobilization dates. ARNG units conducting pre-
mobilization training in fiscal year 2008 are associated with fiscal
year 2009/fiscal year 2010 rotations. The basic calculations include
additional Inactive Duty for Training, Annual Training, and Active Duty
for Training days, plus supporting operational tempo and associated
operations and maintenance costs. These costs are considered global war
on terrorism expenses for fiscal year 2008. The Army is updating its
supplemental request to reflect these new requirements.
163. Senator Martinez. Secretary Geren, will there need to be a
further reallocation of funding to support this shift of responsibility
to the States and regions?
Mr. Geren. Funding for the recent change of the mobilization policy
for the Reserve component will require some reallocation of funding. At
this time, the Army is working with the ARNG and Army Reserve to
determine what the fiscal year 2008 requirement will be to implement
this policy. Previously, the majority of training was performed post
mobilization and funded through Active component appropriations. The
new policy will require training to be performed prior to actual
mobilization. A reallocation of funding to the Reserve component
appropriations may be needed to support this. The appropriate amount
will be determined upon final decisions on training requirements and
certification.
national guard support to security operations on our southern border
164. Senator Martinez. General Schoomaker, last year the President
directed approximately 5,000 National Guard troops to protect critical
infrastructure and patrol our southern border. Can you provide an
update on how that mission is going and what its impact is on overall
readiness?
General Schoomaker. The mission of this operation is to provide a
short-term enhancement to the ability of the Department of Homeland
Security to secure our southwest border while additional border patrol
agents are being hired and trained. This mission is being successfully
accomplished and has allowed Customs and Border Protection to bring
more agents on board and focus on reducing the number of illegal border
crossings. The mission is staffed by National Guard volunteers. One of
the Presidential directives for this mission was that it not degrade
the National Guard's combat capability, and we have been successful in
that regard.
u.s. army wounded warrior program
165. Senator Martinez. General Schoomaker, during a recent visit to
Walter Reed, I was briefed on the Army Wounded Warrior (AW2) Program
(program designed to provide special help to the severely wounded in
rehabilitation, retraining, and adjustment). It is a superb initiative.
What more can be done to rapidly expand the AW2 Program?
General Schoomaker. The Army thanks you for the compliment and
remains committed that ``We Will Never Leave a Fallen Comrade.'' The
AW2 Program is now tracking more than 1,500 severely injured and
wounded soldiers. To ensure these soldiers receive the best treatment
available to them the Army works closely with the VA to coordinate the
medical care of seriously wounded and disabled soldiers while they are
being treated.
Our wounded warriors are treated with the dignity and respect they
have earned and deserve. Since October 2005, the program has expanded
by more than 400 percent. We have increased the number of Soldier-
Family Management Specialists (SFMS) from 9 to 46 with continuous
hiring to reduce the average caseload to 33 soldiers to every 1 SFMS.
Our SFMSs are currently embedded in 11 military medical treatment
facilities and 19 VA medical centers throughout the United States with
further expansion anticipated. This decentralization of operations
allow our SFMSs to literally ``reach out and touch'' our soldiers and
families.
The Army is developing a more seamless transition to the VA for
separating soldiers with moderate injuries and disabilities. In
addition, we have extended current outreach programs to include Corps
G1s, commanders at brigade level, and rear detachments of deployed
units and their Family Readiness Groups. There are still some
commanders at battalion and company level that are not aware of the AW2
Program. We have to reach this population not only to ensure that we
are providing the best possible care to the soldiers, but also to reach
other veterans/soldiers unaware of the program. We have dozens of
initiatives working including involvement with the Veterans Advisory
Committee on Rehabilitation, the DOD Mental Health Task Force, the
Office of Secretary of Defense FOR Health Affairs Family Transition
Initiative, The Surgeon General of the Army's Traumatic Brain Injury
Task Force, and the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and
Reserve Affairs) directed Physical Disability Transformation
Initiative.
166. Senator Martinez. General Schoomaker, what more can Congress
do to support the soldiers and their families as they transition--
oftentimes with life-changing injuries?
General Schoomaker. Congress has provided all of the resources
necessary for the Army to operate the Army Career Alumni Program
(ACAP). The ACAP provides transition services to all separating/
retiring soldiers, including soldiers with life-changing injuries. The
services provided by ACAP include congressionally mandated pre-
separation counseling and coordination with other Federal agencies such
as the Department of Labor for an employment workshop and the VA for
benefits briefings and a Disabled Transition Program briefing. ACAP
also offers one-on-one counseling, use of automated employment tools,
and special seminars. Our guidance and policies are established by DOD
based upon current requirements in Public Law.
narco-terror in the latin america and the caribbean
167. Senator Martinez. General Schoomaker, the overall U.S.
military support to the counterdrug effort is coordinated through
SOUTHCOM. I think it is important that we continue to adequately fund
military and non-military parts of our support to Colombia. Can you
comment on the overall Army contribution to the U.S. effort in the
Andean Counterdrug Initiative and Plan Colombia for fiscal year 2008?
General Schoomaker. Currently in the Andean Ridge area (Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Venezuela) the Army has approximately 200
soldiers, of which approximately 60 are permanently assigned to these
countries. In Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Peru the Army
counterdrug effort is through the Military Assistance Groups and
Military Advisory and Assistance Groups at the embassies. Most Army
support to the region takes place in Colombia.
U.S. Army South supports the overall U.S. effort in Colombia in a
number of ways: For 3 years, U.S. Army South has been assisting in the
development and improvement of the Colombian Army's Sergeant Major
Academy Program in order to institutionalize a formal training system
for Senior Noncommissioned Officers (NCOs) in the Colombian Army. Our
intent is to help the Colombian Army develop and sustain an NCO
education system adequate for their needs.
The 204th Military Intelligence Battalion routinely deploys
approximately 55 soldiers to Colombia with Airborne Reconnaissance Low
(ARL) platforms. These soldiers provide real time information in
support of U.S. and Colombian requirements. The unit deploys to
Colombia for 9 months out the year (on a cycle of 135 days in country/
45 days reset at home station).
U.S. Army South manages the U.S. portion of a Forward Operating
Site in Apiay, Colombia. This Colombian Airbase provides the lodging,
maintenance, planning, and operations support to U.S. aircraft,
including the ARL aircraft, operating in the region.
U.S. Army South provides a range of administrative and logistic
support to the U.S. Military Group in Colombia. The U.S. Military Group
is in turn working directly with the Colombian Armed Forces to support
their counterdrug and counterterrorism efforts.
U.S. Army South conducts several subject matter expert exchanges
with the Colombian Army in order to share ideas, explain concepts and
assist the Colombian Army. Topics for these exchanges include the use
of military police working dogs, aviation logistics, personnel
recovery, geospatial intelligence/terrain analysis, and military law.
In fiscal year 2007, U.S. Army had over 45 engagement events with the
Colombian Armed Forces at a cost of approximately $1.2 million.
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia still hold three U.S.
DOD contractors hostage and we are working with the Colombian Armed
Forces to locate and free these three men.
168. Senator Martinez. General Schoomaker, with all the demands on
Army forces worldwide, will you have the numbers and specialties
required to conduct these counterdrug training and operational programs
in the Western Hemisphere?
General Schoomaker. The Army meets the U.S. Army South requirements
in support of subject matter expert exchanges, peacekeeping exercises,
and small unit exchanges with the countries of Latin America. We remain
engaged throughout the region and, through efficient use of resources,
are able to maintain our presence in Latin America.
building the military capacity of allies through security cooperation
169. Senator Martinez. Secretary Geren, I am impressed with the
counterpart programs being executed by the Army throughout the world--
particularly with our partner nations in the Western Hemisphere. These
military-to-military programs of exercises, exchanges, and training
provide our U.S. Ambassadors in the region with additional tools to
encourage democracy and development. Our Army Officers and NCOs conduct
these training and exchange programs and build necessary capacity. Just
as importantly, they serve as role models for the military institutions
that operate under civilian control. The example of El Salvador serving
by our side is a great example of the success of these military-to-
military programs. Are we funding those programs adequately?
Mr. Geren. The Army participates in numerous security cooperation
programs, to include the types that are cited in your question:
exercises, exchanges, and training. We refer to these and other
international activities as security cooperation and execute them in
accordance with the DOD's Security Cooperation Guidance. The Army and
the other military Services are charged with providing assets to
support the combatant commanders, especially the geographic combatant
commanders, as they conduct their respective security cooperation
efforts. However, the Army also uses security cooperation to improve
its own abilities--whether to improve our ability to conduct closely
coordinated military operations with allied forces, to develop and
acquire the best available technology, or to increase the individual
soldier's language and cultural skills.
The geographic combatant commanders use Army assets in their
efforts to encourage other nations to work with us to achieve mutual
strategic objectives, thus shaping the strategic environment. They
annually assess not only the effectiveness of their respective theater
security cooperation efforts, but also the effectiveness of the support
that they received from the military Services. These assessments are
classified; nevertheless, we can say that each combatant commander
reported some progress.
There is an intense competition for funding amongst the many things
the Army does. Factors other than funding play a major role in the
conduct of security cooperation activities. For example, in the
National Defense Authorization Act of 2007, Congress lifted
restrictions previously imposed on the International Military Education
and Training Program and we now have more flexibility in allocating
future Army school spaces to foreign soldiers. Nevertheless, since
there were no additional funds allocated, we will still not be able to
meet all the demand for security cooperation support that came from the
combatant commanders--we receive more requests for attendance at the
Army War College and the Army CGSC than we can satisfy.
In the interim, the Army continues to improve its security
cooperation strategy and program management.
aviation modernization
170. Senator Martinez. General Schoomaker, you are asking $4.18
billion for aviation procurement and that includes new UH-60 Black
Hawks to meet future force requirements--in addition to what you have
requested in the supplementals. What is the state of readiness of the
aviation fleet?
General Schoomaker. The UH-60 fleet overall is in good shape in
terms of readiness. Our deployed fleet maintained the highest state of
readiness, followed by our nondeployed aircraft and National Guard
aircraft. This level of readiness is due in large part to the
supplemental appropriations which allowed the Army to continue to reset
the force and maintain our readiness at Army standards. Readiness will
further increase for the entire force as we resource the following
modernization activities: AH-64D (remanufacture and new build), CH-47F
(remanufacture and new build), UH-60M (new build) and the UH-72A (new
build). The UH-72A will greatly benefit the readiness of National Guard
aviation units and enhance their ability to respond to State and
national disaster missions. Army aviation could not have addressed the
needs of the aforementioned aircraft systems if not for the direct
support of Congress in reprogramming Comanche budgetary authority.
171. Senator Martinez. General Schoomaker, what are your key
challenges and what are you doing to adapt to the increasing demand
being placed on Army aviation resources?
General Schoomaker. Understanding the stress of the global war on
terrorism on the useful life of aviation platforms, Army aviation
identified the need to initiate sustainment programs that allowed our
aviation force to provide continuous operations in the protracted war.
These sustainment programs include:
a. Reset: returns aircraft to pre-deployment conditions.
b. Preset: installs modification work orders to incorporate
lessons learned into our systems--reduce environmental impacts
and enhance Aircraft/Aircrew Survivability.
c. Operational Losses: resources for replacement aircraft has
been funded through congressional supplemental fiscal year
2005-fiscal year 2007. Currently 90 of 126 aircraft have
approved for supplemental funding for replacement. Of the
remaining 36 to be replaced, 29 are OH-58Ds that will be
replaced with the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH). As of
this date, the funding of these 29 aircraft has not been
provided in previous supplemental requests. The last seven
aircraft have been results of operational losses in January,
February, and April 2007 (two AH-64s, three UH-60s, one CH-47,
and one OH-58D) that have not been included in the supplemental
request.
d. Recapitalization Program: returns a limited number of
aircraft to ``like new'' near zero time condition (193 UH-60
and 56 CH-47).
e. Purchasing New CH-47Fs and UH-60Ms: new CH-47s and UH-60s
will eventually replace the oldest/most damaged aircraft of
their respective fleets after filling holes in the fleets. The
ARH will replace the antiquated OH-58D aircraft. The light
utility helicopter relieves the pressure on the UH-60 fleet.
These sustainment programs have allowed Army aviation to maintain a
flying operational tempo up to five times higher than peace-time rates.
joint cargo aircraft program
172. Senator Martinez. Secretary Geren, it is my understanding that
the Army is in the lead for the joint Army/Air Force JCA program to
replace several old platforms (C-12, C-23, C-26). Can you give me an
update on the status of the JCA program?
Mr. Geren. The JCA is a fixed-wing cargo aircraft, providing light-
to-medium intratheater airlift capability for time-sensitive/mission-
critical cargo and troops in support of combat operations. JCA will
support all five airlift missions (passenger/cargo movement, combat
employment and sustainment, aero medical evacuation, special operations
support, and operational support airlift), plus homeland security and
relief missions.
In October 2006 a Joint Program Office was established between Army
and Air Force, with the Army as lead agent. The Army AoA update is
complete, as requested by OSD, to enable a sufficiency review. The Air
Force is studying initial fleet size requirements. The Deputy Secretary
of Defense has approved continuance of the program as a Dual Service
Army/Air Force program. The Capability Development/Production Document
was approved by the JROC on April 19, 2007. Strategies addressing Joint
Training and Sustainment are coordinated between the Army and Air Force
and reside with the Director, Acquisition Executive pending formal
approval. The source selection is ongoing and should be completed in
May 2007. The Milestone C decision/Defense Acquisition Board is
scheduled for May 2007 and source selection results will be announced
following the Milestone C decision. We can expect to purchase two
aircraft following this decision.
173. Senator Martinez. Secretary Geren, how important is the JCA to
the Army's strategic mobility?
Mr. Geren. JCA is not a strategic mobility platform; this is a
transformation piece to the Army's fixed-wing legacy fleet. The Air
Force will use the JCA to supplement the existing C-130 intratheater
airlift fleet, allowing for greater efficiencies for hauling smaller
loads. The Army will use the JCA to focus on time-sensitive mission-
critical resupply and key personnel transport at the tactical level--
the last tactical mile.
174. Senator Martinez. Secretary Geren, what effect will any delay
in procuring this platform cause to our lift capability? At what cost?
Mr. Geren. Operational impacts to the Army are twofold. The Army is
currently meeting its critical needs with inadequate and costly
platforms for this logistical mission--the C-23 Sherpa and the CH-47
Chinook. The CH-47, from the onset of OEF and OIF, is conducting
logistical resupply missions that could be performed by a JCA.
Conservatively, over 25 percent of CH-47 usage in OIF is attributed to
resupply missions, nontactical functions. In OEF, we have been forced
to use contract aircraft due to the C-23's inability to meet lift and
performance capabilities at high and hot altitudes present in
Afghanistan. The impact of a delay will be an increase in lifecycle
costs and a decrease in airframe life with longer reliance on rotary
wing aircraft and ground vehicles on an asymmetrical battlefield and
subsequent higher force protection risks. Operational impact to the
Army fixed-wing fleet (C-23, C-26, and C-12) are specific modernization
costs to include: upgrades and survivability as immediately associated
with: global air traffic management, safety, aircraft survivability
equipment, and night vision goggles, along with continued modifications
and sustainment. This has future implications as legacy aircraft are
programmed for retirement from the force.
florida national guard helicopters
175. Senator Martinez. General Schoomaker, today more than ever,
the National Guard is a full partner with the Army in performing vital
war and local emergency needs. Every month the National Guard deploys
their best equipment, including many HH-60 Blackhawk helicopters, to
the war on terror. I remain concerned about the ability of the National
Guard to respond to natural disasters in my State of Florida. What is
your view of National Guard aviation readiness in light of the demands
being placed on National Guard equipment?
General Schoomaker. Our overall Army priority remains focused
toward best meeting the warfighting needs of our deployed forces, and
doing so to the greatest extent possible by providing both complete and
coherent units. However, we also work closely with both the National
Guard Bureau and the ARNG to do whatever is achievable to minimize and
mitigate the impacts on any single State or region when some of their
ARNG units are mobilized for overseas duty. In the case of Florida,
this mitigation includes filling Florida's two UH/HH-60 units to 100
percent of their authorized level vice the overall 80-83 percent fill
level existing in the ARNG UH/HH-60 inventory; sequencing the
mobilization of one Florida UH/HH-60 unit so that it is offset by the
return and demobilization of Florida's other UH/HH-60 unit; and pre-
planned regional and national arrangements to rapidly reinforce
Florida's UH/HH-60 force with assets from adjoining and nearby States,
in the event of a disaster. Active Army aviation forces are also
available to support disaster relief if requested by State authorities.
176. Senator Martinez. General Schoomaker, how vital is the
Blackhawk H-60 A to L modernization program?
General Schoomaker. Currently, UH-60A to L is not part of the UH-60
Modernization Program. The National Defense Appropriations Act for
Fiscal Year 2007 identified $12.35 million towards UH-60 Black Hawk
modifications, specifically A to L conversions. This will be used for
engineering, production analysis, cost verification, and conversion of
a pilot/demonstration aircraft within the next 12 to 18 months. Once
complete, we will analyze the cost data to determine the feasibility of
further conversions.
177. Senator Martinez. General Schoomaker, does Congress need to
set aside funding specifically for the National Guard so they can
maintain their lift capability?
General Schoomaker. The Army and the ARNG already have longstanding
standard funding mechanisms in place for maintaining aircraft and
training aviation units. The Army training resource model identifies
the flying hour requirements and funding needed by each Army, ARNG, and
Army Reserve aviation unit throughout the force. Efforts by Congress to
fully fund aviation operational tempo would significantly help all Army
units, including the National Guard, to sustain proficiencies.
Additionally, should the UH-60 A to L recap pilot/demonstration
aircraft prove feasible, funding for the remaining UH-60 aircraft
scheduled to undergo this recap/upgrade would be important to the Army.
[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2008
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 20, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m. in room
SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Bill
Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Clinton, Pryor, McCaskill, Warner,
Inhofe, Chambliss, Dole, Cornyn, and Thune.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Gerald J.
Leeling, counsel, and William K. Sutey, professional staff
member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member;
Derek J. Maurer, professional staff member; David M. Morriss,
minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff
member; Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member; and
Sean G. Stackley, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Micah H.
Harris, and Benjamin L. Rubin.
Committee members' assistants present: Frederick M. Downey,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Christopher Caple, assistant to
Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben
Nelson; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; Gordon I.
Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Stephen C. Hedger and
Jason D. Rauch, assistants to Senator McCaskill; Mark J.
Winter, assistant to Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV,
assistant to Senator Chambliss; Lindsey Neas, assistant to
Senator Dole; Stuart C. Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune;
and Brian W. Walsh, assistant to Senator Martinez.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee will
come to order.
I want to welcome Secretary Wynne and General Moseley back
to the committee this morning. Both of you have had outstanding
careers of leadership and service to the Nation. We're grateful
to you for that service. We know that you have some special
guests with you this morning, too, and, in a moment, when we
call on you, we would appreciate your introducing those
wonderful people to the committee.
You're faced with a number of critical issues that confront
the Air Force. Although not at the same operating tempo as the
Army and Marine Corps, the Air Force faces a difficult
challenge in balancing its modernization needs against the
costs of supporting ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
One of these acquisition challenges is in space systems.
All of the Air Force space satellite systems are in the process
of modernization and replacement and all have seen substantial
cost growth and schedule delays. In many instances, the initial
cost and schedule predictions were unrealistic; in others, the
technical risk was greater than thought, or not well-
understood, and others suffered from poor management or
execution. Some of these programs are showing improvement, but
most are not out of the woods yet. As a result, the space
program costs have increased substantially overall.
During our deliberations on the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, it became clear that
the Air Force could not meet its requirements with the
reduction in the B-52 bomber fleet that was proposed in the
Quadrennial Defense Review. Therefore, Congress did not approve
the Air Force's request to reduce the number of B-52 bombers to
56 aircraft. Congress did authorize the Air Force to retire up
to 18 bombers from the current fleet of 93 B-52 bombers,
leaving at least 75 B-52s in the force structure. That
authorized reduction was predicated on the completion of a
report that would analyze all aspects of the overall bomber
fleet, including requirements and modernization plans. Our
understanding is that this report will not be completed and
submitted to Congress at least until the end of fiscal year
2007. As a result, the Air Force will not be able to retire any
of the 18 bombers until fiscal year 2008.
Nevertheless, the Air Force is again requesting permission
to retire more B-52s, and we need to hear from our witnesses
this morning: Why does it makes sense for Congress to authorize
more reductions prior to receiving the report from last year,
as the questions remain the same and remain unanswered?
In another area, last year Congress added 10 C-17 aircraft
to the fiscal year 2007 bridge supplemental request. The Air
Force budget request for fiscal year 2008 does not include any
funding to keep the C-17 production line open. Nevertheless,
General Moseley, you've been quoted as saying that you would
like to retire C-5A aircraft and buy more C-17 aircraft. You
are requesting two more C-17s on your unfunded priority list
(UPL), at a cost of roughly $473 million. Also this year, some
are asking that we add full funding for 16 more C-17 aircraft
to the fiscal year 2008 budget, at a cost of more than $3
billion. There have also been reports of cost increases in the
C-5 re-engining program that was at one time intended to
modernize the 49 C-5B and 62 C-5A aircraft in the fleet. So we
need to hear about the Air Force's plans for airlift
modernization and sustainment.
Underlying all of these major acquisition concerns is an
acquisition management issue. Secretary Wynne, when you came
into the job, you recognized that you would have to take
significant steps to build up the acquisition workforce and
restore confidence in the Air Force acquisition system after
the abuses and the poor decisions that were previously
documented in the tanker lease program. We'd like to hear of
your progress in that effort, this morning.
On the tanker issue, we appreciate that the Air Force
leadership has taken special measures to ensure transparency in
the tanker acquisition process. Openness is an excellent model
for how the Air Force and the Department of Defense (DOD)
should deal with Congress and we are appreciative of the
progress that you made relative to that in the tanker
acquisition matter.
So we look forward to hearing your testimony this morning
on these and other issues facing the Air Force. For the
information of all of our members, I believe there is a series
of three votes that are scheduled to take place this morning,
not later than 11:30 a.m., which will likely cause us to
adjourn the hearing at that time. So our goal is to complete
our hearing by the time the first vote is called.
Senator Warner.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
On behalf of our distinguished ranking member, Senator
McCain, I place in the record this morning his opening
statement. I urge that our witnesses examine it with care,
because Senator McCain, being an airman, has taken a very
special interest in a number of the programs; likewise, he has
a very special interest in acquisition. I think it's important
that our witnesses examine carefully the strong and sage advice
that he provides the Department of the Air Force in his opening
statement.
[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain
Chairman Levin, thank you.
I join our chairman in welcoming our witnesses here today.
While many focus on the Army and Marine Corps contributions in Iraq
and Afghanistan, the efforts of the U.S. Air Force on behalf of our
Nation are significant. The Air Force has been actively engaged in the
Central Command area of operations for 16 years--the first Gulf War,
enforcement of Iraq no fly zones along with the Navy, and, now,
Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Those deployments, in
addition to operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and elsewhere throughout the
world in support of humanitarian efforts, have made maximum use of the
Air Force's Air Expeditionary Force concept. Allow me to express our
gratitude to the men and women of the Air Force as they continue their
selfless sacrifice.
While we recognize the Air Force's invaluable contribution to the
defense and security of our Nation, a few programs make this hearing
seem like we are fighting the same budget and policy battles as last
year.
Once again, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program eliminates
funding for the development of a second engine production source. Last
year, we held extensive hearings on this subject, and are still
awaiting the required reports discussing the pros and cons of ensuring
that a competitive environment is maintained for the production of
aircraft engines. Yet, contrary to expert opinion and congressional
direction, this budget eliminates funding for a second source before
the analysis is complete.
Similarly, the Air Force is again sending conflicting messages that
it has the minimum required strategic lift capability with the current
fleet mix of C-17s and C-5s, and yet included C-17s in its unfunded
priorities list (UPL). The Air Force has also argued it needs to retire
C-5s--begging the question what is to replace that capability if
allowed to retire C-5s, since the budget does not include funding for
the C-17 program. This apparent brinkmanship approach to shutting down
the C-17 production line has once again set off a lobbying effort
within the halls of Congress to add additional C-17 aircraft to the
defense budget.
Let me remind my colleagues of one of the more egregious add-ons in
the Defense Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 2007--the addition of
$2.1 billion for 10 C-17 cargo aircraft that were not requested by the
administration. The Air Force did not ask for these additional C-17s
and the Quadrennial Defense Review clearly states a need for a total of
only 180 aircraft. However, Congress agreed to add 10 more C-17s than
our top military planners say they need to meet our National Military
Strategy. Another reason why this earmark was particularly
objectionable was that going into the Defense Appropriations Conference
last year the House had only approved three additional C-17s and the
Senate had approved only two. At a minimum, seven additional C-17
aircraft were added by the conferees that were outside the scope of
matter they were tasked to resolve.
Again, the acquisition process within the Air Force is coming under
scrutiny. In past years, as we are all well familiar, the focus has
been on the tanker replacement program. While I am encouraged that
program is finally on firmer footing with industry now preparing
proposals for the Air Force to evaluate, concerns remain over other Air
Force acquisition efforts.
Last year, the Air Force proffered a multi-year procurement
proposal in which ``substantial savings,'' as defined in applicable
law, were suspect. This year alone, a bid protest for the next
generation combat search and rescue helicopter was upheld by the
Government Accountability Office; the C-130 aviation modernization
program reported a Nunn-McCurdy cost breach; and both the planned C-5
re-engining effort and the future core component jammer are on the
brink of major cost and schedule breaches.
Finally, the Air Force has submitted a UPL of items that did not
make it into the final budget request that totals in the billions of
dollars, despite the fact the Air Force budget has grown by nearly 30
percent, in constant dollars, since 2001. The Air Force submitted a UPL
totaling $16.9 billion for 2008. That amount is nearly twice as large
as the Army's, six times as large as the Marine Corps', and triple the
amount the Air Force requested just last year. A full $6.0 billion of
the request is for military construction projects and appears to
contain every military construction program in the Air Force's 5-year
future defense program. The top ``unfunded'' request includes $2.6
billion for aircraft recapitalization and modernization--a longstanding
Air Force top priority.
I have concerns in other areas, as well, that I hope the witnesses
will address in their testimony, or during the question and answer
period. The witnesses should expect questions on: the recent anti-
satellite test conducted by the Chinese; the impact on Air Force
requirements resulting from planned Army and Marine Corps end strength
increases; the Air Force certification of substantial savings for the
F-22 multi-year procurement; and concerns over certain costs included
in the President's supplemental requests--such as those added for
additional F-35s and CV-22 Ospreys.
I thank the witnesses and look forward to your testimony.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I think all of us here on the
committee are very grateful that you've brought these
distinguished airmen here this morning to introduce. But, while
we focus so much of our attention, and understandably, on the
Army and the Marine Corps, as they're courageously carrying out
the missions in Afghanistan and in Iraq, we are mindful of the
support role, and in often cases, not just support, but direct
interaction, at a very high risk, that the members of the
United States Air Force are taking in these two operations, as
well as other operations elsewhere in the world. So, all
America has in its heart the men and women in uniform today. I
say ``in its heart,'' because it is in sharp contrast to
previous periods that I have experienced in my long and
privileged association with the men and women in the military,
not only the uniformed persons are in their hearts, but the
families of these very brave men and women who go forward and
depart from their families and take on these risks.
So, I salute not only your honored guests this morning,
but, I expect, thousands of others similar to them, elsewhere
at various places throughout the world, and, indeed, in
training, here in the United States. My very limited
association with flying always reminds me that there's just as
much risk on a takeoff as there is on a landing, whether that's
abroad or right here at home. So, it's a high-risk business
that many of your airmen are engaged in, and we are proud to
salute them.
I will just make two other observations. One, I listened
very carefully to the distinguished chairman as he described
the various disconnects, apparently, between Congress and the
Department of the Air Force with regard to the management of
aircraft. I would hope that we could quietly get together and
sort these things out somehow. Having been in your position,
Secretary Wynne, for some period of time myself many years ago,
I just feel that these are decisions that can be worked out.
You have to be given the maximum flexibility possible to manage
your inventory of aircraft, be it the acquisition of the new
ones or the retirement of those that have served our Nation
well.
So, I hope, Mr. Chairman, that you and others on this
committee that have direct responsibility for these programs--
and I will join, also--see if we can't sort it out and give you
the flexibility you need.
Now, I do want to address, gentlemen, the question of the
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and the two-engine program. Now, I
fully recognize that each of you have bosses in this world in
which we live. I know them very well, and have a high degree of
respect for them. But I'll ask the question and you can ponder
the answer before it comes. I don't know of any time in history
that we have contemplated giving to a single contractor a $100
billion contract, which could play out over the next 10 or 12
years. Experience with high technology has shown us that we
should have some backup. Experience has told us that
competition can improve not only the price, but the quality of
the product. So, I'll return to that, Mr. Chairman, in the
course of my question period. It concerns me greatly.
Having said that, I wish you well. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, we now turn to you. We
would ask that you do take a moment and introduce your special
guests, and our special guests, to the committee this morning.
Why don't we start with that, if you would.
Secretary Wynne. Senator, I'll defer to General Moseley and
allow him to, in fact, do that.
General Moseley. Mr. Chairman, if you'll allow me, instead
of prepared remarks, I would like to introduce these great
airmen.
STATEMENT OF GEN. T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, USAF, CHIEF OF STAFF,
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
General Moseley. First, Lieutenant Colonel Marty McBride.
He currently commands the 81st Fighter Squadron in Spangdahlem,
Germany. He's a Weapons School graduate, and he's recently
returned from Afghanistan, where he led a total force--Guard,
Reserve, and Active A-10s--through 24-hours-a-day, 7-days-a-
week combat operations from May until September 2006. His
squadron flew over 2,000 missions and 7,000 combat hours,
operating out of Bagram in northern Afghanistan. They
accomplished over 520 troops in contact close-air-support
missions. He delivered 102,000 rounds of 30-millimeter off the
A-10, and delivered over 300 bombs. Sir, this is a squadron
commander just back from Afghanistan. He's one of our great
airmen.
Next is Major Toby Doran. He's the chief of tactics at
Headquarters Air Force Space Command. He's also a Weapons
School graduate. His other assignments have included chief of
tactics, chief of precision-guided munitions, and chief of
operations. He was a previous enlisted airborne crypto-linguist
aboard our RC-135 Rivet Joints. He served in Operations Desert
Shield, Desert Storm, and Provide Comfort. Most recently, he
served as the space weapons officer with the 1st Marine
Expeditionary Force forward in Al Anbar province, from February
to July 2006. His job was to ensure seamless connectivity from
Air Force space systems into the Marine system and on to the
ground parties. He helped ensure the Marines had accurate
artillery, rocketfire, as well as navigation and
communications. He is one of our great space warfighters.
Sir, next is Captain Andi McElvaine, bomber pilot. She's
from Minot Air Force Base, ND. She's a Weapons School graduate
also, with 2,000 flight hours, including 360 combat hours.
She's been an aircraft commander on unit deployments. She's a
weapons and tactics officer. She's deployed to the Arabian Gulf
for Operation Southern Watch, two times for Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF), and two times to Anderson Air Force Base, in
Guam, as part of our Pacific Command's continuous bomber
presence there. She represents everything that we hold dear
about opportunities in the Air Force and our bomber community.
Sir, next is somebody that is near and dear to every
aviator's heart. He's a pararescueman (PJ). This is Tech
Sergeant Jason Marfell. He's from the 38th Rescue Squadron at
Moody Air Force Base, GA. He's the noncommissioned officer in
charge of standardization and evaluation. He's won two Sikorsky
Awards for skill and courage during two actual lifesaving
missions. He's a winner of the 2006 Air Force Pitsenbarger
Award for the year's top lifesaving rescue. He's deployed
multiple times on a wide range of contingency and combat
operations: Southern Watch, Northern Watch, and Enduring
Freedom. Three times, he's deployed to support space shuttle
transoceanic landing sites. He's deployed to southern Africa
for Operation Atlas Response. He's provided humanitarian
disaster relief after flooding in Mozambique in South Africa in
2000. This is one of the guys that will come get you if you
have to dismount from an airplane, and there's no better sight
for anybody that flies airplanes than to be around a PJ.
Sir, last is a boomer. She's the person responsible for
transferring fuel from our tankers into a wide range of other
aircraft. This is Staff Sergeant Christine Chavez. She's an
instructor boom operator from McConnell Air Force Base, KS. In
Airman Leadership School, she won the Levitow Award for being
the top graduate. She's been a flight supervisor and refueling
instructor. She's been a systems operator through numerous
deployments including Operations Southern Watch, Enduring
Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom. She's operated out of Diego Garcia;
Sheik Isa, in Bahrain; Al Udeid, in Qatar; and Al Dhafra, in
the United Arab Emirates. She has 1,000 hours and 163 combat
missions.
Sir, this is also everything that we hold dear about
officers, enlisted folks, and people that fly.
So, sir, behind me, you have a fighter guy, a space guy, a
bomber, a boomer, and a PJ. This is the wide spectrum of
everything that we do for this country. Sir, I'm so proud to
serve alongside them and wear the same uniform. [Applause.]
Secretary Wynne. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
thank you very much.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Wynne and General
Moseley and the 2007 Air Force Posture Statement Package
follow:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Hon. Michael W. Wynne and General T.
Michael Moseley, USAF
maintaining america's edge
We are America's airmen. Our mission is to deliver sovereign
options for the defense of the United States of America and its global
interests--to fly and fight in air, space, and cyberspace.
Our Air Force Core Values of Integrity First, Service Before Self
and Excellence in All We Do--embodied in every airman--guide our
actions and ensure your Air Force remains committed and ready to deter,
dissuade or defeat any adversary anywhere in the world.
As airmen, we are the Nation's premier multi-dimension maneuver
force, with the agility, reach, speed, stealth, payload, precision, and
persistence to achieve global effects. Control of the air, space, and
cyberspace domains provides the essential bedrock for effective joint
operations--securing freedom to attack and freedom from attack.
In 2005, we revised the Air Force mission statement to include
cyberspace. This inclusion of cyberspace reflects our recognition of
cross-domain interdependence and emphasizes our non-negotiable
commitment to deliver sovereign options for the U.S. through not only
air and space but also cyberspace.
Our 2007 Posture Statement articulates the major elements required
to fulfill our mission. It reaffirms our commitment to focus our
energies on the global war on terror; to develop and care for our
airmen and their families; and to recapitalize and modernize our aging
aircraft, spacecraft, and equipment.
Our top acquisition priorities include: the KC-X Tanker; the CSAR-X
Combat Search and Rescue Helicopter; space communications, space
situational awareness and early warning programs; the F-35A Joint
Strike Fighter (JSF); and Next Generation Long Range Strike--a new
bomber.
Our Posture Statement further reaffirms our commitment to be good
stewards of the resources entrusted to us and our resolve to dominate
air, space, and cyberspace in defense of our Nation now and in the
future.
Challenges
America's Air Force faces significant challenges. We have been
engaged in combat for 16 years while transforming into a smaller,
leaner and more capable force. Fiscal constraints combined with
operational challenges and a dynamic international security environment
translate into risks we continue to manage and mitigate in order to
provide capabilities America needs. The Air Force continues to fight
the global war on terror and prepares to face and overcome threats and
conflicts of the future. In order to remain dominant, we must maintain
our air, space, and cyberspace power advantages over potential
adversaries.
Modern warfare is changing. This is nothing new to America's
airmen, whose heritage spans and embraces change and whose culture
embodies courage and innovation for America. We are ensuring a lean,
lethal, and agile Air Force for America. We are building and posturing
our force structure to meet future threats emerging on the dynamic
world stage, and we are strengthening the interdependent joint team.
We face a security environment that poses an array of dynamic
challenges and threats. The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
characterized this threat environment and mandated force structure
goals for all of the Department of Defense (DOD). The Air Force and all
of the Services must be able to operate and defend against traditional,
irregular, disruptive and catastrophic threats. In the future, the Air
Force and the entire joint team will operate within a strategic
environment involving one or more of these challenges. We will prepare
to defend against high-end conventional forces, asymmetric threats and
irregular forces such as terrorists or insurgents. To mitigate
potential for disruptive surprises, we will strive to stay ahead of
adversaries' technology efforts. Most importantly, we will protect our
Homeland from hostile states' and non-state actors' use of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) and attacks in and through cyberspace. The
threat array requires that we prepare the Air Force for a broad
spectrum of future conflicts. At the same time, several factors have
created a difficult and challenging fiscal environment in which to
organize, train, and equip for the future.
The 2005 QDR specified a Force Planning Construct to shape the
entire DOD force to protect our Nation, its ideals and interests now
and in the future. Originally presented in the National Military
Strategy (NMS), the Force Planning Construct provides guidance for
determining the capacity and capabilities needed to meet both steady
state and surge demands for homeland defense, irregular warfare, and
conventional campaigns. As a result of the NMS guidance and
comprehensive analysis, the QDR determined America's Air Force needs to
organize, train, and equip 86 ``modern combat wings.''
Emerging National Security Concerns and Threats
While the global war on terror is our immediate priority, America's
airmen must also stay ahead of competitors preparing for conventional
conflict and attempting to counter the asymmetric advantage our air,
space, and cyberspace power currently gives our joint team. Sustaining
U.S. advantages in such conflicts will become increasingly more
challenging as advanced air defense, aircraft, WMD, cyber and anti-
satellite (ASAT) capabilities proliferate.
Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) continue to evolve, placing
current generation aircraft at increasing risk. Modern IADS incorporate
more data sources, process and pass information faster, and are
increasingly mobile. Manportable air defense systems (MANPADS),
shoulder-fired SAMs, also are an increasingly serious threat. Their
availability, affordability, and proliferation increases the likelihood
of modern MANPADS ending up in the hands of non-state actors, placing
U.S. civil and military aircraft at risk around the world.
The lethality and availability of fourth-generation combat aircraft
is also increasing, and potential adversaries are already purchasing
and fielding these complex and capable weapon systems. Many nations are
enhancing the capabilities of their existing fighter and bomber
aircraft through use of aerial refueling, signature reduction
technology, and cyberspace weapons that inject confusion or mask
operations. Ever greater numbers of states are not only acquiring
advanced aircraft, but are developing indigenous production capability,
increasing the likelihood of proliferation.
Proliferation of WMD to countries and non-state actors remains a
significant challenge to U.S. interests and a top priority in the QDR.
While nuclear weapons and materials proliferation always pose grave
dangers, chemical and biological weapons pose arguably greater
detection challenges. Easier and less costly to make than nuclear
weapons, chemical and biological weapons are easier to transport,
produce and mask from detection because they can be camouflaged as
dual-use civilian industrial products. Proliferation may also enable
future adversaries, especially terrorist groups, to develop, use, or
threaten to use WMD as an asymmetric response to American conventional
warfighting dominance, which might otherwise deter them from directly
challenging the U.S.
Perhaps less obvious, but all the more insidious, is the
adversary's use of the cyberspace domain to support and carry out their
attacks worldwide and on our shores. The adversary knows that they can
contest our use of the electromagnetic spectrum and conduct their war
of ideas from a supposed sanctuary in this domain.
Finally, we see challenges to our current advantages in the space
domain. Employment of Global Positioning System (GPS) jammers in an
attempt to reduce U.S. and coalition air strike precision is an
example. While we can currently overcome this threat through a variety
of methods, such a challenge presents a warning and a valuable lesson
as we posture our air, space, and cyberspace forces for the future.
Recent foreign testing of kinetic ASAT weapon capabilities further
demonstrates an explicit willingness to challenge, disrupt, or destroy
America's space assets and capabilities. This testing also demonstrates
a disregard for both American and global concerns over space debris and
the damage it may inflict upon any object stationed in or traversing
through low Earth orbit.
As technology matures and proliferates, and as access to space
becomes available to more countries, organizations and individuals,
threats to America's air, space, and cyberspace capabilities will
continue to grow and evolve. America's airmen aim to be ready to meet
these and all other threats to our Nation.
Irregular Warfare
Our Nation is now in its 6th year waging the global war on terror
while the Air Force is entering its 17th year of engagement in
Southwest Asia. Current conditions portend this to remain a long war.
The enemy chooses not to operate as a ``uniformed military,'' but
rather uses criminal networks and terror tactics to attack from the
shadows. They use indiscriminate violence against combatants and non-
combatants alike. They extensively use propaganda to advance their
radical ideology of tyranny and hatred. Iraq and Afghanistan are two
current fronts in this war, but the struggle extends beyond these vital
campaigns. The Air Force and the entire joint team must wage this war
on a global scale, in multiple locations and domains at simultaneous
times, and for a number of years.
We are strengthening our ability to deter and defend against non-
state threats and our ability to conduct globally distributed irregular
operations of varying duration. We stand ready to conduct a large-
scale, long-duration irregular warfare campaign as an integral part of
the joint team, to include counterinsurgency, security, stability,
transition, and reconstruction operations.
Adapting to Nontraditional Roles
Airmen are finding innovative new uses for our current systems
while successfully executing irregular warfare operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Airmen increasingly find themselves engaged in
nontraditional roles requiring ingenuity and the use of joint
warfighting technology. Our missions and taskings range from standard
close air support and armed reconnaissance to non-traditional taskings
like convoy escort, infrastructure protection, provincial
reconstruction, and host nation election support.
Still other airmen have stepped in to fill joint warfighter
taskings in stressed skill areas in which other Services are
shorthanded. The Air Force currently provides over 7,700 airmen to
fulfill these ``In-Lieu Of'' (ILO) ground force taskings. These airmen
fulfill ILO requirements in areas such as detainee operations, convoy
operations and protection, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Police Training
Teams, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Military Transition Teams,
civil engineering, security, interrogation, communications, fuels,
medical services, logistics, intelligence, and base operating support.
The Air Force also fills another 1,200 Joint Individual Augmentee
positions. Airmen began fulfilling these requirements in 2003 and will
continue to do so through 2007 and beyond--until the ground force
component recaptures these missions and our job is done.
Finally, Air Force mission, training, and force structure
requirements will necessarily increase correspondingly as joint ground
force, Army and Marine Corps requirements and end strength increase.
The full range of Air Force air, space, and cyberspace capabilities and
personnel are interdependently woven into joint ground forces
operations.
Recognizing there will be an impact of increased ground forces on
our budget, we are assessing our programs. We forecast there may be
increased requirements in the areas of inter- and intra-theater
airlift; command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (C\4\ISR) capabilities; Close Air
Support (CAS); Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) personnel; and
extended ILO personnel requirements. While the Army and Marine Corps
reset and recapitalize, we are following through in every way with our
joint teammates.
Defending Our Homeland
Future threats to our Homeland are constantly evolving. They
present challenges to the established methods and structures of
homeland defense. Development, fielding and proliferation of standoff
weapons, such as long-range cruise missiles, provide potential
adversaries with offensive capabilities of increasing accuracy and
range. In addition, we can expect many of these future weapons to be of
relatively small size, presenting an extremely difficult detection and
tracking challenge.
As we safeguard the aerial, maritime and cyber approaches to our
Nation, the Air Force will continue to play a large role in providing
the full spectrum of air sovereignty options, including air defense,
missile defense and support to civil authorities for consequence
management. Additionally, as illustrated by our response to Hurricane
Katrina, the Air Force will surge and contribute to national responses
in the event of natural disasters or catastrophic events, supplying
airlift, communications, imagery from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
and space assets, and combat search and rescue capabilities.
Cyberspace
America's Air Force is redefining air and space power for the 21st
century.
Our current and potential adversaries already operate in
cyberspace, exploiting the low entry costs and minimal technological
investment needed to inflict serious harm. We cannot allow them to
expand their foothold. We seek to deny our adversaries cyberspace
sanctuary while ensuring our access and operations in this domain. Our
Nation's ability to deliver effects in air, in space, on land, and at
sea depends on control of this domain.
Cyberspace dominance goes beyond communications and information
technology. It requires superiority across the entire electromagnetic
spectrum--DC to daylight--radio waves, microwaves, infrared, x-rays,
directed energy, and applications we have not even begun to think
about--to ensure global command and control, global reach, and global
power. We have a well-established capability to operate in cyberspace.
We take advantage of physics, technology, and synergies to operate in
and through it. Therefore, we are establishing a new Cyberspace Command
to stand alongside Air Force Space Command and Air Combat Command.
America's airmen are force providers the President, combatant
commanders (COCOMs) and the American people can rely on to preserve
freedom of access and operations in air, space, and cyberspace.
The newly designated Air Force Cyberspace Command will provide
combat ready forces trained and equipped to conduct sustained combat
operations through the electromagnetic spectrum and fully integrate
these with air and space operations. In November 2006, we held a
Cyberspace Summit and, in January 2007, we hosted the first-ever
integrated cyber exercise, Cyber Vision 2007, at the U.S. Air Force
Warfare Center (USAFWC). This exercise focused on dominating the
cyberspace domain in a potential conflict. These events and future
integration of Cyber Aggressor Teams into Red Flag will build upon the
significant cyberspace capabilities we already contribute to homeland
defense and the joint fight.
Cyberspace Command will leverage, consolidate and integrate unique
Air Force cyber capabilities and functions across the spectrum of
conflict from peace, to crisis and war: Command and Control; Electronic
Warfare; Network Warfare; and Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR). Many Air Force programs, while contributing to
air and space power, also directly contribute to our dominance of the
cyberspace domain.
Loss of Buying Power
While the Air Force is postured to meet our Nation's near-term
requirements, our ability to meet steady state and surge requirements
over the long term hinges on our ability to organize, train and equip
86 modern combat wings, as mandated in the QDR. Achieving these goals
will be difficult, as we balance fighting the global war on terror,
maintaining our readiness, maintaining America's air, space, and
cyberspace advantages, modernizing our equipment and capabilities, and
shaping our airmen, organizations and force structure for the future.
Several factors have applied pressure to the Air Force budget:
global war on terror and operations costs; increasing costs of fuel,
utilities, manpower, and health care; increased costs to own, operate
and maintain our aging aircraft; unforeseen base realignment and
closure (BRAC) costs; and lost savings due to congressional
restrictions on retirement and divestment of our least useful legacy
aircraft. Although recent congressional support for planned legacy
aircraft retirements has aided our divestment strategy, unnecessary
restrictions draw critical resources away from our aircraft
modernization programs and degrade our efforts to recapitalize our
aircraft inventory.
We are meeting our current wartime commitments. We are also
operating within the resources entrusted to our service--we are staying
in bounds. We are self-financing our modernization and recapitalization
efforts to the maximum extent possible though initiatives such as Force
Shaping, Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century (AFSO21) and
aircraft retirements, while focusing on a ``mission first'' basis.
Furthermore, we are committed to operate, organize, train, and equip to
meet the projected demands of the future--they are many. The Future
Years Defense Program (FYDP) involves taking acceptable risk in lower
priority areas in order to meet future readiness, capability, force
structure, and national security requirements.
Next Generation Air Force
Our loss of overall buying power means the Air Force must attempt
to rebalance our available resources and force structure to achieve
Force Planning Construct goals. To reach our 2025 force structure
objectives, we will synchronize our investments to maximize their
effect.
In 2005, we began divesting significant numbers of our oldest,
least capable, and most costly and difficult to maintain aircraft. In
2006, we also initiated a carefully calculated reduction in personnel
end strength to match our declining force structure. As investments in
research, development, and procurement grow, we will continue building
our force structure towards 86 modern combat wings. Our personnel end
strength must concurrently keep pace as we modernize our force
structure. These two elements--force structure and personnel end
strength--drive our resource requirements.
The Air Force is committed--now and in the future--to not only
defend our Nation but also provide good stewardship of the resources
entrusted to us. We look forward to working closely with Congress to
ensure our force structure and personnel investments are synchronized,
and our efforts to posture, recapitalize and modernize America's Air
Force fly together in close formation.
Air Force Priorities
As the Air Force strives to defend America's interests within a
dynamic strategic environment, we remain committed to our top service
priorities, as stated by Air Force leaders and outlined in our Vision:
Fighting and winning the global war on terror
Developing and caring for our airmen and their
families
Recapitalizing and modernizing our aging aircraft and
spacecraft inventories
These priorities, together with our Enduring Core Values of
Integrity, Service and Excellence, provide America's airmen a steady
beacon, guiding how we organize, train and equip in defense of our
Nation. Our national strategic requirements, global complexities and
threats, and fiscal elements within the overall strategic environment
will continue to shape how we execute these priorities. We remain
focused on the global war on terror, our people, and a modern, capable
force.
Your Air Force is dedicated to maintaining, evolving, and expanding
America's capabilities in air, space, and cyberspace. These
capabilities are America's Edge--the foundation of America's
unparalleled Global Vigilance, Reach and Power.
fighting and winning the global war on terror
Our Air Force has been engaged in over 16 years of continuous
combat in Iraq, currently a central front in the global war on terror.
In addition to OIF, the Air Force is a critical player on the joint and
coalition team in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan.
Airmen also vigilantly defend the skies of our Homeland in Operation
Noble Eagle (ONE). Our enemies are vile, unrelenting, adaptive and
global. They are motivated by extremist ideologies and bent on
subjugation and denial of basic freedoms of expression, government and
religion. It will ultimately require all elements of national power to
defeat them. Militarily, the Air Force remains committed to finding and
destroying our Nation's enemies wherever they seek sanctuary, fighting
side by side with friendly nations in this struggle against violent
extremism.
America's airmen operate on a global scale every day. The full,
complete impact of Air Force engagement includes airmen deployed
outside of the Continental United States (OCONUS) to contingencies,
forward deployed in Europe and the Pacific, and employed from their
home stations as they execute global missions. The Air Force has nearly
30,000 airmen deployed in Central Command conducting theater
operations. Similarly, 60,000 Pacific Air Forces and U.S. Air Forces
Europe airmen are fully engaged in the full spectrum of dissuasion,
deterrence, coalition training, and military-to-military activities.
Furthermore, the inherent qualities of air, space, and cyberspace--
speed, range, and payload--allow the forward deployed Air Force
footprint to be smaller, less vulnerable, and vastly more flexible.
Airmen are also fully engaged in the global war on terror from their
home stations, controlling satellites, standing on alert with
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), providing intelligence
assessments, operating UAVs, and launching airlift, tanker and other
aircraft missions essential to joint operations worldwide. Every day
over 200,000 Active, Guard, and Reserve airmen fulfill COCOM missions
around the world.
A Day in the Life of America's Airmen
The Air Force delivers Global Vigilance, Global Reach and Global
Power for our Nation. America's airmen provide vigilance that is
persistent, focused, and predictive; reach that is reliable, rapid and
agile; and power that is flexible, precise, stealthy, and decisive.
A snapshot of current Air Force operations illustrates the myriad
ways in which COCOMs employ air, space, and cyberspace power to
accomplish their missions.
Global Vigilance
Air Force Global Vigilance capabilities are critical elements of
the global war on terror, at home and abroad. For instance, the Air
Force currently operates and maintains satellites directly serving
Central Command and providing the communications, sensor, and
navigation capabilities on which the lives and missions of soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen depend. From bases in the
continental U.S., our airmen also maintain space situational awareness
(SSA) for the region, tracking over 500 daily orbital passes over
Baghdad of satellites of all nations.
Theater-based aircraft have become critical elements in the
Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (Counter-IED) effort by ``scanning
and jamming.'' On a daily basis U-2s, Global Hawk and Predator UAVs,
and E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS)
aircraft survey, track, identify--and sometimes destroy--insurgents and
safe houses. In fact, the Air Force maintains over 10 24/7 UAV Combat
Air Patrols (CAP) in Central Command, providing persistent ISR and--in
the case of Predator--a lethal strike option. In addition to their
global responsibilities, stateside Airborne Warning and Control System
(AWACS) crews and airplanes fly and stand on alert as part of our
homeland defense surveillance requirements.
Global Reach
Air Force airlifters and tankers provide the global reach that
underwrites the joint effort in the global war on terror. An Air
Mobility Command aircraft departs a runway somewhere on the planet
every 90 seconds, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. On a typical day,
the Air Force flies over 250 airlift sorties, moves over 1,000 tons of
cargo, and transports nearly 2,500 passengers. In Central Command,
intratheater airlift aircraft like the C-130 and C-17 have borne heavy
loads, taking thousands of convoys off dangerous roads and reducing the
threat of IEDs to about 8,500 people each month.
Aeromedical evacuation (AE) has emerged as a critical capability
for the Joint Force. In fact, Air Force AE is responsible for the
transport and care of over 36,000 patients in the global war on terror.
Our airmen have achieved a recordsetting average patient movement time
of 72 hours, a dramatic reduction from the 10-14 days required during
the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Such rapid global movement provides U.S.
service men and women the highest survival rates in the history of
warfare.
Air Force tankers provide global mobility and reach for Air Force
aircraft, the joint team and coalition forces. While the average tanker
is over 40 years old, KC-135s and KC-10s nonetheless fly 30 tanker
missions on a typical day in Central Command and stand on alert to
provide additional endurance for our aircraft performing homeland
defense missions.
Global Power
At the sharp end of Air Force capabilities, America's airmen
deliver Global Power in the global war on terror. Using UAVs, tight
air-ground integration, and time sensitive targeting, we have
eliminated several high-value terrorist and insurgent targets in
Afghanistan, Somalia, and Iraq. In a war where intelligence is
fleeting, the Air Force has made constant innovations to shorten the
time cycle it takes to deliver rapid, precise effects. Fighters
originally designed for strike missions are now using their targeting
pods as nontraditional ISR sensors over Iraq and Afghanistan, providing
a unique extension of both vigilance and power for the Joint Force
Commander (JFC). Battlefield airmen serve side by side with our joint
partners on the ground and use live streaming video from Predators or
targeting pods to orchestrate rapid air and ground attacks on
insurgents. The successful June 2006 strike against al Qaeda leader Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi is only one illustration of how the active Duty, Air
National Guard, and Air Force Reserve Command seamlessly integrate
capabilities from around the globe into precise, dislocating, and
decisive effect.
Since the beginning of the global war on terror, the typical strike
mission has evolved from a pre-planned sortie against a fixed target to
a flexible, on-call mission profile responsive to a rapidly changing
battlefield. In Central Command, fighters typically fly nearly 80
strike, electronic warfare, or non-traditional ISR sorties each day.
Back in the U.S., fighters stand guard over our Homeland, ready to
launch at a moment's notice. Worldwide, Air Force fighters and bombers,
coupled with the strength of America's space and cyberspace
capabilities, are the tools of reassurance, deterrence and dissuasion.
America's airmen are the global, strategic muscle behind U.S.
diplomacy, providing a lethal over-the-horizon capability to directly
influence events on the ground--whether based in Japan, Guam, or
Whiteman Air Force Base (AFB), Missouri.
Fostering Joint Interdependence
Air Force dedication to joint interdependence is illustrated in the
global war on terror. Around the world, we are committed to providing
COCOMs an increased ability to integrate air, space, and cyberspace
capabilities and gain cross-dimensional synergies in pursuit of
National Security Joint Force objectives.
Fifth-Generation Fighters
Currently in production and fully operational at Langley AFB,
Virginia, the F-22A is the newest member of the Air and Space
Expeditionary Force--our airmen are putting the world's first fifth-
generation fighter into action. Its attributes of speed, stealth,
maneuverability, advanced sensors and adaptable, integrated avionics
will meet our Nation's enduring national security requirement to gain
and maintain joint air dominance, as well as enable precise engagement
against a broad range of surface targets.
America's airmen are understandably proud of their contributions to
the joint fight. They have prevented enemy aircraft from inflicting any
U.S. ground force casualties for over 50 years. We dedicate our efforts
and risk our lives to sustain this record. Production in sufficient
numbers of fifth-generation fighters--both the F-22A Raptor and the F-
35A Lightning II--remains the best guarantee of homeland air
sovereignty and joint air dominance.
Numbered Air Forces
The Air Force has established component Numbered Air Forces (NAFs)
dedicated to supporting each COCOM across the full range of military
operations. Each component NAF provides an integrated and
technologically advanced command and control capability, adaptable to
contingencies across the spectrum of conflict. Over the next several
years, we will continue to refine this command and control structure
through the development of centralized ``reach back'' capabilities,
integration of guardsmen and reservists, and more advanced cyber
technologies.
Air and Space Expeditionary Force
The Air and Space Expeditionary Force (AEF) organizational
construct is a modern design for the modern world.
Since the end of the Cold War, the Air Force has evolved from a
force based at large, permanent U.S. and overseas bases to an
expeditionary force, requiring fewer permanent bases and using an
expanded network of temporary forward bases. As we adapted to this new
operating environment, we quickly recognized the deployment construct
for our force also had to change. Since 1999, we have organized our Air
Force combat forces into 10 AEFs that present capability to COCOMs,
provide trained and ready forces for emerging threats and
contingencies, and help manage high deployment tempo through a stable
and predictable rotation schedule. When demand for American air power
skyrocketed after September 11, the Air Force extended the deployment
period from 90 to 120 days to accommodate the COCOMs' demands.
We continue to adapt our people and organizational constructs to
ensure airmen are highly motivated, exceptionally well-trained, and
equipped with the right skill sets to present the joint warfighter with
a broad set of capabilities. We realigned the AEF Center under the Air
Force Personnel Center at Randolph Air Force Base, Texas, to leverage
similar functions and merge permanent authorizations, wartime
requirements, and assignments under a single commander. The Air Force
is also moving forward with fielding of Contingency Response Groups
(CRGs), organized, trained and equipped to provide an initial ``Open
the Base'' capability to COCOMs. The CRG provides a rapid response team
to assess the location-specific support requirements necessary to open
an expeditionary airfield, as well as provide a rapid projection of
America's vigilance, reach, and power.
Joint Warfighting Integration
Due to the dynamic demands of the global war on terror, airmen fly
strike, ISR, combat search and rescue (CSAR), AE, electronic warfare
and airlift sorties everyday over Afghanistan and Iraq. They also
augment ground forces to provide security and stability in both
countries. Airmen are working hand-in-hand with ground and naval forces
training and augmenting both Iraqi and Afghan security forces,
rebuilding critical infrastructure, and providing medical services to
these war-torn countries.
Air Force CSAR helicopters remain on alert in Iraq and Afghanistan,
providing commanders with the capability to rescue isolated military
and civilian personnel. Air Force CSAR crews answer the moral
obligation to safely secure and return any and every member of our
joint team.
The effectiveness CAS provides soldiers and marines is another
example of interdependence. Tactical training at the National Training
Center provides soldiers and airmen the opportunity to see how they
will deploy and fight together on future battlefields. The Army's
Stryker Brigade Combat Teams now in service and the Future Combat
System under development both rely heavily on Air Force strike
capabilities to remain effective. Therefore, we are adding 700 TACP
airmen to serve with ground components to ensure the Air Force's timely
and precise effects are always available.
Building Global Partnerships
Fighting and winning the global war on terror requires commitment,
capability, and cooperation from allies and partners around the world.
We depend on our international partners to secure their territory,
support regional stability, provide base access and overflight rights,
and contribute a host of air, space, and cyber power capabilities as
interoperable coalition partners. As the pace of economic, political
and cultural globalization increases, the importance of strong global
partnerships--both now and in the future--is abundantly clear.
The Air Force leads the way in developing enduring air force-to-air
force relationships around the world. To strengthen these
relationships, we are expanding Red Flag access to our allies and
partners. We are also working to establish the Gulf Air Warfare Center
as a tactical center of excellence. In addition to integrating
coalition partners into our most robust combat training scenarios, we
have established the Coalition and Irregular Warfare Center of
Excellence to facilitate development of relevant airpower capabilities,
capacities, and relationships in partner nations in the global war on
terror, and to facilitate development of innovative Air Force irregular
warfare applications. We are also expanding the 6th Special Operations
Squadron to bolster our ability to train foreign air forces and expand
our repertoire of non-kinetic capabilities in the global war on terror.
Furthermore, our aircrews, especially airmen executing global mobility
and airlift missions, interact daily with host nation personnel,
representatives and citizenry, enhancing America's image of strength,
freedom, and hope.
Through the Air Force Security Cooperation Strategy, we continue
working with allies and friends to help them attain capabilities that
complement our own air, space, and cyberspace capabilities. This
document uses the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Security
Cooperation Guidance as a foundation and aligns with COCOM Theater
Security Cooperation strategies. This comprehensive, coordinated effort
builds capability in potential partner air forces using the six U.S.
Air Force Distinctive Capabilities as driving tenets.
Recent commitments, such as procurement of C-17 airlifters by
Australia and the NATO Alliance, and broad international participation
in the F-35A JSF program, will further reinforce our current and future
interoperability with global partners. Finally, we have infused
expeditionary, regional, cultural and linguistic education throughout
our training programs at every level. The Air Force executes a global
mission. Our approaches to operations, interoperability and training
exemplify our global, international perspective.
Air Staff Intelligence Directorate
Intelligence is becoming more critical in today's rapidly changing
security environment. Collection, analysis, and timely distribution of
information are essential to kinetic and nonkinetic approaches to our
Nation's security challenges. Accordingly, we moved Intelligence
directly under the Chief of Staff, creating the position of Deputy
Chief of Staff for Intelligence (A2) and elevating the position to a
three-star billet from its former two-star billet.
Partnership with the National Reconnaissance Office
The Air Force and the National Reconnaissance Office achieved a
groundbreaking agreement on 7 June 2006 to share expertise and best
practices. The agreement focuses specifically on sharing lessons
learned in developing, acquiring, fielding and operating modern space
systems. Both organizations recognize the need to enhance their
respective capabilities, as well as to work collaboratively to respond
to future challenges.
Combat Search and Rescue Realignment
The transfer of the CSAR mission from Air Force Special Operations
Command to Air Combat Command provides a clearer presentation of forces
to joint commanders and ensures a direct CSAR link to the Combat Air
Forces and the personnel they serve. In addition, the Air Force's Next
Generation Combat Search and Rescue aircraft (CSAR-X) will modernize an
aging CSAR fleet, provide greatly improved all-weather combat search
and rescue worldwide--an essential component of our commitment to the
joint team and our allies.
Air and Space Operations Centers
In June 2005, we achieved an Initial Operational Capability with
our Air and Space Operations Center (AOC) Weapon System and are well on
our way to a Full Operational Capability for the entire AOC inventory.
The Air Force leads the way in delivering sovereign options to defend
our Homeland and our global interests by providing a global command and
control (C2) capability to COCOMs, enabling them to orchestrate air,
space, and cyberspace effects in pursuit of national military
objectives. AOCs are the central operational nodes in this capability,
and the Combined AOC in operation at Al Udeid, Qatar, exemplifies the
most advanced and robust AOC system in the Air Force today.
Aeromedical Evacuation
Air Force AE contributes a unique, nationally vital capability to
the joint fight. Air Force AE innovations include use of ``designated
vs. dedicated'' aircraft, ``universally-qualified'' AE crewmembers,
able to fly on any AE-configured aircraft, and the extensive use of
Critical Care Air Transport Teams to transport stabilized patients.
Air Force AE is combat proven. Since late 2001, we have
orchestrated the care and transfer of more than 36,000 overseas
patients to CONUS facilities. We continue to refine this remarkable
capability and the ``en route care'' system built upon our
expeditionary medical system.
Air Force AE is a Total Force system, and both AE and en route care
are built on teamwork, synergy, and joint execution. Technological
advances such as the single integrated patient data system, high-flow
ventilators, high deck patient loading system, and the Joint Patient
Isolation Unit are under development and will further enable safe
patient movement regardless of transportation mode.
America's Air Force has provided soldiers, sailors, marines,
coastguardsmen, and airmen the highest casualty survival rates in the
history of warfare. By leveraging AE and en route care, we will
continue to improve our ability to save and sustain lives.
Space Capabilities in Joint Operations
The entire joint force depends on Air Force space-based
capabilities to meet not only the needs of military operations, but
also the full spectrum of civil, economic, and diplomatic activities.
Moreover, rescue and recovery operations in 2005 following Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita clearly demonstrated the humanitarian mission utility
of space-based communications, positioning and navigation services, and
environmental monitoring. America's airmen safeguard the high ground of
space and ensure America's unimpeded access to vital space
capabilities.
Space Applications in Afghanistan and Iraq
Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan highlight the importance of
space-based capabilities to U.S. and coalition forces. An example of
Air Force response to warfighter needs is the successful deployment of
the Satellite Interference Response System (SIRS), a defensive
counterspace prototype. It aids in the identification, geolocation and
reduction of interference sources for critical satellite
communications. SIRS has improved the response time to unknown
interference sources within the CENTCOM AOR and reduced friendly
interference sources from impacting operations.
Blue Force Tracking capability is another success story. Joint Blue
Force Tracking has fundamentally changed ground warfare. The ability to
accurately locate friendly forces with GPS timing and positioning
information, and then share that information, dramatically improves
understanding on the battlefield and reduces the risk of friendly fire.
The unprecedented real-time knowledge of friendly force locations
renders all operations--especially night and urban operations--less
dangerous and more effective.
Joint Space Operations Center
The 14th Air Force Air and Space Operations Center (Space AOC) at
Vandenberg AFB, CA, serves as the core of the United States Strategic
Command Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC). The Space AOC/JSpOC is
the primary command and control node for integrating the full resources
of space-based sensor and command-control systems. The Space AOC/JSpOC
proactively reaches forward to COCOMs, ensuring accomplishment of
theater and global space objectives, while providing a continually
updated space common operating picture for integration into current
wartime and peacetime missions.
The Space AOC/JSpOC consists of personnel, facilities, and
resources providing long-term strategy development, short-term crisis
and contingency planning, real-time execution, space asset
reallocation, and space forces assessment. The Space AOC/JSpOC provides
tailored space effects to joint forces worldwide.
The Space AOC/JSpOC maintains SSA through the fusion of
intelligence, space- and ground-based sensor readings, and operational
indications to allow U.S. and allied forces unfettered access to space.
The Space AOC/JSpOC also provides predictive analysis of adversary
space activity and supports the protection of National Security Space
assets.
Counterspace
Air, space, and cyberspace superiority are the foundational
elements of joint success in any action. Counterspace and Countercyber
technologies and operations provide America with the tools to achieve
space and cyber superiority, allowing America freedom of action while
denying freedom of action to an adversary or enemy. SSA, Defensive
Counterspace (DCS) and Offensive Counterspace (OCS) capabilities
comprise the main elements of Air Force counterspace efforts.
SSA provides airmen with detailed knowledge of the space
environment, enabling responsive, effective execution of DCS and OCS
actions. Enhanced ground-based and new space-based SSA assets would
provide the needed information. In the near-term, the Rapid Attack
Identification Detection and Reporting System (RAIDRS), along with
SIRS, will test detection and geo-location technologies. The Space
Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) and Space Fence programs will deliver
transformational capabilities to improve responsiveness, surveillance
coverage, and small object detection. We expect to field these improved
capabilities in the fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2013 timeframes,
respectively.
Air Force Defensive Counterspace efforts will protect National
Security Space capabilities vital to joint success. Some defensive
strategies comprise technical solutions integrated into satellite
designs. We will design other systems specifically to counter
adversarial threats. Additionally, our airmen are continuously
developing new tactics to mitigate potential threats to our space
systems.
Offensive Counterspace technologies and operations seek to disrupt,
deny, or degrade an adversary's ability to leverage space capabilities.
The Counter Communications System (CCS) provides COCOMs a method to
deny an adversary's access to satellite communications through
temporary, reversible and nondestructive means. CCS expands the options
available for the COCOM to address the proliferation of advanced space
technologies and their availability to potential adversaries.
developing and caring for our airmen
Your Air Force today is a seamless Total Force, with over 690,000
airmen serving on Active Duty, in the Air National Guard (ANG), in the
Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) and as Air Force civilians. While
modern equipment, technology and capability are essential to success,
your airmen are the bedrock of America's ability to succeed in an era
of challenge and uncertainty.
While emphasizing our global expeditionary culture, organization
and mission, we remain committed to providing and maintaining the
highest possible standards of education, training, health care, and
installation services for America's airmen.
Force Shaping
When the Air Force began to develop a long-term force structure
plan, we started with divestment of legacy aircraft. While we have
achieved some success, significant investment gaps remain. Moreover,
the costs of personnel continue to rise. Personnel costs have increased
57 percent in the past decade. In early 2006, Program Budget Decision
720 directed additional end strength reductions over the FYDP. As we
manage this downsizing, we remain committed to a balanced force. We
will increase manning in stressed career fields, and expand
opportunities for career development and training. Our goal is a lean,
more capable, more lethal Air Force, organized, trained, and equipped
for our global, expeditionary mission.
To tailor our personnel mix to the new security environment, we
authorized implementation of annual Force Shaping Boards (FSBs). The
purpose of the fiscal year 2006 FSB was to reduce officer overages by
identifying eligible officers for separation, while balancing career
fields and officer commissioned year groups. Prior to the board,
eligible officers were offered voluntary options to transition to other
forms of service in and out of the Air Force. The Air Force also waived
most Active Duty Service Commitments (ADSC) to allow officers to
separate early. In addition, the Air Force is offering Voluntary
Separation Pay to officers in overage career fields, and we will
convene a Selective Early Retirement Board to identify retirement-
eligible officers for early retirement if necessary.
To achieve the required reductions of enlisted airmen, the Air
Force instituted a date of separation rollback for personnel with
limitations on their assignment or enlistment eligibility. We also
offered a limited number of ADSC waivers for eligible members in
overage career fields. These initiatives to shape the enlisted force
join the tools already in place: Career Job Reservations, reduction in
accessions, and the Noncommissioned Officer Retraining Program.
Overall, the Air Force aims for a reduction of over 4,000 officers
and 10,000 enlisted members by the end of fiscal year 2007. These
reductions are difficult but necessary to ensure the Air Force
maintains the right size and mix of forces to meet the fiscal and
global challenges of today and tomorrow.
Total Force Integration
A distinguishing hallmark of the Air Force is the ease with which
airmen from Active Duty, ANG, and AFRC work together at home and
abroad. From the build-up of the ANG after World War II, the first
Reserve Associate unit in 1968 and the full integration of Guard and
Reserve units into the Air and Space Expeditionary Force in the 1990s,
the Air Force has a history of employing airmen from all components in
innovative and effective ways.
One of the Air Force's significant commitments to long-term
transformation is Total Force Integration (TFI). The Total Force
construct seeks to maximize the Air Force's overall joint combat
capability with Active Duty, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve
airmen working together cohesively. TFI is critical to meeting the
challenges of competing resource demands, an aging aircraft inventory,
and emerging missions.
New and Emerging Missions
As the Air Force transforms to a smaller, more agile and lethal
force, we will retain the strengths of the Guard and Reserve and use
them in new ways to reflect a changing mission set. Increased
integration allows Air Force personnel to capitalize on experience
levels inherent in the Guard and Reserve, while building vital
relationships necessary to sustain successful combat operations.
Ongoing Total Force initiatives integrate Air Force components into
missions critical to future warfighting, and include ISR, UAVs, space
and cyberspace operations. Given the ease of employing these
capabilities from home station, these missions are ideally suited for
the Guard and Reserve. In a time of increasing demand for these
capabilities, it only makes sense to use reachback technologies to tap
into our Air Reserve component. Using this approach improves our
operational effectiveness, reduces reliance on involuntary
mobilization, and provides more stability for our airmen and their
civilian employers. It also allows the Air Force to capitalize on the
state-of-the-industry advanced skills and best practices residing in
the ranks of the ANG and AFRC.
Way Ahead
The Air Force continues to make significant progress on our Total
Force initiatives. We have identified 136, secured funding for 98
opportunities and are executing 19. We have established associate units
at several locations including F-22As in Virginia and Alaska, C-17s in
Hawaii, F-16s in Utah, and C-130s in Wyoming. Additionally, Guardsmen
are analyzing global war on terror intelligence in Kansas, and
reservists are flying operational global war on terror UAV missions
from Nevada. With over 100 initiatives in the planning phase and many
more in the development phase, Total Force Integration is paving the
way for a smaller, more capable, more affordable Air Force.
Improving Training Opportunities
Spanning 6 decades of Air Force history, particularly over the past
16 years, our airmen have proven themselves as the global first
responders in times of crisis--taking action anytime, anywhere. The
foundation for this well-deserved reputation is the quality and
frequency of the training and education we provide. Our Air Force
training initiatives continue to evolve, improving our ability to
develop and retain the world's best air, space, and cyberspace
warriors--expeditionary, knowledge-enabled, ethical, and prepared for
the interdependent fight.
Air Force Basic Military Training
We changed Air Force Basic Military Training (BMT) curriculum to
stress an expeditionary mindset in all phases of training, providing
airmen with more expeditionary capability from day one. These changes
are the most significant in BMT history. The Air Force basic training
experience now mirrors the AEF cycle with a pre-deployment, deployment
and reconstitution phases. We emphasize basic war skills and practical
application throughout BMT. Beginning 1st quarter fiscal year 2009, BMT
will incorporate 2 additional weeks of instruction--lasting 8.5 weeks
total--to provide more opportunities for practical application and
field exercises. Finally, we have added ``Airman's Time,'' mentoring
sessions in which our veteran instructors share their real world
experiences, relate daily training events to warrior and Airmanship
qualities, and reinforce the Core Values expected of all airmen.
Space Professional Development
Space capabilities have become vital in the defense of our Nation
and the continued growth of the U.S. and world economies. Developing,
fielding, operating, and maintaining the Air Force's broad array of
space systems demands a highly-trained, expertly managed workforce of
space professionals. As we begin to field even more capable and complex
systems, the demands on our space professionals will only increase. We
have brought these personnel together within the Space Professional
Development Program, ensuring our operations, acquisition and support
personnel receive the training, education and experience necessary to
accomplish our mission in space--now and in the future.
U.S. Air Force Warfare Center
The U.S. Air Force Warfare Center (USAFWC) integrates initiatives
across the Air Force. USAFWC sets the standard for executing joint and
coalition air, space, and cyberspace operations. The USAFWC provides
advanced training designed to ensure our Air Force warfighting
capability remains unrivaled. USAFWC provides performance assessment
and joint integrated exercise venues for units from the USAF, USN,
USMC, and USA--as well as our allies. They provide adversary analysis
through a unified and coordinated ``Red Force'' ready to ``combat'' the
United States' and their coalition partners during all phases of
testing, tactics development, training programs, and integrated
exercises.
Red Flag
In addition to its original location at Nellis AFB, NV, the Air
Force now conducts Red Flag exercises in Alaska using Eielson AFB,
Elmendorf AFB, and the Pacific Alaska Range Complex. The two exercises
are designated Red Flag-Nellis and Red Flag-Alaska, respectively.
Red Flag is expanding aggressor capabilities to provide enhanced
training at both locations. The Air Force added an F-15 aggressor unit
in Nevada and, starting in October 2007, we will establish an F-16
Aggressor Squadron at Eielson AFB ready to participate in Red Flag-
Alaska exercises in 2008. Aggressor functions have expanded to include
air defense, space, and cyber operations. This integrated aggressor
force provides all Red Flag exercises with a consistent, world-class
training capability. Bolstering the dissimilar combat experience, the
Air Force also has taken steps to expand the participation of coalition
partners and allies in Red Flag.
Overall, enhanced aggressor operations and common training concepts
will increase the quality of Red Flag training, and two locations will
increase the quantity of training opportunities. When complete, these
changes will make a great program even better--saving lives in the next
fight.
Military Personnel Exchange Program
Through the Military Personnel Exchange Program, the Air Force
builds, sustains, and expands international relationships that are
critical enablers for our Expeditionary Air and Space Force. Long-term
success in the global war on terror calls for broad international
partnership and integration. Expanding our exchange programs to Eastern
Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia is critical to the conduct
of the global war on terror and in building lasting partnerships with
our Allies.
Quality of Life
Your Air Force has been at war for nearly 17 consecutive years.
These challenging times underscore the importance of properly
maintaining the capabilities of the primary weapons in our Air Force
arsenal--our airmen. Our focus on their quality of life ensures these
vital ``weapon systems'' remain ready when called upon.
Expeditionary Support
We ensure the best possible facilities and programs at all our
expeditionary locations. Our dining facilities are unequalled--
currently serving over 36,000 meals daily to deployed forces. We also
provide fitness and recreation support to help maintain the health and
morale of our airmen. Additionally, our Learning Resource Centers
provide the necessary means for distance learning, continued
professional development, and connectivity with friends and family.
Our Airman and Family Readiness Program is an aggressive effort to
prepare airmen and their families for deployment challenges. Mandatory
pre-deployment briefings provide information on personal planning and
stressors related to extended duty away from home, while mandatory
post-deployment briefings prepare airmen for the dynamics of reuniting
with their families.
Language and Cultural Education Opportunities
We are moving beyond traditional Air Force and joint warfighting
skills development. Our educational programs provide increased
opportunities for airmen to receive focused cultural and language
training, facilitating greater professional interaction, deeper
understanding, and more effective operations.
The expanded instruction includes cultural awareness, regional
affairs, and foreign language proficiency. All Air Force Academy cadets
and Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) nontechnical scholarship
cadets will be required to take language courses. Additionally, both
Academy and ROTC cadets have increased opportunities for Foreign
Language and Area Studies degrees and have expanded Cultural Immersion
and Foreign Exchange Programs. Our enlisted basic military training
also will provide instruction on cultural sensitivity.
Once in the Air Force, each level of Officer and Enlisted
professional military education (PME) provides additional cultural,
regional and foreign language instruction, developing leaders who can
articulate U.S. policy and operate effectively in foreign settings.
Furthermore, we will increase Developmental Educational opportunities
for global skills, including overseas professional military education
and the Olmstead Scholars Program. We will then vector these airmen
into Political-Military Affairs or Regional Affairs Strategist career
tracks, maximizing America's return-on-investment.
Housing and Military Construction
Air Force investments in housing underscore our emphasis on
developing and caring for airmen. Through military construction
(MILCON) and housing privatization, we are providing quality homes
faster than ever before. Over the next 2 years, the Air Force will
renovate or replace more than 4,200 homes through MILCON. We are on
track to meet our fiscal year 2009 goal of eliminating inadequate
housing at overseas locations.
Investment in dormitories continues to provide superior housing to
our unaccompanied members. We have over 3,000 dormitory rooms
programmed for funding over the next 6 years. Approximately 75 percent
of these initiatives rectify inadequate dormitory conditions for
permanent party members. Our new ``Dorms-4-Airmen'' standard is a
concept designed to increase camaraderie, social interaction and
accountability. The remaining dormitory program modernizes inadequate
``pipeline'' dormitories that house young enlisted students during
their initial technical training.
MILCON is an essential enabler of Air Force missions; however, we
are accepting risk in facilities and infrastructure funding in order to
bolster our efforts to recapitalize and modernize our aging aircraft
and equipment. We have prioritized the most critical requirements to
support the Air Force and DOD requirements. Our MILCON strategy
supports these priorities by focusing on new mission beddowns,
dormitories, fitness centers, childcare centers, and depot
transformation.
Joint Basing
The Air Force has a long and successful history of working toward
common goals in a joint environment, without compromising Air Force
principles and the well-being of our people. Joint Basing initiatives
are no exception. We want Joint Basing to be a raging success.
Therefore, each Joint Base should be required to provide an attractive
setting to all of its assigned personnel.
To accomplish this end, we advocate the establishment of the
highest Quality of Life standards of individual bases as the Joint Base
Quality of Life standards. Joint Basing is an opportunity to improve
efficiency, Quality of Life standards and common delivery of
Installation Support Services. Joint Basing will consider best business
practices to ensure enhancement of joint warfighting capabilities,
eliminate duplication, and ultimately achieve synergy for base support
services. These actions will optimize joint use of limited resources
and result in more efficient installations from which all Services will
project combat power for our Nation.
Through the establishment of the highest level of Quality of Life
standards at each joint base, our airmen, soldiers, sailors, marines,
DOD civilians, and their families will benefit from efficient,
consistent Installation Support Services. These standards will ensure
the Air Force and our sister Services continue to provide all personnel
with the level of Installation Support Services they deserve. As we
work with OSD and our sister Services, we will ensure all Joint Basing
initiatives guard against any interference with the DOD's ability to
perform its mission. Joint Basing allows us to build closer
relationships and forge stronger ties among the Services. We will not
only train as we fight, we will live as we fight.
recapitalizing and modernizing the force
To meet the needs of our Nation at war and successfully build the
86 modern combat wings necessary to maintain a credible defense posture
in the future, we are committed to aggressively recapitalizing and
modernizing our inventories of aircraft, space systems, equipment, and
operational infrastructure. Executing a successful recapitalization
plan is a balancing act. We will continue to meet today's operational
needs while striving to ensure America and our future airmen inherit an
Air Force that is ready, capable and sustainable. We are committed to
maintaining air, space, and cyberspace advantages and America's
unparalleled Global Vigilance, Reach and Power--America's Edge.
Comprehensive Plan
Our recapitalization and modernization plan follows an integrated
strategy of retirement, procurement, selective Service Life Extension
Programs (SLEPs) and modifications--coupled with the broadest, most
innovative science and technology program in DOD. We will progressively
shed our oldest, most costly, and least capable legacy aircraft, while
reinvesting in a smaller--but more capable--expeditionary force,
emphasizing global and joint capabilities. While these strategies will
sustain selected legacy systems for near-term, we will avoid billions
of dollars on further SLEPs by working our stewardship of funds today.
It has become far more expensive to continuously extend the life of
older aircraft. We are fast approaching the point where it is cheaper
to buy new aircraft.
Our plan will allow effective, efficient modernization and
replacement of our air superiority, strike, space, ISR, mobility,
special operations, and combat support systems. Fully recapitalized,
America's Air Force will remain dominant in the conduct of modern,
networked, cross-dimensional 21st century warfare.
An Aging Inventory
The Air Force is meeting today's combat requirements--but not
without increasing risks and costs. We have an aging and increasingly
unfit inventory of aircraft, space systems, and equipment. Of our
inventory of approximately 6,000 aircraft, a significant number operate
under flight restrictions. Many transport aircraft and aerial refueling
tankers are more than 40 years old. The average age of the bomber force
exceeds 30 years. The fighter force is the oldest it has ever been, at
an average age of more than 18 years. Additionally, our airmen operate
and maintain many satellites well in excess of their originally
designed mission durations. Across every mission, the Air Force is
experiencing detrimental effects of high tempo operations and age,
including engine and structural fatigue, deterioration, corrosion and
increased rates of component failure.
As a result, the Air Force's ability to meet the combat
requirements of tomorrow is in question. The increased tempo of current
operations delays routine maintenance and we find our systems becoming
progressively less effective and more costly to own and operate.
Aircraft and equipment modifications currently absorb 20 percent of the
Air Force's procurement budget. This is the highest percentage in the
history of the Air Force. In fact, 14 percent of our Air Force fleet is
either grounded or operating under mission-limiting flight
restrictions. Our comprehensive plan for modernization and
recapitalization outlines the prudent investments necessary today to
avoid the future capability risks and spiraling maintenance and
modernization costs we currently experience with our legacy systems.
Inventory Management
Fiscal responsibility is a critical element of our plan. The Air
Force is committed to planning and operating within our allocated
resources. However, we face fiscal constraints that introduce risk into
our efforts to successfully posture America's Air Force for the future.
We appreciate congressional language in the 2007 National Defense
Authorization Act supporting our efforts to retire older aircraft and
manage our inventory of aging equipment. However, remaining legislative
restrictions on aircraft retirements remain the biggest obstacle to
efficient divestiture of our oldest, least capable, and most costly to
maintain platforms and equipment. Keeping these legacy aircraft on the
flightline levies additional operations and maintenance costs at the
expense of modernization programs and funding. These costs cascade into
procurement delays for future platforms and divert resources away from
expanded joint capabilities. We welcome the opportunity to work with
Congress to overcome these fiscal challenges, reduce risks to meeting
our national security and joint requirements, and successfully prepare
our Air Force for the future.
Procurement Priorities
We design and structure every Air Force program throughout our
diverse, comprehensive recapitalization and modernization plan to meet
critical Air Force, joint, and national requirements. Several programs
currently receive our highest attention and represent our top
priorities within the plan.
Our top acquisition priorities include: the KC-X Tanker; the CSAR-X
Combat Search and Rescue Helicopter; space communications, space
situational awareness and early warning programs; the F-35A JSF; and
Next Generation Long Range Strike--a new bomber. We will continue to
advocate and advance these and many other modern elements of air,
space, and cyberspace capability. Collectively they will strengthen
America's advantages in Global Vigilance, Reach and Power for years to
come.
Global Vigilance
The Air Force acts as the global eyes and ears of the joint team
and our Nation. Using a vast array of terrestrial, airborne, and
spaceborne sensors, we monitor and characterize the Earth's sea, air,
space, land, and cyber domains around the clock and around the world.
Our command, control, communications, and computers (C\4\) networks
link the joint team together and speed information to users at the
point of action, from commanders in AOCs, to ground units engaged with
the enemy, to a pilot dropping a precision-guided munition.
The future vision of all the U.S. military Services is information-
driven. Success will hinge on America's cyberspace advantages. Air
Force assets like Joint STARS, AWACS, Rivet Joint, Global Hawk,
Predator and our constellations of satellites, contribute vital
networking and C\4\ISR products and services to every aspect of every
joint operation. Our recapitalization and modernization plan aims to
increase dramatically the quantity and quality of C\4\ISR capabilities,
products and services available to the joint team and the Nation. Our
plan especially focuses on ensuring Air Force space communications, SSA
and early warning missions provide uninterrupted continuity of service
for America and our allies.
Transformational Satellite Communications System
The Air Force continues to pursue next-generation satellite
communications technology with the Transformational Satellite
Communications System (TSAT). The TSAT program will employ Internet
Protocol networks, on-board routing and high-bandwidth laser
communication relays in space, dramatically increasing warfighter
connectivity. TSAT capabilities will enable the realization and success
of all DOD and joint visions of future network-centric operations, such
as the Army's Battle Command-on-the-Move and the Navy's Sea Power 21
vision and Fleet FORCEnet/FORCEview concepts. In 2007, we expect the
TSAT program to complete system design milestones.
Advanced Extremely High Frequency System
The Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite
communications system reaches Assembly Integration and Test in 2007,
preparing for first launch in spring 2008. When deployed, AEHF will
provide the secure, survivable, anti-jam communications that MILSTAR
currently provides. AEHF will, however, also provide greater bandwidth,
larger throughput, faster dissemination, and better service quality to
U.S. and allied users.
Wideband Global SATCOM System
In 2007, the Air Force will take the first major step in the
modernization of its satellite communications architecture with launch
of the first satellite in the Wideband Global Satellite Communications
(SATCOM) System (WGS), a program formerly known as Wideband Gapfiller
Satellite. A single WGS satellite has more communications capacity than
the entire Defense Satellite Communications System it replaces,
enabling direct broadcast of digital multimedia, high-bandwidth imagery
and digital video information directly from global and theater sites to
deployed warfighters.
Terminal Programs
Air- and ground-based satellite communications terminals provide
warfighters with critical links to America's space assets from anywhere
in the world. Our terminal modernization programs are maintaining pace
with the high performance satellites they support. Through programs
like the Family of Advanced Beyond Line of Sight Terminals (FAB-T) and
the Ground Multi-band Terminal, the Air Force will transform its air-
and ground-based space capabilities with terminals that consolidate
logistics support, provide increased communications throughput, and
ensure seamless command and control.
Space Based Missile Warning Capabilities
The Air Force is America's only provider of Space-Based Missile
Warning. Providing a robust missile warning capability to the Nation
through enhanced space-based ISR systems remains a priority in 2007. We
expect to launch the final Defense Support Program launch (DSP-23) in
spring 2007, continuing 36 years of the DSP constellation's outstanding
service.
The Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) represents the next
generation of Early Warning satellites. The first SIBRS Highly
Elliptical Orbit (HEO) payload is currently deployed on-orbit and
undergoing operational testing. The HEO-2 payload has been delivered
for integration. Launch of the SBIRS Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO)-1
satellite is scheduled for late 2008. Once fielded, SBIRS will provide
a transformational leap in capability over our current DSP system.
Space Radar
Space Radar (SR), another key transformational space-based ISR
program, will have the ability to look into denied areas and to cue
additional sensors, such as those on Predator and Global Hawk. The SR
will provide COCOMs unprecedented surface wide-area surveillance
capabilities, updating its AOR coverage report several times per hour.
SR will characterize objects and activities of interest for target
development in conjunction with other assets to meet critical joint
warfighter requirements. In 2007, the program will focus on building
engineering development hardware while emphasizing risk reduction,
integration, and systems engineering.
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite
System (NPOESS) is a tri-agency program sponsored by DOD, the
Department of Commerce, and NASA. NPOESS will support DOD forces
worldwide as well as Homeland Security agencies. The system will
provide assured, timely and high-quality environmental data to our
warfighters for weather forecasting, mission planning and weapons
employment. NPOESS environmental data will also enhance our domestic
preparedness when dealing with natural disasters.
Rapid Attack Identification Detection and Reporting System
Meeting the requirement to assist in the protection of our space
assets, the Rapid Attack Identification Detection and Reporting System
(RAIDRS) will provide a capability to detect and locate satellite
communications interference using fixed and deployable ground systems.
A fully operational RAIDRS Spiral 1 will be delivered in fiscal year
2008 and provide detection and location of SATCOM interference. Future
developments will automate data analysis and fusion, as well as provide
decision support tools for near-real-time actions.
Global Hawk
The RQ-4A Global Hawk is a high altitude, long endurance UAV
providing the joint warfighter with persistent vigilance and
observation of targets in day, night and adverse weather. Global Hawk
entered development in 2001 after completing a successful Advanced
Concept Technology Demonstration. We plan to develop and field the
aircraft in blocks of increasing capability, allowing accelerated
delivery to the warfighter, while the system evolves and expands to its
full potential.
We have already employed block 10, the first of four production
variants, in support of global war on terror. It provides an effective,
persistent imagery capability using synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and
electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensors. The larger Block 20 aircraft,
which will begin development test in early 2007, will provide 50
percent more payload capacity carrying enhanced SAR and EO/IR sensors
for even clearer images at greater ranges.
In 2012, Block 30 will field a more versatile, multi-intelligence
capability by integrating Block 20 imagery sensors with a robust
signals intelligence (SIGINT) suite. The fourth Global Hawk variant,
Block 40, will be available for operations in 2011. It will carry a
single payload--a Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program
sensor--to provide the warfighter a highly advanced radar imagery and
moving target indicator capability. Global Hawk has demonstrated its
combat value in global war on terror and the Air Force will continue to
mature and enhance its capabilities in the coming years.
MQ-1 Predator
Leading the way in armed reconnaissance, the Air Force is currently
flying MQ-1 Predator missions 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The MQ-1
Predator is a medium-altitude, multi-role, long endurance UAV,
providing persistent ISR and strike capabilities to COCOMs. Predator
aircraft are able to transmit live, full motion digital video to
ground-based and airborne targeting teams equipped with the Remote
Operations Video Enhanced Receiver (ROVER) system.
The Predator is operational, and by 2010, we will expand its
capability from 10 to 21 total CAPs to meet increased COCOM and
warfighter demands. We also plan to incorporate Target Location
Accuracy improvements to rapidly provide targeting data for GPS-guided
munitions.
Total Force airmen in Nevada and California control Predator
aircraft operating in numerous locations around the world, including
Iraq and Afghanistan. By 2010, this capability will spread to Air
National Guard units in Arizona, North Dakota, and Texas. The Predator
has transformed the way we fight, providing persistent ISR, reliable
target acquisition and lethal strike capability for COCOMs and our
joint warfighters.
RC-135 Rivet Joint
The RC-135 Rivet Joint continues its four decades of success in
providing SIGINT capabilities across the full spectrum of joint
operations and national information needs. Most missions directly
support OEF and OIF tactical operations, adding to Rivet Joint's
outstanding record of accomplishment and continuous presence in CENTCOM
since 1990.
In addition to mission equipment upgrades, we have completed re-
engining and cockpit modernization, keeping the force viable until
2040. In 2007, the Air Force will procure Rivet Joint 17, a global war
on terror acquisition for additional medium-altitude SIGINT capacity.
Rivet Joint has become the cornerstone of an airborne targeting
modernization effort known as Net-Centric Collaborative Targeting.
Rivet Joint has demonstrated the capability to horizontally integrate
C\4\ISR assets across the entire Joint Force and dramatically improve
target location accuracy, timeliness and identification.
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
The E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint
STARS) is an airborne battle management, command and control,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platform. Its primary
mission is to provide theater ground and air commanders with surface
moving target indications (SMTI) and tailored surveillance in support
of operations and targeting. Joint STARS has been a significant
contributor to U.S. Air Force fighting effectiveness in Operations
Desert Storm, Joint Endeavor, Allied Force, OEF, and OIF. Continuing
modifications and enhancements will sustain Joint STARS viability
beyond 2034.
E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System
The E-3 AWACS is the premier airborne command and control platform
in the DOD and a key element of all airborne operations. AWACS supports
decentralized execution of the joint air component missions and
provides theater commanders with the ability to find, fix, track, and
target airborne or maritime threats, and to detect, locate, and
identify radars. AWACS has been the key airborne asset in all
operations since its fielding in 1983. Our ongoing modernization of the
platform will position AWACS to remain a viable airborne command and
control platform beyond 2035.
Air and Space Operations Center
The Air and Space Operations Center (AOC) Weapon System is the
Combined/Joint Force Air Component Commander's (C/JFACC's) tool for
employing air, space, and cyberspace power. The AOC enables decision-
makers to focus and synchronize our air, space, and cyber superiority,
global attack, precision engagement, information superiority, and rapid
global mobility capabilities across the full range of military
operations in multiple, geographically separated arenas.
The AOC weapon system, with its Theater Battle Management Core
System (TBMCS), has evolved significantly since its designation as a
weapon system in 2001. We used the Al Udeid Combined AOC model to
establish the AOC Weapon System Block 10.1 baseline. Creating this
baseline enabled us to standardize our development, procurement and
presentation of C2 capabilities to Joint and Combined Commanders
worldwide. Increment 10.1 standardizes configuration among the five
deployed Falconer systems, providing operators with greater and faster
access to air battle management information. The program team efforts
continue to generate greater system performance for warfighters, with
major improvements planned for delivery over the next 2 years.
The Air Force has committed to continue evolving and modernizing
our AOC Weapon System through the FYDP, building toward a fully
operational, cross-dimensional C2 enterprise by fiscal year 2014.
Battle Control System-Fixed
The Battle Control System-Fixed (BCS-F) system is a cooperative
program with Canada. The system provides air defense and surveillance
capability for the entire North American continent. BCS-F supports ONE
and serves as the Air Force's homeland defense battle management,
command, and control system. The BCS-F system integrates data from
multiple radar sensors providing tactical communications and data link
capabilities with other military and civil systems responsible for air
surveillance, air defense and control of sovereign U.S. air space.
Battle Control System-Mobile
The Battle Control System-Mobile (BCS-M) is the next generation of
Low Density/High Demand (LD/HD) ground-based tactical C2 nodes
supporting the warfighter with theater air defense, airspace
management, aircraft identification, wide-area surveillance and
tactical data link management. These are the same missions the current
legacy system, the Control and Reporting Center, performs in support of
OIF, OEF, and ONE, as well as homeland defense activities such as
counter-drug operations and special security events.
Air Force Distributed Common Ground System
The Air Force Distributed Common Ground System (AF-DCGS) is the Air
Force's premier ISR Tasking, Collection, Processing, Exploitation and
Dissemination (TCPED) weapon system. From reach back locations, AF-DCGS
operators collect raw sensor data from the Global Hawk, Predator, and
other platforms around the world, turn it into decision-quality
intelligence in near-real-time, and send it directly to those in need
at the Joint Task Force level and below. Its proven capabilities in
sharing and correlating multi-source SIGINT, imagery intelligence, and
signature intelligence data will be enhanced with the fielding of the
AF-DCGS Block 10.2, which is leading the way in DOD's net-centric ISR
enterprise transformation.
Global Reach
America's airmen provide not only the long legs and heavy lifting
for joint warfighters' rapid global mobility, but also the long arms
for global strike and high endurance for global persistence and
presence. On a daily basis, Air Force mobility forces support all DOD
branches as well as other government agency operations all over the
world. Increased demand and decreased availability underscore the
critical need for tanker recapitalization and investment to ensure the
long-term viability of this national capability. Without prudent,
timely investment, our national defense, global vigilance, reach,
presence, and power are put in serious peril.
Tanker Recapitalization
Aerial refueling capability is essential to the expeditionary
nature of America's Armed Forces. Aerial refueling serves as a joint
force multiplier, providing American and coalition air forces with
increased range, persistence, and endurance. We are committed to
maintaining an inventory of tankers that guarantees the projection of
U.S. combat power.
For the past 50 years, the Air Force's primary tanker platform has
been the KC-135, and it has served with distinction. However, we are
carrying great risk operating this aircraft beyond expected service
life. Some of the oldest models already operate well beyond the point
of cost-effective repair. Tanker recapitalization is not a new idea. In
1999, a thorough GAO report presaged the declining operational utility
of our aging tankers and underscored the need for immediate investments
in recapitalization. Given the increased operational requirements of
the global war on terror, procurement of a new tanker aircraft--the KC-
X--has become both an operational necessity and the most fiscally
prudent option to maintain America's global presence and expeditionary
capabilities.
The KC-X is our number one procurement priority. KC-X tankers will
provide increased aircraft availability, more adaptable technology, and
greater overall capability than the current inventory of KC-135E and
KC-135R tankers they will replace. Enhancements in every aspect of
aircraft operation will provide the joint warfighter with more flexible
employment options. It is imperative we begin a program of smart,
steady reinvestment in a new tanker--coupled with measured, timely
retirements of the oldest, least capable tankers. Recapitalizing our
tankers will ensure the viability of the vital national capability they
provide.
Intratheater Airlift
The Air Force has a two-pronged approach to modernize America's
intratheater airlift capabilities. First, we are striving to replace
our oldest aircraft with a mixture of new C-130Js and Joint Cargo
Aircraft (JCA). The JCA offers the potential for additional solutions
to the Air Force's intra-theater airlift recapitalization strategy. JCA
will provide a modern mobility platform suited to accessing an array of
demanding and remote worldwide locations, including short, unimproved
and austere airfields.
Second, we will standardize remaining C-130s via the C-130 Avionics
Modernization Program (AMP) and center-wing box replacement programs.
C-130 modernization extends operational lifetime, reduces operation and
sustainment costs, and increases the combat effectiveness of our
intratheater airlift capability.
For decades, C-130s have been the workhorses for intratheater
airlift during numerous contingences. Additionally, the C-17 has done a
superb job augmenting the C-130s in the intratheater airlift role.
Similarly, the new C-130Js, which are far more capable than legacy C-
130s, have proved their worth supporting global war on terror and
humanitarian operations since December 2004.
Intertheater Airlift
The C-17 continues its outstanding support for joint operations
across the spectrum of conflict. During the past year, C-17s flew over
44,000 sorties, bringing the total number of OEF and OIF missions to
over 123,000. Additionally, the C-17 flew 900 humanitarian and disaster
relief sorties following Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma, as well as
the Southeast Asian tsunami, Pakistani earthquake, and the Lebanon
noncombatant evacuation operations. Given this high operational tempo,
the Air Force appreciates congressional action to procure additional C-
17s to sustain a fleet of 190.
During 2006, the Air Force's other heavy lifter, the C-5 Galaxy,
flew 5,500 sorties in support of the global war on terror. Since 11
September 2001, C-5 have flown over 50,000 sorties in support of the
joint warfighter and provided humanitarian aid around the world. To
keep the C-5 mission capable and maximize capability, the Air Force is
continuing the C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) and the
Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program (RERP). The AMP and
RERP efforts ensure compliance with emerging airspace requirements,
upgrade aircraft propulsion, and improve over 70 other unreliable C-5
systems, enabling this large airlifter to remain viable through 2040.
Together, the C-17 and C-5 weapons systems provide complementary
capabilities and are critical to meeting our U.S. intertheater airlift
requirements today and in the future--for the entire joint force.
Space Launch Operations
The Air Force continues to fulfill its role as the guardian of the
world's premier gateways to space and America's vital national space
launch capabilities. Space launch is another element of Air Force space
capability that is vital to American global military, political, and
economic success.
With 14 operational launch successes, the Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle (EELV) program provides assured access to space in support of
operational requirements. In fiscal year 2007, we expect to continue
building upon our DOD launch successes with seven EELV and three Delta
II launches.
Launch and Test Range System. The Eastern and Western Ranges,
located at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, FL, and Vandenberg AFB,
CA, respectively, comprise the Launch and Test Range System (LTRS). The
LTRS, part of the DOD's Major Range and Test Facility Base (MRTFB)
infrastructure, provides tracking, telemetry, communications, command
and control to support the testing of ballistic missiles, precision
weapons, national missile defense and advanced aeronautical systems.
The LTRS also provides the vital infrastructure necessary to support
manned and unmanned space launches for DOD, national, civil and
commercial space missions. We will continue LRTS modernization and
further reinforce our capabilities to ensure space launch safety and
mission success.
Global Power
The U.S. Air Force provides the joint team a historically
unprecedented ability to deliver a precise, tailored effects whenever,
and wherever and however needed--kinetic and nonkinetic, lethal and
nonlethal, at the speed of sound and at the speed of light. It is an
integrated cross-dimensional capability that rests on our ability to
control air, space, and cyber. We exploit these domains to hold at risk
any target on the surface of the Earth. As we continue to transform
this capability, we will focus on expanding our effectiveness in
multiple dimensions. We will continue to refine our abilities to
deliver lethal and nonlethal effects at the time and place of our
choosing, shortening the sensor-to-shooter ``kill chain.''
Combat Search and Rescue
Uniquely within DOD the Air Force organizes, trains and equips
dedicated forces for Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) mission. Air Force
CSAR crews fulfill our absolute moral imperative to safely secure and
return all of our airmen and any member of our joint team.
We are recapitalizing this vital combat capability with the CSAR-X
aircraft. This effort represents one of our top Air Force acquisition
priorities. These modern aircraft will enable COCOMs to recover
isolated joint or coalition personnel engaged across the spectrum of
military operations as well as perform non-combatant evacuation and
disaster relief operations. CSAR-X aircraft will relieve the high
operations tempo (OPTEMPO) strain placed on the current LD/HD inventory
of HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopters, and they will present COCOMs with key
combat and noncombat mission options.
This new aircraft will dramatically improve Air Force CSAR mission
capabilities. It will provide our personnel recovery forces with an
aircraft that is quickly deployable and capable of operations from
austere locations. It will operate day or night, during adverse weather
conditions, and in all environments including nuclear, biological and
chemical conditions. On-board defensive capabilities will permit the
CSAR-X aircraft to operate in an increased threat environment, and in-
flight refueling will provide an airborne alert capability and extend
its combat mission range.
These increased capabilities are crucial to meeting current and
future joint operational needs, while providing greater capability to
Air Force CSAR forces, ``that others may live.''
F-35A Lightning II
The F-35A Lightning II JSF is a fifth-generation multi-role strike
fighter aircraft optimized for air-to-ground attack. The F-35A is the
Conventional Take-off and Landing (CTOL) variant, and it will
recapitalize F-117, F-16, and A-10 combat capabilities. The F-35A will
complement the capabilities of the F-22A. Like the Raptor, the F-35A
reaps the benefits of decades of advanced research, development, and
field experience.
The F-35A will provide affordable precision engagement and global
attack capabilities for the Air Force, Navy, Marines, and our
international partners. In 2006, the JSF program delivered the first
CTOL variant test aircraft and completed its first flight on 15
December 2006.
Next Generation Long-Range Strike
Range and payload are the soul of an Air Force. These elements form
the foundation of strategic military deterrence. The LRS mission, a
primary reason the Air Force became a separate Service in 1947,
continues as a vital and unique Air Force contribution to national
defense. The Air Force has a three-phased strategy to help ensure the
U.S. meets its enduring LRS capability requirements. Phase One includes
near-term maintenance and modernization of current bombers and air-to
surface weapons.
By 2018 and in accordance with QDR goals, Phase Two will deliver a
new LRS bomber incorporating highly advanced technologies. This next
generation bomber will combine speed, stealth, payload, and improved
avionics/sensors suites. This new bomber will bring America's bomber
forces up to the same high standard we are setting with our F-22A and
F-35A fifth-generation fighters. It will ensure our bomber force will
continue to be effective in meeting COCOMs' global needs across the
full range of military operations. The Analysis of Alternatives will be
complete in the spring of 2007.
In Phase Three, the Air Force plans to field a revolutionary LRS
capability in the 2035 time frame using an advanced system-of-systems
approach. We expect technology maturation to yield advancements in
several areas, including hypersonic propulsion, advanced materials and
nonkinetic weapons.
F-22A Raptor
The F-22A Raptor is the Air Force's primary air superiority
fighter, providing unmatched capabilities for operational access,
homeland defense, cruise missile defense and force protection for the
joint team. The F-22A's combination of speed, stealth, maneuverability,
and integrated avionics gives this remarkable aircraft the ability to
penetrate denied, anti-access environments. The F-22A's unparalleled
ability to find, fix, track, and target enemy air- and surface-based
threats ensures air dominance and freedom of maneuver for all joint
forces. In addition, the F-22A is the only airborne system in the U.S.
military that can conduct network-centric warfare and provide ISR
capability from inside adversary battlespace in the opening moments of
any contingency.
Until the F-22A became operational in 2005, America's Air Force had
not fielded a new fighter since the 1970s. Today, combat-capable
Raptors are in full-rate production on the world's only fifth-
generation fighter production line. As of 1 January 2007, 84 aircraft
have been delivered, including 44 combat coded aircraft, and another 25
are in production. The first operational F-22A unit declared initial
operational capability at Langley AFB, Virginia, in December 2005. The
second operational F-22A unit will pick up the AEF rotation in May
2007. Meanwhile, the third operational unit is standing up at Elmendorf
AFB, Alaska with a projected AEF rotation of May 2008. We will also
station a fourth unit at Elmendorf, followed by fifth and sixth units
at Holloman AFB, New Mexico, and the seventh unit at Hickam AFB, HI.
The F-22A flew its first operational mission in support of ONE in
January 2006, participated in the Alaskan Northern Edge exercise in
July 2006, and is preparing for upcoming AEF deployments.
MQ-9 Reaper
Similar to its smaller MQ-1 Predator sibling, the MQ-9 Reaper is a
medium-altitude, multi-role, long endurance UAV that will provide
persistent ISR and improved strike capabilities to COCOMs. MQ-9
incorporates MQ-1 operational design improvements, a larger airframe,
battle-proven sensors, full motion digital video, Rover connectivity
and expanded munitions capability.
Initial mission capability will begin at Nellis AFB, NV, with
future expansion to New York ANG. In 2007, we expect to continue
rigorous MQ-9 development and demonstration, as well as operational
employment with pre-production aircraft to meet urgent joint warfighter
needs.
The MQ-9, like the MQ-1, will also incorporate Target Location
Accuracy improvements to support GPS-guided munitions. Ultimately, the
MQ-9 will provide theater commanders with expanded employment options
in a vastly improved Hunter-Killer UAV, incorporating a larger payload,
automatic cueing, and self-contained capabilities to strike time
sensitive and hard targets.
CV-22 Osprey
The Air Force will procure 50 CV-22s, with an Initial Operational
Capability scheduled for fiscal year 2009. The CV-22 is a V-22 tilt-
rotor aircraft designed to meet a U.S. Special Operations Command
(USSOCOM) requirement for long-range infiltration, exfiltration, and
resupply of Special Operations Forces. The CV-22's advanced systems
include Terrain Following/Terrain Avoidance Radar, Integrated RF
Countermeasures, Directional Infrared Countermeasures, the Multi-
mission Advanced Tactical Terminal, and additional fuel tanks and
tactical communications gear.
Global Positioning System
The GPS constellation serves as a global utility for precision
navigation and timing. GPS is yet another Air Force mission that has
become vital to American military and global economic activity. As with
all elements of the Air Force space mission, we are dedicated to
ensuring uninterrupted continuity of GPS services.
GPS modernization continues in 2007 with additional launches of GPS
IIR-M satellites. The GPS IIR-M satellites will provide a new military
signal more resistant to jamming and a new civil signal for improved
position accuracy for civil, commercial, and recreational GPS users.
The follow-on system, GPS IIF, will provide IIR-M capabilities plus an
additional civil signal for aviation safety-of-flight services. The
development of the next-generation GPS-III will further enhance
navigation and precision-engagement capabilities and improve resistance
to jamming, as well as add a third civil signal compatible with the
European Galileo System.
Counter Communications System
As part of the broader Counterspace mission, the ground-based,
theater-deployable CCS provides COCOMs with a non-destructive,
reversible capability to deny space-based communication services to our
adversaries. CCS enhances our capability to ensure air, space and
cyberspace superiority for the Nation.
We plan to procure three additional operational CCS and one
training system. This comprises the full complement of systems for two
Space Control Squadrons. We will continue block upgrades to the CCS to
enhance our Offensive Counterspace capabilities and begin pre-
acquisition work for the next generation CCS.
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
America's ICBM force remains the foundation of our Nation's nuclear
deterrent capability. Modernization programs are crucial to the
Minuteman ICBM, which, when initially deployed in the 1960s, were
designed to last 10 years. Service life extension programs are underway
to ensure the Minuteman III remains mission capable through 2020. These
programs replace obsolete, failing, and environmentally unsound
materials, while maintaining missile reliability, survivability,
security, and sustainability. These efforts are critical to sustaining
the ICBM force and are vital to America's nuclear deterrent posture.
Operationally Responsive Space
The Air Force intends to continue its demonstration, acquisition,
and deployment of an effective Operationally Responsive Space (ORS)
capability in support of the DOD's focus on meeting the urgent needs of
the COCOM.
ORS includes the ability to launch, activate, and employ low-cost,
militarily useful satellites to provide surge capability, reconstitute
damaged or incapacitated satellites, or provide timely availability of
tailored or new capabilities. ORS capabilities can lead to long-term
benefits by advancing technology, improving space acquisitions,
enhancing the skills of the technical workforce, and broadening the
space industrial base.
Space Development and Test Wing. In 2006, the Air Force established
the Space Development and Test Wing (SDTW), headquartered at Kirtland
AFB, New Mexico, to focus on the development and testing of orbital
assets with the goal of encouraging innovation in the space mission
area.
One of the Wing's responsibilities is ORS. Working with other
services and agencies, it will perform concept development, design,
manufacturing, and operation of small satellites, as well as other
activities required to support the fielding of ORS capabilities. As
capabilities are developed and fielded, the wing will directly
interface with user organizations responsible for employing ORS
capabilities in joint and coalition operations.
During fiscal year 2007, we will develop a plan further refining
ORS. This plan will fully define ORS roles and missions, along with the
organization and reporting structure. In addition, we plan to develop
specific acquisition policies, implementation schedules, funding, and
personnel requirements to support deployment of ORS capabilities.
Science and Technology
True to our history over the past century of powered flight, the
Air Force continues to maintain the most complex, diverse and ambitious
science and technology (S&T) portfolio of all the Services. History
clearly demonstrates the broad benefits to America of our S&T efforts,
in terms of military power, industrial capability, economic growth,
educational richness, cultural wealth, and national prestige. Examples
include aerospace technology and propulsion, materials science,
advanced computing and communications, atmospheric science, remote
sensing and satellite navigation. What has been good for the Air Force
has been great for America. We are committed to building upon this
heritage.
The Air Force S&T Program develops, demonstrates and tests
technologies and advanced warfighting capabilities against the spectrum
of 21st century threats. As we continue to adapt to a volatile and
uncertain world, today's focused investment in our S&T Program will
strive to produce the future warfighting capabilities needed to ensure
America's continued technological pre-eminence and military
flexibility. Additionally, Air Force S&T organizations work closely
with the other Services, Defense Agencies, Intelligence Community, and
other Federal agencies, such as the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, as well as partner nations. Through these partnerships,
we leverage efforts, share information, and advance state-of-the-art
technologies.
The Air Force S&T Program provides the foundation for future joint
warfighting capabilities, focusing on dominance of the air, space, and
cyberspace domains for America.
Improving Energy Efficiency
The Air Force is taking the lead in reducing the DOD's dependence
on foreign oil. As the DOD's leading consumer of jet fuel, we are
currently engaged in evaluating alternative fuels and engine
technologies leading to greater fuel efficiency. Air Force efforts
focus on high-efficiency aerodynamic concepts, advanced gas turbines
and variable cycle engines providing higher performance and greater
efficiency.
As a part of this effort, the Air Force is performing flight tests
on a B-52 using a blend of MILSPEC JP-8 fuel and a synthetic fuel
derived from natural gas. We plan to continue airworthiness
certification testing of synthetic fuel.
Cyber Technology
Fulfilling its role as a leader in the Information Age, the Air
Force is exploring technologies and concepts of operations within the
cyberspace domain. Air Force Cyberspace initiatives will provide tools
for offensive and defensive cyberspace operations as well as bolster
our information assurance capabilities. The Air Force is investing in
technology concepts to ensure reliable, operational links between
individuals and systems--in addition to machine-to-machine interfaces--
to ensure cyberspace dominance, information delivery, situational
awareness, and rich connectivity across the joint team.
Small Satellites
The Air Force is pursuing development of small satellite
technologies, including modular buses with ``plug-n-play'' payloads,
along with the development of low-cost launch systems. We aim to
provide a greater range of responsive space applications for the
tactical warfighter. Small satellite technology demonstrations have
achieved lighter payloads and reduced development and integration
timelines. Additionally, these achievements serve to mitigate
technology risks for larger, more complex satellite programs in
development. Small satellites with operationally responsive payloads
could potentially provide either specifically tailored, stand-alone
capabilities, or rapid augmentation capability for a satellite or
constellation of satellites that suffer failure or attack.
Directed Energy
Directed energy weapons will profoundly transform how we fly,
fight, and defend ourselves, and we are integrating them into our
broader cyber operations effort. As lasers and radio frequency weapons
find applications in the battlespace, their ability to operate at the
speed of light will change both offensive and defensive capabilities
and tactics. New designs and technology may be necessary to offer
adequate protection for our people and capabilities.
Weapons in development include the Airborne Laser (ABL), a large
aircraft carrying the High Energy Laser for missile defense.
Additionally, the active Denial System has demonstrated the viability
for a long-range, nonlethal, anti-personnel weapon.
These systems benefit from many years of technology development.
Revolutionary technologies continue to be developed. These include
versatile high power solid-state lasers; devices for aircraft self-
protection; higher power active denial components for airborne
applications; relay mirrors to extend the range of systems like ABL;
and high power microwave devices to disable electronics covertly
without affecting structures or people.
Hypersonics
The Air Force is a world leader in the development of practical
hypersonic air-breathing propulsion. Hypersonic research, relating to
flight speeds greater than five times the speed of sound, offers
dramatically reduced time-to-target for conventional weapons and, in
the future, may provide ``airplane-like'' on-demand access to space.
Our effort involving supersonic-combustion-ramjets (Scramjets)--
specifically our planned flight tests of the X-51 Scramjet Engine
Demonstrator--highlights our commitment to maintaining America's
leading role in this field.
We also expect advanced hypersonic munitions technologies to
improve penetration capabilities and decrease collateral damage. These
characteristics will allow us to expand our target attack ability,
particularly in urban environments and against time critical, hardened,
and buried targets.
Composites
Air Force S&T is exploring advancements in composite structures and
manufacturing technologies for lightweight unconventional aircraft
shapes. Example applications include short take-off and landing
capabilities, high-lift aircraft wing systems, integrated propulsion
inlet/diffuser geometries, and integrated flight control surfaces. We
expect these efforts to shorten development times for next generation
aircraft with lighter, stronger airframes offering far greater mission
utility than legacy aircraft.
Simultaneously, we are addressing sustainment of composite
structures, in order to ensure future aircraft built with these
materials will be readily maintainable and serviceable.
Nanotechnology
Investment in nanotechnologies could provide stronger and lighter
air vehicle structures including potential applications in unmanned
vehicles. Other nano-materials show promise as high-performance water-
repellant coatings. These coatings may protect Air Force systems
against corrosion and chemical/biological contaminants, providing
significant savings in maintenance costs and extending the lifetime of
aircraft and other military equipment.
delivering excellence
Fighting the global war on terror, developing and caring for our
airmen and their families, and recapitalizing and modernizing the Air
Force all require substantial national resources.
Throughout 2006, the Air Force embarked on several forward-leaning
initiatives to improve our organization, efficiency, agility, and
lethality. We are committed to good stewardship of America's resources,
while strengthening America's current and future air, space, and
cyberspace capabilities.
The Air Force is making strides in a range of activities and
through multiple, overlapping initiatives to improve what the QDR
refers to as ``reshaping the defense enterprise.'' The Air Force is
moving toward financial transparency and reinforcing our culture of
efficiency and process improvement through the AFSO21 initiative. We
are also transforming our approach to infrastructure and maintenance,
executing an aggressive energy strategy, and reforming our acquisition
practices--emphasizing a ``Back to Basics'' approach to space
acquisitions, in particular.
All of these efforts will lead to greater efficiency, lower
operating costs, and greater availability of resources for
recapitalization and modernization of critical Air Force capabilities.
In short, our airmen are striving to provide an even higher return on
America's national security investments.
Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century
To meet the challenges of this environment and the road ahead, we
have embarked on an Air Force-wide effort embracing efficiency and
process improvement. AFSO21 applies many concepts developed and proven
in industry--Lean, Business Process Reengineering, Six Sigma, and
Theory of Constraints methodologies. We expect significant savings from
this initiative.
The AFSO21 vision is to increase combat capability by integrating
process improvement into the culture of all of the active Duty, Air
National Guard and Reserve airmen, as well as our civilians and
contractors. All airmen must understand their role in improving daily
processes. AFSO21 identifies and eliminates activities, actions and
policies that do not contribute to efficient and effective operations.
We seek several outcomes from AFSO21. First, we want all airmen to
be fully aware of the importance of their work--how they contribute
directly to the Air Force mission and national defense. Second, we will
strive to improve safety and maintain quality of life for all Air Force
personnel. Third, we push to decrease process cycle times, thereby
increasing our ability to respond to rapidly changing demands. Fourth,
we aim to cut costs and free up funds for modernization. Finally, we
seek to eliminate waste.
Process changes have occurred at every level of the Air Force,
resulting in significant savings. We have more work to do, but
institutionalizing AFSO21 concepts into daily operations allows us to
meet the enormous challenges of the next decade and ultimately sustain
and modernize the world's premier air, space, and cyberspace force.
Business Transformation
The Air Force vision of Business Transformation creates rapid and
predictive operational support and leads to greater situational
awareness for commanders. Our high-level Business Transformation goals
include improving warfighter effectiveness through fast, flexible,
agile, horizontally integrated processes and systems; establishing a
culture of continuous process improvement; achieving efficiencies
allowing us to return resources for the recapitalization of aging
weapons systems and infrastructure; and creating an acquisition process
unparalleled in the Federal Government.
National Defense Authorization Act Certification and Portfolio
Management. The Air Force fully leverages DOD enterprise transition
planning and DOD-mandated certification reviews. We ensure business
systems development supports the effects and capabilities articulated
in the Agile Combat Support concept of operations. These certification
reviews have resulted in the shutdown and elimination of hundreds of
legacy systems and allowed us to redirect additional resources to
critical warfighting requirements.
Transparency. The Air Force is accelerating efforts to deliver
authoritative information to decision makers at all levels, improving
information availability and quality, realizing warfighter cross-
service information requirements, and implementing DOD-wide information
priorities. We will achieve transparency by using correct information
at all echelons--trustworthy, traceable, auditable, and valuable. We
will support cross-domain or cross-mission efforts by defining
architecture and information standards necessary for easy discovery,
use and reuse of data.
Clean Audit Quick Look
Warfighters perform their missions with increasingly limited
resources and manpower. Decisionmakers at every level need the best
information when allocating these scarce resources. To achieve greater
levels of information fidelity, the Air Force is committed to improving
transparency in its business processes, to include Financial
Management. A Clean Audit Opinion defines a major objective of this
commitment. Financial transparency requires the Air Force to have
processes and procedures in place ensuring data is accurately collected
at the source, flows efficiently through to reporting systems and
analytical tools, and is error-free.
The Air Force Information Reliability and Integration (AFIR&I) plan
is our road map toward financial transparency. It is a key component of
the DOD Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Plan aimed at
improving DOD financial health. The AFIR&I Action Plan reinforces our
ongoing commitment to ensuring the absolute highest level of
stewardship of our Nation's investments in the Air Force.
Energy Conservation
We are pursuing an aggressive energy strategy and are committed to
meeting and surpassing the energy goals mandated by the Energy Policy
Act of 2005 (EPAct 05) and other national policies. We successfully
reduced our energy consumption in accordance with past legislation and
continue to use a variety of programs aimed at reducing our use of
fossil fuels and controlling cost growth. Our vision creates a culture
where airmen make energy considerations in all their actions. We aim to
implement our vision with solutions that include alternate sources of
domestic energy as well as an aggressive drive for greater efficiency
in our facilities and vehicles.
The Air Force remains the largest renewable energy purchaser in the
U.S. Our commitment to install 18 megawatts of solar photovoltaic
energy at Nellis AFB is one example of our pursuit of on-base renewable
power generation. Currently 37 bases meet some portion of their base-
wide electrical requirements from commercial sources of wind, solar,
geothermal or biomass. We have several projects planned, in design, or
under construction to expand this capability. With our combined
purchase and production strategy, the Air Force is poised to surpass
the renewable goals set by the Energy Policy Act.
The Air Force applies sustainable development concepts in the
planning, design, construction and operation of facilities using the
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) certification
process. Our long-term goal is to ensure 100 percent of eligible new
facilities are LEED certifiable by fiscal year 2009. This complements
our use of facilities construction and infrastructure improvement
programs designed to create cost effective energy efficiencies in new
and existing facilities.
We have also taken an aggressive stance on replacing our existing
general-purpose vehicles with low speed vehicles (LSVs) without
adversely affecting peacetime or wartime mission requirements. This
measure will reduce vehicle acquisition cost, fuel expenditures and
ozone-depleting exhaust emissions and free up funds for use in other
critical areas. Our goal is to replace 30 percent of general-purpose
vehicles with LSVs by fiscal year 2010. Coupled with the goal to
replace 100 percent our general-purpose vehicles with alternative fuel
vehicles, the Air Force is taking the lead in the use of alternative
energy technologies.
Acquisition Excellence
The Air Force continues its goal of streamlining the acquisition
process to providing efficient and responsive services to the
warfighter. A number of completed and ongoing projects have contributed
to the improvement of acquisition, and fiscal year 2008 promises more
progress.
We have revitalized the Acquisition Strategy Panel, providing a
systematic and disciplined approach to develop an effective acquisition
program roadmap. The newly developed Air Force Review Board process
provides a structured and repeatable system that aids decision-making
on critical aspects of selected acquisition programs. We have also
streamlined periodic review processes by combining several independent
reviews into a single event, saving preparation and travel time.
In 2006, the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA) made
a number of recommendations for improving the acquisition system. The
Air Force is in the process of evaluating and implementing key
recommendations of the DAPA report. For example, the Air Force is
exploring the concept of Time Certain Development (TCD) as the next
step in evolutionary acquisition. TCD involves structuring a program to
deliver its initial capability to the warfighter at an explicitly
specified (and much shorter) interval. Such a policy helps improve the
responsiveness of the acquisition system and keeps our warfighting
capabilities aligned to current threat conditions.
To enhance the credibility of the acquisition system, the Air Force
is strengthening its efforts to analyze risks prior to initiation and
execution of a program. The Air Force is prototyping the Probability of
Program Success model, a framework for identifying and reporting risk
issues that threaten a developer's ability to deliver on time and
budget. Use of this model has the potential to highlight risk areas
requiring the program manager's attention.
The Air Force is improving the source selection process, ensuring
appropriate use of incentives, assessing current contracting
organizational alignments, and implementing strategic sourcing
strategies. We are committed to providing support of contingencies and
to the warfighter by acquiring commodities and services by the most
effective means possible. We continue to maintain the majority of the
deployed contingency contracting assets in the Iraq/Afghanistan AOR,
and we remain dedicated to supporting the COCOMs through joint and Air
Force taskings.
Space Acquisition
The Air Force is committed to revitalizing and restructuring its
overall space acquisition strategy. We will build upon our heritage of
providing unmatched space capabilities to meet national, COCOM, and
Joint Force objectives by developing and executing more deliberate
plans focused on cost and schedule containment.
The Air Force ``Back to Basics'' initiative is part of our plan to
improve space acquisitions. The initiative promotes a renewed emphasis
on management techniques and engineering practices that lead to better
definition of requirements as well as deliberate acquisition strategy
planning. Clear and achievable requirements, appropriate resources,
disciplined systems engineering, and effective management are the basic
elements--the foundation upon which successful acquisition depends.
The ``Back to Basics'' initiative promotes a block approach
strategy focused on delivering capability through value-added
increments. This concept is consistent with current policy specifying
``evolutionary acquisition as the preferred strategy'' for DOD
acquisition. Specific capability increments are based on a balance of
capability, delivery timeline, technology maturity, risk, and budget.
Well-defined increments reduce many of the instabilities plaguing our
past efforts. We will deliberately apportion cost, schedule, and
technical risk across these increments to meet the primary objective--
delivering combat capability on a predictable timeline and at a
predictable cost.
In 2006, the Air Force restructured two major programs to comply
with the ``Back to Basics'' strategy initiative. We have restructured
the GPS III and TSAT programs to reduce risk and define executable
block strategies. We expect these changes to deliver warfighting
capabilities in the least amount of time.
In 2007, the Air Force will expand the implementation of its ``Back
to Basics'' initiative by deliberately and establishing block
development strategies for a greater number of programs within the Air
Force space portfolio. We will continue our conscientious efforts to
stabilize requirements, funding, and workforce within program blocks.
This strategy will place increased emphasis on cost estimating, systems
engineering, and risk management to provide capability to our
warfighters.
Small Business Programs
The Air Force employs over 129 small business professionals across
the country. They strengthen our Nation's industrial base through their
advocacy for the small business community. They also identify future
procurement opportunities for small businesses and refer these
companies to potential Air Force customers. We surpassed our small
business goals for the third consecutive year across all Air Force
primary small business programs. Small business prime contract awards,
in both dollars awarded and percentage of total procurement, increased
in every category. We awarded a record $8 billion in Air Force
contracts to small businesses, accounting for 16.9 percent of all
awarded contract dollars. Additionally, we awarded $86 million to
Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU) and other minority
institutions, accounting for 9.1 percent of all awarded contract and
grant dollars to institutions of higher education.
Operations and Maintenance Facility Projects
The Air Force will continue to prioritize investments in facilities
and infrastructure critical to mission operations. Maintenance and
repair of runways, weapons system facilities, utility systems, and
training facilities represent the Air Force's top projects. We will
invest O&M funds to maximize the economic life and value of this
critical infrastructure, minimizing mission disruptions. The Air Force
continues to face significant challenges in preserving an aging
inventory of utility systems, airfield pavements, and essential support
facilities.
Depot Maintenance Transformation
Throughout Air Force history, our depots have been vital to
success. Our commitment to retain technically relevant depot-level
maintenance and repair capability will ensure sustainment of the
world's dominant air, space, and cyberspace capabilities beyond the
next decade. We programmed investments in depot infrastructure,
equipment, and personnel throughout fiscal year 2004-fiscal year 2009
in order to implement the Air Force Depot Maintenance Strategy and
Master Plan. The Air Force strategy benchmarks industry standards to
improve depot maintenance infrastructure, implement re-engineering
initiatives, and transform depot processes to maintain ``world-class''
status.
Repair Enterprise
As an expeditionary air, space, and cyberspace force, we challenged
our logisticians to develop agile combat support concepts that enhance
our current and future warfighting capabilities. Repair Enterprise
(RE21) is a lean logistics initiative and an integral part of the
Global Logistics Support Center (GLSC) concept of providing global
logistics support to the Air Force. RE21 leverages global visibility of
all repair assets, centralized funds management, strategic sourcing,
and partnerships with industry to provide the Air Force highly
technical logistical support. The main RE21 goal is to establish an
enterprise-wide single repair network supporting the entire Air Force
supply chain and to optimize support to the warfighter through the
GLSC.
minding the future
September 18, 2007, will mark the 60th Anniversary of the creation
of our independent United States Air Force. This year, we commemorate
this anniversary of our proud Service--a service born of revolutionary
ideas, forged in combat, and proven through decades of progress and
achievement. The mission of the Air Force remains to fly, fight and
win--in, through and from air, space, and cyberspace.
While remembering our history and reaffirming our commitments to
the current fight, we are ever mindful of the need for investment in
future capabilities. We will remain focused on our top priorities:
Fighting and Winning the global war on terror; Developing and Caring
for Our Airmen; and Recapitalizing and Modernizing the Force. Meeting
these priorities has become more challenging in light of current fiscal
constraints. Nonetheless, we will move forward, striving to maintain
the Global Vigilance, Reach and Power advantages America has come to
expect. Our allies respect us, and our enemies fear us.
The Air Force has faced challenging times in its past and is
meeting the stress of today's operating environment. It is our heritage
and mission to fly, fight, and win. Our legacy inspires us. Our mission
propels us. Our core values guide us. We have inherited and will build
upon a rich heritage--a heritage shaped through the ingenuity, courage
and resolve of great airmen who preceded us. Our proud heritage,
focused priorities, and enduring core values will serve to guide our
actions and reaffirm our commitments today, over the next 60 years, and
beyond.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Levin. Let me just first thank the airmen and
thank you for all you do, what you stand for, for your
commitment to this Nation, and for the courage that you show.
We also would appreciate it if you'd extend our thanks to your
families, to those who give you the support that's so essential
to keep you going. This committee is totally behind our men and
women in uniform, as is the Nation. I hope you all feel it.
It's heartfelt. Thank you for being with us today. It's an
honor to be in your presence.
Secretary Wynne.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL W. WYNNE, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
Secretary Wynne. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for even
taking the time to acknowledge and thank our airmen. It is an
absolute privilege for General Moseley and I to be their
leaders.
We are grateful for this committee's steadfast support of
our Nation's airmen. They are responsive, whether answering the
call for humanitarian relief, providing commanders and
combatants realtime intelligence, or striking with lethal and
precise effect. They are agile, with the ability to provide
America's strategic shield or form an air bridge from the
continental United States halfway around the world to southwest
Asia--an air bridge, our airmen have maintained now for 17
years--or keep steadfast watch in space and in the skies. They
even superbly perform our assigned ground-force missions,
although all realize that the adage, ``Every airman a
rifleman,'' sacrifices strategic leverage the Nation wants and
needs from its airmen. We look for the ground-force reset to
potentially rectify this. Given the age of our air and space
equipment, there is no doubt that our freedoms are balanced on
the courage, skills, and ingenuity of our Total Force airmen.
Today, our airmen are incredibly busy and fully engaged in
the global war on terror, not just in Iraq or Afghanistan, but
around the world, and yet fully engaged in the strategic
deterrence posture that keeps America safe in the long term.
Our airmen are providing global vigilance through our
manned and unmanned aircraft and space systems. For example,
Air Force assets and airmen surveil, identify, track, and
sometimes even kill enemies as a part of the joint force's
critical counter-improvised explosive device (IED) mission.
We are providing global reach. Our C-130s and C-17s execute
precision airdrop and conventional cargo missions, which are
saving countless lives by taking dangerous convoys off the
road. Our aeromedical evacuation personnel are giving our
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines the highest survival
rate in the history of warfare.
We provide global power, directing, conducting, or
threatening strikes 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days per
year.
Our strategic mission in Iraq was completed long ago, when
we swept the skies of aircraft, which allows the unimpeded
operation of unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) and our fighters. For
example, our battlefield airmen levy global power through
technology like the ROVER platform, which is a laptop computer,
which gives a new level of connectivity and situational
awareness by linking users with a laptop terminal with full-
motion video sensors on our Predator UAVs and our advanced
targeting pods on our fighters. ROVER-equipped users get
realtime, full-motion video from these eyes in the sky and
provide our ground commanders spherical awareness, not just 360
degrees, but also a God's-eye view.
We are also the only Service with dedicated combat search-
and-rescue forces, or PJs. As airmen, we consider combat
search-and-rescue a moral imperative to be able to retrieve the
airmen we send deep into enemy territory. But these combat
search-and-rescue forces are equally adept at rescuing other
Services' isolated personnel when they're required to do so.
As in other domains, your Air Force is engaged daily in
cyberspace. We have established within the 8th Air Force a new
cybercommand to address how we can better train and present our
forces to the U.S. Strategic Command, the combatant commanders,
and other Government agencies engaged in this domain.
It's these linkages where other Services and agencies rely
on us to own our warfighting domains and we count on them to
own theirs. That makes our military truly interdependent today.
So, we owe our ground forces and our maritime partners the very
best in leveraging our air, space, and cyberspace assets to
meet their mission intent.
We say that we set strategic and tactical conditions for
victory, and we mean to do that. It has been 53 years since any
American soldier has been strafed from the air, and we hope to
push that for another 53 years.
Today, we're doing just that, meeting our wartime
requirements. But wear and tear and loss of buying power all
translate into risk into our future readiness capacity and
capability. Today's emerging threats also threaten our future
dominance. Proliferation of advanced technologies and new
threats, such as double-digit surface-to-air-missile systems,
nuclear weapons in North Korea, and the recent Chinese
antisatellite (ASAT) test--which proved that space is no longer
a sanctuary--make it imperative that we adjust our inventories
for this new century. We are responding by fielding a next-
generation long-range strike bomber by 2018 as well as funding
new satellites, tankers, and combat search-and-rescue aircraft.
Last year, I laid out a very difficult strategy to address
this most pressing need: recapitalizing our aging air and space
inventories. We've started this process, while remaining in
bounds by essentially self-funding, to the maximum extent
possible, our recapitalization. We have self-funded by
essentially restructuring our force size and reshaping the
Total Force on a mission-first basis, buying fewer, but more
capable platforms, and implementing new initiatives to become
yet more efficient.
When I was a young officer leaving the Air Force in 1973,
the average age of our equipment, including space assets, was
approximately 8\1/2\ to 9 years old. Our inventory's age is now
triple that, averaging 24 to 25 years old. With this in mind, I
have advised our airmen that it is their duty to ensure that
the airmen of tomorrow are as confident and as capable against
the threat as we are today, and if part of that duty means that
we have to leave the Air Force to provide that resource, we
will do it. We can ensure this only by intensively husbanding
every resource--people, flying hours, and expenses--and
dedicating the freed resources to recapitalization.
I want to thank Congress for its continued help in allowing
the Air Force to manage our flying inventory and in assisting
us in this duty to our future.
I want to thank Congress also for its continued help
recapitalizing our space inventory. We are taking the necessary
steps in our fiscal year 2008 budget to ensure uninterrupted,
continuous service in communications, early warning, position,
navigation, timing, and environmental sensing satellites. We
appreciate your support in the development, procurement, and
fielding of these critical space capabilities because our
military and the citizens of our great Nation depend upon their
continuous service.
We are providing our airmen access to safe, quality,
affordable, well-maintained housing in a community where they
choose to live, through housing privatization. In the Air
Force, our tenet has long been, ``We recruit airmen, but we
retain families,'' and we make quality of life on our bases a
key component of this tenet.
