    [Senate Hearing 110-201]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                     S. Hrg. 110-201, Pt. 1

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2008

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                           ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 1547

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
    PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
                                 OTHER PURPOSES

                                   __________

                                     PART 1

                                MILITARY POSTURE
                                  ARMY POSTURE
                               AIR FORCE POSTURE
                              COMBATANT COMMANDERS
                                  NAVY POSTURE
     WHETHER THE ARMY AND MARINE CORPS ARE PROPERLY SIZED, ORGANIZED, AND
                                    EQUIPPED
                              COMBATANT COMMANDERS
                                CENTRAL COMMAND
                                EUROPEAN COMMAND

                                   __________

        FEBRUARY 6; MARCH 15, 20, 22, 29; APRIL 17, 24; MAY 3, 17, 2007

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

                                   ----------
                             U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

    39-435 PDF                      WASHINGTON : 2008

    For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
    Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
    DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
    Washington, DC 20402-0001

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                         CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

    EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts     JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
    ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia        JOHN WARNER, Virginia,
    JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut     JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
    JACK REED, Rhode Island              JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
    DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii              SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
    BILL NELSON, Florida                 JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
    E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska         SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
    EVAN BAYH, Indiana                   LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
    HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York     ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
    MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas              JOHN CORNYN, Texas
    JIM WEBB, Virginia                   JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           MEL MARTINEZ, Florida

                       Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director

                  Michael V. Kostiw, Republican Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                        CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
                                Military Posture
                                february 6, 2007

                                                                       Page

    Gates, Hon. Robert M., Secretary of Defense; Accompanied by Hon.
      Tina W. Jonas, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)........     4
    Pace, Gen. Peter, USMC, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff..........     9

                       Posture of the United States Army
                                 march 15, 2007

    Geren, Hon. Preston M., ``Pete'' III, Acting Secretary of the
      Army...........................................................   116
    Schoomaker, GEN Peter J., USA, Chief of Staff, United States
      Army; Accompanied by LTG James J. Lovelace, USA, Deputy Chief
      of Staff, U.S. Army; LTG Clyde A. Vaughn, ARNG, Director, Army
      National Guard; LTG Jack C. Stultz, USAR, Commanding General,
      U.S. Army Reserve Command; and LTC Coll S. Haddon, USA, Deputy
      Director, Operations Program Manager, Future Combat Systems,
      Brigade Combat Team............................................   182

                     Posture of the United States Air Force
                                 march 20, 2007

    Moseley, Gen. T. Michael, USAF, Chief of Staff, United States Air
      Force..........................................................   291
    Wynne, Hon. Michael W., Secretary of the Air Force...............   342

      United States Southern Command, United States Northern Command, and
                       United States Joint Forces Command
                                 march 22, 2007

    Keating, ADM Timothy J., USN, Commander, United States Northern
      Command/Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command....   454
    Smith, Gen. Lance L., USAF, Commander, United States Joint Forces
      Command/North Atlantic Treaty Organization Supreme Allied
      Commander for Transformation...................................   463
    Stavridis, ADM James G., USN, Commander, United States Southern
      Command........................................................   475

                       Posture of the United States Navy
                                 march 29, 2007

    Winter, Hon. Donald C., Secretary of the Navy....................   541
    Mullen, ADM Michael G., USN, Chief of Naval Operations...........   696
    Conway, Gen. James T., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps......   726

     Whether the Army and Marine Corps are Properly Sized, Organized, and
       Equipped to Respond to the Most Likely Missions over the Next Two
         Decades While Retaining Adequate Capability to Respond to all
                   Contingencies Along the Spectrum of Combat
                                 april 17, 2007

    McCaffrey, GEN Barry R., USA (Ret.), President, BR McCaffrey
      Associates, LLC................................................   810
    Korb, Dr. Lawrence J., Senior Fellow, Center for American
      Progress.......................................................   816
    Scales, MG Robert H., Jr., USA (Ret.), President, Colgen, Inc....   824
    Krepinevich, Dr. Andrew F., Jr., President, Center for Strategic
      and Budgetary Assessments......................................   830

     United States Pacific Command, United States Forces-Korea, and United
                       States Special Operations Command
                                 april 24, 2007

    Keating, ADM Timothy J., USN, Commander, United States Pacific
      Command........................................................   891
    Bell, GEN Burwell B., III, USA, Commander, United Nations Command
      and Republic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command
      Commander, United States Forces-Korea..........................   905
    Olson, VADM Eric T., USN, Deputy Commander, United States Special
      Operations Command.............................................   920

                         United States Central Command
                                  may 3, 2007

    Fallon, ADM William J., USN, Commander, United States Central
      Command........................................................  1015

                         United States European Command
                                  may 17, 2007

    Craddock, GEN Bantz J., USA, Commander, United States European
      Command, and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe..................  1072

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2008

                                  ----------

                           TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2007

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                                MILITARY POSTURE

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room
    SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy, Byrd,
    Lieberman, Reed, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh,
    Clinton, Pryor, Webb, McCaskill, McCain, Warner, Inhofe,
    Sessions, Collins, Ensign, Chambliss, Graham, Dole, Cornyn,
    Thune, and Martinez.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearing clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, minority
    counsel; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Evelyn
    N. Farkas, professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse,
    professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff
    member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J.
    Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Michael J.
    McCord, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan,
    counsel; and Michael J. Noblet, research assistant.
        Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
    Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
    staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member;
    Derek J. Maurer, professional staff member; David M. Morriss,
    minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff
    member; Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member; Lynn F.
    Rusten, professional staff member; Sean G. Stackley,
    professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff
    member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
        Staff assistants present: David G. Collins, Fletcher L.
    Cork, and Jessica L. Kingston.
        Committee members' assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman,
    assistant to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
    Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
    Caroline Tess, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce
    and Benjamin Rinaker, assistants to Senator Ben Nelson; Todd
    Rosenblum, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant
    to Senator Clinton; Lauren Henry, assistant to Senator Pryor;
    Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Nichole M.
    Distefano, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Sandra Luff,
    assistant to Senator Warner; Arch Galloway II, assistant to
    Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator Collins;
    D'Arcy Grisier, assistant to Senator Ensign; Clyde A. Taylor
    IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Adam G. Brake, assistant to
    Senator Graham; Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole;
    Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; and Stuart
    C. Mallory and Bob Taylor, assistants to Senator Thune.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
    meets this morning to receive the testimony from Secretary of
    Defense, Robert Gates; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
    General Peter Pace; and the Comptroller of the Department of
    Defense, Tina Jonas.
        The subject is the President's fiscal year 2008 budget
    request for the Department of Defense (DOD), including both the
    so-called base budget of $481 billion and the additional $141
    billion requested for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In
    addition, our witnesses will present the $93 billion
    supplemental that is being submitted for the rest of fiscal
    year 2007 for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which is in
    addition to the $70 billion so-called bridge supplemental for
    fiscal year 2007 that Congress provided last fall.
        I want to welcome all of our witnesses this morning.
    Secretary Gates, we know that most of the work of putting this
    budget together took place before you took office, and we
    understand if you turn to the Comptroller to answer, perhaps,
    more questions than usual this year. However, some of the most
    significant proposals contained in this budget and the
    supplemental reflect administration decisions that were made in
    the past month, such as the proposal to surge additional troops
    to Iraq this year and the proposal to seek a large permanent
    increase in the size of the Army and Marine Corps. These are
    key decisions which you, Mr. Secretary, were intimately
    involved.
        I appreciate the effort that all of you made to submit a
    budget that includes the full year's cost of continuing
    operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This was in compliance with
    a provision in last year's National Defense Authorization Act
    (NDAA). It is a step forward, in terms of both budget honesty
    and proper oversight, and I'm pleased that, through the
    leadership of Senators McCain and Byrd, and others, that we
    have gotten to this point.
        I hope we're now moving to an era of real transparency of
    the financial costs of these operations. That still leaves us
    plenty of other work to do on the policy underlying these costs
    and, as the reports of the Special Inspector General for Iraq
    Reconstruction remind us, on the contracting and spending of
    these funds. Making it clear how much we spend and what we plan
    to spend it for is an essential part of congressional oversight
    and accountability to the taxpayer.
        One of the benefits of seeing the full cost of the defense
    program proposed in this budget is that it brings home the
    enormous growth in defense spending we've seen in this
    administration. The fiscal year 2008 base budget is 30 percent
    larger than the defense budget that President Bush inherited in
    2001, and that's in constant dollars. When the cost of
    operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are included, the defense
    budget is now 60 percent larger than it was then, yet it is
    difficult to see how we, as a Nation, are more secure.
        Nowhere are the costs of this administration's policies
    more vivid than in the budget request before us today for
    operations in Iraq. Our Nation has already made an investment
    of over $330 billion and a sacrifice of over 3,000 lives lost
    and 22,000 wounded in Iraq. But this has not brought us the
    secure and stable Iraq that we all wish to see.
        This morning, the administration is presenting to Congress
    and the American people a request to invest an additional $174
    billion in a more robust version of that same Iraq policy for
    the balance of 2007 and 2008. That would bring the total
    invested in military costs in Iraq to $505 billion by the end
    of fiscal year 2008.
        The costs of our policy in Iraq are not limited to those
    enormous sums of money, all of which are borrowed, by the way.
    The heavy deployment of our forces to Iraq has increased the
    stress on our force and reduces the ability of our military to
    train for, and react to, challenges in other parts of the
    world, if need be. The proposed surge of at least 21,500
    additional forces to Iraq will worsen that stress.
        There are other aspects of this request for funds in Iraq
    and Afghanistan that are of concern. The request for over a
    billion dollars of military construction funds in Iraq and
    Afghanistan implies that a long-term presence may be
    envisioned.
        Secretary Gates, a month ago Senator McCain and I wrote to
    you expressing our concern that the directive issued by Deputy
    Secretary England in late October meant that the rules for what
    would be allowed in future supplemental requests were being
    relaxed. We wrote to you, urging that ``a supplemental should
    be limited to expenditures that are directly required in
    connection with ongoing military operations.'' It appears that
    our concerns were well-founded.
        Last fall, we were told that reset requirements for fiscal
    year 2007 would reach about $23 billion, including a
    significant one-time catchup for costs the Army was not able to
    get the administration to request in 2006, but we were told
    that recurring costs would be lower after that. Instead, we now
    see those costs balloon up to $37 billion a year, including the
    purchase of large numbers of aircraft that do not appear to
    meet the definition of emergency spending and which won't be
    delivered for years.
        Finally, in a rather marked change of position for this
    administration, the budget proposes to add 92,000 Active-Duty
    Army and Marine Corps personnel to the force over the next 5
    years, an increase of almost 14 percent in the size of our
    ground forces. This proposed increase is substantially larger
    than increases proposed by Senator Jack Reed and others over
    the past several years, that the DOD had opposed. The
    Department estimates the 5-year cost of this increase at $95
    billion from fiscal years 2008 to 2012, and there are
    additional costs in fiscal year 2007, as well. An increase of
    this size will require us to either permanently increase the
    size of the defense budget or cut back on weapons programs to
    offset the cost of these additional personnel. Once adopted,
    such increases are not easily undone, especially once we invest
    in the equipment and facilities to support these new units.
        We all understand the stress on our forces in Iraq, but
    only some of these additional people would be trained and ready
    to help relieve that stress in the next year or 2. Therefore,
    it is important that we understand exactly what these
    additional personnel are needed for in the long-term that was
    not foreseen in the Quadrennial Defense Review submitted a year
    ago that rejected such increases. Do we intend to stay in Iraq
    for years to come? Does the administration think the long war
    with terrorism is going to be won with large ground forces
    operating in foreign nations?
        Our men and women in uniform are risking their lives
    representing our Nation around the world. All of us support
    them. We appreciate their hard work and the sacrifices that
    they and their families make. We owe it to them to give them
    the tools to succeed, but we also have a duty to them and all
    of America's taxpayers to approve only those funding requests
    that we believe are necessary and appropriate.
        Let me call on Senator Warner. I know that Senator McCain
    is on his way, but--Senator Warner?
        Senator Warner. That's correct. Let's proceed with the
    testimony. At such time as he gets here, he'll make his opening
    remarks.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
        Secretary Gates?

       STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. GATES, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE;
     ACCOMPANIED BY HON. TINA W. JONAS, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
                             (COMPTROLLER)

        Secretary Gates. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I thank the
    committee, first of all, for all you have done over the years
    to support our military for many years, and I appreciate the
    opportunity to provide an overview of the way ahead at the DOD
    through the budgets being proposed this week.
        First, the President's fiscal year 2008 defense budget,
    which includes the base budget request and the fiscal year 2008
    global war on terror request; and, second, the fiscal year 2007
    emergency supplemental appropriation request to fund war-
    related costs for the remainder of the fiscal year. We have
    provided a more detailed statement--opening statement for the
    record, and I'll just be very brief here.
        Joining me today is General Pete Pace, Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Tina Jonas, the Comptroller of the
    DOD.
        In summary, the budget being requested by the President
    will make the strategic investments necessary to modernize and
    recapitalize key capabilities in the Armed Forces, sustain the
    All-Volunteer Military by reducing stress on the force and
    improving the quality of life for our troops and their
    families, improve readiness through additional training and
    maintenance and by resetting forces following their overseas
    deployment, and fund U.S. military operations in Iraq,
    Afghanistan, and elsewhere, in the ongoing campaign against
    violent jihadist networks around the globe.
        I believe it is important to consider these budget requests
    in some historical context, as there has been, understandably,
    sticker shock at their combined price tags, more than $700
    billion. But consider that at about 4 percent of America's
    gross domestic product (GDP), the amount of money the United
    States is projected to spend on defense this year is actually a
    smaller percentage of GDP than when I left government 14 years
    ago, following the end of the Cold War, and a significantly
    smaller percentage than during previous times of war, such as
    Vietnam and Korea.
        Since 1993, with a defense budget that is a smaller
    relative share of our national wealth, the world has gotten
    more complicated and arguably more dangerous. In addition to
    fighting the global war on terror, we also face the danger
    posed by Iran and North Korea's nuclear ambitions and the
    threat they pose not only to their neighbors, but globally,
    because of their record of proliferation; the uncertain paths
    of Russia and China, which are both pursuing sophisticated
    military modernization programs; and a range of other potential
    flashpoints and challenges. In this strategic environment, the
    resources we devote to defense should be at the level to
    adequately meet those challenges.
        Someone once said that experience is that marvelous thing
    that enables you to recognize a mistake when you make it again.
    Five times over the past 90 years, the United States has either
    slashed defense spending or disarmed outright in the mistaken
    belief that the nature of man or the behavior of nations had
    somehow changed, or that we would no longer need capable, well-
    funded military forces on hand to confront threats to our
    Nation's interests and security. Each time, we have paid a
    price.
        The costs of defending the Nation undoubtedly are high. The
    only thing costlier, ultimately, would be to fail to commit the
    resources necessary to defend our interests around the world
    and failure--and to fail to prepare for the inevitable threats
    of the future.
        Before closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this
    opportunity to announce something that is not referenced in my
    statement that was submitted yesterday, but that I wanted to
    bring to the committee's attention.
        The President has decided to stand up a new unified
    combatant command, Africa Command (AFRICOM), to oversee
    security cooperation, building partnership capability, defense
    support to nonmilitary missions, and, if directed, military
    operations on the African continent. This command will enable
    us to have a more effective and integrated approach than the
    current arrangement of dividing Africa between Central Command
    (CENTCOM) and European Command (EUCOM), an outdated arrangement
    left over from the Cold War. This Department will consult
    closely with Congress and work with our European and African
    allies to implement this effort.
        We look forward to taking your questions.
        Thank you, sir.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Gates follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Hon. Robert M. Gates
        Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and members of the committee: I thank
    the committee for all you have done to support our military these many
    years, and I appreciate the opportunity to provide an overview of the
    way ahead at the Department of Defense (DOD) through the budgets being
    proposed this week: First, the President's fiscal year 2008 defense
    budget, which includes the base budget request and the fiscal year 2008
    global war on terror request; and second, the fiscal year 2007
    Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Request to fund war-related costs
    for the remainder of this fiscal year.
        I believe it is important to consider these budget requests in some
    historical context as there has been, understandably, sticker shock at
    their combined price tags--more than $700 billion in total.
        But, consider that at about 4 percent of America's Gross Domestic
    Product (GDP), the amount of money the United States is expected to
    spend on defense this year is actually a smaller percentage of GDP than
    when I left government 14 years ago following the end of the Cold War--
    and a significantly smaller percentage than during previous times of
    war, such as Vietnam and Korea.
        Since 1993, with a defense budget that is a smaller relative share
    of our national wealth, the world has gotten more complicated, and
    arguably more dangerous. In addition to fighting the global war on
    terror, we also face:

             The danger posed by Iran and North Korea's nuclear
            ambitions, and the threat they pose not only to their
            neighbors, but globally, because of their record of
            proliferation.
             The uncertain paths of China and Russia, which are
            both pursuing sophisticated military modernization programs;
            and
             A range of other potential flashpoints and challenges.
            In this strategic environment, the resources we devote to
            defense should be at the level to adequately meet those
            challenges.

        Someone once said that ``Experience is that marvelous thing that
    enables you to recognize a mistake when you make it again.''
        Five times over the past 90 years the United States has either
    slashed defense spending or disarmed outright in the mistaken belief
    that the nature of man or behavior of nations had somehow changed, or
    that we would no longer need capable, well funded military forces on
    hand to confront threats to our Nation's interests and security. Each
    time we have paid a price.
        The costs of defending our Nation are high. The only thing
    costlier, ultimately, would be to fail to commit the resources
    necessary to defend our interests around the world, and to fail to
    prepare for the inevitable threats of the future.
                          fiscal year 2008 base budget
        The President's fiscal year 2008 base budget request of $481.4
    billion is an increase of 11.3 percent over the projected enacted level
    of fiscal year 2007, and provides the resources needed to man,
    organize, train, and equip the Armed Forces of the United States. This
    budget continues efforts to reform and transform our military
    establishment to be more agile, adaptive, and expeditionary to deal
    with a range of both conventional and irregular threats.
        Some military leaders have argued that while our forces can support
    current operations in the war on terror, these operations are
    increasing risks associated with being called on to undertake a major
    conventional conflict elsewhere around the world. This budget provides
    additional resources to mitigate those risks.
        The fiscal year 2008 base budget includes increases of about $16.8
    billion over last year for investments in additional training,
    equipment repair and replacement, and intelligence and support. It
    provides increases in combat training rotations, sustains air crew
    training, and increases ship steaming days.
                             increase ground forces
        Despite significant improvements in the way our military is
    organized and operated, the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan
    have put stress on parts of our Nation's ground forces.
        Last month, the President called for an increase in the permanent
    active end strength of the Army and Marine Corps of some 92,000 troops
    by fiscal year 2012. The base budget request adds $12.1 billion to
    increase ground forces in the next fiscal year, which will consist of
    7,000 additional soldiers and 5,000 additional marines.
        Special Operations Forces, who have come to play an essential and
    unique role in operations against terrorist networks, will also grow by
    5,575 troops between fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008.
                      strategic investments--modernization
        The base budget invests $177 billion in procurement and research
    and development that includes major investments in the next generation
    of technologies. The major weapons systems include:

             Future Combat System ($3.7 billion)--The first
            comprehensive modernization program for the Army in a
            generation.
             Joint Strike Fighter ($6.1 billion)--This next
            generation strike aircraft has variants for the Air Force, the
            Navy, and the Marine Corps. Eight international partners are
            contributing to the JSF's development and production.
             F-22A ($4.6 billion)--Twenty additional aircraft will
            be procured in fiscal year 2008.
             Shipbuilding ($14.4 billion)--The increase of $3.2
            billion over last year is primarily for the next generation
            aircraft carrier, the CVN-21, and the LPD-17 amphibious
            transport ship. The long-term goal is a 313-ship Navy by 2020.
    Missile Defense
        I have believed since the Reagan administration that if we can
    develop a missile defense capability, it would be a mistake for us not
    to do so. There are many countries that either have or are developing
    ballistic missiles, and there are at least two or three others--
    including North Korea--that are developing longer-range systems. We
    also have an obligation to our allies, some of whom have signed on as
    partners in this effort. DOD is proceeding with formal negotiations
    with Poland and the Czech Republic on establishing a European missile
    site. The missile defense program funded by this request will continue
    to test our capability against more complex and realistic scenarios. I
    urge the committee to approve the full $9.9 billion requested for the
    missile defense and Patriot missile programs.
    Space Capabilities
        The recent test of an anti-satellite weapon by China underscored
    the need to continue to develop capabilities in space. The policy of
    the U.S. Government in this area remains consistent with the
    longstanding principles that were established during the Eisenhower
    administration, such as the right of free passage and the use of space
    for peaceful purposes. Space programs are essential to the U.S.
    military's communications, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    capabilities. The base budget requests about $6.0 billion to continue
    the development and fielding of systems that will maintain U.S.
    supremacy while ensuring unfettered, reliable, and secure access to
    space.
    Recapitalization
        A major challenge facing our military is that several key
    capabilities are aging and long overdue for being replaced. The prime
    example is the Air Force KC-135 tanker fleet, which averages 45 years
    per plane. It is becoming more expensive to maintain and less reliable
    to operate. The Air Force has resumed a transparent and competitive
    replacement program to recapitalize this fleet with the KC-X aircraft.
    The KC-X will be able to carry cargo and passengers and will be
    equipped with defensive systems. It is the U.S. Transportation
    Command's and the Air Force's top acquisition and recapitalization
    priority.
              quality of life--sustaining the all-volunteer force
        Our Nation is fortunate that so many talented and patriotic young
    people have stepped forward to serve, and that so many of them have
    chosen to continue to serve.
        In December, all active branches of the U.S. military exceeded
    their recruiting goals, with particularly strong showings by the Army
    and Marine Corps. The fiscal year 2008 request includes $4.0 billion
    for recruiting and retention to ensure that the military continues to
    attract and retain the people we need to grow the ground forces and
    defend the interests of the United States.
        We will continue to support the All-Volunteer Force and their
    families through a variety of programs and initiatives. The budget
    includes:

             $38.7 billion for health care for both Active-Duty and
            retired servicemembers;
             $15 billion for Basic Allowance for Housing to ensure
            that, on average, troops are not forced to incur out-of-pocket
            costs to pay for housing;
             $2.9 billion to improve barracks and family housing
            and privatize an additional 2,870 new family units; and
             $2.1 billion for a 3-percent pay increase for military
            members.

        In addition, recently announced changes in the way the military
    uses and employs the Reserves and National Guard should allow for a
    less frequent and more predictable mobilization schedule for our
    citizen soldiers.
        Combined with other initiatives to better organize, manage, and
    take care of the force, these recent changes should mean that in the
    future our troops should be deployed or mobilized less often, for
    shorter periods of time, and with more predictability and a better
    quality of life for themselves and their families.
                          train and equip authorities
        Operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere have shown the
    critical importance of building the capacity and capability of partners
    and allies to better secure and govern their own countries.
        In recent years we have struggled to overcome the patchwork of
    authorities and regulations that were put in place during a very
    different era--the Cold War--to confront a notably different set of
    threats and challenges.
        The administration has, with congressional support, taken some
    innovative steps to overcome these impediments. A significant
    breakthrough was the section 1206 authority that allows the DOD and
    State Department to more rapidly and effectively train and equip
    partner military forces. In the fiscal year 2008 base budget, we are
    seeking dedicated funding of $500 million to use this authority. I
    would ask for a serious, collaborative effort with Congress to develop
    the right interagency funding mechanisms and authorities to meet
    critical national security needs.
                         global war on terror requests
        The President's two war-related requests are the fiscal year 2007
    Emergency Supplemental request for $93.4 billion, and the fiscal year
    2008 global war on terror request for $141.7 billion.
        The fiscal year 2007 Supplemental Request is in addition to the $70
    billion that has already been appropriated for war-related costs in
    this fiscal year. If these additional funds are delayed, the military
    will be forced to engage in costly and counterproductive reprogramming
    actions starting this spring to make up the shortfall. Timely enaction
    of the fiscal year 2007 supplemental is critical to ensuring our troops
    in the field have the resources they need.
        The additional U.S. ground and naval forces being sent to the Iraq
    theater are projected to cost $5.6 billion. This total includes funding
    for personnel costs, supplies, spare parts, contractor support, and
    transportation.
        The fiscal year 2008 global war on terror request complies with
    Congress's direction to include the costs of ongoing operations in Iraq
    and Afghanistan in the annual DOD budget. Given the uncertainty of
    projecting the cost of operations so far in the future, the funds
    sought for the fiscal year 2008 global war on terror request are
    generally based on a straight-line projection of current costs for Iraq
    and Afghanistan.
        The war-related requests include $39.3 billion in the fiscal year
    2007 supplemental and $70.6 billion in the fiscal year 2008 global war
    on terror request to provide the incremental pay, supplies,
    transportation, maintenance, and logistical support to conduct military
    operations.
    Reconstitution
        The fiscal year 2007 supplemental requests $13.9 billion--and the
    fiscal year 2008 global war on terror request $37.6 billion--to
    reconstitute our Nation's Armed Forces--in particular, to refit the
    ground forces, the Army and Marine Corps, who have borne the brunt of
    combat in both human and material terms. These funds will go to repair
    or replace equipment that has been destroyed, damaged, or stressed in
    the current conflict.
        All Army units deployed, or about to deploy, for missions overseas
    are fully trained and equipped, often with additional gear for their
    particular mission. In an expeditionary, rotational force one can
    expect that units returning from their deployment will decline to a
    lower readiness level as personnel turn over and equipment is repaired
    or replaced. The $13.6 billion in reset funds in the fiscal year 2008
    global war on terror request for the U.S. Army will go a long way
    towards raising the readiness levels across the force.
    Force Protection
        The war-related requests include $10.4 billion in the fiscal year
    2007 Supplemental, and $15.2 billion in the fiscal year 2008 global war
    on terror request for investments in new technologies to better protect
    our troops from an agile and adaptive enemy. Programs being funded
    would include a new generation of body armor, vehicles that can better
    withstand the blasts from improved explosive devises (IEDs), and
    electronic devices that interrupt the enemy's ability to attack U.S.
    forces. Within this force protection category, the fiscal year 2007
    supplemental includes $2.4 billion and the fiscal year 2008 global war
    on terror includes $4.0 billion to counter and defeat the threat posed
    by IEDs.
    Afghan/Iraqi Security Forces
        The fiscal year 2007 supplemental requests $9.7 billion, and the
    fiscal year 2008 global war on terror requests $4.7 billion, to stand
    up capable military and police forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.
        The bulk of these funds are going to train and equip Afghan
    National Security Forces (ANSF) to assume the lead in operations
    throughout Afghanistan. As of last month, some 88,000 have been trained
    and equipped, an increase of 31,000 from the previous year.
        The $5.9 billion for the ANSF in the fiscal year 2007 Supplemental
    is a substantial increase over previous years' appropriations. It
    reflects the urgent priority of countering increased activity by the
    Taliban, al Qaeda, and narcotics traffickers to destabilize and
    undermine the new democracy in Afghanistan. These funds will
    significantly upgrade the capability of Afghan forces to conduct
    independent counterinsurgency operations.
        In Iraq, more than 300,000 soldiers and police have been trained
    and equipped, and are in charge of more than 60 percent of Iraqi
    territory and more than 65 percent of that country's population. They
    have assumed full security responsibility for 3 out of Iraq's 18
    provinces and are scheduled to take over more territory over the course
    of the year. These Iraqi troops, though far from perfect, have shown
    that they can perform with distinction when properly led and supported.
    Iraqi forces will be in the lead during operations to secure Baghdad's
    violent neighborhoods. By significantly increasing and improving the
    embedding program, Iraqi forces will operate with more and better
    coalition support than they had in the past.
    Non-Military Assistance
        Success in the kinds of conflicts our military finds itself in
    today--in Iraq, or elsewhere--cannot be achieved by military means
    alone. The President's strategy for Iraq hinges on key programs and
    additional resources to improve local governance, delivery of public
    services, and quality of life--to get angry young men off the street
    and into jobs where they will be less susceptible to the appeals of
    insurgents or militia groups.
        Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds are a relatively
    small piece of the war-related budgets--$456 million in the fiscal year
    2007 supplemental, and $977 million in the fiscal year 2008 global war
    on terror request. But because they can be dispensed quickly and
    applied directly to local needs, they have had a tremendous impact--far
    beyond the dollar value--on the ability of our troops to succeed in
    Iraq and Afghanistan. By building trust and confidence in coalition
    forces, these CERP projects increase the flow of intelligence to
    commanders in the field and help turn local Iraqis and Afghans against
    insurgents and terrorists.
                                   conclusion
        With the assistance and the counsel of Congress, I believe we have
    the opportunity to do right by our troops and the sacrifices that they
    and their families have made these past few years. That means we must
    make the difficult choices and commit the necessary resources to not
    only prevail in the current conflicts in which they are engaged, but to
    be prepared to take on the threats that they, their children, and our
    Nation may face in the future.

        Chairman Levin. General Pace?

     STATEMENT OF GEN. PETER PACE, USMC, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF
                                 STAFF

        General Pace. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
    thank you very much, sir, for this opportunity to be with you
    today.
        If I may ask, Mr. Chairman, that my written statement be
    made part of the record.
        Chairman Levin. It will be.
        General Pace. I would like to, on behalf of all of us in
    uniform, thank this committee and the Members of Congress for
    your strong bipartisan support, and especially for the trips
    that you make to the region and to the hospitals. Your visits
    make a difference.
        I'd like to thank our troops and their families. They are
    just magnificent, both when they serve overseas and with their
    families here at home. We owe them a great debt of gratitude,
    and I am proud to represent them in front of you this morning.
        I'd also like to thank the employers of our National Guard
    and Reserve. We could not be doing what we're doing without the
    National Guard and Reserve. These military members are key
    parts of our team, and we recognize that they are also key
    parts of business teams from where they come, and we appreciate
    the employers' patience and support as they perform their
    duties for the Nation.
        As you look out across the globe for the next 12 months or
    so, it's hard to see where the demand is going to diminish.
    Without predicting, you can take a lap around the globe, start
    with Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen,
    Somalia, Sudan, Colombia, Venezuela, Philippines, Indonesia,
    Malaysia, North Korea, and back around to Pakistan. I'm sure I
    missed a few, but there are multiple challenges out there for
    our Armed Forces, which, to me, solidifies the need for more
    troops, as has already been mentioned, and the opportunity, in
    the mid-grade levels and mid-grade enlisted--to be able to
    expand those groups, because they're the ones we depend on
    heavily to help train and equip our partners. We need to look
    at how we have authorized our military and our Department of
    State (DOS) to work with our partners and find those
    impediments to effective and efficient assistance, and work
    with Congress to overcome them.
        We should also look at the expeditionary capabilities of
    other parts of our Government, other than the U.S. military, to
    see what the impediments are there that we might be able to
    employ more efficiently all the powers of national government
    and not just your military.
        Lastly, we should take a good hard look at our interagency
    effectiveness, take a look at, for example, the empowerment
    that the Goldwater-Nichols Act gave us in jointness in the
    military, and see which, if any, of those kinds of ideas would
    help us be more effective and efficient in the way we operate
    in interagency here in and across the planet.
        With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you, again, for this
    opportunity, and I'll look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Pace follows:]
                  Prepared Statement by Gen. Peter Pace, USMC
        Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and distinguished members of the
    committee, it is my privilege to report to you on the posture of the
    U.S. Armed Forces. On behalf of 2.4 million Active-Duty, Guard, and
    Reserve soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and our families, thank you
    for your continued support. Your visits to troops in Iraq, Afghanistan,
    and beyond; comfort to the wounded; and funding for transformation,
    recapitalization, pay and benefits are deeply appreciated.
        America's military is the world's finest, due in large measure to
    the patriotic sacrifices of our Nation's servicemembers. I want to
    thank them and their families for all they have done, and continue to
    do, to maintain our freedom. For the first time, America's All-
    Volunteer Force is fighting a long term war with a significant
    commitment of combat forces. Our troops are serving with extraordinary
    dedication and distinction. They are an inspiration to us all and I am
    honored to represent them here today.
        Winning the war on terrorism is and will remain our number one
    priority. At the same time, we will continue to transform our Armed
    Forces, strengthen joint warfighting capabilities, and improve the
    quality-of-life of our servicemembers and their families.
                             strategic environment
        My biennial National Military Strategy Risk Assessment was recently
    submitted to Congress. That classified document and the Secretary of
    Defense's plan for mitigating risk depict the challenges we face around
    the globe and discuss how we will overcome them. Sustained deployments,
    equipment utilization, and operational tempo each impart risk from a
    military perspective. The current heavy demand for ground, sea, and air
    capabilities is not likely to dissipate in the immediate future.
        As stated in my assessment, our Armed Forces stand ready to protect
    the homeland, prevent conflict, and prevail over adversaries. These
    missions present simultaneous and interrelated challenges of varying
    intensity, immediacy, and danger.
        America's Armed Forces are in our sixth year of sustained combat
    operations. We are fighting sectarian violence, insurgency, and
    terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan. Al Qaeda and its allies threaten the
    safety of our homeland and our overseas partners--threats made more
    alarming by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We face
    other threats and challenges as well:

             Iran sponsors operations in Lebanon and Iraq that are
            destabilizing those governments. In addition, Iran's drive to
            enrich uranium highlights its desire to assert greater
            influence in a region of vital interest to our Nation.
             North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons and
            associated missile technologies poses another strategic
            challenge. The launch of multiple ballistic missiles on the
            Fourth of July 2006 coupled with the apparent successful
            detonation of a nuclear device in October 2006 undermines
            counterproliferation efforts, threatens many, and could provoke
            a regional arms race.
             China's military build-up continues unabated, to
            include offensive strike missiles, expanded sea and air control
            capabilities, antisatellite systems, cyberattack technologies,
            and an increasingly capable Navy and Air Force.
             Pakistan requires continued international support to
            maintain stability. Given its possession of nuclear weapons and
            pivotal location, a stable government in Pakistan is critical
            to guard against transnational terrorism and ease tensions with
            neighboring India.
             The Abu Sayaf Group in the southern Philippines and al
            Qaeda's partner Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia threaten
            international maritime security in strategic waterways.
             Narcoterrorists in Latin America destabilize
            societies, harm nations, and hold American citizens hostage.
             The governments of Venezuela and Cuba are openly anti-
            U.S. Together, they actively seek to create alignments to
            oppose us throughout the region.
             Succession questions in Cuba may lead to mass
            migration.
             Political and humanitarian challenges in Africa are
            myriad, including the specter of growing instability, genocide,
            civil war, and safe havens for terrorists.

        Given the breadth of these challenges, their complexity, and their
    potential long duration, we must increase our overall capacity in order
    to reduce strategic risk. The proposed fiscal year 2008 budget, the
    fiscal year 2007 supplemental, and the fiscal year 2008 global war on
    terrorism request match resources to these tasks. These budget requests
    represent a significant investment, but that investment is
    approximately 3.9 percent of our gross national product--relatively
    modest in historic terms.
                            win the war on terrorism
        We must prevail in the global war on terrorism. Sustaining
    operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, while maintaining readiness to
    respond to new contingencies around the globe, is a heavy burden for
    our current force structure. Nearly a million American men and women in
    uniform have deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, and more than 400,000
    have been deployed more than once. Presently, more than 200,000 troops
    are deployed to the Central Command area of responsibility; another
    210,000 are elsewhere overseas. Most of our Army Brigade Combat Teams
    and their Marine Corps regiment equivalents receive only 1 year at
    their home station before deploying again--and that year is spent
    actively preparing to redeploy overseas to fight. We will have 20
    Brigade/Regimental Combat Teams deployed to Iraq, with another 3 in
    Afghanistan, 1 in Korea, and 1 in Kosovo. This drives our units to
    operate at about a 1:1 ``deployed:at-home'' ratio--which is about half
    the time we believe is necessary to sustain readiness for the long-
    term.
        To accomplish our missions in Iraq and Afghanistan and remain
    prepared for other challenges, the President and Secretary of Defense
    have announced a number of personnel initiatives. These include the
    increase of force structure for the Army and Marine Corps, and policy
    changes to the way we mobilize our Reserve Component. The Army and
    Marine Corps are both focused on using this added troop strength to
    grow their operational forces. We are committed to building an active
    Army of 48 Brigade Combat Teams. That is an increase from a previous
    goal of 42. For the Marine Corps, we are adding one Regimental Combat
    Team. The Army is also civilianizing military positions, cutting its
    non-operational force structure, and reallocating those manpower
    savings to combat units. The Marine Corps is also implementing policy
    to ensure all marines have the opportunity to serve in a combat zone.
        Approximately 38,000 individual augmentees have deployed to
    headquarters such as Multi-National Force-Iraq, the International
    Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, and U.S. Central Command.
    Nearly 13,000 others have helped train Afghan and Iraqi forces. Most of
    these positions are filled by mid-grade leaders normally serving in
    operational units. Increased manning in these mid-grade ranks, to
    include the Army's request for an additional 2,852 field grade
    officers, will fill requirements without undermining combat units.
        Our weapons, equipment, and supplies have been reduced by combat
    loss and consumption in Iraq and Afghanistan during the past 5\1/2\
    years. We have also used significant resources in disaster relief
    operations responding to the Asian Tsunami, Hurricane Katrina, and
    Pakistan's earthquake. The fiscal year 2007 supplemental and fiscal
    year 2008 global war on terrorism request include a total of $51.5
    billion to reconstitute our Joint Forces. While it will take some time
    for newly authorized troops to become available for deployment and for
    reconstitution of equipment to take effect, our men and women in
    uniform are grateful for the much needed additional manpower and
    resources that are on the way.
        The challenges we face are not ours alone; they threaten many
    others. Working with partners improves our ability to defeat terrorist
    networks and increases regional stability and security. Our regional
    security cooperation efforts in Latin America, particularly in Colombia
    where great progress is occurring, help local militaries protect
    democratic governments and build partnership capacity to counter
    terrorist, narcotic, and other illicit activity. In the Far East, our
    support for Southeast Asia maritime security in the Strait of Malacca
    and the Sulu and Sulawesi Seas helps fight terrorist and criminal
    activity. Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa and the Trans-Sahara
    Counterterrorism Initiative deter terrorist activity, provide
    humanitarian assistance, and improve the ability of African countries
    to foster security within their own borders. We are establishing a new
    unified command for Africa to better integrate U.S. interagency efforts
    and partner with other nations and international organizations.
        Boosting the capability of other countries' forces and providing
    direct action support to commanders in the field requires that we
    expand our irregular warfare capabilities. Irregular warfare includes
    long duration unconventional warfare, counterterrorism,
    counterinsurgency, clandestine operations, and military support for
    stabilization and reconstruction. Our Special Operations units perform
    these missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and deploy to approximately 40
    other countries around the world. To answer these demands, we are
    expanding the size of our Special Operations Forces and we have
    established the Marine Special Operations Command. We are also moving
    forward with the Global Special Operations Force Posture plan that will
    maximize the number of Special Operations Units forward deployed.
        In addition to physical battlefields, the global war on terrorism
    has a significant information component. Our enemies use propaganda to
    deliver their message and justify their actions. We counter the enemy's
    efforts most effectively when our actions and words reinforce America's
    strategic goals and national ideals. We deny our foes success in
    mobilizing sympathizers when local and global audiences understand the
    enemy's true intent. The Joint Staff, the combatant commands, and the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense are working together to ensure
    greater consistency and timeliness in our strategic communication
    efforts.
        At its most basic level, winning the war on terrorism means
    defending our homeland. To better protect the United States from direct
    attack, our Armed Forces are working closely with civilian leadership
    in Federal, State, and local governments to provide an effective
    response in time of crisis. The Navy and Coast Guard are strengthening
    maritime domain awareness. The Air Force maintains surveillance and
    interceptor alerts to provide air sovereignty protection. The Army is
    investing in expanded biological weapons detection equipment and
    vaccines. We are continuing to increase the capability of our Chemical,
    Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosive Consequence
    Management Response Forces and seeking more resources to better respond
    to multiple events in different locations. Contingency plans are
    continually refined so that the Armed Forces are prepared to assist
    civil authorities in the event of another terrorist attack. We are
    creating additional weapons of mass destruction response teams.
    Moreover, we are working with coalition partners, through intelligence
    sharing, coordinated planning, and agreements such as the Proliferation
    Security Initiative to prevent the spread of weapons of mass
    destruction.
        Additionally, your Armed Forces are prepared to assist in
    responding to natural disasters. In such events, we would provide
    support in the form of manpower, logistics, transportation,
    communications, and planning, just as we did following the devastation
    of Hurricane Katrina. Likewise, military planners are focused on the
    dangers of a possible global Pandemic Influenza, to ensure our
    readiness to execute military missions and support civil authorities.
                           accelerate transformation
        The evolving diverse threats to our Nation make it imperative that
    we adapt and innovate. Transformation is a continual effort to
    significantly increase our ability to deter and defeat America's foes.
    It is an ongoing process of rethinking our doctrine and operational
    concepts; fashioning professional education and training to meet new
    challenges; restructuring our organizations and business practices to
    be more agile; improving our personnel policies; adapting our planning
    systems to be more responsive; reforming our acquisition and budget
    processes; and harnessing advanced technology. It is not an end state.
    It is a mindset and a culture that encourages innovation and fresh
    thinking.
        We need a dramatic leap forward in our relationship with
    interagency and international partners. Today's many challenges--
    conventional, insurgency, terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons
    of mass destruction--require that our Armed Forces work closely with
    our civilian government counterparts and multinational partners. Much
    like Goldwater-Nichols accomplished for our Armed Forces two decades
    ago, we should assess what new or revised authorities are needed to
    enhance interagency coordination, and build a more joint and integrated
    process. To increase our Government's overall effectiveness in the war
    on terrorism, we must improve three areas.
        First, we must improve our ability to build partnership capacity.
    Our struggle against violent extremists requires that we fight people
    who hide in countries with whom we are not at war. In many cases, the
    best way to do this is by augmenting the capacity of those countries to
    defeat terrorism and increase stability--helping them overcome problems
    within their borders and eliminate terrorist safe havens. Legislation
    proposed by the Department of Defense and Department of State, the
    Building Global Partnerships Act, extends and expands past enacted
    1206, 1207, and 1208 authorities for educating, training, and equipping
    foreign forces for counterterrorism and stability operations. In
    addition, an interagency National Security Initiative Fund, to better
    invest in countering terrorism with other countries is required. In a
    time when national security priorities require integrated action by
    multiple government agencies, resource sharing and coordination among
    departments is essential. Authorization for a National Security
    Initiative Fund, under congressional oversight and managed jointly by
    the Departments of State and Defense, will provide us with needed
    flexibility. Such a fund will be instrumental in harnessing resources
    across agencies to address changed circumstances and policies, and will
    complement congressionally granted transfer authority and emergency
    supplemental appropriations.
        Second, we need greater expeditionary capabilities in U.S.
    Government civilian agencies for stabilization and reconstruction
    operations. Our civilian agencies are underresourced to meet the
    requirements of the 21 century. Greater investment in these agencies is
    required if they are to be more effective in the global war on
    terrorism. To increase their expeditionary capability, the President
    has proposed the creation of a Civilian Reserve Corps for the State
    Department. We strongly support this initiative to boost our Nation's
    capability to deploy civilian expertise in tandem with our military.
        Third, we must enhance interagency effectiveness. Just as the
    Goldwater-Nichols Act established a system of incentives and
    requirements to foster jointness among military officers, we need to
    find ways inside of our Government to encourage interagency expertise.
    Rewarding interagency education, interagency experiences, interagency
    collaboration, and interagency planning will facilitate better synergy
    between departments. We can go beyond the education we provide our
    military and civil servant professionals by transforming our National
    Defense University into a National Security University. We can build on
    the success of interagency centers such as the National
    Counterterrorism Center and Joint Interagency Coordination Groups at
    the combatant commands--which increase our operational effectiveness
    while providing personnel with interagency experience. We can increase
    planning capacity in civilian agencies. We can improve our planning,
    coordination, and operational execution through interagency exercises.
    Shared deliberate and crisis planning capacity among our interagency
    partners will improve our Nation's readiness for operations, and better
    integrate our Nation's diplomatic, military, intelligence, information,
    and economic instruments to forestall and address crises.
    Strengthen Joint Warfighting
        To win the war and continue the process of transformation, we are
    strengthening our joint warfighting capabilities. By employing our
    Service branches in a joint manner, we leverage their complementary
    capabilities. We can and should, however, go beyond our current level
    of jointness by moving from an interoperable force to an interdependent
    force. We have already had some successes. For instance, naval aviation
    is now responsible for all airborne electronic warfare. Air Force
    Unmanned Aircraft Systems provide key intelligence for all Services.
    Moreover, Navy and Air Force security, communications, and logistics
    elements fill joint requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan.
        Combatant commanders have identified shortfalls in our persistent
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, such as
    shortages of platforms, sensors, and processing infrastructure. To
    better support our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    needs, we are budgeting for more capacity. We are also refining
    integration between our unmanned assets, human intelligence operations,
    and our analysis capabilities--improving all.
        Warfighter demands for satellite platforms and related terminal
    programs continue to grow as we field more bandwidth-intensive systems,
    deploy to austere locations, and connect more tactical users to our
    Global Information Grid. To meet our requirements for beyond-line-of-
    sight and reachback communications, we must maintain military satellite
    communications launch schedules, leverage commercial capabilities,
    pursue efficiencies, and continue research and development initiatives.
        America and our friends around the globe are increasingly dependent
    on networked communications systems to store, modify, and exchange
    data. Interruption of our access to cyberspace could significantly
    damage national defense and civil society. The Armed Forces' new cyber
    strategy sets a course that calls for the development of new
    organizations, intellectual capital, and greater interagency
    coordination. To ensure unity of effort, U.S. Strategic Command's Joint
    Task Force--Global Network Operations is working with the combatant
    commands, the Services, and the interagency to strengthen and integrate
    defensive and offensive cyber capabilities. We are reviewing the
    authorities and responsibilities required for dealing with cyberspace
    threats, particularly as they apply to our relationship with other U.S.
    Government agencies. Changes in authority and policy must ensure that
    the entire U.S. Government is able to meet current and emerging
    threats.
        We must also enhance our capability to engage targets globally and
    rapidly to strengthen strategic deterrence and response. We are
    developing conventional long-range strike capability, improving missile
    defense, and modernizing our national command and control. These
    efforts will ensure our strategic deterrence capabilities remain
    relevant.
       improve the quality of life of our servicemembers and our families
        Our men and women in uniform are our most precious resource. We
    must continue to ensure their welfare and that of their families. The
    most advanced ship, aircraft, or weapon system is useless without
    motivated and well-trained people. Every day, our soldiers, sailors,
    airmen, and marines serve our Nation with distinction. We do well to
    honor their service by providing for them and their loved ones.
        As of the submission of this statement, the fiscal year 2007
    military construction, quality of life, and veteran's affairs
    appropriation is being considered for funding by a House Joint
    Resolution. Congressional approval of the proposed resolution without
    amendment will cause a $3.1 billion shortfall in the Base Realignment
    and Closure (BRAC) appropriation. This shortfall will jeopardize our
    ability to complete BRAC actions within statutory deadlines and create
    negative effects on the movement of our troops and their families in
    support of our global defense posture restructuring.
        Predictability of deployments for all servicemembers is a key
    factor to quality of life. Sustainable force rotation policies are
    needed to spread the burden across the Active and Reserve components.
    Greater mobilization predictability for Reserve component members, and
    their families and employers is required. To accomplish this, the
    Secretary of Defense has established a new Total Force Policy. The
    mobilization of Reserve component forces will be managed on a unit,
    instead of an individual, basis--and with a goal of one year maximum
    mobilization, followed by 5 years at home. This predictability will
    improve the quality of life in our National Guard and Reserve while
    fostering greater unit cohesion. Stop Loss for both Active-Duty and
    Reserve Forces will be minimized.
        To our families, protecting our troops in combat is the most
    important measure of quality of life. All DOD personnel in Iraq and
    Afghanistan have state-of-the-art body armor. As technology improves we
    are procuring the next generation of body armor. Likewise, thanks to
    your continued support, currently all of our tactical vehicles that
    operate off forward operating bases in Central Command's area of
    responsibility have armor protection. We are purchasing vehicles
    explicitly designed from the wheels up to limit Improvised Explosive
    Device damage. To further counter Improvised Explosive Devices, we
    established the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization.
    Teaming with private industry, we continue to make progress in this
    vital endeavor.
        Providing for our troops and their families also means caring for
    our wounded. Our military medical system saves lives everyday--and
    helps them heal here at home. The efforts of our medical professionals
    and recent advances in medicine, technology, and rehabilitation
    techniques make a huge difference. Injury survivability rates are at a
    historic high--nearly 9 in 10 of all wounded troops survive, many of
    whom would have died in past conflicts. We are also working to address
    the effects of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. Many injuries have a
    profound impact on troops and their families, and our health care
    system is dedicated to doing everything possible to bring them back to
    duty, if they wish--or, through our Military Severely Injured Center
    and the Services' wounded warrior programs, help our wounded return to
    society empowered to make a positive difference.
                                   conclusion
        I testify before you today with tremendous pride in the performance
    of your Armed Forces. Some are in combat. Others stand guard. All are
    at war helping deter attacks on our Nation and allies.
        Like World War II did for the Greatest Generation, this war will
    define this generation, and our troops are doing an extraordinary job.
    They serve this Nation superbly, willingly, and unflinchingly--
    volunteers all. The sacrifices they and their families bear for our
    entire Nation warrant our deepest gratitude. Like so many who have gone
    before them, their heroism is awe inspiring. It is an honor to serve
    alongside them.
        Thank you for your support.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you, General.
        Ms. Jonas?
        Ms. Jonas. I have nothing for the record, sir, and I'll be
    glad to answer questions.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Let's have a 8-minute round for our first round.
        General, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General
    Schoomaker, has expressed some real concern about our readiness
    situation, particularly the readiness of our nondeployed ground
    forces. Are you concerned?
        Secretary Gates. Sir, I am concerned. We have had this
    discussion with the Chiefs multiple times. I'm satisfied that
    the amount of money in the budget, about $51 billion, give or
    take a little bit over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP),
    addresses the need for reconstitution of the force. We also are
    taking a look at the training time available, and that's why
    the increased size of the force would really help. Mr.
    Chairman, right now our Army units are about 1 year out and 1
    year back, and then 1 year out again. In that 1 year that
    they're back, they get a little bit of leave, some family time,
    and then they retrain to go back to either Afghanistan or Iraq.
    Therefore, they do not have the opportunity that they would
    normally have on our 2-year cycle to train for the combined
    arms that they may be required to execute elsewhere in the
    world. So, there's a collection of things out there that can be
    mitigated by the budget that's before us.
        Chairman Levin. There recently was an article in the
    Washington Post that indicated that plans to surge additional
    U.S. forces into Iraq are placing an unacceptable strain on the
    Army's capability to provide deploying units with required
    equipment. The DOD Inspector General (IG) released a report on
    January 25 indicating that troops in the theater are already
    experiencing shortages of force-protection equipment,
    electronic countermeasure devices, crew-served weapons, and
    communications equipment.
        There's also some anecdotal evidence of problems. The San
    Francisco Chronicle reported on Sunday that the 1st Brigade of
    the 3rd Infantry Division had so little time between
    deployments to Iraq that they had to cram more than a year's
    worth of training into 4 months.
        Can you give us assurance that troops arriving in the
    theater are going to be fully equipped and trained before they
    enter combat in Iraq?
        General Pace. Sir, the short answer to your question is,
    yes, sir. I had a discussion, as recently as yesterday, with
    General Conway, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and General
    Schoomaker and General Cody, the Chief of Staff and the Vice
    Chief of the Army, and they are looking at the deployment plan
    to get the additional troops to Iraq. The timeline that our
    troops are on will allow us to fully man, train, and equip the
    units before they deploy to Iraq. There's one area that is not
    going to be 100-percent equipment, and that has to deal with
    the uparmored Humvees and some of the armored trucks. We have
    about 41,000-plus armored vehicles in theater. There's a small
    delta that that number will not be able to cover all of the
    troops that are deploying. But the mandate from General Casey
    is, and will remain, that no one will leave operating bases
    unless they are in properly uparmored Humvees. So, we do have a
    delta there. That will be closed by July of this year. But
    that's the only place, sir, where the troops will not have the
    equipment before they deploy.
        Chairman Levin. Why should they be deployed before they
    have that equipment?
        General Pace. Sir, they'll be able to have about 98 percent
    of the vehicles that are required. There's a small delta. The
    commanders on the ground have talked with the Chief of Staff of
    the Army and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and have
    agreed that they will be able to share the assets on the ground
    so that no soldier or marine will leave the compound without
    proper protection.
        Chairman Levin. I thank you.
        Secretary Gates, although it's been suggested that we will
    be able to----
        [Audience interruption.]
        Ma'am, if you'd be seated, we would appreciate it.
        Although it has been suggested, Secretary Gates, that we be
    able to measure Iraqi performance on their commitments, the new
    National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq indicates that
    bringing down the level of violence in Baghdad could take more
    than a year and a half, and that's if things go better than
    expected. How long are you planning for the increased number of
    U.S. troops to be deployed? How much funding are you requesting
    and planning to request for this increase? Very specifically,
    is it true that there are no dollars for the surge in the
    fiscal year 2008 request?
        Secretary Gates. The answer to your last question is yes,
    Mr. Chairman, there is no money in there for the surge.
        Chairman Levin. Starting October 1.
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. As I testified earlier, I think
    those of us involved in the decisionmaking process anticipated
    that this reinforcement would take months, not 18 months to 2
    years. As we've indicated, the fiscal year 2008 global war on
    terror request is basically a straight-line projection of our
    costs in fiscal year 2007, based on 140,000 troops in Iraq and
    20,000 troops in Afghanistan.
        Chairman Levin. But is the bottom line, because of the time
    limitation that you are assuming in your budget, that the surge
    will not last longer than September 30?
        Secretary Gates. Well, we are----
        Chairman Levin. In terms of budgeting.
        Secretary Gates. We are basically--in the budget, there is
    no assumption to that effect, but we have allowed as----
        Chairman Levin. There is no assumption to what effect?
        Secretary Gates. That the reinforcement lasts beyond the
    end of this year.
        Chairman Levin. The fiscal year.
        Secretary Gates. This fiscal year. But we have allowed as
    how the fiscal year 2008 global war on terror request is a
    straight-line projection that probably will need to be
    adjusted, one way or the other, depending on events on the
    ground.
        Chairman Levin. All right, thank you. General Casey, at his
    confirmation hearing, said that two of the three Iraqi brigade
    headquarters and four of the seven battalions which the Iraqis
    have promised have arrived in Baghdad. He said that they're in
    the range of only 55- to 65-percent strength. Is that
    acceptable?
        Secretary Gates. When I was asked this at a press
    conference last Friday, I said no, that 55 percent wasn't good
    enough.
        Chairman Levin. Now, we do have off-ramps, I understand, in
    the brigades as they arrive, so that each month we'll make a
    decision--in the next few months--as to whether the next
    month's arrival should continue. Is that accurate?
        Secretary Gates. All of the brigades that are part of the
    reinforcement have orders to deploy. As I indicated in an
    earlier testimony, there will be the opportunity to evaluate
    the situation on the ground, and the commander on the ground
    will evaluate the situation, in terms of whether all those
    forces ultimately are needed or deploy.
        Chairman Levin. Now, is one of the reasons they might not
    be utilized, although the current order exists, is because the
    Iraqis have not come through with their committed forces? Could
    that be a reason not to proceed with those--actual utilization
    of the forces? Could that be?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. I've testified several times
    that I believe that the performance of the Iraqis is absolutely
    critical to the success of this operation.
        Chairman Levin. Now, is that going to be left to General
    Petraeus, that decision, or is that going to be ultimately
    yours and the President's?
        Secretary Gates. That decision, sir, I think, would
    ultimately be the President's. It would clearly be informed by
    the recommendations of the commander in the field, the Chiefs,
    and myself.
        Chairman Levin. I want to be really clear here that you are
    leaving open the possibility that troops, even though there is
    an order to deploy them, may not be, in fact, utilized, and
    that decision will be made month to month, and could be based
    on whether or not the Iraqis come through with their committed
    troops. I want to be real clear on that.
        Secretary Gates. Trying to be equally clear, I would say
    that we will have a continuing evaluation going on, in terms of
    the Iraqis' performance, but the troops are, at this point, all
    under orders to deploy.
        Chairman Levin. All right. In terms of Iraqi performance, I
    want to get the word ``could'' and ``would'' and ``should''
    straight here--I think it ``should'' be--you're not testifying
    on a ``should.'' I'm asking you on the ``could'' word. Could
    the failure, if it happens, of Iraq to provide the troops
    committed--could that be a factor as to whether or not troops--
    although currently ordered to deploy, are, in fact, utilized?
    Could that be a factor?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        My time is up. Senator Warner?
        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        We welcome our guests today. It's a very difficult task to
    try and do the budgetary calculations for the most uncertain
    future that faces our military. In my first view of it, you've
    done as well as you could under the circumstances.
        I would like to follow on to the Chairman's question about
    the readiness of the Iraqi army. Three hundred and twenty
    thousand is the overall figure, of army and police, that the
    United States have been training. It's interesting, the quote
    is, ``The Iraqi security forces are 2\1/2\ years into 3\1/2\-
    year development process.'' So, it takes us from 2\1/2\ to 3\1/
    2\ years to train these forces? I have never, in my
    recollection, heard those types of estimates given to this
    committee heretofore. Furthermore, the equipment that they will
    need--which of you witnesses--the general?--could respond--on
    the status of the equipment--because some months ago, when I
    was chairman of the committee, I think Senator Levin and I sent
    a series of letters urging that we expedite the equipping of
    the Iraqi forces so they could become a more viable partner in
    this conflict. What's your understanding of the status of that
    equipping?
        General Pace. Sir, the original 328,000 Iraqi army and
    police that were due to be trained and equipped by the end of
    December 2006 have, in fact, been trained and equipped. What
    has been added to that is up to 362,000 in addition, by Prime
    Minister Maliki, to be trained during 2007 and what we had
    already planned to do, which was, in 2007, train their
    logistics elements. So, I'm not--I guess if you do the math,
    it's 2\1/2\ years plus 1 year--probably 2\1/2\ years of
    training to date plus 1 year of training in 2007, but the
    328,000 that were supposed to be done has been done, and the
    new add for 2007 will be done in 2007.
        Senator Warner. So, generally speaking, can you make the
    statement that the Iraqi troops that are going to be engaged in
    the Baghdad campaign, as enunciated by the President on January
    20, are trained and equipped adequately.
        General Pace. Yes, sir, I can.
        Senator Warner. It's interesting that it takes 2\1/2\ years
    to train the Iraqi forces. If you look at the NIE that was just
    issued, ``nonetheless, the term `civil war' accurately
    describes key elements of the Iraqi conflict, including
    hardening ethnosectarian identities, a sea of change in the
    character of the violence, ethnosectarian mobilization, and
    population displacements.'' Really, there's so many definitions
    of the different types of individuals striking at the coalition
    forces, and principally the United States, they haven't had
    2\1/2\ years of training, yet they're fighting, I would say,
    somewhat effectively. So, I've just never been able to
    comprehend why we've put 2\1/2\ years into training an Iraqi
    force, when these people, almost overnight, train themselves,
    equip themselves, and are becoming formidable combatants.
        General Pace. Sir, the 2\1/2\ years is done, as of December
    2006, for the first 328,000. We had to recruit and form up into
    units, learned lessons along the way about some of the recruits
    not being loyal to the central government, but being loyal to
    sects, and having then to be brought offline and retrained. To
    properly man, train, and equip an army, sir, is different than
    training somebody to take an artillery shell and plant it on
    the side of the road and be effective.
        Sir, there have been no effective attacks of enemy units on
    any coalition forces. Where they are effective is in the
    improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and it does not take 2\1/
    2\ years to train somebody how to build and deploy an IED.
        Senator Warner. Right, and the snipers have been very
    effective.
        General Pace. Some of their snipers have been very
    effective, sir, and they've received weapons from outside the
    country that have helped in that effectiveness, that's true.
        Senator Warner. We witnessed here what was described as one
    of the largest explosions ever experienced in the history of
    this conflict, when that marketplace was hit and some 150
    killed and some several hundred seriously wounded. Give us your
    own feeling about the progression by which this polyglot of
    enemies that are coming against us--whether it's sectarian
    violence or all of these phrases I've never seen before--
    ethnosectarian mobilization, so forth--what is the status of
    their weaponry? Is it not improving? Are our forces now subject
    to similar risk associated with this bombing that took 150
    lives? It seems to me that was a truck loaded with some type of
    explosives. Can you give us a degree of the increasing risk due
    to the weaponry that is now facing--or in the hands of these
    polyglot of people coming after us?
        General Pace. Sure. Let me give you some information about
    the IEDs, if I may, sir, and I'll see if that answers your
    question.
        First of all, the number of IEDs that has been emplaced has
    doubled over the course of the last year. The equipment that we
    have provided, thanks to Congress, to our troops, plus, the
    tactics, techniques, and procedures that we use against them,
    plus the jammers and the like that we provide, technology wise,
    have resulted in much fewer of those explosions and having less
    casualties against our troops. But, the increase in the number,
    despite the decrease in their effectiveness, has resulted in
    about a sustained level of casualties from IEDs.
        The basic material for an IED is ammunition. So far, we
    have cleared 430,000 tons of ammunition from over 15,000 sites
    in Iraq. The amount of ammunition available is incredible. You
    add that to the new explosively formed projectiles, which are a
    much more deadly form, that are coming into Iraq from Iran, and
    the combination has maintained the level of casualties, despite
    the fact that we have been more effective against each
    explosion.
        Senator Warner. Secretary Gates, I've supported the
    President in his conclusion that we cannot let the Iraq
    sovereign nation, which we have had so much of our sacrifice to
    achieve, be lost, and that it must be this government and any
    successive government, supported so that that country can
    continue to exercise, as best it can, the reins of sovereignty.
        Yet recently, people have described the surge operation--
    and I quote are, ``the last chance,'' or ``the last best
    chance.'' To me, that type of rhetoric is inviting almost--it's
    a timetable for the Baghdad operation, ``If it doesn't succeed,
    it was our last chance.'' I have to believe that we're thinking
    beyond the Baghdad operation, and if it doesn't meet all of its
    goals, we still have to, if we're going to stick with the
    President, say that we have to come up with some formulation to
    see that we can continue to try and help this government and
    the people of Iraq maintain their sovereignty. Am I correct?
        [Audience interruption.]
        Chairman Levin. Excuse me. Excuse me, ma'am. Please sit
    down.
        Senator Warner. Is this our last chance in your judgment?
        Secretary Gates. It is not the last chance. I think
    everyone agrees that--or most people agree that it would be a
    serious consequence for this country and for the region were we
    to leave Iraq in chaos. Clearly, part of the debate, if I
    understand it correctly, that is going on, is, how best do you
    incentivize the Iraqi Government to take responsibility for the
    future of their own country, and in a way that allows us, over
    some period of time, to draw down our forces, because they have
    performed and have accepted responsibility for their country? I
    think that if this operation were not to succeed--and we
    clearly are hoping it will succeed, planning for it to succeed,
    allocating the resources for it to succeed--but I would tell
    you that I think I would be irresponsible if I weren't thinking
    about what the alternatives might be if that didn't happen. But
    we are planning for its success.
        Senator Warner. I certainly hope it is successful. I just
    have my thoughts about this operation, as we stated in the
    resolution I've drawn up, to put greater and greater emphasis
    on the Iraqis taking the lead. We've trained 300,000-plus of
    these individuals, and now is the time for them to show that
    that training can enable them to take the brunt, the major
    portion, of this Iraqi Baghdad operation, and perhaps we don't
    need to reach the level of troops that are forecast by the
    President, some 20,000 additional. Then, there's a subsidiary
    question raised by various budget authorities, If the 21,500 is
    all, are there not other supplemental troops that have to
    accompany those troops, and, therefore, the figure is bigger
    than 21,500?
        Secretary Gates. The----
        Chairman Levin. The gentleman's time has expired, and we
    also have a quorum, if we could just, before we call on Senator
    Kennedy.
        [Recess.]
        Senator Kennedy.
        Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, the witness was about to
    answer the question I posed as to whether or not the 21,500
    needs to be increased by an additional group of soldiers,
    sailors, airmen, and marines, to provide the infrastructure.
        Secretary Gates. Each of the brigades that is included in
    the 21,500 has inherent in it combat support elements that the
    number of 21,500 might go up modestly or go down modestly,
    depending on the requirements on the ground.
        General Pace, do you want to add anything to that?
        General Pace. Yes, sir. The bulk of the combat support--
    combat service support will be provided by the units that are
    already there or inherent in the units that are going. There
    may be some unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) support needed and
    some military police support needed. But, as the Secretary
    said, it would be a modest amount, perhaps within 10 percent,
    plus or minus, of that number.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Kennedy.
        Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much.
        Thank you for your service.
        Just to go back to this issue about the number of troops,
    because it seems to me we have the President's surge and then
    sort of a hidden surge. The President said, ``We'll have a
    little over 20,000 more troops.'' Then, the next day, DOD said,
    ``Other combat support may be deployed.'' Then, we have the
    Congressional Budget Office (CBO) that talks about the
    additional troops indicating that it could go as high as
    48,000. It could go from 35,000 to 48,000. So, that is the
    question we're having. The American people want to know,
    honestly, what the numbers are going to be. We can have our
    differences of whether we're for surge or against the surge,
    but we ought to know what are going to be the numbers that
    we're talking about. The President mentions one figure; CBO has
    figures that go double that if they're going to be deployed;
    the DOD itself said ``other combat support may be deployed.''
    Obviously, they understand whether they're going to be
    deployed. This is the concern that the American people have.
    Are they getting the facts? Are they getting the true numbers
    on this? What can you do to help them out so that they will
    understand what will be the total numbers?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. Very fair question.
        First of all, one of the reasons for the cost difference
    between the CBO and our own cost is that they project the cost
    through the end of fiscal year 2009. Our cost projection is
    through the end of fiscal year 2007.
        Second, as we've just been discussing, we think that the
    figure--the five brigades that are being put forward as part of
    this reinforcement are comprised approximately of 21,500. Most
    of them have the combat support. Frankly, I don't know what
    CBO's assumptions were that would allow them to more than
    double that number, where you would have more than one combat
    support person for each person being deployed. But, as the
    Chairman and I were just saying, we think that the number is
    going to be around 21,500. It could be a little more, it could
    be a little less, but it would not be more than 10 percent more
    than the 21,500--10 to 15 percent.
        Senator Kennedy. I'd rather keep moving along, but they say
    over the past few years the DOD's practices has been to deploy
    about 9,500 personnel per combat brigade to arrive, including
    about 4,000 combat troops and 5,500 support troops. So, they're
    looking at the past deployment schedules. I'm less interested
    in just the figures, the costs for the purposes of this
    discussion, but the total number of troops, because I think we
    ought to understand whether it's going to be at the 20,000 that
    the President said or whether, as CBO has estimated, in the
    past, could be considerably higher. So, what should we conclude
    now, finally, would be if we could get the numbers so that we
    all understand what we're dealing it with?
        General Pace. Sir, if I may.
        Senator Kennedy. Sure.
        General Pace. If you do the pure math today, and they talk
    about 9,500, that's probably a fair number to point to based on
    the troops on the ground; however, the folks that are in that
    9,500 are--have additional capacity to handle the additional
    support needed for the troops that are coming in. So, when you
    add the 21,500 additional troops, which may or may not be that
    exact number, you're going to need no more than another 2,000,
    2,500 troops on the ground to do the additional wrench-turning,
    food delivery, and UAVs, military police, and the like. But
    within 10 to 15 percent, sir, at max.
        Senator Kennedy. All right. So, we're looking at somewhat--
    approximately 25,000.
        Senator Levin went through this article in the San
    Francisco Chronicle. I hope you'll have an opportunity to look
    through it, because it's rather particular in the areas of
    training. But it talks about--``this is talking about the 1st
    Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division had only a few days to learn how
    to fire new rifles. They are deployed to Iraq for the third
    time. They had no access to the heavily armored vehicles
    they'll be using in Iraq, so they're trained in a handful of
    old military trucks instead. Some soldiers were assigned to the
    brigade so late, they had no time to train in the United States
    at all. Instead of the year-long training recommended prior to
    deployment, they prepared for war during the 2 weeks they spend
    in Kuwait en route to Anbar, Iraq's deadliest province.''
        Then, towards the end, it talks about the--``it also leaves
    the troops in the United States to train on equipment that is
    often completely different from the gear they'll use in Iraq.
    The 2-7 battalion had to train on obsolete models of Humvees
    that are no longer used in Iraq,'' said Chrissman, the
    battalion commander. ``We trained with a smaller set of
    equipment. I'll admit, that presented some challenges,''
    Chrissman told the Chronicle before his unit for Iraq. ``The 2-
    7 had no time to train at Fort Irwin, California's Mojave
    Desert, where Arabic-speaking roleplayers and trainers simulate
    conditions and battle Iraqi insurgents. Instead, they conducted
    a 3-week exercise in a forest of towering pines and oaks hung
    with Spanish moss outside the division base at Fort Stewart,
    Georgia. Such deficiencies decrease the level of troop
    readiness.''
        So, perhaps you can--if you'd give us at least your chance
    to--review that article, General Pace, and give us a response?
        General Pace. Certainly, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The unit was placed on a condensed timeline in order to meet surge
    requirements. The training pace was accelerated but soldiers were not
    deployed unless they were ready. The commander makes the determination
    as to whether his/her unit is ready to deploy. The Chief of Staff of
    the Army will not allow troops to deploy unless they are properly
    trained, manned, and equipped. As far as training locations that were
    addressed in the article, it was a conscious decision not to send the
    brigade to the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin,
    California. The command determined training at home station would allow
    more time to train/focus on specific mission essential tasks versus
    using valuable time deploying the unit to and from the NTC. Everything
    was done to set the conditions during home station training to prepare
    for deployment to Iraq.
        The unit did not have the uparmored M1114 high mobility
    multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) to train-on at home station;
    instead, they used a different version of the HMMWV (or Humvee). The
    unit will fall-in on the uparmored version of the Humvee once they
    arrive in theater. The uparmored vehicles are left in theater because
    of the real world mission need, so the access to these vehicles is very
    limited for units to train on at their home station. Training
    accomplished at home station fully enabled personnel to rapidly adjust
    to the uparmored Humvee in theater before operational employment.

        General Pace. If I may, sir, just because those families
    need to know.
        Senator Kennedy. Yes, sure, please.
        General Pace. The Chief of Staff of the Army, the
    Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Joint Chiefs are
    steadfast that we are not going to deploy troops until they are
    properly trained, manned, and equipped. The timeline that these
    brigades are on allows us to do just that. It is true that the
    best armed vehicles we have are currently in Iraq, and that's
    what the troops will fall in on. Therefore, some of the
    vehicles that they are training up here in the States are not
    the exact model of Humvee that they'll be falling in on. So,
    they'll be falling in on better equipment, but that does not
    preclude them from training properly, sir.
        Senator Kennedy. Now, just on the training equipment and
    the fact that you have some deficit that's going to be finished
    in the next few months, are you talking about those V-shaped
    hulls, the Mine-Resistant Ambush (MRAP) vehicle, which is V-
    shaped underneath, for practical purposes, which has been more
    effective in reducing casualties? There have been other
    articles about whether all of the military personnel that are
    going out on patrol are going to have that equipment. Is this
    the vehicle that you were describing earlier, when you were
    talking about the shortages of equipment?
        General Pace. That is not the vehicle, sir. Senator, as we
    go along, we learn what works and what does not work. The V-
    shaped bottom is more effective and is now in the request for
    the supplemental budget, and in the main budget to be able to
    buy into the future. The vehicles I'm talking about are the
    vehicles, right now, that are providing protection for our
    troops on the ground. The uparmored Humvees that are factory-
    made, have been very effective against the roadside bombs. It
    is those current vehicles, of which there will be a small
    shortage, that will be covered by not letting our troops go
    anyplace without them.
        Senator Kennedy. General, my time is going to be up. On the
    V-shaped hull, which, as you just mentioned, are by far the
    most effective. By your own testimony, how long will it be
    before the troops in the field are going to have really the
    very best in terms of equipment and the V-shaped hull? How long
    will it take for them to have that equipment?
        General Pace. Sir, I need to take that for the record,
    because I do not know the industrial line, how quickly it can
    produce.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles are currently in
    use in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. MRAPs are
    primarily being used in theater for clearing vehicle routes of
    improvised explosive devices to ensure other armored vehicles are less
    likely to encounter them. MRAP vehicles are moving to theater as fast
    as the assembly line can produce them.

        Senator Kennedy. But you're going to do it as fast as
    possible, and that you've given the green light to go ahead and
    produce as many as they can as quick as they can and get them
    over there as fast as they can?
        General Pace. Well----
        Senator Kennedy. Would that be an overstatement?
        General Pace.--sir, I need to get back to you for the
    record.
        Senator Kennedy. All right.
        General Pace. I do not know what the requirement is. I
    don't have that in my head.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The ability to get these vehicles to the troops is limited by the
    current manufacturers' ability to produce the vehicles. The Army and
    Marine Corps are working together to alleviate the manufacturing
    bottleneck by initiating a larger open competition for new mine
    resistant ambush protected type vehicle contracts. An evaluation of
    nine different vehicles, including some currently in use, is underway
    and is scheduled for completion in May 2007. At that time, based on the
    performance and the capability to meet accelerated fielding timelines,
    contracts will be awarded. Multiple vehicles may be chosen to get more
    of this level of protection to the troops as quick as possible.

        Senator Kennedy. All right.
        General Pace. I don't know how long it will take industry.
    But I can tell you, sir, that just like the small-arms
    protective inserts for our body armor, as our industry produces
    new and better equipment, this Congress has provided the
    funding to allow us to procure it as quickly as possible. I
    will get you the specific answer on the vehicle.
        Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much.
        Secretary Gates. Senator, I might just add, on this MRAP
    vehicle that you referred to, which I've been told is the best
    of these new vehicles, it is my understanding that the plant in
    South Carolina that produces these is operating at full
    capacity, and we have put out bids for eight additional
    companies to provide demonstration models of a similar vehicle,
    to see if we can increase the production as we go along.
        Senator Kennedy. Thank you.
        Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Kennedy.
        Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Gates, I would like to say I appreciate the fact
    that this budget that has been sent over is far more realistic
    than those in the past, as this committee has urged over the
    course of this war, rather than by emergency supplementals. I
    think it gives us a chance to more carefully scrutinize the
    requests for the funding of our obligations, both in Iraq and
    Afghanistan. So, I would like to say thank you for this new
    revised process.
        Senator Byrd. Me, too.
        Senator McCain. Whenever Senator Byrd agrees, it is a good
    thing. [Laughter.]
        Recent reports, Secretary Gates, indicate that Iraqi army
    units are showing up in Baghdad significantly under strength.
    Is that accurate? If so, is it of concern to you?
        Secretary Gates. I received a report the end of last week
    that one of the Iraqi brigades had showed up at 55-percent
    strength, and I told reporters at a press roundtable at the
    Pentagon that that wasn't good enough. I learned in a report
    from General Casey yesterday that, in fact, they have showed up
    at 60 percent, and that 25 percent were on leave to either take
    their pay back home or to protect their home base. So, he felt
    that the level of turnout for the brigade, in his opinion, and
    I don't think I'm misquoting him--was better than expected.
        Senator McCain. Senator Levin and I requested the so-called
    benchmarks that were laid out a long time ago, which we were
    unable to obtain. Some of those benchmarks were achieved, as we
    noted, but a number of those were not. Are you seeing any signs
    now that the Iraqi Government is taking the necessary measures
    that we have all sought for the last several years: revenue-
    sharing, provincial elections, and sufficient commitment of the
    Iraqi military? Have you gotten an assessment of how you regard
    the performance of the Iraqi Government and military here in
    the last several weeks?
        Secretary Gates. Yesterday was to be the start of the
    Baghdad operation, and it's probably going to slip a few days,
    and it's probably going to be a rolling implementation. What I
    have asked for, and I have learned is already being addressed--
    is to put together a more sophisticated checklist or matrix of
    these benchmarks and what our expectations are and what the
    performance is, so that in the weeks to come, we can evaluate
    this. My hope is that the detailed approach will be available
    to us literally within a matter of days so that we can begin
    measuring against our expectations and the Iraqi Government's
    commitments.
        As we've talked before, the military commitments are going
    to be the ones where we can evaluate performance first. Are
    they showing up? What numbers are they showing up in? Are they
    going into all neighborhoods? and so on. The political and
    economic benchmarks, in terms of the Iraqis paying--putting up
    their own money, getting elections, authorizing a provincial
    elections law, a hydrocarbons law, and so on, will probably
    take a little longer--but, in my opinion, we ought to be in a
    position to provide regular briefings to you all on that,
    beginning fairly soon.
        Senator McCain. I think it would be very helpful if you
    would keep us up to speed on that matrix that you are setting
    up. It has been somewhat frustrating to us in the past that we
    have not been able to have access to specific benchmarks or
    specific progress, or lack of. So, I thank you for that.
        Do we have enough troops going into Afghanistan? Everybody
    says it is going to be a very hot spring, Mr. Secretary.
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir, I've extended a brigade of the
    10th Mountain Division by 120 days. We will be surging in
    another brigade from the 82nd Airborne, which was scheduled to
    be in there, is coming in. So, we will be up about 3,200
    troops. We have met the request of the North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization (NATO) commander, and the need for additional
    forces. There is a requirement outstanding for additional
    trainers, and I will be going to a NATO ministerial tomorrow
    afternoon, and one of my requests of those folks, and one of
    the issues that I'll be pressing very hard, is that they meet
    the commitments that they made at Riga, and help us out in
    this.
        Senator McCain. I think if you talk to General Jones, which
    a lot of us do, the former head of NATO, who we have the
    greatest respect for, our allies are not only not sufficiently
    assisting us in troops, but in rules of engagement, helping in
    setting up the judicial system, and the training of police. I
    hope that in this meeting that we can talk in a straightforward
    manner to our NATO allies, that we need a lot more from them
    than we're getting, not only rules of engagement for the
    troops, but also in various commitments they have made, such as
    assistance in setting up a judiciary, et cetera.
        General Pace, in his testimony, General Casey stated he
    requested two Army brigades to help quell the violence in
    Baghdad, versus the five brigades. He also said that the
    previous policy had not failed, that he thought it was
    succeeding. How do you explain the discrepancy between what
    General Casey requested and the President's plan?
        General Pace. Sir, what General Casey requested was about
    4,000 additional marines for al Anbar and 2 brigades for
    Baghdad, for a total of about 3 brigade equivalents. When we
    looked at that, back here amongst the Joint Chiefs, and we had
    a dialogue here in Washington and back down with General Casey
    and General Abizaid, we recommended an increase of the total
    number committed to ensure that the commanders on the ground
    had not only what they asked for immediately, but had
    additional troops to be able to take care of unforeseen
    problems. When we said that we thought we should put six
    brigades total into the pipeline instead of the three, both
    General Abizaid and General Casey were happy to have those
    additional troops, even though they did not ask for them up
    front.
        Senator McCain. How do you explain the testimony of General
    Casey, who said that the present strategy, which you said we
    are not winning and we are not losing, others have said the
    past strategies have failed, that is why we are changing it. In
    General Casey's testimony, he said that he thought it was
    succeeding. How do you reconcile those two points of view,
    General Pace?
        General Pace. Sir, I cannot speak for General Casey.
        Senator McCain. I am telling you what his testimony was.
        General Pace. Yes, sir. I can tell you that General Casey,
    in July, was the person who came forward to the Joint Chiefs
    and said that he could not go down below 15 brigades, as he
    projected he would do at one time, and then that started us
    all--General Casey, the Joint Chiefs, and General Abizaid--into
    the review that led to his requesting to go up from 15 to 18,
    and us recommending going beyond that. Clearly, from my
    perspective, where we were, and where we were supposed to be,
    were not the same place. Continuing on the track that we were
    on was not going to provide success, and we needed to have a
    different plan to get there. That we did, collectively, with
    General Casey, General Abizaid, the Joint Chiefs, and with the
    group here in Washington.
        Senator McCain. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, but I still find
    it hard to reconcile General Casey's continued assertion that
    the previous strategy was working, this in contravention of the
    view of most any observer, and at the same time, we are now
    going to put him in charge of the training and equipping
    responsibilities, for this new strategy. All this, when
    obviously he believes the old one was just fine.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
        Senator Byrd.
        Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary, General Pace, I
    voted not to go into Iraq. Everybody knows it. I was against
    it. Everybody knows that. There's nothing new about that. But
    we're there.
        General Pace, Secretary Gates, how much longer do you think
    the United States is going to be in Iraq before we begin to
    bring our people home? How much longer are you planning for?
        Secretary Gates. Mr. Chairman, as you say, it's hard to
    make any kind of a real prediction, especially where our
    adversaries have a vote. But it seems to me that if the plan to
    quiet Baghdad is successful, and the Iraqis step up, as I was
    discussing with Senator Warner, accept their responsibilities
    and assume leadership and successfully assume the leadership in
    trying to establish order and then beginning their political--
    or further carrying out their political reconciliation process,
    I would hope that we would be able to begin drawing down our
    troops later this year. If we have to look at other alternative
    strategies, then that would depend on what those strategies
    might be. But as I say, and as you say, it's a very difficult
    question to answer with any precision, because it so depends on
    what's going on, on the ground.
        [Audience interruption.]
        Senator Byrd. Excuse me.
        Chairman Levin. Ma'am, you're going to need to sit down.
    You're going to need to sit down and not interrupt. You're
    going to not be allowed to interrupt again. I'm afraid that
    we're going to have to ask you to leave or we're going to have
    to remove you now.
        Senator Byrd. Right. Now, we mean business.
        Now, Mr. Secretary, would you, again--I don't believe you
    answered my question. Perhaps you can't. When do you think we
    can, I guess, begin to bring our troops home?
        Secretary Gates. If the circumstances on the ground permit,
    Senator, I would hope later this year.
        Senator Byrd. I hope so. I don't believe we will, but I
    hope so. What is the cost of this war, thus far? Just if you
    can state within reason.
        Ms. Jonas. Mr. Chairman, thank you, the cost so far that
    Congress has appropriated is $452 billion in supplementals and
    another $3 billion in the base budget, we include Operation
    Noble Eagle in those costs. As the Secretary has stated, we're
    asking for additional funds here today.
        Senator Byrd. Those are supplementals?
        Ms. Jonas. Yes, sir.
        Senator Byrd. What is the cost, thus far?
        Ms. Jonas. So far, what we refer to as ``obligations,''
    sir, $372 billion, of which $276 billion is for Iraq.
        Senator Byrd. Iraq.
        Ms. Jonas. Operation Iraqi Freedom, sir.
        Senator Byrd. Very well. Can you give us some idea as to
    how much longer we're going to have our men over there? Do you
    have some projected cost estimate of having our people there?
    The cost in dead and wounded, as of now? We can probably get
    that from the newspapers, but do you have it?
        Ms. Jonas. Sir, I can only give you what we have in terms
    of our expenditures for DOD, which I just articulated, and what
    we're projecting for the remainder of this year, in terms of
    funding that will be required, approximately $93 billion for
    2007, and then we're projecting, for fiscal year 2008, for the
    entire year, about $141.7 billion, sir.
        Senator Byrd. That's 2007 and 2008.
        Ms. Jonas. Yes, sir.
        Senator Byrd. Mr. Secretary, do you want to add anything to
    that? This is going to go beyond that. Surely you're projecting
    some estimates for that eventuality.
        Secretary Gates. I think the Office of Management and
    Budget (OMB), Mr. Chairman, has put $50 billion in the budget
    for fiscal year 2009 as part of their longer-term plan. I don't
    know of any allocations beyond fiscal year 2009.
        Senator Byrd. No allocations. I don't know whether we're
    beginning to understand what we're talking about or not. What
    do you see, as far as the cost is concerned, what it is now for
    the military operations and so on there, and what it's
    anticipated to be over the foreseeable future? How long do you
    see this war going on?
        Secretary Gates. Sir, I think that there's very likely to
    be at least some American presence in Iraq for a number of
    years. We obviously don't seek any permanent bases, but there's
    going to be some need for forces. But my hope would be that,
    over the longer-term, that it would be a fraction of what we
    have there now.
        Senator Byrd. A fraction of what?
        Secretary Gates. Of the force that we have there now, sir.
        Senator Byrd. My time is up. But I don't think we ought to
    have gone into Iraq. I said that to begin with. We are there. I
    don't see any end to it. So, I just anticipate that 5 years
    from now, or 10, my successor--I guess in 10 years there will
    be a successor--he won't be on this committee, because he'll be
    a new man. But somebody's going to be asking, ``I see where
    Senator Byrd said thus and so, and asked thus and so. How much
    longer, Mr. Secretary''--you may not be Secretary--``how much
    longer are we going to be in Iraq?'' This is a question that
    will be asked again, and it will reverberate down through the
    halls of Congress and the ages. How much longer do you think
    we'll be in Iraq? Number one. Number two, what is the cost now,
    and what's it going to be? I wouldn't want to be in your chair,
    but I would have some idea that Senator Byrd's going to ask
    questions like that. How much longer is this war going on in
    Iraq? Of course, you can't foresee every eventuality, but how
    much longer, at the present rate, do you think we'll be there?
        Secretary Gates. I would hope that, if our operations are
    successful this year, that we would be able to begin drawing
    down our forces toward the end of the year.
        Senator Byrd. Right. That's what you said earlier. My
    time's up?
        Chairman Levin. Yes, thank you.
        Senator Byrd. My time is up. I can understand why it takes
    him about 2 minutes to ask a question, the same question that I
    could ask in 6 minutes. [Gesturing towards Chairman Levin.]
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Byrd.
        Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First of all, Mr. Chairman, there are several members of
    this committee that are also on the Environment and Public
    Works Committee. We're having a very significant meeting right
    now at the same time in the same building, so we'll be coming
    in and out.
        Mr. Secretary, you said, during your opening statement,
    there was something that was not in your printed statement, and
    it kind of went by me a little bit too fast, but I think it's
    good news. Are you saying that we're now making progress
    toward--well, Africa's been divided between EUCOM and CENTCOM
    now for--and I've been complaining about it for about 10 years.
    Are they talking about, now, a new AFRICOM that you think is
    working into the process?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. We're moving to stand it up.
        Senator Inhofe. That's very, very good news now, I wanted
    to make sure everyone heard what you said.
        You also said--and I looked it up in your opening
    statement; I kind of like this one--it said, ``Experience is
    that marvelous thing that enables you to recognize a mistake
    when you make it again.'' It reminds me a little bit of going
    back to the 1990s, when there was this euphoric attitude that
    the Cold War is over and we no longer need a military, and we
    started drawing down. I went back and checked, and found that
    more than once every month during that entire period of time, I
    was on the Senate floor saying that we will regret that it
    happened.
        So, I'd like to get into something that others haven't
    talked about yet, and it goes back to, many years ago, when the
    first confirmation hearing of Secretary Rumsfeld, when I made
    the observation that we all try to look into the future 10
    years or so and determine, what are our needs going to be? The
    American people have always expected that we would be number
    one in all of our equipment, in our abilities, that, when we
    send our kids into battle, that we have the very best, whether
    it's an artillery piece, strike vehicles, lift capability, and
    all of that. So, we have these hearings. I go back to my days
    in the House, on the House Armed Services Committee. I can
    recall, in 1994, we had someone testify that in 10 years we
    would no longer need ground troops.
        So, I guess what I'm saying, General Pace, is that you have
    a lot of smart generals around that are going to try to guess
    what in the lead time that we have right now for--preparing for
    10 years from now--what are our needs going to be? As smart as
    the generals are, they're going to be wrong. The only answer to
    this, as I said to Secretary Rumsfeld during that confirmation
    hearing, is, What's the answer to this? He, from memory, drew
    upon some facts that I didn't know he had, because he didn't
    know I was going to ask it. He said, ``If you'll take the
    entire 20th century for 100 years, the average amount spent on
    defense as related to GDP was 5.7 percent. That's in wartime,
    peacetime. That is the average. At that time--this is right
    after the drawdown of the 1990s, it was down to 2.9 percent.''
    I said, where do you think it should be? He said, at that time,
    maybe around 5 percent.
        In anticipating coming into this job, Secretary Gates--and
    you and I talked, the day before it was even announced that you
    were going to be in there; we talked about this--have you given
    thought as to where we should be? Right now, we are at 3.8
    percent, which I think is totally inadequate, and where we
    should be looking into the future, in terms of the
    prioritization of military, you can express it anyway you want,
    percentage of GDP or any other way?
        Secretary Gates. I think that the historical figure of
    about 5 percent probably is on an ongoing basis, I think, is a
    good one. I would tell you that, in my experience in
    government, from the mid-1960s to the early 1990s, if you were
    to graph American defense spending, it would look a little bit
    like the electrocardiogram on a fibrillating heart. I think
    what's as important as the amount is the predictability of it--
    being able to know that you can invest today, knowing that you
    will be able to maintain a level of investment over a period of
    a decade or more. So, you don't have to try and rush to get
    things done in a hurry because you're scared to death that the
    defense budget will be cut badly the next year or 2 years
    later. I was in the position of having invested almost $1
    billion of the taxpayers' money in a very sensitive program
    before, and having to kill it because the money wasn't there to
    finish it.
        Senator Inhofe. Well, and we understand we're here----
        Secretary Gates. The reliability, I think, is as important
    as the amount.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes. We're here today talking about the
    crisis we're currently in but I just want to get us thinking,
    in the future, as to where we should be. General Pace, you and
    I have talked about this. We talked about the fact that General
    Jumper came down, in the late 1990s, and admitted that some of
    our strike vehicles weren't as good as the--I think it was SU-
    35s that were on the market by the Russians at that time, which
    is totally unacceptable to the American people. They don't know
    that this is the case.
        Now, in this brief period of time, one of the major
    concerns I have--and it doesn't necessarily fit into this
    discussion of the 2008 budget, but in a way it does, because
    we're talking about the inadequacy of funding the military
    construction under the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC). To
    go back--this last BRAC round, I remember that I was opposed to
    it, having one more BRAC round, and it was a very close vote,
    but we went ahead and had it. The comment that I made is, yes,
    we know we're going to save money in the future, but it's going
    to cost money for the next 5 or 6 years. It always costs more
    money when you go into closing bases and that type of thing.
    Well, we went ahead and had it, maybe we were right on
    projecting that $20 billion will be saved, in the long run, but
    right now we are $3.1 billion short in the 2007 budget. Now, I
    think this is a real crisis right now, and I'd like to get the
    response from both of you. Let's start with you, General Pace,
    as to what do you think is the consequence of not adequately
    funding our BRAC process for this last round?
        General Pace. Sir, the continuing resolution has resulted
    in the money made available in fiscal year 2007 being $3.1
    billion less than was projected. Therefore, absent that money,
    we will not be able to meet the statutory requirements to
    complete the BRAC process by the end of the period that was
    allowed. Immediately, it means that the kinds of things that we
    need to do for our families that we're trying to move back from
    Germany, for example, back to the United States, that the
    housing, the schools, the hospitals, all the infrastructure
    that needs to be built on the bases here isn't going to happen,
    so we are in jeopardy of not abiding by the law, which is,
    ``get it done within a certain time period,'' because we don't
    have the funding to be able to do that.
        Senator Inhofe. What kind of an effect would this have on
    individuals out there considering whether or not to re-enlist,
    looking down the road, after the promises that have been made
    to them?
        General Pace. Sir, I don't know that it would have a direct
    impact on that piece, because I don't know what they'd actually
    be able to----
        Senator Inhofe. That may be true.
        General Pace.--think through the BRAC part.
        Senator Inhofe. Any comments on that, Secretary Gates?
        Secretary Gates. I know that, if I recall correctly, one
    piece of that $3.1 billion is $300 million in housing
    allowances. So, as General Pace is indicating, to help the
    military pay for their housing. I will say that I paid a
    courtesy call on both the Republican and Democratic leadership
    of the Senate last week, and we discussed this, and they
    expressed concern, and indicated a willingness to try and do
    something about it.
        Senator Inhofe. I really think we're going to need to do
    that. I looked, and it's not in the supplemental. So, I'd like
    to have your prioritizing that as much as you could.
        Lastly, on the reset, we've talked about that a little bit.
    I had an occasion to go to Texas, in both Red River and Corpus
    Christi, and look at the problems that we're having down there
    right now, and--where do you think we are on that, on our reset
    of the Army, General Pace?
        General Pace. Sir, the funding that is proposed in this
    budget, and in the supplementals, will allow us to use the
    capacities of our depots, to the maximum extent possible. If
    you were to stop creating any more damage to any more vehicles
    right now, if the war stopped today----
        Senator Inhofe. Yes.
        General Pace.--we'd have about 2 more years of about $14 to
    $15 billion for the Army and about $3 billion per year for the
    Marine Corps, for them to work off their backload of repair of
    equipment that would then begin.
        Senator Inhofe. Those lines are still long out there today,
    and it's very much of a concern.
        Thank you very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Bill Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, I want to ask you a question on the
    reliability of the Iraqi army. When you were in front of our
    committee last January, I asked you, ``how long would it take
    you to make a determination that things were working out as in
    the President's plan so that you would know that this was the
    right thing to do?'' At the time, you said, ``about 2 months.''
    I said, ``well then, come March, I'm going to be asking you
    that question.'' In the meantime, a senior officer on the Joint
    Staff has testified in another committee--and this is a senior
    officer with significant military experience in Iraq, and I'm
    about to repeat is unclassified--and he said that, of about the
    325,000 army and police in Iraq, that 130,000 are army that are
    trained and equipped, and, of them, about 65,000 are nationally
    recruited, as opposed to being recruited in areas that they
    would not want to move out of. So, you have 65,000. He said of
    those 65,000, he expected about 30,000 of them would be in
    Baghdad.
        Now, I come back to my initial question that I've asked in
    every one of these hearings in three committees--Senate Select
    Committee on Intelligence, Armed Services Committee, and the
    Foreign Relations Committee--regarding the reliability of those
    troops. I would like your perspective now, as opposed to when
    we talked to you in January, on that reliability, particularly
    in light of what you said today, that you expect 60 percent of
    troops are reporting in Baghdad, and you also said today that
    25 percent of those troops are going to be on leave. Bring us
    up-to-date.
        Secretary Gates. That information was on one brigade that
    General Casey had reported to me on, in terms of accounting for
    85 percent of their soldiers. At this early stage, it's still
    very impressionistic, and I would say that--I think that
    General Casey's words have been, ``So far, so good.'' There
    have been some cases where the Iraqis have been very aggressive
    and out in front and doing exactly what we want them to do.
    There have been some cases where they haven't fought so well.
    They fought very well in this attack in the south, where they
    took out this Shiite group, with many hundreds of casualties on
    the part of the Shiite. It was an entrenched group, and we
    brought in some air support and so on. It sounded to me like
    the kind of operation we were hoping would actually happen,
    where they do the ground fighting, the bulk of the ground
    fighting, and we provide some additional combat support.
        So, I would say, based here, right at the very beginning,
    and really only as they are beginning to flow into Baghdad, on
    balance, they're probably doing okay. But you will always find
    instances where they aren't performing. There will always be a
    patrol or something, I think, where our soldiers will say they
    were disappointed. But maybe General Pace has a little broader
    perspective than I do.
        General Pace. Just two things to add to that, sir, if I
    may, in addition to Najaf. One is the Ashura Holy Day, which
    was January 30, where millions of pilgrims visit the holy
    mosques, went off without any incidents at all, all of that
    being handled by the Iraqi army and the Iraqi police. In years
    gone by, there have been bombings and the like. So, they did a
    very, very credible job there. In addition, the Iraqi commander
    in Baghdad, Lieutenant General Aboud, has assembled his team
    together, and is showing very, very balanced approach to Sunni/
    Shiite neighborhoods. So, the initial indications--not to be
    giddy about, but the initial indications on the execution of
    the Iraqi piece of Baghdad, on the military part, are
    promising.
        Senator Bill Nelson. So, he's screening to screen out the
    criminals? He's screening out those who would support the
    militia that's inside the Iraqi army? Is that what's happening
    with those Iraqi troops that are going in to Baghdad?
        General Pace. Sir, what's happening right now is, they are
    flowing into Baghdad on the timeline that they're supposed to
    be flowing in. Two brigades are there now, the third brigade is
    arriving as we speak. So, it'll be a little while longer before
    full operations begin. But in those instances, so far, where we
    have had the opportunity to go against Shiite criminals and
    Sunni criminals, he has been very balanced in his approach to
    that.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I'm asking this because this senior
    military official that testified on this unclassified material
    said, of those troops showing up in Baghdad, he expects 80
    percent of them to be reliable. Therefore, 20 percent are going
    to be unreliable. If that's true--and I don't know what's true;
    I'm the one who keeps asking the questions about reliability--
    if the President's plan is predicated on the reliability of the
    Iraqi troops, when we go in to clear, before we hold, with more
    Iraqi troops than American troops, then they have to be
    reliable. I'm trying to get my hands around this question, are
    they reliable or not?
        Secretary Gates. Senator, I think that's the question we
    all have, and I think that we've talked here a lot about. We're
    going to have to see how it actually plays out on the ground.
    People have their theories about how this is going to work and
    how many are reliable, and this, that, and the other thing, and
    we have a mutual interest in an honest evaluation of how these
    guys are doing, because it's our kids that are there at risk. I
    probably shouldn't say ``kids,'' but it's our men and women out
    there----
        Senator Bill Nelson. I understand.
        Secretary Gates.--who are the front lines. As I was
    mentioning earlier to Senator McCain, we are trying to put
    together a fairly complete checklist, matrix, whatever you want
    to call it, of how to evaluate these guys as we go forward and
    how the Iraqis are doing, because so much depends on their
    performance in so many different areas. I think that, as I
    indicated, it's probably premature, but, in a certain period of
    time, when we have enough data to begin to be able to come up
    and brief you all and your House colleagues every couple of
    weeks on how we think they're doing.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I'll just say, in
    conclusion, that what bothers me is this, if the President's
    plan--and Senator Warner is nodding his head, because we've
    talked about this--is predicated on the reliability of the
    Iraqi troops, and yet no one has a handle as to whether or not
    they're reliable until we see them in action, that doesn't
    sound to me to be the good way to implement a plan.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Collins.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        General, just last week, at a hearing before the Commission
    on National Guard and Reserves, the National Guard Bureau
    Chief, Lieutenant General Steve Blum, stated that 88 percent of
    the National Guard forces that have returned from Iraq and
    Afghanistan are, ``very poorly equipped'' today in the Army
    National Guard. He also went on to say that the Air Guard, for
    the first time in 30 years, has 45 percent of its units with
    less than a C-2 readiness rating because of lack of equipment.
    He further testified that 9 out of every 10 Army National Guard
    units that are not serving in Iraq and Afghanistan have less
    than half the equipment that is needed to respond to domestic
    crises. The general went on to estimate that it would take $40
    billion to bring the National Guard up to an acceptable level
    of readiness. As the ranking member of the Homeland Security
    and Governmental Affairs Committee, I'm very concerned about
    the ability of the National Guard to respond to a domestic
    crisis, whether it's a hurricane, an ice storm, or a terrorist
    attack on our homeland.
        The budget does not appear to have anywhere close to the
    amount of money that General Blum has estimated is necessary to
    restore the equipment levels to an acceptable readiness level.
    Could you comment on the adequacy of the budget and also the
    impact on the National Guard's ability to respond to domestic
    missions?
        General Pace. Yes, ma'am. It is absolutely true that, as
    both Active-Duty and National Guard and Reserve units go over
    to Iraq and Afghanistan, that the equipment they take over
    there with them that is not damaged is left behind for the
    units that are coming in. That just makes good management
    sense, so we're not shipping the same kinds of equipment back
    and forth by sea all the time. We have about 40 percent of our
    inventory of equipment either currently deployed or in the
    depots for repair. That means, almost by definition, then, that
    the units that are home are going to have about 60 percent or
    less of their equipment today.
        The budget includes some $51 billion over the FYDP for
    reconstitution, and the Army specifically has focused $21
    billion in their budget to flesh out the needs of the National
    Guard and Reserve. The only number you used, ma'am, that I
    can't talk to is the $40 billion, because I do know, because
    I've talked to General Blum about this, that the Army National
    Guard leadership, including General Blum, is very comfortable
    with the $21 billion that have been allocated to flesh out the
    equipment that's missing in the National Guard, plus the money
    that's been allocated to refurbish the things that have been
    damaged. So, from the equipment standpoint, I believe that all
    of their concerns are addressed in this budget. With regard to
    responding, we were able to very quickly, in the response to
    Hurricane Katrina, have 70,000 troops into Louisiana and the
    Gulf region; about 50,000 of those were National Guard and
    Reserve, the other 20,000 were Active-Duty. The Governors have,
    amongst themselves, agreed on how to share troops and share
    equipment so that, as we approach things like the hurricane
    season, we have worked through the details of who would
    respond, what equipment they would have.
        The other piece of this that is working right now, and is
    very important, is, the Department of Homeland Security, under
    Secretary Chertoff, is looking at natural disasters and manmade
    disasters. What capacities does the Nation need? Of those
    capacities that we need, what exists right now, and where are
    the gaps? Of the gaps, what should the Nation look to their
    military for, so that we can properly fund those?
        The other piece that's very important is a new force-
    generation model that calls for 1-year deployed and 5 years at
    home, as a goal for our National Guard and Reserve,
    automatically puts those units into a system that ensures that
    their manning, their training, and their equipment are all
    properly addressed as they come up toward--as they get closer
    to their deployment window.
        So, there are several things ongoing, ma'am, that I think
    mitigate the factors that you mentioned.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Secretary Gates. Senator, I might just add, very quickly on
    this, that there is, in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental and
    fiscal year 2008 global war on terror, together, something like
    $8.8 billion for equipment for the National Guard,
    specifically. Between fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2013, we
    will invest $36 billion strictly in the National Guard for
    equipment. I've also been assured by both the Chief of Staff of
    the Army and the head of the National Guard Bureau that they
    have surveyed the National Guard units, the National Guard in
    the eight States that are susceptible to hurricanes, and
    those--and the National Guard in those States have 100 percent
    of the equipment they need in order to be able to respond in
    the event of a disaster.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        I would note that this testimony was given by General Blum
    just last week, and the $40 billion is a direct quote from his
    testimony. He breaks it down as $24 billion for the Army Guard
    and 13.8 billion for the Air National Guard. So, I would ask
    that you get back to me on that specific issue.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The $40 billion figure mentioned by General Blum includes all
    shortfalls across the Army and Air Guard, to include operation and
    maintenance, personnel, and equipping costs. According to General Blum,
    the Army shortfall is $24 billion and is fairly consistent with the
    Army's documented shortfall. At the time he released the information,
    the Army had programmed $21.1 billion against that shortfall. With the
    release of the fiscal year 2008 budget, the funding programmed from
    2008-2013 is $36.7 billion, which addresses their shortfalls and
    continues to address modernization.

        Senator Collins. I appreciate the explanation you both have
    given.
        General, I'd now like to switch to the issue of
    shipbuilding. It would be very rare for me to go through a
    budget hearing without bringing up shipbuilding at least once.
    [Laughter.]
        While I'm still concerned about the adequacy of the
    shipbuilding budget, I do commend you for continuing to
    progress toward the Chief of Naval Operations' goal.
    Development is progressing well, as you're aware, on the guided
    missile destroyer, or DDG-1000. We talk a lot about the
    advantages of the DDG-1000, in terms of increased firepower,
    the greatly reduced profile on radars, the electric propulsion
    system, but something that isn't discussed as often is the far
    smaller crew size that the ship is going to be operating with.
    Could you discuss the positive impact on the budget of being
    able to operate a destroyer of this size with a far smaller
    crew size than is required for the DDG today?
        General Pace. Yes, ma'am. Just one ship will be manned at
    about half the crew that a current-day destroyer requires, so
    all that that implies, as far as training, family support,
    housing, medical, retirement, as you add all that up, that's an
    enormous savings over time, when you multiply it times the
    number of ships that are involved. So, I applaud the Navy, not
    only in the way that they have reduced the size of the ships,
    but in the way that they have redesigned the Navy's tempo so
    that we can surge when we need to and have many more of our
    ships readily available to the Nation when it's needed and when
    we don't know that they're going to be needed.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you--Senator Collins, thank you.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Okay. Senator Ben Nelson.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for your service for our men and
    women at home and abroad.
        Mr. Secretary, you've heard a lot about the surge and the
    concerns that have been raised. At your nomination hearing, I
    asked about the consequences if the Iraqis don't step forward
    as a result of the President's decision to surge the forces in
    Baghdad. It's one of the reasons I've been pushing benchmarks
    for more than 2 years, so that we have a way to measure
    progress. It appears that we're in the process now of being
    able to do that. If, in spite of all the best efforts, the
    Iraqis can't take the lead, they can't quell the violence in
    their neighborhoods, I think you've said it isn't necessarily
    the consequence that we're going to withdraw or leave Iraq, it
    just means that we'll have to make another plan. General Casey
    said, about that question, that it's a political judgment that
    we would work with the government. So, I guess what I'd like to
    ask you, because you're in a policymaking position, and you
    have to make political judgments as well, what are the
    consequences? What are the consequences if the Iraqi military
    doesn't show up, if the Iraqi Government doesn't create an oil
    agreement, doesn't work to protect the rights of the minority,
    and fails to hold up their end of the bargain? What are the
    consequences to that? Because that's not simply a military plan
    that has to be readjusted. It goes way beyond the military. It
    is now a question of whether they are an adequate partner in
    this process. The question is, what do they want to do?
        Secretary Gates. I think what we have to bear in mind is
    there has often been, at these hearings, a long list of broken
    promises by the Iraqi Government. I think it is useful to
    maintain some perspective that none of these guys were in
    government a year ago. Most of them were in opposition, some of
    them were in jail, some of them were in exile. They're trying
    to do something that's never been done in the history of their
    country before. So, frankly, I think sometimes their failure to
    fulfill their commitments is more a question of capacity than
    it is will. It is clear that Prime Minister Maliki intends to
    fulfill the commitments that he's made. It's clear he wants
    Iraq to be in charge of this operation. If the Iraqi----
        Senator Ben Nelson. Well, excuse me----
        Secretary Gates. If the----
        Senator Ben Nelson. Is it really that clear? Because he,
    and some of his members of his government have raised questions
    about whether more U.S. troops were desirable or whether it was
    going to be an Iraqi military operation in Baghdad.
        Secretary Gates. No, that's absolutely right. I think that
    his original hope had been that this would be an entirely Iraqi
    operation, and it was when his military people began talking
    with our military people, that they, in essence, persuaded him
    that the Iraqis perhaps weren't ready to do it all by
    themselves, just like we had to provide air support in this one
    other attack that just happened last week. So, he has, I think,
    grudgingly accepted having U.S. support, where he wanted to do
    it all by themselves. We don't want them to fail.
        So, I think that they have the desire and the intent to
    make this work. I think what remains to be seen is whether they
    have the capacity to do it. If they can't make it work--we're
    planning on them fulfilling their commitments, and if they
    can't, then, as I have said, I think we have to revisit our
    strategy.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Is it a military strategy or is it a
    political strategy?
        Secretary Gates. I think it's both. The part that I feel
    that I have to take personal responsibility for is the military
    part of it.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Could you see any set of circumstances
    under which you might suggest, if this fails and there is not
    the capability, that you might recommend we withdraw?
        Secretary Gates. I think that a precipitous withdrawal by
    the United----
        Senator Ben Nelson. I don't mean precipitous, I mean, would
    you recommend that we withdraw, not in a precipitous fashion,
    but in a structured withdrawal scenario?
        Secretary Gates. I can see--I can envision--I hate to get
    into hypotheticals----
        Senator Ben Nelson. I know.
        Secretary Gates.--at this point, but I certainly see
    circumstances in which we would, first of all, reposition our
    forces, try and move them out of harm's way as much as
    possible, and then see where we go from there.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Isn't it true that the President said
    something to the effect, to Prime Minister Maliki, that we're
    not there forever?
        Secretary Gates. Absolutely.
        Senator Ben Nelson. All right.
        General Pace, I'm concerned about force protection, given
    what happened at Karbala. We happened to lose an Nebraskan in
    that effort, and I just received, while we were sitting here,
    notification that we just lost another Nebraskan whose sister's
    in the Army National Guard and brother is in Active-Duty. So,
    it's very personal, as it is for all of us, because we're all
    experiencing these losses. The question of force protection,
    really, doesn't that rise to a higher level if we're going to
    be positioned with the Iraqi forces in Baghdad to quell the
    violence? How will this work? Will there be one of ours out on
    point, as well as another Iraqi on point? What kind of unified
    command, or what kind of dual command, exists? It's true, we're
    not going to be just supporting behind the scenes, we're going
    to be out front. Isn't that correct?
        General Pace. Sir, we will not be out front by plan. What's
    planned is for each of the nine districts in Baghdad to have a
    Iraqi brigade. Co-located with that Iraqi brigade, teamed up
    with that brigade, would be a U.S. battalion. The Iraqis would
    be the ones going door to door, knocking on doors, doing the
    census work, doing the kinds of work that would put them out in
    front for the first part of a, if it develops, firefight. Our
    troops would be available to backstop them and to bring in the
    kind of fire support we bring in. But it would not be one Iraqi
    and one U.S. soldier. In the Iraqi units that are forward, we
    have our embedded trainers, some 30 or 40 groups will be
    traveling with them, but they would not be walking point. The
    Iraqis would be.
        Your point about the attack on Karbala is very important,
    Senator, and that is, that was a very sophisticated event. We
    are in the middle of investigating how that happened, where the
    equipment came from, how they got to be looking, as much as
    they did, like----
        Senator Ben Nelson. There could be complicity with Iraqi
    government and/or military forces, couldn't that be the case,
    as well?
        General Pace. It's possible, sir, but it doesn't look like
    that. It looks like this is a very well-designed operation by
    insurgents who had equipment that made them look like U.S. or
    coalition forces, that got them that close to that checkpoint.
    But that's still an ongoing investigation.
        Senator Ben Nelson. There is a concern about force
    protection for our troops that would be embedded. If they came
    upon, I think, as Senator Levin said, in talking--in one of the
    other hearings--if they met up with thousands of people in the
    street, I think we would not want them to have to depend on
    whether 60 percent of the Iraqi forces stayed and 40 percent
    left or some other significant departure occurred, because it
    would put them in harm's way in a way that we wouldn't expect
    it and we wouldn't want it. Is that correct?
        General Pace. Sir, we have taken precautions to ensure
    that, regardless of what happens on the battlefield, our guys
    and gals are ready. Those folks who are embedded with the
    battalions, instead of being 10 to 12, are going to be about 30
    to 40. A good number of those additional 30 to 40 are folks
    carrying rifles to ensure that our cell of U.S. folks can
    protect itself regardless of the event. Immediately behind them
    is the reinforcing unit of our U.S. battalion that's there to
    help the Iraqis, but is also there as a quick-reaction force to
    go help our folks. We have this thing lined up in a way that
    does not guarantee that U.S. troops will not get into harm's
    way, but it does guarantee that, if they are in harm's way,
    that they'll be properly armed, protected, and have lots of
    U.S. response available to them.
        Senator Ben Nelson. So, we shouldn't expect another Karbala
    incident, is that fair?
        General Pace. Two different things, sir. One is units in
    the attack, which is what I've been talking about; the other,
    in Karbala, was a stationary point to which insurgents, with
    vehicles that looked like coalition vehicles, with people
    inside wearing uniforms that looked like coalition uniforms,
    were able to approach that checkpoint. A totally different
    environment. But, again, that's under investigation to see what
    broke down, what are the lessons, so it doesn't reoccur.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Okay, thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Dole.
        Senator Dole. Secretary Gates, would you give us your views
    on the need for follow-on legislation similar in nature to the
    Goldwater-Nichols Act, building on that legislation, but
    involving all relevant departments and agencies? I'm assuming
    that you agree with the need for such legislation, but what
    steps could you initiate, what steps should Congress begin, in
    order to move this discussion forward? I'd appreciate both you
    and General Pace responding to this question.
        Secretary Gates. I've spent a lot of time working these
    problems, including almost 9 years, under four different
    Presidents, on the National Security Council, and just, sort
    of, the predicate for your question is that there are a lot of
    folks in the DOD who wonder where the rest of the Government is
    in this war, and our DOS friends sometimes, I think, wonder the
    same thing.
        There is clearly a need for greater interagency
    collaboration, and some of the legislation that we will be
    proposing for building the capacity of our partner nations that
    requires collaboration between the DOD and the DOS and other
    parts of the Government, their legislation can help us, where
    we can provide money from the DOD, perhaps to the DOS, to help
    train and equip some partner in Africa or someplace else, in
    terms of counterterrorism, that sort of thing.
        The concern that I have--and I know that General Pace has
    referred to the need for Goldwater-Nichols for the rest of the
    executive branch, and I would never disagree with the chairman,
    except that what made Goldwater-Nichols work for the DOD was,
    at the end of the day, there was one person making the
    decisions, and that was the Secretary of Defense. So, those who
    didn't want to play ball eventually all had to answer to the
    same person. That's much harder where you have a dozen or 15
    Cabinet Secretaries. In effect, the President becomes the
    action officer, if you will.
        I'm not quite sure what the right answer is, but what I
    know is that, as we look at these Provincial Reconstruction
    Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, Iraq, and where we're deploying
    elsewhere--where there's a need not just for State and Defense,
    but Agriculture, and so on, there is a need, somehow, for an
    interagency empowerment that requires these agencies to provide
    the personnel that are necessary to do the job. Whether that's
    something that the President does through an executive order or
    a directive, or whether there is some way legislation can
    enable that, I'm not sure. Frankly, I'm not optimistic that
    legislation is the answer. But there's clearly a need for there
    to be a greater ability to transfer funds and people and
    establish partnerships among the different parts of the
    Government, the executive branch, than now exists.
        Senator Dole. General Pace?
        General Pace. Senator, the Secretary and I have not had a
    chance to have a discussion about this, but, as it turns out,
    we are not at all in disagreement. I am not at all certain that
    it requires enactment of some kind of legislation. What I am
    certain of is that there are lessons to be learned from the
    Goldwater-Nichols Act. The things that created joint tasks
    forces, might there be something there that gets at what the
    Secretary just said about some way to have someone below the
    President of the United States empowered in the interagency
    process to make things happen? Might we reward things like we
    have in the joint world, such as tours between departments or
    individuals who volunteer to go overseas and serve their
    country in more dangerous locations? Are there ways that we can
    train ourselves, interagencywise, for better planning efforts?
    You can take every piece of Goldwater-Nichols, and we should,
    and see whether or not it applies prospectively to the
    interagency process, and then, if it does, do we need a law or
    do we need just executive decision? What is it that would allow
    us to get on about doing that business? Goldwater-Nichols has
    been so empowering to the military that something like it would
    be enormously effective for the rest of our Government.
        Secretary Gates. I would just lay down one marker. I would
    not give the National Security Council staff an operational
    role in managing the Government. Every time the President has
    done that, it's spelled trouble.
        Senator Dole. Thank you, both, for your answers, and I look
    forward to working with you in this respect.
        Secretary Gates, we briefly discussed at your nomination
    hearing the need for further improvements in the DOD financial
    management systems. In the time that you have been there, have
    you had an opportunity to look at this further, in terms of
    increased transparency, the need for accountability of dollars
    spent? As you have looked at it, if you've had an opportunity
    to really get into this one, what do you think the next steps
    would be? It's a very serious issue.
        Secretary Gates. Senator, in all honesty, I haven't had a
    chance to get into it, but I'm sure that Ms. Jonas would be in
    a position to answer your question.
        Senator Dole. Thank you.
        Ms. Jonas. Senator, thank you for the question. As you may
    know, we've been pretty hard at work at trying to obtain a
    clean audit opinion on the DOD's books. We have implemented an
    extensive program, called the Financial Improvement and Audit
    Readiness Program. To date, we have our line items on the
    balance sheet, we have about 15 percent of our assets, about
    $215 billion, that receive a clean opinion, and close to a
    trillion in assets that would receive a clean opinion. So,
    that's one part of the equation. The other part of it, in
    getting toward our 11 material weaknesses, is really deploying
    systems, financial systems, that will help us be able to trace
    all those transactions. We're working very hard at that. We
    have an extensive plan on that, called the Enterprise
    Transition Plan, and we've testified before some of the
    subcommittees here on that.
        So, we're working very hard at it. It's a very difficult
    problem, largely because of the systems. But we appreciate
    Congress's interest in it, and we hope we're making progress.
        Senator Dole. Thank you.
        Secretary Gates, Afghanistan now accounts for more than 90
    percent of the global opium supply. Since your confirmation
    hearing, let me ask, have you had the opportunity to look more
    closely at this issue? On the importance of undercutting the
    drug trade in Afghanistan, what must we do to effectively deny
    the Taliban the support of the population and the great revenue
    that they realize from the opium trade?
        Secretary Gates. Senator, I raised this problem with
    President Karzai when I was in Afghanistan a couple of weeks
    ago. He admitted that they had made a terrible mistake, that,
    in the first year, they basically bought the crop from the
    farmers, and, lo and behold, the next year, a lot more people
    were planting poppies, in the hope that it would be bought by
    the government.
        Our eradication efforts, with our NATO allies, have been
    stymied by the inability to get agreement on both aerial and
    ground spraying. We are going to continue to pursue that with
    the Afghans. Part of the problem with the money aspect of it is
    certainly not that the farmers get it, but that it fuels the
    Taliban and it fuels corruption. I told President Karzai that
    it corrodes the entire fabric of the state, and that if they
    don't get some kind of a handle on it, they're going to have a
    problem. The good news is that the economy is growing enough
    that opium is--or the poppies are becoming a smaller percentage
    of the GDP. But that doesn't mean there's less opium out there
    available. Most of it goes to the Europeans.
        All I can tell you is that the counternarcotics initiative
    is going to be part of the agenda at the NATO Defense Ministers
    meeting the end of this week. We intend to pursue it. We know
    it's important. It's important not only because of the drug
    aspect of it, but because of what I just said, in terms of its
    impact both on the Taliban and on official corruption. So, we
    will be pursuing it with our allies. To be honest, some of our
    allies have had the lead in this, and it hasn't gone quite as
    far as we would have hoped.
        Senator Dole. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Dole.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. General Pace, Secretary Gates, and Ms. Jonas.
        Secretary Gates, on January 11, you announced a permanent
    end strength of the Active-Duty Army would go up 65,000 over
    the next 5 years, beginning with 37,000 troops in fiscal year
    2008. It's my understanding that only 7,000 troops are being
    paid for in this base budget. Is that correct?
        Secretary Gates. There is a small amount--I'll try to
    answer, and then ask Ms. Jonas, I think there's a small amount
    in the fiscal year 2007 emergency supplemental, just to get
    started, in terms of facilities and so on. The troops will be
    recruited at a rate of 7,000 a year for 5 years. So, the
    funding for the base budget in fiscal year 2008, as I
    understand it, is for the first tranche of the 7,000 of the
    final 35,000.
        Ms. Jonas. Yes, Senator Reed, just to clarify, there's
    $12.1 billion in the base budget for the increase of 7,000 Army
    and 5,000 Marines, and that carries through the FYDP. The
    additional amount we have been carrying in the supplementals,
    36,000 Army and 9,000 Marines. That will appear in the 2007
    supplemental and also in the fiscal year 2008 global war on
    terror, which this committee will have. But it all becomes
    permanent in the 2009, every part of that. So, but----
        Chairman Levin. Could you just----
        Ms. Jonas. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. I think some know what global war on terror
    means, but----
        Ms. Jonas. I'm sorry----
        Chairman Levin.--why don't you explain for the record.
        Ms. Jonas. Yes, I'm sorry. The global war on terror
    request. So, we have the full-year request that we're asking
    for from this committee, of $141.7 billion. Included in that is
    a portion of the over strength of 36,000 and the 9,000.
        Senator Reed. So that the request this year in this budget
    is the 7,000 additional soldiers.
        Ms. Jonas. The 5,000 marines.
        Senator Reed. 5,000 marines.
        Ms. Jonas. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. In the 2009 budget?
        Ms. Jonas. Yes.
        Senator Reed. The request will be for how many forces?
        Ms. Jonas. You will have the 7,000 Army, 5,000 Marines; in
    addition, the over strength that had been carried in the
    supplemental, of 36,000 Army and 9,000 Marines, will be
    included in the base. So, it will all become permanent.
        Senator Reed. So that you pull it out of the supplemental,
    put it in. That gets us to the point, where are we with respect
    to the increase in the Army? Are we going to 7,000 additional
    troops?
        We are carrying troops on the Army roles now in the
    supplemental, about 30,000-plus?
        Ms. Jonas. 36,000, sir.
        Senator Reed. 36,000 troops. The increase that the
    Secretary talked about was an additional, roughly, 37,000
    troops, correct?
        Ms. Jonas. There are two pieces.
        Senator Reed. Yes.
        Ms. Jonas. The 36,000 in the over strength for the Army
    which is carried in the supplemental, and that the Secretary
    just talked to you is an additional 7,000 Army.
        Senator Reed. Right.
        Ms. Jonas. For--yes, okay.
        Senator Reed. Fiscal year 2009.
        Ms. Jonas. Yes.
        Senator Reed. 36,000 troops that are in the supplemental
    roll into the baseline budget.
        Ms. Jonas. Yes, sir. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Reed. 7,000 plus 7,000 troops that are carried
    forward--new troops that carry forward from this 2008 budget.
        Ms. Jonas. Right.
        Senator Reed. Plus another 7,000 troops that will be
    recruited, is that correct?
        Ms. Jonas. There's only one 7,000.
        Senator Reed. Okay. So, that's----
        Ms. Jonas. We'd be happy to provide you a chart of all
    this, sir----
        Senator Reed. So, at the end of 2009, we have plus-42,000
    troops that are in the budget, regular Army troops.
        Ms. Jonas. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. I'm just trying to understand how that
    equates with an increase of 65,000 over 5 years, Mr. Secretary.
        Secretary Gates. We're starting with 482,000 as the Army
    base. An additional 30,000 were authorized in an earlier
    supplemental. That would take the Army to 512,000. Beginning in
    fiscal year 2008, we will begin recruiting 7,000 a year for 5
    years. That will take the Army to 547,000 in a 5-year period.
    Beginning in fiscal year 2008, the 35,000.
        Senator Reed. So, the 5 years really is that it's--it's not
    7,000 a year, it's maintaining a plus-7,000 over 5 years.
        Secretary Gates. Yes, it's the 30,000 that has been made
    permanent from the supplemental, plus 7,000 a year for 5 years,
    so a total of 65,000.
        Senator Reed. What are the chances of that transfer being
    delayed again, as it has been over the last several--Mr.
    Secretary, many on this committee have urged that that
    supplemental increase in forces that's paid by the supplemental
    should be in the permanent budget. Once again, that decision
    was not made. In lieu of that, there was a 7,000 increment in
    the baseline budget, I think. My concern, obviously, is that
    every time we come up to this tough budget decision, which
    takes money from other Services, potentially, or at least
    raises the bottom line of the Service, we tend to punt, as we
    are doing this time.
        Secretary Gates. Senator, this is an issue that I had some
    feelings about before I ever was asked to take this job, and I
    feel strongly about it. I will tell you, it'll be in the budget
    as long as I'm Secretary.
        Senator Reed. I hope so, Mr. Secretary.
        This is another issue of, the numbers. As I understand it--
    and, Ms. Jonas, you can correct me--the budget includes $142
    billion for spending related to operations in Iraq and
    Afghanistan.
        Ms. Jonas. That's for 2008, yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. For fiscal year 2008.
        Ms. Jonas. Yes.
        Senator Reed. Plus a $93 billion supplemental for those
    related costs?
        Ms. Jonas. That's correct, in fiscal year 2007.
        Senator Reed. For a total in this budget, going forward, up
    until September 2008, costs related to Iraq and Afghanistan of
    about, if I do the math correctly, roughly $230 billion?
        Ms. Jonas. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. That's correct? You're showing a projection
    of war costs in the following budget, in fiscal year 2009, of
    $50 billion?
        Ms. Jonas. Yes, sir. That was OMB's decision to do that.
        Senator Reed. So, we go from $230 billion thats already on
    the table, and suddenly we go from $230 to $50 billion? How
    realistic is that assumption?
        Ms. Jonas. Sir, we were asked to do the best we could, gave
    our best judgment as to what we would require in fiscal year
    2008, and I think, as the Secretary has indicated, we're sure
    that the conditions will change, and that will be subject to
    some adjustment. I think we would be far less precise about
    predicting out in fiscal year 2009.
        Senator Reed. Frankly, if you looked at the level of
    spending--estimates in actual spending, it's always been up,
    not down. So, if I were a betting guy, I'd bet that it's not--
    if it's $243 billion in this budget cycle, and it's not $50
    billion, it's probably $240-plus billion. Was that decision
    made by OMB to provide room for permanent tax cuts and for
    projected paper savings on the deficit?
        Ms. Jonas. Sir, I don't know, I've had no conversations
    with OMB about that.
        Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, have you had any
    conversations?
        Secretary Gates. No.
        Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, did you give them a number of
    projected spending for the follow-on budget?
        Secretary Gates. Not that I'm aware of.
        Ms. Jonas. No. No, sir.
        Senator Reed. So, this $50 billion is a fiction that has
    been agreed to by OMB.
        Ms. Jonas. What we have provided, sir, is--we've been
    asked, as provided in section 1008 of the NDAA, was to try do
    our best to give you a good projection, with detail to the
    budget. We believe we've done that for fiscal year 2008. I
    think that would be very difficult to do for fiscal year 2009
    with a detailed justification for fiscal year 2009.
        Senator Reed. I don't know, but General, I would have
    presumed that you have force-structure plans and a campaign
    plan that stretches out at least through 2009 into 2010. Is
    that fair?
        General Pace. Sir, the----
        Senator Reed. Rotation of troops and forces, at least
    conditional.
        General Pace. The force structure from fiscal year 2009 on
    is going to be in the budget as----
        Senator Reed. No, I'm talking about your projected force
    structure in Iraq and Afghanistan. Do you have a campaign plan
    that goes beyond September 1, 2008?
        General Pace. Do not have a campaign plan, sir, but if--for
    planning purposes, as we answer questions about what the
    future's going to hold, we are saying that what we have
    committed now is what we use to plan to. Not that we're saying
    that that's a decision, but what we have is what we have.
    Trying to argue it's going to go up or go down makes no more
    sense than having it stay stable----
        Senator Reed. All right, so----
        General Pace.--so we have it stay stable.
        Senator Reed. So, for operational planning purposes, you're
    looking at roughly 140,000 troops in Iraq, and yet, the
    budget----
        General Pace. No, for funding--I'm sorry, sir.
        Senator Reed. No, what are you looking at, past September
    of fiscal year 2008?
        General Pace. For funding purposes, we project straight
    line, so we have a base, off of which to go up or down, sir.
    That's as simple as it gets.
        Senator Reed. How many troops do you have projected to be
    in Iraq October 2008 and November 2008?
        General Pace. Sir, do not have a projection of troops, per
    se. Have a projection of continuing to spend about $7 billion a
    month----
        Senator Reed. Okay.
        General Pace.--on the war. It's a fine point, but it----
        Senator Reed. If I do the math, $7 billion a month is about
    $84 billion, and that's a little more than $50 billion.
        General Pace. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. So, there seems to be a huge disconnect
    between your plans and what OBM is showing as the cost.
        General Pace. Projection, if I could just--projection, sir,
    not plan.
        Senator Reed. Okay.
        My time's expired. Thank you.
        Senator Lieberman. [presiding]. In the absence of Senator
    Levin, who's had to leave the room for a while, I thank Senator
    Reed and call now on Senator Thune. [Audience interruption.]
        Ma'am, we're going to ask you to please be quiet or we will
    have to remove you from the room. Will the Capitol Police there
    please take action so Senator Thune can proceed with his
    questions. Thank you.
        Senator Thune.
        Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, thank you for your service. Mr. Secretary, thank
    you for your testimony today, as well, and for giving us an
    idea about where the DOD tends to go with the budget in the
    upcoming years.
        Secretary Gates, I know that it's difficult, with the ever-
    changing situation on the ground, to get accurate estimates and
    knowing what future costs of operations in Iraq and the global
    war on terror, I'm sure, is no easy task and very difficult to
    predict. You stated in your testimony, however, that in fiscal
    year 2007, the emergency supplemental request is $93.4 billion
    and that that's all--and $70 billion you add to that in 2007,
    that's already been appropriated, brings the total war-related
    cost to about $163.4 billion for fiscal year 2007. The fiscal
    year 2008 global war on terror request is $141.7 billion, or
    $21.7 billion less than the fiscal year 2007 request. So I
    guess my question is, how do you explain a 13 percent decrease
    in the global war on terror request for fiscal year 2008 when,
    in fact, we're increasing troop strength and support in the
    region?
        Secretary Gates. I don't have the figure for the enacted
    fiscal year 2007 budget, but I know that, for the supplemental,
    we have $34.4 billion budgeted for operations. So, of the $93.4
    billion in the supplemental, $34.4 billion is actually for
    operations, and then the rest if reset and readiness, force
    protection, and so on. In the fiscal year 2008 global war on
    terror budget, of that $141.7 billion, about $65.7 billion is
    budgeted for operations. So, I don't know what the enacted
    figure was for 2007, but if you look at the difference between
    the fiscal year 2008 global war on terror budget and the fiscal
    year 2007 supplemental, it's almost twice as much in fiscal
    year 2008. Maybe Ms. Jonas could actually shed a little light
    on this subject.
        Senator Thune. Ms. Jonas, could you respond to that?
        Ms. Jonas. Okay. Thank you, Senator. [Laughter.]
        For 2008, if you looked in our operations costs, you'd come
    to a total of about $69.9 billion, if Congress acts favorably
    on our request. What we've asked for----
        Senator Thune. So $69 billion, you said?
        Ms. Jonas. $69.9 billion for operations, if Congress
    appropriates what we're putting before them now. In fiscal year
    2008, what we project is about $70.6 billion for operations.
    Your differences, the reasons that you're going to have
    differences are in policy--some of the policy changes. For
    example, your security forces numbers will go down. We project
    about $12.9 billion for security forces for fiscal year 2007,
    going down to $4.7 billion in fiscal year 2008. Then the pieces
    that we've been discussing here with regard to enhancing the
    forces, including the $5.6 billion for the reinforcement or
    plus-up, and we also have included in the 2007 an acceleration
    of two brigade combat teams and one regimental combat team. So,
    there are a few differences there.
        Senator Thune. When you said ``security force,'' which
    security are you referring to?
        Ms. Jonas. The Iraq and Afghan security forces.
        Senator Thune. So, we're assuming----
        Ms. Jonas. The training funds.
        Senator Thune.--that's going to go down a lot once
    they're----
        Ms. Jonas. Yes, sir.
        Secretary Gates. Actually, there's an imbalance in fiscal
    year 2008. The Afghans are actually getting quite a bit more
    than the Iraqis are.
        Senator Thune. Okay.
        General Pace, you had mentioned in your testimony that the
    global war on terror request includes a total of $51.5 billion
    to reconstitute our joint forces. This ground may have been
    plowed already, but I'd be interested in knowing what portion
    of that request is going to go to National Guard and Reserve
    units to improve warfighting readiness, and, second, to repair
    or replace equipment that has been lost or damaged in combat.
        General Pace. Senator, if I may ask Ms. Jonas to answer
    this specific question, because I know them--the macro number,
    and I don't want to misstate. I know that there's $21 billion
    going to the National Guard and Reserve, but that's on top of
    some $15 billion that's already been spent, so that adds up to
    $36 billion. Rather than start doing pluses and minuses,
    perhaps I can get a precise answer from her.
        Senator Thune. Okay.
        Ms. Jonas. Thank you, Senator.
        In total, for the base budget for the Army National Guard
    and the Air Guard, over the fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year
    2013 period, we have about $27.2 billion budgeted. In the
    fiscal year 2007 supplemental for the Army Guard, we have
    another billion, and for the fiscal year 2008 global war on
    terror, we have--meaning the request that's before you for
    fiscal year 2008 global war on terror, another $2.7 billion. On
    the reset costs, we had appropriated to us in title IX about
    $23.6 billion, and we're requesting in this supplemental
    another $13.9 billion. So, that would bring the total cost to
    about $37.6 billion for fiscal year 2007. Then, as we've
    discussed here, we've basically have about a $38 billion--$37.6
    billion also in reset for fiscal year 2008 in the global war on
    terror.
        Senator Thune. A follow-up question to that, does
    reconstituting the force include replacing weapons systems lost
    in combat with next-generation-technology weapons systems? Is
    that contemplated?
        Ms. Jonas. Senator, we have, in the past, upgraded, for
    example, helicopters, when certain helicopters have been lost
    in combat, we have replaced them with the V-22. One of the
    items in this supplemental, there are two Joint Strike
    Fighters, which I know is of some concern to some Members of
    Congress. The Air Force was asking for those replacements for
    three F-16s that have been lost in combat, and their concern is
    that we don't have an open production line for the F-16s. There
    is a foreign military sales open line, but we understand that
    that decision will have to be made by Congress.
        Senator Thune. So, the answer is yes, at least to some
    level.
        Ms. Jonas. Yes, sir.
        Senator Thune. Okay.
        Secretary Gates, the Army and the Marine Corps both are, as
    we all know, in a state of transition, both with regard to
    doctrine and equipment. In your testimony, you had mentioned
    that we'll spend about 4 percent of our GDP on defense, and
    that that is a lower percentage than what we've spent during
    other times of conflict. If you look back--and I have some data
    going back from 1940 on--in World War II, we were spending over
    a third of our GDP, and throughout other periods in history,
    including from the Cold War and post-Cold War period, we were
    spending considerably more than that. That dropped off in the
    mid/late 1990s. But at a 4-percent-of-GDP investment in our
    military, will the Army and the Marine Corps have enough
    funding to, one, fight the war on terror, two, meet
    recapitalization requirements, and, three, be able to
    transition to new weapons systems, like the Army's future
    combat system, without having to make cutbacks to the program?
        Secretary Gates. Senator, my understanding is that--and I'm
    not quite sure what percentage of GDP the budget you have in
    front of you for fiscal year 2008 represents, but enactment of
    the three pieces before you--the fiscal year 2008 base budget,
    the fiscal year 2008 global war on terror piece, and the fiscal
    year 2007 emergency supplemental--would meet all those needs,
    yes, sir--and I'm not quite sure what percentage of GDP the
    budget you have in front of you for fiscal year 2008
    represents, but enactment of the three pieces before you--the
    fiscal year 2008 base budget, the fiscal year 2008 global war
    on terror piece, and the fiscal year 2007 emergency
    supplemental--would meet all those needs, yes, sir.
        Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you. Thanks to the panel.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Thune.
        Senator McCaskill.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Gates, do you know, or perhaps you would maybe
    want to defer this to Ms. Jonas, what percentage of the fiscal
    year 2006 money that was spent by DOD was spent competitively?
        Ms. Jonas. Senator, we'd have to get back to you. I don't
    have that at my disposal here, but we've be happy to get that
    for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Department of Defense (DOD) reported 62.4 percent of total contract
    dollars were competitively awarded in 2006. Dollars awarded by another
    agency on DOD's behalf are not included in these calculations (see
    Note).
          Note: Our procurement database has a degree of reporting
    inaccuracy and there are differences of opinion as to how to measure
    competition. For example, DOD traditionally has considered orders made
    utilizing the Federal Supply Schedules as competitive. Others argue we
    should not consider these awards as competitive.

        Senator McCaskill. What percent of the money that the DOD
    spent in fiscal year 2006 was spent through interagency
    contracts?
        Ms. Jonas. Again, I would have to ask our acquisition,
    technology, and logistics (AT&L) folks to help with that. We
    could certainly get that for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        In fiscal year 2006, approximately 6 to 7 percent of Department of
    Defense funds were spent through interagency contracts.

        Senator McCaskill. How much money was spent on sole-source
    contracts?
        Ms. Jonas. I'd have to again, I'd defer to our AT&L folks,
    they would have that data. I'm glad to provide that for the
    record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Department of Defense (DOD) reported that 37.6 percent of total
    contract dollars awarded by DOD in 2006 were not competed (see Note).

             23.2 percent of dollars were attributed specifically to
            actions citing the Competition in Contracting Act ``only one
            source'' authority.
             6.1 percent of dollars were justified by other statutory
            exceptions to competition.
             2.1 percent of dollars were follow-on actions to prior
            competitions that are placed with a particular contractor to
            continue or augment a specific competed program.
             6.2 percent of dollars were awards to Government activities,
            mandated by international agreements, authorized by statute, or
            were brand name purchases for resale in commissaries and
            exchanges.

          Note: Our procurement database has a degree of reporting
    inaccuracy and there arc differences of opinion as to how to measure
    competition. For example, DOD traditionally has considered orders made
    utilizing the Federal Supply Schedules as competitive. Others argue we
    should not consider these awards as competitive.

        Senator McCaskill. Okay. The other one that I have
    specifically is how many Antideficiency Act (ADA) violations
    have been found on behalf of monies--personnel working for the
    Government, either in the DOD or in other agencies, in spending
    DOD dollars?
        Ms. Jonas. The overall figures would probably be held by
    OMB. I could get, for the record--we do review the
    antideficiency cases as a routine, and we try to make sure that
    people who violate those rules are held accountable for that. I
    can get you the specific number of cases for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator McCaskill. I would like, from your office, the
    numbers as to how many have been referred, how many
    investigations have been done, the average length of time those
    investigations have taken, and what has happened as an end
    result of those investigations. I'm particularly interested in
    how many are reversed with accounting entries. When we have
    expenditures in one fiscal year that is actually monies that
    were supposed to be spent in another fiscal year, and when
    they've been found out, someone has gone back in and reversed
    the accounting industry to cure it.
        Ms. Jonas. Okay. I'm unaware of that. I will tell you this,
    that we vigorously investigate these cases. I take them very
    seriously. I'd be happy to provide that data to you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator McCaskill. Okay. Further, have you had an
    opportunity to review the IG's report on interagency
    contracting that we have received here on this committee?
        Ms. Jonas. I have seen the data on that, yes.
        Senator McCaskill. Have you had a chance to review the
    Acquisition Advisory Panel's report--the independent advisory
    panel that has worked for 22 months and taken over 7,000 pages
    of testimony--concerning the way the DOD buys stuff?
        Ms. Jonas. I have not. I will say that the acquisition and
    procurement responsibilities are part of the AT&L section of
    the DOD. But I'd be happy to get with Ken Krieg about this as a
    concern. I know you've had AT&L witnesses up here, and we
    support your efforts there.
        Senator McCaskill. Frankly, I think it should be a concern
    for General Pace and Secretary Gates, and not just a
    department. It may surprise you to know that that Acquisition
    Advisory Panel says that you're not going to be able to give me
    the percentage of competitive spending, because it said, ``We
    can't tell, even, how much of the money that's being spent
    through interagency contracts is being spent competitively.''
    What they have been able to tell is, in the years of fiscal
    years 2005 and 2004, that over $100 billion was being spent
    noncompetitively through the DOD. Does that sound--and that's
    without knowing how much of the interagency contracts are being
    spent noncompetitively.
        Ms. Jonas. Yes, I can't confirm that. What I can say is
    that the Defense Contract Audit Agency, which does report to
    me, evaluates about $320 billion of defense spending annually.
    Last year, they did over 35,000--actually 35,610 audits to try
    to help the DOD make sure that contracts are done correctly,
    according to the Federal Acquisition Regulations. I think they
    do a very good job. They recovered about $2.3 billion last year
    in potential costs to the Government. So, I appreciate your
    concern, and we will get back to you on that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Department of Defense (DOD) reported 62.4 percent of total
    contract dollars were competitively awarded in 2006. Dollars awarded on
    DOD's behalf, by other agencies, are not included in these
    calculations. In fiscal year 2006, approximately 6-7 percent of DOD
    funds were spent through interagency contracts.
        As to whether these interagency contracts are competitive: our
    procurement database has a degree of reporting inaccuracy, and there
    are differences of opinion as to how to measure competition. For
    example, with regard to DOD funds spent through interagency contracts,
    the Department traditionally has considered orders made utilizing the
    Federal Supply Schedules to be competitive awards.

        Senator McCaskill. I have to tell you that, as somebody
    who's been auditing for a while, these reports I just referred
    to are absolutely stunning in terms of the news they deliver.
    If you think those 35,000 audits are, in fact, delivering--it's
    hard for me to believe that, if we have that percentage of our
    dollars being spent noncompetitively.
        Let me ask you specifically about the issue of
    noncompetitiveness. When we evaluate competing contracts at the
    DOD--and, Secretary Gates, you may want to address this--for
    example, when Quick Kill was selected by the Future Combat
    System (FCS) for the system that was supposed to repel rocket-
    propelled grenades, a third of the members on that evaluation
    team worked for the company that received the contract. I would
    be curious as to whether or not that is common. Do we allow the
    companies that want to build these systems to be the ones to
    pick who gets to build the systems?
        Secretary Gates. Doesn't sound right to me, Senator.
        Senator McCaskill. That is a--and I noticed that the FCS in
    this budget has gone from several hundred million dollars to
    $3.7 billion. Is that correct?
        Secretary Gates. I think it's up $300 million.
        Ms. Jonas. Right. Senator, last year, I believe it was $3.4
    billion, and the increase this year is $300 million.
        Senator McCaskill. Okay. So, this system is $3.7 billion,
    and we know that a $70 million contract within there was given
    when the team that was making the technical specs and making
    the recommendations was--the huge chunk of it was, in fact,
    from the company that got the bid.
        I would be interested--Secretary Gates, would you have any
    problem in--or you may want to take time to answer this--in
    deciding that, from here on out, the companies that are
    participating in trying to win these bids can no longer be part
    of the team that decides who wins the bids?
        Secretary Gates. I would--in principle, I think that sounds
    right. I would like to look into it, myself, and find out what
    the circumstances were. The only circumstance I can think of
    would be that there's some kind of a rare technical skill that
    may not exist someplace else. Let me look into it. But, in
    principle, I think that sounds right.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The standard Future Combat Systems (FCS) business model for
    selecting subcontracted efforts was used to select a developer for
    active protection systems. As the FCS prime contractor, Boeing has
    responsibility for selection of its subcontractors. Quick Kill was
    subsequently identified as a materiel solution to satisfy part of this
    requirement. Army has responsibility for oversight of the contractor's
    evaluation process and concurrence in the contractor's final selection
    decision. Boeing selected Raytheon from among three competitors as the
    best qualified to develop a robust, detailed active protection system
    architecture for manned ground vehicles. This effort is to be performed
    as a second tier subcontract in support of BAE, the first tier
    subcontractor that has responsibility to integrate hit avoidance
    capabilities into FCS. No employee of Raytheon participated in the
    source selection for the active protection system architecture
    developer. Following its selection of Raytheon, Boeing directed BAE to
    award a subcontract to Raytheon. The first task for Raytheon under its
    subcontract was to conduct a trade study to determine components to be
    used to satisfy the performance requirements in the architecture.
    Raytheon performed this study with oversight from Boeing, BAE, and the
    Army to ensure that appropriate processes were followed, the technical
    conclusions of the trade study were supported by the findings included
    in the trade study, and industry had fair and equitable participation.
    The Quick Kill system was identified as the FCS solution for the
    current force under the trade study. The trade study team consisted of
    30 members, including 8 members from Raytheon.

        Senator McCaskill. I especially hope that--Secretary Gates,
    that you and General Pace will take time to read the IG's
    report on the interagency contracting. I'll tell you one of
    things that stuck out in my mind, and that was the use of
    operational monies to build things and the use of service
    contracts to lease space. Let me hone in, because I know I
    don't have a lot of time--on the one example that I think is so
    egregious, and that is, to build a building--this is for the
    Materiel Command at the Fort in Virginia. They used operational
    money through General Services Administration to build a
    building. Now, I thought, well, this is obviously going to be a
    little, small building. If they are going around the
    requirements of military contracting to build a building, this
    is probably a small trailer or a modular unit. This building is
    230,000 square feet and houses over 1,400 civilian and military
    personnel.
        Now, I ran into the Secretary of the Army in the hallway
    the other day, and I told him that I may not be his favorite
    new member of the Armed Services Committee because of my focus
    in this area. I mentioned this building to him, and he looked
    at me with a perfectly straight face and said, ``Well, that's a
    temporary building.'' Now, I have to tell you, where I come
    from, a 230,000-square-foot building isn't temporary, that's
    pretty permanent. I would like to find out who's responsible
    for making that decision and why in the world, if we know why
    we need that kind of space for civilian and military personnel,
    would it be justified that--we're not talking about an
    emergency, in terms of something going on in Iraq, we're not
    talking about getting armor to our men and women in the field,
    we're talking about housing personnel. I would like a better
    answer than I've received so far as to who's responsible for
    this and what is going to be done to hold them accountable.
        Thank you. My time's up.
        Chairman Levin [presiding]. Senator, we're going to join
    you in that request. There wasn't an answer to your question,
    but it seems to me, Mr. Secretary, that the issues here are
    similar to the ones that we raised at lunch with you yesterday
    on this contracting and this offloading, which we used to call
    using other agencies' contracts, and that you really do need to
    get some answers for the record here on the number of questions
    which have been raised here.
        Senator McCaskill has a background here which is truly
    important and vital to us, and we're grateful that she's
    focusing on an area where we've spent a lot of time, but
    without, obviously, having the success which we need to have.
    So, I want to thank her, but I also want to, if you would,
    because of the way that last question was phrased, for the
    record, give us much more material in an effort to respond to
    the points that were raised.
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir, we will.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        I cannot comment or provide the requested details at this time due
    to an ongoing investigation of a potential violation of the Anti-
    Deficiency Act. The Department will be happy to brief the committee
    once the investigation is complete.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Chambliss.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your continued service to our
    country. We can't overstate how much we appreciate and value
    that service.
        To both Secretary Gates and General Pace, you mention in
    your statements that the DOD is changing the way it looks at
    the employment of the National Guard and Reserve. Certainly,
    nobody can question that, over the last decade and a half, we
    have changed the way that we employ and deploy the National
    Guard and Reserve. We have made a number of changes in quality-
    of-life benefits for our National Guard and Reserve, and if
    we're going to continue to be able to attract and retain the
    National Guard and Reserve, particularly in light of the way we
    intend to use them in the future, I think we have to continue
    to look at changing the benefits that are available to them,
    even though we will never, and should never, make it on an
    equal basis with the Active-Duty Force.
        I've had an amendment, for the last 3 years on the NDAA,
    that seeks to lower the retirement age for the National Guard
    and Reserve. It's the number-one issue now of the National
    Guard and Reserve, from a quality-of-life standpoint. Can you
    tell me what, if any, consideration has been given to that
    particular issue in this budget? Was there any discussion
    whatsoever about that as you prepared these numbers?
        Secretary Gates. This is a new issue to me, Senator. Let me
    ask Ms. Jonas.
        Ms. Jonas. I can get back to you, sir, on that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Department has consistently opposed efforts to lower the
    retirement age for Guard and Reserve personnel due to the adverse
    impact it would have on controlling TRICARE costs. I have made Dr.
    David Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), aware
    of your concerns, and he would be happy to discuss this matter with you
    in greater detail.

        Senator Chambliss. Okay. We have added that amendment to
    the NDAA for the last 3 years, and it is critically important
    that we address it, and I'm amazed that it hasn't reached your
    level, Ms. Jonas.
        There are several States, of which Georgia is one, that, as
    a result of the BRAC, are going to see an influx of new troops
    coming in. We have about 10,000 new troops coming to Fort
    Benning alone with the movement of the Armor School from Fort
    Knox. As a result of that, the school systems that serve Fort
    Benning are going to have a critical shortage of space to be
    able to house the students that are going to be coming in. Now,
    I understand that not all of the 10,000 new troops will be
    coming in 1 month or maybe even 1 year, but we have been
    dialoging with the DOD on providing some funding to assist
    these school systems, in Georgia and the other States, with
    respect to the infrastructure that's needed to house those
    students.
        As best we can tell, there's about $2.4 million in the
    defense budget that is to be used for that. I'd like to ask you
    where that stands, what consideration is given to it, and do
    you think that's adequate to meet the needs that we're going to
    have here?
        Ms. Jonas. Sir, are you speaking of the impact aid?
        Senator Chambliss. No, I'm not speaking of impact aid.
        Ms. Jonas. Okay.
        Senator Chambliss. This is a different issue altogether.
        Ms. Jonas. Okay. I'll take a look at what we have in the
    budget. The $2.4 million sounds right. We'll get back to you on
    that specific piece.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        In fiscal year 2008, the Department has budgeted $2.4 million to
    ease the transition of military dependent students from attendance at
    DOD schools to attendance at local educational agencies consistent with
    section 574(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
    Year 2007. The Department of Defense Dependents' Education (DODDE) will
    use these funds to share educational expertise and experience with
    school districts impacted by large influxes of students because of base
    closures, global rebasing, and force restructuring. The fiscal year
    2008 funds will be used to do initial assessments of school district
    needs and to begin developing partnerships with the affected school
    systems.
        The DODDE will first consider school districts that will be most
    impacted by force structure changes. Next, the DODDE will consider
    school districts that ask for educational assistance. Based on DODDE's
    record of building instructional programs that consistently produce
    students whose test scores are above average, the DODDE will offer
    educational enhancements and strategies to affected school systems to
    help them build instructional programs similar to those in DODDE
    schools.

        Senator Chambliss. All right. I'd like to know whether or
    not that's going to be an annual budgeted item for some period
    of time. If so, what's the length of time.
        Ms. Jonas. I can check with the folks who are responsible
    for that in the building and get back to you. I don't have any
    understanding of where that is right now, but if it's in the
    budget, the $2.4 million, I would guess it would be a
    continuing item.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Department will request additional funds in subsequent years as
    the troops and their families move and there is a need for such
    efforts. The goal is to ensure that the Department provides a high
    quality educational program to all military dependents regardless of
    where they live.

        Senator Chambliss. Okay. With respect to the operating
    tempo (OPTEMPO) we've seen in the Active-Duty Force, certainly
    there's no question we have seen an increase there, but, by the
    same token, with the fact that we have been wearing out the
    equipment that we're using in theater, the fact that we've had
    to change a lot of the equipment, the OPTEMPO at our depots has
    also increased significantly.
        Now, I note that there's a $51.5 billion figure in this
    budget for reconstituting our forces, and there's about a $4.7
    billion increase going to our depots. Because of the fact that
    we have seen that OPTEMPO at the depots increase, can you tell
    me what the thought process is, relative to whether or not
    we're going to be able to handle this surge in-house, or do we
    intend to contract more out, and what impact, again, does the
    DOD anticipate with respect to that ongoing surge at our
    military depots?
        Ms. Jonas. Senator, we have about $11 billion in the base
    budget for depot maintenance, and my understanding is that we
    project that they'll be operating at about 64 percent of
    capacity. So, my own understanding, and what I've been told, is
    that we should be able to handle the additional surge.
        Senator Chambliss. Do you intend to handle it in-house, or
    is there going to be a significant increase in contracting out?
        Ms. Jonas. I wouldn't anticipate that. Of course, we'd
    follow the law, which requires the 50 percent. So, I can get
    back to you, for the record, on that, but I'm sure that we
    would use the in-house capacity as we can.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        We'd use a combination of organic (in-house) and commercial based
    on the type of equipment being repaired. By law, no more than 50
    percent of the funds made available to the Department for depot
    maintenance may be used to contract for performance by non-Federal
    Government personnel. As workload demand increases, production output
    will also have to increase so equipment can be cycled back to the
    operating forces in a timely fashion. To accomplish this will require
    repair work done at a mix of organic and commercial activities based on
    the type of equipment that will need to be repaired. In April of each
    year, the Department submits a report to Congress showing the
    percentage of workload achieved organically and commercially for the
    prior year, and the percentage of workload planned for the execution
    year and beyond. This report will factor in supplemental funds for
    depot maintenance activities. Preliminary data supporting that report
    show the workload split by Military Service and Defense Agency is
    roughly 50 percent organic and 50 percent commercial.

        Senator Chambliss. The other issue, relative to depots,
    General Pace, you may be aware that at Marine Corps Logistics
    Base in Albany, we have done a lot of work for the Army, as
    well as for the National Guard. The cross-servicing issue is
    going to be critically important, particularly from an in-house
    standpoint. Has any consideration been given to the fact that
    we need to increase that cross-service work at our depots?
        General Pace. Sir, the short answer is yes, sir, and that's
    why, as you mentioned, you see what you do at Albany. As Ms.
    Jonas mentioned, the capacity of our depots is projected to be
    at about 54 percent, so there is the opportunity for more
    cross-servicing. But if I can take a second to just thank the
    great folks at Albany, because they have been doing fabulous
    work for us, and they deserve our thanks.
        Senator Chambliss. You're exactly right. If there is any
    legislative action that's necessary, obviously I hope, as we go
    through this budget process, you'll give us an indication of
    what legislation may be needed.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
        Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Thanks, to the three witnesses, excellent testimony.
        General Pace, let me start with a specific question for
    you. I've been alarmed, and I'm sure you have, too, over the
    last 2 weeks, that four American helicopters, three military,
    one private contractor, have gone down. Apparently now there is
    a conclusion, tentative or otherwise, that those were not
    accidents, they were shot down. I presume this means that enemy
    forces have achieved some higher level of capability with
    shoulder-fired missiles. Am I right about that? What are your
    conclusions about it? Where do you think that weaponry is
    coming from? Obviously, we suspect that maybe--I suspect it may
    be from Iran; maybe it's not. What are we going to do about it?
        General Pace. Senator, first, you're right, all four have
    been accredited to enemy fire. Second, each of those
    investigations, as you would expect, is under a detailed
    investigation to figure out what they were doing at the time,
    how they were doing it, the tactics, techniques, and
    procedures. To my knowledge--I'll have to check this for the
    record, but, to my knowledge, each of those was shot down by
    small arms, not by missiles.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [Deleted.]

        Senator Lieberman. Interesting.
        General Pace. At this point in time, I do not know whether
    or not it is the law of averages that caught up with us or if
    there had been a change in tactics, techniques, and procedures
    on the part of the enemy, which is what the investigations will
    do.
        Regardless of what the answer is to that particular
    question, the commanders on the ground have gone to--not safety
    stand-down, but stand-downs designed to share the information
    about the shoot-downs so that the pilots that continue to fly
    those aircraft have the latest information we have, and, as the
    investigations unfold, we'll make sure that it gets put into
    our training.
        Senator Lieberman. Could you indicate for the record what
    kind of protection systems those aircraft have on them? Is
    there something more than can be acquired for them if we come
    to a conclusion that the enemy forces have obtained more
    sophisticated capabilities to shoot down our helicopters?
        General Pace. I will, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The survivability and protection of rotary wing aircraft has been
    an ongoing issue since their advent in combat operations during the
    1940s. Through the Korean War, the Vietnam conflict, and the ongoing
    series of low and high intensity conflicts since then, helicopter
    losses or damage in combat continue to be an issue. The reality which
    cannot be avoided is that any slow moving, noisy, and relatively soft
    vehicle operating in close proximity to the ground and hostile ground
    forces is an inviting target for a wide range of weapons, be they man
    portable or carried by vehicles or other aircraft. Because Blackwater
    Corporation helicopters are utilized for contracted security and are
    beyond the oversight of the U.S. military, the responses to this
    question will only address protection systems for U.S. military
    aircraft.
        All tactical helicopters are equipped with a suite of Aircraft
    Survivability Systems (ASE) designed for each aircraft while performing
    their unique missions. ASE can be categorized in the three areas of
    aircraft signature reduction, situational awareness, and active
    countermeasures. To aid in signature reduction, all tactical
    helicopters are painted with non-reflective infrared absorbing paint.
    AH-64 Apache aircraft also have exhaust suppression that reduces the
    infrared signature and aids in the effectiveness of the AN/ALQ-144A
    infrared radar missile jammer on the aircraft. For situational
    awareness, all tactical helicopters are equipped with electronic
    systems that alert the aircrew of radar activity and laser activity.
    For active countermeasures when masking terrain is not available or
    time is unavailable for the aircrew to maneuver out of threat range,
    infrared radar threats can be jammed by the AN/ALQ-144A system.
    Additionally, radar threats can be decoyed by the M-130 system and
    associated chaff dispenser. There is little doubt that the significant
    ballistic tolerance to 7.62mm and 23mm weapons designed into the UH-60
    Blackhawk, the AH-64 Apache aircraft, and subsequent designs has had a
    large impact on fleet survivability and saved many lives.

        Senator Lieberman. Thanks.
        Secretary Gates, let me go to something you said in your
    opening statement, I thought quite a remarkable statement, and
    we should not let it go, at least unrepeated, which is that,
    ``In December, all active branches of the U.S. military
    exceeded their recruiting goals, with particularly strong
    showings by the Army and Marine Corps,'' who are obviously
    bearing the largest burden of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan.
    How about retention? How are we doing on retention?
        Secretary Gates. Senator, they're meeting all of their
    goals on retention. The one area that the Army and the Navy
    believe is a temporary shortfall is in mid-level enlisted. Let
    me just check to make sure I get it right. It's E-5s and E-6s
    in the Army, where the retention is about 84 percent of their
    goal; and E-4s and E-5s in the Navy, which is about 89 percent
    of their goal. In some respects, the Navy figure is a part of
    their restructuring of their force, of their manpower, and the
    Army is confident that it will meet its goal. But, in truth--
    and General Pace may want to say something--there's a lot out
    there in the press and elsewhere about the stress on the force
    and that the Army is broken and so on. In many respects--I'm
    told by all of the Chiefs that the best measure of the morale
    of the force is, in fact, in the retention numbers, and the
    retention numbers are excellent. That's looking back over the
    past year, which has been a pretty tough year for them. But I
    don't know, the General may want to add something.
        Senator Lieberman. I think it's a good point. That's a
    market test--and I use the word respectfully--of the morale of
    the forces, whether they want to stay in. I welcome your
    comments, General Pace, also whether you're at all alarmed
    about the slight drop below the goals in those mid-level
    positions. Obviously, those are people we would want to keep at
    100 percent.
        General Pace. Sir, the only thing I would add would be that
    this strong retention is something we should not assume, that--
    --
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        General Pace.--we need to continually check ourselves for:
    (a) the missions we're assigning our troops, and (b) how well
    we're taking care of them. One of the strong points of this
    budget is the request for funding to increase the size of the
    Army and increase the size of the Marine Corps. Soldiers and
    marines know that that will take some time to deliver, but they
    know that help is on the way. Just knowing that Congress and
    the leadership understands the need for these forces goes a
    long way in the value of service for them.
        Senator Lieberman. Good point.
        Secretary Gates. Getting back to these dwell periods that
    are goals of 1 year deployed, 2 years at home for the Active-
    Duty Force, and 1 year deployed and 5 years back home, is also
    very important for retention and for their families. That's
    another reason why we changed the mobilization rules, in terms
    of how we're going to do this in the future. It'll take us a
    little while to get to where we need to be on that, but, again,
    they're both signs that things are going to get better.
        Senator Lieberman. I thank you for that.
        I want to talk about the overall budget, generally. As you
    point out, there's good news and challenging news, which is
    that the President is recommending an 11.3 percent increase in
    spending over the projected enacted level for fiscal year 2007.
    That's for next year. Overall, as you've indicated, the budget
    in the fiscal year 2008 will still be 3.8 percent,
    approximately--a little less than 4 percent of GDP, which is
    below not only the average, but certainly way below when we've
    been at war. If you look--and I honestly think that we are
    underfunding some needs we have. I think the Army needs more,
    and the National Guard needs more. I think we're heading
    rapidly to a 274-ship Navy. We're flat-funding research and
    development. If you look at the President's budget, it seems to
    me that one of the consequences of the 11.3 percent increase is
    that we're really squeezing some critical domestic programs.
        I'm about to say something that is, fortunately for you,
    outside of your orbit of responsibility, and this committee's.
    I think we have to start thinking about a war on terrorism tax.
    People keep saying that we're not asking a sacrifice of anybody
    but our military in this war, and some civilians who are
    working on it. When you put together the DOD budgets with
    homeland security budgets, we need to ask people to help us in
    a way that they know, when they pay more, will go for their
    security.
        But I want to ask, having said that, this question. Though
    I'd support more funding, I think we ought to aspire to go up
    to the 5 percent of GDP for the military and security at a time
    of war such as we're in. We obviously have to be able to
    convince our constituents and each other that you're spending
    the money we're giving you efficiently. Senator McCaskill's
    questions were excellent. I want to ask you a different kind of
    question.
        Critics will say--and it's started already on this budget--
    that the DOD is still carrying on some outmoded, Cold War,
    major arms-systems programs that we really don't need anymore.
    If we stop them, it could save billions of dollars. I know
    that's a large question. I suppose, during the Service
    hearings, we'll come back and ask more specifically. But what
    would you say, when someone comes up and asks you whether--
    you're asking for this increase after you've squeezed
    everything you could out of the budget that you have?
        Secretary Gates. As the chairman generously noted at the
    beginning of the hearing, I didn't put together most of this
    budget. [Laughter.]
        Senator Lieberman. You get a 1-year pass.
        Secretary Gates. But I'll tell you that I had three
    concerns when I was asked to do this job. One was whether the
    National Guard--whether the Army and the Marine Corps were the
    right size. The second was whether we were asking too much of
    the National Guard. The third was whether we were buying large
    systems that were more tied to Cold War needs than future
    needs. To be honest, I haven't gotten into it much. What little
    I have, I've been persuaded that the requirements make sense.
    But I think--I owe you an honest answer that I haven't really
    had the opportunity to satisfy myself as to the answer to your
    question, and that's clearly on my agenda. But let me ask
    General Pace his view.
        General Pace. Sir, as a taxpayer, I have to believe that
    there's money out there that's not being well spent. What's
    been visible in the process, as it's identified in the process,
    is changed. So, I feel good about the intent and the vigor with
    which those who are responsible for providing recommendations
    go after efficiencies. The Army, for example, has canceled more
    than 100 programs. But I'd be wrong to sit here and say that
    there wasn't more out there to be found. I can say: when found,
    we'll work with it, but that's about as far as I can go, sir.
        Senator Lieberman. I appreciate your answer, General Pace.
    I appreciate yours, Secretary Gates. We'll look forward, as you
    go on--as we go on this journey together, to hearing your
    evaluations of the spending of the DOD.
        Thanks very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I would just note, for our perspective, an interesting
    couple of editorials in the Washington Times about the overall
    rate of defense spending, which is high compared to recent
    years in real-dollar terms, but they note that, as of today,
    we're at 4.4 percent of GDP committed to defense and 19.6
    percent of our budget--total budget committed to defense.
    That's up a little from the time--at least as a percentage of
    budget. I think we got as low as 16 percent of the budget being
    committed to defense, and now, in this period of war, since
    September 11, we are up to 19 percent. But also, I would note
    that as a percentage of the GDP during Korea, we spent not 4
    percent on defense, as we do today, but 14.2 percent. During
    Vietnam, it was 9.5 percent of GDP that we spent on that war,
    more than twice what the current rate is for this war. During
    the peak of Reagan's time there, when we were not in a state of
    active war, it was 6.2 percent of GDP. That number has
    continued to fall to 4 percent. During Reagan's period, 28
    percent of the budget went to defense, not 19 percent.
        That gives us some perspective, I think, on where we are,
    although I have to tell you, you're going to have oversight,
    dollars are going to be tough to come by. This Senator is going
    to ask tough questions, other Senators are going to ask tough
    questions. We have to be sure we're not, even in this period of
    hostilities and soldiers at risk, wasting a dime. Just not
    wanting to do it.
        One of the things that troubled me, General Pace, is
    interagency support for the military. I know there's a lot of
    reasons for the difficulties that we've had. I'm just very
    uneasy about it, for several reasons. One is, under our plan,
    other agencies are expected to do things. In other words, when
    we develop a plan for Iraq in reconstruction and law and
    agriculture, we expect these other agencies to produce. That
    was the original plan. However, they're not really producing
    well at all, and it's falling on the DOD. For example, are you
    familiar with the DOS memorandum of January 25, 2007, to
    William Marriott, Executive Secretary, the Office of the DOD?
        General Pace. I am, sir. That's the one requesting
    assistance for the PRTs.
        Senator Sessions. I find it--yes--very troubling, because
    my understanding was that the DOS would organize other agencies
    and produce PRTs, which are critical to a peaceful and
    prosperous Iraq, at least they have been in our plans. They had
    to be deployed rapidly. But my understanding is that the DOD,
    the military, your soldiers, are overwhelmingly providing the
    resources to operate those, and not these other agencies. Could
    you give us a factual rundown on how that's developing?
        Secretary Gates. Maybe I could, Senator, since I've gotten
    involved in this, personally. Let me say a word, and then
    invite General Pace to comment.
        If you were troubled by the memo, that was mild compared to
    my reaction when I saw it, because, out of 129 positions that
    were being requested, I think 120 or 121 were being requested
    from the DOD for the PRTs, and for a period of 9 months to a
    year, which was contrary to my understanding.
        I've talked with Secretary Rice about this, personally, and
    I've been assured that the memo did not accurately reflect what
    their request to us is. They are asking for some help, but for
    a period of 30 to 60 days, or 60 to 90 days, while they recruit
    people from other parts of the Government, get them the right
    clearances, and so on; and, also, perhaps, up to 6 months to
    enable them to get contractors, who will have to be cleared and
    go through various procedures and so on. So, it's still a big
    number. Compared to the number of forces we have over there,
    it's a modest number. It's important to us to make sure that
    these PRTs work. Even with the shorter timelines that Secretary
    Rice has assured me are the case, it is illustrative of the
    problem that you were talking about, and that Senator Dole
    discussed earlier, in terms of the difficulty of getting other
    agencies to provide people on a timely basis. It's one of the
    reasons behind the idea of this Civilian Reserve Corps that
    people who could be called on short notice to do this. But
    these PRTs are critically important in both Iraq and
    Afghanistan, and having the civilians who can come in behind
    our military forces and do that, so that it isn't just our
    National Guard civic affairs officers and people like that who
    have to do it, is really important. We're happy to help in the
    short-term, but it's a government problem.
        General Pace. Sir, this is not at all a fingerpointing
    exercise, this is about the current status of our Government to
    be able to respond, and it goes to the expeditionary nature, or
    lack thereof, of most of the departments in the government--
    understandably, based on the kind of wars we've faced in the
    past. This is totally different. If we're going to be able to
    prevent having to send thousands of troops, we need to be able
    to get folks over to be able to help with judiciary systems, be
    able to help with engineering, be able to help with electricity
    and the like, before a country devolves into a state where the
    terrorists can find a home. Because of that, and because of our
    current state, leads to the DOD asking us for this short-term
    help, which includes, as you see on the list, everything from
    engineers to folks who know how to manage governments to----
        Senator Sessions. Veterinarians.
        General Pace.--veterinarians, a whole----
        Senator Sessions. Public health advisors.
        General Pace.--yes, sir--a whole list of individuals who--
    reasonably, we should expect the U.S. Government to provide
    from other than the U.S. military. So, my recommendation would
    be, sir, that we embrace this as a problem that needs to be
    fixed, that we take a look at who's able to deploy now, and
    who's not, and that we devise a plan for our Government that
    allows us to deploy. By the way, if we're going to ask Mr.
    Pace, from Department of Treasury, to go someplace, does he
    have the same benefits that General Pace has when I deploy? Is
    my family going to be taken care of? Is my medical going to be
    taken care of? If I get killed serving my country, will there
    be insurance? There's a whole list of things that we should
    take a look at, that we do for our military, that we are not
    currently doing for our civilians, and then help close that
    gap, because this will not be won militarily. Security can be
    provided militarily, but we're going to prevail in the war on
    terrorism through all the other kinds of capacities that are on
    that list, and the U.S. military is not the best instrument to
    do that.
        Senator Sessions. Secretary Gates and General Pace, either
    one of you, it seems to me that if we created, within all these
    agencies, certain designated slots--and maybe this is what the
    President's thinking about--that were called ``expeditionary
    slots,'' and, if you didn't want those jobs, you didn't take
    them, but, if you took them, perhaps you have better pay and
    you had to do some extra training, maybe with the military, so
    that you could be deployable to tough areas of the globe, where
    you may not have running water, and you may have to live in
    substandard housing, and you may have to be at risk, and you
    may be in some danger, and that people would voluntarily sign
    up for that, and they, then, wouldn't be able to object if
    called upon to go. Is something like that possible?
        Secretary Gates. I think so, Senator. I think that this is
    a matter of sufficient importance to both Congress and the
    executive branch, that this is an area where we, speaking for
    the DOD, because we obviously are the most affected by it,
    would be very happy to work with both you all and others in the
    executive branch to see if, together, we can figure out a way
    to solve this problem.
        Senator Sessions. Do you have any other ideas or thoughts
    about it?
        Secretary Gates. We talked about a few, with Senator Dole,
    in terms of whether there's some additional authorities that
    need to be given to the executive branch, in terms of being
    able to shift money from one Department to another. In other
    words, there are some of these things, where, frankly, if DOS,
    the Department of Treasury, or the Department of Agriculture
    had the people, we'd rather be able to transfer some of our
    money to them to help pay for it rather than send a soldier to
    do the job. So, there may be other options like that. But I
    think the first thing to do is--for a group of people to sit
    down and start putting together some options of how you'd go at
    this problem.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Following that up, can you report back to
    us on what effort will be made, along the lines that Senator
    Sessions has suggested?
        Secretary Gates. Sure.
        Chairman Levin. Could you take that up at the Cabinet
    meeting?
        Secretary Gates. Sure.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Department of Defense (DOD) civilian employees have a long history
    of providing key supporting roles in accompanying the military on
    deployments around the globe. Current strategies rely on a mix of
    military members, DOD civilian employees, and contractor employees to
    ensure success. The DOD monies for civilian employees could be emulated
    by other agencies, and I will raise that issue at the cabinet level.
        Title 10, U.S.C., section 1580, authorizes the Secretary of Defense
    to designate as Emergency-Essential (E-E) any employee whose position
    provides immediate and continuing support for combat operations or
    support for maintenance and repair of combat essential systems of the
    Armed Forces, and whose duties must be performed in a combat zone after
    the evacuation of nonessential personnel from the zone in connection
    with a war, a national emergency declared by Congress or the President,
    or the commencement of combat operations of the Armed Forces in the
    zone. E-E employees are deployed to or retained in the zone as needed
    to support the operations.
        Generally, such E-E positions are designated in advance of hiring.
    As a result, when employees are hired for these positions, they
    understand the terms and conditions of their assignment. Current DOD
    policies regulate this authority, requiring E-E employees to sign an
    agreement to deploy or remain in place as the situation dictates. When
    positions are designated E-E subsequent to a hiring action based upon
    an emergent requirement for immediate and continuing support of combat
    operations, current DOD policy provides for advance notice to an
    employee, and the opportunity to seek volunteers for the position. When
    volunteers are not available to meet the requirement, DOD has the
    authority to compel the assignment of the DOD civilian to the E-E
    requirement.
        Prior to their deployment assignments, civilian employees undergo
    readiness processing and instruction, including specialized in-country
    training. For example, as part of their pre-deployment processing, DOD
    employees assigned to Iraq Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
    receive the following:

             Department of State at the Foreign Service Institute--
            training on interagency engagement in the PRT effort;
             Department of State Foreign Area Counter Threat--training
            designed to prepare employees entering areas of a higher risk/
            danger for terrorist activities;
             Army CONUS Replacement Center Pre-deployment Readiness
            Processing--provides medical screening, outfitting, equipment
            training, and validation of documentation prior to deployment;
            and
             National Coordinating Team--specialized in-country training
            on cultural and role awareness.

        The Department has been successful in enhancing benefits and
    incentives for deployed civilians. Many of these resulted from
    legislation while others required policy changes. The provisions of S.
    2600 (introduced by Senator Warner in April 2006), were incorporated
    into the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, Global
    War on Terror and Hurricane Recovery Act 2006 (Public Law 109-234,
    section 1603). This provision authorized the Secretary of Defense to
    provide the same allowances, benefits, and gratuities which were
    currently provided to members of the Department of State Foreign
    Service who were serving the United States Government in Iraq and
    Afghanistan. The attached paper summarizes the allowances, benefits,
    and gratuities available for those civilian employees deployed to Iraq.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

            Senator Sessions. I know Senator Levin has expressed some
    concern about this also, and maybe it's something we could
    facilitate, if you'll help us.
        Secretary Gates. This is an area of some real opportunity.
    The President raised it with the Cabinet yesterday, of the need
    for others to step up.
        Chairman Levin. If Senator Bayh would yield for just 1
    minute, Senator Warner would bring us up-to-date on some
    legislation we passed in this area.
        Senator Warner. This very issue was before the committee,
    and I solicited views of all the Cabinet officers, came back
    and wrote a bill, the bill passed, as to how to do these
    things. I know the President held a Cabinet meeting, was very
    assertive in the need to get done what you've described. So, I
    guess we have to go back and dig the corpse up and start all
    over again. [Laughter.]
        But we tried, on this committee, to do the very things that
    our colleagues said.
        Chairman Levin. We did it under Senator Warner's
    leadership, and perhaps you could bring us up-to-date as to
    what it led to.
        Secretary Gates. Yes. We'll find out.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, thank you.
        Thank you Senator Bayh.
        Senator Bayh. Thank you.
        Thank you all for your time today. I have one comment and
    three quick questions I hope we'll be able to get through.
        Mr. Secretary, I'd like to start by thanking you for your
    prompt response to the request that Senator Clinton and I
    submitted to you following our visit to Afghanistan. This was a
    country from which we were attacked. Many of us feel that it
    has been under-resourced, and we are at a critical juncture,
    and we need to step up to try and make sure that events there
    go in a better direction. So, adding the additional troops and
    other resources, we think, is vitally important.
        One thing I would like to ask you to follow up on--I think
    General Pace mentioned this in his submitted testimony, and we
    heard this very clearly from both our military commanders and
    our intelligence officials--there still aren't the Predator
    assets that we need to make the most of our opportunities
    there. This is a weapons system that kills terrorists in real
    time, and 6 years into this thing, it's somewhat mindboggling
    to me why we still don't have enough of those assets deployed
    in the hands of our commanders. So, I hope you'll follow up on
    that and tell us what we can do to rectify that situation.
        Secretary Gates. I would just comment, this is an area that
    I did look into, because they do seem so valuable to me. I
    heard plenty, in both Iraq and in Afghanistan, about the need
    for them. What I'm told is that the pipeline for production is
    completely full and out for several years. I think that there
    has been a reluctance--not knowing how long this war was going
    to go on, a reluctance to expand capacity at the factory. I
    think we now need to revisit that and look at it.
        Senator Bayh. I hope you will.
        There seems to be some--and I don't want to run out my time
    or my three questions, Ms. Jonas. Maybe we can follow up
    later--there seems to be, at least on the part of some of our
    people who have handled these kind of issues before, that
    perhaps on the private side they say the pipeline is full, but
    some things can done to expand the pipeline. Let's follow up on
    that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Department of Defense (DOD) continues to explore all available
    means to accelerate the delivery of MQ-1 Predator unmanned aircraft
    systems (UAS) Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) to the Commander U.S. Central
    Command. In 2005, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council validated a
    Quadrennial Defense Review requirement for 21 MQ-1 Predator CAPs of 24
    hours per day, 7 days per week operations. The Air Force, using Air
    Combat Command (ACC), Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), and
    Air National Guard (ANG) crews, currently provides 12 CAPs in Central
    Command's area of responsibility. The current Air Force plan is to grow
    available Predator CAPs to 16 by the end of fiscal year 2008 and 21 by
    the first quarter of fiscal year 2010.
        Aircraft production is not a limiting factor. In 2006, the Defense
    Contract Management Agency (DCMA) completed an industrial capacity
    assessment of General Atomics Aeronautical systems (GA), the
    manufacturer of the MQ-1B Predator, MQ-9 Reaper, and Army's MQ-1C
    Warrior. DCMA confirmed GA has excess production capacity to meet all
    planned procurements identified in the FY08 President's Budget.
        The most significant issue in expanding available Predator CAPs is
    training enough qualified crews to operate Predator. Last year, the Air
    Force trained 120 aircrews (with each crew consisting of one pilot and
    one sensor operator) to meet Predator crew requirements. Even though
    we've doubled aircrew training capacity in the last year and a half,
    the Air Force is taking action to further increase Predator crew
    production.
        The Air Force recently enacted several key changes to Predator
    pilot tour assignment policy: all tour assignments (in-place and new)
    are now 36 months in duration as measured from the qualification
    training completion date, adding approximately 4 months to the typical
    tour length--effectively freezing all in-place Predator pilots until
    spring 2008. Additional tour policy changes include requiring a 24-
    month time on station payback for any Predator pilot accepting an
    instructor assignment. We will also begin immediately accepting
    volunteers for extended or repeat Predator tours. The Air Force plan
    increases crew training to match aircraft production.

        General Pace. Yes, sir.
        Senator Bayh. Vitally important.
        My three questions. First, following up on a couple of
    comments by my colleagues. Senator Nelson, from Florida, asked
    you about the reliability of Iraqi troops. I'd like to ask you
    about the reliability of the Iraqi political leadership. I
    think we all acknowledge that no matter what we do, how long we
    stay, how much we spend, how many of our brave forces die, this
    is not going to go well if they don't have the political will
    to get the job done. I think, Mr. Secretary, you mentioned
    that, in your opinion, it was clear that Maliki intends to
    fulfill his commitments. I'd like to ask you what are the
    reasons for your optimism there? Some of us are a little bit
    more skeptical, when you look at things like: he posted, on the
    presidential Web site last October a series of what they called
    benchmarks, which they have either not adhered to or, to me,
    looked like the path of least resistance, not some of the hard
    things that need to be done.
        Then, you look at what he said, apparently, to the
    President last November in Amman, and he said to Senator
    Clinton and myself, just a few weeks ago, which was his
    preferred course of action in Baghdad was for us to arm his
    forces more heavily and for us to get out of the way. He's
    reluctantly come around to supporting this surge, but it was
    clear from reading between the lines, that wasn't his
    preference.
        You look at some of the constraints that have been put on
    us of our ability to act in the past, why do you have
    confidence in the political leadership of the Iraqis to get
    this done?
        Secretary Gates. What I said, Senator Bayh, was that I
    believe that he had the intent to follow through on these
    commitments. I think that at times, they lack the capacity to
    follow through.
        Senator Bayh. Could I just interject for a second here? I
    always listen to what people say. I think a better indication
    of someone's intent is what they do. We have a series of
    actions here which belie what he said. Which leads me to be a
    little more skeptical.
        Secretary Gates. I think that's one of the reasons why, as
    we've discussed, it's so important to put together--and, as I
    mentioned at the beginning of the hearing, a matrix or a
    checklist that basically allows us to measure progress here
    with this Baghdad plan. The first thing that we will be able to
    measure is military performance. Are the brigades showing up on
    time? Are they fully staffed, and so on?--so we can tell
    whether the intent has led to the action. The answer, so far,
    from General Casey, is, ``So far, so good.''
        Senator Bayh. As we've discussed before, there's a military
    component to this and there's a political component to this,
    and some of those steps, in the hands of the politicians, are
    going to need to be taken if we're going to deal with the root
    causes of the insurgency, not just its superficial
    manifestations.
        So, that gets me to my second question, which is following
    up on something Senator Ben Nelson said, which was--and I never
    think we got to his question--the consequences. Senator Clinton
    has been very good on this. We can measure progress, but, if
    there aren't specific consequences for failure to make the
    decisions necessary to achieve that progress, this is not going
    to work very well.
        So, here's my question. It seems to me, for the last
    several years we've pursued the theory of reassuring them,
    telling them we're standing by them to try and boost their
    confidence so the political leaders will feel secure enough to
    take some of the difficult steps that need to be taken. That
    hasn't worked real well. Some of us have concluded that there
    need to be some specific adverse consequences for them if they
    don't start doing the right thing, making some of the hard
    decisions. What will those specific consequences for their
    failure to act be under this plan?
        Secretary Gates. If they fail to act, as General Petraeus
    told you in his testimony during his confirmation hearing,
    first, obviously, we're going to try and persuade them to do
    what they promised to do, but then there is always the
    potential of withholding assistance or of changing our approach
    over there, in terms of how we interact with that government.
    The President has said that Americans' patience is not
    unlimited. We've said from the very beginning, the success of
    this strategy is dependent entirely on the Iraqis' willingness
    to fulfill the commitments that they've made to us. If they
    don't fulfill those commitments, then we clearly have to change
    what we're doing.
        Senator Bayh. Many of us have concluded, Mr. Secretary,
    that the moment of truth has arrived, and we have to have a
    pretty direct dialogue with them and actually lay out some
    specific consequences that will matter to them so that they
    will know very clearly the price of their failure to perform.
    It's only human nature for people to take the path of least
    resistance. What we have to do is convince them that that path
    is not one that they can follow any longer. You'd think it
    would be in their own self-interest, but that doesn't seem to
    have worked. So, specific things, like cutting off resources to
    them and other things that will matter--many of us have
    concluded there needs to be a wake-up call here. I hope it will
    be something more than vague public statements, because that
    doesn't seem to have worked very well, to date.
        Secretary Gates. No, I agree with that.
        Senator Bayh. My final question has to do with what we're
    doing in Iraq and how that might affect the larger strategic
    picture with regard to Iran. We've been told that the Iranians,
    in the short run, really like the fact that we're bogged down
    in Iraq, that we're being bled both literally and financially
    there, because we can't offer the kind of credible, deterrent
    to them that they would fear. In the longer term, what they
    would like to see is an Iraq dominated by the Shiite, closely
    allied to Iran, that that's their short-term and their long-
    term interest. But, in the long-term, they also fear a real
    Sunni/Shiite split across the Islamic world, because that might
    operate as a constraint to their ambitions.
        Our policy seems to have the current state of affairs in
    Iraq, suits their purposes. We are bogged down there. Might it
    not be in our interest, vis-a-vis Iran, to say, ``Look, if the
    Iraqis don't do the right thing here to give us any chance of
    success, we will begin to extricate ourselves.'' That takes
    away their short-run objective, which is bogging us down, and
    it confronts them with their long-term fear, which is a real
    Shiite/Sunni split.
        So, my question, Mr. Secretary, might it not be that the
    path that some of us have recommended to them, which is saying
    to them, ``Look, if you don't get this right, we are going to
    begin to leave,'' gives us a better chance to constrain Iran in
    the long run, because it removes their short-term objective, it
    confronts them with their long-term fear. They will never do
    anything in our best interest, but they might conclude that
    greater stability in Iraq is in their best interest and begin
    to behave more responsibly there.
        Secretary Gates. Senator, it seems to me that--in essence,
    that the debate here on the Hill is not about the war on
    terror, and is not about taking on our adversaries. At the end
    of the day, it has seemed to me that it is more about, how best
    do you incentivize the Iraqi Government to take responsibility
    for their own government and their own people so that we can
    leave? There is clearly a difference of view, in terms of how
    you do that, how you incentivize that government.
        I would say that doing it--giving the President's effort a
    try does not foreclose them being able to do the other.
        Senator Bayh. My time is expired, Mr. Secretary, but my
    point is that having specific timelines, real benchmarks for
    progress, and real adverse consequences for not doing those
    things that we could reasonably expect them do, not only
    incentivizes the Iraqis, but, if they fail, might then
    incentivize the Iranians to behave more responsibly.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Bayh.
        One factual issue, if I could, Senator. Senator Bayh, your
    reference to that Web site, there is some suggestion that that
    was removed from the Web site. The benchmarks, to the extent
    that they existed--Senator McCain and I have written to
    Secretary Rice asking if, in fact, they were removed from the
    Web site. If so, why? So, that's a new development there, which
    I know you'd be interested in, given your line of questions.
        Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Graham.
        Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I guess we'll talk about the budget maybe a little bit in
    the 8 minutes, but we'll pick up where my good friend Senator
    Bayh left off, because I think this is the heart and soul of
    where we're at as a Congress, where we're at as a Nation.
        One of the concerns I have is that whatever we do here,
    particularly in a nonbinding fashion, may incentivize our
    enemies. Are you concerned about that?
        Secretary Gates. Sir, I think that, from time immemorial,
    that if you think that your adversary is divided, it is a
    source of strength. I would say that there's unfortunately a
    history of our enemies misunderstanding our robust debate in a
    democracy for weakness that actually wasn't there. I think that
    as I just suggested, that there is no division and no
    irresolution and no weakness in this Government, including
    Congress, in terms of taking on terrorism, taking on our
    adversaries. So, I hope that our adversaries don't
    misunderstand this robust debate as being a sign of weakness. I
    think it's a sign of strength.
        Senator Graham. Mr. Secretary, with all due respect, one, I
    think you're doing an outstanding job with an incredibly
    difficult hand being dealt, but if we did put--some of our
    former colleagues are suggesting, of pulling out 50,000 troops
    in the next 3 months. I am no foreign policy expert or military
    expert, but if I was an al Qaeda member, I would say, ``Aha.''
    Do you think it would be wise for us to withdraw 50,000 troops
    in Iraq in the next 3 to 4 months?
        Secretary Gates. No, sir, I don't. That's because I don't
    envision the situation on the ground improving to that----
        Senator Graham. Do you think it would be wise to tell our
    enemy, ``This war is over January 2009, no matter what''?
        Secretary Gates. I think we have said, all along, that
    having any kind of timeline is probably a mistake.
        Senator Graham. Well, see, that's the point. The point is
    that the American public is genuinely frustrated, because it
    hasn't gone as well as we'd like. How old is the Maliki
    government? How many years old is it?
        Secretary Gates. I think it's just about a year old.
        Senator Graham. It's about 9 months old, and to the
    American public, as imperfect as the Maliki government is, it's
    a heck of a lot better than anybody else in town. Whether it
    succeeds or fails is eventually up to them, but I am convinced
    that no politician in anyone's history, including ours, could
    bring about democracy with this level of violence in Iraq. Do
    you agree that the level of violence in Baghdad, and Iraq in
    general, is counterproductive to political reconciliation, at
    this point?
        Secretary Gates. Certainly, Senator.
        Senator Graham. As to this idea that the pathway to success
    and peace in Iraq runs through Tehran and Damascus, to me, is
    just naive, at best. I think the Syrians and the Iranians are
    united around one fact and one event, ``We're not going to let
    a democracy emerge in Iraq, because it's a threat to our own
    dictatorships.'' Do you agree with that?
        Secretary Gates. I've always believed, Senator, in the line
    of Frederick the Great, that negotiations without arms are like
    notes without instruments.
        Senator Graham. The reason that Syria is funding Hezbollah
    in Lebanon is not because they desire a Shiite-dominated
    Lebanon, they just fear democracy. If you're a dictator, a
    police state in Syria, your worst nightmare is not a
    dysfunctional Iraq, it's men and women getting together of
    different religious backgrounds, picking their own leaders. If
    you're a religious theocrat in Iran who wants to dominate the
    region through a Shiite theocracy that has no other place for
    any other religion, your biggest fear is: the Sunnis, the
    Kurds, and the Shiites in Iraq will actually live together in
    peace.
        So, this idea that we're going to go to Tehran and
    Damascus, and all of a sudden they're going to buy into a
    democracy in Iraq, is crazy. The only thing they're going to
    buy into, in my opinion, is a resolve by the United States
    that's unquestionable. We're in one of the biggest conflicts in
    the history of our Nation. Do you agree with that, General
    Pace? The war on terror?
        General Pace. This is a defining moment for our Nation,
    like World War II was for that generation.
        Senator Graham. Do you agree with that, Secretary Gates?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. So, here we are in one of the most defining
    moments in the history of the United States, and our spending
    on defense is below 4 percent of GDP.
        If everything works well with the surge, will we have an
    overwhelming force in Iraq to deal with the insurgency, General
    Pace? If we get every troop we can muster, will it still be
    overwhelming?
        General Pace. Let me make sure I'm hearing the question
    right. Our troops plus the Iraqi troops----
        Senator Graham. If everything works perfectly, would it
    come to the Powell Doctrine that we finally have, in Iraq, an
    overwhelming force to deal with the insurgency?
        General Pace. I cannot say yes to that, because the
    insurgency is different than the Powell Doctrine applied to
    conventional forces.
        Senator Graham. Will we have enough to meet the
    counterinsurgency doctrine of General Petraeus?
        General Pace. In pure math terms, no, sir. In terms of what
    is needed on the ground to get the job done, yes, sir, meaning
    that their talk about 50 to 1--or whatever it is to 1--that you
    need to quell a generic insurgency--we helped in El Salvador
    with 55, and that turned out the way we wanted it to, and we
    have 140,000 in Iraq, and that has not yet turned out the way
    we want it to. So, I'm just being careful not to say yes or no
    to precise math.
        Senator Graham. I understand. I guess I would just conclude
    with this whole budget debate in how to get the Iraqis to do
    better. I would like them to do better. I believe, over time,
    they will. But, if you're asking somebody, in 8 months, to
    solve a 1,400-year-old religious dispute, bring people together
    who have suffered under a dictatorship for 30 years,
    reconstruct an economy that was raped by a dictator, that's a
    pretty tall order. I am willing to give not only this new
    strategy a chance, I am willing to do whatever it takes to make
    sure we don't have a failed state in Iraq.
        Secretary Gates, is there any doubt in your mind that if we
    lose in Iraq, it becomes a failed state, that the war on terror
    suffers, and that we will be going back to the Middle East with
    a bigger war on our hands?
        Secretary Gates. If Iraq were to fall into chaos, I think
    those things would happen.
        Senator Graham. So, to my colleagues, we can't have 535
    commanders in chief, and we can't have 535 Secretaries of
    State. I hope we can muster the political will, at least for a
    few more months, to give what I think is a reasonable
    opportunity a chance to succeed. The elections are going to
    come, everybody's going to be held accountable politically for
    their positions, but what happens in Iraq is so much bigger
    than the 2008 election for anybody here, that I hope we don't
    lose sight of the big picture.
        This budget is, in my opinion, lean for the needs of this
    country at one of its most critical times, and if you need more
    money, spend what you have wisely, but never hesitate to ask
    for more.
        General Pace. Senator, may I give you a more complete
    answer on the overwhelming force?
        Senator Graham. Yes, sir.
        General Pace. Thank you.
        This isn't only about force, which is why ``overwhelming''
    doesn't make the equation. It's about a three-legged stool:
    security, good governance, and good economy. The security plan
    that is laid out, with the forces that are allocated to it, is
    going to be sufficient to do that leg of the stool, but no size
    force, no matter how defined as ``overwhelming,'' will be
    sufficient absent the other two legs of the stool. I think
    that's a better answer to your question.
        Senator Graham. I totally agree. I would say the biggest
    mistake we have made--and I may be completely wrong--about
    Iraq, is we've always done it on the cheap, that we have never
    put in place, after the fall of Baghdad, the overwhelming force
    that would have kept the country intact. I don't want to
    compound those mistakes again.
        Thank you for your testimony.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
        Senator Clinton.
        Senator Clinton. Thank you very much for your service and
    your patience. I'm grateful to each and every one of you for
    the work you do.
        It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that we have a number of
    extremely important issues before the committee that have been
    highlighted by various members. We have the budget, which is
    going to deserve, and need, a lot more scrutiny. We've heard a
    lot of talk about the percentage of GDP in comparison to the
    percentage of GDP in other wars and conflicts. I might also
    add, the taxation rates were considerably different during
    those conflicts, as well. We are not paying for the military
    that we want, nor are we paying adequately for the global war
    on terrorism. So, this budget is going to have to be
    scrutinized, but we're going to be faced with the dilemma of
    whether we are adequately funding our troops and whether we
    will pay for adequately funding our troops.
        Second, we continue to have questions about how we ensure
    American troops are trained and equipped, something that I've
    raised in a series of our hearings with General Petraeus,
    Admiral Fallon, and others--General Casey, most recently--and I
    think you can hear, Secretary Gates, we're still not satisfied.
    Both you and General Pace have responded to questions, starting
    with the chairman's from the very beginning of this hearing,
    but there remains a considerable amount of anecdotal evidence
    about shortages. I will be reading the IG's report later this
    afternoon, but, from the reports that we have received, it
    appears that there was a lack of cooperation, perhaps, with
    appropriate officials in DOD and the chain of command in trying
    to get to the bottom of whether or not we have adequate
    training and equipping of our troops. So, this will continue to
    be an issue that I and others will pursue.
        We also have heard about the need to enlist the entire
    government to participate effectively in the war on terrorism,
    and, as Senator Warner said--I can remember when he was on the
    floor, introducing his bill and speaking about it--we actually
    have made a stab at this. I think it's fair to say none of us
    are either fully aware of, or satisfied with, what direction it
    has taken us. I think Senator Sessions' suggestions are really
    serious ones that should be carefully considered by the
    administration.
        Senator Warner. Senator, if you'd yield.
        Senator Clinton. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. I have here the reference to legislation
    and you cosponsored that legislation.
        Senator Clinton. Yes, I did.
        Senator Warner.--together with Senator Lugar and myself.
        Senator Clinton. That's exactly right. We did, under
    Senator Warner's leadership, pass that legislation, but it's
    clear that none of us has a handle on what, if anything, has
    been done to implement it. So, we really do wish to have some
    additional information and feedback on that.
        We've also begun to examine--and I appreciate very much
    Senator McCaskill's lead on this--the way our Government has
    outsourced so much of the work of preparing and defending our
    Nation to private contractors who may be neither cost-effective
    nor free of conflict. I think this will be a very important
    issue for this Congress that we will be exploring, and, again,
    looking for assistance from you.
        Finally, your words, Secretary Gates, ``how we best
    incentivize the Iraqi Government,'' there are those who think
    that the era of carrots has to end, that we've been, in effect,
    ignored by giving them a blank check and the blood and treasure
    of our Nation, especially the lives of our young men and women
    and the injured that have come home with such grievous wounds,
    and we don't believe that's an effective way to get their
    attention. This part of the world, which you have studied--you
    were certainly part of the Iraq Study Group before being asked
    to be Secretary of Defense, you know very well that--I'm not
    sure carrots are part of the diet. So, I think that many of us
    have been searching for more effective ways that can get the
    attention not only of the nominal Iraqi government, but of the
    sources that support it.
        To that end, in addition to our concerns about the attack
    on Karbala and what that meant--and I appreciate General Pace
    referencing the likelihood that it was well-organized
    insurgents, which I translate to be Sunni elements--we also are
    concerned about the Mahdi army militia obtaining not only
    trained men who we have trained, but also equipment. A recent
    article on February 2, from McClatchy newspapers, titled
    ``Mahdi Army Gains Strength Through Unwitting Aid of U.S.,''
    and ``The U.S. military drive to train and equip Iraq's
    security forces has unwittingly strengthened Sadr and his
    militia.''
        These are deep concerns to us, and we don't believe that
    we, at least speaking for myself, see much change in the
    testimony we hear, in the plans that are being implemented, as
    to how we're going to get a handle on these very serious
    challenges.
        But, Mr. Secretary, I want to change direction just
    somewhat abruptly, because I want to ask you about a letter
    that, on January 16, along with 21 of my colleagues, including
    several members of this committee, sent to President Bush
    asking for an explanation of what Plan B steps he was
    considering with respect to Darfur, including possible punitive
    military action, such as a no-fly zone or blockade of Port
    Sudan. Obviously, we are facing, once again, the repeated and
    blatant violations of numerous cease-fires, peace agreements,
    and U.N. obligations by the government of President Bashir.
        It is worth noting, I think, that this does not need to be
    a no-fly zone on the scale of what we formerly ran over Iraq,
    but could be accomplished with a significantly smaller outlay
    of resources by directing punitive strikes against Sudanese
    planes known to have taken part in illegal bombing missions in
    Darfur.
        I've made this suggestion on several occasions to our NATO
    commander in the past, and to others within the administration,
    and I'd like to ask you if you have been instructed by the
    President to begin planning or preparing any such measure, and
    whether or not you would look into that, if you have not yet
    been asked to do so.
        Secretary Gates. I have not been asked to. I would defer to
    General Pace, in terms of whether the Joint Chiefs have done
    any contingency planning along those lines. I'm certainly
    willing to pursue it.
        Senator Clinton. General Pace?
        General Pace. Have not been asked to do that, ma'am.
        Senator Clinton. I think that, obviously, from the
    perspective of many of us, the ongoing genocide in Darfur and
    the blatant refusal by the Sudanese Government to act has been
    deeply concerning. We have about 7,000 African Union (AU)
    troops there. They are the sole line of defense for the
    hundreds of thousand civilians facing genocide. Twenty million
    dollars was included in the 2007 Defense Appropriations Bill to
    provide assistance to these troops. They are obviously woefully
    underfunded, they don't have logistics support, they have no
    airlift capacity. I understand the DOS, which has been
    administering all U.S. funding going to the AU troops, has
    requested that this new $20 million be transferred to them. Is
    your office considering that request? Do you have an opinion,
    as the Secretary of Defense, whether that meets our desire,
    having put this into the DOD appropriations rather than DOS
    appropriations?
        Secretary Gates. This is the first I've heard of it,
    Senator. I'll have to look into it.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        We are aware of this requirement. My staff has prepared the
    transfer documentation, which should be signed shortly.
        These funds were specifically designated within the Defense
    Appropriations Bill to support peacekeeping operations in Sudan. In the
    future, these funds should be placed within the Department of State's
    appropriations.

        Senator Clinton. Thank you.
        Finally, Mr. Secretary, the Defense Appropriations Bill for
    Fiscal Year 2007 contains a provision I sponsored requiring the
    DOD to submit a detailed report on the DOD's role in assisting
    the parties to implement the Darfur Peace Agreement of May 5,
    2006. The report is envisioned to contain information on issues
    of critical importance to stabilizing Darfur, such as an
    assessment of assets that the U.S. military and NATO are able
    to offer the AU mission in Sudan and any efforts made by the
    DOD to leverage troop contributions from other countries to
    serve in the proposed hybrid AU/U.N. peacekeeping mission for
    Darfur. This report was supposed to be available no later than
    January 15, 2007. That was 90 days after enactment of the bill,
    as of October 17, 2006. May I ask you, Mr. Secretary, if you
    know the status of this report?
        Secretary Gates. No, ma'am, and I'll find out.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Darfur Peace
    Agreement that is contained within the Defense Appropriations Act, 2007
    (Public Law 109-289) requires coordination with the Department of State
    and that is presently ongoing. The report should be ready shortly.
        We have offered up to 11 staff officers to the Africa Union (AU) to
    assist them with Africa Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) operations; the
    AU accepted 6. Difficulties in obtaining Sudanese visas resulted in
    only two officers being able to work at the AMIS Headquarters in Al
    Fashir. The other four officers are presently waiting in Djibouti for
    permission from the Government of Sudan to enter the country.

        Senator Clinton. I would appreciate it being promptly
    delivered to me and to this committee.
        Secretary Gates. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Clinton. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Clinton.
        Senator Cornyn.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I share Senator Clinton's concerns about conditions in
    Darfur, and yesterday the Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on
    Human Rights, had a hearing on the humanitarian crisis
    occurring there.
        I'm struck that when I visited Iraq in July 2003/August
    2003, we had an opportunity to stand on the edge of mass grave
    sites where Saddam had reportedly killed as many as 400,000 of
    his countrymen. I guess my question, since obviously, Iraq is
    on all of our minds--is, if you, General Pace, could tell us
    what sort of humanitarian crisis do you think we could
    anticipate if, in fact, the United States Government cut off
    funds to support our military efforts in Iraq or if we
    precipitously pulled out? What kind of humanitarian crisis
    would you anticipate?
        General Pace. Sir, as best I can tell, from a military
    standpoint, that the current Iraqi army and police would not
    have the strength to do all the work that they need to do, to
    keep sectarian violence quelled. Therefore, I believe that,
    based on that, the numbers of killed and murdered because of
    sectarian violence would spike.
        Senator Cornyn. Would you anticipate that if, in fact, it
    appeared that the Shiite in Iran were taking advantage of that
    lack of order, and the sectarian violence did spike, that that
    might cause other nations, principally Sunni-majority nations,
    to get very directly involved, in a military way, to defend the
    Sunni minority in Iraq?
        General Pace. Sir, I think an Iraq that was clearly
    disintegrating would be of great concern to all the neighbors,
    and they would all try to find ways to influence their concerns
    inside of Iraq.
        Senator Cornyn. Secretary Gates, I think there was a
    question earlier asked to you about if we left a destabilized
    Iraq and it descended into either a regional conflict of the
    kind that General Pace and I are talking about, whether it
    would, in all likelihood, necessitate our return, to try to
    salvage a chaotic regional situation. Is that your testimony?
        Secretary Gates. I would say that that certainly is one
    possible outcome, particularly if other regional states became
    involved.
        Senator Cornyn. I'd like to ask, Mr. Secretary, a question
    about the appropriation bill that we'll be considering here
    very soon. I know Senator Inhofe asked you about the issue of
    the BRAC Commission issue. The Senate will soon consider an
    appropriation bill, sometimes called a continuing resolution,
    but I think it's really more of an omnibus appropriation bill,
    that will cut $3.1 billion from the DOD account for BRAC. I'm
    strongly opposed to that, but, unfortunately, we're being told
    that, in all likelihood, this bill will come to the floor with
    no opportunity to offer any amendments and merely be given an
    up or down vote on the bill without any amendments. Texas has
    approximately $750 million in BRAC funding that will be in
    jeopardy if, in fact, this transpires. Can you tell me how this
    $3.1 billion deficit will impact the DOD's ability to fund
    military construction projects that will help our military men
    and women and their families?
        Secretary Gates. It will, Senator, make it impossible for
    us to meet the statutory deadline for the completion of BRAC.
    It will have a direct impact on facilities being built at the
    receiving end of units that are being consolidated to new
    locations. I think there is about $300 million in the $3.1
    billion for housing allowances for the troops. So, there is a
    huge impact, frankly, on us. As I had indicated, I think that--
    I mentioned this to leadership here in the Senate, and I think
    there's a real understanding of the magnitude of the problem
    and a willingness to consider some alternatives. One
    possibility is adding it to the fiscal year 2007 emergency
    supplemental. That really is an issue for the Senate--for
    Congress to decide. But clearly that $3.1 billion is very
    important to our troops and to us.
        Senator Cornyn. I agree with you that it's very important.
    I would just say that adding it to the supplemental will
    basically mean that there will be no offset and that, in
    essence, Congress will get to spend that $3.1 billion on other
    things, and not the BRAC construction that was originally
    intended.
        Can you tell me, Secretary Gates, since we have an All-
    Volunteer Military, nobody is required to serve in the military
    involuntarily, would this sort of denial of funding for our
    troops and their families have any impact, in terms of our
    ability to not only recruit, but also to retain our volunteer
    troops, in your opinion?
        Secretary Gates. Let me give you a brief answer. General
    Pace is probably in a better position to answer the question
    than I am. But, I think, clearly the troops feel strongly about
    fulfilling our commitments to them. We're asking a lot of them,
    particularly units that have been extended, people who are
    being deployed early, or mobilized and deployed early, so we
    are asking a lot. I think that when it comes to things,
    particularly that affect their homes and their families, that
    they feel pretty strongly about that. Retention is not a
    problem for us, at this point, as we talked about earlier, but
    clearly somebody's decision whether or not to remain in the
    military is impacted by these kinds of things. But I also
    wouldn't underestimate their loyalty and their willingness to
    put up with temporary hardships--particularly if they saw it as
    temporary. But let me ask the General.
        Senator Cornyn. General Pace, would you care to add to
    that?
        General Pace. Sir, hard to draw a straight line between
    $3.1 billion less in BRAC and X-percent change in retention.
    Congress has been very good at making sure we've have the
    resources we've needed to support our troops. Certainly,
    though, as troops come home--if they're not able to come home
    because the facilities aren't there, or if they come home and
    the facilities aren't done, that certainly impacts their vision
    of whether or not they are being adequately taken care of. But,
    sir, to draw a straight line between those two, I think, is a
    bit of a stretch.
        Senator Cornyn. I understand. Of course, we're not just
    talking about recruiting and retaining the current level of our
    end strength. We're also talking about growing that end
    strength by a large number. But my impression would be that
    anything we can do to make their lives better and to fulfill
    our commitments is a good thing. Anything we do to disappoint
    their expectations or to not live up to our commitments, in
    terms of how we treat them, is a bad thing. Maybe I look at it
    too simplistically.
        General Pace. No, I agree with that, sir.
        Senator Cornyn. In closing, let me just ask for one brief
    comment. Secretary Gates, then General Pace, China's new
    demonstrated ability to destroy U.S. satellites in a low-earth
    orbit raises a lot of questions about whether we're doing
    enough to counter such threats and maintain our freedom of
    action in space. I realize we're in an open session here, and
    several of us have attended a closed session where some of this
    has been discussed, but in this open session would you comment
    on your strategic assessment, to the extent you can, of the
    recent Chinese anti-satellite test (ASAT) and what you believe
    the DOD--and whether you believe the DOD is doing enough
    towards countering those threats at this time? Secretary Gates
    and then General Pace.
        Secretary Gates. First of all, I think that the Chinese
    ASAT test is very troubling. Perhaps what is as troubling as
    the technical achievement is how one interprets it as a part of
    their own strategic outlook and how they would anticipate using
    that kind of a capability in the event of a conflict, and the
    consequences for us of that. This is one of those areas where
    I've received some very preliminary kinds of briefings, in
    terms of our capabilities, but, since I'm not sure enough of my
    ground to know what's classified and what's not, let me ask
    General Pace if he can thread that needle.
        General Pace. Sir, first of all, very worrisome, capacity
    on behalf of the Chinese. A threat, sir, is defined two ways:
    one, capacity; and, two, intent. There's no belief, on my part
    right now, that the Chinese intend to use this capacity anytime
    soon. On the other hand, it is a unique capacity in the world,
    and we need to, in a very separate conversation, take a look
    at: Where are we with regard to that capacity? Where should we
    be? If there is a gap, how we close it? That is something that
    deserves very close attention, sir.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Cornyn, thank you.
        I think we'll try another round of, maybe, 3 minutes.
        Senator Warner. How about 4?
        Chairman Levin. Three and a half minutes. [Laughter.]
        Chairman Levin. Senator Warner and I always are going to
    split the difference somehow. We'll try 4 minutes.
        Mr. Secretary, the President, last year, said, ``that the
    presence of the United States will be in Iraq, so long as the
    Government of Iraq asks us to be in Iraq.'' Sounded mighty
    open-ended. Is that still our policy, that we're going to be
    there as long as the government asks us to be there?
        Secretary Gates. We certainly have no desire for permanent
    bases in Iraq, but I think that there clearly is going to be a
    prolonged need for U.S. military assistance over some period of
    years, but I think it would be a very small fraction of the
    number of forces that we have there now.
        Chairman Levin. Is our presence left up to the Iraqis, or
    do we make the decision?
        Secretary Gates. We will make that decision, sir.
        Chairman Levin. You made reference to the word
    ``incentivize,'' and the Iraq Study Group said that incentive
    is necessary on the Iraqis to take the political action, and
    that--in the absence, in their words, of such incentive, the
    Iraqi Government might continue to delay taking those difficult
    actions. So, would you agree that there needs to be an
    incentive if the Iraqis are going to be taking difficult
    political decisions?
        Secretary Gates. To pick up on a point that others have
    made, I think the Iraqis need to know that there are
    consequences for failing to follow through on their commitments
    in this reinforcement.
        Chairman Levin. Is that what you mean by ``incentivize''?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. It's both carrots and sticks. It
    works both ways.
        Chairman Levin. Yes. But the incentives, the sticks, have
    to be there. The argument, as you pointed out, is, what will
    incentivize the Iraqi government?
        Secretary Gates. Exactly.
        Chairman Levin. Would you agree that, whatever the level of
    troops, that, in the absence of a political settlement by the
    Iraqis, we're not going to see the violence reduced or ended?
        Secretary Gates. I think we cannot succeed in Iraq without
    a political settlement.
        Chairman Levin. By the Iraqis.
        Secretary Gates. By the Iraqis.
        Chairman Levin. Success means the reduction or end of
    violence.
        Secretary Gates. Correct, an Iraq that basically is able to
    govern itself.
        Chairman Levin. Which means that we avoid, or we end, the
    current level of violence. Would that be fair?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Now, there's been certain circumstances,
    which were set forth by some of the questions a few moments
    ago, where you said that the violence would likely spike if
    those circumstances existed, such as a precipitous withdrawal
    of American troops. My question is, will we be able to see a
    reduction of that violence, an avoidance of spikes, unless
    there is a political settlement in Iraq? In other words, is
    this settlement the absolutely essential ingredient in there
    being a end of violence or avoidance of the spikes?
        Secretary Gates. I think so, yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. All right. Now, I just want to outline,
    it's a nightmare scenario. General, I want to ask you about
    this. We're putting troops in 30 joint security locations in
    Baghdad. I'd like to know what are the rules of engagement if
    there is a major civil disturbance--10,000 Iraqis, in anger,
    come to one of those locations, they're angry, whatever
    triggers it--could be a number of things--we don't know what
    can trigger it; we saw what happened in Mogadishu--what are the
    rules of engagement now if that happens? Let's say, unarmed,
    but approaching one of these sites in a violent way so that our
    troops feel like there could be a violent end to themselves
    unless they take action--what do they do in that circumstance?
    What are the rules of engagement?
        General Pace. Sir, the rules of engagement are going to be
    what they have been and will continue to be, which is: our
    servicemembers, feeling threatened, are authorized to take
    whatever measures they must to protect themselves and those
    around them.
        Chairman Levin. That includes----
        General Pace. Having said that, sir, if they have the
    ability to, if these are unarmed people--but they're
    threatening--disengage and move back away from that point,
    that's what we would expect them to do. We're not expecting
    them to take on unarmed civilians. You're asking a hypothetical
    question.
        Chairman Levin. That's correct.
        General Pace. Fundamentally, and most important for our
    troops to know today and tomorrow, is that we expect them to
    defend themselves, and we would support them if they defend
    themselves. Inside of that construct, then, we expect them to
    take reasonable measures to not escalate something--as you
    pointed out, the crowd being unarmed.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Gates, I like the way you have a long-range
    approach to this situation. Nevertheless, we're faced with a
    short-term debate here. I speak ``short-term,'' in the next few
    days, whenever it occurs. You said, ``If they fail to act''--in
    other words, consistent with certain benchmarks--``we will
    change our course.'' I agree with you, just how best to do this
    is to incentivize the Iraqi people. So, it seems to me there's
    a careful balance here that we have to be guarded against. No
    matter how strong we all feel, there has to be benchmarks, if
    we pile up too many benchmarks and ask for too much, we might
    topple this government. There is a risk of that. We don't know
    how fragile this thing is. Then, what takes its place? So, I
    would hope, as we look at this very critical issue of
    benchmarks, that it's you and the DOD, together with the
    Secretary of State and perhaps others, that carefully begin to
    strike the balance of how hard we push on certain benchmarks,
    for fear that we could dislodge this government. Do you agree
    with that?
        Secretary Gates. Senator, I agree, but I have this
    perspective. I think the Iraqi government knows what it needs
    to do and what our expectations are. I think, now what we need
    to focus on, first of all, it's initially, certainly in the
    first instance, up to General Petraeus to keep the pressure on,
    in terms of them fulfilling--and our Ambassador--their
    commitments. But I think the other thing that we need to do
    here in Washington is something that I spoke about earlier to
    Senator McCain, and then later, we need to evaluate how they're
    doing against the commitments that they've made.
        Senator Warner. I agree with all of what you say.
        Secretary Gates. We need to do it on an ongoing basis with
    some understanding that this isn't going to be like D-Day, it's
    going to unfold probably over a period of time, but, overall,
    are they doing--and a brigade is certainly going to show up
    later than we expected, but if it shows up within a few days,
    maybe that's good enough. We'll need to make a qualitative, as
    well as a quantitative, evaluation of how they're doing against
    their commitments.
        Senator Warner. I support everything you say, but I just
    want to throw out a caution. There is a fragility to this
    situation, and----
        Secretary Gates. Right.
        Senator Warner.--we'd better know what happens--if this one
    fails, what comes up in its place.
        Second, on a procurement item, this committee worked very
    hard on the Joint Strike Fighter. We have good support across
    the board here. We have adequate funding. But there's a
    question of whether to not the DOD wants to revisit this issue
    of going forward with two engines. If we have but a single
    engine, then we're, in effect, giving a sole-source contract to
    one contractor which could amount to $100 billion. I've
    calculated that out. Do you know anything about the budget as
    it relates to that engine, as to whether or not you're going to
    pursue a single engine now, reverse what Congress has asked you
    to do?
        Secretary Gates. I know there was an issue last year, but,
    to be honest, I'm not sure about this year's budget.
        Senator Warner. Ms. Jonas, do you wish to comment?
        Ms. Jonas. Yes, Senator, appreciate the question. This
    budget does not include funds for the second engine. The DOD
    had evaluated that, and continues to evaluate the need for a
    second engine, but I believe that the savings that the DOD
    believes that it could get by----
        Senator Warner. Canceling.
        Ms. Jonas.--not doing it was about $1.8 billion. But we'll
    be happy to work with you on this, sir.
        Senator Warner. Well, I'm going to ask you, Mr. Secretary,
    to look at that.
        Ms. Jonas. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. We, on this committee, invested a lot of
    time in it, and I really think the importance of that fighter
    and the credibility of the United States to have a joint
    program which involves a number of countries, some of which
    want to use other than the one engine--they want to look at
    both. Would you just commit to look at it?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Department assessed all aspects of the F-35 Lightning II Joint
    Strike Fighter program in preparation for this year's budget
    submission. The Department continues to believe the risks associated
    with a single source engine program are manageable and do not outweigh
    the investment required to fund a competitive alternative engine. The
    three congressionally-directed engine studies have now completed. The
    conclusions, while supportive of competition in general, are consistent
    with the Department's initial findings that the expected savings from
    competition do not outweigh the investment costs.
        The F-35 international partners support the overall direction the
    program is headed, as evidenced by all eight partners signing the
    Production, Sustainment, and Follow-on Development Memorandum of
    Understanding.

        Senator Warner. Thank you very much.
        General, we were greeted in the paper this morning with the
    following: ``An Iraqi general took charge''--repeat--``An Iraqi
    general took charge of the security operation in Baghdad.''
    Now, I understand what that is. We have now, I think, gotten in
    place a general that has a high degree of confidence with
    General Casey and presumably General Abizaid. Is that correct?
        General Pace. Sir, it is.
        Senator Warner. But when they say ``take charge,'' we have
    a dual command there, do we not?
        General Pace. We have a single chain of command for U.S.
    troops.
        Senator Warner. For U.S. troops.
        General Pace. There's a single chain of command for Iraqi
    troops and there is a mechanism between the commanders to work
    collaboratively together, pared down to the battalion and
    brigade level, to be able to provide support--U.S. supporting
    Iraqi troops.
        Senator Warner. But some of us are concerned as to how that
    might work; when we get down to company level, whether or not
    two company commanders or two platoon commanders, one Iraqi,
    one American, get into a quarrel, what do we do. Now, I
    understand you're going to look at that very carefully, and you
    have a high degree of confidence that this system can work, is
    that it?
        General Pace. Sir, I have a high degree of confidence that
    the U.S. officers in the chain of command understand from whom
    they take their orders and what they're supposed to do.
        Senator Warner. But if that's in conflict with what the
    Iraqis want to do, who resolves the conflict?
        General Pace. Sir, there's a mechanism for that. If it's
    immediately on the ground and there's a disagreement, then the
    U.S. commander will simply just not do whatever it is that the
    Iraqi commanders ask them to do.
        Senator Warner. Well, I hope it works. I repeat that, I
    hope it works.
        General Pace. It is not as clean as we would like, sir,
    that's for sure.
        Senator Warner. No, it's not. I don't know of a precedent
    in our contemporary military history where we've engaged in
    such a duality of command as this.
        General Pace. Yes, sir. Our troops, though, will not have a
    duality of command; they will have a single command.
        Senator Warner. I understand. All right.
        On the intelligence, reading through the stories this
    morning--and it just--the story of the American GI trying to
    carry out these orders in the face of this polyglot or
    diversity of people who are angry and--whatever reason it is.
    To what extent do we have to give that GI, that platoon, or
    that squad down there, sufficient intelligence and efficient--
    sufficient language capability to go in on this daunting task
    of, in the crowded slums and communities, trying to sort out
    whom to shoot at and whom to help?
        General Pace. Sir, in the operations where we have the
    lead, which is mostly with our Special Operations Forces, the
    intelligence that's developed and provided is very good, and
    has led to the killing and capturing of high-value targets.
        Senator Warner. All right. So, you can tell us it's
    adequate, then, in your judgment.
        General Pace. Sir, the rest of my answer, if I may, because
    your question is very important. With regard to the troops on
    the ground in Baghdad, that's why it's important to have the
    Iraqi troops in front, because it'll be the Iraqi citizens and
    Iraqi human intelligence that will provide to Iraqis the
    ability. We do not have enough troops who have the kind of
    language capacity and cultural understanding to take the lead
    in those regards. We can provide support to them. So, from the
    standpoint of conventional force, Iraqis in the lead, us
    supporting. But as far as the high-value targets, our
    intelligence is what we use.
        Senator Warner. I thank you for that, because my resolution
    just simply says we should put greater reliance on the Iraqi
    forces and less need for perhaps 21,000 troops.
        General Pace. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. But that'll come to pass. We just give the
    best judgment we can to the President.
        Lastly, Secretary Gates, you quite correctly pointed out
    that this program in Baghdad has three parts--a diplomatic
    part, an economic part, and a military part--and you very
    cautiously stayed in your lane and addressed the military part.
    But it's essential that all these parts converge at the same
    time. You've committed to this committee that you will keep us
    informed with regard to the success or the lack of success with
    this program as it goes forward, but do we have in place, Mr.
    Chairman, a similar commitment from the DOS and other areas of
    the Federal Government as to whether or not the other two
    components are going to keep pace with the military? I suggest,
    Mr. Chairman, we look at some means by which to get reports,
    comparable to that which Secretary Gates said he'll give this
    committee, from others who are responsible for the economic and
    diplomatic.
        So, I just close out by saying I think it's terribly
    important, and I hope it does not fail, but if it does, I just
    don't want the military to take the blame because of the
    shortfall of the other two parts.
        So, I thank the Chair.
        Secretary Gates. Senator?
        Senator Warner. Yes?
        Secretary Gates. One thing that we might look at is seeing
    if--when we make a presentation to you all, that it's vetted on
    an interagency basis so that we give you the information on
    each of the elements that are involved.
        Senator Warner. Mr. Secretary, I think that's very wise.
    Therefore, to constitute the panels, Mr. Chairman, as they come
    before the committee, with representatives from the other. I
    think that's an excellent way to approach it.
        I thank you, again. We've had a very good hearing, and I
    wish you well.
        Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Before I call on Senator Sessions, on that
    last point is the matrix you referred to just a DOD matrix, or
    is that going to be joint with other agencies?
        Secretary Gates. Mr. Chairman, the package that I saw a few
    days ago had a piece being done by the DOD, another piece was
    being done interagency, and, frankly, the whole thing--and a
    part being done by the Joint Staff--and I think the whole
    thing, right now, is still a work in progress. I'm not quite
    sure how it's going to look. It also was short-term, medium-
    term, and long-term.
        Chairman Levin. Just wondering, while Senator Warner is
    still here, that may help address the issue that you very
    effectively raised.
        Senator Warner. Yes.
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Which is, if the matrix that you referred
    to is a multi-agency matrix, that may, at least, go some
    distance in addressing Senator Warner's point.
        Senator Warner. That would give us the benefit of cross-
    examination.
        Chairman Levin. Right. That's correct. I'm very glad that
    you raised this question. Also, will you be giving us a copy of
    the matrix that you're working on?
        Secretary Gates. I see no reason not to. My notion would be
    that if we came up here and briefed, every 2 or 3 weeks, that
    there might be some charts that we could present or something.
        Chairman Levin. If you can give us an answer to that, that
    document, which you call a checklist or a matrix--whatever that
    document is, you will share that with us every couple of weeks,
    just brief it to us.
        Secretary Gates. Sure.
        Chairman Levin. That would be helpful.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. With regard to the BRAC process that
    Senator Cornyn asked about, I think it's a very important
    issue. As I understand it, the John Warner NDAA for Fiscal Year
    2007, had $5.6 billion, really crucial money, to fund the
    realignment of our bases, fund people coming back from foreign
    bases in Europe, Korea, and other places, and to provide the
    housing and support they need. So, this is a 55-percent
    reduction that we now see that has occurred this year under the
    new leadership here in the Senate. What I want to mention to
    you, Secretary Gates, and why this is painful to us, is because
    that money was spent on social projects or other projects,
    nondefense projects, essentially, and we have to have it. So,
    now we're going to be reduced to putting it into the
    supplemental, which will raise the supplemental and will shift
    more debt to our children and grandchildren, because the
    supplemental is unpaid-for and whereas, before, it was paid for
    within our budget. So, it increases the debt by that much. Do
    you understand the difficulties that we face there?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. Now, General Pace, there's been some
    interest in how to improve the Iraqi army and military. Are we
    being too slow to equip them with more capable equipment?
    What's your theory about the rate we're on, do we need to
    accelerate that? Do we need just to give them the equipment and
    try to make sure that--and won't that help them be more
    effective?
        General Pace. Sir, the goal which was attained, as of
    December 2006, was to have 328,000 army and police manned,
    trained, and equipped, and the equipping was done to about the
    98 percent level. Added to that for fiscal year 2007 has been
    an increase up to 362,000, and the money for that is being
    provided partially by us and partially from Prime Minister
    Maliki's budget for his government. So, everything we were
    supposed to do by the end of 2006, we did. The additional delta
    is now being provided for, both in this budget and primarily
    from the Iraqi budget, to buy the equipment for the increased
    number of troops they wanted to have.
        Senator Sessions. I'm thinking about vehicles, armaments,
    more modern weapons, or better movement capability, that kind
    of thing. Should we do more there? Wouldn't that be a step
    toward improving their morale and their self-confidence and
    their capability to respond to attacks on their units?
        General Pace. Sir, let me take that for the record, because
    we designed the equipment in 2006 to be delivered. We've now
    had some experience with the units operating with it, and I do
    not know whether or not that experience has led us to believe
    that there's some other kind of equipment that ought to be
    delivered. So, if I may, let me check with the folks in theater
    and find out, because I just don't know.
        [The information referred to follows:]
    System capabilities:
        Mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) will replace uparmored
    HMMWVs in theater but MRAPs are not HMMVW replacements. Additional MRAP
    vehicles will be used in theater to augment current levels of
    protection. Three categories of MRAP provide the improved protection
    and enable our forces to survive underbody and other forms of attack.
        CAT I - Mine Resistant Utility Vehicle for urban combat patrol
    operations; CAT II - Larger Joint EOD Rapid Response Vehicle for multi-
    mission operations such as convoy lead, troop transport, ambulance,
    EOD, and combat engineering; CAT III--Buffalo; mine/improvised
    explosive device clearance operations. Mine detection vehicle--MRAPs
    can reduce the number of vehicles required to perform a mission.
        For example, 9 MRAPs may take the place of 12 HMMWVs.
        The validated joint requirement on 6 February 07 was 6,738 vehicles
    (3,700-USMC, 2,500-USA, 538-USN).

        Senator Sessions. Secretary Gates, one final question. With
    regard to Korea and Iran and their missile program, are there
    any indications that you're aware that would indicate we should
    reduce our plans to build a missile defense system capable of
    defending against potential attacks from those countries, or
    other rogue nations, for that matter?
        Secretary Gates. No, sir.
        Senator Sessions. Fact, it would seem that they've stepped
    up their efforts rather publicly to achieve missile strike
    capability against the United States.
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
        We thank all of our witnesses for their testimony. It was a
    very helpful, very useful hearing. I'm sorry it went on so
    late, but it was better than having a recess and coming back,
    we hope.
        We stand adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
    justification for navy and air force aircraft purchases with emergency
                                    funding
        1. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, in the fiscal year 2007
    supplemental and the fiscal year 2008 Global War on Terrorism Emergency
    requests the Department of Defense (DOD) is requesting $5.3 billion for
    the purchase of new manned aircraft for the Departments of the Navy and
    the Air Force. Please provide a full justification for the purchase of
    each of these aircraft as follows:

             For aircraft requested to replace a combat loss, the
            type of aircraft lost in combat and the date and location of
            the loss.
             For new aircraft that are not being requested to
            replace a combat loss, the justification should include, for
            each new aircraft to be purchased, the aircraft type or model
            to be replaced, the expected service life (in flight hours) of
            that aircraft, the total hours flown on that aircraft, and the
            number of those total flying hours that were charged to
            Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom.

        Dr. Gates. The following chart lists the Air Force aircraft loss
    during contingency operations and replaced either in the fiscal year
    supplemental request, fiscal year 2008 supplemental request, or
    replaced by fiscal year 2006 global war on terror or prior funds.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                             science and technology
        2. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, this 2008 request reduces your
    investment in science and technology (S&T) programs by over $500
    million in constant dollars with respect to the 2007 budget request and
    over $2.5 billion relative to 2007 appropriations. It represents only
    2.2 percent of the total DOD budget, far short of the goal of 3 percent
    investment in innovative S&T programs. These programs are investing in
    industry, universities, and our defense laboratories to develop next
    generation capabilities for the military.
        What effect will this severe reduction have on the Department's
    ability to support the Nation's technology base and to develop needed
    capabilities to meet future threats? Please provide the committee with
    a list of research and technology areas where additional funding could
    be used well to support the development of needed next generation
    capabilities.
        Dr. Gates. The level of S&T funding requested in the fiscal year
    2008 President's budget request (PBR) appears to be lower than the
    Department's fiscal year 2007 request due to the realignment of $316
    million of Air Force Special Programs funding from the Budget Activity
    3 to other non-S&T accounts. There was no real impact to the Air Force
    S&T program since the $316 million was used to fund small projects that
    were not managed by the Air Force S&T community. If a funding
    adjustment of $316 million is made to the fiscal year 2007 PBR, then
    the fiscal year 2008 request is 2.1 percent lower than the adjusted
    fiscal year 2007 request, in constant dollars. The Department's request
    for S&T is still very high in historical terms. The seven highest
    requests for S&T, in constant dollars, have occurred in the last seven
    years. We have looked hard at all DOD investments, and had to fund the
    priorities within the Department. The same is true in portfolios like
    S&T. Within S&T, we believe we have funded the highest priority items.

                     hydrogen technology and infrastructure
        3. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, what investments are you making
    in this budget to move DOD towards the adoption of hydrogen as a
    logistics fuel--for example, in the development of hydrogen vehicle
    technologies, hydrogen storage systems, and in the development and
    installation of hydrogen infrastructure--such as production or
    distribution systems?
        Dr. Gates. The DOD investments in hydrogen technology and
    infrastructure are focused on furthering DOD's experience with
    hydrogen. In the near-term we are working with the Department of Energy
    as an ``early adopter'' where hydrogen shows potential for benefiting
    DOD industrial and non-tactical operations. For example, we are
    piloting the replacement of lead acid batteries with hydrogen fuel
    cells in forklifts used by DOD warehouses. Fuel cell forklifts provide
    important productivity improvements and reduce environmental impact
    while advancing the fuel cell technology. Establishing hydrogen fueling
    stations that are available to the public as well as the DOD is also
    helping to meet the Energy Policy Act and the President's Executive
    order to reduce petroleum consumption. We have considerable work to do
    before we will understand the requirements for using hydrogen as
    mobility fuel. We are partnering with the Services, Department of
    Energy, and Department of Transportation on all of the hydrogen work so
    that DOD's investments complements the ongoing work across the
    Government. The fiscal year 2008 budget request supports this effort.
    The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is requesting $0.4 million and $1.5
    million in fiscal year 2009 to fund the continued program development
    of the DOD Roadmap and Strategy for Hydrogen. The fiscal year 2008
    phase of the program also supports the development of synthetic fuel
    specifications with industry and finalization of the schedule in
    preparation of the initial deployment of a limited hydrogen technology
    and infrastructure capability. The military Services also have S&T
    investments on tactical use of hydrogen--primarily for man-pack
    applications.

                    training and equipping of afghan forces
        4. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, in your written testimony, you
    indicate that as of the end of January some 88,000 Afghanistan National
    Security Forces (ANSF) have been trained and equipped, an increase of
    31,000 over the previous year. Please provide a breakout of the total
    number of ANSF in terms of how many are Afghan National Army (ANA) and
    how many are Afghan National Police (ANP).
        Dr. Gates. There currently are 32,300 ANA and 61,100 ANP personnel
    trained and equipped.

        5. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, according to a November 2006
    report issued jointly by the Inspectors General of the DOD and
    Department of State, the Combined Security Transition Command
    Afghanistan (CSTC-A) established new criteria for reporting readiness
    of the ANP to plan, execute, and sustain independent law enforcement
    operations. As of last month, how many ANP personnel met these
    readiness criteria?
        Dr. Gates. No ANP personnel currently meet the readiness criteria
    to conduct, plan, execute, and sustain independent law enforcement
    operations. One ANP battalion is capable of planning, executing, and
    sustaining law enforcement operations with coalition support. Funds
    requested for the ANP in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental request and
    the fiscal year 2008 global war on terror request will be used to train
    and equip the ANP to operate independently.

        6. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, did the CSTC-A also establish
    new criteria for reporting the readiness of the ANA? If so, as of last
    month, now many ANA personnel met these readiness criteria?
        Dr. Gates. The CSTC-A did not change its criteria for reporting
    readiness of the ANA. CSTC-A now is training and equipping the ANA to
    conduct fully independent operations. In the past, CSTC-A was training
    and equipping the ANA to lead operations with coalition support.
        No ANA units are able to plan, execute, and sustain independent
    counterinsurgency operations at the battalion level. Thirteen
    battalions are capable of planning, executing, and sustaining
    operations with coalition support. Funds requested for the ANA in the
    fiscal year 2007 supplemental request and the fiscal year 2008 global
    war on terror request will be used to train and equip the ANA to
    operate independently.

                           quadrennial defense review
        7. Senator Levin. General Pace, the Quadrennial Defense Review
    (QDR) submitted to Congress in February 2006 called for no increase in
    the size of the Active Army or the Marine Corps, and called for a
    reduction in the size of the Army National Guard. The fiscal year 2008
    budget request proposes to increase the end strength of all three above
    both the current levels and the levels that were determined by the QDR
    to be sufficient to execute the National Military Strategy. Has the
    National Military Strategy been changed since the QDR was submitted?
        General Pace. The National Military Strategy has not changed.
    However, my assessment of the risk in executing that strategy in the
    current and foreseeable strategic operating environment has changed.
    America faces increasingly complex and dangerous threats, resulting in
    increased risk. Sustaining operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, while
    maintaining readiness to respond to new contingencies around the globe,
    is a challenge with our current force structure. While we are fully
    ready to respond to any new contingency, we would rely more heavily on
    less precise munitions and the length of time necessary to succeed
    would be longer than we would like. The increases in Army and Marine
    Corps active end strength proposed by the budget are consistent with
    this need to increase our overall capacity and will reduce strategic
    risk.

        8. Senator Levin. General Pace, given these substantial changes,
    does the QDR still represent the position of the DOD?
        General Pace. Yes, the QDR and the fiscal year 2008 budget reflect
    our priorities. The QDR represented a snapshot in time of the overall
    strategy; the report itself noted that we must continuously reassess
    and apply lessons learned if it is to be successful. It recognizes that
    the strategic environment is not static, and that we must continue to
    transform along a continuum that reflects our best understanding of a
    changing world. The focus areas of the QDR (defeating terrorist
    networks, defending the Homeland in depth, shaping the choices of
    countries at strategic crossroads, and preventing hostile states and
    non-state actors from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction)
    are still relevant. Additionally, the Secretary of Defense has
    established five priorities for the DOD. These priorities are:
    increasing end strength, resetting the force, operationalizing our
    Reserve component, strategic modernization, and transformation.

        9. Senator Levin. General Pace, what is the detailed rationale for
    these proposed increases?
        General Pace. My biennial National Military Strategy Risk
    Assessment was recently submitted to Congress. This assessment and the
    Secretary of Defense's plan for mitigating risk depict the challenges
    we face around the globe and discuss how we will overcome them.
    Sustained deployments, equipment utilization, and operational tempo
    each impart risk from a military perspective. The current heavy demand
    for ground, sea, and air capabilities is unlikely to dissipate in the
    immediate future.
        As stated in my assessment, our Armed Forces stand ready to protect
    the Homeland, prevent conflict, and prevail over adversaries. These
    missions present simultaneous and interrelated challenges of varying
    intensity, immediacy, and danger.
        America's Armed Forces are in our sixth year of sustained combat
    operations. We are fighting sectarian violence, insurgency, and
    terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan. Al Qaeda and its allies threaten the
    safety of our Homeland and our overseas partners--threats made more
    alarming by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We face
    additional threats and growing challenges in other regions of the world
    where we are currently unable to provide the military support desired
    by our allies and combatant commanders to meet their presence,
    training, and deterrence objectives.
        Given the breadth of these challenges, their complexity, and their
    probable long duration, we must increase our overall military capacity
    to reduce strategic risk. Sustaining operations in Iraq and
    Afghanistan, while maintaining readiness to respond to new
    contingencies around the globe is a heavy burden for our current force
    structure. Presently, more than 200,000 troops are deployed to the U.S.
    Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR); another 210,000
    are elsewhere overseas. The size of our Army and Marine Corps is not
    large enough to accommodate these multiple missions in the long-term.
    Currently, most of our Army Brigade Combat Teams and their Marine Corps
    regiment equivalents are experiencing only 1 year or less at their home
    station before deploying again--and that year is largely spent actively
    preparing to redeploy overseas to fight.
        Currently, we have at least 20 Brigade/Regimental Combat Teams
    deployed to Iraq, with another three in Afghanistan, one in Korea, and
    one in Kosovo. This operational tempo drives our units to operate at
    close to a 1:1 ``deployed:at-home'' ratio--which is approximately half
    the time necessary to sustain enduring readiness. This year at ``home''
    is usually spent training for missions relevant to Operations Iraqi
    Freedom or Enduring Freedom and not on the full scope of reset and
    retrain requirements needed to meet global threats. Additionally, this
    usually intense pre-deployment training takes time away from families
    during the year at ``home''.
        The current rotation requirements conflict with our policy goal--
    which is to deploy Active Duty individuals for 1 year and then provide
    2 years at home; our policy for the Reserve component is to deploy
    individuals for 1 year and then provide 5 years at home. Because the
    forces are deployed in a wide variety of places, especially in Iraq, we
    have had to break that commitment. The minimal time our troops spend
    with their families between deployments has induced significant stress
    on our forces. In addition, their inability to train for the full range
    of missions has decreased readiness and increased associated risk.
        The Army and Marine Corps are both focused on using this added
    troop strength to mitigate current, serious shortfalls and ensure their
    operational forces are balanced across the range of military
    capabilities that will continue to be in high demand for the duration
    of the long war. These forces will enhance the combat capability of the
    United States, reduce stress on deployable personnel and units, and
    provide the necessary forces for success in the long war.

                       paying for end strength increases
        10. Senator Levin. General Pace, do you support the proposed
    increases in Army and Marine Corps end strength regardless of how they
    are paid for, or only if the entire cost of these additional personnel
    are added to the DOD topline?
        General Pace. Given the complex strategic environment that we
    expect to face, we must increase the overall capacity of our forces to
    reduce risk. Specifically, to accomplish our missions in Iraq and
    Afghanistan and remain prepared for other challenges, we must increase
    the ground force structure of the Army and Marine Corps. Growing our
    ground forces is a top priority that reduces the risk to the execution
    of our National Military Strategy. The ground force increase initiative
    will compete for resources such that the overall DOD budget provides
    funding for a strategic approach that includes this effort along with
    operations, modernization, and personnel.

        11. Senator Levin. General Pace, I understand that DOD estimates
    the additional cost at about $95 billion over 5 years. Are you willing
    to cut modernization or other programs to make room for the significant
    increase in personnel and operating costs that these additional
    personnel would entail?
        General Pace. The ground force increase initiative will compete for
    resources such that the overall DOD budget provides funding for a
    strategic approach that includes this effort along with operations,
    modernization, and personnel.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy
                              joint strike fighter
        12. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Gates, last year, one of the most
    contentious issues in Congress was the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
    alternate engine program. The Department had decided to terminate the
    General Electric/Rolls Royce engine and rely solely on the Pratt &
    Whitney engine that is a derivative of the F-22 engine. I understand
    that DOD is again proposing to terminate the JSF alternate engine
    program. Why would the Department again propose this alternative? Have
    you completed all the life cycle cost analyses and other reviews
    required by Congress that were so notably absent from last year's
    deliberations?
        Dr. Gates. The three congressionally-directed independent analyses
    are due by March 15, 2007. The Department believes it is prudent to
    await the results of these studies prior to making new investments in a
    second engine source for the F-35.

                              university research
        13. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Gates, as you are well aware
    university research has been the engine that has developed a vast array
    of military capabilities that we depend upon today. Capabilities that
    we take for granted--such as radar, stealth, and robotics--all were
    developed only with significant contributions from the academic
    community. You recently served on a National Academy of Sciences
    committee that produced a report called ``Rising Above the Gathering
    Storm'' that noted ``The Federal Government should increase our
    investment in long-term basic research . . . by 10 percent annually
    over the next 7 years. It should place special emphasis on . . . basic
    research conducted by the DOD.'' The 2008 budget request falls well
    short of this goal, and in fact reduces investments in the critical
    University Research Initiatives program run by each of the military
    Services. What is your view of the value of university research in the
    overall S&T investment plan of the DOD?
        Dr. Gates. For the past half century DOD has invested in
    fundamental research in the physical sciences and engineering. A
    significant amount of that research has been conducted at our Nation's
    universities. Today's warfighter enjoys technological superiority as a
    consequence of the application of that investment to defense systems.
    In my most recent position as the President of Texas A&M University, I
    was privileged to lead an organization proficient in executing basic
    research. As a result of that experience future DOD 6.1 budgets will
    reflect a strong commitment to university research.

        14. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Gates, how is this reduced
    investment in university research and minor overall increase in basic
    research consistent with the conclusions you reached in the National
    Academy of Sciences study?
        Dr. Gates. My personal experience in government, my tenure in
    academia, membership on the ``Gathering Storm'' committee and numerous
    other National Research Council Boards provide a basis for reviewing
    DOD basic research levels. However, I remain mindful of the many
    factors and urgent considerations that will attend all DOD budget
    decisions in the future. I expect to weigh, carefully, the full
    spectrum of demands on defense budget dollars, factoring in the long-
    term needs of the Defense Department, as set by future funding levels
    for basic research.

                                    patriot
        15. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Gates, we just received the fiscal
    year 2007 supplemental along with the fiscal year 2008 budget. My
    understanding is that the Department approved the Army's request to
    include funds in the supplemental for upgrading the remainder of the
    Patriot fleet to Configuration 3, thereby making every Patriot launcher
    in the Army capable of firing our most advanced missile, the PAC-3.
    Unfortunately, the administration (OMB) denied this request and removed
    Patriot upgrade funds from the supplemental. The President even
    mentioned in his speech to the Nation on January 10, 2007 that he
    ordered more Patriots to the Middle East to reassure our friends and
    allies. Obviously, Patriot is a very important defensive weapon system
    in the global war on terror and our combatant commanders need the most
    capable Patriot systems to defend our forces. I further understand that
    the Army did not request funding for these upgrades in the fiscal year
    2008 budget. What is the Department's, and the Army's, plan to fund the
    remaining upgrades to make all of the Patriots Configuration 3?
        Dr. Gates. The Army will address the PAC 3 upgrades through the
    normal budget process since the supplemental request was not supported.

        16. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Gates, it is my understanding that
    the Army conducted an internal Mission Area Assessment to review the
    types and quantities of capabilities they required for air and missile
    defense against global requirements. That assessment came to the
    conclusion that Patriot remains the cornerstone of our current
    capabilities to protect our troops and coalition allies. The assessment
    also concluded that the current Patriot force required three battalions
    to be upgraded to the latest Configuration 3 capable of using the most
    capable interceptor missile the PAC-3. How is the Army and the
    Department addressing the upgrade of these three battalions which is
    nearly one-third the force to PAC-3 capability? What is the funding
    plan and the schedule to which you are working to address this
    capability shortfall?
        Dr. Gates. The Army will address the PAC 3 upgrades through the
    normal budget process since the supplemental request was not supported.
    The Chief of Staff of the Army directed these upgrades to be complete
    by fiscal year 2009. The Army is unable to meet this timeline unless
    funding is available by June 2007. If funding is not provided, a 2- to
    3-year delay in fielding the PAC 3 capability will result.

        17. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Gates, it is my understanding that
    the Patriot air and missile defense system is considered by the DOD to
    be a ``High Demand/Low Density'' resource and that almost all our
    combatant commanders see Patriot critical to their war plans. How is
    the Army and the Department addressing the fact that nearly one-third
    of the Patriot 10 battalion force is not capable of employing the
    latest hit-to-kill Patriot PAC-3 missile because required ground
    equipment upgrades have not been funded? When does the Department
    intend to fix this problem?
        Dr. Gates. The Army will address the PAC 3 upgrades through the
    normal budget process since the supplemental request was not supported.
    A 2- to 3-year delay in fielding the PAC-3 capability is the result.

        18. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Gates, recent press stories indicate
    the Army has determined the need to activate two additional Patriot
    battalions raising the force from 10 current battalions to 12. How and
    by what means does the Department intend to activate these two
    battalions and what will it do to equip these two plus three existing
    battalions incapable of firing the PAC-3 missile to that configuration?
        Dr. Gates. The Army currently has 10 PAC-3 battalions and 3 PAC-2
    battalions. The Army assessed a need, due to ongoing commitments of the
    Patriot force, for two additional PAC-3 battalions. This addition to
    the force, coupled with modernization of the PAC-2 units to PAC 3,
    would pure-fleet the Army with 15 PAC-3 battalions. Fifteen battalions
    are essential to meeting combatant commander's requirements, meeting
    rotational objectives for soldiers and families, and continuing
    transformation.
        Funding to support the additional two battalions will be included
    as part of the ``Grow the Army'' effort.

        19. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Gates, the Department testified in
    the past as to the critical need for the PAC-3 missile to protect our
    troops and coalition partners from weapons of mass destruction (WMD);
    yet more than a third of the planned Patriot force structure is
    incapable of using that missile because the ground equipment has not
    been modified. What is the Department doing to address this critical
    force protection shortfall for our troops?
        Dr. Gates. The Army currently has 10 PAC-3 battalions and 3 PAC-2
    battalions. The Army is deploying or has deployed its most advanced
    Patriot systems to Southwest Asia and Southeast Asia to protect forward
    deployed troops and coalition partners. The Army maintains PAC-3 units
    ready to deploy in case the need arise. The next opportunity to address
    the upgrade of units to PAC-3 to support overseas rotations is during
    the normal budget process.

        20. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Gates, why is the Department
    procuring in excess of 108 PAC-3 missiles annually while they fail to
    program funding to modify the Patriot ground equipment systems to use
    the missile? It appears this acquisition strategy is flawed. We buy the
    missiles while only upgrading two thirds of the systems to use it.
    Which combatant commanders won't receive PAC-3 capable units in their
    force flow when they need them?
        Dr. Gates. The Army has deployed its most advanced PAC-3 capable
    units to combatant commanders in Southwest Asia and Southeast Asia. The
    acquisition strategy of procuring in excess of 108 PAC-3 missiles
    allows us to meet the PAC-3 missile requirements of our combatant
    commanders in these regions more rapidly. The Army prioritizes
    distribution of available PAC-3 units to meet COCOM requirements and
    maintains PAC-3 units ready to deploy in case they are needed by any
    combatant commander.

                               defense accounting
        21. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Gates, when confronted by this
    committee during his confirmation hearings to become Secretary of
    Defense, Donald Rumsfeld admitted that the Department had lost track of
    over $2 trillion and said it would take a few years to get the
    Pentagon's books in order. The DOD now comes before Congress asking for
    another half trillion dollars. Is the DOD now ready for a full and
    complete audit of its books?
        Dr. Gates. The Department has significantly increased the accuracy
    and validity of its financial information since 1999, and reduced the
    undocumented accounting entries problem by $63 billion in 2005 alone,
    with an overall reduction of 86 percent from $2.3 trillion in 1999.
        Although the Department is not ready for a complete audit of its
    books, it has made and continues to make significant progress toward
    that goal. For fiscal year 2006, it received unqualified (``clean'')
    audit opinions on 15 percent of its assets and 49 percent of its
    liabilities. In addition, it received a qualified opinion on 6 percent
    of its assets and 28 percent of its liabilities. Finally, it received
    favorable audit results on three accounts at the Department level,
    i.e., Appropriations Received, Federal Employees Compensation Act
    Liabilities, and Investments.
        Although there are a number of initiatives to move us toward our
    goal of a clean audit opinion on all of the Department's statements,
    the two most significant are contained within its Financial Improvement
    and Audit Readiness and the Enterprise Transition Plans.
        The Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness Plan focuses the
    Department's efforts for improving business processes, internal
    controls, and resolving material weaknesses. The September 2006 plan
    projects that by 2011 the Department will have unqualified opinions on
    72 percent of its assets and 79 percent of its liabilities.
        The Enterprise Transition Plan details the schedules, milestones,
    and costs for 106 key transformational programs and initiatives across
    the Department of which 44 impact financial improvement and audit
    readiness.

                      medical free electron laser program
        22. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Gates, the Medical Free Electron
    Laser (MFEL) program has been around for many years. It is a world-
    recognized national resource that is dedicated to developing new
    medical diagnostics and treatments for our young men and women in the
    military, especially for injuries associated with combat casualty. For
    example, a unique system to diagnose and treat burns is in use today to
    care for our injured soldiers. I was one of eight Senators who recently
    sent a letter to Deputy Secretary Gordon England in support of the
    program. We asked the Department to increase the funding for the MFEL
    program so that the program would continue to have the needed
    resources. In fact, Congress has increased the requested budget time
    after time because this program is a model for the way successful
    medical interventions that benefit our troops, should be developed. But
    instead of increasing the funding for the program, it was zeroed out. I
    cannot understand why such a valuable medical program, which directly
    helps our wounded warriors, was so abruptly terminated. This action has
    the potential to stop in its tracks all the impending interventions
    which are primed to give us treatments for leishmaniasis (Baghdad
    boil), nerve and blood vessel bonding, novel wound healing, smart
    needles, miniature endoscopes, and field-deployable diagnostic tools--
    just to name a few. What is the reasoning behind the decision to cut
    the funding for this proven program?
        Dr. Gates. The Department's Military Health System will continue to
    benefit from the contributions that the MFEL program has made to
    diagnosis and treatment of battlefield-related and civilian medical
    problems. I recognize the history of congressional support for this
    program and especially by Senator Kennedy's recognition of the
    Department's achievements in its management and execution. This
    confidence was well-placed, and the citizens of our country--both in
    and out of uniform--have benefited.
        With your encouragement and support we have pushed laser medicine
    into general medical use in U.S. domestic health care. After 22 years
    and almost $400 million, I believe it is time for the MFEL program to
    transition to a more broadly competitive research environment. Program
    performers and their ideas are ready to compete for support by the
    Department of Health and Human Services and other sources that invest
    in a broad set of health care challenges. This is not to say that the
    Department has no further interest in the promise of this technology.
    We expect current MFEL centers and other qualified entities to compete
    for funding under DOD Broad Agency Announcements for medical S&T
    focused on combat casualty care and infectious diseases.
        In research, as in procurement, the Department must make careful
    investment choices that reflect its understanding of both experience
    and likely needs. The MFEL program has long been a part of our research
    portfolio but we now have higher priorities in general and,
    specifically, higher human-centered priorities. Fortunately, the choice
    regarding the MFEL program is made easier by this program's maturity
    and readiness for expanded competition.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
                          weapons systems acquisitions
        23. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates and General Pace, according to
    an October 2006 study by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), CBO
    projects that ``the demand for defense resources averages about $492
    billion annually (in 2007 dollars) . . . [but, when] . . . factoring in
    the potential risk of higher-than-anticipated costs raises the
    projected long-term demand for defense funding to an annual average of
    about $560 billion. . . .'' This is $80 billion more than the
    Department's base budget for fiscal year 2008. CBO indicated that part
    of the increase is based on weapon systems currently under development
    and the fact that these systems usually have cost overruns.
        While this study gives me great concern, one area that I am
    extremely troubled by is the fact that many of these weapon systems on
    order are having delays and cost overruns. These delays not only hurt
    our men and women in the Armed Forces, but also hurt the American
    people. What is the DOD doing to ensure that unwanted delays and cost
    overruns are being addressed?
        Dr. Gates. The Defense acquisition business is about managing risk,
    and the Department is committed to ensuring that Defense acquisition
    programs have predicable and achievable cost, schedule, and performance
    outcomes.
        In order to satisfy warfighting needs within cost and schedule, we
    need to continually identify and manage risk. We've found that as
    programs slide farther in time, it becomes more difficult to hold
    requirements and funding stable enough to mitigate or even sustain
    risk. We are focusing a great deal of effort on reforming our three
    primary decision processes: acquisition, requirements, and funding. Our
    plan is to integrate, synchronize, and focus on output, such that
    relevant data is both transparent and readily available to senior
    decisionmakers, appropriate performance metrics are developed and
    applied, and continuous improvement is assured. We've had some early
    success by putting into practice a Concept Decision methodology,
    identifying specific capabilities for portfolio management, and
    implementing capital budgeting for selected programs. These reforms
    have been generally well-received. We find that success is more likely
    where stakeholder organizations--and specifically the people who will
    implement the practice--both support the reform's objective and are
    involved in implementation. We remain focused on fulfilling warfighting
    needs within cost and schedule.
        General Pace. I share your concerns and I have taken measures to
    address unwanted delays and cost overruns. These measures include
    revisions to existing policies, pilot projects that provide greater
    inclusion of all stakeholders in the acquisition process, a systems-
    based approach to fielding new capabilities, and the establishment of
    early tripwires to identify potential problem areas.
        The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), as an advisory
    body to the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Acquisition Executive
    (DAE), has increased consideration of cost, schedule, and technology
    readiness in addition to the performance information that was
    previously evaluated. The pending revision of the governing instruction
    (CJCS 3170.01) mandates that the timeframe of required capabilities be
    incorporated into the analysis and development of the program
    acquisition strategy. This approach will allow the JROC to make better
    recommendations to the DAE on the initiation, continuation,
    modification, or cancellation of acquisition programs.
        Additionally, the Joint Staff is participating in a series of OSD-
    led pilots on a tri-chaired concept decision process that will evaluate
    the needs and the resources required earlier in the development of a
    capability. Resources will then be committed based on the maturity of
    the proposed solutions. This concept decision approach is designed to
    permit early and regular trade-offs between cost, schedule, and
    performance among alternative approaches within capability areas,
    increase confidence and decrease risk through early program definition,
    and decrease acquisition risk through early senior leadership
    engagement (including Service Chiefs) in corporate investment
    decisions.
        We are also addressing affordability earlier in the JROC process
    with a systems-based approach. This requires sponsors to describe the
    desired capability in the context of a family of systems. This change
    enables better definition of the system inter-relationships,
    dependencies, and synchronization with complimentary systems. We are
    also requiring sponsors to assess the technology readiness and identify
    the top cost drivers.
        The JROC directs programs to return when program cost exceeds 10
    percent of the approved acquisition baseline to get ahead of potential
    Nunn-McCurdy breaches. The JROC can then act early to adjust
    requirements while favorable alternatives still exist and before
    options for successful resolution become increasingly limited. The JROC
    will have a stronger role in the approval process of rebaselining
    acquisition programs--ensuring all requirements are still valid under
    proposed changes in cost and schedule parameters.

                                budget requests
        24. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, you said that you would listen
    to the Service Chiefs and other military officers about matters that
    affect the Services. However, in an article I read in the Los Angeles
    Times, Army Chief of Staff General Schoomaker did not agree with the
    administration's budget request for the Army and he made a point to
    ensure that the administration understood that he was not pleased with
    the request. In doing so, the Army was provided more funding. However,
    it is my understanding that some of the other Service Chiefs were not
    pleased that their Services were not provided more money because they
    ``were being penalized for playing by the rules.''
        I am a bit concerned by the article because we, in Congress, and
    the American people have been told time and time again that should the
    Services need more funding, equipment, personnel, et cetera, that they
    would get it. However, now it seems that there is an unspoken process
    that has certain rules that must be played. Could you enlighten us on
    this matter?
        Dr. Gates. Our Government has a very open and transparent process
    for deciding military Service needs for more funding, equipment,
    personnel, et cetera. Resources, however, are not unlimited. The
    administration evaluates and funds the highest priorities of the
    military department to ensure that U.S. Forces have what they need to
    accomplish their military mission. Congress plays a major role in this
    process since it controls much of the process through its
    constitutional responsibility for military appropriations.

        25. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, now that we have seen the
    budget request and supplemental request, I am concerned by reports that
    are indicating that more money will be necessary to meet the strategic
    needs outlined by the DOD. Do you believe that the missions outlined by
    the Pentagon may be unrealistic to achieve with the current budget
    request and supplemental?
        Dr. Gates. I believe that the missions assigned to the DOD are
    realistic, if circumstances change, the Department will reassess our
    budget estimates and that the current budget request and supplemental
    are sufficient to support those missions.

                              defense acquisition
        26. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, I am very supportive of making
    sure that our troops have everything they need to perform their
    mission, including the latest and best technology. However, we have
    recently received two audit reports on DOD contracting that have some
    very disturbing findings. The first was Government Accountability
    Office (GAO) report GAO-07-20, titled, ``Defense Acquisitions, Tailored
    Approach Needed to Improve Service Acquisition Outcomes'' dated
    November 2006. The second report is DOD Inspector General (IG) report
    D-2007-044, titled, ``Fiscal Year 2005 DOD Purchases Made Through the
    Department of the Interior,'' dated January 16, 2007. These reports
    highlight significant weaknesses in DOD's contract management and
    oversight.
        Specific problems identified by the DOD IG include a finding that
    both DOD and the Department of the Interior (DOI) did not comply with
    laws and regulations. Specific examples of problems found include:

             DOD used DOI contracting officials who did not
            adequately document and support that the prices paid were fair
            and reasonable. Also, competition was not usually obtained.
            Therefore, DOD has no assurance that it is obtaining best value
            for its purchases.
             The Southwest Acquisition Branch contracting officer
            granted contract-ordering authority to a DOD employee who
            issued $135 million in contract awards without having a
            contracting officer warrant.
             The Counterintelligence Field Activity did not follow
            the required procedures for obtaining leased office space in
            the National Capital Region. The Counterintelligence Field
            Activity, through GovWorks, obtained a 10-year, $100 million
            lease that violates a myriad of laws including potential
            violations of the Antideficiency Act. The contracting process
            also circumvented the required congressional review for leases
            of this size. The lease may have cost the Counterintelligence
            Field Activity up to $2.7 million annually more than if leased
            through the General Services Administration (GSA).
             The DOD internal controls over management of
            appropriated funds were not adequate.

        Similarly, GAO found significant problems with DOD contracting
    concluding that

              ``Over the past 10 years, DOD has seen large growth in the
            acquisition of services, to the point where the value of these
            acquisitions exceeds the value of major weapon systems. To a
            large extent, this growth has not been a managed outcome.
            Congress, concerned over these rapid increases, has directed
            DOD to take several actions to promote more oversight and
            discipline in service acquisition. DOD has taken action, but
            action has not necessarily equated to progress. At this point,
            DOD is not in a good position to say where service acquisition
            is today in terms of outcomes, where it wants service
            acquisition to be in the next few years, or how to get there.
            This makes it difficult to set the context within which
            individual organizations can make informed judgments on service
            acquisition transactions.''

        What basis can you give me for confirming to the American people
    that DOD is ensuring that they get the best value possible for their
    tax dollars?
        Dr. Gates. Since 2005, the DOD leadership and the DOD IG have been
    working very closely with the DOI, the GSA, and other assisting
    agencies regarding the proper policies and procedures that should apply
    when the Department utilizes other agencies to contract for goods and
    services for the Department. Obviously our goal is to ensure that the
    Department is getting the best value for the American taxpayer and the
    right products and services for our warfighters. We are focused on
    ensuring that when we utilize interagency acquisitions to meet
    Department needs, not only are they done properly--in accordance with
    statute, regulation, and policy--but that our actions are fundamentally
    sound from a business point of view. We have addressed identified
    deficiencies in a series of policy memoranda, dating back to 2003,
    issued by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
    and Logistics (AT&L); the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); and
    the Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, on such
    topics as, ``Proper Use of Non-DOD Contracts,'' ``Non-Economy Act
    Orders,'' ``Use of Federal Supply Schedule and Market Research,''
    ``Contracts for Services,'' ``Advance Payments to Non-DOD Federal
    Agencies for Interagency Acquisitions,'' and ``Leasing Office Space.''
    The Department recently signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with
    both the GSA and the DOI to ensure that all parties understand that DOD
    acquisition and funding policies will be observed when DOD funds are
    transferred to other agencies. Each MOA individually addresses, in a
    corresponding action plan, specific actions the Department and the
    corresponding assisting agency are taking to correct known
    deficiencies. All relevant information related to the Department's use
    of Interagency Acquisitions, including the MOAs, policy memoranda, and
    audits are available on the Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy
    Web site at: http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/specificpolicy/index.htm.

        27. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, what steps are you taking to
    eliminate or minimize the effects of the systemic weaknesses identified
    in these reports?
        Dr. Gates The Department takes these issues very seriously and has
    elevated them to the highest levels of management attention. We are
    taking a number of steps to respond to recent congressional direction
    and to eliminate the systemic weaknesses identified in these and other
    reports. These include:

              I. In section 812 of the National Defense Authorization Act
            for Fiscal Year 2006, Congress directed the Department to
            establish and implement a management structure for the
            acquisition of services. The Under Secretary of Defense for
            Acquisition, Technology and Logistics issued a policy
            memorandum on October 2, 2006, implementing the requirements of
            section 812 by providing updated policy for DOD's acquisition
            of services, and by requiring all DOD components to establish
            and implement a management structure for the acquisition of
            services, based on dollar values.
              II. The Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition
            Policy, in conjunction with the Senior Procurement Executives
            of the military departments, DLA, and Defense Contract
            Management Agency, is developing a new, comprehensive DOD-wide
            architecture for the acquisition of services. Basic tenets of
            the architecture include:

                      (1) Maximum use of competition.
                      (2) Use of acknowledged best practices.
                      (3) Appropriate application of performance-based
                    approaches.
                      (4) Enhanced contract performance management
                    supported by: early identification of appropriate
                    performance metrics, quality assurance or written
                    surveillance plans included in the contract,
                    appointment of properly trained contracting officer
                    representatives, enhanced application of past
                    performance information, and strategic approach to
                    achieving Department socio-economic goals.

              III. DOD, in conjunction with the GAO and the Office of
            Management and Budget's Office of Federal Procurement Policy,
            has established the DOD Improvement Plan for the GAO High Risk
            Area Contract Management, with action items specifically
            targeted at systemic weaknesses identified in these and other
            reports. We have made significant progress in completing these
            action items, which are at the tactical level, and we are in
            the process of establishing a follow-on plan that is oriented
            to implementing the strategic DOD-wide architecture for
            acquiring services.

        28. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, DOD's acquisition workforce has
    gradually been reduced over the last decade while DOD has significantly
    increased its reliance on contract services support. Considering the
    findings of these two reports, can you tell me if DOD's civilian
    workforce is sufficiently staffed to properly process contracts and to
    maintain appropriate oversight of those contracts? If yes, how? If not,
    why not?
        Dr. Gates. The DOD acquisition workforce has been impacted by
    downsizing and, since September 11, by the need for updated skills and
    new mission challenges. With the growth in contracting for services, we
    are re-assessing all of our acquisition oversight processes to improve
    acquisition outcomes. For example, the Under Secretary of Defense for
    AT&L has established a management structure, to include defined roles
    and responsibilities, for the review and approval of the Services'
    acquisitions. The Under Secretary took this action to ensure that the
    Services' acquisition is improved in compliance with statutes, policy,
    and other requirements.
        In addition to contract oversight, we continue to expand our
    training infrastructure and available training resources to provide the
    acquisition workforce with better knowledge sharing tools and Web-based
    performance support resources. Although we are very successful today
    with hiring and high retention, we will face significant challenges as
    the highly experienced Baby Boomer generation departs the workforce.
    Approximately 78 percent of our current acquisition workforce is in the
    Baby Boomer generation. We must address recruiting replacements from a
    smaller national workforce. We are working hard on many fronts to
    ensure we have the right acquisition capability now and into the
    future.
        In June 2006, we published both the DOD Civilian Human Capital
    Strategic Plan (HCSP) and the AT&L HCSP. Meanwhile, the AT&L Workforce
    Senior Steering Board has been working aggressively to position the DOD
    to be successful in the future. The Board has met three times since May
    2006, and it is now planning to meet quarterly to develop and implement
    strategies for identifying capability gaps and for improving the
    effectiveness of the acquisition workforce. The Under Secretary
    deployed a joint competency management initiative in October 2006 in
    alignment with the QDR, the DOD Human Capital Strategy, the AT&L HCSP,
    and the AT&L Implementation Plan. This initiative is expected to update
    and assess acquisition competencies for 12 functional communities
    within the DOD acquisition workforce. Each update will identify
    behaviors and underlying knowledge, skills, and abilities for
    successful performance.
        We have made significant progress in the development of competency
    models for program management, life cycle logistics, and contracting.
    Between now and June 2008, the Department will begin pilot workforce
    assessments for program management and life cycle logistics. In the
    fourth quarter of fiscal year 2008 it will commence a DOD-wide
    assessment of the contracting workforce. These competency assessments
    will help our senior leaders to reallocate resources, target
    recruitment, improve retention strategies, and expand education and
    training resources.
        The combination of our competency assessment initiative and other
    leadership actions to address workforce quality and capability will
    allow us to more accurately assess and address staffing sufficiency. We
    have the right sense of urgency, and I am confident we will shape the
    acquisition workforce in an intelligent manner.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
                               atlantic security
        29. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Gates, senior DOD civilian and
    military leaders have previously noted the importance of having a
    second nuclear aircraft carrier port on the Atlantic coast. Do you
    believe that two Atlantic ports will reduce the risk to our carrier
    fleet by dispersing our carriers and necessary support facilities? Does
    this budget account for that?
        Dr. Gates. The retirement of the U.S.S. John F. Kennedy (CV 67) in
    March 2007 leaves Naval Station, Mayport without an aircraft carrier
    and will reduce overall carrier inventory to 11. In January 2006 the
    Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) directed the Commander, U.S. Fleet
    Forces Command (CFFC) to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement
    (EIS) that will examine 13 alternatives for best utilizing the
    facilities and capabilities of Naval Station Mayport after the
    retirement of CV 67. The options being evaluated by the Navy include:

             The capacity to homeport of one or more large
            amphibious ships, such as an LHA or LHD;
             The capacity to homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft
            carrier (CVN);
             The capacity to serve as a dispersal location but not
            a homeport for a CVN;
             The capacity to homeport additional surface combatants
            (cruisers andlor destroyers [CRUDES]);
             Seven different combinations of the above;
             The homeporting of an Amphibious Ready Group (LHA or
            LHD, LPD, LSD);
             No Action.

        The Navy is being both environmentally and fiscally responsible
    awaiting the conclusion of the EIS in January 2009 before making any
    decisions regarding Mayport and the issue of two carrier ports on the
    east coast.
        The EIS process will be deliberate, balanced, and take into account
    aspects essential for our east coast naval forces. The Navy will take
    the time to ensure that all aspects of the decision, including national
    security requirements, total cost, impact on sailors and their
    families, and the effect on local economies, have been evaluated fully.
    Any corresponding programming of execution funds, if required, will
    occur after the final Record of Decision in January 2009.

                         drilling oil in gulf of mexico
        30. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Gates, I have successfully
    fought the expansion of oil drilling in the Gulf of Mexico in order to
    protect restricted military training areas. What is your position on
    oil drilling east of the military mission line in the Gulf of Mexico,
    where important military testing and training activities take place?
        Dr. Gates. The DOD supports the national goal of exploration and
    development of offshore energy resources, and understands that the
    administration's outer continental shelf oil and gas leasing program is
    critical to the Nation's energy security, economic stability, and
    national defense.
        The DOD, the DOI, and affected States have worked together
    successfully for many years to ensure unrestricted access to critical
    military testing and training areas, whle enabling oil and gas
    exploration in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. Through
    this relationship, we have been able to maintain the proper balance
    between our Nation's energy and national security goals. The current
    program proposal for the eastern Gulf of Mexico does not propose oil
    and gas exploration and leasing in areas used for military testing and
    training, and excludes from exploration and leasing those areas east of
    the Military Mission Line used by the DOD for testing and training. We
    support this proposal. Drilling structures and associated development
    in those areas east of the Military Mission Line would be incompatible
    with military activities, such as missile flights, low-flying aircraft,
    weapons testing, and training.

                          space situational awareness
        31. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Gates, most of the senior
    leaders in the Air Force and the U.S. Strategic Command have indicated
    that increased Space Situational Awareness (SSA) is one of the highest
    priorities for space spending. The Air Force budget request for SSA
    increases from $121.7 million in fiscal year 2007 to $187.8 million in
    fiscal year 2008. However, there is apparently no funding to upgrade
    the aging radars that track space objects. Is there any money in the
    fiscal year 2008 budget to upgrade these radars or otherwise improve
    the ability of the United States to improve SSA?
        Secretary Gates. In the fiscal year 2008 budget, the Air Force has
    requested $216.6 million to maintain and improve its array of SSA
    capabilities, which provide timely detection, tracking and
    characterization of objects in space. The Air Force is fully funding
    the replacement of aging components in the Air Force Space Surveillance
    System (AFSSS) radar in order to maintain its viability. Likewise, the
    fiscal year 2008 budget request supports the service life extension
    effort on the Eglin phased array radar to allow continued operations
    through fiscal year 2015. The Air Force is also upgrading the Haystack
    X-band radar to a higher frequency (W-band) imaging capability which
    will improve the ability to provide detailed characterization of
    smaller space objects.
        The fiscal year 2008 budget also supports investment in next
    generation SSA programs. One such system is the Space Fence, a new SSA
    radar which will replace the aging AFSSS with a multiple-ground-site
    system and provide a capability to detect and track smaller space
    objects. Additionally, the Space Based Space Surveillance (SBSS)
    program will continue building a new optical sensing satellite to
    provide frequent observations of space objects in, or traveling to,
    geosynchronous orbits. Finally, the Air Force is improving the ability
    to integrate and assess SSA data on shorter timelines by developing a
    replacement for the current Space Defense Operations Center computer.