In summary, your Air Force is in the fight, not just in
Iraq, but globally. Your airmen are the Nation's strategic
edge. They are expeditionary, highly-trained warriors, and,
with your help, we will provide them with the necessary
training, equipment, and quality of life to keep this Nation's
asymmetric advantage of global vigilance, reach, and power.
Recapitalizing our aging equipment inventories is the key.
Finally, I want to add my thanks to our airmen here and
abroad. They are amazing, eager to serve, and mindful of their
mission all around the world. I am proud to be their secretary,
and look forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
General, do you have any additional comments?
General Moseley. No, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
I think we'll try a 6-minute round of questions this
morning, because of the looming vote we have here at 11:30.
Mr. Secretary and General Moseley, both, do you believe
that the fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008 supplemental
requests adequately fund your requirements?
Secretary Wynne. Sir, I think they do adequately fund our
requirements. But, as always, there's tension between strategic
and tactical. If you gave me another dollar, I would know
exactly where to spend it. Right now, it would probably be on
C-130Js, because that is how we are taking more convoys off the
road. Second, I would probably spend it on strategic
deterrence, because of a fifth-generation fighter study, as
well as a space event. That's what I would tell you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
General, do you believe your 2007 and 2008 supplementals
adequately fund your requirements?
General Moseley. Sir, as we worked on the fiscal year 2008
President's budget, the Air Force spent 2.2 million man-hours
balancing the program objective memorandum (POM) that is the
submission of the President's budget. That is the rest of the
money moved around in the Department. We were able to catch up
with the two supplementals as well as the UPL. So, with the two
supplementals and the UPL, sir, I think we're adequate. But I
also know where I would spend an extra dollar.
Chairman Levin. When will you have to receive the 2007
supplemental funding in order to avoid a major cash-flow
problem?
Secretary Wynne. Sir, I believe the Department is working
against a late-April receipt, but we are very concerned that it
could extend beyond Memorial Day. I understand that the
Comptroller is beginning to take whatever preventive actions
are necessary to cash-flow this engagement.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
On the C-130 issue, the Department is asking to buy 17 new
C-130Js in the 2008 supplemental. That seems to be a large
number, given that the Air Force has only been buying nine
aircraft a year in the regular 2008 budget. How is it, Mr.
Secretary, that the Air Force would be asking for such a large
number in the supplemental?
Secretary Wynne. I think, at this stage of the engagement,
sir, we have forecast, again, that we will be conducting an air
bridge, both strategically and tactically, for some time to
come. Right now, our C-130Es are excluded from theater, because
they are so broken. We are running only C-130Hs, what used to
be the backbone of the National Guard. We recognize that we are
flying these on double time and are essentially going to
forecast their exhaustion at some point in time. With that, we
think we should backstop our tactical airlift with the request
for C-130Js, and we think that they have shown a dramatic
effect in direct delivery for getting convoys off the road--all
of the Marine convoys except for troops, and about 9,000 per
month of our Army, Air Force, and Navy personnel who are
driving convoys every month. This, sir, I'd like to extend.
Chairman Levin. So, why not part of the regular budget? Why
is this in a wartime emergency supplemental?
Secretary Wynne. I think, sir, the 2.2 million hours that
the General referred to really addressed that part of our force
structure that we think of as how we would operate in
peacetime. I think the backfill to the special operators that
we have been asked to do--and they have, therefore, taken,
essentially, more C-130Hs from us than we anticipated--plus the
dramatic increase in mission set that we find we can perform,
has caused this.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Tell us, if you would, about the C-17
procurement, General. The fiscal year 2008 budget for the Air
Force does not have any funding to keep the C-17 production
line open. You've been quoted, General, as saying that you'd
like to retire C-5A aircraft and buy more C-17s. Last year,
Congress added 10 C-17 aircraft to the fiscal year 2007 bridge
supplemental, and you had asked for 7 more C-17s in your 2007
UPL. You have two C-17s on your UPL for this year. Some are
asking--suggesting that we fund 16 more C-17 in the budget
itself. On the other hand, looking at the C-5, and the question
of whether or not we should re-engine the C-5, that would cost
about $100 million per aircraft. 70 percent of its service life
would be ahead of it if we re-engined that aircraft. It would
cost about half as much as a C-17. So, given the top-line
pressure, General, on the whole DOD, and the Air Force, in
particular, and given the statement of Secretary Wynne about
intensifying our effort to utilize every possible resource that
we can, how do you reject, General, the C-5 re-engining option
and, instead, put that focus on the C-17s and put those on your
UPL?
General Moseley. Sir, there are a couple of unknowns that
we're working our way through now. One is the growth in the
land component with the Army and the Marines, not just in this
surge, but in overall growth. We're beginning to ask, ``does
the Mobility Capability Study that we ran last year cover what
potentially will be a larger land-component footprint?'' The
answer is no, the original Mobility Capability Study did not
cover this growth. So, we're looking now, with the Army, to see
what the brigade combat teams (BCTs) and what the Marines'
regimental combat team means to strategic airlift. We don't
know the answer to that yet, and we'll work our way through
that, this summer, because we've not seen the actual footprint
from the Army or the Marines, other than raw numbers of growth.
So, Mr. Chairman, we know that there will be a larger
requirement for strategic lift. The baseline of the original
Mobility Capability Study was about a minimum of 300 or so
strategic airlifters, to include C-5A, B, C, and the C-17. What
we have asked for is the ability to manage the C-5 fleet; to be
able to ask Air Mobility Command to give us the worst actors,
wherever those tail numbers are, and to be able to retire
those. General McNabb believes that's about 25 or 30 C-5s. What
I would like to do is be able to work with the committee, the
Guard, Reserve, and Air Mobility Command to look at where those
particular 25 or 30 airplanes are, and begin to look at
something to replace those in those units. We had seven C-17s
on the UPL last year to cover the attrition reserve in BAI
aircraft, which we didn't buy. The two this year are to cover
part of the NATO transfer of an airplane, and to cover that
attrition reserve in backup aircraft inventory. We didn't put
any more in there because we don't have the rationale, beyond
the numbers that we have, given the C-5s, and not knowing what
the growth in the Army and the Marines will do to us.
What we would like to do is to be able to run the avionics
modernization program, out on all of the remaining C-5s, and
then run the re-engining program out on the C-5s that have the
most life. We are complying with the guidance of the committee
on the A model re-engining, and we'll have that data out, so
we'll be much more informed about the A model. It may, in fact,
be okay.
But, sir, in the buy of the C-17, we're in a very
interesting place right now, where our land-component brothers
are growing, our strategic airlift inventory is static, our C-
5s are becoming much harder to maintain, and the reliability on
them is in question. The C-17 line is about to be shut down.
That's the concern. That's the crease in history that we're in
right now, where we're going to have to make some decisions.
I'll give you an anecdote on the C-5. The last presidential
deployment support missions into Central and South America,
where we took the majority of the strategic airlifters to
support the presidential mission, the Nation of Argentina
refused landing rights and overflight of the C-5s. When we
asked to be able to bring the C-5s in to support the
presidential mission, back through the assistant attache to our
Tanker Airlift Control Center at Scott, we were told that the
Government of Argentina refuses landing rights and overflight
for six C-5s, because the last time we took them down there,
they broke, and it took too long to get them off their
airfield.
So, there's a variety of concerns in being able to match
the requirement that see ahead of us, with Army and Marine
growth, with the global response, and being able to do this
with strategic airlifters. So, sir, that's a long answer to a
short question.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just a quick follow-on of the 17 versus the 5. The 17 has
operational advantages, particularly shorter takeoff and
landing. Reverse thrust enables it to support land forces in a
wide variety of airfields throughout the world. I would hope
that you'd rely on that also, because it was at great expense
that we built that technical capability into that aircraft.
Gentlemen, I'll ask both of you to give us just a short
report. Again, I focused, in my opening remarks, on the role
that the Department of the Air Force is providing our operating
forces the world over. We've heard reports, candid reports from
the Chief of Staff of the Army and others, that the Army is,
whatever word you wish, stretched, pushed. The Guard and
Reserve are suffering. But they're still standing strong and
carrying out the missions. Do you have any general quick
description of your department and its impact. I don't say this
by word of criticism to this surge concept, but, nevertheless,
it has put, very swiftly, a larger tasking on all of our
Services to meet the requirements for moving over this
additional 21,500, now up to 30,000 individuals, and putting
them in place. What is the impact on your department today?
Secretary Wynne. Sir, it's primarily in our security
forces, and then we actually have teams of battlefield airmen
that deploy with each of the BCTs and the Marine regiments,
much like our space weapons major here, so there is a direct
impact. Then, of course, there's an indirect impact, because we
are now providing what I will tell you is almost valet service,
in that we can precision-drop supplies to our soldiers and to
our marines. We can also precision-drop weapons. Our marines
are fully equipped with the ROVER technology, so we have
essentially stretched those forces to meet this surge.
I would tell you that, for the Air Force, somebody
brilliant in the 1990s who decided that we were in a long war,
because we were in a long war at that time. We had been in
southwest Asia for 6 years when we went to the rotating force
concept called the air and space expeditionary force (AEF). We
are benefiting from their brilliance, and our airmen are
satisfied. We do not have a problem in recruiting, retention of
our Guard, Reserve, or our Active Forces. In fact, it pains me
every time that I have to reduce our force structure by
restructuring our forces, because all of us are volunteers who
add value to the Air Force.
Senator Warner. Indeed, the story of the Air Guard is
extraordinary, and that preceded these particular operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq. We have to be mindful that you flew those
missions over Iraq for many years, as the consequence of the
first Iraq conflict, to comport with the understandings that we
imposed on Iraq at that time.
I then would turn to another issue. We have airlift
capacity like no other nation. Unfortunately, other nations are
not stepping up to augment their own force structures. Are we
not carrying the bulk of the airlift requirements, for example,
for Afghanistan, even though, there, NATO is taking over the
major burden?
General Moseley. Sir, we are. Remember, last year at this
time, when we were working through the C-17 issues, we also
were able to partner in the international market. I believe
there are 12 or 18 C-17s that'll be built for Australia, the
U.K., Sweden, NATO, and Canada. But those are yet to be
delivered. The British Royal Air Force flies four or five C-
17s, and they've been very helpful in this. But the
preponderance of our NATO and coalition partners operate C-130
equivalents, or they contract or lease out big Russian Anatovs
to be able to fly that lift.
Senator Warner. We must be mindful that all of our
rotations of personnel to and from these fronts are done by air
now. No longer do we have the great troop ships that load up
with a thousand or two and cross the ocean; it's all done by
air, am I not correct?
General Moseley. Correct, sir. That is the partnership also
with the Civil Reserve Air Fleet and with contract carriers for
our people.
Senator Warner. Were you impressed with that Airbus
yesterday? Do you have it in the back of your head that you'd
like to have one or two in your inventory?
General Moseley. Sir, I'm still a little fuzzy on how you
get 600 people through Customs and get their bags, and have 600
people so they can go to the restroom before they get on the
airplane.
Senator Warner. Wait a minute, wait a minute, back up. I'm
saying, would that be a troop carrier of the future?
General Moseley. Sir, let's see if it works. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. Good answer. But it was a spectacular, in
overall aviation, achievement. None of us who admire aviation
cannot be impressed by that.
Let's get to the tough question, General. I don't know how
long ago it was that you were sworn in as Chief of Staff of the
Air Force, but I do remember visiting with you and having a
small hand in getting your nomination to the floor very
expeditiously. But, in the course of that hearing, we have a
standard question we ask all of our uniform officers. There
could come a time, and when you're before Congress, that you
have to provide your personal views on tough issues. This issue
of the single-engine or dual-engine requirement for the JSF is
one of those tough issues. Drawing on your enormous experience
with aviation--re-engining, new aircraft, all of that--don't
you think it is a wiser, more prudent course for the United
States to keep in competition two suppliers, given that it is
proven to reduce cost, proven that you increase quality by
virtue of that competition? Second, this JSF is a multi-mission
aircraft. One model, of course, is the short take-off, vertical
landing (STOVL). That STOVL could well require additional
power, particularly on the takeoff mode. What is your personal
opinion as to whether or not our Nation, which is taking the
lead in developing and producing the JSF--with now, what, eight
or nine other nations?
General Moseley. Eight, and growing, sir.
Senator Warner. Eight, and growing. Do not we have an
obligation, not only to ourselves, but those partners, to
provide the two-engine option?
General Moseley. Sir, we've wrestled with this long and
hard inside our world. The real answer is, it's $2 billion that
we don't have. But if you're asking me my personal opinion, I
believe there is always value in competition, and there's
always value in having additional sources.
But, sir, I go back to the notion of, I'm a satisfied
customer. I've spent most of my life sitting on a Pratt &
Whitney motor. I have no issues with that engine. We don't have
$2 billion to do this.
Senator Warner. I'm not suggesting anything against Pratt &
Whitney. They've had a long and distinguished career of
providing this country with engines. But I'm just concerned
about the STOVL requirements of the aircraft. Does that not
require additional thrust?
General Moseley. Sir, we don't know yet, because we haven't
got one built, and we haven't received one into the
developmental testing (DT) and operational test and evaluation
(OT&E) phases. If you're asking a fighter pilot, more thrust is
always better because you don't know what you're going to be
hanging on the airplane, and you don't know what the drag will
be, and you don't know how big the weapons will be in the
future. So, there's always a notion of increased thrust. Sir,
at the end of the day, this is about money. It's $2 billion
that we don't have.
Senator Warner. Then we buy fewer aircraft or take some
reduction to achieve the safety that is accompanied with that
additional thrust.
My time is up, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you Senator Warner.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to both
of you for being here.
I just want to pick this up. I hadn't intended to do it
first, but since we're on the flow about the alternative
engine, my friend, Senator Warner, and I wrestled around a
little bit with this last year too. Obviously, in the best of
all worlds, with no limitations on funding, I'm sure everybody
would like two engines instead of one. But I do think General
Moseley made the point, which is the $2 billion. I'd ask you,
General, or Mr. Secretary, if Congress ordered you to go ahead
with an alternative engine for the JSF, where would the $2
billion come from?
Secretary Wynne. Sir, we are so delicately balanced within
our budget, and I hesitate to say that, because our comptroller
probably has her ear to the ground here on anything that I
would give up, and I just don't have something I would give up.
We are at a limit when we go down 40,000 people. I am not
intending to take any further people out. So, I think General
Moseley has this right. This is about money, in the worst way.
In every case, we are buying weapons systems at too low a rate.
Even the JSF, we're not going to get it at the rate we got the
F-16. We had to take a trim-down of the F-22, from 28 to 20 per
year.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Secretary Wynne. We're not buying the tankers at the rate
we bought in the past so, everything, sir, just as you've
described, is about money.
Senator Lieberman. At a minimum, I assume, if Congress
pushed you to go ahead with the two engines for the JSF, it
would delay the JSF, or narrow the program.
Secretary Wynne. If the money came out of the program, that
is correct, sir. If it were ``manna from heaven,'' I would say
there is probably not the impact on the program, because there
is a parallel path for the engine that the program manager
already has.
Senator Lieberman. Right. If there was not a monetary
concern. But, obviously, if you had to take it out of the JSF
budget, I presume it would delay the JSF?
Secretary Wynne. It would hurt.
Senator Lieberman. I remember a hearing we had last year
with the Vice Chiefs of the four Services, and they were very
strong on that fact. I remember, particularly, the Marines were
concerned about it. I'm sure we'll come back to that. I
appreciate your answers.
I want to ask you a broad question at the beginning. In
some sense, your opening statement answered it. Not to ask you
to deliver another opening statement, but, in brief, we went
through a period of time where, and I know this was never real,
but there were a certain number of people who felt there was
not a conflict that we couldn't win from the air. Now we're at
a point in the war on terrorism where I think some people are
beginning to think that we only win these conflicts on the
ground, and that the role of the Air Force is less. Just speak
for a moment or two, if you would, about the particular value-
added responsibility of the Air Force, in the context of the
war on terrorism and conflicts like Iraq, Afghanistan, and
other special operations kinds of missions that we'll have to
perform for years to come with this war against radical Islam.
Secretary Wynne. Sir, we believe we set the strategic and
then the tactical conditions for victory. In that regard, our
strategic imperative, when 2003 opened up, was, we had only
stealth fighters go to downtown Baghdad to remove the air
defense system. As a result of doing that, we swept the skies
of enemy aircraft, and we opened up all of the altitudes for
slow-moving UAVs or to fast-moving fighters or nonstealthy
bombers to loiter overhead and essentially dispense weaponry.
We feel like this ability to maintain total air dominance is
key to our police action, which is what's going on now, on the
ground, and our ability to restore stable governance in any
part of the world where we so choose.
I will tell you that when the mullahs in Tehran wake up in
the morning, they really do not worry about an army coming over
the Straits of Hormuz, they worry about the United States Air
Force crushing their national interest. Same way when some of
our patrons in North Korea wake up, and they look south, they
are not looking south for an army invasion coming over the
mountains, they're much more concerned about the United States
Air Force essentially sweeping the skies and creating,
strategically, a successful victory.
Senator Lieberman. I presume you would say the same to
those who say that we're about to invest much too much money in
the F-22 and the JSF. The critics would say that these are
geared for the Cold War that is no more. What's your quick
defense to that, not just the war on terrorism, but, obviously,
the possibility of a rising peer superpower that we would be in
conflict with?
Secretary Wynne. What I was shocked at, but not surprised,
was the Chinese ASAT test. It follows the Chinese dramatic
investment in naval and air superiority. The Chinese now have
more Sukhois on the ground than we have in our F-15E program. I
would tell you that the Chinese intend, very much, to be a peer
competitor, and I am hoping, as all airmen do, that we can
manage their entry well into the world using economic
sweeteners, rather than military brickbats.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Moseley. Senator, there's another part of this.
While we focus on a tactical fight, we can't forget the
strategic-level challenges that we face. An air force and a
navy are the strategic shield and long sword for this country.
Mike Mullen, if he were sitting here, he and I could almost
finish each other's sentences about aircraft production, the
aerospace industry, the shipbuilding industry, and the
requirement to get fifth-generation systems and the new
technology out in ships. The ability for the Air Force to
operate on a global scale is one of the asymmetric advantages
that this country has, and, in my view, must maintain; that is
a bomber, that is a tanker, that is strategic airlift, that is
our satellite systems, that's our unmanned vehicles, and that's
these new fifth-generation fighters that will dominate the air
and space mediums. Because, again, we are very proud of the
fact that the last soldier killed from the air was in April
1953.
Senator Lieberman. Right
General Moseley. That is a testament to the partnership of
the United States Army and the United States Air Force. It also
says something about what we do in support of ground activities
and also what we do in direct attack, whether it's strategic
attack or long-range aviation or interdiction. So, sir, we're
beginning to worry a bit about the recapitalization and the
modernization path and how to operate these old systems against
a growing threat.
Senator Lieberman. Right. I appreciate your answers. My
time is up. I would just add this, and not ask a question, that
all the Services are under pressure here. I know the bottom
line on the military budget is large, but we're still spending
a percentage of our gross domestic product (GDP) below the
historic average, let alone the average in a time of war. The
fact that your Service plans to thin its ranks by about 57,000
people by fiscal year 2011, which, factoring in Guard and
Reserve personnel, is quite remarkable. You're doing it not
because you want to, I take it, but because it's necessary to
stay modern and be ready for the next generation of challenges,
in terms of the equipment we're acquiring for you.
General Moseley. Right.
Senator Lieberman. So, anyway, I thank you. Well done. I
look forward to working with you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I was glad that Senator Lieberman ended on that note. All
Services are on a starvation diet now. It goes back to the
question of where we are in adequately funding our Services and
looking into the future. You can't make these changes and get
results in a year from now, it has to be planned out. I always
go back to when I was on the House Armed Services Committee and
someone testified in 1994, that in 10 more years we wouldn't
need ground troops. The generals are all smart, General
Moseley, but they're going to be wrong, when you say, ``what
are our needs going to be in the future.'' That's the reason
that I think that having gone through the entire 20th century,
for 100 years, spending 5.7 percent of our GDP on military, and
then dropping down as low as 2.7 percent at the end of the
1990s, was something that was a mistake. It would be my goal to
get back up there where you don't have to try to make these
decisions and see where things are broken. I disagree with
Senator Warner on the alternative engine, for the same reason
that Senator Lieberman talked about, but it would be great to
have that luxury. It would be. If we could afford it, that
would be a great luxury to have.
We went through this with the C-17 virtually every year
since the late 1980s, as to problems we're going to have and
how many we're going to have. I was honored, in 1995, to
actually fly in the right seat to Altus, Oklahoma, on the first
C-17 that came to Oklahoma. It's an incredible vehicle, and
everything else is old. In the last 17 years, the things that
we've gone through with our lift vehicles: Operations Desert
Storm, Northern Watch, Southern Watch, Desert Fox, and Iraqi
Freedom. So, here we are now faced with something that I
consider to be a crisis, and that is, if we stop the C-17 at
this point, what happens to the line?
Now, I'd like to ask you, to the best of your knowledge,
because I've heard a variety of figures, how many C-17s would
it take to keep the line open?
Secretary Wynne. Sir, I have been pushing Boeing for that
for a long time, to try to make sure that they can tell us what
they can do. I can only remember, back when we were talking
about terminating the F-16 line, and I think the contractor, at
that point, came back in with less than one a month, if he
could continue to go out and get foreign military sales. I have
taken that as a token number, as a target. But Boeing has not
been back to me with what they could do. I think they could do
with less than one a month, and I've told them, if they could
come back, we would try to figure out how to fit them in. The
problem is, on all of our programs, we're down to the minimum
sustaining rate on so many of our programs, and one hiccup of
cost and we're done. Most of the arguments we're all having on
whether it's aircraft retirements or on some of the reliability
aspects have to do with, we don't have the money to really
overlap.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, I understand that. General Moseley, I
appreciate your telling the story, the Argentina story, because
that means I don't have to do it on my time. [Laughter.]
But it is pretty incredible to think that around the world
there are countries that don't let us overfly and land because
our equipment's so old and worn out. I know it's true. On 1 of
our 12 trips to the Central Command area of responsibility--I
think it was probably about a year ago--on a C-130, going into
Baghdad--we didn't lose one engine, we lost two engines.
Senator Warner. How old was it, though?
Senator Inhofe. It was an E model.
General Moseley. Sir, you have four engines on the
airplane, so you had two left. [Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe. I understand that. [Laughter.]
But I also have been an aviator for 50 years now, and I
don't want to lose two engines on a four-engine airplane.
General Moseley. No, it's not good.
Senator Inhofe. We do have a serious problem.
I'd like to pursue this thing, just briefly, on the fifth-
generation fighters. We've talked about General John Jumper
admitting that the Sukhoi SU series that you've referred to is
better, in many ways, than our best strike fighters. Of course,
I think it's important that they get in there. I notice,
though, that the fifth-generation fighters were not in the
supplemental. I understand that maybe two of them were in but
they came out. Do you want to comment on that?
Secretary Wynne. Yes, sir. I will tell you that our
fighters have been the source for funding for other programs
for several years, ever since PBD-753 essentially reduced the
F-22 to its lowest level of affordability and funded some other
programs that were bills facing the Department. Here, I think,
in the supplemental, we had an increase in ground forces above
the surge that we had expected, and the Department rallied
around and essentially stripped out all the fixed-wing
aviation, to include the fifth-generation fighters.
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
Secretary Wynne. Our argument, simply, was that we had
taken combat losses. We've lost over 130 aircraft, 50 fighters,
since 2001, although not all in combat.
[Mr. Wynne provided the following clarifying information.]
We've lost over 130 aircraft, 50 fighters, since 2001, although not
all in combat.
Secretary Wynne. We knew we did not want a fourth-
generation replacement, and so, we did try to get a fifth-
generation. I understand it caused controversy, and the
Department reacted by removing it.
Senator Inhofe. It's just one of these things where
everything is bleeding, at this time. We don't have the
resources for it.
My time has expired, but I would like to have you mention
one thing about the UAV taking the lead between the Army and
the Air Force. It's a discussion that I'd like to at least get
in the record, just very briefly, if that would be all right,
Mr. Chairman.
General Moseley. Senator, I would like to, if you would
allow me, for the record, to provide the letter that I sent to
the Deputy Secretary that outlined our position.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
General Moseley. I believe, if we're not careful, we are
headed for a crisis, in acquisition, in deliveries and
procurement, in command-and-control, the ability to field the
system to support all requirements. We spend most of our day
looking to support joint requirements for the joint warfighting
commanders, but also our Army, Marine, and Navy brothers and
sisters. We have 12 squadrons of these, and we're trying to
flesh out more. I believe there is a cleaner, quicker, more
effective and efficient path to being able to do this, and
that's exactly what we've proposed.
This is not a land-grab. General Schoomaker and I are the
dearest of friends but I believe there is a better way to field
these systems faster and streamline the command-and-control
that exists, and be able to fight this long war on terrorism,
and anything else ahead of us, better. So, if you would allow
me, I'd like to put that in the record.
Senator Inhofe. That would be fine.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me first say to the incredible Americans that were
introduced at the beginning of this hearing, I'm in awe of who
you are and what you do. Congratulations to you and your
families. Congratulations to the Air Force for producing these
kind of fine heroes in our systems.
I have about an hour's worth of questions on acquisition,
but I'm going to try to limit it to 6 minutes. Have both of you
read the Government Accountability Office (GAO) report that was
issued last week on defense acquisitions concerning airlift and
tanker programs?
Secretary Wynne. No, ma'am, I have not read it in the
detail that you expected.
Senator McCaskill. That's probably a huge part of my
concern. This report is incredibly important as we try to do
what you're trying to accomplish, and that is using commercial
technology to update old aircraft. If you read this report in
detail, you have to really slow down. For example, the Mobility
Capability Study (MCS) is clearly flawed, and it's the study on
which you base your number one funding priority, which is the
KC-X tanker. What this shows, if you look at the four major
airlift programs is that none of them are on time, none of them
are on budget. For example, the C-130 Avionics Modernization
Program (AMP) that you have talked about in fiscal year 2008 is
up $700 million, and the number of units that we can acquire
has gone from 434 to 268. The development cost change since the
beginning of this program is up 128 percent. The problems are
pretty clear. How much money will it take to put commercial
technology into a military system? Do we have a stable design
before we get to the system demonstration stage? Most
importantly, failure to show that it will work before we begin
production investment.
I guess my question to you, Mr. Secretary, is, who is
accountable for moving forward on these incredible investments
of billions of dollars without having this basic information at
the critical junctures?
Secretary Wynne. Many of the programs that you have talked
about were actually started some time back. But I will tell you
that myself, the service acquisition officer, the operation
requirements people that lay in the requirements behave in a
manner laid out in the DOD Directive 5000 to try to make sure
that we do this correctly. We use the requirements that we get
out of the requirements generation to lay in the key
performance parameters (KPPs). Many times, our friends and
associates in the GAO don't agree with our assessment, but we
feel like we are making the best judgments we can along the
way.
Senator McCaskill. I have to tell you, it seems to me, if
the best judgments were being made, we wouldn't consistently,
in every single instance, have major, major cost shift, major
reductions in units purchased, and delay. You're looking at a
year and a half to 2 years delay before we can actually even
utilize this technology that we are investing billions of
dollars of taxpayer money in. I get the stresses that you're
facing. What I don't get is a continuation of acquisition
mistakes that don't appear to be taken seriously.
Secretary Wynne. Ma'am, we take every acquisition
governance issue very, very seriously, and we have established
a transparency with Congress, and, frankly, with the GAO where
we're reaching out to the GAO to make sure that we're certain,
for example, on the combat search-and-rescue helicopter, of
what we should be out to resolicit from our vendors. So we take
it very seriously and we are working it very hard. But the
citations that you cite are real, and we are working with the
GAO on each of those instances to demonstrate to them that we
think we're on a little bit better path than they have
asserted.
Senator McCaskill. Have you circled back to look at the MCS
and look at that study and the conclusions that you've drawn
from that, and taken into account the flaws that I think are
very ably pointed out by this GAO report?
Secretary Wynne. The MCS study is actually performed by the
Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD). We have participated in
it. We have had one every year for the last 15 years. We know,
for example, that this one does not take into account the
increase in ground forces that we see. We also know that it
might not take into account the full requirement that the Army
has when they move out on the Future Combat System. So, we have
our concerns. However, I will tell you that the analysts who
performed that model have claimed that they have asked folks
about it and basically have told the Air Force that we should
not submit even the two additional C-17s, because the MCS has
been satisfied.
Senator McCaskill. I would like to see a requirement that,
when one of these reports comes out, that it be consumed
immediately by a number of different people within the
military, because you all have been on the high-risk list for
longer than anyone else, and as we face budget constraints all
of us want you to have what you need to do the incredible work
you do, but it's awfully hard to ignore the detailed analysis
that's factually based that is represented in some of these
reports without shaking your head and wondering who is held
accountable, who, within the military, steps up and says, ``We
made a mistake, and this is costing too much because we made a
mistake. We're not getting what we thought we were going to
get.'' Because if somebody doesn't take responsibility, I don't
know how we're ever going to get it changed.
Secretary Wynne. We have, in fact, canceled some programs
that have approached us when they have ballooned out of sight.
The ones we cannot cancel are the ones that are actually
satisfying a true operational need. I will tell you that it is
a partnership between industry, the requirements people--
namely, the user--and the funding agency. For example, in the
area of the F-22, when that was reduced from a rate of 28 to 20
per year, we were actually asked to go get a multiyear contract
to try to offset that. Frankly, that's very difficult. In the
JSF, which we are forecasting to be a really good performing
program, right now we're questioning what requirements we
should put on that program. If we do it the way Senator
Lieberman or even the way some of our fellows in OSD that are--
wanted to suppress the number, even the GAO says, ``Let's not
do it at the rate that they originally forecast''--if we do
that, the price of that program will increase.
Senator McCaskill. I would really appreciate, after you
have a chance to read this study, since you haven't had the
chance to do it yet, if you would respond to my office or to
the committee with what your answers would be to the very
important points that are made in regard to the airlift and
tanker acquisition program.
[The information referred to follows:]
The study you refer to is Government Accountability Office (GAO)
report GAO-07-566T, ``Issues Concerning Airlift and Tanker Programs,''
published on 7 Mar 07. GAO submitted the report as testimony to the 7
Mar 07 House Air and Land Forces Subcommittee hearing on ``Air Force
and Army airlift and aerial refueling fixed-wing aircraft programs.''
Responses to the report's findings on KC-X, C-130 AMP, C-130J, and C-5
AMP/RERP programs follow.
C-130J:
The C-130J experienced some difficulties during the initial
fielding in 1999. However, these issues have been aggressively worked
and resolved by the Air Force and the contractor. The C-130J is now a
vital member of the intra-theater fleet. To date, the C-130J has been
deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and has completed over
5,500 sorties (over 11,000 flight hours) since 2004, with a mission
capable rate of 85 percent.
The GAO report refers to three deficiencies that result in the
aircraft being rated as partially mission capable: inability to meet
airdrop operations requirements, ineffectiveness in non-permissive
threat environments, and maintainability issues. As stated in the
report, ``program officials plan to address the deficiencies as part of
a C-130J modernization effort.''
First, the aircraft is capable of performing all airdrop and
airland operations except Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC)
Formation Airdrop. Although a limitation is placed on C-130J formation
IMC airdrops, no tasking for the C-130 has required this capability
since the global war on terrorism began. The C-130J is cleared for and
has accomplished formation airdrops in Visual Meteorological Conditions
(VMC). The Air Force plans to address the IMC Station-Keeping Equipment
(SKE) limitations when Block 6.0 is released in spring 2008.
Second, with respect to the ``operation in a non-permissive threat
environment'' limitation, the C-130E/H/J is not designed to operate in
high threat environments and avoids operations at altitudes within the
range of hostile surface-to-air missiles. Therefore, the limitations
cited by DOT&E do not impact the ability of the C-130J to conduct its
mission. Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Command (AFOTEC)
completed C-130J Phase 2 operational testing in December 2005 and
concluded in their final report dated 28 Apr 06 that the C-130J was
effective in a low- to medium-threat environment, and stated the C-130J
is effective for single-ship all-weather airdrop and visual formation
airdrop capabilities which meet the warfighter's approved requirements.
Third, the ``maintainability issues'' resulted from a high false
alarm rate with the C-130J Built in Test (BIT) experienced by AFOTEC
during OT&E. Even with this shortfall, AFOTEC determined that the C-
130J was suitable for both airland and airdrop, with the aircraft's
operational reliability exceeding capability requirements. During OT&E,
the C 130J mission capable rate was 96 percent. The Air Force plans to
address these shortfalls as part of the ongoing C-130J Block upgrade
program.
C-130 AMP:
C-130 AMP currently has two modified aircraft in flight test with
38 test flights totaling 103 flight hours accomplished with no critical
deficiencies noted. C-130 AMP recently declared a critical Nunn-McCurdy
breach and is undergoing an Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
certification process in which the requirements, unit costs, and
management processes are being revalidated. The Air Force is
cooperating fully with OSD to restructure the program.
C-5 AMP and C-5 RERP:
The C-5 AMP program is currently in production and continues to
progress. Twenty-four C-5 aircraft have been AMP-modified and the
program successfully reached Initial Operational Capability (IOC) on 1
Feb 07. AMP-modified C-5s have flown more than 7,300 hours transporting
more than 7,000 passengers and 15,000 short tons worldwide. The Air
Force is correcting some AMP software deficiencies through a Block
Cycle Change process, with the first to be installed on C-5 aircraft
next year. As stated in the GAO report, C-5 RERP is facing cost growth
challenges due to engines, pylons, and touch labor. A detailed Air
Force cost estimating effort is underway to determine the extent of the
cost growth and to develop a service cost position.
KC-X:
The 7 Mar 07 GAO report you mention (GAO-07-566T) cites information
from the final copy of a different KC-X GAO report (GAO-07-367R) issued
on 6 Mar 07. DOD provided comments on the draft copy of GAO-07-367R,
but has not yet responded to the new information included in the final
drafts of both GAO-07-367R and GAO 07 566T. DOD is currently
coordinating a response to the information included in both final
reports, and we can respond to your question after DOD completes its
response.
Secretary Wynne. Thank you.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Senator Dole.
Senator Dole. General Moseley, in a recent newspaper
article, you were quoted as saying the following, ``In working
the budget problem, I believe I'm seeing challenges that lead
us to the notion that maybe it's time to have this discussion
about a higher percentage of GDP. It's going to be very, very
hard to get where we're going, as defined in the Pentagon's
strategic plans, and to do this business on a global scale,
with the resources that we have.''
Now, given that statement, would you share with the
committee your professional views on what you believe the
budgetary requirements of the Air Force will be over the next
several years and beyond, given our role in the world and the
demands that are placed on the Air Force? Would you further
describe for the committee the strategic implications for the
Air Force and for the United States if, indeed, those adequate
resources are not forthcoming on a sustained basis?
General Moseley. Senator, thank you.
Ma'am, I do believe it's perhaps time to have a discussion
about percent of GDP for DOD outlays. As the Secretary has
said, and I've said, for this budget, we've spent 2.2 million
man-hours developing this POM, which became our piece of the
President's budget. We've given up 40,000 people, which really
touches about 57,000, when you add in the full-time
equivalents, which is approaching the size of the French Air
Force. We've given that up to self-finance and to be able to
meet our procurement accounts and our priorities and stay
within our fiscal guidance.
Ma'am, we've run some of the numbers as it looks out over
the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) to be able to deal with
fuel cost that is an unknown, inflation rates, exchange rates,
and to be able to look at economic order quantities of
deliveries of the procurement priorities. It looks like, on an
average, it's about $20 billion more a year just for the Air
Force. To be able to meet our global requirements and our
global challenges in a very uncertain world out there takes you
to the tanker, takes you to strategic airlift, takes you to the
new bomber, and for sure takes you to the air dominance
capabilities in the fifth-generation set of systems of the F-22
and the F-35. So, ma'am, I believe it is time to look at that,
and I believe, if we're not careful, we're going to continue to
squeeze the budget with some of the other costs that are rising
on our human capital. Our people are so precious, but they are
costing more and more and more a year, which then squeezes the
investment account. As we try to hold our quality of life and
our infrastructure constant on our bases, and we try to hold
our operation and maintenance accounts, our flying hours, and
our depots constant, there's no other place to go but the
investment account. That's been our challenge for the last few
years.
Senator Dole. Let me ask you, and Secretary Wynne, also,
given these shortfalls, should we now be giving serious
consideration to the 4 percent rule that will allocate no less
than 4 percent of the GDP to the annual defense budget?
General Moseley. Ma'am, I believe 4 percent would be a good
starting point. I'm a little outside of my lane, but, since you
asked me, I believe less than 4 percent is still going to
continue to crunch the budgets while we're fighting a global
war, while we're taking care of our land component, while we're
looking to grow the Chief of Naval Operations' Navy back to a
strategic setting, and while we attempt to modernize and make
this Air Force what this country demands of it. So, I believe 4
percent is a good starting point.
Senator Dole. Secretary Wynne?
Secretary Wynne. I'm pleased to see you enter the argument.
I'm sure that the President, the Office of Management and
Budget, as well as the Secretary of Defense, have this same
argument amongst themselves. We spent 2.2 million hours trying
to figure out how to balance this budget within ourselves.
We're the only Service that balanced its budget. So, I think
the argument is valid. I would say it should be resolved above
my pay grade.
Senator Dole. Secretary Wynne, let me ask you, how much has
the aerospace industry consolidated, in terms of the number of
prime aerospace contractors, over the past 15 years? Are you
concerned that the aerospace industrial base has contracted too
far? Are you seeing signs that portions of the second- and
third-tier vendor base are thinning beyond what you would
consider to be prudent?
Secretary Wynne. I would tell you that they have
consolidated dramatically. Starting in the early 1990s, they
were the product of the peace dividend. I personally managed
part of an operation in San Diego that had, at its peak, 35,000
employees. It went to 200. So, I would say that that alone
tells you that some places, geographically, paid a peace
dividend well above others.
The consolidation, as you pointed out, is not really there
at the first tier, although, as Senator McCaskill pointed out,
in the tanker world, we only had two, which I would call, free-
world competitors, one in France and one in the United States.
The third maker of tankers is the Russians. We did not invite
them to participate in the competition. I would tell you also
that many foreign nations, India, for example, does invite all
of them to participate, so they get the benefit of worldwide
competition.
It is our fourth tier, the forging-makers, who make landing
gear forgings, that have an extraordinarily long lead on their
products, that cause us, for example, to reach 2 years in
advance to try to get into line on forgings for landing gears
for our fighter aircraft and our bombers. It's these precision
manufacturers that I am concerned about, because I think we're
down to just one, or one and a half, and we do not have the
money to restart the line. Our fear is, when the C-17 line goes
cold, we won't have the money to restart that line. So, I'd
love for somebody--and I don't know who--to have them
available, but I can't expect it. It's one of the reasons we
have to look hard at making sure we get full lifespan out of
the C-5, because if we have to restart a strategic lifter in
the 2025 timeframe, I'd love to have more than one supplier
available. I don't think I will.
Senator Dole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Dole.
Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me start with you, if I can, General. We have Little
Rock Air Force Base in Arkansas, and they do C-130s. I was
there just last month, and they came through base realignment
and closure and all, fine. The C-130 has really developed into
the workhorse of the global war on terror, with this lift
capability. But the Little Rock Air Force Base also has a
challenge, and that is, its runway needs to be resurfaced. I
don't know if you knew that. They're working on a plan,
apparently, with their higher-ups, whoever that is. I'd like to
bring that to your attention for you to know about and maybe
help me work with everybody to try to get them that new surface
they need. Were you aware that they had that problem?
General Moseley. No, sir.
Senator Pryor. I think it's, in some ways, just kind of a
typical maintenance problem, but, given the role the C-130 is
playing now, and the role Little Rock Air Force Base plays in
that, I just wanted to bring it to your attention.
Speaking of the C-130s, they have a lot of wear and tear on
them right now. They're being deployed left and right in
Afghanistan and Iraq. The E models are old, and some of them
are not able to fly. Do we have enough J models coming on line?
General Moseley. Sir, I'll say no. Then let me tell you
another vignette about the E models. Our special operations
birds, which are E-model derivatives, that we have in theater
right now, we operate them after we have the center-wing boxes
fixed on them. The outer wings are still not right. So, after
every 90 hours, we have to take the two outboard engines out of
the airplane, take the skins off the outer wings, and conduct
an inspection that takes 36 hours per airplane. We have to do
this every 90 hours, whether it's in theater or in Little Rock
or whether it's at Yokota or Ramstein. So, sir, this is
beginning to be a very troublesome safety challenge, as well as
an operational challenge, to have to break an airplane down
every 90 hours in combat to inspect the outer wing boxes.
Senator Pryor. I believe Secretary Wynne, a few moments
ago, said that we're at a minimum sustaining rate on a lot of
our programs. Is that also true for the C-130?
General Moseley. Sir, it is. We have about to be completed
an analysis of alternatives from Air Combat Command, Air
Mobility Command, and Air Force Special Ops Command on looking
at a follow-on to the tanker and a follow-on to the MC-130.
I've not seen the results of that yet, but I suspect it'll take
us to something that looks like a modernized C-130.
Senator Pryor. Do you know when the results of that will be
made public?
General Moseley. Sir, I don't.
Senator Pryor. Okay. Well, I'd love for you to share that
with me when you get it in.
General Moseley. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Pryor. That also brings us to the question of the
joint cargo aircraft, which I understand is a smaller aircraft,
probably two engines and all that. But where are we on that?
Where are we on the joint cargo aircraft?
General Moseley. Sir, we have a joint program office which
is an Army-led office, and they are looking at that. We have a
memorandum with them, on looking at building a smaller cargo
aircraft of some form. We are working our way through that. The
Army has not got to a place where they're close to source
selection, that I know of. We are also finishing a much more
detailed requirements document on the Air Force side. Senator,
this is important to us, not only for our Air National Guard
and our Reserve squadrons, and some Active and Air Force
Special Operations squadrons, but also in the international
market. I've sent a letter--if you would allow me to put it in
the record--to global air chiefs, that asks them to partner
with us on the requirements for a joint cargo aircraft, so we
understand emerging countries' capabilities for this sort of
thing. I've also recently sent a letter to the Governors, and
the territorial Governors, asking them to tell me what they
think their State missions are for the joint cargo aircraft.
So, sir, we're vested in this, because I believe it's a good
idea, and I believe it's the right thing to do. We just don't
have the programmatic detail yet, nor are we close to source
selection.
Senator Pryor. Mr. Chairman, I would like for that letter
to be made part of the record.
Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
General Moseley. Yes, sir.
Senator Pryor. So, tell me the general timeframe. What's
your goal to try to get this done and when would you like these
to come into the fleet?
General Moseley. Sir, I believe we, with the Army, will be
looking at source selection sometime in the May or June
timeframe. From there, it will depend on which airplane is
selected and what we have to do to the airplane to make it
mission-capable for our Guard, Reserve, Active, Special
Operations, et cetera. So, sir, I think we'll know more about
that in the May or June timeframe.
Senator Pryor. Okay.
Also, let me ask, in Iraq specifically, there have been a
number of press reports about shoulder-fired missiles going
after our helicopters. Are you seeing that same trend with the
cargo aircraft and with other aircraft in Iraq?
General Moseley. Sir, we've been shot at with the cargo-
carrying airplanes since the very beginning, because you have
to eventually get off the ground and come back to the ground,
and it's not lost on people that the airfield is where you do
that. So, there are lots of people that wait around an airfield
to fire at the C-130s, the C-5s, and the C-17s, which, of
course, we've had them hit.
We don't have the same challenge that the Army has with its
helicopters at low altitude in a variety of other routes. We
can stay out of most of that, which is an inherent benefit of
fixed-wing aircraft, that you can get out of a lot of that
stuff, other than landing and taking off.
Senator Pryor. Okay. I want to ask, if I can, about the
Iraqi air force. I know that in today's world, when you look at
what's going on, say, for example, within Iraq, you're looking
at close air support. One of your primary missions there is to
try to have that close air support. How is the Iraqi air force
doing? What are we doing to give them the capability to someday
turn that role over to them?
General Moseley. Sir, there are two parts to that. The
first thing we've done is to provide them three C-130s. Their
air force, right now, consists of some small aircraft that they
fly around, and three C-130s that they operate. We trained them
at Little Rock. Those were our crews that still fly with them.
So, we're partnered with them.
The second part of your question is, we have an effort
ongoing with Central Command now to interface with both the
Afghans and the Iraqis to look at the next set of decisions
that they make on equipage, on training, and on what types of
aircraft they'd be looking at, whether they're fixed wing or
rotary wing. Sir, that is just beginning to play out.
Senator Pryor. Is it your impression that the Iraqis have
the personnel to do that?
General Moseley. Sir, I don't know yet. From my dialogue
with them, there is a desire to do that. I don't know that
there is a capacity to do that yet. So, sir, there is more to
follow on that as we have a team of about 600 airmen that are
involved in this with Afghanistan and Iraq right now, doing
exactly what you're asking.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Pryor.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Wynne, General Moseley, thank you for your great
service to our country. I especially appreciate the service of
the airmen that you introduced today, and everything that they
are doing to keep our country safe. We are deeply appreciative
of their commitment, their dedication, their skill, and I want
to do everything we can do to continue to support them.
Secretary Wynne, I have a question regarding the B-52
synthetic fuels testing. My understanding is, that testing is
complete. Can you comment on the results of the testing and the
future Air Force plans for synthetic fuel?
Secretary Wynne. Sir, we were very pleased with the outcome
of the B-52 test at Minot Air Force Base. We went up there to
cold-soak it to make sure that it would, in fact, start under
cold conditions. All of the indications are that it performed
well. We are now undergoing a 90- to 120-day teardown of the
engine to try to prove or disprove the supposition that running
this cleaner-burning fuel also helps in the maintenance of the
engine, to try to discern whether there is a life-cycle
benefit, recognizing that we may be faced with paying a premium
for the fuel itself.
We have also laid in plans to qualify other operating
aircraft, and we hope to have the totality of the Air Force
fleet available for synthetic fuel, partnered with JP-8 jet
fuel, by about 2010.
If we can do this, then we will form a small marketplace,
because we want to be a buyer, not a supplier, in this
marketplace. We had a great energy forum. We had a lot of
people show up. Some great Americans came. Recognizing full
well that what the Air Force is trying to spark is to change
the environment in which we operate, politically. It may not
change our national interest, but it certainly will change our
temperament towards it.
Senator Thune. Are you adequately funded to continue the
synthetic fuel certification program?
Secretary Wynne. Sir, I think it's on our UPL. We are,
right now, essentially patchworking fiscal year 2007, and it
would be my intention to continue doing that through 2008, but
I have not truly identified the money. I would tell you that
there are some that really believe that, as an Air Force, we
would have first-priority call over the civilians if it was
truly a need for our Air Force to secure fuel. I just don't
think I ever want to be put in that position. I actually want
to be the source of technology, so that my other airline
colleagues can look elsewhere, and maybe not get us into that
hedge. It's one of those hedge bets that I think somebody in
government has to make, even though we hope it never comes
true.
Senator Thune. I appreciate very much the leadership role
that you've taken in that regard. I think that this is
critically important not only to our energy security needs that
we have as a Nation, but I also believe it becomes a national
security issue, and I think that the efforts that you're making
to move into this whole area of synthetic fuels is critically
important to our future.
General Moseley, Congress has added funds to put an
advanced targeting pod on the B-1 aircraft. How is the
development and fielding progressing?
General Moseley. Sir, that is working out very nicely. It's
the same pod that we use on the F-15Es and the F-16s. There are
a couple of versions of that. We've looked at putting
them on the B-52s, and we've used them on the B-52. The B-1
is the remaining aircraft system. Sir, you know better than
anyone, because they live in your State, 24 hours a day,
7 days a week, we have a B-1 over Afghanistan with
weapons bays full of ordnance. It's a great airplane to do
that. The thing that will make it even better is that pod, so
we can be able to see things from the flight deck of that
bomber, like we can see from fighters and from UAVs. So, sir,
that's progressing, and we appreciate the committee's help in
doing that. That's a big deal for us.
Senator Thune. I have a follow-up question to the line of
questioning that was asked earlier regarding the C-5/C-17
discussion. General, could you clarify your strategic airlift
requirements, and how you would propose to meet those
requirements, if authorized to retire C-5As?
General Moseley. Sir, what we don't know yet is what the
growth of the Army and the Marines is going to do to the
overall strategic airlift requirement. We do know that the MCS
that was conducted did not take into account the growth of the
Army and the Marine Corps. So, there is a piece of this that is
an unknown right now that we're working with the joint staff
and OSD.
I don't believe the numbers of strategic airlifters will go
down. In fact, I believe we're probably at the minimum level
now, with about 300. My desire would be to take out the worst
actors of the C-5 fleet, which is about 25 or 30 airplanes, I'm
told by Air Mobility Command, and be able, then, to look at
retiring them, which will provide us some revenue and some
offset to be able to continue the mods on the C-5 fleet, as
well as perhaps look at additional C-17s.
But, sir, as far as specific numbers, I don't have those
for you, because we've not gone back. We've not had someone
tell us what the results of that growth is for MCS.
Secretary Wynne. I can tell you, sir, that the--right now,
some worry about the entirety of the C-5 fleet. There are two
things we should know about this. First is that we want to line
up, worst to best, and we think there are between 20, 25, and
30 bad actors that we would like to retire. We do not have bus-
fulls of pilots awaiting the retirement language, that would
fly out to any base and begin to remove. What we would do is
begin to really structure a plan, in conjunction with the base
commander and the wing commanders, on, what we can do to
backfill to make that mission whole and what we can do to make
sure that the airmen that are there are fully satisfied and
enticed to stay with our Air Force?
Senator Thune. I thank you, again, for your service, and
thank you for your responses.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, welcome, as always, and thanks for the great job
you do for our country in making us the world's greatest
military power. Your leadership is critical at this point in
the history of our country. Thanks for bringing these great men
and women with you. They really are the face of the United
States Air Force, and we appreciate the great job they do, day
in and day out. Once again, I'm not biased or prejudiced at
all, but knowing that Moody Air Force Base is the best fighter
base in the Air Force, Sergeant Marfell, thank you for being
here, thanks for the great job you do. We're particularly proud
of you, back home.
Gentlemen, over the past several months there has been
considerable discussion relative to the C-17 and C-5 situation.
I think both of you would agree that this is not an either/or
situation. These two weapons systems complement each other, and
there's a need that both systems work in coordination with each
other to get the best for the money that we invest. But I have
a couple of questions to ask you about the C-5 and C-17.
First of all, how are the C-5Ms, that have received both
AMP and reliability enhancement and re-engining program (RERP)
modification, performing? If the Air Force were to cancel that
C-5A RERP, when would that particular cancellation yield
savings to the Air Force?
Secretary Wynne. First of all, I think we're still taking
data on the C-5Ms. The As have just been, I think, modified,
and are going through the test programs right now. We intend to
complete that action. So, we will have that. But, right now,
all indications are that they're performing pretty well. I
would tell you that the refit line always does outperform our
expectations when it comes due.
I would also tell you that where it stands now is that
there are increasing cost pressures that are causing that, if
they're going to live within their budgetary constraints, to
stretch out a little bit. We will be later in the flow.
This gets to the second part of your question, which is,
what would happen if we were to, in fact, move to, cancel the
re-engining which I'm not sure we're there yet. I think we are
all for re-engining most of the Bs, and a good part of the As,
to get there. It would be somewhere in the 2014 to 2016
timeframe, where you would get the bulk of the savings.
I think the immediate savings would literally come from not
maintaining the aircraft that we would retire over the next 2
or 3 years. So, there would be some modest amount of immediate
savings, there would be some compounding by not completing the
program, in the same way that some would say that there are
savings from the C-17 program if you don't produce them. That's
true, in that fiscal year, if you don't spend any money on C-
17, you could say you saved the money. I don't know whether
that savings is prudent, strategically, or whether the C-17/C-5
re-engining program might yet produce those economics that we
expect. But that's where I am on it. We're really balanced on
delicate tenterhooks. As you say, we would rather not see these
as either/or. They provide us a very complementary strategic
lift, and, by the way, as someone else pointed out, no one else
in the world is providing this strategic lift.
Senator Chambliss. Anything to add, General Moseley?
General Moseley. Sir, I would just reiterate that from the
baseline, this time last year, when we had this discussion, now
we have the potential of a bigger Army and a bigger Marine
Corps, which then does change the baseline of calculations on
strategic airlift. I don't see the number going below 300. I
see the number going higher. We need reliable airplanes, which
is why the AMPs, and perhaps the RERP, make even more sense
now, as long as we can continue to fund it.
Sir, I applaud your notion that this is not either/or, this
is a complementary set of operational imperatives for us, to be
able to lift in a strategic setting on these global ranges.
Senator Chambliss. Are the low C-5A reliability rates a
factor of the aircraft or are there other factors there, such
as lack of supplies and spare parts, from a support standpoint?
Any comment on that issue?
General Moseley. Senator, I would say it's a combination of
being an old airplane and where the airplane is based. Our
Guard and Reserve squadrons have the best maintenance of anyone
in the world, but they work one shift. So, you have a
reasonably old airplane that is prone to break, and if you work
it one shift, then you'll have the in-commission rates that are
inherently lower. You can address that by continuing to spend
money on the airplane, increasing their manpower at those
units, or asking them to work two shifts. There are any number
of ways to address that. But I think there are a variety of
factors for why you end up with low in-commission rates.
Senator Chambliss. Moving to the F-22. Last year, we
granted you the authority to enter into a multiyear contract
for 60 F-22s, contingent upon some additional study being
performed that outlines how much money is going to be saved in
that contract. You requested this authority and I'm pleased
that Congress granted it. Can you comment as to where we are
now, relative to that study? Are we on target to enter into
that multiyear later on this year?
Secretary Wynne. Sir, thank you, and thank you to the
committee for allowing us to pursue that multiyear. I think
this is the only way we could bridge over and fund reliably
this wonderful fifth-generation fighter that is going to be the
backbone of our air superiority for years and decades to come.
I will tell you, we are on track. I trade, every day, my
pearl-handled whip for my silver-handled whip. But, frankly,
the federally-funded research and development centers are
cooperating and responsive. The contractors have been
responsive and cooperating, and very diligent. Sir, they are,
so far, reporting to me that we will be successful in our quest
to document, to this committee and to Congress, that we, in
fact, will achieve greater than the forecasted savings, but, at
a minimum, the forecasted savings that we've asked for.
I congratulate them in advance, but I hold them to their
schedule. We should be able to award that contract this year.
Senator Chambliss. I've talked to both of you in private
conversations about the utilization of this aircraft now. I
know we have a wing that has gone to Japan and is going to be
in the rotation in theater here, hopefully sometime soon. This
aircraft seems to be performing beautifully.
General Moseley. Senator, its performance is outstanding.
This is the second overseas deployment we've had of the
airplane. First was to Alaska for Northern Edge, where we were
able to participate in a joint exercise with our Navy brothers
and sisters. The airplane performed magnificently, with the
attendant kill ratios that you would expect from a fifth-
generation airplane, versus the others.
It's deployed now in Okinawa. We have 12 airplanes there
out of the Langley Wing, out of the 1st Wing. It's doing
exactly what we're asking it to do, in a sense of dissuasion
and deterrence, and being forward and performing. Sir, we will
look at the options down the road, in some other places, if
it's required. Then we'll certainly address that. The
airplane's performing magnificently.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Let's try a 4-minute second round.
In testimony to the House Armed Services Committee on
February 28, both of you explained that in order to protect Air
Force modernization accounts and procurement of new aircraft,
the Air Force was increasing the risk in its readiness
accounts. The Air Force's fiscal year 2008 budget request
includes funds for 1.5 million flying hours to keep our pilots
trained and ready, but this is a 10 percent reduction in flying
hours, compared to that which is funded for fiscal year 2007.
Secretary Wynne, you pointed out that, in addition to
assuming the authority to retire older aircraft, the Air Force
is reducing personnel, and is challenging the flying hour
program to try to find efficiencies, such as increased use of
flight simulators, in achieving this same level of quality with
fewer resources. At the same hearing, General Moseley, you
expressed your lack of comfort with the reduction, and that
you're already contemplating ways to migrate funds back into
the flying hour program. This reduction is evidently driven by
the budget, rather than by any rigorous analysis of strategic
or operational requirements or risk.
General, starting with you, what are the strategic,
operational, and safety risks associated with this 10 percent
reduction in flying hours?
General Moseley. Sir, it's always a concern for an aviator
to reduce flying hours, because there are just things that you
can't do in a simulator that you have to do while you're
airborne. The 7.5-percent or so reduction is at the low end of
the risk scale. When you get from 7.5 to 10 percent, though,
now I'm beginning to feel a bit uncomfortable. I have asked the
staff to look at ways for the Guard, Reserve, and Active Forces
to be able to go mitigate the return to those flying hours.
Sir, this is directly relative to the utilization rates of our
airplanes. One of the challenges we have is that some of the
aircraft are so old that it's hard to generate the utilization
rates per airframe, per squadron, per month to be able to meet
those increases in flying hours. So, I'm working on the
maintenance and parts pieces of this, as well as on the flying-
hour piece of this, to see if there's not some way we can get
that back.
I'm okay with simulators, to a certain extent, but a
simulator is not airborne. There are certain things you have to
do in an airplane. You can do procedural things or part-task
trainers in a simulator, and some of the modern simulators are
magnificent for what they do--but you are still not airborne.
To deliver ordnance, to fire a gun, to drop a bomb, to provide
instrument approaches into bad weather, you have to be airborne
to do that.
I'm sounding like a fighter pilot answering your question,
but I am a fighter pilot answering your question, and I am a
service chief that worries about my pilots and my crews.
Chairman Levin. Does the reduction apply to all systems
throughout the Air Force, or is the reduction targeted to
certain aircraft or a certain training or operational
community?
General Moseley. Sir, it's across the Air Force, but some
of our systems are more impacted than others, because, for
instance, in the big airplanes, you can get airborne and do a
variety of things on a mission that is 12 hours long. When I
was up at Minot Air Force Base last week, they were preparing
to launch a 12-hour mission, and you can get a lot of things
done on a mission that long. On the small-airplane side, you
can get fewer things done in an hour or an hour and a half. So,
it varies by mission system.
Chairman Levin. When we look at your list of 25 prioritized
and 80 additional unfunded requirements, flying hours is not
included.
General Moseley. Sir, that is because I think inside our
system I can move and reprogram some of that money around to
address that. I did not want to exacerbate our overall top
line, because we did spend over 2 million man-hours attempting
to balance that budget. If I can do that internal to my major
commands, I'm much better off than having to go outside our
system to make that happen. I'd rather give it a shot, myself.
Chairman Levin. All right. You've also, I see, requested
only 74 percent of your projected depot maintenance
requirements for repair and modification of the current
systems. The Air Force's unfunded requirements list includes
over $500 million for depot maintenance at priority number
five. An additional half-billion dollars would allow the Air
Force to meet 86 percent of its requirement. I'm just
wondering, General, what are the risks involved with only
meeting 74 percent of the Air Force's depot-level maintenance
requirements on aircraft?
General Moseley. Sir, that's another great question where
you get a service chief becoming slightly uncomfortable, when
you reduce the ability for the depots to do their job. I would
offer that our three depots right now are operating at about 93
percent capacity on one shift. So, the efficiencies in the
depots are unbelievable. These people can do almost anything,
in Utah, in Georgia, and in Oklahoma. So, taking slight risk in
that is like the flying-hour program; we're forced to do this,
because, to meet our physical guidance, we've had to make some
hard decisions. On the flying-hours side, I'm sensitive to
that, because that's people in flying machines that are
airborne. On the depot side, I'm sensitive to that, because
that's long-term sustainment.
Chairman Levin. Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Wynne, General Moseley, thank you both for your
service. I appreciate greatly that you each have visited Air
Force installations in New York. I want to thank General
Moseley for honoring my invitation to join me at the Niagara
Falls Air Reserve Station last year. Secretary Wynne, thank you
for accepting my suggestion that you visit the Air Force
Research Laboratory in Rome. They do, obviously, in my opinion,
remarkable work in support of our men and women in uniform.
I have several questions about different items in the Air
Force's budget request for fiscal year 2008. I have a series of
questions about the combat search and rescue aircraft (CSAR-X)
helicopters.
The GAO recently ruled in favor of a bid protest regarding
the Air Force's new the CSAR-X. I'm concerned about some of the
public statements that the Air Force made in the aftermath of
that decision. I recently wrote a letter to you expressing my
concerns. Mr. Chairman, I request that my recent letter to
Secretary Wynne be made part of the record.
Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Clinton. In late February, Mr. Secretary, you
testified to the House Armed Services Committee that it was
your view that the GAO decision should be interpreted narrowly.
Both Reuters and Dow Jones reported that, after your appearance
before the committee, you stated that the Air Force prefers to
stay with what we got and get this product going as soon as
possible. Could you please explain those statements for us?
Secretary Wynne. Yes, ma'am. As usual, they tend to leave
off the last part of your quotation, but I would say I always
try to add that I would like to stay with the current system,
but I have to satisfy the GAO and I have to satisfy the other
competitors to make sure that they believe we have done this in
a transparent and open method. We are actually partnering, as
best we can, with the GAO and have asked them to reconsider, to
make sure that we have a better read on all of the protested
items, not just for Lockheed, but also for Sikorsky, so that,
when we do resolicit--and we have an intention to resolicit--it
will be against the findings that the GAO has alerted us to.
Ma'am, I am agnostic as to which helicopter ultimately comes
out, but, frankly, I would like to support the procurement
system that we have; and so, therefore, would like to get on
with providing this equipment.
Senator Clinton. I really appreciate that very much, Mr.
Secretary. There are a number of specific issues with respect
to the GAO decision recommending that revised proposals should
be solicited. I appreciate your commitment to resolicitation. I
think it's important, given the GAO faulting the process
followed by the prior source-selection team. I'd like to ask,
do you plan to put new personnel in place to ensure the
perception, as well as the reality, of transparency and
fairness in the reevaluation process?
General Moseley. Ma'am, what I intend to do is be very
clear with the vendors as to what we have miscommunicated with
them before. I intend to have that process be open to them so
they can see how it affected the evaluation. I intend to
debrief them on it. I do not see that we were unfair. I do
believe there were some mistakes made, and we will provide
additional oversight for that.
Senator Clinton. Another matter of concern to me with
respect to this solicitation was Secretary Ken Krieg's recent
statement, again, reported in the media, that schedule was the
most important selection criterion. That does not appear to be
consistent with the request for proposals (RFP) that says
schedule is the fifth of sixth priorities. The reason I'm
asking these questions is because obviously the combat search-
and-rescue capacity of the Air Force is critical for our men
and women in uniform, and, General Moseley, I am not aware of
any military in the world that uses the CH-47 for dedicated
CSAR. Are you?
General Moseley. Ma'am, first, thanks for recognizing that
CSAR is a core competency. We do that not just for ourselves;
it's a solemn relationship between a guy that flies and the PJ
that comes to pick him up. But we do this for the joint team,
too, whether it's Navy, Marine, or Army. We have to be able to
go fairly deep at range and pick people up. Remember, when we
send people to do this, somebody shot somebody down, so it's a
hostile place before you show up, and they're normally still
milling around back there. So, to get the PJ there to pick the
person up is a core competency for us.
Ma'am, I'm not aware that anyone uses the CH-47 in a combat
rescue role, but I would also tell you that my Army brothers
and my special operations brothers use that airframe in some
very difficult places. Today, they're flying those airplanes
into some bad places in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is not CSAR,
but it is a hostile place that they operate those airplanes.
Senator Clinton. I appreciate that, General, because I
share your strong commitment to make sure we get this right.
I'm just wondering, General, whether the Air Force completed an
analysis of alternatives for the CSAR-X program. Were any
heavy-lift helicopters, such as the H-53 or the H-47,
considered viable alternatives for the CSAR mission? If not,
could you explain why not?
General Moseley. Ma'am, an analysis of alternatives was
conducted out of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
(JROC), and it was forwarded through the joint system. We asked
for medium-lift helicopters as a nomenclature, but, as the
request for information (RFI) went out, we got no reply back
from anyone with any big helicopters. When the RFP went out,
though, the CH-47 was competed, and it met the timelines. So,
what you're asking is an interesting twist of the process. JROC
conducted an analysis of alternatives, there was an RFI and
then an RFP, and all along the way I would tell you that the
process worked. The contractor just submitted the airplane that
met those requirements in the RFP.
Senator Clinton. General, I understand very well how
important this is to all of us, but I believe that certain KPPs
related to the terminal area were not listed as special-
interested items by the source-selection team, and I think that
it might be appropriate at least to reconsider whether that
would be something to include, going forward.
General Moseley. Ma'am, can I, one more time, thank you for
the recognition that this is a big deal for us. That's why the
two of us have made this the number-two procurement priority
for the Air Force. This is a big deal for the joint team, it's
a big deal for everything that we do, and it's a moral and
ethical imperative that we pick our people up.
Senator Clinton. Obviously we want to get it right, and I'm
worried about the weight and the maneuverability and some of
the issues that have now been pushed into the public arena,
because we do have to get it right.
Mr. Chairman, I have several other questions, which I would
ask unanimous consent to submit to the record for response by
our witnesses.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, they will be made part of the
record for answers by our witnesses.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Senator Clinton.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, and good morning. We have visited personally about
many programs like military space and the Joint Surveillance
and Target Attack Radar System (J-STARS) program. I hope we
were going in the right direction when you canceled the E-10,
and used the E-8 on the J-STARS program. I would like for you
to comment on the capabilities that would have been sacrificed
by canceling the E-10.
But, Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence, I must bring up a
personal snafu that I would like for you all to get into and
see if you can unravel.
Secretary Wynne, you and I are Brevard County boys and
understand the great working relationship that the Cape
Canaveral Air Force Station has had with Port Canaveral.
Indeed, not only are joint uses made of this commercial port,
there is the Naval Ordnance Test Unit that is there, where the
Trident submarines come in and then go out into the Eastern
Test Range to test. There's also a substantial Coast Guard
presence in the port and so forth. There's a portion that is
owned by the Air Force that is underutilized and has been in
discussion and negotiations for some time between Port
Canaveral, the entity, and the Air Force, on acquiring it
either by lease or purchase. There is some bureaucratic red-
tape snafu that has gotten in the way. I wish you all would get
to the bottom of it so I don't have to add something to the
defense authorization bill in law that would direct that it be
done. This is an administrative thing, and it ought to be
handled.
The port had one appraisal, the Air Force had a double
appraisal. On top of that, the Air Force said, ``Oh, by the
way, you come back and build us a new facility and you pay for
all of that,'' and the Air Force said, ``That's it,'' a Mrs.
Katherine Halverson, the Director of the Air Force Real
Property Agency.
The port needs to expand so that it can expand its
commercial activity, but it also needs to expand so that it can
accommodate the Coast Guard. Everybody agrees this is
underutilized Air Force property that abuts right up there to
the port. If there's a legitimate question on the value of the
land, then normal practice is, if you have two appraisals that
are as divergent as one being double the other, you usually go
to a third party for an appraisal. But the Air Force says,
``That's it.'' I shouldn't have to bring this up to you, but I
have to.
Secretary Wynne. I appreciate your doing it, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. If you all can solve this
administratively, it'll save me a lot of effort, because we
have to solve it and it's been such a great working
relationship with the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station which
wants to solve this. When it got into the problem is when it
went up to the Washington level.
Now, General, let's go back to the E-8 and the E-10. Are we
sacrificing anything?
General Moseley. Sir, the Multi-Platform Radar Technology
Insertion Program radar that is the genesis of the E-10 is
still alive and we have asked for money in the UPL to be able
to continue with that radar.
There are opportunities to put that radar and a smaller
antenna on the J-STARS and we're evaluating that, also. The E-
10 itself, with a bigger antenna and a completely different
airplane, as we looked at the fiscal year 2008 budget, and as
we looked at the fiscal guidance that we had, there's not
enough money to do this. The ability to see low-observable,
low-altitude activities today and in the future is certainly a
desired option for an air-component commander in theater. So,
the notion is to keep the radar technology alive with the
people that do this, and perhaps to put it on the J-STARS,
until we get through with the KC-X opportunity and see which
airframe we get and see what opportunities we have down the
road to look at a follow-on to Airborne Warning and Control
System, J-STARS, and the Rivet Joint, sir, I think we'll be
okay. That's why we have--I think it's $408 million in the UPL,
to continue that effort.
Senator Bill Nelson. I want to continue the conversation
with you in another setting, because there are other programs
that would supplement this, and I just want to make sure that
we're doing the right thing.
General Moseley. Senator, remember also that a version of
the MP-RTIP radar is also going on the Global Hawk. So, on our
long-dwell unmanned systems we will also have a version of
this. So, there are several parts and pieces of this radar
picture that are critical for us.
Senator Bill Nelson. I want to continue that conversation.
Would you say, for the record, whatever you can say, given
the fact that the Chinese have now successfully launched an
ASAT, of which I have my own little program of trying to point
out--and we will be holding hearings on what this has done with
all of the space debris there. There are thousands and
thousands and thousands of pieces that are not only threatening
assets of the United States, but space assets of every
spacefaring nation in the world. But, aside from that issue,
the fact is that they now have the capability of knocking down,
and that weather satellite of theirs that they knocked out was
at about 500 kilometers high.
Secretary Wynne. Senator, they actually shocked me, but did
not surprise me. But, you're right, the debris field, I think,
is even causing the International Space Station to consider a
movement to try to avoid this debris, and you know a lot of
nations are partnered on that. So, they availed themselves of a
threat that I'm not even sure that their people fully advised
them of. What shocked me was the cavalier nature of the burst,
which could have been done even differently than it was, but it
was a clear in-your-face demonstration that, ``We are here.
You'd better pay attention to us. We are expanding our navy, we
are expanding our air force, and here we are. We can now take
out your low-flying satellites.'' I'll let General Moseley
speak to that import.
General Moseley. Senator, the concern now is that, for all
to now see, space is not a sanctuary. It is not an opportunity
to place an imaging system in orbit to have a free ride. Now
that another nation is able to attrit and literally kinetically
kill the satellites, it creates a whole set of challenges and
second- and third-order questions.
Sir, there's any number of ways that the Air Force is
addressing this. One is to continue to focus on our space
situation awareness so we know what's out there. We have a
variety of ways to categorize and archive objects in orbit,
from reasonably small to big. Of course, the debris field makes
it a little bit more tricky to be able to categorize all of the
parts and pieces of a debris field that big.
Sir, the next thing you know very well that we do is
attempt to harden our systems against attacks. We attempt to,
in many ways, figure out how to shield them and be able to
protect them from a variety of techniques, both kinetic and
nonkinetic, to negate our capability of either weather
navigation, early warning, or communications.
So, beyond space situation awareness and defending the
asset, I believe, is another set of policy discussions and
another set of questions about what you want your Air Force to
do next. We are not at that point yet, because we've not had
guidance or a policy discussion that takes us beyond space
situation awareness and defending the system.
Senator Bill Nelson. Even something that we take for
granted now, Mr. Chairman, in our everyday personal lives--
GPS--is now threatened, not only from a military standpoint,
but from a personal, private-sector standpoint. I will have a
hearing on this in the Commerce Committee. I have been
absolutely dumbfounded by the deafening silence of anybody
criticizing the Chinese as a result of this ASAT test, which,
as General Moseley just said, does not only pose a military
security threat to us, but poses, because of the debris field,
a threat to everybody's satellite that's up there, whether it's
military or commercial or weather or whatever it is.
General Moseley. Senator, you could teach this course, but
in October 1957 Sputnik was put in orbit. That fundamentally
changed the notion of the relationship between air and space
and the ability to put orbital systems up. This country then
began to do some very energized things that ended up with a
lunar landing. Now we have someone that can attrit systems in
orbit at those altitudes and this is a different ball game.
This is not a sanctuary anymore. So, we've had these
discussions, and we would welcome that dialogue, as to what you
want us to do next.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
I'm going to now call on Senator Warner. I will ask him to
close.
Again, our thanks to our witnesses and to our special
guests.
Senator Warner.
General Moseley. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Warner [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I'd like to follow on the line of questioning
from our distinguished colleague from Florida, who,
fortunately, brings firsthand experience regarding space to
this committee. His customary humility prohibits him from
dwelling on his experience, but we all well know it's very
dedicated, and not just because of the interests of Florida,
it's his personal interest in space.
But I would want to follow on and bring to your attention
that the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act required the
DOD to assess whether the Department is allocating sufficient
resources to the space control mission. While the report is
classified, it can be said that the Department understands that
there are areas where additional effort is needed. You've
already give us pretty much your opinion of the Chinese ASAT
test, but do you believe the DOD is devoting sufficient
resources toward countering such threats?
Secretary Wynne. Sir, at present, we are dedicating what I
think are sufficient resources to develop technologies to
counter this. We think that we have the right kind of programs,
and we just have put into space some additional programs to
provide some defensive capability to these satellites. What we
don't do, and what we could do, but we know that it would
probably break the bank a little bit, is to try to harden all
of the satellites so that they are, in fact, impervious to
ground-based intercepts or ground-based lasing. We see this as
an encroaching requirement and we don't know how to do it
inexpensively. So, that's the area where I would say if we had
another dollar, we would probably put it into that aspect.
We are, right now, though, trying to figure out how to do
sufficient work to make sure that we have a protective device
in front of our satellites, and that's about where we are.
General Moseley. Senator, you know very well the space
fence that's down at Dahlgren. That is one of the capabilities
where we've continued to partner with the Navy, on how we
categorize and archive objects out there. The first part of
this equation is space situation awareness, to know what's out
there and then be able to see the effect. The next step is
defensive counterspace, which is where we are now. Senator,
there's always something better you can do, and there's always
a different technology. That's the challenge of staying ahead.
Like Sputnik, now that space is not a sanctuary, this is
getting to be serious business in orbit.
Senator Warner. Let's get back to the debris issue and how,
as the Senator from Florida pointed out, it affects so many
nations. Here we have the superpower, the United States and the
emerging ambitions of China to be a superpower. Perhaps it's
time for an international consortium to sit down and examine
this issue and, frankly, determine that it's in the interests
of many, many nations, largely for peaceful efforts, that we
have space operable in such a way that satellites can survive.
Many nations cannot afford a fully hardened system to go up
there. That adds weight, that adds thrust problems on launch.
General Moseley. Sir, to include that the security of the
downlinks and uplinks, which are the other part of the system,
are very hard to defend unless you focus on that.
Senator Warner. Anyway, somebody ought to look at who
should try and come up with the formalized idea of calling for
an international consortium to address this issue. I wonder if
you might take it upon yourselves, at your convenience, to get
back to me on that issue. I'd be quite interested in following
that up.
[The information referred to follows:]
International consortia already exist to address the issue of
voluntary space debris mitigation:
The 2006 ``National Space Policy,'' states ``[t]he
United States shall take a leadership role in international
fora to encourage foreign nations and international
organizations to adopt policies and practices aimed at debris
minimization and shall cooperate in the exchange of information
on debris research and the identification of improved debris
mitigation practices.''
The United States actively participates in the U.N.
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS)
Science and Technology Subcommittee (STSC), which formed a
Working Group on Space Debris to address the growing problem of
manmade debris and to outline debris mitigation steps that
spacefaring nations can take.
On 21 Feb 07, the Working Group (including the
Chinese delegation) adopted a set of international
voluntary ``Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines'', under
which member states and international organizations
will voluntarily take measures to ensure, to the
greatest extent feasible, space debris mitigation
practices and procedures are enacted and followed.
The Mitigation Guidelines will now be
forwarded to the UNCOPUOS for approval in June 2007 and
perhaps to a Special Resolution of the U.N. General
Assembly to endorse the Guidelines this fall. The STSC
agreed to include space debris as an item on next
year's agenda to focus on national reporting of debris
issues with an emphasis on implementation of mitigation
practices.
The United States also actively participates in the
International Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee
(IADC), a working group of technical experts from 11
international space agencies. The 11 space agencies are from
China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United
Kingdom, the Ukraine, the United States, and the European Space
Agency. The primary purpose of the IADC is to exchange
information on space debris research activities between member
space agencies, to facilitate opportunities for cooperation in
space debris research, to review the progress of ongoing
cooperative activities, and to identify debris mitigation
options.
Finally, our National Space Policy states that the
United States believes space should be freely available to all
nations for peaceful use and that current treaties and
agreements are sufficient. Further, the United States ``will
oppose the development of new legal regimes or other
restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or
use of space.'' For these reasons, the United States encourages
adoption of the voluntary Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines
developed by the UNCOPUOS.
Senator Warner. Just one concluding question here then
votes are going to require me to suspend.
Now, Mr. Secretary, I don't know of anyone better qualified
to have assumed the position as a Secretary of a military
Service than you as it regards acquisition. You've devoted so
much of your career to acquisition not only in the Department,
but before you came to the Department. Do you think you're
hitting the right balance to provide a workforce that can
continue to demonstrate the transparency and confidence that
Congress will require, and the taxpayer deserves?
Secretary Wynne. Yes, sir, I do. I think that it's not that
we have not stressed to them that we want them to take on,
effectively, more responsibility; in other words, I think
acquisition should return to blue so that we have more of our
own internal expertise, and don't rely so much on contract
support. That's one of the things that we're doing. We are
dedicating some training to that. We have also reassessed the
manpower reductions, if you will, and had our new systems
acquisition executive go through a relook to make sure that we
are well-balanced in that area. We are dedicating some terrific
resources in--as far as knowledgeable individuals to it. So, I
am watching it carefully. It is an area, much like the flying
program, where I have concerns, and we're addressing them.
Senator Warner. I thank you very much. That's reassuring,
because, I tell you, if I look back over a fairly long career
here in the United States Senate, I will never forget the
stories about the cost of a hammer and the cost of a commode
and all of those things that really were devastating to good
procurement records for the DOD. Simple things like that get
the attention of the public.
Secretary Wynne. Right.
Senator Warner. I think that I can also say, having had the
privilege of being here for a number of years, the two of you
provide a great team for leadership. You exemplify what a
secretary and a chief of staff should do as working partners,
yet there has to always be a little element of competition
between the two of you.
So, I wish you well, and I think this has been a very, very
fine hearing, for those who followed it.
Again, we commend our honored guests here today, knowing
that there are literally tens of thousands behind you that
recognize that, while you've been selected to represent all of
them, you did it in a way that reflects honor and credit on all
your other brethren, wherever they are in the world, not
dressed in pristine outfits, as you are this morning, but
working, sweating in dungarees, and taking on the risks
associated with our deployed forces overseas.
Thank you very much.
Secretary Wynne. Thank you, Senator.
General Moseley. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Warner. The committee is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
air force science and technology funding
1. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne, the Air Force's fiscal year 2008
science and technology (S&T) budget request has been reduced by nearly
$200 million from the 2007 request and nearly $650 million from the
2007 appropriated levels. Some of the reason for this reduction was the
transfer of classified programs out of the S&T budget. Why were these
classified programs put in the S&T budget originally?
Secretary Wynne. Funding for the special programs line was
originally put into the Air Force S&T program to cover classified S&T
efforts. In conjunction with the fiscal year 2008 President's budget
request, efforts were reprioritized and special programs funding was
transferred out of the S&T program.
2. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne, did the classified programs
artificially inflate the size of the Air Force S&T investment budget?
Secretary Wynne. This Special Programs line funding was put into
the Air Force S&T program to support valid classified S&T efforts. I
don't know that this should be categorized as `artificial'.
3. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne, what areas of S&T investment
would benefit from additional resources should more become available?
Secretary Wynne. If additional resources should become available,
there are many areas within the Air Force S&T program in which this
funding could be wisely invested. The Air Force Unfunded Priorities
List for Fiscal Year 2008 includes S&T efforts totaling $32 million in
support of critical capability areas, such as Force Application and
Protection, Create and Sustain the Force, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance, Net Centric Enterprise, et cetera. A breakout of
specific efforts is included in the attached spreadsheet.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
manufacturing readiness levels
4. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne, how is the Air Force making use
of manufacturing readiness levels to speed the transition of new
technologies to the warfighter and reduce life cycle costs for deployed
systems?
Secretary Wynne. Implementation of Manufacturing Readiness Levels
(MRLs) is a major step in Air Force efforts to strengthen its
acquisition process and could lead to accelerated technology transition
and reduced life cycle costs by providing risk assessments in terms of
manufacturing similar to those provided by Technology Readiness Level
assessments. The Air Force is currently incorporating MRLs into all of
its Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD) efforts, while also
piloting application to Acquisition Category (ACAT) level programs.
Conducting a Manufacturing Readiness Assessment (MRA) on key
technologies for each ATD is a key component to MRL implementation. The
MRA determines the initial MRL, a final desired MRL within a given
timeframe, and major manufacturing risks associated with achieving the
final target MRL. This process produces a Manufacturing Maturity Plan,
which enables a program to achieve its final target MRL. The
incorporation of MRLs into ATDs is forcing the producibility of the
technology to be considered in parallel with technology development.
Although in the early stages for these ATD programs, transition and
affordability improvements have already been identified for systems
using turbine engines, solar cells, and tactical sensors. While not
fully implemented yet, the MRL methodology is being practiced in ACAT
programs and recently yielded technology transition and production
process benefits for the F-22A and Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air
Missile programs. To date three major themes have evolved from programs
that have conducted MRAs and implemented this MRL methodology-
technology transition is being accelerated, innovative manufacturing
technologies are being established, and technology transition risk is
being reduced.
air force seismic research program
5. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne, the Air Force Research Laboratory
(AFRL) conducts seismic research to support Air Force Technical
Applications Center's (AFTAC) seismic monitoring mission. This nuclear
test treaty monitoring mission was assigned to the Air Force 60 years
ago by President Eisenhower. As such, it is a national mission. Does
AFRL have sufficient funding to support all of the good proposals that
it receives each year in response to its seismic research program
solicitation? If not, what is the dollar level of the shortfall each
year?
Secretary Wynne. No, AFRL does not have sufficient funding to
support all highly rated proposals. The current funding level for the
research program is at about $4.5 million per year. The annual
shortfall is about $21.5 million.
6. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne, what is the projected impact of
not funding these proposals on AFTAC's current and future operational
capability?
Secretary Wynne. [Deleted.]
7. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne, what other Department of Defense
(DOD) seismic research efforts directly support AFTAC's assigned
missions?
Secretary Wynne. [Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
aircraft retirement and recapitalization
8. Senator Akaka. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, in your
posture statement, you discuss the need to recapitalize and revitalize
the aging Air Force fleet. I understand that the average age of the Air
Force's current aircraft inventory is 24 years and that this represents
a significant increase over the Vietnam era when the average age was 9
years. I also understand that 14 percent of Air Force planes are not
mission ready or have mission limiting restrictions. Why is it that
some of your aircraft have mission limiting restrictions or are unable
to fly? Is the Air Force aircraft maintenance budget underfunded or is
there some other cause?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. Senator, as you have pointed
out, our aircraft inventory is on average 24 years old. It is true that
as of 31 December 2006, 14 percent of our inventory was grounded or
mission-limited flight restricted. The primary reason for these
groundings and restrictions is related to structural issues due to age
and usage, not maintenance. Most of the grounded aircraft are the C-
130Es and KC-135Es that we have discussed during this hearing. But to
reiterate, they both have structural issues that have surfaced as a
result of extreme age and high use. Many of the grounded C-130E and KC-
135E aircraft are beyond economical repair. Additionally, most of the
F-15A-E aircraft inventory is under peacetime mission-limiting flight
restrictions due to vertical stabilizer structural issues. A depot
level repair program is ongoing and will be complete on the F-15 fleet
by 2009. In a nutshell, the structural problems we have are a result of
old, tired aircraft. To address these issues, we are putting large
amounts of funding toward service life extension programs and the like;
however, some aircraft are so old that we believe those resources are
better spent toward much needed recapitalization.
9. Senator Akaka. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, your posture
statement states that ``Although recent congressional support for
planned legacy aircraft retirements has aided our divestment strategy,
unnecessary restrictions draw critical resources away from our aircraft
modernization programs and degrade our efforts to recapitalize our
aircraft inventory.'' Can you elaborate on what these ``unnecessary
restrictions'' are and how they are inhibiting your recapitalization
efforts?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. Additional relief from
legislative restrictions would allow for flexibility and increased
options for fleet management. For example, if we were able to retire
the older C-5s, we could recapitalize the airlift capability with C-17
platforms off a production line that is still hot. If we wait we may
not have that option without spending a lot more in procurement later.
Restrictions translate to costs to modernize, operate, and support
aircraft with funds that would otherwise be spent on newer platforms
that would be relevant and sustainable for a longer period of time.
10. Senator Akaka. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, if funded
at the requested funding levels, how long will it take to completely
replace our older planes?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. Under the fiscally constrained
current program, it will take almost 50 years to completely replace our
older planes, and for some major weapon systems, it is longer. Our 50
year recapitalization rate is like planning to use P-51s in Vietnam or
F-86s in Iraq.
The Planning Force establishes a glide path to building a fully
modernized 86 Combat Wing equivalent force as directed in the 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The Air Force requires an average $20
billion more per year to recapitalize and meet joint capability and
capacity goals in the future. The plan is to recapitalize most of the
fleet by 2030.
11. Senator Akaka. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, what will
the average age of the aircraft inventory be after your
recapitalization efforts are complete?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The United States Air Force
has an aging fleet of aircraft that continues to get older, but won't
last forever. The average age in 1973 was 8 years, today it is near 24
years. Even if we divest and fund everything planned in the Future
Years Defense Plan (FYDP), average age still climbs to 26 years by
fiscal year 2013. The National Strategy provides guidance on shaping
the force, but there are also manufacturing and resource limitations.
In order to fully recapitalize the Air Force by 2030, and build a
modern and ready 86 Combat Wing equivalent Air Force as directed by the
2006 QDR, the Air Force will require additional resources to
aggressively recapitalize while sustaining readiness and meeting the
needs of the warfighter.
validity of the quadrennial defense review
12. Senator Akaka. General Moseley, the 2005 QDR appears to have
already been somewhat overtaken by events. Specifically, 1 year later,
DOD is proposing to increase the size of the Active-Duty Army, the Army
National Guard, and the Marine Corps over the levels recommended in the
QDR. To your knowledge, has the National Military Strategy (NMS) been
changed since the QDR was submitted?
General Moseley. Senator Akaka, the 2004 NMS has not changed since
the 2006 QDR was released. The NMS provides a description of the Armed
Forces' plan to achieve military objectives in the near-term. Those
objectives: to protect the United States; prevent conflict and surprise
attack; and prevail against adversaries, have not changed.
13. Senator Akaka. General Moseley, do you believe the QDR threat
environment assumptions and mandated force structure goals for the Air
Force are still appropriate?
General Moseley. The Air Force continues to support the goals and
objectives laid down by both the NMS and the QDR. In turn, the Air
Force's force structure--both present and future force, continues to
support the United States and its allies against all threats,
particularly those dictated in the QDR. While the Air Force's force
structure may be adjusted to increases/decreases to air and space
programs, none of the goals have changed. These goals remain
appropriate given the demands of the war and other identified future
military threats.
nontraditional roles
14. Senator Akaka. General Moseley, the Air Force posture statement
describes the need for the Air Force to adapt to nontraditional roles,
such as convoy escort, infrastructure protection, provincial
reconstruction, and host nation election support. Are these
nontraditional roles factored into your new end strength numbers?
General Moseley. We did not specifically budget for end strength to
perform nontraditional roles, such as convoy escort, infrastructure
protection, provincial reconstruction, and host nation election support
where those represent missions normally performed by other Services. We
will continue to perform these roles as requested as much as we can
accommodate out of current end strength that was budgeted to perform
Air Force missions.
15. Senator Akaka. General Moseley, as the conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan continue, are you expecting the level of effort for these
nontraditional activities to remain constant or do you expect them to
increase?
General Moseley. Presently we are experiencing an increase in the
level of effort required for nontraditional activities as a result of
the additional combat support and combat service support required to
enable the plus-up of combat forces called for by the President. To
support this plus-up, roughly 93 percent of the enabler support our
airmen provide is within our core competency. Aside from that resulting
from the Presidential plus-up, we are seeing an increase in the
nontraditional piece our airmen contribute due in large part to the
vast amount of military, reconstruction, and civil transition training.
Training teams involve skill sets where no service is the single
preferred provider. In the near future we expect the number of training
teams to increase and therefore we expect to see more of these
requirements come our way.
16. Senator Akaka. General Moseley, what are the drivers that cause
the Air Force to be tasked with these nontraditional assignments? Is it
because the Army or Marine Corps have insufficient troop levels and the
Air Force and Navy are being used to make up the difference?
General Moseley. I cannot speak to any of the other Services' end
strength levels. The fact is the Air Force is tasked to provide support
to the combatant commander (COCOM). U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and
the Joint Staff have deemed these requirements as joint and therefore
the Air Force fills them accordingly. As these requirements go up, so
does the Air Force's contribution.
17. Senator Akaka. General Moseley, how would you rate the morale
of our airmen, and has performing these nontraditional tasks had any
effect on morale?
General Moseley. While the level of morale for any unit is
dependent on the specific mission and the quality of the leadership,
overall morale for airmen performing nontraditional in-lieu-of tasks is
very high--they are extremely proud to serve the Nation. Leadership in
these in-lieu-of deployments is pivotal and our senior airmen leaders
in these settings do a great job keeping the group focused on the
mission, taking pride in the adaptability they're building by
performing these nontraditional missions, and leveraging the core
skills they bring to the fight. Morale directly correlates to the
amount and quality of Air Force interest these airmen get: it's
important for them to know the Army values what they're doing, but it's
critical to know that the Air Force values them, values their service,
and hasn't just put them ``out there'' to serve on the end of a thread,
and we reinforce this in leadership visits and media stories of their
service.
Finally, the way we as an Air Force value and employ these airmen
when they return will be a long-term barometer that is important to the
morale of subsequent groups of in-lieu-of airmen. We appreciate their
service and leverage their experience by feeding it as appropriate back
into the pre-deployment and other training. We have consistently
received feedback from Army commanders that the airmen who work for
them are outstanding. This is a direct reflection of the
professionalism and morale of these airmen: they do good work, they
know it's important and they excel because it's an Air Force core value
to be excellent in all we do.
We have outstanding airmen who are dedicated to executing their
assigned mission, adapting and overcoming as necessary, and placing
their lives on the line every day. Without question, they are doing the
Air Force proud!
readiness
18. Senator Akaka. General Moseley, it is my understanding that the
Air Force's readiness level has decreased 17 percent since 2001. What
are the causes of this readiness decrease, and how does this budget
address the problem?
General Moseley. The Air Force has been at war for 16+ consecutive
years. In fact, we are currently flying at the same level as we did 13
years ago, but with fewer aircraft, higher personnel tempo, and older
equipment. While readiness levels are stable and manageable in most
communities, continued tempo of operations (OPTEMPO) and aging
equipment are causing degradation in the readiness of several stressed
low density/high demand (LD/HD) communities including Special
Operations Forces; Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR); Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR); and Command and Control Assets.
Personnel and training issues in certain communities resulting from
exceeding the Air Force's Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) construct also
contribute to the overall readiness decline.
The Air Force's fiscal year 2008 budget prioritizes winning the
global war on terror, caring for our airmen and families, and
recapitalizing and modernizing our air, space, and cyberspace systems.
This budget attempts to maintain a combat capable and ready force while
modernizing for future challenges.
19. Senator Akaka. General Moseley, how long will it take to bring
the Air Force readiness level back up to its pre-2001 level?
General Moseley. It could take several years to return to pre-2001
readiness levels. The Air Force has been at war for 16+ consecutive
years and we've been transforming and making strategic trades for
years. We continue to execute plans to become more efficient and
effective while simultaneously preparing for the long-term. Despite our
best efforts, readiness, recapitalization, and modernization continue
to decline. This downward trend is only slowed due to our dedicated
manpower and adaptable capabilities. Current funding levels slow this
decreasing readiness trend but will not reverse it.
20. Senator Akaka. General Moseley, it is clear that the Army and
the Marine Corps are either overextended, or are being stretched pretty
thin by the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Given the decrease in
readiness of the Air Force over the last 5 years, are we overextending
the Air Force as well?
General Moseley. With the exception of LD/HD career fields and
assets, the Air Force maintains sufficient residual capability to
support ongoing Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation Iraqi Freedom
combat operations and act as the Nation's strategic Reserve. The Air
Force's AEF construct is working as designed by reducing the
possibility of overextending our forces. Despite several career fields
surging (Security Forces, Civil Engineering, Transportation,
Communications, Intelligence, Explosive Ordinance Disposal, some
medical specialties, C-130s, and tankers), the AEF construct enables
the Air Force to meet nearly all COCOM requirements. The AEF continues
to fill its primary purpose of identifying which unit, and which
personnel, are next to deploy while allowing Air Force leadership to
see what forces are available to respond to the next contingency. AEF
is flexible and will adapt to the changing environment and emerging
needs. AEF allows the Air Force to continue to meet COCOM requirements.
21. Senator Akaka. General Moseley, how prepared is the Air Force
to deal with any additional emerging threats?
General Moseley. The Air Force continues to possess sufficient
capability to provide required capabilities for the current conflict
and deal with emerging threats. Investments in modernization and
recapitalization will increase Air Force capabilities to support the
global war on terror as well as any Major Combat Operations against
expanding and changing threats. The Air Force has a critical
requirement to recapitalize its combat air forces. The Air Force is
flying the oldest fleet in its history and the vast majority will
complete its service life within 15 years.
22. Senator Akaka. General Moseley, given the significant
investment by other powers, such as China, in their military, is it
your opinion that this budget is sufficient for our Air Force to
maintain its superiority in the long-term? Please address whether we
are investing sufficient resources into future generation aircraft and
technology research and development (R&D).
General Moseley. We are not investing sufficient resources into
future generation aircraft and technology R&D. The global war on
terror's duration and OPTEMPO has accelerated consumption of service
life for numerous platforms. We must invest in current and future
capabilities that guarantee entry against the anti-access capability of
emerging threats--next generation fighters provide that capability. We
must recapitalize at a faster rate to ensure U.S. advantage over any
future adversary. To build a fully recapitalized, modern, and ready
force as directed by the 2006 QDR, the Air Force will need additional
resources.
risk
23. Senator Akaka. Secretary Wynne, in your posture statement, you
say that ``The FYDP involves taking acceptable risk in lower priority
areas in order to meet future readiness, capability, force structure,
and national security requirements.'' Will you please elaborate on
where in the budget request you are assuming risk, why this level of
risk is acceptable, and what are the consequences of being wrong?
Secretary Wynne. The Air Force has carefully balanced our readiness
requirements with our recapitalization and modernization efforts to
support the warfighter. However, higher aircraft and equipment
utilization rates, loss of buying power, and aging aircraft have
increased our risk both to our ability to ``fight tonight'' and to
prepare for tomorrow's war.
Air Force continues to operate above the steady state level
of two AEFs. Persistent surge operations drive increased
resourcing and readiness issues.
Higher operating costs from utilities, fuel, aircraft
ownership, and manpower costs (retirement, DHP) impact our
ability to recapitalize our Air Force to meet emerging threats
from advanced technologies and air defenses that threaten U.S.
dominance and place ground forces at risk.
Average Air Force aircraft age is 24 years which drives
higher operations and support, investment, and manpower costs
and negatively impacts aircraft availability. Retiring the
oldest, least capable aircraft allows the Air Force to realize
savings that can be used to buy new aircraft or selectively
modify some aircraft in the existing fleet.
The Air Force will continue to assess potential impact to affected
programs, force structure, and capabilities.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
air force test assets
24. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, what
is the status of the planned reorganization of Air Force test assets
that was initiated by Program Budget Decision (PBD) 720?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. Funding was realigned during
the development of the fiscal year 2008 President's budget to preclude
closing or realigning those facilities. The Air Force faces a
challenging fiscal environment and has little choice but to consider
serious options to gain efficiencies. We continue to study the Air
Force Test and Evaluation infrastructure. We look forward to working
closely with Congress to ensure we have the resources such that the Air
Force can preserve the necessary capability for our Nation in order to
win the current conflict and to be prepared to win the next war.
25. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, what
is the status of the development and delivery of the reports required
by the congressional authorization and appropriations conference
reports regarding these proposed actions?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force is currently
conducting a cost-benefit analysis as required by the Defense
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2007. This report is scheduled to be
delivered to Congress no later than 30 April 2007. The results of this
study will provide input for further analysis in the joint study
required by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal
Year 2007.
26. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, have
actions been taken that presume the execution of any activities
contemplated through the implementation of PBD 720?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force has undertaken
no action to close, realign, or transfer any test and evaluation
activities contemplated in the fiscal year 2008 Air Force Materiel
Command test and evaluation proposal.
27. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, what
is the Air Force budget request for test and evaluation activities in
fiscal year 2008 and how does this compare to the fiscal year 2007 and
fiscal year 2006 requested and appropriated levels?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The fiscal year 2008 budget
request for direct funding of Air Force Materiel Command Test and
Evaluation infrastructure is $929.6 million. The fiscal year 2007
request was $919.4 million and appropriated was $930.3 million. The
fiscal year 2006 request was $867.3 million and appropriated was $881.8
million.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator E. Benjamin Nelson
total force integration initiatives
28. Senator Ben Nelson. General Moseley, in your posture statement
you state that ``a distinguishing hallmark of the Air Force is the ease
with which airmen from Active-Duty, Air National Guard, and Air Force
Reserve work together at home and abroad.'' You also note that 136
total force integration initiatives have been identified and funding
has been secured for 98. That leaves 38 initiatives unfunded, 2 of
which happen to be proposed for Offutt Air Force Base (AFB), NE. What
is your plan to resource those total force integration initiatives you
do not fund in your fiscal year 2008 budget request?
General Moseley. Most of the 38 initiatives, including the 2
Nebraska initiatives you mention, are currently at the ``investigate''
stage of the process. The Air Force is working closely with the Air
Force Reserve and the National Guard Bureau to resolve issues regarding
TFI timelines, funding, manpower, potential locations for emerging
missions, and new organizational constructs. The Air Force will pursue
funding in the fiscal year 2010 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for
these initiatives if the decision is made, after further analysis, to
proceed.
wc-135 modernization
29. Senator Ben Nelson. General Moseley, I noted two of your stated
priorities for the Air Force are ``fighting and winning the global war
on terror,'' and ``recapitalizing and modernizing aging aircraft.'' I
was pleased to see that you have requested funding to modernize two WC-
135 Constant Phoenix aircraft in your fiscal year 2008 global war on
terror budget request. The WC-135 has been instrumental in monitoring
the nuclear activities of our potential adversaries around the world.
If you get the $143.8 million you have requested for WC-135
modernization, will that extend the life of the aircraft to something
comparable to the KC-135R tanker?
General Moseley. The $143.8 million estimate is based on $118.8
million for re-engining and $25 million to upgrade the cockpit
avionics. The re-engining figure was based on procuring and installing
two engine kits for the WC-135 aircraft in conjunction with several
foreign military sales (FMS) re-engining initiatives. The FMS
initiatives were later cancelled making re-tooling and re-opening the
engine production line at the Boeing Wichita facility, for only two WC-
135 aircraft, cost prohibitive. The WC-135 re-engining initiative
should be withdrawn from the Air Force fiscal year 2008 global war on
terror request portfolio.
However, the $25 million needed to upgrade the cockpit avionics of
the two WC-135 aircraft is still needed. It will enable the two
aircraft to meet worldwide navigation and communications requirements--
Communication Navigation Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM).
Specific to life extension: The Air Force will not need $118.8
million to obtain the same life expectancy of the KC-135 fleet. The
current cost of re-engining (without concurrent FMS cases) will be cost
prohibitive, so the $118.8 million should no longer be considered.
There are plenty of spare TF-33 engines available to support the WC-135
aircraft until 2040. All the Air Force needs to do is upgrade the
cockpit avionics to meet the CNS/ATM requirements for $25 million.
e-4
30. Senator Ben Nelson. General Moseley, the 2006 QDR proposed to
retire the four E-4B National Airborne Operations Center aircraft
assigned to Offutt AFB. I have been told that this decision has since
been reversed and your posture statement does not show any E-4 aircraft
being retired through 2013. Does your fiscal year 2008 budget request
restore full-funding to the E-4 program?
General Moseley. Sir, the fiscal year 2008 budget restores the
funding necessary to operate a three aircraft E-4B fleet through the
FYDP and beyond. The fiscal year 2008 budget also includes funding for
the minimum number of modifications (mostly crypto updates) necessary
to keep the three aircraft E-4B fleet mission capable through the FYDP
and beyond. The fourth E-4B will be retired as soon as practical. The
Air Force with DOD is conducting an Analysis of Alternatives in fiscal
year 2008 to replace the E-4B.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Evan Bayh
global hawk shortage
31. Senator Bayh. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, what is the
shortage of available Predators, Global Hawks and orbits to stated DOD
requirements in the field, including for U.S. forces in Iraq;
Afghanistan; Colombia; and East, South, and Southeast Asia?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC) endorsed the U.S. Special Operations Command
and U.S. CENTCOM global war on terror demand for increased unmanned
aircraft systems (UAS) orbits (JROCM 283-05).
At the same time, the JROC also validated the Air Force's planning
and programming efforts to build 21 MQ-1 orbits to meet the increased
global war on terror Predator demand. The Air Force programmed
additional funds for MQ-1 Predator procurement and sustainment in
fiscal years 2007-2011 to meet the increased combatant command demand.
The Predator system architecture and concept of operations (CONOPs) is
designed with the flexibility to support any COCOM regardless of
geographic area.
The RQ-4 Global Hawk is fielding aircraft as soon as they complete
testing; the first two production models, Block 10, are supporting
CENTCOM now. The establishment of forward operating locations in U.S.
Pacific Command and European Command in fiscal year 2009 will add to
the Air Force's ability to conduct worldwide operations. The program is
the key element to the transition of high-altitude ISR from the U-2 to
the Global Hawk and will be accomplished without diminishing required
capability.
32. Senator Bayh. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, what is the
timeline for fully closing this shortage?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Predator will achieve its
fielded requirement by fiscal year 2010 and the Global Hawk by fiscal
year 2016.
33. Senator Bayh. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, has DOD
requested all necessary funds to keep Predator, Global Hawk, and
associated orbit production lines running at maximum capacity until the
shortage is fully closed? If not, why not?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. Yes, with the fiscal year 2007
global war on terror Supplemental Appropriation, the fiscal year 2008
President's budget request, and the Predator funding included on our
fiscal year 2008 Unfunded Priority List (UPL), we have requested all
the funds necessary to keep Predator production lines running at
maximum capacity until the shortage, as it is presently defined, is
fully met. The requirement for Predator combat air patrols (CAP)--
previously called orbits--continues to expand, and we will undoubtedly
have to continue at maximum capacity longer than we had previously
projected.
The Global Hawk program is currently funded for maximum production
capacity allowable under the June 2006 Nunn-McCurdy certification.
34. Senator Bayh. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, what steps
do you recommend to close this gap?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. We are currently delivering
Predator aircraft and ground control stations faster than we can train
the crews to operate them. We are taking steps to expand our training
capacity by starting a training unit with the California Air National
Guard. We also need to re-examine the usage rate of our existing crews
and weigh the increased stress on the crew force against the urgency of
providing additional CAPs to support our troops in combat.
35. Senator Bayh. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, does having
a sole source producer delay meeting Predator production and
procurement timelines? If so, how can we best open up the competition?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. Thus far, having a single
source for Predator production has not delayed delivery of combat
capability. As stated previously, the current delay is in training
flight crewmembers.
Previous attempts to broaden the industrial base for this class of
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) have not been successful--no other
offerors came forward. The Air Force has just released another request
for information to stimulate additional vendors.
36. Senator Bayh. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, would you
please provide the 5-year Predator, Global Hawk, and orbit requirement?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The MQ-1 Predator program will
attain its goal of 21 CAPs for COCOM support by fiscal year 2010;
continued procurement throughout the rest of the FYDP will provide
attrition reserve and training systems.
The RQ-4 Global Hawk is building to its requirement of six Multi-
Intelligence (multi-INT) CAPs. Within this FYDP, all aircraft will have
been procured. By fiscal year 2013, the Air Force will have fielded
four multi-INT CAPs and two IMINT-only CAPs.
37. Senator Bayh. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, do you
foresee both armed and ISR, long-endurance UAVs being a long-term and
growing requirement for the United States Armed Forces?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. As you well know, UAVs of all
types are providing invaluable, timely information in support of the
Joint Force Commander's priorities. They provide superb persistent
support to the warfighter, whether that support is a lethal strike in
support of troops, long-term eyes on a target of interest, or
situational awareness on what's over the next hill. For these reasons,
and all of the other missions fulfilled by UAVs, it is clear that
demand for them will only increase over the coming years. Allow me to
also say that it is because of this ever-increasing demand and our need
for joint interdependence--our asymmetric combat edge that I am seeking
to be Executive Agent (EA) for all medium- and high-altitude UAVs. The
intent of the Air Force UAV EA proposal is to increase jointness,
acquisition efficiency, and warfighting effectiveness in the DOD
medium- and high-altitude UAV enterprise. We would deeply appreciate
your support of the Air Force's request to be EA.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton
lab personnel issues
38. Senator Clinton. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, AFRL
performs some of the most cutting edge research in the world and
contributes directly and strongly to the global war on terrorism. There
is concern that the Air Force is not doing enough to ensure that the
laboratories have adequate facilities or are sufficiently empowered to
attract and retain the highest quality technical workforce possible.
Congress has authorized a successful laboratory personnel demonstration
program that has been effective in addressing some of these issues.
AFRL is exempted from inclusion into the National Security Personnel
System (NSPS) until the Secretary of Defense has determined that NSPS
provides more personnel flexibilities than the AFRL Laboratory
Personnel Demonstration System authorities. Is the Air Force supportive
of the AFRL's continued use and expansion of the authorities of the
Laboratory Personnel Demonstration System?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force supports the
DOD's goal of one personnel system for its civilian workforce--the
NSPS. We also recognize the success the AFRL has enjoyed in shaping its
Scientist and Engineer (S&E) workforce through the flexibilities
afforded by the Laboratory Personnel Demonstration System, commonly
referred to as Lab Demo, and will support AFRL's efforts while the
current exemption remains in effect.
39. Senator Clinton. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, has the
Air Force surveyed Air Force laboratory directors to determine if they
feel that the Laboratory Personnel Demonstration System better supports
the performance of their missions than the proposed NSPS system?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force has not formally
surveyed the individual AFRL Technology Directorate Directors regarding
personnel demonstration efforts; however, given the success that AFRL
has enjoyed in shaping its S&E workforce through the flexibilities
afforded by the Laboratory Personnel Demonstration System (i.e., Lab
Demo), it is expected that most would be highly supportive of Lab Demo.
However, only the S&Es at AFRL are covered by Lab Demo, leaving
administrative and other support personnel under the current General
Schedule (GS)/Wage Grade (WG) personnel systems. AFRL would prefer
having the opportunity to move these non-Lab Demo employees into NSPS
in the near-term since this system is better than the current GS/WG
systems.
small business innovation research program
40. Senator Clinton. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, what role
does the Air Force Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program
play in developing new technologies that are supporting Air Force
missions?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The SBIR program funds early-
stage R&D at small technology companies and plays an important role in
supporting Air Force missions by stimulating technological innovation
and increasing private sector commercialization of Air Force R&D
efforts. For a relatively small amount of funding--up to $100,000 in
Phase I and up to $750,000 in Phase II with companies obtaining private
sector and/or non-SBIR government funding for Phase III--small
companies are provided an opportunity to test the scientific,
technical, and commercial merit/feasibility of a particular concept in
response to SBIR solicitations in topic areas of key interest to the
Air Force. The fundamental function of SBIR is to seed new and
innovative firms in the industrial base to meet our current and future
supply needs by funding exploration and development of new and cost-
saving technologies relevant to the warfighter. For example, through
Air Force SBIR and follow-on Manufacturing Technology program efforts
to enhance the durability and service life of jet engines, LSP
Technologies, Inc., developed a laser shock peening process that
significantly improves the high-cycle fatigue properties of blades and
greatly increases resistance to blade failure caused by foreign object
debris. This technology has already resulted in the avoidance of tens
of millions of dollars of fan blade replacement costs, significantly
reduced secondary damage engine repair costs, and avoided cost from
airfoil failures, with the potential for up to $1 billion of savings
across the Air Force fleet going forward.
41. Senator Clinton. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, how is
the Air Force ensuring that the best and most innovative small
businesses in the country are assisting to address our national
security challenges?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force has embraced the
flexibility provided by the Commercialization Pilot Program (CPP)
authorized in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2006 as a key means to ensuring
the most innovative small businesses are tapped to assist in addressing
critical national security challenges. The Air Force has implemented
CPP by placing ``transition agents'' in each Product Center plus the F-
22 and Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program Offices to enhance synergy
among the Product Centers, the AFRLs, and small businesses. CPP
promises to be a powerful tool for our technologists and acquisition
officials to seed and leverage the best innovative solutions to produce
technologies for the warfighter and enhance the vitality of the defense
industrial base by funding these smaller entrepreneurial firms.
air force command, control, and communications research
42. Senator Clinton. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, the Air
Force's fiscal year 2008 budget request reduces funding for S&T
programs in command, control, and communications capabilities, many of
which are managed by AFRL in Rome, NY. Given the importance of these
types of technologies to Air Force missions, to increasing our network-
centric operations capabilities, and to protecting our vital military
cyber-infrastructure, what was the reason for the decrease in
investment in this area?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force recognizes the
importance of information technology and the valuable contributions of
the AFRL at Rome, NY--especially with the stand-up of the new
Cyberspace Command. While near-term reductions were necessary to meet
higher priority warfighter needs, S&T investment in command, control,
and communications across the FYDP increased by over $20 million in the
fiscal year 2008 President's budget request and will continue to have
great interest as Cyberspace Command's needs in network-centric warfare
mature.
43. Senator Clinton. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, what
risks are we taking by reducing Air Force investment in this area?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. We have taken great measures
to ensure reductions in this area were taken either in low risk areas
or in areas that were acceptable to the warfighter. The elimination of
funding for two research institutes created by the Information
Directorate (the Information Assurance Institute and the Intelligent
Information Systems Institute) means that 36 faculty and 18 graduate
students must compete elsewhere for research grants. The risk
associated with the reduction from 4 to 3 ATDs, and from 11 to 9
Critical Experiments planned for the year, as well as scaled back
participation in both Joint-Service and Air Force exercises in 2008 was
deemed acceptable by the warfighter.
c-5a refurbishment and c-17s
44. Senator Clinton. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, the Air
Force's strategic airlift capability depends, to some extent, upon what
the Air Force plans to do to its C-5 fleet. The Air Force seems to face
several challenges in addressing the modernization of its C-5 fleet and
in particular, the C-5A. A recent study, referred to on the Air
Mobility Command's (AMC) official Web site, shows that 80 percent of
the C-5 airframes' service-life remains, and that the AMC has begun an
aggressive program to modernize the C-5. This is to be conducted in two
parts. First, the C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) which would
include upgrading its avionics to comply with the Global Air Traffic
Management requirements, improving navigation and safety equipment, and
installing a new autopilot system. The second part would re-engine the
aircraft under the Reliability Enhancement and Re-Engining (RERP)
program which would include new engines, pylons, and auxiliary power
units, as well as upgrades to the aircraft's skin, frame, landing gear,
and pressurization systems. The website does not, however, specify
which model C-5s will undergo this modernization. In this regard, what
is the Air Force's vision for the future of the C-5A fleet?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The program of record is to
fully modernize (AMP and RERP) all 111 C-5s in the inventory to comply
with the 2005 Mobility Capabilities Study (MCS), as informed by the
2006 QDR, to meet current and projected strategic airlift needs.
However, C-5 modernization, specifically RERP, is facing increasing
cost pressures, bringing into question the cost effectiveness of the
program for a fleet of 111 aircraft. Additionally, the C-5A fleet is
showing some significant structural issues (metal corrosion and stress
cracking) adding to the investment required to maintain the viability
of this fleet. The average age of the current Air Force fleet is 24
years with the C-5A fleet being over 35 years old on average. The Air
Force must consider all these factors for managing our intertheater
airlift fleet. The Air Force is currently refining the intertheater
force mix studies with regards to C-5 modernization, C-5A retirement,
and further C-17 procurement.
45. Senator Clinton. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, how can
AMC support its long-term strategic airlift needs, particularly for the
transportation of out-sized cargo, if the C-5As are not modernized?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force is committed to
maintaining a strategic airlift fleet capable of meeting the Nation's
needs. AMC identified seven critical, time-sensitive items or National
Security Sensitive items that are only airlifted via the C-5. All
options are being studied to determine the most effective fleet mix of
strategic airlifters to meet passenger, bulk, over-size, and out-size
cargo. Current options being considered include retiring a portion of
the C-5A fleet and recapitalizing with C-17s. The Air Force plans to
fully modernize the right number of C-5 aircraft to ensure meeting the
Nation's needs.
46. Senator Clinton. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, what will
happen to units currently flying the C-5A if they are not modernized
under the AMP and RERP programs?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. Under options being studied by
the Air Force, units currently flying C-5A aircraft would retain a
strategic airlift mission. There are no plans to close existing units
or stand up new units at this time.
new york air national guard 106th rescue wing
47. Senator Clinton. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, New York
is proud to have the Air National Guard's 106th Rescue Wing whose Para-
Rescuemen (PJs) have deployed on multiple occasions in support of
combat operations to both Afghanistan and Iraq since September 11,
2001. This is in addition to the search and rescue work they perform at
home during peacetime. Additionally, Cable News Network recently aired
a special on PJs stationed at the 106th Rescue Wing, West Hampton
Beach, NY, and highlighted their intense training and the dangerous
mission profile they support.
The depleted Air National Guard military construction (MILCON)
budget cannot afford to fund the construction of the facility or repair
the housing, storage, and training facilities that the 106th PJ unit
currently operates from. How can we let such a high value unit, whose
value and service to country are without question, continue to operate
in buildings which don't meet the Air Force's own requirements for PJ
facilities?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The 106th Rescue Wing is
essential to the Air National Guard's future mission capability, as
well as to the citizens of West Hampton Beach and the Northeast, who
depend upon their capabilities in peacetime. However, in an era of
fiscal constraints, there was not sufficient funding available to
support the first phase of the PJ facility replacement in the
President's budget in fiscal year 2008.
48. Senator Clinton. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, with the
106th preparing to return to Iraq this fall, what are the Air Force's
plans to provide funding to begin Phase I?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The project is currently shown
on the Air National Guard MILCON FYDP in fiscal year 2013 at $8.4
million.
49. Senator Clinton. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, will the
Department take appropriate action to budget for the second phase of
this project in fiscal year 2009?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The $15.4 million project
(Phase 1 and 2) will be considered with all other high-priority
requirements in the Air Force's fiscal year 2009 budget deliberations.
If sufficient funding can be made available, we are hopeful the project
will be included with the President's budget submittal for fiscal year
2009.
the northeast defense sector facility
50. Senator Clinton. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, the
Northeast Defense Sector (NEADS) facility in Rome, NY, will be assuming
responsibility to monitor all air traffic in the eastern sector of the
United States and provide Air Combat Command (ACC) with threat warning
of any hostile aircraft. The NEADS headquarters facility was phased
with funding provided in fiscal year 2006 for Phase I. While Phase II
was authorized in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007, the project was not
executed since the Guard's MILCON budget was not sizeable enough to
enable it to be in the President's budget request, necessitating that
it be added by Congress. Indeed, the 2007 Continuing Resolution in
essence struck congressional construction adds for fiscal year 2007,
which means the project remains unfunded.
Given the criticality of the NEADS mission and the need to complete
this facility so that all the NEADS personnel can be housed in a
centralized facility to ensure maximum command, control, and
communication among its personnel in this time-sensitive mission, what
steps is the Air Force taking to address the NEADS Phase II project,
and systemically, the need to mitigate this Guard MILCON shortfall?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The NEADS unit is essential to
the Air National Guard's future mission capability, as well as to the
citizens of the Northeast. Congress added MILCON funding for Phase I of
the NEADS program in fiscal year 2006. As part of the fiscal year 2007
budget process, Congress authorized, but did not appropriate, $6.6
million for NEADS Phase II. If Congress can provide an appropriation
for this previously-authorized project, it will be executed as soon as
possible. Should the second phase not be appropriated, the project will
be considered with all other high-priority requirements in the Air
Force's fiscal year 2009 budget deliberations, and if sufficient
funding can be made available, the project may be included with the
President's budget submittal for fiscal year 2009.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
government accountability office reports
51. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Wynne, when a Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report concerning the Air Force is
released, who within the Air Force is responsible for reading and
evaluating the report?
Secretary Wynne. My Financial Policy and Compliance Office,
Financial Operations, Financial Management, and Comptroller, receive
GAO reports that address the Air Force, read and assign reports to the
appropriate Air Force Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR). The Air
Force OPR reads, evaluates, prepares, and submits comments to the
responsible DOD office. The responsible DOD office prepares and submits
the Department's position and comments to the GAO. Our Air Force
Instruction 65-401, relations with the GAO, implements the DOD audit
policy and procedures. The GAO issues all reports to the GAO Liaison
Office, Inspector General, DOD. The GAO Liaison Office releases all
reports to the appropriate DOD office and the military Services,
including the Air Force.
52. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Wynne, what do you think is the
quality and caliber of GAO reports relating to the Air Force?
Secretary Wynne. The GAO reports are usually of high quality and
another effective management tool.
53. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Wynne, what are your specific
concerns with GAO reports relating to the Air Force and what would you
like to see done differently with the reports and investigations?
Secretary Wynne. We have always and will continue to support the
GAO projects within the Air Force. We have a great working relationship
with the GAO.
54. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Wynne, does the Air Force formally
respond to GAO reports that contain unfavorable findings? If so, how is
this done?
Secretary Wynne. The Air Force responds to all GAO reports through
the responsible DOD office.
55. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Wynne, how has the Air Force
responded to GAO's findings associated with the C-130 AMP, C-130J, C-5
AMP, and C-5 RERP programs covered in the testimony of William Solis
and Michael Sullivan (captured in GAO-07-566T)? This testimony captures
findings from previous GAO reports and I would like to know precisely
how the Air Force has addressed and/or rebutted the findings that
concern each of these programs.
Secretary Wynne. The referenced GAO product is a testimony (GAO-07-
566T) and the GAO Liaison Office normally issues testimonies as
information and not for comments. Upon receipt, we distribute
testimonies to our responsible office. For the GAO subject testimony,
we provided our comments to the appropriate DOD office for the two GAO
reports addressed in this testimony. The Department's comments usually
reflect our concerns or rebuttals of the GAO findings.
heavy airlift
56. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Wynne, you have indicated that
based on known, communicated airlift requirements, you do not believe
that the Air Force should purchase additional C-17 aircraft. Can you
please clarify what the precise known, communicated requirements are
that have led you to this conclusion?
Secretary Wynne. The 2006 QDR, as informed by the MCS, identified
the number of organic and commercial strategic airlift assets needed to
support the NMS. The study concluded that the capabilities provided by
180 C-17s and 112 modernized and reliability improved C-5s support the
strategy with acceptable risk. The current program of record includes
the 10 additional C-17s from the fiscal year 2006 Defense
Appropriations Act Conference Report which will bring our strategic
airlift fleet to 301 (190 C-17s and 111 fully modernized C-5s). This
programmed fleet, when fully mobilized and augmented by the Civil
Reserve Airlift Fleet, provides sufficient airlift capacity to support
U.S. strategic and operational objectives during large-scale
deployments, while concurrently supporting other high priority
operations and sustainment of forward deployed forces.
We fully recognize that circumstances have developed beyond the
scenarios studied in the MCS which must be addressed. The Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) is currently planning a follow-on mobility
study to address these changes and the Air Force will be an active
participant. Additionally, AMC, through the United States
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), is currently engaged with the joint
community to help define the scope of the planned Army/Marine Corps end
strength increase and its impacts on air mobility.
Neither the most recent MCS published in 2005 nor the follow-on
excursions in MCS-06 included the force structure increases. OSD and
the Joint Staff anticipate the next MCS round to begin in the Spring of
2008. This study should fully incorporate and examine the changes to
Service force structure and concepts of operation, as well as impacts
on mobility (air, land, sea, and prepositioning).
57. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Wynne, in your understanding, who
is responsible for communicating and determining airlift requirements?
Secretary Wynne. The determination of airlift requirements is a
joint collaborative effort led by AMC. AMC works with U.S. TRANSCOM and
other combatant commands to identify gaps and shortfalls in the Air
Force's ability to meet warfighter needs. These gaps and shortfalls are
determined using a capabilities-based approach that assesses both
current and future operational needs against overarching strategic
guidance (National Defense Strategy, QFR, Strategic Planning Guidance,
et cetera). The requirements are born ``joint'' from the results of the
capabilities-based planning and analyses phases of the requirements
development process.
Once the airlift requirements have been determined they are
communicated across the Air Force and joint communities to ensure
redundancy is eliminated and the proposed requirements will fulfill the
needs, or mitigate the majority of operational risk associated with the
identified capability gaps and shortfalls. Inputs from across the Air
Force and Joint communities are addressed and incorporated, as
appropriate, prior to the final Air Force validation step, conducted by
a formal Air Force requirements council. Once the Air Force has
validated the airlift requirements, they are forwarded to the JROC via
the established Joint Capabilities Development and Integration System
review process. Once the airlift requirements are formally approved by
the JROC, they are provided to the acquisition community to support the
appropriate development and procurement strategy.
58. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Wynne, what specific role does the
Air Force have in identifying requirements and then determining
required airlift assets?
Secretary Wynne. The Air Force capability development process is
closely linked and complies with the joint overarching process known as
the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). The
Air Force participates in this process utilizing inputs from industry
and other government organizations by conducting the necessary analyses
that address capability gaps and shortfalls substantiated by the end-
user combatant commands. Upon completion of the capabilities-based
analysis, the results are validated and the sponsoring major command is
assigned the task of developing the appropriate JCIDS requirements
document. Each JCIDS document is formally reviewed and validated by an
Air Force requirements council before the document is forwarded to the
appropriate Service or joint approving authority, depending upon the
scope and level of joint interest established for the program by the
Joint Staff gatekeeper. Air Mobility Command, in coordination with
TRANSCOM, utilizes critical analyses and results of directed studies to
determine numbers of assets associated with airlift requirements. These
operational capabilities and their analytically based numbers (proper
fleet size and fleet mix) are documented within the Air Force JCIDS
products.
59. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Wynne, has the Air Force studied
the cost of shutting down the C-17 line and then having to restart the
line if a need for additional C-17s arises? What is the total cost?
Secretary Wynne. Boeing completed a study in October 2006 that
addressed two possible shutdown options. The first option was a
``complete shutdown,'' in which all tooling, test equipment, and data
needed to sustain the weapon system would be retained with disposition
of all other production equipment and facilities. Boeing estimates the
shutdown cost to be $1.03 billion. The government is working on an
estimate and expects the number to be lower. This estimate includes
saving select tooling for future Air Force Air Logistics Center use.
The second option studied was a ``warm shutdown,'' where all production
equipment and facilities would be ``mothballed'' with the assumption
that production would restart within a 2-year period. Boeing priced
this option at $918 million. This estimate did not include the costs
associated with completely shutting down the production line or any
cost to restart production. The Air Force would have to fund additional
costs associated with completing a shutdown after the mothball period.
The cost of restarting C-17 production after a period of shutdown
is dependent on a variety of factors. A production break will result in
loss of learning (production expertise decreases) and loss of the
supplier base, causing longer production times and higher overall
aircraft production cost.
60. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Wynne, do you believe that the
Army and Marine Corps have sufficiently identified the airlift
requirements that will be associated with a total increase in end
strength of 92,000 personnel? If so, what have they identified? If not,
what have you done to request that they identify the increased
requirement since you will need to budget for increased assets, if they
are deemed necessary?
Secretary Wynne. Army and Marine Corps (AMC), through TRANSCOM, is
currently engaged with the joint community to help define the scope of
the planned Army/Marine Corps end strength increase and its impacts on
air mobility. Quantifiable insights in response to this question are
anticipated in the early June 2007 timeframe.
Neither the most recent Mobility Capability Study (MCS) published
in 2005 nor the follow-on excursions in MCS-06 included the force
structure in question. The OSD and the Joint Staff anticipate the next
MCS round to begin in the spring of 2008. This study should fully
incorporate and examine the changes to Service force structure and
impacts on mobility (air, land, sea, and prepositioning).
future combat systems airlift requirement
61. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Wynne, General Schoomaker recently
indicated to me that he believes program managers in the Army's Future
Combat Systems (FCS) program have clearly communicated potential
airlift requirements associated with FCS fielding, and particularly
that they have communicated requirements for the C-17. Do you feel the
Army has sufficiently communicated airlift requirements for FCS
fielding?
Secretary Wynne. On 13 May 2003, airlift requirements for the
Army's FCS were established in the JROC approved Operational
Requirements Document (ORD). The ORD contains a key performance
parameter (KPP) requirement for air transportability.
As development of the FCS continues to evolve, the transportability
KPP is being revised and aircraft specific constructs will continue
their development. The Transportability Certification Working Group
(Air Force, Army, TRANSCOM, and contractors) continually meets in order
to define emerging requirements, including C-17 transportability, as
the FCS specifications become more clearly defined.
62. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Wynne, what exactly has the Air
Force received from the Army concerning FCS airlift requirements?
Secretary Wynne. Airlift requirements for the Army's FCS were
established in the ORD which was approved by the JROC of 13 May 2003.
The ORD contains the following KPP requirement for transportability,
which includes air transportability: The FCS Family of Systems must be
transportable worldwide by air, sea, highway, and rail modes to support
intertheater strategic deployment and intratheater operational
maneuver.
As development of the FCS continues to evolve, the transportability
KPP is being revised and aircraft-specific constructs will continue
their development. The Transportability Certification Working Group
(Air Force, Army, TRANSCOM, and contractors) continually meets in order
to define emerging requirements as the FCS specifications become more
clearly defined. Additionally, the FCS CONOPs is still evolving and as
the FCS family of systems matures, transportability concepts of
operations will develop and more clearly define transportation
requirements.
mobility capability study
63. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Wynne, many have attacked the
adequacy of the MCS. While I know that this is a study undertaken under
the auspices of the OSD, what have you communicated to OSD about
updating the study?
Secretary Wynne. Senator, the MCS recognized that further work
remains to be done as the DOD moves forward in refining mobility
requirements and making decisions for recapitalizing the Department's
mobility assets. The Deputy Secretary of Defense said as much in his
December 19, 2005, cover memo accompanying publication of the MCS that
further work has taken shape in a group of substudies that has come to
be known, collectively, as MCS-06. Each of these substudies has
included or includes appropriate representation from the Air Force
staff. My representatives to these MCS-06 studies--and to any full-
scale update to the MCS that may be proposed--will ensure that our
concerns about the changing strategic environment are being considered.
64. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Wynne, do you feel comfortable
with the MCS and relying upon it to make program decisions such as
shutting down the C-17 line?
Secretary Wynne. The 2005 MCS, as informed by the 2006 QDR,
determined that a fleet of 292 strategic airlift aircraft meets the
lower bound with acceptable risk. Since the completion of this study,
the C-17 programmed fleet has increased from 180 aircraft to 190 and we
have lost one C-5. The resulting 301 strategic airlift aircraft, when
fully mobilized and augmented by the Civil Reserve Airlift Fleet,
provides sufficient airlift capacity to support U.S. strategic and
operational objectives during large-scale deployments, while
concurrently supporting other high priority operations and sustainment
of forward deployed forces.
We fully recognize that circumstances have developed beyond the
scenarios studied in the MCS which must be addressed. The OSD is
currently planning a follow-on mobility study to address these changes
and the Air Force will be an active participant. This study is
scheduled to begin in spring 2008. Additionally, AMC, through the
TRANSCOM, is currently engaged with the joint community to help define
the scope of the planned Army/Marine Corps end strength increase and
its impacts on air mobility. However, the decision needs to be made now
as to whether or not to close the C-17 production line. Under current
MCS requirements, 300 strategic airlifters is sufficient. Therefore,
with current congressional restrictions against retiring C-5 aircraft,
the Air Force will maintain the fiscal year 2008 PB program of record.
65. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Wynne, using the current MCS as a
baseline, if Congress gives you authority to retire some C-5s, how
quickly would you seek to retire aircraft and how soon would you seek
to place additional purchase orders for C-17 aircraft to replace C-5s?
Secretary Wynne. The Air Force is currently exploring all options
to effectively manage the strategic airlift fleet. If granted the
ability to manage the Air Force fleet without congressional
restriction, the Air Force will take all factors into account in order
to maintain capability for the Nation while exercising fiscal
responsibility. Studies at AMC and the Air Staff are ongoing to ensure
current and future airlift requirements are met. There is no firm plan,
today, to retire a certain number of aircraft on a given timeline.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
b-52 force structure
66. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, the Air
Force has been struggling for several years on how best to provide a
way forward on airborne electronic attack and stand-off jamming
capabilities. Among the many options under consideration is the
venerable B-52 platform performing a key, enabling role. The
President's fiscal year 2008 budget request funds 56 total aircraft
inventory (TAI) with 32 combat coded B-52s. The John Warner NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2007 requires 44 combat coded B-52s and prohibits retiring
more than 18. Given the importance of B-52s in the current bomber force
structure, and potential for an increased role in airborne electronic
attack, why should Congress consider retiring any more B-52s than
currently allowed?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. Many challenges face the DOD
and managing an aging bomber fleet while simultaneously navigating
transformation to face emerging threats are but two. The Department's
roadmap for long-range strike reflects a balanced approach focused on
transformation and recapitalization while managing operational risk.
Paramount to our Nation's security is the operational need to
project combat power over long distances for long durations with
adequate payloads. To meet this requirement, the Air Force's three-
phase strategy for long-range strike modernizes current bombers,
develops a complementary capability fielding in 2018, and continues
technology development for a transformational capability in 2035.
Integral to the three-phase long-range strike strategy is divestiture
of 20 B-52s as reflected in the fiscal year 2008 President's budget
which results in an estimated $1.44 billion cost avoidance across the
FYDP. The 56 B-52s funded in the program of record are still capable of
meeting any single COCOM requirement. In accordance with phase 1 of the
three-phase strategy, the fiscal year 2008 President's budget maintains
bomber sustainment and modernization investments in excess of $4.1
billion.
The B-52 may play a significant role in advance electronic attack
and as such, the force structure contained in fiscal year 2008 program
of record is adequate to support that future role. Under the proposed
Core Component Jammer (CCJ) program, the B-52 retains its traditional
combat capability concurrent with a stand-off jam capability. Air
Staff, Major Command (MAJCOM), and independent sufficiency studies/
analyses all indicate that CCJ requires 30 aircraft with 24 jammer
shipsets, which is well within the requested B-52 force structure in
the fiscal year 2008 President's budget.
joint strike fighter alternate engine
67. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, Congress
acted last year to restore funding for the development of a second
engine for the JSF and required several reports on the acquisition
strategy for the JSF engine program. The Department has acted contrary
to that direction, and has, once again, eliminated funding for a second
source before the required reports are evaluated. Can you please
describe the Department's rationale for overturning the statutory
guidance Congress provided for the JSF engine procurement before the
results of the required studies have been completed?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Department believes it is
prudent to await the results of the three congressionally-directed
independent studies prior to investing further in a second engine
source for the F-35. The three studies were conducted by the GAO,
Institute for Defence Analyses, and Cost Analysis Improvement Group to
re-examine the procurement and life cycle cost impacts from terminating
the alternate engine program. Final reports are still being written and
should be finished by June 2007.
68. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, does the
Air Force support this DOD decision? Why or why not?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force supports the
DOD's decision to cancel F136 development due to acceptable risk and
constrained budgets, but sees the potential benefit of a second engine
source if funding were available.
strategic airlift requirements
69. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne, the Department's MCS,
submitted with the 2007 President's budget request, determined that 292
strategic lift aircraft were necessary to meet our national security
requirements. The Air Force proposed to meet this requirement by
completing the C-17 program at 180 aircraft and modernizing the
operating force of 112 C-5 Galaxys. In the John Warner NDAA for Fiscal
Year 2007, Congress, in fact, appropriated an additional 10 C-17s above
the Air Force's 2007 request, resulting in a total fleet of 190 C-17s.
The fiscal year 2008 President's budget request provides no funding
for additional C-17 aircraft, effectively shutting down production on
the program. The budget request does include robust funding for C-5
modernization throughout the FYDP. While this appears to be entirely
consistent with the Department's stated airlift requirements, Air Force
leadership has been quoted on more than one occasion since this budget
was submitted, stating the desire to retire the 60 C-5A model aircraft.
To further complicate the matter, the C-5 modernization program is
experiencing early cost growth and may be reporting a Nunn-McCurdy
breach in the year ahead. What actions are you taking to address the
cost growth associated with C-5 modernization in order to keep this
critical program on track?
Secretary Wynne. The C-5 RERP program is experiencing cost growth
pressures due to increases in touch labor, engines, and pylon costs.
The program office is in daily contact with the contractor to address
these program issues and mitigate those cost pressures. A detailed Air
Force cost estimating effort is underway to determine the extent of the
cost growth and to develop a service cost position. The program of
record is to complete AMP and RERP modifications for 111 C-5 aircraft.
70. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne, early test results indicate
that the C-5 modernization program will achieve its targeted
reliability improvements, so how do you overturn the longstanding
business case that argues to modernize rather than replace the existing
C-5A airlift fleet?
Secretary Wynne. The Air Force remains confident in the
technical aspects of C-5 RERP. However, continued cost growth and
program delays are bringing into question the cost effectiveness of the
program. The cost growth to C-5 RERP combined with the high cost of
potential C-17 line shut-down and restart indicate the need to re-
evaluate the business case of RERPing C-5 aircraft versus the benefits
of procuring additional C-17s.
The Air Force is currently refining the inter-theater force mix
studies for C-5 modernization, C-5A retirement, and further C-17
procurement. Additionally, OSD is currently planning to begin a follow-
on mobility study in spring 2008 to address force requirements.
We desire to continue the recapitalization of Air Force aircraft.
Hence, we are requesting permission to manage the Air Force fleet in
order to be able to make timely decisions about aircraft retirements.
71. Senator McCain. General Moseley, would you please clarify your
strategic airlift requirements, and how you would propose to meet these
requirements if authorized to retire C-5As and acquire more C-17s?
General Moseley. The 2005 MCS calls for a range of 292 to 383
strategic lift assets (combination of C-5s and C-17s). The 2007 NDAA
calls for a minimum of 299 tails. Today, we have 190 C-17s and 111 C-5s
in the program of record (301 total tails). For every C-5A we might
retire, we need to replace at least 1-for-1 with a C-17 to preserve the
minimum capacity needed in MCS.
medium and high altitude unmanned aerial vehicles
72. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, in a March
5, 2007, memorandum General Moseley spelled out the case for the Air
Force to become the EA for all medium- and high-altitude UAVs. General
Moseley stated his desire to follow up with a comprehensive plan to
optimize the Nation's ISR assets. This committee has long supported
jointness over parochial interests when it comes to acquisition of
military capabilities, however, programs such as the Joint Air-to-
Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range, Joint Standoff Weapon, and the
Joint Common Missile (JCM) give pause. Why does the Air Force think
their role as the EA would be more successful than previous joint
procurement efforts?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force has already
demonstrated successful acquisition and fielding of UAVs to support
warfighters at all combat echelons, particularly with its medium- and
high-altitude aircraft, Predator and Global Hawk.
1. From an acquisition and logistics perspective, the Army's
Warrior is nearly identical to the Predator; similarly, the
Navy's BAMS UAV requirements could be fulfilled by a variant of
the Air Force's Global Hawk or Reaper. Unique Service solutions
waste valuable resources through duplication of effort;
stovepiped collection, processing, and dissemination
architectures; unsynchronized command and control; and
unnecessary competition for bandwidth and spectrum.
2. The role of the Air Force in conducting warfare from the
air, through space, and in cyberspace--as well as the assigned
missions of the Air Force--make assignment of EA to the Air
Force for medium- and high-altitude UAVs the right decision.
Per DOD Directive 5100.1, the Air Force is directed to
``organize, train and equip, and provide forces for Close Air
Support and tactical air reconnaissance.''
a. The DOD could potentially save nearly $1.7 billion
in the current FYDP with an integrated approach to the
acquisition of medium- and high-altitude UAVs.
b. Combining the MQ-1 Predator, MQ-1C Warrior, RQ-4
Global Hawk, Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS),
and MQ-9 Reaper programs could save $619 million (MQ-1C
Warrior) and $1102 million (BAMS) through purchase
economies of scale, production efficiencies, and
integrated priorities.
c. DOD would not have to pay twice for duplicative
cost categories if consolidated contracts are
maintained for the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-1C Warrior
programs, as well as RQ-4 Global Hawk and BAMS.
3. Air Force has demonstrated its ability to field as much
Predator, Global Hawk, and Reaper capability as possible.
a. The Air Force nearly doubled Predator acquisition
by reprogramming $2.3 billion in the fiscal year 2007
budget submission.
b. Air Force's fiscal year 2008 budget includes
nearly $13 billion to buy 241 UAVs--a 265 percent
increase in UAVs over the previous baseline to equip 12
Total Force Predator squadrons (battalion equivalents):
12 CAPs by April 2007 and 21 CAPs by 2010.
recapitalization of c-130 e/h
73. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne, a review recently conducted by
the Air Force recommended a number of courses of action to ensure the
long-term readiness of the C-130 fleet. What were the underlying
assumptions of the review?
Secretary Wynne. The Air Force Fleet Viability Board analyzed the
technical health, aircraft availability, and cost of ownership in the
C-130E/H1. The underlying assumptions were:
1. Period of assessment is from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal
year 2030.
2. C-130Es and C-130H1s (H1s include three ``super Es'') were
assessed as separate fleets.
3. Fleet size remained constant throughout the assessment
period (assumed no attrition or retirements) for all options.
a. 118 C-130E aircraft (does not include 51 fiscal
year 2007 approved for retirement and 1 attrition
aircraft).
b. 47 C-130H1 aircraft.
4. Average flight hours per aircraft per fiscal year (pulled
from C-130 flying hour database system) used to project future
flight hours.
5. C-130E and C-130H1 will continue on a 69 month (5.75 year)
Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM) cycle.
6. Assume aircraft will undergo PDMs at same source of repair
across the assessment period.
7. Ogden-ALC (Hill AFB, UT) will continue to be the only
organic source for C-130H1 PDM aircraft.
8. All cost information presented in budget year 2006
dollars.
9. Center-wing box service life is 45,000 Equivalent Baseline
Hours (EBH) and outer wing service life is 60,000 (EBH).
10. System Program Manager continues to accept the
``serious'' risk for rainbow fittings past 24,000 EBH.
11. When CWB repairs are completed in accordance with Time
Compliance Technical Order 1908 aircraft operations are
unrestricted between 38,000 and 45,000 EBH.
74. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne, does the C-130J have a center-
wing box?
Secretary Wynne. Yes, the C-130J has a center-wing box structure.
75. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne, is the center-wing box on the
C-130 E/H similar to the center-wing box on the C-130J?
Secretary Wynne. Yes, it is basically the same center-wing box.
76. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne, do you think we should replace
the center-wing boxes on the C-130 Es and Hs? If not, why not?
Secretary Wynne. We recommend replacing the center-wing boxes on
aircraft that will remain viable in the future. We currently have 170
aircraft in our C-130E fleet with an average age of 43 years. The NDAA
for Fiscal Year 2007 language authorized up to 51 E-model retirements
this year. The Air Force will continue to manage the C-130E fleet,
including recommending the optimum number of aircraft for retirement,
in order to maximize combat capability while minimizing excessive
maintenance requirements and repair costs. The last E-models are
scheduled for retirement in fiscal year 2014.
For the remaining C-130 fleet we plan to replace the center-wing
boxes as well as to complete an AMP.
77. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne, the repairs are requested in
the President's budget and the Air Force unfunded priority list. How
much is included on the list for repairs?
Secretary Wynne. For those aircraft that have reached 38,000 EBHs,
we inspect and repair the center-wing box as necessary to allow us to
continue to fly the aircraft until it is grounded at 45,000 EBH. The
cost for these inspections and repairs is between $700,000-$800,000,
depending on the extent of repairs and is funded with O&M dollars.
The only viable option for extending service life is the center-
wing box replacement. We have a total of $645.3 million in the current
FYDP (fiscal year 2008-fiscal year 2013) for center-wing box
replacement. There is currently no requirement on the unfunded priority
list for C-130 center-wing boxes.
78. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne, Air Force documents reveal
that the center-wing box is the ``long pole in the tent'' in terms of
aging aircraft issues with the C-130. Repair/refurbishment of the
center-wing box extends the life of the C-130 by 20 years. Is this
correct?
Secretary Wynne. There is no repair/refurbishment program to extend
the life beyond 45,000 EBH. Our current inspection and repair program
serves to remove restrictions between 38,000 and 45,000 EBH, when the
aircraft ``grounds.'' The replacement resets the service life. When we
replace the center-wing boxes and complete the AMP, our projections are
that we will gain approximately 25-30 years life extension, depending
on the flying profile (how fast the fleet accumulates EBH).
79. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne, according to Air Force
documents, costs for center-wing box repairs of C-130 E/H models could
be accomplished for $6-$9 million per aircraft compared as to as much
as $100 million for a new C-130J. Other key recapitalization efforts
such as AMP and re-engining could be accomplished for $6 million and $2
million respectively. Is this correct? If you challenge these
recapitalization costs, please provide certified data.
Secretary Wynne. C-130E/H center-wing box replacement cost $6-$9
million per aircraft. The acquisition cost for a combat delivery C-130J
based on the current C-130J multi-year contract is $75 million. The
average procurement unit cost for C-130 AMP is $11.8 million, based on
the December 2006 Selected Acquisition Report submitted to Congress in
April 2007. The C-130 Fleet Viability Board has estimated the cost to
upgrade the C-130E engines to a C-130H configuration at $6 million per
aircraft.
80. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne, has the Air Force decided on a
course of action to ensure the long-term readiness of the C-130 fleet?
Secretary Wynne. Our current plan is to retire aircraft that have
passed their useful lives, and recapitalize to replace these aircraft.
For the remaining legacy C-130H fleet, our plan is to replace center-
wing boxes and complete an AMP. This plan will extend the useful life
of our C-130 fleet by 25-30 years which will provide the needed time to
develop a replacement for this capability.
unfunded requirements list
81. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, this year,
the Air Force submitted a $16.9 billion unfunded requirements list.
This is twice as large as the Army's, six times as large as the Marine
Corps', and three times the size of last year's Air Force request. Why
do you have such a large unfunded requirements list?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. We've been at war for 16 years
while transforming into a smaller, leaner, and more capable force.
We've had to balance our resources to fight today and be ready for
tomorrow's fight. Despite that tenuous balance, the Air Force faces
significant challenges in recapitalizing air and space forces, putting
our future fighting capabilities at great risk. The crisis in
recapitalization must be corrected.
The fiscal year 2008 UPL highlights critical requirements the Air
Force could not afford within our current fiscal year 2008 President's
budget. The UPL requirements address our top priorities: fighting and
winning the global war on terror, developing and caring for airmen and
their families, and recapitalizing and modernizing our aging aircraft
and spacecraft. This includes key capabilities in: (1) Global Mobility
such as additional C-130Js and C-37s and modernization of defensive
systems; (2) Global Vigilance where our COCOMs demand more Predator and
Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance systems; and (3) Global
Power where we need to upgrade aging legacy systems and provide
additional targeting pods.
Over the past 2 fiscal years, we have intensified our effort to
reset/recapitalize Air Force aircraft and equipment. The fiscal year
2008 UPL is reflective of this effort.
missile defense
82. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, Admiral
Fallon, Commander of U.S. CENTCOM, has told this committee that our
missile defense capabilities need to pace the threat. Likewise, General
Craddock, Commander of U.S. European Command, has told this committee
that ``rogue states in the Middle East and Southwest Asia possess a
current ballistic missile capability that threatens a major portion of
Europe.'' In light of these comments by the COCOMs, do you agree that
DOD should accord a priority to the successful testing and fielding of
the current generation of ballistic missile defense capabilities in
numbers sufficient to stay ahead of the growing threat?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The COCOMs are in the best
position to determine the risks to their commands and are absolutely
correct about the urgency of the current ballistic missile threat. Our
intelligence estimates indicate an even more challenging threat in the
future due to proliferation and advanced technologies.
The Air Force develops much of the intelligence that characterizes
the threat and has broad responsibility for air and missile defense.
The Air Force and the other military departments support the efforts of
the Missile Defense Agency to develop a layered, integrated ballistic
missile defense system capable of defending the United States, its
deployed forces, and its friends and allies from the weapons delivered
via ballistic missiles. We also currently support a Joint Staff-led
effort in conjunction with the other Services, combatant commands, and
the Missile Defense Agency to assess emerging ballistic defense
operational requirements given this growing threat.
There is a continuous effort to balance resources required to
develop the capabilities needed to defeat the current threat against
those required for future technologies that will put us in a position
to make ballistic missiles a lower value option for potential
adversaries.
The Air Force is working aggressively to help improve the COCOMs'
capabilities to disrupt, deny, and defeat ballistic missiles before
they can be launched, and is working to increase passive defense
capabilities enabling the continuation of operations should such
missiles impact our forward bases.
It is a team effort among the combatant commands, military
departments, and Missile Defense Agency to keep pace with emerging and
future threats. The combined efforts of the Services and the Missile
Defense Agency have struck an appropriate balance between fielding
current capabilities and developing ``leap-ahead'' technology to ensure
our continued battlefield dominance despite the proliferation of these
weapons.
prompt global strike
83. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, the 2001
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) stated the need to provide the President
with a broad array of nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to bolster
deterrence and defense against the new threats we face today. One such
recommendation was the development of long-range, conventionally armed
strike systems, also known as ``Prompt Global Strike (PGS)''
capabilities. The 2006 QDR reinforced this recommendation. Yet 5 years
since the NPR we seem to be without a viable PGS system under
development. Will you explain the strategic requirement for PGS
capabilities and summarize current plans to acquire such capabilities?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The strategic requirements for
PGS stem from the U.S. Strategic Command validated requirement to
strike globally, precisely, and rapidly against high-payoff, time-
sensitive targets in a single or multi-theater environment even when
the United States has no military presence in a region. With our
current capability, we can't effectively engage emerging high valued
targets without either having forces prepositioned, or executing a
nuclear response. This capability gap is documented in the JROC
approved PGS Initial Capability Document.
The Air Force is currently working two interrelated initiatives to
address this gap:
(1) Air Force Space Command is engaged in a PGS technology
demonstration program designed to evolve, mature, and integrate
critical PGS technologies that support the Command's vision for
fielding a mid-term (fiscal years 2014/2015) Conventional
Strike Missile (CSM) capability. As envisioned, CSM will use
existing commercial/excess rocket motors to boost a medium-
lift-to-drag hypersonic glide vehicle capable of dispensing
requalified off-the-shelf munitions at global ranges from the
CONUS. Central to this effort is the development and packaging
of a suite of mitigating measures associated with CSM that
address congressional concerns regarding misinterpretation of
intent (e.g., geographically separated basing, on-site
inspections, unique trajectories, and non-provocative mission
planning).
(2) The PGS Analysis of Alternatives is a joint study led by
Air Force Space Command. It is scheduled for completion in
March 2008 and examines long-term (fiscal year 2020 and beyond)
materiel solutions.
chinese anti-satellite weapons and space control
84. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, given the
recent successful test by the Chinese government of an anti-satellite
weapon, what changes in priorities has the Air Force made in protecting
U.S. assets in space?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force is increasing
priority on protection and reconstitution. Protection is accomplished
by enhancing Space Situational Awareness (SSA) with improved
integration, command and control, and sensors. Integration activities
will improve our fusion capabilities and migrate them to the net-
centric construct enabling more timely attack detection. New sensors
include the Space-Based Surveillance System (SBSS) and Space Fence. The
Air Force is also pursuing concepts of limited reconstitution
capability with the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) program.
Currently, there are five tactical satellites (TacSats) identified
fiscal year 2007--fiscal year 2013 which will fulfill a variety of
missions and provide the opportunity for operational experimentation
and risk reduction for future Air Force programs.
In addition, the Air Force continues to evaluate necessity and
opportunity to accelerate several space control programs on the UPL.
Delivery of Self-Awareness Space Situational Awareness (SASSA), SBSS,
Rapid Attack Identification, Detection, and Reporting System (RAIDRS),
and Space Fence can be accelerated if additional funds are provided.
85. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, what space
control programs, ongoing or future, hold the best promise for
protecting U.S. assets?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. There is no single ``silver
bullet'' solution but instead a combination of classified and
unclassified systems that together impress upon our potential
adversaries the United States' ability to maintain and sustain space
superiority from peace through all phases of conflict.
This said, the Air Force continues to pursue programs to address
deficiencies in light of current threats. The first step in protecting
our space-based assets is improving our SSA capabilities. We are
focused on upgrading both our ground-based and on-orbit capabilities to
improve detection, tracking, and characterization of objects in low-
earth orbit and geosynchronous orbit. The upgrade will also enhance our
ability to detect and characterize threats. Modernization programs for
detecting, tracking, and characterizing include the SBSS system and
Space Fence. Integrated SSA will improve our fusion capabilities and
move us toward the net-centric construct, enabling a more timely event
detection. RAIDRS are envisioned to provide automated attack detection
and characterization against multiple types of threats.
Several space control programs that will assist with these
capabilities are on the UPL--SASSA, SBSS, RAIDRS Block 20, and Space
Fence--to accelerate delivery of capability if additional funds are
provided.
In addition, the Air Force is increasing priority on ORS. In the
future, this program may provide limited reconstitution capability for
essential military space capabilities.
86. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, to what
extent are operationally responsive space efforts to contribute to the
space control mission?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. There are two key areas where
the ORS program will potentially contribute to the space control
mission area. These are SSA and reconstitution. The Air Force is
currently evaluating the ORS program's capability to rapidly field and
launch small satellites that could provide SSA of friendly satellites
as well as potential threats. In this regard, we have submitted the
SASSA, a potential ORS payload, on the UPL for fiscal year 2008. SASSA
will demonstrate an integrated suite of sensors that could supply the
necessary information to warn of environmental and manmade threats. The
other space control related mission area being investigated by the ORS
program is the ability to augment and reconstitute our space systems.
This capability would increase the robustness of our space architecture
in the face of future threats. The Air Force is maturing a satellite
reconstitution capability through our TacSat program. Currently, there
are five TacSats identified in fiscal year 2007--fiscal year 2013 which
will fulfill a variety of missions and provide greater risk reduction
to future Air Force programs.
force protection and improvised explosive devices
87. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, force
protection has been and continues to be a top priority for this
committee. Could you please describe the current status of force
protection for our Air Force troops in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. We have increased our emphasis
on combat skills training and added the Basic Combat Convoy Course at
Lackland AFB. We're fusing Force Protection Intelligence with
aggressive security operations to extend our awareness outside the
perimeter to engage threats at the maximum range possible. We plan to
add special purpose armored vehicles to increase airmen effectiveness
and survivability. Finally, we're also benefiting from the Army's
deployment of Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar systems at key
bases such as Balad Air Base (AB).
88. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, what
technology strategy and level of investment is being proposed in the
Air Force budget to support our ability to get on top of and ahead of
the improvised explosive device (IED)threat?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. In response to April 2006
direction to the Services, the Air Force programmed approximately $9.9
million per year through fiscal year 2013 ($59.443 million total) for
procurement and sustainment costs directly associated with Counter-
Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) equipment/systems. This funding is
specifically for Specialized Search Dogs (the Air Force is the
Department of Defense Executive Agency for Military Working Dogs),
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Robots, and Air Force funded requirements
for uparmor modification kits for the Service's fleet of High Mobility
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) in the theater of operations.
[In millions of dollars]
Specialized Search Dogs.................................... 5.843
Robotics................................................... 19.6
Uparmored HMMWVs........................................... 34.0
------------
Total programmed:........................................ 59.443
Beyond these initiatives, the Air Force does not have any other
dedicated or independent funding lines for C-IED initiatives. However,
the Air Force also makes significant contributions to C-IED efforts
with a variety of initiatives that are corporately vetted through the
Air Force's Rapid Response Process--the most promising of these
initiatives are championed by the Service for potential Joint IED
Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) funding. To date JIEDDO has funded 14 Air
Force initiatives for $87.035 million.
Regarding strategy, the ACC, acting as the Air Force's lead MAJCOM
warfighter force provider, recently signed a C-IED Operating Concept to
ensure Air Force efforts are synchronized and cohesive in the campaign
to overcome the threat and loss of personnel/resources posed by
adversary use of IEDs. This operating concept provides a standardized
approach with the JIEDDO, U.S. CENTCOM, U.S. Central Command Air Forces
(CENTAF), and ACC C-IED efforts by using common constructs and
terminologies. The ACC's C-IED Concept directly supports and is
congruent with CENTCOM's C-IED Campaign plan through mutual focus on
defeating the IED system. To execute this framework, ACC, with
assistance from the Army and CENTCOM, recently completed a draft
Concept of Employment (CONEMP) that is written from an airman's
perspective taking a constrained and unconstrained approach to
interdicting the IED system. Following CONEMP execution, ACC will look
to identify capability and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP)
gaps permitting sound analysis/actions for Doctrine, Organization,
Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities improvements.
In addition to the above, there are a number of technologies within
the Air Force S&T program that could be applicable to countering the
IED threat; however, S&T efforts are typically non-system specific and
support a wide range of potential applications--as such, there is not a
dedicated S&T investment line in this area. For example, one of the Air
Force S&T Program's focused long-term challenges is to dominate
difficult surface target engagement/defeat, which includes technologies
that could be used to find, identify, track, and engage IEDs, such as:
high power microwave devices to defeat a wide range of IEDs; real-time,
24-hour, wide-area electro-optical and radio frequency sensing and data
fusion/analysis; room temperature infrared cameras with increased
temperature discrimination; penetrating terahertz imaging devices;
adversarial modeling; improved operator interfaces for enhanced UAVs;
and a wide range of command, control, communications, computers, ISR
technologies including combining pertinent technologies within a net-
centric environment that could identify where the IED maker lives.
Beyond S&T, the Air Force continues to improve existing platforms
like Compass Call and Predator, which have proven useful in C-IED
missions. Compass Call improvements provide a very effective C-IED
classified capability, while planned fiscal year 2008 Predator
improvements include integration of an airborne signals intelligence
payload and incorporation of real-time targeting processing (Joint
Direct Attack Munition-quality coordinate data from video)--both of
which will enhance Predator support to C-IED missions. In addition, the
Air Force requested global war on terrorism supplemental funding in
both fiscal years 2007 and 2008 to field a net-centric beyond line-of-
sight (BLOS) secure communications capability across the Joint
Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (J-STARS) fleet to enable
full coverage of ground combat operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF)/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). This improvement, combined with
a future Network Centric Collaborative Targeting (NCCT) capability,
will enable J-STARS to rapidly collaborate with other sensors and
intelligence sources to fuse IED events with ground moving target
indicator tracks to produce actionable intelligence. CENTCOM has
recently identified BLOS secure communications as an Urgent Operational
Need and this funding will enable the Air Force to achieve an initial
operational capability for J-STARS BLOS communications by March 2008.
The Air Force will consider funding for NCCT in its fiscal year 2010
budget request.
airmen on the ground in iraq/afghanistan
89. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, the Air
Force has provided significant ``in-lieu-of'' forces on the ground to
support operations in Iraq. Are you comfortable that they are getting
the right equipment to operate in that environment, particularly force
protection equipment?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. I am very comfortable that our
``in-lieu-of'' forces on the ground to support operations in Iraq are
getting not only the right equipment to operate in that environment,
but the best force protection equipment that is available. We are
continuously evaluating the enemy's TTP, and as these TTPs change, we
review materiel and equipment configuration to see if changes are
necessary to keep our airmen safe. Part of our evaluation process is
the continuous collection of information from our deployed airmen,
feedback from the other Services and COCOMs, and even suppliers to
ensure we stay ahead in making appropriate modifications. As an
example, more than 40 functional experts from around the Air Force,
including deployed commanders, met at Keesler AFB, MI, on March 21-22
to review and address ``in-lieu-of'' forces equipment requirements. We
are also aggressively exploring short-, mid-, and long-term solutions,
and where it makes sense, add required equipment for not only ``in-
lieu-of'' forces deployment preparation processes, but for the broader
Air Force as well.
90. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, are the
airmen on the ground in Iraq getting the needed training before
deploying?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. Every airman that deploys to
Iraq gets the best and most up-to-date training available. Each request
for forces that the Air Force receives is reviewed by experts in the
field and back in the States. These experts determine exactly what
training is needed and ensure that our troops receive it prior to
deploying. Typically we send our airman to three courses: Combat Skills
Training, Combat Readiness Course, and in the future, an Air Force-
sponsored Common Battlefield Airman Training. Additionally we send
forces to specialized training such as M-17 helicopter training and
basic combat convoy course.
91. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, has this
training changed as a result of lessons learned, and if so, how?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. Training is not viewed as
being a static commodity. We take lessons learned, both good and bad
from the field, and have adjusted our training programs as required.
One of the things that we did was build up 2nd Air Force located at
Keesler AFB to oversee our training requirements and to better
integrate with the Army. 2nd Air Force has also taken the lead in
establishing a Training Evaluation Review Board (TERB), which is
reviewing our entire combat training spectrum. Finally, the Air Staff
is undertaking a comprehensive review of the entire training process to
streamline the process and ensure critical training objectives are
identified and trained efficiently and effectively.
92. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, how has
the integration worked with the Army?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. Our airmen have been doing a
great job integrating with all the Services to fully meet the CENTCOM
commander's warfighting requirements. Before deployment our airmen
exercise and train with our sister Services and in some cases attend
their organic training courses (e.g., airmen attend Army Combat Skills
Training) in order to ensure they possess the proper combat skill sets.
One example is airmen supporting Afghanistan Provisional Reconstruction
Teams attend extensive training with the Army at Fort Bragg to learn
various civil affairs and combat operations skills. Another is Army and
Marine Aviators taking part in an Air Force-sponsored urban close air
support exercise. Once deployed, our airmen work hand-in-hand with
sister Services supporting each warfighting component. Currently 93
percent of airmen deployed to the combat zone under tactical control of
one of CENTCOM's warfighting components perform their organic skill
sets in large part to relieve the stress on the overall joint force in
critical career specialities.
93. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, do you see
anything that needs to be improved in this process?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. Since our challenges are
constantly changing so are our processes. Our airmen are constantly
finding innovative ways to improve the system to meet future
challenges. Recently the TERB has recommended that the Air Force stand
up its own Combat Skills Training Course to help relieve the Army
throughput bottlenecks.
space acquisition costs
94. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, the costs
of major space acquisitions (including the Transformational Satellite
Communications (TSAT) system, Space-Based Infrared System-High, Space
Tracking and Surveillance System, Space Radar, and National Polar-
Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System) are projected to
increase significantly over the next several years to levels close to
$9 billion per year starting in fiscal year 2009. How does the Air
Force plan to fund this increase? Is it making tradeoffs with aircraft
programs?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force evaluates cost
versus combat capability across the spectrum of Air Force programs. If
a space program delivers the best combat capability for the dollars
invested, the Air Force will make tradeoffs among aircraft programs,
space programs, and other recapitalization investments. Space programs
compete equally with all Air Force acquisition programs. Additionally,
the Air Force does not bear sole responsibility for resourcing all the
space programs mentioned. The Air Force has an established cost-sharing
arrangement with the Department of Commerce for the NPOESS program, and
the OSD recently negotiated a cost-sharing arrangement for space radar
with the Director of National Intelligence. The Space Tracking and
Surveillance System is currently the responsibility of the Missile
Defense Agency. For cost-shared programs, the Air Force will negotiate
with its partners and will make allocation decisions based on delivery
of the most combat capability for the investment.
95. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, does the
Air Force, or DOD, have a spending limit for space investments?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force does not have a
spending limit for space investments. The Air Force evaluates the cost
of space programs against the combat capability delivered by all Air
Force programs and within the context of total available Air Force
resources. The Air Force makes resource allocation decisions based on
maximizing combat capability contributed from each warfighting domain
constrained by the ability to purchase those capabilities.
96. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, to what
extent are DOD and the Air Force able to determine what level of space
investment is affordable and prioritize among their space investments?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force evaluates the
investment in space programs in the context of the combat capability
delivered by all Air Force weapon systems. Space programs compete with
all other programs on an equal basis for resources and priorities. The
Air Force makes resource allocation decisions based on maximizing the
total combat capability within its existing budget.
space communications
97. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, the Air
Force posture statement lists as one of the top Service priorities the
recapitalization of aging spacecraft inventories. The statement
highlights the TSAT system as essential to enable the realization of
all DOD network-centric operations, such as the Army's FCS and the
Navy's Sea Power 21 concept. Given the high priority accorded to space
systems by the Air Force, and the importance of TSAT for future
network-centric operations, why did the Air Force reduce planned
funding for TSAT in the fiscal year 2008 budget request--thereby
delaying the launch of the first satellite by 1 year to 2016?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. TSAT fiscal year 2008 funding
was reduced to fund competing higher DOD priorities. The 1-year TSAT
slip does not impact current operational availability of either
protected or wideband satellite communications capabilities, including
the strategic networks on Milstar and Advanced Extremely High Frequency
(AEHF). Adequate time exists to transition strategic networks onto
combined TSAT-AEHF constellation before the projected fiscal year 2018
Milstar end of life.
The Department remains committed to TSAT for critical net-centric
capabilities. It is the best way to meet warfighter needs, including
the Army's FCS and the Navy's Sea Power 21 concept.
synthetic fuels
98. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, since last
fall, the Air Force has been testing whether Air Force aircraft can fly
on liquid fuels made from natural gas or coal. According to the Air
Force, barring any unforeseen glitches, the Air Force expects to
certify the synthetic fuel for use in B-52 bombers this summer. Given
the interest and publicity with which the Air Force has surrounded
their synthetic fuels research program, how much funding is in the
fiscal year 2008 budget request?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force has $1 million
in its budget request for the certification of the fleet with a 50/50
blend of synthetic fuel and JP-8. The Air Force has requested an
additional $30 million in the UPL to complete necessary testing and
certification in fiscal year 2008 in order to stay on schedule for
fleet certification by fiscal year 2010; and, to be prepared for the
acquisition of 50 percent of our CONUS fuel from domestic, alternative
fuel sources by fiscal year 2016.
99. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, what level
of capability does the Air Force's program of record achieve within the
FYDP?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. Through the FYDP, the Air
Force program of record has $31.48 million to test and certify the use
of a synthetic fuel blend in the fleet. We estimate that it will
require approximately $190 million in total to meet our fiscal year
2010 certification goals and be prepared for the acquisition of 50
percent of our CONUS fuel from domestic, alternative fuel sources by
fiscal year 2016.
congressional adds in air force s&t programs
100. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, defense
S&T funding lines are some of the most heavily earmarked accounts in
the defense budget. A rough analysis of top line figures shows that
components of DOD's basic and applied research funding are
approximately 40 percent earmarked. I am interested in receiving more
detailed information from the Department and each of the Services about
the extent and execution--including the military utility--of earmarks
within their fiscal year 2007 appropriations for S&T programs. Would
you please provide for the record a break-out of the Air Force fiscal
year 2007 S&T funding between requested programs and congressional
earmarks? Please include the status of the execution of these earmarks
(whether funds are let), the identified performers, and any evaluation
you have done--including numerical scoring--of the military utility of
these projects.
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The attached spreadsheet
provides the requested fiscal year 2007 breakout of Air Force S&T
funding by requested amount and congressional add or earmark funding to
include whether or not this additional funding has already been put on
contract and, if so, with whom. Over the past several years, the Air
Force S&T program has received a significant increase in annual
congressional adds and we work hard to structure 1-year efforts that
will yield some measure of military utility. While congressional adds
that complement related, funded Air Force S&T efforts would be expected
to provide more benefit to the Air Force, we do not formally evaluate
these congressional special interest items.
[The spreadsheet referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
101. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, in your
view, does the extent of earmarks you receive for basic and applied
research interfere with the Air Force's ability to conduct a coherent
R&D program which meets the Air Force's technology needs?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force's R&D program is
reflected in this year's budget request and associated unfunded
priority list for S&T. Annual congressional adds or earmarks received
in the Air Force basic and applied research budget activities do not
interfere with our ability to implement this program. We work very hard
to structure 1-year efforts that provide new or complementary military
utility to this program. While adds do not interfere with coherency,
difficulties are experienced in oversight and management of these
congressionally-directed efforts. This becomes especially more
difficult when working new congressional special interest items where
congressional intent is not always clear. With over 200 individual
congressional adds, many hundreds, if not thousands, of man-hours are
spent understanding congressional intent, contracting, and managing
these efforts.
recruitment and retention of air force medical personnel
102. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, the
committee has been concerned about the ability of all three Services to
recruit and retain top quality medical personnel. The Air Force medical
service continues to experience significant challenges. Overall
recruiting of fully qualified health care professionals is barely 50
percent of the requirement, and retention is at a 10-year low,
contributing to chronic shortages in certain specialties. Looking to
the future, what do you think are the most important monetary and
nonmonetary incentives for recruiting and retaining medical personnel?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Deputy Chief of Staff,
Manpower and Personnel is working with Health Affairs, Air Force
Recruiting Service and Air Force Medical Service to maximize the
effectiveness of accession and retention bonuses, and the Health
Professions Scholarship Program. We have provided input to the
Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) to establish more
flexible and expanded special pay and bonus authorities (ability to
vary commitments, expand eligibility to target difficult accession and
retention career fields, offer lump-sum bonus versus incremental bonus
payments). We believe the QRMC proposed revision to special pay
legislation coupled with the necessary appropriation, will allow the
Air Force to obtain additional years of service from difficult-to-
retain career fields and narrow the pay gap with the civilian sector.
We thank Congress for the expanded authorities for physician and
dentist accessions bonuses granted as part of the NDAA for Fiscal Year
2007.
Also of importance are the following initiatives that are
nonmonetary benefits: enhanced professional development, leadership,
and professional opportunities, ensuring predictable defined AEF
rotations, and encouraging the right balance for our personnel between
their professional duties and their families.
103. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, do you
have all the tools needed to turn this situation around?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force will have all
the tools necessary, with the QRMC revision of special pay and bonus
legislation coupled with the required funding. Revision of legislation
will enable the Air Force to vary commitments, expand eligibility to
target difficult accession and retention career fields, and offer lump-
sum bonus versus incremental bonus payments. The Air Force will
continue to prioritize recruitment and retention funds within the Air
Force to meet our most pressing needs and maximize our effectiveness.
medical program ``efficiency'' reductions
104. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, in fiscal
year 2007, $92.5 million was deducted from the Air Force medical budget
as an incentive for hospital efficiencies. By fiscal year 2008, nearly
$200.0 million in reductions would be realized. What impact have these
reductions had on Air Force medical operations in this time of war?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. While the reductions were
intended to be an incentive for healthcare efficiencies, the actual
medical treatment facility efficiencies impact reduced the
recapitalization rate in several critical accounts including medical
equipment; information management/information technology; facilities
sustainment, restoration and modernization; medical supplies; and
contracts. This programmatic approach was used to mitigate any negative
impact to direct patient care delivery. However, continued use of this
strategy will drive critical medical asset recapitalization rates to
unacceptable levels and ultimately adversely impact patient care
delivery.
105. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, the
Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs has testified that the
reductions should be reevaluated. Do you agree with this assessment?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. Yes. The Air Force Medical
Service (AFMS) is concerned with the Medical Treatment Facility (MTF)
Efficiency reductions. No real healthcare savings will be produced. The
AFMS will experience decreased capability/capacity in the direct care
system which will result in diminished access. Patients who cannot be
treated on base will require care from the civilian sector which means
higher costs for TRICARE, a managed health care support program for
members of the armed services, their families, and survivors. Before
that happens, the AFMS will slow spending in a number of areas such as
facility maintenance, new medical equipment, and research and training.
inspection of air force medical facilities
106. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, in light
of the revelations on conditions in Building 18 at Walter Reed Army
Medical Center, have you directed inspection of Air Force medical
facilities to ensure that appropriate standards of cleanliness and
safety are being met throughout Air Force medical facilities worldwide?
If so, what are the results of those inspections?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. Yes, all 75 AFMS MTFs are
regularly inspected (both scheduled and unannounced) by 2 nationally
recognized audit, inspection, and accreditation organizations. The
Joint Commission inspects and accredits Air Force medical centers,
hospitals, and several outpatient clinics. The Accreditation
Association for Ambulatory Health Care inspects and accredits a growing
number of our outpatient clinics. The foremost aspect of these
inspections is always quality of care and quality of the patient
environment, to include cleanliness and safety. We are proud that all
Air Force medical facilities have passed inspection and are accredited.
In addition to this formal inspection regimen, the Air Force
Surgeon General has specialized health facilities staff continuously
engaged with MTF senior leadership at each command and base to
identify, validate, and execute necessary sustainment, repair, and
modernization projects. Furthermore, in support of a 5 March 2007
memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs),
the Air Force Surgeon General directed MTF senior leaders to re-examine
their known facility requirements and forward up any previously
unidentified repair or maintenance projects. The AFMS has funded--or
identified funding--for many of these. We have requested additional
funding, preferably multi-year in the operation and maintenance account
to accomplish the remaining work.
107. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, what
guidance have you received from Secretary Gates with respect to the
revelations at Walter Reed Army Medical Center about facility
condition, outpatient care, and administration of the physical
disability evaluation processes and what steps have you taken as a
result?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The AFMS has been actively
engaged in these issues well before the Walter Reed concerns surfaced.
All 75 AFMS MTFs are regularly inspected (both scheduled and
unannounced) by 2 nationally recognized audit, inspection, and
accreditation organizations. The Joint Commission inspects and
accredits Air Force medical centers, hospitals, and several outpatient
clinics. The Accreditation Association for Ambulatory Health Care
inspects and accredits a growing number of our outpatient clinics. The
foremost aspect of these inspections is always quality of care and
quality of the patient environment, to include cleanliness and safety.
We are proud that all Air Force medical facilities have passed
inspection and are accredited.
In addition to this formal inspection regimen, the Air Force
Surgeon General has specialized health facilities staff continuously
engaged with MTF senior leadership at each command and base to
identify, validate, and execute necessary sustainment, repair, and
modernization projects. Furthermore, in support of a 5 March 2007
memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs),
the Air Force Surgeon General directed MTF senior leaders to re-examine
their known facility requirements and forward up any previously
unidentified repair or maintenance projects. The AFMS has funded--or
identified funding--for many of these. We have requested additional
funding, preferably multi-year in the operation and maintenance
account, to accomplish the remaining work.
With respect to outpatient care, the Air Force Survivor Assistance
Program was expanded late in 2003 to assign a Family Liaison Officer
(FLO) to severely wounded, injured, and seriously ill personnel at
every stop in their evacuation from the AOR, and at every intermediate
treatment facility. The FLO provides any assistance the member or
family needs. The Air Force Palace Helping Airmen Recover Together
(HART) program was implemented in 2005 to provide long-term (5-year)
assistance with relocation, counseling, employment, and transitional
services. The most recent enhancement provides earlier intervention
with information needed to make informed decisions on benefit options
available to wounded servicemembers and their families.
Finally, to improve the Disability Evaluation System, the changes
implemented by the AFMS include simplifying rules for providers when
categorizing conditions, establishing Medical Evaluation Board (MEB)
completion at 90 days, monitoring Air Reserve component (ARC)
(including Air National Guard) Line of Duty determination delays, and
tracking ARC personnel on extensions for medical reasons. The Air Force
is also evaluating automation options for the MEB process, which will
streamline and reduce opportunities for miscommunication for Medical
and Personnel units. Air Force has a daily customer satisfaction
telephone survey and is exploring its use for specific injured/wounded-
warrior issues. To improve case management, Air Force established a
time limit for receiving medical consultant reports that might be
delaying MEB completion.
base realignment and closure decision related to cannon afb, new mexico
108. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, in your
written testimony, you stated that ``several factors have applied
pressure to the Air Force budget including unforeseen Base Realignment
and Closure (BRAC) costs.'' The Air Force proposed to the 2005 BRAC
Commission to close Cannon AFB in New Mexico, which would have saved
the Air Force over $206 million annually and over $2.6 billion over the
next 20 years. The BRAC Commission responded by agreeing to close
Cannon by 2009 if the Secretary could not find ``other newly-
identified'' missions to replace the F-16s currently operating out of
Cannon AFB. The Air Force then recommended stationing Air Force Special
Operations units at Cannon without formally announcing a consideration
of other potential receiving installations, as is done with all other
Air Force weapon system beddowns. In light of budget pressures, why did
the Air Force choose to keep a base open that the Air Force had
previously recommended for closure?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. In September 2005 the BRAC
Commission recommended realignment of Cannon AFB by disestablishing the
27th Fighter Wing, and establishing an enclave at Cannon AFB to remain
open until 31 December 2009, during which time the Secretary of Defense
shall seek other newly-identified missions for Cannon AFB. Under the
direction of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force
began a search for a new mission for Cannon AFB. The Air Force engaged
in a thorough and comprehensive reuse study to find new uses for the
base and its assets. An eight-step process was used by the Assistant
Secretary of Air Force (Installations, Environment, and Logistics) to
search across the Military Departments, Federal agencies, and the
public.
Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) had been looking for a
west base since the mid-1990s with a plan called Commando Vision.
Commando Vision looked at several locations in the northwest United
States, but the plan had not yet been implemented. The DOD QFR and
Global Defense Posture drive the need for a further training and
beddown site for AFSOC.
109. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, prior to
the BRAC decision, were the special operations missions identified for
Cannon AFB originally planned for other installations with higher
military value?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The AFSOC's mission was never
identified for any other installation. As stated previously, AFSOC had
been looking for a west base since the mid-1990s with a plan called
Commando Vision. Commando Vision looked at several locations in the
northwest United States, but the plan could not get enough support to
implement. The Air Force took the task of finding another mission for
Cannon AFB as directed by the BRAC Commission and the Secretary of
Defense.
runway repairs at luke air force base, arizona
110. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, I have
been told that the runway at Luke AFB, AZ, is in serious need of
repair. The Air Force recently sent a team of pavement specialists out
to Luke AFB to analyze the condition and to determine whether immediate
repairs were needed as opposed to waiting until 2011, the current
schedule. As we wait for the test results, we continue to train new
pilots every day at Luke to fly the F--16, the only single-engine
fighter in the U.S. military inventory, which is especially prone to
engine damage caused by debris on the runway. Why are we taking this
risk? Why are we risking a $60 million plus aircraft and a priceless
pilot every time during more than 10,000 takeoffs and landings monthly,
all at the cost of $16 million in operation and maintenance dollars to
repair the runway?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. We agree pilots' lives are
priceless and F--16s are essential warfighting machines, which is
exactly why Luke AFB performs maintenance work and sweeping to keep the
1.5 million square feet of Runway 3L/21R operationally safe. Air Force
Civil Engineer Support Agency (AFCESA) performed an evaluation on the
runway in February 2007. The primary areas of concern on Runway 3L/21R
are sections R02C and R09C. These 2 sections (out of 12) are presently
asphalt and are to be replaced with concrete to provide a more durable
surface. AFCESA evaluation showed one partial section, R09C--C, has a
poor Pavement Condition Index (PCI). All other runway sections have
fair or higher PCI ratings. Luke AFB is continually monitoring the
condition of Runway 3L/21R, and the preliminary analysis by AFCESA in
February 2007 indicates that the runway is not in danger of imminent
failure. There is a $15 million MILCON project.
111. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, why can't
the Air Force find $16 million in a $1.8 billion facility sustainment
account to carry out these repairs in fiscal year 2007?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. We will bring the Luke AFB
Runway 3L/21R repair project forward from fiscal year 2011 if the next
AFCESA report, due to be released in June 2007, validates the
requirement. Luke AFB and AETC will work priority repair projects
during the year as mission, funds, and facility conditions require.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner
total force integration
112. Senator Warner. General Moseley, in reading your opening
statement about total force integration, I've been troubled by recent
reports within the Air Force about how Air National Guard forces in the
total force wing are being viewed. It seems that cuts to manpower in
fiscal year 2007 used to pay for modernization are forcing Guard
personnel to be used as replacements for regular force reductions. As
an example, I've supported the relocation of our Virginia Air National
Guard Fighter Wing to Langley AFB so our Guard members can train and
operate side-by-side with Active-Duty personnel flying the F-22 Raptor.
As I know it, an agreement between the Air Force and the Air National
Guard set forth in 2005 envisioned an increase in the total F-22
capability available to COCOMs as measured by crew ratios. The goal was
to maximize the overall efficiency and the effectiveness of F-22 combat
power by collocating Active and Guard fighting forces to take full
advantage of the mutual benefit of each component's strengths in
training every day side-by-side. Now I hear that upon completion of the
collocation, our Nation may have a net loss of Air Force combat power
by using the Virginia Air Guard Wing to compensate for Active Force
manpower cuts and to sustain current levels of crew ratios and combat
support capability in the active Forces at Langley AFB. What is the
intent of total force integration in relation to maintaining levels of
combat capability?
General Moseley. The intent of total force integration is to
increase Air Force combat capabilities by maximizing crew-ratios and
maintenance support to respond to COCOM taskings. The 192nd Fighter
Wing's relocation to Langley will occur at the end of this year
following the distribution of their F--16s to other Reserve component
units in late fiscal year 2007. Many 192nd Fighter Wing personnel are
already training and working on F-22s at Langley AFB. By fiscal years
2009-2010, all 192nd Fighter Wing personnel will be fully integrated
and collocated with the 1st Fighter Wing. As a result, there will be a
net gain of Air Force combat power.
113. Senator Warner. General Moseley, will Reserve units in total
force wings be used to fill in the gaps exposed by Active Force
reductions, or will they be maintained as additional combat
capabilities?
General Moseley. While some manpower efficiencies may be realized
once Regular and Reserve component units are fully integrated, Reserve
unit personnel are not being used to replace Regular personnel in total
force wings.
The Air Force is modernizing while reducing overall aircraft and
manpower numbers. High-tech emerging mission areas will provide an
exponential increase in capability. As a result, our force structure
will have 25 percent fewer fighters and 10 percent fewer total
aircraft. The 2025 fighter force will be 100 percent PGM-capable and
90+ percent low observable. Higher crew ratios will increase
utilization in wartime and efficiency in peacetime. Reserve components
will fly newer, more capable airplanes as they are introduced.
Technology improvements in newer aircraft have also significantly
reduced the maintenance manpower requirements per flying hour, driving
down manpower requirements.
114. Senator Warner. General Moseley, if the Air Force goal is to
sustain increased capabilities, are operational planners being directed
to increase the war and mobilization planning assumptions for total
force wings?
General Moseley. As the Air Force moves from older generation
aircraft to fifth-generation aircraft, the advances in technology will
deliver better reliability and increased combat capability per
aircraft. In addition, the total force changes being implemented by the
Air Force will maximize crew-ratios in associate units, allowing for a
greater number of sorties to be produced. War planners are aware of all
these parameters, and take them into account as they develop war and
mobilization plans.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
guard and reserve retirement proposal
115. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, in
your written statement you discuss your efforts at total force
integration to seamlessly join the Guard and Reserve components to the
active component in order to take full advantage of all components'
strengths. I think you have been successful in this effort and believe
that, perhaps of all the Services, the Air Force has most efficiently
and effectively utilized its Guard and Reserve members over the past 15
years and, as you have said many times, you could not do your job
without them.
I have introduced a bill in the Senate, S.648, National Guard and
Reserve Retirement Modernization Act, which would lower the age at
which Guard and Reserve members can collect retired pay by 3 months for
every 90 days they spend on Active-Duty in support of a contingency
operation. I have two purposes for this bill. The first is to
incentivize mid-career personnel who are being deployed, and stand to
be deployed again, to stay in the Service by giving them an additional
incentive. The second is simply to recognize that the way we are using
our Guard and Reserve personnel over the past 10 years has
fundamentally changed, and to update the retirement benefit in light of
those changes.
Do you believe that, in light of our current usage of the Guard and
Reserve and unknowns related to how this usage will affect long-term
Guard and Reserve retention and recruiting, we should be considering
changes in the Reserve retirement benefit?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. We are waiting to see the
report from the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve who was
directed by Congress to make recommendations. The cost and its tangible
impact to the overall Air Force budget and support to the Air Reserve
component members must be carefully balanced for a positive conclusion.
116. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, what
specific options related to modernizing the Guard and Reserve
retirement benefit has the Air Force considered?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. None at this time because we
are waiting to see the report from the Commission on the National Guard
and Reserve who was directed by Congress to make recommendations. The
cost and its tangible impact to the overall Air Force budget and
support to the Air Reserve component members must be carefully balanced
for a positive conclusion.
117. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, in
light of different options for improving or changing the Reserve
retirement benefit, would you prefer:
An option that rewards Guard and Reserve members
across the board, regardless of their level or type of
participation?
An option that rewards Guard and Reserve members who
remain in the Selected Reserve beyond 20 years?
An option that simply lowers the age of annuity
receipt by 5 or 10 years?
An option that is targeted to Guard and Reserve who
are deploying in support of contingency operations related to
the global war on terrorism?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force cannot elect any
options at this time, until sufficient information on the cost/benefit
analysis as it impacts recruiting and retention is received.
118. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, in
structuring a potential change to the Reserve retirement benefit, what
factors would you consider and what type of behavior would you want to
incentivize through a changed benefit?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. We would consider and attempt
to incentivize enhanced recruiting and retention of Reserve component
members, limiting Reserve component mobilization and enhancing Reserve
component volunteerism.
119. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, what
is your specific opinion of S.648?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. We do not have a specific
opinion at this time. We are waiting to see the report from the
Commission on the National Guard and Reserve who was directed by
Congress to make recommendations. We would happily consider any
proposal, but would need to fully understand how the proposal benefits,
applies to, or affects the Total Force.
repair enterprise 21
120. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, in the
section on ``Depot Maintenance Transformation'' in your written
statement you discuss an initiative called ``Repair Enterprise 21''
which appears to be a new approach to Air Force logistics. Repair
Enterprise 21 is a lean logistics initiative which will ``establish an
enterprise-wide single repair network supporting the entire Air Force
supply chain.'' Would you please explain in more detail the status of
Repair Enterprise 21, what it entails exactly, how it will impact or
change the current role of the Air Logistics Centers, and most
importantly, how it will affect the Air Force's sustainment of weapon
systems?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. Repair Enterprise 21 (RE21)
will right-size and rationalize the Air Force's intermediate
maintenance infrastructure. Ultimately, RE21 will reduce the number of
Air Force intermediate repair facilities from approximately 75 to 22
and increase slightly the workload at the Air Logistics Centers (ALCs).
Intermediate repair requirements will be prioritized centrally and
accomplished by either a Centralized Intermediate Repair Facility or at
an ALC. Senior Air Force leadership has approved 9 of 14 organic
repaired commodities for transition to the RE21 repair network:
- B-1, C-5, C-130, E-3, and F-16 Avionics
- TF33 engines
- Pave Penny and Low Altitude Navigation Targeting Infrared
for Night (LANTIRN) Pods
The F100/F110 and F101 engines are pending approval. We anticipate
late spring or early summer for their approval.
Three commodities have been disapproved or tabled:
- ALQ131 and ALQ184 pods were disapproved due to cost to
ship oversized classified cargo and lack of spare pods
- F-15 Avionics has been tabled and will be readdressed in
12 months
We expect the TF33 engine transition to start in the fourth quarter
of fiscal year 2007. The B-1, C-5, C-130, E-3, and F-16 Avionics and
Pave Penny pod transitions will start in the first quarter of fiscal
year 2008. The F101 engine and LANTIRN pods will start in the second
quarter of fiscal year 2008.
We expect weapon system sustainment to improve with RE21,
particularly with a stable workforce and standardized work practices.
Additionally, by centralizing engine repair we can focus on reliability
centered maintenance through module matching and more rapid
introduction of technical improvements to improve engine average time
on wing.
total force integration
121. Senator Chambliss. General Moseley, the 116th Air Control Wing
is the first and only ``blended wing'' which includes both Active and
Guard personnel doing the same tasks and deploying together. The
``blended wing'' has worked well in this case, but it has worked well
primarily because the people involved have made it work well, in spite
of organizational challenges and cultural differences between the Guard
and Active force. What have the Air Force and DOD in general learned
from the ``blended wing'' concept and how has it informed the Air
Force's efforts at ``Total Force Integration''?
General Moseley. The Air Force learned a great deal from this
initial integration effort at Robins AFB. We took a brand new mission
that had not received all of its equipment, threw it into a conversion
that had never been tried, shortened the conversion period and then
sent it immediately to war . . . and it was successful. This proved
that Air Force men and women can accomplish remarkable feats in the
face of substantial obstacles. We also learned that each component
brings a unique set of tools and capabilities that, when combined and
shared daily, is greater than the sum of its parts. This is especially
true in the maintenance community. We learned that many of the ``pre-
set'' notions one component formulates about the other are marginalized
or dissolved totally with integration. Finally, we learned that one
size does not fit all. Total Force Integration transformation efforts
are dependent upon a number of factors which must be identified,
analyzed, and coordinated to ensure the Air Force gets the greatest
value for the effort. As a result of what we learned,we sought and
received congressional support for important changes to the legal
guidance in titles 10 and 32. We still have work to do operationally to
facilitate support using full-time Guard and Reserve personnel as well
as dual-hatted authority.
122. Senator Chambliss. General Moseley, what are other models for
Active/Reserve interaction that you are considering that might take
advantage of the unique capabilities and best practices resident in the
Reserve and the Active Force?
General Moseley. There are four associate models being used for
Total Force Integration implementation:
Classic Associate:
An integration model where a Regular Air Force component unit
retains principle responsibility for weapon system or systems, which it
shares with one or more Reserve component units. Regular and Reserve
component units retain separate organizational structures and chains of
command. There are varying degrees of functional integration based on
MOUs.
Active Associate:
An integration model where a Reserve component unit has principle
responsibility for weapon system or systems, which it shares with one
or more regular units. Reserve and regular component units retain
separate organizational structures and chains of command. There are
varying degrees of functional integration based on MOUs.
ARC Associate:
An integration model where two or more ARC units integrate, with
one retaining principle responsibility for weapon system or systems,
which are shared by all. Each unit retains separate organizational
structures and chains of commands. There are varying degrees of
functional integration based on MOUs.
Integrated Associate:
An integration model similar to the classic associate model;
however, members of all components contribute to one unit mission with
administrative control and support provided by the respective component
via detachments.
c-130 and joint cargo aircraft
123. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, the
Air Force is requesting funding for 33 C- and KC-130J aircraft in the
fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008 supplemental requests and the
fiscal year 2008 base budget. The Air Force is also planning to procure
another intratheater airlift platform, the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA)
which is a joint program with the Army. What business case and
requirements have led you to a decision to procure both these aircraft?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The 2006 QDR, informed by the
2005 MCS, established a range of 395-674 C-130s to support the NMS with
acceptable risk. In December 2007, AMC is scheduled to complete an
Intratheater Fleet Mix Analysis to determine the best mix of
intratheater aircraft. The future Air Force intratheater fleet will
include the C-130, C-17, and the JCA, and the mix of that fleet is
dependent on many factors including health of the C-130 fleet and
dedicated intratheater C-17 lift.
C-130Js
To meet the minimum MCS requirement, the Air Force requested 29 C-
130Js. In the fiscal year 2007 supplemental request, the Air Force
requested 5 C-130Js to replace 5 C-130H2s being converted to MC-130Ws.
In the fiscal year 2008 budget, the Air Force requested 9 C-130Js on
the multi-year procurement contract. In the fiscal year 2008
supplemental, the Air Force requested 5 C-130Js to replace the
remaining 5 C-130Hs being converted to MC-130Ws, 7 C-130Js to replace
stressed C-130s due to the global war on terror, and 3 C-130Js to
replace 3 non-combat C-130 losses.
The United States Marine Corps requested 4 KC-130Js in the fiscal
year 2008 budget and 7 KC-130Js in the fiscal year 2008 supplemental.
JCAs
In accordance with Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) III in
December 2005, the Army and Air Force were directed to form a Joint
Program Office (JPO) from the Army's Future Cargo Aircraft (FCA) and
the Air Force's Light Cargo Aircraft. In June 2006, the Army and Air
Force signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to purchase the same JCA
platform. The Army and Air Force are on track to meet the Milestone C
decision by 30 May 07. The Air Force is committed to the JCA program
and to delivering unparalleled intratheater airlift to the COCOMs.
124. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, to
what extent do the JCA and C-130J have overlapping versus distinct
capabilities?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The JCA and C-130J have
similar capabilities for use in the intratheater airlift role. Both are
capable of short takeoff and landing at fields as short as 2,000 feet.
Both aircraft are capable of moving the Department's standard 463L
pallet and can airdrop container delivery system bundles. Additionally,
both aircraft will be equipped with all the requisite communications,
navigation, and defensive gear to operate as an integral part of our
combat theater airlift system. Still, the C-130J offers capabilities
that the JCA does not, and the JCA offers efficiencies not available in
the C-130J. The C-130J is faster and offers greater cargo capacity,
higher climb gradients, and more flexibility on similar sized runways
than the JCA. The C-130J is compatible with all current Air Force
Material Handling Equipment (MHE) and can accept a 463L pallet
configured at a standard height of 96 inches, both of which the JCA
cannot. Finally, the C-130J can carry many vehicle types that the JCA
cannot (Stryker, Fire Engine, Up-armored Humvee, et cetera). However,
our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan shows frequent, but required,
movement of less-than-C-130 sized loads. In these situations, the JCA
offers more efficiency than the C-130J because its cost to operate per
flight hour is less. Also, depending on which aircraft is selected for
the JCA, it may even burn fewer pounds of fuel per passenger or pallet
mile than the C-130J. Finally, the unit cost of a JCA will be
significantly less than a C-130J. In December 2007, AMC is scheduled to
complete an Intratheater Fleet Mix Analysis to determine the best mix
of intratheater aircraft. The future Air Force intratheater fleet will
include the C-130, C-17, and the JCA, and the mix of that fleet is
dependent on many factors including health of the C-130 fleet and
dedicated intratheater C-17 lift.
125. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, what
missions will you use the JCA for that are unique from missions that C-
130Js and existing rotary wing assets currently accomplish?
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. There are currently no unique
JCA missions in the intratheater airlift role that cannot be performed
by a C-130J or by rotary wing assets. JCA and C-130J takeoff and
landing performance is almost the same with both aircraft capable of
short takeoff and landing at fields as short as 2,000 feet. Further,
the C-130J offers greater cargo capacity and flexibility on similar
sized runways as the JCA.
However, the JCA dimensions are significantly smaller than those of
the C-130J. This will allow the JCA to maneuver into tighter spaces on
the ground and in parking which offers the potential to operate at
fields with a more tightly constrained ``maximum on ground'' factor. In
addition, the JCA will be a more efficient passenger and cargo mover of
less-than-C-130 sized loads, since its operating costs will be less per
flight hour and the unit cost of a JCA will be significantly less than
a C-130J.
In December 2007, AMC is scheduled to complete an Intratheater
Fleet Mix Analysis to determine the best mix of intratheater aircraft.
The future Air Force intratheater fleet will include the C-130, C-17,
and the JCA, and the mix of that fleet is dependent on many factors
including health of the C-130 fleet and dedicated intratheater C-17
lift.
combat search and rescue-x
126. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Wynne, senior Air Force and OSD
officials have stated that early delivery of the Boeing HH-47 was a
high priority criterion to its selection for CSAR-X. Was delivering
CSAR-X early a KPP?
Secretary Wynne. The early delivery of the CSAR-X is not a KPP in
the CSAR-X Capability Development Document (CDD) or the Systems
Requirements Document (SRD). The Air Force's selection was based upon
an integrated Best Value assessment using the evaluation criteria
published in the Request for Proposal (RFP). The evaluation criteria
are as follows: Factor 1, Mission Capability (includes the following
subfactors listed in rank order: Aircraft Performance--Block 0, System
Architecture and Software, Systems Engineering, Product Support,
Management/Schedule, and Aircraft Performance--Block 10); Factor 2,
Proposal Risk; Factor 3, Past Performance; and Factor 4, Cost/Price.
Factors 1, 2, and 3 were equally important, but when combined are
significantly more important than Cost/Price. Evaluation of the
Management/Schedule subfactor included the offeror's approach and
ability to effectively and efficiently implement and manage the CSAR-X
program to support an Initial Operational Capability not later than
fiscal year 2012.
Timely replacement of the aging and under capable HH-60 fleet is an
Air Force priority which is why the acquisition strategy delivers a
Block 0 (initial capability) first followed by Block 10 (full
capability).
127. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Wynne, will any CSAR-X
capabilities be sacrificed for earlier delivery?
Secretary Wynne. The Air Force did not trade any CSAR-X
capabilities for early delivery during source selection; however the
Air Force may make necessary program adjustments as permitted within
the approved contract to maintain schedule, cost, and performance
parameters.
128. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Wynne, what early schedule
benefit will the Air Force receive by selecting Boeing versus the other
bidders for CSAR-X?
Secretary Wynne. The early delivery of the CSAR-X is not a KPP in
the CSAR-X CDD or the SRD. The Air Force's selection was based upon an
integrated Best Value assessment using the evaluation criteria
published in the RFP. The evaluation criteria are as follows: Factor 1,
Mission Capability (includes the following subfactors listed in rank
order: Aircraft Performance--Block 0, System Architecture and Software,
Systems Engineering, Product Support, Management/Schedule, and Aircraft
Performance--Block 10); Factor 2, Proposal Risk; Factor 3, Past
Performance; and Factor 4, Cost/Price. Factors 1, 2, and 3 were equally
important, but when combined are significantly more important than
Cost/Price. Evaluation of the Management/Schedule subfactor included
the offeror's approach and ability to effectively and efficiently
implement and manage the CSAR-X program to support an Initial
Operational Capability not later than fiscal year 2012.
Timely replacement of the aging and under capable HH-60 fleet is an
Air Force priority which is why the acquisition strategy delivers a
Block 0 (initial capability)first followed by Block 10 (full
capability).
129. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Wynne, operations in the terminal
area--the combat landing zone and surrounding area--is the most
critical, dangerous portion of a combat rescue mission. Were terminal
area characteristics a KPP for the CSAR-X program?
Secretary Wynne. The development of the CSAR-X requirements was led
by experienced Air Force operators, maintainers, and support personnel
who have performed the demanding CSAR mission. Terminal area
characteristics are not addressed as a stand-alone KPP for CSAR-X,
however they were considered during CSAR-X requirements development and
influenced eight of the nine KPPs, including: Combat Radius, Rotor-
Downwash at Mid-mission gross weight, Net Ready, Self Defense,
Vulnerability Reduction, Electro Optical/Infrared (EO/IR) threat
disengagement, Radio Frequency (RF) threat disengagement, and Payload/
Cabin Space.
130. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Wynne, if there is a follow-on
source selection for CSAR-X, will the Air Force place greater emphasis
on aircraft attributes for terminal area operations?
Secretary Wynne. In response to the GAO's recommendation in their
February 26 decision, the Air Force will soon issue an amendment to the
RFP and conduct an evaluation of the revised proposals. The Air Force
validated requirements have not changed and we will continue to apply
an integrated Best Value assessment, which considers Mission
Capability, Proposal Risk, Past Performance, and Cost/Price evaluation
factors. The evaluation criteria are as follows: Factor 1, Mission
Capability (includes the following subfactors listed in rank order:
Aircraft Performance--Block 0, System Architecture and Software,
Systems Engineering, Product Support, Management/Schedule, and Aircraft
Performance--Block 10); Factor 2, Proposal Risk; Factor 3, Past
Performance; and Factor 4, Cost/Price. Factors 1, 2, and 3 were equally
important, but when combined are significantly more important than
Cost/Price.
131. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Wynne, did the less expensive
medium-lift CSAR-X competitors fail to meet the minimum specified
requirements?
Secretary Wynne. The CSAR-X RFP required that all offerors meet all
the Government's specified minimum requirements. The integrated Best
Value assessment determines which offeror best meets or exceeds the
Government's requirements as stated in the RFP.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn
c-130 avionics modernization program
132. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Wynne, what is the Air Force's plan
for the AMP for the C-130 fleet?
Secretary Wynne. The plan in the fiscal year 2008 President's
budget is to install AMP on 268 C-130H1, H2, H2.5, and H3 combat
delivery aircraft. On 2 February 2007, C-130 AMP declared a critical
Nunn-McCurdy breach and is currently undergoing an OSD certification
process. Results of this certification process are due to Congress on 5
June 2007.
133. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Wynne, what is the estimated cost
per aircraft?
Secretary Wynne. The Average Procurement Unit Cost is $11.8 million
(procurement cost/procurement quantity). The Program Acquisition Unit
Cost is $17.29 million ((RDT&E cost + procurement cost)/total
quantity). This information is based on the December 2006 Selected
Acquisition Report submitted to Congress in April 2007.
134. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Wynne, how many C-130Es will undergo
the modernization program and what is the timetable for this work to be
done?
Secretary Wynne. No C-130Es will undergo C-130 AMP or Center-Wing
Replacement.
135. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Wynne, how many C-130H1s will
undergo the modernization program and what is the timetable for this
work to be done?
Secretary Wynne. All 47 C-130H1 aircraft are planned for
modernization. They are tentatively scheduled to begin C-130 AMP
modification in fiscal year 2011.
c-130 wing box repairs
136. Senator Cornyn. General Moseley, what is the Air Force's plan
for repairing the wing boxes of the C-130 fleet?
General Moseley. As mentioned above, we inspect and repair as
necessary to lift flight restrictions between 38K and 45K EBH, at which
point the aircraft grounds regardless. The only way to remove the
aircraft from grounded status is a full replacement of the center-wing
box. Our replacement program is being implemented in 3 stages to
accommodate changing requirements based on force structure decisions.
At this point, we have no requirement to replace center-wing boxes on E
models. All other C-130 Mission Design Series (MDSs) are phased into
the program based on projected restriction points and EBH analysis.
Phase 1 is a Sole Source Contract to Lockheed Martin to convert an
AC-130H center-wing box to the MC-130H configuration; currently being
installed and scheduled to complete by the end of April 2007.
Phase 2 is a Sole Source Contract for Lockheed Martin to deliver 12
Kits for the MC-130H, HC-130N/P, and the C-130H.
Phase 3 is a Sole Source Contract for Lockheed Martin and was
awarded on 31 Mar 07. This phase replaces the center-wing boxes of the
remaining fleet of AC-130U, EC-130H, MC-130H, HC-130N/P, C-130H1/H2/H3,
any potential Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Coast Guard (USCG), and
Navy requirements. We expect to recompete in fiscal year 2009 and
estimate contract award in fiscal year 2010 for components surrounding
the wing box; this could result in qualification of a second source.
137. Senator Cornyn. General Moseley, what is the estimated repair
cost per aircraft?
General Moseley. Current costs to replace the center-wing box range
is between $6-$7.5 million per aircraft depending on the Mission Design
Series. If you are looking at repair cost, then repairs resulting from
the Time Compliance Technical Order (TCTO) 1908 inspection are running
about $700,000-$800,000 depending on the extent of damage. TCTO 1908
inspection takes a restricted aircraft (38,000 EBH) and identifies
structural deficiencies to repair it to put in ``unrestricted flight
status to 45,000 EBH'' and then it is grounded, regardless of repairs.
For the most part a TCTO 1908 aircraft gets between 4-7 years of
unrestricted life on it--depending on how you fly the aircraft and the
EBH factor, but it does not prevent grounding at 45,000 EBH.
138. Senator Cornyn. General Moseley, how many C-130Es will undergo
wing box repairs and what is the timetable for these repairs?
General Moseley. Currently we do not plan, nor have we budgeted, to
replace any center-wing boxes on our C-130E fleet.
139. Senator Cornyn. General Moseley, how many H1s will undergo
wing box repairs and what is the timetable for these repairs?
General Moseley. The current replacement plan is for 47 C-130H1s to
undergo wing box replacement. The timetable for these replacements is
based on projected restriction points and EBH analysis with
replacements beginning in fiscal year 2009 and completing in fiscal
year 2013.
Since the TCTO 1908 inspection and repair is only an interim
solution to allow unrestricted flight operations between 38,000 and
45,000 EBHs, at which point the aircraft grounds, we are trying to
limit the number of 1908 inspections and repairs to minimum essential.
140. Senator Cornyn. General Moseley, how many H2s will undergo
wing box repairs and what is the timetable for these repairs?
General Moseley. The current plan is for 152 C-130H2s to undergo
center-wing box replacement. The timetable for these replacements is
based on projected restriction points (38,000 EBH) and EBH analysis
with repairs beginning in fiscal year 2014 and completing in fiscal
year 2020.
Given that we have sufficient lead time to replace C-130H2 center-
wings at or just prior to their restriction point, it is highly
unlikely that we will conduct TCTO 1908 inspections on H2s.
141. Senator Cornyn. General Moseley, how many H3s will undergo
center-wing box repairs and what is the timetable for these repairs?
General Moseley. The current plan is for 80 C-130H3s to undergo
center-wing box replacement. The timetable for these replacements is
based on projected restriction points and EBH analysis with
replacements beginning in fiscal year 2014 and completing in fiscal
year 2020.
Given that we have sufficient lead time to replace C-130H3 center-
wing boxes at or just prior to their restriction point, it is highly
unlikely that we will conduct TCTO 1908 inspections on H3s.
c-130 retirement
142. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Wynne, what is the Air Force plan
for retiring C-130s?
Secretary Wynne. The Air Force plan is to divest the C-130E fleet
by fiscal year 2015. The Air Force will have 119 C-130Es at the end of
fiscal year 2007 following the retirement of 51 C-130Es authorized in
the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007. The 119 C-130Es remaining will be
retired over the next 8 years. The Air Force retirement plan will
balance the declining health of the C-130E fleet with recapitalization
efforts to meet the 395 C-130 minimum directed by the 2005 MCS to
achieve moderate risk.
143. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Wynne, how many C-130Es are to be
retired and what is the timetable for them?
Secretary Wynne. The Air Force current C-130 retirement/
modernization plan is to divest the C-130E fleet and modernize the C-
130H fleet (H, H1, H2, H2.5, and H3). The Air Force will have 119 C-
130Es at the end of fiscal year 2007 following the retirement of 51 C-
130Es authorized in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007. The level and speed
of recapitalization efforts will directly impact the speed at which the
Air Force retires the structurally fatigued, less capable C-130E. The
Air Force is requesting to retire 24 C-130Es in fiscal year 2008,
bringing the C-130E fleet strength down to 95 by the end of fiscal year
2008. The C-130Js requested in the fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year
2008 global war on terror supplementals will assist the Air Force in
the recapitalization of the C-130Es.
144. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Wynne, how many C-130H1s are to be
retired and what is the timetable for retiring them?
Secretary Wynne. The Air Force has no plan to retire any of the 47
C-130H1s in the current C-130 fleet. The Air Force current program of
record is to include all 47 C-130H1s in the C-130 Avionics
Modernization Program and the Center-Wing Box replacement program.
c-130 basing
145. Senator Cornyn. General Moseley, please list all of the C-130
bases and the following information for each base:
The number and model (E, H1, H2, H3, or J) of C-130
aircraft.
The number of such aircraft in Active-Duty, Guard, or
Air Force Reserve.
General Moseley. Please see attached C-130 Fleet as of 01 Oct 06
slide which provides complete break out of the C-130 number, model,
location, and disposition (Active-Duty, Guard, or Air Force Reserve).
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
146. Senator Cornyn. General Moseley, what is the Air Force's plan
for maintaining C-130s in the Active-Duty Force?
General Moseley. The Air Force currently has 13 Active-Duty C-130
Squadrons, including an Active-Duty Association at Cheyenne. By fiscal
year 2008 the Air Force will convert one of their squadrons to an
Active-Duty Association at Pope and by fiscal year 2011 the Air Force
plans to stand-up one additional Active-Duty Association at Elmendorf;
both in support of BRAC-directed force structure changes. This will
bring the final total Active-Duty C-130 Squadron count to 14 through
the FYDP.
147. Senator Cornyn. General Moseley, what is the Air Force basing
plan for Active-Duty C-130s in the next 5 years?
General Moseley. Over the next 5 years the Air Force will maintain
Active-Duty C-130 presence at Dyess AFB, TX; Little Rock AFB, AR;
Ramstein AB, Germany; and Yokota AB, Japan. Additionally, the Air Force
will have three Active Associate units at Cheyenne, WY; Pope AAF, NC;
and Elmendorf AFB, AK.
148. Senator Cornyn. General Moseley, what is the Air Force basing
plan for Active-Duty C-130s in the next 10 years?
General Moseley. Over the next 10 years the Air Force will maintain
Active-Duty C-130 presence at Dyess AFB, TX; Little Rock AFB, AR;
Ramstein AB, Germany; and Yokota AB, Japan. Additionally, the Air Force
will have three Active-Duty Associate units at Cheyenne, WY; Pope AAF,
NC; and Elmendorf AFB, AK.
joint cargo aircraft
149. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Wynne, what is the Air Force's plan
concerning the acquisition of JCA?
Secretary Wynne. The Army and Air Force have been conducting a
Joint Source Selection since the RFP was released on 17 March 06. The
Services are on track for a Milestone C decision for low rate
production in May. We expect the winner to be announced shortly after a
successful Milestone C decision.
150. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Wynne, how many JCAs are needed?
Secretary Wynne. In June 2006, the Army and Air Force signed an MOA
to purchase the same JCA platform. In preparation for Milestone C
decision in May 2007, the Air Force is finalizing a preliminary
assessment of JCA quantities. A more detailed analysis of the optimum
intratheater airlift fleet mix is being conducted by RAND and will be
complete in December 2007. The Air Force is committed to the JCA
program and to delivering unparalleled intratheater airlift to the
COCOMs.
151. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Wynne, what is the Air Force's
timetable for procuring these JCAs?
Secretary Wynne. The Air Force is scheduled to begin procurement in
fiscal year 2010 after a successful Full Rate Production decision.
152. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Wynne, is the Air Force planning to
use JCAs as replacements for C-130s?
Secretary Wynne. No, based on the 2005 MCS, we need the capacity of
at least 395 C-130s to stay above the acceptable risk level.
153. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Wynne, what is the Air Force's
basing plan for the JCAs?
Secretary Wynne. The Air Force transformational efforts maximize
current and future capabilities through Total Force Integration; a
cornerstone of the JCA program. The basing and beddown for this new
airframe will leverage the strengths of Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve
Forces to ensure maximum effectiveness of this vital asset. JCA basing
is still in development and will take into consideration many factors
to include the Army's basing strategy, expanding role of homeland
security/homeland defense, support to FEMA regions, and minimizing
MILCON costs. At this time, the Air Force is postured for aircraft
selection in May 2007 and reception of its first JCA in fiscal year
2012.
c-130j
154. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Wynne, what is the Air Force plan
for continued acquisition of the C-130J stretch model beyond the
existing contract?
Secretary Wynne. The Air Force's Multi-Year Procurement of the C-
130J is set to end in fiscal year 2008 with additional procurements
based solely on unfunded priorities and global war on terrorism
supplementals.
155. Senator Cornyn. General Moseley, please list the bases that
will receive C-130Js, the number of C-130Js at each base, and specify
whether the aircraft will be in Active-Duty, Guard, or Air Force
Reserve.
General Moseley. Please see attached C-130J Beddown Plan slide
which provides the Air Force's programmed C-130J force structure.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[Whereupon, at 11:46 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2008
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 22, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND, UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND, AND
UNITED STATES JOINT FORCES COMMAND
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Bill Nelson,
Bayh, Pryor, Warner, Sessions, Thune, and Martinez.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Evelyn N. Farkas,
professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional
staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member;
Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Michael J. Noblet, research
assistant; Arun A. Seraphin, professional staff member; and
William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L.
Niemeyer, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten,
professional staff member; Robert M. Soofer, professional staff
member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: David G. Collins, Fletcher L.
Cork, and Jessica L. Kingston.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Caple,
Sherry Davich, and Caroline Tess, assistants to Senator Bill
Nelson; Todd Rosenblum, assistant to Senator Bayh; M. Bradford
Foley and Terri Glaze, assistants to Senator Pryor; Sandra
Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; Mark J. Winter, assistant to
Senator Collins; Stuart C. Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune;
and John L. Goetchius, assistant to Senator Martinez.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
meets this morning to consider the posture of three military
commands that are crucial to our National Security: U.S.
Northern Command (NORTHCOM), U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM),
and U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM).
With the high-stress deployments in Iraq, and the resulting
strains on the readiness of our military forces, this hearing
is a timely opportunity to hear from JFCOM which is the force
provider for the combatant commands, and from two of the
combatant commands that depend upon JFCOM for the military
forces that they would need if a contingency were to arise in
their areas of responsibility.
In this regard, NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM are two of the
economy of force commands, because they do not require large
numbers of military forces on a normal basis. Under today's
circumstances with so many of our military forces deployed to
Iraq, preparing to deploy, or recovering from recent
deployments, a question arises as to where JFCOM would get
ready, trained, and equipped forces to provide NORTHCOM or
SOUTHCOM, if needed. I hope we can explore that topic, among
others, at today's hearing.
This morning, we welcome Admiral Timothy Keating, who is
the Commander of U.S. NORTHCOM, and of North American Aerospace
Defense Command (NORAD). Admiral Keating has been the Commander
of U.S. NORTHCOM since November 2004, has recently been
nominated for, and on Monday was confirmed as, the next
Commander of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). We congratulate you,
Admiral, on your confirmation, and we'll look forward to
working with you on your next assignment.
Admiral Keating will not assume command of PACOM until
later in the month, so we will have the benefit of his
experience, and his knowledge of NORTHCOM for today's hearing.
NORTHCOM has a two-pronged mission. It is responsible for
conducting operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and
aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and
interests within its assigned area of responsibility (AOR), and
as directed by the President, or Secretary of Defense, it
provides military assistance to civil authorities for domestic
crises, including consequence management of natural disasters,
like Hurricane Katrina, and man-made disasters, like those
involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
high-yield explosive incidents.
The NORTHCOM AOR is the United States, Canada, and Mexico,
and the land, sea, and air approaches to those territories. So,
when it comes to defending the territory of the United States,
NORTHCOM has the primary responsibility.
The committee also welcomes Admiral James Stavridis,
Commander of SOUTHCOM, who is responsible for an area including
Latin America, south of Mexico, and the countries and
territories of the Caribbean as well as the surrounding waters,
ocean, and sea.
The committee is interested in hearing from the Admiral
regarding U.S. assistance to Colombia, and the progress being
made to balance our security, stability, and democracy in
Colombia, and also stop the cultivation, manufacturing, and
trafficking of drugs. The price, purity, and supply of cocaine
in the United States does not appear to have changed much, and
so we'll want to hear why and whether we need to do more to
interdict drugs across the transit zone from South America to
the United States.
We'll also hear, or hope to hear, the SOUTHCOM perspective
regarding ongoing U.N. Peacekeeping Operations in Haiti, and
the impact of populist anti-Americanism in South and Central
America.
Within the direct responsibility of SOUTHCOM, Admiral
Stavridis, we also would like to have your assessment of the
ongoing detention and interrogation operations at Guantanamo
Bay, and your understanding of what the plans are for the
future of the installations there, and the status of any plans
for dealing with a post-Castro Cuba.
Finally, emphasizing my initial point, the committee needs
to hear how SOUTHCOM activities are being affected, or could be
affected, by the reduced availability of U.S. Forces, including
Special Operations Forces, due to operational requirements in
other combatant command areas.
Finally, we welcome General Lance Smith, U.S. Air Force,
Commander of the JFCOM. General Smith and his command have the
important responsibility of providing mission-ready, joint-
capable forces to our combatant commanders around the world.
This is a particularly challenging mission at a time when so
many of our military forces are deployed in Iraq.
JFCOM also supports the development and integration of
present and future interagency and multi-national military
capabilities.
Our committee has a longstanding interest in JFCOM's
mission, responsibilities, authorities, and activities with
respect to joint doctrine development, training
experimentation, and acquisition. We're particularly interested
today to hear General Smith's views on the status of JFCOM's
contribution to the readiness of our deployed and nondeployed
forces.
We thank each of you for your long and continued service to
our Nation, and we look forward to your testimony.
Senator Warner?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
On behalf of the distinguished ranking member, Senator
McCain, I ask unanimous consent to place his full statement in
the record.
Chairman Levin. It will be.
[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain
The committee meets today to receive testimony from Admiral Timothy
Keating, Commander of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM); General Lance
Smith, Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM); and Admiral
James Stavridis, Commander of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), on
their military strategy and operational requirements. As combatant
commanders, we welcome your insight on developments in your areas of
responsibility, as well as your assessment of the fiscal year 2008
defense budget request. The committee values the contributions and
sacrifices you and the fine men and women under your command are making
on behalf of the American people.
Admiral Keating, protecting the United States from direct attack is
the highest priority of the Department of Defense (DOD). In addition to
defending the Nation against attacks by hostile forces, NORTHCOM also
is charged with the responsibility for providing critical support to
civil authorities in preventing and responding to terrorist incidents
and in assisting civilian agencies in dealing with the aftermath of
other domestic emergencies and natural disasters.
The DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support assumes
there will be a mass casualty attack against the United States. While
the Department of Homeland Security is the lead Federal agency for
preventing and responding to such attacks, I would note that 12 of the
15 National Planning Scenarios issued by the Homeland Security Council
deal with chemical, biological, or radiological events that could
quickly overwhelm the capacity of local and State first responders. As
such, the DOD must be prepared to address these important civil support
missions utilizing both the Active and Reserve component.
At the same time, however, the Government Accountability Office,
the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, and the Chief of the
National Guard Bureau all warn that the National Guard is under-
resourced for many of the missions it now performs--especially those
necessary to deal with weapons of mass destruction events in the
Homeland. Likewise, it is unclear whether we have made sufficient
progress as a government in addressing those communications
interoperability and interagency coordination problems that hampered
recovery efforts after Hurricane Katrina. I will be interested to learn
how well NORTHCOM is progressing in these areas.
General Smith, as Commander of JFCOM, you are responsible for
providing the trained and ready forces needed by regional combatant
commanders. In this role, JFCOM assigns nearly all conventional forces
based in the continental U.S. In 2006, JFCOM developed recommendations
and coordinated the deployment of more than 310,000 personnel in
support of requirements identified by combatant commanders.
We look forward to hearing your testimony today about JFCOM's
important role as force provider as well as JFCOM's complementary work
in joint training, joint experimentation, and the development of
interoperability requirements which ensure our soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines can combine their capabilities into a single
successful effort. Because JFCOM's recommendations and analysis of
readiness issues form the basis for deployment decisions, I ask that
your testimony today also present your assessment, and any
recommendations you have, regarding how best to maintain the Nation's
forces at the highest possible level of readiness.
Admiral Stavridis, I welcome you to your first posture hearing as
the Commander of SOUTHCOM and commend you for a very comprehensive
written statement that emphasizes the linkages, challenges, and
promises for improving and sustaining our security cooperation, and
strengthening our partnerships, throughout the region. United States
national interests with our hemispheric neighbors to the south, the 32
nations that comprise the United States SOUTHCOM area of
responsibility, are indeed important and diverse. I applaud President
Bush's recent trip to the region and his desire to reinvigorate and
reframe relations with our Latin American and Caribbean neighbors. The
President expressed his commitment to help the democracies of the
Western Hemisphere build government institutions and meet basic needs
like education, health care, and housing.
This morning the committee will be interested in your assessment of
efforts to curb the flow of illegal drugs into the United States from
the south, especially those associated with Plan Colombia; the rise of
violent crime in the region and any links between those criminal groups
and gangs in the United States; the rise of radical populism in the
region and the influence of Hugo Chavez; the future of post-Castro
Cuba; violent extremists in the region and any ties between these
groups and movements like Hezbollah and al Qaeda; operations at the
detention facility at Guantanamo; and, to the extent you can, the
efforts and progress to locate the three American hostages held by the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia guerrillas in Colombia since
February 2003.
In closing, I would like to express our Nation's gratitude to all
of you, and to the men and women of your commands, for all of their
efforts in providing for the Nation's defense. I look forward to
hearing from today's witnesses.
Senator Warner. I have a similar statement which I would
put in the record to supplement that.
[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner
Chairman Levin, thank you.
On behalf of Senator McCain, I request unanimous consent to place
his prepared remarks into the record.
Mr Chairman, I join you in welcoming our witnesses here today.
I would like to thank our witnesses, and their families, for their
long and distinguished service to our Nation. I would also like them to
convey my personal word of commendation, and my deep admiration, for
the dedicated men and women of their commands. Their efforts are vital
to our homeland defense; to the protection of our national interests in
the Western Hemisphere; and in support of our joint forces deployed
abroad in harm's way.
Admiral Keating, welcome back for another appearance before the
committee. Congratulations on your recent confirmation to be the next
Commander of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and thank you for your
willingness to take on another position of great responsibility. We
know you will relinquish command of North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) in a change-of-
command ceremony tomorrow in Colorado and we are so very grateful that
you are able to appear here today.
The attacks on September 11 were a day of unprecedented alarm and
anguish, and the devastation of Hurricane Katrina created a time of
extraordinary suffering and sorrow. Admiral Keating, you and members of
your command, have a sweeping mission and a wide-ranging mandate. The
Nation looks to you, and the men and women of your command, to ensure
we are not attacked again and to save lives in the United States.
NORTHCOM, the Department of Defense (DOD), and Federal, State, and
local officials have come a long way since those dreadful days, but you
have a mission that requires continuous coordination, greater
collaboration, and constant vigilance. The committee looks forward to
your valued insights on homeland defense and DOD support, to civil
authorities responding to terrorist incidents, domestic emergencies,
and natural disasters.
Admiral Stavridis, I welcome you to your first posture hearing as
the Commander of United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), and commend
you for a very comprehensive written statement that speaks to the
promises and opportunities that exist to sustain and improve our
partnerships in the 32 nations that comprise SOUTHCOM.
While our Nation's attention is, at present, focused in other areas
of the world, we should not, and can not, neglect the potential threats
to our national interests that exist in South America and the
Caribbean.
I applaud President Bush's recent trip to the region and his desire
to reinvigorate and reframe relations with our neighbors and his
expressed commitment to help the democracies of the Western Hemisphere.
General Smith, welcome back. You have appeared before this
committee in other capacities, but this is your first JFCOM posture
hearing. General Smith, you and the men and women of JFCOM have a very
broad mission that contributes appreciably, each and every day, to the
success of our efforts in the global war on terrorism and the
development of our future joint force.
We have a great joint force now, but it is under strain. Those of
us who have been members of this committee since the enactment of the
Goldwater-Nichols legislation more than 20 years have watched our joint
forces capability mature with great satisfaction. Our joint force is
great because we have the best soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines
in the world. This force is made even better by the contributions of
the men and women of JFCOM. Their efforts develop a force that can
fight, and win, as a joint U.S. force and can operate as part of a
multinational force with allied, coalition, and interagency partners.
We look forward to hearing your testimony today about JFCOM's role
as force provider, to include your assessment of the readiness of the
force for forward deployment, as well as its complementary work in
joint training, joint experimentation, and the development of
interoperability requirements.
Mr Chairman, thank you and I look forward to the testimony today.
Senator Warner. I join you in welcoming this very
distinguished panel, and also express our appreciation, not
only to your service, but that of your respective families
through the many, many long years of service. Admiral Keating,
turning right around tonight, and go back out to Colorado for a
change of command in the morning, is that correct?
Admiral Keating. That's correct, sir.
Senator Warner. We thank you for making yourself available
for this important hearing today.
Admiral Keating. Thank you, sir.
Senator Warner. Your portfolio is one that, unfortunately,
we do not hear a lot about, because it is being executed. But,
we sleep better at night knowing that you don't sleep that well
at night.
It's extremely important how you integrate the uniformed
forces of the United States with the local communities, the
States, the National Guard, the Reserve, and all of the
components of the military to provide the security that we need
here at home.
In my questions, I will bring out a point that my able
staff prepared for me last night, about how the perspective of
homeland security is looked at perhaps one way by the
Department of Defense (DOD) and another way by, for instance,
our Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
(HSGAC). I want to make sure that that ties in very closely.
General Smith, you are in my home State. I am proud to have
you there. Thank you for taking on this assignment. But you
have the arduous task of making certain that the men and women
of the Armed Forces who leave our shores are equipped and
trained sufficiently to meet their missions, and we have
potentially some rather challenging pieces of legislative
initiative, largely emanating on the House side, the other
body, with regard to the reporting to Congress and the public
about the degree of equipment, training, and readiness of those
forces before they deploy.
I hope to engage you in a colloquy on that, and perhaps, in
your general opening statement, you will address that specific
requirement.
Admiral Stavridis, we welcome you. This is your first
appearance before us since your confirmation.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. We tend to look south and think everything
is going to be all right, but each day we pick up our news, and
learn about the very troubled area in which you now have a most
significant responsibility. So, we look forward to your
testimony.
We thank each of you, again, for your public service.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, your statement covered, I
think, a lot of the specifics that I was going to cover, so we
will proceed with the hearing.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
I think we'll start with Admiral Keating.
STATEMENT OF ADM TIMOTHY J. KEATING, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES NORTHERN COMMAND/COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE
DEFENSE COMMAND
Admiral Keating. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Warner, members of the committee.
I'm proud to represent the 1,500 or so men and women from
the headquarters at NORAD and NORTHCOM before you this morning.
As you've said, Mr. Chairman, homeland defense is the core
of our National Military Strategy. The NORTHCOM and NORAD are
separate commands, but they have a complementary mission. We
work together to defend our Homeland.
The commands operate within a common security environment,
we share a common headquarters building, and largely the same
headquarters staff. We embrace common values, we understand the
importance of executing our duties with a sense of urgency in
the face of very real and present dangers.
Homeland defense is a high priority for NORTHCOM and NORAD.
As NORTHCOM enters its 5th year, we're fully mission capable,
and ready to respond to the full spectrum of homeland defense
challenges in this modern security environment.
On the other hand, the NORAD agreement, initially signed in
1958, was renewed just last May 2006. NORAD has evolved from
its Cold War construct into an adaptive, flexible, and
responsive bi-national organization, ideally suited to address
modern threats in the aerospace domain, and will now contribute
to greater awareness of threats in the maritime domain. The
mission for both Commands is the defense of North America.
NORTHCOM and NORAD are integral elements in the active,
layered, integrated defense in which we seek to confront early,
and from a safe distance, anyone who threatens our Homeland.
NORTHCOM and NORAD operate in a changing, uncertain security
environment, a range of symmetric and asymmetric transnational
threats represents an immediate challenge for both Commands.
These threats continue to be diverse, adaptive, and by their
very nature, difficult to predict.
Potential enemies will attempt surprise as they try to
employ an array of persistent, catastrophic, and destructive
methods and capabilities, which could include nuclear weapons.
NORTHCOM and NORAD will act in a timely, and when appropriate,
coordinated fashion in concert with our international and
domestic partners to deter, detect, prevent, and defeat
threats.
NORTHCOM also must plan for military response, as you
stated, Mr. Chairman, to requests for support when natural or
manmade disasters affect our United States. Catastrophes such
as hurricanes, earthquakes, wildland fires, and pandemics can
overwhelm local responders, and may require Federal military
sources to support State and local efforts.
Likewise, a successful terrorist attack, particularly
involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) could cause mass
panic, environmental damage, and significant loss of life. In
catastrophic incidents--and only when directed--NORTHCOM will
support civil authorities to provide an integrated response as
quickly and effectively as we can.
The core capability to accomplish our missions resides, of
course, in our people. We must continue to ensure their
welfare, and the welfare of their families. We're grateful to
you for your support, for our soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines, coastguardsmen, and their families.
The men and women of NORTHCOM and NORAD are resolutely
committed to defending the United States, Canada, and Mexico
against all threats. I'm privileged to be part of this
outstanding team, and I look forward to your questions this
morning. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Keating follows:]
Prepared Statement by ADM Timothy J. Keating, USN
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and members of the committee: At
its most basic level, winning the war on terror means defending our
Homeland. Homeland defense lies at the core of our National Military
Strategy. United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and North American
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) are separate commands that have
complementary missions and work closely together to fulfill our
homeland defense responsibilities. The commands operate within a common
security environment, predominately share a headquarters staff, and are
dedicated to defending North America. We also share common values and
understand the importance of carrying out our duties with a sense of
urgency in the face of very real and present dangers. It is my honor to
report to you on the current state and future direction of our
commands.
Homeland defense is the highest priority for NORTHCOM and NORAD. As
NORTHCOM enters its 5th year, we are fully mission capable and ready to
respond to the full spectrum of homeland defense challenges existing in
the modern security environment. The NORAD Agreement, initially signed
in 1958, was renewed in May 2006, when NORAD's mission set was expanded
to include maritime warning. NORAD has evolved from a cold war
construct into an adaptive, flexible, and responsive bi-national
organization that is ideally suited to address modern threats in the
aerospace domain and contribute to greater awareness of threats in the
maritime domain. The desired end state of our commands is the
maintenance of our Nations' ways of life and the defense and
territorial integrity of North America.
NORTHCOM and NORAD are integral parts of an active, layered defense
in which we seek to confront, early and from a safe distance, those who
threaten our Homeland. NORTHCOM and NORAD operate in a changing,
uncertain security environment. A range of asymmetric, transnational
threats represent an immediate challenge for both commands. These
threats continue to be diverse, adaptive, and, by their nature, are
difficult to predict. Potential enemies will attempt surprise as they
try to employ an array of persistent and emerging, catastrophic, and
disruptive methods and capabilities, to include nuclear weapons.
NORTHCOM and NORAD will act in a timely, and when appropriate,
coordinated fashion in concert with our international and domestic
mission partners to deter, detect, prevent, and defeat threats.
NORTHCOM must additionally plan for a military response to civil
requests for support in response to natural or manmade disasters that
affect the United States. Natural disasters such as hurricanes,
earthquakes, wildland fires, or pandemics can overwhelm local
responders and require significant contribution of Federal military
resources to support State and local response efforts to mitigate
effects. Likewise, a successful terrorist attack, particularly one
involving a weapon of mass destruction, may cause mass panic,
environmental damage, and significant loss of life requiring
substantial defense support of civil authorities. In catastrophic
incidents, and as directed, NORTHCOM will support civil authorities to
help effect an integrated national response as quickly and effectively
as possible.
plans
We rapidly adapt homeland defense and civil support plans as
circumstances dictate based upon current intelligence, and regularly
exercise them across all domains with our domestic and international
homeland defense partners. Over the last 2 years, we finalized the
following plans:
Concept Plan 3310-07, Aerospace Warning, Aerospace
Control, and Maritime Warning for North America
Concept Plan 2002-05, Homeland Defense
Campaign Plan 2075, Regional Campaign Plan for the War
on Terror
Concept Plan 2501, Defense Support of Civil
Authorities
Concept Plan 2505, Nuclear Weapon Accident Response
Plan
Concept Plan 0500, Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Consequence
Management Operations
Concept Plan 2591, Pandemic Influenza
Concept Plan 2707, Military Support to the U.S.
Government Agencies for Caribbean Mass Migration
Concept Plan 2400, Emergency Preparedness in the
National Capital Region
Concept Plan 2502, Civil Disturbance Operations
Campaign Plan 2900, Strategic Communication
This year, we will focus our efforts to complete the following
plans:
United States-Canada Combined Defense Plan
Canada-United States Civil Assistance Plan
In addition to our current family of plans, we continue to advocate
development of an overarching national homeland security plan that
coordinates the pre-attack actions of the Federal Government. This
plan, as advocated in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, will clarify
the distribution of effort among Federal agencies, promote unity of
effort, and reduce uncertainty in the overlap of responsibilities and
capabilities among homeland security partners.
training and education
NORTHCOM's and NORAD's comprehensive training and education program
supports the mission of North American defense. NORTHCOM's defense
support of civil authorities training programs have also become a
national resource for homeland security and defense professionals as
exemplified by the training of over 1,200 people in fiscal year 2006 in
our defense support of civil authorities course.
Our Homeland Security/Defense Education Consortium (HSDEC) has
established a national homeland security and defense curriculum.
Currently the organization has 183 charter and associate university
members, including the American Association of Community Colleges with
1,154 members in 40 States, the Canadian Defence Academy, and
University del Salvador, Argentina. The $1.8 million apportioned to
HSDEC from Congress as part of the Fiscal Year 2007 Defense
Appropriations Bill is being used to sponsor research into our
Commands' priority questions of interest, to develop an internship
program for recruiting new defense and security personnel into
government service, and for workshops to bring an academic perspective
to our commands' respective missions. We also seek to foster greater
senior civilian leadership knowledge as NORTHCOM and NORAD partner with
the Naval Postgraduate School and civilian institutions in the
development of a doctorate degree in the areas of homeland defense and
security, with initial classes beginning in summer 2007.
To build on our already strong working relationship with the
National Guard, we're continuing the Joint Force Orientation program,
which is a cooperative training effort between NORTHCOM, National Guard
Bureau, Joint Forces Command and the States' National Guard
Headquarters. The program enhances coordination, cooperation, and
information sharing between the States' Joint Force Headquarters and
NORTHCOM.
exercises
Each year, NORTHCOM and NORAD sponsor two large-scale exercises--
Ardent Sentry and Vigilant Shield--and participate in over 30 smaller
regional, State, and local exercises. We continually review lessons
learned from past exercises and real-world events (such as Hurricane
Katrina) and take corrective action when necessary. These actions are
an integral part of our exercise program. Our exercise scenarios have
involved air (civil and military) incidents and attacks; maritime and
port security; maritime interception operations; missile defense;
support to law enforcement agencies for border security; consequence
management in support of civil authorities; nuclear proliferation;
nuclear weapons accidents; weapons of mass destruction attacks; and
natural disasters.
Our civil support exercises are evolving to integrate fully with
the Department of Homeland Security's National Exercise Program and are
now national events with the support of the Federal Government,
regional organizations, and the private sector. We actively engage our
training partners at every level of Federal, State, tribal, and local
government to employ the most comprehensive and realistic scenarios in
order to achieve each participating organization's training objectives.
Our exercises are based on the 15 National Planning Scenarios and are
accomplished in accordance with the National Response Plan and the
principles of the National Incident Management System.
Last year, we developed and hosted six major Table Top Exercises
(TTXs) and several additional smaller scale TTXs involving military,
agency, and governmental participation at all levels. Examples of
scenarios addressed during these synchronized TTXs include response to
a major earthquake; terrorist use of Man-Portable Air Defense Systems
against civilian airliners and Department of Defense (DOD) aircraft;
and detection, tracking, and response to a ship-borne nuclear weapon
detonated in a major U.S. port.
Canada, primarily through Canada Command, is a full partner in
these exercises. Although we have rehearsed and executed trans-border
missions, such as the 2006 Super Bowl in Detroit, we have yet to
conduct fully combined exercises that occur across the northern border.
We continually work with the Government of Canada and its Strategic
Joint Staff in the air arena through numerous NORAD exercises that are
conducted regularly in, and across, all NORAD Regions (Continental
United States, Canadian, and Alaskan NORAD Regions). Canada Command and
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, Canada participated in the
Ardent Sentry series of exercises for the first time in 2006.
We work with the National Guard Bureau to coordinate and
synchronize major NORTHCOM and NORAD exercises with the National Guard
State exercise series, Vigilant Guard.
We support the DOD's decision to reprogram combatant command
funding for the Joint Exercise Program and Training Transformation from
the Services into a defense-wide account to be centrally managed by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. The
consolidation of existing funding into the Combatant Commanders'
Exercise Engagement and Training Transformation program will result in
efficiencies that can be rapidly applied against training requirements
for new mission areas.
intelligence activities
NORTHCOM and NORAD maintain situational awareness and readiness
around-the-clock to protect against a range of symmetric and asymmetric
threats in all domains. The Intelligence Community supports NORTHCOM
and NORAD by providing actionable information needed for homeland
defense operations. Timely and actionable intelligence is the most
critical enabler to protecting the Homeland at a safe distance. Threat
awareness allows us to tailor our deterrent posture and convince
adversaries that their objectives cannot be achieved by attacking our
Homeland and that any attack will result in an overwhelming response.
NORTHCOM uses intelligence and threat information from other
Federal agencies to develop and maintain situational awareness of
threats within our area of responsibility and to facilitate a seamless
handoff of threats to our homeland originating in other combatant
commands' areas of responsibility. These assessments and intelligence
products are provided to NORTHCOM components, subordinate commands, and
lead Federal agencies. NORTHCOM assessments are shared with the
intelligence community by posting them to the National Counterterrorism
Center Online secure web portal, and our own web portals at various
classification levels.
A significant tool within NORTHCOM and NORAD is the Joint
Intelligence Operations Center North (JIOC-North), which is part of the
intelligence community. JIOC-North provides predictive and actionable
threat estimates and timely warning of worldwide threats against North
America using fused all-source intelligence and law enforcement
information.
To protect Americans' civil liberties, intelligence received from
the intelligence community is filtered through a well-established and
disciplined Intelligence Oversight Program. This ensures we analyze,
retain, and disseminate intelligence with a foreign or international
terrorist threat nexus, and then only to the extent the intelligence is
relevant to our missions.
homeland defense operations
Should deterrence fail, we will access and assume operational
control of forces that are trained and ready to respond and defeat
threats directed at our areas of responsibility. Adaptability and
flexibility are critical to our commands' ability to counter the modern
threat.
NORAD Sector Consolidation
Prior to November 2006, the NORAD Continental Region was divided
into three air defense sectors: the Southeast Air Defense Sector at
Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida; the Northeast Air Defense Sector at
Rome, New York; and the Western Air Defense Sector at McChord Air Force
Base, Washington. In November 2006, NORAD consolidated the Northeast
and Southeast Air Defense Sectors into a single Eastern Air Defense
Sector located in Rome, New York. We are standing up a robust Air
Operations Center at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida. Fielding of the
Battle Control System Fixed, a modernized, tactical-level command and
control system, enabled this sector consolidation and will reduce
manpower requirements.
In 2006, we conducted the following homeland defense operations:
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
NORTHCOM is responsible for directing missile defense operations
within our area of responsibility and Hawaii to defend the Homeland,
allies, friends, and other national interests from potentially hostile
acts. The GMD system achieved limited defensive operations capability
in October 2004, was placed in an operational status in June 2006, and
is available when needed to defend the United States' and its allies'
infrastructure and population centers. Our missile defense crews are
trained and our systems are ready to respond as necessary. In July
2006, the NORAD Integrated Threat Warning and Attack Assessment System
immediately detected the launch of all seven North Korean missiles,
tracked their trajectories, and watched as they landed in the Sea of
Japan. The North Korean missile launch activities that occurred from
May to July 2006 provided an excellent opportunity for NORTHCOM and
NORAD to coordinate with national senior leadership, other combatant
commands, and assigned missile defense assets. The challenge now is to
balance operations with research, development, test, and evaluation to
ensure the architecture will evolve to defend against a changing
threat. Continued funding of GMD is critical to this effort.
Operation Noble Eagle
Since the attacks of September 11, NORAD has supported Operation
Noble Eagle with airspace surveillance, a ready alert force, irregular
air patrols, and the unique National Capital Region Integrated Air
Defense System. Over 45,000 sorties have been flown in support of
Operation Noble Eagle, with the Air National Guard conducting over 70
percent of these sorties. We have adjusted our air patrols to achieve
the balance between readiness and sustainability. In September 2006,
the U.S. Coast Guard assumed the Rotary Wing Air Intercept mission to
counter the light civil air threat to our Nation's capital.
On October 11, 2006, minutes after the crash of a civilian light
aircraft into a New York City building, NORAD scrambled several fighter
and support aircraft to cities on the east and west coasts of the
United States including New York, Washington, DC, and Boston.
Additional aircraft were scrambled over cities in Canada. The aircraft
were dispatched as a prudent measure and in anticipation of a potential
terrorist attack; they were airborne within minutes of the incident and
remained airborne until it was determined the incident was in fact an
accident. The quick reaction demonstrated NORAD's capability and
preparedness to coordinate a swift, elevated, and large-scale defensive
and deterrent posture.
Northern Sovereignty Operations
On September 28, fighters from Alaskan NORAD Region and Canadian
NORAD Region were launched in response to Russian aircraft that
penetrated North America's Air Defense Identification Zone. While the
Russian air assets at no time violated U.S. or Canadian airspace, NORAD
integrated air defense assets in and around Alaska and Canada were able
to detect, intercept and identify a number of Russian Tu-95 Bear heavy
bombers participating in an annual Russian air force exercise near the
coasts of Alaska and Canada. This operation demonstrated our continued
vigilance and readiness to defend North American air sovereignty.
defense support of civil authorities
In addition to homeland defense, NORTHCOM has a second core mission
to support civil authorities with military capabilities that can
rapidly stabilize and improve the situation in the wake of a
catastrophic event. The NORTHCOM support is in addition to the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers response in their role as the DOD lead for
Emergency Support Function #3, Public Works and Engineering, which is
executed independent of NORTHCOM control.
NORTHCOM provides defense support of civil authorities primarily
through our subordinate commands: Joint Task Force Civil Support at
Fort Monroe, VA; Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region at
Fort McNair, Washington DC; Joint Task Force Alaska at Elmendorf Air
Force Base, AK; and Joint Task Force North (JTF-N) at Fort Bliss, TX.
In addition, the Army, Air Force and Marine Corps have established
dedicated Service Components for NORTHCOM. These commands are: U.S.
Army North located at Fort Sam Houston, TX; U.S. Air Force North
located at Tyndall Air Force Base, FL, and U.S. Marine Forces North
located in New Orleans, LA. The Commander, Fleet Forces Command,
located at Naval Station Norfolk, VA, is designated as the Navy's
Supporting Commander to NORTHCOM.
At the direction of the President or Secretary of Defense, NORTHCOM
supports primary response agencies as part of a comprehensive national
response to manage the consequences of an attack or a natural disaster,
to include a pandemic. Civil authorities are most likely to request our
support to draw upon unique military capabilities or to augment
civilian responders. Our ability to respond rapidly with the full range
of military capabilities to these requests can be critical in saving
lives, minimizing human suffering, and preserving infrastructure.
Successful and timely response includes anticipating and planning
for various types of requests that may arise in order to posture
appropriate military capabilities. As a lesson learned from Hurricane
Katrina, Defense Coordinating Officers and their supporting elements
have been positioned in each of the 10 Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) regions. The Defense Coordinating Officers act as
military liaisons to increase full-time coordination with State
governments and the Adjutants General regarding disaster response
planning and to facilitate the ``Request For Assistance'' process
following a disaster. These Defense Coordinating Officers and their
support staff fall under U.S. Army North, a dedicated Army Service
Component Command under the operational control of NORTHCOM, which
achieved full operational capability in October 2006.
In an effort to close the response gaps identified in the wake of
Hurricane Katrina, NORTHCOM undertook several efforts to improve
defense support of civil authorities. NORTHCOM deployed military
planners to work hand in hand with the FEMA--assisting FEMA's stand up
of their Operational Planning Unit, a group intended to provide FEMA
with a robust crisis planning capability for future disasters. Also
last year, NORTHCOM military planners deployed to the Gulf Coast
Recovery Office in Baton Rouge, LA, and assisted the interagency effort
in developing disaster preparedness plans in collaboration with State
and local agencies of the Gulf Coast Region. Working with local, State,
and Federal participants and in accordance with DOD's direction,
NORTHCOM demonstrated unique military capabilities to provide
situational awareness to senior leaders in Washington, DC, and at
NORTHCOM, as well as local first responders--a vital capability that
provides disaster survey information quickly to decision makers and
first responders. NORTHCOM also developed several prescripted mission
assignments that expedite the response of military personnel and
supplies immediately after a disaster occurs.
National Guard
Over the past year, we have actively collaborated with the National
Guard Bureau to improve communications, operational synchronization,
and training. Programs such as the Joint Continental United States
Communication Support Environment, which provides a comprehensive
strategy for domestic military interoperable communications and
information sharing, 24/7 connectivity to the National Guard Bureau
Joint Operations Center, and hosting the Joint Task Force Commanders'
Course at the NORTHCOM headquarters improve our ability to seamlessly
work together.
Pandemic Influenza
In August 2006, we completed our plan for addressing pandemic
influenza and were tasked by the Secretary of Defense to be both the
supported commander for pandemic influenza and the DOD lead for
directing, planning, and synchronizing the DOD's global response to a
pandemic. NORTHCOM has established a joint pandemic influenza team to
carry out this critical mission and we have made pandemic influenza
planning a top priority for 2007.
support to law enforcement agencies
Support to law enforcement is an important element in NORTHCOM's
and NORAD's mission to deter, detect, prevent, and defeat threats to
the Homeland, because of its direct applicability to the global war on
terror. Transnational threats include international terrorism,
narcotics trafficking, and proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. Federal laws and policies allow us to support law
enforcement agencies by conducting operations to deter and prevent
transnational threats. We further assist law enforcement agencies in
their counterdrug mission. NORTHCOM provides support to law enforcement
agencies primarily through our subordinate command, Joint Task Force
North at Fort Bliss, TX. Terrorists have used smuggling networks and
money laundering to achieve their goals and fund their activities. As
we support law enforcement agencies in the fight against drugs, we also
focus our efforts on terrorist organizations with a nexus to drug
trafficking. We support the global war on terrorism at home by
providing unique military capabilities to support civilian law
enforcement agencies.
Operation Gulfview
This year, we expanded the role of NORTHCOM's subordinate command,
JTF-N, to include integrative support to multiple law enforcement
agencies with a focus on coastal border operations. In support of the
U.S. Border Patrol's Rio Grande Valley Sector, JTF-N planned and
facilitated Operation Gulfview from February to March 2006. Designed to
support and improve law enforcement interdiction of transnational
threats in the maritime domain along the Southeastern Texas Coastal
area of the Padre Island National Seashore, this multi-sensor, multi-
agency operation expanded to include the contiguous land border within
Rio Grande Valley sector's border domain. This mission employed a DOD-
funded coastal defense system designed to provide a command, control,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance node capable of fusing
multi-sensor, multi-source information into a common operational
picture. In conjunction with this system, various title 10 and title 32
assets provided a multi-layered detection and monitoring environment
designed to maximize law enforcement interdiction assets. This
operation validated emerging maritime surveillance technologies,
explored JTF-N capabilities in the maritime domain, opened lines of
communication, and established productive relationships among the 29
interagency participants.
Operation Outlook
In June 2006, JTF-N participated in Operation Outlook, which
involved multi-sensor DOD support to the U.S. Border Patrol's Spokane
Sector and other Federal law enforcement agencies and interagency
partners combining title 10 and multi-state title 32 military forces.
Washington Air National Guard Counterdrug Task Force Title 32 forces
provided detection support. Title 10 forces, under the command of JTF-
N, provided ground-based, mobile ground-to-air sentinel radars. DOD
assets were used to increase detection of low-flying helicopters and
ground smuggling conveyances for transporting contraband between the
U.S. and Canada.
Operation Key Watch Alpha and Able Venture
Key Watch Alpha occurred from May to July 2006 in support of the
U.S. Border Patrol's Miami Sector. For the first time, JTF-N worked
closely with the U.S. Coast Guard's District Seven Headquarters as a
parallel lead Federal agency and once again employed a multi-layered
detection, assessment, and awareness approach. Operation Keywatch Alpha
incorporated multiple assets, both title 10 and title 32, in an effort
to enhance law enforcement agencies' interdiction of smuggling
activities along the Florida Keys and the Florida mainland approaches.
JTF-N will continue to provide support in the maritime domain and
recently concluded Operation Able Venture, a first-ever integrated
mission in support of the U.S. Coast Guard in San Diego. These missions
validate the need for monitoring of the approaches to, and enforcement
of, our Nation's coastal borders and are planned to continue in 2007.
Operation Jump Start
Along the southern border, NORTHCOM and JTF-N have worked closely
with the National Guard Bureau and the U.S. Border Patrol to ensure
deconfliction with Operation Jump Start, which provides title 32
support to the U.S. Border Patrol along the entire 2,000 mile border
with Mexico. In a separate but parallel effort, JTF-N conducted
numerous engineer support missions, primarily in Arizona and New
Mexico, to construct barrier obstacles that restrict smuggling
activities and roads in support of law enforcement agency effort. We
will remain engaged with the National Guard Bureau and U.S. Border
Patrol throughout Operation Jump Start and, where viable, will continue
to support as requested by law enforcement agencies along the southern
border.
Tunnel Detection
Applying DOD and Intelligence Community technology and intelligence
analysis in support of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, JTF-N
supported the detection of four tunnels on the southwest border with
Mexico. In conjunction with its homeland security and Intelligence
Community partners, JTF-N continues its support of tunnel detection
efforts along the U.S. borders. In September 2006, JTF-N co-hosted an
interagency tunnel conference with U.S. Customs and Border Protection
to enhance knowledge of tunnel detection technologies.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems Operation
Through JTF-N, unmanned aircraft systems were employed, operating
solely in restricted military airspace, along the southwest border in
support of U.S. Customs and Border Protection. NORTHCOM is engaged with
the Federal Aviation Administration to develop airspace procedures for
unmanned aircraft systems to operate in the National Airspace System
outside of full-time military restricted airspace to provide support to
border control lead agencies and disaster response operations. While
this is a complex issue, we remain confident that unmanned aircraft
systems will be granted access to the National Airspace System in the
near future to increase our ability to safely conduct critical homeland
security operations and law enforcement support.
interagency coordination
Lessons learned from conflicts such as the first Gulf War and the
Balkans indicated an increasing need for coordination between the
military services as well as with other Federal Government agencies.
The attacks on September 11 and the resulting war on terrorism
highlighted the need for military activities to be more closely tied to
diplomatic, law enforcement, and intelligence sharing activities. In
October 2001, the Secretary of Defense directed combatant commanders to
integrate and synchronize activities of multiple civilian, State, and
Federal Government agencies and departments under a Joint Interagency
Coordination Group (JIACG). The JIACGs were made a permanent part of
each combatant commander's staff. They facilitate two-way coordination
and communication between military and civilian operations in each
combatant command's area of responsibility.
At NORTHCOM, we oversee an active JIACG composed of every element
across the NORTHCOM and NORAD staff and more than 60 resident or local
representatives from DOD and non-DOD agencies. The JIACG meets as a
broad corporate entity one to two times per month on topics pertaining
to homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities. Our
JIACG, combined with myriad interactions with Federal agencies,
National Guard, State and local first responders, and countless local
and private associates, contributes to information and knowledge
sharing and to a collaborative approach to operations in our Homeland.
Interagency operations are the next frontier of jointness and one
that the United States should continue to foster. We continually add to
our capable team of partners at NORTHCOM and are optimizing
collaborative relationship building to achieve our Nation's homeland
defense and security imperatives.
Interagency coordination permeates all of NORTHCOM's and NORAD's
activities. We harness the power of the JIACG to help us craft
realistic, collaborative, and workable plans and we provide the right
support, at the right time, in concert with the right partners--always
respecting the authorities of those States and agencies that we have
been charged to assist through our operation.
In this complex interagency environment, we must also identify and
transition meaningful technology that will strengthen homeland security
efforts. Deliberative engagement is required across all levels of
government and the private sector to support technology which enhances
homeland defense and security capabilities. The acquisition and
implementation of standards-driven, effective technological networks
will be a catalyst to the development and sustainment of critical human
networks required to build our capacity along with those of our
national and international partners.
interoperable communications
During 2006, NORTHCOM made significant strides in increasing
communications interoperability and improving communications planning
and response with our numerous mission partners, while posturing our
subordinate and supporting commands with rapidly deployable
communications equipment for use during contingency operations.
During the Defense Interoperability Communications Exercise in
March 2006, NORTHCOM hosted 17 communications teams representing
various DOD, National Guard, Coast Guard, FEMA, and local first
responder organizations. To further increase interoperability, the
command also published an equipment technical standards document in
2006. This document recommends the technical standards that units and
mission partners should adhere to when procuring new communications
equipment.
Response operations in the wake of the 2005 devastating hurricane
season revealed a number of important lessons--the most critical of
these was our Nation's requirement for efficient and effective
communications.
The results of the National Baseline Assessment conducted by the
SAFECOM Program, an entity within the DHS Office for Interoperability
and Compatibility, show that most agencies have developed, at the very
least, a minimum technological capability to achieve tactical
interoperable communications. However, each urban/metropolitan area has
incorporated different technology solutions because achieving
interoperability is dependent on the specific types of communications
equipment and infrastructures each agency has procured and currently
employs. Therefore, a voice communications solution that would be
considered ideal in one area could be unsuited for another. Currently,
there is a shortage of pre-incident communications planning and
coordination among State and local governments that impedes
collaboration, sharing of critical information, and the ability of the
Federal Government and NORTHCOM to support State and local response
efforts effectively.
To address communications shortfalls discovered during Hurricane
Katrina, NORTHCOM procured and employed interoperable communications
packages that are ideally suited to our homeland defense and defense
support of civil authorities mission sets. During exercise periods, we
procured and employed several deployable, cellular-based communications
suites that provide an autonomous infrastructure to extend
communications connectivity in the NORTHCOM area of responsibility. We
also procured three Incident Awareness and Assessment/Full Motion Video
communications suites to augment or replace capabilities required
during emergency response operations.
theater security cooperation
NORTHCOM Theater Security Cooperation activities contribute to the
Secretary of Defense's Security Cooperation Guidance's top priority to
build the capacities of allies and partners to help win the global war
on terror by enhancing coordination with our continental neighbors,
Canada and Mexico. American Servicemembers' Protection Act sanctions
not only prohibited equipment transfers, but encouraged Mexico to
consider military purchases from other countries and the continuing
restrictions on Foreign Military Financing and the Excess Defense
Articles grant programs for Mexico dampens our ability to effectively
counter transnational terrorism and narcotics threats. Lifting these
restrictions will have a significant impact on our homeland defense
efforts with our southern neighbor.
conclusion
NORTHCOM and NORAD are part of a binational and interagency team
dedicated to strengthening the security and defense of North America.
We have finalized our homeland defense and civil support plans and are
now looking at ways to improve continental defense. The continued
evolution of the commands is critical to our ability to provide a
flexible, adaptable, and scaleable response to modern threats. NORTHCOM
and NORAD have synchronized our existing plans, directives, and major
operations; established intelligence priorities; and prioritized other
resources in pursuit of designated strategic objectives with regard to
the global war on terror. Activities and operations directed by
NORTHCOM complement and support the United States Government-led
international effort to deny terrorist networks what they need to
operate and survive. NORTHCOM and NORAD contribute to the overarching
national goals of countering ideological support for the enemy,
disrupting and attacking the enemy, and protecting the American
Homeland.
Responsibility for protecting North America is divided among
Federal, State, tribal, and local governments. NORTHCOM and NORAD
coordinate closely with other government agencies to achieve integrated
plans and operations. NORTHCOM is maximizing cooperation with Canada
and Mexico and thus enabling them to counter terrorism through
bilateral partnerships. Additionally, we look beyond the established
NORTHCOM area of responsibility in coordination with U.S. Special
Operations Command and the other regional combatant commands to
institute a synchronized DOD global approach to disrupt transnational
terrorists through continuous collaboration and a rigorous program of
exercises to enhance our ability to conduct homeland defense
operations.
The core capability to accomplish our missions resides in our
people. We must continue to ensure their welfare and that of their
families. We are grateful to Congress for the support that it provides
our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coastguardsmen, and their
families, in their efforts to defend our Nation at home and abroad.
Increases in pay and benefits, such as military housing upgrades,
medical care improvements, and other quality of life enhancements, are
clear indicators of the extent to which Congress values our
servicemembers. The men and women of NORTHCOM and NORAD are dedicated
to defending the United States and Canadian homelands against all
threats. I am privileged to be a part of this outstanding team.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Admiral.
General Smith?
STATEMENT OF GEN. LANCE L. SMITH, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES JOINT FORCES COMMAND/NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER FOR TRANSFORMATION
General Smith. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and
distinguished members of the committee. I really am honored to
be able to testify today and talk about the role that JFCOM
pursues on a daily basis as we work towards fighting the global
war on terror, providing trained and ready conventional forces
to the combatant commanders, as well as joint enabling
capabilities to those commanders, and at the same time, attempt
to lead the transformation effort of the DOD.
It's also an honor to share this opportunity with my
friends, Admiral Tim Keating and Admiral Jim Stavridis. I would
normally have my closest advisor and senior enlisted member of
JFCOM, Sergeant Major Mark Ripka, but he's in Jordan today,
looking at the cultural awareness training that our forces are
getting before they go in there.
I do have a prepared statement that I would like to submit
for the record, and with your permission, I'll make a few
statements, and then get to the questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, it will be made part of the
record.
General Smith. Our message today is that the ability of our
military to operate as an integrated, joint force matters.
Whether our Armed Forces are engaged overseas, employed to
defend the Homeland, or sent to assist natural disasters, we
fight and operate as a joint team.
This is because the range and complexity of operations
today, and the requirement to coordinate with disparate
organizations, make it absolutely essential that we have the
right joint enabling capabilities, the right level of joint
training and education, and the right level of joint skills and
leadership.
I should make it clear, when I use the term ``joint'' I'm
referring to it in the very broadest terms. That's the ability
to seamlessly integrate the capabilities of our separate
services, other government agencies, allies, coalition
partners, multi-national organizations, and other
nongovernmental organizations. Simply stated, at JFCOM, we
supply joint-capable forces for the combatant commanders' use.
These forces come from the 1.16 million Active-Duty
National Guard and Reserve soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines from our headquarters and our component commands, our
combat command, fleet forces command, Army forces command, and
Marine forces command.
We've witnessed a significant shift in the way our forces
organize and prepare to conduct joint operations. For instance,
almost all of our deployed forces today are organized as joint
task forces while they're in the Service-pure entities.
The reasons are clear--we can generate more power to create
the effects we want, by the integration of our many
capabilities and those from the interagencies and coalition
members that we work with, than any one Service can produce
alone.
Our training methods and infrastructure have likewise
undergone a quiet, but significant transformation. With our
joint national training capability, we now have the ability to
reach out and train the staffs of combatant commands and joint
task forces anywhere around the world, without having to deploy
to a common location.
In the United States we have 72 different training sites
across the country, that connect all of the Services in a
common training network. This allows us to leverage over 20
service training programs to identify joint training
shortfalls, as well as to add a common joint context, and
provide operational and tactical level joint training.
In the same vein, JFCOM is currently coordinated with the
National Defense University, United States Army, and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) fleet over in Oberammergau,
Germany, to support joint training requirements for the civil
military Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), prior to their
deployments into Afghanistan and Iraq. We're also engaged with
the Foreign Service Institute at the Department of State (DOS)
to do the same thing.
We possess a world-class center of excellence for joint
innovation and experimentation, as well as a Joint Systems
Integration Command for the DOD and we've built a powerful
federation of partners from the Services, interagencies, multi-
national partners, and members from academia and industry to
participate in the concept development and experimentation for
the joint community.
Today, we have the ability not only to peer into the future
security environment, and to anticipate what the requirements
might be, but also the partnership base, and integration know-
how to quickly turn our collective future concepts into real
capabilities today, by pulling those experiments and those
capabilities forward.
These joint experiments and wargames are also intricately
designed to support the needs of combatant commands like
NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM. For instance, next month, JFCOM will
support NORTHCOM in their homeland defense mission, while
conducting an experiment called Noble Resolve.
That experiment logs in, among other things, the ability of
the military to operate with Federal, State, and local
governments as a joint team in responding to a series of crises
on the homefront.
In summary, jointness is real and powerful. It's about
creating a culture of innovation and adaptiveness across the
force. It's about delivering products that resolve common
challenges. Without a new culture that employs integrated
products, we won't get beyond the old way of doing business.
Those were the days when our capabilities couldn't talk to one
another, and interdependence was impossible. Our ability to
generate integrated effects across the battlespace was
difficult at best.
We couldn't get away from this in the past, but in this
era, where our adversaries are extremely adaptive and
technologically and asymmetrically savvy, we can't afford to
operate like we did. The challenge is real, and I invite each
of you to visit JFCOM and our NATO Command, Allied Command
Transformation Headquarters in Norfolk.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Smith follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Lance Smith, USAF
The efforts of United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) are
focused on providing forces and capabilities to help win the war today,
while preparing forces for the challenges of tomorrow. Our current
enemy in the war on terror is adaptive, elusive, and determined to win
at all costs. Defeating such a broad and decentralized terrorist
network requires innovation and agility. The capabilities of tomorrow's
enemy are less clear. We don't know if it will be a peer competitor, a
nation-state, or a transnational organization, but we can be assured
that we will still need a trained and ready force capable of fighting
and winning in any environment.
I am very pleased to be able to share the accomplishments of JFCOM
with the committee. As a command we work hard to ensure our 1.16
million Active-Duty, National Guard, and Reserve soldiers, sailors,
airmen, marines, and civilians can operate seamlessly and
interdependently with each other and with our interagency and
multinational partners, maximizing all instruments of national power to
fight and win.
JFCOM is uniquely structured to provide Joint Force Commanders with
timely, relevant enabling capabilities, including trained and ready
joint forces, capable of integrated operations with governmental
agencies, multinational partners and nongovernmental organizations. Our
over 5,350 headquarters personnel--a blend of military from every
branch of the Service, Reserves, and National Guard, along with
government civilians and contractors--bring a combined expertise that
is unique among military and civilian organizations. Their pride and
professionalism is the key to JFCOM's success.
Working towards meeting both the needs of today and the challenges
of tomorrow defines the mission of JFCOM:
To provide mission ready joint capable forces and support the
development and integration of joint, interagency, and multinational
capabilities to meet the present and future operational needs of the
Joint Force.
With a renewed focus on the joint warfighter, 2006 was highlighted
by great partnerships with the combatant commanders, the Services,
Federal agencies, academia and industry, and our components: Air Combat
Command, Marine Forces Command, Fleet Forces Command, and Army Forces
Command. We provide:
Multiple deployments of Standing Joint Force
Headquarters and other assets in support of operational needs
of the combatant commanders from Pakistan to Qatar and beyond.
Continuous robust and tailored tactical communications
support to conventional and Special Operations Forces in Iraq
and Afghanistan by the Joint Communications Support Element
(JCSE).
The first time deployment of JCSE's U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) C3 Quick Reaction Force to provide
communications support for noncombatant evacuation operations
in Lebanon
Preparation of joint warfighters for operational
missions, through 6 Mission Rehearsal Exercises and 16
combatant commander training events, conducting more than 70
collective joint training events involving more than 46,000
participants
Realistic training for commanders and staffs of Joint
Task Force Horn of Africa, Multinational Force-Iraq,
Multinational Corps-Iraq, and Combined Joint Task Force 76 in
Afghanistan
Significant expansion of joint distance learning tools
such as the Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution
Capability
Enabling technology for all major Service training
centers and combatant commanders to train together in a
distributed environment through the Joint National Training
Capability
Dedicated assessment teams to Iraq and Afghanistan to
identify areas for improved command and control of U.S. and
multinational forces
Sourcing recommendations and coordinated the
deployment of more than 310,000 personnel in support of
combatant commanders
The stand up of the Joint Command and Control
Capability Portfolio Manager capabilities function to deliver
integrated joint command and control capabilities, improve
interoperability and increase joint operational effectiveness
Leadership for Multinational Experiment (MNE) 4, with
participants from eight nations and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO)
Advanced terrain analysis prototype software
(Geospatial Analysis and Planning Support (GAPS)) to meet the
warfighter requirements for rapid route analysis and
identification, sensor planning and placement and counter fire
systems planning and placement.
Development of timely products such as the HARMONIEWeb
Interagency collaborative tool and the Counter Improvised
Explosive Device Knowledge and Information Fusion Exchange
(KnIFE)
core competencies
JFCOM's five core competencies--unique mission areas--form the
nucleus of the command's day-to-day operations.
Joint Force Provider
As the conventional Joint Force Provider, JFCOM provides trained
and capable forces to commanders in the field. This entails identifying
and recommending global joint sourcing solutions in coordination with
both the Services and combatant commanders.
Joint Force Trainer
As the lead Joint Force Trainer, JFCOM conducts and assesses joint
and multinational training and exercises for assigned forces, and
assists the chairman and other combatant commanders and Service Chiefs
in their preparations for joint and combined operations.
Joint Force Integrator
As the lead Joint Integrator for all of the Department of Defense's
(DOD) uniformed components, JFCOM is responsible for recommending
changes in doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership,
personnel, and facilities to integrate Service, defense agency, and
interagency and multinational capabilities. Efforts range from
integrating the disparate systems and processes that exist today, to
ensuring that the systems and processes of tomorrow are ``born joint.''
Joint Innovation & Experimentation
As the DOD lead for concept development and experimentation, JFCOM
leads the development, exploration and assessment of new joint
concepts, organizational structures and emerging technologies. This
includes operational concepts involving multinational and interagency
transformation efforts.
Joint Force Enabler
As a joint enabling capabilities provider to commanders in the
field, JFCOM provides joint enabling capabilities that streamline the
rapid formation and organization of a Joint Task Force (JTF)
Headquarters. These include command and control capability, augmenting
the headquarters with rapidly deployable critical skills support, and
providing reach-back support as required.
strategic goals
The command's strategic goals are focused on helping the joint
warfighters of today in their efforts to win the war on terror, while
working to transform the force to meet the threats and challenges of
tomorrow. These strategic goals guide the application of JFCOM's core
competencies.
Provide Focused JFCOM Support to Win the War on Terror
JFCOM provides combatant commanders enhanced joint enabling
capabilities for defeating violent extremism and building a security
environment that is inhospitable to terrorist threats. These
capabilities were provided to some 24 separate JTFs throughout the
globe in 2006 with even greater requirements in 2007. We will continue
to integrate our actions with U.S. agencies and international partners
to achieve a common purpose.
JFCOM has established several joint enabling capabilities to
complement service headquarters trained or designated to serve as JTF
Headquarters. These capabilities provide unique, mission ready support
to joint force commanders to aid in the accelerated formation and
increased effectiveness of their headquarters.
The more significant joint enabling capabilities are:
Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element (SJFHQ
(CE))
JCSE
Intelligence Quick Reaction Team (QRT) [resourced from
Joint Transformation Command-Intelligence (JTC-I)
Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE)
The mission of the SJFHQ(CE) is to accelerate the transition of a
Service component headquarters to a JTF headquarters. These core
elements, ready to deploy worldwide on short notice, are capable of
providing initial joint planning and operations within a collaborative
environment to access information from global locations. Each core
element's personnel and equipment can be tailored for a specific
mission to support joint/combined planning, operations, knowledge
management and information superiority.
The JCSE provides simultaneous communications support for two JTF
Headquarters and two Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF)
Headquarters within 72 hours of notification. JCSE also provides
contingency and crisis communications to meet operational and support
needs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Commands, Services, defense
agencies, and non-defense agencies. These assets, alert-postured and
globally deployable, provide en-route and early entry command, control,
computers, and communications to combatant commanders.
The Joint Transformation Command-Intelligence (JTC-I) resourced
Intelligence Quick Reaction Teams (QRT) provide military and civilian
intelligence professionals with targeting and collection management
expertise to a JTF within 24 hours of notification, or during events
leading up to crisis/contingency operations.
The Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE) provides dedicated
and sustained joint public affairs capability on a scalable and
expeditionary basis to support JTFs worldwide. The JPASE is also the
joint public affairs defense-wide proponent.
In the last 2 years, these elements supported operations in
numerous locations including the U.S. Gulf Coast, Iraq, Afghanistan,
Qatar, Horn of Africa, Lebanon, and Pakistan, in support of the war on
terror, disaster relief, and noncombatant evacuations.
JFCOM searches for opportunities to develop new joint enabling
capabilities that can accelerate the establishment and immediate
effectiveness of JTF headquarters and related joint organizations.
Joint enabling capabilities are integrated into JTF headquarters
training and exercises to increase proficiency for future operations
and doctrine changes.
A key JFCOM capability supporting the war on terrorism is the Joint
Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC). This center develops and adapts
modeling and simulation technologies for analysis, computation and the
presentation of options to combatant commands. JWAC's support to the
warfighter in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2006 was substantial, and will be
again in 2007.
Deliver Trained, Capable, and Interoperable Joint Forces
JFCOM provides forces that meet combatant commanders' requirements
for trained and interdependent forces capable of adaptively operating
in a joint, interagency, multinational, and coalition environment.
JFCOM supports:
the continued improvement of the joint staffs and
operating forces that are currently deployed
provision of timely and tailored joint training
standards for tasks that are jointly executed
creation of a collaborative environment that, in real
time, routinely makes use of lessons learned and best practices
reduction of solution cycle time to develop relevant,
accessible, and value-added training capabilities to the joint
warfighter
JFCOM achieves these goals through timely and realistic joint
training support at the operational level to combatant commanders,
Services, and interagency/multinational partners. Each year JFCOM
coordinates and supports commanders through more than 70 collective
joint training events involving 46,000 training participants, and
individual joint training for more than 26,000 people. In addition,
JFCOM, through the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC), supports
training for accredited service and combatant command training
programs. This support extends to all Army, Air Force, Marine Corps,
and Navy pre-deployment training environments by providing a joint
training environment for their mission rehearsal events.
The Joint National Training Capability uses a mix of live, virtual,
and constructive simulations. Key to this capability is the Joint
Training and Experimentation Network (JTEN), a 32 node persistent
global network to deliver realistic joint training to the warfighter at
72 sites across the Continental United States and abroad. JTEN provides
connectivity with the Navy Cooperative Training Environment (NCTE), the
Air Force Distributed Mission Operations Network, and Office of
Secretary of Defense's (OSD) Secret-Defense Research and Engineering
Network, and will soon be connected with multinational partner training
and experimentation networks. Connecting the JTEN and the NCTE enabled
the delivery of Joint training during the Terminal Fury 07 Exercise to
3 countries, 14 States, across 19 time zones with 24 federated
simulation systems.
JFCOM uses this capability to conduct and support training for
combatant commands, JTFs, functional component battle staffs, and
Service selected tactical units worldwide, as well as leveraging 20+
Service training programs through an accreditation and certification
process that identifies joint training shortfalls, to add joint context
and provide operational and tactical level joint training. In addition,
JFCOM is currently coordinating with the National Defense University,
the U.S. Army, and the NATO School to support joint training
requirements for the Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT) Training
prior to deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq.
In 2006, JFCOM prepared warfighters through 6 Mission Rehearsal
Exercises, 16 combatant commander events, and 69 JNTC-enabled Service
training events through the use of 43 joint trainer support elements
forward deployed to 20 combatant command and Service training sites.
JFCOM significantly enhanced mission rehearsal exercises for
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM with an unprecedented headquarters training
exercise, in which NATO's International Security Assistance Force
Afghanistan and a U.S. Regional Command (82d Airborne Division HQ)
trained together in the same exercise. Headquarters personnel from the
Afghan National Security Forces, Afghan National Army, Pakistani Army,
and the U.S. Embassy in Kabul also participated and achieved a
significant level of multinational realism from both exercise and
operational environments.
In conjunction with these training events, the Joint Knowledge
Development and Distribution Capability (JKDDC) provides online
training for individual augmentees and headquarters staff members. It
is an adaptable and world class learning management system used by the
warfighter, coalition forces, and Reserves for initial and continuous
training in JTF Headquarters. By April of this year, JKDDC will offer
over 85 courses (700 hours of instruction) in a variety of subjects to
include headquarters operations, interagency, and culturally related
topics through a dynamic global network.
JFCOM also executes its responsibilities to transform senior
military leadership development and education by bringing joint
training and professional military education together, ensuring
military, coalition, and interagency leaders are prepared to operate
cohesively in joint operations. The command hosts portions of three
courses sponsored by JFCOM and the National Defense University:
Keystone joint operations module for command senior
enlisted leaders (91 participants in fiscal year 2006)
Capstone joint operations module for newly selected
flag and general officers (171 fellows participated in fiscal
year 2006)
Pinnacle course for two- and three-star commanders
focusing on JTF Commander training (57 participants in fiscal
year 2006)
Additionally, JFCOM oversees specialized training provided by:
Standing Joint Force Headquarters
Special Operations Command-Joint Forces Command
Joint Transformation Command-Intelligence (JTC-I)
Joint Targeting School
Joint Public Affairs Support Element
Joint Deployment Training Center
Joint Personnel Recovery Agency
JTC-I Quick Response Teams
JFCOM supports the Combatant Commander's Exercise Engagement and
Training Transformation (CE2T2) program, which addresses joint
warfighter training shortfalls by consolidating existing resources.
This will benefit the largest audience and enable portfolio management
for the Joint Training Program. The CE2T2 program is based on an
extension of the Training Transformation (T2) business model that has
become a catalyst for inter-Service coordination, and keeps programs on
budget and on schedule while defraying costs of Service training
programs. CE2T2 eliminates redundancy, and ensures resource alignment
against validated needs.
Primary Joint Force Provider (Global Force Management)
As the conventional Joint Force Provider (JFP), JFCOM provides DOD
leadership with the necessary data and alternatives to make proactive,
risk-informed force management and allocation decisions. JFCOM uses a
process that identifies risks to execute combatant commander missions,
forecast sourcing challenges to execute contingencies and project
Reserve Component unit mobilization/availability. This requires global
visibility on unit readiness as well as the ability to analyze force
structure, capabilities, availability, location, and apportionment of
those assets.
JFCOM's objective is to source all rotational and emergent force
requirements, including individual and ad-hoc force capabilities in
collaboration with components, Services (both Active and Reserve) and
combatant commands' input to achieve effective/efficient sourcing
solutions. JFCOM also sources OSD prioritized JTF Headquarters and the
individual augmentees identified to staff those JTF Headquarters, in
coordination with the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and Service
headquarters. In 2006, JFCOM developed sourcing recommendations and
coordinated the deployment of more than 310,000 personnel in support of
all combatant commanders.