                              test and evaluation
        32. Senator Bill Nelson. Ms. Jonas, last summer, there was a budget
    decision to reduce funds for Air Force test and evaluation and to close
    some test labs in Florida, New Mexico, and California. How did the DOD
    come to the decision to try to reduce our test and evaluation?
        Ms. Jonas. The Department did not reduce the funding for the Air
    Force test and evaluation program and has not made a final decision on
    closing labs in Florida, New Mexico, and California. Many times during
    budget preparation internal discussions occur on how the Department
    might best optimize our resources and operations. The Department
    continues to review the DOD lab structure and will comply with
    congressional direction to provide an analysis of any proposed
    realignments.
                                     ______

                    Question Submitted by Senator Evan Bayh
                             printed circuit boards
        33. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates, the National Research Council
    recently released a report that identified printed circuit board
    technology as critical in nearly every weapons system. The report
    concluded that the ability of the domestic printed circuit board
    industry to innovate and manufacture printed circuit boards in a secure
    environment is diminishing. What actions are you taking and investments
    are you making with this budget to ensure that DOD has a reliable and
    trusted supply of printed circuit boards for future and legacy systems
    and to ensure necessary innovation in the design and manufacture of
    this critical technology?
        Dr. Gates. The Department requested and received appropriated funds
    from Congress in fiscal year 2007 for logistics research and
    development of printed circuit board technologies and demonstrations.
    Included in this appropriation was funding for the preservation of
    access to reliable printed circuit board manufacturing in the United
    States. One of our centerpiece efforts is the DLA sponsorship of
    logistics research and development technology demonstrations under an
    Emerging Critical Interconnection Technology (ECIT) program. The ECIT
    program is providing the means for DLA to support organic printed
    circuit board centers at the Naval Surface Warfare Center and the
    Warner Robins Air Logistics Center. The increased support for these
    printed circuit board centers is intended to address the Department's
    continuing printed circuit board requirements. In addition, the
    Department has formed a task force of stakeholders and subject matter
    experts to identify and evaluate ongoing and possible future actions
    for protecting access to trusted and reliable printed circuit boards.
    The formation of the taskforce was directed in the John Warner National
    Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2007. The NDAA also
    directed a congressional reporting requirement on implementing the
    recommendations of the National Research Council Committee on
    Manufacturing Trends in Printed Circuit Board Technology. The report is
    due in July 2007 and will address in greater detail current and future
    actions the Department is taking in this area. This report will help
    inform future budget and program decisions on circuit board technology.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
                                homeland defense
        34. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates and General Pace, since
    September 11, the DOD has acknowledged an expanded role and mission for
    its forces in the Homeland--both to defend against external threats and
    to provide support to civil authorities. In light of the strains placed
    on our military manpower and material due to our commitments in Iraq
    and Afghanistan, do you believe the DOD is fully prepared to provide
    the support to civil authorities that the Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS) is expecting of the DOD under the most extreme planning
    scenarios (such as the detonation of a nuclear device or multiple
    terrorist attacks)?
        Dr. Gates and General Pace. The DOD stands ready to provide all
    available resources to fulfill our roles and responsibilities
    identified in existing Federal plans such as the National Response Plan
    and the National Implementation Plan for Pandemic Influenza--one of the
    15 National Planning Scenarios. As the interagency planning effort
    based on the 15 National Planning Scenarios matures, DOD will be
    actively engaged to fill shortfalls in the Federal response
    capabilities.
        DOD is currently developing plans that address the 15 National
    Planning Scenarios and has advocated that other Federal departments and
    agencies do the same. Detailed advance planning such as this will
    identify those local, State, or Federal capabilities and/or resource
    gaps that DOD may be called upon to fill.
        DOD stands ready to assist our interagency partners with their
    planning efforts. DOD is providing planners to the DHS's Incident
    Management Planning Team and providing training allocations at our
    institutions that train DOD planners.

                                missile defense
        35. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates and General Pace, Admiral
    Fallon, Commander of Pacific Command--and soon to be Commander of
    CENTCOM, has told this committee that our missile defense capabilities
    need to pace the threat. Likewise, General Craddock, Commander of U.S.
    European Command, has told this committee that ``rogue states in the
    Middle East and Southwest Asia possess a current ballistic missile
    capability that threatens a major portion of Europe.'' In light of
    these comments by the combatant commanders, do you agree that the DOD
    should accord a priority to the successful testing and fielding of the
    current generation of ballistic missile defense capabilities in numbers
    sufficient to stay ahead of the growing threat?
        Dr. Gates. Testing and fielding BMD capabilities to defeat the real
    and growing ballistic missile threat has been and remains a priority
    for DOD.
        In 2002, the President directed us to develop and deploy, at the
    earliest possible date, ballistic missile defenses drawing upon the
    best technologies available. In 2004, we began fielding land- and sea-
    based interceptors and radars. These systems were available to defend
    the U.S. Homeland if necessary during the North Korean test launches in
    2006. We will continue to build our interceptor inventories to counter
    the growing threat while we test and improve our current capabilities.
        General Pace. The current threat will grow and is growing in sheer
    numbers as existing ballistic missile capabilities are spread around
    the world as we have seen. Increasing the quantity and deployment of
    current ballistic missile capabilities can address the proliferation
    challenge. While more inventory is important, the continued
    development, integration, and test of missile defense technologies will
    yield capabilities that will mitigate the risk posed by future, more
    sophisticated threats.
        The advancements we have made since 2004, utilizing the Missile
    Defense Agency's unique capability-based acquisition approach which
    implements an integrated development, test, and fielding strategy, gave
    us the flexibility we needed to respond to the recent, near-term threat
    posed by North Korea. We want to be as ready and as confident, if not
    more so, against future threats as we were then.

                              prompt global strike
        36. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates and General Pace, the 2001
    Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) stated the need to provide the President
    with a broad array of nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to bolster
    deterrence and defense against the new threats we face today. One such
    recommendation was the development of long-range, conventionally armed
    strike systems, also known as ``prompt global strike'' capabilities.
    The 2006 QDR reinforced this recommendation. Yet 5 years since the NPR
    we seem to be without a viable prompt global strike system under
    development. Please explain the strategic requirement for prompt global
    strike capabilities and summarize current plans to acquire such
    capabilities.
        Dr. Gates and General Pace. As the 2006 National Security Strategy
    notes, the new security environment differs radically from that of the
    Cold War and requires new approaches to international diplomacy,
    deterrence, and defense. In particular, deterrence can no longer rely
    on a one-size-fits-all approach, but must be tailored to address a wide
    range of threats including the prospect of WMD acquisition or use by
    both state and non-state actors. In this new security environment,
    crises can quickly develop to threaten U.S. national interests. Such
    crises could occur in areas that are beyond the range of existing U.S.
    forces, or in heavily defended areas that cannot be penetrated by
    existing systems without jeopardizing mission success or putting U.S.
    lives at risk. Today, however, nuclear-armed ballistic missiles are the
    only means the United States possesses for striking virtually anywhere
    in the world promptly (within minutes to hours from the time of a
    presidential decision). The President must be afforded a broader range
    of options to strike time-sensitive, high-value targets, including the
    conventional capability for worldwide, prompt response.
        Current plans for a prompt Global Strike capability consist of:

             Development of Conventional Trident Modification to
            provide a non-nuclear prompt Global Strike capability from
            existing SSBNs;
             Conversion of ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to
            guided missile submarines (SSGNs) armed with conventional
            Tomahawk cruise missiles to provide a prompt Global Strike
            capability in scenarios where SSGNs are on station within range
            of a target; and
             Deployment of the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff
            Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER), with a range of over 500
            nautical miles and capability for loitering and transmitting
            imagery to planners, to provide a prompt Global Strike
            capability in scenarios where U.S. aircraft are within range of
            a target.

        The 2006 QDR recommended the Conventional Trident as the best near-
    term, low-cost, low-risk technical solution for acquiring a prompt
    Global Strike capability. DOD has requested $175 million in fiscal year
    2008 to begin modifying 24 D5 Trident missiles to Conventional Tridents
    by removing their nuclear warheads and replacing them with up to four
    conventional warheads per missile. IOC would be within 2 years of full-
    funding. For the longer-term, the Navy, Air Force, and Army are
    studying concepts for advanced prompt Global Strike systems that use a
    combination of ballistic missiles and hypersonic reentry systems to
    maneuver or extend range. These systems involve technological
    challenges and are years away from providing operational capability.
    Once fielded, however, these systems would provide a range of effects
    against a wider spectrum of targets, and a greater number of options
    for decisionmakers. Finally, non-kinetic systems, including information
    operations, are also envisioned as part of the suite of prompt Global
    Strike capabilities. The Prompt Global Strike Report to Congress for
    Fiscal Year 2006 and the Conventional Trident Modification Report to
    Congress of 1 February 2007, provide expanded discussion on the need
    for prompt Global Strike, Conventional Trident, and follow-on
    capabilities.

                       threats to u.s. space capabilities
        37. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates and General Pace, China's newly
    demonstrated ability to destroy U.S. satellites in low earth orbit
    raises the question of whether the United States is doing enough to
    counter such threats and maintain its freedom of action in space. The
    NDAA for Fiscal Year 2006 required the DOD to assess whether the
    Department is allocating sufficient resources to the space control
    mission. While the report is classified, it can be said that the DOD
    understands there are areas where additional effort is needed. What is
    your strategic assessment of the recent Chinese anti-satellite test and
    do you believe the DOD is devoting sufficient resources toward
    countering such threats?
        Dr. Gates and General Pace. The Chinese ASAT test represents a
    threat to the United States' superiority in space and the Department is
    paying close attention to its continued development, as we are for all
    threats to our space systems. With this emerging threat, we are
    increasing our priority on space protection and reconstitution efforts.
    Improvements are being made to our SSA and our ability to automate
    attack detection and characterization of ASAT and other threats. We are
    also developing the Operationally Responsive Space program to enhance
    our augmentation and reconstitution capabilities. The fiscal year 2008
    budget request will allow us to meet the milestones necessary to field
    new capabilities required to ensure our freedom to operate in space. We
    are continuing to evaluate the necessity/opportunity to accelerate
    capabilities as threats mature.
        This year, the Department has submitted to Congress several space
    control programs on the Unfunded Priority List. This additional funding
    would enable us to accelerate delivery of critical space protection
    capabilities such as the Rapid Attack Identification, Detection, and
    Reporting System (RAIDRS), the SBSS system, and Self-Awareness Space
    Situational Awareness (SASSA).
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
                        defense contracts for the f-22a
        38. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Gates, the Department has
    requested approximately $4.6 billion for F-22As in fiscal year 2008
    based on a multi-year procurement (MYP) plan. However, a multi-year
    contract has not been entered into yet, although it is authorized in
    the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007. Is it appropriate for the Department to
    request funding for a multi-year contract that has not yet been entered
    into?
        Dr. Gates. It is appropriate to request funding for a MYP contract
    that has not yet been entered into. If the President's budget had not
    requested funding needed for the F-22 MYP, the Department could not
    make the certifications required by Section 134 of the John Warner NDAA
    for Fiscal Year 2007, Public Law 109-364 (NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007),
    10 U.S.C. 2306b and 10 U.S.C. 2306b(i)(l)(A). The NDAA for Fiscal Year
    2007 and the DOD Appropriations Act, 2007, Public Law 109-289, approved
    MYP of the F-22 and associated engines beginning in fiscal year 2007.
    The Department plans to exercise the MYP authority provided by these
    statutes and plans to award the MYP contracts for the aircraft and
    engines in the August 2007 timeframe after providing the required
    certification. Prior to contract award, the Department must comply with
    the multiyear criteria set forth in 10 U.S.C. 2306b. The Secretary's
    certification must validate that there is a reasonable expectation
    throughout the contemplated contract period that the Secretary of the
    Air Force will request funding for the contract at the level required
    to avoid contract cancellation. Additionally, 10 U.S.C. 2306b(i)(l)(A)
    requires the Secretary to certify that the current Future Years Defense
    Program fully funds the support costs associated with the multiyear
    program already authorized by law. The fiscal year 2008 President's
    budget submission must include the funds needed for the MYP before the
    Secretary can complete the required certifications and execute the MYP
    contracts. The Department will comply with the law relating to the MYP
    contract award, and we will work with this committee and the entire
    Congress to provide sufficient information to permit Congress to act
    prudently to promote our national security needs.

        39. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Gates, is the Air Force on track
    to meet all the conditions required by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007 by
    30 days prior to award of the multi-year contract?
        Dr. Gates. The Air Force is on track to award the F-22A MYP
    contracts in August 2007. The Under Secretary of Defense for
    Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and his staff are working very
    closely with the Air Force on all of the requirements which must be
    satisfied before award of the F-22 MYP contracts. We share the Air
    Force's goal to award the MYP contracts in the August 2007 timefiame.
    We are currently on track to complete contract negotiations and make
    the certifications required by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007, section
    134, and 10 U.S.C. 2306b(i)(l)(A) in July 2007, to permit contract
    award in August 2007. In addition, the NDAA requires the Secretary
    provide for a federally funded research and development center cost
    report on the MYP savings to be submitted no later than 30 days prior
    to contract award. The Department commissioned RAND to complete the
    required report which is on schedule to be delivered in July 2007.

        40. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Gates, can you explain why the
    Secretary of Defense did not certify the savings related to the
    proposed F-22A multi-year contract prior to submission of the fiscal
    year 2008 President's budget?
        Dr. Gates. Section 134 of the John Warner NDAA for Fiscal Year
    2007, Public Law 109-364, requires certification to the 10 U.S.C. 2306b
    criteria at least 30 days prior to award of the MYP contracts. The
    Department plans to exercise the MYP authority provided in the NDAA for
    Fiscal Year 2007 and the Defense Appropriation Act for F-22 beginning
    in fiscal year 2007. The fiscal year 2008 President's budget submission
    includes the funding needed for the MYP. The Department will comply
    with the law relating to the certification requirement, including the
    verification of savings. We anticipate the contract award in the August
    2007 timefiarne. We will comply with that congressional mandate, and
    the Department will work with this committee and the entire Congress to
    provide sufficient information to permit this Congress to act prudently
    to promote our national security needs.

                           air force c-130 and c-130j
        41. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Gates, the Air Force is requesting
    authority to retire 24 C-130Es in fiscal year 2008. The fiscal year
    2008 budget also requests funding for 9 C-130Js, the fiscal year 2008
    global war on terror request requests funding for 17 C-130Js, and the
    fiscal year 2007 supplemental requests funding for 5 C-130Js. Please
    explain the request to retire older model C-130s, rather than repair or
    upgrade them, in favor of purchasing new C-130Js. Is the Department's
    request in this regard based on an analysis of what is most cost
    effective in the long-term, or based on a desire to replace older, less
    capable aircraft with more modern, reliable, and capable new aircraft?
        Dr. Gates. The 24 C-130E retirements are not directly related to
    the 31 C-130Js requested. The planned 24 C-130E retirements are a fleet
    management and cost avoidance measure to retire the least capable, most
    problematic C-130s in the Air Force fleet. In recent analysis, the
    required cost to bring these C-130Es to viable status (approximately
    $26.9 million per aircraft) will only delay future issues relating to
    aircraft structural integrity (i.e. outer wings, empennage, et cetera)
    The nine C-130Js in the fiscal year 2008 budget are the last aircraft
    in the MYP stated to assist in the recapitalization of the C-130E fleet
    supporting EUCOM. The 5 C-130Js in the fiscal year 2007 global war on
    terror and 5 of the 17 C-130Js in the fiscal year 2008 global war on
    terror are supporting replacement of 12 C-130H2s given to SOCOM to
    support their Combat Loss Recapitalization (CLR) efforts. Seven of the
    remaining 12 C-130Js in the fiscal year 2008 global war on terror are
    to support an overstressed fleet which, if continued to fly under
    current operations tempo, will accelerate problems plaguing existing
    fleet, such as center and outer wing structures. Three of the remaining
    five C-130Js are for replacement due to non-combat loss. The last two
    C-130Js are to support MC-130 recapitalization efforts.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 C-13OJs                    Funding             Purpose
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    9...............................  2008 President's    C-130J MYP
                                       budget.
    5...............................  2007 global war on  Replacement to
                                       terror.             support 12 C-130s
                                                           given to SOCOM
                                                           for CLR
    5...............................  2008 global war on  Replacement to
                                       terror.             support 12 C-130s
                                                           given to SOCOM
                                                           for CLR
    7...............................  2008 global war on  Alleviate stressed
                                       terror.             fleet due to
                                                           overfly
                                                           supporting global
                                                           war on terror
    3...............................  2008 global war on  Replacement for
                                       terror.             non-combat losses
    2...............................  2008 global war on  Support MC-130
                                       terror.             recapitalization
                                                           effort
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        42. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Gates, please explain the
    relationship between the numbers of C-130s the Air Force needs with the
    number of Joint Cargo Aircraft the Air Force and Army intend to
    purchase.
        Dr. Gates. The Mobility Capabilities Study (MCS) identified 395 C-
    130s is the lowest point in a range of acceptable risk the Air Force
    needs to support the National Military Strategy with intratheater
    airlift. Air Mobility Command (AMC) forecasted the number of usable C-
    130s in the fleet will drop below the 395 threshold by 2011. Until we
    are able to recapitalize our aging C-130s, the Air Force must retain
    its oldest aircraft longer than planned to keep the intratheater force
    structure above 395. The Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA), C-130Js, and
    center wing box (CWB) repaired C-103s are all candidates to fill the
    shortfall in meeting the intratheater capabilities identified in the
    MCS. RAND had just completed a Functional Solutions Analysis (in draft
    now) that preliminarily concluded, ``no viable non materiel solution
    was found that can delay the need for C-130 recapitalization more than
    a few years.'' As the next step, an Intratheater Fleet Mix Analysis let
    by RAND will begin soon and we anticipate these study results as early
    as December 2007. These study results should provide details about the
    optimum mix of JCAs and C-130s needed to preserve our intratheater lift
    capabilities at acceptable levels of risk.

                          base realignment and closure
        43. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Gates and General Pace, as a
    result of the Department's Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process,
    tens of thousands of military personnel, and their families, will be
    relocating to new bases in CONUS. The Conference Report accompanying
    the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007, states:

              The committee understands that the number of personnel and
            dependents who will be relocated as a result of the 2005 BRAC
            round, in concert with global rebasing, may well be
            unprecedented in the history of our country. The committee
            finds it alarming that neither the DOD nor the Department of
            Education appears, at this point, to have taken seriously the
            impact these relocations will have on local communities and, in
            particular, local school districts. The committee believes it
            is premature to assign specific cost sharing formulas regarding
            what costs should be paid by Federal, State, or local
            governments. However, the committee believes the Department
            needs to carefully consider this and other issues as it
            develops a comprehensive plan for addressing the off-base
            impacts of BRAC and assorted other personnel movements.

        As a supplement to the report directed in the NDAA for Fiscal Year
    2006, the committee directs the DOD, in coordination with the
    Department of Education, to report to the Committees on Armed Services
    of the Senate and the House of Representatives every 6 months in
    relation to their plans to work with State and local education agencies
    to accommodate the growth in local school districts resulting from BRAC
    and assorted troop movements, to include: specific recommendations
    regarding cost sharing; grants and matching grants; planning grants; as
    well as specific recommendations from the DOD's Office of Economic
    Adjustment related to how local communities can prepare for and raise
    resources to accommodate the large influx of school students they
    expect as a result of DOD initiated actions.
        I understand the Department's fiscal year 2008 budget request
    provides $2.4 million in start-up costs to begin developing educational
    partnerships with local school systems impacted by base closures,
    global rebasing, and force restructuring; and that the purpose of these
    partnerships is to ease the transition of military dependent children
    from DOD Education Activity (DODEA) schools to stateside schools.
    Please explain the types of initiatives and projects these
    ``educational partnerships'' include.
        Dr. Gates and General Pace. The $2.4 million requested in the DODEA
    fiscal year 2008 budget is in direct response to section 574(d) of the
    NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007, wherein Congress directed the Secretary to
    ease the transition of military dependent students from attendance at
    DOD schools to attendance at local educational agencies (LEAs). These
    funds will not go toward school system infrastructure, but will be used
    to share DODEA educational expertise and experience with school
    districts impacted by large influxes of students resulting from base
    closures, global rebasing, and force restructuring. The $2.4 million
    for fiscal year 2008 will be used to do initial assessments of school
    districts' needs, and to begin developing partnerships with the
    affected school systems.
        Through educational partnerships, the Department will work to
    increase the academic performance of K-12 students in partner schools
    and districts, and increase the opportunities and successes in foreign
    language courses in grades K-12. Below are descriptions of the types of
    programs and projects the Department plans to offer impacted school
    systems:

              a. High Quality Educational Program. This program seeks to
            increase the academic performance of students through the
            alignment of curriculum, instruction, assessment, and program
            evaluation to promote data-driven decision making; outline
            processes for ongoing program review; and maintain an effective
            communication program so all military families are aware of
            educational opportunities that are available to them. This
            program also provides opportunities for DODEA and the LEA to
            further enhance school administrator and teacher leadership
            through joint training, mentorship programs, and collaborative
            exchanges.
              b. High School Program. This program seeks to add rigor to
            the high school program through enhanced offerings, highly
            trained teachers, and by facilitating student participation and
            success in the following assessments: Preliminary Scholastic
            Assessment Test, Scholastic Assessment Test or American College
            Test, Advanced Placement, International Baccalaureate, and End-
            of-Course Exams.
              c. Academic Support. This program specifically provides
            transitioning students with continuity across school systems,
            and opportunities to access and complete courses not available
            locally.
              d. Social/Emotional Support. This program addresses the
            unique needs of military dependents who may have a parent
            deployed in a war zone; have lost a parent or have one with a
            severe injury; have moved frequently during their early
            academic careers; or have encountered other situations not
            experienced by their non-military sponsored classmates. DODEA
            will work to increase the participation rates of students and
            their sponsors/parents in programs implemented to address the
            unique needs of military families (summer school in high
            deployment locations, after-school academic and co-curricular
            programs, et cetera) in partner schools and districts.
              e. Educator Placement. This program provides opportunities
            for DODEA educators to become employed in locations serving
            large military populations, thus sharing their expertise in
            working with military children and their families.
              f. President's Foreign Language Initiative. This program
            provides ongoing support for the President's Foreign Language
            Initiative where DODEA is working to increase the number and
            levels of foreign language proficiency of K-12 students in its
            schools. DODEA will provide its expertise to plan and guide
            implementation of foreign language programs (especially in
            Mandarin Chinese and Arabic) in LEAs.

        44. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Gates and General Pace, is the
    Department's intent for this to be an annual funding request, or is it
    only for fiscal year 2008?
        Dr. Gates and General Pace. Global rebasing, force restructuring,
    and unique requirements for military dependents will continue to affect
    DOD even after base closures occur. To accommodate the impact of these
    issues, this will be an annual funding request. The amount will vary as
    troops move and LEAs request assistance.

        45. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Gates and General Pace, is the
    Department considering other cost sharing initiatives to assist local
    school systems, and does the Department have additional plans for
    working collaboratively with other Federal agencies and local/State
    education agencies to ensure that military children have access to
    sufficient educational resources and facilities when they arrive at one
    of the new, highly impacted installations? If so, please explain the
    extent of these cost sharing initiatives and plans.
        Dr. Gates and General Pace. The Department encourages LEAs to work
    with the Department of Education which has information that enables
    communities to understand and access opportunities to expand their
    range of choices (public, private, and charter). These choices include
    funding and financing alternatives designed to supplement traditional
    construction financing arranged through county and State government
    resources. Federal programs provide excess property, funding to assist
    LEAs secure favorable rates on loans, and grants to assist LEAs with
    facility repair and refurbishment. Many States have already considered
    alternative funding for construction, along with alternatives to
    traditional school facilities, to contend with capacity requirements.
        Additionally, the Department is partnering with national
    associations representing State governments to obtain support. For
    example, the Department is working with the Council of State
    Governments to establish an interstate compact, which is designed to
    ameliorate differences in school systems ranging from differing age
    requirements to start kindergarten through varying requirements to
    graduate from high school.
        The Department recently hosted the ``Department of Defense
    Conference on Education for Military-Connected Communities'' for 17 of
    the most heavily impacted military communities to share information
    from a range of experts who have experience with educational
    facilities, financing, and funding. The after action report is
    available online at www.militarystudent.org.
        Finally, part of the plan to assist schools includes utilizing the
    expertise of DODEA, which has developed successful practices to educate
    military children. Congress extended the DODEA charter to share this
    expertise and experience with LEAs. Such resources include 20
    exportable component programs that include foreign language curriculum
    and support, access to virtual/distance learning technology
    capabilities and related applications, teacher training, and high
    quality teaching and learning programs.

                         president's state of the union
        46. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Gates and General Pace, in his
    State of the Union address, President Bush proposed the development of
    a Civilian Reserve Corps. DOD is already relying on the deployment of
    civilians to support contingency operations, and is looking at
    strategies to create a more expeditionary workforce. How is the support
    of DOD civilian deployment accounted for in the budget, and what
    policies and initiatives are in development to enhance the Department's
    ability to attract and mobilize the civilian workforce in support of
    the global war on terrorism?
        Dr. Gates and General Pace. The Department primarily funds support
    for civilian deployments through global war on terror. The Emergency
    Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the global war on terror,
    and Hurricane Recovery Act of 2006, contained a provision that
    authorized the Secretary of Defense to match the benefits offered to
    Defense civilian employees to those offered by the State Department for
    its employees in the Foreign Service. These benefits include a
    provision to provide a death benefit equivalent to 1 year of an
    employee's salary for those serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
    Department also offers its deploying civilians the option of enrolling
    in life insurance, specific training related to the area of deployment,
    and rest and recuperation trips out of contingency zones. We are
    grateful to Congress for continuing to waive the limitations on the
    amount of premium pay that may be paid to a Federal civilian employee
    while the employee performs work in an overseas location that is in the
    AOR of the Commander, U.S. CENTCOM, and in direct support of, or
    directly related to, a military operation or operation in response to a
    declared emergency.

        [Whereupon, at 1:30 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2008

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, MARCH 15, 2007

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                       POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:41 a.m. in room
    SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
    Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh, Pryor, Webb,
    McCaskill, Warner, Inhofe, Collins, Chambliss, Thune, and
    Martinez.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
    Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Gabriella Eisen,
    professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional
    staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member;
    Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J.
    Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Michael J.
    McCord, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan,
    counsel; and Michael J. Noblet, research assistant.
        Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
    Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
    staff member; Paul C. Hutton IV, research assistant; Gregory T.
    Kiley, professional staff member; Derek J. Maurer, minority
    counsel; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L.
    Niemeyer, professional staff member; Sean G. Stackley,
    professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff
    member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
        Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Kevin A.
    Cronin, and Micah H. Harris.
        Committee members' assistants present: Frederick M. Downey,
    assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to
    Senator Reed; Darcie Tokioka, assistant to Senator Akaka;
    Caroline Tess, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce,
    assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Todd Rosenblum, assistant to
    Senator Bayh; Lauren Henry, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon
    I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Stephen C. Hedger and
    Jason D. Rauch, assistants to Senator McCaskill; John A.
    Bonsell and Jeremy Shull, assistants to Senator Inhofe; Mark J.
    Winter, assistant to Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV,
    assistant to Senator Chambliss; Lindsey Neas, assistant to
    Senator Dole; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator
    Cornyn; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; and John L.
    Goetchius and Brian W. Walsh, assistants to Senator Martinez.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. Today Secretary
    Geren testifies for the first time in his new capacity as
    Acting Secretary of the Army. General Schoomaker testifies for
    probably the last time as Chief of Staff. I say probably
    because, although there are no current plans to invite you
    again before your change of command, General, we obviously
    don't know when issues affecting the Army today may necessitate
    your appearance before the committee before that change of
    command.
        We welcome you both. We again want to give special thanks
    to you, General, for your decades of service to the Nation and
    especially for your willingness to answer the call from
    retirement to lead the Army over the last 4 years during this
    time of war. We wish you the best of luck in all of your future
    endeavors and again our gratitude to you for your special
    service coming out of retirement.
        We also want to welcome our visiting soldiers, representing
    the Active Army, the Army Reserve, and the National Guard, and
    we thank you for your service and all those that you represent
    in uniform.
        This is indeed an Army at war. The Army has been engaged in
    Afghanistan for over 5 years, will soon be entering its fifth
    year of war in Iraq. None of the administration's rosier
    predictions have come true, I am afraid, but with this surge
    the number of soldiers engaged in Iraq will approach previously
    high level marks. Some Army units are on or entering their
    third year of Afghanistan or Iraq service and some individual
    soldiers are on their fourth.
        While individual Americans may differ in their opinions
    about these operations, especially about Iraq, all Americans
    recognize and honor the bravery, the self-sacrifice, the
    devotion to duty of our soldiers and their families, indeed
    that of all of our military personnel and their families. For
    those of us in Congress, no matter how we voted on authorizing
    the war, whether we have been critics or supporters of the
    handling of the war, we are determined to see that our troops
    and their families are supported in every possible way. That
    determination unifies this Nation, unifies Congress. We're
    going to support our troops and their families.
        We were dismayed to learn that the Army did not meet its
    obligation to provide for the proper care of injured and
    wounded soldiers recuperating at Walter Reed Army Medical
    Center. The concerns expressed by the soldiers in medical hold
    and holdover status at Walter Reed are more than about physical
    conditions of the buildings. The bureaucracy is often mind-
    numbing in its roadblocks and delays. For example, the Army's
    physical disability evaluation process is in disarray. Soldiers
    are frustrated because they don't understand the process, they
    don't understand why it takes months and months to get a
    disability rating, they don't understand why their disability
    ratings are so low when compared to disability ratings awarded
    by the Veterans Administration (VA).
        The recent Army Inspector General (IG) report describes a
    system which is dysfunctional, does not clearly give our
    wounded soldiers the treatment that they deserve, and which our
    laws require. We are committed to shaking up this system so
    that our soldiers will get a fair and a prompt disability
    rating.
        The heaviest burden in this war has fallen on the Army.
    Although it appeared somewhat fashionable to question the
    relevance of ground forces prior to September 11, that can
    hardly be the case now. The reality of warfare in the 21st
    century demands both the high intensity force on force combat
    as characterized in the early weeks of the Iraq war and the
    grinding, all-encompassing stability and support and
    counterinsurgency operations of the last few years.
        Almost all types of warfare require, in Army parlance,
    boots on the ground. They require an Army that is optimally
    organized, trained, and equipped for anything we might ask it
    to do. The challenge for the Army, for this Nation, and for
    this Congress is sustaining an Army fully engaged in current
    operations while also modernizing and transforming that Army to
    meet future threats. This hearing will help us understand what
    needs to be done to ensure an Army that is ready for all of its
    potential missions, both today and in the future.
        With respect to current operations, in order to sustain the
    necessary higher readiness levels in our deployed forces the
    readiness of our non-deployed forces has declined. Most of
    those units are not ready, the non-deployed force units.
    Consequently, getting these units fully equipped and trained
    for their rotation to Iraq or Afghanistan or other places is
    that much more difficult and risky. It substantially increases
    the risk that this Nation faces should those forces be required
    to respond to other full-spectrum requirements of the National
    Military Strategy.
        The President's plan to plus-up U.S. forces in Iraq with an
    additional five Army brigade combat teams (BCTs) and a still-
    evolving combat support commitment puts pressure on an already
    strained readiness situation. This morning we look forward to
    an update on the preparation of this plus-up force so that we
    can be assured that these units will be fully trained and fully
    equipped before they deploy.
        Long before the President announced his new strategy in
    Iraq, military leaders raised questions about the Nation's
    readiness to deal with other contingencies in a world which has
    many dangers and uncertainties. In testimony to this committee
    just last month, General Schoomaker was direct in his concern
    for the strategic depth of our Army and its readiness. He was
    clear in his apprehensions about the short- and long-term risks
    resulting from the lower readiness levels of our non-deployed
    forces.
        In a marked change of position for the Defense Department,
    the Army is proposing this year to increase its Active Duty end
    strength by 65,000 soldiers to 547,000 over the next 5 years.
    As we enter year 5 of the Iraq war, the proposed increases come
    late and are substantially larger than increases proposed by
    Senators on this committee over the past several years,
    proposals that the Defense Department previously opposed.
        We all understand the stress on our forces in Iraq, but few
    of these proposed additional soldiers, if any, would be trained
    and ready in time to help relieve that stress. Therefore it is
    important that we understand why additional personnel of this
    magnitude are needed in the long-term when that need was not
    foreseen by the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that
    rejected such force increases. How did the Army arrive at
    547,000 as the appropriate size of its Active Force? Do these
    numbers reflect more what can be achieved rather than what
    should be achieved? Is the Department of Defense (DOD)
    committed to funding this proposed increase or does the Army
    intend to identify offsets within its own budget to grow the
    additional forces and, if so, at what cost to transformation,
    modernization, and future readiness?
        The administration's proposal to increase the permanent end
    strength and structure of the Army is welcome, although late.
    Had we started in earnest to grow the Army even 4 years ago,
    our forces today would be less stressed and more ready.
        We must guard against merely creating a larger version of a
    less ready force. Army plans for expansion must be
    comprehensive, detailed, and fully resourced. Congress must
    understand what is needed to bring our ground forces to the
    levels of strength and readiness necessary to avoid the
    unacceptable risks and readiness shortfalls that exist today
    and to modernize our Army to meet our national security
    requirements into the future.
        Finally, through this hearing we would like to know the
    impact of the Iraq surge on the Army, including the National
    Guard and Reserve.
        Senator Warner.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I
    will put a statement in this morning's record on behalf of the
    ranking member, Senator McCain.
        [The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain
        Thank you, Chairman Levin. I join you in welcoming our witnesses
    here today.
        Secretary Geren, welcome. You have been in this job for only a few
    days, but I would like to commend you on your years in public service
    that date to 1989, when you took a seat in the United States House of
    Representatives, representing the 12th Congressional District in Texas,
    for 4 terms. After returning to the private sector, you joined the
    Department of Defense in September 2001 to serve as Special Assistant
    to the Defense Secretary. In July 2005, President Bush appointed you as
    the Acting Secretary of the Air Force until November 2005 and you
    assumed the post as Under Secretary of the Army in February 2006.
        Mr. Chairman, I would particularly like to welcome General
    Schoomaker--to what will likely be his last appearance before the
    committee.
        General Schoomaker, I join my colleagues in recognizing decades of
    selfless service that started at the end of the Vietnam War and
    included participation in Operation Desert One in Iran; Urgent Fury in
    Grenada; Just Cause in Panama; Desert Storm in Southwest Asia; Uphold
    Democracy in Haiti; and many other worldwide joint contingency
    operations as a commander of Special Forces units. I would like to
    principally acknowledge your last assignment as the 35th Chief of Staff
    of the Army. Your return to Active Duty from retirement was a
    remarkable act of selfless service and devotion to duty. Our Nation has
    benefited greatly from your professionalism, especially during one of
    the most challenging chapters in the history of this country. In times
    of enormous uncertainty and high operational tempo, you stayed focus on
    the mission and guided the Army with a steady hand.
        America has been engaged in this long war against global extremists
    since the September 11 attacks, and then in combat operations, first
    against the Taliban beginning in October 2001, and then in a military
    campaign to oust Saddam in March 2003. It has been a joint service
    endeavor from the start, but the Army, Marine Corps, and our special
    forces who have borne a larger share of the combat. Since September 11,
    over 750,000 Active, Guard, and Reserve soldiers have been, at one
    time, deployed overseas in support of the war on terror, primarily in
    the Central Command area of operations. They are all volunteers who
    have served unselfishly and with great bravery, distinction, and
    devotion to duty.
        While the Army is fighting two land campaigns, it must also
    transform its structure and capabilities to meet future challenges;
    sustain the All-Volunteer Force; and cope effectively with the
    increasing level of stress that our soldiers and their families are
    weathering. We have a great Army--but, it has been under enormous
    strain. General Schoomaker, in December 2006, in testimony before the
    Commission on the National Guard and Reserves you warned that the
    Active-Duty Army ``will break'' under the strain of today's war-zone
    rotations. This is an area of vital concern to the committee.
        At today's hearing, the witnesses will be asked about: the Army's
    readiness; the proposed growth in the Army end strength; Army progress
    towards modular conversion; balancing the current structure between the
    Active and Reserve Forces; mobilization policies; the Army's request
    for multi-procurement authority for the Army Chinook helicopter, Abrams
    tanks, and Bradley upgrades; the Army's commitment to resource the
    National Guard's role as an operational force and the States' homeland
    defense and civil support missions; the Future Combat Systems program;
    the investment in Army aircraft; and Army plans to remedy conditions
    found to exist in the Army Medical Command.
        In the fiscal year 2008 budget request of $130 billion, the Army,
    along with the other Services, presented long lists of priorities that
    were left without funding. I am concerned about the size of the
    unfunded requirements lists which were submitted with the fiscal year
    2008 budget. The Army's fiscal year 2008 budget request is $20 billion
    more than the 2007 request, and the fiscal year 2007 supplemental
    request increased by $49 billion, and yet the Army's 2008 unfunded
    requirements list increased by almost $3 billion.
        In closing, people are the Army's most valuable resource. More than
    30 years ago, General Creighton Abrams, the 26th Chief of Staff of the
    Army, said, ``The Army is people.'' These are America's sons and
    daughters who, each and every day, put themselves in harm's way
    prosecuting the long war against global extremists--away from those
    they love and often on multiple tours. Finally, I would like to
    recognize, with our most sincere gratitude, the Army families who have
    sacrificed so much, especially those who have lost loved ones, and
    those who are caring for those wounded in service to our Nation.
        I look forward to today's testimony. Senator Levin.

        Senator Warner. I would just like to add my personal
    observations here, first to our long-time associate here,
    Secretary Geren. My recollection is you came to the DOD 6 years
    ago; would that be correct?
        Mr. Geren. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. In that period of time you have had six
    different jobs, is that right?
        Mr. Geren. Just four, sir.
        Senator Warner. Four. You have currently been in the Army
    secretariat as Under Secretary now for a year and we are
    fortunate that you are available to take on this assignment as
    the acting until such time as the Secretary and the President
    make their determination for a successor. Now, I would hope
    that they would consider you among the candidates. I think it
    would be well deserving. I just offer that because you bring an
    unusual experience of having been a part of the Congress of the
    United States, which, as we can see by this hearing this
    morning, an understanding of Congress and an ability to work
    with them, which you have displayed in all of your assignments,
    is very, very key to the position of being a Service Secretary.
        So I wish you well, my good friend.
        Mr. Geren. Thank you, sir. I appreciate your kind words.
        Senator Warner. General Schoomaker, my distinguished
    colleague here, the chairman, has reviewed your record, but I
    would just like to add. It is extraordinary. You joined the
    Army in the closing period of Vietnam, and you and I have
    talked about that period and your recollections of the Army at
    that time and how everything you have done is to avoid any
    repetition of what you witnessed in that very stressful
    situation post-Vietnam when transitioning from the draft to the
    All-Volunteer Army and how hard you have fought to keep the
    All-Volunteer Army concept viable and working, I can say I
    think you have achieved in large measure.
        But in that period since the closing year of the Vietnam
    War when you joined the United States Army, you participated in
    Operation Desert 1 in Iran, Urgent Fury--these are military
    combat operations--Urgent Fury in Grenada, Just Cause in
    Panama, Desert Storm in Southwest Asia, Uphold Democracy in
    Haiti, and many other worldwide joint contingency operations as
    commander of Special Forces units; and now your last
    assignment, as the 35th Chief of Staff of the United States
    Army. I would say without reservation, well done, sir.
        Now, in the final weeks that you have or whatever period it
    may be, we are going to have to look to you to give us the
    guidance here in Congress to make sure that we can continue the
    modernization of the Army and the transformation initiated on
    your watch.
        I have always been an admirer of the force with which you
    speak and you have spoken out very forcefully on these
    situations. Let me call your attention to December 2006, just
    last December, testimony before the Commission on the National
    Guard and Reserves. You warned that the Active-Duty Army,
    ``will break,'' under the strain of today's war zone rotations.
        This is an area of vital concern to this committee and I
    hope today you will continue without reservation to express
    your personal opinions. Sometimes we get lost in all these
    carefully prepared statements by staff. No disrespect to staff,
    but every now and then when you just look us straight in the
    eye and tell us as it is, drawing on all of that incredible
    experience that you have rendered in uniform on behalf of the
    United States Army and this Nation. Well done, sir.
        General Schoomaker. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner, so much.
        Secretary Geren.

        STATEMENT OF HON. PRESTON M. ``PETE'' GEREN III, ACTING
                         SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

        Mr. Geren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, and
    members of the committee. It is truly an honor to be before you
    today representing your United States Army.
        Senator, if I could, I am here to talk about our budget and
    our posture statement, but I would like to speak to the Walter
    Reed issue. You raised it in your remarks. You said the
    response of Congress was dismay. I can assure you in the Army
    the dismay was profound. Part of the Army ethos is we will
    never leave a fallen comrade. That is part of the heart and
    soul of every soldier in uniform and every civilian that serves
    in the Army, and what happened at Walter Reed violated that
    principle, and I can assure you that this Army is committed to
    making sure that it does not happen again and we are taking
    steps to ensure that it does not.
        I would like to talk about that in a little more detail,
    though. There is really, the issue that brought some of the
    problems to light, which was a facilities and the treatment of
    one outpatient area, but as we have studied this, in fact as we
    studied it over the past year, we have learned that the system
    has need of great reform, as you noted in your remarks.
        But in order to address the immediate challenges, I would
    like to tell you what we have done. The infamous Building 18,
    there is not a single soldier left in Building 18. Every one of
    those soldiers has been moved out to the Abrams Barracks on the
    Walter Reed campus. Those are barracks that are appropriate to
    serve these fine soldiers. They are up-to-date, they are
    modern. They have computers in them. They have telephones,
    televisions in them, and they are getting the treatment that
    they deserve in those quarters.
        We have also taken some steps and I think the most
    important step we have taken is personnel changes, new
    leadership at Walter Reed, leadership that is charged and feels
    deeply this responsibility and going to act on it. We happen to
    have another General Schoomaker out there, General Eric
    Schoomaker, the Chief's brother. He was appointed in the
    position as commander of Walter Reed on a Friday afternoon. He
    was there within hours on the ground with his command sergeant
    major, and she went to every single room where these soldiers
    were going to be quartered. That kind of commitment to these
    soldiers was evidenced from the very beginning.
        We have also created a new office that did not exist
    before. It is a brigadier general. It is a deputy commanding
    general at Walter Reed, and this general's job is going to be
    the bureaucracy-buster. In your opening remarks you alluded to
    the mind-numbing bureaucracy that so many of these soldiers are
    trapped in. I agree with you, and the job of this general--he
    is a one-star general, he is a combat veteran. He took this job
    with enthusiasm. In fact, he was there the next morning after
    he was notified of his assignment and he is working his full-
    time deployment to Walter Reed right now. But he shares your
    commitment and he will be our bureaucracy-buster.
        We have also established a new Wounded Warrior Transition
    Brigade, an O-6 colonel in charge of it, and it has a command
    sergeant major by the name of Sergeant Major Hartless. He
    happens to be a combat veteran himself, a severely wounded
    veteran. He was at Walter Reed and I can tell you from day one
    his commitment to these soldiers was demonstrated and
    heartfelt, and he is going to be their advocate. He is going to
    work with them and make sure that they have the leadership they
    deserve.
        Long-term, we are creating a one-stop soldier family and
    assistance center out there to make sure a soldier knows where
    to go and where he can get the assistance he deserves. We are
    creating a wounded warrior and family hotline that will be up
    and operational March 19, 2007, and this is going to come into
    the Army headquarters; it is not going to be staffed at a low
    level. This is going to come up, so we make sure that we hear
    from the grassroots people who can get something done.
        We have a team of experts, and Vice Chief of Staff General
    Richard A. Cody, USA, is heading up an action plan--a team of
    experts that is going to every single major medical facility,
    going to report back to the Vice Chief of Staff and to me
    within 30 days. We have a similar team that is going to examine
    all the community-based health care organizations that are out
    there serving our Reserve component soldiers who are assigned
    to recover and rehabilitate closer to their homes. The Vice
    Chief of Staff has a teleconferencing initiative where he meets
    by secure video teleconferencing system with the hospital
    commanders regularly, hears what their needs are, and we are
    creating a formal patient advocacy program.
        You also mentioned the DOD IG. The IG began his work a year
    ago, his report very timely, and the Army leadership is
    embracing that report and we are working to update the Army
    regulations. As he has noted there, the timeliness standards
    were not up to standard. Training standards needed updating,
    quality controls, automated systems. I have already met with
    Major General Gale S. Pollock, USA, Acting Surgeon General, and
    this is her top priority and she is working with that, and the
    IG is going to remain engaged to make sure we get it done.
        We also have the issue that has come up and some of your
    colleagues have raised, appropriate and timely pay to these
    wounded warriors. We are reviewing that system and making sure
    we do everything we can to make sure they get paid on time and
    get the benefits they deserve.
        Senator, again the dismay that we experience as an Army,
    the pain that this institution felt when we let wounded
    warriors down, I can assure you is profound, it is heartfelt,
    and our soldiers are moving out. There are going to be long-
    term fixes proposed. Congress will be working these.
    Legislation has already been proposed. The President has
    proposed commissions under the able leadership of former
    Senator Robert J. Dole, and former Secretary of Health and
    Human Services, Donna E. Shalala.
        We have internal investigations under way. We have to look
    at the overall system. But I can assure you we are not waiting
    on those policy decisions. We are moving out to the extent we
    can and we are going to be a part of the long-term solution as
    well.
        Two weeks ago the last combat veteran of World War I died.
    He was 109 years old. That gives you a sense of the kind of
    challenge we have ahead of us. We live longer today than we did
    then. We have severely-wounded warriors that are surviving
    wounds they would not have survived in the past, and we as a
    Nation have to make up our minds that we are going to step up
    and meet their needs, and I can assure you your Army is
    committed to doing our part.
        Let me turn now to the posture statement. Our budget lives
    up, I believe, to our commitment to soldiers and their
    families. They are our priority. I know they are this
    committee's priority. Let me say at the beginning, thank you
    for the support you have given the Army over the decades, over
    the centuries frankly. The soldier has no better friend than
    this committee and we thank you for that.
        Our top priority is meeting the needs of the soldiers and
    their families. There are 130,000 soldiers in combat, soon to
    be 150,000. They are the best-trained, best-led, best-equipped
    soldiers we have ever put in the field, and this budget is
    going to ensure that we continue to be able to provide that
    kind of combat-trained soldier in the field.
        This budget also assures that we are going to have a
    quality of life for our soldiers that matches the quality of
    their service. This has a 3 percent pay raise in it. It has
    base operating support and facilities sustainment, restoration,
    and modernization at 90 percent.
        Four years ago, the operating account for the facilities
    was 40 percent lower than it is now. We are making a commitment
    to soldiers and their families to make sure that they have the
    quality of life that they deserve.
        We are putting a heavy burden on the soldiers, it is well
    known, but a heavier burden on the families, and all of you who
    work so closely with our soldiers and their families, you
    appreciate the stress on those families, and this investment is
    an investment in those families.
        The stress on the force is obviously the war. But even
    without the war this is an extraordinarily busy Army. We are
    working through the Active component and the Reserve component
    rebalancing. We are undertaking the modularity initiative. We
    are adding end strength, 65,000 in the Active, 8,000 in the
    Reserve, and 1,000 in the Guard. The reset and modernization
    and business transformation--we are asking a lot of our
    soldiers and families, and this budget makes those investments.
        Another point that I would like to make is this budget
    represents an investment in the total force, one Army, Active,
    Guard, and Reserve. They train as one and they fight as one.
    Our budget from 2005 to 2013 has a $36 billion investment in
    the Guard equipment, $36 billion, unprecedented. Sixty-five
    percent of all of our new trucks are going to the Guard. Forty
    percent of our new helicopters are going to the Guard and
    Reserve. The Guard and Reserve are no longer part of the
    strategic Reserve. The Guard and Reserve are part of the
    operational force and this budget and this Program Objective
    Memorandum (POM) reflects that.
        Force protection. This makes a continuing investment in
    force protection and we commend this committee for its
    leadership in this area, but this continues to ensure that we
    have the best equipped and best protected soldiers.
        Let me mention one thing in closing. We have a supplemental
    and Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) funding before you
    today to communicate to you the urgency of moving that
    supplemental and moving that BRAC funding on time. We
    experienced last summer a delay and the impact on soldiers and
    their families and our training opportunities was serious. I
    just urge Congress to help us meet our financing needs by
    getting our supplemental to the President, to us, by late
    April.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity to
    address the committee and I stand ready to answer questions.
    Pardon me, let me say one thing about my colleague to the left.
    There is little I could add to what you and Senator Warner said
    about Pete Schoomaker. But I would say, having worked with him
    fairly closely for the last couple years, he is a leader of
    extraordinary ability. I think that when history looks at the
    last 4 years that he served it will note that Pete Schoomaker
    was one of the great leaders in our United States Army. The
    work before this, how he helped make the Special Forces that we
    have today and how he has transformed the force right now--
    extraordinary leader.
        Yesterday Pete Schoomaker said to me, he recalled a country
    music song. He said: I would rather have 10 minutes in the
    saddle than a lifetime in the stands. Well, he has had a
    lifetime in the saddle and he claims that he is heading for the
    stands now. I do not believe it. I will believe it when he sees
    it--when we all see it.
        Pete Schoomaker, thank you for your service to our Army.
    Thank you for your service to our soldiers. A great American.
    Thank you very much, chief.
        [The 2007 Army Posture Statement follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman Levin. Secretary, thank you so much for your
    commitment to the troops that you laid out relative to the
    Walter Reed, so-called, type problem, which is much broader
    than Walter Reed, for your other comments about the needs of
    the Army, and for your comments about General Schoomaker. Thank
    you for all of that.
        General Schoomaker.

      STATEMENT OF GEN PETER J. SCHOOMAKER, USA, CHIEF OF STAFF,
    UNITED STATES ARMY; ACCOMPANIED BY LTG JAMES J. LOVELACE, USA,
     DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY; LTG CLYDE A. VAUGHN, ARNG,
       DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD; LTG JACK C. STULTZ, USAR,
    COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY RESERVE COMMAND; AND LTC COLL S.
       HADDON, USA, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OPERATIONS PROGRAM MANAGER,
               FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS, BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

        General Schoomaker. Sir, thank you very much. Mr. Chairman,
    distinguished members of the committee: Chairman Levin, thanks
    very much for your kind words. Pete, thanks very much. I could
    not be prouder of the United States Army and the young men and
    women that are in it, and it has been a distinct privilege to
    be able to be associated once again with these young people.
        I am not going to provide a long opening statement because
    I want to introduce these soldiers, but also because I would
    like to associate myself officially with your statement that
    you just read. I think that I could not make a better opening
    statement than the one that you just did and I hope that we
    continue to achieve the support out of this committee that we
    have enjoyed over the 4 years of my tenure, because I think it
    is important.
        I would like to introduce these three soldiers that
    represent our young men and women. They do represent each of
    the components. The first one is Staff Sergeant David W. Hatton
    from Macon, Georgia. He is a member of the Georgia Army
    National Guard. He deployed to Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom
    3 as a military police squad leader in the headquarters company
    of the 48th BCT serving out of Camp Stryker in Baghdad.
        Staff Sergeant Hatton and his squad provided security for
    explosive ordnance disposal personnel for destroying improvised
    explosive devices (IEDs) detected by patrols, and on one such
    mission Staff Sergeant Hatton was injured in an IED strike.
    Although injured, he continued to set the example for courage
    in the face of adversity as he resumed leading his squad and
    was then given added responsibility for providing security for
    other logistics convoys delivering supplies to the forward
    operations base (FOBs) and camps throughout Iraq.
        Staff Sergeant Hatton conducted more than 250 combat
    patrols from May 2005 through May 2006, and for his leadership
    and courage he has been awarded the Purple Heart Medal, the
    Bronz Star Medal, and the Army Commendation Medal with the V
    Device for Valor. Staff Sergeant Hatton. [Applause.]
        From our Army Reserve, Sergeant First Class Robert Groff. A
    native of Bartonville, Illinois, he currently works as a
    recruiter in Peoria, Illinois. As a soldier on Active, Guard,
    or Reserve status, Sergeant First Class Groff also represents a
    critical aspect of what our Reserve component soldiers provide,
    full-time support to enable our Guard and Reserve units to
    sustain a high operational tempo to support both their
    mobilization and recruiting activities.
        I have invited Sergeant First Class Groff to be here today
    because from February 2004 through February 2005 he served as a
    platoon sergeant in the 724th Transportation Company during
    Operation Iraqi Freedom 2. On 9 April 2004, Sergeant First
    Class Groff was the assistant commander for a critical fuel
    convoy. The ground convoy consisted of 42 personnel and 26
    vehicles, manned largely by civilian drivers, with soldiers
    providing security and command and control. Of the 26 vehicles,
    17 were fuel tankers, each loaded with 7,500 gallons of JP-8
    jet fuel.
        Sergeant First Class Groff was responsible to ensure that
    the convoy stayed together and that each vehicle made the
    proper turns. Although inherently dangerous, the convoy should
    have been a routine mission. Instead it became one of the
    largest enemy ambushes in the history of Operation Iraqi
    Freedom. Over a 4.5 mile stretch of the convoy route, an enemy
    force of 200 to 300 insurgents armed with small arms, heavy
    machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and mortars,
    augmented by IEDs along the street, sat waiting for the convoy
    to enter into the kill zone.
        Within minutes, the convoy was ambushed and the convoy
    commander was among the first casualties, leaving Sergeant
    First Class Groff in charge and at the rear of a now very
    intense firefight. Several vehicles were disabled or destroyed,
    including a number of fuel tankers, leaving the vehicle crews
    and passengers stranded in the kill zone.
        Sergeant First Class Groff acted quickly and decisively,
    ordering his driver to enter the kill zone and move to the
    front of the convoy. He then exposed himself to further danger
    by proceeding slowly in order to check the disabled and burning
    vehicles for personnel left behind. Under fire, he proceeded to
    extract ten personnel, two soldiers and eight civilians, who
    would have otherwise been killed or captured by an overwhelming
    enemy force.
        As a result of his actions, he was awarded the Bronze Star
    Medal with V Device for Valor. However, I am told that an
    official effort is under way to have his Bronze Star upgraded
    to the Silver Star. [Applause.]
        Finally, Sergeant Christopher Fernandez, a native of
    Tucson, Arizona, an Active Duty soldier, an artilleryman
    assigned to the fires brigade of the Fourth Infantry Division.
    Sergeant Fernandez was deployed most recently as the
    noncommissioned officer (NCO) in charge of the personnel
    security detachment responsible for protecting the command
    group.
        In that role, he led more than 200 highly successful escort
    missions in the Multi-National Division Bravo area of
    operations. Like many of our soldiers, Sergeant Fernandez owes
    much of his knowledge to previous training and real life
    experience. Nearly 3 years ago, then Private Fernandez played a
    pivotal role in protecting the lives of his fellow First
    Cavalry Division soldiers when their convoy was suddenly and
    violently struck by an IED and immediately came under attack by
    small arms and automatic weapons.
        On the night of 5 May 2004, the three-vehicle convoy with
    soldiers from the 21st Field Artillery was returning to base
    after a night of dismounted patrols in a Baghdad neighborhood.
    The blast from the IED left two of the convoy's three vehicles
    disabled in the kill zone. They were dangerously exposed and
    receiving heavy volumes of enemy fire.
        With complete disregard for his own safety and in order to
    protect the occupants of the disabled vehicles and prevent the
    enemy from employing RPGs, Private Fernandez took up an
    unprotected position in front of his vehicle. He provided
    suppressive fires with the squad automatic weapon. After
    expending all of his ammunition and without prompting or
    hesitation, Private Fernandez ran through the enemy fire to
    retrieve a second machine gun from one of the disabled
    vehicles. He then shouldered the machine gun and, despite the
    fact that it did not have protective hand rails because it was
    a vehicle-mounted machine gun, he continued firing. Private
    Fernandez eventually suffered burns to his hands from the
    machine gun's unguarded barrel, but his efforts allowed the
    casualty recovery team to move the wounded to an operational
    vehicle without further loss of life.
        For his heroic and selfless deeds that night, Sergeant
    Fernandez was awarded the Silver Star Medal and the Combat
    Action Badge. He has subsequently earned the Bronze Star Medal.
    However, the thing that he would probably tell you he is most
    proud of is the work that he does in San Antonio in the Fort
    Hood community, where he actively volunteers to serve our
    wounded warriors and their families. [Applause.]
        These three soldiers epitomize why I am so absolutely proud
    of the young men and women that serve with us.
        I would like to very quickly show some things that our
    Future Combat System (FCS) is now providing, spinouts, to help
    these soldiers as they put their boots on the ground. If you
    will notice the screen up here, we will run the little robot
    out. This robot represents--we have several hundred of these
    deployed right now in Iraq. These are the kind of things you
    can throw into a building, run down into a cave, run along a
    route, find wires. As you can see, it has a camera on it. Turn
    it around. It can climb stairs with a 12-inch rise.
        These in fact are in Iraq today and are part of the
    spinouts that we are doing out of our FCS program. Turn that
    thing around to show the members.
        Chairman Levin. You said this can climb stairs?
        General Schoomaker. It can climb stairs with a 12-inch
    rise. There is a larger version of this that we have several
    hundred of them now in Iraq.
        Then on the table over here to my left--and what is
    interesting is, because of the communications systems now that
    we have and because we are building the FCS around a very
    robust transport system, communications, information system,
    all of this is available all the way from the top of the chain
    all the way down to the lowest tactical level in terms of these
    pictures and the other sensors.
        The same is true with these unattended ground sensors on my
    left here. These sensors also connect into the same bandwidth
    and they provide acoustic or seismic or aural kinds of sensors,
    to include infrared, electro-optical, and the rest, and also
    allow us now to cover ground, where you do not have to put
    soldiers on the ground and you can watch things, like where
    people may be implanting IEDs or where you have cleared a piece
    of urban terrain and need to watch it and all this.
        Again, this is part of this network that we are building
    and part of the spinouts. It is in the first spinout, as a
    matter of fact, of our FCS.
        Finally, you see this little thing that looks like a beer
    can down here. You start it like you would start a lawnmower,
    but that thing is an unattended aerial vehicle that a soldier
    can carry. That thing will fly and hover, so that you can hover
    up on top of a building or you can hover in a space and stare
    at things.
        Chairman Levin. Which are you pointing to now, because
    there is a number of items there.
        Senator Warner. It is that rather large beer can that he
    referred to.
        Chairman Levin. Yes, because I never saw a beer can that
    looked quite like that. I have seen a few in my life, too.
    [Laughter.]
        General Schoomaker. Maybe it is more like a beer mug. But
    you saw he picked it up with one hand and carried it out there.
        Chairman Levin. That flies? That can fly and it is mobile,
    easily carried?
        General Schoomaker. This thing can be carried with a
    soldier. He starts it and it will fly and hover. So you can sit
    and stare at something, which is a lot different than having to
    orchestrate orbits. Again, there is a larger version of this as
    well that of course has more station time, and you can put all
    kinds of sensors on it. You can also put on there such things
    that, like laser designation. It has global position system on
    it. So you can direct fires, precision fires with this kind of
    thing.
        Chairman Levin. Is that deployed now?
        General Schoomaker. This will be. This will be deployed.
        There are 50 units with the 25th Infantry Division and they
    will be deploying with these things. They will be the first
    unit that will deploy with this level of unmanned aerial
    vehicle (UAV).
        Mr. Geren. The signal comes out and hooks up into the
    network, so it does not just go to a single soldier; all levels
    will be able to use it. It is situational awareness all the way
    from the company level up to the brigade level.
        General Schoomaker. So all of these enter the network and
    all of them are available. This is what now allows very agile
    units with a great deal of precision, a great deal of
    lethality, to now operate in this irregular warfare
    environment. This is not Cold War stuff. This is stuff that
    takes a very lethal force and extends it into the irregular
    warfare arena in a way that is very, very important to us.
        So when people talk about the FCS and we tell them that the
    most important things we are doing in that is this
    communications system that is associated with it and the
    spinouts of technology that we are putting on our current
    units--this is not something way down the road. This is
    something that is helping our units today as we transform the
    Army.
        So I wanted to show that because it is this kind of
    technology coupled with these kinds of young men and women that
    make such a difference and are so important as we go forward in
    the future.
        So with that, sir, I would like to close. Again, I thank
    you very, very much for your kind words. The one thing I would
    like to say about the Walter Reed situation that needs to be
    reinforced is that the medical professionals associated in Army
    medicine, we must never forget that these are great heroes out
    there and that they are performing every day in ways that--I am
    talking about the doctors and the nurses and the clinical
    technicians that are taking care of our wounded warriors. I
    would hope that as we fix the system, which needs to be fixed,
    that we recognize that these people 24-7 are operating and
    performing heroic efforts in support of our soldiers.
        So thank you very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, General.
        Senator Warner. One question on these. Chief, what is the
    vulnerability and the battlefield survivability of these units?
    You must have some estimate of that.
        General Schoomaker. These things basically can be
    destroyed. They are throw-away kinds of things. They are not
    armored. Their survivability has to do with the ability to
    maneuver them and to hide them and this kind of thing. For
    instance, these sensors, these are all prototype sensors, but
    these would all be camouflaged, some of them being fake rocks
    and trees and things like that.
        Chairman Levin. The UAV, though, is not a prototype. That
    is being deployed.
        General Schoomaker. These are prototypes.
        Chairman Levin. Okay.
        General, thank you, and again thank you for introducing the
    soldiers. We share your pride in them. We share your gratitude
    for their work, their bravery, their patriotism. They
    represent, of course, their own courage, but as well the
    courage of their buddies, their families that support them. I
    know that everybody in the country who could have heard just
    about what your heroics were would join that applause that you
    received from the committee. So we thank you. We join your
    Chief in thanking you.
        Secretary Geren, on the Army--we will have 8-minute rounds,
    by the way.
        The Army posture statement points out that the defense
    budget allocation by Service has changed very little over time,
    with the Air Force and the Navy around 30 percent and the Army
    around 25 percent. Since the Army is manpower intensive and
    personnel costs eat up a large part of its budget, only 25
    percent of the Army's budget goes toward research, development,
    and acquisition, as compared to 38 percent in the Navy and 43
    percent in the Air Force.
        The Army's overall share of the DOD investment dollar is
    only 17 percent as compared to 33 percent for the Navy and 35
    percent for the Air Force. As a result, the Army has been
    unable to invest in capabilities that are needed to sustain a
    rising operational tempo and to prepare for emerging threats.
    That is according to the Army posture statement.
        Now, Secretary Geren, have you discussed this with the
    Secretary of Defense, this problem? If so, what is his
    response?
        Mr. Geren. Sir, over the last year we have been working
    with the Secretary of Defense and working with the Office of
    Management and Budget and working hand-in-glove on developing
    the Army budget. It has been a process that has involved a good
    deal of give and take. The percentages are important, but we
    are very manpower intensive, obviously, and so we are always
    going to have a disproportionate share of our budget in
    manpower. But the Secretary certainly understands our need for
    modernization and supports the FCS, which is our primary
    modernization investment.
        Over the POM we are going to be able to make the investment
    in FCS and in our modernization that our plan requires. The
    readiness issues and many of the other investments, we have to
    look more broadly at the benefit to the Army. But we are
    rebalancing the active component and the Reserve component. We
    are moving people from low demand positions to high demand
    positions. We are doing a better job of utilizing the Guard and
    Reserve. We are making a greater investment in the Guard and
    Reserve.
        So overall we are, the Army is stepping up to meet the
    challenge. But we understand that in time of war particularly
    the difficulty of making the modernization investment. Over the
    history of this country, we often have neglected modernization
    in time of war. We are trying to make sure we do not make that
    mistake this time, sir.
        Chairman Levin. There is a discrepancy here which your own
    posture statement points out. General, have you talked about
    the specific effects of that funding discrepancy with the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and what does he say about it? How
    will this discrepancy be addressed?
        General Schoomaker. Yes, sir, I have. I have testified over
    the last several years in terms of my concerns about our
    funding profiles. My personal belief is the Nation can afford
    to raise the top line of defense and that we should not do this
    on the backs of the Navy and the Air Force. That is exactly the
    discussion I have had with the other chiefs.
        We need a strong Navy and Air Force and Marine Corps. But I
    do believe the Army has been traditionally underfunded and that
    we find ourself always trying to catch up. It is just the way
    that it works.
        My view has been that this is not just about dollars; it is
    about readiness. I know that you have had several readiness
    hearings and I have personally spoken with you and the ranking
    member about my readiness concerns and strategic depth. But I
    have had those conversations in spades with the Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense, both the previous
    Secretary of Defense and the current one.
        Chairman Levin. General, you submitted a list of unfunded
    requirements which total over $10 billion. The top two unfunded
    requirements in your 2008 list are $2.25 billion for mine-
    resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) armored vehicles and $207
    million for aviation survivability equipment. I am just
    wondering whether or not those items were requested for your
    budget and did the Office of the Secretary of Defense turn them
    down, and if so why?
        General Schoomaker. The MRAP vehicle, that requirement came
    in after the budget was closed and so it was included--we asked
    for it--in the supplemental.
        Chairman Levin. It is in the supplemental?
        General Schoomaker. We did, we asked for it in the
    supplemental.
        Chairman Levin. The other one?
        General Schoomaker. We are funded only partially in the
    supplemental for that. The aircraft survivability equipment is
    part of the effort that we had in the Comanche cancellation and
    what we are asking for there is to accelerate it. The answer is
    yes, we did request that.
        Mr. Geren. Sir, if I can just make sure we are clear on
    that. In the supplemental we have approximately $770 million
    requested for the MRAPs, for 700 MRAPs, not that full amount
    that you read on there, just to be clear, make sure the record
    is clear.
        Chairman Levin. You got $700 million of the total $2.25
    billion which is needed for it. So it is only one-third funded
    in the supplemental?
        General Schoomaker. Sir, those vehicles are a million
    dollars apiece, not just for the vehicle but for 1 year of
    contracted logistics service and basically a turnkey operation.
    So our current funding provides us about 700 vehicles.
        Chairman Levin. But it is still one-third of the
    requirement, is that correct?
        General Schoomaker. That is correct.
        Mr. Geren. I have had a discussion with the Deputy
    Secretary on that very point. We have production issues. These
    are not in production yet. We will enter into contract this
    summer. As we identify additional requirements and also examine
    the production capacity, he is going to work with us to
    identify reprogramming and ensure that we are able to buy and
    work towards meeting the total requirement.
        Chairman Levin. Is the constraint here then production
    capability or is it financial?
        Mr. Geren. We do not have a line up and going at this
    point, so we are projecting into the future.
        Chairman Levin. Is this as many of those vehicles as can be
    produced? Does that $700 million cover all that can be
    produced, or is it a financial deal?
        Mr. Geren. I could not answer that right now, but I would
    expect that we would have a difficult time spending all of that
    money between now and the fall considering where we stand in
    relation to that production line. It is a joint program with
    the Marines. We will be entering into a contract soon. But you
    have the uncertainty of predicting when the production will
    come off the line, and that is what I discussed with the Deputy
    Secretary. As we understand better the production capacity, we
    want to revisit this issue.
        General Schoomaker. Sir, if I could add to that. I think we
    owe you an answer for the record with some specifics, but my
    information is that this is a matter of funding, not capacity
    for some of these vehicles.
        Chairman Levin. We need to know that fact, is it a funding
    issue or is it a capacity issue. If you would let us know for
    the record. Check it out, because this is an area where we have
    been determined that we are going to provide whatever is
    needed. This is an area we have taken an awful lot of losses.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The maximum production capability for Mine Resistant Ambush
    Protected (MRAP) systems is a function of funding amounts, the timing
    of funding, each individual firm's production capacities, the complex
    interrelationships and interdependence of the prime and subcontractors,
    and the distribution of vehicles between the four Services and Special
    Operations Command. Given the number of unknowns, the Army believes the
    440 vehicle per month estimate to be reasonable and achievable.
        The Army's intent is to limit the number of manufacturers and
    thereby ease the burden on theater to train, utilize, and maintain
    MRAP. Our estimates are based on using a portion of the capacity from
    two of the larger manufacturers. If enough manufactures make it through
    testing and the other Services do not order through the same
    manufacturers as the Army, production capacity should be greater. If
    only a few manufacturers are able to produce the systems, then
    production will likely be lower.

        Chairman Levin. General or Secretary, either one. Let me in
    fact address this to the Secretary first. Everybody understands
    that a disability rating of 30 percent or more results in
    medical retirement and eligibility for military health care for
    the member and his family, the wounded member and his family,
    and that a rating of less than 30 percent results in separation
    pay and eligibility for care for the member, but not for the
    family, from the VA.
        What we do not understand and what the soldiers do not
    understand is why the disability ratings from the Army are so
    much lower than disability ratings awarded by the VA and, for
    that matter, so much lower in terms of the percentage that
    reach that 30 percent threshold than the Air Force. I
    understand that the Army awards disability ratings of 30
    percent or higher in only about 4 percent of the cases of our
    wounded troops, while the Air Force awards 30 percent or higher
    in about 25 percent of its cases. So it is about six times as
    many percentagewise.
        What is the explanation for the disparity in the disability
    ratings awarded by the Army compared to the VA and the Air
    Force?
        Mr. Geren. That 4 percent that you cited, Mr. Chairman,
    understates actual numbers of disability ratings that qualify
    for medical retirement. We have a category where a soldier goes
    into a hold position. If you add that category in, we get up
    into the low 20s.
        But the fundamental question that you ask, is this system
    fair, is it right, is it up-to-date, does it meet the needs of
    the soldier today, why is it different from the VA? Both
    systems in my opinion are out-of-date. Both systems do not
    reflect many of the types of threats and the injuries and the
    illnesses that soldiers experience today and also what we are
    able to do for those soldiers long-term.
        Part of our charge both in the Army and as an
    administration is to examine those and look at our disability
    rating. I would not stand here and try to defend it. I think it
    is out-of-date. I think it has not been looked at for a very
    long time, and that is one of the charges that we have taken on
    as an Army, to review that system and make sure that it
    reflects the needs of soldiers and their families. I do not
    believe it does right now.
        Chairman Levin. Are you saying that over 20 percent then of
    the Army disability ratings end up at 30 percent or more so
    that they are eligible then for a medical retirement?
        Mr. Geren. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. That figure is not 4 percent, but it is
    over 20?
        Mr. Geren. 4 percent understates it.
        Chairman Levin. But it is over 20 that are eligible----
        Mr. Geren. Yes, sir. I believe the number is 21 percent,
    but I will get it for you for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The 4 percent figure and disparity with the other Services comes
    from the following quotation from the February 25, 2007, Washington
    Post Magazine, ``The Defense Department reports that the Army, which
    handles more than half of the military's disability cases, put less
    than 4 percent of the 10,460 active duty soldiers and reservists it
    evaluated last year on permanent disability retirement and less than 15
    percent on the temporary list. (Temporary retirees undergo periodic
    reassessments of their conditions for as much as 5 years before a final
    decision.) By comparison, the Navy (including the Marine Corps) retired
    about 35 percent of its injured, temporarily or permanently, and the
    Air Force about 24 percent the Defense Department says.'' Although not
    stated in the article, these Department of Defense figures are from
    fiscal year 2006 only.
        Approximately 19 percent (4 percent plus 15 percent mentioned
    above) is the appropriate Army disability retirement figure to compare
    to Navy and Air Force. Further refinement of the Army disability
    retirements: fiscal year 2006--18.7 percent and fiscal year 2007
    through February 28, 2007--21.36 percent.

        Chairman Levin. That are medically retired, not discharged;
    medically retired?
        Mr. Geren. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Mr. Geren. Let me confirm that for the record, but that is
    within a percentage point or two.
        Chairman Levin. Then we also need the explanation as to why
    the VA is significantly higher than that.
        Mr. Geren. They have a totally different rating system.
    They look at different criteria, different issues. That is
    also, it does not make sense to a soldier. It is confusing. We
    have to rationalize those two systems and bring them----
        Chairman Levin. This committee is going to be making that
    effort with our Veterans Committee. We are going to have joint
    hearings. We are going to attempt to see what the reasons are
    for those discrepancies between the VA and the military,
    because it is incomprehensible to our troops. It sounds unfair.
    It probably is unfair. We are going to do everything we can
    from the congressional side to eliminate the delays, which is
    one big problem we are determined to in any event going to
    correct, but also the conflicts between the approaches taken
    between the VA and the military in terms of what that
    disability rating is. We are going to work on both of those
    jointly, both those issues, the long delays as well as the
    discrepancies between VA and military disability ratings. We
    are going to work on those jointly with our Veterans Committee.
        Mr. Geren. We welcome the opportunity to work with you.
    Just real quickly, the Army rating system rates their ability
    to serve in the Army and VA aims at a different evaluation
    entirely. We are looking, can the soldier continue to serve,
    and it is a different approach.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, the Committee on Environment
    and Public Works is having a hearing and I am going to now
    yield to the ranking member of that committee such that he can
    join his hearing upstairs.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Warner. I have made this
    request of you several times and you are always so generous to
    do this, and I appreciate it.
        I hope, Mr. Chairman, that maybe we can get together with
    some of the other chairmen and try to avoid some of these
    conflicts. It is very difficult to deal with.
        Let me say to both Petes here, you are great guys and you
    came in and served at a most difficult time. We all know that.
    You have both conventional and unconventional types of
    conflicts, resetting, retraining. Of the 92,000 increases in
    ground forces, you have 65,000 in the Army. You are going to
    have to put that together, transform the Army through the BRAC
    process that is underfunded right now, and modernize the FCS.
        We have talked about these things, and you two have done a
    great job under the most difficult of circumstances and I
    compliment you. If this is your last hearing, General
    Schoomaker, thank you so much for coming out of retirement and
    helping us along.
        Last year when the supplemental was delayed, General Cody
    came over and several others and talked about how serious it
    was. A week ago when the Democrats came out with their $124
    billion supplemental plans, that both increases spending and
    sets limits on the war and the upcoming war supplemental and
    sets the stage for withdrawal from Iraq--now, I am going to
    read the Army's posture statement and I want you to listen
    carefully: ``Full, timely, and predictable funding of the
    Army's budget request and supplemental appropriations will
    ensure the Army is ready, fully manned, trained, equipped to
    sustain the full range of its global commitments and to achieve
    victory in the war on terror.''
        Now, I would like to know right now in advance, not when it
    is too late, not when we find out that we are getting down to
    the wire, not when we have to be looking at the possibility of
    not being able to pay widows benefits or having reenlistment
    bonuses shelved for a period of time. Just imagine what the New
    York Times would do with something like that.
        So before that happens, I would like to have each one of
    you, maybe starting with you, Mr. Secretary: In this
    supplemental, if it gets delayed in a similar fashion as last
    year's, what are the consequences? Now is the time to be very
    bold about answering that question.
        Mr. Geren. Thank you, Senator. We do not have to imagine
    what would happen if the supplemental is delayed. We
    experienced it last summer and the impact on the soldiers and
    on training and on soldiers' families was significant. Last
    summer we had to lay off temporary workers. We had to lay off
    contract workers. We had to cut back on recreation
    opportunities for children in the summer. We had to reduce a
    wide range of services, and we also had to cut back on many
    essential contracts on programs that were supporting
    procurement and refit operations around the country.
        So we had to slow everything down. We had to start
    reprogramming. In the words of Dick Cody, we had to do a lot of
    dumb things in order to make sure that we had the resources for
    the soldiers that are on the front line. I have a list of
    specific actions that we took last summer. Those were draconian
    actions. They affected a lot of folks. But it was necessary in
    order to meet the obligation to the 130,000 troops on the
    ground, and if this slides into the summer again we are going
    to be faced with those same kind of decisions. We are going to
    have to pull those same levers and we are going to have to----
        Senator Inhofe. Is it overreacting for me to say--and
    General Schoomaker, I would like to have your answer, too--that
    it could infringe upon widows benefits and reenlistment
    bonuses? It could get that serious; could it?
        General Schoomaker. Sir, again going back to last year, the
    answer is yes. It impacted a lot of things. Of course, the
    place that we have to go is to our personnel accounts to help
    fund the kind of things we need to do to operate. That is how
    you have to reprogram.
        So if you take last year as an example, a fiscal year runs
    from October 1 to September 30. Last year we received our base
    funding and the first increment of the supplemental after
    Christmas, 3 months into the fiscal year, and we received the
    second piece of the supplemental for the war at the end of
    June. So we had to take great draconian measures.
        This year, through the help of this committee and others,
    we received our reset funding in time for the fiscal year to
    start and we have obligated that money and are on a great roll.
    But if you take a look at--we still do not have a veterans
    bill. We do not have our BRAC and we do not have our military
    construction bill, and we are 6 months into the year right now.
        So on top of that, a delay in getting the supplemental,
    which we must have by April--we have to have it in April.
    Otherwise we will have to start doing the kind of lever-pulling
    that we did last year.
        Senator Inhofe. I did not mean to cut you off, Secretary
    Geren. But I think I have the drift of the seriousness of this.
        Let me ask you another question for both of you here, I
    would say primarily you, General Schoomaker. In terms of a
    program that is going to have benchmarks and time lines, we
    have heard from General Peter Pace, we have heard from General
    David H. Petraeus, and Lieutenant General Raymond T. Odierno,
    and I think that they feel, and they have made the statement,
    that if you give them a road map it is not to our benefit. But
    the argument is always, what other ways do we have to hold, to
    apply pressure to the Iraqis, to tell them that they have to
    come forward in doing this.
        I personally disagree with both time lines and benchmarks,
    but I would like to hear your comments about that, General
    Schoomaker.
        General Schoomaker. Sir, that is, quite frankly, a little
    bit out of my lane, although at the strategic level as a member
    of the Joint Chiefs we do discuss strategy.
        Senator Inhofe. They have already expressed themselves on
    this and you are the only military at the table right now, so
    go ahead.
        General Schoomaker. Right. So I would have to associate
    myself with their assessment, because they are very close to
    it. My day-to-day life is looking forward several years trying
    to make sure that we have the resources to be able to support
    people like General Odierno and General Petraeus and others.
        Senator Inhofe. One last thing, because I do not want to go
    over my time. The Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon (NLOS-C) and the FCS
    is still on the Spinout 1. I have taken a lot of time going out
    and looking at it, seeing why this is so necessary. I went to
    Fort Lewis, I say to my friend Senator Warner, Fort Lewis,
    Washington, when they were actually working on this and rode in
    it at that time and observed it, then went over to Mosul the
    day that it arrived over there and saw it in action.
        The chief complaint about that, of course, it was supposed
    to be self-propelled and it is not self-propelled. Obviously
    the first step of the NLOS-1 on the FCS is. Are we seriously
    looking at filling that requirement and eventually putting the
    NLOS-C in the Stryker Brigade?
        General Schoomaker. I do not know about putting it in
    Stryker. It is the lead vehicle in our FCS.
        Senator Inhofe. That answers the question. Thank you very
    much. I appreciate it. I would hope, Mr. Secretary, that we
    will have a chance to talk in the future because this is a very
    serious thing looking down the road. The propensity right now,
    with all the problems we have, is let us put out the current
    fires without preparing for the future, and this is an area I
    think it is very important that we attend to, the FCS.
        Thank you, Senator Warner, for giving me your time.
        Senator Warner. Senator Reed, I think it's your turn.
        Senator Reed. Thanks very much.
        Secretary Geren, welcome. It is good to see you as a
    colleague and friend from the House of Representatives, now as
    the acting Secretary. Good luck.
        General Schoomaker, thank you for your service, courageous
    service over many, many years.
        General Schoomaker. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Reed. Looking forward to getting back in that
    pickup truck, I think.
        Shortly, I believe that the Army is going to have to
    generate nine brigades of Reserve component forces for the
    sustainment operation in Iraq. When is that notice going to
    come down to these units, or it already has? General
    Schoomaker?
        General Schoomaker. I missed right at the tail end. What
    is--
        Senator Reed. My understanding is that the current surge is
    being supported by regular component forces, but that within 6
    months you are going to have to generate up to nine brigades of
    Reserve component forces for Iraq. When are you prepared to
    notify those forces? What is the strain on the Reserve
    component, since they have been through the mill a couple of
    times? Their equipment status is poor. I think you have seen
    all the reports.
        Can you give me an update on that situation?
        General Schoomaker. Under the current rules as approved now
    by Secretary Gates, under the new mobilization deal our
    intention is to alert units 1 year prior to their mobilization
    date. So Reserve component brigades that you are describing--
    and I cannot attest to nine of them, but I do know we have
    several--they should get 1 year alert, and we should get
    focused attention on those brigades prior to mobilization, and
    their mobilization time should be limited to 1 year.
        Senator Reed. To sustain, though, the increase in forces--
    right now we have a plus-up of about 30,000 forces in Iraq. The
    first tranche is regular forces----
        General Schoomaker. The first two brigades have gone.
        Senator Reed.--extending people. My understanding, though,
    is that at some point very quickly you have to get additional
    Reserve Forces in. Are you saying that you will not deploy
    Reserve Forces into Iraq unless they have 1 year's notice?
        General Schoomaker. No. I was talking specifically about
    BCTs. Obviously, during this transition period there are
    smaller units of the Reserve component, both Guard and Reserve,
    that have less notice than that; talk about detachments,
    companies, in some cases battalions. But the transition we are
    moving to is that Reserve component units under the new
    mobilization criteria should receive a year's alert and get the
    focused attention I am talking about.
        Senator Reed. I think that is a very sensible approach. But
    I am just wondering in terms of the manpower that you are going
    to need to sustain. Again, General Odierno now is talking about
    this operation stretching into next February or March. You are
    going to need brigade-sized units and I cannot understand how
    you are going to get them unless you bring in National Guard
    and Reserve component brigades.
        General Schoomaker. It is absolutely essential that we have
    National Guard and Army Reserve units to help us meet this
    demand.
        Senator Reed. Well then, I would think these notices would
    go out immediately if you are going to give them a year's
    notice and training opportunities. Is that fair?
        General Schoomaker. It is fair, and notices are going out,
    and in some cases people are getting less than a year's notice.
    But what I am saying is as we transition through it, once this
    thing gets in balance, our intention is to give people a year's
    alert.
        Senator Reed. When do you think you will reach the point
    where you are on a steady state year-to-year notice? Not right
    away?
        General Schoomaker. No. No, I think--in fact, the G3 is
    here. I do not know if you have an estimate. Where is he?
        Senator Reed. General Lovelace?
        General Lovelace. Sir, we are more than 18 months out.
        Senator Reed. So in the intervening 18 months we are going
    to be notifying at some point upwards of nine brigades of
    National Guard with short timeframes?
        General Lovelace. Sir, I am like the Chief; I cannot
    testify to the number nine. I do not have that. Several is the
    current number. We are giving them more notification--we are
    giving as much notification as we can. We are trying to get to
    a year, just like the Chief said. We have recently held a
    sourcing conference for what is, in fiscal year 2008, to begin
    to attempt to understand, to identify those units, in order to
    be able to notify them, like the Chief said, in this
    transitional period.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        There is another issue that is I think a reflection of the
    great operational tempo that the Army is serving, the increase
    in promotion rates to cover the shortfall in company grade
    officers, which I think you are acutely aware of. One of the
    first signs that the organization is showing stress is that
    company-grade officers, E-6s, E-7s, the good ones start
    leaving.
        Are you concerned that these promotion rates are beginning
    to pick up, that we cannot maintain the same level of quality
    that we have over the last several years?
        General Schoomaker. First of all, of course we are
    concerned when we see good people leaving the Army. But I have
    a different perspective on this perhaps. We started combat
    operations in both Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and
    Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) back in 2001 with a shortage of
    captains. The reason we had a shortage of captains was because
    we underassessed lieutenants when we drew the Army down to only
    40 percent of the size that it was in the Cold War.
        So one of the ways that you have to do that is you have to
    cut off the numbers of lieutenants you bring in. Of course,
    that bubble then goes through the system. So we started the
    fight short of company-grade officers. Those shortage of
    captains is now a shortage of majors, because 5 years has gone
    by and we have moved into that.
        Second, we are now growing the Army bigger, and of course
    as we grow it bigger we now have an additional I think about
    8,000 requirements for captains and majors. So we stared in the
    hole, we have a bigger threshold to jump, and so we have this.
        The acceleration of promotion--for instance, to major, we
    moved the promotion date from 11 years time in service to 10
    years time in service. That is consistent with what the other
    Services are doing. We were promoting a little bit slower. But
    I will remind you that during the Vietnam period we were
    promoting some people to major with 5, 5\1/2\ years. We were
    promoting people to captain with 2 years.
        Senator Reed. That might be my point.
        General Schoomaker. Yes, and we do not want to go there. We
    were making staff sergeants in 6 months. We do not want to do
    that.
        So I think that the fact that we are promoting captains now
    at 38 months of service, which is over 3\1/2\ years of service,
    and the fact that we are promoting majors at 10 years, my view
    is this is realistic. I think it is a necessary move. But I do
    not think it is anywhere near being a crisis. I think it is the
    appropriate thing to do and proper management.
        Senator Reed. Do you see this as a trend, though, that if
    it continues to accelerate will cause problems?
        General Schoomaker. I think that if we started approaching
    the kind of things we had to do in the Vietnam War it would be
    a big problem. I would never advise that we do that. I think
    that would be very, very dangerous. But I think that what we
    are doing right now is appropriate.
        Senator Reed. Can you give us a feel for the status of
    equipment in the prepositioned stocks, particularly in
    conjunction with the surge?
        General Schoomaker. I could tell you that the--in an
    unclassified sense, and you know I have testified in closed
    hearings--that without the prepositioned stocks we would not
    have been able to meet the surge requirement. So we have used a
    certain percentage of them. It will take us 2 years to rebuild
    those stocks. That is part of my concern about our strategic
    depth. So unless you want to go to a closed session, I think I
    probably ought to leave it about there.
        Senator Reed. Just a final question which may or may not be
    appropriate here. That is, does this budget contain the
    resources to replenish those stocks in a 2-year time?
        General Schoomaker. It contains some of the resources to
    start that replenishment.
        Senator Reed. But not all?
        General Schoomaker. In fact, let me----
        General Lovelace. Not all of it, sir.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to first deal with this issue of Walter Reed. I am
    going to read what I understand was testimony given yesterday
    before the Senate Appropriations Committee. In a hearing
    yesterday before the Senate Appropriations Defense
    Subcommittee, General Schoomaker, you are represented as
    saying, ``Rather than reopening BRAC and changing the decision
    on Walter Reed, we need to make sure that Walter Reed is fully
    operational, able to deliver 100 percent quality care up until
    the moment that the Bethesda Center and the Belvoir Center are
    open and ongoing.'' You went on to note that not all the
    facilities currently available at Walter Reed will be
    duplicated at Bethesda.
        Now, here is where I have communicated my views to the
    Secretary of Defense. I think it would not be wise to try and
    alter BRAC by pulling Walter Reed out. The BRAC process--and
    Senator Levin and I in our 29 years here have seen it all. All
    five of them we worked on together. To the best of my
    knowledge, we have never gone back and altered a BRAC decision,
    because Walter Reed is certainly a very important issue to
    address by Congress working with DOD. But if we do make a
    substantial change by eliminating Walter Reed or so forth in
    BRAC, it could provide a precedent for other Members to bring
    forth their problems at home, which may not be as serious as
    Walter Reed, but in the view of their States and those Members
    of Congress it could be.
        So what is the best thing to do? It seems to me we could
    look at what I call a stay of the date, simply make the most
    modest modification, just saying we will not try and meet the
    dates, or put in some contingency to make certain that the
    Bethesda and Belvoir objectives are up and running so there can
    be a seamless turnover of Walter Reed's responsibilities to
    those two institutions.
        I am going to try and work with DOD and others in Congress
    to see whether or not that can be done. So it would be just a
    minor modification in my judgment, while in some sense it would
    be precedent-setting. It seems to me this situation drives the
    requirement to do it that way.
        Then at the same time, take such steps to accelerate the
    funding provided by Congress for both Bethesda and Belvoir such
    that those projects can hopefully be advanced in their startup
    time and then move forward. So I do not necessarily put this in
    the form of a question, but I would simply ask both of our
    witnesses today to frankly give me your comments on the
    approach that I have outlined.
        Mr. Geren. Senator Warner, I think it makes great sense.
    having lived through three of those BRACs myself, I appreciate
    the intensity of emotion associated with those decisions, how
    hard they are. We have to make sure--and the Army and DOD and
    Congress are all committed to make sure--that our soldiers and
    their families receive the best quality care, whatever we need
    to do to make sure that happens--accelerate Bethesda,
    accelerate Belvoir. Get it done, but make sure that we do not
    stop delivering quality care before those open, and make sure
    that there is a seamless transition between the Walter Reed
    facility and the two new facilities.
        But I agree with you, reopening BRAC would be a dangerous
    precedent and not only impact what we have done in this BRAC,
    but I think make future realignments and closings very
    difficult for our Congress to ever consider again. So I agree
    with you, sir.
        Senator Warner. Do you wish to add a word, Chief?
        General Schoomaker. Sir, since you quoted me----
        Senator Warner. Did I quote you accurately? I want to make
    sure.
        General Schoomaker. Yes, sir, I think so. What I meant by
    that quote, I was glad to hear--I was not recommending
    reopening BRAC. I do not think that is a smart idea.
        Senator Warner. No, I am not saying you did.
        General Schoomaker. No, my concern is that we are
    underfunded in BRAC and that we are not right now currently
    replicating--we do not have the funding to replicate some of
    the things that are at Walter Reed.
        Senator Warner. That is troublesome. For instance, what is
    it, the pathologic center?
        General Schoomaker. There is that. There are things like
    the Mologne House, the Fisher House, barracks for soldiers.
    There are lots of things that need to be done. So what my
    statement was intended to do was to say exactly what you have
    said, and that is we need to accelerate the build at Belvoir
    and accelerate the build out at Bethesda. Until those things
    are in place and we can make a seamless transition, we should
    not underfund Walter Reed. We should not be in a retrograde
    motion at Walter Reed, because there are lots of unknowns in
    this long war we are in and Walter Reed is essential to provide
    the care to our wounded warriors that we need. That was what my
    concern was and I am sorry that I was not more clear.
        Senator Warner. No, I was not suggesting you were not
    clear. But I just picked that out because what I would like to
    ask of the Secretary is that we work together. Now, there may
    be others that are going to be participating. But I am going to
    take the initiative and see what I can do to provide both
    legislative actions.
        But I agree with the Chief. Walter Reed has to be fully
    operational up until there is a turnkey type of transfer from
    Walter Reed to this new bifurcated sort of Bethesda and Belvoir
    situation. Now, no shovel has gone in the ground at Belvoir. So
    that gives you some idea of how quickly we have to move. I do
    not look at this simply because I am privileged to represent
    that region of Belvoir. I am doing this in the interest of our
    Defense Department and particularly the Army.
        But this is the direction in which I am going to move.
    Secretary Geren, I think my staff and your legislative team,
    the great team you have, are working this. But I wonder if you
    could give it your own personal attention as we go along.
        Mr. Geren. I assure you that I will, Senator.
        Senator Warner. I thank you very much.
        Senator Reed and others talked about the readiness issue.
    Was there any further comment you might wish to make, because I
    keep going back to your comment about what will it take to
    prevent the breaking of the Army. That we have to do. I think
    you put us on alert. Do we have the steps in place so that that
    statement which you made just 3 months ago--that was before the
    surge, the surge was finalized. It may well be that you were in
    the process, and I hope you were, in the planning process for
    the surge. But that statement ranks right up there with old Shy
    Meyer's statement, we have a hollow Army.
        So what can we do to prevent that breaking that you
    referred to? Are those steps in place today?
        General Schoomaker. Sir, the----
        Senator Warner. This is the greatest army in the world.
        General Schoomaker. It is. The Army we fielded is the
    greatest we have ever fielded and I think it is the greatest in
    the world. But we are paying a price at home, providing the
    equipment at the rates that we are, and we are turning the Army
    too fast.
        If you go back to the QDR, in normal times we ought to have
    one increment of deployment for three increments of dwell. When
    you go to a surge situation, it should be two increments of
    dwell for every increment of deployment. We are now at one
    increment of dwell for one increment of deployment. That is not
    sustainable. I have said this now for quite some time. It is
    not sustainable to do that for a long time and that is why we
    have to have the Guard and Reserve, the operational Reserve,
    more readily available to sustain this deal.
        Now, that means that they are going to have to deploy more
    frequently than what we would like the normal situation to be,
    with 5, in some cases 6, years of dwell for an increment of
    deployment. So any way you cut it, if we need to use the force
    at the speed that we are using this force and we are going to
    train the force to perform the missions we are asking them to
    do, then what we give up is the recuperation period, the
    respite with family, and the rest of it.
        This is where I have deep concerns. I know we are training
    and equipping and leading these forces correctly for what they
    are doing. But I am concerned about the back side price that is
    being paid.
        I am on the supply side of this equation. I do not have
    control of the demand side of it, and if the demand is going to
    be where it is then we are going to need a significantly larger
    Army. Again, I go back and say that the Army is about 40
    percent the size it was during the Cold War and it is being
    used at 300, 400 percent of the rate that it was, and we still
    have people, even in the DOD, that say that we do not have
    needs for boots on the ground and that there is going to be a
    day when we are not going to have to have an Army and all that
    stuff. I just think it is ludicrous.
        Senator Warner. You point out quite accurately that, while
    you are on the supply side and you do not have control over the
    operating requirements, but you have on your desk a requirement
    to do 21,500 plus another, what is it, about 5,000 individuals?
    What is that add-on?
        General Schoomaker. It is continuing to evolve. So it could
    get bigger.
        Senator Warner. It even could get bigger above the 5,000?
    In your professional judgment, can you meet that?
        General Schoomaker. With National Guard and Reserve. We
    would need National Guard and Reserve to meet that and we will
    meet it. But again, I was concerned before the surge with the
    strategic depth of the Army and the resourcing of the Army, and
    of course with additional things it deepens my concerns. I have
    already testified that we have used our prepositioned stocks,
    which is a concern for me. That has a lot to do with our
    strategic agility.
        Senator Warner. All right. But you are on record you feel
    you can meet it.
        General Schoomaker. Sir, we will meet the surge as we know
    it right now. But sustainment of that is going to continue to
    be a challenge.
        Senator Warner. Lastly, and I do not say this by way of
    criticism of any Member of Congress, but there has been a lot
    of publicity about a formulation which would go to some
    criteria by which the President is going to have to certify
    that each of the units that you as a supplier are providing to
    the operators are fully trained and fully equipped, and I am
    not sure to whose standards. I would be hopeful that Congress
    is not going to set the standards, but that the DOD and
    specifically the Department of the Army is going to set the
    standard.
        Do you have any comment on how, if that formulation--and I
    hope it will not become law--but should it become law, what
    problems it would cause you?
        General Schoomaker. I think, first of all, only we can
    determine what standards are required to meet things. I need to
    remind everybody that we have a requirement to be a full-
    spectrum force, but once we get a requirement for, let us say,
    a brigade and they tell us what they are going to use that
    brigade for, that is what we focus our training on. So we are
    sure that the brigades and the other units that we are sending,
    that they ask for, and they tell us what it is they want them
    to do, we are sure that we train them and equip them to do the
    mission.
        Now, the problem is if they want units to do something
    different, and we have seen in the past, especially with some
    of our Reserve component units, where they have been asked for
    to do one thing and they have re-missioned them over there,
    where there has been difficulties in the re-missioning process.
    So I think we are working through that. I am very confident
    that we are sending trained and equipped and well-led units.
        But again, what I am concerned about is the depth we have
    and what it is costing us to be able to sustain that. Again, I
    will tell you a surge in my view means that it is a temporary--
    --
        Senator Warner. I do not know what your definition of
    temporary is. This original surge was characterized to those of
    us in Congress as perhaps a couple of months, and then slowly
    with Odierno and now Petraeus this thing looks like it is going
    to be maintained at full tempo once you reach the 21,500 plus
    the add-ons through the end of this calendar year. Would that
    be correct?
        General Schoomaker. I think that is in discussion. Again, I
    want to go back. In my view there is a difference between a
    surge and a plus-up. A surge in my view is a temporary
    condition, whether it is 4 months, 6 months, 8 months, but
    there is a plan to come off of that. A plus-up, which means you
    are raising up to another level that is going to be expected to
    be sustained, is a whole different story. My view is this is
    not a plus-up.
        Senator Warner. You are operating it as it is on a surge
    basis.
        General Schoomaker. I am operating on the belief it is a
    surge basis.
        Senator Warner. Which means we will have some terminal end
    where you do not have to maintain this?
        General Schoomaker. That is my understanding.
        Senator Warner. That could be what duration?
        General Schoomaker. Sir, that is in discussion. Right now
    my understanding is somewhere between August and the end of the
    year.
        Senator Warner. That is pretty indefinite.
        Thank you. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Akaka.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank you, Mr. Secretary and General, for being
    here. This hearing is of particular importance and interest to
    me as chairman of the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management
    Support, and I am very concerned with ensuring that our
    military has everything it needs to be able to respond whenever
    our Nation calls. We all are trying to do the same.
        I believe the Army's posture statement outlines many of the
    challenges the Army faces in transforming itself into an Army
    that is ready to deal with and carry out the missions of
    support for our Nation in the 21st century. The briefings we
    have had already on it are very compelling and I look forward
    to carrying that out.
        But General Schoomaker, in the posture statement it says,
    ``Changes are needed to eliminate unintended constraints on
    programs such as the Commander's Emergency Response Program
    (CERP), the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), and
    the administering security cooperation and assistance programs,
    as well as furnishing humanitarian assistance.''
        Can you elaborate on what these changes are being referred
    to, whether these changes will be in the Defense Department
    policies, and are they changes that may require congressional
    action?
        General Schoomaker. Sir, I think it is well-accepted that
    all of us have been saying that this war is not going to be won
    militarily; it is going to be won in political and in a hearts
    and minds way by changing the nature of life for people. One of
    the most important tools that commanders have in this war both
    in Afghanistan and in Iraq has to do with their ability to
    influence the local population through things like the CERP
    funds, to be able to put people to work, to be able to get
    projects that make a difference in the towns, villages, and
    people's lives. I think that is well accepted, that people now
    understand that this is a very, very important tool.
        So all that was is reinforcement of this notion. I think
    that we need to continue to enable our commanders out there to
    have tools beyond bullets coming out of the end of the gun, but
    actually changing people's lives in a way that would bring them
    over and establish the kind of stability and security that is
    required for governance to take hold and to return to normalcy.
        So that is what that statement is intended to do. My belief
    is that the DOD understands this very well and that certainly
    the commanders on the ground understand it.
        Senator Akaka. Secretary and General, I am pleased to see
    that the Army is trying to achieve targeted efficiencies
    through management reform, acquisition reform, comprehensive
    redesign of the organization and business processes that
    generate, deploy, and reset forces, consolidation of bases and
    activities, military to civilian conversion programs, and
    performance measurement enhancements.
        Again as chairman of the Readiness and Management Support
    Subcommittee, I have been concerned about the problems in DOD's
    acquisition program. DOD's IG and the Government Accountability
    Office have identified significant problems, and we call those
    high risks, with DOD's acquisition program that has led to
    significant waste of taxpayer dollars.
        Mr. Secretary and General, can you please elaborate on the
    efficiencies you are targeting for acquisition and how you are
    intending to achieve these efficiencies? Mr. Secretary?
        Mr. Geren. There are many challenges in the field of
    acquisition. We have seen the acquisition budget increase 254
    percent over the last 5 years. It has put an extraordinary
    strain on our dedicated professionals in that area. We also
    have an aging workforce in that area. We have 34 percent are
    eligible to retire, 20 percent are expected to retire. It is an
    area that Secretary Harvey focused on a great deal of his time.
    It is not just an Army issue. It is across the DOD. Under
    Secretary Krieg has just delivered a report to Congress on
    defense acquisition transformation.
        It is going to be something that all the Services are going
    to work together. I believe former Secretary of the Army, Dr.
    Francis J. Harvey, made great advances in that area with his
    Lean 6 Sigma and other transformation, get the depots working
    better, get the acquisition workforce working better. But we
    have a lot of work to do in that area. We have to make
    investment in people. We have to make investment in training,
    make sure that we have the high performing and agile and
    ethical workforce. That is our commitment going in. We have to
    have cost-effective logistics support. We have to have improved
    governance and decisionmaking.
        Again, this was a focus of Dr. Harvey. We made steps
    forward. The DOD is going to work together on this issue and I
    can assure you it will remain a high priority for me and the
    DOD as we move into--it is a big challenge, though. We are
    asking a lot of that acquisition workforce, just as we are a
    lot of our soldiers, and we are going to have to make
    investments in them to ensure that they are able to do the job.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you.
        General, would you comment on that?
        General Schoomaker. Sir, I think Secretary Geren has
    answered very well. I would just reinforce one thing. If you
    are frustrated with bureaucracy, the acquisition community is
    one of the places that can take you right over the top. I do
    not know of a bureaucracy that is worse. I do not know of a
    system that is built on risk avoidance. It will not, under the
    current method of doing business, be able to keep up with the
    demands of this century. It is not agile enough, it is not
    focused enough.
        So I agree with Secretary Geren. I think we have made great
    progress in this regard and I think that the transformation is
    absolutely essential.
        Senator Akaka. In the early 1970s the Army was reorganized
    so that the regular Army could not conduct an extended campaign
    without mobilizing the Guard and Reserve. This was asked by
    Senator Reed as well. It is not clear, however, that the
    Defense Department leadership at the time anticipated the kind
    of protracted conflict we are facing today with the global war
    on terror.
        Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, will the Army,
    looking at the 21st century, be more reliant on National Guard
    and Reserves to meet its global commitments? Also, have we
    reduced our capability to deal with threats and natural
    disasters at home by being so reliant on the National Guard and
    the Reserve to support national interests abroad?
        Mr. Geren. The role of the Guard and Reserve has changed
    from being a strategic Reserve to part of the operational
    force. It is a total force now. We train as one, we fight as
    one. A third of the combat veterans of OIF and OEF have come
    out of the Guard and Reserve. So unquestionably they are part
    of the total force today, and this budget reflects that--$38
    billion worth of investment in equipment for the Guard over 5
    years.
        We are making a large investment in aviation modernization
    for the Guard and Reserve. The Light Utility Helicopter and the
    Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter that we are purchasing, 40
    percent of those are going into the Guard. Sixty-five percent
    of all our medium and heavy trucks are going into the Guard.
        So part of this is making up for underinvestment in the
    past, but part of it is just recognizing the role that the
    Guard plays now, the Guard and Reserve play, and will continue
    to play. We will not be able to meet our global commitments
    without having them part of the operational Reserve.
        You raise the issue of domestic crises, whether it is
    hurricanes, floods, or another terrorist attack. The Guard has
    left some of its equipment behind in theater, some of its best
    equipment. Part of the refit money that you gave us last
    summer, $2 billion of that, is going to replace that equipment
    for the Guard.
        We also have under way, and we did it last year in
    anticipation of the hurricane season and we are doing it right
    now, working with the The Adjutants General (TAGs) and working
    with the governors to assess what the needs are, anticipating
    the hurricane and storm season. The Active Army and the Reserve
    are going to provide resources, provide people, provide
    transportation. We looked first across the Gulf States and then
    the States that go up the east coast, but we are looking ahead,
    we are planning ahead, to make sure that, just as we are
    looking for the Guard to be part of everything we do around the
    world, we are going to stand in support of them in meeting
    domestic crises as well, looking ahead, planning together.
        But bottom line, they are part of the operational force
    now. The total force is a reality and our budget reflects that,
    sir.
        General Schoomaker. Sir, I think Secretary Geren said it
    very well, but I would just like to simplify this whole thing.
    The Army is 40 percent of what it was in the Cold War. Today 55
    percent of the total Army is Guard and Reserve, over 50
    percent. So if we are going to operate at 300 percent of what
    we used to operate on when we had an Army that was 60 bigger,
    it is unreasonable to not expect 55 percent of the total force
    not to participate.
        So it is out of necessity that the Guard and Reserve, both
    for operations outside the United States as well as operations
    inside the United States in homeland security, homeland
    defense, are going to be called on more than they have in the
    past. I think it is that simple.
        Senator Akaka. I thank you both for your responses. General
    Schoomaker, I want to say that you have done such a great job
    for our country and God bless you and your family.
        General Schoomaker. Thank you very much.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you.
        Senator Lieberman [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
        Senator Thune.
        Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Schoomaker, let me also thank you for your
    extraordinary service to our country and wish you well in a
    well-deserved retirement. We will see how long this retirement
    lasts.
        To soldiers who are here, thank you so much for the
    extraordinary work you do day in and day out to keep our
    country safe and strong and secure.
        Secretary Geren, welcome and good to see you again, and we
    look forward to working with you again in your new
    responsibilities.
        General Schoomaker, the 2007 Army Posture Statement
    identifies a set of core objectives which the Army must
    achieve, one of which is to modernize by accelerating the
    fielding of advanced technologies to our soldiers today. This
    objective requires funding for the Army's FCS, as you mentioned
    earlier, which is a critical investment program that will
    protect troops and enhance combat effectiveness.
        I want to point out there was a February 2007 Congressional
    Budget Office (CBO) report, I guess you would call it, that
    developed various budget options for altering Federal spending.
    One of the options presented in that report was--and this is a
    copy of the report--was to cancel the Future Combat Program and
    invest more in existing heavier combat vehicles that have a
    proven track record.
        Now, since the Army must continue to sustain their current
    mission while transforming at the same time to meet future
    challenges, could you just explain why cancelling or delaying
    the FCS program would be such a mistake?
        General Schoomaker. Sir, I would be glad to. First of all,
    it is prohibitively expensive to take the current force and
    carry it into the future for another 40 or 50 years or even 25
    years.
        Second, the kinds of threats that we are facing and the
    kinds of systems that we are facing, we must put these new
    technologies on these systems to be able to survive these kind
    of threats, and we must have the kinds of capabilities, some of
    which are demonstrated here, to be able to enhance the human
    dimension of war to meet the kind of irregular challenges that
    we face as well as the future conventional challenges.
        So I would tell you it is both an issue of affordability
    and it is an issue of necessity. We do not manufacture tanks
    and Bradleys any more. What we are doing is remanufacturing the
    hull. We are taking old hulls and upgrading them. But we are
    going to run into a point that this is just financially
    unattainable, to do this any more.
        So I think in the long run the FCS is not only a more
    effective solution, but it is also the most affordable solution
    to the kind of things that we have to do. It is the first
    modernization program we have had in what, 40 years, for the
    United States Army.
        Senator Thune. Of course, we all know and anybody who has
    visited Walter Reed knows very well that most of the injuries
    that our soldiers are sustaining, the guys who are coming back
    wounded are IED-related. That unmanned ground vehicle, that
    unit that you had rolling around out here today, is that
    currently being used? Can it be used to detect or to trip those
    IEDs before personnel come in or our convoys come in?
        It seems to me that if that thing is effective at doing
    that, we ought to be using it.
        General Schoomaker. Sir, we have several hundred of these
    deployed right now, the smaller ones going into buildings and
    in caves and wells and things and larger ones that are doing
    precisely what you said. Of course, these things are becoming
    more sophisticated and are absolutely essential to provide the
    stand-off that we need to deal with--and again, it goes back
    to, this is FCS technology.
        Senator Thune. I know it is a part of FCS. I guess the
    reason I ask the question is you mentioned they are deployed
    over there, but specifically with regard to the IED threat, if
    that is an effective counter to that.
        One just more broader philosophical question. The Services
    have to balance near-term requirements with long-term
    investments and ongoing operations with military modernization.
    When faced with the budgetary constraints, oftentimes you are
    forced to spend on today's forces rather than invest in
    tomorrow's. I do not believe that we can afford to take another
    procurement holiday, so how do you recommend that the Army
    balance their immediate needs against those long-term
    modernization needs?
        General Schoomaker. From my perspective, I think that's
    exactly the program that we presented. What we are doing is we
    are bringing our current force into the future and we are
    augmenting it with future capabilities like this that we are
    bringing down into the force, and we are actually transforming
    ourselves as we fight by bringing the current to the future and
    pulling some of the future back on top of the current.
        I know that sounds a little bit strange, but this is not
    peacetime and this is not a time that we can afford to run an
    old system up to some kind of a point of then introducing
    comprehensively new systems. These things have to be brought in
    as we fight.
        So I think we have presented a program that does precisely
    what you are saying, and this is the most dramatic
    transformation that this Army has been through, quite frankly,
    since World War II, and we are doing it in a very accelerated
    fashion. Of course, our experiences that we have in combat are
    helping us focus and giving us the sense of urgency that is
    required to do this.
        Senator Thune. Secretary Geren, I appreciated your comments
    about the expansive investment in the National Guard, the Army
    National Guard. We all had our TAGs in town last week and we
    all heard the stories about the wear and tear on equipment. I
    am just wondering maybe if you could give me a little bit of
    perspective. You talked about $38 billion over 5 years for
    equipment, and how that compares with previous investment, what
    the sort of trend line has been there, because they do--and
    General Schoomaker, you mentioned that 55 percent of the total
    Army is Guard and Reserve. We are riding those guys hard, our
    Guard units across this country and in my State of South
    Dakota, and everybody is feeling the consequences of that.
        So could you just give me a little bit, put in perspective
    the $38 billion in equipment that you are talking about and how
    that compares?
        Mr. Geren. I am not able to give you an historical trend
    line, but I know that as a general principle we have
    underfunded the investment in the Guard and the Reserve. The
    Guard had many, to use the words of the Chief, holes in the
    yard, had many of the units that did not have the equipment
    that they needed, and we are working now to fill those backlogs
    and equipment needs and invest into the future so that they
    have the same kind of equipment, they are able to train and
    fight just as the Active Duty is.
        As I mentioned, we are not limiting it to any area. It is
    aviation modernization, they are going to participate in that.
    Trucks; the modernization of the tanks and the Bradley fleets
    in the Guard is actually going to get accomplished before the
    active component. It is going to finish in 2011.
        We are making up for lack of investment in the past. We are
    reorganizing. We are also, when you look at the nature of the
    Guard force as we are moving forward, moving more from heavy
    combat into combat service and combat support, more versatile
    Guard units that will not only be able to help us around the
    world, but also be able to better help us here at home.
        General Schoomaker. Sir, I think, rough order of magnitude,
    the level of funding from 2005 to 2013 for the Guard and
    Reserve is an order of magnitude about five over historical
    levels, about five times. If you take a look, one of the
    important things to understand is we complete the total
    transformation of the Army out by 2019. So from what, 2013 to
    2019, there is another $52 billion. Inside that $52 billion is
    another $24 billion required for Guard and Reserve to complete
    their transformation out there.
        My view is what we ought to be looking at is how much of
    that can we accelerate to the left. How much of that can we
    pull closer to where we are, not only for the Guard and
    Reserve, but for the active Force, to complete this
    transformation more quickly.
        Senator Thune. I appreciate again your testimony and your
    service. I would share your view that we have to do better on
    the top line, and I think that the telling in your
    presentation, this chart, which I think is always very telling,
    about percentage of gross domestic product that we spend on the
    military. Relative to times throughout our history whenever we
    have been at war, we are spending less today than we ever have.
    We have a lot more needs, as you have pointed out. So I share
    your view on that and look forward to working with you to
    address that.
        So thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin [presiding]: Thank you, Senator Thune.
        Senator McCaskill.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First let me express my respect for both of you and
    certainly acknowledge that the action on the part of the Army
    as it relates to Walter Reed has embraced accountability, and
    especially the very difficult decisions in terms of change of
    leadership. I want to express how pleased I am with that and
    thank you for it.
        I want to ask some questions also about the FCS. One of the
    things that I have learned is that there is an issue in terms
    of the manned ground vehicles, the weight; that the original
    plans for that had a weight at a certain level and now we are
    contemplating that weight going as high as 24 tons.
        My question to you today is if the plans all along had been
    to transport with the C-130s and that if now you are
    contemplating using the C-17s because of the efficiencies that
    would be gained and in terms of how much you would be--in terms
    of the type of runways you could use and how many you could
    move, what I am concerned about is it does not appear to me
    that the Army has expressed this to the Air Force.
        We are getting ready to take the C-17s off line and it
    seems to me that if we are going to need the C-17s, if we are
    going to rely on FCS in the future--and I think the rationale
    you have expressed, General, is certainly valid--then why would
    we not at this point be going, whoa, whoa, whoa, we need the C-
    17 as it relates to the future of FCS?
        General Schoomaker. We do need the C-17 as it relates to
    the future FCS, because one of the reasons we used C-130 sizing
    constructs is so that we could get three of these systems on a
    C-17. That is the whole point. Currently, one C-17 can only
    carry one system of that current heavy armor.
        We have expressed our requirements and, quite frankly,
    General Norton A. Schwartz, USAF, out at Transportation
    Command, who is responsible for all this in terms of managing
    the C-17s, C-5s, and the strategic deployability issues, has
    been working with the Air Force about what he views his
    requirements to be. The discussions that I have been involved
    in, I think that they are adequately being addressed and that
    people do understand what the--it is not just purely an Air
    Force-Army discussion. There is a discussion of the owner of
    these systems, which is U.S. Transportation Command, that
    enters. They feel that they are building sufficient C-17s to
    meet the requirement.
        Senator McCaskill. But you know they are going to shut it
    down. They are in the process of shutting down these lines and
    not going to build any more C-17s. That is the plan, which is
    what I am confused about.
        General Schoomaker. Again, the planners for all of this--
    first of all, the FCS reduces the requirement for the numbers
    of aircraft. Today we have a higher requirement if we are going
    to air transport our systems. What General Schwartz has looked
    at is the combination of C-5 modernization, C-17s, and the
    other systems that they are talking about, to include what the
    future tanker is going to be and what its cargo capabilities
    will be.
        So I have listened to these discussions ad nauseam and I
    think that the people are putting their arms around what the
    total requirement is for armed forces. I would also state that
    we also move the preponderance of our stuff by sea, so we have
    equal concerns in terms of fast shipping to be able to move our
    units, et cetera. So I am confident that the right people are
    working this and I am not uncomfortable with where we are.
        Senator McCaskill. Okay. What I would hate to see is us
    coming back in one of these hearings in a couple of years and
    saying, after the line has been shut down and the costs
    associated with that, that we, the taxpayer, are going to pay
    again to start that line because we must have the C-17 to
    transport the FCS.
        General Schoomaker. I would hate to see that, too. But I
    believe the proper conversations are going on and I will leave
    it to the transporters to determine. They know what our
    requirement is.
        Senator McCaskill. Okay.
        The next question I would have for you, if you were going
    to decide, both of you, in terms of making a recommendation as
    to contracting processes as it relates to troop support in
    Iraq, not just reconstruction but troop support, would you
    think that we should look at a single unified contracting
    entity to coordinate all the contracting in the theater? Or do
    you think we should expand the jurisdiction of the Special
    Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction to perform that
    function?
        Mr. Geren. I would have to look at that proposal with
    greater detail before I could offer you a recommendation on it.
    I can tell you, though, the way we operate as an Army or as a
    military, we depend on contractor support. When we downsized
    the military, we found ourselves in the position where we are
    not able to deploy without depending upon contractor support.
    Transportation, food, laundry, so many of the support services,
    we have moved into the support role of contractors, including
    much of security.
        So that is going to be, continue to be, part of the present
    and the future for your military. It also enables us to move
    more soldiers from tail to tooth and put them in warfighting
    roles rather than in support roles. But as far as your specific
    question about how to best manage that, I would like to get
    back with you for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        I agree with having a single unified entity responsible for
    coordinating Department of Defense (DOD) contracting in Iraq. The
    Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), has coordinating authority
    over all supporting DOD contracting organizations, and the Joint
    Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan provides unity of contracting
    effort for the combined/joint operations areas Iraq and Afghanistan.
        In addition, the DOD is establishing new procedures aimed at
    improving coordination with contracting offices in a combatant command
    to verify whether contemplated acquisitions requiring performance in,
    or delivery to, the theater of operations will duplicate or conflict
    with existing work and whether economies of scope/schedule can be
    leveraged from existing contracts.
        Although the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
    (SIGIR) has a crucial role in the oversight of those contracts
    obligating Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds, it is not the only
    organization providing oversight of contracting in Iraq. There have
    been nearly 200 major audits, reviews, or assessments of contracting
    activities in Iraq by the various oversight agencies. In addition to
    the SIGIR, the Government Accountability Office, Department of Defense
    Inspector General, Defense Contract Management Agency, Defense Contract
    Audit Agency, and the Army Audit Agency also have oversight of DOD
    contracting in Iraq.

        Senator McCaskill. I really would like your thoughts on
    that, because it seems to me that we need to do one or the
    other. We need to either have a single unified contracting
    entity for all of the support in Iraq or we need to expand the
    IG that is over there now looking at reconstruction to be able
    to look at this area also. I certainly would respect your
    opinion on that in terms of what you think would be most
    efficient and effective in terms of changing some of the things
    to avoid some of the serious, serious inefficiencies and
    problems we have had with some of these contracting practices.
        Mr. Geren. I know your background. You could offer us great
    expertise in this area and we look forward to working with you.
        Senator McCaskill. More auditors everywhere. Auditors,
    auditors. [Laughter.]
        Mr. Geren. I tell you, the LOGCAP contract, which has been
    much in the news and criticized by many people, the concept
    goes back to the early 1990s. Recognizing that we were going to
    limit many of those capabilities within the military and wanted
    to be able to look at the outside to be able to surge and
    support the military wherever we needed to go, whenever we
    needed it, we currently have that LOGCAP contract under
    negotiation right now, under source selection. Rather than
    having one contractor going forward, we are going to have
    three, so we do not put so much burden on a single LOGCAP
    contractor to support the military. So that is one of the
    changes that has been made going forward from this point. We
    are in the source selection now and we will be making the
    decision soon. I think that that will help address some of the
    issues that have come up over the last couple years.
        Thank you, Senator.
        Senator McCaskill. I have had an opportunity to look in
    some detail at the Army physical disability evaluation system
    inspection that was done by the IG. But I have to tell you, I
    do not know how many people are going to read this whole thing.
    I would be curious, General, as to whether or not you would
    comment on that. I was able to go through here and find the
    bottom line, a bottom line slide, and to some extent in the
    executive summary.
        But at some point in time, these products need to be
    consumed, and it is tough, tough reading to get through this
    thing. This is really important stuff. This is it. This is why
    these bureaucracies have frozen these families into a level of
    stress that we just simply cannot accept for our wounded and
    their loved ones.
        I am curious, how many people do you think in the Army have
    read this entire document, besides the people in the IG's
    office that wrote it and reviewed it?
        General Schoomaker. First of all, that document is the
    result of Secretary Harvey directing a year ago----
        Senator McCaskill. Right, in April 2006.
        General Schoomaker. April 2006, because of--and things have
    been getting fixed as we go along. So I do not know how many
    people are going to read it, but I can tell you the right
    people are going to read it. We have Tiger Teams on top of this
    thing. What I believe is that that will only be a piece of what
    we will find as we go through it. Because of the nature of what
    started that, I think we are going to find lots of things that
    we need to work on.
        One of the things I think we already testified to is, title
    10, which is what DOD operates under, has a different set of
    criteria than title 38, which is what the VA operates under,
    and I understand Social Security is in even different. So this
    really is going to require strategic level transformation and
    it is going to have to be driven all the way down into
    something that is coherent, because I believe that the
    fundamental distrust and frustration that people have in this
    business, compensation system, is as fundamental as the
    differences in compensation tables and all the kinds of stuff
    that are extraordinarily difficult to read, and it leads one to
    believe--I mean, if the VA can give 70 percent for something
    that DOD gives 40 percent for, there is a fundamental problem
    here in terms of people's confidence that this is a system that
    works.
        So I think that that is only going to be one piece of it,
    and I think a lot of people are going to read this and that
    they are going to be the people that need to read it so that
    the leadership can change it.
        Senator McCaskill. I hope that there will be some attempt
    to simplify some of the information that is contained in this
    report. Make sure the Physical Evaluation Board Liaison
    Officers (PEBLOs) read it systemwide. The PEBLOs need to read
    this. The people that are working, the doctor who signs the
    narrative summary and it takes 2\1/2\ weeks for it to go across
    the hall. The person responsible for getting that narrative
    summary across the hall needs to read this.
        I just think the nature of this document makes it tougher,
    and probably I should be having this conversation with the DOD
    IG. But I think that to pull out parts of it and simplify it
    and make it in a very consumable product for the people in the
    system, and then maybe they would realize that their part of
    the system may be part of the problem.
        General Schoomaker. I think that is a point very well
    taken.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you very much. Thank you both.
        Mr. Geren. Let me just mention one thing in response to
    that. We are going to work to make this system work better and
    that is long-term. But in the short-term, there is--and you
    address it in the legislation you propose--really no substitute
    for having effective patient advocates for these soldiers that
    are in rehab and getting treated. We are not going to wait
    until that bureaucracy is fixed to stand up for these soldiers.
    The command sergeant major that works for them, this colonel
    that is going to head up this brigade, and this new position
    that was just created, a deputy commanding general at Walter
    Reed, a one-star general, his job is going to be bureaucracy-
    buster. We are not going to wait for the final fix. These
    soldiers are going to have an advocate in that command sergeant
    major, are going to have an advocate in that colonel, and going
    to have an advocate at the top of the system, this deputy
    commanding general that is going to be working directly for
    Major General Eric B. Schoomaker, USA, and make sure that they
    are represented effectively and that their needs are met today,
    not weeks from now, years from now, or decades from now when
    this whole system is fixed.
        Senator McCaskill. I think that is great. I tell you what
    would really, you would get some--I would be clicking my heels
    if you could fix some of this stuff before all these
    commissions even finish meeting, because I have a feeling that
    might take a while.
        Mr. Geren. We did put some fixes in place and some of them
    are ones that you called for in your legislation. I would like
    to get with you and brief you and show you on the ground the
    things that we have already taken. In fact, your 800 line, we
    are going to have an 800 line up and operational by March 19.
        Senator McCaskill. Congratulations. That is great news.
        Chairman Levin. We welcome your assurance earlier in the
    hearing that you are not waiting for those panels. As Senator
    McCaskill says, that is not what your intent is. You are making
    these changes as soon as you possibly can and you are not going
    to delay them for any report of any of the panels which are
    going to be appointed.
        Mr. Geren. Changes have already been made. They are being
    made as we sit here today and they are going to continue, I
    assure you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you. Senator McCaskill, thank you.
        Senator Chambliss.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, let me echo the sentiments of my colleagues in
    thanking you for your service to our country. Pete, you and I
    go back to our early days, my early days in the House and our
    service together in the House Armed Services Committee, and you
    have once again stepped in to fill a position in a time of
    crisis and, on behalf of all of us, we thank you for your great
    service.
        General, we are sorry to see you moving on, but you also
    stepped forward in a very critical time in the history of our
    country and when you were called by the Secretary to put that
    uniform on once again you did not hesitate. So we thank you for
    your great service.
        I cannot tell you how much I appreciate your recognizing
    these three men you brought with you this morning. One of them
    happens to be a good friend of mine, Staff Sergeant David
    Hatton. He is a great Georgian, but most importantly he is a
    great American, and I have seen him operate in theater as well
    as out of theater, and he represents everything that is great
    about America.
        I am proud of all those members of the 48th Brigade, but
    folks like Staff Sergeant Hatton just exemplify why we have to
    continue to equip and train the National Guard and our Reserves
    so that they are a seamless operation with our Active-Duty
    Force. Under your leadership, we have certainly seen that
    continued and it is a true statement more so today than ever
    before that there is a seamless transition when they are thrown
    into combat together.
        Gentlemen, you mentioned in your written statement that you
    are in the process of rebalancing and redistributing forces
    within the active, Guard, and Reserve components to create the
    right mix of high-demand units in each of our Active Duty and
    Reserve components. Specifically, you are focusing on the units
    and the skills that are in the greatest demand, including
    infantry, engineer, military police, intelligence, civil
    affairs, and psychological operations, just to name a few of
    them.
        My question is that if I am a member of the Guard or
    Reserve who happens to be in one of those high-demand career
    fields, such as civil affairs or military police, and my
    position or unit gets shifted to Active Duty, what happens to
    me? Where do I go as a member of the Guard or Reserve in that
    instance?
        General Schoomaker. We are building greater capacity, both
    Active and Reserve component, in those kinds of things that you
    are talking about. However, there are some people that may
    require reclassification. In other words, on the Active side,
    we have reduced certain capabilities to increase others within
    the different components. We have had to reclassify soldiers,
    put them into another career field and do that. We have done
    some of that same thing in the Reserve components.
        Senator Chambliss. So does that Guard or Reserve member get
    a choice then as to where he is redirected?
        General Schoomaker. To a certain extent, yes, sir, in terms
    of--and I probably ought to have Clyde Vaughn or Jack Schultz
    talk about it a little bit, because I think they each have
    different challenges in that regard. Part of what they are
    doing as they are transforming both the Guard and Reserve is
    looking at what the relationships of this unit against the
    demographics are and how they are reassociating units in a
    better way in terms of how to sustain and retain the soldiers
    that way.
        I do not know if--where are you at?
        General Vaughn. Down here, sir.
        General Schoomaker. There you are. Go ahead.
        General Vaughn. Sir, with regard to high usage and military
    police (MPs)--we are all picking up a lot of MPs--what we are
    doing is, what we did some time back----
        Chairman Levin. May I suggest you get to a mike.
        General Vaughn. Yes, sir.
        What we did some time back with BCTs--there was a great
    discussion about what the requirement was. What our requirement
    was for was a lot of infantry forces along with the engineers
    and MPs, as you so well pointed out. So we went through a
    transition to move this into maneuver enhancement brigades,
    which actually makes it a more usable organization for our
    States. We will end up keeping actually more infantry
    battalions. We will grow MPs, we will grow engineers.
        There is some turbidity associated with modularity in terms
    of our combat forces and there will have to be some retraining
    that goes with that. But in the end soldiers will have an
    adjustment period. If they have to switch to another military
    occupational specialty, they will be offered the chance to go
    outside of the 50 miles. But we try to keep them within the 50
    miles. I think that overall what we are trying to do is to keep
    the turbulence down the best we can in the Army National Guard
    and the Army at a time of great turbulence just by design. So I
    hope we are trying to work through that in the best possible
    manner.
        Senator Chambliss. I think you are smart to try to make
    sure that in these high-demand fields we take advantage of the
    capabilities of each of these individuals and their respective
    professionals in the private sector. Obviously we are doing
    that and we do not want to lose that capability.
        Gentlemen, in your written statement you discuss your
    recruiting and your retention metrics for 2006 as well as
    recent years. What you say in your statement reflects what I
    have been hearing myself, which is that although you have not
    necessarily met every goal every year, the recruiting and
    retention remain strong across the Army.
        First I would like to commend you for that because I think
    it is a reflection of the great leadership that we have seen in
    the Army, and even as hard as we are working soldiers today,
    that they still want to sign up and resign up to be a part of
    the Army is a great testimony to that leadership.
        In particular I think it is important to note that the
    retention rate for soldiers in the Guard and Reserve components
    that are deployed is higher than those who have not, which is
    amazing in some respects. But it is truly a testimony to the
    type of people that we have serving in our military today.
        Now, I have introduced a bill in the Senate which would
    lower the age at which Guard and Reserve members can retire by
    3 months for every 90 days they spend on Active Duty in support
    of a contingency operation. One of the reasons I have
    structured that bill the way I have is to incentivize mid-
    career personnel who are being deployed and stand to be
    deployed again to stay in the Service by giving them an
    additional incentive.
        Some observers of the military personnel system have noted
    that two unknowns related to how the current operations tempo
    is affecting our military are, number one, the long-term effect
    it will have on Guard and Reserve recruiting, and two, the
    effect multiple deployments will have on Guard and Reserve
    reenlistment. I would like for you to comment on what you think
    the long-term effect on multiple deployments will have on
    Reserve components, and are you seeing any trends in that area
    that cause you concern and what are some of the leading
    indicators that may indicate that we are having a problem or
    may not indicate that we are having a problem there?
        Mr. Geren. Let me first mention your legislation. I have
    reviewed your legislation. Across the Service--Active, Guard,
    and Reserve--we are looking at the retention issue and
    obviously recruiting as well, what type of incentives we need
    to build into the system to make sure that we do recruit and
    retain, some the force overall and some targeted specialties.
    As we work to--it will be an evolving process. We will continue
    to change the incentive packages both in regard to retirement
    and compensation and other career choices. That will change as
    the needs of the Service change and also as the recruiting
    challenges change. But your legislation is something we are
    reviewing as part of this package.
        As far as recruiting overall, you noted correctly we have
    enjoyed tremendous success. We have met in the active component
    our recruiting goals 21 straight months, and we have seen that
    the soldiers who have deployed have reenlisted at a higher rate
    than those who have not. So the commitment of the soldiers has
    been inspiring, the commitment of the soldiers and their
    families.
        But we recognize over the coming years as we ask more and
    more of the force, as the force ages, we are going to have to
    do things to keep up with these recruiting challenges. Up until
    now we have been successful. I would like to just congratulate
    the Guard for one of the most innovative recruiting
    initiatives. They have turned every guardsman into a recruiter.
    Remember about a year ago when folks were speculating that the
    Guard would not meet its 350,000-person goal? They are going to
    do that soon. They have had tremendous success with that
    program and both the Reserve and the active Duty are looking at
    and going to school on what the Guard has done and what they
    have accomplished.
        So we recognize the challenge here. We recognize as we have
    more deployments, we are an All-Volunteer Force in a long war.
    We have never had an All-Volunteer Force in modern times fight
    a war of this length. It poses some challenges that we have not
    addressed before. But we have soldiers that are willing to step
    up to the line and we have leaders that continue to adapt the
    system to make sure we meet the needs of these soldiers and
    their families.
        Senator Chambliss. Let me just say too, General Schoomaker,
    I have the same concern that Senator McCaskill does about the
    C-17 issue. We are flying that airplane today at 150 percent of
    projected mission rates, and shutting that line down is going
    to be a terrible mistake that we will regret. I just hope we
    are going to be able to figure out some way to make sure that
    that does not happen.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
        Senator Webb.
        Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, good to see you. General, I not only thank
    you for your service, but I wish you godspeed and, to
    paraphrase another former general, I doubt that you are going
    to fade away. I think we are going to be hearing from you a
    good bit in the future.
        I would like to thank you and your staff also for the
    meetings that were arranged for me earlier this week. We had a
    great series of presentations with General Richard A. Cody,
    USA, and Major General Stephen Speakes, USA, which was really
    good for me as a former Assistant Secretary of Defense, where I
    was working with the Army every day on these force structure
    issues and this sort of thing to get up to speed on Army
    reorganization, streamlining the divisional structure,
    uniformity in terms of falling in on other people's gear when
    you are rotating in and out. Also, the streamlining of the
    Guard and Reserve missions, which have been mentioned here, and
    the hard work that has gone in to find compatibility with local
    needs of the different States, those sorts of things--just a
    tremendous amount of really forward thinking, and I would
    congratulate you and all your staff on that.
        General Schoomaker. Sir, thanks for taking, investing the
    time.
        Senator Webb. I would like to say something else I think
    that is really vitally important right now in the way that we
    are addressing this whole series of issues that spun out of
    Walter Reed. You made a comment which I think is really
    important in terms of the public understanding, and I would
    encourage the other Army leadership to be pretty
    straightforward in explaining it. That goes to the different
    nature historically in disability evaluations.
        It is one thing--we want the system to work better, no
    question about that. At the same time, there has been a
    different methodology over the years between what DOD looks at
    and what the VA looks at. I will give you a classic example,
    two brothers who are both good friends of mine. One is Colonel
    John McKay, former marine. He and I were wounded in the same
    bunker complex, although at different times. Had his eye shot
    out, could not even wear an artificial eye, shattered his
    sinus, busted his jaw. He fought to stay on Active Duty for 29
    years and was successful in doing that. When he retired from
    the Marine Corps, the Marine Corps gave him zero disability
    because they said: You are fit for duty; you returned to duty.
    He went over to the VA and got a very high percentage.
        His brother did the same thing. His brother was a
    helicopter crew chief in Vietnam, was wounded badly, took
    shrapnel in his back, lost his patella. But he went from the
    hospital and returned to Vietnam and did another tour. He got
    back out and the Marine Corps gave him zero disability. They
    said: You are fit for duty; you returned to your unit. He
    walked across the street to the VA and got 60 percent.
        There may be a way that we can match these two disability
    evaluation systems and we certainly want to work to move toward
    fairness. But at the same time, I hope that the leadership in
    the military will help the American public understand that
    these have historically been two different systems.
        I have one concern in this budget and I raised it with you
    personally before, and it is the end strength build. I think
    the great challenge for the Army is going to be to justify the
    build with the prospect of troop levels in Iraq being reduced.
    I know you build your manpower to the requirements and these
    are your requirements. At the same time, we all know what
    manpower does. It is probably two-thirds of your budget when
    you get into recruiting, training, deploying, retiring, caring
    for people, caring for dependents, dependent schools, all those
    sorts of things. It is very, very costly. We are very manpower-
    intensive. We are the most manpower-intensive DOD budget in the
    world. That is why our budget looks so high when you put it
    next to China.
        When Secretary Gates was before us I asked him this
    question. He said to me that there would be what he called off-
    ramps built into the plan, given possible force structure
    reductions. I am wondering if that is actually in your planning
    phase or how you are looking at justifying the builds?
        General Schoomaker. The answer is no, it is not. My view is
    that would be a bad mistake, for this Nation to again reduce
    the United States Army. I do not think we should reduce the
    Army, I do not think we should reduce the Marine Corps, and I
    do not think we should reduce our Special Operations Forces.
        Senator Webb. No one is saying we should reduce the size of
    the Army. What I am saying is, in justifying the build in your
    end strength, your challenge is to justify the build in the
    environment in which we may be reducing force structure in
    Iraq. No one is saying to reduce the actual size. It is in
    terms of justifying the growth of the Army. That is the matrix
    in which you are going to be asked to do it.
        General Schoomaker. I know of no off-ramping that is going
    on. I think that we have taken a conservative look at how large
    the Army should be. I think the future is going to justify even
    a larger Army than we are currently building, because I do not
    believe that we are going to see as we go into this century the
    kind of reduction in requirement that some people hope for, and
    ``hope'' is the proper word.
        My view is that it is important that we pull this end
    strength growth inside the base budget, which all of it does
    come in starting in 2009. This year's budget, you see 7,000 of
    it coming inside, and I believe that what we are going to have
    to do is stay on course here and that the future is going to
    inform us on whether we have this about right or not.
        I am concerned about whether or not we have enough going
    towards building the institutional part of the Army that is
    required, because I think that is fundamental to some of these
    problems we have in things like training and at Walter Reed and
    other kinds of things. The Army right now of all the Services
    has the smallest percentage of its personnel end strength
    committed to the institution.
        Senator Webb. My instinct is to agree with you. I want to
    be able to justify that support based on numbers. But I did, I
    think as you and I discussed, I spent an entire year back in
    the 1980s analyzing Army force structure at the request of
    Secretary Weinberger. At that time the active-Duty Army was
    761,000.
        General Schoomaker. Much larger.
        Senator Webb. The bottom line justification after talking
    to Army force structure people was that, given the functions
    around the world, they have changed in some measure, but that
    12 divisions was about as low as the Army could afford to go if
    we are going to keep our place around the world.
        General Schoomaker. But you remember that the expectation
    of the Army's deployment was nothing compared to what we are
    experiencing.
        Senator Webb. True. We had 200,000 people in Germany at the
    time, arguably deployed, but not operational as they are now.
        General Schoomaker. That is correct. Living with their
    families, with basic quality of life, et cetera. We are talking
    about an Army that is operating at an extraordinary rate, and I
    think that this is not an anomaly. Now, there are a lot of
    people talking differently, but I hope that we do not find
    ourselves back into a position that we find ourselves needing
    an Army and Marine Corps and Special Operating Forces (SOF)
    again and we find ourselves back down at the bottom of the
    ramp.
        By the way, I go back to remembering when we were taking
    down SOF. When I first got into SOF many years ago, it was on
    the decline.
        Senator Webb. I remember that time.
        General Schoomaker. There was only three Special Forces
    groups left. It's just our nature, and I think what we ought to
    do is get informed about our nature and we ought to counter it,
    because it is a cycle.
        Senator Webb. I appreciate your comments. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
        Senator Collins.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, you pointed out this morning that 55 percent of
    our total force is now Guard and Reserve, if I understood you
    correctly; is that correct?
        General Schoomaker. That is correct, yes, ma'am.
        Senator Collins. That certainly explains to me why we have
    what I consider to be an overreliance on our Guard and Reserve.
    Are you comfortable with that proportion? If you were designing
    the total force from scratch today or had a magic wand, what
    proportion would be Guard and Reserve?
        General Schoomaker. I would be much more comfortable if
    there was something more on the order of 60 percent Active and
    40 percent Reserve. I think our Active Force is too small. I
    think we are doing the right thing now in building this active
    Force. Again, if we are going to maintain this level of balance
    then we are going to have to invest in the Guard and Reserve to
    make sure that they are effective as an operational Reserve,
    which I think we are doing.
        Senator Collins. I was really surprised that more than a
    majority of the force was Guard and Reserve, and that seems
    like an issue this committee should really take a hard look at
    in terms of whether we have the right force structure and
    whether we are asking too much of our Guard and Reserve.
        General Schoomaker. If I could be so bold, since this might
    be my last hearing----
        Senator Collins. That is why I am asking.
        General Schoomaker.--and it might not, but there is a lot
    more political constituency for Guard and Reserve, and I
    believe it was not taken down proportionately because of the
    political clout that the Guard and Reserve has as opposed to an
    Active Force. So there is no military rhyme or reason for us to
    be where we are. It has to do with the politics. I think that
    what we need to do is we need to get ourselves organized for
    the realities of the future and we ought to balance ourselves
    in such a way that is commensurate with how we are going to use
    these forces.
        Senator Collins. Since I chair, or used to chair rather,
    the Homeland Security Committee, I am also very aware of the
    role that the Guard plays in responding to natural disasters
    and other emergencies. I am just concerned about how much we
    are asking the Guard to do.
        General Schoomaker. Ma'am, if I could just say something
    here. I am a big fan of the Guard and Reserve.
        Senator Collins. As am I.
        General Schoomaker. I think that in this century that we
    had better have an effective Guard and Reserve, not only to
    reinforce us operationally away, but we better get better at
    our homeland security, homeland defense issues. I do believe
    that we are on borrowed time when it comes to what is going on
    in this century.
        Senator Collins. I certainly agree with you.
        I want to switch to a different issue and ask both of you
    to comment on the next question. All of us have seen how the
    advances in military medicine, the extraordinary treatment on
    the battlefield, have allowed far more of our injured troops to
    survive than in other conflicts. But in the last week I have
    met with constituents, including a neurologist, who have
    expressed to me significant concern about the increased number
    of traumatic brain injury (TBI) cases and whether they are
    being caught and screened.
        This neurologist from Maine in particular told me of a
    soldier who came to him who had been diagnosed with post-
    traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and that was not the problem
    at all. He had a TBI that had been missed.
        I also met with some other experts from Maine. I have had
    letters from constituents who have expertise in dealing with
    these injuries, and they are expressing a pattern that I am
    seeing here, a common concern that some of our troops are being
    diagnosed as just having--not ``just,'' because it is serious
    as well, but as having PTSD, when in fact they have a TBI.
        They explained to me that that is an injury that can be a
    silent killer if it is misdiagnosed. Many of these individuals
    have advocated that every servicemember should be screened for
    TBI upon their return from deployment, as well as at
    separation.
        General, I am going to ask you to comment first. Should we
    be doing more in this area? Are we providing sufficient
    funding? I am very concerned about this. It is coming up from
    people whom I really respect and who are giving me actual cases
    of Maine soldiers with brain injury who are misdiagnosed.
        General Schoomaker. I think I share your concern. I will
    tell you, of course I am not an expert on this, but my brother
    is commander at Walter Reed now and he has been my brother for
    a long time and he has been informing me about his concerns
    about the things we do not know about this and how it is
    emerging now, the body of knowledge is increasing on it. It is
    very confusing.
        I will tell you, yesterday I happened to be at one of our
    regional medical centers looking at, just checking things out
    and talking to the leaders and stuff. I will not name which one
    this is, but there was a soldier there that had been diagnosed
    with PTSD that never deployed. So we are finding--one would
    say, how could this be? The fact of the matter is there are all
    kinds of traumatic things that can occur in life that have
    these kinds of symptoms. Of course, when we have a soldier that
    is on Active Duty with this, whether it is Guard, Reserve, or
    an Active soldier, we have a responsibility to treat it
    regardless of the cost.
        So I think this is an area that has not been well-
    understood, that because of this we are now learning a lot
    more. I believe your concerns are valid, that we must explore
    this and must make sure that we understand, because this is a
    readiness issue. If these effects are delayed effects, there is
    no commander that wants to have somebody with these kinds of
    problems committed back in another rotation into combat. That
    is not what any logical commander would want.
        So if we do not understand how to measure it and we do not
    know what it looks like and these things have delayed effects,
    then we have to get smarter pretty quick here because of the
    nature of how we are operating.
        Senator Collins. Secretary Geren.
        Mr. Geren. On that same point, does our disability system
    accurately reflect that injury and anticipate the impact of
    that injury later in that soldier's life? Those are issues we
    have to examine. The Surgeon General has appointed a task
    force, with the southeast medical commander, to look at TBI
    specifically. But there is much we have to learn about that.
        You also mentioned PTSD. We now estimate 10 to 15 percent
    of all of our soldiers that are coming back from deployment are
    experiencing some degree of PTSD. These are two issues that we
    are concentrating on, have deep concerns about, certainly share
    your concerns. But I would be the first to tell you we have a
    lot to learn in that area. When you think about it, the issues
    are varied as well. It is not just medical, not just clinical.
    But just as in civilian life, people are reluctant to come
    forward and deal with psychological or emotional problems. The
    culture is the same in the Army, maybe more so. There is a
    reluctance to admit you have a problem in that area.
        We now have a predeployment and postdeployment assessment,
    a mental health assessment for all of our soldiers. We are
    making headway in that area, but we have a ways to go. The
    long-term look at the disability system is going to have to
    look at these areas and make sure we are capturing the needs of
    the soldiers now and the needs of the soldiers long-term. I do
    not think right now we could say that we are doing that
    effectively.
        Senator Collins. I agree. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
        Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thanks, Mr. Secretary, General Schoomaker. Thank you very
    much to the impressive group behind you, I might say. Thanks
    for your service to our country at a very challenging time. In
    fairness, thanks to Secretary Harvey in absentia for the great
    job that he did.
        General Schoomaker, I join everybody in wishing you well in
    the next chapter. It has been a real honor to get to know you.
    You have been in my opinion a very strong leader in the Army.
    You have also been a uniquely persistent and I think effective
    advocate for the Army, both within Congress and within the
    Pentagon. That is really very important for the Army and for
    our country.
        I want to just say a word about the last subject before I
    go to some questions about Walter Reed. I do not want to spend
    my time on a question, but I think I am going to put a letter
    to you, Mr. Secretary, maybe to the Surgeon General. At the
    hearing we had about the Walter Reed problems on this
    committee, I raised the question about whether we should take a
    second look at the BRAC decision about Walter Reed. I do not
    have a conclusion about it, but here is the question that I
    want to raise. I wonder whether there was adequate attention
    paid by the BRAC to the demands on our health care, our
    military health care system, that will be generated now and in
    the years ahead as a result of the very high level of activity
    of engagement that the Army will have in the war we are in with
    radical Islam, which is not going to end any time soon.
        It just seems to me that, notwithstanding the horrific,
    embarrassing conditions of Building 18, that some of the
    buildings out there are state-of-the-art. It could well be that
    it still makes sense to move them all to different places and
    build some new stuff, but I am thinking really more in terms of
    demands on the system and whether this is the right moment. I
    am not talking about not doing anything up at Bethesda, but
    whether this is the right moment to close down that facility as
    we see a lot more demand coming along.
        I am not going to ask you to answer that right now. I will
    send you a letter on it.
        Those thanks I offered for your service----
        Senator Warner. Senator, would you--before you joined us
    here, I raised that question. This is on my time. We will not
    take yours.
        I suggest--I am trying to work through, and I would enjoy
    your advice on it, a system by which recognizing Walter Reed is
    currently playing a vital role and recognizing there is some
    uncertainty about when Bethesda through additional construction
    and funding can take part of Walter Reed and a new hospital--
    and a spade has not even been put in the ground down at Fort
    Belvoir--that Congress look at staying the timetable of the
    closure of Walter Reed and, as the Chief of Staff and the
    Secretary said, maintaining the quality of care with funds
    until there is a perfect meshing of the gear wheels as Walter
    Reed goes out and the other two medical centers come on line.
        So that is what we are looking at now.
        Senator Lieberman. Senator Warner, I think that is a very
    good proposal and I would support it. Here is the question. I
    go beyond that. I would like somebody who is much more of an
    expert on this than I am to make some projections about what
    the demands on the Army's medical system are going to be for
    the next 25, 30 years, and to decide whether, assuming a
    seamless transition, the new facilities that are contemplated
    are going to be enough to handle it, so that we do not look
    back and say, why the heck did we close some of those buildings
    at Walter Reed; they were just state-of-the-art. Besides we
    need the space.
        This is a non-expert question I am asking. That is why I am
    going to ask it of the experts. But in either case, I think
    your idea is an excellent idea.
        Mr. Geren. If I could just add one point.
        Senator Lieberman. Yes.
        Mr. Geren. This is addressing the need in the short-term.
    General Eric Schoomaker, the head of Walter Reed, one of the
    initiatives he has already undertaken in the short time he has
    been there is to look across the system outside of Walter Reed
    and where the services can be performed elsewhere in the
    medical system, make sure we are utilizing the capacity
    elsewhere as well. That kind of a look at the system I think is
    overdue, and I applaud General Schoomaker for looking out
    across the system and making sure that we are utilizing all of
    our capacity as best we can, making sure that we continue at
    Walter Reed to provide the highest quality care. I assure you
    he is committed to that.
        But he has undertaken a review and tasked his staff to look
    at other options to make sure that we use all the resources to
    meet all of our soldiers' needs and do not let any area go
    underutilized.
        Senator Lieberman. That is encouraging news and I
    appreciate it.
        When I thanked you earlier for the tremendous job you and
    your whole leadership team have done in the Army under
    difficult circumstances, I really mean it and I mean it in part
    because of what you two have said here today--and General, you
    have said it for quite a while now--which is that this is a
    classic where demands are going way up on the Army and to a
    certain extent supply has not gone up commensurately. By that I
    mean I believe the Army, as you do, is underfunded and
    understaffed, and it has been quite remarkable we have been
    able to do what you have been able to do. But this cannot go on
    the way it has been.
        As you come to the end of this career, assuming that no one
    convinces you to come back out of retirement, you said a few
    times that you do not think the current increase in end
    strength to 547,000--which incidentally does not happen until
    fiscal year 2013--that that is not enough, and that is my
    suspicion.
        Assuming for a moment that the money is not an issue, how
    high would you take the end strength of the Army?
        General Schoomaker. Well, sir, first of all, let me say
    that, remember the 30,000 that we have been growing is a down
    payment on the 74,000 that we are talking about.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        General Schoomaker. Our estimates were that we probably,
    our conservative estimates in the past, were we probably ought
    to see an active end strength somewhere around 565,000,
    something like that. But my concern really goes back to the
    institutional thing that I was talking to Senator Webb about. I
    worry that we have taken too much risk in the important aspects
    of the Army, like the medical system, like the education and
    training system, the kinds of things that support and are so
    important to the Army, because we have taken a lot of
    efficiencies there and I worry we have overreached a little.
        Senator Lieberman. Talk a little bit more, get down a
    little deeper into that, because that was the next question I
    was going to ask you. The institutional Army is, except in a
    moment of great unexpected public attention like the Walter
    Reed situation, is the part of the Army that nobody really sees
    or generally sees outside of the Army. So what is happening and
    why is it happening? Who are we talking about?
        General Schoomaker. We are talking about all of the
    business side of the Army. We are talking about drill sergeants
    and instructors and teachers and people that support
    maintenance, all of the kinds of things that happen. I am not
    just talking about headquarters now. I am talking about people
    who make--they are the people down in the engine room of the
    Army, that keep the--as an example, and this is--each of the
    Services is different and it is not fair to mirror image
    because they are not mirror images of each other. But the Navy
    and the Air Force, almost 50 percent of their structure is in
    the institution.
        Senator Lieberman. The Army?
        General Schoomaker. We are down, we have gone from about 31
    percent. We are on a move down I think to around 27 percent.
        Senator Lieberman. Much too low in your opinion?
        General Schoomaker. It is too low. So when you take a look
    at Walter Reed--I was talking yesterday; as I said, I was at a
    medical center. We have lots of soldiers now that are being
    supervised by civilians. I am not sure that is the smartest way
    to develop our medical personnel through the system, not just
    because of the technical thing, but because of the leadership
    side and because of the professional development aspect of it.
        So I applaud what we have done to move soldiers into the
    operational force, but we may be on a path of overreaching in
    terms of what is smart for the long-term.
        Senator Lieberman. That is what I was going to ask you.
    Maybe it is self-evident. Is the institutional Army down in
    percentage because you have had to take soldiers out of the
    institutional Army into the operational Army?
        General Schoomaker. Yes. Part of our program of trying to
    grow the Army in this time of war is to move civilians into
    positions that civilians can do that does not require a soldier
    totally to do. We just have to be careful with that. I am not
    suggesting it is not the right thing to do, but we have to be
    careful how far we go with that. There may be a couple areas
    where we have overreached a little.
        I am concerned about Training and Doctrine Command as an
    example, which is where we train and educate our force.
        Senator Lieberman. Yes, exactly.
        General Schoomaker. It is a very, very important part of
    what we do. The Medical Command is another. Our institutions--
    part of the situation we had at Walter Reed is a direct result
    of the A-76 study and the garrison that is out there. All of
    our installations out there are run by garrisons. That is part
    of the institutional Army. It is not part of the operational
    Army. Somebody has to repair the roof and fix the plumbing and
    mow the grass and all the kinds of things you have to do so
    that we do not have these soldiers coming out of the
    battlefield and running lawnmowers and then going back to the
    battlefield. We have to train them and have them go.
        So that is the kind of thing I am talking about, and I
    think we may be on the path of overreaching just a little bit
    there.
        Senator Lieberman. Thank you very much for your words. I
    hope they resonate and echo throughout the years ahead and I
    wish you well and your family well. Thank you.
        General Schoomaker. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
        On the issue that Senator Lieberman raised and was talking
    to Senator Warner about, you have indicated that the new head
    of Walter Reed, General Schoomaker, is doing a study of the
    utilization of all of our medical facilities. I am wondering,
    who is doing this review?
        Mr. Geren. It is not a study. He actually instructed his
    staff to look to put patients where you have facilities that
    are underutilized; actually an operational decision, not a
    study, but to identify opportunities so we could make sure we
    could continue to meet the needs at Walter Reed and use
    capacity elsewhere.
        Chairman Levin. Who is going to be doing this review of the
    timing and the need for Walter Reed, whether or not we should
    reconsider? Is there someone who has the responsibility inside
    the Army to be taking another look at the Walter Reed BRAC
    issue plus the need issue which Senator Lieberman raises, the
    timing issue which Senator Warner raises? Is that
    responsibility assigned to somebody?
        Mr. Geren. There is a task force and the Army is
    represented on it. It is a joint task force that looks at all
    the issues, the planning for the new facility.
        Chairman Levin. No, not just that. But there is a new issue
    that has been raised, should we reconsider at least the timing,
    but maybe even the total desirability of the Walter Reed
    closing decision? Obviously we ought to be very careful because
    it is a BRAC issue and it is decided and once you reopen that
    issue all hell breaks loose in terms of a lot of other BRAC
    decisions which would like to be reviewed by some people.
        But my question is, is there such a review going on of, the
    review of Walter Reed's closing, both in terms of desirability
    and timing to do the seamless approach that Senator Warner
    talked about and the need issue which Senator Lieberman has
    raised? Is that assigned to somebody?
        Mr. Geren. At this point the decision is to proceed with
    BRAC. Dr. Robert M. Gates has focused on this personally and I
    have been at meetings with Dr. Gates and discussed this. We do
    not want to reopen BRAC. We want to make sure that Bethesda and
    Belvoir are done and done on time or sooner and make sure that
    we maintain the quality at Walter Reed up until that point.
    That is the commitment of the DOD.
        Chairman Levin. I think what you better do at a minimum is
    to get to this Mr. Chairman a letter telling us how that
    seamless transition is supposed to--what is the current plan,
    what is the capacity of Walter Reed, how is that capacity going
    to be handled seamlessly if we proceed on the course that we
    are on. Can you get us some kind of an overview of that so we
    have something specific, at least as a starting point?
        Mr. Geren. I will, Mr. Chairman.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Military Health System (MHS) Base Realignment and Closure
    (BRAC) 2005 actions in the National Capital Region (NCR) include the
    realignment of Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) to the Walter
    Reed National Military Medical Center (WRNMMC) in Bethesda, MD; a new
    community hospital at Fort Belvoir, VA; and closure of the WRAMC main
    post.
        WRNMMC will be a combination of new construction and partial
    renovation of the existing National Naval Medical Center. As currently
    planned, construction at Bethesda will start in March 2008.
    Establishing the new Fort Belvoir community hospital will involve all
    new construction and will start in January 2008.
        At Bethesda, prior to initiation of construction, there will be a
    transition plan ensuring continuation of services and capacity
    throughout the duration of the project. This transition plan will
    likely involve use of ``swing space'' on the Bethesda campus, plus the
    potential need to consolidate clinical service(s) or support functions
    at WRAMC while portions of NNMC are under construction.
        In October 2010, construction of the new medical facilities will be
    complete. In mid-to-late fiscal year 2011, there will be a final
    transition from WRAMC to WRNMMC, plus a transition from WRAMC to the
    new Fort Belvoir community hospital. These late fiscal year 2011
    transitions will be part of closing the WRAMC main post.
        The transition plan at WRNMMC will be tightly linked to the
    construction schedule. The design effort for the WRNMMC is not
    sufficiently advanced to provide a construction schedule. Once a
    sequence of construction is established, then NCR planners will develop
    a parallel transition plan that migrates/moves services and functions
    such that NCA multi-service market maintains clinical capability and
    throughput. It is anticipated the transition plan will be completed
    late in calendar year 2007.
        In keeping with Joint Commission requirements, the transition
    planning will include specific attention to facility related life-
    safety issues, infection control, and robust clinical case management
    to ensure no disruption in continuity of care. Transition planning will
    focus on aggregation of projects to minimize number and duration of
    moves. When physical movement of a service is necessary, the transition
    site will have all amenities required for patients and families. In
    addition to these non-negotiable clinical tenets, the transition plan
    will include a vigorous communications plan providing:

             Advance notice of move
             Education and training about new sites or pathways
             Trained support staff to assist patients and families
            with transition related issues/concerns

        On May 25, 2007, the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved the
    Acceleration/Enhanced Scope initiatives at WRNMMC and the new Fort
    Belvoir community hospital. The Acceleration/Enhanced Scope initiative
    at WRNMMC will simplify transition planning as the functions necessary
    to accomplish high acuity inpatient care will have optimal adjacencies,
    be consolidated at one location in the NCR, and include family support
    services.

        Chairman Levin. I have two questions. I know Senator Warner
    has a couple. On FCSs, General, the Army recently adjusted the
    FCS program and deleted 2 of the 18 planned systems, deferring
    two more, and taking $3.4 billion out of the program over the
    fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2013 POM years. Were there
    problems with the program or was that a budgetary decision?
        General Schoomaker. Sir, we were cut over. Over the last
    several years we have been getting cut a little bit each year.
    So what we are trying to do is set our priorities and keep it
    within executability.
        Chairman Levin. So that was a budget issue.
        Another medical question which has arisen recently has to
    do with reports that the Third Infantry Division (I.D.) has
    changed the medical profiles of soldiers who have medical
    conditions so that they could be sent to Iraq as part of the
    Third I.D.'s accelerated deployment to support the surge. Did
    the Third Infantry Division change the medical profiles of the
    Third I.D. soldiers so that they would be deployable?
        Mr. Geren. Sir, I am aware of those allegations and
    concerns. Major General Rick Lynch, the commander, has
    conducted a commander's inquiry into those allegations. I have
    requested that commander's inquiry. I have not received it yet.
    We take any allegation of that seriously, as did the commanding
    general on sight, and the commander's inquiry is completed and
    I have requested to have it sent to me and I will review it and
    share the results with you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Department of the Army Inspector General conducted a thorough
    inquiry into this matter. The issue that soldiers with medical profiles
    assigned to the 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division (3rd BCT, 3 ID) were
    reevaluated and their physical profiles improperly changed was found in
    only 1 instance of the 75 cases reviewed.
        Of the 75 soldiers assigned to the 3rd BCT who were reevaluated by
    medical personnel in February 2007 at the direction of the commander,
    only one soldier's profile was improperly changed, allowing that
    soldier to be deployed in March 2007. That soldier had a permanent P3
    profile that was improperly changed. When the soldier continued to have
    medical issues, he was reevaluated in theater and redeployed to Fort
    Benning, GA, on April 9, 2007.
        This soldier's medical profile was improperly changed from ``P3''
    (a permanent profile indicating one or medical conditions or physical
    defects that may require significant limitations) to ``P2'' (some
    medical condition or physical defect that may require activity
    limitations) and was subsequently deployed. However, the evidence
    indicated that the soldier's ``P3'' profile was changed to ``P2''
    because the reviewing physician mistakenly believed that the ``P3''
    profile had not been properly approved by two profiling officers, one
    of whom was a physician approving authority, as required by AR 40-501.
        Evidence also indicated that the profiles of five other 3rd BCT
    soldiers were properly changed from ``P3'' to ``P2''. These changes
    were authorized because these profiles had not been properly approved
    by two authorized physicians as required. After being reviewed, these
    profiles were properly changed and these soldiers deployed. Five other
    soldiers had their profiles changed from ``P2'' to ``P3'' and those
    soldiers did not deploy. The profiles of the remaining 64 soldiers
    under review were not changed. Evidence indicated that 34 of the
    soldiers whose profiles were reviewed actually deployed.
        The issue that commanders and leaders improperly ordered soldiers
    to perform duties and functions in violation of their physical profiles
    was not founded. In several cases, soldiers presumed that they could
    not be deployed to Iraq because of their temporary profiles and that
    deployment, in and of itself, would violate their profiles. AR 40-501,
    Standards of Medical Fitness, states that properly processed medical
    profiles do not, in and of themselves, determine a soldier's
    deployability. Rather, a medical profile is a recommendation from a
    medical professional. The decision to deploy a soldier remains with the
    commander. For example, a soldier with a properly processed profile
    could be assigned to serve in an administrative role. In most cases, a
    soldier could perform that duty, within the limits recommended by his
    or her profile, at his or her home station, or deployed. Although a
    commander that is responsible for accomplishing a wartime mission would
    likely want to deploy with as many of his or her soldiers as possible,
    no evidence suggested that 3rd BCT commanders tried or intended to
    compromise the medical welfare of their soldiers. Rather, the evidence
    reflected that soldiers were deployed and assigned duties and functions
    within their physical limitations and consistent with their profiles.
    If the soldiers had received properly authorized P3 or P4 profiles they
    could not have been deployed until their profiles were referred and
    reviewed by a Military Occupational Specially Medical Retention Board
    or the soldiers had been processed through the Physical Disability
    Evaluation System and found to be fit.
        The issue that 3rd BCT, 3ID soldiers were intimidated and harassed
    in retaliation for informing Salon.com about their unit's deployment of
    soldiers who had physical profiles was not rounded. Evidence does not
    indicate soldiers were the subject of retribution for contacting the
    media. Nor is there evidence to indicate that the soldiers' chain of
    command pursued or threatened any acts of reprisal in retaliation for
    the soldiers' communications with the media.

        Chairman Levin. You do agree, though, that it would be
    inappropriate for an Army unit to change a soldier's medical
    profile to qualify that soldier for deployment to a combat
    zone? Would you agree with that?
        Mr. Geren. Yes, sir, if that was the motivation, yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. If that was the case.
        Mr. Geren. Circumstances may change and the profile may
    change, but as far as if that is the motivation, absolutely,
    sir.
        Chairman Levin. For that purpose it would be improper?
        Mr. Geren. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Warner.
        Mr. Geren. Mr. Chairman, could I correct the record on one
    point? I said 21 percent earlier. I was passed a note: It was
    19 percent, not 21 percent.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you for that correction.
        Mr. Geren. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. Chairman Levin, this has been a very good
    hearing and we are going to do our best to support the Army in
    every respect with its request. But we should close out in a
    recognition of the Army family, the support system that is
    probably the most important of all. We saw examples in the
    distressing chapter of Walter Reed where families were often
    filling the gap in many respects.
        I just want to get the assurance from both of you that this
    budget keeps in place, as best you can, those family systems
    whereby they can step in and help their uniformed member of
    that family in all types of circumstances.
        Mr. Geren. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. Is that correct?
        Mr. Geren. It does. The commitment of the Army is to ensure
    that we maintain the quality of life and we give the families
    what they deserve. The strain the families are under right now,
    it is humbling to consider it, and I can assure you that is our
    commitment, sir.
        General Schoomaker. I tell you, sir, we still need to get
    that military construction budget and the BRAC, because we have
    quality of life issues in there, we have child care centers in
    there, and all kinds of things that are part of that issue that
    you are talking about.
        Senator Warner. I hope that will be forthcoming. Not to
    point fingers at anyone here in Congress, those issues so far
    as I know are being addressed by our leadership to try and have
    those funds which are badly needed forthcoming. You are under
    that impression?
        Chairman Levin. Yes.
        Senator Warner. Thank you, gentlemen, very much. Your
    staff, the very impressive support team you have here today.
        Chairman Levin. Just one clarification. General, you talked
    about the definition of the surge and contrasting it with
    something which was----
        Senator Warner. Plus-up.
        Chairman Levin. Plus-up, as you call it. You indicated a
    surge--a surge, as it is characterized, there has to be a plan
    to come off of that surge. You indicated that it was your
    understanding that the plan would be somewhere between August
    and the end of the year to come off the surge. Is that an
    understanding which is shared by the Secretary of Defense?
        General Schoomaker. Sir, I cannot speak for the Secretary
    of Defense, but it is certainly that which has been discussed
    by the Chiefs.
        Chairman Levin. They understand that? Do all the Chiefs
    understand that?
        General Schoomaker. We understand that--our belief is that
    a surge is different than a plus-up. The timing is going to be
    dependent upon the commander on the ground in Iraq and the rest
    of it. But in our view, a surge is different than a plus-up.
        Chairman Levin. Is there a shared feeling that that would
    mean somewhere between August and the end of the year, as you
    feel?
        General Schoomaker. That is my personal belief. Now, what I
    have understood----
        Chairman Levin. Not necessarily?
        General Schoomaker. I have not had anybody tell me that is
    the official----
        Chairman Levin. Or that that is shared by the other Chiefs?
        General Schoomaker. Sir, I could not speak for the other
    Chiefs.
        Chairman Levin. How about the Chairman?
        General Schoomaker. Nor could I speak for him. That is
    certainly my understanding of my conversations with the
    Chairman. Whether or not he agrees with that----
        Chairman Levin. Is it your understanding that that is his
    understanding or you just do not have any understanding about
    that? Is it your understanding that that is also his
    understanding, or you just do not have----
        General Schoomaker. He heard me say that. I have not heard
    him make a decision or a conclusion or do anything definitive
    with it. I think that--and I am talking about the Chairman and
    the Secretary of Defense, in conversation with the Central
    Command Commander and General Petraeus on the ground, and I
    think this is an issue here. My understanding was that that was
    the ballpark that we were talking about.
        Chairman Levin. Have you heard anything different from the
    Chairman?
        General Schoomaker. I have heard no decision.
        Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, in view of the seriousness of
    the question, which both of us raised, perhaps we should
    collaborate on a letter to have this clarified, because it is,
    I think, extremely important to all, not only to Congress but
    to the DOD as it is carrying forth with this plan of the surge
    now.
        Chairman Levin. I do agree with that.
        Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        I wanted to come back, General, just for one last question
    about the end strength of the Army, because we got off on a
    discussion about the institutional Army, which was important.
    Look, my concern is that, with what we are facing around the
    world, that we are going to get to a point where our military
    strategy is going to be determined by a shortage of personnel,
    not by what is the best military strategy.
        I agree with you that the idea that the high-tech equipment
    is enough and we can use a smaller Army--with the conflict we
    are facing now, with the enemy we are facing now, if I might
    quote your straight talk, it is ludicrous.
        So I want to give you a chance, since this is your last
    appearance before us, to leave us with a goal. When I asked you
    what you thought the end strength of the Army should be, you
    said, I believe you said, a minimum or a conservative estimate
    would be 565,000.
        General Schoomaker. Active.
        Senator Lieberman. Active, exactly. What should our goal be
    beyond the minimum, beyond the conservative estimate, for what
    the Active Army should be in the years ahead?
        General Schoomaker. Sir, I think you almost have to go back
    and think of this in kind of a generic context. Strategy is the
    application of ends, ways, and means.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        General Schoomaker. You and I have had this conversation
    before.
        Senator Lieberman. Yes, we have.
        General Schoomaker. There are people that are very loose
    with talking about what the end state is and how we are going
    to get there, but very few people want to sign up to what it
    costs you, the means to get there. My view is we have a
    strategy right now that is outstripping the means to execute it
    and to sustain it. I think our current tempo of operations
    exceeds what the QDR said that our strategy was going to be and
    I believe that our resources up to this point have undershot
    even what the QDR said they are supposed to be.
        Senator Lieberman. Well said.
        General Schoomaker. So I think what we have to do is take a
    look at what do we believe the demand is going to be on this
    force, the joint force, into the future and, looking at that
    demand, how are we going to sustain that? Again, I go back to
    what--the QDR rule said that in normal times a soldier, sailor,
    airman, or marine on Active Duty should have three increments
    of dwell for every increment of deployed. We agreed that a
    surge was going to two increments of dwell for every increment
    deployed.
        We are now operating at one to one and going short of that.
    That is not sustainable. So what it says is the strategy is not
    resourced or the equation is not balanced in the strategy.
    Therefore, I think that what we have to do is say, what is the
    demand, and do the equation back and figure out what means are
    required.
        Now, the reality is we may come up with a number that is
    unaffordable, which means you have to change what end state you
    want to go to, or you have to come up with a different way of
    getting to the end state that you want.
        Senator Lieberman. Or you have to decide that the end state
    is important enough that you have to find a way to afford it.
        General Schoomaker. So then you get into the old, what I
    have talked in front of this committee many times about before
    as George Marshall said in the middle of World War II: Before
    the war, I had all the time in the world and no money; and now
    here I am in the middle of World War II and I have all kinds of
    resources and no time.
        So we put soldiers ashore 3 years after the Germans invaded
    Poland, without rifles. Every tank we put ashore in North
    Africa was knocked out. Patton landed with training ammunition.
    It is well-documented. This Nation has always gone to war
    short, because we get into the roller coaster. We are always
    late to need and therefore we pay a huge premium to get ready,
    and we are always late to need.
        Body armor. The United States Army when I came on board, we
    were manufacturing body armor at the rate of about 1,200 sets a
    month. It was going to take over 40 years to put body armor on
    the entire United States Army. We were manufacturing some 34
    up-armored Humvees. I mean, hell, there was less than 500 of
    them in the entire Army. We had a requirement for only 235 of
    them in Iraq. Today we have a demand of over 15,000 up-armored
    Humvees in Iraq and we have been through all kinds of
    iterations of getting there. Now we are going to MRAP.
        So what I am saying is we are acting very consistent with
    our past. I believe we ought to educate ourselves. We ought to
    look at what we are paying, what we can afford to pay, what our
    strategy requires, and we ought to resource it. We ought to
    quit trying to go on the cheap and we ought to quit worrying
    about what the traditional pie has been and who gets what, and
    we ought to talk about what this Nation's priorities and what
    our affordability is.
        I have been very consistent in the last 4 years talking
    this way. I believe we have made some progress, but I still
    think that we are undershooting the obvious. This is a very
    dangerous time. This Nation is at great risk for an enemy that
    we are not accustomed to fighting. We are adapting to that
    enemy. This is not the Cold War and the Soviet Union any more,
    and we are at risk here at home and we are going to have to
    deal with an enemy that is fighting in an irregular fashion,
    and even our other potential foes are now looking at these
    irregular techniques to incorporate into their conventional
    forces. We are going to see this in the future. It is not going
    to go away.
        Yet, in our own Department we still hear people talking
    that when this is over we are going to go back down to normal.
    There is no normal. This is the new normal. So I hate to be--I
    am sorry to be pedantic on this, but I really do believe this
    is real. I really do believe that we must take a very strong
    look at how we should balance this and we ought to talk about
    what strategy really is, the application of ends, ways, and
    means, and we ought to figure out whether our appetite is
    affordable or whether we are going to reduce our appetite to
    our checkbook or whether we are going to come up with different
    ways of doing business.
        But we have to come to grips with this.
        Senator Lieberman. That is a very wise statement built on
    experience, and it should be heard as a clarion call because
    the appetite here we are talking about is national security. If
    this is a long war, which I believe it is, which we are all
    calling it, we are not, to use your appropriate word,
    resourcing to fight that war.
        Also, the enemy we are facing is not going to be taken out
    with a lot of high tech equipment alone. This enemy will be
    defeated with personnel, with people.
        So I hope we can live up to, in the years ahead, to the
    charge and challenge that you leave us with, and every now and
    then we will expect you to come back and shout a little more to
    make sure we are.
        General Schoomaker. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. I think you also, though, would agree that
    it is not just a matter of adequacy of resources; it is a
    matter of where those resources and how those resources are
    allocated against a very different type of an enemy. It is not
    necessarily a larger amount, by the way. It may be. So we have
    to do it. But it also may be a very different way of allocating
    resources in terms of where we put our focus for a totally
    different kind of an enemy, for a much longer kind of a
    conflict.
        Senator Bill Nelson, I am going to not only call on you as
    our last questioner, but I am also going to ask you to close
    because I must leave. Senator Nelson.
        Thank you both, gentlemen, again.
        Senator Bill Nelson [presiding]. Mr. Chairman, adjusting to
    the new normal, maybe we ought to be listening to our generals,
    such as General Shinseki with regard to the occupation, and
    retired General Garner with regard to the disbanding of the
    Iraqi army once we were in.
        It is most revealing that in your comments about the
    equipment in adjusting to this new normal--it is not normal
    that mammas and daddies would be calling me in the early part
    of the war saying that their sons and daughters did not have
    the body armor, and that when the Florida National Guard got
    there that they did not have the kind of body armor that the
    other troops had. That is not normal.
        So it must be very frustrating to you as the Chief of Staff
    to have to deal with those kind of shortages.
        General Schoomaker. Sir, I would say that it is not right,
    but it has been consistent and normal with the way we have done
    business in the past, and it is not right. We should not
    continue to do business that way and we are not. We are
    resourcing the Guard and Reserve. We are resourcing the Active
    Force and we have asked for what we need and we are moving very
    fast.
        But quite frankly, my view is we should have started this
    fight resourced the way we are trying to get resourced now.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Amen to that.
        General Schoomaker. Which I think is your point.
        Mr. Geren. The differences that you refer to regarding the
    Guard, there were clear differences. They were not organized
    the same, they were not equipped the same, and they did not
    train the same. But our commitment now is to organize, train,
    and equip. It is one Army--Active, Guard, and Reserve--and we
    are making a significant investment to make sure that the Guard
    has the same kind of equipment that the Active-Duty does, over
    2005-2013 spending nearly $37 billion on Guard equipment alone,
    both modernization in aviation and in ground equipment.
        So the goal of this budget and this Department is to make
    sure they are organized, trained, and equipped the same, they
    are all one Army, best-led, best-trained, best-equipped Army we
    can put in the field.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Four years ago, as you said, they were
    not organized, equipped, or trained the same. Yet they were
    asked to do the same mission as the Active-Duty Forces.
        General Schoomaker. That is correct.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I want to ask you about recruiting.
    Your comments?
        General Schoomaker. We had the best year in 9 years in the
    Active Force and the best year in 13 years in the National
    Guard last year. We are on track again this year to have a very
    good recruiting year and meet our goals. I think it is
    extraordinary that 6 years into a wartime period that we are
    getting some very good young men and women that are stepping
    forward to do this. I think it is heartening.
        Senator Bill Nelson. How about the Reserves?
        General Schoomaker. The Army Reserves did about--Jack?
        General Stultz. Twenty-five percent higher than the year
    prior.
        General Schoomaker. Twenty-five percent higher than the
    year prior. They are still challenged a little bit more, but
    part of their challenge is that the primary source of Army
    Reserve soldiers is soldiers leaving Active-Duty, is one of
    their biggest. Of course, we are growing the Active Force and
    it really challenges the Army Reserve in that regard.
        Senator Bill Nelson. So the Army Reserves are meeting their
    goals in recruiting?
        Mr. Geren. They are not. The Army Reserve has fallen a
    little short. Active and Guard both are exceeding their goals
    in recruiting. They are all three exceeding their goals in
    retention. The Army Reserve I believe was at 90 percent last
    month--90 percent for recruiting, so 600 short of our goal.
        Senator Bill Nelson. So with regard to the Active Forces
    and the Guard, according to the last couple of years of
    recruiting it is going to meet our goals for not only keeping
    the force structure that we have, but increasing the force
    structure?
        General Schoomaker. That is correct.
        Senator Bill Nelson. That is a good report. What do you
    have to do about the Reserves to get them up?
        General Schoomaker. I will let the Chief of the Army
    Reserves talk about what he is doing, because he is pretty
    sharp and he is working hard.
        General Stultz. Yes, sir, and I happen to come from
    Florida.
        The Army Reserve right now, sir, we are about 600 short.
    Last year we recruited 25,000 soldiers. The year before we
    recruited 19,000. So we are on an upward slope of increasing.
    This year we have increased above what the 25,000--now we are
    saying we need about 28,000 to keep growing. What we are going
    to do is we are learning from the Guard and the Guard is saying
    that their strength is getting their soldiers to go out and
    recruit within their own communities. We are community-based.
    So we are taking that lesson and we are incorporating what
    Clyde Vaughn has already started and we are going out in our
    communities.
        But the other thing we are doing is, our soldiers are
    citizen soldiers and so what I have done is I have started
    talking to the employers of America and I have talked to police
    forces, I have talked to police departments in Florida, New
    York, California, Arizona. They are having a hard time filling
    their ranks. I have said: Why do we not work together? When I
    recruit a soldier, I am looking for a 17- to 24-year-old drug-
    free physically fit high-aptitude soldier. The chief of police
    in Queens, NY, I had a conversation with him 3 weeks ago, he
    said: I am looking for the same guy. I said: Then why do we not
    work together? Why do I not go into a high school and a kid
    says, I want to be in law enforcement, I will say: Join the
    Army Reserve and I can give you a job; where do you want to
    live?
        Schneider Trucking, J.B. Hunt Trucking are looking for
    truck drivers. I have truck drivers. Why do I not become an
    enabler to employment. So that I think is the key to success,
    is take our citizen soldiers and help our employers of America
    grow in terms of their strength by the quality of their
    workforce by hiring our soldiers. That is going to be the key
    to, I think, making our numbers in the future.
        We are going to make our numbers. I am not worried about
    that. The quality of the force we are getting right now is
    better than we have ever had before. When I go to Iraq and I
    promote two young E-4s to E-5, one of which has a master's in
    financial planning, one of which is a young lady that just got
    a bachelor's in molecular biology, the quality of that force is
    enormously greater than where we were in 1979 when I joined the
    Army Reserve.
        So we are going to make our numbers, but we are going to go
    to school on what the Army Guard is doing in learn from them.
        Senator Bill Nelson. General Schoomaker, we have had
    upwards of 40 percent of the total force in Iraq is Guard and
    Reserve. As you project in the future, what percent of that
    force will be Guard and Reserve?
        General Schoomaker. I think we peaked during, what was it,
    2005?
        General Lovelace. 2004.
        General Schoomaker. 2004, where we were up approaching 40
    percent. I think now we are talking about being in the 20, 25
    percent. Where are we going to?
        General Lovelace. It is going to be about 30 percent.
        General Schoomaker. Thirty percent.
        General Lovelace. We dropped down to 20 percent and then
    it, with the new mobilization policy it's pushing back up to 30
    percent.
        General Schoomaker. So we were moving to 20 percent. With
    the new mobilization policy we will be approaching 30 percent
    again. We are looking at shorter mobilization periods, which
    means that what we will be doing is turning--actually, three
    rotations become four rotations because of the new mobilization
    policy.
        Senator Bill Nelson. General, since you were here last week
    on the issue of the hospitals, I have gone to one of the TBI
    hospitals, the one in Tampa. They are doing a very good job.
    They have an old facility that needs upgrading. They are
    crowded and especially so since so much of the care is often
    with a family member that is there with them. Their facilities
    are considerably crowded compared, for example, in the same
    hospital to the spinal cord injury unit, which also is having a
    great deal of success.
        I would call that to the attention of the Secretary as
    well, even though that is a VA hospital. As a result of last
    week's hearing, we see that we have to have the coordination
    and the cooperation between the two. I think those attempts are
    happening.
        But on the very day that I was there, which was Monday, we
    had another example of where a soldier at first on Active Duty
    and then released, had gotten bounced around in the system.
    This calls for greater cooperation. So that this particular
    soldier had been sent to another VA hospital and basically they
    said, ``we cannot help you,'' but nobody was there to tell him:
    ``What you need to do is get to the Tampa hospital, to the TBI
    unit,'' and make him an appointment.
        It took that soldier calling his Senator in order for that
    to happen, and then once it did he is now getting the care, but
    delayed care. So we are going to have to confront that over and
    over.
        The other thing that we are going to have to confront is
    that Active-Duty soldiers are not being told that they can get
    treatment in private facilities; if the military hospitals and/
    or the coordination with the VA hospitals is not occurring,
    that they have the ability under their insurance system to get
    care in private facilities, and they are not being told that.
    Now, that is directly Active-Duty, Mr. Secretary, and I would
    implore you to try to get that communication out into the
    organization.
        Thank you. The meeting is adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
                               growth of the army
        1. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, last year the Department of
    Defense (DOD) presented to Congress a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
    that asserted that the National Military Strategy could be executed at
    low-to-moderate risk by holding the Active Duty manning levels of the
    Army at pre-Iraq war levels of 482,400. It further asserted the Army
    National Guard (ARNG) should be reduced from 350,000 to 333,000. The
    Department abandoned its position on the Army Guard within days of
    releasing the QDR. Now, 1 year later, the Department is proposing to
    increase the size of the total Army: the Active-Duty Army to 547,400,
    the ARNG to 358,200, and the Army Reserve to 206,000. What has changed,
    if anything, in the National Military Strategy since the QDR was
    submitted to warrant the proposed growth in the Army?
        General Schoomaker. There has not been a change in the National
    Military Strategy nor the QDR Force Planning Construct that has driven
    the Army to request an increase in its end strength. During QDR 2006,
    the Army was tasked with building 70 brigade combat teams (BCTs) (42
    Active component (AC), 28 ARNG) to meet the strategic challenges that
    threatened the Nation, while building supporting force structure that
    would enable the Army to shift its balance away from our traditional
    focus. This 70-BCT force relied on predictable, assured access to the
    Reserve component (RC) that would generate 18-19 BCTs per Army Force
    Generation (ARFORGEN) rotation once all conversions were completed in
    fiscal year 2013. However, current global demand on the Army has
    exceeded our capacity to provide forces within the ARFORGEN construct,
    compounded by the years of insufficient modernization investments. To
    meet the global demand for the long war and to provide strategic depth
    to the Nation, the Army proposed a plan to grow end strength across all
    three components to increase operating force capabilities, with modest
    increases in the Institutional Army and Individuals Account to retain
    structure needed to effectively recruit, train, and support the growth
    in the operating force. The proposed end-strength growth will provide
    the Army with 76 BCTs (48 AC, 28 ARNG) and over 200 multi-functional
    and functional support brigades. These 76 BCTs, and the additional
    Combat Support Brigade (Maneuver Enhancement) with supporting tactical
    combat formations, will generate 22-23 BCTs at a surge rotation rate
    (1:2 in the Active and 1:4 in the ARNG) by fiscal year 2013.

        2. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, if the strategy has not
    changed, then in your view, did the DOD incorrectly assess the forces
    necessary to implement that strategy in the QDR?
        General Schoomaker. QDR 2006 was a collaborative effort between the
    Services, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
    (OSD) to define the strategy to meet future war requirements. QDR 2006
    also provided insights for the Joint Staff and the Services to do
    additional analysis based on the effects of Phase IV/V (Stability/
    Enabling Civil Authorities) operations on the joint force, and the
    means for building partnership capacity through the combatant
    commanders' security cooperation plans. The force assessments and
    associated resourcing decisions for Army forces supported that
    strategy. The challenge is that since QDR 2006 the sustained
    requirements for the Global Force Demand now exceed that strategy. OSD
    has acknowledged that capabilities shortfall and provided support to
    the Army's proposed plan to increase capabilities to mitigate the risk
    associated with that shortfall gap.

        3. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, on what basis is the growth
    of the Army justified?
        General Schoomaker. A key objective of the proposed growth in the
    Army is to increase capabilities and improve readiness for both current
    and future challenges. This proposed growth reflects clear recognition
    on the part of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and Congress
    that we expect persistent conflict for the long war and need to build
    strategic depth. We know from our national experience that this is a
    time consuming process dependent upon an investment in manning,
    equipping, training, and caring for our people. Likewise, this growth
    will depend upon our capacity to build and maintain the infrastructure
    needed to recruit, train, and sustain these forces. Coming out of QDR
    2006, the Army was building toward 70 BCTs (42 AC, 28 ARNG) to provide
    18-19 BCTs per annual ARFORGEN rotation. To maintain the momentum of
    transformation while meeting the operational demands of the war on
    terror, the AC was growing by 30,000 with the temporary authority by
    Congress. Since QDR 2006, the global demand has exceeded that capacity.
    The Army is now seeking permanent growth to provide strategic depth and
    meet global demands of the long war. The proposed growth in the Army
    will provide 76 BCTs (48 AC, 28 ARNG) and over 200 support brigades
    with assured and predicted access to the RCs. Under surge rotation
    rates of 1:2 in the Active and 1:4 in the ARNG, the Army will be able
    to provide 22-23 BCTs per rotation when we include the Combat Support
    Brigade (Maneuver Enhancement) with its organic combat capabilities.
    This increase in Army rotational depth and capacity also will expand
    our ability to support requirements outside of the war of terror,
    participate in multi-national exercises, and peacekeeping operations
    around the world. This proposed growth will improve the Army's ability
    to meet the increasing global force demand and reduce stress across the
    force.

        4. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, what will be the impact on
    organizational structure, including the operational and institutional
    parts of the Army, and on the manning, training, and equipping of the
    force, including transformation to the Future Combat Systems (FCS)?
        General Schoomaker. The proposed growth increases capabilities in
    the operating force and Institutional Army across all three components
    to include additional combat brigades, the reduction of high demand/low
    density capability shortfalls, and the addition of needed combat
    support and combat service support units. Under the growth plan, by
    fiscal year 2013, the Army's end-strength will increase in the AC to
    547,400; in the ARNG to 358,200; and in the Army Reserve to 206,000.
    The total end strength increase of 74,200, along with the rebalancing
    of force capabilities within the RC, will grow the operating force by
    over 80,000 spaces and reduce the military strength in the
    Institutional Army to 80,000 vice the 75,000 spaces as previously
    programmed. As we grow the Army we must retain an adequate
    Institutional Army capability to generate and sustain the force. One of
    the Army's strengths is its investment in formal training and
    development of leaders. Additionally, the ability of the Army to
    maintain and rest our forces for future contingencies is largely
    resident in the Institutional Army. In order to recruit, train, and
    care for soldiers and their families, the capacity of the Institutional
    Army must be preserved and strengthened. Under the proposed plan, the
    Army will complete organizing, manning, and training by fiscal year
    2013; equipping of the BCTs by fiscal year 2015; and equipping of the
    multi-functional and functional support brigades by fiscal year 2019.
    The plan is synchronized with the transformation timeline for the FCS.

                         supplemental request criteria
        5. Senator Levin. Secretary Geren, many of the funding requests for
    Army equipment appear to be distributed arbitrarily between the fiscal
    year 2008 regular budget request and the 2007 and 2008 global war on
    terror supplemental requests. What criteria have you used to determine
    what equipment is appropriate to include in the 2007 and 2008
    supplemental requests as opposed to the regular fiscal year 2008 budget
    request?
        Mr. Geren. Many lines of equipment have been requested in both the
    regular (base) budget request and the supplemental requests. While
    these requests may appear to be arbitrarily spread across the 2007 and
    2008 supplemental requests and 2008 base budget, they are in fact not
    arbitrary.
        The OSD establishes the criteria for supplemental funding requests.
    In short, this guidance is that emergency supplemental requests must
    address the incremental costs above the baseline funding needed to
    support specific forces and capabilities required to execute Operation
    Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Jump Start.
        Therefore a single line of equipment may be found in both the base
    budget and the supplemental requests depending on the nature of the
    requirement. If the requirement is for normal replacement of equipment
    or a programmed fielding, then the request is in the base budget. If
    the requirement is an incremental increase resulting from the ongoing
    global war on terror, or the acceleration of a capability required for
    global war on terror, then the request will be in the supplemental even
    though the same line item may be found in the base budget.

                         force protection technologies
        6. Senator Levin. Secretary Geren, the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 included language strengthening
    the role of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)
    with respect to the testing of force protection technologies. This
    includes direction to the Services to ensure that the DOT&E is made
    aware of all ongoing force protection technology development and
    acquisition programs. How are you working with DOT&E on the testing of
    force protection technologies?
        Mr. Geren. The Army will work with DOT&E with a view toward
    adequate testing and analysis of systems to ensure safety-of-use and to
    demonstrate the capabilities and limitations of materiel delivered to
    warfighters. Army will comply with DOT&E's April 9, 2007 request for
    support on force protection equipment and non-lethal weapons to ensure
    the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines get the very best test and
    evaluation on the force protection systems the Department provides.

        7. Senator Levin. Secretary Geren, what processes have been
    established to comply with the congressional directive on notifying
    DOT&E of Army force protection programs?
        Mr. Geren. On April 9, 2007, the Director of DOT&E issued a
    directive to the secretaries of the military departments requiring each
    to identify and submit a list of all force protection and non-lethal
    weapons programs as part of the established process for preparing the
    annual OSD Test and Evaluation Oversight List. In response to this
    directive, the Army has directed all program executive offices to
    provide a consolidated list of their programs that meet the criteria
    for force protection and nonlethal weapons identified within the
    directive for submittal to DOT&E.

                   collaboration with israeli defense forces
        8. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, I understand that the Israeli
    Defense Forces (IDF) are currently developing and evaluating a vehicle-
    based active protection system to defend against rocket-propelled
    grenades and other threats. I also understand that the Army is
    attempting to develop similar systems. Are there any formal data
    exchange agreements or cooperative activities between the Army and IDF
    to better understand each other's technologies, capabilities, testing,
    collateral damage, or integration issues or the planned use of the
    active protection systems?
        General Schoomaker. The Army does not have any formal data exchange
    agreements with the IDF that cover active protection systems. With
    respect to cooperative activities, the Army participates in a
    Technology Round Table with the Israel Ministry of Defense and conducts
    staff talks with the IDF. Within these fora the Israelis have kept the
    Army current on the development of their active protection systems.

               deploying soldiers with medical conditions to iraq
        9. Senator Levin. Secretary Geren, the committee has received
    reports that state that the 3rd Infantry Division changed medical
    profiles of soldiers with medical conditions so that they could be sent
    to Iraq as part of the 3rd Infantry Division's accelerated deployment
    to support the surge. Both you and General Schoomaker testified that it
    would be improper to change a medical profile for the sole purpose of
    making a soldier deployable. You also indicated that a commander's
    inquiry was being conducted. Who is conducting the investigation for
    the Army?
        Mr. Geren. On March 13, 2007, the U.S. Army Forces Command
    (FORSCOM) Inspector General (IG) received an Inspector General Action
    Request from the Department of the Army IG (DAIG). The FORSCOM IG
    opened a case on March 13, 2007, and initiated an inquiry. DAIG will
    retain oversight of the inquiry.

        10. Senator Levin. Secretary Geren, will the investigation include
    interviews of the soldiers identified to the Army as having their
    profiles changed?
        Mr. Geren. Yes. DAIG conducted witness interviews of the soldiers
    identified as having their profiles changed. DAIG provided to FORSCOM
    IG audio files of six witness interviews conducted at Fort Benning, GA,
    on March 15-16, 2007. FORSCOM IG summarized the sworn testimony and
    DAIG provided verbatim transcripts of the sworn statements. The
    summarizations and transcripts will serve as exhibits of evidence in
    the Report of Investigative Inquiry (ROII).

        11. Senator Levin. Secretary Geren, has your investigation
    determined whether the 3rd Infantry Division downgraded medical
    profiles of 3rd Infantry Division soldiers so they could be deployed to
    Iraq?
        Mr. Geren. The ROII is ongoing and FORSCOM IG will submit the
    completed ROII to DAIG upon completion; at which time we can better
    answer this question.

        12. Senator Levin. Secretary Geren, do you know whether other Army
    units are changing soldiers' medical profiles to qualify more soldiers
    for deployment to a combat zone?
        Mr. Geren. There have not been any identified complaints at this
    level of other Army units changing soldiers' profiles to qualify more
    soldiers for deployment to a combat zone.

        13. Senator Levin. Secretary Geren, please provide a copy of the
    report of investigation to the Senate Armed Services Committee for the
    record.
        Mr. Geren. DAIG will submit a completed report to the Senate Armed
    Services Committee once it has been finalized.
                                     ______

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
                                    comanche
        14. Senator Reed. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, when the
    Comanche program was terminated in 2003, the Army and Congress agreed
    to reinvest the entire program funding into Army aviation
    modernization. How is the revised aviation strategy being executed?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The Army terminated the Comanche
    program in order to make funding available for restructuring Army
    aviation to reflect current and anticipated needs; increase aircraft
    survivability, sustainability, and operability; divest programs that no
    longer meet the needs of the changing operational environment; and
    extend aviation capabilities. The Comanche program reinvestment
    strategy modernizes Army aviation by accelerating development and
    procurement of Aircraft Survivability Equipment, Apache engines Block
    III conversions, Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters, Light Utility
    Helicopters, UH-60 Black Hawks, CH-47 Chinooks, and Future Cargo
    Aircraft (now called Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA)). Reallocating Comanche
    funding also included investment in the common cockpit, fly-by-wire,
    aviation munitions, and investment in Army Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
    (UAV) requirements. Funding for Army aviation programs is being
    executed in accordance with the Army Modernization Plan. All funds
    resulting from the termination of Comanche remain within Army aviation
    to fix deficiencies.

        15. Senator Reed. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, how much
    money was transferred and for what purposes?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. A total of $14.7 billion became
    available from the Comanche termination which was reinvested in order
    to train, sustain, and equip Army aviation.

                        unmanned aerial vehicle programs
        16. Senator Reed. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, the Army
    Warrior UAV system is currently being developed and procured to provide
    direct support at the division level and below. Other systems are also
    being deployed today to serve in direct support for Army tactical
    operations. What is the status of the Warrior program?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The Army Joint Requirements
    Oversight Council (JROC)-approved Extended Range/Multi-Purpose (ER/MP)
    Warrior Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) program continues its success in
    system development and demonstration (SDD) of the acquisition system.
    The critical design review was completed in October 2006 and the design
    readiness review followed with completion on December 21, 2006. The
    milestone decision authority gave approval to proceed with the
    production of SDD hardware, with air vehicle deliveries to begin in
    October 2007. The hardware includes the One System Ground Control
    Station that is interoperable with other Army unmanned aircraft and
    common with the Navy/Marine Corps Shadow systems. The Product Manager
    continues activities in preparation for the limited user test scheduled
    to occur May-June 2008, prior to milestone C decision and low rate
    initial production contract award.

        17. Senator Reed. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, the Air
    Force has continued with its procurement of the Predator UAV system,
    also being used in Iraq and Afghanistan. How are the acquisition
    strategies and battlefield use of the two platforms coordinated between
    the Army and Air Force?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. Acquisition Strategies: The
    Predator UAV is a legacy advanced concept technology demonstration
    system, while the Army JROC-approved ER/MP Warrior UAS is an
    acquisition program. On November 8, 2006, Office of the Under Secretary
    of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics requested the
    Army and Air Force collaborate on the Warrior and Predator programs to
    improve acquisition efficiency and provide better capability to our
    warfighters. A memorandum of agreement was drafted and the concept was
    endorsed by both Services. On January 23, 2007, the Chief of Staff, Air
    Force (CSAF) procured two Army Warrior air vehicles to determine the
    applicability for meeting future Air Force requirements. On March 5,
    2007, the CSAF requested to be executive agent within DOD for Medium-
    High Altitude UAS. Due to the Air Force's executive agency activities,
    collaboration efforts ceased and have not resumed.
        Battlefield Coordination: The Air Force uses a method of strategic
    satellite ``reach back'' for operational control and UAS mission
    execution. These UAS missions are flown via satellite from Nellis Air
    Force Base. The Army operates its UAS within a division's battle space
    in direct support to commanders on the ground. Army UAS missions are
    planned, coordinated, and executed from start to finish from the same
    location as the supported ground commander. Air Force flies pre-planned
    mission sets with limited ability to respond to re-tasking while the
    Army conducts dynamic and responsive missions with on demand re-tasking
    capability as required to support the ground fight. Both Army and Air
    Force UAS missions are coordinated through the air coordination order
    and air tasking order and are under positive air traffic control.

        18. Senator Reed. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, should we
    have a single Service, such as the Army, serving as executive agent for
    both platforms?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The Army does not support a
    single Service executive agent for medium and high-altitude UAVs. The
    Army recommends the OSD uphold the 2005 decision to use the Joint UAS
    Materiel Review Board (JUAS MRB) and the Joint UAS Center of Excellence
    (JUAS COE) in lieu of a single Service executive agent. The JUAS MRB
    and the JUAS COE can and will work and achieve the Air Force's
    executive agency goals. With full support, these organizations will
    enable full joint Service buy-in and resolution of issues.
    Additionally, to continue the research and development of UAS and meet
    the DOD's UAS requirements, we must create an environment of
    competition within industry. Competition promotes innovation,
    challenges industry to achieve a higher level of technological
    achievement, and spurs investment. The Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and
    Special Operations Forces have all benefited from competitively
    selected solutions and are already sharing UAS training, logistics, and
    systems development in three formal programs. The DOD should continue
    on its present course of developing inclusive, synergistic
    complementary capabilities to fuse the contributions of each Service.

                             science and technology
        19. Senator Reed. General Schoomaker, you showed a number of
    technologies here today that are the result of investments in science
    and technology (S&T). But your fiscal year 2008 budget request reduced
    S&T investment by over $1 billion with respect to fiscal year 2007
    appropriations and is even below the fiscal year 2007 original budget
    request. Do you think we are risking not developing the next generation
    of technologies like the ones you showed us with this low request?
        General Schoomaker. Despite the demands of the ongoing global war
    on terrorism, the Army has been able to maintain its S&T investment at
    over $1.7 billion for each of the past two budget requests. We believe
    this level of investment is sufficient to support our acquisition
    priorities consistent with our broad resource demands.

        20. Senator Reed. General Schoomaker, what areas of S&T investment
    do you think this committee should consider adding funds to as we look
    at your budget request?
        General Schoomaker. The area of force protection technologies
    continues to be our top priority investment and has shown promise in
    providing innovative solutions for platform and soldier protection.

                          bradley reactive armor tiles
        21. Senator Reed. General Schoomaker, what is your assessment of
    the effectiveness of Bradley Reactive Armor Tiles (BRAT) in dealing
    with current and future battlefield threats?
        General Schoomaker. The BRAT A2 tile defeats the current threat and
    is adequate against the projected near-term threat. A reactive tile
    technology improvement that is being tested now is expected to improve
    BRAT capability against the anticipated evolution of that threat.
    Active protective systems under development, combined with BRAT, also
    counter the projected anti-tank guided missile threat in the near- and
    mid-term.

        22. Senator Reed. General Schoomaker, is the current budget request
    sufficient to continue the development and fielding of this equipment?
        General Schoomaker. Overall, yes. To date, BRAT fielding has been
    funded with supplemental dollars and congressional additions to the
    Bradley budget modernization line; there were no dollars for BRAT in
    the base budget. We have sufficient BRAT procured to buy-out production
    for the next year, but we anticipate a delay in reaching the Army
    Acquisition Objective (AAO) due to redirecting funds for ``belly''
    armor in Iraq. The Army will mitigate this shortfall by modifying the
    base budget request (expected in the President's budget requests for
    2009-2013) to ensure the AAO for BRAT is achieved. In regard to funding
    current BRAT technology development, efforts are on track and should
    result in some common reactive materiel solutions.

                       alternative landmine technologies
        23. Senator Reed. General Schoomaker, the Army has invested
    resources in the development of advanced mine warfare systems--
    including Spider and the Intelligent Munitions Systems. Army
    requirements currently dictate that a deployed system have the ability
    to be operated in a ``target activation'' mode. Many experts and public
    citizens are advocating the banning of weapons systems that utilize
    this ``target activation'' mode and would require the Army to only use
    systems in a ``man-in-the-loop'' mode. What is the basis for the Army
    requirement for a ``target activation'' mode in the systems?
        General Schoomaker. The basis for the Army requirement for a
    ``target activation'' mode in the Spider System resides in the Joint
    Requirement Oversight Council-approved Spider Capabilities Procurement
    Document, dated March 10, 2006. The basis for the Army requirement for
    a ``target activation'' mode in the Intelligent Munitions System (IMS)
    resides in the Future Combat System (FCS) Operational Requirements
    Document, dated December 16, 2005, Army Requirements Oversight Council
    Validated Change 2.
        The Spider/IMS military tactics, techniques, procedures, and self-
    destruct/self-deactivation features will ensure that the target
    activation capability is not abused or does not result in
    indiscriminate effects. A field of Spider/IMS munitions is always under
    the control and observation of U.S. forces. If autonomous operation is
    permitted by the mission rules of engagement (and if autonomous
    operation was enabled during set-up of the munitions field), the
    operator decides whether the presence of hostile forces require
    autonomous operation. The operator can revert back to man-in-the-loop
    control of the field at any time. When operating autonomously, Spider/
    IMS munitions will initiate a self-destruct/self-deactivation timer to
    prevent creating a residual hazard to civilians.

        24. Senator Reed. General Schoomaker, what technologies (sensors,
    data fusion, communications, munitions, others) would need to be
    developed in order to have systems operated in the ``person-in-the-
    loop'' mode provide the same capability as those operated in the
    ``target activation'' mode?
        General Schoomaker. Generally speaking, adding a ``person-in-the-
    loop'' increases system complexity, cost, and response time between the
    sensor and the decisionmaker. Automated sensor systems are pursued to
    specifically reduce these cost drivers. Even with a ``person-in-the-
    loop'' the greatest unknown in response activations to a threat is how
    to validate intent of subject(s) of interest. With a ``person-in-the-
    loop,'' the most critical technologies to maintain relevant response
    times are those that enable networks, communications, and decision
    tools.

             joint improvised explosive device defeat organization
        25. Senator Reed. Secretary Geren, how are Army research,
    development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) efforts coordinated with the
    Joint Improvised Explosive Device Office (JIEDDO)?
        Mr. Geren. In April 2006 the Army created the Army Asymmetric
    Warfare Office (AAWO) within the Army's Operations Directorate. One of
    the primary missions of the AAWO is to be the Army's link to the
    JIEDDO. The AAWO IED defeat division executes this mission by
    coordinating all Service IED defeat actions to validate, prioritize,
    integrate, and synchronize potential IED defeat initiatives. An
    important component of this effort is ensuring Army RDT&E efforts are
    coordinated, synchronized, and supportive of JIEDDO efforts. The AAWO
    consolidates Army input from the Army Research, Development, and
    Engineering Command, the Army Test and Evaluation Command, and the
    Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,
    Logistics, and Technology to represent the Army position on multiple
    JIEDDO research working groups, and as a voting member on JIEDDO review
    and funding boards. Each of the Army RDT&E entities also provides
    direct support to JIEDDO for their respective areas such as assessments
    and recommendations on technology, testing, and evaluations, and
    technology development.

                               rand arroyo center
        26. Senator Reed. Secretary Geren, how much of the work of the RAND
    Arroyo Center in fiscal year 2006 was in direct support of Army
    activities related to the global war on terror?
        Mr. Geren. Out of 55 total RAND studies conducted during fiscal
    year 2006, only 2 were specifically devoted to the global war on
    terror: they are the Continuing Military Operations in Afghanistan and
    Iraq, Comprehensive Data Collection and Defining the Behaviors of
    Adaptive Enemies--Theory to Tools.

                             army laboratory issues
        27. Senator Reed. Secretary Geren, in August 2006, six of the
    directors of Army laboratories wrote a letter to the OSD expressing a
    number of concerns regarding the state of the in-house laboratory
    system. Please review this letter and indicate whether you share these
    concerns and endorse some or all of the directors' proposed remedies.
        Mr. Geren. The Army recognizes the importance of having a highly
    competent workforce performing research and development. The Army
    recognizes the concerns of the laboratory directors regarding changes
    from the current S&T reinvention laboratory authorities as they
    transition to the National Security Personnel System. The Army is
    reviewing the laboratory directors' recommendations to assess their
    potential efficacy and feasibility.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
                    mine resistant ambush protected vehicles
        28. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, is the
    amount of the Army's funding request for Mine Resistant Ambush
    Protected Vehicles (MRAPs) limited by budget concerns, or by production
    capacity?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The Army requires full funding,
    or $2.8 billion, in April 2007 to begin fielding by October 2007. If
    the funding is received, we can field the initial 2,500 vehicles by May
    2008. The exact number of MRAP vehicles to be procured hinges on the
    testing and performance of the initial MRAP vehicles. The next
    increment of funding is needed by October 2007 to buy beyond our
    initial request. Production capacity is dependant upon several factors,
    but we believe it supports our procurement plans to ramp up to 440
    vehicles per month.

        29. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, what is
    the total requirement for MRAPs?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The Army will initially buy up to
    2,500 MRAP vehicles while maintaining the flexibility to buy up to
    17,770 vehicles. Incremental procurement will be based on theater
    commanders' performance assessment of the initial vehicles.

        30. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, how many
    MRAPs are funded in the current request?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The fiscal year 2007 main
    supplemental request and fiscal year 2007 supplemental amendment
    provide for an expected 706 vehicles. We will have firm quantities once
    the Army down-selects to the chosen vehicles to be procured. If our
    fiscal year 2007 funding requirement--to include the $1.999 billion
    unfunded requirement--is resourced, we can procure about 2,500 MRAP
    vehicles. The Army will continue to work with the OSD to request and
    obtain this required funding.

                 shortage of resources in modernizing equipment
        31. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, the
    posture statement states the challenges the Army must overcome to
    modernize its equipment. Specifically, 80 percent of its budget is
    committed to sustaining people, maintaining vital infrastructure, and
    preparing equipment for combat deployment. This limits the Army's
    ability to fund investment accounts. Given the significant commonality
    between the equipment needs of the Army, and that of the Marine Corps,
    what have you done to leverage your resources with the Navy to fund
    investment accounts for modernization of equipment, such as the FCS
    development?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The Army and Marine Corps have
    been engaged in leveraging service resources to fund investment
    accounts for modernization of equipment, such as the FCS development.
    The Army and Marine Corps established the Army and Marine Corps Board
    (AMCB) in October 2003. Co-chaired by the Army G-8 and the Marine Corps
    Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources, charter membership
    includes the service leadership responsible for requirements, concepts,
    and acquisition. There are also non-charter member-participants from
    other Services, staff agencies, the United Kingdom (or ``UK'', a
    coalition participant since January 2004), and Australia (requested
    selected participation in June 2006).
        AMCB's mission is to identify, develop, review, and resolve issues
    with Army and Marine Corps concepts, capabilities, and service-approved
    requirements and programs to pursue potential joint warfighting
    interoperability and material solutions that provide a single ``DOTML-
    PF''--Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and
    Education, Personnel and Facilities--solution in order to save service
    costs in RDT&E and gain economies of scale through large order
    quantities. AMCB reviews address Army and Marine Corps-focused issues
    emerging from: the previous programming cycle; OSD reviews; and new
    internal and external initiatives or issues supporting current
    operations. Since its inception, the AMCB membership has addressed such
    issues as the Joint High Speed Vessel, Rapid Fielding Initiative, Army
    Operational Needs Statements, Marine Corps Universal Needs Statement,
    Army and Marine Corps Blue Force Tracking/Command and Control
    Convergence, UAVs (an expanded AMCB venue to include commanders in
    chief, allies, all Services, and the Coast Guard), Coalition Combat
    Identification, Aircraft Commonality, Tactical Wheeled Vehicle
    Strategy, and the MRAPs. Future issues scheduled for AMCB review are:
    Soldier as a System, Biometrics, and High Capacity Communications
    Capability.

     moral waivers, personnel shortages, and policy toward gay and lesbian
                                 servicemembers
        32. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, in your
    posture statement, you state that attracting and retaining high quality
    people is one of the Army's core objectives. There have been numerous
    media reports about how the Army has increased the number of waivers it
    has given to new recruits who have criminal records. At the same time,
    we continue to discharge quality soldiers who happen to be gay
    (although the numbers of people discharged for being gay has dropped by
    50 percent since September 11). Many of the discharged soldiers have
    had critical skills, such as Arabic speakers and other linguists,
    intelligence experts, and medical personnel. The Washington Post
    recently reported that in 2005 alone, 49 medical workers were
    discharged. Given the significant recruiting challenges the Army faces
    as it continues to grow, and given that Army regulations already
    address the appropriate conduct of troops both on and off duty, do you
    think it would be appropriate to consider the discontinuation of the
    ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' policy for the military?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. Although there has been an
    increase in the number of moral waivers granted over the past 4 years
    (fiscal years 2003-2006), the increase is reflective and consistent
    with the increase in civil convictions nationwide. A majority of
    enlistees who were granted moral waivers committed the offenses in
    question while a juvenile and have had no subsequent legal problems.
    The Army does not anticipate negative trends resulting from their
    enlistment or adverse impacts on the overall quality or capability of
    the force at this time.
        The Army's policy on homosexuals implements DOD policy. DOD policy
    implements Federal law. Specifically, the DOD policy and Army policy
    flow from section 654 of title 10, U.S.C. Section 654 pertains to all
    branches of the Armed Forces and makes several findings with regard to
    homosexuals serving in the Armed Forces. As a result, any discussion of
    homosexuals in the Armed Forces must start with the congressional
    findings and involve all branches of the Armed Forces. Under this
    provision, the Army does not and will not ask a servicemember about his
    or her sexual orientation, nor is a servicemember required to tell
    anyone in uniform their sexual orientation. Further, the Army is bound,
    both ethically and by law, to prohibit harassment and takes appropriate
    punitive actions against those found guilty of harassment of any kind.

        33. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, can you
    explain why the military could not simply rely on regulations covering
    military conduct?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The Army's policy on homosexuals
    implements DOD policy. DOD policy implements Federal law. Specifically,
    the DOD policy and Army policy flow from section 654 of title 10,
    U.S.C. Section 654 pertains to all branches of the Armed Forces and
    makes several findings with regard to homosexuals serving in the Armed
    Forces. As a result, any discussion of homosexuals in the Armed Forces
    must start with the congressional findings and involve all branches of
    the Armed Forces. Under this provision, the Army does not and will not
    ask a servicemember about his or her sexual orientation, nor is a
    servicemember required to tell anyone in uniform their sexual
    orientation. Further, the Army is bound, both ethically and by law, to
    prohibit harassment and takes appropriate punitive actions against
    those found guilty of harassment of any kind.

                             acquisition activities
        34. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, the Army
    posture statement states that one of the strategies to meet the core
    objectives is to accelerate the Army's efforts to transform and
    modernize. The need to ``develop FCS, new aviation systems, and over
    300 advanced technologies and systems'' is specifically cited. With the
    Army's budget being significantly increased to meet its increased
    demands, resets, and modernization, I am concerned about the Army's
    ability to manage the additional acquisition dollars. Numerous problems
    with DOD's acquisition activities have come to light recently,
    including improper use of sole-sourcing contracts and outsourcing of
    contract processing to other agencies It seems possible that the DOD
    acquisition workforce is understaffed. What steps are you taking to
    make sure that these problems are addressed, and that the Army's
    acquisition dollars are spent wisely?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. Growing the Army accelerates the
    pace of systems production while increasing the numbers of systems
    produced. Such activity requires collateral growth in the
    infrastructure that supports the acquisition of systems ranging from
    individual equipment to complex weapons systems that equip soldiers and
    units. Effective acquisition management of these systems is the
    responsibility of the program executive officers (PEOs).
        Current acquisition policy and procedures permit the flexibility
    for the PEO to develop and document the acquisition strategy that is in
    the best interest of the Army. We require the PEO or designee to
    carefully review and certify the use of any non-DOD contract vehicle
    over $100,000 and to fully justify the use of sole source procurements
    with approvals by the appropriate procurement officials.
        There has been an increase in procurement funds between 2006 and
    2007, most notably attributable to the $8.5 billion for reset
    requirements resulting from the global war on terror. To manage these
    additional resources, specific accountability measures were emplaced
    throughout the Army Secretariat and Army Staff to track the execution
    of the resources against requirements and outcomes with the results
    reported to us as the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff, Army.
    The PEOs provide monthly updates on the obligation of the dollars and
    commensurate weapon systems and equipment produced, which are
    integrated into the Army's reporting process.
        Accordingly, the Army acquisition workforce and Army acquisition
    corps are experiencing unprecedented workload in support of the global
    war on terror, which impact all Army acquisition organizations and a
    majority of the acquisition career fields. We recognized that our
    staffing levels may be inadequate to provide the requisite execution,
    oversight, and fiduciary responsibility for recent increases in
    funding. In order to relieve some of the stress on our PEOs and their
    respective project and product managers, the Army Acquisition Executive
    delegated authority to hire up to 110 percent of the respective PEO's
    authorized manpower to ensure they have the necessary staff to meet the
    warfighter's demands. We will also be conducting a functional
    organizational analysis of several acquisition organizations to ensure
    the organizations have the right structure to achieve mission success.
        The Army remains confident that appropriate oversight and execution
    of our programs supporting modernization and transformation are
    occurring at all levels.

                        army national guard and reserves
        35. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, during
    the early 1970s, the Army was reorganized so that the Regular Army
    could not conduct an extended campaign without mobilizing the Guard and
    Reserves. It is not clear, however, that the Defense Department
    leadership at that time anticipated the kind of protracted conflict we
    are facing today with the global war on terror, with an Army that is
    comprised of 55 percent National Guard and Reserves. With the current
    Army organization, is the Army too reliant on the National Guard to
    meet its global commitments? In other words, are we fighting a
    sustained war with a peacetime organization?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The Army Generation (ARFORGEN)
    model, which is designed to supply a steady flow of ready forces,
    integrates the complementary Active and Reserve component capabilities.
    With ARFORGEN and sufficient resources, the Army will continue to field
    the best led, equipped, manned, and trained cohesive units. Once
    ARFORGEN is in place and generating a steady flow of ready forces, our
    models indicate that to maintain a 1 year at home to 2 years deployed
    ratio, and a 1 year deployed and 5 years home for the Reserve and
    National Guard, the Army could sustain a long-duration deployment of
    170,000 soldiers in any given time period.

        36. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, since
    our Army force structure consists of 55 percent National Guard and
    Reserves to 45 percent Active Duty, have we reduced our capability to
    deal with threats and natural disasters at home by relying on the
    National Guard to provide extended support to our national interests
    abroad?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. Army National Guard (ARNG) and
    Army Reserve contributions to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have
    affected the readiness of units at home. Still, important efforts are
    underway to increase and to improve response and support to incidents
    in the Homeland. We are investing approximately $36 billion in ARNG
    equipment from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2013. The majority of
    this equipment will have utility for both domestic and warfighting
    missions. In the short-term, the States have negotiated Emergency
    Management Assistance Compacts to provide capabilities to each other if
    requested. Although the Army is taking risk with equipment procurement,
    all components working in concert will support the ARNG in its mission
    of aiding and assisting the States in responding to domestic
    emergencies and homeland defense missions. The Army is taking
    significant steps to address ARNG equipment requirements, and the
    fiscal year 2008 budget fully funded the ARNG's requirements.

        37. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, according to press reports,
    the head of the National Guard Bureau, General Blum, testified before
    the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves on January 31 that
    the Guard needs a total of $40 billion to get their equipment up to
    ``an acceptable level of readiness.'' How would you assess General
    Blum's $40 billion unfunded requirement list, if you are familiar with
    it?
        General Schoomaker. The $40 billion figure mentioned by General
    Blum includes all shortfalls across the Army and Air Guard, to include
    operation and maintenance, personnel, and equipping costs. According to
    General Blum, the Army shortfall is $24 billion and is fairly
    consistent with our documented shortfall. At the time he released the
    information, the Army had programmed $21.1 billion against that
    shortfall. With the release of the fiscal year 2008 budget, the funding
    programmed from 2008-2013 is $36.7 billion, which addresses their
    shortfalls and continues to address modernization.

        38. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, how much of that is funded
    in the current Army Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)?
        General Schoomaker. The $40 billion figure mentioned by General
    Blum includes all shortfalls across the Army and Air Guard, to include
    operation and maintenance, personnel, and equipping costs. According to
    General Blum, the Army shortfall is $24 billion and is fairly
    consistent with our documented shortfall. At the time he released the
    information, the Army had programmed $21.1 billion against that
    shortfall. With the release of the fiscal year 2008 budget, the funding
    programmed from 2008-2013 is $36.7 billion, which addresses their
    shortfalls and continues to address modernization.

        39. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, in your view, if there are
    not sufficient funds to address every equipping shortfall in the
    National Guard structure, should the priority be on equipment that is
    useful for the homeland defense and disaster response mission, or on
    equipment that is useful only for combat missions?
        General Schoomaker. We are committed to resourcing the ARNG
    consistent with its roles as both an operational military force and as
    the first responder for homeland defense and civil support at the State
    level. Indeed, our ultimate goal is to equip the ARNG to full Active
    component-like structure. This would be accomplished both through the
    procurement of new equipment from the industrial base and by providing
    current on-hand equipment from the active inventory. We have made
    significant progress towards this goal since 2005, particularly in the
    areas of aviation, armor, and transportation. But we still have a long
    way to go, and we will need Congress's continued support in the future
    if we hope to remain on track.
        In terms of the total acquisition cost of equipment for the ARNG, I
    would like to say two things: First, that as a result of our most
    recent Army equipping and reuse conference in the first quarter of
    fiscal year 2007, we have identified approximately $10.6 billion of
    equipment for distribution to the ARNG between 2007 and the first
    quarter of fiscal year 2009. The intent is to help ensure that every
    ARNG unit deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan has the best equipment
    available, and that those remaining at home will be adequately equipped
    to respond to homeland defense and security missions as necessary.
        The second thing I can say is that the Army has programmed $36.8
    billion for new equipment procurement for the ARNG from fiscal year
    2005 to fiscal year 2013. While we acknowledge that this will still
    leave equipping holes to fill across the Army beyond 2013, we think
    this approach strikes the best balance between the competing needs of
    the Army as a whole and the total funding available. It also brings the
    ARNG to an equipping level that allows it to better manage risk in
    terms of cross-leveling equipment to deploying units while still
    maintaining the capability to mobilize, train, and respond to homeland
    defense and security missions.

                               islamic radicalism
        40. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, I find
    it interesting that one of the reasons cited in the posture statement
    for the complexity of the threat is the ``growing disparities among
    `haves' and `have-nots' in the international order, compounded by
    feelings of hopelessness and despair, which are creating fertile ground
    to sow the seeds of hatred and radicalism.'' Is it not possible that
    the U.S. actions, such as the invasion of Iraq, could be perceived by
    some in the Middle East as U.S. expansion into the Middle East?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. This question would be better
    addressed by the combatant commander.

        41. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, would
    not this also potentially sow the seeds of hatred and radicalism from
    those who resent our presence in their land? If so, would you suggest
    we take steps to mitigate both of these underlying causes of
    radicalism, and if so, how?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. This question would be better
    addressed by the combatant commander.

              army troop levels and overall size of ground forces
        42. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, the Army is proposing to add
    7,000 soldiers per year through 2011, and 1,000 more in 2012, for a
    total increase of 65,000. Yet the DOD FYDP for fiscal years 2008 to
    2013 shows the Army's budget peaking in 2009, flattening out at that
    level in 2010, in real terms, and then declining--again in real terms
    correcting for inflation--for 3 straight years in 2011, 2012, and 2013.
    How does the Army plan to grow the force while shrinking your budget?
        Mr. Geren. Funding peaks identified in 2008, 2009, and 2010 are for
    the equipment and military construction needs of the new growth. In
    fiscal years 2011 and 2012, funds remain in the Army program for
    military construction projects and procurement of equipment, but at a
    vastly lower figure. The front-loading of funds to military
    construction projects and procurement items ensures that sufficient
    facilities and equipment are available as the increase in soldiers
    occurs through the years. The first fiscal year where there are no
    funds programmed for military construction projects or equipment is
    2013, when operations and support and family housing operations
    comprise 100 percent of the projected costs.

        43. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, what are
    you planning to cut back on to pay for these additional people?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. There appears to be no need to
    reduce any other programs or capabilities to pay for additional end
    strength. Though we are assessing the need in relation to current pay
    rates and personnel grades, we believe adequate resources have been
    programmed to support the necessary equipment and facilities in the
    near-term and to sustain the personnel and training costs in the
    future.
        The augmentation of ground forces was a DOD-supported decision.
    This decision was accompanied by sufficient funds to support the
    procurement, military construction, personnel, and operation and
    maintenance funding necessary to support such an end strength increase.
    The Department did not request the Services reduce or eliminate current
    mission capabilities to support this increase. With the support of DOD,
    there are no plans to cut back existing programs to pay for this troop
    strength increase.

        44. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, do you support the proposed
    increases in Army end strength regardless of how they are paid for, or
    only if the entire cost of these additional personnel are added to the
    Army topline to reflect an increase in your Service's budget?
        General Schoomaker. The size and resourcing of the Army is not a
    question of cost, but rather national priorities. Given the Army's
    current funding levels, our Army cannot afford to internally resource
    such end strength increases without breaking our ability to field a
    properly trained, manned, and equipped force to meet the Nation's
    needs.

        45. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, are you willing to cut
    modernization or other programs in your budget to make room for the
    significant increase in personnel and operating costs that these
    additional personnel would entail?
        General Schoomaker. Though we are assessing current pay rates and
    personnel grades, the Army allocation appears to take the additional
    personnel into account so no reductions are necessary. It is critical
    that the Army not mortgage its future by reducing modernization
    programs to pay for current bills. Our current program strikes a
    balance between resourcing the current force while preparing for the
    future. Maintaining a ready Army now and in the future is a matter of
    national will and commitment, not an affordability issue.

                       training space and infrastructure
        46. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, the Army is in the process of
    moving three brigades from Europe to the United States over the next
    few years. Once those brigades are relocated, you will have excess
    capacity at your training center in Germany, but not enough capacity at
    your training centers in the United States, at Fort Irwin and Fort
    Polk. Given that the training and basing infrastructure are already in
    place to support additional forces in Germany, and noting that Germans
    were not asking us to leave (contrary to the situation the Marines have
    in Okinawa, for example), is the Army considering basing any of the
    additional six brigades you are seeking in Germany?
        Mr. Geren. The Army enjoys a strong reputation and friendly
    relationship with Germany, developed over years of Army presence. Under
    Integrated Global Posture and Basing Strategy (IGPBS) the Army has made
    many difficult decisions in order to strategically posture our forces
    to meet global commitments. As a result, the Army decided to return
    three brigades from Europe to continental United States (CONUS)
    beginning in fiscal year 2007 and finishing in fiscal year 2011.
    However, the Army is considering a full range of options for stationing
    the new BCTs, but any decision regarding force levels in Europe must be
    made in close cooperation with the combatant commander's input. In
    addition, the Army will carefully weigh the benefit of existing
    infrastructure in Europe to ensure the Army remains trained and ready
    to deploy. The range and training land capacity and capability in
    Germany is sufficient to meet the current training demand. The Army
    will optimize and adapt the training assets in Germany to meet the
    future needs of assigned and rotational units. However, there remains a
    significant Army presence in Europe, which includes a Stryker BCT and
    an Airborne BCT.

        47. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, have you made any irrevocable
    decisions to return property in Germany that would preclude basing
    forces there?
        Mr. Geren. Property that has been returned to the Federal Republic
    of Germany can be reacquired through the accommodation program request
    procedures outlined in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
    Status of Forces Agreement, Supplementary Agreements. Reacquiring land
    would be dependent upon its availability. Property that was sold,
    deconstructed, or reoccupied by someone other than the United States
    after its return to the Federal Republic of Germany's control would be
    unavailable for reacquisition. Property still retained by U.S. Forces
    may accommodate potential Grow the Force organizations and would not
    have to be reacquired from the Federal Republic of Germany. Most fiscal
    year 2006 and fiscal year 2007 released property remains under Federal
    Republic of Germany control so would likely be available, if needed.

        48. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, how would you assess the
    strategic case for basing one or more of these additional six brigades
    in Germany or elsewhere in Europe, in terms of both U.S.-only combat
    training and ability to deploy, but also cooperative training with our
    NATO allies on missions such as the International Security Assistance
    Force One in Afghanistan?
        General Schoomaker. The Army remains cognizant of the changes to
    the strategic landscape; and its requirement to maintain flexibility in
    defending emerging global threats. We have reviewed the impact of Base
    Realignment and Closure (BRAC) and the IGPBS, and specifically the
    decisions of maintaining or returning brigades from Europe. Any
    decision regarding force levels in Europe must be made in close
    cooperation with the combatant commander's input. Cooperative training
    with our NATO allies remains an important factor in any decision. In
    addition the Army will carefully weigh the benefit of existing
    infrastructure in Europe to ensure the Army remains trained and ready
    to deploy. U.S. forces continue to demonstrate the ability to operate
    along side its allies in Afghanistan and Iraq regardless of their home
    station.

                           combat ready troop levels
        49. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, I think we all agree with
    the Army's core objective of growing the All-Volunteer Force through
    the recruiting and retention of high quality people in order to expand
    the deployable pool of troops to meet the Army's global commitments.
    This committee has been told by the Army and the Secretary of Defense
    that it has sufficient troops to meet current commitments, including
    the escalations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now, however, there have been
    reports that the Army has been re-evaluating troops who have been
    declared unfit for duty and reclassifying them as ready to deploy. They
    have then been almost immediately deployed to Iraq. In particular,
    media reports specifically state that the Army is deploying troops with
    serious injuries and other medical problems, including soldiers that
    doctors have previously said are medically unfit for battle. Some of
    the soldiers are reportedly too injured to wear their body armor,
    according to their medical records. The reports I have seen indicated
    that this reclassification of troops occurred for a unit of the Army's
    3rd Infantry Division at Fort Benning. Can you please comment on the
    accuracy of these reports? Please indicate if the Army is straining to
    meet the levels of combat ready troops necessary to support the surge.
        General Schoomaker. Our forces are stretched. The Army is currently
    too small. In order to meet the demands of the current operational
    environment and prepare for other potential contingencies we must
    increase end strength. Congress has approved growth of 65,000 soldiers
    in the Active component, 8,200 soldiers in the ARNG, and 1,000 in the
    U.S. Army Reserve. However, it will take time to recruit and retain the
    soldiers to meet these increased authorizations. The plan to grow the
    Army will go a long way towards alleviating strains on the Army and
    demands of future missions. Growing the Army will allow soldiers to
    remain at home at least 12 months between deployments. This will also
    allow more training for other potential scenarios. This is the best way
    to reduce the strain on the force.

        50. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, the posture statement
    repeatedly refers to the need for the Army to provide ``boots on the
    ground'' for the war on terror. It states that our Nation will be
    involved in a long struggle of continuous, evolving conflict. Given the
    level of uncertainty in the global war on terror, how can we be sure we
    have ``right-sized'' our forces?
        General Schoomaker. The Army was sized post-QDR to reflect the
    lessons learned from the global war on terrorism and to achieve
    strategic depth necessary to sustain increasing global commitments. The
    Grow the Army Plan was informed by QDR decisions, operational
    availability studies, current operational demands, combatant commander
    requests, and other DOD initiatives (e.g., homeland defense and
    building partnership capacity). Under the plan, the Army will grow all
    three components to build requisite rotational capacity available
    through recurrent, assured, predictable access to the Reserve
    components. The most recent analysis concluded the minimum size of the
    force to be 563,000 in the Active Army; 358,000 in the ARNG; and
    206,000 in the U.S. Army Reserve. In coordination with OSD, the Army
    has programmed for growth at 547,400 Active; 358,200 in the ARNG; and
    206,000 in the U.S. Army Reserve. This growth increases BCT surge
    capacity (1 year deployed, 2 years at home for the Active component,
    and 1 year deployed and 4 years at home for the Reserve component) from
    18-19 BCTs to 21-22 BCTs with up to 2 additional Maneuver Enhancement
    Brigades per rotation. This growth will improve Active component dwell
    by fiscal year 2013 with recurrent, assured access to the Reserve
    component. Additionally, the growth and rebalance of capabilities will
    reduce high demand/low density shortfalls and increase combat, combat
    support, and combat service support capacity in air defense, engineer,
    explosive ordnance disposal, medical, military police, military
    intelligence, transportation, and maintenance. However, the growth
    numbers are not without risk due to continuing demands for additional
    operating force and Institutional Army capabilities. We will continue
    to evaluate the impacts of global force demands on the balance and mix
    of capabilities across all three components to ensure we have ``right-
    sized'' the force within our resources.

        51. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, please explain how the
    recommended end strength increases for the Army were determined.
        General Schoomaker. The Army analyzed the increasing Global Force
    demand required for the long war and the imperative to build strategic
    depth. To provide 20-21 BCTs at a rotation rate of 1:2 in the Active
    component and 1:5 in the Reserve components, the Army proposed a growth
    plan identifying the need for additional BCTs, along with growth in
    combat support and combat service support units to meet sustained
    operational demands and minimize high demand, low density capability
    shortfalls. Additionally, the Army reviewed the balance of capabilities
    within each component and across the three components to build the
    right force mix in the operating force. Finally, the Army identified
    reducing the military strength in the Institutional Army to 80,000 vice
    the 75,000 spaces as previously programmed to ensure its ability to
    man, equip, train, and station the increase in the operating force. The
    resulting plan proposed a total increase of 74,200 end strength (65,000
    in the Active component, 8,200 in the ARNG, and 1,000 in the Army
    Reserve).

        52. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, the surge of 21,500
    additional troops to Iraq that the President has proposed would be
    accomplished by extending some units that are there now, and
    accelerating the deployment of units that would ordinarily have
    deployed much later this year as part of the next rotation. Are you
    concerned that this will cause a problem several months down the road
    for the next rotation?
        General Schoomaker. There are impacts on the upcoming rotation. The
    five BCTs that form the plus-up all had their deployment timelines
    accelerated. This acceleration resulted in modifications to training
    schedules. In order to extend the plus-up through February 2008, a full
    12 months, the Army will be required to extend another 10 BCTs in
    theater. The plus-up could require a number of units to redeploy to
    Iraq and Afghanistan with less than 12 months of dwell time in the
    United States without employing other measures.

        53. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, what steps is the Army
    taking to identify, train, and equip the units that will have to fill
    in, several months from now, to cover the gaps this surge would create
    in your previous plan for preparing and deploying units to Iraq?
        General Schoomaker. In order the meet the plus-up, the OSD and the
    Joint Staff will have to use a combination of unit extensions
    (extending units in Iraq and Afghanistan beyond their 12 month
    rotation) and early deployments (sending units to Iraq and Afghanistan
    with less than 12 months at home). However, the Army will continue to
    only send units that are trained and ready for combat operations.
    Additionally, we are sensitive to and supportive of the challenges that
    face our forces as they accelerate manning, equipping, and training
    requirements to support the plus-up. Every deploying unit will be
    manned to no less than 100 percent of their authorized strength, they
    will be equipped with the most modern equipment available to the Army,
    and each will complete intensive training that will begin with a focus
    on individual and small unit (squad through platoon level training) and
    progress to company and battalion level collective training. Lastly,
    every unit will complete a BCT-level mission rehearsal exercise focused
    on counterinsurgency operations.

        54. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, the main rationale presented
    to Congress thus far for increasing your Active-Duty end strengths is
    that it would allow your Active-Duty Forces to spend 2 months back home
    for every 1 month deployed. It is impossible to assess whether or not
    these proposed end strength increases would achieve this goal by
    looking at your personnel levels in isolation. One also needs an
    assumption about how many of them would be deployed. How many soldiers
    could be deployed at the QDR force structure levels of 482,400 in order
    to live within this 1-to-2 ratio of time deployed to time at home?
        General Schoomaker. The ARFORGEN model would provide a steady
    supply of ready units, rely on assured access to the Reserve component,
    careful management of time deployed to time at home, and balanced
    demand across the Army. Once ARFORGEN is in place and generating a
    steady flow of ready forces, our models indicate that to maintain a 1
    year at home to 2 years deployed ratio, the Army could sustain a long-
    duration deployment of 170,000 soldiers in any given time period.
    ARFORGEN has not yet been implemented because the current demand for
    forces in Iraq and Afghanistan far exceeds the available supply of
    fully manned and equipped units.

        55. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, how many more Active-Duty
    Forces could be deployed on a continuous basis, using the same
    assumptions on dwell time, if you were to add the 65,000 soldiers as
    you are proposing?
        General Schoomaker. Under the ARFORGEN construct, at a rotation
    rate of 1:2 for Active Forces, the Army will be able to deploy a total
    of 20 to 21 BCTs per rotation cycle, an increase in capacity of 2 to 3
    BCTs. Once we achieve programmed growth levels of 547,000 in the Active
    component, 358,200 in the ARNG, and 206,000 in the Army Reserve by
    fiscal year 2013, the Army will be able to generate a total of 165,000
    soldiers per rotation (115,000 Active, 35,000 ARNG, and 15,000 Army
    Reserve).

        56. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, do you believe, based on our
    experience to date, that ground forces will be necessary and effective
    in combating terrorism around the world in the coming years?
        General Schoomaker. Yes, the Army will be effective in combating
    terrorism around the world in the coming years. The Army's experience
    to date is that ground forces provide an effective, necessary, and
    essential capability in combating terrorists. The Army's modular force
    structure builds BCTs that are prepared to conduct a full-spectrum of
    operations, from force on force action to stability and support
    operations to homeland defense operations.

        57. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, to what extent is this the
    justification for your proposed end strength increases?
        General Schoomaker. The justification for the proposed end strength
    increases is based on more than the immediate mission of combating
    terrorism. Our Army's forces are postured to counter a wide spectrum of
    threats over the next 2 to 3 decades. To do this, the Army continues to
    responsibly use the funding provided by Congress to meet its title 10
    responsibilities of providing an Army that supports the Nation's
    interests, and meets the requirements of the National Military
    Strategy. The end strength increase ensures the Army's flexibility to
    respond to an evolving global security environment.

        58. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, do you believe that extended
    deployments of ground forces to other nations should be our primary
    method of combating terrorism?
        General Schoomaker. The Army's experience to date is that ground
    forces provide an effective, necessary, and essential capability in
    combating terrorists. The Army's modular force structure builds BCTs
    that are prepared to conduct a full-spectrum of operations, from force
    on force action to stability and support operations to homeland defense
    operations.
        Since combating terrorism is often conducted in the minds of
    people, the employment of ground forces is one of many methods of
    combating terrorism. For example, strategic communications is also an
    effective tool in combating terrorism. The U.S. Government may allocate
    resources to security cooperation and security assistance so that
    partner nations can, as may be required, both secure themselves and
    contribute to coalition efforts. However, the Army must continue an
    active role in both security and stability operations and retain the
    capability to respond to a range of challenges.

        59. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, last year the QDR asserted
    that the National Military Strategy could be executed at low-to-
    moderate risk by holding the Active Duty manning levels of the Army at
    the pre-Iraq war levels of 482,400. It further asserted the ARNG should
    be reduced from 350,000 to 333,000. Now, 1 year later, the Department
    is proposing to increase the size of the Active-Duty Army to 547,400
    and the ARNG to 358,200. To your knowledge, has the National Military
    Strategy been changed since the QDR was submitted?
        General Schoomaker. There has not been a change in the National
    Military Strategy nor the QDR Force Planning Construct that has driven
    the Army to request an increase in its end strength. During QDR 2006,
    the Army was tasked with building 70 BCTs (42 Active component, 28
    ARNG) to meet the strategic challenges that threatened the Nation,
    while building supporting force structure that would enable the Army to
    shift its balance away from our traditional focus. This 70-BCT force
    relied on predictable, assured access to the Reserve component that
    would generate 18-19 BCTs per ARFORGEN rotation once all conversions
    were completed in fiscal year 2013. However, current global demand on
    the Army has exceeded our capacity to provide forces within the
    ARFORGEN construct, compounded by the years of insufficient
    modernization investments. To meet the global demand for the long war
    and to provide strategic depth to the Nation, the Army proposed a plan
    to grow end strength across all three components to increase operating
    force capabilities, with modest increases in the Institutional Army and
    Individuals Account to retain structure needed to effectively recruit,
    train, and support the growth in the operating force. The proposed end
    strength growth will provide the Army with 76 BCTs (48 Active
    component, 28 ARNG) and over 200 multi-functional and functional
    support brigades. These 76 BCTs, and the additional Combat Support
    Brigade (Maneuver Enhancement) with supporting tactical combat
    formations, will generate 22-23 BCTs at a surge rotation rate (1:2 in
    the Active and 1:4 in the ARNG) by fiscal year 2013.

        60. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, if the strategy has not
    changed, then in your view, did the DOD incorrectly assess the forces
    necessary to implement that strategy in the QDR?
        General Schoomaker. QDR 2006 was a collaborative effort between the
    Services, the Joint Staff, and OSD to define the strategy to meet
    future war requirements. QDR 2006 also provided insights for the Joint
    Staff and the Services to do additional analysis based on the effects
    of Phase IV/V (Stability/Enabling Civil Authorities) operations on the
    Joint Force, and the means for building partnership capacity through
    the combatant commanders' security cooperation plans. The force
    assessments and associated resourcing decisions for Army forces
    supported that strategy. The challenge is that since QDR 2006 the
    sustained requirements for the Global Force Demand now exceed that
    strategy. OSD has acknowledged that capabilities shortfall and provided
    support to the Army's proposed plan to increase capabilities to
    mitigate the risk associated with that shortfall gap.

        61. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, the number of forces
    deployed in Iraq today is fairly similar to the number there a year ago
    when the QDR was released. Do you believe a change in assumptions about
    how long our forces would be in Iraq explains this change in the
    Department's position?
        General Schoomaker. The number of troops on the ground is primarily
    determined by the military requirements of the commanders in Iraq. The
    QDR expressed the priority mission for the DOD is the war on terror,
    and that remains as true today as it was last year when the QDR was
    released. As the QDR indicated, we want to better utilize an indirect
    approach for defeating the terrorist threat in Iraq. This approach
    requires building the capability of Iraqi security forces to stand on
    their own. Until that is achieved, our continued security and stability
    operations will allow the necessary governance in Iraq.

                                   readiness
        62. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, last year you made a
    presentation to the House Armed Services Committee on the Army's
    readiness situation in closed session that many of our colleagues found
    very disturbing. You presented those same charts to Senator Warner and
    I at a later date. Yet last August, about a month after your hearing
    with the House, when Secretary Rumsfeld and General Pace met with us,
    they were not willing to agree that the Army had a readiness problem.
    General Pace told us, ``to try to have a discussion that just lays out
    exactly precisely what readiness ratings are lends itself to
    misinterpretation and misunderstanding.'' The readiness reporting
    system has been around for a long time. Although we receive those
    reports in Congress in support of our constitutional responsibilities,
    those reports were not designed for us. They were designed for the
    decisionmakers inside the military--they were designed for you and
    General Pace. It causes confusion and concern when, nearly
    simultaneously, you tell Congress the Army has readiness problems and
    General Pace disputes that idea. Do the Army and the DOD leadership in
    the OSD and the Joint Staff have a common understanding of the Army's
    readiness situation today?
        General Schoomaker. The soldiers we have deployed into current
    theaters of operation are the best-trained, best-equipped, and best-led
    we have ever fielded. As I have explained in recent testimony,
    including last year's testimony before the House Armed Services
    Committee, our immediate challenge lies in the readiness of our
    nondeployed forces. I am greatly encouraged by the recent actions of
    Congress, the President, and the Secretary of Defense which reflect
    clear recognition of the compelling need to rectify our current
    situation. The Army needs your continued support to restore the
    necessary strategic depth so that we can respond decisively to
    potential strategic contingencies. I look forward to working with this
    Congress to enhance the readiness and strategic depth of our Army.

        63. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, last fall Congress provided
    an additional $17.1 billion in equipment repair and replacement funds--
    known as ``reset''--to the Army. What impact will those additional
    funds have on your readiness levels?
        General Schoomaker. The additional $17.1 billion will address the
    decline in the readiness of our on-hand equipment and allow the Army to
    return existing equipment back to units in combat ready condition.
    Because reset is focused on replacing, repairing, and recapitalizing
    equipment, it has limited impact on equipment shortfalls.

        64. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, how much of an improvement
    do you expect, and how soon?
        General Schoomaker. Reset funding includes replacement of battle
    losses--primarily helicopters--and replacement of Reserve component
    equipment diverted to support theater requirements--primarily trucks
    and radios. The major systems will begin arriving in early fiscal year
    2008 and continue for several more years afterward.

        65. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, what impact will this
    additional ``surge'' of forces to Iraq proposed by the President have
    on the readiness of your forces to fulfill all their global
    commitments?
        General Schoomaker. The Army still retains the capability to
    respond to all of its global commitments. However, the Army is
    stressed, and response timelines are increasing as much of the Army is
    focused on Iraq and Afghanistan. The continued support of Congress in
    funding the Army will help to alleviate the stress on the Army. The
    Army is resourced with budget and wartime supplemental funding to
    execute the current OIF/OEF fight. However, additional funding is
    required to implement the full strategy outlined in the 2006 QDR.

        66. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, were these risks discussed
    and debated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as part of the
    administration's decisionmaking process?
        General Schoomaker. Yes. The Chairman of the Joint Chief's
    classified risk assessment, provided to Congress in January, addresses
    the risks discussed and debated among the Joint Chiefs.

        67. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, to what extent will the
    requirement to pull additional equipment forward to Iraq cancel the
    benefits of the additional reset funds Congress provided last fall,
    which were designed to make more equipment available for our
    nondeployed forces to train with?
        General Schoomaker. The troop plus-up has had a modest impact on
    both fiscal years 2007 and 2008 reset plans, but not in the manner you
    mention. Three BCTs that were planned to begin reset in the fourth
    quarter of fiscal year 2007 will be delayed until the first quarter of
    fiscal year 2008. Further, the plus-up increases reset requirements in
    fiscal year 2008 by two BCTs. This represents a total increased
    requirement in fiscal year 2008 of five BCTs.
        The goal of reset is to restore returning units to a desired level
    of combat capability commensurate with full spectrum operations and
    potential future mission requirements. Reset is only one of several
    means to increase the equipment available to non-deployed units. The
    others include: moving equipment between units to meet training
    requirements prior to deployment; filling requirements from new
    production; and requesting additional funding to purchase needed
    equipment.

        68. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, some analysts point out that
    your conversion of Army brigades to a modular format with more combat
    elements per brigade automatically reduces your readiness levels by
    spreading the existing amount of available equipment over a larger
    number of reporting units, and that this reduced readiness will
    therefore exist until a significant amount of new equipment is
    delivered. Is that accurate, in your view?
        General Schoomaker. Attributing reduced readiness across the force
    to modular conversion is not accurate. We have been experiencing
    decreases in readiness since fiscal year 2002 but modular conversion
    did not start until fiscal year 2005, at which point only 6 percent of
    the force was converted. Currently, 32 percent of the force has
    converted to the organizational design. So modular conversion is not
    the primary reason for decreasing overall readiness, it is the pre-
    existing shortage of unit equipment or what I call ``holes in the
    force,'' the subsequent cross-leveling to fill those holes, equipment
    left in theater, and replacement of outdated equipment.
        Currently, the Army is only resourced through base budget and
    wartime supplemental funding to execute the current OEF/OIF fight.
    Resources continue to fall short of the level necessary to implement
    the full strategy outlined in the 2005 QDR. The Army outlined specific
    areas of risk in the recent Chairman's Risk Assessment submitted with
    the President's budget in February 2007. Had the Army been funded to
    requested levels in recent years, and had endorsed policies that
    assured access to all of our capability, we would be in a better
    strategic posture today.
        Recent decisions to expand the Army reflect the clear recognition
    of the dangers we face and the strain that 5 years of sustained demand
    has placed on our All-Volunteer Force. We remain committed to
    generating whole, cohesive units that are fully manned, trained, and
    equipped--that are fully ready for the challenges they will face. This
    will require a national commitment to sustain predictable resourcing
    over time and to build our force in a balanced, coordinated fashion,
    while providing adequately for the needs of our All Volunteer soldiers
    and their families.
        The Army's transformation is improving our ability to support
    protracted campaigns by increasing the depth, breadth, and the overall
    capacity of our force. We are converting to more versatile and more
    capable modular formations while balancing the size and capabilities of
    our Active and Reserve components, and stabilizing our force. Your
    continued support is helping to fix our ``holes in the force.'' I ask
    you to increase your support for this effort as we work to break the
    historical cycle of unpreparedness.

        69. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, does your ``modular force''
    conversion make your readiness look worse than it is?
        General Schoomaker. The resources that Congress has invested in the
    Army have greatly increased the capabilities of our Army. Today,
    brigades, the building blocks of our strategy, have enhanced and
    embedded battlefield enablers that greatly increase their effectiveness
    across the spectrum of military operations. In building these
    formations we have documented these units focusing on the true go to
    war requirements based on current and future military operations. We
    have not ``gamed'' our requirements process for political or budgetary
    expediency; instead we have deliberately developed formations based on
    real world feedback from our deployed units and combatant commander
    requirements. The resources granted the Army are being consumed by
    several demands and should be viewed as a cumulative and combined
    effect. Although the transformation to the Army Modular Force has
    impacted some units by creating artificial dips in equipment on-hand
    readiness rates, this is a marginal driver. One of the most significant
    reasons for lowered equipment on-hand readiness rates can be traced to
    equipment left behind to fill theatre provided equipment stocks. In-
    theater equipment demands are above and beyond MTOE and require re-
    deploying units to leave their equipment behind to equip follow-on
    forces. We cannot ignore the $56 billion equipment shortfalls in the
    Army prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation Enduring Freedom
    (OEF).
        Additionally, the concentration of personnel and equipment in
    theatre greatly magnifies those shortfalls when spread across the
    remaining nondeployed force. High operational tempo, as experienced in
    OIF/OEF, causes un-forecasted equipment fatigue creating a large pool
    for depot-level repair and further creating a maintenance burden in-
    theater. This is further compounded by battle damaged equipment.
    Finally, full, timely, and predictable funding is required to ensure
    Army units are fully manned, equipped, and trained to sustain the full
    range of global commitments in the war on terror.

        walter reed army medical center and base realignment and closure
        70. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, a bill has been introduced in
    the House to repeal the closure of the Walter Reed Army Medical Center
    mandated by the 2005 base closure round. In your opinion, would this be
    a wise move?
        Mr. Geren. No. Reversing the current Base Realignment and Closure
    (BRAC) recommendations for Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC)
    would not address the need for significant modernization and renovation
    at Dewitt Army Community Hospital at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and
    establishing the Walter Reed National Military Medical Center at
    Bethesda, Maryland, nor would it account for the changing demographic
    of health consumers. As the Army implements the BRActive component law
    by building a new hospital at Fort Belvoir and significantly expanding
    the hospital at Bethesda, we will be better equipped to provide world-
    class health care for soldiers, veterans, and their families well into
    the future.

        71. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, is it realistic to think we can
    reopen one BRActive component decision, in this case Walter Reed,
    without reopening other BRActive component decisions that are related
    to Walter Reed, such as Fort Belvoir, or even reopening the entire
    BRActive component round?
        Mr. Geren. The Department opposes any amendment that would alter
    the approved recommendations of the 2005 BRActive component Commission.
    Legislating a specific change to a BRActive component Commission
    recommendation would adversely affect the integrity of the BRActive
    component 2005 process.

        72. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, do you believe keeping Walter
    Reed open is the best way to provide the quality medical care our
    servicemembers deserve?
        Mr. Geren. No. Renovations required to update the hospital at WRAMC
    would be costly and disruptive to the care of patients as portions of
    the hospital would have to be closed for protracted periods. Such
    renovations would have the unintended effect of interrupting the
    medical system's ability to provide care to the same number of patients
    it handles at the present time. Building a new hospital with greater
    capacity and capability at Fort Belvoir and making significant
    enhancements to Walter Reed National Military Medical Center at
    Bethesda, MD, will significantly improve the quality of care for all
    beneficiaries.

        73. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, do you believe keeping Walter
    Reed open is the best solution to the recent problems there?
        Mr. Geren. No. The recently identified problems are being
    addressed. We are drafting an Army Action Plan to use as our blueprint
    for successfully fixing the problems we have identified. The solutions
    identified at Walter Reed will be transferred to the new sites, to
    ensure that the Army provides world-class inpatient care and outpatient
    support services.

        74. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, do you believe we can close
    Walter Reed in 2011 and still maintain the capacity we need to treat
    wounded soldiers at Bethesda or other locations?
        Mr. Geren. Yes. The Department developed a business plan with input
    from physicians, medical support personnel, architects, and engineers.
    The plans were formally coordinated with the Navy, Air Force, Medical
    Joint Cross Service Group, and TRICARE Management Activity and the
    Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs). All
    concurred that the scope and cost of the projects in the business plan
    addressed capabilities and facilities requirements at the designated
    receiving locations.

        75. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, because the President decided
    late in the process to propose an increase in the Army's end strength,
    the budget was submitted with essentially a $2 billion placeholder, or
    blank check, in the military construction accounts because no locations
    had been selected for basing these additional personnel, in particular
    the six additional infantry brigades the Army wants. I do not believe
    Congress will sign a $2 billion blank check. When do the Army and DOD
    leadership plan to make a decision on where you propose to base these
    forces?
        Mr. Geren. The fiscal year 2008 budget request supports the recent
    decisions to grow the Army for combat and combat support units. The
    Army is currently conducting thorough analyses for locations to station
    the six new BCTs using the BRActive component ``best military value''
    process, which includes the opportunity to solicit public comment and
    interface with the local communities which may be affected by these
    actions.

        76. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, these basing decisions would
    rival the largest moves in the 2005 BRActive component round. That was
    an open process, with the data comparing the attributes of various
    bases available to everyone. What process does the Army envision using
    in making and defending these decisions?
        Mr. Geren. The Army is currently conducting our analysis and
    modeling of the possible BCT locations using the BRActive component
    ``best military value'' decision support framework. Additionally, the
    Army intents to integrate the data collected from the Programmatic
    Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) in order to have the opportunity
    to assess the input and comments of local affected communities. In the
    end, the combination of the data collected from the PEIS combined
    together with the analysis from the decision support framework will
    provide the bases of our selection for the new BCTs.

        77. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, how do you plan to consult with
    Congress on these basing decisions?
        Mr. Geren. The Army will not make its decision regarding the
    stationing locations of the new BCTs until we have completed our
    analysis and modeling using the BRActive component ``best military
    value'' decision support framework. Additionally, the Army intends to
    consider the impacts identified in the PEIS in order to have the
    opportunity to assess the input and comments of local affected
    communities. In the end, the combination of the data collected from the
    PEIS combined together with the analysis from the decision support
    framework will provide the bases of our selection for the new BCTs.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
                   reconstitution of army prepositioned stock
        78. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, the
    surge in troops and the requirements to create new brigades have caused
    a significant drawdown on Army prepositioned equipment stocks (APS).
    These stocks are important to our strategic flexibility. How do you
    plan to reconstitute those stocks?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. Since the first Gulf War, the APS
    program has expanded from its European-centric, Cold War origins to the
    array of global capabilities reached prior to the start of OIF. At the
    start of OIF, APS stocks afloat at Diego Garcia and ground-based in
    Southwest Asia, were drawn to equip units that conducted the initial
    assault to Baghdad. What remained in APS in the spring of 2003 is very
    similar to what we have today, though the equipment sets remaining are
    filled to a much higher level and of a modular design and with more
    modern equipment. Over the past 4 years, the assets used in the initial
    operations in Iraq were reconstituted in a manner that provided the
    maximum operational flexibility and strategic responsiveness.
        The Army will reconstitute its APS capabilities. They will be
    reconstituted in a manner that provides the maximum level of strategic
    flexibility and operational agility. Based on the availability of
    resources (requested funding and equipment returned for reset), the
    U.S. Army Materiel Command anticipates it will take approximately 18-24
    months to reset an APS set. The Army`s APS Strategy 2013 articulates
    the afloat and ashore equipment required to meet the future
    responsiveness needs of the combatant commanders.
        Once the current operational and equipping tempo stabilizes, the
    Army will develop an executable timeline within available resources to
    reset its APS sets according to the APS Strategy 2013.
        The Army could not have met the requirements of this most recent
    surge without APS. With the continued support of Congress to fully
    resource equipment, the Army will be able to return equipment to pre-
    positioned stocks as it becomes available from new production, repair,
    and recapitalization.

        79. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, does
    that reconstitution involve waiting for the surge in forces in Iraq and
    Afghanistan to end? If so, what are your plans if the surge is actually
    a plus-up, and doesn't end for the foreseeable future?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. Regardless of whether the plus-up
    remains in effect for the foreseeable future or not, the Army is
    committed to fully equipping all its organizations. The Army went into
    global war on terror with an equipping shortfall that has been
    magnified by consumption of equipment in OIF and OEF and growth through
    modularity. Additionally, the recently approved growth of the Army will
    result in higher overall equipping requirements. Overall Army equipment
    requirements will be addressed through procurement and reset/
    recapitalization of current equipment funded through a combination of
    base budget and supplemental monies, as appropriate.
        APS is an important strategic asset that enables both the strategic
    responsiveness and the operational agility of our Army. As such, we
    have begun efforts to reestablish our most critical strategic
    capabilities, those that support force reception, and will continue to
    increase our prepositioned capabilities until we meet the level
    articulated in APS Strategy 2013. This strategy addresses both afloat
    and ashore equipment sets and is designed to meet the future
    responsiveness needs of the combatant commanders.
        Once the current operational and equipping tempo stabilizes, the
    Army will develop an executable timeline within available resources to
    reset its APS sets according to the APS Strategy 2013.
        Without APS, the Army would not have been able to meet the
    requirements of the current surge, and with the continued support of
    Congress to fully resource the administration's budget request for Army
    equipment, the Army will be able to return equipment to pre-positioned
    stocks as it becomes available from new production, repair, and
    recapitalization.

                         readiness of nondeployed units
        80. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, part of
    the readiness problems for nondeployed units involved not having enough
    of the equipment they are supposed to have. If, in fact, the missing
    gear is not waiting to go through the depots or it is deployed to Iraq
    or Afghanistan, how do you plan to improve the availability of
    equipment for our nondeployed units?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. If unit equipping requirements do
    not change significantly over 2008-2013, the Army estimates that there
    are sufficient resources in the program (including the fiscal year 2007
    main supplemental, and fiscal year 2008 global war on terrorism
    requests) to procure all modified table of organization and equipment
    (MTOE) requirements for all BCTs by fiscal year 2013 and all MTOE
    requirements for support brigades by fiscal year 2017. Any additional
    resources received or applied above the program years, fiscal year 2007
    supplemental, or fiscal year 2008 global war on terror requests would
    accelerate fulfilling these requirements.

        81. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, are you
    planning to buy more of the missing equipment?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. As stated previously, the Army's
    program for 2008-2013, plus fiscal year 2007 main supplemental and
    fiscal year 2008 global war on terrorism requests, will procure the
    MTOE equipment needed for all Army BCTs and support brigades by fiscal
    year 2017. This does not include the $13-14 billion a year, plus at
    least 2 years after the cessation of operations, the Army will need to
    reset its current forces.

        82. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, is the
    procurement of equipment to replace that which is missing in the budget
    request? If not, is it in your unfunded requirements list?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. At the conclusion of the Army's
    programming process for 2008-2013, it realized that all critical
    requirements and essential needs for equipment for these years could
    not be met with the allocated resources. At that time, the Army
    generated its critical unfunded requirements list and forwarded a
    portion of these requirements, specifically those requirements for
    deployers and next-to-deploy units, through the OSD to Congress as part
    of the fiscal year 2007 main supplemental request. The Army also
    forwarded a subset of these requirements--specifically those
    requirements for deployers and next-to-deploy units that were not
    included in these requests--in its Unfunded Requirements List requested
    by Congress. To the extent that these unfunded requirements remain,
    they will be shifted to subsequent years for possible funding.

                        walter reed army medical center
        83. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, Major
    General Pollack, Acting Surgeon General, has directed that for the next
    30 days, only soldiers with major amputations and critical needs whose
    unit is assigned east of the Mississippi will be accepted from theater
    for care at Walter Reed. Other severely injured patients will be sent
    to military treatment facilities elsewhere in the United States. Is
    this a rational response to the problems of outpatient treatment at
    Walter Reed? Or, is it recognition that it is time to reexamine the
    fundamental soundness of the Army policy that causes hundreds of
    patients to be brought to Walter Reed directly from the theater, and
    keeps them there until the physical disability evaluation system is
    exhausted?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. This policy allows for proper
    distribution of patients throughout our Army Medical Treatment
    Facilities (MTFs). The primary criteria for medically regulating
    soldiers to specific MTFs are the soldier's medical requirements.
    Unless medically contraindicated, all Active component soldiers are
    regulated to the MTF that supports their unit of assignment. All
    mobilized/demobilized Reserve component, as well as Active component
    soldiers assigned to Reserve component deployed units, are regulated to
    the closest MTF having geographical area of responsibility for their
    mobilization/demobilization site. A revision of this policy is
    currently being staffed that will allow the soldiers to be more
    involved with their treatment location. If the capacity and capability
    exist, the soldier can be moved to the MTF nearest the location
    providing an adequate support structure, (i.e. family or other support
    systems).

                            support to army families
        84. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren, our military forces cannot be
    sustained without tangible support to military families--programs for
    children and youth; morale, welfare, and recreation; educational and
    employment assistance to spouses. Are the resources provided in this
    budget keeping pace with the growing demand for services, and will
    they, as the Army grows?
        Mr. Geren. The Army is working hard to ensure that these programs
    keep pace with the demands for services. These programs are essential
    to sustain the All-Volunteer Force and provide our soldiers and
    families a quality of life that is commensurate with the duties they
    are asked to perform. As the Army grows, we will adjust resources to
    address these family needs. While plans to grow the Army are not yet
    finalized, we are confident that adequate funding for these programs is
    contained in the Army's request.

                        future combat system acquisition
        85. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren, since the inception of the FCS
    program, the Senate Armed Services Committee has exercised its
    authority to ensure that it meets the needs of the Army and the Nation.
    To protect taxpayers, the committee required the Army to revise the
    contract under the Federal Acquisitions Regulations and convert it into
    a proper military procurement contract, after the Army had inexplicably
    procured this system-of-systems as a commercial item. In the last
    year's Defense Authorization Act, the committee included language
    requiring that the Secretary submit a comprehensive report upon
    completing preliminary design review to determine if the program should
    be restructured and called for an independent cost estimate for the
    program. The Army restructured FCS in January 2007. Program adjustments
    include deferring two classes of UAVs, eliminating the IMS, and
    deferring two types of armed robotic vehicles. The Army has also pushed
    back the anticipated date for fielding FCS-equipped brigades. Army
    officials have stated that the program adjustments do not compromise
    the systems' capabilities. How can four unmanned systems that have been
    previously described as critical, be eliminated without losing combat
    capability?
        Mr. Geren. The Army continuously evaluates FCS program technical
    and cost metrics. The congressional funding cuts in fiscal year 2005-
    2007 required the program to make an adjustment to some of its key
    milestones. Based on the assessment of the technical maturity of these
    unmanned platforms as well as anticipated average unit production cost,
    a decision was made to defer these systems until such time as the
    technology is more mature. To compensate for the BCT unmanned system
    reduction, an increase to the quantities of other unmanned systems, as
    well as adjustments in individual system requirements, has been
    addressed. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is
    continuously assessing the FCS BCT capabilities under multiple
    scenarios with various mixes of platform systems, quantities, and force
    sizes to ensure that the capabilities meet the operational requirements
    documents (ORD) requirements.

        86. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren, does the Army have a plan to
    reevaluate the FCS program to see if the remaining 14 systems can be
    consolidated or have their functions consolidated to reduce costs while
    maintaining the program's original operational capabilities?
        Mr. Geren. The Army is undergoing the fiscal year 2007 and fiscal
    years 2008-2013 FCS program adjustment and has no additional plans at
    this time to consolidate functionality for the 14 systems. The FCS BCT
    utilizes each of the systems as an integrated fighting force following
    approved future fighting doctrine concepts while maintaining its
    survivability and lethality. U.S. Army TRADOC continually reviews the
    FCS BCT capabilities, and doctrinal concepts to ensure that the
    operational requirements are still valid.

        87. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren, the Joint Tactical Radio
    System Ground Mobile Radio (JTRS-GMR) is a key component of the FCS
    manned ground vehicle development. What is the status of that program?
        Mr. Geren. Your question has been forwarded to the Office of the
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
    Logistics, for appropriate response. Specifically, this program is
    managed by the JTRS-Joint Program Executive Office.

        88. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren, operations in Afghanistan have
    demonstrated the utility of light infantry. What benefit would FCS
    bring to such units?
        Mr. Geren. Light infantry is a former label used to distinguish
    between mounted and dismounted forces. Today we simply use infantry.
    Before the modular conversion, formations formerly labeled as light
    infantry lacked mobility and firepower. Modular infantry BCTs address
    some of these capability gaps, but formations still have limitations in
    individual and unit protection, situational awareness, and
    communications on the move, down to the lowest level. FCS addresses
    these shortfalls within FCS BCTs and within modular BCTs that receive
    selected FCS capabilities.
        For example, unmanned systems connected to the formations via the
    advanced integrated network will perform many more of the dangerous and
    dirty tasks soldiers perform today. Larger territory is covered with
    aerial and ground sensors. Unmanned aerial and ground sensors increase
    survivability and force protect from ambushes and raids. The ability to
    employ a wider range of precision fires increases infantry lethality
    while minimizing collateral damage. Infantry forces have great utility
    and the most flexibility across the spectrum of conflict including
    irregular warfare and operations in complex terrain like cities and
    mountains. Irregular warfare is normally of long duration, against
    adversaries who deliberately seek to avoid accepted rules in the
    conduct of war. This includes, but is not limited to, unconventional
    warfare, guerrilla warfare, counter-guerrilla warfare, subversion,
    sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted
    recovery. Irregular warfare normally requires the support of the
    population. FCS BCTs are optimally configured for irregular warfare
    where information is the premium asset. The working design for FCS BCTs
    has the same number of infantry squads as today's modular infantry BCT,
    and due to the effectiveness of the FCS BCT, we have less total
    soldiers than a current heavy BCT with a much greater number of
    infantrymen in squads.

                             multiyear procurements
        89. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren, I understand that the Army
    proposes to procure Chinook helicopters, the Abrams M1A2 Systems
    Enhancement Package upgrades, and M2A3/M3A3 Bradley upgrades, under a
    multiyear contract. Do these proposed procurements comply with all of
    the requirements of the Federal multiyear procurement statute, title
    10, U.S.C., section 2306b?
        Mr. Geren. Yes. The Army is aware of the six conditions which must
    be met prior to the award of a multiyear procurement contract. The
    procedures and notifications to Congress IAW title 10, U.S.C. 2306(B)
    (Statutory) and DFARS 217.172 (Regulatory) will be followed and
    executed when appropriate. At this time, the six conditions required by
    the statute have been satisfied and are documented in the P-Forms and
    the multiyear exhibits with one caveat. The stability of funding for
    both the Abrams and Bradley MYP assumes a significant amount of global
    war on terror funding will be provided to the Army in fiscal year 2008.
    The remaining MYP years for both Abrams and Bradley Fighting Vehicle
    Systems (BFVS) will be funded in the base program. The Army will
    address the remaining certification requirements at the appropriate
    time.

        90. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren, will the expected savings
    obtained from the proposed multiyear procurements be ``substantial''
    (as opposed to executing under a series of annual contracts) within the
    meaning of the statute?
        Mr. Geren. Yes, for Chinook helicopters, the Abrams M1A2 Systems
    Enhancement Package upgrades, and M2A3/M3A3 Bradley upgrades.
    Chinook Helicopters
        The Multiyear Procurement Criteria Exhibits that were submitted
    with the President's budget indicate that the anticipated savings
    resulting from the requested multiyear contract would be $173 million,
    or slightly more than 4 percent of the total contract price. This was a
    conservative government estimate that was based on the information
    available to the program office at the time the exhibits were prepared.
        Since the submission of the President's budget, the program office
    has begun the early stages of alpha discussions and continues to refine
    the estimate. Currently the anticipated savings are estimated to be
    between 5 and 6 percent of the total contract price.
    Abrams M1A2SEP and M2A3/M3A3 Bradley Upgrades
        The MYP for the Abrams M1A2 SEP tank would begin in third quarter
    of fiscal year 2008 for a period of 5 years with a total estimated
    savings of $178 million, or approximately 10 percent ($300,000 per
    vehicle) and an MYP contract for the BFVS/BFIST would begin in third
    quarter of fiscal year 2008 for a period of 4 years with a total
    estimated savings of $131 million, or approximately 5 percent ($135,000
    per vehicle).

        91. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren, will these multiyear contracts
    contain ``re-opener'' provisions? If so, please describe.
        Mr. Geren. For the Chinook it has not yet been determined if the
    multiyear contract will contain ``re-opener'' provisions. The program
    office is in the early stages of alpha discussions, as the anticipated
    contract award is not until December 2007. These provisions have been
    employed in some Army aircraft multiyear contracts in the past, but at
    this time neither the Government nor Boeing have identified a risk area
    that would require a ``re-opener'' provision. The issue will be
    considered as negotiations progress.
        For the Abrams M1A2SEP and M2A3/M3A3 Bradley upgrades, there is
    currently no plan to have any ``re-opener'' provisions concerning the
    prime contractors. The program office has not begun contract
    negotiations at this time since the anticipated contract award will not
    occur until 3rd quarter fiscal year 2008. However, it is possible that
    during contract negotiations some major ``subcontractors'' may have
    ``re-opener'' provisions included in their contracts.

        92. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren, with respect to each of these
    multiyear procurement proposals, does the Army intend to obligate funds
    in an amount necessary to fully fund termination liability with respect
    to the advance buy or economic order quantities, as well as
    cancellation ceiling liability? If so, what are those values? If not,
    why not?
        Mr. Geren. The Army typically covers multiyear cancellation ceiling
    by using current year funding in the event of a cancellation. If a
    multiyear contract were cancelled, the termination liability would be
    paid for with a portion of the funding originally budgeted for that
    year's multiyear increment. MYP termination requires the commitment of
    the Army to set aside the necessary funding to cover the cancellation
    ceiling amount.
    Chinook Helicopters
        Yes. The Chinook funding plan identifies a $90 million funded
    cancellation ceiling in the second year of the contract, which is
    reduced by $30 million per year for each subsequent year of the
    contract.
    Abrams M1A2SEP and M2A3/M3A3 Bradley Upgrades
        The Abrams and BFVS MYP exhibits represent the Government's initial
    cost estimate only. Therefore, the exact cancellation ceiling amount
    will not be determined until the contractor proposals are received and
    negotiated. The PM HBCT has developed an initial estimate of the
    maximum termination liability based upon cancellation of all remaining
    years beyond the year of termination.

                            [In millions of dollars]
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                              Program
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Bradley....................................................       $145.0
    Abrams.....................................................        111.5
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

                              joint cargo aircraft
        93. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren, contrary to guidance from the
    congressional defense authorizing committees in the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, the Army continues efforts to
    acquire JCA. To quote last year's bill: ``The Air Force's LCA would
    provide intratheater lift mission support for the U.S. Transportation
    Command (USTRANSCOM) which is the distribution process owner for the
    DOD. The conferees note that intratheater lift using fixed-wing
    aircraft is performed most efficiently when it is coordinated by
    USTRANSCOM.'' Fixed-wing cargo delivery has been included in the roles
    and missions of the Air Force. What is your view of the proper roles
    and missions for the Army and Air Force in intratheater lift?
        Mr. Geren. The Army and the Air Force have partnered to shape
    complementary capability requirements for the JCA program. A Joint
    Army/Air Force JCA program provides for a balance between the
    operational efficiencies of common-use, centrally-managed intratheater
    airlift assets, and the tactical response and effectiveness gained from
    service operated assets. USTRANSCOM coordinates intratheater
    distribution through Joint Deployment and Distribution Operations
    Centers (JDDOCs). Both the Army and Air Force JCA operations will be
    visible to the JDDOC, allowing TRANSCOM to impact the distribution
    process. The Air Force will use the JCA to supplement the existing C-
    130 intratheater airlift fleet, allowing for greater efficiencies for
    hauling smaller loads. The Army will use the JCA to focus on time-
    sensitive mission-critical resupply and key personnel transport at the
    tactical level--the last tactical mile. The Army will use the JCA to
    replace three less capable and aging Army airframes (C-23, C-26, and
    some C-12s) with more capable cargo platforms while simultaneously
    modernizing the Reserve components. The Army JCA will also relieve a
    portion of the logistical burden currently carried by the CH-47. These
    logistical operations are costly, maintenance intensive, and serve to
    reduce the availability of CH-47 aircraft for tactical missions.

        94. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren, in the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, the Senate Armed Services
    Committee restricted the purchase of this aircraft until two critical
    studies, the JCS Intratheater Lift Capabilities Study Phase 1 and AMC's
    Mobility Roadmap, are complete. What is the status of these reports?
        Mr. Geren. The ITLCS study was a follow on to the Mobility
    Capabilities Study (MCS). ITLCS built on MCS intratheater lift insights
    and determined the preferred mix of lift platforms to accomplish
    intratheater lift at the operational level in support of the Defense
    Strategy in the 2012 program of record; the study was approved on March
    27, 2007. The insights from ITLCS determined that JCA would be well-
    suited for lower volume standard terminal arrival routes; however, that
    more analysis would be needed to assess intratheater tactical airlift
    (the last tactical mile) requirements. This analysis is being executed
    by a combination of the Joint Intratheater Distribution Assessment
    (JITDA), an addendum to the JCA Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), and an
    Air Force Intratheater Airlift AoA. The JITDA goal, being led by the
    Joint Staff, is to conduct theater distribution assessments to
    determine required joint distribution capabilities to the point of
    effect, typically at the BCT level.

                             operational readiness
        95. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, to what extent have you
    evaluated whether units are ready and trained to respond to operations
    other than Iraq or Afghanistan?
        General Schoomaker. More than 4,500 commanders report their
    readiness monthly. Readiness reporting requires commanders to assess
    their status against the mission their unit is organized/designed to
    perform, against any assigned missions. We place great value on
    commander assessments of their unit's readiness and these reports are
    reviewed in great detail with appropriate follow-on action at the
    Headquarters, Department of the Army level. Quarterly, the Army
    assesses its ability to provide trained and ready forces to the
    combatant commanders. These two levels of assessment allow the Army to
    measure its ability to respond to challenges throughout the world.

        96. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, what, if any, impact have
    the large supplemental appropriations had on the readiness of Army
    units since operations in Iraq and Afghanistan began? When do you
    project that the funds will begin to have an impact on readiness?
        General Schoomaker. These resources have enabled us to increase
    readiness for counter-insurgency operations for the current fight but
    not increase readiness of the force overall. From fiscal year 2003 to
    2006, the Army has received over $200 billion in supplemental funding.
    Of these funds, $162 billion (79 percent) have gone to operations and
    support costs, which enabled us to support the conflict in Afghanistan
    and Iraq. Another $29 billion (15 percent) was allocated and executed
    in investment accounts to support specific in-theater requirements,
    force protection, and infrastructure. Of the remaining funds, $10
    billion was allocated for the modularity initiative, and only $4
    billion (2 percent) addressed Army equipment shortfalls, which directly
    affect readiness. Supplemental funding does not put us on a robust path
    to filling shortages that exist in the Army, which impact readiness.

        97. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, in light of recent plans to
    increase end strength, do you have the capacity in terms of trainers,
    facilities, et cetera, to train a larger force, and if not, have you
    begun planning for the increased end strength from this perspective?
        General Schoomaker. Army will require additional military and
    civilian authorizations to support both the Active component and
    Reserve component training capacity. These additional authorizations
    will ensure that the training base can fully support the Army's
    increase in end strength through initial military training (IMT),
    functional training, and professional military education requirements.
    We may also require additional investment in facilities and equipment
    and these requirements are being assessed now.
        In the near-term, the combat training centers (CTC) have the
    capability to meet essential training requirements of deploying units,
    to include the additional six BCTs called to support the global war on
    terrorism. However, as the Army grows, the CTC program, in its current
    state, will not be able to support all training events envisioned in
    ARFORGEN training strategies. With 76 BCTs, the Army's worldwide annual
    maneuver CTC (MCTC) throughput capability requirement for Active
    component and Army National (ARNG) BCTs and one U.S. Army Special
    Operations Command rotation will be 38 to 40 rotations annually at
    objective ARFORGEN. The current MCTC capability of 33-36 rotations
    annually depends on establishing an exportable training capability
    (ETC) in CONUS and at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC)
    by fiscal year 2010. Because the current MCTC capacity will not be able
    to meet throughput requirements at objective ARFORGEN, the Army is
    currently assessing whether to establish a second CONUS ETC in the next
    Program Objective Memorandum cycle.
        We have also analyzed training ammunition requirements. Increasing
    the Army force structure will increase training ammunition requirements
    approximately 7 percent annually. We do not anticipate any significant
    issues with the current ammunition industrial base to increase
    production to support potential training requirement increases.
        Finally, we are analyzing the training support systems at
    installations. There is an ongoing study, initiated in late November
    2006, to look at the Army's inventory of ranges, facilities, equipment,
    and other requirements necessary to support training a larger Army. The
    results of this study will be complete by mid-summer 2006.