In addition, the expanding Joint Force Provider mission requires
that JFCOM attain an automated capability to assess and monitor force
capabilities, availability, location, readiness, and assignment, and to
be able to track the status of units through the entire pre-deployment,
deployment, redeployment, and reconstitution cycle for both the Active
and Reserve components, down to an individual. This requirement is
termed the Global Visibility Capability (GVC), for which the Defense
Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) and other contributing technologies
such as the Joint Event Scheduling System (JESS) and the Joint Force
Projection Advanced Capability Technology Demonstration (JFP-ACTD) are
currently being pursued and/or enhanced.
JFCOM is spearheading the development and enforcement of policies
that transform Global Force Management into a predictive, streamlined
and integrated process supported by net-centric tools that expand total
force visibility. This effort will enable effective and efficient
sourcing of all rotational and emergent force requirements while
simultaneously seeking to reduce, and ultimately eliminate, persistent
force capability shortfalls (low density/high demand) and fully
coordinating the availability of Active and Reserve Forces. This will
allow earlier notification of forces that will be deployed, thus adding
stability of their personal lives, predictability to their schedules,
and greater opportunities for their training.
In October 2006, JFCOM gained responsibility for assignment of
individual augmentees to deployed units, a sourcing workload of
approximately 10,000 joint positions annually for 55 JTF Headquarters
worldwide. This is a new mission requirement of our force provider role
which demands an efficient and effective process in order to ensure
these individual augmentees arrive where they were needed in a timely
manner, trained and ready to fight.
Develop Joint Capabilities and Interoperable Joint Command and Control
(JC2)
As the Joint Capability Developer, JFCOM advances warfighter
effectiveness, improves combat capability, and helps minimize
fratricide by leading the combatant commands, Services, agencies, and
multinational partners in the interdependent and integrated development
and transition of Joint Warfighting Capabilities. In September 2006,
the Deputy Secretary of Defense designated JFCOM to lead a trial
program as the Joint Command and Control Capability Portfolio Manager
(JC2 CPM). In this capacity, JFCOM has established a JC2 CPM capability
function, characterized by short reporting lines, and close
coordination with Service C2 programs. JFCOM, along with a multitude of
partners, is working to establish the technical expertise and attendant
authorities necessary to eliminate unnecessary duplication, close
capability gaps, and ensure joint integrated capability solutions for
the warfighter.
A fully networked, interoperable, and interdependent joint force is
essential to the achievement of successful military operations now and
in the future. While we have come very far since the enactment of the
Goldwater-Nichols legislation, we still have much work to do with
achieving this vision for our Armed Forces. As we learned in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and elsewhere, the lack of interoperability in command and
control and other functions significantly reduces the effectiveness of
our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines on the battlefield. Unique
among combatant commands, JFCOM works the critical seams of joint
warfighting, leading the migration of existing Service-based systems
toward a single, integrated joint capability.
JFCOM's goal is to develop operational level forces and
headquarters with the organic ability to fight as part of a joint and
combined force alongside our multinational and interagency partners.
The command's integration efforts will yield a joint command and
control capability that ensures decisionmakers receive information when
they need it, allowing them to observe, orient, decide, adjust, and act
faster than an adversary. Moreover, it will meet the pressing demands
of today's battlefield by linking voice and data from global and
national command centers to joint task force headquarters, between
component commands, and on to the soldier, sailor, airman, marines,
coalition partner, or governmental/nongovernmental agency over the last
tactical mile.
The goal is to create an ``Interoperable JC2 Environment'' that:
Ensures a JC2 capability ``Born Joint'' not ``Made
Joint'' on the battlefield, as was required for:
Blue Force Tracker
Joint Airborne Communications Suite
Joint Airborne Communications Center Command
Post (JACC/CP)
Provides a persistent test and evaluation environment
to assess aspects of command and control portfolio programs
Provides cross-program and enterprise-wide system
engineering
Recommends Program Objective Memorandum (POM) offsets
to ensure the ``jointness'' of Service and agency command and
control programs
Supports future JTF Headquarters
The CPM will focus on the needs of the combatant commander to
ensure proposed solutions contribute to joint command and control
warfighting capabilities and that resources are distributed according
to joint command and control priorities.
As part of its CPM duties, JFCOM also serves as the operational
proponent for the Net Enabled Command Capability (NECC), the web-based
replacement for the stove-piped Global Command and Control (GCCS)
family of systems. In this role, JFCOM partners with the combatant
commands and Services to establish the warfighter requirements for the
new command and control system and then ensures our acquisition
partner, the Defense Information Systems Agency, delivers an
interoperable capability that meets the warfighter's needs.
Beyond its joint command and control duties, JFCOM also develops
additional warfighting capabilities for the joint force. These
capabilities include Joint Data Link software, precision targeting
system, and machine to machine interfaces for passing that targeting
information without relying on voice transmission. All of these
capabilities are in use today.
Since 2004, JFCOM's implementation of Limited Acquisition Authority
(LAA) in support of the combatant commands has been used to fund/
provide several critical capabilities to the warfighter:
The Joint Precision Air Drop System in partnership
with U.S. Special Operations Command, currently employed in
theater (January 2006).
The Change Detection Work Station (CDWS), a Marine
Corps initiative, deployed to CENTCOM in January 2005.
The JTF Commander Executive Command and Control
Capability (JTF CDR EC2) delivered to CENTCOM/U.S. European
Command (EUCOM) Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) in fiscal
years 2004-2005.
Blue Force Situational Awareness, in partnership with
U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), in Iraq today with Multi-
National Force-West and currently being tested to support XVIII
Airborne Corps in their upcoming JTF role.
Warfare is inherently difficult and dangerous. To be effective in
the global war on terror, and to be more interoperable with coalition
partners, we need better cultural and language tools. To help overcome
the language barrier, JFCOM has partnered with the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to develop and provide over 1,000
language translation devices for CENTCOM and others. These devices
include over 950 one-way speech translation devices (Phrasealator and
Voice Response Translators) and nearly 100 prototype two-way Speech-to-
Speech (English-Arabic) Translators.
Our Collaborative Information Environment Management Office (CIEMO)
is working with the Services, to include the Virginia Army National
Guard, nongovernment organizations and other mission partners to
further develop and employ Humanitarian Assistance Response for
Multipartner Operations Network on Internet Enterprise (HARMONIEWeb).
HARMONIEWeb, developed in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, affords
the ability for mission partners outside of the U.S. Government to
collaborate, share and better integrate information across the spectrum
of support for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief operations.
To reduce the danger of fratricide, JFCOM worked with the Services
and the combatant commands to establish a common training standard for
authorizing servicemembers to direct close air support fires to
targets. Moreover, the command planned and executed a combat
identification experiment with over 700 U.S. and coalition participants
designed to assess the military utility of specific anti-fratricide
technologies. This experiment was such a success and the results of
sufficient rigor that the Army and Marines decided to purchase improved
combat identification systems for use in the near future.
Two additional subordinate commands that support the joint
warfighter and facilitate the integration and interoperability effort
are the Joint Fires Integration and Interoperability Team (JFIIT) and
Joint Systems Integration Command (JSIC). JFIIT, located at Eglin Air
Force Base, FL, conducts joint tactical testing and evaluation designed
to improve the integration, interoperability, and operational
effectiveness of joint fires and combat identification. JSIC, located
in Suffolk, VA, is the battle laboratory for analyzing command and
control systems integration and interoperability issues and works
closely with the Joint Warfighting Center and the Joint Futures
Laboratory.
Lead Continuous Effort to Transform the Joint Force
JFCOM coordinates the transformational actions of the Services,
other government agencies, and our international partners to improve
our ability to conduct integrated planning, coordination, and execution
of complex operations. Our goal is to identify and develop the joint
capabilities that provide combatant commanders with the ability to
operate continuously and effectively within any adversary's decision-
cycle, under any conditions, now and in the future.
Transformation is a continuous process of innovation,
experimentation and the transition of solution capabilities into the
hands of the Nation's joint forces for today's fight and future
engagements. The efforts of JFCOM are directed to ensure the Joint
Force Commander is equipped with improved concepts and capabilities
across the spectrum of operations, and will be better prepared to
command. For example, JFCOM is engaged in providing near-term command
and control solutions while working toward the force of the future that
will:
Be more capable of working with joint, interagency,
and multinational partners
Be able to work in an environment that deeply
integrates planning, intelligence, and operations
Possess the tools and operational art required to
operate at the commanders' discretion,
Be rapidly deployable and efficiently sustainable
Be an enabled element within and contribute to a
synchronized strategic communication environment
Transformation is about developing new concepts and capabilities
together in a wider range of settings from the traditional laboratory
experimentation to prototyping the emerging concepts and capabilities
in the field. Much of our work is now informed by powerful federations
of models and simulations run on supercomputers. This technological
edge at the beginning of the development and experimentation process is
a key enabler for producing what our primary customers, the combatant
commanders, have told us they need to address today's realities and
tomorrow's emerging challenges.
Modeling and Simulation (M&S) provides the foundation for
innovation and experimentation. Ongoing sophisticated M&S capabilities
include the Joint Semi-Automated Forces (JSAF), a high fidelity
multidimensional environment that can replicate real-world urban
environments such as Baghdad or Norfolk. Matching the real-time
fidelity of JSAF, but in a faster-than-real-time capacity, is the Joint
Analysis System (JAS). JAS, a constructive simulation, facilitates
analysis of actions and results of those actions in an entire joint
campaign, from pre-deployment, to employment, and re-deployment of
forces. This lets us be more effective and efficient before, during,
and after operations. Another emerging model is the Synthetic
Environment for Analysis and Simulation (SEAS). This tool models and
simulates reactions of institutions, organizations, and individuals
that make up a society and their effects on joint operations. We will
soon be experimenting with this tool on the battlefield.
JFCOM continues to leverage our affiliation with the Congressional
M&S Caucus. For the last 2 years, the Hampton Roads area has hosted the
Nation's leaders in M&S to highlight the importance of the industry.
This provides a forum not only to share with industry and academia, but
also to showcase M&S training initiatives of the military in a JTF
environment, promote enhanced M&S capabilities, and understand the
importance of such training to success on the battlefield. These
conferences also provide a means to share with academia and industry,
strategies to foster increased participation by college students in the
math and science disciplines. This partnership with academia is a key
area that we want to grow in 2007 and beyond.
Recent experiments like the Urban Resolve experimentation series
address the capability gaps our commanders now face. By focusing on the
challenges of urban operations in 2015, the Urban Resolve series
analyzes the effectiveness of current and future capabilities in
demanding environments. Over 1,000 people, including representatives
from the Services, DARPA, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, interagency
and multinational partners, from more than 19 sites, participated in
and contributed to the JFCOM lead Urban Resolve experiment series,
designed to explore and deliver capabilities for the urban battlespace
of tomorrow.
Likewise, the MNE Series brings the multinational and interagency
communities together to examine better ways to work together. Eight
partner countries, including the U.S., NATO, and other nations
participated in the MNE series in 2006. The experiment further refined
an effects-based approach to operations, which led to the development
of an effects-based planning tool that NATO is fielding to the
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.
In 2006, JFCOM established the Joint Intelligence Operations
Center-Experimental (JIOC-X) to conduct joint intelligence concept
development and experimentation (JICD&E), to conduct joint training,
and to incorporate lessons learned, best practices, and assessments in
support of both combatant command and Defense JIOCs. The ultimate end-
state of the JIOC is the integration of plans, intelligence, and
operations in order to increase the speed, power, and combat
effectiveness of DOD operations.
A key element in transforming the joint force is achieving Unified
Action--achieving unity of effort in complex operations involving the
participation of military forces, civilian agencies, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), international organizations, and multinational
partners. JFCOM development partners in Unified Action include the
National Security Council, Departments of Defense, State, Justice,
Treasury, and Commerce, U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID), the private sector, multinational and multilateral partners,
and NGOs. Together, we must develop a coherent interagency planning
process and the requisite tools necessary to synchronize the diverse
capabilities that our civilian agencies, military, multilateral,
international organizations, and NGOs bring to the effort. The war on
terrorism that we are fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan demand this kind
of interagency and multinational participation. The Department of State
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)
maintains a strong partnership with JFCOM as we work together to
understand and develop solutions for common civilian-military planning
and coordination, striving to improve the Whole of Government Approach.
Our close partnership with Allied Command Transformation and NATO
allows us to leverage each other's capabilities with S/CRS to enhance
the integration of Defense, US Government, and other national and
international agencies efforts in order to develop and deploy fully
integrated and interdependent solutions. This will be a challenge and
we must strive for seamless integration of our combined efforts.
The 3-year Unified Action development and experimentation program,
which began in mid 2005, will identify capability gaps in the areas of
Security, Economic Stabilization, Justice and Reconciliation,
Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-being, and Governance and
Participation. These capability gaps will be cross-walked with
developing initiatives across the Unified Action community of interest
to develop potential solution sets.
Concurrently, JFCOM and its partners are developing an integrated
planning and implementation framework, to include a national security
training and education program. These concepts will then be assessed
during major experiments to include Unified Action 07 and MNE 5 in
fiscal year 2008.
Our new experimentation series in 2007, named Noble Resolve, is
intended to improve information sharing, communications
interoperability and unity of effort within the areas of Homeland
Defense, Homeland Security and Defense Support to Civil Authorities.
Utilizing advanced modeling and simulation, Noble Resolve uses a
scenario focused on preventing overseas threats from migrating to the
homeland. Partners and participants in this experiment include other
combatant commands (NORTHCOM, EUCOM, STRATCOM, Transportation Command
(TRANSCOM), and Pacific Command (PACOM)), Department of Homeland
Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), FEMA, port
authorities, the Commonwealth of Virginia, the cities of Norfolk, VA,
and Portland, OR, academic institutions like Old Dominion University,
University of Virginia and Virginia Polytechnic Institute, as well as
companies like Maersk Shipping. Through this innovative use of
technology, we are able to focus on critical homeland defense skills,
assess risk management, test command and control with first responders,
and build counterterrorism tools between States.
In developing the foundation for the combatant commanders' success
in future operations, JFCOM has pursued a wide range of activities that
provide unique joint enhancing capabilities. For example, the Cross-
Domain Collaborative Information Environment is a hardware and software
solution that supports cross-mission and cross-domain information
sharing throughout the battlespace. The key deliverable to the
warfighter is the capability to allow multiple data types to pass from
one classified domain to another.
Combatant commanders have also identified a requirement for more
robust joint logistic processes that impact the Joint Force Commander's
ability to effectively plan, execute, and integrate logistics at the
operational level. As a result, JFCOM, partnering with the combatant
commands, the Services, and the Defense Logistics Agency, is developing
a family of scalable joint and combined capabilities (JxDS) that will
enhance coordination, integration, and synchronization to increase
force employment opportunities.
A unique challenge of combatant commanders conducting operations in
the urban environment is inhibited employment of joint fires due to
complex terrain, weapons effects and the proximity of noncombatants.
The Joint Urban Fires Prototype focuses on improving the ability of
joint commanders to apply precision fires in the urban environment by
improving precision, discrimination and response.
``Angel Fire'' is another joint enhancing capability showing
tremendous potential, and is currently being tested on the battlefield
by the Marine Corps. Angel Fire was pulled forward after our Urban
Resolve experiment identified the dramatic value of persistent
surveillance. The optical sensor device covers a 16 square kilometer
area and can provide the joint warfighter with a dedicated sensor to
rapidly respond to enemy actions and near real-time reaction to an
improvised explosive device (IED) or any other event in the area. The
ability to pull forward tomorrow's capability to today is the most
important thing we do.
JFCOM's Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) assists in
accelerating transformation of the joint force by producing
recommendations for change derived from direct observations and sound
analysis of current joint operations, exercises, and experiments. This
mission is accomplished by providing tailored, worldwide deployable
teams of multidisciplined operations analysts, experts in joint,
combined, and interagency matters, with reach-back to greater
analytical expertise and an extensive lessons learned database.
JCOA conducts robust and timely analysis of operational issues in
order to provide immediate feedback to the joint warfighter and provide
input for transformational change to joint doctrine, organizations,
training, material, leader development, personnel, and facilities. In
support of this mission, JCOA has maintained a permanent presence in
Iraq since May 2003 and in Afghanistan since September 2004. In
addition to supporting CENTCOM for Operations Enduring Freedom and
Iraqi Freedom, JCOA has simultaneously supported other operations or
missions around the world to include Pakistan earthquake assistance,
the Lebanon Noncombatant Evacuation Operation, Tsunami Relief, Haiti
and Guatemala disaster relief, and Hurricane Katrina relief operations.
Last year, Congress received a copy of one of JCOA's most publicly
visible products, the ``Iraqi Perspectives Report.''
JCOA also operates the KnIFE, aimed specifically at the current
threat to our forces posed by IEDs. KnIFE is a capability to
comprehensively fuse data sources, databases, best practices, tactics,
techniques, and procedures dealing with asymmetric warfare into
products requested by and provided to warfighters and our coalition
partners.
JFCOM continues to work to build innovative partnerships between
private industry, academia and DOD through Cooperative Research and
Development Agreements (CRADAs). With projects of mutual benefit to
these organizations and the DOD, these agreements, enable pooling of
scarce research assets, and the sharing of information to facilitate
fast, effective and efficient research and development of capabilities
required by the joint warfighter today and in the future. We currently
have CRADAs with approximately 20 companies and several academic
institutions.
Allied Command Transformation
JFCOM values a close working relationship with NATO's Allied
Command-Transformation (ACT). This relationship provides a vehicle for
achieving synergy in Allied interoperability, through collaboration on
a multitude of levels, to include exercises, training, and sharing of
lessons learned and best practices. JFCOM and ACT have combined on
numerous projects to improve training and capabilities of U.S. and
coalition forces, solve capabilities shortfalls and identify solutions
for NATO forces.
The combined capabilities and synergy of effort of JFCOM and ACT
are maximized through efforts such as the upcoming MNE 5, which is
focused on the ``Whole of Government'' approach, and the Coalition
Warrior Interoperability Demonstration, that will test the
interoperability of the NATO Network Enabled Capability.
This close working relationship allows development of appropriate
``teamed'' solutions that not only address the problems at hand, but
strengthens relationships with and the capacity of our multinational
partners. The synergy of the projects we're working on together helps
to improve allied and coalition operations.
the way ahead
We are balancing the war today with the imperative needs of
tomorrow. In 2007, JFCOM continues to provide capabilities that will
achieve this.
The 33 training exercises scheduled for this fiscal
year, in conjunction with training exercises conducted by 22
accredited Service and combatant command training programs,
will be facilitated by the expanded Joint Training and
Experimentation Network and the interactive Joint Knowledge
Development and Distribution Capability portal, which will
enhance joint training immeasurably.
Experiments, focused on the integration of interagency
and multinational partners, will bring the joint force closer
to the realization of Unified Action.
As JFCOM gains experience with management of
Individual Augmentees and In-Lieu of Units, additional force
providing efficiencies will be realized with the goal of moving
unit, IA, and ILO force notification from weeks to months.
Deployment of responsive joint enabling capabilities
will continue to contribute unique capabilities to the global
war on terror and disaster relief/humanitarian assistance
operations.
The JC2 Capabilities Portfolio Management effort will
mature.
Based on assessment of training and current
operations, JFCOM will continue to improve and refine Mission
Rehearsal Training for OIF and OEF forces and enhance
information exchange abilities to help defeat Improved
Explosive Devices.
JFCOM will continue to work with OSD, Joint Staff,
CENTCOM, EUCOM, and NATO to improve Afghan National Security
Force Training.
Establishing two Standing Joint Force Headquarters
Core Elements with Full Operational Capability to deploy
globally by 31 December 2007 in support of a wide range of
mission sets.
Enabling the sustainment of two Standing Joint Force
Headquarters Core Elements with the transformational use of 240
deployable reservists in key billets.
Increase Homeland Security capabilities, and increase
training and education opportunities for the National Guard and
Reserve.
conclusion
JFCOM is dedicated to the total force of soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines, and civilians who serve our country and champion freedom
around the globe. We stand ready to rapidly deploy enabling and
enhancing capabilities to support the joint warfighter as well as our
interagency and multinational partners in complex operations. We bring
these current capabilities to bear while keeping a watchful eye toward
the continuously changing threat to develop solutions to defend our
freedoms today and tomorrow. On behalf of our 1.16 million great men
and women, the combatant commanders, and our components, we thank you
for this opportunity to present the JFCOM story.
Chairman Levin. General Smith, thank you so much.
Admiral Stavridis?
STATEMENT OF ADM JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner,
Senator Nelson, Senator Martinez, and Senator Sessions; let me
just begin by simply saying thank you for the opportunity to
appear here today in front of all of you. I'm also very happy
to be appearing with General Lance Smith, who came out and
greeted my aircraft carrier strike group in the Arabian Gulf in
2003, when I first met him. Sir, it's good to be with you.
Admiral Tim Keating who--I could ask for no finer wingman, and
has been a mentor of mine for many years. It's great to appear
with both of you.
I do want to particularly thank the members of the
committee who've taken the time to come travel in the region,
and I think there is no substitute for the kind of personal
eyes-on experience you get. Most recently, Senator Levin was
visiting Guantanamo Bay, Senator Nelson was through the region,
and visited one of our New Horizons projects. I know Senator
Martinez has been through the region recently--I would extend
an invitation to the committee to come as a group, or
individually, to any part of the region, at any time. It's a
vibrant, exciting, and diverse region where great interests of
the United States are at play every day.
It is also a region, I always like to say, which is not
America's backyard--that's not the right expression. It's not
even America's front porch, it's our home. The Americas stretch
from Canada to the tip of Tierra del Fuego in the South, and
collectively, we live in this shared home, all of us, all of
the countries. The 32 that are under my AOR are going through
some challenging times, and I think that together the United
States and those countries can partner in ways that will help
us fulfill a true partnership here in the Americas.
I've had the opportunity in my 5 months in command to do
some travel through the region myself. Most recently, for
example, last week I spent an hour with Daniel Ortega in
Nicaragua. I'd be happy to talk about that. I spent some time
in Panama with President Torrijos, and others. I will tell you,
generally, in the region, the United States is looked on as a
strong partner. Always, there will be some strong
disagreements, country to country, but overall, this is an area
of great potential for the United States of America.
I think the way to unpack that potential is by taking the
kinds of approaches you heard Lance Smith talk about a moment
ago--interagency, joint--obviously--combined, working with our
partners. This is really, as Senator Levin said, an economy of
force theater, but to execute what we need to do, we have to
team up with the DOS with the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), the Coast Guard, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and many
others. I'd be happy to address some of that today.
If I may, I'd simply like to close this brief opening
statement by saying how proud and lucky I am to be at U.S.
SOUTHCOM to work with great reservists, great civilians, great
Active-Duty, coastguardsmen, soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines. They're the best shipmates a sailor like me could ask
for. Our families support us every day. Senator Warner, I
appreciate your words on the families involved, and I look
forward to all of the questions to come. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Stavridis follows:]
Prepared Statement by ADM James G. Stavridis, USN
introduction
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McCain, and distinguished members of
the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
to discuss the environment in which we operate, the challenges we face,
and what we are doing throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. I
would like to begin by thanking the committee members, particularly
those who have traveled to our region to gather first hand impressions.
Most importantly, on behalf of all the members of the United States
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), thank you, as a committee, for your
continued support. We at SOUTHCOM very much look forward to working
with you and your staffs in the coming years.
Our mission is straight-forward: to promote security cooperation
and conduct military operations with the 32 nations and 13 territories
in the region to achieve U.S. strategic objectives. Our mission
enhances security and stability in the Western Hemisphere and, in so
doing, ensures the forward defense of the United States. Our ability to
accomplish this mission is significantly influenced by our
understanding of the diverse environment in our hemisphere and the
linkages that bind the Americas together.
linkages
Our shared home is the Americas. We have much in common with our
partners throughout the region; we share common interests and are
dependent upon each other in many ways. There are numerous and
compelling geographic, cultural, economic, political, and historical
linkages that tie all of the Nations of the Americas together and which
must be understood in order for us to achieve our mission.
Nearly half a billion people live in the SOUTHCOM region--roughly
one half of this hemisphere's population. Our area of responsibility
covers roughly one sixth of the Earth's surface and is bounded by large
bodies of water, making the maritime environment of great importance.
The people of this part of the world have diverse and rich heritages
and languages. A growing part of the population has strong cultural,
political and economic ties to the United States. In 2000, for example,
the U.S. Census Bureau reported that the number of Hispanics in America
accounted for 12 percent of our population. Today the government
estimates the figure as approximately 15 percent, with more than 40
million U.S. citizens of Hispanic origin. This figure is expected to
grow rapidly in the coming decades, making the U.S. very soon the
second most populous country of Spanish-speakers in the world. This
significant cultural and human linkage between the U.S. and the region
is underscored by the almost 15 million U.S. citizens who traveled to
Latin America and the Caribbean in each of the past 2 years, with an
almost equal number of our neighbors coming north.
The economic linkage between the Nations of the Americas has risen
dramatically over the last decade, with north-south trade comprising
almost 40 percent of U.S. total global trade in 2005. Trade between the
U.S. and SOUTHCOM's partner nations in Latin America and the Caribbean
increased 22 percent between 2004 and 2005, with considerable repeat
growth last year; and further substantial growth is predicted as a
result of the Free Trade Agreements we have with a number of countries
in the region. In particular, we also currently have a unique and
valuable opportunity to strengthen our economic ties to Colombia, Peru,
and Panama through the passage of Free Trade Agreements with these key
friends to foster economic security, stability, and prosperity there.
The U.S. also imports over 50 percent of its oil from the Western
Hemisphere, with 34 percent coming from Latin America and the Caribbean
in 2005--outweighing the 22 percent imported from the Middle East. An
important facilitator to this critical trade throughout the Americas is
the Panama Canal, which sees almost 15,000 ships transit each year, of
which two thirds are going to or from one of our coasts in the U.S. The
canal, in effect, is the economic heartbeat of the Americas. Panama
recently passed an important referendum to expand the canal to allow
for a projected twofold increase in throughput capacity, which would
certainly build upon the growing economic interdependence of this
hemisphere.
Beyond the cultural and economic linkages, perhaps the most
important connection we share with the region is a social and political
sense that respects democracy, freedom, justice, human dignity, human
rights, and human values. We share the belief that these democratic
principles must be at the core of what we accomplish in the region and
that free governments should be accountable to their people and govern
effectively. This common belief is most evident as expressed in the
first article of the Inter-American Democratic Charter: ``The people of
the Americas have the right to democracy and their governments have an
obligation to promote and defend it. Democracy is essential for the
social, political, and economic development of the peoples of the
Americas.'' The rest of this tremendous consensus document of the
Americas goes on to further reinforce our shared values and our goal of
strengthening representative democracy in the region. We have made
great strides over the last 2 decades in helping democratic values
spread, with all but one leader in the Americas having been
democratically elected.
We are passionate about the linkages we share in this hemisphere.
We at SOUTHCOM dedicate a good portion of our time to studying these
connections, and we firmly believe that our region is inextricably
linked to the economic, political, cultural, and security fabric of the
United States. Understanding these linkages helps us make the best use
of our resources in order to better secure the U.S. and to help extend
peace and prosperity to the entire region.
challenges
Beyond the understanding of these critical linkages, we at SOUTHCOM
also devote a considerable amount of energy to the study of the
significant challenges confronting the region--challenges such as
crime, gangs, and illegal drug trafficking as primary examples. These
challenges loom large for many nations in the region; they are
transnational, adaptive, and insidious threats to those seeking peace
and stability. By their nature, these challenges cannot be countered by
one nation alone. Therefore, they require cooperative solutions
involving a unified, full-spectrum governmental and international
approach in order to best address them.
In many cases, the main source for these challenges stems from the
underlying conditions of poverty and inequality that are prevalent in
most of the area. According to 2005 United Nations statistics, about 40
percent of the region's inhabitants are living in poverty, defined as
an income of less than two U.S. dollars per day. Of that number, about
16 percent are living in extreme poverty--less than one dollar per day.
Couple these poverty figures with the most unequal distribution of
wealth for any of the world's regions, and you have a catalyst for
potential social and political insecurity and instability.
Stemming from these underlying conditions, illegal drugs and crime
are the most pressing security concerns for this part of the world--and
based upon the region's proximity and linkages to the U.S., a security
concern here at home as well. The Andean Ridge in South America is the
world's leading source of coca cultivation, and despite international
efforts and record interdictions and seizures, the region still
produces enough cocaine to meet demand here in the U.S. and a growing
demand abroad.
A close corollary to the illegal drug trade is the alarming growth
of criminal activity in the region--some of which is a byproduct of the
drug trade but just as much stems from the region's extensive poverty
and inequality. Violence is now among the five principal causes of
death in several countries in the area. The annual homicide rate for
Latin America and the Caribbean is among the highest in the world, with
25 homicides per 100,000 people compared to Africa's 22 and the U.S.'s
5.5. In Central America, Haiti, Jamaica, and major cities in Brazil,
gangs and criminal violence are a security priority, with some gang
population estimates reaching into the hundreds of thousands. These
gangs do not just pose a concern in Latin America. They have spread
from Los Angeles and New York to around your homes in northern Virginia
and my home in southern Florida. Members cross borders, moving drugs
and money. This is an issue not just for our partners in the region,
but for Americans on our own soil.
The costs associated with violence in the region are difficult to
assess, but according to the Inter-American Development Bank, they were
estimated as close to 15 percent of Gross Domestic Product across this
part of the world in 2005. This inhibits efforts to alleviate the
underlying conditions of poverty and inequality.
As stated earlier, we are fortunate as a hemisphere to have as
neighbors democracies that virtually all share similar values with us.
Unfortunately, poverty, inequality, and security challenges all
contribute to a growing, frustrated expectation from the people for
dramatic change. We have seen instances in some countries where
``change agents'' have successfully campaigned on themes of radical
change, with promises of achieving sweeping results through unorthodox
and unproven economic and political policies. We will closely follow
any developments in the degradation or dismantling of democratic
institutions in these countries and any security crisis that follows
from destabilizing political and/or economic policies. In some cases,
we have the complicated task of maintaining working relationships with
a nation's security forces in the face of antagonistic political
leadership and attempts to spread anti-U.S. views and influence. This
situation exacerbates the already difficult mission of achieving
regional cooperation to address ever-changing and insidious
transnational challenges.
command priorities
Within this diverse environment, with its compelling hemispheric
linkages and its significant region-wide challenges, we at SOUTHCOM
have several key priority focus areas, discussed below.
First and foremost is the hostage situation in Colombia. Not a day
goes by without our team focusing on the plight of Keith Stansell, Marc
Gonsalves, and Thomas Howes. These three men are American hostages who
have been held captive by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de
Colombia (FARC) for over 4 years, having first been taken into
captivity on 13 February 2003. The safe recovery of our countrymen is
our top priority. We search every day for leads that will help bring
these Americans home. Finding them is of utmost importance to SOUTHCOM.
Another focus area, associated with the hostage situation, is the
overall security challenge in Colombia. Over the last decade, Colombia
has achieved great success in its complex struggle for peace and
security. Ten years ago, the headlines coming out of Colombia resembled
the worst of those to come out of any war-torn country: beheadings,
kidnappings, torture, and bombings occurred essentially daily. Through
its own interagency efforts and a welcomed steady stream of resources
and support from the U.S., Colombia has battled from the brink of chaos
to a far better situation in terms of peace and stability. Last year
marked the lowest homicide rate in two decades. At great effort, the
government has established security police force presence in all of its
1,098 municipalities, significantly deterring crime and terrorist
incidents. This increased security presence, coupled with significant
operational successes against the FARC, has contributed to the fastest
sustained economic growth in a decade--over 5 percent annually for the
past 2 years--and has encouraged a real sense of positive momentum for
the entire country.
These hard-fought successes, however, need continued U.S. support
and steadfast effort from the Colombian government in order to fully
win the peace for the country. SOUTHCOM continues to be a steady
partner to our Colombian counterparts and is constantly striving to
advise and assist them as they plan for the future. In addition to
supporting Colombia, countering any expansion of FARC activity into
neighboring countries is also part of our focus.
As in all combatant commands, support for the global war on terror
is a major priority for SOUTHCOM. We remain vigilant and are constantly
working with our partners in the U.S. interagency and with our partners
in the region to keep our Nation secure. I would characterize our
region as being a highly-likely base for future terrorist threats.
Members, facilitators, and sympathizers of Islamic terrorist
organizations are present throughout the region. Hizballah appears to
be the most prominent group active in the region, and while much of
their activity is currently linked to revenue generation, there are
indications of an operational presence and the potential for attacks.
The Hizballah network in the region is suspected of supporting the
terrorist attacks in Buenos Aires in 1992 and again in 1994. We suspect
that a similar operational support network exists today and could be
leveraged in the future.
We have seen successes in mitigating Islamic terrorist activity in
the region. Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina have made progress in
working together to address terrorism and illicit criminal activity
through the Tri-border Commission's 3+1 conference. A Regional
Intelligence Center, located in Brazil and staffed by agents from all
three countries, is nearly operational. Throughout 2006, countries in
the region have taken action against terrorist-linked supporters and
facilitators. In January 2006, Colombian authorities dismantled a
complex document forgery ring with alleged ties to indigenous and
Islamic terrorist organizations. Also in early 2006, Brazilian
authorities arrested a suspect linked to the late Lebanese Prime
Minister Rafik Hariri's assassination. We will continue to work with
our partner nations throughout the region to maximize counter-terrorist
successes and ultimately deny, disrupt, dissuade, and deter terrorist
and terrorist-associated activities in the area.
SOUTHCOM's most visible assignment in the global war on terror is
conducted at the U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo by Joint Task Force--
Guantanamo. We conduct safe, humane, legal, and transparent detention
operations in compliance with the laws of our Nation, Common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions, and the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In
accordance with the Detainee Treatment Act, all interrogation
operations comply with the interrogation techniques prescribed in Army
Field Manual 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations, and all
detention and interrogation operations are conducted humanely. Both I
and members of my staff make frequent inspection visits to our
facilities at Guantanamo and we are in constant communication with the
Task Force Commander.
As detailed earlier, a key challenge for the region is the spread
and breadth of criminal activity and illegal drug trafficking. As a
priority, we work with our counterparts throughout the region to assist
them in their attempt to cope with the serious effect gangs and
criminal activities have on their ability to govern. In some instances,
due to a lack of enough trained law enforcement entities, countries'
militaries have been asked to assist in combating these violent gangs.
The situation in Cuba and any potential repercussions from the end
of Fidel Castro's rule are another set of our priorities. We are
concerned that Cuba's poor socio-economic conditions and repressive
regime, combined with a leadership change, could spark mass migration,
and we are ready to assist the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security to respond if mass migration occurs.
promises
As evinced by the already strong linkages we share as a hemisphere,
we believe that if we were able to overcome the region's challenges to
security and prosperity, we would be able to unlock the true promise of
the Americas: the promise of a secure, prosperous, and democratic
hemisphere that works together to face threats to peace and stability.
The word `promise' has two appropriate meanings for how SOUTHCOM
approaches its role in the region and for our view of the future for
this hemisphere. On one hand, a promise is a commitment honestly
undertaken and executed by two or more parties. In this case, SOUTHCOM
is committed to lasting and beneficial partnerships with the countries
in the region. Encouraging regional partnerships has been a cornerstone
of our strategy for many years and a formal strategic objective for the
last 4 years. Our ``promise'' entails fulfilling the commitment of
being a good partner and pursuing better cooperative security
arrangements in order to face together the tough challenges that
confront us now and into the future.
Promise can also mean ``potential''--the potential to do something
vital and important; the potential to be something special and
extraordinary. We believe that through lasting partnerships, we can
help achieve the security conditions necessary to create the enduring
basis for prosperity and healthy democratic institutions in this
important region. This is the promise of a hemisphere free of gangs and
drugs; free of human trafficking, money laundering, and terrorism; free
of repressive regimes; it is the promise of all of us together finding
cooperative solutions to demanding security challenges.
Our goal at SOUTHCOM is simple: we will work with our partners to
unlock this ``Promise of the Americas.'' Every day we strive to be
engaged in a positive way with as many of our regional partners as
possible, and in doing so, enhance the security of the United States
while simultaneously enhancing their own security. The U.S. SOUTHCOM
strives to fulfill the promise of this region through military-to-
military engagements that build the capacity of the Nations in the
region to protect their own sovereign territories. Given our close
linkages, this increased capacity and stability will also provide a
first line of defense for the United States.
In support of our goal, we employ a theater security cooperation
strategy that calls for building host nation capabilities. Over time,
these capabilities will ensure our partner nations have the means to
control their borders and protect their citizens, while also deepening
the roots of good governance. We also envision our partners being able
to work together in a collective environment to be able to counter
emerging and adapting threats. To this end, most of our military-to-
military engagement is in the form of training and education programs,
joint exercises, peacekeeping, and other partnership programs.
Education and Training
Education, training, and military operations provide substance to
our collective security agreements and contribute directly to building
capability. Education and training are prerequisites to effective
operations, while operations enable partner nations to protect and
control their sovereign territories. Two institutions that provide
formal education to nations in the Americas are the Western Hemisphere
Institute for Security Cooperation and the Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies.
The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation provides
professional education and training--particularly in human rights--to
select uniformed and civilian security forces of nations within the
Western Hemisphere and operates in the context of the democratic
principles set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American
States. Their curriculum is designed to foster mutual knowledge,
transparency, confidence, and cooperation among the participating
nations, as well as to promote democratic values, respect for human
rights, and knowledge and understanding of U.S. customs and traditions.
The student body of Western Hemisphere civilians and police personnel
receives instruction in human rights, the rule of law, due process,
civilian control of the military, and the role of the military in a
democratic society. Partner nations nominate students to attend this
Defense Department school, and the State Department leads an
interagency vetting process that examines each nominee prior to final
selection.
The Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies is a regional academic
forum offering strategic level defense and security cooperation,
research, and dialogue for the promotion of effective security policies
within the Western Hemisphere. The Center's civilian and military
graduates and partner institutions comprise communities of influence
that work toward a more cooperative and stable international security
environment. The Center also facilitates NationLab Strategic Seminars
at foreign national defense universities with a primary focus on
national policy innovations for breaking the cycles of poverty,
corruption, narcotrafficking, gangs, organized crime, and other key
challenges in the region.
We have made tremendous progress in extending the International
Military Education and Training (IMET) program to partner nations
throughout the theater. We truly appreciate Congress's delinking IMET
from the American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA). IMET's
overarching training program, as executed by the Department of Defense,
has trained tens of thousands of Latin American officers, enlisted, and
defense civilian personnel, with graduates reaching the highest level
of military and civil service. IMET is a key training program that,
until Congress provided relief, had been subject to the provisions of
ASPA. We are working vigorously to renew training opportunities
throughout the region, including partner nations like Nicaragua, where
an IMET graduate recently led the interception of 871 kilograms of
cocaine.
As we seek to train the future defense leaders of our partner
nations, we must also continue rigorous training of our own forces. The
establishment of a Combatant Commanders Exercise Engagement and
Training Transformation (CE2T2) Program would consolidate all joint
training initiatives and provide visibility and accountability in
planning and executing our Joint exercise and engagement program. This
program would make better use of existing training funds and provide
the flexibility that is critical, given the complex and adaptive nature
of our sustained operations in the global war on terrorism. CE2T2 funds
are a consolidation of existing joint training resources and not a new
or growth initiative.
Complementing formal education is a myriad of training exercises
that improve capability and interoperability while building confidence
and improving transparency. Medical readiness, disaster relief,
humanitarian assistance, counterterrorism, peacekeeping, and maritime
capabilities are all developed through a family of related exercises.
Joint Exercises and Initiatives
The Humanitarian and Civic Assistance program provides training for
U.S. Forces and provides tangible benefits to host nations in the form
of medical clinics, schools, well drilling, and construction of
rudimentary roads. As part of this program, Medical Readiness Training
Exercises (MEDRETEs) serve as a mutually-beneficial effort to improve
medical treatment capacity of U.S. personnel while providing an
invaluable service to citizens in partner nations who might otherwise
never receive much needed treatment. U.S. medical personnel benefit by
providing medical care in a challenging and often unique environment;
local medical professionals develop closer relationships with U.S.
medical personnel; and the population receives quality medical care.
MEDRETEs create close human linkages amongst the people of our Nations
and generate tremendous goodwill towards the United States. In fiscal
year 2006 alone, our MEDRETEs treated 272,600 people and 41,000 animals
and conducted 3,327 surgical procedures.
New Horizons are engineer-based humanitarian and civic assistance
exercises that provide excellent training for U.S. forces and a
tangible benefit to the Nations in which the exercises are conducted.
As an example, in 2006, a New Horizons project provided Peru with two
clinics, one school, three wells and three MEDRETEs. We also conducted
similar exercises in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Honduras,
all benefiting the local populace and strengthening the ties that
connect the Americas. The demonstrated goodwill and benefit generated
by these exercises is immense.
Last year, 21 nations from the Caribbean and Central America came
together for the Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias (Humanitarian Allied
Forces) exercise to focus on regional cooperation and information
sharing to prepare for humanitarian and disaster relief operations.
Fourteen military, government, and nongovernment regional organizations
participated in this exercise. Emergency operations centers from the
participating countries were linked to a single Partner Nation
Network--a major step toward capacity building and information sharing.
The Humanitarian Assistance Program is another element of security
cooperation that provides engagement opportunities for U.S. personnel
while serving the basic social needs of the residents where exercises
are conducted. Over 60 training projects in 22 countries were conducted
in fiscal year 2006 for $15.4 million, while another 116 projects in 26
countries are scheduled for fiscal year 2007 with a budget of $13.2
million. These projects are conducted to contribute to the sustainment
of regional partnerships.
Fuerzas Comando (Commando Forces) is a skill competition and senior
leader seminar designed to enhance cooperation and trust between
international Special Operations Forces while improving their training,
readiness, and interoperability. A total of 15 countries from
throughout the region participated in 2006. This exercise drew anti-
terrorism experts from 15 countries who exchanged information and
shared tactics, techniques, and procedures for counter-terrorist
operations. Fuerzas Comando builds regional capability and supports our
war on terror efforts.
Tradewinds is a phased, joint, combined exercise that occurs
throughout the Caribbean and is intended to improve the readiness of
the Caribbean Basin nations to respond to transnational threats and
disasters. Enhancing Caribbean regional capability supports the war on
terror and provides defense-in-depth for the United States.
Panamax is an annual multinational exercise tailored to the defense
of the Panama Canal against asymmetric threats. For last year's
exercise, 17 nations from North America, South America, and Europe came
together to work in unison to better prepare for today's security
challenges. The objectives of the exercise included the full
integration of all participants into a multi-national staff and
concentrated on the Proliferation Security Initiative. This year we
expect more than 20 participants.
Another key part of our military-to-military engagement strategy is
our annual Partner Nation Communication and Collaboration conference
that is hosted by a different partner nation each year. In 2006, it
took place in Montevideo, Uruguay. This year we will gather in the
Dominican Republic. This conference focuses on strategies to improve
communication in order to respond to regional crises, such as disaster
relief and peacekeeping operations.
Peacekeeping and other Partnership Initiatives
Peacekeeping, like MEDRETEs, crosses the boundary between training
and operations. SOUTHCOM assists in enhancing the peacekeeping capacity
of partner nations through the conduct of peacekeeping activities. The
Department of State-funded and Department of Defense-executed Global
Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) is another excellent example of
interagency cooperation. GPOI provides for the equipping and training
of a multi-national Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) battalion of up to
650 soldiers from the Central American Armed Forces (CFAC). This
battalion includes one infantry company each from Guatemala, Nicaragua,
Honduras, and El Salvador. The GPOI program within the SOUTHCOM area of
responsibility also provides for the equipping and training of two
specialized companies: a Military Police company from Guatemala and an
Engineer company from Paraguay. These specific capabilities were
requested by the United Nations. The CFAC battalion staff will
participate in this year's Panamax exercise as part of its operational
preparation.
Yet another example of the peacekeeping operations ongoing within
our region is the United Nations Stability Mission (MINUSTAH) in Haiti.
Commanded by a Brazilian officer and manned by regional soldiers from
many countries, MINUSTAH demonstrates the viability of our coalition
approach to peacekeeping exercises and operations and the enduring
value of regional cooperation.
This past year we held our first maritime Partnership of the
Americas event. A portion of the George Washington Strike Group
conducted unit-level training in the region where 5 partner nations
conducted 24 community relations events in eleven countries. These
countries included the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Jamaica,
Honduras, and Trinidad and Tobago. We are planning a second Partnership
of the Americas for 2007. In conjunction with this exercise, we will
also leverage a world-wide U.S. Navy program called Project Handclasp
that distributes humanitarian, educational, and goodwill materials to
the needy in our partner nations. These materials are donated by the
U.S. private sector and will be distributed by U.S. servicemembers in
conjunction with community service projects. This year we have received
over 285,000 high-nutrition meals valued at over $70,000 through
Project Handclasp for distribution throughout the region. We are also
focusing this program elsewhere in the region to add impact to our
outreach efforts.
We will deploy a U.S. Navy hospital ship (U.S.N.S. Comfort) to the
Caribbean, Central America, and the Andean Ridge this summer to conduct
theater security cooperation and humanitarian assistance operations.
Like our MEDRETE exercises, these operations serve as a mutually-
beneficial effort to hone the readiness skills of medical personnel of
U.S. Armed Forces while helping to improve and save lives, reduce
suffering, stimulate public health, and support the command's theater
security cooperation objectives. The Comfort will visit various
countries in a 4-month deployment and treat as many as 70,000 patients.
Nongovernmental organizations, partner nation medical staff, and U.S.
medical staff will work closely to aid those without access to medical
service and build lasting relationships for the future.
In concert with the deployment of the Comfort, we will deploy a
U.S. Navy high-speed vessel (H.S.V. Swift) to Central America and the
Caribbean for 6 months this spring. The Swift would conduct training
and exchanges with our partners in the region and participate in
community relations projects. The Swift deployment is part of a broader
Global Fleet Station program designed by the Navy to provide flexible
forward presence for theater security cooperation activities around the
world.
The Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) is a key tool in
preventing terrorist groups from using our region as a staging ground
for terror attacks against the United States and Partner Nations. CTFP
goals are to build capabilities and capacity to combat terrorism and to
develop a global network of ``combating terrorism'' experts and
practitioners, all sharing common values, language, and understanding
of the terrorism threat. The program is conducted through education and
training seminars on intelligence gathering and sharing, senior level
military education for both officers and enlisted soldiers, legal
aspects in combating terrorism, civil-military responses to terrorism,
countering ideological support for terrorism and its financing, and
various maritime security procedures.
The State Partnership Program (SPP) is another example of
successful collaboration that has had dramatic growth and benefit in
our region over the past few years. The SPP links 20 U.S. states to 26
partner nations using the U.S. National Guard as the executive agent.
In fiscal year 2006, State National Guards conducted 149 separate
events with partner nations. These events develop core competencies in
regional military forces, promote the concept of citizen-soldiers as
public servants, and reinforce our bilateral relationships.
Enduring Friendship is a regional multi-year initiative that
provides maritime security assistance to select countries in the
region. Enduring Friendship will strengthen partner nations' maritime
domain awareness and operational capabilities to anticipate and respond
to threats, maritime emergencies, and natural disasters, and will also
enhance control over illicit trafficking lanes. This program will
improve partner nation maritime command, control, and communications
(C3) capability; increase interoperability; and integrate maritime
operational pictures, thus laying the foundation for maritime theater-
wide information sharing and coalition operations.
The first of three Enduring Friendship phases focused on the
Dominican Republic, Panama, Jamaica, and the Bahamas. Phase two will
include Belize, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua. The Eastern
Caribbean and the Regional Security Systems (RSS) countries will be in
phase three. In conjunction with other SOUTHCOM efforts, Enduring
Friendship will increase Western Hemisphere collective maritime
security.
Our Enduring Friendship initiative greatly benefited from the
recently approved Global Train and Equip authority approved by
Congress. Last year, we were able to concentrate Section 1206 funds on
two of our phase one countries, significantly accelerating our timeline
to reach operational capability in these countries and giving us the
flexibility to build a more responsive program. We plan on using this
year's funds, if approved, to jump-start our phase two countries,
bringing much closer to fruition our goal of a vigilant and responsive
maritime capability in this region so critical to our own security.
These Train and Equip funds have proven to be an extremely
proactive tool for this and other initiatives at SOUTHCOM and have
provided us with a truly responsive funding source for priority
programs. As we develop our regional partnerships, it is critical to be
able to dedicate resources quickly to build capability and/or capacity
in response to emergent threats or during unique opportunities. The
authority to train and equip ensures that we maintain this flexibility.
The ability to build the capacity of our partner nations and to
respond quickly to unconventional threats would allow SOUTHCOM to
better fulfill the cornerstone of our regional strategy: being
steadfast, responsive, and lasting partners to help bring about the
promise of the Americas. By fulfilling our promise, we will be
enhancing our own security, with our capable partners in the region
responding to emergent threats and denying access and maneuver room for
our Nation's enemies.
Partnerships in the Region
We have many examples of successful partnering with countries in
our region. Since 2000, Colombia stands out as a true reflection of
what steady partnership with the U.S. can achieve. Through
collaboration, partnering, education, training, and operations
supported by the U.S., Colombia's military has grown by 27 percent
since 2000, or 128,000 members, and by 2010 the national police are
projected to increase their end strength by 25 percent, or 163,000
members. According to the Colombian National Inspector General's
office, while the size of the security forces has grown in the past 10
years, the number of human rights allegations is down 67 percent thanks
to an aggressive human rights program that now extends down to
battalion level. Polling also indicates a high respect for the
Colombian military among the populace.
Today, the Colombian military conducts sustained
counternarcoterrorism operations, developing actionable intelligence,
protecting the National infrastructure, and enhancing civil-military
cooperation in the context of their democratic security strategy. They
do so consistent with the norms of international human rights and the
rule of law. Colombia has dramatically improved security throughout its
country and is poised for truly winning the peace for its democracy--
among the oldest in Latin America.
Another positive example of regional partnership can be seen in
Central America, where the System for Central American Integration
Meeting of Heads of State met in October 2006 to identify and publish a
plan of action for the Central American security priorities. The plan,
published in November 2006, addresses how the region can counter
organized crime, gang participation, illicit arms transfers, and porous
borders.
Our emphasis within Central America is to build partner nation
capacity to improve internal security, prevent illicit activity, and
enhance regional stability. To do so, USSOUTHCOM leverages existing
organizations such as the Conference of Central American Armed Forces
(CFAC) to improve the collective response of our partners and advance
our security cooperation objectives. As members of CFAC, the Central
American countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua
work together to respond to threats throughout Central America and
mitigate the effects of ungoverned space, porous borders, corruption,
and organized crime. Outside of the construct of the CFAC, El Salvador
continues to be a steady partner of the U.S. and is a champion of peace
and stability in Iraq. Their Cuscatlan Battalion is currently on its
eighth rotation to Iraq in support of peacekeeping and stabilization
operations.
In the Caribbean, the Cricket World Cup is fostering collaboration
among the participating nations on matters from threat identification
to threat mitigation, including maritime port security and consequence
management for possible chemical, biological and radiological attacks.
The Caribbean Community, with our help, is working diligently to face
these and other security concerns.
operations
Ultimately, education and training translate to operational
capability and, in our region, operations are conducted not from fixed,
large U.S.-run bases, but instead from a combination of flexible U.S.
and partner nation facilities. With our departure from Panama at the
turn of the century, there was less emphasis placed on permanent basing
and more emphasis put on the use of partner nation facilities from
which counternarcotics operations could be launched. Three such
facilities, known as Forward Operating Locations, are at Manta in
Ecuador; Comalapa in El Salvador; and Curacao and Aruba in the
Caribbean Basin. These sites, which fall under the broader category of
overseas facilities known as Cooperative Security Locations, are well
forward of the United States and are unique in that they are used only
for counternarcotics operations. We also maintain a forward operating
site at Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras. We currently operate out of
Apiay in Colombia and are working with the Government of Colombia to
increase access for counternarcotics and other missions. These overseas
cooperative locations are a cornerstone of our ability to operate in
the SOUTHCOM region.
Joint Interagency Task Force South
Located in Key West, Florida, Joint Interagency Task Force South
(JIATF South) is the Nation's crown jewel in addressing the challenges
posed by transnational narcoterrorism and a model for interagency and
partner nation cooperation. In a combined effort with the U.S.
Government interagency and our partner nations, JIATF South continues
to disrupt record levels of cocaine bound for the U.S. and Europe. It
conducts highly effective interagency operations by coordinating,
integrating, and synchronizing scarce Department of Defense,
interagency, allied, and partner nation resources. Most of our partner
nations do not have the resources to devote exclusively to
interdiction, yet their willingness and governmental cooperation
increase each year as the negative effects associated with the illegal
drug trade spread and as our collective successes in attacking illicit
drug trafficking increase throughout the region.
The positive effects of everyone pulling together are clearly
illustrated by the great successes JIATF South has achieved over the
last 6 years of ever increasing record disruptions. The last 3 years
alone resulted in cocaine disruptions of 219 metric tons (MTs) in 2004,
252 MTs in 2005, and 260 MTs in 2006. These numbers represent nearly a
threefold increase in disruptions since 2000, and all of this is a
result of continually improving our working relationships with involved
U.S. Government entities and with our partner nations. However, today's
more robust intelligence picture of illicit drug movements also points
to room for continued improvement. Intelligence suggests that some
cocaine movements in JIATF South's operating area go undetected each
year because of a lack of an appropriate detection resource to respond
to intelligence queuing, a real missed opportunity because nearly 90
percent of illicit drug movements that are successfully detected by
JIATF South assets are eventually interdicted.
Joint Task Force-Bravo
Joint Task Force-Bravo (JTF-B) in Soto Cano, Honduras, represents
the only permanently deployed U.S. forces in the region. JTF-B is a
first responder to crises in the region and routinely conducts
humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, search and rescue, personnel
recovery, and noncombatant medical evacuation operations. Their most
recent humanitarian operation was the deployment of three helicopters
in response to flooding in Panama as part of Task Force-Estamos Unidos.
They flew six relief sorties transporting food, water, mattresses, and
petroleum products to disaster stricken areas. The familiarity of JTF-B
crews and support personnel with the topography, communications
systems, and movement corridors were instrumental in mission success.
JTF-B is also a key contributor to our counternarcotics effort, using
their assets, regional knowledge, and professional contacts to
facilitate local law enforcement and interagency interdiction of
illicit drug trafficking. JTF-B has a long history of answering our
partner nations' calls for support during crisis--especially during
hurricane season--and is a valuable asset to SOUTHCOM's partnership and
cooperation plans in the region.
Joint Task Force Guantanamo
Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
provides significant support to the overall global war on terror and
ensures enemy combatants are kept off the battlefield while garnering
information of strategic value for dissemination to national security
decision makers. Over the past year alone, JTF-GTMO completed over
3,000 interrogations and developed over 200 Intelligence Information
Reports.
Currently JTF-GTMO detains less than 400 unlawful enemy combatants,
down from a total lifetime population of approximately 800, in a legal,
humane, safe, and transparent manner. Over the past year, JTF-GTMO
hosted over 320 individual media representatives from over 220 outlets.
We also work closely with the International Committee of the Red Cross.
Detainees have communication with the outside world through mail and
receive medical care and food service similar to that of the U.S.
military servicemembers who guard them. The Military Commissions Act of
2006 established procedures for trying unlawful enemy combatants for
violations of the laws of war. While the conduct of such commissions is
not our responsibility at SOUTHCOM, we provide administrative and
logistical support to the commission process as directed by the
Department of Defense.
initiatives
Within SOUTHCOM, we are striving to transform into a true
interagency organization. To facilitate this, we recently established a
new directorate for interagency partnering, with support from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of State. This
directorate's goal is to develop a culture of robust partnering with
the interagency, international, nongovernmental, and private
organizations to better integrate and focus national and international
efforts to support security, stability and prosperity in the region.
Our efforts include coordination and synchronization with members
of the interagency, academia, nongovernmental organizations, think
tanks, our senior leadership in the Department of Defense, and Members
of Congress and their staffs. These organizations formulate policy,
allocate resources, develop strategies, and strive to ensure the U.S.
Government shares a common vision and strategic objectives. It is in
this arena that we seek to play a leading role in the transformation
effort. The products of these key organizations shape the SOUTHCOM's
theater security cooperation strategy and provide vectors for our
engagement.
U.S. SOUTHCOM is also committed to experimentation and innovation.
Experimentation provides a means to increase capability, capacity, and
collaboration with the interagency and coalition nations in the
theater. It is an integral part of our overall theater security
strategy. Latin America and the Caribbean is an excellent region for
innovation--for trying new approaches, new technologies, new
applications of existing technologies, and new ways to combine
capabilities. We will continue to seek out opportunities to incorporate
experimentation into ongoing operations and exercises to increase the
Nation's effective and efficient accomplishment of its objectives.
As an example of experimentation, we recently completed a Crisis
Management experiment with multiagency participation from the U.S.,
Argentina, and Honduras. This event provided a multinational
environment to collaborate with regional and functional experts to
address three time-sensitive crisis scenarios: responses to a natural
disaster, a chemical incident, and civil unrest. We will expand the
experimentation audience in 2008 by combining the next crisis
management experiment with a recurring exercise that trains and
improves humanitarian assistance and disaster relief skills for
approximately 150 personnel from 27 nations in the region.
We will also continue to bring innovative and experimental
capabilities under development into Colombia, such as the ability to
detect objects under dense foliage, use of unmanned systems, innovative
data fusion, biometrics, and others for validation in an operational
environment, as well as providing near real time support to the
Colombian military from such cutting edge technologies.
conclusion
We believe that the bilateral and multilateral education, training,
and operations achieved through partnering with U.S. SOUTHCOM are
having a significant positive influence in the Americas. There is
regional momentum to develop solutions to the challenges faced by the
Americas. The Defense Ministers of 34 American nations met in October
2006 to examine the changing threat environment, both internal and
external to the hemisphere. These Ministers agreed that regional
challenges need cooperative solutions and that the collaboration of
virtually every nation is essential. They produced a consensus document
that describes the region's commitment to combating the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction and which firmly condemns all forms of
terrorism, drug trafficking, and transnational crime. The document also
identified the need to strengthen cooperative mechanisms to counter
these threats. This event reinforced the importance of partnering and
highlighted the need for cooperative solutions for problems such as
poverty, gangs, money laundering, human smuggling, counterdrug
activities and dealing with regional violence.
I would like to thank all of the members of the committee and all
the Members of Congress for your support of U.S. SOUTHCOM and the
important work we are doing in Latin America and the Caribbean. While
the likelihood of large-scale military combat in our region remains
low, the importance of sharing ideas, economic activity, cultural
exchanges, and conducting military exercises is quite high. In fact it
is essential to creating a mutually beneficial security environment in
this hemisphere, and we ask your continued support of our initiatives
throughout the region.
In this vein, we are cautiously optimistic that Colombia is on the
threshold of achieving its strategic objectives, but they will be
heavily reliant on U.S. support for the next 2 or 3 years. The support
from Congress has been invaluable for the past 6 years and we strongly
encourage your continued support. Our initiatives include aircrew and
maintenance personnel for helicopters, a robust logistics support
system supporting JTF-Omega, Plan Consolidacion, and other ongoing
support. In addition, we are seeking to provide the Colombian military
with an automated on-line logistics system that integrates the supply
and maintenance function of the Colombian military and national police.
We are also trying to support to a modest depot level repair
capability, fielding ``Midnight Express'' boats supporting riverine
interdiction for the Colombian Navy on their North and Pacific coasts,
and helping to establish the 2d Riverine Brigade on their Pacific
coast.
We also appreciate your past support for several of our other
initiatives, including expanded authority to conduct
counternarcoterrorism operations in Colombia.
We understand and appreciate the value of congressional support and
are thankful for all you have provided for the command. I want to thank
you again for delinking IMET from the ASPA sanctions. Your actions will
enable us to re-engage hundreds of military personnel each year who
would otherwise be denied an opportunity to benefit from U.S. military
education and training.
While we deeply appreciate your support in this area, there are
other areas for which we also seek assistance. The command is seeking
congressional support for the construction of a consolidated
headquarters facility in Miami-Doral for occupancy by 2010. The
headquarters is vital for effective command and control of future
joint, coalition and interagency operations that we conduct in the
region. Our current headquarters complex lacks adequate space, is
improperly configured, does not comply with anti-terrorism and force
protection standards, and has dated communications architectures and
expensive annual lease costs. Your support for this project is of
tremendous importance.
The command received $110 million in Foreign Military Financing
(FMF) for the region in fiscal year 2006. FMF is a prerequisite for
successfully funding many of the programs that enable military-to-
military engagements that lead to long-term relationships. In addition,
it enables partner nation capacity that, in turn, provides for defense-
in-depth for the U.S. Partner nations prefer to buy U.S. military
equipment for the quality and sustainment packages that accompany the
purchases. We appreciate your continued support on this important
program.
Finally, we ask your support for the proposed Center for Excellence
in Human Rights. SOUTHCOM is the only combatant command with a
dedicated Human Rights program. The authorities we would gain from this
proposed language would allow SOUTHCOM to intensify our support to our
partner governments in their efforts to eliminate human rights
violations. The protection of human rights is an essential step toward
strengthening democracy in our neighboring countries.
As I mentioned earlier, it is in the context of geographic, social,
economic, political and military linkages that we plan and execute the
daily activities associated with our mission, and successful mission
accomplishment for the command requires cooperation and reliable
partnerships--partnerships based on commitment, based on a promise to
this region of the world.
This combatant command is committed to being the strategic partner
of choice in the region and will focus on the relationships necessary
to do so. We will strive to invent new approaches in every area; from
tactical execution to strategic engagement, from more efficient
training methodologies to creative ways to improve resources.
I take great pride in our mission and in the exceptional men and
women of the United States SOUTHCOM. I know from first hand experience
that today's men and women in uniform are patriots of extraordinary
promise. They are coming of age in this new century as the war on
terror unfolds; they watched the World Trade towers fall to earth with
incomprehension and anger; and then reacted with fierce determination.
They have made a promise to their country that they will stand the
watch and fight for us to win the battle that is unfolding today. From
the dusty streets of Baghdad to the mountain passes of Afghanistan to
the tropics of Colombia to the cold foothills of Korea--they are
fulfilling that promise. I am proud to serve with them in U.S.
SOUTHCOM.
I thank you for your support to the finest military in the world.
I am prepared to answer your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Admiral.
Thank you all, not just for your opening statements, but
also for your statements that you prepared in advance. They
came, as we really prefer, a couple of days in advance, and you
have kept that commitment to us, it's not always kept by a lot
of our witnesses, and it's very much appreciated when it is,
because it allows us to prepare better, to actually read your
statements, have our staff read your statements before we meet
together. So, thank you for that, as well.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Admiral Keating, one of the major problems
that we had before the September 11 terrorist attacks was a
lack of information sharing--by the way, let's try an 8-minute
round in the first round here.
One of the major problems that we had before the September
11 terrorist attacks was a lack of information sharing among
relevant government agencies. When General Renuart had his
confirmation hearing earlier this month, I asked him about the
apparent fact that NORTHCOM had withdrawn its representative to
the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) last year, because
NORTHCOM and the Defense Intelligence Agency found that it was
too hard to get information and cooperation from the NCTC. In
order to avoid a repeat of the pre-September 11 failure to
share information, would you agree that we need to ensure that
there is good information sharing and cooperation between
NORTHCOM and the NCTC as well as among other Federal agencies?
Admiral Keating. I would agree emphatically.
Chairman Levin. Admiral, one of the painful lessons that we
saw from Hurricane Katrina was the need for better planning,
coordination, and integration among Federal and State emergency
response agencies, NORTHCOM, and the National Guard in the
event of a domestic disaster.
What were some of the key NORTHCOM lessons learned from the
Hurricane Katrina response experience, and what--in your
judgment--remains to be done to ensure that that kind of
confusion and delay is not repeated?
Admiral Keating. Principal lessons learned would be
several, Mr. Chairman.
One, the ability to assess the situation accurately and
rapidly. Two, the ability to communicate across the spectrum of
first responders, up to and including title 10 Reserve National
Guard Forces who would come from out of the area to deploy.
Three, to provide--via whatever means--the capability to
stabilize and mitigate human suffering, and restore
infrastructure as quickly as possible. Those would be the three
major areas where we've concentrated our efforts.
Changes would include--we now have a full-time, Active-Duty
colonel embedded with each Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) region, at the FEMA region headquarters. So, that's 10
Active-Duty personnel, with a small support staff who are,
essentially, FEMA operatives, to provide direct liaison from
NORTHCOM. In conjunction with the National Guard and FEMA and
the support of Congress, and with some extra money, we
purchased cell phone farms. We have three, at NORTHCOM, of
these cell phone farms. We can either airlift, drive, or float
these cell phone farms in where we power up a Honda generator,
put a tower up and start dispersing cell phones, and it is an
organic, but complete system which--when infrastructure is
restored--can then integrate into the full system.
Chairman Levin. Great.
Admiral Keating. Then the third point might be the
exercises we're doing with increased frequency, and complexity,
to ensure that the responders at the State level understand the
capabilities at the Federal level.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Just one question on ballistic missile defense, Admiral.
Would you agree that it's important that the ground-based mid-
course defense, the GMD system, be operationally effective and
reliable, before being declared fully operational?
Admiral Keating. I would, sir.
Chairman Levin. General, let me turn to you now.
The pace of operations and the scope of operations in Iraq,
Afghanistan, as well as our rotational strategy for meeting
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) force requirements has put an
extraordinary strain on the readiness of our uncommitted units.
So many people and so much equipment is already deployed that
on February 28 this year, General Schoomaker in the Army, and
General Conway in the Marine Corps, each acknowledged their
concern about the challenge of manning, equipping, and training
units that are preparing to deploy, but are not deployed.
The readiness in nondeployed Army units has declined to
alarmingly low levels, General Schoomaker refers to this as a
``lack of strategic depth.'' Your command is responsible to
provide trained and ready joint forces to our combatant
commanders, can you give us your assessment of the readiness of
our non-deployed land, air, and sea forces? Also, what
specifically can be done to improve the readiness of those
forces? Particularly our ground forces?
General Smith. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I share the assessment that the Chief of
Staff of the Army and the Commandant of the Marine Corps have.
For those forces that are not deployed and not very close to
getting deployed, have personnel shortfalls, as well as
equipment shortfalls. The kind of training that they're getting
is very much focused on counterinsurgency as opposed to some of
the other skills that they would need for a conventional
warfight.
The way we do business is we move the training flow and we
move the equipment towards units as they get closer to
deployment. That leaves those that just returned in the process
of regaining and resetting their equipment that they brought
back from war, turning over in the organization and sending
people off to school, and then reintegrating generally about a
third of their personnel to the training flow so that they can
get prepared for their next deployment. That results in a very
significant number of people being at a readiness levels of
category level (C)-3 or C-4.
Chairman Levin. Just briefly, that's an unacceptable level,
bottom line.
General Smith. C-1, of course, is they can do any mission.
C-2 is they can do primarily the missions that they're being
asked to, but some that they can't do, and C-3 is a readiness
level that we would not send them to war at. We would send them
to war at C-1 or C-2 as long as they could perform the mission.
So our goal is, as they sit static and they go through reset,
is they will be generally at that C-3 readiness level. But,
then as they start standing up their training pipeline and
their personnel pipeline, they will get closer and closer to C-
2 and then ultimately we'll have them at C-1 prior to them
going into the theater.
As I was at Fort Stewart and Fort Bragg about 10 days ago,
and I asked what they desired the most, as far as being able to
have a capability in the United States to train on, was
peacetime up-armored Humvees, the M11-14. That's because most
of them go to Iraq or Afghanistan, there are insufficient
numbers to be able to train on in the States until they go
through their National Training Center, or the Joint Readiness
Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk.
Chairman Levin. General, a recent New York Times article
highlighted the challenges that the Army's having in providing
its typical airborne infantry portrayed as a ``force
immediately ready'' to deploy for a contingency anywhere in the
world. This ready brigade, also known as the Division Ready
Brigade, ordinarily stands to deploy by air within 18 hours of
alert, its U.S. combat troops anywhere in the world that they
are needed.
The article points out that our most recently designated
Ready Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg is
getting ready to deploy as part of the surge to Iraq, and
therefore, as of this moment, the Nation is without its
required Ready Brigade.
As a force provider, you obviously will be paying
particular attention to and be involved in making sure that we
have an appropriate combat brigade capable and available for
worldwide deployment within the 18- to 72-hour standard which
has been established. What can be done to ensure that the
Nation reestablishes this capability, how concerned are you
about the fact that we don't have it at the moment, and how are
we going to cover that Ready Brigade mission adequately,
without interruption, as we continue the plus-up of forces in
Iraq, and the rotational strategy in both Iraq and Afghanistan?
General Smith. Mr. Chairman, I was with that unit, the 1st
Brigade Combat Team (BCT), the 82nd last Friday--I'm sorry, a
week ago Friday, and they're out at the JRTC right now at Fort
Polk. So, indeed, to meet the timelines that we would expect of
the Division Ready Brigade, they would have some challenges
trying to meet the specific requirements, but would they be
able to respond to a threat in another part of the world, other
than Iraq or Afghanistan? Yes. It would just take a little bit
more time than we would like it to take. We've accepted that
risk through April 1, at which time, a unit of the 101st will
take over that role.
I have cautioned everybody that might want to use those
units that because of the way we're doing business, they might
find themselves in a situation where it might take a little bit
longer than the specific timeline, which is a fairly
challenging timeline--within a day. We are accepting some level
of risk as we go about doing that. But, we always have somebody
in mind to be able to go perform that mission. We will have a
permanently trained and ready force to do that with the 101st,
with some delays, depending on where they are in their reset
timeline, to meet those----
Chairman Levin. The added risks are obviously of concern to
us, as they are to you. I'm wondering if you, for the record
because my time is up, would give us an idea as to how much
additional time would be required for them to respond?
General Smith. I certainly will, Senator.
Senator Warner. It is an important question, as part of
this hearing, it ought to be answered here.
Chairman Levin. Do you have the additional time that it
would take?
General Smith. Senator, I don't, because it would change
every day.
Chairman Levin. How about a range? I'll get you in trouble
with a range question.
General Smith. I would say, we would like to have them be
able to get airborne or at least a first unit at a classified,
but at a fairly short period of time, which would constitute, a
day or two. Then the rest would follow in a matter of days.
The fact that the JRTC, they are probably the most ready
force we have in the United States right now, as far as
equipment and training, and the ability to go do this. So, they
would take a couple of extra days to go. When they get back,
and they're back at Fort Bragg, then that timeline will change.
Chairman Levin. Which way?
General Smith. It will probably improve. Just because they
have the facilities there, and we have the rapid ability to
move airplanes in there, and they would be in a State, and they
would be on some level of standby to be able to----
Chairman Levin. When are they going to Iraq?
General Smith. I'm sorry, did you say when?
Chairman Levin. Yes.
General Smith. They go the 2nd or the 3rd--I'm sorry, the
1st of the 82nd goes in June.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
That important colloquy just underscores the stress that
all military commanders, indeed, from the Secretary of Defense
down, have acknowledged that our forces are being put under. It
means greater requests to the individual in uniform and to
their families, and to the question of our carefully planned
operations here at home, and they impact, indeed, on our
homeland defense, and other things. So, we better deal with it,
the surge is going forward, we all hope it is successful.
I would like to follow on that General Smith, because
Congress this week, and perhaps into next, is going to be
dealing with the governmental appropriations, and I am reading
from the full committee print of the House of Representatives,
March, this month, Section--Chapter 9--General Provisions,
``Congress finds that as Defense Department policy that units
should not be deployed for combat unless they are fully mission
capable. None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made
available in this act may be used to deploy any unit of the
Armed Forces to Iraq unless the Chief of the military
department concerned has certified in writing to the
Committees, the Appropriations Committee and Armed Services
Committee, days in advance of the deployment that the unit is
fully mission capable.''
Help us work through your role in that very important
decisionmaking, if in fact, this or something similar to it
became law. What is your role in that?
General Smith. Senator Warner, first of all, my role on a
regular basis is to monitor the readiness of the force, so that
we know, in a contingency, what our capabilities are, so that
we could advise the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense, and
in turn, the President on what capabilities we can respond to.
As far as the certification process, or a signing off on a
unit that is ready to go, we don't do that.
Senator Warner. That is clear.
General Smith. There's a service responsibility and my
component commands, however, do. So, in the instance of an--I'm
sorry, they do not do a written statement.
But certainly, General Campbell who is a component
commander, is integrally involved in the training, the
equipping, and the readiness of that unit to meet its latest
arrival date in Iraq or Afghanistan or Kosovo or wherever----
Senator Warner. Now, he is the Army?
General Smith. He's the Army Forces Commander at Fort
McPherson, and he's my Army component commander.
Senator Warner. You have a similar one for Navy?
General Smith. Indeed we do, Admiral Naplan at Fleet Forces
Command, and General Blackman at Marine Forces Command, and
General Keys at Air Combat Command.
So they regularly report on the readiness of the unit, so
as their personnel are trained and ready and the numbers are
right, they will change from a lower readiness status, to a
higher readiness status, and then we track them on a stair-
step, and we watch them as they get closer and closer to
deployment so to make sure that we're providing for those
trained and ready forces.
But we rely on the Services, and we rely on our component
commanders, and indeed, the Division and BCT Commanders to
ensure that they're ready to go.
Senator Warner. Let me probe more deeply here. Force
commander makes the certification that this specific unit is C-
1, C-2, whatever the case may be. That is transmitted to you,
is that correct?
General Smith. It is.
Senator Warner. Now, my question is do you do any
independent analysis to verify the finding of that force
commander?
General Smith. I do not.
Senator Warner. You do not. So, simply you accept it at
face value, you have no responsibility under law or otherwise
to go back and review it and give your own command's judgment
as to the accuracy of that report.
General Smith. That's correct, Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Then it goes on up to the Chief of Staff of
the respective Service. Now, do they then try and go back
through you, or some other ways to make an independent
assessment?
General Smith. They do not come back through me. They have
a very close relationship with their Service headquarters.
Senator Warner. Well, of course.
General Smith. So they're also--I think this is a better
question for General Schoomaker, for instance, I believe that
he accepts the readiness rating and the status of the unit as
determined by the commander of that unit.
Senator Warner. So as this proposed law is written, that
force commander is the one that is going to make that decision?
General Smith. Indeed.
Senator Warner. Whether or not the unit is ready?
General Smith. Indeed, the commander should make that
decision.
Senator Warner. Now, back again to your command, as I read
this, this would not permit anyone, any unit, below C-1 to be
deployed. Do you come into that equation at all?
General Smith. First of all, the C status is a--there are a
variety of ways to look at readiness, and that happens to be
one, and it's fairly simplistic. So really, the combatant
commander on the receiving end establishes the requirement.
For instance, an artillery unit may not be C-1 to perform
its artillery role. On the other hand, we will use them to go
perform a military police role. So that the readiness of them
to perform that mission, would not necessarily be reflected in
the readiness status of the unit to do its other conventional
missions. So, it was tailored to meet the combatant commanders'
requirements, and we monitor that. Then we rely on the
commander to say, ``Yes, indeed, we are ready and trained to do
the mission we've been asked to do.''
Senator Warner. I think, I judged from your response, you
are not a part of that decisionmaking.
General Smith. We are not. That's correct, we are not.
Senator Warner. Now, Admiral Keating, as you complete your
very distinguished career in your current assignment, our wish
to you, as I have come to know you quite well through the
years, personally, you leave with a sense of satisfaction and
achievement. But, there must be things that either you were not
able to achieve, for whatever reason, on your watch, or if you
had more time, you would achieve them, but what is left undone
that you think your successor has to do to continue to improve
this structure?
Admiral Keating. Primarily, Senator Warner, it would be to
make even healthier and more open interagency cooperation--not
just relationships, but work ethic--between the DOD and the
other Federal agencies, and the commercial sector.
Post-Hurricane Katrina, we were getting phone calls in the
hours after the storm moved--you remember it missed New
Orleans, but it hit Gulfport, MS--very hard. Phone calls from
folks like Home Depot, FedEx, and Wal-Mart saying, ``You want
wood? We have wood. You want trucks? We have trucks. You want
water? We have water.'' We really hadn't thought through the
commercial application of help that could be provided.
Remember, there were 140 countries around the world who
volunteered assistance. So, making more healthy and more
transparent the interagency working relationships on a day-to-
day basis, I say would be a primary goal for my successor.
Senator Warner. Then, I presume that as you turn over that
you've made those points clear to your successor.
Admiral Keating. He is well aware, yes, sir.
Senator Warner. Well aware of that.
On a scale of 1 to 10, how do you feel America is prepared
to meet the range of contingency that any prudent planning
document requires? Not only of hurricanes, but WMDs, Heaven
forbid a repeat of September 11 proportions. Where do you think
we are, 1 to 10?
Admiral Keating. In the aggregate, Senator, a seven. We
could be lower in some specifics. Some of the high end--a
biological attack would be a significant challenge. Pandemic
influenza, not even an attack.
Senator Warner. Surely, disease.
Admiral Keating. On the other hand, we are much better
today than we were 4 or 5 years ago, one has to be careful. A
disaster may be relatively low-end unless you're in the path of
the hurricane or the tornado.
Senator Warner. Right.
Admiral Keating. But we're much better at it today than we
were 3 or 4 years ago.
Senator Warner. About a seven?
Admiral Keating. About a seven.
Senator Warner. Lastly, to Admiral Stavridis. You mentioned
that you just visited the Panama Canal, and that is an issue
that rises and falls. At the moment it seems to be relatively
quiet. I recall the last consternation was that China was
beginning to close in at both ends of the Canal with offerings
to the locals to do certain things that gave us a presence
there.
Give us a short report on the Canal, how you feel it is?
Because it is integral to our security program. Is the
modernization likely to go ahead? What role has China or other
foreign nationals taken to support the operation of that Canal?
Admiral Stavridis. I will, sir.
First of all, as we say in Spanish, I think you're right,
it is ``muy tranquilo,'' very calm, in the Canal right now. I
just had the opportunity to go down and open one of the locks
down there. I spent a fair amount of time talking about the
security issues with the Administrator of the Panama Canal, a
Panamanian, of course.
I will tell you as a professional mariner who has sailed
the Canal under U.S. operations, and has sailed it under
Panamanian operations, that it runs in a completely
professional and excellent fashion today. So, as an entity, as
an organization, as a flow, it's excellent.
Sir, as you mentioned, the Panamanians just passed a
referendum with a 72 percent majority, very, very high approval
for a $5.25 billion expansion of the Canal. This expansion,
which will take about 7 years to complete, will open the Canal
to about 50 percent more shipping, because the current Canal is
not quite wide enough for the larger ships to pass through it.
That's a significant economic benefit, not only to Panama, but
to the region, and to the United States.
We are very concerned, however, about the potential for the
Canal to get targeted. It's something we think about at
SOUTHCOM and we partner closely, not only with the Panamanians,
with all the concerned nations.
As a result, we do an annual exercise in Panama, and off
the waters of Panama, that began 3 years ago with only three
nations participating, this summer there will be 20 countries
participating in it. It's become one of our largest multi-
lateral exercises anywhere in the world, and it's focused on
counterterrorism as it might attack in the Panama Canal.
So, we're looking at it very closely, there's multi-lateral
coordination to deal with any potential threat to it. In terms
of the foreign influence over the Canal, sir, I don't see that
as a factor. I think the Canal is run extremely well by the
Panamanian government without outside influences. They are
partnering closely with us, and with other nations of the
region to protect it appropriately.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
My time is up, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Bill Nelson [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Warner.
General Smith, I want to pick up on some line of
questioning from Senator Warner.
I was struck last week when the Chief of Staff of the Army
was here, in which he openly stated and admitted, at the early
part of the war that units of the National Guard went to Iraq
without the proper training, and without the proper equipment.
On the latter, I know firsthand, because I was getting calls
from moms, dads, husbands, and wives about members of the
Florida National Guard not having the proper body armor. Even
though, I think, an objective analysis would say that certainly
the training was not a question for the Florida National Guard,
but the equipment was.
Now, since you are to monitor the readiness of the forces,
how can you make sure that--not only the Active-Duty Forces,
but the National Guard Forces and the Reserves that are going
to Iraq--are ready and equipped?
General Smith. Senator Nelson, we treat and consider the
National Guard and Reserve exactly the same as we do the
Active-Duty units, in their march to deployment. Now, we focus
mostly on the major units and, at the BCT level, and as a
National Guard or Reserve unit gets closer to their deployment
date, you'll see them go from a readiness status of, let's say,
C-4 to C-3, their equipment will get better, they'll get
equipment to train on, their personnel situation will get
better, their training will get better, and they will turn from
red to yellow to green during that process.
The reason this process works--because it is true that the
readiness level of the National Guard is less than the Active-
Duty Force, is because their time during reset, or their time
back to the States, between the time they got back the last
time and the time they're going, it's supposed to be 5 years.
So consequently, they are not going to get attention until they
get closer to their deployment dates.
That, again, is one of those areas where we find ourselves
taking some risks in some other areas of the world, if we had
to deploy them, that I know you're aware of. But again, the
first of the 34th, for instance, the Minnesota National Guard
unit that we extended not too long ago, went over there with
all of the same equipment and everything that the Active-Duty
Force had.
Senator Bill Nelson. The question is, how are you involved
in making sure--since one of your tasks is to monitor the
readiness of the force--that they are trained, and that they
are equipped, so that we don't again have what General
Schoomaker told us--which stunned this committee last week,
when he testified that the National Guard was going to Iraq,
and it wasn't trained, and it wasn't equipped.
General Smith. Again, I don't think--at that point, that
was because of the rapidity that that happened, so there was no
training pipeline and readiness pipeline that there is today to
do that, and some level of, with some thorough process.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do you think that your command, you,
should have more authority in the certification of the
readiness of the forces, and the decision to deploy them?
General Smith. I'm satisfied that our component commanders
do a good job at evaluating the readiness of the force before
they deploy them into war.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay, and who is making that decision?
General Smith. That decision is made by, the first command
commander in that part of the Army, in concert with the
commander of whatever the unit happens to be. In the Active-
Duty Force, it would be the Division Commander or the Corps
Commander. In the National Guard and Reserve it would be, first
Air Force or whoever it is, that's coming, first Army or
whoever it does that's responsible for the training, readiness,
and equipping of the Reserve component.
Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Stavridis, let me take care of
some housekeeping here, for you. Why don't you lay out for the
committee, why your command headquarters needs to be where it
is, so that we can have it on the record here, especially since
we thought this thing was done with Base Realignment and
Closure, if you will?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, thank you.
First, sort of proceeding from the bigger picture to the
specifics, I'm absolutely convinced the command should be in
South Florida. Why? Because it's the nexus of transportation,
of intellectual discourse, of publishing, of academe as it
relates to Latin America and the Caribbean. All roads lead to
Miami, in terms of the way the league flows together, and the
way it connects with the United States. I'm absolutely
convinced South Florida is the correct location for it.
Let's kind of bring that in a little closer--the best place
to locate it, specifically in South Florida, in my opinion, is
in Doral, which is effectively in the heart of Miami itself.
It's extremely close to the international airport.
Now, why is that important? It's because there is a
tremendous leveraging effect of people, team leaders passing
through Miami, because of its transportation nexus, and it
affords us at the headquarters the opportunity to literally
scoop people up at the airport, get them to the headquarters,
have a discussion with them, put them on an airplane, get them
back.
Senator Bill Nelson. Give us an example of who.
Admiral Stavridis. I can very well. Minister Santos, of
Colombia, who routinely comes to Washington, makes a point of
passing through the Miami International Airport, I get a chance
to just hop in the car and go over there. I get a very valuable
30, 45 minutes with him, and he makes his connecting flight.
That example is repeated frequently and often at all levels in
my staff, through all my flag and general officers.
Second, that Doral location is extremely proximate to the
Florida International University and the University of Miami,
two of the leading centers of thought and intellectual study of
the entire region--the Caribbean and Latin America.
Third, the school situation is the best there for my
families and the ability of spouses to have work in the area.
All of this plays into a quality of life piece that fits, I
think, best in Doral.
So, the State of Florida has made an offering of land to us
there, upon which we could use military construction funds, if
the committee and the Senate, and ultimately, Congress approve
it, and we would like to begin construction on the
headquarters.
Our current situation is, we're scattered in nine
buildings, all around the Miami area, and then we have one--far
too small--central location, and we're seeking to consolidate
that, put it in one place, and as I look at the ability to
conduct the mission that I've been given as a combatant
commander, I do believe the Doral location is the best one,
overall.
Senator Bill Nelson. In effect, the State of Florida
location is giving you at what would be a good value, whereas
the present landlord is Jack Lorada.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, those are both true statements.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay.
Admiral Keating--and thank all of you for your public
service.
Senator Warner. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman, I wonder, I had a
question along your lines.
Senator Bill Nelson. Sure.
Senator Warner. I wonder if I might put it in the record at
this point?
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Warner. Admiral Stavridis, I note in your thorough written
statement that you advocate for congressional support for the
authorization in fiscal year 2008 for $237 million to construct a new
headquarters complex for Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in Miami, FL.
While I am supportive of your need for a new headquarters, my concern
is that, unlike most other U.S. major command headquarters which are
located on military installations, you are proposing to build this
complex on land leased from the State of Florida. The lease for part of
the land will expire in 2015 (albeit with four 10-year options upon
mutual agreement by both parties). Furthermore, the lease requires that
the new construction must be used for a SOUTHCOM headquarters, or the
lease is terminated. Finally, upon termination of the lease for any
reason, ownership and control of the headquarters complex will revert
to the State of Florida, and the State has the option to require the
DOD to tear down the headquarters at DOD expense and to restore the
land to a pre-existing condition. The lease also requires SOUTHCOM to
grant the State of Florida access and inspections rights to any part of
the headquarters complex, including areas for classified and coalition
forces operations. Why are these terms considered acceptable for a $237
million military construction investment?
Admiral Stavridis. The State of Florida is providing land valued at
$40 million via a no-cost ground lease for the construction of SOUTHCOM
headquarters through 2055, with options. The four 10-year options will
be granted by the State of Florida upon authorization of the $237
million military construction project. The U.S. Government may use this
property through 2055 for SOUTHCOM headquarters purposes. The State
land is located in the optimal location to support SOUTHCOM's mission
accomplishment. In the event that SOUTHCOM headquarters relocates or
vacates the property, the U.S. Government may utilize the property for
other purposes upon approval by the State of Florida.
The Department of Defense (DOD) is negotiating a ground lease
amendment with the State of Florida to gain greater flexibility of
facility use. The DOD is working with the State of Florida to amend the
ground lease agreement to gain the State's pre-approval of acceptable
alternative uses by any U.S. Government agency for administration,
military headquarters, emergency operations center, and equivalent
administrative uses in the event SOUTHCOM vacates the facility. The
State has indicated a willingness to pre-approve alternate uses of the
facility for other U.S. Government agency use for administrative
purposes.
In the event the U.S. Government vacates the facility and no longer
requires its use by any Federal agency, the State has two options; (1)
retain the improvements, or (2) require improvements be removed.
The lease agreement allows the State, upon reasonable notice, to
inspect the premises. The DOD will escort State government officials
during any inspection to protect classified information.
Senator Warner. Admiral Stavridis, doesn't this lease agreement in
effect deny the DOD the flexibility to realign unified and combatant
commands without the significant penally of losing a headquarters
complex?
Admiral Stavridis. No. In the event that SOUTHCOM headquarters
utilize the property for other purposes upon approval by the State of
Florida. The DOD is working with the State of Florida to amend the
ground lease agreement to gain the State's pre-approval of acceptable
alternative uses by any U.S. Government agency for administration,
military headquarters, emergency operations center, and equivalent
administrative uses in the event SOUTHCOM relocates or vacates the
facility.
Senator Warner. Admiral Stavridis, did SOUTHCOM or the Department
of the Army ever request an outright deed transfer of the land from the
Slate of Florida in order to secure ownership? If so, what was the
State's response?
Admiral Stavridis. The State is researching this option. Early
feedback is that the State of Florida may transfer title to the land if
approved by the State Board of Trustees and if the U.S. Government pays
fair market value. The State is researching to determine if there arc
other options for transfer of title.
Senator Warner. Admiral Stavridis, did you analyze the alternative
of locating your headquarters on a military installation which might
benefit from a greater measure of force protection and the efficiencies
gained by sharing supporting activities in existing facilities? If, so,
what were those alternatives, and why are you proposing to build on
leased property?
Admiral Stavridis. Construction on State land in Miami-Doral is the
best site location for SOUTHCOM's mission accomplishment and meets DOD
anti-terrorism and force protection requirements.
Seven studies have been conducted since 1995 to explore multiple
site locations. All studies indicate that Miami is the best location
for SOUTHCOM headquarters. The studies include; (1) 1995 Relocation
Study, (2) 2001 Interim Facilities Master Plan, (3) 2002 Facilities
Master Plan, (4) 2003 Business Plan, (5) 2004 Northern Command
(NORTHCOM)-SOUTHCOM Merger Study, (6) 2005 Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC), and (6) 2006 Economic Analysis. The current and past five
combatant commanders have all testified before Congress that Miami is
the best location for SOUTHCOM headquarters. In the most recent study,
Homestead Air Reserve Base and Patrick Air Force Base were explored as
potential alternate locations. A summary of the latest study follows:
Miami-Doral
The State of Florida land in Miami-Doral is the optimal site
location because:
Organizational efficiencies will be achieved by being
located in close proximity to key collaborative partners,
transportation nodes, and community support:
International Airports (daily non-stop flights
to most Partner Nations; 10,000 flights/yr)
Housing communities (top notch schools, best
hospitals, safe housing)
Partner Nation consulates
Coast Guard District-7 headquarters
Universities that collaborate on Latin
American Studies
Seaports (Port of Miami, and Port of
Everglades)
Federal Agency regional offices (DHS, DOJ,
DEA, DOS, Treasury, FAA)
Network Access Point (NAP) of Americas
Miami-Doral is outside of the hurricane storm surge
evacuation zone.
State land is immediately available and
environmentally sound. Adjoining FAA land is available and has
been tentatively approved for storm-water retention.
Miami-Doral is centrally located within reasonable
commute distance to preferred housing communities in both Dade
and Broward Counties.
Miami-Doral has ample nearby hotels within walking
distance to support contingencies, exercises, and conferences.
Miami is considered the gateway to the Americas, and
is culturally tied to Latin America.
Homestead ARB and Patrick AFB
Even though some facility co-use benefits could be achieved at
Homestead Air Reserve Base and Patrick Air Force Base, the following
costs and disadvantages significantly outweigh facility co-use
benefits:
Cumulative loss of organizational efficiencies
associated with the lack of proximity to key collaborative
partners, transportation nodes, and community support:
International Airports (10,000 annual
commercial flights; longer travel distance/time)
Housing communities (schools, hospitals,
housing)
Partner Nation consulates (visas and
collaboration)
Coast Guard District-7 headquarters
Universities that collaborate on Latin
American Studies
Seaports
Federal Agency regional offices (DHS, DOJ,
DEA, DOS, Treasury, FAA)
Network Access Point (NAP) of Americas
Homestead ARB is inside the mandatory hurricane storm
surge evacuation zone.
Sufficient land is not immediately available
(Homestead-litigation).
Not located within reasonable commute distance to
preferred housing communities in Broward County (or relocation
costs for employees to Patrick AFB), forcing civilian employees
who have working relationships with our partner nations to:
Relocate (Homestead--at own expense)
(Patrick--at government expense), or
Commute longer distances; 3-tolls each way, $6
round trip daily, or
Seek employment elsewhere.
Lacks nearby hotels to support exercises,
contingencies, and conferences (Homestead).
Distance from international airports costs 1,250 man-
days in additional travel time to/from airports for 10,000
annual commercial flights.
Miami-Doral is the best strategic location for USSOUTHCOM
headquarters.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, if you'd like to go----
Senator Warner. No.
Senator Bill Nelson. Why don't you? No, I'll just defer to
you?
Senator Warner. It will take some time. This is one of
these brilliant staff documents that goes into every aspect. I
assure you that I am not trying to put it in Virginia.
[Laughter.]
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, I have to always--[Laughter.]
Senator Warner. Correct. But this is a series of questions,
very ably put together by our staff, because we are just trying
to look at the costs and the other questions.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. So, if you would put that in the record at
this point, I would be very much appreciative.
Senator Bill Nelson. Absolutely.
Admiral Stavridis. We would be happy to answer them, sir.
Senator Warner. Fine, thank you very much.
Senator Bill Nelson. It is so done.
I'm glad you made that comment, I want to go onto Admiral
Keating, just so that we could clear the record, Admiral
Stavridis, because now there are folks that are saying it ought
to be the old Homestead Air Force Base, and so forth, and
you've just made the case clear, by your role is not only as a
warrior, but it's also as a diplomat. When you can have access
to all of these governmental and diplomatic leaders on the spur
of the moment, which increases your contact and effectiveness
by quantum leaps, then it's the logical thing to do.
I'll close that, I want to pick up on what the chairman had
asked you, Admiral Keating. On the cooperation of your command
with the National Guard, and the State and local authorities
when we have a national emergency. It was not a fine day when,
in the midst of Hurricane Katrina, we suddenly had the military
trying to order the National Guard around, and you got into all
of those problems down there.
I would hope that--particularly if it's a natural disaster
in Florida, let me tell you, the Florida National Guard knows
how to handle hurricanes. It shouldn't be the military
commanders from someplace else coming in and telling them what
to do.
Admiral Keating. Couldn't agree more.
Senator Bill Nelson. Would you comment on that?
Admiral Keating. I couldn't agree more with you, Senator.
I'm not aware of a specific example--you may have in mind as
to--when you say it was not a good day when the military tried
to order the National Guard around, in either Louisiana or
Mississippi. Benny Landreneau, The Adjutant General (TAG),
Major General Landreneau, the TAG from Louisiana, and Major
General Cross, the TAG from Mississippi, and I, we were in
communication, I never issued an edict to them. They asked for
help, and we tried to provide it to the best we could.
We ended up with some 55,000 guardsmen principally in
Louisiana under the Emergency Management Assistance Compact
where governors provided help by the National Guard, and we
ended up with about 25,000 Active-Duty Forces. Some of those
were afloat in the Gulf.
I spend a lot of time with Doug Burnett, your TAG. He has
come to our headquarters 2 years running for our annual
Hurricane TAG Conference. We are well aware of Florida's
experience in dealing with hurricanes. The last thing we would
do is to presume command control of any State forces, or local
responders in a crisis.
So, we couldn't agree more, we understand our role,
Senator, we will be in support of someone when we're directed,
and that is how we train, and that is how we will employ our
forces.
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen, for your great service to our country.
I want to follow up on one of Senator Nelson's questions
with General Smith. I heard some of the same complaints from my
constituents, the National Guard units were going to Iraq
unprepared, and I guess I'd like to get you to comment on
whether that was a problem, was it a leadership problem, was it
a funding problem, was it indicative of another large peace-
time military drawdown that had left our military unprepared to
deploy, as has happened in previous conflicts, and as a follow-
up question to that, what are your thoughts on congressional
efforts to raise the top line of the Defense budget, so that we
don't have those same sorts of problems in the future?
General Smith. Senator, thank you.
First of all, with regard to the specific shortcomings or
instances, it's hard to address the lack of readiness of a
National Guard or a Reserve unit that goes over there. I was on
the receiving end of those forces at the time that I think
you're talking about, but I'm not sure as I was the Deputy
Commander of CENTCOM.
Of course, one of the issues, if you're talking armored
Humvee and the like, is that we didn't anticipate the
requirement. We were used to thinking about war with the enemy
in front of you, not behind you. So, for a variety of reasons,
the industrial base, power requirements, all of those were not
established sufficiently to make sure that everybody had
armored Humvees.
As far as the armor piece, that continues to change. Today,
the requirement for armor is considerably different than it was
3 years ago. Today, you have the armor that goes down the arms
and the legs, and much more protection, and that becomes the
norm. That, by the way, is not inexpensive, and so the pipeline
to get that stuff in theater continues on a regular basis, and
those that need it, get it.
Certainly the top line investment to re-equip the forces,
and make sure that we have sufficient equipment for those kinds
of contingencies is important. As we go into the surge, if you
will, we were taking out some of the equipment out of our
normal Reserve capability, that we would otherwise have to give
to Active-Duty National Guard and Reserve Forces that go over,
so there will--if we had to do something else, there would, no
doubt, be some instances where people would not have the
absolute best equipment, or the equipment that we'd like them
to have, and so we would adjust our tactics for that.
Uparmored Humvees is another good example. We would simply
say, ``You can't leave the compound,'' or ``You can't go across
the berm or whatever, unless you have the proper equipment.''
Those inside the fence, or otherwise, might have lesser capable
equipment than those that are outside and patrolling the
forces.
The top line raise could help that, and make sure that our
pre-position stocks are sufficient for the missions that we'd
be asked to perform.
Senator Thune. Thanks.
Admiral Keating, with responsibility for protecting the
United States from missile attacks, you are the primary user of
the Missile Defense System (MDS), and over the last several
years, Congress has provided resources to develop and deploy a
system capable of destroying ballistic missiles from our
enemies before they reach our cities.
However, for Congress to continue to invest resources in
this national priority, we have to know that you, as the
warfighter, have confidence in the system. Do you have
confidence in our MDS today? If so, how did the successful
intercept test last September impact your views?
Admiral Keating. I do have confidence in the system,
Senator. We were prepared to deploy that system. The Secretary
of Defense brought that system out of research and development
and put it in the limited defensive operational status, as you
recall, on July 4 and 5. In the weeks leading up to July 4 and
5 this past year, as we were watching the North Koreans as they
executed what we suspected they would, they launched a volley
of missiles, one of them appeared to be an intercontinental
ballistic missile.
The integrated intelligence systems detected that launch
and transmitted that information to our headquarters, I was in
communication with the Secretary of Defense. We were prepared
to respond with ground-based interceptors, had we been so
directed by the Secretary. He had to give us the authorization,
but the missile didn't get very far.
So we were prepared to use it that day--prior to the
successful test on September 1. That test, again, not an end-
to-end test, further reinforced my confidence in the system. I
appear before you today as confident as I know how to be in the
employability and the efficacy of that system.
Senator Thune. Thank you. In 2007, the National Defense
Authorization Act called for an organizational structure for
effective management, coordination, and budgeting for the
development and procurement of unmanned systems, including an
assessment of the feasibility and advisability of designating a
single department or other element of the DOD to act as
executive agent of the Department on unmanned systems.
So, Admiral Keating, I would direct this to you, as well.
Do you think that establishing a single department to act as an
executive agent for UAVs would enhance coordination, promote
unity of effort, and reduce the uncertainty in the overlap of
responsibilities in the event of a natural or manmade disaster?
Admiral Keating. I do, sir.
Senator Thune. On March 5, 2007, Air Force Chief of Staff,
General Moseley, sent a memo to each of the Services, as well,
asking the commanders of the combatant commands which
recommends that the Air Force be the executive agency for
medium and high-altitude UAVs, and I guess my question has to
do with, since it is the existing role of the Air Force to
conduct joint interdependent warfare from the air and through
space and cyberspace, and they already have a proven record for
providing vital air space and cyberspace capabilities for the
Services, is the Air Force the best choice to be executive
agent for fielding and integrating and operating UAVs?
Admiral Keating. I think it is, sir.
Senator Thune. Thank you.
One question for Admiral Stavridis, after September 11,
Congress passed House Resolution 4775, which was designed to
fund operations in Colombia, the target being the narco-
terrorist factions. This expanded authority was further
codified by National Security Presidential Directive 18 that
allowed special forces soldiers in Colombia to expand their
mission from solely counterdrug operations to one that includes
fighting counternarcoterrorists, and counternarcoterrorism,
trained for the national police and the Colombian Army.
Just the question I have is how successful has that program
in Colombia been, and are there lessons that can be learned
there, that could be applied to what is a very serious drug
problem in Afghanistan? Just your thoughts on that.
Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, sir.
If I could, just Colombia broadly, I think is moving in the
right direction. If we look back on Colombia in 1997, 1998,
1999, it was on the brink of falling into being a true narco-
terrorist state--kidnappings, murders, bombings, violence
throughout the country, essentially trending toward an
ungoverned state.
Come forward, 5 or 6 years. Because, I would argue, the
reasonable application of U.S. resources, and a small presence
of U.S. military, civilians, and contractors; and Senator,
there's a cap on our military of about 800--we've been well
below that throughout this whole process, and then we only have
about 500 Active-Duty military in Colombia--but partnering in
the system the Colombians have shown great progress.
For example, in Colombia today, in all 1,098
municipalities, there's a strong police presence. Kidnappings
are down 76 percent, murder rates are down 50 percent. The
economy is doing well, unemployment is down. President Uribe
enjoys popular approval ratings well over 75 percent. One of
the three major opposition groups, the Self-Defense Forces of
Colombia (AUC), has been completely demobilizing, taking 15,000
fighters out of the field. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC)--by all intelligence estimates--have decreased
about 30 percent, from 18,000 to 12,000.
Now, are there continuing challenges in Colombia? You bet
there are. Are drugs still a big problem? Yes, sir, they are.
But are they making progress? I would say by any reasonable
metrics standard, they are. I believe that we need to continue
to provide that relatively modest level of resources over the
next 2 to 3 years, and I think we will see Colombia move from a
state which could have failed badly 5 or 6 years ago, to being
one of our strongest and potentially most stable allies in the
region. I think that's an important thing to understand.
Again, there are going to be continuing problems and
challenges, but I think the trends are up--Colombia is a
country on the move.
Senator Thune. Second part of that question--any parallels
there with what's happening in Afghanistan? Any lessons that
can be learned or applied?
Admiral Stavridis. Two very different countries, but I
think the fundamental answer is yes. Today there are a handful
of Afghani police who are--just a handful, I believe less than
10, but it's a start--who are in Colombia working with the
Colombians to try and take some of these lessons back, and a
lot of these lessons are classic counterinsurgency kinds of
things. The fight against narcotics--both in Colombia and
elsewhere around the world, is intertwined with the practice of
sound counterinsurgency tactics, techniques, and procedures. I
believe there is a good opportunity for cooperation and it is
nascent, but it is starting now.
Senator Thune. Thank you all, very much.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to ask some questions on NORTHCOM, if I may.
My first question on NORTHCOM is how is the relationship with
the DHS?
Admiral Keating. It's good.
Senator Pryor. Is it integrated?
Admiral Keating. Not as well as it should be, Senator,
getting better. Things I might illustrate that would merit that
evaluation--we now have a full-time, senior executive service
level representative from DHS in our headquarters. We have two
military officers who go to work every day at the DHS. We have
10 Active-Duty colonels who are permanently assigned to FEMA
regions, so they're working closely with the DHS throughout the
country, in each of the 10 FEMA regions.
We have aligned our exercise programs--under the national
exercise program, DOD, DHS are conducting exercises--the same
exercise, then enabling them therefore to be simultaneous with
the same scenarios presented in the course of that exercise,
two of those simulated exercises a year.
So, I would say that there is work to be done, principally
in the area of plans--we in the military have a culture of, we
kind of know how to do plans, we go to school to learn how to
do it, and for hundreds of years, we've been developing plans.
DHS, relatively new, they have asked for our help, we're
providing them help in building a family of plans to replicate
the plans that are on our shelf in NORTHCOM and DHS. There's
work to be done, but we're a lot better off than we were a
couple of years ago.
Senator Pryor. The chairman and I are also members of the
HSGAC here in the Senate, and I'm the chair of a newly-created
subcommittee called the State, Local, and Private Sector
Preparedness and Integration Subcommittee. That is a lot of
lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, but a lot of other
things, too--September 11 and a lot of other things, so I think
that we need to do a better job, generally, and Congress needs
to do a better job of oversight, at making sure that we are
integrated, and that we are talking to each other.
One question I would have for NORTHCOM, and it may be a
non-traditional question, but in this world--I'm curious about
your relationships with the Governors of the States. The reason
I ask about them, is surely the number of times that the
National Guard has been called up, so to speak, 99 percent of
the time, it's been by the Governors, commanders in chief, to
handle some local situations.
Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.
Senator Pryor. But tell me how your relationship is with
the Governors, and how you're building that.
Admiral Keating. I have gone with the Secretary of Defense
to the National Governor's Conference here in Washington, DC.
We have concentrated our efforts, primarily, Senator, through
TAGs of the States to keep it on a military basis. General
Renuart, when he assumes command tomorrow of NORTHCOM has, on
his agenda, to appear before the National Lieutenant Governor's
Conference. We have worked and collaborated extensively with
the States, the head of the States' militia, and the National
Guard, there is work to be done with the Governors themselves,
and we're attempting to make those inroads through the
Lieutenant Governors.
Senator Pryor. With regard to this general emphasis that
has been talked about in Congress and over at DHS with
interoperable communications, are you all participating with
DHS and with local law enforcement about trying to build an
interoperable communications system?
Admiral Keating. Extensively, yes, sir.
Senator Pryor. How do you think that's going?
Admiral Keating. Significant progress, particularly in the
last 18 months, Senator. We came to you and asked for a little
bit of extra money. Each of these systems costs about $2
million. The system is an organic cell phone farm, we have
three of them ourselves. DHS and FEMA have a half a dozen and
the National Guard has 12 to 18, and they're procuring more.
These can be rolled out in the event of a disaster when the
infrastructure is wiped slick. We put them in, turn on the
power, and distribute cell phones and satellite phones. Those
systems did not exist pre-Hurricane Katrina, they now do.
We also convened our second annual Defense Interoperability
Communications Exercise down at Fort Monroe, VA, where all
manner of agencies--from Sheriff Department to Fire Department,
Red Cross, commercial, we have Wal-Mart and Coors Brewing
Company come as well as National Guard, Active-Duty, and
Reserve Forces. They literally set up their communications gear
in a great big football field, go inside and figure out how
they can talk to each other, using satellites and other methods
of communication. So, lots of progress is being made. There is
work to be done, to be sure, because there is not a single
standard, and likely will never be, a single standard for all
manner of communication within the common United States. But we
are taking down some barriers, and we're getting good
cooperation from industry in so doing.
Senator Pryor. Great, thank you. I have a question for
SOUTHCOM, and that, I think, Senator Thune a few moments ago
asked about activities in Colombia, and you gave us an update
on that, but I don't think he asked, unless I missed it, about
hostages? Three American hostages being held by the FARC--
what's the status of that?
Admiral Stavridis. Senator, thank you for asking that
question.
We have three U.S. hostages who are held today by the FARC,
the lead insurgent group, narcoterrorist group. They are Tom
Howes, Marc Gonsalves, and Keith Stansell, and they have been
held hostage for over 4 years. It's an extremely challenging
environment to try and effect their safe recovery, for a
variety of reasons. One is the tactics, techniques, and
procedures of the FARC, who are very good, they move the
hostages frequently. They are in triple-canopy jungle, it's a
very difficult operating environment.
They are part of a larger group of Colombian hostages being
held. We're working diligently with the Colombian military, the
Colombian police, our own interagency partners by the U.S.
Embassy, and we think about them every day. They are literally
my top priority at U.S. SOUTHCOM.
To have a fuller discussion of the current status of the
efforts, or the opportunities to pursue that, we'd need to go
into a closed session or I can submit that on a classified
basis for the record, sir.
Senator Pryor. We don't need to do that right now, but tell
me, are you confident that they're still alive?
Admiral Stavridis. The last proof of life was a video that
was made almost 4 years ago. However, we remain confident they
are still alive. Beyond that, I would not want to say without
going into a closed session.
Senator Pryor. Okay, I understand. Thank you.
I have one last question for JFCOM and that is, the Joint
Fires Integration and Interoperability Team (JFIIT), I'm just
curious about the status of that, and how that's going, and
where it's heading.
General Smith. Senator, they're doing great things. They
recently have been working with the Marine Corps to develop
better procedures and capacities in the close air support role
with the AV8 Harrier to give it digital communications and the
like. We have recently used the JFIIT to go out and certify the
Australian joint ground Forward Air Controllers (FACs) in
Australia, and they're working with a Canadian joint ground
FACs school to certify them as well. Much of this is a result
of some of the fratricide incidents that have occurred
elsewhere. But they are actively engaged in trying to make sure
that the systems that we bring to the battlefield are able to
talk to one another, that we can move information rapidly, and
that the tactics, techniques, and procedures are standardized.
Senator Pryor. Just one follow-up on that, if I may, Mr.
Chairman, is what you've learned there and what you're doing
there, does that transfer to interoperability with regard to
DHS here in this country, and homeland security?
General Smith. At JFCOM, I don't know that there is really
a relationship between JFIIT and----
Senator Pryor. I understand that there are things that
you're doing there that would benefit homeland security and
local law enforcement to know about.
General Smith. Probably less in the JFIIT realm than in our
lessons learned area in the exercise and experimentation we do
with NORTHCOM.
Senator Pryor. Okay.
General Smith. There's an active relationship between my
staff, both on the integration and experimentation and exercise
business and Admiral Keating's staff.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Pryor.
Senator Martinez.
Senator Martinez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning to all of you and welcome to the committee.
Admiral Stavridis, I wanted to, first of all, tell you how
happy we are to have you at SOUTHCOM in Florida, and we're
proud of your service there, and appreciate all that you're
doing, and I wanted to begin my questions by following up on
the issue of Colombia. I took a break a moment ago and met
outside with Foreign Minister Fernando Araujo who is here
visiting, and I think leading to my question, I want to just
touch on his life, a very courageous gentleman who spent 6
years kidnapped by the FARC. He was able to escape during a
rescue attempt in the midst of battle, and has been now named
the Foreign Minister of Colombia.
He's here, of course, promoting the Free Trade Agreement,
which the President and I spoke about yesterday, I know you
would agree is a very important component of what we're trying
to do in the region to approve the Free Trade Agreement.
Foreign Minister Araujo was telling me that kidnappings
have been reduced by 90 percent in a country where no one who
holds public office has not been touched by violence, whether a
kidnapping or a murder to a public official or a family member.
The Vice-President of Colombia has been a victim of kidnapping,
President Uribe's father was killed in the course of a
kidnapping. But it has been reduced, and so I think what we're
doing in Plan Colombia is working.
In addition to that, he also told me the flip side of that,
which is economic growth, is now at 7 percent. Which is very
encouraging and good news, and would be helped by the approval
of a free trade agreement with Colombia--nothing more
important, I think, for the region, including also Panama and
Peru.
I guess I would ask you an obvious question, which is,
would you agree that these free trade agreements would be
important for the region and the opportunity for economic
growth, jobs, and those kinds of things, which help security
issues, as well?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir. Clearly, my lane, if you will,
is how does it impact the security of the region? I will tell
you that, within the region, if you look at the results of free
trade agreements, and I would point to the Central American
Free Trade Agreement, there is an underlying security
improvement in countries where the economies improve. So, from
a national security perspective, the free trade agreements in,
both proposed free trade agreements in both Peru and Colombia
are important in terms of overall security.
Senator Martinez. Admiral, we've made a great investment in
Colombia, our forces have been there, assisting training,
providing support, intelligence, can you tell us an assessment
of where the Colombian armed forces are today, and how well
they're taking the fight to the insurgents, and what the status
of that is?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir. The Colombian armed forces
have increased in size and capacity over the last 5 years,
that's been due not only to their own efforts, obviously, but
also to the assistance provided by the United States. Their
training is improving constantly. I want to particularly
underline that they work very hard on human rights, they put in
place a serious vetting process, they are very receptive of the
kinds of human rights training that we are able to provide to
them, and I think, even as recently as the last year, you're
starting to see significant military successes that you had not
seen in the previous 5 years, including successful attacks on
relatively high-value targets, relatively senior members of the
FARC, second the demobilization of the AUC, one of the three
insurgent groups distinct from the FARC, but that
demobilization is a result of military pressure, as well as a
negotiated settlement with the government.
The FARC's decrease in size and capabilities is directly
reflective of the increased military pressure that the
Colombian military has placed on them. They are making strong
progress, and I'm pleased from my perspective as I look at it,
to see that.
Senator Martinez. Also, of course, they've made progress,
the government has, in deactivating a lot of the
paramilitaries, more than 30,000 have now been deactivated, so
that's also a good sign.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir, that's the AUC group I was
talking about.
Senator Martinez. That's what you meant.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
Senator Martinez. I'm sorry.
Venezuela is a concern, and their connection with Cuba, the
two of them working in partnership, but one of the real
concerns to me is the military buildup, the billions of
dollars, instead of going to Venezuelan's poor, are now going
to go to creating an armed environment in Venezuela. I wondered
if you had any comment on that, and what your assessment of
that situation might be?
Admiral Stavridis. Whenever I speak of Venezuela, sir, I
always like to start by reflecting that historically, the
United States and Venezuela have enjoyed a very positive
relationship. At the moment, with the current government in
Venezuela, we see far less cooperation in areas of my
responsibility--virtually no military-to-military cooperation,
we see limited cooperation, if at all, in the narcotic front.
As you said, I'm particularly concerned by the increasing
purchases of arms by the current government. To simply list a
few, 24 SU-30 fighters, a very advanced Russian fighter, 50
advanced attack and transport helicopters, and in some ways,
perhaps, most troubling, the purchase of 100,000 AK-103 rifles,
this is the follow-on to the famous AK-47. With that 100,000
comes the purchase of a factory, and the capacity to build even
more.
We worry, appropriately, in the United States about the
proliferation of WMD. One hundred thousand AK-103s in
Venezuela, I worry about the proliferation of weapons of micro
destruction. That many rifles, they're going to be moving
through that region, perhaps falling into the hands of fighters
across the border, in Colombia, it's a very great concern.
There's also discussion by that government of perhaps
purchasing diesel submarines. It is hard to understand what is
the perceived threat in this hemisphere. It's just difficult to
understand why the government of Venezuela would feel the need
to purchase that level of arms, and I'm concerned about the
destabilizing effect throughout the region of that.
Senator Martinez. It certainly goes well beyond what
defense needs Venezuela could possibly have.
Admiral Stavridis. As I perceive them, that is correct.
Senator Martinez. The issues of the physical site in Miami,
I understand Senator Nelson covered, and I hope you know that
if there's anything I can do to be of assistance, I'd be very
happy to do that.
Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, sir.
Senator Martinez. We're so delighted that you're in our
neighborhood, and particularly you personally, and we want to
make sure that anything we can do to be of help in that
situation that you would contact us, so I won't go back over
those issues, since Senator Nelson covered them.
But thank you very much, and thank you, gentlemen.
Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
Can we have a clarification of one aspect of the question
by our colleague from Florida?
The new factory is to build the old 47? Or the newer
version?
Admiral Stavridis. Newer version, sir, that is my
understanding.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
Admiral, you were asked a question, I believe, about the
Panama Canal.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Your indication is that it's being very
well run?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. That the involvement of other countries, I
believe, has not been an impediment to that?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. I want to ask you, specifically, since the
issue was raised a number of years ago about a Chinese
commercial presence, as to whether or not you view that as a
problem.
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I do not, it's Hutchinson Whampoa
Company, they're a globalized holding company, there is some
Chinese ownership in that company, but we've watched that
situation closely over the last few years, and we do not see
any threat to the operations or security of the Canal as a
result of that.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Admiral, I think in reference to the missile test you said
that the test was not an end-to-end test, as you put it. What
does that mean? What pieces were missing from end-to-end test?
Admiral Keating. We were aware that there would be a target
vehicle launch and we had a very good idea as to the azimuth of
that launch through the flight profile of the launch, Senator.
To a degree--not to belittle the technological success--it was
an open-book test. We knew it was coming, and we knew about
where it was going.
For my role in defending the Homeland, we would, of course,
like to have that kind of information in advance. We're not
likely to get it. So, in my view, an end-to-end test would be a
launch that is not announced, from a location that is
unspecified, on an azimuth that is not pre-determined, and we
would have to employ all aspects of our system--intelligence,
C2, and the hardware, to intercept the inbound target.
Chairman Levin. Do you know when such a test is scheduled?
Admiral Keating. I don't, I'll find out for you, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Chairman Levin. It may be classified, if it is just let us
have the information in a classified session.
Last May, the President announced--and Admiral Keating,
this is for you, also--6,000 National Guard troops were going
to be deployed temporarily to the Southern Border to help the
DHS's border patrol mission, and then apparently the DOD's
recently been asked to consider the option of extending that
mission beyond the 2 years originally announced.
Would you agree that border patrol is a mission that
belongs to civilian agencies, and that it should be handled by
civilian agencies?
Admiral Keating. From my position as Commander of NORTHCOM,
I would agree with that statement, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you know what the cost is, off hand, to
the DOD?
Admiral Keating. I do not, sir, I'll find out.
[The information referred to follows:]
Border patrol missions are performed by National Guard forces in
State (title 32) status, and have been funded by the Department of
Defense through supplemental appropriations. The mission is estimated
to cost approximately $1.2 billion for fiscal years 2006-2008.
Admiral Keating. As I'm sure you're aware, those folks are
not under the control of NORTHCOM, they were obtained under
State authorities.
Chairman Levin. There is a cost, however, to the Defense
Department.
Admiral Keating. Okay.
Chairman Levin. Sometimes there's confusion between the
term ``Homeland Defense'' and ``Homeland Security''. Do you
want to give us your take on the difference?
Admiral Keating. I'll do my best. It's a fine line, but
there is a distinction. We, in the DOD--whatever capacity we
are, Active-Duty, Reserve, National Guard--will probably take a
more kinetic role, and we will try and do it as our National
Security Strategy says, ``In as timely a manner as possible, as
far from our shores as possible.'' That would be defending our
Homeland, the physical act of preventing attacks, deterring
those attacks, and that someone would try to mount an attack,
defeating the attack.
``Homeland Security'' is a broader application of a concept
that would deal with our success in defending the Homeland,
through limited success, and it would also include actual
disasters. So, it is a broader term, in my view, ``Homeland
Security,'' than the relatively narrow application of military
power, and that being ``Homeland Defense.''
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Admiral Stavridis, can we expect any additional military
construction on Guantanamo for the detainee facilities,
including tribunals for detainees?
Admiral Stavridis. I think there will be some very minimal
level of construction done, Senator. May I say also, there is
some construction scheduled now, but that's for migrant
operations, to be very minimal, prudent capability in case
there is, for example, a mass migration of some kind.
I have no immediate tasking about a military construction
project, that's a policy decision that will be made at the DOD,
but the indications I get are that it will be very minimal,
indeed.
Chairman Levin. Have all the 14 detainees that were
recently transferred to Guantanamo received their enemy
combatant status review tribunals, do you know? I should know
the answer, I was just there.
Admiral Stavridis. We were just there, and also was the
first one asked today.
Yes, sir, I think they're not quite complete yet, but I
need to submit that for the record.
Chairman Levin. All right.
[The information referred to follows:]
As of April 13, 2007, Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs)
have been completed for 12 of the 14 detainees transferred to
Guantanamo in September 2006. The CSRTs for the remaining two detainees
have not been completed pending resolution of witness availability and
other related evidentiary issues. I would defer any specific questions
concerning the CSRTs to the Office for the Administrative Review of the
Detention of Enemy Combatants, which manages the CSRT, and
administrative review board processes.
Chairman Levin. Then, did you know if the plan is to
release all of the transcripts? Do you know what that plan is?
I know this is not your----
Admiral Stavridis. No, sir, that would be an Office of the
Secretary of Defense decision, sir.
Chairman Levin. Then, finally, General Smith, I want to ask
you about the authority which Congress has granted the JFCOM
for research on and procurement of equipment for C-2 activities
to enhance the interoperability of joint forces, and otherwise
facilitate the use of joint forces. We have extended that
authority through your fiscal year 2008, recently. There's a
departmental proposal to make that authority permanent and to
expand it to include the sustainment of the command's products
on the battlefield until a Service can take over the program.
The Government Accountability Office has indicated concerns
that other parts of the DOD can handle those tasks more
efficiently. Can you comment on both the need for an
acquisition authority, whether or not you could work through
existing DOD and Service acquisition efforts to manage the
joint programs that you seek to establish, how big of an
acquisition workforce would have to be established in order to
operate a robust acquisition program at JFCOM, and if you can
remember all of these questions--I probably ought to throw them
at you one at a time, at least when you get to be my age, I
appreciate that--and I'll be happy to repeat them. What
resources would you require in order to make full use of the
authority that Congress has given you?
General Smith. Mr. Chairman, we have $10 million authority
in research and development and experimentation. Then $50
million worth of procurement authority, neither of which comes
with money.
As you mentioned, that authority is out there until 2008, I
would like it made permanent. We'd make good use of the
program, perhaps not as good use as we could have, but we are
working to re-energize the innovation part of it.
But there's some great successes out there that we continue
to work, our Joint Precision Airdrop System, for example, the
ability to take a 2,000-pound pallet and drop it through the
weather with reasonable precision--football field-length
precision to somebody that's in the mountains of Afghanistan,
for instance.
One of the things about a limited acquisition authority, to
get 10 of those systems to Special Operations Command (SOCOM),
and then ultimately 50 to CENTCOM.
We are currently working on a 10,000-pound model and a
20,000-pound model.
The sustainment case is that I can go out and get those,
CENTCOM will go out and pay for those 50. The issue for us, and
the sustainment piece is, it will become a program of record,
probably, in the United States Air Force. But that's going to
take a couple of years, and what, through having the limited
acquisition authority, we are able to continue the work on that
and continue to improve the process before we turn it over to
the Service.
Another excellent example is the use of limited acquisition
authority to tie the 7 Blue Force Trackers, the friendly force
trackers, that showed up in Iraq, that couldn't talk to each
other, so therefore didn't have, didn't share a common
operating picture. So, the Army in one sector may not know
exactly what the Marines are doing right next to them. We were
able to use limited acquisition authority to take that
information, bounce the information from each of the different
systems through a U.S. Strategic Command facility in Colorado
Springs, and back within 2 seconds to the common operating
picture inside a Stryker, or in a command post or whatever, so
they all share the same common operating picture.
We are now working to include the Iraqi military. The
ability to be able to track, find out, and maintain where they
are. That, also, will ultimately become a program of record for
somebody. But that requires sustainment.
I don't mind going out and asking the Services for money or
combatant command money, though I've never asked at this stage
for money in the research, development, test, and evaluation or
the procurement. I'm satisfied with just the authority. So, the
only request I would have for money is some small amount of
money to be able to work that bridging time period, while we're
trying to get these systems into the program of record.
We could use other systems like the Rapid Acquisition
Program, or so. Certainly there are other avenues that we could
do this within the acquisition business. Would it be as
flexible, as agile, or give me the ability to respond rapidly
to a combatant commander's need? Probably not as rapidly, and
it would take away some of my flexibility to be able to supply
the combatant commander with what he would like. The amount of
money we're talking about, in my view, is not such that we
really need to go into that massive acquisition piece.
I have never asked for complete acquisition authority down
there at JFCOM, although we've considered it, along the lines
of SOCOM. I don't know exactly what the numbers are, but
they're pretty significant in the acquisition authority, and
I'm satisfied to use the existing service acquisition people
and contractors.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Warner, let me ask you--I should have asked you
this privately--I'm going to have to leave now, would you be
able to close up?
Senator Warner. Yes, to make a quick reference, we have
four votes in a few minutes.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. We do, and I thank you for that,
and let me thank our witnesses before I run along.
Senator Warner. We have had a very good hearing.
Chairman Levin. Thank you for your testimony, and we really
appreciate your presence, your testimony, and indeed it has
been a really good hearing. Thank you.
Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, sir.
Senator Warner. General Smith, I keep coming back to the
concern I have about the certification process. Your
responsibility is to draw on the Army, the Navy, and the Air
Force for components to put together in one unit to meet the
requirement of a commander in chief in various areas of the
globe.
If that one link does not measure up in readiness, it could
imperil the components of the other two who presumably are up
to complete readiness. So, it seems to me that perhaps we
should revisit whether or not you should get more deeply
involved into the certification process, because in a sense,
your stamp of approval on that and moving the package of the
three component Joint Services forward, could have a flaw in it
that would impinge on the ability of the other two.
General Smith. Senator Warner, it really depends on the
construct we're talking about. I am absolutely satisfied that a
BCT that's an Army BCT is, never leaves the Forces Command
arena without being certified within their own organization. I
mean, maybe not with a piece of paper, but that the Brigade
Commander----
Senator Warner. All right.
General Smith. Senator, there is another piece out there
that we are responsible for. They do that with a title 10
train, organize, and equip role. They're given to me.
Now, it's different with the Joint Task Force headquarters.
In that case, we do indeed train the individuals in the joint
environment, we are responsible for helping to equip, in that
case, for instance of both Admiral Keating and Admiral
Stavridis with deployable joint command and control systems.
Then we train through mission rehearsal exercises and the like,
and other exercises, the Joint Staff and ultimately, in one way
or another, certify that staff.
Now, in the case of people going into Baghdad, for
instance, General Odierno went in to take over Multi-National
Forces for Iraq--we had a whole series of training programs
that culminated in a mission rehearsal exercise that tied his
entire staff together, and he, as the Corps commander, is the
one that certified the readiness and the capability of his
joint task force headquarters to go over there, and I validated
that with him.
Senator Warner. Right. All right. I'll leave that.
Admiral Keating, could you put into the record in reply to
this question, an update on the Cheyenne Mountain situation?
What your intentions are there?
Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
We are consolidating day-to-day operations within the North
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command
(USNORTHCOM) Command Center on Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. The
transfer of functions from Cheyenne Mountain to the NORAD and
USNORTHCOM Command Center will result in greater operational efficiency
and effectiveness through enhanced unity of effort. Plans, policies,
and procedures are being developed to ensure a smooth and efficient
transition of functions. Modifications to the NORAD and USNORTHCOM
Command Center will begin early this summer with completion by the end
of December 2007. Full operational capability is planned for May 2008.
We will maintain Cheyenne Mountain as an Alternate Command Center.
In addition, Cheyenne Mountain will serve as a fully functional
training facility to allow crew members to qualify in a shorter period
of time and at a much higher standard than is currently possible.
Senator Warner. Admiral Stavridis, would you also place
into the record your current assessment of the International
Military Education and Training (IMET) program? It has been a
very successful one throughout history. Congress took certain
steps to put limitations because of legitimate concerns, what
is the status of that? What initiatives could Congress take to
help improve it? I think IMET is one of the most successful
programs this government has ever devised to strengthen our
relations between countries all over the world.
Admiral Stavridis. Senator, I will put it in the record,
and I want to say thank you to this committee and to the entire
Congress for correcting what was not the right situation with
IMET. It's a huge success, it's taken off again in my part of
the world and around, and I will put it in the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
I agree that the International Military Education and Training
(IMET) program is one of the most successful and important programs
available to U.S. Southern Command. IMET gives us the opportunity to
bring partner nations' military personnel into our schools, provide
relevant training, build friendships, and expose them to strong
democratic institutions and civilian leadership of the military.
Eliminating American Servicemembers Protection Act sanctions on IMET
allowed us to renew positive, partnership-strengthening activities with
military personnel from previously sanctioned countries.
Continuing congressional support to level fund the IMET program in
fiscal year 2008 and beyond will send a strong message to our partner
nations that we remain committed to assisting in establishing and
maintaining professional security forces. Continued support to one of
our premier training institutions, the Western Hemisphere Institute for
Security Cooperation, also will benefit us by allowing greater access
for Latin American Armed Forces personnel to professional courses
conducted in Spanish.
Senator Warner. You're satisfied now?
Admiral Stavridis. I'm satisfied now with what Congress has
provided in IMET, yes, sir.
Senator Warner. All right.
Lastly, Admiral, the Detainee Treatment Act. In response to
my questions of how you and your staff at SOUTHCOM conduct
oversight of the interrogation operations at Guantanamo, it's
something that's of great interest to Congress.
Admiral Stavridis. I'll be glad to, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
Prior to my assumption of command of U.S. Southern Command, the
provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 had already been
implemented at Joint Task Force-Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO). Specifically, I
have been advised that, on 1 January 2006, General John Craddock
(former Commander, U.S. Southern Command) directed compliance with the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and that Major General Jay Hood (former
Commander, JTF-GTMO) confirmed, on 2 January 2006, that JTF-GTMO was in
compliance with the Detainee Treatment Act.
Additionally, on 22 January 2007, I issued specific instructions to
JTF-GTMO concerning the implementation of DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
Department of Defense Detainee Program, and Field Manual (FM) 2-22.3,
Human Intelligence Collector Operations. This guidance repeated the
provision of the Detainee Treatment Act that mandates the only
interrogation approaches and techniques authorized for use at JTF-GTMO
are those authorized by and listed in FM 2-22.3. Rear Admiral Harry
Harris (current Commander, JTF-GTMO) confirmed, on 27 January 2007,
that JTF-GTMO remains in compliance with U.S. law, including the
Detainee Treatment Act. Rear Admiral Harris issued a policy memorandum
to remind all personnel assigned to JTF-GTMO that they must be
knowledgeable of and at all times in compliance with U.S. law and
applicable DOD policies.
In exercising oversight of detention and interrogation operations,
I have, since assuming command 6 months ago in October 2006, personally
visited Guantanamo three times. During those visits, I have been
briefed extensively by JTF-GTMO personnel on both detention and
intelligence matters. Additionally, I exercise oversight and maintain
awareness of camp operations through the receipt of daily situation
reports from JTF-GTMO, weekly communications with the Rear Admiral
Harris, and through a multi-disciplined U.S. Southern Command Detainee
Coordination Team, which interacts daily with JTF-GTMO.
Senator Warner. I join Senator Levin, we've had an
excellent hearing. We wish you well, gentlemen, thank you very
much.
Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, sir.
Senator Warner. We are adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
nuclear warheads
1. Senator Akaka. Admiral Keating, the administration recently
selected a design for a new generation of nuclear warheads, which if
built, would be the first new U.S. nuclear weapon since the end of the
Cold War. I understand that the new warhead design is intended to
replace those in our existing arsenal. However, some have criticized
the United States as sending the wrong signal to the world at a time
when we are striving to deter nuclear weapon development in North Korea
and Iran. In your opinion, what is the current health of our North
American nuclear arsenal?
Admiral Keating. I defer to the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command
(STRATCOM) regarding the health of our Nation's nuclear arsenal. The
Services have an excellent record of safely storing and maintaining our
Nation's nuclear weapons. U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) has a
response plan in place for consequence management in the unlikely event
of an accident involving nuclear weapons.
2. Senator Akaka. Admiral Keating, are there issues with our
arsenal that make it desirable to replace our warheads?
Admiral Keating. I defer to the Commander, U.S. STRATCOM, regarding
the need to replace our Nation's nuclear warheads.
3. Senator Akaka. Admiral Keating, do we really need to build
replacement warheads?
Admiral Keating. Without first-hand knowledge of the life cycle
issues involved, I defer to Commander, U.S. STRATCOM on the need to
build replacement warheads.
homeland defense
4. Senator Akaka. Admiral Keating, your statement discusses the
continual improvement cycle that U.S. NORTHCOM and North American
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) undergo each year, participating in
and reviewing the lessons from numerous exercises, such as Ardent
Sentry and Vigilant Shield, as well as smaller regional, State, and
local exercises. In addition, you state that you factor in lessons
learned from real-world events, such as Hurricane Katrina. Corrective
actions are then initiated, as appropriate, based on the lessons
learned. Please elaborate on some of the improvements made to your
response plans since Hurricane Katrina.
Admiral Keating. Since Hurricane Katrina, U.S. NORTHCOM has taken
significant actions to improve the effectiveness of our response plans.
For instance, the Command assigned a full-time Defense Coordinating
Officer to each Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) region to
build relationships with our interagency partners. As a result, U.S.
NORTHCOM is able to obtain situational awareness more quickly to speed
our response time. U.S. NORTHCOM also operates under a standing execute
order that enables us to better prepare and more rapidly respond when
called upon by President or Secretary of Defense. In coordination with
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), we have developed 25 pre-
scripted mission assignments to reduce the staffing time required to
process military support requests during crises. Furthermore, we have
engaged with our National Guard and interagency partners to enhance
unity of effort. U.S. NORTHCOM and the National Guard have worked
together in table-top exercises and conferences, most recently the
National Hurricane Conference. U.S. NORTHCOM and the DHS have also
exchanged a dedicated on-site representative to improve planning and
exercise efforts.
5. Senator Akaka. Admiral Keating, has NORTHCOM developed metrics
by which it can measure its performance in disaster response?
Admiral Keating. Yes. U.S. NORTHCOM's plans contain metrics that
measure the command's performance in disaster response. Our plans have
stated objectives, which reflect the desired end state for each
operation. Also, each objective has a set of tasks that support the
objective. These supporting tasks all have measures of performance and
measures of effectiveness. These metrics give us a structured approach
to evaluate whether our objectives and end states are accomplished.
ground-based midcourse defense
6. Senator Akaka. Admiral Keating, in your statement, you said that
the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system achieved ``limited defensive
operations capability in October 2004.'' You then follow that up by
stating that it was ``placed in an operational status in June 2006, and
is available when needed to defend the United States' and its allies'
infrastructure and population centers.'' It appears from your statement
that this system was placed into operational service with only a
limited defensive operations capability. Is that correct?
If this is correct, what threats is this system capable of
defending against?
Admiral Keating. [Deleted.]
7. Senator Akaka. Admiral Keating, what is the cost to the taxpayer
of deploying this system with limited capabilities?
Admiral Keating. U.S. NORTHCOM does not have cost data for the
Ground-based Midcourse Defense System. This information resides with
the Missile Defense Agency.
8. Senator Akaka. Admiral Keating, would it not be better to
utilize taxpayer dollars on other high priority needs than to deploy a
limited capability system?
Admiral Keating. No. In my view, our ability to defend and deter
attacks against the United States, its population centers and critical
infrastructure is vital to our security. The Ground-Based Midcourse
Defense system provides a defense against rogue nations from attempting
to hold the United States hostage, both militarily and politically.
9. Senator Akaka. Admiral Keating, what is the status of developing
the full operational capabilities of the system?
Admiral Keating. [Deleted.]
national guard readiness
10. Senator Akaka. Admiral Keating, multiple deployments to Iraq
and Afghanistan have significantly impacted the readiness of our
National Guard units. In particular, much of their equipment has been
left in theater. In your conduct of homeland defense exercises and
disaster planning efforts, have you considered the current readiness
state of our National Guard units and their lack of adequate equipment?
Admiral Keating. Yes, we consider the readiness status for all
Department of Defense (DOD) forces in our plans and exercises. The sum
total of available DOD and National Guard resources gives me confidence
in our ability to provide assistance to civil authorities in response
to an event of national significance as directed by the President or
Secretary of Defense.
11. Senator Akaka. Admiral Keating, how are you compensating the
reduction in National Guard readiness until such time as the resets
catch up?
Admiral Keating. We are continuously engaged with our designated
force providers (U.S. Joint Forces Command, the Services, and Defense
Agencies) to identify specific capabilities required to accomplish our
missions. Often, Active Duty and National Guard capabilities are
complementary and overlapping, particularly with the defense support of
civil authorities mission. Where we identify gaps in capabilities, we
work with our force providers to find trained and ready forces to fill
the requirement.
border patrol funding
12. Senator Akaka. Admiral Keating, you describe in your statement
the expanded operations that NORTHCOM has been undertaking in support
of law enforcement to protect our borders. While I applaud the efforts
of our military to assist our law enforcement agencies in interdiction
of transnational threats, I believe that we need to keep an eye on the
impacts of expanded roles for our military to ensure that they do not
erode readiness. How are we paying for this expansion of military
mission into the law enforcement arena?
Admiral Keating. Joint Task Force North (JTF-North) employs
military capabilities to support law enforcement agencies by employing
title 10 and title 32 volunteer units. JTF-North supports law
enforcement agencies with unique military capabilities and the
volunteer units benefit from training that prepares them for missions
in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF). Because of the training opportunities inherent in these
missions, there is no negative impact to unit readiness.
To fund these operations, JTF-North operates an annual budget of
approximately $9 million funded through the DOD counterdrug program.
For fiscal year 2006 operational missions, no additional funds were
requested or required to perform missions in support of law enforcement
agencies.
13. Senator Akaka. Admiral Keating, were additional resources
budgeted to allow for this expanded mission?
Admiral Keating. For fiscal year 2006, no additional funds were
requested or required for mission in support of law enforcement
agencies. The expanded mission referenced in the statement refers to
JTF-North's support to coastal border operations along the Texas and
Florida coastal areas. These missions were performed at the request,
and in support of the lead law enforcement agency (U.S. Border Patrol)
with no additional funding or resources required.
theater effects based operations
14. Senator Akaka. General Smith, I understand that Theater Effects
Based Operations (TEBO) is the wave of the future for joint military
operations, and that Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) will roll out a set
of tools for combatant commanders to use by 2009. It strikes me that
this concept of operations would have been extremely useful to use in
Iraq prior to our attack, and may have reduced the severity of the
situation we are currently facing. How well does TEBO integrate with
other military operational doctrine and tactics, such as the Army's
counterinsurgency operations doctrine?
General Smith. We believe that well-planned joint campaigns and
operations rely upon an effects-based approach to joint operations.
TEBO is an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) sponsored
by the U.S. Army in conjunction with JFCOM, U.S. Forces Korea, and
other partners to enhance the implementation and use of an effects-
based approach to joint operations. The TEBO ACTD focuses on the
development of tools, applications, and techniques that facilitate the
analysis, planning, and assessment of military operations by U.S. joint
forces.
Two other tools being evaluated are:
Conflict Modeling, Planning, and Outcomes Exploration
Formerly known as Integrated Battle Command Conflict
Modeling, Planning, and Outcomes Exploration (COMPOEX) is a
suite of tools being developed in partnership with the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency in a user-in-the-loop
methodology to provide Joint Force Commanders with the ability
to develop plans employing all diplomatic, informational,
military, and economic actions across political, military,
economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII)
domains.
Synthetic Environment for Analysis and Simulation
The Synthetic Environment for Analysis and Simulation (SEAS)
tool is an agent-based simulation configured to assess and
predict culturally- and situationally-accurate PMESII effects
that are beyond the capabilities of a human subject matter
expert.
JFCOM will soon conduct a ``flyoff'' among all known effects-based
tools (including TEBO, COMPOEX, SEAS, the Global Synchronization Tool,
experimental North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) tools, and
others) in mid-2007 to determine the best technical and operational
aspects of each one and to further determine to what extent they may be
combined.
As with other technology enhancements, the fielding of proven TEBO
capabilities prior to beginning operations in Iraq might have enhanced
the military's ability to perform these process-related tasks. However,
the current situation in Iraq has evolved over time based on a
combination of many military, political, economic, and other factors.
So it is difficult to determine, even in retrospect, how TEBO
capabilities might have affected the course of events. Independent of
the TEBO ACTD, U.S. forces have selectively used related processes and
techniques in both Afghanistan and Iraq to improve their understanding
of the complex operational environment and determine effective courses
of action for different situations. These processes and techniques
generally met with mixed success, but provided valuable insights for
follow-on improvements.
TEBO technologies and techniques can enhance planning,
intelligence, and assessment, but TEBO capabilities do not replace
current proven processes or constitute new ways of conducting joint
military operations. TEBO is part of a more extensive effort that uses
``effects'' and a ``systems perspective'' to help commanders and staff
clarify their objectives, achieve a better understanding of the
operational environment, promote unity of effort with agency and
coalition partners, and assess progress toward mission accomplishment.
These new ideas are now being incorporated in joint doctrine, training,
and joint professional military education. These ideas are relevant not
only to planning and conducting large-scale combat, such as initial
operations in Iraq, but also to planning and assessing other types of
operations such as counterinsurgency and humanitarian assistance. Since
these are process improvements and related technology enhancements
rather than process replacement, these new ideas can be integrated
readily in existing joint and Service doctrine as appropriate.
15. Senator Akaka. General Smith, has the JFCOM tested the concept
in any current real world situations, such as Afghanistan, and if so,
what are the results?
General Smith. The TEBO ACTD and its associated tools have been
used in several exercises/events within the Korean area of operations
(AOR) (Combined Forces Command-Korea). In addition, in December 2006
General McNeill, the incoming Commander of NATO's International
Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF-X), requested U.S. JFCOM
to provide enhancements for a coalition staff conducting effects-based
planning and assessment at the operational level. U.S. JFCOM is
currently conducting a field experiment with ISAF-X staff which will
provide an ideal opportunity to assess the utility of U.S. JFCOM
developed capabilities in an operational environment. ISAF will use the
JFCOM-provided SEAS (see above), which will enable the staff to assess
potential kinetic and non-kinetic Senate Armed Services Committee
courses of action against the effects on population attitudes towards
the coalition, the government, and the insurgency. The tools, and the
processes they enable, support synchronized interagency planning and
execution and can help ISAF coordinate application of all elements of
national and coalition power in Afghanistan.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton
homeland security and the national guard
16. Senator Clinton. Admiral Keating, the National Guard plays a
critical role in our homeland defense. New York has more Air National
Guard bases than any other State and is home to the 42d Infantry
Division, the first National Guard Division headquarters to deploy into
combat since the Korean War. In fact, one of the 42d's brigade combat
teams will deploy to Afghanistan next year, potentially limiting the
National Guard's capability to respond to homeland defense disaster
relief support.
On March 1, the congressionally-appointed Commission on the
National Guard and Reserves released its second report to Congress. The
years of repeated and prolonged deployments and inadequate budgets have
left the National Guard and Reserves so short of equipment, training,
and personnel that 88 percent of the Army National Guard units and 44
percent of Air National Guard units in the United States are not ready
to be deployed. They are not prepared for overseas deployments and in
some cases cannot respond to homeland security threats or emergencies.
The chairman reported, ``We can't sustain the [National Guard and
Reserves] on the course we're on.''
Does NORTHCOM have sufficient National Guard and Reserve units and
personnel, with the appropriate equipment and training, to respond to
homeland threats and respond to emergencies?
Admiral Keating. Although National Guard and Reserve Forces are not
assigned to U.S. NORTHCOM until mobilized into title 10 status, we have
an ongoing dialogue with our force providers (U.S. JFCOM, the Services,
and Defense Agencies) to identify specific capabilities from the Total
Force required to accomplish our homeland defense and civil support
missions. When we identify shortfalls in capabilities, we work with our
force providers to find trained and ready forces (Active Duty, National
Guard, or Reserve) to fill the requirement.
border security
17. Senator Clinton. Admiral Keating, NORTHCOM plays an important
role in securing New York's northern border with Canada. Can you
describe any progress over the past year NORTHCOM has made to
coordinate with other U.S. Government agencies to secure our northern
border?
Admiral Keating. U.S. NORTHCOM and its subordinate commands
participate in the bi-national, multi-agency Project North Star.
Project North Star gathers law enforcement experts from the United
States and Canada to exchange information and plan operations to
counter transnational threats (to include counterdrug) along the
northern border.
U.S. NORTHCOM's subordinate, JTF-North, conducts operations to
support U.S. Customs and Border Protection along the northern U.S.
border. Cooperative law enforcement operations with Canada are
coordinated by U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the Canadian
Royal Canadian Mounted Police through the International Border
Enforcement Team.
In addition, U.S. NORTHCOM recently coordinated with U.S. Customs
and Border Protection on a strategic-level presentation concerning
pandemic influenza and its potential impact on U.S. and Canadian law
enforcement agencies.
preparedness
18. Senator Clinton. Admiral Keating, the 2-year anniversary of
Hurricane Katrina will be September 2007. In the aftermath of the
response to Hurricane Katrina, questions were raised about whether the
military, both National Guard and Active-Duty, could have responded
further. What lessons learned from Katrina have been incorporated into
NORTHCOM planning?
Admiral Keating. Lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina have been
incorporated into U.S. NORTHCOM planning. First, to address the need to
reduce Federal response time, in coordination with the DHS, U.S.
NORTHCOM developed 25 prescripted mission assignments as required by
the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. These mission
assignments were designed to reduce the staffing time required to
respond.
U.S. NORTHCOM has also applied lessons learned in consequence
management by developing a functional plan for catastrophic natural
disasters, which formalizes an accelerated force provider process to
support planned responses. With this plan, we have developed four
robust response packages that cover land, air, and sea domains. We also
developed alert levels to posture the force and tailor our response.
U.S. NORTHCOM implemented Katrina lessons learned during Exercise
Ardent Sentry 2006. This exercise rehearsed DOD response to a Category
3 hurricane striking New Orleans resulting in flooding and significant
damage. Specifically, the exercise focused on the following key tasks:
Maintaining pre-drafted orders and planning templates in
preparation of the event
Participating in U.S. JFCOM sourcing conferences to expedite
the sourcing process
Conducting bi-weekly video teleconferences with the FEMA
Headquarters
Conducting weekly video conferences with Service components
Developing hurricane execution checklists
Developing and rehearsing incident awareness and assessment
capabilities
Developing a DOD catastrophic hurricane response concept of
operations
Developing catastrophic hurricane response force packages
19. Senator Clinton. Admiral Keating, if we were faced with a
disaster of the magnitude of Hurricane Katrina somewhere else in the
United States, are you satisfied that NORTHCOM's response would be
adequate?
Admiral Keating. Yes. Strategic and operational planners at U.S.
NORTHCOM and its components have led the DOD planning efforts for
hurricane responses. We have coordinated with FEMA to ensure that we
understand projected needs for military assistance in response to a
hurricane. This coordination has resulted in pre-scripted mission
assignments that articulate the military capabilities needed to respond
quickly to a catastrophic hurricane. We also have been engaged with the
rewrite and coordination of the National Response Plan and the
Catastrophic Incident Supplement. U.S. NORTHCOM has developed plans to
employ a similar-sized title 10 force that was employed during the
response to Hurricane Katrina. The NORAD and U.S. NORTHCOM Exercise
Program includes several table-top exercises that are directly related
to how we support the overall Federal response to disasters. In
addition, our national-level, semi-annual exercises include hurricane
scenarios. These exercises require collaboration, coordination, and
interaction with our interagency partners.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
defense readiness reporting
20. Senator McCain. General Smith, JFCOM is currently developing an
automated system to monitor force availability, location, readiness,
assignment, and to be able to track the status of units through the
entire pre-deployment, deployment, redeployment, and reconstitution
cycle for both the Active-Duty and Reserve components, down to the
individual. When do you project that you will have this automated
capability that tracks down to the individual?
General Smith. We have made good progress with our focused efforts
to include development of the Defense Readiness Reporting System, the
Joint Event Scheduling System, the Joint Force Projection Advanced
Capability Technology Demonstration, and the Global Force Management
Data Improvement Initiative.
JFCOM currently utilizes a multitude of systems, applications, and
data sources to monitor and analyze availability, location, readiness,
assignment, and unit status in support of our role as the global
looking Joint Force Provider. JFCOM has achieved some success in
automating parts of this process, specifically in the area of Force
Rotation. We are also experimenting with technology in our joint
futures lab to automate and streamline force deployment and logistics
visibility. However, the ultimate desire is to develop a web-enabled,
service-oriented architecture that allows the free exchange of data
from multiple sources that can then be manipulated by user defined
applications and tools.
These architectural models, as well as the suite of capabilities to
meet user-defined requirements, constitute part of an overarching
systems approach to Command and Control, including Force monitoring,
called the Net Enabled Command Capability (NECC). This initiative has
been validated through the Joint Readiness Oversight Council, and is
part of a future capability package that we hope to begin phasing into
place within the next 2-3 years. It is envisioned that NECC will
replace many of the legacy systems currently in existence, and will
fully support Joint Global Force Management.
Due to the complexity associated with this effort, the number of
systems and stakeholders involved, and the varied and often unique
requirements Senate Armed Services Committee generated by the multitude
of users, a ``quick'' solution is not feasible. However, the phased
approach we are taking with this will ensure that the user can receive
capabilities when they are available vice waiting for the entire suite
of capabilities to be fielded. It is too early in the NECC development
process to be able to say with certainty at what point we will be able
to track down to the individual level.
21. Senator McCain. General Smith, will this capability allow for
the earlier notification of forces who are to be deployed?
General Smith. Once the capabilities supporting that part of the
command and control construct are implemented in NECC, the answer is
yes.
interoperable joint command and control
22. Senator McCain. General Smith, the lack of interoperability in
command and control, and other challenges in interoperable
communications, hampers the effectiveness of our warfighters. What does
JFCOM currently have underway or under development to advance the
interoperability of our forces?
General Smith. In the area of Joint Command and Control (JC2), we
are currently executing, in concert with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD), a capabilities-based portfolio management approach to
better coordinate and integrate JC2 across the three DOD processes
(Requirements, Acquisition and Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
Execution) in order to deliver integrated JC2 capabilities, improve
interoperability, identify and capture efficiencies where possible
(unnecessary duplicative efforts) and close capability gaps.
On September 14, 2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense designated
JFCOM as the ``JC2 Capability Portfolio Manager'' (JC2 CPM) and gave us
the responsibility to ensure the JC2 portfolio is aligned with
strategic objectives and that the capability mix is optimized to meet
warfighters' needs. Part of this responsibility involves identifying
and assessing risk in the portfolio to assist DOD in balancing joint-
warfighting demands against resource constraints.
As the JC2 CPM, we are currently working with CENTCOM to assist
them in sorting through the many C2 systems they currently use in Iraq
to determine the ``Best of Breed'' among those systems for the near-
term. We are also working with OSD (PA&E and USD(C)) to review C2 R&D
and procurement investments to ensure alignment with DOD strategic
direction and emergent warfighting requirements and we are looking into
potential duplicative efforts among the Services in developing
deployable/mobile C2 capabilities. It is a significant challenge to
Senate Armed Services Committee determine which capabilities are
duplicative, when you consider the scope and complexity of Service-
unique and Joint C2 requirements ranging from the tactical to the
strategic level, across multiple domains (air, land, sea) that include
fixed, deployable, and ``mobile'' or ``on the move'' systems.
Individually, these C2 systems meet the operational requirements for
which they were intended, but collectively they pose joint
interoperability issues. The JC2 CPM is an important step in
approaching this challenge as we balance operational effectiveness and
risk and migrate toward future ``joint solutions.''
For the long-term, JFCOM has in its JC2 CPM portfolio the
``flagship'' program for future joint C2 capabilities, the Net-Enabled
Command Capability or NECC program. As DOD's operational sponsor for
NECC, JFCOM has established a Joint Combat Capability Developer (JCCD)
team to ensure the warfighter's operational requirements are accurately
described and provided to the Defense Information Systems Agency, who
is responsible for developing the material solution. Through the NECC
JCCD, we expect to achieve continuous warfighter engagement from
concept development through fielding and sustainment and completely
integrate material with the doctrine, organizational design, training
plans, personnel and facilities requirements, and policy changes (DOT--
LPF-P) necessary to support the warfighter. This continuous engagement
by the CPM and JCCD will provide the requisite checks and balances to
ensure development of integrated and interoperable (''Born Joint'')
capabilities with holistic DOT--LPF-P support.
23. Senator McCain. General Smith, what effort is JFCOM devoting to
the goal of reducing the danger of fratricide when directing close air
support (CAS) fires?
General Smith. JFCOM is engaged in efforts to reduce the danger of
fratricide and improve combat effectiveness during CAS operations.
JFCOM has identified key problems in joint CAS terminal control
capabilities through live assessments and evaluations:
Talking a pilot's eyes onto a target takes time and is not
conclusive
Pilots have a limited capability to independently verify
target ID
Errors occur when copying and entering target coordinates
manually
Automated system features without checks can lead to errors
Accurate visual assessment of the aim point of a strike
aircraft from the ground is difficult even under ideal
conditions
Most CAS fratricides occur because standard procedures are not
followed or the intended target is misidentified.
To address the issue of standardization, the JFCOM-chaired Joint
Close Air Support (JCAS) Executive Steering Committee led the
development of the Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) and Forward
Air Controller (Airborne) Memoranda of Agreement, which established
training and certification standards for all DOD terminal attack
controllers. To enforce these standards, a JFCOM-led JTAC
Standardization Team conducts initial accreditation and biennial course
reviews of all JTAC schoolhouses for compliance.
To aid in the proper identification of targets, JFCOM provided
essential support in fielding the Digital Precision Strike Suite,
coordinated software integration into JTAC equipment, and published new
procedures to improve laser range finder and satellite navigation
system target location accuracies. JFCOM was a primary promoter of the
use of the Remotely Operated Video Enhanced Receiver) III, which
provides real-time, full motion video for situational awareness and
targeting. JFCOM led the effort to develop and field the Rapid Attack
Information Dissemination Execution Relay system which will provide
digital Blue Force situational awareness data to terminal attack
controllers.
JFCOM is continuing the efforts to reduce fratricide potential by
spearheading the establishment of a JCAS digital data exchange standard
which will enable the seamless exchange of critical target and friendly
location information between the JTAC, weapon delivery platforms, and
command and control agencies.
24. Senator McCain. General Smith, has JFCOM evaluated the military
utility of specific anti-fratricide technologies, and if so, what were
the results?
General Smith. The JFCOM-sponsored Coalition Combat Identification
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (CCID ACTD) has been a
catalyst for not only assessing fratricide prevention technologies, but
also moving proven solutions into the acquisition process.
A notable CCID ACTD milestone was a large-scale field exercise
demonstration during September-October 2005 in the United Kingdom. The
United States and eight other nations provided ground and air forces
employing the ACTD's technologies in scenarios representative of
coalition operations. The participating coalition warfighters and
analysts determined that two technologies, Battlefield Target
Identification Device and Radio Based Combat Identification, provided a
useful, complementary capability to quickly and accurately identify
friendly ground forces and minimize fratricide from either direct or
supporting fires (artillery, mortars, CAS). Joint Combat Identification
Marking System provided a discriminating infrared signature and radio
frequency tags demonstrated potential, but more development is
necessary to achieve a useful discrimination capability in the cockpit.
During March 2006, JFCOM and Service program representatives
presented these results to senior Army and Marine Corps resource
sponsors who decided jointly to pursue an acquisition strategy for both
technologies during POM 08-13. This joint approach, reflecting an
investment of approximately $450 million, was endorsed by the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council during December 2006, which provides
clear leadership and guidance to coalition partners sponsoring
parallel, interoperable programs.
Building upon this momentum and in partnership with the U.S. Air
Force, we extended the CCID ACTD through 2008 in order to assess other
CID technologies employed by fixed wing aircrew in attacking ground
targets. Two additional nations have joined the original CCID ACTD
group in this extended phase.
CCID ACTD Extension, Bold Quest, will assess the military utility
of a Synthetic Aperture Radar/Aided Target Recognition on JSTARS and
the Laser Target Imaging Program on the Litening Advanced Targeting Pod
in a coalition operational environment. This will also validate U.S.
strike aircraft capability to exchange digital targeting data with U.S.
JTAC digital suites including the U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Control
Party Close-Air Support System, USMC Target Locator Designator Handoff
System (TLDHS)/StrikeLink, and the Special Operations Command
Battlefield Air Operations Kit. In addition, the CCID ACTD extension
will assess the ability of the CAS aircraft to exchange digital
targeting data with U.S. JTAC digital suites will be assessed.
Besides the CCID ACTD, JFCOM findings and recommendations from OIF
Major Combat Operations induced the Army to make a positive ID
capability a requirement in the Patriot weapon system. JFCOM also
supported the development of the Recognition of Combat Vehicles
training system, which is a principal catalyst for developing Joint
Service combat identification training requirements and solutions.
interagency coordination and effective disaster response
25. Senator McCain. General Smith, JFCOM is working to develop a
more coherent interagency planning process and tools to coordinate the
diverse capabilities that the military, civilian agencies, and even
nongovernmental groups can bring to bear in the event of a natural
disaster or some other crisis. Your testimony discusses something
called the ``Whole of Government Approach.'' What work does JFCOM
currently have underway, and what is planned, under the broad heading
of improving our national response capabilities?
General Smith. On a daily basis JFCOM seeks to enable conditions
that result in whole of government interdependent capabilities that
promote success in complex contingency operations both at home and
abroad. JFCOM is in a unique position to assist both sides of the
interagency equation in relation to prioritizing and coordinating
Combatant Command (COCOM)-U.S. Government interagency training,
operational planning, lessons learned, experiment, and other
participation and interactions with regard to national response
capabilities. We are hard at work with our COCOM/JTF partners as well
as other Federal departments, State and local governments, and
nongovernmental organizations in support of National Security
Presidential Directive 44, DODD 3000.05 (Military Support to
Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations), and
other key policy and strategy guidance and directives that drive our
command.
In the here and now, JFCOM is striving to stimulate improved
interagency interaction and integration into the Joint Training
Enterprise on behalf of COCOMs/JTFs. Beginning with federating
interagency injects into modeling and simulations, we are developing
deeper mutual understanding. We are also developing an understanding of
the challenges to unlimited participation in joint training events. We
hope to enable joint and interagency partners in scoping the magnitude
of the problem, setting criteria for working together, and highlighting
the biggest mutual bang for the buck. A highlight of this effort will
be an interagency syllabus of joint training opportunities--easily read
and understood by all. Effects will include increased value, not
necessarily participation, as we seek to find out what interagency
partners expect to gain from integrating events. We are also leveraging
existing interagency training/education programs to synergize these
efforts. Our Joint Knowledge Online enterprise will bring free and
available interagency education opportunities to military communities
and vice versa.
We have emerged, at the operational level, as a key node in the
Interagency Lessons Learned Crossroads. Our Joint Center for
Operational Analysis mission is to lead and accelerate transformation
of the joint force by producing compelling recommendations to change--a
byproduct of this mission has been better coordination and
collaboration with our interagency partners. Improving two-way U.S.
Government information sharing on lessons learned can eliminate
redundant U.S. Government operational-level missteps in the future. Our
efforts in examining Hurricane Katrina, OEF, OIF, and other whole of
government enterprises has resulted in a groundswell of information
that is now integrated into an integrated joint lessons learned
database connected to Service databases--interagency partner lessons
learned sharing is being encouraged to better support our COCOM/JTF
partners.
We are also forging ahead as a leader in solving joint force and
interagency information sharing challenges at the operational level.
Our JC2 Portfolio Management platform and our HARMONIE.org vehicle (an
online unclassified website available to broad variety of interagency
partners to enhance information sharing and unclassified planning) are
just two instances where we are developing and offering information
sharing and collaboration capability development tools to a variety of
willing partners. As we strive to develop a fully-networked joint
force, fluent in U.S. Government information sharing, information
sharing will remain paramount to executing integrated actions that
solve complex contingencies in the United States and elsewhere.
Lastly, we are developing concepts and experimenting in a variety
of areas that will help bring the interagency planning and execution
community closer together.
First, we are working with the Department of State (DOS)
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to address interagency
planning process shortfalls through a series of activities called
Unified Action 07. Through this effort we plan to jointly deliver a
baseline study on U.S. Government planning process, a Rule of Law
Handbook for Ungoverned Spaces, a comprehensive approach to security
sector reform, an Ungoverned Space Strategy, and an overall final
report capturing all other learning points along the way. Unified
Action 07 is designed to test the integrated planning and
implementation of processes, structures, authorizations, and tools
associated with development of U.S. Government strategic policy and
plans.
Second, we are working with allies, interagency, and NGOs in
preparation for Multinational Experiment 5 (MNE 5) through which we
intend to deliver a Coalition Handbook of Best Practices, an
Implementation Planning Management and Evaluation Guide, a
Multinational Logistics concept of operations, as well as contributing
to products under development by our partner nations that will benefit
everyone. The central theme for MNE 5 will be exploration of a
multinational, interagency, comprehensive engagement strategy, which
incorporates government, non-government, and private organizations,
using all national and international elements of power, to influence a
stable international environment.
Third, we are integrating operations, planning, and intelligence
functions through the Joint Intelligence Operations Center-
Transformation concept. This concept is being shared with and
recommended to our interagency partners as a means to close the gaps in
our collective planning, execution, and intelligence functions.
Fourth, we are bringing a special focus to the homeland defense
problem set through a series of experiments called Noble Resolve. In
this effort, we are partnering with U.S. NORTHCOM, DHS, Federal, State,
and local governments, and NGOs to work out best practices for
collectively coping with large-scale disasters, both natural and man-
made.
Finally, through our Military Support to Stabilization, Security,
Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations and Military Support
to Shaping Operations Joint Operating Concepts (JOCs) we are helping
set the foundation for future civ-mil coordination and collaboration in
our future doctrine, plans, et cetera. The SSTR JOC proposes means to
effectively combine the efforts of the U.S. and coalition militaries
with those of U.S. Government agencies and multi-national partners to
provide direct assistance and build self-sufficient host nation
capability and capacity in several key areas. The proposed definition
of shaping is the set of continuous, long-term integrated,
comprehensive actions with a broad spectrum of government, non-
governmental and international partners that maintains or enhances
stability, prevents or mitigates crises, and enables other operations
when crises occur.
We continue to set trends in current training, lessons learned,
information sharing, capabilities development, and futures/
experimentation as we seek to improve our COCOM/JTF/U.S. Government
interagency partners and our own ``Whole of Government Approach'' to
complex contingencies both at home and abroad.
provisional reconstruction teams
26. Senator McCain. General Smith, JFCOM is currently coordinating
with the National Defense University, the Army, and the NATO School to
support joint training requirements for the Provincial Reconstruction
Teams (PRTs) prior to the deployments of these teams to Afghanistan and
Iraq. Are there any unique challenges posed by the development or
delivery of training for these specialized civil-military units? If so,
what innovations or solutions has JFCOM developed to address these
challenges?
General Smith. The main challenge in development and delivery of
training is gathering the teams together to participate in training
opportunities. Excellent and ever-improving training venues have been
developed through the efforts of the organizations listed above, and it
is important to afford the personnel who will deploy access to these
opportunities.
JFCOM personnel have worked with DOS and USAID personnel who are
leading the effort to train PRTs for Iraq to develop the Iraq PRT
training program. DOS and DOD signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on
22 February 07 that specifies operational requirements, authorities,
and responsibilities shared between the U.S. Mission-Iraq and the
Multi-National Forces-Iraq or successor organizations for PRTs. The PRT
program is a priority joint DOS-DOD initiative to bolster moderates,
support U.S. counterinsurgency strategy, promote reconciliation and
shape the political environment, support economic development, and
build the capacity of Iraqi provincial governments to hasten the
transition to Iraqi self-sufficiency. JFCOM will team with DOS/USAID
personnel conducting the initial Iraq PRT training courses being
conducted at the Foreign Service Institute this month for an initial
group of 40 personnel who will form the core of 10 additional PRTs and
deploy to theater by the end of March 2007. We will continue to engage
with DOS/USAID and other DOD agencies as the Iraq PRT program matures.
With regard to Afghanistan PRT training, JFCOM has partnered with
Allied Command for Transformation to effect cross pollination between
NATO led and U.S. led PRT training venues. NATO and U.S. PRT curricula
have been shared; instructors from the U.S. PRT course have attended
the NATO course and vice versa. The exchange with NATO of PRT expertise
for training and integration is in addition to the interagency
partnerships described above, and together they will further enhance
the depth and quality of training given to PRT members prior to
deployment.
homeland defense and support to civil authorities
27. Senator McCain. Admiral Keating, the Commander of NORTHCOM has
two missions: 1) defend the homeland against land, maritime, and air
threats; and 2) when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense,
provide support to civil authorities, including consequence management
operations. The Army National Guard and Army Reserve have both reported
equipment and personnel shortages. As a command without assigned
forces, NORTHCOM may be particularly dependent on the National Guard
and Reserve and consequently impacted by these shortages:
According to a Government Accountability Office (GAO)
report in September 2006, continued deployments have depleted
the National Guard's inventories of many items that would be
useful for domestic missions, while nondeployed Active-Duty
Forces have also experienced decreased equipment levels.
The March 1, 2007 Report to Congress by the Commission
on the National Guard and Reserves notes that ``the equipment
readiness of the Army National Guard is unacceptable and has
reduced the capability of the United States to respond to
current and additional major contingencies, foreign and
domestic.''
Do these reports give you cause for concern?
Admiral Keating. We considered this issue carefully and remain
confident in our ability to provide military support to civil
authorities as directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense.
We work closely with our force providers--U.S. JFCOM, the Services, and
Defense Agencies--to ensure trained and ready forces from the Active
and Reserve components are available to execute our missions.
28. Senator McCain. Admiral Keating, what should NORTHCOM's role be
in ensuring joint readiness to perform the homeland defense mission
given the current and prospective depleted state of National Guard and
Reserve resources and personnel?
Admiral Keating. Our role is to clearly identify and articulate
specific U.S. NORTHCOM requirements to our force providers (U.S. JFCOM,
the Services, and Defense Agencies). Our force providers must ensure
those required capabilities are sourced with ready and trained forces.
Once sourced, we monitor the readiness of those forces and provide
feedback to the force providers where shortfalls exist.
29. Senator McCain. Admiral Keating, as the Commander of NORTHCOM,
what steps will you take to ensure that these equipment deficiencies at
home do not leave NORTHCOM under-prepared to perform homeland defense
missions?
Admiral Keating. U.S. NORTHCOM has identified specific, mission-
focused requirements (in forces, training, equipment, et cetera) to our
force providers. We continually monitor overall force readiness from
the perspective of our assigned missions and consult regularly with
force providers to identify and correct gaps in required capabilities.
When a critical capabilities gap arises that might potentially
jeopardize mission accomplishment, we take that issue immediately to
the national leadership for resolution.
interagency coordination
30. Senator McCain. Admiral Keating, in May 2006, as part of the
GAO's body of ongoing work that covers the Federal Government's
preparedness and response to Hurricane Katrina, they reported that
DOD's emergency response plan for providing military assistance to
civil authorities during disasters lacked adequate detail. The DOD
Inspector General also found that ``NORTHCOM did not coordinate with
FEMA on using military assets according to their capabilities . . . and
did not coordinate deploying and integrating title 10 forces with
National Guard forces.'' What steps does NORTHCOM need to take to
improve interagency coordination to better integrate military with
local, State, and other Federal responders?
Admiral Keating. Since Hurricane Katrina, U.S. NORTHCOM has taken
numerous steps to improve interagency coordination to better integrate
military with local, State, and other Federal responders. For instance,
U.S. NORTHCOM recognized the need to work more efficiently with FEMA
during a Federal response to a crisis. To that end, we established
full-time Defense Coordinating Officers within each FEMA region. This
action improved relationships with our interagency partners, and
resulted in a much quicker response and better situational awareness
during an incident. We have also taken steps to engage more with the
National Guard and the DHS in order to improve unity of effort. Our
engagement with these interagency partners includes extensive
participation in conferences and exercises. Nevertheless, exercising
still remains a challenge. We need more practice working with our
interagency partners and to train the way we intend to respond.
31. Senator McCain. Admiral Keating, what can be done to improve
NORTHCOM's planning process for both homeland defense and support to
civil authorities plans?
Admiral Keating. Exercising is the best way to improve our planning
process. Robust exercises allow us to test our plans and implement
lessons learned. We need to train the way we intend to respond, and we
need to make the cost and time involved to conduct this training
priorities.
national guard weapons of mass destruction-civil support teams
32. Senator McCain. Admiral Keating, in recent years, legislation
has been enacted to establish 55 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)-
Civil Support Teams (CST) to ensure that each State and territory of
the United States has such a team at the disposal of the Governor. To
date, 47 of these WMD-CST have been certified by DOD to be mission
capable. States will also depend on the National Guard chemical,
biological, radioactive, and nuclear explosive (CBRNE) Enhanced
Response Force Package (CERFP) teams, available in each FEMA area, for
consequence management in the event of a chemical, biological, or
nuclear incident. How confident are you that these teams are fully
equipped and ready to perform their important mission in the event of
multiple CBRNE events?
Admiral Keating. I have high confidence in the WMD-CSTs. Every 18
months, Army North, a component of U.S. NORTHCOM, performs evaluation
exercises to determine continued certification of the WMD-CSTs. Army
North reports the results of the exercises to U.S. NORTHCOM. This is
the basis for our level of confidence. Currently, there is no
certification program for the CBRNE CERFPs. The National Guard Bureau
and U.S. NORTHCOM are coordinating the homeland defense and civil
support training and exercise program and related MOA. This program
would assign U.S. NORTHCOM the mission for ``Collective standardized
CBRNE training and exercise for CERFPs and CSTs.'' Once this process is
in place, U.S. NORTHCOM will have better visibility into the readiness
of each CERFP.
33. Senator McCain. Admiral Keating, with strains being placed on
the National Guard for its overseas warfighting mission, how can we be
assured that these important units will be available for their critical
homeland defense and civil support missions?
Admiral Keating. DOD works closely with U.S. JFCOM and the National
Guard Bureau on a domestic response concept that fully integrates the
capabilities of title 10 and title 32 forces. This concept maximizes
the capabilities each entity provides by ensuring full
interoperability, unambiguous lines of authority, and training and
operational relationships.
restrictions on military-to-military relations in the southern command
area of responsibility
34. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, last year, your predecessor
General Craddock (and other regional combatant commanders) testified
before this committee that there were unintended negative consequences
for U.S. interests as a result of the restrictions in the American
Servicemembers Protection Act on providing military assistance to
countries that have not signed Article 98 agreements with the United
States. Many of us were persuaded by that powerful testimony and, as a
result, we included in the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2007 a repeal of the restriction in the American
Servicemembers Protection Act on providing international military
education and training (IMET) funds to countries that haven't signed
Article 98 agreements. Has the United States initiated or resumed IMET
programs with countries in the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) area of
responsibility (AOR) as a consequence of this change in law? If so, how
do you expect the United States to benefit from these military-to-
military contacts?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, we have initiated and resumed IMET programs
to countries previously sanctioned by the American Servicemembers
Protection Act.
The United States will benefit from these military-to-military
contacts through continued professionalization of Latin American Armed
Forces personnel in courses like the senior service schools, basic
officer and career courses, NCO development, and even a few masters
level courses. Special emphasis will focus on rebuilding a broad range
of long-neglected technical skills such as medical training, aircraft
maintenance, helicopter mechanics, electrician training, joint
operations, and instructor training.
35. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, do you believe it would be
beneficial for United States' interests were Congress to similarly
repeal the restriction in the American Servicemembers Protection Act on
the provision of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to countries that may
not have signed Article 98 agreements with the United States?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, in my personal opinion, I believe that a
repeal would help advance U.S. objectives in the region. The threats of
transnational crime, narcotics trafficking, and potential establishment
of terrorist safe havens continue to challenge democratic governance in
the region. A robust partnership with countries willing to address
these security threats requires some assistance from the United States
Repeal of FMF and Excess Defense Articles restrictions will restore an
important tool that assists the U.S. SOUTHCOM in forging regional and
bilateral partnerships, building partner nation capability, and
contributing to the homeland defense.
center for excellence in human rights
36. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, I understand that you
propose an initiative for a Center for Excellence in Human Rights that
would allow SOUTHCOM to intensify its support to partner governments in
their efforts to eliminate human rights violations. Eliminating human
rights violations is an essential step towards strengthening democracy
in any country. What will this Center allow you to do now, that you
cannot do now or is not being done at the Western Hemispheric Institute
for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC)?
Admiral Stavridis. The Center will allow us to expand and
accelerate the Human Rights Initiative, an engagement program that U.S.
SOUTHCOM began in 1997 dedicated to assisting partner nation military
forces in institutionalizing a culture of respect for human rights
within their organizations. The Center will enable us to collaborate
with organizations in the private sector such as non-governmental
organizations, academic institutions, foundations, and private
enterprise. As a result, we will be able to sponsor a wider variety of
activities to execute highly tailored country-specific programs.
WHINSEC provides human rights education and training in a classroom
setting within the broader context of education and training on
security competencies. WHINSEC's instruction is ``one size fits all''
for students from throughout the region. The Center will perform a very
different function. The Center will assist partner nations through a
strategic planning process to develop national human rights
implementation plans. The Center will additionally have an operational
mission with experts to support and facilitate the actual
implementation of these plans. The Center will be 100 percent dedicated
to promoting human rights. It will assist partner nation military and
security forces to provide security to their citizens in a manner
consistent with respect for human rights and international humanitarian
law. Moreover, the Center will be able to design processes and plans
tailored to the specific human rights histories and realities of each
of our partner nations.
37. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, where will this Center be
located and how much money is needed to start this program and sustain
it?
Admiral Stavridis. The Center will be located within the SOUTHCOM
Headquarters in Miami, staffed by personnel from our existing Human
Rights Division. Overall, we anticipate minimal resource requirements
to establish the Center. The proposal authorizes the Center to accept
private contributions to further critical human rights work. The Center
will allow us to aggressively promote and implement the Human Rights
Initiative and identify emerging needs through consultations with our
partner nations. At the same time, we will dedicate our efforts to
establishing partnerships with private organizations that share our
interest in promoting a culture of respect for human rights in the
region. We will sustain and grow the program though these
relationships.
enduring friendship and maritime strategy
38. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, Enduring Friendship (EF) is
a regional multi-year initiative that provides maritime security
assistance to select countries in the region. The first phase of EF
focused on the Dominican Republic, Panama, Jamaica, and the Bahamas.
Phase two will include Belize, Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. How
does implementing a regional maritime strategy focused on South and
Central America and the Caribbean enhance our maritime homeland
security?
Admiral Stavridis. EF is a Theater Security Cooperation initiative
that:
1. Promotes information sharing about possible threats
affecting the region;
2. Enhances our partner nations ability to patrol their
sovereign waters in accordance with international and domestic
laws; and
3. Provides a mechanism for collective action should a threat
arise.
The National Strategic Plan for the war on terrorism states that
the strategic aims of the National Strategy are to create a ``global
environment inhospitable to violent extremists.'' The ungoverned spaces
of the maritime domain are a key enabler to terrorist networks. The
maritime domain offers anonymity not available on land or in the air
and it provides vast resources via illicit trafficking activities.
Maritime security is a top U.S. national security priority. The United
States eastern coastline contains major population centers and critical
infrastructure that are in close proximity to ports or are accessible
by waterways. EF will deny the southern approaches of the United States
to trans-national terrorists by establishing a networked ``defense in
depth'' with our partner nations to detect, deter, disrupt, and defeat
illicit activity and terrorists within the Caribbean and Central
America region.
39. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, are partner nations and
allies willingly cooperating in our regional maritime security
initiative?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes. U.S. SOUTHCOM has conducted numerous
partner nation requirements coordination assessments and visits to EF
countries. Senior leaders from partner nations with whom we have met
view EF as a positive initiative to enhance regional security and
promote a common maritime defense strategy.
40. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, are training and equipment
funds used for this initiative?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes. EF uses both traditional multi-year FMF and
single-year section 1206 resources.
u.s. southern command counternarcotic operations in manta, equador
41. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, in your written statement,
you note that SOUTHCOM uses a U.S. forward operating location at Manta,
Equador to launch U.S. counternarcotic missions and is ``a cornerstone
of our ability to operate in the SOUTHCOM region.'' Per a 10-year lease
agreement, we currently have over 220 U.S. service personnel stationed
at Manta on a rotational basis supporting A-3 Airborne Warning and
System Control and P-3 Orion aircraft operations. We also invested over
$60 million in military construction funds to build new facilities and
to repair the runway at Manta, which we share with the Ecuadorian Air
Force. Recent press reports have quoted the new President of Ecuador,
Rafael Correa, as rejecting a continued U.S. military presence in
Ecuador: ``We've said clearly that in 2009 the agreement will not be
renewed.'' How will U.S. counternarcotic operations be affected by the
loss of Manta as a forward operating location?
Admiral Stavridis. [Deleted.]
42. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, what options is SOUTHCOM
pursuing to compensate for potential loss of Manta in 2009?
Admiral Stavridis. SOUTHCOM continues to work closely with partner
nations to increase their capability to interdict and disrupt illegal
drug trafficking. We are also examining options for operating from
other nations to mitigate the potential loss of Manta.
43. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, if so, what are the costs
and benefits of these options?
Admiral Stavridis. Other than the benefit of continued disruption
of trafficking operations, we have only recently begun to examine other
options and have not yet assessed the associated costs and potential
derived benefits.
44. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, does the DOD budget request
for fiscal year 2008 contain any funding to establish and operate
alternate forward locations?
Admiral Stavridis. I am not aware of any.
mission of joint task force bravo
45. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, in your written testimony
you state that JTF-Bravo operating out of Soto Cano, Honduras,
represents the only permanently deployed U.S. forces in the region.
This task force ``is a first responder to crises in the region and
routinely conducts humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, search and
rescue, personnel recovery, and non-combatant medical evacuations.''
JTF-Bravo was originally established in 1984 as a base for U.S. support
of regional military operations. We still have over 550 U.S. service
personnel stationed in Honduras and the budget request for fiscal year
2008 includes military construction funds for a new dining facility at
Soto Cano Air Base. Also, I cannot recall any other location or task
force that we employ U.S. military forces on a permanent basis
primarily to support potential humanitarian and disaster relief
operations. Is it time once again to reassess the relative value JTF-
Bravo provides you in the SOUTHCOM AOR or are you sure that the
investments in resources and personnel are paying off in the region?
Admiral Stavridis. JTF-Bravo personnel and resources directly
support the National Security Strategy and the National Strategy for
Combating Terrorism. In addition to the relationships that are
strengthened through humanitarian efforts, JTF-Bravo supports regional
legal and economic stability by enhancing the professionalism of Latin
American military and police forces. The combined efforts of task force
components play a pivotal role in defeating terrorists, denying them
support and sanctuary in the region, diminishing the conditions they
try to exploit, and defending U.S. citizens abroad.
JTF-Bravo delivers a great return on relatively small investment
for the United States. It is a forward deployed force capable of a
range of theater support activities, including disaster relief and
humanitarian assistance, counterdrug operations, and command and
control for joint coalition exercises.
During the recent flooding in Panama, JTF-Bravo deployed personnel
and equipment within 18 hours of notification and ultimately provided
over 130,000 pounds of critically needed food, water, clothing, and
medical supplies to the affected area. The familiarity of JTF-Bravo
personnel with the topography, communications systems, and movement
corridors were instrumental in the success of this mission.
JTF-Bravo also conducts counterdrug missions, transporting host
nation law enforcement forces for interdiction and eradication of
illicit drugs. The task force supported counterdrug operations in the
past year that resulted in the seizure of 2,700 KG of cocaine, valued
at over $50 million.
Command and control for many joint coalition exercises in Central
America is conducted out of JTF-Bravo, allowing for training of our own
and partner nation forces. This training directly contributes to the
defense of our homeland.
46. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, in lieu of the potential
loss of Manta in Ecuador, what type of agreement do we have with the
Government of Honduras related to our presence there?
Admiral Stavridis. The 1954 Bilateral Military Assistance Treaty is
the basis for military cooperation and assistance between the United
States and Honduras. The treaty is a broad agreement between the United
States and Honduras to provide military equipment, services, and
assistance to each other. A 1982 Annex to the 1954 Bilateral Military
Assistance Treaty authorizes the United States to make use of Honduran
aerial ports at Soto Cano, Goloson, and La Mesa for ``fueling or
refueling of aircraft, maintenance of aircraft and equipment,
accommodation of personnel, communications, supply, storage and other
such activities.'' The United States agreed to bear the cost of
supplies and services which it requests and receives from Honduran
sources. The annex and the treaty do not have termination dates.
47. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, are we faced with the risk
of being asked to leave after sinking investment in facilities and
infrastructure?
Admiral Stavridis. I believe there is a very low risk of the
Government of Honduras, with whom we have a close and strong
relationship, asking us to leave.
interagency coordination
48. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, in your prepared statement
you wrote ``Within SOUTHCOM, we are striving to transform into a true
interagency organization. To facilitate this, we recently established a
new directorate for interagency partnering, with support from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and the DOS.'' I fully endorse this
effort. Will you produce a study or report describing your efforts and
results, and make it available to the Departments of Defense and State,
and your fellow combatant commanders?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, we will produce a report describing the
efforts and results of our interagency partnering initiative. The new
directorate is documenting all of the efforts and capturing vital
information regarding the processes and the impact on both the command
and the interagency. We are coordinating our efforts with studies and
lessons learned that JFCOM is developing. We will publish a
comprehensive and thorough report that will serve as a basis for future
development in the field of interagency partnering.
49. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, are you coordinating your
work on this with JFCOM?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes. In addition to supporting SOUTHCOM on the
development of a study/report to document the transformation efforts,
JFCOM J9 Experimentation Division as part of their Unified Action (UA)
Initiative will provide support and insights in a number of other
transformation and interagency initiatives. During the Unified Action
DOD Objectives Conference on 4-5 April 07, SOUTHCOM provided a number
of interagency transformation initiatives/objectives that JFCOM will
provide assistance including:
a. Development of an interagency data base that will contain
U.S. Government agencies security cooperation activities.
Purpose of the database is to identify partnering opportunities
between DOD and other U.S. Government agencies.
b. Provide support and insights in the development of public/
private cooperation opportunities.
c. Assist in the development and coordination of interagency
coordination and planning opportunities at the COCOM level.
Purpose is to synchronize existing plans and operations between
DOD and U.S. Government agencies.
d. Identify training and career progression opportunities for
interagency personnel that are assigned to other agencies.
Desire is to make it career enhancing for individuals that are
assigned as representatives or liaison officers to another
agency of the Federal Government. For example when a military
officer is assigned to DOS, this should be a career enhancing
opportunity.
e. Provide assistance and insights to SOUTHCOM J9 and staff
in the transition of the command to an interagency
organization.
united states naval ship comfort
50. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, on March 5, 2007, President
Bush said he would deploy one of the Navy's medical ships, the U.S.N.S.
Comfort, to the SOUTHCOM AOR. The U.S.N.S. Comfort will make port calls
in 12 countries--Belize, Guatemala, Panama, Nicaragua, El Salvador,
Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Haiti, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and
Suriname. President Bush said, ``the Comfort's doctors and nurses and
health care professionals expect to treat 85,000 patients and conduct
up to 15,000 surgeries.'' This is an important effort. How long will
the deployment last and would you assess the potential impact?
Admiral Stavridis. The U.S.N.S. Comfort deployment will last 4
months. The ship will make humanitarian assistance stops in 12 cities
in 12 countries. The distance the ship will travel is equivalent to a
deployment to the Persian Gulf and back. This mission is all about
caring through partnership. The Comfort's medical staff will partner
with NGOs, international military and civilian medical professionals,
and U.S. Government interagency health care providers. This deployment
will build trust and cooperation with host nations and is a
demonstration of the U.S. support and commitment to the entire SOUTHCOM
AOR. The ship will provide life-changing care to thousands of people,
which will make a lasting impression to all of those touched by the
improved quality of life as a result of the Comfort's efforts.
Additionally, U.S. personnel will gain valuable training in conducting
humanitarian assistance; and through the relationships and experience
gained will be postured to conduct future disaster relief missions.
china's influence
51. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, an increasing presence of
the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the region is an emerging
dynamic that must not be ignored. How would you assess the PRC's
growing economic interest and influence in the region and how concerned
are you about it?
Admiral Stavridis. PRC influence in Latin America is growing,
mostly in the economic sphere. However, I am concerned long-term (20 or
more years out) about the strategic implications if the current trends
continue.
american hostages in colombia
52. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, I appreciate that in your
statement you recognized that a top priority in Colombia is the safe
return of the three American hostages who have been held captive by the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) for over 4 years. I would
like an update on that situation.
Admiral Stavridis. SOUTHCOM continues to work closely with the
interagency and the Government of Colombia to safely recover the three
American hostages being held by the FARC based on information
available--Tom Howes, Keith Stansell, and Marc Gonsalvez. We are happy
to provide an update at a classified level.
colombia
53. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, the United States has made a
significant commitment of funds and material support to help Colombia
and the Andean region fight drug trafficking since the development of
Plan Colombia in 1999. In 2003, Colombia developed Plan Patriota, a
multi-year, broadbased plan focused on military operations and social
development. Can you assess inroads Colombia has made with regard to
the eradication of illicit drug crops and improved security conditions?
Admiral Stavridis. Our strategic partnership with Colombia remains
a key priority. With our assistance, President Uribe has achieved
tremendous success in helping to consolidate Colombia's democracy and
to confront the country's drug traffickers and terrorists, but much
remains to be done.
The United States has no international partner more firmly
committed to the elimination of drug crops and narcotics trafficking
than the Government of Colombia (GOC). The GOC aerial eradication
program has exceeded its goals in every one of the last 6 years. The
Colombian manual eradication program was responsible for the
elimination of 43,000 hectares of coca and poppy in 2006. Sustained
eradication has reduced Colombian opium poppy cultivation by 68 percent
since 2001, from 6,540 hectares to 2,100 hectares.
Military and law enforcement presence has dramatically improved the
security conditions in Colombia. In 2002, many municipalities lacked a
public security presence. Today, all 1,098 municipalities in the
country are covered. During Uribe's administration, kidnappings have
decreased more than 80 percent, homicides by 40 percent, acts of
terrorism by 63 percent and poverty rates fell 11 percent. Homicides in
2006 were the lowest in 20 years. Colombia has supervised over 30,000
terrorist demobilizations and 11,000 desertions from all subversive
groups. Over 30,000 judges, investigators, public prosecutors, and
defenders have received training in the implementation of the new
accusatory system implemented to protect human rights, erase impunity,
and bring criminals to justice.
54. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, are we providing the
Colombian military with the capacity they require to combat the FARC
and other narcoterrorist organizations?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, we are providing the Colombian military
with the capacity they require to combat the FARC and other narco-
terrorist organizations. SOUTHCOM enhances the joint capabilities of
the Colombian military through a balanced approach that includes
training, nonlethal equipping, and infrastructure. Examples of this
type of support include $41 million provided this fiscal year of
counternarcotics (CN) and counternarcoterrorism training (CNT), NCO
development, medical training, riverine tactics and operations
training, special operations training, and the aviation program being
supported in Melgar by a technical assistance field team. We are also
providing operational and logistic support worth $53 million. This
included planning assistance, communications, information operations,
contract support, fuel, contract airlift, aviation parts, medical
equipment, and logistics and operations integration including
infrastructure support. With our support, the Colombian military is
achieving strategic success against the FARC and other narco-terrorist
organizations. The FARC remains in an overall defensive posture as a
result of aggressive Colombian military actions.
55. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, what is the current level of
support that SOUTHCOM provides to Plan Patriota and Plan Colombia?
Admiral Stavridis. Our current level of support to the Government
of Colombia and Colombian military is close to 80 percent of the total
CN funds we receive every year to improve partner nation capabilities.
U.S. SOUTHCOM directly supported the Colombian efforts in the form of
operations, logistics, command and control, and infrastructure
capabilities throughout the 6-year Plan Colombia and the 4-year Plan
Patriota, and we continue to do so as the Colombian military executes
its follow-on 4-year military campaign, Plan Consolidacion. Translating
into numbers, U.S. SOUTHCOM support is close to $130 million out of the
$170 million we dedicate for theater security cooperation in our AOR
and a total of 267 military personnel and 119 contractors providing CN/
CNT training and maintenance and logistics support.
56. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, what can you tell us in open
session about the activities of the FARC today?
Admiral Stavridis. The FARC is a significantly weakened terrorist
organization in comparison to what it was just a few short years ago.
Since the implementation of President Uribe's Democratic Security
Strategy, the group's ability to project power, terrorize citizens, and
traffic narcotics has been greatly diminished.
While 5 years ago the FARC enjoyed a safe haven the size of
Switzerland in the center of Colombia, and saw its ranks swell to more
17,000 terrorists under arms, today the group's entire leadership is on
the run, under Colombian and U.S. indictment, and fields fewer than
12,000 armed members. The conditions FARC members face worsen every day
and since 2002 more than 6,400 FARC members have entered into the
Government of Colombia's demobilization program. In order to stem the
tide of desertions, the FARC has increasingly relied on the recruitment
of children to fill the group's ranks.
Though the FARC's offensive capability has been greatly diminished
and the group can no longer directly challenge the Colombian military
as it has in the past, the FARC maintains a capability to conduct
small-scale, effective attacks against vulnerable Colombian military
units, and bombings against Government of Colombia infrastructure.
venezuela
57. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, in testimony before this
committee last March, General Craddock described his concern with
Venezuela's influence in the region. In October 2006, General Craddock
said that President Chavez has become a ``destabilizing'' force in the
region. In February 7, 2007, testimony before the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, Secretary of State Rice stated that she believes ``there's
an assault on democracy in Venezuela'' and that ``the president of
Venezuela is really destroying his own country economically,
politically.'' How would you characterize Chavez's influence now?
Admiral Stavridis. President Chavez continues to assert his
personal dominion over all instruments of national power in Venezuela.
In some countries, he has great influence; in others, he is tolerated.
He has been using money and oil to generate greater influence. As an
example of Chavez's increasing authoritarianism, on January 29, 2007,
the Chavez-dominated Venezuelan National Assembly passed ``The Enabling
Law.'' This Enabling Law transferred legislative power from the
National Assembly directly to President Chavez and granted him special
powers to issue executive decrees.
58. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, what are his goals and
ambitions in the region?
Admiral Stavridis. President Chavez openly proclaims his intent is
to lead a self-described ``Bolivarian'' revolution, with a strong anti-
U.S. component.
59. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, Venezuelan ties with Iranian
leaders have become increasingly active. Are these ties exaggerated and
where will these ties to Iran go next?
Admiral Stavridis. I know that there have been at least 12 senior
level visits between these countries, clearly showing a tie. The
Venezuelan and Iranian presidents find a common voice in proselytizing
against the United States. Both countries would like to lead an
international anti-U.S. alignment.
60. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, according to the DOS's April
2006 terrorism report, Venezuela has virtually ceased its cooperation
in the global war on terror. Colombian terrorist groups use Venezuelan
territory for safe-haven, although it is unclear whether and to what
extent the government of President Chavez provides material support to
these terrorist groups and at what level. To what extent do you believe
terrorist groups find safehaven in Venezuela?
Admiral Stavridis. Pervasive corruption probably provides a degree
of safe haven in Venezuela for terrorist groups. There have been
several documented cases of FARC members, including high level FARC
members, in Venezuela. In fact, one high-level FARC member, Rodrigo
Granda, was captured in Venezuela in December 2004 where he apparently
had lived openly.
central american gangs
61. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis and Admiral Keating,
especially troublesome is the growth of gangs and drug-related crimes
across Central America, portions of the Caribbean, and in some cities
in Brazil. The level of sophistication and brutality of these gangs is
without precedent. How do you assess the threat of transnational gangs
to U.S. national interests in the region?
Admiral Stavridis and Admiral Keating.
a. El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala continue to bear the
brunt of gang activity. Central American gangs impact security
in the United States as gangs increasingly engage in drug
trafficking activities. Gangs pose a critical criminal threat
to U.S. persons visiting Central America especially in San
Salvador, Guatemala City, and Tegucigalpa. Brazilian gangs do
not pose a direct threat to U.S. national interests; however,
they do pose a critical criminal threat to U.S. persons
visiting Brazil especially in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo.
b. The threat posed by Mexican transnational gangs to U.S.
national interests primarily stems from violent crime and drug-
related activity throughout North America. These gangs focus on
protecting their territory, mostly in urban areas, and building
up power and money. Major Mara gangs in Mexico are Mara
Salvatrucha (MS 13) and Mara 18. They are involved in
kidnapping, extortion, drugs, and human trafficking. In October
2005, Secretariat of Public Security Eduardo Medina Mora Icaza
stated there were 5,000 MS 13 members and up to 15,000 Mara 18
members in Mexico.
62. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis and Admiral Keating, are
contacts between gang members in Central America and the United States
increasing?
Admiral Stavridis and Admiral Keating.
a. Contacts between Central American gang members and U.S.
gang members have always existed. In fact, the Central American
gangs Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) or Mara-18 first began in the
United States Anecdotal information indicates movement between
the United States and Central America may be increasing with
gangs using their own smuggling routes to move their members to
the United States.
b. We have no specific information on this issue. Monitoring
criminal gang activity within the United States is exclusively
a civilian law enforcement responsibility unless it indicates a
direct threat to DOD personnel or operations.
63. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis and Admiral Keating, how do
you assess contacts between Islamic extremists and Central American
gangs?
Admiral Stavridis. [Deleted.]
Admiral Keating. [Deleted.]
tri-border area
64. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, in recent years, U.S.
concerns have increased over activities of the radical Lebanon-based
Islamic group Hezbollah (Party of God) and the Sunni Muslim Palestinian
group Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) in the tri-border area of
Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, which has a large Muslim population.
This area has long been used for arms and drug trafficking, contraband
smuggling, document and currency fraud, money laundering, and the
manufacture and movement of pirated goods. How active is Hezbollah and
Hamas in raising funds among the sizable Muslim communities in the tri-
border region?
Admiral Stavridis. The triborder area (TBA) is perhaps South
America's busiest and certainly most infamous smuggling and contraband
center, however, it is just one of several areas in the region
exploited by these groups. Nevertheless, there are numerous illicit
activities taking place in the TBA that generate millions of dollars
for a number of criminal and transnational organizations. Lebanese
Hizballah (and to a lesser extent Hamas) have members and affiliates in
the region actively engaged in leveraging legal and illegal economic
mechanisms to fund their parent organizations.
65. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, do these groups have an
operational presence in the TBA?
Admiral Stavridis. Hizballah, with support from its network(s) in
the TBA, is suspected of having conducted terrorist attacks in Buenos
Aires first in 1992 and then in 1994. Some of the people in the TBA
that allegedly helped facilitate these attacks are still present, and
could be used again in that capacity.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner
joint forces command headquarters
66. Senator Warner. General Smith, it is my understanding that your
headquarters and staff are currently located in multiple buildings and
that the condition of one specific building, a World War II era
facility currently used as part of your headquarters, is in very poor
condition. Based on the importance of JFCOM contributions to the
warfighters, coupled with its four mission areas which include joint
innovation and experimentation, joint training, joint capabilities
development, and serving as the joint force provider, what impact does
your current facility have on your ability to effectively execute these
missions?
General Smith. The JFCOM headquarters staff in Norfolk operates out
of 16 buildings on two separate Navy installations. Ten of the
buildings are World War II era structures, eight of which were
originally constructed as a naval hospital complex and are now well
beyond their useful life. These buildings suffer from routine
electrical irregularities, plumbing problems, leaking during inclement
weather, mold and mildew problems, lead paint, asbestos, and an overall
dilapidated condition. Anti-terrorism/force protection standoff
requirements for vehicular traffic cannot be met. Of the six newer
buildings, two are modular (temporary) structures accommodating about
60 people and costing $150,000 per year to lease. Because no additional
suitable office space exists on either Navy installation, most of the
staff are assigned work spaces that are substantially smaller than the
applicable DOD standard for their rank or staff function.
The frequent requirement for maintenance and repair of these old
structures is a constant drain on the Navy's budget. Recently we
investigated the feasibility of renovating one of these buildings to
make it minimally functional and determined that it would cost
approximately $5.2 million to renovate roughly 33,000 square feet of
office space ($158/SF). This includes removal of asbestos and lead
paint. By comparison, the office and administrative space portion of
the proposed JFCOM headquarters MILCON project will cost approximately
$6.9 million for new construction of approximately 40,000 square feet
($173/SF), and the new building systems and exterior finishes will last
for many years to come. Under the renovation scenario, we would
continue to occupy space configured to support a World War II medical
mission. With new construction, we would occupy space deliberately
designed and built to support our mission.
The current condition and configuration of our headquarters
facilities does not prevent us from accomplishing any single aspect of
our mission, but it obviously impedes our overall effectiveness in each
of the mission areas. For instance, our J8 Directorate, whose primary
responsibility is the development of joint capabilities, has a staff of
208 people located in 7 separate buildings at the Naval Support
Activity, Norfolk. The effect of having such a scattered arrangement is
that the cohesiveness of the staff is strained daily, inhibiting
effective communication and reducing the synergistic effects of
physically working within the same office space. In addition, a
significant amount of time is wasted daily simply in transit from
building to building.
67. Senator Warner. General Smith, what is the impact of the
conditions of these facilities on the quality of life of the
servicemembers and civilians who work there?
General Smith. The condition of the facilities also has an effect
on the morale of the staff. Although the actual extent of the effect of
lower morale on work output cannot be measured without considerable
research, the fact that there is a negative effect is self-evident. Our
staff is highly capable intellectually and technically, and the work
ethic at JFCOM remains excellent. Even so, having to accomplish a
future-focused, complex, and important mission in less-than-adequate
facilities can be frustrating and discouraging, even for the best in
the business.
68. Senator Warner. General Smith, can you provide us your
assessment regarding the priority you place on the construction of a
new headquarters facility and what direct impact such a facility would
have on your mission?
General Smith. The provision of a new headquarters facility would
give us full capability to accomplish our mission. It would allow us to
consolidate the Norfolk-based staff into a single facility, improving
the cohesiveness of the staff and significantly improving the corporate
climate and morale. A new headquarters facility would allow JFCOM to
shed the lease cost of its modular facilities and the Navy to relieve
itself of the massive investment cost to continually renovate 65-year-
old decaying buildings. I therefore consider the JFCOM headquarters a
high priority.
interrogation operations
69. Senator Warner. Admiral Stavridis, the Detainee Treatment Act
which states that ``no person in the custody or under the effective
control of the DOD or under detention in a DOD facility shall be
subject to any treatment or technique of interrogation not authorized
by and listed in the United States Army Field Manual on Intelligence
Interrogation.'' How do you and staff at SOUTHCOM conduct oversight of
interrogation operations at Guantanamo to ensure compliance with the
requirements of?
Admiral Stavridis. Prior to my assumption of command of U.S.
SOUTHCOM, the provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 had
already been implemented at JTF-Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO). Specifically, I
have been Senate Armed Services Committee advised that, on 1 January
2006, General John Craddock (former Commander, U.S. SOUTHCOM) directed
compliance with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and that Major
General Jay Hood (former Commander, JTF-GTMO) confirmed, on 2 January
2006, that JTF-GTMO was in compliance with the Detainee Treatment Act.
Additionally, on 22 January 2007, I issued specific instructions to
JTF-GTMO concerning the implementation of DOD Directive 2310.01E, The
DOD Detainee Program, and Field Manual (FM) 2-22.3, Human Intelligence
Collector Operations. This guidance repeated the provision of the
Detainee Treatment Act that mandates the only interrogation approaches
and techniques authorized for use at JTF-GTMO are those authorized by
and listed in FM 2-22.3. Rear Admiral Harry Harris (current Commander,
JTF-GTMO) confirmed, on 27 January 2007, that JTF-GTMO remains in
compliance with U.S. law, including the Detainee Treatment Act. Rear
Admiral Harris issued a policy memorandum to remind all personnel
assigned to JTF-GTMO that they must be knowledgeable of and at all
times in compliance with U.S. law and applicable DOD policies.
In exercising oversight of detention and interrogation operations,
I have, since assuming command 6 months ago in October 2006, personally
visited Guantanamo three times. During those visits, I have been
briefed extensively by JTF-GTMO personnel on both detention and
intelligence matters. Additionally, I exercise oversight and maintain
awareness of camp operations through the receipt of daily situation
reports from JTF-GTMO, weekly communications with the Rear Admiral
Harris, and through a multi-disciplined U.S. SOUTHCOM Detainee
Coordination Team, which interacts daily with JTF-GTMO.
70. Senator Warner. Admiral Stavridis, do you believe that the
Services and other elements of the DOD are proving you with
interrogators that clearly understand the requirements of the Detainee
Treatment Act?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, from my constant interactions with Rear
Admiral Harris, my personal observations from my visits to Guantanamo,
and reports from my staff, I firmly believe that all interrogators at
JTF-GTMO, both military and civilian, understand the requirements of
and comply with the Detainee Treatment Act and other applicable laws
and policies.
future of cheyenne mountain
71. Senator Warner. Admiral Keating, as I reviewed your written
statement, I did not see any mention of your plans related to the
Cheyenne Mountain Complex near your headquarters in Colorado Springs,
CO. Cheyenne Mountain is the original home of NORAD and serves us today
as the center for a worldwide system of satellites, radars, and sensors
providing early warnings of missile or space threat to North America. I
am aware that you are studying the continued operation and cost to run
Cheyenne Mountain with the potential to either shut it down or reduce
operations. Can you provide this committee an update on the status of
your review?
Admiral Keating. [Deleted.]
72. Senator Warner. Admiral Keating, what are the costs and
benefits to continuing to operate this huge underground complex?
Admiral Keating. [Deleted.]
73. Senator Warner. Admiral Keating, what will you gain by shutting
it down?
Admiral Keating. Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station (CMAFS) will
not shut down. Currently NORAD and U.S. NORTHCOM's Cheyenne Mountain
Directorate consists of approximately 20 percent of the total number of
people assigned to CMAFS; the rest of the people assigned to Cheyenne
Mountain belong to other commands such as U.S. STRATCOM and Air Force
Space Command.
Cheyenne Mountain will continue to operate as an Alternate Command
Center for NORAD and U.S. NORTHCOM, a training facility for Initial
Qualification Training and a facility for many other operations not
associated with NORAD and U.S. NORTHCOM.
74. Senator Warner. Admiral Stavridis, how will shutting Cheyenne
Mountain down or reducing operations affect NORAD's ability to continue
to guard the skies and to provide an early warning of potential air and
space threats?
Admiral Stavridis. The impetus for moving Cheyenne Mountain
Directorate missions and people to the NORAD and U.S. NORTHCOM Command
Center at Peterson Air Force Base, CO, is to gain operational
efficiencies and improve unity of effort between the two commands. The
integration of NORAD and U.S. NORTHCOM Command Center functions will
result in improved worldwide situational awareness and enhanced mission
planning and execution through a single integrated command center
charged with responding to the full spectrum of security threats to
North America.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
western hemisphere institute for security cooperation
75. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Stavridis, WHINSEC is a critical
member of the U.S. community of military education and training
institutions. WHINSEC provides invaluable opportunities and instruction
to military, civilians, and police from the countries within the
Western Hemisphere to solve regional problems. I commend your efforts
to strengthen the peace and security of the continent, as they are
critical to the national security of the United States. As a member of
the WHINSEC Board of Visitors, I take very seriously my role in
oversight of WHINSEC's programs and activities. Please discuss the role
WHINSEC plays in the promotion of democracy and human rights in Central
and South America, and elaborate on the education and training provided
by the school.
Admiral Stavridis. The institute's Democracy and Human Rights
Program is ambitious and effective. It is a vital educational
experience for a new generation of security forces throughout the
Western Hemisphere security forces committed to the rule of law and
respect for democratic values and international human rights rules.
WHINSEC provides civilians, military, and law enforcement officers, and
U.S. military officers, professional education which supports the
democratic principles of our hemisphere.
On a daily basis, WHINSEC-trained officials are making significant
contributions to stability and security operations in the hemisphere
and throughout the world. WHINSEC training programs are first rate:
effectively and efficiently building partner nation security capacity
on an indispensable foundation of support to democratic governance,
subordination to civil authority, and respect for human rights. The
institute is also indispensable to fostering regional relationships
essential to hemispheric security cooperation. WHINSEC's programs--
which train almost 1,000 Latin American officials annually--include a
wide variety of courses ranging from peace and counterdrug operations,
democratic sustainment, medical assistance, leadership development, and
civil-military operations, to name just a few.
[Whereupon, at 11:24 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2008
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 29, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:50 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
E. Benjamin Nelson, Webb, McCain, Warner, Inhofe, Collins, and
Martinez.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Creighton Greene,
professional staff member; Thomas K. McConnell, professional
staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; Pablo E. Carrillo, minority investigative
counsel; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; David M.
Morriss, minority counsel; Christopher J. Paul, professional
staff member; Sean G. Stackley, professional staff member; and
Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: David G. Collins, Kevin A.
Cronin, and Micah H. Harris.
Committee members' assistants present: Joseph Axelrad,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Sandra Luff and
Samuel Zega, assistants to Senator Warner; Jeremy Shull,
assistant to Senator Inhofe; Mark J. Winter, assistant to
Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator
Chambliss; Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; Stuart C.
Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune; and Brian W. Walsh,
assistant to Senator Martinez.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. We will come to order and quickly adjourn
because of up to five more votes in the Senate. I had hoped to
be able to announce that right at 9:30 a.m., but I was looking
for the ranking member while the ranking member was looking for
me. So we will adjourn to the call of the chair, but I expect
that that will be some time around 10:45 a.m. So you have all
been around here long enough to know that the Senate operates
that way. We do not have a Rules Committee, which means we are
sometimes unruly, and so we will stand adjourned to the call of
the chair. Thank you for your patience. [Recess from 9:51 a.m.
to 10:48 a.m.]
Good morning again, everybody. We welcome Secretary Winter,
Admiral Mullen, and General Conway back to the committee this
morning. We are most appreciative of the patience that you have
all shown because of the operation of the Senate this morning
and we are, more importantly, grateful to you for your service
to the Nation, for the valorous and truly professional men and
women that you command.
You are faced with a number of critical issues that
confront the Department of the Navy in balancing your
modernization needs against the costs of supporting ongoing
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some of those challenges
center on acquisition programs. Within the Navy, we have
concerns about the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. This was
intended to be a ship that the Navy could acquire relatively
inexpensively and relatively quickly. As it turns out, it looks
like the LCS program may fill neither bill. Once again, we are
presented with a program with significant cost growth, which at
least in part is driven by the Service's changing requirements
after the design and construction contract was signed.
In the Marine Corps programs, we have seen significant cost
growth on the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program. So
we will need to understand what has caused the cost problems
there and what steps are being taken to correct them.
In the case of the Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP)
Vehicle program, we have concerns about how aggressively the
Marine Corps and the Army are acquiring these vehicles that
have the potential to provide greater protection to our forces
deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, and we just, on the floor of
the Senate, took action that hopefully will expedite that.
With the LCS and the EFV acquisition situations, there are
significant questions about acquisition management. In the case
of the LCS in particular, why were not the Navy and the
contractor teams better able to see the problems sooner, how
could we have gotten to the point that the program was just
months away from running out of money when no alarms had been
sounded up the acquisition chain of command? We would also be
interested in hearing from Secretary Winter about what actions
he believes the Department should take to strengthen
acquisition oversight and restore confidence in the Navy's
ability to manage major acquisition programs.
On the LCS issue, we are disappointed that many of the
revelations came to the committee via the press. The Navy
should be taking extra care to ensure transparency with the
congressional oversight committees about the acquisition
process and we can only deal effectively with one another if
the environment of prompt and open information exchange
prevails.
Another concern surrounds future force levels. We are
facing the prospect that the current Department of the Navy
program will lead to potentially large gaps between the forces
that the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has said he needs and
the forces that will be available to his successors. In one
case, the CNO has said that the Navy needs to have 48 attack
submarines to meet combatant commander requirements, but we are
faced with the risk of falling well short of that goal for more
than 10 years starting during the next decade.
In another case, under current plans for tactical aircraft
acquisition we are facing a shortfall of as many as 150
tactical fighters needed to outfit our 10 aircraft carrier air
wings. With shortfalls that large, we could be faced with
drastically reducing the number of aircraft available on short
notice to the combatant commanders, either because we have
deployed understrength air wings or because we did not deploy
the carrier at all because of these aircraft shortages.
On a more positive note, we very much appreciate the fact
that our witnesses provided their prepared testimony within the
requested time frame. This is a very important development. It
is always helpful for the members to have adequate time to read
these statements before the hearing.
Again, we thank you all for your service to this Nation. We
know you face a number of very difficult challenges and we look
forward to your testimony and to the questions that may be
asked of you this morning.
Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I join you in
welcoming our distinguished witnesses. General Conway, Admiral
Mullen, and Secretary Winter, I thank you for your service and
for appearing for this very important hearing.
Obviously, defending our Nation against its enemies is the
primary responsibility of the government and resourcing our
military to defend the Nation requires an appropriate working
relationship between industry, the Department of Defense (DOD),
and Congress with an eye toward faithful and efficient
expenditure of every taxpayer dollar. For the Navy and Marine
Corps, this comes down to ships and aircraft, ordnance and
armor, and a trained force of sailors and marines.
In reviewing the budget request for fiscal year 2008,
including the 2007 supplemental funding request and the 2008
request for the global war on terror, I am encouraged by the
Navy's and Marine Corps's efforts to accurately determine and
fund force reset, to fully fund readiness and manpower
requirements, and to invest in the development of future
capabilities.
I commend the CNO and the Commandant of the Marine Corps
for maintaining the integrity of the unfunded priority lists
(UPLs) by keeping them at an appropriate size. Not all the
Services were as responsible and in the case of the CNO, I
commend you for including in the Navy's unfunded priorities
those equipment and readiness requirements of the Navy Reserve.
I particularly appreciate the Marine Corps commitment to
increasing its end strength and I'm interested in your
assessment of the plan to grow the force to 202,000 marines
over the next 4 years.
I look forward to hearing from the Commandant about current
efforts to surge two additional combat battalions to Iraq and
to meet the Corps' most urgent requirements for force
protection and armored vehicles, most notably the MRAP
Vehicles.
Additionally, we are approaching a major milestone in
Marine Corps aviation, with initial deployment of the MV-22
Osprey planned for the fall. I am confident you will ensure
that the safety and reliability of this aircraft will meet the
aviation community's high standards of readiness prior to
assignment for combat operations.
I am also encouraged by the significant strides that the
Navy has made in addressing steaming days and flying hour
requirements. In addition, I am pleased that the Navy has
submitted a shipbuilding request that substantially increases
the Navy's investment in shipbuilding for 2008. However, I am
troubled by the continuing downward trends in the size of our
fleet and naval air force, trends that must be broken lest the
freedom of the seas which we so enjoy today will slip loose.
I understand that the Navy has proposed legislation to
reduce the number of aircraft carriers from 11 to 10. I am
opposed to such a reduction and look forward to hearing from
you on this considerable change to our national maritime
strategy.
In considering this budget request, we must come to grips
with approaching shortfalls in our numbers of aircraft
carriers, strike fighter aircraft, submarines, and amphibious
lift. Shipbuilding in particular appears locked into a spiral
of increasing costs, evidenced most recently by the LCS
program. This affordability dilemma or, more correctly, the
affordability crisis, cannot be resolved by merely raising the
budgets for shipbuilding. Simply put, last year you brought us
a requirement to build to a fleet of 313 ships to meet the
potentials that we see beginning to emerge today. Last year we
were 281 ships strong. This year we are 276 ships, and the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates the cost of
building the 313-ship Navy may be as high as $20 billion per
year. That estimate greatly exceeds the Navy's estimate of $15
billion per year and, unfortunately, our confidence in Navy
estimates has suffered a setback.
Secretary Winter, I greatly appreciate your focused efforts
to right the ship, so to speak, of the Navy and Marine Corps
major programs that have threatened to founder over the past
year. Recent developments on the LCS program and the EFV point
to serious acquisition failures in both Services. But your
immediate steps to stop work, hold responsible acquisition
officials accountable, and seek fixed price agreements on the
LCS program, and your restructuring of the failing EFV program
serve as examples of leadership in an acquisition process that
is in desperate need for reform.
I have long called for an examination of the whole
procurement process as it works today in DOD. Accordingly, I am
interested in your thoughts on how we can work together in
striking a course in acquisition that brings the Navy's
affordability imperatives into line with its mission
requirements.
I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Secretary Winter.
STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD C. WINTER, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
Secretary Winter. Thank you very much, Chairman Levin,
Senator McCain, and members of the committee. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear before this committee this morning.
Today I am joined by Admiral Mullen and General Conway, two
outstanding leaders whose dedication to the Navy and Marine
Corps is apparent to all who have had the pleasure of working
with them. Each of us has prepared a statement for the record,
which we respectfully submit.
Chairman Levin. They will be made part of the record.
Secretary Winter. Thank you, sir.
These documents outline in detail this Department's
priorities, the strategic thinking behind them, and the funding
requests that are necessary to support them. Our priorities
presented in the fiscal year 2008 budget and the global war on
terror request encompass both long-term and short-term
requirements. The short-term imperatives include supporting
marines and sailors in the field, funding the urgent
requirements, such as the MRAP Vehicle program, and making up
for the losses of vehicles, equipment, and aircraft that have
been incurred in combat operations.
At the same time, we must provide for the critical needs of
the Navy and the Marine Corps of the future. To that end, the
Department of the Navy is pursuing an unprecedented
modernization program across the full spectrum of our weapons
platforms in both the Navy and Marine Corps. This drive to
transform the force is necessary and vital to our national
security.
The current transformation entails a shift from a blue
water centric fleet to one with greater capability in brown and
green water operations. This shift in focus reflects a greater
demand for expeditionary capability, a capability that will
allow us to operate in the littorals. The broad transformation
now under way includes a new generation of ships, submarines,
and aircraft, with programs in development, production, or
already in operation with the fleet.
Some of the Department of the Navy's new programs have
encountered significant challenges. The Navy's LCS program and
the Marine Corps' EFV program are both innovative weapons
platforms incorporating new technologies. We are working on
solving the problems that have arisen so that we can deliver
vitally needed capabilities to our warfighters. Both of these
programs represent the kind of capabilities that the future
Navy and Marine Corps will need to fight and win the wars of
tomorrow.
Faced with a dangerous, uncertain world, with terrorist
enemies, states that actively support or condone them, and
rising powers with intentions and capabilities that lack
transparency, we have no choice but to improve our own
capabilities.
Mr. Chairman, the Department of the Navy's fiscal year 2008
budget request is critical to both the short-term and long-term
national security of the United States. We thank you for your
continued support for our efforts to meet our constitutional
obligations to provide for the common defense of the American
people. I look forward to answering your questions.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Winter follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Donald C. Winter
i. introduction
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and members of the committee, it
is an honor to appear before you representing the brave men and women
of the United States Navy and the United States Marine Corps--Active,
Reserve, and civilian over 800,000 strong.
Over the past year, I have had many opportunities to meet with
sailors and marines who are stationed both within the continental
United States and abroad. I have traveled three times to the Central
Command Area of Responsibility including Iraq. During my visits I have
had countless conversations with our young sailors and marines. I am
continually amazed at how dedicated and committed they are to carrying
out their duties--without question, without complaint. Our sailors and
marines recognize the significance of their mission. They remain
determined to win the current war and are committed to defending our
Nation against future threats. They are the very best and they deserve
the very best from their leadership in the Pentagon and on Capitol
Hill.
Today, I am here to present the Department of the Navy's plan to
support our sailors and marines in their mission to fight the global
war on terror and to defend our Nation against future challenges. I
believe the President's fiscal year 2008 budget request for the Navy
and Marine Corps provides them what they need and I ask that you
support this request--submitted to Congress on February 5, 2007.
The Department of the Navy's budget signifies a vital investment in
our Navy and Marine Corps. In its totality, this budget represents $160
billion in requested funding for fiscal year 2008, including the
estimated costs of the global war on terror.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``Highlights of the Department of the Navy's fiscal year 2008
budget,'' p. 1-15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These funds are essential in enabling the Department of the Navy to
maintain current readiness, sustain the operational tempo in the global
war on terror, support the quality of life of our sailors, marines, and
their families, while preparing for a future of uncertainty. Our
priorities for fiscal year 2008 are simply stated:
We will:
1. Fight the global war on terror by investing in the present
needs of our Navy and Marine Corps, while we
2. Prepare for future challenges by investing in our people,
facilities, and capabilities.
The development of this budget has not been easy--tough decisions
have been made and continue to be made throughout the Department to
balance risk and to be responsible stewards of the tax dollars
entrusted to us. Yet, we believe that this budget is appropriately
structured and is a necessary investment to successfully meet both our
present and future challenges.
The difficulty of preparing for future challenges has been striking
the proper balance between building capabilities to support traditional
and irregular warfare demands while transforming a blue water navy into
one that can operate, fight, and win in blue, green, and brown waters,
and expanding the lethality and reach of the Marine Corps.
Justification of every program is important for Congress to
understand the Department's intent and rationale, and we will do so.
For the sake of brevity in this statement I will not go into detail on
each program. Instead, I will call attention to areas crucial to our
budget submission and I ask that the ``Highlights of the Department of
the Navy's Fiscal Year 2008 Budget'' book be submitted for the record
as part of my statement.
ii. investing in the present
Fighting the Global War on Terror
As we come before you today, I do not have to remind you that we
are a Nation in our 6th year of a long, irregular, and global war. Your
naval forces--sailors, marines, and civilians--are engaged at home and
around the world today in a full spectrum of operations in support of
this war. They have answered the call to defend the Nation and they are
carrying out their duties superbly. Yet while focusing on the present
needs of the global war on terror, we must also keep a keen eye on an
ever evolving strategic environment around the globe. The pace of
change in today's world is very rapid. We have witnessed events--such
as North Korea's nuclear test last October and China's test of an anti-
satellite weapon this past January--that can change our strategic
calculations overnight. Even as these changes occur, our sailors and
marines continue to stand guard across the world.
As I speak to you today, there are over 50,000 sailors and marines
serving in the Central Command Area of Responsibility. Of those, over
21,000 marines and 12,000 sailors are serving on the ground in Iraq and
Afghanistan. It also includes over 8,000 sailors deployed as Individual
Augmentees (IA) and 4,500 performing ``in-lieu-of'' missions often
serving in nontraditional capacities but adding to the warfighting
capability of our military forces with their expertise. Additionally,
over 700 sailors and marines are in the Horn of Africa. Finally, on any
given day, approximately 30 percent of our ships and submarines and
over 45,000 of our sailors are deployed worldwide serving in, on, or
over the world's oceans.
We are also key players in executing the President's new strategy
in Iraq. The strategy requires increased coalition military and
civilian resources to include an additional two battalions of marines
to strengthen control of the Al Anbar Province. Approximately 4,000
additional sailors and marines will be part of this effort.
This ongoing pace of operations in fighting the global war on
terror has had a financial impact on the Department of the Navy.
Approximately 40-50 percent of the fleet continues to be at sea. This,
coupled with the increased deployment of marines across the globe, has
placed a strain on our resources. The 2008 global war on terror request
represents a critical investment in providing the adequate resources
necessary to prosecute and win the global war on terror. The Department
of the Navy is seeking approximately $20 billion to directly support
prosecution of the global war on terror and to reset the force.
Safeguarding our Forces in Harms Way
Before we deploy our brave men and women in harm's way we must do
everything in our power to invest in their protection. Therefore, we
are investing in measures to counter and protect our men and women from
Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) with such platforms as the Mine
Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle. We are transitioning to a
newly designed Modular Tactical Vest and are committed to providing the
best head protection to our warfighters. We are also investing in
measures I am personally involved with seeking improved acquisition
processes which will accelerate fielding of these new technologies.
Unavoidably, with war comes the tragedy of loss of life and injury
to our young men and women. We are committed to providing the best
medical care on and off the battlefield. The treatment of patients has
been greatly enhanced by improvements in medical capabilities at the
personal, unit,and organizational levels--yet we must never be
satisfied with where we are. We will continue to seek advancements in
medical care. Care for our wounded does not end at the field hospital.
We continue to aggressively monitor post-deployment mental health
screenings as well as, suicides, domestic violence, and divorce rates
and to assure the quality long-term physical and psychological welfare
of our sailors and marines.
Resetting the Force
While we endeavor to provide what is needed, we also recognize that
war is a costly business, and this one is no different. Our sailors and
marines will always do what it takes, but there is a significant
price--not only in their personal sacrifices--but also in the financial
cost of operations and on the equipment that we provide them. We must
continue to invest in the present needs of our warfighters.
The ongoing intense combat operations and high operational tempo
have had a significant impact on the quality, operability, and service
life of Navy and Marine Corps equipment--it is imperative that we
support our brave men and women by replacing our rapidly aging
equipment. In many cases it makes no sense to replace aging legacy
equipment with more of the same. In the case where it makes smart
financial or operational sense, we are purchasing next generation
equipment and platforms to replace combat losses. Resetting the Navy
and Marine Corps is essential, and we are investing significant
resources to restore our combat capability and readiness. The fiscal
year 2008 global war on terror request includes $3.8 billion--$2.1
billion for the Navy, $1.7 billion for the Marine Corps--toward reset
requirements. These funds will refurbish or replace equipment damaged
or lost during combat operations and restore the capability and
readiness of the Navy and Marine Corps for future threats and
operations. It should be noted that the reset requirement is dynamic
and changes as conditions change.\2\
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\2\ ``Highlights of the Department of the Navy's Fiscal Year 2008
Budget,'' p. 2-10.
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iii. investing in the future
As we fight the global war on terrorism, we cannot forget that the
security challenges of the 21st century are complex and varied. They
range from the irregular, asymmetric threats of terrorists, and rogue
states, to the sophisticated military technology of future peer
competitors. The Department has also been called upon to conduct
disaster relief and humanitarian assistance missions--often being the
first to respond to natural disasters around the world as in the case
of the 2005 Indian Ocean tsunami, the earthquake in Pakistan and
Hurricane Katrina in the Gulf Coast. Naval forces are uniquely balanced
to address these diverse strategic challenges with the capability and
capacity to rapidly project power anywhere in the world. We must
continue to invest in this capability. We cannot allow ourselves to be
fixated on one threat alone.
Preparing for an uncertain future demands that the seas of the
world remain safe for all nations. The Department of the Navy strongly
supports U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. Joining the
Convention, with the declarations and understandings reflected in
Executive Report 108-10 (Senate Foreign Relations Committee), will
enable the United States to exercise a leadership role in the future
development of oceans law and policy. As a non-party, the United States
does not have access to the Convention's formal processes in which over
150 nations participate in influencing future law of the sea
developments, and is therefore less able to promote and protect our
security and commercial interests. Additionally, by providing legal
certainty and stability for the world's largest maneuver space, the
Convention furthers a core goal of our National Security Strategy to
promote the rule of law around the world.
This is also a time of unprecedented change in the Department of
the Navy. We are executing a major transformation of the force at the
same time that we are executing an array of operations in the global
war on terror. This transformation is about people as much as it is
about equipment.
Investing in our People
The development and retention of quality people are vital to our
continued success. America's naval forces are combat-ready due to the
dedication and motivation of individual sailors, marines, civilians,
and their families. The Department is committed to taking care of them
by sustaining our quality-of-service/quality-of-life programs,
including training, compensation, and promotion opportunities, health
care, housing, and reasonable operational and personnel tempo. The cost
of manpower is the single greatest factor in the fiscal year 2008
budget, but it is money well spent. We must continue to recruit,
retain, and provide for our sailors and marines.
Recruiting and Retention
We continue to invest in programs to recruit the right people,
retain the right people, and achieve targeted attrition. The fiscal
year 2008 budget requests a 3-percent raise in military base pay. This
investment along with increased enlistment and re-enlistment bonuses,
is necessary if we are to continue to man our forces with the highest
levels of ability and character. These citizens are in high demand
everywhere; since we ask so much of them, we owe them proper
compensation. The Navy and Marine Corps are currently meeting
recruiting and retention goals for most ratings and designators in the
Active and Reserve components. In fiscal year 2006, Navy achieved 100
percent of its overall active component enlisted recruiting goal and
the Marine Corps also achieved over 100 percent of its accession goal.
Navy and Marine Corps End Strength
To avoid an adverse toll on our sailors, marines, and their
families, and to prevent a decrease in readiness, the Secretary of
Defense established a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio goal for all Active
component forces. Our goal for the Marine Corps is to achieve that 1:2
deployment-to-dwell ratio for Active component units and 1:5 for
Reserve units. Currently, the deployment length for Marine units in
Iraq is 7 months.
While our recruiting remains at impressive levels, it is important
to focus on sizing the Department to achieve its overall objectives. As
we develop and build more efficient and automated ships, aircraft, and
combat systems, personnel reductions are inevitable; yet the skill
level and specialization requirements increase. The Navy has reduced
its end strength by approximately 40,000 over the last 5 years, and as
we look ahead to more capable ships entering service in the next few
years, we anticipate a stabilization of that trend at an end strength
of about 320,000-325,000.
For the Marine Corps the proposed increase to our Active component
end strength to 202,000 marines, by 2011, is an investment in reducing
the strain on the individual marines and the institution of the Marine
Corps while ensuring the Marine Corps can provide trained forces in
support of other contingencies. Our first task will be to build three
new infantry battalions and their supporting structure--approximately
4,000 marines. We will then systematically build the additional units
and individuals on a schedule of approximately 5,000 marines per year.
National Security Personnel System
It is important to note that while a considerable investment is
taking place in the uniformed workforce, we are also placing emphasis
on creating a proficient civilian workforce, whose pay and promotions
are performance-based. Deployment of the National Security Personnel
System began in fiscal year 2006 and continued through fiscal year
2007. A significant portion, over 50,000 employees, are scheduled to
transition at the start of fiscal year 2008.
Safety
Fundamental to taking care of our sailors, marines, and DON
civilian employees is establishing a culture and environment where
safety is an intrinsic and critical component of all decisionmaking,
both on- and off-duty. Safety directly affects the readiness of our
fighting forces and significant Mishap Reductions remains a key
department-wide objective in fiscal year 2008. We are refining our
concept of Operational Risk Management, which calls for assessing risks
prior to an evolution and then implementing mitigating actions during
the evolution, to ensure it is more widely accepted and employed by our
younger sailors and marines when making decisions off duty. We have
placed great emphasis on reducing Private Motor Vehicle (PMV) mishap
rates through new policy changes we believe will help reduce needless
PMV-related injuries and fatalities. Other safety initiatives are aimed
at the reduction of aviation mishaps and improving safety in the
workplace.
Investing in Our Facilities
Essential to recruiting and retaining the right people is
maintaining their quality of life and service. The Department of the
Navy continues to invest in our sailors and marines by sustaining our
quality-of-life/quality-of-service programs and by ensuring quality
housing and facilities in which to live, work, and train. We are
developing Global Infrastructure Plans to analyze bottom line facility
requirements. The Department of the Navy has been aggressively
eliminating excess facilities and is on track to its footprint of 23.9
million square feet by 2013.
Military Construction
The fiscal year 2008 budget invests over $2.1 billion toward 64
military construction projects for our active Navy and Marine Corps and
10 projects for our Reserve Forces.
Base Realignment and Closure
The fiscal year 2008 budget continues to fund Base Realignment and
Closure (BRAC) initiatives. We are requesting $733.7 million in the
fiscal year 2008 budget submission to continue implementation of the
2005 BRAC Commission recommendations. The fiscal year 2008 request
invests in construction (including planning and design), operational
movements at key closure and realignment locations, and the necessary
environmental studies at receiving locations to fulfill National
Environmental Policy Act requirements.
Carrier Homeporting
Consistent with the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Navy plans
to adjust its force posture to base at least six ``operationally
available'' carriers in the Pacific while maintaining the flexibility
to respond to threats around the world.\4\ The Navy will achieve the
six Pacific carrier posture in fiscal year 2010 when the U.S.S. Carl
Vinson (CVN-70) is homeported to the Pacific.
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\4\ ``2006 Quadrennial Defense Review,'' p. 47.
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Realignment of our Forces in the Western Pacific
As part of the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), a change in
the U.S.-Japan alliance to the security environment, the United States
and the Government of Japan signed an agreement for the relocation of
some marines from Okinawa to Guam. This realignment requires a
commitment to investment in our Western Pacific area of operations. The
fiscal year 2008 budget invests $28 million for planning and
continuation of the Environmental Impact Analysis.
Investment in Capabilities
To meet the demands of the global war on terror and the uncertain
threats of the future, the Department of the Navy must also invest in
new generation capabilities and to transform the force. We must
continue an acquisition program which seeks to build a fleet that is
both affordable and meets the national security challenges of the 21st
century. It must cover all facets of the surface, subsurface, and
aviation requirements. We must also invest in our expeditionary forces
providing them with the capabilities to remain always ready and always
capable of forcible entry. Our fiscal year 2008 baseline budget invests
almost $46 billion for procurement programs.
As we invest in our naval force it is critical that we pursue a
program of stable transformation. The core products that the Navy and
Marine Corps buy face a significant time constraint--we go into battle
with assets that are built many years in advance; and a stable
transformation can only be achieved if the Department of the Navy, in
conjunction with Congress, follow a long-term path of program
stability.
Building a Fleet for the Future
We have initiated an aggressive investment strategy to build an
affordable 313-ship fleet tailored to support the National Defense
Strategy and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. The Department plans
to procure seven ships \5\ in fiscal year 2008 for the United States
Navy, and we are serving as the executive agent for one Joint High-
Speed Vessel for the United States Army--an investment of over $14.2
billion toward shipbuilding and conversion.\6\ As required by Congress,
the Department of the Navy recently submitted its 30-year shipbuilding
plan which reinforces the 313-ship fleet introduced last year.\7\ The
fiscal year 2008 30-year shipbuilding plan, unchanged from the fiscal
year 2007 plan, represents the Departments commitment to creating
programs of stability and predictability which in turn minimizes
disruption in shipbuilding and creates efficiency and effectiveness in
our industrial base.
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\5\ ``Highlights of the Department of the Navy's Fiscal Year 2008
Budget,'' P. 3-5.
\6\ ``Highlights of the Department of the Navy's Fiscal Year 2008
Budget'', P. 1-15.
\7\ Department of the Navy 30-year Shipbuilding Plan, submitted to
Congress on Feb. 5, 2007.
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The fiscal year 2008 budget continues investment in the shift to
next generation warships. The surface ships and submarines which make
up the fleet of the future will be more capable than ever to respond to
enhanced threats across the globe. Several critical shipbuilding
programs in support of the 30-year shipbuilding plan include:
The lead ship of the CVN-21 Program--Gerald R. Ford
(CVN-78) with expected delivery in 2015--will replace U.S.S.
Enterprise (CVN-65). Program funding is requested over 2 years
with 40 percent, approximately $2.7 billion, in fiscal year
2008 and the remaining 60 percent in fiscal year 2009.
The DDG-1000 program, formerly known as the DDX, is
the next generation of multi-mission surface combatants. Under
the dual lead ship strategy, a lead ship will be constructed at
both Northrop Grumman Ship Systems and General Dynamics Bath
Iron Works. Contracts for detail design were awarded to the
shipbuilders in August 2006. Construction contracts of the dual
lead ships are expected to be awarded in fiscal year 2007. The
fiscal year 2008 budget provides the second increment of
funding, approximately $2.8 billion, required to complete the
two fiscal year 2007 lead ships.
The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) will be a fast, agile,
and networked surface combatant with capabilities optimized to
assure naval and joint force access into contested littoral
regions. The Navy has awarded contracts for construction of the
first four LCS sea frames. LCS-1 was launched in September
2006. The Navy intends to continue with a plan to procure a
reduced number of ships in fiscal 2008 and 2009 within existing
budget resources. LCS is needed now to fill critical, urgent
warfighting requirements gaps that exist today. Operational
experience and analyses indicate that potential adversaries
will employ asymmetric capabilities to deny U.S. and allied
forces access in critical coastal regions to include strategic
choke points and vital economic sea lanes.
In the past year the second and third Virginia Class
fast attack submarines joined the fleet. Construction of the
Virginia Class continues to be performed under a teaming
arrangement between General Dynamics Electric Boat Corporation
and Northrop Grumman Newport News Shipbuilding. Six Virginia
Class submarines are under construction. The fiscal year 2008
budget invests approximately $1.8 billion in the 10th Virginia
Class submarine and is the fifth of five Virginia class
submarines covered under a multiyear procurement contract.
A number of congressional authorities are necessary in order to
maintain the stability of the 30-year shipbuilding plan. Key to
achieving cost reductions in our Virginia Class program is the ability
to enter into multiyear ship contracts. We are asking Congress to
continue Multiyear Procurement Authority for Virginia Class Submarines.
As we modernize our carrier force to the new Gerald R. Ford Class (CVN-
78), we will drop below our carrier requirement by one ship during a 2-
year period. Through adjustments to refueling availabilities and by
carefully managing our Nimitz Class service life, we will be able to
mitigate the impact of this drop in the short-term and long-term. We
are asking Congress to authorize a temporary waiver of the carrier
requirement from eleven to ten ships.
Enhancing Expeditionary Warfare Capabilities
The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review describes the reorientation of
joint ground forces from dependence on large, permanent overseas
garrisons toward expeditionary operations. This includes a focus on
greater capability to conduct irregular warfare. Naval forces are
inherently prepared for this role through our ability to project power
ashore. Amphibious warships and Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)
capability are essential to the Navy-Marine Corps ability to conduct
forcible entry. The Department of the Navy will invest in several key
procurement programs to enhance our expeditionary warfare capability.
The San Antonio (LPD-17) Class of amphibious warfare
ships represents the Department of the Navy's commitment to a
modern expeditionary power projection fleet. The rapid off-load
capability of the San Antonio Class will enable our naval force
to operate across the spectrum of warfare. The fiscal year 2008
budget invests $1.4 billion to fully fund the construction of
the ninth ship in the San Antonio Class.
The Marine Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) is the
Marine Corps' largest ground combat system acquisition program.
It will replace the aging Assault Amphibious Vehicle that has
been in service since 1972. The fiscal year 2008 budget invests
$288 million from the Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation account toward EFV development to ensure that EFV
meets all requirements for performance and reliability before
entering into production.
The MRAP Vehicle is playing an increased role in
protecting our sailors and marines in harm's way. MRAPs are
employed to protect against the three primary kill mechanisms
of mines and IEDs--fragmentation, blast overpressure, and
acceleration. These vehicles provide the best available
protection against IEDs. The fiscal year 2008 globar war on
terror request procures over 255 MRAP vehicles for the Navy and
Marine Corps team. We continue to assess this need as is
necessary.
Recapitalizing Aviation Capacity
The Department of the Navy requires a robust aviation capacity
including attack, utility, and lift capabilities. The Department is in
the midst of an extensive, long-term consolidation and recapitalization
of all aircraft in the naval inventory in order to develop the optimum
balance between requirements and usage. We are increasing our
investment in our aviation programs. In fiscal year 2008 we plan to
procure 188 aircraft for the Navy and Marine Corps team.\8\
Particularly critical programs include the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF),
the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, the EA-18G Growler, the P-8A Multi-Mission
Maritime Aircraft (MMA), the MV-22, and helicopter programs. The
Department also serves as the executive agent for the modernization of
the fleet of Presidential Helicopters which will be replaced by the VH-
71.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ ``Highlights of the Department of the Navy's Fiscal Year 2008
Budget'', P. 3-15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The JSF (STOVL, CV, CTOL) is the next-generation
strike fighter weapons system designed to counter the threats
of 2010 and beyond. Low rate initial production (LRIP) long
lead funding for initial Conventional Take-off and Landing
(CTOL) aircraft was awarded in March 2006. A significant
upcoming milestone for JSF is the Defense Acquisition Board in
spring 2007 for approval of LRIP 1 full funding and LRIP 2 long
lead contract awards.
The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet is the Navy's multi-mission
strike fighter. Currently in its 8th year of full production,
65 percent of the total procurement objective has been
delivered (298/460). The fiscal year 2008 budget requests
funding for 24 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets. An additional 12 F/A-
18E/F Super Hornets are requested in the fiscal year 2008
globar war on terror request to bridge the projected shortfalls
due to excessive operational use which will shorten ESL.
The EA-18G Growler is the Navy's replacement for the
legacy EA-6B and will assume the role for Airborne Electronic
Attack. First flight for the Growler occurred in August 2006.
EA-18G aircraft are being procured as part of the F/A-18E/F
Multi-Year Procurement II contract. The fiscal year 2008 budget
invests $1.3 billion which procures 18 E/A-18G aircraft.
The P-8A MMA replaces the Navy's P-3C Orion and fills
Combatant Commander requirements for long-endurance naval
aircraft in fulfillment of many missions in major combat
operations, globar war on terror, and homeland defense. The
program, now in detailed design phase, will achieve Initial
Operational Capability in fiscal year 2013--initial production
buys will begin in fiscal year 2010.
The MV-22 Osprey Tilt Rotor aircraft will supplement
and replace the CH-46 with enhanced mission capabilities. The
CH-46E is over 40 years old, with limited lift and mission
capabilities to support the MAGTF and the globar war on terror.
MV-22 Initial Operational Capability is scheduled for fall 2007
with a continued transition of two CH-46E squadrons per year
thereafter. The fiscal year 2008 budget includes a request for
21 MV-22 aircraft.
Helicopters continue to provide essential lift
capability to the Navy and Marine Corps. Critical to this
capability are the MH-60R/S and the UH-1 programs. The MH-60R
will replace the aging SH-60B and SH-60F helicopters with the
primary mission of undersea and surface warfare. The MH-60S
will support the CSG and ESG combat logistics, search and
rescue, vertical replenishment, anti-surface warfare, airborne
mine countermeasures, combat search and rescue, and naval
special warfare mission area. The fiscal year 2008 budget
invests in 27 MH-60R and 18 MH-60S helicopters. The UH-1
continues to fulfill the Marine Corps utility helicopter
missions. The fiscal year 2008 budget supports the UH-1Y new
build strategy and procures 20 UH-1Y helicopters.
Research and Development
As we look to transform our force with new generation platforms, we
must also actively seek out new innovations and niche technology. Our
fiscal year 2008 budget continues investment in the Research and
Development, Science and Technology (S&T), and the Research,
Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) management support accounts.
In fiscal year 2008, the RDT&E account decreases by over 8 percent,
reflecting technology maturation and the transition to production of
programs previously in RDT&E. Funding for S&T is kept relatively
constant to enhance capabilities for the naval forces of today,
tomorrow, and the future. To maximize our return on S&T funding, we
have developed a newly integrated Naval S&T Strategic Plan focused on
areas where the Department of the Navy needs to be a world leader and
an early adopter of technologies. RDT&E accounts also support the
transition of technologies and the development of critical new weapon
systems. Critical shipbuilding programs include CVN-21, SSN-774
Virginia Class Submarine, DDG-1000, LCS, LPD-17, T-AKE, and Joint High
Speed Vessel. Critical manned aviation programs include the F-35, VH-
71, P-8A, CH-53K, E-2D, and EA-18G. As a final part of the RDT&E
account, our Test and Evaluation communities are ensuring that
technologies will perform as required in the field.
Cultivating a Stable Acquisition Environment
While our investment strategy is forward-leaning--so must our
procurement process be. It is clear that we must better define our
programs early in the acquisition process. A key emphasis must be to
properly incentivize contractors to bid in a responsible manner and
then to diligently execute to the accepted proposal. I intend to focus
a significant part of my remaining time as Secretary of the Navy in
getting this right. This year we are focusing our efforts to take on
the challenges of: (1) revising and reinstituting our policy on
contractor performance assessment, (2) controlling cost growth and
reducing program volatility, and (3) building rapid acquisition
processes. We have established acquisition guidelines concerning urgent
warfighting needs, addressing schedule priority, source selection
criteria and contract performance. Specific acquisition policies
emphasize rapid deployment capability, rapid acquisition processing,
controlling cost growth, and contractor performance assessments. An
acquisition reengineering effort addressing: (1) an open systems
business model, (2) accountability and portfolio assessment, (3) human
capital planning, and (4) program formulation and capability planning
has been initiated. These four threads are aimed at making the
acquisition process more responsive and delivering the agreed-upon
warfighting capability within the agreed-upon cost and schedule.
In addition to acquisition reform, we are investing in methods to
increase efficiency and maximize the return on our investments. Though
still maturing, the Navy is developing the Navy Enterprise Framework
which will better leverage the value streams consisting of people,
dollars, and materiel needed to deliver warfighting readiness to Navy
component and combatant commanders. The Department is also seeking to
use ``best practices'' of the private sector through the deployment of
Lean Six-Sigma (LSS). LSS is being implemented throughout the
Department to increase quality of work life, safety levels, speed of
decisions and transactions, and to decrease total cost of ownership.
The vision is to create a critical mass of leaders and personnel who
routinely apply LSS methodologies for continuous process improvement.
The Department will continue to seek ways to transform the way we
do business resulting in improved efficiency, better decisionmaking,
and an organizational culture that is performance-based.
iv. conclusion
Investing in our present needs and fighting the global war on
terror are on the forefront of our priorities--but we must not forget
that the world is an ever evolving environment. We must be prepared to
respond to emerging threats of an uncertain future. To accomplish these
goals we must continue to invest in our national defense.
Thanks to the continuous support of Congress, our naval forces are
superior to all others. But developing and maintaining capable naval
forces requires our Nation to take a long-term view. It requires time,
constant strategic planning, and significant commitment of resources to
develop and maintain the world's premier naval force. Together, we have
made tough decisions and I believe that this budget submission is
adequately structured to support the needs of the United States Navy
and the United States Marine Corps.
Only through the collaborative efforts of Congress and the
Department of the Navy and with the support of the American people can
we provide the Nation the naval force it needs to fight the global war
on terror and prepare for the challenges of the future.
Thank you.
[The book ``Highlights of the Department of the Navy's Fiscal Year
2008 Budget'' follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Admiral Mullen.
STATEMENT OF ADM MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS
Admiral Mullen. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, Senator
Warner, and distinguished members of this committee: Thank you
for your continued strong support of our men and women in
uniform and for the opportunity to appear before you today. I
am honored to join Secretary Winter and General Conway
representing the longest-lasting inter-Service relationship in
our Nation's history, the Navy-Marine Corps team.
As the Secretary said, we are a Nation at war, a maritime
Nation, fighting an elusive and adaptive enemy bent on using
terror and irregular tactics to spread hatred and fear across
the globe. At the same time, we are confronted by potentially
hostile nation states determined to develop and use
sophisticated weapons systems. Your Navy is ready to meet these
challenges.
2006 was a busy year. Your Navy met the demands of
combatant commanders for well-trained combat-ready forces
around the world, deterring aggression and combating terrorism
while providing international disaster relief to Pakistan and
the Philippines; revisiting tsunami-ravaged Southeast Asia with
humanitarian relief from the hospital ship Mercy; successfully
evacuating over 14,000 American citizens safely from Lebanon;
and demonstrating our surge capability and partner-building
capacity in Exercises Valiant Shield and RIMPAC.
In addition to that, we monitored missile launches on the
Korean peninsula with our Aegis destroyers, sent a message of
hope and resolve with the George Washington Carrier Strike
Group in Partnership of the Americas in Latin America, and
developed closer military relationships with the navies of
China, India, and Russia. Some of our finest warfare officers
command Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Navy
admirals command the Joint Task Forces in the Horn of Africa
and Guantanamo Bay. We also helped strengthen homeland security
through a continued and growing partnership with the United
States Coast Guard.
Today nearly 100 of your ships and submarines are at sea
and more than 60,000 sailors are forward-deployed. Fully half
of these men and women serve in the Central Command (CENTCOM)
area of responsibility and almost half of that number are on
the ground in combat and combat support roles. They are
performing magnificently, each and every one.
I had the opportunity to visit with many of them over the
holidays in the Arabian Gulf, Iraq and Afghanistan, Bahrain,
and the Horn of Africa. I can tell you they are focused, well-
trained, and well-led. They are proud of what they are doing
and still prouder of the difference they know they are making.
But we must work hard to sustain this readiness. Though we
continue to meet or exceed almost all of our recruiting and
retention goals, I remain concerned about certain shortfalls
among our expeditionary forces, SEALs, explosive ordnance
disposal personnel, our naval construction force, medical
corps, and naval intelligence community. Additionally, I am
starting to see for the first time in years a drop in our
first-term retention. I am watching this very, very closely.
As I testified to the House Armed Services Committee last
month, the accelerated wear and tear on systems and equipment
in a harsh physical environment requires immediate attention,
especially on combat construction equipment for our Seabees and
our older models of expeditionary aircraft, the P-3, the EP-3,
and the EA-6B Prowlers.
The same investments we have made to improve fleet
capabilities have paid off. We must now continue to reenergize
procurement accounts to maintain those capabilities in the
future. Our fiscal year 2008 budget helps us do that, calling
for the construction of 7 new ships as well as the additional
of 188 new operational aircraft to the inventory, nearly 40
more aircraft than we ordered last year.
We submitted a shipbuilding plan to Congress last year that
would produce a fleet of 313 ships by 2020, a fleet sized and
balanced to meet the challenges we face at maximum acceptable
risk. That plan submitted with this budget has not changed.
Still centered on 11 and eventually 12 aircraft carriers, 30
amphibious ships, 48 submarines, 88 surface combatants, and 55
LCSs, as well as the support ships, it will provide the Nation
more options and more flexibility than ever before,
particularly in core warfighting areas like mine and undersea
warfare and anti-ballistic missile defense.
I appreciate the support we have received from this
committee in developing this plan and in building this fleet.
We continue to evaluate, as we must, the impact global
developments have had on the plan's original risk assumptions.
I assure you that I remain committed to a stable shipbuilding
program and to pursuing with our partners in industry and here
on Capitol Hill the efficiencies required to make it
affordable.
Three things definitely have not changed, Mr. Chairman: my
priorities to sustain our combat readiness, to build a fleet
for the future, and to develop the 21st century leaders that we
need. I know the role our Navy must play in helping to win the
war on terror while providing a powerful strategic deterrent
and remaining a vital element of this Nation's strategic
reserve. I know well our requirement to support those we send
into harm's way with the very best medical care, top-notch
housing and installations, and a strong commitment to their
professional support and their professional growth, as well as
strong support for their magnificent families.
The 2008 budget we have submitted is not without risk.
While other Services have seen top lines increase since
September 11, the Navy has experienced a $7 billion decrease in
buying power over the last 4 years. Our budget requests
represent the maximum risk I believe we can accept in four key
areas: manpower; readiness, both ashore and afloat; procurement
accounts; and our reset.
When our ground forces return from Iraq and Afghanistan,
the Nation will increasingly depend upon the expeditionary
capabilities of its Navy and Marine Corps team. I know and I
know you know that a maritime Nation such as ours depends in
great measure, as it has for more than 230 years, on the
flexibility, reach, agility, and lethality of that team.
Indeed, I note with pride that this week, March 27 in fact,
marks the anniversary of the passage of the Naval Act of 1794,
the legislation that revived the United States Navy and led to
the construction of the original six frigates, including of
course U.S.S. Constitution.
In his annual address to Congress just a few months prior
to the passage of that act, President Washington alluded to the
young Nation's need to defend itself: ``If we desire to avoid
insult,'' he noted, ``we must be able to repel it. If we desire
to secure the peace, it must be known that we are at all times
ready for war.''
Your Navy today, sir, is still ready to help secure peace
and ready at all times to both deter war and to fight it. I
thank you for the support you so generously give us to maintain
our readiness, and again on behalf of your sailors, Navy
civilians, and their wonderfully supportive families, I thank
you for the opportunity to appear before you today and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Mullen follows:]
Prepared Statement by ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN
Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and members of the committee, it is
an honor to appear before you today representing the brave men and
women, sailors and civilians, of the United States Navy. It is with
great pride, tempered by the urgency of war, that I report to you the
Navy's readiness to answer all bells for our Nation's security, today
and for generations to come. Thank you for your longstanding support.
introduction
We are a maritime nation involved in a long, irregular and global
war that extends far beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. The threat we face
breeds within failing states and the under-governed spaces of the world
and preys upon those weakened by poverty, disease, and hatred. It
thrives where there is no rule of law and spreads like a malignancy
through cyberspace and the vast maritime commons that serve as
connecting tissue in this age of globalization.
We are also confronted by nation-states determined to develop
sophisticated weapons systems, including nuclear arms. We cannot allow
ourselves to be fixated on one threat alone. Our national security is
dependent upon a strong Navy that can keep the sea lanes free, deter
aggression, safeguard our sources of energy, protect the interests of
our citizens at home and reassure our friends abroad. We must never
relinquish overmatching capability and capacity.
While our ground forces are engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan, the
Navy--with its ability to deliver two unique attributes day-to-day--
global reach and persistent presence--will continue to support our
responsibilities worldwide and provide a powerful deterrence, both in
day-to-day operations as well as being a vital element of our Nation's
``Strategic Reserve.'' As we pace the rapidly changing security
environment, there is no alternative to a well balanced Fleet.
Much has changed in the world since I testified before this
committee last year. Iran has been emboldened by the Israel/Hezbollah
war and continues the overt pursuit of a nuclear production capability.
North Korea has test fired long-range ballistic missiles and conducted
an underground nuclear detonation. China has demonstrated the ability
and willingness to conduct out of area diesel submarine operations and
their advanced military and space technology development continues
apace. The stated desire for, and apparent pursuit of, weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and advanced delivery systems has increased among
terrorist organizations and their state sponsors. Within our own
hemisphere, some leaders have become increasingly vocal in their
opposition to policies of the United States.
Last Spring I signed the Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) to better align
budgetary decisions with future operations and risk assessments. The
NSP also laid the foundation for the Naval Operating Concept (NOC),
which I co-signed with the Commandant of the Marine Corps in August
2006. The NOC is intended to define the objectives and missions of the
Navy-Marine Corps Team and to underscore our warfighting
interdependence.
The President's National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS)
calls for enhanced international cooperation to ensure lawful and
timely enforcement actions against maritime threats. During the Cold
War, our Navy was guided by a Maritime Strategy focused on containing
and defeating the spread of communism and Soviet domination. It is time
to develop a new Maritime Strategy based on global reach and persistent
presence--a strategy that includes core Navy warfighting competencies
and deterrence, strategic communication and information operations,
shaping and stability operations, emerging and enduring partnerships.
At the International Sea Power Symposium in September 2005, the
Chiefs of 49 navies and coast guards, among 72 countries represented,
discussed a new vision of sea power in the 21st century. That vision of
sea power encourages international partnerships for maritime security
and awareness, consisting of vessels and capabilities from partner
nations around the world--nations with a shared stake in international
commerce, security and freedom of the seas: the ``1,000 Ship Navy.''
This year the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard have joined maritime forces
around the world interested in participating in Global Maritime
Partnerships--a proverbial ``1,000 Ship Navy.'' Membership in this
``global fleet'' is not proscriptive and has no legal or encumbering
ties. It is envisioned to be a Free Form Force of maritime partners who
see the promise of sea power to unite, rather than to divide:
Collective security on the oceans highways through a global maritime
network.
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priorities
In last year's testimony, I identified three priorities addressed
by our fiscal year 2007 budget. We have made progress in all three and
our fiscal year 2008 budget reaffirms our commitment to these
priorities. We seek your assistance as we move forward, placing
particular emphasis on strengthening our core warfighting capabilities
and increasing our own military capacity as well as that of our
partners. Our three priorities remain:
I. Sustain combat readiness--with the right combat
capabilities--speed, agility, persistence, and dominance--for
the right cost.
II. Build a fleet for the future--balanced, rotational,
forward deployed and surge capable--the proper size and mix of
capabilities to empower our enduring and emerging partners,
deter our adversaries, and defeat our enemies.
III. Develop 21st century leaders--inherent in a strategy
which, through a transformed manpower, personnel, training and
education organization, better competes for the talent our
country produces and creates the conditions in which the full
potential of every man and woman serving our Navy can be
achieved.
I. Sustain Combat Readiness
A. Fiscal Year 2006 in Review
The Navy answered all bells in 2006. We met the demands of
Combatant Commanders for well-trained, combat-ready forces--deterring
aggression while conducting Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi
Freedom, international disaster relief, and humanitarian missions. We
successfully evacuated over 14,000 American citizens safely from
Lebanon and demonstrated our resolve, capability and partner building
capacity in Exercises Valiant Shield, Rimpac, and Partnership of the
Americas.
Over 10,000 Navy Individual Augmentees continued to make
significant contributions around the world in all manner of joint and
coalition billets, particularly in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility.
We continued to provide vital direct and indirect combat support to the
Marine Corps through a variety of Blue in Support of Green programs,
and we supported homeland defense initiatives with the U.S. Coast
Guard, including the development of a Maritime Domain Awareness Concept
of Operations (CONOPs) and the establishment of three Sector Command
Center-Joint, interagency harbor operations centers.
Last year the Navy also made progress toward improving our core
warfighting competencies: anti-submarine warfare (ASW), mine warfare,
and ballistic missile defense. As the missile tests on the Korean
Peninsula and the out of area deployment of a Chinese diesel submarine
remind us, we must ensure we sustain our overmatching capability and
capacity in these, and other, core warfighting mission areas.
B. Current Readiness
I recently returned from a trip to Iraq, Afghanistan, Djibouti,
Bahrain, and ships at sea in the Arabian Gulf. I visited with sailors
conducting special operations and combat support in Iraq, flying combat
sorties in support of OEF and OIF, providing security protection for
oil platforms, conducting civil affairs missions in Afghanistan,
participating in Theater Security Cooperation activities in Horn of
Africa, and standing watches onboard U.S.S. Dwight D. Eisenhower,
U.S.S. Anzio, and U.S.S. Boxer--reassuring our allies in the region
while providing a formidable deterrent to Iran.
Our Navy's readiness is superb and our sailors are performing at
exceptional levels at sea and ashore. The men and women of your Navy
are on watch around the world, around the clock.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
On 15 March 2007 we had 95 ships on deployment (34 percent of the
Fleet) and 127 ships underway (46 percent of the Fleet) in every
theater of operation; this included 3 aircraft carriers, and 4 big deck
amphibious ships (LHA/LHD), and approximately 25 submarines (Figure 1).
That same day, 2,744 active and Reserve Seabees, and 4,896 of our
Active and Reserve medical corps were serving overseas, many in combat
support roles. Additionally, 817 members of the Navy Special Warfare
community were deployed overseas (of 3,616 deployable), as were 247
Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel (with 105 surge-available to
deploy), and 744 Naval Coastal Warfare/Expeditionary Security Force
personnel (of 2,640 deployable). Earlier this month, 167 sailors from
the Navy's first, newly established Riverine Squadron arrived in Iraq
to provide area security at the Haditha Dam.
Worldwide, on 15 March 2007, there were 60,313 of our sailors
deployed ashore and afloat worldwide, conducting strategic deterrence;
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; ASW training, ballistic
missile defense, mine counter warfare, counter piracy and counter-drug
patrols, theater security cooperation activities, and humanitarian
assistance. On that day there were 31,120 sailors serving in the
CENTCOM AOR, 13,007 of whom, were on the ground building roads and
schools, offering combat care and medical assistance to our Fleet
Marines, providing timely intelligence support to Special Operations,
and contributing to the myriad combat support and reconstruction
missions ongoing in that region. No less vital are the sailors and
civilians--the Total Navy--who serve the shore-based infrastructure
that underpins our Fleet worldwide.
Perhaps the greatest enabler of our current, and continuous,
readiness has been the ongoing development of the Fleet Response Plan
(FRP). FRP is an evolving, deliberate process to ensure increased and
continuous availability of trained, ready Navy forces capable of a
surge response forward on short notice. FRP does not change training
requirements, operational capabilities or the amount of maintenance.
Rather, it delivers enhanced surge capability while providing
rotationally deployed forces to fulfill Global Force commitments.
Another key enabler of our Fleet readiness is family readiness.
``Family readiness'' means sailors' families are prepared for the
absence of their loved one. The Navy strives to reduce the uncertainty
and apprehension experienced by our Navy families in these stressful
times, while strengthening the programs and resources available to
support them.
Without the support of our families--and, without supporting them
in return--we cannot hope to sustain combat readiness. We owe our
sailors and their families the very best quality of life we can offer.
This includes top-notch housing and installations, the best health care
we can provide, and a strong commitment to child care.
C. Requirements to Sustain Combat Readiness
As we adapt to asymmetric threats and the challenges of irregular
warfare, we cannot lose sight of Navy's core warfighting competencies.
We must continue to improve performance in anti-submarine and mine
warfare, anti-surface warfare, anti-air warfare, strike warfare,
ballistic missile defense, and other core maritime supremacy missions.
We will continue to mature our Fleet Response Plan (FRP) and strengthen
Fleet and Family Readiness--to ensure combat ready, surge-capable
forces are available to meet any contingency. Natural disasters abroad
and hurricanes here at home taught us valuable lessons. We need to
extend the FRP philosophy of ``continuous readiness'' to our shore
commands, our people, and to our families.
To sustain our combat readiness, we seek congressional support in
the following areas:
Anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Submarines with
improving stealth and attack capability--particularly modern
diesel attack submarines--are proliferating world-wide at an
alarming rate. Locating these relatively inexpensive but
extremely quiet boats presents our Navy with a formidable
challenge. Navy is pursuing a distributed and netted approach
to ASW. Some of the key ASW programs we must continue to
develop and field as quickly as possible include: the
Deployable Autonomous Distributed System (DADS); the Reliable
Acoustic Path Vertical Line Array (RAPVLA); the Surface Ship
Torpedo Defense System (SSTD); the Aircraft Carrier Periscope
Detection Radar (CVNPDR); and, the High Altitude ASW Weapon
Concept (HAAWC).
SONAR restrictions. ASW is a very complex and
challenging warfighting competency in which to achieve and
sustain the required level of expertise. Therefore every
opportunity we have to gain and maintain proficiency at the
ship/unit level, and every opportunity we have to integrate
units in complex scenarios is crucial to our readiness.
Unfortunately, our ability to train in the same manner in which
we fight is under attack in public forums, including the
courts. Thus far, we have seen little scientific basis for the
claims lodged against the Navy. However, these allegations
present the potential for severe restrictions on our continued
ability to train effectively, as we saw in RIMPAC 2006 wherein
we lost 3 days of valuable ASW training with active sonar
because of a court restraining order. Navy is currently
executing a comprehensive plan of action to cover all our at-
sea training areas with environmental compliance documents by
the end of 2009. We are committed to maintaining an open
dialogue, continuing to advance our scientific understanding of
the impacts of sonar on marine mammals, and complying with the
relevant statutes. We have consistently made this clear as an
organization in our debate on this issue. Maintaining
proficiency in ASW is a daily challenge, and while our long-
term compliance documents are being developed, we cannot afford
to stop training. We owe it to our sailors to ensure they
receive the training they need to fight and win.
The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) requires permits for
activities that may affect marine mammals. This includes
military activities, including certain Navy activities at sea.
The National Defense Authorization Act of 2004 included a
provision that authorizes the Secretary of Defense to grant
exemptions to the MMPA for certain military activities critical
to our National defense. On 23 January 2007, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense granted Navy a National Defense Exemption
(NDE) for 2 years covering mid-frequency active (MFA) sonar
activities for major exercises and in major operating areas, as
well as the use of Improved Explosive Echo Ranging sonobuoys
(IEER). The NDE will help Navy continue to conduct the sonar
training necessary for our National defense while protecting
marine mammals through established mitigation measures.
Naval Expeditionary Combat Command. NECC is developing
into a true force of choice in phase zero (pre-conflict) and
phase V (reconstruction) operations, and as a vital part of our
Nation's long war against terrorism. Included in the Naval
Expeditionary Combat Command today are 30,363 Active and
Reserve component sailors including 15,339 in the Naval
Construction Force, 6,557 in Naval Coastal Warfare, 3,607 in
the Navy Expeditionary Logistics Force, 2,482 in Explosive
Ordnance Disposal, 712 in the Riverine Force, 591 in the Navy
Expeditionary Guard Battalion, 441 in Visit Board Search and
Seizure/Intel, 431 in the Maritime Civil Affairs Group, 85 in
Combat Camera, 68 in the Expeditionary Combat Readiness Center,
and 50 in the Expeditionary Training Group. All new forces--
Riverine, Expeditionary Training Group, Maritime Civil Affairs
and Maritime Expeditionary Security Force--will meet full IOC
objectives in fiscal year 2007. Riverine will deploy its first
squadron to Iraq this month to provide area security at Haditha
dam and interdiction operations on the Euphrates river. Your
continued support of our Riverine capability and capacity is
vital. Our second Riverine Squadron was established on 2
February, 2007 and our third Squadron will be stood up this
June.
Sea Basing. It would be difficult to consider any
future expeditionary missions without recognizing the need for
a sea base from which to stage Joint Forcible Entry Operations,
Theater Security Cooperation, and humanitarian assistance
activities. Sea Basing provides operational maneuver and
assured access to the joint force while significantly reducing
our footprint ashore and minimizing the permissions required to
operate from host nations. These are operational
characteristics that will prove increasingly vital in the post-
OIF/OEF political-military security environment. Navy is
exploring innovative operational concepts combining sea basing
with adaptive force packaging that will further support
national security policy and the Combatant Commanders'
objectives worldwide. Our 30-year shipbuilding plan provides
for Sea Basing that covers the spectrum of warfare from Joint
Forcible Entry to persistent and cooperative Theater Security
Cooperation.
Ballistic Missile Defense. Missile tests on the Korean
Peninsula and by Iran, along with the proliferation of
ballistic missile technology underscores the growing need for a
robust, sea-borne ballistic missile defense system. Last year,
the Navy made further progress on our Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD), the sea based component of the Missile Defense
Agency's (MDA) Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). It
enables surface combatants to support ground-based sensors and
provides a capability to intercept short- and medium-range
ballistic missiles with ship-based interceptors (SM-3). The
Sea-Based Terminal Program will provide the ability to engage
Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) with modified SM-2 BLk
IV missiles from Aegis BMD capable ships.
Depot Level Maintenance. Ship and aviation depot level
maintenance is critical to enable the continuing readiness of
our warfighting capabilities. Support of our O&MN accounts will
ensure we don't defer critical maintenance.
U.S.S. George Washington. The U.S.S. George Washington
will relieve U.S.S. Kitty Hawk as our forward deployed naval
forces CVN in Japan in fiscal year 2008. This transition, vital
to our security interests in the Asian Pacific region, needs to
be fully funded.
Fleet and Family Readiness. The Navy is addressing
Fleet and family readiness in many critical areas, four of
which are: minimizing financial risk and predatory lending;
improving crisis management and response procedures; enhancing
child care programs and centers; and, improving ombudsman
programs. We also continue to work with those families
struggling to recover from the devastation of Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita.
Steaming Days. The fiscal year 2008 budget provides
funds necessary to support 48 underway days per quarter of the
active operational tempo (OPTEMPO) for deployed forces and 22
underway days per quarter for nondeployed forces (primarily
used for training). Our fiscal year 2008 baseline budget
estimates also include reductions to peacetime OPTEMPO levels.
The fiscal year 2008 budget supports the ``6+1'' surge
readiness level from our Carrier Strike Groups. As in fiscal
year 2006 and fiscal year 2007, it is anticipated that
operational requirements will continue to exceed peacetime
levels in fiscal year 2008.
II. Build a Fleet for the Future
A. Fiscal Year 2006 in Review
In 2005 the Navy conducted extensive analysis to determine the
minimum required force structure needed to meet the security demands of
the 21st century with an acceptable level of risk. In February 2006,
the Navy unveiled a new 30-year shipbuilding plan that will provide a
Battle Force of approximately 313 ships by 2020 with more capacity and
capability than was ever dreamed when our fleet was much larger in
size. Stabilizing this plan, which remained essentially unchanged in
our 2007 submission, is intended to provide the shipbuilding industry
with sufficient predictability to maintain critical skills and to make
business decisions that increase efficiency and productivity in order
to meet the Navy's projected shipbuilding requirements.
Last year we began to see our future Fleet taking shape. We
currently have 38 ships under contract for construction, and in fiscal
year 2006 ships that had been designed a few short years ago rolled
down the ways. We christened the first Freedom Class Littoral Combat
Ship, amphibious assault ship Makin Island, amphibious transport dock
ship Green Bay, Guided Missile Destroyers Gridley and Sampson, nuclear
fast attack submarine Hawaii, auxiliary dry cargo ships Alan Shepard
and Sacagawea, and the aircraft carrier George H.W. Bush. We
commissioned the amphibious nuclear attack submarine Texas and the
guided missile destroyer Farragut. We also rolled out the first EA-18G
Growler.
In fiscal year 2006, the increased wartime OPTEMPO of Operations
Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom, and the global war on terror continued
to wear down Navy's aging, ``legacy'' aircraft. Expeditionary aircraft
utilization has dramatically increased, particularly for EA-6B airborne
electronic attack aircraft, MH-60 multi-mission helicopters, P-3
maritime patrol aircraft, EP-3 electronic surveillance aircraft, and F/
A-18 C/D attack aircraft, thus shortening the expected service life
(ESL) of these aging airframes.
Improving our own capacity was only part of the Navy's focus in
fiscal year 2006. We also pursued the broadest possible approach to
strengthening maritime security through partnerships. This included
closer cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard and our other interagency
partners, international organizations, nongovernmental agencies,
commercial shippers, and maritime nations great and small.
Perhaps the most tangible application of Navy's global reach and
persistent presence in building partner capacity was last year's 5
month deployment of the hospital ship Mercy in the summer of 2006 to
the tsunami-affected areas in South and Southeast Asia. Working with
embarked military medical personnel from Canada, Australia, Singapore,
India and Malaysia as well as representatives from 11 nongovernmental
organizations, Mercy's accomplishments ashore and afloat included:
60,081 patients seen, 131,511 total services provided; 1,083 surgeries;
19,375 immunizations; 20,134 optometry evaluations, 16,141 glasses
distributed; 9,373 dental extractions; 236 biomedical equipment
repairs, 254 people trained; 59 major and 177 minor medical systems
restored to 100 percent operational capacity; and, 6,201 host nation
students trained.
In an August 2006 public opinion survey, conducted by Terror Free
Tomorrow, Indonesians and Bangladeshis overwhelmingly indicated their
support of this humanitarian mission. In Indonesia, 85 percent of those
aware of Mercy's visit had a favorable opinion, and in Bangladesh this
figure was 95 percent. Further, 87 percent of those polled in
Bangladesh stated that Mercy's activities made their overall view of
the United States more positive. These polling results provide some
indication of the power of partnerships.
B. Current Force
By the end of fiscal year 2007 we will have stopped the free fall
of our Navy and our Fleet's net size will have grown from a low of 274
ships in March 2007 to 279, including 5 newly commissioned ships.
Navy is in the process of evaluating the impact global developments
have had on our risk assumptions, and ultimately whether or not this
will affect the build rate of our future Battle Force. Whatever the
outcome of this evaluation, we will work closely with our partners in
industry to control requirements costs and provide the industrial base
the stability it needs to become more productive.
Future platforms and combat systems must be designed and built with
the knowledge that we plan to continually upgrade them over their
lifetime. An Open Architecture approach to software acquisition and
development of integrated weapons systems is a critical part of this
business model. Free and open competition in which the best idea wins
is the goal.
The fiscal year 2008 President's budget submission provides for
procuring 7 new ships in fiscal year 2008 and 67 new ships over the
FYDP (fiscal years 2008-2013). To facilitate the stability required to
achieve reduced costs in this constrained industrial sector, no changes
in ship acquisitions were made in fiscal year 2008 from President's
budget 2007 to President's budget 2008. The Navy has a long-range
vision to reduce types and models of ships, to maximize reuse of ship
designs and components, and to employ a business model that encourages
the use of open architecture and mission systems modularity.
The next major challenge in building a fleet for the future is to
deliver a long range aviation procurement plan. Much work has been done
analyzing Joint warfighting capabilities and capacity based on threat
and risk assessments driven by Defense Planning Guidance. Consideration
has also been given to affordability, industrial capacity and
production times associated with next generation aviation warfare. The
Navy will work to deliver a stable aviation build plan that transforms
and balances aviation capabilities with respect to conventional and
irregular warfare, reduces excess capacity, and achieves technological
superiority through cost-wise investments in recapitalization,
sustainment and modernization programs.
President's budget 2008 procures 188 aircraft in fiscal year 2008
and 1,295 aircraft across the FYDP (fiscal years 2008-2013), reduces
average aircraft age from 74 percent to 50 percent of expected service
life, and concentrates on resourcing critical maritime and Joint
effects. The plan is structured to support required economic order
quantity investments and facilitate Multi-Year Procurement (MYP)
contracts.
We must include the vital contribution that can be made in securing
the global commons by our partners with common interests. The
President's National Strategy for Maritime Security states, that, ``The
safety and economic security of the United States depends upon the
secure use of the world's oceans.'' It further notes that, ``Maritime
security is best achieved by blending public and private maritime
security activities on a global scale into an integrated effort that
addresses all maritime threats.''
I believe an international ``1,000 ship navy,'' offers a real
opportunity to increase partner nation capabilities while reducing
transnational crime, WMD proliferation, terrorism, and human
trafficking. Regional maritime security partnerships are already taking
shape worldwide that support this ideal, some with and some without
direct US Navy involvement. The self-organizing evacuation of non-
combatants from Lebanon during the Israeli-Hezbollah war, in which 170
ships from 17 countries came together, accomplished their mission, and
dispersed is often cited as a good example of how such partnerships
might work.
Critical to increasing partner capacity in the war on terror, as
well as building strong global maritime partnerships (the ``1,000 ship
navy'') that promote maritime security, is the Building Global
Partnerships Act of 2007, being submitted to Congress by the Department
of Defense as a top legislative priority. The BGP Act will
significantly improve our ability to help friendly nations develop
capabilities to better govern and defend their territorial waters and
the global maritime commons, denying access to terrorists and criminal
organizations. We encourage your support for this vital legislation
that will further enable support for the ``1,000 ship navy'' concept.
Sea Power in this century cannot be harnessed by a single nation
acting alone. If we are to build a fleet for the future capable of
keeping pace with globalization, we must leverage the capacity of our
partners with common interests. The positive potential of Sea Power and
freedom of the seas can only be achieved through a collective and
cooperative approach focused on international rule of law and freedom
of the maritime commons.
C. Requirements to Build a Fleet for the Future
We have worked hard with Congress and Industry to start to create
stability in our shipbuilding plans and industrial base. We must
continue to fund and build a balanced, effective Battle Force of about
313 ships . . . the minimum force required to guarantee the long-term
strength and viability of U.S. naval air and sea power with acceptable
risk. We recognize the need to control requirements, maintain program
stability, curb costs, and monitor best business practices. We need
support for sustained funding of our shipbuilding account--consistent
with the 30-year plan--that is critical to provide our partners in
industry the stability they need to curb cost growth and sustain our
vital shipbuilding industrial base.
To build a fleet for the future and strong partnerships, we seek
congressional support in the following areas:
11 Carrier Force. The 30-year shipbuilding plan
recognizes that as a result of the retirement of U.S.S.
Enterprise in fiscal year 2013, the number of aircraft carriers
will drop to 10 for a period of approximately 30 months, until
the U.S.S. Gerald Ford enters active service. Legislative
relief is required from the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2007 requiring a carrier force of 11. In
developing the 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan, Navy conducted
extensive analysis that concluded the temporary drop to a
carrier force of 10 from fiscal year 2013 through fiscal year
2015 is an acceptable, though moderate, risk. A carrier force
of 11 is recognized as minimum risk over the long run.