        98. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, to what extent have you
    analyzed the implications of increasing end strength in terms of
    maintaining overall readiness while growing the force?
        General Schoomaker. During the Army's plan to grow the force, the
    impact on manning, equipping, training, sustaining, and stationing the
    growth in the force to minimize the impact on readiness, while meeting
    current operational demands, was considered. The analysis of the
    required increase in capabilities to meet global force demands and the
    need to ensure the right force mix across all three components resulted
    in a timeline for the plan that builds a balance of combat, combat
    support, and combat service support capabilities in the operating force
    between fiscal years 2008-2013. Additionally, the impacts on the
    Institutional Army were evaluated and the results incorporated into the
    plan ensuring adequate capacity to generate and sustain the Operational
    Force. Finally, the funding to implement the plan, along with
    maintaining the Army's current transformation plan and operational
    requirements, was evaluated and integrated in the program and budget
    review process. The resulting Grow the Army Plan has been incorporated
    in current initiatives under the AFORGEN construct to maintain
    readiness of the units deployed to meet the Global Force demand.

        99. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, what are your specific
    recommendations as to how to reduce the impact of high operations tempo
    operations on both near- and long-term readiness and modernization
    programs?
        General Schoomaker. The Army is resourced with budget and wartime
    supplemental funding to execute the current OIF/OEF fight. Resources
    continue to fall short of the level necessary to implement the full
    strategy outlined in the 2005 QDR. Long-term fixes are primary
    objectives of ongoing efforts toward force modernization and
    transformation coupled with the Grow the Army initiative. Each is a
    years-long effort with substantial funding requirements. Current
    projections are that, with sufficient reliable funding, we can meet
    operational requirements and execute the National Military Strategy by
    2013.
        In the interim, the Army continues to maximize available resources
    to ensure units in theater are fully manned, trained, and equipped to
    execute their missions. Critical to this near-term readiness is
    ensuring sufficient reset time for redeploying units to ensure
    personnel and equipment recovery can be completed prior to beginning
    collective training efforts for the next assigned mission. The Army
    recently enacted policy mandating that units have a minimum of 12
    months dwell time between deployments. Priority of personnel is to
    these units preparing to deploy. The goal is for every BCT to deploy to
    theater at 95 percent strength or better. Near-term equipment fixes
    include the forward repair activities: reset and recapitalization. The
    Army consistently meets equipment readiness standards due to
    supplemental funding supporting these programs. The Army is maximizing
    the use of Army pre-positioned stocks and is sustaining unit equipment
    availability and readiness with the help of supplemental funding. There
    still exists shortfalls in equipment fill and levels of modernization,
    training (both institutional and unit), and sustainment throughout all
    components of the Army. This impacts our strategic depth and
    flexibility to address unforeseen challenges.

                          readiness of the total army
        100. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, your testimony before the
    Commission on the National Guard and Reserves in December 2006 was
    instrumental in bringing about change to the previous OSD policy
    regarding redeployment of soldiers of the National Guard and Reserve
    for deployments in excess of 24 months. You stated then that ``the Army
    is incapable of generating and sustaining the required forces to wage
    the global war on terror without its components--Active, Guard and
    Reserve--surging together.'' You indicated that the Active-Duty Army
    ``will break'' under the strain of war-zone rotations without change,
    and Secretary Gates changed the policy. In 2004, however, you used your
    ``rain barrel'' analogy to argue against added end strength and to make
    the point that the Army was incapable of making good use of its Reserve
    manpower. Please explain to us whether and how the rain barrel was
    emptied.
        General Schoomaker. The purpose of the ``rain barrel'' analogy was
    not to portray a degree of ``emptiness.'' Rather, it was used to show
    how operating force capabilities would be increased over time by
    rebalancing existing structure within the Army's approved end strength.
    Under our original plan, and with the support of Congress, Active
    component end strength would increase temporarily by 30,000 to allow
    that rebalance as we transformed the force to modular designs while
    meeting the operational demands of the war on terror. At the end of
    that transformation period we would have increased the Active component
    operating force from a baseline of 315,000 in fiscal year 2004 to
    355,000 by fiscal year 2011. Along with assured and predicted access to
    the Reserve components, the plan would have reduced stress in high
    demand capabilities, redistributed soldiers to ensure the right mix
    between our operational and institutional forces, and increased overall
    force effectiveness and readiness. The challenge since QDR 2006 is the
    increasing global force demand required by the long war. With demand
    exceeding resources and with limited access to Reserve component forces
    under previous mobilization policies, the impact on Army force
    capabilities was creating ``emptiness'' in the Army's capacity to meet
    that growing demand. The Army's proposed growth, along with new
    mobilization policies, will allow us to curtail that drain on capacity
    and build additional capability to retain the barrel at a safe level.

        101. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, when did you first realize
    that adhering to the 482,400 end strength mandated by Secretary
    Rumsfeld was unsustainable?
        General Schoomaker. During my testimony to the Commission on
    National Guard and Reserves in December 2006, I first proposed growing
    the size of the Army as a course of action. I did not come to this
    conclusion without first being convinced that all other feasible
    alternatives had been exhausted. Even with 482,400 soldiers in the
    Active component, the Army was growing 30,000 temporarily to meet
    operational demands. Additionally, the Reserve components have become
    an integral part of the deployed Operational Force. The Army depends on
    recurrent access to the Reserve component to ensure integrity of the
    force and to maintain a reasonable dwell time under the ARFORGEN
    construct. Over the last 5 years, and, in particular since QDR 2006,
    the increasing strategic demand of deployed combat brigades and other
    supporting units is placing a strain on the Army's All-Volunteer Force,
    now being tested for the first time in an extended period of conflict.
    The dwell time between deployments for Active Duty units is less than
    the goal of 2 years, and in certain high demand/low density units, the
    dwell time is less than a year. Further, since almost all Reserve
    component units already have been partially or completely mobilized in
    support of the global war on terrorism, current mobilization policies
    and practices require the Army to rely on individual volunteers from
    those units. All this runs counter to the military necessity of
    deploying trained, ready, and cohesive units to meet operational
    demands. The realization is that we needed to make the temporary growth
    permanent and build additional capacity across all three components. If
    today's global demand is indicative of the future demand on our Army to
    provide combatant commanders with a wide range of forces and
    capabilities to prevail in the war on terror, to sustain our global
    commitments, and to build effective multinational coalitions, then we
    must build today to meet these challenges in the future.

        102. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, what is your assessment
    today of the personnel readiness of the Active Army? What will it take
    to prevent ``breaking'' the Army as you warned about just 3 months ago?
        General Schoomaker. The foundation of personnel readiness in the
    Active Army is sustaining the All-Volunteer Force. The Army has
    continued to achieve its retention mission for the past 9 years. The
    Active Army is ahead of its year-to-date recruiting goal and expects to
    meet its goal for fiscal year 2007. The recruiting environment will
    remain challenging. With continued congressional support of new
    authorities and funding, the Army will meet accession and retention
    goals. To avoid ``breaking the Army,'' the Army is accelerating its end
    strength growth. This will decrease stress on soldiers and families and
    meet future demands. The Army consistently monitors the quality of life
    for soldiers and families and adjusts programs to ensure the All-
    Volunteer Force is sustained.

                               military equipment
        103. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, with
    the Army surging larger numbers of troops to Iraq, and given the
    difficulties in meeting equipment requirements for troops already
    deployed, how will the Army cope with the requirement to equip these
    additional units?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. First and most importantly, we do
    not compromise our standards in force protection for deploying units,
    and the Army has and will continue to meet the requirements of
    deploying forces, including those involved in the surge. The impact of
    sustaining equipment is felt in nondeployed units. For instance, the
    Army is moving UAH between units to ensure pre-deployment training
    requirements are met at home station, while units in theater are
    provided the quantities of UAHs required to perform their missions. The
    Army is addressing this problem by:

              (1) using reset to repair, replace, and recapitalize
            equipment;
              (2) moving equipment between units to meet training
            requirements prior to deployment;
              (3) filling requirements from new production; and
              (4) requesting additional funding to purchase needed
            equipment.

        104. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, how
    will this affect already low levels of nondeploying unit readiness?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The current level of demand,
    combined with resource shortfalls, forces the Army to continually shift
    resources from nondeployed forces to sustain those currently in the
    fight. The pace of current operations and our commitment to fully man,
    train, and equip our deploying forces for their assigned missions
    leaves holes in the readiness of our next to deploy units. After years
    of insufficient investment in the Army, many of our units were under-
    equipped and not ready for deployment, especially in our Reserve units.
    The low readiness of our nondeployed force impacts our strategic
    flexibility and depth. This practice increases risk in our ability to
    perform other critical missions. Through base and supplemental
    appropriations--we have addressed many of our equipment shortfalls.
    Supplemental appropriations, however, have not enabled the Army to
    recover, as they are intended to pay for the costs of war, principally
    through the purchase of consumable supplies and the replacement of
    battle losses.

        105. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, how
    will this affect Army capability to respond to crises in other areas of
    the world?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. There are sufficient nondeployed
    units to respond to another major conflict, but the readiness of those
    units may result in longer timelines and increased risk in achieving
    mission success. For homeland defense missions and consequence
    management, there are a specified number of forces tasked and
    maintained in a high state of readiness to respond.

        106. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, given
    steady trends over the last 2 to 3 years of decreasing levels of
    equipment readiness among nondeployed units, what specific equipment
    readiness areas are of the most concern to you?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. Due to theatre requirements, some
    equipment is unavailable for units to train with prior to deployment.
    The most common shortfall occurs with force protection equipment, where
    equipping solutions are developed to meet specific theatre threats, and
    production of these items go straight into theatre to meet demand.
    These items include: uparmored HMMWVs and medium and heavy trucks,
    armored security vehicles, the RG-31, Buffalo, Husky, Cougar, Counter-
    Rocket, Artillery and Mortar and Counter Remote Controlled IED Warfare
    devices. Additionally, kits designed for standard Army equipment to
    increase survivability are also provided only in theatre. These include
    the Bradley and Tank Urban Survivability Kits, Frag Kits, Bradley
    Reactive Armor, and Surface-Launched Air-Targeted Armor for Strykers.
    Some new standard Army equipment is being sent directly to theatre as
    well, with little to none remaining for training units. These items
    include Profiler, Chemical Biological Protective Shelters, Command Post
    of the Future, Tactical Water Purification Systems, and Forward Area
    Water Point Supply Systems. There are also items that are only fielded
    in limited quantities due to new production (a force feasibility review
    reduced number), most importantly Thermal Weapon Sights.

        107. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, how
    has this trend affected your ability to train and equip your deploying
    units?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. First and most importantly, we do
    not compromise our standards in force protection for deploying units,
    and the Army has, and will continue to meet, the equipping requirements
    of deploying forces, including those involved in the plus-up.
        The impact of sustaining equipment is felt in non-deployed units.
    For instance, the Army is moving Up-armored High Mobility Multipurpose
    Wheeled Vehicles (UAH) between units to ensure pre-deployment training
    requirements are met at home station, while units in theater are
    provided the quantities of UAHs required to perform their missions. The
    Army is addressing this problem by: (1) using reset to repair, replace,
    and recapitalize equipment; (2) moving equipment between units to meet
    training requirements prior to deployment; (3) filling requirements
    from new production; and (4) requesting additional funding to purchase
    needed equipment.

        108. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, how do
    reset efforts address these problems?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. Reset prevents further erosion of
    readiness of the force and restores equipment to a desired level of
    combat capability commensurate with a unit's future mission. The $17.1
    billion provides the resources to replace, repair, and recapitalize
    equipment for 24 BCTs and support units. Contracts to replace battle
    losses are being put in place during fiscal year 2007, but most of the
    equipment will not be delivered to the Army until fiscal year 2008.
        The reset funding will meet the requirements to properly equip our
    deploying forces, but will not `fix' all equipment shortfalls or
    equipment still committed overseas in support of OIF and OEF.

        109. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, given
    the surge in troop levels, how will the larger troop levels impact
    requirements to rotate equipment from overseas theaters back to the
    United States for reset?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The troop plus-up has a modest
    impact on both fiscal years 2007 and 2008 reset plans. Three BCTs that
    were planned to begin reset in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2007
    will be delayed until the first quarter of fiscal year 2008. Further,
    the plus-up also increases reset requirements in fiscal year 2008 by
    two BCTs. This represents a total increased requirement in fiscal year
    2008 of five BCTs.

        110. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, if
    these rotations cannot occur, how will this impact Service plans to
    execute the funds allocated for reset in fiscal year 2007 and requested
    in fiscal year 2008?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. To manage the reset process, the
    Army has established a Reset Task Force comprised of staff elements
    throughout the Army Staff. While the Reset Task Force has made some
    adjustments due to extension of units in theater and equipment swaps
    between units, we are still on a glide path to fully execute our fiscal
    year 2007 reset program. Current assessments as a result of the plus-up
    in theater have identified an increase of five BCTs to the fiscal year
    2008 reset plan.
        The fiscal year 2008 global war on terrorism budget request was
    made prior to the current plus-up of forces in theater. The Reset Task
    Force, in coordination with other staff elements, is currently in the
    process of revalidating the fiscal year 2008 reset requirement and will
    make adjustments as necessary.

                      corrosion prevention and mitigation
        111. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, the
    Government Accountability Office (GAO) previously reported that
    corrosion has significant impacts on the cost, readiness, and safety of
    military equipment. Corrosion prevention is considered to be the most
    cost effective way to reduce corrosion and its effects on DOD
    equipment. We understand that DOD and the Services are not doing as
    much as they can in incorporating corrosion prevention planning in many
    of our newest and most expensive weapons systems, despite considerable
    guidance calling for this planning. What are the challenges to having
    more effective corrosion prevention planning and what efforts have been
    taken or are planned to overcome these challenges?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The Corrosion Prevention and
    Control (CPC) program has not been funded to develop and execute a plan
    to reduce the cost of corrosion on Army materiel.
        The immediate challenge to having more effective corrosion
    prevention planning is funding. The CPC program submitted a fiscal
    years 2008-2013 Program Objective Memorandum request of $32 million,
    $88 million, $90 million, $29 million, and $108 million. Although $180
    million of that requirement was validated, we have not received funding
    for the program.
        If the CPC program was funded we could execute the plan to reduce
    the cost of corrosion on Army materiel. The planned efforts to overcome
    these challenges include: 1) conduct more comprehensive corrosion
    prevention planning during equipment design, 2) obtain statistically
    significant data that identifies corrosion failure on equipment at the
    parts level, 3) obtain research funding to develop design improvements
    for fielded systems, and 4) obtain Army OMA funding to implement state-
    of-the-art preventive maintenance and repair solutions.
        These are the impediments that prevent the Army from improving
    corrosion resistance for Army systems.

                              sheltering equipment
        112. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, Army propositioning
    equipment in Kuwait is not under shelter, because the buildings that
    were supposed to provide that shelter have been taken for offices for
    U.S. forces stationed there. GAO has reported that this lack of shelter
    invites corrosion and contributes to decreased readiness levels. What
    actions have been taken to provide more shelters for Army equipment?
        General Schoomaker. Most available storage at Camp Arifjan has been
    diverted for other OIF purposes. Other Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS)
    construction projects are either not prioritized, funded, or have other
    (e.g., host nation) issues. A plan for cost-effective shelters and
    facilities for all APS equipment is under evaluation by the U.S. Army
    Materiel Command. The funding identified from this evaluation will be
    requested under MCA projects in the fiscal years 2010-2015 Program
    Objective Memorandum.
        Currently, APS-5 unit sets have been issued and are employed
    supporting the plus-up operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Use of APS-5
    has repeatedly illustrated the value of the APS strategy. Prior to this
    recent full APS-5 draw, portions have repeatedly been drawn and
    subsequently reset since 2002. A testament to the high operational
    readiness of the APS sets occurred during the August 2006 draw when
    members of the supported task force commented that the equipment drawn
    from APS was better than their own unit equipment. Upon completion of
    the current missions the Army will reconstitute and reset APS to
    support the APS Strategy 2013 restoring the strategic and operational
    responsiveness required by the combatant commands.
        Contingency planning for APS shelter is an ongoing and dynamic
    process. For example, in APS-4 (Northeast Asia), once the new
    maintenance facility is finished in 2007, the humidity controlled
    warehouse currently being used for maintenance will be converted to
    provide 50,000 square feet of controlled humidity storage.

        113. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, has the Army done a cost-
    effectiveness study for acquiring more shelters and if it has, what are
    the results of the study?
        General Schoomaker. The Army has not done a specific cost-
    effectiveness study for APS shelters, but relies on other similar
    studies and findings to support APS storage requirements. The June 14,
    2006, GAO report, Additional Measures to Reduce Corrosion of
    Prepostitioned Military Assets Could Achieve Cost Savings, noted the
    Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center study that found the return on
    investment for controlled humidity preservation storage of equipment to
    be 8:1 over 10 years. Mean time between failure for electronics
    improved by 30 percent and cyclic maintenance time was reduced by 50
    percent.
        Presently, all APS watercraft are supported by controlled humidity
    preservation systems, when not undergoing repairs/modifications or on-
    condition-cyclic-maintenance. Part of the APS facility requirement plan
    is to prioritize construction of APS storage shelters for the critical
    equipment items that are of high dollar value, reduce expensive
    maintenance cycles, require controlled humidity for corrosion
    prevention, and where readiness rates are increased.

        114. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, are there any plans to
    acquire sheltering for the rest of the equipment and if not, why?
        General Schoomaker. Presently, requirements for APS facilities
    (storage, maintenance, and other) are being evaluated as part of the
    comprehensive implementation plan for APS Strategy 2013. The employment
    of APS equipment follows the shift in focus for the combatant
    commanders as potential theater threats increase or decrease over time.
        The APS facility strategy is to develop unit set, operational
    project, and sustainment stock maintenance facilities and storage
    (controlled humidity) capabilities at strategic locations and sites
    that support contingency and operations worldwide. The goal is to have
    a fully coordinated ``end-state'' for APS facilities that can be
    executable with major construction funding and leveraging partner
    nation funding where feasible. The comprehensive facility plan aligned
    to the APS Strategy 2013 mission and structure will provide ready
    equipment to Army and Joint force execution authorities.

                                 national guard
        115. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, the
    ARNG has been stretched to meet its State and Federal missions. The
    Guard has been neither well-resourced nor, according to the Army staff,
    retained a high level of readiness. Experts in and out of uniform
    report that the National Guard currently faces a severe shortage of
    available equipment in the United States. Should the National Guard
    adopt an equipment modernization program to meet its own unique needs?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. At this time, the Army has no
    plan to initiate an equipment modernization program devoted to
    requirements found only in the National Guard. The Army uses an
    integrated and synchronized requirements and resourcing process to
    ensure that Army forces are manned, trained, and equipped for their
    mission requirements. Additionally, the ARNG annually receives National
    Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA) funds directly from
    Congress to address its own unique needs.
        Furthermore, the ARNG leadership is a participant in the Army's
    cyclic requirements and resourcing meetings--such as the Army Campaign
    Plan, the Army Resource and Requirement Board, the Army Requirements
    Oversight Council, the Army System Acquisition Review Council, the Army
    Modular Force General Officer Steering Committee, the Army Equipping
    and Reuse Conference, and the Senior Review Group.
        The Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the Director of the ARNG
    have access to the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army
    to provide input and address issues and decisions affecting the
    organization, manning, equipping, training, and resourcing of the ARNG.
        Since the beginning of the global war on terror, the Department of
    the Army has significantly increased funding for ARNG equipment. We
    have allocated $36 billion over the fiscal years 2005-2013 period to
    equip and modernize the ARNG. This funding will bring the ARNG to 77
    percent equipment on hand by fiscal year 2014. The Army goal is to
    equip all components to 100 percent of the Active component standard.
    If the current funding stream progresses beyond the fiscal years 2008-
    2013 POM, this goal could potentially be achieved by 2020.

        116. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, what
    role should the Guard play in homeland defense?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. In its non-Federalized status,
    the National Guard is controlled by the Governor of the State or
    territory, and as such it works for the Governor, but also supports the
    combatant commander--U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), U.S. Southern
    Command (SOUTHCOM), or U.S. Pacific Command, as specified in the
    supporting plans to that combatant command. In this case, the National
    Guard Bureau works with the combatant command to ensure their homeland
    defense plans facilitate achievement of unity of effort.
        In its Federalized status, the National Guard is controlled by the
    President, and as such it accomplishes homeland defense missions given
    to it by the combatant commander.

        117. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, does
    the ARNG have the equipment and readiness to fill this role?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. As you are aware, the ARNG is
    experiencing serious equipping and readiness challenges. These
    challenges stem from decades of the ARNG being postured as a strategic
    Reserve. In that capacity, the Army accepted a certain amount of risk.
    The Guard was funded at levels appropriate for a strategic Reserve and
    fully equipped and trained when mobilized for their Federal mission.
    Currently, the ARNG is engaged in a demanding and complex transition to
    an Operational Force. The Guard's equipping and readiness shortfalls
    have been exacerbated by the global war on terror, high operational
    tempo, and the cross-leveling of equipment.
        While the ARNG has a diminished capability to respond to domestic
    emergencies, I am confident they have the capacity required to respond
    to all contingencies. LTG Blum, Chief National Guard Bureau, has stated
    that the issue is not whether the Guard will respond, it is about the
    time it will take to respond. The Guard's response time hinges on
    getting the right mix of people, equipment, and supplies to the right
    place on time.
        The Army and Congress have worked tirelessly to ensure the ARNG's
    equipment requirements are programmed. We are investing approximately
    $36 billion in ARNG equipment from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year
    2013. The majority of this equipment will have utility for both
    domestic and warfighting missions. In the short-term, the States have
    negotiated Emergency Management Assistance Compacts to provide
    capabilities to each other, if requested. Although the Army is strapped
    for equipment, all components working in concert will support the ARNG
    in its mission of aiding and assisting the States in responding to
    domestic emergencies and homeland defense missions.

        118. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, the
    Army's Stryker BCT concept has been suggested as a model by which to
    equip Guard units. I understand that such a unit exists in the
    Pennsylvania National Guard already. Are there plans to role out more
    Guard Stryker units?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The mission of the Stryker was to
    fulfill an immediate requirement in the Army's transformation process
    to equip a strategically and operationally deployable brigade capable
    of rapid movement anywhere in the world in a combat ready
    configuration. The armored wheeled vehicle is designed to enable the
    Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) to maneuver easily in close and
    urban terrain while providing protection in open terrain.
        The Stryker is an excellent multi-functional platform that is a
    good fit within the ARNG brigade structure. However, the Army has not
    validated or programmed any additional requirements for the ARNG beyond
    the one Stryker brigade stationed in the Pennsylvania National Guard.

        119. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, the
    Commission on the Guard and Reserves has recommended that the Chief of
    the National Guard Bureau be a four-star general and that the Commander
    or Deputy Commander of U.S. NORTHCOM should be an officer of the
    National Guard. Do you agree with those recommendations?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The National Guard plays play a
    critical role as warfighters abroad defending our Nation and as the
    military first-responder at home when disaster strikes. The Army
    leadership recognizes this dual role as central to the National Guard's
    place in our Army. The Guard comprises about one third of our total
    force and National Guard soldiers in their local communities form the
    Army's strongest, most direct link to the American people. The Guard's
    expertise, versatility, and connectedness make it a force of choice in
    almost any situation where the Nation calls on its military Services.
    The Army has a vital interest in ensuring that the National Guard is
    trained and equipped to the same level as Active component units.
        The current Joint Chiefs of Staff structure has sustained the Army
    and the ARNG for many decades and that structure has ensured that the
    ARNG was always manned, trained, and equipped for all assigned
    missions. We do not support a change to the current structure that
    would add a four-star National Guard officer to it. With regard to the
    possibility of a National Guard officer being the Deputy Commander of
    NORTHCOM, we fully support and advise the Secretary of Defense to
    appoint the most qualified officers into combatant commander and deputy
    commander positions; there is no reason a National Guard officer could
    not perform in that capacity.

        120. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, what
    about making the Chief of the National Guard Bureau a member of the
    JCS?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The proposed change is not
    necessary. It would confuse command and control relationships and line
    of authorities that the Department has formed over the past 20 years
    since Goldwater-Nichols was enacted. The Chief of the National Guard
    Bureau (CNGB) plays a very important role, but he does not have
    responsibilities for organizing, manning, training, and equipping
    forces or for corresponding budget and programming responsibilities.
    All of those functions reside with the Army. While those areas are not
    his primary responsibilities, he does provide input for integration
    into all of them. The CNGB has unfettered access to every key official
    in the DOD and the Army.
        The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has two assistants; one
    for the National Guard and one for the Reserve, and they participant in
    matters affecting the Reserve component. The National Guard Bureau
    assigns the Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for
    National Guard Matters (ACJCS NGM) and that assistant gives advice to
    the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense on National Guard matters on
    a permanent basis. The ACJCS NGM is responsible for providing the
    Chairman with information, advice, and counsel on matters concerning
    the National Guard. It also enhances and facilitates Reserve component
    utilization. Any actions that could affect these responsibilities or
    any issues that could impact the Reserve component must be coordinated
    through the ACJCS NGM.

        121. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, what
    is your view about necessary changes, if any, to the duties of the
    Chief of the National Guard Bureau?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The proposed change to the duties
    of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau is not necessary. It would
    confuse command and control relationships and line of authorities that
    the Department has formed over the past 20 years since Goldwater-
    Nichols was enacted. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB)
    plays a very important role, but does not have responsibilities for
    organizing, manning, training, and equipping forces or for
    corresponding budget and programming responsibilities. All of those
    functions reside with the Army. While those areas are not his primary
    responsibilities, he does provide input for integration into all of
    them. The CNGB has unfettered access to every key official in the DOD
    and the Army.

                 detainee treatment and interrogation training
        122. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, the
    Detainee Treatment Act directed that ``No person in the custody or
    under the effective control of the DOD or under detention in a DOD
    facility shall be subject to any treatment or technique of
    interrogation not authorized by and listed in the United States Army
    Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation.'' In September 2006, the
    Army released the revised manual. How would you assess the training on
    the new field manual?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The new field manual, FM 2-22.3,
    Human Intelligence Collector Operations, has been seamlessly integrated
    into Army training. Current training is adequate.
        Combat arms maneuver brigades and associated combat service support
    units normally conduct a CTC rotation prior to deployment.
    Interrogation training at the CTCs incorporates FM 2-22.3.
        In October 2006, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAIC) deployed
    a mobile training team to the Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of
    Operations and trained all senior interrogators on the differences
    between the superseded Field Manual 34-52, Interrogation, and FM 2-
    22.3.
        The USAIC, in conjunction with the Army G-2 and U.S. Army Forces
    Command, executes mobile training teams for units preparing for
    deployments, to update and reinforce their training. Training is
    tailored per unit request and addresses FM 2-22.3.
        The USAIC has also revised the Programs of Instruction for
    institutional or classroom training to incorporate lessons learned and
    reflect the expanded doctrinal guidance contained in FM 2-22.3 and the
    provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act.

        123. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, what
    safeguards has the Army established to ensure that detainee abuse at
    Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib will not be repeated?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The Army is committed to ensuring
    all of its soldiers live up to the Army values and the law of war,
    regardless of the environment or circumstances, and we are equally
    committed to ensuring that those responsible for detainee abuse are
    held accountable. The Army has established a wide range of safeguards
    to minimize the chance of detainee abuse incidents occurring in the
    future. The Army will also continue to aggressively investigate every
    credible allegation of detainee abuse to fix accountability where
    appropriate.
        The criminals who carried out detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib have
    been held accountable. There have been no substantiated cases of
    detainee abuse by soldiers at Guantanamo.
        The Army has incorporated detainee operations lessons learned into
    training guidance, CTC rotations, training support products, and
    updated institutional training Programs of Instruction. Several
    comprehensive training support packages which cover the full spectrum
    of detainee operations were distributed. We continue to provide mobile
    training teams focused on detainee operations for predeployment
    training and post deployment in theater training. The Army also
    provides detainee operations training for sister Service units, as
    required.
        Our policy never allowed for detainee abuse. We continue to address
    and provide detailed procedures for reporting and investigating even
    suspected abuse. The Abu Ghraib abuses were first reported by a
    soldier. Army leaders involved in theater detainee operations work
    closely with the International Red Cross to ensure they have required
    accessed to detainees and facilities. We also created new force
    structure which greatly enhances detainee operations capability.
        As executive agent for administration of DOD detainee operations
    policy we work across DOD to ensure results of reports and periodic
    inspections and assessments are analyzed across the policy, doctrine,
    organization, training, material, leader development, personnel, and
    facilities spectrum to ensure not only the best conditions, based on
    military necessity, for detainees, but for our service men and women as
    well. The all-Service FM 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector
    Operations, was released in September 2006 and the Army is currently
    staffing the revised all-Service policy, AR 190-8, Detainee Operations.

        124. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, is
    detainee treatment sufficiently incorporated into courses of
    instruction at our military schools at all levels?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. Current detainee treatment
    training is sufficient and provides instruction and practical
    application of principles and policy at all levels of soldier and
    leader responsibility. Changes continue to be made to Programs of
    Instruction (POI) from initial military training to Professional
    Military Education courses based on a wide range of lessons learned.
    Specific changes as a result of detainee operations lessons learned
    have been extensive. The U.S. Army TRADOC has updated and published
    three field manuals (FMs), FM 6-22, Army Leadership; FM 2-22.3, HUMINT
    Collector Operations; and FM 3-19.17, Military Working Dogs; one
    interim manual, FMI 3-63.6, Command and Control of Detainee Operations;
    six student texts related to detainee operations; six training support
    packages for detainee operations; and the Center for Army Lessons
    Learned (CALL) Handbook No. 06-17, Detainee Operations at the Point of
    Capture, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, which was published in
    May 2006.
        Individual Entry Training (IET) including basic training and one
    unit station training (OSUT) provides all new soldiers with Law of Land
    Warfare/Rules of Engagement. IET soldiers conduct 43 hours of specific
    detainee operations instruction (roughly 50 percent academic and 50
    percent hands on practical exercises) including the use of role players
    and an 8-hour detainee operations facility culminating exercise.
        Basic Officer Leader Course conducts training on detainee
    operations. Additionally, Officer Intermediate Level Education (ILE)
    was updated in Academic Year 2004-05 to cover detainee operations. ILE
    students have the opportunity to enroll in electives covering detainee
    operations in depth.
        The U.S. Army Military Police School incorporates the humane
    treatment of detainees, pursuant to the internationally accepted
    protocols of the Geneva and Hague Conventions, at all levels of soldier
    and leader responsibility from IET to battalion and brigade pre-command
    courses. The MP School also recently opened a mock internment facility.
        The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School (USAIC&S) has revised
    programs of instruction to incorporate lessons learned and reflects
    expanded doctrinal guidance contained in FM 2-22.3, Human Intelligence
    Collector Operations, and the provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act
    of 2005. USAIC&S has revised and expanded the Human Intelligence
    Collector Course to 18 weeks with 3 days of lecture and practical
    exercises.
        USAIC has deployed a mobile training team to the CENTCOM Area of
    Operations where they trained and certified all senior interrogators on
    the restricted technique and the differences between the superseded
    Field Manual 34-52, Interrogation, and FM 2-22.3.

                               counterinsurgency
        125. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, counterinsurgency
    operations, conducted at the squad and platoon level in populated urban
    areas, stress cultural, language, and human intelligence skills over
    technological resources. How will the Army improve these capabilities?
        General Schoomaker. A counterinsurgency campaign is a mix of
    offensive, defensive, and stability operations conducted along multiple
    lines of operations. It requires soldiers to employ a mix of familiar
    combat tasks and skills more often associated with nonmilitary
    agencies. The balance between them depends on the local situation.
    Achieving this balance is not easy. It requires leaders at all levels
    to adjust their approach constantly. They must ensure that their
    soldiers are ready to be greeted with either a handshake or a hand
    grenade while taking on missions only infrequently practiced until
    recently at our CTCs. Soldiers are expected to be nation builders as
    well as warriors. They must be prepared to help reestablish
    institutions and local security forces and assist in rebuilding
    infrastructure and basic services. They must be able to facilitate
    establishing local governance and the rule of law. The list of such
    tasks is long; performing them involves extensive coordination and
    cooperation with many intergovernmental, host-nation, and international
    agencies. We are focused on ensuring our institutional organizations
    (TRADOC schools, centers of excellence, and training centers) provide
    our soldiers the requisite skills to execute our current
    counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq and Afghanistan while simultaneously
    maintaining skills across the full spectrum of combat operations.

         congressional earmarks in army science and technology programs
        126. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren, defense S&T funding lines are
    some of the most heavily earmarked accounts in the defense budget. A
    rough analysis of top-line figures shows that--setting aside the
    Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency which has not traditionally
    been earmarked--the DOD's basic and applied research funding is
    approximately 40 percent earmarked. I am interested in receiving more
    detailed information from the Department and each of the Services about
    the extent and execution--including the military utility--of these
    earmarks. Could you please provide a breakout of the Army fiscal year
    2007 S&T funding between requested programs and congressional earmarks?
        Mr. Geren. Yes. The Army had $1.2 billion in earmarks in fiscal
    year 2007 to the requested budget of $1.7 billion, a 40 percent
    increase over the request. This level of congressional earmarks has
    increased steadily over the past few years. In fiscal year 2003 the
    earmarks to S&T totaled $749 million. Our experience and assessments
    have shown that the majority of these earmarks have had marginal to no
    military utility. The additional appropriation funding has imposed more
    workload on S&T managers, principal investigators, and contracting
    offices. See Attachment.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        127. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren, could you include any
    evaluations you have done of the military utility of these projects?
        Mr. Geren. Our experience and assessments have shown that the
    majority of these earmarks have had marginal to no military utility.

        128. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren, does receiving your funding
    for basic and applied research in such a heavily earmarked fashion
    interfere with the Army's ability to conduct a coherent research and
    development program which meets the Army's technology needs?
        Mr. Geren. Yes. The additional earmark workload on S&T managers,
    principal investigators, contracting offices, and resource managers
    reduces the time available to manage the core programs that are vital
    to developing technologies that could enable new warfighting
    capabilities. Further, many of the earmarked efforts fund development
    of technology that is inconsistent with the Army's acquisition and
    warfighting investment strategies.

            urban combat, cultural awareness, and counterinsurgency
        129. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, we are conducting
    counterinsurgency operations in a city of 6 million people, currently
    rife with sectarian discord. Can you describe the pre-deployment
    training that the brigades deploying to this operation receive?
        General Schoomaker. A unit's training strategy is focused on its
    assigned mission and culminates in a mission rehearsal exercise
    specifically designed to challenge soldiers and leaders with situations
    and conditions similar to those they will face when deployed. Training
    scenarios created for mission rehearsal exercises require units to
    execute complex operations involving multiple missions and requiring
    unit personnel to cope with rapidly changing circumstances. The
    training environment created for mission rehearsal exercises prepares
    units to operate in Iraq and Afghanistan, to include realistic convoy
    live-fire events, simulated IEDs, emphasis on detainee operations,
    dealing with large numbers of civilians in villages and towns for urban
    operations, cultural awareness training, use of interpreters, response
    to media on the battlefield, emphasis on information operations,
    increase medical training and medical rules of engagement,
    synchronizing medical and logistical task forces with the unit,
    counter-insurgency operations, greater use of Army Special Operations
    Forces, and greater use of UAVs. Rigorous mission rehearsal exercises
    are indispensable to preparing units for deployment, especially when
    redeploying within a year. Continued congressional support of Army
    supplemental funding requests is essential for the Army to adequately
    replicate the contemporary operational environment for mission
    rehearsal exercises.

        130. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, what is the Army doing to
    improve the cultural awareness of its soldiers and leaders in general?
        General Schoomaker. Cultural training is in the curricula of IMT,
    for both officer and enlisted soldiers. The most important training
    conducted in each are the field exercises that challenge soldiers to
    apply what they learn in a realistic setting. The U.S. Army Accessions
    Command (USAAC) has woven cultural challenges into the fabric of the
    training environment so that outcomes are realistic and influenced by
    the use of appropriate tactics.
        The Army has established a TRADOC Culture Center (TCC), at Fort
    Huachuca, Arizona, to provide support to operational units and
    professional military education. The efforts of the TCC and the Defense
    Language Institute Foreign Language Center at Monterey, California, are
    closely coordinated. Culture and language are inherently linked and
    both organizations regularly coordinate training strategies and
    schedules to reduce redundancy, and ensure complimentary instructions.
        Almost one-third of the education provided at the Command and
    General Staff College (CGSC) involves improving the student's cultural
    and regional awareness. The current educational programs and ongoing
    initiatives in the areas of cultural awareness, language training, and
    regional studies address Joint Professional Military Educational
    objectives and the 2005 Defense Language Transformation Roadmap. The
    International Military Student program allows students to interact with
    officers from approximately 90 different countries and each student is
    required to take a regional or religion course elective. The CGSC, in
    collaboration with the Defense Language Institute, requires a language
    elective for students identified for assignments in Iraq and
    Afghanistan. Additionally, officers selected for Military Transition
    Teams in Iraq receive required language coursework in Iraqi Arabic.
        The CTCs are considered the cornerstones of Army training
    readiness. The CTCs further that reputation by providing the most
    realistic training feasible for units scheduled for deployment. The
    training is focused specifically on the area of operation where the
    unit will eventually deploy. To enhance a unit's level of cultural
    competency, the training received in this seminar is sequentially and
    progressively built upon with additional cultural awareness training
    and culminates during the mission rehearsal exercise.
        After action reports are a critical component of all CTC training.
    Feedback from units in theater suggests the training the unit received
    at the CTCs helped to prepare them for eventual operations in theater.

        131. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, was the urban combat
    training adequate?
        General Schoomaker. Yes, the urban combat training afforded each
    brigade prior to deployment prepares soldiers for urban operations and
    to deal with large numbers of civilians in villages and towns. The Army
    has an extensive inventory of urban training facilities resulting from
    investments made in the 1980s. More recently, as part of a
    comprehensive overhaul of urban training, the Army has been investing
    in urban training facilities since 2002. The strategy to modernize
    urban training facilities began as a study conducted by the U.S. Army
    TRADOC that recommended a minimum, standardized set of facilities to
    enable rigorous, realistic live training in an urban environment. The
    study showed that each combat brigade should have home-station access
    to a shoot house, an urban assault course, and a ``capstone'' training
    facility called a Combined Arms Collective Training Facility (CACTF).
    The CACTF is a small village-like cluster of 12-28 robust building
    shells that enable units to develop and hone urban combat skills.
    Generally, units at company level and below train at home station using
    a shoot house, urban assault course, and CACTF. Brigade-level training
    in urban operations takes place at the CTCs. In cases where full MILCON
    projects are not practical or available, the Army uses inexpensive, low
    maintenance, pre-fabricated training facilities that support many of
    the critical tasks that lead to urban operations proficiency. Overall,
    the Army has a sound, deliberate, and economical program to achieve the
    number of urban training facilities that are needed by fiscal year
    2013.

        132. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, does the Army have
    sufficient facilities to train for urban combat?
        General Schoomaker. The Army has an extensive inventory of urban
    training facilities resulting from investments made in the 1980s. More
    recently, as part of a comprehensive overhaul of urban training, the
    Army has been investing in urban training facilities since 2002. The
    strategy to modernize urban training facilities began as a study
    conducted by the U.S. Army TRADOC that recommended a minimum,
    standardized set of facilities to enable rigorous, realistic live
    training in an urban environment. The study showed that each combat
    brigade should have home-station access to a shoot house, an urban
    assault course, and a ``capstone'' training facility called a CACTF.
    The CACTF is a small village-like cluster of 12-28 robust building
    shells that enable units to develop and hone urban combat skills.
    Generally, units at company level and below train at home station using
    a shoot house, urban assault course, and CACTF. Brigade-level training
    in urban operations takes place at the CTCs. In cases where full
    military construction projects are not practical or available, the Army
    uses inexpensive, low maintenance, pre-fabricated training facilities
    that support many of the critical tasks that lead to urban operations
    proficiency. Overall, the Army has a sound, deliberate, and economical
    program to achieve the number of urban training facilities that are
    needed by fiscal year 2013.

                soldier-to-soldier combat identification system
        133. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, are we near fielding a
    soldier-to-soldier combat identification system that could be central
    to reducing incidents of fratricide?
        General Schoomaker. Yes. We have fielded several solutions that
    reduce the risk of soldier-to-soldier fratricide. The Army currently
    fields glow tape patches to all soldiers. The new Army Advanced Combat
    Uniform has built in shoulder glow tape patches with cover flaps that
    aid in identification at night when a soldier is using night vision
    devices. Additionally, the camouflage helmet covers have button holes
    that allow Soldier Combat Identification Helmet Marking System to be
    inserted on the helmet and there are 1-inch square glow tape patches
    for additional uniform attachment for friendly force marking and
    identification. The Joint Combat Identification Marking System (JCIMS)
    includes a Soldier Dismounted Combat Identification Marking System
    (DCIMS)--a helmet cover that provides a negative thermal image when
    seen through thermal devices. The DCIMS is under consideration for
    deployment. There are 230 Land Warrior (LW) and 133 Mounted Warrior
    (MW) systems being deployed with the 4th Battalion, and the 9th
    Infantry Battalion under the 4th Stryker BCT. Both LW and MW systems
    provide enhanced soldier Situational Awareness (SA) along with
    networked communications. The results of this deployment will be looked
    at closely for its impact on the operational environment, to include
    anti-fratricide. Currently, this program is unfunded beyond 2007.
        Additionally, with very limited funds, we are currently engaged in
    several research related areas relative to soldier anti-fratricide:
              a. The Integrated Battlespace-Combat SA System program is in
            its final stage investigating Position Navigation and Geometric
            Pairing to provide more accurate soldier positions in urban
            environments.
              b. Radio-based combat identification where there is a soldier
            based query (radio frequency or laser based) of a region (or
            individual) and a radio response is under investigation with
            limited funding through fiscal year 2008. Additionally, the
            examination of rifle-mounted active radio frequency tags is
            underway.
              c. We continue to improve range and resolution of existing
            sensors and optics. We have been leveraging limited funding
            resources under a Phase I Small Business Innovation Research
            project and have proposals submitted into the Defense
            Acquisition Challenge Program to leverage and accelerate this
            range identification technology to the soldier in the field.
            Ideally, a soldier should be able to identify a potential
            target at 1.5 times the maximum effective range of his weapon.

                               officer attrition
        134. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, for the last few years,
    Army leaders have testified that retention of soldiers is strong both
    in the Active component and Reserve component. We're hearing now
    reports about an exodus of company grade officers who have reached the
    end of their obligated service and, effectively, 100 percent selections
    for promotion to captain, major, and lieutenant colonel. Some military
    analysts worry that the rush to promote officers may be lowering the
    overall quality of the officer corps. What can you tell us about mid-
    grade and junior officer attrition?
        General Schoomaker. The Army Competitive Category (ACC) mid-grade
    officers serving in the rank of major have a 10-year historical average
    attrition rate of 5.9 percent. The projected ACC major attrition rate
    for fiscal year 2007 is below average at 5.0 percent. The ACC company-
    grade historical average attrition rate following the drawdown period
    and prior to September 11, 2001 (fiscal years 1995-2001) was 9.0
    percent. The ACC company-grade average attrition rate from fiscal years
    2004-2006 was 8.3 percent. The projected ACC company-grade attrition
    rate for fiscal year 2007 is 8.5 percent which is slightly up from 8.1
    percent in fiscal year 2006. The attached chart provides specific
    numbers for company/field grade losses.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        135. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, what were the rates of
    promotion to major and lieutenant colonel last year?
        General Schoomaker. There were two promotion boards during fiscal
    year 2006 for the rank of major due to reducing the pin-on time to
    major from 11 to 10 years in service. The promotion rate for majors in
    the primary zone in April 2006 was 97.1 percent. The promotion rate for
    majors in the primary zone in September 2006 was 98.0 percent. The
    promotion rate for lieutenant colonels in the primary zone for fiscal
    year 2006 was 90.9 percent.

        136. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, is this something that
    concerns you?
        General Schoomaker. Promotion rates reflect the needs of the Army.
    The Army is committed to maintaining a quality force and will not
    compromise its standards for promotion selection.

        137. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, while the ARFORGEN process
    may serve to identify units and personnel who will deploy to Iraq and
    Afghanistan, do you believe career officers and NCOs in general are
    ready in all respects for repeated tours of duty in the war zone?
        General Schoomaker. Yes, career officers and NCOs are more ready
    for repeated deployments than ever before. Army leaders understand that
    the Army is engaged in this prolonged war that will continue for
    sometime. These leaders have made a conscious decision to continue to
    serve their country and through experience of previous deployments,
    lessons learned, pre-deployment training, the latest equipment, and an
    increased emphasis on ensuring families are taken care of; our leaders
    are ready.
        The Army does everything it can to ensure our soldiers and leaders
    are prepared for the environment they will encounter in theater. As our
    leaders go on more deployments, they gain more experience. They gain a
    richer understanding of the culture and other challenges faced in this
    region. Understanding the culture and being able to interact with the
    people and their leaders (mayors, police, and local army) makes a
    significant difference in our success in counterinsurgency war.
    Experience counts for a lot in readiness.
        Mission and theater focused training is executed through a series
    of key training events prior to deployment. Commanders use this
    training program to continuously assess and validate their units'
    readiness for the assigned mission. This training includes but is not
    limited to:

             Mission-focused individual, battlestaff, and collective
            training at home station.
             Battle command training seminars for BCTs.
             A CTC supported maneuver mission rehearsal exercise for BCTs.
             Collective training event(s) for non-BCT units.
             A full regimen of final preparatory training in Kuwait before
            moving into combat.

        Prior to deployment, individual soldiers are trained in warrior
    tasks and battle drills, counter-IED, anti-terrorism awareness, media
    awareness, specific first aid tasks, combat life saving, detainee
    operations, basic language, and short-range marksmanship. Leaders must
    also be proficient in cultural awareness, interpreter operations,
    convoy operations, urban operations, risk management, traffic control
    supervision, and counter-IED (leader response).

                    compensation for insufficient dwell time
        138. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, in
    January, when announcing changes to policies affecting deployments of
    soldiers, Secretary Gates stated that the Department would offer
    financial compensation for those whose ``dwell time,'' or time at home
    station, did not meet certain prescribed standards. What is your
    understanding of the status of that pay policy change?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. In January the Secretary of
    Defense announced new force utilization goals and directed a
    compensation program be developed. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
    the Service Chiefs of Staff, and Service Secretaries have been working
    with the OSD in developing a program that is flexible and meets the
    needs of each Service. At this time, a final program has not been
    developed.

        139. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, do you
    think that soldiers should be compensated with additional payments
    every time an operational necessity requires deployment of additional
    troops?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. With the nature of today's
    expeditionary force we think it is important to recognize the changing
    global environment and increased pace of operations our soldiers are
    experiencing throughout their career. The global war on terrorism will
    be a long fight and soldiers can expect to be engaged in that fight
    potentially over the course of their career. It may very well be time
    to use a compensation program that rewards the experience gained in
    multiple deployments or mobilizations and provides an incentive to
    volunteer for duty with a deploying unit. A tool tailored to achieve
    these goals would be predictable, and recognizes the dedication and
    commitment our soldiers display.

        140. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, do you
    think this ``sweetener'' to repeal of the 24-month policy is necessary?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The Army in coordination with the
    other Services and the OSD is prepared to address any additional
    actions necessary to ensure we are capable of meeting our operational
    mission. Should that mean developing new policies in support of
    utilization of total force goals, then we would certainly consider all
    available resources and alternatives to accomplish these goals.

                         contractors on the battlefield
        141. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, more
    and more of the DOD's maintenance and support functions are outsourced.
    These ``contractor logistics support'' agreements have resulted in the
    deployment and employment of civilian contractors in combat areas. What
    problems have emerged for the Department as a result of increased
    numbers of contractors on the battlefield?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. Accounting for the number of
    contractors on the battlefield emerged as a significant challenge
    because there was no single personnel system used by all Services and
    even within the Services, tactical-level personnel systems use by the
    military either did not accept data on contractors or those systems did
    not feed into operational personnel systems.
        In January 2007, the Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational
    Tracker (SPOT) was designated by the Office of the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD (P&R)) in coordination with
    the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology
    and Logistics (OUSD (AT&L)) as the Joint Solution required by DOD
    Instruction 3020.41. This tracker is essentially a joint database to
    provide visibility over all contractor support to deployed forces,
    including a summary of services or capabilities provided and by-name
    accountability of contractors. On January 29, 2007, the Army published
    an All Army Activity message directing the use of SPOT and DOD is
    preparing a joint-level directive for its use as the designated
    enterprise system. In addition, an update to Defense Federal
    Acquisition Regulation Supplement Clause 252.225-7040 has been approved
    specifically naming SPOT for use in all Department contracts when
    contractors accompany the U.S. Armed Forces.
        Prior to the January 2007, designation of SPOT as the Department
    contractor personnel tracking system, the Department initiated the
    requirement for U.S. CENTCOM to conduct quarterly contractor census in
    2005. Census numbers reside with the Office of the Assistant Deputy
    Under Secretary of Defense for Program Support, where they are received
    on a quarterly basis.
        The goal for the Department and Coalition Force Land Component
    Command (CFLCC) was to gain total accountability over contractor
    personnel deployed and contractor capabilities resident within Iraq. A
    total of 128,888 contractor personnel in Iraq were reported in the most
    recent April 2007 census. The next quarterly census will provide the
    number of contractors in every country CFLCC conducts operations, to
    include Afghanistan. The DOD, Department of State, and U.S. Agency for
    International Development (USAID) have held a number of meetings the
    past few months to discuss whether State and USAID can also incorporate
    the SPOT system into their contract management process. The three
    agencies are currently exploring technical and logistical issues with
    using a common database for all three agencies.

        142. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, do you
    support the DOD's initiative to review 300,000 DOD positions which
    could result in shifting logistics billets and other functions, such as
    civil affairs, away from uniformed personnel and into the civil service
    and private sector for potential outsourcing?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. DOD Instruction (DODI) 1100.22,
    Guidance for Determining Workforce Mix, implements DOD policy for
    determining the appropriate mix of military, civilian, and private
    sector manpower. The guidance specifies the criteria for designating
    DOD activities for military, civilian, or private sector performance.
    The policy designates activities for military performance when military
    incumbency is required by law, executive order, treaty, or other
    international agreements; for command and control of crisis situations;
    to maintain combat readiness or esprit de corps; to mitigate
    operational risk; when unique military knowledge or skill are required
    for successful completion of duties; or to maintain sufficient military
    manpower for rotation, career progression, or wartime assignments. In
    April 2007 the Army completed an annual inventory of inherently
    governmental and commercial activities. All military billets were
    evaluated with the DODI 1100.22 manpower mix criteria. All military
    billets in the Operational Force were coded for military performance.
    The 300,000 figure was simply based on an analysis performed in 1998 of
    military occupational specialties mapped to civilian skills. It is the
    number of military billets initially identified for review for possible
    conversion. Military positions are not identified for conversion if
    they are required for reasons stated above or if sufficient numbers of
    fully trained and qualified civilians are not available to perform the
    duties.

        143. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, the
    extraordinary number of civilian contractors performing what were
    previously military duties, like security, has raised public concerns.
    Do commanders on the ground have sufficient oversight of civilian
    contractors who support them?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. Within the last 20 years, Army
    functions traditionally performed by soldiers have migrated to
    contractors. Examples of such functions include services for security
    guards, food service/dining facilities, and information technology (IT)
    automation. Motor pools, as well as soldier mechanics, are vanishing,
    and vehicle maintenance is being performed via service contracts and
    vehicle leasing (with maintenance performed by the contractor). All of
    these contracts require verification of services performed by a
    Government Contracting Officer's Representative (COR).
        The Army does not have enough contracting officers/contract
    administrators to provide the required level of contract administration
    on large contracts. These acquisition professionals are attempting to
    meet daily contract mission requirements and training the ever changing
    CORs who are normally in theater on deployments ranging anywhere from 4
    months to 1 year. On occasion, this has resulted in CORs who are not
    adequately trained to perform surveillance on their respective
    contracts.
        The number of unit-level COR personnel is normally adequate for the
    large contracts, but the high turnover of personnel in theater presents
    a constant challenge of training/appointing new CORs. Many have not
    completed the formal COR course offered by the Defense Acquisition
    University (DAU). Additionally, some COR duties require unique skill
    sets and training. For example, military occupational specialty, 92G
    (Food Service Specialist) is tracked and managed separately to ensure
    that a sufficient quantity of trained personnel are available to
    provide oversight for important dining facility contracts. Another
    problem is that being appointed as a COR in a unit is often an
    additional duty and is not normally someone's major function or sole
    position. This has resulted in COR duties not being given the attention
    they deserve which can impede performance. To help remedy this concern,
    the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Policy and Procurement
    issued a policy memorandum on February 9, 2007, titled ``Contract
    Administration and Surveillance for Service Contracts'' to all Army
    contracting offices. This policy memorandum requires the appointment of
    properly trained CORs, the preparation of Quality Assurance
    Surveillance Plans (QASPs), and requires COR's contributions to be
    included in their annual performance reviews in accordance with DOD
    policy.

        144. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, does
    the Army have sufficient numbers of contracting officers, including in
    the field, to properly oversee the execution of contracts?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. Currently, there are 5,563
    contract specialists/contracting officers within the Army of which over
    500 are in non-contracting offices. This number is expected to decrease
    to 3,472 by 2011. This projected loss is due to retirement and
    attrition (migration to private industry, BRActive component actions,
    regional hiring difficulties due to lack of PCS funding, et cetera).
    Since 1995, the workforce numbers have decreased by 53 percent, while
    the workload actions have increased by 278 percent. The decrease in
    career field 1102s has resulted in a lack of contract administration
    (which has been validated by several outside audits), and a lack of
    contract planning. New hires (1102s) of 418 per year would result in 0
    percent growth over the next 5 years and new hires (1102s) of 529 per
    year would result in 10 percent growth over the next 5 years.
        The shortage is particularly severe for the Army's population of
    285 military contracting officers who support operations in Iraq and
    Afghanistan. The Army, along with the other military services, has been
    unable to provide the total number of Level II and III certified
    military contracting officers requested by commanders in Iraq and
    Afghanistan. This shortage is also evident within the Defense Contract
    Management Agency which, on a few occasions, was forced to turn down
    requests from the Army for the administration for theater support
    contracts citing a lack of resources.
        The small number of civilian and military contracting personnel is
    compounded by the fact that the contracting career field requires
    several years of training and experience to develop the business acumen
    necessary to craft contract arrangements and to negotiate the best
    interests of the United States Government when dealing with industry.
    Moreover, losses of senior contracting personnel result in fewer
    experienced trainers to acclimate and mentor the increasingly junior
    workforce in the business of Army contracting.

        145. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, will
    an FCS-equipped brigade be able to maintain itself in the field without
    attached civilian contractors?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The Program Manager, FCS intends
    to comply with the maintenance concept outlined by the FCS ORD, which
    does not require the use of contractor personnel below the Corps/
    Division level except for scheduled services and unique troubleshooting
    situations. All field maintenance will be performed by the crew (80
    percent) and the combat repair team mechanics (20 percent).

             gap in army chemical and biological unit preparedness
        146. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker,
    according to a January 2007 report by the GAO, ``most Army units tasked
    with providing chemical and biological defense support are not
    adequately staffed, equipped, or trained to perform their missions.''
    The report goes on to say that as of March 2006, ``most of the Army's
    chemical companies, particularly in the National Guard and Reserve,
    were reporting the two lowest states of readiness measured by the
    Army's Unit Status Reporting System.'' Moreover, ``Army chemical
    companies reporting the lowest levels of readiness doubled from 2000 to
    2006.'' Finally, the GAO reports that ``the absence of a plan to
    address the personnel and equipment shortfalls that are primarily
    responsible for these readiness problems makes it unclear whether and
    when these problems will be corrected.'' Would chemical and biological
    defense not be available in the event of a mass casualty weapons of
    mass destruction (WMD) attack at home?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. Chemical and biological defense
    would be available in the event of a WMD attack at home. The Army has
    completed certification of 45 of 55 WMD Civil Support Teams (CST) in
    the National Guard of each state and territory. Additionally, the
    National Guard is providing one of the three planned chemical,
    biological, radiological, or nuclear explosive consequence management
    forces for domestic emergencies.
        To improve training and equipping, the U.S. Army Chemical School
    provides training on increased emphasis of full spectrum chemical,
    biological, radiological, or nuclear explosive (CBRNE) hazards and
    operations and emergency response competencies. Additionally, new
    equipment, the Joint Service Transportable Decontamination System-Small
    Scale, will provide operational and thorough decontamination of
    equipment, aircraft, facilities, shelters, surface areas, and terrain.
    When fielded, the system will replace existing decontamination systems
    and provide enhanced decontamination capabilities for chemical units.

        147. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, would
    you comment on GAO's assessment and, if it is correct, explain how the
    Army plans to restore the readiness levels of these important chem-bio
    units?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The GAO assessment is generally
    accurate. To improve readiness assessments, in October 2006, the Army
    implemented the Defense Readiness Reporting System-Army (DRRS-A). Among
    other improvements, this system will allow commanders to evaluate their
    unit's ability to execute defined mission essential tasks (METs). Such
    METs are being identified and incorporated for units with homeland
    defense missions. This will allow the Army greater visibility on
    chemical units' ability to support the Joint Force Commander executing
    WMD related homeland defense missions. Additionally, the U.S. Army
    Chemical School provides training on increased emphasis of full
    spectrum CBRNE hazards and operations and emergency response
    competencies. Finally, new equipment, the Joint Service Transportable
    Decontamination System-Small Scale, will provide operational and
    thorough decontamination of equipment, aircraft, facilities, shelters,
    surface areas, and terrain. When fielded, the system will replace
    existing decontamination systems and provide enhanced decontamination
    capabilities for chemical units.

                  funds for the sustainment of army facilities
        148. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, in your testimony to our
    committee last week about out-patient care at Walter Reed Army Medical
    Center, you responded to a question about the causes of the deplorable
    conditions at Building 18 by noting that historically in the Army ``You
    can find years where we are funding maintenance at less than 50 percent
    of what was required.'' In fiscal year 2008, the Army has proposed a
    budget that only funds 86 percent of facility sustainment requirement,
    as opposed to the 100 percent goal established by the DOD. My concern
    is that this chronic underfunding of facility sustainment accounts has
    resulted in similar deteriorated facility conditions in barracks and
    working facilities around the Army. What is your assessment of the
    general condition of living facilities for our soldiers?
        General Schoomaker. Each year since 2002, the Army's Installation
    Status Report has reported a steady improvement in the quality of
    enlisted unaccompanied personal housing throughout the Army. From
    fiscal year 2005 to 2006, the percentage of barrack spaces receiving
    the lowest ratings decreased from 33 to 26 percent. These improvements
    are a direct result of the Army barracks modernization program that has
    been steadily improving barracks quality. Barracks continue to be a top
    priority in the overall facilities sustainment funding strategy.
        In fiscal year 2005, the Barracks Improvement Program was executed
    to correct life, health, and safety deficiencies in 339 permanent party
    barracks and improve the living conditions for 40,000 soldier spaces.
    In fiscal year 2006, the Training Barracks Improvement Program executed
    40 projects to correct life, health, and safety deficiencies in 148
    trainee barracks and improve the living conditions for 80,000 soldiers
    in trainee barracks world wide. That program is continuing today. In
    fiscal year 2007, the Army funded the Training Barracks Upgrade
    Program, which will modernize 19 barracks facilities this year.

        149. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, in your view, are we
    spending enough money on facilities to ensure our soldiers have safe
    and adequate facilities to live and work? If not, is the Army committed
    in fiscal years 2007 and 2008 to making adjustments in the operations
    and maintenance accounts to increase funding for barracks and other
    critical facilities?
        General Schoomaker. Our soldiers have safe and adequate facilities
    to live and work, but we are not able to spend as much money on their
    facilities as we would like due to the numerous competing initiatives
    for scarce resources while also at war. In fiscal year 2006, the Active
    component stopped migrating facility sustainment dollars to Base
    Operations Support that had prevailed for many years. Our goal is to
    also end this practice in the Reserve components as well. Nonetheless,
    decades of underfunding facility sustainment have taken its toll, and
    we have much work to do to bring facilities up to where they should be.
        In fiscal year 2008, the Army is requesting 86 percent of the OSD
    Facilities Sustainment Model, but is committed to achieve 90 percent
    through efficiencies. Where year-end execution permits, we will shift
    funding to critical facilities.

                  facility requirements for ``grow the force''
        150. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren, the President's budget
    request for fiscal year 2008 includes an authorization for military
    construction of $1.6 billion as the first installment of a multi-year
    program to provide facilities and barracks for an additional 65,000
    soldiers over the next 5 years. Very little detail is provided in the
    budget request beyond this statement. Since we do not historically
    offer vague authorizations for these type of investments, when will the
    Army come forward with details about the proposed locations of these
    forces, the specific facility projects required, and an estimate of the
    total investment required to support the increase in force structure?
        Mr. Geren. The Army will provide budget details by the end of March
    2007 for the fiscal year 2008 projects. After gathering and analyzing a
    full set of data to support stationing decisions this fall, the Army
    expects to provide proposed locations of forces by the end of the year.

        151. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren, how will your planning for
    the increase in force structure affect current plans for the Army's
    transformation to modular brigades, the Defense BRActive component
    Round, and the Global Posture Review?
        Mr. Geren. The Army is executing a tightly-woven, operationally-
    synchronized stationing plan that integrates BRActive component, Global
    Defense Posture Realignment (GDPR), and Modular Transformation to
    posture the force for the long war, consolidate institutional functions
    to improve effectiveness, provide infrastructure necessary to grow the
    force, while meeting the high rotational demand for forces. While
    growing the force will increase operational capability and bring
    additive requirements, BRActive component, GDPR, and Modular
    Transformation will remain critical to fighting the global war on
    terrorism, ensuring soldier and family quality of life, and meeting the
    increased operational demands for the Army.

        152. Senator McCain. Secretary Geren, do you anticipate a need to
    reevaluate past decisions related to the reductions of installations
    and Army presence in Europe or Korea?
        Mr. Geren. The Army will conduct analysis and modeling using the
    BRActive component ``best military value'' to evaluate installations
    for their capacity to station, train, and provide quality of life for
    the increased forces associated with Army growth. The growth initiative
    will rely on existing facilities and installations in Europe and Korea
    to support increased forces and will not require revisiting past
    reductions of installations and Army presence in Europe and Korea.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
       realignment of department of defense supply and storage functions
        153. Senator Sessions. Secretary Geren, on February 9, 2007, the
    Under Secretary of Defense, Kenneth Krieg, directed the Army and the
    Director of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to reach an agreement
    regarding realignment of the DOD supply and storage functions. This
    mandate instructed the Army and the DLA to reach an agreement within 45
    days. Many of us are concerned that a transition at this time is
    detrimental to the efficiency of the Army during the reset process. Is
    this assumption correct? If so, would you explain the Army's position
    on this issue?
        Mr. Geren. The realignment of supply, storage, and distribution
    functions at Army maintenance depots should not be detrimental to the
    efficiency of the Army during the reset process. The realignment
    requires an ``in-place'' transfer of functions and personnel to DLA,
    which means the same function will continue being performed, by the
    same workers, and in the same locations. Mr. Krieg's mandate required
    resolving differences between the Army and DLA on which specific
    functions should transfer, and to do so in 45 days. The actual transfer
    of these functions is not currently planned to occur until fiscal year
    2011.

        154. Senator Sessions. Secretary Geren, would a delay in the
    implementation of this policy until after the immediate challenge of
    the reset are completed address the Army's concerns on this issue?
        Mr. Geren. A delay in the implementation of this functional
    realignment is unnecessary because the Army feels that there will be no
    impacts on efficiency during the reset process. Additionally,
    implementation of this realignment at Army depots is not scheduled to
    occur until fiscal year 2011.

        155. Senator Sessions. Secretary Geren, how does the surge in Iraq
    impact the reset plan?
        Mr. Geren. The surge will result in a requirement to reset more
    equipment in fiscal year 2008 than originally planned. The Army's
    organic depots have ramped up their civilian and contractor workforce
    to reduce the previous year maintenance backlogs and to execute the
    current year reset requirements. The Army's depots are postured to
    accomplish the additional equipment reset requirements that will
    generate due to the surge.

    air force as the executive agency for medium and high-altitude unmanned
                                aerial vehicles
        156. Senator Sessions. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, the
    recent March 5 letter from the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General
    Moseley, indicates the Air Force's interest in being the executive
    agency for medium and high-altitude UAVs. However, I am aware of the
    Army's well-established interest in the continuation of research and
    development of UAVs. What is the Army's position regarding this issue?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The Army does not support a
    single Service executive agent for medium and high-altitude UAVs. The
    Army recommends the OSD uphold the 2005 decision to use the JUAS MRB
    and the JUAS COE in lieu of a single Service executive agent. The JUAS
    MRB and the JUAS COE can and will work and achieve the Air Force's
    executive agency goals. With full support, these organizations will
    enable full joint Service buy-in and resolution of issues.
    Additionally, to continue the research and development of UAS and meet
    the DOD's UAS requirements, we must create an environment of
    competition within industry. Competition promotes innovation,
    challenges industry to achieve a higher level of technological
    achievement, and spurs investment. The Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and
    Special Operations Forces have all benefited from competitively
    selected solutions and are already sharing UAS training, logistics, and
    systems development in three formal programs. The DOD should continue
    on its present course of developing inclusive, synergistic
    complementary capabilities to fuse the contributions of each Service.

        157. Senator Sessions. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, can
    the Air Force effectively control medium- and high-altitude UAVs, and
    provide timely support to the warfighter?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. Four years of combat operations
    in Iraq and Afghanistan reinforce the need to maximize all elements of
    combat power at the tactical level. The Army and Marine Corps have
    demonstrated the decisive benefits of employing UAS at the tactical
    level in concert with other air and ground systems to enable greater
    lethality, while reducing fratricide and collateral damage. Examples
    include: Warrior Alpha, Shadow, Raven, Apache, Kiowa, Aerial
    Reconnaissance Multi-System, and Constant Hawk. These systems need to
    remain in the tactical formations where they are most useful to our
    warfighters. The UASs perform distinct and unique roles and missions
    for the Services depending on their echelon and purpose of employment.
        Operations at the tactical level of war, in a distributed and
    dispersed non-contiguous environment, demand responsive UAS capability
    at division, brigade and battalion levels. Tactical-echelon battle
    captains are responsible for integrating all types of Army multi-
    mission UAS systems to fully enable combat missions such as
    Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Target Acquisition,
    communications relay, and manned-unmanned teaming with weaponized
    systems.
        At the strategic and operational levels of war, Joint and Theater
    Commanders shape the battlespace through deliberate planning afforded
    by time. As the Air Force memo explains, the UAS contribution at this
    level can be allocated to supporting activities such as ISR.

        158. Senator Sessions. Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker, do
    you believe the Army's interests will be fully represented if the Air
    Force is the executive agency of this program?
        Mr. Geren and General Schoomaker. The Army does not believe that
    the Army's UAS requirements will be fully represented if the Air Force
    is the executive agency for this program. The Army therefore recommends
    the OSD uphold the 2005 decision to use the JUAS MRB and the JUAS COE
    in lieu of a single Service executive agent. The JUAS MRB and the JUAS
    COE can and will work and achieve the Air Force's executive agency
    goals. With full support, these organizations will enable full joint
    service buy-in and resolution of issues.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Mel Martinez
                     funding the army end strength increase
        159. Senator Martinez. Secretary Geren, I was pleased to see the
    President propose an end strength increase for the Army (65,000 Active
    Duty soldier increase over 5 years) and I fully support that increase.
    Can you estimate how much will the first installment of that increase
    (7,000 troops) cost for fiscal year 2008 and how much it will cost over
    time?
        Mr. Geren. The incremental cost for the first installment of 7,000
    soldiers totals $630.4 million for pay and allowances. The estimated
    cost of pay and allowances for the 65,000 increase through fiscal year
    2013 is $24.7 billion.

        160. Senator Martinez. Secretary Geren, will this be funded from
    the Army's top line--or will the Army budget be increased to fund the
    increase?
        Mr. Geren. The Army budget received an increase to its topline to
    fund the pay and allowances to support the Active Army's end strength
    growth through fiscal year 2013.

         readiness of army reserve and army national guard force forces
        161. Senator Martinez. Secretary Geren, I am concerned about the
    state of both the Army Reserve and the ARNG. They must be properly
    resourced and that is a challenge in a constrained budget environment.
    The demands on both the Guard and Army Reserves have greatly expanded
    since September 11. The National Guard is deploying worldwide at a
    demanding pace, while playing an absolutely critical role in assisting
    our States meet their homeland security and natural disaster
    requirements. We know that this deployment pace means that we are
    incurring increasing risk. I know the Army is undergoing a shift of how
    the Reserve components are structured--our Reserve and ARNG Forces are
    being severely tested. Are there more legislative and/or policy changes
    needed in the way we can structure, resource, and use our Guard or
    Reserves?
        Mr. Geren. The Army is committed to resourcing the Reserve
    component at 100 percent of their documented authorizations with
    available resources. The Army has just finished a collaborative
    reorganization of the Active component and Reserve component to meet
    the operational needs of a nation at war and to posture ourselves to
    meet the future security needs of America. Additionally, the Army is
    implementing recent policy changes from the OSD to redefine the use of
    the Reserve component. Both the Army reorganization and the Defense
    policy changes will provide an Army ready to answer the requirements of
    this Nation. We are currently working to identify future training and
    equipping requirements for the Reserve component.

        162. Senator Martinez. Secretary Geren, I also understand that in
    an effort to reduce mobilization time and enhance preparation for
    combat deployments, more National Guard and Reserve training will be
    done at home station--before they get to a mobilization center. Does
    this fiscal year 2008 budget request include sufficient funding for
    State Adjutants General to do this home station training?
        Mr. Geren. The DOD recently revised its policy with respect to the
    mobilization of ARNG and Reserve Forces for service in contingency
    operations. Previously, ARNG units would spend 18 months or longer in a
    mobilized status in order to serve approximately 12 months of boots-on-
    the-ground in theater. The extra 6 months or more of mobilized time was
    consumed primarily by individual and collective training that took
    place at the mobilization station prior to overseas deployment. The
    policy change now limits the mobilized time to no more than 12 months
    per specific contingency operation.
        The Army supports what is allocated in the fiscal year 2008
    President's budget. The new mobilization policy was enacted after the
    submission of the President's budget; therefore, the ARNG pre-
    mobilization training requirements were not included. Current fiscal
    year 2008 budget funding levels allow National Guard units to achieve
    the minimal training requirement for a peacetime force. This is a risk
    that is no longer acceptable for an Operational Force. Resourcing for
    pre-mobilization training is essential to ensure trained and ready
    units prior to official mobilization dates. ARNG units conducting pre-
    mobilization training in fiscal year 2008 are associated with fiscal
    year 2009/fiscal year 2010 rotations. The basic calculations include
    additional Inactive Duty for Training, Annual Training, and Active Duty
    for Training days, plus supporting operational tempo and associated
    operations and maintenance costs. These costs are considered global war
    on terrorism expenses for fiscal year 2008. The Army is updating its
    supplemental request to reflect these new requirements.

        163. Senator Martinez. Secretary Geren, will there need to be a
    further reallocation of funding to support this shift of responsibility
    to the States and regions?
        Mr. Geren. Funding for the recent change of the mobilization policy
    for the Reserve component will require some reallocation of funding. At
    this time, the Army is working with the ARNG and Army Reserve to
    determine what the fiscal year 2008 requirement will be to implement
    this policy. Previously, the majority of training was performed post
    mobilization and funded through Active component appropriations. The
    new policy will require training to be performed prior to actual
    mobilization. A reallocation of funding to the Reserve component
    appropriations may be needed to support this. The appropriate amount
    will be determined upon final decisions on training requirements and
    certification.

      national guard support to security operations on our southern border
        164. Senator Martinez. General Schoomaker, last year the President
    directed approximately 5,000 National Guard troops to protect critical
    infrastructure and patrol our southern border. Can you provide an
    update on how that mission is going and what its impact is on overall
    readiness?
        General Schoomaker. The mission of this operation is to provide a
    short-term enhancement to the ability of the Department of Homeland
    Security to secure our southwest border while additional border patrol
    agents are being hired and trained. This mission is being successfully
    accomplished and has allowed Customs and Border Protection to bring
    more agents on board and focus on reducing the number of illegal border
    crossings. The mission is staffed by National Guard volunteers. One of
    the Presidential directives for this mission was that it not degrade
    the National Guard's combat capability, and we have been successful in
    that regard.

                       u.s. army wounded warrior program
        165. Senator Martinez. General Schoomaker, during a recent visit to
    Walter Reed, I was briefed on the Army Wounded Warrior (AW2) Program
    (program designed to provide special help to the severely wounded in
    rehabilitation, retraining, and adjustment). It is a superb initiative.
    What more can be done to rapidly expand the AW2 Program?
        General Schoomaker. The Army thanks you for the compliment and
    remains committed that ``We Will Never Leave a Fallen Comrade.'' The
    AW2 Program is now tracking more than 1,500 severely injured and
    wounded soldiers. To ensure these soldiers receive the best treatment
    available to them the Army works closely with the VA to coordinate the
    medical care of seriously wounded and disabled soldiers while they are
    being treated.
        Our wounded warriors are treated with the dignity and respect they
    have earned and deserve. Since October 2005, the program has expanded
    by more than 400 percent. We have increased the number of Soldier-
    Family Management Specialists (SFMS) from 9 to 46 with continuous
    hiring to reduce the average caseload to 33 soldiers to every 1 SFMS.
    Our SFMSs are currently embedded in 11 military medical treatment
    facilities and 19 VA medical centers throughout the United States with
    further expansion anticipated. This decentralization of operations
    allow our SFMSs to literally ``reach out and touch'' our soldiers and
    families.
        The Army is developing a more seamless transition to the VA for
    separating soldiers with moderate injuries and disabilities. In
    addition, we have extended current outreach programs to include Corps
    G1s, commanders at brigade level, and rear detachments of deployed
    units and their Family Readiness Groups. There are still some
    commanders at battalion and company level that are not aware of the AW2
    Program. We have to reach this population not only to ensure that we
    are providing the best possible care to the soldiers, but also to reach
    other veterans/soldiers unaware of the program. We have dozens of
    initiatives working including involvement with the Veterans Advisory
    Committee on Rehabilitation, the DOD Mental Health Task Force, the
    Office of Secretary of Defense FOR Health Affairs Family Transition
    Initiative, The Surgeon General of the Army's Traumatic Brain Injury
    Task Force, and the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and
    Reserve Affairs) directed Physical Disability Transformation
    Initiative.

        166. Senator Martinez. General Schoomaker, what more can Congress
    do to support the soldiers and their families as they transition--
    oftentimes with life-changing injuries?
        General Schoomaker. Congress has provided all of the resources
    necessary for the Army to operate the Army Career Alumni Program
    (ACAP). The ACAP provides transition services to all separating/
    retiring soldiers, including soldiers with life-changing injuries. The
    services provided by ACAP include congressionally mandated pre-
    separation counseling and coordination with other Federal agencies such
    as the Department of Labor for an employment workshop and the VA for
    benefits briefings and a Disabled Transition Program briefing. ACAP
    also offers one-on-one counseling, use of automated employment tools,
    and special seminars. Our guidance and policies are established by DOD
    based upon current requirements in Public Law.

              narco-terror in the latin america and the caribbean
        167. Senator Martinez. General Schoomaker, the overall U.S.
    military support to the counterdrug effort is coordinated through
    SOUTHCOM. I think it is important that we continue to adequately fund
    military and non-military parts of our support to Colombia. Can you
    comment on the overall Army contribution to the U.S. effort in the
    Andean Counterdrug Initiative and Plan Colombia for fiscal year 2008?
        General Schoomaker. Currently in the Andean Ridge area (Colombia,
    Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Venezuela) the Army has approximately 200
    soldiers, of which approximately 60 are permanently assigned to these
    countries. In Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Peru the Army
    counterdrug effort is through the Military Assistance Groups and
    Military Advisory and Assistance Groups at the embassies. Most Army
    support to the region takes place in Colombia.
        U.S. Army South supports the overall U.S. effort in Colombia in a
    number of ways: For 3 years, U.S. Army South has been assisting in the
    development and improvement of the Colombian Army's Sergeant Major
    Academy Program in order to institutionalize a formal training system
    for Senior Noncommissioned Officers (NCOs) in the Colombian Army. Our
    intent is to help the Colombian Army develop and sustain an NCO
    education system adequate for their needs.
        The 204th Military Intelligence Battalion routinely deploys
    approximately 55 soldiers to Colombia with Airborne Reconnaissance Low
    (ARL) platforms. These soldiers provide real time information in
    support of U.S. and Colombian requirements. The unit deploys to
    Colombia for 9 months out the year (on a cycle of 135 days in country/
    45 days reset at home station).
        U.S. Army South manages the U.S. portion of a Forward Operating
    Site in Apiay, Colombia. This Colombian Airbase provides the lodging,
    maintenance, planning, and operations support to U.S. aircraft,
    including the ARL aircraft, operating in the region.
        U.S. Army South provides a range of administrative and logistic
    support to the U.S. Military Group in Colombia. The U.S. Military Group
    is in turn working directly with the Colombian Armed Forces to support
    their counterdrug and counterterrorism efforts.
        U.S. Army South conducts several subject matter expert exchanges
    with the Colombian Army in order to share ideas, explain concepts and
    assist the Colombian Army. Topics for these exchanges include the use
    of military police working dogs, aviation logistics, personnel
    recovery, geospatial intelligence/terrain analysis, and military law.
    In fiscal year 2007, U.S. Army had over 45 engagement events with the
    Colombian Armed Forces at a cost of approximately $1.2 million.
        The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia still hold three U.S.
    DOD contractors hostage and we are working with the Colombian Armed
    Forces to locate and free these three men.

        168. Senator Martinez. General Schoomaker, with all the demands on
    Army forces worldwide, will you have the numbers and specialties
    required to conduct these counterdrug training and operational programs
    in the Western Hemisphere?
        General Schoomaker. The Army meets the U.S. Army South requirements
    in support of subject matter expert exchanges, peacekeeping exercises,
    and small unit exchanges with the countries of Latin America. We remain
    engaged throughout the region and, through efficient use of resources,
    are able to maintain our presence in Latin America.

     building the military capacity of allies through security cooperation
        169. Senator Martinez. Secretary Geren, I am impressed with the
    counterpart programs being executed by the Army throughout the world--
    particularly with our partner nations in the Western Hemisphere. These
    military-to-military programs of exercises, exchanges, and training
    provide our U.S. Ambassadors in the region with additional tools to
    encourage democracy and development. Our Army Officers and NCOs conduct
    these training and exchange programs and build necessary capacity. Just
    as importantly, they serve as role models for the military institutions
    that operate under civilian control. The example of El Salvador serving
    by our side is a great example of the success of these military-to-
    military programs. Are we funding those programs adequately?
        Mr. Geren. The Army participates in numerous security cooperation
    programs, to include the types that are cited in your question:
    exercises, exchanges, and training. We refer to these and other
    international activities as security cooperation and execute them in
    accordance with the DOD's Security Cooperation Guidance. The Army and
    the other military Services are charged with providing assets to
    support the combatant commanders, especially the geographic combatant
    commanders, as they conduct their respective security cooperation
    efforts. However, the Army also uses security cooperation to improve
    its own abilities--whether to improve our ability to conduct closely
    coordinated military operations with allied forces, to develop and
    acquire the best available technology, or to increase the individual
    soldier's language and cultural skills.
        The geographic combatant commanders use Army assets in their
    efforts to encourage other nations to work with us to achieve mutual
    strategic objectives, thus shaping the strategic environment. They
    annually assess not only the effectiveness of their respective theater
    security cooperation efforts, but also the effectiveness of the support
    that they received from the military Services. These assessments are
    classified; nevertheless, we can say that each combatant commander
    reported some progress.
        There is an intense competition for funding amongst the many things
    the Army does. Factors other than funding play a major role in the
    conduct of security cooperation activities. For example, in the
    National Defense Authorization Act of 2007, Congress lifted
    restrictions previously imposed on the International Military Education
    and Training Program and we now have more flexibility in allocating
    future Army school spaces to foreign soldiers. Nevertheless, since
    there were no additional funds allocated, we will still not be able to
    meet all the demand for security cooperation support that came from the
    combatant commanders--we receive more requests for attendance at the
    Army War College and the Army CGSC than we can satisfy.
        In the interim, the Army continues to improve its security
    cooperation strategy and program management.

                             aviation modernization
        170. Senator Martinez. General Schoomaker, you are asking $4.18
    billion for aviation procurement and that includes new UH-60 Black
    Hawks to meet future force requirements--in addition to what you have
    requested in the supplementals. What is the state of readiness of the
    aviation fleet?
        General Schoomaker. The UH-60 fleet overall is in good shape in
    terms of readiness. Our deployed fleet maintained the highest state of
    readiness, followed by our nondeployed aircraft and National Guard
    aircraft. This level of readiness is due in large part to the
    supplemental appropriations which allowed the Army to continue to reset
    the force and maintain our readiness at Army standards. Readiness will
    further increase for the entire force as we resource the following
    modernization activities: AH-64D (remanufacture and new build), CH-47F
    (remanufacture and new build), UH-60M (new build) and the UH-72A (new
    build). The UH-72A will greatly benefit the readiness of National Guard
    aviation units and enhance their ability to respond to State and
    national disaster missions. Army aviation could not have addressed the
    needs of the aforementioned aircraft systems if not for the direct
    support of Congress in reprogramming Comanche budgetary authority.

        171. Senator Martinez. General Schoomaker, what are your key
    challenges and what are you doing to adapt to the increasing demand
    being placed on Army aviation resources?
        General Schoomaker. Understanding the stress of the global war on
    terrorism on the useful life of aviation platforms, Army aviation
    identified the need to initiate sustainment programs that allowed our
    aviation force to provide continuous operations in the protracted war.
    These sustainment programs include:

              a. Reset: returns aircraft to pre-deployment conditions.
              b. Preset: installs modification work orders to incorporate
            lessons learned into our systems--reduce environmental impacts
            and enhance Aircraft/Aircrew Survivability.
              c. Operational Losses: resources for replacement aircraft has
            been funded through congressional supplemental fiscal year
            2005-fiscal year 2007. Currently 90 of 126 aircraft have
            approved for supplemental funding for replacement. Of the
            remaining 36 to be replaced, 29 are OH-58Ds that will be
            replaced with the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH). As of
            this date, the funding of these 29 aircraft has not been
            provided in previous supplemental requests. The last seven
            aircraft have been results of operational losses in January,
            February, and April 2007 (two AH-64s, three UH-60s, one CH-47,
            and one OH-58D) that have not been included in the supplemental
            request.
              d. Recapitalization Program: returns a limited number of
            aircraft to ``like new'' near zero time condition (193 UH-60
            and 56 CH-47).
              e. Purchasing New CH-47Fs and UH-60Ms: new CH-47s and UH-60s
            will eventually replace the oldest/most damaged aircraft of
            their respective fleets after filling holes in the fleets. The
            ARH will replace the antiquated OH-58D aircraft. The light
            utility helicopter relieves the pressure on the UH-60 fleet.

        These sustainment programs have allowed Army aviation to maintain a
    flying operational tempo up to five times higher than peace-time rates.

                          joint cargo aircraft program
        172. Senator Martinez. Secretary Geren, it is my understanding that
    the Army is in the lead for the joint Army/Air Force JCA program to
    replace several old platforms (C-12, C-23, C-26). Can you give me an
    update on the status of the JCA program?
        Mr. Geren. The JCA is a fixed-wing cargo aircraft, providing light-
    to-medium intratheater airlift capability for time-sensitive/mission-
    critical cargo and troops in support of combat operations. JCA will
    support all five airlift missions (passenger/cargo movement, combat
    employment and sustainment, aero medical evacuation, special operations
    support, and operational support airlift), plus homeland security and
    relief missions.
        In October 2006 a Joint Program Office was established between Army
    and Air Force, with the Army as lead agent. The Army AoA update is
    complete, as requested by OSD, to enable a sufficiency review. The Air
    Force is studying initial fleet size requirements. The Deputy Secretary
    of Defense has approved continuance of the program as a Dual Service
    Army/Air Force program. The Capability Development/Production Document
    was approved by the JROC on April 19, 2007. Strategies addressing Joint
    Training and Sustainment are coordinated between the Army and Air Force
    and reside with the Director, Acquisition Executive pending formal
    approval. The source selection is ongoing and should be completed in
    May 2007. The Milestone C decision/Defense Acquisition Board is
    scheduled for May 2007 and source selection results will be announced
    following the Milestone C decision. We can expect to purchase two
    aircraft following this decision.

        173. Senator Martinez. Secretary Geren, how important is the JCA to
    the Army's strategic mobility?
        Mr. Geren. JCA is not a strategic mobility platform; this is a
    transformation piece to the Army's fixed-wing legacy fleet. The Air
    Force will use the JCA to supplement the existing C-130 intratheater
    airlift fleet, allowing for greater efficiencies for hauling smaller
    loads. The Army will use the JCA to focus on time-sensitive mission-
    critical resupply and key personnel transport at the tactical level--
    the last tactical mile.

        174. Senator Martinez. Secretary Geren, what effect will any delay
    in procuring this platform cause to our lift capability? At what cost?
        Mr. Geren. Operational impacts to the Army are twofold. The Army is
    currently meeting its critical needs with inadequate and costly
    platforms for this logistical mission--the C-23 Sherpa and the CH-47
    Chinook. The CH-47, from the onset of OEF and OIF, is conducting
    logistical resupply missions that could be performed by a JCA.
    Conservatively, over 25 percent of CH-47 usage in OIF is attributed to
    resupply missions, nontactical functions. In OEF, we have been forced
    to use contract aircraft due to the C-23's inability to meet lift and
    performance capabilities at high and hot altitudes present in
    Afghanistan. The impact of a delay will be an increase in lifecycle
    costs and a decrease in airframe life with longer reliance on rotary
    wing aircraft and ground vehicles on an asymmetrical battlefield and
    subsequent higher force protection risks. Operational impact to the
    Army fixed-wing fleet (C-23, C-26, and C-12) are specific modernization
    costs to include: upgrades and survivability as immediately associated
    with: global air traffic management, safety, aircraft survivability
    equipment, and night vision goggles, along with continued modifications
    and sustainment. This has future implications as legacy aircraft are
    programmed for retirement from the force.

                       florida national guard helicopters
        175. Senator Martinez. General Schoomaker, today more than ever,
    the National Guard is a full partner with the Army in performing vital
    war and local emergency needs. Every month the National Guard deploys
    their best equipment, including many HH-60 Blackhawk helicopters, to
    the war on terror. I remain concerned about the ability of the National
    Guard to respond to natural disasters in my State of Florida. What is
    your view of National Guard aviation readiness in light of the demands
    being placed on National Guard equipment?
        General Schoomaker. Our overall Army priority remains focused
    toward best meeting the warfighting needs of our deployed forces, and
    doing so to the greatest extent possible by providing both complete and
    coherent units. However, we also work closely with both the National
    Guard Bureau and the ARNG to do whatever is achievable to minimize and
    mitigate the impacts on any single State or region when some of their
    ARNG units are mobilized for overseas duty. In the case of Florida,
    this mitigation includes filling Florida's two UH/HH-60 units to 100
    percent of their authorized level vice the overall 80-83 percent fill
    level existing in the ARNG UH/HH-60 inventory; sequencing the
    mobilization of one Florida UH/HH-60 unit so that it is offset by the
    return and demobilization of Florida's other UH/HH-60 unit; and pre-
    planned regional and national arrangements to rapidly reinforce
    Florida's UH/HH-60 force with assets from adjoining and nearby States,
    in the event of a disaster. Active Army aviation forces are also
    available to support disaster relief if requested by State authorities.

        176. Senator Martinez. General Schoomaker, how vital is the
    Blackhawk H-60 A to L modernization program?
        General Schoomaker. Currently, UH-60A to L is not part of the UH-60
    Modernization Program. The National Defense Appropriations Act for
    Fiscal Year 2007 identified $12.35 million towards UH-60 Black Hawk
    modifications, specifically A to L conversions. This will be used for
    engineering, production analysis, cost verification, and conversion of
    a pilot/demonstration aircraft within the next 12 to 18 months. Once
    complete, we will analyze the cost data to determine the feasibility of
    further conversions.

        177. Senator Martinez. General Schoomaker, does Congress need to
    set aside funding specifically for the National Guard so they can
    maintain their lift capability?
        General Schoomaker. The Army and the ARNG already have longstanding
    standard funding mechanisms in place for maintaining aircraft and
    training aviation units. The Army training resource model identifies
    the flying hour requirements and funding needed by each Army, ARNG, and
    Army Reserve aviation unit throughout the force. Efforts by Congress to
    fully fund aviation operational tempo would significantly help all Army
    units, including the National Guard, to sustain proficiencies.
    Additionally, should the UH-60 A to L recap pilot/demonstration
    aircraft prove feasible, funding for the remaining UH-60 aircraft
    scheduled to undergo this recap/upgrade would be important to the Army.

        [Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2008

                                  ----------

                            TUESDAY, MARCH 20, 2007

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                     POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m. in room
    SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Bill
    Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Clinton, Pryor, McCaskill, Warner,
    Inhofe, Chambliss, Dole, Cornyn, and Thune.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
    counsel; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Gerald J.
    Leeling, counsel, and William K. Sutey, professional staff
    member.
        Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
    Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
    staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member;
    Derek J. Maurer, professional staff member; David M. Morriss,
    minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff
    member; Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member; and
    Sean G. Stackley, professional staff member.
        Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Micah H.
    Harris, and Benjamin L. Rubin.
        Committee members' assistants present: Frederick M. Downey,
    assistant to Senator Lieberman; Christopher Caple, assistant to
    Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben
    Nelson; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; Gordon I.
    Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Stephen C. Hedger and
    Jason D. Rauch, assistants to Senator McCaskill; Mark J.
    Winter, assistant to Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV,
    assistant to Senator Chambliss; Lindsey Neas, assistant to
    Senator Dole; Stuart C. Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune;
    and Brian W. Walsh, assistant to Senator Martinez.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee will
    come to order.
        I want to welcome Secretary Wynne and General Moseley back
    to the committee this morning. Both of you have had outstanding
    careers of leadership and service to the Nation. We're grateful
    to you for that service. We know that you have some special
    guests with you this morning, too, and, in a moment, when we
    call on you, we would appreciate your introducing those
    wonderful people to the committee.
        You're faced with a number of critical issues that confront
    the Air Force. Although not at the same operating tempo as the
    Army and Marine Corps, the Air Force faces a difficult
    challenge in balancing its modernization needs against the
    costs of supporting ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
        One of these acquisition challenges is in space systems.
    All of the Air Force space satellite systems are in the process
    of modernization and replacement and all have seen substantial
    cost growth and schedule delays. In many instances, the initial
    cost and schedule predictions were unrealistic; in others, the
    technical risk was greater than thought, or not well-
    understood, and others suffered from poor management or
    execution. Some of these programs are showing improvement, but
    most are not out of the woods yet. As a result, the space
    program costs have increased substantially overall.
        During our deliberations on the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, it became clear that
    the Air Force could not meet its requirements with the
    reduction in the B-52 bomber fleet that was proposed in the
    Quadrennial Defense Review. Therefore, Congress did not approve
    the Air Force's request to reduce the number of B-52 bombers to
    56 aircraft. Congress did authorize the Air Force to retire up
    to 18 bombers from the current fleet of 93 B-52 bombers,
    leaving at least 75 B-52s in the force structure. That
    authorized reduction was predicated on the completion of a
    report that would analyze all aspects of the overall bomber
    fleet, including requirements and modernization plans. Our
    understanding is that this report will not be completed and
    submitted to Congress at least until the end of fiscal year
    2007. As a result, the Air Force will not be able to retire any
    of the 18 bombers until fiscal year 2008.
        Nevertheless, the Air Force is again requesting permission
    to retire more B-52s, and we need to hear from our witnesses
    this morning: Why does it makes sense for Congress to authorize
    more reductions prior to receiving the report from last year,
    as the questions remain the same and remain unanswered?
        In another area, last year Congress added 10 C-17 aircraft
    to the fiscal year 2007 bridge supplemental request. The Air
    Force budget request for fiscal year 2008 does not include any
    funding to keep the C-17 production line open. Nevertheless,
    General Moseley, you've been quoted as saying that you would
    like to retire C-5A aircraft and buy more C-17 aircraft. You
    are requesting two more C-17s on your unfunded priority list
    (UPL), at a cost of roughly $473 million. Also this year, some
    are asking that we add full funding for 16 more C-17 aircraft
    to the fiscal year 2008 budget, at a cost of more than $3
    billion. There have also been reports of cost increases in the
    C-5 re-engining program that was at one time intended to
    modernize the 49 C-5B and 62 C-5A aircraft in the fleet. So we
    need to hear about the Air Force's plans for airlift
    modernization and sustainment.
        Underlying all of these major acquisition concerns is an
    acquisition management issue. Secretary Wynne, when you came
    into the job, you recognized that you would have to take
    significant steps to build up the acquisition workforce and
    restore confidence in the Air Force acquisition system after
    the abuses and the poor decisions that were previously
    documented in the tanker lease program. We'd like to hear of
    your progress in that effort, this morning.
        On the tanker issue, we appreciate that the Air Force
    leadership has taken special measures to ensure transparency in
    the tanker acquisition process. Openness is an excellent model
    for how the Air Force and the Department of Defense (DOD)
    should deal with Congress and we are appreciative of the
    progress that you made relative to that in the tanker
    acquisition matter.
        So we look forward to hearing your testimony this morning
    on these and other issues facing the Air Force. For the
    information of all of our members, I believe there is a series
    of three votes that are scheduled to take place this morning,
    not later than 11:30 a.m., which will likely cause us to
    adjourn the hearing at that time. So our goal is to complete
    our hearing by the time the first vote is called.
        Senator Warner.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        On behalf of our distinguished ranking member, Senator
    McCain, I place in the record this morning his opening
    statement. I urge that our witnesses examine it with care,
    because Senator McCain, being an airman, has taken a very
    special interest in a number of the programs; likewise, he has
    a very special interest in acquisition. I think it's important
    that our witnesses examine carefully the strong and sage advice
    that he provides the Department of the Air Force in his opening
    statement.
        [The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain
        Chairman Levin, thank you.
        I join our chairman in welcoming our witnesses here today.
        While many focus on the Army and Marine Corps contributions in Iraq
    and Afghanistan, the efforts of the U.S. Air Force on behalf of our
    Nation are significant. The Air Force has been actively engaged in the
    Central Command area of operations for 16 years--the first Gulf War,
    enforcement of Iraq no fly zones along with the Navy, and, now,
    Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Those deployments, in
    addition to operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and elsewhere throughout the
    world in support of humanitarian efforts, have made maximum use of the
    Air Force's Air Expeditionary Force concept. Allow me to express our
    gratitude to the men and women of the Air Force as they continue their
    selfless sacrifice.
        While we recognize the Air Force's invaluable contribution to the
    defense and security of our Nation, a few programs make this hearing
    seem like we are fighting the same budget and policy battles as last
    year.
        Once again, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program eliminates
    funding for the development of a second engine production source. Last
    year, we held extensive hearings on this subject, and are still
    awaiting the required reports discussing the pros and cons of ensuring
    that a competitive environment is maintained for the production of
    aircraft engines. Yet, contrary to expert opinion and congressional
    direction, this budget eliminates funding for a second source before
    the analysis is complete.
        Similarly, the Air Force is again sending conflicting messages that
    it has the minimum required strategic lift capability with the current
    fleet mix of C-17s and C-5s, and yet included C-17s in its unfunded
    priorities list (UPL). The Air Force has also argued it needs to retire
    C-5s--begging the question what is to replace that capability if
    allowed to retire C-5s, since the budget does not include funding for
    the C-17 program. This apparent brinkmanship approach to shutting down
    the C-17 production line has once again set off a lobbying effort
    within the halls of Congress to add additional C-17 aircraft to the
    defense budget.
        Let me remind my colleagues of one of the more egregious add-ons in
    the Defense Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 2007--the addition of
    $2.1 billion for 10 C-17 cargo aircraft that were not requested by the
    administration. The Air Force did not ask for these additional C-17s
    and the Quadrennial Defense Review clearly states a need for a total of
    only 180 aircraft. However, Congress agreed to add 10 more C-17s than
    our top military planners say they need to meet our National Military
    Strategy. Another reason why this earmark was particularly
    objectionable was that going into the Defense Appropriations Conference
    last year the House had only approved three additional C-17s and the
    Senate had approved only two. At a minimum, seven additional C-17
    aircraft were added by the conferees that were outside the scope of
    matter they were tasked to resolve.
        Again, the acquisition process within the Air Force is coming under
    scrutiny. In past years, as we are all well familiar, the focus has
    been on the tanker replacement program. While I am encouraged that
    program is finally on firmer footing with industry now preparing
    proposals for the Air Force to evaluate, concerns remain over other Air
    Force acquisition efforts.
        Last year, the Air Force proffered a multi-year procurement
    proposal in which ``substantial savings,'' as defined in applicable
    law, were suspect. This year alone, a bid protest for the next
    generation combat search and rescue helicopter was upheld by the
    Government Accountability Office; the C-130 aviation modernization
    program reported a Nunn-McCurdy cost breach; and both the planned C-5
    re-engining effort and the future core component jammer are on the
    brink of major cost and schedule breaches.
        Finally, the Air Force has submitted a UPL of items that did not
    make it into the final budget request that totals in the billions of
    dollars, despite the fact the Air Force budget has grown by nearly 30
    percent, in constant dollars, since 2001. The Air Force submitted a UPL
    totaling $16.9 billion for 2008. That amount is nearly twice as large
    as the Army's, six times as large as the Marine Corps', and triple the
    amount the Air Force requested just last year. A full $6.0 billion of
    the request is for military construction projects and appears to
    contain every military construction program in the Air Force's 5-year
    future defense program. The top ``unfunded'' request includes $2.6
    billion for aircraft recapitalization and modernization--a longstanding
    Air Force top priority.
        I have concerns in other areas, as well, that I hope the witnesses
    will address in their testimony, or during the question and answer
    period. The witnesses should expect questions on: the recent anti-
    satellite test conducted by the Chinese; the impact on Air Force
    requirements resulting from planned Army and Marine Corps end strength
    increases; the Air Force certification of substantial savings for the
    F-22 multi-year procurement; and concerns over certain costs included
    in the President's supplemental requests--such as those added for
    additional F-35s and CV-22 Ospreys.
        I thank the witnesses and look forward to your testimony.

        Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I think all of us here on the
    committee are very grateful that you've brought these
    distinguished airmen here this morning to introduce. But, while
    we focus so much of our attention, and understandably, on the
    Army and the Marine Corps, as they're courageously carrying out
    the missions in Afghanistan and in Iraq, we are mindful of the
    support role, and in often cases, not just support, but direct
    interaction, at a very high risk, that the members of the
    United States Air Force are taking in these two operations, as
    well as other operations elsewhere in the world. So, all
    America has in its heart the men and women in uniform today. I
    say ``in its heart,'' because it is in sharp contrast to
    previous periods that I have experienced in my long and
    privileged association with the men and women in the military,
    not only the uniformed persons are in their hearts, but the
    families of these very brave men and women who go forward and
    depart from their families and take on these risks.
        So, I salute not only your honored guests this morning,
    but, I expect, thousands of others similar to them, elsewhere
    at various places throughout the world, and, indeed, in
    training, here in the United States. My very limited
    association with flying always reminds me that there's just as
    much risk on a takeoff as there is on a landing, whether that's
    abroad or right here at home. So, it's a high-risk business
    that many of your airmen are engaged in, and we are proud to
    salute them.
        I will just make two other observations. One, I listened
    very carefully to the distinguished chairman as he described
    the various disconnects, apparently, between Congress and the
    Department of the Air Force with regard to the management of
    aircraft. I would hope that we could quietly get together and
    sort these things out somehow. Having been in your position,
    Secretary Wynne, for some period of time myself many years ago,
    I just feel that these are decisions that can be worked out.
    You have to be given the maximum flexibility possible to manage
    your inventory of aircraft, be it the acquisition of the new
    ones or the retirement of those that have served our Nation
    well.
        So, I hope, Mr. Chairman, that you and others on this
    committee that have direct responsibility for these programs--
    and I will join, also--see if we can't sort it out and give you
    the flexibility you need.
        Now, I do want to address, gentlemen, the question of the
    Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and the two-engine program. Now, I
    fully recognize that each of you have bosses in this world in
    which we live. I know them very well, and have a high degree of
    respect for them. But I'll ask the question and you can ponder
    the answer before it comes. I don't know of any time in history
    that we have contemplated giving to a single contractor a $100
    billion contract, which could play out over the next 10 or 12
    years. Experience with high technology has shown us that we
    should have some backup. Experience has told us that
    competition can improve not only the price, but the quality of
    the product. So, I'll return to that, Mr. Chairman, in the
    course of my question period. It concerns me greatly.
        Having said that, I wish you well. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, we now turn to you. We
    would ask that you do take a moment and introduce your special
    guests, and our special guests, to the committee this morning.
    Why don't we start with that, if you would.
        Secretary Wynne. Senator, I'll defer to General Moseley and
    allow him to, in fact, do that.
        General Moseley. Mr. Chairman, if you'll allow me, instead
    of prepared remarks, I would like to introduce these great
    airmen.

      STATEMENT OF GEN. T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, USAF, CHIEF OF STAFF,
                        UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

        General Moseley. First, Lieutenant Colonel Marty McBride.
    He currently commands the 81st Fighter Squadron in Spangdahlem,
    Germany. He's a Weapons School graduate, and he's recently
    returned from Afghanistan, where he led a total force--Guard,
    Reserve, and Active A-10s--through 24-hours-a-day, 7-days-a-
    week combat operations from May until September 2006. His
    squadron flew over 2,000 missions and 7,000 combat hours,
    operating out of Bagram in northern Afghanistan. They
    accomplished over 520 troops in contact close-air-support
    missions. He delivered 102,000 rounds of 30-millimeter off the
    A-10, and delivered over 300 bombs. Sir, this is a squadron
    commander just back from Afghanistan. He's one of our great
    airmen.
        Next is Major Toby Doran. He's the chief of tactics at
    Headquarters Air Force Space Command. He's also a Weapons
    School graduate. His other assignments have included chief of
    tactics, chief of precision-guided munitions, and chief of
    operations. He was a previous enlisted airborne crypto-linguist
    aboard our RC-135 Rivet Joints. He served in Operations Desert
    Shield, Desert Storm, and Provide Comfort. Most recently, he
    served as the space weapons officer with the 1st Marine
    Expeditionary Force forward in Al Anbar province, from February
    to July 2006. His job was to ensure seamless connectivity from
    Air Force space systems into the Marine system and on to the
    ground parties. He helped ensure the Marines had accurate
    artillery, rocketfire, as well as navigation and
    communications. He is one of our great space warfighters.
        Sir, next is Captain Andi McElvaine, bomber pilot. She's
    from Minot Air Force Base, ND. She's a Weapons School graduate
    also, with 2,000 flight hours, including 360 combat hours.
    She's been an aircraft commander on unit deployments. She's a
    weapons and tactics officer. She's deployed to the Arabian Gulf
    for Operation Southern Watch, two times for Operation Enduring
    Freedom (OEF), and two times to Anderson Air Force Base, in
    Guam, as part of our Pacific Command's continuous bomber
    presence there. She represents everything that we hold dear
    about opportunities in the Air Force and our bomber community.
        Sir, next is somebody that is near and dear to every
    aviator's heart. He's a pararescueman (PJ). This is Tech
    Sergeant Jason Marfell. He's from the 38th Rescue Squadron at
    Moody Air Force Base, GA. He's the noncommissioned officer in
    charge of standardization and evaluation. He's won two Sikorsky
    Awards for skill and courage during two actual lifesaving
    missions. He's a winner of the 2006 Air Force Pitsenbarger
    Award for the year's top lifesaving rescue. He's deployed
    multiple times on a wide range of contingency and combat
    operations: Southern Watch, Northern Watch, and Enduring
    Freedom. Three times, he's deployed to support space shuttle
    transoceanic landing sites. He's deployed to southern Africa
    for Operation Atlas Response. He's provided humanitarian
    disaster relief after flooding in Mozambique in South Africa in
    2000. This is one of the guys that will come get you if you
    have to dismount from an airplane, and there's no better sight
    for anybody that flies airplanes than to be around a PJ.
        Sir, last is a boomer. She's the person responsible for
    transferring fuel from our tankers into a wide range of other
    aircraft. This is Staff Sergeant Christine Chavez. She's an
    instructor boom operator from McConnell Air Force Base, KS. In
    Airman Leadership School, she won the Levitow Award for being
    the top graduate. She's been a flight supervisor and refueling
    instructor. She's been a systems operator through numerous
    deployments including Operations Southern Watch, Enduring
    Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom. She's operated out of Diego Garcia;
    Sheik Isa, in Bahrain; Al Udeid, in Qatar; and Al Dhafra, in
    the United Arab Emirates. She has 1,000 hours and 163 combat
    missions.
        Sir, this is also everything that we hold dear about
    officers, enlisted folks, and people that fly.
        So, sir, behind me, you have a fighter guy, a space guy, a
    bomber, a boomer, and a PJ. This is the wide spectrum of
    everything that we do for this country. Sir, I'm so proud to
    serve alongside them and wear the same uniform. [Applause.]
        Secretary Wynne. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
    thank you very much.
        [The joint prepared statement of Mr. Wynne and General
    Moseley and the 2007 Air Force Posture Statement Package
    follow:]
       Joint Prepared Statement by Hon. Michael W. Wynne and General T.
                             Michael Moseley, USAF
                           maintaining america's edge
        We are America's airmen. Our mission is to deliver sovereign
    options for the defense of the United States of America and its global
    interests--to fly and fight in air, space, and cyberspace.
        Our Air Force Core Values of Integrity First, Service Before Self
    and Excellence in All We Do--embodied in every airman--guide our
    actions and ensure your Air Force remains committed and ready to deter,
    dissuade or defeat any adversary anywhere in the world.
        As airmen, we are the Nation's premier multi-dimension maneuver
    force, with the agility, reach, speed, stealth, payload, precision, and
    persistence to achieve global effects. Control of the air, space, and
    cyberspace domains provides the essential bedrock for effective joint
    operations--securing freedom to attack and freedom from attack.
        In 2005, we revised the Air Force mission statement to include
    cyberspace. This inclusion of cyberspace reflects our recognition of
    cross-domain interdependence and emphasizes our non-negotiable
    commitment to deliver sovereign options for the U.S. through not only
    air and space but also cyberspace.
        Our 2007 Posture Statement articulates the major elements required
    to fulfill our mission. It reaffirms our commitment to focus our
    energies on the global war on terror; to develop and care for our
    airmen and their families; and to recapitalize and modernize our aging
    aircraft, spacecraft, and equipment.
        Our top acquisition priorities include: the KC-X Tanker; the CSAR-X
    Combat Search and Rescue Helicopter; space communications, space
    situational awareness and early warning programs; the F-35A Joint
    Strike Fighter (JSF); and Next Generation Long Range Strike--a new
    bomber.
        Our Posture Statement further reaffirms our commitment to be good
    stewards of the resources entrusted to us and our resolve to dominate
    air, space, and cyberspace in defense of our Nation now and in the
    future.
    Challenges
        America's Air Force faces significant challenges. We have been
    engaged in combat for 16 years while transforming into a smaller,
    leaner and more capable force. Fiscal constraints combined with
    operational challenges and a dynamic international security environment
    translate into risks we continue to manage and mitigate in order to
    provide capabilities America needs. The Air Force continues to fight
    the global war on terror and prepares to face and overcome threats and
    conflicts of the future. In order to remain dominant, we must maintain
    our air, space, and cyberspace power advantages over potential
    adversaries.
        Modern warfare is changing. This is nothing new to America's
    airmen, whose heritage spans and embraces change and whose culture
    embodies courage and innovation for America. We are ensuring a lean,
    lethal, and agile Air Force for America. We are building and posturing
    our force structure to meet future threats emerging on the dynamic
    world stage, and we are strengthening the interdependent joint team.
        We face a security environment that poses an array of dynamic
    challenges and threats. The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
    characterized this threat environment and mandated force structure
    goals for all of the Department of Defense (DOD). The Air Force and all
    of the Services must be able to operate and defend against traditional,
    irregular, disruptive and catastrophic threats. In the future, the Air
    Force and the entire joint team will operate within a strategic
    environment involving one or more of these challenges. We will prepare
    to defend against high-end conventional forces, asymmetric threats and
    irregular forces such as terrorists or insurgents. To mitigate
    potential for disruptive surprises, we will strive to stay ahead of
    adversaries' technology efforts. Most importantly, we will protect our
    Homeland from hostile states' and non-state actors' use of weapons of
    mass destruction (WMD) and attacks in and through cyberspace. The
    threat array requires that we prepare the Air Force for a broad
    spectrum of future conflicts. At the same time, several factors have
    created a difficult and challenging fiscal environment in which to
    organize, train, and equip for the future.
        The 2005 QDR specified a Force Planning Construct to shape the
    entire DOD force to protect our Nation, its ideals and interests now
    and in the future. Originally presented in the National Military
    Strategy (NMS), the Force Planning Construct provides guidance for
    determining the capacity and capabilities needed to meet both steady
    state and surge demands for homeland defense, irregular warfare, and
    conventional campaigns. As a result of the NMS guidance and
    comprehensive analysis, the QDR determined America's Air Force needs to
    organize, train, and equip 86 ``modern combat wings.''
        Emerging National Security Concerns and Threats
        While the global war on terror is our immediate priority, America's
    airmen must also stay ahead of competitors preparing for conventional
    conflict and attempting to counter the asymmetric advantage our air,
    space, and cyberspace power currently gives our joint team. Sustaining
    U.S. advantages in such conflicts will become increasingly more
    challenging as advanced air defense, aircraft, WMD, cyber and anti-
    satellite (ASAT) capabilities proliferate.
        Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) continue to evolve, placing
    current generation aircraft at increasing risk. Modern IADS incorporate
    more data sources, process and pass information faster, and are
    increasingly mobile. Manportable air defense systems (MANPADS),
    shoulder-fired SAMs, also are an increasingly serious threat. Their
    availability, affordability, and proliferation increases the likelihood
    of modern MANPADS ending up in the hands of non-state actors, placing
    U.S. civil and military aircraft at risk around the world.
        The lethality and availability of fourth-generation combat aircraft
    is also increasing, and potential adversaries are already purchasing
    and fielding these complex and capable weapon systems. Many nations are
    enhancing the capabilities of their existing fighter and bomber
    aircraft through use of aerial refueling, signature reduction
    technology, and cyberspace weapons that inject confusion or mask
    operations. Ever greater numbers of states are not only acquiring
    advanced aircraft, but are developing indigenous production capability,
    increasing the likelihood of proliferation.
        Proliferation of WMD to countries and non-state actors remains a
    significant challenge to U.S. interests and a top priority in the QDR.
    While nuclear weapons and materials proliferation always pose grave
    dangers, chemical and biological weapons pose arguably greater
    detection challenges. Easier and less costly to make than nuclear
    weapons, chemical and biological weapons are easier to transport,
    produce and mask from detection because they can be camouflaged as
    dual-use civilian industrial products. Proliferation may also enable
    future adversaries, especially terrorist groups, to develop, use, or
    threaten to use WMD as an asymmetric response to American conventional
    warfighting dominance, which might otherwise deter them from directly
    challenging the U.S.
        Perhaps less obvious, but all the more insidious, is the
    adversary's use of the cyberspace domain to support and carry out their
    attacks worldwide and on our shores. The adversary knows that they can
    contest our use of the electromagnetic spectrum and conduct their war
    of ideas from a supposed sanctuary in this domain.
        Finally, we see challenges to our current advantages in the space
    domain. Employment of Global Positioning System (GPS) jammers in an
    attempt to reduce U.S. and coalition air strike precision is an
    example. While we can currently overcome this threat through a variety
    of methods, such a challenge presents a warning and a valuable lesson
    as we posture our air, space, and cyberspace forces for the future.
        Recent foreign testing of kinetic ASAT weapon capabilities further
    demonstrates an explicit willingness to challenge, disrupt, or destroy
    America's space assets and capabilities. This testing also demonstrates
    a disregard for both American and global concerns over space debris and
    the damage it may inflict upon any object stationed in or traversing
    through low Earth orbit.
        As technology matures and proliferates, and as access to space
    becomes available to more countries, organizations and individuals,
    threats to America's air, space, and cyberspace capabilities will
    continue to grow and evolve. America's airmen aim to be ready to meet
    these and all other threats to our Nation.
        Irregular Warfare
        Our Nation is now in its 6th year waging the global war on terror
    while the Air Force is entering its 17th year of engagement in
    Southwest Asia. Current conditions portend this to remain a long war.
    The enemy chooses not to operate as a ``uniformed military,'' but
    rather uses criminal networks and terror tactics to attack from the
    shadows. They use indiscriminate violence against combatants and non-
    combatants alike. They extensively use propaganda to advance their
    radical ideology of tyranny and hatred. Iraq and Afghanistan are two
    current fronts in this war, but the struggle extends beyond these vital
    campaigns. The Air Force and the entire joint team must wage this war
    on a global scale, in multiple locations and domains at simultaneous
    times, and for a number of years.
        We are strengthening our ability to deter and defend against non-
    state threats and our ability to conduct globally distributed irregular
    operations of varying duration. We stand ready to conduct a large-
    scale, long-duration irregular warfare campaign as an integral part of
    the joint team, to include counterinsurgency, security, stability,
    transition, and reconstruction operations.
        Adapting to Nontraditional Roles
        Airmen are finding innovative new uses for our current systems
    while successfully executing irregular warfare operations in
    Afghanistan and Iraq. Airmen increasingly find themselves engaged in
    nontraditional roles requiring ingenuity and the use of joint
    warfighting technology. Our missions and taskings range from standard
    close air support and armed reconnaissance to non-traditional taskings
    like convoy escort, infrastructure protection, provincial
    reconstruction, and host nation election support.
        Still other airmen have stepped in to fill joint warfighter
    taskings in stressed skill areas in which other Services are
    shorthanded. The Air Force currently provides over 7,700 airmen to
    fulfill these ``In-Lieu Of'' (ILO) ground force taskings. These airmen
    fulfill ILO requirements in areas such as detainee operations, convoy
    operations and protection, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Police Training
    Teams, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Military Transition Teams,
    civil engineering, security, interrogation, communications, fuels,
    medical services, logistics, intelligence, and base operating support.
    The Air Force also fills another 1,200 Joint Individual Augmentee
    positions. Airmen began fulfilling these requirements in 2003 and will
    continue to do so through 2007 and beyond--until the ground force
    component recaptures these missions and our job is done.
        Finally, Air Force mission, training, and force structure
    requirements will necessarily increase correspondingly as joint ground
    force, Army and Marine Corps requirements and end strength increase.
    The full range of Air Force air, space, and cyberspace capabilities and
    personnel are interdependently woven into joint ground forces
    operations.
        Recognizing there will be an impact of increased ground forces on
    our budget, we are assessing our programs. We forecast there may be
    increased requirements in the areas of inter- and intra-theater
    airlift; command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
    surveillance and reconnaissance (C\4\ISR) capabilities; Close Air
    Support (CAS); Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) personnel; and
    extended ILO personnel requirements. While the Army and Marine Corps
    reset and recapitalize, we are following through in every way with our
    joint teammates.
        Defending Our Homeland
        Future threats to our Homeland are constantly evolving. They
    present challenges to the established methods and structures of
    homeland defense. Development, fielding and proliferation of standoff
    weapons, such as long-range cruise missiles, provide potential
    adversaries with offensive capabilities of increasing accuracy and
    range. In addition, we can expect many of these future weapons to be of
    relatively small size, presenting an extremely difficult detection and
    tracking challenge.
        As we safeguard the aerial, maritime and cyber approaches to our
    Nation, the Air Force will continue to play a large role in providing
    the full spectrum of air sovereignty options, including air defense,
    missile defense and support to civil authorities for consequence
    management. Additionally, as illustrated by our response to Hurricane
    Katrina, the Air Force will surge and contribute to national responses
    in the event of natural disasters or catastrophic events, supplying
    airlift, communications, imagery from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
    and space assets, and combat search and rescue capabilities.
    Cyberspace
        America's Air Force is redefining air and space power for the 21st
    century.
        Our current and potential adversaries already operate in
    cyberspace, exploiting the low entry costs and minimal technological
    investment needed to inflict serious harm. We cannot allow them to
    expand their foothold. We seek to deny our adversaries cyberspace
    sanctuary while ensuring our access and operations in this domain. Our
    Nation's ability to deliver effects in air, in space, on land, and at
    sea depends on control of this domain.
        Cyberspace dominance goes beyond communications and information
    technology. It requires superiority across the entire electromagnetic
    spectrum--DC to daylight--radio waves, microwaves, infrared, x-rays,
    directed energy, and applications we have not even begun to think
    about--to ensure global command and control, global reach, and global
    power. We have a well-established capability to operate in cyberspace.
    We take advantage of physics, technology, and synergies to operate in
    and through it. Therefore, we are establishing a new Cyberspace Command
    to stand alongside Air Force Space Command and Air Combat Command.
    America's airmen are force providers the President, combatant
    commanders (COCOMs) and the American people can rely on to preserve
    freedom of access and operations in air, space, and cyberspace.
        The newly designated Air Force Cyberspace Command will provide
    combat ready forces trained and equipped to conduct sustained combat
    operations through the electromagnetic spectrum and fully integrate
    these with air and space operations. In November 2006, we held a
    Cyberspace Summit and, in January 2007, we hosted the first-ever
    integrated cyber exercise, Cyber Vision 2007, at the U.S. Air Force
    Warfare Center (USAFWC). This exercise focused on dominating the
    cyberspace domain in a potential conflict. These events and future
    integration of Cyber Aggressor Teams into Red Flag will build upon the
    significant cyberspace capabilities we already contribute to homeland
    defense and the joint fight.
        Cyberspace Command will leverage, consolidate and integrate unique
    Air Force cyber capabilities and functions across the spectrum of
    conflict from peace, to crisis and war: Command and Control; Electronic
    Warfare; Network Warfare; and Intelligence, Surveillance and
    Reconnaissance (ISR). Many Air Force programs, while contributing to
    air and space power, also directly contribute to our dominance of the
    cyberspace domain.
    Loss of Buying Power
        While the Air Force is postured to meet our Nation's near-term
    requirements, our ability to meet steady state and surge requirements
    over the long term hinges on our ability to organize, train and equip
    86 modern combat wings, as mandated in the QDR. Achieving these goals
    will be difficult, as we balance fighting the global war on terror,
    maintaining our readiness, maintaining America's air, space, and
    cyberspace advantages, modernizing our equipment and capabilities, and
    shaping our airmen, organizations and force structure for the future.
        Several factors have applied pressure to the Air Force budget:
    global war on terror and operations costs; increasing costs of fuel,
    utilities, manpower, and health care; increased costs to own, operate
    and maintain our aging aircraft; unforeseen base realignment and
    closure (BRAC) costs; and lost savings due to congressional
    restrictions on retirement and divestment of our least useful legacy
    aircraft. Although recent congressional support for planned legacy
    aircraft retirements has aided our divestment strategy, unnecessary
    restrictions draw critical resources away from our aircraft
    modernization programs and degrade our efforts to recapitalize our
    aircraft inventory.
        We are meeting our current wartime commitments. We are also
    operating within the resources entrusted to our service--we are staying
    in bounds. We are self-financing our modernization and recapitalization
    efforts to the maximum extent possible though initiatives such as Force
    Shaping, Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century (AFSO21) and
    aircraft retirements, while focusing on a ``mission first'' basis.
    Furthermore, we are committed to operate, organize, train, and equip to
    meet the projected demands of the future--they are many. The Future
    Years Defense Program (FYDP) involves taking acceptable risk in lower
    priority areas in order to meet future readiness, capability, force
    structure, and national security requirements.
    Next Generation Air Force
        Our loss of overall buying power means the Air Force must attempt
    to rebalance our available resources and force structure to achieve
    Force Planning Construct goals. To reach our 2025 force structure
    objectives, we will synchronize our investments to maximize their
    effect.
        In 2005, we began divesting significant numbers of our oldest,
    least capable, and most costly and difficult to maintain aircraft. In
    2006, we also initiated a carefully calculated reduction in personnel
    end strength to match our declining force structure. As investments in
    research, development, and procurement grow, we will continue building
    our force structure towards 86 modern combat wings. Our personnel end
    strength must concurrently keep pace as we modernize our force
    structure. These two elements--force structure and personnel end
    strength--drive our resource requirements.
        The Air Force is committed--now and in the future--to not only
    defend our Nation but also provide good stewardship of the resources
    entrusted to us. We look forward to working closely with Congress to
    ensure our force structure and personnel investments are synchronized,
    and our efforts to posture, recapitalize and modernize America's Air
    Force fly together in close formation.
    Air Force Priorities
        As the Air Force strives to defend America's interests within a
    dynamic strategic environment, we remain committed to our top service
    priorities, as stated by Air Force leaders and outlined in our Vision:

             Fighting and winning the global war on terror
             Developing and caring for our airmen and their
            families
             Recapitalizing and modernizing our aging aircraft and
            spacecraft inventories

        These priorities, together with our Enduring Core Values of
    Integrity, Service and Excellence, provide America's airmen a steady
    beacon, guiding how we organize, train and equip in defense of our
    Nation. Our national strategic requirements, global complexities and
    threats, and fiscal elements within the overall strategic environment
    will continue to shape how we execute these priorities. We remain
    focused on the global war on terror, our people, and a modern, capable
    force.
        Your Air Force is dedicated to maintaining, evolving, and expanding
    America's capabilities in air, space, and cyberspace. These
    capabilities are America's Edge--the foundation of America's
    unparalleled Global Vigilance, Reach and Power.
                 fighting and winning the global war on terror
        Our Air Force has been engaged in over 16 years of continuous
    combat in Iraq, currently a central front in the global war on terror.
    In addition to OIF, the Air Force is a critical player on the joint and
    coalition team in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan.
    Airmen also vigilantly defend the skies of our Homeland in Operation
    Noble Eagle (ONE). Our enemies are vile, unrelenting, adaptive and
    global. They are motivated by extremist ideologies and bent on
    subjugation and denial of basic freedoms of expression, government and
    religion. It will ultimately require all elements of national power to
    defeat them. Militarily, the Air Force remains committed to finding and
    destroying our Nation's enemies wherever they seek sanctuary, fighting
    side by side with friendly nations in this struggle against violent
    extremism.
        America's airmen operate on a global scale every day. The full,
    complete impact of Air Force engagement includes airmen deployed
    outside of the Continental United States (OCONUS) to contingencies,
    forward deployed in Europe and the Pacific, and employed from their
    home stations as they execute global missions. The Air Force has nearly
    30,000 airmen deployed in Central Command conducting theater
    operations. Similarly, 60,000 Pacific Air Forces and U.S. Air Forces
    Europe airmen are fully engaged in the full spectrum of dissuasion,
    deterrence, coalition training, and military-to-military activities.
        Furthermore, the inherent qualities of air, space, and cyberspace--
    speed, range, and payload--allow the forward deployed Air Force
    footprint to be smaller, less vulnerable, and vastly more flexible.
    Airmen are also fully engaged in the global war on terror from their
    home stations, controlling satellites, standing on alert with
    intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), providing intelligence
    assessments, operating UAVs, and launching airlift, tanker and other
    aircraft missions essential to joint operations worldwide. Every day
    over 200,000 Active, Guard, and Reserve airmen fulfill COCOM missions
    around the world.
    A Day in the Life of America's Airmen
        The Air Force delivers Global Vigilance, Global Reach and Global
    Power for our Nation. America's airmen provide vigilance that is
    persistent, focused, and predictive; reach that is reliable, rapid and
    agile; and power that is flexible, precise, stealthy, and decisive.
        A snapshot of current Air Force operations illustrates the myriad
    ways in which COCOMs employ air, space, and cyberspace power to
    accomplish their missions.
        Global Vigilance
        Air Force Global Vigilance capabilities are critical elements of
    the global war on terror, at home and abroad. For instance, the Air
    Force currently operates and maintains satellites directly serving
    Central Command and providing the communications, sensor, and
    navigation capabilities on which the lives and missions of soldiers,
    sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen depend. From bases in the
    continental U.S., our airmen also maintain space situational awareness
    (SSA) for the region, tracking over 500 daily orbital passes over
    Baghdad of satellites of all nations.
        Theater-based aircraft have become critical elements in the
    Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (Counter-IED) effort by ``scanning
    and jamming.'' On a daily basis U-2s, Global Hawk and Predator UAVs,
    and E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS)
    aircraft survey, track, identify--and sometimes destroy--insurgents and
    safe houses. In fact, the Air Force maintains over 10 24/7 UAV Combat
    Air Patrols (CAP) in Central Command, providing persistent ISR and--in
    the case of Predator--a lethal strike option. In addition to their
    global responsibilities, stateside Airborne Warning and Control System
    (AWACS) crews and airplanes fly and stand on alert as part of our
    homeland defense surveillance requirements.
        Global Reach
        Air Force airlifters and tankers provide the global reach that
    underwrites the joint effort in the global war on terror. An Air
    Mobility Command aircraft departs a runway somewhere on the planet
    every 90 seconds, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. On a typical day,
    the Air Force flies over 250 airlift sorties, moves over 1,000 tons of
    cargo, and transports nearly 2,500 passengers. In Central Command,
    intratheater airlift aircraft like the C-130 and C-17 have borne heavy
    loads, taking thousands of convoys off dangerous roads and reducing the
    threat of IEDs to about 8,500 people each month.
        Aeromedical evacuation (AE) has emerged as a critical capability
    for the Joint Force. In fact, Air Force AE is responsible for the
    transport and care of over 36,000 patients in the global war on terror.
    Our airmen have achieved a recordsetting average patient movement time
    of 72 hours, a dramatic reduction from the 10-14 days required during
    the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Such rapid global movement provides U.S.
    service men and women the highest survival rates in the history of
    warfare.
        Air Force tankers provide global mobility and reach for Air Force
    aircraft, the joint team and coalition forces. While the average tanker
    is over 40 years old, KC-135s and KC-10s nonetheless fly 30 tanker
    missions on a typical day in Central Command and stand on alert to
    provide additional endurance for our aircraft performing homeland
    defense missions.
        Global Power
        At the sharp end of Air Force capabilities, America's airmen
    deliver Global Power in the global war on terror. Using UAVs, tight
    air-ground integration, and time sensitive targeting, we have
    eliminated several high-value terrorist and insurgent targets in
    Afghanistan, Somalia, and Iraq. In a war where intelligence is
    fleeting, the Air Force has made constant innovations to shorten the
    time cycle it takes to deliver rapid, precise effects. Fighters
    originally designed for strike missions are now using their targeting
    pods as nontraditional ISR sensors over Iraq and Afghanistan, providing
    a unique extension of both vigilance and power for the Joint Force
    Commander (JFC). Battlefield airmen serve side by side with our joint
    partners on the ground and use live streaming video from Predators or
    targeting pods to orchestrate rapid air and ground attacks on
    insurgents. The successful June 2006 strike against al Qaeda leader Abu
    Musab al-Zarqawi is only one illustration of how the active Duty, Air
    National Guard, and Air Force Reserve Command seamlessly integrate
    capabilities from around the globe into precise, dislocating, and
    decisive effect.
        Since the beginning of the global war on terror, the typical strike
    mission has evolved from a pre-planned sortie against a fixed target to
    a flexible, on-call mission profile responsive to a rapidly changing
    battlefield. In Central Command, fighters typically fly nearly 80
    strike, electronic warfare, or non-traditional ISR sorties each day.
    Back in the U.S., fighters stand guard over our Homeland, ready to
    launch at a moment's notice. Worldwide, Air Force fighters and bombers,
    coupled with the strength of America's space and cyberspace
    capabilities, are the tools of reassurance, deterrence and dissuasion.
    America's airmen are the global, strategic muscle behind U.S.
    diplomacy, providing a lethal over-the-horizon capability to directly
    influence events on the ground--whether based in Japan, Guam, or
    Whiteman Air Force Base (AFB), Missouri.
    Fostering Joint Interdependence
        Air Force dedication to joint interdependence is illustrated in the
    global war on terror. Around the world, we are committed to providing
    COCOMs an increased ability to integrate air, space, and cyberspace
    capabilities and gain cross-dimensional synergies in pursuit of
    National Security Joint Force objectives.
        Fifth-Generation Fighters
        Currently in production and fully operational at Langley AFB,
    Virginia, the F-22A is the newest member of the Air and Space
    Expeditionary Force--our airmen are putting the world's first fifth-
    generation fighter into action. Its attributes of speed, stealth,
    maneuverability, advanced sensors and adaptable, integrated avionics
    will meet our Nation's enduring national security requirement to gain
    and maintain joint air dominance, as well as enable precise engagement
    against a broad range of surface targets.
        America's airmen are understandably proud of their contributions to
    the joint fight. They have prevented enemy aircraft from inflicting any
    U.S. ground force casualties for over 50 years. We dedicate our efforts
    and risk our lives to sustain this record. Production in sufficient
    numbers of fifth-generation fighters--both the F-22A Raptor and the F-
    35A Lightning II--remains the best guarantee of homeland air
    sovereignty and joint air dominance.
        Numbered Air Forces
        The Air Force has established component Numbered Air Forces (NAFs)
    dedicated to supporting each COCOM across the full range of military
    operations. Each component NAF provides an integrated and
    technologically advanced command and control capability, adaptable to
    contingencies across the spectrum of conflict. Over the next several
    years, we will continue to refine this command and control structure
    through the development of centralized ``reach back'' capabilities,
    integration of guardsmen and reservists, and more advanced cyber
    technologies.
        Air and Space Expeditionary Force
        The Air and Space Expeditionary Force (AEF) organizational
    construct is a modern design for the modern world.
        Since the end of the Cold War, the Air Force has evolved from a
    force based at large, permanent U.S. and overseas bases to an
    expeditionary force, requiring fewer permanent bases and using an
    expanded network of temporary forward bases. As we adapted to this new
    operating environment, we quickly recognized the deployment construct
    for our force also had to change. Since 1999, we have organized our Air
    Force combat forces into 10 AEFs that present capability to COCOMs,
    provide trained and ready forces for emerging threats and
    contingencies, and help manage high deployment tempo through a stable
    and predictable rotation schedule. When demand for American air power
    skyrocketed after September 11, the Air Force extended the deployment
    period from 90 to 120 days to accommodate the COCOMs' demands.
        We continue to adapt our people and organizational constructs to
    ensure airmen are highly motivated, exceptionally well-trained, and
    equipped with the right skill sets to present the joint warfighter with
    a broad set of capabilities. We realigned the AEF Center under the Air
    Force Personnel Center at Randolph Air Force Base, Texas, to leverage
    similar functions and merge permanent authorizations, wartime
    requirements, and assignments under a single commander. The Air Force
    is also moving forward with fielding of Contingency Response Groups
    (CRGs), organized, trained and equipped to provide an initial ``Open
    the Base'' capability to COCOMs. The CRG provides a rapid response team
    to assess the location-specific support requirements necessary to open
    an expeditionary airfield, as well as provide a rapid projection of
    America's vigilance, reach, and power.
        Joint Warfighting Integration
        Due to the dynamic demands of the global war on terror, airmen fly
    strike, ISR, combat search and rescue (CSAR), AE, electronic warfare
    and airlift sorties everyday over Afghanistan and Iraq. They also
    augment ground forces to provide security and stability in both
    countries. Airmen are working hand-in-hand with ground and naval forces
    training and augmenting both Iraqi and Afghan security forces,
    rebuilding critical infrastructure, and providing medical services to
    these war-torn countries.
        Air Force CSAR helicopters remain on alert in Iraq and Afghanistan,
    providing commanders with the capability to rescue isolated military
    and civilian personnel. Air Force CSAR crews answer the moral
    obligation to safely secure and return any and every member of our
    joint team.
        The effectiveness CAS provides soldiers and marines is another
    example of interdependence. Tactical training at the National Training
    Center provides soldiers and airmen the opportunity to see how they
    will deploy and fight together on future battlefields. The Army's
    Stryker Brigade Combat Teams now in service and the Future Combat
    System under development both rely heavily on Air Force strike
    capabilities to remain effective. Therefore, we are adding 700 TACP
    airmen to serve with ground components to ensure the Air Force's timely
    and precise effects are always available.
        Building Global Partnerships
        Fighting and winning the global war on terror requires commitment,
    capability, and cooperation from allies and partners around the world.
    We depend on our international partners to secure their territory,
    support regional stability, provide base access and overflight rights,
    and contribute a host of air, space, and cyber power capabilities as
    interoperable coalition partners. As the pace of economic, political
    and cultural globalization increases, the importance of strong global
    partnerships--both now and in the future--is abundantly clear.
        The Air Force leads the way in developing enduring air force-to-air
    force relationships around the world. To strengthen these
    relationships, we are expanding Red Flag access to our allies and
    partners. We are also working to establish the Gulf Air Warfare Center
    as a tactical center of excellence. In addition to integrating
    coalition partners into our most robust combat training scenarios, we
    have established the Coalition and Irregular Warfare Center of
    Excellence to facilitate development of relevant airpower capabilities,
    capacities, and relationships in partner nations in the global war on
    terror, and to facilitate development of innovative Air Force irregular
    warfare applications. We are also expanding the 6th Special Operations
    Squadron to bolster our ability to train foreign air forces and expand
    our repertoire of non-kinetic capabilities in the global war on terror.
    Furthermore, our aircrews, especially airmen executing global mobility
    and airlift missions, interact daily with host nation personnel,
    representatives and citizenry, enhancing America's image of strength,
    freedom, and hope.
        Through the Air Force Security Cooperation Strategy, we continue
    working with allies and friends to help them attain capabilities that
    complement our own air, space, and cyberspace capabilities. This
    document uses the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Security
    Cooperation Guidance as a foundation and aligns with COCOM Theater
    Security Cooperation strategies. This comprehensive, coordinated effort
    builds capability in potential partner air forces using the six U.S.
    Air Force Distinctive Capabilities as driving tenets.
        Recent commitments, such as procurement of C-17 airlifters by
    Australia and the NATO Alliance, and broad international participation
    in the F-35A JSF program, will further reinforce our current and future
    interoperability with global partners. Finally, we have infused
    expeditionary, regional, cultural and linguistic education throughout
    our training programs at every level. The Air Force executes a global
    mission. Our approaches to operations, interoperability and training
    exemplify our global, international perspective.
        Air Staff Intelligence Directorate
        Intelligence is becoming more critical in today's rapidly changing
    security environment. Collection, analysis, and timely distribution of
    information are essential to kinetic and nonkinetic approaches to our
    Nation's security challenges. Accordingly, we moved Intelligence
    directly under the Chief of Staff, creating the position of Deputy
    Chief of Staff for Intelligence (A2) and elevating the position to a
    three-star billet from its former two-star billet.
        Partnership with the National Reconnaissance Office
        The Air Force and the National Reconnaissance Office achieved a
    groundbreaking agreement on 7 June 2006 to share expertise and best
    practices. The agreement focuses specifically on sharing lessons
    learned in developing, acquiring, fielding and operating modern space
    systems. Both organizations recognize the need to enhance their
    respective capabilities, as well as to work collaboratively to respond
    to future challenges.
        Combat Search and Rescue Realignment
        The transfer of the CSAR mission from Air Force Special Operations
    Command to Air Combat Command provides a clearer presentation of forces
    to joint commanders and ensures a direct CSAR link to the Combat Air
    Forces and the personnel they serve. In addition, the Air Force's Next
    Generation Combat Search and Rescue aircraft (CSAR-X) will modernize an
    aging CSAR fleet, provide greatly improved all-weather combat search
    and rescue worldwide--an essential component of our commitment to the
    joint team and our allies.
        Air and Space Operations Centers
        In June 2005, we achieved an Initial Operational Capability with
    our Air and Space Operations Center (AOC) Weapon System and are well on
    our way to a Full Operational Capability for the entire AOC inventory.
    The Air Force leads the way in delivering sovereign options to defend
    our Homeland and our global interests by providing a global command and
    control (C2) capability to COCOMs, enabling them to orchestrate air,
    space, and cyberspace effects in pursuit of national military
    objectives. AOCs are the central operational nodes in this capability,
    and the Combined AOC in operation at Al Udeid, Qatar, exemplifies the
    most advanced and robust AOC system in the Air Force today.
        Aeromedical Evacuation
        Air Force AE contributes a unique, nationally vital capability to
    the joint fight. Air Force AE innovations include use of ``designated
    vs. dedicated'' aircraft, ``universally-qualified'' AE crewmembers,
    able to fly on any AE-configured aircraft, and the extensive use of
    Critical Care Air Transport Teams to transport stabilized patients.
        Air Force AE is combat proven. Since late 2001, we have
    orchestrated the care and transfer of more than 36,000 overseas
    patients to CONUS facilities. We continue to refine this remarkable
    capability and the ``en route care'' system built upon our
    expeditionary medical system.
        Air Force AE is a Total Force system, and both AE and en route care
    are built on teamwork, synergy, and joint execution. Technological
    advances such as the single integrated patient data system, high-flow
    ventilators, high deck patient loading system, and the Joint Patient
    Isolation Unit are under development and will further enable safe
    patient movement regardless of transportation mode.
        America's Air Force has provided soldiers, sailors, marines,
    coastguardsmen, and airmen the highest casualty survival rates in the
    history of warfare. By leveraging AE and en route care, we will
    continue to improve our ability to save and sustain lives.
    Space Capabilities in Joint Operations
        The entire joint force depends on Air Force space-based
    capabilities to meet not only the needs of military operations, but
    also the full spectrum of civil, economic, and diplomatic activities.
    Moreover, rescue and recovery operations in 2005 following Hurricanes
    Katrina and Rita clearly demonstrated the humanitarian mission utility
    of space-based communications, positioning and navigation services, and
    environmental monitoring. America's airmen safeguard the high ground of
    space and ensure America's unimpeded access to vital space
    capabilities.
        Space Applications in Afghanistan and Iraq
        Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan highlight the importance of
    space-based capabilities to U.S. and coalition forces. An example of
    Air Force response to warfighter needs is the successful deployment of
    the Satellite Interference Response System (SIRS), a defensive
    counterspace prototype. It aids in the identification, geolocation and
    reduction of interference sources for critical satellite
    communications. SIRS has improved the response time to unknown
    interference sources within the CENTCOM AOR and reduced friendly
    interference sources from impacting operations.
        Blue Force Tracking capability is another success story. Joint Blue
    Force Tracking has fundamentally changed ground warfare. The ability to
    accurately locate friendly forces with GPS timing and positioning
    information, and then share that information, dramatically improves
    understanding on the battlefield and reduces the risk of friendly fire.
    The unprecedented real-time knowledge of friendly force locations
    renders all operations--especially night and urban operations--less
    dangerous and more effective.
        Joint Space Operations Center
        The 14th Air Force Air and Space Operations Center (Space AOC) at
    Vandenberg AFB, CA, serves as the core of the United States Strategic
    Command Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC). The Space AOC/JSpOC is
    the primary command and control node for integrating the full resources
    of space-based sensor and command-control systems. The Space AOC/JSpOC
    proactively reaches forward to COCOMs, ensuring accomplishment of
    theater and global space objectives, while providing a continually
    updated space common operating picture for integration into current
    wartime and peacetime missions.
        The Space AOC/JSpOC consists of personnel, facilities, and
    resources providing long-term strategy development, short-term crisis
    and contingency planning, real-time execution, space asset
    reallocation, and space forces assessment. The Space AOC/JSpOC provides
    tailored space effects to joint forces worldwide.
        The Space AOC/JSpOC maintains SSA through the fusion of
    intelligence, space- and ground-based sensor readings, and operational
    indications to allow U.S. and allied forces unfettered access to space.
    The Space AOC/JSpOC also provides predictive analysis of adversary
    space activity and supports the protection of National Security Space
    assets.
        Counterspace
        Air, space, and cyberspace superiority are the foundational
    elements of joint success in any action. Counterspace and Countercyber
    technologies and operations provide America with the tools to achieve
    space and cyber superiority, allowing America freedom of action while
    denying freedom of action to an adversary or enemy. SSA, Defensive
    Counterspace (DCS) and Offensive Counterspace (OCS) capabilities
    comprise the main elements of Air Force counterspace efforts.
        SSA provides airmen with detailed knowledge of the space
    environment, enabling responsive, effective execution of DCS and OCS
    actions. Enhanced ground-based and new space-based SSA assets would
    provide the needed information. In the near-term, the Rapid Attack
    Identification Detection and Reporting System (RAIDRS), along with
    SIRS, will test detection and geo-location technologies. The Space
    Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) and Space Fence programs will deliver
    transformational capabilities to improve responsiveness, surveillance
    coverage, and small object detection. We expect to field these improved
    capabilities in the fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2013 timeframes,
    respectively.
        Air Force Defensive Counterspace efforts will protect National
    Security Space capabilities vital to joint success. Some defensive
    strategies comprise technical solutions integrated into satellite
    designs. We will design other systems specifically to counter
    adversarial threats. Additionally, our airmen are continuously
    developing new tactics to mitigate potential threats to our space
    systems.
        Offensive Counterspace technologies and operations seek to disrupt,
    deny, or degrade an adversary's ability to leverage space capabilities.
    The Counter Communications System (CCS) provides COCOMs a method to
    deny an adversary's access to satellite communications through
    temporary, reversible and nondestructive means. CCS expands the options
    available for the COCOM to address the proliferation of advanced space
    technologies and their availability to potential adversaries.
                      developing and caring for our airmen
        Your Air Force today is a seamless Total Force, with over 690,000
    airmen serving on Active Duty, in the Air National Guard (ANG), in the
    Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) and as Air Force civilians. While
    modern equipment, technology and capability are essential to success,
    your airmen are the bedrock of America's ability to succeed in an era
    of challenge and uncertainty.
        While emphasizing our global expeditionary culture, organization
    and mission, we remain committed to providing and maintaining the
    highest possible standards of education, training, health care, and
    installation services for America's airmen.
    Force Shaping
        When the Air Force began to develop a long-term force structure
    plan, we started with divestment of legacy aircraft. While we have
    achieved some success, significant investment gaps remain. Moreover,
    the costs of personnel continue to rise. Personnel costs have increased
    57 percent in the past decade. In early 2006, Program Budget Decision
    720 directed additional end strength reductions over the FYDP. As we
    manage this downsizing, we remain committed to a balanced force. We
    will increase manning in stressed career fields, and expand
    opportunities for career development and training. Our goal is a lean,
    more capable, more lethal Air Force, organized, trained, and equipped
    for our global, expeditionary mission.
        To tailor our personnel mix to the new security environment, we
    authorized implementation of annual Force Shaping Boards (FSBs). The
    purpose of the fiscal year 2006 FSB was to reduce officer overages by
    identifying eligible officers for separation, while balancing career
    fields and officer commissioned year groups. Prior to the board,
    eligible officers were offered voluntary options to transition to other
    forms of service in and out of the Air Force. The Air Force also waived
    most Active Duty Service Commitments (ADSC) to allow officers to
    separate early. In addition, the Air Force is offering Voluntary
    Separation Pay to officers in overage career fields, and we will
    convene a Selective Early Retirement Board to identify retirement-
    eligible officers for early retirement if necessary.
        To achieve the required reductions of enlisted airmen, the Air
    Force instituted a date of separation rollback for personnel with
    limitations on their assignment or enlistment eligibility. We also
    offered a limited number of ADSC waivers for eligible members in
    overage career fields. These initiatives to shape the enlisted force
    join the tools already in place: Career Job Reservations, reduction in
    accessions, and the Noncommissioned Officer Retraining Program.
        Overall, the Air Force aims for a reduction of over 4,000 officers
    and 10,000 enlisted members by the end of fiscal year 2007. These
    reductions are difficult but necessary to ensure the Air Force
    maintains the right size and mix of forces to meet the fiscal and
    global challenges of today and tomorrow.
    Total Force Integration
        A distinguishing hallmark of the Air Force is the ease with which
    airmen from Active Duty, ANG, and AFRC work together at home and
    abroad. From the build-up of the ANG after World War II, the first
    Reserve Associate unit in 1968 and the full integration of Guard and
    Reserve units into the Air and Space Expeditionary Force in the 1990s,
    the Air Force has a history of employing airmen from all components in
    innovative and effective ways.
        One of the Air Force's significant commitments to long-term
    transformation is Total Force Integration (TFI). The Total Force
    construct seeks to maximize the Air Force's overall joint combat
    capability with Active Duty, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve
    airmen working together cohesively. TFI is critical to meeting the
    challenges of competing resource demands, an aging aircraft inventory,
    and emerging missions.
        New and Emerging Missions
        As the Air Force transforms to a smaller, more agile and lethal
    force, we will retain the strengths of the Guard and Reserve and use
    them in new ways to reflect a changing mission set. Increased
    integration allows Air Force personnel to capitalize on experience
    levels inherent in the Guard and Reserve, while building vital
    relationships necessary to sustain successful combat operations.
        Ongoing Total Force initiatives integrate Air Force components into
    missions critical to future warfighting, and include ISR, UAVs, space
    and cyberspace operations. Given the ease of employing these
    capabilities from home station, these missions are ideally suited for
    the Guard and Reserve. In a time of increasing demand for these
    capabilities, it only makes sense to use reachback technologies to tap
    into our Air Reserve component. Using this approach improves our
    operational effectiveness, reduces reliance on involuntary
    mobilization, and provides more stability for our airmen and their
    civilian employers. It also allows the Air Force to capitalize on the
    state-of-the-industry advanced skills and best practices residing in
    the ranks of the ANG and AFRC.
        Way Ahead
        The Air Force continues to make significant progress on our Total
    Force initiatives. We have identified 136, secured funding for 98
    opportunities and are executing 19. We have established associate units
    at several locations including F-22As in Virginia and Alaska, C-17s in
    Hawaii, F-16s in Utah, and C-130s in Wyoming. Additionally, Guardsmen
    are analyzing global war on terror intelligence in Kansas, and
    reservists are flying operational global war on terror UAV missions
    from Nevada. With over 100 initiatives in the planning phase and many
    more in the development phase, Total Force Integration is paving the
    way for a smaller, more capable, more affordable Air Force.
    Improving Training Opportunities
        Spanning 6 decades of Air Force history, particularly over the past
    16 years, our airmen have proven themselves as the global first
    responders in times of crisis--taking action anytime, anywhere. The
    foundation for this well-deserved reputation is the quality and
    frequency of the training and education we provide. Our Air Force
    training initiatives continue to evolve, improving our ability to
    develop and retain the world's best air, space, and cyberspace
    warriors--expeditionary, knowledge-enabled, ethical, and prepared for
    the interdependent fight.
        Air Force Basic Military Training
        We changed Air Force Basic Military Training (BMT) curriculum to
    stress an expeditionary mindset in all phases of training, providing
    airmen with more expeditionary capability from day one. These changes
    are the most significant in BMT history. The Air Force basic training
    experience now mirrors the AEF cycle with a pre-deployment, deployment
    and reconstitution phases. We emphasize basic war skills and practical
    application throughout BMT. Beginning 1st quarter fiscal year 2009, BMT
    will incorporate 2 additional weeks of instruction--lasting 8.5 weeks
    total--to provide more opportunities for practical application and
    field exercises. Finally, we have added ``Airman's Time,'' mentoring
    sessions in which our veteran instructors share their real world
    experiences, relate daily training events to warrior and Airmanship
    qualities, and reinforce the Core Values expected of all airmen.
        Space Professional Development
        Space capabilities have become vital in the defense of our Nation
    and the continued growth of the U.S. and world economies. Developing,
    fielding, operating, and maintaining the Air Force's broad array of
    space systems demands a highly-trained, expertly managed workforce of
    space professionals. As we begin to field even more capable and complex
    systems, the demands on our space professionals will only increase. We
    have brought these personnel together within the Space Professional
    Development Program, ensuring our operations, acquisition and support
    personnel receive the training, education and experience necessary to
    accomplish our mission in space--now and in the future.
        U.S. Air Force Warfare Center
        The U.S. Air Force Warfare Center (USAFWC) integrates initiatives
    across the Air Force. USAFWC sets the standard for executing joint and
    coalition air, space, and cyberspace operations. The USAFWC provides
    advanced training designed to ensure our Air Force warfighting
    capability remains unrivaled. USAFWC provides performance assessment
    and joint integrated exercise venues for units from the USAF, USN,
    USMC, and USA--as well as our allies. They provide adversary analysis
    through a unified and coordinated ``Red Force'' ready to ``combat'' the
    United States' and their coalition partners during all phases of
    testing, tactics development, training programs, and integrated
    exercises.
        Red Flag
        In addition to its original location at Nellis AFB, NV, the Air
    Force now conducts Red Flag exercises in Alaska using Eielson AFB,
    Elmendorf AFB, and the Pacific Alaska Range Complex. The two exercises
    are designated Red Flag-Nellis and Red Flag-Alaska, respectively.
        Red Flag is expanding aggressor capabilities to provide enhanced
    training at both locations. The Air Force added an F-15 aggressor unit
    in Nevada and, starting in October 2007, we will establish an F-16
    Aggressor Squadron at Eielson AFB ready to participate in Red Flag-
    Alaska exercises in 2008. Aggressor functions have expanded to include
    air defense, space, and cyber operations. This integrated aggressor
    force provides all Red Flag exercises with a consistent, world-class
    training capability. Bolstering the dissimilar combat experience, the
    Air Force also has taken steps to expand the participation of coalition
    partners and allies in Red Flag.
        Overall, enhanced aggressor operations and common training concepts
    will increase the quality of Red Flag training, and two locations will
    increase the quantity of training opportunities. When complete, these
    changes will make a great program even better--saving lives in the next
    fight.
        Military Personnel Exchange Program
        Through the Military Personnel Exchange Program, the Air Force
    builds, sustains, and expands international relationships that are
    critical enablers for our Expeditionary Air and Space Force. Long-term
    success in the global war on terror calls for broad international
    partnership and integration. Expanding our exchange programs to Eastern
    Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia is critical to the conduct
    of the global war on terror and in building lasting partnerships with
    our Allies.
    Quality of Life
        Your Air Force has been at war for nearly 17 consecutive years.
    These challenging times underscore the importance of properly
    maintaining the capabilities of the primary weapons in our Air Force
    arsenal--our airmen. Our focus on their quality of life ensures these
    vital ``weapon systems'' remain ready when called upon.
        Expeditionary Support
        We ensure the best possible facilities and programs at all our
    expeditionary locations. Our dining facilities are unequalled--
    currently serving over 36,000 meals daily to deployed forces. We also
    provide fitness and recreation support to help maintain the health and
    morale of our airmen. Additionally, our Learning Resource Centers
    provide the necessary means for distance learning, continued
    professional development, and connectivity with friends and family.
        Our Airman and Family Readiness Program is an aggressive effort to
    prepare airmen and their families for deployment challenges. Mandatory
    pre-deployment briefings provide information on personal planning and
    stressors related to extended duty away from home, while mandatory
    post-deployment briefings prepare airmen for the dynamics of reuniting
    with their families.
        Language and Cultural Education Opportunities
        We are moving beyond traditional Air Force and joint warfighting
    skills development. Our educational programs provide increased
    opportunities for airmen to receive focused cultural and language
    training, facilitating greater professional interaction, deeper
    understanding, and more effective operations.
        The expanded instruction includes cultural awareness, regional
    affairs, and foreign language proficiency. All Air Force Academy cadets
    and Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) nontechnical scholarship
    cadets will be required to take language courses. Additionally, both
    Academy and ROTC cadets have increased opportunities for Foreign
    Language and Area Studies degrees and have expanded Cultural Immersion
    and Foreign Exchange Programs. Our enlisted basic military training
    also will provide instruction on cultural sensitivity.
        Once in the Air Force, each level of Officer and Enlisted
    professional military education (PME) provides additional cultural,
    regional and foreign language instruction, developing leaders who can
    articulate U.S. policy and operate effectively in foreign settings.
    Furthermore, we will increase Developmental Educational opportunities
    for global skills, including overseas professional military education
    and the Olmstead Scholars Program. We will then vector these airmen
    into Political-Military Affairs or Regional Affairs Strategist career
    tracks, maximizing America's return-on-investment.
        Housing and Military Construction
        Air Force investments in housing underscore our emphasis on
    developing and caring for airmen. Through military construction
    (MILCON) and housing privatization, we are providing quality homes
    faster than ever before. Over the next 2 years, the Air Force will
    renovate or replace more than 4,200 homes through MILCON. We are on
    track to meet our fiscal year 2009 goal of eliminating inadequate
    housing at overseas locations.
        Investment in dormitories continues to provide superior housing to
    our unaccompanied members. We have over 3,000 dormitory rooms
    programmed for funding over the next 6 years. Approximately 75 percent
    of these initiatives rectify inadequate dormitory conditions for
    permanent party members. Our new ``Dorms-4-Airmen'' standard is a
    concept designed to increase camaraderie, social interaction and
    accountability. The remaining dormitory program modernizes inadequate
    ``pipeline'' dormitories that house young enlisted students during
    their initial technical training.
        MILCON is an essential enabler of Air Force missions; however, we
    are accepting risk in facilities and infrastructure funding in order to
    bolster our efforts to recapitalize and modernize our aging aircraft
    and equipment. We have prioritized the most critical requirements to
    support the Air Force and DOD requirements. Our MILCON strategy
    supports these priorities by focusing on new mission beddowns,
    dormitories, fitness centers, childcare centers, and depot
    transformation.
        Joint Basing
        The Air Force has a long and successful history of working toward
    common goals in a joint environment, without compromising Air Force
    principles and the well-being of our people. Joint Basing initiatives
    are no exception. We want Joint Basing to be a raging success.
    Therefore, each Joint Base should be required to provide an attractive
    setting to all of its assigned personnel.
        To accomplish this end, we advocate the establishment of the
    highest Quality of Life standards of individual bases as the Joint Base
    Quality of Life standards. Joint Basing is an opportunity to improve
    efficiency, Quality of Life standards and common delivery of
    Installation Support Services. Joint Basing will consider best business
    practices to ensure enhancement of joint warfighting capabilities,
    eliminate duplication, and ultimately achieve synergy for base support
    services. These actions will optimize joint use of limited resources
    and result in more efficient installations from which all Services will
    project combat power for our Nation.
        Through the establishment of the highest level of Quality of Life
    standards at each joint base, our airmen, soldiers, sailors, marines,
    DOD civilians, and their families will benefit from efficient,
    consistent Installation Support Services. These standards will ensure
    the Air Force and our sister Services continue to provide all personnel
    with the level of Installation Support Services they deserve. As we
    work with OSD and our sister Services, we will ensure all Joint Basing
    initiatives guard against any interference with the DOD's ability to
    perform its mission. Joint Basing allows us to build closer
    relationships and forge stronger ties among the Services. We will not
    only train as we fight, we will live as we fight.
                    recapitalizing and modernizing the force
        To meet the needs of our Nation at war and successfully build the
    86 modern combat wings necessary to maintain a credible defense posture
    in the future, we are committed to aggressively recapitalizing and
    modernizing our inventories of aircraft, space systems, equipment, and
    operational infrastructure. Executing a successful recapitalization
    plan is a balancing act. We will continue to meet today's operational
    needs while striving to ensure America and our future airmen inherit an
    Air Force that is ready, capable and sustainable. We are committed to
    maintaining air, space, and cyberspace advantages and America's
    unparalleled Global Vigilance, Reach and Power--America's Edge.
    Comprehensive Plan
        Our recapitalization and modernization plan follows an integrated
    strategy of retirement, procurement, selective Service Life Extension
    Programs (SLEPs) and modifications--coupled with the broadest, most
    innovative science and technology program in DOD. We will progressively
    shed our oldest, most costly, and least capable legacy aircraft, while
    reinvesting in a smaller--but more capable--expeditionary force,
    emphasizing global and joint capabilities. While these strategies will
    sustain selected legacy systems for near-term, we will avoid billions
    of dollars on further SLEPs by working our stewardship of funds today.
    It has become far more expensive to continuously extend the life of
    older aircraft. We are fast approaching the point where it is cheaper
    to buy new aircraft.
        Our plan will allow effective, efficient modernization and
    replacement of our air superiority, strike, space, ISR, mobility,
    special operations, and combat support systems. Fully recapitalized,
    America's Air Force will remain dominant in the conduct of modern,
    networked, cross-dimensional 21st century warfare.
        An Aging Inventory
        The Air Force is meeting today's combat requirements--but not
    without increasing risks and costs. We have an aging and increasingly
    unfit inventory of aircraft, space systems, and equipment. Of our
    inventory of approximately 6,000 aircraft, a significant number operate
    under flight restrictions. Many transport aircraft and aerial refueling
    tankers are more than 40 years old. The average age of the bomber force
    exceeds 30 years. The fighter force is the oldest it has ever been, at
    an average age of more than 18 years. Additionally, our airmen operate
    and maintain many satellites well in excess of their originally
    designed mission durations. Across every mission, the Air Force is
    experiencing detrimental effects of high tempo operations and age,
    including engine and structural fatigue, deterioration, corrosion and
    increased rates of component failure.
        As a result, the Air Force's ability to meet the combat
    requirements of tomorrow is in question. The increased tempo of current
    operations delays routine maintenance and we find our systems becoming
    progressively less effective and more costly to own and operate.
    Aircraft and equipment modifications currently absorb 20 percent of the
    Air Force's procurement budget. This is the highest percentage in the
    history of the Air Force. In fact, 14 percent of our Air Force fleet is
    either grounded or operating under mission-limiting flight
    restrictions. Our comprehensive plan for modernization and
    recapitalization outlines the prudent investments necessary today to
    avoid the future capability risks and spiraling maintenance and
    modernization costs we currently experience with our legacy systems.
        Inventory Management
        Fiscal responsibility is a critical element of our plan. The Air
    Force is committed to planning and operating within our allocated
    resources. However, we face fiscal constraints that introduce risk into
    our efforts to successfully posture America's Air Force for the future.
    We appreciate congressional language in the 2007 National Defense
    Authorization Act supporting our efforts to retire older aircraft and
    manage our inventory of aging equipment. However, remaining legislative
    restrictions on aircraft retirements remain the biggest obstacle to
    efficient divestiture of our oldest, least capable, and most costly to
    maintain platforms and equipment. Keeping these legacy aircraft on the
    flightline levies additional operations and maintenance costs at the
    expense of modernization programs and funding. These costs cascade into
    procurement delays for future platforms and divert resources away from
    expanded joint capabilities. We welcome the opportunity to work with
    Congress to overcome these fiscal challenges, reduce risks to meeting
    our national security and joint requirements, and successfully prepare
    our Air Force for the future.
        Procurement Priorities
        We design and structure every Air Force program throughout our
    diverse, comprehensive recapitalization and modernization plan to meet
    critical Air Force, joint, and national requirements. Several programs
    currently receive our highest attention and represent our top
    priorities within the plan.
        Our top acquisition priorities include: the KC-X Tanker; the CSAR-X
    Combat Search and Rescue Helicopter; space communications, space
    situational awareness and early warning programs; the F-35A JSF; and
    Next Generation Long Range Strike--a new bomber. We will continue to
    advocate and advance these and many other modern elements of air,
    space, and cyberspace capability. Collectively they will strengthen
    America's advantages in Global Vigilance, Reach and Power for years to
    come.
    Global Vigilance
        The Air Force acts as the global eyes and ears of the joint team
    and our Nation. Using a vast array of terrestrial, airborne, and
    spaceborne sensors, we monitor and characterize the Earth's sea, air,
    space, land, and cyber domains around the clock and around the world.
    Our command, control, communications, and computers (C\4\) networks
    link the joint team together and speed information to users at the
    point of action, from commanders in AOCs, to ground units engaged with
    the enemy, to a pilot dropping a precision-guided munition.
        The future vision of all the U.S. military Services is information-
    driven. Success will hinge on America's cyberspace advantages. Air
    Force assets like Joint STARS, AWACS, Rivet Joint, Global Hawk,
    Predator and our constellations of satellites, contribute vital
    networking and C\4\ISR products and services to every aspect of every
    joint operation. Our recapitalization and modernization plan aims to
    increase dramatically the quantity and quality of C\4\ISR capabilities,
    products and services available to the joint team and the Nation. Our
    plan especially focuses on ensuring Air Force space communications, SSA
    and early warning missions provide uninterrupted continuity of service
    for America and our allies.
        Transformational Satellite Communications System
        The Air Force continues to pursue next-generation satellite
    communications technology with the Transformational Satellite
    Communications System (TSAT). The TSAT program will employ Internet
    Protocol networks, on-board routing and high-bandwidth laser
    communication relays in space, dramatically increasing warfighter
    connectivity. TSAT capabilities will enable the realization and success
    of all DOD and joint visions of future network-centric operations, such
    as the Army's Battle Command-on-the-Move and the Navy's Sea Power 21
    vision and Fleet FORCEnet/FORCEview concepts. In 2007, we expect the
    TSAT program to complete system design milestones.
        Advanced Extremely High Frequency System
        The Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite
    communications system reaches Assembly Integration and Test in 2007,
    preparing for first launch in spring 2008. When deployed, AEHF will
    provide the secure, survivable, anti-jam communications that MILSTAR
    currently provides. AEHF will, however, also provide greater bandwidth,
    larger throughput, faster dissemination, and better service quality to
    U.S. and allied users.
        Wideband Global SATCOM System
        In 2007, the Air Force will take the first major step in the
    modernization of its satellite communications architecture with launch
    of the first satellite in the Wideband Global Satellite Communications
    (SATCOM) System (WGS), a program formerly known as Wideband Gapfiller
    Satellite. A single WGS satellite has more communications capacity than
    the entire Defense Satellite Communications System it replaces,
    enabling direct broadcast of digital multimedia, high-bandwidth imagery
    and digital video information directly from global and theater sites to
    deployed warfighters.
        Terminal Programs
        Air- and ground-based satellite communications terminals provide
    warfighters with critical links to America's space assets from anywhere
    in the world. Our terminal modernization programs are maintaining pace
    with the high performance satellites they support. Through programs
    like the Family of Advanced Beyond Line of Sight Terminals (FAB-T) and
    the Ground Multi-band Terminal, the Air Force will transform its air-
    and ground-based space capabilities with terminals that consolidate
    logistics support, provide increased communications throughput, and
    ensure seamless command and control.
        Space Based Missile Warning Capabilities
        The Air Force is America's only provider of Space-Based Missile
    Warning. Providing a robust missile warning capability to the Nation
    through enhanced space-based ISR systems remains a priority in 2007. We
    expect to launch the final Defense Support Program launch (DSP-23) in
    spring 2007, continuing 36 years of the DSP constellation's outstanding
    service.
        The Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) represents the next
    generation of Early Warning satellites. The first SIBRS Highly
    Elliptical Orbit (HEO) payload is currently deployed on-orbit and
    undergoing operational testing. The HEO-2 payload has been delivered
    for integration. Launch of the SBIRS Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO)-1
    satellite is scheduled for late 2008. Once fielded, SBIRS will provide
    a transformational leap in capability over our current DSP system.
        Space Radar
        Space Radar (SR), another key transformational space-based ISR
    program, will have the ability to look into denied areas and to cue
    additional sensors, such as those on Predator and Global Hawk. The SR
    will provide COCOMs unprecedented surface wide-area surveillance
    capabilities, updating its AOR coverage report several times per hour.
    SR will characterize objects and activities of interest for target
    development in conjunction with other assets to meet critical joint
    warfighter requirements. In 2007, the program will focus on building
    engineering development hardware while emphasizing risk reduction,
    integration, and systems engineering.
        National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
        The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite
    System (NPOESS) is a tri-agency program sponsored by DOD, the
    Department of Commerce, and NASA. NPOESS will support DOD forces
    worldwide as well as Homeland Security agencies. The system will
    provide assured, timely and high-quality environmental data to our
    warfighters for weather forecasting, mission planning and weapons
    employment. NPOESS environmental data will also enhance our domestic
    preparedness when dealing with natural disasters.
        Rapid Attack Identification Detection and Reporting System
        Meeting the requirement to assist in the protection of our space
    assets, the Rapid Attack Identification Detection and Reporting System
    (RAIDRS) will provide a capability to detect and locate satellite
    communications interference using fixed and deployable ground systems.
    A fully operational RAIDRS Spiral 1 will be delivered in fiscal year
    2008 and provide detection and location of SATCOM interference. Future
    developments will automate data analysis and fusion, as well as provide
    decision support tools for near-real-time actions.
        Global Hawk
        The RQ-4A Global Hawk is a high altitude, long endurance UAV
    providing the joint warfighter with persistent vigilance and
    observation of targets in day, night and adverse weather. Global Hawk
    entered development in 2001 after completing a successful Advanced
    Concept Technology Demonstration. We plan to develop and field the
    aircraft in blocks of increasing capability, allowing accelerated
    delivery to the warfighter, while the system evolves and expands to its
    full potential.
        We have already employed block 10, the first of four production
    variants, in support of global war on terror. It provides an effective,
    persistent imagery capability using synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and
    electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensors. The larger Block 20 aircraft,
    which will begin development test in early 2007, will provide 50
    percent more payload capacity carrying enhanced SAR and EO/IR sensors
    for even clearer images at greater ranges.
        In 2012, Block 30 will field a more versatile, multi-intelligence
    capability by integrating Block 20 imagery sensors with a robust
    signals intelligence (SIGINT) suite. The fourth Global Hawk variant,
    Block 40, will be available for operations in 2011. It will carry a
    single payload--a Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program
    sensor--to provide the warfighter a highly advanced radar imagery and
    moving target indicator capability. Global Hawk has demonstrated its
    combat value in global war on terror and the Air Force will continue to
    mature and enhance its capabilities in the coming years.
        MQ-1 Predator
        Leading the way in armed reconnaissance, the Air Force is currently
    flying MQ-1 Predator missions 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The MQ-1
    Predator is a medium-altitude, multi-role, long endurance UAV,
    providing persistent ISR and strike capabilities to COCOMs. Predator
    aircraft are able to transmit live, full motion digital video to
    ground-based and airborne targeting teams equipped with the Remote
    Operations Video Enhanced Receiver (ROVER) system.
        The Predator is operational, and by 2010, we will expand its
    capability from 10 to 21 total CAPs to meet increased COCOM and
    warfighter demands. We also plan to incorporate Target Location
    Accuracy improvements to rapidly provide targeting data for GPS-guided
    munitions.
        Total Force airmen in Nevada and California control Predator
    aircraft operating in numerous locations around the world, including
    Iraq and Afghanistan. By 2010, this capability will spread to Air
    National Guard units in Arizona, North Dakota, and Texas. The Predator
    has transformed the way we fight, providing persistent ISR, reliable
    target acquisition and lethal strike capability for COCOMs and our
    joint warfighters.
        RC-135 Rivet Joint
        The RC-135 Rivet Joint continues its four decades of success in
    providing SIGINT capabilities across the full spectrum of joint
    operations and national information needs. Most missions directly
    support OEF and OIF tactical operations, adding to Rivet Joint's
    outstanding record of accomplishment and continuous presence in CENTCOM
    since 1990.
        In addition to mission equipment upgrades, we have completed re-
    engining and cockpit modernization, keeping the force viable until
    2040. In 2007, the Air Force will procure Rivet Joint 17, a global war
    on terror acquisition for additional medium-altitude SIGINT capacity.
        Rivet Joint has become the cornerstone of an airborne targeting
    modernization effort known as Net-Centric Collaborative Targeting.
    Rivet Joint has demonstrated the capability to horizontally integrate
    C\4\ISR assets across the entire Joint Force and dramatically improve
    target location accuracy, timeliness and identification.
        Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
        The E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint
    STARS) is an airborne battle management, command and control,
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platform. Its primary
    mission is to provide theater ground and air commanders with surface
    moving target indications (SMTI) and tailored surveillance in support
    of operations and targeting. Joint STARS has been a significant
    contributor to U.S. Air Force fighting effectiveness in Operations
    Desert Storm, Joint Endeavor, Allied Force, OEF, and OIF. Continuing
    modifications and enhancements will sustain Joint STARS viability
    beyond 2034.
        E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System
        The E-3 AWACS is the premier airborne command and control platform
    in the DOD and a key element of all airborne operations. AWACS supports
    decentralized execution of the joint air component missions and
    provides theater commanders with the ability to find, fix, track, and
    target airborne or maritime threats, and to detect, locate, and
    identify radars. AWACS has been the key airborne asset in all
    operations since its fielding in 1983. Our ongoing modernization of the
    platform will position AWACS to remain a viable airborne command and
    control platform beyond 2035.
        Air and Space Operations Center
        The Air and Space Operations Center (AOC) Weapon System is the
    Combined/Joint Force Air Component Commander's (C/JFACC's) tool for
    employing air, space, and cyberspace power. The AOC enables decision-
    makers to focus and synchronize our air, space, and cyber superiority,
    global attack, precision engagement, information superiority, and rapid
    global mobility capabilities across the full range of military
    operations in multiple, geographically separated arenas.
        The AOC weapon system, with its Theater Battle Management Core
    System (TBMCS), has evolved significantly since its designation as a
    weapon system in 2001. We used the Al Udeid Combined AOC model to
    establish the AOC Weapon System Block 10.1 baseline. Creating this
    baseline enabled us to standardize our development, procurement and
    presentation of C2 capabilities to Joint and Combined Commanders
    worldwide. Increment 10.1 standardizes configuration among the five
    deployed Falconer systems, providing operators with greater and faster
    access to air battle management information. The program team efforts
    continue to generate greater system performance for warfighters, with
    major improvements planned for delivery over the next 2 years.
        The Air Force has committed to continue evolving and modernizing
    our AOC Weapon System through the FYDP, building toward a fully
    operational, cross-dimensional C2 enterprise by fiscal year 2014.
        Battle Control System-Fixed
        The Battle Control System-Fixed (BCS-F) system is a cooperative
    program with Canada. The system provides air defense and surveillance
    capability for the entire North American continent. BCS-F supports ONE
    and serves as the Air Force's homeland defense battle management,
    command, and control system. The BCS-F system integrates data from
    multiple radar sensors providing tactical communications and data link
    capabilities with other military and civil systems responsible for air
    surveillance, air defense and control of sovereign U.S. air space.
        Battle Control System-Mobile
        The Battle Control System-Mobile (BCS-M) is the next generation of
    Low Density/High Demand (LD/HD) ground-based tactical C2 nodes
    supporting the warfighter with theater air defense, airspace
    management, aircraft identification, wide-area surveillance and
    tactical data link management. These are the same missions the current
    legacy system, the Control and Reporting Center, performs in support of
    OIF, OEF, and ONE, as well as homeland defense activities such as
    counter-drug operations and special security events.
        Air Force Distributed Common Ground System
        The Air Force Distributed Common Ground System (AF-DCGS) is the Air
    Force's premier ISR Tasking, Collection, Processing, Exploitation and
    Dissemination (TCPED) weapon system. From reach back locations, AF-DCGS
    operators collect raw sensor data from the Global Hawk, Predator, and
    other platforms around the world, turn it into decision-quality
    intelligence in near-real-time, and send it directly to those in need
    at the Joint Task Force level and below. Its proven capabilities in
    sharing and correlating multi-source SIGINT, imagery intelligence, and
    signature intelligence data will be enhanced with the fielding of the
    AF-DCGS Block 10.2, which is leading the way in DOD's net-centric ISR
    enterprise transformation.
    Global Reach
        America's airmen provide not only the long legs and heavy lifting
    for joint warfighters' rapid global mobility, but also the long arms
    for global strike and high endurance for global persistence and
    presence. On a daily basis, Air Force mobility forces support all DOD
    branches as well as other government agency operations all over the
    world. Increased demand and decreased availability underscore the
    critical need for tanker recapitalization and investment to ensure the
    long-term viability of this national capability. Without prudent,
    timely investment, our national defense, global vigilance, reach,
    presence, and power are put in serious peril.
        Tanker Recapitalization
        Aerial refueling capability is essential to the expeditionary
    nature of America's Armed Forces. Aerial refueling serves as a joint
    force multiplier, providing American and coalition air forces with
    increased range, persistence, and endurance. We are committed to
    maintaining an inventory of tankers that guarantees the projection of
    U.S. combat power.
        For the past 50 years, the Air Force's primary tanker platform has
    been the KC-135, and it has served with distinction. However, we are
    carrying great risk operating this aircraft beyond expected service
    life. Some of the oldest models already operate well beyond the point
    of cost-effective repair. Tanker recapitalization is not a new idea. In
    1999, a thorough GAO report presaged the declining operational utility
    of our aging tankers and underscored the need for immediate investments
    in recapitalization. Given the increased operational requirements of
    the global war on terror, procurement of a new tanker aircraft--the KC-
    X--has become both an operational necessity and the most fiscally
    prudent option to maintain America's global presence and expeditionary
    capabilities.
        The KC-X is our number one procurement priority. KC-X tankers will
    provide increased aircraft availability, more adaptable technology, and
    greater overall capability than the current inventory of KC-135E and
    KC-135R tankers they will replace. Enhancements in every aspect of
    aircraft operation will provide the joint warfighter with more flexible
    employment options. It is imperative we begin a program of smart,
    steady reinvestment in a new tanker--coupled with measured, timely
    retirements of the oldest, least capable tankers. Recapitalizing our
    tankers will ensure the viability of the vital national capability they
    provide.
        Intratheater Airlift
        The Air Force has a two-pronged approach to modernize America's
    intratheater airlift capabilities. First, we are striving to replace
    our oldest aircraft with a mixture of new C-130Js and Joint Cargo
    Aircraft (JCA). The JCA offers the potential for additional solutions
    to the Air Force's intra-theater airlift recapitalization strategy. JCA
    will provide a modern mobility platform suited to accessing an array of
    demanding and remote worldwide locations, including short, unimproved
    and austere airfields.
        Second, we will standardize remaining C-130s via the C-130 Avionics
    Modernization Program (AMP) and center-wing box replacement programs.
    C-130 modernization extends operational lifetime, reduces operation and
    sustainment costs, and increases the combat effectiveness of our
    intratheater airlift capability.
        For decades, C-130s have been the workhorses for intratheater
    airlift during numerous contingences. Additionally, the C-17 has done a
    superb job augmenting the C-130s in the intratheater airlift role.
    Similarly, the new C-130Js, which are far more capable than legacy C-
    130s, have proved their worth supporting global war on terror and
    humanitarian operations since December 2004.
        Intertheater Airlift
        The C-17 continues its outstanding support for joint operations
    across the spectrum of conflict. During the past year, C-17s flew over
    44,000 sorties, bringing the total number of OEF and OIF missions to
    over 123,000. Additionally, the C-17 flew 900 humanitarian and disaster
    relief sorties following Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma, as well as
    the Southeast Asian tsunami, Pakistani earthquake, and the Lebanon
    noncombatant evacuation operations. Given this high operational tempo,
    the Air Force appreciates congressional action to procure additional C-
    17s to sustain a fleet of 190.
        During 2006, the Air Force's other heavy lifter, the C-5 Galaxy,
    flew 5,500 sorties in support of the global war on terror. Since 11
    September 2001, C-5 have flown over 50,000 sorties in support of the
    joint warfighter and provided humanitarian aid around the world. To
    keep the C-5 mission capable and maximize capability, the Air Force is
    continuing the C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) and the
    Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program (RERP). The AMP and
    RERP efforts ensure compliance with emerging airspace requirements,
    upgrade aircraft propulsion, and improve over 70 other unreliable C-5
    systems, enabling this large airlifter to remain viable through 2040.
        Together, the C-17 and C-5 weapons systems provide complementary
    capabilities and are critical to meeting our U.S. intertheater airlift
    requirements today and in the future--for the entire joint force.
        Space Launch Operations
        The Air Force continues to fulfill its role as the guardian of the
    world's premier gateways to space and America's vital national space
    launch capabilities. Space launch is another element of Air Force space
    capability that is vital to American global military, political, and
    economic success.
        With 14 operational launch successes, the Evolved Expendable Launch
    Vehicle (EELV) program provides assured access to space in support of
    operational requirements. In fiscal year 2007, we expect to continue
    building upon our DOD launch successes with seven EELV and three Delta
    II launches.
        Launch and Test Range System. The Eastern and Western Ranges,
    located at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, FL, and Vandenberg AFB,
    CA, respectively, comprise the Launch and Test Range System (LTRS). The
    LTRS, part of the DOD's Major Range and Test Facility Base (MRTFB)
    infrastructure, provides tracking, telemetry, communications, command
    and control to support the testing of ballistic missiles, precision
    weapons, national missile defense and advanced aeronautical systems.
    The LTRS also provides the vital infrastructure necessary to support
    manned and unmanned space launches for DOD, national, civil and
    commercial space missions. We will continue LRTS modernization and
    further reinforce our capabilities to ensure space launch safety and
    mission success.
    Global Power
        The U.S. Air Force provides the joint team a historically
    unprecedented ability to deliver a precise, tailored effects whenever,
    and wherever and however needed--kinetic and nonkinetic, lethal and
    nonlethal, at the speed of sound and at the speed of light. It is an
    integrated cross-dimensional capability that rests on our ability to
    control air, space, and cyber. We exploit these domains to hold at risk
    any target on the surface of the Earth. As we continue to transform
    this capability, we will focus on expanding our effectiveness in
    multiple dimensions. We will continue to refine our abilities to
    deliver lethal and nonlethal effects at the time and place of our
    choosing, shortening the sensor-to-shooter ``kill chain.''
        Combat Search and Rescue
        Uniquely within DOD the Air Force organizes, trains and equips
    dedicated forces for Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) mission. Air Force
    CSAR crews fulfill our absolute moral imperative to safely secure and
    return all of our airmen and any member of our joint team.
        We are recapitalizing this vital combat capability with the CSAR-X
    aircraft. This effort represents one of our top Air Force acquisition
    priorities. These modern aircraft will enable COCOMs to recover
    isolated joint or coalition personnel engaged across the spectrum of
    military operations as well as perform non-combatant evacuation and
    disaster relief operations. CSAR-X aircraft will relieve the high
    operations tempo (OPTEMPO) strain placed on the current LD/HD inventory
    of HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopters, and they will present COCOMs with key
    combat and noncombat mission options.
        This new aircraft will dramatically improve Air Force CSAR mission
    capabilities. It will provide our personnel recovery forces with an
    aircraft that is quickly deployable and capable of operations from
    austere locations. It will operate day or night, during adverse weather
    conditions, and in all environments including nuclear, biological and
    chemical conditions. On-board defensive capabilities will permit the
    CSAR-X aircraft to operate in an increased threat environment, and in-
    flight refueling will provide an airborne alert capability and extend
    its combat mission range.
        These increased capabilities are crucial to meeting current and
    future joint operational needs, while providing greater capability to
    Air Force CSAR forces, ``that others may live.''
        F-35A Lightning II
        The F-35A Lightning II JSF is a fifth-generation multi-role strike
    fighter aircraft optimized for air-to-ground attack. The F-35A is the
    Conventional Take-off and Landing (CTOL) variant, and it will
    recapitalize F-117, F-16, and A-10 combat capabilities. The F-35A will
    complement the capabilities of the F-22A. Like the Raptor, the F-35A
    reaps the benefits of decades of advanced research, development, and
    field experience.
        The F-35A will provide affordable precision engagement and global
    attack capabilities for the Air Force, Navy, Marines, and our
    international partners. In 2006, the JSF program delivered the first
    CTOL variant test aircraft and completed its first flight on 15
    December 2006.
        Next Generation Long-Range Strike
        Range and payload are the soul of an Air Force. These elements form
    the foundation of strategic military deterrence. The LRS mission, a
    primary reason the Air Force became a separate Service in 1947,
    continues as a vital and unique Air Force contribution to national
    defense. The Air Force has a three-phased strategy to help ensure the
    U.S. meets its enduring LRS capability requirements. Phase One includes
    near-term maintenance and modernization of current bombers and air-to
    surface weapons.
        By 2018 and in accordance with QDR goals, Phase Two will deliver a
    new LRS bomber incorporating highly advanced technologies. This next
    generation bomber will combine speed, stealth, payload, and improved
    avionics/sensors suites. This new bomber will bring America's bomber
    forces up to the same high standard we are setting with our F-22A and
    F-35A fifth-generation fighters. It will ensure our bomber force will
    continue to be effective in meeting COCOMs' global needs across the
    full range of military operations. The Analysis of Alternatives will be
    complete in the spring of 2007.
        In Phase Three, the Air Force plans to field a revolutionary LRS
    capability in the 2035 time frame using an advanced system-of-systems
    approach. We expect technology maturation to yield advancements in
    several areas, including hypersonic propulsion, advanced materials and
    nonkinetic weapons.
        F-22A Raptor
        The F-22A Raptor is the Air Force's primary air superiority
    fighter, providing unmatched capabilities for operational access,
    homeland defense, cruise missile defense and force protection for the
    joint team. The F-22A's combination of speed, stealth, maneuverability,
    and integrated avionics gives this remarkable aircraft the ability to
    penetrate denied, anti-access environments. The F-22A's unparalleled
    ability to find, fix, track, and target enemy air- and surface-based
    threats ensures air dominance and freedom of maneuver for all joint
    forces. In addition, the F-22A is the only airborne system in the U.S.
    military that can conduct network-centric warfare and provide ISR
    capability from inside adversary battlespace in the opening moments of
    any contingency.
        Until the F-22A became operational in 2005, America's Air Force had
    not fielded a new fighter since the 1970s. Today, combat-capable
    Raptors are in full-rate production on the world's only fifth-
    generation fighter production line. As of 1 January 2007, 84 aircraft
    have been delivered, including 44 combat coded aircraft, and another 25
    are in production. The first operational F-22A unit declared initial
    operational capability at Langley AFB, Virginia, in December 2005. The
    second operational F-22A unit will pick up the AEF rotation in May
    2007. Meanwhile, the third operational unit is standing up at Elmendorf
    AFB, Alaska with a projected AEF rotation of May 2008. We will also
    station a fourth unit at Elmendorf, followed by fifth and sixth units
    at Holloman AFB, New Mexico, and the seventh unit at Hickam AFB, HI.
        The F-22A flew its first operational mission in support of ONE in
    January 2006, participated in the Alaskan Northern Edge exercise in
    July 2006, and is preparing for upcoming AEF deployments.
        MQ-9 Reaper
        Similar to its smaller MQ-1 Predator sibling, the MQ-9 Reaper is a
    medium-altitude, multi-role, long endurance UAV that will provide
    persistent ISR and improved strike capabilities to COCOMs. MQ-9
    incorporates MQ-1 operational design improvements, a larger airframe,
    battle-proven sensors, full motion digital video, Rover connectivity
    and expanded munitions capability.
        Initial mission capability will begin at Nellis AFB, NV, with
    future expansion to New York ANG. In 2007, we expect to continue
    rigorous MQ-9 development and demonstration, as well as operational
    employment with pre-production aircraft to meet urgent joint warfighter
    needs.
        The MQ-9, like the MQ-1, will also incorporate Target Location
    Accuracy improvements to support GPS-guided munitions. Ultimately, the
    MQ-9 will provide theater commanders with expanded employment options
    in a vastly improved Hunter-Killer UAV, incorporating a larger payload,
    automatic cueing, and self-contained capabilities to strike time
    sensitive and hard targets.
        CV-22 Osprey
        The Air Force will procure 50 CV-22s, with an Initial Operational
    Capability scheduled for fiscal year 2009. The CV-22 is a V-22 tilt-
    rotor aircraft designed to meet a U.S. Special Operations Command
    (USSOCOM) requirement for long-range infiltration, exfiltration, and
    resupply of Special Operations Forces. The CV-22's advanced systems
    include Terrain Following/Terrain Avoidance Radar, Integrated RF
    Countermeasures, Directional Infrared Countermeasures, the Multi-
    mission Advanced Tactical Terminal, and additional fuel tanks and
    tactical communications gear.
        Global Positioning System
        The GPS constellation serves as a global utility for precision
    navigation and timing. GPS is yet another Air Force mission that has
    become vital to American military and global economic activity. As with
    all elements of the Air Force space mission, we are dedicated to
    ensuring uninterrupted continuity of GPS services.
        GPS modernization continues in 2007 with additional launches of GPS
    IIR-M satellites. The GPS IIR-M satellites will provide a new military
    signal more resistant to jamming and a new civil signal for improved
    position accuracy for civil, commercial, and recreational GPS users.
    The follow-on system, GPS IIF, will provide IIR-M capabilities plus an
    additional civil signal for aviation safety-of-flight services. The
    development of the next-generation GPS-III will further enhance
    navigation and precision-engagement capabilities and improve resistance
    to jamming, as well as add a third civil signal compatible with the
    European Galileo System.
        Counter Communications System
        As part of the broader Counterspace mission, the ground-based,
    theater-deployable CCS provides COCOMs with a non-destructive,
    reversible capability to deny space-based communication services to our
    adversaries. CCS enhances our capability to ensure air, space and
    cyberspace superiority for the Nation.
        We plan to procure three additional operational CCS and one
    training system. This comprises the full complement of systems for two
    Space Control Squadrons. We will continue block upgrades to the CCS to
    enhance our Offensive Counterspace capabilities and begin pre-
    acquisition work for the next generation CCS.
        Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
        America's ICBM force remains the foundation of our Nation's nuclear
    deterrent capability. Modernization programs are crucial to the
    Minuteman ICBM, which, when initially deployed in the 1960s, were
    designed to last 10 years. Service life extension programs are underway
    to ensure the Minuteman III remains mission capable through 2020. These
    programs replace obsolete, failing, and environmentally unsound
    materials, while maintaining missile reliability, survivability,
    security, and sustainability. These efforts are critical to sustaining
    the ICBM force and are vital to America's nuclear deterrent posture.
        Operationally Responsive Space
        The Air Force intends to continue its demonstration, acquisition,
    and deployment of an effective Operationally Responsive Space (ORS)
    capability in support of the DOD's focus on meeting the urgent needs of
    the COCOM.
        ORS includes the ability to launch, activate, and employ low-cost,
    militarily useful satellites to provide surge capability, reconstitute
    damaged or incapacitated satellites, or provide timely availability of
    tailored or new capabilities. ORS capabilities can lead to long-term
    benefits by advancing technology, improving space acquisitions,
    enhancing the skills of the technical workforce, and broadening the
    space industrial base.
        Space Development and Test Wing. In 2006, the Air Force established
    the Space Development and Test Wing (SDTW), headquartered at Kirtland
    AFB, New Mexico, to focus on the development and testing of orbital
    assets with the goal of encouraging innovation in the space mission
    area.
        One of the Wing's responsibilities is ORS. Working with other
    services and agencies, it will perform concept development, design,
    manufacturing, and operation of small satellites, as well as other
    activities required to support the fielding of ORS capabilities. As
    capabilities are developed and fielded, the wing will directly
    interface with user organizations responsible for employing ORS
    capabilities in joint and coalition operations.
        During fiscal year 2007, we will develop a plan further refining
    ORS. This plan will fully define ORS roles and missions, along with the
    organization and reporting structure. In addition, we plan to develop
    specific acquisition policies, implementation schedules, funding, and
    personnel requirements to support deployment of ORS capabilities.
    Science and Technology
        True to our history over the past century of powered flight, the
    Air Force continues to maintain the most complex, diverse and ambitious
    science and technology (S&T) portfolio of all the Services. History
    clearly demonstrates the broad benefits to America of our S&T efforts,
    in terms of military power, industrial capability, economic growth,
    educational richness, cultural wealth, and national prestige. Examples
    include aerospace technology and propulsion, materials science,
    advanced computing and communications, atmospheric science, remote
    sensing and satellite navigation. What has been good for the Air Force
    has been great for America. We are committed to building upon this
    heritage.
        The Air Force S&T Program develops, demonstrates and tests
    technologies and advanced warfighting capabilities against the spectrum
    of 21st century threats. As we continue to adapt to a volatile and
    uncertain world, today's focused investment in our S&T Program will
    strive to produce the future warfighting capabilities needed to ensure
    America's continued technological pre-eminence and military
    flexibility. Additionally, Air Force S&T organizations work closely
    with the other Services, Defense Agencies, Intelligence Community, and
    other Federal agencies, such as the National Aeronautics and Space
    Administration, as well as partner nations. Through these partnerships,
    we leverage efforts, share information, and advance state-of-the-art
    technologies.
        The Air Force S&T Program provides the foundation for future joint
    warfighting capabilities, focusing on dominance of the air, space, and
    cyberspace domains for America.
        Improving Energy Efficiency
        The Air Force is taking the lead in reducing the DOD's dependence
    on foreign oil. As the DOD's leading consumer of jet fuel, we are
    currently engaged in evaluating alternative fuels and engine
    technologies leading to greater fuel efficiency. Air Force efforts
    focus on high-efficiency aerodynamic concepts, advanced gas turbines
    and variable cycle engines providing higher performance and greater
    efficiency.
        As a part of this effort, the Air Force is performing flight tests
    on a B-52 using a blend of MILSPEC JP-8 fuel and a synthetic fuel
    derived from natural gas. We plan to continue airworthiness
    certification testing of synthetic fuel.
        Cyber Technology
        Fulfilling its role as a leader in the Information Age, the Air
    Force is exploring technologies and concepts of operations within the
    cyberspace domain. Air Force Cyberspace initiatives will provide tools
    for offensive and defensive cyberspace operations as well as bolster
    our information assurance capabilities. The Air Force is investing in
    technology concepts to ensure reliable, operational links between
    individuals and systems--in addition to machine-to-machine interfaces--
    to ensure cyberspace dominance, information delivery, situational
    awareness, and rich connectivity across the joint team.
        Small Satellites
        The Air Force is pursuing development of small satellite
    technologies, including modular buses with ``plug-n-play'' payloads,
    along with the development of low-cost launch systems. We aim to
    provide a greater range of responsive space applications for the
    tactical warfighter. Small satellite technology demonstrations have
    achieved lighter payloads and reduced development and integration
    timelines. Additionally, these achievements serve to mitigate
    technology risks for larger, more complex satellite programs in
    development. Small satellites with operationally responsive payloads
    could potentially provide either specifically tailored, stand-alone
    capabilities, or rapid augmentation capability for a satellite or
    constellation of satellites that suffer failure or attack.
        Directed Energy
        Directed energy weapons will profoundly transform how we fly,
    fight, and defend ourselves, and we are integrating them into our
    broader cyber operations effort. As lasers and radio frequency weapons
    find applications in the battlespace, their ability to operate at the
    speed of light will change both offensive and defensive capabilities
    and tactics. New designs and technology may be necessary to offer
    adequate protection for our people and capabilities.
        Weapons in development include the Airborne Laser (ABL), a large
    aircraft carrying the High Energy Laser for missile defense.
    Additionally, the active Denial System has demonstrated the viability
    for a long-range, nonlethal, anti-personnel weapon.
        These systems benefit from many years of technology development.
    Revolutionary technologies continue to be developed. These include
    versatile high power solid-state lasers; devices for aircraft self-
    protection; higher power active denial components for airborne
    applications; relay mirrors to extend the range of systems like ABL;
    and high power microwave devices to disable electronics covertly
    without affecting structures or people.
        Hypersonics
        The Air Force is a world leader in the development of practical
    hypersonic air-breathing propulsion. Hypersonic research, relating to
    flight speeds greater than five times the speed of sound, offers
    dramatically reduced time-to-target for conventional weapons and, in
    the future, may provide ``airplane-like'' on-demand access to space.
    Our effort involving supersonic-combustion-ramjets (Scramjets)--
    specifically our planned flight tests of the X-51 Scramjet Engine
    Demonstrator--highlights our commitment to maintaining America's
    leading role in this field.
        We also expect advanced hypersonic munitions technologies to
    improve penetration capabilities and decrease collateral damage. These
    characteristics will allow us to expand our target attack ability,
    particularly in urban environments and against time critical, hardened,
    and buried targets.
        Composites
        Air Force S&T is exploring advancements in composite structures and
    manufacturing technologies for lightweight unconventional aircraft
    shapes. Example applications include short take-off and landing
    capabilities, high-lift aircraft wing systems, integrated propulsion
    inlet/diffuser geometries, and integrated flight control surfaces. We
    expect these efforts to shorten development times for next generation
    aircraft with lighter, stronger airframes offering far greater mission
    utility than legacy aircraft.
        Simultaneously, we are addressing sustainment of composite
    structures, in order to ensure future aircraft built with these
    materials will be readily maintainable and serviceable.
        Nanotechnology
        Investment in nanotechnologies could provide stronger and lighter
    air vehicle structures including potential applications in unmanned
    vehicles. Other nano-materials show promise as high-performance water-
    repellant coatings. These coatings may protect Air Force systems
    against corrosion and chemical/biological contaminants, providing
    significant savings in maintenance costs and extending the lifetime of
    aircraft and other military equipment.
                             delivering excellence
        Fighting the global war on terror, developing and caring for our
    airmen and their families, and recapitalizing and modernizing the Air
    Force all require substantial national resources.
        Throughout 2006, the Air Force embarked on several forward-leaning
    initiatives to improve our organization, efficiency, agility, and
    lethality. We are committed to good stewardship of America's resources,
    while strengthening America's current and future air, space, and
    cyberspace capabilities.
        The Air Force is making strides in a range of activities and
    through multiple, overlapping initiatives to improve what the QDR
    refers to as ``reshaping the defense enterprise.'' The Air Force is
    moving toward financial transparency and reinforcing our culture of
    efficiency and process improvement through the AFSO21 initiative. We
    are also transforming our approach to infrastructure and maintenance,
    executing an aggressive energy strategy, and reforming our acquisition
    practices--emphasizing a ``Back to Basics'' approach to space
    acquisitions, in particular.
        All of these efforts will lead to greater efficiency, lower
    operating costs, and greater availability of resources for
    recapitalization and modernization of critical Air Force capabilities.
    In short, our airmen are striving to provide an even higher return on
    America's national security investments.
    Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century
        To meet the challenges of this environment and the road ahead, we
    have embarked on an Air Force-wide effort embracing efficiency and
    process improvement. AFSO21 applies many concepts developed and proven
    in industry--Lean, Business Process Reengineering, Six Sigma, and
    Theory of Constraints methodologies. We expect significant savings from
    this initiative.
        The AFSO21 vision is to increase combat capability by integrating
    process improvement into the culture of all of the active Duty, Air
    National Guard and Reserve airmen, as well as our civilians and
    contractors. All airmen must understand their role in improving daily
    processes. AFSO21 identifies and eliminates activities, actions and
    policies that do not contribute to efficient and effective operations.
        We seek several outcomes from AFSO21. First, we want all airmen to
    be fully aware of the importance of their work--how they contribute
    directly to the Air Force mission and national defense. Second, we will
    strive to improve safety and maintain quality of life for all Air Force
    personnel. Third, we push to decrease process cycle times, thereby
    increasing our ability to respond to rapidly changing demands. Fourth,
    we aim to cut costs and free up funds for modernization. Finally, we
    seek to eliminate waste.
        Process changes have occurred at every level of the Air Force,
    resulting in significant savings. We have more work to do, but
    institutionalizing AFSO21 concepts into daily operations allows us to
    meet the enormous challenges of the next decade and ultimately sustain
    and modernize the world's premier air, space, and cyberspace force.
        Business Transformation
        The Air Force vision of Business Transformation creates rapid and
    predictive operational support and leads to greater situational
    awareness for commanders. Our high-level Business Transformation goals
    include improving warfighter effectiveness through fast, flexible,
    agile, horizontally integrated processes and systems; establishing a
    culture of continuous process improvement; achieving efficiencies
    allowing us to return resources for the recapitalization of aging
    weapons systems and infrastructure; and creating an acquisition process
    unparalleled in the Federal Government.
        National Defense Authorization Act Certification and Portfolio
    Management. The Air Force fully leverages DOD enterprise transition
    planning and DOD-mandated certification reviews. We ensure business
    systems development supports the effects and capabilities articulated
    in the Agile Combat Support concept of operations. These certification
    reviews have resulted in the shutdown and elimination of hundreds of
    legacy systems and allowed us to redirect additional resources to
    critical warfighting requirements.
        Transparency. The Air Force is accelerating efforts to deliver
    authoritative information to decision makers at all levels, improving
    information availability and quality, realizing warfighter cross-
    service information requirements, and implementing DOD-wide information
    priorities. We will achieve transparency by using correct information
    at all echelons--trustworthy, traceable, auditable, and valuable. We
    will support cross-domain or cross-mission efforts by defining
    architecture and information standards necessary for easy discovery,
    use and reuse of data.
        Clean Audit Quick Look
        Warfighters perform their missions with increasingly limited
    resources and manpower. Decisionmakers at every level need the best
    information when allocating these scarce resources. To achieve greater
    levels of information fidelity, the Air Force is committed to improving
    transparency in its business processes, to include Financial
    Management. A Clean Audit Opinion defines a major objective of this
    commitment. Financial transparency requires the Air Force to have
    processes and procedures in place ensuring data is accurately collected
    at the source, flows efficiently through to reporting systems and
    analytical tools, and is error-free.
        The Air Force Information Reliability and Integration (AFIR&I) plan
    is our road map toward financial transparency. It is a key component of
    the DOD Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Plan aimed at
    improving DOD financial health. The AFIR&I Action Plan reinforces our
    ongoing commitment to ensuring the absolute highest level of
    stewardship of our Nation's investments in the Air Force.
    Energy Conservation
        We are pursuing an aggressive energy strategy and are committed to
    meeting and surpassing the energy goals mandated by the Energy Policy
    Act of 2005 (EPAct 05) and other national policies. We successfully
    reduced our energy consumption in accordance with past legislation and
    continue to use a variety of programs aimed at reducing our use of
    fossil fuels and controlling cost growth. Our vision creates a culture
    where airmen make energy considerations in all their actions. We aim to
    implement our vision with solutions that include alternate sources of
    domestic energy as well as an aggressive drive for greater efficiency
    in our facilities and vehicles.
        The Air Force remains the largest renewable energy purchaser in the
    U.S. Our commitment to install 18 megawatts of solar photovoltaic
    energy at Nellis AFB is one example of our pursuit of on-base renewable
    power generation. Currently 37 bases meet some portion of their base-
    wide electrical requirements from commercial sources of wind, solar,
    geothermal or biomass. We have several projects planned, in design, or
    under construction to expand this capability. With our combined
    purchase and production strategy, the Air Force is poised to surpass
    the renewable goals set by the Energy Policy Act.
        The Air Force applies sustainable development concepts in the
    planning, design, construction and operation of facilities using the
    Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) certification
    process. Our long-term goal is to ensure 100 percent of eligible new
    facilities are LEED certifiable by fiscal year 2009. This complements
    our use of facilities construction and infrastructure improvement
    programs designed to create cost effective energy efficiencies in new
    and existing facilities.
        We have also taken an aggressive stance on replacing our existing
    general-purpose vehicles with low speed vehicles (LSVs) without
    adversely affecting peacetime or wartime mission requirements. This
    measure will reduce vehicle acquisition cost, fuel expenditures and
    ozone-depleting exhaust emissions and free up funds for use in other
    critical areas. Our goal is to replace 30 percent of general-purpose
    vehicles with LSVs by fiscal year 2010. Coupled with the goal to
    replace 100 percent our general-purpose vehicles with alternative fuel
    vehicles, the Air Force is taking the lead in the use of alternative
    energy technologies.
    Acquisition Excellence
        The Air Force continues its goal of streamlining the acquisition
    process to providing efficient and responsive services to the
    warfighter. A number of completed and ongoing projects have contributed
    to the improvement of acquisition, and fiscal year 2008 promises more
    progress.
        We have revitalized the Acquisition Strategy Panel, providing a
    systematic and disciplined approach to develop an effective acquisition
    program roadmap. The newly developed Air Force Review Board process
    provides a structured and repeatable system that aids decision-making
    on critical aspects of selected acquisition programs. We have also
    streamlined periodic review processes by combining several independent
    reviews into a single event, saving preparation and travel time.
        In 2006, the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA) made
    a number of recommendations for improving the acquisition system. The
    Air Force is in the process of evaluating and implementing key
    recommendations of the DAPA report. For example, the Air Force is
    exploring the concept of Time Certain Development (TCD) as the next
    step in evolutionary acquisition. TCD involves structuring a program to
    deliver its initial capability to the warfighter at an explicitly
    specified (and much shorter) interval. Such a policy helps improve the
    responsiveness of the acquisition system and keeps our warfighting
    capabilities aligned to current threat conditions.
        To enhance the credibility of the acquisition system, the Air Force
    is strengthening its efforts to analyze risks prior to initiation and
    execution of a program. The Air Force is prototyping the Probability of
    Program Success model, a framework for identifying and reporting risk
    issues that threaten a developer's ability to deliver on time and
    budget. Use of this model has the potential to highlight risk areas
    requiring the program manager's attention.
        The Air Force is improving the source selection process, ensuring
    appropriate use of incentives, assessing current contracting
    organizational alignments, and implementing strategic sourcing
    strategies. We are committed to providing support of contingencies and
    to the warfighter by acquiring commodities and services by the most
    effective means possible. We continue to maintain the majority of the
    deployed contingency contracting assets in the Iraq/Afghanistan AOR,
    and we remain dedicated to supporting the COCOMs through joint and Air
    Force taskings.
        Space Acquisition
        The Air Force is committed to revitalizing and restructuring its
    overall space acquisition strategy. We will build upon our heritage of
    providing unmatched space capabilities to meet national, COCOM, and
    Joint Force objectives by developing and executing more deliberate
    plans focused on cost and schedule containment.
        The Air Force ``Back to Basics'' initiative is part of our plan to
    improve space acquisitions. The initiative promotes a renewed emphasis
    on management techniques and engineering practices that lead to better
    definition of requirements as well as deliberate acquisition strategy
    planning. Clear and achievable requirements, appropriate resources,
    disciplined systems engineering, and effective management are the basic
    elements--the foundation upon which successful acquisition depends.
        The ``Back to Basics'' initiative promotes a block approach
    strategy focused on delivering capability through value-added
    increments. This concept is consistent with current policy specifying
    ``evolutionary acquisition as the preferred strategy'' for DOD
    acquisition. Specific capability increments are based on a balance of
    capability, delivery timeline, technology maturity, risk, and budget.
    Well-defined increments reduce many of the instabilities plaguing our
    past efforts. We will deliberately apportion cost, schedule, and
    technical risk across these increments to meet the primary objective--
    delivering combat capability on a predictable timeline and at a
    predictable cost.
        In 2006, the Air Force restructured two major programs to comply
    with the ``Back to Basics'' strategy initiative. We have restructured
    the GPS III and TSAT programs to reduce risk and define executable
    block strategies. We expect these changes to deliver warfighting
    capabilities in the least amount of time.
        In 2007, the Air Force will expand the implementation of its ``Back
    to Basics'' initiative by deliberately and establishing block
    development strategies for a greater number of programs within the Air
    Force space portfolio. We will continue our conscientious efforts to
    stabilize requirements, funding, and workforce within program blocks.
    This strategy will place increased emphasis on cost estimating, systems
    engineering, and risk management to provide capability to our
    warfighters.
        Small Business Programs
        The Air Force employs over 129 small business professionals across
    the country. They strengthen our Nation's industrial base through their
    advocacy for the small business community. They also identify future
    procurement opportunities for small businesses and refer these
    companies to potential Air Force customers. We surpassed our small
    business goals for the third consecutive year across all Air Force
    primary small business programs. Small business prime contract awards,
    in both dollars awarded and percentage of total procurement, increased
    in every category. We awarded a record $8 billion in Air Force
    contracts to small businesses, accounting for 16.9 percent of all
    awarded contract dollars. Additionally, we awarded $86 million to
    Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU) and other minority
    institutions, accounting for 9.1 percent of all awarded contract and
    grant dollars to institutions of higher education.
    Operations and Maintenance Facility Projects
        The Air Force will continue to prioritize investments in facilities
    and infrastructure critical to mission operations. Maintenance and
    repair of runways, weapons system facilities, utility systems, and
    training facilities represent the Air Force's top projects. We will
    invest O&M funds to maximize the economic life and value of this
    critical infrastructure, minimizing mission disruptions. The Air Force
    continues to face significant challenges in preserving an aging
    inventory of utility systems, airfield pavements, and essential support
    facilities.
        Depot Maintenance Transformation
        Throughout Air Force history, our depots have been vital to
    success. Our commitment to retain technically relevant depot-level
    maintenance and repair capability will ensure sustainment of the
    world's dominant air, space, and cyberspace capabilities beyond the
    next decade. We programmed investments in depot infrastructure,
    equipment, and personnel throughout fiscal year 2004-fiscal year 2009
    in order to implement the Air Force Depot Maintenance Strategy and
    Master Plan. The Air Force strategy benchmarks industry standards to
    improve depot maintenance infrastructure, implement re-engineering
    initiatives, and transform depot processes to maintain ``world-class''
    status.
        Repair Enterprise
        As an expeditionary air, space, and cyberspace force, we challenged
    our logisticians to develop agile combat support concepts that enhance
    our current and future warfighting capabilities. Repair Enterprise
    (RE21) is a lean logistics initiative and an integral part of the
    Global Logistics Support Center (GLSC) concept of providing global
    logistics support to the Air Force. RE21 leverages global visibility of
    all repair assets, centralized funds management, strategic sourcing,
    and partnerships with industry to provide the Air Force highly
    technical logistical support. The main RE21 goal is to establish an
    enterprise-wide single repair network supporting the entire Air Force
    supply chain and to optimize support to the warfighter through the
    GLSC.
                               minding the future
        September 18, 2007, will mark the 60th Anniversary of the creation
    of our independent United States Air Force. This year, we commemorate
    this anniversary of our proud Service--a service born of revolutionary
    ideas, forged in combat, and proven through decades of progress and
    achievement. The mission of the Air Force remains to fly, fight and
    win--in, through and from air, space, and cyberspace.
        While remembering our history and reaffirming our commitments to
    the current fight, we are ever mindful of the need for investment in
    future capabilities. We will remain focused on our top priorities:
    Fighting and Winning the global war on terror; Developing and Caring
    for Our Airmen; and Recapitalizing and Modernizing the Force. Meeting
    these priorities has become more challenging in light of current fiscal
    constraints. Nonetheless, we will move forward, striving to maintain
    the Global Vigilance, Reach and Power advantages America has come to
    expect. Our allies respect us, and our enemies fear us.
        The Air Force has faced challenging times in its past and is
    meeting the stress of today's operating environment. It is our heritage
    and mission to fly, fight, and win. Our legacy inspires us. Our mission
    propels us. Our core values guide us. We have inherited and will build
    upon a rich heritage--a heritage shaped through the ingenuity, courage
    and resolve of great airmen who preceded us. Our proud heritage,
    focused priorities, and enduring core values will serve to guide our
    actions and reaffirm our commitments today, over the next 60 years, and
    beyond.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman Levin. Let me just first thank the airmen and
    thank you for all you do, what you stand for, for your
    commitment to this Nation, and for the courage that you show.
    We also would appreciate it if you'd extend our thanks to your
    families, to those who give you the support that's so essential
    to keep you going. This committee is totally behind our men and
    women in uniform, as is the Nation. I hope you all feel it.
    It's heartfelt. Thank you for being with us today. It's an
    honor to be in your presence.
        Secretary Wynne.

     STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL W. WYNNE, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

        Secretary Wynne. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for even
    taking the time to acknowledge and thank our airmen. It is an
    absolute privilege for General Moseley and I to be their
    leaders.
        We are grateful for this committee's steadfast support of
    our Nation's airmen. They are responsive, whether answering the
    call for humanitarian relief, providing commanders and
    combatants realtime intelligence, or striking with lethal and
    precise effect. They are agile, with the ability to provide
    America's strategic shield or form an air bridge from the
    continental United States halfway around the world to southwest
    Asia--an air bridge, our airmen have maintained now for 17
    years--or keep steadfast watch in space and in the skies. They
    even superbly perform our assigned ground-force missions,
    although all realize that the adage, ``Every airman a
    rifleman,'' sacrifices strategic leverage the Nation wants and
    needs from its airmen. We look for the ground-force reset to
    potentially rectify this. Given the age of our air and space
    equipment, there is no doubt that our freedoms are balanced on
    the courage, skills, and ingenuity of our Total Force airmen.
        Today, our airmen are incredibly busy and fully engaged in
    the global war on terror, not just in Iraq or Afghanistan, but
    around the world, and yet fully engaged in the strategic
    deterrence posture that keeps America safe in the long term.
        Our airmen are providing global vigilance through our
    manned and unmanned aircraft and space systems. For example,
    Air Force assets and airmen surveil, identify, track, and
    sometimes even kill enemies as a part of the joint force's
    critical counter-improvised explosive device (IED) mission.
        We are providing global reach. Our C-130s and C-17s execute
    precision airdrop and conventional cargo missions, which are
    saving countless lives by taking dangerous convoys off the
    road. Our aeromedical evacuation personnel are giving our
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines the highest survival
    rate in the history of warfare.
        We provide global power, directing, conducting, or
    threatening strikes 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days per
    year.
        Our strategic mission in Iraq was completed long ago, when
    we swept the skies of aircraft, which allows the unimpeded
    operation of unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) and our fighters. For
    example, our battlefield airmen levy global power through
    technology like the ROVER platform, which is a laptop computer,
    which gives a new level of connectivity and situational
    awareness by linking users with a laptop terminal with full-
    motion video sensors on our Predator UAVs and our advanced
    targeting pods on our fighters. ROVER-equipped users get
    realtime, full-motion video from these eyes in the sky and
    provide our ground commanders spherical awareness, not just 360
    degrees, but also a God's-eye view.
        We are also the only Service with dedicated combat search-
    and-rescue forces, or PJs. As airmen, we consider combat
    search-and-rescue a moral imperative to be able to retrieve the
    airmen we send deep into enemy territory. But these combat
    search-and-rescue forces are equally adept at rescuing other
    Services' isolated personnel when they're required to do so.
        As in other domains, your Air Force is engaged daily in
    cyberspace. We have established within the 8th Air Force a new
    cybercommand to address how we can better train and present our
    forces to the U.S. Strategic Command, the combatant commanders,
    and other Government agencies engaged in this domain.
        It's these linkages where other Services and agencies rely
    on us to own our warfighting domains and we count on them to
    own theirs. That makes our military truly interdependent today.
    So, we owe our ground forces and our maritime partners the very
    best in leveraging our air, space, and cyberspace assets to
    meet their mission intent.
        We say that we set strategic and tactical conditions for
    victory, and we mean to do that. It has been 53 years since any
    American soldier has been strafed from the air, and we hope to
    push that for another 53 years.
        Today, we're doing just that, meeting our wartime
    requirements. But wear and tear and loss of buying power all
    translate into risk into our future readiness capacity and
    capability. Today's emerging threats also threaten our future
    dominance. Proliferation of advanced technologies and new
    threats, such as double-digit surface-to-air-missile systems,
    nuclear weapons in North Korea, and the recent Chinese
    antisatellite (ASAT) test--which proved that space is no longer
    a sanctuary--make it imperative that we adjust our inventories
    for this new century. We are responding by fielding a next-
    generation long-range strike bomber by 2018 as well as funding
    new satellites, tankers, and combat search-and-rescue aircraft.
        Last year, I laid out a very difficult strategy to address
    this most pressing need: recapitalizing our aging air and space
    inventories. We've started this process, while remaining in
    bounds by essentially self-funding, to the maximum extent
    possible, our recapitalization. We have self-funded by
    essentially restructuring our force size and reshaping the
    Total Force on a mission-first basis, buying fewer, but more
    capable platforms, and implementing new initiatives to become
    yet more efficient.
        When I was a young officer leaving the Air Force in 1973,
    the average age of our equipment, including space assets, was
    approximately 8\1/2\ to 9 years old. Our inventory's age is now
    triple that, averaging 24 to 25 years old. With this in mind, I
    have advised our airmen that it is their duty to ensure that
    the airmen of tomorrow are as confident and as capable against
    the threat as we are today, and if part of that duty means that
    we have to leave the Air Force to provide that resource, we
    will do it. We can ensure this only by intensively husbanding
    every resource--people, flying hours, and expenses--and
    dedicating the freed resources to recapitalization.
        I want to thank Congress for its continued help in allowing
    the Air Force to manage our flying inventory and in assisting
    us in this duty to our future.
        I want to thank Congress also for its continued help
    recapitalizing our space inventory. We are taking the necessary
    steps in our fiscal year 2008 budget to ensure uninterrupted,
    continuous service in communications, early warning, position,
    navigation, timing, and environmental sensing satellites. We
    appreciate your support in the development, procurement, and
    fielding of these critical space capabilities because our
    military and the citizens of our great Nation depend upon their
    continuous service.
        We are providing our airmen access to safe, quality,
    affordable, well-maintained housing in a community where they
    choose to live, through housing privatization. In the Air
    Force, our tenet has long been, ``We recruit airmen, but we
    retain families,'' and we make quality of life on our bases a
    key component of this tenet.
        In summary, your Air Force is in the fight, not just in
    Iraq, but globally. Your airmen are the Nation's strategic
    edge. They are expeditionary, highly-trained warriors, and,
    with your help, we will provide them with the necessary
    training, equipment, and quality of life to keep this Nation's
    asymmetric advantage of global vigilance, reach, and power.
    Recapitalizing our aging equipment inventories is the key.
        Finally, I want to add my thanks to our airmen here and
    abroad. They are amazing, eager to serve, and mindful of their
    mission all around the world. I am proud to be their secretary,
    and look forward to your questions.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
        General, do you have any additional comments?
        General Moseley. No, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        I think we'll try a 6-minute round of questions this
    morning, because of the looming vote we have here at 11:30.
        Mr. Secretary and General Moseley, both, do you believe
    that the fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008 supplemental
    requests adequately fund your requirements?
        Secretary Wynne. Sir, I think they do adequately fund our
    requirements. But, as always, there's tension between strategic
    and tactical. If you gave me another dollar, I would know
    exactly where to spend it. Right now, it would probably be on
    C-130Js, because that is how we are taking more convoys off the
    road. Second, I would probably spend it on strategic
    deterrence, because of a fifth-generation fighter study, as
    well as a space event. That's what I would tell you, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        General, do you believe your 2007 and 2008 supplementals
    adequately fund your requirements?
        General Moseley. Sir, as we worked on the fiscal year 2008
    President's budget, the Air Force spent 2.2 million man-hours
    balancing the program objective memorandum (POM) that is the
    submission of the President's budget. That is the rest of the
    money moved around in the Department. We were able to catch up
    with the two supplementals as well as the UPL. So, with the two
    supplementals and the UPL, sir, I think we're adequate. But I
    also know where I would spend an extra dollar.
        Chairman Levin. When will you have to receive the 2007
    supplemental funding in order to avoid a major cash-flow
    problem?
        Secretary Wynne. Sir, I believe the Department is working
    against a late-April receipt, but we are very concerned that it
    could extend beyond Memorial Day. I understand that the
    Comptroller is beginning to take whatever preventive actions
    are necessary to cash-flow this engagement.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        On the C-130 issue, the Department is asking to buy 17 new
    C-130Js in the 2008 supplemental. That seems to be a large
    number, given that the Air Force has only been buying nine
    aircraft a year in the regular 2008 budget. How is it, Mr.
    Secretary, that the Air Force would be asking for such a large
    number in the supplemental?
        Secretary Wynne. I think, at this stage of the engagement,
    sir, we have forecast, again, that we will be conducting an air
    bridge, both strategically and tactically, for some time to
    come. Right now, our C-130Es are excluded from theater, because
    they are so broken. We are running only C-130Hs, what used to
    be the backbone of the National Guard. We recognize that we are
    flying these on double time and are essentially going to
    forecast their exhaustion at some point in time. With that, we
    think we should backstop our tactical airlift with the request
    for C-130Js, and we think that they have shown a dramatic
    effect in direct delivery for getting convoys off the road--all
    of the Marine convoys except for troops, and about 9,000 per
    month of our Army, Air Force, and Navy personnel who are
    driving convoys every month. This, sir, I'd like to extend.
        Chairman Levin. So, why not part of the regular budget? Why
    is this in a wartime emergency supplemental?
        Secretary Wynne. I think, sir, the 2.2 million hours that
    the General referred to really addressed that part of our force
    structure that we think of as how we would operate in
    peacetime. I think the backfill to the special operators that
    we have been asked to do--and they have, therefore, taken,
    essentially, more C-130Hs from us than we anticipated--plus the
    dramatic increase in mission set that we find we can perform,
    has caused this.
        Chairman Levin. Okay. Tell us, if you would, about the C-17
    procurement, General. The fiscal year 2008 budget for the Air
    Force does not have any funding to keep the C-17 production
    line open. You've been quoted, General, as saying that you'd
    like to retire C-5A aircraft and buy more C-17s. Last year,
    Congress added 10 C-17 aircraft to the fiscal year 2007 bridge
    supplemental, and you had asked for 7 more C-17s in your 2007
    UPL. You have two C-17s on your UPL for this year. Some are
    asking--suggesting that we fund 16 more C-17 in the budget
    itself. On the other hand, looking at the C-5, and the question
    of whether or not we should re-engine the C-5, that would cost
    about $100 million per aircraft. 70 percent of its service life
    would be ahead of it if we re-engined that aircraft. It would
    cost about half as much as a C-17. So, given the top-line
    pressure, General, on the whole DOD, and the Air Force, in
    particular, and given the statement of Secretary Wynne about
    intensifying our effort to utilize every possible resource that
    we can, how do you reject, General, the C-5 re-engining option
    and, instead, put that focus on the C-17s and put those on your
    UPL?
        General Moseley. Sir, there are a couple of unknowns that
    we're working our way through now. One is the growth in the
    land component with the Army and the Marines, not just in this
    surge, but in overall growth. We're beginning to ask, ``does
    the Mobility Capability Study that we ran last year cover what
    potentially will be a larger land-component footprint?'' The
    answer is no, the original Mobility Capability Study did not
    cover this growth. So, we're looking now, with the Army, to see
    what the brigade combat teams (BCTs) and what the Marines'
    regimental combat team means to strategic airlift. We don't
    know the answer to that yet, and we'll work our way through
    that, this summer, because we've not seen the actual footprint
    from the Army or the Marines, other than raw numbers of growth.
        So, Mr. Chairman, we know that there will be a larger
    requirement for strategic lift. The baseline of the original
    Mobility Capability Study was about a minimum of 300 or so
    strategic airlifters, to include C-5A, B, C, and the C-17. What
    we have asked for is the ability to manage the C-5 fleet; to be
    able to ask Air Mobility Command to give us the worst actors,
    wherever those tail numbers are, and to be able to retire
    those. General McNabb believes that's about 25 or 30 C-5s. What
    I would like to do is be able to work with the committee, the
    Guard, Reserve, and Air Mobility Command to look at where those
    particular 25 or 30 airplanes are, and begin to look at
    something to replace those in those units. We had seven C-17s
    on the UPL last year to cover the attrition reserve in BAI
    aircraft, which we didn't buy. The two this year are to cover
    part of the NATO transfer of an airplane, and to cover that
    attrition reserve in backup aircraft inventory. We didn't put
    any more in there because we don't have the rationale, beyond
    the numbers that we have, given the C-5s, and not knowing what
    the growth in the Army and the Marines will do to us.
        What we would like to do is to be able to run the avionics
    modernization program, out on all of the remaining C-5s, and
    then run the re-engining program out on the C-5s that have the
    most life. We are complying with the guidance of the committee
    on the A model re-engining, and we'll have that data out, so
    we'll be much more informed about the A model. It may, in fact,
    be okay.
        But, sir, in the buy of the C-17, we're in a very
    interesting place right now, where our land-component brothers
    are growing, our strategic airlift inventory is static, our C-
    5s are becoming much harder to maintain, and the reliability on
    them is in question. The C-17 line is about to be shut down.
    That's the concern. That's the crease in history that we're in
    right now, where we're going to have to make some decisions.
        I'll give you an anecdote on the C-5. The last presidential
    deployment support missions into Central and South America,
    where we took the majority of the strategic airlifters to
    support the presidential mission, the Nation of Argentina
    refused landing rights and overflight of the C-5s. When we
    asked to be able to bring the C-5s in to support the
    presidential mission, back through the assistant attache to our
    Tanker Airlift Control Center at Scott, we were told that the
    Government of Argentina refuses landing rights and overflight
    for six C-5s, because the last time we took them down there,
    they broke, and it took too long to get them off their
    airfield.
        So, there's a variety of concerns in being able to match
    the requirement that see ahead of us, with Army and Marine
    growth, with the global response, and being able to do this
    with strategic airlifters. So, sir, that's a long answer to a
    short question.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Just a quick follow-on of the 17 versus the 5. The 17 has
    operational advantages, particularly shorter takeoff and
    landing. Reverse thrust enables it to support land forces in a
    wide variety of airfields throughout the world. I would hope
    that you'd rely on that also, because it was at great expense
    that we built that technical capability into that aircraft.
        Gentlemen, I'll ask both of you to give us just a short
    report. Again, I focused, in my opening remarks, on the role
    that the Department of the Air Force is providing our operating
    forces the world over. We've heard reports, candid reports from
    the Chief of Staff of the Army and others, that the Army is,
    whatever word you wish, stretched, pushed. The Guard and
    Reserve are suffering. But they're still standing strong and
    carrying out the missions. Do you have any general quick
    description of your department and its impact. I don't say this
    by word of criticism to this surge concept, but, nevertheless,
    it has put, very swiftly, a larger tasking on all of our
    Services to meet the requirements for moving over this
    additional 21,500, now up to 30,000 individuals, and putting
    them in place. What is the impact on your department today?
        Secretary Wynne. Sir, it's primarily in our security
    forces, and then we actually have teams of battlefield airmen
    that deploy with each of the BCTs and the Marine regiments,
    much like our space weapons major here, so there is a direct
    impact. Then, of course, there's an indirect impact, because we
    are now providing what I will tell you is almost valet service,
    in that we can precision-drop supplies to our soldiers and to
    our marines. We can also precision-drop weapons. Our marines
    are fully equipped with the ROVER technology, so we have
    essentially stretched those forces to meet this surge.
        I would tell you that, for the Air Force, somebody
    brilliant in the 1990s who decided that we were in a long war,
    because we were in a long war at that time. We had been in
    southwest Asia for 6 years when we went to the rotating force
    concept called the air and space expeditionary force (AEF). We
    are benefiting from their brilliance, and our airmen are
    satisfied. We do not have a problem in recruiting, retention of
    our Guard, Reserve, or our Active Forces. In fact, it pains me
    every time that I have to reduce our force structure by
    restructuring our forces, because all of us are volunteers who
    add value to the Air Force.
        Senator Warner. Indeed, the story of the Air Guard is
    extraordinary, and that preceded these particular operations in
    Afghanistan and Iraq. We have to be mindful that you flew those
    missions over Iraq for many years, as the consequence of the
    first Iraq conflict, to comport with the understandings that we
    imposed on Iraq at that time.
        I then would turn to another issue. We have airlift
    capacity like no other nation. Unfortunately, other nations are
    not stepping up to augment their own force structures. Are we
    not carrying the bulk of the airlift requirements, for example,
    for Afghanistan, even though, there, NATO is taking over the
    major burden?
        General Moseley. Sir, we are. Remember, last year at this
    time, when we were working through the C-17 issues, we also
    were able to partner in the international market. I believe
    there are 12 or 18 C-17s that'll be built for Australia, the
    U.K., Sweden, NATO, and Canada. But those are yet to be
    delivered. The British Royal Air Force flies four or five C-
    17s, and they've been very helpful in this. But the
    preponderance of our NATO and coalition partners operate C-130
    equivalents, or they contract or lease out big Russian Anatovs
    to be able to fly that lift.
        Senator Warner. We must be mindful that all of our
    rotations of personnel to and from these fronts are done by air
    now. No longer do we have the great troop ships that load up
    with a thousand or two and cross the ocean; it's all done by
    air, am I not correct?
        General Moseley. Correct, sir. That is the partnership also
    with the Civil Reserve Air Fleet and with contract carriers for
    our people.
        Senator Warner. Were you impressed with that Airbus
    yesterday? Do you have it in the back of your head that you'd
    like to have one or two in your inventory?
        General Moseley. Sir, I'm still a little fuzzy on how you
    get 600 people through Customs and get their bags, and have 600
    people so they can go to the restroom before they get on the
    airplane.
        Senator Warner. Wait a minute, wait a minute, back up. I'm
    saying, would that be a troop carrier of the future?
        General Moseley. Sir, let's see if it works. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. Good answer. But it was a spectacular, in
    overall aviation, achievement. None of us who admire aviation
    cannot be impressed by that.
        Let's get to the tough question, General. I don't know how
    long ago it was that you were sworn in as Chief of Staff of the
    Air Force, but I do remember visiting with you and having a
    small hand in getting your nomination to the floor very
    expeditiously. But, in the course of that hearing, we have a
    standard question we ask all of our uniform officers. There
    could come a time, and when you're before Congress, that you
    have to provide your personal views on tough issues. This issue
    of the single-engine or dual-engine requirement for the JSF is
    one of those tough issues. Drawing on your enormous experience
    with aviation--re-engining, new aircraft, all of that--don't
    you think it is a wiser, more prudent course for the United
    States to keep in competition two suppliers, given that it is
    proven to reduce cost, proven that you increase quality by
    virtue of that competition? Second, this JSF is a multi-mission
    aircraft. One model, of course, is the short take-off, vertical
    landing (STOVL). That STOVL could well require additional
    power, particularly on the takeoff mode. What is your personal
    opinion as to whether or not our Nation, which is taking the
    lead in developing and producing the JSF--with now, what, eight
    or nine other nations?
        General Moseley. Eight, and growing, sir.
        Senator Warner. Eight, and growing. Do not we have an
    obligation, not only to ourselves, but those partners, to
    provide the two-engine option?
        General Moseley. Sir, we've wrestled with this long and
    hard inside our world. The real answer is, it's $2 billion that
    we don't have. But if you're asking me my personal opinion, I
    believe there is always value in competition, and there's
    always value in having additional sources.
        But, sir, I go back to the notion of, I'm a satisfied
    customer. I've spent most of my life sitting on a Pratt &
    Whitney motor. I have no issues with that engine. We don't have
    $2 billion to do this.
        Senator Warner. I'm not suggesting anything against Pratt &
    Whitney. They've had a long and distinguished career of
    providing this country with engines. But I'm just concerned
    about the STOVL requirements of the aircraft. Does that not
    require additional thrust?
        General Moseley. Sir, we don't know yet, because we haven't
    got one built, and we haven't received one into the
    developmental testing (DT) and operational test and evaluation
    (OT&E) phases. If you're asking a fighter pilot, more thrust is
    always better because you don't know what you're going to be
    hanging on the airplane, and you don't know what the drag will
    be, and you don't know how big the weapons will be in the
    future. So, there's always a notion of increased thrust. Sir,
    at the end of the day, this is about money. It's $2 billion
    that we don't have.
        Senator Warner. Then we buy fewer aircraft or take some
    reduction to achieve the safety that is accompanied with that
    additional thrust.
        My time is up, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you Senator Warner.
        Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to both
    of you for being here.
        I just want to pick this up. I hadn't intended to do it
    first, but since we're on the flow about the alternative
    engine, my friend, Senator Warner, and I wrestled around a
    little bit with this last year too. Obviously, in the best of
    all worlds, with no limitations on funding, I'm sure everybody
    would like two engines instead of one. But I do think General
    Moseley made the point, which is the $2 billion. I'd ask you,
    General, or Mr. Secretary, if Congress ordered you to go ahead
    with an alternative engine for the JSF, where would the $2
    billion come from?
        Secretary Wynne. Sir, we are so delicately balanced within
    our budget, and I hesitate to say that, because our comptroller
    probably has her ear to the ground here on anything that I
    would give up, and I just don't have something I would give up.
    We are at a limit when we go down 40,000 people. I am not
    intending to take any further people out. So, I think General
    Moseley has this right. This is about money, in the worst way.
    In every case, we are buying weapons systems at too low a rate.
    Even the JSF, we're not going to get it at the rate we got the
    F-16. We had to take a trim-down of the F-22, from 28 to 20 per
    year.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        Secretary Wynne. We're not buying the tankers at the rate
    we bought in the past so, everything, sir, just as you've
    described, is about money.
        Senator Lieberman. At a minimum, I assume, if Congress
    pushed you to go ahead with the two engines for the JSF, it
    would delay the JSF, or narrow the program.
        Secretary Wynne. If the money came out of the program, that
    is correct, sir. If it were ``manna from heaven,'' I would say
    there is probably not the impact on the program, because there
    is a parallel path for the engine that the program manager
    already has.
        Senator Lieberman. Right. If there was not a monetary
    concern. But, obviously, if you had to take it out of the JSF
    budget, I presume it would delay the JSF?
        Secretary Wynne. It would hurt.
        Senator Lieberman. I remember a hearing we had last year
    with the Vice Chiefs of the four Services, and they were very
    strong on that fact. I remember, particularly, the Marines were
    concerned about it. I'm sure we'll come back to that. I
    appreciate your answers.
        I want to ask you a broad question at the beginning. In
    some sense, your opening statement answered it. Not to ask you
    to deliver another opening statement, but, in brief, we went
    through a period of time where, and I know this was never real,
    but there were a certain number of people who felt there was
    not a conflict that we couldn't win from the air. Now we're at
    a point in the war on terrorism where I think some people are
    beginning to think that we only win these conflicts on the
    ground, and that the role of the Air Force is less. Just speak
    for a moment or two, if you would, about the particular value-
    added responsibility of the Air Force, in the context of the
    war on terrorism and conflicts like Iraq, Afghanistan, and
    other special operations kinds of missions that we'll have to
    perform for years to come with this war against radical Islam.
        Secretary Wynne. Sir, we believe we set the strategic and
    then the tactical conditions for victory. In that regard, our
    strategic imperative, when 2003 opened up, was, we had only
    stealth fighters go to downtown Baghdad to remove the air
    defense system. As a result of doing that, we swept the skies
    of enemy aircraft, and we opened up all of the altitudes for
    slow-moving UAVs or to fast-moving fighters or nonstealthy
    bombers to loiter overhead and essentially dispense weaponry.
    We feel like this ability to maintain total air dominance is
    key to our police action, which is what's going on now, on the
    ground, and our ability to restore stable governance in any
    part of the world where we so choose.
        I will tell you that when the mullahs in Tehran wake up in
    the morning, they really do not worry about an army coming over
    the Straits of Hormuz, they worry about the United States Air
    Force crushing their national interest. Same way when some of
    our patrons in North Korea wake up, and they look south, they
    are not looking south for an army invasion coming over the
    mountains, they're much more concerned about the United States
    Air Force essentially sweeping the skies and creating,
    strategically, a successful victory.
        Senator Lieberman. I presume you would say the same to
    those who say that we're about to invest much too much money in
    the F-22 and the JSF. The critics would say that these are
    geared for the Cold War that is no more. What's your quick
    defense to that, not just the war on terrorism, but, obviously,
    the possibility of a rising peer superpower that we would be in
    conflict with?
        Secretary Wynne. What I was shocked at, but not surprised,
    was the Chinese ASAT test. It follows the Chinese dramatic
    investment in naval and air superiority. The Chinese now have
    more Sukhois on the ground than we have in our F-15E program. I
    would tell you that the Chinese intend, very much, to be a peer
    competitor, and I am hoping, as all airmen do, that we can
    manage their entry well into the world using economic
    sweeteners, rather than military brickbats.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        General Moseley. Senator, there's another part of this.
    While we focus on a tactical fight, we can't forget the
    strategic-level challenges that we face. An air force and a
    navy are the strategic shield and long sword for this country.
    Mike Mullen, if he were sitting here, he and I could almost
    finish each other's sentences about aircraft production, the
    aerospace industry, the shipbuilding industry, and the
    requirement to get fifth-generation systems and the new
    technology out in ships. The ability for the Air Force to
    operate on a global scale is one of the asymmetric advantages
    that this country has, and, in my view, must maintain; that is
    a bomber, that is a tanker, that is strategic airlift, that is
    our satellite systems, that's our unmanned vehicles, and that's
    these new fifth-generation fighters that will dominate the air
    and space mediums. Because, again, we are very proud of the
    fact that the last soldier killed from the air was in April
    1953.
        Senator Lieberman. Right
        General Moseley. That is a testament to the partnership of
    the United States Army and the United States Air Force. It also
    says something about what we do in support of ground activities
    and also what we do in direct attack, whether it's strategic
    attack or long-range aviation or interdiction. So, sir, we're
    beginning to worry a bit about the recapitalization and the
    modernization path and how to operate these old systems against
    a growing threat.
        Senator Lieberman. Right. I appreciate your answers. My
    time is up. I would just add this, and not ask a question, that
    all the Services are under pressure here. I know the bottom
    line on the military budget is large, but we're still spending
    a percentage of our gross domestic product (GDP) below the
    historic average, let alone the average in a time of war. The
    fact that your Service plans to thin its ranks by about 57,000
    people by fiscal year 2011, which, factoring in Guard and
    Reserve personnel, is quite remarkable. You're doing it not
    because you want to, I take it, but because it's necessary to
    stay modern and be ready for the next generation of challenges,
    in terms of the equipment we're acquiring for you.
        General Moseley. Right.
        Senator Lieberman. So, anyway, I thank you. Well done. I
    look forward to working with you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I was glad that Senator Lieberman ended on that note. All
    Services are on a starvation diet now. It goes back to the
    question of where we are in adequately funding our Services and
    looking into the future. You can't make these changes and get
    results in a year from now, it has to be planned out. I always
    go back to when I was on the House Armed Services Committee and
    someone testified in 1994, that in 10 more years we wouldn't
    need ground troops. The generals are all smart, General
    Moseley, but they're going to be wrong, when you say, ``what
    are our needs going to be in the future.'' That's the reason
    that I think that having gone through the entire 20th century,
    for 100 years, spending 5.7 percent of our GDP on military, and
    then dropping down as low as 2.7 percent at the end of the
    1990s, was something that was a mistake. It would be my goal to
    get back up there where you don't have to try to make these
    decisions and see where things are broken. I disagree with
    Senator Warner on the alternative engine, for the same reason
    that Senator Lieberman talked about, but it would be great to
    have that luxury. It would be. If we could afford it, that
    would be a great luxury to have.
        We went through this with the C-17 virtually every year
    since the late 1980s, as to problems we're going to have and
    how many we're going to have. I was honored, in 1995, to
    actually fly in the right seat to Altus, Oklahoma, on the first
    C-17 that came to Oklahoma. It's an incredible vehicle, and
    everything else is old. In the last 17 years, the things that
    we've gone through with our lift vehicles: Operations Desert
    Storm, Northern Watch, Southern Watch, Desert Fox, and Iraqi
    Freedom. So, here we are now faced with something that I
    consider to be a crisis, and that is, if we stop the C-17 at
    this point, what happens to the line?
        Now, I'd like to ask you, to the best of your knowledge,
    because I've heard a variety of figures, how many C-17s would
    it take to keep the line open?
        Secretary Wynne. Sir, I have been pushing Boeing for that
    for a long time, to try to make sure that they can tell us what
    they can do. I can only remember, back when we were talking
    about terminating the F-16 line, and I think the contractor, at
    that point, came back in with less than one a month, if he
    could continue to go out and get foreign military sales. I have
    taken that as a token number, as a target. But Boeing has not
    been back to me with what they could do. I think they could do
    with less than one a month, and I've told them, if they could
    come back, we would try to figure out how to fit them in. The
    problem is, on all of our programs, we're down to the minimum
    sustaining rate on so many of our programs, and one hiccup of
    cost and we're done. Most of the arguments we're all having on
    whether it's aircraft retirements or on some of the reliability
    aspects have to do with, we don't have the money to really
    overlap.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes, I understand that. General Moseley, I
    appreciate your telling the story, the Argentina story, because
    that means I don't have to do it on my time. [Laughter.]
        But it is pretty incredible to think that around the world
    there are countries that don't let us overfly and land because
    our equipment's so old and worn out. I know it's true. On 1 of
    our 12 trips to the Central Command area of responsibility--I
    think it was probably about a year ago--on a C-130, going into
    Baghdad--we didn't lose one engine, we lost two engines.
        Senator Warner. How old was it, though?
        Senator Inhofe. It was an E model.
        General Moseley. Sir, you have four engines on the
    airplane, so you had two left. [Laughter.]
        Senator Inhofe. I understand that. [Laughter.]
        But I also have been an aviator for 50 years now, and I
    don't want to lose two engines on a four-engine airplane.
        General Moseley. No, it's not good.
        Senator Inhofe. We do have a serious problem.
        I'd like to pursue this thing, just briefly, on the fifth-
    generation fighters. We've talked about General John Jumper
    admitting that the Sukhoi SU series that you've referred to is
    better, in many ways, than our best strike fighters. Of course,
    I think it's important that they get in there. I notice,
    though, that the fifth-generation fighters were not in the
    supplemental. I understand that maybe two of them were in but
    they came out. Do you want to comment on that?
        Secretary Wynne. Yes, sir. I will tell you that our
    fighters have been the source for funding for other programs
    for several years, ever since PBD-753 essentially reduced the
    F-22 to its lowest level of affordability and funded some other
    programs that were bills facing the Department. Here, I think,
    in the supplemental, we had an increase in ground forces above
    the surge that we had expected, and the Department rallied
    around and essentially stripped out all the fixed-wing
    aviation, to include the fifth-generation fighters.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes.
        Secretary Wynne. Our argument, simply, was that we had
    taken combat losses. We've lost over 130 aircraft, 50 fighters,
    since 2001, although not all in combat.
        [Mr. Wynne provided the following clarifying information.]

        We've lost over 130 aircraft, 50 fighters, since 2001, although not
    all in combat.

        Secretary Wynne. We knew we did not want a fourth-
    generation replacement, and so, we did try to get a fifth-
    generation. I understand it caused controversy, and the
    Department reacted by removing it.
        Senator Inhofe. It's just one of these things where
    everything is bleeding, at this time. We don't have the
    resources for it.
        My time has expired, but I would like to have you mention
    one thing about the UAV taking the lead between the Army and
    the Air Force. It's a discussion that I'd like to at least get
    in the record, just very briefly, if that would be all right,
    Mr. Chairman.
        General Moseley. Senator, I would like to, if you would
    allow me, for the record, to provide the letter that I sent to
    the Deputy Secretary that outlined our position.
        [The information referred to follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        General Moseley. I believe, if we're not careful, we are
    headed for a crisis, in acquisition, in deliveries and
    procurement, in command-and-control, the ability to field the
    system to support all requirements. We spend most of our day
    looking to support joint requirements for the joint warfighting
    commanders, but also our Army, Marine, and Navy brothers and
    sisters. We have 12 squadrons of these, and we're trying to
    flesh out more. I believe there is a cleaner, quicker, more
    effective and efficient path to being able to do this, and
    that's exactly what we've proposed.
        This is not a land-grab. General Schoomaker and I are the
    dearest of friends but I believe there is a better way to field
    these systems faster and streamline the command-and-control
    that exists, and be able to fight this long war on terrorism,
    and anything else ahead of us, better. So, if you would allow
    me, I'd like to put that in the record.
        Senator Inhofe. That would be fine.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Senator McCaskill.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me first say to the incredible Americans that were
    introduced at the beginning of this hearing, I'm in awe of who
    you are and what you do. Congratulations to you and your
    families. Congratulations to the Air Force for producing these
    kind of fine heroes in our systems.
        I have about an hour's worth of questions on acquisition,
    but I'm going to try to limit it to 6 minutes. Have both of you
    read the Government Accountability Office (GAO) report that was
    issued last week on defense acquisitions concerning airlift and
    tanker programs?
        Secretary Wynne. No, ma'am, I have not read it in the
    detail that you expected.
        Senator McCaskill. That's probably a huge part of my
    concern. This report is incredibly important as we try to do
    what you're trying to accomplish, and that is using commercial
    technology to update old aircraft. If you read this report in
    detail, you have to really slow down. For example, the Mobility
    Capability Study (MCS) is clearly flawed, and it's the study on
    which you base your number one funding priority, which is the
    KC-X tanker. What this shows, if you look at the four major
    airlift programs is that none of them are on time, none of them
    are on budget. For example, the C-130 Avionics Modernization
    Program (AMP) that you have talked about in fiscal year 2008 is
    up $700 million, and the number of units that we can acquire
    has gone from 434 to 268. The development cost change since the
    beginning of this program is up 128 percent. The problems are
    pretty clear. How much money will it take to put commercial
    technology into a military system? Do we have a stable design
    before we get to the system demonstration stage? Most
    importantly, failure to show that it will work before we begin
    production investment.
        I guess my question to you, Mr. Secretary, is, who is
    accountable for moving forward on these incredible investments
    of billions of dollars without having this basic information at
    the critical junctures?
        Secretary Wynne. Many of the programs that you have talked
    about were actually started some time back. But I will tell you
    that myself, the service acquisition officer, the operation
    requirements people that lay in the requirements behave in a
    manner laid out in the DOD Directive 5000 to try to make sure
    that we do this correctly. We use the requirements that we get
    out of the requirements generation to lay in the key
    performance parameters (KPPs). Many times, our friends and
    associates in the GAO don't agree with our assessment, but we
    feel like we are making the best judgments we can along the
    way.
        Senator McCaskill. I have to tell you, it seems to me, if
    the best judgments were being made, we wouldn't consistently,
    in every single instance, have major, major cost shift, major
    reductions in units purchased, and delay. You're looking at a
    year and a half to 2 years delay before we can actually even
    utilize this technology that we are investing billions of
    dollars of taxpayer money in. I get the stresses that you're
    facing. What I don't get is a continuation of acquisition
    mistakes that don't appear to be taken seriously.
        Secretary Wynne. Ma'am, we take every acquisition
    governance issue very, very seriously, and we have established
    a transparency with Congress, and, frankly, with the GAO where
    we're reaching out to the GAO to make sure that we're certain,
    for example, on the combat search-and-rescue helicopter, of
    what we should be out to resolicit from our vendors. So we take
    it very seriously and we are working it very hard. But the
    citations that you cite are real, and we are working with the
    GAO on each of those instances to demonstrate to them that we
    think we're on a little bit better path than they have
    asserted.
        Senator McCaskill. Have you circled back to look at the MCS
    and look at that study and the conclusions that you've drawn
    from that, and taken into account the flaws that I think are
    very ably pointed out by this GAO report?
        Secretary Wynne. The MCS study is actually performed by the
    Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD). We have participated in
    it. We have had one every year for the last 15 years. We know,
    for example, that this one does not take into account the
    increase in ground forces that we see. We also know that it
    might not take into account the full requirement that the Army
    has when they move out on the Future Combat System. So, we have
    our concerns. However, I will tell you that the analysts who
    performed that model have claimed that they have asked folks
    about it and basically have told the Air Force that we should
    not submit even the two additional C-17s, because the MCS has
    been satisfied.
        Senator McCaskill. I would like to see a requirement that,
    when one of these reports comes out, that it be consumed
    immediately by a number of different people within the
    military, because you all have been on the high-risk list for
    longer than anyone else, and as we face budget constraints all
    of us want you to have what you need to do the incredible work
    you do, but it's awfully hard to ignore the detailed analysis
    that's factually based that is represented in some of these
    reports without shaking your head and wondering who is held
    accountable, who, within the military, steps up and says, ``We
    made a mistake, and this is costing too much because we made a
    mistake. We're not getting what we thought we were going to
    get.'' Because if somebody doesn't take responsibility, I don't
    know how we're ever going to get it changed.
        Secretary Wynne. We have, in fact, canceled some programs
    that have approached us when they have ballooned out of sight.
    The ones we cannot cancel are the ones that are actually
    satisfying a true operational need. I will tell you that it is
    a partnership between industry, the requirements people--
    namely, the user--and the funding agency. For example, in the
    area of the F-22, when that was reduced from a rate of 28 to 20
    per year, we were actually asked to go get a multiyear contract
    to try to offset that. Frankly, that's very difficult. In the
    JSF, which we are forecasting to be a really good performing
    program, right now we're questioning what requirements we
    should put on that program. If we do it the way Senator
    Lieberman or even the way some of our fellows in OSD that are--
    wanted to suppress the number, even the GAO says, ``Let's not
    do it at the rate that they originally forecast''--if we do
    that, the price of that program will increase.
        Senator McCaskill. I would really appreciate, after you
    have a chance to read this study, since you haven't had the
    chance to do it yet, if you would respond to my office or to
    the committee with what your answers would be to the very
    important points that are made in regard to the airlift and
    tanker acquisition program.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The study you refer to is Government Accountability Office (GAO)
    report GAO-07-566T, ``Issues Concerning Airlift and Tanker Programs,''
    published on 7 Mar 07. GAO submitted the report as testimony to the 7
    Mar 07 House Air and Land Forces Subcommittee hearing on ``Air Force
    and Army airlift and aerial refueling fixed-wing aircraft programs.''
    Responses to the report's findings on KC-X, C-130 AMP, C-130J, and C-5
    AMP/RERP programs follow.
    C-130J:
        The C-130J experienced some difficulties during the initial
    fielding in 1999. However, these issues have been aggressively worked
    and resolved by the Air Force and the contractor. The C-130J is now a
    vital member of the intra-theater fleet. To date, the C-130J has been
    deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and has completed over
    5,500 sorties (over 11,000 flight hours) since 2004, with a mission
    capable rate of 85 percent.
        The GAO report refers to three deficiencies that result in the
    aircraft being rated as partially mission capable: inability to meet
    airdrop operations requirements, ineffectiveness in non-permissive
    threat environments, and maintainability issues. As stated in the
    report, ``program officials plan to address the deficiencies as part of
    a C-130J modernization effort.''
        First, the aircraft is capable of performing all airdrop and
    airland operations except Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC)
    Formation Airdrop. Although a limitation is placed on C-130J formation
    IMC airdrops, no tasking for the C-130 has required this capability
    since the global war on terrorism began. The C-130J is cleared for and
    has accomplished formation airdrops in Visual Meteorological Conditions
    (VMC). The Air Force plans to address the IMC Station-Keeping Equipment
    (SKE) limitations when Block 6.0 is released in spring 2008.
        Second, with respect to the ``operation in a non-permissive threat
    environment'' limitation, the C-130E/H/J is not designed to operate in
    high threat environments and avoids operations at altitudes within the
    range of hostile surface-to-air missiles. Therefore, the limitations
    cited by DOT&E do not impact the ability of the C-130J to conduct its
    mission. Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Command (AFOTEC)
    completed C-130J Phase 2 operational testing in December 2005 and
    concluded in their final report dated 28 Apr 06 that the C-130J was
    effective in a low- to medium-threat environment, and stated the C-130J
    is effective for single-ship all-weather airdrop and visual formation
    airdrop capabilities which meet the warfighter's approved requirements.
        Third, the ``maintainability issues'' resulted from a high false
    alarm rate with the C-130J Built in Test (BIT) experienced by AFOTEC
    during OT&E. Even with this shortfall, AFOTEC determined that the C-
    130J was suitable for both airland and airdrop, with the aircraft's
    operational reliability exceeding capability requirements. During OT&E,
    the C 130J mission capable rate was 96 percent. The Air Force plans to
    address these shortfalls as part of the ongoing C-130J Block upgrade
    program.
    C-130 AMP:
        C-130 AMP currently has two modified aircraft in flight test with
    38 test flights totaling 103 flight hours accomplished with no critical
    deficiencies noted. C-130 AMP recently declared a critical Nunn-McCurdy
    breach and is undergoing an Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
    certification process in which the requirements, unit costs, and
    management processes are being revalidated. The Air Force is
    cooperating fully with OSD to restructure the program.
    C-5 AMP and C-5 RERP:
        The C-5 AMP program is currently in production and continues to
    progress. Twenty-four C-5 aircraft have been AMP-modified and the
    program successfully reached Initial Operational Capability (IOC) on 1
    Feb 07. AMP-modified C-5s have flown more than 7,300 hours transporting
    more than 7,000 passengers and 15,000 short tons worldwide. The Air
    Force is correcting some AMP software deficiencies through a Block
    Cycle Change process, with the first to be installed on C-5 aircraft
    next year. As stated in the GAO report, C-5 RERP is facing cost growth
    challenges due to engines, pylons, and touch labor. A detailed Air
    Force cost estimating effort is underway to determine the extent of the
    cost growth and to develop a service cost position.
    KC-X:
        The 7 Mar 07 GAO report you mention (GAO-07-566T) cites information
    from the final copy of a different KC-X GAO report (GAO-07-367R) issued
    on 6 Mar 07. DOD provided comments on the draft copy of GAO-07-367R,
    but has not yet responded to the new information included in the final
    drafts of both GAO-07-367R and GAO 07 566T. DOD is currently
    coordinating a response to the information included in both final
    reports, and we can respond to your question after DOD completes its
    response.