Littoral Combat Ship. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
program remains of critical importance to our Navy. Current
cost estimates exceed established thresholds for detail design
and construction of LCS-1, the lead Lockheed Martin hull. This
recent cost growth has provided an opportunity to reinforce the
Navy's commitment to providing warfighting capability through
affordability. The Navy is executing a pause in the
construction of LCS-3, the second Lockheed Martin hull, to
conduct a thorough review of the program, and to examine both
internal and external factors relating to the acquisition and
contracting processes, practices, and oversight and the related
impact on cost. The Navy remains committed to bringing Littoral
Combat Ship capability into the Fleet quickly and by means of
an acquisition strategy that is executable, affordable, and in
the best interests of the Navy.
Virginia Class Multi-Year Procurement (MYP). Navy is
seeking multi-year procurement authority in fiscal year 2008
for Virginia Class submarine contracts beginning with the
fiscal year 2009 ship. Continued MYP authority will help
maintain a stable SCN profile and greatly aid in Virginia Class
cost reduction initiatives. In order to support our long-term
submarine force structure of 48 boats, Navy plans to increase
the build rate of this Class to 2/year beginning in fiscal year
2012.
Split Funding for Zumwalt Class DDG. The support of
Congress for last year's split funding request was greatly
appreciated. This year Navy requests the second half of split
year funding for dual lead ships of the Zumwalt Class destroyer
to maximize competitive efficiencies and focus design efforts.
Split funding will also lend stability to the shipbuilding
industrial base. This funding strategy supports the current
budget structure, enhances future competitive opportunities,
and limits liability for appropriations in future years.
Joint Strike Fighter. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
remains the cornerstone of Navy's continuing superiority in air
warfare. Although risk associated with the recent 2 year slide
in the carrier variant of the F-35 will be mitigated by an
increased buy of F/A-18 E,F variants, there should be no doubt
that JSF is a much more capable aircraft. I encourage your
continued strong support of this program to guard against
further delays in production.
Legacy Expeditionary Aircraft Replacment. As our
aging, legacy aircraft reach the end of the service lives,
funding for follow-on programs becomes critical. Among these
programs are the P-8A multi-mission maritime aircraft, the F/A
18-E/F and JSF, the EA-18G airborne electronic attack aircraft,
the V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft, and the MH-60R/S and CH-53K
helicopters. Navy's RDT&E program is also vital to this effort.
Research and Development. To achieve the speed of war
Navy is pursuing Innovative Naval Prototypes (INPs)--
revolutionary ``game changers'' for future naval warfare. These
initiatives have resulted in the development of an electro-
magnetic rail-gun prototype; new concepts for persistent,
netted, littoral ASW; technologies to enable Sea-basing; and
the naval tactical utilization of space.
Public Shipyard Loading. As we work with industry on
shipbuilding cost reduction, we must ensure legislation and
policy support best business practices and efficiencies.
Apportioning work based upon funding quotas to drive work-
loading in public Naval shipyards potentially diverts
efficiency opportunities away from the private sector. Public
yards provide vital services for nuclear propulsion and
submarine work, and these critical competencies must be
maintained. However, our first priorities in shipyard loading
should be quality, efficiency, and cost savings. We seek your
assistance in removing restrictions on our work-loading
flexibility.
Shore Installations and BRAC V. In addition to our
ships and airplanes, another critical piece of Force Structure
is our shore infrastructure, to include installations, piers
and support facilities, training ranges, schoolhouses,
hospitals, and housing. Supporting a ``Surge Navy'' demands we
create an infrastructure that leverages advanced technology,
sound investment and intelligent sustainment for the Fleet, for
our sailors and their families. The Navy's Ashore Vision 2030
is our roadmap for transforming the Navy shore infrastructure
over the next 25 years; it is aligned with the congressionally-
mandated Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process.
The Continuing Resolution (CR) voted into Public Law in
February 2007, decreased Department of Defense BRAC V funding
from $5.6B request to $2.5 billion. Without supplemental
funding to remedy the $3.1 billion reduction this law made in
the DOD BRAC request, Navy's BRAC V funding will essentially be
cut from $675 million to $291 million--a 57-percent reduction.
This would devastate a program entering the critical stages of
execution. This reduction would also delay, or in some cases
negate, our ability to harvest savings and reap funds from land
sales and transfers. Should this shortfall be remedied through
fiscal year 2007 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations funding,
Navy would do its best to minimize the impact of this delay
through prompt execution of funds.
MHC Transfers. Legislative authority for planned ship
transfers are an important aspect of inter-operability with the
navies of our allies. These transfers also contribute to the
1,000 ship Navy vision by building partner nation capacity,
while reducing the taxpayer costs of maintaining or disposing
of decommissioned ships. Navy seeks authority to transfer
coastal mine hunting ships (MHCs) to Lithuania and Turkey.
Limited in speed and endurance, the MHCs were designed as non-
deploying assets. With no sweep capability and without
redundant engineering and combat systems equipment, they are
constrained in their ability to conduct mine clearance
operations. For the MHCs to provide utility in a Homeland
Defense role, they would have to be strategically distributed
across the United States which would drain limited fiscal and
manpower resources and hamper the Navy's ability to field a
responsive and capable MCM force. These ships are scheduled for
decommissioning in fiscal year 2008 and if authority is timely,
they can be ``hot transferred'' which is less expensive for
both the United States and the recipient.
United Nations Law of the Sea Convention. To interact
more effectively with our maritime partners, it is time to
ratify the Law of the Sea Convention. Robust operational and
navigational rights codified in the Law of the Sea Convention
must be preserved for the Navy to continue to maximize its
ability to execute the National Strategy for Maritime Security.
Accession to the Convention is of critical importance to global
naval maritime and over flight mobility.
III. Develop 21st Century Leaders
A. Fiscal Year 2006 in Review
In fiscal year 2006, Navy continued to meet recruiting and
retention goals for most ratings and designators in the active and
Reserve components. We achieved 100 percent of our overall active
component enlisted recruiting goal, and our overall enlisted retention
goal was exceeded at 104 percent. We met 98 percent of our overall
active component officer accession goal and 99 percent of our active
officer end strength goal. Navy will continue to remain vigilant in
what is proving to be an increasingly difficult recruiting environment.
Fiscal Year 2006 was the 5th year of support for the global war on
terror. Continued wartime OPTEMPO for Operations OIF and OEF has raised
concern for the health and welfare of some parts of our expeditionary
force. Medical ratings and designators, Explosive Ordnance Disposal
(EOD) personnel, Divers, Special Warfare Combat Crewmen (SWCC), and
SEALs remained recruiting challenges.
Last year, Navy put a great deal of effort into analyzing and
addressing the root causes of these recruiting shortfalls. New
authorities provided in the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2007, such as increased accession bonuses and college
stipends, are expected to help mitigate medical officer recruiting
challenges. Increased accession bonuses for SEAL/Navy Special Warfare
ratings and improved training techniques to reduce attrition will help
us meet future requirements in our Global War on Terror intensive
ratings.
The Expeditionary Combat Readiness Center (ECRC), a command within
the NECC, was established in fiscal year 2006 as the single process
owner for the deployment of Navy Individual Augmentees (IA) and In-lieu
of (ILO) forces, of which the Navy is currently fielding over 10,000
sailors. The ECRC helps organize, process, train, equip, and deploy
IAs, providing reach-back support and eventually helping them re-
integrate with their parent command. Additionally, all active duty
Sailors now process through one of four Navy Mobilization Processing
Sites (NMPS) which has greatly enhanced consistency in processing
between our Active and Reserve components. The ECRC NMPS and are
helping Navy process IAs while meeting a goal of 60 day advanced
notification of deployment.
Central to Navy's ability to sustain overall readiness,
particularly in support the global war on terror through the Individual
Augmentee program, was, and is, the near-seamless integration of our
Active and Reserve components. Since 11 September 2001, over 42,000
Navy reservists have been mobilized in support of the global war on
terror, representing over 80 percent of the total number of sailors
deployed on the ground in theater. On any given day, over 20,000
citizen-sailors are on some type of Active Duty (AD) or Inactive Duty
(ID) orders at their supported commands meeting global COCOM
requirements. This number includes about 5,000 RC sailors mobilized in
support of OIF and OEF. Additionally, we maintain the capacity to
rapidly increase contingency support with more than 28,000 RC sailors
yet to be mobilized.
Navy's Active/Reserve Integration program (ARI) aligns Reserve
component (RC) and Active component (AC) personnel, training,
equipment, and policy to achieve unity of command. It leverages both
budgetary and administrative efficiencies, as well as ensuring that the
full weight of Navy resources and capabilities are under the authority
of a single commander. Navy reservists are aligned and fully integrated
into their AC supported commands, and often conduct ``flex-drilling,''
putting multiple drill periods together to provide longer periods of
availability when requested. This flexibility enables our Reserve
sailors to better balance the schedules and demands of their civilian
employers and families while achieving greater technical proficiency,
more cohesive units and increased readiness.
The Reserve component is a critical enabler of the ``Sailor for
Life'' concept that is central to our Strategy for our People. This
approach to recruiting, retention, and professional development
explores innovative opportunities for career on-ramps and off-ramps,
providing fluidity between the Active and Reserve components. Last
year, Navy continued to actively pursue incentives that will develop a
more adaptable, better educated, and more highly skilled workforce
while encouraging sailors to serve longer and more productively.
Based on national demographic trends and the pace of globalization,
it is clear we must build a more diverse Navy. According to the U.S.
Census Bureau, by 2030 African Americans will comprise approximately 14
percent of the population nationally, Hispanics 20 percent, and Asians/
Pacific Islanders/Other 10 percent. Our officer corps currently
consists of 81 percent non-minority and our enlisted ranks are
approximately 52 percent non-minority. To ensure we have the best
people, from the widest talent pool available, we must do a better job
of recruiting and retaining our Nation's young minority students.
B. Current Status of Our Sailors and Civilians
Perhaps no where else in our Navy is the pace of change more
profoundly felt than in our manpower, personnel, and training
enterprise. It is here that the dynamics of globalization, cultural
diversity, advancing technologies, generational differences, changes in
the labor market, and declining numbers of hard science degrees among
America's youth combine to make recruiting and retention more
challenging than ever.
Currently, only 3 in 10 high school graduates meet the minimum
criteria for military service, including academic/mental, physical, and
social/legal requirements. With all four armed services, a great number
of colleges and universities, as well as corporate America seeking
talented and qualified high school graduates, competition is stiff.
If we are to pace the security challenges of this century, our
sailors and civilian workforce must evolve with our weapons systems. We
must recruit today the young men and women who will be leading the
Fleet tomorrow. This will be a more specialized, technically capable,
better educated, more culturally diverse and aware Navy than we have
today. It will be smaller.
Unfortunately, the old model of recruiting and detailing in which
we focused on simply filling specific requirements, is no longer
sufficient. Today, and in the future, as we reduce the size of our
force to align it with increasingly sophisticated systems in a complex
security environment, we must strive to FIT the right person to match
the requirements. As we eliminate excess infrastructure ashore and
increase our global outreach and persistent presence forward, the ratio
of sea to shore billets will become more balanced. In order to make the
right FIT for each individual sailor, we must be mindful of providing
geographic stability, satisfying work, personal and professional
development, and, to the degree possible, predictability in their
future assignments.
Admittedly, we could adapt more easily to the rapidly changing
security environment if we could focus on a specific enemy or choose
between effectiveness in irregular warfare or major combat operations--
between asymmetric or conventional threats. Unfortunately, we cannot
choose; we must prepare for both.
Nor can we make it the responsibility of each sailor to
individually sort out priorities or determine how to accommodate the
greater breadth of learning and the depth of experience the future
requires. Rather, we must adjust our personnel strategies to account
for the dynamic nature of the demands on our people while assuring a
predictable availability of current capability and future capacity
suitable to the needs of the Joint Force and the Nation.
As we develop and build more efficient and automated ships, planes,
and combat systems, personnel reductions are inevitable, and as crew
sizes decrease, the skill level and specialization requirements
increase. The Navy has reduced its active end strength by some 35,000
sailors over the last 4 years. In 2003 our Active component consisted
of 375,700 sailors; at the end of fiscal year 2007 we will have
340,700; and, by the end of fiscal year 2008 we will have 328,400. As
we look ahead to the smaller, more capable ships entering service in
the FYDP, we anticipate a stabilization of that trend at an active end-
strength between 320,000 and 325,000. We are also trimming our Reserve
component which will have gone from a total of 87,800 in 2003 to a
total of 71,300 at the end of fiscal year 2007 and 67,800 by the end of
fiscal year 2008. But these reductions are more about shaping the right
force, than simply trimming its size. Our priority, then, is to recruit
some 45,000 active sailors with the right mix of diversity, education,
and skill sets necessary to serve our Fleet in 2009 and beyond.
The Strategy for our People provides the framework through which we
will size, shape, and stabilize the Navy Total Force. The execution of
Navy's overarching Strategy for Our People focuses on six goals:
capability driven management; a competency based workforce; an
effective Total Force; increased diversity; being competitive in the
Marketplace; and, being agile and cost efficient. The achievement of
these goals depends on our ability to execute our programs of record.
This strategy will satisfy future Joint warfighting needs by
attracting, retaining, and better educating sailors and civilians
capable of adapting and responding to mission needs anytime, anyplace,
anywhere. [Figure 2]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Capability driven manpower. . . . Warfighting missions and
operations have become more complex and uncertain. Navy work and
workforce requirements are constantly shifting and evolving with
changes in required operational, political and strategic capabilities.
Basing manpower requirements on current and projected warfighting needs
will ensure we meet today's operational requirements while continuously
updating and balancing the workforce as needs change.
A competency based workforce. . . . The Force Planning Concept
suggests the joint force must develop unique capabilities that fall
outside the realm of conventional warfighting. This means an expansion
of the Navy workforce requirements beyond traditional roles (e.g.
Maritime Civil Affairs Group). Developing the workforce based on
competencies allows the Navy to continuously evaluate critical skills
and create a workforce well-matched to the needs of the warfighters. A
competency-based workforce also enables the Navy to determine where
there is workforce commonality (or exclusivity) across a range of
military operations so efficiencies can be realized.
An effective Total Force. . . . A constrained fiscal environment
and workforce reductions demand our focus on applying the best
resources to jobs as creatively as necessary. Viewing workforce
components as one integrated team of sailors and civilians provides
flexibility and reduces risk while better meeting warfighting needs.
Leveraging the strength of the Total Force provides maximum flexibility
in applying the right skill-set to a requirement in the most cost-
efficient manner.
Diversity. . . . The changing demographics of the American
population and the diversity of our missions in the world demand Navy
take proactive steps to ensure it has access to the full range of the
Nation's talent. Leveraging the strength of the Nation's diversity
creates an environment of excellence and continuous improvement, in
which artificial barriers to achievement are removed and the
contributions of all participants are valued.
Being competitive in the Marketplace. . . . The Navy is faced with
recruiting and retention challenges in an era of increased military
operations, a strong civilian economy, and a decreasing propensity for
military service. To remain competitive with the other Services,
academic institutions, and corporate America the Navy must revise and
update its personnel policies and programs so it is attractive to the
desired talent base and successfully competes with the private sector
for the best talent.
Being agile and cost efficient. . . . Expanding capability-driven
workforce requirements and fiscal constraints require the Navy to
deliver a more capable, versatile force. Agility means swiftly
developing and implementing strategies, policies and processes to
proactively meet evolving needs and challenges while focusing on the
skills and abilities most in demand right now. Cost-efficient means we
do this economically and without fiscal waste.
Education is another area that will be treated as a strategic
investment in our future. Our Education Strategy must reflect the
technological basis of our core warfighting skills, the interdependence
of joint and combined operations, the complexity of decisionmaking, and
the sophisticated regional knowledge and grasp of political-military
issues expected of Navy leaders. The objective of the Education
Strategy is to enhance overall performance excellence in current and
future joint operations and operations support by addressing the
individual needs of those who are currently serving as well as the
future force.
C. Requirements to Develop 21st Century Leaders
The challenges we face in shaping the force are considerable. We
must deliver on the strategy for our people.
To develop 21st century leaders, we seek congressional support in
the following areas:
Combat Casualty Care. The objective of Navy's combat
casualty care is to maximize the continuum of quality care with
lifesaving interventions as close to the battlespace as
possible and with no decrease in quality of service during
rehabilitation and recuperation. On the battlefield this
includes forward surgical access and capabilities that have
resulted in dramatically improved survival rates; diagnosis of
mild/moderate traumatic brain injury/closed-head injury;
improved patient care during transport; and, careful monitoring
of mental health surveys administered during and after
deployment to combat areas. After leaving the combat area,
there is a 99.2 percent survival rate once an injured sailor
reaches a Navy Medical Treatment Facility. Navy supports the
Secretary's ongoing review of Walter Reed Army Medical Center
and the National Naval Medical Center at Bethesda and is
currently and seperately evaluating, through our Inspector
General, the material condition and Quality of Service at each
of our Navy Medical Treatment Facilities.
Our highest priority is to win the global war on terror.
Second only to this is our determination to take care of those
wounded in this fight and their families.
Health Care Cost Control. The Navy is committed to
ensuring our sailors and their families receive top quality
health care throughout the continuum of service. By 2009 our
Navy will not only be smaller, it will be leaner. Health care
costs continue to rise at a rate disproportionate to inflation.
DOD TRICARE costs have more than doubled in 5 years from $19
billion in fiscal year 2001 to $38 billion in fiscal year 2006,
and analysts project these costs could reach $64 billion by
2015--more than 12 percent of DOD's anticipated budget (versus
8 percent today). Yet this problem extends beyond our active
duty, or even our Reserve, health care costs. One of the
significant drivers of this increased cost is the TRICARE for
Life program developed for the 2001 National Defense
Authorization Act.
We could not have anticipated the growing number of retirees
and their dependents, not yet Medicare eligible, who have
chosen or have been driven to switch from private/commercial
health care plans to TRICARE in order to better cope with
rising health care costs. Despite greatly increased utilization
rates, TRICARE Premiums have not changed with inflation since
the program began in 1995, so that total beneficiary cost
shares have declined substantially--27 percent of total benefit
cost in 1995 while 12 percent in 2005. In fact, from fiscal
year 2008 to fiscal year 2013, Navy's accrual costs for future
retirees alone are expected to increase by $4 billion (a 16-
percent increase) despite a flattened and stabilized end
strength over that same period of time.
There is no longer any tolerance for inefficiencies in our
manpower system and very little flexibility in our MPN account.
This has a carry-over effect by further pressurizing our
procurement accounts. We again urge Congress to implement the
initiatives and administrative actions that will restore
appropriate cost sharing relationships between beneficiaries
and the Department of Defense.
DOPMA Relief. While Navy end strength is reduced and
stabilizes across the FYDP, the demand continues to increase
for experienced officers to fill joint requirements, core
mission areas and jobs related to the war on terror. Navy is
already operating at or near control grade limits imposed by
Title 10, resulting in billet-grade suppression. Navy currently
suppresses 106 captain, 279 commander, and 199 lieutenant
commander billets at a lower pay grade (a total of 584 control
grade billets). If title 10 limits were increased by 5 percent,
Navy would be authorized to grow 131 captains, 304 commanders,
and 478 lieutenant commanders. Funding to current control-grade
requirements would give Navy the authority to grow 25 captains,
25 commanders, and 279 lieutenant commanders as future control-
grade requirements emerge. This legislation is critical to
Navy's ability to carry out the National Military Strategy.
Special Pay and Incentives. Navy will continue to seek
funding for special pay, recruitment and retention bonus to
maintain the right balance of skills out workforce.
Sailor for Life. Navy requires assistance in providing
sufficient flexibility in transitioning between our Active and
Reserve components as we pursue our sailor-for-life
initiatives.
Path to Jointness. The Navy is committed to pursuing a
Path to Jointness--developing Joint leaders both in the officer
and senior enlisted communities. We are pursuing initiatives
that will: establish the professional military education (PME)
requirements for the ranks of E-1 through O-8 across our Active
and Reserve components; ensure that PME graduates are closely
tracked and assigned to billets that exploit their education
and accelerate their development as Joint leaders; assess
policy effectiveness by tracking the number and percentages of
PME graduates assigned to career enhancing billets, and require
100 percent fill of Navy resident student billets at all joint,
Service and foreign war colleges.
Tuition Assistance. The Navy is committed to
supporting its sailors who choose education as a path to
personal and professional development. The Navy provides 100
percent reimbursement up to $250 and $50 per semester hour for
up to 16 credit hours. This is an increase from previous policy
which only allowed reimbursement up to 12 credit hours. Tuition
assistance is capped by DOD at $4,500 per person per fiscal
year.
National Security Personnel System (NSPS). NSPS is a
new personnel system that will create new civil service rules
for the 750,000 Defense Department civilian workers. It
strengthens our ability to accomplish the mission in an ever-
changing national security environment. NSPS accelerates
efforts to create a Total Force (Active-Duty military
personnel, civilian personnel, Reserve, Guard, and
contractors), operating as one cohesive unit, with each
performing the work most suitable to their skills and the
Department's priorities. The Department of the Navy needs a
Human Resource system that appropriately recognizes and rewards
employees' performance and the contributions they make to the
mission. NSPS gives us better tools to attract and retain good
employees.
Department of the Navy deployment of the remaining portions
of NSPS continues. Pay and performance provisions have so far
been deployed to approximately 4,000 employees and another
16,000 will be done by spring 2007. Further deployment of non-
enjoined portions of the law will continue. Specifically, the
pay, performance, recruiting, workforce shaping and other
provisions of this new personnel system will be enacted
throughout 2007-2008.
IV. Conclusion
Our Navy is truly a bargain, costing the taxpayers less than 1
percent of the GDP. Though we are increasingly stretched, the Navy is
in great shape and our people are remarkable. But as we strive to
sustain combat readiness, build a fleet for the future and develop 21st
century leaders we cannot allow ourselves to take this for granted. We
must be mindful of the need to maintain a strong Navy now, with our
ground forces stretched thin in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also after
they return home.
Our Nation depends upon a strong Navy with the global reach and
persistent presence needed to provide deterrence, access, and
assurance, while delivering lethal warfighting capacity whenever and
wherever it is needed. Our Navy is fighting the global war on terror
while at the same time providing a Strategic Reserve worldwide for the
President and our unified and combatant commanders. As we assess the
risks associated with the dynamic security challenges that face us, we
must ensure we have the battle force, the people, and the combat
readiness we need to win our Nation's wars.
We have put the rudder over, and I believe we have the course about
right. Simply reacting to change is no longer an acceptable course of
action if our Navy is to successfully wage asymmetric warfare and
simultaneously deter regional and transnational threats: Two
Challenges, One Fleet. Our nation's security and prosperity depend upon
keeping our shores safe and the world's maritime highways open and
free.
ANNEX I
programs and initiatives to achieve cno priorities
Sustain Combat Readiness
Programs and practices of particular interest include (listed in
order of fiscal year 2008 dollar value):
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS)
MUOS is the next generation Ultra High Frequency (UHF) narrowband
satellite communications (SATCOM) system, replacing UHF Follow-On
(UFO). MUOS supports communications-on-the-move to small and less
stable platforms (handhelds, aircraft, missiles, UAVs, remote sensors)
in stressed environments (foliage, urban environment, high sea state).
UHF SATCOM provides critical command and control connectivity and is
the essential common denominator for all forces. $828 million in fiscal
year 2008 keeps MUOS funded to meet all Threshold requirements and is
on track to meet an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in 2010.
Nimitz-Class Refueling Complex Overhaul (RCOH)
RCOH subjects Nimitz-class aircraft carriers to comprehensive
modernization upgrades, maintenance work, and nuclear refueling to
extend the service life of a Nimitz-class carrier out to approximately
50 years, about 20 years longer than its originally planned service
life. Execution of RCOH is required to maintain an 11 aircraft carrier
force and provide Naval Tactical Air with an overmatch capability
against any potential adversary. A notional RCOH consists of 3.2
million man-days and a 36-month execution period conducted at Northrop
Grumman Newport News, Virginia facilities. While U.S.S. Carl Vinson
(CVN-70) completes RCOH in fiscal year 2008-2009, the fiscal year 2008
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) funding of $297 million
primarily supports the advance funding and sequencing of follow-on
overhauls for CVNs-71-73.
Cobra Judy Replacement (CJR)
$133 million in CJR funds the acquisition of a single ship-based
radar suite for world-wide technical data collection against ballistic
missiles in flight. This unit will replace the current Cobra Judy/
U.S.N.S. Observation Island, which is due to leave service in 2012.
Upon achieving Initial Operating Capability, Navy will transfer the CJR
to the U.S. Air Force for operation and maintenance. The CJR program
has entered production stage.
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC)
CEC is an advanced sensor netting system enabling real-time
exchange of fire-control quality data between battle force units. CEC
provides the integrated, precision air defense picture required to
counter the increased agility, speed, maneuverability, and advanced
design of cruise missiles, manned aircraft; and in the future, tactical
ballistic missiles. Funding requested for fiscal year 2008 is $123
million.
CEC's acquisition strategy implements Open Architecture based
hardware with re-hosted existing software. A critical element is the
P3I hardware that reduces cost, weight, cooling, and power
requirements. The Integrated Architecture Behavior Model (IABM) will be
implemented as a host combat system software upgrade replacing the
cooperative engagement processor functionality enabling joint
interoperability with common track management across the Services.
Distributed Common Ground/Surface Systems (DCGS)
DCGS-N is the Navy's Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance,
and Targeting (ISR&T) system. Funded at $107 million in fiscal year
2008, DCGS-N will support the new Maritime Headquarters/Maritime
Operations Center (MHQ/MOC). DCGS-N will receive and process multiple
data streams from various ISR sources to provide time-critical aim
points and intelligence products. It will enhance the warfighter's
Common Operational Picture (COP) and Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).
Deployable Joint Command and Control (DJC2)
DJC2 is a Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff priority transformation initiative providing Combatant Commanders
(COCOMs) with a standardized, deployable, and scalable Joint C2
headquarters capability tailored to support Joint Task Force (JTF)
operations. DJC2 enables a COCOM to rapidly deploy and activate a JTF
headquarters equipped with a common C2 package with which to plan,
control, coordinate, execute, and assess operations across the spectrum
of conflict and domestic disaster relief missions. This budget request
of $31 million provides operations and sustainment for the six existing
systems and continued development efforts.
Navy Special Warfare (NSW) Support
NSW programs provide critical service common support to eight SEAL
teams, two SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams, three Special Boat Teams and
five NSW Groups.
During fiscal years 2007 and 2008, six pre-positioned operational
stocks will be procured and staged, hundreds of common small arms,
weapons mounts and visual augmentation systems will be provided to NSW
combat elements, up to 20 standard boats will continue to replace an
aging fleet of 61 NSW training support craft and 4 Navy-mandated
management support systems will be funded. A total of $21 million in
various procurement and operations support accounts is dedicated in
fiscal year 2008.
Navy Computer Network Attack (CNA)
Navy Computer Network Attack develops force structure for
operations in the cyberspace environment. This is the programmatic
continuation of Navy Cyber Attack Team (NCAT) initiative which is
endorsed by several Combatant Commanders. Program focus is on unique
capabilities to address Navy warfighting gaps. Our $11 million fiscal
year 2008 investment is required to develop the capability to access
adversary networks and enable Information Operations (IO) in asymmetric
warfare.
Marine Mammal Research/Sound in Water Effects
The Navy is committed to following proactive compliance strategies
to meet legal requirements and to identify and fund marine mammal
research requirements--especially related to potential effects of mid-
frequency active sonar. In support, Navy has requested $10 million in
funding for these efforts in fiscal year 2008. Compliance with Marine
Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), Endangered Species Act (ESA), Coastal
Zone Management Act (CZMA), and National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) related to potential effects to marine animals from sound in the
water are dependent on filling gaps in scientific data and continued
research on acoustic criteria. However, increasing pressures related to
restricting the use of active sonar are adversely impacting Navy
training and readiness. Clearer, science-based standards are needed in
future MMPA amendments to ensure environmental protection while not
endangering our sailors.
Forward Deployed Naval Forces (Japan)
U.S.S. George Washington (CVN-73) will replace U.S.S. Kitty Hawk
(CV-63) as the forward deployed aircraft carrier in Yokosuka, Japan in
2008. The move represents a strong and continuing commitment to the
security of the Asian Pacific region and our alliance.
George Washington will be the first nuclear aircraft carrier to
join the Navy's permanently forward deployed naval forces (FDNF),
replacing the conventionally powered the Kitty Hawk that will retire
after 47 years of superb service. Funding of $9 million in fiscal year
2008 supports the final of several years investments for George
Washington's anticipated 2008 FDNF arrival.
TRIDENT
TRIDENT is maritime intelligence production capability within the
Office of Naval Intelligence providing tailored, focused, timely
intelligence support to Naval Special Warfare (NSW) and other joint
special operations forces operating in the maritime arena. For a
relatively small investment in fiscal year 2008 of $9 million, TRIDENT
production directly supports the Global War on Terror and is a response
to ongoing initiatives to improve intelligence support to NSW. TRIDENT
deployed its initial two Tactical Intelligence Support Teams (TIST) in
support of Naval Special Warfare in the Spring and Fall of 2006. They
are currently providing both forward deployed and reach back support to
NSW forces.
Undersea Warfare Training Range (USWTR)
The proposed USWTR is a 500-square nautical mile instrumented
underwater training range in shallow littoral waters on each coast.
USWTR will support undersea warfare (USW) training exercises for the
Atlantic and Pacific Fleet Forces. Undersea hydrophone sensors will
provide a suite to deliver real time tracking and a record of
participants' activities used to evaluate tactics, proficiency and
undersea warfare combat readiness. The instrumented area would be
connected to shore via a single trunk cable.
Pending signature of the environmental Record of Decision (ROD) for
the east coast USWTR in April 2008, the Navy will commence hardware
procurement and installation in fiscal year 2008. Supporting this, Navy
has requested $7 million in fiscal year 2008. The west coast ROD is
scheduled for signature in September 2008. The shallow water ranges
planned for both coasts will be completed in fiscal year 2013.
Tactical Aircraft (TACAIR) Integration (TAI)
Our TACAIR Integration initiative merges Navy and Marine Corps
Tactical Aviation into a seamless Naval Aviation force at sea and
ashore. This is an organizational change that ``buys'' increased combat
capability without requiring additional investment.Naval Aviation force
projection is accomplished by increased integration of Marine tactical
squadrons into Carrier Air Wings and Navy squadrons into Marine
Aircraft Wings. Successful integration, also leveraging the common
characteristics of the F/A-18s, further enhances core combat
capabilities providing a more potent, cohesive, smaller and affordable
fighting force.
Build a Fleet for the Future
Programs and practices of particular interest (listed in order of
fiscal year 2008 dollar value):
RDT&E Development and Demonstration Funds
Navy's $15.9 billion investment in various technology, component,
and system development funds, as well as our operational development
and testing programs provide a balanced portfolio. Not only do they
ensure successful development of programs for our Fleet for the Future,
they also leverage the Fleet, Systems Commands, warfare centers, and
others to align wargaming, experimentation, and exercises in developing
supporting concepts and technologies.
DDG-1000
This multi-mission surface combatant, tailored for land attack and
littoral dominance, will provide independent forward presence and
deterrence and operate as an integral part of joint and combined
expeditionary forces. DDG-1000 will capitalize on reduced signatures
and enhanced survivability to maintain persistent presence in the
littoral. The program provides the baseline for spiral development to
support future surface ships. Our fiscal year 2008 request is for $3.3
billion in shipbuilding and research funds.
With the Advanced Gun System (AGS) and associated Long Range Land
Attack Projectile (LRLAP) DDG-1000 will provide volume and precision
fires in support of Joint forces ashore. A Global Positioning System
(GPS) guided, 155 millimeter round, LRLAP will provide all weather
fires capability out to 83 nautical miles. Its Dual Band Radar
represents a significant increase in air defense capability in the
cluttered littoral environment. Investment in Open Architecture and
reduced manning will provide the Navy life cycle cost savings and
technology that can be retrofit to legacy ships.
Facilities Recapitalization and Sustainment
Facilities Recapitalization is comprised of modernization and
restoration. Modernization counters obsolescence by renewing a facility
to new standards or functions without changing the fundamental facility
size. Restoration includes efforts to restore degraded facilities to
working condition beyond design service life or to fix damage from
natural disaster, fire, etc. Restoration and modernization funding in
fiscal year 2008 is requested at $2.0 billion.
Facilities Sustainment includes those maintenance and repair
activities necessary to keep facilities in working order through their
design service life.
Navy's sustainment rate, and fiscal year funding request of $1.1
billion, is at the level at which facilities can be maintained and
still remain mission capable. Navy's intent is to aggressively scrub
requirements, reduce facilities footprint and drive down costs. Our
goal is to provide the resources required to execute wartime missions.
Our planning and footprint reduction initiatives are intended to ensure
that adequate facilities are available to support our mission
requirements.
CVN-21
The CVN-21 Program is designing the next generation aircraft
carrier to replace U.S.S. Enterprise (CVN-65) and Nimitz-class aircraft
carriers. CVN-78-class ships will provide improved warfighting
capability and increased quality of life for our sailors at reduced
acquisition and life cycle costs. $2.8 billion in shipbuilding funds
for fiscal year 2008 supports acquisition of U.S.S. Gerald R. Ford
(CVN-78), the lead ship of the class, scheduled for delivery in late
fiscal year 2015. Additionally, the program has $232 million in
research and development supporting work on the Electromagnetic
Aircraft Launch System and other warfighting capability improvements.
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
F-35 is a joint cooperative program to develop and field family of
affordable multi-mission strike fighter aircraft using mature/
demonstrated 21st century technology to meet warfighter needs of the
Navy, Marines, Air Force, and international partners including the
U.K., Italy, Netherlands, Denmark, Turkey, Norway, Australia, and
Canada. Navy's fiscal year 2008 $1.2 billion in procurement buys six
short take-off and landing variants. An additional $1.7 billion in
research and development continues aircraft and engine development.
Virginia Class Fast Attack Nuclear Submarine (SSN)
Navy needs to maintain a SSN force structure to meet current
operational requirements, prosecute the global war on terror, and face
any potential future threats. The Virginia class emphasizes
affordability and optimizes performance for undersea superiority in
littoral and open ocean missions.
Lead ship operational performance exceeded expectations. Follow-on
submarine performance has been even better:
U.S.S. Texas (SSN-775) INSURV trial was best
performance by the second SSN of any class.
Third ship (Hawaii, SSN-776) was the most complete
submarine ever at launch (greater than 90 percent complete),
had the best INSURV trial of the class, and was delivered on
the original contract delivery date.
$2.6 billion in fiscal year 2008 procures one submarine.
Additionally, the budget requests $137 million for technical insertions
and cost reduction developments. Navy is working closely with industry
to bring the cost per hull down to $2 billion (in fiscal year 2005
dollars) and increase the build rate to two ships/year starting in
fiscal year 2012. Authorization of MYP will help facilitate this. This
will help mitigate future force level deficiencies and achieve cost
reduction goals through Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) savings and
better distributed overhead costs.
F/A-18E/F Super Hornet
The Navy's next generation, multi-mission Strike Fighter replaces
aging F-14s, older model F/A-18s, and assumes the S-3 aircraft carrier-
based aerial refueling role. F/A-18E/F provides a 40-percent increase
in combat radius, 50 percent increase in endurance, 25 percent greater
weapons payload, three times more ordnance bring-back, and is five
times more survivable than F/A-18C models. Approximately 55 percent of
the total procurement objective has been delivered (254 of 460). F/A-
18E/F is in full rate production under a second 5-year multi-year
contract (fiscal years 2005-2009). $2.3 billion in fiscal year 2008
procures 24 aircraft as part of this contract.
MV-22 Osprey
MV-22 Osprey is the Marine Corps medium-lift assault support
aircraft being procured to replace legacy CH-46Es and CH-53Ds. Current
operational projections hold CH-46Es in service through fiscal year
2018, and CH-53Ds through fiscal year 2013. The CH-46Es are playing a
critical role in the war on terror, flying more than four times their
peacetime utilization rate making delivery of the MV-22 even more
critical. The MV-22's improved readiness, survivability and
transformational capability (twice the speed, three times the payload,
and six times range of the airframes it is replacing) will vastly
improve operational reach and capability of deployed forces. The
aircraft is approved for Full Rate Production and enters a
congressionally approved joint 5-year, multi-year procurement in fiscal
year 2008 with $2.0 billion procuring 21 aircraft. The total Marine
requirement is 360 MV-22s; Navy 48 MV-22s; SOCOM 50 CV-22s.
DON Science & Technology (S&T)
The Department of the Navy S&T supports Navy/Marine strategy and
guides the S&T investment portfolio to meet the future needs of the
Navy, the Marine Corps, and combatant commands. The fiscal year 2008
budget of $1.7 billion is a balanced portfolio comprised of discovery
and invention, leap-ahead innovations, acquisition enablers, quick
reaction S&T and Defense Department partnerships. A long-term strategy
will help balance future risks.
EA-18G Growler
The Growler is the Navy's replacement for the EA-6B. Inventory
objective is 84 aircraft for test, Fleet Replacement Squadron,
attrition, pipeline and 10 operational carrier airwing squadrons to
provide the Navy's carrier-based Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA)
capability. The program is on schedule and budget. All Key Performance
Parameter (KPP) and Technical Performance Measure (TPM) thresholds are
being met or exceeded. Program achieved first flight in August 2006; 1
month ahead of schedule. $1.6 billion supports development and
procurement of 18 aircraft in fiscal year 2008.
MH-60R/S Multi-Mission Helicopter
The MH-60R is a cornerstone of the Navy's Helicopter Concept of
Operations (CONOPs), which reduces from six to two the helicopter
variants in use today. The MH-60R Multi-Mission Helicopter program will
replace the surface combatant-based SH-60B, carrier-based SH-60F, and
anti-surface capabilities of the S-3 with a newly manufactured airframe
and enhanced mission systems. Sea control missions include Undersea and
Surface Warfare. The MH-60R provides forward-deployed capabilities to
defeat area-denial strategies, allowing joint forces to project and
sustain power. Full Rate Production was approved in March 2006. $998
million in fiscal year 2008 procures 27 aircraft.
The MH-60S is designed to support Carrier and Expeditionary Strike
Groups in Combat Logistics, Search and Rescue, Vertical Replenishment,
Anti-Surface Warfare, Airborne Mine Countermeasures, Combat Search and
Rescue, and Naval Special Warfare mission areas. This program is in
production. This fiscal year, Block 2 of the program will see the IOC
of the first of five Organic Airborne Mine Countermeasures (OAMCM)
systems (AQS-20). The remaining four airborne mine countermeasure
systems will IOC between fiscal years 2008-2010. An armed helicopter
capability is also expected to enter IOC this year. $504 million in
fiscal year 2008 procures 18 aircraft.
LPD-17
LPD-17 functionally replaces LPD-4, LSD-36, LKA-113, and LST-1179
classes of amphibious ships for embarking, transporting and landing
elements of a Marine landing force in an assault by helicopters,
landing craft, amphibious vehicles, or by a combination of these
methods. $1.5 billion in this budget's shipbuilding request procures
LPD-25.
LHA(R)
LHA(R) replaces four aging LHA Class ships which are reaching the
end of their administratively extended service lives. LHA(R) Flight 0
is a modified LHD-1 Class variant designed to accommodate aircraft in
the future USMC Aircraft Combat Element (ACE) including JSF and MV-22.
The fiscal year 2008 request for $1.4 billion supports procurement of
the lead ship in the class.
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
Designed to be fast and agile, LCS will be a networked surface
combatant with capabilities optimized to assure naval and joint force
access into contested littoral regions. LCS will operate with focused-
mission packages that deploy manned and unmanned vehicles to execute a
variety of missions, including littoral ASW, anti-surface warfare (SUW)
and mine countermeasures (MCM). LCS will possess inherent capabilities
including homeland defense, Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) and
Special Operation Forces support. LCS will employ a Blue-Gold multi-
crewing concept for the early ships. The crews will be at a ``trained
to qualify'' level before reporting to the ship, reducing qualification
time compared to other ships.
The Navy has recently identified significant cost increases for the
lead ship in the LCS class (Lockheed Martin variant). A series of
increases in the contractor estimated cost of completion, the most
recent in December, highlighted the problem and initiated a thorough
analysis by both Navy and industry. After nearly 2 months of in-depth
study, the Navy has revalidated the warfighting requirement and
developed a restructured program plan for the LCS that improves
management oversight, implements more strict cost controls,
incorporates selective contract restructuring, and ensures delivery
within a realistic schedule.
Construction of LCS Hull #3 (Lockheed Martin) will be resumed under
revised contract terms that rebalance cost growth risk between
government and industry. Construction on LCS Hull #4 (General Dynamics)
will continue as long as costs remain defined and manageable. This plan
will provide for best value to the Navy for the completion of the first
four LCS ships, procurement of existing designs in fiscal years 2008-
2009 to fill critical warfighting gaps, and establishment of a sound
framework for transition to a single design in fiscal year 2010. The
Navy will work closely with Congress on reprogramming actions necessary
to bring this program forward.
P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA)
The P-8A replaces the P-3C Orion on a less than 1:1 basis. This
aircraft provides lethality against submarine threats, broad area
maritime and littoral armed ASW patrol, Anti-Surface Warfare, and
Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance. The P-8A is the only platform
with this operationally agile capability set. It fills combatant
commander requirements in major combat and shaping operations, as well
as the war on terror and homeland defense. The program has been
executed on time and on budget. Preliminary Design Review has
successfully completed and is now in the detailed design phase. $880
million in research and development funds is included in the fiscal
year 2008 budget. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) is planned in
fiscal year 2013.
E-2D Advanced Hawkeye
The E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (AHE) program will modernize the current
E-2C weapons system by replacing the radar and other aircraft system
components to improve nearly every facet of tactical air operations.
The modernized weapons system will be designed to maintain open ocean
capability while adding transformational littoral surveillance and
Theater Air and Missile Defense capabilities against emerging air
threats in the high clutter, electromagnetic interference, and jamming
environments. $866 million in fiscal year 2008 continues development
work and procures three Pilot Production Aircraft. The AHE will be one
of the four pillars contributing to Naval Integrated Fire Control-
Counter Air. The AHE program plans to build 75 new aircraft.
ASW Programs
The Navy continues to pursue research and development of
Distributed Netted Sensors (DNS); low-cost, rapidly deployable,
autonomous sensors that can be fielded in sufficient numbers to provide
the cueing and detection of adversary submarines far from the Sea Base.
Examples of our fiscal year 2008 request of $24 million in these
technologies include:
Reliable Acoustic Path, Vertical Line Array (RAP VLA).
A passive-only distributed system exploiting the deep water
propagation phenomena. In essence, a towed array vertically
suspended in the water column.
Deep Water Active Distributed System (DWADS). An
active sonar distributed system optimized for use in deep
water.
Deployable Autonomous Distributed System (DADS). A
shallow water array, using both acoustic and non-acoustic
sensors to detect passing submarines. DADS will test at sea in
fiscal year 2008.
Littoral ASW Multi-static Project (LAMP). A shallow
water distributed buoy system employing the advanced principles
of multi-static (many receivers, one/few active sources) sonar
propagation.
Further developing the Undersea Warfare Decision Support System
will leverage existing data-links, networks, and sensor data from air,
surface, and subsurface platforms and integrate them into a common ASW
operating picture with tactical decision aids to better plan, conduct,
and coordinate ASW operations. We are requesting $23 million in fiscal
year 2008 towards this system.
To engage the threat, our forces must have the means to attack
effectively the first time, every time. The Navy has continued a robust
weapons development investment plan including $293 million requested in
the fiscal year 2008 on such capabilities as:
High-Altitude ASW Weapons Concept (HAAWC). Current
maritime patrol aircraft must descend to very low altitude to
place ASW weapons on target, often losing communications with
the sonobuoy (or distributed sensor) field. This allows the
aircraft to remain at high altitude and conduct an effective
attack while simultaneously enabling the crew to maintain and
exploit the full sensor field in the process. This capability
will be particularly important in concert with the new jet-
powered P-8A MMA. A test is scheduled for May 2007.
Common Very Lightweight Torpedo (CVLWT). The Navy is
developing a 6.75'' torpedo suitable for use in the surface
ship and submarine anti-torpedo torpedo defense, and the
offensive Compact Rapid Attack Weapon (CRAW) intended for the
developing manned and unmanned aerial vehicles.
Finally, to defend our forces, key defensive technologies being
pursued include:
Surface Ship Torpedo Defense (SSTD). Program delivers
near-term and far-term torpedo defense. The planned fiscal year
2008 $16 million R&D investment supports ongoing development of
the 6-inch CVLWT which supports both the Anti-Torpedo Torpedo
(ATT) and the Compact Rapid Attack Weapon (CRAW). Also, several
capability upgrades to the AN/SLQ-25A (NIXIE) are being
incorporated to improve both acoustic and non-acoustic system
performance to counter current threat torpedoes. These
enhancements also support their use in the littorals and are
scheduled to complete in fiscal year 2009. The AN/WSQ-11 System
uses active and passive acoustic sensors for an improved
torpedo Detection Classification and Localization (DCL)
capability, and a hard kill Anti-Torpedo Torpedo (ATT) to
produce an effective, automated and layered system to counter
future torpedo threats. DCL improvements include lower false
alarm rates and better range determination.
Aircraft Carrier Periscope Detection Radar (CVN PDR).
An automated periscope detection and discrimination system
aboard aircraft carriers. System moves from a laboratory model,
currently installed on U.S.S. Kitty Hawk, to 12 units (1 per
carrier, 1 ashore) by fiscal year 2012. Fiscal year 2008 funds
of $7 million support this effort.
Platform Sensor Improvements. Against the quieter, modern diesel-
electric submarines, work continues on both towed arrays and hull
mounted sonars. Our $410 million request in fiscal year 2008 includes
work on the following:
TB-33 thin-line towed array upgrades to forward
deployed SSN's provides near-term improvement in submarine
towed array reliability over existing TB-29 arrays. TB-33
upgrades are being accelerated to Guam based SSNs.
Continued development of twin-line thin line (TLTL)
and vector-sensor towed arrays (VSTA) are under development for
mid-far term capability gaps. TLTL enables longer detection
ranges/contact holding times, improves localization, and
classification of contacts. VSTA is an Office of Naval Research
project that would provide TLTL capability on a single array
while still obviating the bearing ambiguity issue inherent in
traditional single line arrays.
Modernization
Achieving full service life from the fleet is imperative.
Modernization of the existing force is a critical enabler for a
balanced fleet. Platforms must remain tactically capable and
structurally sound for the duration of their designed service life.
Cruiser (Mod)
AEGIS Cruiser Modernization is key to achieving the 313 ship force
structure. A large portion of surface force modernization (including
industrial base stability) is resident in this modernization program.
$403 million across several appropriations in fiscal year 2008 supports
this program.
A comprehensive Mission Life Extension (MLE) will achieve the
ship's expected service life of 35+ years and includes the All Electric
Modification (replacing steam systems), SMARTSHIP technologies, Hull
Mechanical & Electrical (HM&E) system upgrades, and a series of
alterations designed to restore displacement and stability margins,
correct hull and deck house cracking and improve quality of life and
service on board.
Destroyer (Mod)
The DDG 51 modernization program is a comprehensive 62 ship program
designed to modernize HM&E and Combat Systems. These upgrades support
reductions in manpower and operating costs, achieve 35+ year service
life, and allows the class to pace the projected threat well into the
21st century. Our fiscal year 2008 request contains $159 million for
this effort.
Key upgrades to the DDG 51 AEGIS Weapon System (AWS) include an
Open Architecture computing environment, along with an upgrade of the
SPY Radar signal processor, addition of BMD capability, Evolved Sea
Sparrow Missile (ESSM), improved USW sensor, Naval Integrated Fire
Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) and additional other combat systems
upgrades.
Lewis & Clark Dry Cargo/Ammunition Ship (T-AKE)
T-AKE is intended to replace aging combat stores (T-AFS) and
ammunition (T-AE) ships. Working in concert with an oiler (T-AO), the
team can perform a ``substitute'' station ship mission to allow the
retirement of four fast combat support ships (AOE-1 Class). $456
million in fiscal year 2008 supports funding the 11th T-AKE (final
price will be determined through negotiations expected to be completed
during the summer 2007). Lead ship was delivered in June 2006 and has
completed operational evaluation (OPEVAL).
CH-53K
The CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR) is the follow on to the
Marine Corps CH-53E Heavy Lift Helicopter. The CH-53K will more than
double the current CH-53E lift capability under the same environmental
conditions. The CH-53K's increased capabilities are essential to
meeting the Marine Expeditionary Brigade of 2015 Ship-to-Objective
Maneuver vision. fiscal year 2008 research and development funds of
$417 million supports major systems improvements of the new helicopter
including: larger and more capable engines, expanded gross weight
airframe, better drive train, advanced composite rotor blades, modern
interoperable cockpit, external and internal cargo handling systems,
and survivability enhancements.
Tomahawk/Tactical Tomahawk (TACTOM)
Tomahawk and Tactical Tomahawk missiles provide precision, all
weather, and deep strike capabilities. Tactical Tomahawk provides more
flexibility and responsiveness at a significantly reduced life cycle
cost than previous versions and includes flex-targeting, in-flight
retargeting, and two-way communications with the missile.
Our $383 million in this years request sustains the Tomahawk Block
IV full-rate, multi-year procurement contract for fiscal years 2004-
2008, yielding approximately 2,100 missiles. The projected inventory
will accommodate campaign analysis requirements given historical usage
data and acceptable risk.
F/A-18 A/B/C/D Hornet
The F/A-18 Hornet is Naval Aviation's principal strike-fighter.
This state-of-the-art, multi-mission aircraft serves the Navy and
Marine Corps, as well as the armed forces of seven allied countries.
Its reliability and precision weapons delivery capability are
documented frequently in news reports from the front lines. $331
million in fiscal year 2008 supports improvements to the original
Hornet A/B/C/D variants provide significant warfighting enhancements to
the fleet. These improvements include the Global Positioning System
(GPS), Multi-functional Information Distribution System (MIDS), AIM-9X
Sidewinder Missile/Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS), Combined
Interrogator Transponder, Joint Direct Attack Munition/Joint Stand-Off
Weapon delivery capability, and a Digital Communication System (DCS)
for close-air support. Through these improvement and upgrades, the
aircraft's weapons, communications, navigation, and defensive
electronic countermeasure systems have been kept combat relevant.
Although the F/A-18 A/B/C/D are out of production, the existing
inventory of 667 Navy and Marine Corps aircraft will continue to
comprise half of the carrier strike force until 2013, and are scheduled
to remain in the Naval Aviation inventory through 2022.
CG(X)
CG(X) is envisioned to be a highly capable surface combatant
tailored for Joint Air and Missile Defense and Joint Air Control
Operations. CG(X) will provide airspace dominance and protection to all
joint forces operating in the Sea Base. Initial Operational Capability
(IOC) is 2019. $227 million in research and development for fiscal year
2008 supports CG(X) development. The ongoing analysis of alternatives
is considering various propulsion options. CG(X) will replace the CG-47
Aegis class and improve the fleet's air and missile defense
capabilities against an advancing threat--particularly ballistic
missiles.
Standard Missile-6 (SM-6)
The Navy's next-generation Extended Range, Anti-Air Warfare
interceptor is the SM-6. Supporting both legacy and future ships, SM-6
with its active-seeker technology will defeat anticipated theater air
and missile defense warfare threats well into the next decade. The
combined SM-6 Design Readiness Review/Critical Design Review was
completed 3 months ahead of schedule with SM-6 successfully meeting all
entrance and exit criteria. Ahead of schedule and on cost targets, our
fiscal year 2008 budget plan of $207 million will keep this development
effort on track for Initial Operational Capability in fiscal year 2010.
Conventional TRIDENT Modification (CTM)
CTM transforms the submarine launched, nuclear armed Trident II
(D5) missile system into a conventional offensive precision strike
weapon with global range. This new capability is required to defeat a
diverse set of unpredictable threats, such as Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD), at short notice, without the requirement for a
forward-deployed or visible presence, without risk to U.S. forces, and
with little or no warning prior to strike. $175 million is included in
the fiscal year 2008 request. The program and related policy issues are
currently under review by the Office of the Secretary of Defense as
part of the New Strategic Triad capability package.
Navy Unmanned Combat Air System (UCAS)
The former J-UCAS program transferred from Air Force to Navy lead.
The Navy UCAS will develop and demonstrate low observable (LO),
unmanned, air vehicle suitability to operate from aircraft carriers in
support of persistent, penetrating surveillance, and strike capability
in high threat areas. $162 million in fiscal year 2008 research and
development funds advance the programs objectives.
Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW)
JSOW is a low-cost, survivable, air-to-ground glide weapon designed
to attack a variety of targets in day/night and adverse weather
conditions from ranges up to 63 nautical miles. All variants employ a
kinematically efficient, low-signature airframe with GPS/INS guidance
capability. JSOW is additionally equipped with an imaging-infrared
seeker, Autonomous Targeting Acquisition (ATA) software, and a multi-
stage Broach warhead to attack both hard and soft targets with
precision accuracy. The $156 million in fiscal year 2008 funding
continues production to build to our inventory requirements. A Block
III improvement effort will add anti-ship and moving target capability
in fiscal year 2009.
Ohio-Class SSGN
Ohio-Class SSGN is a key transformational capability that can
covertly employ both strike and Special Operations Forces (SOF)
capabilities. Ohio (SSGN-726) and Florida (SSGN-728) were delivered
from conversion in December 2005 and April 2006 respectively and are
conducting modernization, certification, and acceptance evaluation
testing prior to deployment. Georgia (SSGN-729) is in conversion at
Norfolk Naval Shipyard with delivery scheduled for September 2007. The
$134 million in the fiscal year 2008 budget request is primarily for
testing, minor engineering changes, and to procure the final
replacement reactor core.
Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS), Unmanned Aircraft System
(UAS)
BAMS is a post-September 11, Secretary of the Navy directed
transformational initiative. $117 million in research and development
funding continues Navy's commitment to provide a persistent (24 hours/
day, 7 days/week), multi-sensor (radar, Electro-Optical/Infrared,
Electronic Support Measures) maritime intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance capability with worldwide access. Along with Multi-
Mission Aircraft, BAMS is integral to the Navy's airborne intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) recapitalization strategy. BAMS
is envisioned to be forward deployed, land-based, autonomously operated
and unarmed. It will sustain the maritime Common Operational Picture
(COP) and operate under the cognizance of the Maritime Patrol and
Reconnaissance Force.
Long-Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP)
LRLAP is the primary munition for the DDG-1000 Advanced Gun System
(AGS). AGS and LRLAP will provide Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) to
forces ashore during all phases of the land battle. All program flight
test objectives have been met. Six of nine guided test flights have
been successfully completed. Test failures have been isolated and
corrective actions implemented with successful re-tests fired.
$74 million in fiscal year 2008 supports continued development.
Current ammunition inventory estimates are based on conventional
ammunition calculation methods. A pending ammo study will account for
increased LRLAP range and precision to better inform decisions
regarding procurement schedule and total inventory objective.
MQ-8B Fire Scout Vertical Takeoff UAV (VTUAV)
The Navy Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical UAV (VTUAV) is
designed to operate from all air capable ships, carry modular mission
payloads, and operate using the Tactical Control System (TCS) and
Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL). VTUAV will provide day/night real
time reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition capabilities
as well as communications relay and battlefield management to support
the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) core mission areas of Anti-Submarine,
Mine, and Anti-Surface Warfare. It will be part of the LCS mission
module packages supporting these warfare missions. $71 million in
development and procurement funding supports engineering manufacturing
development, operational testing and achievement of initial operational
capability in fiscal year 2008.
Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) (Future)
$68 million in research and development in fiscal year 2008
supports our first year of procurement with (4) MPF(F) ships in fiscal
year 2009. MPF(F) provides a scalable, joint seabased capability for
the closure, arrival, assembly, and employment of up to the Marine
Expeditionary Brigade of 2015 sized force. It will also support the
sustainment and reconstitution of forces when required. MPF(F) is
envisioned for frequent utility in lesser contingency operations, and
when coupled with Carrier or Expeditionary Strike Groups, will provide
the Nation a rapid response capability in anti-access or denial
situations.
Direct Attack (DA) Munitions: JDAM, LGB, Dual Mode LGB, and Direct
Attack Moving Target
Inventories of direct attack munitions include Laser Guided Bombs
(LGB) and Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) weapons; both are
guidance kits for General Purpose bombs and strike fixed targets only.
The LGB guides on a laser spot which provides precise accuracy in clear
weather. JDAM provides Global Positioning / Inertial Guidance Systems
(GPS/INS) giving accurate adverse weather capability ($34 million in
fiscal year 2008). The Dual Mode LGB retrofit to LGB kits, procured in
fiscal years 2006-2007, increases flexibility by combining laser and
GPS/INS capabilities in a single weapon. The next evolutionary upgrade,
Moving Target Weapon (MTW), will combine laser and GPS/INS guidance
with moving target capability. Procurement is planned via a capability-
based competition, with MTW upgrading existing JDAM and/or LGB kit
inventories. $29 million supports this ongoing MTW effort in fiscal
year 2008.
Harpoon Block III Missile
Harpoon Block III represents the only long range, all weather,
precise, ship and air launched, Surface Warfare anti-ship capability.
$44 million in fiscal year 2008 supports development of a kit upgrade
to existing Harpoon Block IC, the addition of a data link and GPS that
will provide increased target selectivity and performance in the
cluttered littorals.
Pioneer Tactical Unmanned Aircraft Sensor (UAS)
The Pioneer UAS System is a transportable Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) asset capable of providing
tactical commanders with day and night, battlefield, and maritime
reconnaissance in support of Marine expeditionary warfare and maritime
control operations. The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $38 million in
operations and maintenance sustainment and $90 million in procurement
for the Army's Shadow RQ-7B UAS as an interim replacement for the
currently fielded Pioneer.
Language, Regional Expertise & Culture (LREC)
Achieving Navy's global strategy depends in part on our ability to
communicate with and comprehend adversaries, enduring allies, and
emerging partners. To facilitate this capability, Navy has developed a
way forward to transform LREC in the force. Consistent with the Defense
Language Transformation Roadmap and the Navy Strategic Plan (NSP), the
program incentivizes language proficiency, increases regional content
in NPME, provides non-resident language instruction to all sailors and
delivers in-residence training to more Officers.
Incentivization through higher foreign language proficiency pay
rates began June 2006. $33 million requested in fiscal year 2008
continues existing efforts and begins new initiatives of enhanced non-
resident (online) and resident (for officers) language training.
Extended Range Munition (ERM)
The concept for expeditionary operations relies on sea-based
surface fire support to aid in destruction and suppression of enemy
forces. The Extended Range Munition (ERM) is a 5-inch rocket assisted
guided projectile providing range and accuracy superior to that of
conventional ammunition. The projectile uses a coupled GPS/INS Guidance
System and unitary warhead with a height-of-burst fuze. $30 million in
fiscal year 2008 research and development funding includes a 20-
reliability demonstration before land-based flight and qualification
testing. The program includes modifications to existing 5 inch guns and
fire control systems. ERM will utilize the Naval Fires Control System
as the mission planning tool.
Automatic Identification System (AIS)
AIS is a commercially available shipboard broadcast Very High
Frequency (VHF) maritime band transponder system capable of sending and
receiving ship information, including Navigation Identification, and
Cargo. AIS significantly increases the Navy's ability to distinguish
between normal and suspicious merchant ships headed towards U.S. and
allied ports. Navy warships using AIS have observed dramatic increases
in situational awareness, safety of ship and intelligence gathering
capability. Programmed funding started in fiscal year 2007. Initially
funded in fiscal year 2006 from ONR Rapid Technology Transition
initiative and reprogramming, AIS shifted to programmed funding in
fiscal year 2007, and with our request of $28 million in fiscal year
2008, it transitions to become a program of record.
Global Hawk Maritime Demonstration (GHMD)
Using an existing Air Force production contract, the Navy procured
two GHMD Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and associated ground control
equipment. GHMD will be used for developing Concept of Operations and
Tactics, Training and Procedures for a persistent ISR maritime
capability in conjunction with the manned P-3 aircraft. The GHMD return
on investment will be risk reduction for the BAMS UAS Program. GHMD
provides a limited, high altitude, endurance UAV platform capability 8
years before the planned fiscal year 2014 IOC of BAMS. $18 million in
operations and maintenance and $6 million in procurement of spares
sustains the program in fiscal year 2008.
Remote Minehunting System (RMS)
RMS utilizes a diesel-powered, high endurance, off-board, semi-
submersible vehicle to tow the Navy's most advanced mine hunting sonar,
the AN/AQS-20A. The system will be launched, operated, and recovered
from surface ships. RMS will provide mine reconnaissance, detection,
classification, localization, and identification of moored and bottom
mines. $23 million in fiscal year 2008 supports the fielding plan
commencing this year providing limited systems for use on select DDGs,
48 RMSs for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Mine Warfare Mission
Packages, and an additional 16 vehicles as part of the LCS ASW Mission
Packages.
Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV)
Navy, along with the Army, SOCOM and Marine Corps, is working to
acquire a Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) that provides the required
intra-theater lift capability necessary to meet each service's
requirements. The acquisition of JHSV will address high-speed, intra-
theater surface lift capability gaps identified to implement Sea Power
21, the Army Future Force operational concepts and SOCOM future
operational plans. Additionally, it will improve intratheater lift
currently provided by Westpac Express and other leased vessels. JHSV is
currently in the Technology Development Phase with Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC) approval of the Capabilities Development
Document (CDD) anticipated soon. Navy's research and development
contribution in fiscal year 2008 is $19 million. Ultimate delivery of
the first vessel is anticipated in 2010.
Aerial Common Sensor (ACS)--Future EPX (EP-3E Replacement)
Navy is on a path to recapitalize the EP-3 airborne electronic
surveillance aircraft, and our $17 million in fiscal year 2008 research
and development funding contributes to this effort. ACS is the Navy's
premier manned Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaisance
(AISR) platform tailored to the maritime environment. ACS will provide
data fusion and a robust reach-back capability allowing onboard
operators to push intelligence to tactical commanders and operators in
mission support centers. With a network-centric approach, ACS
represents a significant capability in the Maritime Patrol and
Reconnaissance Force Family of Systems including MMA and BAMS UAS.
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense is the sea based component of the
Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).
It enables surface combatants to support ground-based sensors and
provides a capability to intercept Short and Medium Range Ballistic
Missiles with ship-based interceptors (SM-3 missiles). The recently
started Gap Filler Sea-Based Terminal Program will provide the ability
to engage Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) with modified SM-2
Block IV missiles from Aegis BMD capable ships. While all development
funding is covered under the MDA budget, Navy has committed $13 million
in fiscal year 2008 for operations and sustainment of Aegis BMD systems
as Navy assumes operational responsibility.
In May, 2006, U.S.S. Lake Erie (CG-70) successfully engaged and
intercepted a Lance short-range test target with a modified SM-2 Block
IV missile in a Navy-sponsored BMD demonstration. As a result, the Navy
is modifying the remaining inventory of 100 SM-2 Block IV missiles, and
MDA is modifying the Aegis BMD program to support sea-based terminal
engagements.
In June 2006, Navy successfully achieved a second engagement of a
separating SRBM target with the Aegis BMD system. This successful
engagement brings the tally to seven successful intercepts in nine
flight tests as of December 2006. Aegis BMD has been installed on 3
Cruisers and 13 Destroyers. All the Cruisers and three Destroyers are
engagement capable. The balance of the Destroyers are Long-Range
Surveillance and Track (LRS&T) capable. Additional installations are
planned for 2007.
In actual operations last July, U.S. and Japanese Aegis radar-
equipped Destroyers successfully monitored North Korea's ballistic
missile tests.
21" Mission Reconfigurable Unmanned Underwater Vehicle System
(MRUUVS)
21" MRUUVS is a submarine launched and recovered, reconfigurable
UUV system that will improve current capabilities in enabling assured
access. It will provide a robust capability to conduct clandestine
minefield reconnaissance and general Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) in denied or inaccessible areas. The MRUUVS
program has been restructured, moving Initial Operational Capability
(IOC) from fiscal year 2013 to 2016 when clandestine mine
countermeasure capability from Los Angles Class submarines will be
delivered. Accordingly, the fiscal year 2008 funding request has been
adjusted to $13 million. ISR capability and Virginia Class host
compatibility will arrive in follow-on increments approximately 2 years
after IOC.
Tactical Control System (TCS)
Research and development funding of $9 million in fiscal year 2008
continues work on the Tactical Control System. The program provides
interoperability and commonality for mission planning, command and
control, and interfaces for tactical and medium altitude UAV systems.
TCS software provides a full range of scaleable capabilities from
passive receipt of air vehicle and payload data to full air vehicle and
payload command and control from ground control stations both ashore
and afloat. TCS will be fielded with the Vertical Takeoff Unmanned Air
Vehicle (VTUAV) system and key to supporting the LCS.
Utilities Privatization (UP)
The Navy and Marine Corps have 645 utilities systems eligible for
privatization on 135 activities/installations worldwide. Of these, 394
have been determined to be exempt, 22 have been awarded for
privatization, and 95 have received a Source Selection Authority (SSA)
decision and are being processed for exemption or award. 122 systems
are still being reviewed for an SSA decision. $3 million requested in
our fiscal year 2008 budget supports these ongoing initiatives.
Develop 21st Century Leaders
Programs and practices of particular interest include (listed in
order of fiscal year 2008 dollar value):
Health Care
Combat Casualty Care. Combat casualty care is provided by Navy
medical personnel assigned to and serving with Marine Corps units, in
Expeditionary Medical Facilities, aboard casualty receiving/treatment
ships and hospital ships, and in military and VA hospitals. Recent
advances in force protection, battlefield medicine, combat/operational
stress control, and medical evacuation have led to improved survival
rates and enhanced combat effectiveness.
Since the start of OEF/OIF the Marine Corps has fielded new combat
casualty care capabilities, including: updated individual first aid
kits with QuikClot and advanced tourniquets, robust vehicle first-aid
kits for convoy use, Combat Lifesaver training, and new systems to
provide forward resuscitative surgery and en route care. Navy Fleet
Hospital transformation is redesigning expeditionary medical facilities
to become lighter, modular, more mobile, and interoperable with other
Services' facilities.
Naval S&T funds of $18 million in fiscal year 2008 in advanced
technology and applied research for combat casualty care sustain our
overall level of effort and focus on this mission. Additionally, mental
health services have been expanded through post-deployment screenings,
expanded briefings, and proactive interactions between providers and
sailors and marines.
Safe Harbor Program. Our care for combat wounded does not end at
the Military Treatment Facility (MTF). The Navy has established the
Safe Harbor Program to ensure seamless transition for the seriously
wounded from arrival at a CONUS MTF to subsequent rehabilitation and
recovery, whether through DOD or the VA. Since its inception, 114
sailors including 103 Active and 11 Reserve members have joined the
program. Currently, 92 are being actively tracked and monitored
including 34 severely injured last year in OIF/OEF. Senior medical
staff personally visit and assist our seriously injured sailors and
their families to ensure their needs are being met.
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Traumatic Brain Injury
(TBI)
The Navy has focused much attention on these complex conditions
that have resulted from combat operations. With PTSD, early
identification and intervention are critical elements of successful
treatment and prevention. Closely aligned with warfighters while in
garrison, health care providers instruct self-aid and buddy-aid
training. When intervention is necessary, treatment occurs via embedded
mental health personnel in deployed units (e.g. via USMC Oscar teams
and Carrier Group Clinical Psychologists). All sailors receive in-
theater assessment through a Behavioral Health Assessment Tool (BHAT)
and receive a Post Deployment Health Assessment (PDHA) immediately
following deployment, and again 90--180 days later. This treatment
coverage is comprehensive for both Active and Reserve members.
Navy is partnering with the other Services to establish a Center
for Deployment Psychology to provide further education and training on
PTSD treatment and other combat stress disorders. Our continuum of care
in this area before, during, and after deployment, coupled with a
review of policies and practices to ensure treatment for PTSD is
``destigmatized,'' are critical steps in addressing the health needs of
our deployed sailors.
The science associated with the diagnosis and treatment of
traumatic brain injuries (TBI) is evolving and the military is at the
leading edge in research and treatment. Military Acute Concussion
Evaluation (MACE) has been developed as part of field assessments and
all casualties transitioned to Bethesda receive neuro-psychological
evaluations with database tracking and follow-up as required.
When members with TBI transition from military service, they may be
transferred to one of the four Veterans Administration (VA) poly-trauma
centers in Palo Alto, California; Richmond, Virginia; Minneapolis,
Minneapolis; and Tampa, Florida--whichever facility is closest to the
member's home of record. The four VA poly-trauma centers are among the
premier treatment facilities for TBI in the country. In addition to VA
tracking, when service members are transferred to the VA, they are also
tracked by case managers from the referring Navy MTF at least bimonthly
by the MTF Case Manager to maintain a coordinated care effort.
Occasionally, the medical case management team determines in
consultation with an individual patient and their family that the
patient's specific condition and/or family needs dictate that the best
location for their continued care is at a civilian hospital rather than
a VA or an MTF.
Quality Medical Care
While continuing to support OIF/OEF with medical personnel, Navy
Medicine remains committed to providing quality care for all
beneficiaries, both in deployed settings and at home. One of the main
challenges has been ensuring sufficient numbers of providers in
critical specialties. We continue to focus on refining and shaping our
force to recruit, train, and retain the right mix of uniformed and
civilian health providers thus sustaining the benefits of our
healthcare system and meeting our obligations during this time of war.
Despite high demands, Navy medicine meets 100 percent of its
operational commitments, and maintains quality care to our
beneficiaries, without any sacrifice in quality.
Post-Deployment Health Care
Navy Medicine has developed new delivery models for deployment-
related concerns and is working with the Office of Seamless Transition
to improve coordination with the Veterans Administration. These include
thirteen Deployment Health Clinics in areas of Fleet and Marine
concentration to support operational commands in ensuring medical care
for those returning from deployment.
Navy Education
Professional Military Education (PME). Our Professional Military
Education continuum provides career-long educational opportunities for
professional and personal development that supports mission
capabilities. It supports development of 21st century leaders who have
the capacity to think through uncertainty; develop innovative concepts,
capabilities, and strategies; fully exploit advanced technologies,
systems, and platforms; understand cultural/regional issues; and
conduct operations as a coherently joint force. Navy PME provides a
common core of knowledge for all sailors. A primary level program was
implemented via distance learning in June 2006. The initial targeted
audience is junior unrestricted line officers and senior enlisted
members. Additional content is in development for all junior officers.
Introductory and basic levels for more junior sailors is also under
development.
Joint Professional Military Education (JPME). Joint Professional
Military Education provides an understanding of the principles of Joint
warfare. Our path is designed to create a change in Navy culture so
that it values jointness and therefore systematically develops a group
of Navy Leaders who are strategically minded, capable of critical
thinking, and skilled in naval and joint warfare. JPME Phase I is a
requirement for screening unrestricted line officers for commander
command beginning in fiscal year 2009. In August 2006, Naval War
College began in-residence instruction of JPME Phase II. The Naval War
College has implemented a Joint Maritime Component Commander's Course
to prepare future Flag Officers to serve as Maritime Component
Commanders. $150 million requested in fiscal year 2008 sustains our
expanded commitment to this vital professional development.
The Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps (NROTC). The NROTC
Program comprises 59 active units at 71 host institutions of higher
learning across the Nation. With $173 million requested in fiscal year
2008, the program is adequately funded to provide 4 and 2 year
scholarships to qualified young men and women to prepare them for
leadership and management positions in an increasingly technical Navy
and Marine Corps with service as commissioned officers. The program
continues to be a key source of nuclear power candidates, nurses, and
increased officer corps diversity. Focus is now on increasing strategic
foreign language skills and expanding cultural awareness among
midshipmen.
The United States Naval Academy (USNA). USNA gives young men and
women the up-to-date academic and professional training needed to be
effective Navy and Marine officers in their assignments after
graduation. Renowned for producing officers with solid technical and
analytical foundations, the Naval Academy is expanding its capabilities
in strategic languages and regional studies.
The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). NPS is the Navy's principal
source for graduate education. It provides Navy and DOD relevant degree
and non-degree programs in residence and at a distance to enhance
combat effectiveness. NPS provides essential flexibility in meeting
Navy and Department of Defense emergent research needs, and the
development of warfighters with otherwise demanding career paths and
deployment cycles making graduate education opportunities difficult to
achieve. NPS also supports operations through naval and maritime
research, and maintains expert faculty capable of working in, or
serving as advisors to operational commands, labs, systems commands,
and headquarters activities. The $84 million requested in fiscal year
2008 sustains this unique national asset and provides increases for lab
upgrades, distance learning, and IT maintenance and support.
The Naval War College (NWC). The Naval War College provides
professional maritime and joint military education, advanced research,
analysis, and gaming to educate future leaders. Its mission is to
enhance the professional capabilities of its students to make sound
decisions in command, staff and management positions in naval, joint,
and multinational environments. The $56 million requested in fiscal
year 2008 is a significant increase to support Joint Forces Maritime
Component Command/Coalition Forces Maritime Component Command analysis
and gaming capability, the China Maritime Studies Institute, initial
investment for Maritime Headquarters (MHQ)/Maritime Operations Center
(MOC), support for JPME II accreditation, funding for JPME I at Naval
Postgraduate School, and for NWC Maritime Operations curriculum
development.
Enlisted Retention (Selective Reenlistment Bonus)
Retaining the best and brightest sailors has always been a Navy
core objective and key to success. Navy retains the right people by
offering rewarding opportunities for professional growth, development,
and leadership directly tied to mission readiness. Navy has experienced
significant reenlistment improvement since a 20-year low in fiscal year
1999, reaching a peak at the end of fiscal year 2003. This improved
retention is part of a long-term trend, allowing us to be more
selective in ensuring the right number of strong performers reenlist in
the right ratings. Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (SRBs) are a key tool
enabling us to offer attractive incentives to selected sailors we want
to retain. $359 million requested in fiscal year 2008 will provide for
nearly 79,000 new and anniversary payments helping ensure the Navy will
be able to remain selective in fiscal year 2008.
Sexual Assault Victim Intervention (SAVI)
SAVI has three major components: (1) awareness and prevention
education, (2) victim advocacy and intervention services, and (3)
collection of reliable data on sexual assault. Per the fiscal year 2005
National Defense Authorization Act requirements, the Navy SAVI Program
was transitioned from a program management to case management focus.
Existing installation program coordinator positions were increased and
became Sexual Assault Response Coordinators (SARCs), which is a
standard title and position across the Department of Defense. SARCs are
accountable for coordinating victim care/support and for tracking each
unrestricted sexual assault incident from initial report to final
disposition. Navy also provides 24/7 response capability for sexual
assaults, on or off the installation, and during deployment through the
use of Victim Advocates who report to installation SARCs. The $3
million requested in the fiscal year 2008 budget enables us to maintain
this expanded SAVI program fleet-wide.
Family Advocacy Program (FAP)
The Family Advocacy Program addresses prevention, identification,
reporting, evaluation, intervention and follow-up with respect to
allegations of child abuse/neglect and domestic abuse involving active
duty and their family members or intimate partners. Maintaining abuse-
free and adaptive family relationships is critical to Navy mission
readiness, maintenance of good order and discipline, and quality of
service for our active duty members and their families.
Sea Warrior Spiral 1
Sea Warrior comprises the Navy's training, education and career
management systems that provide for the growth and development of our
people. The first increment, or ``Spiral 1'', of Sea Warrior is
Interactive Detailing. This system allows sailors to have greater
insight and engagement in identifying and applying for Navy positions
of interest to them professionally and personally. Spiral 1 Sea Warrior
is a funded Navy program and its' develop follows the standard,
rigorous acquisition engineering and program management processes.
Additional Sea Warrior spirals will be developed in accordance with
future capability needs and as clear requirements are defined.
Because of Sea Warrior's complexity, many issues related to sea and
shore connectivity are still being worked out. Further, before fielding
a usable model, the Navy plans to conduct extensive beta testing of
selected ratings. Sea Warrior is funded through the FYDP and is not
expected to reach FOC until 2016.
Chairman Levin. Admiral, thank you very much for that
powerful statement.
General Conway?
STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES T. CONWAY, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE
MARINE CORPS
General Conway. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and
distinguished members of the committee: Thank you for the
opportunity to report to you on the status of our Marine Corps.
In our recent meetings as well as previous testimony before
this Congress, I have pledged to provide you with frank and
honest assessments and I come here today with that again as my
watchword.
For the past 5 years your Marine Corps has been immersed in
the first battles of a long war, a generational struggle
against Islamic extremists.
Our freedom is threatened, not by Nazis or Communists as it
was in the past, but by terrorists who are determined to
destroy us and our way of life. Further, the full array of our
security threat is daunting. But rest assured, this
generation's young Americans are answering the call. Over two-
thirds of our Corps enlisted or reenlisted since September 11,
knowing full well what their Nation expects of marines in time
of war.
Our marines are being pushed hard by the high operational
tempo and frequency of combat deployments. They have been
operating at full bore now for almost 5 years. Despite this, in
fact maybe because of it, I can report firsthand that their
morale has never been higher. I attribute this fact to the
belief that they are making a difference. They see the evidence
of your support everywhere, tangible support, in the fielding
of new material, the latest equipment to protect them while in
harm's way, and your support of the proposal to grow our end
strength.
Increasing to 202,000 marines will reduce the strain both
on the individual marine and on our institution as a whole. It
will require additional infrastructure, but more importantly,
it will gradually improve the deployment-to-dwell ratio in some
of our most critical units. Currently many of these units are
deployed for 7 months, then home for only 7 months, some even
less time than that, before they return to combat.
This end strength increase addresses much more than the
current battles in Iraq and Afghanistan. It ensures that our
Corps will be able to deal with the uncertainties of the long
war. Our Corps is by law to be most ready when the Nation is
least ready; the Nation's shock troops. Additional marines
allow the dwell time needed to train and sharpen the skills
that will be required of us in the next contingency, reducing
our operational and strategic risks.
As over 70 percent of our proposed end strength increase is
comprised of first-term marines, we are making the necessary
increases in recruiting and retention. This is a challenge, but
our standards will remain high. We need your continued support
for recruiting programs such as advertising, which are
essential for us to continue to bring aboard the best in
America.
Our Nation has an enduring commitment to her marines long
after they have returned from the battle, particularly if they
are physically or mentally scarred. Our moral imperative is to
ensure that this support is seamless even as a marine leaves
our uniformed ranks. To this end, we have formed a Wounded
Warrior Regiment with battalions on each coast, that will
ensure that we hold to the maxim that we `never leave a marine
behind.'
Ladies and gentlemen, your marines are honored to be
serving this Nation during such an important time in our
history. They are truly a special breed of patriots and it is
on their behalf that I come before you today to answer your
questions and to help all understand how we can best support
these tremendous young Americans.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Conway follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. James T. Conway, USMC
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to report to you the state of
your Marine Corps.
Your Marine Corps is currently engaged in what we believe to be the
opening battles in a generational struggle against Islamic extremists.
Our commitment is characterized by diverse and sustained employment
around the globe, particularly the central campaigns in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Your marines are fully engaged in this fight, and it is
through their tremendous sacrifices--serving shoulder-to-shoulder with
their fellow service men and women--that we will ultimately prevail. It
is our moral imperative to support them to the hilt--always mindful
that our forward-deployed marines and sailors in combat must be our
number one priority.
Though marines in the operating forces have been pushed hard by the
tempo and frequency of operational deployments, their morale has never
been higher--because they believe they are making a difference. Thanks
to you, ladies and gentlemen, your marines know that the people of the
United States and their Government are behind them. Support has been
exceptional--from the rapid fielding of life-saving equipment to the
proposed increase in end strength, and with your continued support,
mission accomplishment will remain completely viable and achievable.
The Long War is taking a considerable toll on our equipment and we
have tough choices ahead of us--we must support our marines and their
families, while deciding whether to replace our rapidly aging equipment
with similar platforms or to modernize with next generation equipment.
We know these next few years will be challenging--not only in the
immediate conflict in Iraq, but in subsequent campaigns of the Long
War. Therefore, the Corps will balance our skill sets in order to
remain prepared for crisis outside of Iraq and Afghanistan--to be where
our country needs us, when she needs us, and to prevail over whatever
challenges we face. I am confident that with your steadfast support,
our Corps will continue to remain the Nation's force in readiness and
fulfill its congressionally-mandated mission of being the most ready
when the Nation is least ready.
i. marine corps commitments in the long war
Over the past year, your marines deployed to all corners of the
globe in support of our Nation. With more than 24,000 marines ashore
throughout the U.S. Central Command's Area of Responsibility,
Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom remain our largest
commitment. In addition to those operations, the Marine Corps also
deployed forces to: support humanitarian and disaster relief efforts in
Pakistan and the Republic of the Philippines; participate in over fifty
Theater Security Cooperation events ranging from small Mobile Training
Teams in Central America to the first deployment of the Marine Forces
Special Operations Command's Foreign Military Training Unit supporting
our African partner nations; protect our Embassies by providing Fleet
Antiterrorism Security Teams to East Timor and Lebanon; and respond to
a Noncombatant Evacuation from Lebanon--the largest since Vietnam.
Achieve Victory in the Long War
The Defense Department's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review directed
that we enhance our counterinsurgency capabilities. Our enhanced Marine
Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) and the Marine Corps component to
Special Operations Command are part of this commitment. Other types of
forces, unique to counterinsurgency operations, may also need to be
formed. However, we will maintain robust contingency response forces
satisfying Congress' intent to be ``the Nation's shock troops''--always
ready and always capable of forcible entry.
I view the inherent power of the MAGTF as an irreplaceable
component of this Nation's plan for success in the Long War. This war
demands flexible organizations that apply a mix of combat and nonlethal
actions; interagency capabilities and joint warfare applications;
innovative use of airpower; and synchronization of intelligence
activities. For rapid integration of these capabilities--as well as
providing the critical boots on the ground--the MAGTF is better
prepared than any other military formation to execute the full range of
operations required by the current conflict. This is the Corps'
fundamental fighting organization, providing the joint force a unique,
additive capability--one that is much greater than the sum of its
parts.
To further expand the MAGTF's contribution to our Nation's
security, I have directed my staff to develop a series of exercises
that will further enhance the MAGTF's ability to integrate interagency
and coalition operations throughout the spectrum of conflict. Our goal
will be to provide a forum to develop diverse yet cohesive teams that
can best overcome the challenges we are most likely to face in pre- and
post-war phases of operations. These exercises will serve our Nation
well in the Long War, in future conflicts, and in our ongoing security
cooperation efforts.
In February 2006, we established Marine Corps Forces, Special
Operations Command (MARSOC) within the U.S. Special Operations Command.
MARSOC is already employing its five major subordinate elements: the
Foreign Military Training Unit, two Marine Special Operations
Battalions, the Marine Special Operations Support Group, and the Marine
Special Operations School, and is on track to achieve full-operational
capability by the end of fiscal year 2008. Its personnel and equipment
assignment plan is designed to best support our combatant commanders in
their prosecution of the Long War. The Foreign Military Training Unit
was activated in 2005 and has been incorporated into MARSOC, the 2d
Marine Special Operations Battalion was activated in May of 2006,
followed by the 1st Marine Special Operations Battalion in October
2006.
MARSOC deployed Foreign Military Training Unit teams to the
European and Southern Command areas of responsibility last summer and
fall. Through the end of fiscal year 2007, the Foreign Military
Training Unit is scheduled to make 27 deployments to 12 countries to
conduct foreign internal defense and counter narcotics training to
improve the indigenous military forces of those countries.
Additionally, MARSOC began deploying Marine Special Operations
Companies, associated with Marine Expeditionary Units and assigned to
Expeditionary Strike Groups in January of this year. MARSOC provides a
unique combination of land component and maritime expeditionary
capabilities across a wide range of missions. As special operations
forces continue to prosecute the Long War, MARSOC will be a significant
partner in Special Operations Command.
To aid in both the current execution of the campaign in Iraq as
well as the long-term irregular warfare capability of the Marine Corps,
we are establishing a Center for Irregular Warfare. This organization
will serve as the focal point for integration of concepts, doctrine,
training, education, and equipment capability development. This Center
will also maintain close coordination with our sister Services and
external agencies. Our goal is to enhance the MAGTF's capabilities by
training and equipping small-unit leaders to handle the demanding
complexities and possess the adaptive mindset necessary to operate
across the spectrum of conflict--empowering our ``strategic corporals''
as well as all of our junior leaders to fight, operate, and win in this
challenging security environment.
Supporting the Plus-up for Operation Iraqi Freedom
Currently, the Marine Corps has approximately 4,000 marines
affected by the pending plus-up operation in Iraq. The units affected
will be extended for approximately 45-60 days. This change will impact
our marines and their families, but we believe that the support systems
that we have in place within the units and family support systems back
home will help our marines and their families meet the challenges
associated with this extension on deployment. Furthermore, between
their return and next deployment, the addition of new infantry
battalions will allow these units to lengthen the time at their home
station.
Battalions moved forward in the rotation cycle will complete all
required predeployment training that fully qualifies them for
employment. These battalions will be subject to the same predeployment
training standards as their fellow marines. We have accelerated the
normal cycle through our main mission rehearsal exercise, Mojave Viper,
to accommodate consistent training for all units rotating into theater.
The accelerated battalions will deploy with equipment from their
home stations, and the additional equipment required will be provided
by cross-leveling assets in theater as well as leveraging equipment
already positioned forward. This has resulted in some home station
shortfalls and has hindered some stateside units' ability to train for
other missions and contingencies. While the readiness of deployed units
remains high, we have experienced a decrease in the readiness of some
nondeployed units.
There are no Marine Corps Reserve units involved in the plus-up
operations.
ii. right-size our marine corps
To meet the demands of the Long War as well as the inevitable
crises that arise, our Corps must be sufficiently manned in addition to
being well trained and properly equipped. Like the Cold War, the Long
War is a continuing struggle that will not be measured by the number of
near-term deployments or rotations, and while we seek to capitalize on
advances in technology, we know it is our magnificent marines who
invariably decide the outcome.
In order to protect our most precious asset, the individual marine,
we must ensure that our personnel policies, organizational construct,
and training are able to operate at the ``sustained rate of fire.''
Operating at the "sustained rate of fire" means that the Corps will be
able to maintain operations indefinitely without drastic changes to
procedures, policies, organization, or operations. The proposed Active
component end strength increase will significantly enhance our ability
to operate at the ``sustained rate of fire.''
Strain on the Individual
Despite an unparalleled Personnel Tempo, the morale of our marines
and their families remains high. To avoid an adverse toll on our
marines and their families, and to prevent a decrease in readiness, the
former Secretary of Defense established a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio
goal for all Active component forces. This ratio relates to how long
our forces are deployed versus how long they are at home--the goal
being for every 7 months a marine is deployed, they will be back at
their home station for 14 months. We need to relieve the strain on
those superb Americans who have volunteered to fight the Nation's
battles.
Strain on the Institution
The current deployment cycle requires commanders to focus solely on
those skill sets required to accomplish the mission in Iraq and
Afghanistan. This deterioration of capabilities is exacerbated by
individual augments and training team requirements and by many units
being deployed for missions outside of their normal duties. The result
of this strain is evident in the Marine Corps' limited ability to
provide trained forces to project power in support of other
contingencies. Reduced training time and a necessarily singular focus
on current contingency requirements prevents significant opportunities
for units to train to the full range of military operations in varied
operating environments, such as jungle or mountain terrain. To fulfill
our mandate to be ``most ready when the Nation is least ready,'' our
deployment cycles must not only support training for irregular warfare,
they must also provide sufficient time for recovery, maintenance, and
training for other contingency missions. By increasing the dwell time
for our units and allowing them additional time at home stations, we
can accomplish the more comprehensive training needed for the
sophisticated skill sets that have enabled MAGTFs to consistently
achieve success in all types of military operations and operating
environments. Our goal is to increase dwell time and achieve a 1:2
deployment-to-dwell ratio for our Active Forces--our Operating Forces
are routinely falling short of this target.
Reducing the Stress
I would emphasize, the underlying requirement for an end strength
increase is separate from, indeed it pre-dates, the plus-up operation
in Iraq. The proposed increase to our Active component end strength to
202,000 marines will go a long way to reducing the strain on the
individual marines and the Institution. Our first task will be to build
three new infantry battalions and their supporting structure--
approximately 4,000 marines. The resources for this force have been
included in our fiscal year 2007 supplemental. These funds will pay for
initial costs associated with the stand up of these infantry battalions
as well as critical enablers, which are vital not only for the current
fight, but are also critically needed to support long-term Marine Corps
capabilities to accomplish other missions. These enablers include
combat support and combat service support such as intelligence,
military police, and civil affairs capabilities. We will systematically
build the additional individuals and units on a schedule of
approximately 5,000 per year. This plan will gradually increase the
deployment-to-dwell ratio of some of our habitually high operational
tempo units--enabling us to recover our ability to respond in
accordance with timelines outlined in war plans for our combatant
commanders; thereby, reducing future operational risks. We are
initially funding this initiative with supplemental and baseline
funding in fiscal year 2008, but have included all future costs in our
baseline budget as of fiscal year 2009.
Reserve Component End Strength
Our efforts in the Long War have been a Total Force effort, with
our Reserves once again performing with grit and determination. Recent
policy changes within the Department of Defense match up very well with
our existing policies and will allow us to use the Reserve Forces as
they were structured to be employed--to augment and reinforce our
Active component forces. To this end, my goal is to obtain a 1:5
deployment-to-dwell ratio within our Reserve component. We currently
believe our authorized Reserve component end strength of 39,600
Selected Reserve Marines is adequate. As with every organization within
the Marine Corps, we continue to review the make-up and structure of
the Marine Corps Reserve in order to ensure the right capabilities
reside within the Marine Forces Reserve units and our Individual
Mobilization Augmentee program across the force. Finally, as our Active
Force increases in size, our reliance on the Reserve Forces should
decrease--helping us achieve the desired deployment-to-dwell ratio.
Manning the Force
An equally important factor in sustaining a viable force is
continuing to recruit and retain qualified young men and women with the
right character, commitment, and drive to become marines. With over 70
percent of the end strength increase comprised of first-term marines,
both recruiting and retention efforts will be challenged. A major part
of this effort will involve programming increased funding for both the
Enlistment Bonus and the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Programs. We will
need the continued strong support of Congress to achieve ongoing
success.
Our recruiting standards will remain high. While exceeding DOD
quality standards, we continue to recruit the best of America into our
ranks--in fiscal year 2006, the Marine Corps achieved over 100 percent
of our Active component accession goal. The Marine Corps Reserve also
achieved 100 percent of its recruiting goals, but Reserve officer
numbers remain challenging because our primary accession source is from
officers who leave active duty. We appreciate the continued
authorization for Selected Reserve Officer Affiliation Bonuses in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007--they continue
to contribute in this crucial area.
We forecast that both Active and Reserve recruiting will remain
challenging in fiscal year 2007, particularly when viewed through the
lens of accession missions to meet the increased end strength of the
Marine Corps. We will need the continued support of Congress for
programmed enlistment bonuses and other recruiting efforts, such as
advertising, which will be essential to us continuing to meet these
challenges.
Retention is the other important part of manning the force. In
fiscal year 2006, the Marine Corps exceeded its retention goals for
both the First Term and Career Forces. For fiscal year 2007, we expect
to exceed our goals again. This success can be attributed to the Marine
Corps' judicious use of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus, and we now
offer qualified first term and career enlisted marines $10,000 in
Assignment Incentive Pay to reenlist. To keep the very best of our
marines, we must increase the size of our reenlistment bonus program in
order to ensure that we have the right grade and MOS mix to support the
growing force. Not only will we have to retain more first-term marines,
but we will also have to increase the number of marines reenlisting at
the 8- and 12-year mark. This will require a shift toward more
programmed funding in targeted key areas in the career force.
Military-to-Civilian Conversions
Military-to-civilian conversions continue to provide a valuable
source to send additional marines back to the operating force in
support of our warfighting initiatives and help reduce stress. We will
continue to pursue sensible conversions and transfer marines from
nonessential billets.
National Security Personnel System
The Marine Corps is committed to successful implementation of the
National Security Personnel System. The Marine Corps is actively
participating with the Department of Defense in the development and
implementation of this new personnel system and is cooperating with the
sister Services so that our civilian employees receive the training
opportunities and support necessary for a successful transition. The
National Security Personnel System will enable the Marine Corps to
better support the warfighter by providing a civilian workforce that is
flexible, accountable, and aligned to the Marine Corps mission.
iii. resetting the force and preparing for the next contingency
To meet the demands of the Long War, we must reset the force in
order to simultaneously fight, train, and sustain our Corps. To support
our marines in combat, we have routinely drawn additional equipment
from strategic stocks, which need to be replenished to remain
responsive to emerging threats. Congress has responded rapidly and
generously to our requests for equipment and increased protection for
our marines and sailors. It is our responsibility to manage these
resources prudently as we transition to the modernization of our force.
Equipment Readiness
Extended combat operations have severely tested our materiel. While
the vast majority of our equipment has passed the test of sustained
combat operations, it has been subjected to more than a lifetime's
worth of wear stemming from vehicle mileage, operating hours, and harsh
environmental conditions. This increased maintenance requirement is a
consequence of not only operational tempo and operating environments,
but also the sheer amount of equipment employed in operations.
Approximately 30 percent of all Marine Corps ground equipment and
nearly 25 percent of our active duty aviation squadrons are currently
engaged overseas. Most of this equipment is not rotating out of theater
at the conclusion of each force rotation; it remains in combat, used on
a near-continuous basis at an operating tempo that far exceeds normal
peacetime usage.
As our priority for equipment is to support marines serving in
harm's way, we have drawn additional equipment from the Maritime
Prepositioning Ships and prepositioned stores from the caves in Norway;
we have also retained equipment in theater from units that are rotating
back to the United States. The operational results of these efforts
have been outstanding--the average mission capable rates of our
deployed forces' ground equipment remain above 93 percent--but there is
a price.
The cost of this success is a decrease in nondeployed unit
readiness as well as an increase in the maintenance required per hour
of operating time. Equipment across the Marine Corps is continuously
cross-leveled and redistributed to ensure that units preparing to
deploy have sufficient equipment to conduct our rigorous predeployment
training programs. Because the stateside priority of equipment
distribution and readiness is to units preparing to deploy, there has
been a trade-off in unit training for other types of contingencies. The
timely delivery of replacement equipment is crucial to sustaining the
high readiness rates for the marines in theater, as well as improving
the rates for the forces here at home. Although funded, much of this
equipment is still many months from delivery.
Ground Equipment
Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are placing demands on ground
equipment far beyond what is typically experienced during training or
home station operations. Some of these demands rise from higher usage
rates, others from the rigors of extended operations in harsh
environments. These higher demands increase the maintenance
requirements for equipment employed in theater and continue when this
equipment is redeployed to home stations.
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For example, in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) crews are driving
Light Armored Vehicles in excess of 8,700 miles per year--3.5 times
more than programmed annual usage rates of 2,480 miles per year. Our
tactical vehicle fleet is experiencing some of the most dramatic
effects of excessive wear, operating at five to six times the
programmed rates.
Aviation Equipment
The operationally demanding and harsh environments of Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Djibouti have highlighted the limitations of our aging
fleet of aircraft. In order to support our marines, sister Services,
and coalition partners successfully, our aircraft have been flying at
two to three times their designed utilization rates. Despite this
unprecedented utilization, the yeoman efforts of our maintenance and
support personnel have sustained an aviation mission capable rate for
deployed marine aircraft at 79 percent over the past 12 months. The
corresponding aviation mission capable rates for our units in garrison,
who have either recently returned from deployment or are preparing to
deploy again, have averaged 75 percent over the past 12 months. To
maintain sufficient numbers of aircraft in deployed squadrons, our home
squadrons have taken significant cuts in available aircraft and parts
as they prepare for deployment. Reset funding has partially alleviated
this strain, but continued funding is needed as we continue to
recapitalize our aircraft fleets due to age, attrition, and wartime
losses. Maintaining the readiness of our aviation assets while
preparing our aircrew for their next deployment is and will continue to
be a monumental effort and constant challenge for our marines.
We have mitigated aircraft degradation through specific aircraft
modifications, proactive inspections, and additional maintenance
actions enabled by reset programs. Sustaining aircraft material
condition drives aircraft readiness and is the determining factor in
combat aviation support provided to our marines in harm's way. While
these efforts have successfully bolstered aircraft reliability,
sustainability, and survivability, additional requirements for depot
level maintenance on airframes, engines, weapons, and support equipment
will continue well beyond the conclusion of hostilities.
Resetting Marine Aviation means not merely repairing and replacing
damaged or destroyed aircraft, but getting more capable and reliable
aircraft into the operational deployment cycle sooner. Your marines
rely on these aircraft on a daily basis to provide a wide array of
missions including casualty evacuation for our wounded and timely close
air support for troops in contact with the enemy. Production lines to
replace legacy aircraft lost in support of the Long War are no longer
active; therefore, it is urgent and imperative for the Marine Aviation
Plan to remain fully funded and on schedule.
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Additionally, to ensure marine aviation is postured to support the
current needs of our country, the Marine Corps is working to restore
war reserve aircraft and accelerate the upgrades of pre-production
aircraft to help maintain aircraft inventories at minimal acceptable
operating levels. For example, the Marine Corps is modifying pre-
production MV-22s to ensure the transition schedule meets operational
demands and deployment timelines. Resetting our full aviation
capability will require a significant increase in programmed funding
for repair, restoration, and upgrades of destroyed or damaged
airframes, recovery of Pioneer unmanned aerial vehicle components,
refurbishment of air traffic control equipment, replacement of
targeting pods, and numerous other efforts to restore capability
degraded in support of the Long War.
Reset of Prepositioning Programs
Eleven Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) vessels from all three
Maritime Prepositioning Force Squadrons (MPSRON) were downloaded and
used in theater during initial OIF operations. As these operations
concluded, the Marine Corps reconstituted two of three MPSRONs to meet
potential contingencies in other areas of the world. This
reconstitution was conducted both in theater and at the U.S. Marine
Corps (USMC) facilities in Jacksonville, Florida. In February 2004,
MPSRON-2 was downloaded in support of OIF II and has been partially
reconstituted.
Since the MPF offloads in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom I and
II, MPSRON-1 and MPSRON-2 have gone through a complete maintenance
cycle for attainment and supply rotation. Attainment for major end
items is 91 percent and 48 percent respectively. Some of our major end
item shortfalls are a result of ongoing OIF/Operation Enduring Freedom
equipment requirements and availability from the manufacturer. Our end
item shortfalls in the MPF program will be reset during the ship's
maintenance cycle as equipment becomes available. Readiness for all
equipment loaded aboard the MPS is historically 98 percent or better.
MPSRON-3 is currently undergoing its maintenance cycle and we project
an attainment above 98 percent for equipment when completed in June
2007. MPSRON-2's maintenance cycle should begin in April 2008 and be
completed by June 2009.
Equipment from Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway (MCPP-N)
was used in support of Long War operations and to reset other Marine
Corps shortfalls with a higher operational priority. The USMC will
reset MCPP-N as soon as practical in line with USMC operational
priorities.
Costs of Resetting the Force
Last year, our cumulative reset cost estimate was $11.7 billion, of
which Congress appropriated $5.1 billion toward that amount. To date,
Congress has appropriated a total of $10.2 billion for global war on
terror reset costs. The $11.7 figure is based on a point in time (1
October 2005) snapshot of the funding necessary to refit the Marine
Corps to a pre-Long War level of equipment readiness. During the summer
of 2006, the Secretary of Defense standardized the definition of reset
costs across the Services. As a result, the Marine Corps stopped
identifying two major expenses--depot maintenance and attrition
losses--as ``Cost of War'' and moved them into our reset the force
estimate. This definitional change and some additional requirements
have changed our estimate as noted in Table 2.
The first expense to be recategorized is the estimated cost of
residual depot maintenance after the termination of hostilities. Our
analysis shows that we will require at least 4 to 6 years of post-
conflict depot maintenance to bring our force to a fully reset state.
Given the status of our equipment at this time, we estimate additional
programmed funding will be required for post-conflict ground and
aviation depot maintenance costs.
The second item recategorized because of definition changes is
attrition losses. Prior to the redefinition, the Marine Corps had
considered replacement and repair of attrition losses to be a cost of
war, and had not included them in our reset estimate. We have increased
our reset estimate to include forecasted attrition losses.
The net effect is that the Marine Corps reset estimate, once a
fixed point in time estimate, has now become a rolling estimate that
includes future attrition losses and future depot maintenance
estimates. The following table (Table 2) depicts the definitional
changes:
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Not all of the reset the force requirement can be executed in a
single fiscal year. Some items such as attack and utility helicopters
cannot be replaced until acquisition production decisions are made.
Other requirements such as light armored vehicles cannot be fulfilled
in a single year due to production capacity issues. Resourcing costs
must be phased over several years. The table (Table 3) below highlights
specific examples of this challenge.
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iv. modernize for tomorrow, to be ``the most ready when the nation is
least ready''
As prudent stewards of our Nation's resources, we must decide the
most effective way to modernize the Total Force. We are actively
working through the tough decisions of whether to replace aging
equipment with similar platforms or to procure next generation
capabilities--such as cutting edge platforms like the STOVL Joint
Strike Fighter, the MV-22 Osprey, and the Expeditionary Fighting
Vehicle (EFV). Foremost and throughout our modernization efforts, we
will maintain our Congressionally mandated contingency response forces
to be always ready and always capable of forcible entry.
Marine Aviation Plan
The Marine Aviation Plan is designed to posture Marine Corps
Aviation for future warfighting requirements in the near-term (2007-
2009), the mid-term (2010-2012) and the long-term (2013-2015). The
Marine Aviation Plan addresses these challenges by restructuring the
force and managing current aircraft procurement Programs of Record.
We will rebalance our existing Assault Support and Tactical
Aircraft (TACAIR) structure in the Reserve and active components in
order to boost future HMH (heavy lift CH-53), HMLA (light attack UH-1
and AH-1), and VMU (unmanned aerial vehicle) capacity. Increases to
aviation manpower structure at the squadron, group, and wing levels
will enhance operational readiness and better posture these units for
combat operations and their transitions to the new H-1s, MV-22, F-35,
KC-130J, and CH-53K. We will incorporate a fully functional and
resourced Aircrew Training System that will align a new Training
Transformation Plan to each Assault Support and TACAIR community as
they transition to new aircraft in the coming years. Marine aviation
command and control modernization will leverage our new aircraft
capabilities by streamlining command and control functions and radar
inventory to ensure aviation command and control remains agile,
efficient, and responsive to the needs of the MAGTF across the spectrum
of conflict. Marine aviation logistics process modernization applies an
overarching approach to understanding readiness, related costs, and the
removal of performance barriers with the goal of enhancing our
warfighting capabilities while husbanding resources.
The Marine Aviation Plan shapes the future of Marine Aviation to
meet the diverse missions of today's and tomorrow's battlefields, and
provides the MAGTF with improved capabilities, unit manning, and a
thorough safety training system to better overcome known and
foreseeable challenges. This plan sets in place tomorrow's Marine
Aviation as a viable and efficient force in support of the MAGTF on the
battlefield.
Joint Strike Fighter
F-35 development is on track, and will act as an integrated flying
combat system in support of our ground forces and will be the
centerpiece of Marine Aviation. The manufacture of the first test
aircraft--Conventional Take-off and Landing--(CTOL) variant--is well
underway, assembly times are much better than planned, and exceptional
quality has been demonstrated in fabrication and assembly. The first
CTOL aircraft flew in December 2006. Five STOVL and six CTOL aircraft
are currently in production. The JSF acquisition strategy, including
software development, reflects a block approach. The F-35B Short Take-
Off/Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant is a fifth generation aircraft
that will provide a quantum leap in capability, basing flexibility, and
mission execution across the full spectrum of warfare. The Marine Corps
remains committed to its vision of an all STOVL tactical aircraft
force. Fulfilling this vision will best posture the Marine Corps to
support our Nation and the combatant commanders, by enabling the future
MAGTF to accomplish its expeditionary warfighting responsibilities.
MV-22
The MV-22 is replacing the CH-46E and CH-53D aircraft. The CH-46E
is over 40 years old, with limited lift and mission capabilities to
support the MAGTF and the Long War. In September 2005, the V-22 Defense
Acquisition Board approved Full Rate Production. To date, 29 Block A
and 15 Block B aircraft have been delivered. Much like the F-35, the
MV-22 program uses a three-block strategy in its procurement. Block A
aircraft are training aircraft. Block B are operational aircraft. Block
C aircraft are operational aircraft with mission enhancements. To date,
the one V-22 Fleet Replacement Training Squadron, one test squadron,
VMX-22, and two tactical VMM squadrons have stood up with the third
tactical MV-22 squadron scheduled for March 2007. MV-22 Initial
Operational Capability is scheduled for the summer of 2007 with a
continued transition of two CH-46E squadrons per year thereafter. The
MV-22's revolutionary assault support capability allows the MAGTF to
maximize our capstone concept of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. Our
forces in harm's way deserve the best assault support aircraft in the
world--without question, the MV-22 is that aircraft.
KC-130J
The KC-130J has continuously deployed in support of OIF since
February 2005 and has provided the warfighter a state-of-the-art,
multi-mission, tactical aerial refueling, and fixed wing assault
support asset. The introduction of the aerial refuelable MV-22,
combined with the forced retirement of the legacy KC-130F/R aircraft
due to corrosion, fatigue life, and parts obsolescence, significantly
increases the requirement for accelerated procurement of the KC-130J.
Twenty-five new aircraft have been delivered, and the Marine Corps is
contracted to procure a total of 45 aircraft by the end of fiscal year
2013, with 4 KC-130J aircraft requested in the fiscal year 2008 budget.
This is 6 aircraft less than the inventory objective of the 51 aircraft
needed to support the operational requirements of MAGTF, joint, and
combined forces. As the aviation workhorse of the MAGTF, the KC-130J's
theater logistical support reduces the requirement for resupply via
ground, limiting the exposure of our convoys to IEDs and other attacks.
CH-53K
The CH-53K program has reached ``Milestone B'' status-initiation of
system development and demonstration. The current fleet of CH-53E Super
Stallion aircraft will reach its fatigue life during this decade. The
CH-53K will deliver increased range and payload, reduced operations and
support costs, increased commonality with other assault support
platforms, and digital interoperability for the next 25 years. The CH-
53K is one of the elements that will enable the MAGTF and joint force
to project and sustain forces ashore from the sea. A post Milestone B
System Development and Demonstration contract was awarded in April 2006
and IOC is planned for fiscal year 2015.
H-1 Upgrade
The H-1 Upgrade Program (UH-1Y/AH-1Z) is a comprehensive program to
resolve existing operational power margin issues, while significantly
enhancing the tactical capability, operational effectiveness, and
sustainability of the attack and utility helicopter fleet. The Corps'
fleet of UH-1N Hueys is reaching the end of their useful life. Due to
airframe and engine fatigue, the Vietnam-era Huey routinely takes off
at maximum gross weight with no margin for error. This aircraft is long
overdue for replacement; degrading our ability to support our marines
in harm's way. Due to significant GWOT operational demands on the
existing squadrons and aircraft attrition, the Marine Corps has adapted
the ``build new'' strategy for the UH-1Y in fiscal year 2006 and our
first two production aircraft have now been delivered. We are also
examining a ``build new'' strategy for the AH-1Z to preclude
significant inventory shortfalls. The H-1 Upgrade Program will be
restructured pending a Defense Acquisition Board in March 2007.
Command and Control (C2) Harmonization
The C2 harmonization strategy incorporates joint integrating
concepts and C2 mandates, and is a holistic approach that integrates
warfighter requirements into a common capability to deliver an end-to-
end, fully integrated, cross-functional set of capabilities including
forward-deployed and reach-back functions. The strategy's end state is
a seamless capability that crosses warfighting functions and supports
marines from the supporting establishment to our marines in contact
with the enemy, taking the best of emerging capabilities and joint
requirements to build a single solution.
The first step in this direction is the ongoing development of the
Common Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S). CAC2S fuses data
from sensors, weapon systems, and C2 systems into an integrated
display. It allows rapid, flexible operations in a common, modular, and
scalable design by reducing the current five stovepipe systems into one
hardware solution with streamlined equipment training. CAC2S will
enable MAGTF commanders to control timing of organic, joint, or
coalition effects, assault support, and ISR in their battlespace while
operating within a joint task force. With CAC2S and C2 harmonization, a
Joint Task Force Commander will discover that his MAGTF's battlespace
offers maximum flexibility due to its seamless integration with joint
and coalition partners.
Persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
The persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR)
strategy is a component of the Marine Corps ISR-enterprise supporting
marines across the spectrum of military operations. Its focus is the
capability to integrate the network of air, ground, and space sensors
with sufficient fidelity to detect, locate, identify, track, and target
threats. This capability also reduces the effectiveness of improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) through the identification of personnel,
activities, and facilities associated with the manufacture and
emplacement of IEDs. The network is enabled through unmanned aerial and
ground systems, human intelligence exploitation teams, ground signals
intelligence/electronic warfare, tactical fusion centers, and
predeployment training programs. We continue to develop capabilities in
coordination with the Joint IED Defeat Organization's point, route, and
area targeting concepts. Some capabilities under development include
unmanned aerial systems, unmanned ground sensors, wide field of view
persistent surveillance (Angel Fire), and the Ground-Based Operational
Surveillance System (G-BOSS). Angel Fire provides enhanced situational
awareness and support to urban warfare, disaster relief, and other
operations. The initial deployment of this capability is scheduled for
late spring/summer 2007. G-BOSS is a force protection camera system
that provides a 24 hour day/night persistent surveillance capability.
The G-BOSS System of Systems concept is to integrate command and
control; commercial off the shelf and government off the shelf sensors
to ground, airborne, and space-based platforms. The military objective
of G-BOSS is to detect, identify, and track insurgent activities,
specifically associated with the emplacement of IEDs. The initial
employment of autonomous camera tower systems has performed admirably
in theater. The integration of a fully networked G-BOSS system of
systems is anticipated to begin in spring/summer 2007.
Ground Mobility
The Army and Marine Corps are leading the Services in developing
tactical wheeled vehicle requirements for the joint force. The defined
capabilities reflect an appropriate balance in survivability, mobility,
payload, network enabling, transportability, and sustainability for the
light tactical wheeled vehicle supporting the future joint force. The
Army/Marine Corps Board has proven a valuable forum for coordination of
tactical wheeled vehicle development and fielding, the production of
Central Command armoring kits and up-armored HMMWVs, and rapid response
to combatant commander's requests for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
vehicles. Additionally, the Army/Marine Corps Board has been the focal
point for development of the joint requirements for a Joint Light
Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) focused on providing protected, sustained,
networked, and expeditionary mobility to the joint force in the light
tactical vehicle weight class.
Mine Resistant Ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles
MRAP vehicles are designed with a ``V'' shaped hull and are
employed to protect against the three primary kill mechanisms of mines
and improvised explosive devices--fragmentation, blast overpressure,
and acceleration. These vehicles provide the best available protection
against improvised explosive devices and experiences in theater have
shown that a marine is four to five times safer in a MRAP than in an
uparmored HMMWV. There will be three categories of new near-term MRAP
vehicles. Category I, a Mine Resistant Utility Vehicle, will
accommodate up to six personnel and will be employed in urban
operations. Category II vehicles are similar to Cougar/Joint Explosive
Ordnance Disposal Rapid Response Vehicles, and will accommodate up to
ten personnel, and will be multi-mission capable. Category III, Buffalo
vehicles, will be used for route clearance and explosive ordnance
disposal missions.
The MRAP is an example of our adaptation to evolving threats. It is
an attempt to acquire the very best technology available in the
shortest amount of time in order to protect our marines. The USMC
requirement is 3,700 MRAP vehicles and we are aggressively pursuing the
acquisition of this rapidly emerging requirement.
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)
In November 2006, the Army's Training and Doctrine Command and
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, in collaboration with Navy,
Air Force, and Special Operations Command representatives, received
Joint Staff approval of the Ground Combat Forces Light Tactical
Mobility Initial Capability Document, documenting joint forces'
capability needs for the light tactical wheeled vehicle fleet. During
December 2006, Army and Marine Corps combat developers staffed the JLTV
Capability Development Document, defining requirements for the long-
term HMMWV replacement.
Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC)
MPC development is on schedule. In January 2007, the Marine Corps
staffed the Initial Capabilities Document, framed the Capabilities
Development Document and initiated planning for the Analysis of
Alternatives leading to a Marine Personnel Carrier material solution,
moving toward an Initial Operational Capability in the 2012 timeframe.
The MPC will possess a balance between performance, protection, and
payload and will increase infantry battalion protected mobility and
light armored reconnaissance battalion striking power. It will serve as
a balanced expeditionary armored personnel carrier easily optimized for
irregular warfare, but effective across the range of military
operations.
M1114 HMMWV-Upgrade via Fragmentation Kit 2 and Fragmentation Kit 5
The Corps' already fielded M1114 fleet is undergoing an upgrade
with Fragmentation Kits 2 and 5. Fragmentation Kit 2 enhances ballistic
protection in the front driver and assistant driver wheel-well.
Fragmentation Kit 5 degrades improvised explosive device effects and
reduces armor debris that results from overmatch. Installation of both
Fragmentation Kits is underway, with anticipated completion in March
2007. We will continue to evaluate the U.S. Army's objective kit
development and share information and lessons learned. All new Marine
Corps deliveries of M1114, M1151, M1152, and M1165 HMMWV's will have
Fragmentation Kits 2 and 5 level capability integrated.
MAGTF Fires
Several innovative systems related to fire support significantly
enhance the warfighting efficiency and effectiveness of the MAGTF. Such
systems include the M777 Lightweight Howitzer, High Mobility Artillery
Rocket System, Expeditionary Fire Support System, Advanced Field
Artillery Tactical Data System, and the Target Location, Designation,
and Handoff system.
M777 Lightweight Howitzer
The new M777 lightweight howitzer replaces the M198 howitzers. It
can be lifted by the MV-22 Osprey and the CH-53E helicopter and is
paired with the Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement truck for improved
cross-country mobility. The M777, through design innovation,
navigation, positioning aides, and digital fire control, offers
significant improvements in lethality, survivability, mobility, and
durability over the M198 howitzer. The Marine Corps began fielding the
first of 356 new howitzers to the operating forces in April 2005 and
expects to complete fielding in calendar year 2009.
High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS)
The HIMARS fills a critical range and volume gap in Marine Corps
fire support assets by providing 24-hour, all-weather, ground-based,
indirect precision and volume fires throughout all phases of combat
operations ashore. We will field 40 HIMARS (18 to the Active component,
18 to the Reserve component, and 4 to the Supporting Establishment).
When paired with the acquisition of Guided Multiple Launch Rocket
System rockets, HIMARS will provide a highly responsive, precision fire
capability to our forces in conventional as well as unconventional
operations.
Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS)
The EFSS will be the principal indirect fire support system for the
vertical assault element of MAGTFs executing Ship-to-Objective
Maneuver. It is a towed 120mm mortar and when paired with an internally
transportable vehicle, will be transported aboard MV-22 and CH-53E
aircraft. EFSS-equipped units will provide the ground component of a
vertical assault element with immediately responsive, organic indirect
fires at ranges beyond current infantry battalion mortars. Initial
operational capability is planned during calendar year 2007, and full
operational capability is planned for fiscal year 2010.
Target Location, Designation, and Handoff System (TLDHS)
TLDHS is a modular, manportable equipment suite that will provide
the ability to quickly acquire targets and digitally transmit data to
supporting arms elements for attack, as well as designate targets for
laser-seeking precision guided munitions and laser spot trackers. The
system will be capable of providing target location within fifty meters
and designating targets at 5,000 meters. TLDHS will be fielded to
forward observer teams, naval gunfire spot teams, tactical air control
parties, and reconnaissance teams. Block II, scheduled for fielding in
late fiscal year 2007, will communicate with all Naval Strike aircraft,
the AFATDS, and the Naval Fire Control System.
Counter-Sniper technology
The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory is leading a four-pronged
approach to counter the sniper threat. Focused on increasing our
ability to sense and warn, deny, protect, and respond, we are
leveraging the cooperative efforts of Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency, our sister Services, the Marine Corps Intelligence
Activity, and the National Ground Intelligence Center.
Future sense and warn capabilities may include optical, acoustic,
and infrared detection and location. We are examining different
obscurant technologies, while our protection effort focuses on
improving individual armor and new tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Detection of threat optics will provide indications and warning of
impending sniper or IED attacks, and a predictive capability to avoid
or engage prior to sustaining friendly casualties. One potential denial
method is through use of glare aversion devices which apply a non-
injurious, but discomforting, bright light. Assessment of the response
can help determine hostile intent, and the glare aversion effect may be
effective in prohibiting a sniper from visually targeting friendly
forces. Our response capability efforts include examination of counter-
sniper vehicles and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's
sniper rifle program. Finally, we are using experimentation to combat
the sniper threat through advanced equipment and improved tactics,
techniques, and procedures. Ongoing joint and interagency cooperation,
coupled with industry collaboration, will shape our future experiments.
Secure Internet Routing Protocol Network
The continuing evolution and maturation of network threats, along
with the asynchronous nature of network intrusions and vulnerabilities,
requires the Marine Corps to seek improvements in network defense. The
Secure Internet Routing Protocol Network (SIPRNET) is a highly secure
network, physically and logically separate from unclassified networks
and the Internet. In the near future, we foresee greater reliance on
the SIPRNET to enhance the security of Marine Corps war fighting and
business operations. This effort will require additional resources,
which will prove well worth the investment as we secure our networks
and provide for better operational and force protection.
v. naval operating forces and concepts
As the ``Arc of Instability'' is substantially a maritime domain, a
naval force is uniquely suited to respond and provide forward-deployed
expeditionary combat forces in response to crises. It is the Marine
Corps' obligation to provide our Nation a naval force that is fully
prepared for employment as a MAGTF operating across the spectrum of
conflict. The Nation invests tremendous resources knowing that the
ability to project power from the sea is a prerequisite for defending
our sovereignty. To maneuver from the freedom of the seas provides
timely and reliable response solutions to our Nation. In concert with
the U.S. Navy, we support the Law of the Sea Convention, which
preserves our ability to maneuver from the sea.
As demonstrated by the Navy-Marine Corps responses to Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, tsunami relief in southern Asia, and noncombatant
evacuation operations in Lebanon, maneuvering from the sea is a
relevant capability possessing the flexibility to meet our country's
needs both around the world and at home. Marines and sailors embarked
from amphibious platforms provide asymmetric, sustainable, and rapidly
responsive solutions to our combatant commanders.
Working closely with our Navy and Coast Guard partners, we will
advance the amphibious and expeditionary capabilities the combatant
commanders rely on to meet their emerging challenges, strengthen
concepts and training that enhance naval contributions to the Long War,
and provide a naval force that is fully prepared for employment across
the full spectrum of conflict.
Concepts to Capabilities
In September 2006, the Navy and Marine Corps published a new Naval
Operations Concept (NOC), which provides our unified vision for the
future and broadly describes how naval power and influence can be
applied at and from the sea, across the littorals, and ashore. In
tandem, we revised our Marine Corps Operating Concepts (MOC) for a
Changing Security Environment, incorporating our lessons learned and
the unified vision provided in the NOC. Building on the conceptual
foundation for littoral power projection provided in Operational
Maneuver from the Sea, the Naval and Marine Corps Operating Concepts
call for more widely distributed forces to provide increased forward
presence, security cooperation with an expanding set of international
partners, preemption of nontraditional threats, and a global response
to crisis in spite of challenges to access. Collectively, these
concepts provide the foundation for selectively conducting either
distributed or aggregated operations.
Due to changes to the security environment and the effects of
globalization, the Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps have all
concurred with the need to reexamine our maritime strategy. Early this
summer, we intend to produce a new maritime strategy in order to
articulate the ways and means by which maritime forces will support the
Nation's strategic ends in the new security era.
Amphibious Warfare Ships
Amphibious warfare ships are the centerpiece of the Navy-Marine
Corps' forcible entry and Seabasing capability, and have played an
essential role in the Long War. These ships are equipped with aviation
and surface assault capabilities, which coupled with their inherent
survival and self-defense systems, makes them ideally suited to support
a broad range of mission requirements. This survivability is critical
to ensure the Nation has the widest range of response options. Not only
must our naval forces maintain the ability to rapidly close, decisively
employ, and effectively sustain marines from the sea, they must also
respond to emerging Long War requirements, crisis response, and
humanitarian assistance missions on short notice around the world.
For forcible entry, the Marine Corps' requirement is a single,
simultaneously-employed two Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) assault
capability. One MEB requires seventeen amphibious warfare ships;
however, given the fiscally constrained environment, the Navy and
Marine Corps have agreed to assume risk by only using 15. Historical
amphibious ship availability rates dictate a minimum of 11 ships of
each of the current types of amphibious ship--a minimum of 33 total
ships--resulting in a Battle Force that provides 30 operationally
available amphibious warfare ships. In that Battle Force, 10 aviation-
capable big deck ships (LHA/LHD/LHA(R)) and 10 LPD-17 class ships are
required to accommodate the MEB's aviation combat element.
Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD)
The LPD-17 San Antonio class of amphibious warfare ships represents
the Department of the Navy's commitment to a modern expeditionary power
projection fleet that will enable our naval force to operate across the
spectrum of warfare. The Navy took delivery of the first LPD-17 in the
summer of 2005 and operational evaluation is scheduled to begin in the
summer of 2007. The LPD-17 class replaces four classes of older ships--
the LKA, LST, LSD-36, and the LPD-4--and will have a 40-year expected
service life. LPD-17 class ships will play a key role in supporting the
ongoing Long War by forward deploying marines and their equipment to
respond to crises abroad. Its unique design will facilitate expanded
force coverage and decreased reaction times of forward deployed Marine
Expeditionary Units. In forcible entry operations, the LPD-17 will help
maintain a robust surface assault and rapid off-load capability for the
MAGTF far into the future.
Amphibious Assault Ship (Replacement) (LHA(R))
The Tarawa class amphibious assault ships reach the end of their
service life during the next decade (2011-2015). An eighth Wasp class
LHD (multi-purpose amphibious assault ship) is under construction and
will replace one Tarawa class ship during fiscal year 2008. In order to
meet future warfighting requirements and fully capitalize on our
investment in the MV-22 and Joint Strike Fighter, ships with enhanced
aviation capabilities will replace the remaining LHA ships. These ships
will provide enhanced hangar and maintenance spaces to support aviation
maintenance and increased jet fuel storage and aviation ordnance
magazines. The lead ship, LHA-6, is on track for detailed design and
construction contract award during fiscal year 2007, with advanced
procurement funds already provided in the fiscal year 2005 and 2006
budgets.
The Maritime Prepositioning Force
Our proven MPF--capable of supporting the rapid deployment of three
Marine Expeditionary Brigades--is an important complement to our
amphibious warfare capability. Combined, these capabilities provide the
Marine Corps the ability to rapidly react to a crisis in a number of
potential theaters and the flexibility to employ forces across the
battlespace. The natural progression of this capability set, the
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF(F)), is a key enabler of
Seabasing and will build on the success of the legacy MPF program.
MPF(F) will provide support to a wide range of military operations with
capabilities such as at-sea arrival and assembly, selective offload of
specific mission sets, and long-term, sea-based sustainment. The
squadron will be capable of prepositioning the Marine Expeditionary
Brigade's critical equipment and sustainment; but this capability does
not constitute a forcible entry capability. The MPF(F) squadron
composition decision was made by the acting Secretary of the Navy in
May 2005; the program is currently in the technology development phase
of acquisition, with a Milestone B decision planned in fiscal year
2008.
High Speed Connectors
High-speed connectors will facilitate the conduct of sustained sea-
based operations by expediting force closure and allowing the
persistence necessary for success in the littorals. Connectors are
grouped into three categories: intertheater, the Joint High Speed
Sealift, which provides strategic force closure for CONUS-based forces;
intratheater, the Joint High Speed Vessel that enables rapid closure of
Marine forces and sustainment; and the Joint Maritime Assault
Connector, to move troops and resources from the sea base to shore.
These platforms will link bases and stations around the world to the
sea base and other advanced bases, as well as provide linkages between
the sea base and forces operating ashore.
Ship-to-Shore Mobility
For decades, Marine power projection has included a deliberate
buildup of combat power ashore. Only after naval forces fought ashore
and established a beachhead would the MAGTF begin to focus its combat
power on the joint force's operational objective. Advances in mobility,
fires, and sustainment capabilities will enable greater penetration and
exploitation operations from over the horizon, by both air and surface
means, with forces moving rapidly to operational objectives without
stopping to seize, defend, and build up beachheads or landing zones.
The EFV, MV-22 Osprey, and CH-53K heavy lift helicopter are critical to
achieving the necessary forcible entry capabilities of the future.
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle
The Marine Corps provides the Nation's joint warfighting forces
with a unique, flexible, and effective capability to conduct forcible
entry operations from the sea. The EFV, the Corps' largest ground
combat system acquisition program, is the sole ground combat vehicle
that enables projection of combat power from a sea base. It will
replace the aging Assault Amphibious Vehicle that has been in service
since 1972 and will become a complementary component of our modernized
fleet of tactical vehicles that include the JLTV, the Marine Personnel
Carrier, and the Internally Transportable Vehicle. The EFV's amphibious
mobility, day and night lethality, enhanced force protection
capabilities, and robust communications will help the joint force meet
security challenges across the spectrum of conflict. The over-the-
horizon capability of the EFV will also enable amphibious ships to
increase their standoff distance, no longer requiring them to close
within the striking distance of many coastal defense systems in order
to launch their amphibious assault platforms. The EFV will be
specifically well suited to maneuver operations conducted from the sea
and sustained operations in the world's littoral regions.
The Marine Corps recently conducted a demanding operational
assessment of the EFV. It successfully demonstrated most critical
performance requirements, but the design complexities are still
providing challenges to system reliability. To that end, we conducted a
comprehensive requirements review to ensure delivery of the required
capability while reducing complexity of the system where possible. For
example, the human stresses encountered during operations in some high
sea states required us to reevaluate the operational necessity of
exposing marines to those conditions. Based upon this review, and a
subsequent engineering design review, we will tailor final requirements
and system design to support forcible entry concepts while ensuring the
EFV is a safe, reliable, and effective combat vehicle.
Supporting Capabilities
Logistics Modernization is the largest coordinated and cross-
organizational effort ever undertaken to transform Marine Corps
logistics. A three-pronged improvement and integration initiative
focusing on Marine Corps personnel, processes, and technology,
Logistics Modernization is integrating and streamlining supply,
maintenance, and distribution. As our roadmap for more effective and
efficient expeditionary logistics, Logistics Modernization is
multiplying our ability to support the MAGTF across the spectrum of
conflict, in all environments and across all levels of theater
maturity.
vi. beyond the horizon--posturing the marine corps for the future
History has proven that we cannot narrowly define the conditions
for which our military must be ready. With little warning, our Nation
has repeatedly called its Corps front and center--in the southern
Pacific after Pearl Harbor, in Korea after the communist invasion in
1950, in the mountains of Afghanistan after September 11, and in
southern Asia in the wake of the catastrophic tsunami of 2004. Each of
these strategic surprises demonstrates the broad range of possibilities
for which the Marine Corps must be prepared.
The Long War requires a multi-dimensional force that is well
trained and educated for employment in all forms of warfare.
Historically, our Corps has produced respected leaders who have
demonstrated intellectual agility in warfighting. Our current
deployment tempo increasingly places our Professional Military
Education programs at risk. No level of risk is acceptable if it
threatens the steady flow of thinkers, planners, and aggressive
commanders who can execute effectively across the entire spectrum of
operations.
The Future of Training and Education
Looking ahead to the challenges of the Long War, we have enhanced
our counterinsurgency capabilities while remaining vigilant that our
MAGTFs must remain ready to launch robust forcible entry operations and
succeed across the spectrum of conflict with our naval partner. With
Marine forces so closely engaged in an irregular fight, we will have to
take extraordinary steps to retain this ability to serve as the
Nation's shock troops during major conventional combat operations. Your
support of our training and education needs will allow us to remain
faithful to our enduring mission: to be where the country needs us,
when she needs us, and to prevail over whatever challenges we face.
The Training Continuum
Some things remain constant--we continue to ensure that all
marines, regardless of occupational specialty, gain the self-confidence
and skills derived from our warrior ethos ``Every Marine a Rifleman.''
The experience at boot camp remains legendary; this transformation of
young Americans is a national treasure--one that we must preserve and
guard carefully. The core values of Honor, Courage, and Commitment--
imprinted on their souls during recruit training and strengthened
thereafter--mark a marine's character for a lifetime. To reinforce this
transformation, we have focused the emphasis of our officer and
enlisted professional military education on combat leadership.
Marine training is built along a continuum that is well defined,
well structured, and of which we are extremely proud. Marines are
forged in the furnace of recruit training and tempered by shared
hardship and tough training. This transformation process begins the day
they meet their recruiter, who introduces them to the concept of total
fitness: body, mind, and spirit. It continues through their common
experiences at Recruit Training and its Crucible, and Marine Combat
Training. It moves on to skill training at one of our schools or at a
sister Service school. It culminates with assignment to an operational
unit with its own demanding training, where a powerful bond of trust
develops between fellow warriors as they experience the rigors of
combat against a diverse and adaptive foe.
The Infantry Battalion Enhancement Period Program (IBEPP)
Long War operations have significantly increased our training
requirements. Marines must now train to a broader range of skills;
however, due to high operational tempo, we face ever-decreasing
timetables for marines to achieve mastery of these skills. Our first
major initiative to maximize effective use of available time was the
establishment of a standardized and well-defined Pre-deployment
Training Program. To bolster home station training, we took an
additional step by establishing the IBEPP. The primary goal of the
IBEPP is to facilitate better small unit leader training within the
infantry battalion. Highlights of the IBEPP include expanded quotas for
rifle squad leader courses (sergeants) and a new tactical small unit
leader course focused on fire team leaders (corporals). Additionally,
we have updated our School of Infantry curriculum to incorporate the
additional equipment added to our new infantry battalion table of
equipment and increased the instructor base at our Schools of Infantry
to support the new IBEPP.
Expansion of our Weapons and Tactics Training Program
We find ourselves in a cycle of rapid innovation of weapons and
tactics with our enemies. This cycle challenges the creativity and
knowledge of staff officers in our ground and combat logistics
battalions who must direct training programs or staff combat
operations. Our aviation squadrons experienced this during the Vietnam
conflict. To address those challenges, we created the Weapons and
Tactics Training Program to develop and field a cadre of aviators with
advanced understanding of weapon and tactical innovations as well as
the concepts and requirements to train other aviators to adapt to these
trends. This program placed prestige on training expertise and now
provides an effective means by which Marine Aviation stays current on
battlefield innovations. We will soon apply the fundamentals of that
program to our ground staffs. The ground and logistics Weapons and
Tactics Training Program will produce ground marines expert in training
and warfighting functions who will improve their units' ability to
fight. Though we are assessing detailed requirements, we anticipate
this effort could require up to 150 instructors, and increased demands
on combined arms ranges, artillery and aviation units, simulation
centers, and suites of operations center equipment.
Marine Corps Lessons Learned Management System
This adaptive enemy requires us to have a responsive and
collaborative dialogue across the Corps. Our interactive and effective
lessons management system promptly captures and disseminates the
lessons being learned by our marines and sailors in complex combat
actions around the globe. Our web-based lesson input support tool--
selected by the Joint Staff last year to serve as the Department
standard--guides this learning process. Capitalizing on the
institutional agility that has been a hallmark of our success, last
year we implemented changes in such areas as crew-served weapons use,
tactical questioning, evidence gathering procedures, command and
control equipment training and procedures, civil-military operations,
and detainee handling.
Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning
An example of adaptation for the Long War includes our Center for
Advanced Operational Culture Learning, which we established during May
2005 and recently reached its full operational capability. Both officer
and enlisted marines now receive education in the operational aspects
of culture at nearly every phase of their career development. This
year, the Center is establishing Language Learning Resource Centers at
our eight largest bases and stations. These centers provide language
instruction using mobile language training shelters and contracted
professional language trainers. These efforts support the Defense
Language Transformation Roadmap increasing our interoperability with
partner nations around the globe. We are also expanding our Foreign
Area Officer program, creating language and culture experts from all
occupational specialties who can be integrated into Marine units
deployed worldwide. We thank Congress for its support in this venture,
as recent supplemental funding has proved instrumental to this effort.
Advisor Training
During 2006, we institutionalized the structure, resources, and
equipment to advance the individual skills and education of marines
selected to serve as advisors to partner military units. Our Security
Cooperation and Education Training Center had already trained over 50
deploying advisor teams during 2004 and 2005. This formal establishment
allowed us to increase our efforts, as we trained 77 advisor teams
during 2006. Additionally, we expanded advisor skills with upgrades to
training in such areas as foreign weapon handling, medical procedures
and survival, evasion, resistance, and escape. This year we are
establishing a Civil Military Operations Center of Excellence within
this Center, as the Marine Corps' focal agency for civil-military
operations training and education.
Training MAGTFs
Our continuing adaptations and investments in Core Values are
checked once more prior to deployment with a series of unit mission
rehearsals. These exercises occur during the culminating block of our
formal Predeployment Training Program, which we expanded during 2004 to
serve all deploying MAGTFs. These mission rehearsals present all
deploying personnel with increasingly complex situations designed to
replicate the confusing swirl of combat on a complex battlefield. Role
players, many of whom are Iraqi-Americans, portray battlefield
civilians and insurgents alike, presenting exercise-worn marines with
sudden ``shoot-don't shoot'' decisions and forging within our marines a
sense of common cause with the civilians they will soon protect. The
culmination of our pre-deployment training consists of three distinct
exercises: Mojave Viper, Desert Talon, and Mountain Warrior--each
specifically tailored to the deploying unit's destination combat
environment.
During 2006, we continued to modify this program with expanded
training in force escalation and with increased integration of
logistics combat units. To better prepare marines to counter the threat
of improvised explosive devices, we added more training devices, built
new ranges, and employed electronic warfare specialists at our
rehearsal sites. This year we are focusing our enhancements on the
training of advisor teams and of MAGTF staffs by increasing the use of
simulation. Our planned improvements promise to deliver Marine forces
ready to more effectively meet the emerging challenges faced by the
Combatant Commanders as a naval force in readiness in joint, combined,
and interagency operations.
Modernization of Training Ranges
With the support of Congress, we also recently began the most
ambitious modernization of our training ranges since World War II. From
larger and more realistic urban training facilities to increased
opportunities to evaluate advanced air-ground coordination, we have
significantly improved the realism, safety, and capacity of our ranges
and training areas. While our immediate focus has been to acquire
infrastructure and modern technology, our long-term investment is in
people, largely civilian, to both operate and maintain these facilities
and to form the critical training cadres capable of maintaining the
realism our MAGTFs require. Your continued support of our range
modernization efforts, as well as the support for the Department's
programs to ensure future access to adequate sea, air, and land space
for our training ranges, remains vital to our ability to prepare for
the challenges of the future with our joint, coalition, and interagency
partners.
Marine Aviation Training Systems Program
The Aviation Training Systems Program (ATSP) plans, executes, and
manages Marine Aviation Training to achieve individual and unit combat
readiness through standardized training across all aviation core
competencies. Through the ATSP, Marine Aviation develops aircraft
systems that enhance operational readiness, improve safety through
greater standardization, and significantly reduce the life cycle cost
of maintaining and sustaining aircraft.