        Secretary Wynne. Thank you.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
        Senator Dole.
        Senator Dole. General Moseley, in a recent newspaper
    article, you were quoted as saying the following, ``In working
    the budget problem, I believe I'm seeing challenges that lead
    us to the notion that maybe it's time to have this discussion
    about a higher percentage of GDP. It's going to be very, very
    hard to get where we're going, as defined in the Pentagon's
    strategic plans, and to do this business on a global scale,
    with the resources that we have.''
        Now, given that statement, would you share with the
    committee your professional views on what you believe the
    budgetary requirements of the Air Force will be over the next
    several years and beyond, given our role in the world and the
    demands that are placed on the Air Force? Would you further
    describe for the committee the strategic implications for the
    Air Force and for the United States if, indeed, those adequate
    resources are not forthcoming on a sustained basis?
        General Moseley. Senator, thank you.
        Ma'am, I do believe it's perhaps time to have a discussion
    about percent of GDP for DOD outlays. As the Secretary has
    said, and I've said, for this budget, we've spent 2.2 million
    man-hours developing this POM, which became our piece of the
    President's budget. We've given up 40,000 people, which really
    touches about 57,000, when you add in the full-time
    equivalents, which is approaching the size of the French Air
    Force. We've given that up to self-finance and to be able to
    meet our procurement accounts and our priorities and stay
    within our fiscal guidance.
        Ma'am, we've run some of the numbers as it looks out over
    the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) to be able to deal with
    fuel cost that is an unknown, inflation rates, exchange rates,
    and to be able to look at economic order quantities of
    deliveries of the procurement priorities. It looks like, on an
    average, it's about $20 billion more a year just for the Air
    Force. To be able to meet our global requirements and our
    global challenges in a very uncertain world out there takes you
    to the tanker, takes you to strategic airlift, takes you to the
    new bomber, and for sure takes you to the air dominance
    capabilities in the fifth-generation set of systems of the F-22
    and the F-35. So, ma'am, I believe it is time to look at that,
    and I believe, if we're not careful, we're going to continue to
    squeeze the budget with some of the other costs that are rising
    on our human capital. Our people are so precious, but they are
    costing more and more and more a year, which then squeezes the
    investment account. As we try to hold our quality of life and
    our infrastructure constant on our bases, and we try to hold
    our operation and maintenance accounts, our flying hours, and
    our depots constant, there's no other place to go but the
    investment account. That's been our challenge for the last few
    years.
        Senator Dole. Let me ask you, and Secretary Wynne, also,
    given these shortfalls, should we now be giving serious
    consideration to the 4 percent rule that will allocate no less
    than 4 percent of the GDP to the annual defense budget?
        General Moseley. Ma'am, I believe 4 percent would be a good
    starting point. I'm a little outside of my lane, but, since you
    asked me, I believe less than 4 percent is still going to
    continue to crunch the budgets while we're fighting a global
    war, while we're taking care of our land component, while we're
    looking to grow the Chief of Naval Operations' Navy back to a
    strategic setting, and while we attempt to modernize and make
    this Air Force what this country demands of it. So, I believe 4
    percent is a good starting point.
        Senator Dole. Secretary Wynne?
        Secretary Wynne. I'm pleased to see you enter the argument.
    I'm sure that the President, the Office of Management and
    Budget, as well as the Secretary of Defense, have this same
    argument amongst themselves. We spent 2.2 million hours trying
    to figure out how to balance this budget within ourselves.
    We're the only Service that balanced its budget. So, I think
    the argument is valid. I would say it should be resolved above
    my pay grade.
        Senator Dole. Secretary Wynne, let me ask you, how much has
    the aerospace industry consolidated, in terms of the number of
    prime aerospace contractors, over the past 15 years? Are you
    concerned that the aerospace industrial base has contracted too
    far? Are you seeing signs that portions of the second- and
    third-tier vendor base are thinning beyond what you would
    consider to be prudent?
        Secretary Wynne. I would tell you that they have
    consolidated dramatically. Starting in the early 1990s, they
    were the product of the peace dividend. I personally managed
    part of an operation in San Diego that had, at its peak, 35,000
    employees. It went to 200. So, I would say that that alone
    tells you that some places, geographically, paid a peace
    dividend well above others.
        The consolidation, as you pointed out, is not really there
    at the first tier, although, as Senator McCaskill pointed out,
    in the tanker world, we only had two, which I would call, free-
    world competitors, one in France and one in the United States.
    The third maker of tankers is the Russians. We did not invite
    them to participate in the competition. I would tell you also
    that many foreign nations, India, for example, does invite all
    of them to participate, so they get the benefit of worldwide
    competition.
        It is our fourth tier, the forging-makers, who make landing
    gear forgings, that have an extraordinarily long lead on their
    products, that cause us, for example, to reach 2 years in
    advance to try to get into line on forgings for landing gears
    for our fighter aircraft and our bombers. It's these precision
    manufacturers that I am concerned about, because I think we're
    down to just one, or one and a half, and we do not have the
    money to restart the line. Our fear is, when the C-17 line goes
    cold, we won't have the money to restart that line. So, I'd
    love for somebody--and I don't know who--to have them
    available, but I can't expect it. It's one of the reasons we
    have to look hard at making sure we get full lifespan out of
    the C-5, because if we have to restart a strategic lifter in
    the 2025 timeframe, I'd love to have more than one supplier
    available. I don't think I will.
        Senator Dole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Dole.
        Senator Pryor.
        Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me start with you, if I can, General. We have Little
    Rock Air Force Base in Arkansas, and they do C-130s. I was
    there just last month, and they came through base realignment
    and closure and all, fine. The C-130 has really developed into
    the workhorse of the global war on terror, with this lift
    capability. But the Little Rock Air Force Base also has a
    challenge, and that is, its runway needs to be resurfaced. I
    don't know if you knew that. They're working on a plan,
    apparently, with their higher-ups, whoever that is. I'd like to
    bring that to your attention for you to know about and maybe
    help me work with everybody to try to get them that new surface
    they need. Were you aware that they had that problem?
        General Moseley. No, sir.
        Senator Pryor. I think it's, in some ways, just kind of a
    typical maintenance problem, but, given the role the C-130 is
    playing now, and the role Little Rock Air Force Base plays in
    that, I just wanted to bring it to your attention.
        Speaking of the C-130s, they have a lot of wear and tear on
    them right now. They're being deployed left and right in
    Afghanistan and Iraq. The E models are old, and some of them
    are not able to fly. Do we have enough J models coming on line?
        General Moseley. Sir, I'll say no. Then let me tell you
    another vignette about the E models. Our special operations
    birds, which are E-model derivatives, that we have in theater
    right now, we operate them after we have the center-wing boxes
    fixed on them. The outer wings are still not right. So, after
    every 90 hours, we have to take the two outboard engines out of
    the airplane, take the skins off the outer wings, and conduct
    an inspection that takes 36 hours per airplane. We have to do
    this every 90 hours, whether it's in theater or in Little Rock
    or whether it's at Yokota or Ramstein. So, sir, this is
    beginning to be a very troublesome safety challenge, as well as
    an operational challenge, to have to break an airplane down
    every 90 hours in combat to inspect the outer wing boxes.
        Senator Pryor. I believe Secretary Wynne, a few moments
    ago, said that we're at a minimum sustaining rate on a lot of
    our programs. Is that also true for the C-130?
        General Moseley. Sir, it is. We have about to be completed
    an analysis of alternatives from Air Combat Command, Air
    Mobility Command, and Air Force Special Ops Command on looking
    at a follow-on to the tanker and a follow-on to the MC-130.
    I've not seen the results of that yet, but I suspect it'll take
    us to something that looks like a modernized C-130.
        Senator Pryor. Do you know when the results of that will be
    made public?
        General Moseley. Sir, I don't.
        Senator Pryor. Okay. Well, I'd love for you to share that
    with me when you get it in.
        General Moseley. Yes, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Pryor. That also brings us to the question of the
    joint cargo aircraft, which I understand is a smaller aircraft,
    probably two engines and all that. But where are we on that?
    Where are we on the joint cargo aircraft?
        General Moseley. Sir, we have a joint program office which
    is an Army-led office, and they are looking at that. We have a
    memorandum with them, on looking at building a smaller cargo
    aircraft of some form. We are working our way through that. The
    Army has not got to a place where they're close to source
    selection, that I know of. We are also finishing a much more
    detailed requirements document on the Air Force side. Senator,
    this is important to us, not only for our Air National Guard
    and our Reserve squadrons, and some Active and Air Force
    Special Operations squadrons, but also in the international
    market. I've sent a letter--if you would allow me to put it in
    the record--to global air chiefs, that asks them to partner
    with us on the requirements for a joint cargo aircraft, so we
    understand emerging countries' capabilities for this sort of
    thing. I've also recently sent a letter to the Governors, and
    the territorial Governors, asking them to tell me what they
    think their State missions are for the joint cargo aircraft.
    So, sir, we're vested in this, because I believe it's a good
    idea, and I believe it's the right thing to do. We just don't
    have the programmatic detail yet, nor are we close to source
    selection.
        Senator Pryor. Mr. Chairman, I would like for that letter
    to be made part of the record.
        Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

            General Moseley. Yes, sir.
        Senator Pryor. So, tell me the general timeframe. What's
    your goal to try to get this done and when would you like these
    to come into the fleet?
        General Moseley. Sir, I believe we, with the Army, will be
    looking at source selection sometime in the May or June
    timeframe. From there, it will depend on which airplane is
    selected and what we have to do to the airplane to make it
    mission-capable for our Guard, Reserve, Active, Special
    Operations, et cetera. So, sir, I think we'll know more about
    that in the May or June timeframe.
        Senator Pryor. Okay.
        Also, let me ask, in Iraq specifically, there have been a
    number of press reports about shoulder-fired missiles going
    after our helicopters. Are you seeing that same trend with the
    cargo aircraft and with other aircraft in Iraq?
        General Moseley. Sir, we've been shot at with the cargo-
    carrying airplanes since the very beginning, because you have
    to eventually get off the ground and come back to the ground,
    and it's not lost on people that the airfield is where you do
    that. So, there are lots of people that wait around an airfield
    to fire at the C-130s, the C-5s, and the C-17s, which, of
    course, we've had them hit.
        We don't have the same challenge that the Army has with its
    helicopters at low altitude in a variety of other routes. We
    can stay out of most of that, which is an inherent benefit of
    fixed-wing aircraft, that you can get out of a lot of that
    stuff, other than landing and taking off.
        Senator Pryor. Okay. I want to ask, if I can, about the
    Iraqi air force. I know that in today's world, when you look at
    what's going on, say, for example, within Iraq, you're looking
    at close air support. One of your primary missions there is to
    try to have that close air support. How is the Iraqi air force
    doing? What are we doing to give them the capability to someday
    turn that role over to them?
        General Moseley. Sir, there are two parts to that. The
    first thing we've done is to provide them three C-130s. Their
    air force, right now, consists of some small aircraft that they
    fly around, and three C-130s that they operate. We trained them
    at Little Rock. Those were our crews that still fly with them.
    So, we're partnered with them.
        The second part of your question is, we have an effort
    ongoing with Central Command now to interface with both the
    Afghans and the Iraqis to look at the next set of decisions
    that they make on equipage, on training, and on what types of
    aircraft they'd be looking at, whether they're fixed wing or
    rotary wing. Sir, that is just beginning to play out.
        Senator Pryor. Is it your impression that the Iraqis have
    the personnel to do that?
        General Moseley. Sir, I don't know yet. From my dialogue
    with them, there is a desire to do that. I don't know that
    there is a capacity to do that yet. So, sir, there is more to
    follow on that as we have a team of about 600 airmen that are
    involved in this with Afghanistan and Iraq right now, doing
    exactly what you're asking.
        Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Pryor.
        Senator Thune.
        Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Wynne, General Moseley, thank you for your great
    service to our country. I especially appreciate the service of
    the airmen that you introduced today, and everything that they
    are doing to keep our country safe. We are deeply appreciative
    of their commitment, their dedication, their skill, and I want
    to do everything we can do to continue to support them.
        Secretary Wynne, I have a question regarding the B-52
    synthetic fuels testing. My understanding is, that testing is
    complete. Can you comment on the results of the testing and the
    future Air Force plans for synthetic fuel?
        Secretary Wynne. Sir, we were very pleased with the outcome
    of the B-52 test at Minot Air Force Base. We went up there to
    cold-soak it to make sure that it would, in fact, start under
    cold conditions. All of the indications are that it performed
    well. We are now undergoing a 90- to 120-day teardown of the
    engine to try to prove or disprove the supposition that running
    this cleaner-burning fuel also helps in the maintenance of the
    engine, to try to discern whether there is a life-cycle
    benefit, recognizing that we may be faced with paying a premium
    for the fuel itself.
        We have also laid in plans to qualify other operating
    aircraft, and we hope to have the totality of the Air Force
    fleet available for synthetic fuel, partnered with JP-8 jet
    fuel, by about 2010.
        If we can do this, then we will form a small marketplace,
    because we want to be a buyer, not a supplier, in this
    marketplace. We had a great energy forum. We had a lot of
    people show up. Some great Americans came. Recognizing full
    well that what the Air Force is trying to spark is to change
    the environment in which we operate, politically. It may not
    change our national interest, but it certainly will change our
    temperament towards it.
        Senator Thune. Are you adequately funded to continue the
    synthetic fuel certification program?
        Secretary Wynne. Sir, I think it's on our UPL. We are,
    right now, essentially patchworking fiscal year 2007, and it
    would be my intention to continue doing that through 2008, but
    I have not truly identified the money. I would tell you that
    there are some that really believe that, as an Air Force, we
    would have first-priority call over the civilians if it was
    truly a need for our Air Force to secure fuel. I just don't
    think I ever want to be put in that position. I actually want
    to be the source of technology, so that my other airline
    colleagues can look elsewhere, and maybe not get us into that
    hedge. It's one of those hedge bets that I think somebody in
    government has to make, even though we hope it never comes
    true.
        Senator Thune. I appreciate very much the leadership role
    that you've taken in that regard. I think that this is
    critically important not only to our energy security needs that
    we have as a Nation, but I also believe it becomes a national
    security issue, and I think that the efforts that you're making
    to move into this whole area of synthetic fuels is critically
    important to our future.
        General Moseley, Congress has added funds to put an
    advanced targeting pod on the B-1 aircraft. How is the
    development and fielding progressing?
        General Moseley. Sir, that is working out very nicely. It's
    the same pod that we use on the F-15Es and the F-16s. There are
    a couple  of  versions  of  that.  We've  looked  at  putting
    them  on  the  B-52s, and we've used them on the B-52. The B-1
    is the remaining aircraft system. Sir, you know better than
    anyone, because they live  in  your  State,  24  hours  a  day,
     7  days  a  week,  we  have  a  B-1 over Afghanistan with
    weapons bays full of ordnance. It's a great airplane to do
    that. The thing that will make it even better is that pod, so
    we can be able to see things from the flight deck of that
    bomber, like we can see from fighters and from UAVs. So, sir,
    that's progressing, and we appreciate the committee's help in
    doing that. That's a big deal for us.
        Senator Thune. I have a follow-up question to the line of
    questioning that was asked earlier regarding the C-5/C-17
    discussion. General, could you clarify your strategic airlift
    requirements, and how you would propose to meet those
    requirements, if authorized to retire C-5As?
        General Moseley. Sir, what we don't know yet is what the
    growth of the Army and the Marines is going to do to the
    overall strategic airlift requirement. We do know that the MCS
    that was conducted did not take into account the growth of the
    Army and the Marine Corps. So, there is a piece of this that is
    an unknown right now that we're working with the joint staff
    and OSD.
        I don't believe the numbers of strategic airlifters will go
    down. In fact, I believe we're probably at the minimum level
    now, with about 300. My desire would be to take out the worst
    actors of the C-5 fleet, which is about 25 or 30 airplanes, I'm
    told by Air Mobility Command, and be able, then, to look at
    retiring them, which will provide us some revenue and some
    offset to be able to continue the mods on the C-5 fleet, as
    well as perhaps look at additional C-17s.
        But, sir, as far as specific numbers, I don't have those
    for you, because we've not gone back. We've not had someone
    tell us what the results of that growth is for MCS.
        Secretary Wynne. I can tell you, sir, that the--right now,
    some worry about the entirety of the C-5 fleet. There are two
    things we should know about this. First is that we want to line
    up, worst to best, and we think there are between 20, 25, and
    30 bad actors that we would like to retire. We do not have bus-
    fulls of pilots awaiting the retirement language, that would
    fly out to any base and begin to remove. What we would do is
    begin to really structure a plan, in conjunction with the base
    commander and the wing commanders, on, what we can do to
    backfill to make that mission whole and what we can do to make
    sure that the airmen that are there are fully satisfied and
    enticed to stay with our Air Force?
        Senator Thune. I thank you, again, for your service, and
    thank you for your responses.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
        Senator Chambliss.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, welcome, as always, and thanks for the great job
    you do for our country in making us the world's greatest
    military power. Your leadership is critical at this point in
    the history of our country. Thanks for bringing these great men
    and women with you. They really are the face of the United
    States Air Force, and we appreciate the great job they do, day
    in and day out. Once again, I'm not biased or prejudiced at
    all, but knowing that Moody Air Force Base is the best fighter
    base in the Air Force, Sergeant Marfell, thank you for being
    here, thanks for the great job you do. We're particularly proud
    of you, back home.
        Gentlemen, over the past several months there has been
    considerable discussion relative to the C-17 and C-5 situation.
    I think both of you would agree that this is not an either/or
    situation. These two weapons systems complement each other, and
    there's a need that both systems work in coordination with each
    other to get the best for the money that we invest. But I have
    a couple of questions to ask you about the C-5 and C-17.
        First of all, how are the C-5Ms, that have received both
    AMP and reliability enhancement and re-engining program (RERP)
    modification, performing? If the Air Force were to cancel that
    C-5A RERP, when would that particular cancellation yield
    savings to the Air Force?
        Secretary Wynne. First of all, I think we're still taking
    data on the C-5Ms. The As have just been, I think, modified,
    and are going through the test programs right now. We intend to
    complete that action. So, we will have that. But, right now,
    all indications are that they're performing pretty well. I
    would tell you that the refit line always does outperform our
    expectations when it comes due.
        I would also tell you that where it stands now is that
    there are increasing cost pressures that are causing that, if
    they're going to live within their budgetary constraints, to
    stretch out a little bit. We will be later in the flow.
        This gets to the second part of your question, which is,
    what would happen if we were to, in fact, move to, cancel the
    re-engining which I'm not sure we're there yet. I think we are
    all for re-engining most of the Bs, and a good part of the As,
    to get there. It would be somewhere in the 2014 to 2016
    timeframe, where you would get the bulk of the savings.
        I think the immediate savings would literally come from not
    maintaining the aircraft that we would retire over the next 2
    or 3 years. So, there would be some modest amount of immediate
    savings, there would be some compounding by not completing the
    program, in the same way that some would say that there are
    savings from the C-17 program if you don't produce them. That's
    true, in that fiscal year, if you don't spend any money on C-
    17, you could say you saved the money. I don't know whether
    that savings is prudent, strategically, or whether the C-17/C-5
    re-engining program might yet produce those economics that we
    expect. But that's where I am on it. We're really balanced on
    delicate tenterhooks. As you say, we would rather not see these
    as either/or. They provide us a very complementary strategic
    lift, and, by the way, as someone else pointed out, no one else
    in the world is providing this strategic lift.
        Senator Chambliss. Anything to add, General Moseley?
        General Moseley. Sir, I would just reiterate that from the
    baseline, this time last year, when we had this discussion, now
    we have the potential of a bigger Army and a bigger Marine
    Corps, which then does change the baseline of calculations on
    strategic airlift. I don't see the number going below 300. I
    see the number going higher. We need reliable airplanes, which
    is why the AMPs, and perhaps the RERP, make even more sense
    now, as long as we can continue to fund it.
        Sir, I applaud your notion that this is not either/or, this
    is a complementary set of operational imperatives for us, to be
    able to lift in a strategic setting on these global ranges.
        Senator Chambliss. Are the low C-5A reliability rates a
    factor of the aircraft or are there other factors there, such
    as lack of supplies and spare parts, from a support standpoint?
    Any comment on that issue?
        General Moseley. Senator, I would say it's a combination of
    being an old airplane and where the airplane is based. Our
    Guard and Reserve squadrons have the best maintenance of anyone
    in the world, but they work one shift. So, you have a
    reasonably old airplane that is prone to break, and if you work
    it one shift, then you'll have the in-commission rates that are
    inherently lower. You can address that by continuing to spend
    money on the airplane, increasing their manpower at those
    units, or asking them to work two shifts. There are any number
    of ways to address that. But I think there are a variety of
    factors for why you end up with low in-commission rates.
        Senator Chambliss. Moving to the F-22. Last year, we
    granted you the authority to enter into a multiyear contract
    for 60 F-22s, contingent upon some additional study being
    performed that outlines how much money is going to be saved in
    that contract. You requested this authority and I'm pleased
    that Congress granted it. Can you comment as to where we are
    now, relative to that study? Are we on target to enter into
    that multiyear later on this year?
        Secretary Wynne. Sir, thank you, and thank you to the
    committee for allowing us to pursue that multiyear. I think
    this is the only way we could bridge over and fund reliably
    this wonderful fifth-generation fighter that is going to be the
    backbone of our air superiority for years and decades to come.
        I will tell you, we are on track. I trade, every day, my
    pearl-handled whip for my silver-handled whip. But, frankly,
    the federally-funded research and development centers are
    cooperating and responsive. The contractors have been
    responsive and cooperating, and very diligent. Sir, they are,
    so far, reporting to me that we will be successful in our quest
    to document, to this committee and to Congress, that we, in
    fact, will achieve greater than the forecasted savings, but, at
    a minimum, the forecasted savings that we've asked for.
        I congratulate them in advance, but I hold them to their
    schedule. We should be able to award that contract this year.
        Senator Chambliss. I've talked to both of you in private
    conversations about the utilization of this aircraft now. I
    know we have a wing that has gone to Japan and is going to be
    in the rotation in theater here, hopefully sometime soon. This
    aircraft seems to be performing beautifully.
        General Moseley. Senator, its performance is outstanding.
    This is the second overseas deployment we've had of the
    airplane. First was to Alaska for Northern Edge, where we were
    able to participate in a joint exercise with our Navy brothers
    and sisters. The airplane performed magnificently, with the
    attendant kill ratios that you would expect from a fifth-
    generation airplane, versus the others.
        It's deployed now in Okinawa. We have 12 airplanes there
    out of the Langley Wing, out of the 1st Wing. It's doing
    exactly what we're asking it to do, in a sense of dissuasion
    and deterrence, and being forward and performing. Sir, we will
    look at the options down the road, in some other places, if
    it's required. Then we'll certainly address that. The
    airplane's performing magnificently.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
        Let's try a 4-minute second round.
        In testimony to the House Armed Services Committee on
    February 28, both of you explained that in order to protect Air
    Force modernization accounts and procurement of new aircraft,
    the Air Force was increasing the risk in its readiness
    accounts. The Air Force's fiscal year 2008 budget request
    includes funds for 1.5 million flying hours to keep our pilots
    trained and ready, but this is a 10 percent reduction in flying
    hours, compared to that which is funded for fiscal year 2007.
        Secretary Wynne, you pointed out that, in addition to
    assuming the authority to retire older aircraft, the Air Force
    is reducing personnel, and is challenging the flying hour
    program to try to find efficiencies, such as increased use of
    flight simulators, in achieving this same level of quality with
    fewer resources. At the same hearing, General Moseley, you
    expressed your lack of comfort with the reduction, and that
    you're already contemplating ways to migrate funds back into
    the flying hour program. This reduction is evidently driven by
    the budget, rather than by any rigorous analysis of strategic
    or operational requirements or risk.
        General, starting with you, what are the strategic,
    operational, and safety risks associated with this 10 percent
    reduction in flying hours?
        General Moseley. Sir, it's always a concern for an aviator
    to reduce flying hours, because there are just things that you
    can't do in a simulator that you have to do while you're
    airborne. The 7.5-percent or so reduction is at the low end of
    the risk scale. When you get from 7.5 to 10 percent, though,
    now I'm beginning to feel a bit uncomfortable. I have asked the
    staff to look at ways for the Guard, Reserve, and Active Forces
    to be able to go mitigate the return to those flying hours.
    Sir, this is directly relative to the utilization rates of our
    airplanes. One of the challenges we have is that some of the
    aircraft are so old that it's hard to generate the utilization
    rates per airframe, per squadron, per month to be able to meet
    those increases in flying hours. So, I'm working on the
    maintenance and parts pieces of this, as well as on the flying-
    hour piece of this, to see if there's not some way we can get
    that back.
        I'm okay with simulators, to a certain extent, but a
    simulator is not airborne. There are certain things you have to
    do in an airplane. You can do procedural things or part-task
    trainers in a simulator, and some of the modern simulators are
    magnificent for what they do--but you are still not airborne.
    To deliver ordnance, to fire a gun, to drop a bomb, to provide
    instrument approaches into bad weather, you have to be airborne
    to do that.
        I'm sounding like a fighter pilot answering your question,
    but I am a fighter pilot answering your question, and I am a
    service chief that worries about my pilots and my crews.
        Chairman Levin. Does the reduction apply to all systems
    throughout the Air Force, or is the reduction targeted to
    certain aircraft or a certain training or operational
    community?
        General Moseley. Sir, it's across the Air Force, but some
    of our systems are more impacted than others, because, for
    instance, in the big airplanes, you can get airborne and do a
    variety of things on a mission that is 12 hours long. When I
    was up at Minot Air Force Base last week, they were preparing
    to launch a 12-hour mission, and you can get a lot of things
    done on a mission that long. On the small-airplane side, you
    can get fewer things done in an hour or an hour and a half. So,
    it varies by mission system.
        Chairman Levin. When we look at your list of 25 prioritized
    and 80 additional unfunded requirements, flying hours is not
    included.
        General Moseley. Sir, that is because I think inside our
    system I can move and reprogram some of that money around to
    address that. I did not want to exacerbate our overall top
    line, because we did spend over 2 million man-hours attempting
    to balance that budget. If I can do that internal to my major
    commands, I'm much better off than having to go outside our
    system to make that happen. I'd rather give it a shot, myself.
        Chairman Levin. All right. You've also, I see, requested
    only 74 percent of your projected depot maintenance
    requirements for repair and modification of the current
    systems. The Air Force's unfunded requirements list includes
    over $500 million for depot maintenance at priority number
    five. An additional half-billion dollars would allow the Air
    Force to meet 86 percent of its requirement. I'm just
    wondering, General, what are the risks involved with only
    meeting 74 percent of the Air Force's depot-level maintenance
    requirements on aircraft?
        General Moseley. Sir, that's another great question where
    you get a service chief becoming slightly uncomfortable, when
    you reduce the ability for the depots to do their job. I would
    offer that our three depots right now are operating at about 93
    percent capacity on one shift. So, the efficiencies in the
    depots are unbelievable. These people can do almost anything,
    in Utah, in Georgia, and in Oklahoma. So, taking slight risk in
    that is like the flying-hour program; we're forced to do this,
    because, to meet our physical guidance, we've had to make some
    hard decisions. On the flying-hours side, I'm sensitive to
    that, because that's people in flying machines that are
    airborne. On the depot side, I'm sensitive to that, because
    that's long-term sustainment.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Clinton.
        Senator Clinton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Wynne, General Moseley, thank you both for your
    service. I appreciate greatly that you each have visited Air
    Force installations in New York. I want to thank General
    Moseley for honoring my invitation to join me at the Niagara
    Falls Air Reserve Station last year. Secretary Wynne, thank you
    for accepting my suggestion that you visit the Air Force
    Research Laboratory in Rome. They do, obviously, in my opinion,
    remarkable work in support of our men and women in uniform.
        I have several questions about different items in the Air
    Force's budget request for fiscal year 2008. I have a series of
    questions about the combat search and rescue aircraft (CSAR-X)
    helicopters.
        The GAO recently ruled in favor of a bid protest regarding
    the Air Force's new the CSAR-X. I'm concerned about some of the
    public statements that the Air Force made in the aftermath of
    that decision. I recently wrote a letter to you expressing my
    concerns. Mr. Chairman, I request that my recent letter to
    Secretary Wynne be made part of the record.
        Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

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        Senator Clinton. In late February, Mr. Secretary, you
    testified to the House Armed Services Committee that it was
    your view that the GAO decision should be interpreted narrowly.
    Both Reuters and Dow Jones reported that, after your appearance
    before the committee, you stated that the Air Force prefers to
    stay with what we got and get this product going as soon as
    possible. Could you please explain those statements for us?
        Secretary Wynne. Yes, ma'am. As usual, they tend to leave
    off the last part of your quotation, but I would say I always
    try to add that I would like to stay with the current system,
    but I have to satisfy the GAO and I have to satisfy the other
    competitors to make sure that they believe we have done this in
    a transparent and open method. We are actually partnering, as
    best we can, with the GAO and have asked them to reconsider, to
    make sure that we have a better read on all of the protested
    items, not just for Lockheed, but also for Sikorsky, so that,
    when we do resolicit--and we have an intention to resolicit--it
    will be against the findings that the GAO has alerted us to.
    Ma'am, I am agnostic as to which helicopter ultimately comes
    out, but, frankly, I would like to support the procurement
    system that we have; and so, therefore, would like to get on
    with providing this equipment.
        Senator Clinton. I really appreciate that very much, Mr.
    Secretary. There are a number of specific issues with respect
    to the GAO decision recommending that revised proposals should
    be solicited. I appreciate your commitment to resolicitation. I
    think it's important, given the GAO faulting the process
    followed by the prior source-selection team. I'd like to ask,
    do you plan to put new personnel in place to ensure the
    perception, as well as the reality, of transparency and
    fairness in the reevaluation process?
        General Moseley. Ma'am, what I intend to do is be very
    clear with the vendors as to what we have miscommunicated with
    them before. I intend to have that process be open to them so
    they can see how it affected the evaluation. I intend to
    debrief them on it. I do not see that we were unfair. I do
    believe there were some mistakes made, and we will provide
    additional oversight for that.
        Senator Clinton. Another matter of concern to me with
    respect to this solicitation was Secretary Ken Krieg's recent
    statement, again, reported in the media, that schedule was the
    most important selection criterion. That does not appear to be
    consistent with the request for proposals (RFP) that says
    schedule is the fifth of sixth priorities. The reason I'm
    asking these questions is because obviously the combat search-
    and-rescue capacity of the Air Force is critical for our men
    and women in uniform, and, General Moseley, I am not aware of
    any military in the world that uses the CH-47 for dedicated
    CSAR. Are you?
        General Moseley. Ma'am, first, thanks for recognizing that
    CSAR is a core competency. We do that not just for ourselves;
    it's a solemn relationship between a guy that flies and the PJ
    that comes to pick him up. But we do this for the joint team,
    too, whether it's Navy, Marine, or Army. We have to be able to
    go fairly deep at range and pick people up. Remember, when we
    send people to do this, somebody shot somebody down, so it's a
    hostile place before you show up, and they're normally still
    milling around back there. So, to get the PJ there to pick the
    person up is a core competency for us.
        Ma'am, I'm not aware that anyone uses the CH-47 in a combat
    rescue role, but I would also tell you that my Army brothers
    and my special operations brothers use that airframe in some
    very difficult places. Today, they're flying those airplanes
    into some bad places in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is not CSAR,
    but it is a hostile place that they operate those airplanes.
        Senator Clinton. I appreciate that, General, because I
    share your strong commitment to make sure we get this right.
    I'm just wondering, General, whether the Air Force completed an
    analysis of alternatives for the CSAR-X program. Were any
    heavy-lift helicopters, such as the H-53 or the H-47,
    considered viable alternatives for the CSAR mission? If not,
    could you explain why not?
        General Moseley. Ma'am, an analysis of alternatives was
    conducted out of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
    (JROC), and it was forwarded through the joint system. We asked
    for medium-lift helicopters as a nomenclature, but, as the
    request for information (RFI) went out, we got no reply back
    from anyone with any big helicopters. When the RFP went out,
    though, the CH-47 was competed, and it met the timelines. So,
    what you're asking is an interesting twist of the process. JROC
    conducted an analysis of alternatives, there was an RFI and
    then an RFP, and all along the way I would tell you that the
    process worked. The contractor just submitted the airplane that
    met those requirements in the RFP.
        Senator Clinton. General, I understand very well how
    important this is to all of us, but I believe that certain KPPs
    related to the terminal area were not listed as special-
    interested items by the source-selection team, and I think that
    it might be appropriate at least to reconsider whether that
    would be something to include, going forward.
        General Moseley. Ma'am, can I, one more time, thank you for
    the recognition that this is a big deal for us. That's why the
    two of us have made this the number-two procurement priority
    for the Air Force. This is a big deal for the joint team, it's
    a big deal for everything that we do, and it's a moral and
    ethical imperative that we pick our people up.
        Senator Clinton. Obviously we want to get it right, and I'm
    worried about the weight and the maneuverability and some of
    the issues that have now been pushed into the public arena,
    because we do have to get it right.
        Mr. Chairman, I have several other questions, which I would
    ask unanimous consent to submit to the record for response by
    our witnesses.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, they will be made part of the
    record for answers by our witnesses.
        Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Senator Clinton.
        Senator Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Welcome, and good morning. We have visited personally about
    many programs like military space and the Joint Surveillance
    and Target Attack Radar System (J-STARS) program. I hope we
    were going in the right direction when you canceled the E-10,
    and used the E-8 on the J-STARS program. I would like for you
    to comment on the capabilities that would have been sacrificed
    by canceling the E-10.
        But, Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence, I must bring up a
    personal snafu that I would like for you all to get into and
    see if you can unravel.
        Secretary Wynne, you and I are Brevard County boys and
    understand the great working relationship that the Cape
    Canaveral Air Force Station has had with Port Canaveral.
    Indeed, not only are joint uses made of this commercial port,
    there is the Naval Ordnance Test Unit that is there, where the
    Trident submarines come in and then go out into the Eastern
    Test Range to test. There's also a substantial Coast Guard
    presence in the port and so forth. There's a portion that is
    owned by the Air Force that is underutilized and has been in
    discussion and negotiations for some time between Port
    Canaveral, the entity, and the Air Force, on acquiring it
    either by lease or purchase. There is some bureaucratic red-
    tape snafu that has gotten in the way. I wish you all would get
    to the bottom of it so I don't have to add something to the
    defense authorization bill in law that would direct that it be
    done. This is an administrative thing, and it ought to be
    handled.
        The port had one appraisal, the Air Force had a double
    appraisal. On top of that, the Air Force said, ``Oh, by the
    way, you come back and build us a new facility and you pay for
    all of that,'' and the Air Force said, ``That's it,'' a Mrs.
    Katherine Halverson, the Director of the Air Force Real
    Property Agency.
        The port needs to expand so that it can expand its
    commercial activity, but it also needs to expand so that it can
    accommodate the Coast Guard. Everybody agrees this is
    underutilized Air Force property that abuts right up there to
    the port. If there's a legitimate question on the value of the
    land, then normal practice is, if you have two appraisals that
    are as divergent as one being double the other, you usually go
    to a third party for an appraisal. But the Air Force says,
    ``That's it.'' I shouldn't have to bring this up to you, but I
    have to.
        Secretary Wynne. I appreciate your doing it, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. If you all can solve this
    administratively, it'll save me a lot of effort, because we
    have to solve it and it's been such a great working
    relationship with the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station which
    wants to solve this. When it got into the problem is when it
    went up to the Washington level.
        Now, General, let's go back to the E-8 and the E-10. Are we
    sacrificing anything?
        General Moseley. Sir, the Multi-Platform Radar Technology
    Insertion Program radar that is the genesis of the E-10 is
    still alive and we have asked for money in the UPL to be able
    to continue with that radar.
        There are opportunities to put that radar and a smaller
    antenna on the J-STARS and we're evaluating that, also. The E-
    10 itself, with a bigger antenna and a completely different
    airplane, as we looked at the fiscal year 2008 budget, and as
    we looked at the fiscal guidance that we had, there's not
    enough money to do this. The ability to see low-observable,
    low-altitude activities today and in the future is certainly a
    desired option for an air-component commander in theater. So,
    the notion is to keep the radar technology alive with the
    people that do this, and perhaps to put it on the J-STARS,
    until we get through with the KC-X opportunity and see which
    airframe we get and see what opportunities we have down the
    road to look at a follow-on to Airborne Warning and Control
    System, J-STARS, and the Rivet Joint, sir, I think we'll be
    okay. That's why we have--I think it's $408 million in the UPL,
    to continue that effort.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I want to continue the conversation
    with you in another setting, because there are other programs
    that would supplement this, and I just want to make sure that
    we're doing the right thing.
        General Moseley. Senator, remember also that a version of
    the MP-RTIP radar is also going on the Global Hawk. So, on our
    long-dwell unmanned systems we will also have a version of
    this. So, there are several parts and pieces of this radar
    picture that are critical for us.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I want to continue that conversation.
        Would you say, for the record, whatever you can say, given
    the fact that the Chinese have now successfully launched an
    ASAT, of which I have my own little program of trying to point
    out--and we will be holding hearings on what this has done with
    all of the space debris there. There are thousands and
    thousands and thousands of pieces that are not only threatening
    assets of the United States, but space assets of every
    spacefaring nation in the world. But, aside from that issue,
    the fact is that they now have the capability of knocking down,
    and that weather satellite of theirs that they knocked out was
    at about 500 kilometers high.
        Secretary Wynne. Senator, they actually shocked me, but did
    not surprise me. But, you're right, the debris field, I think,
    is even causing the International Space Station to consider a
    movement to try to avoid this debris, and you know a lot of
    nations are partnered on that. So, they availed themselves of a
    threat that I'm not even sure that their people fully advised
    them of. What shocked me was the cavalier nature of the burst,
    which could have been done even differently than it was, but it
    was a clear in-your-face demonstration that, ``We are here.
    You'd better pay attention to us. We are expanding our navy, we
    are expanding our air force, and here we are. We can now take
    out your low-flying satellites.'' I'll let General Moseley
    speak to that import.
        General Moseley. Senator, the concern now is that, for all
    to now see, space is not a sanctuary. It is not an opportunity
    to place an imaging system in orbit to have a free ride. Now
    that another nation is able to attrit and literally kinetically
    kill the satellites, it creates a whole set of challenges and
    second- and third-order questions.
        Sir, there's any number of ways that the Air Force is
    addressing this. One is to continue to focus on our space
    situation awareness so we know what's out there. We have a
    variety of ways to categorize and archive objects in orbit,
    from reasonably small to big. Of course, the debris field makes
    it a little bit more tricky to be able to categorize all of the
    parts and pieces of a debris field that big.
        Sir, the next thing you know very well that we do is
    attempt to harden our systems against attacks. We attempt to,
    in many ways, figure out how to shield them and be able to
    protect them from a variety of techniques, both kinetic and
    nonkinetic, to negate our capability of either weather
    navigation, early warning, or communications.
        So, beyond space situation awareness and defending the
    asset, I believe, is another set of policy discussions and
    another set of questions about what you want your Air Force to
    do next. We are not at that point yet, because we've not had
    guidance or a policy discussion that takes us beyond space
    situation awareness and defending the system.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Even something that we take for
    granted now, Mr. Chairman, in our everyday personal lives--
    GPS--is now threatened, not only from a military standpoint,
    but from a personal, private-sector standpoint. I will have a
    hearing on this in the Commerce Committee. I have been
    absolutely dumbfounded by the deafening silence of anybody
    criticizing the Chinese as a result of this ASAT test, which,
    as General Moseley just said, does not only pose a military
    security threat to us, but poses, because of the debris field,
    a threat to everybody's satellite that's up there, whether it's
    military or commercial or weather or whatever it is.
        General Moseley. Senator, you could teach this course, but
    in October 1957 Sputnik was put in orbit. That fundamentally
    changed the notion of the relationship between air and space
    and the ability to put orbital systems up. This country then
    began to do some very energized things that ended up with a
    lunar landing. Now we have someone that can attrit systems in
    orbit at those altitudes and this is a different ball game.
    This is not a sanctuary anymore. So, we've had these
    discussions, and we would welcome that dialogue, as to what you
    want us to do next.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        I'm going to now call on Senator Warner. I will ask him to
    close.
        Again, our thanks to our witnesses and to our special
    guests.
        Senator Warner.
        General Moseley. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Warner [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, I'd like to follow on the line of questioning
    from our distinguished colleague from Florida, who,
    fortunately, brings firsthand experience regarding space to
    this committee. His customary humility prohibits him from
    dwelling on his experience, but we all well know it's very
    dedicated, and not just because of the interests of Florida,
    it's his personal interest in space.
        But I would want to follow on and bring to your attention
    that the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act required the
    DOD to assess whether the Department is allocating sufficient
    resources to the space control mission. While the report is
    classified, it can be said that the Department understands that
    there are areas where additional effort is needed. You've
    already give us pretty much your opinion of the Chinese ASAT
    test, but do you believe the DOD is devoting sufficient
    resources toward countering such threats?
        Secretary Wynne. Sir, at present, we are dedicating what I
    think are sufficient resources to develop technologies to
    counter this. We think that we have the right kind of programs,
    and we just have put into space some additional programs to
    provide some defensive capability to these satellites. What we
    don't do, and what we could do, but we know that it would
    probably break the bank a little bit, is to try to harden all
    of the satellites so that they are, in fact, impervious to
    ground-based intercepts or ground-based lasing. We see this as
    an encroaching requirement and we don't know how to do it
    inexpensively. So, that's the area where I would say if we had
    another dollar, we would probably put it into that aspect.
        We are, right now, though, trying to figure out how to do
    sufficient work to make sure that we have a protective device
    in front of our satellites, and that's about where we are.
        General Moseley. Senator, you know very well the space
    fence that's down at Dahlgren. That is one of the capabilities
    where we've continued to partner with the Navy, on how we
    categorize and archive objects out there. The first part of
    this equation is space situation awareness, to know what's out
    there and then be able to see the effect. The next step is
    defensive counterspace, which is where we are now. Senator,
    there's always something better you can do, and there's always
    a different technology. That's the challenge of staying ahead.
    Like Sputnik, now that space is not a sanctuary, this is
    getting to be serious business in orbit.
        Senator Warner. Let's get back to the debris issue and how,
    as the Senator from Florida pointed out, it affects so many
    nations. Here we have the superpower, the United States and the
    emerging ambitions of China to be a superpower. Perhaps it's
    time for an international consortium to sit down and examine
    this issue and, frankly, determine that it's in the interests
    of many, many nations, largely for peaceful efforts, that we
    have space operable in such a way that satellites can survive.
    Many nations cannot afford a fully hardened system to go up
    there. That adds weight, that adds thrust problems on launch.
        General Moseley. Sir, to include that the security of the
    downlinks and uplinks, which are the other part of the system,
    are very hard to defend unless you focus on that.
        Senator Warner. Anyway, somebody ought to look at who
    should try and come up with the formalized idea of calling for
    an international consortium to address this issue. I wonder if
    you might take it upon yourselves, at your convenience, to get
    back to me on that issue. I'd be quite interested in following
    that up.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        International consortia already exist to address the issue of
    voluntary space debris mitigation:

             The 2006 ``National Space Policy,'' states ``[t]he
            United States shall take a leadership role in international
            fora to encourage foreign nations and international
            organizations to adopt policies and practices aimed at debris
            minimization and shall cooperate in the exchange of information
            on debris research and the identification of improved debris
            mitigation practices.''
             The United States actively participates in the U.N.
            Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS)
            Science and Technology Subcommittee (STSC), which formed a
            Working Group on Space Debris to address the growing problem of
            manmade debris and to outline debris mitigation steps that
            spacefaring nations can take.

                     On 21 Feb 07, the Working Group (including the
                    Chinese delegation) adopted a set of international
                    voluntary ``Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines'', under
                    which member states and international organizations
                    will voluntarily take measures to ensure, to the
                    greatest extent feasible, space debris mitigation
                    practices and procedures are enacted and followed.
                     The Mitigation Guidelines will now be
                    forwarded to the UNCOPUOS for approval in June 2007 and
                    perhaps to a Special Resolution of the U.N. General
                    Assembly to endorse the Guidelines this fall. The STSC
                    agreed to include space debris as an item on next
                    year's agenda to focus on national reporting of debris
                    issues with an emphasis on implementation of mitigation
                    practices.

             The United States also actively participates in the
            International Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee
            (IADC), a working group of technical experts from 11
            international space agencies. The 11 space agencies are from
            China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United
            Kingdom, the Ukraine, the United States, and the European Space
            Agency. The primary purpose of the IADC is to exchange
            information on space debris research activities between member
            space agencies, to facilitate opportunities for cooperation in
            space debris research, to review the progress of ongoing
            cooperative activities, and to identify debris mitigation
            options.
             Finally, our National Space Policy states that the
            United States believes space should be freely available to all
            nations for peaceful use and that current treaties and
            agreements are sufficient. Further, the United States ``will
            oppose the development of new legal regimes or other
            restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or
            use of space.'' For these reasons, the United States encourages
            adoption of the voluntary Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines
            developed by the UNCOPUOS.

        Senator Warner. Just one concluding question here then
    votes are going to require me to suspend.
        Now, Mr. Secretary, I don't know of anyone better qualified
    to have assumed the position as a Secretary of a military
    Service than you as it regards acquisition. You've devoted so
    much of your career to acquisition not only in the Department,
    but before you came to the Department. Do you think you're
    hitting the right balance to provide a workforce that can
    continue to demonstrate the transparency and confidence that
    Congress will require, and the taxpayer deserves?
        Secretary Wynne. Yes, sir, I do. I think that it's not that
    we have not stressed to them that we want them to take on,
    effectively, more responsibility; in other words, I think
    acquisition should return to blue so that we have more of our
    own internal expertise, and don't rely so much on contract
    support. That's one of the things that we're doing. We are
    dedicating some training to that. We have also reassessed the
    manpower reductions, if you will, and had our new systems
    acquisition executive go through a relook to make sure that we
    are well-balanced in that area. We are dedicating some terrific
    resources in--as far as knowledgeable individuals to it. So, I
    am watching it carefully. It is an area, much like the flying
    program, where I have concerns, and we're addressing them.
        Senator Warner. I thank you very much. That's reassuring,
    because, I tell you, if I look back over a fairly long career
    here in the United States Senate, I will never forget the
    stories about the cost of a hammer and the cost of a commode
    and all of those things that really were devastating to good
    procurement records for the DOD. Simple things like that get
    the attention of the public.
        Secretary Wynne. Right.
        Senator Warner. I think that I can also say, having had the
    privilege of being here for a number of years, the two of you
    provide a great team for leadership. You exemplify what a
    secretary and a chief of staff should do as working partners,
    yet there has to always be a little element of competition
    between the two of you.
        So, I wish you well, and I think this has been a very, very
    fine hearing, for those who followed it.
        Again, we commend our honored guests here today, knowing
    that there are literally tens of thousands behind you that
    recognize that, while you've been selected to represent all of
    them, you did it in a way that reflects honor and credit on all
    your other brethren, wherever they are in the world, not
    dressed in pristine outfits, as you are this morning, but
    working, sweating in dungarees, and taking on the risks
    associated with our deployed forces overseas.
        Thank you very much.
        Secretary Wynne. Thank you, Senator.
        General Moseley. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Warner. The committee is adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
                    air force science and technology funding
        1. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne, the Air Force's fiscal year 2008
    science and technology (S&T) budget request has been reduced by nearly
    $200 million from the 2007 request and nearly $650 million from the
    2007 appropriated levels. Some of the reason for this reduction was the
    transfer of classified programs out of the S&T budget. Why were these
    classified programs put in the S&T budget originally?
        Secretary Wynne. Funding for the special programs line was
    originally put into the Air Force S&T program to cover classified S&T
    efforts. In conjunction with the fiscal year 2008 President's budget
    request, efforts were reprioritized and special programs funding was
    transferred out of the S&T program.

        2. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne, did the classified programs
    artificially inflate the size of the Air Force S&T investment budget?
        Secretary Wynne. This Special Programs line funding was put into
    the Air Force S&T program to support valid classified S&T efforts. I
    don't know that this should be categorized as `artificial'.

        3. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne, what areas of S&T investment
    would benefit from additional resources should more become available?
        Secretary Wynne. If additional resources should become available,
    there are many areas within the Air Force S&T program in which this
    funding could be wisely invested. The Air Force Unfunded Priorities
    List for Fiscal Year 2008 includes S&T efforts totaling $32 million in
    support of critical capability areas, such as Force Application and
    Protection, Create and Sustain the Force, Surveillance and
    Reconnaissance, Net Centric Enterprise, et cetera. A breakout of
    specific efforts is included in the attached spreadsheet.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                         manufacturing readiness levels
        4. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne, how is the Air Force making use
    of manufacturing readiness levels to speed the transition of new
    technologies to the warfighter and reduce life cycle costs for deployed
    systems?
        Secretary Wynne. Implementation of Manufacturing Readiness Levels
    (MRLs) is a major step in Air Force efforts to strengthen its
    acquisition process and could lead to accelerated technology transition
    and reduced life cycle costs by providing risk assessments in terms of
    manufacturing similar to those provided by Technology Readiness Level
    assessments. The Air Force is currently incorporating MRLs into all of
    its Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD) efforts, while also
    piloting application to Acquisition Category (ACAT) level programs.
    Conducting a Manufacturing Readiness Assessment (MRA) on key
    technologies for each ATD is a key component to MRL implementation. The
    MRA determines the initial MRL, a final desired MRL within a given
    timeframe, and major manufacturing risks associated with achieving the
    final target MRL. This process produces a Manufacturing Maturity Plan,
    which enables a program to achieve its final target MRL. The
    incorporation of MRLs into ATDs is forcing the producibility of the
    technology to be considered in parallel with technology development.
    Although in the early stages for these ATD programs, transition and
    affordability improvements have already been identified for systems
    using turbine engines, solar cells, and tactical sensors. While not
    fully implemented yet, the MRL methodology is being practiced in ACAT
    programs and recently yielded technology transition and production
    process benefits for the F-22A and Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air
    Missile programs. To date three major themes have evolved from programs
    that have conducted MRAs and implemented this MRL methodology-
    technology transition is being accelerated, innovative manufacturing
    technologies are being established, and technology transition risk is
    being reduced.

                       air force seismic research program
        5. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne, the Air Force Research Laboratory
    (AFRL) conducts seismic research to support Air Force Technical
    Applications Center's (AFTAC) seismic monitoring mission. This nuclear
    test treaty monitoring mission was assigned to the Air Force 60 years
    ago by President Eisenhower. As such, it is a national mission. Does
    AFRL have sufficient funding to support all of the good proposals that
    it receives each year in response to its seismic research program
    solicitation? If not, what is the dollar level of the shortfall each
    year?
        Secretary Wynne. No, AFRL does not have sufficient funding to
    support all highly rated proposals. The current funding level for the
    research program is at about $4.5 million per year. The annual
    shortfall is about $21.5 million.

        6. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne, what is the projected impact of
    not funding these proposals on AFTAC's current and future operational
    capability?
        Secretary Wynne. [Deleted.]

        7. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne, what other Department of Defense
    (DOD) seismic research efforts directly support AFTAC's assigned
    missions?
        Secretary Wynne. [Deleted.]
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
                    aircraft retirement and recapitalization
        8. Senator Akaka. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, in your
    posture statement, you discuss the need to recapitalize and revitalize
    the aging Air Force fleet. I understand that the average age of the Air
    Force's current aircraft inventory is 24 years and that this represents
    a significant increase over the Vietnam era when the average age was 9
    years. I also understand that 14 percent of Air Force planes are not
    mission ready or have mission limiting restrictions. Why is it that
    some of your aircraft have mission limiting restrictions or are unable
    to fly? Is the Air Force aircraft maintenance budget underfunded or is
    there some other cause?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. Senator, as you have pointed
    out, our aircraft inventory is on average 24 years old. It is true that
    as of 31 December 2006, 14 percent of our inventory was grounded or
    mission-limited flight restricted. The primary reason for these
    groundings and restrictions is related to structural issues due to age
    and usage, not maintenance. Most of the grounded aircraft are the C-
    130Es and KC-135Es that we have discussed during this hearing. But to
    reiterate, they both have structural issues that have surfaced as a
    result of extreme age and high use. Many of the grounded C-130E and KC-
    135E aircraft are beyond economical repair. Additionally, most of the
    F-15A-E aircraft inventory is under peacetime mission-limiting flight
    restrictions due to vertical stabilizer structural issues. A depot
    level repair program is ongoing and will be complete on the F-15 fleet
    by 2009. In a nutshell, the structural problems we have are a result of
    old, tired aircraft. To address these issues, we are putting large
    amounts of funding toward service life extension programs and the like;
    however, some aircraft are so old that we believe those resources are
    better spent toward much needed recapitalization.

        9. Senator Akaka. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, your posture
    statement states that ``Although recent congressional support for
    planned legacy aircraft retirements has aided our divestment strategy,
    unnecessary restrictions draw critical resources away from our aircraft
    modernization programs and degrade our efforts to recapitalize our
    aircraft inventory.'' Can you elaborate on what these ``unnecessary
    restrictions'' are and how they are inhibiting your recapitalization
    efforts?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. Additional relief from
    legislative restrictions would allow for flexibility and increased
    options for fleet management. For example, if we were able to retire
    the older C-5s, we could recapitalize the airlift capability with C-17
    platforms off a production line that is still hot. If we wait we may
    not have that option without spending a lot more in procurement later.
    Restrictions translate to costs to modernize, operate, and support
    aircraft with funds that would otherwise be spent on newer platforms
    that would be relevant and sustainable for a longer period of time.

        10. Senator Akaka. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, if funded
    at the requested funding levels, how long will it take to completely
    replace our older planes?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. Under the fiscally constrained
    current program, it will take almost 50 years to completely replace our
    older planes, and for some major weapon systems, it is longer. Our 50
    year recapitalization rate is like planning to use P-51s in Vietnam or
    F-86s in Iraq.
        The Planning Force establishes a glide path to building a fully
    modernized 86 Combat Wing equivalent force as directed in the 2006
    Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The Air Force requires an average $20
    billion more per year to recapitalize and meet joint capability and
    capacity goals in the future. The plan is to recapitalize most of the
    fleet by 2030.

        11. Senator Akaka. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, what will
    the average age of the aircraft inventory be after your
    recapitalization efforts are complete?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The United States Air Force
    has an aging fleet of aircraft that continues to get older, but won't
    last forever. The average age in 1973 was 8 years, today it is near 24
    years. Even if we divest and fund everything planned in the Future
    Years Defense Plan (FYDP), average age still climbs to 26 years by
    fiscal year 2013. The National Strategy provides guidance on shaping
    the force, but there are also manufacturing and resource limitations.
    In order to fully recapitalize the Air Force by 2030, and build a
    modern and ready 86 Combat Wing equivalent Air Force as directed by the
    2006 QDR, the Air Force will require additional resources to
    aggressively recapitalize while sustaining readiness and meeting the
    needs of the warfighter.

                   validity of the quadrennial defense review
        12. Senator Akaka. General Moseley, the 2005 QDR appears to have
    already been somewhat overtaken by events. Specifically, 1 year later,
    DOD is proposing to increase the size of the Active-Duty Army, the Army
    National Guard, and the Marine Corps over the levels recommended in the
    QDR. To your knowledge, has the National Military Strategy (NMS) been
    changed since the QDR was submitted?
        General Moseley. Senator Akaka, the 2004 NMS has not changed since
    the 2006 QDR was released. The NMS provides a description of the Armed
    Forces' plan to achieve military objectives in the near-term. Those
    objectives: to protect the United States; prevent conflict and surprise
    attack; and prevail against adversaries, have not changed.

        13. Senator Akaka. General Moseley, do you believe the QDR threat
    environment assumptions and mandated force structure goals for the Air
    Force are still appropriate?
        General Moseley. The Air Force continues to support the goals and
    objectives laid down by both the NMS and the QDR. In turn, the Air
    Force's force structure--both present and future force, continues to
    support the United States and its allies against all threats,
    particularly those dictated in the QDR. While the Air Force's force
    structure may be adjusted to increases/decreases to air and space
    programs, none of the goals have changed. These goals remain
    appropriate given the demands of the war and other identified future
    military threats.

                              nontraditional roles
        14. Senator Akaka. General Moseley, the Air Force posture statement
    describes the need for the Air Force to adapt to nontraditional roles,
    such as convoy escort, infrastructure protection, provincial
    reconstruction, and host nation election support. Are these
    nontraditional roles factored into your new end strength numbers?
        General Moseley. We did not specifically budget for end strength to
    perform nontraditional roles, such as convoy escort, infrastructure
    protection, provincial reconstruction, and host nation election support
    where those represent missions normally performed by other Services. We
    will continue to perform these roles as requested as much as we can
    accommodate out of current end strength that was budgeted to perform
    Air Force missions.

        15. Senator Akaka. General Moseley, as the conflicts in Iraq and
    Afghanistan continue, are you expecting the level of effort for these
    nontraditional activities to remain constant or do you expect them to
    increase?
        General Moseley. Presently we are experiencing an increase in the
    level of effort required for nontraditional activities as a result of
    the additional combat support and combat service support required to
    enable the plus-up of combat forces called for by the President. To
    support this plus-up, roughly 93 percent of the enabler support our
    airmen provide is within our core competency. Aside from that resulting
    from the Presidential plus-up, we are seeing an increase in the
    nontraditional piece our airmen contribute due in large part to the
    vast amount of military, reconstruction, and civil transition training.
    Training teams involve skill sets where no service is the single
    preferred provider. In the near future we expect the number of training
    teams to increase and therefore we expect to see more of these
    requirements come our way.

        16. Senator Akaka. General Moseley, what are the drivers that cause
    the Air Force to be tasked with these nontraditional assignments? Is it
    because the Army or Marine Corps have insufficient troop levels and the
    Air Force and Navy are being used to make up the difference?
        General Moseley. I cannot speak to any of the other Services' end
    strength levels. The fact is the Air Force is tasked to provide support
    to the combatant commander (COCOM). U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and
    the Joint Staff have deemed these requirements as joint and therefore
    the Air Force fills them accordingly. As these requirements go up, so
    does the Air Force's contribution.

        17. Senator Akaka. General Moseley, how would you rate the morale
    of our airmen, and has performing these nontraditional tasks had any
    effect on morale?
        General Moseley. While the level of morale for any unit is
    dependent on the specific mission and the quality of the leadership,
    overall morale for airmen performing nontraditional in-lieu-of tasks is
    very high--they are extremely proud to serve the Nation. Leadership in
    these in-lieu-of deployments is pivotal and our senior airmen leaders
    in these settings do a great job keeping the group focused on the
    mission, taking pride in the adaptability they're building by
    performing these nontraditional missions, and leveraging the core
    skills they bring to the fight. Morale directly correlates to the
    amount and quality of Air Force interest these airmen get: it's
    important for them to know the Army values what they're doing, but it's
    critical to know that the Air Force values them, values their service,
    and hasn't just put them ``out there'' to serve on the end of a thread,
    and we reinforce this in leadership visits and media stories of their
    service.
        Finally, the way we as an Air Force value and employ these airmen
    when they return will be a long-term barometer that is important to the
    morale of subsequent groups of in-lieu-of airmen. We appreciate their
    service and leverage their experience by feeding it as appropriate back
    into the pre-deployment and other training. We have consistently
    received feedback from Army commanders that the airmen who work for
    them are outstanding. This is a direct reflection of the
    professionalism and morale of these airmen: they do good work, they
    know it's important and they excel because it's an Air Force core value
    to be excellent in all we do.
        We have outstanding airmen who are dedicated to executing their
    assigned mission, adapting and overcoming as necessary, and placing
    their lives on the line every day. Without question, they are doing the
    Air Force proud!

                                   readiness
        18. Senator Akaka. General Moseley, it is my understanding that the
    Air Force's readiness level has decreased 17 percent since 2001. What
    are the causes of this readiness decrease, and how does this budget
    address the problem?
        General Moseley. The Air Force has been at war for 16+ consecutive
    years. In fact, we are currently flying at the same level as we did 13
    years ago, but with fewer aircraft, higher personnel tempo, and older
    equipment. While readiness levels are stable and manageable in most
    communities, continued tempo of operations (OPTEMPO) and aging
    equipment are causing degradation in the readiness of several stressed
    low density/high demand (LD/HD) communities including Special
    Operations Forces; Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR); Intelligence,
    Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR); and Command and Control Assets.
    Personnel and training issues in certain communities resulting from
    exceeding the Air Force's Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) construct also
    contribute to the overall readiness decline.
        The Air Force's fiscal year 2008 budget prioritizes winning the
    global war on terror, caring for our airmen and families, and
    recapitalizing and modernizing our air, space, and cyberspace systems.
    This budget attempts to maintain a combat capable and ready force while
    modernizing for future challenges.

        19. Senator Akaka. General Moseley, how long will it take to bring
    the Air Force readiness level back up to its pre-2001 level?
        General Moseley. It could take several years to return to pre-2001
    readiness levels. The Air Force has been at war for 16+ consecutive
    years and we've been transforming and making strategic trades for
    years. We continue to execute plans to become more efficient and
    effective while simultaneously preparing for the long-term. Despite our
    best efforts, readiness, recapitalization, and modernization continue
    to decline. This downward trend is only slowed due to our dedicated
    manpower and adaptable capabilities. Current funding levels slow this
    decreasing readiness trend but will not reverse it.

        20. Senator Akaka. General Moseley, it is clear that the Army and
    the Marine Corps are either overextended, or are being stretched pretty
    thin by the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Given the decrease in
    readiness of the Air Force over the last 5 years, are we overextending
    the Air Force as well?
        General Moseley. With the exception of LD/HD career fields and
    assets, the Air Force maintains sufficient residual capability to
    support ongoing Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation Iraqi Freedom
    combat operations and act as the Nation's strategic Reserve. The Air
    Force's AEF construct is working as designed by reducing the
    possibility of overextending our forces. Despite several career fields
    surging (Security Forces, Civil Engineering, Transportation,
    Communications, Intelligence, Explosive Ordinance Disposal, some
    medical specialties, C-130s, and tankers), the AEF construct enables
    the Air Force to meet nearly all COCOM requirements. The AEF continues
    to fill its primary purpose of identifying which unit, and which
    personnel, are next to deploy while allowing Air Force leadership to
    see what forces are available to respond to the next contingency. AEF
    is flexible and will adapt to the changing environment and emerging
    needs. AEF allows the Air Force to continue to meet COCOM requirements.

        21. Senator Akaka. General Moseley, how prepared is the Air Force
    to deal with any additional emerging threats?
        General Moseley. The Air Force continues to possess sufficient
    capability to provide required capabilities for the current conflict
    and deal with emerging threats. Investments in modernization and
    recapitalization will increase Air Force capabilities to support the
    global war on terror as well as any Major Combat Operations against
    expanding and changing threats. The Air Force has a critical
    requirement to recapitalize its combat air forces. The Air Force is
    flying the oldest fleet in its history and the vast majority will
    complete its service life within 15 years.

        22. Senator Akaka. General Moseley, given the significant
    investment by other powers, such as China, in their military, is it
    your opinion that this budget is sufficient for our Air Force to
    maintain its superiority in the long-term? Please address whether we
    are investing sufficient resources into future generation aircraft and
    technology research and development (R&D).
        General Moseley. We are not investing sufficient resources into
    future generation aircraft and technology R&D. The global war on
    terror's duration and OPTEMPO has accelerated consumption of service
    life for numerous platforms. We must invest in current and future
    capabilities that guarantee entry against the anti-access capability of
    emerging threats--next generation fighters provide that capability. We
    must recapitalize at a faster rate to ensure U.S. advantage over any
    future adversary. To build a fully recapitalized, modern, and ready
    force as directed by the 2006 QDR, the Air Force will need additional
    resources.

                                      risk
        23. Senator Akaka. Secretary Wynne, in your posture statement, you
    say that ``The FYDP involves taking acceptable risk in lower priority
    areas in order to meet future readiness, capability, force structure,
    and national security requirements.'' Will you please elaborate on
    where in the budget request you are assuming risk, why this level of
    risk is acceptable, and what are the consequences of being wrong?
        Secretary Wynne. The Air Force has carefully balanced our readiness
    requirements with our recapitalization and modernization efforts to
    support the warfighter. However, higher aircraft and equipment
    utilization rates, loss of buying power, and aging aircraft have
    increased our risk both to our ability to ``fight tonight'' and to
    prepare for tomorrow's war.

             Air Force continues to operate above the steady state level
            of two AEFs. Persistent surge operations drive increased
            resourcing and readiness issues.
             Higher operating costs from utilities, fuel, aircraft
            ownership, and manpower costs (retirement, DHP) impact our
            ability to recapitalize our Air Force to meet emerging threats
            from advanced technologies and air defenses that threaten U.S.
            dominance and place ground forces at risk.
             Average Air Force aircraft age is 24 years which drives
            higher operations and support, investment, and manpower costs
            and negatively impacts aircraft availability. Retiring the
            oldest, least capable aircraft allows the Air Force to realize
            savings that can be used to buy new aircraft or selectively
            modify some aircraft in the existing fleet.

        The Air Force will continue to assess potential impact to affected
    programs, force structure, and capabilities.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
                             air force test assets
        24. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, what
    is the status of the planned reorganization of Air Force test assets
    that was initiated by Program Budget Decision (PBD) 720?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. Funding was realigned during
    the development of the fiscal year 2008 President's budget to preclude
    closing or realigning those facilities. The Air Force faces a
    challenging fiscal environment and has little choice but to consider
    serious options to gain efficiencies. We continue to study the Air
    Force Test and Evaluation infrastructure. We look forward to working
    closely with Congress to ensure we have the resources such that the Air
    Force can preserve the necessary capability for our Nation in order to
    win the current conflict and to be prepared to win the next war.

        25. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, what
    is the status of the development and delivery of the reports required
    by the congressional authorization and appropriations conference
    reports regarding these proposed actions?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force is currently
    conducting a cost-benefit analysis as required by the Defense
    Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2007. This report is scheduled to be
    delivered to Congress no later than 30 April 2007. The results of this
    study will provide input for further analysis in the joint study
    required by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal
    Year 2007.

        26. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, have
    actions been taken that presume the execution of any activities
    contemplated through the implementation of PBD 720?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force has undertaken
    no action to close, realign, or transfer any test and evaluation
    activities contemplated in the fiscal year 2008 Air Force Materiel
    Command test and evaluation proposal.

        27. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, what
    is the Air Force budget request for test and evaluation activities in
    fiscal year 2008 and how does this compare to the fiscal year 2007 and
    fiscal year 2006 requested and appropriated levels?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The fiscal year 2008 budget
    request for direct funding of Air Force Materiel Command Test and
    Evaluation infrastructure is $929.6 million. The fiscal year 2007
    request was $919.4 million and appropriated was $930.3 million. The
    fiscal year 2006 request was $867.3 million and appropriated was $881.8
    million.
                                     ______

               Questions Submitted by Senator E. Benjamin Nelson
                      total force integration initiatives
        28. Senator Ben Nelson. General Moseley, in your posture statement
    you state that ``a distinguishing hallmark of the Air Force is the ease
    with which airmen from Active-Duty, Air National Guard, and Air Force
    Reserve work together at home and abroad.'' You also note that 136
    total force integration initiatives have been identified and funding
    has been secured for 98. That leaves 38 initiatives unfunded, 2 of
    which happen to be proposed for Offutt Air Force Base (AFB), NE. What
    is your plan to resource those total force integration initiatives you
    do not fund in your fiscal year 2008 budget request?
        General Moseley. Most of the 38 initiatives, including the 2
    Nebraska initiatives you mention, are currently at the ``investigate''
    stage of the process. The Air Force is working closely with the Air
    Force Reserve and the National Guard Bureau to resolve issues regarding
    TFI timelines, funding, manpower, potential locations for emerging
    missions, and new organizational constructs. The Air Force will pursue
    funding in the fiscal year 2010 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for
    these initiatives if the decision is made, after further analysis, to
    proceed.

                              wc-135 modernization
        29. Senator Ben Nelson. General Moseley, I noted two of your stated
    priorities for the Air Force are ``fighting and winning the global war
    on terror,'' and ``recapitalizing and modernizing aging aircraft.'' I
    was pleased to see that you have requested funding to modernize two WC-
    135 Constant Phoenix aircraft in your fiscal year 2008 global war on
    terror budget request. The WC-135 has been instrumental in monitoring
    the nuclear activities of our potential adversaries around the world.
    If you get the $143.8 million you have requested for WC-135
    modernization, will that extend the life of the aircraft to something
    comparable to the KC-135R tanker?
        General Moseley. The $143.8 million estimate is based on $118.8
    million for re-engining and $25 million to upgrade the cockpit
    avionics. The re-engining figure was based on procuring and installing
    two engine kits for the WC-135 aircraft in conjunction with several
    foreign military sales (FMS) re-engining initiatives. The FMS
    initiatives were later cancelled making re-tooling and re-opening the
    engine production line at the Boeing Wichita facility, for only two WC-
    135 aircraft, cost prohibitive. The WC-135 re-engining initiative
    should be withdrawn from the Air Force fiscal year 2008 global war on
    terror request portfolio.
        However, the $25 million needed to upgrade the cockpit avionics of
    the two WC-135 aircraft is still needed. It will enable the two
    aircraft to meet worldwide navigation and communications requirements--
    Communication Navigation Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM).
        Specific to life extension: The Air Force will not need $118.8
    million to obtain the same life expectancy of the KC-135 fleet. The
    current cost of re-engining (without concurrent FMS cases) will be cost
    prohibitive, so the $118.8 million should no longer be considered.
    There are plenty of spare TF-33 engines available to support the WC-135
    aircraft until 2040. All the Air Force needs to do is upgrade the
    cockpit avionics to meet the CNS/ATM requirements for $25 million.

                                      e-4
        30. Senator Ben Nelson. General Moseley, the 2006 QDR proposed to
    retire the four E-4B National Airborne Operations Center aircraft
    assigned to Offutt AFB. I have been told that this decision has since
    been reversed and your posture statement does not show any E-4 aircraft
    being retired through 2013. Does your fiscal year 2008 budget request
    restore full-funding to the E-4 program?
        General Moseley. Sir, the fiscal year 2008 budget restores the
    funding necessary to operate a three aircraft E-4B fleet through the
    FYDP and beyond. The fiscal year 2008 budget also includes funding for
    the minimum number of modifications (mostly crypto updates) necessary
    to keep the three aircraft E-4B fleet mission capable through the FYDP
    and beyond. The fourth E-4B will be retired as soon as practical. The
    Air Force with DOD is conducting an Analysis of Alternatives in fiscal
    year 2008 to replace the E-4B.
                                     ______

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Evan Bayh
                              global hawk shortage
        31. Senator Bayh. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, what is the
    shortage of available Predators, Global Hawks and orbits to stated DOD
    requirements in the field, including for U.S. forces in Iraq;
    Afghanistan; Colombia; and East, South, and Southeast Asia?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Joint Requirements
    Oversight Council (JROC) endorsed the U.S. Special Operations Command
    and U.S. CENTCOM global war on terror demand for increased unmanned
    aircraft systems (UAS) orbits (JROCM 283-05).
        At the same time, the JROC also validated the Air Force's planning
    and programming efforts to build 21 MQ-1 orbits to meet the increased
    global war on terror Predator demand. The Air Force programmed
    additional funds for MQ-1 Predator procurement and sustainment in
    fiscal years 2007-2011 to meet the increased combatant command demand.
    The Predator system architecture and concept of operations (CONOPs) is
    designed with the flexibility to support any COCOM regardless of
    geographic area.
        The RQ-4 Global Hawk is fielding aircraft as soon as they complete
    testing; the first two production models, Block 10, are supporting
    CENTCOM now. The establishment of forward operating locations in U.S.
    Pacific Command and European Command in fiscal year 2009 will add to
    the Air Force's ability to conduct worldwide operations. The program is
    the key element to the transition of high-altitude ISR from the U-2 to
    the Global Hawk and will be accomplished without diminishing required
    capability.

        32. Senator Bayh. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, what is the
    timeline for fully closing this shortage?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Predator will achieve its
    fielded requirement by fiscal year 2010 and the Global Hawk by fiscal
    year 2016.

        33. Senator Bayh. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, has DOD
    requested all necessary funds to keep Predator, Global Hawk, and
    associated orbit production lines running at maximum capacity until the
    shortage is fully closed? If not, why not?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. Yes, with the fiscal year 2007
    global war on terror Supplemental Appropriation, the fiscal year 2008
    President's budget request, and the Predator funding included on our
    fiscal year 2008 Unfunded Priority List (UPL), we have requested all
    the funds necessary to keep Predator production lines running at
    maximum capacity until the shortage, as it is presently defined, is
    fully met. The requirement for Predator combat air patrols (CAP)--
    previously called orbits--continues to expand, and we will undoubtedly
    have to continue at maximum capacity longer than we had previously
    projected.
        The Global Hawk program is currently funded for maximum production
    capacity allowable under the June 2006 Nunn-McCurdy certification.

        34. Senator Bayh. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, what steps
    do you recommend to close this gap?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. We are currently delivering
    Predator aircraft and ground control stations faster than we can train
    the crews to operate them. We are taking steps to expand our training
    capacity by starting a training unit with the California Air National
    Guard. We also need to re-examine the usage rate of our existing crews
    and weigh the increased stress on the crew force against the urgency of
    providing additional CAPs to support our troops in combat.

        35. Senator Bayh. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, does having
    a sole source producer delay meeting Predator production and
    procurement timelines? If so, how can we best open up the competition?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. Thus far, having a single
    source for Predator production has not delayed delivery of combat
    capability. As stated previously, the current delay is in training
    flight crewmembers.
        Previous attempts to broaden the industrial base for this class of
    unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) have not been successful--no other
    offerors came forward. The Air Force has just released another request
    for information to stimulate additional vendors.

        36. Senator Bayh. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, would you
    please provide the 5-year Predator, Global Hawk, and orbit requirement?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The MQ-1 Predator program will
    attain its goal of 21 CAPs for COCOM support by fiscal year 2010;
    continued procurement throughout the rest of the FYDP will provide
    attrition reserve and training systems.
        The RQ-4 Global Hawk is building to its requirement of six Multi-
    Intelligence (multi-INT) CAPs. Within this FYDP, all aircraft will have
    been procured. By fiscal year 2013, the Air Force will have fielded
    four multi-INT CAPs and two IMINT-only CAPs.

        37. Senator Bayh. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, do you
    foresee both armed and ISR, long-endurance UAVs being a long-term and
    growing requirement for the United States Armed Forces?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. As you well know, UAVs of all
    types are providing invaluable, timely information in support of the
    Joint Force Commander's priorities. They provide superb persistent
    support to the warfighter, whether that support is a lethal strike in
    support of troops, long-term eyes on a target of interest, or
    situational awareness on what's over the next hill. For these reasons,
    and all of the other missions fulfilled by UAVs, it is clear that
    demand for them will only increase over the coming years. Allow me to
    also say that it is because of this ever-increasing demand and our need
    for joint interdependence--our asymmetric combat edge that I am seeking
    to be Executive Agent (EA) for all medium- and high-altitude UAVs. The
    intent of the Air Force UAV EA proposal is to increase jointness,
    acquisition efficiency, and warfighting effectiveness in the DOD
    medium- and high-altitude UAV enterprise. We would deeply appreciate
    your support of the Air Force's request to be EA.
                                     ______

             Questions Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton
                              lab personnel issues
        38. Senator Clinton. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, AFRL
    performs some of the most cutting edge research in the world and
    contributes directly and strongly to the global war on terrorism. There
    is concern that the Air Force is not doing enough to ensure that the
    laboratories have adequate facilities or are sufficiently empowered to
    attract and retain the highest quality technical workforce possible.
    Congress has authorized a successful laboratory personnel demonstration
    program that has been effective in addressing some of these issues.
    AFRL is exempted from inclusion into the National Security Personnel
    System (NSPS) until the Secretary of Defense has determined that NSPS
    provides more personnel flexibilities than the AFRL Laboratory
    Personnel Demonstration System authorities. Is the Air Force supportive
    of the AFRL's continued use and expansion of the authorities of the
    Laboratory Personnel Demonstration System?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force supports the
    DOD's goal of one personnel system for its civilian workforce--the
    NSPS. We also recognize the success the AFRL has enjoyed in shaping its
    Scientist and Engineer (S&E) workforce through the flexibilities
    afforded by the Laboratory Personnel Demonstration System, commonly
    referred to as Lab Demo, and will support AFRL's efforts while the
    current exemption remains in effect.

        39. Senator Clinton. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, has the
    Air Force surveyed Air Force laboratory directors to determine if they
    feel that the Laboratory Personnel Demonstration System better supports
    the performance of their missions than the proposed NSPS system?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force has not formally
    surveyed the individual AFRL Technology Directorate Directors regarding
    personnel demonstration efforts; however, given the success that AFRL
    has enjoyed in shaping its S&E workforce through the flexibilities
    afforded by the Laboratory Personnel Demonstration System (i.e., Lab
    Demo), it is expected that most would be highly supportive of Lab Demo.
    However, only the S&Es at AFRL are covered by Lab Demo, leaving
    administrative and other support personnel under the current General
    Schedule (GS)/Wage Grade (WG) personnel systems. AFRL would prefer
    having the opportunity to move these non-Lab Demo employees into NSPS
    in the near-term since this system is better than the current GS/WG
    systems.

                   small business innovation research program
        40. Senator Clinton. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, what role
    does the Air Force Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program
    play in developing new technologies that are supporting Air Force
    missions?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The SBIR program funds early-
    stage R&D at small technology companies and plays an important role in
    supporting Air Force missions by stimulating technological innovation
    and increasing private sector commercialization of Air Force R&D
    efforts. For a relatively small amount of funding--up to $100,000 in
    Phase I and up to $750,000 in Phase II with companies obtaining private
    sector and/or non-SBIR government funding for Phase III--small
    companies are provided an opportunity to test the scientific,
    technical, and commercial merit/feasibility of a particular concept in
    response to SBIR solicitations in topic areas of key interest to the
    Air Force. The fundamental function of SBIR is to seed new and
    innovative firms in the industrial base to meet our current and future
    supply needs by funding exploration and development of new and cost-
    saving technologies relevant to the warfighter. For example, through
    Air Force SBIR and follow-on Manufacturing Technology program efforts
    to enhance the durability and service life of jet engines, LSP
    Technologies, Inc., developed a laser shock peening process that
    significantly improves the high-cycle fatigue properties of blades and
    greatly increases resistance to blade failure caused by foreign object
    debris. This technology has already resulted in the avoidance of tens
    of millions of dollars of fan blade replacement costs, significantly
    reduced secondary damage engine repair costs, and avoided cost from
    airfoil failures, with the potential for up to $1 billion of savings
    across the Air Force fleet going forward.

        41. Senator Clinton. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, how is
    the Air Force ensuring that the best and most innovative small
    businesses in the country are assisting to address our national
    security challenges?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force has embraced the
    flexibility provided by the Commercialization Pilot Program (CPP)
    authorized in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2006 as a key means to ensuring
    the most innovative small businesses are tapped to assist in addressing
    critical national security challenges. The Air Force has implemented
    CPP by placing ``transition agents'' in each Product Center plus the F-
    22 and Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program Offices to enhance synergy
    among the Product Centers, the AFRLs, and small businesses. CPP
    promises to be a powerful tool for our technologists and acquisition
    officials to seed and leverage the best innovative solutions to produce
    technologies for the warfighter and enhance the vitality of the defense
    industrial base by funding these smaller entrepreneurial firms.

            air force command, control, and communications research
        42. Senator Clinton. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, the Air
    Force's fiscal year 2008 budget request reduces funding for S&T
    programs in command, control, and communications capabilities, many of
    which are managed by AFRL in Rome, NY. Given the importance of these
    types of technologies to Air Force missions, to increasing our network-
    centric operations capabilities, and to protecting our vital military
    cyber-infrastructure, what was the reason for the decrease in
    investment in this area?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force recognizes the
    importance of information technology and the valuable contributions of
    the AFRL at Rome, NY--especially with the stand-up of the new
    Cyberspace Command. While near-term reductions were necessary to meet
    higher priority warfighter needs, S&T investment in command, control,
    and communications across the FYDP increased by over $20 million in the
    fiscal year 2008 President's budget request and will continue to have
    great interest as Cyberspace Command's needs in network-centric warfare
    mature.

        43. Senator Clinton. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, what
    risks are we taking by reducing Air Force investment in this area?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. We have taken great measures
    to ensure reductions in this area were taken either in low risk areas
    or in areas that were acceptable to the warfighter. The elimination of
    funding for two research institutes created by the Information
    Directorate (the Information Assurance Institute and the Intelligent
    Information Systems Institute) means that 36 faculty and 18 graduate
    students must compete elsewhere for research grants. The risk
    associated with the reduction from 4 to 3 ATDs, and from 11 to 9
    Critical Experiments planned for the year, as well as scaled back
    participation in both Joint-Service and Air Force exercises in 2008 was
    deemed acceptable by the warfighter.

                          c-5a refurbishment and c-17s
        44. Senator Clinton. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, the Air
    Force's strategic airlift capability depends, to some extent, upon what
    the Air Force plans to do to its C-5 fleet. The Air Force seems to face
    several challenges in addressing the modernization of its C-5 fleet and
    in particular, the C-5A. A recent study, referred to on the Air
    Mobility Command's (AMC) official Web site, shows that 80 percent of
    the C-5 airframes' service-life remains, and that the AMC has begun an
    aggressive program to modernize the C-5. This is to be conducted in two
    parts. First, the C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) which would
    include upgrading its avionics to comply with the Global Air Traffic
    Management requirements, improving navigation and safety equipment, and
    installing a new autopilot system. The second part would re-engine the
    aircraft under the Reliability Enhancement and Re-Engining (RERP)
    program which would include new engines, pylons, and auxiliary power
    units, as well as upgrades to the aircraft's skin, frame, landing gear,
    and pressurization systems. The website does not, however, specify
    which model C-5s will undergo this modernization. In this regard, what
    is the Air Force's vision for the future of the C-5A fleet?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The program of record is to
    fully modernize (AMP and RERP) all 111 C-5s in the inventory to comply
    with the 2005 Mobility Capabilities Study (MCS), as informed by the
    2006 QDR, to meet current and projected strategic airlift needs.
    However, C-5 modernization, specifically RERP, is facing increasing
    cost pressures, bringing into question the cost effectiveness of the
    program for a fleet of 111 aircraft. Additionally, the C-5A fleet is
    showing some significant structural issues (metal corrosion and stress
    cracking) adding to the investment required to maintain the viability
    of this fleet. The average age of the current Air Force fleet is 24
    years with the C-5A fleet being over 35 years old on average. The Air
    Force must consider all these factors for managing our intertheater
    airlift fleet. The Air Force is currently refining the intertheater
    force mix studies with regards to C-5 modernization, C-5A retirement,
    and further C-17 procurement.

        45. Senator Clinton. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, how can
    AMC support its long-term strategic airlift needs, particularly for the
    transportation of out-sized cargo, if the C-5As are not modernized?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force is committed to
    maintaining a strategic airlift fleet capable of meeting the Nation's
    needs. AMC identified seven critical, time-sensitive items or National
    Security Sensitive items that are only airlifted via the C-5. All
    options are being studied to determine the most effective fleet mix of
    strategic airlifters to meet passenger, bulk, over-size, and out-size
    cargo. Current options being considered include retiring a portion of
    the C-5A fleet and recapitalizing with C-17s. The Air Force plans to
    fully modernize the right number of C-5 aircraft to ensure meeting the
    Nation's needs.

        46. Senator Clinton. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, what will
    happen to units currently flying the C-5A if they are not modernized
    under the AMP and RERP programs?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. Under options being studied by
    the Air Force, units currently flying C-5A aircraft would retain a
    strategic airlift mission. There are no plans to close existing units
    or stand up new units at this time.

                 new york air national guard 106th rescue wing
        47. Senator Clinton. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, New York
    is proud to have the Air National Guard's 106th Rescue Wing whose Para-
    Rescuemen (PJs) have deployed on multiple occasions in support of
    combat operations to both Afghanistan and Iraq since September 11,
    2001. This is in addition to the search and rescue work they perform at
    home during peacetime. Additionally, Cable News Network recently aired
    a special on PJs stationed at the 106th Rescue Wing, West Hampton
    Beach, NY, and highlighted their intense training and the dangerous
    mission profile they support.
        The depleted Air National Guard military construction (MILCON)
    budget cannot afford to fund the construction of the facility or repair
    the housing, storage, and training facilities that the 106th PJ unit
    currently operates from. How can we let such a high value unit, whose
    value and service to country are without question, continue to operate
    in buildings which don't meet the Air Force's own requirements for PJ
    facilities?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The 106th Rescue Wing is
    essential to the Air National Guard's future mission capability, as
    well as to the citizens of West Hampton Beach and the Northeast, who
    depend upon their capabilities in peacetime. However, in an era of
    fiscal constraints, there was not sufficient funding available to
    support the first phase of the PJ facility replacement in the
    President's budget in fiscal year 2008.

        48. Senator Clinton. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, with the
    106th preparing to return to Iraq this fall, what are the Air Force's
    plans to provide funding to begin Phase I?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The project is currently shown
    on the Air National Guard MILCON FYDP in fiscal year 2013 at $8.4
    million.

        49. Senator Clinton. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, will the
    Department take appropriate action to budget for the second phase of
    this project in fiscal year 2009?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The $15.4 million project
    (Phase 1 and 2) will be considered with all other high-priority
    requirements in the Air Force's fiscal year 2009 budget deliberations.
    If sufficient funding can be made available, we are hopeful the project
    will be included with the President's budget submittal for fiscal year
    2009.

                     the northeast defense sector facility
        50. Senator Clinton. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, the
    Northeast Defense Sector (NEADS) facility in Rome, NY, will be assuming
    responsibility to monitor all air traffic in the eastern sector of the
    United States and provide Air Combat Command (ACC) with threat warning
    of any hostile aircraft. The NEADS headquarters facility was phased
    with funding provided in fiscal year 2006 for Phase I. While Phase II
    was authorized in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007, the project was not
    executed since the Guard's MILCON budget was not sizeable enough to
    enable it to be in the President's budget request, necessitating that
    it be added by Congress. Indeed, the 2007 Continuing Resolution in
    essence struck congressional construction adds for fiscal year 2007,
    which means the project remains unfunded.
        Given the criticality of the NEADS mission and the need to complete
    this facility so that all the NEADS personnel can be housed in a
    centralized facility to ensure maximum command, control, and
    communication among its personnel in this time-sensitive mission, what
    steps is the Air Force taking to address the NEADS Phase II project,
    and systemically, the need to mitigate this Guard MILCON shortfall?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The NEADS unit is essential to
    the Air National Guard's future mission capability, as well as to the
    citizens of the Northeast. Congress added MILCON funding for Phase I of
    the NEADS program in fiscal year 2006. As part of the fiscal year 2007
    budget process, Congress authorized, but did not appropriate, $6.6
    million for NEADS Phase II. If Congress can provide an appropriation
    for this previously-authorized project, it will be executed as soon as
    possible. Should the second phase not be appropriated, the project will
    be considered with all other high-priority requirements in the Air
    Force's fiscal year 2009 budget deliberations, and if sufficient
    funding can be made available, the project may be included with the
    President's budget submittal for fiscal year 2009.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
                    government accountability office reports
        51. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Wynne, when a Government
    Accountability Office (GAO) report concerning the Air Force is
    released, who within the Air Force is responsible for reading and
    evaluating the report?
        Secretary Wynne. My Financial Policy and Compliance Office,
    Financial Operations, Financial Management, and Comptroller, receive
    GAO reports that address the Air Force, read and assign reports to the
    appropriate Air Force Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR). The Air
    Force OPR reads, evaluates, prepares, and submits comments to the
    responsible DOD office. The responsible DOD office prepares and submits
    the Department's position and comments to the GAO. Our Air Force
    Instruction 65-401, relations with the GAO, implements the DOD audit
    policy and procedures. The GAO issues all reports to the GAO Liaison
    Office, Inspector General, DOD. The GAO Liaison Office releases all
    reports to the appropriate DOD office and the military Services,
    including the Air Force.

        52. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Wynne, what do you think is the
    quality and caliber of GAO reports relating to the Air Force?
        Secretary Wynne. The GAO reports are usually of high quality and
    another effective management tool.

        53. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Wynne, what are your specific
    concerns with GAO reports relating to the Air Force and what would you
    like to see done differently with the reports and investigations?
        Secretary Wynne. We have always and will continue to support the
    GAO projects within the Air Force. We have a great working relationship
    with the GAO.

        54. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Wynne, does the Air Force formally
    respond to GAO reports that contain unfavorable findings? If so, how is
    this done?
        Secretary Wynne. The Air Force responds to all GAO reports through
    the responsible DOD office.

        55. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Wynne, how has the Air Force
    responded to GAO's findings associated with the C-130 AMP, C-130J, C-5
    AMP, and C-5 RERP programs covered in the testimony of William Solis
    and Michael Sullivan (captured in GAO-07-566T)? This testimony captures
    findings from previous GAO reports and I would like to know precisely
    how the Air Force has addressed and/or rebutted the findings that
    concern each of these programs.
        Secretary Wynne. The referenced GAO product is a testimony (GAO-07-
    566T) and the GAO Liaison Office normally issues testimonies as
    information and not for comments. Upon receipt, we distribute
    testimonies to our responsible office. For the GAO subject testimony,
    we provided our comments to the appropriate DOD office for the two GAO
    reports addressed in this testimony. The Department's comments usually
    reflect our concerns or rebuttals of the GAO findings.

                                 heavy airlift
        56. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Wynne, you have indicated that
    based on known, communicated airlift requirements, you do not believe
    that the Air Force should purchase additional C-17 aircraft. Can you
    please clarify what the precise known, communicated requirements are
    that have led you to this conclusion?
        Secretary Wynne. The 2006 QDR, as informed by the MCS, identified
    the number of organic and commercial strategic airlift assets needed to
    support the NMS. The study concluded that the capabilities provided by
    180 C-17s and 112 modernized and reliability improved C-5s support the
    strategy with acceptable risk. The current program of record includes
    the 10 additional C-17s from the fiscal year 2006 Defense
    Appropriations Act Conference Report which will bring our strategic
    airlift fleet to 301 (190 C-17s and 111 fully modernized C-5s). This
    programmed fleet, when fully mobilized and augmented by the Civil
    Reserve Airlift Fleet, provides sufficient airlift capacity to support
    U.S. strategic and operational objectives during large-scale
    deployments, while concurrently supporting other high priority
    operations and sustainment of forward deployed forces.
        We fully recognize that circumstances have developed beyond the
    scenarios studied in the MCS which must be addressed. The Office of the
    Secretary of Defense (OSD) is currently planning a follow-on mobility
    study to address these changes and the Air Force will be an active
    participant. Additionally, AMC, through the United States
    Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), is currently engaged with the joint
    community to help define the scope of the planned Army/Marine Corps end
    strength increase and its impacts on air mobility.
        Neither the most recent MCS published in 2005 nor the follow-on
    excursions in MCS-06 included the force structure increases. OSD and
    the Joint Staff anticipate the next MCS round to begin in the Spring of
    2008. This study should fully incorporate and examine the changes to
    Service force structure and concepts of operation, as well as impacts
    on mobility (air, land, sea, and prepositioning).

        57. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Wynne, in your understanding, who
    is responsible for communicating and determining airlift requirements?
        Secretary Wynne. The determination of airlift requirements is a
    joint collaborative effort led by AMC. AMC works with U.S. TRANSCOM and
    other combatant commands to identify gaps and shortfalls in the Air
    Force's ability to meet warfighter needs. These gaps and shortfalls are
    determined using a capabilities-based approach that assesses both
    current and future operational needs against overarching strategic
    guidance (National Defense Strategy, QFR, Strategic Planning Guidance,
    et cetera). The requirements are born ``joint'' from the results of the
    capabilities-based planning and analyses phases of the requirements
    development process.
        Once the airlift requirements have been determined they are
    communicated across the Air Force and joint communities to ensure
    redundancy is eliminated and the proposed requirements will fulfill the
    needs, or mitigate the majority of operational risk associated with the
    identified capability gaps and shortfalls. Inputs from across the Air
    Force and Joint communities are addressed and incorporated, as
    appropriate, prior to the final Air Force validation step, conducted by
    a formal Air Force requirements council. Once the Air Force has
    validated the airlift requirements, they are forwarded to the JROC via
    the established Joint Capabilities Development and Integration System
    review process. Once the airlift requirements are formally approved by
    the JROC, they are provided to the acquisition community to support the
    appropriate development and procurement strategy.

        58. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Wynne, what specific role does the
    Air Force have in identifying requirements and then determining
    required airlift assets?
        Secretary Wynne. The Air Force capability development process is
    closely linked and complies with the joint overarching process known as
    the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). The
    Air Force participates in this process utilizing inputs from industry
    and other government organizations by conducting the necessary analyses
    that address capability gaps and shortfalls substantiated by the end-
    user combatant commands. Upon completion of the capabilities-based
    analysis, the results are validated and the sponsoring major command is
    assigned the task of developing the appropriate JCIDS requirements
    document. Each JCIDS document is formally reviewed and validated by an
    Air Force requirements council before the document is forwarded to the
    appropriate Service or joint approving authority, depending upon the
    scope and level of joint interest established for the program by the
    Joint Staff gatekeeper. Air Mobility Command, in coordination with
    TRANSCOM, utilizes critical analyses and results of directed studies to
    determine numbers of assets associated with airlift requirements. These
    operational capabilities and their analytically based numbers (proper
    fleet size and fleet mix) are documented within the Air Force JCIDS
    products.

        59. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Wynne, has the Air Force studied
    the cost of shutting down the C-17 line and then having to restart the
    line if a need for additional C-17s arises? What is the total cost?
        Secretary Wynne. Boeing completed a study in October 2006 that
    addressed two possible shutdown options. The first option was a
    ``complete shutdown,'' in which all tooling, test equipment, and data
    needed to sustain the weapon system would be retained with disposition
    of all other production equipment and facilities. Boeing estimates the
    shutdown cost to be $1.03 billion. The government is working on an
    estimate and expects the number to be lower. This estimate includes
    saving select tooling for future Air Force Air Logistics Center use.
    The second option studied was a ``warm shutdown,'' where all production
    equipment and facilities would be ``mothballed'' with the assumption
    that production would restart within a 2-year period. Boeing priced
    this option at $918 million. This estimate did not include the costs
    associated with completely shutting down the production line or any
    cost to restart production. The Air Force would have to fund additional
    costs associated with completing a shutdown after the mothball period.
        The cost of restarting C-17 production after a period of shutdown
    is dependent on a variety of factors. A production break will result in
    loss of learning (production expertise decreases) and loss of the
    supplier base, causing longer production times and higher overall
    aircraft production cost.

        60. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Wynne, do you believe that the
    Army and Marine Corps have sufficiently identified the airlift
    requirements that will be associated with a total increase in end
    strength of 92,000 personnel? If so, what have they identified? If not,
    what have you done to request that they identify the increased
    requirement since you will need to budget for increased assets, if they
    are deemed necessary?
        Secretary Wynne. Army and Marine Corps (AMC), through TRANSCOM, is
    currently engaged with the joint community to help define the scope of
    the planned Army/Marine Corps end strength increase and its impacts on
    air mobility. Quantifiable insights in response to this question are
    anticipated in the early June 2007 timeframe.
        Neither the most recent Mobility Capability Study (MCS) published
    in 2005 nor the follow-on excursions in MCS-06 included the force
    structure in question. The OSD and the Joint Staff anticipate the next
    MCS round to begin in the spring of 2008. This study should fully
    incorporate and examine the changes to Service force structure and
    impacts on mobility (air, land, sea, and prepositioning).

                   future combat systems airlift requirement
        61. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Wynne, General Schoomaker recently
    indicated to me that he believes program managers in the Army's Future
    Combat Systems (FCS) program have clearly communicated potential
    airlift requirements associated with FCS fielding, and particularly
    that they have communicated requirements for the C-17. Do you feel the
    Army has sufficiently communicated airlift requirements for FCS
    fielding?
        Secretary Wynne. On 13 May 2003, airlift requirements for the
    Army's FCS were established in the JROC approved Operational
    Requirements Document (ORD). The ORD contains a key performance
    parameter (KPP) requirement for air transportability.
        As development of the FCS continues to evolve, the transportability
    KPP is being revised and aircraft specific constructs will continue
    their development. The Transportability Certification Working Group
    (Air Force, Army, TRANSCOM, and contractors) continually meets in order
    to define emerging requirements, including C-17 transportability, as
    the FCS specifications become more clearly defined.

        62. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Wynne, what exactly has the Air
    Force received from the Army concerning FCS airlift requirements?
        Secretary Wynne. Airlift requirements for the Army's FCS were
    established in the ORD which was approved by the JROC of 13 May 2003.
    The ORD contains the following KPP requirement for transportability,
    which includes air transportability: The FCS Family of Systems must be
    transportable worldwide by air, sea, highway, and rail modes to support
    intertheater strategic deployment and intratheater operational
    maneuver.
        As development of the FCS continues to evolve, the transportability
    KPP is being revised and aircraft-specific constructs will continue
    their development. The Transportability Certification Working Group
    (Air Force, Army, TRANSCOM, and contractors) continually meets in order
    to define emerging requirements as the FCS specifications become more
    clearly defined. Additionally, the FCS CONOPs is still evolving and as
    the FCS family of systems matures, transportability concepts of
    operations will develop and more clearly define transportation
    requirements.

                           mobility capability study
        63. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Wynne, many have attacked the
    adequacy of the MCS. While I know that this is a study undertaken under
    the auspices of the OSD, what have you communicated to OSD about
    updating the study?
        Secretary Wynne. Senator, the MCS recognized that further work
    remains to be done as the DOD moves forward in refining mobility
    requirements and making decisions for recapitalizing the Department's
    mobility assets. The Deputy Secretary of Defense said as much in his
    December 19, 2005, cover memo accompanying publication of the MCS that
    further work has taken shape in a group of substudies that has come to
    be known, collectively, as MCS-06. Each of these substudies has
    included or includes appropriate representation from the Air Force
    staff. My representatives to these MCS-06 studies--and to any full-
    scale update to the MCS that may be proposed--will ensure that our
    concerns about the changing strategic environment are being considered.

        64. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Wynne, do you feel comfortable
    with the MCS and relying upon it to make program decisions such as
    shutting down the C-17 line?
        Secretary Wynne. The 2005 MCS, as informed by the 2006 QDR,
    determined that a fleet of 292 strategic airlift aircraft meets the
    lower bound with acceptable risk. Since the completion of this study,
    the C-17 programmed fleet has increased from 180 aircraft to 190 and we
    have lost one C-5. The resulting 301 strategic airlift aircraft, when
    fully mobilized and augmented by the Civil Reserve Airlift Fleet,
    provides sufficient airlift capacity to support U.S. strategic and
    operational objectives during large-scale deployments, while
    concurrently supporting other high priority operations and sustainment
    of forward deployed forces.
        We fully recognize that circumstances have developed beyond the
    scenarios studied in the MCS which must be addressed. The OSD is
    currently planning a follow-on mobility study to address these changes
    and the Air Force will be an active participant. This study is
    scheduled to begin in spring 2008. Additionally, AMC, through the
    TRANSCOM, is currently engaged with the joint community to help define
    the scope of the planned Army/Marine Corps end strength increase and
    its impacts on air mobility. However, the decision needs to be made now
    as to whether or not to close the C-17 production line. Under current
    MCS requirements, 300 strategic airlifters is sufficient. Therefore,
    with current congressional restrictions against retiring C-5 aircraft,
    the Air Force will maintain the fiscal year 2008 PB program of record.

        65. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Wynne, using the current MCS as a
    baseline, if Congress gives you authority to retire some C-5s, how
    quickly would you seek to retire aircraft and how soon would you seek
    to place additional purchase orders for C-17 aircraft to replace C-5s?
        Secretary Wynne. The Air Force is currently exploring all options
    to effectively manage the strategic airlift fleet. If granted the
    ability to manage the Air Force fleet without congressional
    restriction, the Air Force will take all factors into account in order
    to maintain capability for the Nation while exercising fiscal
    responsibility. Studies at AMC and the Air Staff are ongoing to ensure
    current and future airlift requirements are met. There is no firm plan,
    today, to retire a certain number of aircraft on a given timeline.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
                              b-52 force structure
        66. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, the Air
    Force has been struggling for several years on how best to provide a
    way forward on airborne electronic attack and stand-off jamming
    capabilities. Among the many options under consideration is the
    venerable B-52 platform performing a key, enabling role. The
    President's fiscal year 2008 budget request funds 56 total aircraft
    inventory (TAI) with 32 combat coded B-52s. The John Warner NDAA for
    Fiscal Year 2007 requires 44 combat coded B-52s and prohibits retiring
    more than 18. Given the importance of B-52s in the current bomber force
    structure, and potential for an increased role in airborne electronic
    attack, why should Congress consider retiring any more B-52s than
    currently allowed?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. Many challenges face the DOD
    and managing an aging bomber fleet while simultaneously navigating
    transformation to face emerging threats are but two. The Department's
    roadmap for long-range strike reflects a balanced approach focused on
    transformation and recapitalization while managing operational risk.
        Paramount to our Nation's security is the operational need to
    project combat power over long distances for long durations with
    adequate payloads. To meet this requirement, the Air Force's three-
    phase strategy for long-range strike modernizes current bombers,
    develops a complementary capability fielding in 2018, and continues
    technology development for a transformational capability in 2035.
    Integral to the three-phase long-range strike strategy is divestiture
    of 20 B-52s as reflected in the fiscal year 2008 President's budget
    which results in an estimated $1.44 billion cost avoidance across the
    FYDP. The 56 B-52s funded in the program of record are still capable of
    meeting any single COCOM requirement. In accordance with phase 1 of the
    three-phase strategy, the fiscal year 2008 President's budget maintains
    bomber sustainment and modernization investments in excess of $4.1
    billion.
        The B-52 may play a significant role in advance electronic attack
    and as such, the force structure contained in fiscal year 2008 program
    of record is adequate to support that future role. Under the proposed
    Core Component Jammer (CCJ) program, the B-52 retains its traditional
    combat capability concurrent with a stand-off jam capability. Air
    Staff, Major Command (MAJCOM), and independent sufficiency studies/
    analyses all indicate that CCJ requires 30 aircraft with 24 jammer
    shipsets, which is well within the requested B-52 force structure in
    the fiscal year 2008 President's budget.

                     joint strike fighter alternate engine
        67. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, Congress
    acted last year to restore funding for the development of a second
    engine for the JSF and required several reports on the acquisition
    strategy for the JSF engine program. The Department has acted contrary
    to that direction, and has, once again, eliminated funding for a second
    source before the required reports are evaluated. Can you please
    describe the Department's rationale for overturning the statutory
    guidance Congress provided for the JSF engine procurement before the
    results of the required studies have been completed?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Department believes it is
    prudent to await the results of the three congressionally-directed
    independent studies prior to investing further in a second engine
    source for the F-35. The three studies were conducted by the GAO,
    Institute for Defence Analyses, and Cost Analysis Improvement Group to
    re-examine the procurement and life cycle cost impacts from terminating
    the alternate engine program. Final reports are still being written and
    should be finished by June 2007.

        68. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, does the
    Air Force support this DOD decision? Why or why not?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force supports the
    DOD's decision to cancel F136 development due to acceptable risk and
    constrained budgets, but sees the potential benefit of a second engine
    source if funding were available.

                         strategic airlift requirements
        69. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne, the Department's MCS,
    submitted with the 2007 President's budget request, determined that 292
    strategic lift aircraft were necessary to meet our national security
    requirements. The Air Force proposed to meet this requirement by
    completing the C-17 program at 180 aircraft and modernizing the
    operating force of 112 C-5 Galaxys. In the John Warner NDAA for Fiscal
    Year 2007, Congress, in fact, appropriated an additional 10 C-17s above
    the Air Force's 2007 request, resulting in a total fleet of 190 C-17s.
        The fiscal year 2008 President's budget request provides no funding
    for additional C-17 aircraft, effectively shutting down production on
    the program. The budget request does include robust funding for C-5
    modernization throughout the FYDP. While this appears to be entirely
    consistent with the Department's stated airlift requirements, Air Force
    leadership has been quoted on more than one occasion since this budget
    was submitted, stating the desire to retire the 60 C-5A model aircraft.
    To further complicate the matter, the C-5 modernization program is
    experiencing early cost growth and may be reporting a Nunn-McCurdy
    breach in the year ahead. What actions are you taking to address the
    cost growth associated with C-5 modernization in order to keep this
    critical program on track?
        Secretary Wynne. The C-5 RERP program is experiencing cost growth
    pressures due to increases in touch labor, engines, and pylon costs.
    The program office is in daily contact with the contractor to address
    these program issues and mitigate those cost pressures. A detailed Air
    Force cost estimating effort is underway to determine the extent of the
    cost growth and to develop a service cost position. The program of
    record is to complete AMP and RERP modifications for 111 C-5 aircraft.

        70. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne, early test results indicate
    that the C-5 modernization program will achieve its targeted
    reliability improvements, so how do you overturn the longstanding
    business case that argues to modernize rather than replace the existing
    C-5A airlift fleet?
        Secretary  Wynne.  The  Air  Force  remains  confident  in  the
    technical  aspects  of C-5 RERP. However, continued cost growth and
    program delays are bringing into question the cost effectiveness of the
    program. The cost growth to C-5 RERP combined with the high cost of
    potential C-17 line shut-down and restart indicate the need to re-
    evaluate the business case of RERPing C-5 aircraft versus the benefits
    of procuring additional C-17s.
        The Air Force is currently refining the inter-theater force mix
    studies for C-5 modernization, C-5A retirement, and further C-17
    procurement. Additionally, OSD is currently planning to begin a follow-
    on mobility study in spring 2008 to address force requirements.
        We desire to continue the recapitalization of Air Force aircraft.
    Hence, we are requesting permission to manage the Air Force fleet in
    order to be able to make timely decisions about aircraft retirements.

        71. Senator McCain. General Moseley, would you please clarify your
    strategic airlift requirements, and how you would propose to meet these
    requirements if authorized to retire C-5As and acquire more C-17s?
        General Moseley. The 2005 MCS calls for a range of 292 to 383
    strategic lift assets (combination of C-5s and C-17s). The 2007 NDAA
    calls for a minimum of 299 tails. Today, we have 190 C-17s and 111 C-5s
    in the program of record (301 total tails). For every C-5A we might
    retire, we need to replace at least 1-for-1 with a C-17 to preserve the
    minimum capacity needed in MCS.

               medium and high altitude unmanned aerial vehicles
        72. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, in a March
    5, 2007, memorandum General Moseley spelled out the case for the Air
    Force to become the EA for all medium- and high-altitude UAVs. General
    Moseley stated his desire to follow up with a comprehensive plan to
    optimize the Nation's ISR assets. This committee has long supported
    jointness over parochial interests when it comes to acquisition of
    military capabilities, however, programs such as the Joint Air-to-
    Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range, Joint Standoff Weapon, and the
    Joint Common Missile (JCM) give pause. Why does the Air Force think
    their role as the EA would be more successful than previous joint
    procurement efforts?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force has already
    demonstrated successful acquisition and fielding of UAVs to support
    warfighters at all combat echelons, particularly with its medium- and
    high-altitude aircraft, Predator and Global Hawk.

              1. From an acquisition and logistics perspective, the Army's
            Warrior is nearly identical to the Predator; similarly, the
            Navy's BAMS UAV requirements could be fulfilled by a variant of
            the Air Force's Global Hawk or Reaper. Unique Service solutions
            waste valuable resources through duplication of effort;
            stovepiped collection, processing, and dissemination
            architectures; unsynchronized command and control; and
            unnecessary competition for bandwidth and spectrum.
              2. The role of the Air Force in conducting warfare from the
            air, through space, and in cyberspace--as well as the assigned
            missions of the Air Force--make assignment of EA to the Air
            Force for medium- and high-altitude UAVs the right decision.
            Per DOD Directive 5100.1, the Air Force is directed to
            ``organize, train and equip, and provide forces for Close Air
            Support and tactical air reconnaissance.''

                      a. The DOD could potentially save nearly $1.7 billion
                    in the current FYDP with an integrated approach to the
                    acquisition of medium- and high-altitude UAVs.
                      b. Combining the MQ-1 Predator, MQ-1C Warrior, RQ-4
                    Global Hawk, Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS),
                    and MQ-9 Reaper programs could save $619 million (MQ-1C
                    Warrior) and $1102 million (BAMS) through purchase
                    economies of scale, production efficiencies, and
                    integrated priorities.
                      c. DOD would not have to pay twice for duplicative
                    cost categories if consolidated contracts are
                    maintained for the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-1C Warrior
                    programs, as well as RQ-4 Global Hawk and BAMS.

              3. Air Force has demonstrated its ability to field as much
            Predator, Global Hawk, and Reaper capability as possible.

                      a. The Air Force nearly doubled Predator acquisition
                    by reprogramming $2.3 billion in the fiscal year 2007
                    budget submission.
                      b. Air Force's fiscal year 2008 budget includes
                    nearly $13 billion to buy 241 UAVs--a 265 percent
                    increase in UAVs over the previous baseline to equip 12
                    Total Force Predator squadrons (battalion equivalents):
                    12 CAPs by April 2007 and 21 CAPs by 2010.

                         recapitalization of c-130 e/h
        73. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne, a review recently conducted by
    the Air Force recommended a number of courses of action to ensure the
    long-term readiness of the C-130 fleet. What were the underlying
    assumptions of the review?
        Secretary Wynne. The Air Force Fleet Viability Board analyzed the
    technical health, aircraft availability, and cost of ownership in the
    C-130E/H1. The underlying assumptions were:

              1. Period of assessment is from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal
            year 2030.
              2. C-130Es and C-130H1s (H1s include three ``super Es'') were
            assessed as separate fleets.
              3. Fleet size remained constant throughout the assessment
            period (assumed no attrition or retirements) for all options.

                      a. 118 C-130E aircraft (does not include 51 fiscal
                    year 2007 approved for retirement and 1 attrition
                    aircraft).
                      b. 47 C-130H1 aircraft.

              4. Average flight hours per aircraft per fiscal year (pulled
            from C-130 flying hour database system) used to project future
            flight hours.
              5. C-130E and C-130H1 will continue on a 69 month (5.75 year)
            Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM) cycle.
              6. Assume aircraft will undergo PDMs at same source of repair
            across the assessment period.
              7. Ogden-ALC (Hill AFB, UT) will continue to be the only
            organic source for C-130H1 PDM aircraft.
              8. All cost information presented in budget year 2006
            dollars.
              9. Center-wing box service life is 45,000 Equivalent Baseline
            Hours (EBH) and outer wing service life is 60,000 (EBH).
              10. System Program Manager continues to accept the
            ``serious'' risk for rainbow fittings past 24,000 EBH.
              11. When CWB repairs are completed in accordance with Time
            Compliance Technical Order 1908 aircraft operations are
            unrestricted between 38,000 and 45,000 EBH.

        74. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne, does the C-130J have a center-
    wing box?
        Secretary Wynne. Yes, the C-130J has a center-wing box structure.

        75. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne, is the center-wing box on the
    C-130 E/H similar to the center-wing box on the C-130J?
        Secretary Wynne. Yes, it is basically the same center-wing box.

        76. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne, do you think we should replace
    the center-wing boxes on the C-130 Es and Hs? If not, why not?
        Secretary Wynne. We recommend replacing the center-wing boxes on
    aircraft that will remain viable in the future. We currently have 170
    aircraft in our C-130E fleet with an average age of 43 years. The NDAA
    for Fiscal Year 2007 language authorized up to 51 E-model retirements
    this year. The Air Force will continue to manage the C-130E fleet,
    including recommending the optimum number of aircraft for retirement,
    in order to maximize combat capability while minimizing excessive
    maintenance requirements and repair costs. The last E-models are
    scheduled for retirement in fiscal year 2014.
        For the remaining C-130 fleet we plan to replace the center-wing
    boxes as well as to complete an AMP.

        77. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne, the repairs are requested in
    the President's budget and the Air Force unfunded priority list. How
    much is included on the list for repairs?
        Secretary Wynne. For those aircraft that have reached 38,000 EBHs,
    we inspect and repair the center-wing box as necessary to allow us to
    continue to fly the aircraft until it is grounded at 45,000 EBH. The
    cost for these inspections and repairs is between $700,000-$800,000,
    depending on the extent of repairs and is funded with O&M dollars.
        The only viable option for extending service life is the center-
    wing box replacement. We have a total of $645.3 million in the current
    FYDP (fiscal year 2008-fiscal year 2013) for center-wing box
    replacement. There is currently no requirement on the unfunded priority
    list for C-130 center-wing boxes.

        78. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne, Air Force documents reveal
    that the center-wing box is the ``long pole in the tent'' in terms of
    aging aircraft issues with the C-130. Repair/refurbishment of the
    center-wing box extends the life of the C-130 by 20 years. Is this
    correct?
        Secretary Wynne. There is no repair/refurbishment program to extend
    the life beyond 45,000 EBH. Our current inspection and repair program
    serves to remove restrictions between 38,000 and 45,000 EBH, when the
    aircraft ``grounds.'' The replacement resets the service life. When we
    replace the center-wing boxes and complete the AMP, our projections are
    that we will gain approximately 25-30 years life extension, depending
    on the flying profile (how fast the fleet accumulates EBH).

        79. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne, according to Air Force
    documents, costs for center-wing box repairs of C-130 E/H models could
    be accomplished for $6-$9 million per aircraft compared as to as much
    as $100 million for a new C-130J. Other key recapitalization efforts
    such as AMP and re-engining could be accomplished for $6 million and $2
    million respectively. Is this correct? If you challenge these
    recapitalization costs, please provide certified data.
        Secretary Wynne. C-130E/H center-wing box replacement cost $6-$9
    million per aircraft. The acquisition cost for a combat delivery C-130J
    based on the current C-130J multi-year contract is $75 million. The
    average procurement unit cost for C-130 AMP is $11.8 million, based on
    the December 2006 Selected Acquisition Report submitted to Congress in
    April 2007. The C-130 Fleet Viability Board has estimated the cost to
    upgrade the C-130E engines to a C-130H configuration at $6 million per
    aircraft.

        80. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne, has the Air Force decided on a
    course of action to ensure the long-term readiness of the C-130 fleet?
        Secretary Wynne. Our current plan is to retire aircraft that have
    passed their useful lives, and recapitalize to replace these aircraft.
    For the remaining legacy C-130H fleet, our plan is to replace center-
    wing boxes and complete an AMP. This plan will extend the useful life
    of our C-130 fleet by 25-30 years which will provide the needed time to
    develop a replacement for this capability.

                           unfunded requirements list
        81. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, this year,
    the Air Force submitted a $16.9 billion unfunded requirements list.
    This is twice as large as the Army's, six times as large as the Marine
    Corps', and three times the size of last year's Air Force request. Why
    do you have such a large unfunded requirements list?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. We've been at war for 16 years
    while transforming into a smaller, leaner, and more capable force.
    We've had to balance our resources to fight today and be ready for
    tomorrow's fight. Despite that tenuous balance, the Air Force faces
    significant challenges in recapitalizing air and space forces, putting
    our future fighting capabilities at great risk. The crisis in
    recapitalization must be corrected.
        The fiscal year 2008 UPL highlights critical requirements the Air
    Force could not afford within our current fiscal year 2008 President's
    budget. The UPL requirements address our top priorities: fighting and
    winning the global war on terror, developing and caring for airmen and
    their families, and recapitalizing and modernizing our aging aircraft
    and spacecraft. This includes key capabilities in: (1) Global Mobility
    such as additional C-130Js and C-37s and modernization of defensive
    systems; (2) Global Vigilance where our COCOMs demand more Predator and
    Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance systems; and (3) Global
    Power where we need to upgrade aging legacy systems and provide
    additional targeting pods.
        Over the past 2 fiscal years, we have intensified our effort to
    reset/recapitalize Air Force aircraft and equipment. The fiscal year
    2008 UPL is reflective of this effort.

                                missile defense
        82. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, Admiral
    Fallon, Commander of U.S. CENTCOM, has told this committee that our
    missile defense capabilities need to pace the threat. Likewise, General
    Craddock, Commander of U.S. European Command, has told this committee
    that ``rogue states in the Middle East and Southwest Asia possess a
    current ballistic missile capability that threatens a major portion of
    Europe.'' In light of these comments by the COCOMs, do you agree that
    DOD should accord a priority to the successful testing and fielding of
    the current generation of ballistic missile defense capabilities in
    numbers sufficient to stay ahead of the growing threat?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The COCOMs are in the best
    position to determine the risks to their commands and are absolutely
    correct about the urgency of the current ballistic missile threat. Our
    intelligence estimates indicate an even more challenging threat in the
    future due to proliferation and advanced technologies.
        The Air Force develops much of the intelligence that characterizes
    the threat and has broad responsibility for air and missile defense.
    The Air Force and the other military departments support the efforts of
    the Missile Defense Agency to develop a layered, integrated ballistic
    missile defense system capable of defending the United States, its
    deployed forces, and its friends and allies from the weapons delivered
    via ballistic missiles. We also currently support a Joint Staff-led
    effort in conjunction with the other Services, combatant commands, and
    the Missile Defense Agency to assess emerging ballistic defense
    operational requirements given this growing threat.
        There is a continuous effort to balance resources required to
    develop the capabilities needed to defeat the current threat against
    those required for future technologies that will put us in a position
    to make ballistic missiles a lower value option for potential
    adversaries.
        The Air Force is working aggressively to help improve the COCOMs'
    capabilities to disrupt, deny, and defeat ballistic missiles before
    they can be launched, and is working to increase passive defense
    capabilities enabling the continuation of operations should such
    missiles impact our forward bases.
        It is a team effort among the combatant commands, military
    departments, and Missile Defense Agency to keep pace with emerging and
    future threats. The combined efforts of the Services and the Missile
    Defense Agency have struck an appropriate balance between fielding
    current capabilities and developing ``leap-ahead'' technology to ensure
    our continued battlefield dominance despite the proliferation of these
    weapons.

                              prompt global strike
        83. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, the 2001
    Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) stated the need to provide the President
    with a broad array of nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to bolster
    deterrence and defense against the new threats we face today. One such
    recommendation was the development of long-range, conventionally armed
    strike systems, also known as ``Prompt Global Strike (PGS)''
    capabilities. The 2006 QDR reinforced this recommendation. Yet 5 years
    since the NPR we seem to be without a viable PGS system under
    development. Will you explain the strategic requirement for PGS
    capabilities and summarize current plans to acquire such capabilities?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The strategic requirements for
    PGS stem from the U.S. Strategic Command validated requirement to
    strike globally, precisely, and rapidly against high-payoff, time-
    sensitive targets in a single or multi-theater environment even when
    the United States has no military presence in a region. With our
    current capability, we can't effectively engage emerging high valued
    targets without either having forces prepositioned, or executing a
    nuclear response. This capability gap is documented in the JROC
    approved PGS Initial Capability Document.
        The Air Force is currently working two interrelated initiatives to
    address this gap:

              (1) Air Force Space Command is engaged in a PGS technology
            demonstration program designed to evolve, mature, and integrate
            critical PGS technologies that support the Command's vision for
            fielding a mid-term (fiscal years 2014/2015) Conventional
            Strike Missile (CSM) capability. As envisioned, CSM will use
            existing commercial/excess rocket motors to boost a medium-
            lift-to-drag hypersonic glide vehicle capable of dispensing
            requalified off-the-shelf munitions at global ranges from the
            CONUS. Central to this effort is the development and packaging
            of a suite of mitigating measures associated with CSM that
            address congressional concerns regarding misinterpretation of
            intent (e.g., geographically separated basing, on-site
            inspections, unique trajectories, and non-provocative mission
            planning).
              (2) The PGS Analysis of Alternatives is a joint study led by
            Air Force Space Command. It is scheduled for completion in
            March 2008 and examines long-term (fiscal year 2020 and beyond)
            materiel solutions.

                chinese anti-satellite weapons and space control
        84. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, given the
    recent successful test by the Chinese government of an anti-satellite
    weapon, what changes in priorities has the Air Force made in protecting
    U.S. assets in space?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force is increasing
    priority on protection and reconstitution. Protection is accomplished
    by enhancing Space Situational Awareness (SSA) with improved
    integration, command and control, and sensors. Integration activities
    will improve our fusion capabilities and migrate them to the net-
    centric construct enabling more timely attack detection. New sensors
    include the Space-Based Surveillance System (SBSS) and Space Fence. The
    Air Force is also pursuing concepts of limited reconstitution
    capability with the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) program.
    Currently, there are five tactical satellites (TacSats) identified
    fiscal year 2007--fiscal year 2013 which will fulfill a variety of
    missions and provide the opportunity for operational experimentation
    and risk reduction for future Air Force programs.
        In addition, the Air Force continues to evaluate necessity and
    opportunity to accelerate several space control programs on the UPL.
    Delivery of Self-Awareness Space Situational Awareness (SASSA), SBSS,
    Rapid Attack Identification, Detection, and Reporting System (RAIDRS),
    and Space Fence can be accelerated if additional funds are provided.

        85. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, what space
    control programs, ongoing or future, hold the best promise for
    protecting U.S. assets?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. There is no single ``silver
    bullet'' solution but instead a combination of classified and
    unclassified systems that together impress upon our potential
    adversaries the United States' ability to maintain and sustain space
    superiority from peace through all phases of conflict.
        This said, the Air Force continues to pursue programs to address
    deficiencies in light of current threats. The first step in protecting
    our space-based assets is improving our SSA capabilities. We are
    focused on upgrading both our ground-based and on-orbit capabilities to
    improve detection, tracking, and characterization of objects in low-
    earth orbit and geosynchronous orbit. The upgrade will also enhance our
    ability to detect and characterize threats. Modernization programs for
    detecting, tracking, and characterizing include the SBSS system and
    Space Fence. Integrated SSA will improve our fusion capabilities and
    move us toward the net-centric construct, enabling a more timely event
    detection. RAIDRS are envisioned to provide automated attack detection
    and characterization against multiple types of threats.
        Several space control programs that will assist with these
    capabilities are on the UPL--SASSA, SBSS, RAIDRS Block 20, and Space
    Fence--to accelerate delivery of capability if additional funds are
    provided.
        In addition, the Air Force is increasing priority on ORS. In the
    future, this program may provide limited reconstitution capability for
    essential military space capabilities.

        86. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, to what
    extent are operationally responsive space efforts to contribute to the
    space control mission?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. There are two key areas where
    the ORS program will potentially contribute to the space control
    mission area. These are SSA and reconstitution. The Air Force is
    currently evaluating the ORS program's capability to rapidly field and
    launch small satellites that could provide SSA of friendly satellites
    as well as potential threats. In this regard, we have submitted the
    SASSA, a potential ORS payload, on the UPL for fiscal year 2008. SASSA
    will demonstrate an integrated suite of sensors that could supply the
    necessary information to warn of environmental and manmade threats. The
    other space control related mission area being investigated by the ORS
    program is the ability to augment and reconstitute our space systems.
    This capability would increase the robustness of our space architecture
    in the face of future threats. The Air Force is maturing a satellite
    reconstitution capability through our TacSat program. Currently, there
    are five TacSats identified in fiscal year 2007--fiscal year 2013 which
    will fulfill a variety of missions and provide greater risk reduction
    to future Air Force programs.

               force protection and improvised explosive devices
        87. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, force
    protection has been and continues to be a top priority for this
    committee. Could you please describe the current status of force
    protection for our Air Force troops in Iraq and Afghanistan?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. We have increased our emphasis
    on combat skills training and added the Basic Combat Convoy Course at
    Lackland AFB. We're fusing Force Protection Intelligence with
    aggressive security operations to extend our awareness outside the
    perimeter to engage threats at the maximum range possible. We plan to
    add special purpose armored vehicles to increase airmen effectiveness
    and survivability. Finally, we're also benefiting from the Army's
    deployment of Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar systems at key
    bases such as Balad Air Base (AB).

        88. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, what
    technology strategy and level of investment is being proposed in the
    Air Force budget to support our ability to get on top of and ahead of
    the improvised explosive device (IED)threat?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. In response to April 2006
    direction to the Services, the Air Force programmed approximately $9.9
    million per year through fiscal year 2013 ($59.443 million total) for
    procurement and sustainment costs directly associated with Counter-
    Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) equipment/systems. This funding is
    specifically for Specialized Search Dogs (the Air Force is the
    Department of Defense Executive Agency for Military Working Dogs),
    Explosive Ordnance Disposal Robots, and Air Force funded requirements
    for uparmor modification kits for the Service's fleet of High Mobility
    Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) in the theater of operations.

                            [In millions of dollars]
    Specialized Search Dogs....................................        5.843
    Robotics...................................................         19.6
    Uparmored HMMWVs...........................................         34.0
                                                                ------------
      Total programmed:........................................       59.443

        Beyond these initiatives, the Air Force does not have any other
    dedicated or independent funding lines for C-IED initiatives. However,
    the Air Force also makes significant contributions to C-IED efforts
    with a variety of initiatives that are corporately vetted through the
    Air Force's Rapid Response Process--the most promising of these
    initiatives are championed by the Service for potential Joint IED
    Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) funding. To date JIEDDO has funded 14 Air
    Force initiatives for $87.035 million.
        Regarding strategy, the ACC, acting as the Air Force's lead MAJCOM
    warfighter force provider, recently signed a C-IED Operating Concept to
    ensure Air Force efforts are synchronized and cohesive in the campaign
    to overcome the threat and loss of personnel/resources posed by
    adversary use of IEDs. This operating concept provides a standardized
    approach with the JIEDDO, U.S. CENTCOM, U.S. Central Command Air Forces
    (CENTAF), and ACC C-IED efforts by using common constructs and
    terminologies. The ACC's C-IED Concept directly supports and is
    congruent with CENTCOM's C-IED Campaign plan through mutual focus on
    defeating the IED system. To execute this framework, ACC, with
    assistance from the Army and CENTCOM, recently completed a draft
    Concept of Employment (CONEMP) that is written from an airman's
    perspective taking a constrained and unconstrained approach to
    interdicting the IED system. Following CONEMP execution, ACC will look
    to identify capability and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP)
    gaps permitting sound analysis/actions for Doctrine, Organization,
    Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities improvements.
        In addition to the above, there are a number of technologies within
    the Air Force S&T program that could be applicable to countering the
    IED threat; however, S&T efforts are typically non-system specific and
    support a wide range of potential applications--as such, there is not a
    dedicated S&T investment line in this area. For example, one of the Air
    Force S&T Program's focused long-term challenges is to dominate
    difficult surface target engagement/defeat, which includes technologies
    that could be used to find, identify, track, and engage IEDs, such as:
    high power microwave devices to defeat a wide range of IEDs; real-time,
    24-hour, wide-area electro-optical and radio frequency sensing and data
    fusion/analysis; room temperature infrared cameras with increased
    temperature discrimination; penetrating terahertz imaging devices;
    adversarial modeling; improved operator interfaces for enhanced UAVs;
    and a wide range of command, control, communications, computers, ISR
    technologies including combining pertinent technologies within a net-
    centric environment that could identify where the IED maker lives.
        Beyond S&T, the Air Force continues to improve existing platforms
    like Compass Call and Predator, which have proven useful in C-IED
    missions. Compass Call improvements provide a very effective C-IED
    classified capability, while planned fiscal year 2008 Predator
    improvements include integration of an airborne signals intelligence
    payload and incorporation of real-time targeting processing (Joint
    Direct Attack Munition-quality coordinate data from video)--both of
    which will enhance Predator support to C-IED missions. In addition, the
    Air Force requested global war on terrorism supplemental funding in
    both fiscal years 2007 and 2008 to field a net-centric beyond line-of-
    sight (BLOS) secure communications capability across the Joint
    Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (J-STARS) fleet to enable
    full coverage of ground combat operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom
    (OIF)/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). This improvement, combined with
    a future Network Centric Collaborative Targeting (NCCT) capability,
    will enable J-STARS to rapidly collaborate with other sensors and
    intelligence sources to fuse IED events with ground moving target
    indicator tracks to produce actionable intelligence. CENTCOM has
    recently identified BLOS secure communications as an Urgent Operational
    Need and this funding will enable the Air Force to achieve an initial
    operational capability for J-STARS BLOS communications by March 2008.
    The Air Force will consider funding for NCCT in its fiscal year 2010
    budget request.

                    airmen on the ground in iraq/afghanistan
        89. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, the Air
    Force has provided significant ``in-lieu-of'' forces on the ground to
    support operations in Iraq. Are you comfortable that they are getting
    the right equipment to operate in that environment, particularly force
    protection equipment?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. I am very comfortable that our
    ``in-lieu-of'' forces on the ground to support operations in Iraq are
    getting not only the right equipment to operate in that environment,
    but the best force protection equipment that is available. We are
    continuously evaluating the enemy's TTP, and as these TTPs change, we
    review materiel and equipment configuration to see if changes are
    necessary to keep our airmen safe. Part of our evaluation process is
    the continuous collection of information from our deployed airmen,
    feedback from the other Services and COCOMs, and even suppliers to
    ensure we stay ahead in making appropriate modifications. As an
    example, more than 40 functional experts from around the Air Force,
    including deployed commanders, met at Keesler AFB, MI, on March 21-22
    to review and address ``in-lieu-of'' forces equipment requirements. We
    are also aggressively exploring short-, mid-, and long-term solutions,
    and where it makes sense, add required equipment for not only ``in-
    lieu-of'' forces deployment preparation processes, but for the broader
    Air Force as well.

        90. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, are the
    airmen on the ground in Iraq getting the needed training before
    deploying?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. Every airman that deploys to
    Iraq gets the best and most up-to-date training available. Each request
    for forces that the Air Force receives is reviewed by experts in the
    field and back in the States. These experts determine exactly what
    training is needed and ensure that our troops receive it prior to
    deploying. Typically we send our airman to three courses: Combat Skills
    Training, Combat Readiness Course, and in the future, an Air Force-
    sponsored Common Battlefield Airman Training. Additionally we send
    forces to specialized training such as M-17 helicopter training and
    basic combat convoy course.

        91. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, has this
    training changed as a result of lessons learned, and if so, how?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. Training is not viewed as
    being a static commodity. We take lessons learned, both good and bad
    from the field, and have adjusted our training programs as required.
    One of the things that we did was build up 2nd Air Force located at
    Keesler AFB to oversee our training requirements and to better
    integrate with the Army. 2nd Air Force has also taken the lead in
    establishing a Training Evaluation Review Board (TERB), which is
    reviewing our entire combat training spectrum. Finally, the Air Staff
    is undertaking a comprehensive review of the entire training process to
    streamline the process and ensure critical training objectives are
    identified and trained efficiently and effectively.

        92. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, how has
    the integration worked with the Army?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. Our airmen have been doing a
    great job integrating with all the Services to fully meet the CENTCOM
    commander's warfighting requirements. Before deployment our airmen
    exercise and train with our sister Services and in some cases attend
    their organic training courses (e.g., airmen attend Army Combat Skills
    Training) in order to ensure they possess the proper combat skill sets.
    One example is airmen supporting Afghanistan Provisional Reconstruction
    Teams attend extensive training with the Army at Fort Bragg to learn
    various civil affairs and combat operations skills. Another is Army and
    Marine Aviators taking part in an Air Force-sponsored urban close air
    support exercise. Once deployed, our airmen work hand-in-hand with
    sister Services supporting each warfighting component. Currently 93
    percent of airmen deployed to the combat zone under tactical control of
    one of CENTCOM's warfighting components perform their organic skill
    sets in large part to relieve the stress on the overall joint force in
    critical career specialities.

        93. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, do you see
    anything that needs to be improved in this process?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. Since our challenges are
    constantly changing so are our processes. Our airmen are constantly
    finding innovative ways to improve the system to meet future
    challenges. Recently the TERB has recommended that the Air Force stand
    up its own Combat Skills Training Course to help relieve the Army
    throughput bottlenecks.

                            space acquisition costs
        94. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, the costs
    of major space acquisitions (including the Transformational Satellite
    Communications (TSAT) system, Space-Based Infrared System-High, Space
    Tracking and Surveillance System, Space Radar, and National Polar-
    Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System) are projected to
    increase significantly over the next several years to levels close to
    $9 billion per year starting in fiscal year 2009. How does the Air
    Force plan to fund this increase? Is it making tradeoffs with aircraft
    programs?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force evaluates cost
    versus combat capability across the spectrum of Air Force programs. If
    a space program delivers the best combat capability for the dollars
    invested, the Air Force will make tradeoffs among aircraft programs,
    space programs, and other recapitalization investments. Space programs
    compete equally with all Air Force acquisition programs. Additionally,
    the Air Force does not bear sole responsibility for resourcing all the
    space programs mentioned. The Air Force has an established cost-sharing
    arrangement with the Department of Commerce for the NPOESS program, and
    the OSD recently negotiated a cost-sharing arrangement for space radar
    with the Director of National Intelligence. The Space Tracking and
    Surveillance System is currently the responsibility of the Missile
    Defense Agency. For cost-shared programs, the Air Force will negotiate
    with its partners and will make allocation decisions based on delivery
    of the most combat capability for the investment.

        95. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, does the
    Air Force, or DOD, have a spending limit for space investments?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force does not have a
    spending limit for space investments. The Air Force evaluates the cost
    of space programs against the combat capability delivered by all Air
    Force programs and within the context of total available Air Force
    resources. The Air Force makes resource allocation decisions based on
    maximizing combat capability contributed from each warfighting domain
    constrained by the ability to purchase those capabilities.

        96. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, to what
    extent are DOD and the Air Force able to determine what level of space
    investment is affordable and prioritize among their space investments?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force evaluates the
    investment in space programs in the context of the combat capability
    delivered by all Air Force weapon systems. Space programs compete with
    all other programs on an equal basis for resources and priorities. The
    Air Force makes resource allocation decisions based on maximizing the
    total combat capability within its existing budget.

                              space communications
        97. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, the Air
    Force posture statement lists as one of the top Service priorities the
    recapitalization of aging spacecraft inventories. The statement
    highlights the TSAT system as essential to enable the realization of
    all DOD network-centric operations, such as the Army's FCS and the
    Navy's Sea Power 21 concept. Given the high priority accorded to space
    systems by the Air Force, and the importance of TSAT for future
    network-centric operations, why did the Air Force reduce planned
    funding for TSAT in the fiscal year 2008 budget request--thereby
    delaying the launch of the first satellite by 1 year to 2016?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. TSAT fiscal year 2008 funding
    was reduced to fund competing higher DOD priorities. The 1-year TSAT
    slip does not impact current operational availability of either
    protected or wideband satellite communications capabilities, including
    the strategic networks on Milstar and Advanced Extremely High Frequency
    (AEHF). Adequate time exists to transition strategic networks onto
    combined TSAT-AEHF constellation before the projected fiscal year 2018
    Milstar end of life.
        The Department remains committed to TSAT for critical net-centric
    capabilities. It is the best way to meet warfighter needs, including
    the Army's FCS and the Navy's Sea Power 21 concept.

                                synthetic fuels
        98. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, since last
    fall, the Air Force has been testing whether Air Force aircraft can fly
    on liquid fuels made from natural gas or coal. According to the Air
    Force, barring any unforeseen glitches, the Air Force expects to
    certify the synthetic fuel for use in B-52 bombers this summer. Given
    the interest and publicity with which the Air Force has surrounded
    their synthetic fuels research program, how much funding is in the
    fiscal year 2008 budget request?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force has $1 million
    in its budget request for the certification of the fleet with a 50/50
    blend of synthetic fuel and JP-8. The Air Force has requested an
    additional $30 million in the UPL to complete necessary testing and
    certification in fiscal year 2008 in order to stay on schedule for
    fleet certification by fiscal year 2010; and, to be prepared for the
    acquisition of 50 percent of our CONUS fuel from domestic, alternative
    fuel sources by fiscal year 2016.

        99. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, what level
    of capability does the Air Force's program of record achieve within the
    FYDP?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. Through the FYDP, the Air
    Force program of record has $31.48 million to test and certify the use
    of a synthetic fuel blend in the fleet. We estimate that it will
    require approximately $190 million in total to meet our fiscal year
    2010 certification goals and be prepared for the acquisition of 50
    percent of our CONUS fuel from domestic, alternative fuel sources by
    fiscal year 2016.

                  congressional adds in air force s&t programs
        100. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, defense
    S&T funding lines are some of the most heavily earmarked accounts in
    the defense budget. A rough analysis of top line figures shows that
    components of DOD's basic and applied research funding are
    approximately 40 percent earmarked. I am interested in receiving more
    detailed information from the Department and each of the Services about
    the extent and execution--including the military utility--of earmarks
    within their fiscal year 2007 appropriations for S&T programs. Would
    you please provide for the record a break-out of the Air Force fiscal
    year 2007 S&T funding between requested programs and congressional
    earmarks? Please include the status of the execution of these earmarks
    (whether funds are let), the identified performers, and any evaluation
    you have done--including numerical scoring--of the military utility of
    these projects.
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The attached spreadsheet
    provides the requested fiscal year 2007 breakout of Air Force S&T
    funding by requested amount and congressional add or earmark funding to
    include whether or not this additional funding has already been put on
    contract and, if so, with whom. Over the past several years, the Air
    Force S&T program has received a significant increase in annual
    congressional adds and we work hard to structure 1-year efforts that
    will yield some measure of military utility. While congressional adds
    that complement related, funded Air Force S&T efforts would be expected
    to provide more benefit to the Air Force, we do not formally evaluate
    these congressional special interest items.
        [The spreadsheet referred to follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        101. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, in your
    view, does the extent of earmarks you receive for basic and applied
    research interfere with the Air Force's ability to conduct a coherent
    R&D program which meets the Air Force's technology needs?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force's R&D program is
    reflected in this year's budget request and associated unfunded
    priority list for S&T. Annual congressional adds or earmarks received
    in the Air Force basic and applied research budget activities do not
    interfere with our ability to implement this program. We work very hard
    to structure 1-year efforts that provide new or complementary military
    utility to this program. While adds do not interfere with coherency,
    difficulties are experienced in oversight and management of these
    congressionally-directed efforts. This becomes especially more
    difficult when working new congressional special interest items where
    congressional intent is not always clear. With over 200 individual
    congressional adds, many hundreds, if not thousands, of man-hours are
    spent understanding congressional intent, contracting, and managing
    these efforts.
            recruitment and retention of air force medical personnel
        102. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, the
    committee has been concerned about the ability of all three Services to
    recruit and retain top quality medical personnel. The Air Force medical
    service continues to experience significant challenges. Overall
    recruiting of fully qualified health care professionals is barely 50
    percent of the requirement, and retention is at a 10-year low,
    contributing to chronic shortages in certain specialties. Looking to
    the future, what do you think are the most important monetary and
    nonmonetary incentives for recruiting and retaining medical personnel?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Deputy Chief of Staff,
    Manpower and Personnel is working with Health Affairs, Air Force
    Recruiting Service and Air Force Medical Service to maximize the
    effectiveness of accession and retention bonuses, and the Health
    Professions Scholarship Program. We have provided input to the
    Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) to establish more
    flexible and expanded special pay and bonus authorities (ability to
    vary commitments, expand eligibility to target difficult accession and
    retention career fields, offer lump-sum bonus versus incremental bonus
    payments). We believe the QRMC proposed revision to special pay
    legislation coupled with the necessary appropriation, will allow the
    Air Force to obtain additional years of service from difficult-to-
    retain career fields and narrow the pay gap with the civilian sector.
    We thank Congress for the expanded authorities for physician and
    dentist accessions bonuses granted as part of the NDAA for Fiscal Year
    2007.
        Also of importance are the following initiatives that are
    nonmonetary benefits: enhanced professional development, leadership,
    and professional opportunities, ensuring predictable defined AEF
    rotations, and encouraging the right balance for our personnel between
    their professional duties and their families.

        103. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, do you
    have all the tools needed to turn this situation around?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force will have all
    the tools necessary, with the QRMC revision of special pay and bonus
    legislation coupled with the required funding. Revision of legislation
    will enable the Air Force to vary commitments, expand eligibility to
    target difficult accession and retention career fields, and offer lump-
    sum bonus versus incremental bonus payments. The Air Force will
    continue to prioritize recruitment and retention funds within the Air
    Force to meet our most pressing needs and maximize our effectiveness.

                   medical program ``efficiency'' reductions
        104. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, in fiscal
    year 2007, $92.5 million was deducted from the Air Force medical budget
    as an incentive for hospital efficiencies. By fiscal year 2008, nearly
    $200.0 million in reductions would be realized. What impact have these
    reductions had on Air Force medical operations in this time of war?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. While the reductions were
    intended to be an incentive for healthcare efficiencies, the actual
    medical treatment facility efficiencies impact reduced the
    recapitalization rate in several critical accounts including medical
    equipment; information management/information technology; facilities
    sustainment, restoration and modernization; medical supplies; and
    contracts. This programmatic approach was used to mitigate any negative
    impact to direct patient care delivery. However, continued use of this
    strategy will drive critical medical asset recapitalization rates to
    unacceptable levels and ultimately adversely impact patient care
    delivery.

        105. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, the
    Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs has testified that the
    reductions should be reevaluated. Do you agree with this assessment?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. Yes. The Air Force Medical
    Service (AFMS) is concerned with the Medical Treatment Facility (MTF)
    Efficiency reductions. No real healthcare savings will be produced. The
    AFMS will experience decreased capability/capacity in the direct care
    system which will result in diminished access. Patients who cannot be
    treated on base will require care from the civilian sector which means
    higher costs for TRICARE, a managed health care support program for
    members of the armed services, their families, and survivors. Before
    that happens, the AFMS will slow spending in a number of areas such as
    facility maintenance, new medical equipment, and research and training.

                   inspection of air force medical facilities
        106. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, in light
    of the revelations on conditions in Building 18 at Walter Reed Army
    Medical Center, have you directed inspection of Air Force medical
    facilities to ensure that appropriate standards of cleanliness and
    safety are being met throughout Air Force medical facilities worldwide?
    If so, what are the results of those inspections?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. Yes, all 75 AFMS MTFs are
    regularly inspected (both scheduled and unannounced) by 2 nationally
    recognized audit, inspection, and accreditation organizations. The
    Joint Commission inspects and accredits Air Force medical centers,
    hospitals, and several outpatient clinics. The Accreditation
    Association for Ambulatory Health Care inspects and accredits a growing
    number of our outpatient clinics. The foremost aspect of these
    inspections is always quality of care and quality of the patient
    environment, to include cleanliness and safety. We are proud that all
    Air Force medical facilities have passed inspection and are accredited.
        In addition to this formal inspection regimen, the Air Force
    Surgeon General has specialized health facilities staff continuously
    engaged with MTF senior leadership at each command and base to
    identify, validate, and execute necessary sustainment, repair, and
    modernization projects. Furthermore, in support of a 5 March 2007
    memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs),
    the Air Force Surgeon General directed MTF senior leaders to re-examine
    their known facility requirements and forward up any previously
    unidentified repair or maintenance projects. The AFMS has funded--or
    identified funding--for many of these. We have requested additional
    funding, preferably multi-year in the operation and maintenance account
    to accomplish the remaining work.

        107. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, what
    guidance have you received from Secretary Gates with respect to the
    revelations at Walter Reed Army Medical Center about facility
    condition, outpatient care, and administration of the physical
    disability evaluation processes and what steps have you taken as a
    result?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The AFMS has been actively
    engaged in these issues well before the Walter Reed concerns surfaced.
    All 75 AFMS MTFs are regularly inspected (both scheduled and
    unannounced) by 2 nationally recognized audit, inspection, and
    accreditation organizations. The Joint Commission inspects and
    accredits Air Force medical centers, hospitals, and several outpatient
    clinics. The Accreditation Association for Ambulatory Health Care
    inspects and accredits a growing number of our outpatient clinics. The
    foremost aspect of these inspections is always quality of care and
    quality of the patient environment, to include cleanliness and safety.
    We are proud that all Air Force medical facilities have passed
    inspection and are accredited.
        In addition to this formal inspection regimen, the Air Force
    Surgeon General has specialized health facilities staff continuously
    engaged with MTF senior leadership at each command and base to
    identify, validate, and execute necessary sustainment, repair, and
    modernization projects. Furthermore, in support of a 5 March 2007
    memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs),
    the Air Force Surgeon General directed MTF senior leaders to re-examine
    their known facility requirements and forward up any previously
    unidentified repair or maintenance projects. The AFMS has funded--or
    identified funding--for many of these. We have requested additional
    funding, preferably multi-year in the operation and maintenance
    account, to accomplish the remaining work.
        With respect to outpatient care, the Air Force Survivor Assistance
    Program was expanded late in 2003 to assign a Family Liaison Officer
    (FLO) to severely wounded, injured, and seriously ill personnel at
    every stop in their evacuation from the AOR, and at every intermediate
    treatment facility. The FLO provides any assistance the member or
    family needs. The Air Force Palace Helping Airmen Recover Together
    (HART) program was implemented in 2005 to provide long-term (5-year)
    assistance with relocation, counseling, employment, and transitional
    services. The most recent enhancement provides earlier intervention
    with information needed to make informed decisions on benefit options
    available to wounded servicemembers and their families.
        Finally, to improve the Disability Evaluation System, the changes
    implemented by the AFMS include simplifying rules for providers when
    categorizing conditions, establishing Medical Evaluation Board (MEB)
    completion at 90 days, monitoring Air Reserve component (ARC)
    (including Air National Guard) Line of Duty determination delays, and
    tracking ARC personnel on extensions for medical reasons. The Air Force
    is also evaluating automation options for the MEB process, which will
    streamline and reduce opportunities for miscommunication for Medical
    and Personnel units. Air Force has a daily customer satisfaction
    telephone survey and is exploring its use for specific injured/wounded-
    warrior issues. To improve case management, Air Force established a
    time limit for receiving medical consultant reports that might be
    delaying MEB completion.

    base realignment and closure decision related to cannon afb, new mexico
        108. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, in your
    written testimony, you stated that ``several factors have applied
    pressure to the Air Force budget including unforeseen Base Realignment
    and Closure (BRAC) costs.'' The Air Force proposed to the 2005 BRAC
    Commission to close Cannon AFB in New Mexico, which would have saved
    the Air Force over $206 million annually and over $2.6 billion over the
    next 20 years. The BRAC Commission responded by agreeing to close
    Cannon by 2009 if the Secretary could not find ``other newly-
    identified'' missions to replace the F-16s currently operating out of
    Cannon AFB. The Air Force then recommended stationing Air Force Special
    Operations units at Cannon without formally announcing a consideration
    of other potential receiving installations, as is done with all other
    Air Force weapon system beddowns. In light of budget pressures, why did
    the Air Force choose to keep a base open that the Air Force had
    previously recommended for closure?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. In September 2005 the BRAC
    Commission recommended realignment of Cannon AFB by disestablishing the
    27th Fighter Wing, and establishing an enclave at Cannon AFB to remain
    open until 31 December 2009, during which time the Secretary of Defense
    shall seek other newly-identified missions for Cannon AFB. Under the
    direction of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force
    began a search for a new mission for Cannon AFB. The Air Force engaged
    in a thorough and comprehensive reuse study to find new uses for the
    base and its assets. An eight-step process was used by the Assistant
    Secretary of Air Force (Installations, Environment, and Logistics) to
    search across the Military Departments, Federal agencies, and the
    public.
        Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) had been looking for a
    west base since the mid-1990s with a plan called Commando Vision.
    Commando Vision looked at several locations in the northwest United
    States, but the plan had not yet been implemented. The DOD QFR and
    Global Defense Posture drive the need for a further training and
    beddown site for AFSOC.

        109. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, prior to
    the BRAC decision, were the special operations missions identified for
    Cannon AFB originally planned for other installations with higher
    military value?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The AFSOC's mission was never
    identified for any other installation. As stated previously, AFSOC had
    been looking for a west base since the mid-1990s with a plan called
    Commando Vision. Commando Vision looked at several locations in the
    northwest United States, but the plan could not get enough support to
    implement. The Air Force took the task of finding another mission for
    Cannon AFB as directed by the BRAC Commission and the Secretary of
    Defense.

                 runway repairs at luke air force base, arizona
        110. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, I have
    been told that the runway at Luke AFB, AZ, is in serious need of
    repair. The Air Force recently sent a team of pavement specialists out
    to Luke AFB to analyze the condition and to determine whether immediate
    repairs were needed as opposed to waiting until 2011, the current
    schedule. As we wait for the test results, we continue to train new
    pilots every day at Luke to fly the F--16, the only single-engine
    fighter in the U.S. military inventory, which is especially prone to
    engine damage caused by debris on the runway. Why are we taking this
    risk? Why are we risking a $60 million plus aircraft and a priceless
    pilot every time during more than 10,000 takeoffs and landings monthly,
    all at the cost of $16 million in operation and maintenance dollars to
    repair the runway?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. We agree pilots' lives are
    priceless and F--16s are essential warfighting machines, which is
    exactly why Luke AFB performs maintenance work and sweeping to keep the
    1.5 million square feet of Runway 3L/21R operationally safe. Air Force
    Civil Engineer Support Agency (AFCESA) performed an evaluation on the
    runway in February 2007. The primary areas of concern on Runway 3L/21R
    are sections R02C and R09C. These 2 sections (out of 12) are presently
    asphalt and are to be replaced with concrete to provide a more durable
    surface. AFCESA evaluation showed one partial section, R09C--C, has a
    poor Pavement Condition Index (PCI). All other runway sections have
    fair or higher PCI ratings. Luke AFB is continually monitoring the
    condition of Runway 3L/21R, and the preliminary analysis by AFCESA in
    February 2007 indicates that the runway is not in danger of imminent
    failure. There is a $15 million MILCON project.

        111. Senator McCain. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, why can't
    the Air Force find $16 million in a $1.8 billion facility sustainment
    account to carry out these repairs in fiscal year 2007?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. We will bring the Luke AFB
    Runway 3L/21R repair project forward from fiscal year 2011 if the next
    AFCESA report, due to be released in June 2007, validates the
    requirement. Luke AFB and AETC will work priority repair projects
    during the year as mission, funds, and facility conditions require.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner
                            total force integration
        112. Senator Warner. General Moseley, in reading your opening
    statement about total force integration, I've been troubled by recent
    reports within the Air Force about how Air National Guard forces in the
    total force wing are being viewed. It seems that cuts to manpower in
    fiscal year 2007 used to pay for modernization are forcing Guard
    personnel to be used as replacements for regular force reductions. As
    an example, I've supported the relocation of our Virginia Air National
    Guard Fighter Wing to Langley AFB so our Guard members can train and
    operate side-by-side with Active-Duty personnel flying the F-22 Raptor.
    As I know it, an agreement between the Air Force and the Air National
    Guard set forth in 2005 envisioned an increase in the total F-22
    capability available to COCOMs as measured by crew ratios. The goal was
    to maximize the overall efficiency and the effectiveness of F-22 combat
    power by collocating Active and Guard fighting forces to take full
    advantage of the mutual benefit of each component's strengths in
    training every day side-by-side. Now I hear that upon completion of the
    collocation, our Nation may have a net loss of Air Force combat power
    by using the Virginia Air Guard Wing to compensate for Active Force
    manpower cuts and to sustain current levels of crew ratios and combat
    support capability in the active Forces at Langley AFB. What is the
    intent of total force integration in relation to maintaining levels of
    combat capability?
        General Moseley. The intent of total force integration is to
    increase Air Force combat capabilities by maximizing crew-ratios and
    maintenance support to respond to COCOM taskings. The 192nd Fighter
    Wing's relocation to Langley will occur at the end of this year
    following the distribution of their F--16s to other Reserve component
    units in late fiscal year 2007. Many 192nd Fighter Wing personnel are
    already training and working on F-22s at Langley AFB. By fiscal years
    2009-2010, all 192nd Fighter Wing personnel will be fully integrated
    and collocated with the 1st Fighter Wing. As a result, there will be a
    net gain of Air Force combat power.

        113. Senator Warner. General Moseley, will Reserve units in total
    force wings be used to fill in the gaps exposed by Active Force
    reductions, or will they be maintained as additional combat
    capabilities?
        General Moseley. While some manpower efficiencies may be realized
    once Regular and Reserve component units are fully integrated, Reserve
    unit personnel are not being used to replace Regular personnel in total
    force wings.
        The Air Force is modernizing while reducing overall aircraft and
    manpower numbers. High-tech emerging mission areas will provide an
    exponential increase in capability. As a result, our force structure
    will have 25 percent fewer fighters and 10 percent fewer total
    aircraft. The 2025 fighter force will be 100 percent PGM-capable and
    90+ percent low observable. Higher crew ratios will increase
    utilization in wartime and efficiency in peacetime. Reserve components
    will fly newer, more capable airplanes as they are introduced.
    Technology improvements in newer aircraft have also significantly
    reduced the maintenance manpower requirements per flying hour, driving
    down manpower requirements.

        114. Senator Warner. General Moseley, if the Air Force goal is to
    sustain increased capabilities, are operational planners being directed
    to increase the war and mobilization planning assumptions for total
    force wings?
        General Moseley. As the Air Force moves from older generation
    aircraft to fifth-generation aircraft, the advances in technology will
    deliver better reliability and increased combat capability per
    aircraft. In addition, the total force changes being implemented by the
    Air Force will maximize crew-ratios in associate units, allowing for a
    greater number of sorties to be produced. War planners are aware of all
    these parameters, and take them into account as they develop war and
    mobilization plans.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
                     guard and reserve retirement proposal
        115. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, in
    your written statement you discuss your efforts at total force
    integration to seamlessly join the Guard and Reserve components to the
    active component in order to take full advantage of all components'
    strengths. I think you have been successful in this effort and believe
    that, perhaps of all the Services, the Air Force has most efficiently
    and effectively utilized its Guard and Reserve members over the past 15
    years and, as you have said many times, you could not do your job
    without them.
        I have introduced a bill in the Senate, S.648, National Guard and
    Reserve Retirement Modernization Act, which would lower the age at
    which Guard and Reserve members can collect retired pay by 3 months for
    every 90 days they spend on Active-Duty in support of a contingency
    operation. I have two purposes for this bill. The first is to
    incentivize mid-career personnel who are being deployed, and stand to
    be deployed again, to stay in the Service by giving them an additional
    incentive. The second is simply to recognize that the way we are using
    our Guard and Reserve personnel over the past 10 years has
    fundamentally changed, and to update the retirement benefit in light of
    those changes.
        Do you believe that, in light of our current usage of the Guard and
    Reserve and unknowns related to how this usage will affect long-term
    Guard and Reserve retention and recruiting, we should be considering
    changes in the Reserve retirement benefit?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. We are waiting to see the
    report from the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve who was
    directed by Congress to make recommendations. The cost and its tangible
    impact to the overall Air Force budget and support to the Air Reserve
    component members must be carefully balanced for a positive conclusion.

        116. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, what
    specific options related to modernizing the Guard and Reserve
    retirement benefit has the Air Force considered?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. None at this time because we
    are waiting to see the report from the Commission on the National Guard
    and Reserve who was directed by Congress to make recommendations. The
    cost and its tangible impact to the overall Air Force budget and
    support to the Air Reserve component members must be carefully balanced
    for a positive conclusion.

        117. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, in
    light of different options for improving or changing the Reserve
    retirement benefit, would you prefer:

             An option that rewards Guard and Reserve members
            across the board, regardless of their level or type of
            participation?
             An option that rewards Guard and Reserve members who
            remain in the Selected Reserve beyond 20 years?
             An option that simply lowers the age of annuity
            receipt by 5 or 10 years?
             An option that is targeted to Guard and Reserve who
            are deploying in support of contingency operations related to
            the global war on terrorism?

        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force cannot elect any
    options at this time, until sufficient information on the cost/benefit
    analysis as it impacts recruiting and retention is received.

        118. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, in
    structuring a potential change to the Reserve retirement benefit, what
    factors would you consider and what type of behavior would you want to
    incentivize through a changed benefit?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. We would consider and attempt
    to incentivize enhanced recruiting and retention of Reserve component
    members, limiting Reserve component mobilization and enhancing Reserve
    component volunteerism.

        119. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, what
    is your specific opinion of S.648?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. We do not have a specific
    opinion at this time. We are waiting to see the report from the
    Commission on the National Guard and Reserve who was directed by
    Congress to make recommendations. We would happily consider any
    proposal, but would need to fully understand how the proposal benefits,
    applies to, or affects the Total Force.

                              repair enterprise 21
        120. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, in the
    section on ``Depot Maintenance Transformation'' in your written
    statement you discuss an initiative called ``Repair Enterprise 21''
    which appears to be a new approach to Air Force logistics. Repair
    Enterprise 21 is a lean logistics initiative which will ``establish an
    enterprise-wide single repair network supporting the entire Air Force
    supply chain.'' Would you please explain in more detail the status of
    Repair Enterprise 21, what it entails exactly, how it will impact or
    change the current role of the Air Logistics Centers, and most
    importantly, how it will affect the Air Force's sustainment of weapon
    systems?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. Repair Enterprise 21 (RE21)
    will right-size and rationalize the Air Force's intermediate
    maintenance infrastructure. Ultimately, RE21 will reduce the number of
    Air Force intermediate repair facilities from approximately 75 to 22
    and increase slightly the workload at the Air Logistics Centers (ALCs).
    Intermediate repair requirements will be prioritized centrally and
    accomplished by either a Centralized Intermediate Repair Facility or at
    an ALC. Senior Air Force leadership has approved 9 of 14 organic
    repaired commodities for transition to the RE21 repair network:
              -  B-1, C-5, C-130, E-3, and F-16 Avionics
              -  TF33 engines
              -  Pave Penny and Low Altitude Navigation Targeting Infrared
            for Night (LANTIRN) Pods

        The F100/F110 and F101 engines are pending approval. We anticipate
    late spring or early summer for their approval.
        Three commodities have been disapproved or tabled:

              -  ALQ131 and ALQ184 pods were disapproved due to cost to
            ship oversized classified cargo and lack of spare pods
              -  F-15 Avionics has been tabled and will be readdressed in
            12 months

        We expect the TF33 engine transition to start in the fourth quarter
    of fiscal year 2007. The B-1, C-5, C-130, E-3, and F-16 Avionics and
    Pave Penny pod transitions will start in the first quarter of fiscal
    year 2008. The F101 engine and LANTIRN pods will start in the second
    quarter of fiscal year 2008.
        We expect weapon system sustainment to improve with RE21,
    particularly with a stable workforce and standardized work practices.
    Additionally, by centralizing engine repair we can focus on reliability
    centered maintenance through module matching and more rapid
    introduction of technical improvements to improve engine average time
    on wing.

                            total force integration
        121. Senator Chambliss. General Moseley, the 116th Air Control Wing
    is the first and only ``blended wing'' which includes both Active and
    Guard personnel doing the same tasks and deploying together. The
    ``blended wing'' has worked well in this case, but it has worked well
    primarily because the people involved have made it work well, in spite
    of organizational challenges and cultural differences between the Guard
    and Active force. What have the Air Force and DOD in general learned
    from the ``blended wing'' concept and how has it informed the Air
    Force's efforts at ``Total Force Integration''?
        General Moseley. The Air Force learned a great deal from this
    initial integration effort at Robins AFB. We took a brand new mission
    that had not received all of its equipment, threw it into a conversion
    that had never been tried, shortened the conversion period and then
    sent it immediately to war . . . and it was successful. This proved
    that Air Force men and women can accomplish remarkable feats in the
    face of substantial obstacles. We also learned that each component
    brings a unique set of tools and capabilities that, when combined and
    shared daily, is greater than the sum of its parts. This is especially
    true in the maintenance community. We learned that many of the ``pre-
    set'' notions one component formulates about the other are marginalized
    or dissolved totally with integration. Finally, we learned that one
    size does not fit all. Total Force Integration transformation efforts
    are dependent upon a number of factors which must be identified,
    analyzed, and coordinated to ensure the Air Force gets the greatest
    value for the effort. As a result of what we learned,we sought and
    received congressional support for important changes to the legal
    guidance in titles 10 and 32. We still have work to do operationally to
    facilitate support using full-time Guard and Reserve personnel as well
    as dual-hatted authority.

        122. Senator Chambliss. General Moseley, what are other models for
    Active/Reserve interaction that you are considering that might take
    advantage of the unique capabilities and best practices resident in the
    Reserve and the Active Force?
        General Moseley. There are four associate models being used for
    Total Force Integration implementation:
    Classic Associate:
        An integration model where a Regular Air Force component unit
    retains principle responsibility for weapon system or systems, which it
    shares with one or more Reserve component units. Regular and Reserve
    component units retain separate organizational structures and chains of
    command. There are varying degrees of functional integration based on
    MOUs.
    Active Associate:
        An integration model where a Reserve component unit has principle
    responsibility for weapon system or systems, which it shares with one
    or more regular units. Reserve and regular component units retain
    separate organizational structures and chains of command. There are
    varying degrees of functional integration based on MOUs.
    ARC Associate:
        An integration model where two or more ARC units integrate, with
    one retaining principle responsibility for weapon system or systems,
    which are shared by all. Each unit retains separate organizational
    structures and chains of commands. There are varying degrees of
    functional integration based on MOUs.
    Integrated Associate:
        An integration model similar to the classic associate model;
    however, members of all components contribute to one unit mission with
    administrative control and support provided by the respective component
    via detachments.

                         c-130 and joint cargo aircraft
        123. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, the
    Air Force is requesting funding for 33 C- and KC-130J aircraft in the
    fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008 supplemental requests and the
    fiscal year 2008 base budget. The Air Force is also planning to procure
    another intratheater airlift platform, the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA)
    which is a joint program with the Army. What business case and
    requirements have led you to a decision to procure both these aircraft?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The 2006 QDR, informed by the
    2005 MCS, established a range of 395-674 C-130s to support the NMS with
    acceptable risk. In December 2007, AMC is scheduled to complete an
    Intratheater Fleet Mix Analysis to determine the best mix of
    intratheater aircraft. The future Air Force intratheater fleet will
    include the C-130, C-17, and the JCA, and the mix of that fleet is
    dependent on many factors including health of the C-130 fleet and
    dedicated intratheater C-17 lift.
    C-130Js
        To meet the minimum MCS requirement, the Air Force requested 29 C-
    130Js. In the fiscal year 2007 supplemental request, the Air Force
    requested 5 C-130Js to replace 5 C-130H2s being converted to MC-130Ws.
    In the fiscal year 2008 budget, the Air Force requested 9 C-130Js on
    the multi-year procurement contract. In the fiscal year 2008
    supplemental, the Air Force requested 5 C-130Js to replace the
    remaining 5 C-130Hs being converted to MC-130Ws, 7 C-130Js to replace
    stressed C-130s due to the global war on terror, and 3 C-130Js to
    replace 3 non-combat C-130 losses.
        The United States Marine Corps requested 4 KC-130Js in the fiscal
    year 2008 budget and 7 KC-130Js in the fiscal year 2008 supplemental.
    JCAs
        In accordance with Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) III in
    December 2005, the Army and Air Force were directed to form a Joint
    Program Office (JPO) from the Army's Future Cargo Aircraft (FCA) and
    the Air Force's Light Cargo Aircraft. In June 2006, the Army and Air
    Force signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to purchase the same JCA
    platform. The Army and Air Force are on track to meet the Milestone C
    decision by 30 May 07. The Air Force is committed to the JCA program
    and to delivering unparalleled intratheater airlift to the COCOMs.

        124. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, to
    what extent do the JCA and C-130J have overlapping versus distinct
    capabilities?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The JCA and C-130J have
    similar capabilities for use in the intratheater airlift role. Both are
    capable of short takeoff and landing at fields as short as 2,000 feet.
    Both aircraft are capable of moving the Department's standard 463L
    pallet and can airdrop container delivery system bundles. Additionally,
    both aircraft will be equipped with all the requisite communications,
    navigation, and defensive gear to operate as an integral part of our
    combat theater airlift system. Still, the C-130J offers capabilities
    that the JCA does not, and the JCA offers efficiencies not available in
    the C-130J. The C-130J is faster and offers greater cargo capacity,
    higher climb gradients, and more flexibility on similar sized runways
    than the JCA. The C-130J is compatible with all current Air Force
    Material Handling Equipment (MHE) and can accept a 463L pallet
    configured at a standard height of 96 inches, both of which the JCA
    cannot. Finally, the C-130J can carry many vehicle types that the JCA
    cannot (Stryker, Fire Engine, Up-armored Humvee, et cetera). However,
    our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan shows frequent, but required,
    movement of less-than-C-130 sized loads. In these situations, the JCA
    offers more efficiency than the C-130J because its cost to operate per
    flight hour is less. Also, depending on which aircraft is selected for
    the JCA, it may even burn fewer pounds of fuel per passenger or pallet
    mile than the C-130J. Finally, the unit cost of a JCA will be
    significantly less than a C-130J. In December 2007, AMC is scheduled to
    complete an Intratheater Fleet Mix Analysis to determine the best mix
    of intratheater aircraft. The future Air Force intratheater fleet will
    include the C-130, C-17, and the JCA, and the mix of that fleet is
    dependent on many factors including health of the C-130 fleet and
    dedicated intratheater C-17 lift.

        125. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, what
    missions will you use the JCA for that are unique from missions that C-
    130Js and existing rotary wing assets currently accomplish?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. There are currently no unique
    JCA missions in the intratheater airlift role that cannot be performed
    by a C-130J or by rotary wing assets. JCA and C-130J takeoff and
    landing performance is almost the same with both aircraft capable of
    short takeoff and landing at fields as short as 2,000 feet. Further,
    the C-130J offers greater cargo capacity and flexibility on similar
    sized runways as the JCA.
        However, the JCA dimensions are significantly smaller than those of
    the C-130J. This will allow the JCA to maneuver into tighter spaces on
    the ground and in parking which offers the potential to operate at
    fields with a more tightly constrained ``maximum on ground'' factor. In
    addition, the JCA will be a more efficient passenger and cargo mover of
    less-than-C-130 sized loads, since its operating costs will be less per
    flight hour and the unit cost of a JCA will be significantly less than
    a C-130J.
        In December 2007, AMC is scheduled to complete an Intratheater
    Fleet Mix Analysis to determine the best mix of intratheater aircraft.
    The future Air Force intratheater fleet will include the C-130, C-17,
    and the JCA, and the mix of that fleet is dependent on many factors
    including health of the C-130 fleet and dedicated intratheater C-17
    lift.

                           combat search and rescue-x
        126. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Wynne, senior Air Force and OSD
    officials have stated that early delivery of the Boeing HH-47 was a
    high priority criterion to its selection for CSAR-X. Was delivering
    CSAR-X early a KPP?
        Secretary Wynne. The early delivery of the CSAR-X is not a KPP in
    the CSAR-X Capability Development Document (CDD) or the Systems
    Requirements Document (SRD). The Air Force's selection was based upon
    an integrated Best Value assessment using the evaluation criteria
    published in the Request for Proposal (RFP). The evaluation criteria
    are as follows: Factor 1, Mission Capability (includes the following
    subfactors listed in rank order: Aircraft Performance--Block 0, System
    Architecture and Software, Systems Engineering, Product Support,
    Management/Schedule, and Aircraft Performance--Block 10); Factor 2,
    Proposal Risk; Factor 3, Past Performance; and Factor 4, Cost/Price.
    Factors 1, 2, and 3 were equally important, but when combined are
    significantly more important than Cost/Price. Evaluation of the
    Management/Schedule subfactor included the offeror's approach and
    ability to effectively and efficiently implement and manage the CSAR-X
    program to support an Initial Operational Capability not later than
    fiscal year 2012.
        Timely replacement of the aging and under capable HH-60 fleet is an
    Air Force priority which is why the acquisition strategy delivers a
    Block 0 (initial capability) first followed by Block 10 (full
    capability).

        127. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Wynne, will any CSAR-X
    capabilities be sacrificed for earlier delivery?
        Secretary Wynne. The Air Force did not trade any CSAR-X
    capabilities for early delivery during source selection; however the
    Air Force may make necessary program adjustments as permitted within
    the approved contract to maintain schedule, cost, and performance
    parameters.

        128. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Wynne, what early schedule
    benefit will the Air Force receive by selecting Boeing versus the other
    bidders for CSAR-X?
        Secretary Wynne. The early delivery of the CSAR-X is not a KPP in
    the CSAR-X CDD or the SRD. The Air Force's selection was based upon an
    integrated Best Value assessment using the evaluation criteria
    published in the RFP. The evaluation criteria are as follows: Factor 1,
    Mission Capability (includes the following subfactors listed in rank
    order: Aircraft Performance--Block 0, System Architecture and Software,
    Systems Engineering, Product Support, Management/Schedule, and Aircraft
    Performance--Block 10); Factor 2, Proposal Risk; Factor 3, Past
    Performance; and Factor 4, Cost/Price. Factors 1, 2, and 3 were equally
    important, but when combined are significantly more important than
    Cost/Price. Evaluation of the Management/Schedule subfactor included
    the offeror's approach and ability to effectively and efficiently
    implement and manage the CSAR-X program to support an Initial
    Operational Capability not later than fiscal year 2012.
        Timely replacement of the aging and under capable HH-60 fleet is an
    Air Force priority which is why the acquisition strategy delivers a
    Block 0 (initial capability)first followed by Block 10 (full
    capability).

        129. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Wynne, operations in the terminal
    area--the combat landing zone and surrounding area--is the most
    critical, dangerous portion of a combat rescue mission. Were terminal
    area characteristics a KPP for the CSAR-X program?
        Secretary Wynne. The development of the CSAR-X requirements was led
    by experienced Air Force operators, maintainers, and support personnel
    who have performed the demanding CSAR mission. Terminal area
    characteristics are not addressed as a stand-alone KPP for CSAR-X,
    however they were considered during CSAR-X requirements development and
    influenced eight of the nine KPPs, including: Combat Radius, Rotor-
    Downwash at Mid-mission gross weight, Net Ready, Self Defense,
    Vulnerability Reduction, Electro Optical/Infrared (EO/IR) threat
    disengagement, Radio Frequency (RF) threat disengagement, and Payload/
    Cabin Space.

        130. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Wynne, if there is a follow-on
    source selection for CSAR-X, will the Air Force place greater emphasis
    on aircraft attributes for terminal area operations?
        Secretary Wynne. In response to the GAO's recommendation in their
    February 26 decision, the Air Force will soon issue an amendment to the
    RFP and conduct an evaluation of the revised proposals. The Air Force
    validated requirements have not changed and we will continue to apply
    an integrated Best Value assessment, which considers Mission
    Capability, Proposal Risk, Past Performance, and Cost/Price evaluation
    factors. The evaluation criteria are as follows: Factor 1, Mission
    Capability (includes the following subfactors listed in rank order:
    Aircraft Performance--Block 0, System Architecture and Software,
    Systems Engineering, Product Support, Management/Schedule, and Aircraft
    Performance--Block 10); Factor 2, Proposal Risk; Factor 3, Past
    Performance; and Factor 4, Cost/Price. Factors 1, 2, and 3 were equally
    important, but when combined are significantly more important than
    Cost/Price.

        131. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Wynne, did the less expensive
    medium-lift CSAR-X competitors fail to meet the minimum specified
    requirements?
        Secretary Wynne. The CSAR-X RFP required that all offerors meet all
    the Government's specified minimum requirements. The integrated Best
    Value assessment determines which offeror best meets or exceeds the
    Government's requirements as stated in the RFP.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn
                      c-130 avionics modernization program
        132. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Wynne, what is the Air Force's plan
    for the AMP for the C-130 fleet?
        Secretary Wynne. The plan in the fiscal year 2008 President's
    budget is to install AMP on 268 C-130H1, H2, H2.5, and H3 combat
    delivery aircraft. On 2 February 2007, C-130 AMP declared a critical
    Nunn-McCurdy breach and is currently undergoing an OSD certification
    process. Results of this certification process are due to Congress on 5
    June 2007.

        133. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Wynne, what is the estimated cost
    per aircraft?
        Secretary Wynne. The Average Procurement Unit Cost is $11.8 million
    (procurement cost/procurement quantity). The Program Acquisition Unit
    Cost is $17.29 million ((RDT&E cost + procurement cost)/total
    quantity). This information is based on the December 2006 Selected
    Acquisition Report submitted to Congress in April 2007.

        134. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Wynne, how many C-130Es will undergo
    the modernization program and what is the timetable for this work to be
    done?
        Secretary Wynne. No C-130Es will undergo C-130 AMP or Center-Wing
    Replacement.

        135. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Wynne, how many C-130H1s will
    undergo the modernization program and what is the timetable for this
    work to be done?
        Secretary Wynne. All 47 C-130H1 aircraft are planned for
    modernization. They are tentatively scheduled to begin C-130 AMP
    modification in fiscal year 2011.

                             c-130 wing box repairs
        136. Senator Cornyn. General Moseley, what is the Air Force's plan
    for repairing the wing boxes of the C-130 fleet?
        General Moseley. As mentioned above, we inspect and repair as
    necessary to lift flight restrictions between 38K and 45K EBH, at which
    point the aircraft grounds regardless. The only way to remove the
    aircraft from grounded status is a full replacement of the center-wing
    box. Our replacement program is being implemented in 3 stages to
    accommodate changing requirements based on force structure decisions.
    At this point, we have no requirement to replace center-wing boxes on E
    models. All other C-130 Mission Design Series (MDSs) are phased into
    the program based on projected restriction points and EBH analysis.
        Phase 1 is a Sole Source Contract to Lockheed Martin to convert an
    AC-130H center-wing box to the MC-130H configuration; currently being
    installed and scheduled to complete by the end of April 2007.
        Phase 2 is a Sole Source Contract for Lockheed Martin to deliver 12
    Kits for the MC-130H, HC-130N/P, and the C-130H.
        Phase 3 is a Sole Source Contract for Lockheed Martin and was
    awarded on 31 Mar 07. This phase replaces the center-wing boxes of the
    remaining fleet of AC-130U, EC-130H, MC-130H, HC-130N/P, C-130H1/H2/H3,
    any potential Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Coast Guard (USCG), and
    Navy requirements. We expect to recompete in fiscal year 2009 and
    estimate contract award in fiscal year 2010 for components surrounding
    the wing box; this could result in qualification of a second source.

        137. Senator Cornyn. General Moseley, what is the estimated repair
    cost per aircraft?
        General Moseley. Current costs to replace the center-wing box range
    is between $6-$7.5 million per aircraft depending on the Mission Design
    Series. If you are looking at repair cost, then repairs resulting from
    the Time Compliance Technical Order (TCTO) 1908 inspection are running
    about $700,000-$800,000 depending on the extent of damage. TCTO 1908
    inspection takes a restricted aircraft (38,000 EBH) and identifies
    structural deficiencies to repair it to put in ``unrestricted flight
    status to 45,000 EBH'' and then it is grounded, regardless of repairs.
    For the most part a TCTO 1908 aircraft gets between 4-7 years of
    unrestricted life on it--depending on how you fly the aircraft and the
    EBH factor, but it does not prevent grounding at 45,000 EBH.

        138. Senator Cornyn. General Moseley, how many C-130Es will undergo
    wing box repairs and what is the timetable for these repairs?
        General Moseley. Currently we do not plan, nor have we budgeted, to
    replace any center-wing boxes on our C-130E fleet.

        139. Senator Cornyn. General Moseley, how many H1s will undergo
    wing box repairs and what is the timetable for these repairs?
        General Moseley. The current replacement plan is for 47 C-130H1s to
    undergo wing box replacement. The timetable for these replacements is
    based on projected restriction points and EBH analysis with
    replacements beginning in fiscal year 2009 and completing in fiscal
    year 2013.
        Since the TCTO 1908 inspection and repair is only an interim
    solution to allow unrestricted flight operations between 38,000 and
    45,000 EBHs, at which point the aircraft grounds, we are trying to
    limit the number of 1908 inspections and repairs to minimum essential.

        140. Senator Cornyn. General Moseley, how many H2s will undergo
    wing box repairs and what is the timetable for these repairs?
        General Moseley. The current plan is for 152 C-130H2s to undergo
    center-wing box replacement. The timetable for these replacements is
    based on projected restriction points (38,000 EBH) and EBH analysis
    with repairs beginning in fiscal year 2014 and completing in fiscal
    year 2020.
        Given that we have sufficient lead time to replace C-130H2 center-
    wings at or just prior to their restriction point, it is highly
    unlikely that we will conduct TCTO 1908 inspections on H2s.

        141. Senator Cornyn. General Moseley, how many H3s will undergo
    center-wing box repairs and what is the timetable for these repairs?
        General Moseley. The current plan is for 80 C-130H3s to undergo
    center-wing box replacement. The timetable for these replacements is
    based on projected restriction points and EBH analysis with
    replacements beginning in fiscal year 2014 and completing in fiscal
    year 2020.
        Given that we have sufficient lead time to replace C-130H3 center-
    wing boxes at or just prior to their restriction point, it is highly
    unlikely that we will conduct TCTO 1908 inspections on H3s.

                                c-130 retirement
        142. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Wynne, what is the Air Force plan
    for retiring C-130s?
        Secretary Wynne. The Air Force plan is to divest the C-130E fleet
    by fiscal year 2015. The Air Force will have 119 C-130Es at the end of
    fiscal year 2007 following the retirement of 51 C-130Es authorized in
    the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007. The 119 C-130Es remaining will be
    retired over the next 8 years. The Air Force retirement plan will
    balance the declining health of the C-130E fleet with recapitalization
    efforts to meet the 395 C-130 minimum directed by the 2005 MCS to
    achieve moderate risk.

        143. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Wynne, how many C-130Es are to be
    retired and what is the timetable for them?
        Secretary Wynne. The Air Force current C-130 retirement/
    modernization plan is to divest the C-130E fleet and modernize the C-
    130H fleet (H, H1, H2, H2.5, and H3). The Air Force will have 119 C-
    130Es at the end of fiscal year 2007 following the retirement of 51 C-
    130Es authorized in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007. The level and speed
    of recapitalization efforts will directly impact the speed at which the
    Air Force retires the structurally fatigued, less capable C-130E. The
    Air Force is requesting to retire 24 C-130Es in fiscal year 2008,
    bringing the C-130E fleet strength down to 95 by the end of fiscal year
    2008. The C-130Js requested in the fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year
    2008 global war on terror supplementals will assist the Air Force in
    the recapitalization of the C-130Es.

        144. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Wynne, how many C-130H1s are to be
    retired and what is the timetable for retiring them?
        Secretary Wynne. The Air Force has no plan to retire any of the 47
    C-130H1s in the current C-130 fleet. The Air Force current program of
    record is to include all 47 C-130H1s in the C-130 Avionics
    Modernization Program and the Center-Wing Box replacement program.

                                  c-130 basing
        145. Senator Cornyn. General Moseley, please list all of the C-130
    bases and the following information for each base:

             The number and model (E, H1, H2, H3, or J) of C-130
            aircraft.
             The number of such aircraft in Active-Duty, Guard, or
            Air Force Reserve.

        General Moseley. Please see attached C-130 Fleet as of 01 Oct 06
    slide which provides complete break out of the C-130 number, model,
    location, and disposition (Active-Duty, Guard, or Air Force Reserve).

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        146. Senator Cornyn. General Moseley, what is the Air Force's plan
    for maintaining C-130s in the Active-Duty Force?
        General Moseley. The Air Force currently has 13 Active-Duty C-130
    Squadrons, including an Active-Duty Association at Cheyenne. By fiscal
    year 2008 the Air Force will convert one of their squadrons to an
    Active-Duty Association at Pope and by fiscal year 2011 the Air Force
    plans to stand-up one additional Active-Duty Association at Elmendorf;
    both in support of BRAC-directed force structure changes. This will
    bring the final total Active-Duty C-130 Squadron count to 14 through
    the FYDP.

        147. Senator Cornyn. General Moseley, what is the Air Force basing
    plan for Active-Duty C-130s in the next 5 years?
        General Moseley. Over the next 5 years the Air Force will maintain
    Active-Duty C-130 presence at Dyess AFB, TX; Little Rock AFB, AR;
    Ramstein AB, Germany; and Yokota AB, Japan. Additionally, the Air Force
    will have three Active Associate units at Cheyenne, WY; Pope AAF, NC;
    and Elmendorf AFB, AK.

        148. Senator Cornyn. General Moseley, what is the Air Force basing
    plan for Active-Duty C-130s in the next 10 years?
        General Moseley. Over the next 10 years the Air Force will maintain
    Active-Duty C-130 presence at Dyess AFB, TX; Little Rock AFB, AR;
    Ramstein AB, Germany; and Yokota AB, Japan. Additionally, the Air Force
    will have three Active-Duty Associate units at Cheyenne, WY; Pope AAF,
    NC; and Elmendorf AFB, AK.

                              joint cargo aircraft
        149. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Wynne, what is the Air Force's plan
    concerning the acquisition of JCA?
        Secretary Wynne. The Army and Air Force have been conducting a
    Joint Source Selection since the RFP was released on 17 March 06. The
    Services are on track for a Milestone C decision for low rate
    production in May. We expect the winner to be announced shortly after a
    successful Milestone C decision.

        150. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Wynne, how many JCAs are needed?
        Secretary Wynne. In June 2006, the Army and Air Force signed an MOA
    to purchase the same JCA platform. In preparation for Milestone C
    decision in May 2007, the Air Force is finalizing a preliminary
    assessment of JCA quantities. A more detailed analysis of the optimum
    intratheater airlift fleet mix is being conducted by RAND and will be
    complete in December 2007. The Air Force is committed to the JCA
    program and to delivering unparalleled intratheater airlift to the
    COCOMs.

        151. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Wynne, what is the Air Force's
    timetable for procuring these JCAs?
        Secretary Wynne. The Air Force is scheduled to begin procurement in
    fiscal year 2010 after a successful Full Rate Production decision.

        152. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Wynne, is the Air Force planning to
    use JCAs as replacements for C-130s?
        Secretary Wynne. No, based on the 2005 MCS, we need the capacity of
    at least 395 C-130s to stay above the acceptable risk level.

        153. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Wynne, what is the Air Force's
    basing plan for the JCAs?
        Secretary Wynne. The Air Force transformational efforts maximize
    current and future capabilities through Total Force Integration; a
    cornerstone of the JCA program. The basing and beddown for this new
    airframe will leverage the strengths of Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve
    Forces to ensure maximum effectiveness of this vital asset. JCA basing
    is still in development and will take into consideration many factors
    to include the Army's basing strategy, expanding role of homeland
    security/homeland defense, support to FEMA regions, and minimizing
    MILCON costs. At this time, the Air Force is postured for aircraft
    selection in May 2007 and reception of its first JCA in fiscal year
    2012.

                                     c-130j
        154. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Wynne, what is the Air Force plan
    for continued acquisition of the C-130J stretch model beyond the
    existing contract?
        Secretary Wynne. The Air Force's Multi-Year Procurement of the C-
    130J is set to end in fiscal year 2008 with additional procurements
    based solely on unfunded priorities and global war on terrorism
    supplementals.

        155. Senator Cornyn. General Moseley, please list the bases that
    will receive C-130Js, the number of C-130Js at each base, and specify
    whether the aircraft will be in Active-Duty, Guard, or Air Force
    Reserve.
        General Moseley. Please see attached C-130J Beddown Plan slide
    which provides the Air Force's programmed C-130J force structure.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        [Whereupon, at 11:46 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2008

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, MARCH 22, 2007

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

      UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND, UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND, AND
                       UNITED STATES JOINT FORCES COMMAND

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room
    SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Bill Nelson,
    Bayh, Pryor, Warner, Sessions, Thune, and Martinez.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Evelyn N. Farkas,
    professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional
    staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member;
    Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Michael J. Noblet, research
    assistant; Arun A. Seraphin, professional staff member; and
    William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
    Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
    staff member; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L.
    Niemeyer, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten,
    professional staff member; Robert M. Soofer, professional staff
    member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
        Staff assistants present: David G. Collins, Fletcher L.
    Cork, and Jessica L. Kingston.
        Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Caple,
    Sherry Davich, and Caroline Tess, assistants to Senator Bill
    Nelson; Todd Rosenblum, assistant to Senator Bayh; M. Bradford
    Foley and Terri Glaze, assistants to Senator Pryor; Sandra
    Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; Mark J. Winter, assistant to
    Senator Collins; Stuart C. Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune;
    and John L. Goetchius, assistant to Senator Martinez.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
    meets this morning to consider the posture of three military
    commands that are crucial to our National Security: U.S.
    Northern Command (NORTHCOM), U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM),
    and U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM).
        With the high-stress deployments in Iraq, and the resulting
    strains on the readiness of our military forces, this hearing
    is a timely opportunity to hear from JFCOM which is the force
    provider for the combatant commands, and from two of the
    combatant commands that depend upon JFCOM for the military
    forces that they would need if a contingency were to arise in
    their areas of responsibility.
        In this regard, NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM are two of the
    economy of force commands, because they do not require large
    numbers of military forces on a normal basis. Under today's
    circumstances with so many of our military forces deployed to
    Iraq, preparing to deploy, or recovering from recent
    deployments, a question arises as to where JFCOM would get
    ready, trained, and equipped forces to provide NORTHCOM or
    SOUTHCOM, if needed. I hope we can explore that topic, among
    others, at today's hearing.
        This morning, we welcome Admiral Timothy Keating, who is
    the Commander of U.S. NORTHCOM, and of North American Aerospace
    Defense Command (NORAD). Admiral Keating has been the Commander
    of U.S. NORTHCOM since November 2004, has recently been
    nominated for, and on Monday was confirmed as, the next
    Commander of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). We congratulate you,
    Admiral, on your confirmation, and we'll look forward to
    working with you on your next assignment.
        Admiral Keating will not assume command of PACOM until
    later in the month, so we will have the benefit of his
    experience, and his knowledge of NORTHCOM for today's hearing.
        NORTHCOM has a two-pronged mission. It is responsible for
    conducting operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and
    aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and
    interests within its assigned area of responsibility (AOR), and
    as directed by the President, or Secretary of Defense, it
    provides military assistance to civil authorities for domestic
    crises, including consequence management of natural disasters,
    like Hurricane Katrina, and man-made disasters, like those
    involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
    high-yield explosive incidents.
        The NORTHCOM AOR is the United States, Canada, and Mexico,
    and the land, sea, and air approaches to those territories. So,
    when it comes to defending the territory of the United States,
    NORTHCOM has the primary responsibility.
        The committee also welcomes Admiral James Stavridis,
    Commander of SOUTHCOM, who is responsible for an area including
    Latin America, south of Mexico, and the countries and
    territories of the Caribbean as well as the surrounding waters,
    ocean, and sea.
        The committee is interested in hearing from the Admiral
    regarding U.S. assistance to Colombia, and the progress being
    made to balance our security, stability, and democracy in
    Colombia, and also stop the cultivation, manufacturing, and
    trafficking of drugs. The price, purity, and supply of cocaine
    in the United States does not appear to have changed much, and
    so we'll want to hear why and whether we need to do more to
    interdict drugs across the transit zone from South America to
    the United States.
        We'll also hear, or hope to hear, the SOUTHCOM perspective
    regarding ongoing U.N. Peacekeeping Operations in Haiti, and
    the impact of populist anti-Americanism in South and Central
    America.
        Within the direct responsibility of SOUTHCOM, Admiral
    Stavridis, we also would like to have your assessment of the
    ongoing detention and interrogation operations at Guantanamo
    Bay, and your understanding of what the plans are for the
    future of the installations there, and the status of any plans
    for dealing with a post-Castro Cuba.
        Finally, emphasizing my initial point, the committee needs
    to hear how SOUTHCOM activities are being affected, or could be
    affected, by the reduced availability of U.S. Forces, including
    Special Operations Forces, due to operational requirements in
    other combatant command areas.
        Finally, we welcome General Lance Smith, U.S. Air Force,
    Commander of the JFCOM. General Smith and his command have the
    important responsibility of providing mission-ready, joint-
    capable forces to our combatant commanders around the world.
    This is a particularly challenging mission at a time when so
    many of our military forces are deployed in Iraq.
        JFCOM also supports the development and integration of
    present and future interagency and multi-national military
    capabilities.
        Our committee has a longstanding interest in JFCOM's
    mission, responsibilities, authorities, and activities with
    respect to joint doctrine development, training
    experimentation, and acquisition. We're particularly interested
    today to hear General Smith's views on the status of JFCOM's
    contribution to the readiness of our deployed and nondeployed
    forces.
        We thank each of you for your long and continued service to
    our Nation, and we look forward to your testimony.
        Senator Warner?

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        On behalf of the distinguished ranking member, Senator
    McCain, I ask unanimous consent to place his full statement in
    the record.
        Chairman Levin. It will be.
        [The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain
        The committee meets today to receive testimony from Admiral Timothy
    Keating, Commander of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM); General Lance
    Smith, Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM); and Admiral
    James Stavridis, Commander of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), on
    their military strategy and operational requirements. As combatant
    commanders, we welcome your insight on developments in your areas of
    responsibility, as well as your assessment of the fiscal year 2008
    defense budget request. The committee values the contributions and
    sacrifices you and the fine men and women under your command are making
    on behalf of the American people.
        Admiral Keating, protecting the United States from direct attack is
    the highest priority of the Department of Defense (DOD). In addition to
    defending the Nation against attacks by hostile forces, NORTHCOM also
    is charged with the responsibility for providing critical support to
    civil authorities in preventing and responding to terrorist incidents
    and in assisting civilian agencies in dealing with the aftermath of
    other domestic emergencies and natural disasters.
        The DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support assumes
    there will be a mass casualty attack against the United States. While
    the Department of Homeland Security is the lead Federal agency for
    preventing and responding to such attacks, I would note that 12 of the
    15 National Planning Scenarios issued by the Homeland Security Council
    deal with chemical, biological, or radiological events that could
    quickly overwhelm the capacity of local and State first responders. As
    such, the DOD must be prepared to address these important civil support
    missions utilizing both the Active and Reserve component.
        At the same time, however, the Government Accountability Office,
    the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, and the Chief of the
    National Guard Bureau all warn that the National Guard is under-
    resourced for many of the missions it now performs--especially those
    necessary to deal with weapons of mass destruction events in the
    Homeland. Likewise, it is unclear whether we have made sufficient
    progress as a government in addressing those communications
    interoperability and interagency coordination problems that hampered
    recovery efforts after Hurricane Katrina. I will be interested to learn
    how well NORTHCOM is progressing in these areas.
        General Smith, as Commander of JFCOM, you are responsible for
    providing the trained and ready forces needed by regional combatant
    commanders. In this role, JFCOM assigns nearly all conventional forces
    based in the continental U.S. In 2006, JFCOM developed recommendations
    and coordinated the deployment of more than 310,000 personnel in
    support of requirements identified by combatant commanders.
        We look forward to hearing your testimony today about JFCOM's
    important role as force provider as well as JFCOM's complementary work
    in joint training, joint experimentation, and the development of
    interoperability requirements which ensure our soldiers, sailors,
    airmen, and marines can combine their capabilities into a single
    successful effort. Because JFCOM's recommendations and analysis of
    readiness issues form the basis for deployment decisions, I ask that
    your testimony today also present your assessment, and any
    recommendations you have, regarding how best to maintain the Nation's
    forces at the highest possible level of readiness.
        Admiral Stavridis, I welcome you to your first posture hearing as
    the Commander of SOUTHCOM and commend you for a very comprehensive
    written statement that emphasizes the linkages, challenges, and
    promises for improving and sustaining our security cooperation, and
    strengthening our partnerships, throughout the region. United States
    national interests with our hemispheric neighbors to the south, the 32
    nations that comprise the United States SOUTHCOM area of
    responsibility, are indeed important and diverse. I applaud President
    Bush's recent trip to the region and his desire to reinvigorate and
    reframe relations with our Latin American and Caribbean neighbors. The
    President expressed his commitment to help the democracies of the
    Western Hemisphere build government institutions and meet basic needs
    like education, health care, and housing.
        This morning the committee will be interested in your assessment of
    efforts to curb the flow of illegal drugs into the United States from
    the south, especially those associated with Plan Colombia; the rise of
    violent crime in the region and any links between those criminal groups
    and gangs in the United States; the rise of radical populism in the
    region and the influence of Hugo Chavez; the future of post-Castro
    Cuba; violent extremists in the region and any ties between these
    groups and movements like Hezbollah and al Qaeda; operations at the
    detention facility at Guantanamo; and, to the extent you can, the
    efforts and progress to locate the three American hostages held by the
    Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia guerrillas in Colombia since
    February 2003.
        In closing, I would like to express our Nation's gratitude to all
    of you, and to the men and women of your commands, for all of their
    efforts in providing for the Nation's defense. I look forward to
    hearing from today's witnesses.

        Senator Warner. I have a similar statement which I would
    put in the record to supplement that.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner
        Chairman Levin, thank you.
        On behalf of Senator McCain, I request unanimous consent to place
    his prepared remarks into the record.
        Mr Chairman, I join you in welcoming our witnesses here today.
        I would like to thank our witnesses, and their families, for their
    long and distinguished service to our Nation. I would also like them to
    convey my personal word of commendation, and my deep admiration, for
    the dedicated men and women of their commands. Their efforts are vital
    to our homeland defense; to the protection of our national interests in
    the Western Hemisphere; and in support of our joint forces deployed
    abroad in harm's way.
        Admiral Keating, welcome back for another appearance before the
    committee. Congratulations on your recent confirmation to be the next
    Commander of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and thank you for your
    willingness to take on another position of great responsibility. We
    know you will relinquish command of North American Aerospace Defense
    Command (NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) in a change-of-
    command ceremony tomorrow in Colorado and we are so very grateful that
    you are able to appear here today.
        The attacks on September 11 were a day of unprecedented alarm and
    anguish, and the devastation of Hurricane Katrina created a time of
    extraordinary suffering and sorrow. Admiral Keating, you and members of
    your command, have a sweeping mission and a wide-ranging mandate. The
    Nation looks to you, and the men and women of your command, to ensure
    we are not attacked again and to save lives in the United States.
        NORTHCOM, the Department of Defense (DOD), and Federal, State, and
    local officials have come a long way since those dreadful days, but you
    have a mission that requires continuous coordination, greater
    collaboration, and constant vigilance. The committee looks forward to
    your valued insights on homeland defense and DOD support, to civil
    authorities responding to terrorist incidents, domestic emergencies,
    and natural disasters.
        Admiral Stavridis, I welcome you to your first posture hearing as
    the Commander of United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), and commend
    you for a very comprehensive written statement that speaks to the
    promises and opportunities that exist to sustain and improve our
    partnerships in the 32 nations that comprise SOUTHCOM.
        While our Nation's attention is, at present, focused in other areas
    of the world, we should not, and can not, neglect the potential threats
    to our national interests that exist in South America and the
    Caribbean.
        I applaud President Bush's recent trip to the region and his desire
    to reinvigorate and reframe relations with our neighbors and his
    expressed commitment to help the democracies of the Western Hemisphere.
        General Smith, welcome back. You have appeared before this
    committee in other capacities, but this is your first JFCOM posture
    hearing. General Smith, you and the men and women of JFCOM have a very
    broad mission that contributes appreciably, each and every day, to the
    success of our efforts in the global war on terrorism and the
    development of our future joint force.
        We have a great joint force now, but it is under strain. Those of
    us who have been members of this committee since the enactment of the
    Goldwater-Nichols legislation more than 20 years have watched our joint
    forces capability mature with great satisfaction. Our joint force is
    great because we have the best soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines
    in the world. This force is made even better by the contributions of
    the men and women of JFCOM. Their efforts develop a force that can
    fight, and win, as a joint U.S. force and can operate as part of a
    multinational force with allied, coalition, and interagency partners.
        We look forward to hearing your testimony today about JFCOM's role
    as force provider, to include your assessment of the readiness of the
    force for forward deployment, as well as its complementary work in
    joint training, joint experimentation, and the development of
    interoperability requirements.
        Mr Chairman, thank you and I look forward to the testimony today.

        Senator Warner. I join you in welcoming this very
    distinguished panel, and also express our appreciation, not
    only to your service, but that of your respective families
    through the many, many long years of service. Admiral Keating,
    turning right around tonight, and go back out to Colorado for a
    change of command in the morning, is that correct?
        Admiral Keating. That's correct, sir.
        Senator Warner. We thank you for making yourself available
    for this important hearing today.
        Admiral Keating. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Warner. Your portfolio is one that, unfortunately,
    we do not hear a lot about, because it is being executed. But,
    we sleep better at night knowing that you don't sleep that well
    at night.
        It's extremely important how you integrate the uniformed
    forces of the United States with the local communities, the
    States, the National Guard, the Reserve, and all of the
    components of the military to provide the security that we need
    here at home.
        In my questions, I will bring out a point that my able
    staff prepared for me last night, about how the perspective of
    homeland security is looked at perhaps one way by the
    Department of Defense (DOD) and another way by, for instance,
    our Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
    (HSGAC). I want to make sure that that ties in very closely.
        General Smith, you are in my home State. I am proud to have
    you there. Thank you for taking on this assignment. But you
    have the arduous task of making certain that the men and women
    of the Armed Forces who leave our shores are equipped and
    trained sufficiently to meet their missions, and we have
    potentially some rather challenging pieces of legislative
    initiative, largely emanating on the House side, the other
    body, with regard to the reporting to Congress and the public
    about the degree of equipment, training, and readiness of those
    forces before they deploy.
        I hope to engage you in a colloquy on that, and perhaps, in
    your general opening statement, you will address that specific
    requirement.
        Admiral Stavridis, we welcome you. This is your first
    appearance before us since your confirmation.
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. We tend to look south and think everything
    is going to be all right, but each day we pick up our news, and
    learn about the very troubled area in which you now have a most
    significant responsibility. So, we look forward to your
    testimony.
        We thank each of you, again, for your public service.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, your statement covered, I
    think, a lot of the specifics that I was going to cover, so we
    will proceed with the hearing.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
        I think we'll start with Admiral Keating.

      STATEMENT OF ADM TIMOTHY J. KEATING, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED
      STATES NORTHERN COMMAND/COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE
                            DEFENSE COMMAND

        Admiral Keating. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator
    Warner, members of the committee.
        I'm proud to represent the 1,500 or so men and women from
    the headquarters at NORAD and NORTHCOM before you this morning.
        As you've said, Mr. Chairman, homeland defense is the core
    of our National Military Strategy. The NORTHCOM and NORAD are
    separate commands, but they have a complementary mission. We
    work together to defend our Homeland.
        The commands operate within a common security environment,
    we share a common headquarters building, and largely the same
    headquarters staff. We embrace common values, we understand the
    importance of executing our duties with a sense of urgency in
    the face of very real and present dangers.
        Homeland defense is a high priority for NORTHCOM and NORAD.
    As NORTHCOM enters its 5th year, we're fully mission capable,
    and ready to respond to the full spectrum of homeland defense
    challenges in this modern security environment.
        On the other hand, the NORAD agreement, initially signed in
    1958, was renewed just last May 2006. NORAD has evolved from
    its Cold War construct into an adaptive, flexible, and
    responsive bi-national organization, ideally suited to address
    modern threats in the aerospace domain, and will now contribute
    to greater awareness of threats in the maritime domain. The
    mission for both Commands is the defense of North America.
        NORTHCOM and NORAD are integral elements in the active,
    layered, integrated defense in which we seek to confront early,
    and from a safe distance, anyone who threatens our Homeland.
    NORTHCOM and NORAD operate in a changing, uncertain security
    environment, a range of symmetric and asymmetric transnational
    threats represents an immediate challenge for both Commands.
    These threats continue to be diverse, adaptive, and by their
    very nature, difficult to predict.
        Potential enemies will attempt surprise as they try to
    employ an array of persistent, catastrophic, and destructive
    methods and capabilities, which could include nuclear weapons.
    NORTHCOM and NORAD will act in a timely, and when appropriate,
    coordinated fashion in concert with our international and
    domestic partners to deter, detect, prevent, and defeat
    threats.
        NORTHCOM also must plan for military response, as you
    stated, Mr. Chairman, to requests for support when natural or
    manmade disasters affect our United States. Catastrophes such
    as hurricanes, earthquakes, wildland fires, and pandemics can
    overwhelm local responders, and may require Federal military
    sources to support State and local efforts.
        Likewise, a successful terrorist attack, particularly
    involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) could cause mass
    panic, environmental damage, and significant loss of life. In
    catastrophic incidents--and only when directed--NORTHCOM will
    support civil authorities to provide an integrated response as
    quickly and effectively as we can.
        The core capability to accomplish our missions resides, of
    course, in our people. We must continue to ensure their
    welfare, and the welfare of their families. We're grateful to
    you for your support, for our soldiers, sailors, airmen,
    marines, coastguardsmen, and their families.
        The men and women of NORTHCOM and NORAD are resolutely
    committed to defending the United States, Canada, and Mexico
    against all threats. I'm privileged to be part of this
    outstanding team, and I look forward to your questions this
    morning. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Keating follows:]
               Prepared Statement by ADM Timothy J. Keating, USN
        Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and members of the committee: At
    its most basic level, winning the war on terror means defending our
    Homeland. Homeland defense lies at the core of our National Military
    Strategy. United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and North American
    Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) are separate commands that have
    complementary missions and work closely together to fulfill our
    homeland defense responsibilities. The commands operate within a common
    security environment, predominately share a headquarters staff, and are
    dedicated to defending North America. We also share common values and
    understand the importance of carrying out our duties with a sense of
    urgency in the face of very real and present dangers. It is my honor to
    report to you on the current state and future direction of our
    commands.
        Homeland defense is the highest priority for NORTHCOM and NORAD. As
    NORTHCOM enters its 5th year, we are fully mission capable and ready to
    respond to the full spectrum of homeland defense challenges existing in
    the modern security environment. The NORAD Agreement, initially signed
    in 1958, was renewed in May 2006, when NORAD's mission set was expanded
    to include maritime warning. NORAD has evolved from a cold war
    construct into an adaptive, flexible, and responsive bi-national
    organization that is ideally suited to address modern threats in the
    aerospace domain and contribute to greater awareness of threats in the
    maritime domain. The desired end state of our commands is the
    maintenance of our Nations' ways of life and the defense and
    territorial integrity of North America.
        NORTHCOM and NORAD are integral parts of an active, layered defense
    in which we seek to confront, early and from a safe distance, those who
    threaten our Homeland. NORTHCOM and NORAD operate in a changing,
    uncertain security environment. A range of asymmetric, transnational
    threats represent an immediate challenge for both commands. These
    threats continue to be diverse, adaptive, and, by their nature, are
    difficult to predict. Potential enemies will attempt surprise as they
    try to employ an array of persistent and emerging, catastrophic, and
    disruptive methods and capabilities, to include nuclear weapons.
    NORTHCOM and NORAD will act in a timely, and when appropriate,
    coordinated fashion in concert with our international and domestic
    mission partners to deter, detect, prevent, and defeat threats.
        NORTHCOM must additionally plan for a military response to civil
    requests for support in response to natural or manmade disasters that
    affect the United States. Natural disasters such as hurricanes,
    earthquakes, wildland fires, or pandemics can overwhelm local
    responders and require significant contribution of Federal military
    resources to support State and local response efforts to mitigate
    effects. Likewise, a successful terrorist attack, particularly one
    involving a weapon of mass destruction, may cause mass panic,
    environmental damage, and significant loss of life requiring
    substantial defense support of civil authorities. In catastrophic
    incidents, and as directed, NORTHCOM will support civil authorities to
    help effect an integrated national response as quickly and effectively
    as possible.
                                     plans
        We rapidly adapt homeland defense and civil support plans as
    circumstances dictate based upon current intelligence, and regularly
    exercise them across all domains with our domestic and international
    homeland defense partners. Over the last 2 years, we finalized the
    following plans:

             Concept Plan 3310-07, Aerospace Warning, Aerospace
            Control, and Maritime Warning for North America
             Concept Plan 2002-05, Homeland Defense
             Campaign Plan 2075, Regional Campaign Plan for the War
            on Terror
             Concept Plan 2501, Defense Support of Civil
            Authorities
             Concept Plan 2505, Nuclear Weapon Accident Response
            Plan
             Concept Plan 0500, Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
            Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Consequence
            Management Operations
             Concept Plan 2591, Pandemic Influenza
             Concept Plan 2707, Military Support to the U.S.
            Government Agencies for Caribbean Mass Migration
             Concept Plan 2400, Emergency Preparedness in the
            National Capital Region
             Concept Plan 2502, Civil Disturbance Operations
             Campaign Plan 2900, Strategic Communication

        This year, we will focus our efforts to complete the following
    plans:

             United States-Canada Combined Defense Plan
             Canada-United States Civil Assistance Plan

        In addition to our current family of plans, we continue to advocate
    development of an overarching national homeland security plan that
    coordinates the pre-attack actions of the Federal Government. This
    plan, as advocated in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, will clarify
    the distribution of effort among Federal agencies, promote unity of
    effort, and reduce uncertainty in the overlap of responsibilities and
    capabilities among homeland security partners.
                             training and education
        NORTHCOM's and NORAD's comprehensive training and education program
    supports the mission of North American defense. NORTHCOM's defense
    support of civil authorities training programs have also become a
    national resource for homeland security and defense professionals as
    exemplified by the training of over 1,200 people in fiscal year 2006 in
    our defense support of civil authorities course.
        Our Homeland Security/Defense Education Consortium (HSDEC) has
    established a national homeland security and defense curriculum.
    Currently the organization has 183 charter and associate university
    members, including the American Association of Community Colleges with
    1,154 members in 40 States, the Canadian Defence Academy, and
    University del Salvador, Argentina. The $1.8 million apportioned to
    HSDEC from Congress as part of the Fiscal Year 2007 Defense
    Appropriations Bill is being used to sponsor research into our
    Commands' priority questions of interest, to develop an internship
    program for recruiting new defense and security personnel into
    government service, and for workshops to bring an academic perspective
    to our commands' respective missions. We also seek to foster greater
    senior civilian leadership knowledge as NORTHCOM and NORAD partner with
    the Naval Postgraduate School and civilian institutions in the
    development of a doctorate degree in the areas of homeland defense and
    security, with initial classes beginning in summer 2007.
        To build on our already strong working relationship with the
    National Guard, we're continuing the Joint Force Orientation program,
    which is a cooperative training effort between NORTHCOM, National Guard
    Bureau, Joint Forces Command and the States' National Guard
    Headquarters. The program enhances coordination, cooperation, and
    information sharing between the States' Joint Force Headquarters and
    NORTHCOM.
                                   exercises
        Each year, NORTHCOM and NORAD sponsor two large-scale exercises--
    Ardent Sentry and Vigilant Shield--and participate in over 30 smaller
    regional, State, and local exercises. We continually review lessons
    learned from past exercises and real-world events (such as Hurricane
    Katrina) and take corrective action when necessary. These actions are
    an integral part of our exercise program. Our exercise scenarios have
    involved air (civil and military) incidents and attacks; maritime and
    port security; maritime interception operations; missile defense;
    support to law enforcement agencies for border security; consequence
    management in support of civil authorities; nuclear proliferation;
    nuclear weapons accidents; weapons of mass destruction attacks; and
    natural disasters.
        Our civil support exercises are evolving to integrate fully with
    the Department of Homeland Security's National Exercise Program and are
    now national events with the support of the Federal Government,
    regional organizations, and the private sector. We actively engage our
    training partners at every level of Federal, State, tribal, and local
    government to employ the most comprehensive and realistic scenarios in
    order to achieve each participating organization's training objectives.
    Our exercises are based on the 15 National Planning Scenarios and are
    accomplished in accordance with the National Response Plan and the
    principles of the National Incident Management System.
        Last year, we developed and hosted six major Table Top Exercises
    (TTXs) and several additional smaller scale TTXs involving military,
    agency, and governmental participation at all levels. Examples of
    scenarios addressed during these synchronized TTXs include response to
    a major earthquake; terrorist use of Man-Portable Air Defense Systems
    against civilian airliners and Department of Defense (DOD) aircraft;
    and detection, tracking, and response to a ship-borne nuclear weapon
    detonated in a major U.S. port.
        Canada, primarily through Canada Command, is a full partner in
    these exercises. Although we have rehearsed and executed trans-border
    missions, such as the 2006 Super Bowl in Detroit, we have yet to
    conduct fully combined exercises that occur across the northern border.
    We continually work with the Government of Canada and its Strategic
    Joint Staff in the air arena through numerous NORAD exercises that are
    conducted regularly in, and across, all NORAD Regions (Continental
    United States, Canadian, and Alaskan NORAD Regions). Canada Command and
    Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, Canada participated in the
    Ardent Sentry series of exercises for the first time in 2006.
        We work with the National Guard Bureau to coordinate and
    synchronize major NORTHCOM and NORAD exercises with the National Guard
    State exercise series, Vigilant Guard.
        We support the DOD's decision to reprogram combatant command
    funding for the Joint Exercise Program and Training Transformation from
    the Services into a defense-wide account to be centrally managed by the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. The
    consolidation of existing funding into the Combatant Commanders'
    Exercise Engagement and Training Transformation program will result in
    efficiencies that can be rapidly applied against training requirements
    for new mission areas.
                            intelligence activities
        NORTHCOM and NORAD maintain situational awareness and readiness
    around-the-clock to protect against a range of symmetric and asymmetric
    threats in all domains. The Intelligence Community supports NORTHCOM
    and NORAD by providing actionable information needed for homeland
    defense operations. Timely and actionable intelligence is the most
    critical enabler to protecting the Homeland at a safe distance. Threat
    awareness allows us to tailor our deterrent posture and convince
    adversaries that their objectives cannot be achieved by attacking our
    Homeland and that any attack will result in an overwhelming response.
        NORTHCOM uses intelligence and threat information from other
    Federal agencies to develop and maintain situational awareness of
    threats within our area of responsibility and to facilitate a seamless
    handoff of threats to our homeland originating in other combatant
    commands' areas of responsibility. These assessments and intelligence
    products are provided to NORTHCOM components, subordinate commands, and
    lead Federal agencies. NORTHCOM assessments are shared with the
    intelligence community by posting them to the National Counterterrorism
    Center Online secure web portal, and our own web portals at various
    classification levels.
        A significant tool within NORTHCOM and NORAD is the Joint
    Intelligence Operations Center North (JIOC-North), which is part of the
    intelligence community. JIOC-North provides predictive and actionable
    threat estimates and timely warning of worldwide threats against North
    America using fused all-source intelligence and law enforcement
    information.
        To protect Americans' civil liberties, intelligence received from
    the intelligence community is filtered through a well-established and
    disciplined Intelligence Oversight Program. This ensures we analyze,
    retain, and disseminate intelligence with a foreign or international
    terrorist threat nexus, and then only to the extent the intelligence is
    relevant to our missions.
                          homeland defense operations
        Should deterrence fail, we will access and assume operational
    control of forces that are trained and ready to respond and defeat
    threats directed at our areas of responsibility. Adaptability and
    flexibility are critical to our commands' ability to counter the modern
    threat.
    NORAD Sector Consolidation
        Prior to November 2006, the NORAD Continental Region was divided
    into three air defense sectors: the Southeast Air Defense Sector at
    Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida; the Northeast Air Defense Sector at
    Rome, New York; and the Western Air Defense Sector at McChord Air Force
    Base, Washington. In November 2006, NORAD consolidated the Northeast
    and Southeast Air Defense Sectors into a single Eastern Air Defense
    Sector located in Rome, New York. We are standing up a robust Air
    Operations Center at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida. Fielding of the
    Battle Control System Fixed, a modernized, tactical-level command and
    control system, enabled this sector consolidation and will reduce
    manpower requirements.
        In 2006, we conducted the following homeland defense operations:
    Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
        NORTHCOM is responsible for directing missile defense operations
    within our area of responsibility and Hawaii to defend the Homeland,
    allies, friends, and other national interests from potentially hostile
    acts. The GMD system achieved limited defensive operations capability
    in October 2004, was placed in an operational status in June 2006, and
    is available when needed to defend the United States' and its allies'
    infrastructure and population centers. Our missile defense crews are
    trained and our systems are ready to respond as necessary. In July
    2006, the NORAD Integrated Threat Warning and Attack Assessment System
    immediately detected the launch of all seven North Korean missiles,
    tracked their trajectories, and watched as they landed in the Sea of
    Japan. The North Korean missile launch activities that occurred from
    May to July 2006 provided an excellent opportunity for NORTHCOM and
    NORAD to coordinate with national senior leadership, other combatant
    commands, and assigned missile defense assets. The challenge now is to
    balance operations with research, development, test, and evaluation to
    ensure the architecture will evolve to defend against a changing
    threat. Continued funding of GMD is critical to this effort.
    Operation Noble Eagle
        Since the attacks of September 11, NORAD has supported Operation
    Noble Eagle with airspace surveillance, a ready alert force, irregular
    air patrols, and the unique National Capital Region Integrated Air
    Defense System. Over 45,000 sorties have been flown in support of
    Operation Noble Eagle, with the Air National Guard conducting over 70
    percent of these sorties. We have adjusted our air patrols to achieve
    the balance between readiness and sustainability. In September 2006,
    the U.S. Coast Guard assumed the Rotary Wing Air Intercept mission to
    counter the light civil air threat to our Nation's capital.
        On October 11, 2006, minutes after the crash of a civilian light
    aircraft into a New York City building, NORAD scrambled several fighter
    and support aircraft to cities on the east and west coasts of the
    United States including New York, Washington, DC, and Boston.
    Additional aircraft were scrambled over cities in Canada. The aircraft
    were dispatched as a prudent measure and in anticipation of a potential
    terrorist attack; they were airborne within minutes of the incident and
    remained airborne until it was determined the incident was in fact an
    accident. The quick reaction demonstrated NORAD's capability and
    preparedness to coordinate a swift, elevated, and large-scale defensive
    and deterrent posture.
    Northern Sovereignty Operations
        On September 28, fighters from Alaskan NORAD Region and Canadian
    NORAD Region were launched in response to Russian aircraft that
    penetrated North America's Air Defense Identification Zone. While the
    Russian air assets at no time violated U.S. or Canadian airspace, NORAD
    integrated air defense assets in and around Alaska and Canada were able
    to detect, intercept and identify a number of Russian Tu-95 Bear heavy
    bombers participating in an annual Russian air force exercise near the
    coasts of Alaska and Canada. This operation demonstrated our continued
    vigilance and readiness to defend North American air sovereignty.
                      defense support of civil authorities
        In addition to homeland defense, NORTHCOM has a second core mission
    to support civil authorities with military capabilities that can
    rapidly stabilize and improve the situation in the wake of a
    catastrophic event. The NORTHCOM support is in addition to the U.S.
    Army Corps of Engineers response in their role as the DOD lead for
    Emergency Support Function #3, Public Works and Engineering, which is
    executed independent of NORTHCOM control.
        NORTHCOM provides defense support of civil authorities primarily
    through our subordinate commands: Joint Task Force Civil Support at
    Fort Monroe, VA; Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region at
    Fort McNair, Washington DC; Joint Task Force Alaska at Elmendorf Air
    Force Base, AK; and Joint Task Force North (JTF-N) at Fort Bliss, TX.
    In addition, the Army, Air Force and Marine Corps have established
    dedicated Service Components for NORTHCOM. These commands are: U.S.
    Army North located at Fort Sam Houston, TX; U.S. Air Force North
    located at Tyndall Air Force Base, FL, and U.S. Marine Forces North
    located in New Orleans, LA. The Commander, Fleet Forces Command,
    located at Naval Station Norfolk, VA, is designated as the Navy's
    Supporting Commander to NORTHCOM.
        At the direction of the President or Secretary of Defense, NORTHCOM
    supports primary response agencies as part of a comprehensive national
    response to manage the consequences of an attack or a natural disaster,
    to include a pandemic. Civil authorities are most likely to request our
    support to draw upon unique military capabilities or to augment
    civilian responders. Our ability to respond rapidly with the full range
    of military capabilities to these requests can be critical in saving
    lives, minimizing human suffering, and preserving infrastructure.
        Successful and timely response includes anticipating and planning
    for various types of requests that may arise in order to posture
    appropriate military capabilities. As a lesson learned from Hurricane
    Katrina, Defense Coordinating Officers and their supporting elements
    have been positioned in each of the 10 Federal Emergency Management
    Agency (FEMA) regions. The Defense Coordinating Officers act as
    military liaisons to increase full-time coordination with State
    governments and the Adjutants General regarding disaster response
    planning and to facilitate the ``Request For Assistance'' process
    following a disaster. These Defense Coordinating Officers and their
    support staff fall under U.S. Army North, a dedicated Army Service
    Component Command under the operational control of NORTHCOM, which
    achieved full operational capability in October 2006.
        In an effort to close the response gaps identified in the wake of
    Hurricane Katrina, NORTHCOM undertook several efforts to improve
    defense support of civil authorities. NORTHCOM deployed military
    planners to work hand in hand with the FEMA--assisting FEMA's stand up
    of their Operational Planning Unit, a group intended to provide FEMA
    with a robust crisis planning capability for future disasters. Also
    last year, NORTHCOM military planners deployed to the Gulf Coast
    Recovery Office in Baton Rouge, LA, and assisted the interagency effort
    in developing disaster preparedness plans in collaboration with State
    and local agencies of the Gulf Coast Region. Working with local, State,
    and Federal participants and in accordance with DOD's direction,
    NORTHCOM demonstrated unique military capabilities to provide
    situational awareness to senior leaders in Washington, DC, and at
    NORTHCOM, as well as local first responders--a vital capability that
    provides disaster survey information quickly to decision makers and
    first responders. NORTHCOM also developed several prescripted mission
    assignments that expedite the response of military personnel and
    supplies immediately after a disaster occurs.
    National Guard
        Over the past year, we have actively collaborated with the National
    Guard Bureau to improve communications, operational synchronization,
    and training. Programs such as the Joint Continental United States
    Communication Support Environment, which provides a comprehensive
    strategy for domestic military interoperable communications and
    information sharing, 24/7 connectivity to the National Guard Bureau
    Joint Operations Center, and hosting the Joint Task Force Commanders'
    Course at the NORTHCOM headquarters improve our ability to seamlessly
    work together.
    Pandemic Influenza
        In August 2006, we completed our plan for addressing pandemic
    influenza and were tasked by the Secretary of Defense to be both the
    supported commander for pandemic influenza and the DOD lead for
    directing, planning, and synchronizing the DOD's global response to a
    pandemic. NORTHCOM has established a joint pandemic influenza team to
    carry out this critical mission and we have made pandemic influenza
    planning a top priority for 2007.
                      support to law enforcement agencies
        Support to law enforcement is an important element in NORTHCOM's
    and NORAD's mission to deter, detect, prevent, and defeat threats to
    the Homeland, because of its direct applicability to the global war on
    terror. Transnational threats include international terrorism,
    narcotics trafficking, and proliferation of weapons of mass
    destruction. Federal laws and policies allow us to support law
    enforcement agencies by conducting operations to deter and prevent
    transnational threats. We further assist law enforcement agencies in
    their counterdrug mission. NORTHCOM provides support to law enforcement
    agencies primarily through our subordinate command, Joint Task Force
    North at Fort Bliss, TX. Terrorists have used smuggling networks and
    money laundering to achieve their goals and fund their activities. As
    we support law enforcement agencies in the fight against drugs, we also
    focus our efforts on terrorist organizations with a nexus to drug
    trafficking. We support the global war on terrorism at home by
    providing unique military capabilities to support civilian law
    enforcement agencies.
    Operation Gulfview
        This year, we expanded the role of NORTHCOM's subordinate command,
    JTF-N, to include integrative support to multiple law enforcement
    agencies with a focus on coastal border operations. In support of the
    U.S. Border Patrol's Rio Grande Valley Sector, JTF-N planned and
    facilitated Operation Gulfview from February to March 2006. Designed to
    support and improve law enforcement interdiction of transnational
    threats in the maritime domain along the Southeastern Texas Coastal
    area of the Padre Island National Seashore, this multi-sensor, multi-
    agency operation expanded to include the contiguous land border within
    Rio Grande Valley sector's border domain. This mission employed a DOD-
    funded coastal defense system designed to provide a command, control,
    intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance node capable of fusing
    multi-sensor, multi-source information into a common operational
    picture. In conjunction with this system, various title 10 and title 32
    assets provided a multi-layered detection and monitoring environment
    designed to maximize law enforcement interdiction assets. This
    operation validated emerging maritime surveillance technologies,
    explored JTF-N capabilities in the maritime domain, opened lines of
    communication, and established productive relationships among the 29
    interagency participants.
    Operation Outlook
        In June 2006, JTF-N participated in Operation Outlook, which
    involved multi-sensor DOD support to the U.S. Border Patrol's Spokane
    Sector and other Federal law enforcement agencies and interagency
    partners combining title 10 and multi-state title 32 military forces.
    Washington Air National Guard Counterdrug Task Force Title 32 forces
    provided detection support. Title 10 forces, under the command of JTF-
    N, provided ground-based, mobile ground-to-air sentinel radars. DOD
    assets were used to increase detection of low-flying helicopters and
    ground smuggling conveyances for transporting contraband between the
    U.S. and Canada.
    Operation Key Watch Alpha and Able Venture
        Key Watch Alpha occurred from May to July 2006 in support of the
    U.S. Border Patrol's Miami Sector. For the first time, JTF-N worked
    closely with the U.S. Coast Guard's District Seven Headquarters as a
    parallel lead Federal agency and once again employed a multi-layered
    detection, assessment, and awareness approach. Operation Keywatch Alpha
    incorporated multiple assets, both title 10 and title 32, in an effort
    to enhance law enforcement agencies' interdiction of smuggling
    activities along the Florida Keys and the Florida mainland approaches.
    JTF-N will continue to provide support in the maritime domain and
    recently concluded Operation Able Venture, a first-ever integrated
    mission in support of the U.S. Coast Guard in San Diego. These missions
    validate the need for monitoring of the approaches to, and enforcement
    of, our Nation's coastal borders and are planned to continue in 2007.
    Operation Jump Start
        Along the southern border, NORTHCOM and JTF-N have worked closely
    with the National Guard Bureau and the U.S. Border Patrol to ensure
    deconfliction with Operation Jump Start, which provides title 32
    support to the U.S. Border Patrol along the entire 2,000 mile border
    with Mexico. In a separate but parallel effort, JTF-N conducted
    numerous engineer support missions, primarily in Arizona and New
    Mexico, to construct barrier obstacles that restrict smuggling
    activities and roads in support of law enforcement agency effort. We
    will remain engaged with the National Guard Bureau and U.S. Border
    Patrol throughout Operation Jump Start and, where viable, will continue
    to support as requested by law enforcement agencies along the southern
    border.
    Tunnel Detection
        Applying DOD and Intelligence Community technology and intelligence
    analysis in support of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, JTF-N
    supported the detection of four tunnels on the southwest border with
    Mexico. In conjunction with its homeland security and Intelligence
    Community partners, JTF-N continues its support of tunnel detection
    efforts along the U.S. borders. In September 2006, JTF-N co-hosted an
    interagency tunnel conference with U.S. Customs and Border Protection
    to enhance knowledge of tunnel detection technologies.
    Unmanned Aircraft Systems Operation
        Through JTF-N, unmanned aircraft systems were employed, operating
    solely in restricted military airspace, along the southwest border in
    support of U.S. Customs and Border Protection. NORTHCOM is engaged with
    the Federal Aviation Administration to develop airspace procedures for
    unmanned aircraft systems to operate in the National Airspace System
    outside of full-time military restricted airspace to provide support to
    border control lead agencies and disaster response operations. While
    this is a complex issue, we remain confident that unmanned aircraft
    systems will be granted access to the National Airspace System in the
    near future to increase our ability to safely conduct critical homeland
    security operations and law enforcement support.
                            interagency coordination
        Lessons learned from conflicts such as the first Gulf War and the
    Balkans indicated an increasing need for coordination between the
    military services as well as with other Federal Government agencies.
    The attacks on September 11 and the resulting war on terrorism
    highlighted the need for military activities to be more closely tied to
    diplomatic, law enforcement, and intelligence sharing activities. In
    October 2001, the Secretary of Defense directed combatant commanders to
    integrate and synchronize activities of multiple civilian, State, and
    Federal Government agencies and departments under a Joint Interagency
    Coordination Group (JIACG). The JIACGs were made a permanent part of
    each combatant commander's staff. They facilitate two-way coordination
    and communication between military and civilian operations in each
    combatant command's area of responsibility.
        At NORTHCOM, we oversee an active JIACG composed of every element
    across the NORTHCOM and NORAD staff and more than 60 resident or local
    representatives from DOD and non-DOD agencies. The JIACG meets as a
    broad corporate entity one to two times per month on topics pertaining
    to homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities. Our
    JIACG, combined with myriad interactions with Federal agencies,
    National Guard, State and local first responders, and countless local
    and private associates, contributes to information and knowledge
    sharing and to a collaborative approach to operations in our Homeland.
        Interagency operations are the next frontier of jointness and one
    that the United States should continue to foster. We continually add to
    our capable team of partners at NORTHCOM and are optimizing
    collaborative relationship building to achieve our Nation's homeland
    defense and security imperatives.
        Interagency coordination permeates all of NORTHCOM's and NORAD's
    activities. We harness the power of the JIACG to help us craft
    realistic, collaborative, and workable plans and we provide the right
    support, at the right time, in concert with the right partners--always
    respecting the authorities of those States and agencies that we have
    been charged to assist through our operation.
        In this complex interagency environment, we must also identify and
    transition meaningful technology that will strengthen homeland security
    efforts. Deliberative engagement is required across all levels of
    government and the private sector to support technology which enhances
    homeland defense and security capabilities. The acquisition and
    implementation of standards-driven, effective technological networks
    will be a catalyst to the development and sustainment of critical human
    networks required to build our capacity along with those of our
    national and international partners.
                          interoperable communications
        During 2006, NORTHCOM made significant strides in increasing
    communications interoperability and improving communications planning
    and response with our numerous mission partners, while posturing our
    subordinate and supporting commands with rapidly deployable
    communications equipment for use during contingency operations.
        During the Defense Interoperability Communications Exercise in
    March 2006, NORTHCOM hosted 17 communications teams representing
    various DOD, National Guard, Coast Guard, FEMA, and local first
    responder organizations. To further increase interoperability, the
    command also published an equipment technical standards document in
    2006. This document recommends the technical standards that units and
    mission partners should adhere to when procuring new communications
    equipment.
        Response operations in the wake of the 2005 devastating hurricane
    season revealed a number of important lessons--the most critical of
    these was our Nation's requirement for efficient and effective
    communications.
        The results of the National Baseline Assessment conducted by the
    SAFECOM Program, an entity within the DHS Office for Interoperability
    and Compatibility, show that most agencies have developed, at the very
    least, a minimum technological capability to achieve tactical
    interoperable communications. However, each urban/metropolitan area has
    incorporated different technology solutions because achieving
    interoperability is dependent on the specific types of communications
    equipment and infrastructures each agency has procured and currently
    employs. Therefore, a voice communications solution that would be
    considered ideal in one area could be unsuited for another. Currently,
    there is a shortage of pre-incident communications planning and
    coordination among State and local governments that impedes
    collaboration, sharing of critical information, and the ability of the
    Federal Government and NORTHCOM to support State and local response
    efforts effectively.
        To address communications shortfalls discovered during Hurricane
    Katrina, NORTHCOM procured and employed interoperable communications
    packages that are ideally suited to our homeland defense and defense
    support of civil authorities mission sets. During exercise periods, we
    procured and employed several deployable, cellular-based communications
    suites that provide an autonomous infrastructure to extend
    communications connectivity in the NORTHCOM area of responsibility. We
    also procured three Incident Awareness and Assessment/Full Motion Video
    communications suites to augment or replace capabilities required
    during emergency response operations.
                          theater security cooperation
        NORTHCOM Theater Security Cooperation activities contribute to the
    Secretary of Defense's Security Cooperation Guidance's top priority to
    build the capacities of allies and partners to help win the global war
    on terror by enhancing coordination with our continental neighbors,
    Canada and Mexico. American Servicemembers' Protection Act sanctions
    not only prohibited equipment transfers, but encouraged Mexico to
    consider military purchases from other countries and the continuing
    restrictions on Foreign Military Financing and the Excess Defense
    Articles grant programs for Mexico dampens our ability to effectively
    counter transnational terrorism and narcotics threats. Lifting these
    restrictions will have a significant impact on our homeland defense
    efforts with our southern neighbor.
                                   conclusion
        NORTHCOM and NORAD are part of a binational and interagency team
    dedicated to strengthening the security and defense of North America.
    We have finalized our homeland defense and civil support plans and are
    now looking at ways to improve continental defense. The continued
    evolution of the commands is critical to our ability to provide a
    flexible, adaptable, and scaleable response to modern threats. NORTHCOM
    and NORAD have synchronized our existing plans, directives, and major
    operations; established intelligence priorities; and prioritized other
    resources in pursuit of designated strategic objectives with regard to
    the global war on terror. Activities and operations directed by
    NORTHCOM complement and support the United States Government-led
    international effort to deny terrorist networks what they need to
    operate and survive. NORTHCOM and NORAD contribute to the overarching
    national goals of countering ideological support for the enemy,
    disrupting and attacking the enemy, and protecting the American
    Homeland.
        Responsibility for protecting North America is divided among
    Federal, State, tribal, and local governments. NORTHCOM and NORAD
    coordinate closely with other government agencies to achieve integrated
    plans and operations. NORTHCOM is maximizing cooperation with Canada
    and Mexico and thus enabling them to counter terrorism through
    bilateral partnerships. Additionally, we look beyond the established
    NORTHCOM area of responsibility in coordination with U.S. Special
    Operations Command and the other regional combatant commands to
    institute a synchronized DOD global approach to disrupt transnational
    terrorists through continuous collaboration and a rigorous program of
    exercises to enhance our ability to conduct homeland defense
    operations.
        The core capability to accomplish our missions resides in our
    people. We must continue to ensure their welfare and that of their
    families. We are grateful to Congress for the support that it provides
    our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coastguardsmen, and their
    families, in their efforts to defend our Nation at home and abroad.
    Increases in pay and benefits, such as military housing upgrades,
    medical care improvements, and other quality of life enhancements, are
    clear indicators of the extent to which Congress values our
    servicemembers. The men and women of NORTHCOM and NORAD are dedicated
    to defending the United States and Canadian homelands against all
    threats. I am privileged to be a part of this outstanding team.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Admiral.
        General Smith?

       STATEMENT OF GEN. LANCE L. SMITH, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
    STATES JOINT FORCES COMMAND/NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
              SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER FOR TRANSFORMATION

        General Smith. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and
    distinguished members of the committee. I really am honored to
    be able to testify today and talk about the role that JFCOM
    pursues on a daily basis as we work towards fighting the global
    war on terror, providing trained and ready conventional forces
    to the combatant commanders, as well as joint enabling
    capabilities to those commanders, and at the same time, attempt
    to lead the transformation effort of the DOD.
        It's also an honor to share this opportunity with my
    friends, Admiral Tim Keating and Admiral Jim Stavridis. I would
    normally have my closest advisor and senior enlisted member of
    JFCOM, Sergeant Major Mark Ripka, but he's in Jordan today,
    looking at the cultural awareness training that our forces are
    getting before they go in there.
        I do have a prepared statement that I would like to submit
    for the record, and with your permission, I'll make a few
    statements, and then get to the questions.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, it will be made part of the
    record.
        General Smith. Our message today is that the ability of our
    military to operate as an integrated, joint force matters.
    Whether our Armed Forces are engaged overseas, employed to
    defend the Homeland, or sent to assist natural disasters, we
    fight and operate as a joint team.
        This is because the range and complexity of operations
    today, and the requirement to coordinate with disparate
    organizations, make it absolutely essential that we have the
    right joint enabling capabilities, the right level of joint
    training and education, and the right level of joint skills and
    leadership.
        I should make it clear, when I use the term ``joint'' I'm
    referring to it in the very broadest terms. That's the ability
    to seamlessly integrate the capabilities of our separate
    services, other government agencies, allies, coalition
    partners, multi-national organizations, and other
    nongovernmental organizations. Simply stated, at JFCOM, we
    supply joint-capable forces for the combatant commanders' use.
        These forces come from the 1.16 million Active-Duty
    National Guard and Reserve soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
    marines from our headquarters and our component commands, our
    combat command, fleet forces command, Army forces command, and
    Marine forces command.
        We've witnessed a significant shift in the way our forces
    organize and prepare to conduct joint operations. For instance,
    almost all of our deployed forces today are organized as joint
    task forces while they're in the Service-pure entities.
        The reasons are clear--we can generate more power to create
    the effects we want, by the integration of our many
    capabilities and those from the interagencies and coalition
    members that we work with, than any one Service can produce
    alone.
        Our training methods and infrastructure have likewise
    undergone a quiet, but significant transformation. With our
    joint national training capability, we now have the ability to
    reach out and train the staffs of combatant commands and joint
    task forces anywhere around the world, without having to deploy
    to a common location.
        In the United States we have 72 different training sites
    across the country, that connect all of the Services in a
    common training network. This allows us to leverage over 20
    service training programs to identify joint training
    shortfalls, as well as to add a common joint context, and
    provide operational and tactical level joint training.
        In the same vein, JFCOM is currently coordinated with the
    National Defense University, United States Army, and the North
    Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) fleet over in Oberammergau,
    Germany, to support joint training requirements for the civil
    military Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), prior to their
    deployments into Afghanistan and Iraq. We're also engaged with
    the Foreign Service Institute at the Department of State (DOS)
    to do the same thing.
        We possess a world-class center of excellence for joint
    innovation and experimentation, as well as a Joint Systems
    Integration Command for the DOD and we've built a powerful
    federation of partners from the Services, interagencies, multi-
    national partners, and members from academia and industry to
    participate in the concept development and experimentation for
    the joint community.
        Today, we have the ability not only to peer into the future
    security environment, and to anticipate what the requirements
    might be, but also the partnership base, and integration know-
    how to quickly turn our collective future concepts into real
    capabilities today, by pulling those experiments and those
    capabilities forward.
        These joint experiments and wargames are also intricately
    designed to support the needs of combatant commands like
    NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM. For instance, next month, JFCOM will
    support NORTHCOM in their homeland defense mission, while
    conducting an experiment called Noble Resolve.
        That experiment logs in, among other things, the ability of
    the military to operate with Federal, State, and local
    governments as a joint team in responding to a series of crises
    on the homefront.
        In summary, jointness is real and powerful. It's about
    creating a culture of innovation and adaptiveness across the
    force. It's about delivering products that resolve common
    challenges. Without a new culture that employs integrated
    products, we won't get beyond the old way of doing business.
    Those were the days when our capabilities couldn't talk to one
    another, and interdependence was impossible. Our ability to
    generate integrated effects across the battlespace was
    difficult at best.
        We couldn't get away from this in the past, but in this
    era, where our adversaries are extremely adaptive and
    technologically and asymmetrically savvy, we can't afford to
    operate like we did. The challenge is real, and I invite each
    of you to visit JFCOM and our NATO Command, Allied Command
    Transformation Headquarters in Norfolk.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Smith follows:]
                  Prepared Statement by Gen. Lance Smith, USAF
        The efforts of United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) are
    focused on providing forces and capabilities to help win the war today,
    while preparing forces for the challenges of tomorrow. Our current
    enemy in the war on terror is adaptive, elusive, and determined to win
    at all costs. Defeating such a broad and decentralized terrorist
    network requires innovation and agility. The capabilities of tomorrow's
    enemy are less clear. We don't know if it will be a peer competitor, a
    nation-state, or a transnational organization, but we can be assured
    that we will still need a trained and ready force capable of fighting
    and winning in any environment.
        I am very pleased to be able to share the accomplishments of JFCOM
    with the committee. As a command we work hard to ensure our 1.16
    million Active-Duty, National Guard, and Reserve soldiers, sailors,
    airmen, marines, and civilians can operate seamlessly and
    interdependently with each other and with our interagency and
    multinational partners, maximizing all instruments of national power to
    fight and win.
        JFCOM is uniquely structured to provide Joint Force Commanders with
    timely, relevant enabling capabilities, including trained and ready
    joint forces, capable of integrated operations with governmental
    agencies, multinational partners and nongovernmental organizations. Our
    over 5,350 headquarters personnel--a blend of military from every
    branch of the Service, Reserves, and National Guard, along with
    government civilians and contractors--bring a combined expertise that
    is unique among military and civilian organizations. Their pride and
    professionalism is the key to JFCOM's success.
        Working towards meeting both the needs of today and the challenges
    of tomorrow defines the mission of JFCOM:
        To provide mission ready joint capable forces and support the
    development and integration of joint, interagency, and multinational
    capabilities to meet the present and future operational needs of the
    Joint Force.
        With a renewed focus on the joint warfighter, 2006 was highlighted
    by great partnerships with the combatant commanders, the Services,
    Federal agencies, academia and industry, and our components: Air Combat
    Command, Marine Forces Command, Fleet Forces Command, and Army Forces
    Command. We provide:

             Multiple deployments of Standing Joint Force
            Headquarters and other assets in support of operational needs
            of the combatant commanders from Pakistan to Qatar and beyond.
             Continuous robust and tailored tactical communications
            support to conventional and Special Operations Forces in Iraq
            and Afghanistan by the Joint Communications Support Element
            (JCSE).
             The first time deployment of JCSE's U.S. Central
            Command (CENTCOM) C3 Quick Reaction Force to provide
            communications support for noncombatant evacuation operations
            in Lebanon
             Preparation of joint warfighters for operational
            missions, through 6 Mission Rehearsal Exercises and 16
            combatant commander training events, conducting more than 70
            collective joint training events involving more than 46,000
            participants
             Realistic training for commanders and staffs of Joint
            Task Force Horn of Africa, Multinational Force-Iraq,
            Multinational Corps-Iraq, and Combined Joint Task Force 76 in
            Afghanistan
             Significant expansion of joint distance learning tools
            such as the Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution
            Capability
             Enabling technology for all major Service training
            centers and combatant commanders to train together in a
            distributed environment through the Joint National Training
            Capability
             Dedicated assessment teams to Iraq and Afghanistan to
            identify areas for improved command and control of U.S. and
            multinational forces
             Sourcing recommendations and coordinated the
            deployment of more than 310,000 personnel in support of
            combatant commanders
             The stand up of the Joint Command and Control
            Capability Portfolio Manager capabilities function to deliver
            integrated joint command and control capabilities, improve
            interoperability and increase joint operational effectiveness
             Leadership for Multinational Experiment (MNE) 4, with
            participants from eight nations and the North Atlantic Treaty
            Organization (NATO)
             Advanced terrain analysis prototype software
            (Geospatial Analysis and Planning Support (GAPS)) to meet the
            warfighter requirements for rapid route analysis and
            identification, sensor planning and placement and counter fire
            systems planning and placement.
             Development of timely products such as the HARMONIEWeb
            Interagency collaborative tool and the Counter Improvised
            Explosive Device Knowledge and Information Fusion Exchange
            (KnIFE)
                               core competencies
        JFCOM's five core competencies--unique mission areas--form the
    nucleus of the command's day-to-day operations.
    Joint Force Provider
        As the conventional Joint Force Provider, JFCOM provides trained
    and capable forces to commanders in the field. This entails identifying
    and recommending global joint sourcing solutions in coordination with
    both the Services and combatant commanders.
    Joint Force Trainer
        As the lead Joint Force Trainer, JFCOM conducts and assesses joint
    and multinational training and exercises for assigned forces, and
    assists the chairman and other combatant commanders and Service Chiefs
    in their preparations for joint and combined operations.
    Joint Force Integrator
        As the lead Joint Integrator for all of the Department of Defense's
    (DOD) uniformed components, JFCOM is responsible for recommending
    changes in doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership,
    personnel, and facilities to integrate Service, defense agency, and
    interagency and multinational capabilities. Efforts range from
    integrating the disparate systems and processes that exist today, to
    ensuring that the systems and processes of tomorrow are ``born joint.''
    Joint Innovation & Experimentation
        As the DOD lead for concept development and experimentation, JFCOM
    leads the development, exploration and assessment of new joint
    concepts, organizational structures and emerging technologies. This
    includes operational concepts involving multinational and interagency
    transformation efforts.
    Joint Force Enabler
        As a joint enabling capabilities provider to commanders in the
    field, JFCOM provides joint enabling capabilities that streamline the
    rapid formation and organization of a Joint Task Force (JTF)
    Headquarters. These include command and control capability, augmenting
    the headquarters with rapidly deployable critical skills support, and
    providing reach-back support as required.
                                strategic goals
        The command's strategic goals are focused on helping the joint
    warfighters of today in their efforts to win the war on terror, while
    working to transform the force to meet the threats and challenges of
    tomorrow. These strategic goals guide the application of JFCOM's core
    competencies.
    Provide Focused JFCOM Support to Win the War on Terror
        JFCOM provides combatant commanders enhanced joint enabling
    capabilities for defeating violent extremism and building a security
    environment that is inhospitable to terrorist threats. These
    capabilities were provided to some 24 separate JTFs throughout the
    globe in 2006 with even greater requirements in 2007. We will continue
    to integrate our actions with U.S. agencies and international partners
    to achieve a common purpose.
        JFCOM has established several joint enabling capabilities to
    complement service headquarters trained or designated to serve as JTF
    Headquarters. These capabilities provide unique, mission ready support
    to joint force commanders to aid in the accelerated formation and
    increased effectiveness of their headquarters.
        The more significant joint enabling capabilities are:

             Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element (SJFHQ
            (CE))
             JCSE
             Intelligence Quick Reaction Team (QRT) [resourced from
            Joint Transformation Command-Intelligence (JTC-I)
             Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE)

        The mission of the SJFHQ(CE) is to accelerate the transition of a
    Service component headquarters to a JTF headquarters. These core
    elements, ready to deploy worldwide on short notice, are capable of
    providing initial joint planning and operations within a collaborative
    environment to access information from global locations. Each core
    element's personnel and equipment can be tailored for a specific
    mission to support joint/combined planning, operations, knowledge
    management and information superiority.
        The JCSE provides simultaneous communications support for two JTF
    Headquarters and two Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF)
    Headquarters within 72 hours of notification. JCSE also provides
    contingency and crisis communications to meet operational and support
    needs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Commands, Services, defense
    agencies, and non-defense agencies. These assets, alert-postured and
    globally deployable, provide en-route and early entry command, control,
    computers, and communications to combatant commanders.
        The Joint Transformation Command-Intelligence (JTC-I) resourced
    Intelligence Quick Reaction Teams (QRT) provide military and civilian
    intelligence professionals with targeting and collection management
    expertise to a JTF within 24 hours of notification, or during events
    leading up to crisis/contingency operations.
        The Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE) provides dedicated
    and sustained joint public affairs capability on a scalable and
    expeditionary basis to support JTFs worldwide. The JPASE is also the
    joint public affairs defense-wide proponent.
        In the last 2 years, these elements supported operations in
    numerous locations including the U.S. Gulf Coast, Iraq, Afghanistan,
    Qatar, Horn of Africa, Lebanon, and Pakistan, in support of the war on
    terror, disaster relief, and noncombatant evacuations.
        JFCOM searches for opportunities to develop new joint enabling
    capabilities that can accelerate the establishment and immediate
    effectiveness of JTF headquarters and related joint organizations.
    Joint enabling capabilities are integrated into JTF headquarters
    training and exercises to increase proficiency for future operations
    and doctrine changes.
        A key JFCOM capability supporting the war on terrorism is the Joint
    Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC). This center develops and adapts
    modeling and simulation technologies for analysis, computation and the
    presentation of options to combatant commands. JWAC's support to the
    warfighter in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2006 was substantial, and will be
    again in 2007.
    Deliver Trained, Capable, and Interoperable Joint Forces
        JFCOM provides forces that meet combatant commanders' requirements
    for trained and interdependent forces capable of adaptively operating
    in a joint, interagency, multinational, and coalition environment.
    JFCOM supports:

             the continued improvement of the joint staffs and
            operating forces that are currently deployed
             provision of timely and tailored joint training
            standards for tasks that are jointly executed
             creation of a collaborative environment that, in real
            time, routinely makes use of lessons learned and best practices
             reduction of solution cycle time to develop relevant,
            accessible, and value-added training capabilities to the joint
            warfighter

        JFCOM achieves these goals through timely and realistic joint
    training support at the operational level to combatant commanders,
    Services, and interagency/multinational partners. Each year JFCOM
    coordinates and supports commanders through more than 70 collective
    joint training events involving 46,000 training participants, and
    individual joint training for more than 26,000 people. In addition,
    JFCOM, through the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC), supports
    training for accredited service and combatant command training
    programs. This support extends to all Army, Air Force, Marine Corps,
    and Navy pre-deployment training environments by providing a joint
    training environment for their mission rehearsal events.
        The Joint National Training Capability uses a mix of live, virtual,
    and constructive simulations. Key to this capability is the Joint
    Training and Experimentation Network (JTEN), a 32 node persistent
    global network to deliver realistic joint training to the warfighter at
    72 sites across the Continental United States and abroad. JTEN provides
    connectivity with the Navy Cooperative Training Environment (NCTE), the
    Air Force Distributed Mission Operations Network, and Office of
    Secretary of Defense's (OSD) Secret-Defense Research and Engineering
    Network, and will soon be connected with multinational partner training
    and experimentation networks. Connecting the JTEN and the NCTE enabled
    the delivery of Joint training during the Terminal Fury 07 Exercise to
    3 countries, 14 States, across 19 time zones with 24 federated
    simulation systems.
        JFCOM uses this capability to conduct and support training for
    combatant commands, JTFs, functional component battle staffs, and
    Service selected tactical units worldwide, as well as leveraging 20+
    Service training programs through an accreditation and certification
    process that identifies joint training shortfalls, to add joint context
    and provide operational and tactical level joint training. In addition,
    JFCOM is currently coordinating with the National Defense University,
    the U.S. Army, and the NATO School to support joint training
    requirements for the Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT) Training
    prior to deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq.
        In 2006, JFCOM prepared warfighters through 6 Mission Rehearsal
    Exercises, 16 combatant commander events, and 69 JNTC-enabled Service
    training events through the use of 43 joint trainer support elements
    forward deployed to 20 combatant command and Service training sites.
        JFCOM significantly enhanced mission rehearsal exercises for
    Operation ENDURING FREEDOM with an unprecedented headquarters training
    exercise, in which NATO's International Security Assistance Force
    Afghanistan and a U.S. Regional Command (82d Airborne Division HQ)
    trained together in the same exercise. Headquarters personnel from the
    Afghan National Security Forces, Afghan National Army, Pakistani Army,
    and the U.S. Embassy in Kabul also participated and achieved a
    significant level of multinational realism from both exercise and
    operational environments.
        In conjunction with these training events, the Joint Knowledge
    Development and Distribution Capability (JKDDC) provides online
    training for individual augmentees and headquarters staff members. It
    is an adaptable and world class learning management system used by the
    warfighter, coalition forces, and Reserves for initial and continuous
    training in JTF Headquarters. By April of this year, JKDDC will offer
    over 85 courses (700 hours of instruction) in a variety of subjects to
    include headquarters operations, interagency, and culturally related
    topics through a dynamic global network.
        JFCOM also executes its responsibilities to transform senior
    military leadership development and education by bringing joint
    training and professional military education together, ensuring
    military, coalition, and interagency leaders are prepared to operate
    cohesively in joint operations. The command hosts portions of three
    courses sponsored by JFCOM and the National Defense University:

             Keystone joint operations module for command senior
            enlisted leaders (91 participants in fiscal year 2006)
             Capstone joint operations module for newly selected
            flag and general officers (171 fellows participated in fiscal
            year 2006)
             Pinnacle course for two- and three-star commanders
            focusing on JTF Commander training (57 participants in fiscal
            year 2006)

        Additionally, JFCOM oversees specialized training provided by:

             Standing Joint Force Headquarters
             Special Operations Command-Joint Forces Command
             Joint Transformation Command-Intelligence (JTC-I)
             Joint Targeting School
             Joint Public Affairs Support Element
             Joint Deployment Training Center
             Joint Personnel Recovery Agency
             JTC-I Quick Response Teams

        JFCOM supports the Combatant Commander's Exercise Engagement and
    Training Transformation (CE2T2) program, which addresses joint
    warfighter training shortfalls by consolidating existing resources.
    This will benefit the largest audience and enable portfolio management
    for the Joint Training Program. The CE2T2 program is based on an
    extension of the Training Transformation (T2) business model that has
    become a catalyst for inter-Service coordination, and keeps programs on
    budget and on schedule while defraying costs of Service training
    programs. CE2T2 eliminates redundancy, and ensures resource alignment
    against validated needs.
    Primary Joint Force Provider (Global Force Management)
        As the conventional Joint Force Provider (JFP), JFCOM provides DOD
    leadership with the necessary data and alternatives to make proactive,
    risk-informed force management and allocation decisions. JFCOM uses a
    process that identifies risks to execute combatant commander missions,
    forecast sourcing challenges to execute contingencies and project
    Reserve Component unit mobilization/availability. This requires global
    visibility on unit readiness as well as the ability to analyze force
    structure, capabilities, availability, location, and apportionment of
    those assets.
        JFCOM's objective is to source all rotational and emergent force
    requirements, including individual and ad-hoc force capabilities in
    collaboration with components, Services (both Active and Reserve) and
    combatant commands' input to achieve effective/efficient sourcing
    solutions. JFCOM also sources OSD prioritized JTF Headquarters and the
    individual augmentees identified to staff those JTF Headquarters, in
    coordination with the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and Service
    headquarters. In 2006, JFCOM developed sourcing recommendations and
    coordinated the deployment of more than 310,000 personnel in support of
    all combatant commanders.
        In addition, the expanding Joint Force Provider mission requires
    that JFCOM attain an automated capability to assess and monitor force
    capabilities, availability, location, readiness, and assignment, and to
    be able to track the status of units through the entire pre-deployment,
    deployment, redeployment, and reconstitution cycle for both the Active
    and Reserve components, down to an individual. This requirement is
    termed the Global Visibility Capability (GVC), for which the Defense
    Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) and other contributing technologies
    such as the Joint Event Scheduling System (JESS) and the Joint Force
    Projection Advanced Capability Technology Demonstration (JFP-ACTD) are
    currently being pursued and/or enhanced.
        JFCOM is spearheading the development and enforcement of policies
    that transform Global Force Management into a predictive, streamlined
    and integrated process supported by net-centric tools that expand total
    force visibility. This effort will enable effective and efficient
    sourcing of all rotational and emergent force requirements while
    simultaneously seeking to reduce, and ultimately eliminate, persistent
    force capability shortfalls (low density/high demand) and fully
    coordinating the availability of Active and Reserve Forces. This will
    allow earlier notification of forces that will be deployed, thus adding
    stability of their personal lives, predictability to their schedules,
    and greater opportunities for their training.
        In October 2006, JFCOM gained responsibility for assignment of
    individual augmentees to deployed units, a sourcing workload of
    approximately 10,000 joint positions annually for 55 JTF Headquarters
    worldwide. This is a new mission requirement of our force provider role
    which demands an efficient and effective process in order to ensure
    these individual augmentees arrive where they were needed in a timely
    manner, trained and ready to fight.
    Develop Joint Capabilities and Interoperable Joint Command and Control
            (JC2)
        As the Joint Capability Developer, JFCOM advances warfighter
    effectiveness, improves combat capability, and helps minimize
    fratricide by leading the combatant commands, Services, agencies, and
    multinational partners in the interdependent and integrated development
    and transition of Joint Warfighting Capabilities. In September 2006,
    the Deputy Secretary of Defense designated JFCOM to lead a trial
    program as the Joint Command and Control Capability Portfolio Manager
    (JC2 CPM). In this capacity, JFCOM has established a JC2 CPM capability
    function, characterized by short reporting lines, and close
    coordination with Service C2 programs. JFCOM, along with a multitude of
    partners, is working to establish the technical expertise and attendant
    authorities necessary to eliminate unnecessary duplication, close
    capability gaps, and ensure joint integrated capability solutions for
    the warfighter.
        A fully networked, interoperable, and interdependent joint force is
    essential to the achievement of successful military operations now and
    in the future. While we have come very far since the enactment of the
    Goldwater-Nichols legislation, we still have much work to do with
    achieving this vision for our Armed Forces. As we learned in Iraq,
    Afghanistan, and elsewhere, the lack of interoperability in command and
    control and other functions significantly reduces the effectiveness of
    our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines on the battlefield. Unique
    among combatant commands, JFCOM works the critical seams of joint
    warfighting, leading the migration of existing Service-based systems
    toward a single, integrated joint capability.
        JFCOM's goal is to develop operational level forces and
    headquarters with the organic ability to fight as part of a joint and
    combined force alongside our multinational and interagency partners.
    The command's integration efforts will yield a joint command and
    control capability that ensures decisionmakers receive information when
    they need it, allowing them to observe, orient, decide, adjust, and act
    faster than an adversary. Moreover, it will meet the pressing demands
    of today's battlefield by linking voice and data from global and
    national command centers to joint task force headquarters, between
    component commands, and on to the soldier, sailor, airman, marines,
    coalition partner, or governmental/nongovernmental agency over the last
    tactical mile.
        The goal is to create an ``Interoperable JC2 Environment'' that:

             Ensures a JC2 capability ``Born Joint'' not ``Made
            Joint'' on the battlefield, as was required for:

                     Blue Force Tracker
                     Joint Airborne Communications Suite
                     Joint Airborne Communications Center Command
                    Post (JACC/CP)

             Provides a persistent test and evaluation environment
            to assess aspects of command and control portfolio programs
             Provides cross-program and enterprise-wide system
            engineering
             Recommends Program Objective Memorandum (POM) offsets
            to ensure the ``jointness'' of Service and agency command and
            control programs
             Supports future JTF Headquarters

        The CPM will focus on the needs of the combatant commander to
    ensure proposed solutions contribute to joint command and control
    warfighting capabilities and that resources are distributed according
    to joint command and control priorities.
        As part of its CPM duties, JFCOM also serves as the operational
    proponent for the Net Enabled Command Capability (NECC), the web-based
    replacement for the stove-piped Global Command and Control (GCCS)
    family of systems. In this role, JFCOM partners with the combatant
    commands and Services to establish the warfighter requirements for the
    new command and control system and then ensures our acquisition
    partner, the Defense Information Systems Agency, delivers an
    interoperable capability that meets the warfighter's needs.
        Beyond its joint command and control duties, JFCOM also develops
    additional warfighting capabilities for the joint force. These
    capabilities include Joint Data Link software, precision targeting
    system, and machine to machine interfaces for passing that targeting
    information without relying on voice transmission. All of these
    capabilities are in use today.
        Since 2004, JFCOM's implementation of Limited Acquisition Authority
    (LAA) in support of the combatant commands has been used to fund/
    provide several critical capabilities to the warfighter:

             The Joint Precision Air Drop System in partnership
            with U.S. Special Operations Command, currently employed in
            theater (January 2006).
             The Change Detection Work Station (CDWS), a Marine
            Corps initiative, deployed to CENTCOM in January 2005.
             The JTF Commander Executive Command and Control
            Capability (JTF CDR EC2) delivered to CENTCOM/U.S. European
            Command (EUCOM) Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) in fiscal
            years 2004-2005.
             Blue Force Situational Awareness, in partnership with
            U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), in Iraq today with Multi-
            National Force-West and currently being tested to support XVIII
            Airborne Corps in their upcoming JTF role.

        Warfare is inherently difficult and dangerous. To be effective in
    the global war on terror, and to be more interoperable with coalition
    partners, we need better cultural and language tools. To help overcome
    the language barrier, JFCOM has partnered with the Defense Advanced
    Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to develop and provide over 1,000
    language translation devices for CENTCOM and others. These devices
    include over 950 one-way speech translation devices (Phrasealator and
    Voice Response Translators) and nearly 100 prototype two-way Speech-to-
    Speech (English-Arabic) Translators.
        Our Collaborative Information Environment Management Office (CIEMO)
    is working with the Services, to include the Virginia Army National
    Guard, nongovernment organizations and other mission partners to
    further develop and employ Humanitarian Assistance Response for
    Multipartner Operations Network on Internet Enterprise (HARMONIEWeb).
    HARMONIEWeb, developed in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, affords
    the ability for mission partners outside of the U.S. Government to
    collaborate, share and better integrate information across the spectrum
    of support for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief operations.
        To reduce the danger of fratricide, JFCOM worked with the Services
    and the combatant commands to establish a common training standard for
    authorizing servicemembers to direct close air support fires to
    targets. Moreover, the command planned and executed a combat
    identification experiment with over 700 U.S. and coalition participants
    designed to assess the military utility of specific anti-fratricide
    technologies. This experiment was such a success and the results of
    sufficient rigor that the Army and Marines decided to purchase improved
    combat identification systems for use in the near future.
        Two additional subordinate commands that support the joint
    warfighter and facilitate the integration and interoperability effort
    are the Joint Fires Integration and Interoperability Team (JFIIT) and
    Joint Systems Integration Command (JSIC). JFIIT, located at Eglin Air
    Force Base, FL, conducts joint tactical testing and evaluation designed
    to improve the integration, interoperability, and operational
    effectiveness of joint fires and combat identification. JSIC, located
    in Suffolk, VA, is the battle laboratory for analyzing command and
    control systems integration and interoperability issues and works
    closely with the Joint Warfighting Center and the Joint Futures
    Laboratory.
    Lead Continuous Effort to Transform the Joint Force
        JFCOM coordinates the transformational actions of the Services,
    other government agencies, and our international partners to improve
    our ability to conduct integrated planning, coordination, and execution
    of complex operations. Our goal is to identify and develop the joint
    capabilities that provide combatant commanders with the ability to
    operate continuously and effectively within any adversary's decision-
    cycle, under any conditions, now and in the future.
        Transformation is a continuous process of innovation,
    experimentation and the transition of solution capabilities into the
    hands of the Nation's joint forces for today's fight and future
    engagements. The efforts of JFCOM are directed to ensure the Joint
    Force Commander is equipped with improved concepts and capabilities
    across the spectrum of operations, and will be better prepared to
    command. For example, JFCOM is engaged in providing near-term command
    and control solutions while working toward the force of the future that
    will:

             Be more capable of working with joint, interagency,
            and multinational partners
             Be able to work in an environment that deeply
            integrates planning, intelligence, and operations
             Possess the tools and operational art required to
            operate at the commanders' discretion,
             Be rapidly deployable and efficiently sustainable
             Be an enabled element within and contribute to a
            synchronized strategic communication environment

        Transformation is about developing new concepts and capabilities
    together in a wider range of settings from the traditional laboratory
    experimentation to prototyping the emerging concepts and capabilities
    in the field. Much of our work is now informed by powerful federations
    of models and simulations run on supercomputers. This technological
    edge at the beginning of the development and experimentation process is
    a key enabler for producing what our primary customers, the combatant
    commanders, have told us they need to address today's realities and
    tomorrow's emerging challenges.
        Modeling and Simulation (M&S) provides the foundation for
    innovation and experimentation. Ongoing sophisticated M&S capabilities
    include the Joint Semi-Automated Forces (JSAF), a high fidelity
    multidimensional environment that can replicate real-world urban
    environments such as Baghdad or Norfolk. Matching the real-time
    fidelity of JSAF, but in a faster-than-real-time capacity, is the Joint
    Analysis System (JAS). JAS, a constructive simulation, facilitates
    analysis of actions and results of those actions in an entire joint
    campaign, from pre-deployment, to employment, and re-deployment of
    forces. This lets us be more effective and efficient before, during,
    and after operations. Another emerging model is the Synthetic
    Environment for Analysis and Simulation (SEAS). This tool models and
    simulates reactions of institutions, organizations, and individuals
    that make up a society and their effects on joint operations. We will
    soon be experimenting with this tool on the battlefield.
        JFCOM continues to leverage our affiliation with the Congressional
    M&S Caucus. For the last 2 years, the Hampton Roads area has hosted the
    Nation's leaders in M&S to highlight the importance of the industry.
    This provides a forum not only to share with industry and academia, but
    also to showcase M&S training initiatives of the military in a JTF
    environment, promote enhanced M&S capabilities, and understand the
    importance of such training to success on the battlefield. These
    conferences also provide a means to share with academia and industry,
    strategies to foster increased participation by college students in the
    math and science disciplines. This partnership with academia is a key
    area that we want to grow in 2007 and beyond.
        Recent experiments like the Urban Resolve experimentation series
    address the capability gaps our commanders now face. By focusing on the
    challenges of urban operations in 2015, the Urban Resolve series
    analyzes the effectiveness of current and future capabilities in
    demanding environments. Over 1,000 people, including representatives
    from the Services, DARPA, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, interagency
    and multinational partners, from more than 19 sites, participated in
    and contributed to the JFCOM lead Urban Resolve experiment series,
    designed to explore and deliver capabilities for the urban battlespace
    of tomorrow.
        Likewise, the MNE Series brings the multinational and interagency
    communities together to examine better ways to work together. Eight
    partner countries, including the U.S., NATO, and other nations
    participated in the MNE series in 2006. The experiment further refined
    an effects-based approach to operations, which led to the development
    of an effects-based planning tool that NATO is fielding to the
    International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.
        In 2006, JFCOM established the Joint Intelligence Operations
    Center-Experimental (JIOC-X) to conduct joint intelligence concept
    development and experimentation (JICD&E), to conduct joint training,
    and to incorporate lessons learned, best practices, and assessments in
    support of both combatant command and Defense JIOCs. The ultimate end-
    state of the JIOC is the integration of plans, intelligence, and
    operations in order to increase the speed, power, and combat
    effectiveness of DOD operations.
        A key element in transforming the joint force is achieving Unified
    Action--achieving unity of effort in complex operations involving the
    participation of military forces, civilian agencies, nongovernmental
    organizations (NGOs), international organizations, and multinational
    partners. JFCOM development partners in Unified Action include the
    National Security Council, Departments of Defense, State, Justice,
    Treasury, and Commerce, U.S. Agency for International Development
    (USAID), the private sector, multinational and multilateral partners,
    and NGOs. Together, we must develop a coherent interagency planning
    process and the requisite tools necessary to synchronize the diverse
    capabilities that our civilian agencies, military, multilateral,
    international organizations, and NGOs bring to the effort. The war on
    terrorism that we are fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan demand this kind
    of interagency and multinational participation. The Department of State
    Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)
    maintains a strong partnership with JFCOM as we work together to
    understand and develop solutions for common civilian-military planning
    and coordination, striving to improve the Whole of Government Approach.
    Our close partnership with Allied Command Transformation and NATO
    allows us to leverage each other's capabilities with S/CRS to enhance
    the integration of Defense, US Government, and other national and
    international agencies efforts in order to develop and deploy fully
    integrated and interdependent solutions. This will be a challenge and
    we must strive for seamless integration of our combined efforts.
        The 3-year Unified Action development and experimentation program,
    which began in mid 2005, will identify capability gaps in the areas of
    Security, Economic Stabilization, Justice and Reconciliation,
    Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-being, and Governance and
    Participation. These capability gaps will be cross-walked with
    developing initiatives across the Unified Action community of interest
    to develop potential solution sets.
        Concurrently, JFCOM and its partners are developing an integrated
    planning and implementation framework, to include a national security
    training and education program. These concepts will then be assessed
    during major experiments to include Unified Action 07 and MNE 5 in
    fiscal year 2008.
        Our new experimentation series in 2007, named Noble Resolve, is
    intended to improve information sharing, communications
    interoperability and unity of effort within the areas of Homeland
    Defense, Homeland Security and Defense Support to Civil Authorities.
    Utilizing advanced modeling and simulation, Noble Resolve uses a
    scenario focused on preventing overseas threats from migrating to the
    homeland. Partners and participants in this experiment include other
    combatant commands (NORTHCOM, EUCOM, STRATCOM, Transportation Command
    (TRANSCOM), and Pacific Command (PACOM)), Department of Homeland
    Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), FEMA, port
    authorities, the Commonwealth of Virginia, the cities of Norfolk, VA,
    and Portland, OR, academic institutions like Old Dominion University,
    University of Virginia and Virginia Polytechnic Institute, as well as
    companies like Maersk Shipping. Through this innovative use of
    technology, we are able to focus on critical homeland defense skills,
    assess risk management, test command and control with first responders,
    and build counterterrorism tools between States.
        In developing the foundation for the combatant commanders' success
    in future operations, JFCOM has pursued a wide range of activities that
    provide unique joint enhancing capabilities. For example, the Cross-
    Domain Collaborative Information Environment is a hardware and software
    solution that supports cross-mission and cross-domain information
    sharing throughout the battlespace. The key deliverable to the
    warfighter is the capability to allow multiple data types to pass from
    one classified domain to another.
        Combatant commanders have also identified a requirement for more
    robust joint logistic processes that impact the Joint Force Commander's
    ability to effectively plan, execute, and integrate logistics at the
    operational level. As a result, JFCOM, partnering with the combatant
    commands, the Services, and the Defense Logistics Agency, is developing
    a family of scalable joint and combined capabilities (JxDS) that will
    enhance coordination, integration, and synchronization to increase
    force employment opportunities.
        A unique challenge of combatant commanders conducting operations in
    the urban environment is inhibited employment of joint fires due to
    complex terrain, weapons effects and the proximity of noncombatants.
    The Joint Urban Fires Prototype focuses on improving the ability of
    joint commanders to apply precision fires in the urban environment by
    improving precision, discrimination and response.
        ``Angel Fire'' is another joint enhancing capability showing
    tremendous potential, and is currently being tested on the battlefield
    by the Marine Corps. Angel Fire was pulled forward after our Urban
    Resolve experiment identified the dramatic value of persistent
    surveillance. The optical sensor device covers a 16 square kilometer
    area and can provide the joint warfighter with a dedicated sensor to
    rapidly respond to enemy actions and near real-time reaction to an
    improvised explosive device (IED) or any other event in the area. The
    ability to pull forward tomorrow's capability to today is the most
    important thing we do.
        JFCOM's Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) assists in
    accelerating transformation of the joint force by producing
    recommendations for change derived from direct observations and sound
    analysis of current joint operations, exercises, and experiments. This
    mission is accomplished by providing tailored, worldwide deployable
    teams of multidisciplined operations analysts, experts in joint,
    combined, and interagency matters, with reach-back to greater
    analytical expertise and an extensive lessons learned database.
        JCOA conducts robust and timely analysis of operational issues in
    order to provide immediate feedback to the joint warfighter and provide
    input for transformational change to joint doctrine, organizations,
    training, material, leader development, personnel, and facilities. In
    support of this mission, JCOA has maintained a permanent presence in
    Iraq since May 2003 and in Afghanistan since September 2004. In
    addition to supporting CENTCOM for Operations Enduring Freedom and
    Iraqi Freedom, JCOA has simultaneously supported other operations or
    missions around the world to include Pakistan earthquake assistance,
    the Lebanon Noncombatant Evacuation Operation, Tsunami Relief, Haiti
    and Guatemala disaster relief, and Hurricane Katrina relief operations.
    Last year, Congress received a copy of one of JCOA's most publicly
    visible products, the ``Iraqi Perspectives Report.''
        JCOA also operates the KnIFE, aimed specifically at the current
    threat to our forces posed by IEDs. KnIFE is a capability to
    comprehensively fuse data sources, databases, best practices, tactics,
    techniques, and procedures dealing with asymmetric warfare into
    products requested by and provided to warfighters and our coalition
    partners.
        JFCOM continues to work to build innovative partnerships between
    private industry, academia and DOD through Cooperative Research and
    Development Agreements (CRADAs). With projects of mutual benefit to
    these organizations and the DOD, these agreements, enable pooling of
    scarce research assets, and the sharing of information to facilitate
    fast, effective and efficient research and development of capabilities
    required by the joint warfighter today and in the future. We currently
    have CRADAs with approximately 20 companies and several academic
    institutions.
    Allied Command Transformation
        JFCOM values a close working relationship with NATO's Allied
    Command-Transformation (ACT). This relationship provides a vehicle for
    achieving synergy in Allied interoperability, through collaboration on
    a multitude of levels, to include exercises, training, and sharing of
    lessons learned and best practices. JFCOM and ACT have combined on
    numerous projects to improve training and capabilities of U.S. and
    coalition forces, solve capabilities shortfalls and identify solutions
    for NATO forces.
        The combined capabilities and synergy of effort of JFCOM and ACT
    are maximized through efforts such as the upcoming MNE 5, which is
    focused on the ``Whole of Government'' approach, and the Coalition
    Warrior Interoperability Demonstration, that will test the
    interoperability of the NATO Network Enabled Capability.
        This close working relationship allows development of appropriate
    ``teamed'' solutions that not only address the problems at hand, but
    strengthens relationships with and the capacity of our multinational
    partners. The synergy of the projects we're working on together helps
    to improve allied and coalition operations.
                                 the way ahead
        We are balancing the war today with the imperative needs of
    tomorrow. In 2007, JFCOM continues to provide capabilities that will
    achieve this.

             The 33 training exercises scheduled for this fiscal
            year, in conjunction with training exercises conducted by 22
            accredited Service and combatant command training programs,
            will be facilitated by the expanded Joint Training and
            Experimentation Network and the interactive Joint Knowledge
            Development and Distribution Capability portal, which will
            enhance joint training immeasurably.
             Experiments, focused on the integration of interagency
            and multinational partners, will bring the joint force closer
            to the realization of Unified Action.
             As JFCOM gains experience with management of
            Individual Augmentees and In-Lieu of Units, additional force
            providing efficiencies will be realized with the goal of moving
            unit, IA, and ILO force notification from weeks to months.
             Deployment of responsive joint enabling capabilities
            will continue to contribute unique capabilities to the global
            war on terror and disaster relief/humanitarian assistance
            operations.
             The JC2 Capabilities Portfolio Management effort will
            mature.
             Based on assessment of training and current
            operations, JFCOM will continue to improve and refine Mission
            Rehearsal Training for OIF and OEF forces and enhance
            information exchange abilities to help defeat Improved
            Explosive Devices.
             JFCOM will continue to work with OSD, Joint Staff,
            CENTCOM, EUCOM, and NATO to improve Afghan National Security
            Force Training.
             Establishing two Standing Joint Force Headquarters
            Core Elements with Full Operational Capability to deploy
            globally by 31 December 2007 in support of a wide range of
            mission sets.
             Enabling the sustainment of two Standing Joint Force
            Headquarters Core Elements with the transformational use of 240
            deployable reservists in key billets.
             Increase Homeland Security capabilities, and increase
            training and education opportunities for the National Guard and
            Reserve.
                                   conclusion
        JFCOM is dedicated to the total force of soldiers, sailors, airmen,
    marines, and civilians who serve our country and champion freedom
    around the globe. We stand ready to rapidly deploy enabling and
    enhancing capabilities to support the joint warfighter as well as our
    interagency and multinational partners in complex operations. We bring
    these current capabilities to bear while keeping a watchful eye toward
    the continuously changing threat to develop solutions to defend our
    freedoms today and tomorrow. On behalf of our 1.16 million great men
    and women, the combatant commanders, and our components, we thank you
    for this opportunity to present the JFCOM story.

        Chairman Levin. General Smith, thank you so much.
        Admiral Stavridis?

      STATEMENT OF ADM JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED
                        STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

        Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner,
    Senator Nelson, Senator Martinez, and Senator Sessions; let me
    just begin by simply saying thank you for the opportunity to
    appear here today in front of all of you. I'm also very happy
    to be appearing with General Lance Smith, who came out and
    greeted my aircraft carrier strike group in the Arabian Gulf in
    2003, when I first met him. Sir, it's good to be with you.
    Admiral Tim Keating who--I could ask for no finer wingman, and
    has been a mentor of mine for many years. It's great to appear
    with both of you.
        I do want to particularly thank the members of the
    committee who've taken the time to come travel in the region,
    and I think there is no substitute for the kind of personal
    eyes-on experience you get. Most recently, Senator Levin was
    visiting Guantanamo Bay, Senator Nelson was through the region,
    and visited one of our New Horizons projects. I know Senator
    Martinez has been through the region recently--I would extend
    an invitation to the committee to come as a group, or
    individually, to any part of the region, at any time. It's a
    vibrant, exciting, and diverse region where great interests of
    the United States are at play every day.
        It is also a region, I always like to say, which is not
    America's backyard--that's not the right expression. It's not
    even America's front porch, it's our home. The Americas stretch
    from Canada to the tip of Tierra del Fuego in the South, and
    collectively, we live in this shared home, all of us, all of
    the countries. The 32 that are under my AOR are going through
    some challenging times, and I think that together the United
    States and those countries can partner in ways that will help
    us fulfill a true partnership here in the Americas.
        I've had the opportunity in my 5 months in command to do
    some travel through the region myself. Most recently, for
    example, last week I spent an hour with Daniel Ortega in
    Nicaragua. I'd be happy to talk about that. I spent some time
    in Panama with President Torrijos, and others. I will tell you,
    generally, in the region, the United States is looked on as a
    strong partner. Always, there will be some strong
    disagreements, country to country, but overall, this is an area
    of great potential for the United States of America.
        I think the way to unpack that potential is by taking the
    kinds of approaches you heard Lance Smith talk about a moment
    ago--interagency, joint--obviously--combined, working with our
    partners. This is really, as Senator Levin said, an economy of
    force theater, but to execute what we need to do, we have to
    team up with the DOS with the Department of Homeland Security
    (DHS), the Coast Guard, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and many
    others. I'd be happy to address some of that today.
        If I may, I'd simply like to close this brief opening
    statement by saying how proud and lucky I am to be at U.S.
    SOUTHCOM to work with great reservists, great civilians, great
    Active-Duty, coastguardsmen, soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
    marines. They're the best shipmates a sailor like me could ask
    for. Our families support us every day. Senator Warner, I
    appreciate your words on the families involved, and I look
    forward to all of the questions to come. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Stavridis follows:]
               Prepared Statement by ADM James G. Stavridis, USN
                                  introduction
        Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McCain, and distinguished members of
    the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
    to discuss the environment in which we operate, the challenges we face,
    and what we are doing throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. I
    would like to begin by thanking the committee members, particularly
    those who have traveled to our region to gather first hand impressions.
    Most importantly, on behalf of all the members of the United States
    Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), thank you, as a committee, for your
    continued support. We at SOUTHCOM very much look forward to working
    with you and your staffs in the coming years.
        Our mission is straight-forward: to promote security cooperation
    and conduct military operations with the 32 nations and 13 territories
    in the region to achieve U.S. strategic objectives. Our mission
    enhances security and stability in the Western Hemisphere and, in so
    doing, ensures the forward defense of the United States. Our ability to
    accomplish this mission is significantly influenced by our
    understanding of the diverse environment in our hemisphere and the
    linkages that bind the Americas together.
                                    linkages
        Our shared home is the Americas. We have much in common with our
    partners throughout the region; we share common interests and are
    dependent upon each other in many ways. There are numerous and
    compelling geographic, cultural, economic, political, and historical
    linkages that tie all of the Nations of the Americas together and which
    must be understood in order for us to achieve our mission.
        Nearly half a billion people live in the SOUTHCOM region--roughly
    one half of this hemisphere's population. Our area of responsibility
    covers roughly one sixth of the Earth's surface and is bounded by large
    bodies of water, making the maritime environment of great importance.
    The people of this part of the world have diverse and rich heritages
    and languages. A growing part of the population has strong cultural,
    political and economic ties to the United States. In 2000, for example,
    the U.S. Census Bureau reported that the number of Hispanics in America
    accounted for 12 percent of our population. Today the government
    estimates the figure as approximately 15 percent, with more than 40
    million U.S. citizens of Hispanic origin. This figure is expected to
    grow rapidly in the coming decades, making the U.S. very soon the
    second most populous country of Spanish-speakers in the world. This
    significant cultural and human linkage between the U.S. and the region
    is underscored by the almost 15 million U.S. citizens who traveled to
    Latin America and the Caribbean in each of the past 2 years, with an
    almost equal number of our neighbors coming north.
        The economic linkage between the Nations of the Americas has risen
    dramatically over the last decade, with north-south trade comprising
    almost 40 percent of U.S. total global trade in 2005. Trade between the
    U.S. and SOUTHCOM's partner nations in Latin America and the Caribbean
    increased 22 percent between 2004 and 2005, with considerable repeat
    growth last year; and further substantial growth is predicted as a
    result of the Free Trade Agreements we have with a number of countries
    in the region. In particular, we also currently have a unique and
    valuable opportunity to strengthen our economic ties to Colombia, Peru,
    and Panama through the passage of Free Trade Agreements with these key
    friends to foster economic security, stability, and prosperity there.
        The U.S. also imports over 50 percent of its oil from the Western
    Hemisphere, with 34 percent coming from Latin America and the Caribbean
    in 2005--outweighing the 22 percent imported from the Middle East. An
    important facilitator to this critical trade throughout the Americas is
    the Panama Canal, which sees almost 15,000 ships transit each year, of
    which two thirds are going to or from one of our coasts in the U.S. The
    canal, in effect, is the economic heartbeat of the Americas. Panama
    recently passed an important referendum to expand the canal to allow
    for a projected twofold increase in throughput capacity, which would
    certainly build upon the growing economic interdependence of this
    hemisphere.
        Beyond the cultural and economic linkages, perhaps the most
    important connection we share with the region is a social and political
    sense that respects democracy, freedom, justice, human dignity, human
    rights, and human values. We share the belief that these democratic
    principles must be at the core of what we accomplish in the region and
    that free governments should be accountable to their people and govern
    effectively. This common belief is most evident as expressed in the
    first article of the Inter-American Democratic Charter: ``The people of
    the Americas have the right to democracy and their governments have an
    obligation to promote and defend it. Democracy is essential for the
    social, political, and economic development of the peoples of the
    Americas.'' The rest of this tremendous consensus document of the
    Americas goes on to further reinforce our shared values and our goal of
    strengthening representative democracy in the region. We have made
    great strides over the last 2 decades in helping democratic values
    spread, with all but one leader in the Americas having been
    democratically elected.
        We are passionate about the linkages we share in this hemisphere.
    We at SOUTHCOM dedicate a good portion of our time to studying these
    connections, and we firmly believe that our region is inextricably
    linked to the economic, political, cultural, and security fabric of the
    United States. Understanding these linkages helps us make the best use
    of our resources in order to better secure the U.S. and to help extend
    peace and prosperity to the entire region.
                                   challenges
        Beyond the understanding of these critical linkages, we at SOUTHCOM
    also devote a considerable amount of energy to the study of the
    significant challenges confronting the region--challenges such as
    crime, gangs, and illegal drug trafficking as primary examples. These
    challenges loom large for many nations in the region; they are
    transnational, adaptive, and insidious threats to those seeking peace
    and stability. By their nature, these challenges cannot be countered by
    one nation alone. Therefore, they require cooperative solutions
    involving a unified, full-spectrum governmental and international
    approach in order to best address them.
        In many cases, the main source for these challenges stems from the
    underlying conditions of poverty and inequality that are prevalent in
    most of the area. According to 2005 United Nations statistics, about 40
    percent of the region's inhabitants are living in poverty, defined as
    an income of less than two U.S. dollars per day. Of that number, about
    16 percent are living in extreme poverty--less than one dollar per day.
    Couple these poverty figures with the most unequal distribution of
    wealth for any of the world's regions, and you have a catalyst for
    potential social and political insecurity and instability.
        Stemming from these underlying conditions, illegal drugs and crime
    are the most pressing security concerns for this part of the world--and
    based upon the region's proximity and linkages to the U.S., a security
    concern here at home as well. The Andean Ridge in South America is the
    world's leading source of coca cultivation, and despite international
    efforts and record interdictions and seizures, the region still
    produces enough cocaine to meet demand here in the U.S. and a growing
    demand abroad.
        A close corollary to the illegal drug trade is the alarming growth
    of criminal activity in the region--some of which is a byproduct of the
    drug trade but just as much stems from the region's extensive poverty
    and inequality. Violence is now among the five principal causes of
    death in several countries in the area. The annual homicide rate for
    Latin America and the Caribbean is among the highest in the world, with
    25 homicides per 100,000 people compared to Africa's 22 and the U.S.'s
    5.5. In Central America, Haiti, Jamaica, and major cities in Brazil,
    gangs and criminal violence are a security priority, with some gang
    population estimates reaching into the hundreds of thousands. These
    gangs do not just pose a concern in Latin America. They have spread
    from Los Angeles and New York to around your homes in northern Virginia
    and my home in southern Florida. Members cross borders, moving drugs
    and money. This is an issue not just for our partners in the region,
    but for Americans on our own soil.
        The costs associated with violence in the region are difficult to
    assess, but according to the Inter-American Development Bank, they were
    estimated as close to 15 percent of Gross Domestic Product across this
    part of the world in 2005. This inhibits efforts to alleviate the
    underlying conditions of poverty and inequality.
        As stated earlier, we are fortunate as a hemisphere to have as
    neighbors democracies that virtually all share similar values with us.
    Unfortunately, poverty, inequality, and security challenges all
    contribute to a growing, frustrated expectation from the people for
    dramatic change. We have seen instances in some countries where
    ``change agents'' have successfully campaigned on themes of radical
    change, with promises of achieving sweeping results through unorthodox
    and unproven economic and political policies. We will closely follow
    any developments in the degradation or dismantling of democratic
    institutions in these countries and any security crisis that follows
    from destabilizing political and/or economic policies. In some cases,
    we have the complicated task of maintaining working relationships with
    a nation's security forces in the face of antagonistic political
    leadership and attempts to spread anti-U.S. views and influence. This
    situation exacerbates the already difficult mission of achieving
    regional cooperation to address ever-changing and insidious
    transnational challenges.
                               command priorities
        Within this diverse environment, with its compelling hemispheric
    linkages and its significant region-wide challenges, we at SOUTHCOM
    have several key priority focus areas, discussed below.
        First and foremost is the hostage situation in Colombia. Not a day
    goes by without our team focusing on the plight of Keith Stansell, Marc
    Gonsalves, and Thomas Howes. These three men are American hostages who
    have been held captive by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de
    Colombia (FARC) for over 4 years, having first been taken into
    captivity on 13 February 2003. The safe recovery of our countrymen is
    our top priority. We search every day for leads that will help bring
    these Americans home. Finding them is of utmost importance to SOUTHCOM.
        Another focus area, associated with the hostage situation, is the
    overall security challenge in Colombia. Over the last decade, Colombia
    has achieved great success in its complex struggle for peace and
    security. Ten years ago, the headlines coming out of Colombia resembled
    the worst of those to come out of any war-torn country: beheadings,
    kidnappings, torture, and bombings occurred essentially daily. Through
    its own interagency efforts and a welcomed steady stream of resources
    and support from the U.S., Colombia has battled from the brink of chaos
    to a far better situation in terms of peace and stability. Last year
    marked the lowest homicide rate in two decades. At great effort, the
    government has established security police force presence in all of its
    1,098 municipalities, significantly deterring crime and terrorist
    incidents. This increased security presence, coupled with significant
    operational successes against the FARC, has contributed to the fastest
    sustained economic growth in a decade--over 5 percent annually for the
    past 2 years--and has encouraged a real sense of positive momentum for
    the entire country.
        These hard-fought successes, however, need continued U.S. support
    and steadfast effort from the Colombian government in order to fully
    win the peace for the country. SOUTHCOM continues to be a steady
    partner to our Colombian counterparts and is constantly striving to
    advise and assist them as they plan for the future. In addition to
    supporting Colombia, countering any expansion of FARC activity into
    neighboring countries is also part of our focus.
        As in all combatant commands, support for the global war on terror
    is a major priority for SOUTHCOM. We remain vigilant and are constantly
    working with our partners in the U.S. interagency and with our partners
    in the region to keep our Nation secure. I would characterize our
    region as being a highly-likely base for future terrorist threats.
    Members, facilitators, and sympathizers of Islamic terrorist
    organizations are present throughout the region. Hizballah appears to
    be the most prominent group active in the region, and while much of
    their activity is currently linked to revenue generation, there are
    indications of an operational presence and the potential for attacks.
    The Hizballah network in the region is suspected of supporting the
    terrorist attacks in Buenos Aires in 1992 and again in 1994. We suspect
    that a similar operational support network exists today and could be
    leveraged in the future.
        We have seen successes in mitigating Islamic terrorist activity in
    the region. Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina have made progress in
    working together to address terrorism and illicit criminal activity
    through the Tri-border Commission's 3+1 conference. A Regional
    Intelligence Center, located in Brazil and staffed by agents from all
    three countries, is nearly operational. Throughout 2006, countries in
    the region have taken action against terrorist-linked supporters and
    facilitators. In January 2006, Colombian authorities dismantled a
    complex document forgery ring with alleged ties to indigenous and
    Islamic terrorist organizations. Also in early 2006, Brazilian
    authorities arrested a suspect linked to the late Lebanese Prime
    Minister Rafik Hariri's assassination. We will continue to work with
    our partner nations throughout the region to maximize counter-terrorist
    successes and ultimately deny, disrupt, dissuade, and deter terrorist
    and terrorist-associated activities in the area.
        SOUTHCOM's most visible assignment in the global war on terror is
    conducted at the U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo by Joint Task Force--
    Guantanamo. We conduct safe, humane, legal, and transparent detention
    operations in compliance with the laws of our Nation, Common Article 3
    of the Geneva Conventions, and the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In
    accordance with the Detainee Treatment Act, all interrogation
    operations comply with the interrogation techniques prescribed in Army
    Field Manual 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations, and all
    detention and interrogation operations are conducted humanely. Both I
    and members of my staff make frequent inspection visits to our
    facilities at Guantanamo and we are in constant communication with the
    Task Force Commander.
        As detailed earlier, a key challenge for the region is the spread
    and breadth of criminal activity and illegal drug trafficking. As a
    priority, we work with our counterparts throughout the region to assist
    them in their attempt to cope with the serious effect gangs and
    criminal activities have on their ability to govern. In some instances,
    due to a lack of enough trained law enforcement entities, countries'
    militaries have been asked to assist in combating these violent gangs.
        The situation in Cuba and any potential repercussions from the end
    of Fidel Castro's rule are another set of our priorities. We are
    concerned that Cuba's poor socio-economic conditions and repressive
    regime, combined with a leadership change, could spark mass migration,
    and we are ready to assist the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Department
    of Homeland Security to respond if mass migration occurs.
                                    promises
        As evinced by the already strong linkages we share as a hemisphere,
    we believe that if we were able to overcome the region's challenges to
    security and prosperity, we would be able to unlock the true promise of
    the Americas: the promise of a secure, prosperous, and democratic
    hemisphere that works together to face threats to peace and stability.
        The word `promise' has two appropriate meanings for how SOUTHCOM
    approaches its role in the region and for our view of the future for
    this hemisphere. On one hand, a promise is a commitment honestly
    undertaken and executed by two or more parties. In this case, SOUTHCOM
    is committed to lasting and beneficial partnerships with the countries
    in the region. Encouraging regional partnerships has been a cornerstone
    of our strategy for many years and a formal strategic objective for the
    last 4 years. Our ``promise'' entails fulfilling the commitment of
    being a good partner and pursuing better cooperative security
    arrangements in order to face together the tough challenges that
    confront us now and into the future.
        Promise can also mean ``potential''--the potential to do something
    vital and important; the potential to be something special and
    extraordinary. We believe that through lasting partnerships, we can
    help achieve the security conditions necessary to create the enduring
    basis for prosperity and healthy democratic institutions in this
    important region. This is the promise of a hemisphere free of gangs and
    drugs; free of human trafficking, money laundering, and terrorism; free
    of repressive regimes; it is the promise of all of us together finding
    cooperative solutions to demanding security challenges.
        Our goal at SOUTHCOM is simple: we will work with our partners to
    unlock this ``Promise of the Americas.'' Every day we strive to be
    engaged in a positive way with as many of our regional partners as
    possible, and in doing so, enhance the security of the United States
    while simultaneously enhancing their own security. The U.S. SOUTHCOM
    strives to fulfill the promise of this region through military-to-
    military engagements that build the capacity of the Nations in the
    region to protect their own sovereign territories. Given our close
    linkages, this increased capacity and stability will also provide a
    first line of defense for the United States.
        In support of our goal, we employ a theater security cooperation
    strategy that calls for building host nation capabilities. Over time,
    these capabilities will ensure our partner nations have the means to
    control their borders and protect their citizens, while also deepening
    the roots of good governance. We also envision our partners being able
    to work together in a collective environment to be able to counter
    emerging and adapting threats. To this end, most of our military-to-
    military engagement is in the form of training and education programs,
    joint exercises, peacekeeping, and other partnership programs.
    Education and Training
        Education, training, and military operations provide substance to
    our collective security agreements and contribute directly to building
    capability. Education and training are prerequisites to effective
    operations, while operations enable partner nations to protect and
    control their sovereign territories. Two institutions that provide
    formal education to nations in the Americas are the Western Hemisphere
    Institute for Security Cooperation and the Center for Hemispheric
    Defense Studies.
        The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation provides
    professional education and training--particularly in human rights--to
    select uniformed and civilian security forces of nations within the
    Western Hemisphere and operates in the context of the democratic
    principles set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American
    States. Their curriculum is designed to foster mutual knowledge,
    transparency, confidence, and cooperation among the participating
    nations, as well as to promote democratic values, respect for human
    rights, and knowledge and understanding of U.S. customs and traditions.
    The student body of Western Hemisphere civilians and police personnel
    receives instruction in human rights, the rule of law, due process,
    civilian control of the military, and the role of the military in a
    democratic society. Partner nations nominate students to attend this
    Defense Department school, and the State Department leads an
    interagency vetting process that examines each nominee prior to final
    selection.
        The Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies is a regional academic
    forum offering strategic level defense and security cooperation,
    research, and dialogue for the promotion of effective security policies
    within the Western Hemisphere. The Center's civilian and military
    graduates and partner institutions comprise communities of influence
    that work toward a more cooperative and stable international security
    environment. The Center also facilitates NationLab Strategic Seminars
    at foreign national defense universities with a primary focus on
    national policy innovations for breaking the cycles of poverty,
    corruption, narcotrafficking, gangs, organized crime, and other key
    challenges in the region.
        We have made tremendous progress in extending the International
    Military Education and Training (IMET) program to partner nations
    throughout the theater. We truly appreciate Congress's delinking IMET
    from the American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA). IMET's
    overarching training program, as executed by the Department of Defense,
    has trained tens of thousands of Latin American officers, enlisted, and
    defense civilian personnel, with graduates reaching the highest level
    of military and civil service. IMET is a key training program that,
    until Congress provided relief, had been subject to the provisions of
    ASPA. We are working vigorously to renew training opportunities
    throughout the region, including partner nations like Nicaragua, where
    an IMET graduate recently led the interception of 871 kilograms of
    cocaine.
        As we seek to train the future defense leaders of our partner
    nations, we must also continue rigorous training of our own forces. The
    establishment of a Combatant Commanders Exercise Engagement and
    Training Transformation (CE2T2) Program would consolidate all joint
    training initiatives and provide visibility and accountability in
    planning and executing our Joint exercise and engagement program. This
    program would make better use of existing training funds and provide
    the flexibility that is critical, given the complex and adaptive nature
    of our sustained operations in the global war on terrorism. CE2T2 funds
    are a consolidation of existing joint training resources and not a new
    or growth initiative.
        Complementing formal education is a myriad of training exercises
    that improve capability and interoperability while building confidence
    and improving transparency. Medical readiness, disaster relief,
    humanitarian assistance, counterterrorism, peacekeeping, and maritime
    capabilities are all developed through a family of related exercises.
    Joint Exercises and Initiatives
        The Humanitarian and Civic Assistance program provides training for
    U.S. Forces and provides tangible benefits to host nations in the form
    of medical clinics, schools, well drilling, and construction of
    rudimentary roads. As part of this program, Medical Readiness Training
    Exercises (MEDRETEs) serve as a mutually-beneficial effort to improve
    medical treatment capacity of U.S. personnel while providing an
    invaluable service to citizens in partner nations who might otherwise
    never receive much needed treatment. U.S. medical personnel benefit by
    providing medical care in a challenging and often unique environment;
    local medical professionals develop closer relationships with U.S.
    medical personnel; and the population receives quality medical care.
    MEDRETEs create close human linkages amongst the people of our Nations
    and generate tremendous goodwill towards the United States. In fiscal
    year 2006 alone, our MEDRETEs treated 272,600 people and 41,000 animals
    and conducted 3,327 surgical procedures.
        New Horizons are engineer-based humanitarian and civic assistance
    exercises that provide excellent training for U.S. forces and a
    tangible benefit to the Nations in which the exercises are conducted.
    As an example, in 2006, a New Horizons project provided Peru with two
    clinics, one school, three wells and three MEDRETEs. We also conducted
    similar exercises in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Honduras,
    all benefiting the local populace and strengthening the ties that
    connect the Americas. The demonstrated goodwill and benefit generated
    by these exercises is immense.
        Last year, 21 nations from the Caribbean and Central America came
    together for the Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias (Humanitarian Allied
    Forces) exercise to focus on regional cooperation and information
    sharing to prepare for humanitarian and disaster relief operations.
    Fourteen military, government, and nongovernment regional organizations
    participated in this exercise. Emergency operations centers from the
    participating countries were linked to a single Partner Nation
    Network--a major step toward capacity building and information sharing.
        The Humanitarian Assistance Program is another element of security
    cooperation that provides engagement opportunities for U.S. personnel
    while serving the basic social needs of the residents where exercises
    are conducted. Over 60 training projects in 22 countries were conducted
    in fiscal year 2006 for $15.4 million, while another 116 projects in 26
    countries are scheduled for fiscal year 2007 with a budget of $13.2
    million. These projects are conducted to contribute to the sustainment
    of regional partnerships.
        Fuerzas Comando (Commando Forces) is a skill competition and senior
    leader seminar designed to enhance cooperation and trust between
    international Special Operations Forces while improving their training,
    readiness, and interoperability. A total of 15 countries from
    throughout the region participated in 2006. This exercise drew anti-
    terrorism experts from 15 countries who exchanged information and
    shared tactics, techniques, and procedures for counter-terrorist
    operations. Fuerzas Comando builds regional capability and supports our
    war on terror efforts.
        Tradewinds is a phased, joint, combined exercise that occurs
    throughout the Caribbean and is intended to improve the readiness of
    the Caribbean Basin nations to respond to transnational threats and
    disasters. Enhancing Caribbean regional capability supports the war on
    terror and provides defense-in-depth for the United States.
        Panamax is an annual multinational exercise tailored to the defense
    of the Panama Canal against asymmetric threats. For last year's
    exercise, 17 nations from North America, South America, and Europe came
    together to work in unison to better prepare for today's security
    challenges. The objectives of the exercise included the full
    integration of all participants into a multi-national staff and
    concentrated on the Proliferation Security Initiative. This year we
    expect more than 20 participants.
        Another key part of our military-to-military engagement strategy is
    our annual Partner Nation Communication and Collaboration conference
    that is hosted by a different partner nation each year. In 2006, it
    took place in Montevideo, Uruguay. This year we will gather in the
    Dominican Republic. This conference focuses on strategies to improve
    communication in order to respond to regional crises, such as disaster
    relief and peacekeeping operations.
    Peacekeeping and other Partnership Initiatives
        Peacekeeping, like MEDRETEs, crosses the boundary between training
    and operations. SOUTHCOM assists in enhancing the peacekeeping capacity
    of partner nations through the conduct of peacekeeping activities. The
    Department of State-funded and Department of Defense-executed Global
    Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) is another excellent example of
    interagency cooperation. GPOI provides for the equipping and training
    of a multi-national Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) battalion of up to
    650 soldiers from the Central American Armed Forces (CFAC). This
    battalion includes one infantry company each from Guatemala, Nicaragua,
    Honduras, and El Salvador. The GPOI program within the SOUTHCOM area of
    responsibility also provides for the equipping and training of two
    specialized companies: a Military Police company from Guatemala and an
    Engineer company from Paraguay. These specific capabilities were
    requested by the United Nations. The CFAC battalion staff will
    participate in this year's Panamax exercise as part of its operational
    preparation.
        Yet another example of the peacekeeping operations ongoing within
    our region is the United Nations Stability Mission (MINUSTAH) in Haiti.
    Commanded by a Brazilian officer and manned by regional soldiers from
    many countries, MINUSTAH demonstrates the viability of our coalition
    approach to peacekeeping exercises and operations and the enduring
    value of regional cooperation.
        This past year we held our first maritime Partnership of the
    Americas event. A portion of the George Washington Strike Group
    conducted unit-level training in the region where 5 partner nations
    conducted 24 community relations events in eleven countries. These
    countries included the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Jamaica,
    Honduras, and Trinidad and Tobago. We are planning a second Partnership
    of the Americas for 2007. In conjunction with this exercise, we will
    also leverage a world-wide U.S. Navy program called Project Handclasp
    that distributes humanitarian, educational, and goodwill materials to
    the needy in our partner nations. These materials are donated by the
    U.S. private sector and will be distributed by U.S. servicemembers in
    conjunction with community service projects. This year we have received
    over 285,000 high-nutrition meals valued at over $70,000 through
    Project Handclasp for distribution throughout the region. We are also
    focusing this program elsewhere in the region to add impact to our
    outreach efforts.
        We will deploy a U.S. Navy hospital ship (U.S.N.S. Comfort) to the
    Caribbean, Central America, and the Andean Ridge this summer to conduct
    theater security cooperation and humanitarian assistance operations.
    Like our MEDRETE exercises, these operations serve as a mutually-
    beneficial effort to hone the readiness skills of medical personnel of
    U.S. Armed Forces while helping to improve and save lives, reduce
    suffering, stimulate public health, and support the command's theater
    security cooperation objectives. The Comfort will visit various
    countries in a 4-month deployment and treat as many as 70,000 patients.
    Nongovernmental organizations, partner nation medical staff, and U.S.
    medical staff will work closely to aid those without access to medical
    service and build lasting relationships for the future.
        In concert with the deployment of the Comfort, we will deploy a
    U.S. Navy high-speed vessel (H.S.V. Swift) to Central America and the
    Caribbean for 6 months this spring. The Swift would conduct training
    and exchanges with our partners in the region and participate in
    community relations projects. The Swift deployment is part of a broader
    Global Fleet Station program designed by the Navy to provide flexible
    forward presence for theater security cooperation activities around the
    world.
        The Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) is a key tool in
    preventing terrorist groups from using our region as a staging ground
    for terror attacks against the United States and Partner Nations. CTFP
    goals are to build capabilities and capacity to combat terrorism and to
    develop a global network of ``combating terrorism'' experts and
    practitioners, all sharing common values, language, and understanding
    of the terrorism threat. The program is conducted through education and
    training seminars on intelligence gathering and sharing, senior level
    military education for both officers and enlisted soldiers, legal
    aspects in combating terrorism, civil-military responses to terrorism,
    countering ideological support for terrorism and its financing, and
    various maritime security procedures.
        The State Partnership Program (SPP) is another example of
    successful collaboration that has had dramatic growth and benefit in
    our region over the past few years. The SPP links 20 U.S. states to 26
    partner nations using the U.S. National Guard as the executive agent.
    In fiscal year 2006, State National Guards conducted 149 separate
    events with partner nations. These events develop core competencies in
    regional military forces, promote the concept of citizen-soldiers as
    public servants, and reinforce our bilateral relationships.
        Enduring Friendship is a regional multi-year initiative that
    provides maritime security assistance to select countries in the
    region. Enduring Friendship will strengthen partner nations' maritime
    domain awareness and operational capabilities to anticipate and respond
    to threats, maritime emergencies, and natural disasters, and will also
    enhance control over illicit trafficking lanes. This program will
    improve partner nation maritime command, control, and communications
    (C3) capability; increase interoperability; and integrate maritime
    operational pictures, thus laying the foundation for maritime theater-
    wide information sharing and coalition operations.
        The first of three Enduring Friendship phases focused on the
    Dominican Republic, Panama, Jamaica, and the Bahamas. Phase two will
    include Belize, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua. The Eastern
    Caribbean and the Regional Security Systems (RSS) countries will be in
    phase three. In conjunction with other SOUTHCOM efforts, Enduring
    Friendship will increase Western Hemisphere collective maritime
    security.
        Our Enduring Friendship initiative greatly benefited from the
    recently approved Global Train and Equip authority approved by
    Congress. Last year, we were able to concentrate Section 1206 funds on
    two of our phase one countries, significantly accelerating our timeline
    to reach operational capability in these countries and giving us the
    flexibility to build a more responsive program. We plan on using this
    year's funds, if approved, to jump-start our phase two countries,
    bringing much closer to fruition our goal of a vigilant and responsive
    maritime capability in this region so critical to our own security.
        These Train and Equip funds have proven to be an extremely
    proactive tool for this and other initiatives at SOUTHCOM and have
    provided us with a truly responsive funding source for priority
    programs. As we develop our regional partnerships, it is critical to be
    able to dedicate resources quickly to build capability and/or capacity
    in response to emergent threats or during unique opportunities. The
    authority to train and equip ensures that we maintain this flexibility.
        The ability to build the capacity of our partner nations and to
    respond quickly to unconventional threats would allow SOUTHCOM to
    better fulfill the cornerstone of our regional strategy: being
    steadfast, responsive, and lasting partners to help bring about the
    promise of the Americas. By fulfilling our promise, we will be
    enhancing our own security, with our capable partners in the region
    responding to emergent threats and denying access and maneuver room for
    our Nation's enemies.
    Partnerships in the Region
        We have many examples of successful partnering with countries in
    our region. Since 2000, Colombia stands out as a true reflection of
    what steady partnership with the U.S. can achieve. Through
    collaboration, partnering, education, training, and operations
    supported by the U.S., Colombia's military has grown by 27 percent
    since 2000, or 128,000 members, and by 2010 the national police are
    projected to increase their end strength by 25 percent, or 163,000
    members. According to the Colombian National Inspector General's
    office, while the size of the security forces has grown in the past 10
    years, the number of human rights allegations is down 67 percent thanks
    to an aggressive human rights program that now extends down to
    battalion level. Polling also indicates a high respect for the
    Colombian military among the populace.
        Today, the Colombian military conducts sustained
    counternarcoterrorism operations, developing actionable intelligence,
    protecting the National infrastructure, and enhancing civil-military
    cooperation in the context of their democratic security strategy. They
    do so consistent with the norms of international human rights and the
    rule of law. Colombia has dramatically improved security throughout its
    country and is poised for truly winning the peace for its democracy--
    among the oldest in Latin America.
        Another positive example of regional partnership can be seen in
    Central America, where the System for Central American Integration
    Meeting of Heads of State met in October 2006 to identify and publish a
    plan of action for the Central American security priorities. The plan,
    published in November 2006, addresses how the region can counter
    organized crime, gang participation, illicit arms transfers, and porous
    borders.
        Our emphasis within Central America is to build partner nation
    capacity to improve internal security, prevent illicit activity, and
    enhance regional stability. To do so, USSOUTHCOM leverages existing
    organizations such as the Conference of Central American Armed Forces
    (CFAC) to improve the collective response of our partners and advance
    our security cooperation objectives. As members of CFAC, the Central
    American countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua
    work together to respond to threats throughout Central America and
    mitigate the effects of ungoverned space, porous borders, corruption,
    and organized crime. Outside of the construct of the CFAC, El Salvador
    continues to be a steady partner of the U.S. and is a champion of peace
    and stability in Iraq. Their Cuscatlan Battalion is currently on its
    eighth rotation to Iraq in support of peacekeeping and stabilization
    operations.
        In the Caribbean, the Cricket World Cup is fostering collaboration
    among the participating nations on matters from threat identification
    to threat mitigation, including maritime port security and consequence
    management for possible chemical, biological and radiological attacks.
    The Caribbean Community, with our help, is working diligently to face
    these and other security concerns.
                                   operations
        Ultimately, education and training translate to operational
    capability and, in our region, operations are conducted not from fixed,
    large U.S.-run bases, but instead from a combination of flexible U.S.
    and partner nation facilities. With our departure from Panama at the
    turn of the century, there was less emphasis placed on permanent basing
    and more emphasis put on the use of partner nation facilities from
    which counternarcotics operations could be launched. Three such
    facilities, known as Forward Operating Locations, are at Manta in
    Ecuador; Comalapa in El Salvador; and Curacao and Aruba in the
    Caribbean Basin. These sites, which fall under the broader category of
    overseas facilities known as Cooperative Security Locations, are well
    forward of the United States and are unique in that they are used only
    for counternarcotics operations. We also maintain a forward operating
    site at Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras. We currently operate out of
    Apiay in Colombia and are working with the Government of Colombia to
    increase access for counternarcotics and other missions. These overseas
    cooperative locations are a cornerstone of our ability to operate in
    the SOUTHCOM region.
    Joint Interagency Task Force South
        Located in Key West, Florida, Joint Interagency Task Force South
    (JIATF South) is the Nation's crown jewel in addressing the challenges
    posed by transnational narcoterrorism and a model for interagency and
    partner nation cooperation. In a combined effort with the U.S.
    Government interagency and our partner nations, JIATF South continues
    to disrupt record levels of cocaine bound for the U.S. and Europe. It
    conducts highly effective interagency operations by coordinating,
    integrating, and synchronizing scarce Department of Defense,
    interagency, allied, and partner nation resources. Most of our partner
    nations do not have the resources to devote exclusively to
    interdiction, yet their willingness and governmental cooperation
    increase each year as the negative effects associated with the illegal
    drug trade spread and as our collective successes in attacking illicit
    drug trafficking increase throughout the region.
        The positive effects of everyone pulling together are clearly
    illustrated by the great successes JIATF South has achieved over the
    last 6 years of ever increasing record disruptions. The last 3 years
    alone resulted in cocaine disruptions of 219 metric tons (MTs) in 2004,
    252 MTs in 2005, and 260 MTs in 2006. These numbers represent nearly a
    threefold increase in disruptions since 2000, and all of this is a
    result of continually improving our working relationships with involved
    U.S. Government entities and with our partner nations. However, today's
    more robust intelligence picture of illicit drug movements also points
    to room for continued improvement. Intelligence suggests that some
    cocaine movements in JIATF South's operating area go undetected each
    year because of a lack of an appropriate detection resource to respond
    to intelligence queuing, a real missed opportunity because nearly 90
    percent of illicit drug movements that are successfully detected by
    JIATF South assets are eventually interdicted.
    Joint Task Force-Bravo
        Joint Task Force-Bravo (JTF-B) in Soto Cano, Honduras, represents
    the only permanently deployed U.S. forces in the region. JTF-B is a
    first responder to crises in the region and routinely conducts
    humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, search and rescue, personnel
    recovery, and noncombatant medical evacuation operations. Their most
    recent humanitarian operation was the deployment of three helicopters
    in response to flooding in Panama as part of Task Force-Estamos Unidos.
    They flew six relief sorties transporting food, water, mattresses, and
    petroleum products to disaster stricken areas. The familiarity of JTF-B
    crews and support personnel with the topography, communications
    systems, and movement corridors were instrumental in mission success.
    JTF-B is also a key contributor to our counternarcotics effort, using
    their assets, regional knowledge, and professional contacts to
    facilitate local law enforcement and interagency interdiction of
    illicit drug trafficking. JTF-B has a long history of answering our
    partner nations' calls for support during crisis--especially during
    hurricane season--and is a valuable asset to SOUTHCOM's partnership and
    cooperation plans in the region.
    Joint Task Force Guantanamo
        Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
    provides significant support to the overall global war on terror and
    ensures enemy combatants are kept off the battlefield while garnering
    information of strategic value for dissemination to national security
    decision makers. Over the past year alone, JTF-GTMO completed over
    3,000 interrogations and developed over 200 Intelligence Information
    Reports.
        Currently JTF-GTMO detains less than 400 unlawful enemy combatants,
    down from a total lifetime population of approximately 800, in a legal,
    humane, safe, and transparent manner. Over the past year, JTF-GTMO
    hosted over 320 individual media representatives from over 220 outlets.
    We also work closely with the International Committee of the Red Cross.
    Detainees have communication with the outside world through mail and
    receive medical care and food service similar to that of the U.S.
    military servicemembers who guard them. The Military Commissions Act of
    2006 established procedures for trying unlawful enemy combatants for
    violations of the laws of war. While the conduct of such commissions is
    not our responsibility at SOUTHCOM, we provide administrative and
    logistical support to the commission process as directed by the
    Department of Defense.
                                  initiatives
        Within SOUTHCOM, we are striving to transform into a true
    interagency organization. To facilitate this, we recently established a
    new directorate for interagency partnering, with support from the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of State. This
    directorate's goal is to develop a culture of robust partnering with
    the interagency, international, nongovernmental, and private
    organizations to better integrate and focus national and international
    efforts to support security, stability and prosperity in the region.
        Our efforts include coordination and synchronization with members
    of the interagency, academia, nongovernmental organizations, think
    tanks, our senior leadership in the Department of Defense, and Members
    of Congress and their staffs. These organizations formulate policy,
    allocate resources, develop strategies, and strive to ensure the U.S.
    Government shares a common vision and strategic objectives. It is in
    this arena that we seek to play a leading role in the transformation
    effort. The products of these key organizations shape the SOUTHCOM's
    theater security cooperation strategy and provide vectors for our
    engagement.
        U.S. SOUTHCOM is also committed to experimentation and innovation.
    Experimentation provides a means to increase capability, capacity, and
    collaboration with the interagency and coalition nations in the
    theater. It is an integral part of our overall theater security
    strategy. Latin America and the Caribbean is an excellent region for
    innovation--for trying new approaches, new technologies, new
    applications of existing technologies, and new ways to combine
    capabilities. We will continue to seek out opportunities to incorporate
    experimentation into ongoing operations and exercises to increase the
    Nation's effective and efficient accomplishment of its objectives.
        As an example of experimentation, we recently completed a Crisis
    Management experiment with multiagency participation from the U.S.,
    Argentina, and Honduras. This event provided a multinational
    environment to collaborate with regional and functional experts to
    address three time-sensitive crisis scenarios: responses to a natural
    disaster, a chemical incident, and civil unrest. We will expand the
    experimentation audience in 2008 by combining the next crisis
    management experiment with a recurring exercise that trains and
    improves humanitarian assistance and disaster relief skills for
    approximately 150 personnel from 27 nations in the region.
        We will also continue to bring innovative and experimental
    capabilities under development into Colombia, such as the ability to
    detect objects under dense foliage, use of unmanned systems, innovative
    data fusion, biometrics, and others for validation in an operational
    environment, as well as providing near real time support to the
    Colombian military from such cutting edge technologies.
                                   conclusion
        We believe that the bilateral and multilateral education, training,
    and operations achieved through partnering with U.S. SOUTHCOM are
    having a significant positive influence in the Americas. There is
    regional momentum to develop solutions to the challenges faced by the
    Americas. The Defense Ministers of 34 American nations met in October
    2006 to examine the changing threat environment, both internal and
    external to the hemisphere. These Ministers agreed that regional
    challenges need cooperative solutions and that the collaboration of
    virtually every nation is essential. They produced a consensus document
    that describes the region's commitment to combating the proliferation
    of weapons of mass destruction and which firmly condemns all forms of
    terrorism, drug trafficking, and transnational crime. The document also
    identified the need to strengthen cooperative mechanisms to counter
    these threats. This event reinforced the importance of partnering and
    highlighted the need for cooperative solutions for problems such as
    poverty, gangs, money laundering, human smuggling, counterdrug
    activities and dealing with regional violence.
        I would like to thank all of the members of the committee and all
    the Members of Congress for your support of U.S. SOUTHCOM and the
    important work we are doing in Latin America and the Caribbean. While
    the likelihood of large-scale military combat in our region remains
    low, the importance of sharing ideas, economic activity, cultural
    exchanges, and conducting military exercises is quite high. In fact it
    is essential to creating a mutually beneficial security environment in
    this hemisphere, and we ask your continued support of our initiatives
    throughout the region.
        In this vein, we are cautiously optimistic that Colombia is on the
    threshold of achieving its strategic objectives, but they will be
    heavily reliant on U.S. support for the next 2 or 3 years. The support
    from Congress has been invaluable for the past 6 years and we strongly
    encourage your continued support. Our initiatives include aircrew and
    maintenance personnel for helicopters, a robust logistics support
    system supporting JTF-Omega, Plan Consolidacion, and other ongoing
    support. In addition, we are seeking to provide the Colombian military
    with an automated on-line logistics system that integrates the supply
    and maintenance function of the Colombian military and national police.
    We are also trying to support to a modest depot level repair
    capability, fielding ``Midnight Express'' boats supporting riverine
    interdiction for the Colombian Navy on their North and Pacific coasts,
    and helping to establish the 2d Riverine Brigade on their Pacific
    coast.
        We also appreciate your past support for several of our other
    initiatives, including expanded authority to conduct
    counternarcoterrorism operations in Colombia.
        We understand and appreciate the value of congressional support and
    are thankful for all you have provided for the command. I want to thank
    you again for delinking IMET from the ASPA sanctions. Your actions will
    enable us to re-engage hundreds of military personnel each year who
    would otherwise be denied an opportunity to benefit from U.S. military
    education and training.
        While we deeply appreciate your support in this area, there are
    other areas for which we also seek assistance. The command is seeking
    congressional support for the construction of a consolidated
    headquarters facility in Miami-Doral for occupancy by 2010. The
    headquarters is vital for effective command and control of future
    joint, coalition and interagency operations that we conduct in the
    region. Our current headquarters complex lacks adequate space, is
    improperly configured, does not comply with anti-terrorism and force
    protection standards, and has dated communications architectures and
    expensive annual lease costs. Your support for this project is of
    tremendous importance.
        The command received $110 million in Foreign Military Financing
    (FMF) for the region in fiscal year 2006. FMF is a prerequisite for
    successfully funding many of the programs that enable military-to-
    military engagements that lead to long-term relationships. In addition,
    it enables partner nation capacity that, in turn, provides for defense-
    in-depth for the U.S. Partner nations prefer to buy U.S. military
    equipment for the quality and sustainment packages that accompany the
    purchases. We appreciate your continued support on this important
    program.
        Finally, we ask your support for the proposed Center for Excellence
    in Human Rights. SOUTHCOM is the only combatant command with a
    dedicated Human Rights program. The authorities we would gain from this
    proposed language would allow SOUTHCOM to intensify our support to our
    partner governments in their efforts to eliminate human rights
    violations. The protection of human rights is an essential step toward
    strengthening democracy in our neighboring countries.
        As I mentioned earlier, it is in the context of geographic, social,
    economic, political and military linkages that we plan and execute the
    daily activities associated with our mission, and successful mission
    accomplishment for the command requires cooperation and reliable
    partnerships--partnerships based on commitment, based on a promise to
    this region of the world.
        This combatant command is committed to being the strategic partner
    of choice in the region and will focus on the relationships necessary
    to do so. We will strive to invent new approaches in every area; from
    tactical execution to strategic engagement, from more efficient
    training methodologies to creative ways to improve resources.
        I take great pride in our mission and in the exceptional men and
    women of the United States SOUTHCOM. I know from first hand experience
    that today's men and women in uniform are patriots of extraordinary
    promise. They are coming of age in this new century as the war on
    terror unfolds; they watched the World Trade towers fall to earth with
    incomprehension and anger; and then reacted with fierce determination.
    They have made a promise to their country that they will stand the
    watch and fight for us to win the battle that is unfolding today. From
    the dusty streets of Baghdad to the mountain passes of Afghanistan to
    the tropics of Colombia to the cold foothills of Korea--they are
    fulfilling that promise. I am proud to serve with them in U.S.
    SOUTHCOM.
        I thank you for your support to the finest military in the world.
        I am prepared to answer your questions.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Admiral.
        Thank you all, not just for your opening statements, but
    also for your statements that you prepared in advance. They
    came, as we really prefer, a couple of days in advance, and you
    have kept that commitment to us, it's not always kept by a lot
    of our witnesses, and it's very much appreciated when it is,
    because it allows us to prepare better, to actually read your
    statements, have our staff read your statements before we meet
    together. So, thank you for that, as well.
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Admiral Keating, one of the major problems
    that we had before the September 11 terrorist attacks was a
    lack of information sharing--by the way, let's try an 8-minute
    round in the first round here.
        One of the major problems that we had before the September
    11 terrorist attacks was a lack of information sharing among
    relevant government agencies. When General Renuart had his
    confirmation hearing earlier this month, I asked him about the
    apparent fact that NORTHCOM had withdrawn its representative to
    the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) last year, because
    NORTHCOM and the Defense Intelligence Agency found that it was
    too hard to get information and cooperation from the NCTC. In
    order to avoid a repeat of the pre-September 11 failure to
    share information, would you agree that we need to ensure that
    there is good information sharing and cooperation between
    NORTHCOM and the NCTC as well as among other Federal agencies?
        Admiral Keating. I would agree emphatically.
        Chairman Levin. Admiral, one of the painful lessons that we
    saw from Hurricane Katrina was the need for better planning,
    coordination, and integration among Federal and State emergency
    response agencies, NORTHCOM, and the National Guard in the
    event of a domestic disaster.
        What were some of the key NORTHCOM lessons learned from the
    Hurricane Katrina response experience, and what--in your
    judgment--remains to be done to ensure that that kind of
    confusion and delay is not repeated?
        Admiral Keating. Principal lessons learned would be
    several, Mr. Chairman.
        One, the ability to assess the situation accurately and
    rapidly. Two, the ability to communicate across the spectrum of
    first responders, up to and including title 10 Reserve National
    Guard Forces who would come from out of the area to deploy.
    Three, to provide--via whatever means--the capability to
    stabilize and mitigate human suffering, and restore
    infrastructure as quickly as possible. Those would be the three
    major areas where we've concentrated our efforts.
        Changes would include--we now have a full-time, Active-Duty
    colonel embedded with each Federal Emergency Management Agency
    (FEMA) region, at the FEMA region headquarters. So, that's 10
    Active-Duty personnel, with a small support staff who are,
    essentially, FEMA operatives, to provide direct liaison from
    NORTHCOM. In conjunction with the National Guard and FEMA and
    the support of Congress, and with some extra money, we
    purchased cell phone farms. We have three, at NORTHCOM, of
    these cell phone farms. We can either airlift, drive, or float
    these cell phone farms in where we power up a Honda generator,
    put a tower up and start dispersing cell phones, and it is an
    organic, but complete system which--when infrastructure is
    restored--can then integrate into the full system.
        Chairman Levin. Great.
        Admiral Keating. Then the third point might be the
    exercises we're doing with increased frequency, and complexity,
    to ensure that the responders at the State level understand the
    capabilities at the Federal level.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Just one question on ballistic missile defense, Admiral.
    Would you agree that it's important that the ground-based mid-
    course defense, the GMD system, be operationally effective and
    reliable, before being declared fully operational?
        Admiral Keating. I would, sir.
        Chairman Levin. General, let me turn to you now.
        The pace of operations and the scope of operations in Iraq,
    Afghanistan, as well as our rotational strategy for meeting
    U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) force requirements has put an
    extraordinary strain on the readiness of our uncommitted units.
    So many people and so much equipment is already deployed that
    on February 28 this year, General Schoomaker in the Army, and
    General Conway in the Marine Corps, each acknowledged their
    concern about the challenge of manning, equipping, and training
    units that are preparing to deploy, but are not deployed.
        The readiness in nondeployed Army units has declined to
    alarmingly low levels, General Schoomaker refers to this as a
    ``lack of strategic depth.'' Your command is responsible to
    provide trained and ready joint forces to our combatant
    commanders, can you give us your assessment of the readiness of
    our non-deployed land, air, and sea forces? Also, what
    specifically can be done to improve the readiness of those
    forces? Particularly our ground forces?
        General Smith. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
        First of all, I share the assessment that the Chief of
    Staff of the Army and the Commandant of the Marine Corps have.
    For those forces that are not deployed and not very close to
    getting deployed, have personnel shortfalls, as well as
    equipment shortfalls. The kind of training that they're getting
    is very much focused on counterinsurgency as opposed to some of
    the other skills that they would need for a conventional
    warfight.
        The way we do business is we move the training flow and we
    move the equipment towards units as they get closer to
    deployment. That leaves those that just returned in the process
    of regaining and resetting their equipment that they brought
    back from war, turning over in the organization and sending
    people off to school, and then reintegrating generally about a
    third of their personnel to the training flow so that they can
    get prepared for their next deployment. That results in a very
    significant number of people being at a readiness levels of
    category level (C)-3 or C-4.
        Chairman Levin. Just briefly, that's an unacceptable level,
    bottom line.
        General Smith. C-1, of course, is they can do any mission.
    C-2 is they can do primarily the missions that they're being
    asked to, but some that they can't do, and C-3 is a readiness
    level that we would not send them to war at. We would send them
    to war at C-1 or C-2 as long as they could perform the mission.
    So our goal is, as they sit static and they go through reset,
    is they will be generally at that C-3 readiness level. But,
    then as they start standing up their training pipeline and
    their personnel pipeline, they will get closer and closer to C-
    2 and then ultimately we'll have them at C-1 prior to them
    going into the theater.
        As I was at Fort Stewart and Fort Bragg about 10 days ago,
    and I asked what they desired the most, as far as being able to
    have a capability in the United States to train on, was
    peacetime up-armored Humvees, the M11-14. That's because most
    of them go to Iraq or Afghanistan, there are insufficient
    numbers to be able to train on in the States until they go
    through their National Training Center, or the Joint Readiness
    Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk.
        Chairman Levin. General, a recent New York Times article
    highlighted the challenges that the Army's having in providing
    its typical airborne infantry portrayed as a ``force
    immediately ready'' to deploy for a contingency anywhere in the
    world. This ready brigade, also known as the Division Ready
    Brigade, ordinarily stands to deploy by air within 18 hours of
    alert, its U.S. combat troops anywhere in the world that they
    are needed.
        The article points out that our most recently designated
    Ready Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg is
    getting ready to deploy as part of the surge to Iraq, and
    therefore, as of this moment, the Nation is without its
    required Ready Brigade.
        As a force provider, you obviously will be paying
    particular attention to and be involved in making sure that we
    have an appropriate combat brigade capable and available for
    worldwide deployment within the 18- to 72-hour standard which
    has been established. What can be done to ensure that the
    Nation reestablishes this capability, how concerned are you
    about the fact that we don't have it at the moment, and how are
    we going to cover that Ready Brigade mission adequately,
    without interruption, as we continue the plus-up of forces in
    Iraq, and the rotational strategy in both Iraq and Afghanistan?
        General Smith. Mr. Chairman, I was with that unit, the 1st
    Brigade Combat Team (BCT), the 82nd last Friday--I'm sorry, a
    week ago Friday, and they're out at the JRTC right now at Fort
    Polk. So, indeed, to meet the timelines that we would expect of
    the Division Ready Brigade, they would have some challenges
    trying to meet the specific requirements, but would they be
    able to respond to a threat in another part of the world, other
    than Iraq or Afghanistan? Yes. It would just take a little bit
    more time than we would like it to take. We've accepted that
    risk through April 1, at which time, a unit of the 101st will
    take over that role.
        I have cautioned everybody that might want to use those
    units that because of the way we're doing business, they might
    find themselves in a situation where it might take a little bit
    longer than the specific timeline, which is a fairly
    challenging timeline--within a day. We are accepting some level
    of risk as we go about doing that. But, we always have somebody
    in mind to be able to go perform that mission. We will have a
    permanently trained and ready force to do that with the 101st,
    with some delays, depending on where they are in their reset
    timeline, to meet those----
        Chairman Levin. The added risks are obviously of concern to
    us, as they are to you. I'm wondering if you, for the record
    because my time is up, would give us an idea as to how much
    additional time would be required for them to respond?
        General Smith. I certainly will, Senator.
        Senator Warner. It is an important question, as part of
    this hearing, it ought to be answered here.
        Chairman Levin. Do you have the additional time that it
    would take?
        General Smith. Senator, I don't, because it would change
    every day.
        Chairman Levin. How about a range? I'll get you in trouble
    with a range question.
        General Smith. I would say, we would like to have them be
    able to get airborne or at least a first unit at a classified,
    but at a fairly short period of time, which would constitute, a
    day or two. Then the rest would follow in a matter of days.
        The fact that the JRTC, they are probably the most ready
    force we have in the United States right now, as far as
    equipment and training, and the ability to go do this. So, they
    would take a couple of extra days to go. When they get back,
    and they're back at Fort Bragg, then that timeline will change.
        Chairman Levin. Which way?
        General Smith. It will probably improve. Just because they
    have the facilities there, and we have the rapid ability to
    move airplanes in there, and they would be in a State, and they
    would be on some level of standby to be able to----
        Chairman Levin. When are they going to Iraq?
        General Smith. I'm sorry, did you say when?
        Chairman Levin. Yes.
        General Smith. They go the 2nd or the 3rd--I'm sorry, the
    1st of the 82nd goes in June.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        That important colloquy just underscores the stress that
    all military commanders, indeed, from the Secretary of Defense
    down, have acknowledged that our forces are being put under. It
    means greater requests to the individual in uniform and to
    their families, and to the question of our carefully planned
    operations here at home, and they impact, indeed, on our
    homeland defense, and other things. So, we better deal with it,
    the surge is going forward, we all hope it is successful.
        I would like to follow on that General Smith, because
    Congress this week, and perhaps into next, is going to be
    dealing with the governmental appropriations, and I am reading
    from the full committee print of the House of Representatives,
    March, this month, Section--Chapter 9--General Provisions,
    ``Congress finds that as Defense Department policy that units
    should not be deployed for combat unless they are fully mission
    capable. None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made
    available in this act may be used to deploy any unit of the
    Armed Forces to Iraq unless the Chief of the military
    department concerned has certified in writing to the
    Committees, the Appropriations Committee and Armed Services
    Committee, days in advance of the deployment that the unit is
    fully mission capable.''
        Help us work through your role in that very important
    decisionmaking, if in fact, this or something similar to it
    became law. What is your role in that?
        General Smith. Senator Warner, first of all, my role on a
    regular basis is to monitor the readiness of the force, so that
    we know, in a contingency, what our capabilities are, so that
    we could advise the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense, and
    in turn, the President on what capabilities we can respond to.
        As far as the certification process, or a signing off on a
    unit that is ready to go, we don't do that.
        Senator Warner. That is clear.
        General Smith. There's a service responsibility and my
    component commands, however, do. So, in the instance of an--I'm
    sorry, they do not do a written statement.
        But certainly, General Campbell who is a component
    commander, is integrally involved in the training, the
    equipping, and the readiness of that unit to meet its latest
    arrival date in Iraq or Afghanistan or Kosovo or wherever----
        Senator Warner. Now, he is the Army?
        General Smith. He's the Army Forces Commander at Fort
    McPherson, and he's my Army component commander.
        Senator Warner. You have a similar one for Navy?
        General Smith. Indeed we do, Admiral Naplan at Fleet Forces
    Command, and General Blackman at Marine Forces Command, and
    General Keys at Air Combat Command.
        So they regularly report on the readiness of the unit, so
    as their personnel are trained and ready and the numbers are
    right, they will change from a lower readiness status, to a
    higher readiness status, and then we track them on a stair-
    step, and we watch them as they get closer and closer to
    deployment so to make sure that we're providing for those
    trained and ready forces.
        But we rely on the Services, and we rely on our component
    commanders, and indeed, the Division and BCT Commanders to
    ensure that they're ready to go.
        Senator Warner. Let me probe more deeply here. Force
    commander makes the certification that this specific unit is C-
    1, C-2, whatever the case may be. That is transmitted to you,
    is that correct?
        General Smith. It is.
        Senator Warner. Now, my question is do you do any
    independent analysis to verify the finding of that force
    commander?
        General Smith. I do not.
        Senator Warner. You do not. So, simply you accept it at
    face value, you have no responsibility under law or otherwise
    to go back and review it and give your own command's judgment
    as to the accuracy of that report.
        General Smith. That's correct, Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Then it goes on up to the Chief of Staff of
    the respective Service. Now, do they then try and go back
    through you, or some other ways to make an independent
    assessment?
        General Smith. They do not come back through me. They have
    a very close relationship with their Service headquarters.
        Senator Warner. Well, of course.
        General Smith. So they're also--I think this is a better
    question for General Schoomaker, for instance, I believe that
    he accepts the readiness rating and the status of the unit as
    determined by the commander of that unit.
        Senator Warner. So as this proposed law is written, that
    force commander is the one that is going to make that decision?
        General Smith. Indeed.
        Senator Warner. Whether or not the unit is ready?
        General Smith. Indeed, the commander should make that
    decision.
        Senator Warner. Now, back again to your command, as I read
    this, this would not permit anyone, any unit, below C-1 to be
    deployed. Do you come into that equation at all?
        General Smith. First of all, the C status is a--there are a
    variety of ways to look at readiness, and that happens to be
    one, and it's fairly simplistic. So really, the combatant
    commander on the receiving end establishes the requirement.
        For instance, an artillery unit may not be C-1 to perform
    its artillery role. On the other hand, we will use them to go
    perform a military police role. So that the readiness of them
    to perform that mission, would not necessarily be reflected in
    the readiness status of the unit to do its other conventional
    missions. So, it was tailored to meet the combatant commanders'
    requirements, and we monitor that. Then we rely on the
    commander to say, ``Yes, indeed, we are ready and trained to do
    the mission we've been asked to do.''
        Senator Warner. I think, I judged from your response, you
    are not a part of that decisionmaking.
        General Smith. We are not. That's correct, we are not.
        Senator Warner. Now, Admiral Keating, as you complete your
    very distinguished career in your current assignment, our wish
    to you, as I have come to know you quite well through the
    years, personally, you leave with a sense of satisfaction and
    achievement. But, there must be things that either you were not
    able to achieve, for whatever reason, on your watch, or if you
    had more time, you would achieve them, but what is left undone
    that you think your successor has to do to continue to improve
    this structure?
        Admiral Keating. Primarily, Senator Warner, it would be to
    make even healthier and more open interagency cooperation--not
    just relationships, but work ethic--between the DOD and the
    other Federal agencies, and the commercial sector.
        Post-Hurricane Katrina, we were getting phone calls in the
    hours after the storm moved--you remember it missed New
    Orleans, but it hit Gulfport, MS--very hard. Phone calls from
    folks like Home Depot, FedEx, and Wal-Mart saying, ``You want
    wood? We have wood. You want trucks? We have trucks. You want
    water? We have water.'' We really hadn't thought through the
    commercial application of help that could be provided.
    Remember, there were 140 countries around the world who
    volunteered assistance. So, making more healthy and more
    transparent the interagency working relationships on a day-to-
    day basis, I say would be a primary goal for my successor.
        Senator Warner. Then, I presume that as you turn over that
    you've made those points clear to your successor.
        Admiral Keating. He is well aware, yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. Well aware of that.
        On a scale of 1 to 10, how do you feel America is prepared
    to meet the range of contingency that any prudent planning
    document requires? Not only of hurricanes, but WMDs, Heaven
    forbid a repeat of September 11 proportions. Where do you think
    we are, 1 to 10?
        Admiral Keating. In the aggregate, Senator, a seven. We
    could be lower in some specifics. Some of the high end--a
    biological attack would be a significant challenge. Pandemic
    influenza, not even an attack.
        Senator Warner. Surely, disease.
        Admiral Keating. On the other hand, we are much better
    today than we were 4 or 5 years ago, one has to be careful. A
    disaster may be relatively low-end unless you're in the path of
    the hurricane or the tornado.
        Senator Warner. Right.
        Admiral Keating. But we're much better at it today than we
    were 3 or 4 years ago.
        Senator Warner. About a seven?
        Admiral Keating. About a seven.
        Senator Warner. Lastly, to Admiral Stavridis. You mentioned
    that you just visited the Panama Canal, and that is an issue
    that rises and falls. At the moment it seems to be relatively
    quiet. I recall the last consternation was that China was
    beginning to close in at both ends of the Canal with offerings
    to the locals to do certain things that gave us a presence
    there.
        Give us a short report on the Canal, how you feel it is?
    Because it is integral to our security program. Is the
    modernization likely to go ahead? What role has China or other
    foreign nationals taken to support the operation of that Canal?
        Admiral Stavridis. I will, sir.
        First of all, as we say in Spanish, I think you're right,
    it is ``muy tranquilo,'' very calm, in the Canal right now. I
    just had the opportunity to go down and open one of the locks
    down there. I spent a fair amount of time talking about the
    security issues with the Administrator of the Panama Canal, a
    Panamanian, of course.
        I will tell you as a professional mariner who has sailed
    the Canal under U.S. operations, and has sailed it under
    Panamanian operations, that it runs in a completely
    professional and excellent fashion today. So, as an entity, as
    an organization, as a flow, it's excellent.
        Sir, as you mentioned, the Panamanians just passed a
    referendum with a 72 percent majority, very, very high approval
    for a $5.25 billion expansion of the Canal. This expansion,
    which will take about 7 years to complete, will open the Canal
    to about 50 percent more shipping, because the current Canal is
    not quite wide enough for the larger ships to pass through it.
    That's a significant economic benefit, not only to Panama, but
    to the region, and to the United States.
        We are very concerned, however, about the potential for the
    Canal to get targeted. It's something we think about at
    SOUTHCOM and we partner closely, not only with the Panamanians,
    with all the concerned nations.
        As a result, we do an annual exercise in Panama, and off
    the waters of Panama, that began 3 years ago with only three
    nations participating, this summer there will be 20 countries
    participating in it. It's become one of our largest multi-
    lateral exercises anywhere in the world, and it's focused on
    counterterrorism as it might attack in the Panama Canal.
        So, we're looking at it very closely, there's multi-lateral
    coordination to deal with any potential threat to it. In terms
    of the foreign influence over the Canal, sir, I don't see that
    as a factor. I think the Canal is run extremely well by the
    Panamanian government without outside influences. They are
    partnering closely with us, and with other nations of the
    region to protect it appropriately.
        Senator Warner. Thank you.
        My time is up, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Bill Nelson [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Warner.
        General Smith, I want to pick up on some line of
    questioning from Senator Warner.
        I was struck last week when the Chief of Staff of the Army
    was here, in which he openly stated and admitted, at the early
    part of the war that units of the National Guard went to Iraq
    without the proper training, and without the proper equipment.
    On the latter, I know firsthand, because I was getting calls
    from moms, dads, husbands, and wives about members of the
    Florida National Guard not having the proper body armor. Even
    though, I think, an objective analysis would say that certainly
    the training was not a question for the Florida National Guard,
    but the equipment was.
        Now, since you are to monitor the readiness of the forces,
    how can you make sure that--not only the Active-Duty Forces,
    but the National Guard Forces and the Reserves that are going
    to Iraq--are ready and equipped?
        General Smith. Senator Nelson, we treat and consider the
    National Guard and Reserve exactly the same as we do the
    Active-Duty units, in their march to deployment. Now, we focus
    mostly on the major units and, at the BCT level, and as a
    National Guard or Reserve unit gets closer to their deployment
    date, you'll see them go from a readiness status of, let's say,
    C-4 to C-3, their equipment will get better, they'll get
    equipment to train on, their personnel situation will get
    better, their training will get better, and they will turn from
    red to yellow to green during that process.
        The reason this process works--because it is true that the
    readiness level of the National Guard is less than the Active-
    Duty Force, is because their time during reset, or their time
    back to the States, between the time they got back the last
    time and the time they're going, it's supposed to be 5 years.
    So consequently, they are not going to get attention until they
    get closer to their deployment dates.
        That, again, is one of those areas where we find ourselves
    taking some risks in some other areas of the world, if we had
    to deploy them, that I know you're aware of. But again, the
    first of the 34th, for instance, the Minnesota National Guard
    unit that we extended not too long ago, went over there with
    all of the same equipment and everything that the Active-Duty
    Force had.
        Senator Bill Nelson. The question is, how are you involved
    in making sure--since one of your tasks is to monitor the
    readiness of the force--that they are trained, and that they
    are equipped, so that we don't again have what General
    Schoomaker told us--which stunned this committee last week,
    when he testified that the National Guard was going to Iraq,
    and it wasn't trained, and it wasn't equipped.
        General Smith. Again, I don't think--at that point, that
    was because of the rapidity that that happened, so there was no
    training pipeline and readiness pipeline that there is today to
    do that, and some level of, with some thorough process.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Do you think that your command, you,
    should have more authority in the certification of the
    readiness of the forces, and the decision to deploy them?
        General Smith. I'm satisfied that our component commanders
    do a good job at evaluating the readiness of the force before
    they deploy them into war.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Okay, and who is making that decision?
        General Smith. That decision is made by, the first command
    commander in that part of the Army, in concert with the
    commander of whatever the unit happens to be. In the Active-
    Duty Force, it would be the Division Commander or the Corps
    Commander. In the National Guard and Reserve it would be, first
    Air Force or whoever it is, that's coming, first Army or
    whoever it does that's responsible for the training, readiness,
    and equipping of the Reserve component.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Stavridis, let me take care of
    some housekeeping here, for you. Why don't you lay out for the
    committee, why your command headquarters needs to be where it
    is, so that we can have it on the record here, especially since
    we thought this thing was done with Base Realignment and
    Closure, if you will?
        Admiral Stavridis. Sir, thank you.
        First, sort of proceeding from the bigger picture to the
    specifics, I'm absolutely convinced the command should be in
    South Florida. Why? Because it's the nexus of transportation,
    of intellectual discourse, of publishing, of academe as it
    relates to Latin America and the Caribbean. All roads lead to
    Miami, in terms of the way the league flows together, and the
    way it connects with the United States. I'm absolutely
    convinced South Florida is the correct location for it.
        Let's kind of bring that in a little closer--the best place
    to locate it, specifically in South Florida, in my opinion, is
    in Doral, which is effectively in the heart of Miami itself.
    It's extremely close to the international airport.
        Now, why is that important? It's because there is a
    tremendous leveraging effect of people, team leaders passing
    through Miami, because of its transportation nexus, and it
    affords us at the headquarters the opportunity to literally
    scoop people up at the airport, get them to the headquarters,
    have a discussion with them, put them on an airplane, get them
    back.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Give us an example of who.
        Admiral Stavridis. I can very well. Minister Santos, of
    Colombia, who routinely comes to Washington, makes a point of
    passing through the Miami International Airport, I get a chance
    to just hop in the car and go over there. I get a very valuable
    30, 45 minutes with him, and he makes his connecting flight.
    That example is repeated frequently and often at all levels in
    my staff, through all my flag and general officers.
        Second, that Doral location is extremely proximate to the
    Florida International University and the University of Miami,
    two of the leading centers of thought and intellectual study of
    the entire region--the Caribbean and Latin America.
        Third, the school situation is the best there for my
    families and the ability of spouses to have work in the area.
    All of this plays into a quality of life piece that fits, I
    think, best in Doral.
        So, the State of Florida has made an offering of land to us
    there, upon which we could use military construction funds, if
    the committee and the Senate, and ultimately, Congress approve
    it, and we would like to begin construction on the
    headquarters.
        Our current situation is, we're scattered in nine
    buildings, all around the Miami area, and then we have one--far
    too small--central location, and we're seeking to consolidate
    that, put it in one place, and as I look at the ability to
    conduct the mission that I've been given as a combatant
    commander, I do believe the Doral location is the best one,
    overall.
        Senator Bill Nelson. In effect, the State of Florida
    location is giving you at what would be a good value, whereas
    the present landlord is Jack Lorada.
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, those are both true statements.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Okay.
        Admiral Keating--and thank all of you for your public
    service.
        Senator Warner. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman, I wonder, I had a
    question along your lines.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Sure.
        Senator Warner. I wonder if I might put it in the record at
    this point?
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Senator Warner. Admiral Stavridis, I note in your thorough written
    statement that you advocate for congressional support for the
    authorization in fiscal year 2008 for $237 million to construct a new
    headquarters complex for Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in Miami, FL.
    While I am supportive of your need for a new headquarters, my concern
    is that, unlike most other U.S. major command headquarters which are
    located on military installations, you are proposing to build this
    complex on land leased from the State of Florida. The lease for part of
    the land will expire in 2015 (albeit with four 10-year options upon
    mutual agreement by both parties). Furthermore, the lease requires that
    the new construction must be used for a SOUTHCOM headquarters, or the
    lease is terminated. Finally, upon termination of the lease for any
    reason, ownership and control of the headquarters complex will revert
    to the State of Florida, and the State has the option to require the
    DOD to tear down the headquarters at DOD expense and to restore the
    land to a pre-existing condition. The lease also requires SOUTHCOM to
    grant the State of Florida access and inspections rights to any part of
    the headquarters complex, including areas for classified and coalition
    forces operations. Why are these terms considered acceptable for a $237
    million military construction investment?
        Admiral Stavridis. The State of Florida is providing land valued at
    $40 million via a no-cost ground lease for the construction of SOUTHCOM
    headquarters through 2055, with options. The four 10-year options will
    be granted by the State of Florida upon authorization of the $237
    million military construction project. The U.S. Government may use this
    property through 2055 for SOUTHCOM headquarters purposes. The State
    land is located in the optimal location to support SOUTHCOM's mission
    accomplishment. In the event that SOUTHCOM headquarters relocates or
    vacates the property, the U.S. Government may utilize the property for
    other purposes upon approval by the State of Florida.
        The Department of Defense (DOD) is negotiating a ground lease
    amendment with the State of Florida to gain greater flexibility of
    facility use. The DOD is working with the State of Florida to amend the
    ground lease agreement to gain the State's pre-approval of acceptable
    alternative uses by any U.S. Government agency for administration,
    military headquarters, emergency operations center, and equivalent
    administrative uses in the event SOUTHCOM vacates the facility. The
    State has indicated a willingness to pre-approve alternate uses of the
    facility for other U.S. Government agency use for administrative
    purposes.
        In the event the U.S. Government vacates the facility and no longer
    requires its use by any Federal agency, the State has two options; (1)
    retain the improvements, or (2) require improvements be removed.
        The lease agreement allows the State, upon reasonable notice, to
    inspect the premises. The DOD will escort State government officials
    during any inspection to protect classified information.
        Senator Warner. Admiral Stavridis, doesn't this lease agreement in
    effect deny the DOD the flexibility to realign unified and combatant
    commands without the significant penally of losing a headquarters
    complex?
        Admiral Stavridis. No. In the event that SOUTHCOM headquarters
    utilize the property for other purposes upon approval by the State of
    Florida. The DOD is working with the State of Florida to amend the
    ground lease agreement to gain the State's pre-approval of acceptable
    alternative uses by any U.S. Government agency for administration,
    military headquarters, emergency operations center, and equivalent
    administrative uses in the event SOUTHCOM relocates or vacates the
    facility.
        Senator Warner. Admiral Stavridis, did SOUTHCOM or the Department
    of the Army ever request an outright deed transfer of the land from the
    Slate of Florida in order to secure ownership? If so, what was the
    State's response?
        Admiral Stavridis. The State is researching this option. Early
    feedback is that the State of Florida may transfer title to the land if
    approved by the State Board of Trustees and if the U.S. Government pays
    fair market value. The State is researching to determine if there arc
    other options for transfer of title.
        Senator Warner. Admiral Stavridis, did you analyze the alternative
    of locating your headquarters on a military installation which might
    benefit from a greater measure of force protection and the efficiencies
    gained by sharing supporting activities in existing facilities? If, so,
    what were those alternatives, and why are you proposing to build on
    leased property?
        Admiral Stavridis. Construction on State land in Miami-Doral is the
    best site location for SOUTHCOM's mission accomplishment and meets DOD
    anti-terrorism and force protection requirements.
        Seven studies have been conducted since 1995 to explore multiple
    site locations. All studies indicate that Miami is the best location
    for SOUTHCOM headquarters. The studies include; (1) 1995 Relocation
    Study, (2) 2001 Interim Facilities Master Plan, (3) 2002 Facilities
    Master Plan, (4) 2003 Business Plan, (5) 2004 Northern Command
    (NORTHCOM)-SOUTHCOM Merger Study, (6) 2005 Base Realignment and Closure
    (BRAC), and (6) 2006 Economic Analysis. The current and past five
    combatant commanders have all testified before Congress that Miami is
    the best location for SOUTHCOM headquarters. In the most recent study,
    Homestead Air Reserve Base and Patrick Air Force Base were explored as
    potential alternate locations. A summary of the latest study follows:
    Miami-Doral
        The State of Florida land in Miami-Doral is the optimal site
    location because:

             Organizational efficiencies will be achieved by being
            located in close proximity to key collaborative partners,
            transportation nodes, and community support:

                     International Airports (daily non-stop flights
                    to most Partner Nations; 10,000 flights/yr)
                     Housing communities (top notch schools, best
                    hospitals, safe housing)
                     Partner Nation consulates
                     Coast Guard District-7 headquarters
                     Universities that collaborate on Latin
                    American Studies
                     Seaports (Port of Miami, and Port of
                    Everglades)
                     Federal Agency regional offices (DHS, DOJ,
                    DEA, DOS, Treasury, FAA)
                     Network Access Point (NAP) of Americas

             Miami-Doral is outside of the hurricane storm surge
            evacuation zone.
             State land is immediately available and
            environmentally sound. Adjoining FAA land is available and has
            been tentatively approved for storm-water retention.
             Miami-Doral is centrally located within reasonable
            commute distance to preferred housing communities in both Dade
            and Broward Counties.
             Miami-Doral has ample nearby hotels within walking
            distance to support contingencies, exercises, and conferences.
             Miami is considered the gateway to the Americas, and
            is culturally tied to Latin America.
    Homestead ARB and Patrick AFB
        Even though some facility co-use benefits could be achieved at
    Homestead Air Reserve Base and Patrick Air Force Base, the following
    costs and disadvantages significantly outweigh facility co-use
    benefits:

             Cumulative loss of organizational efficiencies
            associated with the lack of proximity to key collaborative
            partners, transportation nodes, and community support:

                     International Airports (10,000 annual
                    commercial flights; longer travel distance/time)
                     Housing communities (schools, hospitals,
                    housing)
                     Partner Nation consulates (visas and
                    collaboration)
                     Coast Guard District-7 headquarters
                     Universities that collaborate on Latin
                    American Studies
                     Seaports
                     Federal Agency regional offices (DHS, DOJ,
                    DEA, DOS, Treasury, FAA)
                     Network Access Point (NAP) of Americas

             Homestead ARB is inside the mandatory hurricane storm
            surge evacuation zone.
             Sufficient land is not immediately available
            (Homestead-litigation).
             Not located within reasonable commute distance to
            preferred housing communities in Broward County (or relocation
            costs for employees to Patrick AFB), forcing civilian employees
            who have working relationships with our partner nations to:

                     Relocate (Homestead--at own expense)
                    (Patrick--at government expense), or
                     Commute longer distances; 3-tolls each way, $6
                    round trip daily, or
                     Seek employment elsewhere.

             Lacks nearby hotels to support exercises,
            contingencies, and conferences (Homestead).
             Distance from international airports costs 1,250 man-
            days in additional travel time to/from airports for 10,000
            annual commercial flights.

        Miami-Doral is the best strategic location for USSOUTHCOM
    headquarters.

        Senator Bill Nelson. Well, if you'd like to go----
        Senator Warner. No.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Why don't you? No, I'll just defer to
    you?
        Senator Warner. It will take some time. This is one of
    these brilliant staff documents that goes into every aspect. I
    assure you that I am not trying to put it in Virginia.
    [Laughter.]
        Senator Bill Nelson. Well, I have to always--[Laughter.]
        Senator Warner. Correct. But this is a series of questions,
    very ably put together by our staff, because we are just trying
    to look at the costs and the other questions.
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. So, if you would put that in the record at
    this point, I would be very much appreciative.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Absolutely.
        Admiral Stavridis. We would be happy to answer them, sir.
        Senator Warner. Fine, thank you very much.
        Senator Bill Nelson. It is so done.
        I'm glad you made that comment, I want to go onto Admiral
    Keating, just so that we could clear the record, Admiral
    Stavridis, because now there are folks that are saying it ought
    to be the old Homestead Air Force Base, and so forth, and
    you've just made the case clear, by your role is not only as a
    warrior, but it's also as a diplomat. When you can have access
    to all of these governmental and diplomatic leaders on the spur
    of the moment, which increases your contact and effectiveness
    by quantum leaps, then it's the logical thing to do.
        I'll close that, I want to pick up on what the chairman had
    asked you, Admiral Keating. On the cooperation of your command
    with the National Guard, and the State and local authorities
    when we have a national emergency. It was not a fine day when,
    in the midst of Hurricane Katrina, we suddenly had the military
    trying to order the National Guard around, and you got into all
    of those problems down there.
        I would hope that--particularly if it's a natural disaster
    in Florida, let me tell you, the Florida National Guard knows
    how to handle hurricanes. It shouldn't be the military
    commanders from someplace else coming in and telling them what
    to do.
        Admiral Keating. Couldn't agree more.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Would you comment on that?
        Admiral Keating. I couldn't agree more with you, Senator.
    I'm not aware of a specific example--you may have in mind as
    to--when you say it was not a good day when the military tried
    to order the National Guard around, in either Louisiana or
    Mississippi. Benny Landreneau, The Adjutant General (TAG),
    Major General Landreneau, the TAG from Louisiana, and Major
    General Cross, the TAG from Mississippi, and I, we were in
    communication, I never issued an edict to them. They asked for
    help, and we tried to provide it to the best we could.
        We ended up with some 55,000 guardsmen principally in
    Louisiana under the Emergency Management Assistance Compact
    where governors provided help by the National Guard, and we
    ended up with about 25,000 Active-Duty Forces. Some of those
    were afloat in the Gulf.
        I spend a lot of time with Doug Burnett, your TAG. He has
    come to our headquarters 2 years running for our annual
    Hurricane TAG Conference. We are well aware of Florida's
    experience in dealing with hurricanes. The last thing we would
    do is to presume command control of any State forces, or local
    responders in a crisis.
        So, we couldn't agree more, we understand our role,
    Senator, we will be in support of someone when we're directed,
    and that is how we train, and that is how we will employ our
    forces.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Thune.
        Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
    gentlemen, for your great service to our country.
        I want to follow up on one of Senator Nelson's questions
    with General Smith. I heard some of the same complaints from my
    constituents, the National Guard units were going to Iraq
    unprepared, and I guess I'd like to get you to comment on
    whether that was a problem, was it a leadership problem, was it
    a funding problem, was it indicative of another large peace-
    time military drawdown that had left our military unprepared to
    deploy, as has happened in previous conflicts, and as a follow-
    up question to that, what are your thoughts on congressional
    efforts to raise the top line of the Defense budget, so that we
    don't have those same sorts of problems in the future?
        General Smith. Senator, thank you.
        First of all, with regard to the specific shortcomings or
    instances, it's hard to address the lack of readiness of a
    National Guard or a Reserve unit that goes over there. I was on
    the receiving end of those forces at the time that I think
    you're talking about, but I'm not sure as I was the Deputy
    Commander of CENTCOM.
        Of course, one of the issues, if you're talking armored
    Humvee and the like, is that we didn't anticipate the
    requirement. We were used to thinking about war with the enemy
    in front of you, not behind you. So, for a variety of reasons,
    the industrial base, power requirements, all of those were not
    established sufficiently to make sure that everybody had
    armored Humvees.
        As far as the armor piece, that continues to change. Today,
    the requirement for armor is considerably different than it was
    3 years ago. Today, you have the armor that goes down the arms
    and the legs, and much more protection, and that becomes the
    norm. That, by the way, is not inexpensive, and so the pipeline
    to get that stuff in theater continues on a regular basis, and
    those that need it, get it.
        Certainly the top line investment to re-equip the forces,
    and make sure that we have sufficient equipment for those kinds
    of contingencies is important. As we go into the surge, if you
    will, we were taking out some of the equipment out of our
    normal Reserve capability, that we would otherwise have to give
    to Active-Duty National Guard and Reserve Forces that go over,
    so there will--if we had to do something else, there would, no
    doubt, be some instances where people would not have the
    absolute best equipment, or the equipment that we'd like them
    to have, and so we would adjust our tactics for that.
        Uparmored Humvees is another good example. We would simply
    say, ``You can't leave the compound,'' or ``You can't go across
    the berm or whatever, unless you have the proper equipment.''
    Those inside the fence, or otherwise, might have lesser capable
    equipment than those that are outside and patrolling the
    forces.
        The top line raise could help that, and make sure that our
    pre-position stocks are sufficient for the missions that we'd
    be asked to perform.
        Senator Thune. Thanks.
        Admiral Keating, with responsibility for protecting the
    United States from missile attacks, you are the primary user of
    the Missile Defense System (MDS), and over the last several
    years, Congress has provided resources to develop and deploy a
    system capable of destroying ballistic missiles from our
    enemies before they reach our cities.
        However, for Congress to continue to invest resources in
    this national priority, we have to know that you, as the
    warfighter, have confidence in the system. Do you have
    confidence in our MDS today? If so, how did the successful
    intercept test last September impact your views?
        Admiral Keating. I do have confidence in the system,
    Senator. We were prepared to deploy that system. The Secretary
    of Defense brought that system out of research and development
    and put it in the limited defensive operational status, as you
    recall, on July 4 and 5. In the weeks leading up to July 4 and
    5 this past year, as we were watching the North Koreans as they
    executed what we suspected they would, they launched a volley
    of missiles, one of them appeared to be an intercontinental
    ballistic missile.
        The integrated intelligence systems detected that launch
    and transmitted that information to our headquarters, I was in
    communication with the Secretary of Defense. We were prepared
    to respond with ground-based interceptors, had we been so
    directed by the Secretary. He had to give us the authorization,
    but the missile didn't get very far.
        So we were prepared to use it that day--prior to the
    successful test on September 1. That test, again, not an end-
    to-end test, further reinforced my confidence in the system. I
    appear before you today as confident as I know how to be in the
    employability and the efficacy of that system.
        Senator Thune. Thank you. In 2007, the National Defense
    Authorization Act called for an organizational structure for
    effective management, coordination, and budgeting for the
    development and procurement of unmanned systems, including an
    assessment of the feasibility and advisability of designating a
    single department or other element of the DOD to act as
    executive agent of the Department on unmanned systems.
        So, Admiral Keating, I would direct this to you, as well.
    Do you think that establishing a single department to act as an
    executive agent for UAVs would enhance coordination, promote
    unity of effort, and reduce the uncertainty in the overlap of
    responsibilities in the event of a natural or manmade disaster?
        Admiral Keating. I do, sir.
        Senator Thune. On March 5, 2007, Air Force Chief of Staff,
    General Moseley, sent a memo to each of the Services, as well,
    asking the commanders of the combatant commands which
    recommends that the Air Force be the executive agency for
    medium and high-altitude UAVs, and I guess my question has to
    do with, since it is the existing role of the Air Force to
    conduct joint interdependent warfare from the air and through
    space and cyberspace, and they already have a proven record for
    providing vital air space and cyberspace capabilities for the
    Services, is the Air Force the best choice to be executive
    agent for fielding and integrating and operating UAVs?
        Admiral Keating. I think it is, sir.
        Senator Thune. Thank you.
        One question for Admiral Stavridis, after September 11,
    Congress passed House Resolution 4775, which was designed to
    fund operations in Colombia, the target being the narco-
    terrorist factions. This expanded authority was further
    codified by National Security Presidential Directive 18 that
    allowed special forces soldiers in Colombia to expand their
    mission from solely counterdrug operations to one that includes
    fighting counternarcoterrorists, and counternarcoterrorism,
    trained for the national police and the Colombian Army.
        Just the question I have is how successful has that program
    in Colombia been, and are there lessons that can be learned
    there, that could be applied to what is a very serious drug
    problem in Afghanistan? Just your thoughts on that.
        Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, sir.
        If I could, just Colombia broadly, I think is moving in the
    right direction. If we look back on Colombia in 1997, 1998,
    1999, it was on the brink of falling into being a true narco-
    terrorist state--kidnappings, murders, bombings, violence
    throughout the country, essentially trending toward an
    ungoverned state.
        Come forward, 5 or 6 years. Because, I would argue, the
    reasonable application of U.S. resources, and a small presence
    of U.S. military, civilians, and contractors; and Senator,
    there's a cap on our military of about 800--we've been well
    below that throughout this whole process, and then we only have
    about 500 Active-Duty military in Colombia--but partnering in
    the system the Colombians have shown great progress.
        For example, in Colombia today, in all 1,098
    municipalities, there's a strong police presence. Kidnappings
    are down 76 percent, murder rates are down 50 percent. The
    economy is doing well, unemployment is down. President Uribe
    enjoys popular approval ratings well over 75 percent. One of
    the three major opposition groups, the Self-Defense Forces of
    Colombia (AUC), has been completely demobilizing, taking 15,000
    fighters out of the field. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of
    Colombia (FARC)--by all intelligence estimates--have decreased
    about 30 percent, from 18,000 to 12,000.
        Now, are there continuing challenges in Colombia? You bet
    there are. Are drugs still a big problem? Yes, sir, they are.
    But are they making progress? I would say by any reasonable
    metrics standard, they are. I believe that we need to continue
    to provide that relatively modest level of resources over the
    next 2 to 3 years, and I think we will see Colombia move from a
    state which could have failed badly 5 or 6 years ago, to being
    one of our strongest and potentially most stable allies in the
    region. I think that's an important thing to understand.
        Again, there are going to be continuing problems and
    challenges, but I think the trends are up--Colombia is a
    country on the move.
        Senator Thune. Second part of that question--any parallels
    there with what's happening in Afghanistan? Any lessons that
    can be learned or applied?
        Admiral Stavridis. Two very different countries, but I
    think the fundamental answer is yes. Today there are a handful
    of Afghani police who are--just a handful, I believe less than
    10, but it's a start--who are in Colombia working with the
    Colombians to try and take some of these lessons back, and a
    lot of these lessons are classic counterinsurgency kinds of
    things. The fight against narcotics--both in Colombia and
    elsewhere around the world, is intertwined with the practice of
    sound counterinsurgency tactics, techniques, and procedures. I
    believe there is a good opportunity for cooperation and it is
    nascent, but it is starting now.
        Senator Thune. Thank you all, very much.
        Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Thune.
        Senator Pryor.
        Senator Pryor. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        I would like to ask some questions on NORTHCOM, if I may.
    My first question on NORTHCOM is how is the relationship with
    the DHS?
        Admiral Keating. It's good.
        Senator Pryor. Is it integrated?
        Admiral Keating. Not as well as it should be, Senator,
    getting better. Things I might illustrate that would merit that
    evaluation--we now have a full-time, senior executive service
    level representative from DHS in our headquarters. We have two
    military officers who go to work every day at the DHS. We have
    10 Active-Duty colonels who are permanently assigned to FEMA
    regions, so they're working closely with the DHS throughout the
    country, in each of the 10 FEMA regions.
        We have aligned our exercise programs--under the national
    exercise program, DOD, DHS are conducting exercises--the same
    exercise, then enabling them therefore to be simultaneous with
    the same scenarios presented in the course of that exercise,
    two of those simulated exercises a year.
        So, I would say that there is work to be done, principally
    in the area of plans--we in the military have a culture of, we
    kind of know how to do plans, we go to school to learn how to
    do it, and for hundreds of years, we've been developing plans.
    DHS, relatively new, they have asked for our help, we're
    providing them help in building a family of plans to replicate
    the plans that are on our shelf in NORTHCOM and DHS. There's
    work to be done, but we're a lot better off than we were a
    couple of years ago.
        Senator Pryor. The chairman and I are also members of the
    HSGAC here in the Senate, and I'm the chair of a newly-created
    subcommittee called the State, Local, and Private Sector
    Preparedness and Integration Subcommittee. That is a lot of
    lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, but a lot of other
    things, too--September 11 and a lot of other things, so I think
    that we need to do a better job, generally, and Congress needs
    to do a better job of oversight, at making sure that we are
    integrated, and that we are talking to each other.
        One question I would have for NORTHCOM, and it may be a
    non-traditional question, but in this world--I'm curious about
    your relationships with the Governors of the States. The reason
    I ask about them, is surely the number of times that the
    National Guard has been called up, so to speak, 99 percent of
    the time, it's been by the Governors, commanders in chief, to
    handle some local situations.
        Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.
        Senator Pryor. But tell me how your relationship is with
    the Governors, and how you're building that.
        Admiral Keating. I have gone with the Secretary of Defense
    to the National Governor's Conference here in Washington, DC.
    We have concentrated our efforts, primarily, Senator, through
    TAGs of the States to keep it on a military basis. General
    Renuart, when he assumes command tomorrow of NORTHCOM has, on
    his agenda, to appear before the National Lieutenant Governor's
    Conference. We have worked and collaborated extensively with
    the States, the head of the States' militia, and the National
    Guard, there is work to be done with the Governors themselves,
    and we're attempting to make those inroads through the
    Lieutenant Governors.
        Senator Pryor. With regard to this general emphasis that
    has been talked about in Congress and over at DHS with
    interoperable communications, are you all participating with
    DHS and with local law enforcement about trying to build an
    interoperable communications system?
        Admiral Keating. Extensively, yes, sir.
        Senator Pryor. How do you think that's going?
        Admiral Keating. Significant progress, particularly in the
    last 18 months, Senator. We came to you and asked for a little
    bit of extra money. Each of these systems costs about $2
    million. The system is an organic cell phone farm, we have
    three of them ourselves. DHS and FEMA have a half a dozen and
    the National Guard has 12 to 18, and they're procuring more.
    These can be rolled out in the event of a disaster when the
    infrastructure is wiped slick. We put them in, turn on the
    power, and distribute cell phones and satellite phones. Those
    systems did not exist pre-Hurricane Katrina, they now do.
        We also convened our second annual Defense Interoperability
    Communications Exercise down at Fort Monroe, VA, where all
    manner of agencies--from Sheriff Department to Fire Department,
    Red Cross, commercial, we have Wal-Mart and Coors Brewing
    Company come as well as National Guard, Active-Duty, and
    Reserve Forces. They literally set up their communications gear
    in a great big football field, go inside and figure out how
    they can talk to each other, using satellites and other methods
    of communication. So, lots of progress is being made. There is
    work to be done, to be sure, because there is not a single
    standard, and likely will never be, a single standard for all
    manner of communication within the common United States. But we
    are taking down some barriers, and we're getting good
    cooperation from industry in so doing.
        Senator Pryor. Great, thank you. I have a question for
    SOUTHCOM, and that, I think, Senator Thune a few moments ago
    asked about activities in Colombia, and you gave us an update
    on that, but I don't think he asked, unless I missed it, about
    hostages? Three American hostages being held by the FARC--
    what's the status of that?
        Admiral Stavridis. Senator, thank you for asking that
    question.
        We have three U.S. hostages who are held today by the FARC,
    the lead insurgent group, narcoterrorist group. They are Tom
    Howes, Marc Gonsalves, and Keith Stansell, and they have been
    held hostage for over 4 years. It's an extremely challenging
    environment to try and effect their safe recovery, for a
    variety of reasons. One is the tactics, techniques, and
    procedures of the FARC, who are very good, they move the
    hostages frequently. They are in triple-canopy jungle, it's a
    very difficult operating environment.
        They are part of a larger group of Colombian hostages being
    held. We're working diligently with the Colombian military, the
    Colombian police, our own interagency partners by the U.S.
    Embassy, and we think about them every day. They are literally
    my top priority at U.S. SOUTHCOM.
        To have a fuller discussion of the current status of the
    efforts, or the opportunities to pursue that, we'd need to go
    into a closed session or I can submit that on a classified
    basis for the record, sir.
        Senator Pryor. We don't need to do that right now, but tell
    me, are you confident that they're still alive?
        Admiral Stavridis. The last proof of life was a video that
    was made almost 4 years ago. However, we remain confident they
    are still alive. Beyond that, I would not want to say without
    going into a closed session.
        Senator Pryor. Okay, I understand. Thank you.
        I have one last question for JFCOM and that is, the Joint
    Fires Integration and Interoperability Team (JFIIT), I'm just
    curious about the status of that, and how that's going, and
    where it's heading.
        General Smith. Senator, they're doing great things. They
    recently have been working with the Marine Corps to develop
    better procedures and capacities in the close air support role
    with the AV8 Harrier to give it digital communications and the
    like. We have recently used the JFIIT to go out and certify the
    Australian joint ground Forward Air Controllers (FACs) in
    Australia, and they're working with a Canadian joint ground
    FACs school to certify them as well. Much of this is a result
    of some of the fratricide incidents that have occurred
    elsewhere. But they are actively engaged in trying to make sure
    that the systems that we bring to the battlefield are able to
    talk to one another, that we can move information rapidly, and
    that the tactics, techniques, and procedures are standardized.
        Senator Pryor. Just one follow-up on that, if I may, Mr.
    Chairman, is what you've learned there and what you're doing
    there, does that transfer to interoperability with regard to
    DHS here in this country, and homeland security?
        General Smith. At JFCOM, I don't know that there is really
    a relationship between JFIIT and----
        Senator Pryor. I understand that there are things that
    you're doing there that would benefit homeland security and
    local law enforcement to know about.
        General Smith. Probably less in the JFIIT realm than in our
    lessons learned area in the exercise and experimentation we do
    with NORTHCOM.
        Senator Pryor. Okay.
        General Smith. There's an active relationship between my
    staff, both on the integration and experimentation and exercise
    business and Admiral Keating's staff.
        Senator Pryor. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Pryor.
        Senator Martinez.
        Senator Martinez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Good morning to all of you and welcome to the committee.
        Admiral Stavridis, I wanted to, first of all, tell you how
    happy we are to have you at SOUTHCOM in Florida, and we're
    proud of your service there, and appreciate all that you're
    doing, and I wanted to begin my questions by following up on
    the issue of Colombia. I took a break a moment ago and met
    outside with Foreign Minister Fernando Araujo who is here
    visiting, and I think leading to my question, I want to just
    touch on his life, a very courageous gentleman who spent 6
    years kidnapped by the FARC. He was able to escape during a
    rescue attempt in the midst of battle, and has been now named
    the Foreign Minister of Colombia.
        He's here, of course, promoting the Free Trade Agreement,
    which the President and I spoke about yesterday, I know you
    would agree is a very important component of what we're trying
    to do in the region to approve the Free Trade Agreement.
        Foreign Minister Araujo was telling me that kidnappings
    have been reduced by 90 percent in a country where no one who
    holds public office has not been touched by violence, whether a
    kidnapping or a murder to a public official or a family member.
    The Vice-President of Colombia has been a victim of kidnapping,
    President Uribe's father was killed in the course of a
    kidnapping. But it has been reduced, and so I think what we're
    doing in Plan Colombia is working.
        In addition to that, he also told me the flip side of that,
    which is economic growth, is now at 7 percent. Which is very
    encouraging and good news, and would be helped by the approval
    of a free trade agreement with Colombia--nothing more
    important, I think, for the region, including also Panama and
    Peru.
        I guess I would ask you an obvious question, which is,
    would you agree that these free trade agreements would be
    important for the region and the opportunity for economic
    growth, jobs, and those kinds of things, which help security
    issues, as well?
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir. Clearly, my lane, if you will,
    is how does it impact the security of the region? I will tell
    you that, within the region, if you look at the results of free
    trade agreements, and I would point to the Central American
    Free Trade Agreement, there is an underlying security
    improvement in countries where the economies improve. So, from
    a national security perspective, the free trade agreements in,
    both proposed free trade agreements in both Peru and Colombia
    are important in terms of overall security.
        Senator Martinez. Admiral, we've made a great investment in
    Colombia, our forces have been there, assisting training,
    providing support, intelligence, can you tell us an assessment
    of where the Colombian armed forces are today, and how well
    they're taking the fight to the insurgents, and what the status
    of that is?
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir. The Colombian armed forces
    have increased in size and capacity over the last 5 years,
    that's been due not only to their own efforts, obviously, but
    also to the assistance provided by the United States. Their
    training is improving constantly. I want to particularly
    underline that they work very hard on human rights, they put in
    place a serious vetting process, they are very receptive of the
    kinds of human rights training that we are able to provide to
    them, and I think, even as recently as the last year, you're
    starting to see significant military successes that you had not
    seen in the previous 5 years, including successful attacks on
    relatively high-value targets, relatively senior members of the
    FARC, second the demobilization of the AUC, one of the three
    insurgent groups distinct from the FARC, but that
    demobilization is a result of military pressure, as well as a
    negotiated settlement with the government.
        The FARC's decrease in size and capabilities is directly
    reflective of the increased military pressure that the
    Colombian military has placed on them. They are making strong
    progress, and I'm pleased from my perspective as I look at it,
    to see that.
        Senator Martinez. Also, of course, they've made progress,
    the government has, in deactivating a lot of the
    paramilitaries, more than 30,000 have now been deactivated, so
    that's also a good sign.
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir, that's the AUC group I was
    talking about.
        Senator Martinez. That's what you meant.
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
        Senator Martinez. I'm sorry.
        Venezuela is a concern, and their connection with Cuba, the
    two of them working in partnership, but one of the real
    concerns to me is the military buildup, the billions of
    dollars, instead of going to Venezuelan's poor, are now going
    to go to creating an armed environment in Venezuela. I wondered
    if you had any comment on that, and what your assessment of
    that situation might be?
        Admiral Stavridis. Whenever I speak of Venezuela, sir, I
    always like to start by reflecting that historically, the
    United States and Venezuela have enjoyed a very positive
    relationship. At the moment, with the current government in
    Venezuela, we see far less cooperation in areas of my
    responsibility--virtually no military-to-military cooperation,
    we see limited cooperation, if at all, in the narcotic front.
        As you said, I'm particularly concerned by the increasing
    purchases of arms by the current government. To simply list a
    few, 24 SU-30 fighters, a very advanced Russian fighter, 50
    advanced attack and transport helicopters, and in some ways,
    perhaps, most troubling, the purchase of 100,000 AK-103 rifles,
    this is the follow-on to the famous AK-47. With that 100,000
    comes the purchase of a factory, and the capacity to build even
    more.
        We worry, appropriately, in the United States about the
    proliferation of WMD. One hundred thousand AK-103s in
    Venezuela, I worry about the proliferation of weapons of micro
    destruction. That many rifles, they're going to be moving
    through that region, perhaps falling into the hands of fighters
    across the border, in Colombia, it's a very great concern.
        There's also discussion by that government of perhaps
    purchasing diesel submarines. It is hard to understand what is
    the perceived threat in this hemisphere. It's just difficult to
    understand why the government of Venezuela would feel the need
    to purchase that level of arms, and I'm concerned about the
    destabilizing effect throughout the region of that.
        Senator Martinez. It certainly goes well beyond what
    defense needs Venezuela could possibly have.
        Admiral Stavridis. As I perceive them, that is correct.
        Senator Martinez. The issues of the physical site in Miami,
    I understand Senator Nelson covered, and I hope you know that
    if there's anything I can do to be of assistance, I'd be very
    happy to do that.
        Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Martinez. We're so delighted that you're in our
    neighborhood, and particularly you personally, and we want to
    make sure that anything we can do to be of help in that
    situation that you would contact us, so I won't go back over
    those issues, since Senator Nelson covered them.
        But thank you very much, and thank you, gentlemen.
        Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
        Can we have a clarification of one aspect of the question
    by our colleague from Florida?
        The new factory is to build the old 47? Or the newer
    version?
        Admiral Stavridis. Newer version, sir, that is my
    understanding.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
        Admiral, you were asked a question, I believe, about the
    Panama Canal.
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Your indication is that it's being very
    well run?
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. That the involvement of other countries, I
    believe, has not been an impediment to that?
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. I want to ask you, specifically, since the
    issue was raised a number of years ago about a Chinese
    commercial presence, as to whether or not you view that as a
    problem.
        Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I do not, it's Hutchinson Whampoa
    Company, they're a globalized holding company, there is some
    Chinese ownership in that company, but we've watched that
    situation closely over the last few years, and we do not see
    any threat to the operations or security of the Canal as a
    result of that.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Admiral, I think in reference to the missile test you said
    that the test was not an end-to-end test, as you put it. What
    does that mean? What pieces were missing from end-to-end test?
        Admiral Keating. We were aware that there would be a target
    vehicle launch and we had a very good idea as to the azimuth of
    that launch through the flight profile of the launch, Senator.
    To a degree--not to belittle the technological success--it was
    an open-book test. We knew it was coming, and we knew about
    where it was going.
        For my role in defending the Homeland, we would, of course,
    like to have that kind of information in advance. We're not
    likely to get it. So, in my view, an end-to-end test would be a
    launch that is not announced, from a location that is
    unspecified, on an azimuth that is not pre-determined, and we
    would have to employ all aspects of our system--intelligence,
    C2, and the hardware, to intercept the inbound target.
        Chairman Levin. Do you know when such a test is scheduled?
        Admiral Keating. I don't, I'll find out for you, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [Deleted.]

        Chairman Levin. It may be classified, if it is just let us
    have the information in a classified session.
        Last May, the President announced--and Admiral Keating,
    this is for you, also--6,000 National Guard troops were going
    to be deployed temporarily to the Southern Border to help the
    DHS's border patrol mission, and then apparently the DOD's
    recently been asked to consider the option of extending that
    mission beyond the 2 years originally announced.
        Would you agree that border patrol is a mission that
    belongs to civilian agencies, and that it should be handled by
    civilian agencies?
        Admiral Keating. From my position as Commander of NORTHCOM,
    I would agree with that statement, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Do you know what the cost is, off hand, to
    the DOD?
        Admiral Keating. I do not, sir, I'll find out.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Border patrol missions are performed by National Guard forces in
    State (title 32) status, and have been funded by the Department of
    Defense through supplemental appropriations. The mission is estimated
    to cost approximately $1.2 billion for fiscal years 2006-2008.

        Admiral Keating. As I'm sure you're aware, those folks are
    not under the control of NORTHCOM, they were obtained under
    State authorities.
        Chairman Levin. There is a cost, however, to the Defense
    Department.
        Admiral Keating. Okay.
        Chairman Levin. Sometimes there's confusion between the
    term ``Homeland Defense'' and ``Homeland Security''. Do you
    want to give us your take on the difference?
        Admiral Keating. I'll do my best. It's a fine line, but
    there is a distinction. We, in the DOD--whatever capacity we
    are, Active-Duty, Reserve, National Guard--will probably take a
    more kinetic role, and we will try and do it as our National
    Security Strategy says, ``In as timely a manner as possible, as
    far from our shores as possible.'' That would be defending our
    Homeland, the physical act of preventing attacks, deterring
    those attacks, and that someone would try to mount an attack,
    defeating the attack.
        ``Homeland Security'' is a broader application of a concept
    that would deal with our success in defending the Homeland,
    through limited success, and it would also include actual
    disasters. So, it is a broader term, in my view, ``Homeland
    Security,'' than the relatively narrow application of military
    power, and that being ``Homeland Defense.''
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Admiral Stavridis, can we expect any additional military
    construction on Guantanamo for the detainee facilities,
    including tribunals for detainees?
        Admiral Stavridis. I think there will be some very minimal
    level of construction done, Senator. May I say also, there is
    some construction scheduled now, but that's for migrant
    operations, to be very minimal, prudent capability in case
    there is, for example, a mass migration of some kind.
        I have no immediate tasking about a military construction
    project, that's a policy decision that will be made at the DOD,
    but the indications I get are that it will be very minimal,
    indeed.
        Chairman Levin. Have all the 14 detainees that were
    recently transferred to Guantanamo received their enemy
    combatant status review tribunals, do you know? I should know
    the answer, I was just there.
        Admiral Stavridis. We were just there, and also was the
    first one asked today.
        Yes, sir, I think they're not quite complete yet, but I
    need to submit that for the record.
        Chairman Levin. All right.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        As of April 13, 2007, Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs)
    have been completed for 12 of the 14 detainees transferred to
    Guantanamo in September 2006. The CSRTs for the remaining two detainees
    have not been completed pending resolution of witness availability and
    other related evidentiary issues. I would defer any specific questions
    concerning the CSRTs to the Office for the Administrative Review of the
    Detention of Enemy Combatants, which manages the CSRT, and
    administrative review board processes.

        Chairman Levin. Then, did you know if the plan is to
    release all of the transcripts? Do you know what that plan is?
    I know this is not your----
        Admiral Stavridis. No, sir, that would be an Office of the
    Secretary of Defense decision, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Then, finally, General Smith, I want to ask
    you about the authority which Congress has granted the JFCOM
    for research on and procurement of equipment for C-2 activities
    to enhance the interoperability of joint forces, and otherwise
    facilitate the use of joint forces. We have extended that
    authority through your fiscal year 2008, recently. There's a
    departmental proposal to make that authority permanent and to
    expand it to include the sustainment of the command's products
    on the battlefield until a Service can take over the program.
        The Government Accountability Office has indicated concerns
    that other parts of the DOD can handle those tasks more
    efficiently. Can you comment on both the need for an
    acquisition authority, whether or not you could work through
    existing DOD and Service acquisition efforts to manage the
    joint programs that you seek to establish, how big of an
    acquisition workforce would have to be established in order to
    operate a robust acquisition program at JFCOM, and if you can
    remember all of these questions--I probably ought to throw them
    at you one at a time, at least when you get to be my age, I
    appreciate that--and I'll be happy to repeat them. What
    resources would you require in order to make full use of the
    authority that Congress has given you?
        General Smith. Mr. Chairman, we have $10 million authority
    in research and development and experimentation. Then $50
    million worth of procurement authority, neither of which comes
    with money.
        As you mentioned, that authority is out there until 2008, I
    would like it made permanent. We'd make good use of the
    program, perhaps not as good use as we could have, but we are
    working to re-energize the innovation part of it.
        But there's some great successes out there that we continue
    to work, our Joint Precision Airdrop System, for example, the
    ability to take a 2,000-pound pallet and drop it through the
    weather with reasonable precision--football field-length
    precision to somebody that's in the mountains of Afghanistan,
    for instance.
        One of the things about a limited acquisition authority, to
    get 10 of those systems to Special Operations Command (SOCOM),
    and then ultimately 50 to CENTCOM.
        We are currently working on a 10,000-pound model and a
    20,000-pound model.
        The sustainment case is that I can go out and get those,
    CENTCOM will go out and pay for those 50. The issue for us, and
    the sustainment piece is, it will become a program of record,
    probably, in the United States Air Force. But that's going to
    take a couple of years, and what, through having the limited
    acquisition authority, we are able to continue the work on that
    and continue to improve the process before we turn it over to
    the Service.
        Another excellent example is the use of limited acquisition
    authority to tie the 7 Blue Force Trackers, the friendly force
    trackers, that showed up in Iraq, that couldn't talk to each
    other, so therefore didn't have, didn't share a common
    operating picture. So, the Army in one sector may not know
    exactly what the Marines are doing right next to them. We were
    able to use limited acquisition authority to take that
    information, bounce the information from each of the different
    systems through a U.S. Strategic Command facility in Colorado
    Springs, and back within 2 seconds to the common operating
    picture inside a Stryker, or in a command post or whatever, so
    they all share the same common operating picture.
        We are now working to include the Iraqi military. The
    ability to be able to track, find out, and maintain where they
    are. That, also, will ultimately become a program of record for
    somebody. But that requires sustainment.
        I don't mind going out and asking the Services for money or
    combatant command money, though I've never asked at this stage
    for money in the research, development, test, and evaluation or
    the procurement. I'm satisfied with just the authority. So, the
    only request I would have for money is some small amount of
    money to be able to work that bridging time period, while we're
    trying to get these systems into the program of record.
        We could use other systems like the Rapid Acquisition
    Program, or so. Certainly there are other avenues that we could
    do this within the acquisition business. Would it be as
    flexible, as agile, or give me the ability to respond rapidly
    to a combatant commander's need? Probably not as rapidly, and
    it would take away some of my flexibility to be able to supply
    the combatant commander with what he would like. The amount of
    money we're talking about, in my view, is not such that we
    really need to go into that massive acquisition piece.
        I have never asked for complete acquisition authority down
    there at JFCOM, although we've considered it, along the lines
    of SOCOM. I don't know exactly what the numbers are, but
    they're pretty significant in the acquisition authority, and
    I'm satisfied to use the existing service acquisition people
    and contractors.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Warner, let me ask you--I should have asked you
    this privately--I'm going to have to leave now, would you be
    able to close up?
        Senator Warner. Yes, to make a quick reference, we have
    four votes in a few minutes.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you. We do, and I thank you for that,
    and let me thank our witnesses before I run along.
        Senator Warner. We have had a very good hearing.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you for your testimony, and we really
    appreciate your presence, your testimony, and indeed it has
    been a really good hearing. Thank you.
        Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Warner. General Smith, I keep coming back to the
    concern I have about the certification process. Your
    responsibility is to draw on the Army, the Navy, and the Air
    Force for components to put together in one unit to meet the
    requirement of a commander in chief in various areas of the
    globe.
        If that one link does not measure up in readiness, it could
    imperil the components of the other two who presumably are up
    to complete readiness. So, it seems to me that perhaps we
    should revisit whether or not you should get more deeply
    involved into the certification process, because in a sense,
    your stamp of approval on that and moving the package of the
    three component Joint Services forward, could have a flaw in it
    that would impinge on the ability of the other two.
        General Smith. Senator Warner, it really depends on the
    construct we're talking about. I am absolutely satisfied that a
    BCT that's an Army BCT is, never leaves the Forces Command
    arena without being certified within their own organization. I
    mean, maybe not with a piece of paper, but that the Brigade
    Commander----
        Senator Warner. All right.
        General Smith. Senator, there is another piece out there
    that we are responsible for. They do that with a title 10
    train, organize, and equip role. They're given to me.
        Now, it's different with the Joint Task Force headquarters.
    In that case, we do indeed train the individuals in the joint
    environment, we are responsible for helping to equip, in that
    case, for instance of both Admiral Keating and Admiral
    Stavridis with deployable joint command and control systems.
    Then we train through mission rehearsal exercises and the like,
    and other exercises, the Joint Staff and ultimately, in one way
    or another, certify that staff.
        Now, in the case of people going into Baghdad, for
    instance, General Odierno went in to take over Multi-National
    Forces for Iraq--we had a whole series of training programs
    that culminated in a mission rehearsal exercise that tied his
    entire staff together, and he, as the Corps commander, is the
    one that certified the readiness and the capability of his
    joint task force headquarters to go over there, and I validated
    that with him.
        Senator Warner. Right. All right. I'll leave that.
        Admiral Keating, could you put into the record in reply to
    this question, an update on the Cheyenne Mountain situation?
    What your intentions are there?
        Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        We are consolidating day-to-day operations within the North
    American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command
    (USNORTHCOM) Command Center on Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. The
    transfer of functions from Cheyenne Mountain to the NORAD and
    USNORTHCOM Command Center will result in greater operational efficiency
    and effectiveness through enhanced unity of effort. Plans, policies,
    and procedures are being developed to ensure a smooth and efficient
    transition of functions. Modifications to the NORAD and USNORTHCOM
    Command Center will begin early this summer with completion by the end
    of December 2007. Full operational capability is planned for May 2008.
        We will maintain Cheyenne Mountain as an Alternate Command Center.
    In addition, Cheyenne Mountain will serve as a fully functional
    training facility to allow crew members to qualify in a shorter period
    of time and at a much higher standard than is currently possible.

        Senator Warner. Admiral Stavridis, would you also place
    into the record your current assessment of the International
    Military Education and Training (IMET) program? It has been a
    very successful one throughout history. Congress took certain
    steps to put limitations because of legitimate concerns, what
    is the status of that? What initiatives could Congress take to
    help improve it? I think IMET is one of the most successful
    programs this government has ever devised to strengthen our
    relations between countries all over the world.
        Admiral Stavridis. Senator, I will put it in the record,
    and I want to say thank you to this committee and to the entire
    Congress for correcting what was not the right situation with
    IMET. It's a huge success, it's taken off again in my part of
    the world and around, and I will put it in the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        I agree that the International Military Education and Training
    (IMET) program is one of the most successful and important programs
    available to U.S. Southern Command. IMET gives us the opportunity to
    bring partner nations' military personnel into our schools, provide
    relevant training, build friendships, and expose them to strong
    democratic institutions and civilian leadership of the military.
    Eliminating American Servicemembers Protection Act sanctions on IMET
    allowed us to renew positive, partnership-strengthening activities with
    military personnel from previously sanctioned countries.
        Continuing congressional support to level fund the IMET program in
    fiscal year 2008 and beyond will send a strong message to our partner
    nations that we remain committed to assisting in establishing and
    maintaining professional security forces. Continued support to one of
    our premier training institutions, the Western Hemisphere Institute for
    Security Cooperation, also will benefit us by allowing greater access
    for Latin American Armed Forces personnel to professional courses
    conducted in Spanish.

        Senator Warner. You're satisfied now?
        Admiral Stavridis. I'm satisfied now with what Congress has
    provided in IMET, yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. All right.
        Lastly, Admiral, the Detainee Treatment Act. In response to
    my questions of how you and your staff at SOUTHCOM conduct
    oversight of the interrogation operations at Guantanamo, it's
    something that's of great interest to Congress.
        Admiral Stavridis. I'll be glad to, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Prior to my assumption of command of U.S. Southern Command, the
    provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 had already been
    implemented at Joint Task Force-Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO). Specifically, I
    have been advised that, on 1 January 2006, General John Craddock
    (former Commander, U.S. Southern Command) directed compliance with the
    Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and that Major General Jay Hood (former
    Commander, JTF-GTMO) confirmed, on 2 January 2006, that JTF-GTMO was in
    compliance with the Detainee Treatment Act.
        Additionally, on 22 January 2007, I issued specific instructions to
    JTF-GTMO concerning the implementation of DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
    Department of Defense Detainee Program, and Field Manual (FM) 2-22.3,
    Human Intelligence Collector Operations. This guidance repeated the
    provision of the Detainee Treatment Act that mandates the only
    interrogation approaches and techniques authorized for use at JTF-GTMO
    are those authorized by and listed in FM 2-22.3. Rear Admiral Harry
    Harris (current Commander, JTF-GTMO) confirmed, on 27 January 2007,
    that JTF-GTMO remains in compliance with U.S. law, including the
    Detainee Treatment Act. Rear Admiral Harris issued a policy memorandum
    to remind all personnel assigned to JTF-GTMO that they must be
    knowledgeable of and at all times in compliance with U.S. law and
    applicable DOD policies.
        In exercising oversight of detention and interrogation operations,
    I have, since assuming command 6 months ago in October 2006, personally
    visited Guantanamo three times. During those visits, I have been
    briefed extensively by JTF-GTMO personnel on both detention and
    intelligence matters. Additionally, I exercise oversight and maintain
    awareness of camp operations through the receipt of daily situation
    reports from JTF-GTMO, weekly communications with the Rear Admiral
    Harris, and through a multi-disciplined U.S. Southern Command Detainee
    Coordination Team, which interacts daily with JTF-GTMO.

        Senator Warner. I join Senator Levin, we've had an
    excellent hearing. We wish you well, gentlemen, thank you very
    much.
        Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Warner. We are adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
                                nuclear warheads
        1. Senator Akaka. Admiral Keating, the administration recently
    selected a design for a new generation of nuclear warheads, which if
    built, would be the first new U.S. nuclear weapon since the end of the
    Cold War. I understand that the new warhead design is intended to
    replace those in our existing arsenal. However, some have criticized
    the United States as sending the wrong signal to the world at a time
    when we are striving to deter nuclear weapon development in North Korea
    and Iran. In your opinion, what is the current health of our North
    American nuclear arsenal?
        Admiral Keating. I defer to the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command
    (STRATCOM) regarding the health of our Nation's nuclear arsenal. The
    Services have an excellent record of safely storing and maintaining our
    Nation's nuclear weapons. U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) has a
    response plan in place for consequence management in the unlikely event
    of an accident involving nuclear weapons.

        2. Senator Akaka. Admiral Keating, are there issues with our
    arsenal that make it desirable to replace our warheads?
        Admiral Keating. I defer to the Commander, U.S. STRATCOM, regarding
    the need to replace our Nation's nuclear warheads.

        3. Senator Akaka. Admiral Keating, do we really need to build
    replacement warheads?
        Admiral Keating. Without first-hand knowledge of the life cycle
    issues involved, I defer to Commander, U.S. STRATCOM on the need to
    build replacement warheads.

                                homeland defense
        4. Senator Akaka. Admiral Keating, your statement discusses the
    continual improvement cycle that U.S. NORTHCOM and North American
    Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) undergo each year, participating in
    and reviewing the lessons from numerous exercises, such as Ardent
    Sentry and Vigilant Shield, as well as smaller regional, State, and
    local exercises. In addition, you state that you factor in lessons
    learned from real-world events, such as Hurricane Katrina. Corrective
    actions are then initiated, as appropriate, based on the lessons
    learned. Please elaborate on some of the improvements made to your
    response plans since Hurricane Katrina.
        Admiral Keating. Since Hurricane Katrina, U.S. NORTHCOM has taken
    significant actions to improve the effectiveness of our response plans.
    For instance, the Command assigned a full-time Defense Coordinating
    Officer to each Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) region to
    build relationships with our interagency partners. As a result, U.S.
    NORTHCOM is able to obtain situational awareness more quickly to speed
    our response time. U.S. NORTHCOM also operates under a standing execute
    order that enables us to better prepare and more rapidly respond when
    called upon by President or Secretary of Defense. In coordination with
    the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), we have developed 25 pre-
    scripted mission assignments to reduce the staffing time required to
    process military support requests during crises. Furthermore, we have
    engaged with our National Guard and interagency partners to enhance
    unity of effort. U.S. NORTHCOM and the National Guard have worked
    together in table-top exercises and conferences, most recently the
    National Hurricane Conference. U.S. NORTHCOM and the DHS have also
    exchanged a dedicated on-site representative to improve planning and
    exercise efforts.

        5. Senator Akaka. Admiral Keating, has NORTHCOM developed metrics
    by which it can measure its performance in disaster response?
        Admiral Keating. Yes. U.S. NORTHCOM's plans contain metrics that
    measure the command's performance in disaster response. Our plans have
    stated objectives, which reflect the desired end state for each
    operation. Also, each objective has a set of tasks that support the
    objective. These supporting tasks all have measures of performance and
    measures of effectiveness. These metrics give us a structured approach
    to evaluate whether our objectives and end states are accomplished.

                         ground-based midcourse defense
        6. Senator Akaka. Admiral Keating, in your statement, you said that
    the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system achieved ``limited defensive
    operations capability in October 2004.'' You then follow that up by
    stating that it was ``placed in an operational status in June 2006, and
    is available when needed to defend the United States' and its allies'
    infrastructure and population centers.'' It appears from your statement
    that this system was placed into operational service with only a
    limited defensive operations capability. Is that correct?
        If this is correct, what threats is this system capable of
    defending against?
        Admiral Keating. [Deleted.]

        7. Senator Akaka. Admiral Keating, what is the cost to the taxpayer
    of deploying this system with limited capabilities?
        Admiral Keating. U.S. NORTHCOM does not have cost data for the
    Ground-based Midcourse Defense System. This information resides with
    the Missile Defense Agency.

        8. Senator Akaka. Admiral Keating, would it not be better to
    utilize taxpayer dollars on other high priority needs than to deploy a
    limited capability system?
        Admiral Keating. No. In my view, our ability to defend and deter
    attacks against the United States, its population centers and critical
    infrastructure is vital to our security. The Ground-Based Midcourse
    Defense system provides a defense against rogue nations from attempting
    to hold the United States hostage, both militarily and politically.

        9. Senator Akaka. Admiral Keating, what is the status of developing
    the full operational capabilities of the system?
        Admiral Keating. [Deleted.]

                            national guard readiness
        10. Senator Akaka. Admiral Keating, multiple deployments to Iraq
    and Afghanistan have significantly impacted the readiness of our
    National Guard units. In particular, much of their equipment has been
    left in theater. In your conduct of homeland defense exercises and
    disaster planning efforts, have you considered the current readiness
    state of our National Guard units and their lack of adequate equipment?
        Admiral Keating. Yes, we consider the readiness status for all
    Department of Defense (DOD) forces in our plans and exercises. The sum
    total of available DOD and National Guard resources gives me confidence
    in our ability to provide assistance to civil authorities in response
    to an event of national significance as directed by the President or
    Secretary of Defense.

        11. Senator Akaka. Admiral Keating, how are you compensating the
    reduction in National Guard readiness until such time as the resets
    catch up?
        Admiral Keating. We are continuously engaged with our designated
    force providers (U.S. Joint Forces Command, the Services, and Defense
    Agencies) to identify specific capabilities required to accomplish our
    missions. Often, Active Duty and National Guard capabilities are
    complementary and overlapping, particularly with the defense support of
    civil authorities mission. Where we identify gaps in capabilities, we
    work with our force providers to find trained and ready forces to fill
    the requirement.

                             border patrol funding
        12. Senator Akaka. Admiral Keating, you describe in your statement
    the expanded operations that NORTHCOM has been undertaking in support
    of law enforcement to protect our borders. While I applaud the efforts
    of our military to assist our law enforcement agencies in interdiction
    of transnational threats, I believe that we need to keep an eye on the
    impacts of expanded roles for our military to ensure that they do not
    erode readiness. How are we paying for this expansion of military
    mission into the law enforcement arena?
        Admiral Keating. Joint Task Force North (JTF-North) employs
    military capabilities to support law enforcement agencies by employing
    title 10 and title 32 volunteer units. JTF-North supports law
    enforcement agencies with unique military capabilities and the
    volunteer units benefit from training that prepares them for missions
    in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring
    Freedom (OEF). Because of the training opportunities inherent in these
    missions, there is no negative impact to unit readiness.
        To fund these operations, JTF-North operates an annual budget of
    approximately $9 million funded through the DOD counterdrug program.
    For fiscal year 2006 operational missions, no additional funds were
    requested or required to perform missions in support of law enforcement
    agencies.

        13. Senator Akaka. Admiral Keating, were additional resources
    budgeted to allow for this expanded mission?
        Admiral Keating. For fiscal year 2006, no additional funds were
    requested or required for mission in support of law enforcement
    agencies. The expanded mission referenced in the statement refers to
    JTF-North's support to coastal border operations along the Texas and
    Florida coastal areas. These missions were performed at the request,
    and in support of the lead law enforcement agency (U.S. Border Patrol)
    with no additional funding or resources required.

                        theater effects based operations
        14. Senator Akaka. General Smith, I understand that Theater Effects
    Based Operations (TEBO) is the wave of the future for joint military
    operations, and that Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) will roll out a set
    of tools for combatant commanders to use by 2009. It strikes me that
    this concept of operations would have been extremely useful to use in
    Iraq prior to our attack, and may have reduced the severity of the
    situation we are currently facing. How well does TEBO integrate with
    other military operational doctrine and tactics, such as the Army's
    counterinsurgency operations doctrine?
        General Smith. We believe that well-planned joint campaigns and
    operations rely upon an effects-based approach to joint operations.
    TEBO is an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) sponsored
    by the U.S. Army in conjunction with JFCOM, U.S. Forces Korea, and
    other partners to enhance the implementation and use of an effects-
    based approach to joint operations. The TEBO ACTD focuses on the
    development of tools, applications, and techniques that facilitate the
    analysis, planning, and assessment of military operations by U.S. joint
    forces.
        Two other tools being evaluated are:
    Conflict Modeling, Planning, and Outcomes Exploration
              Formerly known as Integrated Battle Command Conflict
            Modeling, Planning, and Outcomes Exploration (COMPOEX) is a
            suite of tools being developed in partnership with the Defense
            Advanced Research Projects Agency in a user-in-the-loop
            methodology to provide Joint Force Commanders with the ability
            to develop plans employing all diplomatic, informational,
            military, and economic actions across political, military,
            economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII)
            domains.
    Synthetic Environment for Analysis and Simulation
              The Synthetic Environment for Analysis and Simulation (SEAS)
            tool is an agent-based simulation configured to assess and
            predict culturally- and situationally-accurate PMESII effects
            that are beyond the capabilities of a human subject matter
            expert.

        JFCOM will soon conduct a ``flyoff'' among all known effects-based
    tools (including TEBO, COMPOEX, SEAS, the Global Synchronization Tool,
    experimental North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) tools, and
    others) in mid-2007 to determine the best technical and operational
    aspects of each one and to further determine to what extent they may be
    combined.
        As with other technology enhancements, the fielding of proven TEBO
    capabilities prior to beginning operations in Iraq might have enhanced
    the military's ability to perform these process-related tasks. However,
    the current situation in Iraq has evolved over time based on a
    combination of many military, political, economic, and other factors.
    So it is difficult to determine, even in retrospect, how TEBO
    capabilities might have affected the course of events. Independent of
    the TEBO ACTD, U.S. forces have selectively used related processes and
    techniques in both Afghanistan and Iraq to improve their understanding
    of the complex operational environment and determine effective courses
    of action for different situations. These processes and techniques
    generally met with mixed success, but provided valuable insights for
    follow-on improvements.
        TEBO technologies and techniques can enhance planning,
    intelligence, and assessment, but TEBO capabilities do not replace
    current proven processes or constitute new ways of conducting joint
    military operations. TEBO is part of a more extensive effort that uses
    ``effects'' and a ``systems perspective'' to help commanders and staff
    clarify their objectives, achieve a better understanding of the
    operational environment, promote unity of effort with agency and
    coalition partners, and assess progress toward mission accomplishment.
    These new ideas are now being incorporated in joint doctrine, training,
    and joint professional military education. These ideas are relevant not
    only to planning and conducting large-scale combat, such as initial
    operations in Iraq, but also to planning and assessing other types of
    operations such as counterinsurgency and humanitarian assistance. Since
    these are process improvements and related technology enhancements
    rather than process replacement, these new ideas can be integrated
    readily in existing joint and Service doctrine as appropriate.

        15. Senator Akaka. General Smith, has the JFCOM tested the concept
    in any current real world situations, such as Afghanistan, and if so,
    what are the results?
        General Smith. The TEBO ACTD and its associated tools have been
    used in several exercises/events within the Korean area of operations
    (AOR) (Combined Forces Command-Korea). In addition, in December 2006
    General McNeill, the incoming Commander of NATO's International
    Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF-X), requested U.S. JFCOM
    to provide enhancements for a coalition staff conducting effects-based
    planning and assessment at the operational level. U.S. JFCOM is
    currently conducting a field experiment with ISAF-X staff which will
    provide an ideal opportunity to assess the utility of U.S. JFCOM
    developed capabilities in an operational environment. ISAF will use the
    JFCOM-provided SEAS (see above), which will enable the staff to assess
    potential kinetic and non-kinetic Senate Armed Services Committee
    courses of action against the effects on population attitudes towards
    the coalition, the government, and the insurgency. The tools, and the
    processes they enable, support synchronized interagency planning and
    execution and can help ISAF coordinate application of all elements of
    national and coalition power in Afghanistan.
                                     ______

             Questions Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton
                    homeland security and the national guard
        16. Senator Clinton. Admiral Keating, the National Guard plays a
    critical role in our homeland defense. New York has more Air National
    Guard bases than any other State and is home to the 42d Infantry
    Division, the first National Guard Division headquarters to deploy into
    combat since the Korean War. In fact, one of the 42d's brigade combat
    teams will deploy to Afghanistan next year, potentially limiting the
    National Guard's capability to respond to homeland defense disaster
    relief support.
        On March 1, the congressionally-appointed Commission on the
    National Guard and Reserves released its second report to Congress. The
    years of repeated and prolonged deployments and inadequate budgets have
    left the National Guard and Reserves so short of equipment, training,
    and personnel that 88 percent of the Army National Guard units and 44
    percent of Air National Guard units in the United States are not ready
    to be deployed. They are not prepared for overseas deployments and in
    some cases cannot respond to homeland security threats or emergencies.
    The chairman reported, ``We can't sustain the [National Guard and
    Reserves] on the course we're on.''
        Does NORTHCOM have sufficient National Guard and Reserve units and
    personnel, with the appropriate equipment and training, to respond to
    homeland threats and respond to emergencies?
        Admiral Keating. Although National Guard and Reserve Forces are not
    assigned to U.S. NORTHCOM until mobilized into title 10 status, we have
    an ongoing dialogue with our force providers (U.S. JFCOM, the Services,
    and Defense Agencies) to identify specific capabilities from the Total
    Force required to accomplish our homeland defense and civil support
    missions. When we identify shortfalls in capabilities, we work with our
    force providers to find trained and ready forces (Active Duty, National
    Guard, or Reserve) to fill the requirement.

                                border security
        17. Senator Clinton. Admiral Keating, NORTHCOM plays an important
    role in securing New York's northern border with Canada. Can you
    describe any progress over the past year NORTHCOM has made to
    coordinate with other U.S. Government agencies to secure our northern
    border?
        Admiral Keating. U.S. NORTHCOM and its subordinate commands
    participate in the bi-national, multi-agency Project North Star.
    Project North Star gathers law enforcement experts from the United
    States and Canada to exchange information and plan operations to
    counter transnational threats (to include counterdrug) along the
    northern border.
        U.S. NORTHCOM's subordinate, JTF-North, conducts operations to
    support U.S. Customs and Border Protection along the northern U.S.
    border. Cooperative law enforcement operations with Canada are
    coordinated by U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the Canadian
    Royal Canadian Mounted Police through the International Border
    Enforcement Team.
        In addition, U.S. NORTHCOM recently coordinated with U.S. Customs
    and Border Protection on a strategic-level presentation concerning
    pandemic influenza and its potential impact on U.S. and Canadian law
    enforcement agencies.

                                  preparedness
        18. Senator Clinton. Admiral Keating, the 2-year anniversary of
    Hurricane Katrina will be September 2007. In the aftermath of the
    response to Hurricane Katrina, questions were raised about whether the
    military, both National Guard and Active-Duty, could have responded
    further. What lessons learned from Katrina have been incorporated into
    NORTHCOM planning?
        Admiral Keating. Lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina have been
    incorporated into U.S. NORTHCOM planning. First, to address the need to
    reduce Federal response time, in coordination with the DHS, U.S.
    NORTHCOM developed 25 prescripted mission assignments as required by
    the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. These mission
    assignments were designed to reduce the staffing time required to
    respond.
        U.S. NORTHCOM has also applied lessons learned in consequence
    management by developing a functional plan for catastrophic natural
    disasters, which formalizes an accelerated force provider process to
    support planned responses. With this plan, we have developed four
    robust response packages that cover land, air, and sea domains. We also
    developed alert levels to posture the force and tailor our response.
        U.S. NORTHCOM implemented Katrina lessons learned during Exercise
    Ardent Sentry 2006. This exercise rehearsed DOD response to a Category
    3 hurricane striking New Orleans resulting in flooding and significant
    damage. Specifically, the exercise focused on the following key tasks:

             Maintaining pre-drafted orders and planning templates in
            preparation of the event
             Participating in U.S. JFCOM sourcing conferences to expedite
            the sourcing process
             Conducting bi-weekly video teleconferences with the FEMA
            Headquarters
             Conducting weekly video conferences with Service components
             Developing hurricane execution checklists
             Developing and rehearsing incident awareness and assessment
            capabilities
             Developing a DOD catastrophic hurricane response concept of
            operations
             Developing catastrophic hurricane response force packages

        19. Senator Clinton. Admiral Keating, if we were faced with a
    disaster of the magnitude of Hurricane Katrina somewhere else in the
    United States, are you satisfied that NORTHCOM's response would be
    adequate?
        Admiral Keating. Yes. Strategic and operational planners at U.S.
    NORTHCOM and its components have led the DOD planning efforts for
    hurricane responses. We have coordinated with FEMA to ensure that we
    understand projected needs for military assistance in response to a
    hurricane. This coordination has resulted in pre-scripted mission
    assignments that articulate the military capabilities needed to respond
    quickly to a catastrophic hurricane. We also have been engaged with the
    rewrite and coordination of the National Response Plan and the
    Catastrophic Incident Supplement. U.S. NORTHCOM has developed plans to
    employ a similar-sized title 10 force that was employed during the
    response to Hurricane Katrina. The NORAD and U.S. NORTHCOM Exercise
    Program includes several table-top exercises that are directly related
    to how we support the overall Federal response to disasters. In
    addition, our national-level, semi-annual exercises include hurricane
    scenarios. These exercises require collaboration, coordination, and
    interaction with our interagency partners.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
                          defense readiness reporting
        20. Senator McCain. General Smith, JFCOM is currently developing an
    automated system to monitor force availability, location, readiness,
    assignment, and to be able to track the status of units through the
    entire pre-deployment, deployment, redeployment, and reconstitution
    cycle for both the Active-Duty and Reserve components, down to the
    individual. When do you project that you will have this automated
    capability that tracks down to the individual?
        General Smith. We have made good progress with our focused efforts
    to include development of the Defense Readiness Reporting System, the
    Joint Event Scheduling System, the Joint Force Projection Advanced
    Capability Technology Demonstration, and the Global Force Management
    Data Improvement Initiative.
        JFCOM currently utilizes a multitude of systems, applications, and
    data sources to monitor and analyze availability, location, readiness,
    assignment, and unit status in support of our role as the global
    looking Joint Force Provider. JFCOM has achieved some success in
    automating parts of this process, specifically in the area of Force
    Rotation. We are also experimenting with technology in our joint
    futures lab to automate and streamline force deployment and logistics
    visibility. However, the ultimate desire is to develop a web-enabled,
    service-oriented architecture that allows the free exchange of data
    from multiple sources that can then be manipulated by user defined
    applications and tools.
        These architectural models, as well as the suite of capabilities to
    meet user-defined requirements, constitute part of an overarching
    systems approach to Command and Control, including Force monitoring,
    called the Net Enabled Command Capability (NECC). This initiative has
    been validated through the Joint Readiness Oversight Council, and is
    part of a future capability package that we hope to begin phasing into
    place within the next 2-3 years. It is envisioned that NECC will
    replace many of the legacy systems currently in existence, and will
    fully support Joint Global Force Management.
        Due to the complexity associated with this effort, the number of
    systems and stakeholders involved, and the varied and often unique
    requirements Senate Armed Services Committee generated by the multitude
    of users, a ``quick'' solution is not feasible. However, the phased
    approach we are taking with this will ensure that the user can receive
    capabilities when they are available vice waiting for the entire suite
    of capabilities to be fielded. It is too early in the NECC development
    process to be able to say with certainty at what point we will be able
    to track down to the individual level.

        21. Senator McCain. General Smith, will this capability allow for
    the earlier notification of forces who are to be deployed?
        General Smith. Once the capabilities supporting that part of the
    command and control construct are implemented in NECC, the answer is
    yes.

                    interoperable joint command and control
        22. Senator McCain. General Smith, the lack of interoperability in
    command and control, and other challenges in interoperable
    communications, hampers the effectiveness of our warfighters. What does
    JFCOM currently have underway or under development to advance the
    interoperability of our forces?
        General Smith. In the area of Joint Command and Control (JC2), we
    are currently executing, in concert with the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense (OSD), a capabilities-based portfolio management approach to
    better coordinate and integrate JC2 across the three DOD processes
    (Requirements, Acquisition and Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
    Execution) in order to deliver integrated JC2 capabilities, improve
    interoperability, identify and capture efficiencies where possible
    (unnecessary duplicative efforts) and close capability gaps.
        On September 14, 2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense designated
    JFCOM as the ``JC2 Capability Portfolio Manager'' (JC2 CPM) and gave us
    the responsibility to ensure the JC2 portfolio is aligned with
    strategic objectives and that the capability mix is optimized to meet
    warfighters' needs. Part of this responsibility involves identifying
    and assessing risk in the portfolio to assist DOD in balancing joint-
    warfighting demands against resource constraints.
        As the JC2 CPM, we are currently working with CENTCOM to assist
    them in sorting through the many C2 systems they currently use in Iraq
    to determine the ``Best of Breed'' among those systems for the near-
    term. We are also working with OSD (PA&E and USD(C)) to review C2 R&D
    and procurement investments to ensure alignment with DOD strategic
    direction and emergent warfighting requirements and we are looking into
    potential duplicative efforts among the Services in developing
    deployable/mobile C2 capabilities. It is a significant challenge to
    Senate Armed Services Committee determine which capabilities are
    duplicative, when you consider the scope and complexity of Service-
    unique and Joint C2 requirements ranging from the tactical to the
    strategic level, across multiple domains (air, land, sea) that include
    fixed, deployable, and ``mobile'' or ``on the move'' systems.
    Individually, these C2 systems meet the operational requirements for
    which they were intended, but collectively they pose joint
    interoperability issues. The JC2 CPM is an important step in
    approaching this challenge as we balance operational effectiveness and
    risk and migrate toward future ``joint solutions.''
        For the long-term, JFCOM has in its JC2 CPM portfolio the
    ``flagship'' program for future joint C2 capabilities, the Net-Enabled
    Command Capability or NECC program. As DOD's operational sponsor for
    NECC, JFCOM has established a Joint Combat Capability Developer (JCCD)
    team to ensure the warfighter's operational requirements are accurately
    described and provided to the Defense Information Systems Agency, who
    is responsible for developing the material solution. Through the NECC
    JCCD, we expect to achieve continuous warfighter engagement from
    concept development through fielding and sustainment and completely
    integrate material with the doctrine, organizational design, training
    plans, personnel and facilities requirements, and policy changes (DOT--
    LPF-P) necessary to support the warfighter. This continuous engagement
    by the CPM and JCCD will provide the requisite checks and balances to
    ensure development of integrated and interoperable (''Born Joint'')
    capabilities with holistic DOT--LPF-P support.

        23. Senator McCain. General Smith, what effort is JFCOM devoting to
    the goal of reducing the danger of fratricide when directing close air
    support (CAS) fires?
        General Smith. JFCOM is engaged in efforts to reduce the danger of
    fratricide and improve combat effectiveness during CAS operations.
    JFCOM has identified key problems in joint CAS terminal control
    capabilities through live assessments and evaluations:

              Talking a pilot's eyes onto a target takes time and is not
            conclusive
              Pilots have a limited capability to independently verify
            target ID
              Errors occur when copying and entering target coordinates
            manually
              Automated system features without checks can lead to errors
              Accurate visual assessment of the aim point of a strike
            aircraft from the ground is difficult even under ideal
            conditions

        Most CAS fratricides occur because standard procedures are not
    followed or the intended target is misidentified.
        To address the issue of standardization, the JFCOM-chaired Joint
    Close Air Support (JCAS) Executive Steering Committee led the
    development of the Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) and Forward
    Air Controller (Airborne) Memoranda of Agreement, which established
    training and certification standards for all DOD terminal attack
    controllers. To enforce these standards, a JFCOM-led JTAC
    Standardization Team conducts initial accreditation and biennial course
    reviews of all JTAC schoolhouses for compliance.
        To aid in the proper identification of targets, JFCOM provided
    essential support in fielding the Digital Precision Strike Suite,
    coordinated software integration into JTAC equipment, and published new
    procedures to improve laser range finder and satellite navigation
    system target location accuracies. JFCOM was a primary promoter of the
    use of the Remotely Operated Video Enhanced Receiver) III, which
    provides real-time, full motion video for situational awareness and
    targeting. JFCOM led the effort to develop and field the Rapid Attack
    Information Dissemination Execution Relay system which will provide
    digital Blue Force situational awareness data to terminal attack
    controllers.
        JFCOM is continuing the efforts to reduce fratricide potential by
    spearheading the establishment of a JCAS digital data exchange standard
    which will enable the seamless exchange of critical target and friendly
    location information between the JTAC, weapon delivery platforms, and
    command and control agencies.

        24. Senator McCain. General Smith, has JFCOM evaluated the military
    utility of specific anti-fratricide technologies, and if so, what were
    the results?
        General Smith. The JFCOM-sponsored Coalition Combat Identification
    Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (CCID ACTD) has been a
    catalyst for not only assessing fratricide prevention technologies, but
    also moving proven solutions into the acquisition process.
        A notable CCID ACTD milestone was a large-scale field exercise
    demonstration during September-October 2005 in the United Kingdom. The
    United States and eight other nations provided ground and air forces
    employing the ACTD's technologies in scenarios representative of
    coalition operations. The participating coalition warfighters and
    analysts determined that two technologies, Battlefield Target
    Identification Device and Radio Based Combat Identification, provided a
    useful, complementary capability to quickly and accurately identify
    friendly ground forces and minimize fratricide from either direct or
    supporting fires (artillery, mortars, CAS). Joint Combat Identification
    Marking System provided a discriminating infrared signature and radio
    frequency tags demonstrated potential, but more development is
    necessary to achieve a useful discrimination capability in the cockpit.
        During March 2006, JFCOM and Service program representatives
    presented these results to senior Army and Marine Corps resource
    sponsors who decided jointly to pursue an acquisition strategy for both
    technologies during POM 08-13. This joint approach, reflecting an
    investment of approximately $450 million, was endorsed by the Joint
    Requirements Oversight Council during December 2006, which provides
    clear leadership and guidance to coalition partners sponsoring
    parallel, interoperable programs.
        Building upon this momentum and in partnership with the U.S. Air
    Force, we extended the CCID ACTD through 2008 in order to assess other
    CID technologies employed by fixed wing aircrew in attacking ground
    targets. Two additional nations have joined the original CCID ACTD
    group in this extended phase.
        CCID ACTD Extension, Bold Quest, will assess the military utility
    of a Synthetic Aperture Radar/Aided Target Recognition on JSTARS and
    the Laser Target Imaging Program on the Litening Advanced Targeting Pod
    in a coalition operational environment. This will also validate U.S.
    strike aircraft capability to exchange digital targeting data with U.S.
    JTAC digital suites including the U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Control
    Party Close-Air Support System, USMC Target Locator Designator Handoff
    System (TLDHS)/StrikeLink, and the Special Operations Command
    Battlefield Air Operations Kit. In addition, the CCID ACTD extension
    will assess the ability of the CAS aircraft to exchange digital
    targeting data with U.S. JTAC digital suites will be assessed.
        Besides the CCID ACTD, JFCOM findings and recommendations from OIF
    Major Combat Operations induced the Army to make a positive ID
    capability a requirement in the Patriot weapon system. JFCOM also
    supported the development of the Recognition of Combat Vehicles
    training system, which is a principal catalyst for developing Joint
    Service combat identification training requirements and solutions.

            interagency coordination and effective disaster response
        25. Senator McCain. General Smith, JFCOM is working to develop a
    more coherent interagency planning process and tools to coordinate the
    diverse capabilities that the military, civilian agencies, and even
    nongovernmental groups can bring to bear in the event of a natural
    disaster or some other crisis. Your testimony discusses something
    called the ``Whole of Government Approach.'' What work does JFCOM
    currently have underway, and what is planned, under the broad heading
    of improving our national response capabilities?
        General Smith. On a daily basis JFCOM seeks to enable conditions
    that result in whole of government interdependent capabilities that
    promote success in complex contingency operations both at home and
    abroad. JFCOM is in a unique position to assist both sides of the
    interagency equation in relation to prioritizing and coordinating
    Combatant Command (COCOM)-U.S. Government interagency training,
    operational planning, lessons learned, experiment, and other
    participation and interactions with regard to national response
    capabilities. We are hard at work with our COCOM/JTF partners as well
    as other Federal departments, State and local governments, and
    nongovernmental organizations in support of National Security
    Presidential Directive 44, DODD 3000.05 (Military Support to
    Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations), and
    other key policy and strategy guidance and directives that drive our
    command.
        In the here and now, JFCOM is striving to stimulate improved
    interagency interaction and integration into the Joint Training
    Enterprise on behalf of COCOMs/JTFs. Beginning with federating
    interagency injects into modeling and simulations, we are developing
    deeper mutual understanding. We are also developing an understanding of
    the challenges to unlimited participation in joint training events. We
    hope to enable joint and interagency partners in scoping the magnitude
    of the problem, setting criteria for working together, and highlighting
    the biggest mutual bang for the buck. A highlight of this effort will
    be an interagency syllabus of joint training opportunities--easily read
    and understood by all. Effects will include increased value, not
    necessarily participation, as we seek to find out what interagency
    partners expect to gain from integrating events. We are also leveraging
    existing interagency training/education programs to synergize these
    efforts. Our Joint Knowledge Online enterprise will bring free and
    available interagency education opportunities to military communities
    and vice versa.
        We have emerged, at the operational level, as a key node in the
    Interagency Lessons Learned Crossroads. Our Joint Center for
    Operational Analysis mission is to lead and accelerate transformation
    of the joint force by producing compelling recommendations to change--a
    byproduct of this mission has been better coordination and
    collaboration with our interagency partners. Improving two-way U.S.
    Government information sharing on lessons learned can eliminate
    redundant U.S. Government operational-level missteps in the future. Our
    efforts in examining Hurricane Katrina, OEF, OIF, and other whole of
    government enterprises has resulted in a groundswell of information
    that is now integrated into an integrated joint lessons learned
    database connected to Service databases--interagency partner lessons
    learned sharing is being encouraged to better support our COCOM/JTF
    partners.
        We are also forging ahead as a leader in solving joint force and
    interagency information sharing challenges at the operational level.
    Our JC2 Portfolio Management platform and our HARMONIE.org vehicle (an
    online unclassified website available to broad variety of interagency
    partners to enhance information sharing and unclassified planning) are
    just two instances where we are developing and offering information
    sharing and collaboration capability development tools to a variety of
    willing partners. As we strive to develop a fully-networked joint
    force, fluent in U.S. Government information sharing, information
    sharing will remain paramount to executing integrated actions that
    solve complex contingencies in the United States and elsewhere.
        Lastly, we are developing concepts and experimenting in a variety
    of areas that will help bring the interagency planning and execution
    community closer together.
        First, we are working with the Department of State (DOS)
    Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to address interagency
    planning process shortfalls through a series of activities called
    Unified Action 07. Through this effort we plan to jointly deliver a
    baseline study on U.S. Government planning process, a Rule of Law
    Handbook for Ungoverned Spaces, a comprehensive approach to security
    sector reform, an Ungoverned Space Strategy, and an overall final
    report capturing all other learning points along the way. Unified
    Action 07 is designed to test the integrated planning and
    implementation of processes, structures, authorizations, and tools
    associated with development of U.S. Government strategic policy and
    plans.
        Second, we are working with allies, interagency, and NGOs in
    preparation for Multinational Experiment 5 (MNE 5) through which we
    intend to deliver a Coalition Handbook of Best Practices, an
    Implementation Planning Management and Evaluation Guide, a
    Multinational Logistics concept of operations, as well as contributing
    to products under development by our partner nations that will benefit
    everyone. The central theme for MNE 5 will be exploration of a
    multinational, interagency, comprehensive engagement strategy, which
    incorporates government, non-government, and private organizations,
    using all national and international elements of power, to influence a
    stable international environment.
        Third, we are integrating operations, planning, and intelligence
    functions through the Joint Intelligence Operations Center-
    Transformation concept. This concept is being shared with and
    recommended to our interagency partners as a means to close the gaps in
    our collective planning, execution, and intelligence functions.
        Fourth, we are bringing a special focus to the homeland defense
    problem set through a series of experiments called Noble Resolve. In
    this effort, we are partnering with U.S. NORTHCOM, DHS, Federal, State,
    and local governments, and NGOs to work out best practices for
    collectively coping with large-scale disasters, both natural and man-
    made.
        Finally, through our Military Support to Stabilization, Security,
    Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations and Military Support
    to Shaping Operations Joint Operating Concepts (JOCs) we are helping
    set the foundation for future civ-mil coordination and collaboration in
    our future doctrine, plans, et cetera. The SSTR JOC proposes means to
    effectively combine the efforts of the U.S. and coalition militaries
    with those of U.S. Government agencies and multi-national partners to
    provide direct assistance and build self-sufficient host nation
    capability and capacity in several key areas. The proposed definition
    of shaping is the set of continuous, long-term integrated,
    comprehensive actions with a broad spectrum of government, non-
    governmental and international partners that maintains or enhances
    stability, prevents or mitigates crises, and enables other operations
    when crises occur.
        We continue to set trends in current training, lessons learned,
    information sharing, capabilities development, and futures/
    experimentation as we seek to improve our COCOM/JTF/U.S. Government
    interagency partners and our own ``Whole of Government Approach'' to
    complex contingencies both at home and abroad.

                        provisional reconstruction teams
        26. Senator McCain. General Smith, JFCOM is currently coordinating
    with the National Defense University, the Army, and the NATO School to
    support joint training requirements for the Provincial Reconstruction
    Teams (PRTs) prior to the deployments of these teams to Afghanistan and
    Iraq. Are there any unique challenges posed by the development or
    delivery of training for these specialized civil-military units? If so,
    what innovations or solutions has JFCOM developed to address these
    challenges?
        General Smith. The main challenge in development and delivery of
    training is gathering the teams together to participate in training
    opportunities. Excellent and ever-improving training venues have been
    developed through the efforts of the organizations listed above, and it
    is important to afford the personnel who will deploy access to these
    opportunities.
        JFCOM personnel have worked with DOS and USAID personnel who are
    leading the effort to train PRTs for Iraq to develop the Iraq PRT
    training program. DOS and DOD signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on
    22 February 07 that specifies operational requirements, authorities,
    and responsibilities shared between the U.S. Mission-Iraq and the
    Multi-National Forces-Iraq or successor organizations for PRTs. The PRT
    program is a priority joint DOS-DOD initiative to bolster moderates,
    support U.S. counterinsurgency strategy, promote reconciliation and
    shape the political environment, support economic development, and
    build the capacity of Iraqi provincial governments to hasten the
    transition to Iraqi self-sufficiency. JFCOM will team with DOS/USAID
    personnel conducting the initial Iraq PRT training courses being
    conducted at the Foreign Service Institute this month for an initial
    group of 40 personnel who will form the core of 10 additional PRTs and
    deploy to theater by the end of March 2007. We will continue to engage
    with DOS/USAID and other DOD agencies as the Iraq PRT program matures.
        With regard to Afghanistan PRT training, JFCOM has partnered with
    Allied Command for Transformation to effect cross pollination between
    NATO led and U.S. led PRT training venues. NATO and U.S. PRT curricula
    have been shared; instructors from the U.S. PRT course have attended
    the NATO course and vice versa. The exchange with NATO of PRT expertise
    for training and integration is in addition to the interagency
    partnerships described above, and together they will further enhance
    the depth and quality of training given to PRT members prior to
    deployment.

               homeland defense and support to civil authorities
        27. Senator McCain. Admiral Keating, the Commander of NORTHCOM has
    two missions: 1) defend the homeland against land, maritime, and air
    threats; and 2) when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense,
    provide support to civil authorities, including consequence management
    operations. The Army National Guard and Army Reserve have both reported
    equipment and personnel shortages. As a command without assigned
    forces, NORTHCOM may be particularly dependent on the National Guard
    and Reserve and consequently impacted by these shortages:

             According to a Government Accountability Office (GAO)
            report in September 2006, continued deployments have depleted
            the National Guard's inventories of many items that would be
            useful for domestic missions, while nondeployed Active-Duty
            Forces have also experienced decreased equipment levels.
             The March 1, 2007 Report to Congress by the Commission
            on the National Guard and Reserves notes that ``the equipment
            readiness of the Army National Guard is unacceptable and has
            reduced the capability of the United States to respond to
            current and additional major contingencies, foreign and
            domestic.''

        Do these reports give you cause for concern?
        Admiral Keating. We considered this issue carefully and remain
    confident in our ability to provide military support to civil
    authorities as directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense.
    We work closely with our force providers--U.S. JFCOM, the Services, and
    Defense Agencies--to ensure trained and ready forces from the Active
    and Reserve components are available to execute our missions.

        28. Senator McCain. Admiral Keating, what should NORTHCOM's role be
    in ensuring joint readiness to perform the homeland defense mission
    given the current and prospective depleted state of National Guard and
    Reserve resources and personnel?
        Admiral Keating. Our role is to clearly identify and articulate
    specific U.S. NORTHCOM requirements to our force providers (U.S. JFCOM,
    the Services, and Defense Agencies). Our force providers must ensure
    those required capabilities are sourced with ready and trained forces.
    Once sourced, we monitor the readiness of those forces and provide
    feedback to the force providers where shortfalls exist.

        29. Senator McCain. Admiral Keating, as the Commander of NORTHCOM,
    what steps will you take to ensure that these equipment deficiencies at
    home do not leave NORTHCOM under-prepared to perform homeland defense
    missions?
        Admiral Keating. U.S. NORTHCOM has identified specific, mission-
    focused requirements (in forces, training, equipment, et cetera) to our
    force providers. We continually monitor overall force readiness from
    the perspective of our assigned missions and consult regularly with
    force providers to identify and correct gaps in required capabilities.
    When a critical capabilities gap arises that might potentially
    jeopardize mission accomplishment, we take that issue immediately to
    the national leadership for resolution.

                            interagency coordination
        30. Senator McCain. Admiral Keating, in May 2006, as part of the
    GAO's body of ongoing work that covers the Federal Government's
    preparedness and response to Hurricane Katrina, they reported that
    DOD's emergency response plan for providing military assistance to
    civil authorities during disasters lacked adequate detail. The DOD
    Inspector General also found that ``NORTHCOM did not coordinate with
    FEMA on using military assets according to their capabilities . . . and
    did not coordinate deploying and integrating title 10 forces with
    National Guard forces.'' What steps does NORTHCOM need to take to
    improve interagency coordination to better integrate military with
    local, State, and other Federal responders?
        Admiral Keating. Since Hurricane Katrina, U.S. NORTHCOM has taken
    numerous steps to improve interagency coordination to better integrate
    military with local, State, and other Federal responders. For instance,
    U.S. NORTHCOM recognized the need to work more efficiently with FEMA
    during a Federal response to a crisis. To that end, we established
    full-time Defense Coordinating Officers within each FEMA region. This
    action improved relationships with our interagency partners, and
    resulted in a much quicker response and better situational awareness
    during an incident. We have also taken steps to engage more with the
    National Guard and the DHS in order to improve unity of effort. Our
    engagement with these interagency partners includes extensive
    participation in conferences and exercises. Nevertheless, exercising
    still remains a challenge. We need more practice working with our
    interagency partners and to train the way we intend to respond.

        31. Senator McCain. Admiral Keating, what can be done to improve
    NORTHCOM's planning process for both homeland defense and support to
    civil authorities plans?
        Admiral Keating. Exercising is the best way to improve our planning
    process. Robust exercises allow us to test our plans and implement
    lessons learned. We need to train the way we intend to respond, and we
    need to make the cost and time involved to conduct this training
    priorities.

         national guard weapons of mass destruction-civil support teams
        32. Senator McCain. Admiral Keating, in recent years, legislation
    has been enacted to establish 55 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)-
    Civil Support Teams (CST) to ensure that each State and territory of
    the United States has such a team at the disposal of the Governor. To
    date, 47 of these WMD-CST have been certified by DOD to be mission
    capable. States will also depend on the National Guard chemical,
    biological, radioactive, and nuclear explosive (CBRNE) Enhanced
    Response Force Package (CERFP) teams, available in each FEMA area, for
    consequence management in the event of a chemical, biological, or
    nuclear incident. How confident are you that these teams are fully
    equipped and ready to perform their important mission in the event of
    multiple CBRNE events?
        Admiral Keating. I have high confidence in the WMD-CSTs. Every 18
    months, Army North, a component of U.S. NORTHCOM, performs evaluation
    exercises to determine continued certification of the WMD-CSTs. Army
    North reports the results of the exercises to U.S. NORTHCOM. This is
    the basis for our level of confidence. Currently, there is no
    certification program for the CBRNE CERFPs. The National Guard Bureau
    and U.S. NORTHCOM are coordinating the homeland defense and civil
    support training and exercise program and related MOA. This program
    would assign U.S. NORTHCOM the mission for ``Collective standardized
    CBRNE training and exercise for CERFPs and CSTs.'' Once this process is
    in place, U.S. NORTHCOM will have better visibility into the readiness
    of each CERFP.

        33. Senator McCain. Admiral Keating, with strains being placed on
    the National Guard for its overseas warfighting mission, how can we be
    assured that these important units will be available for their critical
    homeland defense and civil support missions?
        Admiral Keating. DOD works closely with U.S. JFCOM and the National
    Guard Bureau on a domestic response concept that fully integrates the
    capabilities of title 10 and title 32 forces. This concept maximizes
    the capabilities each entity provides by ensuring full
    interoperability, unambiguous lines of authority, and training and
    operational relationships.

    restrictions on military-to-military relations in the southern command
                             area of responsibility
        34. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, last year, your predecessor
    General Craddock (and other regional combatant commanders) testified
    before this committee that there were unintended negative consequences
    for U.S. interests as a result of the restrictions in the American
    Servicemembers Protection Act on providing military assistance to
    countries that have not signed Article 98 agreements with the United
    States. Many of us were persuaded by that powerful testimony and, as a
    result, we included in the National Defense Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Year 2007 a repeal of the restriction in the American
    Servicemembers Protection Act on providing international military
    education and training (IMET) funds to countries that haven't signed
    Article 98 agreements. Has the United States initiated or resumed IMET
    programs with countries in the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) area of
    responsibility (AOR) as a consequence of this change in law? If so, how
    do you expect the United States to benefit from these military-to-
    military contacts?
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, we have initiated and resumed IMET programs
    to countries previously sanctioned by the American Servicemembers
    Protection Act.
        The United States will benefit from these military-to-military
    contacts through continued professionalization of Latin American Armed
    Forces personnel in courses like the senior service schools, basic
    officer and career courses, NCO development, and even a few masters
    level courses. Special emphasis will focus on rebuilding a broad range
    of long-neglected technical skills such as medical training, aircraft
    maintenance, helicopter mechanics, electrician training, joint
    operations, and instructor training.

        35. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, do you believe it would be
    beneficial for United States' interests were Congress to similarly
    repeal the restriction in the American Servicemembers Protection Act on
    the provision of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to countries that may
    not have signed Article 98 agreements with the United States?
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, in my personal opinion, I believe that a
    repeal would help advance U.S. objectives in the region. The threats of
    transnational crime, narcotics trafficking, and potential establishment
    of terrorist safe havens continue to challenge democratic governance in
    the region. A robust partnership with countries willing to address
    these security threats requires some assistance from the United States
    Repeal of FMF and Excess Defense Articles restrictions will restore an
    important tool that assists the U.S. SOUTHCOM in forging regional and
    bilateral partnerships, building partner nation capability, and
    contributing to the homeland defense.

                     center for excellence in human rights
        36. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, I understand that you
    propose an initiative for a Center for Excellence in Human Rights that
    would allow SOUTHCOM to intensify its support to partner governments in
    their efforts to eliminate human rights violations. Eliminating human
    rights violations is an essential step towards strengthening democracy
    in any country. What will this Center allow you to do now, that you
    cannot do now or is not being done at the Western Hemispheric Institute
    for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC)?
        Admiral Stavridis. The Center will allow us to expand and
    accelerate the Human Rights Initiative, an engagement program that U.S.
    SOUTHCOM began in 1997 dedicated to assisting partner nation military
    forces in institutionalizing a culture of respect for human rights
    within their organizations. The Center will enable us to collaborate
    with organizations in the private sector such as non-governmental
    organizations, academic institutions, foundations, and private
    enterprise. As a result, we will be able to sponsor a wider variety of
    activities to execute highly tailored country-specific programs.
        WHINSEC provides human rights education and training in a classroom
    setting within the broader context of education and training on
    security competencies. WHINSEC's instruction is ``one size fits all''
    for students from throughout the region. The Center will perform a very
    different function. The Center will assist partner nations through a
    strategic planning process to develop national human rights
    implementation plans. The Center will additionally have an operational
    mission with experts to support and facilitate the actual
    implementation of these plans. The Center will be 100 percent dedicated
    to promoting human rights. It will assist partner nation military and
    security forces to provide security to their citizens in a manner
    consistent with respect for human rights and international humanitarian
    law. Moreover, the Center will be able to design processes and plans
    tailored to the specific human rights histories and realities of each
    of our partner nations.

        37. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, where will this Center be
    located and how much money is needed to start this program and sustain
    it?
        Admiral Stavridis. The Center will be located within the SOUTHCOM
    Headquarters in Miami, staffed by personnel from our existing Human
    Rights Division. Overall, we anticipate minimal resource requirements
    to establish the Center. The proposal authorizes the Center to accept
    private contributions to further critical human rights work. The Center
    will allow us to aggressively promote and implement the Human Rights
    Initiative and identify emerging needs through consultations with our
    partner nations. At the same time, we will dedicate our efforts to
    establishing partnerships with private organizations that share our
    interest in promoting a culture of respect for human rights in the
    region. We will sustain and grow the program though these
    relationships.

                   enduring friendship and maritime strategy
        38. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, Enduring Friendship (EF) is
    a regional multi-year initiative that provides maritime security
    assistance to select countries in the region. The first phase of EF
    focused on the Dominican Republic, Panama, Jamaica, and the Bahamas.
    Phase two will include Belize, Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. How
    does implementing a regional maritime strategy focused on South and
    Central America and the Caribbean enhance our maritime homeland
    security?
        Admiral Stavridis. EF is a Theater Security Cooperation initiative
    that:

              1. Promotes information sharing about possible threats
            affecting the region;
              2. Enhances our partner nations ability to patrol their
            sovereign waters in accordance with international and domestic
            laws; and
              3. Provides a mechanism for collective action should a threat
            arise.

        The National Strategic Plan for the war on terrorism states that
    the strategic aims of the National Strategy are to create a ``global
    environment inhospitable to violent extremists.'' The ungoverned spaces
    of the maritime domain are a key enabler to terrorist networks. The
    maritime domain offers anonymity not available on land or in the air
    and it provides vast resources via illicit trafficking activities.
    Maritime security is a top U.S. national security priority. The United
    States eastern coastline contains major population centers and critical
    infrastructure that are in close proximity to ports or are accessible
    by waterways. EF will deny the southern approaches of the United States
    to trans-national terrorists by establishing a networked ``defense in
    depth'' with our partner nations to detect, deter, disrupt, and defeat
    illicit activity and terrorists within the Caribbean and Central
    America region.

        39. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, are partner nations and
    allies willingly cooperating in our regional maritime security
    initiative?
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes. U.S. SOUTHCOM has conducted numerous
    partner nation requirements coordination assessments and visits to EF
    countries. Senior leaders from partner nations with whom we have met
    view EF as a positive initiative to enhance regional security and
    promote a common maritime defense strategy.

        40. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, are training and equipment
    funds used for this initiative?
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes. EF uses both traditional multi-year FMF and
    single-year section 1206 resources.

       u.s. southern command counternarcotic operations in manta, equador
        41. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, in your written statement,
    you note that SOUTHCOM uses a U.S. forward operating location at Manta,
    Equador to launch U.S. counternarcotic missions and is ``a cornerstone
    of our ability to operate in the SOUTHCOM region.'' Per a 10-year lease
    agreement, we currently have over 220 U.S. service personnel stationed
    at Manta on a rotational basis supporting A-3 Airborne Warning and
    System Control and P-3 Orion aircraft operations. We also invested over
    $60 million in military construction funds to build new facilities and
    to repair the runway at Manta, which we share with the Ecuadorian Air
    Force. Recent press reports have quoted the new President of Ecuador,
    Rafael Correa, as rejecting a continued U.S. military presence in
    Ecuador: ``We've said clearly that in 2009 the agreement will not be
    renewed.'' How will U.S. counternarcotic operations be affected by the
    loss of Manta as a forward operating location?
        Admiral Stavridis. [Deleted.]

        42. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, what options is SOUTHCOM
    pursuing to compensate for potential loss of Manta in 2009?
        Admiral Stavridis. SOUTHCOM continues to work closely with partner
    nations to increase their capability to interdict and disrupt illegal
    drug trafficking. We are also examining options for operating from
    other nations to mitigate the potential loss of Manta.

        43. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, if so, what are the costs
    and benefits of these options?
        Admiral Stavridis. Other than the benefit of continued disruption
    of trafficking operations, we have only recently begun to examine other
    options and have not yet assessed the associated costs and potential
    derived benefits.

        44. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, does the DOD budget request
    for fiscal year 2008 contain any funding to establish and operate
    alternate forward locations?
        Admiral Stavridis. I am not aware of any.

                       mission of joint task force bravo
        45. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, in your written testimony
    you state that JTF-Bravo operating out of Soto Cano, Honduras,
    represents the only permanently deployed U.S. forces in the region.
    This task force ``is a first responder to crises in the region and
    routinely conducts humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, search and
    rescue, personnel recovery, and non-combatant medical evacuations.''
    JTF-Bravo was originally established in 1984 as a base for U.S. support
    of regional military operations. We still have over 550 U.S. service
    personnel stationed in Honduras and the budget request for fiscal year
    2008 includes military construction funds for a new dining facility at
    Soto Cano Air Base. Also, I cannot recall any other location or task
    force that we employ U.S. military forces on a permanent basis
    primarily to support potential humanitarian and disaster relief
    operations. Is it time once again to reassess the relative value JTF-
    Bravo provides you in the SOUTHCOM AOR or are you sure that the
    investments in resources and personnel are paying off in the region?
        Admiral Stavridis. JTF-Bravo personnel and resources directly
    support the National Security Strategy and the National Strategy for
    Combating Terrorism. In addition to the relationships that are
    strengthened through humanitarian efforts, JTF-Bravo supports regional
    legal and economic stability by enhancing the professionalism of Latin
    American military and police forces. The combined efforts of task force
    components play a pivotal role in defeating terrorists, denying them
    support and sanctuary in the region, diminishing the conditions they
    try to exploit, and defending U.S. citizens abroad.
        JTF-Bravo delivers a great return on relatively small investment
    for the United States. It is a forward deployed force capable of a
    range of theater support activities, including disaster relief and
    humanitarian assistance, counterdrug operations, and command and
    control for joint coalition exercises.
        During the recent flooding in Panama, JTF-Bravo deployed personnel
    and equipment within 18 hours of notification and ultimately provided
    over 130,000 pounds of critically needed food, water, clothing, and
    medical supplies to the affected area. The familiarity of JTF-Bravo
    personnel with the topography, communications systems, and movement
    corridors were instrumental in the success of this mission.
        JTF-Bravo also conducts counterdrug missions, transporting host
    nation law enforcement forces for interdiction and eradication of
    illicit drugs. The task force supported counterdrug operations in the
    past year that resulted in the seizure of 2,700 KG of cocaine, valued
    at over $50 million.
        Command and control for many joint coalition exercises in Central
    America is conducted out of JTF-Bravo, allowing for training of our own
    and partner nation forces. This training directly contributes to the
    defense of our homeland.

        46. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, in lieu of the potential
    loss of Manta in Ecuador, what type of agreement do we have with the
    Government of Honduras related to our presence there?
        Admiral Stavridis. The 1954 Bilateral Military Assistance Treaty is
    the basis for military cooperation and assistance between the United
    States and Honduras. The treaty is a broad agreement between the United
    States and Honduras to provide military equipment, services, and
    assistance to each other. A 1982 Annex to the 1954 Bilateral Military
    Assistance Treaty authorizes the United States to make use of Honduran
    aerial ports at Soto Cano, Goloson, and La Mesa for ``fueling or
    refueling of aircraft, maintenance of aircraft and equipment,
    accommodation of personnel, communications, supply, storage and other
    such activities.'' The United States agreed to bear the cost of
    supplies and services which it requests and receives from Honduran
    sources. The annex and the treaty do not have termination dates.

        47. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, are we faced with the risk
    of being asked to leave after sinking investment in facilities and
    infrastructure?
        Admiral Stavridis. I believe there is a very low risk of the
    Government of Honduras, with whom we have a close and strong
    relationship, asking us to leave.

                            interagency coordination
        48. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, in your prepared statement
    you wrote ``Within SOUTHCOM, we are striving to transform into a true
    interagency organization. To facilitate this, we recently established a
    new directorate for interagency partnering, with support from the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense and the DOS.'' I fully endorse this
    effort. Will you produce a study or report describing your efforts and
    results, and make it available to the Departments of Defense and State,
    and your fellow combatant commanders?
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, we will produce a report describing the
    efforts and results of our interagency partnering initiative. The new
    directorate is documenting all of the efforts and capturing vital
    information regarding the processes and the impact on both the command
    and the interagency. We are coordinating our efforts with studies and
    lessons learned that JFCOM is developing. We will publish a
    comprehensive and thorough report that will serve as a basis for future
    development in the field of interagency partnering.

        49. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, are you coordinating your
    work on this with JFCOM?
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes. In addition to supporting SOUTHCOM on the
    development of a study/report to document the transformation efforts,
    JFCOM J9 Experimentation Division as part of their Unified Action (UA)
    Initiative will provide support and insights in a number of other
    transformation and interagency initiatives. During the Unified Action
    DOD Objectives Conference on 4-5 April 07, SOUTHCOM provided a number
    of interagency transformation initiatives/objectives that JFCOM will
    provide assistance including:

              a. Development of an interagency data base that will contain
            U.S. Government agencies security cooperation activities.
            Purpose of the database is to identify partnering opportunities
            between DOD and other U.S. Government agencies.
              b. Provide support and insights in the development of public/
            private cooperation opportunities.
              c. Assist in the development and coordination of interagency
            coordination and planning opportunities at the COCOM level.
            Purpose is to synchronize existing plans and operations between
            DOD and U.S. Government agencies.
              d. Identify training and career progression opportunities for
            interagency personnel that are assigned to other agencies.
            Desire is to make it career enhancing for individuals that are
            assigned as representatives or liaison officers to another
            agency of the Federal Government. For example when a military
            officer is assigned to DOS, this should be a career enhancing
            opportunity.
              e. Provide assistance and insights to SOUTHCOM J9 and staff
            in the transition of the command to an interagency
            organization.

                        united states naval ship comfort
        50. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, on March 5, 2007, President
    Bush said he would deploy one of the Navy's medical ships, the U.S.N.S.
    Comfort, to the SOUTHCOM AOR. The U.S.N.S. Comfort will make port calls
    in 12 countries--Belize, Guatemala, Panama, Nicaragua, El Salvador,
    Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Haiti, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and
    Suriname. President Bush said, ``the Comfort's doctors and nurses and
    health care professionals expect to treat 85,000 patients and conduct
    up to 15,000 surgeries.'' This is an important effort. How long will
    the deployment last and would you assess the potential impact?
        Admiral Stavridis. The U.S.N.S. Comfort deployment will last 4
    months. The ship will make humanitarian assistance stops in 12 cities
    in 12 countries. The distance the ship will travel is equivalent to a
    deployment to the Persian Gulf and back. This mission is all about
    caring through partnership. The Comfort's medical staff will partner
    with NGOs, international military and civilian medical professionals,
    and U.S. Government interagency health care providers. This deployment
    will build trust and cooperation with host nations and is a
    demonstration of the U.S. support and commitment to the entire SOUTHCOM
    AOR. The ship will provide life-changing care to thousands of people,
    which will make a lasting impression to all of those touched by the
    improved quality of life as a result of the Comfort's efforts.
    Additionally, U.S. personnel will gain valuable training in conducting
    humanitarian assistance; and through the relationships and experience
    gained will be postured to conduct future disaster relief missions.

                               china's influence
        51. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, an increasing presence of
    the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the region is an emerging
    dynamic that must not be ignored. How would you assess the PRC's
    growing economic interest and influence in the region and how concerned
    are you about it?
        Admiral Stavridis. PRC influence in Latin America is growing,
    mostly in the economic sphere. However, I am concerned long-term (20 or
    more years out) about the strategic implications if the current trends
    continue.

                         american hostages in colombia
        52. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, I appreciate that in your
    statement you recognized that a top priority in Colombia is the safe
    return of the three American hostages who have been held captive by the
    Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) for over 4 years. I would
    like an update on that situation.
        Admiral Stavridis. SOUTHCOM continues to work closely with the
    interagency and the Government of Colombia to safely recover the three
    American hostages being held by the FARC based on information
    available--Tom Howes, Keith Stansell, and Marc Gonsalvez. We are happy
    to provide an update at a classified level.

                                    colombia
        53. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, the United States has made a
    significant commitment of funds and material support to help Colombia
    and the Andean region fight drug trafficking since the development of
    Plan Colombia in 1999. In 2003, Colombia developed Plan Patriota, a
    multi-year, broadbased plan focused on military operations and social
    development. Can you assess inroads Colombia has made with regard to
    the eradication of illicit drug crops and improved security conditions?
        Admiral Stavridis. Our strategic partnership with Colombia remains
    a key priority. With our assistance, President Uribe has achieved
    tremendous success in helping to consolidate Colombia's democracy and
    to confront the country's drug traffickers and terrorists, but much
    remains to be done.
        The United States has no international partner more firmly
    committed to the elimination of drug crops and narcotics trafficking
    than the Government of Colombia (GOC). The GOC aerial eradication
    program has exceeded its goals in every one of the last 6 years. The
    Colombian manual eradication program was responsible for the
    elimination of 43,000 hectares of coca and poppy in 2006. Sustained
    eradication has reduced Colombian opium poppy cultivation by 68 percent
    since 2001, from 6,540 hectares to 2,100 hectares.
        Military and law enforcement presence has dramatically improved the
    security conditions in Colombia. In 2002, many municipalities lacked a
    public security presence. Today, all 1,098 municipalities in the
    country are covered. During Uribe's administration, kidnappings have
    decreased more than 80 percent, homicides by 40 percent, acts of
    terrorism by 63 percent and poverty rates fell 11 percent. Homicides in
    2006 were the lowest in 20 years. Colombia has supervised over 30,000
    terrorist demobilizations and 11,000 desertions from all subversive
    groups. Over 30,000 judges, investigators, public prosecutors, and
    defenders have received training in the implementation of the new
    accusatory system implemented to protect human rights, erase impunity,
    and bring criminals to justice.

        54. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, are we providing the
    Colombian military with the capacity they require to combat the FARC
    and other narcoterrorist organizations?
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, we are providing the Colombian military
    with the capacity they require to combat the FARC and other narco-
    terrorist organizations. SOUTHCOM enhances the joint capabilities of
    the Colombian military through a balanced approach that includes
    training, nonlethal equipping, and infrastructure. Examples of this
    type of support include $41 million provided this fiscal year of
    counternarcotics (CN) and counternarcoterrorism training (CNT), NCO
    development, medical training, riverine tactics and operations
    training, special operations training, and the aviation program being
    supported in Melgar by a technical assistance field team. We are also
    providing operational and logistic support worth $53 million. This
    included planning assistance, communications, information operations,
    contract support, fuel, contract airlift, aviation parts, medical
    equipment, and logistics and operations integration including
    infrastructure support. With our support, the Colombian military is
    achieving strategic success against the FARC and other narco-terrorist
    organizations. The FARC remains in an overall defensive posture as a
    result of aggressive Colombian military actions.

        55. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, what is the current level of
    support that SOUTHCOM provides to Plan Patriota and Plan Colombia?
        Admiral Stavridis. Our current level of support to the Government
    of Colombia and Colombian military is close to 80 percent of the total
    CN funds we receive every year to improve partner nation capabilities.
    U.S. SOUTHCOM directly supported the Colombian efforts in the form of
    operations, logistics, command and control, and infrastructure
    capabilities throughout the 6-year Plan Colombia and the 4-year Plan
    Patriota, and we continue to do so as the Colombian military executes
    its follow-on 4-year military campaign, Plan Consolidacion. Translating
    into numbers, U.S. SOUTHCOM support is close to $130 million out of the
    $170 million we dedicate for theater security cooperation in our AOR
    and a total of 267 military personnel and 119 contractors providing CN/
    CNT training and maintenance and logistics support.

        56. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, what can you tell us in open
    session about the activities of the FARC today?
        Admiral Stavridis. The FARC is a significantly weakened terrorist
    organization in comparison to what it was just a few short years ago.
    Since the implementation of President Uribe's Democratic Security
    Strategy, the group's ability to project power, terrorize citizens, and
    traffic narcotics has been greatly diminished.
        While 5 years ago the FARC enjoyed a safe haven the size of
    Switzerland in the center of Colombia, and saw its ranks swell to more
    17,000 terrorists under arms, today the group's entire leadership is on
    the run, under Colombian and U.S. indictment, and fields fewer than
    12,000 armed members. The conditions FARC members face worsen every day
    and since 2002 more than 6,400 FARC members have entered into the
    Government of Colombia's demobilization program. In order to stem the
    tide of desertions, the FARC has increasingly relied on the recruitment
    of children to fill the group's ranks.
        Though the FARC's offensive capability has been greatly diminished
    and the group can no longer directly challenge the Colombian military
    as it has in the past, the FARC maintains a capability to conduct
    small-scale, effective attacks against vulnerable Colombian military
    units, and bombings against Government of Colombia infrastructure.

                                   venezuela
        57. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, in testimony before this
    committee last March, General Craddock described his concern with
    Venezuela's influence in the region. In October 2006, General Craddock
    said that President Chavez has become a ``destabilizing'' force in the
    region. In February 7, 2007, testimony before the House Foreign Affairs
    Committee, Secretary of State Rice stated that she believes ``there's
    an assault on democracy in Venezuela'' and that ``the president of
    Venezuela is really destroying his own country economically,
    politically.'' How would you characterize Chavez's influence now?
        Admiral Stavridis. President Chavez continues to assert his
    personal dominion over all instruments of national power in Venezuela.
    In some countries, he has great influence; in others, he is tolerated.
    He has been using money and oil to generate greater influence. As an
    example of Chavez's increasing authoritarianism, on January 29, 2007,
    the Chavez-dominated Venezuelan National Assembly passed ``The Enabling
    Law.'' This Enabling Law transferred legislative power from the
    National Assembly directly to President Chavez and granted him special
    powers to issue executive decrees.

        58. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, what are his goals and
    ambitions in the region?
        Admiral Stavridis. President Chavez openly proclaims his intent is
    to lead a self-described ``Bolivarian'' revolution, with a strong anti-
    U.S. component.

        59. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, Venezuelan ties with Iranian
    leaders have become increasingly active. Are these ties exaggerated and
    where will these ties to Iran go next?
        Admiral Stavridis. I know that there have been at least 12 senior
    level visits between these countries, clearly showing a tie. The
    Venezuelan and Iranian presidents find a common voice in proselytizing
    against the United States. Both countries would like to lead an
    international anti-U.S. alignment.

        60. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, according to the DOS's April
    2006 terrorism report, Venezuela has virtually ceased its cooperation
    in the global war on terror. Colombian terrorist groups use Venezuelan
    territory for safe-haven, although it is unclear whether and to what
    extent the government of President Chavez provides material support to
    these terrorist groups and at what level. To what extent do you believe
    terrorist groups find safehaven in Venezuela?
        Admiral Stavridis. Pervasive corruption probably provides a degree
    of safe haven in Venezuela for terrorist groups. There have been
    several documented cases of FARC members, including high level FARC
    members, in Venezuela. In fact, one high-level FARC member, Rodrigo
    Granda, was captured in Venezuela in December 2004 where he apparently
    had lived openly.

                             central american gangs
        61. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis and Admiral Keating,
    especially troublesome is the growth of gangs and drug-related crimes
    across Central America, portions of the Caribbean, and in some cities
    in Brazil. The level of sophistication and brutality of these gangs is
    without precedent. How do you assess the threat of transnational gangs
    to U.S. national interests in the region?
        Admiral Stavridis and Admiral Keating.

              a. El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala continue to bear the
            brunt of gang activity. Central American gangs impact security
            in the United States as gangs increasingly engage in drug
            trafficking activities. Gangs pose a critical criminal threat
            to U.S. persons visiting Central America especially in San
            Salvador, Guatemala City, and Tegucigalpa. Brazilian gangs do
            not pose a direct threat to U.S. national interests; however,
            they do pose a critical criminal threat to U.S. persons
            visiting Brazil especially in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo.
              b. The threat posed by Mexican transnational gangs to U.S.
            national interests primarily stems from violent crime and drug-
            related activity throughout North America. These gangs focus on
            protecting their territory, mostly in urban areas, and building
            up power and money. Major Mara gangs in Mexico are Mara
            Salvatrucha (MS 13) and Mara 18. They are involved in
            kidnapping, extortion, drugs, and human trafficking. In October
            2005, Secretariat of Public Security Eduardo Medina Mora Icaza
            stated there were 5,000 MS 13 members and up to 15,000 Mara 18
            members in Mexico.

        62. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis and Admiral Keating, are
    contacts between gang members in Central America and the United States
    increasing?
        Admiral Stavridis and Admiral Keating.

              a. Contacts between Central American gang members and U.S.
            gang members have always existed. In fact, the Central American
            gangs Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) or Mara-18 first began in the
            United States Anecdotal information indicates movement between
            the United States and Central America may be increasing with
            gangs using their own smuggling routes to move their members to
            the United States.
              b. We have no specific information on this issue. Monitoring
            criminal gang activity within the United States is exclusively
            a civilian law enforcement responsibility unless it indicates a
            direct threat to DOD personnel or operations.

        63. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis and Admiral Keating, how do
    you assess contacts between Islamic extremists and Central American
    gangs?
        Admiral Stavridis. [Deleted.]
        Admiral Keating. [Deleted.]

                                tri-border area
        64. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, in recent years, U.S.
    concerns have increased over activities of the radical Lebanon-based
    Islamic group Hezbollah (Party of God) and the Sunni Muslim Palestinian
    group Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) in the tri-border area of
    Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, which has a large Muslim population.
    This area has long been used for arms and drug trafficking, contraband
    smuggling, document and currency fraud, money laundering, and the
    manufacture and movement of pirated goods. How active is Hezbollah and
    Hamas in raising funds among the sizable Muslim communities in the tri-
    border region?
        Admiral Stavridis. The triborder area (TBA) is perhaps South
    America's busiest and certainly most infamous smuggling and contraband
    center, however, it is just one of several areas in the region
    exploited by these groups. Nevertheless, there are numerous illicit
    activities taking place in the TBA that generate millions of dollars
    for a number of criminal and transnational organizations. Lebanese
    Hizballah (and to a lesser extent Hamas) have members and affiliates in
    the region actively engaged in leveraging legal and illegal economic
    mechanisms to fund their parent organizations.

        65. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, do these groups have an
    operational presence in the TBA?
        Admiral Stavridis. Hizballah, with support from its network(s) in
    the TBA, is suspected of having conducted terrorist attacks in Buenos
    Aires first in 1992 and then in 1994. Some of the people in the TBA
    that allegedly helped facilitate these attacks are still present, and
    could be used again in that capacity.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner
                       joint forces command headquarters
        66. Senator Warner. General Smith, it is my understanding that your
    headquarters and staff are currently located in multiple buildings and
    that the condition of one specific building, a World War II era
    facility currently used as part of your headquarters, is in very poor
    condition. Based on the importance of JFCOM contributions to the
    warfighters, coupled with its four mission areas which include joint
    innovation and experimentation, joint training, joint capabilities
    development, and serving as the joint force provider, what impact does
    your current facility have on your ability to effectively execute these
    missions?
        General Smith. The JFCOM headquarters staff in Norfolk operates out
    of 16 buildings on two separate Navy installations. Ten of the
    buildings are World War II era structures, eight of which were
    originally constructed as a naval hospital complex and are now well
    beyond their useful life. These buildings suffer from routine
    electrical irregularities, plumbing problems, leaking during inclement
    weather, mold and mildew problems, lead paint, asbestos, and an overall
    dilapidated condition. Anti-terrorism/force protection standoff
    requirements for vehicular traffic cannot be met. Of the six newer
    buildings, two are modular (temporary) structures accommodating about
    60 people and costing $150,000 per year to lease. Because no additional
    suitable office space exists on either Navy installation, most of the
    staff are assigned work spaces that are substantially smaller than the
    applicable DOD standard for their rank or staff function.
        The frequent requirement for maintenance and repair of these old
    structures is a constant drain on the Navy's budget. Recently we
    investigated the feasibility of renovating one of these buildings to
    make it minimally functional and determined that it would cost
    approximately $5.2 million to renovate roughly 33,000 square feet of
    office space ($158/SF). This includes removal of asbestos and lead
    paint. By comparison, the office and administrative space portion of
    the proposed JFCOM headquarters MILCON project will cost approximately
    $6.9 million for new construction of approximately 40,000 square feet
    ($173/SF), and the new building systems and exterior finishes will last
    for many years to come. Under the renovation scenario, we would
    continue to occupy space configured to support a World War II medical
    mission. With new construction, we would occupy space deliberately
    designed and built to support our mission.
        The current condition and configuration of our headquarters
    facilities does not prevent us from accomplishing any single aspect of
    our mission, but it obviously impedes our overall effectiveness in each
    of the mission areas. For instance, our J8 Directorate, whose primary
    responsibility is the development of joint capabilities, has a staff of
    208 people located in 7 separate buildings at the Naval Support
    Activity, Norfolk. The effect of having such a scattered arrangement is
    that the cohesiveness of the staff is strained daily, inhibiting
    effective communication and reducing the synergistic effects of
    physically working within the same office space. In addition, a
    significant amount of time is wasted daily simply in transit from
    building to building.

        67. Senator Warner. General Smith, what is the impact of the
    conditions of these facilities on the quality of life of the
    servicemembers and civilians who work there?
        General Smith. The condition of the facilities also has an effect
    on the morale of the staff. Although the actual extent of the effect of
    lower morale on work output cannot be measured without considerable
    research, the fact that there is a negative effect is self-evident. Our
    staff is highly capable intellectually and technically, and the work
    ethic at JFCOM remains excellent. Even so, having to accomplish a
    future-focused, complex, and important mission in less-than-adequate
    facilities can be frustrating and discouraging, even for the best in
    the business.

        68. Senator Warner. General Smith, can you provide us your
    assessment regarding the priority you place on the construction of a
    new headquarters facility and what direct impact such a facility would
    have on your mission?
        General Smith. The provision of a new headquarters facility would
    give us full capability to accomplish our mission. It would allow us to
    consolidate the Norfolk-based staff into a single facility, improving
    the cohesiveness of the staff and significantly improving the corporate
    climate and morale. A new headquarters facility would allow JFCOM to
    shed the lease cost of its modular facilities and the Navy to relieve
    itself of the massive investment cost to continually renovate 65-year-
    old decaying buildings. I therefore consider the JFCOM headquarters a
    high priority.

                            interrogation operations
        69. Senator Warner. Admiral Stavridis, the Detainee Treatment Act
    which states that ``no person in the custody or under the effective
    control of the DOD or under detention in a DOD facility shall be
    subject to any treatment or technique of interrogation not authorized
    by and listed in the United States Army Field Manual on Intelligence
    Interrogation.'' How do you and staff at SOUTHCOM conduct oversight of
    interrogation operations at Guantanamo to ensure compliance with the
    requirements of?
        Admiral Stavridis. Prior to my assumption of command of U.S.
    SOUTHCOM, the provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 had
    already been implemented at JTF-Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO). Specifically, I
    have been Senate Armed Services Committee advised that, on 1 January
    2006, General John Craddock (former Commander, U.S. SOUTHCOM) directed
    compliance with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and that Major
    General Jay Hood (former Commander, JTF-GTMO) confirmed, on 2 January
    2006, that JTF-GTMO was in compliance with the Detainee Treatment Act.
        Additionally, on 22 January 2007, I issued specific instructions to
    JTF-GTMO concerning the implementation of DOD Directive 2310.01E, The
    DOD Detainee Program, and Field Manual (FM) 2-22.3, Human Intelligence
    Collector Operations. This guidance repeated the provision of the
    Detainee Treatment Act that mandates the only interrogation approaches
    and techniques authorized for use at JTF-GTMO are those authorized by
    and listed in FM 2-22.3. Rear Admiral Harry Harris (current Commander,
    JTF-GTMO) confirmed, on 27 January 2007, that JTF-GTMO remains in
    compliance with U.S. law, including the Detainee Treatment Act. Rear
    Admiral Harris issued a policy memorandum to remind all personnel
    assigned to JTF-GTMO that they must be knowledgeable of and at all
    times in compliance with U.S. law and applicable DOD policies.
        In exercising oversight of detention and interrogation operations,
    I have, since assuming command 6 months ago in October 2006, personally
    visited Guantanamo three times. During those visits, I have been
    briefed extensively by JTF-GTMO personnel on both detention and
    intelligence matters. Additionally, I exercise oversight and maintain
    awareness of camp operations through the receipt of daily situation
    reports from JTF-GTMO, weekly communications with the Rear Admiral
    Harris, and through a multi-disciplined U.S. SOUTHCOM Detainee
    Coordination Team, which interacts daily with JTF-GTMO.

        70. Senator Warner. Admiral Stavridis, do you believe that the
    Services and other elements of the DOD are proving you with
    interrogators that clearly understand the requirements of the Detainee
    Treatment Act?
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, from my constant interactions with Rear
    Admiral Harris, my personal observations from my visits to Guantanamo,
    and reports from my staff, I firmly believe that all interrogators at
    JTF-GTMO, both military and civilian, understand the requirements of
    and comply with the Detainee Treatment Act and other applicable laws
    and policies.

                          future of cheyenne mountain
        71. Senator Warner. Admiral Keating, as I reviewed your written
    statement, I did not see any mention of your plans related to the
    Cheyenne Mountain Complex near your headquarters in Colorado Springs,
    CO. Cheyenne Mountain is the original home of NORAD and serves us today
    as the center for a worldwide system of satellites, radars, and sensors
    providing early warnings of missile or space threat to North America. I
    am aware that you are studying the continued operation and cost to run
    Cheyenne Mountain with the potential to either shut it down or reduce
    operations. Can you provide this committee an update on the status of
    your review?
        Admiral Keating. [Deleted.]

        72. Senator Warner. Admiral Keating, what are the costs and
    benefits to continuing to operate this huge underground complex?
        Admiral Keating. [Deleted.]

        73. Senator Warner. Admiral Keating, what will you gain by shutting
    it down?
        Admiral Keating. Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station (CMAFS) will
    not shut down. Currently NORAD and U.S. NORTHCOM's Cheyenne Mountain
    Directorate consists of approximately 20 percent of the total number of
    people assigned to CMAFS; the rest of the people assigned to Cheyenne
    Mountain belong to other commands such as U.S. STRATCOM and Air Force
    Space Command.
        Cheyenne Mountain will continue to operate as an Alternate Command
    Center for NORAD and U.S. NORTHCOM, a training facility for Initial
    Qualification Training and a facility for many other operations not
    associated with NORAD and U.S. NORTHCOM.

        74. Senator Warner. Admiral Stavridis, how will shutting Cheyenne
    Mountain down or reducing operations affect NORAD's ability to continue
    to guard the skies and to provide an early warning of potential air and
    space threats?
        Admiral Stavridis. The impetus for moving Cheyenne Mountain
    Directorate missions and people to the NORAD and U.S. NORTHCOM Command
    Center at Peterson Air Force Base, CO, is to gain operational
    efficiencies and improve unity of effort between the two commands. The
    integration of NORAD and U.S. NORTHCOM Command Center functions will
    result in improved worldwide situational awareness and enhanced mission
    planning and execution through a single integrated command center
    charged with responding to the full spectrum of security threats to
    North America.
                                     ______

                 Question Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
             western hemisphere institute for security cooperation
        75. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Stavridis, WHINSEC is a critical
    member of the U.S. community of military education and training
    institutions. WHINSEC provides invaluable opportunities and instruction
    to military, civilians, and police from the countries within the
    Western Hemisphere to solve regional problems. I commend your efforts
    to strengthen the peace and security of the continent, as they are
    critical to the national security of the United States. As a member of
    the WHINSEC Board of Visitors, I take very seriously my role in
    oversight of WHINSEC's programs and activities. Please discuss the role
    WHINSEC plays in the promotion of democracy and human rights in Central
    and South America, and elaborate on the education and training provided
    by the school.
        Admiral Stavridis. The institute's Democracy and Human Rights
    Program is ambitious and effective. It is a vital educational
    experience for a new generation of security forces throughout the
    Western Hemisphere security forces committed to the rule of law and
    respect for democratic values and international human rights rules.
    WHINSEC provides civilians, military, and law enforcement officers, and
    U.S. military officers, professional education which supports the
    democratic principles of our hemisphere.
        On a daily basis, WHINSEC-trained officials are making significant
    contributions to stability and security operations in the hemisphere
    and throughout the world. WHINSEC training programs are first rate:
    effectively and efficiently building partner nation security capacity
    on an indispensable foundation of support to democratic governance,
    subordination to civil authority, and respect for human rights. The
    institute is also indispensable to fostering regional relationships
    essential to hemispheric security cooperation. WHINSEC's programs--
    which train almost 1,000 Latin American officials annually--include a
    wide variety of courses ranging from peace and counterdrug operations,
    democratic sustainment, medical assistance, leadership development, and
    civil-military operations, to name just a few.

        [Whereupon, at 11:24 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2008

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, MARCH 29, 2007

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                       POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:50 a.m. in room
    SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
    E. Benjamin Nelson, Webb, McCain, Warner, Inhofe, Collins, and
    Martinez.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Creighton Greene,
    professional staff member; Thomas K. McConnell, professional
    staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
    Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
    staff member; Pablo E. Carrillo, minority investigative
    counsel; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; David M.
    Morriss, minority counsel; Christopher J. Paul, professional
    staff member; Sean G. Stackley, professional staff member; and
    Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
        Staff assistants present: David G. Collins, Kevin A.
    Cronin, and Micah H. Harris.
        Committee members' assistants present: Joseph Axelrad,
    assistant to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
    Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
    Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Sandra Luff and
    Samuel Zega, assistants to Senator Warner; Jeremy Shull,
    assistant to Senator Inhofe; Mark J. Winter, assistant to
    Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator
    Chambliss; Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; Stuart C.
    Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune; and Brian W. Walsh,
    assistant to Senator Martinez.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. We will come to order and quickly adjourn
    because of up to five more votes in the Senate. I had hoped to
    be able to announce that right at 9:30 a.m., but I was looking
    for the ranking member while the ranking member was looking for
    me. So we will adjourn to the call of the chair, but I expect
    that that will be some time around 10:45 a.m. So you have all
    been around here long enough to know that the Senate operates
    that way. We do not have a Rules Committee, which means we are
    sometimes unruly, and so we will stand adjourned to the call of
    the chair. Thank you for your patience. [Recess from 9:51 a.m.
    to 10:48 a.m.]
        Good morning again, everybody. We welcome Secretary Winter,
    Admiral Mullen, and General Conway back to the committee this
    morning. We are most appreciative of the patience that you have
    all shown because of the operation of the Senate this morning
    and we are, more importantly, grateful to you for your service
    to the Nation, for the valorous and truly professional men and
    women that you command.
        You are faced with a number of critical issues that
    confront the Department of the Navy in balancing your
    modernization needs against the costs of supporting ongoing
    operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some of those challenges
    center on acquisition programs. Within the Navy, we have
    concerns about the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. This was
    intended to be a ship that the Navy could acquire relatively
    inexpensively and relatively quickly. As it turns out, it looks
    like the LCS program may fill neither bill. Once again, we are
    presented with a program with significant cost growth, which at
    least in part is driven by the Service's changing requirements
    after the design and construction contract was signed.
        In the Marine Corps programs, we have seen significant cost
    growth on the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program. So
    we will need to understand what has caused the cost problems
    there and what steps are being taken to correct them.
        In the case of the Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP)
    Vehicle program, we have concerns about how aggressively the
    Marine Corps and the Army are acquiring these vehicles that
    have the potential to provide greater protection to our forces
    deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, and we just, on the floor of
    the Senate, took action that hopefully will expedite that.
        With the LCS and the EFV acquisition situations, there are
    significant questions about acquisition management. In the case
    of the LCS in particular, why were not the Navy and the
    contractor teams better able to see the problems sooner, how
    could we have gotten to the point that the program was just
    months away from running out of money when no alarms had been
    sounded up the acquisition chain of command? We would also be
    interested in hearing from Secretary Winter about what actions
    he believes the Department should take to strengthen
    acquisition oversight and restore confidence in the Navy's
    ability to manage major acquisition programs.
        On the LCS issue, we are disappointed that many of the
    revelations came to the committee via the press. The Navy
    should be taking extra care to ensure transparency with the
    congressional oversight committees about the acquisition
    process and we can only deal effectively with one another if
    the environment of prompt and open information exchange
    prevails.
        Another concern surrounds future force levels. We are
    facing the prospect that the current Department of the Navy
    program will lead to potentially large gaps between the forces
    that the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has said he needs and
    the forces that will be available to his successors. In one
    case, the CNO has said that the Navy needs to have 48 attack
    submarines to meet combatant commander requirements, but we are
    faced with the risk of falling well short of that goal for more
    than 10 years starting during the next decade.
        In another case, under current plans for tactical aircraft
    acquisition we are facing a shortfall of as many as 150
    tactical fighters needed to outfit our 10 aircraft carrier air
    wings. With shortfalls that large, we could be faced with
    drastically reducing the number of aircraft available on short
    notice to the combatant commanders, either because we have
    deployed understrength air wings or because we did not deploy
    the carrier at all because of these aircraft shortages.
        On a more positive note, we very much appreciate the fact
    that our witnesses provided their prepared testimony within the
    requested time frame. This is a very important development. It
    is always helpful for the members to have adequate time to read
    these statements before the hearing.
        Again, we thank you all for your service to this Nation. We
    know you face a number of very difficult challenges and we look
    forward to your testimony and to the questions that may be
    asked of you this morning.
        Senator McCain.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I join you in
    welcoming our distinguished witnesses. General Conway, Admiral
    Mullen, and Secretary Winter, I thank you for your service and
    for appearing for this very important hearing.
        Obviously, defending our Nation against its enemies is the
    primary responsibility of the government and resourcing our
    military to defend the Nation requires an appropriate working
    relationship between industry, the Department of Defense (DOD),
    and Congress with an eye toward faithful and efficient
    expenditure of every taxpayer dollar. For the Navy and Marine
    Corps, this comes down to ships and aircraft, ordnance and
    armor, and a trained force of sailors and marines.
        In reviewing the budget request for fiscal year 2008,
    including the 2007 supplemental funding request and the 2008
    request for the global war on terror, I am encouraged by the
    Navy's and Marine Corps's efforts to accurately determine and
    fund force reset, to fully fund readiness and manpower
    requirements, and to invest in the development of future
    capabilities.
        I commend the CNO and the Commandant of the Marine Corps
    for maintaining the integrity of the unfunded priority lists
    (UPLs) by keeping them at an appropriate size. Not all the
    Services were as responsible and in the case of the CNO, I
    commend you for including in the Navy's unfunded priorities
    those equipment and readiness requirements of the Navy Reserve.
    I particularly appreciate the Marine Corps commitment to
    increasing its end strength and I'm interested in your
    assessment of the plan to grow the force to 202,000 marines
    over the next 4 years.
        I look forward to hearing from the Commandant about current
    efforts to surge two additional combat battalions to Iraq and
    to meet the Corps' most urgent requirements for force
    protection and armored vehicles, most notably the MRAP
    Vehicles.
        Additionally, we are approaching a major milestone in
    Marine Corps aviation, with initial deployment of the MV-22
    Osprey planned for the fall. I am confident you will ensure
    that the safety and reliability of this aircraft will meet the
    aviation community's high standards of readiness prior to
    assignment for combat operations.
        I am also encouraged by the significant strides that the
    Navy has made in addressing steaming days and flying hour
    requirements. In addition, I am pleased that the Navy has
    submitted a shipbuilding request that substantially increases
    the Navy's investment in shipbuilding for 2008. However, I am
    troubled by the continuing downward trends in the size of our
    fleet and naval air force, trends that must be broken lest the
    freedom of the seas which we so enjoy today will slip loose.
        I understand that the Navy has proposed legislation to
    reduce the number of aircraft carriers from 11 to 10. I am
    opposed to such a reduction and look forward to hearing from
    you on this considerable change to our national maritime
    strategy.
        In considering this budget request, we must come to grips
    with approaching shortfalls in our numbers of aircraft
    carriers, strike fighter aircraft, submarines, and amphibious
    lift. Shipbuilding in particular appears locked into a spiral
    of increasing costs, evidenced most recently by the LCS
    program. This affordability dilemma or, more correctly, the
    affordability crisis, cannot be resolved by merely raising the
    budgets for shipbuilding. Simply put, last year you brought us
    a requirement to build to a fleet of 313 ships to meet the
    potentials that we see beginning to emerge today. Last year we
    were 281 ships strong. This year we are 276 ships, and the
    Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates the cost of
    building the 313-ship Navy may be as high as $20 billion per
    year. That estimate greatly exceeds the Navy's estimate of $15
    billion per year and, unfortunately, our confidence in Navy
    estimates has suffered a setback.
        Secretary Winter, I greatly appreciate your focused efforts
    to right the ship, so to speak, of the Navy and Marine Corps
    major programs that have threatened to founder over the past
    year. Recent developments on the LCS program and the EFV point
    to serious acquisition failures in both Services. But your
    immediate steps to stop work, hold responsible acquisition
    officials accountable, and seek fixed price agreements on the
    LCS program, and your restructuring of the failing EFV program
    serve as examples of leadership in an acquisition process that
    is in desperate need for reform.
        I have long called for an examination of the whole
    procurement process as it works today in DOD. Accordingly, I am
    interested in your thoughts on how we can work together in
    striking a course in acquisition that brings the Navy's
    affordability imperatives into line with its mission
    requirements.
        I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses. Thank
    you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
        Secretary Winter.

       STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD C. WINTER, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

        Secretary Winter. Thank you very much, Chairman Levin,
    Senator McCain, and members of the committee. Thank you for the
    opportunity to appear before this committee this morning.
        Today I am joined by Admiral Mullen and General Conway, two
    outstanding leaders whose dedication to the Navy and Marine
    Corps is apparent to all who have had the pleasure of working
    with them. Each of us has prepared a statement for the record,
    which we respectfully submit.
        Chairman Levin. They will be made part of the record.
        Secretary Winter. Thank you, sir.
        These documents outline in detail this Department's
    priorities, the strategic thinking behind them, and the funding
    requests that are necessary to support them. Our priorities
    presented in the fiscal year 2008 budget and the global war on
    terror request encompass both long-term and short-term
    requirements. The short-term imperatives include supporting
    marines and sailors in the field, funding the urgent
    requirements, such as the MRAP Vehicle program, and making up
    for the losses of vehicles, equipment, and aircraft that have
    been incurred in combat operations.
        At the same time, we must provide for the critical needs of
    the Navy and the Marine Corps of the future. To that end, the
    Department of the Navy is pursuing an unprecedented
    modernization program across the full spectrum of our weapons
    platforms in both the Navy and Marine Corps. This drive to
    transform the force is necessary and vital to our national
    security.
        The current transformation entails a shift from a blue
    water centric fleet to one with greater capability in brown and
    green water operations. This shift in focus reflects a greater
    demand for expeditionary capability, a capability that will
    allow us to operate in the littorals. The broad transformation
    now under way includes a new generation of ships, submarines,
    and aircraft, with programs in development, production, or
    already in operation with the fleet.
        Some of the Department of the Navy's new programs have
    encountered significant challenges. The Navy's LCS program and
    the Marine Corps' EFV program are both innovative weapons
    platforms incorporating new technologies. We are working on
    solving the problems that have arisen so that we can deliver
    vitally needed capabilities to our warfighters. Both of these
    programs represent the kind of capabilities that the future
    Navy and Marine Corps will need to fight and win the wars of
    tomorrow.
        Faced with a dangerous, uncertain world, with terrorist
    enemies, states that actively support or condone them, and
    rising powers with intentions and capabilities that lack
    transparency, we have no choice but to improve our own
    capabilities.
        Mr. Chairman, the Department of the Navy's fiscal year 2008
    budget request is critical to both the short-term and long-term
    national security of the United States. We thank you for your
    continued support for our efforts to meet our constitutional
    obligations to provide for the common defense of the American
    people. I look forward to answering your questions.
        Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Winter follows:]
                  Prepared Statement by Hon. Donald C. Winter
                                i. introduction
        Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and members of the committee, it
    is an honor to appear before you representing the brave men and women
    of the United States Navy and the United States Marine Corps--Active,
    Reserve, and civilian over 800,000 strong.
        Over the past year, I have had many opportunities to meet with
    sailors and marines who are stationed both within the continental
    United States and abroad. I have traveled three times to the Central
    Command Area of Responsibility including Iraq. During my visits I have
    had countless conversations with our young sailors and marines. I am
    continually amazed at how dedicated and committed they are to carrying
    out their duties--without question, without complaint. Our sailors and
    marines recognize the significance of their mission. They remain
    determined to win the current war and are committed to defending our
    Nation against future threats. They are the very best and they deserve
    the very best from their leadership in the Pentagon and on Capitol
    Hill.
        Today, I am here to present the Department of the Navy's plan to
    support our sailors and marines in their mission to fight the global
    war on terror and to defend our Nation against future challenges. I
    believe the President's fiscal year 2008 budget request for the Navy
    and Marine Corps provides them what they need and I ask that you
    support this request--submitted to Congress on February 5, 2007.
        The Department of the Navy's budget signifies a vital investment in
    our Navy and Marine Corps. In its totality, this budget represents $160
    billion in requested funding for fiscal year 2008, including the
    estimated costs of the global war on terror.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ ``Highlights of the Department of the Navy's fiscal year 2008
    budget,'' p. 1-15.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        These funds are essential in enabling the Department of the Navy to
    maintain current readiness, sustain the operational tempo in the global
    war on terror, support the quality of life of our sailors, marines, and
    their families, while preparing for a future of uncertainty. Our
    priorities for fiscal year 2008 are simply stated:

            We will:

              1. Fight the global war on terror by investing in the present
            needs of our Navy and Marine Corps, while we
              2. Prepare for future challenges by investing in our people,
            facilities, and capabilities.

        The development of this budget has not been easy--tough decisions
    have been made and continue to be made throughout the Department to
    balance risk and to be responsible stewards of the tax dollars
    entrusted to us. Yet, we believe that this budget is appropriately
    structured and is a necessary investment to successfully meet both our
    present and future challenges.
        The difficulty of preparing for future challenges has been striking
    the proper balance between building capabilities to support traditional
    and irregular warfare demands while transforming a blue water navy into
    one that can operate, fight, and win in blue, green, and brown waters,
    and expanding the lethality and reach of the Marine Corps.
        Justification of every program is important for Congress to
    understand the Department's intent and rationale, and we will do so.
    For the sake of brevity in this statement I will not go into detail on
    each program. Instead, I will call attention to areas crucial to our
    budget submission and I ask that the ``Highlights of the Department of
    the Navy's Fiscal Year 2008 Budget'' book be submitted for the record
    as part of my statement.
                          ii. investing in the present
    Fighting the Global War on Terror
        As we come before you today, I do not have to remind you that we
    are a Nation in our 6th year of a long, irregular, and global war. Your
    naval forces--sailors, marines, and civilians--are engaged at home and
    around the world today in a full spectrum of operations in support of
    this war. They have answered the call to defend the Nation and they are
    carrying out their duties superbly. Yet while focusing on the present
    needs of the global war on terror, we must also keep a keen eye on an
    ever evolving strategic environment around the globe. The pace of
    change in today's world is very rapid. We have witnessed events--such
    as North Korea's nuclear test last October and China's test of an anti-
    satellite weapon this past January--that can change our strategic
    calculations overnight. Even as these changes occur, our sailors and
    marines continue to stand guard across the world.
        As I speak to you today, there are over 50,000 sailors and marines
    serving in the Central Command Area of Responsibility. Of those, over
    21,000 marines and 12,000 sailors are serving on the ground in Iraq and
    Afghanistan. It also includes over 8,000 sailors deployed as Individual
    Augmentees (IA) and 4,500 performing ``in-lieu-of'' missions often
    serving in nontraditional capacities but adding to the warfighting
    capability of our military forces with their expertise. Additionally,
    over 700 sailors and marines are in the Horn of Africa. Finally, on any
    given day, approximately 30 percent of our ships and submarines and
    over 45,000 of our sailors are deployed worldwide serving in, on, or
    over the world's oceans.
        We are also key players in executing the President's new strategy
    in Iraq. The strategy requires increased coalition military and
    civilian resources to include an additional two battalions of marines
    to strengthen control of the Al Anbar Province. Approximately 4,000
    additional sailors and marines will be part of this effort.
        This ongoing pace of operations in fighting the global war on
    terror has had a financial impact on the Department of the Navy.
    Approximately 40-50 percent of the fleet continues to be at sea. This,
    coupled with the increased deployment of marines across the globe, has
    placed a strain on our resources. The 2008 global war on terror request
    represents a critical investment in providing the adequate resources
    necessary to prosecute and win the global war on terror. The Department
    of the Navy is seeking approximately $20 billion to directly support
    prosecution of the global war on terror and to reset the force.
    Safeguarding our Forces in Harms Way
        Before we deploy our brave men and women in harm's way we must do
    everything in our power to invest in their protection. Therefore, we
    are investing in measures to counter and protect our men and women from
    Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) with such platforms as the Mine
    Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle. We are transitioning to a
    newly designed Modular Tactical Vest and are committed to providing the
    best head protection to our warfighters. We are also investing in
    measures I am personally involved with seeking improved acquisition
    processes which will accelerate fielding of these new technologies.
        Unavoidably, with war comes the tragedy of loss of life and injury
    to our young men and women. We are committed to providing the best
    medical care on and off the battlefield. The treatment of patients has
    been greatly enhanced by improvements in medical capabilities at the
    personal, unit,and organizational levels--yet we must never be
    satisfied with where we are. We will continue to seek advancements in
    medical care. Care for our wounded does not end at the field hospital.
    We continue to aggressively monitor post-deployment mental health
    screenings as well as, suicides, domestic violence, and divorce rates
    and to assure the quality long-term physical and psychological welfare
    of our sailors and marines.
    Resetting the Force
        While we endeavor to provide what is needed, we also recognize that
    war is a costly business, and this one is no different. Our sailors and
    marines will always do what it takes, but there is a significant
    price--not only in their personal sacrifices--but also in the financial
    cost of operations and on the equipment that we provide them. We must
    continue to invest in the present needs of our warfighters.
        The ongoing intense combat operations and high operational tempo
    have had a significant impact on the quality, operability, and service
    life of Navy and Marine Corps equipment--it is imperative that we
    support our brave men and women by replacing our rapidly aging
    equipment. In many cases it makes no sense to replace aging legacy
    equipment with more of the same. In the case where it makes smart
    financial or operational sense, we are purchasing next generation
    equipment and platforms to replace combat losses. Resetting the Navy
    and Marine Corps is essential, and we are investing significant
    resources to restore our combat capability and readiness. The fiscal
    year 2008 global war on terror request includes $3.8 billion--$2.1
    billion for the Navy, $1.7 billion for the Marine Corps--toward reset
    requirements. These funds will refurbish or replace equipment damaged
    or lost during combat operations and restore the capability and
    readiness of the Navy and Marine Corps for future threats and
    operations. It should be noted that the reset requirement is dynamic
    and changes as conditions change.\2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ ``Highlights of the Department of the Navy's Fiscal Year 2008
    Budget,'' p. 2-10.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          iii. investing in the future
        As we fight the global war on terrorism, we cannot forget that the
    security challenges of the 21st century are complex and varied. They
    range from the irregular, asymmetric threats of terrorists, and rogue
    states, to the sophisticated military technology of future peer
    competitors. The Department has also been called upon to conduct
    disaster relief and humanitarian assistance missions--often being the
    first to respond to natural disasters around the world as in the case
    of the 2005 Indian Ocean tsunami, the earthquake in Pakistan and
    Hurricane Katrina in the Gulf Coast. Naval forces are uniquely balanced
    to address these diverse strategic challenges with the capability and
    capacity to rapidly project power anywhere in the world. We must
    continue to invest in this capability. We cannot allow ourselves to be
    fixated on one threat alone.
        Preparing for an uncertain future demands that the seas of the
    world remain safe for all nations. The Department of the Navy strongly
    supports U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. Joining the
    Convention, with the declarations and understandings reflected in
    Executive Report 108-10 (Senate Foreign Relations Committee), will
    enable the United States to exercise a leadership role in the future
    development of oceans law and policy. As a non-party, the United States
    does not have access to the Convention's formal processes in which over
    150 nations participate in influencing future law of the sea
    developments, and is therefore less able to promote and protect our
    security and commercial interests. Additionally, by providing legal
    certainty and stability for the world's largest maneuver space, the
    Convention furthers a core goal of our National Security Strategy to
    promote the rule of law around the world.
        This is also a time of unprecedented change in the Department of
    the Navy. We are executing a major transformation of the force at the
    same time that we are executing an array of operations in the global
    war on terror. This transformation is about people as much as it is
    about equipment.
    Investing in our People
        The development and retention of quality people are vital to our
    continued success. America's naval forces are combat-ready due to the
    dedication and motivation of individual sailors, marines, civilians,
    and their families. The Department is committed to taking care of them
    by sustaining our quality-of-service/quality-of-life programs,
    including training, compensation, and promotion opportunities, health
    care, housing, and reasonable operational and personnel tempo. The cost
    of manpower is the single greatest factor in the fiscal year 2008
    budget, but it is money well spent. We must continue to recruit,
    retain, and provide for our sailors and marines.
        Recruiting and Retention
        We continue to invest in programs to recruit the right people,
    retain the right people, and achieve targeted attrition. The fiscal
    year 2008 budget requests a 3-percent raise in military base pay. This
    investment along with increased enlistment and re-enlistment bonuses,
    is necessary if we are to continue to man our forces with the highest
    levels of ability and character. These citizens are in high demand
    everywhere; since we ask so much of them, we owe them proper
    compensation. The Navy and Marine Corps are currently meeting
    recruiting and retention goals for most ratings and designators in the
    Active and Reserve components. In fiscal year 2006, Navy achieved 100
    percent of its overall active component enlisted recruiting goal and
    the Marine Corps also achieved over 100 percent of its accession goal.
        Navy and Marine Corps End Strength
        To avoid an adverse toll on our sailors, marines, and their
    families, and to prevent a decrease in readiness, the Secretary of
    Defense established a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio goal for all Active
    component forces. Our goal for the Marine Corps is to achieve that 1:2
    deployment-to-dwell ratio for Active component units and 1:5 for
    Reserve units. Currently, the deployment length for Marine units in
    Iraq is 7 months.
        While our recruiting remains at impressive levels, it is important
    to focus on sizing the Department to achieve its overall objectives. As
    we develop and build more efficient and automated ships, aircraft, and
    combat systems, personnel reductions are inevitable; yet the skill
    level and specialization requirements increase. The Navy has reduced
    its end strength by approximately 40,000 over the last 5 years, and as
    we look ahead to more capable ships entering service in the next few
    years, we anticipate a stabilization of that trend at an end strength
    of about 320,000-325,000.
        For the Marine Corps the proposed increase to our Active component
    end strength to 202,000 marines, by 2011, is an investment in reducing
    the strain on the individual marines and the institution of the Marine
    Corps while ensuring the Marine Corps can provide trained forces in
    support of other contingencies. Our first task will be to build three
    new infantry battalions and their supporting structure--approximately
    4,000 marines. We will then systematically build the additional units
    and individuals on a schedule of approximately 5,000 marines per year.
        National Security Personnel System
        It is important to note that while a considerable investment is
    taking place in the uniformed workforce, we are also placing emphasis
    on creating a proficient civilian workforce, whose pay and promotions
    are performance-based. Deployment of the National Security Personnel
    System began in fiscal year 2006 and continued through fiscal year
    2007. A significant portion, over 50,000 employees, are scheduled to
    transition at the start of fiscal year 2008.
        Safety
        Fundamental to taking care of our sailors, marines, and DON
    civilian employees is establishing a culture and environment where
    safety is an intrinsic and critical component of all decisionmaking,
    both on- and off-duty. Safety directly affects the readiness of our
    fighting forces and significant Mishap Reductions remains a key
    department-wide objective in fiscal year 2008. We are refining our
    concept of Operational Risk Management, which calls for assessing risks
    prior to an evolution and then implementing mitigating actions during
    the evolution, to ensure it is more widely accepted and employed by our
    younger sailors and marines when making decisions off duty. We have
    placed great emphasis on reducing Private Motor Vehicle (PMV) mishap
    rates through new policy changes we believe will help reduce needless
    PMV-related injuries and fatalities. Other safety initiatives are aimed
    at the reduction of aviation mishaps and improving safety in the
    workplace.
    Investing in Our Facilities
        Essential to recruiting and retaining the right people is
    maintaining their quality of life and service. The Department of the
    Navy continues to invest in our sailors and marines by sustaining our
    quality-of-life/quality-of-service programs and by ensuring quality
    housing and facilities in which to live, work, and train. We are
    developing Global Infrastructure Plans to analyze bottom line facility
    requirements. The Department of the Navy has been aggressively
    eliminating excess facilities and is on track to its footprint of 23.9
    million square feet by 2013.
        Military Construction
        The fiscal year 2008 budget invests over $2.1 billion toward 64
    military construction projects for our active Navy and Marine Corps and
    10 projects for our Reserve Forces.
        Base Realignment and Closure
        The fiscal year 2008 budget continues to fund Base Realignment and
    Closure (BRAC) initiatives. We are requesting $733.7 million in the
    fiscal year 2008 budget submission to continue implementation of the
    2005 BRAC Commission recommendations. The fiscal year 2008 request
    invests in construction (including planning and design), operational
    movements at key closure and realignment locations, and the necessary
    environmental studies at receiving locations to fulfill National
    Environmental Policy Act requirements.
        Carrier Homeporting
        Consistent with the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Navy plans
    to adjust its force posture to base at least six ``operationally
    available'' carriers in the Pacific while maintaining the flexibility
    to respond to threats around the world.\4\ The Navy will achieve the
    six Pacific carrier posture in fiscal year 2010 when the U.S.S. Carl
    Vinson (CVN-70) is homeported to the Pacific.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ ``2006 Quadrennial Defense Review,'' p. 47.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Realignment of our Forces in the Western Pacific
        As part of the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), a change in
    the U.S.-Japan alliance to the security environment, the United States
    and the Government of Japan signed an agreement for the relocation of
    some marines from Okinawa to Guam. This realignment requires a
    commitment to investment in our Western Pacific area of operations. The
    fiscal year 2008 budget invests $28 million for planning and
    continuation of the Environmental Impact Analysis.
    Investment in Capabilities
        To meet the demands of the global war on terror and the uncertain
    threats of the future, the Department of the Navy must also invest in
    new generation capabilities and to transform the force. We must
    continue an acquisition program which seeks to build a fleet that is
    both affordable and meets the national security challenges of the 21st
    century. It must cover all facets of the surface, subsurface, and
    aviation requirements. We must also invest in our expeditionary forces
    providing them with the capabilities to remain always ready and always
    capable of forcible entry. Our fiscal year 2008 baseline budget invests
    almost $46 billion for procurement programs.
        As we invest in our naval force it is critical that we pursue a
    program of stable transformation. The core products that the Navy and
    Marine Corps buy face a significant time constraint--we go into battle
    with assets that are built many years in advance; and a stable
    transformation can only be achieved if the Department of the Navy, in
    conjunction with Congress, follow a long-term path of program
    stability.
        Building a Fleet for the Future
        We have initiated an aggressive investment strategy to build an
    affordable 313-ship fleet tailored to support the National Defense
    Strategy and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. The Department plans
    to procure seven ships \5\ in fiscal year 2008 for the United States
    Navy, and we are serving as the executive agent for one Joint High-
    Speed Vessel for the United States Army--an investment of over $14.2
    billion toward shipbuilding and conversion.\6\ As required by Congress,
    the Department of the Navy recently submitted its 30-year shipbuilding
    plan which reinforces the 313-ship fleet introduced last year.\7\ The
    fiscal year 2008 30-year shipbuilding plan, unchanged from the fiscal
    year 2007 plan, represents the Departments commitment to creating
    programs of stability and predictability which in turn minimizes
    disruption in shipbuilding and creates efficiency and effectiveness in
    our industrial base.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ ``Highlights of the Department of the Navy's Fiscal Year 2008
    Budget,'' P. 3-5.
        \6\ ``Highlights of the Department of the Navy's Fiscal Year 2008
    Budget'', P. 1-15.
        \7\ Department of the Navy 30-year Shipbuilding Plan, submitted to
    Congress on Feb. 5, 2007.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The fiscal year 2008 budget continues investment in the shift to
    next generation warships. The surface ships and submarines which make
    up the fleet of the future will be more capable than ever to respond to
    enhanced threats across the globe. Several critical shipbuilding
    programs in support of the 30-year shipbuilding plan include:

             The lead ship of the CVN-21 Program--Gerald R. Ford
            (CVN-78) with expected delivery in 2015--will replace U.S.S.
            Enterprise (CVN-65). Program funding is requested over 2 years
            with 40 percent, approximately $2.7 billion, in fiscal year
            2008 and the remaining 60 percent in fiscal year 2009.
             The DDG-1000 program, formerly known as the DDX, is
            the next generation of multi-mission surface combatants. Under
            the dual lead ship strategy, a lead ship will be constructed at
            both Northrop Grumman Ship Systems and General Dynamics Bath
            Iron Works. Contracts for detail design were awarded to the
            shipbuilders in August 2006. Construction contracts of the dual
            lead ships are expected to be awarded in fiscal year 2007. The
            fiscal year 2008 budget provides the second increment of
            funding, approximately $2.8 billion, required to complete the
            two fiscal year 2007 lead ships.
             The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) will be a fast, agile,
            and networked surface combatant with capabilities optimized to
            assure naval and joint force access into contested littoral
            regions. The Navy has awarded contracts for construction of the
            first four LCS sea frames. LCS-1 was launched in September
            2006. The Navy intends to continue with a plan to procure a
            reduced number of ships in fiscal 2008 and 2009 within existing
            budget resources. LCS is needed now to fill critical, urgent
            warfighting requirements gaps that exist today. Operational
            experience and analyses indicate that potential adversaries
            will employ asymmetric capabilities to deny U.S. and allied
            forces access in critical coastal regions to include strategic
            choke points and vital economic sea lanes.
             In the past year the second and third Virginia Class
            fast attack submarines joined the fleet. Construction of the
            Virginia Class continues to be performed under a teaming
            arrangement between General Dynamics Electric Boat Corporation
            and Northrop Grumman Newport News Shipbuilding. Six Virginia
            Class submarines are under construction. The fiscal year 2008
            budget invests approximately $1.8 billion in the 10th Virginia
            Class submarine and is the fifth of five Virginia class
            submarines covered under a multiyear procurement contract.

        A number of congressional authorities are necessary in order to
    maintain the stability of the 30-year shipbuilding plan. Key to
    achieving cost reductions in our Virginia Class program is the ability
    to enter into multiyear ship contracts. We are asking Congress to
    continue Multiyear Procurement Authority for Virginia Class Submarines.
    As we modernize our carrier force to the new Gerald R. Ford Class (CVN-
    78), we will drop below our carrier requirement by one ship during a 2-
    year period. Through adjustments to refueling availabilities and by
    carefully managing our Nimitz Class service life, we will be able to
    mitigate the impact of this drop in the short-term and long-term. We
    are asking Congress to authorize a temporary waiver of the carrier
    requirement from eleven to ten ships.
        Enhancing Expeditionary Warfare Capabilities
        The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review describes the reorientation of
    joint ground forces from dependence on large, permanent overseas
    garrisons toward expeditionary operations. This includes a focus on
    greater capability to conduct irregular warfare. Naval forces are
    inherently prepared for this role through our ability to project power
    ashore. Amphibious warships and Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)
    capability are essential to the Navy-Marine Corps ability to conduct
    forcible entry. The Department of the Navy will invest in several key
    procurement programs to enhance our expeditionary warfare capability.

             The San Antonio (LPD-17) Class of amphibious warfare
            ships represents the Department of the Navy's commitment to a
            modern expeditionary power projection fleet. The rapid off-load
            capability of the San Antonio Class will enable our naval force
            to operate across the spectrum of warfare. The fiscal year 2008
            budget invests $1.4 billion to fully fund the construction of
            the ninth ship in the San Antonio Class.
             The Marine Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) is the
            Marine Corps' largest ground combat system acquisition program.
            It will replace the aging Assault Amphibious Vehicle that has
            been in service since 1972. The fiscal year 2008 budget invests
            $288 million from the Research, Development, Test and
            Evaluation account toward EFV development to ensure that EFV
            meets all requirements for performance and reliability before
            entering into production.
             The MRAP Vehicle is playing an increased role in
            protecting our sailors and marines in harm's way. MRAPs are
            employed to protect against the three primary kill mechanisms
            of mines and IEDs--fragmentation, blast overpressure, and
            acceleration. These vehicles provide the best available
            protection against IEDs. The fiscal year 2008 globar war on
            terror request procures over 255 MRAP vehicles for the Navy and
            Marine Corps team. We continue to assess this need as is
            necessary.
        Recapitalizing Aviation Capacity
        The Department of the Navy requires a robust aviation capacity
    including attack, utility, and lift capabilities. The Department is in
    the midst of an extensive, long-term consolidation and recapitalization
    of all aircraft in the naval inventory in order to develop the optimum
    balance between requirements and usage. We are increasing our
    investment in our aviation programs. In fiscal year 2008 we plan to
    procure 188 aircraft for the Navy and Marine Corps team.\8\
    Particularly critical programs include the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF),
    the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, the EA-18G Growler, the P-8A Multi-Mission
    Maritime Aircraft (MMA), the MV-22, and helicopter programs. The
    Department also serves as the executive agent for the modernization of
    the fleet of Presidential Helicopters which will be replaced by the VH-
    71.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ ``Highlights of the Department of the Navy's Fiscal Year 2008
    Budget'', P. 3-15.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             The JSF (STOVL, CV, CTOL) is the next-generation
            strike fighter weapons system designed to counter the threats
            of 2010 and beyond. Low rate initial production (LRIP) long
            lead funding for initial Conventional Take-off and Landing
            (CTOL) aircraft was awarded in March 2006. A significant
            upcoming milestone for JSF is the Defense Acquisition Board in
            spring 2007 for approval of LRIP 1 full funding and LRIP 2 long
            lead contract awards.
             The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet is the Navy's multi-mission
            strike fighter. Currently in its 8th year of full production,
            65 percent of the total procurement objective has been
            delivered (298/460). The fiscal year 2008 budget requests
            funding for 24 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets. An additional 12 F/A-
            18E/F Super Hornets are requested in the fiscal year 2008
            globar war on terror request to bridge the projected shortfalls
            due to excessive operational use which will shorten ESL.
             The EA-18G Growler is the Navy's replacement for the
            legacy EA-6B and will assume the role for Airborne Electronic
            Attack. First flight for the Growler occurred in August 2006.
            EA-18G aircraft are being procured as part of the F/A-18E/F
            Multi-Year Procurement II contract. The fiscal year 2008 budget
            invests $1.3 billion which procures 18 E/A-18G aircraft.
             The P-8A MMA replaces the Navy's P-3C Orion and fills
            Combatant Commander requirements for long-endurance naval
            aircraft in fulfillment of many missions in major combat
            operations, globar war on terror, and homeland defense. The
            program, now in detailed design phase, will achieve Initial
            Operational Capability in fiscal year 2013--initial production
            buys will begin in fiscal year 2010.
             The MV-22 Osprey Tilt Rotor aircraft will supplement
            and replace the CH-46 with enhanced mission capabilities. The
            CH-46E is over 40 years old, with limited lift and mission
            capabilities to support the MAGTF and the globar war on terror.
            MV-22 Initial Operational Capability is scheduled for fall 2007
            with a continued transition of two CH-46E squadrons per year
            thereafter. The fiscal year 2008 budget includes a request for
            21 MV-22 aircraft.
             Helicopters continue to provide essential lift
            capability to the Navy and Marine Corps. Critical to this
            capability are the MH-60R/S and the UH-1 programs. The MH-60R
            will replace the aging SH-60B and SH-60F helicopters with the
            primary mission of undersea and surface warfare. The MH-60S
            will support the CSG and ESG combat logistics, search and
            rescue, vertical replenishment, anti-surface warfare, airborne
            mine countermeasures, combat search and rescue, and naval
            special warfare mission area. The fiscal year 2008 budget
            invests in 27 MH-60R and 18 MH-60S helicopters. The UH-1
            continues to fulfill the Marine Corps utility helicopter
            missions. The fiscal year 2008 budget supports the UH-1Y new
            build strategy and procures 20 UH-1Y helicopters.
        Research and Development
        As we look to transform our force with new generation platforms, we
    must also actively seek out new innovations and niche technology. Our
    fiscal year 2008 budget continues investment in the Research and
    Development, Science and Technology (S&T), and the Research,
    Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) management support accounts.
    In fiscal year 2008, the RDT&E account decreases by over 8 percent,
    reflecting technology maturation and the transition to production of
    programs previously in RDT&E. Funding for S&T is kept relatively
    constant to enhance capabilities for the naval forces of today,
    tomorrow, and the future. To maximize our return on S&T funding, we
    have developed a newly integrated Naval S&T Strategic Plan focused on
    areas where the Department of the Navy needs to be a world leader and
    an early adopter of technologies. RDT&E accounts also support the
    transition of technologies and the development of critical new weapon
    systems. Critical shipbuilding programs include CVN-21, SSN-774
    Virginia Class Submarine, DDG-1000, LCS, LPD-17, T-AKE, and Joint High
    Speed Vessel. Critical manned aviation programs include the F-35, VH-
    71, P-8A, CH-53K, E-2D, and EA-18G. As a final part of the RDT&E
    account, our Test and Evaluation communities are ensuring that
    technologies will perform as required in the field.
    Cultivating a Stable Acquisition Environment
        While our investment strategy is forward-leaning--so must our
    procurement process be. It is clear that we must better define our
    programs early in the acquisition process. A key emphasis must be to
    properly incentivize contractors to bid in a responsible manner and
    then to diligently execute to the accepted proposal. I intend to focus
    a significant part of my remaining time as Secretary of the Navy in
    getting this right. This year we are focusing our efforts to take on
    the challenges of: (1) revising and reinstituting our policy on
    contractor performance assessment, (2) controlling cost growth and
    reducing program volatility, and (3) building rapid acquisition
    processes. We have established acquisition guidelines concerning urgent
    warfighting needs, addressing schedule priority, source selection
    criteria and contract performance. Specific acquisition policies
    emphasize rapid deployment capability, rapid acquisition processing,
    controlling cost growth, and contractor performance assessments. An
    acquisition reengineering effort addressing: (1) an open systems
    business model, (2) accountability and portfolio assessment, (3) human
    capital planning, and (4) program formulation and capability planning
    has been initiated. These four threads are aimed at making the
    acquisition process more responsive and delivering the agreed-upon
    warfighting capability within the agreed-upon cost and schedule.
        In addition to acquisition reform, we are investing in methods to
    increase efficiency and maximize the return on our investments. Though
    still maturing, the Navy is developing the Navy Enterprise Framework
    which will better leverage the value streams consisting of people,
    dollars, and materiel needed to deliver warfighting readiness to Navy
    component and combatant commanders. The Department is also seeking to
    use ``best practices'' of the private sector through the deployment of
    Lean Six-Sigma (LSS). LSS is being implemented throughout the
    Department to increase quality of work life, safety levels, speed of
    decisions and transactions, and to decrease total cost of ownership.
    The vision is to create a critical mass of leaders and personnel who
    routinely apply LSS methodologies for continuous process improvement.
        The Department will continue to seek ways to transform the way we
    do business resulting in improved efficiency, better decisionmaking,
    and an organizational culture that is performance-based.
                                 iv. conclusion
        Investing in our present needs and fighting the global war on
    terror are on the forefront of our priorities--but we must not forget
    that the world is an ever evolving environment. We must be prepared to
    respond to emerging threats of an uncertain future. To accomplish these
    goals we must continue to invest in our national defense.
        Thanks to the continuous support of Congress, our naval forces are
    superior to all others. But developing and maintaining capable naval
    forces requires our Nation to take a long-term view. It requires time,
    constant strategic planning, and significant commitment of resources to
    develop and maintain the world's premier naval force. Together, we have
    made tough decisions and I believe that this budget submission is
    adequately structured to support the needs of the United States Navy
    and the United States Marine Corps.
        Only through the collaborative efforts of Congress and the
    Department of the Navy and with the support of the American people can
    we provide the Nation the naval force it needs to fight the global war
    on terror and prepare for the challenges of the future.
        Thank you.

        [The book ``Highlights of the Department of the Navy's Fiscal Year
    2008 Budget'' follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Admiral Mullen.

        STATEMENT OF ADM MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL
                               OPERATIONS

        Admiral Mullen. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, Senator
    Warner, and distinguished members of this committee: Thank you
    for your continued strong support of our men and women in
    uniform and for the opportunity to appear before you today. I
    am honored to join Secretary Winter and General Conway
    representing the longest-lasting inter-Service relationship in
    our Nation's history, the Navy-Marine Corps team.
        As the Secretary said, we are a Nation at war, a maritime
    Nation, fighting an elusive and adaptive enemy bent on using
    terror and irregular tactics to spread hatred and fear across
    the globe. At the same time, we are confronted by potentially
    hostile nation states determined to develop and use
    sophisticated weapons systems. Your Navy is ready to meet these
    challenges.
        2006 was a busy year. Your Navy met the demands of
    combatant commanders for well-trained combat-ready forces
    around the world, deterring aggression and combating terrorism
    while providing international disaster relief to Pakistan and
    the Philippines; revisiting tsunami-ravaged Southeast Asia with
    humanitarian relief from the hospital ship Mercy; successfully
    evacuating over 14,000 American citizens safely from Lebanon;
    and demonstrating our surge capability and partner-building
    capacity in Exercises Valiant Shield and RIMPAC.
        In addition to that, we monitored missile launches on the
    Korean peninsula with our Aegis destroyers, sent a message of
    hope and resolve with the George Washington Carrier Strike
    Group in Partnership of the Americas in Latin America, and
    developed closer military relationships with the navies of
    China, India, and Russia. Some of our finest warfare officers
    command Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Navy
    admirals command the Joint Task Forces in the Horn of Africa
    and Guantanamo Bay. We also helped strengthen homeland security
    through a continued and growing partnership with the United
    States Coast Guard.
        Today nearly 100 of your ships and submarines are at sea
    and more than 60,000 sailors are forward-deployed. Fully half
    of these men and women serve in the Central Command (CENTCOM)
    area of responsibility and almost half of that number are on
    the ground in combat and combat support roles. They are
    performing magnificently, each and every one.
        I had the opportunity to visit with many of them over the
    holidays in the Arabian Gulf, Iraq and Afghanistan, Bahrain,
    and the Horn of Africa. I can tell you they are focused, well-
    trained, and well-led. They are proud of what they are doing
    and still prouder of the difference they know they are making.
        But we must work hard to sustain this readiness. Though we
    continue to meet or exceed almost all of our recruiting and
    retention goals, I remain concerned about certain shortfalls
    among our expeditionary forces, SEALs, explosive ordnance
    disposal personnel, our naval construction force, medical
    corps, and naval intelligence community. Additionally, I am
    starting to see for the first time in years a drop in our
    first-term retention. I am watching this very, very closely.
        As I testified to the House Armed Services Committee last
    month, the accelerated wear and tear on systems and equipment
    in a harsh physical environment requires immediate attention,
    especially on combat construction equipment for our Seabees and
    our older models of expeditionary aircraft, the P-3, the EP-3,
    and the EA-6B Prowlers.
        The same investments we have made to improve fleet
    capabilities have paid off. We must now continue to reenergize
    procurement accounts to maintain those capabilities in the
    future. Our fiscal year 2008 budget helps us do that, calling
    for the construction of 7 new ships as well as the additional
    of 188 new operational aircraft to the inventory, nearly 40
    more aircraft than we ordered last year.
        We submitted a shipbuilding plan to Congress last year that
    would produce a fleet of 313 ships by 2020, a fleet sized and
    balanced to meet the challenges we face at maximum acceptable
    risk. That plan submitted with this budget has not changed.
    Still centered on 11 and eventually 12 aircraft carriers, 30
    amphibious ships, 48 submarines, 88 surface combatants, and 55
    LCSs, as well as the support ships, it will provide the Nation
    more options and more flexibility than ever before,
    particularly in core warfighting areas like mine and undersea
    warfare and anti-ballistic missile defense.
        I appreciate the support we have received from this
    committee in developing this plan and in building this fleet.
    We continue to evaluate, as we must, the impact global
    developments have had on the plan's original risk assumptions.
    I assure you that I remain committed to a stable shipbuilding
    program and to pursuing with our partners in industry and here
    on Capitol Hill the efficiencies required to make it
    affordable.
        Three things definitely have not changed, Mr. Chairman: my
    priorities to sustain our combat readiness, to build a fleet
    for the future, and to develop the 21st century leaders that we
    need. I know the role our Navy must play in helping to win the
    war on terror while providing a powerful strategic deterrent
    and remaining a vital element of this Nation's strategic
    reserve. I know well our requirement to support those we send
    into harm's way with the very best medical care, top-notch
    housing and installations, and a strong commitment to their
    professional support and their professional growth, as well as
    strong support for their magnificent families.
        The 2008 budget we have submitted is not without risk.
    While other Services have seen top lines increase since
    September 11, the Navy has experienced a $7 billion decrease in
    buying power over the last 4 years. Our budget requests
    represent the maximum risk I believe we can accept in four key
    areas: manpower; readiness, both ashore and afloat; procurement
    accounts; and our reset.
        When our ground forces return from Iraq and Afghanistan,
    the Nation will increasingly depend upon the expeditionary
    capabilities of its Navy and Marine Corps team. I know and I
    know you know that a maritime Nation such as ours depends in
    great measure, as it has for more than 230 years, on the
    flexibility, reach, agility, and lethality of that team.
    Indeed, I note with pride that this week, March 27 in fact,
    marks the anniversary of the passage of the Naval Act of 1794,
    the legislation that revived the United States Navy and led to
    the construction of the original six frigates, including of
    course U.S.S. Constitution.
        In his annual address to Congress just a few months prior
    to the passage of that act, President Washington alluded to the
    young Nation's need to defend itself: ``If we desire to avoid
    insult,'' he noted, ``we must be able to repel it. If we desire
    to secure the peace, it must be known that we are at all times
    ready for war.''
        Your Navy today, sir, is still ready to help secure peace
    and ready at all times to both deter war and to fight it. I
    thank you for the support you so generously give us to maintain
    our readiness, and again on behalf of your sailors, Navy
    civilians, and their wonderfully supportive families, I thank
    you for the opportunity to appear before you today and I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Mullen follows:]
                Prepared Statement by ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN
        Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and members of the committee, it is
    an honor to appear before you today representing the brave men and
    women, sailors and civilians, of the United States Navy. It is with
    great pride, tempered by the urgency of war, that I report to you the
    Navy's readiness to answer all bells for our Nation's security, today
    and for generations to come. Thank you for your longstanding support.
                                  introduction
        We are a maritime nation involved in a long, irregular and global
    war that extends far beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. The threat we face
    breeds within failing states and the under-governed spaces of the world
    and preys upon those weakened by poverty, disease, and hatred. It
    thrives where there is no rule of law and spreads like a malignancy
    through cyberspace and the vast maritime commons that serve as
    connecting tissue in this age of globalization.
        We are also confronted by nation-states determined to develop
    sophisticated weapons systems, including nuclear arms. We cannot allow
    ourselves to be fixated on one threat alone. Our national security is
    dependent upon a strong Navy that can keep the sea lanes free, deter
    aggression, safeguard our sources of energy, protect the interests of
    our citizens at home and reassure our friends abroad. We must never
    relinquish overmatching capability and capacity.
        While our ground forces are engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan, the
    Navy--with its ability to deliver two unique attributes day-to-day--
    global reach and persistent presence--will continue to support our
    responsibilities worldwide and provide a powerful deterrence, both in
    day-to-day operations as well as being a vital element of our Nation's
    ``Strategic Reserve.'' As we pace the rapidly changing security
    environment, there is no alternative to a well balanced Fleet.
        Much has changed in the world since I testified before this
    committee last year. Iran has been emboldened by the Israel/Hezbollah
    war and continues the overt pursuit of a nuclear production capability.
    North Korea has test fired long-range ballistic missiles and conducted
    an underground nuclear detonation. China has demonstrated the ability
    and willingness to conduct out of area diesel submarine operations and
    their advanced military and space technology development continues
    apace. The stated desire for, and apparent pursuit of, weapons of mass
    destruction (WMD) and advanced delivery systems has increased among
    terrorist organizations and their state sponsors. Within our own
    hemisphere, some leaders have become increasingly vocal in their
    opposition to policies of the United States.
        Last Spring I signed the Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) to better align
    budgetary decisions with future operations and risk assessments. The
    NSP also laid the foundation for the Naval Operating Concept (NOC),
    which I co-signed with the Commandant of the Marine Corps in August
    2006. The NOC is intended to define the objectives and missions of the
    Navy-Marine Corps Team and to underscore our warfighting
    interdependence.
        The President's National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS)
    calls for enhanced international cooperation to ensure lawful and
    timely enforcement actions against maritime threats. During the Cold
    War, our Navy was guided by a Maritime Strategy focused on containing
    and defeating the spread of communism and Soviet domination. It is time
    to develop a new Maritime Strategy based on global reach and persistent
    presence--a strategy that includes core Navy warfighting competencies
    and deterrence, strategic communication and information operations,
    shaping and stability operations, emerging and enduring partnerships.
        At the International Sea Power Symposium in September 2005, the
    Chiefs of 49 navies and coast guards, among 72 countries represented,
    discussed a new vision of sea power in the 21st century. That vision of
    sea power encourages international partnerships for maritime security
    and awareness, consisting of vessels and capabilities from partner
    nations around the world--nations with a shared stake in international
    commerce, security and freedom of the seas: the ``1,000 Ship Navy.''
        This year the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard have joined maritime forces
    around the world interested in participating in Global Maritime
    Partnerships--a proverbial ``1,000 Ship Navy.'' Membership in this
    ``global fleet'' is not proscriptive and has no legal or encumbering
    ties. It is envisioned to be a Free Form Force of maritime partners who
    see the promise of sea power to unite, rather than to divide:
    Collective security on the oceans highways through a global maritime
    network.

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                                   priorities
        In last year's testimony, I identified three priorities addressed
    by our fiscal year 2007 budget. We have made progress in all three and
    our fiscal year 2008 budget reaffirms our commitment to these
    priorities. We seek your assistance as we move forward, placing
    particular emphasis on strengthening our core warfighting capabilities
    and increasing our own military capacity as well as that of our
    partners. Our three priorities remain:

              I. Sustain combat readiness--with the right combat
            capabilities--speed, agility, persistence, and dominance--for
            the right cost.
              II. Build a fleet for the future--balanced, rotational,
            forward deployed and surge capable--the proper size and mix of
            capabilities to empower our enduring and emerging partners,
            deter our adversaries, and defeat our enemies.
              III. Develop 21st century leaders--inherent in a strategy
            which, through a transformed manpower, personnel, training and
            education organization, better competes for the talent our
            country produces and creates the conditions in which the full
            potential of every man and woman serving our Navy can be
            achieved.
    I. Sustain Combat Readiness
        A. Fiscal Year 2006 in Review
        The Navy answered all bells in 2006. We met the demands of
    Combatant Commanders for well-trained, combat-ready forces--deterring
    aggression while conducting Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi
    Freedom, international disaster relief, and humanitarian missions. We
    successfully evacuated over 14,000 American citizens safely from
    Lebanon and demonstrated our resolve, capability and partner building
    capacity in Exercises Valiant Shield, Rimpac, and Partnership of the
    Americas.
        Over 10,000 Navy Individual Augmentees continued to make
    significant contributions around the world in all manner of joint and
    coalition billets, particularly in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility.
    We continued to provide vital direct and indirect combat support to the
    Marine Corps through a variety of Blue in Support of Green programs,
    and we supported homeland defense initiatives with the U.S. Coast
    Guard, including the development of a Maritime Domain Awareness Concept
    of Operations (CONOPs) and the establishment of three Sector Command
    Center-Joint, interagency harbor operations centers.
        Last year the Navy also made progress toward improving our core
    warfighting competencies: anti-submarine warfare (ASW), mine warfare,
    and ballistic missile defense. As the missile tests on the Korean
    Peninsula and the out of area deployment of a Chinese diesel submarine
    remind us, we must ensure we sustain our overmatching capability and
    capacity in these, and other, core warfighting mission areas.
        B. Current Readiness
        I recently returned from a trip to Iraq, Afghanistan, Djibouti,
    Bahrain, and ships at sea in the Arabian Gulf. I visited with sailors
    conducting special operations and combat support in Iraq, flying combat
    sorties in support of OEF and OIF, providing security protection for
    oil platforms, conducting civil affairs missions in Afghanistan,
    participating in Theater Security Cooperation activities in Horn of
    Africa, and standing watches onboard U.S.S. Dwight D. Eisenhower,
    U.S.S. Anzio, and U.S.S. Boxer--reassuring our allies in the region
    while providing a formidable deterrent to Iran.
        Our Navy's readiness is superb and our sailors are performing at
    exceptional levels at sea and ashore. The men and women of your Navy
    are on watch around the world, around the clock.

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        On 15 March 2007 we had 95 ships on deployment (34 percent of the
    Fleet) and 127 ships underway (46 percent of the Fleet) in every
    theater of operation; this included 3 aircraft carriers, and 4 big deck
    amphibious ships (LHA/LHD), and approximately 25 submarines (Figure 1).
        That same day, 2,744 active and Reserve Seabees, and 4,896 of our
    Active and Reserve medical corps were serving overseas, many in combat
    support roles. Additionally, 817 members of the Navy Special Warfare
    community were deployed overseas (of 3,616 deployable), as were 247
    Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel (with 105 surge-available to
    deploy), and 744 Naval Coastal Warfare/Expeditionary Security Force
    personnel (of 2,640 deployable). Earlier this month, 167 sailors from
    the Navy's first, newly established Riverine Squadron arrived in Iraq
    to provide area security at the Haditha Dam.
        Worldwide, on 15 March 2007, there were 60,313 of our sailors
    deployed ashore and afloat worldwide, conducting strategic deterrence;
    intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; ASW training, ballistic
    missile defense, mine counter warfare, counter piracy and counter-drug
    patrols, theater security cooperation activities, and humanitarian
    assistance. On that day there were 31,120 sailors serving in the
    CENTCOM AOR, 13,007 of whom, were on the ground building roads and
    schools, offering combat care and medical assistance to our Fleet
    Marines, providing timely intelligence support to Special Operations,
    and contributing to the myriad combat support and reconstruction
    missions ongoing in that region. No less vital are the sailors and
    civilians--the Total Navy--who serve the shore-based infrastructure
    that underpins our Fleet worldwide.
        Perhaps the greatest enabler of our current, and continuous,
    readiness has been the ongoing development of the Fleet Response Plan
    (FRP). FRP is an evolving, deliberate process to ensure increased and
    continuous availability of trained, ready Navy forces capable of a
    surge response forward on short notice. FRP does not change training
    requirements, operational capabilities or the amount of maintenance.
    Rather, it delivers enhanced surge capability while providing
    rotationally deployed forces to fulfill Global Force commitments.
        Another key enabler of our Fleet readiness is family readiness.
    ``Family readiness'' means sailors' families are prepared for the
    absence of their loved one. The Navy strives to reduce the uncertainty
    and apprehension experienced by our Navy families in these stressful
    times, while strengthening the programs and resources available to
    support them.
        Without the support of our families--and, without supporting them
    in return--we cannot hope to sustain combat readiness. We owe our
    sailors and their families the very best quality of life we can offer.
    This includes top-notch housing and installations, the best health care
    we can provide, and a strong commitment to child care.
        C. Requirements to Sustain Combat Readiness
        As we adapt to asymmetric threats and the challenges of irregular
    warfare, we cannot lose sight of Navy's core warfighting competencies.
    We must continue to improve performance in anti-submarine and mine
    warfare, anti-surface warfare, anti-air warfare, strike warfare,
    ballistic missile defense, and other core maritime supremacy missions.
    We will continue to mature our Fleet Response Plan (FRP) and strengthen
    Fleet and Family Readiness--to ensure combat ready, surge-capable
    forces are available to meet any contingency. Natural disasters abroad
    and hurricanes here at home taught us valuable lessons. We need to
    extend the FRP philosophy of ``continuous readiness'' to our shore
    commands, our people, and to our families.
        To sustain our combat readiness, we seek congressional support in
    the following areas:

             Anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Submarines with
            improving stealth and attack capability--particularly modern
            diesel attack submarines--are proliferating world-wide at an
            alarming rate. Locating these relatively inexpensive but
            extremely quiet boats presents our Navy with a formidable
            challenge. Navy is pursuing a distributed and netted approach
            to ASW. Some of the key ASW programs we must continue to
            develop and field as quickly as possible include: the
            Deployable Autonomous Distributed System (DADS); the Reliable
            Acoustic Path Vertical Line Array (RAPVLA); the Surface Ship
            Torpedo Defense System (SSTD); the Aircraft Carrier Periscope
            Detection Radar (CVNPDR); and, the High Altitude ASW Weapon
            Concept (HAAWC).
             SONAR restrictions. ASW is a very complex and
            challenging warfighting competency in which to achieve and
            sustain the required level of expertise. Therefore every
            opportunity we have to gain and maintain proficiency at the
            ship/unit level, and every opportunity we have to integrate
            units in complex scenarios is crucial to our readiness.
            Unfortunately, our ability to train in the same manner in which
            we fight is under attack in public forums, including the
            courts. Thus far, we have seen little scientific basis for the
            claims lodged against the Navy. However, these allegations
            present the potential for severe restrictions on our continued
            ability to train effectively, as we saw in RIMPAC 2006 wherein
            we lost 3 days of valuable ASW training with active sonar
            because of a court restraining order. Navy is currently
            executing a comprehensive plan of action to cover all our at-
            sea training areas with environmental compliance documents by
            the end of 2009. We are committed to maintaining an open
            dialogue, continuing to advance our scientific understanding of
            the impacts of sonar on marine mammals, and complying with the
            relevant statutes. We have consistently made this clear as an
            organization in our debate on this issue. Maintaining
            proficiency in ASW is a daily challenge, and while our long-
            term compliance documents are being developed, we cannot afford
            to stop training. We owe it to our sailors to ensure they
            receive the training they need to fight and win.
              The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) requires permits for
            activities that may affect marine mammals. This includes
            military activities, including certain Navy activities at sea.
            The National Defense Authorization Act of 2004 included a
            provision that authorizes the Secretary of Defense to grant
            exemptions to the MMPA for certain military activities critical
            to our National defense. On 23 January 2007, the Deputy
            Secretary of Defense granted Navy a National Defense Exemption
            (NDE) for 2 years covering mid-frequency active (MFA) sonar
            activities for major exercises and in major operating areas, as
            well as the use of Improved Explosive Echo Ranging sonobuoys
            (IEER). The NDE will help Navy continue to conduct the sonar
            training necessary for our National defense while protecting
            marine mammals through established mitigation measures.
             Naval Expeditionary Combat Command. NECC is developing
            into a true force of choice in phase zero (pre-conflict) and
            phase V (reconstruction) operations, and as a vital part of our
            Nation's long war against terrorism. Included in the Naval
            Expeditionary Combat Command today are 30,363 Active and
            Reserve component sailors including 15,339 in the Naval
            Construction Force, 6,557 in Naval Coastal Warfare, 3,607 in
            the Navy Expeditionary Logistics Force, 2,482 in Explosive
            Ordnance Disposal, 712 in the Riverine Force, 591 in the Navy
            Expeditionary Guard Battalion, 441 in Visit Board Search and
            Seizure/Intel, 431 in the Maritime Civil Affairs Group, 85 in
            Combat Camera, 68 in the Expeditionary Combat Readiness Center,
            and 50 in the Expeditionary Training Group. All new forces--
            Riverine, Expeditionary Training Group, Maritime Civil Affairs
            and Maritime Expeditionary Security Force--will meet full IOC
            objectives in fiscal year 2007. Riverine will deploy its first
            squadron to Iraq this month to provide area security at Haditha
            dam and interdiction operations on the Euphrates river. Your
            continued support of our Riverine capability and capacity is
            vital. Our second Riverine Squadron was established on 2
            February, 2007 and our third Squadron will be stood up this
            June.
             Sea Basing. It would be difficult to consider any
            future expeditionary missions without recognizing the need for
            a sea base from which to stage Joint Forcible Entry Operations,
            Theater Security Cooperation, and humanitarian assistance
            activities. Sea Basing provides operational maneuver and
            assured access to the joint force while significantly reducing
            our footprint ashore and minimizing the permissions required to
            operate from host nations. These are operational
            characteristics that will prove increasingly vital in the post-
            OIF/OEF political-military security environment. Navy is
            exploring innovative operational concepts combining sea basing
            with adaptive force packaging that will further support
            national security policy and the Combatant Commanders'
            objectives worldwide. Our 30-year shipbuilding plan provides
            for Sea Basing that covers the spectrum of warfare from Joint
            Forcible Entry to persistent and cooperative Theater Security
            Cooperation.
             Ballistic Missile Defense. Missile tests on the Korean
            Peninsula and by Iran, along with the proliferation of
            ballistic missile technology underscores the growing need for a
            robust, sea-borne ballistic missile defense system. Last year,
            the Navy made further progress on our Aegis Ballistic Missile
            Defense (BMD), the sea based component of the Missile Defense
            Agency's (MDA) Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). It
            enables surface combatants to support ground-based sensors and
            provides a capability to intercept short- and medium-range
            ballistic missiles with ship-based interceptors (SM-3). The
            Sea-Based Terminal Program will provide the ability to engage
            Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) with modified SM-2 BLk
            IV missiles from Aegis BMD capable ships.
             Depot Level Maintenance. Ship and aviation depot level
            maintenance is critical to enable the continuing readiness of
            our warfighting capabilities. Support of our O&MN accounts will
            ensure we don't defer critical maintenance.
             U.S.S. George Washington. The U.S.S. George Washington
            will relieve U.S.S. Kitty Hawk as our forward deployed naval
            forces CVN in Japan in fiscal year 2008. This transition, vital
            to our security interests in the Asian Pacific region, needs to
            be fully funded.
             Fleet and Family Readiness. The Navy is addressing
            Fleet and family readiness in many critical areas, four of
            which are: minimizing financial risk and predatory lending;
            improving crisis management and response procedures; enhancing
            child care programs and centers; and, improving ombudsman
            programs. We also continue to work with those families
            struggling to recover from the devastation of Hurricanes
            Katrina and Rita.
             Steaming Days. The fiscal year 2008 budget provides
            funds necessary to support 48 underway days per quarter of the
            active operational tempo (OPTEMPO) for deployed forces and 22
            underway days per quarter for nondeployed forces (primarily
            used for training). Our fiscal year 2008 baseline budget
            estimates also include reductions to peacetime OPTEMPO levels.
            The fiscal year 2008 budget supports the ``6+1'' surge
            readiness level from our Carrier Strike Groups. As in fiscal
            year 2006 and fiscal year 2007, it is anticipated that
            operational requirements will continue to exceed peacetime
            levels in fiscal year 2008.

    II. Build a Fleet for the Future
        A. Fiscal Year 2006 in Review
        In 2005 the Navy conducted extensive analysis to determine the
    minimum required force structure needed to meet the security demands of
    the 21st century with an acceptable level of risk. In February 2006,
    the Navy unveiled a new 30-year shipbuilding plan that will provide a
    Battle Force of approximately 313 ships by 2020 with more capacity and
    capability than was ever dreamed when our fleet was much larger in
    size. Stabilizing this plan, which remained essentially unchanged in
    our 2007 submission, is intended to provide the shipbuilding industry
    with sufficient predictability to maintain critical skills and to make
    business decisions that increase efficiency and productivity in order
    to meet the Navy's projected shipbuilding requirements.
        Last year we began to see our future Fleet taking shape. We
    currently have 38 ships under contract for construction, and in fiscal
    year 2006 ships that had been designed a few short years ago rolled
    down the ways. We christened the first Freedom Class Littoral Combat
    Ship, amphibious assault ship Makin Island, amphibious transport dock
    ship Green Bay, Guided Missile Destroyers Gridley and Sampson, nuclear
    fast attack submarine Hawaii, auxiliary dry cargo ships Alan Shepard
    and Sacagawea, and the aircraft carrier George H.W. Bush. We
    commissioned the amphibious nuclear attack submarine Texas and the
    guided missile destroyer Farragut.  We also rolled out the first EA-18G
    Growler.
        In fiscal year 2006, the increased wartime OPTEMPO of Operations
    Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom, and the global war on terror continued
    to wear down Navy's aging, ``legacy'' aircraft. Expeditionary aircraft
    utilization has dramatically increased, particularly for EA-6B airborne
    electronic attack aircraft, MH-60 multi-mission helicopters, P-3
    maritime patrol aircraft, EP-3 electronic surveillance aircraft, and F/
    A-18 C/D attack aircraft, thus shortening the expected service life
    (ESL) of these aging airframes.
        Improving our own capacity was only part of the Navy's focus in
    fiscal year 2006. We also pursued the broadest possible approach to
    strengthening maritime security through partnerships. This included
    closer cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard and our other interagency
    partners, international organizations, nongovernmental agencies,
    commercial shippers, and maritime nations great and small.
        Perhaps the most tangible application of Navy's global reach and
    persistent presence in building partner capacity was last year's 5
    month deployment of the hospital ship Mercy in the summer of 2006 to
    the tsunami-affected areas in South and Southeast Asia. Working with
    embarked military medical personnel from Canada, Australia, Singapore,
    India and Malaysia as well as representatives from 11 nongovernmental
    organizations, Mercy's accomplishments ashore and afloat included:
    60,081 patients seen, 131,511 total services provided; 1,083 surgeries;
    19,375 immunizations; 20,134 optometry evaluations, 16,141 glasses
    distributed; 9,373 dental extractions; 236 biomedical equipment
    repairs, 254 people trained; 59 major and 177 minor medical systems
    restored to 100 percent operational capacity; and, 6,201 host nation
    students trained.
        In an August 2006 public opinion survey, conducted by Terror Free
    Tomorrow, Indonesians and Bangladeshis overwhelmingly indicated their
    support of this humanitarian mission. In Indonesia, 85 percent of those
    aware of Mercy's visit had a favorable opinion, and in Bangladesh this
    figure was 95 percent. Further, 87 percent of those polled in
    Bangladesh stated that Mercy's activities made their overall view of
    the United States more positive. These polling results provide some
    indication of the power of partnerships.
        B. Current Force
        By the end of fiscal year 2007 we will have stopped the free fall
    of our Navy and our Fleet's net size will have grown from a low of 274
    ships in March 2007 to 279, including 5 newly commissioned ships.
        Navy is in the process of evaluating the impact global developments
    have had on our risk assumptions, and ultimately whether or not this
    will affect the build rate of our future Battle Force. Whatever the
    outcome of this evaluation, we will work closely with our partners in
    industry to control requirements costs and provide the industrial base
    the stability it needs to become more productive.
        Future platforms and combat systems must be designed and built with
    the knowledge that we plan to continually upgrade them over their
    lifetime. An Open Architecture approach to software acquisition and
    development of integrated weapons systems is a critical part of this
    business model. Free and open competition in which the best idea wins
    is the goal.
        The fiscal year 2008 President's budget submission provides for
    procuring 7 new ships in fiscal year 2008 and 67 new ships over the
    FYDP (fiscal years 2008-2013). To facilitate the stability required to
    achieve reduced costs in this constrained industrial sector, no changes
    in ship acquisitions were made in fiscal year 2008 from President's
    budget 2007 to President's budget 2008. The Navy has a long-range
    vision to reduce types and models of ships, to maximize reuse of ship
    designs and components, and to employ a business model that encourages
    the use of open architecture and mission systems modularity.
        The next major challenge in building a fleet for the future is to
    deliver a long range aviation procurement plan. Much work has been done
    analyzing Joint warfighting capabilities and capacity based on threat
    and risk assessments driven by Defense Planning Guidance. Consideration
    has also been given to affordability, industrial capacity and
    production times associated with next generation aviation warfare. The
    Navy will work to deliver a stable aviation build plan that transforms
    and balances aviation capabilities with respect to conventional and
    irregular warfare, reduces excess capacity, and achieves technological
    superiority through cost-wise investments in recapitalization,
    sustainment and modernization programs.
        President's budget 2008 procures 188 aircraft in fiscal year 2008
    and 1,295 aircraft across the FYDP (fiscal years 2008-2013), reduces
    average aircraft age from 74 percent to 50 percent of expected service
    life, and concentrates on resourcing critical maritime and Joint
    effects. The plan is structured to support required economic order
    quantity investments and facilitate Multi-Year Procurement (MYP)
    contracts.
        We must include the vital contribution that can be made in securing
    the global commons by our partners with common interests. The
    President's National Strategy for Maritime Security states, that, ``The
    safety and economic security of the United States depends upon the
    secure use of the world's oceans.'' It further notes that, ``Maritime
    security is best achieved by blending public and private maritime
    security activities on a global scale into an integrated effort that
    addresses all maritime threats.''
        I believe an international ``1,000 ship navy,'' offers a real
    opportunity to increase partner nation capabilities while reducing
    transnational crime, WMD proliferation, terrorism, and human
    trafficking. Regional maritime security partnerships are already taking
    shape worldwide that support this ideal, some with and some without
    direct US Navy involvement. The self-organizing evacuation of non-
    combatants from Lebanon during the Israeli-Hezbollah war, in which 170
    ships from 17 countries came together, accomplished their mission, and
    dispersed is often cited as a good example of how such partnerships
    might work.
        Critical to increasing partner capacity in the war on terror, as
    well as building strong global maritime partnerships (the ``1,000 ship
    navy'') that promote maritime security, is the Building Global
    Partnerships Act of 2007, being submitted to Congress by the Department
    of Defense as a top legislative priority. The BGP Act will
    significantly improve our ability to help friendly nations develop
    capabilities to better govern and defend their territorial waters and
    the global maritime commons, denying access to terrorists and criminal
    organizations. We encourage your support for this vital legislation
    that will further enable support for the ``1,000 ship navy'' concept.
        Sea Power in this century cannot be harnessed by a single nation
    acting alone. If we are to build a fleet for the future capable of
    keeping pace with globalization, we must leverage the capacity of our
    partners with common interests. The positive potential of Sea Power and
    freedom of the seas can only be achieved through a collective and
    cooperative approach focused on international rule of law and freedom
    of the maritime commons.
        C. Requirements to Build a Fleet for the Future
        We have worked hard with Congress and Industry to start to create
    stability in our shipbuilding plans and industrial base. We must
    continue to fund and build a balanced, effective Battle Force of about
    313 ships . . . the minimum force required to guarantee the long-term
    strength and viability of U.S. naval air and sea power with acceptable
    risk. We recognize the need to control requirements, maintain program
    stability, curb costs, and monitor best business practices. We need
    support for sustained funding of our shipbuilding account--consistent
    with the 30-year plan--that is critical to provide our partners in
    industry the stability they need to curb cost growth and sustain our
    vital shipbuilding industrial base.
        To build a fleet for the future and strong partnerships, we seek
    congressional support in the following areas:

             11 Carrier Force. The 30-year shipbuilding plan
            recognizes that as a result of the retirement of U.S.S.
            Enterprise in fiscal year 2013, the number of aircraft carriers
            will drop to 10 for a period of approximately 30 months, until
            the U.S.S. Gerald Ford enters active service. Legislative
            relief is required from the National Defense Authorization Act
            for Fiscal Year 2007 requiring a carrier force of 11. In
            developing the 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan, Navy conducted
            extensive analysis that concluded the temporary drop to a
            carrier force of 10 from fiscal year 2013 through fiscal year
            2015 is an acceptable, though moderate, risk. A carrier force
            of 11 is recognized as minimum risk over the long run.
             Littoral Combat Ship. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
            program remains of critical importance to our Navy. Current
            cost estimates exceed established thresholds for detail design
            and construction of LCS-1, the lead Lockheed Martin hull. This
            recent cost growth has provided an opportunity to reinforce the
            Navy's commitment to providing warfighting capability through
            affordability. The Navy is executing a pause in the
            construction of LCS-3, the second Lockheed Martin hull, to
            conduct a thorough review of the program, and to examine both
            internal and external factors relating to the acquisition and
            contracting processes, practices, and oversight and the related
            impact on cost. The Navy remains committed to bringing Littoral
            Combat Ship capability into the Fleet quickly and by means of
            an acquisition strategy that is executable, affordable, and in
            the best interests of the Navy.
             Virginia Class Multi-Year Procurement (MYP). Navy is
            seeking multi-year procurement authority in fiscal year 2008
            for Virginia Class submarine contracts beginning with the
            fiscal year 2009 ship. Continued MYP authority will help
            maintain a stable SCN profile and greatly aid in Virginia Class
            cost reduction initiatives. In order to support our long-term
            submarine force structure of 48 boats, Navy plans to increase
            the build rate of this Class to 2/year beginning in fiscal year
            2012.
             Split Funding for Zumwalt Class DDG. The support of
            Congress for last year's split funding request was greatly
            appreciated. This year Navy requests the second half of split
            year funding for dual lead ships of the Zumwalt Class destroyer
            to maximize competitive efficiencies and focus design efforts.
            Split funding will also lend stability to the shipbuilding
            industrial base. This funding strategy supports the current
            budget structure, enhances future competitive opportunities,
            and limits liability for appropriations in future years.
             Joint Strike Fighter. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
            remains the cornerstone of Navy's continuing superiority in air
            warfare. Although risk associated with the recent 2 year slide
            in the carrier variant of the F-35 will be mitigated by an
            increased buy of F/A-18 E,F variants, there should be no doubt
            that JSF is a much more capable aircraft. I encourage your
            continued strong support of this program to guard against
            further delays in production.
             Legacy Expeditionary Aircraft Replacment. As our
            aging, legacy aircraft reach the end of the service lives,
            funding for follow-on programs becomes critical. Among these
            programs are the P-8A multi-mission maritime aircraft, the F/A
            18-E/F and JSF, the EA-18G airborne electronic attack aircraft,
            the V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft, and the MH-60R/S and CH-53K
            helicopters. Navy's RDT&E program is also vital to this effort.
             Research and Development. To achieve the speed of war
            Navy is pursuing Innovative Naval Prototypes (INPs)--
            revolutionary ``game changers'' for future naval warfare. These
            initiatives have resulted in the development of an electro-
            magnetic rail-gun prototype; new concepts for persistent,
            netted, littoral ASW; technologies to enable Sea-basing; and
            the naval tactical utilization of space.
             Public Shipyard Loading. As we work with industry on
            shipbuilding cost reduction, we must ensure legislation and
            policy support best business practices and efficiencies.
            Apportioning work based upon funding quotas to drive work-
            loading in public Naval shipyards potentially diverts
            efficiency opportunities away from the private sector. Public
            yards provide vital services for nuclear propulsion and
            submarine work, and these critical competencies must be
            maintained. However, our first priorities in shipyard loading
            should be quality, efficiency, and cost savings. We seek your
            assistance in removing restrictions on our work-loading
            flexibility.
             Shore Installations and BRAC V. In addition to our
            ships and airplanes, another critical piece of Force Structure
            is our shore infrastructure, to include installations, piers
            and support facilities, training ranges, schoolhouses,
            hospitals, and housing. Supporting a ``Surge Navy'' demands we
            create an infrastructure that leverages advanced technology,
            sound investment and intelligent sustainment for the Fleet, for
            our sailors and their families. The Navy's Ashore Vision 2030
            is our roadmap for transforming the Navy shore infrastructure
            over the next 25 years; it is aligned with the congressionally-
            mandated Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process.
              The Continuing Resolution (CR) voted into Public Law in
            February 2007, decreased Department of Defense BRAC V funding
            from $5.6B request to $2.5 billion. Without supplemental
            funding to remedy the $3.1 billion reduction this law made in
            the DOD BRAC request, Navy's BRAC V funding will essentially be
            cut from $675 million to $291 million--a 57-percent reduction.
            This would devastate a program entering the critical stages of
            execution. This reduction would also delay, or in some cases
            negate, our ability to harvest savings and reap funds from land
            sales and transfers. Should this shortfall be remedied through
            fiscal year 2007 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations funding,
            Navy would do its best to minimize the impact of this delay
            through prompt execution of funds.
             MHC Transfers. Legislative authority for planned ship
            transfers are an important aspect of inter-operability with the
            navies of our allies. These transfers also contribute to the
            1,000 ship Navy vision by building partner nation capacity,
            while reducing the taxpayer costs of maintaining or disposing
            of decommissioned ships. Navy seeks authority to transfer
            coastal mine hunting ships (MHCs) to Lithuania and Turkey.
            Limited in speed and endurance, the MHCs were designed as non-
            deploying assets. With no sweep capability and without
            redundant engineering and combat systems equipment, they are
            constrained in their ability to conduct mine clearance
            operations. For the MHCs to provide utility in a Homeland
            Defense role, they would have to be strategically distributed
            across the United States which would drain limited fiscal and
            manpower resources and hamper the Navy's ability to field a
            responsive and capable MCM force. These ships are scheduled for
            decommissioning in fiscal year 2008 and if authority is timely,
            they can be ``hot transferred'' which is less expensive for
            both the United States and the recipient.
             United Nations Law of the Sea Convention. To interact
            more effectively with our maritime partners, it is time to
            ratify the Law of the Sea Convention. Robust operational and
            navigational rights codified in the Law of the Sea Convention
            must be preserved for the Navy to continue to maximize its
            ability to execute the National Strategy for Maritime Security.
            Accession to the Convention is of critical importance to global
            naval maritime and over flight mobility.
    III. Develop 21st Century Leaders
        A. Fiscal Year 2006 in Review
        In fiscal year 2006, Navy continued to meet recruiting and
    retention goals for most ratings and designators in the active and
    Reserve components. We achieved 100 percent of our overall active
    component enlisted recruiting goal, and our overall enlisted retention
    goal was exceeded at 104 percent. We met 98 percent of our overall
    active component officer accession goal and 99 percent of our active
    officer end strength goal. Navy will continue to remain vigilant in
    what is proving to be an increasingly difficult recruiting environment.
        Fiscal Year 2006 was the 5th year of support for the global war on
    terror. Continued wartime OPTEMPO for Operations OIF and OEF has raised
    concern for the health and welfare of some parts of our expeditionary
    force. Medical ratings and designators, Explosive Ordnance Disposal
    (EOD) personnel, Divers, Special Warfare Combat Crewmen (SWCC), and
    SEALs remained recruiting challenges.
        Last year, Navy put a great deal of effort into analyzing and
    addressing the root causes of these recruiting shortfalls. New
    authorities provided in the National Defense Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Year 2007, such as increased accession bonuses and college
    stipends, are expected to help mitigate medical officer recruiting
    challenges. Increased accession bonuses for SEAL/Navy Special Warfare
    ratings and improved training techniques to reduce attrition will help
    us meet future requirements in our Global War on Terror intensive
    ratings.
        The Expeditionary Combat Readiness Center (ECRC), a command within
    the NECC, was established in fiscal year 2006 as the single process
    owner for the deployment of Navy Individual Augmentees (IA) and In-lieu
    of (ILO) forces, of which the Navy is currently fielding over 10,000
    sailors. The ECRC helps organize, process, train, equip, and deploy
    IAs, providing reach-back support and eventually helping them re-
    integrate with their parent command. Additionally, all active duty
    Sailors now process through one of four Navy Mobilization Processing
    Sites (NMPS) which has greatly enhanced consistency in processing
    between our Active and Reserve components. The ECRC NMPS and are
    helping Navy process IAs while meeting a goal of 60 day advanced
    notification of deployment.
        Central to Navy's ability to sustain overall readiness,
    particularly in support the global war on terror through the Individual
    Augmentee program, was, and is, the near-seamless integration of our
    Active and Reserve components. Since 11 September 2001, over 42,000
    Navy reservists have been mobilized in support of the global war on
    terror, representing over 80 percent of the total number of sailors
    deployed on the ground in theater. On any given day, over 20,000
    citizen-sailors are on some type of Active Duty (AD) or Inactive Duty
    (ID) orders at their supported commands meeting global COCOM
    requirements. This number includes about 5,000 RC sailors mobilized in
    support of OIF and OEF. Additionally, we maintain the capacity to
    rapidly increase contingency support with more than 28,000 RC sailors
    yet to be mobilized.
        Navy's Active/Reserve Integration program (ARI) aligns Reserve
    component (RC) and Active component (AC) personnel, training,
    equipment, and policy to achieve unity of command. It leverages both
    budgetary and administrative efficiencies, as well as ensuring that the
    full weight of Navy resources and capabilities are under the authority
    of a single commander. Navy reservists are aligned and fully integrated
    into their AC supported commands, and often conduct ``flex-drilling,''
    putting multiple drill periods together to provide longer periods of
    availability when requested. This flexibility enables our Reserve
    sailors to better balance the schedules and demands of their civilian
    employers and families while achieving greater technical proficiency,
    more cohesive units and increased readiness.
        The Reserve component is a critical enabler of the ``Sailor for
    Life'' concept that is central to our Strategy for our People. This
    approach to recruiting, retention, and professional development
    explores innovative opportunities for career on-ramps and off-ramps,
    providing fluidity between the Active and Reserve components. Last
    year, Navy continued to actively pursue incentives that will develop a
    more adaptable, better educated, and more highly skilled workforce
    while encouraging sailors to serve longer and more productively.
        Based on national demographic trends and the pace of globalization,
    it is clear we must build a more diverse Navy. According to the U.S.
    Census Bureau, by 2030 African Americans will comprise approximately 14
    percent of the population nationally, Hispanics 20 percent, and Asians/
    Pacific Islanders/Other 10 percent. Our officer corps currently
    consists of 81 percent non-minority and our enlisted ranks are
    approximately 52 percent non-minority. To ensure we have the best
    people, from the widest talent pool available, we must do a better job
    of recruiting and retaining our Nation's young minority students.
        B. Current Status of Our Sailors and Civilians
        Perhaps no where else in our Navy is the pace of change more
    profoundly felt than in our manpower, personnel, and training
    enterprise. It is here that the dynamics of globalization, cultural
    diversity, advancing technologies, generational differences, changes in
    the labor market, and declining numbers of hard science degrees among
    America's youth combine to make recruiting and retention more
    challenging than ever.
        Currently, only 3 in 10 high school graduates meet the minimum
    criteria for military service, including academic/mental, physical, and
    social/legal requirements. With all four armed services, a great number
    of colleges and universities, as well as corporate America seeking
    talented and qualified high school graduates, competition is stiff.
        If we are to pace the security challenges of this century, our
    sailors and civilian workforce must evolve with our weapons systems. We
    must recruit today the young men and women who will be leading the
    Fleet tomorrow. This will be a more specialized, technically capable,
    better educated, more culturally diverse and aware Navy than we have
    today. It will be smaller.
        Unfortunately, the old model of recruiting and detailing in which
    we focused on simply filling specific requirements, is no longer
    sufficient. Today, and in the future, as we reduce the size of our
    force to align it with increasingly sophisticated systems in a complex
    security environment, we must strive to FIT the right person to match
    the requirements. As we eliminate excess infrastructure ashore and
    increase our global outreach and persistent presence forward, the ratio
    of sea to shore billets will become more balanced. In order to make the
    right FIT for each individual sailor, we must be mindful of providing
    geographic stability, satisfying work, personal and professional
    development, and, to the degree possible, predictability in their
    future assignments.
        Admittedly, we could adapt more easily to the rapidly changing
    security environment if we could focus on a specific enemy or choose
    between effectiveness in irregular warfare or major combat operations--
    between asymmetric or conventional threats. Unfortunately, we cannot
    choose; we must prepare for both.
        Nor can we make it the responsibility of each sailor to
    individually sort out priorities or determine how to accommodate the
    greater breadth of learning and the depth of experience the future
    requires. Rather, we must adjust our personnel strategies to account
    for the dynamic nature of the demands on our people while assuring a
    predictable availability of current capability and future capacity
    suitable to the needs of the Joint Force and the Nation.
        As we develop and build more efficient and automated ships, planes,
    and combat systems, personnel reductions are inevitable, and as crew
    sizes decrease, the skill level and specialization requirements
    increase. The Navy has reduced its active end strength by some 35,000
    sailors over the last 4 years. In 2003 our Active component consisted
    of 375,700 sailors; at the end of fiscal year 2007 we will have
    340,700; and, by the end of fiscal year 2008 we will have 328,400. As
    we look ahead to the smaller, more capable ships entering service in
    the FYDP, we anticipate a stabilization of that trend at an active end-
    strength between 320,000 and 325,000. We are also trimming our Reserve
    component which will have gone from a total of 87,800 in 2003 to a
    total of 71,300 at the end of fiscal year 2007 and 67,800 by the end of
    fiscal year 2008. But these reductions are more about shaping the right
    force, than simply trimming its size. Our priority, then, is to recruit
    some 45,000 active sailors with the right mix of diversity, education,
    and skill sets necessary to serve our Fleet in 2009 and beyond.
        The Strategy for our People provides the framework through which we
    will size, shape, and stabilize the Navy Total Force. The execution of
    Navy's overarching Strategy for Our People focuses on six goals:
    capability driven management; a competency based workforce; an
    effective Total Force; increased diversity; being competitive in the
    Marketplace; and, being agile and cost efficient. The achievement of
    these goals depends on our ability to execute our programs of record.
    This strategy will satisfy future Joint warfighting needs by
    attracting, retaining, and better educating sailors and civilians
    capable of adapting and responding to mission needs anytime, anyplace,
    anywhere. [Figure 2]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Capability driven manpower. . . . Warfighting missions and
    operations have become more complex and uncertain. Navy work and
    workforce requirements are constantly shifting and evolving with
    changes in required operational, political and strategic capabilities.
    Basing manpower requirements on current and projected warfighting needs
    will ensure we meet today's operational requirements while continuously
    updating and balancing the workforce as needs change.
        A competency based workforce. . . . The Force Planning Concept
    suggests the joint force must develop unique capabilities that fall
    outside the realm of conventional warfighting. This means an expansion
    of the Navy workforce requirements beyond traditional roles (e.g.
    Maritime Civil Affairs Group). Developing the workforce based on
    competencies allows the Navy to continuously evaluate critical skills
    and create a workforce well-matched to the needs of the warfighters. A
    competency-based workforce also enables the Navy to determine where
    there is workforce commonality (or exclusivity) across a range of
    military operations so efficiencies can be realized.
        An effective Total Force. . . . A constrained fiscal environment
    and workforce reductions demand our focus on applying the best
    resources to jobs as creatively as necessary. Viewing workforce
    components as one integrated team of sailors and civilians provides
    flexibility and reduces risk while better meeting warfighting needs.
    Leveraging the strength of the Total Force provides maximum flexibility
    in applying the right skill-set to a requirement in the most cost-
    efficient manner.
        Diversity. . . . The changing demographics of the American
    population and the diversity of our missions in the world demand Navy
    take proactive steps to ensure it has access to the full range of the
    Nation's talent. Leveraging the strength of the Nation's diversity
    creates an environment of excellence and continuous improvement, in
    which artificial barriers to achievement are removed and the
    contributions of all participants are valued.
        Being competitive in the Marketplace. . . . The Navy is faced with
    recruiting and retention challenges in an era of increased military
    operations, a strong civilian economy, and a decreasing propensity for
    military service. To remain competitive with the other Services,
    academic institutions, and corporate America the Navy must revise and
    update its personnel policies and programs so it is attractive to the
    desired talent base and successfully competes with the private sector
    for the best talent.
        Being agile and cost efficient. . . . Expanding capability-driven
    workforce requirements and fiscal constraints require the Navy to
    deliver a more capable, versatile force. Agility means swiftly
    developing and implementing strategies, policies and processes to
    proactively meet evolving needs and challenges while focusing on the
    skills and abilities most in demand right now. Cost-efficient means we
    do this economically and without fiscal waste.
        Education is another area that will be treated as a strategic
    investment in our future. Our Education Strategy must reflect the
    technological basis of our core warfighting skills, the interdependence
    of joint and combined operations, the complexity of decisionmaking, and
    the sophisticated regional knowledge and grasp of political-military
    issues expected of Navy leaders. The objective of the Education
    Strategy is to enhance overall performance excellence in current and
    future joint operations and operations support by addressing the
    individual needs of those who are currently serving as well as the
    future force.
        C. Requirements to Develop 21st Century Leaders
        The challenges we face in shaping the force are considerable. We
    must deliver on the strategy for our people.
        To develop 21st century leaders, we seek congressional support in
    the following areas:

             Combat Casualty Care. The objective of Navy's combat
            casualty care is to maximize the continuum of quality care with
            lifesaving interventions as close to the battlespace as
            possible and with no decrease in quality of service during
            rehabilitation and recuperation. On the battlefield this
            includes forward surgical access and capabilities that have
            resulted in dramatically improved survival rates; diagnosis of
            mild/moderate traumatic brain injury/closed-head injury;
            improved patient care during transport; and, careful monitoring
            of mental health surveys administered during and after
            deployment to combat areas. After leaving the combat area,
            there is a 99.2 percent survival rate once an injured sailor
            reaches a Navy Medical Treatment Facility. Navy supports the
            Secretary's ongoing review of Walter Reed Army Medical Center
            and the National Naval Medical Center at Bethesda and is
            currently and seperately evaluating, through our Inspector
            General, the material condition and Quality of Service at each
            of our Navy Medical Treatment Facilities.
              Our highest priority is to win the global war on terror.
            Second only to this is our determination to take care of those
            wounded in this fight and their families.
             Health Care Cost Control. The Navy is committed to
            ensuring our sailors and their families receive top quality
            health care throughout the continuum of service. By 2009 our
            Navy will not only be smaller, it will be leaner. Health care
            costs continue to rise at a rate disproportionate to inflation.
            DOD TRICARE costs have more than doubled in 5 years from $19
            billion in fiscal year 2001 to $38 billion in fiscal year 2006,
            and analysts project these costs could reach $64 billion by
            2015--more than 12 percent of DOD's anticipated budget (versus
            8 percent today). Yet this problem extends beyond our active
            duty, or even our Reserve, health care costs. One of the
            significant drivers of this increased cost is the TRICARE for
            Life program developed for the 2001 National Defense
            Authorization Act.
              We could not have anticipated the growing number of retirees
            and their dependents, not yet Medicare eligible, who have
            chosen or have been driven to switch from private/commercial
            health care plans to TRICARE in order to better cope with
            rising health care costs. Despite greatly increased utilization
            rates, TRICARE Premiums have not changed with inflation since
            the program began in 1995, so that total beneficiary cost
            shares have declined substantially--27 percent of total benefit
            cost in 1995 while 12 percent in 2005. In fact, from fiscal
            year 2008 to fiscal year 2013, Navy's accrual costs for future
            retirees alone are expected to increase by $4 billion (a 16-
            percent increase) despite a flattened and stabilized end
            strength over that same period of time.
              There is no longer any tolerance for inefficiencies in our
            manpower system and very little flexibility in our MPN account.
            This has a carry-over effect by further pressurizing our
            procurement accounts. We again urge Congress to implement the
            initiatives and administrative actions that will restore
            appropriate cost sharing relationships between beneficiaries
            and the Department of Defense.
             DOPMA Relief. While Navy end strength is reduced and
            stabilizes across the FYDP, the demand continues to increase
            for experienced officers to fill joint requirements, core
            mission areas and jobs related to the war on terror. Navy is
            already operating at or near control grade limits imposed by
            Title 10, resulting in billet-grade suppression. Navy currently
            suppresses 106 captain, 279 commander, and 199 lieutenant
            commander billets at a lower pay grade (a total of 584 control
            grade billets). If title 10 limits were increased by 5 percent,
            Navy would be authorized to grow 131 captains, 304 commanders,
            and 478 lieutenant commanders. Funding to current control-grade
            requirements would give Navy the authority to grow 25 captains,
            25 commanders, and 279 lieutenant commanders as future control-
            grade requirements emerge. This legislation is critical to
            Navy's ability to carry out the National Military Strategy.
             Special Pay and Incentives. Navy will continue to seek
            funding for special pay, recruitment and retention bonus to
            maintain the right balance of skills out workforce.
             Sailor for Life. Navy requires assistance in providing
            sufficient flexibility in transitioning between our Active and
            Reserve components as we pursue our sailor-for-life
            initiatives.
             Path to Jointness. The Navy is committed to pursuing a
            Path to Jointness--developing Joint leaders both in the officer
            and senior enlisted communities. We are pursuing initiatives
            that will: establish the professional military education (PME)
            requirements for the ranks of E-1 through O-8 across our Active
            and Reserve components; ensure that PME graduates are closely
            tracked and assigned to billets that exploit their education
            and accelerate their development as Joint leaders; assess
            policy effectiveness by tracking the number and percentages of
            PME graduates assigned to career enhancing billets, and require
            100 percent fill of Navy resident student billets at all joint,
            Service and foreign war colleges.
             Tuition Assistance. The Navy is committed to
            supporting its sailors who choose education as a path to
            personal and professional development. The Navy provides 100
            percent reimbursement up to $250 and $50 per semester hour for
            up to 16 credit hours. This is an increase from previous policy
            which only allowed reimbursement up to 12 credit hours. Tuition
            assistance is capped by DOD at $4,500 per person per fiscal
            year.
             National Security Personnel System (NSPS). NSPS is a
            new personnel system that will create new civil service rules
            for the 750,000 Defense Department civilian workers. It
            strengthens our ability to accomplish the mission in an ever-
            changing national security environment. NSPS accelerates
            efforts to create a Total Force (Active-Duty military
            personnel, civilian personnel, Reserve, Guard, and
            contractors), operating as one cohesive unit, with each
            performing the work most suitable to their skills and the
            Department's priorities. The Department of the Navy needs a
            Human Resource system that appropriately recognizes and rewards
            employees' performance and the contributions they make to the
            mission. NSPS gives us better tools to attract and retain good
            employees.
              Department of the Navy deployment of the remaining portions
            of NSPS continues. Pay and performance provisions have so far
            been deployed to approximately 4,000 employees and another
            16,000 will be done by spring 2007. Further deployment of non-
            enjoined portions of the law will continue. Specifically, the
            pay, performance, recruiting, workforce shaping and other
            provisions of this new personnel system will be enacted
            throughout 2007-2008.
    IV. Conclusion
        Our Navy is truly a bargain, costing the taxpayers less than 1
    percent of the GDP. Though we are increasingly stretched, the Navy is
    in great shape and our people are remarkable. But as we strive to
    sustain combat readiness, build a fleet for the future and develop 21st
    century leaders we cannot allow ourselves to take this for granted. We
    must be mindful of the need to maintain a strong Navy now, with our
    ground forces stretched thin in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also after
    they return home.
        Our Nation depends upon a strong Navy with the global reach and
    persistent presence needed to provide deterrence, access, and
    assurance, while delivering lethal warfighting capacity whenever and
    wherever it is needed. Our Navy is fighting the global war on terror
    while at the same time providing a Strategic Reserve worldwide for the
    President and our unified and combatant commanders. As we assess the
    risks associated with the dynamic security challenges that face us, we
    must ensure we have the battle force, the people, and the combat
    readiness we need to win our Nation's wars.
        We have put the rudder over, and I believe we have the course about
    right. Simply reacting to change is no longer an acceptable course of
    action if our Navy is to successfully wage asymmetric warfare and
    simultaneously deter regional and transnational threats: Two
    Challenges, One Fleet. Our nation's security and prosperity depend upon
    keeping our shores safe and the world's maritime highways open and
    free.
                                    ANNEX I
               programs and initiatives to achieve cno priorities
    Sustain Combat Readiness
        Programs and practices of particular interest include (listed in
    order of fiscal year 2008 dollar value):
        Mobile User Objective System (MUOS)
        MUOS is the next generation Ultra High Frequency (UHF) narrowband
    satellite communications (SATCOM) system, replacing UHF Follow-On
    (UFO). MUOS supports communications-on-the-move to small and less
    stable platforms (handhelds, aircraft, missiles, UAVs, remote sensors)
    in stressed environments (foliage, urban environment, high sea state).
    UHF SATCOM provides critical command and control connectivity and is
    the essential common denominator for all forces. $828 million in fiscal
    year 2008 keeps MUOS funded to meet all Threshold requirements and is
    on track to meet an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in 2010.
        Nimitz-Class Refueling Complex Overhaul (RCOH)
        RCOH subjects Nimitz-class aircraft carriers to comprehensive
    modernization upgrades, maintenance work, and nuclear refueling to
    extend the service life of a Nimitz-class carrier out to approximately
    50 years, about 20 years longer than its originally planned service
    life. Execution of RCOH is required to maintain an 11 aircraft carrier
    force and provide Naval Tactical Air with an overmatch capability
    against any potential adversary. A notional RCOH consists of 3.2
    million man-days and a 36-month execution period conducted at Northrop
    Grumman Newport News, Virginia facilities. While U.S.S. Carl Vinson
    (CVN-70) completes RCOH in fiscal year 2008-2009, the fiscal year 2008
    Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) funding of $297 million
    primarily supports the advance funding and sequencing of follow-on
    overhauls for CVNs-71-73.
        Cobra Judy Replacement (CJR)
        $133 million in CJR funds the acquisition of a single ship-based
    radar suite for world-wide technical data collection against ballistic
    missiles in flight. This unit will replace the current Cobra Judy/
    U.S.N.S. Observation Island, which is due to leave service in 2012.
    Upon achieving Initial Operating Capability, Navy will transfer the CJR
    to the U.S. Air Force for operation and maintenance. The CJR program
    has entered production stage.
        Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC)
        CEC is an advanced sensor netting system enabling real-time
    exchange of fire-control quality data between battle force units. CEC
    provides the integrated, precision air defense picture required to
    counter the increased agility, speed, maneuverability, and advanced
    design of cruise missiles, manned aircraft; and in the future, tactical
    ballistic missiles. Funding requested for fiscal year 2008 is $123
    million.
        CEC's acquisition strategy implements Open Architecture based
    hardware with re-hosted existing software. A critical element is the
    P3I hardware that reduces cost, weight, cooling, and power
    requirements. The Integrated Architecture Behavior Model (IABM) will be
    implemented as a host combat system software upgrade replacing the
    cooperative engagement processor functionality enabling joint
    interoperability with common track management across the Services.
        Distributed Common Ground/Surface Systems (DCGS)
        DCGS-N is the Navy's Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance,
    and Targeting (ISR&T) system. Funded at $107 million in fiscal year
    2008, DCGS-N will support the new Maritime Headquarters/Maritime
    Operations Center (MHQ/MOC). DCGS-N will receive and process multiple
    data streams from various ISR sources to provide time-critical aim
    points and intelligence products. It will enhance the warfighter's
    Common Operational Picture (COP) and Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).
        Deployable Joint Command and Control (DJC2)
        DJC2 is a Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff priority transformation initiative providing Combatant Commanders
    (COCOMs) with a standardized, deployable, and scalable Joint C2
    headquarters capability tailored to support Joint Task Force (JTF)
    operations. DJC2 enables a COCOM to rapidly deploy and activate a JTF
    headquarters equipped with a common C2 package with which to plan,
    control, coordinate, execute, and assess operations across the spectrum
    of conflict and domestic disaster relief missions. This budget request
    of $31 million provides operations and sustainment for the six existing
    systems and continued development efforts.
        Navy Special Warfare (NSW) Support
        NSW programs provide critical service common support to eight SEAL
    teams, two SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams, three Special Boat Teams and
    five NSW Groups.
        During fiscal years 2007 and 2008, six pre-positioned operational
    stocks will be procured and staged, hundreds of common small arms,
    weapons mounts and visual augmentation systems will be provided to NSW
    combat elements, up to 20 standard boats will continue to replace an
    aging fleet of 61 NSW training support craft and 4 Navy-mandated
    management support systems will be funded. A total of $21 million in
    various procurement and operations support accounts is dedicated in
    fiscal year 2008.
        Navy Computer Network Attack (CNA)
        Navy Computer Network Attack develops force structure for
    operations in the cyberspace environment. This is the programmatic
    continuation of Navy Cyber Attack Team (NCAT) initiative which is
    endorsed by several Combatant Commanders. Program focus is on unique
    capabilities to address Navy warfighting gaps. Our $11 million fiscal
    year 2008 investment is required to develop the capability to access
    adversary networks and enable Information Operations (IO) in asymmetric
    warfare.
        Marine Mammal Research/Sound in Water Effects
        The Navy is committed to following proactive compliance strategies
    to meet legal requirements and to identify and fund marine mammal
    research requirements--especially related to potential effects of mid-
    frequency active sonar. In support, Navy has requested $10 million in
    funding for these efforts in fiscal year 2008. Compliance with Marine
    Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), Endangered Species Act (ESA), Coastal
    Zone Management Act (CZMA), and National Environmental Policy Act
    (NEPA) related to potential effects to marine animals from sound in the
    water are dependent on filling gaps in scientific data and continued
    research on acoustic criteria. However, increasing pressures related to
    restricting the use of active sonar are adversely impacting Navy
    training and readiness. Clearer, science-based standards are needed in
    future MMPA amendments to ensure environmental protection while not
    endangering our sailors.
        Forward Deployed Naval Forces (Japan)
        U.S.S. George Washington (CVN-73) will replace U.S.S. Kitty Hawk
    (CV-63) as the forward deployed aircraft carrier in Yokosuka, Japan in
    2008. The move represents a strong and continuing commitment to the
    security of the Asian Pacific region and our alliance.
        George Washington will be the first nuclear aircraft carrier to
    join the Navy's permanently forward deployed naval forces (FDNF),
    replacing the conventionally powered the Kitty Hawk that will retire
    after 47 years of superb service. Funding of $9 million in fiscal year
    2008 supports the final of several years investments for George
    Washington's anticipated 2008 FDNF arrival.
        TRIDENT
        TRIDENT is maritime intelligence production capability within the
    Office of Naval Intelligence providing tailored, focused, timely
    intelligence support to Naval Special Warfare (NSW) and other joint
    special operations forces operating in the maritime arena. For a
    relatively small investment in fiscal year 2008 of $9 million, TRIDENT
    production directly supports the Global War on Terror and is a response
    to ongoing initiatives to improve intelligence support to NSW. TRIDENT
    deployed its initial two Tactical Intelligence Support Teams (TIST) in
    support of Naval Special Warfare in the Spring and Fall of 2006. They
    are currently providing both forward deployed and reach back support to
    NSW forces.
        Undersea Warfare Training Range (USWTR)
        The proposed USWTR is a 500-square nautical mile instrumented
    underwater training range in shallow littoral waters on each coast.
    USWTR will support undersea warfare (USW) training exercises for the
    Atlantic and Pacific Fleet Forces. Undersea hydrophone sensors will
    provide a suite to deliver real time tracking and a record of
    participants' activities used to evaluate tactics, proficiency and
    undersea warfare combat readiness. The instrumented area would be
    connected to shore via a single trunk cable.
        Pending signature of the environmental Record of Decision (ROD) for
    the east coast USWTR in April 2008, the Navy will commence hardware
    procurement and installation in fiscal year 2008. Supporting this, Navy
    has requested $7 million in fiscal year 2008. The west coast ROD is
    scheduled for signature in September 2008. The shallow water ranges
    planned for both coasts will be completed in fiscal year 2013.
        Tactical Aircraft (TACAIR) Integration (TAI)
        Our TACAIR Integration initiative merges Navy and Marine Corps
    Tactical Aviation into a seamless Naval Aviation force at sea and
    ashore. This is an organizational change that ``buys'' increased combat
    capability without requiring additional investment.Naval Aviation force
    projection is accomplished by increased integration of Marine tactical
    squadrons into Carrier Air Wings and Navy squadrons into Marine
    Aircraft Wings. Successful integration, also leveraging the common
    characteristics of the F/A-18s, further enhances core combat
    capabilities providing a more potent, cohesive, smaller and affordable
    fighting force.
    Build a Fleet for the Future
        Programs and practices of particular interest (listed in order of
    fiscal year 2008 dollar value):
        RDT&E Development and Demonstration Funds
        Navy's $15.9 billion investment in various technology, component,
    and system development funds, as well as our operational development
    and testing programs provide a balanced portfolio. Not only do they
    ensure successful development of programs for our Fleet for the Future,
    they also leverage the Fleet, Systems Commands, warfare centers, and
    others to align wargaming, experimentation, and exercises in developing
    supporting concepts and technologies.
        DDG-1000
        This multi-mission surface combatant, tailored for land attack and
    littoral dominance, will provide independent forward presence and
    deterrence and operate as an integral part of joint and combined
    expeditionary forces. DDG-1000 will capitalize on reduced signatures
    and enhanced survivability to maintain persistent presence in the
    littoral. The program provides the baseline for spiral development to
    support future surface ships. Our fiscal year 2008 request is for $3.3
    billion in shipbuilding and research funds.
        With the Advanced Gun System (AGS) and associated Long Range Land
    Attack Projectile (LRLAP) DDG-1000 will provide volume and precision
    fires in support of Joint forces ashore. A Global Positioning System
    (GPS) guided, 155 millimeter round, LRLAP will provide all weather
    fires capability out to 83 nautical miles. Its Dual Band Radar
    represents a significant increase in air defense capability in the
    cluttered littoral environment. Investment in Open Architecture and
    reduced manning will provide the Navy life cycle cost savings and
    technology that can be retrofit to legacy ships.
        Facilities Recapitalization and Sustainment
        Facilities Recapitalization is comprised of modernization and
    restoration. Modernization counters obsolescence by renewing a facility
    to new standards or functions without changing the fundamental facility
    size. Restoration includes efforts to restore degraded facilities to
    working condition beyond design service life or to fix damage from
    natural disaster, fire, etc. Restoration and modernization funding in
    fiscal year 2008 is requested at $2.0 billion.
        Facilities Sustainment includes those maintenance and repair
    activities necessary to keep facilities in working order through their
    design service life.
        Navy's sustainment rate, and fiscal year funding request of $1.1
    billion, is at the level at which facilities can be maintained and
    still remain mission capable. Navy's intent is to aggressively scrub
    requirements, reduce facilities footprint and drive down costs. Our
    goal is to provide the resources required to execute wartime missions.
    Our planning and footprint reduction initiatives are intended to ensure
    that adequate facilities are available to support our mission
    requirements.
        CVN-21
        The CVN-21 Program is designing the next generation aircraft
    carrier to replace U.S.S. Enterprise (CVN-65) and Nimitz-class aircraft
    carriers. CVN-78-class ships will provide improved warfighting
    capability and increased quality of life for our sailors at reduced
    acquisition and life cycle costs. $2.8 billion in shipbuilding funds
    for fiscal year 2008 supports acquisition of U.S.S. Gerald R. Ford
    (CVN-78), the lead ship of the class, scheduled for delivery in late
    fiscal year 2015. Additionally, the program has $232 million in
    research and development supporting work on the Electromagnetic
    Aircraft Launch System and other warfighting capability improvements.
        F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
        F-35 is a joint cooperative program to develop and field family of
    affordable multi-mission strike fighter aircraft using mature/
    demonstrated 21st century technology to meet warfighter needs of the
    Navy, Marines, Air Force, and international partners including the
    U.K., Italy, Netherlands, Denmark, Turkey, Norway, Australia, and
    Canada. Navy's fiscal year 2008 $1.2 billion in procurement buys six
    short take-off and landing variants. An additional $1.7 billion in
    research and development continues aircraft and engine development.
        Virginia Class Fast Attack Nuclear Submarine (SSN)
        Navy needs to maintain a SSN force structure to meet current
    operational requirements, prosecute the global war on terror, and face
    any potential future threats. The Virginia class emphasizes
    affordability and optimizes performance for undersea superiority in
    littoral and open ocean missions.
        Lead ship operational performance exceeded expectations. Follow-on
    submarine performance has been even better:

             U.S.S. Texas (SSN-775) INSURV trial was best
            performance by the second SSN of any class.
             Third ship (Hawaii, SSN-776) was the most complete
            submarine ever at launch (greater than 90 percent complete),
            had the best INSURV trial of the class, and was delivered on
            the original contract delivery date.