Core Values and Ethics Training
During this past year, we also reviewed our efforts to instill in
marines those core values necessary to guide them correctly through the
complex ethical demands of armed conflict. We have ensured that every
marine, at every phase of the training continuum, studies ethical
leadership, the Law of War, escalation of force, and Rules of
Engagement. Our entry-level training first presents these concepts in
the classroom, and then tests for proper application of these
principles under stressful field exercises. We further reinforce
confident, ethical decision-making through the Marine Corps Martial
Arts Program that teaches our Core Values and presents ethical
scenarios pertaining to restraint and proper escalation of force as the
foundation of its curriculum. We imbue our marines with the mindset
that ``wherever we go, everyone is safer because a US marine is
there.''
Building Esprit and Warrior Pride
The Marine Corps dress blue uniform is as legendary as the marines
who wear it. However, while this well-known uniform is one of the most
admired uniforms in the world, owning one is out of the reach of most
enlisted marines--it simply costs too much for them to buy on their
own.
No marine should be denied the honor of wearing this symbol of more
than two centuries of bravery and sacrifice. Therefore, I have ordered
that every marine recruit now be issued a dress blue uniform before
they graduate from boot camp, and all enlisted marines are to receive
an appropriate clothing allowance so that they are able to purchase and
maintain a dress blue uniform. They have earned this privilege.
vii. improve the quality of life for our marines and our families
Enhancing Individual Survivability-Personal Protective Equipment.
The Corps will continue to pursue technological advancements in
personal protective equipment--our marines deserve nothing less. Fully
recognizing the trade-off between weight, protection, fatigue, and
movement restriction, we are providing marines the latest in personal
protective equipment--such as the Modular Tactical Vest (MTV), Quad
Guard, Lightweight Helmet, and Flame Resistant Organizational Gear.
Body Armor
Combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted a need
to evolve our personal protective vest system. Therefore, in February,
we started transitioning to a newly designed MTV. This vest is
virtually the same weight as its predecessor, the Outer Tactical Vest,
but it more easily integrates our other personal protection systems. It
provides greater comfort through the incorporation of state-of-the-art
load carriage techniques that better distributes the combat load over
the torso and onto the hips of the marine. The acquisition objective
for the MTV is 60,000 systems, with anticipated completion of
deliveries in December 2007. The MTV also incorporates our existing
Enhanced Small Arms Protective Inserts (E-SAPI), and Side SAPI plates.
These plates are currently provided to every marine in theater. The E-
SAPI provides the best protection available against a wide variety of
small arms threats, to include protection against 7.62mm ammunition
threats.
QuadGard
The QuadGard system is designed to provide ballistic protection for
a marine's arms and legs when serving as a gunner on convoy duty. This
system, which integrates with other personal ballistic protection
equipment such as the MTV, Enhanced SAPI, and Lightweight Helmet,
reduces minimum standoff distances from the marine to ballistic
threats, particularly improvised explosive device fragmentation.
Lightweight Helmet
We are committed to providing the best head protection available to
our warfighters. The lightweight helmet weighs less than its
predecessor, and provides a high level of protection against
fragmentation threats and 9mm bullets. We now require use of the pad
system as study results demonstrated it provides greater protection
against nonballistic blunt trauma than the sling suspension system. We
are retrofitting more than 150,000 helmets with the pad system and have
already fielded enough helmet pads for every deployed marine. Beginning
in January, all lightweight helmets produced by the manufacturer are
now delivered with the approved pad system installed.
Flame Resistant Organizational Gear (FROG)
In February, we began fielding FROG to all deployed and deploying
marines. This life saving ensemble of clothing items--gloves,
balaclava, long-sleeved fire resistant shirt, combat shirt, and combat
trouser--is designed to mitigate potential injuries to our marines from
flame exposure. These clothing items provide protection that is
comparable to that of the NOMEX combat vehicle crewman suit/flight
suit.
With this mix of body armor, undergarments, and outerwear,
operational commanders can determine what equipment their marines will
employ based upon mission requirements and environmental conditions.
Taking Care of our Marines and Their Families
Just as every marine makes a commitment to the Corps and the Nation
when they earn the title marine, we make an enduring commitment to
every marine and Marine family. Marines are renowned for ``taking care
of our own.'' Part of taking care of our own means we will provide for
marines and their families through appropriate pay and compensation,
housing, health care, infrastructure, and community services. Strong
congressional support for many administration initiatives has made
possible the significant investments required to improve each of the
components of quality of life. This support requires continuous
assessment to ensure that it is both sufficient and relevant,
particularly during war. These programs must be on a wartime footing to
seamlessly sustain our marines and their families for the duration--
long past the redeployment of our marines and sailors.
We are scrutinizing the support for our marines and their families
to ensure our family support programs remain on a wartime footing--
particularly those that assist in integrating civilian, military,
charitable, and Veterans Affairs programs. This support targets both
marines who suffer from the physical costs of this war, and those who
carry unseen scars--those suffering from Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI)
and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). As I testified in my
confirmation hearing, I feel strongly that these wounds of war should
be characterized as any other wound--and our commitment to those
marines who suffer from these ailments will not falter.
We continue to aggressively monitor post-deployment mental health
screenings, suicides, domestic violence, and divorce rates. Marine
commanders and noncommissioned officers at every level are charged to
monitor these indications closely and to stay engaged on these issues.
Our Casualty Assistance, Marine For Life, and Combat/Operational Stress
Control Programs continue to be the frontline of support to our wartime
efforts.
Casualty Assistance
Each fallen marine is a tragic loss to the survivors, the Corps,
and our Nation. We endeavor to honor their sacrifices with sincerity
and commitment. Our Casualty Assistance Calls Officers are trained to
treat next of kin and other family members as they would their own
family. Rendering casualty assistance begins with the basic tenet that
there is no standard casualty call; each case is distinct, as families
grieve in different ways. Assistance to surviving families is
individually tailored to facilitate their transition through the stages
of grief and the completion of the casualty assistance process.
Wounded Warrior Regiment
While the support to our Marine Corps and families has been
exceptional, I intend to increase this support through the creation of
a Wounded Warrior Regiment. This new regimental headquarters will
provide centralized oversight of the care for our wounded marines and
assist in the integration of their support with military, Department of
Veterans Affairs, charitable, and civilian systems. The regiment will
have a battalion headquarters on each coast, commanded by officers
personally selected by me. My criteria for this leadership will be
rigorous, as I will seek to select only those officers with previous
command experience. My staff is reviewing the fiscal program
requirements for this unit now--to include facilities, manning, and
support requirements. I view this initiative as a personal priority to
fulfill our commitment to these valiant Americans.
Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI)
As the quality of individual combat armor has increased, so have
the number of blast survivors and Marines with TBI. Mild to moderate
traumatic brain injuries can be difficult to diagnose and yet can cause
changes in personality, cognition, and memory that significantly impair
a service member's ability to make the life and death decisions
required of them while in a combat environment. TBI and PTSD have many
symptoms in common, and TBI can co-occur with PTSD. Recent measures to
mitigate the impact of traumatic brain injuries to individual marines
and their units include the release of a medical guidance letter from
the Medical Officer of the Marine Corps outlining proper diagnosis and
treatment strategies.
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
The science of diagnosing and treating PTSD continues to evolve.
The Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Training and Education
Command, Naval Health Research Center, and others are studying ways to
identify risk and protective factors for PTSD and to increase our
resilience to stress. By improving the awareness of both individuals
and our leaders, we can provide early identification and psychological
first aid to those who are stress-injured. Better screening and
referral of at-risk marines is underway via pre- and post-deployment
standard health assessments that specifically screen for mental health
problems. Navy Medicine has established new Deployment Health Centers
with additional mental health providers readily available to treat PTSD
and other combat stress injuries. The Department of Veterans Affairs
and the Department of Defense have established comprehensive guidelines
for managing Post-Traumatic Stress, which are available to all
services. The Marine Corps, Navy Medicine, and Veterans Affairs have
coordinated a Seamless Transition program to help our Marine veterans
move smoothly into the Veterans Affairs treatment system to get the
help they need and deserve. In addition, Veterans Affairs Readjustment
Centers at 209 communities around the country now provide mental health
services for eligible active and discharged veterans and their
families.
Combat/Operational Stress Control
Battlefields are familiar territory for marines--we train marines
to excel in chaotic and unpredictable surroundings. Yet all marines
will experience combat/operational stress to some extent, as transient
symptoms for most, but as persistent stress injuries for others.
Managing combat stress is vital to the operation of the Marine Corps as
a fighting force and the long-term health and well-being of marines and
their families. All deploying marines receive warrior preparation,
transition briefs, and health assessments. In addition, mental health
professionals or specially trained medical officers brief marine
leaders on the prevention and management of adverse stress reactions.
We have also implemented the innovative Operational Stress Control and
Readiness (OSCAR) program, which embeds mental health providers with
ground forces. OSCAR provides early identification and treatment of
combat/operational stress problems, attempts to defeat the stigma of
combat stress, and overcomes the barriers to care.
The Combat/Operational Stress Control deployment cycle resources
for families include the Family Deployment Support Program. The
program's components consist of Family Readiness Days, family crisis
support services, Return and Reunion Briefs for spouses, and building a
sense of community among our military families.
Marine For Life
The Marine For Life Injured Support program assists seriously and
very seriously injured marines, sailors who served with marines, and
their families. This program bridges the gap between military medical
care and the Department of Veterans Affairs by providing individualized
support through the transition period.
Individual case tracking and enduring support for our injured
marines and sailors complements the Office of the Secretary of
Defense's Military Severely Injured Center, which enables the program
to provide around-the-clock injured support service. Marine For Life
provides support tailored to an individual's needs, including pre- and
post-service separation case tracking, assistance with the physical
evaluation board process, and an interactive website that acts as a
clearinghouse for all disability and benefit information. The program
also provides employment assistance through a preexisting Marine For
Life network that establishes local coordination with veterans, public,
private, and charitable organizations that provide support to our
injured warriors.
In April 2005, Marine For Life integrated Marine Corps and
Department of Veterans Affairs' handling of Marine cases by assigning a
marine field grade officer to the Department of Veterans Affairs
Headquarters' Seamless Transition Office. This integrates marines into
the Department of Veterans Affairs system and provides service
oversight of Veterans Health Administration care and Veterans Benefits
Administration benefits delivery. The Marine For Life program provides
the direct point of contact for problem resolution for marines within
the Veterans Administration system.
Military Construction-Bachelor Enlisted Quarters Initiative
Bachelor housing is my top military construction priority for
Program Objective Memorandum 2008. Barracks are a linchpin in the
quality of life for our single marines. With the help of Congress, we
have tripled the funding for bachelor housing from fiscal year 2006 to
2007, and if the President's request is funded, we will double the 2007
funding in fiscal year 2008. We are funding barracks' furnishings on a
7-year replacement cycle and prioritizing barracks repair projects to
preempt a backlog of repairs. Our $1.7 billion barracks investment plan
in support of a 175,000 marine end strength provides adequate billeting
for our unmarried junior enlisted and noncommissioned officer marines
by 2012.
Public Private Venture Family Housing
Our efforts to improve housing for marines and their families
continue. Thanks to continuing congressional support, the Marine Corps
will have contracts in place by the end of fiscal year 2007 to
eliminate all inadequate family housing.
viii. conclusion
This Nation has high expectations of her Corps--as she should. Your
marines are answering the call around the globe, performing with
distinction in the face of great hardships. As they continue to serve
in harm's way, our moral imperative is to fully support them--we owe
them the full resources required to complete the tasks we have given
them. Now more than ever they need the sustained support of the
American people and Congress to simultaneously maintain our readiness,
reset the force during an extended war, modernize to face the
challenges of the future, and fulfill our commitment to marine
families. On behalf of your marines, I extend great appreciation for
your support to date and thank you in advance for your ongoing efforts
to support our brave countrymen and women in harm's way. I promise you
that the Corps understands the value of each dollar provided and will
continue to provide maximum return for every dollar spent.
Chairman Levin. General, thank you for your statement and
again to all of you for your service.
Let me first start with the question about the 2007 and the
2008 supplementals. Let me ask you both, Admiral and General,
whether or not the supplementals adequately fund your
requirements to support the war effort. Admiral, let me start
with you.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, they do. They are very heavily
focused, obviously, on the flying hours and steaming days and
the area of equipment particularly support for Seabees, whose
equipment, we are running through pretty quickly, as well as
the manpower support. So the supplemental request is adequate
in that regard.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
General?
General Conway. My response is the same, sir. It is
adequate. We will include some of our end strength growth and
as a byproduct of that, some equipment. We will put some of it
toward the MRAP Vehicles again to get them in the hands of our
troops as soon as possible.
Chairman Levin. Thank you both.
By the way, we are going to have an 8-minute first round
here.
Secretary Winter, the LCS program has had some real
problems. It was supposed to be a relatively inexpensive
program. It was supposed to be a relatively quickly delivered
program. But we have cost growth which is significant and
apparently the Service changed its requirements after the
design and construction contract was signed.
Why did that happen? We have had so much experience with
changes in the requirements after contracts have been entered
into. Why was that allowed to occur here?
Secretary Winter. Sir, I believe that there was in general
an overly optimistic view of what could be accomplished. That
said, we are still getting a first lead ship here in a lot
shorter time period than we normally have. However, that over
optimism has created some obvious issues in terms of decisions
to proceed forward before the requirements were fully
definitized and we are now having to deal with the consequences
of that.
Chairman Levin. What actions are we taking to avoid that or
correct that?
Secretary Winter. I think, sir, first of all in terms of
the LCS, we are working very hard to enhance the Navy's
oversight of the activity. We have added personnel both to the
program office and also to the supervisor of shipbuilding that
has the responsibility of directly overseeing the activities at
the shipyards. We have also worked very hard to complete the
definitization of the requirements and design development
process and we are at the very end, I believe, of that aspect
of it. We are also using a negotiation of the contract type to
force both the Navy and the contractor to come to final
agreement on a number of these items.
Chairman Levin. The EFV was projected to enter production
this year. Now we are going to have to go back into research
and development (R&D) for 4 years more if that program is
continued. Apparently the vehicle design was too fragile and
unreliable. That should have been foreseeable and preventable.
Apparently the program manager got a major promotion just
before the real status of this project became known via
testing.
What is going on? Why don't we start with you, Mr.
Secretary?
Secretary Winter. I think again we have an issue here where
the program got going in an overly optimistic form. I think
there was an objective to try to bring this program in for
dollars which were not achievable. The net of that was that
certain basic systems engineering functions that should have
been performed at the beginning of the program were not
undertaken. The net result is we wound up having a design that
did not have a firm basis in particular for some of the
reliability and maintainability objectives that are core to
this program.
We are now in the process of having to go back into the
design and develop the appropriate models, and undertake the
appropriate systems engineering activities to see whether or
not we can in fact convert the current configuration into a
configuration that will provide us with the reliability and
maintainability that is core to this program.
Chairman Levin. Is there any accountability for these
failures?
Secretary Winter. Sir, one of the things that we are going
to have to take a look at is exactly how we got into this
situation. We have been doing that on the LCS. We have not yet
done that on EFV, but it is my intention to do that there as
well.
Chairman Levin. Will you keep this committee informed on an
ongoing basis of both of those reviews?
Secretary Winter. Most definitely, sir.
Chairman Levin. Servicemembers with a disability that is
rated 30 percent or higher, as you all know, qualify for
medical retirement. Those with less than 30 percent are
separated with severance pay and the consequences are very
significant, particularly in terms of family health care. The
Center for Naval Analysis reviewed the disability ratings of
all of the Services and they report that 26 percent of airmen
determined to be unfit for duty received disability ratings of
30 percent or higher. The other Services award ratings of 30
percent or more to far, far fewer servicemembers. The Army
awards this rating 4.3 percent of the time, the Navy 4.1
percent of the time, and the Marines only 2.7 percent of the
time.
I am wondering, Mr. Secretary, is there an explanation for
why the Marine Corps number is less than the Navy's number?
Also, can you explain why both the Navy and Marine Corps
numbers are so far below the Air Force number?
Secretary Winter. Sir, this is an area that we are still
trying to get our hands around in terms of the overall
assessment. We do use a common board approach and we have been
going through to reassess that board approach, both in terms of
what is known as the ``informal'' and the ``formal'' board
aspects. I think we have gone a long way in terms of
understanding how to move through the process in a fairly
expeditious manner, but I do not have a specific answer to you,
for you today in terms of those differences. We will be working
towards that end, however.
Chairman Levin. We are going to have a hearing with the
Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee and one of the issues that
is going to come up is this issue. So we would hope in the next
2 weeks that you would have that answer ready for us.
Secretary Winter. We will work to that end, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thanks.
We have been using sailors in lieu of the shortfall of
persons who are trained to do the specialties that these
sailors are now engaged in. As of February 2007, 12,000 Navy
personnel were engaged on the ground in the CENTCOM and 79
percent of the personnel on the ground are deploying and
supporting ground forces in their traditional military
specialties, such as base and port operations support, medical
services, and explosive ordnance disposal. But the others are
being used for convoy security or for detention facility
guards. They are performing well, but using sailors outside of
their primary military duties must have an impact on both the
institutional Navy as well as on individual servicemembers.
Admiral, how would you describe the pace and scope of
sailors being used in lieu of ground combat forces for those
types of assignments in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Admiral Mullen. Mr. Chairman, this is something that I have
made a priority from the standpoint of supporting the ongoing
effort for the country. In my travels in theater, I would tell
you first of all that the sailors I have seen in the
performance of these duties are very proud of what they do and
they know they are making a big impact. They are also highly
praised by the ground forces from both the Marine Corps and the
Army.
In addition, this is not just Navy. I think you are aware
that the Air Force is also doing this as well.
Clearly it is pressure on us as an institution but I do not
consider myself close to red lines yet with respect to that. In
fact, today it is over 13,000 sailors that are on the ground
and over 5,000 specifically who are in Iraq.
We also have some particular skills. Prison security
capability is a natural skill for us, so that maps literally
100 percent. We have some technical skills that have made a
huge difference with respect to improvised explosive device
(IED), countering the IED problem.
But from a philosophical standpoint, I come at this having
grown up through Vietnam and knowing what long deployments can
do. This is the fight we are in right now and I want to provide
as much relief as I can. I am comfortable that the training
they are getting before they go and that the missions they are
performing are well within their capability to perform.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Finally, General Conway, can you assure us that deploying
marines will be fully equipped and trained before they enter
combat in Iraq?
General Conway. Absolutely, sir. There is a five-phased
training program that all of our deploying units have to
experience before they are deployed. Based upon the recent
surge operations, we have had to rework some schedules in order
to be able to make that happen. But it is a service requirement
that no marine or sailor deployed with our units will go
overseas without those kinds of experiences.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is the third
time in a row that I have imposed upon Senator Warner to allow
me to go first, and I thank him very much. I will make it much
shorter than I otherwise would.
Senator Warner. We both serve on the Senate Environment and
Public Works Committee, where you are the ranking member, and
you have a lot of work.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, that is right.
Senator Warner. I congratulate you on getting that
legislation out this morning.
Senator Inhofe. It is very significant. Thank you, Senator
Warner.
Back during the 1990s, I was pretty stressed out over what
China was doing, not just with nuclear weapons but also the
conventional forces. At the same time we were downsizing
substantially, in the 1990s, they actually increased their
procurement by 1,000 percent. Now, when you look at what is
going on right now with what they are doing with their navy,
one example you would have is, we have around 55 fast attack
submarines and they are projected to go down during the next 20
years. At the same time, China, it is my understanding, will be
outproducing us about seven to one.
Now, I think that is accurate information. Do you agree
with that?
Admiral Mullen. They are certainly outproducing us. I am
not sure on the ratio.
Senator Inhofe. Does this really concern you?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, it does. The amount of their
investment concerns me and what they are doing with their navy,
and the technology they are investing in, concern me. That is a
very important part of the world. We need it to be stable. We
have a strong presence there. We will continue to do that.
Senator Inhofe. I am glad you said the technology because
qualitatively we have been superior, but they are making
headway.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, they are. That is very evident to
us. They are also making headway operationally. We see them
operating better than they were just a few years ago. So the
issue and I think it has been discussed widely, is that their
strategic intent here is not clear and more transparency is
important. One of the things we are doing is engaging them more
militarily to try to understand, to have relationships.
Additionally, we try to understand where they are headed.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, because it is not just in your end,
Mr. Secretary.
Admiral Mullen. No, sir.
Senator Inhofe. It is in terms of strike vehicles and
everything else. They are very aggressive right now. In fact, I
think they are probably greater than our published figures.
General Conway, you probably know that we took a vote just
a few minutes ago on the MRAP and I am sure that pleased you.
You had written a letter to General Pace saying that the MRAP
could reduce our casualties by 80 percent. That is a pretty
high amount. I guess the amount to get us to that point would
be over $4 billion; is that correct?
General Conway. Sir, I want to qualify the statement to the
degree that it is understood completely. Against the same
blast, riding in an uparmored Humvee, which is currently the
gold standard in Iraq----
Senator Inhofe. Which is flat.
General Conway. Yes, sir, it has a flat and arguably even
concave bottom, which in some cases exacerbates the blast.
Against the same blast, marines, sailors, and soldiers who are
riding in the vehicle, are judged to be 400 percent less likely
to sustain death or injury. I think that is where the figure of
80 percent comes from and it was a little more clarified in the
letter.
Senator Inhofe. That is good. Let us stay on top of that,
because obviously that is something we want to do and it took a
major step today.
I want to comment also on what you said about the two-
thirds reenlistment rate. I have had occasion to spend a lot of
time with your people up around Fallujah and other places and
it is just incredible what they are doing. I wish the media
were a little more aware of that. Maybe you can help us in that
respect.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Senator
Warner.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to the three of you for your service. It is good to
see you again.
Admiral Mullen, before I get to the budget I want to ask
you a couple of questions about what is happening in the
Persian Gulf now. Obviously, we are all following closely and
with great concern the status of the British sailors who were
seized. Do we have any independent evidence as to whether the
two British boats were in Iranian water, as the Iranians claim,
or not, as the Brits claim?
Admiral Mullen. We are aware that the Brits have said they
were not in Iraqi territorial waters.
Senator Lieberman. Right. Based on the presence of two
carrier battle groups of ours in the Persian Gulf and watching
what is happening there, were you surprised by the Iranian
seizure of these two British boats?
Admiral Mullen. I guess I was not surprised from the
standpoint of the actions of the Republican Guard Navy. The
Iranian navy is made up of two separate and distinct groups.
What I do not know is to what degree that was sanctioned. I do
not have a feel for that at all, quite frankly.
It is a very tight water space. It is an area that has been
disputed for decades and centuries. There was an accord, the
Algiers Accord, in 1975, to which the Iranian and Iraqi
governments did not agree, so that there is a dispute up there
in these very tight waters and that certainly lends to the
difficulty of sorting this out.
The Stennis, which is the second carrier strike group
recently deployed, actually has been in the area for weeks and
has transited into the Gulf in recent days, and the exercise
that is ongoing there really is a training exercise to improve
our capability as well as provide the kind of signal that it
was originally intended to, which is one of strength and
stability, and support of our allies and friends there. That is
a part of the world that really needs to be stable. They are
training in the middle of the Gulf. They are not up near the
north, where the problem occurred.
Senator Lieberman. Are we doing anything different since
the seizure of the two British boats to avoid the same?
Admiral Mullen. We are always mindful of these kinds of
possibilities. There have been a significant number of Iranian
incursions into these waters in recent weeks, months, and
years. So we are certainly mindful of the possibilities. This
obviously, as an incident like this always does, sharpens your
edge considerably.
Senator Lieberman. Sure.
Admiral Mullen. But certainly it has always been a concern.
Senator Lieberman. Just one more brief question and it is
worth coming back for a separate hearing perhaps. As we face
the real threat that Iran represents to us, as we listen to
people in the square in Teheran shouting ``Death to America''
and we begin to try to understand their military capabilities,
what you said I think is probably little appreciated not only
by the American people, but by us here. We have now become
familiar with the fact that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard is
in Iraq training and equipping, et cetera. We know that it is a
unique group, an elite group, but not a small group. I gather
that it is well over 100,000 and reports to the Supreme Leader,
Ayatollah Khameini.
But you are telling us something else, which is that in
some sense there is a separate Iranian Guard Navy, separate
from the other navy.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, that is correct. It has been that
way for a long time. We understand a lot more about the
activities of the regular Iranian Navy than we do, quite
frankly, about the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy in
terms of either predictability or routine operations and
exercises.
Senator Lieberman. I would like to come back to that on
another occasion.
I have a concern about the submarine program. You mentioned
the number of 48 nuclear-powered subs as a minimum. We are on a
path now in construction to go down to 40 by around 2020. There
is a group of us in both chambers that would like to move the
year in which we go to two submarines a year from 2012 forward
to 2010. The money is not in this budget.
Am I correct to conclude, Mr. Secretary, that if you had
the money you would like to do this as well?
Secretary Winter. Sir, I think first of all we are hopeful
to be able to reduce the cost of these submarines. As you
recall, we are running about $2.4 billion in 2005 dollars per
submarine. We are looking to be able to take that down about
$200 million based on the economic order quantity and about
$200 million based on design improvements which are currently
under way.
We think the most cost effective way of doing that is to go
through that process, which we believe we will be able to
achieve consistent with the 2012 two-a-year production rate
program. I would just note two other aspects, one of which is
that, as we go into the ramp-up from one-a-year to two-a-year,
we do need to precede this by 2 years in terms of advance
procurement activities, principally associated with the reactor
power plant.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Secretary Winter. So we have a process where we have to go
through and ramp this up. I am also very concerned that we do
this and stabilize it. I do not want to go to two-a-year for a
year and then back to one-a-year and then back up to two-a-
year.
Senator Lieberman. Yes, no one wants that. I gather in the
House that there is some significant movement toward funding
the reactor core development on a time line to get to two
submarines by 2010. But you are absolutely right, it does come
down to dollars. We do not want to start it and ramp up and
then have to ramp down.
Secretary Winter. Yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. That would be bad for everybody.
I want to ask you one more question about the sub program.
The RAND Corporation recently did a study that concluded that
extending design on the next generation submarine from 15 to 20
years will result in up to a 20 percent savings over the long-
term by maintaining an experienced labor pool and the
industrial base.
The fiscal year 2008 shipbuilding plan does accelerate the
start of construction on the replacement of the Trident class
submarine from 2022 to 2019, but there is no initial funding in
it. I intend to try to add, not a large amount of money,
perhaps $25 million, to the budget to begin the design on the
new class of Trident submarine to meet the 2019 date. Do you
have an opinion on that at this point?
Secretary Winter. Senator, one of the things that I have
been trying to do is to ensure that our SSBN replacement
program has the proper systems engineering ahead of it. There
is a whole set of processes. The only reason for the SSBN is to
be able to carry the strategic missiles, and the only reason
for the missiles is to be able to carry the warheads. So we
need to make sure that we understand exactly what it is that we
are going to try to do with this deterrent force in the future,
what type of deployments, what type of targets, what type of
ranges and accuracies we will need with those missiles, what
options we have for the missiles themselves, and what
implications that has for the submarines.
One of the things I have been working to do here is to
establish the appropriate early partnership with Strategic
Command to be able to engage in the type of early-on systems
engineering which will let us go and take the first steps
towards the development of appropriate designs for a future
SSBN that are consistent with the future vision of what we need
for a deterrent force.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate your answer. My time is up.
I look forward to working with you on these two initiatives to
maintain the vitality of our submarine fleet and our submarine
base over the long term.
Thank you, all three of you, very much. Thanks for the
extraordinary service that your folks in uniform are giving in
the war on terrorism.
Secretary Winter. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to associate myself with my colleague's
remarks with regard to the submarines. We are very proud that
our shipyard in Newport News is a full partner in that program.
I am optimistic that we can go to the two submarines. You say
that you hope to achieve it through cost savings. Can you put a
little earmark on that money so it does not stray out of that
submarine account and drift over into another account? Is that
agreed to here?
Secretary Winter. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. Thank you very much. Keep those funds
there.
I also was quite interested in my colleague's questions to
the Admiral about the Iranian situation and our ships offshore.
I really view those ships as performing the traditional mission
of deterrence. We very carefully, as a consortium of nations
under the banner of NATO, did precisely that with the Warsaw
Pact. When questions are asked about the use of force in Iran,
it seems to me before we ever get to the serious consideration
of the use of force, we should simply pursue the deterrence
concept of ringing Iran with ships and perhaps other military
assets, just as a reminder. The presence alone, the old gunboat
diplomacy, has a very remarkable impact on normal diplomacy. It
would be helpful if ships from other nations that are similarly
affected by the threats that Iran poses through its nuclear
weapons production concept could join so that we begin to have
more of a NATO-type appearance and it is just not the United
States.
I am coming back to your first words, Admiral, which you
uttered when you came in here. You threw up a cautionary sign
on your retention and you simply said, appropriately, we are
looking into it. Could you share with us some of the early
signs that concern you? Is there a shift in retention that is a
reflection of the understandably serious divisive consternation
across this land with regard to the current operations?
Admiral Mullen. I do not know yet if that is part of the
reason, Senator Warner. This is the first time in about 7 years
that we have seen our first-term retention dip below 50
percent. Our goal is 50 percent and we have been between 50 and
60 since 2000. It has been a remarkable level of achievement.
In fact, I set out both recruiting and retention as a priority
for us. So literally, the data just got to me within the last
couple of weeks.
There is a piece of this that I do not quite understand
yet, which is that we are seeing a larger number of sailors
request extensions as opposed to reenlisting right now. Some of
that historically is tied to their ability to get into a combat
zone and reenlist for the tax-free benefit, which certainly
they are deserving of and brings them a lot more cash when they
reenlist.
So we are really pulling this apart. Also, there is a very
slight dip in our second-term retention. So we are certainly
seeing these indicators. It is the first time. It is what I
have been very wary of, just because I have been here awhile
and I have seen this certainly go in cycles. So we are working
to try to understand the details of it.
Senator Warner. I have to move on. I am delighted that you
are going to general quarters.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. This is a very critical situation.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. When I was in the building during Vietnam,
I began to see some of the recruiting and retention reflected
because of the public concern about that conflict. We have to
track that and track it instantly.
Now, General Conway, I listened to you carefully. I have
gone back and re-read your statement. You seem not to be
experiencing that problem; is that correct?
General Conway. Sir, that is correct. We annually target
about 25 percent for retention. Actually, with our growth we
are moving that figure up to 33 percent, and we still have a
high level of optimism that we will be able to meet those
figures.
Senator Warner. Good. The Navy has, as the Admiral
mentioned, some 4,000 white hats and officers in country now in
Iraq?
Admiral Mullen. 5,000.
Senator Warner. 5,000.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. So you are certainly doing that. You have a
much larger contingent which is performing in the finest
traditions.
Admiral Mullen. About 26,000 right now, sir, with the
turnover taking place.
Senator Warner. Quickly again, let us go to the Secretary.
The U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention, in your
prepared testimony you support it?
Secretary Winter. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. Does the administration intend to seek
Senate approval or ratification this year?
Secretary Winter. I believe we are working toward that end,
sir.
Senator Warner. All right, I am glad. I think it is
important that we move along on that.
Now, to the Commandant and then to the Secretary.
Commandant, you have quite appropriately, I believe, responded
to concerns that I and others had with regard to Marine Corps
Base, Quantico, which corrected the flight safety deficiencies
on your ramps. You have now put that on your unfunded
requirements, is that correct?
General Conway. That is correct, sir.
Senator Warner. I will personally see whether or not we
cannot move that through. I have gone in and out of that little
air strip many a time in my lifetime.
General Conway. Very functional, sir.
Senator Warner. I think it is important to do that. I thank
you very much.
Now, on the Navy shipbuilding, Admiral. The affordability
of the Navy program and our ability to meet your plan of 313
ships. CBO estimates $20 billion per year, $5 billion greater
than the Navy's budget estimate. In other words, you have set
your goals and the CBO has set their goals. They are not
consistent. What can we do to help you?
Admiral Mullen. I think the CBO continues to put pressure
on the system and I think that is a healthy thing. It is
interesting that in the discussion, for instance, about the
design base for SSBNs one of the challenges that we have in
reconciling the two is just our assumptions about how many we
are going to have and when we are going to have them. One of
the changes that is on the right-hand side of the shipbuilding
program in the out-years, the 2020s and 2030s, is that we have
changed some numbers there so there actually is some additional
cost that has gone up.
But in the new SSBN force, we for example imagine having
just the number of ships that we need because we will have
cores which will last the life of the ship. That clearly is not
going to require us to have two additional SSBNs, which we have
right now.
The affordability piece comes in great part into focus
because of LCS. I really do want to applaud Secretary Winter
for his leading the efforts to pull us through a very thorough
understanding in what was a high-risk program, very demanding
schedule, and focusing us on requirements. We have to make sure
we do not change the requirements. We have to make sure we
oversee it correctly, not just us but also on the industry
side. So we have learned a lot. We are going to take those
lessons and put it into our other major programs to make sure
we are within bounds.
Senator Warner. I only bring it to the attention of you two
gentlemen. I do this in a very straightforward, professional
way, nothing personal about it. I have noted of recent, and I
have had the privilege of working with many Secretaries of
Defense, the current Secretary of Defense moved swiftly,
courageously, and decisively on the issue of accountability.
Program managers do their best, but there are those who oversee
program managers, and I hope both you and the Admiral handle
the situation in a way that there is full accountability in the
eyes of Congress and others.
Secretary Winter. I fully understand, sir.
Senator Warner. Good.
The new medical centers at Bethesda and Fort Belvoir.
Yesterday I endeavored to put in an amendment to the current
appropriations bill which simply said that we should maintain
Walter Reed as best we can and put it into terms of a first-
class military facility, but not amend the Base Realignment and
Closure (BRAC) law. I feel very strongly that if we cannot go
in for the first time in five BRAC laws and try to change it,
although this program at Walter Reed has a lot of merits to it,
there are many other Members of Congress here who feel that
their BRAC decisions are equally meritorious and then it puts
in jeopardy another BRAC round. May it not happen on my watch,
but anyway it is somewhere in the future. I will let Chairman
Levin and Senator McCain write the next BRAC law. I have
written five of them.
So let us be cautious. I believe what we should do is
accelerate the funding for the planned and proposed incremental
improvements at Bethesda. I say plans; I am not sure they are
in full force yet. Now, we are not going to address Belvoir,
but there was a comparable situation. We can accelerate the
funding so that those two physical structures can be ready to,
on the BRAC schedule, receive from Walter Reed those components
that are to be integrated at the different sites.
Do you feel that that is an appropriate program, Mr.
Secretary?
Secretary Winter. Sir, there are two points here that I
would offer. First of all, we do believe that there is value to
combining Bethesda and Walter Reed and that having that
integrated capability enables many of the critical skills and
the unique specialties there to reach a critical mass of
capability and will avoid some of the back and forth use of the
facility by many of the casualties that are coming back right
now.
I would suggest, sir, that relative to the acceleration
opportunities there, there probably are some opportunities to
accelerate the process of the new facility. I just would
caution that it not be done in such a way that we give short
shrift, if you will, to the requirements development process.
Senator Warner. All right. Would you provide for the
committee, and mark it to the chairman's attention and he will
see that I get it, your proposals with regard to what is
feasible by way of acceleration? What are the costs associated
and what if any do you feel are the advantages of doing that,
namely to make that facility ready at the time the BRAC
decision says Walter Reed has to phase out?
Secretary Winter. I would be pleased to do that, sir.
Senator Warner. That would avoid, I hope, a change in the
law or a necessity to do so. But we must always put care for
our wounded and care for our Active and retired community as
the top priority. So let us work within those constraints.
Lastly on the question of aircraft carrier basing and
Mayport. I have been following with interest the Navy's
assessment of the strategic home porting and dispersal options
for the Atlantic fleet surface ships. I believe it is important
that all factors be considered in any large operational move,
to include not only environmental concerns, but also national
security requirements, the impact on the sailors, and so forth.
What is the current status and the way ahead for the
current Naval Air Station (NAS) Mayport Environmental Impact
Study (EIS)?
Secretary Winter. Sir, we have proceeded on the EIS
activity there. We are undergoing the initial phases of that.
We are doing this in such a way as to encompass all options
that have been contemplated or considered for the use of
Mayport, and we are also doing it in such a way as to ensure
that we factor in all aspects of the proper tradeoffs there, as
we are required to do in terms of the assessment of
alternatives that accompanies any EIS.
Senator Warner. At what point in time do you feel that
could be through?
Secretary Winter. I believe we are targeting to the January
2009 time period for record of decision.
Senator Warner. Admiral Mullen, on the assessment of the
NAS, Oceana, I am going to give a question to you because my
time has moved along. But I am anxious to know where that
matter's status is now.
If you would answer this question for the record.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, we will do that.
Senator Warner. I think it is important that we continue to
give reassurance to the people in that community to maintain
their commitments in order to bring that base into a greater
operational safety and have less adverse impact on the
community and fleet operations.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. I thank you for the manner in which you
have handled that thus far. It has not been an easy issue. I
will put this one into the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[See questions for the record #58 and #59.]
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Senator Lieberman [presiding]. Without objection. Thanks,
Senator Warner.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank you gentlemen for your service to our country as
well and to all the marines and sailors that are under your
commands.
This would be a question to Admiral Mullen and to Secretary
Winter. With respect to the retrofitting of the SSBN fleet, in
some cases to conventional weapons, what priority would you
give that within your budget and your overall priorities?
Secretary Winter. Sir, I think we have prioritized that
very highly. We have three out of the four boats returned to
service and the work on the fourth boat is proceeding according
to schedule. Sir, are you talking SSGN or are you talking----
Senator Ben Nelson. No, the Trident.
Secretary Winter. Oh, I am sorry, sir. My apologies. I was
thinking of the SSGN conversion program.
Our discussions with Strategic Command have indicated that
there is a lot of advantage to being able to provide a greater
diversity of options for the President in terms of a rapid
response and strategic capability. It is clear from a technical
point of view that we can accomplish this through modifications
of the Trident missile, and we believe that this can be done in
a low risk manner and in a short period of time and we are
ready to proceed on that, subject to the authorizations and
appropriations.
Senator Ben Nelson. Would that SSBN be as high a priority
as the SSGN, or how have you prioritized these retrofittings?
Secretary Winter. The SSGN, as I started to say, has
proceeded on through most of its activities. It is at the final
stages of completion of that activity. So I do not see this as
being in competition, if you will, from a funding point of
view.
Senator Ben Nelson. General Cartwright has testified and
has spoken to me privately as well about the importance of this
conversion. Senator Sessions and I and others tried to get this
done in the last go-around, but we were unsuccessful. I hope we
will be far more successful with the authorization this time.
This is a question for General Conway. In your written
testimony you note that the Marine Corps has approximately
4,000 marines affected by the pending plus-up operation in
Iraq. Of course, these marines are going to be a vital asset to
the operation, essential as we all know, and of course we wish
them well and we hope that they will be able to accomplish
their mission both safely and effectively.
You also note that the affected units will be extended for
45 to 60 days. Now, depending on the length of the plus-up in
Iraq, will the Marine Corps be able to progress towards
establishing a one to two deployment-to-dwell ratio goal? Every
7 months a marine is deployed, will they be back at their home
station for 14 months? How are we going to make that goal work
with the current situation?
General Conway. Sir, the eventual goal, of course, is to
try to get to one to two--7 months deployed, 14 months home.
The addition of the two infantry battalions, potentially the
Marine Expeditionary Unit in Iraq, for this plus-up, of course,
heads us in the other direction. So although we will continue
to build infantry battalions and some of these critical units
that are impacted by a high deployment to dwell ratio, it will
take us time, growing at roughly 5,000 marines a year, to be
able to have that kind of impact.
Senator Ben Nelson. Will the growth of the marine end
strength help take some of the pressure off this operational
tempo for the marines?
General Conway. Absolutely, sir, in that we are looking at
which units are most heavily impacted and we are building those
units first.
Senator Ben Nelson. But it will take quite a while to bring
the training of the new recruits up to the level that it will
provide any help soon. Are you concerned about the training
level of the troops? Are we having to train them faster than we
would prefer to train them so that we get their efforts put in
place?
General Conway. Senator Nelson, there is a built-in
safeguard there, in that we will simply not deploy units that
are not readiness category 1, across the board. It takes us
about 5 months out of a 7-month cycle to be able to achieve
that. But we are drawing a red line. We will simply not deploy
units if they have not accomplished all of their training and
those things that we expect them to have before they are
deployment-ready.
Senator Ben Nelson. With respect to the new armor
protection that you testified about earlier, how soon will we
have that kind of protection for our force?
General Conway. Sir, we have some of it now. The Secretary
and his procurement personnel have engineered eight other
potential contractors that can provide a similar class vehicle
for us. As we sit here today, tests are taking place at
Aberdeen to make sure that these vehicles are blast-resistant
as well as able to provide the expected road miles that we
would have to have off the vehicles. Assuming success there,
they are going to go on to full rate production contracts as
soon as we can get them there. So we expect that, if all things
go well, we could have thousands of these vehicles in the
theater by the end of the year.
Senator Ben Nelson. Now, that might be for IEDs, but what
about for the penetrating explosive that is being used today?
General Conway. Sir, probably we should not talk too much
about that in open session, except to say that we are making
advancements there as well with regard to technologies that can
defeat that type of system.
Senator Ben Nelson. Finally, for Admiral Mullen and General
Conway. What individually are your three top budget priorities
this go-around? Admiral Mullen?
Admiral Mullen. The top for me, Senator Nelson, is to
continue to support the shipbuilding program, the stability
there, and the investment there. I talk about making sure we
have it right for our people, that our readiness stays high,
but at the top of that heap has been and will continue to be to
build the fleet for the future, to get to 313 ships.
Senator McCain pointed out that last year we had 281 ships.
This year we have 276. By the end of this year we will actually
have started going upwards as opposed to continuing down and be
at 279. So we are on track. It has to be affordable and I
understand that. That really is top priority.
Part of that is also how I stabilize my aviation plan as
well. I need a long-term stable plan, not unlike what I have in
shipbuilding. So that is really at the top of the heap and
there are lots of pieces inside that. We have to make sure we
have a robust industrial base, which is a real challenge for us
right now. Those are national treasures for us. We have to get
the investment right in that. Stability in this plan is key to
that, and then everybody has to perform, the contractors and
the Government, together.
Senator Ben Nelson. Your personnel reduction, is that
occurring at the rate you would prefer it?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, it is. We have come down. We are
in our 4th year this year, in 2007, of about 10,000 a year.
There is a proposal for another 12,000. I told the committee
last year at this hearing that I needed to go figure out what
the end state would be. We have done that. We think we will be
between 320,000 to 325,000 as we flatten out.
I remain concerned that overall in the budget sense that we
as institutions have to come to grips with how we are going to
continue to pay for these personnel costs which continue to
rise at a very high rate. I have been flat in my personnel
accounts in terms of investment because we have been coming
down, but that is going to disappear in the next 2 to 3 years
and I will experience that same kind of inflation.
Senator Ben Nelson. It is amazing how a budget looks good
when you are going out of business. But you do not want to go
out of business.
Admiral Mullen. No, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. General Conway?
General Conway. Sir, you took care of, I think, my most
urgent concern this morning, and I thank you for that vote. I
think that will be very helpful in terms of the moral
imperative we have for taking care of our people.
Beyond that, as we grow the force, we would like to see
those personnel costs into the top line as soon as we can. We
are contracting people for 4 years at a time and it gets
difficult if we have to look to year-to-year appropriations in
order to be able to sustain that.
I would share the CNO's observations on a strong fleet. The
Marine Corps needs that kind of support, particularly as it
relates to the amphibious ships. We believe that we probably
have to have 33 amphibious ships to have 30 available at any
time. So we will work with the Navy over the out-years to see
exactly how we accomplish that.
We also see, and I think the chairman mentioned it in his
opening statement, that there is a bathtub out there with
regard to strike aircraft. In the not-too-distant future, we
are going to be short some 40 to 50 aircraft, and that will
only be exacerbated if we continue to move Joint Strike Fighter
right. That is the generation of aircraft we have long awaited
now and we would like to see that program kept on line as much
as possible.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is my
understanding that Senator Thune has a time constraint, so I am
going to ask that you recognize him before me, even though I am
just dying to ask my questions.
Chairman Levin. We are dying to hear them, but Senator
Thune?
Senator Thune. Mr. Chairman, I will not be long.
I want to thank the Secretary and the Admiral and the
General for their service and for their leadership. I am not
going to be able to stay for the duration of the hearing, but I
do have some questions I would like to submit for the record
and get your response to them. So I would ask unanimous consent
that I be able to do that.
Is anybody there to say ``without objection''?
Senator Collins. Without objection.
Senator Thune. I thank my colleague.
Chairman Levin. Whatever it was, it is granted.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Collins. Mr. Chairman, since that only took about
30 seconds, may I proceed, or do you want to recognize Senator
Reed?
Chairman Levin. Senator Reed has graciously acknowledged
that 30 seconds does not count and therefore Senator Collins is
next.
Senator Collins. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First let me commend all three of you for your strong
leadership and your outstanding service to your country. I very
much appreciate your hard work and service.
Admiral Mullen, I have been concerned for some time about
the impact of the transition from the DDG-51 class of
destroyers to the new DDG-1000 class of ships. We need to avoid
schedule slippages in order to avoid a gap in the workload that
could have a significantly adverse effect on our skilled
industrial base. We do not want to have a workload that has a
big gap in it and thus we lose those highly skilled workers and
cause problems in our capacity.
Two years ago this committee asked the Navy to evaluate
this issue and the Navy reported that Navy and industry
assessments of workload projections suggested that the
transition had the potential to negatively impact workload at
the shipyards. But the Navy went on to say that we are
confident we can manage that transition and maintain the
viability of the surface combatant industrial base.
What is your current judgment of our ability to avoid the
kind of gap in the workload that could hurt the industrial
base?
Admiral Mullen. I think the concern as it was a couple of
years ago, is well-founded, in the sense that transitions are
always difficult. You more than just about everybody else know
how difficult it is to move on from the DDG-51. I have been an
advocate for some time, to get to the new capability and the
new technology and really a 21st century Navy. So I think it is
vital that we continue to press on.
Clearly at the center of that is the viability of the DDG-
1000 program. We have taken extensive looks at this over the
last couple of years, because of the risk that has been in that
program. I am confident at this point that, with what we know,
that it is going to be on schedule. At the same time, it is at
a very delicate time when you are going to design and you are
really going to start building, and there are historical
challenges with the first of a class, as there have always
been.
So we are mindful of all that, back to the lessons that we
have learned in LCS, to try to make sure we rope them, as much
as they apply, into the DDG-1000 program, and very mindful, as
I spoke earlier, that this is a national treasure. We have to
treat it well. We need to invest in it. There needs to be a
plan that can sustain itself, which I think goes to a healthier
work force in the long run.
So it is a consideration in all of our deliberations to
make sure we get this right.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
There is a lot of discussion about the higher cost of the
DDG-1000 and what is often overlooked in that discussion is the
tremendous cost savings that result from the smaller crew size
for the DDG-1000 versus the old DDG-51. Could you comment on
the potential cost savings from being able to operate this new
cutting-edge destroyer with a substantially smaller crew?
Admiral Mullen. We have a tendency in Washington to focus
on what it takes to build it now and then worry about what you
are referring to, which is life cycle costs, which we all have
to pay, down the road. So it is an investment in technology
which will greatly reduce the life cycle cost in lots of ways,
including a much smaller crew size.
We talked earlier about the expense of our people. Our most
important resource, our number one priority, is our people and
will remain so. But this will require many, many fewer sailors
to man her and sail her and fight her. So that is a big deal.
This is a program that underpins the shipbuilding,
industrial, technological base. We did not have that 5, 6, or 7
years ago. In fact, in the specific costs, if you look at the
cost of the last DDGs at the end of the production line, which
is 1980s technology, we were still at $1.5 billion. So a lead
ship would be $3 billion. It is not $5 billion, as was
indicated in one of the newspaper articles this morning. To get
to the technology and the kind of investment that we need is
not as overwhelming in terms of expense in my mind as it could
be.
We are on track at this point to bring it in at that and
then to get that cost down closer to $2 billion, which I think
is a significant goal, and it will be a great accomplishment
when we get there.
Senator Collins. I agree and thank you for clarifying that
issue.
Secretary Winter, we have talked many times about the
challenges of allocating work load across the four public yards
that the Navy has. I am very proud of the one in Kittery,
Maine, the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, which the BRAC Commission
cited as being the gold standard for public shipyards.
Recently, Admiral Sullivan briefed the Maine and New
Hampshire delegations on the Navy's latest shipyard business
plan for 2008 through 2013 and I know you have been personally
very involved in this and I want to thank you for spending so
much time. I am, however, concerned that the Navy's shipyard
business plan does not fully take into account the
specializations that have been developed by the various
shipyards. For example, our shipyard in Maine is known for its
proficiency in work on attack submarines. By contrast, Norfolk
specializes more in surface combatants and aircraft carriers.
Are you taking a look at the efficiencies, the
specializations, and the expertise developed by various
shipyards, as you make those allocations?
Secretary Winter. Yes, Senator. While it may not have
appeared explicitly in our long-term strategic plan for the
public yards, it is clearly an implicit part of the
optimization that we have incorporated into our future strategy
for assignment of availabilities to the yards. What we are
trying to do is be able to effect the greatest availability for
the lowest cost that we can for the fleet. Given the
specialization, that does affect, if you will, the time frame
that it takes, as well as the cost, of undergoing certain
modifications, upgrades, and basic maintenance tasks at the
various yards. That will be, in fact, an explicit factor in the
consideration and the assessment of the assignment of the
ships.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
I look forward to working with all of you as we proceed. I
again want to congratulate you all for a very good budget
proposal that I think is in our national security interest and
helps move us forward. Thank you.
Secretary Winter. Thank you.
Senator Reed [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator
Collins.
Gentlemen, welcome. Admiral, in the spirit that not enough
good things can ever be said about submarines, let me follow up
some of the questions that Senator Lieberman raised. Do you
feel confident that the submarine shipbuilders are going to
meet your goal of $2 billion per submarine? I think that was
the confidence of the Secretary. Do you feel that?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, I am. Actually, part of my
confidence is what I see as a dramatic shift in their
commitment to getting there. They believe it is possible. They
believe we are going to put two submarines in in 2012. We have
stayed with that. That has affected a big shift in the way they
are approaching this problem, and they are on track right now.
Senator Reed. Part of the confidence is a result, I think,
of some factors. One is the design for affordability R&D
investment that is being made. Is that critical? I think the
Secretary mentioned that.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, that is critical.
Senator Reed. There is also the commitment, because of
these innovations, to reduce the construction cycle from about
84 to 60 months. That is another part.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir. Also, actually regarding the
concern that we have had about this reduction to 40 submarines
in the out-years, one of the potential gap-fillers in that is
to reduce the 72-month build time, which is where we are right
now, down to 60 months. That in combination with an extra
deployment out of a hull or two, dramatically reduces that gap.
Senator Reed. One other factor is the multiyear procurement
authority that you have.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. One other factor is the multiyear procurement
authority that you have, which allows you essentially to buy
particularly significant components ahead and in a certain
degree begin to build a second ship, perhaps a virtual second
ship, while you are building officially one ship, if that is
accurate.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
You raised the issue just in your response, Admiral, about
the sufficiency of the fleet. With 313 ships overall and 48
attack submarines, that allows about 10 ships to be forward
deployed on a day-to-day basis. However, it is my understanding
that the combatant commanders always dial you up and ask for
more, upwards to 18 if they could have them, and that raises
the number. Is 48 the right number?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, 48 is the right number. We looked
at that extensively, as we understand the world right now. The
issue that gets adjudicated in the combatant commanders'
requirements request, is that they have been fulfilled to about
the 95 percent of the apportioned availability of the
submarines in particular. I have also engaged them at my level
and they are very comfortable with what they have right now.
Backing those 10 up is a surge capability of a significant
number of submarines if we had to move forward.
Senator Reed. We run into a scenario, though, between 2020
and 2033 where we drop to 40 boats. Actually, in the 2028-2029
year we are at 40 boats, which is significantly low and puts at
risk, I think, even the projected plans of the moment.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, I understand that, and that is
why getting to two a year is important. In addition to that, we
have just completed a study which looks at other ways to
mitigate this, which fills that gap up--building Virginia
faster, getting additional deployment out of some of the
submarines that have core life left, and looking at other ways
to do that--that gets me, quite frankly, down to a gap of maybe
2 or 3 on that 48, as opposed to the 8 that you are talking
about right now.
All that says is, as I have committed to before, I am
working hard to mitigate that gap. I also have that gap coming
in surface combatants. These are both classes of ships I
previously built at higher levels--three a year in the case of
submarines, five a year in the case of surface combatants. They
are going to decommission at that rate and we are clearly not
replacing them at that rate. So we are looking for ways to
mitigate the gap.
Senator Reed. One of the aspects that I think might suggest
increased demand, even from today's tempo of operations, is the
role submarines are playing in terms of covert intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance, covert insertion and recovery
of special operations forces, covert strikes with Tomahawk
cruise missiles, covert offensive and defensive mine warfare,
and also in a sense I think an aspect of our commitment in
Southwest Asia some economy of force missions, at least in
terms of screening and intelligence gathering when you cannot
have a major presence. Either you do not have the ships or you
do not want to be overt.
This, I think, puts additional pressure on the bottom line
number of submarines that you need.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, I do not think there is any
question. The viability and the criticality of the mission
sets, including those that you are describing, is not in
question. I had just one thought as you asked that question.
These four SSGNs are clearly not fast attack submarines, but
they bring special operations capability, they bring the
stealth, they bring the striking capability, and I think they
are going to bring a lot more that we do not even understand
yet because of the volume that they have that we can work with.
So that mitigates against the 48 to a degree that we really
have not talked a lot about in some of those capabilities.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, I just want to commend you for
your testimony in response to Senator Lieberman's questions. I
think it has been echoed by the CNO in terms of what we have to
do to get our submarine fleet going forward.
Let me turn to an issue now that bridges the gap between
the Navy and the Marine Corps. You mentioned it, General
Conway, in what you are looking at, which is with 31 amphibious
ships rather than 36 amphibious ships and your operational
availability needs of 30, that does not leave a big margin. How
are you going to plan to deal with that very narrow margin
between available ships and operational demand?
General Conway. Sir, our estimate, based upon what we think
is 85 percent availability historically for all Navy ships, is
that the magic number is probably 33 for us, which would then
in all likelihood give us that 30 operationally available in
the event of a crisis or in the event of a need. It was just
through dialogue with the Navy, we had a great warfighter
conference with the CNO and his senior officers probably about
3 weeks, maybe about a month ago. We impressed upon them the
need. We have shown them where we have accepted some level of
risk already, because actually the 2015 Marine Expeditionary
Brigade requires 17 ships, but we think we can get that down to
15 with some follow-on. But that is a hard-line number. So just
through good negotiations and comradeship, sir, we are going to
work it out. It is a tough issue.
Senator Reed. Admiral?
Admiral Mullen. It is an affordability issue. We talked
about the 10th LPD, which is on the UPL right now because it is
a requirement that I just do not have the resources to get at.
We are very committed to making sure that we deliver the Marine
Corps. General Conway and I want to commend him as well and his
people. We have worked very hard together to make sure we
understand how we are going to operate in the future. It is
clearly going to take ships. When the marines come out of Iraq,
we want to get under way with them as rapidly as we can and do
the work that we need to do, and it takes ships to do that.
So I know I have to provide those 30 ships. The question is
whether I purchase new ones or make the ones I have more
available? That is really the space that we are working hard in
right now.
Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
I have a final question, General Conway, and that is on the
EFV program. Can you give an assessment of the program and also
the tradeoffs between that program and continuing use of the
Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV)?
General Conway. Sir, first of all, as I came to this job, I
was disappointed to hear that we had somehow used a series of
old vehicles, vehicles that had gone past their service life
expectancy, to test reliability. I still do not quite
understand the logic behind that, but the fact is that it has
happened, and we have had some reliability problems in the
vehicles that we have tested.
The requirement, I think, is a very real requirement. I do
not think, based upon what we know about anti-access systems
and anti-ship missiles, that the Navy is going to go closer
than 25 miles to any given beach. Our AAV, which has already
undergone a significant upgrade and a very successful one, I
might add, still only swims at 8 miles an hour. So we have a
risk factor right now as far as I am concerned, that allows our
marines to get to a shore from 25 miles out.
What I am saying, sir, is that I think the requirement is
real. We have to be able to get some sort of surface skimming
kind of capability that gets us to the beach and then, by the
way, transitions into an armored fighting vehicle. It does push
the edge of industry and of science in some regards to come up
with that type of vehicle. But we are pressing hard. We would
like to have it sooner rather than later.
Senator Reed. Thank you. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Senator Martinez.
Senator Martinez. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Good afternoon to all of you gentlemen and thank you for
being here. I want to echo the other comments. I very much
appreciate the service that all of you provide and I appreciate
your also sliding your chairs to accommodate the last rung on
the totem pole in this committee. [Laughter.]
Admiral Mullen, I do want, in the absence of my colleague
from Virginia, to go back to the issue of Mayport. I realize
that we have in the past discussed the importance of a
diversification of our fleet as well as the need for Mayport to
be available as a nuclear port, and I very much appreciate all
the work that is being done with the environmental study that
needs to take place. The Secretary and I and of course you and
I have also discussed this some, just re-emphasizing to me the
importance that I think all of us agree that there is in having
more than one carrier home port on the East Coast of the United
States. I presume, Secretary and Admiral, that we still all are
in agreement on that?
It is kind of a question.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, I sensed that. The strategic
dispersion issue still is a very high priority. I think, as the
Secretary indicated earlier in his testimony, we do need to get
through the EIS to get to a record of decision.
I want to emphasize that it is not just Mayport, but that
part of our country--Kings Bay, Jacksonville, and Mayport--is a
hub for us for lots of capabilities, surface ships, submarines,
and aviation, as well as for our people and our families. So
commitment to that hub, both in the near-term and in the long-
term, is vital for us. We appreciate the support from you and
your colleagues in letting us get through this in a measured
way to make sure we get the decision right.
Senator Martinez. We want to do it right, I understand that
completely and am very supportive. Believe me that the
Jacksonville area is a Navy town, and of course we are proud
that Blount Island is there as well serving the Marines.
There was a mention by Senator Inhofe about the Chinese
capabilities. I was concerned when I learned about the incident
regarding the Kitty Hawk that was shadowed by a Chinese Song-
class diesel-powered submarine that went undetected until it
was 5 miles from our ship. I wonder, Admiral, if you can tell
me what your interpretation is of that event and how have we
adjusted to that eventuality.
Admiral Mullen. Senator, it very much got our attention. We
did not expect it. We did not expect that submarine to be ``out
of area.'' We follow that very closely. There were some
indications and warnings that we need to go back and reassess
how we do that.
I spoke to this earlier. It is indicative that they are
operating better. They clearly have a navy which is growing.
They are learning. I do not consider them to be 10 feet tall,
but it is back to this strategic intent and engagement and
making sure that diplomatically we are engaged to ensure that
there is no miscalculation.
The importance of a strong naval presence in that part of
the world, both Navy and Marine Corps, continues because of the
stability needed there. So we are watching that very carefully.
We did learn a lot. I really would not want to go into too much
detail in an open hearing like this. We learned a lot and we
have adjusted.
Senator Martinez. That is important to know. But also I
think your comments about strategic intent are vital and I
think continued engagement is equally important.
General Conway, I presume it was mentioned to you, but the
Senate just voted to move forward with the MRAPs, which I know
are very important to you, and we hope that those will be in
production and on their way to help our men and women serving
in harm's way as soon as possible.
General Conway. I concur, sir, and thank you for the vote.
Senator Martinez. Yes, sir. It was unanimous, you should
know.
Back to Florida and our needs and problems. There is
continuing concern about the possibility of a migrant event
from Cuba relating to the events taking place on the island.
The Secretary and I have spoken about this. There continue to
be questions and concerns. Mr. Secretary, I know that part of
this responsibility is obviously Coast Guard, but I know there
is an element of cooperation.
I have spoken with Admiral Stavridis about this and I would
like your take on the situation in terms of containing any
attempt by Cuba to flood the United States with migrants.
Secretary Winter. Sir, first of all I would like to give
you the assurance that we have a very good working relationship
with the Coast Guard there, and I have had the opportunity to
review the latest status of plans in the event that such an
event would occur. I think that we have a good plan to be able
to deal with the matter. I think in this plan of action,
obviously, the Navy is a supporting element to the Coast Guard,
which would have the lead responsibility for it. I believe that
all the elements that have been assessed we are in a position
to be able to provide in a timely manner.
Senator Martinez. We had an incident yesterday where a
Haitian ship came ashore on one of our beaches right there in
broad daylight. From time to time these incidents occur. I know
it is a bit unnerving to Floridians as we worry about homeland
security that a foreign vessel could come right to our shores
undetected until we got a cell-phone call saying they are on
the beach.
Admiral, I realize that this is a shared responsibility
with the Coast Guard, but what can you tell the people of
Florida to reassure us that we are keeping a close eye on our
shores and are reasonably protected?
Admiral Mullen. It is a shared responsibility, and I want
to echo what the Secretary said in terms of our relationship
with the Coast Guard. It is particularly close with myself,
Admiral Allen, and Admiral Stavridis. My components and Admiral
Allen's have worked this very hard. So I am comfortable that we
are prepared up to a point, but clearly there have been various
estimates of if this were to occur how big the number might be,
and I know that this has Admiral Stavridis' full focus.
I think that, specifically regarding yesterday, we are not
in a position to surveil every nautical mile of the Florida
coast and the coasts throughout our country, on a daily basis.
We have not had that focus. Clearly, if we receive indications
that this starts to go on, we do have the availability to
adjust, and so I would feel comfortable offering the assurance
that we could certainly be more predictive. This had not
happened in a while. If it is the first of many, I think we
will know that in short order, and that would certainly cause
us to adjust our resources.
Senator Martinez. Admiral, I think it is clearly an
isolated event. It is not something that we have been seeing
lately and it was a surprise, I think, to all of us.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Martinez. The Government of Venezuela seems to be
interested in obtaining submarines. Admiral Stavridis and I
discussed this a few days ago when he was here testifying. They
are in a very aggressive arms-purchasing mode. How do you think
we should deal with this emerging concern? Obviously,
submarines are not usually for defensive purposes only. So what
do you make of the intentions of the Venezuelan government?
Admiral Mullen. I am very mindful of it. It is a concern to
me. I have seen what President Chavez has certainly indicated
through his rhetoric. Not unlike some other state leaders, the
rhetoric concerns me. What is the strategic intent here? I
share your evaluation that submarines are not anything that I
think we would need in this part of the world from that regard.
Certainly I do not think there is any threat from us to
Venezuela.
His broader arms buildup, combined with the leverage that
he has through his energy control, those are growing concerns.
I am sure you spoke with Admiral Stavridis about this, but
there is more of this going on in Latin America than there has
been in the past. It is clear that Chavez is trying to align
some other state leaders to him. So it really does have our
attention.
We will be, as a naval force, much more engaged than we
have in the past. We are setting up a prototype or an
experiment this year for global fleet station, which is an
engagement level of activity. Clearly Admiral Stavridis has
asked us for more capability, and I think we will continue to
fill that.
Senator Martinez. The intent behind my question is the fact
that this is an area of new concern and one that I do not think
we can overlook, particularly when the leadership of Venezuela
seems to be interested in aligning himself with Iran, which we
know would be a negative force.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Martinez. I thank you for the diplomatic message
that you are sending with your forces in the Persian Gulf; and
General, I also appreciate your response to the issue of
training. I cannot imagine that you would send a marine into
battle that was not properly trained. That is just something
you would not do, correct?
General Conway. Sir, no, we would not do that.
Senator Martinez. That is why I do not take my time to ask
you that kind of question. I presume that your good judgment
would keep you there.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony and for your
service to the Nation. This concludes the hearing. Thank you.
We are adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
military sealift command resources
1. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, our ability to conduct operations
in a foreign theater is reliant on our ability to move the equipment
for our troops into the foreign theater of operations and then to
sustain the troops in theater including redeployments. Military Sealift
Command (MSC) assets are the primary way we move combat equipment into
the theater of operations. With the Department of Defense's (DOD)
change in policy regarding deployment schedules for our Active and
Reserve Forces, can you describe what impact this may have on MSC's
ability to support deployment schedules necessary to support Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)? Please
specifically address whether MSC has adequate resources for new
deployment schedules, and indicate if they would need to contract for
additional ships.
Admiral Mullen. The MSC directly supports U.S. Transportation
Command (TRANSCOM) which is responsible for the synchronization and
interoperability of distribution-related activities supporting force
projection, sustainment, and redeployment/retrograde of military forces
and materiel. MSC has the resources to meet current demands.
2. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, if the United States were to
engage in a significant and extended conflict in another theater of
operations (e.g., the Far East) while we are still engaged in the
Middle East, would MSC have sufficient ships to handle deployments and
redeployments in two theaters of operation at the same time? Again,
please address whether they would have enough of their own ships, or if
they would need to contract for additional ships.
Admiral Mullen. The MSC directly supports TRANSCOM which is
responsible for the synchronization and interoperability of
distribution-related activities supporting force projection,
sustainment, and redeployment/retrograde of military forces and
materiel. Without understanding specific requirements, yet to be
identified, it would be impossible to speculate on the adequacy of MSC
resources to meet future demands.
sailors in nontraditional roles
3. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, the Air Force indicated in a
recent hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee that they
have a significant number of airmen, who are performing work that is
not normally performed by the Air Force in order to support OIF and
OEF. These assignments are traditionally handled by our ground forces.
It is my understanding that the Air Force has been requested to fulfill
these nontraditional assignments due to shortages of available troops
in the Army and the Marine Corps. How many of the sailors currently
deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq are performing assignments which are
traditionally non-Navy work?
Admiral Mullen. The Joint Staff considers a full range of sourcing
solutions across all Services and the Navy has optimized its force to
support a wide range of mission areas. By leveraging core skills and
providing tailored training, the Navy is able to provide the Joint
Staff with a broader range of sourcing solutions including
approximately 2,300 sailors that are currently executing traditional
Army missions. The skills required to conduct these missions generally
fall within the core competencies of many Navy ratings and officer sub-
specialties. Each augmentee is further provided specific training to
perform the mission assigned. Mission areas include Personal Security
Detachments, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion support to Coalition
Forces Land Component Command, counter rocket and mortar,
communications, detainee operations (Camp Bucca), civil affairs,
tactical UAV, interrogators, customs operations, and counter-improvised
explosive devices (IED) electronic warfare.
4. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, how many sailors are performing
nontraditional assignments outside the U.S. Central Command area of
responsibility due to shortages of troops?
Admiral Mullen. The Navy is not currently supporting any
nontraditional assignments due to shortages of troops outside the U.S.
Central Command area of responsibility.
5. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, is it anticipated that the Navy
will need to continue providing resources to support these non-Navy
functions in fiscal year 2008 and beyond?
Admiral Mullen. Assuming that no new requirements are identified
and the level of U.S. presence remains the same, we anticipate
continuing to source current requirements through fiscal year 2008.
medical facilities
6. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, in your statement, you state that
you support the ongoing review of conditions at Walter Reed, and that
the Navy Inspector General is separately evaluating the material
condition and quality of service at each of the Navy's medical
treatment facilities. Has there been any effort to integrate the
solutions that the Army is initiating into the Navy's facilities in
order to ensure consistency of care across the Services? This seems
particularly important given the upcoming merger of Walter Reed and the
National Naval Medical Center at Bethesda, Maryland.
Admiral Mullen. Navy Medicine is currently participating in the
Tricare Management Activity Health Facilities Steering Committee which
is working on a common facility condition assessment process for all
medical facilities across the DOD. The results of the Army's review and
lessons learned will be used in the decisionmaking process of this
committee.
The material condition of all Navy medical facilities is monitored
and reported using a centrally managed continuous inspection process.
Facilities requirements identified during the inspection process are
documented in a single web-accessible database. Centrally funded
inspections by professional engineering teams are completed for all
Class II Type 2 real property assets once every 3 years using a single
inspection service provider and a common health care industry standard
evaluation criteria which are consistent with all applicable codes and
standards.
7. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, Walter Reed has seen a
significant increase in the number of patients due to the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Since the beginning of these wars, how much of a
surge in casualties have the Navy's medical treatment facilities seen?
Admiral Mullen. Since January 2003, 3,565 OEF/OIF Navy and Marine
casualties have been evacuated from theater to Landstuhl Regional
Medical Center (LRMC) and subsequently transferred to specialized
continental United States (CONUS) Medical Centers and Combat Support
Medical Treatment Facilities. Among these Medical Centers, Navy
Military Treatment Facilities have received the following numbers of
Navy and Marine Corps casualties: National Naval Medical Center (NNMC)
Bethesda--1,214; NH Camp Pendleton--951; NH Camp Lejeune--727; NMC San
Diego--513; and NMC Portsmouth--160.
8. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, was the Navy able and did they
absorb some of the surge in casualties from the Army?
Admiral Mullen. Since March 2003, approximately 70 0EF/OIF Army
casualties have been transferred from LRMC directly to NNMC Bethesda
for treatment.
navy downsizing and marine corps increase
9. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, in your statement, you address
the downsizing of the Navy over the past couple of years and the
additional decreases in end strength in fiscal years 2007 and 2008. It
seems that many of the sailors in the Navy Active and Reserve
components who are leaving the Service due to reductions in end
strength may be quality candidates that are desirable for retention in
military service. Since the Marine Corps and the Army are increasing
their end strength in fiscal years 2007 and 2008, has there been any
effort to look at potential candidates who may be interested in
transferring to the Army or Marine Corps?
Admiral Mullen. The Blue to Green program was established in
October 2004 to generate Army enlistments for personnel separating from
all other Services; however, there is not a similar program for the
Marine Corps. On a monthly basis, Navy Personnel Command provides the
Army access to sailors who will be separating from the Navy for the
following reasons:
- Involuntary separations under perform to serve
- E-4 High Year Tenure
- Sailors with less than 12 years of service who are opting
to separate from the Navy
The lists include sailors who are recommended for retention and
evaluated as promotable, must promote, or early promote on most recent
enlisted performance evaluation. The lists exclude individuals with
discipline problems or substandard performance.
Sailors are advised of the Army Blue to Green program by Navy
Career Counselors at individual units and stations, on separation
orders, and during the Transition Assistance Program classes.
Army statistics reflected below show the number of sailors who have
converted to the Army via this program:
Enlisted: (as of 19 April 2007)
101 Navy contracts in fiscal year 2007 (412 total
since implementation).
Officer: (as of 19 April 2007)
11 Navy Officer interservice transfers in fiscal year
2007 (119 total since implementation).
public vs. private shipyard efficiencies
10. Senator Akaka. Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen, Admiral
Mullen's statement says that the Navy needs Congress to ensure that
legislation and policy support best business practices and
efficiencies. It says that funding quotas for public Navy shipyards
``potentially'' diverts efficiency opportunities away from the private
sector. I find this an interesting statement given the serious cost
overruns with the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, and I find it
hard to see how work being performed at public Navy shipyards
potentially reduces ``efficiencies'' in the private sector. Please
explain the connection between funding requirements for public Navy
shipyards and private shipyard efficiencies.
Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen. The Navy completed a Naval
Shipyard Business Plan in February. This plan was created to determine
the workload necessary to efficiently and effectively operate the four
naval shipyards, while ensuring compliance with statutory requirements.
The issue now emerging is a potential reduction in the overall Navy
projected ship depot maintenance workload in fiscal year 2010 and
beyond.
Within this plan, there are several workload-shaping options that
potentially reallocate work from the private ship repair/modernization
vendor base, including an option to reduce subcontracted work from the
public shipyards. There is also a potential for shifting nontraditional
naval shipyard work to the naval shipyards only in those years
necessary to comply with the 50/50 statute. By doing this, the Navy
would potentially impact funding to the private sector vendor base,
which may impact their incentive to make the investments to improve
their efficiency in support of Navy workload.
In order to mitigate these issues and motivate the private
shipyards, the Navy has already begun several initiatives to focus on
improving our ability to work with private repair and modernization
shipyards. The initiatives range from a new contracting strategy to
streamlining our business through Lean Six Sigma and new business
practices.
11. Senator Akaka. Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen, please
explain what you believe would happen to our Navy shipyards if funding
quotas were to be removed.
Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen. If the statute for funding
quotas (i.e., the 50/50 statute) were removed, the Navy would still
need to comply with requirements for a core logistics capability. 10
U.S.C. 2464 requires a core logistics capability (skills, processes,
and infrastructure) that is government-owned and government-operated,
to ensure a ready and controlled source of technical competence and
resources necessary to ensure effective and timely response for all
weapons systems. Naval shipyards have a critical role in repair and
modernization, as they have specific areas of expertise that are not
available at private yards (e.g., nuclear refueling and repairs of
submarines). If workloads were reduced in these public shipyards, the
expectation would be an increase in costs accompanied by a decrease in
their efficiency and capacity.
Maintaining the correct level of workload in the shipyards is
critical to maintaining the capability and ensuring an efficient and
effective use of taxpayer's money. The Navy just completed a Naval
Shipyard Business Plan in February, which examined, in part, the issue
of distributing work to the public shipyards to ensure compliance with
statutory requirements and an effective use of the in-house capability.
marine corps end strength
12. Senator Akaka. General Conway, you indicate in your statement
that the proposed increase in Marine Corps Active component end
strength to 202,000 marines will go a long way toward reducing the
strain on the individual marines and the institution. This sounds like
the Marine Corps still is not receiving enough resources. To bring the
Marine Corps in line with an appropriate level of stress, both for the
individual marines and for the institution, are 202,000 marines enough?
Please consider the current operational tempo, and the DOD targets for
deployment versus home time.
General Conway. Yes, I believe 202,000 marines is the appropriate
and achievable level to which the Marine Corps can grow quickly in the
near-term while maintaining our high recruiting and retention
standards.
Our proposed end strength growth to 202,000 marines was based upon
three main goals:
1. Creation of three balanced Marine Expeditionary Forces
capable of responding equally to combatant commander
requirements
2. Reduction of the strain on individual marines and their
families, and prevention of a decrease in readiness
3. Reduction of strain on the institution by strengthening
our capacity to train to the range of skills necessary for
combined-arms maneuver, mountain warfare, amphibious, and
jungle operations
Achievement of the 1:2 deployment-to-dwell target for all Active
component forces will directly address goals 1 and 2.
The President's recent OIF ``Plus Up'' has added a requirement for
two additional Marine Corps infantry battalions and associated support
to remain deployed in support of OIF. Resultantly, the DOD target of a
1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio will not be met for many occupational
specialties for the duration of ``Plus Up'' operations.
13. Senator Akaka. General Conway, are 202,000 marines enough if we
have to maintain the current tempo in the Middle East while being
engaged in another significant conflict elsewhere in the world?
General Conway. The 202,000 Marine Corps end strength request was
derived from conditions prior to the surge in Iraq, and based on both
the existing requirement and our known requirements for the future. It
provides enough forces to allow us to achieve a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell
ratio at pre-surge commitment levels. We believe that if called to
respond to a second contingency a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio will
provide the Marine Corps with enough trained and ready forces to
adequately address any second contingency.
14. Senator Akaka. General Conway, what are the assumptions used to
determine the appropriate end strength for the Marine Corps?
General Conway. Force requirements are based on demands determined
by the DOD. For the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and
associated Operational Availability 2006 study, these demands were
provided in the Baseline Security Posture (BSP). The BSP provided
numerous planning assumptions by specifying both the frequency and
duration of events as well as force caps for each individual event.
In addition to the assumptions contained in the BSR, two additional
assumptions for determining end strength are:
- Section 5063 of title X which states, ``The Marine Corps,
within the Department of the Navy, shall be so organized as to
include not less than three combat divisions and three air
wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services
as may be organic therein.''
- The new force-planning construct that puts increased
emphasis on defending against terrorist threats which requires
less force capacity as well as a different capability set.
15. Senator Akaka. General Conway, if the Marine Corps receives its
full funding request, how long will it take to reset the force and
bring Marine Corps readiness levels back to their pre-war levels while
continuing to maintain the current operational tempo?
General Conway. In total, the Marine Corps has received $10.2
billion of the total $13.7 billion reset requirement. Of the remaining
funding, $1.8 billion is executable in fiscal year 2008. After fiscal
year 2008, additional funding is required for certain aviation
procurement items with long lead times. Depot maintenance funding is
also required at least 2 years beyond the end of hostilities to begin
to fully repair equipment returning from Iraq and Afghanistan.
There are a number of factors which cloud our ability to arrive at
a precise point in time estimate for the total post-global war on
terror reset costs. However, estimates range from 2 to 5 years to
return the equipment from theater and conduct a complete depot rework
for ground equipment. Some of the principal factors impacting the
timing and costs of ground equipment depot rework include:
1. Useful life remaining in equipment to be retrograded,
which will dictate whether it is more cost effective to replace
rather than repair.
2. Availability, cost, and timing of sealift and/or
commercial shipping assets to transport equipment back to
CONUS.
3. Degree to which depot throughput capacity can/should be
expanded to address retrograde ``surge'' requirements.
4. The ability, as well as cost and schedule implications, to
transfer workload to either DOD, or commercial sources.
Aviation asset depot repair costs are somewhat easier to project
based upon the impact of flying hours and operational conditions on
scheduled aircraft rework. The reset effort for Marine aviation assets
will require upwards of 5 years according to current estimates. This
time period is predicated on depot capacity and a prescheduled depot
induction date for each aircraft.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton
vh-71 ``marine one'' presidential helicopter program
16. Senator Clinton. Secretary Winter and General Conway, the VH-71
has conducted some initial flight tests simulating landing and take-off
within confined landing zones. On January 13, 2007, Robert Kimble, VH-
71 Deputy Program Manager, U.S. Navy, reported that these performance
landing tests included White House lawn landings. How successful were
these initial flight tests and landings?
Secretary Winter and General Conway. The EH-101 Test Vehicle One
(TV-1) Rotor Down Wash Flight Test Evaluation was successfully
completed January 13, 2007. Tests were conducted, making a total of six
approaches and departures to the White House south lawn, while building
gross weights up to maximum of 32,000 lbs. All test objectives were
successfully met.
17. Senator Clinton. Secretary Winter and General Conway, are all
of the test objectives being met?
Secretary Winter and General Conway. The objectives of the TV-1
Rotor Down Wash Flight Test Evaluation were successfully met.
Additional testing will be conducted as the program continues
development.
18. Senator Clinton. Secretary Winter and General Conway, what
adjustments in capabilities have been made as a result of these tests?
Secretary Winter and General Conway. No adjustments to VH-71A
capabilities were made as a result of the TV-1 Rotor Down Wash Flight
Test Evaluation. It was a satisfactory test.
19. Senator Clinton. Secretary Winter and General Conway, the VH-71
program schedule has an October 2009 suspense to meet its objectives.
Under the current operational testing schedule will this date be met?
Secretary Winter and General Conway. Lockheed Martin is on contract
to meet an initial operative capability (IOC) date of October 2009. The
Navy is working closely with Lockheed Martin and the White House to
achieve this aggressive program schedule.
20. Senator Clinton. Secretary Winter and General Conway, what
measures of performance and quality control checks are currently in
place to meet this deadline?
Secretary Winter and General Conway. The VH-71 Program is an
Acquisition Category 1D Major Defense Acquisition Program and, per
Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, provides all statutory,
regulatory, and contract reporting information to accomplish program
objectives. This information is assessed continuously against cost,
schedule, and performance. It is reported up to the Milestone Decision
Authority, the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics.
In addition, acknowledging the imperative for leadership engagement
to enable program success, the Navy has established a VH-71 Senior
Leadership Council (SLC). The SLC, chaired by the Assistant Secretary
of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition, and including
White House Military Office and Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation of the DOD membership, regularly reviews program progress
and risk assessment updates. Through close oversight of the program's
event-based activities, the SLC is empowered to recommend schedule
adjustments as warranted. The Navy recognizes the fundamental tenets of
safety, reliability, availability, and security as overriding concerns.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark L. Pryor
mine resistant ambush protected vehicles
21. Senator Pryor. General Conway, the Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected (MRAP) Vehicles have been shown to protect military personnel
against IEDs, significantly reducing casualties. I cosponsored an
amendment with my friend, Senator Joseph Biden, to procure an
additional 2,500 MRAP Vehicles for our troops serving in combat
overseas. How important is this vehicle to the Marine Corps, and do you
believe that with maximum production capacity they can be operational
by the end of the year?
General Conway. Delivering the MRAP Vehicle into Al Anbar province
is my number one unfilled warfighting requirement at this time. The
MRAP Vehicle has a dramatically better record of preventing fatal and
serious injuries from attacks by IED, the leading cause of all
casualties in theater. Multi-National Forces-West estimates use of the
MRAP Vehicles could reduce the casualties due to vehicle IED attack by
as much as 80 percent.
We have developed a joint acquisition strategy which maximizes the
number of vendors involved, and as each successfully completes
appropriate testing, will immediately ramp up the production to their
maximum capacity. For example, one vendor presently being evaluated
possesses a production capacity of 50 vehicles a month, but is capable
of increasing to a minimum of 280 vehicles by December 2007. As vendors
complete testing, the cumulative production capacity will be
proportionate to the resources available for application. Assuming
resources are not a constraining factor, Marine Corps Systems Command,
designated as the Joint Program Executive Office, believes the entire
joint requirement for 7,770 vehicles (to include the United States
Marine Corps (USMC) requirement for 3,700 vehicles) can be produced by
October 2008.
mv-22
22. Senator Pryor. General Conway, the MV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft is
indeed a unique and vital air asset to compliment Marines engaged in
battle. How has the MV-22 performed, and what is the Marine Corps' plan
to operationally employ it in combat?
General Conway. The MV-22 is the future of Marine Corps Assault
Support Aviation. It will give the warfighter unprecedented aviation
maneuver capability, and provides an exponential increase in
survivability over legacy assault support aircraft. The MV-22 has
successfully completed Operational Test and Evaluation and has met or
exceeded all defined Key Performance Parameters (KPPs). Marines are
transitioning legacy CH-46E squadrons to the MV-22 as we speak. The V-
22, to date, has logged well over 27,000 flight hours and will flow
seamlessly into our aviation infrastructure to support existing Marine
Corps medium lift operational commitments.
biopersistent littoral combat ship insulation
23. Senator Pryor. Secretary Winter, the LCS is a part of the
Navy's shipbuilding strategy for the future. Are you familiar with the
installation of a new insulating material in LCS-1 that is of a
manufactured vitreous fiber found to be biopersistent?
Secretary Winter. The Bureau of Navy Medicine and Surgery,
specifically the Environmental Health Effects Laboratory and the Navy
Environmental Health Center (NEHC), reviewed the safety of the
MasterGlas insulating material used on LCS-1 in 2003 and concluded that
use of the product would create no more risk than use of standard
military specification fiberglass insulation. Manufactured in the
United States, MasterGlas is in accordance with all worker health and
safety laws and has been installed on commercial aircraft for decades.
NEHC reviewed the February 9, 2007, Input/Output Module study,
which was ordered and funded by the manufacturer of a competing
material, InspecFoam. The study concluded that MasterGlas fibers may be
more biopersistent than the MIL-I-742 Fiberglass Hullboard. This means
that the fibers are not dissolved in body fluids nor cleared from the
body as readily. However, the study did not take into consideration
other factors, such as work processes, ventilation, personal protective
equipment worn, thermal decomposition products, and others. In
addition, this is single study has not been subjected to an independent
scientific peer review process.
MasterGlas insulation has been determined to be as safe as other
fiberglass products currently in use by the Navy. Nonetheless, the Navy
will carefully monitor its use.
24. Senator Pryor. Secretary Winter, can you explain the decision
to use this material?
Secretary Winter. All shipbuilding programs use materials that have
some risks. Naval Sea Systems Command uses established Federal, State,
and local environmental and occupational safety and health regulations
to establish baseline safety requirements for materials. Once materials
satisfy the baseline safety requirements, they are considered
acceptable for use on Navy ships. Shipbuilders then evaluate costs,
weight, and performance to determine which materials are appropriate
for which applications.
The LCS program is an innovative shipbuilding effort. Marinette
Marine Corporation, the shipbuilder for Lockheed Martin, has procured
and is installing MasterGlas on LCS-1 based on its analysis of
alternatives. MasterGlas is a lightweight, fiberglass insulation
product manufactured in the United States that has been reviewed by the
NEHC and found to as safe as other fiberglass insulation manufactured
in the United States, given the same parameters of use and safe work
procedures. Thus, MasterGlas has been shown to satisfy all established
Navy, Federal, State, and local safety requirements and was
appropriately selected for use on the LCS 1 based on cost, weight, and
performance requirements.
25. Senator Pryor. Secretary Winter, what steps is the Navy taking
to address this situation?
Secretary Winter. Since MasterGlas insulation has been determined
to be as safe as other fiberglass products currently used by the Navy,
its use will continue under careful monitoring. In addition, the Navy
will respond promptly with appropriate Navy occupational safety and
health guidance if any biopersistence rulemaking activity at the U.S.
Occupational Safety and Health Administration leads to new regulations
on this issue.
submarine detection
26. Senator Pryor. Admiral Mullen, the Navy has submitted that
``submarines with improving stealth and attack capability--particularly
modern diesel attack submarines--are proliferating worldwide at an
alarming rate, and that locating these relatively inexpensive but
extremely quiet boats present the Navy with a formidable challenge.''
How are we countering this perceived threat?
Admiral Mullen. Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) is one of the Navy's
top warfighting priorities. The Navy has significantly increased the
level of effort in ASW through fleet doctrine, tactics, and training
initiatives, and through investments in platform and off-board sensors,
ASW command and control, and weapons capability. Some of the new
technologies are now entering the fleet, while others are still in
development. The focus is to deliver these capabilities in sufficient
quantities to meet combatant commander requirements while continuing
research and development to identify new mid- to far-term capabilities.
Some of the Navy's specific initiatives are detailed below.
The Navy has implemented key warfighting guidance in
ASW strategy and concept of operations (CONOPs) identifying
capability requirements, doctrine, organization, training,
materiel, education, personnel, and facilities that can fill
the existing capability gaps. Major ASW platforms (Virginia
Class SSN, P-8A Multi-Mission Aircraft, and MH-60R helicopter)
reach IOC within the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).
Additionally, there are planned improvements to the ASW command
and control systems for current Navy P-3C aircraft to provide
enhanced capabilities needed to detect, classify, identify,
localize, and attack adversary submarines.
The Navy has made significant headway in improving
both acoustic and non-acoustic detection capabilities. Acoustic
capabilities include the Improved Performance SONAR (IPS) and
Scaled IPS (SIPS) system. Nonacoustic sensing technologies are
progressing with airborne mine detection systems and Electro-
Optic Passive ASW System (EPAS) experimentation. Progress has
been achieved in the areas of Synthetic Aperture Sonar, Receive
While Transmit Sonar, and Multi-static Active Detection at-sea
tactical testing and development.
The Navy is developing a networked sensor environment
using automated, off-board systems increasing the area of
coverage. The Navy continues to develop Distributed Netted
Sensors. Three distributed systems have shown promise to
transition to production criteria within the FYDP: Reliable
Acoustic Path Vertical Line Array; the Deep Water Distributed
Active System; and the Deployable Autonomous Distributed
System.
Near-term fleet requirements are addressed through
development of the Surface Ship Periscope Detection Radar for
Aircraft Carriers, with installation planned for all aircraft
carriers within the FYDP. Similar periscope detection radar
capability for cruiser-destroyer platforms is under research
and development. False alarm reduction efforts are being
implemented to enhance our surface ship mid-frequency active
sonar capabilities. Major FORCEnet improvements occurring in
the FYDP increase situational awareness and reduce the detect-
to-engage timeline. In addition, the Navy is converting
existing torpedoes (both heavyweight and lightweight) into more
capable variants.
The Navy is working on developing new torpedo defense
systems to protect our ships. The Anti-Torpedo Torpedo is
scheduled for installation on cruisers and destroyers beginning
in fiscal year 2015. Other systems under development include Mk
54 torpedo/Surface Ship Digital Fire Control Interface and
acoustic countermeasures.
ASW training has undergone a number of steps to
sustain and improve our ASW proficiency. An integrated stair-
step training approach has been adopted (simple to complex) for
our ASW forces bringing together aviation, surface, subsurface,
and other resources in a standardized training continuum. This
integrated ASW training supports our Fleet Response Plan and
includes the execution of major fleet exercises involving
multiple strike groups and allied forces. This continuum
incorporates standardized metrics to assess performance and
provides rapid reconstruction and analysis that is fed back to
Navy leadership and the operators.
The Navy incorporates a number of training
opportunities involving modern allied diesel submarines. Our
integrated ASW training continuum through the Diesel Electric
Submarine Initiative with South American navies and the use of
the Swedish submarine Gotland has improved ASW proficiency
against capable diesel submarines. Allied diesel submarine
participation in U.S. fleet exercises such as WAC and Valiant
Shield 2006 as well as exercises with our allies both in the
Pacific and Atlantic theaters continue to benefit the Navy's
ASW training efforts in diverse ocean environments.
The Navy continues to promote international
collaboration and global maritime partnerships through Ships
ASW Effectiveness Readiness Measuring events with Japan, Korea,
India, Pakistan, Russia, Germany, Denmark, Great Britain,
Australia, Canada, Poland, Sweden, Italy, Turkey, and Spain.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
littoral combat ship
27. Senator McCain. Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen, from an
acquisition reform perspective, I have been very concerned about cost
performance on the LCS program. Unfortunately, we are on a path which
doubles the $220 million estimates for the first four LCSs. That is a
serious problem for this program and an equally serious problem for all
of Navy shipbuilding. As I mentioned in my opening statement, I
appreciate your deliberate corrective actions in response to signs of
breakage on this program. Can you provide the Navy's current cost and
schedule estimate to complete the ships under contract?
Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen. Detailed execution costs and
timelines for LCS-1, -2, and -4 will be addressed within the scope of
the briefings requested by Congress in coming weeks, and as part of the
reprogramming request.
28. Senator McCain. Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen, what is
the magnitude of the delay and overrun?
Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen. Details of the execution cost
and schedule for LCS-1, -2, and -4 will be addressed within the scope
of the revised briefings requested by Congress and as part of the
reprogramming request.
29. Senator McCain. Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen, why were
the follow ships awarded to both shipbuilders when costs on the program
had clearly risen to the extent that these ships were no longer
affordable within the Navy's budget?
Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen. Contract options were awarded
for construction of LCS-3 in June 2006 and LCS-4 in December 2006 based
on negotiated contract values and budget risk assessments conducted at
the time of each award.
30. Senator McCain. Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen, why did
the Navy award the contract on LCS-1 before it finalized the Naval
Vessel Rules (NVR) and had a clear picture of how those rules would
impact costs?
Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen. The Navy has been actively
working with industry to incorporate and exercise oversight of NVR. In
the Preliminary Design Phase Request for Proposal (RFP) issued February
28, 2003, the LCS Industry Teams were required to team with American
Bureau of Shipping (ABS) to aid in producing an acceptable design, and
to conduct an early assessment of each design to gauge its ability to
comply with the design rules that were under development at that time.
The Preliminary Design RFP stated:
``It is the Government's intention that the Preliminary Design
be evaluated by ABS and judged acceptable at that stage of
design. This evaluation will be repeated at the end of Final
System Design (FSD). It is also Government's intention to have
the LCS classed by ABS at delivery. The Government understands
that there is currently no complete set of U.S. approved rules
applicable to LCS. The Government expects that the U.S. naval
ship rules currently under development will be available prior
to the award of FSD.''
To provide advance insight into the required rules set, ABS issued
a Draft Final Rules Matrix for LCS to the Industry Preliminary Design
teams in October 2003. From January 2004 to May 2004, the Navy worked
to finalize the first issue of NVR. This first edition NVR was released
May 21, 2004, and immediately provided to the industry teams by ABS.
The December 19, 2003, FSD Phase RFP reiterated the requirement for
the ships to be delivered in class as a naval combatant ship in
accordance with NVR. By the time of FSD contract award on May 28, 2004,
the Industry Teams were aware of the February 3, 2004, draft NVR. Both
teams inserted reference to the May 21, 2004, NVR in their approved
Specified Performance Documents, thereby noting the NVR among the
applicable requirements documents.
With the continued and close interaction between each of the LCS
industry teams and ABS during the refinement of the draft NVR, the Navy
had confidence in the validity of cost data received from the industry
teams at the time of contract award. The LCS industry teams have the
opportunity to seek equitable adjustment for the cost incurred due to
NVR, or any other contract change from the contract change order line.
31. Senator McCain. Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen, although
the LCS program has not established a formal cost baseline and
therefore has not technically tripped a Nunn-McCurdy breach, the Nunn-
McCurdy criteria regarding validity of requirements, validity of costs,
and adequacy of management come into question. Does the Navy intend to
come forward to Congress with the same degree of rigor commanded by the
Nunn-McCurdy certification process prior to requesting support for
further funding on this program?
Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen. The Navy has and will continue
to provide full and open disclosure of all LCS acquisition and
financial actions to Congress including compliance with the formal
rigor of the Nunn-McCurdy requirements. Using a root cause analysis
methodology and the expertise of the Program Management Assist Group,
the Secretary of the Navy has recertified the LCS requirements base and
taken action to ensure that program management entities are equipped
for success. Cost details will be addressed within the scope of the
briefings requested by Congress, and as a part of the reprogramming
request.
32. Senator McCain. Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen, since the
Navy's estimates indicate that both Lockheed Martin and General
Dynamics appear to be experiencing the same degree of cost growth on
their first ships, why has the Navy only taken corrective action with
Lockheed Martin?
Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen. The decision to take action to
control cost growth on the Lockheed Martin LCS contract was based on
deteriorating cost performance following the launch of LCS-1 coupled
with evidence of escalating cost growth on their second ship, LCS-3.
The Navy has determined specific programmable cost growth thresholds
for the General Dynamics program. These thresholds have not yet been
communicated publicly to ensure the integrity of the competition
throughout the completion of contract execution. Should General
Dynamic's cost growth exceed these thresholds, the Navy is prepared to
take comparable measures with General Dynamics as were taken with
Lockheed Martin to control the costs of this program.
33. Senator McCain. Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen, since both
shipbuilders' designs reportedly meet your requirements, it would
appear that it would be most affordable to downselect as soon as
possible and compete the winning design. What are the Navy's plans for
singling up on a design and opening up competition for construction?
Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen. Details of the Navy's plans to
down-select to a single design will be addressed within the scope of
the revised LCS Acquisition Strategy. It is the Navy's intent to
conduct an operational assessment of the Lockheed Martin and General
Dynamics designs in fiscal year 2009, and then down-select to a single
design based on demonstrated performance and other relevant factors.
Lessons learned will be incorporated from all aspects of program
execution, and a full and open competition for the selected design will
be initiated in fiscal year 2010. Under this plan, fiscal year 2010 is
the earliest opportunity for down-select.
34. Senator McCain. Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen, Congress
imposed a $220 million cost cap for the fifth and sixth ships of the
class to impose cost discipline. These ships may now be the ships
requested with the fiscal year 2008 budget. How does the Navy plan to
bring these ships' costs in line with the cost cap to allow Congress to
consider support for this request or a future request?
Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen. The fifth ship cost threshold
will need to be adjusted, and it will be addressed within the scope of
the briefings requested by Congress, and as a part of the reprogramming
request.
reducing aircraft carrier force structure from 11 to 10
35. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, the Navy's fiscal year 2008
budget proposes reducing the aircraft carrier force from 11 to 10
operational aircraft carriers. This is the lowest aircraft carrier
force since the 1930s. Reducing aircraft carrier force structure while
potential competitors are continually increasing their capabilities
raises serious questions regarding the Navy's ability to sustain the
level of readiness required by its own maritime strategy. What detailed
planning has the Navy conducted to ensure the ability to surge up to 6
aircraft carriers within 30 days of a crisis if the Navy drops to 10
aircraft carriers?
Admiral Mullen. The Navy is requesting authorization from Congress
to allow the Navy to temporarily operate with a 10-carrier force
starting in November 2012, with the decommissioning of U.S.S.
Enterprise (CVN-65), and ending in September 2015 when Gerald R. Ford
(CVN-78) is delivered, a period of 34 months. We have conducted risk
analysis for this period, balancing projected demands with projected
operations and maintenance (O&M) schedules, and determined the risk to
be acceptable, although moderate. Moderate risk is characterized by a
greater than 50 percent likelihood that assets would arrive later than
planned, but without negative impact on the ultimate outcome of the
conflict. It should be noted that the Navy has always and will always
take extraordinary measures to put the necessary force to sea in a time
of national emergency.
We looked at several strategies during our risk analysis, including
maintaining the U.S.S. Enterprise (CVN-65), as well as impacts that any
change to operational and maintenance schedules might have on our surge
capability.
Our risk analysis determined that the 10-carrier option, from a
technical, fiscal, and risk perspective, leverages the flexibility
available in our O&M schedules to manage the moderate but acceptable
risk during the period of concern. During the 34-month period in
question, the Navy can maintain (when averaged over a year) the ability
to surge up to six carriers with 30 days of a crisis, with no quarter
providing less than five carriers able to surge within 30 days.
Detailed analysis of this option is ongoing, to include the technical
risks, cost impacts, and the timing for decision points for changes in
the operational and maintenance schedules.
Our need for this legislation should in no way be mistaken for any
change to our long-term carrier strategy. We remain committed to the
requirement for an 11-carrier force and have no analysis that would
indicate anything less than 11 carriers as acceptable for an extended
period of time. Our sustainment and acquisition programs are aligned
with this strategy. In fact, the 30-year shipbuilding plan represents
our ongoing efforts to balance warfighting capability requirements and
affordability with industrial base capacity. A minimum 11-carrier force
structure is central to this plan.
36. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, if the Navy retires the U.S.S.
Enterprise instead of extending her service, what are the Navy's
options to maintain an 11 aircraft carrier force structure until U.S.S.
Gerald Ford (CVN-78) is operationally available--expected in 2017?
Admiral Mullen. The Navy remains committed to the requirement for
an 11-carrier force and has no analysis that would indicate anything
less than 11 carriers is acceptable for an extended period of time. Our
sustainment and acquisition programs are aligned with this strategy. In
fact, the 30-year shipbuilding plan represents our ongoing efforts to
balance warfighting capability requirements and affordability with
industrial base capacity. A minimum 11-carrier force structure is
central to this plan. However, following the retirement of U.S.S.
Enterprise (CVN-65) in November 2012, the Navy would be operating with
a 10-carrier force until U.S.S. Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) is delivered in
September 2015, a period of 34 months.
The Navy conducted a risk analysis of this period, looking at
several strategies as part of that analysis. The first strategy
investigated keeping Enterprise operational from 2013 to 2016. Keeping
Enterprise operational from 2013 to 2016 would cost approximately $1.7
billion. This option will also require significant maintenance work and
shipyard time beginning in fiscal year 2008. Enterprise has already
experienced the effects of aging ship systems and degrading material
condition, due in part to the ship being 46 years old, though she was
designed with a 30-year design life. This has led to lost operational
availability due to unplanned work growth following her fiscal year
2002 and fiscal year 2004 maintenance periods. Both shipyard periods
were extended by over 110 days and incurred cost growth totaling over
$120 million. The material condition is expected to worsen as the ship
ages, leading to significant material deficiencies requiring expensive
and time-consuming repair.
At 50 years, Enterprise has a very complex, manpower intensive,
engineering plant. There are a number of components that are near the
end of their design service life, and many of these are at that point
as a result of having been exposed to high-density neutron fluxes over
extended periods of time. This exposure makes the metal more brittle
and limits the range through which the plant can be operated. The Navy
understands the failure mechanisms involved. However, while no design
safety limits will be violated if Enterprise was extended to 2015, the
Navy would be rapidly approaching her design margin limitations in
these areas.
Navy also evaluated maintaining the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk (CV-63) in a
mobilization status. Additionally, Kitty Hawk will be 47 years old when
she is decommissioned in September 2008, an impressive accomplishment
considering she was designed for a 30-year service life. She will also
be our last fossil-fueled carrier. Reactivation of a ship the size and
complexity of an aircraft carrier is estimated to take 24-30 months,
making this option infeasible for the relatively short timeframe
considered. It would also be costly, increasing the planned
inactivation availability costs by $20 million and adding reactivation
costs on the order of $500 million. Remanning would also pose
significant costs and challenges. The current process would have her
remanned in 12-18 months, at a cost of $400 million, but the challenges
in filling many of the billets, including propulsion plant operators,
are significant, and would negatively impact manning across the fleet.
The analysis also looked at another strategy that would maintain
Kitty Hawk in a mobilization status that would support reactivation in
a 12-18 month timeframe. Again, the challenges were similar. The
additional service life would remain a concern. The costs to inactivate
would increase by $35 million, and the annual cost to maintain that
condition would increase by $450,000 to about $700,000 per year.
Reactivation costs are estimated at $450 million and remanning costs at
$210 million. Again, the challenges in remanning specific skilled
personnel would be significant and would impact across the fleet.
The risk analysis determined that our most feasible option, from a
technical, fiscal, and risk perspective, is to leverage the flexibility
available in our O&M schedules, to manage the moderate but acceptable
risk during the period of concern. Detailed analysis of this option is
ongoing, to include the technical risks, cost impacts, and the timing
for decision points.
37. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, does the National Military
Strategy reflect a 10-aircraft carrier force structure? If not, does
this concern you?
Admiral Mullen. The National Military Strategy does not specify a
force level for the Nation's aircraft carrier fleet. However, the 2007
National Defense Authorization Act requires a force level of 11
aircraft carriers. The Navy is currently seeking congressional relief
to reduce the number of aircraft carriers to 10 for a period of 33
months, from 2013 to 2015, to accommodate the decommissioning of U.S.S.
Enterprise in November 2012 and the commissioning of the U.S.S. Gerald
R. Ford in September 2015. The Navy has conducted risk analysis that
balances projected demands with projected O&M schedules, and has
determined the risk to be acceptable, although moderate.
While I am not concerned that the National Military Strategy does
not specify a level for our aircraft carrier force, the Navy remains
committed to the requirement for an 11-carrier force structure and has
no analysis that would indicate anything less than 11 operational
carriers is acceptable for an extended period of time. The Navy's PB08
Long Range Plan for the Construction of Naval Vessels represents our
ongoing efforts to balance warfighting capability requirements and
affordability with individual base capacity. A minimum of 11
operational carriers is central to this plan and provides the coverage
necessary for support of the combatant commanders without unduly
burdening the remaining 10 carriers. Return to at least 11 operational
carriers in fiscal year 2016 is necessary to alleviate this short
period (fiscal years 2013-2014) where carrier force structure is below
the minimum.
navy fighter gap
38. Senator McCain. Secretary Winter, Admiral Mullen, and General
Conway, on March 22, Admiral Bruce Clingan, Director, Air Warfare
Division Headquarters, U.S. Navy, testified before the House Armed
Services Committee that the current naval tactical aviation procurement
strategy has created a strike fighter shortfall that will extend
through the next decade. The shortfall is derived from current and
projected inventory compared to requirements. Current Navy projections
show legacy strike fighter shortfalls ranging from about 50 aircraft to
more than 200, depending on the service life extension for F/A-18
aircraft (10,000 or 9,000 hours) and the F-35 (Joint Strike Fighter
(JSF)) buy rate (50 or 35 per year beginning in fiscal year 2014).
Admiral Clingan's testimony raises some important questions. First, the
difference between 50 and ``more than 200'' is significant and, in
either case, troubling. Isn't expecting a 10,000 flight hour service
life extension on legacy model Hornets overly-optimistic (considering
its original design service life was 6,000 hours)?
Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen. The ongoing Service Life
Assessment Program (SLAP) that is analyzing fatigue life of the F/A-18
A/B/C/D is 73 percent complete, and initial indications are very
promising. Based on data collected to date, a significant portion of
the airframe can be extended from the design limit of 6,000 flight
hours out to 10,000 flight hours without modification. This is due to
an excess strength margin and fleet utilization being less than the
limits to which the airframe was designed and tested.
SLAP will be complete in December 2007 and will provide the
analysis necessary to develop the inspections and modifications
required to extend the F/A-18
A/B/C/D service life out to 10,000 hours.
General Conway. The original design life of 6,000 hours for the F/
A-18 series aircraft has already been increased to 8,000 hours through
inspections. Studies underway for the past year to determine the
feasibility of extending that limit to 10,000 hours have demonstrated
positive indications. We anticipate release of this study in December
of this year.
39. Senator McCain. Secretary Winter, Admiral Mullen, and General
Conway, additionally, isn't a buy rate of 50 F-35 aircraft in fiscal
year 2014 also unrealistic given the Chief of Naval Operations' (CNO)
goal of achieving a 313-ship Navy and our fiscally constrained
environment?
Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen. The Navy believes that this
buy rate is challenging but achievable based on current acquisition
plans and continued congressional support. In order to recapitalize
Navy strike fighters, it is imperative to begin procurement of F-35s at
a rate which will minimize the projected inventory shortfall, as well
as maintain F-35 affordability via economical production rates.
General Conway. The buy rate of 50 F-35s per year will have to be
balanced against completing requirements within the Navy's defense
budget to reach the best balance of capabilities across our warfighting
functions. The USMC TACAIR shortfall and transition to the F-35B is a
high priority that will need to be adequately addressed to assure our
ability to divest legacy aircraft that are at the end of their service
life.
40. Senator McCain. Secretary Winter, Admiral Mullen, and General
Conway, more fundamentally, if current assumptions prove overly
optimistic, what steps is the Navy taking to address what could be a
catastrophic short-fall in naval tactical air (TACAIR) capabilities?
Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen. The Navy's strategy in the
President's 2008 budget invests in 28 additional F/A-18 E/F aircraft,
maintains the JSF Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) IOC at
2012, and completes SLAP on the F/A-18 A/B/C/D by December 2007. These
28 additional F/A-18 E/Fs maintain the production line for an
additional year and allow for the current SLAP study to provide
information for Navy decisions during the Program Objective Memorandum
(POM) 2010 process. Refined analysis will provide options for a more
complete strategy to mitigate or resolve from a holistic tactical
aviation perspective.
General Conway. The Marine Corps is managing our TACAIR
capabilities shortfall on two fronts. First, we are committed to
sustaining the current legacy TACAIR force through service life
extension of our F/A-18 fleet and incremental upgrades of our AV-8B
fleet to ensure we are consistently able to respond to our operational
commitments. Second, we are placing a number of our TACAIR squadrons in
cadre status and reinvesting those aircraft into remaining squadrons in
order to ensure our remaining squadrons have adequate numbers of
aircraft on the flight line.
41. Senator McCain. Secretary Winter, Admiral Mullen, and General
Conway, does Navy leadership think this is an appropriate level of
risk, placed in the appropriate area of its budget?
Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen. Based on best analysis of
complex competing priorities, Navy leadership feels that the budget
submittal contains an appropriate level of risk, placed appropriately
within the budget.
General Conway. At this point, the Marine Corps has planned for and
feels the risk in TACAIR shortfalls is manageable. It is critical to
note, though, that any further slide in the F-35B IOC coupled with a
shallowing of the F-35B procurement profile will introduce increased
risk threaten USMC ability to meet future TACAIR operational
commitments.
relocation of marine corps units to guam
42. Senator McCain. Secretary Winter and General Conway, the Navy
has been assigned executive oversight over the planned relocation of
over 8,000 U.S. marines from the Island of Okinawa to Guam within the
next 6 years. This move is estimated to cost the United States over
$4.3 billion just to provide facilities and infrastructure on Guam for
our marines and their families. The Japanese Government will also share
the costs of over $6.0 billion for additional facilities and housing.
The DOD Inspector General released a preliminary report on March 12,
2007, estimating that, in addition to the capital investment already
mentioned, the move would add operations and readiness expenses of over
$460.0 million annually to the Navy budget. This was a Marine Corps
estimate. Currently, this cost is not captured in the FYDP accompanying
the President's budget request for fiscal year 2008. Do you believe
these cost estimates are accurate?
Secretary Winter and General Conway.
a. Facilities and Infrastructure - The $10.3 billion facilities and
infrastructure estimate was made using standard assumptions, planning
factors, and DOD estimating methods and sources such as the Unified
Facilities Criteria and Naval Facilities P-80 data. Final project costs
will depend on how closely the actual requirements and implementation
tracks with the original planning assumptions. Additionally, the $10.3
billion estimate does not include a number of ancillary costs that were
not part of the negotiated agreement. Some examples include full
training development in the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas
Islands (CNMI), inter- and intra-theatre mobility, actual relocation
costs of our personnel, and facility furnishings. We continue to refine
these initial estimates.
b. Operations and Maintenance - The O&M estimates were based on the
best information and assumptions available. These estimates are
reasonable for initial budget estimating purposes and are anticipated
to be in line with O&M costs at other USMC installations. Although
itemized costs are expected to be similar to typical USMC installation
O&M costs, we expect overall USMC expenses to increase irrespective of
where units are relocated. This is due to discontinued Host Nation
support as our forces move from Japan. Several costs which were
previously borne by the Government of Japan (GOJ) will become the
responsibility of the U.S. Government including: installation labor
under the Master Labor Contract, Utilities, Host Nation replacement
construction funding, and Housing. Housing costs no longer covered by
GOJ will become an annual Basic Allowance for Housing or Overseas
Housing Allowance bill for USMC to pay.
43. Senator McCain. Secretary Winter and General Conway, with
significant competing budget priorities for the Marine Corps, most
notably the increase in end strength, can the Navy afford the move to
Guam?
Secretary Winter.
a. The Navy can afford to pay its share of the cost within current
top line budget controls. According to the negotiated agreement between
Japan and the United States, Japan will pay up to $6.1 billion of the
estimated $10.3 billion cost to relocate about 8,000 marines from
Okinawa. The current FYDP includes $2.5 billion across the fiscal year
2008 through fiscal year 2013 timeframe as the Navy's share to support
the relocation of the marines from Okinawa. The remaining
implementation cost will be addressed beyond the FYDP.
b. Costs to move these marines and their families from Japan to
Guam should be borne in light of several key factors.
(1) Our presence in the Western Pacific is of immense
strategic value and is vital to U.S. Government interests.
Timely response to crises, as well as the goodwill and trust
built by constant exercises and operations with our partner
nations in the Pacific, makes our forward presence
irreplaceable. Locating marines in Guam allows us to continue
to meet these strategic imperatives. Location is everything, as
it buys us precious time to quickly respond and allows us to
respond using locally based forces and organic mobility.
(2) The GOJ has agreed to pay $6.1 billion of the estimated
$10.3 billion cost to move the marines specifically to Guam.
Relocation to other locations (e.g. Hawaii or CONUS) may not
come with the same GOJ commitment of funding, and could thereby
increase the cost to the U.S. taxpayer.
(3) In addition to the $6.1 billion that our Japanese allies
have committed toward building a new base in Guam, they are
making other contributions as well. These include rebuilding,
modernizing, and helping as we realign our forces on Okinawa
and in Japan, at an expected cost of an additional $20 billion.
c. The advantages of a long-term strategic relationship weigh
favorably against the monetary costs of this endeavor.
General Conway. According to the negotiated agreement between Japan
and the United States, Japan will pay up to $6.1 billion of the
estimated $10.2 billion cost to relocate about 8,000 marines from
Okinawa. The current FYDP includes $2.5 billion across the fiscal year
2008 through fiscal year 2013 timeframe as the Department of Navy's
share to support the relocation of the Marines from Okinawa. The
remaining implementation cost will be addressed beyond the FYDP.
Costs to move these marines and their families from Japan to Guam
must be considered in light of several factors.
1. Our presence in the Western Pacific, our daily living and
operating, is of an immense strategic value and is vital to
U.S. Government interests. Timely response to crises, as well
as the goodwill and trust built by constant exercises and
operations with our partner nations in the Pacific, makes our
forward presence irreplaceable. Locating Marines in Guam allows
us to continue to meet these strategic imperatives. Location is
everything, as it buys us precious time to quickly respond and
allows us to respond using locally based forces and organic
mobility.
2. The GOJ has agreed to pay $6.1 billion of the estimated
$10.3 billion cost to move the marines specifically to Guam.
Relocation to other locations (.e.g. Hawaii or CONUS) may not
come with the same GOJ commitment of funding, and could thereby
increase the cost to the U.S. taxpayer. When we discuss Guam,
we must keep this in mind, this relocation bill will still need
to be paid, even if these forces move somewhere else.
3. We should keep in mind that in addition to the $6 billion
that our Japanese allies have committed for building a new base
in Guam, they are additionally rebuilding, modernizing, and
helping us as we realign our forces on Okinawa and in Japan, at
an expected cost of an additional $20 billion. While the
current effort will be expensive, it would be significantly
more expensive if we were to attempt this enterprise alone. The
advantages of a long-term stable relationship weigh favorably
against the monetary costs of this endeavor.
44. Senator McCain. Secretary Winter and General Conway, when will
a master plan be developed detailing the military construction (MILCON)
and housing projects to be required for the Marine Corps forces?
Secretary Winter. The contract to develop the Guam master plan was
awarded in January 2007. The final plan is expected to be complete in
July 2008.
General Conway. The Guam Master Plan is due to OSD by September
2008.
45. Senator McCain. Secretary Winter and General Conway, assuming
the Navy maintains its current level of facility investment in the rest
of its installations, where is the Department going to get an
additional $4 billion for construction on Guam and what other
priorities will be deferred?
Secretary Winter and General Conway. The current FYDP includes $2.5
billion across the fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2013 timeframe
as the Navy's share to support the relocation of the Marines from
Okinawa to Guam. Maintaining this level of funding beyond the FYDP
would allow the Navy to address the remaining implementation cost
without the need to defer other priorities.
46. Senator McCain. General Conway, what is your perspective on the
impact of the move to Guam on the Marines?
General Conway. The USMC is working with the Commander, U.S.
Pacific Command and our senior leadership in DOD to ensure our service
remains relevant to our Nation's military requirements in the Asia-
Pacific region. III Marine Expeditionary Force units and other U.S.
military forces currently conduct mission essential training in Guam
and the CNMI. We expect that USMC air, ground, and logistics training
will continue in the future and potentially expand with our planned
relocation to Guam. We envision a series of training areas in this
region where we will be able to adequately train to the majority of our
combat and non-combat related missions. For the remaining training
requirements, we will look at innovative opportunities to train with
our allies and partner nations.
47. Senator McCain. General Conway, what is the cumulative effect
of this relocation on the Marines' ability to provide adequate forces
for regional conflicts?
General Conway. [Deleted.]
total costs to grow the force for the marine corps
48. Senator McCain. General Conway, regarding the costs to grow the
Active-Duty Marine Corps to 202,000 marines by 2011, you mention in
your opening statement that the Marine Corps has requested funds in the
fiscal year 2007 Emergency Supplemental to start constructing the
facilities and equipping three new infantry battalions totaling over
4,000 troops. The fiscal year 2008 President's budget request includes
over $4.3 billion for military pay, training, recruiting, equipment,
and other costs dedicated to growth of the force. Do you have an
estimate of total investment required in equipment, facilities, and
increased operating expenses to complete the growth to 202,000 marines?
General Conway. The total estimated fiscal years 2008-2013 cost to
grow the Marine Corps by 27,000 was initially calculated at $30.8
billion. That amount was reflected in our fiscal years 2008-2013
President's budget submission. Within that amount, $7.025 billion was
for the procurement of equipment, $3.230 billion was for MILCON and
family housing projects, and $620.6 million was for additional base
operating expenses.
49. Senator McCain. General Conway, will the Marine Corps be
seeking these costs as an increase to the Marine Corps top-line, or do
you anticipate the Marine Corps will have to shed or defer existing
requirements?
General Conway. The fiscal year 2008 President's budget request
provides funding for the increase in USMC end strength with an
increased topline. The budget provides funding for the end strength
increase without a negative financial to any USMC functions.
declining investment for base sustainment
50. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, in the President's budget
request for fiscal year 2008, the Navy proposes to reduce the amount
dedicated to the sustainment of Navy facilities by over $330 million in
order to cover other budget shortfalls. This account has historically
been raided to pay for other bills, leading to a perpetual deferment of
critical readiness requirements. This is the account used to repair
leaking roofs, remove mold from walls, repair deteriorated runways and
piers, and ensure that the facilities our sailors and marines live and
work in are safe, secure, and in good condition. In light of all the
recent attention to the impact of deteriorated facilities on the morale
and well-being of our military personnel, why is the Navy willing to
underfund this account?
Admiral Mullen. The resources contained in the Navy's fiscal year
2008 budget help us support the joint war on terrorism, sustain our
combat readiness, and provide quality services and benefits for our
sailors and their families. However, persistent high tempo operations
related to the global war on terrorism and attaining our shipbuilding
and aircraft procurement objectives continue to stretch the Navy's
limited resources. The resultant pressurized Navy top-line and
competing readiness account priorities result in an underfunded
Facility Sustainment account. In fiscal year 2004, fiscal year 2005,
and fiscal year 2006, we transferred $504 million, $195 million, and
$216 million, respectively, from Facility Sustainment to Base Operating
(BOS) accounts in order to fund civilian personnel salaries, utilities,
contracts, and to provide minimum levels of service. In anticipation of
the Facility Sustainment appropriation being provided under the fiscal
year 2007 Military Construction Appropriations Bill (QOL/NA) vice the
Operations and Maintenance Appropriations Bill, we aligned SRM funds to
meet BOS must-fund requirements, and decreased the Sustainment account
$179 million in fiscal year 2008. Sustainment is funded at 95 percent
of the OSD goal (Facility Sustainment Model) in fiscal year 2007 and
PB08 requests 83 percent of the OSD goal. Concerned about this risk, I
requested an additional $240 million for Facility Sustainment as my #10
priority on my POM-08 Unfunded Programs List to raise the fiscal year
2008 sustainment rate to 100 percent of the OSD goal.
51. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, how long can the Navy continue
this risk before seeing real consequences in terms of reduced readiness
and affected daily operations?
Admiral Mullen. Regretfully, we are already seeing the effects of
underfunding the Facilities Sustainment account in quality of life and
limited daily operations. For example, the inability to adequately fund
sustainment of waterfront facilities has resulted in quay walls,
wharves, and piers in the Southwest, Mid-Atlantic, Guam, and Hawaii
Navy Regions approaching failure and has directly impacted the movement
of ships in and out of port. Naval Station Pearl Harbor currently has a
restoration backlog of over $67 million on critical waterfront
facilities. Lack of maintenance on heating and air-conditioning systems
has also resulted in a lowered quality of life for our sailors who
experience intermittent loss of heating and cooling in their work and
living spaces.
We seek to achieve the service life of our facilities. This
requires sufficient/sustained preventive and condition-based
maintenance funding. Over the past several budget cycles, we have
executed approximately 82 percent of the funding requirement. As a
result, we expect to see a reduction in service life and adverse
impacts on mission and quality of life. A key focus of my POM-10
deliberations will be to develop a shore infrastructure capital
investment program that will arrest the decay in our shore
infrastructure and realize the expected facility service life to meet
mission and quality of life demands.
52. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, do you agree that deferring
maintenance and repairs to critical infrastructure and facilities will
just make the problem harder and more expensive to fix down the road?
Admiral Mullen. Yes. The Navy's average sustainment rate across the
FYDP is 81 percent. The Navy is taking manageable risk in order to fund
other priorities, while recognizing that continued lower levels of
sustainment will generate higher costs for restoration and
modernization in later years.
marine corps amphibious lift requirements
53. Senator McCain. General Conway, the Marine Corps has held a
longstanding requirement for the Navy to provide amphibious lift for
three Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) to support forcible entry
operations. I notice in your statement this year that you are now
calling for two brigades to perform such an assault. What was the basis
for the Marine Corps' determination to reduce assault echelon (AE)
requirements for an opposed landing?
General Conway. The Marine Corps has not reduced AE requirements
for an opposed landing. What has been reduced is the total amphibious
lift requirement for AE-capable forces. The basis for the 3.0 MEB AE
fiscally constrained to 2.5 MEB AE requirement noted in this question
was documented in the Navy's 1992 Posture Statement signed by Secretary
of the Navy, CNO, and CMC, and is quoted in part, as follows:
For a global ready response capability and forward presence,
the Nation needs a tailored force with at least enough
amphibious ships to lift the AEs of 2.5 brigade-size units.
This allows the Navy and Marine Corps to meet current
requirements for the forward deployed forces and still provide
sufficient surge capability to assemble a brigade-size
amphibious assault force in either the Atlantic or Pacific.
This fiscally constrained goal meets the Nation's minimum
requirements.
As noted above, the total requirement identified in the 1992
statement was for 2.5 MEB AE lift capacity, and the forcible entry
component of that requirement was two brigade-size amphibious assault
forces--one on each coast--totaling the same as today's stated
requirement for 2.0 MEB AE.
The current requirement for 2.0 MEB AE is traced to the Strategic
Planning Guidance (SPG), directing us to ``. . . consider capability
alternatives . . . to support a single two MEB forcible entry
operation.'' Although the language in today's SPG is different than in
the 1992 statement, the requirement to maintain a 2.0 MEB forcible
entry capability remains the same.
54. Senator McCain. General Conway, what changes have occurred
regarding the threat or Marine Corps doctrine that provides confidence
that this reduced assault force is right-sized for major combat
operations?
Admiral Mullen. The global threat and Marine Corps doctrine have
not changed appreciably in the past several years. Greater emphasis has
been placed on dispersed, global terrorist networks that exploit Islam
to advance radical political aims rather than on the employment of
traditional military forces. The guidance published in the QDR
highlights the transformation of the DOD:
- From major conventional combat operations to multiple
irregular, asymmetric operations
Based on the QDR Report, the SPG further tasks the Services to:
- Components will reduce priority of current and future
capabilities and forces that provided disproportionate
overmatch against traditional challenges
- Reduce resources for future capabilities that would
marginally increase existing U.S. advantages against
traditional challenges
- The Marine Corps will consider capability alternatives for
review by the Deputy's Advisory Working Group to support a
single two MEB forcible entry operation
Historically, the Marine Corps has stated its requirement for
amphibious lift in terms of three MEBs, fiscally constrained to 2.5
MEBs to support amphibious assault forcible entry operations. In
accordance with the guidance set forth in the most recent SPG, the
Marine Corps has further constrained this requirement for amphibious
lift to two MEBs. This 2.0 MEB capability is generally acknowledged by
the U.S. Navy providing and maintaining a Battle Force of 30
operationally available amphibious warfare ships for forcible entry
operations. The ability to successfully conduct a major combat
operation requiring an amphibious assault with a force of this size
accepts risk in two areas: future challenges and current operations.
Additionally, it potentially limits future national security options
for forcible entry from the sea in a period of time where anti-access
is growing among non-U.S. aligned countries, non-state actors, and
reluctant allies.
sea-based ballistic missile defense
55. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, the sea-based ballistic missile
defense system (AEGIS BMD) has been successful in 7 of the last 8
intercept tests, and up to 10 SM-3 interceptors are now deployed on 3
ships in the Pacific Fleet. The current AEGIS BMD system is capable of
intercepting short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, such as the
North Korean No Dong missile and the Iranian Shehab-3. Current plans
call for deploying over 100 SM-3 missiles on 18 AEGIS cruisers and
destroyers by fiscal year 2012. The Missile Defense Agency funds
procurement for the missiles and shipboard upgrades, while the Navy
assumes the operations and support costs associated with this sea-based
missile defense capability. Current plans call for upgrading 18 Pacific
Fleet AEGIS ships by 2012 for the missile defense mission. Given the
growing threat posed by Iranian ballistic missiles, what are the Navy's
plans to similarly equip Atlantic Fleet ships with a ballistic missile
defense capability?
Admiral Mullen. Two Atlantic Fleet ships are among the 18 ships
scheduled to be upgraded with Ballistic Missile Defense capability by
2012. One will be finished in August 2007 and the other ship will be
finished in December 2008. Despite homeport locations, all Navy ships
are worldwide deployable. The Navy's Destroyer Modernization program is
funded to provide BMD capability for all remaining 47 Arleigh Burke
class destroyers. Two destroyers will begin modernization in fiscal
year 2012, and three destroyers will be upgraded each following year.
BMD capability for the 19 remaining cruisers is not funded and is being
considered for POM-10.
conditions at marine corps battalion level medical facilities
56. Senator McCain. General Conway, committee staff has reported to
Marine Corps leadership on several occasions that conditions at medical
facilities supporting marines at the battalion level are substandard
and unacceptable. At Camp Horno, for example, third-world conditions
exist such as open bays for medical exams, open doorways to the outside
hung with plastic curtains, poor lighting, and dust and dirt throughout
the facility. For the second year since learning of these conditions,
the budget request includes no funds for improving battalion level
medical facilities. I believe our marines deserve better. How do you
explain this?
Admiral Mullen. Senator, the conditions you cite at Camp Horno are
unacceptable but I wish to assure you that these conditions are not
representative of the approximately 90 Battalion and Regimental Aid
Stations (BAS/RAS) we have across the Marine Corps. That said, and
based upon input we have compiled from a recent data call, we have
action underway on several fronts. For the near-term, HQMC developed
minimum habitability standards and directed that our operational
commanders and installations take immediate action to ensure these
standards are met. If they cannot be met, the facility is to be closed.
Installations are to report back no later than 30 June of this year
that each BAS/RAS has met these standards or has been closed. If
closed, they are to report the alternate means used to obtain medical
services. These standards include but are not limited to requirements
for clean and freshly painted surfaces, well-maintained floors in good
structural repair, mechanical systems in good operating order,
sufficient lighting, regularly scheduled field days and solid waste
disposal, exam room privacy, waiting areas that are separated from the
examination rooms, clean and operational windows with proper window
treatments, sufficient double lock storage for medical records, doors
with properly functioning hardware, sufficient fire suppression
equipment/smoke detectors with documented evidence of routine
inspection, and furnishings that comply with basic infection control by
being clean, functional, and in reasonable repair. Funding is in place
at the operational unit level and at our installations to take
necessary corrective actions to meet these standards.
We are also translating recently developed medical standards to
identify the level of care that should be provided within an Aid
Station (BAS/RAS) into basic facilities planning criteria to support
this level of care. These criteria define the square footage,
configuration, special requirements, et cetera, necessary to support
the number of marines assigned. These planning criteria will be used to
assess whether sufficient capacity of facilities is available to
support these units, and where not, provide the necessary information
to develop corrective projects. In addition, we are revising our
facility coding process to provide aid stations with a unique facility
identifier, which will allow better tracking of the condition of these
facilities. We expect initial efforts to be completed this fiscal year.
These criteria and unique identifiers will allow us to ensure the
appropriate priority is assigned to corrective projects for these
facilities and that we programmatically address overall requirements
through our repair, minor construction and, if necessary, military
construction programs.
Finally, our Health Services and Facilities organizations are
ensuring these habitability standards, medical standards, and
facilities planning criteria are incorporated into inspection protocols
used by the Inspector General and other oversight organizations to
validate routine compliance.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner
the new national medical center at bethesda
57. Senator Warner. Secretary Winter, concerns have been raised
about the Department's planned end-state capacity of medical facilities
in the National Capital Region and the potential for patient care
disruption during the transition to new facilities at Bethesda from the
existing Walter Reed facilities. The transition planning process cannot
succeed without leadership at the highest levels of the Navy along with
the Army. What are your thoughts regarding the acceleration of
construction at Bethesda to ensure effective and seamless transition of
care for wounded servicemembers, as well as regular medical services
for the population serviced by Walter Reed?
Secretary Winter. Leaders from National Naval Medical Center,
Walter Reed Army Medical Center, along with Military Health System
(MHS) leadership and Office of Secretary of Defense/Health Affairs,
will work to ensure that the health care delivery is not compromised.
All resources within the MHS will be made available to ensure effective
and seamless transition of care for eligible beneficiaries. The
military medical and NAVFAC team will work towards completing the
construction as expeditiously and economically as possible, without
sacrificing quality of care.
Construction phasing is an integral part of the design and
construction process being developed to create a seamless transition in
the design and construction of Bethesda and Fort Belvoir. Any
acceleration at either site will potentially affect additional health
care workload. Existing patient health care is a critical factor that
is receiving the utmost attention as part of the design effort. Design
and construction decisions, such as stand alone structures and location
of additions, can help minimize patient care disruptions.
The Navy fully understands the importance of completing BRACON
Project P-005V, Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, Bethesda,
MD, as early as possible. We have already compressed the original 38
month construction schedule to 30 months, and are exploring
alternatives to improve upon that construction duration. The required
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) will be completed in time to allow
a construction start in April 2008. Additionally, there are options to
phase construction completion that would enable portions of the
improved facility to open in advance of the overall planned project
completion date of October 2010. Given a constrained site and the
desire to preserve the quality of ongoing medical care at the existing
hospital complex, acceleration beyond the already compressed schedule
would be extremely challenging.
east coast aircraft carrier basing and mayport environmental impact
study
58. Senator Warner. Secretary Winter, I have been following with
interest the Navy's assessment of strategic homeporting and dispersal
options for Atlantic Fleet surface ships. I believe it is important
that all factors be considered in any large operational move, to
include not only environmental concerns, but also national security
requirements, the impact on sailors and their families, and local
economies. What is the current status and way ahead for the current
Naval Air Station (NAS) Mayport environmental impact study?
Secretary Winter. The Navy has undertaken this EIS to ensure that
we continue to effectively support fleet operational requirements
through the most efficient utilization of Naval Station Mayport in the
future, and to evaluate the potential environmental impacts on Mayport
for each of the ship homeporting alternatives that are under
consideration.
A Notice of Intent to prepare the EIS was published in the Federal
Register on 14 November 2006. A public scoping meeting was held in
Jacksonville on 5 December 2006. The Navy is being both environmentally
and fiscally responsible in awaiting the conclusion of the EIS, with a
Record of Decision expected in January 2009.
The final decision on utilization of Mayport will include
consideration of other factors such as national security requirements,
total cost and other programmatic implications, impact on sailors and
their families, and the effect on local economies.
59. Senator Warner. Secretary Winter, what are your thoughts on
where the Atlantic Fleet end state may be, in terms of what ships,
including carriers or large deck amphibs, may be moved?
Admiral Mullen. In January 2006, Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces
Command, was directed to conduct an EIS that will review and assess a
broad range of alternatives for the potential homeporting of additional
surface ships at Naval Station Mayport. The purpose of the EIS is to
evaluate the potential environmental impacts on Mayport for each of the
alternatives that are under study. Specifically, the EIS will examine
13 alternatives for Naval Station Mayport:
The homeporting of large amphibious ships, either an
LHA or LHD
The homeporting of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier
(CVN)
Making Naval Station Mayport capable of hosting a CVN
The homeporting of additional surface combatants
(cruisers and/or destroyers [CRUDES])
Seven different combinations of the above
The homeporting of an Amphibious Ready Group (LHA or
LHD, LPD, LSD)
No Action
In order to be both environmentally and fiscally responsible, the
Navy will await the conclusion of the EIS in January 2009 before making
any decisions regarding Mayport. Accordingly, the Navy will allow
adequate time to fully assure that all considerations have been
evaluated regarding the potential move of additional ships to Mayport,
Florida. These considerations include national security requirements,
total cost and other programmatic implications, impact on sailors and
their families, and the effect on local economies.
master jet base assessment for naval air station oceana, virginia
60. Senator Warner. Admiral Mullen, you recently released a report
to this committee, which was commissioned by the Office of the CNO, and
consisted of an assessment of NAS Oceana in Virginia as it compared to
an ``ideal'' master jet base. In the report, NAS Oceana was assessed
the highest grade in the operational training category, which measures
the installation's capability to support required flight training.
Unfortunately, because of the significant local community development
around NAS Oceana, the base was rated lowest in ``field operational
environment.'' Now I note that this report was conducted in December
2005. The Virginia Beach community and the Commonwealth of Virginia
have taken great steps to work with the Navy over the past year and a
half on the encroachment issue. How would you assess the current
situation for the Navy as it related to the field operating
environment?
Admiral Mullen. Encroachment remains a serious issue with potential
operational impacts, however, the Navy is encouraged by the hard work
achieved thus far by Virginia Beach, Chesapeake, and the Commonwealth
of Virginia, and I view the following steps taken as positive progress
toward improving the field operating environment.
- The recently adopted Virginia Beach/Navy Memorandum of
Understanding establishes the process by which all development
proposals within the Air Installations Compatible Use Zone (AICUZ)
contours will be reviewed and processed. The measures thus far adopted
by the City will help to limit future incompatible development that
could have an adverse impact on the conduct of air operations at
Oceana.
1. The MOU creates a new process for Navy officials to review
and comment earlier in the process on proposed development in
the AICUZ, thereby strengthening the parties' working
relationship and commitment to address potential encroachment
at NAS Oceana. Communications and meetings between Navy and
City staff well in advance of Planning Commission and City
Council consideration will help to ensure that land use
decisions are fully informed and conflicts are avoided to the
extent possible. The results have been commendable and have not
only halted encroachment around Oceana/Fentress but have
several programs in effect which will rollback existing
development from several of Oceana's Accident Potential Zone
One and Clear Zone.
- Virginia Beach adopted an AICUZ Overlay ordinance for the areas
within Noise Zones 70 dB day-night noise level (DNL) and higher.
- Virginia Beach established an Accident Potential Zone (APZ) and
Clear Zone acquisition program to roll back existing incompatible
development. $15 million per year ($7.5 million city and $7.5 million
State) has been budgeted for fiscal years 2007 and 2008.
- Virginia Beach enacted an ordinance (APZ Ordinance) that
prohibits future incompatible development in APZ areas.
- Virginia Beach enacted an ordinance that adopted an amended
comprehensive plan and the official zoning map to now include the NAS
Oceana--Navy Auxiliary Landing Field (NALF) Fentress Interfacility
Traffic Area (IFTA).
- Virginia Beach amended the comprehensive plan by revising
chapters discussing strategic growth areas, primary residential areas,
and the transition area between NAS Oceana and NALF Fentress by
incorporating provisions pertaining to the AICUZ program.
- Virginia Beach enacted an ordinance amending the zoning and
design guidelines in the majority of the ocean front resort area, the
net result is a reduction in the potential amount of residential units
by 4,000.
- Virginia Beach enacted an ordinance to establish an IFTA Property
Acquisition Plan. As of 17 April 2007, 15 properties have been
identified, prioritized, and prices negotiated by the City of Virginia
Beach.
- Chesapeake enacted an ordinance to amend its AICUZ overlay
district to include noise zones greater than 70 dB DNL.
- Commonwealth of Virginia amended the State code to require noise
and APZ zone disclosures for all residential and commercial sales and
leases when the noise and APZ are on a city zoning map. The
Commonwealth amended the State building code to require sound
attenuation in all new residential and commercial construction.
- Commonwealth of Virginia created the Oceana Fentress Military
Advisory Committee, responsible to the Governor's standing Virginia
Military Advisory Commission, to provide continuing oversight of land
use issues affecting Navy Air Operations in Chesapeake and Virginia
Beach.