        $2.6 billion in fiscal year 2008 procures one submarine.
    Additionally, the budget requests $137 million for technical insertions
    and cost reduction developments. Navy is working closely with industry
    to bring the cost per hull down to $2 billion (in fiscal year 2005
    dollars) and increase the build rate to two ships/year starting in
    fiscal year 2012. Authorization of MYP will help facilitate this. This
    will help mitigate future force level deficiencies and achieve cost
    reduction goals through Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) savings and
    better distributed overhead costs.
        F/A-18E/F Super Hornet
        The Navy's next generation, multi-mission Strike Fighter replaces
    aging F-14s, older model F/A-18s, and assumes the S-3 aircraft carrier-
    based aerial refueling role. F/A-18E/F provides a 40-percent increase
    in combat radius, 50 percent increase in endurance, 25 percent greater
    weapons payload, three times more ordnance bring-back, and is five
    times more survivable than F/A-18C models. Approximately 55 percent of
    the total procurement objective has been delivered (254 of 460). F/A-
    18E/F is in full rate production under a second 5-year multi-year
    contract (fiscal years 2005-2009). $2.3 billion in fiscal year 2008
    procures 24 aircraft as part of this contract.
        MV-22 Osprey
        MV-22 Osprey is the Marine Corps medium-lift assault support
    aircraft being procured to replace legacy CH-46Es and CH-53Ds. Current
    operational projections hold CH-46Es in service through fiscal year
    2018, and CH-53Ds through fiscal year 2013. The CH-46Es are playing a
    critical role in the war on terror, flying more than four times their
    peacetime utilization rate making delivery of the MV-22 even more
    critical. The MV-22's improved readiness, survivability and
    transformational capability (twice the speed, three times the payload,
    and six times range of the airframes it is replacing) will vastly
    improve operational reach and capability of deployed forces. The
    aircraft is approved for Full Rate Production and enters a
    congressionally approved joint 5-year, multi-year procurement in fiscal
    year 2008 with $2.0 billion procuring 21 aircraft. The total Marine
    requirement is 360 MV-22s; Navy 48 MV-22s; SOCOM 50 CV-22s.
        DON Science & Technology (S&T)
        The Department of the Navy S&T supports Navy/Marine strategy and
    guides the S&T investment portfolio to meet the future needs of the
    Navy, the Marine Corps, and combatant commands. The fiscal year 2008
    budget of $1.7 billion is a balanced portfolio comprised of discovery
    and invention, leap-ahead innovations, acquisition enablers, quick
    reaction S&T and Defense Department partnerships. A long-term strategy
    will help balance future risks.
        EA-18G Growler
        The Growler is the Navy's replacement for the EA-6B. Inventory
    objective is 84 aircraft for test, Fleet Replacement Squadron,
    attrition, pipeline and 10 operational carrier airwing squadrons to
    provide the Navy's carrier-based Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA)
    capability. The program is on schedule and budget. All Key Performance
    Parameter (KPP) and Technical Performance Measure (TPM) thresholds are
    being met or exceeded. Program achieved first flight in August 2006; 1
    month ahead of schedule. $1.6 billion supports development and
    procurement of 18 aircraft in fiscal year 2008.
        MH-60R/S Multi-Mission Helicopter
        The MH-60R is a cornerstone of the Navy's Helicopter Concept of
    Operations (CONOPs), which reduces from six to two the helicopter
    variants in use today. The MH-60R Multi-Mission Helicopter program will
    replace the surface combatant-based SH-60B, carrier-based SH-60F, and
    anti-surface capabilities of the S-3 with a newly manufactured airframe
    and enhanced mission systems. Sea control missions include Undersea and
    Surface Warfare. The MH-60R provides forward-deployed capabilities to
    defeat area-denial strategies, allowing joint forces to project and
    sustain power. Full Rate Production was approved in March 2006. $998
    million in fiscal year 2008 procures 27 aircraft.
        The MH-60S is designed to support Carrier and Expeditionary Strike
    Groups in Combat Logistics, Search and Rescue, Vertical Replenishment,
    Anti-Surface Warfare, Airborne Mine Countermeasures, Combat Search and
    Rescue, and Naval Special Warfare mission areas. This program is in
    production. This fiscal year, Block 2 of the program will see the IOC
    of the first of five Organic Airborne Mine Countermeasures (OAMCM)
    systems (AQS-20). The remaining four airborne mine countermeasure
    systems will IOC between fiscal years 2008-2010. An armed helicopter
    capability is also expected to enter IOC this year. $504 million in
    fiscal year 2008 procures 18 aircraft.
        LPD-17
        LPD-17 functionally replaces LPD-4, LSD-36, LKA-113, and LST-1179
    classes of amphibious ships for embarking, transporting and landing
    elements of a Marine landing force in an assault by helicopters,
    landing craft, amphibious vehicles, or by a combination of these
    methods. $1.5 billion in this budget's shipbuilding request procures
    LPD-25.
        LHA(R)
        LHA(R) replaces four aging LHA Class ships which are reaching the
    end of their administratively extended service lives. LHA(R) Flight 0
    is a modified LHD-1 Class variant designed to accommodate aircraft in
    the future USMC Aircraft Combat Element (ACE) including JSF and MV-22.
    The fiscal year 2008 request for $1.4 billion supports procurement of
    the lead ship in the class.
        Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
        Designed to be fast and agile, LCS will be a networked surface
    combatant with capabilities optimized to assure naval and joint force
    access into contested littoral regions. LCS will operate with focused-
    mission packages that deploy manned and unmanned vehicles to execute a
    variety of missions, including littoral ASW, anti-surface warfare (SUW)
    and mine countermeasures (MCM). LCS will possess inherent capabilities
    including homeland defense, Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) and
    Special Operation Forces support. LCS will employ a Blue-Gold multi-
    crewing concept for the early ships. The crews will be at a ``trained
    to qualify'' level before reporting to the ship, reducing qualification
    time compared to other ships.
        The Navy has recently identified significant cost increases for the
    lead ship in the LCS class (Lockheed Martin variant). A series of
    increases in the contractor estimated cost of completion, the most
    recent in December, highlighted the problem and initiated a thorough
    analysis by both Navy and industry. After nearly 2 months of in-depth
    study, the Navy has revalidated the warfighting requirement and
    developed a restructured program plan for the LCS that improves
    management oversight, implements more strict cost controls,
    incorporates selective contract restructuring, and ensures delivery
    within a realistic schedule.
        Construction of LCS Hull #3 (Lockheed Martin) will be resumed under
    revised contract terms that rebalance cost growth risk between
    government and industry. Construction on LCS Hull #4 (General Dynamics)
    will continue as long as costs remain defined and manageable. This plan
    will provide for best value to the Navy for the completion of the first
    four LCS ships, procurement of existing designs in fiscal years 2008-
    2009 to fill critical warfighting gaps, and establishment of a sound
    framework for transition to a single design in fiscal year 2010. The
    Navy will work closely with Congress on reprogramming actions necessary
    to bring this program forward.
        P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA)
        The P-8A replaces the P-3C Orion on a less than 1:1 basis. This
    aircraft provides lethality against submarine threats, broad area
    maritime and littoral armed ASW patrol, Anti-Surface Warfare, and
    Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance. The P-8A is the only platform
    with this operationally agile capability set. It fills combatant
    commander requirements in major combat and shaping operations, as well
    as the war on terror and homeland defense. The program has been
    executed on time and on budget. Preliminary Design Review has
    successfully completed and is now in the detailed design phase. $880
    million in research and development funds is included in the fiscal
    year 2008 budget. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) is planned in
    fiscal year 2013.
        E-2D Advanced Hawkeye
        The E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (AHE) program will modernize the current
    E-2C weapons system by replacing the radar and other aircraft system
    components to improve nearly every facet of tactical air operations.
    The modernized weapons system will be designed to maintain open ocean
    capability while adding transformational littoral surveillance and
    Theater Air and Missile Defense capabilities against emerging air
    threats in the high clutter, electromagnetic interference, and jamming
    environments. $866 million in fiscal year 2008 continues development
    work and procures three Pilot Production Aircraft. The AHE will be one
    of the four pillars contributing to Naval Integrated Fire Control-
    Counter Air. The AHE program plans to build 75 new aircraft.
        ASW Programs
        The Navy continues to pursue research and development of
    Distributed Netted Sensors (DNS); low-cost, rapidly deployable,
    autonomous sensors that can be fielded in sufficient numbers to provide
    the cueing and detection of adversary submarines far from the Sea Base.
    Examples of our fiscal year 2008 request of $24 million in these
    technologies include:

             Reliable Acoustic Path, Vertical Line Array (RAP VLA).
            A passive-only distributed system exploiting the deep water
            propagation phenomena. In essence, a towed array vertically
            suspended in the water column.
             Deep Water Active Distributed System (DWADS). An
            active sonar distributed system optimized for use in deep
            water.
             Deployable Autonomous Distributed System (DADS). A
            shallow water array, using both acoustic and non-acoustic
            sensors to detect passing submarines. DADS will test at sea in
            fiscal year 2008.
             Littoral ASW Multi-static Project (LAMP). A shallow
            water distributed buoy system employing the advanced principles
            of multi-static (many receivers, one/few active sources) sonar
            propagation.

        Further developing the Undersea Warfare Decision Support System
    will leverage existing data-links, networks, and sensor data from air,
    surface, and subsurface platforms and integrate them into a common ASW
    operating picture with tactical decision aids to better plan, conduct,
    and coordinate ASW operations. We are requesting $23 million in fiscal
    year 2008 towards this system.
        To engage the threat, our forces must have the means to attack
    effectively the first time, every time. The Navy has continued a robust
    weapons development investment plan including $293 million requested in
    the fiscal year 2008 on such capabilities as:

             High-Altitude ASW Weapons Concept (HAAWC). Current
            maritime patrol aircraft must descend to very low altitude to
            place ASW weapons on target, often losing communications with
            the sonobuoy (or distributed sensor) field. This allows the
            aircraft to remain at high altitude and conduct an effective
            attack while simultaneously enabling the crew to maintain and
            exploit the full sensor field in the process. This capability
            will be particularly important in concert with the new jet-
            powered P-8A MMA. A test is scheduled for May 2007.
             Common Very Lightweight Torpedo (CVLWT). The Navy is
            developing a 6.75'' torpedo suitable for use in the surface
            ship and submarine anti-torpedo torpedo defense, and the
            offensive Compact Rapid Attack Weapon (CRAW) intended for the
            developing manned and unmanned aerial vehicles.

        Finally, to defend our forces, key defensive technologies being
    pursued include:

             Surface Ship Torpedo Defense (SSTD). Program delivers
            near-term and far-term torpedo defense. The planned fiscal year
            2008 $16 million R&D investment supports ongoing development of
            the 6-inch CVLWT which supports both the Anti-Torpedo Torpedo
            (ATT) and the Compact Rapid Attack Weapon (CRAW). Also, several
            capability upgrades to the AN/SLQ-25A (NIXIE) are being
            incorporated to improve both acoustic and non-acoustic system
            performance to counter current threat torpedoes. These
            enhancements also support their use in the littorals and are
            scheduled to complete in fiscal year 2009. The AN/WSQ-11 System
            uses active and passive acoustic sensors for an improved
            torpedo Detection Classification and Localization (DCL)
            capability, and a hard kill Anti-Torpedo Torpedo (ATT) to
            produce an effective, automated and layered system to counter
            future torpedo threats. DCL improvements include lower false
            alarm rates and better range determination.
             Aircraft Carrier Periscope Detection Radar (CVN PDR).
            An automated periscope detection and discrimination system
            aboard aircraft carriers. System moves from a laboratory model,
            currently installed on U.S.S. Kitty Hawk, to 12 units (1 per
            carrier, 1 ashore) by fiscal year 2012. Fiscal year 2008 funds
            of $7 million support this effort.

        Platform Sensor Improvements. Against the quieter, modern diesel-
    electric submarines, work continues on both towed arrays and hull
    mounted sonars. Our $410 million request in fiscal year 2008 includes
    work on the following:

             TB-33 thin-line towed array upgrades to forward
            deployed SSN's provides near-term improvement in submarine
            towed array reliability over existing TB-29 arrays. TB-33
            upgrades are being accelerated to Guam based SSNs.
             Continued development of twin-line thin line (TLTL)
            and vector-sensor towed arrays (VSTA) are under development for
            mid-far term capability gaps. TLTL enables longer detection
            ranges/contact holding times, improves localization, and
            classification of contacts. VSTA is an Office of Naval Research
            project that would provide TLTL capability on a single array
            while still obviating the bearing ambiguity issue inherent in
            traditional single line arrays.
    Modernization
        Achieving full service life from the fleet is imperative.
    Modernization of the existing force is a critical enabler for a
    balanced fleet. Platforms must remain tactically capable and
    structurally sound for the duration of their designed service life.
        Cruiser (Mod)
        AEGIS Cruiser Modernization is key to achieving the 313 ship force
    structure. A large portion of surface force modernization (including
    industrial base stability) is resident in this modernization program.
    $403 million across several appropriations in fiscal year 2008 supports
    this program.
        A comprehensive Mission Life Extension (MLE) will achieve the
    ship's expected service life of 35+ years and includes the All Electric
    Modification (replacing steam systems), SMARTSHIP technologies, Hull
    Mechanical & Electrical (HM&E) system upgrades, and a series of
    alterations designed to restore displacement and stability margins,
    correct hull and deck house cracking and improve quality of life and
    service on board.
        Destroyer (Mod)
        The DDG 51 modernization program is a comprehensive 62 ship program
    designed to modernize HM&E and Combat Systems. These upgrades support
    reductions in manpower and operating costs, achieve 35+ year service
    life, and allows the class to pace the projected threat well into the
    21st century. Our fiscal year 2008 request contains $159 million for
    this effort.
        Key upgrades to the DDG 51 AEGIS Weapon System (AWS) include an
    Open Architecture computing environment, along with an upgrade of the
    SPY Radar signal processor, addition of BMD capability, Evolved Sea
    Sparrow Missile (ESSM), improved USW sensor, Naval Integrated Fire
    Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) and additional other combat systems
    upgrades.
        Lewis & Clark Dry Cargo/Ammunition Ship (T-AKE)
        T-AKE is intended to replace aging combat stores (T-AFS) and
    ammunition (T-AE) ships. Working in concert with an oiler (T-AO), the
    team can perform a ``substitute'' station ship mission to allow the
    retirement of four fast combat support ships (AOE-1 Class). $456
    million in fiscal year 2008 supports funding the 11th T-AKE (final
    price will be determined through negotiations expected to be completed
    during the summer 2007). Lead ship was delivered in June 2006 and has
    completed operational evaluation (OPEVAL).
        CH-53K
        The CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR) is the follow on to the
    Marine Corps CH-53E Heavy Lift Helicopter. The CH-53K will more than
    double the current CH-53E lift capability under the same environmental
    conditions. The CH-53K's increased capabilities are essential to
    meeting the Marine Expeditionary Brigade of 2015 Ship-to-Objective
    Maneuver vision. fiscal year 2008 research and development funds of
    $417 million supports major systems improvements of the new helicopter
    including: larger and more capable engines, expanded gross weight
    airframe, better drive train, advanced composite rotor blades, modern
    interoperable cockpit, external and internal cargo handling systems,
    and survivability enhancements.
        Tomahawk/Tactical Tomahawk (TACTOM)
        Tomahawk and Tactical Tomahawk missiles provide precision, all
    weather, and deep strike capabilities. Tactical Tomahawk provides more
    flexibility and responsiveness at a significantly reduced life cycle
    cost than previous versions and includes flex-targeting, in-flight
    retargeting, and two-way communications with the missile.
        Our $383 million in this years request sustains the Tomahawk Block
    IV full-rate, multi-year procurement contract for fiscal years 2004-
    2008, yielding approximately 2,100 missiles. The projected inventory
    will accommodate campaign analysis requirements given historical usage
    data and acceptable risk.
        F/A-18 A/B/C/D Hornet
        The F/A-18 Hornet is Naval Aviation's principal strike-fighter.
    This state-of-the-art, multi-mission aircraft serves the Navy and
    Marine Corps, as well as the armed forces of seven allied countries.
    Its reliability and precision weapons delivery capability are
    documented frequently in news reports from the front lines. $331
    million in fiscal year 2008 supports improvements to the original
    Hornet A/B/C/D variants provide significant warfighting enhancements to
    the fleet. These improvements include the Global Positioning System
    (GPS), Multi-functional Information Distribution System (MIDS), AIM-9X
    Sidewinder Missile/Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS), Combined
    Interrogator Transponder, Joint Direct Attack Munition/Joint Stand-Off
    Weapon delivery capability, and a Digital Communication System (DCS)
    for close-air support. Through these improvement and upgrades, the
    aircraft's weapons, communications, navigation, and defensive
    electronic countermeasure systems have been kept combat relevant.
        Although the F/A-18 A/B/C/D are out of production, the existing
    inventory of 667 Navy and Marine Corps aircraft will continue to
    comprise half of the carrier strike force until 2013, and are scheduled
    to remain in the Naval Aviation inventory through 2022.
        CG(X)
        CG(X) is envisioned to be a highly capable surface combatant
    tailored for Joint Air and Missile Defense and Joint Air Control
    Operations. CG(X) will provide airspace dominance and protection to all
    joint forces operating in the Sea Base. Initial Operational Capability
    (IOC) is 2019. $227 million in research and development for fiscal year
    2008 supports CG(X) development. The ongoing analysis of alternatives
    is considering various propulsion options. CG(X) will replace the CG-47
    Aegis class and improve the fleet's air and missile defense
    capabilities against an advancing threat--particularly ballistic
    missiles.
        Standard Missile-6 (SM-6)
        The Navy's next-generation Extended Range, Anti-Air Warfare
    interceptor is the SM-6. Supporting both legacy and future ships, SM-6
    with its active-seeker technology will defeat anticipated theater air
    and missile defense warfare threats well into the next decade. The
    combined SM-6 Design Readiness Review/Critical Design Review was
    completed 3 months ahead of schedule with SM-6 successfully meeting all
    entrance and exit criteria. Ahead of schedule and on cost targets, our
    fiscal year 2008 budget plan of $207 million will keep this development
    effort on track for Initial Operational Capability in fiscal year 2010.
        Conventional TRIDENT Modification (CTM)
        CTM transforms the submarine launched, nuclear armed Trident II
    (D5) missile system into a conventional offensive precision strike
    weapon with global range. This new capability is required to defeat a
    diverse set of unpredictable threats, such as Weapons of Mass
    Destruction (WMD), at short notice, without the requirement for a
    forward-deployed or visible presence, without risk to U.S. forces, and
    with little or no warning prior to strike. $175 million is included in
    the fiscal year 2008 request. The program and related policy issues are
    currently under review by the Office of the Secretary of Defense as
    part of the New Strategic Triad capability package.
        Navy Unmanned Combat Air System (UCAS)
        The former J-UCAS program transferred from Air Force to Navy lead.
    The Navy UCAS will develop and demonstrate low observable (LO),
    unmanned, air vehicle suitability to operate from aircraft carriers in
    support of persistent, penetrating surveillance, and strike capability
    in high threat areas. $162 million in fiscal year 2008 research and
    development funds advance the programs objectives.
        Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW)
        JSOW is a low-cost, survivable, air-to-ground glide weapon designed
    to attack a variety of targets in day/night and adverse weather
    conditions from ranges up to 63 nautical miles. All variants employ a
    kinematically efficient, low-signature airframe with GPS/INS guidance
    capability. JSOW is additionally equipped with an imaging-infrared
    seeker, Autonomous Targeting Acquisition (ATA) software, and a multi-
    stage Broach warhead to attack both hard and soft targets with
    precision accuracy. The $156 million in fiscal year 2008 funding
    continues production to build to our inventory requirements. A Block
    III improvement effort will add anti-ship and moving target capability
    in fiscal year 2009.
        Ohio-Class SSGN
        Ohio-Class SSGN is a key transformational capability that can
    covertly employ both strike and Special Operations Forces (SOF)
    capabilities. Ohio (SSGN-726) and Florida (SSGN-728) were delivered
    from conversion in December 2005 and April 2006 respectively and are
    conducting modernization, certification, and acceptance evaluation
    testing prior to deployment. Georgia (SSGN-729) is in conversion at
    Norfolk Naval Shipyard with delivery scheduled for September 2007. The
    $134 million in the fiscal year 2008 budget request is primarily for
    testing, minor engineering changes, and to procure the final
    replacement reactor core.
        Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS), Unmanned Aircraft System
            (UAS)
        BAMS is a post-September 11, Secretary of the Navy directed
    transformational initiative. $117 million in research and development
    funding continues Navy's commitment to provide a persistent (24 hours/
    day, 7 days/week), multi-sensor (radar, Electro-Optical/Infrared,
    Electronic Support Measures) maritime intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance capability with worldwide access. Along with Multi-
    Mission Aircraft, BAMS is integral to the Navy's airborne intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) recapitalization strategy. BAMS
    is envisioned to be forward deployed, land-based, autonomously operated
    and unarmed. It will sustain the maritime Common Operational Picture
    (COP) and operate under the cognizance of the Maritime Patrol and
    Reconnaissance Force.
        Long-Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP)
        LRLAP is the primary munition for the DDG-1000 Advanced Gun System
    (AGS). AGS and LRLAP will provide Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) to
    forces ashore during all phases of the land battle. All program flight
    test objectives have been met. Six of nine guided test flights have
    been successfully completed. Test failures have been isolated and
    corrective actions implemented with successful re-tests fired.
        $74 million in fiscal year 2008 supports continued development.
    Current ammunition inventory estimates are based on conventional
    ammunition calculation methods. A pending ammo study will account for
    increased LRLAP range and precision to better inform decisions
    regarding procurement schedule and total inventory objective.
        MQ-8B Fire Scout Vertical Takeoff UAV (VTUAV)
        The Navy Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical UAV (VTUAV) is
    designed to operate from all air capable ships, carry modular mission
    payloads, and operate using the Tactical Control System (TCS) and
    Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL). VTUAV will provide day/night real
    time reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition capabilities
    as well as communications relay and battlefield management to support
    the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) core mission areas of Anti-Submarine,
    Mine, and Anti-Surface Warfare. It will be part of the LCS mission
    module packages supporting these warfare missions. $71 million in
    development and procurement funding supports engineering manufacturing
    development, operational testing and achievement of initial operational
    capability in fiscal year 2008.
        Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) (Future)
        $68 million in research and development in fiscal year 2008
    supports our first year of procurement with (4) MPF(F) ships in fiscal
    year 2009. MPF(F) provides a scalable, joint seabased capability for
    the closure, arrival, assembly, and employment of up to the Marine
    Expeditionary Brigade of 2015 sized force. It will also support the
    sustainment and reconstitution of forces when required. MPF(F) is
    envisioned for frequent utility in lesser contingency operations, and
    when coupled with Carrier or Expeditionary Strike Groups, will provide
    the Nation a rapid response capability in anti-access or denial
    situations.
        Direct Attack (DA) Munitions: JDAM, LGB, Dual Mode LGB, and Direct
            Attack Moving Target
        Inventories of direct attack munitions include Laser Guided Bombs
    (LGB) and Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) weapons; both are
    guidance kits for General Purpose bombs and strike fixed targets only.
    The LGB guides on a laser spot which provides precise accuracy in clear
    weather. JDAM provides Global Positioning / Inertial Guidance Systems
    (GPS/INS) giving accurate adverse weather capability ($34 million in
    fiscal year 2008). The Dual Mode LGB retrofit to LGB kits, procured in
    fiscal years 2006-2007, increases flexibility by combining laser and
    GPS/INS capabilities in a single weapon. The next evolutionary upgrade,
    Moving Target Weapon (MTW), will combine laser and GPS/INS guidance
    with moving target capability. Procurement is planned via a capability-
    based competition, with MTW upgrading existing JDAM and/or LGB kit
    inventories. $29 million supports this ongoing MTW effort in fiscal
    year 2008.
        Harpoon Block III Missile
        Harpoon Block III represents the only long range, all weather,
    precise, ship and air launched, Surface Warfare anti-ship capability.
    $44 million in fiscal year 2008 supports development of a kit upgrade
    to existing Harpoon Block IC, the addition of a data link and GPS that
    will provide increased target selectivity and performance in the
    cluttered littorals.
        Pioneer Tactical Unmanned Aircraft Sensor (UAS)
        The Pioneer UAS System is a transportable Intelligence,
    Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) asset capable of providing
    tactical commanders with day and night, battlefield, and maritime
    reconnaissance in support of Marine expeditionary warfare and maritime
    control operations. The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $38 million in
    operations and maintenance sustainment and $90 million in procurement
    for the Army's Shadow RQ-7B UAS as an interim replacement for the
    currently fielded Pioneer.
        Language, Regional Expertise & Culture (LREC)
        Achieving Navy's global strategy depends in part on our ability to
    communicate with and comprehend adversaries, enduring allies, and
    emerging partners. To facilitate this capability, Navy has developed a
    way forward to transform LREC in the force. Consistent with the Defense
    Language Transformation Roadmap and the Navy Strategic Plan (NSP), the
    program incentivizes language proficiency, increases regional content
    in NPME, provides non-resident language instruction to all sailors and
    delivers in-residence training to more Officers.
        Incentivization through higher foreign language proficiency pay
    rates began June 2006. $33 million requested in fiscal year 2008
    continues existing efforts and begins new initiatives of enhanced non-
    resident (online) and resident (for officers) language training.
        Extended Range Munition (ERM)
        The concept for expeditionary operations relies on sea-based
    surface fire support to aid in destruction and suppression of enemy
    forces. The Extended Range Munition (ERM) is a 5-inch rocket assisted
    guided projectile providing range and accuracy superior to that of
    conventional ammunition. The projectile uses a coupled GPS/INS Guidance
    System and unitary warhead with a height-of-burst fuze. $30 million in
    fiscal year 2008 research and development funding includes a 20-
    reliability demonstration before land-based flight and qualification
    testing. The program includes modifications to existing 5 inch guns and
    fire control systems. ERM will utilize the Naval Fires Control System
    as the mission planning tool.
        Automatic Identification System (AIS)
        AIS is a commercially available shipboard broadcast Very High
    Frequency (VHF) maritime band transponder system capable of sending and
    receiving ship information, including Navigation Identification, and
    Cargo. AIS significantly increases the Navy's ability to distinguish
    between normal and suspicious merchant ships headed towards U.S. and
    allied ports. Navy warships using AIS have observed dramatic increases
    in situational awareness, safety of ship and intelligence gathering
    capability. Programmed funding started in fiscal year 2007. Initially
    funded in fiscal year 2006 from ONR Rapid Technology Transition
    initiative and reprogramming, AIS shifted to programmed funding in
    fiscal year 2007, and with our request of $28 million in fiscal year
    2008, it transitions to become a program of record.
        Global Hawk Maritime Demonstration (GHMD)
        Using an existing Air Force production contract, the Navy procured
    two GHMD Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and associated ground control
    equipment. GHMD will be used for developing Concept of Operations and
    Tactics, Training and Procedures for a persistent ISR maritime
    capability in conjunction with the manned P-3 aircraft. The GHMD return
    on investment will be risk reduction for the BAMS UAS Program. GHMD
    provides a limited, high altitude, endurance UAV platform capability 8
    years before the planned fiscal year 2014 IOC of BAMS. $18 million in
    operations and maintenance and $6 million in procurement of spares
    sustains the program in fiscal year 2008.
        Remote Minehunting System (RMS)
        RMS utilizes a diesel-powered, high endurance, off-board, semi-
    submersible vehicle to tow the Navy's most advanced mine hunting sonar,
    the AN/AQS-20A. The system will be launched, operated, and recovered
    from surface ships. RMS will provide mine reconnaissance, detection,
    classification, localization, and identification of moored and bottom
    mines. $23 million in fiscal year 2008 supports the fielding plan
    commencing this year providing limited systems for use on select DDGs,
    48 RMSs for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Mine Warfare Mission
    Packages, and an additional 16 vehicles as part of the LCS ASW Mission
    Packages.
        Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV)
        Navy, along with the Army, SOCOM and Marine Corps, is working to
    acquire a Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) that provides the required
    intra-theater lift capability necessary to meet each service's
    requirements. The acquisition of JHSV will address high-speed, intra-
    theater surface lift capability gaps identified to implement Sea Power
    21, the Army Future Force operational concepts and SOCOM future
    operational plans. Additionally, it will improve intratheater lift
    currently provided by Westpac Express and other leased vessels. JHSV is
    currently in the Technology Development Phase with Joint Requirements
    Oversight Council (JROC) approval of the Capabilities Development
    Document (CDD) anticipated soon. Navy's research and development
    contribution in fiscal year 2008 is $19 million. Ultimate delivery of
    the first vessel is anticipated in 2010.
        Aerial Common Sensor (ACS)--Future EPX (EP-3E Replacement)
        Navy is on a path to recapitalize the EP-3 airborne electronic
    surveillance aircraft, and our $17 million in fiscal year 2008 research
    and development funding contributes to this effort. ACS is the Navy's
    premier manned Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaisance
    (AISR) platform tailored to the maritime environment. ACS will provide
    data fusion and a robust reach-back capability allowing onboard
    operators to push intelligence to tactical commanders and operators in
    mission support centers. With a network-centric approach, ACS
    represents a significant capability in the Maritime Patrol and
    Reconnaissance Force Family of Systems including MMA and BAMS UAS.
        Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
        Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense is the sea based component of the
    Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).
    It enables surface combatants to support ground-based sensors and
    provides a capability to intercept Short and Medium Range Ballistic
    Missiles with ship-based interceptors (SM-3 missiles). The recently
    started Gap Filler Sea-Based Terminal Program will provide the ability
    to engage Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) with modified SM-2
    Block IV missiles from Aegis BMD capable ships. While all development
    funding is covered under the MDA budget, Navy has committed $13 million
    in fiscal year 2008 for operations and sustainment of Aegis BMD systems
    as Navy assumes operational responsibility.
        In May, 2006, U.S.S. Lake Erie (CG-70) successfully engaged and
    intercepted a Lance short-range test target with a modified SM-2 Block
    IV missile in a Navy-sponsored BMD demonstration. As a result, the Navy
    is modifying the remaining inventory of 100 SM-2 Block IV missiles, and
    MDA is modifying the Aegis BMD program to support sea-based terminal
    engagements.
        In June 2006, Navy successfully achieved a second engagement of a
    separating SRBM target with the Aegis BMD system. This successful
    engagement brings the tally to seven successful intercepts in nine
    flight tests as of December 2006. Aegis BMD has been installed on 3
    Cruisers and 13 Destroyers. All the Cruisers and three Destroyers are
    engagement capable. The balance of the Destroyers are Long-Range
    Surveillance and Track (LRS&T) capable. Additional installations are
    planned for 2007.
        In actual operations last July, U.S. and Japanese Aegis radar-
    equipped Destroyers successfully monitored North Korea's ballistic
    missile tests.
        21" Mission Reconfigurable Unmanned Underwater Vehicle System
            (MRUUVS)
        21" MRUUVS is a submarine launched and recovered, reconfigurable
    UUV system that will improve current capabilities in enabling assured
    access. It will provide a robust capability to conduct clandestine
    minefield reconnaissance and general Intelligence, Surveillance, and
    Reconnaissance (ISR) in denied or inaccessible areas. The MRUUVS
    program has been restructured, moving Initial Operational Capability
    (IOC) from fiscal year 2013 to 2016 when clandestine mine
    countermeasure capability from Los Angles Class submarines will be
    delivered. Accordingly, the fiscal year 2008 funding request has been
    adjusted to $13 million. ISR capability and Virginia Class host
    compatibility will arrive in follow-on increments approximately 2 years
    after IOC.
        Tactical Control System (TCS)
        Research and development funding of $9 million in fiscal year 2008
    continues work on the Tactical Control System. The program provides
    interoperability and commonality for mission planning, command and
    control, and interfaces for tactical and medium altitude UAV systems.
    TCS software provides a full range of scaleable capabilities from
    passive receipt of air vehicle and payload data to full air vehicle and
    payload command and control from ground control stations both ashore
    and afloat. TCS will be fielded with the Vertical Takeoff Unmanned Air
    Vehicle (VTUAV) system and key to supporting the LCS.
        Utilities Privatization (UP)
        The Navy and Marine Corps have 645 utilities systems eligible for
    privatization on 135 activities/installations worldwide. Of these, 394
    have been determined to be exempt, 22 have been awarded for
    privatization, and 95 have received a Source Selection Authority (SSA)
    decision and are being processed for exemption or award. 122 systems
    are still being reviewed for an SSA decision. $3 million requested in
    our fiscal year 2008 budget supports these ongoing initiatives.
    Develop 21st Century Leaders
        Programs and practices of particular interest include (listed in
    order of fiscal year 2008 dollar value):
        Health Care
        Combat Casualty Care. Combat casualty care is provided by Navy
    medical personnel assigned to and serving with Marine Corps units, in
    Expeditionary Medical Facilities, aboard casualty receiving/treatment
    ships and hospital ships, and in military and VA hospitals. Recent
    advances in force protection, battlefield medicine, combat/operational
    stress control, and medical evacuation have led to improved survival
    rates and enhanced combat effectiveness.
        Since the start of OEF/OIF the Marine Corps has fielded new combat
    casualty care capabilities, including: updated individual first aid
    kits with QuikClot and advanced tourniquets, robust vehicle first-aid
    kits for convoy use, Combat Lifesaver training, and new systems to
    provide forward resuscitative surgery and en route care. Navy Fleet
    Hospital transformation is redesigning expeditionary medical facilities
    to become lighter, modular, more mobile, and interoperable with other
    Services' facilities.
        Naval S&T funds of $18 million in fiscal year 2008 in advanced
    technology and applied research for combat casualty care sustain our
    overall level of effort and focus on this mission. Additionally, mental
    health services have been expanded through post-deployment screenings,
    expanded briefings, and proactive interactions between providers and
    sailors and marines.
        Safe Harbor Program. Our care for combat wounded does not end at
    the Military Treatment Facility (MTF). The Navy has established the
    Safe Harbor Program to ensure seamless transition for the seriously
    wounded from arrival at a CONUS MTF to subsequent rehabilitation and
    recovery, whether through DOD or the VA. Since its inception, 114
    sailors including 103 Active and 11 Reserve members have joined the
    program. Currently, 92 are being actively tracked and monitored
    including 34 severely injured last year in OIF/OEF. Senior medical
    staff personally visit and assist our seriously injured sailors and
    their families to ensure their needs are being met.
        Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Traumatic Brain Injury
    (TBI)
        The Navy has focused much attention on these complex conditions
    that have resulted from combat operations. With PTSD, early
    identification and intervention are critical elements of successful
    treatment and prevention. Closely aligned with warfighters while in
    garrison, health care providers instruct self-aid and buddy-aid
    training. When intervention is necessary, treatment occurs via embedded
    mental health personnel in deployed units (e.g. via USMC Oscar teams
    and Carrier Group Clinical Psychologists). All sailors receive in-
    theater assessment through a Behavioral Health Assessment Tool (BHAT)
    and receive a Post Deployment Health Assessment (PDHA) immediately
    following deployment, and again 90--180 days later. This treatment
    coverage is comprehensive for both Active and Reserve members.
        Navy is partnering with the other Services to establish a Center
    for Deployment Psychology to provide further education and training on
    PTSD treatment and other combat stress disorders. Our continuum of care
    in this area before, during, and after deployment, coupled with a
    review of policies and practices to ensure treatment for PTSD is
    ``destigmatized,'' are critical steps in addressing the health needs of
    our deployed sailors.
        The science associated with the diagnosis and treatment of
    traumatic brain injuries (TBI) is evolving and the military is at the
    leading edge in research and treatment. Military Acute Concussion
    Evaluation (MACE) has been developed as part of field assessments and
    all casualties transitioned to Bethesda receive neuro-psychological
    evaluations with database tracking and follow-up as required.
        When members with TBI transition from military service, they may be
    transferred to one of the four Veterans Administration (VA) poly-trauma
    centers in Palo Alto, California; Richmond, Virginia; Minneapolis,
    Minneapolis; and Tampa, Florida--whichever facility is closest to the
    member's home of record. The four VA poly-trauma centers are among the
    premier treatment facilities for TBI in the country. In addition to VA
    tracking, when service members are transferred to the VA, they are also
    tracked by case managers from the referring Navy MTF at least bimonthly
    by the MTF Case Manager to maintain a coordinated care effort.
    Occasionally, the medical case management team determines in
    consultation with an individual patient and their family that the
    patient's specific condition and/or family needs dictate that the best
    location for their continued care is at a civilian hospital rather than
    a VA or an MTF.
        Quality Medical Care
        While continuing to support OIF/OEF with medical personnel, Navy
    Medicine remains committed to providing quality care for all
    beneficiaries, both in deployed settings and at home. One of the main
    challenges has been ensuring sufficient numbers of providers in
    critical specialties. We continue to focus on refining and shaping our
    force to recruit, train, and retain the right mix of uniformed and
    civilian health providers thus sustaining the benefits of our
    healthcare system and meeting our obligations during this time of war.
    Despite high demands, Navy medicine meets 100 percent of its
    operational commitments, and maintains quality care to our
    beneficiaries, without any sacrifice in quality.
        Post-Deployment Health Care
        Navy Medicine has developed new delivery models for deployment-
    related concerns and is working with the Office of Seamless Transition
    to improve coordination with the Veterans Administration. These include
    thirteen Deployment Health Clinics in areas of Fleet and Marine
    concentration to support operational commands in ensuring medical care
    for those returning from deployment.
        Navy Education
        Professional Military Education (PME). Our Professional Military
    Education continuum provides career-long educational opportunities for
    professional and personal development that supports mission
    capabilities. It supports development of 21st century leaders who have
    the capacity to think through uncertainty; develop innovative concepts,
    capabilities, and strategies; fully exploit advanced technologies,
    systems, and platforms; understand cultural/regional issues; and
    conduct operations as a coherently joint force. Navy PME provides a
    common core of knowledge for all sailors. A primary level program was
    implemented via distance learning in June 2006. The initial targeted
    audience is junior unrestricted line officers and senior enlisted
    members. Additional content is in development for all junior officers.
    Introductory and basic levels for more junior sailors is also under
    development.
        Joint Professional Military Education (JPME). Joint Professional
    Military Education provides an understanding of the principles of Joint
    warfare. Our path is designed to create a change in Navy culture so
    that it values jointness and therefore systematically develops a group
    of Navy Leaders who are strategically minded, capable of critical
    thinking, and skilled in naval and joint warfare. JPME Phase I is a
    requirement for screening unrestricted line officers for commander
    command beginning in fiscal year 2009. In August 2006, Naval War
    College began in-residence instruction of JPME Phase II. The Naval War
    College has implemented a Joint Maritime Component Commander's Course
    to prepare future Flag Officers to serve as Maritime Component
    Commanders. $150 million requested in fiscal year 2008 sustains our
    expanded commitment to this vital professional development.
        The Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps (NROTC). The NROTC
    Program comprises 59 active units at 71 host institutions of higher
    learning across the Nation. With $173 million requested in fiscal year
    2008, the program is adequately funded to provide 4 and 2 year
    scholarships to qualified young men and women to prepare them for
    leadership and management positions in an increasingly technical Navy
    and Marine Corps with service as commissioned officers. The program
    continues to be a key source of nuclear power candidates, nurses, and
    increased officer corps diversity. Focus is now on increasing strategic
    foreign language skills and expanding cultural awareness among
    midshipmen.
        The United States Naval Academy (USNA). USNA gives young men and
    women the up-to-date academic and professional training needed to be
    effective Navy and Marine officers in their assignments after
    graduation. Renowned for producing officers with solid technical and
    analytical foundations, the Naval Academy is expanding its capabilities
    in strategic languages and regional studies.
        The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). NPS is the Navy's principal
    source for graduate education. It provides Navy and DOD relevant degree
    and non-degree programs in residence and at a distance to enhance
    combat effectiveness. NPS provides essential flexibility in meeting
    Navy and Department of Defense emergent research needs, and the
    development of warfighters with otherwise demanding career paths and
    deployment cycles making graduate education opportunities difficult to
    achieve. NPS also supports operations through naval and maritime
    research, and maintains expert faculty capable of working in, or
    serving as advisors to operational commands, labs, systems commands,
    and headquarters activities. The $84 million requested in fiscal year
    2008 sustains this unique national asset and provides increases for lab
    upgrades, distance learning, and IT maintenance and support.
        The Naval War College (NWC). The Naval War College provides
    professional maritime and joint military education, advanced research,
    analysis, and gaming to educate future leaders. Its mission is to
    enhance the professional capabilities of its students to make sound
    decisions in command, staff and management positions in naval, joint,
    and multinational environments. The $56 million requested in fiscal
    year 2008 is a significant increase to support Joint Forces Maritime
    Component Command/Coalition Forces Maritime Component Command analysis
    and gaming capability, the China Maritime Studies Institute, initial
    investment for Maritime Headquarters (MHQ)/Maritime Operations Center
    (MOC), support for JPME II accreditation, funding for JPME I at Naval
    Postgraduate School, and for NWC Maritime Operations curriculum
    development.
        Enlisted Retention (Selective Reenlistment Bonus)
        Retaining the best and brightest sailors has always been a Navy
    core objective and key to success. Navy retains the right people by
    offering rewarding opportunities for professional growth, development,
    and leadership directly tied to mission readiness. Navy has experienced
    significant reenlistment improvement since a 20-year low in fiscal year
    1999, reaching a peak at the end of fiscal year 2003. This improved
    retention is part of a long-term trend, allowing us to be more
    selective in ensuring the right number of strong performers reenlist in
    the right ratings. Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (SRBs) are a key tool
    enabling us to offer attractive incentives to selected sailors we want
    to retain. $359 million requested in fiscal year 2008 will provide for
    nearly 79,000 new and anniversary payments helping ensure the Navy will
    be able to remain selective in fiscal year 2008.
        Sexual Assault Victim Intervention (SAVI)
        SAVI has three major components: (1) awareness and prevention
    education, (2) victim advocacy and intervention services, and (3)
    collection of reliable data on sexual assault. Per the fiscal year 2005
    National Defense Authorization Act requirements, the Navy SAVI Program
    was transitioned from a program management to case management focus.
    Existing installation program coordinator positions were increased and
    became Sexual Assault Response Coordinators (SARCs), which is a
    standard title and position across the Department of Defense. SARCs are
    accountable for coordinating victim care/support and for tracking each
    unrestricted sexual assault incident from initial report to final
    disposition. Navy also provides 24/7 response capability for sexual
    assaults, on or off the installation, and during deployment through the
    use of Victim Advocates who report to installation SARCs. The $3
    million requested in the fiscal year 2008 budget enables us to maintain
    this expanded SAVI program fleet-wide.
        Family Advocacy Program (FAP)
        The Family Advocacy Program addresses prevention, identification,
    reporting, evaluation, intervention and follow-up with respect to
    allegations of child abuse/neglect and domestic abuse involving active
    duty and their family members or intimate partners. Maintaining abuse-
    free and adaptive family relationships is critical to Navy mission
    readiness, maintenance of good order and discipline, and quality of
    service for our active duty members and their families.
        Sea Warrior Spiral 1
        Sea Warrior comprises the Navy's training, education and career
    management systems that provide for the growth and development of our
    people. The first increment, or ``Spiral 1'', of Sea Warrior is
    Interactive Detailing. This system allows sailors to have greater
    insight and engagement in identifying and applying for Navy positions
    of interest to them professionally and personally. Spiral 1 Sea Warrior
    is a funded Navy program and its' develop follows the standard,
    rigorous acquisition engineering and program management processes.
    Additional Sea Warrior spirals will be developed in accordance with
    future capability needs and as clear requirements are defined.
        Because of Sea Warrior's complexity, many issues related to sea and
    shore connectivity are still being worked out. Further, before fielding
    a usable model, the Navy plans to conduct extensive beta testing of
    selected ratings. Sea Warrior is funded through the FYDP and is not
    expected to reach FOC until 2016.

        Chairman Levin. Admiral, thank you very much for that
    powerful statement.
        General Conway?

      STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES T. CONWAY, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE
                              MARINE CORPS

        General Conway. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and
    distinguished members of the committee: Thank you for the
    opportunity to report to you on the status of our Marine Corps.
    In our recent meetings as well as previous testimony before
    this Congress, I have pledged to provide you with frank and
    honest assessments and I come here today with that again as my
    watchword.
        For the past 5 years your Marine Corps has been immersed in
    the first battles of a long war, a generational struggle
    against Islamic extremists.
        Our freedom is threatened, not by Nazis or Communists as it
    was in the past, but by terrorists who are determined to
    destroy us and our way of life. Further, the full array of our
    security threat is daunting. But rest assured, this
    generation's young Americans are answering the call. Over two-
    thirds of our Corps enlisted or reenlisted since September 11,
    knowing full well what their Nation expects of marines in time
    of war.
        Our marines are being pushed hard by the high operational
    tempo and frequency of combat deployments. They have been
    operating at full bore now for almost 5 years. Despite this, in
    fact maybe because of it, I can report firsthand that their
    morale has never been higher. I attribute this fact to the
    belief that they are making a difference. They see the evidence
    of your support everywhere, tangible support, in the fielding
    of new material, the latest equipment to protect them while in
    harm's way, and your support of the proposal to grow our end
    strength.
        Increasing to 202,000 marines will reduce the strain both
    on the individual marine and on our institution as a whole. It
    will require additional infrastructure, but more importantly,
    it will gradually improve the deployment-to-dwell ratio in some
    of our most critical units. Currently many of these units are
    deployed for 7 months, then home for only 7 months, some even
    less time than that, before they return to combat.
        This end strength increase addresses much more than the
    current battles in Iraq and Afghanistan. It ensures that our
    Corps will be able to deal with the uncertainties of the long
    war. Our Corps is by law to be most ready when the Nation is
    least ready; the Nation's shock troops. Additional marines
    allow the dwell time needed to train and sharpen the skills
    that will be required of us in the next contingency, reducing
    our operational and strategic risks.
        As over 70 percent of our proposed end strength increase is
    comprised of first-term marines, we are making the necessary
    increases in recruiting and retention. This is a challenge, but
    our standards will remain high. We need your continued support
    for recruiting programs such as advertising, which are
    essential for us to continue to bring aboard the best in
    America.
        Our Nation has an enduring commitment to her marines long
    after they have returned from the battle, particularly if they
    are physically or mentally scarred. Our moral imperative is to
    ensure that this support is seamless even as a marine leaves
    our uniformed ranks. To this end, we have formed a Wounded
    Warrior Regiment with battalions on each coast, that will
    ensure that we hold to the maxim that we `never leave a marine
    behind.'
        Ladies and gentlemen, your marines are honored to be
    serving this Nation during such an important time in our
    history. They are truly a special breed of patriots and it is
    on their behalf that I come before you today to answer your
    questions and to help all understand how we can best support
    these tremendous young Americans.
        I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Conway follows:]
                Prepared Statement by Gen. James T. Conway, USMC
        Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and distinguished members of the
    committee, thank you for the opportunity to report to you the state of
    your Marine Corps.
        Your Marine Corps is currently engaged in what we believe to be the
    opening battles in a generational struggle against Islamic extremists.
    Our commitment is characterized by diverse and sustained employment
    around the globe, particularly the central campaigns in Iraq and
    Afghanistan. Your marines are fully engaged in this fight, and it is
    through their tremendous sacrifices--serving shoulder-to-shoulder with
    their fellow service men and women--that we will ultimately prevail. It
    is our moral imperative to support them to the hilt--always mindful
    that our forward-deployed marines and sailors in combat must be our
    number one priority.
        Though marines in the operating forces have been pushed hard by the
    tempo and frequency of operational deployments, their morale has never
    been higher--because they believe they are making a difference. Thanks
    to you, ladies and gentlemen, your marines know that the people of the
    United States and their Government are behind them. Support has been
    exceptional--from the rapid fielding of life-saving equipment to the
    proposed increase in end strength, and with your continued support,
    mission accomplishment will remain completely viable and achievable.
        The Long War is taking a considerable toll on our equipment and we
    have tough choices ahead of us--we must support our marines and their
    families, while deciding whether to replace our rapidly aging equipment
    with similar platforms or to modernize with next generation equipment.
        We know these next few years will be challenging--not only in the
    immediate conflict in Iraq, but in subsequent campaigns of the Long
    War. Therefore, the Corps will balance our skill sets in order to
    remain prepared for crisis outside of Iraq and Afghanistan--to be where
    our country needs us, when she needs us, and to prevail over whatever
    challenges we face. I am confident that with your steadfast support,
    our Corps will continue to remain the Nation's force in readiness and
    fulfill its congressionally-mandated mission of being the most ready
    when the Nation is least ready.
                  i. marine corps commitments in the long war
        Over the past year, your marines deployed to all corners of the
    globe in support of our Nation. With more than 24,000 marines ashore
    throughout the U.S. Central Command's Area of Responsibility,
    Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom remain our largest
    commitment. In addition to those operations, the Marine Corps also
    deployed forces to: support humanitarian and disaster relief efforts in
    Pakistan and the Republic of the Philippines; participate in over fifty
    Theater Security Cooperation events ranging from small Mobile Training
    Teams in Central America to the first deployment of the Marine Forces
    Special Operations Command's Foreign Military Training Unit supporting
    our African partner nations; protect our Embassies by providing Fleet
    Antiterrorism Security Teams to East Timor and Lebanon; and respond to
    a Noncombatant Evacuation from Lebanon--the largest since Vietnam.
    Achieve Victory in the Long War
        The Defense Department's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review directed
    that we enhance our counterinsurgency capabilities. Our enhanced Marine
    Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) and the Marine Corps component to
    Special Operations Command are part of this commitment. Other types of
    forces, unique to counterinsurgency operations, may also need to be
    formed. However, we will maintain robust contingency response forces
    satisfying Congress' intent to be ``the Nation's shock troops''--always
    ready and always capable of forcible entry.
        I view the inherent power of the MAGTF as an irreplaceable
    component of this Nation's plan for success in the Long War. This war
    demands flexible organizations that apply a mix of combat and nonlethal
    actions; interagency capabilities and joint warfare applications;
    innovative use of airpower; and synchronization of intelligence
    activities. For rapid integration of these capabilities--as well as
    providing the critical boots on the ground--the MAGTF is better
    prepared than any other military formation to execute the full range of
    operations required by the current conflict. This is the Corps'
    fundamental fighting organization, providing the joint force a unique,
    additive capability--one that is much greater than the sum of its
    parts.
        To further expand the MAGTF's contribution to our Nation's
    security, I have directed my staff to develop a series of exercises
    that will further enhance the MAGTF's ability to integrate interagency
    and coalition operations throughout the spectrum of conflict. Our goal
    will be to provide a forum to develop diverse yet cohesive teams that
    can best overcome the challenges we are most likely to face in pre- and
    post-war phases of operations. These exercises will serve our Nation
    well in the Long War, in future conflicts, and in our ongoing security
    cooperation efforts.
        In February 2006, we established Marine Corps Forces, Special
    Operations Command (MARSOC) within the U.S. Special Operations Command.
    MARSOC is already employing its five major subordinate elements: the
    Foreign Military Training Unit, two Marine Special Operations
    Battalions, the Marine Special Operations Support Group, and the Marine
    Special Operations School, and is on track to achieve full-operational
    capability by the end of fiscal year 2008. Its personnel and equipment
    assignment plan is designed to best support our combatant commanders in
    their prosecution of the Long War. The Foreign Military Training Unit
    was activated in 2005 and has been incorporated into MARSOC, the 2d
    Marine Special Operations Battalion was activated in May of 2006,
    followed by the 1st Marine Special Operations Battalion in October
    2006.
        MARSOC deployed Foreign Military Training Unit teams to the
    European and Southern Command areas of responsibility last summer and
    fall. Through the end of fiscal year 2007, the Foreign Military
    Training Unit is scheduled to make 27 deployments to 12 countries to
    conduct foreign internal defense and counter narcotics training to
    improve the indigenous military forces of those countries.
    Additionally, MARSOC began deploying Marine Special Operations
    Companies, associated with Marine Expeditionary Units and assigned to
    Expeditionary Strike Groups in January of this year. MARSOC provides a
    unique combination of land component and maritime expeditionary
    capabilities across a wide range of missions. As special operations
    forces continue to prosecute the Long War, MARSOC will be a significant
    partner in Special Operations Command.
        To aid in both the current execution of the campaign in Iraq as
    well as the long-term irregular warfare capability of the Marine Corps,
    we are establishing a Center for Irregular Warfare. This organization
    will serve as the focal point for integration of concepts, doctrine,
    training, education, and equipment capability development. This Center
    will also maintain close coordination with our sister Services and
    external agencies. Our goal is to enhance the MAGTF's capabilities by
    training and equipping small-unit leaders to handle the demanding
    complexities and possess the adaptive mindset necessary to operate
    across the spectrum of conflict--empowering our ``strategic corporals''
    as well as all of our junior leaders to fight, operate, and win in this
    challenging security environment.
    Supporting the Plus-up for Operation Iraqi Freedom
        Currently, the Marine Corps has approximately 4,000 marines
    affected by the pending plus-up operation in Iraq. The units affected
    will be extended for approximately 45-60 days. This change will impact
    our marines and their families, but we believe that the support systems
    that we have in place within the units and family support systems back
    home will help our marines and their families meet the challenges
    associated with this extension on deployment. Furthermore, between
    their return and next deployment, the addition of new infantry
    battalions will allow these units to lengthen the time at their home
    station.
        Battalions moved forward in the rotation cycle will complete all
    required predeployment training that fully qualifies them for
    employment. These battalions will be subject to the same predeployment
    training standards as their fellow marines. We have accelerated the
    normal cycle through our main mission rehearsal exercise, Mojave Viper,
    to accommodate consistent training for all units rotating into theater.
        The accelerated battalions will deploy with equipment from their
    home stations, and the additional equipment required will be provided
    by cross-leveling assets in theater as well as leveraging equipment
    already positioned forward. This has resulted in some home station
    shortfalls and has hindered some stateside units' ability to train for
    other missions and contingencies. While the readiness of deployed units
    remains high, we have experienced a decrease in the readiness of some
    nondeployed units.
        There are no Marine Corps Reserve units involved in the plus-up
    operations.
                        ii. right-size our marine corps
        To meet the demands of the Long War as well as the inevitable
    crises that arise, our Corps must be sufficiently manned in addition to
    being well trained and properly equipped. Like the Cold War, the Long
    War is a continuing struggle that will not be measured by the number of
    near-term deployments or rotations, and while we seek to capitalize on
    advances in technology, we know it is our magnificent marines who
    invariably decide the outcome.
        In order to protect our most precious asset, the individual marine,
    we must ensure that our personnel policies, organizational construct,
    and training are able to operate at the ``sustained rate of fire.''
    Operating at the "sustained rate of fire" means that the Corps will be
    able to maintain operations indefinitely without drastic changes to
    procedures, policies, organization, or operations. The proposed Active
    component end strength increase will significantly enhance our ability
    to operate at the ``sustained rate of fire.''
    Strain on the Individual
        Despite an unparalleled Personnel Tempo, the morale of our marines
    and their families remains high. To avoid an adverse toll on our
    marines and their families, and to prevent a decrease in readiness, the
    former Secretary of Defense established a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio
    goal for all Active component forces. This ratio relates to how long
    our forces are deployed versus how long they are at home--the goal
    being for every 7 months a marine is deployed, they will be back at
    their home station for 14 months. We need to relieve the strain on
    those superb Americans who have volunteered to fight the Nation's
    battles.
    Strain on the Institution
        The current deployment cycle requires commanders to focus solely on
    those skill sets required to accomplish the mission in Iraq and
    Afghanistan. This deterioration of capabilities is exacerbated by
    individual augments and training team requirements and by many units
    being deployed for missions outside of their normal duties. The result
    of this strain is evident in the Marine Corps' limited ability to
    provide trained forces to project power in support of other
    contingencies. Reduced training time and a necessarily singular focus
    on current contingency requirements prevents significant opportunities
    for units to train to the full range of military operations in varied
    operating environments, such as jungle or mountain terrain. To fulfill
    our mandate to be ``most ready when the Nation is least ready,'' our
    deployment cycles must not only support training for irregular warfare,
    they must also provide sufficient time for recovery, maintenance, and
    training for other contingency missions. By increasing the dwell time
    for our units and allowing them additional time at home stations, we
    can accomplish the more comprehensive training needed for the
    sophisticated skill sets that have enabled MAGTFs to consistently
    achieve success in all types of military operations and operating
    environments. Our goal is to increase dwell time and achieve a 1:2
    deployment-to-dwell ratio for our Active Forces--our Operating Forces
    are routinely falling short of this target.
    Reducing the Stress
        I would emphasize, the underlying requirement for an end strength
    increase is separate from, indeed it pre-dates, the plus-up operation
    in Iraq. The proposed increase to our Active component end strength to
    202,000 marines will go a long way to reducing the strain on the
    individual marines and the Institution. Our first task will be to build
    three new infantry battalions and their supporting structure--
    approximately 4,000 marines. The resources for this force have been
    included in our fiscal year 2007 supplemental. These funds will pay for
    initial costs associated with the stand up of these infantry battalions
    as well as critical enablers, which are vital not only for the current
    fight, but are also critically needed to support long-term Marine Corps
    capabilities to accomplish other missions. These enablers include
    combat support and combat service support such as intelligence,
    military police, and civil affairs capabilities. We will systematically
    build the additional individuals and units on a schedule of
    approximately 5,000 per year. This plan will gradually increase the
    deployment-to-dwell ratio of some of our habitually high operational
    tempo units--enabling us to recover our ability to respond in
    accordance with timelines outlined in war plans for our combatant
    commanders; thereby, reducing future operational risks. We are
    initially funding this initiative with supplemental and baseline
    funding in fiscal year 2008, but have included all future costs in our
    baseline budget as of fiscal year 2009.
    Reserve Component End Strength
        Our efforts in the Long War have been a Total Force effort, with
    our Reserves once again performing with grit and determination. Recent
    policy changes within the Department of Defense match up very well with
    our existing policies and will allow us to use the Reserve Forces as
    they were structured to be employed--to augment and reinforce our
    Active component forces. To this end, my goal is to obtain a 1:5
    deployment-to-dwell ratio within our Reserve component. We currently
    believe our authorized Reserve component end strength of 39,600
    Selected Reserve Marines is adequate. As with every organization within
    the Marine Corps, we continue to review the make-up and structure of
    the Marine Corps Reserve in order to ensure the right capabilities
    reside within the Marine Forces Reserve units and our Individual
    Mobilization Augmentee program across the force. Finally, as our Active
    Force increases in size, our reliance on the Reserve Forces should
    decrease--helping us achieve the desired deployment-to-dwell ratio.
    Manning the Force
        An equally important factor in sustaining a viable force is
    continuing to recruit and retain qualified young men and women with the
    right character, commitment, and drive to become marines. With over 70
    percent of the end strength increase comprised of first-term marines,
    both recruiting and retention efforts will be challenged. A major part
    of this effort will involve programming increased funding for both the
    Enlistment Bonus and the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Programs. We will
    need the continued strong support of Congress to achieve ongoing
    success.
        Our recruiting standards will remain high. While exceeding DOD
    quality standards, we continue to recruit the best of America into our
    ranks--in fiscal year 2006, the Marine Corps achieved over 100 percent
    of our Active component accession goal. The Marine Corps Reserve also
    achieved 100 percent of its recruiting goals, but Reserve officer
    numbers remain challenging because our primary accession source is from
    officers who leave active duty. We appreciate the continued
    authorization for Selected Reserve Officer Affiliation Bonuses in the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007--they continue
    to contribute in this crucial area.
        We forecast that both Active and Reserve recruiting will remain
    challenging in fiscal year 2007, particularly when viewed through the
    lens of accession missions to meet the increased end strength of the
    Marine Corps. We will need the continued support of Congress for
    programmed enlistment bonuses and other recruiting efforts, such as
    advertising, which will be essential to us continuing to meet these
    challenges.
        Retention is the other important part of manning the force. In
    fiscal year 2006, the Marine Corps exceeded its retention goals for
    both the First Term and Career Forces. For fiscal year 2007, we expect
    to exceed our goals again. This success can be attributed to the Marine
    Corps' judicious use of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus, and we now
    offer qualified first term and career enlisted marines $10,000 in
    Assignment Incentive Pay to reenlist. To keep the very best of our
    marines, we must increase the size of our reenlistment bonus program in
    order to ensure that we have the right grade and MOS mix to support the
    growing force. Not only will we have to retain more first-term marines,
    but we will also have to increase the number of marines reenlisting at
    the 8- and 12-year mark. This will require a shift toward more
    programmed funding in targeted key areas in the career force.
    Military-to-Civilian Conversions
        Military-to-civilian conversions continue to provide a valuable
    source to send additional marines back to the operating force in
    support of our warfighting initiatives and help reduce stress. We will
    continue to pursue sensible conversions and transfer marines from
    nonessential billets.
    National Security Personnel System
        The Marine Corps is committed to successful implementation of the
    National Security Personnel System. The Marine Corps is actively
    participating with the Department of Defense in the development and
    implementation of this new personnel system and is cooperating with the
    sister Services so that our civilian employees receive the training
    opportunities and support necessary for a successful transition. The
    National Security Personnel System will enable the Marine Corps to
    better support the warfighter by providing a civilian workforce that is
    flexible, accountable, and aligned to the Marine Corps mission.
        iii. resetting the force and preparing for the next contingency
        To meet the demands of the Long War, we must reset the force in
    order to simultaneously fight, train, and sustain our Corps. To support
    our marines in combat, we have routinely drawn additional equipment
    from strategic stocks, which need to be replenished to remain
    responsive to emerging threats. Congress has responded rapidly and
    generously to our requests for equipment and increased protection for
    our marines and sailors. It is our responsibility to manage these
    resources prudently as we transition to the modernization of our force.
    Equipment Readiness
        Extended combat operations have severely tested our materiel. While
    the vast majority of our equipment has passed the test of sustained
    combat operations, it has been subjected to more than a lifetime's
    worth of wear stemming from vehicle mileage, operating hours, and harsh
    environmental conditions. This increased maintenance requirement is a
    consequence of not only operational tempo and operating environments,
    but also the sheer amount of equipment employed in operations.
    Approximately 30 percent of all Marine Corps ground equipment and
    nearly 25 percent of our active duty aviation squadrons are currently
    engaged overseas. Most of this equipment is not rotating out of theater
    at the conclusion of each force rotation; it remains in combat, used on
    a near-continuous basis at an operating tempo that far exceeds normal
    peacetime usage.
        As our priority for equipment is to support marines serving in
    harm's way, we have drawn additional equipment from the Maritime
    Prepositioning Ships and prepositioned stores from the caves in Norway;
    we have also retained equipment in theater from units that are rotating
    back to the United States. The operational results of these efforts
    have been outstanding--the average mission capable rates of our
    deployed forces' ground equipment remain above 93 percent--but there is
    a price.
        The cost of this success is a decrease in nondeployed unit
    readiness as well as an increase in the maintenance required per hour
    of operating time. Equipment across the Marine Corps is continuously
    cross-leveled and redistributed to ensure that units preparing to
    deploy have sufficient equipment to conduct our rigorous predeployment
    training programs. Because the stateside priority of equipment
    distribution and readiness is to units preparing to deploy, there has
    been a trade-off in unit training for other types of contingencies. The
    timely delivery of replacement equipment is crucial to sustaining the
    high readiness rates for the marines in theater, as well as improving
    the rates for the forces here at home. Although funded, much of this
    equipment is still many months from delivery.
    Ground Equipment
        Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are placing demands on ground
    equipment far beyond what is typically experienced during training or
    home station operations. Some of these demands rise from higher usage
    rates, others from the rigors of extended operations in harsh
    environments. These higher demands increase the maintenance
    requirements for equipment employed in theater and continue when this
    equipment is redeployed to home stations.

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        For example, in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) crews are driving
    Light Armored Vehicles in excess of 8,700 miles per year--3.5 times
    more than programmed annual usage rates of 2,480 miles per year. Our
    tactical vehicle fleet is experiencing some of the most dramatic
    effects of excessive wear, operating at five to six times the
    programmed rates.
    Aviation Equipment
        The operationally demanding and harsh environments of Iraq,
    Afghanistan, and Djibouti have highlighted the limitations of our aging
    fleet of aircraft. In order to support our marines, sister Services,
    and coalition partners successfully, our aircraft have been flying at
    two to three times their designed utilization rates. Despite this
    unprecedented utilization, the yeoman efforts of our maintenance and
    support personnel have sustained an aviation mission capable rate for
    deployed marine aircraft at 79 percent over the past 12 months. The
    corresponding aviation mission capable rates for our units in garrison,
    who have either recently returned from deployment or are preparing to
    deploy again, have averaged 75 percent over the past 12 months. To
    maintain sufficient numbers of aircraft in deployed squadrons, our home
    squadrons have taken significant cuts in available aircraft and parts
    as they prepare for deployment. Reset funding has partially alleviated
    this strain, but continued funding is needed as we continue to
    recapitalize our aircraft fleets due to age, attrition, and wartime
    losses. Maintaining the readiness of our aviation assets while
    preparing our aircrew for their next deployment is and will continue to
    be a monumental effort and constant challenge for our marines.
        We have mitigated aircraft degradation through specific aircraft
    modifications, proactive inspections, and additional maintenance
    actions enabled by reset programs. Sustaining aircraft material
    condition drives aircraft readiness and is the determining factor in
    combat aviation support provided to our marines in harm's way. While
    these efforts have successfully bolstered aircraft reliability,
    sustainability, and survivability, additional requirements for depot
    level maintenance on airframes, engines, weapons, and support equipment
    will continue well beyond the conclusion of hostilities.
        Resetting Marine Aviation means not merely repairing and replacing
    damaged or destroyed aircraft, but getting more capable and reliable
    aircraft into the operational deployment cycle sooner. Your marines
    rely on these aircraft on a daily basis to provide a wide array of
    missions including casualty evacuation for our wounded and timely close
    air support for troops in contact with the enemy. Production lines to
    replace legacy aircraft lost in support of the Long War are no longer
    active; therefore, it is urgent and imperative for the Marine Aviation
    Plan to remain fully funded and on schedule.

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        Additionally, to ensure marine aviation is postured to support the
    current needs of our country, the Marine Corps is working to restore
    war reserve aircraft and accelerate the upgrades of pre-production
    aircraft to help maintain aircraft inventories at minimal acceptable
    operating levels. For example, the Marine Corps is modifying pre-
    production MV-22s to ensure the transition schedule meets operational
    demands and deployment timelines. Resetting our full aviation
    capability will require a significant increase in programmed funding
    for repair, restoration, and upgrades of destroyed or damaged
    airframes, recovery of Pioneer unmanned aerial vehicle components,
    refurbishment of air traffic control equipment, replacement of
    targeting pods, and numerous other efforts to restore capability
    degraded in support of the Long War.
    Reset of Prepositioning Programs
        Eleven Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) vessels from all three
    Maritime Prepositioning Force Squadrons (MPSRON) were downloaded and
    used in theater during initial OIF operations. As these operations
    concluded, the Marine Corps reconstituted two of three MPSRONs to meet
    potential contingencies in other areas of the world. This
    reconstitution was conducted both in theater and at the U.S. Marine
    Corps (USMC) facilities in Jacksonville, Florida. In February 2004,
    MPSRON-2 was downloaded in support of OIF II and has been partially
    reconstituted.
        Since the MPF offloads in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom I and
    II, MPSRON-1 and MPSRON-2 have gone through a complete maintenance
    cycle for attainment and supply rotation. Attainment for major end
    items is 91 percent and 48 percent respectively. Some of our major end
    item shortfalls are a result of ongoing OIF/Operation Enduring Freedom
    equipment requirements and availability from the manufacturer. Our end
    item shortfalls in the MPF program will be reset during the ship's
    maintenance cycle as equipment becomes available. Readiness for all
    equipment loaded aboard the MPS is historically 98 percent or better.
    MPSRON-3 is currently undergoing its maintenance cycle and we project
    an attainment above 98 percent for equipment when completed in June
    2007. MPSRON-2's maintenance cycle should begin in April 2008 and be
    completed by June 2009.
        Equipment from Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway (MCPP-N)
    was used in support of Long War operations and to reset other Marine
    Corps shortfalls with a higher operational priority. The USMC will
    reset MCPP-N as soon as practical in line with USMC operational
    priorities.
    Costs of Resetting the Force
        Last year, our cumulative reset cost estimate was $11.7 billion, of
    which Congress appropriated $5.1 billion toward that amount. To date,
    Congress has appropriated a total of $10.2 billion for global war on
    terror reset costs. The $11.7 figure is based on a point in time (1
    October 2005) snapshot of the funding necessary to refit the Marine
    Corps to a pre-Long War level of equipment readiness. During the summer
    of 2006, the Secretary of Defense standardized the definition of reset
    costs across the Services. As a result, the Marine Corps stopped
    identifying two major expenses--depot maintenance and attrition
    losses--as ``Cost of War'' and moved them into our reset the force
    estimate. This definitional change and some additional requirements
    have changed our estimate as noted in Table 2.
        The first expense to be recategorized is the estimated cost of
    residual depot maintenance after the termination of hostilities. Our
    analysis shows that we will require at least 4 to 6 years of post-
    conflict depot maintenance to bring our force to a fully reset state.
    Given the status of our equipment at this time, we estimate additional
    programmed funding will be required for post-conflict ground and
    aviation depot maintenance costs.
        The second item recategorized because of definition changes is
    attrition losses. Prior to the redefinition, the Marine Corps had
    considered replacement and repair of attrition losses to be a cost of
    war, and had not included them in our reset estimate. We have increased
    our reset estimate to include forecasted attrition losses.
        The net effect is that the Marine Corps reset estimate, once a
    fixed point in time estimate, has now become a rolling estimate that
    includes future attrition losses and future depot maintenance
    estimates. The following table (Table 2) depicts the definitional
    changes:

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        Not all of the reset the force requirement can be executed in a
    single fiscal year. Some items such as attack and utility helicopters
    cannot be replaced until acquisition production decisions are made.
    Other requirements such as light armored vehicles cannot be fulfilled
    in a single year due to production capacity issues. Resourcing costs
    must be phased over several years. The table (Table 3) below highlights
    specific examples of this challenge.

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     iv. modernize for tomorrow, to be ``the most ready when the nation is
                                 least ready''
        As prudent stewards of our Nation's resources, we must decide the
    most effective way to modernize the Total Force. We are actively
    working through the tough decisions of whether to replace aging
    equipment with similar platforms or to procure next generation
    capabilities--such as cutting edge platforms like the STOVL Joint
    Strike Fighter, the MV-22 Osprey, and the Expeditionary Fighting
    Vehicle (EFV). Foremost and throughout our modernization efforts, we
    will maintain our Congressionally mandated contingency response forces
    to be always ready and always capable of forcible entry.
    Marine Aviation Plan
        The Marine Aviation Plan is designed to posture Marine Corps
    Aviation for future warfighting requirements in the near-term (2007-
    2009), the mid-term (2010-2012) and the long-term (2013-2015). The
    Marine Aviation Plan addresses these challenges by restructuring the
    force and managing current aircraft procurement Programs of Record.
        We will rebalance our existing Assault Support and Tactical
    Aircraft (TACAIR) structure in the Reserve and active components in
    order to boost future HMH (heavy lift CH-53), HMLA (light attack UH-1
    and AH-1), and VMU (unmanned aerial vehicle) capacity. Increases to
    aviation manpower structure at the squadron, group, and wing levels
    will enhance operational readiness and better posture these units for
    combat operations and their transitions to the new H-1s, MV-22, F-35,
    KC-130J, and CH-53K. We will incorporate a fully functional and
    resourced Aircrew Training System that will align a new Training
    Transformation Plan to each Assault Support and TACAIR community as
    they transition to new aircraft in the coming years. Marine aviation
    command and control modernization will leverage our new aircraft
    capabilities by streamlining command and control functions and radar
    inventory to ensure aviation command and control remains agile,
    efficient, and responsive to the needs of the MAGTF across the spectrum
    of conflict. Marine aviation logistics process modernization applies an
    overarching approach to understanding readiness, related costs, and the
    removal of performance barriers with the goal of enhancing our
    warfighting capabilities while husbanding resources.
        The Marine Aviation Plan shapes the future of Marine Aviation to
    meet the diverse missions of today's and tomorrow's battlefields, and
    provides the MAGTF with improved capabilities, unit manning, and a
    thorough safety training system to better overcome known and
    foreseeable challenges. This plan sets in place tomorrow's Marine
    Aviation as a viable and efficient force in support of the MAGTF on the
    battlefield.
    Joint Strike Fighter
        F-35 development is on track, and will act as an integrated flying
    combat system in support of our ground forces and will be the
    centerpiece of Marine Aviation. The manufacture of the first test
    aircraft--Conventional Take-off and Landing--(CTOL) variant--is well
    underway, assembly times are much better than planned, and exceptional
    quality has been demonstrated in fabrication and assembly. The first
    CTOL aircraft flew in December 2006. Five STOVL and six CTOL aircraft
    are currently in production. The JSF acquisition strategy, including
    software development, reflects a block approach. The F-35B Short Take-
    Off/Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant is a fifth generation aircraft
    that will provide a quantum leap in capability, basing flexibility, and
    mission execution across the full spectrum of warfare. The Marine Corps
    remains committed to its vision of an all STOVL tactical aircraft
    force. Fulfilling this vision will best posture the Marine Corps to
    support our Nation and the combatant commanders, by enabling the future
    MAGTF to accomplish its expeditionary warfighting responsibilities.
    MV-22
        The MV-22 is replacing the CH-46E and CH-53D aircraft. The CH-46E
    is over 40 years old, with limited lift and mission capabilities to
    support the MAGTF and the Long War. In September 2005, the V-22 Defense
    Acquisition Board approved Full Rate Production. To date, 29 Block A
    and 15 Block B aircraft have been delivered. Much like the F-35, the
    MV-22 program uses a three-block strategy in its procurement. Block A
    aircraft are training aircraft. Block B are operational aircraft. Block
    C aircraft are operational aircraft with mission enhancements. To date,
    the one V-22 Fleet Replacement Training Squadron, one test squadron,
    VMX-22, and two tactical VMM squadrons have stood up with the third
    tactical MV-22 squadron scheduled for March 2007. MV-22 Initial
    Operational Capability is scheduled for the summer of 2007 with a
    continued transition of two CH-46E squadrons per year thereafter. The
    MV-22's revolutionary assault support capability allows the MAGTF to
    maximize our capstone concept of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. Our
    forces in harm's way deserve the best assault support aircraft in the
    world--without question, the MV-22 is that aircraft.
    KC-130J
        The KC-130J has continuously deployed in support of OIF since
    February 2005 and has provided the warfighter a state-of-the-art,
    multi-mission, tactical aerial refueling, and fixed wing assault
    support asset. The introduction of the aerial refuelable MV-22,
    combined with the forced retirement of the legacy KC-130F/R aircraft
    due to corrosion, fatigue life, and parts obsolescence, significantly
    increases the requirement for accelerated procurement of the KC-130J.
    Twenty-five new aircraft have been delivered, and the Marine Corps is
    contracted to procure a total of 45 aircraft by the end of fiscal year
    2013, with 4 KC-130J aircraft requested in the fiscal year 2008 budget.
    This is 6 aircraft less than the inventory objective of the 51 aircraft
    needed to support the operational requirements of MAGTF, joint, and
    combined forces. As the aviation workhorse of the MAGTF, the KC-130J's
    theater logistical support reduces the requirement for resupply via
    ground, limiting the exposure of our convoys to IEDs and other attacks.
    CH-53K
        The CH-53K program has reached ``Milestone B'' status-initiation of
    system development and demonstration. The current fleet of CH-53E Super
    Stallion aircraft will reach its fatigue life during this decade. The
    CH-53K will deliver increased range and payload, reduced operations and
    support costs, increased commonality with other assault support
    platforms, and digital interoperability for the next 25 years. The CH-
    53K is one of the elements that will enable the MAGTF and joint force
    to project and sustain forces ashore from the sea. A post Milestone B
    System Development and Demonstration contract was awarded in April 2006
    and IOC is planned for fiscal year 2015.
    H-1 Upgrade
        The H-1 Upgrade Program (UH-1Y/AH-1Z) is a comprehensive program to
    resolve existing operational power margin issues, while significantly
    enhancing the tactical capability, operational effectiveness, and
    sustainability of the attack and utility helicopter fleet. The Corps'
    fleet of UH-1N Hueys is reaching the end of their useful life. Due to
    airframe and engine fatigue, the Vietnam-era Huey routinely takes off
    at maximum gross weight with no margin for error. This aircraft is long
    overdue for replacement; degrading our ability to support our marines
    in harm's way. Due to significant GWOT operational demands on the
    existing squadrons and aircraft attrition, the Marine Corps has adapted
    the ``build new'' strategy for the UH-1Y in fiscal year 2006 and our
    first two production aircraft have now been delivered. We are also
    examining a ``build new'' strategy for the AH-1Z to preclude
    significant inventory shortfalls. The H-1 Upgrade Program will be
    restructured pending a Defense Acquisition Board in March 2007.
    Command and Control (C2) Harmonization
        The C2 harmonization strategy incorporates joint integrating
    concepts and C2 mandates, and is a holistic approach that integrates
    warfighter requirements into a common capability to deliver an end-to-
    end, fully integrated, cross-functional set of capabilities including
    forward-deployed and reach-back functions. The strategy's end state is
    a seamless capability that crosses warfighting functions and supports
    marines from the supporting establishment to our marines in contact
    with the enemy, taking the best of emerging capabilities and joint
    requirements to build a single solution.
        The first step in this direction is the ongoing development of the
    Common Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S). CAC2S fuses data
    from sensors, weapon systems, and C2 systems into an integrated
    display. It allows rapid, flexible operations in a common, modular, and
    scalable design by reducing the current five stovepipe systems into one
    hardware solution with streamlined equipment training. CAC2S will
    enable MAGTF commanders to control timing of organic, joint, or
    coalition effects, assault support, and ISR in their battlespace while
    operating within a joint task force. With CAC2S and C2 harmonization, a
    Joint Task Force Commander will discover that his MAGTF's battlespace
    offers maximum flexibility due to its seamless integration with joint
    and coalition partners.
    Persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
        The persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR)
    strategy is a component of the Marine Corps ISR-enterprise supporting
    marines across the spectrum of military operations. Its focus is the
    capability to integrate the network of air, ground, and space sensors
    with sufficient fidelity to detect, locate, identify, track, and target
    threats. This capability also reduces the effectiveness of improvised
    explosive devices (IEDs) through the identification of personnel,
    activities, and facilities associated with the manufacture and
    emplacement of IEDs. The network is enabled through unmanned aerial and
    ground systems, human intelligence exploitation teams, ground signals
    intelligence/electronic warfare, tactical fusion centers, and
    predeployment training programs. We continue to develop capabilities in
    coordination with the Joint IED Defeat Organization's point, route, and
    area targeting concepts. Some capabilities under development include
    unmanned aerial systems, unmanned ground sensors, wide field of view
    persistent surveillance (Angel Fire), and the Ground-Based Operational
    Surveillance System (G-BOSS). Angel Fire provides enhanced situational
    awareness and support to urban warfare, disaster relief, and other
    operations. The initial deployment of this capability is scheduled for
    late spring/summer 2007. G-BOSS is a force protection camera system
    that provides a 24 hour day/night persistent surveillance capability.
    The G-BOSS System of Systems concept is to integrate command and
    control; commercial off the shelf and government off the shelf sensors
    to ground, airborne, and space-based platforms. The military objective
    of G-BOSS is to detect, identify, and track insurgent activities,
    specifically associated with the emplacement of IEDs. The initial
    employment of autonomous camera tower systems has performed admirably
    in theater. The integration of a fully networked G-BOSS system of
    systems is anticipated to begin in spring/summer 2007.
    Ground Mobility
        The Army and Marine Corps are leading the Services in developing
    tactical wheeled vehicle requirements for the joint force. The defined
    capabilities reflect an appropriate balance in survivability, mobility,
    payload, network enabling, transportability, and sustainability for the
    light tactical wheeled vehicle supporting the future joint force. The
    Army/Marine Corps Board has proven a valuable forum for coordination of
    tactical wheeled vehicle development and fielding, the production of
    Central Command armoring kits and up-armored HMMWVs, and rapid response
    to combatant commander's requests for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
    vehicles. Additionally, the Army/Marine Corps Board has been the focal
    point for development of the joint requirements for a Joint Light
    Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) focused on providing protected, sustained,
    networked, and expeditionary mobility to the joint force in the light
    tactical vehicle weight class.
    Mine Resistant Ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles
        MRAP vehicles are designed with a ``V'' shaped hull and are
    employed to protect against the three primary kill mechanisms of mines
    and improvised explosive devices--fragmentation, blast overpressure,
    and acceleration. These vehicles provide the best available protection
    against improvised explosive devices and experiences in theater have
    shown that a marine is four to five times safer in a MRAP than in an
    uparmored HMMWV. There will be three categories of new near-term MRAP
    vehicles. Category I, a Mine Resistant Utility Vehicle, will
    accommodate up to six personnel and will be employed in urban
    operations. Category II vehicles are similar to Cougar/Joint Explosive
    Ordnance Disposal Rapid Response Vehicles, and will accommodate up to
    ten personnel, and will be multi-mission capable. Category III, Buffalo
    vehicles, will be used for route clearance and explosive ordnance
    disposal missions.
        The MRAP is an example of our adaptation to evolving threats. It is
    an attempt to acquire the very best technology available in the
    shortest amount of time in order to protect our marines. The USMC
    requirement is 3,700 MRAP vehicles and we are aggressively pursuing the
    acquisition of this rapidly emerging requirement.
    Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)
        In November 2006, the Army's Training and Doctrine Command and
    Marine Corps Combat Development Command, in collaboration with Navy,
    Air Force, and Special Operations Command representatives, received
    Joint Staff approval of the Ground Combat Forces Light Tactical
    Mobility Initial Capability Document, documenting joint forces'
    capability needs for the light tactical wheeled vehicle fleet. During
    December 2006, Army and Marine Corps combat developers staffed the JLTV
    Capability Development Document, defining requirements for the long-
    term HMMWV replacement.
    Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC)
        MPC development is on schedule. In January 2007, the Marine Corps
    staffed the Initial Capabilities Document, framed the Capabilities
    Development Document and initiated planning for the Analysis of
    Alternatives leading to a Marine Personnel Carrier material solution,
    moving toward an Initial Operational Capability in the 2012 timeframe.
    The MPC will possess a balance between performance, protection, and
    payload and will increase infantry battalion protected mobility and
    light armored reconnaissance battalion striking power. It will serve as
    a balanced expeditionary armored personnel carrier easily optimized for
    irregular warfare, but effective across the range of military
    operations.
    M1114 HMMWV-Upgrade via Fragmentation Kit 2 and Fragmentation Kit 5
        The Corps' already fielded M1114 fleet is undergoing an upgrade
    with Fragmentation Kits 2 and 5. Fragmentation Kit 2 enhances ballistic
    protection in the front driver and assistant driver wheel-well.
    Fragmentation Kit 5 degrades improvised explosive device effects and
    reduces armor debris that results from overmatch. Installation of both
    Fragmentation Kits is underway, with anticipated completion in March
    2007. We will continue to evaluate the U.S. Army's objective kit
    development and share information and lessons learned. All new Marine
    Corps deliveries of M1114, M1151, M1152, and M1165 HMMWV's will have
    Fragmentation Kits 2 and 5 level capability integrated.
    MAGTF Fires
        Several innovative systems related to fire support significantly
    enhance the warfighting efficiency and effectiveness of the MAGTF. Such
    systems include the M777 Lightweight Howitzer, High Mobility Artillery
    Rocket System, Expeditionary Fire Support System, Advanced Field
    Artillery Tactical Data System, and the Target Location, Designation,
    and Handoff system.
    M777 Lightweight Howitzer
        The new M777 lightweight howitzer replaces the M198 howitzers. It
    can be lifted by the MV-22 Osprey and the CH-53E helicopter and is
    paired with the Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement truck for improved
    cross-country mobility. The M777, through design innovation,
    navigation, positioning aides, and digital fire control, offers
    significant improvements in lethality, survivability, mobility, and
    durability over the M198 howitzer. The Marine Corps began fielding the
    first of 356 new howitzers to the operating forces in April 2005 and
    expects to complete fielding in calendar year 2009.
    High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS)
        The HIMARS fills a critical range and volume gap in Marine Corps
    fire support assets by providing 24-hour, all-weather, ground-based,
    indirect precision and volume fires throughout all phases of combat
    operations ashore. We will field 40 HIMARS (18 to the Active component,
    18 to the Reserve component, and 4 to the Supporting Establishment).
    When paired with the acquisition of Guided Multiple Launch Rocket
    System rockets, HIMARS will provide a highly responsive, precision fire
    capability to our forces in conventional as well as unconventional
    operations.
    Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS)
        The EFSS will be the principal indirect fire support system for the
    vertical assault element of MAGTFs executing Ship-to-Objective
    Maneuver. It is a towed 120mm mortar and when paired with an internally
    transportable vehicle, will be transported aboard MV-22 and CH-53E
    aircraft. EFSS-equipped units will provide the ground component of a
    vertical assault element with immediately responsive, organic indirect
    fires at ranges beyond current infantry battalion mortars. Initial
    operational capability is planned during calendar year 2007, and full
    operational capability is planned for fiscal year 2010.
    Target Location, Designation, and Handoff System (TLDHS)
        TLDHS is a modular, manportable equipment suite that will provide
    the ability to quickly acquire targets and digitally transmit data to
    supporting arms elements for attack, as well as designate targets for
    laser-seeking precision guided munitions and laser spot trackers. The
    system will be capable of providing target location within fifty meters
    and designating targets at 5,000 meters. TLDHS will be fielded to
    forward observer teams, naval gunfire spot teams, tactical air control
    parties, and reconnaissance teams. Block II, scheduled for fielding in
    late fiscal year 2007, will communicate with all Naval Strike aircraft,
    the AFATDS, and the Naval Fire Control System.
    Counter-Sniper technology
        The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory is leading a four-pronged
    approach to counter the sniper threat. Focused on increasing our
    ability to sense and warn, deny, protect, and respond, we are
    leveraging the cooperative efforts of Defense Advanced Research
    Projects Agency, our sister Services, the Marine Corps Intelligence
    Activity, and the National Ground Intelligence Center.
        Future sense and warn capabilities may include optical, acoustic,
    and infrared detection and location. We are examining different
    obscurant technologies, while our protection effort focuses on
    improving individual armor and new tactics, techniques, and procedures.
    Detection of threat optics will provide indications and warning of
    impending sniper or IED attacks, and a predictive capability to avoid
    or engage prior to sustaining friendly casualties. One potential denial
    method is through use of glare aversion devices which apply a non-
    injurious, but discomforting, bright light. Assessment of the response
    can help determine hostile intent, and the glare aversion effect may be
    effective in prohibiting a sniper from visually targeting friendly
    forces. Our response capability efforts include examination of counter-
    sniper vehicles and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's
    sniper rifle program. Finally, we are using experimentation to combat
    the sniper threat through advanced equipment and improved tactics,
    techniques, and procedures. Ongoing joint and interagency cooperation,
    coupled with industry collaboration, will shape our future experiments.
    Secure Internet Routing Protocol Network
        The continuing evolution and maturation of network threats, along
    with the asynchronous nature of network intrusions and vulnerabilities,
    requires the Marine Corps to seek improvements in network defense. The
    Secure Internet Routing Protocol Network (SIPRNET) is a highly secure
    network, physically and logically separate from unclassified networks
    and the Internet. In the near future, we foresee greater reliance on
    the SIPRNET to enhance the security of Marine Corps war fighting and
    business operations. This effort will require additional resources,
    which will prove well worth the investment as we secure our networks
    and provide for better operational and force protection.
                     v. naval operating forces and concepts
        As the ``Arc of Instability'' is substantially a maritime domain, a
    naval force is uniquely suited to respond and provide forward-deployed
    expeditionary combat forces in response to crises. It is the Marine
    Corps' obligation to provide our Nation a naval force that is fully
    prepared for employment as a MAGTF operating across the spectrum of
    conflict. The Nation invests tremendous resources knowing that the
    ability to project power from the sea is a prerequisite for defending
    our sovereignty. To maneuver from the freedom of the seas provides
    timely and reliable response solutions to our Nation. In concert with
    the U.S. Navy, we support the Law of the Sea Convention, which
    preserves our ability to maneuver from the sea.
        As demonstrated by the Navy-Marine Corps responses to Hurricanes
    Katrina and Rita, tsunami relief in southern Asia, and noncombatant
    evacuation operations in Lebanon, maneuvering from the sea is a
    relevant capability possessing the flexibility to meet our country's
    needs both around the world and at home. Marines and sailors embarked
    from amphibious platforms provide asymmetric, sustainable, and rapidly
    responsive solutions to our combatant commanders.
        Working closely with our Navy and Coast Guard partners, we will
    advance the amphibious and expeditionary capabilities the combatant
    commanders rely on to meet their emerging challenges, strengthen
    concepts and training that enhance naval contributions to the Long War,
    and provide a naval force that is fully prepared for employment across
    the full spectrum of conflict.
    Concepts to Capabilities
        In September 2006, the Navy and Marine Corps published a new Naval
    Operations Concept (NOC), which provides our unified vision for the
    future and broadly describes how naval power and influence can be
    applied at and from the sea, across the littorals, and ashore. In
    tandem, we revised our Marine Corps Operating Concepts (MOC) for a
    Changing Security Environment, incorporating our lessons learned and
    the unified vision provided in the NOC. Building on the conceptual
    foundation for littoral power projection provided in Operational
    Maneuver from the Sea, the Naval and Marine Corps Operating Concepts
    call for more widely distributed forces to provide increased forward
    presence, security cooperation with an expanding set of international
    partners, preemption of nontraditional threats, and a global response
    to crisis in spite of challenges to access. Collectively, these
    concepts provide the foundation for selectively conducting either
    distributed or aggregated operations.
        Due to changes to the security environment and the effects of
    globalization, the Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps have all
    concurred with the need to reexamine our maritime strategy. Early this
    summer, we intend to produce a new maritime strategy in order to
    articulate the ways and means by which maritime forces will support the
    Nation's strategic ends in the new security era.
    Amphibious Warfare Ships
        Amphibious warfare ships are the centerpiece of the Navy-Marine
    Corps' forcible entry and Seabasing capability, and have played an
    essential role in the Long War. These ships are equipped with aviation
    and surface assault capabilities, which coupled with their inherent
    survival and self-defense systems, makes them ideally suited to support
    a broad range of mission requirements. This survivability is critical
    to ensure the Nation has the widest range of response options. Not only
    must our naval forces maintain the ability to rapidly close, decisively
    employ, and effectively sustain marines from the sea, they must also
    respond to emerging Long War requirements, crisis response, and
    humanitarian assistance missions on short notice around the world.
        For forcible entry, the Marine Corps' requirement is a single,
    simultaneously-employed two Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) assault
    capability. One MEB requires seventeen amphibious warfare ships;
    however, given the fiscally constrained environment, the Navy and
    Marine Corps have agreed to assume risk by only using 15. Historical
    amphibious ship availability rates dictate a minimum of 11 ships of
    each of the current types of amphibious ship--a minimum of 33 total
    ships--resulting in a Battle Force that provides 30 operationally
    available amphibious warfare ships. In that Battle Force, 10 aviation-
    capable big deck ships (LHA/LHD/LHA(R)) and 10 LPD-17 class ships are
    required to accommodate the MEB's aviation combat element.
    Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD)
        The LPD-17 San Antonio class of amphibious warfare ships represents
    the Department of the Navy's commitment to a modern expeditionary power
    projection fleet that will enable our naval force to operate across the
    spectrum of warfare. The Navy took delivery of the first LPD-17 in the
    summer of 2005 and operational evaluation is scheduled to begin in the
    summer of 2007. The LPD-17 class replaces four classes of older ships--
    the LKA, LST, LSD-36, and the LPD-4--and will have a 40-year expected
    service life. LPD-17 class ships will play a key role in supporting the
    ongoing Long War by forward deploying marines and their equipment to
    respond to crises abroad. Its unique design will facilitate expanded
    force coverage and decreased reaction times of forward deployed Marine
    Expeditionary Units. In forcible entry operations, the LPD-17 will help
    maintain a robust surface assault and rapid off-load capability for the
    MAGTF far into the future.
    Amphibious Assault Ship (Replacement) (LHA(R))
        The Tarawa class amphibious assault ships reach the end of their
    service life during the next decade (2011-2015). An eighth Wasp class
    LHD (multi-purpose amphibious assault ship) is under construction and
    will replace one Tarawa class ship during fiscal year 2008. In order to
    meet future warfighting requirements and fully capitalize on our
    investment in the MV-22 and Joint Strike Fighter, ships with enhanced
    aviation capabilities will replace the remaining LHA ships. These ships
    will provide enhanced hangar and maintenance spaces to support aviation
    maintenance and increased jet fuel storage and aviation ordnance
    magazines. The lead ship, LHA-6, is on track for detailed design and
    construction contract award during fiscal year 2007, with advanced
    procurement funds already provided in the fiscal year 2005 and 2006
    budgets.
    The Maritime Prepositioning Force
        Our proven MPF--capable of supporting the rapid deployment of three
    Marine Expeditionary Brigades--is an important complement to our
    amphibious warfare capability. Combined, these capabilities provide the
    Marine Corps the ability to rapidly react to a crisis in a number of
    potential theaters and the flexibility to employ forces across the
    battlespace. The natural progression of this capability set, the
    Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF(F)), is a key enabler of
    Seabasing and will build on the success of the legacy MPF program.
    MPF(F) will provide support to a wide range of military operations with
    capabilities such as at-sea arrival and assembly, selective offload of
    specific mission sets, and long-term, sea-based sustainment. The
    squadron will be capable of prepositioning the Marine Expeditionary
    Brigade's critical equipment and sustainment; but this capability does
    not constitute a forcible entry capability. The MPF(F) squadron
    composition decision was made by the acting Secretary of the Navy in
    May 2005; the program is currently in the technology development phase
    of acquisition, with a Milestone B decision planned in fiscal year
    2008.
    High Speed Connectors
        High-speed connectors will facilitate the conduct of sustained sea-
    based operations by expediting force closure and allowing the
    persistence necessary for success in the littorals. Connectors are
    grouped into three categories: intertheater, the Joint High Speed
    Sealift, which provides strategic force closure for CONUS-based forces;
    intratheater, the Joint High Speed Vessel that enables rapid closure of
    Marine forces and sustainment; and the Joint Maritime Assault
    Connector, to move troops and resources from the sea base to shore.
    These platforms will link bases and stations around the world to the
    sea base and other advanced bases, as well as provide linkages between
    the sea base and forces operating ashore.
    Ship-to-Shore Mobility
        For decades, Marine power projection has included a deliberate
    buildup of combat power ashore. Only after naval forces fought ashore
    and established a beachhead would the MAGTF begin to focus its combat
    power on the joint force's operational objective. Advances in mobility,
    fires, and sustainment capabilities will enable greater penetration and
    exploitation operations from over the horizon, by both air and surface
    means, with forces moving rapidly to operational objectives without
    stopping to seize, defend, and build up beachheads or landing zones.
    The EFV, MV-22 Osprey, and CH-53K heavy lift helicopter are critical to
    achieving the necessary forcible entry capabilities of the future.
    Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle
        The Marine Corps provides the Nation's joint warfighting forces
    with a unique, flexible, and effective capability to conduct forcible
    entry operations from the sea. The EFV, the Corps' largest ground
    combat system acquisition program, is the sole ground combat vehicle
    that enables projection of combat power from a sea base. It will
    replace the aging Assault Amphibious Vehicle that has been in service
    since 1972 and will become a complementary component of our modernized
    fleet of tactical vehicles that include the JLTV, the Marine Personnel
    Carrier, and the Internally Transportable Vehicle. The EFV's amphibious
    mobility, day and night lethality, enhanced force protection
    capabilities, and robust communications will help the joint force meet
    security challenges across the spectrum of conflict. The over-the-
    horizon capability of the EFV will also enable amphibious ships to
    increase their standoff distance, no longer requiring them to close
    within the striking distance of many coastal defense systems in order
    to launch their amphibious assault platforms. The EFV will be
    specifically well suited to maneuver operations conducted from the sea
    and sustained operations in the world's littoral regions.
        The Marine Corps recently conducted a demanding operational
    assessment of the EFV. It successfully demonstrated most critical
    performance requirements, but the design complexities are still
    providing challenges to system reliability. To that end, we conducted a
    comprehensive requirements review to ensure delivery of the required
    capability while reducing complexity of the system where possible. For
    example, the human stresses encountered during operations in some high
    sea states required us to reevaluate the operational necessity of
    exposing marines to those conditions. Based upon this review, and a
    subsequent engineering design review, we will tailor final requirements
    and system design to support forcible entry concepts while ensuring the
    EFV is a safe, reliable, and effective combat vehicle.
    Supporting Capabilities
        Logistics Modernization is the largest coordinated and cross-
    organizational effort ever undertaken to transform Marine Corps
    logistics. A three-pronged improvement and integration initiative
    focusing on Marine Corps personnel, processes, and technology,
    Logistics Modernization is integrating and streamlining supply,
    maintenance, and distribution. As our roadmap for more effective and
    efficient expeditionary logistics, Logistics Modernization is
    multiplying our ability to support the MAGTF across the spectrum of
    conflict, in all environments and across all levels of theater
    maturity.
       vi. beyond the horizon--posturing the marine corps for the future
        History has proven that we cannot narrowly define the conditions
    for which our military must be ready. With little warning, our Nation
    has repeatedly called its Corps front and center--in the southern
    Pacific after Pearl Harbor, in Korea after the communist invasion in
    1950, in the mountains of Afghanistan after September 11, and in
    southern Asia in the wake of the catastrophic tsunami of 2004. Each of
    these strategic surprises demonstrates the broad range of possibilities
    for which the Marine Corps must be prepared.
        The Long War requires a multi-dimensional force that is well
    trained and educated for employment in all forms of warfare.
    Historically, our Corps has produced respected leaders who have
    demonstrated intellectual agility in warfighting. Our current
    deployment tempo increasingly places our Professional Military
    Education programs at risk. No level of risk is acceptable if it
    threatens the steady flow of thinkers, planners, and aggressive
    commanders who can execute effectively across the entire spectrum of
    operations.
    The Future of Training and Education
        Looking ahead to the challenges of the Long War, we have enhanced
    our counterinsurgency capabilities while remaining vigilant that our
    MAGTFs must remain ready to launch robust forcible entry operations and
    succeed across the spectrum of conflict with our naval partner. With
    Marine forces so closely engaged in an irregular fight, we will have to
    take extraordinary steps to retain this ability to serve as the
    Nation's shock troops during major conventional combat operations. Your
    support of our training and education needs will allow us to remain
    faithful to our enduring mission: to be where the country needs us,
    when she needs us, and to prevail over whatever challenges we face.
    The Training Continuum
        Some things remain constant--we continue to ensure that all
    marines, regardless of occupational specialty, gain the self-confidence
    and skills derived from our warrior ethos ``Every Marine a Rifleman.''
    The experience at boot camp remains legendary; this transformation of
    young Americans is a national treasure--one that we must preserve and
    guard carefully. The core values of Honor, Courage, and Commitment--
    imprinted on their souls during recruit training and strengthened
    thereafter--mark a marine's character for a lifetime. To reinforce this
    transformation, we have focused the emphasis of our officer and
    enlisted professional military education on combat leadership.
        Marine training is built along a continuum that is well defined,
    well structured, and of which we are extremely proud. Marines are
    forged in the furnace of recruit training and tempered by shared
    hardship and tough training. This transformation process begins the day
    they meet their recruiter, who introduces them to the concept of total
    fitness: body, mind, and spirit. It continues through their common
    experiences at Recruit Training and its Crucible, and Marine Combat
    Training. It moves on to skill training at one of our schools or at a
    sister Service school. It culminates with assignment to an operational
    unit with its own demanding training, where a powerful bond of trust
    develops between fellow warriors as they experience the rigors of
    combat against a diverse and adaptive foe.
    The Infantry Battalion Enhancement Period Program (IBEPP)
        Long War operations have significantly increased our training
    requirements. Marines must now train to a broader range of skills;
    however, due to high operational tempo, we face ever-decreasing
    timetables for marines to achieve mastery of these skills. Our first
    major initiative to maximize effective use of available time was the
    establishment of a standardized and well-defined Pre-deployment
    Training Program. To bolster home station training, we took an
    additional step by establishing the IBEPP. The primary goal of the
    IBEPP is to facilitate better small unit leader training within the
    infantry battalion. Highlights of the IBEPP include expanded quotas for
    rifle squad leader courses (sergeants) and a new tactical small unit
    leader course focused on fire team leaders (corporals). Additionally,
    we have updated our School of Infantry curriculum to incorporate the
    additional equipment added to our new infantry battalion table of
    equipment and increased the instructor base at our Schools of Infantry
    to support the new IBEPP.
    Expansion of our Weapons and Tactics Training Program
        We find ourselves in a cycle of rapid innovation of weapons and
    tactics with our enemies. This cycle challenges the creativity and
    knowledge of staff officers in our ground and combat logistics
    battalions who must direct training programs or staff combat
    operations. Our aviation squadrons experienced this during the Vietnam
    conflict. To address those challenges, we created the Weapons and
    Tactics Training Program to develop and field a cadre of aviators with
    advanced understanding of weapon and tactical innovations as well as
    the concepts and requirements to train other aviators to adapt to these
    trends. This program placed prestige on training expertise and now
    provides an effective means by which Marine Aviation stays current on
    battlefield innovations. We will soon apply the fundamentals of that
    program to our ground staffs. The ground and logistics Weapons and
    Tactics Training Program will produce ground marines expert in training
    and warfighting functions who will improve their units' ability to
    fight. Though we are assessing detailed requirements, we anticipate
    this effort could require up to 150 instructors, and increased demands
    on combined arms ranges, artillery and aviation units, simulation
    centers, and suites of operations center equipment.
    Marine Corps Lessons Learned Management System
        This adaptive enemy requires us to have a responsive and
    collaborative dialogue across the Corps. Our interactive and effective
    lessons management system promptly captures and disseminates the
    lessons being learned by our marines and sailors in complex combat
    actions around the globe. Our web-based lesson input support tool--
    selected by the Joint Staff last year to serve as the Department
    standard--guides this learning process. Capitalizing on the
    institutional agility that has been a hallmark of our success, last
    year we implemented changes in such areas as crew-served weapons use,
    tactical questioning, evidence gathering procedures, command and
    control equipment training and procedures, civil-military operations,
    and detainee handling.
    Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning
        An example of adaptation for the Long War includes our Center for
    Advanced Operational Culture Learning, which we established during May
    2005 and recently reached its full operational capability. Both officer
    and enlisted marines now receive education in the operational aspects
    of culture at nearly every phase of their career development. This
    year, the Center is establishing Language Learning Resource Centers at
    our eight largest bases and stations. These centers provide language
    instruction using mobile language training shelters and contracted
    professional language trainers. These efforts support the Defense
    Language Transformation Roadmap increasing our interoperability with
    partner nations around the globe. We are also expanding our Foreign
    Area Officer program, creating language and culture experts from all
    occupational specialties who can be integrated into Marine units
    deployed worldwide. We thank Congress for its support in this venture,
    as recent supplemental funding has proved instrumental to this effort.
    Advisor Training
        During 2006, we institutionalized the structure, resources, and
    equipment to advance the individual skills and education of marines
    selected to serve as advisors to partner military units. Our Security
    Cooperation and Education Training Center had already trained over 50
    deploying advisor teams during 2004 and 2005. This formal establishment
    allowed us to increase our efforts, as we trained 77 advisor teams
    during 2006. Additionally, we expanded advisor skills with upgrades to
    training in such areas as foreign weapon handling, medical procedures
    and survival, evasion, resistance, and escape. This year we are
    establishing a Civil Military Operations Center of Excellence within
    this Center, as the Marine Corps' focal agency for civil-military
    operations training and education.
    Training MAGTFs
        Our continuing adaptations and investments in Core Values are
    checked once more prior to deployment with a series of unit mission
    rehearsals. These exercises occur during the culminating block of our
    formal Predeployment Training Program, which we expanded during 2004 to
    serve all deploying MAGTFs. These mission rehearsals present all
    deploying personnel with increasingly complex situations designed to
    replicate the confusing swirl of combat on a complex battlefield. Role
    players, many of whom are Iraqi-Americans, portray battlefield
    civilians and insurgents alike, presenting exercise-worn marines with
    sudden ``shoot-don't shoot'' decisions and forging within our marines a
    sense of common cause with the civilians they will soon protect. The
    culmination of our pre-deployment training consists of three distinct
    exercises: Mojave Viper, Desert Talon, and Mountain Warrior--each
    specifically tailored to the deploying unit's destination combat
    environment.
        During 2006, we continued to modify this program with expanded
    training in force escalation and with increased integration of
    logistics combat units. To better prepare marines to counter the threat
    of improvised explosive devices, we added more training devices, built
    new ranges, and employed electronic warfare specialists at our
    rehearsal sites. This year we are focusing our enhancements on the
    training of advisor teams and of MAGTF staffs by increasing the use of
    simulation. Our planned improvements promise to deliver Marine forces
    ready to more effectively meet the emerging challenges faced by the
    Combatant Commanders as a naval force in readiness in joint, combined,
    and interagency operations.
    Modernization of Training Ranges
        With the support of Congress, we also recently began the most
    ambitious modernization of our training ranges since World War II. From
    larger and more realistic urban training facilities to increased
    opportunities to evaluate advanced air-ground coordination, we have
    significantly improved the realism, safety, and capacity of our ranges
    and training areas. While our immediate focus has been to acquire
    infrastructure and modern technology, our long-term investment is in
    people, largely civilian, to both operate and maintain these facilities
    and to form the critical training cadres capable of maintaining the
    realism our MAGTFs require. Your continued support of our range
    modernization efforts, as well as the support for the Department's
    programs to ensure future access to adequate sea, air, and land space
    for our training ranges, remains vital to our ability to prepare for
    the challenges of the future with our joint, coalition, and interagency
    partners.
    Marine Aviation Training Systems Program
        The Aviation Training Systems Program (ATSP) plans, executes, and
    manages Marine Aviation Training to achieve individual and unit combat
    readiness through standardized training across all aviation core
    competencies. Through the ATSP, Marine Aviation develops aircraft
    systems that enhance operational readiness, improve safety through
    greater standardization, and significantly reduce the life cycle cost
    of maintaining and sustaining aircraft.
    Core Values and Ethics Training
        During this past year, we also reviewed our efforts to instill in
    marines those core values necessary to guide them correctly through the
    complex ethical demands of armed conflict. We have ensured that every
    marine, at every phase of the training continuum, studies ethical
    leadership, the Law of War, escalation of force, and Rules of
    Engagement. Our entry-level training first presents these concepts in
    the classroom, and then tests for proper application of these
    principles under stressful field exercises. We further reinforce
    confident, ethical decision-making through the Marine Corps Martial
    Arts Program that teaches our Core Values and presents ethical
    scenarios pertaining to restraint and proper escalation of force as the
    foundation of its curriculum. We imbue our marines with the mindset
    that ``wherever we go, everyone is safer because a US marine is
    there.''
    Building Esprit and Warrior Pride
        The Marine Corps dress blue uniform is as legendary as the marines
    who wear it. However, while this well-known uniform is one of the most
    admired uniforms in the world, owning one is out of the reach of most
    enlisted marines--it simply costs too much for them to buy on their
    own.
        No marine should be denied the honor of wearing this symbol of more
    than two centuries of bravery and sacrifice. Therefore, I have ordered
    that every marine recruit now be issued a dress blue uniform before
    they graduate from boot camp, and all enlisted marines are to receive
    an appropriate clothing allowance so that they are able to purchase and
    maintain a dress blue uniform. They have earned this privilege.
       vii. improve the quality of life for our marines and our families
        Enhancing Individual Survivability-Personal Protective Equipment.
    The Corps will continue to pursue technological advancements in
    personal protective equipment--our marines deserve nothing less. Fully
    recognizing the trade-off between weight, protection, fatigue, and
    movement restriction, we are providing marines the latest in personal
    protective equipment--such as the Modular Tactical Vest (MTV), Quad
    Guard, Lightweight Helmet, and Flame Resistant Organizational Gear.
    Body Armor
        Combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted a need
    to evolve our personal protective vest system. Therefore, in February,
    we started transitioning to a newly designed MTV. This vest is
    virtually the same weight as its predecessor, the Outer Tactical Vest,
    but it more easily integrates our other personal protection systems. It
    provides greater comfort through the incorporation of state-of-the-art
    load carriage techniques that better distributes the combat load over
    the torso and onto the hips of the marine. The acquisition objective
    for the MTV is 60,000 systems, with anticipated completion of
    deliveries in December 2007. The MTV also incorporates our existing
    Enhanced Small Arms Protective Inserts (E-SAPI), and Side SAPI plates.
    These plates are currently provided to every marine in theater. The E-
    SAPI provides the best protection available against a wide variety of
    small arms threats, to include protection against 7.62mm ammunition
    threats.
    QuadGard
        The QuadGard system is designed to provide ballistic protection for
    a marine's arms and legs when serving as a gunner on convoy duty. This
    system, which integrates with other personal ballistic protection
    equipment such as the MTV, Enhanced SAPI, and Lightweight Helmet,
    reduces minimum standoff distances from the marine to ballistic
    threats, particularly improvised explosive device fragmentation.
    Lightweight Helmet
        We are committed to providing the best head protection available to
    our warfighters. The lightweight helmet weighs less than its
    predecessor, and provides a high level of protection against
    fragmentation threats and 9mm bullets. We now require use of the pad
    system as study results demonstrated it provides greater protection
    against nonballistic blunt trauma than the sling suspension system. We
    are retrofitting more than 150,000 helmets with the pad system and have
    already fielded enough helmet pads for every deployed marine. Beginning
    in January, all lightweight helmets produced by the manufacturer are
    now delivered with the approved pad system installed.
    Flame Resistant Organizational Gear (FROG)
        In February, we began fielding FROG to all deployed and deploying
    marines. This life saving ensemble of clothing items--gloves,
    balaclava, long-sleeved fire resistant shirt, combat shirt, and combat
    trouser--is designed to mitigate potential injuries to our marines from
    flame exposure. These clothing items provide protection that is
    comparable to that of the NOMEX combat vehicle crewman suit/flight
    suit.
        With this mix of body armor, undergarments, and outerwear,
    operational commanders can determine what equipment their marines will
    employ based upon mission requirements and environmental conditions.
    Taking Care of our Marines and Their Families
        Just as every marine makes a commitment to the Corps and the Nation
    when they earn the title marine, we make an enduring commitment to
    every marine and Marine family. Marines are renowned for ``taking care
    of our own.'' Part of taking care of our own means we will provide for
    marines and their families through appropriate pay and compensation,
    housing, health care, infrastructure, and community services. Strong
    congressional support for many administration initiatives has made
    possible the significant investments required to improve each of the
    components of quality of life. This support requires continuous
    assessment to ensure that it is both sufficient and relevant,
    particularly during war. These programs must be on a wartime footing to
    seamlessly sustain our marines and their families for the duration--
    long past the redeployment of our marines and sailors.
        We are scrutinizing the support for our marines and their families
    to ensure our family support programs remain on a wartime footing--
    particularly those that assist in integrating civilian, military,
    charitable, and Veterans Affairs programs. This support targets both
    marines who suffer from the physical costs of this war, and those who
    carry unseen scars--those suffering from Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI)
    and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). As I testified in my
    confirmation hearing, I feel strongly that these wounds of war should
    be characterized as any other wound--and our commitment to those
    marines who suffer from these ailments will not falter.
        We continue to aggressively monitor post-deployment mental health
    screenings, suicides, domestic violence, and divorce rates. Marine
    commanders and noncommissioned officers at every level are charged to
    monitor these indications closely and to stay engaged on these issues.
    Our Casualty Assistance, Marine For Life, and Combat/Operational Stress
    Control Programs continue to be the frontline of support to our wartime
    efforts.
    Casualty Assistance
        Each fallen marine is a tragic loss to the survivors, the Corps,
    and our Nation. We endeavor to honor their sacrifices with sincerity
    and commitment. Our Casualty Assistance Calls Officers are trained to
    treat next of kin and other family members as they would their own
    family. Rendering casualty assistance begins with the basic tenet that
    there is no standard casualty call; each case is distinct, as families
    grieve in different ways. Assistance to surviving families is
    individually tailored to facilitate their transition through the stages
    of grief and the completion of the casualty assistance process.
    Wounded Warrior Regiment
        While the support to our Marine Corps and families has been
    exceptional, I intend to increase this support through the creation of
    a Wounded Warrior Regiment. This new regimental headquarters will
    provide centralized oversight of the care for our wounded marines and
    assist in the integration of their support with military, Department of
    Veterans Affairs, charitable, and civilian systems. The regiment will
    have a battalion headquarters on each coast, commanded by officers
    personally selected by me. My criteria for this leadership will be
    rigorous, as I will seek to select only those officers with previous
    command experience. My staff is reviewing the fiscal program
    requirements for this unit now--to include facilities, manning, and
    support requirements. I view this initiative as a personal priority to
    fulfill our commitment to these valiant Americans.
    Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI)
        As the quality of individual combat armor has increased, so have
    the number of blast survivors and Marines with TBI. Mild to moderate
    traumatic brain injuries can be difficult to diagnose and yet can cause
    changes in personality, cognition, and memory that significantly impair
    a service member's ability to make the life and death decisions
    required of them while in a combat environment. TBI and PTSD have many
    symptoms in common, and TBI can co-occur with PTSD. Recent measures to
    mitigate the impact of traumatic brain injuries to individual marines
    and their units include the release of a medical guidance letter from
    the Medical Officer of the Marine Corps outlining proper diagnosis and
    treatment strategies.
    Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
        The science of diagnosing and treating PTSD continues to evolve.
    The Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Training and Education
    Command, Naval Health Research Center, and others are studying ways to
    identify risk and protective factors for PTSD and to increase our
    resilience to stress. By improving the awareness of both individuals
    and our leaders, we can provide early identification and psychological
    first aid to those who are stress-injured. Better screening and
    referral of at-risk marines is underway via pre- and post-deployment
    standard health assessments that specifically screen for mental health
    problems. Navy Medicine has established new Deployment Health Centers
    with additional mental health providers readily available to treat PTSD
    and other combat stress injuries. The Department of Veterans Affairs
    and the Department of Defense have established comprehensive guidelines
    for managing Post-Traumatic Stress, which are available to all
    services. The Marine Corps, Navy Medicine, and Veterans Affairs have
    coordinated a Seamless Transition program to help our Marine veterans
    move smoothly into the Veterans Affairs treatment system to get the
    help they need and deserve. In addition, Veterans Affairs Readjustment
    Centers at 209 communities around the country now provide mental health
    services for eligible active and discharged veterans and their
    families.
    Combat/Operational Stress Control
        Battlefields are familiar territory for marines--we train marines
    to excel in chaotic and unpredictable surroundings. Yet all marines
    will experience combat/operational stress to some extent, as transient
    symptoms for most, but as persistent stress injuries for others.
    Managing combat stress is vital to the operation of the Marine Corps as
    a fighting force and the long-term health and well-being of marines and
    their families. All deploying marines receive warrior preparation,
    transition briefs, and health assessments. In addition, mental health
    professionals or specially trained medical officers brief marine
    leaders on the prevention and management of adverse stress reactions.
    We have also implemented the innovative Operational Stress Control and
    Readiness (OSCAR) program, which embeds mental health providers with
    ground forces. OSCAR provides early identification and treatment of
    combat/operational stress problems, attempts to defeat the stigma of
    combat stress, and overcomes the barriers to care.
        The Combat/Operational Stress Control deployment cycle resources
    for families include the Family Deployment Support Program. The
    program's components consist of Family Readiness Days, family crisis
    support services, Return and Reunion Briefs for spouses, and building a
    sense of community among our military families.
    Marine For Life
        The Marine For Life Injured Support program assists seriously and
    very seriously injured marines, sailors who served with marines, and
    their families. This program bridges the gap between military medical
    care and the Department of Veterans Affairs by providing individualized
    support through the transition period.
        Individual case tracking and enduring support for our injured
    marines and sailors complements the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense's Military Severely Injured Center, which enables the program
    to provide around-the-clock injured support service. Marine For Life
    provides support tailored to an individual's needs, including pre- and
    post-service separation case tracking, assistance with the physical
    evaluation board process, and an interactive website that acts as a
    clearinghouse for all disability and benefit information. The program
    also provides employment assistance through a preexisting Marine For
    Life network that establishes local coordination with veterans, public,
    private, and charitable organizations that provide support to our
    injured warriors.
        In April 2005, Marine For Life integrated Marine Corps and
    Department of Veterans Affairs' handling of Marine cases by assigning a
    marine field grade officer to the Department of Veterans Affairs
    Headquarters' Seamless Transition Office. This integrates marines into
    the Department of Veterans Affairs system and provides service
    oversight of Veterans Health Administration care and Veterans Benefits
    Administration benefits delivery. The Marine For Life program provides
    the direct point of contact for problem resolution for marines within
    the Veterans Administration system.
    Military Construction-Bachelor Enlisted Quarters Initiative
        Bachelor housing is my top military construction priority for
    Program Objective Memorandum 2008. Barracks are a linchpin in the
    quality of life for our single marines. With the help of Congress, we
    have tripled the funding for bachelor housing from fiscal year 2006 to
    2007, and if the President's request is funded, we will double the 2007
    funding in fiscal year 2008. We are funding barracks' furnishings on a
    7-year replacement cycle and prioritizing barracks repair projects to
    preempt a backlog of repairs. Our $1.7 billion barracks investment plan
    in support of a 175,000 marine end strength provides adequate billeting
    for our unmarried junior enlisted and noncommissioned officer marines
    by 2012.
    Public Private Venture Family Housing
        Our efforts to improve housing for marines and their families
    continue. Thanks to continuing congressional support, the Marine Corps
    will have contracts in place by the end of fiscal year 2007 to
    eliminate all inadequate family housing.
                                viii. conclusion
        This Nation has high expectations of her Corps--as she should. Your
    marines are answering the call around the globe, performing with
    distinction in the face of great hardships. As they continue to serve
    in harm's way, our moral imperative is to fully support them--we owe
    them the full resources required to complete the tasks we have given
    them. Now more than ever they need the sustained support of the
    American people and Congress to simultaneously maintain our readiness,
    reset the force during an extended war, modernize to face the
    challenges of the future, and fulfill our commitment to marine
    families. On behalf of your marines, I extend great appreciation for
    your support to date and thank you in advance for your ongoing efforts
    to support our brave countrymen and women in harm's way. I promise you
    that the Corps understands the value of each dollar provided and will
    continue to provide maximum return for every dollar spent.

        Chairman Levin. General, thank you for your statement and
    again to all of you for your service.
        Let me first start with the question about the 2007 and the
    2008 supplementals. Let me ask you both, Admiral and General,
    whether or not the supplementals adequately fund your
    requirements to support the war effort. Admiral, let me start
    with you.
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, they do. They are very heavily
    focused, obviously, on the flying hours and steaming days and
    the area of equipment particularly support for Seabees, whose
    equipment, we are running through pretty quickly, as well as
    the manpower support. So the supplemental request is adequate
    in that regard.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        General?
        General Conway. My response is the same, sir. It is
    adequate. We will include some of our end strength growth and
    as a byproduct of that, some equipment. We will put some of it
    toward the MRAP Vehicles again to get them in the hands of our
    troops as soon as possible.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you both.
        By the way, we are going to have an 8-minute first round
    here.
        Secretary Winter, the LCS program has had some real
    problems. It was supposed to be a relatively inexpensive
    program. It was supposed to be a relatively quickly delivered
    program. But we have cost growth which is significant and
    apparently the Service changed its requirements after the
    design and construction contract was signed.
        Why did that happen? We have had so much experience with
    changes in the requirements after contracts have been entered
    into. Why was that allowed to occur here?
        Secretary Winter. Sir, I believe that there was in general
    an overly optimistic view of what could be accomplished. That
    said, we are still getting a first lead ship here in a lot
    shorter time period than we normally have. However, that over
    optimism has created some obvious issues in terms of decisions
    to proceed forward before the requirements were fully
    definitized and we are now having to deal with the consequences
    of that.
        Chairman Levin. What actions are we taking to avoid that or
    correct that?
        Secretary Winter. I think, sir, first of all in terms of
    the LCS, we are working very hard to enhance the Navy's
    oversight of the activity. We have added personnel both to the
    program office and also to the supervisor of shipbuilding that
    has the responsibility of directly overseeing the activities at
    the shipyards. We have also worked very hard to complete the
    definitization of the requirements and design development
    process and we are at the very end, I believe, of that aspect
    of it. We are also using a negotiation of the contract type to
    force both the Navy and the contractor to come to final
    agreement on a number of these items.
        Chairman Levin. The EFV was projected to enter production
    this year. Now we are going to have to go back into research
    and development (R&D) for 4 years more if that program is
    continued. Apparently the vehicle design was too fragile and
    unreliable. That should have been foreseeable and preventable.
    Apparently the program manager got a major promotion just
    before the real status of this project became known via
    testing.
        What is going on? Why don't we start with you, Mr.
    Secretary?
        Secretary Winter. I think again we have an issue here where
    the program got going in an overly optimistic form. I think
    there was an objective to try to bring this program in for
    dollars which were not achievable. The net of that was that
    certain basic systems engineering functions that should have
    been performed at the beginning of the program were not
    undertaken. The net result is we wound up having a design that
    did not have a firm basis in particular for some of the
    reliability and maintainability objectives that are core to
    this program.
        We are now in the process of having to go back into the
    design and develop the appropriate models, and undertake the
    appropriate systems engineering activities to see whether or
    not we can in fact convert the current configuration into a
    configuration that will provide us with the reliability and
    maintainability that is core to this program.
        Chairman Levin. Is there any accountability for these
    failures?
        Secretary Winter. Sir, one of the things that we are going
    to have to take a look at is exactly how we got into this
    situation. We have been doing that on the LCS. We have not yet
    done that on EFV, but it is my intention to do that there as
    well.
        Chairman Levin. Will you keep this committee informed on an
    ongoing basis of both of those reviews?
        Secretary Winter. Most definitely, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Servicemembers with a disability that is
    rated 30 percent or higher, as you all know, qualify for
    medical retirement. Those with less than 30 percent are
    separated with severance pay and the consequences are very
    significant, particularly in terms of family health care. The
    Center for Naval Analysis reviewed the disability ratings of
    all of the Services and they report that 26 percent of airmen
    determined to be unfit for duty received disability ratings of
    30 percent or higher. The other Services award ratings of 30
    percent or more to far, far fewer servicemembers. The Army
    awards this rating 4.3 percent of the time, the Navy 4.1
    percent of the time, and the Marines only 2.7 percent of the
    time.
        I am wondering, Mr. Secretary, is there an explanation for
    why the Marine Corps number is less than the Navy's number?
    Also, can you explain why both the Navy and Marine Corps
    numbers are so far below the Air Force number?
        Secretary Winter. Sir, this is an area that we are still
    trying to get our hands around in terms of the overall
    assessment. We do use a common board approach and we have been
    going through to reassess that board approach, both in terms of
    what is known as the ``informal'' and the ``formal'' board
    aspects. I think we have gone a long way in terms of
    understanding how to move through the process in a fairly
    expeditious manner, but I do not have a specific answer to you,
    for you today in terms of those differences. We will be working
    towards that end, however.
        Chairman Levin. We are going to have a hearing with the
    Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee and one of the issues that
    is going to come up is this issue. So we would hope in the next
    2 weeks that you would have that answer ready for us.
        Secretary Winter. We will work to that end, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Thanks.
        We have been using sailors in lieu of the shortfall of
    persons who are trained to do the specialties that these
    sailors are now engaged in. As of February 2007, 12,000 Navy
    personnel were engaged on the ground in the CENTCOM and 79
    percent of the personnel on the ground are deploying and
    supporting ground forces in their traditional military
    specialties, such as base and port operations support, medical
    services, and explosive ordnance disposal. But the others are
    being used for convoy security or for detention facility
    guards. They are performing well, but using sailors outside of
    their primary military duties must have an impact on both the
    institutional Navy as well as on individual servicemembers.
        Admiral, how would you describe the pace and scope of
    sailors being used in lieu of ground combat forces for those
    types of assignments in Iraq and Afghanistan?
        Admiral Mullen. Mr. Chairman, this is something that I have
    made a priority from the standpoint of supporting the ongoing
    effort for the country. In my travels in theater, I would tell
    you first of all that the sailors I have seen in the
    performance of these duties are very proud of what they do and
    they know they are making a big impact. They are also highly
    praised by the ground forces from both the Marine Corps and the
    Army.
        In addition, this is not just Navy. I think you are aware
    that the Air Force is also doing this as well.
        Clearly it is pressure on us as an institution but I do not
    consider myself close to red lines yet with respect to that. In
    fact, today it is over 13,000 sailors that are on the ground
    and over 5,000 specifically who are in Iraq.
        We also have some particular skills. Prison security
    capability is a natural skill for us, so that maps literally
    100 percent. We have some technical skills that have made a
    huge difference with respect to improvised explosive device
    (IED), countering the IED problem.
        But from a philosophical standpoint, I come at this having
    grown up through Vietnam and knowing what long deployments can
    do. This is the fight we are in right now and I want to provide
    as much relief as I can. I am comfortable that the training
    they are getting before they go and that the missions they are
    performing are well within their capability to perform.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Finally, General Conway, can you assure us that deploying
    marines will be fully equipped and trained before they enter
    combat in Iraq?
        General Conway. Absolutely, sir. There is a five-phased
    training program that all of our deploying units have to
    experience before they are deployed. Based upon the recent
    surge operations, we have had to rework some schedules in order
    to be able to make that happen. But it is a service requirement
    that no marine or sailor deployed with our units will go
    overseas without those kinds of experiences.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is the third
    time in a row that I have imposed upon Senator Warner to allow
    me to go first, and I thank him very much. I will make it much
    shorter than I otherwise would.
        Senator Warner. We both serve on the Senate Environment and
    Public Works Committee, where you are the ranking member, and
    you have a lot of work.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes, that is right.
        Senator Warner. I congratulate you on getting that
    legislation out this morning.
        Senator Inhofe. It is very significant. Thank you, Senator
    Warner.
        Back during the 1990s, I was pretty stressed out over what
    China was doing, not just with nuclear weapons but also the
    conventional forces. At the same time we were downsizing
    substantially, in the 1990s, they actually increased their
    procurement by 1,000 percent. Now, when you look at what is
    going on right now with what they are doing with their navy,
    one example you would have is, we have around 55 fast attack
    submarines and they are projected to go down during the next 20
    years. At the same time, China, it is my understanding, will be
    outproducing us about seven to one.
        Now, I think that is accurate information. Do you agree
    with that?
        Admiral Mullen. They are certainly outproducing us. I am
    not sure on the ratio.
        Senator Inhofe. Does this really concern you?
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, it does. The amount of their
    investment concerns me and what they are doing with their navy,
    and the technology they are investing in, concern me. That is a
    very important part of the world. We need it to be stable. We
    have a strong presence there. We will continue to do that.
        Senator Inhofe. I am glad you said the technology because
    qualitatively we have been superior, but they are making
    headway.
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, they are. That is very evident to
    us. They are also making headway operationally. We see them
    operating better than they were just a few years ago. So the
    issue and I think it has been discussed widely, is that their
    strategic intent here is not clear and more transparency is
    important. One of the things we are doing is engaging them more
    militarily to try to understand, to have relationships.
    Additionally, we try to understand where they are headed.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes, because it is not just in your end,
    Mr. Secretary.
        Admiral Mullen. No, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. It is in terms of strike vehicles and
    everything else. They are very aggressive right now. In fact, I
    think they are probably greater than our published figures.
        General Conway, you probably know that we took a vote just
    a few minutes ago on the MRAP and I am sure that pleased you.
    You had written a letter to General Pace saying that the MRAP
    could reduce our casualties by 80 percent. That is a pretty
    high amount. I guess the amount to get us to that point would
    be over $4 billion; is that correct?
        General Conway. Sir, I want to qualify the statement to the
    degree that it is understood completely. Against the same
    blast, riding in an uparmored Humvee, which is currently the
    gold standard in Iraq----
        Senator Inhofe. Which is flat.
        General Conway. Yes, sir, it has a flat and arguably even
    concave bottom, which in some cases exacerbates the blast.
    Against the same blast, marines, sailors, and soldiers who are
    riding in the vehicle, are judged to be 400 percent less likely
    to sustain death or injury. I think that is where the figure of
    80 percent comes from and it was a little more clarified in the
    letter.
        Senator Inhofe. That is good. Let us stay on top of that,
    because obviously that is something we want to do and it took a
    major step today.
        I want to comment also on what you said about the two-
    thirds reenlistment rate. I have had occasion to spend a lot of
    time with your people up around Fallujah and other places and
    it is just incredible what they are doing. I wish the media
    were a little more aware of that. Maybe you can help us in that
    respect.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Senator
    Warner.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Thanks to the three of you for your service. It is good to
    see you again.
        Admiral Mullen, before I get to the budget I want to ask
    you a couple of questions about what is happening in the
    Persian Gulf now. Obviously, we are all following closely and
    with great concern the status of the British sailors who were
    seized. Do we have any independent evidence as to whether the
    two British boats were in Iranian water, as the Iranians claim,
    or not, as the Brits claim?
        Admiral Mullen. We are aware that the Brits have said they
    were not in Iraqi territorial waters.
        Senator Lieberman. Right. Based on the presence of two
    carrier battle groups of ours in the Persian Gulf and watching
    what is happening there, were you surprised by the Iranian
    seizure of these two British boats?
        Admiral Mullen. I guess I was not surprised from the
    standpoint of the actions of the Republican Guard Navy. The
    Iranian navy is made up of two separate and distinct groups.
    What I do not know is to what degree that was sanctioned. I do
    not have a feel for that at all, quite frankly.
        It is a very tight water space. It is an area that has been
    disputed for decades and centuries. There was an accord, the
    Algiers Accord, in 1975, to which the Iranian and Iraqi
    governments did not agree, so that there is a dispute up there
    in these very tight waters and that certainly lends to the
    difficulty of sorting this out.
        The Stennis, which is the second carrier strike group
    recently deployed, actually has been in the area for weeks and
    has transited into the Gulf in recent days, and the exercise
    that is ongoing there really is a training exercise to improve
    our capability as well as provide the kind of signal that it
    was originally intended to, which is one of strength and
    stability, and support of our allies and friends there. That is
    a part of the world that really needs to be stable. They are
    training in the middle of the Gulf. They are not up near the
    north, where the problem occurred.
        Senator Lieberman. Are we doing anything different since
    the seizure of the two British boats to avoid the same?
        Admiral Mullen. We are always mindful of these kinds of
    possibilities. There have been a significant number of Iranian
    incursions into these waters in recent weeks, months, and
    years. So we are certainly mindful of the possibilities. This
    obviously, as an incident like this always does, sharpens your
    edge considerably.
        Senator Lieberman. Sure.
        Admiral Mullen. But certainly it has always been a concern.
        Senator Lieberman. Just one more brief question and it is
    worth coming back for a separate hearing perhaps. As we face
    the real threat that Iran represents to us, as we listen to
    people in the square in Teheran shouting ``Death to America''
    and we begin to try to understand their military capabilities,
    what you said I think is probably little appreciated not only
    by the American people, but by us here. We have now become
    familiar with the fact that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard is
    in Iraq training and equipping, et cetera. We know that it is a
    unique group, an elite group, but not a small group. I gather
    that it is well over 100,000 and reports to the Supreme Leader,
    Ayatollah Khameini.
        But you are telling us something else, which is that in
    some sense there is a separate Iranian Guard Navy, separate
    from the other navy.
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, that is correct. It has been that
    way for a long time. We understand a lot more about the
    activities of the regular Iranian Navy than we do, quite
    frankly, about the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy in
    terms of either predictability or routine operations and
    exercises.
        Senator Lieberman. I would like to come back to that on
    another occasion.
        I have a concern about the submarine program. You mentioned
    the number of 48 nuclear-powered subs as a minimum. We are on a
    path now in construction to go down to 40 by around 2020. There
    is a group of us in both chambers that would like to move the
    year in which we go to two submarines a year from 2012 forward
    to 2010. The money is not in this budget.
        Am I correct to conclude, Mr. Secretary, that if you had
    the money you would like to do this as well?
        Secretary Winter. Sir, I think first of all we are hopeful
    to be able to reduce the cost of these submarines. As you
    recall, we are running about $2.4 billion in 2005 dollars per
    submarine. We are looking to be able to take that down about
    $200 million based on the economic order quantity and about
    $200 million based on design improvements which are currently
    under way.
        We think the most cost effective way of doing that is to go
    through that process, which we believe we will be able to
    achieve consistent with the 2012 two-a-year production rate
    program. I would just note two other aspects, one of which is
    that, as we go into the ramp-up from one-a-year to two-a-year,
    we do need to precede this by 2 years in terms of advance
    procurement activities, principally associated with the reactor
    power plant.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        Secretary Winter. So we have a process where we have to go
    through and ramp this up. I am also very concerned that we do
    this and stabilize it. I do not want to go to two-a-year for a
    year and then back to one-a-year and then back up to two-a-
    year.
        Senator Lieberman. Yes, no one wants that. I gather in the
    House that there is some significant movement toward funding
    the reactor core development on a time line to get to two
    submarines by 2010. But you are absolutely right, it does come
    down to dollars. We do not want to start it and ramp up and
    then have to ramp down.
        Secretary Winter. Yes, sir.
        Senator Lieberman. That would be bad for everybody.
        I want to ask you one more question about the sub program.
    The RAND Corporation recently did a study that concluded that
    extending design on the next generation submarine from 15 to 20
    years will result in up to a 20 percent savings over the long-
    term by maintaining an experienced labor pool and the
    industrial base.
        The fiscal year 2008 shipbuilding plan does accelerate the
    start of construction on the replacement of the Trident class
    submarine from 2022 to 2019, but there is no initial funding in
    it. I intend to try to add, not a large amount of money,
    perhaps $25 million, to the budget to begin the design on the
    new class of Trident submarine to meet the 2019 date. Do you
    have an opinion on that at this point?
        Secretary Winter. Senator, one of the things that I have
    been trying to do is to ensure that our SSBN replacement
    program has the proper systems engineering ahead of it. There
    is a whole set of processes. The only reason for the SSBN is to
    be able to carry the strategic missiles, and the only reason
    for the missiles is to be able to carry the warheads. So we
    need to make sure that we understand exactly what it is that we
    are going to try to do with this deterrent force in the future,
    what type of deployments, what type of targets, what type of
    ranges and accuracies we will need with those missiles, what
    options we have for the missiles themselves, and what
    implications that has for the submarines.
        One of the things I have been working to do here is to
    establish the appropriate early partnership with Strategic
    Command to be able to engage in the type of early-on systems
    engineering which will let us go and take the first steps
    towards the development of appropriate designs for a future
    SSBN that are consistent with the future vision of what we need
    for a deterrent force.
        Senator Lieberman. I appreciate your answer. My time is up.
    I look forward to working with you on these two initiatives to
    maintain the vitality of our submarine fleet and our submarine
    base over the long term.
        Thank you, all three of you, very much. Thanks for the
    extraordinary service that your folks in uniform are giving in
    the war on terrorism.
        Secretary Winter. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I would like to associate myself with my colleague's
    remarks with regard to the submarines. We are very proud that
    our shipyard in Newport News is a full partner in that program.
    I am optimistic that we can go to the two submarines. You say
    that you hope to achieve it through cost savings. Can you put a
    little earmark on that money so it does not stray out of that
    submarine account and drift over into another account? Is that
    agreed to here?
        Secretary Winter. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. Thank you very much. Keep those funds
    there.
        I also was quite interested in my colleague's questions to
    the Admiral about the Iranian situation and our ships offshore.
    I really view those ships as performing the traditional mission
    of deterrence. We very carefully, as a consortium of nations
    under the banner of NATO, did precisely that with the Warsaw
    Pact. When questions are asked about the use of force in Iran,
    it seems to me before we ever get to the serious consideration
    of the use of force, we should simply pursue the deterrence
    concept of ringing Iran with ships and perhaps other military
    assets, just as a reminder. The presence alone, the old gunboat
    diplomacy, has a very remarkable impact on normal diplomacy. It
    would be helpful if ships from other nations that are similarly
    affected by the threats that Iran poses through its nuclear
    weapons production concept could join so that we begin to have
    more of a NATO-type appearance and it is just not the United
    States.
        I am coming back to your first words, Admiral, which you
    uttered when you came in here. You threw up a cautionary sign
    on your retention and you simply said, appropriately, we are
    looking into it. Could you share with us some of the early
    signs that concern you? Is there a shift in retention that is a
    reflection of the understandably serious divisive consternation
    across this land with regard to the current operations?
        Admiral Mullen. I do not know yet if that is part of the
    reason, Senator Warner. This is the first time in about 7 years
    that we have seen our first-term retention dip below 50
    percent. Our goal is 50 percent and we have been between 50 and
    60 since 2000. It has been a remarkable level of achievement.
    In fact, I set out both recruiting and retention as a priority
    for us. So literally, the data just got to me within the last
    couple of weeks.
        There is a piece of this that I do not quite understand
    yet, which is that we are seeing a larger number of sailors
    request extensions as opposed to reenlisting right now. Some of
    that historically is tied to their ability to get into a combat
    zone and reenlist for the tax-free benefit, which certainly
    they are deserving of and brings them a lot more cash when they
    reenlist.
        So we are really pulling this apart. Also, there is a very
    slight dip in our second-term retention. So we are certainly
    seeing these indicators. It is the first time. It is what I
    have been very wary of, just because I have been here awhile
    and I have seen this certainly go in cycles. So we are working
    to try to understand the details of it.
        Senator Warner. I have to move on. I am delighted that you
    are going to general quarters.
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. This is a very critical situation.
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. When I was in the building during Vietnam,
    I began to see some of the recruiting and retention reflected
    because of the public concern about that conflict. We have to
    track that and track it instantly.
        Now, General Conway, I listened to you carefully. I have
    gone back and re-read your statement. You seem not to be
    experiencing that problem; is that correct?
        General Conway. Sir, that is correct. We annually target
    about 25 percent for retention. Actually, with our growth we
    are moving that figure up to 33 percent, and we still have a
    high level of optimism that we will be able to meet those
    figures.
        Senator Warner. Good. The Navy has, as the Admiral
    mentioned, some 4,000 white hats and officers in country now in
    Iraq?
        Admiral Mullen. 5,000.
        Senator Warner. 5,000.
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. So you are certainly doing that. You have a
    much larger contingent which is performing in the finest
    traditions.
        Admiral Mullen. About 26,000 right now, sir, with the
    turnover taking place.
        Senator Warner. Quickly again, let us go to the Secretary.
    The U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention, in your
    prepared testimony you support it?
        Secretary Winter. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. Does the administration intend to seek
    Senate approval or ratification this year?
        Secretary Winter. I believe we are working toward that end,
    sir.
        Senator Warner. All right, I am glad. I think it is
    important that we move along on that.
        Now, to the Commandant and then to the Secretary.
    Commandant, you have quite appropriately, I believe, responded
    to concerns that I and others had with regard to Marine Corps
    Base, Quantico, which corrected the flight safety deficiencies
    on your ramps. You have now put that on your unfunded
    requirements, is that correct?
        General Conway. That is correct, sir.
        Senator Warner. I will personally see whether or not we
    cannot move that through. I have gone in and out of that little
    air strip many a time in my lifetime.
        General Conway. Very functional, sir.
        Senator Warner. I think it is important to do that. I thank
    you very much.
        Now, on the Navy shipbuilding, Admiral. The affordability
    of the Navy program and our ability to meet your plan of 313
    ships. CBO estimates $20 billion per year, $5 billion greater
    than the Navy's budget estimate. In other words, you have set
    your goals and the CBO has set their goals. They are not
    consistent. What can we do to help you?
        Admiral Mullen. I think the CBO continues to put pressure
    on the system and I think that is a healthy thing. It is
    interesting that in the discussion, for instance, about the
    design base for SSBNs one of the challenges that we have in
    reconciling the two is just our assumptions about how many we
    are going to have and when we are going to have them. One of
    the changes that is on the right-hand side of the shipbuilding
    program in the out-years, the 2020s and 2030s, is that we have
    changed some numbers there so there actually is some additional
    cost that has gone up.
        But in the new SSBN force, we for example imagine having
    just the number of ships that we need because we will have
    cores which will last the life of the ship. That clearly is not
    going to require us to have two additional SSBNs, which we have
    right now.
        The affordability piece comes in great part into focus
    because of LCS. I really do want to applaud Secretary Winter
    for his leading the efforts to pull us through a very thorough
    understanding in what was a high-risk program, very demanding
    schedule, and focusing us on requirements. We have to make sure
    we do not change the requirements. We have to make sure we
    oversee it correctly, not just us but also on the industry
    side. So we have learned a lot. We are going to take those
    lessons and put it into our other major programs to make sure
    we are within bounds.
        Senator Warner. I only bring it to the attention of you two
    gentlemen. I do this in a very straightforward, professional
    way, nothing personal about it. I have noted of recent, and I
    have had the privilege of working with many Secretaries of
    Defense, the current Secretary of Defense moved swiftly,
    courageously, and decisively on the issue of accountability.
    Program managers do their best, but there are those who oversee
    program managers, and I hope both you and the Admiral handle
    the situation in a way that there is full accountability in the
    eyes of Congress and others.
        Secretary Winter. I fully understand, sir.
        Senator Warner. Good.
        The new medical centers at Bethesda and Fort Belvoir.
    Yesterday I endeavored to put in an amendment to the current
    appropriations bill which simply said that we should maintain
    Walter Reed as best we can and put it into terms of a first-
    class military facility, but not amend the Base Realignment and
    Closure (BRAC) law. I feel very strongly that if we cannot go
    in for the first time in five BRAC laws and try to change it,
    although this program at Walter Reed has a lot of merits to it,
    there are many other Members of Congress here who feel that
    their BRAC decisions are equally meritorious and then it puts
    in jeopardy another BRAC round. May it not happen on my watch,
    but anyway it is somewhere in the future. I will let Chairman
    Levin and Senator McCain write the next BRAC law. I have
    written five of them.
        So let us be cautious. I believe what we should do is
    accelerate the funding for the planned and proposed incremental
    improvements at Bethesda. I say plans; I am not sure they are
    in full force yet. Now, we are not going to address Belvoir,
    but there was a comparable situation. We can accelerate the
    funding so that those two physical structures can be ready to,
    on the BRAC schedule, receive from Walter Reed those components
    that are to be integrated at the different sites.
        Do you feel that that is an appropriate program, Mr.
    Secretary?
        Secretary Winter. Sir, there are two points here that I
    would offer. First of all, we do believe that there is value to
    combining Bethesda and Walter Reed and that having that
    integrated capability enables many of the critical skills and
    the unique specialties there to reach a critical mass of
    capability and will avoid some of the back and forth use of the
    facility by many of the casualties that are coming back right
    now.
        I would suggest, sir, that relative to the acceleration
    opportunities there, there probably are some opportunities to
    accelerate the process of the new facility. I just would
    caution that it not be done in such a way that we give short
    shrift, if you will, to the requirements development process.
        Senator Warner. All right. Would you provide for the
    committee, and mark it to the chairman's attention and he will
    see that I get it, your proposals with regard to what is
    feasible by way of acceleration? What are the costs associated
    and what if any do you feel are the advantages of doing that,
    namely to make that facility ready at the time the BRAC
    decision says Walter Reed has to phase out?
        Secretary Winter. I would be pleased to do that, sir.
        Senator Warner. That would avoid, I hope, a change in the
    law or a necessity to do so. But we must always put care for
    our wounded and care for our Active and retired community as
    the top priority. So let us work within those constraints.
        Lastly on the question of aircraft carrier basing and
    Mayport. I have been following with interest the Navy's
    assessment of the strategic home porting and dispersal options
    for the Atlantic fleet surface ships. I believe it is important
    that all factors be considered in any large operational move,
    to include not only environmental concerns, but also national
    security requirements, the impact on the sailors, and so forth.
        What is the current status and the way ahead for the
    current Naval Air Station (NAS) Mayport Environmental Impact
    Study (EIS)?
        Secretary Winter. Sir, we have proceeded on the EIS
    activity there. We are undergoing the initial phases of that.
    We are doing this in such a way as to encompass all options
    that have been contemplated or considered for the use of
    Mayport, and we are also doing it in such a way as to ensure
    that we factor in all aspects of the proper tradeoffs there, as
    we are required to do in terms of the assessment of
    alternatives that accompanies any EIS.
        Senator Warner. At what point in time do you feel that
    could be through?
        Secretary Winter. I believe we are targeting to the January
    2009 time period for record of decision.
        Senator Warner. Admiral Mullen, on the assessment of the
    NAS, Oceana, I am going to give a question to you because my
    time has moved along. But I am anxious to know where that
    matter's status is now.
        If you would answer this question for the record.
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, we will do that.
        Senator Warner. I think it is important that we continue to
    give reassurance to the people in that community to maintain
    their commitments in order to bring that base into a greater
    operational safety and have less adverse impact on the
    community and fleet operations.
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. I thank you for the manner in which you
    have handled that thus far. It has not been an easy issue. I
    will put this one into the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [See questions for the record #58 and #59.]

        Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
        Senator Lieberman [presiding]. Without objection. Thanks,
    Senator Warner.
        Senator Ben Nelson.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I thank you gentlemen for your service to our country as
    well and to all the marines and sailors that are under your
    commands.
        This would be a question to Admiral Mullen and to Secretary
    Winter. With respect to the retrofitting of the SSBN fleet, in
    some cases to conventional weapons, what priority would you
    give that within your budget and your overall priorities?
        Secretary Winter. Sir, I think we have prioritized that
    very highly. We have three out of the four boats returned to
    service and the work on the fourth boat is proceeding according
    to schedule. Sir, are you talking SSGN or are you talking----
        Senator Ben Nelson. No, the Trident.
        Secretary Winter. Oh, I am sorry, sir. My apologies. I was
    thinking of the SSGN conversion program.
        Our discussions with Strategic Command have indicated that
    there is a lot of advantage to being able to provide a greater
    diversity of options for the President in terms of a rapid
    response and strategic capability. It is clear from a technical
    point of view that we can accomplish this through modifications
    of the Trident missile, and we believe that this can be done in
    a low risk manner and in a short period of time and we are
    ready to proceed on that, subject to the authorizations and
    appropriations.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Would that SSBN be as high a priority
    as the SSGN, or how have you prioritized these retrofittings?
        Secretary Winter. The SSGN, as I started to say, has
    proceeded on through most of its activities. It is at the final
    stages of completion of that activity. So I do not see this as
    being in competition, if you will, from a funding point of
    view.
        Senator Ben Nelson. General Cartwright has testified and
    has spoken to me privately as well about the importance of this
    conversion. Senator Sessions and I and others tried to get this
    done in the last go-around, but we were unsuccessful. I hope we
    will be far more successful with the authorization this time.
        This is a question for General Conway. In your written
    testimony you note that the Marine Corps has approximately
    4,000 marines affected by the pending plus-up operation in
    Iraq. Of course, these marines are going to be a vital asset to
    the operation, essential as we all know, and of course we wish
    them well and we hope that they will be able to accomplish
    their mission both safely and effectively.
        You also note that the affected units will be extended for
    45 to 60 days. Now, depending on the length of the plus-up in
    Iraq, will the Marine Corps be able to progress towards
    establishing a one to two deployment-to-dwell ratio goal? Every
    7 months a marine is deployed, will they be back at their home
    station for 14 months? How are we going to make that goal work
    with the current situation?
        General Conway. Sir, the eventual goal, of course, is to
    try to get to one to two--7 months deployed, 14 months home.
    The addition of the two infantry battalions, potentially the
    Marine Expeditionary Unit in Iraq, for this plus-up, of course,
    heads us in the other direction. So although we will continue
    to build infantry battalions and some of these critical units
    that are impacted by a high deployment to dwell ratio, it will
    take us time, growing at roughly 5,000 marines a year, to be
    able to have that kind of impact.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Will the growth of the marine end
    strength help take some of the pressure off this operational
    tempo for the marines?
        General Conway. Absolutely, sir, in that we are looking at
    which units are most heavily impacted and we are building those
    units first.
        Senator Ben Nelson. But it will take quite a while to bring
    the training of the new recruits up to the level that it will
    provide any help soon. Are you concerned about the training
    level of the troops? Are we having to train them faster than we
    would prefer to train them so that we get their efforts put in
    place?
        General Conway. Senator Nelson, there is a built-in
    safeguard there, in that we will simply not deploy units that
    are not readiness category 1, across the board. It takes us
    about 5 months out of a 7-month cycle to be able to achieve
    that. But we are drawing a red line. We will simply not deploy
    units if they have not accomplished all of their training and
    those things that we expect them to have before they are
    deployment-ready.
        Senator Ben Nelson. With respect to the new armor
    protection that you testified about earlier, how soon will we
    have that kind of protection for our force?
        General Conway. Sir, we have some of it now. The Secretary
    and his procurement personnel have engineered eight other
    potential contractors that can provide a similar class vehicle
    for us. As we sit here today, tests are taking place at
    Aberdeen to make sure that these vehicles are blast-resistant
    as well as able to provide the expected road miles that we
    would have to have off the vehicles. Assuming success there,
    they are going to go on to full rate production contracts as
    soon as we can get them there. So we expect that, if all things
    go well, we could have thousands of these vehicles in the
    theater by the end of the year.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Now, that might be for IEDs, but what
    about for the penetrating explosive that is being used today?
        General Conway. Sir, probably we should not talk too much
    about that in open session, except to say that we are making
    advancements there as well with regard to technologies that can
    defeat that type of system.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Finally, for Admiral Mullen and General
    Conway. What individually are your three top budget priorities
    this go-around? Admiral Mullen?
        Admiral Mullen. The top for me, Senator Nelson, is to
    continue to support the shipbuilding program, the stability
    there, and the investment there. I talk about making sure we
    have it right for our people, that our readiness stays high,
    but at the top of that heap has been and will continue to be to
    build the fleet for the future, to get to 313 ships.
        Senator McCain pointed out that last year we had 281 ships.
    This year we have 276. By the end of this year we will actually
    have started going upwards as opposed to continuing down and be
    at 279. So we are on track. It has to be affordable and I
    understand that. That really is top priority.
        Part of that is also how I stabilize my aviation plan as
    well. I need a long-term stable plan, not unlike what I have in
    shipbuilding. So that is really at the top of the heap and
    there are lots of pieces inside that. We have to make sure we
    have a robust industrial base, which is a real challenge for us
    right now. Those are national treasures for us. We have to get
    the investment right in that. Stability in this plan is key to
    that, and then everybody has to perform, the contractors and
    the Government, together.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Your personnel reduction, is that
    occurring at the rate you would prefer it?
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, it is. We have come down. We are
    in our 4th year this year, in 2007, of about 10,000 a year.
    There is a proposal for another 12,000. I told the committee
    last year at this hearing that I needed to go figure out what
    the end state would be. We have done that. We think we will be
    between 320,000 to 325,000 as we flatten out.
        I remain concerned that overall in the budget sense that we
    as institutions have to come to grips with how we are going to
    continue to pay for these personnel costs which continue to
    rise at a very high rate. I have been flat in my personnel
    accounts in terms of investment because we have been coming
    down, but that is going to disappear in the next 2 to 3 years
    and I will experience that same kind of inflation.
        Senator Ben Nelson. It is amazing how a budget looks good
    when you are going out of business. But you do not want to go
    out of business.
        Admiral Mullen. No, sir.
        Senator Ben Nelson. General Conway?
        General Conway. Sir, you took care of, I think, my most
    urgent concern this morning, and I thank you for that vote. I
    think that will be very helpful in terms of the moral
    imperative we have for taking care of our people.
        Beyond that, as we grow the force, we would like to see
    those personnel costs into the top line as soon as we can. We
    are contracting people for 4 years at a time and it gets
    difficult if we have to look to year-to-year appropriations in
    order to be able to sustain that.
        I would share the CNO's observations on a strong fleet. The
    Marine Corps needs that kind of support, particularly as it
    relates to the amphibious ships. We believe that we probably
    have to have 33 amphibious ships to have 30 available at any
    time. So we will work with the Navy over the out-years to see
    exactly how we accomplish that.
        We also see, and I think the chairman mentioned it in his
    opening statement, that there is a bathtub out there with
    regard to strike aircraft. In the not-too-distant future, we
    are going to be short some 40 to 50 aircraft, and that will
    only be exacerbated if we continue to move Joint Strike Fighter
    right. That is the generation of aircraft we have long awaited
    now and we would like to see that program kept on line as much
    as possible.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Collins.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is my
    understanding that Senator Thune has a time constraint, so I am
    going to ask that you recognize him before me, even though I am
    just dying to ask my questions.
        Chairman Levin. We are dying to hear them, but Senator
    Thune?
        Senator Thune. Mr. Chairman, I will not be long.
        I want to thank the Secretary and the Admiral and the
    General for their service and for their leadership. I am not
    going to be able to stay for the duration of the hearing, but I
    do have some questions I would like to submit for the record
    and get your response to them. So I would ask unanimous consent
    that I be able to do that.
        Is anybody there to say ``without objection''?
        Senator Collins. Without objection.
        Senator Thune. I thank my colleague.
        Chairman Levin. Whatever it was, it is granted.
        Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Collins. Mr. Chairman, since that only took about
    30 seconds, may I proceed, or do you want to recognize Senator
    Reed?
        Chairman Levin. Senator Reed has graciously acknowledged
    that 30 seconds does not count and therefore Senator Collins is
    next.
        Senator Collins. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        First let me commend all three of you for your strong
    leadership and your outstanding service to your country. I very
    much appreciate your hard work and service.
        Admiral Mullen, I have been concerned for some time about
    the impact of the transition from the DDG-51 class of
    destroyers to the new DDG-1000 class of ships. We need to avoid
    schedule slippages in order to avoid a gap in the workload that
    could have a significantly adverse effect on our skilled
    industrial base. We do not want to have a workload that has a
    big gap in it and thus we lose those highly skilled workers and
    cause problems in our capacity.
        Two years ago this committee asked the Navy to evaluate
    this issue and the Navy reported that Navy and industry
    assessments of workload projections suggested that the
    transition had the potential to negatively impact workload at
    the shipyards. But the Navy went on to say that we are
    confident we can manage that transition and maintain the
    viability of the surface combatant industrial base.
        What is your current judgment of our ability to avoid the
    kind of gap in the workload that could hurt the industrial
    base?
        Admiral Mullen. I think the concern as it was a couple of
    years ago, is well-founded, in the sense that transitions are
    always difficult. You more than just about everybody else know
    how difficult it is to move on from the DDG-51. I have been an
    advocate for some time, to get to the new capability and the
    new technology and really a 21st century Navy. So I think it is
    vital that we continue to press on.
        Clearly at the center of that is the viability of the DDG-
    1000 program. We have taken extensive looks at this over the
    last couple of years, because of the risk that has been in that
    program. I am confident at this point that, with what we know,
    that it is going to be on schedule. At the same time, it is at
    a very delicate time when you are going to design and you are
    really going to start building, and there are historical
    challenges with the first of a class, as there have always
    been.
        So we are mindful of all that, back to the lessons that we
    have learned in LCS, to try to make sure we rope them, as much
    as they apply, into the DDG-1000 program, and very mindful, as
    I spoke earlier, that this is a national treasure. We have to
    treat it well. We need to invest in it. There needs to be a
    plan that can sustain itself, which I think goes to a healthier
    work force in the long run.
        So it is a consideration in all of our deliberations to
    make sure we get this right.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        There is a lot of discussion about the higher cost of the
    DDG-1000 and what is often overlooked in that discussion is the
    tremendous cost savings that result from the smaller crew size
    for the DDG-1000 versus the old DDG-51. Could you comment on
    the potential cost savings from being able to operate this new
    cutting-edge destroyer with a substantially smaller crew?
        Admiral Mullen. We have a tendency in Washington to focus
    on what it takes to build it now and then worry about what you
    are referring to, which is life cycle costs, which we all have
    to pay, down the road. So it is an investment in technology
    which will greatly reduce the life cycle cost in lots of ways,
    including a much smaller crew size.
        We talked earlier about the expense of our people. Our most
    important resource, our number one priority, is our people and
    will remain so. But this will require many, many fewer sailors
    to man her and sail her and fight her. So that is a big deal.
        This is a program that underpins the shipbuilding,
    industrial, technological base. We did not have that 5, 6, or 7
    years ago. In fact, in the specific costs, if you look at the
    cost of the last DDGs at the end of the production line, which
    is 1980s technology, we were still at $1.5 billion. So a lead
    ship would be $3 billion. It is not $5 billion, as was
    indicated in one of the newspaper articles this morning. To get
    to the technology and the kind of investment that we need is
    not as overwhelming in terms of expense in my mind as it could
    be.
        We are on track at this point to bring it in at that and
    then to get that cost down closer to $2 billion, which I think
    is a significant goal, and it will be a great accomplishment
    when we get there.
        Senator Collins. I agree and thank you for clarifying that
    issue.
        Secretary Winter, we have talked many times about the
    challenges of allocating work load across the four public yards
    that the Navy has. I am very proud of the one in Kittery,
    Maine, the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, which the BRAC Commission
    cited as being the gold standard for public shipyards.
        Recently, Admiral Sullivan briefed the Maine and New
    Hampshire delegations on the Navy's latest shipyard business
    plan for 2008 through 2013 and I know you have been personally
    very involved in this and I want to thank you for spending so
    much time. I am, however, concerned that the Navy's shipyard
    business plan does not fully take into account the
    specializations that have been developed by the various
    shipyards. For example, our shipyard in Maine is known for its
    proficiency in work on attack submarines. By contrast, Norfolk
    specializes more in surface combatants and aircraft carriers.
        Are you taking a look at the efficiencies, the
    specializations, and the expertise developed by various
    shipyards, as you make those allocations?
        Secretary Winter. Yes, Senator. While it may not have
    appeared explicitly in our long-term strategic plan for the
    public yards, it is clearly an implicit part of the
    optimization that we have incorporated into our future strategy
    for assignment of availabilities to the yards. What we are
    trying to do is be able to effect the greatest availability for
    the lowest cost that we can for the fleet. Given the
    specialization, that does affect, if you will, the time frame
    that it takes, as well as the cost, of undergoing certain
    modifications, upgrades, and basic maintenance tasks at the
    various yards. That will be, in fact, an explicit factor in the
    consideration and the assessment of the assignment of the
    ships.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        I look forward to working with all of you as we proceed. I
    again want to congratulate you all for a very good budget
    proposal that I think is in our national security interest and
    helps move us forward. Thank you.
        Secretary Winter. Thank you.
        Senator Reed [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator
    Collins.
        Gentlemen, welcome. Admiral, in the spirit that not enough
    good things can ever be said about submarines, let me follow up
    some of the questions that Senator Lieberman raised. Do you
    feel confident that the submarine shipbuilders are going to
    meet your goal of $2 billion per submarine? I think that was
    the confidence of the Secretary. Do you feel that?
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, I am. Actually, part of my
    confidence is what I see as a dramatic shift in their
    commitment to getting there. They believe it is possible. They
    believe we are going to put two submarines in in 2012. We have
    stayed with that. That has affected a big shift in the way they
    are approaching this problem, and they are on track right now.
        Senator Reed. Part of the confidence is a result, I think,
    of some factors. One is the design for affordability R&D
    investment that is being made. Is that critical? I think the
    Secretary mentioned that.
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, that is critical.
        Senator Reed. There is also the commitment, because of
    these innovations, to reduce the construction cycle from about
    84 to 60 months. That is another part.
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir. Also, actually regarding the
    concern that we have had about this reduction to 40 submarines
    in the out-years, one of the potential gap-fillers in that is
    to reduce the 72-month build time, which is where we are right
    now, down to 60 months. That in combination with an extra
    deployment out of a hull or two, dramatically reduces that gap.
        Senator Reed. One other factor is the multiyear procurement
    authority that you have.
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. One other factor is the multiyear procurement
    authority that you have, which allows you essentially to buy
    particularly significant components ahead and in a certain
    degree begin to build a second ship, perhaps a virtual second
    ship, while you are building officially one ship, if that is
    accurate.
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        You raised the issue just in your response, Admiral, about
    the sufficiency of the fleet. With 313 ships overall and 48
    attack submarines, that allows about 10 ships to be forward
    deployed on a day-to-day basis. However, it is my understanding
    that the combatant commanders always dial you up and ask for
    more, upwards to 18 if they could have them, and that raises
    the number. Is 48 the right number?
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, 48 is the right number. We looked
    at that extensively, as we understand the world right now. The
    issue that gets adjudicated in the combatant commanders'
    requirements request, is that they have been fulfilled to about
    the 95 percent of the apportioned availability of the
    submarines in particular. I have also engaged them at my level
    and they are very comfortable with what they have right now.
        Backing those 10 up is a surge capability of a significant
    number of submarines if we had to move forward.
        Senator Reed. We run into a scenario, though, between 2020
    and 2033 where we drop to 40 boats. Actually, in the 2028-2029
    year we are at 40 boats, which is significantly low and puts at
    risk, I think, even the projected plans of the moment.
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, I understand that, and that is
    why getting to two a year is important. In addition to that, we
    have just completed a study which looks at other ways to
    mitigate this, which fills that gap up--building Virginia
    faster, getting additional deployment out of some of the
    submarines that have core life left, and looking at other ways
    to do that--that gets me, quite frankly, down to a gap of maybe
    2 or 3 on that 48, as opposed to the 8 that you are talking
    about right now.
        All that says is, as I have committed to before, I am
    working hard to mitigate that gap. I also have that gap coming
    in surface combatants. These are both classes of ships I
    previously built at higher levels--three a year in the case of
    submarines, five a year in the case of surface combatants. They
    are going to decommission at that rate and we are clearly not
    replacing them at that rate. So we are looking for ways to
    mitigate the gap.
        Senator Reed. One of the aspects that I think might suggest
    increased demand, even from today's tempo of operations, is the
    role submarines are playing in terms of covert intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance, covert insertion and recovery
    of special operations forces, covert strikes with Tomahawk
    cruise missiles, covert offensive and defensive mine warfare,
    and also in a sense I think an aspect of our commitment in
    Southwest Asia some economy of force missions, at least in
    terms of screening and intelligence gathering when you cannot
    have a major presence. Either you do not have the ships or you
    do not want to be overt.
        This, I think, puts additional pressure on the bottom line
    number of submarines that you need.
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, I do not think there is any
    question. The viability and the criticality of the mission
    sets, including those that you are describing, is not in
    question. I had just one thought as you asked that question.
    These four SSGNs are clearly not fast attack submarines, but
    they bring special operations capability, they bring the
    stealth, they bring the striking capability, and I think they
    are going to bring a lot more that we do not even understand
    yet because of the volume that they have that we can work with.
        So that mitigates against the 48 to a degree that we really
    have not talked a lot about in some of those capabilities.
        Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, I just want to commend you for
    your testimony in response to Senator Lieberman's questions. I
    think it has been echoed by the CNO in terms of what we have to
    do to get our submarine fleet going forward.
        Let me turn to an issue now that bridges the gap between
    the Navy and the Marine Corps. You mentioned it, General
    Conway, in what you are looking at, which is with 31 amphibious
    ships rather than 36 amphibious ships and your operational
    availability needs of 30, that does not leave a big margin. How
    are you going to plan to deal with that very narrow margin
    between available ships and operational demand?
        General Conway. Sir, our estimate, based upon what we think
    is 85 percent availability historically for all Navy ships, is
    that the magic number is probably 33 for us, which would then
    in all likelihood give us that 30 operationally available in
    the event of a crisis or in the event of a need. It was just
    through dialogue with the Navy, we had a great warfighter
    conference with the CNO and his senior officers probably about
    3 weeks, maybe about a month ago. We impressed upon them the
    need. We have shown them where we have accepted some level of
    risk already, because actually the 2015 Marine Expeditionary
    Brigade requires 17 ships, but we think we can get that down to
    15 with some follow-on. But that is a hard-line number. So just
    through good negotiations and comradeship, sir, we are going to
    work it out. It is a tough issue.
        Senator Reed. Admiral?
        Admiral Mullen. It is an affordability issue. We talked
    about the 10th LPD, which is on the UPL right now because it is
    a requirement that I just do not have the resources to get at.
    We are very committed to making sure that we deliver the Marine
    Corps. General Conway and I want to commend him as well and his
    people. We have worked very hard together to make sure we
    understand how we are going to operate in the future. It is
    clearly going to take ships. When the marines come out of Iraq,
    we want to get under way with them as rapidly as we can and do
    the work that we need to do, and it takes ships to do that.
        So I know I have to provide those 30 ships. The question is
    whether I purchase new ones or make the ones I have more
    available? That is really the space that we are working hard in
    right now.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
        I have a final question, General Conway, and that is on the
    EFV program. Can you give an assessment of the program and also
    the tradeoffs between that program and continuing use of the
    Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV)?
        General Conway. Sir, first of all, as I came to this job, I
    was disappointed to hear that we had somehow used a series of
    old vehicles, vehicles that had gone past their service life
    expectancy, to test reliability. I still do not quite
    understand the logic behind that, but the fact is that it has
    happened, and we have had some reliability problems in the
    vehicles that we have tested.
        The requirement, I think, is a very real requirement. I do
    not think, based upon what we know about anti-access systems
    and anti-ship missiles, that the Navy is going to go closer
    than 25 miles to any given beach. Our AAV, which has already
    undergone a significant upgrade and a very successful one, I
    might add, still only swims at 8 miles an hour. So we have a
    risk factor right now as far as I am concerned, that allows our
    marines to get to a shore from 25 miles out.
        What I am saying, sir, is that I think the requirement is
    real. We have to be able to get some sort of surface skimming
    kind of capability that gets us to the beach and then, by the
    way, transitions into an armored fighting vehicle. It does push
    the edge of industry and of science in some regards to come up
    with that type of vehicle. But we are pressing hard. We would
    like to have it sooner rather than later.
        Senator Reed. Thank you. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
        Senator Martinez.
        Senator Martinez. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Good afternoon to all of you gentlemen and thank you for
    being here. I want to echo the other comments. I very much
    appreciate the service that all of you provide and I appreciate
    your also sliding your chairs to accommodate the last rung on
    the totem pole in this committee. [Laughter.]
        Admiral Mullen, I do want, in the absence of my colleague
    from Virginia, to go back to the issue of Mayport. I realize
    that we have in the past discussed the importance of a
    diversification of our fleet as well as the need for Mayport to
    be available as a nuclear port, and I very much appreciate all
    the work that is being done with the environmental study that
    needs to take place. The Secretary and I and of course you and
    I have also discussed this some, just re-emphasizing to me the
    importance that I think all of us agree that there is in having
    more than one carrier home port on the East Coast of the United
    States. I presume, Secretary and Admiral, that we still all are
    in agreement on that?
        It is kind of a question.
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, I sensed that. The strategic
    dispersion issue still is a very high priority. I think, as the
    Secretary indicated earlier in his testimony, we do need to get
    through the EIS to get to a record of decision.
        I want to emphasize that it is not just Mayport, but that
    part of our country--Kings Bay, Jacksonville, and Mayport--is a
    hub for us for lots of capabilities, surface ships, submarines,
    and aviation, as well as for our people and our families. So
    commitment to that hub, both in the near-term and in the long-
    term, is vital for us. We appreciate the support from you and
    your colleagues in letting us get through this in a measured
    way to make sure we get the decision right.
        Senator Martinez. We want to do it right, I understand that
    completely and am very supportive. Believe me that the
    Jacksonville area is a Navy town, and of course we are proud
    that Blount Island is there as well serving the Marines.
        There was a mention by Senator Inhofe about the Chinese
    capabilities. I was concerned when I learned about the incident
    regarding the Kitty Hawk that was shadowed by a Chinese Song-
    class diesel-powered submarine that went undetected until it
    was 5 miles from our ship. I wonder, Admiral, if you can tell
    me what your interpretation is of that event and how have we
    adjusted to that eventuality.
        Admiral Mullen. Senator, it very much got our attention. We
    did not expect it. We did not expect that submarine to be ``out
    of area.'' We follow that very closely. There were some
    indications and warnings that we need to go back and reassess
    how we do that.
        I spoke to this earlier. It is indicative that they are
    operating better. They clearly have a navy which is growing.
    They are learning. I do not consider them to be 10 feet tall,
    but it is back to this strategic intent and engagement and
    making sure that diplomatically we are engaged to ensure that
    there is no miscalculation.
        The importance of a strong naval presence in that part of
    the world, both Navy and Marine Corps, continues because of the
    stability needed there. So we are watching that very carefully.
    We did learn a lot. I really would not want to go into too much
    detail in an open hearing like this. We learned a lot and we
    have adjusted.
        Senator Martinez. That is important to know. But also I
    think your comments about strategic intent are vital and I
    think continued engagement is equally important.
        General Conway, I presume it was mentioned to you, but the
    Senate just voted to move forward with the MRAPs, which I know
    are very important to you, and we hope that those will be in
    production and on their way to help our men and women serving
    in harm's way as soon as possible.
        General Conway. I concur, sir, and thank you for the vote.
        Senator Martinez. Yes, sir. It was unanimous, you should
    know.
        Back to Florida and our needs and problems. There is
    continuing concern about the possibility of a migrant event
    from Cuba relating to the events taking place on the island.
    The Secretary and I have spoken about this. There continue to
    be questions and concerns. Mr. Secretary, I know that part of
    this responsibility is obviously Coast Guard, but I know there
    is an element of cooperation.
        I have spoken with Admiral Stavridis about this and I would
    like your take on the situation in terms of containing any
    attempt by Cuba to flood the United States with migrants.
        Secretary Winter. Sir, first of all I would like to give
    you the assurance that we have a very good working relationship
    with the Coast Guard there, and I have had the opportunity to
    review the latest status of plans in the event that such an
    event would occur. I think that we have a good plan to be able
    to deal with the matter. I think in this plan of action,
    obviously, the Navy is a supporting element to the Coast Guard,
    which would have the lead responsibility for it. I believe that
    all the elements that have been assessed we are in a position
    to be able to provide in a timely manner.
        Senator Martinez. We had an incident yesterday where a
    Haitian ship came ashore on one of our beaches right there in
    broad daylight. From time to time these incidents occur. I know
    it is a bit unnerving to Floridians as we worry about homeland
    security that a foreign vessel could come right to our shores
    undetected until we got a cell-phone call saying they are on
    the beach.
        Admiral, I realize that this is a shared responsibility
    with the Coast Guard, but what can you tell the people of
    Florida to reassure us that we are keeping a close eye on our
    shores and are reasonably protected?
        Admiral Mullen. It is a shared responsibility, and I want
    to echo what the Secretary said in terms of our relationship
    with the Coast Guard. It is particularly close with myself,
    Admiral Allen, and Admiral Stavridis. My components and Admiral
    Allen's have worked this very hard. So I am comfortable that we
    are prepared up to a point, but clearly there have been various
    estimates of if this were to occur how big the number might be,
    and I know that this has Admiral Stavridis' full focus.
        I think that, specifically regarding yesterday, we are not
    in a position to surveil every nautical mile of the Florida
    coast and the coasts throughout our country, on a daily basis.
    We have not had that focus. Clearly, if we receive indications
    that this starts to go on, we do have the availability to
    adjust, and so I would feel comfortable offering the assurance
    that we could certainly be more predictive. This had not
    happened in a while. If it is the first of many, I think we
    will know that in short order, and that would certainly cause
    us to adjust our resources.
        Senator Martinez. Admiral, I think it is clearly an
    isolated event. It is not something that we have been seeing
    lately and it was a surprise, I think, to all of us.
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
        Senator Martinez. The Government of Venezuela seems to be
    interested in obtaining submarines. Admiral Stavridis and I
    discussed this a few days ago when he was here testifying. They
    are in a very aggressive arms-purchasing mode. How do you think
    we should deal with this emerging concern? Obviously,
    submarines are not usually for defensive purposes only. So what
    do you make of the intentions of the Venezuelan government?
        Admiral Mullen. I am very mindful of it. It is a concern to
    me. I have seen what President Chavez has certainly indicated
    through his rhetoric. Not unlike some other state leaders, the
    rhetoric concerns me. What is the strategic intent here? I
    share your evaluation that submarines are not anything that I
    think we would need in this part of the world from that regard.
    Certainly I do not think there is any threat from us to
    Venezuela.
        His broader arms buildup, combined with the leverage that
    he has through his energy control, those are growing concerns.
    I am sure you spoke with Admiral Stavridis about this, but
    there is more of this going on in Latin America than there has
    been in the past. It is clear that Chavez is trying to align
    some other state leaders to him. So it really does have our
    attention.
        We will be, as a naval force, much more engaged than we
    have in the past. We are setting up a prototype or an
    experiment this year for global fleet station, which is an
    engagement level of activity. Clearly Admiral Stavridis has
    asked us for more capability, and I think we will continue to
    fill that.
        Senator Martinez. The intent behind my question is the fact
    that this is an area of new concern and one that I do not think
    we can overlook, particularly when the leadership of Venezuela
    seems to be interested in aligning himself with Iran, which we
    know would be a negative force.
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
        Senator Martinez. I thank you for the diplomatic message
    that you are sending with your forces in the Persian Gulf; and
    General, I also appreciate your response to the issue of
    training. I cannot imagine that you would send a marine into
    battle that was not properly trained. That is just something
    you would not do, correct?
        General Conway. Sir, no, we would not do that.
        Senator Martinez. That is why I do not take my time to ask
    you that kind of question. I presume that your good judgment
    would keep you there.
        Thank you very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony and for your
    service to the Nation. This concludes the hearing. Thank you.
    We are adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
                       military sealift command resources
        1. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, our ability to conduct operations
    in a foreign theater is reliant on our ability to move the equipment
    for our troops into the foreign theater of operations and then to
    sustain the troops in theater including redeployments. Military Sealift
    Command (MSC) assets are the primary way we move combat equipment into
    the theater of operations. With the Department of Defense's (DOD)
    change in policy regarding deployment schedules for our Active and
    Reserve Forces, can you describe what impact this may have on MSC's
    ability to support deployment schedules necessary to support Operation
    Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)? Please
    specifically address whether MSC has adequate resources for new
    deployment schedules, and indicate if they would need to contract for
    additional ships.
        Admiral Mullen. The MSC directly supports U.S. Transportation
    Command (TRANSCOM) which is responsible for the synchronization and
    interoperability of distribution-related activities supporting force
    projection, sustainment, and redeployment/retrograde of military forces
    and materiel. MSC has the resources to meet current demands.

        2. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, if the United States were to
    engage in a significant and extended conflict in another theater of
    operations (e.g., the Far East) while we are still engaged in the
    Middle East, would MSC have sufficient ships to handle deployments and
    redeployments in two theaters of operation at the same time? Again,
    please address whether they would have enough of their own ships, or if
    they would need to contract for additional ships.
        Admiral Mullen. The MSC directly supports TRANSCOM which is
    responsible for the synchronization and interoperability of
    distribution-related activities supporting force projection,
    sustainment, and redeployment/retrograde of military forces and
    materiel. Without understanding specific requirements, yet to be
    identified, it would be impossible to speculate on the adequacy of MSC
    resources to meet future demands.

                        sailors in nontraditional roles
        3. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, the Air Force indicated in a
    recent hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee that they
    have a significant number of airmen, who are performing work that is
    not normally performed by the Air Force in order to support OIF and
    OEF. These assignments are traditionally handled by our ground forces.
    It is my understanding that the Air Force has been requested to fulfill
    these nontraditional assignments due to shortages of available troops
    in the Army and the Marine Corps. How many of the sailors currently
    deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq are performing assignments which are
    traditionally non-Navy work?
        Admiral Mullen. The Joint Staff considers a full range of sourcing
    solutions across all Services and the Navy has optimized its force to
    support a wide range of mission areas. By leveraging core skills and
    providing tailored training, the Navy is able to provide the Joint
    Staff with a broader range of sourcing solutions including
    approximately 2,300 sailors that are currently executing traditional
    Army missions. The skills required to conduct these missions generally
    fall within the core competencies of many Navy ratings and officer sub-
    specialties. Each augmentee is further provided specific training to
    perform the mission assigned. Mission areas include Personal Security
    Detachments, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion support to Coalition
    Forces Land Component Command, counter rocket and mortar,
    communications, detainee operations (Camp Bucca), civil affairs,
    tactical UAV, interrogators, customs operations, and counter-improvised
    explosive devices (IED) electronic warfare.

        4. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, how many sailors are performing
    nontraditional assignments outside the U.S. Central Command area of
    responsibility due to shortages of troops?
        Admiral Mullen. The Navy is not currently supporting any
    nontraditional assignments due to shortages of troops outside the U.S.
    Central Command area of responsibility.

        5. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, is it anticipated that the Navy
    will need to continue providing resources to support these non-Navy
    functions in fiscal year 2008 and beyond?
        Admiral Mullen. Assuming that no new requirements are identified
    and the level of U.S. presence remains the same, we anticipate
    continuing to source current requirements through fiscal year 2008.

                               medical facilities
        6. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, in your statement, you state that
    you support the ongoing review of conditions at Walter Reed, and that
    the Navy Inspector General is separately evaluating the material
    condition and quality of service at each of the Navy's medical
    treatment facilities. Has there been any effort to integrate the
    solutions that the Army is initiating into the Navy's facilities in
    order to ensure consistency of care across the Services? This seems
    particularly important given the upcoming merger of Walter Reed and the
    National Naval Medical Center at Bethesda, Maryland.
        Admiral Mullen. Navy Medicine is currently participating in the
    Tricare Management Activity Health Facilities Steering Committee which
    is working on a common facility condition assessment process for all
    medical facilities across the DOD. The results of the Army's review and
    lessons learned will be used in the decisionmaking process of this
    committee.
        The material condition of all Navy medical facilities is monitored
    and reported using a centrally managed continuous inspection process.
    Facilities requirements identified during the inspection process are
    documented in a single web-accessible database. Centrally funded
    inspections by professional engineering teams are completed for all
    Class II Type 2 real property assets once every 3 years using a single
    inspection service provider and a common health care industry standard
    evaluation criteria which are consistent with all applicable codes and
    standards.

        7. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, Walter Reed has seen a
    significant increase in the number of patients due to the wars in
    Afghanistan and Iraq. Since the beginning of these wars, how much of a
    surge in casualties have the Navy's medical treatment facilities seen?
        Admiral Mullen. Since January 2003, 3,565 OEF/OIF Navy and Marine
    casualties have been evacuated from theater to Landstuhl Regional
    Medical Center (LRMC) and subsequently transferred to specialized
    continental United States (CONUS) Medical Centers and Combat Support
    Medical Treatment Facilities. Among these Medical Centers, Navy
    Military Treatment Facilities have received the following numbers of
    Navy and Marine Corps casualties: National Naval Medical Center (NNMC)
    Bethesda--1,214; NH Camp Pendleton--951; NH Camp Lejeune--727; NMC San
    Diego--513; and NMC Portsmouth--160.

        8. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, was the Navy able and did they
    absorb some of the surge in casualties from the Army?
        Admiral Mullen. Since March 2003, approximately 70 0EF/OIF Army
    casualties have been transferred from LRMC directly to NNMC Bethesda
    for treatment.

                   navy downsizing and marine corps increase
        9. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, in your statement, you address
    the downsizing of the Navy over the past couple of years and the
    additional decreases in end strength in fiscal years 2007 and 2008. It
    seems that many of the sailors in the Navy Active and Reserve
    components who are leaving the Service due to reductions in end
    strength may be quality candidates that are desirable for retention in
    military service. Since the Marine Corps and the Army are increasing
    their end strength in fiscal years 2007 and 2008, has there been any
    effort to look at potential candidates who may be interested in
    transferring to the Army or Marine Corps?
        Admiral Mullen. The Blue to Green program was established in
    October 2004 to generate Army enlistments for personnel separating from
    all other Services; however, there is not a similar program for the
    Marine Corps. On a monthly basis, Navy Personnel Command provides the
    Army access to sailors who will be separating from the Navy for the
    following reasons:

              - Involuntary separations under perform to serve
              - E-4 High Year Tenure
              - Sailors with less than 12 years of service who are opting
            to separate from the Navy

        The lists include sailors who are recommended for retention and
    evaluated as promotable, must promote, or early promote on most recent
    enlisted performance evaluation. The lists exclude individuals with
    discipline problems or substandard performance.
        Sailors are advised of the Army Blue to Green program by Navy
    Career Counselors at individual units and stations, on separation
    orders, and during the Transition Assistance Program classes.
        Army statistics reflected below show the number of sailors who have
    converted to the Army via this program:

        Enlisted: (as of 19 April 2007)

             101 Navy contracts in fiscal year 2007 (412 total
            since implementation).

        Officer: (as of 19 April 2007)

             11 Navy Officer interservice transfers in fiscal year
            2007 (119 total since implementation).

                    public vs. private shipyard efficiencies
        10. Senator Akaka. Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen, Admiral
    Mullen's statement says that the Navy needs Congress to ensure that
    legislation and policy support best business practices and
    efficiencies. It says that funding quotas for public Navy shipyards
    ``potentially'' diverts efficiency opportunities away from the private
    sector. I find this an interesting statement given the serious cost
    overruns with the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, and I find it
    hard to see how work being performed at public Navy shipyards
    potentially reduces ``efficiencies'' in the private sector. Please
    explain the connection between funding requirements for public Navy
    shipyards and private shipyard efficiencies.
        Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen. The Navy completed a Naval
    Shipyard Business Plan in February. This plan was created to determine
    the workload necessary to efficiently and effectively operate the four
    naval shipyards, while ensuring compliance with statutory requirements.
    The issue now emerging is a potential reduction in the overall Navy
    projected ship depot maintenance workload in fiscal year 2010 and
    beyond.
        Within this plan, there are several workload-shaping options that
    potentially reallocate work from the private ship repair/modernization
    vendor base, including an option to reduce subcontracted work from the
    public shipyards. There is also a potential for shifting nontraditional
    naval shipyard work to the naval shipyards only in those years
    necessary to comply with the 50/50 statute. By doing this, the Navy
    would potentially impact funding to the private sector vendor base,
    which may impact their incentive to make the investments to improve
    their efficiency in support of Navy workload.
        In order to mitigate these issues and motivate the private
    shipyards, the Navy has already begun several initiatives to focus on
    improving our ability to work with private repair and modernization
    shipyards. The initiatives range from a new contracting strategy to
    streamlining our business through Lean Six Sigma and new business
    practices.

        11. Senator Akaka. Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen, please
    explain what you believe would happen to our Navy shipyards if funding
    quotas were to be removed.
        Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen. If the statute for funding
    quotas (i.e., the 50/50 statute) were removed, the Navy would still
    need to comply with requirements for a core logistics capability. 10
    U.S.C. 2464 requires a core logistics capability (skills, processes,
    and infrastructure) that is government-owned and government-operated,
    to ensure a ready and controlled source of technical competence and
    resources necessary to ensure effective and timely response for all
    weapons systems. Naval shipyards have a critical role in repair and
    modernization, as they have specific areas of expertise that are not
    available at private yards (e.g., nuclear refueling and repairs of
    submarines). If workloads were reduced in these public shipyards, the
    expectation would be an increase in costs accompanied by a decrease in
    their efficiency and capacity.
        Maintaining the correct level of workload in the shipyards is
    critical to maintaining the capability and ensuring an efficient and
    effective use of taxpayer's money. The Navy just completed a Naval
    Shipyard Business Plan in February, which examined, in part, the issue
    of distributing work to the public shipyards to ensure compliance with
    statutory requirements and an effective use of the in-house capability.

                           marine corps end strength
        12. Senator Akaka. General Conway, you indicate in your statement
    that the proposed increase in Marine Corps Active component end
    strength to 202,000 marines will go a long way toward reducing the
    strain on the individual marines and the institution. This sounds like
    the Marine Corps still is not receiving enough resources. To bring the
    Marine Corps in line with an appropriate level of stress, both for the
    individual marines and for the institution, are 202,000 marines enough?
    Please consider the current operational tempo, and the DOD targets for
    deployment versus home time.
        General Conway. Yes, I believe 202,000 marines is the appropriate
    and achievable level to which the Marine Corps can grow quickly in the
    near-term while maintaining our high recruiting and retention
    standards.
        Our proposed end strength growth to 202,000 marines was based upon
    three main goals:

              1. Creation of three balanced Marine Expeditionary Forces
            capable of responding equally to combatant commander
            requirements
              2. Reduction of the strain on individual marines and their
            families, and prevention of a decrease in readiness
              3. Reduction of strain on the institution by strengthening
            our capacity to train to the range of skills necessary for
            combined-arms maneuver, mountain warfare, amphibious, and
            jungle operations

        Achievement of the 1:2 deployment-to-dwell target for all Active
    component forces will directly address goals 1 and 2.
        The President's recent OIF ``Plus Up'' has added a requirement for
    two additional Marine Corps infantry battalions and associated support
    to remain deployed in support of OIF. Resultantly, the DOD target of a
    1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio will not be met for many occupational
    specialties for the duration of ``Plus Up'' operations.

        13. Senator Akaka. General Conway, are 202,000 marines enough if we
    have to maintain the current tempo in the Middle East while being
    engaged in another significant conflict elsewhere in the world?
        General Conway. The 202,000 Marine Corps end strength request was
    derived from conditions prior to the surge in Iraq, and based on both
    the existing requirement and our known requirements for the future. It
    provides enough forces to allow us to achieve a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell
    ratio at pre-surge commitment levels. We believe that if called to
    respond to a second contingency a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio will
    provide the Marine Corps with enough trained and ready forces to
    adequately address any second contingency.

        14. Senator Akaka. General Conway, what are the assumptions used to
    determine the appropriate end strength for the Marine Corps?
        General Conway. Force requirements are based on demands determined
    by the DOD. For the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and
    associated Operational Availability 2006 study, these demands were
    provided in the Baseline Security Posture (BSP). The BSP provided
    numerous planning assumptions by specifying both the frequency and
    duration of events as well as force caps for each individual event.
        In addition to the assumptions contained in the BSR, two additional
    assumptions for determining end strength are:

              - Section 5063 of title X which states, ``The Marine Corps,
            within the Department of the Navy, shall be so organized as to
            include not less than three combat divisions and three air
            wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services
            as may be organic therein.''
              - The new force-planning construct that puts increased
            emphasis on defending against terrorist threats which requires
            less force capacity as well as a different capability set.

        15. Senator Akaka. General Conway, if the Marine Corps receives its
    full funding request, how long will it take to reset the force and
    bring Marine Corps readiness levels back to their pre-war levels while
    continuing to maintain the current operational tempo?
        General Conway. In total, the Marine Corps has received $10.2
    billion of the total $13.7 billion reset requirement. Of the remaining
    funding, $1.8 billion is executable in fiscal year 2008. After fiscal
    year 2008, additional funding is required for certain aviation
    procurement items with long lead times. Depot maintenance funding is
    also required at least 2 years beyond the end of hostilities to begin
    to fully repair equipment returning from Iraq and Afghanistan.
        There are a number of factors which cloud our ability to arrive at
    a precise point in time estimate for the total post-global war on
    terror reset costs. However, estimates range from 2 to 5 years to
    return the equipment from theater and conduct a complete depot rework
    for ground equipment. Some of the principal factors impacting the
    timing and costs of ground equipment depot rework include:

              1. Useful life remaining in equipment to be retrograded,
            which will dictate whether it is more cost effective to replace
            rather than repair.
              2. Availability, cost, and timing of sealift and/or
            commercial shipping assets to transport equipment back to
            CONUS.
              3. Degree to which depot throughput capacity can/should be
            expanded to address retrograde ``surge'' requirements.
              4. The ability, as well as cost and schedule implications, to
            transfer workload to either DOD, or commercial sources.

        Aviation asset depot repair costs are somewhat easier to project
    based upon the impact of flying hours and operational conditions on
    scheduled aircraft rework. The reset effort for Marine aviation assets
    will require upwards of 5 years according to current estimates. This
    time period is predicated on depot capacity and a prescheduled depot
    induction date for each aircraft.
                                     ______

             Questions Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton
              vh-71 ``marine one'' presidential helicopter program
        16. Senator Clinton. Secretary Winter and General Conway, the VH-71
    has conducted some initial flight tests simulating landing and take-off
    within confined landing zones. On January 13, 2007, Robert Kimble, VH-
    71 Deputy Program Manager, U.S. Navy, reported that these performance
    landing tests included White House lawn landings. How successful were
    these initial flight tests and landings?
        Secretary Winter and General Conway. The EH-101 Test Vehicle One
    (TV-1) Rotor Down Wash Flight Test Evaluation was successfully
    completed January 13, 2007. Tests were conducted, making a total of six
    approaches and departures to the White House south lawn, while building
    gross weights up to maximum of 32,000 lbs. All test objectives were
    successfully met.

        17. Senator Clinton. Secretary Winter and General Conway, are all
    of the test objectives being met?
        Secretary Winter and General Conway. The objectives of the TV-1
    Rotor Down Wash Flight Test Evaluation were successfully met.
    Additional testing will be conducted as the program continues
    development.

        18. Senator Clinton. Secretary Winter and General Conway, what
    adjustments in capabilities have been made as a result of these tests?
        Secretary Winter and General Conway. No adjustments to VH-71A
    capabilities were made as a result of the TV-1 Rotor Down Wash Flight
    Test Evaluation. It was a satisfactory test.

        19. Senator Clinton. Secretary Winter and General Conway, the VH-71
    program schedule has an October 2009 suspense to meet its objectives.
    Under the current operational testing schedule will this date be met?
        Secretary Winter and General Conway. Lockheed Martin is on contract
    to meet an initial operative capability (IOC) date of October 2009. The
    Navy is working closely with Lockheed Martin and the White House to
    achieve this aggressive program schedule.

        20. Senator Clinton. Secretary Winter and General Conway, what
    measures of performance and quality control checks are currently in
    place to meet this deadline?
        Secretary Winter and General Conway. The VH-71 Program is an
    Acquisition Category 1D Major Defense Acquisition Program and, per
    Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, provides all statutory,
    regulatory, and contract reporting information to accomplish program
    objectives. This information is assessed continuously against cost,
    schedule, and performance. It is reported up to the Milestone Decision
    Authority, the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and
    Logistics.
        In addition, acknowledging the imperative for leadership engagement
    to enable program success, the Navy has established a VH-71 Senior
    Leadership Council (SLC). The SLC, chaired by the Assistant Secretary
    of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition, and including
    White House Military Office and Director of Operational Test and
    Evaluation of the DOD membership, regularly reviews program progress
    and risk assessment updates. Through close oversight of the program's
    event-based activities, the SLC is empowered to recommend schedule
    adjustments as warranted. The Navy recognizes the fundamental tenets of
    safety, reliability, availability, and security as overriding concerns.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Mark L. Pryor
                    mine resistant ambush protected vehicles
        21. Senator Pryor. General Conway, the Mine Resistant Ambush
    Protected (MRAP) Vehicles have been shown to protect military personnel
    against IEDs, significantly reducing casualties. I cosponsored an
    amendment with my friend, Senator Joseph Biden, to procure an
    additional 2,500 MRAP Vehicles for our troops serving in combat
    overseas. How important is this vehicle to the Marine Corps, and do you
    believe that with maximum production capacity they can be operational
    by the end of the year?
        General Conway. Delivering the MRAP Vehicle into Al Anbar province
    is my number one unfilled warfighting requirement at this time. The
    MRAP Vehicle has a dramatically better record of preventing fatal and
    serious injuries from attacks by IED, the leading cause of all
    casualties in theater. Multi-National Forces-West estimates use of the
    MRAP Vehicles could reduce the casualties due to vehicle IED attack by
    as much as 80 percent.
        We have developed a joint acquisition strategy which maximizes the
    number of vendors involved, and as each successfully completes
    appropriate testing, will immediately ramp up the production to their
    maximum capacity. For example, one vendor presently being evaluated
    possesses a production capacity of 50 vehicles a month, but is capable
    of increasing to a minimum of 280 vehicles by December 2007. As vendors
    complete testing, the cumulative production capacity will be
    proportionate to the resources available for application. Assuming
    resources are not a constraining factor, Marine Corps Systems Command,
    designated as the Joint Program Executive Office, believes the entire
    joint requirement for 7,770 vehicles (to include the United States
    Marine Corps (USMC) requirement for 3,700 vehicles) can be produced by
    October 2008.

                                     mv-22
        22. Senator Pryor. General Conway, the MV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft is
    indeed a unique and vital air asset to compliment Marines engaged in
    battle. How has the MV-22 performed, and what is the Marine Corps' plan
    to operationally employ it in combat?
        General Conway. The MV-22 is the future of Marine Corps Assault
    Support Aviation. It will give the warfighter unprecedented aviation
    maneuver capability, and provides an exponential increase in
    survivability over legacy assault support aircraft. The MV-22 has
    successfully completed Operational Test and Evaluation and has met or
    exceeded all defined Key Performance Parameters (KPPs). Marines are
    transitioning legacy CH-46E squadrons to the MV-22 as we speak. The V-
    22, to date, has logged well over 27,000 flight hours and will flow
    seamlessly into our aviation infrastructure to support existing Marine
    Corps medium lift operational commitments.

                 biopersistent littoral combat ship insulation
        23. Senator Pryor. Secretary Winter, the LCS is a part of the
    Navy's shipbuilding strategy for the future. Are you familiar with the
    installation of a new insulating material in LCS-1 that is of a
    manufactured vitreous fiber found to be biopersistent?
        Secretary Winter. The Bureau of Navy Medicine and Surgery,
    specifically the Environmental Health Effects Laboratory and the Navy
    Environmental Health Center (NEHC), reviewed the safety of the
    MasterGlas insulating material used on LCS-1 in 2003 and concluded that
    use of the product would create no more risk than use of standard
    military specification fiberglass insulation. Manufactured in the
    United States, MasterGlas is in accordance with all worker health and
    safety laws and has been installed on commercial aircraft for decades.
        NEHC reviewed the February 9, 2007, Input/Output Module study,
    which was ordered and funded by the manufacturer of a competing
    material, InspecFoam. The study concluded that MasterGlas fibers may be
    more biopersistent than the MIL-I-742 Fiberglass Hullboard. This means
    that the fibers are not dissolved in body fluids nor cleared from the
    body as readily. However, the study did not take into consideration
    other factors, such as work processes, ventilation, personal protective
    equipment worn, thermal decomposition products, and others. In
    addition, this is single study has not been subjected to an independent
    scientific peer review process.
        MasterGlas insulation has been determined to be as safe as other
    fiberglass products currently in use by the Navy. Nonetheless, the Navy
    will carefully monitor its use.

        24. Senator Pryor. Secretary Winter, can you explain the decision
    to use this material?
        Secretary Winter. All shipbuilding programs use materials that have
    some risks. Naval Sea Systems Command uses established Federal, State,
    and local environmental and occupational safety and health regulations
    to establish baseline safety requirements for materials. Once materials
    satisfy the baseline safety requirements, they are considered
    acceptable for use on Navy ships. Shipbuilders then evaluate costs,
    weight, and performance to determine which materials are appropriate
    for which applications.
        The LCS program is an innovative shipbuilding effort. Marinette
    Marine Corporation, the shipbuilder for Lockheed Martin, has procured
    and is installing MasterGlas on LCS-1 based on its analysis of
    alternatives. MasterGlas is a lightweight, fiberglass insulation
    product manufactured in the United States that has been reviewed by the
    NEHC and found to as safe as other fiberglass insulation manufactured
    in the United States, given the same parameters of use and safe work
    procedures. Thus, MasterGlas has been shown to satisfy all established
    Navy, Federal, State, and local safety requirements and was
    appropriately selected for use on the LCS 1 based on cost, weight, and
    performance requirements.

        25. Senator Pryor. Secretary Winter, what steps is the Navy taking
    to address this situation?
        Secretary Winter. Since MasterGlas insulation has been determined
    to be as safe as other fiberglass products currently used by the Navy,
    its use will continue under careful monitoring. In addition, the Navy
    will respond promptly with appropriate Navy occupational safety and
    health guidance if any biopersistence rulemaking activity at the U.S.
    Occupational Safety and Health Administration leads to new regulations
    on this issue.

                              submarine detection
        26. Senator Pryor. Admiral Mullen, the Navy has submitted that
    ``submarines with improving stealth and attack capability--particularly
    modern diesel attack submarines--are proliferating worldwide at an
    alarming rate, and that locating these relatively inexpensive but
    extremely quiet boats present the Navy with a formidable challenge.''
    How are we countering this perceived threat?
        Admiral Mullen. Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) is one of the Navy's
    top warfighting priorities. The Navy has significantly increased the
    level of effort in ASW through fleet doctrine, tactics, and training
    initiatives, and through investments in platform and off-board sensors,
    ASW command and control, and weapons capability. Some of the new
    technologies are now entering the fleet, while others are still in
    development. The focus is to deliver these capabilities in sufficient
    quantities to meet combatant commander requirements while continuing
    research and development to identify new mid- to far-term capabilities.
    Some of the Navy's specific initiatives are detailed below.

             The Navy has implemented key warfighting guidance in
            ASW strategy and concept of operations (CONOPs) identifying
            capability requirements, doctrine, organization, training,
            materiel, education, personnel, and facilities that can fill
            the existing capability gaps. Major ASW platforms (Virginia
            Class SSN, P-8A Multi-Mission Aircraft, and MH-60R helicopter)
            reach IOC within the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).
            Additionally, there are planned improvements to the ASW command
            and control systems for current Navy P-3C aircraft to provide
            enhanced capabilities needed to detect, classify, identify,
            localize, and attack adversary submarines.
             The Navy has made significant headway in improving
            both acoustic and non-acoustic detection capabilities. Acoustic
            capabilities include the Improved Performance SONAR (IPS) and
            Scaled IPS (SIPS) system. Nonacoustic sensing technologies are
            progressing with airborne mine detection systems and Electro-
            Optic Passive ASW System (EPAS) experimentation. Progress has
            been achieved in the areas of Synthetic Aperture Sonar, Receive
            While Transmit Sonar, and Multi-static Active Detection at-sea
            tactical testing and development.
             The Navy is developing a networked sensor environment
            using automated, off-board systems increasing the area of
            coverage. The Navy continues to develop Distributed Netted
            Sensors. Three distributed systems have shown promise to
            transition to production criteria within the FYDP: Reliable
            Acoustic Path Vertical Line Array; the Deep Water Distributed
            Active System; and the Deployable Autonomous Distributed
            System.
             Near-term fleet requirements are addressed through
            development of the Surface Ship Periscope Detection Radar for
            Aircraft Carriers, with installation planned for all aircraft
            carriers within the FYDP. Similar periscope detection radar
            capability for cruiser-destroyer platforms is under research
            and development. False alarm reduction efforts are being
            implemented to enhance our surface ship mid-frequency active
            sonar capabilities. Major FORCEnet improvements occurring in
            the FYDP increase situational awareness and reduce the detect-
            to-engage timeline. In addition, the Navy is converting
            existing torpedoes (both heavyweight and lightweight) into more
            capable variants.
             The Navy is working on developing new torpedo defense
            systems to protect our ships. The Anti-Torpedo Torpedo is
            scheduled for installation on cruisers and destroyers beginning
            in fiscal year 2015. Other systems under development include Mk
            54 torpedo/Surface Ship Digital Fire Control Interface and
            acoustic countermeasures.
             ASW training has undergone a number of steps to
            sustain and improve our ASW proficiency. An integrated stair-
            step training approach has been adopted (simple to complex) for
            our ASW forces bringing together aviation, surface, subsurface,
            and other resources in a standardized training continuum. This
            integrated ASW training supports our Fleet Response Plan and
            includes the execution of major fleet exercises involving
            multiple strike groups and allied forces. This continuum
            incorporates standardized metrics to assess performance and
            provides rapid reconstruction and analysis that is fed back to
            Navy leadership and the operators.
             The Navy incorporates a number of training
            opportunities involving modern allied diesel submarines. Our
            integrated ASW training continuum through the Diesel Electric
            Submarine Initiative with South American navies and the use of
            the Swedish submarine Gotland has improved ASW proficiency
            against capable diesel submarines. Allied diesel submarine
            participation in U.S. fleet exercises such as WAC and Valiant
            Shield 2006 as well as exercises with our allies both in the
            Pacific and Atlantic theaters continue to benefit the Navy's
            ASW training efforts in diverse ocean environments.
             The Navy continues to promote international
            collaboration and global maritime partnerships through Ships
            ASW Effectiveness Readiness Measuring events with Japan, Korea,
            India, Pakistan, Russia, Germany, Denmark, Great Britain,
            Australia, Canada, Poland, Sweden, Italy, Turkey, and Spain.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
                              littoral combat ship
        27. Senator McCain. Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen, from an
    acquisition reform perspective, I have been very concerned about cost
    performance on the LCS program. Unfortunately, we are on a path which
    doubles the $220 million estimates for the first four LCSs. That is a
    serious problem for this program and an equally serious problem for all
    of Navy shipbuilding. As I mentioned in my opening statement, I
    appreciate your deliberate corrective actions in response to signs of
    breakage on this program. Can you provide the Navy's current cost and
    schedule estimate to complete the ships under contract?
        Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen. Detailed execution costs and
    timelines for LCS-1, -2, and -4 will be addressed within the scope of
    the briefings requested by Congress in coming weeks, and as part of the
    reprogramming request.

        28. Senator McCain. Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen, what is
    the magnitude of the delay and overrun?
        Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen. Details of the execution cost
    and schedule for LCS-1, -2, and -4 will be addressed within the scope
    of the revised briefings requested by Congress and as part of the
    reprogramming request.

        29. Senator McCain. Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen, why were
    the follow ships awarded to both shipbuilders when costs on the program
    had clearly risen to the extent that these ships were no longer
    affordable within the Navy's budget?
        Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen. Contract options were awarded
    for construction of LCS-3 in June 2006 and LCS-4 in December 2006 based
    on negotiated contract values and budget risk assessments conducted at
    the time of each award.

        30. Senator McCain. Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen, why did
    the Navy award the contract on LCS-1 before it finalized the Naval
    Vessel Rules (NVR) and had a clear picture of how those rules would
    impact costs?
        Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen. The Navy has been actively
    working with industry to incorporate and exercise oversight of NVR. In
    the Preliminary Design Phase Request for Proposal (RFP) issued February
    28, 2003, the LCS Industry Teams were required to team with American
    Bureau of Shipping (ABS) to aid in producing an acceptable design, and
    to conduct an early assessment of each design to gauge its ability to
    comply with the design rules that were under development at that time.
        The Preliminary Design RFP stated:

            ``It is the Government's intention that the Preliminary Design
            be evaluated by ABS and judged acceptable at that stage of
            design. This evaluation will be repeated at the end of Final
            System Design (FSD). It is also Government's intention to have
            the LCS classed by ABS at delivery. The Government understands
            that there is currently no complete set of U.S. approved rules
            applicable to LCS. The Government expects that the U.S. naval
            ship rules currently under development will be available prior
            to the award of FSD.''

        To provide advance insight into the required rules set, ABS issued
    a Draft Final Rules Matrix for LCS to the Industry Preliminary Design
    teams in October 2003. From January 2004 to May 2004, the Navy worked
    to finalize the first issue of NVR. This first edition NVR was released
    May 21, 2004, and immediately provided to the industry teams by ABS.
        The December 19, 2003, FSD Phase RFP reiterated the requirement for
    the ships to be delivered in class as a naval combatant ship in
    accordance with NVR. By the time of FSD contract award on May 28, 2004,
    the Industry Teams were aware of the February 3, 2004, draft NVR. Both
    teams inserted reference to the May 21, 2004, NVR in their approved
    Specified Performance Documents, thereby noting the NVR among the
    applicable requirements documents.
        With the continued and close interaction between each of the LCS
    industry teams and ABS during the refinement of the draft NVR, the Navy
    had confidence in the validity of cost data received from the industry
    teams at the time of contract award. The LCS industry teams have the
    opportunity to seek equitable adjustment for the cost incurred due to
    NVR, or any other contract change from the contract change order line.

        31. Senator McCain. Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen, although
    the LCS program has not established a formal cost baseline and
    therefore has not technically tripped a Nunn-McCurdy breach, the Nunn-
    McCurdy criteria regarding validity of requirements, validity of costs,
    and adequacy of management come into question. Does the Navy intend to
    come forward to Congress with the same degree of rigor commanded by the
    Nunn-McCurdy certification process prior to requesting support for
    further funding on this program?
        Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen. The Navy has and will continue
    to provide full and open disclosure of all LCS acquisition and
    financial actions to Congress including compliance with the formal
    rigor of the Nunn-McCurdy requirements. Using a root cause analysis
    methodology and the expertise of the Program Management Assist Group,
    the Secretary of the Navy has recertified the LCS requirements base and
    taken action to ensure that program management entities are equipped
    for success. Cost details will be addressed within the scope of the
    briefings requested by Congress, and as a part of the reprogramming
    request.

        32. Senator McCain. Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen, since the
    Navy's estimates indicate that both Lockheed Martin and General
    Dynamics appear to be experiencing the same degree of cost growth on
    their first ships, why has the Navy only taken corrective action with
    Lockheed Martin?
        Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen. The decision to take action to
    control cost growth on the Lockheed Martin LCS contract was based on
    deteriorating cost performance following the launch of LCS-1 coupled
    with evidence of escalating cost growth on their second ship, LCS-3.
    The Navy has determined specific programmable cost growth thresholds
    for the General Dynamics program. These thresholds have not yet been
    communicated publicly to ensure the integrity of the competition
    throughout the completion of contract execution. Should General
    Dynamic's cost growth exceed these thresholds, the Navy is prepared to
    take comparable measures with General Dynamics as were taken with
    Lockheed Martin to control the costs of this program.

        33. Senator McCain. Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen, since both
    shipbuilders' designs reportedly meet your requirements, it would
    appear that it would be most affordable to downselect as soon as
    possible and compete the winning design. What are the Navy's plans for
    singling up on a design and opening up competition for construction?
        Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen. Details of the Navy's plans to
    down-select to a single design will be addressed within the scope of
    the revised LCS Acquisition Strategy. It is the Navy's intent to
    conduct an operational assessment of the Lockheed Martin and General
    Dynamics designs in fiscal year 2009, and then down-select to a single
    design based on demonstrated performance and other relevant factors.
    Lessons learned will be incorporated from all aspects of program
    execution, and a full and open competition for the selected design will
    be initiated in fiscal year 2010. Under this plan, fiscal year 2010 is
    the earliest opportunity for down-select.

        34. Senator McCain. Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen, Congress
    imposed a $220 million cost cap for the fifth and sixth ships of the
    class to impose cost discipline. These ships may now be the ships
    requested with the fiscal year 2008 budget. How does the Navy plan to
    bring these ships' costs in line with the cost cap to allow Congress to
    consider support for this request or a future request?
        Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen. The fifth ship cost threshold
    will need to be adjusted, and it will be addressed within the scope of
    the briefings requested by Congress, and as a part of the reprogramming
    request.

            reducing aircraft carrier force structure from 11 to 10
        35. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, the Navy's fiscal year 2008
    budget proposes reducing the aircraft carrier force from 11 to 10
    operational aircraft carriers. This is the lowest aircraft carrier
    force since the 1930s. Reducing aircraft carrier force structure while
    potential competitors are continually increasing their capabilities
    raises serious questions regarding the Navy's ability to sustain the
    level of readiness required by its own maritime strategy. What detailed
    planning has the Navy conducted to ensure the ability to surge up to 6
    aircraft carriers within 30 days of a crisis if the Navy drops to 10
    aircraft carriers?
        Admiral Mullen. The Navy is requesting authorization from Congress
    to allow the Navy to temporarily operate with a 10-carrier force
    starting in November 2012, with the decommissioning of U.S.S.
    Enterprise (CVN-65), and ending in September 2015 when Gerald R. Ford
    (CVN-78) is delivered, a period of 34 months. We have conducted risk
    analysis for this period, balancing projected demands with projected
    operations and maintenance (O&M) schedules, and determined the risk to
    be acceptable, although moderate. Moderate risk is characterized by a
    greater than 50 percent likelihood that assets would arrive later than
    planned, but without negative impact on the ultimate outcome of the
    conflict. It should be noted that the Navy has always and will always
    take extraordinary measures to put the necessary force to sea in a time
    of national emergency.
        We looked at several strategies during our risk analysis, including
    maintaining the U.S.S. Enterprise (CVN-65), as well as impacts that any
    change to operational and maintenance schedules might have on our surge
    capability.
        Our risk analysis determined that the 10-carrier option, from a
    technical, fiscal, and risk perspective, leverages the flexibility
    available in our O&M schedules to manage the moderate but acceptable
    risk during the period of concern. During the 34-month period in
    question, the Navy can maintain (when averaged over a year) the ability
    to surge up to six carriers with 30 days of a crisis, with no quarter
    providing less than five carriers able to surge within 30 days.
    Detailed analysis of this option is ongoing, to include the technical
    risks, cost impacts, and the timing for decision points for changes in
    the operational and maintenance schedules.
        Our need for this legislation should in no way be mistaken for any
    change to our long-term carrier strategy. We remain committed to the
    requirement for an 11-carrier force and have no analysis that would
    indicate anything less than 11 carriers as acceptable for an extended
    period of time. Our sustainment and acquisition programs are aligned
    with this strategy. In fact, the 30-year shipbuilding plan represents
    our ongoing efforts to balance warfighting capability requirements and
    affordability with industrial base capacity. A minimum 11-carrier force
    structure is central to this plan.

        36. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, if the Navy retires the U.S.S.
    Enterprise instead of extending her service, what are the Navy's
    options to maintain an 11 aircraft carrier force structure until U.S.S.
    Gerald Ford (CVN-78) is operationally available--expected in 2017?
        Admiral Mullen. The Navy remains committed to the requirement for
    an 11-carrier force and has no analysis that would indicate anything
    less than 11 carriers is acceptable for an extended period of time. Our
    sustainment and acquisition programs are aligned with this strategy. In
    fact, the 30-year shipbuilding plan represents our ongoing efforts to
    balance warfighting capability requirements and affordability with
    industrial base capacity. A minimum 11-carrier force structure is
    central to this plan. However, following the retirement of U.S.S.
    Enterprise (CVN-65) in November 2012, the Navy would be operating with
    a 10-carrier force until U.S.S. Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) is delivered in
    September 2015, a period of 34 months.
        The Navy conducted a risk analysis of this period, looking at
    several strategies as part of that analysis. The first strategy
    investigated keeping Enterprise operational from 2013 to 2016. Keeping
    Enterprise operational from 2013 to 2016 would cost approximately $1.7
    billion. This option will also require significant maintenance work and
    shipyard time beginning in fiscal year 2008. Enterprise has already
    experienced the effects of aging ship systems and degrading material
    condition, due in part to the ship being 46 years old, though she was
    designed with a 30-year design life. This has led to lost operational
    availability due to unplanned work growth following her fiscal year
    2002 and fiscal year 2004 maintenance periods. Both shipyard periods
    were extended by over 110 days and incurred cost growth totaling over
    $120 million. The material condition is expected to worsen as the ship
    ages, leading to significant material deficiencies requiring expensive
    and time-consuming repair.
        At 50 years, Enterprise has a very complex, manpower intensive,
    engineering plant. There are a number of components that are near the
    end of their design service life, and many of these are at that point
    as a result of having been exposed to high-density neutron fluxes over
    extended periods of time. This exposure makes the metal more brittle
    and limits the range through which the plant can be operated. The Navy
    understands the failure mechanisms involved. However, while no design
    safety limits will be violated if Enterprise was extended to 2015, the
    Navy would be rapidly approaching her design margin limitations in
    these areas.
        Navy also evaluated maintaining the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk (CV-63) in a
    mobilization status. Additionally, Kitty Hawk will be 47 years old when
    she is decommissioned in September 2008, an impressive accomplishment
    considering she was designed for a 30-year service life. She will also
    be our last fossil-fueled carrier. Reactivation of a ship the size and
    complexity of an aircraft carrier is estimated to take 24-30 months,
    making this option infeasible for the relatively short timeframe
    considered. It would also be costly, increasing the planned
    inactivation availability costs by $20 million and adding reactivation
    costs on the order of $500 million. Remanning would also pose
    significant costs and challenges. The current process would have her
    remanned in 12-18 months, at a cost of $400 million, but the challenges
    in filling many of the billets, including propulsion plant operators,
    are significant, and would negatively impact manning across the fleet.
        The analysis also looked at another strategy that would maintain
    Kitty Hawk in a mobilization status that would support reactivation in
    a 12-18 month timeframe. Again, the challenges were similar. The
    additional service life would remain a concern. The costs to inactivate
    would increase by $35 million, and the annual cost to maintain that
    condition would increase by $450,000 to about $700,000 per year.
    Reactivation costs are estimated at $450 million and remanning costs at
    $210 million. Again, the challenges in remanning specific skilled
    personnel would be significant and would impact across the fleet.
        The risk analysis determined that our most feasible option, from a
    technical, fiscal, and risk perspective, is to leverage the flexibility
    available in our O&M schedules, to manage the moderate but acceptable
    risk during the period of concern. Detailed analysis of this option is
    ongoing, to include the technical risks, cost impacts, and the timing
    for decision points.

        37. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, does the National Military
    Strategy reflect a 10-aircraft carrier force structure? If not, does
    this concern you?
        Admiral Mullen. The National Military Strategy does not specify a
    force level for the Nation's aircraft carrier fleet. However, the 2007
    National Defense Authorization Act requires a force level of 11
    aircraft carriers. The Navy is currently seeking congressional relief
    to reduce the number of aircraft carriers to 10 for a period of 33
    months, from 2013 to 2015, to accommodate the decommissioning of U.S.S.
    Enterprise in November 2012 and the commissioning of the U.S.S. Gerald
    R. Ford in September 2015. The Navy has conducted risk analysis that
    balances projected demands with projected O&M schedules, and has
    determined the risk to be acceptable, although moderate.
        While I am not concerned that the National Military Strategy does
    not specify a level for our aircraft carrier force, the Navy remains
    committed to the requirement for an 11-carrier force structure and has
    no analysis that would indicate anything less than 11 operational
    carriers is acceptable for an extended period of time. The Navy's PB08
    Long Range Plan for the Construction of Naval Vessels represents our
    ongoing efforts to balance warfighting capability requirements and
    affordability with individual base capacity. A minimum of 11
    operational carriers is central to this plan and provides the coverage
    necessary for support of the combatant commanders without unduly
    burdening the remaining 10 carriers. Return to at least 11 operational
    carriers in fiscal year 2016 is necessary to alleviate this short
    period (fiscal years 2013-2014) where carrier force structure is below
    the minimum.

                                navy fighter gap
        38. Senator McCain. Secretary Winter, Admiral Mullen, and General
    Conway, on March 22, Admiral Bruce Clingan, Director, Air Warfare
    Division Headquarters, U.S. Navy, testified before the House Armed
    Services Committee that the current naval tactical aviation procurement
    strategy has created a strike fighter shortfall that will extend
    through the next decade. The shortfall is derived from current and
    projected inventory compared to requirements. Current Navy projections
    show legacy strike fighter shortfalls ranging from about 50 aircraft to
    more than 200, depending on the service life extension for F/A-18
    aircraft (10,000 or 9,000 hours) and the F-35 (Joint Strike Fighter
    (JSF)) buy rate (50 or 35 per year beginning in fiscal year 2014).
    Admiral Clingan's testimony raises some important questions. First, the
    difference between 50 and ``more than 200'' is significant and, in
    either case, troubling. Isn't expecting a 10,000 flight hour service
    life extension on legacy model Hornets overly-optimistic (considering
    its original design service life was 6,000 hours)?
        Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen. The ongoing Service Life
    Assessment Program (SLAP) that is analyzing fatigue life of the F/A-18
    A/B/C/D is 73 percent complete, and initial indications are very
    promising. Based on data collected to date, a significant portion of
    the airframe can be extended from the design limit of 6,000 flight
    hours out to 10,000 flight hours without modification. This is due to
    an excess strength margin and fleet utilization being less than the
    limits to which the airframe was designed and tested.
        SLAP will be complete in December 2007 and will provide the
    analysis necessary to develop the inspections and modifications
    required to extend the F/A-18
    A/B/C/D service life out to 10,000 hours.
        General Conway. The original design life of 6,000 hours for the F/
    A-18 series aircraft has already been increased to 8,000 hours through
    inspections. Studies underway for the past year to determine the
    feasibility of extending that limit to 10,000 hours have demonstrated
    positive indications. We anticipate release of this study in December
    of this year.

        39. Senator McCain. Secretary Winter, Admiral Mullen, and General
    Conway, additionally, isn't a buy rate of 50 F-35 aircraft in fiscal
    year 2014 also unrealistic given the Chief of Naval Operations' (CNO)
    goal of achieving a 313-ship Navy and our fiscally constrained
    environment?
        Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen. The Navy believes that this
    buy rate is challenging but achievable based on current acquisition
    plans and continued congressional support. In order to recapitalize
    Navy strike fighters, it is imperative to begin procurement of F-35s at
    a rate which will minimize the projected inventory shortfall, as well
    as maintain F-35 affordability via economical production rates.
        General Conway. The buy rate of 50 F-35s per year will have to be
    balanced against completing requirements within the Navy's defense
    budget to reach the best balance of capabilities across our warfighting
    functions. The USMC TACAIR shortfall and transition to the F-35B is a
    high priority that will need to be adequately addressed to assure our
    ability to divest legacy aircraft that are at the end of their service
    life.

        40. Senator McCain. Secretary Winter, Admiral Mullen, and General
    Conway, more fundamentally, if current assumptions prove overly
    optimistic, what steps is the Navy taking to address what could be a
    catastrophic short-fall in naval tactical air (TACAIR) capabilities?
        Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen. The Navy's strategy in the
    President's 2008 budget invests in 28 additional F/A-18 E/F aircraft,
    maintains the JSF Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) IOC at
    2012, and completes SLAP on the F/A-18 A/B/C/D by December 2007. These
    28 additional F/A-18 E/Fs maintain the production line for an
    additional year and allow for the current SLAP study to provide
    information for Navy decisions during the Program Objective Memorandum
    (POM) 2010 process. Refined analysis will provide options for a more
    complete strategy to mitigate or resolve from a holistic tactical
    aviation perspective.
        General Conway. The Marine Corps is managing our TACAIR
    capabilities shortfall on two fronts. First, we are committed to
    sustaining the current legacy TACAIR force through service life
    extension of our F/A-18 fleet and incremental upgrades of our AV-8B
    fleet to ensure we are consistently able to respond to our operational
    commitments. Second, we are placing a number of our TACAIR squadrons in
    cadre status and reinvesting those aircraft into remaining squadrons in
    order to ensure our remaining squadrons have adequate numbers of
    aircraft on the flight line.

        41. Senator McCain. Secretary Winter, Admiral Mullen, and General
    Conway, does Navy leadership think this is an appropriate level of
    risk, placed in the appropriate area of its budget?
        Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen. Based on best analysis of
    complex competing priorities, Navy leadership feels that the budget
    submittal contains an appropriate level of risk, placed appropriately
    within the budget.
        General Conway. At this point, the Marine Corps has planned for and
    feels the risk in TACAIR shortfalls is manageable. It is critical to
    note, though, that any further slide in the F-35B IOC coupled with a
    shallowing of the F-35B procurement profile will introduce increased
    risk threaten USMC ability to meet future TACAIR operational
    commitments.

                    relocation of marine corps units to guam
        42. Senator McCain. Secretary Winter and General Conway, the Navy
    has been assigned executive oversight over the planned relocation of
    over 8,000 U.S. marines from the Island of Okinawa to Guam within the
    next 6 years. This move is estimated to cost the United States over
    $4.3 billion just to provide facilities and infrastructure on Guam for
    our marines and their families. The Japanese Government will also share
    the costs of over $6.0 billion for additional facilities and housing.
    The DOD Inspector General released a preliminary report on March 12,
    2007, estimating that, in addition to the capital investment already
    mentioned, the move would add operations and readiness expenses of over
    $460.0 million annually to the Navy budget. This was a Marine Corps
    estimate. Currently, this cost is not captured in the FYDP accompanying
    the President's budget request for fiscal year 2008. Do you believe
    these cost estimates are accurate?
        Secretary Winter and General Conway.
        a. Facilities and Infrastructure - The $10.3 billion facilities and
    infrastructure estimate was made using standard assumptions, planning
    factors, and DOD estimating methods and sources such as the Unified
    Facilities Criteria and Naval Facilities P-80 data. Final project costs
    will depend on how closely the actual requirements and implementation
    tracks with the original planning assumptions. Additionally, the $10.3
    billion estimate does not include a number of ancillary costs that were
    not part of the negotiated agreement. Some examples include full
    training development in the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas
    Islands (CNMI), inter- and intra-theatre mobility, actual relocation
    costs of our personnel, and facility furnishings. We continue to refine
    these initial estimates.
        b. Operations and Maintenance - The O&M estimates were based on the
    best information and assumptions available. These estimates are
    reasonable for initial budget estimating purposes and are anticipated
    to be in line with O&M costs at other USMC installations. Although
    itemized costs are expected to be similar to typical USMC installation
    O&M costs, we expect overall USMC expenses to increase irrespective of
    where units are relocated. This is due to discontinued Host Nation
    support as our forces move from Japan. Several costs which were
    previously borne by the Government of Japan (GOJ) will become the
    responsibility of the U.S. Government including: installation labor
    under the Master Labor Contract, Utilities, Host Nation replacement
    construction funding, and Housing. Housing costs no longer covered by
    GOJ will become an annual Basic Allowance for Housing or Overseas
    Housing Allowance bill for USMC to pay.

        43. Senator McCain. Secretary Winter and General Conway, with
    significant competing budget priorities for the Marine Corps, most
    notably the increase in end strength, can the Navy afford the move to
    Guam?
        Secretary Winter.
        a. The Navy can afford to pay its share of the cost within current
    top line budget controls. According to the negotiated agreement between
    Japan and the United States, Japan will pay up to $6.1 billion of the
    estimated $10.3 billion cost to relocate about 8,000 marines from
    Okinawa. The current FYDP includes $2.5 billion across the fiscal year
    2008 through fiscal year 2013 timeframe as the Navy's share to support
    the relocation of the marines from Okinawa. The remaining
    implementation cost will be addressed beyond the FYDP.
        b. Costs to move these marines and their families from Japan to
    Guam should be borne in light of several key factors.

              (1) Our presence in the Western Pacific is of immense
            strategic value and is vital to U.S. Government interests.
            Timely response to crises, as well as the goodwill and trust
            built by constant exercises and operations with our partner
            nations in the Pacific, makes our forward presence
            irreplaceable. Locating marines in Guam allows us to continue
            to meet these strategic imperatives. Location is everything, as
            it buys us precious time to quickly respond and allows us to
            respond using locally based forces and organic mobility.
              (2) The GOJ has agreed to pay $6.1 billion of the estimated
            $10.3 billion cost to move the marines specifically to Guam.
            Relocation to other locations (e.g. Hawaii or CONUS) may not
            come with the same GOJ commitment of funding, and could thereby
            increase the cost to the U.S. taxpayer.
              (3) In addition to the $6.1 billion that our Japanese allies
            have committed toward building a new base in Guam, they are
            making other contributions as well. These include rebuilding,
            modernizing, and helping as we realign our forces on Okinawa
            and in Japan, at an expected cost of an additional $20 billion.

        c. The advantages of a long-term strategic relationship weigh
    favorably against the monetary costs of this endeavor.
        General Conway. According to the negotiated agreement between Japan
    and the United States, Japan will pay up to $6.1 billion of the
    estimated $10.2 billion cost to relocate about 8,000 marines from
    Okinawa. The current FYDP includes $2.5 billion across the fiscal year
    2008 through fiscal year 2013 timeframe as the Department of Navy's
    share to support the relocation of the Marines from Okinawa. The
    remaining implementation cost will be addressed beyond the FYDP.
        Costs to move these marines and their families from Japan to Guam
    must be considered in light of several factors.

              1. Our presence in the Western Pacific, our daily living and
            operating, is of an immense strategic value and is vital to
            U.S. Government interests. Timely response to crises, as well
            as the goodwill and trust built by constant exercises and
            operations with our partner nations in the Pacific, makes our
            forward presence irreplaceable. Locating Marines in Guam allows
            us to continue to meet these strategic imperatives. Location is
            everything, as it buys us precious time to quickly respond and
            allows us to respond using locally based forces and organic
            mobility.
              2. The GOJ has agreed to pay $6.1 billion of the estimated
            $10.3 billion cost to move the marines specifically to Guam.
            Relocation to other locations (.e.g. Hawaii or CONUS) may not
            come with the same GOJ commitment of funding, and could thereby
            increase the cost to the U.S. taxpayer. When we discuss Guam,
            we must keep this in mind, this relocation bill will still need
            to be paid, even if these forces move somewhere else.
              3. We should keep in mind that in addition to the $6 billion
            that our Japanese allies have committed for building a new base
            in Guam, they are additionally rebuilding, modernizing, and
            helping us as we realign our forces on Okinawa and in Japan, at
            an expected cost of an additional $20 billion. While the
            current effort will be expensive, it would be significantly
            more expensive if we were to attempt this enterprise alone. The
            advantages of a long-term stable relationship weigh favorably
            against the monetary costs of this endeavor.

        44. Senator McCain. Secretary Winter and General Conway, when will
    a master plan be developed detailing the military construction (MILCON)
    and housing projects to be required for the Marine Corps forces?
        Secretary Winter. The contract to develop the Guam master plan was
    awarded in January 2007. The final plan is expected to be complete in
    July 2008.
        General Conway. The Guam Master Plan is due to OSD by September
    2008.

        45. Senator McCain. Secretary Winter and General Conway, assuming
    the Navy maintains its current level of facility investment in the rest
    of its installations, where is the Department going to get an
    additional $4 billion for construction on Guam and what other
    priorities will be deferred?
        Secretary Winter and General Conway. The current FYDP includes $2.5
    billion across the fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2013 timeframe
    as the Navy's share to support the relocation of the Marines from
    Okinawa to Guam. Maintaining this level of funding beyond the FYDP
    would allow the Navy to address the remaining implementation cost
    without the need to defer other priorities.

        46. Senator McCain. General Conway, what is your perspective on the
    impact of the move to Guam on the Marines?
        General Conway. The USMC is working with the Commander, U.S.
    Pacific Command and our senior leadership in DOD to ensure our service
    remains relevant to our Nation's military requirements in the Asia-
    Pacific region. III Marine Expeditionary Force units and other U.S.
    military forces currently conduct mission essential training in Guam
    and the CNMI. We expect that USMC air, ground, and logistics training
    will continue in the future and potentially expand with our planned
    relocation to Guam. We envision a series of training areas in this
    region where we will be able to adequately train to the majority of our
    combat and non-combat related missions. For the remaining training
    requirements, we will look at innovative opportunities to train with
    our allies and partner nations.

        47. Senator McCain. General Conway, what is the cumulative effect
    of this relocation on the Marines' ability to provide adequate forces
    for regional conflicts?
        General Conway. [Deleted.]

               total costs to grow the force for the marine corps
        48. Senator McCain. General Conway, regarding the costs to grow the
    Active-Duty Marine Corps to 202,000 marines by 2011, you mention in
    your opening statement that the Marine Corps has requested funds in the
    fiscal year 2007 Emergency Supplemental to start constructing the
    facilities and equipping three new infantry battalions totaling over
    4,000 troops. The fiscal year 2008 President's budget request includes
    over $4.3 billion for military pay, training, recruiting, equipment,
    and other costs dedicated to growth of the force. Do you have an
    estimate of total investment required in equipment, facilities, and
    increased operating expenses to complete the growth to 202,000 marines?
        General Conway. The total estimated fiscal years 2008-2013 cost to
    grow the Marine Corps by 27,000 was initially calculated at $30.8
    billion. That amount was reflected in our fiscal years 2008-2013
    President's budget submission. Within that amount, $7.025 billion was
    for the procurement of equipment, $3.230 billion was for MILCON and
    family housing projects, and $620.6 million was for additional base
    operating expenses.

        49. Senator McCain. General Conway, will the Marine Corps be
    seeking these costs as an increase to the Marine Corps top-line, or do
    you anticipate the Marine Corps will have to shed or defer existing
    requirements?
        General Conway. The fiscal year 2008 President's budget request
    provides funding for the increase in USMC end strength with an
    increased topline. The budget provides funding for the end strength
    increase without a negative financial to any USMC functions.

                   declining investment for base sustainment
        50. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, in the President's budget
    request for fiscal year 2008, the Navy proposes to reduce the amount
    dedicated to the sustainment of Navy facilities by over $330 million in
    order to cover other budget shortfalls. This account has historically
    been raided to pay for other bills, leading to a perpetual deferment of
    critical readiness requirements. This is the account used to repair
    leaking roofs, remove mold from walls, repair deteriorated runways and
    piers, and ensure that the facilities our sailors and marines live and
    work in are safe, secure, and in good condition. In light of all the
    recent attention to the impact of deteriorated facilities on the morale
    and well-being of our military personnel, why is the Navy willing to
    underfund this account?
        Admiral Mullen. The resources contained in the Navy's fiscal year
    2008 budget help us support the joint war on terrorism, sustain our
    combat readiness, and provide quality services and benefits for our
    sailors and their families. However, persistent high tempo operations
    related to the global war on terrorism and attaining our shipbuilding
    and aircraft procurement objectives continue to stretch the Navy's
    limited resources. The resultant pressurized Navy top-line and
    competing readiness account priorities result in an underfunded
    Facility Sustainment account. In fiscal year 2004, fiscal year 2005,
    and fiscal year 2006, we transferred $504 million, $195 million, and
    $216 million, respectively, from Facility Sustainment to Base Operating
    (BOS) accounts in order to fund civilian personnel salaries, utilities,
    contracts, and to provide minimum levels of service. In anticipation of
    the Facility Sustainment appropriation being provided under the fiscal
    year 2007 Military Construction Appropriations Bill (QOL/NA) vice the
    Operations and Maintenance Appropriations Bill, we aligned SRM funds to
    meet BOS must-fund requirements, and decreased the Sustainment account
    $179 million in fiscal year 2008. Sustainment is funded at 95 percent
    of the OSD goal (Facility Sustainment Model) in fiscal year 2007 and
    PB08 requests 83 percent of the OSD goal. Concerned about this risk, I
    requested an additional $240 million for Facility Sustainment as my #10
    priority on my POM-08 Unfunded Programs List to raise the fiscal year
    2008 sustainment rate to 100 percent of the OSD goal.

        51. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, how long can the Navy continue
    this risk before seeing real consequences in terms of reduced readiness
    and affected daily operations?
        Admiral Mullen. Regretfully, we are already seeing the effects of
    underfunding the Facilities Sustainment account in quality of life and
    limited daily operations. For example, the inability to adequately fund
    sustainment of waterfront facilities has resulted in quay walls,
    wharves, and piers in the Southwest, Mid-Atlantic, Guam, and Hawaii
    Navy Regions approaching failure and has directly impacted the movement
    of ships in and out of port. Naval Station Pearl Harbor currently has a
    restoration backlog of over $67 million on critical waterfront
    facilities. Lack of maintenance on heating and air-conditioning systems
    has also resulted in a lowered quality of life for our sailors who
    experience intermittent loss of heating and cooling in their work and
    living spaces.
        We seek to achieve the service life of our facilities. This
    requires sufficient/sustained preventive and condition-based
    maintenance funding. Over the past several budget cycles, we have
    executed approximately 82 percent of the funding requirement. As a
    result, we expect to see a reduction in service life and adverse
    impacts on mission and quality of life. A key focus of my POM-10
    deliberations will be to develop a shore infrastructure capital
    investment program that will arrest the decay in our shore
    infrastructure and realize the expected facility service life to meet
    mission and quality of life demands.

        52. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, do you agree that deferring
    maintenance and repairs to critical infrastructure and facilities will
    just make the problem harder and more expensive to fix down the road?
        Admiral Mullen. Yes. The Navy's average sustainment rate across the
    FYDP is 81 percent. The Navy is taking manageable risk in order to fund
    other priorities, while recognizing that continued lower levels of
    sustainment will generate higher costs for restoration and
    modernization in later years.

                   marine corps amphibious lift requirements
        53. Senator McCain. General Conway, the Marine Corps has held a
    longstanding requirement for the Navy to provide amphibious lift for
    three Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) to support forcible entry
    operations. I notice in your statement this year that you are now
    calling for two brigades to perform such an assault. What was the basis
    for the Marine Corps' determination to reduce assault echelon (AE)
    requirements for an opposed landing?
        General Conway. The Marine Corps has not reduced AE requirements
    for an opposed landing. What has been reduced is the total amphibious
    lift requirement for AE-capable forces. The basis for the 3.0 MEB AE
    fiscally constrained to 2.5 MEB AE requirement noted in this question
    was documented in the Navy's 1992 Posture Statement signed by Secretary
    of the Navy, CNO, and CMC, and is quoted in part, as follows:

              For a global ready response capability and forward presence,
            the Nation needs a tailored force with at least enough
            amphibious ships to lift the AEs of 2.5 brigade-size units.
            This allows the Navy and Marine Corps to meet current
            requirements for the forward deployed forces and still provide
            sufficient surge capability to assemble a brigade-size
            amphibious assault force in either the Atlantic or Pacific.
            This fiscally constrained goal meets the Nation's minimum
            requirements.

        As noted above, the total requirement identified in the 1992
    statement was for 2.5 MEB AE lift capacity, and the forcible entry
    component of that requirement was two brigade-size amphibious assault
    forces--one on each coast--totaling the same as today's stated
    requirement for 2.0 MEB AE.
        The current requirement for 2.0 MEB AE is traced to the Strategic
    Planning Guidance (SPG), directing us to ``. . . consider capability
    alternatives . . . to support a single two MEB forcible entry
    operation.'' Although the language in today's SPG is different than in
    the 1992 statement, the requirement to maintain a 2.0 MEB forcible
    entry capability remains the same.

        54. Senator McCain. General Conway, what changes have occurred
    regarding the threat or Marine Corps doctrine that provides confidence
    that this reduced assault force is right-sized for major combat
    operations?
        Admiral Mullen. The global threat and Marine Corps doctrine have
    not changed appreciably in the past several years. Greater emphasis has
    been placed on dispersed, global terrorist networks that exploit Islam
    to advance radical political aims rather than on the employment of
    traditional military forces. The guidance published in the QDR
    highlights the transformation of the DOD:

             - From major conventional combat operations to multiple
            irregular, asymmetric operations

        Based on the QDR Report, the SPG further tasks the Services to:

             - Components will reduce priority of current and future
            capabilities and forces that provided disproportionate
            overmatch against traditional challenges
             - Reduce resources for future capabilities that would
            marginally increase existing U.S. advantages against
            traditional challenges
             - The Marine Corps will consider capability alternatives for
            review by the Deputy's Advisory Working Group to support a
            single two MEB forcible entry operation

        Historically, the Marine Corps has stated its requirement for
    amphibious lift in terms of three MEBs, fiscally constrained to 2.5
    MEBs to support amphibious assault forcible entry operations. In
    accordance with the guidance set forth in the most recent SPG, the
    Marine Corps has further constrained this requirement for amphibious
    lift to two MEBs. This 2.0 MEB capability is generally acknowledged by
    the U.S. Navy providing and maintaining a Battle Force of 30
    operationally available amphibious warfare ships for forcible entry
    operations. The ability to successfully conduct a major combat
    operation requiring an amphibious assault with a force of this size
    accepts risk in two areas: future challenges and current operations.
    Additionally, it potentially limits future national security options
    for forcible entry from the sea in a period of time where anti-access
    is growing among non-U.S. aligned countries, non-state actors, and
    reluctant allies.

                      sea-based ballistic missile defense
        55. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, the sea-based ballistic missile
    defense system (AEGIS BMD) has been successful in 7 of the last 8
    intercept tests, and up to 10 SM-3 interceptors are now deployed on 3
    ships in the Pacific Fleet. The current AEGIS BMD system is capable of
    intercepting short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, such as the
    North Korean No Dong missile and the Iranian Shehab-3. Current plans
    call for deploying over 100 SM-3 missiles on 18 AEGIS cruisers and
    destroyers by fiscal year 2012. The Missile Defense Agency funds
    procurement for the missiles and shipboard upgrades, while the Navy
    assumes the operations and support costs associated with this sea-based
    missile defense capability. Current plans call for upgrading 18 Pacific
    Fleet AEGIS ships by 2012 for the missile defense mission. Given the
    growing threat posed by Iranian ballistic missiles, what are the Navy's
    plans to similarly equip Atlantic Fleet ships with a ballistic missile
    defense capability?
        Admiral Mullen. Two Atlantic Fleet ships are among the 18 ships
    scheduled to be upgraded with Ballistic Missile Defense capability by
    2012. One will be finished in August 2007 and the other ship will be
    finished in December 2008. Despite homeport locations, all Navy ships
    are worldwide deployable. The Navy's Destroyer Modernization program is
    funded to provide BMD capability for all remaining 47 Arleigh Burke
    class destroyers. Two destroyers will begin modernization in fiscal
    year 2012, and three destroyers will be upgraded each following year.
    BMD capability for the 19 remaining cruisers is not funded and is being
    considered for POM-10.

         conditions at marine corps battalion level medical facilities
        56. Senator McCain. General Conway, committee staff has reported to
    Marine Corps leadership on several occasions that conditions at medical
    facilities supporting marines at the battalion level are substandard
    and unacceptable. At Camp Horno, for example, third-world conditions
    exist such as open bays for medical exams, open doorways to the outside
    hung with plastic curtains, poor lighting, and dust and dirt throughout
    the facility. For the second year since learning of these conditions,
    the budget request includes no funds for improving battalion level
    medical facilities. I believe our marines deserve better. How do you
    explain this?
        Admiral Mullen. Senator, the conditions you cite at Camp Horno are
    unacceptable but I wish to assure you that these conditions are not
    representative of the approximately 90 Battalion and Regimental Aid
    Stations (BAS/RAS) we have across the Marine Corps. That said, and
    based upon input we have compiled from a recent data call, we have
    action underway on several fronts. For the near-term, HQMC developed
    minimum habitability standards and directed that our operational
    commanders and installations take immediate action to ensure these
    standards are met. If they cannot be met, the facility is to be closed.
    Installations are to report back no later than 30 June of this year
    that each BAS/RAS has met these standards or has been closed. If
    closed, they are to report the alternate means used to obtain medical
    services. These standards include but are not limited to requirements
    for clean and freshly painted surfaces, well-maintained floors in good
    structural repair, mechanical systems in good operating order,
    sufficient lighting, regularly scheduled field days and solid waste
    disposal, exam room privacy, waiting areas that are separated from the
    examination rooms, clean and operational windows with proper window
    treatments, sufficient double lock storage for medical records, doors
    with properly functioning hardware, sufficient fire suppression
    equipment/smoke detectors with documented evidence of routine
    inspection, and furnishings that comply with basic infection control by
    being clean, functional, and in reasonable repair. Funding is in place
    at the operational unit level and at our installations to take
    necessary corrective actions to meet these standards.
        We are also translating recently developed medical standards to
    identify the level of care that should be provided within an Aid
    Station (BAS/RAS) into basic facilities planning criteria to support
    this level of care. These criteria define the square footage,
    configuration, special requirements, et cetera, necessary to support
    the number of marines assigned. These planning criteria will be used to
    assess whether sufficient capacity of facilities is available to
    support these units, and where not, provide the necessary information
    to develop corrective projects. In addition, we are revising our
    facility coding process to provide aid stations with a unique facility
    identifier, which will allow better tracking of the condition of these
    facilities. We expect initial efforts to be completed this fiscal year.
    These criteria and unique identifiers will allow us to ensure the
    appropriate priority is assigned to corrective projects for these
    facilities and that we programmatically address overall requirements
    through our repair, minor construction and, if necessary, military
    construction programs.
        Finally, our Health Services and Facilities organizations are
    ensuring these habitability standards, medical standards, and
    facilities planning criteria are incorporated into inspection protocols
    used by the Inspector General and other oversight organizations to
    validate routine compliance.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner
                  the new national medical center at bethesda
        57. Senator Warner. Secretary Winter, concerns have been raised
    about the Department's planned end-state capacity of medical facilities
    in the National Capital Region and the potential for patient care
    disruption during the transition to new facilities at Bethesda from the
    existing Walter Reed facilities. The transition planning process cannot
    succeed without leadership at the highest levels of the Navy along with
    the Army. What are your thoughts regarding the acceleration of
    construction at Bethesda to ensure effective and seamless transition of
    care for wounded servicemembers, as well as regular medical services
    for the population serviced by Walter Reed?
        Secretary Winter. Leaders from National Naval Medical Center,
    Walter Reed Army Medical Center, along with Military Health System
    (MHS) leadership and Office of Secretary of Defense/Health Affairs,
    will work to ensure that the health care delivery is not compromised.
    All resources within the MHS will be made available to ensure effective
    and seamless transition of care for eligible beneficiaries. The
    military medical and NAVFAC team will work towards completing the
    construction as expeditiously and economically as possible, without
    sacrificing quality of care.
        Construction phasing is an integral part of the design and
    construction process being developed to create a seamless transition in
    the design and construction of Bethesda and Fort Belvoir. Any
    acceleration at either site will potentially affect additional health
    care workload. Existing patient health care is a critical factor that
    is receiving the utmost attention as part of the design effort. Design
    and construction decisions, such as stand alone structures and location
    of additions, can help minimize patient care disruptions.
        The Navy fully understands the importance of completing BRACON
    Project P-005V, Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, Bethesda,
    MD, as early as possible. We have already compressed the original 38
    month construction schedule to 30 months, and are exploring
    alternatives to improve upon that construction duration. The required
    Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) will be completed in time to allow
    a construction start in April 2008. Additionally, there are options to
    phase construction completion that would enable portions of the
    improved facility to open in advance of the overall planned project
    completion date of October 2010. Given a constrained site and the
    desire to preserve the quality of ongoing medical care at the existing
    hospital complex, acceleration beyond the already compressed schedule
    would be extremely challenging.

      east coast aircraft carrier basing and mayport environmental impact
                                     study
        58. Senator Warner. Secretary Winter, I have been following with
    interest the Navy's assessment of strategic homeporting and dispersal
    options for Atlantic Fleet surface ships. I believe it is important
    that all factors be considered in any large operational move, to
    include not only environmental concerns, but also national security
    requirements, the impact on sailors and their families, and local
    economies. What is the current status and way ahead for the current
    Naval Air Station (NAS) Mayport environmental impact study?
        Secretary Winter. The Navy has undertaken this EIS to ensure that
    we continue to effectively support fleet operational requirements
    through the most efficient utilization of Naval Station Mayport in the
    future, and to evaluate the potential environmental impacts on Mayport
    for each of the ship homeporting alternatives that are under
    consideration.
        A Notice of Intent to prepare the EIS was published in the Federal
    Register on 14 November 2006. A public scoping meeting was held in
    Jacksonville on 5 December 2006. The Navy is being both environmentally
    and fiscally responsible in awaiting the conclusion of the EIS, with a
    Record of Decision expected in January 2009.
        The final decision on utilization of Mayport will include
    consideration of other factors such as national security requirements,
    total cost and other programmatic implications, impact on sailors and
    their families, and the effect on local economies.

        59. Senator Warner. Secretary Winter, what are your thoughts on
    where the Atlantic Fleet end state may be, in terms of what ships,
    including carriers or large deck amphibs, may be moved?
        Admiral Mullen. In January 2006, Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces
    Command, was directed to conduct an EIS that will review and assess a
    broad range of alternatives for the potential homeporting of additional
    surface ships at Naval Station Mayport. The purpose of the EIS is to
    evaluate the potential environmental impacts on Mayport for each of the
    alternatives that are under study. Specifically, the EIS will examine
    13 alternatives for Naval Station Mayport:

             The homeporting of large amphibious ships, either an
            LHA or LHD
             The homeporting of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier
            (CVN)
             Making Naval Station Mayport capable of hosting a CVN
             The homeporting of additional surface combatants
            (cruisers and/or destroyers [CRUDES])
             Seven different combinations of the above
             The homeporting of an Amphibious Ready Group (LHA or
            LHD, LPD, LSD)
             No Action

        In order to be both environmentally and fiscally responsible, the
    Navy will await the conclusion of the EIS in January 2009 before making
    any decisions regarding Mayport. Accordingly, the Navy will allow
    adequate time to fully assure that all considerations have been
    evaluated regarding the potential move of additional ships to Mayport,
    Florida. These considerations include national security requirements,
    total cost and other programmatic implications, impact on sailors and
    their families, and the effect on local economies.

       master jet base assessment for naval air station oceana, virginia
        60. Senator Warner. Admiral Mullen, you recently released a report
    to this committee, which was commissioned by the Office of the CNO, and
    consisted of an assessment of NAS Oceana in Virginia as it compared to
    an ``ideal'' master jet base. In the report, NAS Oceana was assessed
    the highest grade in the operational training category, which measures
    the installation's capability to support required flight training.
    Unfortunately, because of the significant local community development
    around NAS Oceana, the base was rated lowest in ``field operational
    environment.'' Now I note that this report was conducted in December
    2005. The Virginia Beach community and the Commonwealth of Virginia
    have taken great steps to work with the Navy over the past year and a
    half on the encroachment issue. How would you assess the current
    situation for the Navy as it related to the field operating
    environment?
        Admiral Mullen. Encroachment remains a serious issue with potential
    operational impacts, however, the Navy is encouraged by the hard work
    achieved thus far by Virginia Beach, Chesapeake, and the Commonwealth
    of Virginia, and I view the following steps taken as positive progress
    toward improving the field operating environment.

        - The recently adopted Virginia Beach/Navy Memorandum of
    Understanding establishes the process by which all development
    proposals within the Air Installations Compatible Use Zone (AICUZ)
    contours will be reviewed and processed. The measures thus far adopted
    by the City will help to limit future incompatible development that
    could have an adverse impact on the conduct of air operations at
    Oceana.

              1. The MOU creates a new process for Navy officials to review
            and comment earlier in the process on proposed development in
            the AICUZ, thereby strengthening the parties' working
            relationship and commitment to address potential encroachment
            at NAS Oceana. Communications and meetings between Navy and
            City staff well in advance of Planning Commission and City
            Council consideration will help to ensure that land use
            decisions are fully informed and conflicts are avoided to the
            extent possible. The results have been commendable and have not
            only halted encroachment around Oceana/Fentress but have
            several programs in effect which will rollback existing
            development from several of Oceana's Accident Potential Zone
            One and Clear Zone.

        - Virginia Beach adopted an AICUZ Overlay ordinance for the areas
    within Noise Zones 70 dB day-night noise level (DNL) and higher.
        - Virginia Beach established an Accident Potential Zone (APZ) and
    Clear Zone acquisition program to roll back existing incompatible
    development. $15 million per year ($7.5 million city and $7.5 million
    State) has been budgeted for fiscal years 2007 and 2008.
        - Virginia Beach enacted an ordinance (APZ Ordinance) that
    prohibits future incompatible development in APZ areas.
        - Virginia Beach enacted an ordinance that adopted an amended
    comprehensive plan and the official zoning map to now include the NAS
    Oceana--Navy Auxiliary Landing Field (NALF) Fentress Interfacility
    Traffic Area (IFTA).
        - Virginia Beach amended the comprehensive plan by revising
    chapters discussing strategic growth areas, primary residential areas,
    and the transition area between NAS Oceana and NALF Fentress by
    incorporating provisions pertaining to the AICUZ program.
        - Virginia Beach enacted an ordinance amending the zoning and
    design guidelines in the majority of the ocean front resort area, the
    net result is a reduction in the potential amount of residential units
    by 4,000.
        - Virginia Beach enacted an ordinance to establish an IFTA Property
    Acquisition Plan. As of 17 April 2007, 15 properties have been
    identified, prioritized, and prices negotiated by the City of Virginia
    Beach.
        - Chesapeake enacted an ordinance to amend its AICUZ overlay
    district to include noise zones greater than 70 dB DNL.
        - Commonwealth of Virginia amended the State code to require noise
    and APZ zone disclosures for all residential and commercial sales and
    leases when the noise and APZ are on a city zoning map. The
    Commonwealth amended the State building code to require sound
    attenuation in all new residential and commercial construction.
        - Commonwealth of Virginia created the Oceana Fentress Military
    Advisory Committee, responsible to the Governor's standing Virginia
    Military Advisory Commission, to provide continuing oversight of land
    use issues affecting Navy Air Operations in Chesapeake and Virginia
    Beach.

        61. Senator Warner. Admiral Mullen, in your opinion, what more can
    be done by the local community and the State to improve the operating
    environment for the Navy at Oceana?
        Admiral Mullen. The Navy recognizes and is grateful for the hard
    work already underway by local and State authorities in the Virginia
    Beach community and the Commonwealth of Virginia. The Navy would like
    the local community to extend the Air Installation Compatible Use Zone
    (AICUZ) Overlay District and Fentress Overlay District out to 65 dB DNL
    vice 70 dB DNL, to conform to Navy AICUZ criteria that discourages
    residential development in that noise zone. In addition, the State and
    local communities need to establish a process and source of funding to
    expand the program to purchase homes from willing sellers into Accident
    Potential Zone II and high noise zones. These recommendations have been
    discussed with appropriate local officials.

        62. Senator Warner. Admiral Mullen, the report also mentioned that
    Oceana's ``base infrastructure is in decline, the result of long-
    deferred maintenance. Runway, taxiway, parking apron, and hangar MILCON
    projects designed to upgrade the airfield infrastructure are either
    underway or programmed.'' Please provide the status of these activities
    for Oceana and the Navy's plan to recover from the deferment of
    maintenance investments at the base.
        Admiral Mullen. The private sector industry standards for facility
    investment (sustainment-ST, restoration and modernization-RM) are
    typically 2 percent of Plant Replacement Value (PRV). In the last 5
    years, NAS Oceana met the 2 percent PRV industry standard only one time
    (fiscal year 2007) as shown in the following table:

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        This long-term underinvestment has resulted in a growing backlog of
    maintenance and repair estimated at $261 million, or approximately 14
    percent of the PRV. The average age of the deficiencies in the backlog
    is 4.1 years. A portion of the under-investment is due to suspending
    noncritical facility repairs/capital investments, pending the
    resolution of NAS Oceana's BRAC status. NAS Oceana's future long-term
    status was resolved in January 2007.
        Improving our shore infrastructure is at the forefront of our PR-09
    budget deliberations, but resources are very tight. The Navy is now
    undertaking a systematic approach to address the critical
    infrastructure requirements world-wide. This will include a deliberate
    ``fence line to fence line'' assessment of the facilities in each shore
    installation, covering three dimensions: (1) Contribution to current
    mission, (2) Quality of current facilities and, (3) Quantity of
    facilities versus projected demand. Once this comprehensive condition
    based assessment is done, decisions will be made to address current and
    projected gaps using MILCON, major repair efforts, or lesser
    maintenance efforts to satisfy mission needs.
        The following MILCON Projects at NAS Oceana have been enacted:

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        President's budget 2008 does not include any MILCON projects in
    fiscal year 2008 at NAS Oceana, but includes the following projects in
    the out years:

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        In addition to the MILCON projects above, fiscal year 2007 special
    projects include:

             Twelve minor restoration and sustainment projects,
            valued at $3.2 million, are currently underway.
             A $8.9 million special project to repair parking
            aprons and taxiways. Award planned 30 August 2007.
             A $20 million special project for hangar repairs.
            Award planned 30 August 2007.
             Repair Runway 14R/32L and 5R/23lR, total $19.8
            million. Timing for execution of these projects is dependent
            upon PR-09 budget deliberations.

        In the past, Navy has failed to pursue a systematic, deliberate,
    and consistent approach to assessing the material condition of our
    shore facilities. I have directed efforts to make quick, deliberate
    progress in getting an accurate fix of our shore infrastructure, to
    develop a comprehensive investment strategy, and to make the
    prioritized resource requirements clear in our POM-10 submission. This
    will benefit not only Oceana, but all our installations, in which we
    are significantly underinvested.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
                              production capacity
        63. Senator Chambliss. General Conway, you emphasize the tempo of
    operational demands as the reason for an increase in maintenance
    requirements and the criticality of maintaining equipment in terms of
    sustaining troop readiness to operate at the ``sustained rate of
    fire.'' Specifically, you mention Light Armored Vehicles being driven
    3.5 times more than their programmed annual usage rates. You have also
    said that maintaining materiel is a key factor in determining combat
    readiness. These statements make it clear that maintenance needs to be
    a priority; however, your written statement says that certain
    production requirements cannot be met in a single year due to
    production capacity issues. Do your maintenance depots have the
    capacity and assets to meet these demands and to meet demands which
    will increase as the size of the force increases?
        General Conway. As long as the assets are available and there is
    funding, our depots have the capacity to meet the demand. Marine Corps
    Depot Maintenance Activity Group (DMAG) is a multi-commodity operation.
    Customer requirements drive the need for additional workers, overtime,
    and additional shifts. Selected areas are currently working 12-hour
    second shifts. As workload increases, the option to expand is
    available.

                     inter-service maintenance cooperation
        64. Senator Chambliss. General Conway, are your logistics depots
    sharing maintenance work with other Services and taking advantage of
    the synergies gained through inter-Service cooperation?
        General Conway. Yes. Currently both Anniston Army Depot and
    Tobyhanna Army Depot are working USMC equipment. We will continue to
    rely on inter-servicing to perform maintenance work as appropriate.
    Additionally, LOGCOM has offered assistance to other Services,
    specifically the Army, to reduce their backlog.

                                     reset
        65. Senator Chambliss. General Conway, the Marine Corps is no
    longer identifying depot maintenance as a ``cost of war'' and is now
    factoring this expense into the cost of resetting the force. Given the
    additional funding requirements necessary to reset your equipment and
    the length of time required to reach pre-war equipment levels, will you
    also need to expand your depot workforce to meet this reset demand?
        General Conway. Asset and funding availability dictate the size of
    the workforce and the number of shifts required. Selected areas are
    currently working 12-hour second shifts. As workload increases, the
    option to expand is available. Expansion of the workforce is
    accomplished using temporary hires and contracted labor, which allows
    contraction of the workforce when the workload decreases. It is
    anticipated that the workforce will expand and contract throughout the
    reset process.

        66. Senator Chambliss. General Conway, what factors will you use to
    determine what equipment to repair and reset, and to determine the
    division of work between industry and your existing depot workforce?
        General Conway. All depot level reparables will be overhauled and
    all field level reparables will be upgraded to serviceable standards.
    In determining the division of work between industry and depots, we
    will use the existing Depot Level Source of Repair (DSOR) decision
    process to determine where the work is accomplished. If the Joint Depot
    Maintenance Activities Group selected DSOR repair facility is unable to
    accomplish the work then an alternate DSOR will be sought. Alternate
    DSORs include private contractors and service depots.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John Thune
                                  shipbuilding
        67. Senator Thune. Admiral Mullen, the affordability of the Navy
    shipbuilding program and our ability to meet the CNO's plan for a 313-
    ship Navy are of great concern. The Congressional Budget Office
    estimates that $20 billion per year--$5 billion greater than the Navy's
    budget estimate--will be required to buy the ships in the Navy's plan.
    We all agree that we need to increase our rate of shipbuilding, and
    that we likewise need to take deliberate actions on the front end of
    this program to ensure that we do not have to cut out future ships to
    pay bills on the back end. Given the cost pressures on the shipbuilding
    program, what impact do the increased cost and delays of the LCS
    program have on the balance of ship programs in the Navy's plan?
        Admiral Mullen. The significant impact that increased cost and
    delays have had is the need to reprogram or request reprogramming
    authority for the fiscal year 2007 funding in order to use these funds
    to complete the vessels that still are under contract.
        In the out-years, the cost reductions associated with our strategy,
    the selected configuration, and the buy will enable cost efficiencies
    associated with a modern production facility. These mechanisms will
    enable us to minimize the cost impact to the overall shipbuilding
    program.
        The Navy needs to understand exactly how much we're going to be
    able to get by way of investment in those facilities and the leverage
    that that will provide us. But I am very hopeful that we will be able
    to recoup a significant amount of the increased cost.

        68. Senator Thune. Admiral Mullen, to the extent that it would be
    possible to accelerate the Navy's shipbuilding plan, where would you
    propose to increase our investment to provide the greatest military
    benefit and financial return on investment?
        Admiral Mullen. Any acceleration of the shipbuilding plan would
    need to be weighed against the impact to the SCN account stability. We
    have provided industry with a stable planning horizon. By not
    constantly modifying the shipbuilding plan, we have established trust
    and facilitated the shipyards to ability to make the kind of capital
    investments necessary to make them more efficient.
        Adding any additional ships without complete funding/top level SCN
    relief, would cause an imbalance with the planned funding for Navy
    ships, potentially causing other shipbuilding programs to destabilize.
        We are in the process of analyzing our shipbuilding plan in an
    unconstrained fiscal environment. While I am confident with the
    original assumptions and work that led to the 313 force structure and
    the current shipbuilding plan, one of the key assumptions was a
    constrained fiscal environment. In a more favorable fiscal environment,
    I would anticipate accelerating the shipbuilding plan and increasing
    the overall size of the force.
        The Navy has examined the feasibility of increased shipbuilding
    investments in fiscal year 2008. Most of the ships in the Navy's
    construction inventory (CVN, LCS, and CG(X)) cannot be accelerated due
    to execution risk associated with maturing programs or production
    limitations. For mature programs without significant risk such as DDG-
    51 Class, the fleet inventory will reach its objective with current
    construction plans and additional ships would be in excess of the
    warfighting requirements.
        LPD-17 Class Amphibious Assault Ship, T-AKE Dry Cargo Carrier, and
    SSN Virginia Class Attack Submarine, could be added to accelerate the
    shipbuilding plan and provide the greatest military benefit and
    financial return on investment.
        Adding a 10th LPD in fiscal year 2008 is a relatively low risk
    option and my top unfunded priority. LPD-26 would execute as if it was
    a fiscal year 2009/2010 ship and would deliver in approximately fiscal
    year 2012/2013; assuming the shipyard did not ramp up the workforce to
    increase their build rate.
        Adding up to three T-AKEs in fiscal year 2008 is again relatively
    low risk. These ships would likely execute as if they were fiscal years
    2009/2010/2011 contracts and would complete approximately fiscal years
    2012/2013/2014; assuming the production line was kept to series
    production. The earliest they could deliver, assuming the yard executed
    them in a block and brought in the manpower to accomplish that, would
    be about fiscal year 2012.
        Adding a Virginia Class SSN would be higher risk requiring a $2.8
    billion SCN increase to account for year 1 and 2 advance procurement.
    This ship would still execute like a fiscal year 2010 SSN in terms of
    actual construction. The build timeline for an SSN is about 5 years so
    this ship would deliver in approximately fiscal year 2015. A lower risk
    option would be to procure the ``ship set'' for a VA SSN this year.
    This option would increase our future year SSN flexibility.

        69. Senator Thune. Secretary Winter, your professional
    qualifications and your recent experience with the LCS program place
    you in a unique position as Secretary of the Navy to make a profound
    and lasting contribution to shipbuilding acquisition. What are the
    principal changes you envision to improve the way we buy our ships to
    place us on the road to an affordable 313-ship Navy?
        Secretary Winter. This is a vital area where the Navy can re-assert
    control over the shipbuilding process. The Navy's shipbuilding plan
    recognizes the need for aggressive requirements and cost control
    measures. These can only be achieved in partnership with industry,
    utilizing realistic assumptions within our ability to instill
    discipline in shipbuilding requirements, and industry's ability to
    drive more investments to reduce cost.
        Given the importance of requirements-containment and cost-reduction
    to the viability of the shipbuilding plan, the Navy continues to
    evaluate each ship class and identify cost reduction opportunities
    while balancing warfighting requirements, costs, and industrial base
    realities.
        The Navy is committed to stable out-year procurements that industry
    can use to determine expected workloads. This, in turn, allows industry
    to commit resources, create efficiencies, and decrease the end-cost of
    Navy ships.
        The Navy plans greater use of contract incentives, such as steep
    share lines combined with performance incentives, to contribute to real
    cost containment in future shipbuilding plans. In addition, the Navy
    plans to pursue other areas for improvement in acquisition workforce
    and organization to strengthen the foundations of the Navy's
    shipbuilding efforts.

                         expeditionary fighting vehicle
        70. Senator Thune. General Conway, the Expeditionary Fighting
    Vehicle (EFV) has faced significant technical challenges throughout
    almost 2 decades of development. Last year, the Navy reduced the
    program by almost half, from 1,013 vehicles to 573 vehicles. Congress
    has recently been notified that the cost impact of this reduction
    causes a Nunn-McCurdy breach. Meanwhile, the vehicle's operational
    assessment, while successful in many areas, has effectively given the
    vehicle a failing grade for poor reliability. I understand that the
    program has been delayed for 3 or 4 years in order to re-design the
    vehicle to meet reliability requirements. Would you please provide your
    assessment of the criticality of the EFV to the Marine Corps'
    requirements and the operational impacts caused by downsizing the
    program to 573 vehicles?
        General Conway. The Marine Corps provides the Nation's joint
    warfighting forces with a unique, flexible, and effective capability to
    conduct forcible entry operations from the sea. The EFV, the Corps'
    largest ground combat system acquisition program, is the sole ground
    combat vehicle that enables projection of combat power from a sea base.
    It will replace the aging Assault Amphibious Vehicle that has been in
    service since 1972 and will become a complementary component of our
    modernized fleet of tactical vehicles that include the Joint Light
    Tactical Vehicle, the Marine Personnel Carrier, and the Internally
    Transportable Vehicle. The EFV's amphibious mobility, day and night
    lethality, enhanced force protection capabilities, and robust
    communications will help the joint force meet security challenges
    across the spectrum of conflict. The over-the-horizon capability of the
    EFV will also enable amphibious ships to increase their standoff
    distance, no longer requiring them to close within the striking
    distance of many coastal defense systems in order to launch their
    amphibious assault platforms. The EFV will be specifically well-suited
    to maneuver operations conducted from the sea and sustained operations
    in the world's littoral regions.
        In our fiscally constrained era, we have balanced the EFV program
    requirements with our need to provide greater tactical mobility
    suitable for the spectrum of operations. Toward that end, 573 EFVs
    maintains our capability to conduct forcible entry operations from the
    sea. With modest research and development funding, the Marine Personnel
    Carrier will provide the requisite ground combat tactical mobility to
    compensate for fewer EFVs. Additionally, the Joint Light Tactical
    Vehicle will serve to enhance the protected mobility of our ground
    forces, complemented by the Internally Transportable Vehicle, which
    will provide vertical assault elements of the Marine Air-Ground Task
    Force with better mobility for weapons and fire support systems once
    disembarked from assault support aircraft.

        71. Senator Thune. General Conway, what impact does the program
    delay have on your ability to meet mobility requirements?
        General Conway. The delay in the EFV program, while unfortunate, is
    mitigated by continued investment in our current Assault Amphibious
    Vehicle, the AAVP7A1 and by investment in the Joint Light Tactical
    Vehicle and the Marine Personnel Carrier. These two new vehicles will
    provide balanced performance, payload, and protection particularly to
    infantry and combat engineer units. In the near-term, our investment in
    MRAPs will afford those marines operating in Iraq with significantly
    enhanced protection tailored specifically for operations in that
    theater. The delay in delivery of the EFV will limit our ability to
    conduct high-speed surface-borne ship-to-objective forcible entry from
    a distant sea-base but it will not constrain our ability to conduct
    amphibious operations and subsequent maneuver ashore in support of
    national objectives.

        72. Senator Thune. Secretary Winter, how confident are you that the
    EFV can be sufficiently redesigned to meet the reliability
    requirements?
        Secretary Winter. A redesigned EFV can meet the established
    reliability requirements. This assessment is based on two in-depth
    reviews of the EFV reliability program conducted in March and April
    2007 by two independent teams of experts commissioned by the Office of
    the Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). Each
    team concluded that the EFV reliability requirement was achievable and
    that the EFV program was employing the rigorous methods necessary to
    achieve the requirement.
        Achieving this requirement, however, will require very focused and
    dedicated technical and engineering efforts by the contractor, along
    with strong oversight by the government. The EFV program strategy had
    been to increase reliability through the reliability growth process.
    However, based on the operational test data, it was determined that
    this process was insufficient to generate reliability growth necessary
    to meet the requirement at Initial Operational Test and Evaluation.
    Therefore, a Design for Reliability (DFR) effort was initiated to
    generate significant improvement to reliability. In addition, the Joint
    Requirements Oversight Committee has approved a change in KPPs that
    gives the program more flexibility in modifications to the design.
        The DFR effort underway includes the overarching systems
    engineering processes to mature the EFV design and vehicle reliability
    growth as well as the detailed planning, redesign, and validation
    efforts for EFV components and subcomponents to meet their reliability
    allocations. The DFR process will lead to building and testing new
    prototypes prior to a production decision to validate the results of
    the DFR effort and verify the KPP can be achieved.

        73. Senator Thune. Secretary Winter, what further cost impact will
    be caused by the redesign effort, including the related production
    delays?
        Secretary Winter. The EFV program did not achieve Milestone C
    decision in January 2007 as planned due to less than predicted
    reliability performance during an operational assessment conducted in
    2006. As a result, the development phase has been extended and the
    estimated cost and schedule impacts of these changes were incorporated
    in the fiscal year 2008 President's budget request, which included an
    increase in total RDT&E funding of approximately $700 million.
        Following the fiscal year 2008 President's budget request to
    Congress, the Navy notified Congress the EFV program was in breach of
    the Nunn-McCurdy amendment due to excess cost. Following notification,
    the Secretary of Defense is required to certify that:

             Program is essential to national security.
             No alternative will provide equal or greater
            capability at less cost.
             New cost estimates are reasonable.
             Management structure for program is adequate to manage
            program and costs.

        The certification teams are currently conducting the necessary
    analysis and developing the required documentation in accordance with
    the statutory certification requirements. Updated cost estimates are
    being developed in conjunction with the proposed program strategy. If
    the program is certified, the new program baseline will be included in
    the certification package, to be submitted to Congress no later than 5
    June 2007, as required by statute.

        74. Senator Thune. Secretary Winter, it is reported that the
    contractor has earned a 7 to 8 percent profit. How do we justify to the
    American taxpayer awarding most of the profit available on this
    contract when we have a vehicle that falls critically short of its
    reliability performance requirement?
        Secretary Winter. The award fees earned by General Dynamics are in
    accordance with provisions of the contract negotiated in 1995. On this
    contract, award fees are the principle mechanism by which the
    contractor has the opportunity to earn a profit. As these fees were
    part of the original contract, there is no mechanism available to
    recoup them.
        We recognize, however, that the award fees did not properly
    motivate General Dynamics to deliver required levels of reliability. We
    are in the process of negotiating a different contract for the next
    phase that will minimize award fees and include targeted incentives
    tied to carefully derived milestones. The program restructuring effort
    currently underway will result in development of an EFV that meets all
    operational requirements.

        75. Senator Thune. Secretary Winter, this is another example of the
    Government bearing the burden of failed performance on a cost-plus
    contract. What revised fee structure would you propose to ensure a more
    equitable sharing between the Government and industry of the downside
    risk on these types of development contracts?
        Secretary Winter. The EFV program plans to provide performance and
    cost incentives using Cost Plus Incentive Fee and Cost Plus Award Fee
    contracts for the remainder of the development phase. Incentives will
    be event-based and tied to well-defined, objective targets for
    technical performance, schedule adherence, and cost control. Multiple-
    incentive structures are being considered whereby the contractor must
    earn fee in each category or forego the fee entirely. This structure
    promotes a balanced approach so that no one evaluation category can
    control fee award.
        The Navy remains committed to developing the EFV as a key element
    of future Navy-Marine Corps expeditionary combat capability while
    maximizing the value of taxpayer dollars.

                        expeditionary brigade reduction
        76. Senator Thune. General Conway, the Marine Corps has held a
    longstanding requirement for the Navy to provide amphibious lift for
    three MEBs to support forcible entry operations. I notice in your
    statement this year that you are now calling for two brigades to
    perform such an assault. How did the Marine Corps determine it should
    reduce AE requirements for an opposed landing?
        General Conway. The Marine Corps has not reduced AE requirements
    for an opposed landing. What has been reduced is the total amphibious
    lift requirement for AE-capable forces. The basis for the 3.0 MEB AE
    fiscally constrained to 2.5 MEB AE requirement noted in this question
    was documented in the Navy's 1992 Posture Statement signed by the
    Secretary of the Navy, CNO, and CMC, and is quoted in part, as follows:

              For a global ready response capability and forward presence,
            the Nation needs a tailored force with at least enough
            amphibious ships to lift the AEs of two and one-half brigade-
            size units. This allows the Navy and Marine Corps to meet
            current requirements for the forward deployed forces and still
            provide sufficient surge capability to assemble a brigade-size
            amphibious assault force in either the Atlantic or Pacific.
            This fiscally constrained goal meets the Nation's minimum
            requirements.

        As noted above, the total requirement identified in the 1992
    statement was for 2.5 MEB AE lift capacity, and the forcible entry
    component of that requirement was two brigade-size amphibious assault
    forces--one on each coast--totaling the same as today's stated
    requirement for 2.0 MEB AE.
        The current requirement for 2.0 MEB AE is traced to the SPG,
    directing us to . . . consider capability alternatives . . . to support
    a single two MEB forcible entry operation. Although the language in
    today's SPG is different than in the 1992 statement, the requirement to
    maintain a 2.0 MEB forcible entry capability remains the same.
        This capability can only be realized by maintaining a Battle Force
    that provides 30 operationally available amphibious warfare ships; of
    these 30 ships, 10 must be aviation-capable big deck ships [LHA/LHD/
    LHA(R)], 10 LPD-17 class ships, and 10 LSD-41/49 or equivalent ships.

        77. Senator Thune. General Conway, does the Navy's shipbuilding
    plan provide the necessary lift to support two MEBs?
        General Conway. No, the Navy's current plan does not provide the
    required focus on amphibious programs to meet the two MEB AE
    requirement. The SPG directed the Marine Corps to consider capability
    alternatives to support a single two MEB forcible entry operation. This
    capability is realized by maintaining a battle force that provides 30
    operationally available amphibious warfare ships; of these 30 ships, 10
    must be aviation-capable big deck ships [LHA/LHD/LHA(R)], 10 LPD-17
    class ships, and 10 LSD-41/49 or equivalent ships. Current and
    projected ship availability based on scheduled and unscheduled
    maintenance suggests at least 33 ships are required to provide 30 that
    are operationally available.
        While the amphibious ship (battle force) inventory is currently 32
    ships, it stabilizes at 30 ships from fiscal year 2015 to the end of
    the plan. At no time does the Navy's plan provide a minimum of 33 ships
    to provide 30 operationally available. Additionally, the well-known
    maintenance challenges of the LHA and LSD class of ships and their age
    make them prime candidates for early retirement, potentially further
    reducing the inventory. Delivery of the LPD-17 has also been slower
    than expected in the wake of Hurricane Katrina further stressing the
    force and requiring older ships to remain in the fleet beyond their
    expected service lives.
        The big deck (LHD/LHA) inventory varies between 10 and 11 ships
    between now and 2018, then stabilizing at 9 ships through the end of
    the 30-year plan--falling short of our long-term requirement for 11 big
    deck ships to provide 10 operationally available.

        78. Senator Thune. General Conway, how important is an additional
    LPD-17 class ship, included as the top Navy unfunded priority, to
    meeting your amphibious lift requirement?
        General Conway. The 10th LPD-17 San Antonio class ship is extremely
    important to meeting the 2 MEB amphibious lift requirement, but still
    does not yet match the 11 necessary to field 2 operationally available
    MEB AEs, since 10 to 15 percent of amphibious ships (by class) are
    operationally unavailable at any time due to scheduled maintenance.
        The LPD-17 class ships will play a key role in supporting the
    ongoing global war on terrorism by forward deploying marines and their
    equipment to respond to crises abroad. Its unique design will
    facilitate expanded force coverage and decreased reaction times of
    forward deployed Marine Expeditionary Units. In forcible entry
    operations, the LPD-17 will help maintain a robust surface assault and
    rapid off-load capability for the Marine Air Ground Task Force far into
    the future.
        Ths class of amphibious warfare ship also represents the Navy's
    commitment to a modern expeditionary power projection fleet and will
    assist our naval forces across the spectrum of warfare. It replaces
    four classes of older ships--the LKA, LST, LSD-36, and the LPD-4 and
    will have a 40-year expected service life.

                               top line spending
        79. Senator Thune. Secretary Winter, you state in your posture
    statement that development of the budget has not been easy--tough
    decisions have been made and continue to be made throughout the
    Department. One of the issues that I have been concerned about for some
    time has been the top line of the defense budget and how much of a
    percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP) it is. Over time we have
    watched the percentage of the defense GDP drop. While this is the
    largest defense budget we have had, it is not as large of a percentage
    of the overall GDP as we have seen in the past. Do you think it would
    be appropriate for Congress to increase the top line of the military's
    budget to 4 percent of GDP as a baseline?
        Secretary Winter. It is the President and Congress that determine
    DOD total funding, and what is a necessary and affordable percentage of
    GDP for our Nation. From the Navy's perspective, I do believe that the
    Navy and Marine Corps will continue to need real budget growth to meet
    commitments and invest for the future.

        80. Senator Thune. Secretary Winter, looking 20 years down the
    road, can you comment on how the Navy will handle reset costs,
    modernization costs, and costs for fielding new platforms?
        Secretary Winter. Future budget development will continue to
    balance requirements against resources. Future budgets will be
    appropriately structured and have the necessary investment to
    successfully meet both our present and future challenges. I am
    confident that the initiatives we have in place now will result in
    efficiencies that will continue to streamline and improve the Navy and
    further improve our support for our National Military Strategy, while
    continuing to be responsible stewards of the tax dollars entrusted to
    us.

        [Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2008

                                  ----------

                            TUESDAY, APRIL 17, 2007

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

     WHETHER THE ARMY AND MARINE CORPS ARE PROPERLY SIZED, ORGANIZED, AND
       EQUIPPED TO RESPOND TO THE MOST LIKELY MISSIONS OVER THE NEXT TWO
         DECADES WHILE RETAINING ADEQUATE CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO ALL
                   CONTINGENCIES ALONG THE SPECTRUM OF COMBAT

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room
    SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
    Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh, Clinton, Pryor,
    Webb, McCaskill, Warner, Inhofe, Sessions, Collins, Chambliss,
    Cornyn, and Thune.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
    Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Michael J.
    Kuiken, professional staff member; Michael J. McCord,
    professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional
    staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
    Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
    staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member;
    David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer,
    professional staff member; Sean G. Stackley, professional staff
    member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
        Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Kevin A.
    Cronin, and Micah H. Harris.
        Committee members' assistants present: Joseph L. Axelrad
    and Jay Maroney, assistants to Senator Kennedy; James Tuite,
    assistant to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
    Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
    Darcie Tokioka, assistant to Senator Akaka; Jonathan Cooper,
    assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Jon Davey and Todd Rosenblum,
    assistants to Senator Bayh, Andrew Shapiro, assistant to
    Senator Clinton; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor;
    Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Stephen C.
    Hedger and Jason D. Rauch, assistants to Senator McCaskill;
    Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; Jeremy Shull,
    assistant to Senator Inhofe; Mark J. Winter, assistant to
    Senator Collins; Adam G. Brake, assistant to Senator Graham;
    Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Stuart C.
    Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune; and Brian W. Walsh,
    assistant to Senator Martinez.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
        Before we start our hearing, I want to recognize Senator
    Warner, who has been my partner on the Armed Services Committee
    for more than 28 years, and Senator Webb, for such comments as
    they may wish to make, because I know that they need to depart
    for Blacksburg.
        Before they do that, I want to express, on behalf of all
    members of the committee and, I'm sure, all members of the
    Senate, to them, to the families and the friends of those who
    were killed or injured in yesterday's tragic event, to all
    Virginians, and to, of course, the Virginia Tech community, our
    deepest sympathy, our support, and our prayers to all of them
    in this very, very difficult time.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and
    the distinguished ranking member, Senator McCain, and others on
    this committee. Senator Webb and I will be departing
    momentarily to go to Blacksburg, Virginia, together with other
    members of the congressional delegation. This is one of those
    unexplainable mysteries in life, this extraordinary tragedy. I
    think it could have happened in many places in the United
    States, and I hope out of this will come some understanding of
    how best America can prepare such that it not reoccur.
        But this hearing this morning is one that I have supported
    you and the ranking member strongly in holding. I've been
    privileged to know all of these gentlemen through the years,
    and it is vitally important that this committee receive the
    benefit of their wisdom. Each has spent an extraordinary amount
    of time involving conflicts in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and I
    thank you gentlemen for your continued public service.
        Mr. Chairman, I ask that the balance of my opening
    statement be placed in the record, together with two or three
    questions I have. One is that Senator Robert C. Byrd, a member
    of our committee, and I have put into the appropriations bill a
    request for a small amount of funds to institute--independent
    from the Federal system--Pentagon and all others--a totally
    independent analysis of the current and projected future
    capabilities of the Iraqi security forces (ISF). I do believe,
    Mr. Chairman, that second opinion is vitally necessary as we go
    forward, irrespective of such approaches that we have in the
    diversity of the Senate today.
        So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to ask that that copy
    of the Warner/Byrd bill be put in the record, together with my
    opening statement and other questions.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Warner and a copy of the
    Warner/Byrd bill follow:
                   Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner
        Chairman Levin, thank you. This is a very significant hearing and I
    appreciate that you have scheduled it.
        Mr Chairman, I join you in welcoming all of our distinguished
    witnesses here today. Their many decades of service to our Nation, both
    in and out of government, have made significant contributions to
    national defense policy and to our Nation's men and women in uniform.
    Each is well known throughout the defense and national security
    community and are all known for their expertise and candor.
        America has been engaged in this war against global extremists
    since the attacks on September 11. These military operations, to
    include combat against the Taliban in Afghanistan, beginning in October
    2001, and then in Iraq, beginning in March 2003, have been joint
    service endeavors from the start: however, our ground forces--the Army
    and Marine Corps--and our Special Operations Forces, have borne a
    larger share of the combat operations in these campaigns.
        Let there be no doubt, our military has performed magnificently and
    with the highest degree of courage and professionalism reflecting the
    best traditions of our Nation's military heritage. However, let there
    be no mistake, our military is under acute strain today.
        The purpose of today's hearing is to receive testimony on whether
    the Army and Marine Corps are properly sized, organized, and equipped
    to respond to the most likely missions in the 21st century. This most
    fundamental sine qua non of national security is perhaps Congress' most
    important responsibility, and, unequivocally, one that we must get
    right.
        This discussion on the future of our ground forces must begin with
    the recognition that we are engaged in a long war against global
    extremists; that this long war will dominate our national defense and
    national military strategy for a generation, or more; and that the war
    in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq are but its initial engagements.
    There is so much at stake in this struggle. Moreover, this war against
    global extremists will not be the only conflict, threat, or crisis that
    our Nation, and its ground forces, will face in the next decades of the
    21st century.
        In 1980, then Chief of Staff of the Army, General Edward Meyer,
    coined the term `hollow Army' to describe the state of the Army in the
    post-Vietnam era, at a time when the Cold War was still a stark
    reality. Most of us remember that period in our history; we remember
    the state of our Army; and we know that it took at least 10 years to
    repair.
        With great regret, I say that some of the indications and warnings
    of an Army under strain, or even a hollow Army, are present today. The
    readiness of non-deployed units is declining; equipment usage rates,
    under combat conditions, are increasing; standards for recruitment and
    basic training graduation have been lowered; the length of combat tours
    were lengthened; mid-grade officers and noncommissioned officers are
    reportedly leaving the Service at higher rates; and there is an over-
    reliance on the National Guard and Reserves as Active-Force augmentees
    than was ever envisioned.
        In December 2006, General Schoomaker, said, in testimony before the
    Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, that the Active-Duty
    Army ``will break'' under the strain of today's war-zone rotations.
    That was compelling testimony. Just last week, Secretary Gates
    announced the extension of combat tours from 12 to 15 months. Earlier
    in the month the Department of Defense announced that mobilization
    warning orders have been issued to selected National Guard units, most
    of whom will be deployed for a second time in less than 5 years.
        These are indicators that are cause for grave concern. Having
    served as Secretary of the Navy when the concept of the All-Volunteer
    Force was being developed, and having observed, in the ensuing years,
    the extraordinary success of that system in providing for America's
    security, I feel strongly that we must carefully monitor the possible
    risks to that system. While the hollow Army of the 1970s is one example
    of a military under strain and under-resourced, I am also reminded of
    the state of our military forces at the start of the Korean War. When
    the North Korean army invaded the Republic of Korea in June 1950, the
    United States deployed available, but largely unready and inadequately
    equipped troops, from the 24th Infantry Division in Japan. This unit is
    known as Task Force Smith. I am sure our witnesses are familiar with
    this episode.
        Task Force Smith was a unit of about 400 soldiers--composed of 2
    under-strength rifle companies, a communications section, a recoilless
    rifle platoon, 2 mortar platoons, and an artillery battalion with 6
    howitzers. They were ordered to block the main road to Pusan. Task
    Force Smith held as long as they could, but finally withdrew. More than
    150 soldiers of that unit were killed. The first U.S. engagement in the
    Korean War, almost 57 years ago, offers a telling reminder of what
    happens when a force goes to war unprepared.
        I, for one, shall retain the imagery of both the `hollow Army' and
    `Task Force Smith,' as we proceed today. The months to follow may be at
    one of those critical periods of dialog, debate, and decision about the
    way ahead for our ground forces. We must do this with vision,
    innovation, and commitment. Time is of the essence. We must act in the
    near-term to ensure there will be no hollow Army and no more Task Force
    Smiths.
        In closing, we should not forget that our ground forces are more
    than a collection of brigades and regiments. It is at its core: about
    people. Our military forces, volunteers all, are America's sons and
    daughters who, each and every day, put themselves in harm's way--away
    from those they love and often on multiple, and now extended combat
    tours. I would also like to recognize, with our most sincere gratitude,
    the military families who have sacrificed so much, especially those who
    have lost loved ones, and those who are caring for those wounded in
    service to our Nation.
        I look forward to today's important testimony.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Warner. I hope that these gentlemen, in the course
    of the testimony, might give the committee the benefit of their
    analysis of the current status of the Iraqi forces.
        I yield to my colleague, Senator Webb.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you so much. We will do that.
        Senator Webb.
        Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I also would like to suggest that the proposal by the
    senior Senator from Virginia regarding an independent look at
    what's going on over there is really needed at this time, and I
    fully support it.
        I'd like to express my appreciation for the witnesses for
    coming today, and my apologies for the fact that we are going
    to have to leave very soon for the memorial service that's
    going to take place down in Blacksburg.
        This is a hearing I look forward to. We are going to
    examine testimony very carefully, and we will have, from our
    perspective, a number of follow-up questions and, hopefully,
    dialogue.
        As many people have--many people, such as myself, had
    predicted, today's sustained ground operations in Iraq are
    progressively stressing our ground forces in ways that were
    both predictable and predicted to those who saw that the
    country would unravel and descend into sectarian strife and
    civil war. Last week's announcement of troop extensions of the
    15-month deployments for the Army is a further indication that
    this administration's failed strategic policies are breaking
    our military. That policy is going to ensure that
    disproportionate sacrifices are going to be placed on families
    and soldiers, and they are going to grow only more
    disproportionate in the coming year. These extensions are going
    to place new strains on an already overburdened Army, a force
    that is being broken progressively as a result of this
    strategy. The extensions may well affect morale. We've seen
    early indications, particularly with the numbers that came out
    on the West Point classes of 2000 and 2001, that perhaps we're
    overloading a small group of this country again and again
    asking them to accept the consequences of this misdirected war.
    It's one thing to say that we're putting predictability into
    systems, and it's another when we note that this predictability
    is uniformly negative on the people who have been serving. The
    strategy does not justify this continuing abuse of our people
    who have put their lives literally in the hands of our
    leadership, and I believe that there are limits to human
    endurance, and there are limits to what families can put up
    with.
        All of this, Mr. Chairman, leads to my appreciation for
    these kinds of hearings, because today's circumstances only
    heighten the need for more forceful congressional oversight. I
    would note that Senator Hagel and I--we're the only two ground
    combat veterans from the Vietnam war serving in the Senate--put
    together a piece of legislation requiring that American
    military units be fully combat ready when they're deployed,
    that the length of the deployments be restricted, and that
    minimum time periods be maintained between deployments. I would
    hope that my colleagues would join us on that legislation.
        I thank you very much for allowing me to speak early in
    this hearing.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
        Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I want to pick up on an
    important note that my colleague made about the stress on our
    forces, not only with this most recent announcement of the
    extensions. I think we're fortunate to have Dr. Korb here,
    because, Doctor, you and I were in the Department of Defense
    (DOD) in the mid-1970s, when the concept of the All-Volunteer
    Force was put in place. You recall the risks that we took, and
    I think you would share with me that it has worked out
    exceedingly well.
        We must, at all costs, preserve the All-Volunteer Force. I
    cannot foresee of any--any--measure that Congress would return
    to a draft, certainly not at this time. So, I hope, perhaps,
    you could address, specifically, how the impact of the events,
    Dr. Korb, might affect the vitality and the success of the All-
    Volunteer Force.
        I thank the chair.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, can I put Senator McCain's
    statement in the record?
        Chairman Levin. Of course. We will put Senator McCain's
    statement in the record, as well.
        [The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain
        Senator Levin, thank you. This is a very important hearing and I
    appreciate that you have scheduled it.
        Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming our distinguished witnesses
    here today. Their many decades of service to our Nation, both in and
    out of government, have made significant contributions to national
    defense policy and to our Nation's men and women in uniform.
        After my first visit to Iraq in 2003, I argued for more troops. I
    took issue with statements characterizing the insurgency as a few
    `dead-enders' or being in its `last throes.' I criticized the search
    and destroy strategy and argued for a counterinsurgency approach that
    separated the reconcilable population from the irreconcilable. That is
    the course now followed by General Petraeus, and the brave Americans
    and coalition troops he has the honor to command. I believe it is the
    right strategy. But having been a critic of the way this war was fought
    and a proponent of the very strategy now being followed, it is my
    obligation to encourage Americans to give it a chance to succeed. To do
    otherwise would be contrary to the interests of my country and
    dishonorable. Our defeat in Iraq would constitute a defeat in the war
    against terror and extremism and would make the world a much more
    dangerous place.
        Consider our other strategic challenges in the region: preventing
    Iran from going nuclear; stabilizing Afghanistan against a resurgent
    Taliban; the battle for the future of Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
    and others; protecting Israel's security; the struggle for Lebanon's
    independence. Does any honest observer believe those challenges will be
    easier to confront and at lesser cost in American blood and treasure if
    we are defeated in Iraq?
        I know the pain war causes. I understand the frustration caused by
    our mistakes in this war. I sympathize with the fatigue of the American
    people, and I regret sincerely the additional sacrifices imposed on the
    brave Americans who defend us. But I also know the toll a lost war
    takes on an army and a country. We, who are willing to support this new
    strategy, and give General Petraeus the time and support he needs, have
    chosen a hard road. But it is the right road.
        No one would disagree that the Army's increased operational tempo
    and multiple combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan have put our
    military, and especially our ground forces and special operations,
    under heightened burden. The announcement last week that the combat
    tours would be lengthened from 12 to 15 months reflects the complexity
    of the current circumstances.
        The purpose of today's hearing is to receive testimony on whether
    the Army and Marine Corps are properly sized, organized, and equipped
    to respond to the most likely missions over the next two decades.
        In recent months there have been reports that warn of costs on the
    troops and the readiness of the Army as a result of multiple
    deployments. This morning the committee will look forward to your
    responses to issues in this ongoing public debate on the readiness of
    our ground forces. The underlying concerns include: reports about the
    declining readiness of nondeployed units; the extremely high equipment
    usage rates; the departure of mid-grade officers and noncommissioned
    officers leaving the Service at higher rates; the over-reliance on the
    National Guard and Reserves as Active-Force augmentees; and the impact
    of the high operational tempo on Army families.
        Accordingly, you will be asked if the planned expansion of the Army
    can be accomplished soon enough to mitigate the impact of the current
    pace of the force and, subsequently, avoid the hollow military that
    some suggest may be looming: and will that expansion impact the
    Department of Defense's ability to modernize.
        In addition, the committee will want to examine whether the Army
    and Marine Corps's modernization and transformation programs will
    provide the country with the capability to provide relevant land power
    to both full spectrum combat missions and stability and support
    missions in this long war, and still be prepared for other uncertain
    and complex threats to our homeland defense and national interests.
    Accordingly, the committee will explore whether or not, and how, our
    military Army can concurrently modernize, transform, and restation the
    force under the demands of ongoing operations and rotation cycles.
        Addressing Congress at the end of his long and distinguished
    career, Douglas MacArthur admonished that, ``When America goes to war
    there can be no alternative to victory.'' With these simple words,
    MacArthur has given us the gauge, the standard, by which we need
    measure the size and organization of the future Army and Marine Corps.
    It is necessarily inexact and imprecise because such is the nature of
    war--it possesses an uncertainty that is exceeded only by the stakes
    which cause you to go to war in the first place. Much has changed in
    the world since General MacArthur uttered those words--but not our
    responsibility to provide America's sons and daughters the best
    equipment, the best training, the best care, and yes, the overwhelming
    superiority necessary to ensure that we leave no alternative to
    victory. Even then, however, success is not guaranteed. If today's war
    in Iraq has taught us anything, it is that the uncertainty of the
    battlefield of the future requires a level of planning and training and
    preparation and persistence that goes beyond our practice of the past.
        There is certainly quite a deal of ground to cover, so, in closing,
    I do not want to forget that in all of this America's sons and
    daughters who put themselves in harm's way each and every day. Their
    service and dedication is selfless and inspiring. I would also like to
    recognize Army families who have sacrificed so much.
        I thank our witnesses and look forward to their testimony.

        Chairman Levin. The evidence is overwhelming that our
    ground forces are under intolerable strain. Last week's
    decision, announced by the Secretary of Defense, that
    deployments of all Active Duty Army brigades in Iraq and
    Afghanistan would be immediately extended to 15 months, as
    would all future deployments, will worsen that strain. It is
    also one more indicator that the burden of over 5 years of war
    in Afghanistan, and going on 5 years of war in Iraq, is falling
    disproportionately on the Army and Marines; more specifically,
    on soldiers and marines and their families. Some units are on,
    or entering, their third year of Afghanistan or Iraq service,
    and some individual soldiers are on their fourth. Marine Corps
    units and marines have seen equal, or greater, numbers of
    deployments, although of shorter duration.
        The duration and intensity of the conflicts, beside wearing
    out the servicemembers, are tearing down the equipment at
    alarming rates. The readiness of nondeployed forces is at
    dangerously low levels as has been testified to by the former
    Army Chief of Staff and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.
        A DOD Inspector General (IG) report in January identified
    force protection equipment shortfalls among units deployed in
    Iraq and Afghanistan, including armored Humvees, electronic
    counter-improvised explosive devices (IEDs), machine guns,
    night-vision equipment, and radios. The Army and Marine Corps
    were unprepared for the insurgency that followed the fall of
    Saddam Hussein, requiring the Nation to frantically increase
    funding and production of armored vehicles, body armor, and
    other equipment required for occupation and counterinsurgency
    operations. In order to equip forces deployed to Iraq and
    Afghanistan, units not deployed are short equipment necessary
    to stay trained and ready. This increases the cost and time
    required for nondeployed units to get ready for their turn in
    the rotation. Equipment is wearing out faster than anyone
    planned, and the cost and time to repair and replace this
    equipment increases the pressure on unit predeployment
    preparation.
        The Ready Brigade that we have traditionally kept in
    reserve has now been committed and is not available for
    contingencies. According to a recent Time magazine article,
    ground forces face a laundry list of problems that undermine
    the readiness of our nondeployed forces, and makes preparing
    units to deploy that much more difficult, costly, and risky.
    Troops are being sent into harm's way with less training,
    shorter breaks, and worn-out equipment. Troops deployed to Iraq
    and Afghanistan more than once, and over 170,000 have been so
    far, are 50 percent more likely to suffer acute combat stress.
    Soldier suicide has grown at a steady rate--has shown a steady
    increase, rising from 51 confirmed in 2001 to 91 last year.
    Desertions are climbing. Manpower shortages exist. Reportedly,
    an artillery battery arrived in Iraq with only 72 percent of
    its required personnel. Since 2004, the Army employs a stop-
    loss policy that prevents 70,000 from leaving the Army at the
    end of their enlistment.
        To relieve some of the pressure on the Army, DOD has tasked
    20,000 Navy and Air Force personnel to perform traditional Army
    roles, such as combat convoy security and detainee guards.
        Recruiting is meeting its goals only with less qualified
    people. The lowest acceptable category of recruits has climbed
    to 4 percent of all enlistments. Only 81 percent of recruits
    have high-school diplomas, down from 94 percent in 2003 and
    below the DOD goal of 90 percent. The maximum enlistment age
    was raised from 35 to 42 years, with 12 percent of those over
    35 dropping out within 6 months of enlisting. Waivers for
    criminal records, medical problems, and low aptitude have
    climbed to over 8,000, well above the 4,900 of only 3 years
    ago.
        The dollar cost of recruiting and retaining soldiers is
    skyrocketing--$1 billion, this year and the next year, to
    recruit new soldiers; $600 million, in 2006, for re-enlistment
    bonuses. The Army will be at least 3,000 mid-level officers--
    captains and majors--short through 2013, with only 83 percent
    of the majors that it needs in aviation, intelligence,
    engineering, and military police.
        So, the Army and Marine Corps are clearly overstressed, and
    we must act promptly to fix those problems. But we must fix
    these problems in a way that positions those forces to meet the
    most likely, as well as the most dangerous, contingencies for
    the future. Secretary Rumsfeld said, and I paraphrase, ``You go
    to war with the Army you have, not with the Army that you need
    or wish you had.'' We never should hear words like that again,
    because unlike the Army that Secretary Rumsfeld sent, which was
    unprepared, underequipped, and ill-equipped to fight the
    insurgency in Iraq, we need to get it right before we commit
    future soldiers and marines. We need to ensure the Army and
    Marine Corps are properly organized, trained, and equipped to
    respond to the most likely contingencies of the next two
    decades, while retaining the capability to respond to all
    contingencies along the spectrum of combat.
        What are those most likely missions? Conventional force-on-
    force fights or counterinsurgency? Does organizing for one, the
    conventional mission, ensure that we can do the other, which
    may be the most likely and prevalent?
        Belatedly, after much pressure from members of this
    committee and others in Congress, the DOD intends to increase
    the size of the Army and Marine Corps. Had that decision been
    taken earlier, perhaps our soldiers and marines would be under
    less stress today. We need to examine these new plans for
    growth to determine the appropriate size of the ground forces
    to minimize risk across the spectrum of combat at optimal cost.
        Are the planned increases sufficient? Or must we add even
    more? Or, conversely, can we add fewer than are currently
    planned, and use those resources for other high-priority
    defense requirements? The Army and Marine Corps are planning to
    add additional combat units to help meet the demands of the
    current rotational cycles. But these additional units will
    probably not be available in time to relieve the stress on the
    current forces. We must ensure, as we grow the ground forces,
    that we don't simply create larger versions of the less-ready
    forces that we have today, or that we create forces which are
    ill-suited to the likely missions of the future.
        We also have to ensure that the Army and Marine Corps
    modernization plans are correctly targeted to give those
    services the necessary capabilities, and are adequately funded
    to do so. That might mean a larger defense budget, a
    differently apportioned defense budget, or both.
        For help in sorting through these issues, we've assembled a
    notable panel of experts in defense and national security
    studies: Dr. Lawrence Korb, Dr. Andrew Krepinevich, General
    (Retired) Barry McCaffrey, and Major General (Retired) Robert
    Scales. They're all well known to this committee and to the
    defense community. We value their expertise.
        We thank them for taking the time to join us today. Their
    written statements will be inserted in the record, and, to
    allow sufficient time for questions and discussion, we would
    hope that they would summarize their written statements in
    their opening remarks.
        Finally, let me express my appreciation to Senator
    Lieberman for his suggestion that these issues are most
    appropriate to be addressed at a full committee hearing instead
    of a three-subcommittee joint hearing, as originally
    contemplated. The committee began addressing these issues with
    a Personnel Subcommittee hearing on March 28 on military
    personnel matters, including recruiting. We will follow up this
    morning's hearing later this afternoon. I believe that's the
    schedule. The Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee
    holds a closed briefing with the Army and Marine Corps to go
    into details regarding the current readiness of our combat
    units. Subsequently, the Readiness and Management Support
    Subcommittee plans to invite nondeployed brigade commanders
    from the Army, Marine Corps, and National Guard to testify on
    the readiness of their units to respond to contingencies across
    the full spectrum of conflict, abroad or at home, and the
    challenges of manning, equipping, and training the force when
    not actively preparing to deploy to Iraq or Afghanistan. Next
    week, the Airland Subcommittee will hold a hearing with the
    acting Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army to receive
    their responses to this morning's hearing and to other
    questions. The Seapower Subcommittee is attempting to schedule
    a hearing to follow up on Marine Corps issues.
        Thank you, again, to our witnesses this morning for a very
    significant hearing.
        We will start with General McCaffrey.

    STATEMENT OF GEN BARRY R. McCAFFREY, USA (RET.), PRESIDENT, BR
                       McCAFFREY ASSOCIATES, LLC

        General McCaffrey. Senator Levin, thanks very much to you
    and the other members of the committee for the opportunity to
    come and appear before the committee.
        Let me also, if I may, qualify my remarks by saying I
    appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and
    talked about the war in Iraq and Afghanistan. I'll try and
    confine my remarks directly to the substance of your hearing,
    the readiness of ground combat forces.
        Seven quick assertions. I'd be prepared to either respond
    to your own questions or defend the assertions in the remainder
    of the hearing, but just put them on the table for us to
    consider.
        Number one, the Army and the Marine Corps are too small.
    I've been arguing, for the last 36 months, the Army's probably
    short by 80,000 or more; Marine Corps, by 25,000 or more. You,
    in your opening statement, cited some of the obvious evidence
    of that fact. I play a trick question with serving Army
    officers: How big is your Army? The answer always comes back
    wrong, because they don't take into account that the serving
    combat forces include huge numbers of National Guard and Army
    Reserve, as well as members of the Air Force and Navy. I look
    at combat logistics units headed up into Iraq from Balad, and
    you'll find sailors and airmen throughout that battle force.
    The Army is simply too small. One can argue it's the smallest
    Active Force since prior to World War II, trying to sustain
    this campaign.
        The second assertion is, the Army's ground combat equipment
    is a disaster. I've tried to put a number on it, and I think
    the answer is probably $212 billion. It's the cost of
    rebuilding not only our fighting-force equipment in the Active
    units, and the National Guard, and continuing a modernization
    program that has been badly dealt with. You look at the top
    projects on the DOD budget right now, number four is the Future
    Combat System (FCS); number 17 is Stryker. Those are the only
    two Army programs that break $1 billion. We're simply not
    funding the repair and reset of the Army ground combat
    equipment.
        Number three, the National Guard. It is hard for me, and
    after 5 years as drug policy director, I learned that, in this
    country, the only large-muscle organization, outside of the
    standing military, is the National Guard. In my view, it is
    vital to our security. It's being broken by a policy that
    essentially uses it as an alternative to the standing Army. In
    the coming year, I think we'll be forced to call up as many as
    nine National Guard combat brigades for second involuntary
    tours, never mind the combat service support units that have to
    come out of the Reserve components.
        Assertion number four--and this one, it's almost an out-of-
    body experience for me to listen to DOD spokesmen, such as Dr.
    Chu--I would argue, though Army reenlistment inside combat
    units in Iraq is superb--when you look at the morale, the
    spirit of our combat units in both areas of operation, it's
    superb--however, our recruiting, I would argue, is starting to
    unravel, and it's being masked by deliberate, deceptive number-
    keeping during the Rumsfeld era. The requirements have been
    kept artificially low by keeping stop-loss programs; calling up
    the Individual Ready Reserve, people who have been out of the
    military for 20 years and have zero relevant skills, they're
    just a body; by the sailors and airmen who have been jerked
    into the Active ground-combat role; and excessive use of the
    Reserves.
        My own gut feeling is that 10 percent of Army recruits are
    of poor caliber and should not be in uniform. They're in there
    under waivers for non-high-school graduate, moral turpitude,
    felony arrest, drug use. The notion that we're going to use 42-
    year-old first-term soldiers is simply laughable. We want
    teenaged boys and girls, and as old as maybe 30--that's who
    we're trying to get in, to carry M-16, M-4 rifles.
        I think we've also tried to keep the Army reenlistment-rate
    numbers depressed by changing our standards on Army basic
    training. There's no question to me that the flunkout rate in
    Army basic training was deliberately put low to try and keep
    bodies flowing into the Active Force. We've cut the dropout
    rate by two-thirds. I'm sure the Army will come up with
    arguments on why that was a rational move. I certainly don't
    blame them for trying to maintain the fighting strength of the
    forces, but we shouldn't kid ourselves that we're not keeping
    in uniform people who simply don't have the physical or mental
    capacity to serve in this demanding environment.
        Number five, an assertion: the Army's restationing strategy
    has been unexamined by the U.S. Congress. We have 200,000
    troops and families coming out of western Europe back to the
    United States. We're pulling troops out of Korea, Okinawa, and
    Japan. In all those theaters of operations, the base
    infrastructure, the training infrastructure, has been paid for
    largely or partially by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
    (NATO), the Korean Government, the Japanese Government, and
    others. We've ordered them home. The war's going to unravel in
    Iraq, I would assume, within 36 months. It's not clear to me
    that we have either the time or the resources devoted to
    restation these elements. They may well unravel, evaporate,
    simply because of the lack of a base to put them into.
        In addition, if you bring brigades out of central Europe,
    where they're 3-hours' flying time from Baghdad, and bring them
    back to Fort Riley and Fort Bliss, did we examine analytically
    how we get them back 7,000 miles to their theater of
    operations? In two senses--one, not just the base
    infrastructure--the railroad, highway, aviation capacity to
    launch them--but to what extent did we examine the U.S. Navy
    and Air Force capability to support an expeditionary
    continental United States-based military ground combat
    capability?
        I think the Air Force and the Navy, I might add--the number
    I'm using, I think, is probably low--have lost $55 billion of
    modernization money to put into Army and Marine ground combat
    operations. That's going to be a problem, not just in the long
    run, in terms of confronting deterring the People's Republic of
    China (PRC) expansionism in the coming 20 years, but, in
    addition, it argues that the Air Force has seriously
    underfunded programs like C-17 acquisition.
        Do we have the time--the bottom line is, do we have the
    time or the resources to build base areas to bring that--those
    combat forces home?
        Assertion number 6, I think we're at the knee of the curve
    in terms of loss rates in senior and mid-grade noncommissioned
    officers (NCOs) and middle-grade officers--captains, in
    particular. I think you're going to see a huge change in the
    caliber of that force as we start disproportionately losing
    Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) distinguished military
    grad kids and West Pointers, and we're going to have to
    scramble and replace them with dedicated, but probably lower-
    caliber, forces--officers out of the existing Army. We're short
    thousands of officers, as you state. Our promotion rates have
    skyrocketed to almost automatic promotion to make up for the
    shortfall.
        Then, the final assertion, for the first time, I would
    argue, since the end of Vietnam, we're faced with a situation
    where there is no strategic Reserve. There is no question in my
    mind, in the coming 10 years, that we will encounter shocks to
    our national security. We'll be attacked by terrorists, without
    question, in the coming decade. We will see the death of Castro
    and maybe a half-million Cubans at sea, where we're going to
    turn to our National Guard and ask them to safeguard people in
    a humanitarian disaster. We may well find interventions by the
    Syrians and North Koreans, the Iranians, or others. We simply
    do not have a strategic fallback position. The crisis will
    come, inevitably. I think this Congress, bottom line, I would
    urge, needs to step forward, under Article I of the
    Constitution--as I tell our cadets at West Point, you are
    charged with raising and supporting an Army and maintaining a
    Navy--not the administration.
        The bottom line, Mr. Chairman, members of this committee,
    it is my judgment we are in a position of strategic peril
    that's going to take us 3 to 5 years to get out of. The time
    now is for action.
        So, again, I thank you, sir, for calling this hearing, for
    the members of the committee being so engaged in the issue.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of General McCaffrey follows:]
            Prepared Statement by GEN Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (Ret.)
            the congress must step up to your constitutional duties
        Senator Levin and Senator McCain--Thank you for the opportunity to
    testify today. This Senate committee is a vital part of America's
    defense. Thanks to all of you on this committee for your intelligent
    oversight, your commitment to our Armed Forces, and for upholding
    Article 1 of the Constitution to raise and support an Army and maintain
    a Navy.
        America has a lot at stake in the coming 24 months. The war in Iraq
    is going badly. The under-resourced war in Afghanistan is now starting
    to turn around for the better despite the growing Taliban violence and
    the massive drag of opium production which has turned the Nation into
    the largest narco-state in history. The consequences of failure in Iraq
    will be a disaster to the American people and our allies if we cannot
    achieve our objective to create a stable, law-based state at peace with
    its neighbors--and which can create enough consensus among the three
    major warring factions of Shia, Kurds, and Sunni to govern without the
    continuation of the bitter civil war which now has engulfed the Iraqi
    people.
        We have 150,000 U.S. troops battling in Iraq and 22,000 fighting
    bravely in Afghanistan. These are the finest, most courageous military
    men and women we have ever fielded in battle. Their commanders--who
    have almost without exception at company, battalion, and brigade level
    served multiple combat tours--are the most capable battle leaders that
    I have encountered in my many years of watching our Armed Forces with
    admiration.
        Our new leadership team in Iraq--our brilliant new commander
    General Dave Petraeus and the equally experienced Ambassador Ryan
    Crocker--are launched on a new approach to use political
    reconciliation, new methods and equipment to strengthen the Iraqi
    security forces, and enhanced U.S. combat protective power to stabilize
    the situation. We must give them time and space. They need the budget
    supplemental passed quickly--and the required congressional political
    backing to push this one last chance at success in Iraq.
        However, the purpose of my testimony is not to talk about the
    ongoing tactical operations in Central Command--but instead the
    disastrous state of America's ground combat forces. Congress has been
    missing-in-action during the past several years while undebated and
    misguided strategies were implemented by former Secretary Rumsfeld and
    his team of arrogant and inexperienced civilian associates in the
    Pentagon. They have gotten us in a terrible strategic position of
    vulnerability. The Army is starting to crack under the strain of lack
    of resources, lack of political support and leadership from both the
    administration and this Congress, and isolation from the American
    people who have now walked away from the war.
        No one is actually at war except the Armed Forces, their
    contractors, and the Central Intelligence Agency. There is only
    rhetoric and posturing from the rest of our Government and the national
    legislature. Where is the shared sacrifice of 300 million Americans in
    the wealthiest nation in history? Where is the tax supplement to pay
    for a $10 billion a month war? Where are the political leaders calling
    publicly for America's parents and teachers to send their sons and
    daughters to fight ``the long war on terror?'' Where is the political
    energy to increase the size of our Marine Corps and U.S. Army? Where is
    the willingness of Congress to implement a modern ``lend-lease
    program'' to give our Afghan and Iraqi allies the tools of war they
    need to protect their own people? Where is the mobilization of
    America's massive industrial capacity to fix the disastrous state of
    our ground combat military equipment?
        We are fortunate that we now have a new Secretary of Defense Bob
    Gates--who is experienced, a patriot, and open to pragmatic logic on
    dealing with the perils we now face. Secretary Condi Rice is immensely
    experienced and now using the leverage of her powerful office to exert
    America's essential ``goodness'' in the diplomatic arena. The White
    House Chief-of-Staff Josh Bolton has now opened a frank dialog with
    many in the public policy arena to begin to build a unity we will need
    to deal with the international menaces we now face. We are not going to
    successfully deal with the many national security problems we now
    encounter unless Congress and the administration can hammer out a new
    strategy going forward which depends on international dialog, economic
    nation-building, and strong military determination and power.
                         the current army is too small
        Our Army has 44 brigades--but 23 are deployed. We cannot sustain
    the current rate (20+ brigades to Iraq; 2+ brigades to Afghanistan) of
    deployment. The Army will unravel.
        We will not be able to handle possible missions to Korea, the
    Taiwan Straits, the Balkans, Cuba (death of Castro), Syria, Venezuela,
    Darfur, and possibly Iran. We may be attacked by terrorists here in the
    continental United States. We may suffer from natural disasters--
    massive earthquakes or major hurricanes such as the devastation caused
    by Katrina in the Gulf Coast States.
        Last week, the Secretary of Defense announced a 3-month extension
    on all Army deployments--a 25-percent increase. This was a good call by
    Secretary Gates for Army families--we have been piecemealing out these
    extensions to an enormously over-committed force at the last minute.
    However, this is just another indication of inadequate Army manpower.
          the senate should conclude that we don't have enough troops
        The combat overload on the Army is having a negative effect on
    readiness. First time Active-Duty soldiers will spend more time at war
    than at home.
        We are encountering a negative effect on the retention of mid- and
    senior-grade noncommissioned officers. We also are already seeing the
    impact on the retention of company-grade officers.
        All ``fully combat ready'' Active-Duty and Reserve combat units are
    now deployed or deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan. No fully-trained
    national strategic Reserve brigades are now prepared to deploy to new
    combat operations.
        Secretary Gates has publicly stated that the 15 month extension
    recognizes that ``our forces are stretched . . . there's no question
    about that.''
        We have used a back-door draft to keep 70,000 soldiers in the Army
    with the ``stop loss program'' beyond their voluntary commitment. We
    have jerked 20,000 sailors and airmen into ground combat roles and
    taken them away from their required air and sea power duties. We have
    recalled as many as 15,000 Individual Readiness Reserve--in many cases
    these people had no current, relevant military skills. They were simply
    needed as bodies.
        We have called up all of our National Guard enhanced readiness
    combat brigades at least once for 18 months of combat requirements. The
    Reserve components have been forced to act as an alternate full-time
    combat extension of our active units with protracted deployments. This
    is not what they enlisted for--nor is it a sensible use of the National
    Reserve components.
                        senior army leaders have spoken
        Gordon Sullivan, the President of Association of the United States
    Army and former Army Chief of Staff (CSA) has publicly stated that even
    with 65,000 new GIs by 2012--the entire U.S. Army will only be 547,000
    soldiers--it should be 700,000. General Sullivan tells us that the Army
    and Marines are being asked to shoulder a disproportionate share of
    nation's burden.
        General Peter Schoomaker our just departed Army Chief-of-Staff
    stated that ``We have to go to some extraordinary measures to make sure
    that we have the ability to respond properly [to the President's surge
    strategy]. General Speakes noted: ``We can fulfill the national
    strategy but it will take us increased casualties to do the job.''
        In recent Senate testimony, the former Army CSA Pete Schoomaker
    said that the increase of 17,500 Army combat troops in Iraq represents
    only the ``tip of the iceberg''--and will potentially require thousands
    of additional support troops and trainers, as well as equipment--
    further eroding the Army's readiness to respond to other world
    contingencies.
        General Schoomaker further asserted to the Senate Armed Services
    Committee: ``I am not satisfied with the readiness of our non-deployed
    forces. . . . We are in a dangerous period.'' He added that he recently
    met with his Chinese counterpart, who made it clear that China is
    scrutinizing U.S. capabilities.
        Even if United States were to carry out a significant troop
    reduction in Iraq, General Schoomaker said in Senate testimony that he
    would advise going ahead with the Army's plan for a permanent increase
    of 65,000 active-duty soldiers by 2013. ``The Army's too small for the
    century we're in,'' he said.
                          the marines need more troops
        In recent Senate testimony, the Marine Corps Commandant General
    Conway discussed a required increase of Marine troops from 180,000 to
    202,000--an increase of 5 battalions. This marine increase will take 5
    years; it doesn't address the current shortage of marines.
        Deployment-to-dwell ratio is currently 1:1; DOD policy states that
    stateside training and recovery time should be 1:2. We do not have
    enough marines. The numbers speak for themselves.
        This increase in deployment-to-dwell ratio means a direct decrease
    in the readiness of deployed units to carry out the full range of
    missions required for our global fighting force.
        Over 70 percent of the proposed Marine Corps end strength increase
    will be comprised of first-time marines--challenging recruiting and
    retention efforts.
                      weakening of the army national guard
        The mathematics of our extended deployments suggest that we will be
    forced to call up as many as nine National Guard combat brigades plus
    required support forces in the coming 12 months for involuntary second
    combat tours--if we are to reset the force and create a strategic
    Reserve. (Note that DOD Assistant Secretary Chu states that this is
    ``no big deal.'')
        The second round of involuntary call-ups may finally topple the
    weakened National Guard structure which is so critical to U.S. domestic
    security.
        Eighty-eight percent of nondeployed Army National Guard units are
    rated as not ready or poorly equipped. The readiness of our National
    Guard forces is at a historic low.
        However, the Washington Post has reported that the Pentagon is
    still planning to rely on these unready forces to meet surge
    requirements.
        The Army Guard/Reserve is anticipated to grow to 20-30 percent of
    deployed combat forces.
        We are now seeing a high loss rate in both Active and Reserve
    components of senior NCOs, West Point graduates, and many other highly-
    qualified battle leaders.
     recruiting standards are compromised; troop basic training standards
                                are compromised
        The Army is lowering standards to meet enlistment goals and initial
    entry training standards in order to make manpower requirements.
    Recruitment will continue to be challenging as the Army tries to power
    up to add 65,000 permanent troops.

             In 2006, there was almost a 50-percent increase in
            waivers of enlistment standards from 2004--waivers for moral
            turpitude, drug use, medical issues and criminal records.
             Recruitment from least-skilled category recruits have
            climbed eight-fold over past 2 years; the percentage of
            recruits who are high school graduates dropped 13 percent from
            2004 to 2006.
             We are increasing the age of first-time enlistees--we
            are now enlisting 42-year-old soldiers. We should only want
            soldiers in superb health--from age 18- to about 30-years-old.
            The Army is not push-button warfare--this is brutal, hard
            business.
             The promotion rates for officers and NCOs have
            skyrocketed to replace departing leaders. We are short
            thousands of officers. We have serious mismatch problems for
            NCOs.
             We have been forced to use U.S. and foreign
            contractors to substitute for required military functions.
            (128,000 contractors in Iraq--includes more than 2,000 armed
            contractor personnel.) Thousands of these brave and dedicated
            people have been killed or wounded. They perform most of our
            logistics functions in the combat zone. (Transportation,
            maintenance, fuel, long-haul communications, food service,
            contractor operation of computer based command and control,
            etc.) Under conditions of great danger such as open warfare
            caused by Iranian or Syrian intervention--they will discontinue
            operations. Our logistics system is a house of cards.
      a lot of u.s. army combat equipment and too many air force air lift
                               assets are broken
        The shortfall on Army equipment is $212 billon to reset the force
    and its reserve stockpiles--as well as buy the required force
    modernization for the additional troops.
        The National Guard Bureau Chief, Lieutenant General Steven Blum, in
    House testimony, stated that the Army Guard has only 40 percent of its
    required equipment. (Generators, trucks, communications, helicopters,
    tentage, modernized fighting vehicles, medical equipment, etc.) We are
    compromising the quality of National Guard force training and limiting
    the Guard's ability to respond to domestic disasters; fundamentally the
    National Guard is in a ``degraded state back at home.''
        About 40 percent of Army/Marine Corps equipment is in Iraq or
    Afghanistan or undergoing repair/maintenance. We are now drawing down
    gear from prepositioned stocks of major equipment. (i.e., Humvees,
    tanks) The situation creates a U.S. strategic vulnerability since rapid
    deploying units will find their equipment is unavailable for other
    conflicts.
        LTG Blum has stated that even if the National Guard receives the
    funding currently pledged by the Army and Air Force--the equipment
    accounts will still be short $40 billion required to bring units back
    to 90 percent level of readiness.
        Equipment shortages mean troops train on outdated equipment--or
    equipment which is not identical to the material they will be using in
    combat.
        The nature and pace of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is
    wearing out critical equipment much faster than expected. In some
    cases, equipment is being used as much as nine times the intended
    peacetime training tempo.
        The DOD Inspector General (IG) concluded that U.S. troops are being
    sent into combat without the necessary equipment--troops are forced to
    delay operations while they wait for the right equipment to become
    available. (DOD/IG, Equipment Status of Deployed Forces.)
        The required number of late model Improved Humvees will not reach
    Iraq until the end of year. The latest models of uparmor Humvees will
    better protect against the advanced roadside bombs which currently
    cause about 70 percent of all U.S. casualties in Iraq.
        We are flying the wings off our C17, C5, and C130 fleet. We are
    being forced into excessive reliance on contract air lift for personnel
    and cargo. (To include former Soviet aircraft).
                                   conclusion
        We are breaking our commitment to our soldiers. In return for their
    voluntary service--we are not providing them with tools they need to
    carry out their mission. We must fix the broken equipment of the Army,
    Marines, and Air Force on a crash basis.
        We are failing our troops in that we are stretching them too thin
    and asking them to do more with much less. Many of these combat, CS,
    and CSS units are now serving on their third, fourth, or even fifth
    combat tour. 28,000 have been killed or wounded. Their training
    resources are being grossly short-changed. Their follow-on medical care
    is inadequate and under-resourced. We have ignored the reality of
    inadequate numbers of ground combat troops. We must increase the
    Active-Duty U.S. Army strength by 80,000 soldiers in the coming 36
    months. We must increase the Active-Duty marines by 25,000 troops. We
    must create the Special Operations Forces needed to protect us in the
    coming 25 years of the war on terror. We must buy the strategic airlift
    and air refueling requirements to deploy global combat power. (600+ C17
    aircraft for a single aircraft fleet.)
        The monthly burn rate of $9 billion a month in Iraq and $1 billion
    a month in Afghanistan has caused us to inadequately fund the
    modernization of the U.S. Air Force and Navy by diverting funds (as
    much as $55 billion) to support the ongoing ground war. If this
    continues, we will be in terrible trouble in the coming decade when the
    PRC emerges as a global military power--which we will then face in the
    Pacific with inadequate deterrence.
        Secretary Rumsfeld unilaterally pushed through a concept to bring
    our deployed military forces back from Europe, Okinawa, and South Korea
    without any debate on the strategic wisdom of leaving NATO/Japanese/
    Korean provided training and basing infrastructure--for an unfunded
    infrastructure requirement in the United States. Have we analyzed and
    funded the Air Force and naval resources required to project power from
    U.S. basing--back to operational areas in the global fight? How much
    time will be required to posture and build the U.S. transportation
    systems (rail, interstate highways, airports, and seaports) required to
    launch stateside units back to operational areas? Why is it a good idea
    to increase the separation of military families from their
    servicemembers--with a concept of unit unaccompanied deployments to
    rotational missions in the Balkans, etc?
        The U.S. Armed Forces are in a position of strategic peril.
    Congress must act.

        Chairman Levin. General, thank you for your testimony, for
    your service, and for all the contributions that you make on
    such an ongoing basis.
        Dr. Korb?

     STATEMENT OF DR. LAWRENCE J. KORB, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR
                           AMERICAN PROGRESS

        Dr. Korb. Mr. Chairman, I think you have summarized, in
    your opening statement, the current situation, so I won't go
    into that. I'll pick up on General McCaffrey's last comment,
    that we're in strategic peril, and address the concerns that
    Senator Warner mentioned.
        About a quarter of a century ago, we were in a similar
    situation, in terms of the All-Volunteer Military. In the
    leadership in this committee, you had a bill that was actually
    started, called Nunn-Warner--before we had Nunn-Lugar, we had
    Nunn-Warner--to deal with the situation. I think, as a result
    of that, with this committee and working with successive
    administrations, we were able to assemble probably, by all
    accounts, the finest military we ever had.
        Now, I think we learned an awful lot of lessons then that
    are important for now:
        The first thing we learned is that you don't lower your
    standards. It's better to take a smaller force than to lower
    your standards, because once you do that, it begins unraveling.
    This is something we did in the late 1970s, before people
    realized how bad the situation was.
        The next thing is that you need to have predictability for
    the people in the Service. The unwritten contract that you make
    with people is that if you're deployed for 1 year, you'll be
    home for 2 years. After I finished my testimony, I happened to
    watch Meet the Press on Sunday, and I think General Anthony
    Zinni, USMC (Ret.) put it very well. He said, ``Traditionally,
    you need three units for every one you have deployed. That's
    the ideal, in terms of training, reconstructing the unit, the
    kind of quality of life and family time necessary to rebuild
    the unit before it goes out.'' We're down to almost one-to-one,
    and, in fact, in some units, are not getting a year before they
    go back.
        Similarly, we learned that to keep a vibrant National
    Guard, you should not deploy people for more than 1 year out of
    every 5. In fact, that was the policy under Secretary Rumsfeld.
    Again, there's a certain amount of predictability. People have
    civilian careers, they have other concerns. When you do that,
    you're going to cause yourself problems.
        Now, in terms of where we are now--and you've all talked
    about the certainty--the readiness problems--but I think you
    also have a human--a moral dimension to this. We often talk
    about the fact that we cannot leave Iraq precipitously, because
    we have a moral obligation to the Iraqi people, having
    overthrown their government. Certainly, there is merit to that
    argument. We also have a moral responsibility to the young men
    and young women that we take into the service, to ensure,
    before we put them in harm's way, that, in fact, they are
    trained to the best of our ability to do so. As pointed out--
    you refer to the Time magazine article, I refer to it in my
    testimony--you're taking people--again, according to newspaper
    accounts--right out of basic training, putting them into units,
    they're missing the unit training out at Fort Irwin, and you're
    sending them into battle. The Time magazine article has a
    graphic description of a young 18-year-old man who missed the
    training cycles, joined the unit late December, was deployed in
    January, and then was killed by friendly fire in February. We
    do not know what would have happened had he been able to have
    that training, and bonded, and had this unit cohesion. But, the
    fact of the matter is, we should not be taking those risks.
        Now, Secretary Rumsfeld said, ``You go to war with the Army
    you have.'' We had a chance, as a Nation, right after September
    11, and particularly--this administration knew back then they
    were going to go to Iraq, as well as Afghanistan--to increase
    the size of the Army, to increase the size of the Marines. We
    did not take it. It's going to be much more difficult now.
        One of my relatives, a young man, tried to join the Navy.
    They wouldn't take him. I had been in the Navy, and somebody
    wanted me to call, and I said, ``What's the problem?'' It turns
    out that this young man had a driving-under-the-influence
    citation, and the Navy wouldn't take him. You know what the
    recruiter told me when I called? He said, ``Tell him to join
    the Army.'' That's the type of thing that I think we have to be
    very, very, very careful about. General McCaffrey talked about
    the moral waivers, over 8,000 last year.
        Now, we need to rebuild the force, and in my testimony I
    make a couple of points in there that I think we have to be
    very careful. We do need to rebuild the Army Ground Force. This
    so-called global war on terror is going to go on for a while,
    and you could have situations where we would have to send large
    numbers of ground troops in a place like Pakistan, for example,
    if that government should implode. When we do it, when you do
    it, I urge you, first of all, do not lower the standards. You
    have those standards. There's good, empirical evidence as to
    why we have the standards for high-school graduates and people
    who score average and above average on the Armed Forces
    qualification test.
        I came across an article the other day, it said that the
    Army National Guard has told their people to take many more of
    the Category 4s (Cat 4s). That's not the way to go.
        The next thing is, we cannot simply rebuild the Army that
    we have. You need to develop new capabilities, peacekeeping and
    counterinsurgency skills need to be developed.
        Third, you need to do it in a fiscally responsible way.
    Your staff pointed out to me last night the Congressional
    Budget Office (CBO) study that said adding the additional
    ground forces to the Army and Marine Corps is going to add to
    the defense budget, over the next 5 years, over $100 billion. I
    think $108 billion was the number. We have to make some
    tradeoffs.
        Senator Warner was kind enough to talk about some of us
    working to save the All-Volunteer Military in the 1970s, and
    one of the people, when we met with Senators Nunn and Warner,
    was former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird under President
    Nixon. One of the things he told me is, ``People, not hardware,
    have to be your highest priority if this is going to work.''
    So, you have to give priority to that, you have to make some
    tough choices in the rest of the budget.
        As I look at the budget, I think we have a lot of weapons
    that deal with threats from a bygone era, so I urge you to take
    a look at that, because, given the other constraints on the
    budget, in terms of Social Security as the baby-boomers start
    to retire, it's not going to be easy to add that money, over
    and above.
        Then, finally, I would say that what we need to do is get
    rid of constraints on personnel that are no longer relevant. I
    agree with General John Malchase David Shalikashvili, USA
    (Ret.), it's time to get beyond, ``Don't ask, don't tell.'' The
    Uniform Code of Military Justice is perfectly adequate for
    dealing with people who happen to be gay or lesbian. The same
    way, drop the artificial constraints on women in ground combat.
    As they have demonstrated over there in Iraq, they are
    perfectly capable of handling these missions, because there is
    no front line.
        Now, let me conclude with this. Can we make it on a
    volunteer basis? With this size Army, it's going to be very
    difficult if we stay in Iraq very long. The concept, when we
    went to the volunteer military, is, you would have a small
    Active Army. You would then have an Army National Guard that
    would be a bridge to conscription if you got involved in a long
    ground war. As I tell young people--and I go around and speak
    in a lot of college campuses: Why do you think we make men
    register? So they can see the post office? We make them
    register as a fallback. I think we have to take a look. I don't
    know what's going to happen. There's a lot of debate going on
    now about how long we will stay in Iraq and what we want to do.
    But, as Senator Levin mentioned, these additional units are not
    going to be available to deal with this situation in Iraq in
    the short-term.
        So, I do worry, and I conclude with a quote I heard the
    late General Davenport Maxwell Taylor, USA (Ret.) say. He said,
    ``We sent the Army to Vietnam to save Vietnam; we took the Army
    out of Vietnam to save the Army.'' The question really is, do
    we have to take the Army out of Iraq in order to save the Army?
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Korb follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Dr. Lawrence J. Korb
        Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and members of the Senate
    Armed Services Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before
    you with these genuine war heroes to discuss the current state of the
    Nation's ground forces. I cannot think of a more critical issue facing
    the Nation at this time.
        After more than 4 years of being engaged in combat operations in
    Iraq and 6\1/2\ years in Afghanistan, America's ground forces are
    stretched to their breaking point. Not since the aftermath of the
    Vietnam War has the U.S. Army been so depleted. In Iraq, about 3,300
    troops have been killed and another 24,000 wounded. The Army is
    severely overstretched and its overall readiness has significantly
    declined. As General Colin Powell noted in December even before the
    surge, the Active Army is about broken, and as General Barry McCaffrey
    has noted the ground forces are in a position of strategic peril. The
    Marine Corps is suffering from the same strains as the Army, and the
    situation for the Army National Guard is even worse. The decision to
    escalate or to ``surge'' more ground troops into Iraq will only put
    additional strain on the ground forces and threatens to leave the
    United States with a broken force that is unprepared to deal with other
    threats around the world.
        Army and Marine commanders will only be able to provide these
    additional troops by cutting corners on training and equipment and by
    putting additional stress on those in uniform. The unprecedented
    decision by Secretary Gates last week, that tours for Army brigades
    would be extended from 12 months to 15 months, is something that was
    not even done in Vietnam when we had over 500,000 troops on the ground
    or in Korea where we had over 300,000. This only further demonstrates
    the dire situation that the Army is facing.
        Meanwhile, the combat readiness of the total Army (Active units,
    the National Guard, and the Army Reserve) is in tatters. General Peter
    Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, conducted his own review
    of the military and concluded that there has been an overall decline in
    military readiness and that there is a significant risk that the U.S.
    military would not be able to respond effectively if it were confronted
    with another crisis. The simple fact is that the United States
    currently does not have enough troops who are ready and available for
    potential contingency missions in Iran, North Korea, or anywhere else.
    For example, when this surge is completed all four brigades of the 82nd
    Airborne will be deployed, leaving us with no strategic ground reserve.
    Even at the height of the Korean War, we always have kept one brigade
    in the continental United States. But it is not simply that so many of
    our soldiers are committed to Iraq, but that so much of the Army's and
    the Marine Corps' equipment is committed to Iraq as well.
        In the following four sections I will discuss the misuse of the
    All-Volunteer military in Iraq, the personnel and equipment challenges
    confronting the ground forces, and in the final section I will make
    some recommendations for rebuilding and expanding the ground forces.
                      iraq and the all-volunteer military.
        The current use of the ground forces in Iraq represents a complete
    misuse of the All-Volunteer Military. America's All-Volunteer Army,
    made up of well-equipped and highly-trained Active-Duty soldiers,
    backed up by a Ready Reserve, was designed to act as an initial
    response force, a force that would be able to repel and counter
    aggression. If America ever found itself in a long protracted ground
    war, or was forced to act against an existential threat, the All-
    Volunteer Force was to act as a bridge to re-instating conscription.
    This is why we require young men to register when they turn 18.
        The All-Volunteer Force, particularly the Army component, as
    General John Abizaid noted last fall, was not ``built to sustain a long
    war.'' Therefore, if the United States is going to have a significant
    component of its ground forces in Iraq over the next 5, 10, 15, or 30
    years, then the responsible course is for the president and those
    supporting this open-ended and escalated presence in Iraq to call for
    re-instating the draft. That would be the responsible path.
        In my view, however, this would be a mistake on par with the
    initial invasion of Iraq. Instead, I believe the United States should
    set a firm timetable for the gradual redeployment of U.S. forces over
    the next 18 months. During that time the United States should work to
    train and support Iraqi security forces and the Iraqi government while
    gradually handing over responsibility for security to the Iraqis. This
    action should be backed up with a diplomatic surge in which the United
    States would engage all countries in the region. There is no guarantee
    that this approach will be effective in stabilizing Iraq or the region.
    In fact, given the misleading justifications for the initial invasion
    and the way in which the Bush administration has conducted the war,
    there are no good options left. But I believe that this course, a
    strategic redeployment and a diplomatic surge, provides the best chance
    for stabilizing the region as well as mitigating the impact of Iraq on
    the ground forces and U.S. national security. As General Maxwell Taylor
    noted some three decades ago, ``we sent the Army to Vietnam to save
    Vietnam; we withdrew the Army to save the Army.'' The same is even more
    true for Iraq today.
                          ground forces overstretched
        Following September 11, the Bush administration had a tremendous
    opportunity to increase the size of the ground forces. Unfortunately,
    the President and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld pursued a misguided and
    naive policy. Instead of increasing the size of the ground forces they
    actually sought to cut them. This error was compounded when the Bush
    administration diverted its efforts from Afghanistan and proceeded to
    undertake an ill-advised invasion of Iraq. This strategic mistake has
    allowed the Taliban to reconstitute in Afghanistan, weakened the
    standing of the United States in the world, and has undermined the
    Nation's efforts in the fight against the radical extremists
    responsible for the attacks on September 11.
        Today there is little doubt that the ground forces are
    overstretched. In early March, we at the Center for American Progress
    released a study chronicling the effects that sustained deployments in
    Iraq are having on the Army.\1\ By analyzing every Army brigade we were
    able to convey the strain and fatigue placed on the force and
    illustrate its implications for our Nation's national security. The
    facts that we compiled are troubling:

        \1\ Lawrence Korb, Peter Rundlet, Max Bergmann, Sean Duggan, and
    Peter Juul, ``Beyond the Call of Duty: A Comprehensive Review of the
    Overuse of the Army in Iraq,'' Center for American Progress, March
    2006.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Of the Army's 44 combat brigades, all but the First Brigade
            of the Second Infantry Division, which is permanently based in
            South Korea, have served at least one tour. Of the remaining
            43:

                     12 Brigades have had one tour in Iraq or
                    Afghanistan
                     20 Brigades have had two tours in Iraq or
                    Afghanistan
                     9 Brigades have had three tours in Iraq or
                    Afghanistan
                     2 Brigades have had four tours in Iraq or
                    Afghanistan

        Additionally, the task of sustaining or increasing troop levels in
    Iraq has forced the Army to frequently violate its own deployment
    policy. Army policy holds that after 12 months of deployment in a
    combat zone, troops should receive 24 months at home for recuperation
    and retraining before returning to combat. Even before the surge, the
    Army had reduced dwell time to 1 year. Increasing troop levels in Iraq
    will only force the Army to place more strain on those serving. In
    fact, on April 2 the Pentagon announced that two units will be sent
    back to Iraq without even a year at home. Extending deployments and
    shortening dwell time cause havoc on the lives of those serving in
    uniform.
        It is also wrong, both militarily and morally, to send troops into
    a war zone who are not fully combat ready. Three units that are part of
    this surge show what happens when units do not receive what the Army
    calls the proper dwell time between deployments.

             The 1st Brigade of the Army's 3rd Infantry Division
            based at Fort Stewart became the Army's first brigade to be
            deployed to Iraq for the third time. It was sent over in
            January 2007 after about a year at home. But, because of its
            compressed time between deployments, some 150 soldiers joined
            the unit right out of basic training, too late to participate
            in the training necessary to prepare soldiers to function
            effectively in Iraq. Unfortunately one of the 18-year-old
            soldiers, Matthew Zeimer, who joined the unit on December 18,
            2006, was killed on February 2 after being at his first combat
            post for just 2 hours. He missed the brigade's intensive 4-week
            pre-Iraq training at the national training center at Fort
            Irwin, California, getting instead a cut rate 10-day course.
             The 4th Brigade of the Army's 1st Infantry Division
            based at Fort Reilly was sent to Iraq in February, about a year
            after it was reactivated. More than half of the brigade's
            soldiers classified as E-4 or below and are right out of basic
            training and the bulk of its mid-level non-commissioned
            officers in the ranks of E-5 and E-6 have no combat experience.
             The 3rd Division's 3rd Brigade was sent back to Iraq
            this month for the third time after spending less than 11
            months at home. In order to meet personnel requirements the
            brigade sent some 75 soldiers with medical problems into the
            war zone. These include troops with serious injuries and other
            medical problems, including GIs who doctors have said are
            medically unfit for battle. Medical records show that some are
            too injured to wear their body armor. According to Steve
            Robinson of Veterans for America, ``this smacks of an
            overstretched military that is in crisis mode to get people
            onto the battlefield.''

        The strain on personnel and the difficulty of recruiting new
    soldiers in the midst of an unpopular war has prompted the Army to
    relax many of its standards and dramatically increase enlistment and
    recruitment bonuses.
        While overall retention is good, the Army is keeping its numbers up
    by increasing financial incentives and allowing soldiers to reenlist
    early. Worryingly, however, retention among West Point graduates is
    declining and the Army's personnel costs continue to increase. Spending
    on enlistment and recruitment bonuses tripled from $328 million before
    the war in Iraq to over $1 billion in 2006. The incentives for Army
    Guard and Reserve have grown ten-fold over the same period.
        After failing to meet its recruitment target for 2005, the Army
    raised the maximum age for enlistment from 35 to 40 in January--only to
    find it necessary to raise it to 42 in June. Basic training, an
    essential tool for developing and training new recruits, has
    increasingly become a rubber-stamping ritual. Through the first 6
    months of 2006, only 7.6 percent of new recruits failed basic training,
    down from 18.1 percent in May 2005.
        Alarmingly, this drop in boot-camp attrition coincides with a
    lowering of recruitment standards. The number of Army recruits who
    scored below average on its aptitude test doubled in 2005, and the Army
    has doubled the number of non-high school graduates it enlisted last
    year. In 2006, only 81 percent of the new enlistees have high school
    diplomas, compared to 94 percent before the invasion. Even as more
    allowances are made, the Government Accountability Office reported that
    allegations and substantiated claims of recruiter wrongdoing have
    increased by 50 percent. Last May, for example, the Army signed up an
    autistic man to become a cavalry scout.
        The number of criminal offenders that the Army has allowed in the
    military--through the granting of ``moral waivers''--has also increased
    significantly. Last year, such waivers were granted to 8,129 men and
    women--or more than one out of every 10 new Army recruits. That number
    is up 65 percent since 2003, the year President Bush ordered the
    invasion of Iraq. In the last 3 years, more than 125,000 moral waivers
    have been granted by America's four military services. A senior
    noncommissioned officer involved in recruiting and retention summarized
    the situation well when he told The New York Times on April 9, 2007,
    ``We're enlisting more dropouts, people with more law violations, lower
    test scores, more moral issues. . . We're really scraping the bottom of
    the barrel to get people to join.'' Private Steven Green, the soldier
    arrested for his alleged role in the rape of an Iraqi girl and the
    murder of her family, was allowed to join the Army upon being granted
    one such moral waiver. Green had legal, educational, and psychological
    problems, didn't graduate from high school and had been arrested
    several times.
        Most of last year's Army waivers were for serious misdemeanors,
    like aggravated assault, robbery, burglary, and vehicular homicide. But
    around 900--double the number in 2003--were for felonies. Worse, the
    Army does no systematic tracking of recruits with waivers once it signs
    them up, and it does not always pay enough attention to any adjustment
    problems.
                                readiness crisis
        Currently there are virtually no Active or Reserve Army combat
    units outside of Iraq and Afghanistan that are rated as ``combat
    ready.'' The Army has deployed 20 of its 43 available Active-Duty
    combat brigades--meaning that virtually all its forces are either in
    Iraq or are preparing to return there. In order to ensure that troops
    fighting in Iraq are fully equipped, units rotating out of Iraq have
    been leaving behind their equipment for units taking their place. The
    units that return home are often so depleted that the Marines have been
    referring to this phase as the `post-deployment death spiral.'
        As a result, combat-readiness worldwide has deteriorated to crisis
    levels. The equipment in Iraq is wearing out at four to nine times the
    normal peacetime rate because of combat losses and harsh operating
    conditions. As we have documented in studies done in coordination with
    the Lexington Institute, the total Army--Active and Reserve--now faces
    at least a $50 billion equipment shortfall and the Marines about $15
    billion.\2\ Without equipment, it's extremely difficult for nondeployed
    units to train for combat. Thus, one of the hidden effects of the Iraq
    war is that even the troops not currently committed to Iraq are
    weakened because of it.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ Lawrence J. Korb, Loren B. Thompson, Caroline P. Wadhams,
    ``Army Equipment After Iraq,'' Center for American Progress and the
    Lexington Institute, April 2006; Lawrence J. Korb, Loren B. Thompson,
    Max A. Bergmann, ``Marine Corps Equipment After Iraq,'' Center for
    American Progress and the Lexington Institute, August 2006.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        To equip those on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army and
    the Marines have been drawing down their prepositioned equipment stocks
    around the globe. These stocks are stored on ships or in strategic
    locations around the world to enable deploying units to be supplied
    rapidly. These stocks have been extensively diminished and limit the
    ability of the United States to respond to possible crises around the
    world. For instance, the Marine Corps has drawn down their
    prepositioned Reserve equipment stocks in the Pacific and Europe by up
    to 70 percent. The Army and Marines have been so overstretched that the
    United States has almost no ready Reserve of ground forces to
    effectively deal with a potential crisis on the Korean peninsula, in
    Iran, or in unstable Pakistan, for example, or to help alleviate the
    grave humanitarian crisis in Darfur.
        The Reserve component is also in tatters. Lieutenant General Steven
    Blum, the head of the National Guard Bureau, stated that the National
    Guard is ``in an even more dire situation than the Active Army but both
    have the same symptoms; I just have a higher fever.'' The Pentagon has
    had to increasingly employ the National Guard and Reserve in order to
    meet demands on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan.
        Both the Army Guard and Reserve began the wars in Afghanistan and
    Iraq with their units short tens of thousands of soldiers, or about 15
    to 20 percent, and lacking more than 30 percent of their necessary
    gear. Those shortages have deepened as people and equipment are
    borrowed from units staying home to fill out those about to go
    overseas. According to Lieutenant General Clyde A. Vaughn, Chief of the
    Army National Guard, what the Guard is trying to deal with right now is
    ``a situation where we have absolutely piecemealed our force to
    death.''
        To make matters worse, the Pentagon is set to notify National Guard
    brigades to prepare again for duty in Iraq. Some 12,000 troops are
    scheduled to be deployed to Iraq early next year. This would be the
    first time that full Guard combat brigades would be sent to Iraq for a
    second tour. These deployments are becoming increasingly necessary
    because the regular Army is not large enough to handle the mission in
    Iraq on its own. Originally these Guard units were to serve no more
    than 24 months total. However, these units and others in the Guard have
    already served 18 months--with training time and time in Iraq or
    Afghanistan--and now they are looking at least another 12 months in
    Iraq.
                   expanding and rebuilding the ground forces
        Secretary Gates' decision to expand the Army and Marines is long
    overdue. At the Center for American Progress we have been calling for
    such an expansion for the past 4 years. However, the difficult
    situation facing the Army and the Marines requires a long-term approach
    toward expanding and rebuilding the ground forces. Increasing the size
    of the Army and Marines will not help the situation on the ground in
    Iraq. Instead, growing these forces is about preparing America's
    military for the future. I have the following recommendations:
    Don't Lower Standards
        The Army and Marines should meet their new end-strength goals
    without relaxing recruitment standards or retention and promotion
    criteria. In order to ensure the Army and Marines continue to get the
    best and the brightest, the current target of adding 7,000 soldiers and
    5,000 marines per year is too ambitious in light of current
    circumstances and should be scaled back. Recruitment and retention
    standards should return to at least pre-Iraq standards. Congress must
    make sure that the quality of U.S. military personnel does not slide as
    it did in the 1970s. It is worth waiting a few extra years to ensure
    that the Army and Marines attract the men and women who possess the
    specialized skill sets needed for an effective 21st-century military.
    Expand with a Focus on Peacekeeping and Counterinsurgency Operations
        Following the war in Vietnam, instead of building off the
    experience of fighting an unconventional force, the military adopted
    the mantra of ``no more Vietnams'' and shifted its focus back to
    confronting conventional threats. We cannot make this same mistake
    today. It is clear going forward that America's ground forces have to
    be prepared to engage an entire spectrum of operations, from
    conventional ground combat to humanitarian and peacekeeping operations.
    The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that while our ground
    forces remain conventionally unmatched, there is significant room for
    improvement in our ability to conduct counterinsurgency and
    peacekeeping operations. In my view, the U.S. Army should consider
    developing specialized ``peacekeeping'' or ``stabilization and
    reconstruction'' brigades. Such specialized brigades would alter both
    the type of recruit the Army is seeking and the type of person who
    might be interested in joining the Army. It is important, therefore,
    that the decision about whether to create specialized brigades of this
    sort be made as soon as possible.
    Grow the Forces in a Fiscally Responsible Manner
        Growing the ground forces is an expensive endeavor. The current
    average annual cost of maintaining a single service member already
    exceeds $100,000. Currently the defense budget is severely unbalanced.
    Despite claims that September 11 changed everything, during Secretary
    Rumsfeld's tenure only two weapons systems were canceled. Many of the
    current weapons programs are unnecessary relics that were borne out of
    Cold War-era thinking. The challenge confronting the Army and Marines
    in terms of both escalating personnel costs and the deepening equipment
    crisis requires significant congressional attention and funding.
    Expanding the ground forces and recovering from Iraq and Afghanistan
    should be the overriding priority of the defense budget.
    Open up the Military to all Americans who Possess the Desire, Talent,
            and Character to Serve
        The Army and Marine Corps cannot afford to place unnecessary
    obstacles in the way of qualified men and women who want to serve. To
    this end, the military should make two major changes to its personnel
    policy.

             First, repeal the ``don't ask, don't tell'' policy.
            The ``don't ask, don't tell'' policy is counterproductive to
            military readiness. Over the past 10 years more than 10,000
            personnel have been discharged as a result of this policy,
            including 800 with skills deemed ``mission critical,'' such as
            pilots, combat engineers, and linguists. These are the very job
            functions for which the military has experienced personnel
            shortfalls. General John M. Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the
            Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1993 when the ``don't ask, don't
            tell'' policy was enacted, no longer supports the policy on the
            grounds that allowing gay men and women to serve openly in the
            military would no longer create intolerable tension among
            personnel and undermine cohesion. Additionally, a recent Zogby
            poll supports this view. It found that three-quarters of
            Afghanistan and Iraq veterans were comfortable interacting with
            gay people.
             Second, all military occupations should be open to
            whoever qualifies, regardless of gender. Currently, the Army
            prohibits women from serving in infantry, field artillery, and
            Special Forces units that directly engage the enemy on the
            ground. The idea that women who possess the requisite mental
            and physical skills should somehow be ``protected'' from the
            dangers of combat fails to acknowledge the reality of the
            modern battlefield and the role women are already playing in
            Iraq and Afghanistan. Nearly 100 women have been killed in
            these wars. We only impede our ability to build a 21st century
            military by constructing barriers where none need exist.

        Twenty-six years ago I was fortunate enough to be confirmed by this
    committee to assume responsibility for the readiness of the Armed
    Forces. Because of Vietnam and its immediate aftermath, this nation had
    what the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army called a ``hollow army.'' With
    the help of Congress, and in particular this committee, we were able to
    reverse this situation. Successive administrations and Congresses
    continued to maintain the quality of the force. It is hard to believe
    that the Bush administration has allowed the readiness of our ground
    forces to deteriorate so rapidly in so short a time. I urge Congress
    and this committee to take the initiative in fixing the problem.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Dr. Korb.
        General Scales, you're next.
        Thank you.

     STATEMENT OF MG ROBERT H. SCALES, JR., USA (RET.), PRESIDENT,
                              COLGEN, INC.

        General Scales. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
    the opportunity to testify today.
        I think, in the various pieces that we've written, and in
    our statements for the record, General McCaffrey and the rest
    of my colleagues have talked about the conditions of the Army.
    What I'd like to do, sir, is just cast forward a little bit,
    because I think it's important to emphasize that, oftentimes,
    times of stress, times of great stress for a military, are just
    the times when the military can take stock of its condition and
    plan for how to reform itself and how to rebuild itself. All of
    us have gray hair here who are testifying, and all of us
    remember the days in 1971, 1972, and 1973, when the Army began
    the process of rebuilding during wartime. So, let me cast, for
    a moment, into the future and talk about three aspects of the
    next decade or so, as we look to reform and rebuild the Army
    and the Marine Corps.
        First, I have to agree with everyone here, we simply have
    an Army and a Marine Corps that's too small. Senator Levin,
    remember 2 years ago, you and I and Senator Clinton and
    Lieutenant General Daniel W. Christman, USA, stood in the
    Senate and talked about 100,000 more forces needed for both.
    That was 2 years ago, and only about 4 months ago was a
    decision made to increase the military by about that number. I
    think it's just incontestable now that the Army and the Marine
    Corps need to be bigger. But the important question to ask is,
    if we're going to increase the size of the ground forces, how
    will we shape them? Clearly, we need to build a combat force in
    the future that's capable, not just of intervention, but
    capable of persistent presence overseas. I've heard different
    numbers thrown around, but the number that seems to support
    persistent presence in theaters of war is about 50 brigade
    combat teams.
        But it's also important to remember, sir, that an Army is
    more than a collection of brigades, that, in fact, the Army
    that we build to the future has to be able to do more than just
    deploy brigades, it has to be able to build coalitions of
    willing partners, it has to deal with alien cultures, it has to
    provide advisors and trainers and instructors to build country
    teams and military advisory groups. These are functions beyond
    just mere intervention.
        President Lincoln, in the Civil War, used to talk about the
    arithmetic. One of the facts we have to remember from this
    terrible experience in Iraq is the arithmetic. What he meant by
    that was, as soon as the bullets start to fly, soldiers start
    to die and armies begin to attrit over time. The arithmetic is
    not our choice; it's determined by the actions of an enemy. In
    virtually every war we've fought since the Civil War, we have
    run out of close combat soldiers, because we go to war with an
    Army that is not robust enough to last the duration. If we're
    going to fight wars in the future with a long-service
    professional force, the lesson we should take away from what's
    happening today is, the force you begin the war with will
    probably not get any bigger or any better through the duration
    of the conflict.
        So, it's important, as we add more troops, to do a couple
    of things. We have to build robustness into our brigades. The
    101st, in World War II, added an extra 1,000 infantrymen to
    every regiment. That's why the Band of Brothers principle works
    so well, because, by the time they got to Holland, they were
    still full strength, tightly coalesced, tightly bonded units,
    because they had built robustness into their units. We have to
    consider increasing the leader-to-led ration. We have to
    increase the number of leaders, because these same soldiers not
    only have to be members of deployed units, but they have to
    perform these other combat functions, as well.
        Also, it's important to realize that, other than brigades,
    if we're going to fight this new style of war, we need
    nonbrigade types of units: civil affairs, psychological
    operations, military police, and engineers.
        The second issue deals with reforming the Army's materiel.
    It would be a mistake, in my mind, if we took the cheap
    alternative, if you will, for rebuilding the Army, and simply
    brought back our Cold War materiel, refurbished it, and put it
    back on the shelf for the future. I believe that history, that
    experience in this war, and that all of the analysis that I've
    ever seen, argues for the core of the Army, as we move into the
    future, needs to consist of light, mobile, flexible, middle-
    weight mechanized forces. Certainly, light forces are useful,
    but one of the lessons we learned is that the price you pay for
    fighting dismounted in places like Fallujah and Ramadi is very
    high. The optimal force for a counter-guerrilla or
    counterinsurgency force is one that is dense in infantry,
    that's able to move about the battlefield very quickly, that is
    efficient in the use of fuel and maintenance, such that it
    doesn't rely on that very dangerous, huge, logistical umbilical
    cord which is causing so many casualties, that it's infantry-
    heavy, and that it's able to put more soldiers under armor, for
    longer periods of time, closer to the enemy.
        So, it's important, I think, to recall that the force
    that's fighting in Iraq today is a legacy force. It was
    designed to fight on the plains of western Europe. If we're
    going to fight pre-insurgency and insurgency campaigns in the
    future, we're going to have to not only fix what we have
    already, but design a new force for the future.
        The third point I want to make is that we've all come back
    to the realization that war--this war and virtually every war
    we've fought--is as much a human as it is a technological
    enterprise, and that as we look into the future, the human,
    cultural, and cognitive dimensions of war are becoming
    increasingly important.
        It's important to also realize that in counterinsurgency
    wars, the focus of action moves from the strategic and the
    operational down to the tactical level, that success in these
    types of wars is determined by the ability to knit together, to
    mold together small units--squads and platoons--that are
    superbly efficient and effective at what they do. The strategy
    in a counterguerrilla campaign is to knit together, to weave
    together a series of tactical successes. As the focus moves
    down the level of command, the human factor, then, becomes as
    important, or more important, than the materiel and the
    technological factor. Therefore, this requires a reform of our
    human capital. You can't throw money at this. It takes time to
    develop great leaders, flexible and adaptive leaders. It takes
    time to develop great squads and platoons. Unfortunately,
    because of the rotation scheme today, our Army and Marine Corps
    have simply become too busy to learn.
        So, as we move into the future, Mr. Chairman, we have to
    make a commitment to send the Army and the Marine Corps back to
    school. Education becomes important. We have to rebuild our
    institutional Army, and put instructors back on the platform.
    Sadly, the Army, because of its shortage of officers, has
    actually had to contract out the instructor duties. Recall, in
    World War II, 31 of the 35 successful Corps commanders in World
    War II had spent at least 3 years instructing in the Army's
    school system. Today, contractors perform that function.
        We have to help our soldiers become more culturally aware,
    give them culture training and help them learn languages so
    they can deal with alien cultures. We have to develop a special
    cadre of leaders with qualifications as advisors and
    instructors; and to do this, we have to send them back to
    school. It's important that they shouldn't have to pay a
    professional price for improving their human capital. We have
    to reward these initiatives, rather than punish them.
        Finally, let me end on the importance of making better
    small units. This is a process that can't be hurried. Like a
    good wine, a small unit takes time to mature. It takes years
    for a small unit to bond, to coalesce, and to become a Band of
    Brothers. These are national treasures. They're precious and
    rare commodities. These are the soldiers and marines who do
    virtually all of the killing and dying. So, we have to treat
    them much like a professional sports team. We have to be able
    to put the resources into small units to provide the means of
    assessing leaders, stressing the soldiers to make sure that
    they can perform these tasks, to have a sort of Top Gun, if you
    will, for these small units to learn how to fight bloodlessly
    before, as Larry says, they're put into the crucible of war and
    have to learn to fight by fighting, which is the most wasteful
    way to train soldiers.
        I guess I'll end by saying that inadequate manpower is not
    a new issue. It's generational. It goes back, over 50 years, to
    the Korean War. We've learned, I think, painfully, in this war
    and other wars, that ``shock and awe'' won't work. The reason
    it doesn't work is because the enemy has a vote. There's this
    great quote from Ho Chi Minh, who, when asked, in 1964, how he
    ever expected to beat the American Army, said, prophetically,
    ``They will kill many of us, we will kill a few of them, and
    they will tire of it first.'' He understood, just like al Qaeda
    understood--or understands--that killing Americans is not a
    means to an end, but it's an end in itself. Those Americans
    most likely to die in this war and in future wars, I would
    suggest, are soldiers and marines.
        So, not only from the standpoint of humanity, but also from
    the standpoint of strategic direction, it's important to do all
    we can to find the best men and women for the Army and the
    Marine Corps, to equip them adequately, and, most importantly,
    to increase the value of their human capital so they will win
    on the battlefield and stand much less a chance of becoming
    killed or wounded.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of General Scales follows:]
           Prepared Statement by MG Robert H. Scales, Jr., USA (Ret.)
        The condition of our ground force is troubling. Two thirds of our
    regular brigades and virtually all of our Reserve brigades are not
    combat ready. The Army's Cold War Reserves of fighting equipment are
    nearly gone with half destroyed or worn out though constant overuse.
    Too many soldiers chasing too many missions for too long have resulted
    on an Army that spends more time in combat than at home. The stress of
    back to back deployments has created uncertainty and anxiety among
    military families that is affecting the morale and resolve of those who
    we will rely on to fight the long war for a generation.
        These conditions are too well documented to dispute. The issue at
    hand is what to do next. Past history tells us that often the adversity
    and stress of war can lead to renewal and rebirth. The Army came out of
    the trauma of Vietnam resolved to rebuild. That same opportunity exists
    today.
                            a larger landpower force
        No one from the Vietnam generation ever would have foreseen that
    America's ground forces would be so stretched for so long without
    breaking. The robustness and resiliency of the forces in Iraq and
    Afghanistan testifies to the value of fighting the long war with a long
    service professional Army and Marine Corps. The bad news is that the
    Pentagon has grossly underestimated the number of ground forces needed
    to fight this long war. We have learned painfully that the challenge of
    recruiting a professional force during wartime dictates that the number
    and quality available at the beginning of the conflict will never get
    larger or better. The consequences of this miscalculation have been
    strategic as well as personal. For the first time since the Civil War
    the shrinking pool of soldiers is shaping strategy rather than strategy
    determining our manpower needs.
        The lesson for the future is clear. We simply cannot rely on Cold
    War manning models to tell us how many soldiers and marines we need.
    Pentagon personnelists know a great deal about human resource
    management but very little about war. We must plan future force
    structures to accommodate the sad fact that wars wear down armies. We
    must build robustness into our ground forces, particularly our close
    combat units, the ones who do most of the fighting and dying.
        The planned increase in the size of ground forces is a proper
    beginning. The Army's effort to modularlize an increased number of
    brigade combat teams will make the best use of this additional
    manpower. But it is also important to remember that ground forces of
    the future will be made up of more than just brigades. We will need a
    very strong corps of trainers, advisors and military assistance groups
    capable of being sustained for decades in regions of the world where
    new allied armies will be created or improved. We will need many more
    specialized units to assist in nation building such as special
    operating forces, civil affairs, military police and engineers.
        How much should the Army grow? If the Army is to restore the
    optimal ratio of three brigades for every brigade deployed then at
    least fifty brigade combat teams will be needed to maintain any
    reasonable presence and fighting capability for the long war. But
    experience in Iraq shows that casualties will begin to reduce the ranks
    of these brigades once in combat. So additional close combat soldiers,
    mainly infantry, armor and Special Forces must be added above and
    beyond the proscribed table of allowances to insure that these brigades
    will be sufficiently robust to sustain themselves over an extended
    campaign. In addition the Army and Marine Corps will need to increase
    the proportion of leaders to followers, the so called ``leader to led
    ratio,'' in order to provide additional skilled leaders to advise,
    train, and instruct coalition partners in the war against radical
    Islamism.
                                    materiel
        Attrition of the Army's fighting materiel due to wear and combat
    damage in Iraq presents an opportunity for the Army to rebuild its
    arsenal. One rebuilding alternative would be to expand the number of
    light foot mobile infantry and Special Forces brigades. These units are
    relatively inexpensive to equip and are particularly useful in terrain
    where vehicular traffic is difficult such as in Afghanistan. But 50
    years of experience in American wars has shown that fighting on foot is
    very costly in human life. Since the end of World War II, four out of
    five Americans from all the Services killed at the hands of the enemy
    have been light infantry, not soldiers and marines, but light infantry,
    a force that comprises less than 4 percent of those in uniform.
        In contrast, when soldiers and marines fight mounted in vehicles
    their chance of survival in battle increases an order of magnitude.
    Thus it makes sense to rebuild the Army around a core of mechanized
    brigades. At first glance the cheapest way to rebuild the Army's
    mounted fighting force would be to repair the mountain of Cold War gear
    that served the Army so well in the Gulf War and put it back into
    action. Unfortunately, this generation of Abrams tanks and Bradley
    fighting vehicles offers protection to be sure but protection
    unsuitable for today's battlefield. Tanks designed to fight on the
    plains of Europe in huge tank on tank engagements required very thick
    and very heavy frontal armor. It's interesting to note that in the
    practical laboratory of real combat frontal armor hasn't been terribly
    useful. Of the tens of thousands of American soldiers killed in wars
    since the end of World War II fewer than ten died in tanks struck on
    the front.
        Weight extorts a very heavy price in diminished capability. Heavy
    Cold War era fighting vehicles cannot move great distances. They
    consume a huge amount of fuel that must be transported by vulnerable
    unarmored convoys from Kuwait to Baghdad. They cannot be easily
    transported by air. It takes a multitude of repairmen, many of them
    civilian contractors and a huge base infrastructure to keep them
    running in the punishing heat and dust of Iraq. As we have seen from
    Generals Petraeus's recent success in Baghdad fighting a dispersed
    insurgent is best done by infantry who are able to disperse in turn and
    stay dispersed for very long periods. The logistics and support demands
    of Cold War fighting vehicles prevents them from operating for very
    long in entities much smaller than a brigade while their cramped crew
    compartments limit severely the number of infantry they carry into
    battle. The actual price of keeping Cold War materiel in action will
    actually be very expensive because over the long term these antiques
    will cost more in maintenance and soldier overhead than the fighting
    systems intended to replace them.
        To be sure the Army will continue to need very heavy Cold War
    equipped and very light units in some proportion. But a half century's
    worth of combat experience, to include most recent experience in Iraq,
    supports the contention that the majority of future ground units should
    consist of mechanized brigades equipped with a high density of compact,
    medium weight, easily transportable fighting vehicles such as Stryker
    today and the Future Combat System tomorrow. We learned in Iraq that
    more soldiers can be kept alive in combat by placing more of them under
    armor and allowing them to remain under armor for longer periods.
    Experience in close combat in places like Falluja suggest that survival
    rates increase when soldiers are able to move in closer to the enemy
    before dismounting in the tactical fight. In addition lighter, more
    agile, reliable and fuel efficient armored vehicles will greatly reduce
    the size and vulnerability of the logistical umbilical cord that has
    proven so costly to maintain in Iraq. Medium weight brigade combat
    teams carry far more infantry into combat, the essential component for
    counter insurgency operations.
        Future medium weight brigades compensate for less bulk and weight
    by their ability to see and engage the enemy from great distances using
    broad assortments of aerial and ground sensors. Much of the dirty and
    dangerous work of tomorrow's mounted soldiers will be done by unmanned
    robots controlled from FCS fighting vehicles. Future mounted soldiers
    will have access to the power of a digital network that will provide
    them with immediate information about the enemy and the whereabouts of
    fellow soldiers. Future brigades will be able to subdivide easily into
    much smaller fighting units, at least to company and probably down to
    platoon, in order to better meet and defeat an insurgent enemy at his
    own level.
        Properly equipping the Army to win the Long War will be very
    expensive. But we have fought 12 wars in the last 30 years and all but
    1 has been decided on the ground. We will fight another one sooner than
    any of us would like so we must start now to build the fighting
    equipment for a new Army rather than put yesterday's Army back on the
    shelf.
              cultural and cognitive dominance on the battlefield
        All of the pre-September 11 military pundits who forecast quick
    victory through shock and awe and precision strike are a distant
    memory. The techocentric view of war has failed because it denied the
    fundamental truth that war is inherently a human rather than a
    technological enterprise. The future will only increase the relative
    importance of the human, cultural and cognitive aspects of war. We will
    continue to witness the classical centers of gravity shift from the
    will of governments and armies to the perceptions of populations.
    Success in battle will be defined as much in terms of capturing the
    human and cultural rather than the geographical high ground.
    Understanding and empathy are already important weapons of war. The
    ability to build ties of trust will offer protection to our troops as
    effectively as body armor. Leaders will seek wisdom and reflective
    thought rather than operational and planning skills as essential
    intellectual tools for guaranteeing future victories.
        Human capital cannot be bought. It must be accumulated through
    learning and reflective thought. Unfortunately our soldiers and marines
    have become too busy to learn at a time when learning has never been so
    important to the future success of our military. World War II leaders
    understood the truism that students gain knowledge while teachers gain
    wisdom. Thus it was no accident that 31 of the Army's 35 corps
    commanders taught at service schools. Today many of our institutions
    contract out teaching to civilians because so few serving officers are
    available for the classroom. After Vietnam the Army sent 7,400 officers
    to fully funded graduate education. Today that figure is about 450,
    half of whom are studying to join the weapons buying community.
        The Army's school system is starved for resources and is unable to
    make best use of the dismally limited time available to soldiers for
    learning. Before Vietnam some of our best universities such as Duke,
    Yale, and Princeton had vibrant defense studies programs that gave
    future combat leaders the opportunity to learn from many great teachers
    of the art of war. For the most part those programs and teachers are
    gone; victims of an academic culture that somehow believes that
    ignoring the study of war will make wars go away.
        As the Army begins to pull back from Iraq it must go back to
    school. Talented officers and senior non commissioned officers should
    be given a ``soldier's sabbatical'' to attend the best civilian
    graduate schools to study alien cultures and the art of war. More
    senior officers should be assigned to instructor duties at all of the
    Army's schools of higher learning. Both students and teachers must be
    rewarded professionally for their intellectual as well as their
    operational proficiency.
        Cultural isolation in Iraq creates a tragic barrier separating
    Iraqis of good will from the inherent goodness that American soldiers
    demonstrated so effectively during previous periods of occupation in
    such places as Korea, Japan, and Germany. This cultural wall must be
    torn down. Lives depend on it. Every young soldier should receive
    cultural and language instruction. The purpose would not be to make
    every soldier a linguist but to make every soldier a diplomat in
    uniform equipped with just enough sensitivity training and linguistic
    skills to understand and converse with the indigenous citizen on the
    street.
        The Army and Marine Corps have proven remarkably competent in the
    complex human skills necessary to stitch together coalitions by
    building, often from whole cloth, effective indigenous armies in such
    remote places as Greece, Korea, Vietnam, El Salvador and now in Iraq.
    But the unique human talents required to perform these tasks have
    rarely been valued or rewarded. Today's soldiers and Marines would
    prefer to be recognized as operators rather than advisors or trainers.
    This must change. If our success in coalition building will depend on
    the ability to create and improve partner armies then we must select,
    promote and put into positions of authority those can do so. We must
    cultivate, amplify, and inculcate these skills in educational
    institutions reserved specifically for that purpose.
        Soldiers need more time to train for combat. Years not months are
    required to produce a close combat soldier with the requisite skills
    and attributes to do the increasingly more difficult and dangerous
    tasks that await him in the future. At least a year together is
    necessary for small units to develop the collective skills necessary to
    coalesce and fight as teams. An infantry squad is the same size as a
    football, soccer or rugby team. Professional team coaches understand
    that blocking and tackling are not enough to win the Super Bowl.
    Instead a pro player must undergo a scientific regimen of physical
    conditioning. He does ``two a day'' during summer camp and watches the
    films at night. He has to fight for his position on the team because
    there is always the eager and hungry rookie looking to take his spot.
        This is the image that we must internalize if we are to build
    exceptional close combat soldiers for the future. Not all need apply
    and very few should expect to join. Any shortcoming in performance
    should threaten a soldier's place on the team. Finally every manager
    knows that winning teams are purchased at a premium. The Air Force and
    Navy have more first line fighter aircraft costing between $50 and $450
    million apiece than the Army has infantry squads. The precious few
    squads we have must be treated as national treasures. Soldiers in close
    combat units, those most likely to die for our country, must be given
    time to train, bond and coalesce before entering combat.
        In the industrial age, junior officers were expected to lead men on
    the battlefield directly by touch and verbal commands. They were
    trained to follow instructions from their immediate commanders and to
    react and conform to the enemy. The image of very junior soldiers,
    isolated in some distant outpost, performing peacekeeping missions one
    moment and engaging the enemy the next reaffirms the truth that
    tomorrow's soldiers must acquire the skills and wisdom to lead
    indirectly--skills formerly reserved for officers of a much higher
    grade and maturity. They must be able to act alone in ambiguous and
    uncertain circumstances, fight with soldiers they cannot touch, and
    think so as to anticipate rather than react to the enemy's action. We
    can make such soldiers. But it takes time.
        History teaches that great combat commanders possess a unique,
    intuitive sense of the battlefield. They have the ability to think in
    time, to sense events they cannot see, to orchestrate disparate actions
    such that the symphony of war is played out in exquisite harmony. In
    the past the only sure venue for exposing the naturals was battle.
    Soldier's lives had to be expended to find commanders with the
    intuitive ``right stuff.'' Human science offers the opportunity to find
    the naturals without bloodshed. We must exploit this opportunity by
    conducting research in cognition, problem solving, and rapid decision
    making in uncertain, stressful environments such as combat. Leaders
    must be exposed during peacetime to realistic simulations that
    replicate the conditions of uncertainty, fear and ambiguity that he
    will experience on the battlefield.
                         the new army will be expensive
        The circumstances that created the Army's dire condition are
    generational. Excessive Korean War casualties convinced President
    Eisenhower to fight the Cold War with firepower rather than manpower.
    All of his successors followed suit, each devising a war-winning
    version of shock-and-awe built principally around airpower. These
    strategies would have worked splendidly except for the tiresome fact
    that the enemy had a vote. Ho Chi Minh got it right: ``They will kill
    many of us,'' he prophesized in 1964. ``We will kill a few of them but
    they will tire of it first.'' Al Qaeda is simply following Uncle Ho's
    philosophy, so far with success.
        So, if our vulnerability is dead Americans, both empathy and
    strategic necessity would dictate that we spend more money to keep
    alive those most likely to die. This year the administration has raised
    the Army's share of the budget--a good first step. But the Army will
    need many more resources if it is to meet the demands of the Long War.
    I hope the painful and tragic condition of our land forces will finally
    convince us that land warfare is no longer the cheap alternative.

        Chairman Levin. General Scales, thank you so much for the
    testimony.
        Dr. Krepinevich?

    STATEMENT OF DR. ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH, JR., PRESIDENT, CENTER
                FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS

        Dr. Krepinevich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I think there, at last, is a fairly high level of
    agreement, among the Defense Department, Congress, and the
    strategic studies community, that, while the Army continues to
    perform effectively in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is under great
    stress. What's even more worrisome is, a lot of the trendlines,
    a lot of the metrics and indicators that have been alluded to
    today, are almost uniformly moving in a more worrisome
    direction, the direction that could lead our ground forces to
    cross that line, that red line that separates a ready Army from
    a hollow Army. So, I'll focus most of my commentary on the
    response, what is being done.
        Of course, we have the planned 92,000 troop increase, more
    Army brigades--6--an additional Marine regiment. We also have
    $19 billion this year, and more on the way, to replace or
    repair destroyed or broken equipment. The question that the
    committee poses is: is this the right approach? Can we do
    better? My sense is that it's not clear that this is the right
    approach.
        We're talking about an Army increasing its end strength by
    65,000. This is an Army that's having trouble recruiting its
    current end strength, that's having to sacrifice quality to do
    so. Now, we may be able to bridge some of that gap by doing
    some of the things that Dr. Korb talks about, eliminating
    ``Don't ask, don't tell,'' expanding opportunities for women.
    But, quite frankly, this is not a done deal.
        Look at the slowness at which the Army plans to ramp up its
    end strength, roughly--it was about 7,000 a year over the next
    5 years. Five years. That's longer than we spent in World War
    II, longer than we spent in the Civil War. If help were on the
    way, in this sense, help is likely to arrive far too late.
        If that's the case, if we don't want to compromise quality,
    as Dr. Korb says--and I think he's right--we may have reached
    our force-structure limit, unless we're willing to adopt
    extreme measures, like the draft, like what some members of the
    strategic studies community are advocating: welcome foreigners
    into our Army in exchange for American citizenship. Of course,
    we already have 20,000 security contractors, many of whom are
    not U.S. citizens, already operating in Iraq. This reminds me
    of what the Duke of Wellington once said about these sorts of
    folks, in commenting on one of his newly formed regiments. He
    said, ``I don't know what they'll do to the enemy, but, by God,
    they sure scare me.''
        We can have a case, as Dr. Korb says, where we have
    subtraction by addition. Those of us here who have commanded
    Army units understand that there are certain people in your
    unit that you'd be better off without. It's not just purely a
    numbers game; it is a quality game. Even if we do recruit the
    additional 65,000, even if they do meet the quality standards
    that Dr. Korb talks about, even these additional numbers, even
    this size of an Army, is not going to meet the force
    requirements that would be imposed by plausible contingencies,
    such as a widespread breakdown in order in countries like
    Pakistan or Nigeria or others. If we're just looking at
    population, Pakistan's six times the population of Iraq;
    Nigeria, four or five times the population of Iraq. There's no
    guarantee, of course, that disorder won't occur in more than
    one place at one time; it could happen simultaneously.
        The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) understood this.
    It said we have to get serious about the business of building
    partner capacity. There are manpower limits to what we can do,
    in terms of our own ground forces. Unfortunately, that QDR did
    not put anything in the way of meat on the bones. I'll talk to
    that in a minute.
        Also of concern is the sense that the Army and the Marine
    Corps seem to intend to use their new, or increased, troop
    strength to increase the number of brigades and regiments,
    respectively, in their force structure. Both seem to be tending
    to orient this force on conventional operations, as opposed to
    irregular warfare. In my discussions with some senior flag
    officers in the Services, they tend to say, ``We have to worry
    about North Korea. We have to worry about Iran. We have to
    worry about maintaining that rotation base.'' That may be true,
    but if you look at the contingencies that North Korea and Iran
    represent, I would argue that the least of our problems is
    confronting another Republican Guard-like force on the
    battlefield.
        In fact, I would argue, we are probably well into what we
    might call an irregular warfare era. Why? I think there are
    about four reasons for this:
        Number one, we so dominate, our ground forces are so
    proficient in conventional warfare, that it is astounding that
    anyone would think that the best way to beat the American
    military is somehow to confront it directly on the battlefield.
        Second, we have the diffusion of technology--rockets and
    missiles, precision-guided munitions, advanced explosive
    charges, the Internet--as a means for irregular forces to
    become far more effective. One of the questions that goes
    around the Pentagon these days is, how much destruction can 10
    determined men cause? The slope of the graph is going up
    dramatically over time.
        Third, if you look at third-world demographic trends,
    inequitable wealth distribution, and our enemy's ability to
    exploit what we call strategic communications to convince the
    people that they have grievances, and that their grievances
    are, in large part, against the United States, we find that, in
    much of the underdeveloped world, there is growing motive,
    means, and organizational skills to create disorder on a large
    scale.
        Finally, and perhaps most important, we have proven, our
    military has proven, far less effective in combating enemies
    waging irregular warfare than those engaged in conventional
    war. One of the reasons I'm convinced, myself, sitting before
    you today, is because I could not learn to hit the curve ball
    as a baseball player. Once the pitching staffs of the other
    team found that out, all I saw was curve balls. Right now, the
    American military does not hit the curveball. Until they learn
    to do it, that's all they're going to see, or that's a lot of
    what they're going to see.
        In a sense, our ground forces are at a crossroads. In
    previous times, when we put our hand on a stove, whether it was
    Vietnam or Iraq, there's a tendency to say, ``We're not going
    to do that anymore. No more Vietnams.'' On the other hand, the
    fact is that if we're entering an era of irregular warfare,
    that's what we're going to see.
        Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz, USA, who's the Deputy
    Commanding General at the United States Army Training and
    Doctrine Command (TRADOC), said, ``We argued in those days,
    before the Iraq war, that if we could do the top end skills, we
    could do all the other ones. I've had to eat a little crow.''
    There is, I think, a sense in the Army and the Marine Corps
    that if we orient on conventional war, somehow those forces can
    quickly and rapidly adapt themselves to wage irregular war.
    Vietnam and Iraq and Afghanistan stand as case studies of why
    that hasn't happened, or it certainly hasn't happened quickly
    enough for us to be effective, as we would have liked to have
    been.
        Given that, and given our manpower limitations, given the
    need to build partner capacity, given the limitations on our
    force structure, it's surprising to me that, as part of this
    reorganization, we have not talked about creating a standing
    training organization, something like the old Military
    Assistance and Advisory Groups we had during the Cold War to
    train indigenous forces, to train forces of our allies, so
    that, together, we could deal with these common threats to our
    security.
        Right now, we're in the process of stripping officers and
    NCOs out of our line units to serve as advisors, because the
    Army is not structured with a lot of excess officers and NCOs
    to perform that function, so the Army is having to rob Peter to
    pay Paul. Yet, we know that if they're going to stand up so we
    can stand down, you can train an Iraqi private, perhaps, in 60
    to 90 days, but you're going to have to have people working
    with Iraqi officers, NCOs, and the same goes in Afghanistan,
    for a much longer period of time for them to get the skill set
    they're going to need to operate effectively.
        We need to orient our training on irregular warfare
    challenges to include stability operations and
    counterinsurgency. This is significantly underway right now,
    but, again, as was pointed out by General McCaffrey, in some
    cases we're actually giving up valuable training areas that are
    going to be needed to organize and train our forces for this
    kind of warfare.
        When we realize that, for example, in the second Gulf War,
    we defeated the Republican Guard with essentially one heavy
    Army division, three brigades, the fact that we have 48 brigade
    elements would indicate that we should take some of them--in
    fact, perhaps a good portion of them--and orient them more on
    counterinsurgency and stability operations. In a sense, the old
    argument that we have to have one Army that can do everything,
    I think we're going to have to look increasingly at a division
    of labor within the Army, within the ground forces, between
    conventional war operations and stability operations.
        Finally, as we've seen, there's a shortage of equipment. We
    seem to have forgotten, after the Vietnam war, that we could
    actually suffer attrition in battle. The canary in the mine
    shaft here is the equipment that we've had destroyed and lost
    in this conflict, and in need of repair. Our industrial base is
    not really organized and equipped to surge production, as we've
    seen. This argues, I think, for creating some kind of war
    reserve stocks that can be employed. For example, if we had had
    them in this war, we could have deployed them much more
    quickly, to help stand up the Afghan National Army, the ISF,
    who are, in many cases, still less well equipped than the
    enemies they go up against, and of course, the re-equipping of
    our own forces in the field, as we surge, in order to deploy
    combat forces into theater.
        In summary, I think the committee is right to be concerned
    over whether our ground forces are stressed and in danger of
    becoming broken. Even though they still perform effectively in
    the field, obviously we can't rest easy. I was told by General
    Shy Meyer, the Army Chief of Staff who coined the phrase ``the
    Hollow Army,'' that once you cross that red line, there is a
    point at which the erosion of the force begins to accelerate.
    There's a knee in the curve where readiness and organizational
    capability and effectiveness really begin to go downhill
    rapidly. He said, ``once you cross that point, like we did in
    the late 1970s, it becomes a lot more difficult, in terms of
    time, in terms of human resources, in terms of material
    resources, to dig yourself out of that hole.''
        So, again, I compliment the committee on taking up this
    issue now, because time is not on our side. Even making changes
    now, in terms of force structure, equipment, and so on, are
    going to take time to implement and bring into effect.
        I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to
    be here today.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Krepinevich follows:]
                Prepared Statement by Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to appear before you
    today, and to share my views on the future of U.S. ground forces. My
    testimony is intended to provide a context within which one might
    evaluate evolving Department of Defense (DOD) plans for the current
    size, organization, and equipment of the Army and Marine Corps, with an
    eye toward better preparing these two Services for the challenges and
    requirements of the next two decades.
             the all-volunteer ground force: stretched to the limit
        Without question, U.S. ground forces are under considerable strain,
    the result of over 5 years of high operational tempo and combat in
    Afghanistan, Iraq, and other locations. Even prior to these wars, U.S.
    ground forces were far from idle. Since 1990, the United States has
    deployed major ground force contingents in a variety of peacekeeping,
    peacemaking, humanitarian and disaster relief, counterterrorism, and
    partnership building missions in places such as Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda,
    Bosnia, Indonesia, Colombia, the Philippines, and the Horn of Africa.
    These have been augmented by routine forward deployments too numerous
    to count.
        Former Secretary of State Madeline Albright once asked ``What's the
    use of having a first-rate military unless you use it?'' A better
    question might have been, ``What is the maximum force utilization rate
    we can sustain before degrading a first-rate military?'' After over 5
    years of combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, both the Army and
    Marine Corps are now stretched to the limit. Our ground forces are
    simply too small to sustain a permanent combat force of over 150,000 in
    Central Command's area of operations. This condition has prompted the
    DOD to announce a 92,000-troop increase in the size of the Army and the
    Marines, with 65,000 of that total going to the Army. Moreover, as
    General McCaffrey and General Scales have pointed out, Army and Marine
    Corps equipment is in such a state of disrepair that it will take years
    and tens of billions of dollars to repair or replace. The list of
    ``high-demand, low-density'' equipment is significant and growing. It
    includes items such as individual body armor, mine- and IED-resistant
    vehicles, nonlethal munitions, and certain kinds of robotics (e.g.,
    small-unit UAVs; ground robots).\1\ Readiness and training are also
    suffering, as the Army is forced to play a shell game with its
    equipment to insure its forces in the field and those about to deploy
    are properly equipped. Even then, units training to deploy still end up
    short.\2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ These UAVs and land robots are part of the FCS effort; however,
    they are but two elements in an overall program comprising 14
    (originally 18) systems, including a family of ground combat vehicles.
    See Andrew F. Krepinevich, Transforming the Legions (Washington, DC:
    Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2004), pp. 52-57.
        \2\ Greg Jaffe, ``Despite a $168 Billion Budget, Army Faces Cash
    Crunch,'' Wall Street Journal, December 12, 2006; and Yochi J. Dreazen
    and Greg Jaffe, ``Calibrating a Troop `Surge','' Wall Street Journal,
    January 2, 2007, p. A6.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Obviously, something must be done to help restore our ground
    forces. The natural question, then, is: How should we go about doing
    it?
                        increasing the size of the force
        The first issue is whether or not to increase the ground forces by
    92,000 personnel. The case for such a move is by no means clear-cut.
    There are very likely clear limits on the size of an All-Volunteer
    ground force the Army and Marine Corps can achieve without dramatically
    increasing the pay and bonuses of soldiers and marines. The annual cost
    for American Active-Duty personnel is already at historic highs. For
    example, between the start of the Second Gulf War and the end of last
    year, the Army had to increase the amount spent on retention bonuses by
    nearly an order of magnitude, from $85 million to $735 million.\3\ At
    the same time, the cost to support each soldier, as measured by
    personnel costs, increased by well over 50 percent since 2001, from
    $75,000 to $120,000 per soldier in 2006.\4\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ Tom Vanden Brook, ``Army Pays $1 Billion to Recruit and Retain
    Soldiers,'' USA Today, April 12, 2007, p. 8.
        \4\ Greg Jaffe, Despite a $168 Billion Budget, Army Faces Cash
    Crunch,'' Wall Street Journal, December 12, 2006.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Moreover, despite these substantial increases in the financial
    incentives being offered to Americans to serve in the military, there
    are worrisome indicators that the quality of the force has declined,
    perhaps significantly. The Army granted some 8,500 moral waivers for
    recruits in 2006, more than triple the 2,260 granted a decade ago.
    Waivers for recruits who committed felonies were up 30 percent in 2006
    over 2005. The Army is also accepting more high school dropouts. Last
    year roughly 82 percent of Army recruits had high school diplomas,
    compared to a benchmark of 90 percent. This is the lowest rate since
    1981, when the Army was beginning to come out of the depths of the
    ``hollow force'' of the immediate post-Vietnam era.\5\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ Tom Vanden Brook, ``Older Recruits are Finding Less Success in
    Army,'' USA Today, February 19, 2007.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Army's problems do not end there. Only 61 percent of Army
    recruits scored above average on the Service's aptitude test for
    recruits last year, the lowest scores since 1985. The Army has lowered
    its weight standards for recruits and increased the recruiting age to
    the point where it would not have met its recruiting targets in 2006
    without those recruited who are over the age of 35.\6\ It seems
    evident, then, that even the dramatic increases in financial incentives
    instituted in recent years are not, by themselves, sufficient to
    attract enough higher quality personnel to fill even its current force
    requirements, much less a substantially larger force.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ Tom Vanden Brook, ``Older Recruits are Finding Less Success in
    Army,'' USA Today, February 19, 2007; and Associated Press, ``Lower
    Standards Help Army Meet Recruiting Goal,'' USA Today, October 9, 2006.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Even more worrisome is the fact that, despite the lower quality of
    recruits being accepted in the Army, the Army's basic trainee
    graduation rate leaped from 82 percent in 2005 to 94 percent in
    2006.\7\ This result seems counter-intuitive. Why is it happening? Why
    are lower quality recruits graduating at a higher level than their more
    qualified predecessors? The likely answer: maintaining tough basic
    training programs increases the number of ``washouts'' while reducing
    the number of graduates ready to fill the ranks. Given the choice of
    sending units to combat zones at substantially less than full strength,
    or sending them with less than the best recruits, the Army, forced to
    make a difficult choice, is opting for the latter.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ Vanden Brook, ``Older Recruits are Finding Less Success in
    Army,'' USA Today, February 19, 2007.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Army is also having problems filling its officer requirements.
    For example, the Active component was short some 3,000 officers in 2006
    and according to projections the shortage will increase to over 3,500
    by next year. Meanwhile, the Guard and Reserve confront a shortfall of
    nearly 7,500 officers.\8\ Recent declines in retention rates of West
    Point graduates are also a source of concern.\9\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ Government Accountability Office (GAO), Military Personnel:
    Strategic Plan Needed to Address Army's Emerging Officer Accession and
    Retention Challenges (Washington, DC: GAO-07-224, January 2007), p. 27;
    and Greg Jaffe, ``Despite a $168B Budget, Army Faces Cash Crunch,''
    Wall Street Journal, December 12, 2006.
        \9\ Bryan Bender, ``West Point Grads Exit Service at High Rate,''
    Boston Globe, April 11, 2007, p. 1.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Under these conditions, despite the Army's shortage of soldiers--
    both in quantity and quality--it will take 5 years to increase its
    ranks by 35,000. While the Marine Corps' problems do not appear to be
    as severe as the Army's, the Marines also plan to take up to 5 years to
    increase their ranks by 22,000.\10\ Simply stated, we appear to be
    reaching the size limit on our ground force structure, unless we are
    willing to resort to extreme measures such as conscription, or, as some
    propose, offering citizenship to foreigners who are willing to fight
    Americans' battles for them.\11\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ The Marine Corps has traditionally had less difficulty filling
    its ranks than the Army, in no small measure because while the Army is
    well over twice the size of the Marine Corps, both recruit from the
    same manpower pool.
        \11\ This latter option has gained some currency in some quarters
    across the political spectrum.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Another problematic course of action is already being pursued: the
    use of security contractors to perform duties that have traditionally
    been performed by soldiers and marines. The Defense Department
    estimates that roughly 20,000 security contractors operate in Iraq
    alone, the equivalent of over three Army combat brigades and their
    associated combat support and combat service support elements. Unlike
    our soldiers and marines, these contractors are typically subjected to
    little in the way of oversight, despite the fact that counterinsurgency
    operations demand the highest levels of restraint on the part of
    counterinsurgent forces.\12\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \12\ Steve Fainaru, ``A Chaotic Day on Baghdad's Airport Road,''
    Washington Post, April 15, 2007, p. A1.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Contractor personnel from ``private security companies'' hail from
    a variety of nations. To be sure, there are substantial numbers of
    Americans and British. But the ranks of private security companies also
    comprise significant numbers of Australians, Chileans, Fijis,
    Romanians, and Ukrainians, to name but a few of the nationalities
    involved.\13\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \13\ Daniel Bergner, ``The Other Army,'' New York Times Magazine,
    August 14, 2005.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        One challenge counterinsurgent forces have in dealing with
    insurgents is differentiating between them and noncombatants. In a
    combat situation, oftentimes the safest thing to do from an individual
    soldier's perspective is to shoot first and ask questions later. This,
    however, risks incurring noncombatant casualties and alienating the
    population. It is for that reason that U.S. forces operate under strict
    rules of engagement (ROE). The contractor security forces, however, do
    not function under the ROE imposed on U.S. and coalition forces. It is
    not clear whether the contract forces even have standing ROE. This has
    the potential to undermine the overall U.S. war effort.\14\ One
    American general officer summed up the effect of contract security
    agents as follows:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \14\ There are indications that security contractors have alienated
    both U.S. troops and Iraqis. As one U.S. intelligence officer stated,
    ``Those Blackwater [security contractor] guys, they drive around
    wearing Oakley sunglasses and pointing their guns out of car windows.
    They have pointed their guns at me, and it pissed me off. Imagine what
    a guy in Fallujah thinks.'' [Fallujah is where four U.S. security
    contractors were killed and their bodies mutilated by Iraqis, setting
    off a confrontation between U.S. and insurgent forces that led to two
    major battles.] Michael Duffy, ``When Private Armies Take to the Front
    Lines,'' Time, April 12, 2004. A year after the initial Fallujah
    battle, 16 American security contractors were arrested by marines after
    they allegedly twice fired on a marine position in Fallujah. Iraqi
    officials asserted that, on average, security contractors kill a dozen
    civilians a week without probable cause. This has the potential to
    create enormous problems for coalition forces in a society where the
    killing of a family member or tribal member is likely to trigger a
    ``blood feud.'' The marines later cited the group in a letter that
    read, in part, ``Your convoy was speeding through Fallujah and firing
    shots indiscriminately, some of which impacted positions manned by U.S.
    marines. Your actions endangered the lives of innocent Iraqis and U.S.
    servicemembers in the area.'' Adrain Blomfield, ``Shootings May Lead to
    Security Guard Curb,'' London Daily Telegraph, June 11, 2005, p. 1; and
    T. Christian Miller, ``Contractors Say Marines Behaved Abusively,'' Los
    Angeles Times, June 11, 2005, p. 1.

            These guys run loose in this country and do stupid stuff.
            There's no authority over them, so you can't come down on them
            hard when they escalate force. They shoot people, and someone
            else has to deal with the aftermath. It happens all over the
            place.\15\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \15\ Jonathan Finer, ``Security Contractors in Iraq Under Scrutiny
    After Shootings,'' Washington Post, September 10, 2005, p. 1. The
    observation was made by Brigadier General Karl R. Horst, Deputy
    Commanding General, 3rd U.S. Infantry Division.

        In brief, we may need a bigger Army and Marine Corps, but it is not
    clear we can get them at an acceptable price. Moreover, even an
    additional 92,000 personnel will likely prove inadequate to address
    some of the highly plausible contingencies outlined below.
                   preparing the ground forces for the future
        Quite apart from the question of increasing the size of the force
    are questions over what types of units will be formed from the
    increase, what type of training they will receive, and what type of
    equipment they will use. The Army plans to utilize the soldiers being
    added to its force structure to create 6 additional brigades (and
    associated combat support and combat service support elements) over the
    42 currently planned, for a total of 48. The Marine Corps plans to use
    their end strength increase to add a regimental combat team to round
    out their three division-wing teams.\16\ Both moves suggest that U.S.
    ground forces will be trained and equipped primarily for conventional,
    high-intensity ground combat operations. Is this a smart move? If
    experience since the end of the Cold War is any indication, the answer
    is: not likely.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \16\ ``DOD News Briefing with Under Secretary of Defense David Chu,
    LTG Stephen Speakes, and LTG Emerson Gardner from the Pentagon,'' U.S.
    DOD Transcript, January 19, 2007, available at http://
    www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3871.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The post-Cold War era has been dominated by irregular warfare
    contingencies. These contingences, as has been the case with most such
    conflicts of this type throughout history, have been dominated by land
    forces--although maritime and air forces have played significant roles
    in many of them--and it seems this will likely continue to be the case
    in the future.
        To be sure, the First Gulf War in 1991 and the conventional combat
    operations phase of the Second Gulf War in 2003 involved major
    combined-arms ground operations. However, both of these conflicts
    vividly demonstrated the enormous overmatch that exists between the
    United States military and those that might choose to challenge it by
    waging conventional warfare, as Saddam Hussein's military did, not
    once, but twice. At the same time, however, the U.S. military's
    performance in irregular warfare campaigns has been far less
    impressive.
        This should come as no surprise. Following the Vietnam War our
    ground forces were optimized for conventional warfare. The slogan ``No
    More Vietnams'' reflected the military's desire to avoid protracted,
    ill-defined conflicts. General William DePuy, one of the Army's leading
    thinkers, viewed the 1973 Middle East War as a godsend of sorts, as it
    enabled the Army to reorient its thinking on the greatest threat to
    U.S. security, the Soviet Army in Central Europe. The attitude of ``No
    More Vietnams'' was heartily seconded by the American people and the
    country's civilian leadership. It spawned the Weinberger and Powell
    doctrines of the 1980s and the ``Exit Strategies'' that obsessed
    political and military leaders during the deployment of U.S. ground
    forces in the 1990s. The force was organized, trained and equipped to
    fight short, decisive wars. When this was not possible, the intent was
    to set clear limits on the duration of U.S. force deployments and avoid
    another ``quagmire'' like Vietnam.
        Alas, as our generals are fond of reminding us, ``The enemy gets a
    vote,'' and many of our enemies--especially those espousing the radical
    Islamist creed--have ``voted'' against taking on the United States with
    conventional forces, instead opting for irregular warfare.
        There are three primary reasons for this:

             First, as noted above, the U.S. military has
            overwhelming dominance in conventional warfare;
             Second, even if they had wanted to confront the United
            States conventionally, most of our enemies simply lack the
            human and material resources to build conventional forces on
            anything like the scale and level of sophistication required to
            pose a serious challenge to our military; and
             Third, and perhaps most important, the U.S. military,
            and other militaries of the first rank like Israel's, have
            proven far less effective in combating enemies waging irregular
            warfare than those engaged in conventional war.

        To buttress their line of thinking, our enemies can cite from an
    impressive run of successes: among them our defeat in Vietnam and
    withdrawal from Lebanon in the 1980s and Somalia in the 1990s; the
    Soviet defeat in Afghanistan; and Israel's apparent inability to defeat
    the Iranian-backed irregular forces of Hezbollah.
        To use a sports analogy, if you're a dead-eye fastball hitter, but
    you can't hit a curveball, and the pitcher has a curveball in his
    repertoire, all you're going to see will be curveballs. Given the
    factors noted above, it seems likely that the U.S. military is destined
    to encounter adversaries waging irregular warfare unless these enemies
    gain an advantage in conventional warfare (an unlikely occurrence over
    the foreseeable future), or until the U.S. military demonstrates an
    ability to deal effectively with the irregular warfare challenge.
        Reasonable minds can certainly differ concerning whether the war in
    Iraq represented a war of necessity, or a war of choice. Moreover,
    given the enormous difficulties associated with counterinsurgency
    operations, some might also reasonably argue that the United States
    should only deploy forces in such operations when the U.S. interests at
    stake are perceived to be very high, and no other options acceptable
    options appear to be available.
        However, given the experience of the past 5-plus years, the
    likelihood of continued operations in Afghanistan (whatever happens in
    Iraq) and the other trends I mentioned, it seems only prudent to make
    sure that our ground forces are trained and equipped to carry out
    counterinsurgency operations.
        In summary, the attacks on New York and Washington on September 11
    and subsequent events indicate that, whatever our desires to avoid
    operations against irregular forces, these kinds of conflicts no longer
    represent wars of choice, but in many cases are now wars of necessity.
                 primacy for conventional or irregular warfare?
        To be sure, there is the possibility that a ``No More Iraqs'' mood
    will dominate our thinking in the coming years. If by this we mean that
    we should not repeat the errors that have foiled our efforts to succeed
    in Iraq, the slogan is an apt one. If, however, the phrase is meant to
    indicate that the U.S. military should get out of the business of
    developing a strong competency in irregular warfare, this would almost
    certainly be a serious error in judgment. Yet there are some who argue
    that Iraq and Afghanistan are ``one-offs''--that given the difficulties
    we have experienced in these wars, we will see a repeat of the ``No
    More Vietnams'' attitude that dominated U.S. foreign policy for nearly
    three decades after that war.
        Several key trends indicate that we are not likely to be afforded
    such a respite. Rather, it appears we may be entering an era of
    irregular warfare:

             First, as I mentioned, most of our enemies have little
            choice: the investment required to take on the U.S. military in
            conventional warfare is prohibitive;
             Second, once an enemy finds a weakness, he tends to
            exploit it until we develop an effective counter;
             Third, the diffusion of technology (e.g., the
            internet, rockets and missiles, precision-guided munitions,
            advanced explosive charges, etc.) is greatly enhancing the
            capabilities of irregular forces, and this seems likely to
            continue for some time; and
             Finally, Third World demographic trends, highly
            inequitable wealth distribution, and our enemies' ability to
            exploit what we now term ``strategic communications'' more
            effectively than we have to date suggest there are likely to be
            large numbers of alienated people in the underdeveloped world
            with the motive, the means and the organizational skills to
            create disorder on a large scale.

        To paraphrase Pericles, ``Just because we don't take an interest in
    the forces of disorder doesn't mean the forces of disorder won't take
    an interest in us.'' Indeed, it is not difficult to imagine the world
    becoming a much more dangerous place in a very short period of time.
    Consider but two examples that could quickly develop into crises
    requiring a far greater capacity for stability operations than our
    forces currently possess, or plan to develop:

             Pakistan, a fragile nuclear-armed state with a
            sizeable radical Islamist population complete with an internal
            sanctuary and a fertile recruiting ground in the form of scores
            of radical madrasas.
             Nigeria, a major supplier of the world's oil, is beset
            with widespread corruption, uncontrolled and armed militias,
            and a growing sectarian fault line between Christians and
            Muslims.

        If this analysis is correct, and we are entering a national
    security era dominated by irregular warfare, history shows us that
    ground forces will dominate our operations against these kinds of
    threats, although it must be noted that air and naval forces will very
    likely play important and sometimes dominant roles in certain irregular
    warfare contingencies. If this is the case, then the question naturally
    becomes: should our ground forces be optimized primarily for major
    conventional combat operations--MCOs in ``Pentagonspeak''--or irregular
    warfare?
        When presented with this question, the Army and Marine Corps are
    quick to note that, given the potential stakes and effects of MCOs,
    they cannot ignore conventional war contingencies. However, this
    concern, which remains valid, rings far more hollow than it did during
    the period following Vietnam, when the Soviet armies posed a threat to
    us that far exceeded any rivals pursuing irregular warfare. But the
    evidence today strongly suggests that no one wants to play the role of
    Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard, now or in the foreseeable future.
    One searches in vain through the pages of military journals to find
    stories of countries assembling tank armies to oppose us. Truth be
    told, the two countries most often cited by our military leaders as
    opposing the United States in major combat operations involving large-
    scale conventional forces--North Korea and Iran--lack even a Republican
    Guard mechanized force, let alone a Soviet tank army.
        As members of this committee well know, the threat from North Korea
    stems from its budding nuclear arsenal, ballistic missiles, special
    operations forces (perhaps armed with chemical or biological agents)
    and artillery positioned in caves and mountains near the demilitarized
    zone (DMZ). Moreover, the mountainous DMZ itself is perhaps the most
    heavily fortified territory in the world, with both flanks anchored on
    the ocean. The South Koreans have both the incentive and the resources
    (a population twice that of the North and an economy dozens of times
    greater) to field ground forces capable of blocking any attempt by
    North Korean forces to advance south--a concept Pyongyang seems ill-
    disposed to execute in any event.
        Iran, having witnessed first hand the American military's utter
    drubbing of Saddam Hussein's conventionally armed and organized
    militaries, and the subsequent success of irregular operations against
    U.S. forces, would not likely be attracted to Saddam's method of
    challenging the U.S. military. Moreover, it is the Iranians who have
    armed and trained groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, and who are
    providing support for Iraqi irregular forces like the Mahdi Army.
    Discussions of Iranian military power center on Tehran's quest for
    weapons of mass destruction, its terrorist networks and its ability to
    close the Strait of Hormuz to shipping traffic by developing anti-
    access/area-denial capabilities. Were the U.S. military to confront
    Iran in a major combat operation--now or a decade from now--Tehran's
    conventional forces would almost certainly be a secondary
    consideration.
        To be sure, our ground forces must remain dominant in conventional
    (or what the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review calls ``traditional'')
    operations. However, it is far from clear that the Army and Marine
    Corps must be principally, or even primarily, devoted to this task.
    Consider that, thanks to the gains in effectiveness realized by our
    Armed Forces, improvements in their ability to fight as a joint force,
    and the U.S. military's enormous advantages in advanced capabilities
    (e.g., precision munitions; C\4\ISR), only one heavy Army division was
    needed to defeat Iraq's army in the Second Gulf War.\17\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \17\ One Marine division was also involved in the major combat
    operation, as was the Army's 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)
    along with some brigade-sized maneuver elements.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The argument is also heard that it is far easier to adapt a force
    oriented on conventional warfare to irregular warfare, than the
    reverse. While this debate is certain to continue, the fact is that a
    U.S. military configured for conventional warfare failed to adapt
    quickly or effectively enough in both the Vietnam War and the current
    wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. As Lieutenant General Thomas Metz, USA,
    the Army's deputy commander of its Training and Doctrine Command, has
    observed,

              We argued in those days that if we could do the top-end
            skills, we could do all the other ones. I have had to eat a
            little crow.\18\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \18\ Greg Jaffe, ``Despite a $168 Billion Budget, Army Faces Cash
    Crunch,'' Wall Street Journal, December 12, 2006.

           preparing our ground forces for future irregular conflicts
        Congress and the Defense Department must therefore decide how best
    to prepare our ground forces--whether to keep them at their current
    size or expand by another 92,000 personnel--for an era in which
    irregular warfare operations are likely to dominate America's ground
    force operations--while retaining the capability to fight a major
    combat operation (albeit one quite different from either of the Gulf
    Wars), if required. The Pentagon's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review took
    an initial step to address this problem when it called for a strategy
    that emphasized ``building partner capacity''--training and equipping
    indigenous military forces in those countries threatened by radical
    elements, and doing the same for the militaries of those countries that
    stand by us as allies and partners. The idea is to acknowledge
    America's manpower limitations and to work with allies and partners, to
    include indigenous forces, to generate the forces required for
    sustained irregular warfare operations. Unfortunately, there has been
    little in the way of action to back up this noteworthy idea, aside from
    mandating a significant increase in our Special Operations Forces
    (SOF).\19\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \19\ In one respect, increasing the size of U.S. special forces
    exacerbates the Army's manpower problems, as it strips out even more
    high quality soldiers from the Army at the same time the Service is
    having to accept lower quality recruits.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        For example, we have spent over 3 years training indigenous forces
    in Afghanistan and Iraq to ``stand up'' so our forces can ``stand
    down.'' We have been handicapped in this effort by the lack of a
    standing organization for training these forces, and a lack of
    equipment stocks from which to outfit them. These capabilities must
    exist in advance of our engagement in stability operations, not be
    cobbled together on the fly. Equipment to outfit these forces should be
    stockpiled, similar in some ways to the prepositioning of materiel
    configured to unit sets (POMCUS) equipment that was positioned to
    support U.S. forces during the Cold War.\20\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \20\ POMCUS stands for positioning of materiel configured in unit
    sets.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We also need to consider creating something equivalent to an
    ``Advisor Corps''--a cadre of officers and NCOs that can train
    indigenous and allied forces in peacetime while serving with newly
    trained indigenous force units in wartime. After several false starts,
    our advisor effort with the Iraqi security forces appears to be
    improving. However, since the Army has no standing Advisor Corps, it is
    forced to strip its own units for officers and NCOs to fill this
    requirement, while confronting officer and NCO shortages. It comes as
    no surprise that oftentimes the soldiers sent by the Army to serve as
    advisors are the men it can most easily afford to do without. Nor is
    this sort of duty looked upon favorably by the Army's best young
    officers and NCOs.
        As I mentioned earlier, the Army plans to utilize its 65,000-troop
    end-strength increase to expand the number of its active brigade combat
    teams, which are oriented primarily on conventional warfare operations.
    I am aware of no plans the Army has to create training and advising
    organizations to build ``partner capacity'' by enabling America's
    allies and partners to ``scale up'' quickly to meet the challenges that
    might be posed by irregular warfare contingencies. In its defense, the
    Service cites the need to maintain a rotation base of brigades for such
    conflicts and the need to ``hedge'' against a major combat operation
    characterized by conventional warfare. While the Army is right to see
    the need to address these issues, as noted above, the way in which it
    is doing so appears highly imbalanced in favor of conventional warfare
    contingencies.
        Put another way, given the overwhelming success of our ground
    forces in conventional warfare operations, and the shift of rival
    militaries and nonstate entities toward irregular warfare, orienting 48
    Active Army brigades, 28 National Guard brigades, and 3 Marine Corps
    divisions primarily on conventional warfare operations would appear to
    reflect a desire to prepare for the kinds of challenges we would prefer
    to confront, rather than those we will most likely encounter.
        In addition to creating a standing capability for training and
    advising indigenous and allied military forces, strong consideration
    should be given to restructuring a substantial number of Army brigades
    for stability operations. As noted above, the Army should also be
    supported in its efforts to equip its forces for stability operations,
    while reducing emphasis on those aspects of its modernization program
    that are devoted to conventional operations, the Future Combat System
    (FCS) in particular. Despite assertions by some to the contrary, the
    FCS, which is projected to cost over $150 billion to equip only 15 Army
    brigades, is optimized to deploy quickly and defeat the kinds of enemy
    forces the Army is least likely to encounter on the battlefield--
    combined arms, mechanized ground forces operating in the open.\21\ The
    Marine Corps' modernization efforts should be viewed in a similar
    light.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \21\ See Andrew F. Krepinevich, Transforming the Legions
    (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2004),
    pp. 52-57.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The goal here, of course, is to support these Services' efforts to
    liberate funding to support modernization efforts designed primarily to
    enable our ground forces to operate more effectively in irregular
    warfare environments, such as those they are experiencing now in
    Afghanistan and Iraq, and also against the kind of threat confronted by
    the Israelis in their war with Hezbollah last summer.
        Equally important, our defense industrial base should be capable of
    producing this equipment in quantity. As I mentioned earlier, the
    irregular warfare campaign that followed the end of major combat
    operations in Iraq has found our ground forces suffering substantial
    attrition of its equipment in a way not seen since the Vietnam War over
    30 years ago. Indeed, recent conflicts such as the First Gulf War, the
    Balkan War, and operations in Somalia and Haiti saw only minor losses
    of equipment, to the point where we seem to have assumed that the
    capacity to replenish our troops with equipment lost or worn out in
    operations is a trivial consideration. This has led to problems with
    equipping not only our ground forces, but those indigenous ground
    forces, such as the Afghan National Army and the Iraqi Security Forces,
    that are badly needed to support operations against our enemies.
        There is also the need to husband America's scarce ground forces.
    The sooner indigenous forces are ready to take the lead, or shoulder
    more of the burden for ground stability operations, the sooner American
    ground forces can reset for other existing or prospective
    contingencies. Finally, while U.S. assistance may be welcomed by
    others, a large U.S. force ``footprint'' may not be. In many cases, the
    sooner this footprint can be reduced the better it will be in terms of
    maintaining the support of the indigenous population, typically a key
    factor in prevailing in counterinsurgency operations.
        This being the case, the U.S. industrial base needs the capacity to
    surge production to replace destroyed or worn out equipment, whether it
    is equipment used by U.S. ground forces, or employed by forces we have
    trained to take on a greater responsibility for conduct of the war.
    More than that, strong consideration should be given to stockpiling
    some amount of equipment to facilitate the training of other militaries
    quickly, should that be necessary.
                                    training
        As counterinsurgency warfare is typically protracted in nature,
    U.S. forces may find themselves engaged in this form of conflict for
    the better part of this decade, and perhaps a major part of the next.
    Thus the U.S. military could benefit substantially from creating the
    necessary infrastructure to support high-fidelity counterinsurgency
    training.
        To be sure, both the Army and Marine Corps are trying to adapt
    their training to prepare soldiers and marines, and their units, for
    combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. For example, a remarkable
    transformation has occurred at the Army's National Training Center
    (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California. Not long ago, the NTC was optimized
    for training Army brigades in combined-arms mechanized warfare. Now the
    NTC has taken on the form of warfare that confronts GIs in Iraq. The
    training area, which is the size of Rhode Island, has no front lines.
    Insurgents plant improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and employ car
    bombs. Army units must convoy their supplies distances approaching 100
    miles, while being subjected to attacks by insurgents. A dozen Iraqi
    ``villages'' dot the landscape, populated by Iraqis and Iraqi-Americans
    who participate in the training. U.S. troops must recruit men from this
    population for the Iraqi security forces; negotiate with local leaders;
    and defend against an array of roadside bombs, car bombs, suicide
    bombers, and mortar attacks.\22\ The International Red Cross has even
    been invited to participate in the training involving mock detainee
    operations.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \22\ Stephen J. Hedges, ``Mock Village Helps GIs See Iraq
    Reality,'' Chicago Tribune, December 14, 2004, p. 1; and Richard
    Whittle, ``In the Army's Sandbox, No Playing Nice,'' Dallas Morning
    News, October 9, 2005. In addition to training at the NTC, other
    training areas have been modified to assist soldiers and marines
    preparing for deployment to Iraq.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        However, a more coherent, focused, long-term approach is needed for
    the U.S. military's training infrastructure for irregular wars, like
    counterinsurgency. Training facilities must not only be adapted, they
    must operate at a higher capacity. This is all the more true given the
    de facto expansion of the active force created by large call-ups of
    National Guard brigades, and by the rapidly growing requirement to
    train the forces of partners in irregular warfare (e.g., Iraqi security
    forces; the Afghan National Army; etc.).
        Compounding the challenge of shoring up its high-fidelity training
    competitive advantage, the insurgents in Iraq are the beneficiaries of
    perhaps the world's best training center for insurgent warfare. Put
    another way, the Iraqi insurgents are in the world's finest high-
    fidelity ``training center''--Iraq itself--24 hours a day, 7 days a
    week, 365 days a year. They are being ``trained'' by the world's best
    ``Opposing Force (OPFOR)'' \23\--the U.S. military. Since insurgent
    forces are not rotated in and out of combat, but are constantly in the
    field, the Army and Marine Corps must find ways to avoid having the
    combat skills of units rotating back to the United States atrophy.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \23\ ``OPFOR'' is a term used by the U.S. Army to denote the units
    stationed at its training centers that serve as the opposing force to
    the units being trained.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        At some point, these soldiers and marines will likely rotate back
    to Afghanistan or Iraq. If they are sent back into the area where they
    were previously deployed, this training gap may be mitigated. The
    effectiveness of unit operations might be enhanced, perhaps
    dramatically, if a major portion of its members remained together over
    successive deployments. There is some debate as to whether such ``unit
    manning,'' as envisioned by the Army, actually produces greater unit
    cohesion, or that the gains in unit cohesion are worth the costs of
    creating it.\24\ However, there would seem to be significant benefits
    to be derived from unit manning and rotation if, as part of the Army
    and Marine Corps rotation sequences, units that had operated in a
    particular area of Afghanistan or Iraq returned to those same areas in
    their successive deployments.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \24\ See Pat Towell, Forging the Sword: Unit-Manning in the U.S.
    Army (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
    2004).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        For this to happen, retention rates must remain high. For retention
    rates to remain high, a rotation base must be established that
    encourages high retention rates. At present, the rotation base for Army
    (in particular) and Marine Corps forces deployed on hardship/combat
    tours appears woefully inadequate to sustain high retention rates. This
    could pose serious problems over time, both for U.S. military
    effectiveness in Afghanistan and Iraq, and for the U.S. military's
    training infrastructure. If, in this protracted conflict, the U.S.
    military is not able to deploy units that contain a significant number
    of veteran soldiers and marines, the training gap between them and
    their enemies may widen.\25\ During the Vietnam War, when U.S. forces
    had a high percentage of draftees in their ranks who were discharged
    after a few years' service, including 1 year in Vietnam, it was said
    that the United States military had ``1 year's worth of experience in
    Vietnam ten times over,'' whereas many of the communist guerrillas they
    confronted had a decade or more of experience. A similar phenomenon
    could occur in today's volunteer military if retention rates decline.
    Should this occur, it will place greater stress on the military's
    training infrastructure to make up the difference, as the training
    infrastructure will have to prepare a higher percentage of ``green''
    troops for counterinsurgency warfare. The implications for U.S.
    military effectiveness could be striking.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \25\ One reason this might not happen is if enemy insurgent forces
    are suffering severe casualties, or experiencing substantial
    defections. This could increase substantially the percentage of
    inexperienced insurgents in their ranks.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        ``soft'' training and education
        Tactics are clearly important in military operations. Soldiers and
    marines must be proficient in individual and small-unit training on
    tasks such as detecting and handling IEDs, conducting convoy
    operations, clearing urban structures, and manning checkpoints. But
    counterinsurgency training is even more challenging. Soldiers and
    marines must also be trained in unconventional, or at least
    traditionally peripheral, tasks that are not central to the ``fire and
    maneuver'' or ``move, shoot and communicate'' that form the core of
    conventional combat operations. Among these tasks are those that focus
    on:

             Possessing an appreciation of cultural norms;
             Maintaining fire power restraint;
             Undertaking civic action with local government and
            civic leaders;
             Operating (and perhaps integrating) with local
            security forces;
             Providing security and other forms of support to
            reconstruction efforts; and
             Possessing sufficient cultural awareness and language
            skills to enable the actions described here.

        It is not clear how well individual soldiers and marines, or small
    units, can be ``trained up'' for these tasks prior to their deployment
    to the combat theater. Training in some skills may be relatively easy.
    There are, for example, ongoing programs to provide U.S. forces with an
    appreciation of Afghan and Iraqi customs and cultural norms. American
    units operating with local security forces can be critical to an
    effective counterinsurgency campaign, as demonstrated by the Army's
    Special Forces in the Buon Enao program and the Marine Combined Action
    Platoons (CAPs) initiative in Vietnam.\26\ Yet other than personal
    experience, and relying on well-crafted ``lessons learned'' reports, it
    would seem difficult to conduct training in these types of tasks beyond
    basic military skills (e.g., patrolling). Similarly, building the
    necessary confidence among local leaders and the population in general,
    so as to promote civic action, enhance security, and thus win their
    ``hearts and minds'' is likely to be, at least in part, a function of
    U.S. troops' ``people skills.'' Yet even for those possessing the
    necessary cultural awareness, building up a level of confidence and
    trust with local religious and civic leaders can only occur over time.
    This cannot be ``pre-loaded'' at a U.S. military training facility.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \26\ Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, MD:
    Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 70-73, 172-177.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Finally, the ability to prepare U.S. forces through training also
    depends on how counterinsurgent forces choose to prosecute the war. For
    example, a strategy that emphasizes periodic sweeps through an area is
    far less likely to provide the level of contact that ``secure and
    hold'' operations would. Familiarity can breed trust, as well as
    contempt. If the local population trusts coalition forces will provide
    it with security, it becomes easier to obtain the intelligence that is
    critical to defeating the insurgents. The choice between a strategy
    that emphasizes periodic sweeps and one that places high priority on
    sustained presence in an area could have a significant influence on the
    type of skills most needed in the force, and thus on what might
    constitute an optimal training program.
                                    summary
        In an era dominated by irregular warfare challenges, the United
    States will require a large, first-rate ground force for some time, and
    the committee is right to be concerned over whether our ground forces,
    the Army in particular, are ``broken,'' or in danger of ``breaking.''
    At present, the evidence indicates this is not the case. Our Army and
    Marine Corps units continue to operate effectively.
        But this does not mean that we can rest easy. If current trends
    continue, we run the risk of crossing a ``red line'' that will find our
    ground forces in a severely ``hollow'' state. The problem is that no
    one knows precisely where the ``red line'' is, or how and when it will
    be crossed, for an All-Volunteer Force in the midst of a long, hard
    fight against enemies waging irregular warfare. One thing we do know,
    however: the Army and Marine Corps--and this committee--are deeply
    concerned that we not cross that line, and rightly so. As we witnessed
    in the mid- and late-1970s, once the force crosses that line, problems
    snowball and it becomes very costly, both in terms of time and
    resources, to restore the force to acceptable levels of effectiveness.
        Indeed, as outlined earlier, while the force may not be broken,
    there are a number of warning indicators that indicate the Army, in
    particular, is moving ever closer toward that red line. These
    indicators function in a manner similar to canaries in a mine shaft--
    used to indicate the presence of dangerous gases or lack of oxygen--as
    harbingers of possible impending disaster. For example, the Army has
    already employed many of the basic tools such as increased
    compensation, and enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, to keep its
    strength and quality up. However, it is still being forced to take
    lower quality recruits than have recently filled out the ranks of the
    All-Volunteer Force. As these trends become more worrisome, as we see
    ``canaries dying,'' we must recognize that we may be courting disaster
    unless remedial measures are taken. Unfortunately, as noted above, our
    ability to remedy these manpower problems quickly or easily is limited.
        Similarly, it is difficult to replace large quantities of equipment
    quickly, when the industrial base is not structured to do so. It is
    difficult to field new equipment within an acquisition system that is
    renowned for its sluggishness.
        Perhaps most critically, solving the manpower and equipment
    problems would be daunting enough if we simply wanted to recreate a
    ground force focused on conventional operations. However, as we have
    discussed, solving these problems must occur as we reorient the ground
    force toward irregular warfare--or, at the very least--rebalance the
    emphasis between forces organized, trained, and equipped for
    conventional MCOs and irregular warfare campaigns. Under the best of
    circumstances, it will be difficult to introduce new doctrines and
    force modifications into military organizations that have for decades
    relegated irregular warfare in general, and counterinsurgency in
    particular, to low-priority status.
        Consequently, I applaud the committee's intention to take on these
    issues now. Time is clearly not on our side. The sooner effective
    remedial action is taken, the better. As history shows, major changes
    in doctrine, force structure, and equipment take years before their
    full impact is realized in the force. However, I urge the committee to
    make such changes with an eye toward how relevant they are, not only in
    terms of our current operations, but also--and perhaps even more so--
    with regard to the kinds of challenges the Army and Marine Corps will
    confront, not only in the weeks and months ahead, but over the next
    decade or two as well.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Dr. Krepinevich. Your
    testimony's really quite extraordinary. This is, I think, a
    very, very significant presentation, and we're very grateful
    for it, from each one of you--you put a lot of thought in your
    testimony, both written and oral, and that testimony has a lot
    of specifics in it, as well as a lot of general thematic
    points.
        There seems to be almost a consensus that the challenges
    that we face are different from the legacy challenges, in that
    we're going to have to equip and train and organize differently
    than we have before. I would like to press you, in probably a
    very unfair way, to be very specific: pick five or six things
    that you would do that you would think are the most specific
    priorities for us. What kind of modernization would you drop?
    Some of you, in your written testimony, have been very specific
    on that point, what modernization plans you think are a
    mistake, given the other needs, and what directions would you
    go.
        So, I'm going to ask each of you to pick a half-dozen very
    specific changes that you would make in our equipment that's
    being planned and funded, our training, our organization, force
    size, that you think would be the most significant changes that
    we could make, either legislatively or just in the Pentagon, to
    address these changes that you all so, I think, brilliantly
    describe.
        Why don't we start with you, Dr. Krepinevich, and we'll go
    down the other end. To my colleagues, this will be an 8-minute
    round.
        Dr. Krepinevich. If I were to come up with a short list, I
    would say, first of all, if we're looking at 48 Army brigade-
    size units and nine or so Marine regiments in the Active Force,
    we need to think about taking a sizable number of those
    elements--a number of those brigades--and orienting them
    primarily on irregular warfare, not only for purposes of
    wartime, but also for purposes of peacetime operations.
        I work on an advisory board for General Lance L. Smith,
    USAF, who commented that when he was in the U.S. Central
    Command (CENTCOM), one of the things that impressed him most
    was the work of Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa. He
    said if we're looking at this part of the world, if we're
    looking at a part of the world where countries are increasingly
    at a crossroads, the fact that you have forces in there working
    with indigenous forces, training them, doing civic action, and
    so on, is kind of a mini-boost, in terms of not only their
    capability, but the kind of positive effect that we saw when we
    did humanitarian relief operations in places like Indonesia,
    after the tsunami, and Pakistan, after the earthquake.
        Chairman Levin. Good. I'm going to make this even a tougher
    quiz. I'm going to ask each of you to list, say, five, if you
    can, in a couple of minutes each, because I only have 8
    minutes.
        Dr. Krepinevich. All right. Well, even faster, then.
        Chairman Levin. Yes.
        Dr. Krepinevich. An advisor corps--we're short officers and
    NCOs to help build partner capacity.
        Third, I think we need some kind of standing training
    organization--one of my colleagues calls it ``Multi-National
    Security Transition Command-Iraq in a box''--so that you have a
    group, whether it's a Military Assistance Advisory Group that's
    able to go in and begin quickly--not after a year or so, but
    quickly--to begin to train indigenous forces.
        Fourth, I think--this is a recommendation we made 10 years
    ago as part of the National Defense Panel--a joint urban
    warfare training center. Thirty-eight percent of the Arab world
    population is under the age of 14, and most of that population
    is in urban areas. These are young, frustrated, undereducated,
    underemployed males that are exposed to the jihadist ideology,
    day in, day out. The world's becoming more urbanized. We need
    to have those kinds of training facilities, as badly as we need
    places like the National Training Center.
        Finally, in terms of equipment, obviously the Chairman
    listed a number of equipment shortage items of our troops going
    overseas. I think we need to take another look at the FCS,
    which principally was a gleam in somebody's eye when they were
    worried about Republican Guard Forces, and is an awfully
    expensive way to try and get more effective at dealing with
    irregular-force enemies.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        General McCaffrey?
        General McCaffrey. It's difficult to dictate Army or Marine
    programs on the fly. Clearly, one of them is increase Army and
    Marine end strength. I'd be a little more cautious than Dr.
    Krepinevich, in one sense. I tell people I spent the early part
    of my career crawling around in the mud with a sack full of
    hand grenades, shooting it out with people at 20-feet range.
    We're really good at it. My rifle company had 100 percent
    casualties, probably, in the 8\1/2\ months that I commanded it.
    It's not a good way to fight. If you can find another way to do
    it, try that. So, I tell people how I fell in love with the
    M1A1 tank. If you countersniper, crowd control, or fight other
    tanks, go with armor every time. So, I'm a little uneasy about
    asserting that there is a light, cute way to fight people. We
    talk enemy capabilities, not intentions. It's not clear to me
    that our only security threat comes out of counterinsurgency.
    We have to have the Air Force and the Navy sitting there in 20
    years to deter the PRC. So, careful we're not going to create
    2.4 million men and women who are prepared to crawl around in
    Arab cities and fight block to block.
        I do think we have to buy strategic mobility. If we're
    going to bring the Armed Forces home from western Europe,
    Korea, and Okinawa, which probably isn't a good idea, but I
    think it's probably irreversible, we'd better fund their basing
    and then sort out how are we going to get them back to the
    combat area. I personally love the C-17 as much as the M1 tank,
    but I want to see how we get the infrastructure to operate in a
    global environment.
        FCS, I couldn't agree more. We have really been diddling
    around with this program for the last decade or so. I got a
    briefing on it yesterday. Looks to me like they're closing in
    on it. But we ought to tell the Army, ``You have--the first
    year of the second term of the next President, you'd better
    tell us what the first FCS brigade looks like. If you can't
    figure it out, then move this thing back into some kind of a
    test and evaluation program that--rather than a real one.'' But
    I think FCS is required. Just got to neck people down and force
    them to come up with the decent ideas.
        I'm appalled at the Army's inability--Marine Corps, also--
    to get language training. I've been saying for 3 years, ``You
    have to take every Leavenworth class, count off by threes, and
    tell the number twos, 'You're going to 90 days of immersion
    Arabic-language training at Defense Language Institute.''' You
    can't do it in 2 weeks. I was an advisor as a lieutenant in
    Vietnam, 90 days of Vietnamese produces subfluent ability to
    operate in a foreign environment. For God's sakes, we're in
    year 5 of the war now, and we still haven't committed to doing
    the sensible thing.
        Finally, and probably most importantly, a necessary, but
    not sufficient, reason for us to succeed in our goal in Iraq
    and Afghanistan and withdraw is to equip, appropriately, Afghan
    and Iraqi security forces. We have not done this. It's
    appalling to me. We look at the ISF, they're going to have 70
    Soviet helicopters at the end of this process, 6 C-130s, 1
    squadron of ground attack aircraft, a collection of junk Soviet
    armor, some new, admittedly, I think, 800 BTR-80s, and Cougar
    fighting vehicles. What are we thinking of? We can't get out of
    there until these people can step forward. If we have 800
    helicopters in Iraq, why do we think 70 Soviet helicopters is
    going to allow them to control this giant country? So, I think
    we need to re-look lend-lease to our new allies, so we can get
    out of there.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, General.
        Dr. Korb?
        Dr. Korb. I think you have to take a hard look at how to
    pay for this, the things you're going to have to do for the
    ground forces, I think you should stop the FA-22 Raptor right
    where it is. I think you have enough of them to hedge against
    anything you need. I think the DDG-1000, I'd take another look
    at that. I think the littoral combat ship can do the job just
    as well, and the costs of that are just exploding. Virginia
    class submarine, I would extend the Los Angeles class longer,
    and I think you could then push that off.
        A big thing that we should do, and it would not only help
    save money, is to cut down nuclear weapons, because our main
    concern is the whole question of nuclear proliferation. We need
    to lead by example. I think we can go down, as General Eugene
    E. Habiger, USAF (Ret.), former head of the Strategic Command
    said, 600 operational, 400 in Reserve, more than enough to
    protect our interests, and it could save substantial amounts of
    money.
        Why we're rushing ahead with ballistic missile defense, to
    me, makes no sense. It's really not ready to go, and it deals
    with the least likely threat that we face. To me, it's
    appalling. We spend more on ballistic missile defense than the
    entire Coast Guard. I'm much more worried about somebody
    sneaking something in here than that.
        FCSs, you have to slow it--I thought I understood defense
    issues. I can't understand the system. I've been over there.
    I'm not quite sure what it is. There's 57 different type
    technologies, and somehow, we have to slow it down until we get
    a handle on it.
        I don't think the Marines need a new amphibious vehicle. I
    think they have other things that they need. The V-22, I would
    stop there now. I think you have enough of those things, and go
    buy some helicopters.
        The most important thing, I think, that you need to do,
    though, and you have to do it, is set a specific withdrawal
    date to get out of Iraq. I think you ought to start a phased
    withdrawal to get out over the next 18 months. That would give
    the Iraqis time to get their act together. General McCaffrey's
    right, they may not have enough equipment. But, a week ago
    today I was in Iraq, sitting next to the Deputy Minister of
    Interior, and he told me it's not a question of training or
    equipment, it's motivation. They're not motivated. I don't
    think they ever will, until those political compromises are
    made. Those political compromises will not be made unless we
    put the pressure on them.
        Then, finally, I think, when we get out of there, you need
    to continue the supplementals, consider them with the regular
    budget, to deal with the equipment situation. This is something
    we didn't do after Vietnam, and it took us about 10 years to
    get our equipment back up.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Dr. Korb. [Audience
    interruption.]
        We're going to have to ask the people in the back not to
    say anything. We've tolerated your holding up signs, but any
    more oral comments, I'm afraid we're going to have to ask you
    to leave the room.
        General Scales?
        General Scales. Sir, I have to agree and disagree with my
    colleagues. First of all, when we talk about equipment, we have
    to understand that it's about balance. Andy is just dead wrong
    when he refers to FCS as a system designed for western Europe.
    I was at the beginning, the birth of FCS in the mid-1990s, and
    we didn't call it that then, we had a different phrase for it,
    but the whole concept behind the FCS is to design a system for
    the full spectrum, with focus on counterinsurgency and
    irregular wars. Obviously, the system will need some tweaking
    over time, because it's a very complex system.
        We have three choices, Mr. Chairman. We can go back to a
    dismounted infantry force that General McCaffrey and I have
    experienced, and we know that 81 percent of every soldier
    killed in combat since the end of World War II were light
    infantryman. You stand a tenfold greater chance of surviving in
    the close fight if you're mounted on anything than if you're
    dismounted. To give up the reform of the Army's mounted force,
    I think, would be irresponsible.
        So, now you have two choices: bring back the old Cold War
    gear, the 70-ton gas-guzzling behemoths designed to fight the
    Soviets on the plains of western Europe, or build a new force.
    I think we need to take a close look at how the new force is
    built, but, the best I can tell, for the last 12 years, that
    force was built around a full-spectrum force, not about taking
    on the Soviets.
        I don't believe in specialized units. I believe that good
    soldiers, given time to train, coalesce, and bond, can do a
    multitude of missions across the full spectrum, and that units
    themselves shouldn't be specialized, because you suboptimize
    the Army when you do that. So, I would not build special
    counterinsurgency units.
        But I would build special people. What's important in
    counterinsurgency are skills, not structure. The ability to
    speak a language, the ability to commune with alien cultures,
    the ability to train, to advise, to--as Andy says, be part of
    military advisory groups and country teams, those are very
    special skills. Brigades don't do that. People do that. So, in
    order to facilitate that, Mr. Chairman, I would--as I said
    earlier, I would change the culture and change the policy that
    deals with officer education and officer training. I would
    reward people for acquiring these skills, rather than punish
    them. Frankly, what I would do, as this war winds down, is, I
    would send the officer corps back to school, I would establish
    a soldier's sabbatical program by which young officers, in
    their fourth to eighth year of service, are sent back to
    civilian graduate schools to study alien cultures and to study
    the art of war so that they can be culturally aware and
    adaptable the next time they go to war. That's my motto.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, all.
        Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        This is one of those few meetings where the statements that
    have been made were not really what I expected, so I'm changing
    around the questions that I would ask.
        Let me, first of all, just share with you a personal
    experience. During the 1990s, there was a drawdown in our
    modernization program, a drawdown in our troop strength, a
    euphoric attitude that the Cold War is over, that our military
    doesn't need to be as strong as it has been in the past. I
    watched it. In the administration, if you add up all 8 years,
    the amount of money lower than a straight-line funding was $412
    billion. Now, this committee enhanced that to about $313
    billion. So, we added about $100 billion to the funds. But we
    watched things going on at that time. As General Schoomaker
    said, we started September 11 with a $56 billion shortfall in
    equipment across our Army, Active and Guard and so forth, so I
    think we know that we had a problem.
        During the 1990s I saw a starvation diet for our military--
    I watched a lot--I remember at Fort Bragg, they used to call
    them the RPM accounts, real property and maintenance. They have
    a new word for it now, but they were actually taking anything
    that isn't bleeding today, and taking the money out of that,
    and putting it in what we had to have. So, they had to have
    bullets for training at Fort Bragg, and they were actually not
    repairing the roofs, and the kids were having to cover up their
    equipment with their own parkas just to keep it operable.
        I look at some of the statements that were made. Dr. Korb,
    I don't agree with you on a lot of things, but I do agree when
    you said that ideally we need to have for every one-third
    deployed, two-thirds that are either in rotation or in
    training. We want to make sure everyone's trained when they go
    in. We don't want to lower the standards, I agree with that.
    But if you don't have the money, you have to do something that
    you don't want to do. I just think that's the situation that we
    found ourselves in.
        I'd like to go back, just for a minute, to the FCS thing. I
    had very strong feelings about this. Most of our military
    people realize that we hadn't made any changes. In fact, I'll
    tell you something interesting. When I was in the House in
    1994, there was someone who testified at that time that we
    would no longer need ground troops in 10 more years. Now, I
    have to say, I love generals, but the generals are all going to
    line up and say, ``What are our needs going to be 10 years from
    now,'' and you're not going to be right. So, I think some of us
    feel that the only solution, if we really want to make America
    as strong as the expectation of the American people, that we
    need to see the overall problem.
        I know it's easy to beat up on Secretary Rumsfeld, but I
    remember at his confirmation hearing I asked him, ``How are you
    going to resolve the problem of trying to anticipate what your
    needs are going to be 10 years from now?'' I suggested to him
    the only solution would be that we have the best of everything
    in all fields--best strike vehicles, the best equipment, best
    on the ground. He said, ``during the entire century, the 20th
    century, the average amount of money during those years spent
    on military was 5.7 percent of GDP. It went down at the end of
    the 1990s to 2.7. Now it's about 3.8.'' So, I see this as a
    problem, that, if we are going to have the best of everything,
    we're just not spending the money.
        I know--and I'd like to ask--I believe, General Scales, you
    said something to the effect that you can't continue just to
    throw money at it. I think that you were the one who said that.
    No, that must have been one of other witnesses.
        Well, anyway, what I'd like to do is, just have you look
    into the future--and, I think, particularly the two generals on
    the panel--as to what we should do today in looking to the
    future, so that, if I'm correct when I said that expectations
    of the American people are that we would have the best of
    everything, what should we do today in planning for that?
        General McCaffrey?
        General McCaffrey. I've tried going into this with a little
    bit of humility--I'm not sure I can see the future. I basically
    agree with your going-in assertion that we ought to build a
    capability to respond across a broad range of potential
    threats. The most important thing we do, bar none--and here, I
    would probably part company with Dr. Korb--is to try and deal
    with the notion of nuclear proliferation. So, I personally
    think we ought to have a modernized, robust, nuclear attack
    capability, and would build a ballistic defense capability.
    Now, how much is enough is where the debate ought to be, not
    whether or not we ought to do this.
        The second most important thing I would do is ensure that
    we control the seas and the air. I'd have a world-class Air
    Force and Navy, without which none of the rest of this stuff
    works. The Army can't get there to fight to intervene in any of
    these contingencies unless we control the seas and the air to
    get in there.
        Then, finally, I think, back to FCS, we have to have a
    modernization program for the Army. We have to, at some point,
    walk away from a 70-ton tank that goes by sea, and get lighter,
    more nimble equipment. I think Bob Scales is entirely right. We
    don't want to elect to fight masses of foreign infantry on
    foot. We're really good at it. There's probably no more better
    team players than U.S. light infantry formations--28,000 killed
    and wounded; their morale is high. But we're trying to find a
    better way to do it. So, we have to do FCS and focus the Army,
    and then getting it out there. Right now, I think they're
    talking 2017 for a first FCS brigade. That's ludicrous.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes, I understand that.
        General Scales, I'm sorry, but our time is cranking away
    here. Let me get into something else.
        When General John P. Jumper, USAF, I thought was
    courageous, back in 1998, when he came up and said that--
    talking about the F-22 program--when the Russians started with
    their SU-30s, SU-35s, they actually had some things that were
    better than our best strike vehicles, which were the F-15 and
    F-16. Then, when you talk about FCS, the best thing that we
    have out there in a non-line-of-site canon is the Paladin,
    which is World War II technology. I just can't imagine anyone
    who wouldn't believe that we need to have the FCS so that we
    get it lighter, faster, more transportable for these less
    predictable enemies that we have out there.
        General Scales, do you have any thoughts about that?
        General Scales. I do, Senator. Let's just talk about that
    for a moment. General McCaffrey is onto something here. The
    advantage of FCS is not just the fact that it's lighter,
    faster, and all the rest of that, but the essence of
    counterinsurgency is what the pundits call ``area control,''
    the ability to control areas, rather than to capture or kill
    the enemy, maneuver along broad arrows on a map. What light,
    mobile, autonomous, mechanized forces bring to the table is the
    ability to spread your forces out, to distribute your forces,
    and to remain there for long periods of time, and yet, still
    protect them. The dream of the Army has always been to build an
    Army that can sustain itself over a long period of time, and
    yet, at the same time, fight at a mechanical advantage. The
    only way to do that, particularly in a counterinsurgency and a
    pre-insurgency environment, is to lighten the force, to be able
    to spread it out, distribute it; so, instead of having bases
    that are based around brigades, or maybe battalions, build the
    ability to have platoon, and even squads, as autonomous
    fighting elements.
        So, it's not just about the machine, it's about the
    concepts that you're able to use, in counterinsurgency, that
    the machine actually facilitates. So, sometimes we get too tied
    up with the technology, we get too focused on sensors and
    platforms, and the rest of that. The key here is to back off
    from the technology and back off from the programs, and ask the
    Army, ``Tell me how you would use this in a counterinsurgency
    environment.'' The answer is--any soldier in Iraq will tell
    you, ``I would rather man a guardpost in Baghdad,'' or, ``I
    would rather go into close attack in Fallujah and Ramadi,
    mounted, rather than dismounted.'' That is the bottom line. If
    we don't buy this next generation of fighting equipment, then
    the next generation, my children, are going to have to go to
    war, just like I did in Vietnam, with nothing to protect us,
    except an armored vest. I think that is absolutely wrong.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes. General Scales, I agree with you. I
    had an occasion to be in that area of responsibility some 13
    times now, and have seen the areas where we're really having
    problems. It just seems to me--and it frustrates me, because I
    can remember going to the Senate floor back in the 1990s
    saying, ``Someday, this day is going to come.'' I would just
    encourage you, in your advisory capacity, and you, General
    McCaffrey, to keep in mind that it's really all of the above
    that we need. Yes, we do need the missile defense. I know that
    Senator Sessions is going to be probably talking about that.
    It's inconceivable to me that we can watch the Chinese knock
    down one of their own satellites that's in the same orbit as
    our reconnaissance satellites, and not be concerned about that
    end of it.
        So, I appreciate very much your comments.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Lieberman [presiding]. Thanks very much, Senator
    Inhofe.
        I want to thank Senator Levin for convening this hearing. I
    appreciate it very much. The truth is--and the testimony of
    this superb panel puts a punctuation or exclamation point
    behind this conclusion, which is, I don't think there's
    anything more important this committee and Congress can do with
    regard to our military this session than to come to the aid of
    the U.S. Army. But we're having a lot of debates, obviously,
    about Iraq. Whatever you think about Iraq, the cumulative
    impact of the testimony--superb testimony that the four of you
    have offered today, to me, is both an indictment of the people
    and policies that have allowed our Army to come to this point
    of stress, and it is an urgent appeal--and, fortunately, an
    informed appeal by the four of you--to do something quickly to
    fix it as best we can.
        In some sense, as I listen to you, it seems to be that
    America, in this stage of our history, repeated a mistake that
    we see so often in history, which is that nations demobilize
    too quickly after victory in war. Here, the evidence is clear
    that we demobilized after our victory in the Cold War. We went
    from average size of the Army of about 780,000, now to about
    480,000. In some senses, that demobilization is understandable.
    What is unacceptable is that we failed to remobilize, as we
    went to war, after we were attacked on September 11. That's
    what we really have to do something about, as quickly as we
    can, as relevantly as we can, to the combat that we're involved
    in, in Iraq and Afghanistan today. Obviously, I fear, as all of
    us do, that the shortage--we're in that circumstance where the
    shortage of soldiers begins to define the military strategy
    more than the military strategy defines the manpower we need.
        General Scales, you make that point very effectively in
    your prepared testimony. In some sense, what we're experiencing
    right now is that the development of a new military strategy,
    the one that General Petraeus is implementing with new troops,
    we don't have the manpower to really carry it out. So, that's
    why the Pentagon has had to increase the stays of so many
    people who are there now, with the consequent negative effects.
        Anyway, I do want to say that Senator Cornyn and I, next
    week, are going to convene a hearing of our Airland
    Subcommittee, which will hear, I hope, Secretary Geren and
    General Casey, to essentially respond to the allegations, the
    charges, the observations, and the suggestions that you've made
    today. I thank you for them.
        The administration has now recommended an increase in the
    size of the U.S. Army by 65,000--but it won't reach that number
    until 2013. So, General Scales, I want to ask you, how much
    should we be increasing the size of the U.S. Army? Is it not
    possible to come to higher numbers before 2013?
        General Scales. Senator, first of all, I think the 100,000
    number has stood the test of time. You may recall, 2 years ago
    we had this long discussion, and the issue, as you recall,
    wasn't the Army. I think the issue we used was the term
    ``ground power.'' That would be Army, Marines, and Special
    Operating Forces.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        General Scales. My answer to you is, we don't have until
    2013 to increase that force. My concern is that we haven't been
    imaginative enough in using the tools that we have at our
    disposal, other than lowering standards. We don't have the
    tools at our disposal to be able to focus our recruiting those
    soldiers we need most. Remember, now that the infantry force of
    the Nation is only about 5 percent of the 1.3 million. If you
    took every infantryman in the Army and the Marine Corps, it
    wouldn't fill FedEx Stadium.
        Senator Lieberman. Yes.
        General Scales. So we're not talking about mobilizing the
    Nation here, we're talking about taking a small part of the
    population, men and women in uniform, and a small part of that,
    those who are engaged in ground combat, which is even a small
    percentage of the Army and the Marine Corps, and raising the
    numbers of those forces in order to get the advisors, the
    trainers, the Military Assistance Advisory Group officers, as
    well as the members of the brigade we need.
        So, my suggestion is--number one, we need to change our
    policy on pay and allowances. Why can't we pay, for instance,
    soldiers, not only for their skills, but for their risk? In
    other words, why can't we pay them a lot more for doing the
    dirty, filthy job of close combat? If we did that, I think we
    would be able to accelerate that curve of accessions without
    diminishing the quality of the force. But I mean do it a lot,
    not just $1,000 a month, but do it substantially, because we're
    only talking about a fairly small number of men and women who
    perform these tasks.
        Senator Lieberman. It's an excellent point. Look, right now
    we are paying some of the private contractors for doing
    military work enormously more than we're paying our people in
    uniform.
        General McCaffrey, I want to ask you a question in the time
    remaining about the other side of this, which is the obvious
    need in wartime to repair and recapitalize your forces, your
    equipment. I believe I heard you use a number of $212 billion.
    Give us some content to that, and, if you had your druthers and
    you were king, how quickly you'd try to do it, apart from right
    now or yesterday.
        General McCaffrey. Let me, if I may, Senator, also add to
    Bob Scales's response. The notion that a country--here, in
    1939, my dad got commissioned in West Point, we were a quarter
    of million people in the Armed Forces, and 6 years later, we
    had 16 million.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        General McCaffrey. There were 130 million people in the
    Nation then. Now it's 300 million. The thought that we can only
    add 7,000 a year is a rounding error, for God's sakes. It's
    completely asinine.
        Senator Lieberman. You are absolutely right.
        General McCaffrey. There's 140,000 contractors in Iraq
    right now. Some of them are getting $120,000 as the base salary
    to go over there. Why would we think it was--and, I might add,
    I have not heard one political leader in this country--not the
    President of the United States, nor any Governor or mayor or
    any Member of Congress--get on TV and say, ``We need your sons
    and daughters to join us to fight.'' I bang away at the White
    House. The President used a remark, something about, ``For
    those of you who are considering a career in the Armed Forces,
    there can be no more honorable way to serve.'' We're not
    talking about a career, we're talking about 19-year-old boys
    and girls carrying M-4 carbines in downtown Ramadi. So, if we
    want our kids to come to the colors, we have to ask them. The
    principals of high schools, the university presidents, have to
    say, ``We're in danger. Come protect us,'' and they'll come.
    They actually don't need $120,000 as a base salary, although I
    clearly would join General Scales in saying you ought to use
    every tool required in a volunteer military to get the manpower
    we need.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        General McCaffrey. Then, back to the equipment thing, I
    remember going out a few years ago to Warren, Michigan,
    Detroit, talking to our Tank Automotive Command people, and
    they reminded me that the entire U.S. military production for
    ground combat equipment is a fraction of 1 day's output by
    Detroit. We are not a big asset--load on the industrial
    capacity. We haven't funded it. We haven't done a darn thing.
    We have hundreds of vehicles broken at Army depots all over the
    country. We have industrial capacity that could surge and fix
    this stuff within 18 months if we told them, ``this is a crash
    basis, 7 days a week, three shifts.'' We're not modernizing the
    force. We have this preposterous 15-year plan right now to
    modernize the existing heavy brigade combat units. So, again,
    to be honest, I think there's been a failure of imagination and
    political will in the Pentagon. I personally hold Secretary
    Rumsfeld and a small group responsible, which has let this
    fighting force get to the edge of a disaster. I think that's
    where we are.
        Senator Lieberman. Thank you. That's a real cry to us to
    respond, and I'm confident that we will.
        Thank you. My time's up.
        Senator Collins.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General McCaffrey, I agree with the seven assertions that
    you made in your testimony, and you've really painted a very
    worrisome picture. In addition, you and I have had the
    opportunity to sit down. I very much appreciate the information
    you've shared with me as a result of your trips to Iraq.
        Dr. Korb raised what is perhaps the central question, and
    it is a question that I'd like to pose to you. It is, can we
    save the Army, can we rebuild the Army, while we're still
    fighting the conflict in Iraq?
        General McCaffrey. Here's the good news. Right now, an
    objective viewpoint, having hung around this military for a
    better part of 42 years, and coming from military family, the
    leadership strength of the Army is simply beyond belief, both
    Active and Guard. You could go to the best company commander in
    each one of these fighting battalions and say, ``You're now a
    lieutenant colonel, you're in charge of forming up a new
    battalion,'' and they're fully capable of doing it. So, the
    leadership limitation, which we faced in World War II during a
    surge, isn't there. They absolutely can do it.
        Second, I think the question is, will the country respond?
    Will the 18- to 30-year-old men and women in the country step
    forward and fight? I think the answer is yes, they would, if we
    sat down and said, ``What do we need to do to get the results
    we require?'' I couldn't agree with Dr. Korb more, lowering the
    standards is the last thing we ought to do. I talk to command
    sergeant majors now in motor pools, they'll say 10, 20 percent
    of these kids we're bringing in right now simply shouldn't be
    in uniform. That's going to be a problem to us, because they're
    going to be our staff sergeants, 6-7 years from now, in the
    next crisis. We shouldn't lower our standards, we should
    increase the size.
        Then, finally, I think we have to remind ourselves that the
    national security of the United States isn't just at stake in
    Afghanistan and Iraq. We have to be concerned about controlling
    the Pacific Ocean. We have to be concerned about the
    proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We should not
    take the entire defense establishment and turn it into a
    counterinsurgency force. That isn't the way to protect the
    American people in the coming two decades.
        So, I actually don't think it's too much of a challenge to
    change the base of the Armed Forces, which is now failing our
    operational commanders. Dave Petraeus is not going to get 20
    brigades for the next 36 months. This thing is coming apart on
    him back here in the United States, and we are in denial.
    Rumsfeld has refused to accept the obvious evidence in front of
    his eyes that that was taking place. So, these nine joint
    commanders, when they turn around and ask for the tool, are
    finding broken Air Force airlift, ships that are undermanned, a
    modernization program that's been put on hold, and an Army
    whose equipment is in disarray because we've under-resourced
    it.
        Thank you.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        General Scales?
        General Scales. Yes, ma'am. I'm a historian, so let me put
    a little military history into the discussion.
        Oftentimes, the greatest opportunity for transformation and
    change is during times of great stress. Militaries are, by
    their very nature, bureaucratic institutions. They're
    pyramidical and they're--I know this really surprises you--they
    grind on very slowly, and they're not likely to change quickly.
    So, it's during times of stress, it's during times of
    uncertainty, it's during times of great ambiguity, when the
    military tends to make its greatest advances in vision and
    concepts and transformation.
        So, I would argue with you, now is the time to begin the
    process, when everybody in this room, I believe, agrees that
    the Army and the Marine Corps are under enormous stress. I have
    never found anyone who's ever come up to me in the street and
    said that a marine infantryman in Fallujah is overpaid or that
    he's well-equipped, or he's as trained as he needs to be.
        So, I guess I view this as a window of opportunity, not an
    open door. I think that's why all four of us are here, because
    the time to begin the process of change and reform is in the
    time of greatest stress, because that's when you are able to
    shine the spotlight of reform on the problem and get reform
    started.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        General McCaffrey, at a previous hearing before this
    committee, the then-Chief of Staff of the Army testified that
    55 percent of the total Army force was made up from the
    National Guard and Reserves. I was really surprised that we
    have reached such a high level. It shows why we're so dependent
    on our National Guard, and why we're placing such demands on
    them.
        What is your reaction to the fact that only 45 percent of
    our total force is now made up of Active Duty soldiers?
        General McCaffrey. I personally believe that a robust
    National Guard is essential to America's security. When you
    start looking around a State--pick a State at random--there'll
    be 2,000 or 3,000 State police, there'll be--you look at the
    Nation as a whole--12,000 local sheriff departments and police
    forces. If you have a problem, you need the National Guard--the
    Air Guard and the Ground Guard. In particular, engineering,
    signal, medical, transportation, the tools that a Governor
    needs to deal with a Hurricane Katrina or with a radiological
    attack. So, I would actually argue the National Guard is too
    small, and the Reserve Forces are too small.
        I think we've had a role problem. We can't allow them to
    fulfill their mission unless the Active Forces are capable of
    picking up these responsibilities. We were looking at an Army
    of 490,000 people, trying to maintain this rate of deployment,
    and it's simply incapable of doing so.
        So, I do believe the Active Force should be substantially
    increased, and not--we keep talking about fighting brigades.
    This thing doesn't work just because of fighting brigades.
    Right now, when you look at the force as it's postured in Iraq,
    contractors are doing long-haul communications, transportation,
    feeding the soldiers, repairing our equipment. You go in a
    division or a brigade Tactical Operations Center, and you have
    contractors in there, in blue shirts, keeping the thing
    running. At some point, when fighting gets intense, they won't
    do it. A marine private will do it for $800 a month, but a
    contractor simply won't, at some point, stay there. So, I
    believe our logistics capability in Iraq and Afghanistan is a
    house of cards that will fall down under intense pressure. The
    Active Force is too small, there's no question.
        Dr. Korb. Senator, could I add something?
        Senator Collins. Dr. Korb?
        Dr. Korb. I think it is important to keep in mind why the
    Guard and Reserve are as big as they are. This was a deliberate
    policy on the part of a general who I'm sure all the people
    here know, Creighton Abrams. He was very concerned that, during
    the war in Vietnam, we never mobilized the National Guard. The
    reason for that is, they were concerned that if they did, given
    some of the people who were in there, to avoid going in the
    Active Service, that it would have sparked a debate that he did
    not want. So, the late General Abrams basically said, ``We're
    never going to have this again. My Active Force is going to be
    so small that if you want to do anything serious, you're going
    to have to mobilize the Guard and Reserve, because we want the
    American people to feel an emotional investment.'' So, it was a
    rationale for why they did it.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Collins.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks, gentlemen.
        General McCaffrey, you seemed to indicate that the
    possibility of success for the latest development, the surge,
    is constrained by inadequate resources, in terms of manpower,
    in terms of support. Is that a fair estimate?
        General McCaffrey. It may be fair, but it's probably less
    important than other assertions one could make, because it's
    not too clear to me--and, again, I didn't intend to talk about
    the policy in Iraq--that we're fighting a counterinsurgency
    campaign in Iraq. I think it's a civil war we're trying to tamp
    down. When we do tamp it down, the end result won't be
    delivered by five brigades, one a month, from now through June,
    but, instead, by political reconciliation, by leverage with
    economic tools, which are lacking in the current plan. So, I
    fundamentally think we're probably still not focused on the
    right approach.
        In addition, though, Petraeus ain't gettin' 20 brigades for
    the next 24 months.
        Senator Reed. That situation is a culmination of decisions
    that have been made over the last 4 years or more, in terms of
    sizing the Army, providing equipment, a host of issues. Is that
    fair?
        General McCaffrey. It is, and--there are some brilliant, I
    know, patriotic people over in that Pentagon. Dr. Chu,
    personally, fascinates me, because I know what an intelligent,
    experienced man he is. But, as we start calling up the National
    Guard brigades here, and the first four have been notified,
    more are to come, he actually said, ``This is no big deal.'' He
    completely misunderstands what's going on in this fighting
    force. Those staff sergeants in the 82nd Airborne, with their
    high morale and their unbelievable courage, are not staying for
    3 years straight in Iraq and Afghanistan. Their wives are
    saying, ``Wait a minute. There's 300 million of us who live
    here. Let somebody else take their turn.'' Those military
    people are watching statements out of the Pentagon that there
    was adequate combat power to sustain his policy. There isn't,
    and the troops know it.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
        We've been at this for more than 4 years, and I just
    wonder, looking forward to the Army that comes after, what are
    the lessons that we draw, both the bad lessons and the good
    lessons? In fact, it's more important, probably, to identify
    the bad lessons, because sometimes they're more harmful.
        General Scales? Then I'll go down the panel.
        General Scales. Senator, I may repeat myself a little bit,
    but let me just go down the laundry list for you.
        I think the first is that the realization that war is a
    human, not a technological, enterprise, that wars are fought as
    one group of men and women against another. At the end of the
    day, we have to walk away, or we have to amend a theory of war
    that's evolved in this country over the last 5 or 6 years, this
    netcentric approach to warfare that views the enemy as objects,
    and views warfare as an engineering problem, and, increasingly,
    change our attitude about how wars are fought. That's hard for
    us, as a Nation, to do, because we tend to apply the physical
    sciences, rather than the social sciences, to war, and you know
    that better than anyone.
        The second thing, if we're going to use the term ``long
    war,'' then we ought to believe it. The object of a military
    force is not just to get there, cause damage, and leave. We
    have to understand that the strategy for fighting the long war
    is persistence, and the ability to get somewhere and stay
    somewhere, and to have some effect.
        The third thing is the idea of a military is not to
    preempt, it's not to destroy, it's to build--it's to build
    trust, it's to form coalitions, it's to build partnerships,
    it's to aggregate, if you will, a collection of willing
    partners.
        Now, is force necessary for that, sometimes? Of course it
    is. But far more the weapon or commodity that we can apply most
    in the next 10 or 20 years to win this long war is trust. Trust
    in the ability and the intentions of the American people, trust
    in the skill and the empathy of the American military. That's a
    sea change from the way we've viewed warfare in the past.
        Senator Reed. Dr. Korb?
        Dr. Korb. I think the main thing we've learned is that you
    have to level with the American people. I have great confidence
    in the American people, and they will trust you, the
    Government, their leaders. But if they feel they've been had,
    they'll turn against you. The best way I can summarize it is to
    quote from Francis Fukuyama, the author of the book, ``The End
    of History,'' who was one of the neoconservative supporters of
    the war. He said, ``If you had told the American people, back
    in early 2003, that we would go to Iraq and lose''--now it's
    over 3,300 lives, close to 30,000 wounded, maybe 500,000 Iraqis
    dead, ``costs spent, $500 billion, so Iraq could have an
    election''--these are his words--``you'd have been laughed out
    of the ballpark.'' That's not what they signed up for. I think
    one of the things we have to do, when you go to war--I don't
    have the military experience of these gentlemen, but I did
    spend some time in the Navy, and what we were always told was,
    ``You obviously hope for the best, but you plan for the
    worst.'' The idea that somehow--and you all know--we've been
    over this--how many troops that they thought they would have,
    and how quick it would be--basically, was not the way to
    approach it.
        I think we also learned that there becomes a moment when
    you can really spark the debate. I think Senator Levin and
    General Eric K. Shinseki, USA (Ret.) will go down in history.
    Everybody knows the question you asked them. The question is,
    ``Why did we stop there?'' We being the American people, ``Why
    didn't we press it more?'' The media, the academic community--
    and say, ``Okay, do we have enough troops?''
        Then, finally, I think we learned that there comes a time--
    and after September 11, the country was ready to do the things
    that people here are talking about. They would have risen to
    the challenge if you had told them to do it. I think you could
    have increased the size of the Army then. I don't think you can
    do it now, because mothers and ministers and priests and rabbis
    and coaches are telling youngsters, who might want to go into
    the Army, ``You really don't want to do it now, because this
    war has become''--to use Tom Ricks's term, ``such a fiasco.''
    So, I think we have to learn, you have to be honest with the
    people. If you want to go to war, make sure people understand.
        I'll end by quoting Colin Powell, as he told the President,
    ``You break it, you own it.'' Did we really realize what that
    meant when we went in there?
        Senator Reed. I think I'm running out of time, but first
    Dr. Krepinevich and then General McCaffrey.
        Dr. Krepinevich. Five lessons.
        First, an Army organized and optimized to run a sprint,
    fight a short war, a decisive war, is not the Army you need for
    a marathon, a long, irregular war.
        Second, in long wars, attrition is not only possible, it's
    likely. We hadn't had sizable attrition of military equipment
    for roughly 30 years after Vietnam. We're seeing it now. It's
    not just a case of this war, it's a case of other contingencies
    and other wars and other services.
        Third, a force that's optimized for conventional war can't
    easily shift gears to fight an irregular war. It's been
    demonstrated twice, in a stark way, not only in Vietnam, but in
    this recent war.
        Fourth, modern communications. In Vietnam, if you went into
    a village, you'd be lucky if they had a radio, and that radio
    would be lucky if it reached Saigon stations, let alone Radio
    Hanoi. You go into Iraq, and the place is swimming in
    information. We are fighting on their terrain, when it comes to
    what we call strategic communications. We say we are there to
    help build democracy, to provide economic growth. What they
    hear inside that country from people who know how to push their
    buttons is, ``The Crusaders are here to defile your religion,
    defile your women, steal your oil, and colonize you.'' We're
    not even in the game when it comes to those kinds of arguments.
        Finally, I guess, the issue of scale. I think a number of
    these contingencies are clearly beyond the scale of the
    military that we're likely to be able to build, especially in
    terms of ground forces, which means indigenous forces,
    partners, and allies are going to be increasingly important to
    us, something that I think we lost track of in this war.
        Senator Reed. General McCaffrey, quickly?
        General McCaffrey. I think Dr. Korb got the most important
    point, you have to level with the American people. You simply
    can't have a divergence between your public rhetoric and what
    the media are reporting. Media have done a first-rate job in
    this war, in my view. They've taken a few raps on, ``why aren't
    they telling us the truth of the goodness going on in Iraq?''
    All of you in the room have been there. This is a tough
    situation. You have to level with the American people.
        Number two, don't get involved in fair fights. The whole
    notion of the planning prior to the intervention in Iraq, that
    we were going to go in there with tiny forces and not waste
    money, was insane. The last thing you ought to choose is the
    military tool. If you do use it, you ought to use overwhelming
    force.
        Then, three, don't think military power is enough. We solve
    these situations--we keep talking the interagency--economic
    power, political power, diplomacy, covert action--right now, we
    have two people fighting the war, the Armed Forces and the
    Central Intelligence Agency, and that's it. The rest of them
    are missing in action.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Senator Cornyn.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General McCaffrey, in your statement you have--under the
    first category of your subheading, you said Congress ``must
    step up to your constitutional duties,'' and that's what I want
    to address with you in my brief time with you.
        First, do you--both on the short-term basis and on the
    long-term basis--it seems to me we can have the very best in
    optimal policies, procedures, and practices, but if Congress
    doesn't provide the funding to make it happen, it's not going
    to happen. In the short-term, you point out the importance of
    funding the war supplemental so that the new plan can go
    forward in Baghdad under General Petraeus to give the Iraqis
    the time and space in order to do the political reconciliation
    that needs to occur. Is that correct, sir?
        General McCaffrey. Yes, sir. It seems to me we have no
    option, at this point, but to give General Petraeus and
    Ambassador Ryan Crocker the tools and the time they need to do
    their job. If it doesn't work within a year, this Congress is
    going to pull the plug on the war. But, in the short-term, I
    can't imagine any other realistic option.
        Senator Cornyn. Yesterday, the Army issued a press release
    which reiterates what Secretary Gates and others have warned
    Congress about, the delay in providing the emergency
    supplemental spending, beyond mid-April, will slow the purchase
    of repair parts and other supplies, defer training and other
    nonmission-critical aspects of our readiness. If it's delayed
    until May, the Army says they'll ``cease entering into new
    contracts and task orders, suspend some service contracts
    supporting training events and facilities.'' If Congress
    doesn't get the money there until the end of June, this
    concludes that ``there will be substantial disruption to
    installation functions, decreasing efficiency, and,
    potentially, further degrading the readiness of nondeployed
    units.''
        I'd also like to ask about the overall level of funding and
    the stream of money coming in, so that the military can do the
    kind of planning that's necessary. Over the period of time
    ranging from, of course, World War II, where funding for the
    DOD was at 38 percent of gross domestic product, we ranged
    from, during the Vietnam war, 9.5 percent, to Korea, 14
    percent. We are now trending down to where the Office of
    Secretary of Defense Comptroller projects 2007 defense spending
    to be about 3.9 percent of gross domestic product.
        All of the various solutions that have been proposed here,
    growing the size of the end force, allowing for expanded
    training functions, rebuilding the National Guard, and perhaps
    deferred compensation of our military dimension, are all going
    to cost some more money. I would just like to ask, first,
    General McCaffrey, then General Scales, to comment on what is
    Congress's responsibility in terms of providing a reliable and
    steady and predictable stream of funding so that the kind of
    planning and preparation that you've talked about can actually
    occur?
        General McCaffrey. Senator, one comment, certainly on that
    supplemental. I personally believe that the intense debate over
    the future of the war here in Washington is helping Ambassador
    Crocker and General Petraeus. I think it has put the fear of
    God into the Maliki government. I think the Sunni tribal
    leaders are saying, ``My gosh, what if these people actually
    pull out in 2 years? We're 16 percent of the population, we're
    going to get slaughtered.'' So, I think the political debate's
    a good thing, not a bad thing, in terms of the situation on the
    ground in Iraq.
        Senator Cornyn. I agree with you about the debate. It's the
    delay in the funding I'm worried about.
        General McCaffrey. To go on to the second point, I think
    the delay of the supplemental would be monumental bad judgment.
    I don't understand how the Pentagon budget works, and never
    have. I was in and out of that system for the better part of 35
    years. I'm sure of this, it's like watching a person freezing
    to death. The last thing that shuts down is blood flow to the
    brain. We're going to fund that war. Congress will have--unless
    they actually pull the plug on the war--no impact on whether we
    buy ammunition, buy petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL), care
    for our wounded. That'll happen.
        What will happen is, we'll turn off every other program, so
    we're going to start sucking money out of the Air Force and
    Navy, we'll close down--and a lot of it will be staged, but
    that'll be minor theater. The grass will grow long at Fort
    Benning. But, in fact, programs are going to start to atrophy
    and suffocate. Once we start that process, backing out of it
    will screw us up for 2 years.
        So, again, now this political argument, I cannot imagine
    why the loyal opposition to the government would want to buy
    responsibility for the outcome of the war in Iraq. I do
    personally think you have to make a political statement of
    opposition to the war, and then give the Commander in Chief the
    tools he needs to fight in the short run.
        Now, the harder question--you talk about reliable, steady
    stream of money--that's been a problem in Congress since World
    War II. Norm Augustine, one of the smartest people we ever had
    in the DOD--I think the figure he used was, ``You can't raise
    the budget by more than 8 percent, or decrease it, without DOD
    screwing it up.'' I think that's probably the case. We need to
    see these programs, 5 years or more, with reliable, steady
    streams of funding. That's what gets us in trouble. You cut
    down the funding on Comanche, and start starving it, and the
    military will continue saying, ``Sir, we'll do it.'' Then, at
    some point, the technology fails on you. So, I think it's a
    challenge to Congress, how do you get 5- to 15-year headlights
    in front of you on building the national defense? But the
    supplemental, I sure hope we pass that, or there's going to be
    real consequences over in the Defense Department.
        Senator Cornyn. General Scales?
        General Scales. Senator, historically, the Army has drawn
    about 23 to 24 percent of the total obligation authority of the
    defense budget since 1950. It's a couple of percentage points
    beyond that right now. So, you have a force that does virtually
    all the killing and dying, living on less than a quarter, or
    approximately a quarter, of the budget. There are many, many
    different reasons for that, much of it driven by culture, much
    of it driven by inertia, much of it driven, as I mentioned
    earlier, by this idea that we can win wars with machines and
    not men.
        But, clearly, you have two choices. Number one is, you can
    grow a bigger pie, or, number two, you can re-slice the pie to
    give the Army's share of the budget somewhere beyond 24 to 25
    percent, in the range of 30 to 31 percent. I think if you're
    going to keep the Army--if you're going to reform the Army and
    allow the Army to fight this war, you're going to have to
    increase the amount of money that goes to the Army.
        One caution. The general officers who I've been raised with
    all my life, have about them this can-do ``hoo-ah'' attitude
    about resources. In other words, you're a platoon leader, and
    you want 1,100 rounds of machine gun ammunition, and you get
    600 rounds of machine gun ammunition to train with, and your
    answer is, ``Sir, I can do it.''
        So, be very, very careful, I believe, as we continue the
    hearing process, to look beyond the ``hoo-ah'' can-do attitude
    about resourcing, and ask the tough questions about the
    institutional Army and its health, about some of the second-
    order needs that an Army has, beyond just bullets and beans,
    and look inside that institution, and open it up, and see
    what's broken. Look at the canaries in the mine to find out
    who's dying in the mine, rather than simply look at some of the
    statistics, the top-line statistics that you get. Make sure
    that you go beyond the ``hoo-ah'' attitude and give the Army--I
    hate to say this, what it needs, not necessarily what it
    decides to ask for.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.
        Senator Akaka.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me add my welcome to our witnesses, and commend you for
    your service to our country.
        As chairman of the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management
    Support, I'm extremely concerned, as you are, about the
    readiness of the Army and Marine Corps, and also their ability
    to respond to the emerging threats, not only of the war we're
    in, but of the 21st century. The challenges that we are in are
    even more difficult, because we are simultaneously increasing
    the size of the force, and having to restructure our military
    posture to effectively deal with the threats and, as you
    mentioned, counterinsurgency operations. There's no question,
    we must do all we can to provide the training and the equipment
    and all that our troops need.
        Regarding this, I have some questions for Dr. Krepinevich
    and General Scales. During the early 1970s, talking about
    history, the Army was reorganized so that the regular Army
    could not conduct an extended campaign without mobilizing the
    Guard and the Reserves. It's not clear, however, that the
    Defense Department leadership at that time anticipated the kind
    of protracted conflict we are facing today, with the global war
    on terror and an Army that is comprised of 55 percent National
    Guard and Reserves. I believe Dr. Korb is right, in that the
    All-Volunteer Force was meant to be an initial defense against
    threats against our country. Now, in a prolonged war, I believe
    that the All-Volunteer Force is meant to be a bridge for
    dealing with threats until a full-time wartime force be built.
        Now, Dr. Krepinevich or General Scales, with the current
    Army organization, is the Army too reliant on the National
    Guard to meet its global commitments? In other words, are we
    fighting a sustained war with a peacetime organization? Since
    our Army force structure consists, as I mentioned, of 55
    percent National Guard and Reserves to 45 percent Active Duty,
    how can the National Guard maintain its capability to deal with
    security threats, with natural disasters at home, while being
    expected to provide extended support to our national interests
    abroad?
        Dr. Krepinevich?
        Dr. Krepinevich. As you noted, Senator, in the wake of the
    Vietnam war, it's been mentioned here, General Abrams put a lot
    of the Army's combat service support in the Reserves, with the
    idea that if you were going to use the Active Army in large
    numbers, you would be likely to call up--or have to call up the
    Guard Forces, Reserve Forces, as well.
        That has, obviously, begun to change with the advent of the
    modular force. Now we have these brigades that can deploy on
    their own with much more regularity than stripping out units
    from the division, and so on. But when you ask, ``Is the
    current Army too reliant on the Guard and Reserve?'' I think
    using the Army's own metrics, you have to say yes. The Army
    strives for a six-to-one rotation rate for our Guard and
    Reserve Forces, which is to say, for every six Guard brigades
    you have, only one would be on deployment at any given time.
        We've seen over the last 4 or 5 years that the Army has
    fallen below that ratio. So, by the Army's own definition, just
    as the Active Force is overstressed, the Reserve Force is
    overstressed, as well. I think when you look at the fact that
    the Army has concentrated a lot of its support elements in the
    Reserve Forces and in the National Guard, you also, if you
    believe as I do, that of the contingencies we're going to see
    most likely, as the chairman points out, are irregular warfare,
    stability operations, counterinsurgency, then these are the
    kinds of forces you're going to need more of. Not only that,
    but when you do talk about things like homeland security,
    disaster relief, as General McCaffrey said, it's not a matter
    of if, it's a matter of when, we're going to get hit here at
    home. You're going to need those kinds of forces, not only for
    these external operations that deal with irregular warfare, but
    also here on the homefront, as well.
        So, these forces are a lot more important. We have to think
    about them a lot differently than we did between the 1970s and
    September 11. During that period, the Guard and Reserve were a
    bridge between the Active Force and mass mobilization of the
    country on a scale like we saw in World War II. This is not the
    force for the occasional war, the occasional large war. As the
    Defense Department has said, the Guard and Reserve have really
    transitioned from being a strategic reserve to an operational
    reserve, which means we plan on using you folks a lot more, not
    only now, but, I think, in the future, as well.
        Senator Akaka. General Scales?
        General Scales. Senator, that's a key question. One of the
    things that I find interesting about this war is that, in many
    ways, the National Guard is threatened by its own success. I
    remember in the 1970s the National Guard was always viewed as a
    follow-on force, as Andy says, or as an augmentation force. But
    what I think has amazed many of my regular Army colleagues is
    that they have performed so incredibly well in Iraq and
    Afghanistan. Several reasons for that. Number one is, they're
    mature, and we know that oftentimes more mature soldiers are
    better decisionmakers in these types of crises. The second is,
    National Guard units, the brigades that I visited, are very
    tightly bonded; they're hometown units. So, their ability to
    know each other and to work with each other intuitively, I
    think, is truly exceptional, than, oftentimes, in many regular
    units.
        But the result is that, in many ways, perhaps the National
    Guard is being killed with kindness, that, in many ways, the
    Abrams doctrine is no longer valid anymore. In many ways, the
    National Guard has bifurcated itself into two forces. One is
    what I guess you could call a quasi-professional force, an
    almost professional force. I met a sergeant major from a
    Minnesota National Guard brigade that's on its way back to
    Iraq, and he told me, ``My unit consists of two types of
    people, those who have already left, because they have jobs,
    and those who are sticking around, because they have committed
    themselves over a lifetime to serve in the National Guard.'' Is
    that good or bad? I don't know. But we're in a completely
    different place now.
        The Guard has now become absolutely essential to our future
    military strategy. I agree with General McCaffrey, I don't
    think we have enough guardsmen now to perform both of those
    functions, the Governor's militia, as well as this quasi-
    professional force. We certainly haven't given the equipment
    and the training and the education that they need, to my mind,
    to perform either one of those.
        The third danger is--by killing with kindness, I mean the
    third danger is that they may be overused. I think that the
    force that is at greatest risk of being harmed in the short-
    term is the National Guard, because of all those things that we
    just talked about, and it concerns us all greatly.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. My time is expired.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Akaka, thank you.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        This has, indeed, been a extraordinary panel, a very
    important panel. I do share with a number of you, and a number
    of the members here, the view that this is the time--General
    Scales, even in a time of great stress--for us to make some
    fundamental changes about how we construct our defense
    capability for the future.
        You've given us some tremendous insight and advice. I think
    we need to take every bit of it seriously. The stress that
    we're now imposing upon our military is extraordinary. I'm very
    worried about it. In fact, I guess I have to say I remain
    amazed that we've held up as well as we have. I see a number of
    you nod.
        I've asked, ``How's recruiting going?'' ``It's going pretty
    well.'' ``How is retention?'' As you, I think, General
    McCaffrey noted, the combat units in Iraq now have remarkable
    retention.
        But I do believe you've pointed out to us that we are
    fraying around the edges, that we are asking more and more, and
    we could get to a point where we could lose this magnificent
    force that we have. I really think this is a serious situation
    for us. Probably, we could rearrange some of the monies that we
    spend, in more effective ways, and probably we need
    significant, but not an impossible, amount more to meet our
    challenges.
        I would just note, with regard to our Guard and Reserve,
    that it is hard--even once in 5 years--for a guardsman or
    guardswoman to be deployed for a full year, maybe 13-14 months.
    That is very hard every 5 years, if they have a profession, or
    they're a lawyer or accountant or some businessperson. Many of
    them are that way. But they are performing exceedingly well.
    Every year they've been trained better and better, and more and
    more capable. So, it's a critical part of what we do, but it
    cannot be a regular supplement, a constant supplement of where
    we are going.
        Several people have talked about the amount of money we
    spend as a percentage of GDP on defense. We are moving back up
    from a low of below 3 to about 4 percent of GDP. We spend $2.5
    trillion every year, this country spends that much. A hundred
    or so billion dollars a year, properly utilized, would have an
    impact, I think, positively, and would not be beyond our
    capacity to fund.
        One of our decisions--I guess it's not possible for us to
    make it here today--Dr. Krepinevich, you mentioned an emphasis,
    within some of our brigades, on irregular combat. I'm inclined
    to agree. We have had an increase in Special Operating Forces,
    which also count, I suppose, in that way. My thinking is that,
    in the future, we're going to have to be wiser about how we
    apply our military force, and it's not possible for us to take
    over complex societies, and run them, as we are finding out.
    Sometimes, we just don't have the capability. I think the
    situation in Afghanistan maybe gave us too much confidence of
    our ability to handle Iraq, which has turned out to be
    exceedingly more complex and difficult. It's just difficult.
    It's just not easy to do that, to create a government where
    none exists.
        So, would you comment, and maybe a little bit more about
    this configuration between conventional forces and irregular
    combat forces?
        Dr. Krepinevich. The one thing that the QDR did do, in
    terms of building partner capacity, is, it called for an
    increase in the Special Forces by one-third. They are working
    towards that, although, I have to say, for the first time we're
    not recruiting our Special Forces from within the Army, we're
    going out on the street and trying to recruit people directly
    into the Special Forces. So, again, it's, I think, a measure of
    the stress that----
        Senator Sessions. They have high, high standards, and they
    refuse to alter those. Should they?
        Dr. Krepinevich. Extremely high. Well, I don't----
        Senator Sessions. Maybe have even less elite forces within
    the group?
        Dr. Krepinevich. I have no understanding that they are
    lowering their standards, but what they are doing is, they're
    widening their aperture, they're not just recruiting from
    within the Army, they're going out and recruiting people in the
    civil society. As General Scales pointed out one of the things,
    aside from the enormously capable physical attributes that
    Special Forces soldiers have, is, they tend to be more mature,
    their decisionmaking processes tend to be a lot better. Of
    course, you get that, I think, more likely, when you recruit
    from within the Army, as opposed to going into the civil
    society.
        But I think there's a real strategy issue here that we
    confront, and that is, are we going to continue to take a more
    direct approach when it comes to these kinds of contingencies
    to build as many brigades as we can, so we have as big a
    rotation base as we can possibly have? Or are we going to take
    a more indirect approach, which is what the QDR alluded to but
    left on the table, which is building partner capacity, building
    capability within indigenous forces in peacetime, and also the
    capability to rapidly build up indigenous forces in countries
    that are threatened in wartime, also build up and equip the
    forces of allies and partners in wartime. I think the indirect
    approach is the preferred approach. I think it's more
    consistent with the limited amount of resources we have. I
    think it's more consistent with our tin ear when it comes to
    strategic communications. I think it also is more consistent
    when you look at the American public's lack of patience for
    protracted engagements on a large scale.
        Senator Sessions. Would you compare that--like in
    Afghanistan, we had less than 2,000 or 3,000 troops in
    Afghanistan when the Taliban fell, but we allied with and
    provided capability to the forces that opposed them. Is that
    what you're referring to?
        Dr. Krepinevich. We had a very small footprint when we took
    Afghanistan down. Of course, that footprint has grown over time
    substantially, although it's nothing like it is in Iraq. You're
    going to require some forces for stability operations. My sense
    is that greater emphasis should be placed than is currently
    being placed on things like training and advising forces,
    forces that are standing parts of the U.S. Army, like the
    former Military Assistance and Advisory Groups, that can go in
    and serve as a functioning entity that builds up and trains
    indigenous forces fairly quickly. Again, you don't have to wait
    until after the war. This should be a prophylactic. We should
    be doing this in peacetime. We are, to some extent, in places
    like the Philippines and Colombia and so on, but, again, on a
    more focused, more regularized basis.
        Then, there is the issue of advisors. The fact of the
    matter is, our Army is not organized and structured with a lot
    of surplus captains, majors, sergeants, and so on, that can
    quickly be infused in these units to help them stand up more
    quickly and more effectively.
        Then, as I pointed out, there are certain contingencies--a
    number of us have mentioned them--concerns about the potential
    for widespread disorder in places like Pakistan, Nigeria, and
    we can name other countries--where you are likely going to have
    to have some sizable U.S.-force element, although it wouldn't
    be, again--against a mass army, it would be trying, again, to
    impose stability on an area in a country that was falling
    apart.
        Senator Sessions. But it's much better if the indigenous
    forces could handle those threats than having to insert
    American forces.
        Dr. Krepinevich. I think our own history in places like
    Greece and the Philippines after World War II, early on in
    Afghanistan, and certainly now in Afghanistan, have been a lot
    more successful than, for example, our experience in places
    like Vietnam and in Iraq. Unfortunately, as we've also seen,
    though, in some cases, you can't avoid the commitment of large
    numbers of ground forces to provide that stability, to provide
    that time. Essentially, what we tried in Vietnam, and what
    we're trying to do in Iraq, is to buy time so that the
    indigenous government can organize itself, gain legitimacy,
    come up with the National Compact that Ambassador Zalmay
    Khalilzad used to talk about, and then develop security forces
    of its own whose loyalty is commanded by the government, and
    who can begin to substitute for our forces.
        That has been a plan that has looked good on paper in
    places like Iraq. Unfortunately, it's a plan that has not
    succeeded, thus far.
        Senator Sessions. My time is up. I don't know if there's
    any other response. But thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
        Senator Bayh.
        Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Scales, I think you made one of the best
    observations I've heard in attending many of these hearings
    over a period of some years now, and that was your point that
    too often we tend to look at military undertakings as an
    engineering problem to be solved, rather than taking a more
    comprehensive approach to things. I'd like to extend upon that
    by saying, too often when it comes to ensuring America's
    security, we tend to look at the military in isolation and
    forget that a strong economic policy, a strong financial
    policy, a policy of energy security for this country, are
    necessary to augmenting the military forces necessary to
    protecting America.
        Iraq is example A when it comes to looking at this as an
    engineering problem. We won the initial combat phase. It's been
    the nation-building that's come thereafter, without looking at
    the sociological aspects that you mentioned, that have proven
    to be so difficult for us.
        So, I think that was just an excellent point. We need an
    integrated approach to national security. We need an integrated
    approach to this tragedy of Iraq. I'd make one comment, General
    McCaffrey, with regard to your dialogue with Senator Cornyn.
    You mentioned that you couldn't understand why the political
    loyal opposition would want to take ownership or
    responsibility, I think, was the word you used for the outcome
    of this war. My response to that would be, we don't. But, in
    the face of continued long, lamentable, demonstrable
    incompetence in running this enterprise, what are we to do?
    Congress shouldn't be micromanaging this conflict. But it's
    been mismanaged, and we have some responsibility to ensure that
    the resources we provide for our military are used in
    furtherance of a strategy likely to lead to success, both for
    our military and for the country, as a whole.
        So, that is what is driving a lot of the dialogue up here
    today. We're going to fund the troops. We have an obligation to
    do that. But we also have a responsibility to ensure that those
    funds are used in an intelligent way to maximize the chances
    that our brave soldiers' sacrifices lead to the outcomes that
    the American people have a right to expect. So, that's what
    driving the dialogue up here today.
        In furtherance of that, I'd like to ask two questions.
    General McCaffrey, I'd like to start with you.
        Some in the intelligence arena opine that the only people
    who are truly happy with the situation in Iraq today are,
    ironically enough, the Iranians; that we are bogged down, we
    are slowly being bled, and yet the situation is not so chaotic
    that they are likely to be dragged in, in a more substantial
    way.
        Which leads me to my question: If we were compelled, for
    whatever reason, to confront Iran in a more serious way, do we
    have the capability of doing that today?
        General McCaffrey. I think there's a good argument that,
    clearly, U.S. policy in the last 5 years has removed the two
    major threats of the Iranian Republic: Afghanistan to the east,
    and Iraq to the west. That has given them, in many ways, the
    political and military latitude to take on new and more
    aggressive roles. I personally thought they decided 10 years
    ago to go nuclear. There's nothing we can do to substantially
    dissuade them, certainly not by threatening them with two
    carrier battle groups. Our military provocative posture a year
    ago was a huge mistake. We're going to--and, I think, now
    Secretary Rice is actually trying to help build a coalition to
    hem in Iranian menace.
        Now, could we deal with the Iranians today? The ground
    combat capability of the U.S. Armed Forces is shot, I do
    believe, and I think General Peter Pace's job is to not talk
    about our vulnerabilities, but to try and keep our deterrence
    capability up, even if through rhetoric. If we were put in a
    serious threat situation, if the Iranians closed the Persian
    Gulf through miscalculation, took out a U.S. cruiser, killed
    1,000 U.S. sailors, turned off our lines of communication
    south, which is largely Shia Arab populations, we could, and
    would, respond. I think it would be a huge miscalculation, by
    either the Syrians or the Iranians, to put us in a survival
    mode.
        Senator Bayh. Can I respond for just one moment, General?
    You said ``our combat capability is shot,'' but that if the
    situation got bad enough----
        General McCaffrey. We'd mobilize the National Guard, we'd
    tell Petraeus, ``Go take down the Iranian armed forces.'' We'd
    go to all-out war. We'd have 50,000 casualties, and we'd
    destroy the Iranian armed forces in less than 6 months, using
    air power, naval power, possibly nuclear weapons, if we got in
    trouble. This is a bad option. It's one we don't want to face
    up to. But if you ask me, ``What would we do if they turned off
    the lines of communication to 150,000 troops up in Iraq and
    closed the Gulf to oil transports?'', we'd end up wrecking
    their armed forces in under 6 months.
        Senator Bayh. My points are twofold. Number one, absent
    that extreme set of circumstances, the current situation--if
    you're the Iranians looking at the current situation in Iraq,
    it has essentially removed the deterrent effect, absent some
    extreme circumstances. Let the record show the General's
    nodding his head.
        The second thing--you said that they might resort to
    shutting down the Gulf--isn't it true that a more aggressive
    policy with regard to our energy situation--if we weren't as
    dependent as we currently are--if the global economy wasn't
    dependent as it currently is upon energy exports from the Gulf
    region, that would make the military options at our disposal
    somewhat--we'd have more flexibility?
        General McCaffrey. Senator, I sure hope in the next
    administration, the next 8 years, we work on an energy policy.
    It would seem to me easy to imagine, if we put 10 smart people
    in a room for 3 days, they'd come up with several things we
    could do in 15 years to change, dramatically, our dependence
    upon oil from that region of the world. We haven't seriously
    begun the discussion. There seems to me currently, no
    likelihood we will.
        Senator Bayh. This is back to your point, again, General
    Scales.
        My last question--and General McCaffrey, I don't want to
    just focus on you, but you mentioned China at least a couple of
    times. I'd be interested in your opinion, General Scales, about
    going forward. Let's take Taiwan, and put Taiwan aside. The
    strategic interests of China, the force structure that they
    will likely pursue to ensure those strategic interests,
    juxtapose those to the strategic interests of the United States
    and what force structure we need to have if our strategic
    interests should rub up one against the other. Does it concern
    any of you that, to the extent that there may be occasional
    conflict between those strategic interests, we're currently in
    a position of borrowing so much money from the country that
    I've just asked about?
        General Scales. Senator, at the Army War College, there's
    an equation, that ``Threat is equal to intent times
    capability.'' All too often, when we look at our enemies, we
    look at them in terms of capability and not in terms of intent.
    The old joke among many of us is, ``We're desperately searching
    for an enemy worthy of our weapons.'' My concern about China is
    that we can whip that froth all we want to. Our policy should
    be to deter China from engaging in a long-term arms race or
    strategic confrontation with the United States. Our policy
    should be to prevent China from looking in an open door. But,
    other than that, the idea that somehow we're going to go mano-
    a-mano with 1.2 billion people is preposterous.
        The other point that I disagree with General McCaffrey on
    is Iran. Iran, with the present force we have, is militarily
    unassailable. We can punish Iran; we can't defeat it. Partially
    because we don't have the forces, but, at the end of the day
    when you plan a strategic campaign, the will of the people and
    geopolitics are the two driving forces that determine whether
    or not you're going to be successful. If you look at both of
    those from the Iranian standpoint, they are militarily
    unassailable. It's almost as if Ahmadinejad wakes up every
    morning and goes to prayers, hoping that we try, because he's
    seeking to be the strategic center of gravity of the war
    against the west. An ill-conceived preemptory campaign to
    punish Iraq [sic] would have absolutely the opposite of the
    intended strategic effect on our interests in the Middle East.
        So, I think, frankly, we all ought to breathe into a bag a
    little bit when we start looking at China, and we start looking
    at Iran, and we start dreaming up these doomsday scenarios, and
    we ought to deal with the enemy we have, rather than the one we
    want.
        General McCaffrey. Let me quickly underscore----
        Chairman Levin. If I could just interrupt for one moment.
        Senator Bayh. That would have been good advice to take,
    some years ago.
        Chairman Levin. If you'd just yield for a second. You said
    a ``strategic campaign to punish Iraq.'' I think you meant
    Iran?
        General Scales. Oh, I'm sorry. I did. I meant ``n,'' not
    ``q.'' Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Excuse the interruption, General.
        General McCaffrey. I just wanted to quickly add, again, I
    think military threats to Iran would be a major miscalculation.
    That was the intent of my remarks. But I think we shouldn't
    lose sight of the fact that they're in a position to put us at
    huge risk right now if they miscalculated, and we'd have to
    take action. But there is no disagreement between General
    Scales and I that a military option against Iran would be a
    fundamental miscalculation.
        To your point on China, it's hard to imagine why we can't,
    in the coming 25 to 50 years, keep China as a strategic
    partner, in economic and political terms. They will, without
    question, emerge as a global military power in the coming 25
    years. We should be there with a deterrent capability that
    makes sense, to add balance to our international policy, but we
    should not count on--nor is there any reason to believe, in my
    view, that the Chinese will be fundamentally an aggressor
    nation in the Pacific Rim in our lifetime. But I think military
    power is certainly a piece of it.
        Dr. Korb. Senator, let me add something, because I think
    you raise a very important point about China and our economic
    situation. This is the first extended war we've ever fought
    where we not only don't have a draft, we have not raised taxes,
    we've cut them. We're funding this war by borrowing money both
    from our Social Security Trust Fund, the surplus, as well as
    from foreign countries, including China.
        Now, let me give you, I think, a scenario that you need to
    be concerned--China, for whatever reason, decides they're going
    to make Taiwan part of China--they've waited long enough--and
    we move carrier battle groups into the area, as we did in the
    1990s. The Chinese say to us, ``If those carrier battle groups
    come within 100 miles of Taiwan, we're going to sell our
    dollars.'' Okay? Do you think the American people, if their
    interest rates go up, and the stock market goes down, they're
    going to say, ``Taiwan''? I think this is what you really have
    to keep in mind as you do this. To me, when people say, ``You
    have to buy this weapons system or that to deal with the
    potential Chinese threat,'' and I'm saying, ``Yes, but you're
    borrowing money from China to buy the weapons,'' and it's not
    just military, it's economic and diplomatic.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Bayh, thank you.
        Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I would only say that the reason for my question--and you
    gentlemen are more familiar with military history than I am,
    but I believe, looking back over history, it is exceptional for
    a country to be militarily strong over an extended period, but
    financially weak. We are currently on the cusp of testing that
    proposition, potentially at our own peril. That was the
    reason--getting, General Scales, to your point, for an
    integrated approach to national security.
        Final thing I'd say, Mr. Chairman--General McCaffrey, I
    agree with you. I am optimistic that we can integrate China
    into the global system, security system, economic system, and
    so forth. But a system of interdependency is one thing, a
    system where we become overly dependent is another thing, and
    that's my concern.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Bayh.
        Senator McCaskill.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        My thanks to the panel for being here.
        As a note of personal privilege, let me specifically give a
    warm welcome to General McCaffrey. I had the distinct honor of
    witnessing his raw leadership skills in his job as the Director
    of National Drug Control Policy in the Clinton administration,
    and had an opportunity to watch him lead.
        That leads me to my first question. I specifically would
    ask, first, General Scales then General McCaffrey to speak to
    this.
        I'm concerned about the promotion rates to captain and
    major. I am concerned that we have a critical shortage of
    captains and majors. I think, for the first time in our
    history--please correct me if I'm wrong--we're offering a
    $20,000 cash bonus to retain captains. We are promoting--98
    percent of the captains become majors, and 98 percent--excuse
    me--98 percent of the lieutenants become captains, 98 percent
    of the captains become majors. At what point have we changed
    from a professional officer corps to a bureaucratic officer
    corps? My concern is, is that the leadership skills that are
    recognized in promotion are the same leadership skills that
    allows you to look a bureaucracy and say, ``It's not working,
    and we have to change it.''
        The automatic promotion that is going on now, I think,
    lends itself to the kind of problems, frankly, like we had at
    Walter Reed Army Medical Center, where no one was willing to
    say, ``Wait a minute, this is not working for these wounded
    soldiers and their families in outpatient treatment. We need to
    be doing something differently.''
        I would like, specifically, any suggestions you would have
    for incentives that would work right now. Obviously, the
    $20,000 cash incentive is not working. What is an incentive
    that might work? With your years in the military, what could we
    be doing to hold onto this precious commodity of leadership in
    the middle?
        General McCaffrey. First of all, Senator McCaskill, I
    served in an Army where I got promoted to captain automatically
    at 24 months, and the screening factors were, ``Were you
    currently not under arrest? Could you cock a 45?'' [Laughter.]
        So, I'm probably not a good one to talk about the
    shortcomings of the current captains.
        When you look at our company commanders, battalion
    commanders, the tactical leadership we have in the Armed Forces
    now is courageous and effective beyond belief. It's simply
    superb. You're right, though, to question where is it going to
    be in 10 years? We are seeing a huge loss rate, accelerated, of
    West Pointers, kids with engineering degrees, business degrees.
    We're watching the ROTC Distinguished Military Graduates (DMGs)
    disappear. We're very concerned about it. We're going to end up
    with an officer corps that'll be 40-50 percent Officer
    Candidate School, and many of them will be tremendously
    dedicated, skilled soldiers, but may not have the growth
    potential that we'll need for the next war. So, we are looking
    at it.
        Some of the tools that are on the table that have worked
    are remarkable. You talk to a captain, ``What's going to keep
    you in?'' First of all, they'd like a year at home. They
    definitely would like to have some confidence that this isn't
    nonstop deployment for the next decade. Second thing they want
    to know is, ``Can I go to a first-rate graduate school?''
        So, when we turn around to the West Pointers and say, ``If
    you'll extend your mandatory 5-year service obligation by X
    number of years, we'll guarantee you a graduate-school slot''--
    actually, we're guaranteeing them branch choice, to include
    infantry--and they're extending up to 3 years of service to get
    what they want to do. So, I think there are tools. We have to
    sit down pragmatically and sort out how to do it. The skill of
    the officer corps is in jeopardy in the coming 10 years.
        Senator McCaskill. Yes, General?
        General Scales. Senator, let me just echo what General
    McCaffrey said.
        We saw our generation of the military breaking in 1972,
    when captains and middle-grade sergeants, E-6 and captains,
    started leaving the service in the combat arms. They were, to
    use an overused expression, the canaries in the mine. Long-
    service combat-arms captains and staff sergeants are the first
    ones to vote with their feet.
        So, your question is, how do you keep them in? First of
    all, as I mentioned to you before, what I would suggest is a
    soldier sabbatical. Without strings and without professional
    punishment, young officers coming back from an operational
    assignment in Iraq should be offered an opportunity to go to
    graduate school, at a name graduate school, to focus
    principally on the study of alien cultures, languages, and
    military art. Their spouses should also be given the
    opportunity to study as well. Remember the old saying, ``You
    recruit soldiers, you retain families.'' Quite often it's the
    spouses who are voting to get out, rather than the soldiers
    themselves.
        Senator McCaskill. Right.
        General Scales. The other reason why graduate school is
    important, is that experience isn't enough. We say we have the
    most experienced officers corps we've ever had. I agree with
    General McCaffrey on that. But that's experience for one style
    of war in one campaign. This is wonderful. But what we have to
    do between their 5th and 20th year of service is expand that
    experiential base and widen their horizons and teach them the
    intellectual skills that it takes, in higher command, to
    command indirectly, and to think creatively and to do intuitive
    decisionmaking and all those intellectual skills that will come
    with time from reflective study.
        So, I don't believe that they look for more money. I think
    they look for three things. They look for more time at home,
    they look for predictability in their family life, and they
    want to expand their horizons. Personal examples are my
    children who were both DMGs, one from Notre Dame, the other
    from Wake Forest. They both went to Airborne School. They
    served in combat units--one, the 1st Armor Division, the other
    in the 1st Cavalry Division. They both got out, not too long
    ago, because they were told that they couldn't go to graduate
    school. Frankly, I think both my daughters would have stayed
    in, had they had an opportunity to go to graduate school. So,
    that's become something of a passion with me.
        When General McCaffrey and I were captains, we lived in an
    isolated cocoon. Captains today are on the Internet every day,
    and they see what their college classmates are doing, like my
    one daughter would see that--she's in Bosnia, and she had
    friends who were in medical school or in law school or in
    business school or in graduate school. Frankly, for this
    generation, they view that as an important point of self
    esteem, not just professional development. So, if we want to
    keep those grades of officers, then we should give a no-
    strings-attached opportunity to further their intellectual
    credentials.
        General McCaffrey. Just to add one anecdote, one of my
    students--I see these kids after teaching 5 years' worth of
    seminars all over the world--Captain Jessica Donker showed up
    to meet me in Kabul; she is a military police officer. It's the
    third time I've seen her in the combat zone since she
    graduated. She said she's really happy. She's going home in
    June from Afghanistan, takes command of a military police
    company in the 18th Airborne Corps that in October, deploys
    into Iraq. She says, ``I own nothing. I don't have a house, a
    car. I gave my car to my mother.'' We are running this force
    ragged. So, she's still in there with us, but again, I would
    just put a note of caution on the table, we wrecked the Army
    coming out of Vietnam. It took us 10 years to recover. We're
    not going to get 10 years in this war.
        Senator McCaskill. With the very limited time I have left,
    I'd like to switch to equipment for a minute. Could somebody
    briefly explain to me the logic--watching from the outside--and
    it appears to be parochial, because this deals with an aircraft
    that is important to the St. Louis region, but I can assure you
    that my concern is not parochial, and it is that, with the FCS
    coming in at more ton weight than had originally been designed,
    the idea as, I think--as you said in your written testimony,
    General McCaffrey, we're flying the wings off the C-17s and the
    C-130s. How do you come to a decision within the military to
    stop production of the C-17 right now? How does that happen?
    Can anybody explain to me how that happens, and why everyone,
    when I ask this question of General Schoomaker or when I ask it
    of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, I get a blank stare? It
    is just amazing to me that no one can give me a good answer why
    we're shutting down the line of an aircraft that, if you look
    at it objectively, clearly we need.
        General McCaffrey. The C-17, seems to me, is a national
    strategic treasure. There probably ought to be 600 of them with
    the air-to-air refueling capability to make them work. It has
    enormous military value, enhanced by this misguided policy of
    bringing all forces back to continental United States, but it's
    also another element of national power for natural disasters,
    for humanitarian crises abroad. We ought to, at the end of the
    day, get rid of our C-5 fleet, probably get rid of most of our
    C-130s, except the fully modernized ones, and have this
    tremendously capable aircraft there.
        I think what's happening is, we're running out of money.
    The burn rate in Iraq is now $9 billion a month. I think it's
    $1.4 billion a month in Afghanistan. It's in consumables--
    ammunition, POL, thousands of casualties--and we're not
    investing in the future.
        But I think that aircraft, without question, we should up-
    ramp the production, not turn it off.
        General Scales. Senator, let me just add to that. It's
    important to understand that the C-17 is important to the Army.
    It's not just important to the Air Force. The Army's concept of
    future warfare is operational maneuver by air.
        Senator McCaskill. Right.
        General Scales. Not by sea or by land. You can't get to the
    far corners of the world and stay there for prolonged periods
    of time by driving there. So, I agree with General McCaffrey,
    absolutely, that it's not just the health of the Air Force
    that's hinging on the decision to continue making C-17s, but
    it's the total effectiveness of the ground forces, the very
    forces that we're talking about here, that are dependent on
    having strategic airlift--robust strategic airlift available in
    the future.
        Dr. Korb. Senator, the reason that it happened is, the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense didn't do its job. When
    you're in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
    Services--I won't get into--you wouldn't believe some of the
    things they want to cut or don't put in their budget--your job
    is to ensure things like that happen, because your job, working
    for the Secretary of Defense and the President, is to ensure
    that the total military capability is what it should be.
        I can remember dealing with the Services, and I would say,
    ``look, here was the Secretary's guidance. You didn't follow
    it.'' They would say, ``He has the wrong guidance.'' ``No,
    that's your job, is to make''--and I think, when we go back and
    look at the history of the things we've spoken about today, as
    well as the war, there will be a failure of the top
    leadership--the Secretary of Defense and his office--to do
    their jobs.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCaskill.
        Senator Pryor.
        Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me start with you, if I may, Mr. Krepinevich. I have a
    question that I think no one really wants to ask, but I hear a
    lot when I travel to Arkansas, when I talk to military people.
    Given the deployment rates and the recruiting and retention
    numbers, et cetera, are we moving toward reinstituting the
    draft?
        Dr. Krepinevich. The answer is, it depends.
        Senator Pryor. Depends on?
        Dr. Krepinevich. As I said earlier, we're talking about
    increasing the Army by 65,000. If you look, as you have, at
    recruitment and retention rates, the Army is barely able to
    make its recruiting numbers. The only reason it made it last
    year is because it recruited people over the age of 35. If you
    take out the over-35 group that's coming into the Army, the
    Army didn't meet its target.
        In terms of retention, people on the Army staff have told
    me, or asked me, ``When you were an officer, when could you
    reenlist somebody?'' I said, ``If they had a year left on their
    enlistment.'' Now the Army is going out and enlisting people--
    or reenlisting people with 2 years, 3 years left on their
    service. In a sense, they're harvesting seed corn from down the
    road.
        So, this is an Army that, right now, is being told,
    ``Increase your end strength by 65,000.'' The Army looks at it,
    and it says, ``Maybe over 5 years, if we go 7,000 a year--maybe
    we can get an extra 7,000. Maybe if we lower our standards a
    little bit more, maybe if we get a little bit closer to that
    red line, maybe if we institute some of the innovative ideas
    that these gentlemen have raised.'' If that's the case, and if
    a contingency like Iraq pales in comparison to what would
    happen if we got entangled in Iran or Pakistan or Nigeria--I
    would encourage people to take a look at what's going on in
    Nigeria right now, and think about the situation we would
    confront if that situation just keeps going the way it is,
    because it is going downhill--then you get to the point where
    it's--even if you could recruit an additional 65,000, that
    isn't enough.
        That's why I think we need to not only look at numbers, but
    also how we use those numbers. I think it's very much in our
    interest to take what some people call the indirect approach,
    building up our capability to build what the Pentagon calls
    ``partner capacity,'' to be able to go in, in peacetime and on
    an even greater scale in wartime, to train up indigenous
    forces, to equip them, to do it quickly, not the way we've done
    it in Iraq, where we had a false start, we started again in
    2004.
        I think one of the reasons why we're in the fix we're in
    right now is, there was a big bet placed, ``We're starting
    again in 2004, after the insurrection. By golly, by 2006,
    they'll be ready.'' Well, they're not ready. So, here you have
    the crunch, not 12 months, but 15 months, and so on and so
    forth.
        But if you get to the point where you have these critical
    contingencies that are happening--a failed nuclear state, a
    failed state that is a critical exporter of oil--in addition to
    what we're confronting right now, you could find yourself
    between a rock and a hard spot. The countries that we have
    traditionally turned to during the Cold War for support, our
    NATO allies, all you have to look at is the demographic death
    spiral the west European countries are going through right now
    and their attitude about what constitutes their principal
    security problems.
        We don't have, like they did, any United States to turn to.
    We're going to have to find different allies that we can work
    with, because they simply don't have the manpower to make up
    the difference.
        So, when you begin to look at where that path takes you, at
    some point, unless you want to engage in some of the, I think,
    rather problematic remedies, like offering large numbers of
    foreigners American citizenship to serve in the Army--Bob
    Scales can tell you, historically, that's one of the paths the
    Romans took on their road to decline and fall--if the day comes
    when Americans aren't willing to fight for their own interests,
    it seems to me that that's a very worrisome day, indeed. But
    there may be a point where, in order to achieve a sufficient
    scale in force, we have to look at conscription again. It's
    certainly not the first choice. I don't think it's a wise
    choice. But you can certainly sketch out a situation where, if
    we fail to build partner capacity elsewhere, if we fail to take
    steps now, we could be confronted by something like that, a
    very difficult and hard choice somewhere down the road.
        Senator Pryor. General McCaffrey?
        General McCaffrey. I don't disagree in anything Dr.
    Krepinevich said. Let me add two thoughts, though. One, I think
    it's important to realize that it's not the job of the Army to
    defend the country. It's the job of three different groups of
    people. One's the American people. Do they have the political
    will to come forward and take part in their own defense? Number
    two, Congress and the resources. Three, those people who are
    privileged to be in uniform.
        So, to be honest, I'm always offended when I hear that
    ``the Army's in trouble.'' It's not the Army that's in trouble,
    it's the country. Where are the political leaders--the mayors,
    Governors, and the Presidents--who have stepped forward and
    said, ``We want your young men and women carrying an M-4
    carbine in Fallujah''? Until that happens, I don't think we're
    going to solve this problem. We need a call to action from our
    leaders as well as high-school principals and university
    presidents.
        The second one is, although I think when you look at the
    polling numbers there is zero support for a draft, it isn't
    there, the war in Iraq is unpopular. The American people have
    walked away from the war. They're not coming back. We're going
    to be out of there, largely, in 36 months. As we come out of
    Iraq, I would argue, you could consider a draft for the
    National Guard for domestic service only. The Canadians went
    all the way through World War II, where they drafted hundreds
    of thousands of their citizens, but none of them were forced to
    go overseas. That's not a desirable outcome, but I personally
    think, in the coming 2 years, we're going to break the Army
    National Guard with this call-up. It's vital to America's
    security, to America's Governors, and we're going to have to
    reconstitute. It may well be, if you offered America's parents
    a 4-year scholarship in college to serve in the Guard, where
    they'd have to volunteer for foreign service, that they'd step
    forward and do it.
        Senator Pryor. General Scales?
        General Scales. Yes, Senator, I appreciate Andy using my
    historical expertise to explain something, but I disagree with
    him. [Laughter.]
        In 1950, we initiated the Lodge Act, many of you may be
    familiar with that by Henry Cabot Lodge, where many of our
    Special Operating Forces were being scooped up in eastern
    Europe by the Soviets, simply because they weren't very good at
    that sort of thing, and we recruited citizens from eastern
    Europe to serve in the American Army. The deal was, they'd
    serve for 5 years, and, if they served honorably, they and
    their families would be made citizens of the United States.
    This was the beginning of the 10th Special Forces Group.
    General John Malchase David Shalikashvili, USA--many of you may
    know, his older brother, Othar--came in under the Lodge Act. We
    did the same thing after the Bay of Pigs in the 1960s, where we
    brought a large number of Cubans into the American Army. I can
    remember in my early days in the 1960s in Europe, there would
    be at least two officers or three officers out of each
    battalion who were either Cuban or eastern European.
        So, the idea that we can't draft, or we can't recruit folks
    from the Middle East who have language and cultural
    sensitivities, or we can't recruit in other places of the
    world, I think, is too shortsighted. I think not only would it
    help to solve our recruiting problem, I think it would actually
    enrich our Armed Forces, rather than diminish them.
        Dr. Korb. Senator, let me say something about the draft,
    which--I worked for a person who was the biggest supporter of
    the All-Volunteer military. That was President Reagan. But he
    told us, when we were trying to help save, with the assistance
    of many people in this room, the volunteer military, ``If you
    can't do it, let me know, because we cannot leave the country
    naked.''
        I remember President Bush saying, ``We'll never have a
    draft.'' You can't say that. What he should say is, ``I would
    prefer not to have it.''
        But if you had a draft right now, you would no longer be in
    Iraq. The American people would say no. That, I think, is
    important to keep in mind, because it's America that goes to
    war, and we need to--as we talk about these issues, we cannot
    put that aside. If the people are not willing to send their
    sons and daughters, we ought to think very carefully about what
    we're doing. If, at some point, they're not willing, but the
    political leaders in both branches decide we have to do
    something, then you're going to, as we did in Korea and in
    Vietnam--is to draft people.
        Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Pryor.
        Senator Clinton.
        Senator Clinton. Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony,
    and, obviously, for your years of service.
        You've covered so much ground, and it's all very rich, that
    I will be reading your testimony and pulling out a lot of your
    ideas. But I want to focus our attention for a minute on what
    seems to be the inherent contradiction.
        On the one hand, what I'm hearing from you, as to the kind
    of Army we need, both in size and in capacity, with respect to
    this era of irregular warfare and stability operations that we
    are engaged in, and the way we should be thinking about
    treating and deploying our forces, both to give them the
    support and the equipment and the training and, frankly, the
    additional opportunities to develop themselves that we've
    discussed, it seems that we're going in an opposite direction.
        We are spending $160 billion on the FCS. As I look at this,
    which is at the heart of the Army's transformation efforts, it
    is the major research, development, and acquisition program. It
    is going to try to take 18 manned and unmanned systems, and put
    them together by this extensive high-tech communications and
    information network. It's going to replace the M-1 Abrams tank
    and the M-2 Bradley. It's going to try to have fighting
    vehicles with advanced network combat systems. I think that
    means we lose one of the decisive advantages we still have on
    the ground, which is heavy armor and mechanized formations if
    we're actually going to put people at risk.
        It also seems to me that we're going to be reducing the
    end-strength calculus of boots-on-the-ground, because we're
    going to be relying so much on this abstraction. We're not
    going to be having people who are involved in understanding the
    cultures, doing what General Scales so eloquently described in
    a almost sociological way to understand enemies, but, more
    importantly, understand their societies, their needs, their
    desires.
        It's a high-risk venture, and it's taking up a lot of time,
    money, and effort on the part of those who are responsible for
    planning the future of the military.
        I know that Dr. Krepinevich has stated his opinion, but I
    want to start with him.
        Number one, what is your opinion of the FCS? Given where we
    are now, how do you try to reverse this gigantic bureaucracy to
    focus more on what we have heard you all describe as the
    pressing needs of our military to create this integrated
    approach to national security?
        Dr. Krepinevich. I think there are----
        Chairman Levin. Let me just interrupt for one second. I'm
    wondering if anyone has a BlackBerry and a mike on at the same
    time, or do you have any idea what that noise is?
        Okay, sorry to interrupt.
        Dr. Krepinevich. Senator, I think there are three areas of
    risk when it comes to the FCS. One is fiscal risk. It's $150
    billion, $160 billion, and growing. It's not clear, even with
    the generous sums we're giving the Army right now, relatively
    generous when you look back in recent years, that the Army's
    going to be able to accommodate this. In fact, when you look at
    the administration's Future Years Defense Plan, what you see
    is, somehow personnel, maintenance, and operations costs are
    supposed to stay flat, even with an increase in the size of the
    force, and somehow procurement's supposed to keep going up to
    accommodate things like the FCS, the F-22, the F-35, and we
    have our list.
        Second, it's a collection of technologies that are all
    supposed to somehow mature along the same timeline, or roughly
    close enough. When I talk to the people who are responsible for
    building it, and I say, ``Wait a minute, this is a networked
    force. You have 18''--now it's down to 14, by the way--
    ``systems that are involved. Suppose I take out three
    technologies that you say are in this basket of 30 or 40 or 50.
    Does that make this force 98 percent effective or 68 percent
    effective?'' You don't get a particularly good answer.
        Third, I think, there is operational risk. Senator
    Lieberman and I, a number of years ago, went down to talk to
    General John Nelson Abrams, USA (Ret.), when this idea was in
    its infancy. The whole concept was built primarily, almost
    exclusively, around the conventional battle. It was an
    expeditionary Army that was going to deal with a conventional
    rival.
        I met a number of times with Major General John Riggs, USA,
    (Ret.), when he was the program officer for the Army's future
    force or objective force. I've read the documents that were
    written up, the concept documents, by some of the Army's
    smartest people, retired Colonel Richard Sinnreich, USA, and
    Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege, USA (Ret.). The idea was,
    indeed, revolutionary. The theme was, the first: we will see
    first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively. It
    was essentially a leap out of blitzkrieg warfare, when armored
    forces closed with, and fought with, each other. In this case,
    we'll see the enemy first, we'll understand what's going on; he
    won't see us; we'll act first by maximum range fires; we'll
    finish decisively; the close battle will be the mop-up battle.
    That is, again, a situation where it's not clear to me that
    this is the kind of force that's optimized for irregular
    warfare, where seeing first and understanding first depends so
    much on human intelligence, not intelligence that's derived
    from electronic systems, for example.
        In a situation where, as one of my colleagues said, troops
    would rather be mounted than dismounted (you run a higher risk
    of casualties if you're dismounted, if you're outside these
    vehicles than if you're in them), if your sole objective is to
    eliminate casualties, don't go into combat.
        General Petraeus right now is finally getting our troops
    out of their base camps, out of their vehicles, and patrolling
    and engaging the people in an effort to convince them that we
    can provide for their personal security. I don't feel
    particularly secure when somebody goes zipping by in an armored
    vehicle, all buttoned up. I do feel more secure when they are
    more like the cop on the beat.
        So, it's not clear that the FCS is, in my mind, what you
    would go to if you were starting out with a clean sheet of
    paper and looking at the problem of irregular warfare.
        Now, having said that, there may be elements of this force
    that are worth pursuing. For example, over time, we may need a
    network battle force if we're going to operate in a
    proliferated world. We're going to need to have a much more
    distributed force than we have right now to minimize its
    vulnerability. We may be able to substitute precision artillery
    for precision aircraft, precision artillery being a lot
    cheaper. Rounds like Excalibur, for example, as opposed to the
    ``dumb rounds'' that the Army has been using for years. So,
    there may be something there.
        There may be something in the robotics, where we want to
    get into areas without risking soldiers or UAVs. But to say
    that we're going to accept this entire concept at the expense
    that it's going to cost us--and, oh, by the way the $150
    billion, out of the 48 Army brigades, only gets you 15 equipped
    with the FCS. In a sense, the Army has finally come up with a
    program where it's as expensive to equip a brigade as it is to
    buy an aircraft carrier. But, again, I think, with the resource
    constraints that the Army's confronting, with a shift towards
    more irregular warfare operations, at the very minimum, we need
    to take a good, hard look at the FCS and see: What do we really
    need out of it? What's technically feasible? What's physically
    feasible? What makes operational sense?
        Senator Clinton. General McCaffrey, do you have an opinion
    on that?
        General McCaffrey. I really don't disagree with anything
    Andy said. I think it's a sad situation we're in right now. The
    Army's acquisition budget, if I remember, is 4 percent of total
    DOD. This is a tiny program. There's only two programs over a
    billion dollars a year in the entire Army lineup.
        I also think FCS, as it currently exists, the next
    President is pulling the plug on this thing. They're going to
    justify it by saying, ``We'll do spiral spin-out of
    technologies into the heavy brigade combat teams,'' et cetera.
    Right now, the first brigade we will field, I believe, is 2017.
        Senator Clinton. That's what I've heard.
        General McCaffrey. So, that's beyond the next President's
    8-year term, and there are two or three miracles that have to
    happen between now and then to get this technology to come
    together.
        Having said that, it seems to me that the U.S. Army needs a
    medium-weight mounted force that should start to be fielded on
    the first year of the second term of the next President. We
    ought to take the system, relook it, and get them serious about
    it. I don't believe this program should be killed, it just
    needs significant redirection.
        Senator Clinton. Dr. Korb?
        Dr. Korb. I think it needs to be slowed down, and we have
    to, first of all, get the costs under control. I'm worried
    about a program whose estimates goes from $90 billion to $160
    billion with no reason.
        There are 57 technologies in there, and I've asked the Army
    to explain to me why they couldn't buy it this way or that way.
    To go to Andy's point, ``if you didn't buy all of these, what
    would you have?'' So, my advice would be, let's slow it down,
    let's figure out how big the Army's going to be, what we want
    the Army to do, and keep this in a research and development
    mode until we're sure which way we need to go and we can be
    assured that the costs are under control.
        As I look at this, I'm reminded of a weapons system that
    Dick Cheney canceled, the A-12. That was going to be the great
    thing for the Navy. It was going to be the Navy's version of
    the F/A-22. The thing ended up way over cost, and it had a lot
    of technological problems. They canceled it. The Navy went back
    and bought F/A-18s, E and Fs.
        Senator Clinton. Because it's also the opportunity costs of
    what you're not getting, as well, which I think is part of what
    all of your testimony's been about.
        General Scales?
        General Scales. First of all, I disagree with my
    colleagues, particularly Andy.
        Let's be clear about the pedigree of this, because I wrote
    the original concept paper for FCS, in 1997, and we started,
    from the very beginning, at least as long as I was in the
    conceptual phase, emphasizing that FCS was not designed for the
    Cold War. Senator Clinton, I got beat up constantly by the
    heavy Army generals, because we were espousing a lighter-weight
    force to fight in distant regions of the world against
    irregular forces.
        So, for Andy to say that this was a force designed for
    conventional war--isn't right. Now, Andy did go to see the
    TRADOC commander at the time and the TRADOC commander tried to
    push it to the right of the conflict spectrum, for whatever
    reason, I don't know. But all along, this system was designed
    for the type of wars that we're engaged in now. All you have to
    do is look at the success of the Stryker brigades. Ask anybody
    in Iraq, ``Which unit would you prefer, if given a Chinese menu
    of available units?'' Every one of them would say, ``I want a
    Stryker.'' A Stryker is a prototype, if you will, of what FCS
    will become.
        I don't see FCS as a network. I see FCS as a collection of
    light infantry-heavy vehicles that are capable of controlling
    areas and controlling populations. An M-1 Abrams organization,
    the smallest divisible entity is a brigade. Why? Because
    they're so maintenance intensive, they have this huge
    logistical umbilical cord that they rely on. If you break those
    down into small units that are capable of autonomous operations
    at company and platoon level, suddenly you're spreading
    yourself just exactly like Dave Petraeus says they should be.
        Andy mentioned the fact that now Petraeus is following this
    philosophy. What's he doing? He's using Stryker units. That's
    the unit of choice for the tactics he's using inside of
    Baghdad. He's not using light infantry, because Petraeus knows
    that you must protect your troops. The difference in casualties
    between a dismounted and a mounted unit is 10 to 1. The idea of
    a future Army going to war dismounted, I think, is
    irresponsible.
        So, the question is, how do you mount the Army? You mount
    in light, mobile units. By the way, the other thing is, Stryker
    and FCS are very infantry-intensive. See, most soldiers don't
    die in Iraq and Afghanistan, an irregular war, mano-a-mano;
    they die driving to the battlefield. They drive through
    ambushes, through IEDs. It's not the Abrams and the Bradleys
    crews that are dying, it's the people in Humvees, it's the
    people driving around in thinly-skinned vehicles. It's much
    better to build a middle-weight force, where everybody is
    protected a little bit, than a small number of people in Abrams
    units who are protected a lot. When I was involved in the
    program, in the 1990s, that was the philosophy.
        The philosophy, which I think the Stryker embodies, is as
    follows: You need to protect more soldiers longer--by that, I
    mean for the duration of a campaign--and allow them to get
    closer to the enemy before dismounting. I agree with Andy that
    the essence of counterinsurgency is infantry forces--dismounted
    infantry forces. But the longer you protect them, the fewer of
    them are going to die.
        Part of the problem, frankly, is the Army's marketing of
    FCS. They try to market it as a netcentric system, as a high-
    tech system, as a system hooked into the global network, tied
    into the joint this and joint that. I view FCS as a collection
    of light, fast, mobile, agile infantry-heavy fighting vehicles
    capable of operating at very small unit level for long periods
    of time, with very little demand on the logistical
    infrastructure. So, if you look at it from that perspective,
    instead of this techno-perspective, you see FCS in an entirely
    different light. Not that I have strong opinions about this.
    [Laughter.]
        Senator Clinton. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. The strength of all of your opinions here
    this morning is really very, very compelling and moving and
    valuable to us. I must tell you, a number of my colleagues have
    told me that this is one of the really great panels that we've
    ever had in front of us, and it's not just one or two, but a
    number of my colleagues. I think we probably all feel that this
    is an unusually experienced and knowledgeable, thoughtful, and
    passionate panel, and we need all of those.
        Unless somebody has a question which is absolutely
    compelling, we will adjourn, with our great thanks to this
    panel.
        Thank you so much.
        We stand adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
     role of the active military, guard, and reserves in the war on terror
        1. Senator Akaka. General McCaffrey, in order to determine the
    appropriate size and organization for our Nation's military in the long
    run, I believe it is essential to fully understand the evolving mission
    of our armed services, and the related missions for our National Guard
    and Reserves. In particular, I think we need to engage in a dialog on
    the role of the Active Military, Guard, and Reserves in the war on
    terror. Thinking beyond Iraq and Afghanistan for the moment, in your
    opinion, what do you see as the Army's and the Marine Corps' role in
    fighting terror?
        General McCaffrey. I do not have time to answer detailed questions.
    My written statement and the several hours of testimony more than
    adequately outline my views on these important issues.

        2. Senator Akaka. General McCaffrey, what role do you see for the
    Guard and Reserve in fighting terror?
        General McCaffrey. I do not have time to answer detailed questions.
    My written statement and the several hours of testimony more than
    adequately outline my views on these important issues.

        3. Senator Akaka. General McCaffrey, what strategies would you
    recommend we, as a Nation, utilize in the global fight against
    terrorists?
        General McCaffrey. I do not have time to answer detailed questions.
    My written statement and the several hours of testimony more than
    adequately outline my views on these important issues.

        4. Senator Akaka. Dr. Korb, you recommend expanding our force with
    a focus on peacekeeping and counterinsurgency operations. What is your
    basis for this mission?
        Dr. Korb. The war in Iraq demonstrates that while the U.S. military
    may be able to rapidly defeat a country's military on the battlefield,
    the operations following that conflict, establishing order, governing
    and policing the country, providing services, are amazingly complex and
    require a tremendous level of planning and commitment. The Bush
    administration utterly failed to understand the magnitude of the task
    that they were taking on when invading Iraq. Some argue that the
    situation in Iraq shows that the United States should not engage in
    stability operations or wars that result in the overthrow of a
    country's government and therefore should not become overly invested in
    dealing with these sorts of operations. However, the tremendous
    strength of American military power means that if it is ever forced to
    act against a particular state the sheer power of American capabilities
    would likely lead to the collapse of that government.
        While it is clear that these types of operations are incredibly
    difficult, the problem is that the United States as the world's sole
    super-power with global military reach will no doubt engage in
    peacekeeping and stability operations in the future, whether resulting
    from the collapse of North Korea, genocide in Darfur, a coup in
    countries like Pakistan or Saudi Arabia, or continued instability in
    Haiti or Somalia. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has
    engaged in these types of operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo,
    Afghanistan, and Iraq. Yet the military has in every case adopted an ad
    hoc approach to each operation--failing to build on its experiences to
    become more adept at these operations. Conducting these operations
    remains one of our military's major weaknesses. Because there are
    numerous scenarios in which the U.S. will have to engage in
    peacekeeping or stability operations, we must become more adept at
    conducting these operations.

        5. Senator Akaka. Dr. Korb, do you foresee nation-building as
    becoming a part of the Army and Marine Corps mission in the future?
        Dr. Korb. Since it is likely that the United States will be forced
    to engage in nation-building missions in the future, it will need to
    become an integral part not just of the Army and Marine Corps mission,
    but of the entire U.S. Government. The U.S. Government needs a new
    blueprint for action to address future post-conflict stability
    operations. In Iraq, the military has frequently complained that
    civilian agencies have been largely absent--forcing the military to
    carry even more of the burden. Just as the Goldwater-Nichols Act
    improved coordination between the Services and empowered the Chairman
    of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a similar act is needed today to improve
    coordination and planning between our Nation's warfighting, diplomatic,
    and aid agencies.

                                growth of forces
        6. Senator Akaka. Dr. Korb, in your statement, you discuss the need
    to grow our forces in a fiscally responsible manner. You specifically
    mention that many of the current weapons programs are unnecessary
    carryovers from Cold War thinking. These systems are, therefore, an
    unnecessary drain on our military budget. Can you elaborate on some of
    the systems you think are no longer needed, and why?
        Dr. Korb. The DOD should seek funding for flexible, efficient
    weapons systems that help combat 21st century threats, while stopping
    development and production of weapons systems that unwisely use scarce
    resources and/or do not meet performance standards. The production and
    development of the following weapons programs deal with threats from a
    bygone era and should be cut in order to pay for increases in the
    personnel and equipment budgets. The DOD should stop funding the:

             F/A-22 Raptor stealth fighter jet, which is an unnecessary
            and costly supplement to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
             SSN-774 Virginia class submarine, which offers few
            technological advantages yet substantially higher costs
            compared to existing submarines and is less relevant to our
            Nation's current challenges.
             DDG 1000 destroyer, which suffers from innumerable
            technological difficulties and ballooning costs without
            offering any true advantage over existing systems.
             V-22 Osprey, which has caused numerous training deaths and
            excessive cost overruns and which suffers from unresolved
            development issues while offering only marginal advantages
            compared to existing helicopters.
             C-130J transport aircraft, which provides few additional
            capabilities compared to existing transport aircraft and has
            suffered from severe technological flaws.
             Offensive space-based weapons, which are of no use in low-
            tech asymmetric conflict and are far more expensive than
            existing technologies without offering many additional strike
            capabilities.
             Continued deployment of the National Missile Defense System,
            which offers unproven technology at exceptionally high costs to
            defend against a highly unlikely nuclear missile strike against
            the United States.

                                  recruitment
        7. Senator Akaka. Dr. Krepinevich, in your statement, you discuss
    the troubles the Army is having in recruiting, and how they are having
    to significantly lower standards in order to recruit and retain
    soldiers. You also note that they have to lower the standards despite
    spending way more on recruiting bonuses. Finally, you note that the
    cost to support each soldier has gone up by well over 50 percent in the
    last 5 years. These challenges make increasing the force size very
    difficult. What do you believe is the underlying cause of the Army's
    recruiting difficulties? Is it just because we are at war? Is it
    disillusionment with the Iraq war specifically? Or do you believe that
    there are other factors?
        Dr. Krepinevich. The root of the recruitment challenges may lie in
    the government's inability or unwillingness to communicate to young
    people that their country needs them for service in the armed forces.
    This has not been a major theme in the administration's public
    relations campaign on the war. Recruiting incentives have been far more
    aligned with economic interests rather than patriotic duty.
        Additionally, there is the matter of mentorship. Apparently, many
    mentors (parents, teachers, and pastors) are advising their young sons
    and daughters who are interested in a military career to postpone
    military service until the war is over, or simply avoid it altogether.
        Finally, since a mass mobilization of U.S. manpower is not required
    to meet the Army's recruitment goals, there may be a ``free rider''
    issue at work. By this I mean that young men and women may feel that,
    since the service of every person is not required, they need not feel
    obligated to answer the call to service. Of course, if too many people
    take this attitude, a shortage of enlistees will result.

        8. Senator Akaka. Dr. Krepinevich, given the budgetary challenges
    facing our Nation and the military, how would you recommend we address
    these recruiting issues?
        Dr. Krepinevich. We can no longer rely primarily on financial
    incentives to meet our recruiting goals. In this time of great security
    challenges, our Nation must convey a real sense of honor, value, and
    appreciation of military service. We must articulate a strong and
    moving message about the threats confronting the United States and the
    important contribution that the military makes to advancing our
    national interests.

        9. Senator Akaka. Dr. Krepinevich, would you take any specific
    steps to address the shortages in the officer and noncommissioned
    officer (NCO) ranks?
        Dr. Krepinevich. Premature mid-career departure of seasoned NCOs
    and officers might be attributable to the toll that current operations
    in Iraq and Afghanistan are taking. One factor that may prove important
    in retaining mid-career officers is the prospect of a graduate
    education that improves the officer's value to the Army and provides
    the soldier and his/her family with a respite period of 2 to 4 years
    (if there is a ``utilization tour'' following receipt of the advanced
    degree) away from a combat zone. Of course, while this may keep mid-
    career officers on duty, it does not redress the shortage of officers
    in these ranks that are available for deployment overseas.