61. Senator Warner. Admiral Mullen, in your opinion, what more can
be done by the local community and the State to improve the operating
environment for the Navy at Oceana?
Admiral Mullen. The Navy recognizes and is grateful for the hard
work already underway by local and State authorities in the Virginia
Beach community and the Commonwealth of Virginia. The Navy would like
the local community to extend the Air Installation Compatible Use Zone
(AICUZ) Overlay District and Fentress Overlay District out to 65 dB DNL
vice 70 dB DNL, to conform to Navy AICUZ criteria that discourages
residential development in that noise zone. In addition, the State and
local communities need to establish a process and source of funding to
expand the program to purchase homes from willing sellers into Accident
Potential Zone II and high noise zones. These recommendations have been
discussed with appropriate local officials.
62. Senator Warner. Admiral Mullen, the report also mentioned that
Oceana's ``base infrastructure is in decline, the result of long-
deferred maintenance. Runway, taxiway, parking apron, and hangar MILCON
projects designed to upgrade the airfield infrastructure are either
underway or programmed.'' Please provide the status of these activities
for Oceana and the Navy's plan to recover from the deferment of
maintenance investments at the base.
Admiral Mullen. The private sector industry standards for facility
investment (sustainment-ST, restoration and modernization-RM) are
typically 2 percent of Plant Replacement Value (PRV). In the last 5
years, NAS Oceana met the 2 percent PRV industry standard only one time
(fiscal year 2007) as shown in the following table:
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
This long-term underinvestment has resulted in a growing backlog of
maintenance and repair estimated at $261 million, or approximately 14
percent of the PRV. The average age of the deficiencies in the backlog
is 4.1 years. A portion of the under-investment is due to suspending
noncritical facility repairs/capital investments, pending the
resolution of NAS Oceana's BRAC status. NAS Oceana's future long-term
status was resolved in January 2007.
Improving our shore infrastructure is at the forefront of our PR-09
budget deliberations, but resources are very tight. The Navy is now
undertaking a systematic approach to address the critical
infrastructure requirements world-wide. This will include a deliberate
``fence line to fence line'' assessment of the facilities in each shore
installation, covering three dimensions: (1) Contribution to current
mission, (2) Quality of current facilities and, (3) Quantity of
facilities versus projected demand. Once this comprehensive condition
based assessment is done, decisions will be made to address current and
projected gaps using MILCON, major repair efforts, or lesser
maintenance efforts to satisfy mission needs.
The following MILCON Projects at NAS Oceana have been enacted:
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
President's budget 2008 does not include any MILCON projects in
fiscal year 2008 at NAS Oceana, but includes the following projects in
the out years:
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
In addition to the MILCON projects above, fiscal year 2007 special
projects include:
Twelve minor restoration and sustainment projects,
valued at $3.2 million, are currently underway.
A $8.9 million special project to repair parking
aprons and taxiways. Award planned 30 August 2007.
A $20 million special project for hangar repairs.
Award planned 30 August 2007.
Repair Runway 14R/32L and 5R/23lR, total $19.8
million. Timing for execution of these projects is dependent
upon PR-09 budget deliberations.
In the past, Navy has failed to pursue a systematic, deliberate,
and consistent approach to assessing the material condition of our
shore facilities. I have directed efforts to make quick, deliberate
progress in getting an accurate fix of our shore infrastructure, to
develop a comprehensive investment strategy, and to make the
prioritized resource requirements clear in our POM-10 submission. This
will benefit not only Oceana, but all our installations, in which we
are significantly underinvested.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
production capacity
63. Senator Chambliss. General Conway, you emphasize the tempo of
operational demands as the reason for an increase in maintenance
requirements and the criticality of maintaining equipment in terms of
sustaining troop readiness to operate at the ``sustained rate of
fire.'' Specifically, you mention Light Armored Vehicles being driven
3.5 times more than their programmed annual usage rates. You have also
said that maintaining materiel is a key factor in determining combat
readiness. These statements make it clear that maintenance needs to be
a priority; however, your written statement says that certain
production requirements cannot be met in a single year due to
production capacity issues. Do your maintenance depots have the
capacity and assets to meet these demands and to meet demands which
will increase as the size of the force increases?
General Conway. As long as the assets are available and there is
funding, our depots have the capacity to meet the demand. Marine Corps
Depot Maintenance Activity Group (DMAG) is a multi-commodity operation.
Customer requirements drive the need for additional workers, overtime,
and additional shifts. Selected areas are currently working 12-hour
second shifts. As workload increases, the option to expand is
available.
inter-service maintenance cooperation
64. Senator Chambliss. General Conway, are your logistics depots
sharing maintenance work with other Services and taking advantage of
the synergies gained through inter-Service cooperation?
General Conway. Yes. Currently both Anniston Army Depot and
Tobyhanna Army Depot are working USMC equipment. We will continue to
rely on inter-servicing to perform maintenance work as appropriate.
Additionally, LOGCOM has offered assistance to other Services,
specifically the Army, to reduce their backlog.
reset
65. Senator Chambliss. General Conway, the Marine Corps is no
longer identifying depot maintenance as a ``cost of war'' and is now
factoring this expense into the cost of resetting the force. Given the
additional funding requirements necessary to reset your equipment and
the length of time required to reach pre-war equipment levels, will you
also need to expand your depot workforce to meet this reset demand?
General Conway. Asset and funding availability dictate the size of
the workforce and the number of shifts required. Selected areas are
currently working 12-hour second shifts. As workload increases, the
option to expand is available. Expansion of the workforce is
accomplished using temporary hires and contracted labor, which allows
contraction of the workforce when the workload decreases. It is
anticipated that the workforce will expand and contract throughout the
reset process.
66. Senator Chambliss. General Conway, what factors will you use to
determine what equipment to repair and reset, and to determine the
division of work between industry and your existing depot workforce?
General Conway. All depot level reparables will be overhauled and
all field level reparables will be upgraded to serviceable standards.
In determining the division of work between industry and depots, we
will use the existing Depot Level Source of Repair (DSOR) decision
process to determine where the work is accomplished. If the Joint Depot
Maintenance Activities Group selected DSOR repair facility is unable to
accomplish the work then an alternate DSOR will be sought. Alternate
DSORs include private contractors and service depots.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Thune
shipbuilding
67. Senator Thune. Admiral Mullen, the affordability of the Navy
shipbuilding program and our ability to meet the CNO's plan for a 313-
ship Navy are of great concern. The Congressional Budget Office
estimates that $20 billion per year--$5 billion greater than the Navy's
budget estimate--will be required to buy the ships in the Navy's plan.
We all agree that we need to increase our rate of shipbuilding, and
that we likewise need to take deliberate actions on the front end of
this program to ensure that we do not have to cut out future ships to
pay bills on the back end. Given the cost pressures on the shipbuilding
program, what impact do the increased cost and delays of the LCS
program have on the balance of ship programs in the Navy's plan?
Admiral Mullen. The significant impact that increased cost and
delays have had is the need to reprogram or request reprogramming
authority for the fiscal year 2007 funding in order to use these funds
to complete the vessels that still are under contract.
In the out-years, the cost reductions associated with our strategy,
the selected configuration, and the buy will enable cost efficiencies
associated with a modern production facility. These mechanisms will
enable us to minimize the cost impact to the overall shipbuilding
program.
The Navy needs to understand exactly how much we're going to be
able to get by way of investment in those facilities and the leverage
that that will provide us. But I am very hopeful that we will be able
to recoup a significant amount of the increased cost.
68. Senator Thune. Admiral Mullen, to the extent that it would be
possible to accelerate the Navy's shipbuilding plan, where would you
propose to increase our investment to provide the greatest military
benefit and financial return on investment?
Admiral Mullen. Any acceleration of the shipbuilding plan would
need to be weighed against the impact to the SCN account stability. We
have provided industry with a stable planning horizon. By not
constantly modifying the shipbuilding plan, we have established trust
and facilitated the shipyards to ability to make the kind of capital
investments necessary to make them more efficient.
Adding any additional ships without complete funding/top level SCN
relief, would cause an imbalance with the planned funding for Navy
ships, potentially causing other shipbuilding programs to destabilize.
We are in the process of analyzing our shipbuilding plan in an
unconstrained fiscal environment. While I am confident with the
original assumptions and work that led to the 313 force structure and
the current shipbuilding plan, one of the key assumptions was a
constrained fiscal environment. In a more favorable fiscal environment,
I would anticipate accelerating the shipbuilding plan and increasing
the overall size of the force.
The Navy has examined the feasibility of increased shipbuilding
investments in fiscal year 2008. Most of the ships in the Navy's
construction inventory (CVN, LCS, and CG(X)) cannot be accelerated due
to execution risk associated with maturing programs or production
limitations. For mature programs without significant risk such as DDG-
51 Class, the fleet inventory will reach its objective with current
construction plans and additional ships would be in excess of the
warfighting requirements.
LPD-17 Class Amphibious Assault Ship, T-AKE Dry Cargo Carrier, and
SSN Virginia Class Attack Submarine, could be added to accelerate the
shipbuilding plan and provide the greatest military benefit and
financial return on investment.
Adding a 10th LPD in fiscal year 2008 is a relatively low risk
option and my top unfunded priority. LPD-26 would execute as if it was
a fiscal year 2009/2010 ship and would deliver in approximately fiscal
year 2012/2013; assuming the shipyard did not ramp up the workforce to
increase their build rate.
Adding up to three T-AKEs in fiscal year 2008 is again relatively
low risk. These ships would likely execute as if they were fiscal years
2009/2010/2011 contracts and would complete approximately fiscal years
2012/2013/2014; assuming the production line was kept to series
production. The earliest they could deliver, assuming the yard executed
them in a block and brought in the manpower to accomplish that, would
be about fiscal year 2012.
Adding a Virginia Class SSN would be higher risk requiring a $2.8
billion SCN increase to account for year 1 and 2 advance procurement.
This ship would still execute like a fiscal year 2010 SSN in terms of
actual construction. The build timeline for an SSN is about 5 years so
this ship would deliver in approximately fiscal year 2015. A lower risk
option would be to procure the ``ship set'' for a VA SSN this year.
This option would increase our future year SSN flexibility.
69. Senator Thune. Secretary Winter, your professional
qualifications and your recent experience with the LCS program place
you in a unique position as Secretary of the Navy to make a profound
and lasting contribution to shipbuilding acquisition. What are the
principal changes you envision to improve the way we buy our ships to
place us on the road to an affordable 313-ship Navy?
Secretary Winter. This is a vital area where the Navy can re-assert
control over the shipbuilding process. The Navy's shipbuilding plan
recognizes the need for aggressive requirements and cost control
measures. These can only be achieved in partnership with industry,
utilizing realistic assumptions within our ability to instill
discipline in shipbuilding requirements, and industry's ability to
drive more investments to reduce cost.
Given the importance of requirements-containment and cost-reduction
to the viability of the shipbuilding plan, the Navy continues to
evaluate each ship class and identify cost reduction opportunities
while balancing warfighting requirements, costs, and industrial base
realities.
The Navy is committed to stable out-year procurements that industry
can use to determine expected workloads. This, in turn, allows industry
to commit resources, create efficiencies, and decrease the end-cost of
Navy ships.
The Navy plans greater use of contract incentives, such as steep
share lines combined with performance incentives, to contribute to real
cost containment in future shipbuilding plans. In addition, the Navy
plans to pursue other areas for improvement in acquisition workforce
and organization to strengthen the foundations of the Navy's
shipbuilding efforts.
expeditionary fighting vehicle
70. Senator Thune. General Conway, the Expeditionary Fighting
Vehicle (EFV) has faced significant technical challenges throughout
almost 2 decades of development. Last year, the Navy reduced the
program by almost half, from 1,013 vehicles to 573 vehicles. Congress
has recently been notified that the cost impact of this reduction
causes a Nunn-McCurdy breach. Meanwhile, the vehicle's operational
assessment, while successful in many areas, has effectively given the
vehicle a failing grade for poor reliability. I understand that the
program has been delayed for 3 or 4 years in order to re-design the
vehicle to meet reliability requirements. Would you please provide your
assessment of the criticality of the EFV to the Marine Corps'
requirements and the operational impacts caused by downsizing the
program to 573 vehicles?
General Conway. The Marine Corps provides the Nation's joint
warfighting forces with a unique, flexible, and effective capability to
conduct forcible entry operations from the sea. The EFV, the Corps'
largest ground combat system acquisition program, is the sole ground
combat vehicle that enables projection of combat power from a sea base.
It will replace the aging Assault Amphibious Vehicle that has been in
service since 1972 and will become a complementary component of our
modernized fleet of tactical vehicles that include the Joint Light
Tactical Vehicle, the Marine Personnel Carrier, and the Internally
Transportable Vehicle. The EFV's amphibious mobility, day and night
lethality, enhanced force protection capabilities, and robust
communications will help the joint force meet security challenges
across the spectrum of conflict. The over-the-horizon capability of the
EFV will also enable amphibious ships to increase their standoff
distance, no longer requiring them to close within the striking
distance of many coastal defense systems in order to launch their
amphibious assault platforms. The EFV will be specifically well-suited
to maneuver operations conducted from the sea and sustained operations
in the world's littoral regions.
In our fiscally constrained era, we have balanced the EFV program
requirements with our need to provide greater tactical mobility
suitable for the spectrum of operations. Toward that end, 573 EFVs
maintains our capability to conduct forcible entry operations from the
sea. With modest research and development funding, the Marine Personnel
Carrier will provide the requisite ground combat tactical mobility to
compensate for fewer EFVs. Additionally, the Joint Light Tactical
Vehicle will serve to enhance the protected mobility of our ground
forces, complemented by the Internally Transportable Vehicle, which
will provide vertical assault elements of the Marine Air-Ground Task
Force with better mobility for weapons and fire support systems once
disembarked from assault support aircraft.
71. Senator Thune. General Conway, what impact does the program
delay have on your ability to meet mobility requirements?
General Conway. The delay in the EFV program, while unfortunate, is
mitigated by continued investment in our current Assault Amphibious
Vehicle, the AAVP7A1 and by investment in the Joint Light Tactical
Vehicle and the Marine Personnel Carrier. These two new vehicles will
provide balanced performance, payload, and protection particularly to
infantry and combat engineer units. In the near-term, our investment in
MRAPs will afford those marines operating in Iraq with significantly
enhanced protection tailored specifically for operations in that
theater. The delay in delivery of the EFV will limit our ability to
conduct high-speed surface-borne ship-to-objective forcible entry from
a distant sea-base but it will not constrain our ability to conduct
amphibious operations and subsequent maneuver ashore in support of
national objectives.
72. Senator Thune. Secretary Winter, how confident are you that the
EFV can be sufficiently redesigned to meet the reliability
requirements?
Secretary Winter. A redesigned EFV can meet the established
reliability requirements. This assessment is based on two in-depth
reviews of the EFV reliability program conducted in March and April
2007 by two independent teams of experts commissioned by the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). Each
team concluded that the EFV reliability requirement was achievable and
that the EFV program was employing the rigorous methods necessary to
achieve the requirement.
Achieving this requirement, however, will require very focused and
dedicated technical and engineering efforts by the contractor, along
with strong oversight by the government. The EFV program strategy had
been to increase reliability through the reliability growth process.
However, based on the operational test data, it was determined that
this process was insufficient to generate reliability growth necessary
to meet the requirement at Initial Operational Test and Evaluation.
Therefore, a Design for Reliability (DFR) effort was initiated to
generate significant improvement to reliability. In addition, the Joint
Requirements Oversight Committee has approved a change in KPPs that
gives the program more flexibility in modifications to the design.
The DFR effort underway includes the overarching systems
engineering processes to mature the EFV design and vehicle reliability
growth as well as the detailed planning, redesign, and validation
efforts for EFV components and subcomponents to meet their reliability
allocations. The DFR process will lead to building and testing new
prototypes prior to a production decision to validate the results of
the DFR effort and verify the KPP can be achieved.
73. Senator Thune. Secretary Winter, what further cost impact will
be caused by the redesign effort, including the related production
delays?
Secretary Winter. The EFV program did not achieve Milestone C
decision in January 2007 as planned due to less than predicted
reliability performance during an operational assessment conducted in
2006. As a result, the development phase has been extended and the
estimated cost and schedule impacts of these changes were incorporated
in the fiscal year 2008 President's budget request, which included an
increase in total RDT&E funding of approximately $700 million.
Following the fiscal year 2008 President's budget request to
Congress, the Navy notified Congress the EFV program was in breach of
the Nunn-McCurdy amendment due to excess cost. Following notification,
the Secretary of Defense is required to certify that:
Program is essential to national security.
No alternative will provide equal or greater
capability at less cost.
New cost estimates are reasonable.
Management structure for program is adequate to manage
program and costs.
The certification teams are currently conducting the necessary
analysis and developing the required documentation in accordance with
the statutory certification requirements. Updated cost estimates are
being developed in conjunction with the proposed program strategy. If
the program is certified, the new program baseline will be included in
the certification package, to be submitted to Congress no later than 5
June 2007, as required by statute.
74. Senator Thune. Secretary Winter, it is reported that the
contractor has earned a 7 to 8 percent profit. How do we justify to the
American taxpayer awarding most of the profit available on this
contract when we have a vehicle that falls critically short of its
reliability performance requirement?
Secretary Winter. The award fees earned by General Dynamics are in
accordance with provisions of the contract negotiated in 1995. On this
contract, award fees are the principle mechanism by which the
contractor has the opportunity to earn a profit. As these fees were
part of the original contract, there is no mechanism available to
recoup them.
We recognize, however, that the award fees did not properly
motivate General Dynamics to deliver required levels of reliability. We
are in the process of negotiating a different contract for the next
phase that will minimize award fees and include targeted incentives
tied to carefully derived milestones. The program restructuring effort
currently underway will result in development of an EFV that meets all
operational requirements.
75. Senator Thune. Secretary Winter, this is another example of the
Government bearing the burden of failed performance on a cost-plus
contract. What revised fee structure would you propose to ensure a more
equitable sharing between the Government and industry of the downside
risk on these types of development contracts?
Secretary Winter. The EFV program plans to provide performance and
cost incentives using Cost Plus Incentive Fee and Cost Plus Award Fee
contracts for the remainder of the development phase. Incentives will
be event-based and tied to well-defined, objective targets for
technical performance, schedule adherence, and cost control. Multiple-
incentive structures are being considered whereby the contractor must
earn fee in each category or forego the fee entirely. This structure
promotes a balanced approach so that no one evaluation category can
control fee award.
The Navy remains committed to developing the EFV as a key element
of future Navy-Marine Corps expeditionary combat capability while
maximizing the value of taxpayer dollars.
expeditionary brigade reduction
76. Senator Thune. General Conway, the Marine Corps has held a
longstanding requirement for the Navy to provide amphibious lift for
three MEBs to support forcible entry operations. I notice in your
statement this year that you are now calling for two brigades to
perform such an assault. How did the Marine Corps determine it should
reduce AE requirements for an opposed landing?
General Conway. The Marine Corps has not reduced AE requirements
for an opposed landing. What has been reduced is the total amphibious
lift requirement for AE-capable forces. The basis for the 3.0 MEB AE
fiscally constrained to 2.5 MEB AE requirement noted in this question
was documented in the Navy's 1992 Posture Statement signed by the
Secretary of the Navy, CNO, and CMC, and is quoted in part, as follows:
For a global ready response capability and forward presence,
the Nation needs a tailored force with at least enough
amphibious ships to lift the AEs of two and one-half brigade-
size units. This allows the Navy and Marine Corps to meet
current requirements for the forward deployed forces and still
provide sufficient surge capability to assemble a brigade-size
amphibious assault force in either the Atlantic or Pacific.
This fiscally constrained goal meets the Nation's minimum
requirements.
As noted above, the total requirement identified in the 1992
statement was for 2.5 MEB AE lift capacity, and the forcible entry
component of that requirement was two brigade-size amphibious assault
forces--one on each coast--totaling the same as today's stated
requirement for 2.0 MEB AE.
The current requirement for 2.0 MEB AE is traced to the SPG,
directing us to . . . consider capability alternatives . . . to support
a single two MEB forcible entry operation. Although the language in
today's SPG is different than in the 1992 statement, the requirement to
maintain a 2.0 MEB forcible entry capability remains the same.
This capability can only be realized by maintaining a Battle Force
that provides 30 operationally available amphibious warfare ships; of
these 30 ships, 10 must be aviation-capable big deck ships [LHA/LHD/
LHA(R)], 10 LPD-17 class ships, and 10 LSD-41/49 or equivalent ships.
77. Senator Thune. General Conway, does the Navy's shipbuilding
plan provide the necessary lift to support two MEBs?
General Conway. No, the Navy's current plan does not provide the
required focus on amphibious programs to meet the two MEB AE
requirement. The SPG directed the Marine Corps to consider capability
alternatives to support a single two MEB forcible entry operation. This
capability is realized by maintaining a battle force that provides 30
operationally available amphibious warfare ships; of these 30 ships, 10
must be aviation-capable big deck ships [LHA/LHD/LHA(R)], 10 LPD-17
class ships, and 10 LSD-41/49 or equivalent ships. Current and
projected ship availability based on scheduled and unscheduled
maintenance suggests at least 33 ships are required to provide 30 that
are operationally available.
While the amphibious ship (battle force) inventory is currently 32
ships, it stabilizes at 30 ships from fiscal year 2015 to the end of
the plan. At no time does the Navy's plan provide a minimum of 33 ships
to provide 30 operationally available. Additionally, the well-known
maintenance challenges of the LHA and LSD class of ships and their age
make them prime candidates for early retirement, potentially further
reducing the inventory. Delivery of the LPD-17 has also been slower
than expected in the wake of Hurricane Katrina further stressing the
force and requiring older ships to remain in the fleet beyond their
expected service lives.
The big deck (LHD/LHA) inventory varies between 10 and 11 ships
between now and 2018, then stabilizing at 9 ships through the end of
the 30-year plan--falling short of our long-term requirement for 11 big
deck ships to provide 10 operationally available.
78. Senator Thune. General Conway, how important is an additional
LPD-17 class ship, included as the top Navy unfunded priority, to
meeting your amphibious lift requirement?
General Conway. The 10th LPD-17 San Antonio class ship is extremely
important to meeting the 2 MEB amphibious lift requirement, but still
does not yet match the 11 necessary to field 2 operationally available
MEB AEs, since 10 to 15 percent of amphibious ships (by class) are
operationally unavailable at any time due to scheduled maintenance.
The LPD-17 class ships will play a key role in supporting the
ongoing global war on terrorism by forward deploying marines and their
equipment to respond to crises abroad. Its unique design will
facilitate expanded force coverage and decreased reaction times of
forward deployed Marine Expeditionary Units. In forcible entry
operations, the LPD-17 will help maintain a robust surface assault and
rapid off-load capability for the Marine Air Ground Task Force far into
the future.
Ths class of amphibious warfare ship also represents the Navy's
commitment to a modern expeditionary power projection fleet and will
assist our naval forces across the spectrum of warfare. It replaces
four classes of older ships--the LKA, LST, LSD-36, and the LPD-4 and
will have a 40-year expected service life.
top line spending
79. Senator Thune. Secretary Winter, you state in your posture
statement that development of the budget has not been easy--tough
decisions have been made and continue to be made throughout the
Department. One of the issues that I have been concerned about for some
time has been the top line of the defense budget and how much of a
percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP) it is. Over time we have
watched the percentage of the defense GDP drop. While this is the
largest defense budget we have had, it is not as large of a percentage
of the overall GDP as we have seen in the past. Do you think it would
be appropriate for Congress to increase the top line of the military's
budget to 4 percent of GDP as a baseline?
Secretary Winter. It is the President and Congress that determine
DOD total funding, and what is a necessary and affordable percentage of
GDP for our Nation. From the Navy's perspective, I do believe that the
Navy and Marine Corps will continue to need real budget growth to meet
commitments and invest for the future.
80. Senator Thune. Secretary Winter, looking 20 years down the
road, can you comment on how the Navy will handle reset costs,
modernization costs, and costs for fielding new platforms?
Secretary Winter. Future budget development will continue to
balance requirements against resources. Future budgets will be
appropriately structured and have the necessary investment to
successfully meet both our present and future challenges. I am
confident that the initiatives we have in place now will result in
efficiencies that will continue to streamline and improve the Navy and
further improve our support for our National Military Strategy, while
continuing to be responsible stewards of the tax dollars entrusted to
us.
[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2008
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 17, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
WHETHER THE ARMY AND MARINE CORPS ARE PROPERLY SIZED, ORGANIZED, AND
EQUIPPED TO RESPOND TO THE MOST LIKELY MISSIONS OVER THE NEXT TWO
DECADES WHILE RETAINING ADEQUATE CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO ALL
CONTINGENCIES ALONG THE SPECTRUM OF COMBAT
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh, Clinton, Pryor,
Webb, McCaskill, Warner, Inhofe, Sessions, Collins, Chambliss,
Cornyn, and Thune.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Michael J.
Kuiken, professional staff member; Michael J. McCord,
professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member;
David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer,
professional staff member; Sean G. Stackley, professional staff
member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Kevin A.
Cronin, and Micah H. Harris.
Committee members' assistants present: Joseph L. Axelrad
and Jay Maroney, assistants to Senator Kennedy; James Tuite,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
Darcie Tokioka, assistant to Senator Akaka; Jonathan Cooper,
assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Jon Davey and Todd Rosenblum,
assistants to Senator Bayh, Andrew Shapiro, assistant to
Senator Clinton; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor;
Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Stephen C.
Hedger and Jason D. Rauch, assistants to Senator McCaskill;
Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; Jeremy Shull,
assistant to Senator Inhofe; Mark J. Winter, assistant to
Senator Collins; Adam G. Brake, assistant to Senator Graham;
Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Stuart C.
Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune; and Brian W. Walsh,
assistant to Senator Martinez.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
Before we start our hearing, I want to recognize Senator
Warner, who has been my partner on the Armed Services Committee
for more than 28 years, and Senator Webb, for such comments as
they may wish to make, because I know that they need to depart
for Blacksburg.
Before they do that, I want to express, on behalf of all
members of the committee and, I'm sure, all members of the
Senate, to them, to the families and the friends of those who
were killed or injured in yesterday's tragic event, to all
Virginians, and to, of course, the Virginia Tech community, our
deepest sympathy, our support, and our prayers to all of them
in this very, very difficult time.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and
the distinguished ranking member, Senator McCain, and others on
this committee. Senator Webb and I will be departing
momentarily to go to Blacksburg, Virginia, together with other
members of the congressional delegation. This is one of those
unexplainable mysteries in life, this extraordinary tragedy. I
think it could have happened in many places in the United
States, and I hope out of this will come some understanding of
how best America can prepare such that it not reoccur.
But this hearing this morning is one that I have supported
you and the ranking member strongly in holding. I've been
privileged to know all of these gentlemen through the years,
and it is vitally important that this committee receive the
benefit of their wisdom. Each has spent an extraordinary amount
of time involving conflicts in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and I
thank you gentlemen for your continued public service.
Mr. Chairman, I ask that the balance of my opening
statement be placed in the record, together with two or three
questions I have. One is that Senator Robert C. Byrd, a member
of our committee, and I have put into the appropriations bill a
request for a small amount of funds to institute--independent
from the Federal system--Pentagon and all others--a totally
independent analysis of the current and projected future
capabilities of the Iraqi security forces (ISF). I do believe,
Mr. Chairman, that second opinion is vitally necessary as we go
forward, irrespective of such approaches that we have in the
diversity of the Senate today.
So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to ask that that copy
of the Warner/Byrd bill be put in the record, together with my
opening statement and other questions.
[The prepared statement of Senator Warner and a copy of the
Warner/Byrd bill follow:
Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner
Chairman Levin, thank you. This is a very significant hearing and I
appreciate that you have scheduled it.
Mr Chairman, I join you in welcoming all of our distinguished
witnesses here today. Their many decades of service to our Nation, both
in and out of government, have made significant contributions to
national defense policy and to our Nation's men and women in uniform.
Each is well known throughout the defense and national security
community and are all known for their expertise and candor.
America has been engaged in this war against global extremists
since the attacks on September 11. These military operations, to
include combat against the Taliban in Afghanistan, beginning in October
2001, and then in Iraq, beginning in March 2003, have been joint
service endeavors from the start: however, our ground forces--the Army
and Marine Corps--and our Special Operations Forces, have borne a
larger share of the combat operations in these campaigns.
Let there be no doubt, our military has performed magnificently and
with the highest degree of courage and professionalism reflecting the
best traditions of our Nation's military heritage. However, let there
be no mistake, our military is under acute strain today.
The purpose of today's hearing is to receive testimony on whether
the Army and Marine Corps are properly sized, organized, and equipped
to respond to the most likely missions in the 21st century. This most
fundamental sine qua non of national security is perhaps Congress' most
important responsibility, and, unequivocally, one that we must get
right.
This discussion on the future of our ground forces must begin with
the recognition that we are engaged in a long war against global
extremists; that this long war will dominate our national defense and
national military strategy for a generation, or more; and that the war
in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq are but its initial engagements.
There is so much at stake in this struggle. Moreover, this war against
global extremists will not be the only conflict, threat, or crisis that
our Nation, and its ground forces, will face in the next decades of the
21st century.
In 1980, then Chief of Staff of the Army, General Edward Meyer,
coined the term `hollow Army' to describe the state of the Army in the
post-Vietnam era, at a time when the Cold War was still a stark
reality. Most of us remember that period in our history; we remember
the state of our Army; and we know that it took at least 10 years to
repair.
With great regret, I say that some of the indications and warnings
of an Army under strain, or even a hollow Army, are present today. The
readiness of non-deployed units is declining; equipment usage rates,
under combat conditions, are increasing; standards for recruitment and
basic training graduation have been lowered; the length of combat tours
were lengthened; mid-grade officers and noncommissioned officers are
reportedly leaving the Service at higher rates; and there is an over-
reliance on the National Guard and Reserves as Active-Force augmentees
than was ever envisioned.
In December 2006, General Schoomaker, said, in testimony before the
Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, that the Active-Duty
Army ``will break'' under the strain of today's war-zone rotations.
That was compelling testimony. Just last week, Secretary Gates
announced the extension of combat tours from 12 to 15 months. Earlier
in the month the Department of Defense announced that mobilization
warning orders have been issued to selected National Guard units, most
of whom will be deployed for a second time in less than 5 years.
These are indicators that are cause for grave concern. Having
served as Secretary of the Navy when the concept of the All-Volunteer
Force was being developed, and having observed, in the ensuing years,
the extraordinary success of that system in providing for America's
security, I feel strongly that we must carefully monitor the possible
risks to that system. While the hollow Army of the 1970s is one example
of a military under strain and under-resourced, I am also reminded of
the state of our military forces at the start of the Korean War. When
the North Korean army invaded the Republic of Korea in June 1950, the
United States deployed available, but largely unready and inadequately
equipped troops, from the 24th Infantry Division in Japan. This unit is
known as Task Force Smith. I am sure our witnesses are familiar with
this episode.
Task Force Smith was a unit of about 400 soldiers--composed of 2
under-strength rifle companies, a communications section, a recoilless
rifle platoon, 2 mortar platoons, and an artillery battalion with 6
howitzers. They were ordered to block the main road to Pusan. Task
Force Smith held as long as they could, but finally withdrew. More than
150 soldiers of that unit were killed. The first U.S. engagement in the
Korean War, almost 57 years ago, offers a telling reminder of what
happens when a force goes to war unprepared.
I, for one, shall retain the imagery of both the `hollow Army' and
`Task Force Smith,' as we proceed today. The months to follow may be at
one of those critical periods of dialog, debate, and decision about the
way ahead for our ground forces. We must do this with vision,
innovation, and commitment. Time is of the essence. We must act in the
near-term to ensure there will be no hollow Army and no more Task Force
Smiths.
In closing, we should not forget that our ground forces are more
than a collection of brigades and regiments. It is at its core: about
people. Our military forces, volunteers all, are America's sons and
daughters who, each and every day, put themselves in harm's way--away
from those they love and often on multiple, and now extended combat
tours. I would also like to recognize, with our most sincere gratitude,
the military families who have sacrificed so much, especially those who
have lost loved ones, and those who are caring for those wounded in
service to our Nation.
I look forward to today's important testimony.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Warner. I hope that these gentlemen, in the course
of the testimony, might give the committee the benefit of their
analysis of the current status of the Iraqi forces.
I yield to my colleague, Senator Webb.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much. We will do that.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I also would like to suggest that the proposal by the
senior Senator from Virginia regarding an independent look at
what's going on over there is really needed at this time, and I
fully support it.
I'd like to express my appreciation for the witnesses for
coming today, and my apologies for the fact that we are going
to have to leave very soon for the memorial service that's
going to take place down in Blacksburg.
This is a hearing I look forward to. We are going to
examine testimony very carefully, and we will have, from our
perspective, a number of follow-up questions and, hopefully,
dialogue.
As many people have--many people, such as myself, had
predicted, today's sustained ground operations in Iraq are
progressively stressing our ground forces in ways that were
both predictable and predicted to those who saw that the
country would unravel and descend into sectarian strife and
civil war. Last week's announcement of troop extensions of the
15-month deployments for the Army is a further indication that
this administration's failed strategic policies are breaking
our military. That policy is going to ensure that
disproportionate sacrifices are going to be placed on families
and soldiers, and they are going to grow only more
disproportionate in the coming year. These extensions are going
to place new strains on an already overburdened Army, a force
that is being broken progressively as a result of this
strategy. The extensions may well affect morale. We've seen
early indications, particularly with the numbers that came out
on the West Point classes of 2000 and 2001, that perhaps we're
overloading a small group of this country again and again
asking them to accept the consequences of this misdirected war.
It's one thing to say that we're putting predictability into
systems, and it's another when we note that this predictability
is uniformly negative on the people who have been serving. The
strategy does not justify this continuing abuse of our people
who have put their lives literally in the hands of our
leadership, and I believe that there are limits to human
endurance, and there are limits to what families can put up
with.
All of this, Mr. Chairman, leads to my appreciation for
these kinds of hearings, because today's circumstances only
heighten the need for more forceful congressional oversight. I
would note that Senator Hagel and I--we're the only two ground
combat veterans from the Vietnam war serving in the Senate--put
together a piece of legislation requiring that American
military units be fully combat ready when they're deployed,
that the length of the deployments be restricted, and that
minimum time periods be maintained between deployments. I would
hope that my colleagues would join us on that legislation.
I thank you very much for allowing me to speak early in
this hearing.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I want to pick up on an
important note that my colleague made about the stress on our
forces, not only with this most recent announcement of the
extensions. I think we're fortunate to have Dr. Korb here,
because, Doctor, you and I were in the Department of Defense
(DOD) in the mid-1970s, when the concept of the All-Volunteer
Force was put in place. You recall the risks that we took, and
I think you would share with me that it has worked out
exceedingly well.
We must, at all costs, preserve the All-Volunteer Force. I
cannot foresee of any--any--measure that Congress would return
to a draft, certainly not at this time. So, I hope, perhaps,
you could address, specifically, how the impact of the events,
Dr. Korb, might affect the vitality and the success of the All-
Volunteer Force.
I thank the chair.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, can I put Senator McCain's
statement in the record?
Chairman Levin. Of course. We will put Senator McCain's
statement in the record, as well.
[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain
Senator Levin, thank you. This is a very important hearing and I
appreciate that you have scheduled it.
Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming our distinguished witnesses
here today. Their many decades of service to our Nation, both in and
out of government, have made significant contributions to national
defense policy and to our Nation's men and women in uniform.
After my first visit to Iraq in 2003, I argued for more troops. I
took issue with statements characterizing the insurgency as a few
`dead-enders' or being in its `last throes.' I criticized the search
and destroy strategy and argued for a counterinsurgency approach that
separated the reconcilable population from the irreconcilable. That is
the course now followed by General Petraeus, and the brave Americans
and coalition troops he has the honor to command. I believe it is the
right strategy. But having been a critic of the way this war was fought
and a proponent of the very strategy now being followed, it is my
obligation to encourage Americans to give it a chance to succeed. To do
otherwise would be contrary to the interests of my country and
dishonorable. Our defeat in Iraq would constitute a defeat in the war
against terror and extremism and would make the world a much more
dangerous place.
Consider our other strategic challenges in the region: preventing
Iran from going nuclear; stabilizing Afghanistan against a resurgent
Taliban; the battle for the future of Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
and others; protecting Israel's security; the struggle for Lebanon's
independence. Does any honest observer believe those challenges will be
easier to confront and at lesser cost in American blood and treasure if
we are defeated in Iraq?
I know the pain war causes. I understand the frustration caused by
our mistakes in this war. I sympathize with the fatigue of the American
people, and I regret sincerely the additional sacrifices imposed on the
brave Americans who defend us. But I also know the toll a lost war
takes on an army and a country. We, who are willing to support this new
strategy, and give General Petraeus the time and support he needs, have
chosen a hard road. But it is the right road.
No one would disagree that the Army's increased operational tempo
and multiple combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan have put our
military, and especially our ground forces and special operations,
under heightened burden. The announcement last week that the combat
tours would be lengthened from 12 to 15 months reflects the complexity
of the current circumstances.
The purpose of today's hearing is to receive testimony on whether
the Army and Marine Corps are properly sized, organized, and equipped
to respond to the most likely missions over the next two decades.
In recent months there have been reports that warn of costs on the
troops and the readiness of the Army as a result of multiple
deployments. This morning the committee will look forward to your
responses to issues in this ongoing public debate on the readiness of
our ground forces. The underlying concerns include: reports about the
declining readiness of nondeployed units; the extremely high equipment
usage rates; the departure of mid-grade officers and noncommissioned
officers leaving the Service at higher rates; the over-reliance on the
National Guard and Reserves as Active-Force augmentees; and the impact
of the high operational tempo on Army families.
Accordingly, you will be asked if the planned expansion of the Army
can be accomplished soon enough to mitigate the impact of the current
pace of the force and, subsequently, avoid the hollow military that
some suggest may be looming: and will that expansion impact the
Department of Defense's ability to modernize.
In addition, the committee will want to examine whether the Army
and Marine Corps's modernization and transformation programs will
provide the country with the capability to provide relevant land power
to both full spectrum combat missions and stability and support
missions in this long war, and still be prepared for other uncertain
and complex threats to our homeland defense and national interests.
Accordingly, the committee will explore whether or not, and how, our
military Army can concurrently modernize, transform, and restation the
force under the demands of ongoing operations and rotation cycles.
Addressing Congress at the end of his long and distinguished
career, Douglas MacArthur admonished that, ``When America goes to war
there can be no alternative to victory.'' With these simple words,
MacArthur has given us the gauge, the standard, by which we need
measure the size and organization of the future Army and Marine Corps.
It is necessarily inexact and imprecise because such is the nature of
war--it possesses an uncertainty that is exceeded only by the stakes
which cause you to go to war in the first place. Much has changed in
the world since General MacArthur uttered those words--but not our
responsibility to provide America's sons and daughters the best
equipment, the best training, the best care, and yes, the overwhelming
superiority necessary to ensure that we leave no alternative to
victory. Even then, however, success is not guaranteed. If today's war
in Iraq has taught us anything, it is that the uncertainty of the
battlefield of the future requires a level of planning and training and
preparation and persistence that goes beyond our practice of the past.
There is certainly quite a deal of ground to cover, so, in closing,
I do not want to forget that in all of this America's sons and
daughters who put themselves in harm's way each and every day. Their
service and dedication is selfless and inspiring. I would also like to
recognize Army families who have sacrificed so much.
I thank our witnesses and look forward to their testimony.
Chairman Levin. The evidence is overwhelming that our
ground forces are under intolerable strain. Last week's
decision, announced by the Secretary of Defense, that
deployments of all Active Duty Army brigades in Iraq and
Afghanistan would be immediately extended to 15 months, as
would all future deployments, will worsen that strain. It is
also one more indicator that the burden of over 5 years of war
in Afghanistan, and going on 5 years of war in Iraq, is falling
disproportionately on the Army and Marines; more specifically,
on soldiers and marines and their families. Some units are on,
or entering, their third year of Afghanistan or Iraq service,
and some individual soldiers are on their fourth. Marine Corps
units and marines have seen equal, or greater, numbers of
deployments, although of shorter duration.
The duration and intensity of the conflicts, beside wearing
out the servicemembers, are tearing down the equipment at
alarming rates. The readiness of nondeployed forces is at
dangerously low levels as has been testified to by the former
Army Chief of Staff and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.
A DOD Inspector General (IG) report in January identified
force protection equipment shortfalls among units deployed in
Iraq and Afghanistan, including armored Humvees, electronic
counter-improvised explosive devices (IEDs), machine guns,
night-vision equipment, and radios. The Army and Marine Corps
were unprepared for the insurgency that followed the fall of
Saddam Hussein, requiring the Nation to frantically increase
funding and production of armored vehicles, body armor, and
other equipment required for occupation and counterinsurgency
operations. In order to equip forces deployed to Iraq and
Afghanistan, units not deployed are short equipment necessary
to stay trained and ready. This increases the cost and time
required for nondeployed units to get ready for their turn in
the rotation. Equipment is wearing out faster than anyone
planned, and the cost and time to repair and replace this
equipment increases the pressure on unit predeployment
preparation.
The Ready Brigade that we have traditionally kept in
reserve has now been committed and is not available for
contingencies. According to a recent Time magazine article,
ground forces face a laundry list of problems that undermine
the readiness of our nondeployed forces, and makes preparing
units to deploy that much more difficult, costly, and risky.
Troops are being sent into harm's way with less training,
shorter breaks, and worn-out equipment. Troops deployed to Iraq
and Afghanistan more than once, and over 170,000 have been so
far, are 50 percent more likely to suffer acute combat stress.
Soldier suicide has grown at a steady rate--has shown a steady
increase, rising from 51 confirmed in 2001 to 91 last year.
Desertions are climbing. Manpower shortages exist. Reportedly,
an artillery battery arrived in Iraq with only 72 percent of
its required personnel. Since 2004, the Army employs a stop-
loss policy that prevents 70,000 from leaving the Army at the
end of their enlistment.
To relieve some of the pressure on the Army, DOD has tasked
20,000 Navy and Air Force personnel to perform traditional Army
roles, such as combat convoy security and detainee guards.
Recruiting is meeting its goals only with less qualified
people. The lowest acceptable category of recruits has climbed
to 4 percent of all enlistments. Only 81 percent of recruits
have high-school diplomas, down from 94 percent in 2003 and
below the DOD goal of 90 percent. The maximum enlistment age
was raised from 35 to 42 years, with 12 percent of those over
35 dropping out within 6 months of enlisting. Waivers for
criminal records, medical problems, and low aptitude have
climbed to over 8,000, well above the 4,900 of only 3 years
ago.
The dollar cost of recruiting and retaining soldiers is
skyrocketing--$1 billion, this year and the next year, to
recruit new soldiers; $600 million, in 2006, for re-enlistment
bonuses. The Army will be at least 3,000 mid-level officers--
captains and majors--short through 2013, with only 83 percent
of the majors that it needs in aviation, intelligence,
engineering, and military police.
So, the Army and Marine Corps are clearly overstressed, and
we must act promptly to fix those problems. But we must fix
these problems in a way that positions those forces to meet the
most likely, as well as the most dangerous, contingencies for
the future. Secretary Rumsfeld said, and I paraphrase, ``You go
to war with the Army you have, not with the Army that you need
or wish you had.'' We never should hear words like that again,
because unlike the Army that Secretary Rumsfeld sent, which was
unprepared, underequipped, and ill-equipped to fight the
insurgency in Iraq, we need to get it right before we commit
future soldiers and marines. We need to ensure the Army and
Marine Corps are properly organized, trained, and equipped to
respond to the most likely contingencies of the next two
decades, while retaining the capability to respond to all
contingencies along the spectrum of combat.
What are those most likely missions? Conventional force-on-
force fights or counterinsurgency? Does organizing for one, the
conventional mission, ensure that we can do the other, which
may be the most likely and prevalent?
Belatedly, after much pressure from members of this
committee and others in Congress, the DOD intends to increase
the size of the Army and Marine Corps. Had that decision been
taken earlier, perhaps our soldiers and marines would be under
less stress today. We need to examine these new plans for
growth to determine the appropriate size of the ground forces
to minimize risk across the spectrum of combat at optimal cost.
Are the planned increases sufficient? Or must we add even
more? Or, conversely, can we add fewer than are currently
planned, and use those resources for other high-priority
defense requirements? The Army and Marine Corps are planning to
add additional combat units to help meet the demands of the
current rotational cycles. But these additional units will
probably not be available in time to relieve the stress on the
current forces. We must ensure, as we grow the ground forces,
that we don't simply create larger versions of the less-ready
forces that we have today, or that we create forces which are
ill-suited to the likely missions of the future.
We also have to ensure that the Army and Marine Corps
modernization plans are correctly targeted to give those
services the necessary capabilities, and are adequately funded
to do so. That might mean a larger defense budget, a
differently apportioned defense budget, or both.
For help in sorting through these issues, we've assembled a
notable panel of experts in defense and national security
studies: Dr. Lawrence Korb, Dr. Andrew Krepinevich, General
(Retired) Barry McCaffrey, and Major General (Retired) Robert
Scales. They're all well known to this committee and to the
defense community. We value their expertise.
We thank them for taking the time to join us today. Their
written statements will be inserted in the record, and, to
allow sufficient time for questions and discussion, we would
hope that they would summarize their written statements in
their opening remarks.
Finally, let me express my appreciation to Senator
Lieberman for his suggestion that these issues are most
appropriate to be addressed at a full committee hearing instead
of a three-subcommittee joint hearing, as originally
contemplated. The committee began addressing these issues with
a Personnel Subcommittee hearing on March 28 on military
personnel matters, including recruiting. We will follow up this
morning's hearing later this afternoon. I believe that's the
schedule. The Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee
holds a closed briefing with the Army and Marine Corps to go
into details regarding the current readiness of our combat
units. Subsequently, the Readiness and Management Support
Subcommittee plans to invite nondeployed brigade commanders
from the Army, Marine Corps, and National Guard to testify on
the readiness of their units to respond to contingencies across
the full spectrum of conflict, abroad or at home, and the
challenges of manning, equipping, and training the force when
not actively preparing to deploy to Iraq or Afghanistan. Next
week, the Airland Subcommittee will hold a hearing with the
acting Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army to receive
their responses to this morning's hearing and to other
questions. The Seapower Subcommittee is attempting to schedule
a hearing to follow up on Marine Corps issues.
Thank you, again, to our witnesses this morning for a very
significant hearing.
We will start with General McCaffrey.
STATEMENT OF GEN BARRY R. McCAFFREY, USA (RET.), PRESIDENT, BR
McCAFFREY ASSOCIATES, LLC
General McCaffrey. Senator Levin, thanks very much to you
and the other members of the committee for the opportunity to
come and appear before the committee.
Let me also, if I may, qualify my remarks by saying I
appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and
talked about the war in Iraq and Afghanistan. I'll try and
confine my remarks directly to the substance of your hearing,
the readiness of ground combat forces.
Seven quick assertions. I'd be prepared to either respond
to your own questions or defend the assertions in the remainder
of the hearing, but just put them on the table for us to
consider.
Number one, the Army and the Marine Corps are too small.
I've been arguing, for the last 36 months, the Army's probably
short by 80,000 or more; Marine Corps, by 25,000 or more. You,
in your opening statement, cited some of the obvious evidence
of that fact. I play a trick question with serving Army
officers: How big is your Army? The answer always comes back
wrong, because they don't take into account that the serving
combat forces include huge numbers of National Guard and Army
Reserve, as well as members of the Air Force and Navy. I look
at combat logistics units headed up into Iraq from Balad, and
you'll find sailors and airmen throughout that battle force.
The Army is simply too small. One can argue it's the smallest
Active Force since prior to World War II, trying to sustain
this campaign.
The second assertion is, the Army's ground combat equipment
is a disaster. I've tried to put a number on it, and I think
the answer is probably $212 billion. It's the cost of
rebuilding not only our fighting-force equipment in the Active
units, and the National Guard, and continuing a modernization
program that has been badly dealt with. You look at the top
projects on the DOD budget right now, number four is the Future
Combat System (FCS); number 17 is Stryker. Those are the only
two Army programs that break $1 billion. We're simply not
funding the repair and reset of the Army ground combat
equipment.
Number three, the National Guard. It is hard for me, and
after 5 years as drug policy director, I learned that, in this
country, the only large-muscle organization, outside of the
standing military, is the National Guard. In my view, it is
vital to our security. It's being broken by a policy that
essentially uses it as an alternative to the standing Army. In
the coming year, I think we'll be forced to call up as many as
nine National Guard combat brigades for second involuntary
tours, never mind the combat service support units that have to
come out of the Reserve components.
Assertion number four--and this one, it's almost an out-of-
body experience for me to listen to DOD spokesmen, such as Dr.
Chu--I would argue, though Army reenlistment inside combat
units in Iraq is superb--when you look at the morale, the
spirit of our combat units in both areas of operation, it's
superb--however, our recruiting, I would argue, is starting to
unravel, and it's being masked by deliberate, deceptive number-
keeping during the Rumsfeld era. The requirements have been
kept artificially low by keeping stop-loss programs; calling up
the Individual Ready Reserve, people who have been out of the
military for 20 years and have zero relevant skills, they're
just a body; by the sailors and airmen who have been jerked
into the Active ground-combat role; and excessive use of the
Reserves.
My own gut feeling is that 10 percent of Army recruits are
of poor caliber and should not be in uniform. They're in there
under waivers for non-high-school graduate, moral turpitude,
felony arrest, drug use. The notion that we're going to use 42-
year-old first-term soldiers is simply laughable. We want
teenaged boys and girls, and as old as maybe 30--that's who
we're trying to get in, to carry M-16, M-4 rifles.
I think we've also tried to keep the Army reenlistment-rate
numbers depressed by changing our standards on Army basic
training. There's no question to me that the flunkout rate in
Army basic training was deliberately put low to try and keep
bodies flowing into the Active Force. We've cut the dropout
rate by two-thirds. I'm sure the Army will come up with
arguments on why that was a rational move. I certainly don't
blame them for trying to maintain the fighting strength of the
forces, but we shouldn't kid ourselves that we're not keeping
in uniform people who simply don't have the physical or mental
capacity to serve in this demanding environment.
Number five, an assertion: the Army's restationing strategy
has been unexamined by the U.S. Congress. We have 200,000
troops and families coming out of western Europe back to the
United States. We're pulling troops out of Korea, Okinawa, and
Japan. In all those theaters of operations, the base
infrastructure, the training infrastructure, has been paid for
largely or partially by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), the Korean Government, the Japanese Government, and
others. We've ordered them home. The war's going to unravel in
Iraq, I would assume, within 36 months. It's not clear to me
that we have either the time or the resources devoted to
restation these elements. They may well unravel, evaporate,
simply because of the lack of a base to put them into.
In addition, if you bring brigades out of central Europe,
where they're 3-hours' flying time from Baghdad, and bring them
back to Fort Riley and Fort Bliss, did we examine analytically
how we get them back 7,000 miles to their theater of
operations? In two senses--one, not just the base
infrastructure--the railroad, highway, aviation capacity to
launch them--but to what extent did we examine the U.S. Navy
and Air Force capability to support an expeditionary
continental United States-based military ground combat
capability?
I think the Air Force and the Navy, I might add--the number
I'm using, I think, is probably low--have lost $55 billion of
modernization money to put into Army and Marine ground combat
operations. That's going to be a problem, not just in the long
run, in terms of confronting deterring the People's Republic of
China (PRC) expansionism in the coming 20 years, but, in
addition, it argues that the Air Force has seriously
underfunded programs like C-17 acquisition.
Do we have the time--the bottom line is, do we have the
time or the resources to build base areas to bring that--those
combat forces home?
Assertion number 6, I think we're at the knee of the curve
in terms of loss rates in senior and mid-grade noncommissioned
officers (NCOs) and middle-grade officers--captains, in
particular. I think you're going to see a huge change in the
caliber of that force as we start disproportionately losing
Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) distinguished military
grad kids and West Pointers, and we're going to have to
scramble and replace them with dedicated, but probably lower-
caliber, forces--officers out of the existing Army. We're short
thousands of officers, as you state. Our promotion rates have
skyrocketed to almost automatic promotion to make up for the
shortfall.
Then, the final assertion, for the first time, I would
argue, since the end of Vietnam, we're faced with a situation
where there is no strategic Reserve. There is no question in my
mind, in the coming 10 years, that we will encounter shocks to
our national security. We'll be attacked by terrorists, without
question, in the coming decade. We will see the death of Castro
and maybe a half-million Cubans at sea, where we're going to
turn to our National Guard and ask them to safeguard people in
a humanitarian disaster. We may well find interventions by the
Syrians and North Koreans, the Iranians, or others. We simply
do not have a strategic fallback position. The crisis will
come, inevitably. I think this Congress, bottom line, I would
urge, needs to step forward, under Article I of the
Constitution--as I tell our cadets at West Point, you are
charged with raising and supporting an Army and maintaining a
Navy--not the administration.
The bottom line, Mr. Chairman, members of this committee,
it is my judgment we are in a position of strategic peril
that's going to take us 3 to 5 years to get out of. The time
now is for action.
So, again, I thank you, sir, for calling this hearing, for
the members of the committee being so engaged in the issue.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General McCaffrey follows:]
Prepared Statement by GEN Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (Ret.)
the congress must step up to your constitutional duties
Senator Levin and Senator McCain--Thank you for the opportunity to
testify today. This Senate committee is a vital part of America's
defense. Thanks to all of you on this committee for your intelligent
oversight, your commitment to our Armed Forces, and for upholding
Article 1 of the Constitution to raise and support an Army and maintain
a Navy.
America has a lot at stake in the coming 24 months. The war in Iraq
is going badly. The under-resourced war in Afghanistan is now starting
to turn around for the better despite the growing Taliban violence and
the massive drag of opium production which has turned the Nation into
the largest narco-state in history. The consequences of failure in Iraq
will be a disaster to the American people and our allies if we cannot
achieve our objective to create a stable, law-based state at peace with
its neighbors--and which can create enough consensus among the three
major warring factions of Shia, Kurds, and Sunni to govern without the
continuation of the bitter civil war which now has engulfed the Iraqi
people.
We have 150,000 U.S. troops battling in Iraq and 22,000 fighting
bravely in Afghanistan. These are the finest, most courageous military
men and women we have ever fielded in battle. Their commanders--who
have almost without exception at company, battalion, and brigade level
served multiple combat tours--are the most capable battle leaders that
I have encountered in my many years of watching our Armed Forces with
admiration.
Our new leadership team in Iraq--our brilliant new commander
General Dave Petraeus and the equally experienced Ambassador Ryan
Crocker--are launched on a new approach to use political
reconciliation, new methods and equipment to strengthen the Iraqi
security forces, and enhanced U.S. combat protective power to stabilize
the situation. We must give them time and space. They need the budget
supplemental passed quickly--and the required congressional political
backing to push this one last chance at success in Iraq.
However, the purpose of my testimony is not to talk about the
ongoing tactical operations in Central Command--but instead the
disastrous state of America's ground combat forces. Congress has been
missing-in-action during the past several years while undebated and
misguided strategies were implemented by former Secretary Rumsfeld and
his team of arrogant and inexperienced civilian associates in the
Pentagon. They have gotten us in a terrible strategic position of
vulnerability. The Army is starting to crack under the strain of lack
of resources, lack of political support and leadership from both the
administration and this Congress, and isolation from the American
people who have now walked away from the war.
No one is actually at war except the Armed Forces, their
contractors, and the Central Intelligence Agency. There is only
rhetoric and posturing from the rest of our Government and the national
legislature. Where is the shared sacrifice of 300 million Americans in
the wealthiest nation in history? Where is the tax supplement to pay
for a $10 billion a month war? Where are the political leaders calling
publicly for America's parents and teachers to send their sons and
daughters to fight ``the long war on terror?'' Where is the political
energy to increase the size of our Marine Corps and U.S. Army? Where is
the willingness of Congress to implement a modern ``lend-lease
program'' to give our Afghan and Iraqi allies the tools of war they
need to protect their own people? Where is the mobilization of
America's massive industrial capacity to fix the disastrous state of
our ground combat military equipment?
We are fortunate that we now have a new Secretary of Defense Bob
Gates--who is experienced, a patriot, and open to pragmatic logic on
dealing with the perils we now face. Secretary Condi Rice is immensely
experienced and now using the leverage of her powerful office to exert
America's essential ``goodness'' in the diplomatic arena. The White
House Chief-of-Staff Josh Bolton has now opened a frank dialog with
many in the public policy arena to begin to build a unity we will need
to deal with the international menaces we now face. We are not going to
successfully deal with the many national security problems we now
encounter unless Congress and the administration can hammer out a new
strategy going forward which depends on international dialog, economic
nation-building, and strong military determination and power.
the current army is too small
Our Army has 44 brigades--but 23 are deployed. We cannot sustain
the current rate (20+ brigades to Iraq; 2+ brigades to Afghanistan) of
deployment. The Army will unravel.
We will not be able to handle possible missions to Korea, the
Taiwan Straits, the Balkans, Cuba (death of Castro), Syria, Venezuela,
Darfur, and possibly Iran. We may be attacked by terrorists here in the
continental United States. We may suffer from natural disasters--
massive earthquakes or major hurricanes such as the devastation caused
by Katrina in the Gulf Coast States.
Last week, the Secretary of Defense announced a 3-month extension
on all Army deployments--a 25-percent increase. This was a good call by
Secretary Gates for Army families--we have been piecemealing out these
extensions to an enormously over-committed force at the last minute.
However, this is just another indication of inadequate Army manpower.
the senate should conclude that we don't have enough troops
The combat overload on the Army is having a negative effect on
readiness. First time Active-Duty soldiers will spend more time at war
than at home.
We are encountering a negative effect on the retention of mid- and
senior-grade noncommissioned officers. We also are already seeing the
impact on the retention of company-grade officers.
All ``fully combat ready'' Active-Duty and Reserve combat units are
now deployed or deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan. No fully-trained
national strategic Reserve brigades are now prepared to deploy to new
combat operations.
Secretary Gates has publicly stated that the 15 month extension
recognizes that ``our forces are stretched . . . there's no question
about that.''
We have used a back-door draft to keep 70,000 soldiers in the Army
with the ``stop loss program'' beyond their voluntary commitment. We
have jerked 20,000 sailors and airmen into ground combat roles and
taken them away from their required air and sea power duties. We have
recalled as many as 15,000 Individual Readiness Reserve--in many cases
these people had no current, relevant military skills. They were simply
needed as bodies.
We have called up all of our National Guard enhanced readiness
combat brigades at least once for 18 months of combat requirements. The
Reserve components have been forced to act as an alternate full-time
combat extension of our active units with protracted deployments. This
is not what they enlisted for--nor is it a sensible use of the National
Reserve components.
senior army leaders have spoken
Gordon Sullivan, the President of Association of the United States
Army and former Army Chief of Staff (CSA) has publicly stated that even
with 65,000 new GIs by 2012--the entire U.S. Army will only be 547,000
soldiers--it should be 700,000. General Sullivan tells us that the Army
and Marines are being asked to shoulder a disproportionate share of
nation's burden.
General Peter Schoomaker our just departed Army Chief-of-Staff
stated that ``We have to go to some extraordinary measures to make sure
that we have the ability to respond properly [to the President's surge
strategy]. General Speakes noted: ``We can fulfill the national
strategy but it will take us increased casualties to do the job.''
In recent Senate testimony, the former Army CSA Pete Schoomaker
said that the increase of 17,500 Army combat troops in Iraq represents
only the ``tip of the iceberg''--and will potentially require thousands
of additional support troops and trainers, as well as equipment--
further eroding the Army's readiness to respond to other world
contingencies.
General Schoomaker further asserted to the Senate Armed Services
Committee: ``I am not satisfied with the readiness of our non-deployed
forces. . . . We are in a dangerous period.'' He added that he recently
met with his Chinese counterpart, who made it clear that China is
scrutinizing U.S. capabilities.
Even if United States were to carry out a significant troop
reduction in Iraq, General Schoomaker said in Senate testimony that he
would advise going ahead with the Army's plan for a permanent increase
of 65,000 active-duty soldiers by 2013. ``The Army's too small for the
century we're in,'' he said.
the marines need more troops
In recent Senate testimony, the Marine Corps Commandant General
Conway discussed a required increase of Marine troops from 180,000 to
202,000--an increase of 5 battalions. This marine increase will take 5
years; it doesn't address the current shortage of marines.
Deployment-to-dwell ratio is currently 1:1; DOD policy states that
stateside training and recovery time should be 1:2. We do not have
enough marines. The numbers speak for themselves.
This increase in deployment-to-dwell ratio means a direct decrease
in the readiness of deployed units to carry out the full range of
missions required for our global fighting force.
Over 70 percent of the proposed Marine Corps end strength increase
will be comprised of first-time marines--challenging recruiting and
retention efforts.
weakening of the army national guard
The mathematics of our extended deployments suggest that we will be
forced to call up as many as nine National Guard combat brigades plus
required support forces in the coming 12 months for involuntary second
combat tours--if we are to reset the force and create a strategic
Reserve. (Note that DOD Assistant Secretary Chu states that this is
``no big deal.'')
The second round of involuntary call-ups may finally topple the
weakened National Guard structure which is so critical to U.S. domestic
security.
Eighty-eight percent of nondeployed Army National Guard units are
rated as not ready or poorly equipped. The readiness of our National
Guard forces is at a historic low.
However, the Washington Post has reported that the Pentagon is
still planning to rely on these unready forces to meet surge
requirements.
The Army Guard/Reserve is anticipated to grow to 20-30 percent of
deployed combat forces.
We are now seeing a high loss rate in both Active and Reserve
components of senior NCOs, West Point graduates, and many other highly-
qualified battle leaders.
recruiting standards are compromised; troop basic training standards
are compromised
The Army is lowering standards to meet enlistment goals and initial
entry training standards in order to make manpower requirements.
Recruitment will continue to be challenging as the Army tries to power
up to add 65,000 permanent troops.
In 2006, there was almost a 50-percent increase in
waivers of enlistment standards from 2004--waivers for moral
turpitude, drug use, medical issues and criminal records.
Recruitment from least-skilled category recruits have
climbed eight-fold over past 2 years; the percentage of
recruits who are high school graduates dropped 13 percent from
2004 to 2006.
We are increasing the age of first-time enlistees--we
are now enlisting 42-year-old soldiers. We should only want
soldiers in superb health--from age 18- to about 30-years-old.
The Army is not push-button warfare--this is brutal, hard
business.
The promotion rates for officers and NCOs have
skyrocketed to replace departing leaders. We are short
thousands of officers. We have serious mismatch problems for
NCOs.
We have been forced to use U.S. and foreign
contractors to substitute for required military functions.
(128,000 contractors in Iraq--includes more than 2,000 armed
contractor personnel.) Thousands of these brave and dedicated
people have been killed or wounded. They perform most of our
logistics functions in the combat zone. (Transportation,
maintenance, fuel, long-haul communications, food service,
contractor operation of computer based command and control,
etc.) Under conditions of great danger such as open warfare
caused by Iranian or Syrian intervention--they will discontinue
operations. Our logistics system is a house of cards.
a lot of u.s. army combat equipment and too many air force air lift
assets are broken
The shortfall on Army equipment is $212 billon to reset the force
and its reserve stockpiles--as well as buy the required force
modernization for the additional troops.
The National Guard Bureau Chief, Lieutenant General Steven Blum, in
House testimony, stated that the Army Guard has only 40 percent of its
required equipment. (Generators, trucks, communications, helicopters,
tentage, modernized fighting vehicles, medical equipment, etc.) We are
compromising the quality of National Guard force training and limiting
the Guard's ability to respond to domestic disasters; fundamentally the
National Guard is in a ``degraded state back at home.''
About 40 percent of Army/Marine Corps equipment is in Iraq or
Afghanistan or undergoing repair/maintenance. We are now drawing down
gear from prepositioned stocks of major equipment. (i.e., Humvees,
tanks) The situation creates a U.S. strategic vulnerability since rapid
deploying units will find their equipment is unavailable for other
conflicts.
LTG Blum has stated that even if the National Guard receives the
funding currently pledged by the Army and Air Force--the equipment
accounts will still be short $40 billion required to bring units back
to 90 percent level of readiness.
Equipment shortages mean troops train on outdated equipment--or
equipment which is not identical to the material they will be using in
combat.
The nature and pace of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is
wearing out critical equipment much faster than expected. In some
cases, equipment is being used as much as nine times the intended
peacetime training tempo.
The DOD Inspector General (IG) concluded that U.S. troops are being
sent into combat without the necessary equipment--troops are forced to
delay operations while they wait for the right equipment to become
available. (DOD/IG, Equipment Status of Deployed Forces.)
The required number of late model Improved Humvees will not reach
Iraq until the end of year. The latest models of uparmor Humvees will
better protect against the advanced roadside bombs which currently
cause about 70 percent of all U.S. casualties in Iraq.
We are flying the wings off our C17, C5, and C130 fleet. We are
being forced into excessive reliance on contract air lift for personnel
and cargo. (To include former Soviet aircraft).
conclusion
We are breaking our commitment to our soldiers. In return for their
voluntary service--we are not providing them with tools they need to
carry out their mission. We must fix the broken equipment of the Army,
Marines, and Air Force on a crash basis.
We are failing our troops in that we are stretching them too thin
and asking them to do more with much less. Many of these combat, CS,
and CSS units are now serving on their third, fourth, or even fifth
combat tour. 28,000 have been killed or wounded. Their training
resources are being grossly short-changed. Their follow-on medical care
is inadequate and under-resourced. We have ignored the reality of
inadequate numbers of ground combat troops. We must increase the
Active-Duty U.S. Army strength by 80,000 soldiers in the coming 36
months. We must increase the Active-Duty marines by 25,000 troops. We
must create the Special Operations Forces needed to protect us in the
coming 25 years of the war on terror. We must buy the strategic airlift
and air refueling requirements to deploy global combat power. (600+ C17
aircraft for a single aircraft fleet.)
The monthly burn rate of $9 billion a month in Iraq and $1 billion
a month in Afghanistan has caused us to inadequately fund the
modernization of the U.S. Air Force and Navy by diverting funds (as
much as $55 billion) to support the ongoing ground war. If this
continues, we will be in terrible trouble in the coming decade when the
PRC emerges as a global military power--which we will then face in the
Pacific with inadequate deterrence.
Secretary Rumsfeld unilaterally pushed through a concept to bring
our deployed military forces back from Europe, Okinawa, and South Korea
without any debate on the strategic wisdom of leaving NATO/Japanese/
Korean provided training and basing infrastructure--for an unfunded
infrastructure requirement in the United States. Have we analyzed and
funded the Air Force and naval resources required to project power from
U.S. basing--back to operational areas in the global fight? How much
time will be required to posture and build the U.S. transportation
systems (rail, interstate highways, airports, and seaports) required to
launch stateside units back to operational areas? Why is it a good idea
to increase the separation of military families from their
servicemembers--with a concept of unit unaccompanied deployments to
rotational missions in the Balkans, etc?
The U.S. Armed Forces are in a position of strategic peril.
Congress must act.
Chairman Levin. General, thank you for your testimony, for
your service, and for all the contributions that you make on
such an ongoing basis.
Dr. Korb?
STATEMENT OF DR. LAWRENCE J. KORB, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR
AMERICAN PROGRESS
Dr. Korb. Mr. Chairman, I think you have summarized, in
your opening statement, the current situation, so I won't go
into that. I'll pick up on General McCaffrey's last comment,
that we're in strategic peril, and address the concerns that
Senator Warner mentioned.
About a quarter of a century ago, we were in a similar
situation, in terms of the All-Volunteer Military. In the
leadership in this committee, you had a bill that was actually
started, called Nunn-Warner--before we had Nunn-Lugar, we had
Nunn-Warner--to deal with the situation. I think, as a result
of that, with this committee and working with successive
administrations, we were able to assemble probably, by all
accounts, the finest military we ever had.
Now, I think we learned an awful lot of lessons then that
are important for now:
The first thing we learned is that you don't lower your
standards. It's better to take a smaller force than to lower
your standards, because once you do that, it begins unraveling.
This is something we did in the late 1970s, before people
realized how bad the situation was.
The next thing is that you need to have predictability for
the people in the Service. The unwritten contract that you make
with people is that if you're deployed for 1 year, you'll be
home for 2 years. After I finished my testimony, I happened to
watch Meet the Press on Sunday, and I think General Anthony
Zinni, USMC (Ret.) put it very well. He said, ``Traditionally,
you need three units for every one you have deployed. That's
the ideal, in terms of training, reconstructing the unit, the
kind of quality of life and family time necessary to rebuild
the unit before it goes out.'' We're down to almost one-to-one,
and, in fact, in some units, are not getting a year before they
go back.
Similarly, we learned that to keep a vibrant National
Guard, you should not deploy people for more than 1 year out of
every 5. In fact, that was the policy under Secretary Rumsfeld.
Again, there's a certain amount of predictability. People have
civilian careers, they have other concerns. When you do that,
you're going to cause yourself problems.
Now, in terms of where we are now--and you've all talked
about the certainty--the readiness problems--but I think you
also have a human--a moral dimension to this. We often talk
about the fact that we cannot leave Iraq precipitously, because
we have a moral obligation to the Iraqi people, having
overthrown their government. Certainly, there is merit to that
argument. We also have a moral responsibility to the young men
and young women that we take into the service, to ensure,
before we put them in harm's way, that, in fact, they are
trained to the best of our ability to do so. As pointed out--
you refer to the Time magazine article, I refer to it in my
testimony--you're taking people--again, according to newspaper
accounts--right out of basic training, putting them into units,
they're missing the unit training out at Fort Irwin, and you're
sending them into battle. The Time magazine article has a
graphic description of a young 18-year-old man who missed the
training cycles, joined the unit late December, was deployed in
January, and then was killed by friendly fire in February. We
do not know what would have happened had he been able to have
that training, and bonded, and had this unit cohesion. But, the
fact of the matter is, we should not be taking those risks.
Now, Secretary Rumsfeld said, ``You go to war with the Army
you have.'' We had a chance, as a Nation, right after September
11, and particularly--this administration knew back then they
were going to go to Iraq, as well as Afghanistan--to increase
the size of the Army, to increase the size of the Marines. We
did not take it. It's going to be much more difficult now.
One of my relatives, a young man, tried to join the Navy.
They wouldn't take him. I had been in the Navy, and somebody
wanted me to call, and I said, ``What's the problem?'' It turns
out that this young man had a driving-under-the-influence
citation, and the Navy wouldn't take him. You know what the
recruiter told me when I called? He said, ``Tell him to join
the Army.'' That's the type of thing that I think we have to be
very, very, very careful about. General McCaffrey talked about
the moral waivers, over 8,000 last year.
Now, we need to rebuild the force, and in my testimony I
make a couple of points in there that I think we have to be
very careful. We do need to rebuild the Army Ground Force. This
so-called global war on terror is going to go on for a while,
and you could have situations where we would have to send large
numbers of ground troops in a place like Pakistan, for example,
if that government should implode. When we do it, when you do
it, I urge you, first of all, do not lower the standards. You
have those standards. There's good, empirical evidence as to
why we have the standards for high-school graduates and people
who score average and above average on the Armed Forces
qualification test.
I came across an article the other day, it said that the
Army National Guard has told their people to take many more of
the Category 4s (Cat 4s). That's not the way to go.
The next thing is, we cannot simply rebuild the Army that
we have. You need to develop new capabilities, peacekeeping and
counterinsurgency skills need to be developed.
Third, you need to do it in a fiscally responsible way.
Your staff pointed out to me last night the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) study that said adding the additional
ground forces to the Army and Marine Corps is going to add to
the defense budget, over the next 5 years, over $100 billion. I
think $108 billion was the number. We have to make some
tradeoffs.
Senator Warner was kind enough to talk about some of us
working to save the All-Volunteer Military in the 1970s, and
one of the people, when we met with Senators Nunn and Warner,
was former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird under President
Nixon. One of the things he told me is, ``People, not hardware,
have to be your highest priority if this is going to work.''
So, you have to give priority to that, you have to make some
tough choices in the rest of the budget.
As I look at the budget, I think we have a lot of weapons
that deal with threats from a bygone era, so I urge you to take
a look at that, because, given the other constraints on the
budget, in terms of Social Security as the baby-boomers start
to retire, it's not going to be easy to add that money, over
and above.
Then, finally, I would say that what we need to do is get
rid of constraints on personnel that are no longer relevant. I
agree with General John Malchase David Shalikashvili, USA
(Ret.), it's time to get beyond, ``Don't ask, don't tell.'' The
Uniform Code of Military Justice is perfectly adequate for
dealing with people who happen to be gay or lesbian. The same
way, drop the artificial constraints on women in ground combat.
As they have demonstrated over there in Iraq, they are
perfectly capable of handling these missions, because there is
no front line.
Now, let me conclude with this. Can we make it on a
volunteer basis? With this size Army, it's going to be very
difficult if we stay in Iraq very long. The concept, when we
went to the volunteer military, is, you would have a small
Active Army. You would then have an Army National Guard that
would be a bridge to conscription if you got involved in a long
ground war. As I tell young people--and I go around and speak
in a lot of college campuses: Why do you think we make men
register? So they can see the post office? We make them
register as a fallback. I think we have to take a look. I don't
know what's going to happen. There's a lot of debate going on
now about how long we will stay in Iraq and what we want to do.
But, as Senator Levin mentioned, these additional units are not
going to be available to deal with this situation in Iraq in
the short-term.
So, I do worry, and I conclude with a quote I heard the
late General Davenport Maxwell Taylor, USA (Ret.) say. He said,
``We sent the Army to Vietnam to save Vietnam; we took the Army
out of Vietnam to save the Army.'' The question really is, do
we have to take the Army out of Iraq in order to save the Army?
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Korb follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Lawrence J. Korb
Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and members of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before
you with these genuine war heroes to discuss the current state of the
Nation's ground forces. I cannot think of a more critical issue facing
the Nation at this time.
After more than 4 years of being engaged in combat operations in
Iraq and 6\1/2\ years in Afghanistan, America's ground forces are
stretched to their breaking point. Not since the aftermath of the
Vietnam War has the U.S. Army been so depleted. In Iraq, about 3,300
troops have been killed and another 24,000 wounded. The Army is
severely overstretched and its overall readiness has significantly
declined. As General Colin Powell noted in December even before the
surge, the Active Army is about broken, and as General Barry McCaffrey
has noted the ground forces are in a position of strategic peril. The
Marine Corps is suffering from the same strains as the Army, and the
situation for the Army National Guard is even worse. The decision to
escalate or to ``surge'' more ground troops into Iraq will only put
additional strain on the ground forces and threatens to leave the
United States with a broken force that is unprepared to deal with other
threats around the world.
Army and Marine commanders will only be able to provide these
additional troops by cutting corners on training and equipment and by
putting additional stress on those in uniform. The unprecedented
decision by Secretary Gates last week, that tours for Army brigades
would be extended from 12 months to 15 months, is something that was
not even done in Vietnam when we had over 500,000 troops on the ground
or in Korea where we had over 300,000. This only further demonstrates
the dire situation that the Army is facing.
Meanwhile, the combat readiness of the total Army (Active units,
the National Guard, and the Army Reserve) is in tatters. General Peter
Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, conducted his own review
of the military and concluded that there has been an overall decline in
military readiness and that there is a significant risk that the U.S.
military would not be able to respond effectively if it were confronted
with another crisis. The simple fact is that the United States
currently does not have enough troops who are ready and available for
potential contingency missions in Iran, North Korea, or anywhere else.
For example, when this surge is completed all four brigades of the 82nd
Airborne will be deployed, leaving us with no strategic ground reserve.
Even at the height of the Korean War, we always have kept one brigade
in the continental United States. But it is not simply that so many of
our soldiers are committed to Iraq, but that so much of the Army's and
the Marine Corps' equipment is committed to Iraq as well.
In the following four sections I will discuss the misuse of the
All-Volunteer military in Iraq, the personnel and equipment challenges
confronting the ground forces, and in the final section I will make
some recommendations for rebuilding and expanding the ground forces.
iraq and the all-volunteer military.
The current use of the ground forces in Iraq represents a complete
misuse of the All-Volunteer Military. America's All-Volunteer Army,
made up of well-equipped and highly-trained Active-Duty soldiers,
backed up by a Ready Reserve, was designed to act as an initial
response force, a force that would be able to repel and counter
aggression. If America ever found itself in a long protracted ground
war, or was forced to act against an existential threat, the All-
Volunteer Force was to act as a bridge to re-instating conscription.
This is why we require young men to register when they turn 18.
The All-Volunteer Force, particularly the Army component, as
General John Abizaid noted last fall, was not ``built to sustain a long
war.'' Therefore, if the United States is going to have a significant
component of its ground forces in Iraq over the next 5, 10, 15, or 30
years, then the responsible course is for the president and those
supporting this open-ended and escalated presence in Iraq to call for
re-instating the draft. That would be the responsible path.
In my view, however, this would be a mistake on par with the
initial invasion of Iraq. Instead, I believe the United States should
set a firm timetable for the gradual redeployment of U.S. forces over
the next 18 months. During that time the United States should work to
train and support Iraqi security forces and the Iraqi government while
gradually handing over responsibility for security to the Iraqis. This
action should be backed up with a diplomatic surge in which the United
States would engage all countries in the region. There is no guarantee
that this approach will be effective in stabilizing Iraq or the region.
In fact, given the misleading justifications for the initial invasion
and the way in which the Bush administration has conducted the war,
there are no good options left. But I believe that this course, a
strategic redeployment and a diplomatic surge, provides the best chance
for stabilizing the region as well as mitigating the impact of Iraq on
the ground forces and U.S. national security. As General Maxwell Taylor
noted some three decades ago, ``we sent the Army to Vietnam to save
Vietnam; we withdrew the Army to save the Army.'' The same is even more
true for Iraq today.
ground forces overstretched
Following September 11, the Bush administration had a tremendous
opportunity to increase the size of the ground forces. Unfortunately,
the President and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld pursued a misguided and
naive policy. Instead of increasing the size of the ground forces they
actually sought to cut them. This error was compounded when the Bush
administration diverted its efforts from Afghanistan and proceeded to
undertake an ill-advised invasion of Iraq. This strategic mistake has
allowed the Taliban to reconstitute in Afghanistan, weakened the
standing of the United States in the world, and has undermined the
Nation's efforts in the fight against the radical extremists
responsible for the attacks on September 11.
Today there is little doubt that the ground forces are
overstretched. In early March, we at the Center for American Progress
released a study chronicling the effects that sustained deployments in
Iraq are having on the Army.\1\ By analyzing every Army brigade we were
able to convey the strain and fatigue placed on the force and
illustrate its implications for our Nation's national security. The
facts that we compiled are troubling:
\1\ Lawrence Korb, Peter Rundlet, Max Bergmann, Sean Duggan, and
Peter Juul, ``Beyond the Call of Duty: A Comprehensive Review of the
Overuse of the Army in Iraq,'' Center for American Progress, March
2006.
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Of the Army's 44 combat brigades, all but the First Brigade
of the Second Infantry Division, which is permanently based in
South Korea, have served at least one tour. Of the remaining
43:
12 Brigades have had one tour in Iraq or
Afghanistan
20 Brigades have had two tours in Iraq or
Afghanistan
9 Brigades have had three tours in Iraq or
Afghanistan
2 Brigades have had four tours in Iraq or
Afghanistan
Additionally, the task of sustaining or increasing troop levels in
Iraq has forced the Army to frequently violate its own deployment
policy. Army policy holds that after 12 months of deployment in a
combat zone, troops should receive 24 months at home for recuperation
and retraining before returning to combat. Even before the surge, the
Army had reduced dwell time to 1 year. Increasing troop levels in Iraq
will only force the Army to place more strain on those serving. In
fact, on April 2 the Pentagon announced that two units will be sent
back to Iraq without even a year at home. Extending deployments and
shortening dwell time cause havoc on the lives of those serving in
uniform.
It is also wrong, both militarily and morally, to send troops into
a war zone who are not fully combat ready. Three units that are part of
this surge show what happens when units do not receive what the Army
calls the proper dwell time between deployments.
The 1st Brigade of the Army's 3rd Infantry Division
based at Fort Stewart became the Army's first brigade to be
deployed to Iraq for the third time. It was sent over in
January 2007 after about a year at home. But, because of its
compressed time between deployments, some 150 soldiers joined
the unit right out of basic training, too late to participate
in the training necessary to prepare soldiers to function
effectively in Iraq. Unfortunately one of the 18-year-old
soldiers, Matthew Zeimer, who joined the unit on December 18,
2006, was killed on February 2 after being at his first combat
post for just 2 hours. He missed the brigade's intensive 4-week
pre-Iraq training at the national training center at Fort
Irwin, California, getting instead a cut rate 10-day course.
The 4th Brigade of the Army's 1st Infantry Division
based at Fort Reilly was sent to Iraq in February, about a year
after it was reactivated. More than half of the brigade's
soldiers classified as E-4 or below and are right out of basic
training and the bulk of its mid-level non-commissioned
officers in the ranks of E-5 and E-6 have no combat experience.
The 3rd Division's 3rd Brigade was sent back to Iraq
this month for the third time after spending less than 11
months at home. In order to meet personnel requirements the
brigade sent some 75 soldiers with medical problems into the
war zone. These include troops with serious injuries and other
medical problems, including GIs who doctors have said are
medically unfit for battle. Medical records show that some are
too injured to wear their body armor. According to Steve
Robinson of Veterans for America, ``this smacks of an
overstretched military that is in crisis mode to get people
onto the battlefield.''
The strain on personnel and the difficulty of recruiting new
soldiers in the midst of an unpopular war has prompted the Army to
relax many of its standards and dramatically increase enlistment and
recruitment bonuses.
While overall retention is good, the Army is keeping its numbers up
by increasing financial incentives and allowing soldiers to reenlist
early. Worryingly, however, retention among West Point graduates is
declining and the Army's personnel costs continue to increase. Spending
on enlistment and recruitment bonuses tripled from $328 million before
the war in Iraq to over $1 billion in 2006. The incentives for Army
Guard and Reserve have grown ten-fold over the same period.
After failing to meet its recruitment target for 2005, the Army
raised the maximum age for enlistment from 35 to 40 in January--only to
find it necessary to raise it to 42 in June. Basic training, an
essential tool for developing and training new recruits, has
increasingly become a rubber-stamping ritual. Through the first 6
months of 2006, only 7.6 percent of new recruits failed basic training,
down from 18.1 percent in May 2005.
Alarmingly, this drop in boot-camp attrition coincides with a
lowering of recruitment standards. The number of Army recruits who
scored below average on its aptitude test doubled in 2005, and the Army
has doubled the number of non-high school graduates it enlisted last
year. In 2006, only 81 percent of the new enlistees have high school
diplomas, compared to 94 percent before the invasion. Even as more
allowances are made, the Government Accountability Office reported that
allegations and substantiated claims of recruiter wrongdoing have
increased by 50 percent. Last May, for example, the Army signed up an
autistic man to become a cavalry scout.
The number of criminal offenders that the Army has allowed in the
military--through the granting of ``moral waivers''--has also increased
significantly. Last year, such waivers were granted to 8,129 men and
women--or more than one out of every 10 new Army recruits. That number
is up 65 percent since 2003, the year President Bush ordered the
invasion of Iraq. In the last 3 years, more than 125,000 moral waivers
have been granted by America's four military services. A senior
noncommissioned officer involved in recruiting and retention summarized
the situation well when he told The New York Times on April 9, 2007,
``We're enlisting more dropouts, people with more law violations, lower
test scores, more moral issues. . . We're really scraping the bottom of
the barrel to get people to join.'' Private Steven Green, the soldier
arrested for his alleged role in the rape of an Iraqi girl and the
murder of her family, was allowed to join the Army upon being granted
one such moral waiver. Green had legal, educational, and psychological
problems, didn't graduate from high school and had been arrested
several times.
Most of last year's Army waivers were for serious misdemeanors,
like aggravated assault, robbery, burglary, and vehicular homicide. But
around 900--double the number in 2003--were for felonies. Worse, the
Army does no systematic tracking of recruits with waivers once it signs
them up, and it does not always pay enough attention to any adjustment
problems.
readiness crisis
Currently there are virtually no Active or Reserve Army combat
units outside of Iraq and Afghanistan that are rated as ``combat
ready.'' The Army has deployed 20 of its 43 available Active-Duty
combat brigades--meaning that virtually all its forces are either in
Iraq or are preparing to return there. In order to ensure that troops
fighting in Iraq are fully equipped, units rotating out of Iraq have
been leaving behind their equipment for units taking their place. The
units that return home are often so depleted that the Marines have been
referring to this phase as the `post-deployment death spiral.'
As a result, combat-readiness worldwide has deteriorated to crisis
levels. The equipment in Iraq is wearing out at four to nine times the
normal peacetime rate because of combat losses and harsh operating
conditions. As we have documented in studies done in coordination with
the Lexington Institute, the total Army--Active and Reserve--now faces
at least a $50 billion equipment shortfall and the Marines about $15
billion.\2\ Without equipment, it's extremely difficult for nondeployed
units to train for combat. Thus, one of the hidden effects of the Iraq
war is that even the troops not currently committed to Iraq are
weakened because of it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Lawrence J. Korb, Loren B. Thompson, Caroline P. Wadhams,
``Army Equipment After Iraq,'' Center for American Progress and the
Lexington Institute, April 2006; Lawrence J. Korb, Loren B. Thompson,
Max A. Bergmann, ``Marine Corps Equipment After Iraq,'' Center for
American Progress and the Lexington Institute, August 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To equip those on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army and
the Marines have been drawing down their prepositioned equipment stocks
around the globe. These stocks are stored on ships or in strategic
locations around the world to enable deploying units to be supplied
rapidly. These stocks have been extensively diminished and limit the
ability of the United States to respond to possible crises around the
world. For instance, the Marine Corps has drawn down their
prepositioned Reserve equipment stocks in the Pacific and Europe by up
to 70 percent. The Army and Marines have been so overstretched that the
United States has almost no ready Reserve of ground forces to
effectively deal with a potential crisis on the Korean peninsula, in
Iran, or in unstable Pakistan, for example, or to help alleviate the
grave humanitarian crisis in Darfur.
The Reserve component is also in tatters. Lieutenant General Steven
Blum, the head of the National Guard Bureau, stated that the National
Guard is ``in an even more dire situation than the Active Army but both
have the same symptoms; I just have a higher fever.'' The Pentagon has
had to increasingly employ the National Guard and Reserve in order to
meet demands on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Both the Army Guard and Reserve began the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq with their units short tens of thousands of soldiers, or about 15
to 20 percent, and lacking more than 30 percent of their necessary
gear. Those shortages have deepened as people and equipment are
borrowed from units staying home to fill out those about to go
overseas. According to Lieutenant General Clyde A. Vaughn, Chief of the
Army National Guard, what the Guard is trying to deal with right now is
``a situation where we have absolutely piecemealed our force to
death.''
To make matters worse, the Pentagon is set to notify National Guard
brigades to prepare again for duty in Iraq. Some 12,000 troops are
scheduled to be deployed to Iraq early next year. This would be the
first time that full Guard combat brigades would be sent to Iraq for a
second tour. These deployments are becoming increasingly necessary
because the regular Army is not large enough to handle the mission in
Iraq on its own. Originally these Guard units were to serve no more
than 24 months total. However, these units and others in the Guard have
already served 18 months--with training time and time in Iraq or
Afghanistan--and now they are looking at least another 12 months in
Iraq.
expanding and rebuilding the ground forces
Secretary Gates' decision to expand the Army and Marines is long
overdue. At the Center for American Progress we have been calling for
such an expansion for the past 4 years. However, the difficult
situation facing the Army and the Marines requires a long-term approach
toward expanding and rebuilding the ground forces. Increasing the size
of the Army and Marines will not help the situation on the ground in
Iraq. Instead, growing these forces is about preparing America's
military for the future. I have the following recommendations:
Don't Lower Standards
The Army and Marines should meet their new end-strength goals
without relaxing recruitment standards or retention and promotion
criteria. In order to ensure the Army and Marines continue to get the
best and the brightest, the current target of adding 7,000 soldiers and
5,000 marines per year is too ambitious in light of current
circumstances and should be scaled back. Recruitment and retention
standards should return to at least pre-Iraq standards. Congress must
make sure that the quality of U.S. military personnel does not slide as
it did in the 1970s. It is worth waiting a few extra years to ensure
that the Army and Marines attract the men and women who possess the
specialized skill sets needed for an effective 21st-century military.
Expand with a Focus on Peacekeeping and Counterinsurgency Operations
Following the war in Vietnam, instead of building off the
experience of fighting an unconventional force, the military adopted
the mantra of ``no more Vietnams'' and shifted its focus back to
confronting conventional threats. We cannot make this same mistake
today. It is clear going forward that America's ground forces have to
be prepared to engage an entire spectrum of operations, from
conventional ground combat to humanitarian and peacekeeping operations.
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that while our ground
forces remain conventionally unmatched, there is significant room for
improvement in our ability to conduct counterinsurgency and
peacekeeping operations. In my view, the U.S. Army should consider
developing specialized ``peacekeeping'' or ``stabilization and
reconstruction'' brigades. Such specialized brigades would alter both
the type of recruit the Army is seeking and the type of person who
might be interested in joining the Army. It is important, therefore,
that the decision about whether to create specialized brigades of this
sort be made as soon as possible.
Grow the Forces in a Fiscally Responsible Manner
Growing the ground forces is an expensive endeavor. The current
average annual cost of maintaining a single service member already
exceeds $100,000. Currently the defense budget is severely unbalanced.
Despite claims that September 11 changed everything, during Secretary
Rumsfeld's tenure only two weapons systems were canceled. Many of the
current weapons programs are unnecessary relics that were borne out of
Cold War-era thinking. The challenge confronting the Army and Marines
in terms of both escalating personnel costs and the deepening equipment
crisis requires significant congressional attention and funding.
Expanding the ground forces and recovering from Iraq and Afghanistan
should be the overriding priority of the defense budget.
Open up the Military to all Americans who Possess the Desire, Talent,
and Character to Serve
The Army and Marine Corps cannot afford to place unnecessary
obstacles in the way of qualified men and women who want to serve. To
this end, the military should make two major changes to its personnel
policy.
First, repeal the ``don't ask, don't tell'' policy.
The ``don't ask, don't tell'' policy is counterproductive to
military readiness. Over the past 10 years more than 10,000
personnel have been discharged as a result of this policy,
including 800 with skills deemed ``mission critical,'' such as
pilots, combat engineers, and linguists. These are the very job
functions for which the military has experienced personnel
shortfalls. General John M. Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1993 when the ``don't ask, don't
tell'' policy was enacted, no longer supports the policy on the
grounds that allowing gay men and women to serve openly in the
military would no longer create intolerable tension among
personnel and undermine cohesion. Additionally, a recent Zogby
poll supports this view. It found that three-quarters of
Afghanistan and Iraq veterans were comfortable interacting with
gay people.
Second, all military occupations should be open to
whoever qualifies, regardless of gender. Currently, the Army
prohibits women from serving in infantry, field artillery, and
Special Forces units that directly engage the enemy on the
ground. The idea that women who possess the requisite mental
and physical skills should somehow be ``protected'' from the
dangers of combat fails to acknowledge the reality of the
modern battlefield and the role women are already playing in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Nearly 100 women have been killed in
these wars. We only impede our ability to build a 21st century
military by constructing barriers where none need exist.
Twenty-six years ago I was fortunate enough to be confirmed by this
committee to assume responsibility for the readiness of the Armed
Forces. Because of Vietnam and its immediate aftermath, this nation had
what the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army called a ``hollow army.'' With
the help of Congress, and in particular this committee, we were able to
reverse this situation. Successive administrations and Congresses
continued to maintain the quality of the force. It is hard to believe
that the Bush administration has allowed the readiness of our ground
forces to deteriorate so rapidly in so short a time. I urge Congress
and this committee to take the initiative in fixing the problem.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Dr. Korb.
General Scales, you're next.
Thank you.
STATEMENT OF MG ROBERT H. SCALES, JR., USA (RET.), PRESIDENT,
COLGEN, INC.
General Scales. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
the opportunity to testify today.
I think, in the various pieces that we've written, and in
our statements for the record, General McCaffrey and the rest
of my colleagues have talked about the conditions of the Army.
What I'd like to do, sir, is just cast forward a little bit,
because I think it's important to emphasize that, oftentimes,
times of stress, times of great stress for a military, are just
the times when the military can take stock of its condition and
plan for how to reform itself and how to rebuild itself. All of
us have gray hair here who are testifying, and all of us
remember the days in 1971, 1972, and 1973, when the Army began
the process of rebuilding during wartime. So, let me cast, for
a moment, into the future and talk about three aspects of the
next decade or so, as we look to reform and rebuild the Army
and the Marine Corps.
First, I have to agree with everyone here, we simply have
an Army and a Marine Corps that's too small. Senator Levin,
remember 2 years ago, you and I and Senator Clinton and
Lieutenant General Daniel W. Christman, USA, stood in the
Senate and talked about 100,000 more forces needed for both.
That was 2 years ago, and only about 4 months ago was a
decision made to increase the military by about that number. I
think it's just incontestable now that the Army and the Marine
Corps need to be bigger. But the important question to ask is,
if we're going to increase the size of the ground forces, how
will we shape them? Clearly, we need to build a combat force in
the future that's capable, not just of intervention, but
capable of persistent presence overseas. I've heard different
numbers thrown around, but the number that seems to support
persistent presence in theaters of war is about 50 brigade
combat teams.
But it's also important to remember, sir, that an Army is
more than a collection of brigades, that, in fact, the Army
that we build to the future has to be able to do more than just
deploy brigades, it has to be able to build coalitions of
willing partners, it has to deal with alien cultures, it has to
provide advisors and trainers and instructors to build country
teams and military advisory groups. These are functions beyond
just mere intervention.
President Lincoln, in the Civil War, used to talk about the
arithmetic. One of the facts we have to remember from this
terrible experience in Iraq is the arithmetic. What he meant by
that was, as soon as the bullets start to fly, soldiers start
to die and armies begin to attrit over time. The arithmetic is
not our choice; it's determined by the actions of an enemy. In
virtually every war we've fought since the Civil War, we have
run out of close combat soldiers, because we go to war with an
Army that is not robust enough to last the duration. If we're
going to fight wars in the future with a long-service
professional force, the lesson we should take away from what's
happening today is, the force you begin the war with will
probably not get any bigger or any better through the duration
of the conflict.
So, it's important, as we add more troops, to do a couple
of things. We have to build robustness into our brigades. The
101st, in World War II, added an extra 1,000 infantrymen to
every regiment. That's why the Band of Brothers principle works
so well, because, by the time they got to Holland, they were
still full strength, tightly coalesced, tightly bonded units,
because they had built robustness into their units. We have to
consider increasing the leader-to-led ration. We have to
increase the number of leaders, because these same soldiers not
only have to be members of deployed units, but they have to
perform these other combat functions, as well.
Also, it's important to realize that, other than brigades,
if we're going to fight this new style of war, we need
nonbrigade types of units: civil affairs, psychological
operations, military police, and engineers.
The second issue deals with reforming the Army's materiel.
It would be a mistake, in my mind, if we took the cheap
alternative, if you will, for rebuilding the Army, and simply
brought back our Cold War materiel, refurbished it, and put it
back on the shelf for the future. I believe that history, that
experience in this war, and that all of the analysis that I've
ever seen, argues for the core of the Army, as we move into the
future, needs to consist of light, mobile, flexible, middle-
weight mechanized forces. Certainly, light forces are useful,
but one of the lessons we learned is that the price you pay for
fighting dismounted in places like Fallujah and Ramadi is very
high. The optimal force for a counter-guerrilla or
counterinsurgency force is one that is dense in infantry,
that's able to move about the battlefield very quickly, that is
efficient in the use of fuel and maintenance, such that it
doesn't rely on that very dangerous, huge, logistical umbilical
cord which is causing so many casualties, that it's infantry-
heavy, and that it's able to put more soldiers under armor, for
longer periods of time, closer to the enemy.
So, it's important, I think, to recall that the force
that's fighting in Iraq today is a legacy force. It was
designed to fight on the plains of western Europe. If we're
going to fight pre-insurgency and insurgency campaigns in the
future, we're going to have to not only fix what we have
already, but design a new force for the future.
The third point I want to make is that we've all come back
to the realization that war--this war and virtually every war
we've fought--is as much a human as it is a technological
enterprise, and that as we look into the future, the human,
cultural, and cognitive dimensions of war are becoming
increasingly important.
It's important to also realize that in counterinsurgency
wars, the focus of action moves from the strategic and the
operational down to the tactical level, that success in these
types of wars is determined by the ability to knit together, to
mold together small units--squads and platoons--that are
superbly efficient and effective at what they do. The strategy
in a counterguerrilla campaign is to knit together, to weave
together a series of tactical successes. As the focus moves
down the level of command, the human factor, then, becomes as
important, or more important, than the materiel and the
technological factor. Therefore, this requires a reform of our
human capital. You can't throw money at this. It takes time to
develop great leaders, flexible and adaptive leaders. It takes
time to develop great squads and platoons. Unfortunately,
because of the rotation scheme today, our Army and Marine Corps
have simply become too busy to learn.
So, as we move into the future, Mr. Chairman, we have to
make a commitment to send the Army and the Marine Corps back to
school. Education becomes important. We have to rebuild our
institutional Army, and put instructors back on the platform.
Sadly, the Army, because of its shortage of officers, has
actually had to contract out the instructor duties. Recall, in
World War II, 31 of the 35 successful Corps commanders in World
War II had spent at least 3 years instructing in the Army's
school system. Today, contractors perform that function.
We have to help our soldiers become more culturally aware,
give them culture training and help them learn languages so
they can deal with alien cultures. We have to develop a special
cadre of leaders with qualifications as advisors and
instructors; and to do this, we have to send them back to
school. It's important that they shouldn't have to pay a
professional price for improving their human capital. We have
to reward these initiatives, rather than punish them.
Finally, let me end on the importance of making better
small units. This is a process that can't be hurried. Like a
good wine, a small unit takes time to mature. It takes years
for a small unit to bond, to coalesce, and to become a Band of
Brothers. These are national treasures. They're precious and
rare commodities. These are the soldiers and marines who do
virtually all of the killing and dying. So, we have to treat
them much like a professional sports team. We have to be able
to put the resources into small units to provide the means of
assessing leaders, stressing the soldiers to make sure that
they can perform these tasks, to have a sort of Top Gun, if you
will, for these small units to learn how to fight bloodlessly
before, as Larry says, they're put into the crucible of war and
have to learn to fight by fighting, which is the most wasteful
way to train soldiers.
I guess I'll end by saying that inadequate manpower is not
a new issue. It's generational. It goes back, over 50 years, to
the Korean War. We've learned, I think, painfully, in this war
and other wars, that ``shock and awe'' won't work. The reason
it doesn't work is because the enemy has a vote. There's this
great quote from Ho Chi Minh, who, when asked, in 1964, how he
ever expected to beat the American Army, said, prophetically,
``They will kill many of us, we will kill a few of them, and
they will tire of it first.'' He understood, just like al Qaeda
understood--or understands--that killing Americans is not a
means to an end, but it's an end in itself. Those Americans
most likely to die in this war and in future wars, I would
suggest, are soldiers and marines.
So, not only from the standpoint of humanity, but also from
the standpoint of strategic direction, it's important to do all
we can to find the best men and women for the Army and the
Marine Corps, to equip them adequately, and, most importantly,
to increase the value of their human capital so they will win
on the battlefield and stand much less a chance of becoming
killed or wounded.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Scales follows:]
Prepared Statement by MG Robert H. Scales, Jr., USA (Ret.)
The condition of our ground force is troubling. Two thirds of our
regular brigades and virtually all of our Reserve brigades are not
combat ready. The Army's Cold War Reserves of fighting equipment are
nearly gone with half destroyed or worn out though constant overuse.
Too many soldiers chasing too many missions for too long have resulted
on an Army that spends more time in combat than at home. The stress of
back to back deployments has created uncertainty and anxiety among
military families that is affecting the morale and resolve of those who
we will rely on to fight the long war for a generation.
These conditions are too well documented to dispute. The issue at
hand is what to do next. Past history tells us that often the adversity
and stress of war can lead to renewal and rebirth. The Army came out of
the trauma of Vietnam resolved to rebuild. That same opportunity exists
today.
a larger landpower force
No one from the Vietnam generation ever would have foreseen that
America's ground forces would be so stretched for so long without
breaking. The robustness and resiliency of the forces in Iraq and
Afghanistan testifies to the value of fighting the long war with a long
service professional Army and Marine Corps. The bad news is that the
Pentagon has grossly underestimated the number of ground forces needed
to fight this long war. We have learned painfully that the challenge of
recruiting a professional force during wartime dictates that the number
and quality available at the beginning of the conflict will never get
larger or better. The consequences of this miscalculation have been
strategic as well as personal. For the first time since the Civil War
the shrinking pool of soldiers is shaping strategy rather than strategy
determining our manpower needs.
The lesson for the future is clear. We simply cannot rely on Cold
War manning models to tell us how many soldiers and marines we need.
Pentagon personnelists know a great deal about human resource
management but very little about war. We must plan future force
structures to accommodate the sad fact that wars wear down armies. We
must build robustness into our ground forces, particularly our close
combat units, the ones who do most of the fighting and dying.
The planned increase in the size of ground forces is a proper
beginning. The Army's effort to modularlize an increased number of
brigade combat teams will make the best use of this additional
manpower. But it is also important to remember that ground forces of
the future will be made up of more than just brigades. We will need a
very strong corps of trainers, advisors and military assistance groups
capable of being sustained for decades in regions of the world where
new allied armies will be created or improved. We will need many more
specialized units to assist in nation building such as special
operating forces, civil affairs, military police and engineers.
How much should the Army grow? If the Army is to restore the
optimal ratio of three brigades for every brigade deployed then at
least fifty brigade combat teams will be needed to maintain any
reasonable presence and fighting capability for the long war. But
experience in Iraq shows that casualties will begin to reduce the ranks
of these brigades once in combat. So additional close combat soldiers,
mainly infantry, armor and Special Forces must be added above and
beyond the proscribed table of allowances to insure that these brigades
will be sufficiently robust to sustain themselves over an extended
campaign. In addition the Army and Marine Corps will need to increase
the proportion of leaders to followers, the so called ``leader to led
ratio,'' in order to provide additional skilled leaders to advise,
train, and instruct coalition partners in the war against radical
Islamism.
materiel
Attrition of the Army's fighting materiel due to wear and combat
damage in Iraq presents an opportunity for the Army to rebuild its
arsenal. One rebuilding alternative would be to expand the number of
light foot mobile infantry and Special Forces brigades. These units are
relatively inexpensive to equip and are particularly useful in terrain
where vehicular traffic is difficult such as in Afghanistan. But 50
years of experience in American wars has shown that fighting on foot is
very costly in human life. Since the end of World War II, four out of
five Americans from all the Services killed at the hands of the enemy
have been light infantry, not soldiers and marines, but light infantry,
a force that comprises less than 4 percent of those in uniform.
In contrast, when soldiers and marines fight mounted in vehicles
their chance of survival in battle increases an order of magnitude.
Thus it makes sense to rebuild the Army around a core of mechanized
brigades. At first glance the cheapest way to rebuild the Army's
mounted fighting force would be to repair the mountain of Cold War gear
that served the Army so well in the Gulf War and put it back into
action. Unfortunately, this generation of Abrams tanks and Bradley
fighting vehicles offers protection to be sure but protection
unsuitable for today's battlefield. Tanks designed to fight on the
plains of Europe in huge tank on tank engagements required very thick
and very heavy frontal armor. It's interesting to note that in the
practical laboratory of real combat frontal armor hasn't been terribly
useful. Of the tens of thousands of American soldiers killed in wars
since the end of World War II fewer than ten died in tanks struck on
the front.
Weight extorts a very heavy price in diminished capability. Heavy
Cold War era fighting vehicles cannot move great distances. They
consume a huge amount of fuel that must be transported by vulnerable
unarmored convoys from Kuwait to Baghdad. They cannot be easily
transported by air. It takes a multitude of repairmen, many of them
civilian contractors and a huge base infrastructure to keep them
running in the punishing heat and dust of Iraq. As we have seen from
Generals Petraeus's recent success in Baghdad fighting a dispersed
insurgent is best done by infantry who are able to disperse in turn and
stay dispersed for very long periods. The logistics and support demands
of Cold War fighting vehicles prevents them from operating for very
long in entities much smaller than a brigade while their cramped crew
compartments limit severely the number of infantry they carry into
battle. The actual price of keeping Cold War materiel in action will
actually be very expensive because over the long term these antiques
will cost more in maintenance and soldier overhead than the fighting
systems intended to replace them.
To be sure the Army will continue to need very heavy Cold War
equipped and very light units in some proportion. But a half century's
worth of combat experience, to include most recent experience in Iraq,
supports the contention that the majority of future ground units should
consist of mechanized brigades equipped with a high density of compact,
medium weight, easily transportable fighting vehicles such as Stryker
today and the Future Combat System tomorrow. We learned in Iraq that
more soldiers can be kept alive in combat by placing more of them under
armor and allowing them to remain under armor for longer periods.
Experience in close combat in places like Falluja suggest that survival
rates increase when soldiers are able to move in closer to the enemy
before dismounting in the tactical fight. In addition lighter, more
agile, reliable and fuel efficient armored vehicles will greatly reduce
the size and vulnerability of the logistical umbilical cord that has
proven so costly to maintain in Iraq. Medium weight brigade combat
teams carry far more infantry into combat, the essential component for
counter insurgency operations.
Future medium weight brigades compensate for less bulk and weight
by their ability to see and engage the enemy from great distances using
broad assortments of aerial and ground sensors. Much of the dirty and
dangerous work of tomorrow's mounted soldiers will be done by unmanned
robots controlled from FCS fighting vehicles. Future mounted soldiers
will have access to the power of a digital network that will provide
them with immediate information about the enemy and the whereabouts of
fellow soldiers. Future brigades will be able to subdivide easily into
much smaller fighting units, at least to company and probably down to
platoon, in order to better meet and defeat an insurgent enemy at his
own level.
Properly equipping the Army to win the Long War will be very
expensive. But we have fought 12 wars in the last 30 years and all but
1 has been decided on the ground. We will fight another one sooner than
any of us would like so we must start now to build the fighting
equipment for a new Army rather than put yesterday's Army back on the
shelf.
cultural and cognitive dominance on the battlefield
All of the pre-September 11 military pundits who forecast quick
victory through shock and awe and precision strike are a distant
memory. The techocentric view of war has failed because it denied the
fundamental truth that war is inherently a human rather than a
technological enterprise. The future will only increase the relative
importance of the human, cultural and cognitive aspects of war. We will
continue to witness the classical centers of gravity shift from the
will of governments and armies to the perceptions of populations.
Success in battle will be defined as much in terms of capturing the
human and cultural rather than the geographical high ground.
Understanding and empathy are already important weapons of war. The
ability to build ties of trust will offer protection to our troops as
effectively as body armor. Leaders will seek wisdom and reflective
thought rather than operational and planning skills as essential
intellectual tools for guaranteeing future victories.
Human capital cannot be bought. It must be accumulated through
learning and reflective thought. Unfortunately our soldiers and marines
have become too busy to learn at a time when learning has never been so
important to the future success of our military. World War II leaders
understood the truism that students gain knowledge while teachers gain
wisdom. Thus it was no accident that 31 of the Army's 35 corps
commanders taught at service schools. Today many of our institutions
contract out teaching to civilians because so few serving officers are
available for the classroom. After Vietnam the Army sent 7,400 officers
to fully funded graduate education. Today that figure is about 450,
half of whom are studying to join the weapons buying community.
The Army's school system is starved for resources and is unable to
make best use of the dismally limited time available to soldiers for
learning. Before Vietnam some of our best universities such as Duke,
Yale, and Princeton had vibrant defense studies programs that gave
future combat leaders the opportunity to learn from many great teachers
of the art of war. For the most part those programs and teachers are
gone; victims of an academic culture that somehow believes that
ignoring the study of war will make wars go away.
As the Army begins to pull back from Iraq it must go back to
school. Talented officers and senior non commissioned officers should
be given a ``soldier's sabbatical'' to attend the best civilian
graduate schools to study alien cultures and the art of war. More
senior officers should be assigned to instructor duties at all of the
Army's schools of higher learning. Both students and teachers must be
rewarded professionally for their intellectual as well as their
operational proficiency.
Cultural isolation in Iraq creates a tragic barrier separating
Iraqis of good will from the inherent goodness that American soldiers
demonstrated so effectively during previous periods of occupation in
such places as Korea, Japan, and Germany. This cultural wall must be
torn down. Lives depend on it. Every young soldier should receive
cultural and language instruction. The purpose would not be to make
every soldier a linguist but to make every soldier a diplomat in
uniform equipped with just enough sensitivity training and linguistic
skills to understand and converse with the indigenous citizen on the
street.
The Army and Marine Corps have proven remarkably competent in the
complex human skills necessary to stitch together coalitions by
building, often from whole cloth, effective indigenous armies in such
remote places as Greece, Korea, Vietnam, El Salvador and now in Iraq.
But the unique human talents required to perform these tasks have
rarely been valued or rewarded. Today's soldiers and Marines would
prefer to be recognized as operators rather than advisors or trainers.
This must change. If our success in coalition building will depend on
the ability to create and improve partner armies then we must select,
promote and put into positions of authority those can do so. We must
cultivate, amplify, and inculcate these skills in educational
institutions reserved specifically for that purpose.
Soldiers need more time to train for combat. Years not months are
required to produce a close combat soldier with the requisite skills
and attributes to do the increasingly more difficult and dangerous
tasks that await him in the future. At least a year together is
necessary for small units to develop the collective skills necessary to
coalesce and fight as teams. An infantry squad is the same size as a
football, soccer or rugby team. Professional team coaches understand
that blocking and tackling are not enough to win the Super Bowl.
Instead a pro player must undergo a scientific regimen of physical
conditioning. He does ``two a day'' during summer camp and watches the
films at night. He has to fight for his position on the team because
there is always the eager and hungry rookie looking to take his spot.
This is the image that we must internalize if we are to build
exceptional close combat soldiers for the future. Not all need apply
and very few should expect to join. Any shortcoming in performance
should threaten a soldier's place on the team. Finally every manager
knows that winning teams are purchased at a premium. The Air Force and
Navy have more first line fighter aircraft costing between $50 and $450
million apiece than the Army has infantry squads. The precious few
squads we have must be treated as national treasures. Soldiers in close
combat units, those most likely to die for our country, must be given
time to train, bond and coalesce before entering combat.
In the industrial age, junior officers were expected to lead men on
the battlefield directly by touch and verbal commands. They were
trained to follow instructions from their immediate commanders and to
react and conform to the enemy. The image of very junior soldiers,
isolated in some distant outpost, performing peacekeeping missions one
moment and engaging the enemy the next reaffirms the truth that
tomorrow's soldiers must acquire the skills and wisdom to lead
indirectly--skills formerly reserved for officers of a much higher
grade and maturity. They must be able to act alone in ambiguous and
uncertain circumstances, fight with soldiers they cannot touch, and
think so as to anticipate rather than react to the enemy's action. We
can make such soldiers. But it takes time.
History teaches that great combat commanders possess a unique,
intuitive sense of the battlefield. They have the ability to think in
time, to sense events they cannot see, to orchestrate disparate actions
such that the symphony of war is played out in exquisite harmony. In
the past the only sure venue for exposing the naturals was battle.
Soldier's lives had to be expended to find commanders with the
intuitive ``right stuff.'' Human science offers the opportunity to find
the naturals without bloodshed. We must exploit this opportunity by
conducting research in cognition, problem solving, and rapid decision
making in uncertain, stressful environments such as combat. Leaders
must be exposed during peacetime to realistic simulations that
replicate the conditions of uncertainty, fear and ambiguity that he
will experience on the battlefield.
the new army will be expensive
The circumstances that created the Army's dire condition are
generational. Excessive Korean War casualties convinced President
Eisenhower to fight the Cold War with firepower rather than manpower.
All of his successors followed suit, each devising a war-winning
version of shock-and-awe built principally around airpower. These
strategies would have worked splendidly except for the tiresome fact
that the enemy had a vote. Ho Chi Minh got it right: ``They will kill
many of us,'' he prophesized in 1964. ``We will kill a few of them but
they will tire of it first.'' Al Qaeda is simply following Uncle Ho's
philosophy, so far with success.
So, if our vulnerability is dead Americans, both empathy and
strategic necessity would dictate that we spend more money to keep
alive those most likely to die. This year the administration has raised
the Army's share of the budget--a good first step. But the Army will
need many more resources if it is to meet the demands of the Long War.
I hope the painful and tragic condition of our land forces will finally
convince us that land warfare is no longer the cheap alternative.
Chairman Levin. General Scales, thank you so much for the
testimony.
Dr. Krepinevich?
STATEMENT OF DR. ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH, JR., PRESIDENT, CENTER
FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS
Dr. Krepinevich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think there, at last, is a fairly high level of
agreement, among the Defense Department, Congress, and the
strategic studies community, that, while the Army continues to
perform effectively in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is under great
stress. What's even more worrisome is, a lot of the trendlines,
a lot of the metrics and indicators that have been alluded to
today, are almost uniformly moving in a more worrisome
direction, the direction that could lead our ground forces to
cross that line, that red line that separates a ready Army from
a hollow Army. So, I'll focus most of my commentary on the
response, what is being done.
Of course, we have the planned 92,000 troop increase, more
Army brigades--6--an additional Marine regiment. We also have
$19 billion this year, and more on the way, to replace or
repair destroyed or broken equipment. The question that the
committee poses is: is this the right approach? Can we do
better? My sense is that it's not clear that this is the right
approach.
We're talking about an Army increasing its end strength by
65,000. This is an Army that's having trouble recruiting its
current end strength, that's having to sacrifice quality to do
so. Now, we may be able to bridge some of that gap by doing
some of the things that Dr. Korb talks about, eliminating
``Don't ask, don't tell,'' expanding opportunities for women.
But, quite frankly, this is not a done deal.
Look at the slowness at which the Army plans to ramp up its
end strength, roughly--it was about 7,000 a year over the next
5 years. Five years. That's longer than we spent in World War
II, longer than we spent in the Civil War. If help were on the
way, in this sense, help is likely to arrive far too late.
If that's the case, if we don't want to compromise quality,
as Dr. Korb says--and I think he's right--we may have reached
our force-structure limit, unless we're willing to adopt
extreme measures, like the draft, like what some members of the
strategic studies community are advocating: welcome foreigners
into our Army in exchange for American citizenship. Of course,
we already have 20,000 security contractors, many of whom are
not U.S. citizens, already operating in Iraq. This reminds me
of what the Duke of Wellington once said about these sorts of
folks, in commenting on one of his newly formed regiments. He
said, ``I don't know what they'll do to the enemy, but, by God,
they sure scare me.''
We can have a case, as Dr. Korb says, where we have
subtraction by addition. Those of us here who have commanded
Army units understand that there are certain people in your
unit that you'd be better off without. It's not just purely a
numbers game; it is a quality game. Even if we do recruit the
additional 65,000, even if they do meet the quality standards
that Dr. Korb talks about, even these additional numbers, even
this size of an Army, is not going to meet the force
requirements that would be imposed by plausible contingencies,
such as a widespread breakdown in order in countries like
Pakistan or Nigeria or others. If we're just looking at
population, Pakistan's six times the population of Iraq;
Nigeria, four or five times the population of Iraq. There's no
guarantee, of course, that disorder won't occur in more than
one place at one time; it could happen simultaneously.
The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) understood this.
It said we have to get serious about the business of building
partner capacity. There are manpower limits to what we can do,
in terms of our own ground forces. Unfortunately, that QDR did
not put anything in the way of meat on the bones. I'll talk to
that in a minute.
Also of concern is the sense that the Army and the Marine
Corps seem to intend to use their new, or increased, troop
strength to increase the number of brigades and regiments,
respectively, in their force structure. Both seem to be tending
to orient this force on conventional operations, as opposed to
irregular warfare. In my discussions with some senior flag
officers in the Services, they tend to say, ``We have to worry
about North Korea. We have to worry about Iran. We have to
worry about maintaining that rotation base.'' That may be true,
but if you look at the contingencies that North Korea and Iran
represent, I would argue that the least of our problems is
confronting another Republican Guard-like force on the
battlefield.
In fact, I would argue, we are probably well into what we
might call an irregular warfare era. Why? I think there are
about four reasons for this:
Number one, we so dominate, our ground forces are so
proficient in conventional warfare, that it is astounding that
anyone would think that the best way to beat the American
military is somehow to confront it directly on the battlefield.
Second, we have the diffusion of technology--rockets and
missiles, precision-guided munitions, advanced explosive
charges, the Internet--as a means for irregular forces to
become far more effective. One of the questions that goes
around the Pentagon these days is, how much destruction can 10
determined men cause? The slope of the graph is going up
dramatically over time.
Third, if you look at third-world demographic trends,
inequitable wealth distribution, and our enemy's ability to
exploit what we call strategic communications to convince the
people that they have grievances, and that their grievances
are, in large part, against the United States, we find that, in
much of the underdeveloped world, there is growing motive,
means, and organizational skills to create disorder on a large
scale.
Finally, and perhaps most important, we have proven, our
military has proven, far less effective in combating enemies
waging irregular warfare than those engaged in conventional
war. One of the reasons I'm convinced, myself, sitting before
you today, is because I could not learn to hit the curve ball
as a baseball player. Once the pitching staffs of the other
team found that out, all I saw was curve balls. Right now, the
American military does not hit the curveball. Until they learn
to do it, that's all they're going to see, or that's a lot of
what they're going to see.
In a sense, our ground forces are at a crossroads. In
previous times, when we put our hand on a stove, whether it was
Vietnam or Iraq, there's a tendency to say, ``We're not going
to do that anymore. No more Vietnams.'' On the other hand, the
fact is that if we're entering an era of irregular warfare,
that's what we're going to see.
Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz, USA, who's the Deputy
Commanding General at the United States Army Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC), said, ``We argued in those days,
before the Iraq war, that if we could do the top end skills, we
could do all the other ones. I've had to eat a little crow.''
There is, I think, a sense in the Army and the Marine Corps
that if we orient on conventional war, somehow those forces can
quickly and rapidly adapt themselves to wage irregular war.
Vietnam and Iraq and Afghanistan stand as case studies of why
that hasn't happened, or it certainly hasn't happened quickly
enough for us to be effective, as we would have liked to have
been.
Given that, and given our manpower limitations, given the
need to build partner capacity, given the limitations on our
force structure, it's surprising to me that, as part of this
reorganization, we have not talked about creating a standing
training organization, something like the old Military
Assistance and Advisory Groups we had during the Cold War to
train indigenous forces, to train forces of our allies, so
that, together, we could deal with these common threats to our
security.
Right now, we're in the process of stripping officers and
NCOs out of our line units to serve as advisors, because the
Army is not structured with a lot of excess officers and NCOs
to perform that function, so the Army is having to rob Peter to
pay Paul. Yet, we know that if they're going to stand up so we
can stand down, you can train an Iraqi private, perhaps, in 60
to 90 days, but you're going to have to have people working
with Iraqi officers, NCOs, and the same goes in Afghanistan,
for a much longer period of time for them to get the skill set
they're going to need to operate effectively.
We need to orient our training on irregular warfare
challenges to include stability operations and
counterinsurgency. This is significantly underway right now,
but, again, as was pointed out by General McCaffrey, in some
cases we're actually giving up valuable training areas that are
going to be needed to organize and train our forces for this
kind of warfare.
When we realize that, for example, in the second Gulf War,
we defeated the Republican Guard with essentially one heavy
Army division, three brigades, the fact that we have 48 brigade
elements would indicate that we should take some of them--in
fact, perhaps a good portion of them--and orient them more on
counterinsurgency and stability operations. In a sense, the old
argument that we have to have one Army that can do everything,
I think we're going to have to look increasingly at a division
of labor within the Army, within the ground forces, between
conventional war operations and stability operations.
Finally, as we've seen, there's a shortage of equipment. We
seem to have forgotten, after the Vietnam war, that we could
actually suffer attrition in battle. The canary in the mine
shaft here is the equipment that we've had destroyed and lost
in this conflict, and in need of repair. Our industrial base is
not really organized and equipped to surge production, as we've
seen. This argues, I think, for creating some kind of war
reserve stocks that can be employed. For example, if we had had
them in this war, we could have deployed them much more
quickly, to help stand up the Afghan National Army, the ISF,
who are, in many cases, still less well equipped than the
enemies they go up against, and of course, the re-equipping of
our own forces in the field, as we surge, in order to deploy
combat forces into theater.
In summary, I think the committee is right to be concerned
over whether our ground forces are stressed and in danger of
becoming broken. Even though they still perform effectively in
the field, obviously we can't rest easy. I was told by General
Shy Meyer, the Army Chief of Staff who coined the phrase ``the
Hollow Army,'' that once you cross that red line, there is a
point at which the erosion of the force begins to accelerate.
There's a knee in the curve where readiness and organizational
capability and effectiveness really begin to go downhill
rapidly. He said, ``once you cross that point, like we did in
the late 1970s, it becomes a lot more difficult, in terms of
time, in terms of human resources, in terms of material
resources, to dig yourself out of that hole.''
So, again, I compliment the committee on taking up this
issue now, because time is not on our side. Even making changes
now, in terms of force structure, equipment, and so on, are
going to take time to implement and bring into effect.
I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to
be here today.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Krepinevich follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to appear before you
today, and to share my views on the future of U.S. ground forces. My
testimony is intended to provide a context within which one might
evaluate evolving Department of Defense (DOD) plans for the current
size, organization, and equipment of the Army and Marine Corps, with an
eye toward better preparing these two Services for the challenges and
requirements of the next two decades.
the all-volunteer ground force: stretched to the limit
Without question, U.S. ground forces are under considerable strain,
the result of over 5 years of high operational tempo and combat in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and other locations. Even prior to these wars, U.S.
ground forces were far from idle. Since 1990, the United States has
deployed major ground force contingents in a variety of peacekeeping,
peacemaking, humanitarian and disaster relief, counterterrorism, and
partnership building missions in places such as Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda,
Bosnia, Indonesia, Colombia, the Philippines, and the Horn of Africa.
These have been augmented by routine forward deployments too numerous
to count.
Former Secretary of State Madeline Albright once asked ``What's the
use of having a first-rate military unless you use it?'' A better
question might have been, ``What is the maximum force utilization rate
we can sustain before degrading a first-rate military?'' After over 5
years of combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, both the Army and
Marine Corps are now stretched to the limit. Our ground forces are
simply too small to sustain a permanent combat force of over 150,000 in
Central Command's area of operations. This condition has prompted the
DOD to announce a 92,000-troop increase in the size of the Army and the
Marines, with 65,000 of that total going to the Army. Moreover, as
General McCaffrey and General Scales have pointed out, Army and Marine
Corps equipment is in such a state of disrepair that it will take years
and tens of billions of dollars to repair or replace. The list of
``high-demand, low-density'' equipment is significant and growing. It
includes items such as individual body armor, mine- and IED-resistant
vehicles, nonlethal munitions, and certain kinds of robotics (e.g.,
small-unit UAVs; ground robots).\1\ Readiness and training are also
suffering, as the Army is forced to play a shell game with its
equipment to insure its forces in the field and those about to deploy
are properly equipped. Even then, units training to deploy still end up
short.\2\
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\1\ These UAVs and land robots are part of the FCS effort; however,
they are but two elements in an overall program comprising 14
(originally 18) systems, including a family of ground combat vehicles.
See Andrew F. Krepinevich, Transforming the Legions (Washington, DC:
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2004), pp. 52-57.
\2\ Greg Jaffe, ``Despite a $168 Billion Budget, Army Faces Cash
Crunch,'' Wall Street Journal, December 12, 2006; and Yochi J. Dreazen
and Greg Jaffe, ``Calibrating a Troop `Surge','' Wall Street Journal,
January 2, 2007, p. A6.
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Obviously, something must be done to help restore our ground
forces. The natural question, then, is: How should we go about doing
it?
increasing the size of the force
The first issue is whether or not to increase the ground forces by
92,000 personnel. The case for such a move is by no means clear-cut.
There are very likely clear limits on the size of an All-Volunteer
ground force the Army and Marine Corps can achieve without dramatically
increasing the pay and bonuses of soldiers and marines. The annual cost
for American Active-Duty personnel is already at historic highs. For
example, between the start of the Second Gulf War and the end of last
year, the Army had to increase the amount spent on retention bonuses by
nearly an order of magnitude, from $85 million to $735 million.\3\ At
the same time, the cost to support each soldier, as measured by
personnel costs, increased by well over 50 percent since 2001, from
$75,000 to $120,000 per soldier in 2006.\4\
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\3\ Tom Vanden Brook, ``Army Pays $1 Billion to Recruit and Retain
Soldiers,'' USA Today, April 12, 2007, p. 8.
\4\ Greg Jaffe, Despite a $168 Billion Budget, Army Faces Cash
Crunch,'' Wall Street Journal, December 12, 2006.
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Moreover, despite these substantial increases in the financial
incentives being offered to Americans to serve in the military, there
are worrisome indicators that the quality of the force has declined,
perhaps significantly. The Army granted some 8,500 moral waivers for
recruits in 2006, more than triple the 2,260 granted a decade ago.
Waivers for recruits who committed felonies were up 30 percent in 2006
over 2005. The Army is also accepting more high school dropouts. Last
year roughly 82 percent of Army recruits had high school diplomas,
compared to a benchmark of 90 percent. This is the lowest rate since
1981, when the Army was beginning to come out of the depths of the
``hollow force'' of the immediate post-Vietnam era.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Tom Vanden Brook, ``Older Recruits are Finding Less Success in
Army,'' USA Today, February 19, 2007.
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The Army's problems do not end there. Only 61 percent of Army
recruits scored above average on the Service's aptitude test for
recruits last year, the lowest scores since 1985. The Army has lowered
its weight standards for recruits and increased the recruiting age to
the point where it would not have met its recruiting targets in 2006
without those recruited who are over the age of 35.\6\ It seems
evident, then, that even the dramatic increases in financial incentives
instituted in recent years are not, by themselves, sufficient to
attract enough higher quality personnel to fill even its current force
requirements, much less a substantially larger force.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Tom Vanden Brook, ``Older Recruits are Finding Less Success in
Army,'' USA Today, February 19, 2007; and Associated Press, ``Lower
Standards Help Army Meet Recruiting Goal,'' USA Today, October 9, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even more worrisome is the fact that, despite the lower quality of
recruits being accepted in the Army, the Army's basic trainee
graduation rate leaped from 82 percent in 2005 to 94 percent in
2006.\7\ This result seems counter-intuitive. Why is it happening? Why
are lower quality recruits graduating at a higher level than their more
qualified predecessors? The likely answer: maintaining tough basic
training programs increases the number of ``washouts'' while reducing
the number of graduates ready to fill the ranks. Given the choice of
sending units to combat zones at substantially less than full strength,
or sending them with less than the best recruits, the Army, forced to
make a difficult choice, is opting for the latter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Vanden Brook, ``Older Recruits are Finding Less Success in
Army,'' USA Today, February 19, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Army is also having problems filling its officer requirements.
For example, the Active component was short some 3,000 officers in 2006
and according to projections the shortage will increase to over 3,500
by next year. Meanwhile, the Guard and Reserve confront a shortfall of
nearly 7,500 officers.\8\ Recent declines in retention rates of West
Point graduates are also a source of concern.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Government Accountability Office (GAO), Military Personnel:
Strategic Plan Needed to Address Army's Emerging Officer Accession and
Retention Challenges (Washington, DC: GAO-07-224, January 2007), p. 27;
and Greg Jaffe, ``Despite a $168B Budget, Army Faces Cash Crunch,''
Wall Street Journal, December 12, 2006.
\9\ Bryan Bender, ``West Point Grads Exit Service at High Rate,''
Boston Globe, April 11, 2007, p. 1.
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Under these conditions, despite the Army's shortage of soldiers--
both in quantity and quality--it will take 5 years to increase its
ranks by 35,000. While the Marine Corps' problems do not appear to be
as severe as the Army's, the Marines also plan to take up to 5 years to
increase their ranks by 22,000.\10\ Simply stated, we appear to be
reaching the size limit on our ground force structure, unless we are
willing to resort to extreme measures such as conscription, or, as some
propose, offering citizenship to foreigners who are willing to fight
Americans' battles for them.\11\
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\10\ The Marine Corps has traditionally had less difficulty filling
its ranks than the Army, in no small measure because while the Army is
well over twice the size of the Marine Corps, both recruit from the
same manpower pool.
\11\ This latter option has gained some currency in some quarters
across the political spectrum.
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Another problematic course of action is already being pursued: the
use of security contractors to perform duties that have traditionally
been performed by soldiers and marines. The Defense Department
estimates that roughly 20,000 security contractors operate in Iraq
alone, the equivalent of over three Army combat brigades and their
associated combat support and combat service support elements. Unlike
our soldiers and marines, these contractors are typically subjected to
little in the way of oversight, despite the fact that counterinsurgency
operations demand the highest levels of restraint on the part of
counterinsurgent forces.\12\
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\12\ Steve Fainaru, ``A Chaotic Day on Baghdad's Airport Road,''
Washington Post, April 15, 2007, p. A1.
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Contractor personnel from ``private security companies'' hail from
a variety of nations. To be sure, there are substantial numbers of
Americans and British. But the ranks of private security companies also
comprise significant numbers of Australians, Chileans, Fijis,
Romanians, and Ukrainians, to name but a few of the nationalities
involved.\13\
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\13\ Daniel Bergner, ``The Other Army,'' New York Times Magazine,
August 14, 2005.
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One challenge counterinsurgent forces have in dealing with
insurgents is differentiating between them and noncombatants. In a
combat situation, oftentimes the safest thing to do from an individual
soldier's perspective is to shoot first and ask questions later. This,
however, risks incurring noncombatant casualties and alienating the
population. It is for that reason that U.S. forces operate under strict
rules of engagement (ROE). The contractor security forces, however, do
not function under the ROE imposed on U.S. and coalition forces. It is
not clear whether the contract forces even have standing ROE. This has
the potential to undermine the overall U.S. war effort.\14\ One
American general officer summed up the effect of contract security
agents as follows:
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\14\ There are indications that security contractors have alienated
both U.S. troops and Iraqis. As one U.S. intelligence officer stated,
``Those Blackwater [security contractor] guys, they drive around
wearing Oakley sunglasses and pointing their guns out of car windows.
They have pointed their guns at me, and it pissed me off. Imagine what
a guy in Fallujah thinks.'' [Fallujah is where four U.S. security
contractors were killed and their bodies mutilated by Iraqis, setting
off a confrontation between U.S. and insurgent forces that led to two
major battles.] Michael Duffy, ``When Private Armies Take to the Front
Lines,'' Time, April 12, 2004. A year after the initial Fallujah
battle, 16 American security contractors were arrested by marines after
they allegedly twice fired on a marine position in Fallujah. Iraqi
officials asserted that, on average, security contractors kill a dozen
civilians a week without probable cause. This has the potential to
create enormous problems for coalition forces in a society where the
killing of a family member or tribal member is likely to trigger a
``blood feud.'' The marines later cited the group in a letter that
read, in part, ``Your convoy was speeding through Fallujah and firing
shots indiscriminately, some of which impacted positions manned by U.S.
marines. Your actions endangered the lives of innocent Iraqis and U.S.
servicemembers in the area.'' Adrain Blomfield, ``Shootings May Lead to
Security Guard Curb,'' London Daily Telegraph, June 11, 2005, p. 1; and
T. Christian Miller, ``Contractors Say Marines Behaved Abusively,'' Los
Angeles Times, June 11, 2005, p. 1.
These guys run loose in this country and do stupid stuff.
There's no authority over them, so you can't come down on them
hard when they escalate force. They shoot people, and someone
else has to deal with the aftermath. It happens all over the
place.\15\
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\15\ Jonathan Finer, ``Security Contractors in Iraq Under Scrutiny
After Shootings,'' Washington Post, September 10, 2005, p. 1. The
observation was made by Brigadier General Karl R. Horst, Deputy
Commanding General, 3rd U.S. Infantry Division.
In brief, we may need a bigger Army and Marine Corps, but it is not
clear we can get them at an acceptable price. Moreover, even an
additional 92,000 personnel will likely prove inadequate to address
some of the highly plausible contingencies outlined below.
preparing the ground forces for the future
Quite apart from the question of increasing the size of the force
are questions over what types of units will be formed from the
increase, what type of training they will receive, and what type of
equipment they will use. The Army plans to utilize the soldiers being
added to its force structure to create 6 additional brigades (and
associated combat support and combat service support elements) over the
42 currently planned, for a total of 48. The Marine Corps plans to use
their end strength increase to add a regimental combat team to round
out their three division-wing teams.\16\ Both moves suggest that U.S.
ground forces will be trained and equipped primarily for conventional,
high-intensity ground combat operations. Is this a smart move? If
experience since the end of the Cold War is any indication, the answer
is: not likely.
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\16\ ``DOD News Briefing with Under Secretary of Defense David Chu,
LTG Stephen Speakes, and LTG Emerson Gardner from the Pentagon,'' U.S.
DOD Transcript, January 19, 2007, available at http://
www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3871.
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The post-Cold War era has been dominated by irregular warfare
contingencies. These contingences, as has been the case with most such
conflicts of this type throughout history, have been dominated by land
forces--although maritime and air forces have played significant roles
in many of them--and it seems this will likely continue to be the case
in the future.
To be sure, the First Gulf War in 1991 and the conventional combat
operations phase of the Second Gulf War in 2003 involved major
combined-arms ground operations. However, both of these conflicts
vividly demonstrated the enormous overmatch that exists between the
United States military and those that might choose to challenge it by
waging conventional warfare, as Saddam Hussein's military did, not
once, but twice. At the same time, however, the U.S. military's
performance in irregular warfare campaigns has been far less
impressive.
This should come as no surprise. Following the Vietnam War our
ground forces were optimized for conventional warfare. The slogan ``No
More Vietnams'' reflected the military's desire to avoid protracted,
ill-defined conflicts. General William DePuy, one of the Army's leading
thinkers, viewed the 1973 Middle East War as a godsend of sorts, as it
enabled the Army to reorient its thinking on the greatest threat to
U.S. security, the Soviet Army in Central Europe. The attitude of ``No
More Vietnams'' was heartily seconded by the American people and the
country's civilian leadership. It spawned the Weinberger and Powell
doctrines of the 1980s and the ``Exit Strategies'' that obsessed
political and military leaders during the deployment of U.S. ground
forces in the 1990s. The force was organized, trained and equipped to
fight short, decisive wars. When this was not possible, the intent was
to set clear limits on the duration of U.S. force deployments and avoid
another ``quagmire'' like Vietnam.
Alas, as our generals are fond of reminding us, ``The enemy gets a
vote,'' and many of our enemies--especially those espousing the radical
Islamist creed--have ``voted'' against taking on the United States with
conventional forces, instead opting for irregular warfare.
There are three primary reasons for this:
First, as noted above, the U.S. military has
overwhelming dominance in conventional warfare;