                              contractor personnel
        10. Senator Akaka. Dr. Krepinevich, in your statement, you discuss
    the large numbers of contractor personnel supporting our troops in
    Iraq, and the potential problems they represent due to the lack of
    contractor oversight. You note that contractor security personnel do
    not operate under the military's rules of engagement (ROE), and
    therefore, pose a potential risk to our counterinsurgency operations
    since they could potentially take actions that could inflame tensions.
    What do you think DOD should do about this problem?
        Dr. Krepinevich. Contractor actions, uncoordinated and
    unsynchronized with the military operations, can be severely
    counterproductive. Achievements made by a host nation and the U.S.
    Government to stabilize a situation can be swiftly reversed by private
    firms whose armed employees operate outside government control. This,
    in turn, can damage the perception of the host nation's ability to
    maintain ``monopoly'' on the use of violence.
        We have routinely employed contractors in recent years. In most
    cases--in the Balkans, for example--involvement of both military and
    contracted support personnel is covered by status of forces agreements
    and other legal agreements between the host nation and the United
    States.
        Owing to difficulties in recruiting and the desire to ``outsource''
    certain military functions in the name of realizing economies, it is
    not possible or even desirable to stop the practice of hiring private
    contractors all together. However, we should do a much better job at
    constructing a legal framework governing contractors' involvement and
    conduct in the U.S. military operations--especially for those
    contractors involved in security operations, as opposed to supporting
    missions.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Mark L. Pryor
                                    waivers
        11. Senator Pryor. Dr. Krepinevich, in your written testimony, you
    note that waivers for Army recruits who committed felonies were up 30
    percent in 2006 over 2005, and that the Army is also accepting more
    high school dropouts. The DOD wants a 92,000 troop increase in the Army
    and Marine Corps end strength. How do we increase our troop levels but
    still maintain the quality of our force?
        Dr. Krepinevich. Under current circumstances, it simply may not be
    possible to field a significantly larger Army while maintaining high
    quality standards. The current data--using the Service's own metrics--
    show that the quality of Army recruits is declining.
        At the same time, we must be very careful about reducing standards
    for new military recruits. The war in Iraq places our military in
    unfamiliar cultural terrain, facing nonconventional situations, and
    difficult mental challenges. Therefore, it requires soldiers with
    greater, not lower, levels of intelligence, maturity, and capability.
        It is no secret that attracting people in sufficient numbers is
    becoming more and more challenging to our military, which again leads
    me to stress the importance of explicit recognition of military service
    and articulation of a strong message on the part of the Nation's
    leaders regarding the value of military service to the Nation.
        Ultimately, the answer may rest in what the Pentagon calls
    ``building partner capacity''--assisting allies, partners, and host
    nations in augmenting their ground forces so that, in conjunction with
    them, we achieve the scale and quality of forces necessary to address
    emerging ground force contingencies.

                              contracted soldiers
        12. Senator Pryor. Dr. Krepinevich, the Washington Post did an
    article this past Sunday on ``hired guns,'' private security civilian
    contractors who fight a parallel war our soldiers are fighting in the
    global war on terror, but who are not under the same oversight when it
    comes to the rules of armed conflict. In your prepared statement you
    mention the challenge these contractors create for our soldiers. Do you
    believe we should or should not rely on these contractors to supplement
    our force?
        Dr. Krepinevich. It is far from clear whether the use of contract
    personnel is a positive development for the war effort. Consider that:

             There are clear differences in pay between soldiers and
            contract workers, with the latter typically receiving
            significantly greater compensation than the former.
             Contractors have not been under the Uniform Code of Military
            Justice (UCMJ) and hence have not operated under the standards
            that, the military has long argued, are key to good order and
            discipline. There has been no central oversight of the private
            security companies that provide security contractors, and no
            uniform rules of engagement (ROE).
             Contract workers generally enjoy a better quality of life
            than their military counterparts, staying in superior quarters
            and being provided with more amenities.
             Contractors enjoy a huge benefit in terms of the personal
            freedom. For example, they are free to quit their job at any
            time; soldiers are not. Indeed, both the government and the
            security companies concede that contract security workers have
            the right to abandon their post if they deem the situation too
            dangerous.

        Contract security workers also present a potential military
    problem. They are not integrated into the overall U.S. military chain
    of command, and thus function outside the overall counterinsurgency
    campaign being conducted in Iraq.
        Differentiating between insurgents and noncombatants is a common
    and serious challenge for counterinsurgent forces. In a combat
    situation, oftentimes the safest thing to do from an individual
    soldier's perspective is to shoot first and ask questions later. This,
    however, risks incurring noncombatant casualties and alienating the
    population. It is for that reason that U.S. forces operate under strict
    ROE. The contractor security forces, however, do not function under the
    ROE imposed on U.S. and coalition forces. It is not clear whether the
    contract forces even have standing ROE. This has the potential to
    undermine U.S. efforts at winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi
    people.
        Another issue concerns the degree of responsibility incurred by
    U.S. forces in protecting U.S. nationals operating as security forces.
    For example, are Army quick reaction forces established to come to the
    aid of U.S. and coalition forces under attack also obligated to respond
    to requests from security contractors? Doing so not only puts U.S.
    forces directly at risk, but also increases the risk to other coalition
    units who may call upon U.S. rapid reaction forces, only to find that
    they are committed to defend security contractors.
        Yet another worrisome issue involves the obligation, if any, of
    U.S. forces to share intelligence with security contractors to enable
    them to perform their job more effectively. The problem here, of
    course, is whether the intelligence will remain a secret, and whether
    the likelihood of security being breached by those who are not subject
    to military order and discipline will be substantially greater.
        In short, it is not clear that this form of outsourcing manpower
    requirements makes good sense, much less whether it should be expanded
    in an effort to solve the personnel challenges confronted by the Army.
    Recently, the Iraqi government has taken steps to impose rules
    requiring all security firms to be registered and limiting the
    possession of weapons only to those who have been licensed.

                               irregular warfare
        13. Senator Pryor. Dr. Krepinevich, in your prepared statement you
    state that ``most of our enemies have little choice: the investment
    required to take on the U.S. military in conventional warfare is
    prohibitive, and that we are entering a national security era dominated
    by irregular warfare.'' What is your perception of our readiness to
    respond to the most likely irregular missions in the future?
        Dr. Krepinevich. Our ``readiness to respond'' will depend entirely
    on the level of institutional commitment the Services make to
    generating and maintaining capabilities appropriate for irregular
    warfare (IW).
        Historically, the Services have viewed IW as a lesser-included-case
    of major combat operations (MCO); i.e. if a force had the skills and
    capabilities to win at high intensity, conventional operations, then it
    had the ability to handle other forms of conflict. However, the past
    few years of experience in Iraq show that this is not necessarily the
    case.
        High-end conventional operations are extremely complex when it
    comes to coordinating and integrating advanced military capabilities
    and conducting sophisticated operations. But such operations are
    typically conducted against a readily identifiable opponent and within
    a fairly straightforward framework of rules. In this case, ``cultural
    awareness'' and ``operational nuance'' are not prerequisites for
    success.
        Conversely, irregular warfare calls for a very mature force that
    routinely handles delicate situations, develops tactical intelligence,
    works within and among populations, and deals with an array of
    opponents who may be very difficult to identify and address. The use of
    combat skills, per se, is the exception rather than the norm.
        There are indications that the Services are tiring of the irregular
    warfare effort. Discussions about ``resetting the force'' typically
    include comments on the need to regain ability to conduct MCO-type
    operations and the atrophying of such skills as a result of the
    protracted operations in Iraq. To the extent the Services pull back
    from irregular warfare operations in order to ``reset'' for high-end
    combat operations, we'll lose our ability to respond to what I consider
    the most likely forms of conflict in the coming years.

        14. Senator Pryor. Dr. Krepinevich, do you believe our conventional
    Army and Marine Corps is, or can be, effective against irregular
    warfare?
        Dr. Krepinevich. Conventional Army/Marine Corps is currently
    marginally effective in irregular warfare; not necessarily due to
    deficiencies in personnel capabilities, but more so because of lack of
    numbers, lack of time available to adequately train and grow a force
    effective at such operations, and lack of time dedicated to gaining the
    institutional maturity required to excel at irregular warfare.
        Whether the Services can be effective in the long run will depend
    on institutional-level decisions to reorient services for the
    challenges of irregular warfare in the same way organizational changes
    were made to excel at conventional land warfare or air superiority or
    undersea operations.
        Nevertheless, it should be noted that ``success'' in irregular
    warfare from the military perspective is only of value to the extent
    the rest of government also embraces the challenges. The military arm
    creates ``maneuver space'' for the other elements of the national power
    to work. An overly strong reliance on the military will eventually be
    counterproductive.

                                  north korea
        15. Senator Pryor. General McCaffrey, you have noted that our
    forces are in a position of ``strategic peril.'' The ramifications of
    the President's ``surge'' in the number of troops headed for the Middle
    East leaves the United States with practically no strategic ground
    Reserve and a National Guard whose readiness has been depleted. What is
    your impression of our military's ability to currently respond to
    aggression from Iran or North Korea?
        General McCaffrey. I do not have time to answer detailed questions.
    My written statement and the several hours of testimony more than
    adequately outline my views on these important issues.

                            training of iraqi troops
        16. Senator Pryor. General McCaffrey, one of the missions of our
    troops in Iraq and Afghanistan is to train indigenous police and
    military forces so that they may become self-sufficient and we can
    ultimately ``stand down.'' You were recently in the region, speaking
    with our military men and women as well as those general officers
    leading the effort. How many fully-trained, self-sufficient Iraqi
    troops are there today?
        General McCaffrey. I do not have time to answer detailed questions.
    My written statement and the several hours of testimony more than
    adequately outline my views on these important issues.

        17. Senator Pryor. General McCaffrey, what significance, if any, do
    the fully-trained, self-sufficient Iraqi troops have?
        General McCaffrey. I do not have time to answer detailed questions.
    My written statement and the several hours of testimony more than
    adequately outline my views on these important issues.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
                             manpower and strategy
        18. Senator Chambliss. General Scales, in your written testimony,
    you make the disturbing statement that for the first time since the
    Civil War, decreasing military manpower is shaping strategy rather than
    strategy determining force needs. But an article in Defense News said
    future warfare is likely to be ``irregular'' or ``counterterrorism,''
    and this kind of warfare calls for a smaller force trained for
    nonconventional missions. How do you see our strategy in Iraq and
    Afghanistan playing out if adequately manning the force was not a
    concern?
        General Scales. In fact manpower is a chief concern in both
    Afghanistan and Iraq. Defense News is simply wrong in equating the need
    for smaller forces to fight irregular warfare. Non-conventional
    missions do require smaller elite units for special missions such as
    training indigenous forces and direct action against terrorist cells.
    But the expanded presence of American ground forces over the breadth of
    the world to conduct these missions will require more of these elite
    units as well as a much larger contingent of traditional ground forces
    trained to fight and sustain themselves in distant places for very long
    periods of time. All of these conditions argue for a larger rather than
    a smaller ground force. The bottom line is that ground warfare,
    particularly at the low end of the conflict spectrum, is a very
    manpower intensive business. Technology can only do so much. Most of
    the heavy lifting in these wars will be done by close combat forces
    (infantry, cavalry, armor, Special Forces). We are woefully short of
    these forces today in Afghanistan and Iraq. The nature of wars in the
    future will demand that we recruit and train many more of them.

        19. Senator Chambliss. General Scales, what decisions have been
    made because manpower needs were or are unable to be met?
        General Scales. Virtually every think tank, military analyst, and
    objective defense intellectual concurs that the counterinsurgency phase
    of the war in Iraq would have evolved much differently had more
    soldiers and marines been available to stem the emergence of both Sunni
    and Shia insurgencies beginning in late 2003 and continuing to today.
    In every case portions of Iraq that were pacified returned to
    lawlessness and anarchy once American troops departed. They were
    obliged to leave because not enough troops were present in Iraq to
    sustain a presence long enough to sustain the gains made. That reality
    is the main reason that General Petraeus requested the ``surge.'' He
    realized then and he does now that in counterinsurgencies numbers
    count. Simply put, throughout this conflict we had too few soldiers
    present to fully execute the policy of providing security to the most
    seriously threatened regions of Iraq.

        20. Senator Chambliss. General Scales, do you agree with the
    assessment that the future force should be a smaller and more focused
    future force, or is a larger ground force a more appropriate defense
    strategy?
        General Scales. I believe that the future force should be more
    focused but I do not believe that it should be smaller. We have two
    options regarding ground forces: either add more to accomplish the
    strategy or change the strategy to be less demanding on the ground
    force we have. Unfortunately the second option is not ours to choose.
    It belongs to the enemy and he has decided wisely to challenge us on
    the ground in the most remote and inhospitable regions of the world. So
    we either cede the enemy dominance over regions of the world vital to
    our national interest or we challenge the enemy in these regions . . .
    on the ground.

                                    training
        21. Senator Chambliss. Dr. Korb, I'd like to quote a piece of your
    written statement about an Army base in my home State of Georgia:

            ``The 1st Brigade of the Army's 3rd Infantry Division based at
            Fort Stewart became the Army's first brigade to be deployed to
            Iraq for the third time. It was sent over in January 2007 after
            about a year at home. But, because of its compressed time
            between deployments, some 150 soldiers joined the unit right
            out of basic training, too late to participate in the training
            necessary to prepare soldiers to function effectively in Iraq.
            Unfortunately one of the 18-year-old soldiers, Matthew Zeimer,
            who joined the unit on Dec. 18, 2006, was killed on February 2
            after being at his first combat post for just 2 hours. He
            missed the brigade's intensive 4 week pre-Iraq training at the
            National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, getting
            instead a cut rate 10-day course.''

        You offer this tragic case in relation to troops being sent into a
    war zone without being fully combat ready. The National Journal had an
    article last week that reported TRADOC officials as saying that skills
    associated with conventional warfare will atrophy due to the focus on
    preparing troops for counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and
    Afghanistan. The article also said units are skipping ``graduate
    level'' training at senior training centers because of reduced dwell
    time between deployments. If they are able to attend the training, the
    curriculum is less challenging--similar to what we saw with Matthew
    Zeimer. Between what you have written and what I am reading, I am
    convinced we need to look at the training our troops are getting and
    require on multiple levels and on a variety of fronts. What is the
    implication or potential effect of these training deficiencies, aside
    from the obvious outcome of the immediate danger to putting our troops
    untrained in harm's way, in terms of training and preparing to fight
    some of the unknown future threats we are looking at today?
        Dr. Korb. I agree with your assessment. The problem is that because
    of the pace of deployments, which results in shorter dwell time, our
    troops as General Scales has noted, are ``too busy to learn.''
    Therefore training is skewed to addressing the immediate problems of
    Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet, as I noted in my testimony, even training
    for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is being short-changed, in a
    rush to get troops to the battlefield. This is problematic, because
    even as General Petraeus is attempting to implement a new
    counterinsurgency approach in Iraq, our troops have had little training
    to deal with counterinsurgency operations. For instance, the Army's
    counterinsurgency manual was only recently completed and the Army and
    our troops have had little time to learn and adapt. The atrophy of
    training in conventional techniques, as well as training in
    environments that are different than Iraq, is a real concern going
    forward and will mean that the United States is less prepared to deal
    with new challenges. The longer we stay in Iraq the less prepared we
    will be to confront future challenges.

                  overseer of efforts in iraq and afghanistan
        22. Senator Chambliss. General McCaffrey, the White House has come
    up with a plan for a ``War Czar'' to be an ``execution manager'' of
    sorts to oversee the efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Former House
    Speaker Newt Gingrich has said this position is necessary as a means to
    cut through the ineffectiveness and bureaucracy that are hindrances to
    winning the wars, and National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley says
    this person would work for the President and fix problems in Washington
    that are in the way of success. However, at least five former 4-stars
    have declined the position, and retired Major General John Batiste
    called this another layer of bureaucracy. What do you think of this
    position?
        General McCaffrey. I do not have time to answer detailed questions.
    My written statement and the several hours of testimony more than
    adequately outline my views on these important issues.

        23. Senator Chambliss. General McCaffrey, is this position
    necessary?
        General McCaffrey. I do not have time to answer detailed questions.
    My written statement and the several hours of testimony more than
    adequately outline my views on these important issues.

        24. Senator Chambliss. General McCaffrey, what void would this
    position fill?
        General McCaffrey. I do not have time to answer detailed questions.
    My written statement and the several hours of testimony more than
    adequately outline my views on these important issues.

                                national energy
        25. Senator Chambliss. General McCaffrey, you have said the Army is
    ``unraveling'' and that we must expend ``significant national energy''
    to reverse that trend. What would that significant energy look like and
    require?
        General McCaffrey. I do not have time to answer detailed questions.
    My written statement and the several hours of testimony more than
    adequately outline my views on these important issues.

        26. Senator Chambliss. General McCaffrey, to follow on with
    expending national energy, how can we as a Nation prepare families,
    employers, and communities to deal with returning soldiers--some who
    will have been deployed 15 months now--experiencing increased stress
    levels and not necessarily being equipped to deal with this stress in a
    healthy way?
        General McCaffrey. I do not have time to answer detailed questions.
    My written statement and the several hours of testimony more than
    adequately outline my views on these important issues.

        27. Senator Chambliss. General McCaffrey, how can we use this
    national energy to support the Army and Marine Corps during this
    challenging time?
        General McCaffrey. I do not have time to answer detailed questions.
    My written statement and the several hours of testimony more than
    adequately outline my views on these important issues.

        [Whereupon, at 12:46 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2008

                                  ----------

                            TUESDAY, APRIL 24, 2007

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

     UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND, UNITED STATES FORCES-KOREA, AND UNITED
                       STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room
    SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Akaka,
    Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh, Webb, Warner, Sessions,
    Thune, and Martinez.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
    counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Creighton
    Greene, professional staff member; and William K. Sutey,
    professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
    Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
    staff member; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L.
    Niemeyer, professional staff member; Christopher J. Paul,
    professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff
    member; Sean G. Stackley, professional staff member; and
    Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
        Staff assistants present: David G. Collins, Fletcher L.
    Cork, and Jessica L. Kingston.
        Committee members' assistants present: Frederick M. Downey,
    assistant to Senator Lieberman; Benjamin Rinaker, assistant to
    Senator Ben Nelson; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator
    Clinton; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Stephen
    C. Hedger, assistant to Senator McCaskill; and Mark J. Winter,
    assistant to Senator Collins.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. We're going to
    begin the hearing today. The ranking--or acting ranking
    member--Senator Warner suggested we proceed, he's going to be a
    few minutes late, and we will do that. So Senator Nelson, I
    think you and I will be manning the fort here this morning, at
    least for awhile.
        Senator Ben Nelson. We'll be able to handle it.
        Chairman Levin. First let me welcome our witnesses, Admiral
    Keating, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command; General Bell,
    Commander of the United Nations Command, the Republic of Korea/
    U.S. Combined Forces Command; and Commander, U.S. Forces-Korea;
    and Vice Admiral Eric Olson, the Deputy Commander of U.S.
    Special Operations Command.
        We not only welcome them, we thank them for their service,
    we thank them for their leadership.
        Today's hearing will focus on the challenges and
    opportunities that we face in the Asia-Pacific Region, along
    with the important work that special operators do globally to
    further U.S. national security interests, including, but not
    limited to, their efforts to combat terrorism.
        In Asia, the most urgent matter is that we need to
    eliminate North Korea's nuclear programs, and the threat that
    is posed by Pyongyang's missile capability. The unclassified
    National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on North Korea's nuclear
    and missile programs, produced in March 2007, stated that by
    early October 2006, ``North Korea could have produced up to 50
    kilograms of plutonium, enough for at least a half a dozen
    nuclear weapons.'' This is a significant increase from the last
    unclassified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimate dating
    to 2001, which assessed that North Korea had enough plutonium
    for one to two weapons.
        In February, it appeared that we had made a significant
    breakthrough in the Six-Party Talks regarding North Korea's
    nuclear program. North Korea should not be rewarded for failing
    to negotiate in good faith, but we should test their statements
    that they will eliminate their nuclear weapons programs.
        I hope that Admiral Keating and General Bell can share
    their thoughts on the impact of the North Korean threat on the
    political-military dynamic in Asia, as well as their
    assessments of the state of the U.S.-South Korean relationship.
        In addition, I hope that we can explore the bilateral
    relationship between the United States and China. The U.S.-
    Japan Alliance, U.S. relations with India, as well as U.S.
    Force posture and the security dynamic in the Asia-Pacific
    region.
        On the issue of readiness in the Pacific theater, this
    committee has learned in a series of hearings, since the
    beginning of this year, that personnel and equipment shortages
    in nondeployed units assigned to the Pacific Command (PACOM)
    exacerbate the challenges of meeting our security commitments
    and challenges in the Pacific, or in other areas, where Pacific
    Forces may be deployed.
        Reduced readiness in our non-deployed forces increases the
    costs and time required to get ready for worldwide
    contingencies, and increases the likelihood of deploying our
    forces underprepared, or unprepared. This increases the risk
    that we fail to accomplish our missions, and also means
    increased casualties.
        This situation is what former Army Chief of Staff General
    Schoomaker was describing when he talked about the U.S.
    military's ``lack of strategic depth.'' I hope to hear from
    Admiral Keating about how he evaluates that risk.
        Special Operations Forces (SOF) have nine statutory
    missions--some that are more useful in the short-term, such as
    direct action, and others that have deeper medium- and long-
    term impacts, such as the foreign training missions. I'm
    concerned that the definition of the war on terrorism has been
    too narrowly conceived by the administration and the
    Department, so that for too long, the emphasis has been placed
    on capturing or eliminating individual terrorists, and not
    enough on combating terrorism using civil affairs,
    psychological operations, and training foreign forces in the
    Middle East and beyond. I'm not even including what needs to be
    done by the State Department and other Government agencies.
        This committee spent considerable time last week, hearing
    from witnesses regarding the impact of the operations in Iraq
    and Afghanistan on the conventional forces, and today I hope
    that we can hear about the impact on SOF--what is the current
    state of Special Operations readiness for all missions and for
    all Service components.
        Do we need to put additional resources into honing the
    special skills of the operators under your command, Admiral
    Olson, especially in the areas of language and cultural
    training? Last week, Major General Scales testified to this
    committee that, ``What's important in counter-insurgency are
    skills, not structure, the ability to speak the language, the
    ability to commune with alien cultures, the ability to train
    and to advise.''
        Some special operators have these skills, though more of
    them need to get those skills, and what can we do to ensure
    language proficiencies are raised and maintained?
        Finally, is the end strength growth that the Department has
    planned for Special Operations Command (SOCOM) sufficient? Is
    it appropriate, given not just current needs, but also future
    projections?
        I look forward to hearing from our witnesses regarding
    these issues, as well as other issues and also whether and how
    the budget request for fiscal year 2008 and beyond meets their
    operational, readiness, and quality-of-life requirements.
        I think we will await Senator Warner's opening statement,
    and start with our witnesses. Admiral Keating?

      STATEMENT OF ADM TIMOTHY J. KEATING, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED
                         STATES PACIFIC COMMAND

        Admiral Keating. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the
    opportunity to appear before your committee this morning. It
    has been almost 4 weeks since the Senate was kind enough to
    confirm me, and Wanda Lee and I returned to Hawaii and began
    again to experience the Aloha that is unique to Hawaii, and
    Senator, it's great to be back in your State.
        I'm proud to represent the men and women of PACOM before
    you this morning, Mr. Chairman. As I said, we've been there 4
    weeks, I've been to four countries in the region and intend to
    travel to China here, next.
        My initial assessment, which I'm happy to share with you
    this morning is that there is much in the Pacific theater that
    is positive. It is, of course, a dynamic, complex region, a
    significant portion of the globe is represented in PACOM. I
    think that there is general stability in the region, security
    is improving, particularly when considering the longer light,
    when I was last there in 1985 at the PACOM headquarters, and of
    course, the growing economies are a highlight in the region.
        The alliances we enjoy there are healthy, strong, vibrant,
    and getting better. In particular, in Japan, Republic of Korea
    (ROK), I have to visit and spend some time with General Bell,
    and I'm very pleased with the progress that we are making
    there, and of course, Australia and the Philippines, as well--
    highlights of the very strong alliances we enjoy.
        In addition, I visited Malaysia and was pleased to see how
    well we're doing there, and other countries that are slightly
    less prominent, but every bit as important, including
    Singapore, Cambodia, and Vietnam.
        The partnership that we enjoy with India is solid and
    expanding; I will visit India later on this summer. We're, of
    course, watching China carefully, we notice an increase in
    China's apparent willingness to act constructively. We have a
    delegation of 25 or so mid-level officers, professionals from
    all 4 Services who are taken from their particular assignment
    right now, on destroyers or in infantry battalions, and they
    are visiting China as we speak. They will report back to us in
    a week or so.
        Challenges throughout the area will remain. You mentioned
    some of them, Mr. Chairman, North Korea, we are watching them
    carefully as is General Bell, their missile and their nuclear
    activity, the Six-Party progress is, while not rapid, we think
    it is no less an important step towards providing peace and
    security on the peninsula.
        The battle that we are fighting with our allies, in
    particular in the Southern Philippines is, we think, producing
    good results, we're eliminating some terrorists from the
    playing field, and the role of the Republic of the Philippines
    army, and military forces is significant, and we're proud of
    our efforts to support them.
        We're, of course, concentrating on understanding China's
    intent, what they're doing with their military spending, and we
    will spend some time with them in the month ahead, as I said.
        So, looking ahead we remain grateful for the committee's
    support, Mr. Chairman, the young men and women are well-
    equipped, they're well-trained, they're highly motivated in the
    area of responsibility (AOR), and we are grateful for your
    support.
        We intend to concentrate on winning the war on terror,
    advancing security cooperation and engagement in the theater,
    making sure that our forces are properly postured and equipped
    to respond to crises should they develop, and we are working
    hard to keep our operational plans current, in light of the
    threats that we see in the area.
        I thank you for your support, and I look forward to your
    questions, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Keating follows:]
               Prepared Statement by ADM Timothy J. Keating, USN
                                  introduction
        Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: On behalf of the men and
    women of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), thank you for this
    opportunity to testify regarding the posture of our command and
    security in the Asia-Pacific region.
        The Asia-Pacific area remains a region of vital importance to our
    Nation. From a security standpoint, the past year has been a time of
    general stability and improving security with the notable exception of
    North Korean nuclear and missile activity.
        Economic development in the region continues at a brisk pace,
    fueled primarily by dynamic growth in China, with positive trends in
    most nations.
        Pacific-based forces have served with distinction in Iraq and
    Afghanistan and have helped combat terrorists in the Philippines
    through intelligence and operational fusion assistance to the Armed
    Forces of the Philippines. Our marvelous men and women have helped
    stabilize the region through exercises and engagement; they have saved
    lives and mitigated human suffering through medical and engineering
    assistance in the wake of natural disasters.
        Progress in the PACOM area of responsibility (AOR) requires close
    cooperation with the Department of State and U.S. Embassy country
    teams. Our important ties with other agencies of the U.S. Government--
    in Washington and in theater--have been keys to stability. Of course,
    Congress is essential to our efforts. I appreciate your support of
    PACOM initiatives. I assure the committee that our activities are
    conducted in accordance with United States law and policy. Our dealings
    with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan are guided by the
    Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint U.S.-PRC communiques (1972, 1979,
    1982), and the one-China policy. Our military-to-military interaction
    with China has been increasing; we abide by restrictions stipulated in
    the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2000.
    NDAA for Fiscal Year 2006, section 1206 ``train and equip'' authority
    made possible a rapid infusion of $30 million in Department of Defense
    (DOD) funds to improve the maritime security capacity of Indonesia and
    Sri Lanka. Section 1022 authority broadened permissible uses for
    counterdrug funding and allowed the Joint Interagency Task Force-West
    to assist partner nations in building the counterterrorism capability
    of their law enforcement agencies. We look forward to the continued
    support of Congress in these areas.
        Direct dialogue and shared experiences with regional civilian and
    military leaders remain keys to enhancing our relationships in the AOR.
    Meaningful and frequent engagement with the nations in the Asia-
    Pacific--characterized by the transparent expression of views and
    intent--contributed to considerable progress across a broad range of
    security issues this past year. Our relationships with regional
    counterparts have ensured cohesion and resolve in addressing strategic
    events such as missile and nuclear testing by North Korea.
        Our alliances with Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK)
    facilitated a strong response to the Democratic People's Republic of
    Korea (DPRK) nuclear event. After the October 9 nuclear test, Chinese
    support moderated North Korean behavior and helped to restart the Six-
    Party Talks. These talks remain a critical framework for addressing
    North Korean nuclear aspirations. Engagement with the Peoples' Republic
    of China (PRC) over the last 2 years was a positive factor throughout.
        The solidarity of the U.S.--Japan alliance is further demonstrated
    by increased cooperation in ballistic missile defense. We are also
    moving ahead with implementation of the security improvements agreed to
    in the Defense Policy Review Initiative. The strategic alliance between
    the U.S. and Japan has been reaffirmed and many force structure changes
    are in planning or underway. A key step will be the move of
    approximately 8,000 marines and their family members from Okinawa to
    Guam. The U.S. and Japan will share the development costs of this
    relocation.
        Our strong alliance with the ROK has enabled us to undertake
    extensive discussion regarding the future of the alliance and agreement
    to shift responsibility for defense of the peninsula to ROK forces.
    U.S. support and engagement, primarily with air and naval capabilities,
    will remain essential to the ROK defense and to regional stability.
        Our military-to-military activities with the PRC have increased and
    this past year marked the first ever U.S.--PRC tactical activity--a
    search and rescue exercise in two phases--off the coast of California
    and in the South China Sea. This progress bodes well for U.S.--China
    relations and regional stability. Exercises, port visits, and mid-level
    officer exchanges can over time reduce the potential for
    misunderstanding and provide the opportunity to positively influence
    future Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) leaders. At every turn, we use
    our interaction to demonstrate the professionalism and readiness of
    U.S. forces, an important element of encouraging responsible behavior
    by the Chinese government and military.
        We continue to push for greater transparency from Chinese
    officials. Without greater insight into Chinese goals and objectives, I
    will remain concerned about continued double-digit growth in annual
    defense spending and investment in systems which threaten Taiwan and
    our own capabilities. Consistent with U.S. policy and legislation,
    PACOM is encouraging Taiwan to improve its self-defense capabilities
    and thereby deter PRC aggression.
        Southeast Asia remains the battleground against terrorism in the
    Pacific. On the island of Jolo, the Armed Forces of the Philippines
    (AFP), with assistance from U.S. military advisers and trainers, have
    kept the terrorists on the run and made progress in creating a stable,
    secure environment.
        Interaction between Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) and the U.S.
    military has been positive and valuable in the war on terror and for
    humanitarian assistance. The peace accord in Aceh accelerated recovery
    from the 2004 tsunami by facilitating stability and security. We are
    addressing maritime security with Indonesian, Malaysian, and Philippine
    authorities to deny terrorists transit and sanctuary at sea. Maritime
    security efforts focus in the Sulu and Sulawesi Seas or triborder sea
    area between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines; these efforts
    foster multilateral cooperation among the littoral states.
        The U.S.-India strategic partnership is expanding and military-to-
    military activities are thriving. Recent congressional approval of the
    Henry J. Hyde U.S.-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Act reinforced those
    ties. Our interaction will improve regional security by addressing
    instability concerns in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka.
        One area of great concern is political upheaval in the region. The
    coups in Thailand and Fiji, while bloodless, were clearly unacceptable.
    The prompt return of democratically-elected government is essential if
    we are to maintain important military-to-military relationships.
    Historic animosity, poor economies, overpopulation, and weak and
    dysfunctional governments fuel insurgencies and unrest in areas
    including the Solomon Islands, East Timor, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh.
        These impressions highlight both the challenge and opportunity in
    the Asia-Pacific region. We have in place key elements to advance U.S.
    security interests and enhance regional stability--vibrant alliances,
    opportunities for new partnerships, combat ready and agile forces, and
    committed soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines to lead our efforts.
    As we move forward, our initiatives remain organized across five focus
    areas--prosecuting and winning the war on terror; advancing regional
    security cooperation and engagement; maturing our joint and combined
    capabilities and readiness; posturing forces for agile and responsive
    employment; and ensuring operational plans at all levels are credible.
                   prosecuting and winning the war on terror
        Engagement with regional partners for support in the war on terror
    continues to pay dividends as Australia, Japan, ROK, Thailand,
    Singapore, Fiji, Mongolia, Tonga, and New Zealand are making or have
    made significant contributions to the efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
        Within Asia and throughout the Pacific, in coordination with the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of State, and our
    U.S. Ambassadors, we work with and through our regional partners to
    combat extremist violence and transform at-risk environments. We are
    making progress but must remain active.
        Forces from the Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) play
    the dominant role in PACOM war on terror operations. The Joint Combined
    Exchange Training program is the principal mechanism used by Special
    Operations Forces (SOF) to assist partner nations in building capacity
    to defeat terrorism and improve our understanding of the complexities
    of the local environment. SOCPAC troops are the core of Operation
    Enduring Freedom-Philippines, an operation which supports the
    Government of the Republic of the Philippines counterterrorism efforts.
    With U.S. advice and training, AFP and civilian authorities have
    improved their ability to coordinate and sustain counterterrorism
    operations. U.S. and Philippine forces have also worked together under
    the new Security Engagement Board framework--the primary mechanism for
    consultation and planning regarding nontraditional security threats--to
    complete humanitarian and civil assistance projects and improve living
    conditions in the southern Philippines. As a result of our combined
    efforts, support for terrorists has waned markedly.
        U.S.-supported operations, civic projects, and Malaysian-mediated
    peace talks with the separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
    continue to erode MILF support to the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Jemaah
    Islamiyah (JI). These efforts have reduced ASG mobility within MILF
    strongholds. With assistance from Australia and Japan, we will continue
    to build Philippine capabilities and capacity to conduct independent,
    joint operations against internal and external threats.
        The Government of Indonesia is a welcome partner in the war on
    terror. Indonesia continues to play an influential role in moderating
    extremism, as evidenced by its willingness to contribute forces to
    peacekeeping operations in Lebanon. At home, President Yudhoyono has
    demonstrated a commitment to democracy and military reform. Our
    interaction with the TNI this year reinforced the positive trends we
    have seen in their professionalism, respect for human rights and
    civilian control of the military.
        We have targeted security assistance and ``train and equip''
    funding to Indonesia towards maritime security in an effort to limit
    mobility for terrorists in Southeast Asia who take advantage of the
    relatively unmonitored, uncontrolled seas. The waters between
    Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines have been a sanctuary for
    transit and illicit activities which sustain terrorist activity. The
    Indonesian military efforts to monitor and control criminal maritime
    traffic in these areas can be enhanced by multilateral cooperation with
    the Philippines and Malaysia, which we encourage.
        Joint Interagency Task Force-West counterdrug programs complement
    and support the war on terror. Key initiatives include enhancing
    Indonesian, Malaysian, and Philippine maritime law enforcement capacity
    in the Sulu and Celebes Seas through focused Security Assistance and
    section 1206 ``train and equip'' proposals that develop military
    capacity to combat transnational threats in these areas. We will
    exercise section 1022 authority (as authorized in the NDAA for Fiscal
    Year 2006) by enhancing the counterterrorism capacity of partner nation
    law enforcement agencies, and we look forward to a continuation of this
    authority beyond fiscal year 2007. As a next step, we continue to seek
    section 1033 authority (NDAA for Fiscal Year 1998) to equip counterdrug
    forces in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand so that we
    can integrate our assistance program more effectively with interagency
    partner efforts.
        A key enabler of all of these cooperative trans-regional efforts is
    effective information sharing. Coordination in intelligence, logistics,
    planning, and operations is critical to success. We have made progress
    in this area and continue to build the infrastructure required to share
    and act upon the information.
    Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction
        We are working with allies and partners to build regional
    capability to combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD). President Bush
    initiated the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which supports
    national counterproliferation efforts. Unlike traditional export
    controls, PSI is a voluntary activity that builds global capacity to
    disrupt WMD proliferation among states, and between states and
    terrorist organizations. Nine nations within the AOR (Australia, Japan,
    Singapore, Philippines, Cambodia, Mongolia, the Marshall Islands, Sri
    Lanka, and Papua New Guinea) have endorsed the statement of
    interdiction principles. We continue work to expand participation
    during our regional military-to-military engagements. We joined PSI
    exercises such as Pacific Protector and Deep Sabre with Australia, New
    Zealand, Singapore, Japan, and the United Kingdom and observers from
    other countries. PACOM participates in multiple working groups with our
    allies and partners to build consequence management capability. We
    established formal work plans with Japan and South Korea in 2006. We
    will execute these plans in 2007, resulting in real improvement to our
    Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) defense and
    consequence management capabilities. On the homefront, we will expand
    consequence management training through our participation in Department
    of Homeland Security-Exercise Topoff 4 in October 2007, validating the
    full range of existing procedures for managing a domestic terrorist WMD
    event.
              advance regional security cooperation and engagement
        Our Theater Security Cooperation Plan serves as the primary
    blueprint to enhance U.S. relationships and military capacities of
    allies and regional partners. The plan is fully coordinated with our
    embassy country teams and integrates security assistance, military-to-
    military exchanges, exercises, cooperative technology development, and
    outreach programs into a coherent, mutually supportive set of
    activities for each country, whether ally, partner, or cooperating
    state.
        These security cooperation activities are essential to the success
    of U.S. national security strategy. For relatively low cost, we have an
    opportunity to make progress in each of the PACOM focus areas, and
    facilitate situations in which future security challenges can be met
    through strong regional cooperation and capacity.
    Japan
        The relationship between the U.S. and Japan is a cornerstone of
    peace and prosperity in the Pacific. Nearly 38,000 U.S. Armed Forces
    personnel are permanently stationed in Japan, with another 14,000
    forward deployed U.S. naval personnel. Japan provides over $4 billion
    in host nation support, the most generous contribution by any U.S.
    ally.
        The response to brinkmanship by Kim Jong-il validated the strength
    and importance of our alliance. Prime Minister Abe's early engagement
    with China's President Hu Jintao and ROK's President Roh Moo-hyun is
    encouraging and offers the potential for better Japanese relationships
    with those nations. Prime Minister Abe has also advocated for
    significant changes within the Japanese government and military to
    support both regional and global security efforts. The Government of
    Japan (GOJ) has provided significant military and financial support to
    coalition operations in the war on terror. For example, GOJ legislation
    supports operations in Afghanistan, maritime logistical support in the
    Indian Ocean, and recently concluded reconstruction efforts in Samawah,
    Iraq. Japanese Self-Defense Forces maintain a presence in the Middle
    East by flying C-130s in support of United Nations (U.N.) and coalition
    missions in Iraq. We appreciate the GOJ support in the war on terror.
        The alliance also continues with the transformation goals laid out
    in the three Security Consultative Committee Statements released by the
    Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and their Japanese
    counterparts in 2005 and 2006. These agreements established our common
    strategic objectives; rebalanced the required roles, missions,
    capabilities and force structure between U.S. and Japanese forces; and
    set forth our roadmap for realignment. They are on track. Implementing
    these agreements will enhance alliance capabilities while ensuring a
    more sustainable U.S. military presence in Japan.
        Japanese commitment to Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) is
    significant. The Japan Defense Agency (JDA) 2004 Defense Budget
    included funds to initiate research and development of a limited
    missile defense plan for the Kanto Plain region involving sea-launched
    SM-3 and ground launched Patriot PAC-3 missiles. The GOJ Cabinet and
    Diet approved the JDA budget for 2005, which included an additional
    106.8 billion yen ($1 billion) for BMD. The JDA, recently elevated to
    the ministerial level and designated as the Ministry of Defense, has
    shown great interest in cooperative development with the U.S. of a more
    capable sea-launched missile and production of PAC-3 missiles. The
    Japanese Defense Ministry and DOD are exploring complementary systems
    that share information and make both systems more capable.
    Republic of Korea
        Despite challenges, the U.S.-ROK alliance is solid and continues to
    form the foundation for peace and security on the Korean peninsula. Our
    partnership remains focused on the most immediate security threat to
    the Korean people--the government of the DPRK. The ROK government has
    expressed a desire to take the lead role in conventional defense. As a
    result of ROK combat capability enhancements, nine military missions--
    ranging from weather forecasting to maritime SOF interdiction--have
    been transferred from U.S. to ROK military forces. Continued
    improvements by the ROK military make possible additional mission
    transfers in the future. The ROK government has sought the ability to
    exercise operational control (OPCON) of its own forces in wartime, and
    we have reached agreement to transition our command relationships in
    April 2012. This is a natural and reasonable next step in the
    maturation of the U.S.-ROK relationship and should be supported.
    Together we will implement a transition process that will assure that
    ROK forces are ready to assume this increased responsibility.
        The DPRK is a proven proliferator of missiles and missile
    technology as well as a participant in a range of other illicit
    activities including probable state-run narcotics exporting and
    counterfeiting of U.S. currency. The Six-Party framework--with
    coordinated multilateral efforts of the ROK, Japan, Russia, and China--
    is a constructive approach, regardless of DPRK wrangling in the near-
    term.
        The U.S. and ROK are transforming our alliance to meet evolving
    security requirements. As ROK force modernization allows Korea to take
    a greater role in its own defense, U.S. forces stationed in Korea are
    improving their strategic flexibility, in keeping with our global force
    transformation. Our partnership is valuable beyond East Asia security
    issues, demonstrated by the significant contingent of ROK engineering,
    medical, aviation, and security forces supporting coalition missions in
    Iraq and Afghanistan. We hope to increase regional partnering with the
    ROK in counterproliferation, maritime security, and disaster relief
    while seeking to foster increased trilateral military cooperation
    between the ROK, Japan, and the U.S. We welcome a shift by South Korea
    toward a more regional view of security and stability.
        Australia is our most steadfast ally, a nation working tirelessly
    to promote stability and good governance in the Pacific. During 2006,
    Australians led efforts to restore stability to East Timor and the
    Solomon Islands, and they continue to provide major security and
    institutional assistance in the region. The Australian Pacific Patrol
    Boat program provides the primary capacity to protect against criminal
    activity in the economic exclusion zones of many island nations. Most
    recently, Australia is leading relief efforts--in coordination with
    nongovernmental organizations--to help the devastated portions of the
    Solomon Islands recover from the recent tsunami, under the auspices of
    the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands or RAMSI.
        The strong bond between our Nations has allowed us to make quick
    strides in areas of mutual concern. U.S. and Australian military forces
    are synchronizing efforts to build capacity in combating terrorism and
    enhancing maritime security in the Philippines, Indonesia, and
    Malaysia. Additionally, we continue to improve interoperability between
    the Australian Defence Force and U.S. Armed Forces. Talsiman Saber, a
    major exercise this spring, will provide proof-of-concept for the Joint
    Combined Training Capability that promises to take bilateral, network-
    centered training to a new level, and ensure our combined forces are
    prepared for today's modern and dynamic threat environment.
        Our partnership with the Republic of the Philippines (RP) is
    central to success in meeting our war on terror goals in Southeast
    Asia. We appreciate President Arroyo's affirmation of the Visiting
    Forces Agreement, allowing for the continued advancement of cooperative
    efforts to rid the Philippines of terrorist activity. The recently
    passed Human Security Act enhances Manila's counterterrorism laws and
    provides new legal authorities for Philippine security forces in
    fighting terrorism. Last year, the GRP also established the Security
    Engagement Board (SEB) as the framework for our bilateral engagement on
    nontraditional activities such as counterterrorism, counterdrug,
    humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and addressing the potential
    of pandemic disease. This development paved the way for engagement
    including security assistance, civil-military operations, and other
    support to AFP operations. The Philippine Defense Reform, endorsed by
    Presidents Bush and Arroyo in 2003, implemented with Foreign Military
    Financing under the auspices of the Philippine Department of National
    Defense and the AFP, is well on the way to producing long-term
    institutional reform.
        Thailand is a major regional ally. Section 508 of the Foreign
    Operations Appropriations Act mandated the suspension of security
    assistance to Thailand following the September 2006 coup. While we
    continue to value Thai support for combined training events, access for
    U.S. forces, and past contributions to operations in Afghanistan and
    Iraq, we encourage the quick return to a democratically elected
    government to allow full restoration of our military relations. We
    appreciate the continued support and cooperation of the interim Royal
    Thai Government in combating terrorism in Southeast Asia and for
    temporary access to its military facilities.
    India
        The U.S.-India strategic partnership deepened significantly in the
    last year. With congressional approval of the Henry J. Hyde Atomic
    Energy Cooperation agreement, we should expect the relationship to
    become even broader and more helpful in addressing common security
    issues. Our experience with military-to-military activities mirrors
    this decidedly positive trend. We foresee great potential for
    cooperation in areas of concern like Nepal and Bangladesh.
        Over the course of the last year, all three Indian Service Chiefs
    expressed satisfaction with the state of our military-to-military
    interaction and a desire to increase the scope of these activities in
    the future. Our two nations conducted a combined Army-Air Force
    exercise in Hawaii and a naval exercise incorporating elements from the
    Marine Corps and Army. PACOM will continue increasingly joint, complex
    and realistic training exercises with the Indian military. Indian Armed
    Service Chiefs are also keenly interested in the Foreign Military Sales
    (FMS) program. In their view, FMS plays a central role in our future
    military relationship. The ongoing transfer of U.S.S. Trenton was
    singled out as a welcome addition to Indian Navy capabilities, building
    Indian confidence in dealing with the U.S. in equipment acquisition
    matters.
        Singapore is one of our strongest security partners in Asia and a
    key coalition partner in the war on terror. Beyond providing strategic
    access to ports and airfields for visiting U.S. forces, Singapore is
    extraordinarily supportive and cooperative in moving forward with our
    shared maritime security, counterterrorism, and regional command and
    control initiatives. Singapore breaks ground this year on a Command and
    Control Center at Changi Naval Base which will facilitate information
    sharing between Singapore, the United States, and other regional
    nations.
        Indonesia continues to make steady progress with the reform of the
    TNI, emphasizing human rights, professionalism and leadership training.
    Through the recently renewed security assistance programs, the U.S.
    helped institutionalize reforms, particularly with the International
    Military Education and Training program. Additionally, the U.S. DOD
    started the Defense Resource Management Study in September 2006 to
    improve Indonesian programming and funding practices.
        President Yudhoyono has sustained his commitment to thwart
    extremism and improve maritime security; those efforts are bolstered by
    carefully targeted security assistance and humanitarian initiatives. We
    have focused the security assistance funding on coastal radars and
    communication equipment to improve situational awareness of the
    maritime domain. Our deployment of the U.S.N.S. Mercy provided medical
    relief to more than 24,000 patients in four areas of Indonesia. In
    addition to the medical care and training opportunities for the
    Indonesian medical personnel, the U.S.N.S. Mercy deployment
    demonstrated the importance of the U.S.-Indonesian strategic
    relationship. Together, these initiatives furthered our common goals in
    the war on terror--denying maritime sanctuary to terrorists and
    improving living conditions for the Indonesian people.
    People's Republic of China
        Chinese global engagement continues to mature. Nations in the
    Pacific, Africa, and South America are benefiting from Chinese economic
    growth, while the increasing energy needs of China are fueling ties to
    the Middle East. China has also demonstrated a greater willingness to
    play a responsible role in the diplomatic arena, particularly with
    North Korea. While PRC military modernization efforts do not yet
    challenge U.S. military capabilities in the AOR, the opaqueness of
    Chinese defense budgets and intentions, as well as the introduction of
    new capabilities, are causes for concern.
        The purpose of the PACOM-initiated military-to-military interaction
    with the PLA, conducted within the framework of our over all policy
    toward China which is based on the three Joint U.S.-PRC communiques
    (1972, 1979, 1982), our one-China policy, and the NDAA for Fiscal Year
    2000, is to increase transparency between our respective militaries,
    break down barriers to understanding, and reduce the potential for
    miscalculation. This past year we have gained traction and are moving
    the U.S.-PLA military-to-military relationship forward as an important
    complement to the other elements of the bilateral U.S.-China
    relationship.
        With each successive trip to China, we have seen improved access to
    leadership and facilities. Most noteworthy has been the increasing
    interaction among junior and mid-grade officers who in the coming years
    will become senior PLA leaders. Through this direct contact, we gain
    experience interacting with one another and build relationships for the
    long term. We have also made practical advancements with our
    activities. Talks held last year under the Military Maritime
    Consultative Agreement (MMCA) yielded a substantial agreement to
    improve the safety of our Sailors and Airmen. The agreement called for
    a bilateral search and rescue exercise (SAREX) with elements of free
    play, internationally accepted protocols, and fixed wing aircraft.
    These terms allowed the U.S. to practice search and rescue with the PLA
    in the same manner we carry out such operations with other partners.
    The need for the PLA to adopt internationally accepted protocols will
    increase as PLA Navy expands its activities in the Western Pacific.
        Progress in the military-to-military venue has been positive. I
    anticipate the relationship will improve in the areas of transparency
    and reciprocity. As we see PLA commitment to these principles, I will
    work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Congress to
    reassess the relationship and, if warranted, propose changes to the
    NDAA for Fiscal Year 2000 restrictions.
        The PRC-Taiwan relationship is an issue that we monitor closely.
    Consistent with legislation and policy, our interactions focus on
    efforts to preserve cross-strait stability. We continue to encourage
    Taiwan to improve its own defenses and create a credible deterrent to
    any attack. We have advocated inexpensive hardening practices as well
    as the acquisition of a combination of defensive weapons and systems.
    PACOM will continue to make available to Taiwan advice, training, and
    support for congressionally-approved equipment to defend against the
    potential military aggression by the PRC.
        Mongolia, a country with a GDP of approximately $2.4 billion and a
    population of 2.8 million, continues to make a substantial contribution
    as a U.S. partner in the war on terror. Mongolian forces have
    maintained a continuous presence as a coalition member in Iraq and
    Afghanistan, with seven company-sized rotations to Iraq and six mobile
    training team detachments to Afghanistan. These efforts and their other
    U.N. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization commitments mean that
    almost one-third (or about 400) of deployment-eligible Mongolian
    soldiers are engaged in peacekeeping missions, worldwide.
        PACOM security cooperation with Mongolia supports their efforts to
    adjust the structure and skills of the military to better match a
    peacekeeping focus. The Mongolian Defense Reform and the Global Peace
    Operations Initiative (GPOI) are being leveraged to maximize the effect
    of both programs and will result in the transformation of the MAF into
    an International Peacekeeping Force. Mongolia was selected as one of
    two countries in the theater (Bangladesh the other) to be sites for
    regional peacekeeping training centers. Mongolia has agreed to host the
    second annual GPOI capstone event at the Five Hills Regional Training
    Center in August 2007 as part of Exercise Khaan Quest 2007.
    Russia
        In support of the U.S. European Command responsibility for Russia,
    we have taken steps to improve operational protocols between U.S. and
    Russian forces. We invited the Russians to participate in Pacreach, our
    multinational submarine rescue exercise. We have broken new ground
    toward access in the Far East by initiating a C-17 squadron
    relationship with a Russian strategic lift unit in the Far East and
    through preparation for Pacific Eagle, a U.S-Russia naval exercise
    building common operating procedures for humanitarian assistance,
    disaster relief and search and rescue responses. We hope to host the
    newly appointed Russian Far East Military District Commander at PACOM
    in Hawaii and the Russian Pacific fleet commander at U.S. Seventh Fleet
    and U.S. Pacific Fleet headquarters in Japan and Hawaii, respectively.
    In addition to interoperability, one of our major goals is to increase
    lower-level exchanges and exercise interaction between PACOM and
    Russian forces.
    Sri Lanka
        The ongoing civil war between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
    (LTTE) and the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) is a continuing source of
    regional instability and loss of life. U.S. focus remains on
    facilitating a negotiated settlement that meets the needs of the
    Sinhalese, Tamil, and other communities. The PACOM security cooperation
    programs with Sri Lanka Armed Forces support their ability to deter
    renewed violence, improve maritime security capabilities, and
    institutionalize respect for human rights. Sri Lanka has been approved
    for $10.88 million in fiscal year 2006 1206 ``train and equip'' funds.
    These funds will assist in the Sri Lanka Armed Forces' ability to
    identify and interdict illegal international arms shipments.
    Nepal
        Political upheaval has curbed military engagement with PACOM. The
    end of the 10-year insurgency and the recent inclusion of former Maoist
    insurgents in the government have not brought about the desired
    national stability. Continued Maoist refusal to fulfill promises to
    disarm, return confiscated property, and cease intimidation and
    extortion cast a shadow of doubt on the future of democracy in Nepal.
    We remain hopeful that the recent political agreement will result in
    lasting peace, opening the way for democratic rule and economic
    development. In the interim, PACOM security cooperation focuses on non-
    lethal assistance with an emphasis on professional military development
    and human rights education for the Nepal Army, which remains a positive
    force for stability and security in the country.
    Bangladesh
        Political turmoil and the increasing influence of extremists in
    Bangladesh are growing challenges to both national and regional
    stability. Political violence led to a decision--backed by the
    Bangladeshi armed forces--to postpone elections and retain the civilian
    interim government. PACOM objectives are to assist Bangladesh in
    combating extremism by enhancing counterterrorism capabilities,
    improving land and sea border control, and promoting a professional
    military that adheres to human rights and respects civilian control of
    the military. PACOM further seeks to enhance Bangladeshi ability to
    contribute to international peacekeeping missions and to increase their
    capacity to conduct domestic humanitarian assistance and disaster
    relief missions.
        Our security relations are good and steadily improving with
    Malaysia, a country whose importance and influence increasingly extends
    beyond its regional neighborhood. In addition to chairing the
    Organization of the Islamic Conference, Malaysia recently hosted the
    Nonaligned Movement and Asean Regional Forum. Malaysia remains active
    by leading the peace monitoring mission in southern Philippines, and
    has contributed peacekeeping troops to East Timor and Lebanon.
        In other areas of interest, Malaysia has demonstrated strong
    leadership in maritime security with its littoral partners, fostering
    support for the ``Eyes in the Sky'' initiative to increase maritime
    surveillance. These efforts contributed to the decision last year by
    Lloyds' of London to declassify the Strait of Malacca as a high-risk
    war zone. The new Malaysian coast guard, the MMEA, continues to
    develop, and take on greater responsibility for maritime patrol.
    Vietnam
        Our military-to-military relationship with Vietnam is advancing
    steadily through high level visits and new initiatives for defense
    cooperation such as additional language and disaster response training
    and information exchange of weather forecasting data. In January,
    Vietnam agreed to allow the conduct of recovery operations of missing
    U.S. personnel in territorial waters using U.S. vessels. Vietnam
    prominence in the region has increased with its hosting of the Asia-
    Pacific Economic Council Summit and accession to the World Trade
    Organization. As their level of confidence and engagement grows, we
    expect Vietnam to pursue a more active regional role and greater
    security cooperation with the U.S.
    Cambodia
        PACOM and the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) are beginning to
    cooperate closely on counterterrorism, peacekeeping, disaster response
    and medical and health related activities. Last year, PACOM conducted
    an assessment of RCAF requirements to better understand their needs and
    determine a way-ahead to professionalize the RCAF in the post-Khmer
    Rouge era. In February 2007, the U.S. Pacific Fleet made the first ship
    visit to Cambodia since the Vietnam War, demonstrating a strengthened
    military-to-military relationship.
    Laos
        We are slowly building security-related activities with Laos beyond
    traditional humanitarian assistance cooperation. As demonstrated during
    the January 2007 Technical Talks with PACOM, the Lao Peoples'
    Democratic Republic (PDR) leadership is receptive to increased
    engagement focused initially on education and language training for
    mid-level and senior officers. As the Lao PDR forces become more
    comfortable with our bilateral interaction, we expect to increase the
    pace of military-to-military activities to include greater cooperation
    in humanitarian assistance, disaster response training, and exchange of
    personnel.
    New Zealand
        New Zealand is strongly supportive of our efforts in the war on
    terror. New Zealand forces are leading a Provincial Reconstruction Team
    in Bamyan Province, Afghanistan and have placed additional troops in
    Bagram. They are also an active, stabilizing force in the Pacific
    Islands, with their soldiers supporting security efforts in East Timor,
    the Solomon Islands, and Tonga. The Government of New Zealand's 1987
    legislative ban of nuclear-powered ships in its waters remains an
    obstacle to improved military-to-military relations. However, they
    continue to provide outstanding support to Operation Deep Freeze
    missions enabling U.S. scientific exploration in Antarctica.
    Compact Nations
        PACOM values our special relationship with the three Compact
    Nations--the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the
    Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau. The Marshall Islands host
    the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site, integral to the
    development of our missile defense programs and conduct of space
    operations. The proud citizens of these nations continue to serve with
    distinction in the U.S. Armed Forces and Coast Guard. The U.S. Army
    Pacific's Joint Task Force for Homeland Defense has taken the lead as
    we partner with these nations to ensure our mutual defense as set forth
    in the Compacts of Free Association. Additionally, we fully support
    initiatives to expand operations to protect their valuable economic
    exclusion zone resources.
    East Timor
        Progress in East Timor remains hindered by weak institutions,
    political infighting, poor education and extreme poverty. Australia and
    the United Nations Interim Mission in Timor (UNMIT) facilitated
    security and stability in advance of the April 2007 presidential
    elections (with inconclusive results, a runoff election is scheduled
    for next month). PACOM works to complement UMINT and the Australian
    Defence Force (ADF) with humanitarian assistance and International
    Military Education and Training (IMET), while the Department of Justice
    provides police training through the International Criminal
    Investigative Training Assistance Program. PACOM also provided
    strategic airlift to support the deployment of Australian soldiers
    following rampant violence in East Timor during May 2006.
    Security Assistance
        One of the most important features of PACOM theater security
    cooperation in the region is our partnership with the Department of
    State and U.S. Embassy country teams, which facilitates military-to-
    military interaction with allies and emerging partners. Powerful
    engagement tools for building security partnerships with developing
    countries include International Military Education and Training (IMET),
    and Foreign Military Financing (FMF). IMET advances U.S. and PACOM
    interests by educating participants on the principles of rule of law,
    human rights and good governance, promoting increased understanding and
    regional stability. FMF continues to prove its value by equipping and
    training regional partners. It is vital in supporting U.S. partners in
    achieving security goals of mutual interest, including the war on
    terror. However, Pacific region countries typically receive less than 1
    percent of the annual worldwide allocation of FMF. These investments in
    capacity building and prevention of the conditions which foster
    instability are very cost-effective and merit increased funding.
        Other key programs in PACOM contribute more broadly to security
    cooperation by addressing transnational concerns. The periodic
    deployment of the hospital ship, U.S.N.S. Mercy, and outreach
    organizations like the Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and
    Humanitarian Assistance (COE) and the Asia-Pacific Center for Security
    Studies (APCSS) provide foundational expertise while establishing
    enduring relationships between nations of the region. Additionally,
    Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command is a powerful tool in our efforts to
    improve relationships in the region, particularly in Southeast Asia.
    U.S.N.S. Mercy Deployment
        Our experience with the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami relief effort
    revealed the tremendous influence of DOD-led humanitarian operations in
    reinforcing a positive view of the U.S. while countering ideological
    support for terrorism. Since then, we have adjusted our priorities and
    resources to achieve those effects through deliberately planned
    humanitarian assistance efforts. The paramount event of this type in
    2006 was the deployment of the Navy hospital ship U.S.N.S. Mercy.
    During a 5-month period, Mercy conducted ten humanitarian visits among
    predominantly Muslim populations in South and Southeast Asia. We
    augmented the Mercy medical complement with hundreds of volunteers from
    nongovernment organizations and military medical personnel from eight
    partner countries. Among a wide array of assistance work, the Mercy
    team treated over 60,000 individuals including a thousand complex
    surgeries. Events of this type will continue to be central to our
    security cooperation efforts in the PACOM AOR.
            mature our joint and combined capabilities and readiness
        Fundamental to success in the war on terror and continued stability
    in the Asia-Pacific region is our Joint Training Program. Virtually
    every operation and activity is conducted jointly and in concert with
    allies, making it important that we train to operate more effectively
    as a multinational team.
        The PACOM joint training plan is specifically designed to mature
    joint and combined warfighting capabilities and readiness and to
    advance security cooperation while using resources more effectively. We
    have taken several steps to maximize scarce training dollars and
    minimize unnecessary stress on the force. For example, Joint Task Force
    certification is accomplished through existing exercises rather than
    new events. By leveraging rotational forces in theater and aligning
    service exercises to create joint training opportunities, we also met
    obligations with partners and allies, enhanced training opportunities,
    and improved interoperability between regional militaries. Combining
    Joint Exercise Keen Edge with Army Exercise Yama Sakura resulted in
    efficiencies while continuing to demonstrate our strong commitment to
    Japan.
        GPOI is a Presidential and G-8 program to expand and train
    competent and professional Peacekeepers worldwide, and is a key
    component in building combined capabilities in the AOR. The PACOM GPOI
    program takes advantage of existing host nation programs, institutions
    and exercises like Khaan Quest in Mongolia. We facilitate long-term
    sustainment and enduring impact of the peacekeeper initiative by using
    a ``train-the-trainer'' concept, standardizing training with U.N.
    guidelines, and conducting combined, multilateral training events that
    foster cooperation, not competition, among countries.
        This past year, PACOM GPOI efforts trained more than 700 tactical
    peacekeepers, 198 qualified staff officers, and 50 trainers from
    Mongolia, India, Thailand, Tonga, Korea, and Bangladesh. Most will
    deploy to a coalition or U.N. peacekeeping mission within the year. The
    Mongolians are supporting U.N. missions in Western Sahara, Congo,
    Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, and Entrea as well as a seventh rotation to
    Iraq and a sixth rotation to Afghanistan. Indonesia, Fiji, Sri Lanka,
    and Nepal are newly approved GPOI participants in fiscal year 2007.
        Maturing our capability and readiness also requires operational
    improvement that not only spans the spectrum of mission types--from
    nontraditional to combat operations--but also reflects the maritime
    nature of our theater.
    Undersea Superiority
        Continued improvement of air, surface, subsurface, C\4\I systems,
    and acoustic modeling and navigation charts through oceanographic
    surveys, and cooperative training and operations with partners and
    allies will enhance our ability to operate effectively in the maritime
    domain. As demonstrated by the PLA Navy Song submarine operating in
    vicinity of U.S.S. Kitty Hawk Strike Group, we must work to maintain
    our operational advantage in the face of fast-paced PLA-N modernization
    and ever-expanding area of operations.
    Maturing Theater Intelligence Capability
        Enhancing information sharing among allies and partners is crucial
    to success in the war on terror and regional stability. We are
    developing intelligence modernization programs with several regional
    partners, helping them improve the professionalism and quality of their
    intelligence institutions. We continue to close the gap between
    intelligence and operations by embedding U.S. experts in partner nation
    intelligence organizations, assisting them to assess their military
    intelligence capabilities, and hosting annual multinational
    intelligence working groups to foster multinational cooperation.
    Persistent Surveillance
        The limited persistence of U.S. intelligence collection systems
    makes it difficult to readily gauge other nations' military capability,
    readiness, and operations. At the current time, it is difficult to
    judge intent or rate of escalation in a crisis. We are further
    challenged in tracking high value individuals in the war on terror,
    maintaining real-time status of ballistic missile launch preparations,
    or monitoring suspected WMD proliferation.
    Command and Control (C2)
        PACOM requires secure, integrated, standardized, and interoperable
    command and control capabilities. This includes robust networks to
    enable horizontal and vertical information sharing and collaborative
    planning across the full spectrum of joint, and multinational
    operations throughout the Asia-Pacific region. Key vulnerabilities
    threaten the commander's ability to effectively command and control
    joint and/or coalition forces and effectively share information with
    our partners.
        A single facility provides tactical access to the Defense
    Information Systems Network within the Pacific theater. If this
    critical network infrastructure suffers a catastrophic failure from
    attack or natural disaster, there is no redundant capability to fully
    restore PACOM communication requirements for the war on terror,
    Ballistic Missile Defense, and execution of standing operations plan.
    Correcting this single point-of-failure involves the construction of an
    additional telecommunications area master station within the PACOM AOR
    at an approximate life cycle cost of $600 million. This new master
    station will provide redundant and reliable communications for both
    PACOM and Central Command. Satellite failures as well as funding cuts
    and delays in follow-on SATCOM systems have also reduced communications
    availability of Military SATCOM. PACOM is actively engaged with the
    national satellite community to ensure satellite and terminal programs
    are synchronized and address this availability gap. The DOD
    communications infrastructure also remains vulnerable to exploitation
    and attack. PACOM continues to work with the DOD Information Assurance
    community to increase the security posture of critical C2 networks
    through real-time analysis of ongoing intrusion threats.
        Expanding coalition communication networks is essential to support
    PACOM missions. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and
    Information Integration and the Joint Staff are implementing a new
    Multinational Information Sharing (MNIS) program and have designated
    MNIS-Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System as the
    DOD standard for multinational networks. The goal of this program is to
    build and sustain a single network that supports multinational
    information sharing requirements. PACOM strongly supports this
    initiative.
    Missile Defense
        The North Korean short- and medium-range ballistic missile launches
    in July 2006 highlighted the need for a robust, active missile defense
    capability in the AOR. The long-term strategy for missile defense in
    PACOM is to establish a forward-deployed, layered, integrated air and
    missile defense system. Once matured, this system should be capable of
    intercepting threat missiles throughout the entire time of flight and
    must be interoperable with our regional partners. Specific initiatives
    include moving a U.S. Patriot PAC-3 Battalion to Kadena Airbase in
    Japan, forward stationing of Aegis Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), deploying
    the first Forward-Based X-Band Transportable radar to Japan, and
    establishing a permanent joint command and control facility for
    integrated air and missile defense within the Pacific Air Forces
    Headquarters. To further our missile defense capabilities, PACOM would
    benefit from forward deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Air Defense
    unit, increased inventories of Patriot PAC-3 and SM-3 missiles, and
    accelerated development of a sea-based terminal defensive capability.
    Strategic and Intratheater Lift
        There is a shortage of responsive strategic air and ship lift to
    support force sustainment and deployment to operating areas.
    Insufficient strategic airlift capability of C-17 and C-5 aircraft
    could cause delays in the arrival of critical cargo and passengers.
    PACOM has eight C-17s based at Hickam AFB, Hawaii, and is looking
    forward to basing eight more at Elmendorf AFB, Alaska, starting in June
    2007. Pacific-based C-17s bring an increased reliability, versatility,
    and delivery capacity to the theater. An increase in Pacific-based C-
    17s, should they become available, would be helpful.
    High-Speed Vessels
        Leased High-Speed Vessels (HSVs) have demonstrated their value in
    the Pacific theater, supporting unit training, joint exercises, global
    war on terror requirements, and humanitarian missions such as the
    tsunami disaster relief effort. They have served as valuable platforms
    for intratheater lift, providing a cost-effective alternative and
    highly flexible augmentation to scarce intratheater airlift assets. As
    the Army continues to transform, the Joint High-Speed Vessels (JHSVs)
    will be increasingly critical in the rapid deployment of the Stryker
    Brigade Combat Team forces throughout the theater. PACOM favors
    continued leasing of HSVs as an interim capability, and strongly
    supports a more aggressive acquisition process to expedite JHSV
    delivery. This capability will fully support Theater Security
    Cooperation Plans and response to disasters, and is also useful as a
    mobile sea base to facilitate security cooperation. This capability
    will be increasingly important with the pending relocation of forces to
    Guam and throughout the theater.
    Prepositioned Stocks/Preferred Munitions
        Due to the time-distance challenges in this theater, PACOM forces
    require readily available and properly maintained prepositioned stocks
    at the outset of any conflict. With the recent download of the APS-3
    afloat equipment sets to support Iraq-bound Army units and the existing
    shortages in the remaining pre-positioned programs, we now have a
    greater need for replenishment of equipment and stocks. Achieving the
    appropriate mix of key munitions, particularly GPS-aided and laser-
    guided weapons to include Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System, new
    Patriot PAC-3 missiles, Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile
    (AMRAAM) version C-7, and the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, is
    imperative.
        Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSAs) enhance
    interoperability, readiness, and provide a cost effective mechanism for
    mutual logistics support between U.S. and allied or partner military
    forces. ACSAs have been particularly helpful in the conduct of war on
    terror operations. For example, we have made extensive use of the
    current agreement with the Republic of the Philippines to support the
    AFP operations against terrorist cells in that country. With the
    recently concluded agreement with Sri Lanka, PACOM has a total of 12
    ACSAs in place, with 14 additional countries within the AOR currently
    ACSA-eligible. We are currently in the renewal process with the
    Philippines and Tonga, negotiating an agreement with India, and we are
    hopeful interest by Maldives will yield results. We view these
    agreements as vital in maximizing our interoperability and helping
    build competent coalition partners in the Pacific region.
               posture forces for agile and responsive employment
        The Asia-Pacific region holds both great potential benefit and
    ongoing challenges for the United States. The region is home to some of
    our most stalwart security allies and partners--Japan, Australia,
    Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore--a rising military
    power in China and burgeoning relationships with India and Vietnam.
    U.S. force presence--in Japan, Korea, and across the Asia-Pacific AOR--
    has long been a guarantor of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific.
        Changes in PACOM force posture reflect the priorities of the
    Quadrennial Defense Review, which seeks to strengthen U.S. response to
    emerging security threats. We are taking advantage of technology to
    enhance our effectiveness and combat power while simultaneously
    reducing our military footprint in Asia. At the same time, we are using
    our increased mobility to guarantee presence where and when needed to
    respond to security challenges.
        We continue to develop and refine plans to reposition and realign
    our forces in Japan, Guam, and Korea following the agreements reached
    through the U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) and the
    U.S.-ROK Future of the Alliance (FOTA) Talks. The goals of our evolving
    force posture are to improve the effectiveness of our alliances with
    these two vital allies while providing the flexibility and agility to
    employ U.S. forces worldwide.
        The U.S.-Japan DPRI discussions reached a milestone in May 2006,
    when Secretary of State Rice and former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld,
    together with their Japanese counterparts, released the Roadmap for
    Realignment, which specifically defined the interrelated initiatives,
    plans and schedules for a number of posture realignment initiatives
    that will ensure an enduring U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific. The
    linchpin for repositioning our forces in Japan is the relocation of
    Marine Corps Air Station Futenma functions from the current facility to
    a new, less encroached area in central Okinawa. This new facility will
    enable us to return the existing Futenma facilities, including several
    acres of highly desirable land, to the government of Japan, and will
    lessen the impact of military aviation operations on the local Okinawan
    populace. We will also move 8,000 marines and their dependents from
    Okinawa to Guam. This action will return additional land to Japan while
    retaining a forward-based Marine presence in the PACOM theater.
    Additionally, we intend to look for more opportunities to leverage our
    interoperability with Japan, such as ballistic missile defense
    cooperation, to better align our capabilities and forces to respond to
    potential security challenges.
        As part of our realignment efforts, PACOM is actively supporting
    various Service planning and infrastructure expansion initiatives that
    are crucial to our force bed-down plans in Guam. Our activities are
    closely linked with Service initiatives as well as our broader theater
    security cooperation efforts. We are finalizing construction details
    and expect to begin upgrades to the military infrastructure, housing
    and training facilities in 2010. The Joint Guam Program Office, led by
    the Department of the Navy, will manage all aspects of the project.
    While Japan will bear approximately $6 billion of the costs of
    facilities and infrastructure development to support relocation of
    Marine units from Okinawa to Guam, we must also do our part and
    financially commit to the required upgrades and changes. Managing the
    construction effort will require coordination from all branches of the
    military and active participation and planning from other Federal and
    territory agencies.
        On the Korean peninsula, with the full support of the ROK
    government, we are reducing and consolidating our footprint into two
    hubs south of the Han River. We continue to transfer missions to the
    ROK military, and modernize our combined combat force capabilities. As
    part of the Security Policy Initiative--the successor to our FOTA
    effort--we have agreed with the ROK government to complete the transfer
    of wartime operational control of ROK forces by April 2012. With this
    agreement, we envision a future force with increased strategic
    relevance, flexibility, and responsiveness.
              ensure operational plans at all levels are credible
        Operational and contingency plans are the basis for PACOM response
    to security challenges. Our planning construct, with renewed emphasis
    on phase zero engagement activities, is designed to synchronize actions
    across the full spectrum of U.S. national power. Emphasis on peacetime
    shaping has significantly improved plan development and generated more
    options for senior decision makers across a wider range of crisis
    scenarios. Our primary effort remains to prevent conflict and ensure a
    stable and secure environment within the region. Should deterrence
    efforts fail, our plans are designed to be successful during all phases
    of crises.
        We validate our planning efforts through annual exercises, such as
    Reception, Staging, On-ward Movement, and Integration and Ulchi Focus
    Lens, which enable us to closely examine potential friction points in
    our plans and develop response options which optimize capabilities.
    Exercises also help the staff to analyze strategic and operational
    goals should the plan become a reality.
        U.S. forces also conducted joint Exercise Valiant Shield in June
    2006 in the waters off Guam, bringing together U.S. Air Force and U.S.
    Navy personnel and assets to work through a range of warfighting skills
    such as maritime interdiction and command and control. This exercise,
    the greatest concentration of naval and air power in the Western
    Pacific since the Vietnam War, demonstrated joint command, control and
    communications of U.S. forces while highlighting continued U.S.
    commitment to allies and friends of the region. We also hosted
    observers from many nations, including China.
        PACOM has developed a robust plan in support of our national
    strategy for a pandemic influenza (PI) response and is prepared to
    support lead agencies (Department of Homeland Security, Department of
    Health and Human Services, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and
    Department of State) at a national level. We are working closely with
    other geographic and functional combatant commands to refine and
    exercise comprehensive PI response actions.
        We are also working to assess activities that support the
    development and execution of operational and contingency plans. From
    peacetime security cooperation to winning the fight against terrorism,
    we are evaluating support of all elements of national power to ensure
    our approach is comprehensive, efficient, risk managed and measurably
    effective.
                               quality of service
        PACOM forces continue to make a difference not only in the region
    but also in Iraq and Afghanistan. The performance of our people during
    this past year has been exemplary. Contributing to their steadfast
    devotion to duty is the knowledge that others, including Congress, are
    actively concerned for their health and well being. We appreciate the
    2.2 percent pay raise, special benefits for injured and recuperating
    personnel and their families, the government match for the Thrift
    Savings Plan for civilian personnel, and expanded authorities for our
    Reserve component men and women. Continued support of these Quality of
    Service initiatives contributes immensely to our combat readiness and
    the retention of our highly-skilled personnel who serve our national
    interests at home and abroad.
                               summary statement
        PACOM long-term priorities emphasize a region that is stable,
    secure and at peace. We are engaged extensively throughout the AOR to
    advance theater security goals. We are committed--along with our allies
    and partners--to turn the promise of a stable and secure region into
    reality and convert challenges into opportunities that strengthen
    regional relationships and cooperation. We are fortunate to have
    traditional allies and partners, as well as emerging partners, who are
    willing to help set conditions for security and stability and work
    together for the common good of the people of the Asia-Pacific. We
    appreciate the staunch support of Congress and American people. I am
    proud and honored to represent the men and women of PACOM. On their
    behalf, thank you for your support, and thank you for this opportunity
    to testify on the defense posture in the PACOM AOR.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Admiral. General Bell.

     STATEMENT OF GEN BURWELL B. BELL III, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
     NATIONS COMMAND AND REPUBLIC OF KOREA/UNITED STATES COMBINED
          FORCES COMMAND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES-KOREA

        General Bell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished
    members of the committee, it's good to see all of you again. I
    want to thank all of you for your continued support for our
    servicemembers serving in Korea. For the record, I'd like to
    submit my 2007 Posture Statement.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, it will be made part of the
    record.
        General Bell. Thank you, sir. Sir, I've commanded U.S. and
    Combined Forces in Korea now for over a year, and I can report
    to you, the ROK/U.S. Alliance is enduring, and it continues to
    function as a pillar for regional stability in that area of the
    world.
        Today, we're working with our Korean partner to evolve our
    alliance to meet both nations' 21st century security
    requirements, and strengthen our position in that U.S. vital
    national interest area.
        For 54 years now, our alliance has successfully deterred
    North Korean aggression. We all remain hopeful that the
    progress made in the latest round of Six-Party Talks will
    result in a denuclearized North Korea. Nonetheless, I remain
    cautious about North Korea's long-term intentions.
        Kim Jong-il has a history of manipulating the international
    community in an attempt to shape the political and military
    environment to meet his objectives. His highly provocative
    military actions this past year, including unprecedented
    missile firings, and the detonation of a nuclear device,
    represent a continuing threat to international peace and
    security worldwide.
        Since its inception nearly 30 years ago, the Combined
    Forces Command, which I command, has been the warfighting
    command of the U.S.-ROK Alliance, and for the past several
    years we've been consulting with the ROK regarding alliance
    transformation, and the re-stationing of U.S. Forces.
        Recently, the ROK and the United States agreed to
    transition operational command and control of the ROK military
    forces in wartime, from combined forces command, to an
    independent ROK military command, in 2012.
        We will inactivate Combined Forces Command, and establish a
    new U.S. independent warfighting command on the Korean
    Peninsula. The United States will retain clear national command
    over all of our forces and personnel in this future
    arrangement.
        Our force re-stationing to consolidated and enduring hubs
    south of Seoul will allow us to focus on improving living and
    working conditions for our servicemembers and their families
    while also providing our forces--strategic and operational--
    flexibility. The ROK has agreed to fund a significant majority
    of our moving expenses, including a significant majority of the
    new construction that will be required.
        To synchronize our contributions to both Iraq and U.S. in
    this re-stationing effort, our sustained access to several
    different U.S. programs is going to be essential, including
    commercial build-to-lease programs.
        In view of this, I do request your full support for our
    fiscal year 2008 legislative request to adjust our lease caps
    for build-to-lease housing in Korea. This will empower the Army
    to actively solicit build-to-lease housing options for our
    servicemembers and their families, thus enabling our move to
    South of Seoul. Without the housing, we cannot make this move.
        Though our mission in Korea has been a resounding success,
    and serves as a model for military response to aggression,
    leading to peace, prosperity, and democracy, today only 2
    percent of the U.S. Active Duty military serves in Korea, the
    war there ended 54 years ago. It's time to begin the process of
    ending what I consider to be a 1-year war zone rotational tour
    mechanism, which needlessly adds to our high worldwide
    operational tempo, while handicapping our readiness and our
    engagement opportunities with our long-time Korean ally. I'm
    advocating 3-year, normal accompanied tours as an objective,
    and a goal that we should work towards in Korea, and I would
    appreciate your support as I work this initiative over the next
    several years.
        Sir, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today, and I
    look forward to answering your questions. Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of General Bell follows:]
                  Prepared Statement by GEN B.B. Bell III, USA
        Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you
    for the opportunity to appear before you today as Commander, United
    Nations Command (UNC); Commander, Republic of Korea (ROK)-United States
    Combined Forces Command (CFC); and Commander, United States Forces-
    Korea (USFK). It is my distinct honor to represent the soldiers,
    sailors, airmen, marines, and their families who serve in the ROK. On
    behalf of these outstanding men and women who serve our country 8,000
    miles from home, I thank you for your unwavering commitment to
    improving the quality of life of our servicemembers and their families.
    Your support allows us to contribute to ensuring security on the Korean
    peninsula while promoting prosperity and stability in Northeast Asia. I
    appreciate this opportunity to present my assessment of the command and
    our plan for continued transformation of the ROK-U.S. Alliance.
        Forged in war, this Alliance has preserved the peace, promoted
    democracy, and provided prosperity for the citizens of the ROK, and the
    region, for over five decades. The ROK-U.S. Alliance is more than a
    military relationship; it is a comprehensive and enduring partnership
    that promotes freedom, prosperity and democracy in the Northeast Asia
    region and the world. A new generation of South Korean leaders,
    cognizant of their national achievements, is eager to achieve what they
    see as a more equitable relationship with the United States. The United
    States supports this and is working with the ROK to evolve the Alliance
    to meet the requirements of the future security environment. We are
    transforming the Alliance into one that is capable of meeting 21st
    century challenges and respects the needs and aspirations of both
    nations.
        Currently, in wartime all forces in the Korea Theater of
    Operations, including ROK forces, are commanded by the U.S. led CFC.
    Over the past few years and while remaining strong supporters of the
    Alliance, the Government of the ROK has expressed a firm desire to
    assume primary responsibility for its own defense, with the U.S. in
    more of a supporting role. The ROK Government views the command
    arrangements of the U.S. led CFC as representing a level of
    infringement on their national sovereignty. The ROK Government
    expresses this desired defense policy in terms of ``ROK Self
    Reliance.'' The United States agrees that, with the application of
    selected bridging strategies, the ROK Government and military are
    capable of assuming full command responsibility for their own forces in
    wartime, which will move the U.S. contribution to a key but supporting
    role.
        Recently, our governments agreed to transition wartime operational
    command and control (OPCON) of ROK forces to the ROK military in 2012.
    This will result in the inactivation of the current U.S. led CFC, and
    the establishment of a U.S. independent, complementary and supporting
    joint command in Korea. In the future, United States forces in Korea
    will be more air and naval centric, while continuing to support the
    superb ground forces of the ROK. I assess the Armed Forces of the ROK
    will be ready for this transition, and I am working closely with our
    Ally to make it smoothly with no degradation to ROK security, while
    ensuring the ROK-U.S. Security Alliance remains strong and viable.
        Transferring wartime OPCON of ROK forces to the ROK will open a new
    and positive chapter in the long and proud history of the Alliance. It
    will likely occur in a challenging security environment. North Korea
    continues to challenge international conventions and presents a clear
    threat to the region and the world. Emerging security dynamics on the
    peninsula and in the region, and North Korea's attempts to divide the
    ROK-U.S. Alliance, reinforce the need for our strong Alliance. We will
    remain in South Korea as a trusted and reliable ally as long as we are
    welcome and wanted.
                   i. the northeast asia security environment
        Northeast Asia is a dynamic region of economic might, varied
    cultures, and competing interests. The United States has significant
    long-term interests in Northeast Asia; namely, maintaining regional
    stability, fulfilling our commitments to friends and allies, promoting
    economic cooperation and promoting free market enterprise. The region
    accounted for approximately 24 percent of our Nation's total
    international trade for 2006. Stability in Northeast Asia is essential
    to the vitality of global and U.S. markets.
        U.S. economic integration with Northeast Asia represents a positive
    reinforcement toward regional stability. Our military presence remains
    essential in a region that includes five of the world's six largest
    militaries; three of the world's proven nuclear powers, including the
    United States; and North Korea, which has violated its own agreements,
    international security norms and standards, and continues to pose a
    proliferation threat. At the 38th Security Consultative Meeting in
    Washington DC, the United States, and the ROK condemned, in the
    strongest terms, North Korea's 2006 nuclear test and missile launches.
    These overt provocations are a clear threat to international peace and
    security as well as the stability of the Korean Peninsula. The Alliance
    remains committed to the peaceful and diplomatic resolution of this
    issue as we continue to deter aggression and stand ready to defeat
    North Korean aggression.
            ii. north korea challenges regional and global security
        North Korea remains the key de-stabilizer in Northeast Asia. It
    continues to devote disproportionate resources (around 30 percent of
    its gross domestic product) to improving its asymmetric military
    capabilities and maintaining a large, forward-deployed conventional
    force. With little notice, these forces can conduct a wide spectrum of
    provocative acts or launch an attack, potentially resulting in a large
    number of casualties and significant destruction in a matter of days.
    North Korea's Strategy and Goals
        Kim Jong-il repeatedly attempts to divide the ROK-U.S. Alliance in
    an effort to exploit any issues that emerge between the two governments
    and sew doubts about Alliance cohesion. Alternating these provocations
    with engagement overtures, in the past Kim Jong-il has allowed
    carefully controlled inter-Korean social and economic exchange,
    garnered financial benefits for his regime and offered only vague
    promises for future cooperation. Often emphasizing symbolism over
    substance, North Korea has projected a cooperative appearance for
    public consumption while taking only limited steps toward
    denuclearization or reducing tensions. While the 13 February agreement
    in Beijing is a positive step, and the ongoing Six-Party Talks continue
    to offer the best route towards resolution of North Korea's nuclear
    aspirations, North Korea's record of noncompliance with past agreements
    suggests a difficult road ahead.
        Domestically, Kim Jong-il ensures internal stability by maintaining
    absolute power. He perpetuates confrontation with Washington and the
    region to justify his ``military first'' societal policy. His scarce
    resources are diverted to support the military and regime elite at the
    expense of the general population. Although reunification of the
    peninsula under North Korean control remains the primary stated
    objective of the regime, Kim's pervasive system of ideological,
    political, and physical control aims to ensure the population presents
    no threats to his rule.
    North Korean Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs
        North Korea continues to develop and hone asymmetric military
    capabilities as a deterrent and force-multiplier. It furthers nuclear
    weapons programs as a political instrument to deter perceived threats
    to Kim Jong-il's rule, while offering an opportunity to coerce
    neighboring countries. Following its early 2005 declaration of a
    nuclear weapons capability, North Korea conducted its first nuclear
    test on October 9, 2006. The device was low yield but significantly
    raised tensions and concerns over the potential for additional tests,
    and North Korean nuclear proliferation. Unless the Six-Party Talks
    process prevails, we expect North Korea to continue nuclear weapons
    research and development to perpetuate its strategy of intimidation. If
    the Six-Party Talks do not produce a lasting settlement, the North
    Koreans will likely conduct a second and potentially additional nuclear
    tests when they see it as serving their purposes.
        North Korea has continued to produce plutonium from spent fuel rods
    obtained from its Yongbyon nuclear facility in violation of its
    international agreements to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. North
    Korea claims weapons-grade plutonium was processed from spent fuel rods
    produced at the reactor over the last 3 years, and others stored at
    Yongbyon since 1994. If these claims are accurate, North Korea may now
    possess as much as 40-50 kg of plutonium, enough to produce several
    nuclear weapons. This reactor is not used for electrical power
    generation, but is used primarily for plutonium production.
        In addition, North Korea is reported to be pursuing a Highly-
    Enriched Uranium (HEU) weapons development program as an alternative
    route to nuclear weapons. A HEU program could provide weapons grade
    material even if North Korea agrees to halt plutonium processing.
    Without a diplomatic settlement, Pyongyang's plutonium production
    capability and its reported HEU program places it on track to become a
    moderate nuclear power, potentially by the end of the decade.
        The regime views its ballistic missile program as a source of
    international power and prestige, a strategic deterrent, a means of
    exerting regional influence, and a source of hard currency derived from
    exports. As a result, North Korea continues to design, develop,
    produce, and proliferate ballistic missiles, and may ultimately aim to
    develop nuclear armed missiles to threaten regional countries, and even
    the U.S. For example, North Korea is developing a new solid propellant
    short-range ballistic missile, which it last successfully test-fired in
    March 2006. Once operational, this missile will be more mobile, more
    rapidly deployable, and more capable of being launched on shorter
    notice than current systems. North Korea is also developing an
    intermediate range ballistic missile, capable of targeting U.S. forces
    as far away as Guam and possibly Alaska.
        From 4-5 July, 2006 North Korea successfully launched six SCUD and
    No Dong short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Its launch of the
    Taepo-dong-2 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) failed early in
    flight. These launches marked the highest number of missiles ever fired
    by North Korea in a 24-hour period. The No Dong launches were the first
    in 13 years. Some were fired in the hours of darkness--a first for the
    North Koreans. These launches validated the operational status of North
    Korea's inventory of about 800 theater ballistic missiles targeting the
    ROK and Japan--intending to provoke regional tension.
        The Taepo-dong-2 ICBM launch demonstrated North Korea's abandonment
    of its 7-year, publicly-announced moratorium on longer-range missile
    development. It drew unanimous condemnation by the United Nations
    (U.N.) Security Council and further isolated Pyongyang from the
    international community. If North Korea's missile research and
    development program continues on its present course, and if they meet
    an objective of developing a nuclear device small enough to be mated
    with an ICBM, they could eventually field missiles capable of striking
    targets within the United States homeland with nuclear weapons.
        North Korea's sale of missiles and related technologies generates
    hard currency. It has aggressively marketed missile technology to
    developing countries throughout the Middle East, North Africa, and
    Asia, including Iran. North Korea will continue to design, develop, and
    produce ballistic missiles. The proliferation threat is real,
    demonstrated, and may not remain limited to conventional weapons. Given
    North Korea's ballistic missile proliferation record, Pyongyang could
    also decide to proliferate nuclear weapons technology, expertise, or
    material to anti-American countries, rogue regimes, or non-state
    actors.
    North Korean Conventional Military Programs
        North Korea continues to emphasize its Special Operations Force
    (SOF) capabilities maintaining the largest force in the world with an
    estimated strength of over 80,000. Its personnel are chosen for
    political reliability, loyalty, are among the most highly trained North
    Korean troops, and have high priority for food and other resources.
    North Korea's SOF has significant capability to infiltrate the ROK and
    can conduct asymmetric attacks against a variety of targets. South
    Korea is particularly vulnerable to these type attacks, given its
    heavily urbanized and dense population of 49 million citizens living
    vertically in large cities.
        The North Korean People's Army is the fourth largest in the world.
    Though their equipment is aging and unsophisticated, it is forward
    deployed and remains capable of launching devastating attacks with
    little warning. Two hundred fifty long range artillery systems can
    easily fire on Seoul, a metropolitan area of over 20 million people,
    from their current positions. Over 60 percent of North Korean ground
    forces are situated within 100 miles of Seoul.
        North Korean conventional forces have some significant challenges.
    Even with its ``military first'' policy and the extraordinary
    commitment of over 30 percent of the Nation's GDP to the military,
    economic difficulties have had a debilitating impact on training levels
    and conventional force readiness over the past decade. It does not
    enjoy the military support that it once did from either China or
    Russia. It is doubtful the North Korean military in its current state
    could sustain offensive operations against the south.
    North Korean Threat Outlook
        North Korea will continue to pose a threat to regional and global
    security until it changes its fundamental strategy. There is no
    indication the regime will curtail its efforts to split the ROK-U.S.
    Alliance, reduce disproportionate military spending, halt destabilizing
    illicit activities, or loosen its stranglehold on the North Korean
    people. Kim Jong-il has the option to continue to manipulate the
    international community by alternating provocations and engagement
    overtures in an attempt to shape the political and military environment
    to meet his objectives. It is because of this threat that during this
    year's Security Consultative Meeting in Washington, the United States
    reaffirmed its long standing commitment to continue, among other
    capabilities, to extend to the ROK the security of our nuclear
    umbrella.
        Another regional security threat is the risk of an internal North
    Korean domestic crisis. This is unlikely in my judgment; however, an
    internal crisis could trigger regime and North Korean instability or
    even potentially collapse. An implosion of the regime would almost
    certainly bring devastating consequences such as a bloody internal
    conflict, humanitarian crisis, mass refugees, or even loss of control
    over nuclear materials. Without a diplomatic breakthrough, North Korea
    will remain a threat to stability and security in Northeast Asia and to
    global security for the foreseeable future.
               iii. the republic of korea-united states alliance
        The ROK-U.S. Alliance has remained stalwart in its mutual and
    enduring commitment to peninsular and regional security. The Armed
    Forces of both nations are in the midst of an unprecedented
    transformation and realignment. By transferring appropriate roles and
    missions to the ROK military and consolidating U.S. forces into
    centralized hubs, we are improving our overall combined readiness and
    expanding the capabilities of ROK and U.S. forces to counter current
    and future threats.
    The Republic of Korea Today
        Over the course of the Alliance's half-century of economic and
    security cooperation, the ROK has emerged as a vibrant democracy, first
    class economic power (by many measures the tenth largest economy in the
    world), and a major U.S. economic partner. Economic growth is fueled by
    global exports of innovative high technology and consumer goods. The
    ROK ranks as the U.S.'s seventh-largest trading partner, seventh-
    largest export market, and is an important investment location for
    American companies.
        The South Korean government views a nuclear armed North Korea as an
    intolerable threat, and that a catastrophic collapse in the north would
    have extremely adverse consequences in the south. However, ROK
    perceptions of the North Korean conventional threat vary, especially
    among younger generations. As memories of American sacrifices in the
    Korean War fade, Korean citizens, seeking what they see as a more equal
    Alliance relationship question the importance of our long-standing
    Alliance. Many raise the issue of ROK sovereignty, and a desire for
    what they characterize as more self-reliance and independence. These
    generations, while not necessarily anti-American, have strong political
    views which are increasingly expressed in national policy.
        In its final year in office, the Roh administration's approach to
    inter-Korean relations is guided by its ``Peace and Prosperity''
    policy, which primarily aims to further inter-Korean rapprochement
    through humanitarian assistance, family reunions, tourism, and trade.
    Seoul promotes gradual economic integration and reconciliation to
    provide the catalyst for a formal peace agreement replacing the
    Armistice Agreement. The United States supports this approach. However,
    the U.S. is concerned over the potential for aid, trade and salaries to
    be used for purposes other than those intended. Recent North Korean
    missile launches and the nuclear test delivered a major blow to the Roh
    administration's policies. Regardless, we do not assess that there will
    be a major shift in South Korean policies as a result of the upcoming
    2007 Presidential election process.
    ROK-U.S. Alliance Today
        For the past several years, the United States and the ROK have been
    engaged in a formal process to evolve the Alliance to meet the demands
    of the future security environment. The Department of Defense (DOD) and
    Department of State, as well as the ROK Ministries of National Defense
    and Foreign Affairs and Trade, are conducting an ongoing dialogue on
    issues related to Alliance modernization and the realignment of U.S.
    forces in Korea. Consultations began with the Future of the Alliance
    talks, were succeeded by the ROK-U.S. Security Policy Initiative, and
    have led to agreements on the enhancement of our combined defense,
    deterrent capabilities, and transfer of wartime OPCON of ROK forces
    from CFC to the ROK military.
        These agreements have now entered the implementation phase. To
    support the realignment of U.S. forces, the ROK has committed
    significant resources to acquiring land for the relocation of our
    current Yongsan Garrison in Seoul, and the 2nd Infantry Division (2ID)
    north of Seoul under the Land Partnership Plan (LPP). This has not been
    politically easy and the efforts of the ROK Government and Ministry of
    National Defense deserve recognition. Under the Yongsan Relocation Plan
    (YRP) and the LPP and in accordance with our ROK-U.S. Status of Forces
    Agreement (SOFA), the U.S. returns vacated camp facilities, capital
    investments and land free to the Korean Government, while consolidating
    into two main hubs south of Seoul. When completed, we will have
    returned 59 camps and all their facilities and buildings to the ROK,
    including 109 acres in the middle of Seoul. Thus far, 30 camps have
    been returned. After consolidating and transforming, our forces will be
    in a much better position to support ROK defense and U.S. national
    interests. Additionally, our servicemembers and their families will
    also enjoy needed and greatly increased quality-of-life.
    ROK Defense Initiatives
        The ROK is committed to increasing its defense capabilities in a
    range of materiel, communications and computers, and weapons
    procurement areas. Under its Defense Reform Plan 2020, the ROK has
    invested over $10 billion in capabilities modernization in the past 3
    years. The ROK military aims to develop a self-reliant, technology
    oriented, qualitative defense force that remains strongly allied with
    the United States.
        The ROK's Ministry of National Defense has requested an average
    defense budget increase of 11 percent per year until 2015 followed by
    an average increase of 9 percent until 2020. While the ROK defense
    budget has not met these annual goals yet (the increase in 2006 was
    about 9 percent of the desired 11 percent), the ROK Government is
    indeed effectively increasing their annual investment in military
    preparedness. The ROK National Assembly passed a reform bill aimed at
    reducing total force levels, overhauling the command and control
    structure, and fielding high-tech weaponry. The force reductions will
    take place over the next 13 years and will reduce overall (Active and
    Reserve) forces from about 3.7 million to about 2 million--a cut of 46
    percent. In this, the total Army (Active and Reserve) ground force
    reduction will be about 45 percent. Additionally, the ROK Government
    has initiated a reduction in the length of service for its conscript
    Army, from 2 years to 1\1/2\ years. Successful ROK execution of Defense
    Reform Plan 2020 will require long term legislative and budgetary
    support from the ROK Government. Additionally and as long as the
    Alliance has the responsibility to deter and if necessary defeat the
    substantial North Korean threat, close coordination of the ROK Defense
    Reform Plan 2020 with the United States through Alliance consultative
    processes will be necessary. As the ROK-U.S. CFC Commander, it is my
    assessment that ROK troop reductions and changes in conscription laws
    must not negatively impact the Command's deterrence and warfighting
    capability on the Korean Peninsula against the postured threat.
    Transfer of Wartime Operational Control
        Given the advanced military and economic capability of the ROK, the
    next logical phase in the maturation of the ROK-U.S. Alliance is for
    the ROK to assume the primary responsibility for their own defense. The
    United States views this effort as an affirmation of the tremendous
    success of the Alliance since the end of the Korean War, and fully
    supports this change. U.S. and ROK civilian and military leaders have
    been discussing wartime OPCON transfer for nearly two decades as part
    of the normal progression of the Alliance. This is a natural
    evolution--one whose time has come both militarily and politically.
    Transitioning the Alliance to a new ROK-led military command and
    control structure in 2012 with U.S. and U.N. forces in doctrinally
    supporting roles will establish relationships that best serve both
    nations' interests and are well suited for the long-term. The United
    States desires that our future force contributions leverage our
    extremely quick reacting and readily available potent air and naval
    capability, while supporting the superb ROK Army ground forces to
    counter North Korean aggression. In transitioning to a doctrinally
    ``supporting to supported'' military relationship, the Commander of
    USFK will maintain uninterrupted national command over all U.S. Forces.
        The United States and the ROK have also reached agreement on the
    strategic flexibility of U.S. forces in Korea. This was achieved during
    the January 2006 inaugural session of the Strategic Consultation for
    Allied Partnership ministerial-level talks between the United States
    Secretary of State and the ROK Foreign Minister on bilateral, regional,
    and global issues of mutual interest. The agreement has two basic
    tenets: the ROK supports the strategic flexibility of U.S. forces in
    Korea, and the United States respects the ROK's position that it shall
    not be involved in a regional conflict against the Korean people's
    will. The transfer of wartime OPCON reinforces these principles as the
    ROK assumes the lead responsibility for its defense, and the United
    States, in a supporting role, becomes more agile and flexible.
    Allied Burden Sharing
        With the ROK's tremendous economic capacity and prominence in the
    international community, a balanced defense burden-sharing arrangement
    in support of United States forces in Korea is fundamental to the
    strength of the Alliance. Today, the ROK contributes approximately 2.6
    percent of its GDP to its national defense, while the United States
    expends around 3.9 percent for our defense. At the end of 2006, the ROK
    and the United States concluded talks on a new Special Measures
    Agreement (SMA) regarding ROK cost sharing support of U.S. forces in
    Korea for 2007-2008.
        In principle, both sides agreed to the goal of reaching an
    equitable level of cost sharing. The United States believes that to
    achieve equitable levels, the two allied nations should contribute
    approximately 50 percent each of the non-personnel stationing costs
    (NPSC) for U.S. forces in Korea. To date, the Korean Government burden-
    sharing contribution to assist the U.S. in military stationing costs
    has been below this 50-50 ratio; the 2006 SMA contribution represented
    only 38 percent of the NPSC. For 2007, the ROK agreed to provide 725.5
    Billion Won ($770 million) as a direct contribution and to increase its
    level in 2008 with the rise in the 2006 Consumer Price Index (CPI). The
    ROK 2007 SMA contribution represents 41 percent of our NPSC, still
    short of the principle of equitable 50-50 cost sharing. As a result of
    SMA burden-sharing shortfalls, we are forced to stretch limited
    funding. I cannot allow readiness to suffer, and I will not allow the
    quality-of-life of my servicemembers or families to suffer. Without
    more equitable allied SMA funding, we may be forced to recommend a
    range of fiscal measures to the U.S. Government, including a review of
    base relocation and consolidation plans.
        Clearly, defense burden sharing is advantageous to both Alliance
    partners. For the United States, the ROK's willingness to equitably
    share appropriate defense costs is a clear indicator that U.S. forces
    in Korea are welcome, wanted, and held necessary by our host. For the
    ROK, an appropriate SMA investment gives them the presence and
    capabilities of the U.S. military. Additionally, 100 percent of ROK SMA
    burden-sharing contributions are returned directly into the Korean
    economy by paying the salaries of Korean USFK local national employees,
    Korean contractors and service agents, and Korean construction firms.
    ROK contributions for the past 4 years represent shortfalls that USFK
    has struggled to absorb by reducing expenditures while maintaining
    readiness.
    Republic of Korea's Support to Global and Regional Security
        The ROK continues to superbly assist United States' efforts to
    promote global and regional security as an active partner in the global
    war on terrorism; to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; and to
    participate in U.N. peacekeeping missions, humanitarian assistance, and
    disaster relief missions. Since 2002, for example, the ROK has
    contributed millions of dollars in aid for reconstruction and deployed
    contingents of troops to support operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In
    December 2006, the ROK's National Assembly approved a third, 1-year
    extension of its force commitment to Iraq through 2007, although their
    force will reduce to 1,200 troops. Support to Afghanistan includes
    providing a 58-person medical unit, a 147-person engineer construction
    unit, and other military assistance worth millions of dollars. Last,
    the ROK is deploying an important 350 soldier contingent to the U.N.
    peacekeeping mission in Lebanon. The ROK has been a steadfast and
    committed Ally in supporting U.S. and U.N. operations worldwide. We
    applaud our ally's efforts in this regard, and thank them.
        In May 2003, the President of the United States introduced the
    Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a measure to enhance
    international efforts to prevent the flow of weapons of mass
    destruction, delivery systems, and related materials on the ground, in
    the air, and at sea. To date, over 75 countries have expressed support
    for this initiative and the U.S. has requested that the ROK fully adopt
    the provisions of the PSI. The Roh administration announced that it
    supports the principles of the PSI and would cooperate on a case-by-
    case basis. With North Korea posing such a significant proliferation
    threat, it is the United States' desire that the ROK fully participate
    in this initiative.
            iv. ensuring peace and stability on the korean peninsula
        Executing the transfer of wartime OPCON of ROK forces to the ROK
    military in 2012 will result in the U.S. shifting its command and
    control structure from the CFC framework to a new structure. North
    Korean aggression on the peninsula will be met by a fierce ROK military
    supported by American ``life-of-the Alliance'' air and naval centric
    combat power, and ``bridging'' capabilities including; command,
    control, communication, computers (C\4\), intelligence, surveillance,
    reconnaissance (ISR), logistics, theater missile defense (TMD), and
    other capabilities, including appropriate ground power. This evolution
    provides a stronger and more complementary Alliance that is better
    organized to meet ROK security needs and our mutual interests in the
    region.
    Readiness
        As Commander of CFC, readiness is my first priority. It is achieved
    through a robust training, exercise, and evaluation program, adequate
    funding for sustainment, maintenance and logistics, and the
    modernization of our capabilities. In order to be ready and continue to
    deter aggression on the peninsula, our training must evolve and keep
    pace with the transformation of our military structure. USFK faces
    challenges in training range and airspace access. Facilities for our
    air and naval forces exist but scheduling and allocation must be
    improved to fully support combat readiness requirements. We need access
    to a modern and instrumented air to ground bombing range. The ROK
    military is working hard to provide such a range and we appreciate
    their efforts. Current ground maneuver training facilities are impacted
    by expanding civilian encroachment. These issues must be resolved in
    order to meet current and future training requirements.
        Continued support for our capabilities enhancements is also
    critical to our readiness. We have made meaningful progress with
    several of our key focus areas for modernization: joint C\4\, ISR, TMD,
    prepositioned equipment, logistics, and counter-fire and precision
    munitions.
    Training/Exercises
        Today, the theater-level exercises--Ulchi-Focus Lens (UFL);
    Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI); and Foal
    Eagle collectively train over 400,000 ROK and United States Active and
    Reserve component personnel in the critical tasks essential to
    deterring, and if necessary, defeating North Korean aggression. These
    command post and field training exercises use battle simulation
    technologies to train senior leaders in 21st century battle command.
    Combat enablers, such as C\4\ and Intelligence (C\4\I), provide the
    Collaborative Information Environment to plan, execute, and assess
    effects from distributed locations, allowing the CFC to see,
    understand, assess and act to dominate the battlespace.
        UFL focuses on effects based operations, C\4\I, and dominant
    maneuver theater of war skills. The goal of RSOI is to improve our
    ability to rapidly reinforce and sustain operations in the Korean
    theater. Foal Eagle is a tactical-level exercise that hones warfighting
    and interoperability skills. These exercises, supplemented by
    subordinate command training programs, ensure that the Alliance remains
    ready and capable to deter North Korean aggression.
    C\4\ and ISR
        Continued modernization of C\4\ and ISR capabilities is crucial for
    the future of the Alliance. An advance in these areas greatly improves
    our ability to gather, integrate, apply, and share information,
    optimizing the way we fight. Timely and accurate information is a
    decisive element of combat power. United States and ROK forces have
    implemented programs to improve their C\4\ capabilities. These upgrades
    will enable parallel planning for all CFC and USFK units as well as
    other friendly forces. In order to leverage these advances, full
    coordination and implementation is required to ensure interoperability
    and survivability at all command levels. Current initiatives in
    coalition interoperability seek to extend a seamless command and
    control capability throughout the theater that will greatly improve
    multi-national information sharing capability, yet maintain a viable
    U.S.-only capability link with our command authorities.
        Synchronized intelligence operations are critical to any Alliance/
    Coalition effort. The Joint Intelligence Operations Center in Korea
    (JIOC-K) is conducting a comprehensive review of roles, missions and
    functions including national, joint, and coalition responsibilities for
    collection, exploitation, and dissemination. The transformational
    objective for JIOC-K is focused with a purpose to fully integrate and
    enhance the means to quickly detect, identify and report on provocative
    acts, combat preparations, and indicators of potential North Korean
    regime instability. Longstanding ISR requirements exist for Global
    Hawk, Predator and the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar
    System (JSTARS). USFK also faces shortfalls in signals and human
    intelligence collection capabilities. Fulfilling these requirements
    will improve situational awareness and warning time which is critical
    to our defense posture and force protection.
        In September 2006, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
    validated the theater's National Intelligence Support Plan which
    clearly identified the shortfalls and agency requirements to address
    them. Congressional support to address and eliminate these shortfalls
    is essential to ensure the theater is well positioned to execute its
    national responsibilities for strategic warning, to support our ROK and
    U.S. warfighters, and support regional stability operations. I view
    this commitment essential to the effective transfer of wartime OPCON to
    the ROK.
        The ROK is planning to acquire important C\4\ and ISR capabilities
    for its assumption of wartime OPCON. Once operational, these
    capabilities will improve the ROK's ability to make critical crisis and
    combat decisions.
    Theater Missile Defense
        North Korea's missile tests of July 2006 highlighted the importance
    of an active theater missile defense system. It is both prudent and
    necessary for the ROK and the United States to enter into discussions
    regarding appropriate commitments and enhancements that each nation
    should pursue regarding ballistic missile defense on the peninsula. The
    U.S. will continue to protect its capability to conduct reception,
    staging, onward movement, and integration in support of the Alliance
    under our contingency plans. The ROK must purchase and field its own
    TMD system, capable of full integration with the U.S. system. The
    regional missile threat from North Korea requires an active ROK missile
    defense capability to protect its critical command capabilities and
    personnel.
        PAC-3 Patriot Missile System upgrades and improved munitions have
    significantly enhanced our posture. To protect critical U.S. facilities
    in Korea, we must complete upgrading the remainder of our systems with
    advanced TMD capabilities. Continued production of PAC-3 missiles in
    the near-term, followed by continued development of the Theater High
    Altitude Air Defense, Airborne Laser, and Aegis Ballistic Missile
    Defense will provide the layered missile defense capability we require
    for the future. Your continued support remains essential to these and
    other Service component programs that protect our forces on peninsula
    and sustain our ability to reinforce South Korea in the event of a
    crisis.
    War Reserve Materiel
        Logistically supporting USFK is a complex, multi-faceted
    undertaking. The proximity of the North Korean threat coupled with the
    long distances from U.S. sustainment bases requires a robust and
    responsive logistics system. The capability enhancements currently
    programmed will significantly improve our core logistics functions
    through modern pre-positioned equipment, responsive strategic
    transportation, and logistics tracking systems.
        Our Joint Force Support Component Command (JFSCC) is an initiative
    to achieve unity of effort in U.S. logistics. It is a single, unified
    logistics command that directs and integrates our logistics efforts
    across the joint community. The JFSCC demonstrated its value during UFL
    2006 and RSOI 2006 and 2007. We are on track to reach full operational
    capability following UFL 2007. My ultimate goal is to achieve the
    ability to bridge gaps between U.S. and ROK logistics capabilities and
    unify allied logistics, particularly once wartime OPCON is transferred.
        Prepositioned equipment sets, which include critical weapons
    systems, preferred munitions, repair parts, and essential supplies, are
    vital to rapid power projection to reinforce the Korean theater. Of
    note, USFK leadership took an aggressive approach in 2005 to improve
    the readiness of Army Pre-positioned Stocks in Korea. The Army Materiel
    Command significantly increased their workforce for these stocks and
    ensured all equipment in the Heavy Brigade Combat Team (BCT) met
    readiness standards. Headquarters, Department of the Army expects to
    reach 100 percent Equipment On Hand--up from 78 percent--for our Heavy
    BCT by June 2007. However, sustainment shortages still exist and can
    only be overcome through increasing the priority of fill for Army
    Prepositioned Stocks and the commitment of additional funding.
    Strategic Lift
        Responsive strategic transportation--fast sealift ships and cargo
    aircraft--remains crucial to rapidly reinforce the Korean theater and
    sustain U.S. forces. Equally important is the ability to maintain in-
    transit visibility of supplies and equipment with a modernized joint
    logistics C\4\ and information system. Lessons from Operations Iraqi
    Freedom and Enduring Freedom have highlighted several areas where
    relatively small investments in asset tracking systems and theater
    distribution yield significant efficiencies and improve the overall
    effectiveness of our logistics systems.
    Preferred Munitions
        Counterfire and precision strike are core requirements for all of
    our contingency plans. These enablers allow us to change the dynamics
    of a conflict and rapidly achieve campaign objectives. Increasing the
    forward stocks of preferred munitions is vital to operational success
    in the Korean theater. Our priority ordnance requirements include: the
    GPS-guided Multiple Launch Rocket System with extended range
    capability; a ground-launched, extended range, all weather capability
    to defeat hardened and deeply buried targets (HDBTs); precision guided
    munitions; and air-to-ground and air-to-air missiles. Your continued
    support to these programs provides the overmatching capabilities to
    buttress our deterrence.
    War Reserve Stocks Allies--Korea
        We anticipate beginning negotiations on the War Reserve Stocks
    Allies--Korea (WRSA-K) program in 2007. Recent legislation permits the
    U.S. to offer, for sale or concession, surplus ammunition and military
    equipment to the ROK. The sale of these munitions will reduce the U.S.
    stockpile maintenance burden and encourages the ROK to continue toward
    its stated goal of a self-reliant defense posture.
                  v. unc, cfc, and united states forces-korea
        The UNC, the CFC, and the USFK provide dominant military
    capabilities to maintain the 1953 Armistice Agreement, deter any
    provocation and deter escalation that could destabilize the region. The
    forces of these commands provide a potent, integrated team that is
    trained and ready.
    United Nations Command
        As the longest standing peace enforcement coalition in the history
    of the U.N., the UNC represents the international community's enduring
    commitment to the security and stability of the Korean Peninsula. With
    15 current member nations and the ROK, the UNC actively supervises
    compliance with the terms of the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement
    fulfilling the members' mutual pledge to ``fully and faithfully carry
    out the terms'' of the Armistice. UNC will provide a unified and prompt
    response to preserve the security of the ROK if there is a North Korean
    attack. With exclusive authority south of the Military Demarcation Line
    for the maintenance of the Armistice, the UNC meets with the North
    Korean People's Army representatives, inspects South Korean units
    positioned along the demilitarized zone (DMZ), and conducts
    investigations into alleged Armistice violations to prevent minor
    incidents from escalating into destabilizing crises.
        As we move towards transfer of wartime OPCON to the ROK military,
    there is one UNC issue that we must address. In the current
    arrangement, the UNC Commander is ultimately responsible for Armistice
    maintenance, crisis management and resolving Armistice violations.
    However, the ROK military already provides security and surveillance
    over the entire DMZ. As the UNC Commander, I do not have ``peacetime''
    OPCON--no command authority--over the ROK military. This creates a
    mismatch between military authority and responsibility. This mismatch
    is currently mitigated through my dual-hat status as CFC Commander.
    However, this mismatch cannot be mitigated once the transfer of wartime
    OPCON is completed, as the U.S. commander will have no ability to
    command and control ROK forces--the very forces that are arrayed along
    the DMZ--in peacetime, crisis escalation, or war.
        As the executive agent for the UNC, the United States will continue
    to work with the ROK and the U.N. Sending States to ensure that the
    future arrangement--after wartime OPCON transfer--takes into account
    the realities of the new command structure. It is our goal to transfer
    or delegate appropriate armistice authorities and responsibilities to
    the ROK, while ensuring that the UNC remains a critical command in
    deterring aggression, and supporting combat operations should war break
    out on the peninsula. We must also maintain the U.N.-Japan Status of
    Forces Agreement, which provides throughput access to critical Japanese
    air and naval bases for U.S. and U.N. forces, should crisis escalate
    and war break out.
    Combined Forces Command
        Since its inception nearly 30 years ago in 1978, the CFC has been
    the warfighting command of the ROK-U.S. Alliance. Through authority
    based on the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty, the CFC provides the
    cornerstone of deterrence against North Korean aggression, and if
    deterrence fails, stands ready to win decisively. Vigilant and well-
    trained, the CFC is the most powerful combined warfighting alliance in
    the world today. As the commander of CFC, I respond equally to both
    Alliance partners, the United States and the ROK. There are an array of
    effective Alliance mechanisms which allow the two allies to coordinate
    and consult on military matters during peace or wartime.
        We are committed to achieving the goal of a ROK-led defense
    structure. Doing so requires a reshaping of the ROK-U.S. military
    partnership in a manner that will strengthen our Nations' relationship
    while facilitating the ROK's predominant role in its own defense. We
    have agreed to transition our relationship in 2012 from a shared
    operational control system under our combined headquarters (CFC), to
    independent, parallel national command systems where the U.S. assumes a
    doctrinally supporting role to the ROK military. CFC will be
    disestablished. Our Combined Implementation Working Group has been
    charged with developing the construct under which the Alliance will
    function after wartime OPCON of ROK forces has transferred to the ROK.
        We are confident that the overall U.S. security posture in the Asia
    Pacific region, coupled with the improvements in ROK capabilities as
    well as significant U.S. capabilities on the peninsula, will enable
    OPCON transfer to occur with no degradation to the Alliance deterrence
    mission. The ROK is also enhancing its military capabilities as it
    continues to field and upgrade its fleet of K1A1 tanks and multiple
    launch rocket systems. Additionally, it plans to purchase upgraded
    Guided Missile Destroyers with enhanced communications and surface to
    air capabilities; four Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft; and
    enhance its own theater missile defense posture with the Patriot
    missile system. The ROK's new naval base for their 3rd Fleet is also
    operational and includes a recently completed pier capable of handling
    U.S. nuclear powered aircraft carriers.
        The transformation of the Alliance makes it essential that we
    continue to expand our capabilities and revise operational concepts.
    Simultaneous maneuvers, parallel planning, effective coordination,
    effects-based operations, and asymmetrical maneuvers all conducted in a
    dynamic battlespace will improve the lethality of our future Alliance
    military operations.
    United States Forces-Korea
        We are focused on maintaining proper capabilities on the peninsula.
    Our assessment is that ROK forces are capable of defending the ROK, but
    that U.S. support is a critical enabler to that defense.
        In 2004, the United States and ROK Governments agreed to the
    reduction of 12,500 personnel from USFK over a 5-year period beginning
    in 2004. Between 2004 and 2005 we reduced 8,000 troops, including the
    deployment of the 2nd Infantry Division's 2nd BCT to Iraq which was
    subsequently relocated to Fort Carson, Colorado.
        We continue to make progress in re-aligning U.S. forces in Korea.
    In late 2004, the Yongsan Relocation Plan was signed and ratified.
    Under that agreement, U.S. force elements assigned to the Yongsan
    Garrison in Seoul will relocate to Camp Humphreys, near Pyongtaek, over
    60 kilometers southwest of Seoul. The relocation of the 2nd Infantry
    Division is also part of the realignment plan which, when complete,
    will allow United States forces to assume a more efficient and less
    intrusive footprint within two hubs of enduring installations.
    Relocation will significantly improve the quality-of-life of our
    servicemembers, while returning valuable land to the citizens of the
    ROK.
        To date, we have closed 36 installations encompassing over 16,700
    acres with a tax assessed value of over $500 million and returned 30
    installations to the ROK. Along with these camps and in accordance with
    our SOFA, we have transferred free to the ROK the full range of
    buildings, capital assets, and improvements found on these camps, many
    built with U.S. appropriated funds. It remains our goal to close a
    total of 59 facilities and areas--two thirds of all land granted us
    under the SOFA, totaling more than 38,000 acres.
        In exchange for the return of the majority of our dispersed camps,
    the ROK, per our agreements, has purchased 2,800 acres of land required
    to expand the Army's Camp Humphreys and the Air Force's Osan Air Base.
    It is also in the process of purchasing more than 250 acres at the Air
    Force's Kunsan Air Base to accommodate relocation efforts there. We
    have awarded a contract to develop the first 205 acres at Camp
    Humphreys for the Army's fiscal year 2007 construction program.
    Sustained funding for our military construction projects, particularly
    Army construction, coupled with sufficient host nation-funded
    construction by the ROK, is crucial for this plan to remain on track.
        As a vital component of our construction programs, the Army is
    pursuing a range of build-to-lease family and senior officer/NCO
    quarters to be sited at the Camp Humphreys facility. Army forces cannot
    displace to Camp Humphreys until these units are completed. To begin
    build-to-lease construction, the Army needs to gain legislative
    approval for lease authority that provides for the appropriate level of
    purchasing power that is essential to the success of the Army build-to-
    lease program.
    Achieving Normalcy for United States Forces-Korea
        We are approaching 54 years since the signing of the Armistice
    Agreement in Korea. In 54 years, South Korea has transformed from a war
    ravaged country to one of the most modern, progressive, democratic and
    free countries in the world. South Korea is a top flight first world
    country, and highly competitive with the most advanced economies in the
    world. Their medical system is world class, their universities
    renowned, and their industries/businesses are credited with superb
    worldwide innovation and reliability. Historically, the United States
    was willing and anxious to face down the Soviet Union in Europe with
    full family accompanied tours authorized. We willingly took this risk
    in the face of over a hundred divisions of enemy forces equipped with
    hundreds of tactical and theater nuclear weapons. My son was born 12
    kilometers across an inter-zonal border from several Soviet divisions.
    Unfortunately in a modern and vibrant ROK, we still rotate
    servicemembers in and out annually as though this remained an active
    combat zone. We only authorize 2,900 of our current 29,000
    servicemembers force (10 percent) to bring their families to Korea. We
    need to initially double this, then over time provide the facilities
    and infrastructure to authorize full accompanied tours for the entire
    force. Korea is one theater where rotational forces and individual
    short tour rotational servicemembers do not serve our national
    interests as effectively as we need.
        By continuing to execute a 1 year rotational force policy in Korea,
    we are contributing to several debilitating realities. First, we are
    needlessly separating our families from their servicemembers--
    servicemembers who are already relentlessly rotating from their bases
    in the United States and Europe to repeated combat tours. Given the
    nature of the global war on terrorism, most political-military analysts
    predict that the U.S. military will continue rotational commitments to
    combat zones for years to come. We are needlessly contributing to
    increased rotational turbulence by continuing short tour rotations in a
    modern Korea.
        Next, we are complicating the opportunity to develop deep and
    lasting cultural ties with our ally, the South Koreans. While strong
    and enduring, our Alliance with South Korea has been under some level
    of stress for the past several years. Some analysts attribute this to
    individual unaccompanied U.S. servicemembers coming and going annually,
    never having a real opportunity to engage at the family level with
    their Korean counterpart citizenry. As individuals, we are pretty much
    isolated on our base camps. Last, we negatively impact readiness and
    spend too much permanent change of station (PCS) money rotating our
    troops each year. The annual rotation ensures that we have a less ready
    force than we should have. We need to keep troops, leaders, and
    commanders in position as long as reasonable--3 years, and we can
    decidedly save money by extending tours and lessening PCS costs for the
    force.
        With about 2 percent of the active military force committed to
    service in Korea, the United States can easily afford to do what is
    right and endorse normal 3 year accompanied tours in Korea, much like
    we endorse in Japan. I strongly and indeed passionately seek
    congressional support for transitioning to normal 3 year command
    sponsored family accompanied tours for our American force in Korea.
    While there will be some expense which we will amortize over time, our
    Korean ally will shoulder a significant amount of the required
    investment in capital assets, through the Special Measures Burden-
    Sharing Agreement and Yongsan Relocation Plan.
        Having spent 14 years of my military service overseas in Korea,
    Europe, and the Middle East, living and working in both accompanied and
    unaccompanied environments, it is my best judgment and recommendation
    that for the health of our alliances and the Nation's engagement
    strategy, a commitment to a reasonable level of normal accompanied
    tours overseas is decidedly in the best interests of the United States.
    I will soon submit formal proposals to the DOD in pursuit of this
    policy. If and when the budget proposals to resource this policy
    formally arrive in front of Congress, our servicemembers, and their
    families would deeply appreciate your favorable consideration and
    support. The ROK-U.S. Alliance will measurably benefit.
    Ensuring Equitable Pay
        Major improvements have been made in pay disparity in the ROK. For
    the first time in over 50 years of the Alliance, a cost-of-living
    allowance was authorized in 2003. Additionally, the Army and the Air
    Force implemented the Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) Program,
    authorizing a cash incentive for servicemembers who are willing to
    extend their tours in Korea. So far, over 16,000 soldiers and airmen
    have volunteered for AIP, saving the DOD over $78 million in PCS costs.
    Following the great success of the Army and Air Force AIP programs, in
    January 2006, the Navy implemented this program for its sailors. The
    combined effect of reduced PCS costs and increased stabilization is a
    win-win situation. However, while AIP has been a major success, for our
    unaccompanied servicemembers (90 percent of the force), accepting AIP
    means longer separations from family back in the States. Nonetheless,
    the AIP program is a superb success and your continued support will
    help improve the stability, predictability, and operational readiness
    of our force.
    Upgrading and Building New Infrastructure
        The relocation of USFK to two enduring hubs will provide the long-
    term infrastructure that is required to maintain a persistent presence
    on the peninsula. As we move forward with our overall construction
    master plan we must also continue to maintain our existing facilities
    until construction is completed. Your support of our Sustainment,
    Restoration, and Modernization Program requirements, supplemented by
    host nation contributions, will allow us to complete our infrastructure
    renewal program to enhance our force protection posture and the
    quality-of-life for our personnel. The President's fiscal year 2008
    budget request includes Service military construction projects that are
    essential to our forces in Korea, and critical to the execution of our
    overall theater master plan.
        The challenge the Services face in recapitalizing their
    infrastructure in Korea is substantial and we continue to work with
    them to prioritize this requirement. Our facilities and infrastructure
    are old, particularly Army facilities: over one-third of the buildings
    in the command are between 25 and 50 years old and another one-third
    are classified as temporary structures. Due to historically
    insufficient sustainment, restoration, and modernization by the
    Services, many buildings have deferred maintenance, contributing to
    their continual deterioration. Our annual allocations for sustainment
    funding have been about 50 percent of requirements, while restoration
    and modernization funding has been much less. A robust sustainment,
    restoration, and modernization profile for each of the Services is
    absolutely essential if we are to maximize the appropriated military
    construction dollars we receive. Without the investment to sustain,
    restore, and modernize our facilities, our servicemembers, especially
    Army soldiers, will be perpetually relegated to live and work in run-
    down, dilapidated, patched-up facilities.
        Many of our servicemembers continue to live in extremely
    substandard housing, whether in military facilities or in crowded urban
    areas outside our installations. Our realignment to two enduring hubs
    will allow us to focus on improving living and working conditions. To
    this end, sustained access to several different funding programs will
    be essential, including United States military construction, host
    nation-funded construction, and commercial build-to-lease programs.
        The Services are working towards achieving the DOD's goal to house
    all unaccompanied USFK servicemembers in adequate installation housing
    as soon as possible. The Army and Air Force are using military
    construction to build unaccompanied housing facilities at the Army's
    Camp Humphreys, and the Air Force's Osan and Kunsan Air Bases. In
    addition, we recently completed two host nation-funded construction
    projects in our southeast hub to provide adequate barracks space for
    our marines and sailors assigned to Camp Mu Juk in Pohang. To improve
    the unaccompanied senior enlisted and officer quarters, the Army has
    contracted a commercial build-to-lease project at K-16 Air Base and
    plans similar projects at Camp Humphreys.
        For fiscal year 2008, the Army is requesting $57 million in
    military construction funds to build two additional barracks complexes
    at Camp Humphreys. I strongly support these projects as essential and
    request your support.
        I am particularly supportive of the Army's requirement to meet our
    national commitments in realigning Army forces from Seoul and north of
    Seoul. For example, the Army is pursuing build-to-lease opportunities
    to meet housing requirements at Camp Humphreys. Build-to-lease provides
    a quality, cost effective housing option and I strongly support the
    Army's pursuit of this effort to leverage private capital. Our current
    lease cap authority does not allow us to keep pace with the high cost
    housing market in Korea. The Army is aggressively seeking your support
    to ensure that our lease cap authority delivers the appropriate
    purchasing power to enable the build-to-lease program to succeed. I
    strongly support the Army's efforts to meet our housing requirements,
    and also ask for your favorable and expeditious approval of our
    legislative proposal to establish the necessary lease cap authority for
    build-to-lease. Continued support for family housing construction in
    Korea through commercial build-to-lease projects will help ensure
    quality housing for all our servicemembers' families. Again, this
    program is essential to the Army's efforts to relocate Army forces from
    north of, and in Seoul, to south of Seoul, and supports national
    agreements the U.S. Government has concluded with the ROK. Unless we
    receive timely approval for lease cap authority adjustments, it will be
    extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the Army to synchronize its
    construction program in Korea with ongoing burden-sharing building
    efforts by the Korean Government on our behalf.
    Good Neighbor Program and Mandatory Theater Specific Required Training
        The Good Neighbor Program is a USFK hallmark for fostering
    harmonious relations between our servicemembers and the ROK citizenry.
    The key pillars include community relations programs, Korean cultural
    awareness programs and ROK-U.S. military-to-military activities. Some
    examples include: servicemembers and their families teaching English to
    Korean children, volunteering in orphanages, and assisting with
    humanitarian projects and conservation efforts; Korean families
    inviting servicemembers to their homes to experience Korean hospitality
    and participate in cultural tours; and commanders hosting local
    government officials to orient them to the military mission. It is our
    hope that the Good Neighbor Program will improve the understanding and
    support of the Korean community for the strategic mission of USFK and
    effectively demonstrate the respect of USFK servicemembers for the
    laws, history, culture, and customs of the ROK. If we are authorized to
    increase our family accompanied tours, the effectiveness of the Good
    Neighbor Program will increase dramatically.
        In addition to the Good Neighbor Program, USFK instituted a
    Mandatory Theater Specific Required Training program for all arriving
    personnel to the ROK. This training--for example in personnel safety,
    prostitution and human trafficking, and sexual assault--not only
    facilitates accomplishment of our assigned missions, but also ensures
    that servicemembers conduct themselves in a manner that is compatible
    with and respectful of ROK culture and law. Commanders are responsible
    for validating the completion of all required theater specific
    training.
                                     safety
        Our well-being is a function of safe training and personal conduct.
    While we recognize that we operate in a hazardous military environment,
    units that aggressively embrace risk management and personal
    intervention with their servicemembers routinely have superb safety
    records. The majority of our serious accidents, incidents and deaths
    occur during off-duty periods. This fact requires the chain of command
    to aggressively engage with its individual servicemembers, and
    positively impact their personal behavior. At USFK, we call this
    process ``Under the Oak Tree Counseling'' through which first line
    supervisors gain a verbal behavior contract with their subordinates
    before each lengthy off-duty period. Through the combined efforts of
    our men and women, we employ appropriate safety measures to ensure that
    all members stationed in the ROK can go about their daily lives knowing
    that we have done everything possible to safeguard and protect them. I
    expect commanders to empower subordinates while holding them
    accountable for the safety of their soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
    marines.
    Prostitution, Human Trafficking, and Sexual Assault
        USFK has zero tolerance for prostitution and human trafficking
    (P&HT). To ensure members are fully aware of our policies regarding
    P&HT, the command has initiated a four-pronged approach focusing on
    awareness, identification, reduction and enforcement. This initiative
    has had a positive effect for the command. In January 2006, a DOD
    Inspector General (IG) team visited USFK as part of an Evaluation of
    DOD Efforts to Combat Trafficking in Persons (TIP). In their report,
    the inspection team praised USFK for aggressively attacking the problem
    of TIP at the ``strategic, operational, and tactical levels,'' and
    further stated that ``the USFK anti-TIP program continues to set the
    standard for DOD efforts to combat TIP.'' In addition to DOD's USFK
    visit, the USFK IG completed several comprehensive inspections of
    command policies and climate relevant to prostitution and its links to
    human trafficking. Recommendations from both DOD and USFK IG
    inspections continue to be incorporated into the command's strategy.
        The Command's initiatives are equally important in combating sexual
    assault. USFK has developed and implemented education programs for
    training our leaders and servicemembers on awareness and prevention of
    sexual assault. The foundation of our USFK program is a 40-hour,
    centralized and certified Victim Advocate and Sexual Assault Response
    Coordinator training program. This training stresses sexual assault
    risk factors and victim care. To date, our program has focused
    primarily on awareness and response. We are currently developing a
    Sexual Assault Prevention Program that meets research based criteria
    for addressing individual attitudes, behaviors and perceptions that
    place servicemembers at risk for victimization and perpetrating sexual
    assault.
        I will continue to be vigilant in enforcing the sexual assault
    prevention programs and zero tolerance approach adopted by the command.
    Promoting dignity and respect are of the utmost importance and a
    mandate we fully embrace within USFK.
          vi. strengthening the alliance and investing for the future
        The ROK and the United States have stood side by side on the Korean
    Peninsula nearly 57 years. We have shed blood together in freedom's
    cause. This relationship, first forged on the battlefields and
    sustained through the years by the courage and efforts of Korean and
    American servicemembers, stands as a testament to the principles of
    freedom and friendship. If we are going to continue to assist in
    securing peace and stability in Northeast Asia in the future, it must
    continue. In pursuit of this, we must recognize that the ROK is
    prosperous, democratic and largely self-reliant. As such, our
    relationship must evolve. Both sides are committed to this
    transformation which will enable future generations to continue to
    enjoy the benefits of our Alliance.
        Your continued support is greatly appreciated and will ensure that
    we achieve our transformation objectives by providing our forces with
    the resources needed to deter aggression and foster peace and stability
    on the Korean peninsula and in the region. I am proud of the soldiers,
    sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians serving in the ROK. I know you
    are too. Through their daily dedication and performance, they continue
    to earn the trust and confidence that you have placed in them, while
    serving upwards of 8,000 miles from home. We owe them and their
    families the very best working, living, and training environment, and
    we should do everything feasible to give it to them. Thank you.

        Chairman Levin. General, thank you so much.
        Admiral Olson?

    STATEMENT OF VADM ERIC T. OLSON, USN, DEPUTY COMMANDER, UNITED
                   STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

        Admiral Olson. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members, thank
    you for the opportunity to appear before you today to report on
    the posture of SOFs. On behalf of my boss, General Brown, I
    thank you for the great support that you've given to U.S.
    SOCOM, it has been significant and its impact has been
    powerful.
        With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I've submitted our
    written posture statement for the record.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Admiral Olson. U.S. SOCOM is celebrating its 20th
    anniversary this week. The command was created by Congress to
    organize, train, and equip SOFs with Service-like Title 10
    authorities, and a separate budget, to develop and acquire
    Special Operations' peculiar material, supplies, and services.
        The wisdom of Congress in so doing has paid significant
    dividends for 2 decades, but especially in the past few years,
    as SOFs proved their agility, innovation, and value in the
    chaotic wars of Afghanistan and Iraq and the emerging terrorism
    and related activities in the Philippines, Colombia, and many
    other places, primarily in those places to return again in
    assistance operations.
        U.S. SOCOM is guided by three enduring priorities. Success
    in our ongoing campaign against terror and terrorists, ensuring
    the readiness of SOFs today and in the future, and taking care
    of our Special Operations warriors and their families, for the
    key to Special Operations success continues to be the
    individual Special Operations operator.
        In Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, SOFs
    conduct direct action missions every day and every night, to
    capture or kill terrorists and violent insurgents, but perhaps
    more importantly, SOFs are conducting indirect operations
    worldwide, that are crucial to building a global environment
    that shuns terrorism and embraces stability and security.
        We know that we cannot kill or talk our way to victory, our
    actions must demonstrate our values, and be convincing locally,
    regionally, and ultimately, globally. It is essential that we
    develop the meaningful relationships with coalition partners
    that will enable access for building their capabilities and
    capacity, and encourage them to resolve threats within their
    own borders.
        U.S. SOCOM has been directed to plan and synchronize
    Department of Defense (DOD) global activities against terrorist
    networks. In collaboration with U.S. agencies and other
    governments, we are maturing into a fusion point for
    operations, intelligence, and strategy that enables SOFs to
    work with our partners in an unprecedented fashion. This has
    been a complex effort, but with the help of Congress and DOD,
    SOCOM is building the infrastructure processes and
    relationships that will enable collaborative operations.
        Current and anticipated future demand for SOFs exceed the
    supply. We are growing our force at a rapid pace, but one that
    enables us to maintain the high standards that have served this
    Nation so well.
        In fiscal year 2008, U.S. SOCOM will grow by about 6,300
    personnel to more than 54,000 military and civilians, including
    over 6,100 in our Reserve components. We will add nearly 1,900
    personnel in Army SOFs that provides Special Forces Battalion,
    3 ranger companies, and nearly 800 additional civil affairs,
    psychological operations, and support personnel.
        Naval Special Warfare will add about 400 personnel. Air
    Force SOCOM will grow a predator squadron, and establish a
    distributed common ground system.
        Last year, we established the Marine Corps Forces Special
    Operations Component (MARSOC). Currently at about 1,500 people
    and on track to expand by nearly 550 in fiscal year 2008.
        Our rate of growth is about what we asked for, and what we
    can sustain without sacrificing quality and readiness. The
    additional manpower is not to relieve stress on SOF or add to
    the numbers already deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq, but
    increase SOFs' presence in the areas of the world where we are
    now underrepresented. It's important to sustain a balanced
    force as we grow, so we must retain our experienced people as
    we train new accessions.
        Two years ago, DOD approved retention initiatives for our
    senior enlisted operators, and in 2005 and 2006, over 1,100 of
    our people with 19 or more years of experience committed to
    stay with us until at least their 25th year.
        Our overall fiscal year 2008 budget request is $6.2
    billion, an increase of just over $1 billion from fiscal year
    2007. This includes a request of $676 million in military
    construction (MILCON) funding, nearly double our request last
    year, in order to fund 36 projects that focus on training and
    operations in support of that Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)-
    directed growth.
        As we grow in personnel and infrastructure, we are also
    closely monitoring the status of our equipment, with special
    focus on our airframes that are operating at a tempo that is
    higher than originally projected. The fiscal year 2008 budget
    includes aircraft procurement that will help us sustain and
    reset our aviation fleet. The budget includes a buy of five CV-
    22s, which are the soft variant of the Osprey. It continues to
    fund the replacement of center wing boxes on our MC-130 Combat
    Talons and AC-130 gun ships, it adds six non-standard aviation
    assets to support Special Operations airlift requirements
    worldwide, by enabling SOF operating in remote locations that
    are not serviced by reliable and safe commercial aviation, and
    recapitalize our aging helicopter refueling fleet. We will
    purchase components required to make the SOF modifications to
    four additional tanker aircraft.
        SOF warrior systems remain a high priority for U.S. SOCOM.
    We will buy body armor, helmets, weapons, ammunition, night-
    vision optics, individual and squad-level radios, and other
    items that optimize success while minimizing casualties.
        U.S. SOCOM was fully engaged in and well-served by the QDR
    process. The QDR's emphasis on irregular warfare capabilities
    contributed to a SOCOM fiscal year 2008 program that supports a
    careful balance of direct and indirect activities around the
    world. We continue to closely monitor the challenges of a
    growing force and aging equipment, and we keep our eye on
    emerging requirements. With the support of Congress, we are
    well-postured for continued success.
        I thank the members of this committee for your continued
    support for the past 20 years, today and into the future.
        I'd be happy to answer your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Olson follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman Levin. Admiral Olson, thank you so much.
        We'll start with an 8-minute round of questions for the
    first round.
        We've heard a lot, and before this committee, about the
    lower basic readiness of our non-deployed forces, and the
    problems that that creates in terms--in many ways, including a
    lack of strategic depth--that puts in your hands, some real
    significant operational risk. I'm wondering whether each of you
    would describe the readiness challenges that you face. Is there
    a lower readiness level in our non-deployed forces, and what
    problems does that create for you? What are the implications,
    long-term and short-term, of these lower levels of readiness
    for your command?
        Admiral, let me start with you.
        Admiral Keating. Mr. Chairman, we look at that carefully,
    as you would expect us to. It would--for us to execute the
    plans, should we be required to do so, not be as elegant, it
    would not be quite as timely, and we would shift our focus from
    certain service-specific capabilities to other Services where
    there are not the draw on those forces--Navy and Air Force, in
    particular, is not as significant as is for the Army and the
    Marine Corps.
        But, it's our assessment that we can respond in a timely
    fashion, should we be required to on the peninsula or elsewhere
    throughout our AOR. We are gradually increasing assets such as
    ship and land-based preposition equipment, we would rather have
    the rate of replenishment for precision-guided munitions
    increased, but there are plans from the Services to address
    each of those shortcomings.
        So, in the shortest answer I can give you, Mr. Chairman, is
    we can respond, if necessary, we would shift some of the
    capabilities to other Services that aren't quite as strapped,
    and the risk is not insignificant, it has increased over time,
    but we are still able to respond.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        General Bell?
        General Bell. Thank you, sir. I agree with Admiral Keating,
    and would amplify in Korea. My requirements for forces are
    initially air- and naval-centric, and I will tell you, Senator,
    that the ability of the Air Force and naval aviation, and naval
    surface combatants and subsurface combatants to respond to my
    requirements is quite high, and I'm very satisfied with that,
    and I exercise it routinely.
        I am not as satisfied, to say the least, with Army ability
    to respond, or Marine Corps ability to respond. The really good
    news in the ROK, is however, that we have a terrific ally with
    a great military, and their strength happens to be their Army
    and their Marine Corps. Their 560,000 men, Active-Duty Army is
    first-class. I've rung that thing out from top to bottom, and
    so we have an environment there, where this idea of
    interdependency in coalition and combined warfare, is a
    reality; it's a great success story.
        So, for our war plans in Korea, the greatest challenge that
    we see in the U.S. military today, which are real and complex,
    do not affect me to the degree that it might in other areas
    where U.S. ground forces are required immediately to a combat
    area.
        So, I am concerned about U.S. ground force readiness, it
    does play in my op plan, however, with the ability of air and
    naval forces to respond being quite good, I am quite confident
    that we can exercise our op plan.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Admiral Olson?
        Admiral Olson. Mr. Chairman, U.S. SOCOM and by law, the
    Commander of U.S. SOCOM, is responsible for the combat
    readiness of SOFs. We are a force provider, unlike other
    combatant commands, and in that role, General Brown and the
    rest of the Command pay great attention--it's our highest
    priority--to ensure that the forces are, indeed, ready.
        The data that is reported by each of our units has been
    consistent for about 5 years. The measurable readiness of the
    force has neither increased nor decreased significantly, as
    we've gone through what we've been through recently.
        Now, the data reports both the technical readiness against
    a discrete set of standards, and it permits the commanders to,
    in their own words, state their readiness for war. The
    readiness for war has increased, as the measurable standard has
    stayed the same. That's because the Command is focusing on a
    mission that is facing us most directly.
        There is a decreased time between deployments that impacts
    the ability to train on the plethora of other things that SOCOM
    forces should be training on, because they've just taken a
    lower priority in preparing for the fight in which we are
    engaged.
        Among those things is language training, which you
    addressed in your opening remarks. We are at an operations
    tempo where we have spelled our commands that are regionally-
    oriented to CENTCOM with commands that are regionally-oriented
    to other parts of the world. That, then, causes a decrease in
    language readiness.
        But, in general, the skill sets and the readiness of the
    equipment are steady, or slightly improving, in recent years.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Admiral Keating, there was a recent New York Times article
    that discusses the debate, allegedly, within the administration
    as to whether the United States could have taken some action to
    address the Chinese anti-satellite weapon test last January.
    Are you familiar with that article?
        Admiral Keating. I am, sir.
        Chairman Levin. In your view, since it's alleged that we
    knew in advance that that test was going to be launched, was
    there such a debate as to whether or not we should meet with
    the Chinese and explain to them what our concerns were?
        Admiral Keating. Senator, I don't know if there was or not.
    I wasn't in the PACOM when that information was apparently
    available. In the job that I had, we would have been interested
    in that discussion, because of requirements I would have had at
    NORTHCOM, and I was not aware at that time of those
    discussions.
        Chairman Levin. All right, General Bell, let me ask you
    about North Korea and its alleged highly-enriched uranium (HEU)
    program. Last February, this committee heard testimony that
    indicated that the Intelligence Community may be reassessing or
    have reassessed the level of confidence that it has about
    whether North Korea has or had a HEU program, and I'm wondering
    whether or not you are aware of any assessment or re-assessment
    relative to that level of confidence about a HEU program in
    North Korea and more specifically, has there been any change in
    our intelligence assessment since the November 2002 NIE on that
    subject?
        General Bell. Yes, sir. I think we all know that we have
    clear evidence and admitted evidence of the transfer of
    centrifuges from the A.Q. Khan network in Pakistan several
    years back, with some small number of centrifuges, that would
    enable the development of a HEU program, along with other
    technologies. The several engagements that the United States
    has had with the North Koreans and their own self-professed
    discussions on this gave us at one time high confidence that
    they were seeking to develop a HEU program to complement their
    plutonium program that they get from their plutonium they get
    from their reactor.
        Since those days, about 5 years ago, the proclamations and
    the evidence of a continuation of a HEU program have been
    sparse. The latest unclassified estimates that I've seen, and
    that I'm aware of, are that we have confidence that this
    program still exists, and that we intend to make it a part of
    the Six-Party Talks process, and that the expectation is during
    Phase 2 of the Six-Party Talks, should we get into Phase 2,
    that the declaration of the North Koreans of a HEU program, or
    not, will be made, and that they will give us access to that
    program--us being the international inspectors--to verify and
    validate what they have been doing in HEU, and then we would
    expect them to disable that program, like we expect the other
    programs to be disabled.
        So, I have no evidence today that the HEU program in North
    Korea has grown any, and I think our Intelligence Community's
    assessment is that they still have a program, that we have
    confidence that they have a program, and it's now up to them to
    declare their program, and allow the inspectors to get in there
    and determine the extent of it, and then in good faith take
    that program apart, as part of the denuclearization effort.
        Chairman Levin. Just to conclude here, the level of
    confidence that we expressed at the time was a high degree of
    confidence.
        General Bell. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Has that level of confidence remained the
    same?
        General Bell. It is my understanding from the Intelligence
    Community that it is a moderate confidence level today.
        Chairman Levin. Would that be a lesser level of confidence?
        General Bell. It would be less than high, yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Is it less than what existed at the 2002
    estimate?
        General Bell. My assessment is that it would be.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you. Thank you very much.
        Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to just ask a quick
    follow-on question to your important line, and then the balance
    of my time go to Senator Martinez who has to depart.
        You know that the North Koreans committed to do a 60-day
    deadline for meeting the initial steps. Now, that failed to
    take place. What's your own feeling, professionally, of that
    breakdown in what, otherwise, was an orderly process outlined,
    and how does that impact or not impact the security
    relationships, which is your prime responsibility?
        General Bell. Thank you, Senator Warner.
        First, the Six-Party process is a solid process with the
    right verification regiments in it, and I think our diplomats
    did a masterful job of negotiating a reasonable approach to the
    requirement to denuclearize North Korea. You're exactly right--
    60 days from the signing on 13 February of this agreement, the
    North Koreans were to have shut down their reactor at----
        Senator Warner. Yongbyon.
        General Bell. Yes, sir. Shut it down, and allow the
    International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors in there. During
    this process, they raised the issue of the frozen funds in the
    Banco Delta Asia, which is not technically a part of the Six-
    Party Talk process. The United States agreed to un-freeze those
    funds, and we did. Those funds are available to the North
    Koreans to withdraw.
        There are complexities for them and the international
    banking community in affecting that withdrawal, apparently. I'm
    certainly not a banker, but I will tell you that there are
    complexities, but nonetheless, it is clear to me that those
    funds are available to be withdrawn, and can be--in my view--
    fairly quickly by the North Koreans, should they choose to do
    it. They have not.
        We're now almost 2 weeks beyond the 60-day point. The North
    Koreans appear to want to assure themselves access to the
    international banking community, and I believe there is concern
    by themselves, and the international bankers, that if a normal
    transfer of funds is made from the Banco Delta Asia to other
    banking entities, that those entities could become liable for
    violating a series of sanctions.
        So, what the diplomats are trying to work out is a way for
    North Korea to gain access to its funds without all of the
    other banks in the international community, without their help.
        So, the process has not broken down. The funds are
    available. The North Koreans have articulated continued good
    faith in this. I believe, sir, that it is acceptable that we
    give them more time to sort out the physics of how they will
    get this money. They are not experienced in international
    banking. With all of the restrictions, and proper restrictions,
    that are placed on illicit funds activities, this is no small
    matter for them.
        So, I think we should give them a little longer, and see
    how it works.
        Senator Warner. That's clear, and I think our country
    deserves credit; it has led these Six-Party Talks and I think
    they've been successful, I share your views. The U.S. has acted
    in good faith, as has the other members of the Six-Party Talks,
    and it's up to the banking community, and I hope it will work
    out.
        Senator Martinez, would you pick up on that, the balance of
    the time?
        Senator Martinez. Thank you, Senator Warner, I appreciate
    your kindness and deference. I wanted to ask Vice Admiral Olson
    a couple of questions, first to congratulate you on your 20th
    anniversary, and tell you how delighted I know all of
    Floridians are that you are headquartered in MacDill in Tampa.
    I know Senator Nelson shares that joy with us, so we're glad to
    have you in Florida, and we appreciate your presence there.
        Admiral Olson. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Martinez. I wanted to ask--one of the things that
    we always are concerned here, particularly in the current
    posture that we are, is recruitment and retention, and wonder--
    particularly in your forces, which requires special endurance,
    expertise, and skill, and everything else--how that picture is
    shaping out, and how we're doing on retention and recruitment?
        Admiral Olson. In a nutshell, Senator, it's shaping out
    okay. We are growing at the rate that we optimistically
    predicted that we could, and our optimism is proving to be
    well-founded.
        We did invest previously in the training infrastructure,
    especially the Army side, and so they had the instructors and
    the classrooms in place to absorb the greater input. We've
    grown an additional battalion of recruiters for SOFs, they've
    been successful. We have more input into Army Special Forces
    this year than we've ever had. The infrastructure--just as an
    example--that we did invest in a few years ago, enabled us to
    increase our annual through-put of Green Berets, Special Forces
    Operators, from about 300 a year to nearly 800 2 years ago. So,
    if that trend continues--and we have every reason to believe it
    will--we'll be in pretty good shape, Army-wise.
        Navy SEALs are a little bit tougher, recruiting-wise, but
    the Navy has given SEAL recruiting its number-one priority this
    year, and invested an awful lot of energy, and a good deal of
    money into recruiting SEALs.
        The statistics that I saw this week show that we have about
    between 30 and 40 percent more sailors eligible to commence
    SEAL training this year than in any previous year. That
    includes a readiness rate, and just the physical fitness test,
    for example, whereas at boot camp, those who volunteered a
    couple of years ago were passing the fitness test at a 17
    percent rate, now those who are volunteering are passing at a
    70 percent success rate.
        So, we will start more SEAL trainees this year than ever
    before, and the motivation week--often called ``Hell Week''--
    which is a crucible of SEAL training, the last two classes have
    been the two largest classes to finish Hell Week in recent
    memory.
        Air Force Combat Controllers and Para-Rescue Jumpers,
    again, a small, but very important and hard recruit-for element
    of our force, have made changes in their recruiting and in
    their pipeline training processes that are showing about the
    same level of success, so again, we expect that we will
    graduate more Combat Controllers and Para-Rescue Jumpers from
    the Air Force than ever before.
        Aviation--both Army and Air Force--is always tough, but we
    don't recruit people to be aviators, we recruit aviators from
    the Services to be Special Operations Aviators, so that's
    something that is very carefully negotiated with the Services
    in terms of what they are willing to let go from their needs to
    meet ours. But, we're having some success with that as well,
    sir.
        So, back to my opening nutshell, I think we are very okay,
    and we are optimistic, but what we don't know is the long-term
    impact of what is happening, yet. So, we are trying to collect
    the data and do the studies regarding recruiting and retention
    to ensure that we can stay ahead. The response generally
    follows the data, and the data follows the reality. We're
    trying to be predictive in that, so that we can stay ahead.
        Senator Martinez. Thank you. I hope it continues to be
    encouraging.
        I want to also have you update me on the progress of the
    timeline to move the Army's 7th Special Forces Group to Eglin
    Air Force Base.
        Admiral Olson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Martinez. Where it is at the moment?
        Admiral Olson. There are environmental impact concerns now,
    largely related to the stationing of the J-35 Strike Fighter at
    Eglin Air Force Base, which has probably delayed our move of
    the 7th Special Forces Group from Fort Bragg to Duke Airfield
    in the Florida panhandle by up to a year. We're expecting now
    fiscal year 2010 movement. Originally, we had programmed fiscal
    year 2009 movement.
        Senator Martinez. Any facilities needs that you are needing
    that relate to that move that are not currently being met? Are
    the facilities at Eglin adequate for what you need?
        Admiral Olson. No, sir. They're not adequate now, but
    they're in our program to be adequate.
        Senator Martinez. Admiral, I wanted to ask of you, relating
    to the Chinese Navy and if you could forecast for us where you
    see their development and, into a Bluewater Navy, and how
    quickly you think that they're evolving into that type of a
    Navy?
        Admiral Keating. Thank you, Senator. The Chinese Navy is,
    they're pretty good and getting better in terms of equipment.
    They have participated with us in a couple of relatively
    rudimentary search-and-rescue exercises, inaugural events for
    our Navy to participate with their Navy. Their skills in those
    exercises were average. These are fairly simple exercises,
    Senator, and their equipment is increasingly impressive.
        They're building some of their own naval vessels, and they
    are buying others, principally from Russia. So, we watch them
    very carefully, we are exercising with them on an increasing
    basis, both in terms of numbers of exercises, and complexity of
    exercises, but they are nowhere close to as capable as our
    United States Navy. We see their growth rate as not being
    insignificant, in terms of capability and equipment, but they
    are a long, long way from challenging us in the maritime
    domain.
        Senator Martinez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
        Senator Ben Nelson.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Keating, the first question regarding the United
    States progress in the global war on terror, in your AOR, is
    the current approach to fighting the global war on terror the
    correct one, in your opinion?
        Admiral Keating. It is, sir.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Part of the success of this global war
    on terror depends on how the world perceives it, and in your
    AOR, what is the perception of the battle, our battle in the
    war against terror?
        Admiral Keating. I believe, Senator, the perception is
    balanced on the part of our allies throughout the Pacific
    Region, it is a challenge for us in the long-term. There are
    schools of thought that suggest that throughout the tens of
    millions of Muslims in Malaysia and Indonesia, and India, in
    particular, those three countries, that there is a perception
    amongst the rank and file that our efforts may be shifting very
    gradually--the United States efforts from a global war on
    terror to a global war on Islam, and if that's accurate, in our
    view, that would be unfortunate.
        So we're trying to shoot ahead of the duck a little bit
    here, and moderate those opinions if they are, in fact,
    developing by increasing our engagement in those countries, in
    particular, and working across the interagency, in particular,
    with our embassies on a strategic communications plan that
    would, to the best of our ability, offset those potential
    changes in perception.
        Senator Ben Nelson. On a scale of 1 to 10, what would you
    give our chances of being successful in changing the attitude
    toward our efforts?
        Admiral Keating. Seven, Senator.
        Senator Ben Nelson. That high.
        Admiral Keating. Well, if I could amplify, sir.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Go ahead, sure.
        Admiral Keating. I was just in Malaysia, I don't know, 10
    days ago, let's say. My first visit to that country, it's an
    amazing place, and growing in a hurry. A vast majority, in the
    high 90 percentile, of the Muslims in that country are very
    much disenchanted with the radical Jihad Muslim movement. But,
    that's not to say that they're not ever-so-slightly skeptical
    of United States efforts in the Middle East.
        So, it is incumbent on us, in my view, based on my one
    visit to Malaysia, to take that number that I just gave you,
    about seven, and try and move it further to the right, and I
    think we are capable of doing that, not just PACOM, much more
    importantly, in the inter-agency effort led by the State
    Department.
        Senator Ben Nelson. General Bell, what are your thoughts
    about that same effort?
        General Bell. Thank you, Senator.
        Where I sit in Korea, we have a very small, but real,
    Muslim population. However, we have no Islamist terrorist
    activity that has been directed at either the Korean Government
    or U.S. interests.
        There is some concern there that there could be, we do
    track the movement of known names in this arena to make sure
    that we're doing our force protection business correctly.
        I think the real issue for me in Korea is, does our ally,
    in this case, Korean ally or any of our allies, do they stand
    by us in this global war on terror and are they contributing?
    Do they see this threat similar to the way we see it? I would
    offer to you that the citizens of the ROK have demonstrated
    their perspective of this by supporting the contribution of
    troops from the ROK both to Iraq and Afghanistan.
        They have also committed a new force to Southern Lebanon,
    and it will be going into Southern Lebanon this summer. About
    350 soldiers to be part of the peacekeeping force there in the
    Middle East, so the ROK, through the engagement strategy that
    the United States has pursued for the last 50 years with that
    great ally of ours, is standing beside us and contributing real
    capability in real places that matter to the United States as
    we pursue this.
        So, I believe, as General Keating said, that engagement
    with our allies, making certain they understand the risks to
    the world that radical, fundamentalist Islam poses, and how it
    ought to be dealt with on a global basis, is paying off in some
    sectors. Certainly, I think, it is for us in the Pacific.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Admiral Olson, your take on this?
        Admiral Olson. Sir, SOFs in the course of a given year will
    go to about 100 different countries. We wake up most days in 45
    or 50. The nature of those deployments is most often to train
    with counterparts in those nations, we're there by invitation,
    and we work at the small unit level. Most often our deployments
    are in single-digits of people, or low double-digits for a
    finite period of time, measured in single-digit weeks, in a
    specific location for a specific training purpose.
        So, the people that we train with are generally focused on
    either their next deployment as coalition members into
    Afghanistan or Iraq or the surrounding nations, or their
    concerns about the security of their own borders, and the
    rising terrorism threat within their nations.
        There is a general concern that as the balloon has squeezed
    in CENTCOM, there will be increased terrorist activity
    elsewhere in the world, in places that are less governed. So
    that is on the minds of many of the nations that we train in,
    sir.
        Senator Ben Nelson. What about language training? Is your
    language training adequate, General Bell?
        General Bell. Certainly where I deal with our ally, our
    language training is adequate. We have a very aggressive Korean
    language program.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Yes, of course.
        General Bell. We do not pursue an Arabic or Islamic
    training program, but I know that language training across the
    Army is a challenge, we struggled coming out of the Cold War to
    shift our language training efforts to more applicable areas,
    particularly the Middle East. Those shifts have been made, it
    takes years to make a good linguist.
        I've learned now from the last 4 years of overseas duty,
    both in Europe, in NATO, and now in the ROK that at the basis
    of the relationship with any foreign country is our ability to
    speak their language, and their ability to speak ours. It is a
    huge multiplier in the investment that's required by our
    Nation, in language training for our servicemembers, and quite
    frankly, across the other interagency activities of our
    Government, is a vital component of our ability to prosecute
    security initiatives across the world.
        So, we're doing well on Korean training, but I would not
    tell you that we're there yet on the kinds of training that we
    need to secure our Nation in the future.
        Senator Ben Nelson. That's after 50 years plus.
        Admiral Keating, what is your take on this as you look
    toward a broader command?
        Admiral Keating. I would echo General Bell's statement,
    although I think Admiral Olson's probably best qualified of the
    three of us to address specifics for SOFs, but in the Pacific
    theater, we capitalize, to the extent that we can, on American
    citizens who have family roots in the countries in our AOR, and
    that is a significant source of language capability for us, and
    I know the Services are actively concentrating on determining
    what those capabilities are in the individual joining the
    Service, and trying to capitalize on those.
        A lack of language ability does not adversely affect our
    readiness, Senator. So, that's a negative way of putting it, it
    can affect our plans based on the capabilities that we have.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Finally, Admiral Olson? You have a much
    broader range, array of requirements.
        Admiral Olson. Yes, sir, we do. We study many more
    languages, we have different structures and some advantages
    over the big Services in terms of the way that we manage our
    language programs, it has been a high priority for us for many,
    many years.
        But all that said, the answer to your question, is it
    adequate? It's still not adequate. It's a perishable skill you
    have to keep at a language over and over and over, classroom
    study is only part of the answer to being proficient in a
    language, and on the scale of one to five by which languages
    are typically measured, it requires a proficiency level of
    three to really be functional to the point where you can
    instruct and interact and converse in another nation.
        So, we don't have as many as three speakers and above as we
    would like, we're striving to get there, we have instituted
    enhancements to our language programs across all of our forces,
    but it's a continuing struggle, sir.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen.
        Senator Reed. Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a comment to
    commend our colleague from Nebraska about raising this rather
    delicate and complex issue about the term of global war on
    terrorism. More and more we find that that, for some reason, is
    being misunderstood as a broad indictment against the Muslim
    religion and the Muslim world, when in fact, the terrorists are
    but a minute fraction.
        I noticed that the House Armed Services Committee under the
    leadership of Chairman Skelton has looked into this issue.
    Great Britain, likewise, has begun to examine it, and I think
    your answer on this question--your response, Admiral Keating,
    is very cogent. I personally am going to try and work through
    this issue and try and figure out what we should do on it.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Admiral Keating, just briefly--you've, in the past, noted
    that North Korea's weapons of mass destruction program does
    present threats to us, and that as Commander of Northern
    Command (NORTHCOM), you were in command of the Ground-Based
    Missile Defense System, our basic missile defense system.
        Now, you're in the Pacific, that is your AOR--how important
    is it that we keep up with the threat, and that we deploy a
    ground-based system, and sea-based systems, in your opinion,
    today?
        Admiral Keating. It's crucial, Senator.
        Senator Sessions. Admiral Keating, and maybe Admiral Olson,
    we've had some very good success as advisors to the Philippine
    military as they have confronted violent terrorist groups in
    the Southern Philippines. Many have suggested that's a model
    for us in the future about how to fight terrorism. Let me ask
    you, do you think that's so? Would you share basically your
    thoughts, each one of you, as to how we've been successful
    there and what lessons we can learn from that?
        Admiral Keating. Senator, you're right. The work being done
    by our Special Forces in the Pacific training the Philippine
    Armed Forces has resulted in significant setbacks for
    terrorists and the criminal elements that would support them,
    and it's a pretty fine line, sometimes there's no distinction
    in that part of the world, Senator.
        Senator Sessions. But, there was direct connections between
    that group and al Qaeda in the Philippines.
        Admiral Keating. That's correct.
        Senator Sessions. This was clearly an international
    terrorist group.
        Admiral Keating. No question about it. Progress has been
    significant. Again, the pace is not breakneck, but it is
    quantifiable nonetheless. There have been less incidents of
    terrorism throughout that particular part of the world, not
    just Southern Philippines, but Indonesia and Malaysia, and not
    just land-based terrorism, but maritime terrorism, as well.
        So, the progress has been measurable, the model--it has
    application throughout our AOR. I would let Eric comment as to
    whether or not the train-the-trainer system is applicable in
    each and every case, but we find it is very effective in our
    particular theater, Senator.
        Senator Sessions. Admiral Olson?
        Admiral Olson. Senator, I agree with Admiral Keating. This
    is a train-and-assist mission in the Philippines that
    incorporates a number of other disciplines like civil affairs
    and psychological operations activities. We are living with the
    Filipino Army, our operations have a Philippine face on them,
    the people in the local areas are crediting the Philippine
    Government for the goodness that is coming from the activity,
    we are assisting the Filipinos with medical programs, dental
    programs, veterinary programs, school-building programs, and
    those things, so for us, it is a form of counterterrorism in
    irregular warfare.
        Basically, it largely is a humanitarian assistance mission,
    coordinated by their government. It is absolutely a model. It's
    a model that doesn't apply everywhere, but it's a model that we
    ought to apply wherever we can.
        Admiral Keating. Senator, I remembered something else.
        Senator Sessions. Yes.
        Admiral Keating. If I could add--an important aspect of
    this, as those smaller nations' militaries get better at
    counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, they will work more
    closely with each other, without our prodding or our assisting.
    That is a significant benefit, I think, to us, as our Forces
    can now, literally stay out of the equation, as let's say,
    Malaysians and Filipinos work closely together to enhance
    maritime and land security in their respective countries,
    without direct assistance from the United States. That is a
    very positive benefit of the train-and-assist program.
        Senator Sessions. I think that's the first step, and
    basically we did that in Afghanistan--we had SOFs when the
    Taliban fell, that's in 2000--would that be right, Admiral
    Olson? In Afghanistan when the Taliban collapsed?
        Admiral Olson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. We were working, allied with indigenous
    forces. In the Philippines we work with the Government of the
    Philippines. These terrorist groups are tough, tough fighters,
    and they know how to attack these governments, and with a
    little help, sometimes these governments can be effective in
    defending themselves, rather than us carrying the burden.
        General Bell, you mentioned the build-to-lease situation in
    Korea. You're moving away from the demilitarized zone (DMZ)?
        General Bell. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. Further south, which makes good sense.
    The Koreans are funding a substantial portion of that. They've
    been a terrific ally. But we do need to build and the way they
    do in that country, a build-to-lease system--would you explain
    to us what we get if we do that? Why it might cost a little
    more than you would think necessary upfront, but in the long-
    run why we would be a winner to take advantage of this
    situation?
        General Bell. Thank you very much, Senator Sessions.
        In my 38 years of military service, and 14 years overseas,
    I have rarely seen the confluence of what we might say is a
    normal building program with national policy and strategy, but
    I have that facing me now in Korea, and I think, the Nation
    does.
        So, this is a reasonable question, and I'd like to spend
    just a moment answering it, because it's really important to
    the United States.
        ROK is a terrific ally. We've had some issues with our
    allies, certainly in the last 10 years we've worked through all
    of those, they have become a First World country. This is the
    10th largest economy in the world. The notion of M*A*S*H and
    Korea is something for the movies. We land in Korea now, you
    have to search for an airport because it is likely that there's
    a high-rise, 80-, 60-story building right there. This is a
    modern First World country with all the trappings of the most
    advanced nations in the world. So they've been expressing a
    level of independence, and God bless them for that.
        This is a great success story for the United States of
    America, in coming to the aid of an ally who was war-ravaged,
    and helping them for the long-haul to get on their feet and to
    become a major world power.
        So, in that regard, it is now time for us to turn over more
    and more of the security responsibility of the ROK to the
    Koreans, and with our guaranteed support, as a reliable and
    trusted ally.
        Part of that is an agreement that the two nations have made
    at the senior administration level, to move our forces from
    north of Seoul, and in Seoul, to south of Seoul, thus ensuring
    that the South Koreans are responsible for dealing directly
    with a threat along the DMZ, and second, getting our forces,
    literally, out from under artillery range, and last, allowing
    us to consolidate at efficient hubs, instead of these
    oftentimes pathetic little enclaves where we are still living
    and working.
        The South Koreans have spent an enormous amount of money
    already helping us with this move. They bought 2,800 acres of
    land next to a place called Camp Humphreys, South of Seoul, for
    $1 billion--bought it, from the local citizens. It's there
    where we want to do this expansion.
        They've agreed to spend over $4 billion in military
    construction--the Koreans have--at their expense, to facilitate
    our move, to build the buildings we need. They've agreed to
    allow us to use levels of burden-sharing money to facilitate
    these operations.
        We've agreed, hopefully, to do one thing, and that is,
    build family housing for the currently authorized members of
    our servicemembers who have their families in Korea today. This
    isn't about normalization in the future, it's about our current
    family housing, and some housing for senior noncommissioned
    officers (NCOs), and officers at this place called Camp
    Humphreys. So, we want to do it through a build-to-lease
    program.
        We've asked Congress in this year's National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 to raise the lease cap
    that we legislatively are faced with right now, to empower us
    to deal in an economy that is a First World economy, and has
    experienced a growth in the standard of living and the cost of
    living. Quite frankly, sir, the lease cap that we have right
    now, legislatively, does not attract an investor to do this
    work.
        If we get the lease cap raised in the legislation this
    year, then we'll be able to meet our end of the bargain, and
    that is putting up 2,800 sets of quarters, both family, senior
    NCO, and officer barracks to meet our end of what has been a
    very good deal for the United States of America. Billions and
    billions and billions of dollars--maybe as much as $6 to $7
    billion--spent by our ally and something dramatically less than
    that to be spent by the United States to make this move.
        So, to make a long story short, I think that this is one
    case where a build-to-lease project--and I did build-to-lease
    in Germany, just before I went to Korea. Build-to-lease there
    was all about us. Build-to-lease in Korean is all about the
    alliance, and it's about our partnership and our future
    commitment to each other, and it's about our people.
        So, I strongly, sir, ask for support of Congress to raise
    that lease cap so that we can meet our obligation. We can't
    move to Camp Humphreys unless we have a place where people can
    live, and we've agreed to do that, and it does take
    congressional support, sir, and I would appreciate it.
        Senator Sessions. I think you're exactly right. I visited
    Korea several years ago, and was very disappointed in the
    quality of housing that our soldiers have in those camps, some
    of them had leaking roofs and Quonset huts from the 1950s and
    we were losing personnel from the military who got assignments
    there.
        Now, we've already made some progress, and this move could
    really create a much better standard of living.
        General Bell. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. We do end up with the property after the
    lease period extends.
        General Bell. We do.
        Senator Sessions. We end up owning it, and don't have to
    make the payments anymore, and the cost of living in South
    Korea is as high as any place in the world, or most places. I
    think this is good advice, and thank you for your leadership.
        General Bell. Sir, it's a good point, if I could just add
    on--this is a 15-year lease, that is congressionally mandated,
    it used to be 10 years, it was raised to 15. But after 15
    years, we retain use of that property, free, and don't have to
    pay lease on it anymore, if we keep it 100 years. So, I realize
    that we do budgets here year to year, and what you're going to
    tell me is going to be good for me 15 years from now, that may
    not be our immediate problem, fiscally, here today, but for
    sure, on the 16th year that our servicemembers live in those
    quarters, we're not going to be paying a lease payment, but
    we're still there.
        Senator Sessions. We're going to end up reducing our number
    of personnel in Korea, and I believe we can end up giving them
    much better quarters, and that would be a major step for us as
    a Nation, and thank you.
        General Bell. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
        Senator Akaka.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to welcome our witnesses this morning, and I want to
    thank you and your families for the long years of service that
    you've given our great, great country.
        Admiral Keating, I want to say Aloha to you, good to have
    you there, even for 4 months in Hawaii and in the Pacific, and
    I hope that your transition there with you and your family has
    been smooth. I want to wish you fair winds and following seas
    in your work there at PACOM.
        Admiral Keating. Mahalo.
        Senator Akaka. You know that a great deal of attention here
    has been given to Iraq and to Afghanistan, but we need to look
    at the Pacific as having special interests of security there
    for our country as well, and that the Pacific is another front
    of the war on terrorism. So, we're glad to have you there.
        Admiral Keating, in your written statement, you stated that
    there is a single facility in PACOM in your AOR for tactical
    access to the Defense Information Systems Network. What
    concerned me is you indicated that if this facility were
    damaged during an attack or natural disaster, there is no
    backup, no redundant capability to restore PACOM's
    communication requirements for the war on terror or the
    Ballistic Missile Defense or even the execution of the standing
    operations of PACOM.
        Admiral, what is the situation there about on that? Is
    there really no backup system to that?
        Admiral Keating. Senator, as best I can describe, there is
    a single point of failure for the system, and I'm happy to
    provide you classified information for the record.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [Deleted.]

        Admiral Keating. The single point of failure--it's not like
    an on-off switch, however, this is a large facility in your
    State through which certain kinds of communications--not all
    communications--but certain kinds of communications upon which
    we rely, but we're not dependent on them, would those forms of
    communications pass through this large facility.
        There are other ways of moving the information. It is not
    as timely, and on occasion they can be less secure. But it is
    not so critical that if there were to be, let's say, a tsunami
    that would wipe this very large, complex, well-fortified
    facility, off the face of Hawaii, we would not be prohibited
    from conducting our operations.
        So, it is a single point of failure for standing
    communications systems. We have backups that are less
    effective, and less efficient, and consequently not desirable,
    but we could use them if we had to.
        Senator Akaka. Can you tell me, or any one of you, whether
    there is a similar problem in other commands or AORs?
        Admiral Keating. There are similar challenges, Senator, the
    work-arounds they're not so elegant, in some cases it's
    literally using cell phones instead of classified systems, but
    if the situation is sufficiently grave, that's what we'll do.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you.
        Admiral Keating. All of the other combatant commands.
        Senator Akaka. Admiral Olson, as indicated in SOCOM's
    posture statement, SOCOM is a lead combatant command for
    planning and synchronizing, and when directed, executing global
    operations against terrorist networks in coordination with
    other combatant commanders.
        One of the pieces of the integrated approach to the global
    war on terror described in your posture statement is that
    actions are being taken to attack the roots of terrorism and
    eliminate its further growth.
        Admiral Olson, how is this strategy being implemented in
    countries like Syria and Iran?
        Admiral Olson. Sir, SOCOM is the DOD lead for planning and
    synchronizing DOD activities in the global war on terror and as
    you said, and when specifically directed for executing those
    activities.
        In many of those activities, we're in a supporting role. We
    support State Department or another agency of Government in
    conducting many of those activities. We are embedded in the
    country teams of many embassies, as an example, to provide
    psychological operations support, or some military information
    support kind of activities. We're supporting rewards for
    information programs, those sorts of things, and of course,
    we're training with our counterparts around the world. Again,
    several dozen nations per year where we train with our
    counterparts, and that has a direct local impact on how they
    view the United States and the skills that they bring to the
    fight, if they're engaged in it.
        In a country like Syria or, obviously, in Iraq, we're there
    in fairly large numbers, and we are conducting the full range
    of Special Operations activities. Most of our forces in Iraq
    are not engaged in direct action activities every day and
    night--most of them are training with their counterparts in the
    Iraqi armed forces.
        There is a SOF Brigade, for example, within the Iraqi Army
    that has been raised, in a sense, by U.S. SOFs and we've seen
    them go from following us onto the targets, to leading us onto
    the targets. From us being the largest number, with a few of
    them, to them being the largest number with a few of us. That
    is the kind of activity that we synchronize and coordinate.
        Again, well beyond direct action into theater security
    cooperation activities, if they are directly involved in the
    global war on terror, then U.S. SOCOM has some responsibility
    for working with each of the combatant commands to coordinate,
    synchronize those activities for maximum effect.
        Senator Akaka. Admiral, in particular, how is this strategy
    being used with the sectarian grievances between the Kurds and
    the Sunnis in Iraq?
        Admiral Olson. Sir, the synchronizing global activities in
    the global war on terror does not apply directly to the
    sectarian violence. We are supporting the Iraqi armed forces.
    We are working with the Iraqi armed forces, and training with
    the Iraqi armed forces as they are directed by their
    operational commanders on target. So that aspect that you're
    addressing is not directly applicable here.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Akaka.
        Senator Webb.
        Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Keating, I want to pick your brain a bit, but first
    I have a question I would like to ask Admiral Olson.
        There have been a number of reports, Admiral Olson, in the
    media that individuals on Active Duty under your command use
    Dragon Skin body armor. The Marine Corps recently joined the
    Army in banning the use of Dragon Skin body armor. Can you
    confirm whether personnel under your command are wearing Dragon
    Skin body armor?
        Admiral Olson. Sir, I can't say absolutely whether or not
    they're wearing them. I'll tell you that Dragon Skin is not a
    U.S. SOCOM program, and if it's being worn, it's being worn
    without the authorization of SOCOM leadership.
        We have a program, the Signal Processing, Evaluation, Alert
    and Reporting (SPEAR) program that develops and procures
    Special Operations peculiar body armor for all of our forces.
    We've bought close to 30,000 sets of SPEARs body armor and
    issued that to all of our force.
        Senator Webb. Right, so if there are individuals wearing
    Dragon Skin, it is not authorized, is that correct?
        Admiral Olson. I will take that for the record, sir, in
    terms of specifically whether or not we have prohibited it. It
    certainly is not a SOCOM program, we do not invest in Dragon
    Skin armor.
        Senator Webb. I understand that. The question is whether
    it's authorized if someone purchases it on their own. This is a
    point of contention among a lot of families with people who
    have sons and daughters in the Army and the Marine Corps,
    whether or not this is a type of body armor that is better than
    the traditionally-issued body armor, and whether or not people
    are allowed to wear it. But, I'd appreciate it if you could let
    us know, and please not on a 60-day for the record kind of
    deal. It should be a pretty easy thing to find out, and I'd
    appreciate it if we could get that information.
        Admiral Olson. Certainly.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The only body armor authorized for use by Special Operations Forces
    (SOF) is the SPEAR body armor system procured by the U.S. Special
    Operations Command (USSOCOM).
        The prohibition on use of non-SPEAR body armor pre-dates formal
    testing of ``Dragon Skin'' and was intended to prevent SOF operators
    from wearing body armor of unknown quality. The U.S. Army's formal
    evaluation of Pinnacle Armor SOV 3000 (Dragon Skin), conducted May 5-
    19, 2006, determined that this system failed to meet both Army Service
    and SOF standards.
        A survey of USSOCOM's component commands conducted last week
    verified that no Special Operations unit is purchasing ``Dragon Skin''
    body armor, and that no unit commander permits the wearing of privately
    purchased ``Dragon Skin'' body armor.
        In our continuing quest to provide the highest quality protective
    equipment, we will conduct another full and open competition for
    ballistic plates. The contract will be a 5-year Indefinite Delivery
    Indefinite Quantity. The award is anticipated for 4th quarter fiscal
    year 2007. Pinnacle and other vendors will be able to compete for this
    new contract.

        Senator Webb. Admiral Keating, I'd like to talk to you a
    bit about national strategy in this region, not simply military
    strategy. We don't get many opportunities to discuss all the
    components as they fit together. I have a lot of time in this
    part of the world, first as an Active-Duty marine, as a
    military planner, as a journalist, as a business person, I've
    been over there as a Government person, I've been there as a
    guest of different governments, and very rarely with Americans,
    which has made it a very unique experience over the past 10
    years or so to watch the emergence of China.
        In fact, not just China--ironically, I was in Japan in 1998
    when the Koreans shot the missile nearby, and I was in Japan
    again in 2002 when former Prime Minister Hashimoto announced
    here that they knew, the Japanese knew that Korea had gone over
    the line in terms of nuclear capabilities.
        I have a real concern that with all of the focus that we
    have spent for a good bit of time on the Middle East that we
    have been ignoring clear danger signals that come from the
    strategic emergence of China for the past 20 years. I've been
    talking about the conscious strategy of the Chinese with
    respect to the Muslim world. It was hard to get people to even
    listen, say, 15 years ago on this.
        We've spent a good bit of time talking about China's
    historic strategic interests in Korea and Northeast Asia,
    Taiwan--although Taiwan really is only one small part of the
    concerns we should be looking at, even militarily, in that part
    of the world. Half of East Asia is Muslim--Mindanao, Malaysia,
    Indonesia--and China pushed very hard for years in South Asia,
    and the strategic axis clearly in Southeast Asia, because it
    was directly in their interest, but in South Asia, also,
    partially because it destabilizes the United States.
        They were partnered up, in many ways, with Libya, they
    enabled Pakistan to acquire nuclear weapons, or Chinese
    companies under a governmental system like that. They were
    partnered up with Iran when I was Secretary of the Navy in
    1987, in terms of weapons systems.
        We've given them a free pass, as we spent so much national
    energy in and around Iraq, for nearly 20 years now. I see them
    as, in terms of national strategy, when you look at the subtle
    combination of diplomacy, economic policy and military policy--
    I see them having been enormously effective when we've been
    tied down, and some of this is pretty specific.
        I think I mentioned to you when you were meeting with me
    before your confirmation hearing about the port facilities that
    are in Pakistan? The ones that I personally saw in Myanmar
    several years ago. An hour outside of Yangon there's a huge
    port facility that the Chinese have built that was basically
    empty at the time, but was giving them warm water access. I
    mentioned on a number of occasions the Shikoku Islands where we
    can look at Taiwan, but you can see they're constantly wanting
    to, or at least in our perception, is that they're wanting to
    push the envelope even beyond Taiwan and toward the Ryukyus,
    and I'm just really interested, and to the extent that you are
    monitoring this incremental but, I think, pretty palpable
    expansionism, and what your thoughts are in terms of national
    policy, what we should be doing about it.
        Admiral Keating. It is a concern of ours at PACOM, Senator.
    The growth that China is--they manifest this growth, and as we,
    at the PACOM move through our region, a mantra that we hear is
    ``The United States proposes, China pays,'' for whatever
    facility upgrade, military, diplomatic, doesn't so much matter,
    they come along and start stroking checks, and that is not, of
    course, specific just to the PACOM.
        With that in mind, that leads to a desire of ours at PACOM
    to integrate this national strategy, national strategic
    strategy, with our military strategy, and not spend all of our
    time just in China working with China, but to move throughout
    the region to consult with our embassies in larger and smaller
    countries.
        Vietnam is an example, I just spoke to Ambassador Marine
    this morning, and he mentions the growth that Vietnam is
    demonstrating economically, and improvements in human rights.
        All the while, they have a very wary eye to the North, and
    so it seems to me by working with, on bilateral and
    multilateral bases with countries throughout the region--not
    specifically to counter Chinese intentions, or even progress,
    but so as to keep those other countries apprized of our
    assessment, to engage with them, militarily, diplomatically,
    politically, economically, we provide an effective hedge--an
    increasingly effective hedge, against what may be actual
    Chinese expansionist policies or, more specifically, Chinese
    military intentions to move beyond, as you say, just the Taiwan
    Straits into a bluewater capacity.
        So, we're not going to concentrate exclusively on China, we
    will spend time and effort throughout the region so as to
    develop stronger relations, enhance security, build military
    and diplomatic relationships, with an eye toward this hedge
    against Chinese expansionism.
        Senator Webb. But I would suggest to you that there are two
    levels of approach on this that could be effective--and I do
    agree with you, in terms of the danger of flagging this as
    overt expansionism, which it's not--it's a national strategy
    that we need to counter. I think your predecessor, Admiral
    Fallon, did a really fine job in terms of attempting to engage
    the Chinese, that's one piece of it. The second piece of it
    would be a really strong push in these so-called ``second
    tier'' countries that don't, historically, have the kind of
    connection that can now be developed. It's either going to be
    developed, or they're going to see the United States recede in
    the region, this is what I hear, and Vietnam is a good example.
        Admiral Keating. Right.
        Senator Webb. I was in Vietnam a year and a half ago, and
    one of the pieces of news in the Vietnamese press was that the
    Vietnamese, the South Koreans, and the Japanese have agreed to
    open visa arrangements, similar to what we have in the European
    Union, or when we go into Thailand. I would think that that is
    a subtle way that they are communicating with each other that
    they have a commonality of interests that is in some ways
    directed at what is happening to the north, and how it needs to
    be counterbalanced.
        Admiral Keating. Right, agreed.
        Senator Webb. Thank you for your testimony.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Webb.
        Senator Warner, you have additional time, would you like to
    take it now?
        Senator Warner. Thank you. I just want to do one follow-on
    to my distinguished colleague's question. Admiral Keating, as I
    look at your portfolio, you probably have more diplomacy in
    your portfolio than most of our commanders abroad. I want to
    say, particularly, Senator McCain had hoped to be here this
    morning, given his heavy investment in this region over many,
    many years, and that of his fathers and forefathers. So, I'll
    just ask unanimous consent to put into the record his
    statement.
        Senator Reed. Without objection.
        [The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain
        I join Senator Levin in welcoming Admiral Keating, General Bell,
    and Admiral Olson, and in thanking them for their service to our
    country.
        Admiral Keating and General Bell, the Pacific area of
    responsibility (AOR) presents enormous opportunities and challenges for
    the United States. Among those challenges, the most immediate is the
    situation on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea's nuclear and missile
    programs continue to pose a threat to its neighbors and to America's
    interests in East Asia. It remains to be seen whether the February 2007
    agreement by the six parties will ultimately lead to a denuclearized
    Korean peninsula; and whether North Korea is truly committed to a
    complete accounting of its nuclear program, materials, and facilities;
    and to complete denuclearization with effective verification--the
    essence of any lasting agreement. Pyongyang has, regrettably, already
    missed the first milestone for inviting in International Atomic Energy
    Agency inspectors and sealing the Yongbyon reactor. We must proceed
    cautiously as we observe in the weeks ahead whether Pyongyang will take
    the initial steps toward disarmament, including shutting down the
    reactor. In the meantime, Pacific Command and United States Forces-
    Korea play a vital role in providing stability and deterrence in
    support of this diplomatic effort.
        Admiral Keating and General Bell, we look forward to hearing your
    assessments of the situation on the Korean Peninsula, including any
    changes you have seen over the past year in North Korea's military
    posture, and your assessment of North Korea's nuclear program,
    ballistic missile and proliferation activities, and the readiness of
    our forces to respond to any possible developments on the Peninsula,
    both now and in the future.
        Admiral Keating, Pacific Command (PACOM) plays a critical role in
    sustaining and expanding the U.S.-Japan strategic alliance, the
    cornerstone of our security umbrella in northeast Asia. PACOM and the
    Commander of U.S. Forces Japan must keep up the robust level of
    dialogue and ensure elements of our relationship, such as the Defense
    Policy Reform Initiative, remain on track. There are a number of ideas
    circulating about the ways in which we can strengthen our already
    robust bilateral ties with Japan, such as the recently released CSIS
    ``Armitage II'' report.
        Admiral Keating, I look forward to your assessment of China's
    military modernization program and plans, to include China's continuing
    build-up of missiles across the Strait, and the impact of China's
    military modernization on U.S. interests in the region. I would also be
    interested in your assessment of the current state of China-Taiwan
    cross-Strait relations, which remains at the core of U.S. interests in
    the region. Beijing's regional and global aspirations are growing, and
    properly managing this relationship is vital.
        In the Asia-Pacific region, the global war on terrorism is being
    waged in Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, and
    other nations. I look forward to an update on the efforts of your
    command to counter the numerous terrorist and transnational threats in
    your AOR.
        Fortunately, the United States does not face these challenges
    alone. One of the vital responsibilities of the PACOM commander is to
    work closely with our key allies in the region--Japan, South Korea,
    Australia, to name a few--to strengthen bilateral relations and to
    develop multilateral approaches and responses to the challenges and
    opportunities that we face in the U.S. PACOM.
        Admiral Olson, this year marks an important milestone for United
    States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) because the command will
    celebrate its 20th anniversary. I, and all Americans, recognize the
    magnificent performance and rich heritage of SOCOM's members, past and
    present. We honor their contributions and sacrifices for the defense of
    our Nation and are conscious that now, more than ever before in that
    illustrious history, we are relying so heavily on Special Operations
    Forces.
        U.S. SOCOM is simultaneously the lead combatant command for
    planning, synchronizing, and executing global operations against
    terrorist networks; conducting demanding, specialized, and sensitive
    missions in hostile areas; performing foreign training and security
    missions with partner nations; and undertaking a transformation of
    unprecedented scope.
        This morning the committee will be interested in the readiness of
    SOCOM, your progress in transformation; the growth in size of SOCOM;
    the establishment of the Marine Corps SOCOM; your ability to attract,
    recruit, and train servicemembers at the quantity, and of the quality,
    required to sustain this growth; and the sustainment of language and
    cultural training in light of heightened operational tempo. In
    addition, in closed session, the committee will be interested in your
    assessment of efforts to locate the al Qaeda senior leaders.
        We welcome our witnesses this morning and look forward to their
    testimony.

        Senator Warner. Thank you very much.
        I think following on to my colleague's question on China, I
    think integrating China into the global community is a strategy
    we should also look at. That would involve, in my judgment,
    trying to explore a framework of more military-to-military
    dialogue, more transparency and coordination with China on a
    number of things.
        Now, I think China was a very stable and major contribution
    to the Six-Party Talks. Admiral Fallon and I, and other members
    of the committee, and throughout his distinguished tenure he
    tried to push that. I hope that you'll continue and maybe
    increase the momentum.
        This is such a fragile world in which we live now, and an
    incident can trigger unanticipated consequences. In the most
    intense part of the Cold War, I remember Senator Nunn, the
    chairman of this committee, and I worked on putting together a
    hotline of communications with the Soviet Union, and prior to
    that I had a modest hand in establishing the Incidents at Sea
    Talks, whereby given the friction between the intelligence-
    collecting elements of our surface fleets and some of our air
    units, we were coming perilously close to having an incident.
    Indeed, we did experience one with China, accidental though it
    may have been, it was a very difficult one to work our way out
    of.
        Do you see a reciprocal interest in China to try and
    develop themselves somewhat along the line of the Super Power
    structure that the Soviet Union once had, and how that was a
    value to the United States and the Soviet Union to avoid
    conflict during the intense Cold War period?
        Admiral Keating. Senator, we do. Since I've been in the
    Pacific, I have learned to my pleasant surprise that there is
    more ongoing than I would have thought. As an example, there
    are 90 different events that involve an exchange of officers or
    senior enlisted currently on the books for fiscal year 2007. I
    would not have guessed it, and that's obviously, almost two a
    week.
        So, there is dialogue at all levels, and I think that is of
    profound importance. It's not just the old grey-haired guy who
    shows up in Beijing to spend 3 or 4 days in high-level
    conferences. We have soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines at
    various levels who are developing the contacts with their
    counterparts in China that could go a long way to diffuse a
    situation that historically will develop.
        In two predecessors removed from the Pacific Commander,
    from where I currently sit, when the incident occurred, we did
    not have phone numbers to call counterparts, something as
    fundamental as that. You raised the issue of a hotline, we're
    actively exploring that, we now have literally the phone
    numbers on military bases which we didn't have 5 years ago.
        So, exchange programs, robust--we're going to improve them
    and enhance them--exercises, we have a very slow approach in
    terms of quality, we are going to increase that, we are going
    to be as aggressive as we can, Senator, and we will increase
    the visits that we conduct, and welcome them into our
    headquarters as well.
        Senator Warner. I would hope, for example, on this, it's
    one thing to have a pocketful of phone numbers, but we actually
    had a telephone right on the desk of the Secretary of State and
    I think it was Secretary of Defense, that phone went direct,
    instantaneously.
        Admiral Keating. We're working with them to develop that
    very capability.
        Senator Warner. I would hope so.
        Then, again, the framework for the Incidents at Sea, was a
    very effective one.
        Admiral Keating. Right.
        Senator Warner. These are the sort of measures. We have to
    recognize China is emerging. Clearly, we are going to try and
    maintain a certain measure of superiority as it relates to the
    relationships of arms, I think we've covered that, but I
    believe that China will reciprocate if given the proper
    opportunity to do so.
        Admiral Keating. Yes, sir, I agree.
        Senator Warner. Now, address the current status of the
    Taiwan situation. We have the Taiwan Relations Act. But
    sometimes tempers flare over there, and in such a way that it
    could trigger unintentional consequences. I hope Taiwan
    recognizes what has been discussed here this morning, that the
    United States of America is heavily engaged, militarily,
    worldwide. We do not need another problem in that region. So, I
    hope they don't try and play the Taiwan Relations card to their
    advantage.
        Could you give us the current assessment that you have on
    that situation?
        Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.
        Senator, it's my assessment that I'm very confident that
    Taiwan, they understand our position, they understand how
    emphatically we emphasize to them that their actions should be
    defensive in nature, not offensive, and that we remain
    committed to helping them provide for their defense, but it is
    very much in their interest not to conduct themselves, either
    by speech or by action, in a way that could be misconstrued by
    China in an unfortunate way. As it happens, Taiwan is
    concluding a significant military exercise on their island
    right now, we have observers there, and I will be back at our
    headquarters tomorrow to take a full debriefing.
        Senator Warner. Fine, point well made.
        My last question is regarding the normalization on the
    North Korean peninsula. Surprisingly, we simply have an
    armistice that's been in place since, what--1953, 1954?
        General Bell. 1953, sir. Fifty-four years ago.
        Senator Warner. I've had some modest relationship with that
    part of the world, having served in the Marines during that
    war.
        General Bell. Yes, sir, I know.
        Senator Warner. Isn't it time that we try and move towards
    a treaty to resolve such uncertainties that linger in
    connection with an armistice as the protocol in place, versus a
    treaty? Do you see an initiative following on to these Six-
    Party Talks to go to that level to bring about a cessation of
    tensions on the peninsula?
        General Bell. Thank you, Senator Warner.
        Certainly, 54 years is a long time, you're right. The good
    news is that containment and deterrence have worked very
    effectively to allow that area of the world to grow and
    prosper, and give North Korea an opportunity to join the free
    community of nations, and it has chosen not to do that. You're
    right, it still has a large army, and a dangerous army,
    postured along the DMZ, which could --with a little provocation
    and almost no warning--launch a strike into South Korea. It
    would not be successful, I will tell you that. But it could,
    because of the density of the population of South Korea, cause
    enormous damage.
        Senator Warner. Damage, not only to South Koreans, but U.S.
    interests and personnel.
        General Bell. Big time. Yes, sir, indeed. So, it's in
    everybody's interest to solve this 54-year old problem, and
    certainly the armistice was never set up to be a permanent
    condition, it was always meant to be a forum to separate the
    warring parties, to allow neutral nations to observe and report
    on the now stood-down parties, and give the diplomats a chance
    to find a lasting peace. Whether that's reunification, or
    another regimen, that was the duties of a range of diplomats at
    those times, and we've not had success.
        North Korea has been an intractable opponent.
        Senator Warner. Where we are now, and there's been a
    successful Six-Party Talks, it seems a logical follow-on might
    be that initiative, and I hope our country would take it.
        General Bell. It could be, and I hope so.
        Senator Warner. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Warner.
        Senator Bill Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Keating, I want to ask you
    about the effect of the China anti-satellite (ASAT) test, but
    before I do, I just want to make an editorial comment. That
    what they have done with this test is put up thousands and
    thousands and thousands of pieces of debris, and the Air Force
    is tracking 1,700 pieces of large debris which--any one of
    which would be a catastrophic failure--large debris more than 3
    centimeters--on any kind of spacecraft.
        In addition, there are tens of thousands of pieces of
    debris that are greater than one centimeter up there as a
    result of this ASAT test. A piece of debris greater than 1
    centimeter would do significant damage to any spacecraft, and
    would be lethal if hitting an extra-vehicular activity suit
    while an astronaut is out on an extra-vehicular activity,
    space-walk operation.
        So, I'm going to take every opportunity that I can to call
    attention to this, and it just all the more makes me wonder, as
    a result of the New York Times article yesterday that discusses
    the debate that went on within the administration as to whether
    or not the U.S. should have warned China ahead of their launch
    of this ASAT test that they should not do it.
        What's your view?
        Admiral Keating. The ASAT test was an unsatisfactory
    demonstration of technological capability, in my opinion,
    Senator. In my position at NORTHCOM I was certainly aware of
    the challenges attendant to the introduction of debris in
    space, you'd be more familiar with what it's like up there than
    anybody here, but our friends at Air Force Space Command
    assured me that these objects, albeit almost microscopic, are
    lethal.
        The policy discussion as to some sort of declaration to
    China prior to the launch is one in which I would have engaged,
    and I would have recommended a very strong declaratory policy
    to China on the part of the United States Government against
    launching that technological demonstration. I would have
    recommended against China launching it, and expressing that in
    very strong terms to China.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I wish whoever made that decision
    would have listened to you, and I agree with you. I think we at
    least ought have warned them, and particularly, when you start
    talking about tens of thousands of pieces of debris that can
    not only harm our assets, and including the international space
    station, but that can harm the assets of other nations that are
    up there.
        A total of 10 percent increase in total debris in space, as
    a result of that one Chinese ASAT test. China ought to be held
    to account for it.
        Admiral Keating. I agree, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. It was at an altitude that this stuff
    isn't going to degrade for years, at least a decade.
        Let me ask you, if the administration had taken the advice
    of folks like you, and warned China ahead of time, do you think
    China would have not conducted the ASAT test?
        Admiral Keating. Senator, I don't know.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I don't know, either. But, we'll never
    know, because nobody ever said it.
        Well, let me ask you----
        [Audience interruption.]
        Senator Reed. The committee will suspend--ma'am, can you
    please sit down so we can conduct the hearing. Thank you very
    much.
        Senator Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. By the way, in the Strategic
    Subcommittee that Senator Sessions and I were leading the other
    day, I saw some ladies standing up in the back, and I insisted
    that some of the gentlemen in the audience give the ladies a
    seat. I was raised to think that if there's a chair that you
    don't have a lady stand up. Well, low and behold, one of the
    ladies was one of the ones that stood up and interrupted the
    session, of which I reminded her, I was the one that enabled
    her to have a seat.
        So, anyway, this is America, and this is what we're here,
    to try to understand the cross-currents of all kinds of ideas,
    and develop Government policy.
        Let me ask you, Admiral Keating, does the Chinese ASAT
    test, does it change your thinking in planning and strategy in
    the Pacific?
        Admiral Keating. It has not yet, Senator. Beyond my
    commitment to discuss it with appropriate officials when I
    visit China. As far as execution of plans and policy, we have
    not made any changes since I've been in the Pacific.
        Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright had a planned visit
    to China to visit his counterpart, and it was cancelled as a
    result of the January ASAT test. Do you think that we ought to
    be rescheduling this trip? What about our military-to-military
    contacts with the Chinese? Should they continue, and should
    they be expanded?
        Admiral Keating. I believe they should continue, and I
    would endorse expansion, Senator.
        Senator Bill Nelson. All right. I've asked you some tough
    questions, Admiral, and I want you to know I appreciate the
    candor of your remarks.
        Admiral Keating. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. You also are very candid with me in
    private, as well as public, and I want you to know I appreciate
    that.
        Admiral Olson, we know the problem that we're going through
    regarding the wear and tear on our conventional forces as a
    result of Iraq and Afghanistan, and we have gone through that
    on this committee quite a bit of times. Can you share with the
    committee, with regard to your SOFs, the cycle of deployed
    time, the training time away from home, and the rest and reset
    time for the Special Forces?
        Admiral Olson. Yes, sir. Of course, many disciplines in
    SOFs, the data is different for all of them, but at the high
    end of our force, those Green Berets, SEALs, the aviation
    crews, those are typically at about a one-to-one ratio now.
    Sometimes a bit longer back than forward, but sometimes a bit
    longer forward than back.
        That creates stress on the force in a number of ways, and
    many of the places where the forces are stationed in the United
    States don't accommodate quality training nearby, so there is a
    requirement to travel to train, and up to half of the working
    days in between deployments are spent away from home, training
    for the next deployment.
        So, we understand that this is a long-term drain on the
    force. Our force has stuck with us so far, our re-enlistment
    rates are pretty good, better in some ways than we had
    anticipated. We are growing the force to provide more out
    there, to get to the places where we haven't been, which would
    put some more variety in the deployments than we've had in
    recent years.
        Wear and tear on the equipment is another factor. Of
    course, we're deploying it at a more rapid rate as well, with a
    much larger percentage of our force overseas. So, I would say
    briefly that we are feeling the strain of back-to-back
    deployments, our training in between has been decreased. We
    have had to prioritize some training so low that it's dropped
    off the scale in some cases--some of the training that we used
    to consider important to us, but is not urgent now--and the
    long-term impact of all that is to be seen.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Just to conclude with this, Mr.
    Chairman, with SOFs, it's not any appreciably different than
    through our regular forces?
        Admiral Olson. From the statistics I've seen, we're about
    on-par with the Army and the Marine Corps in general, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
    Admiral.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Bayh.
        Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your service to our country, and
    for your presence here today.
        Admiral Keating, I'd like to follow up on Senator Nelson's
    excellent questions about the satellite attack that the Chinese
    undertook. You had mentioned--and I didn't get your exact
    words, but you said this was either an unsatisfactory, an
    unpersuasive, technical demonstration--what did you mean by
    that?
        Admiral Keating. China's demonstration of this
    technological capability has led to what is, at least, an
    unfortunate, if not an unsatisfactory situation for, not just
    military space, but all those--as the Senator mentioned--as a
    medium.
        Senator Bayh. You weren't meaning that they demonstrated a
    technical weakness on their part.
        Admiral Keating. No, sir. To the contrary.
        Senator Bayh. Unlike the North Korean missile tests that
    didn't go so well, that demonstrated they had some problems,
    here--you're saying it created--it was an unsatisfactory
    situation created for everybody, as opposed to them having a
    technical problem.
        Admiral Keating. That's correct.
        Senator Bayh. That's what I wanted to clear up.
        Admiral Keating. That's correct. That's what I meant,
    Senator.
        Senator Bayh. Let me follow up with one last question, why
    did they do this?
        Admiral Keating. I'd be guessing, Senator, as to their--it
    is a demonstration of a capability that, if in a--that would
    be, could be used in a time of conflict to disable some
    systems, military systems that would be important to us and
    others.
        Senator Bayh. They were sending us and the rest of the
    world a message that they had the ability to do this if they
    needed to.
        Admiral Keating. I would agree with that, sir.
        Senator Bayh. There are published reports that indicate
    that they're also in the process of modernizing their nuclear
    arsenal, more mobile launchers, perhaps, multiple warhead
    vehicles, that sort of thing--why are they doing that?
        Admiral Keating. Senator, I don't know precisely why,
    again, I haven't been there. I could only offer an opinion that
    it is--it kind of goes to Senator Webb's point--they are
    looking to expand their influence throughout, not just their
    particular region of the world, but on a much more Pacific, if
    not global, theater, stage, and this capability that they may
    be developing would enhance, in their eyes, their----
        Senator Bayh. Forgive me for interrupting, Admiral. Would
    it be a fair speculation on our part that enhancing their
    intercontinental nuclear capabilities is probably not aimed at,
    or intended to effect or send a message to other people in the
    region, but perhaps some other nation, such as our own?
        Admiral Keating. That would be a fair assessment, in my
    opinion, Senator.
        Senator Bayh. Should we have any reaction to that? The
    modernization of their nuclear capabilities?
        Admiral Keating. At least on the PACOM level we have had,
    and we are continuing, to demonstrate to them--that's not the
    right word--to express to them our concern for military build-
    ups. We would prefer that they be more than less transparent,
    and it is our hope by engaging with them at all levels that
    they understand clearly we know what they're doing, we regard
    it with concern, and it would be very much in their interest to
    develop appropriate defensive systems, as opposed to some of
    those that they appear to be developing, that have a much more
    offensive nature to them.
        Senator Bayh. China has had, at least, a history in the
    past of some tension with Russia, but that's abated in recent
    years.
        Admiral Keating. Sure.
        Senator Bayh. So, to the extent that they're modernizing
    their nuclear capability, and much of that is capable of
    hitting or reaching the continental United States, I suppose
    there's a message to us in all of that, and we have to ask
    ourselves why they're doing this, and what the appropriate
    response is.
        Admiral Keating. Right.
        Senator Bayh. It's a part of the ongoing, as Senator Webb
    was indicating, process of trying to incorporate China in the
    global community. That's why Senator Nelson's questions are
    exactly right at the time. We're asking them to be more
    responsible and integrate them into a global economic and
    security system. They take irresponsible steps, such as the one
    he asked you about, that's a somewhat troubling thing, and
    modernizing their nuclear arsenal can only be designed to--
    well, let's just say, that's another message they're sending, I
    think, we have to take into account.
        Admiral Keating. I agree.
        Senator Bayh. Admiral Olson, I continue to hear in
    Afghanistan and some other places that I've been to from some
    of our intelligence people in the field about a shortage of
    Predator capabilities. Can you tell us about that? What are
    your needs? They're under the opinion that--this is a weapons
    system that's tracking bad guys in real time, and at least
    according to people in the field, we don't have enough of them.
    That's pretty concerning, at least to me. What do you need?
        Admiral Olson. Sir, we found that in both direct action and
    force protection, overhead video coverage--full motion video--
    is very important. The quality of the operation depends----
        Senator Bayh. Do you currently have everything you need?
        Admiral Olson. We don't, no, sir.
        Senator Bayh. Tell us about that. We want to provide you
    with everything you need.
        Admiral Olson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Bayh. Because this is a system that's tracking bad
    people who are trying to harm us--what do you need?
        Admiral Olson. We have a standard requirement for 30
    orbits. An orbit is one system, overhead, all the time, 24-
    hours-a-day, 7-days-a-week. We have a standard requirement for
    30 orbits, we are now at the order of about 12 orbits.
        Senator Bayh. How many more Predators do you need to meet
    your requirements?
        Admiral Olson. It's not all Predators if we're talking
    Global Hawks.
        Senator Bayh. In Global Hawks and things of that nature,
    and I've been told that to try to meet the demand in Iraq and
    Afghanistan and elsewhere, we have to perhaps reduce coverage
    some other places.
        So, look, to meet our requirements in this important area,
    what do you need of us?
        Admiral Olson. First of all, let me say that we are
    programmed to receive a squadron of Predators in our program.
    That will provide six orbits. That's very helpful. Ultimately,
    we will need more beyond that, in terms of dozens more, or
    alternatives to Predators, and there are many. But we can--
    there's a rate at which we can absorb them, as well--train
    pilots to operate them, and train the maintainers and the
    ground crewman.
        Senator Bayh. Are you making this a priority?
        Admiral Olson. Yes, sir, it's our number one acquisition
    priority.
        Senator Bayh. All right. I would encourage you to request
    everything you need.
        Admiral Olson. Certainly.
        Senator Bayh. Then some of us will take that very
    seriously, and try and make sure that you get it.
        Admiral Olson. Yes, sir, thank you.
        Senator Bayh. Just a couple of other questions, Admiral
    Keating, from your submitted testimony, I deduced that you were
    somewhat skeptical about North Korea's willingness, ultimately,
    to give up entirely their nuclear capability. Is that a fair
    statement?
        Admiral Keating. Fair statement, sir.
        Senator Bayh. How should we--and perhaps, General Bell,
    this may get into your territory a little bit, but at least the
    two of you--interpret South Korea's actions, where we're trying
    to increase pressure in a variety of ways on North Korea to do
    the right thing here, and yet the South Koreans seem to be
    pursuing a somewhat different policy of engagement, which at
    least in part has the effect of undermining our attempts to
    isolate the regime, bring pressure to bear to take a different
    tact? So, we have allies pursuing different courses, and their
    conduct may undermine our attempts to try and get North Korea
    to be more responsible. Do either of you have an opinion about
    that?
        Admiral Keating. I do, Senator, and I'll be brief. When I
    visited South Korea with General Bell, he was with me in some
    calls, and I went by myself, I saw no manifestation of a split.
    So, I would say, a case could be made by some, I saw no
    evidence of it, Senator.
        Senator Bayh. Aren't they continuing to provide some aid
    and assistance and economic ties to the North, while we're
    trying to cut off their financial assets through the Bank of
    Macao and reduce their counterfeiting and activities and that
    sort of thing? We're trying to increase the financial pressure
    on the North, and they're engaged in activities that are
    decreasing the financial pressure on the North, isn't that
    true?
        Admiral Keating. I think it is true, to an extent, Senator,
    and we just signed the Free Trade Agreement, the Free Trade
    Agreement is coming to Congress----
        Senator Bayh. This may be an issue in some Senators'
    evaluation of that trade agreement.
        Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.
        Senator Bayh. How cooperative are they being with us in an
    attempt to get North Korea to give up its nuclear capabilities?
        Admiral Olson. I saw no manifestation of that split while I
    was there, Senator. General Bell would--he lives there, he'd
    know better than I.
        Senator Bayh. General, I'd be interested in your take,
    there are published articles that the South is behaving in a
    way that is, in some ways, inconsistent with our policy of
    bringing financial pressure to bear on the north.
        General Bell. I'd like to address that directly. The ROK
    has an engagement policy with the North which we endorse, as a
    matter of national policy. However, when it runs afoul of the
    very issues that you're talking about, we raise these issues
    with the ROK.
        I can tell you this--since the October nuclear weapons
    test--the ROK, in my opinion, and I think it's shared by the
    State Department here and other members of Government, has been
    extremely accommodating to the Six-Party Talk process, the ROK
    has ceased the provision of a range of trade mechanisms with
    the North. As of today, they are not providing North Korea with
    humanitarian aid or anything else.
        I will tell you that only 2 days ago, they reached
    agreement with the North Koreans to provide them with a large
    quantity of rice, as they have done every year, in humanitarian
    sense, but they have tied giving them that rice to progress in
    the Six-Party Talk process, directly.
        So, I'll be honest with you, Senator, I think for the last
    6 months, our ally has behaved extraordinarily positively,
    certainly been in lock-step with the United States. I think
    that we've seen a very appropriate era in our relationship with
    South Korea, as a result of their decision that the nuclear
    test was over the line. That the efforts that they had made in
    the engagement strategy had not paid off to the extent that
    they had hoped.
        So, I think we are in lock-step with not only the South
    Koreans, but the Japanese, certainly the Chinese have been very
    helpful in this, the Russians have been helpful, and the five
    parties that engage with the North Koreans--as long as we stay,
    as you so well said, firm and resolute--I believe that that
    will define the Six-Party Talks process in a way quite
    different than talks in the past.
        Now, North Korea would like to split that group up, for
    sure, and they are trying. So, this is a time for our diplomats
    and military personnel and Government officials to remind each
    other--the five parties--that we have to stick together, we
    have to be resolute, and North Korea has to deliver on the
    requirements of the Six-Party Talks that they agreed to. So I
    am pleased right now with our ally's response, the South
    Koreans, and I am fairly confident that they are going to stay
    the course.
        Senator Bayh. My time is expired, I would just say that I
    hope that their behavior over the last 6 months proves to be
    continuing rather than an aberration.
        General Bell. Yes, sir.
        Senator Bayh. It's been my impression from time to time
    that because of generational change, and understandable
    political pressures and that sort of thing, they have, perhaps,
    occasionally been in denial about some of the firmer, tougher
    steps that need to be taken if there's any prospect of getting
    the North to ultimately do what is everybody's best interest
    here.
        General Bell. Yes, sir.
        Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Bayh.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony today, but most for
    your service to the Nation, thank you very much.
        Admiral Olson, last year in the authorization act, both the
    House and the Senate expressed some concern about the
    reorganization of the Office of Under Secretary of Defense for
    Policy. Under title 10, the principle duty of the Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity
    Conflict (ASD-SOLIC) is to have oversight over SOCOM.
        Because of this reorganization now the office has a vast
    span of responsibility--Strategic, U.S. Transportation Command
    (TRANSCOM), Joint Forces Command, all major budget programs.
    Were you and General Brown consulted in advance about this
    reorganization?
        Admiral Olson. Sir, we were not consulted in advance.
        Senator Reed. When you were told about the reorganization,
    what feedback did you provide the Department?
        Admiral Olson. Sir, General Brown and I sat together,
    General Brown on video teleconference and me in the same room
    as the briefer. General Brown's feedback was--he expressed
    concern in three areas--one was that the ASD-SOLIC and
    Integrated Capabilities under the new title, remain a member of
    the SOCOM Board of Directors, a voting member of what it is we
    invest our resources in. That was point one.
        Point two is that the ASD retain oversight of Major Force
    Program (MFP)-11, the program that funds Special Operations
    activities, and three, the General expressed concern that the
    growth in the scope of responsibilities under the ASD would--as
    you said--dilute the focus on Special Operations activities, in
    peculiar.
        We have been assured that all three of those concerns are
    being addressed. Of course, the organization isn't in place,
    the new ASD isn't in place, but we're optimistic that they'll
    continue to work with us.
        Senator Reed. Again, Admiral, I thank you. That's a very
    responsive reply. It just seems to me, in terms of the
    organizational complexity, and the differences between
    strategic policy, and low intensity conflict, TRANSCOM, et
    cetera, that this is a monumental task, and I think the burden
    of proof will be on the agency. Can you keep us apprised from
    SOCOM's perspective, whether the dilution is so great that it
    affects your operations?
        Admiral Olson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. Let me ask another question, Admiral Olson.
    The Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) is an important
    part of your operations, they provide an opportunity to train
    foreign forces, and they also give Special Operators cultural
    and language opportunities. There's been a troublesome trend,
    though--in 2005, 54 of 188 exercises were cancelled and in
    2006, 32 out of 101 were cancelled. Is this a consequence of
    operational demand elsewhere, particularly, Iraq?
        Admiral Olson. It is a direct consequence, for the most
    part, sir. The JCETs that are scheduled, and then not
    conducted, are mostly because of non-availability of our forces
    to participate in the exercise because there's been a higher
    priority demand, typically in CENTCOM. Often, however, they are
    cancelled by the host nation because of a lack of availability
    of their forces, or some political issue.
        Senator Reed. We, many of my colleagues have asked, I
    think, a very important question about language skills and--
    just a quick follow-up for general knowledge--is it a
    requirement for SOCOM for all relevant personnel to have a
    language skill? Or is it individual decisions?
        Admiral Olson. It's all relevant personnel.
        Senator Reed. That's probably a misleading term.
        Admiral Olson. I don't mean to be more complex than it is.
    All of our Green Berets, for example, are relevant. Every one.
    Before he puts on his Green Beret for the first time, has to
    prove proficiency at some level, in some language.
        Then they are regionally assigned in the expectation that
    that language skill will continue to develop over the course of
    their career. So, ensuring that they actually are able to stay
    in the regions where they're assigned is an issue.
        The cut-back on JCETs has a direct impact on our ability to
    go to the places where we think we ought to be, and immerse our
    people in the cultures and the languages that we believe are
    important.
        Senator Reed. You point out Green Berets, but this affects
    other SOCOM operators to include marines, SEALs, et cetera.
        Admiral Olson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. There's not a pervasive requirement, is that
    correct?
        Admiral Olson. There is a requirement in the MARSOC, the
    Marine Corps Command similar to the Green Berets for the
    segment of their force that does foreign military training.
    That's a significant portion of the MARSOC that is dedicated to
    foreign military training, on the order of what Green Berets
    do.
        Navy SEALs do that, but it doesn't have the same priority
    for the SEALs as it does for the Green Berets, Rangers are
    similar.
        Senator Reed. Yes, sir.
        Thank you very much, Admiral.
        General Bell, have any of the Korean prepositioned stocks
    been used for Iraq or Afghanistan?
        General Bell. Sir, none of the stocks in Korea proper have
    been used. I will tell you that there were some fills that we
    needed that were delayed, and some of our readiness was not too
    standard--that's been fixed. My predecessor was very serious
    about fixing that, obviously when I arrived I made that a high
    priority, the Army Materiel Command has done marvelous work, we
    have 100 percent of our combat equipment, our total fills for
    everything from compasses to whatever is at 86 percent--that's
    very high, and growing. I will tell you, I insisted on a test
    of that equipment, I walked all seven warehouses, and I said,
    ``Okay, it looks terrific, but will it hunt?''
        So, we just brought over a battalion from the United
    States, from the 11th Regiment out at Fort Irwin, California,
    they drew several hundred pieces of major combat equipment,
    took the stuff up to a training area and a range. I was
    extraordinarily pleased with the readiness of that equipment.
    In excess of 95 percent, all the crews raved about it, so it's
    a great success story.
        I had some trepidation about pulling this stuff out, to
    make sure that what I had been told, and all the tests we had
    run in the warehouses would, in fact, perform in the field.
    Terrific success.
        Now, having said that--I'll defer to Admiral Keating, but
    there was another preposition set, in the Pacific--not in
    Korea, APS-3, down in Guam--that's being used for Iraq. So, our
    ability to generate preposition sets of equipment is
    constrained in that regard.
        But, what we've had in Korea proper is, it is maintained to
    standard, and it has demonstrated its readiness as late as--
    correction, sir--as recently as a month ago. I'm very pleased
    with it.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, General Bell. I will pick up the
    questioning with Admiral Keating, but let me ask you one more
    question regarding North Korea.
        General Bell. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. That is, in your written statement, you
    state, ``If the Six-Party Talks do not produce a lasting
    settlement, the North Koreans will likely conduct a second,
    additional nuclear test when they see it as serving their
    purposes.''
        General Bell. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. That's your assessment?
        General Bell. It is, sir.
        Senator Reed. Can you elaborate, sir?
        General Bell. I will. The North Koreans have a long-term
    strategy of trying to achieve something. Their ``something'' is
    security of their regime, and they are afraid that they will be
    attacked, or if they're not afraid they will be attacked, they
    want to demonstrate to their own people, regime security. So,
    this is one of their central requirements.
        Their second requirement is to prosecute their Military
    First policy. That is a national policy, it is a public policy.
    They take care of their military first with their economic
    power, and whatever's left, they allow the average citizen to
    partake in. That's why 30 percent of their Gross Domestic
    Product (GDP) is spent on their military, whereas a modern
    nation might be somewhere between 2 and 4 percent.
        So, they're going to continue to try to seek security
    guarantees, along with economic assistance, to ensure that
    their Military First policy will continue to work--that's their
    strategy. If the Six-Party Talks process does not work, and
    they don't get what they want, then they may return--and I
    believe will return--to provocative acts.
        There are a range of provocations they can choose from, and
    they've demonstrated that over the years. Anywhere from gunboat
    diplomacy in the Western Sea where the two nations--North Korea
    and South Korea--fish, to aerial intercepts, over the ROK
    before, all the way to demonstrating their current and latest
    provocative abilities, and that's missile tests, a Taepo-dong-2
    test is certainly in the offing, if they choose. We believe
    they have at least another nuclear device that they could also
    test. Consequently, if indeed it's in their interest in
    achieving these things that they want, they will conduct a
    provocation. They've done that forever.
        We have to be resolute in our containment of North Korea
    and our deterrence of North Korea, and the six parties--or the
    five parties to the Six-Party Talks process--have to hold
    hands. As long as we do that, we will continue to push and
    contain North Korea and have an opportunity to resolve this
    longstanding issue.
        So, I'm still fairly optimistic, Senator, I'll be honest
    with you, more so now than at any time in the past.
        Senator Reed. If I can quickly follow-up because my time is
    expiring.
        General Bell. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. Can you give me sort of a rough percentage
    of--if you were betting--what's the probability of success, and
    second, what's their bottom line? As succinctly as you can,
    sir.
        General Bell. Yes, sir. I would say we have at least a 50/
    50 chance of this working, probably more than 50/50. I think
    that's a great testimony to the diplomats who've worked out a
    very good regimen here. So I remain cautiously optimistic.
        As long as the nations in the region--particularly China--
    stick together, North Korea has few options, and therefore it
    becomes in their interest to find a way out. They can't, if you
    will, ``take on'' all the members of these concerned nations--
    China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and the United States--they
    can't do it. Consequently, I think the results of the Six-Party
    Talks have more to do with those five nations, then it has to
    do with North Korea. As long as we stay resolute and focused
    and stay together on a common objective, I believe there is a
    decent chance of North Korea complying.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator
    Reed, and thank you for taking over when I had to be absent. As
    always, you are most accommodating, we appreciate it.
        Senator Thune?
        Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Olson, since the defeat of Iraq's conventional
    army, our conventional ground forces have been fighting in an
    asymmetric environment, an environment that resembles what the
    Special Operations community is trained to fight in. Can you
    comment on how you believe our conventional forces have adapted
    to fighting in this environment, and would you comment on how
    you believe those lessons should be applied to ensure the
    conventional forces, and the Special Operations community
    continue to compliment one another in combat operations?
        Admiral Olson. Sir, I'd say upfront that I'm not an expert
    on how the conventional Army is doing all of their business in
    Iraq, but I'm aware of enough that it is very encouraging in
    terms of the Army's pursuit of language training, the way that
    they have broken into some smaller units, and placed them in
    some more remote places in order to do day-to-day interaction
    with Iraqi peoples and Iraqi civil as well as military leaders,
    so I think that that's encouraging.
        I think they have a ways to go, this is more of a cultural
    trait within SOCOM than it is in the larger forces, and it
    requires a reprioritization of effort within all of the
    Services to get more tuned into an irregular warfare campaign.
    So, I'd say I'm optimistic that the Services are getting it,
    but they have a ways to go in order to apply at the scale and
    scope that is required.
        Senator Thune. I appreciate that answer.
        General Bell, I serve on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee.
    One of the areas that we have focused on in that subcommittee
    is the issue of missile defense. One of the criticisms facing
    missile defense is that it is a relic of the Cold War in that a
    ballistic missile attack is an unlikely threat scenario that we
    face. You've already had a lot of discussion and interaction
    today on the whole issue of Korea, but as the commander of
    forces in Korea, I guess I'd like to know, what is your
    assessment of the North Korean missile program, and in an open
    session, can you discuss what capabilities the North Koreans
    possess, and what threat that poses to our forces in the Korean
    theater?
        General Bell. I can. Senator, I think we only have to go
    back to last July 4, notwithstanding the failure of the Taepo-
    dong-2 missile test, which is an Intercontinental Ballistic
    Missile (ICBM), when you look at the other missiles they tested
    in that 24-hour period--and there were six of them--each one of
    these missiles performed appropriately, in accordance with the
    design parameters of that missile, in open session, and several
    of them were fired in a configuration that we had not seen
    before, but demonstrated some flexibility that the North
    Koreans have achieved, that was fairly modern.
        So, what we had here was a demonstration of missiles that
    work. Now, we know that North Korea has around 800 various
    types of theater ballistic missiles operational today that are
    capable of striking both the ROK, South Korea, certainly
    capable of striking Japan, and several missiles that
    potentially could strike as far south as Guam.
        So these are serious regional concerns. They consist of
    what are known as KNO-2 missiles, these are relatively short-
    range, traditional SCUD missiles which are liquid-fueled, I
    think we're mostly familiar with, those are theater ballistic
    missiles. There's an upgrade to that called a No Dong missile
    that they have lots of, that shoots a bit farther than a SCUD,
    and they have a medium-range missile called a Musudan that can
    reach certainly out to Japan and potentially Guam.
        These missiles are operational. These are not theoretical,
    technical potentials, they are operational and in the
    inventory. They sold these missiles to both Iran and Syria over
    the years, as late as 2005, so the North Koreans proliferate
    this technology and these missile capabilities to other nations
    of the world.
        So, when you look at that, and you look at the successful
    test launches that they've done, I believe you can only
    conclude that that's a threat, that missile defense is a part
    of the defense against that threat, and the threat is not
    limited to short-range on the Korean Peninsula only but can
    reach out either by the longer-range Musudan or by selling
    these things.
        So, I'm a proponent of both theater Ballistic Missile
    Defense apparatus, and quite frankly, medium-range and ICBM
    defense against these kinds of capabilities of, if you will,
    rogue nations, of which North Korea fits in that parameter.
        Senator Thune. Let me ask you, because in your testimony
    you recommend the continued development of the Theater High-
    Altitude Air Defense System, the Airborne Laser (ABL), and the
    Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System. The Congressional
    Budget Office has recommended terminating the ABL as a viable
    budget option. I would like to hear from you why you recommend
    its continued development, and how does it enhance your ability
    to defend the Korean theater?
        General Bell. Yes, sir. From a theater perspective, a small
    theater like Korea, the ABL is the only weapon I know of, short
    of a kinetic strike before the missile launches, and is
    designed to knockdown one of these missiles in its boost phase.
    So, if you're looking at a SCUD coming out of North Korea going
    to South Korea, the only thing--I say, the only thing--the
    capability we have today is Patriots. It, of course, intercepts
    its missile in its terminal stage, relatively near the ground.
    If that missile happened to be carrying a chemical warhead,
    this can be a wide-area threat by virtue of us intercepting it.
        If we can intercept missiles in their boost phase, over
    enemy territory, then we preclude the opportunity for, if you
    will, fallout--that's not the right term--but the kinds of
    munitions that might be on board hitting the ground anyway over
    friendly territory. The ABL offers that type of capability, to
    intercept a missile while it's ignited in its boost phase. So
    that's why I'm a proponent of it. I realize that decisions have
    to be made, and priorities have to be set, but from a pure
    warfighting perspective, this is something, I think, that would
    be useful in my theater of operations.
        Senator Thune. Okay, I appreciate that very much. I had a
    chance to get out and see it, and some of the things you're
    doing with it, it seems like it holds great promise. I am
    concerned that it could be sacrificed on the alter of budget
    cuts, when in fact, we face some of these threats, and for
    which it is a good counter. So, I appreciate your response to
    that question.
        Thank you all very much for your service to our country,
    we're very grateful for it. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Sessions?
        Senator Sessions. Thank you. Just one question, Admiral
    Olson. I know the Air Force has expressed an interest in
    becoming the executive agent for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
    (UAVs), they'd like control over the training sustainability
    acquisition for systems that fly above 3,500 square feet.
    General David Deptula, USAF, head of the Air Force
    intelligence, recently went further and said that the Air Force
    should be given acquisition authority over all airborne
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.
        Now, I understand that Army, Navy, and Marines last week in
    the House expressed opposition to that. You depend on that, you
    just discussed it, my personal view for some years after early
    in the Iraq war effort was that our ground forces do not have
    as readily available to them in numbers and in capability, UAVs
    as they need, and in fact, it's a real problem for them. You
    indicated somewhat along that line--do you think, would you
    agree with this concern? Do you feel like we can do better in
    having UAVs that can help our combat soldiers who are in harm's
    way this very moment?
        Admiral Olson. Sir, I've seen the letter that proposes
    that, I agree with the concern, I do think that we can do
    better. There are many UAVs flying in the airspace in a fashion
    that could be coordinated better. Whether or not the Air Force
    solution is the right solution, we don't have enough detail yet
    on how it would actually be executed in the theater to
    determine whether or not it's the ideal solution, so our answer
    is we know it can be done better. We look forward to working
    with the Air Force and to hearing more about how they,
    precisely, would execute those responsibilities.
        Senator Sessions. But you do have some concerns?
        Admiral Olson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. My concern is that the Air Force does
    have responsibility, strategic responsibility that Admiral
    Keating knows, for intelligence, surveillance, strategic
    issues--I'm not sure their interest in history and ethic is as
    focused on the ground soldier as might be the case, and would
    be concerned, if we do anything that would diminish the ground
    soldier's needs, in fact, I think they ought to be enhanced for
    some time.
        Admiral Olson. That's precisely our concern, Senator. We
    consider that capability an extension of the ground force, not
    an extension of the air force.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Admiral Keating, let me follow-up very
    briefly. Can you comment on the prepositioned stocks in Guam,
    how much they've been drawn down, and what's the plan to
    replenish them, and briefly the plans to increase submarines in
    Guam?
        Admiral Keating. Senator, I don't have the exact figure as
    to how much they were depleted, we'll get that to you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Marine Corps Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadrons (MPSRON) 2
    and 3 had 100 percent draw down in 2003. MPSRON 3 was fully reset at
    the end of 2003. MPSRON 1 has been temporarily augmenting MPSRON 2
    since third quarter of 2006; however, MPSRON 2 is scheduled to be at
    100 percent by fourth quarter of 2009.
        Air Force and Navy had no items drawn down.
        In reference to submarines homeported in Guam, there are currently
    two submarines in place. Plans are underway which would raise number of
    submarines assigned to Guam to a total of three by July 2007.

        Admiral Keating. It's my understanding that the Army, in
    their budget through the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP),
    intends to replenish that afloat stock within the FYDP.
        Senator Reed. Five years?
        Admiral Keating. Five years. Maybe, 5 to 7 years, Senator.
    We would encourage Army to move that timeline left, if they
    can, recognizing their budget challenges, but that particular
    afloat stock would be important to--but not essential to--the
    execution of our war plans.
        Senator Reed. The submarines? Briefly, Admiral, in Guam?
    The plans to increase the number of submarines in Guam, the
    timeline?
        Admiral Keating. Two, with one third on the way right now,
    and that will be the number, Senator, and I think I'm okay in
    open source, there are provisions being made for other types of
    U.S. submarines that will do maintenance there, but will not be
    stationed there.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Senator Warner?
        Senator Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        To you, Admiral Olson--I just think it's remarkable how
    well the Army and the Navy have partnered to do this SOCOM. I
    remember with Senator Bill Cohen, and my good friend here,
    Senator Levin, setting up most of the structure by which this
    organization has flourished. Now the Marines have begun to be
    integrated and pull their share of the load.
        Is that current transition of the Marines in working out
    satisfactorily?
        Admiral Olson. Yes, sir, it is.
        Senator Warner. We want to recognize--I always loved the
    phrase in the Navy ``the Silent Service'' and in a sense,
    you're sort of a silent service, but your forces have taken a
    very heavy hit in the conflicts in both Afghanistan and Iraq--
    taken those hits with extraordinary courage and hardship to the
    families. I remember vividly going down to one particular
    ceremony, accompanied by General Brown, and extraordinary
    courage manifested by the widows at that service, and it's just
    one of the untold stories that adds to the great contribution
    that SOF are playing in our overall security structure.
        Have these heavy casualties resulted in some attenuation in
    your forces that you've not been able to replenish through
    normal acquisition of new people?
        Admiral Olson. Sir, obviously the casualties are unplanned
    losses, and so we've had to accommodate that within the force.
    Clearly the casualties that we have taken, that have not been
    returned to the battlefield, have been unplanned losses for us,
    and our manpower growth is designed to accommodate that.
    Obviously we are at a lower level now than we would like to be,
    partially because of those casualties that we've taken, sir.
        Senator Warner. Also, you have the competition that will
    always be present among the Services from which you draw your
    forces, namely the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and the Air Force,
    and they're having--well, certainly the United States Army is
    being challenged--is that hindering your ability to fill out
    your ranks? The competition that they are trying to keep good
    people, and you're trying to access good people?
        Admiral Olson. Sir, all of the Services have been very
    forthcoming with their qualified Special Operations applicants
    and candidates. That has not been an issue recently. In fact,
    the Services have given some priority to enable us to recruit
    Special Operations warriors from the Services.
        Senator Warner. Have you noticed any--assuming there is
    some ability to track your resignations or persons leaving for
    whatever causes, the SOF Active-Duty Force, is it in keeping
    with the other retention rates of the other Services, or do you
    have a perturbation of some sort in yours?
        Admiral Olson. Sir, across the board, our retention rates
    are slightly higher than all of the Services.
        Senator Warner. That's encouraging.
        The 2006 QDR mandated a 15 percent increase in the SOF. Are
    you able to begin to access sufficient numbers under that
    mandate, not only of people, but of equipment?
        Admiral Olson. Sir, we are on-track for the manpower growth
    in all of our accession processes and training pipelines. A
    couple not doing as well as others, but none--there's some
    cause for concern--for panic at this point. Programmatically,
    we are on-track with both the MILCON and the system procurement
    that it takes to support the growth. We were well-served by the
    QDR process in that regard, as it programmed additional people,
    it programmed the infrastructure and support that it takes for
    them.
        Senator Warner. Admiral Keating, to another party, your
    area of India--we value our relationships with Pakistan, China,
    Russia, and the like, and it's another one of those very
    delicate balancing acts. I do hope that we're strengthening our
    relationships with India, and can in some ways compete with
    Russia who is, I think, one of their main contributors for arms
    and so forth. Could you address that status?
        Admiral Keating. Yes, sir. I agree with your assessment of
    India's importance to us as an ally. We are discovering India's
    interest in our recognition of the Indian Ocean as something
    other than water through which Navy vessels hurtle as we go to
    the CENTCOM AOR. We just concluded a significant exercise with
    the Indian Navy, five to seven of their ships, and a number of
    our ships, submarines, and airplanes. The Indians accorded
    themselves very well in this exercise, Senator, so this is one
    example of the expansion of our military-to-military
    relationships with India, and as you noted, I think they are
    considering more U.S. weapons systems in their acquisition and
    not relying exclusively on the former Soviet Union equipment.
        So, we're encouraged by India's willingness to deal with
    us, to exercise with us, and to exchange again a broad array of
    officers for individual and group training. We are going to
    pursue this expansion with them aggressively.
        Senator Warner. The relationships are always tenuous
    between India and Pakistan. What are they like today and in the
    foreseeable future?
        Admiral Keating. I had a discussion within the past 24
    hours, Senator, with a couple of senior officers from the
    CENTCOM, and we are entertaining ideas about blurring up this
    line between India and Pakistan, which is the PACOM-CENTCOM-AOR
    line of authority. We are going to intentionally pollinate
    across that line on a military basis, so as to become more
    aware of the issues in Pakistan and India. As I have been
    stationed in the CENTCOM AOR and have several good friends in
    Pakistan still, so we're going to work on understanding the
    differences, and help them decrease the tension, if you will.
    There are indications out of the State Department that the
    Kashmir issue may be moving forward in the eyes of India and
    Pakistan, towards resolution. So, we're encouraged.
        Senator Warner. By the way, I'd like to say, Mr. Chairman,
    that you and I have had quite a bit of time up here through the
    years, but this is a very impressive panel of professional
    witnesses. I've had the privilege of knowing all of them for a
    long time, and I thought your responses to in-depth questions
    were extremely well-done this morning, for all of you.
        General Bell, there's been a lot of consideration about the
    extension of tours and we certainly look at this problem in
    Iraq right now, but again, just drawing on the modest
    experience that I had in 1951, 1952 in Korea in the Marines, I
    don't think global warming has done much to bring up the
    temperatures there. I say that with a little tongue-in-cheek,
    but it's a tough environment in which to live. I see that you
    have under consideration a plan in which, March 28, 2007, a
    letter to Senators Levin and McCain, you recommended that the
    normal tour length for all American forces stationed in Korea
    be extended to 3 years.
        General Bell. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. Currently the 1-year unaccompanied tours
    are the norm in Korea, and that's the way we've been operating.
    Could you bring us up-to-date on where you are on that
    decision? Have you carefully evaluated the impact on families,
    the impact two ways on families--one, it's a tough climate to
    live in, and that affects the wives and the children and
    beginning to assess more of those now? Do you want to have a
    two-tier system, accompanied and unaccompanied? Accompanied is
    3 years, and the other for a certain period of time. Does that
    bring about some tensions? I hope you've thought through it
    very carefully, because somehow we've gotten along reasonably
    well with this current policy, a lot of MILCON dollars would be
    involved, trying to provide adequate housing and other
    facilities for families, which we're obligated and should do,
    so give us your view on that.
        General Bell. Thank you, Senator Warner, I appreciate the
    opportunity.
        Korea has, in the last 15 years, has had a radical
    transformation, and I know you know this, sir, to a First World
    country. It's a place of great universities, great medical
    system now, thriving economy and everything that we hold as
    important for family members is resonant today in Korea. I'm
    sure you're right about the weather, I have to tell you, this
    is a warm winter in Korea, it was unbelievable, but yes, sir,
    we're going to have some more cold winters.
        Here's my assessment of our small mission in Korea. We will
    have 25,000 Americans in Korea.
        Senator Warner. That's down from 50,000.
        General Bell. Yes, sir, it is several years back, you're
    right.
        Senator Warner. Yes.
        General Bell. We're at about 29,000, 28,000 right now, and
    by the end of 2008, we'll be down to this 25,000 number.
        I spent 3 years in Europe as a NATO Commander, and as
    United States Army Europe Commander, and I had all of the
    families in Europe. All of them, fully accompanied. Off went
    our forces to war, and some of them were on their second
    rotation as I left Europe, we suffered a lot of casualties. To
    a person, the spouses told me, and sir, I'm talking about
    thousands of spouses, and young people, kids, because I went to
    all of the high schools, and many of the middle schools, that
    they would rather be with their soldier--and in this case it
    was soldiers, it wasn't, I wasn't dealing with the Air Force,
    Navy, et cetera--they'd rather be with their soldier than be
    separated. Because they know that for years, the United States
    military is going to be committed.
        So, when I got to Korea, I took a good look at the
    situation there, and the fact that we retained 1-year
    rotational tours as the basis. I think it's time for us to
    seriously consider--and I'm raising this with the DOD, I've not
    brought it to Congress yet, formally--transitioning with our
    small force there, to fully-accompanied tours. The families
    want, we have about 3,000 authorized members now, family
    members to be there, spouses; so, it's about a 10 percent
    authorization. When you talk to these family members, there is
    no place in the world they would rather be than with their
    servicemember, in Korea, in this terrific environment, which
    has improved radically.
        So, one, I believe that you'll find, sir, that the family
    members want to be with their servicemember, wherever they are
    on the face of this Earth.
        Senator Warner. That's a given.
        General Bell. Yes.
        Senator Warner. We understand that, and I compliment you
    for looking at that, and attaching the heaviest of weight.
        General Bell. Yes.
        Senator Warner. Certainly the concept of the family in our
    military has gone through a major transformation for the best.
        General Bell. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. The decisions to stay in the military are
    made around the dinner table at night, you know that.
        General Bell. I do, sir.
        Senator Warner. It's a marvelous thing, and fortunately so
    many more of our young people are now married, as opposed to
    the earlier generations.
        But, what concerns me is the family. Europe is a relatively
    safe area in which to let your families remain while you
    deploy. Korea is quite different. The battleplan--if there is
    such a thing as a plan--but certainly we have the analysis of
    what would happen, it would happen in a matter of 24 hours, and
    it is horrific in proportions. The type of firepower that both
    sides could inflict are going to be brought on civilian, as
    well as family, as well as military--it's not, in any sense, a
    forward military position that has to take the brunt of this,
    the DMZ, and the proximity to Seoul----
        General Bell. Sure.
        Senator Warner. --and the other areas. So, I think that
    family consideration, while it's important, is one you have to
    evaluate from the standpoint of the strategic risks of a
    confrontation happening.
        General Bell. Senator, all I can respond--and you're
    certainly right--I'm not challenging you on this.
        But, my son was born 12 miles from two Russian divisions,
    both equipped with nuclear weapons of the 100 Russian, Soviet,
    and East German divisions that the United States and our allies
    faced in the Cold War. If you go over to Korea today, and look
    at the readiness of the South Korean military--which is
    extraordinary--recognize that we're moving south, out from
    underneath that artillery, and look at the condition of the
    North Korean military--which is still lethal, but in my view,
    incapable of driving to Pusan as they certainly almost did in
    the Korean War, I believe we have an environment there that is
    at least equal to the kind of environment we had in the Cold
    War in Europe, if not more stable. That's my best assessment.
        My belief is that the risk to the families--which is real--
    can be mitigated through our current, very sophisticated DOD
    Noncombatant Evacuation Program, which we rehearse twice a
    year, physically, and that the addition of about somewhere
    between 15,000 and 20,000 family members does not unordinarily
    complicate the problem I have today of about 180,000
    noncombatant evacuees that I'm responsible for, along with the
    State Department.
        I have to move all of the American citizens from the ROK,
    and sure there's about 100,000 of them that live there today,
    conducting business and enterprise in the ROK, so adding
    American servicemembers' families in a more sanctuary area,
    South of Seoul, in the year, if you will, 2007, and recognizing
    how many Americans live in that country, civilians, conducting
    business, I don't think is an undue risk, at all.
        Now, I will admit, that this is not something I can execute
    tomorrow. I have to socialize this, I have to do a lot of
    studies, and I have to convince DOD that this is a proper and
    prudent thing to do, and then I have to seek resources.
    Although, we intend to use significant amounts of burden-
    sharing money from the host nation, the Koreans, like we've
    done in Japan, to finance a lot of this in the future,
    overtime.
        So, I'd like to work it, I believe it has merit, your
    cautions are real----
        Senator Warner. I suggest you go ahead and work it, but in
    all deference of having been here on this committee now 29
    years----
        General Bell. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. --and went through a lot of the Cold War
    and the Soviet Union, there was a degree of reliance on the
    judgmental ability of the Soviet Union hierarchy----
        General Bell. There was.
        Senator Warner. --to make decisions in what I would say, a
    reasonably rational and careful way. I do not find that to
    exist with regard to North Korea at this time.
        General Bell. I understand, sir.
        Senator Warner. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
        I think there was a recent report that there was a shift in
    the North Korean budget to reduce its military budget, at least
    potentially, to other government sectors because of their
    nuclear capability. I don't know if you saw that report, is
    there anything to it, as far as you know?
        General Bell. Sir, I've read--not just the report, but I've
    read the transcript--I'll use the word at their party congress
    which was just recently held several weeks ago--where the North
    Koreans announced that now that they were a mature nuclear
    country, that they could protect themselves from all the
    aggressors that are around them, and that they now had the
    opportunity to shift resources from, to shift resources into
    the commercial, private sector, or not private sector, but into
    the civilian sector.
        They made no real claims about withdrawing funds from their
    military, and my assessment is that we'll watch this. My belief
    is that with a Military First policy, and 30 percent of their
    GDP going to their military every year first, and then onto the
    civilian sector, I would be very surprised if this rhetoric was
    followed up with action. It would be a welcomed advancement,
    this would be something that we could respond to in a positive
    way that could lessen tensions on the Peninsula, and if the
    DPRK has any sense at all, they'll execute immediately what
    they claim that they were going to do in this recent
    pronouncement. Because that's exactly what we've asked them to
    do for all of these years.
        So, I've not seen anything, they've made no claims about
    withdrawing or moving their military off the DMZ, or smalling
    their military down, but I hope that their rhetoric is followed
    up with action.
        Chairman Levin. Have we ever seen that kind of rhetoric
    before, do you know?
        General Bell. Sir, I've seen it for years.
        Chairman Levin. That same rhetoric, that they were going to
    shift from----
        General Bell. Not out of the North Koreans, no, sir, I have
    not.
        Chairman Levin. That would be new----
        General Bell. They have--it would be.
        Chairman Levin. That rhetoric would be new.
        In your prepared testimony, General, you discuss that
    launch of Taepo-dong-2, and describe it as an ICBM. I think
    that previously the U.S. Intelligence Community indicated it
    did not know whether Taepo-dong-2 was a space-launched vehicle
    or an ICBM.
        General Bell. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Is it still unknown? Or is it basically
    accepted now that it is an ICBM?
        General Bell. Sir, it is our belief in open session here
    that Taepo-dong-2 can be either. It can be a space-launched
    platform to put a satellite into orbit, it could be, and it can
    also be an offensive weapons system to attack a nation. It has
    a long-range potential that reaches the United States of
    America.
        So, the answer is, it can do both, and that's our
    assessment.
        Chairman Levin. Okay, thank you.
        Admiral Olson, in the National Defense Authorization Bill
    for Fiscal Year 2005, we granted SOCOM a 2-year authority to
    provide support to indigenous forces fighting alongside of U.S.
    Special Operators, and you're seeking our authorization this
    year. Have you used that authority, and if so, to what effect?
        Admiral Olson. Sir, we've used the authority to great
    effect, the first year that it was implemented, we used some of
    it, the second year, more of it, and we're using most of it
    this year. It's a $25 million authority, without an
    appropriation, and we're seeking that that become a permanent
    authority for us.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Admiral, a DOD directive of September 2006 provides the
    Department's guidance on the handling of detainees. According
    to that directive, it is DOD policy that the minimum standards
    of Common Article III of the Geneva Conventions, and the
    detainee treatment standards contained in that directive shall
    apply to all detainees, without regard to their legal status.
        The directive also provides that all persons under the
    control of DOD will receive the protections of the Geneva
    Convention on the treatment of prisoners of war, until their
    legal status is determined by competent authority, consistent
    with Article V of that Convention.
        Are all of SOCOM's units and personnel in any status
    subject to and complying with that DOD directive on DOD's
    Detainee Program?
        Admiral Olson. Sir, detainee abuse is contrary to SOF
    standards, and we are in compliance with all laws, policy, and
    regulation.
        Chairman Levin. So, the answer to that question, then,
    would be yes.
        Admiral Olson. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Are all persons under the control of SOCOM
    personnel receiving the protections of the Geneva Conventions
    on prisoners of war until their legal status can be determined
    by competent authority?
        Admiral Olson. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. The DOD directive also provides that
    detainees shall be moved as soon as practicable from the point
    of capture back to detention locations, and will be assigned an
    internment serial number (ISN) ``as soon as possible after
    coming under DOD control, normally within 14 days of capture.''
    The directive also establishes DOD policy that the
    International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) shall be
    allowed to offer its services during an ``armed conflict,
    however characterized, to which the United States is a party.''
    Are detainees that come into the control of SOCOM personnel
    being assigned an ISN ``as soon as possible'' and generally,
    within 14 days of capture?
        Admiral Olson. Yes, sir, that's true. There is a provision
    to extend beyond 14 days, given the proper permissions, and
    when appropriate, we seek those, but generally, it's a 14-day
    rule for us as well.
        Chairman Levin. Does the ICRC have access to detainees who
    come under the control of SOCOM personnel and to facilities
    where such detainees are being held?
        Admiral Olson. Yes, sir.
        [Additional information provided for the record follows:]

        [Deleted.]

        Chairman Levin. Senator Warner, do you have any more
    questions?
        Senator Warner. No, I think we should wrap up.
        Chairman Levin. Yes, I was going to--we have a vote on--
    Senator Warner pointed out this has been a very constructive,
    very positive, very effective, and a very informative panel. We
    are grateful for your appearance, for your testimony, for your
    service, and unless Senator Warner has a closing comment?
        Senator Warner. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you
    for your very fair hand in managing this important hearing, as
    always.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you so much. We'll stand adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
                    reorganization of the dod policy office
        1. Senator Levin. Vice Admiral Olson, who has been conducting
    oversight of the Major Force Program (MFP)-11 account over the last
    several months?
        Admiral Olson. For the last several months, during the
    reorganization of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Policy, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force
    Transformation Resources has exercised direct oversight of MFP-11.
    Title 10 language places responsibility for oversight of MFP-11 with
    the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low
    Intensity Conflict, recently renamed Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Special Operations, Low Intensity Conflict, and Interdependent
    Capabilities. This position is now vacant.

                              language incentives
        2. Senator Levin. Vice Admiral Olson, I understand that the Army
    and Air Force do not offer foreign language incentive pay until the
    individual reaches Level 2 proficiency. This would appear to work
    against encouraging special operators and conventional forces to start
    learning a language. Are you working with the Services to ensure that
    proficiency incentives are available for personnel from the very
    beginning, when they reach Level 1 proficiency?
        Admiral Olson. I agree that foreign language incentive pay to
    personnel whose language proficiency is Level 1 is important to
    increasing our capability. Special Operations personnel generally
    attend courses that target Level 1 proficiency and will train with a
    regional focus so that subsequent training and assignments will enhance
    the individual's capability over a career within the United States
    Special Operations Command (SOCOM). We approach improving foreign
    language incentive pay on three tracks: 1) the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Personnel and Readiness language transformation team; 2)
    Service, Defense Agency, and combatant command representatives on the
    Defense Language Steering Committee; and 3) one-on-one with specific
    Service Senior Language Authorities.
        The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
    Readiness, through its language transformation efforts, was successful
    in obtaining legislation authorizing payment of foreign language
    incentive pay at Proficiency Level 1.
        Our Senior Language Authority works with the Service Senior
    Language Authorities on the Defense Language Steering Committee. In
    April, he sent a memorandum to the U.S. Army requesting assistance in
    starting foreign language incentive pay for Army Special Operations
    Forces (SOFs) beginning at proficiency Level 1.

                           language testing-retention
        3. Senator Levin. Vice Admiral Olson, unlike intelligence analysts,
    special operators who are interacting with foreign militaries in the
    field need to attain oral foreign language proficiency. Does SOCOM test
    oral language proficiency?
        Admiral Olson. Conversing is indeed the key foreign language skill
    for special operators. Language testing is a Department of Defense
    (DOD) and Service common responsibility and as such, we rely on them
    for this metric. The recognized test for speaking within the various
    Defense Language Proficiency Tests is the Oral Proficiency Interview
    (OPI).
        The OPI measures speaking, whereas other Defense Language
    Proficiency Tests measure listening and reading separately. The OPI
    requires two certified examiners who are native fluent. It is therefore
    expensive, requires intense coordination, and is difficult to
    administer in bulk when compared to the listen/read tests.
        The result is that our instructors focus on read/listen skills to
    demonstrate their effectiveness and our students focus on read/listen
    skills to obtain foreign language incentive pay while our key
    requirement is for speaking.

        4. Senator Levin. Vice Admiral Olson, does the Defense Language
    Institute (DLI) support SOCOM's testing, including oral language
    testing? If not, why not?
        Admiral Olson. The DLI supports limited speaking tests or OPI. DLI
    lacks the capacity to administer this test on a scale that meets U.S.
    SOCOM's needs. Increased operational tempo and time zone differences
    present test scheduling challenges. Also, our personnel must still take
    the read/listen Defense Language Proficiency Test in order to qualify
    for foreign language incentive pay.
        We are concerned by the trends in read/listen Defense Language
    Proficiency Tests that are increasingly constructed to serve the users
    whose military tasks center on listening at proficiency Level 2 and
    higher. SOFs language tasks are most often performed in face-to-face
    conversations. The listening component of these newer read/listen tests
    is becoming less relevant to our requirements.
        SOCOM has articulated its needs to the Services and the DOD. The
    DLI has supported us within its constraints.

        5. Senator Levin. Vice Admiral Olson, I understand that when Army
    and Navy personnel get assigned to SOCOM they become ``SOF for life''
    so that any investment in language or other training is retained with
    these individuals by the command. However, the Navy personnel do not
    necessarily focus exclusively on one region for their careers. The
    Marine Corps and Air Force do not have permanent SOF personnel. What is
    the impact of this difference among the Services, and what would be the
    advantage of having Marine Corps and Air Force personnel who are ``SOF
    for life?''
        Admiral Olson. It is clear that the niche skill sets of language
    expertise and cultural familiarity are enhanced by multiple assignments
    in units focused on a specific region. Although ``SOF for life'' is not
    an official program or a term that directly applies to regionalization,
    it is true that our Army and Navy forces spend a higher percentage of
    their careers in SOF units. Army SOF is particularly well-organized to
    ensure that its enlisted force gains regional expertise through
    repetitive assignments.
        Our new Marine Corps' Marine Special Operations Advisory Groups
    require regionalization and are maturing on the Army model.
        Regionalization is less important to our Air Force units, except
    for one squadron that specializes in training foreign forces.
        ``SOF for life,'' as a concept for ensuring repetitive assignments
    in Special Operations units, irrespective of regional orientation, is
    inherently desirable. The advantage is recoupment on the investment in
    SOF training and SOF operational experience.

               marine corps special operations command--training
        6. Senator Levin. Vice Admiral Olson, on March 4, a Marine Corps
    Special Operations company appears to have used excessive force after a
    suicide bombing in Afghanistan. I understand the incident is being
    investigated. But given the testimony last week by General Scales that
    ``What's important in counterinsurgency are skills, not structure--the
    ability to speak the language, the ability to commune with alien
    cultures . . .,'' I wonder whether all of the Marine Special
    Operators--even the reconnaissance companies conducting direct action
    mission--are being given sufficient training to operate effectively in
    Afghanistan and elsewhere. Are Marine Special Operators training to the
    same level as their counterparts in the Army SOCOM?
        Admiral Olson. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command
    (MARSOC) units do not yet have training or experience equivalent to
    their counterparts in the U.S. Army Special Operations Command
    (USASOC). MARSOC recruited its initial personnel from across the Marine
    Corps and conducted a 6-month course, followed by 6 months of unit
    training, to prepare them for deployment. They were certified as
    operationally ready after a series of evaluated exercises.
    Individually, they were very highly-qualified marines.
        As of May 1, 2007, additional assessment and selection criteria
    have been imposed. The growing interaction with USASOC will ensure a
    higher level of training by all deploying MARSOC units in the future.
        It is SOCOM's intent that all assigned units be equally capable of
    performing their specific mission sets.

        7. Senator Levin. Vice Admiral Olson, how long will the average
    marine remain a Special Operations Marine before he is transferred back
    to the conventional Marine Corps?
        Admiral Olson. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps has established a
    minimum 48-month assignment to the MARSOC for designated SOF operators.
    The goal is to eventually reach a ``closed-loop'' for Marine SOF
    operators, which will ensure their continued assignment within the SOF
    community. Non-operators are assigned based on normal U.S. Marine Corps
    assignment policies of a minimum of 36 months.

                         advanced seal delivery system
        8. Senator Levin. Vice Admiral Olson, to date, about $885 million
    has been spent on developing the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS).
    The fiscal year 2008 request for ASDS is $10.6 million for procurement
    and $20.3 million for research and development. Do you think the
    command can afford to have more than one ASDS? How long will it take
    for you to ensure that we have an operational ASDS?
        Admiral Olson. Funds were realigned to restructure the ASDS program
    and forego the procurement of additional platforms in favor of pursuing
    reliability improvements to ASDS-1. We are conducting an assessment of
    alternative material solutions to fulfill remaining requirements. The
    affordability question cannot be answered until this assessment has
    been completed.
        The ASDS Reliability Improvement Program was initiated in fiscal
    year 2006 to improve the operational reliability of the existing ASDS
    vehicle (ASDS-1). The ASDS Reliability Improvement Program is on
    schedule. This ongoing reliability effort represents the major portion
    of the funding shown in the fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008
    budget exhibits. As a result of this effort, ASDS-1 has demonstrated
    significantly improved reliability within the past year during both
    independent and mated underway operations. We expect ASDS-1 to become
    fully operational and ready for deployment to meet assigned missions in
    fiscal year 2008.
        Although the materiel solution for follow-on craft is still to be
    determined, the objective inventory for ASDS-like submersibles remains
    six.

           training and equipping indigenous forces fighting with sof
        9. Senator Levin. Vice Admiral Olson, in the National Defense
    Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2005, title XII, section 1208, we
    granted SOCOM a 2-year authority to train and equip indigenous forces
    fighting alongside U.S. Special Operators. How have you used this
    authority, and to what effect? If we gave you this authority again
    where would you use it?
        Admiral Olson. We have used section 1208 authority to support
    operations in each of the geographic combatant commands, although the
    majority of its use has been in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area
    of operations. In all locations, the support received from foreign
    forces, irregular forces, groups, and individuals has achieved two
    critical objectives: 1) access into denied hostile areas and terrorist
    safe havens, and 2) operational information about tribes, terrain, and
    terrorists that we could not gather through our own reconnaissance and
    surveillance activities. In the CENTCOM area of operations, section
    1208 authority has been key to finding and fixing terrorist individuals
    and infrastructures. If this authority is extended beyond fiscal year
    2007, we will continue to use it globally to prepare the environment to
    defeat terrorism. We consider section 1208 very important to our
    ability to succeed in the global war on terror.
        A streamlined approval process for the use of section 1208
    authority is key to its flexibility.

                    special operations forces--civil affairs
        10. Senator Levin. Vice Admiral Olson, it is my understanding that
    as a result of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), SOCOM's Reserve
    Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations components have been
    moved from under SOCOM administrative control to Army administrative
    control, under the command of regular Army units. Some operators have
    told committee staff that the conventional Army officers commanding
    these CA components may not understand their special capabilities. This
    could have a negative impact on Reserve CA professional advancement, as
    conventional officers would write their fitness reports, and instead of
    taking advantage of their unique skills, might use them for
    conventional duties. In addition, there is fear that the synergy
    between the ``kinetic'' or ``direct action'' forces and the ``non-
    kinetic, indirect'' forces will be broken and the failure to couple
    these forces in missions will have a negative impact on combating
    terrorism efforts. Do you share these concerns, and what can be done to
    prevent the potential negative impacts I mentioned?
        Admiral Olson. [Deleted.]

                             support to afghanistan
        11. Senator Levin. Admiral Keating, in your written statement you
    mention the support Japan and Korea are providing to our efforts in
    Afghanistan. You were just in Japan and Korea, and are traveling soon
    to China. Have you discussed the possibility of making new
    contributions to Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan
    with Japan and Korea?
        Admiral Keating. In my personal discussions, I have encouraged
    Japan to continue to increase multilateral cooperation efforts such as
    its oiler support in the Indian Ocean and its emphasis on peace
    cooperation activities by the Japan Self-Defense Force. While not
    specifically discussed, Japan Self-Defense Forces offer critical
    skillsets (e.g. medical, engineering, et cetera) that could greater
    benefit the international community and not conflict with their legal/
    constitutional restrictions.
        Led by the Office of the Secretary of Defense on Policy (OSD-P), we
    are talking with the Republic of Korea (ROK) government to determine
    future roles for the ROK in Afghanistan. However, as part of the
    decision to support the 1-year deployment extension in 2006, the
    National Assembly set December 2007 as the redeployment date for ROK
    forces from Afghanistan. Discussions continue, but political challenges
    make it unlikely for ROK forces to deploy past 2007.

        12. Senator Levin. Admiral Keating, if the governments of Japan,
    Korea, and China were asked by the administration and the Afghan
    government to contribute personnel and other resources to PRTs in
    Afghanistan, how would you expect them to respond? Would they be likely
    to contribute?
        Admiral Keating. Japan views its contributions in Afghanistan as a
    substantial part of its ongoing global efforts. New initiatives would
    likely require a tradeoff (e.g. exchange Indian Ocean oiler support for
    PRT efforts in country). Japan would respond more favorably to United
    Nations (U.N.) requests/missions.
        The United States Government is currently discussing extending
    Korea's mission in Afghanistan with the ROK government. However, as
    part of the decision to support the 1-year deployment extension in
    2006, the National Assembly set December 2007 as the redeployment date
    for ROK forces from Afghanistan. Discussions continue, but political
    challenges make it unlikely for ROK forces to deploy past 2007.
        I would anticipate China to emphasize its current contributions in
    terms of financing projects in Afghanistan, but not to offer further
    assistance. Additionally, senior People's Liberation Army officials
    have stated they would not get involved without a U.N. mandate.

                               india--afghanistan
        13. Senator Levin. Admiral Keating, what relationships do you
    believe exist between the armed groups conducting terrorist attacks in
    India, and the armed groups operating in Pakistan and Afghanistan?
        Admiral Keating. There are reported organizational relationships
    between armed groups conducting attacks in India and Afghanistan,
    specifically among Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, al Qaeda, and the
    Taliban. The relationships between groups conducting attacks in India
    and in Pakistan, however, are not assessed to have organizational ties
    but rather a relationship based on links between individuals. Al Qaeda
    operatives remain a common denominator between these disparate groups.

        14. Senator Levin. Admiral Keating, what action, if any, have you
    proposed that India take to undertake substantial counterterrorism
    intelligence-sharing with Pakistan and Afghanistan? Is there a role for
    Pacific Command (PACOM) or U.S. forces in fostering such intelligence-
    sharing?
        Admiral Keating. [Deleted.]

        15. Senator Levin. Admiral Keating, what, if anything, is the U.S.
    military doing to support the efforts of the Indian military to manage
    cross-border terrorism?
        Admiral Keating. [Deleted.]

                 india--international peacekeeping cooperation
        16. Senator Levin. Admiral Keating, in 2004, President Bush
    announced a Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) at the G-8 summit
    in Sea Island, Georgia. Leaving aside whether G-8 members other than
    the United States are contributing sufficient resources to the
    initiative, we do not appear to be reaching out to countries such as
    India, that have significant peacekeeping experience, participation
    levels, and potential ability to contribute resources, in order to make
    them partners in this effort. Do you know whether India has been asked
    to participate in GPOI? If they were, what was the response? If they
    weren't, do you know why?
        Admiral Keating. India received a demarche, coordinated with PACOM
    in October 2006, conveying U.S. interest in a partnership with India on
    the GPOI.
        Indian military officials have expressed interest in participating
    in future GPOI courses and are forwarding their requests to the
    Government of India (GOI) for approval. By September 2007, PACOM
    expects to receive confirmation from the GOI to co-host a January 2008
    Senior Mission Leader course with PACOM and the U.N.'s Department of
    Peacekeeping Operations. Additionally, GOI approval is pending for
    participation in several upcoming GPOI courses occurring in the region
    over the next 3 months.

                                    thailand
        17. Senator Levin. Admiral Keating, your written statement asserts
    that you are continuing to seek authority from this committee to equip
    counterdrug forces in various countries including Thailand. However, in
    the aftermath of the September 2006 military coup, much of our
    assistance to Thailand was suspended, including some of the money
    authorized by this committee. Also, last week, Major General Fridovich,
    the Commander of SOFs in the Pacific, stated that if the Thai
    government asks the U.S. military to help them fight terrorists in
    southern Thailand, we would take the opportunity. Do you believe that
    providing additional funding or training to Thailand right now would
    send the right message to the Thai military leaders, at a time when it
    is far from clear whether Thailand will actually hold elections at the
    end of this year, as the coup leaders have promised?
        Admiral Keating. Section 508 of the Foreign Operations
    Appropriations Act mandated the suspension of security assistance to
    Thailand following the September 2006 coup. However, Combating
    Terrorism Fellowship Program funding is still being applied in Thailand
    in fiscal year 2007. I believe the interagency decision to continue
    this program was the right one because it furthers U.S.
    counterterrorism goals in Southeast Asia. The amount of funding and
    activity is not projected to increase in fiscal year 2008, and all
    interaction will follow normal coordination procedures with the U.S.
    country team in Thailand.

        18. Senator Levin. Admiral Keating, what will be the potential
    impact, both political and military, if we do not extend counterdrug
    support to Thailand?
        Admiral Keating. Because the largest percentage of counterdrug
    support is provided to Thai law enforcement agencies, any lessening of
    support will have minimal direct impact on the Thai military.
        However, the DOD counterdrug support has important impact as part
    of the larger interagency and international effort. Training,
    infrastructure, and information fusion are parts of the DOD support
    plan and these threads, although borne out of counterdrug programs, do
    support efforts to reduce other transnational threats. Additionally,
    U.S. law enforcement agencies in Thailand benefit from the DOD and DOS
    counterdrug support programs.

        19. Senator Levin. Admiral Keating, do we plan to provide training
    to the Thai military, as described by General Fridovich?
        Admiral Keating. [Deleted.]

                           north korea--nuclear tests
        20. Senator Levin. General Bell, in your written statement, you
    assert that, ``If the Six-Party Talks do not produce a lasting
    settlement, the North Koreans will likely conduct a second and
    potentially additional nuclear tests when they see it as serving their
    purposes.'' Can you elaborate on this?
        General Bell. North Korea has a history of using both provocation
    and engagement to seek achievement of its policy objectives. Its
    objectives include security/non-aggression guarantees from the United
    States and economic support from the world community. Pyongyang
    intended for the October 2006 nuclear test to demonstrate a nuclear
    capability, thereby boosting North Korean prestige and enhancing its
    bargaining position relative to the U.S. and the international
    community. The test also served to refocus international attention on
    North Korea.
        If North Korea perceives it is not making progress in international
    negotiations, especially with the U.S., or that it is unlikely to
    achieve its desired objectives, I anticipate Pyongyang would once again
    resort to this type of provocative action. They may hope that such a
    test would increase pressure on the U.S. and the international
    community to accommodate North Korean demands for desired concessions
    in pursuit of their policy objectives.

        21. Senator Levin. General Bell, why do you believe North Korea
    would test again if the talks do not result in ``lasting settlement''
    and when do you believe that Pyongyang would see a test as ``serving
    their purposes?''
        General Bell. If North Korea perceives it is not making progress in
    international negotiations, especially with the United States, or that
    it is unlikely to achieve its desired objectives of security and non-
    aggression guarantees from the United States, Pyongyang may once again
    resort to this type of provocative action to increase pressure on the
    United States. and the international community to accommodate its
    demands for desired concessions. This is particularly true if Pyongyang
    views these additional nuclear tests as carrying only low to moderate
    political risk.
        Based on Pyongyang's public rhetoric since the October 2006 nuclear
    test, North Korea attempts to place itself as a nuclear power on an
    equal strategic footing with the United States. The lack of any
    substantial, coordinated international sanctions against North Korea in
    response to the test may have further emboldened Pyongyang in its
    negotiations.

        22. Senator Levin. General Bell, do you have any reason to believe
    that North Korea might conduct another nuclear or missile test? Do you
    think their last nuclear test was a success?
        General Bell. Although the October 2006 nuclear test was only
    successful as very low yield, it significantly raised tensions and
    concerns over the potential for additional tests, and North Korean
    nuclear proliferation.
        As long as North Korea maintains its nuclear and missile programs,
    it would be logical for Pyongyang to continue to conduct additional
    tests. However, I do not anticipate North Korea will conduct such tests
    while actively engaged in dialogue with the international community. If
    the Six-Party Talks process fails, the probability of North Korea
    conducting a second nuclear test or additional missile tests will
    increase substantially.

                     north korea--conventional capabilities
        23. Senator Levin. General Bell, what is your assessment of North
    Korea's conventional capabilities? Is the conventional threat posed by
    North Korea greater, less, or unchanged in comparison to the threat
    posed last year?
        General Bell. The DPRK maintains a massive, offensively postured
    conventional force that far exceeds the requirements to defend its
    country. It remains a major threat to stability and security in
    Northeast Asia and the world.
        My assessment is that due to the age and questionable readiness of
    North Korea's conventional military equipment, as well as the
    substantial modern readiness of the ROK-U.S. Alliance, I do not believe
    that North Korea can execute sustained operations in depth. However,
    they remain capable of a no-notice and highly lethal assault across the
    front with limited objectives. North Korea continues to envision a
    short, violent assault to overwhelm Combined Forces Command defenses
    with the intent of gaining territorial advantage before additional U.S.
    or UNC forces arrive.
        Compared to 2006, the conventional military threat remains
    unchanged. North Korea concluded its Winter Training Cycle which lasted
    from December 2006 through April 2007. This is the primary period that
    North Korea's million-man army trains. The level and intensity of
    training was adequate for units to sustain basic proficiency.

        24. Senator Levin. General Bell, in the aftermath of the October
    2006 nuclear test, have you seen any decrease in financial and other
    support to conventional forces by the North Korean regime?
        General Bell. Since the October 2006 nuclear test, there has not
    been any reporting to suggest a change in North Korea's financial or
    resource support structure for its military.

        25. Senator Levin. General Bell, has there been any rhetoric coming
    from Pyongyang that would indicate a potential shift of the North
    Korean budget from the military to other government sectors?
        General Bell. While North Korean rhetoric during 2007 has
    frequently focused on the regime's intent to improve the quality of
    life for North Koreans, it has not explicitly stated the intent to do
    so at the expense of the military. There is no intelligence to indicate
    any reduction or reallocation of resources from the military to the
    civil sector has occurred. If any shift should take place, it will be
    incremental in nature, making it difficult to detect in the short-term.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
                                     china
        26. Senator Akaka. Admiral Keating, during the hearing, there was a
    great deal of discussion regarding the aggressive military buildup in
    China, and on China's modernization of their nuclear program. Is
    China's aggressive buildup and nuclear modernization in response to any
    actions on the part of the United States, or on the part of any other
    nations in the region, such as Japan, Russia, or Korea? For instance,
    could part of China's nuclear modernization be driven by our impending
    deployment of antiballistic missile systems?
        Admiral Keating. I do not have any direct insight into Chinese
    rationale for its nuclear modernization efforts. In my opinion,
    however, I think China views its nuclear program as an important
    capability and significant component of its influence regionally and
    globally, independent of the actions by others, to include the
    deployment of U.S. missile defenses.

        27. Senator Akaka. Admiral Keating, how do you believe we should
    respond if China continues this rapid expansion/modernization into the
    foreseeable future?
        Admiral Keating. I believe we should continue to monitor military
    capabilities while at the same time pursuing greater insight into
    People's Republic of China intentions. U.S. PACOM maintains a two-prong
    approach towards China--encouraging transparency while maintaining
    readiness.

        28. Senator Akaka. Admiral Keating, during the hearing, it was
    discussed that the U.S. military may have known China was planning on
    conducting a test to try to destroy a satellite with a missile before
    they conducted the test. During the hearing, you said that you were not
    aware in advance that this test was going to be conducted. Did Admiral
    Fallon as the Commander of PACOM know of this test in advance? If so,
    should you, as the Commander of United States Northern Command
    (NORTHCOM), have been notified in advance?
        Admiral Keating. I have not discussed Admiral Fallon's knowledge of
    the anti-satellite (ASAT) test with him. In my role as NORTHCOM
    commander, I was satisfied with the intelligence I received concerning
    the ASAT test.

        29. Senator Akaka. Admiral Keating, in your statement, you
    highlight the successes occurring in the PACOM area of responsibility
    (AOR). Are there any areas in your AOR that you are most concerned
    about in the fight against terror?
        Admiral Keating. The Sulu and Celebes seas between Malaysia,
    Indonesia, and the Philippines are an area of concern. This region
    remains relatively unmonitored and uncontrolled and is a sanctuary for
    transit and illicit activities, which sustain terrorist activity.
    Building these littoral states' military and law enforcement maritime
    capabilities to combat transnational threat and limit terrorist
    mobility in Southeast Asia is a proven method to reducing terrorist
    activities. Authorities such as ``Train and Equip'' assist us in these
    efforts.
        Additionally, transnational, violent extremists have the ability to
    leverage the insurgency in southern Thailand and portions of
    Bangladesh. These areas provide terrorists with training and
    operational opportunities. The Royal Thai Government and Government of
    Bangladesh are working to counteract terrorists and reestablish secure
    environments. PACOM continues to leverage opportunities to work with
    these countries' armed forces to build their capacity to better combat
    these problems and develop a secure environment.

        30. Senator Akaka. Admiral Keating, in your statement, you
    highlight the successes in building regional capabilities to combat
    weapons of mass destruction (WMD). You state that nine nations in the
    AOR have endorsed President Bush's Proliferation Security Initiative.
    Notably missing from the list endorsing the initiative are China and
    Russia. Are there plans to engage these countries in this initiative?
    If so, what is the status of their participation? If not, why not?
        Admiral Keating. Under the Unified Command Plan, Russia is in the
    European Command AOR and U.S. PACOM therefore did not report on
    Russia's involvement in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
    However, Russia has endorsed the PSI Statement of Interdiction
    Principles and actively participates in the PSI Operational Experts
    Group, a group of 20 states that meet periodically to advance PSI
    concepts on behalf of all PSI nations.
        The U.S. Government continues to engage China on PSI in various
    multinational and bilateral events and will continue to explore
    opportunities to cooperate on nonproliferation issues. The PSI
    community has invited China to attend PSI outreach events, such as the
    New Zealand-hosted Asia and Pacific Islands outreach in March 2007, the
    Japan-hosted Asian Senior-Level Talks on Non-proliferation in January
    2007, and the Australia-hosted PSI exercise Pacific Protector 06. To
    date, China has declined to attend these events or to endorse PSI.

                       operations on the korean peninsula
        31. Senator Akaka. General Bell, in your prepared statement, you
    discuss the transition of wartime operational control of the South
    Korean forces to the ROK in 2012. How will this transition affect the
    U.S. force structure in Korea, and what levels of ground forces will we
    need to sustain an adequate presence in Korea following the transition?
        General Bell. Transition of operational control from Combined
    Forces Command to the ROK is made possible because their military is
    capable, professional, and modern. Their ground forces are particularly
    robust, with 48 divisions standing ready to defend the ROK. The areas
    where they need assistance correspond to areas where the United States
    is particularly strong, air and naval power. As such, U.S. force
    structure in Korea already closely matches what will be required in the
    future, with a small ground component that provides security, helps
    enable the evacuation of our noncombatants, and facilitates the
    introduction of additional U.S. forces should they be required. Our air
    and naval presence provides a deterrent force against aggression but
    can be rapidly expanded should that deterrence fail. Accordingly, at
    this time, I do not foresee changes in the levels of U.S. forces that
    will be assigned in Korea after OPCON transition.

        32. Senator Akaka. General Bell, China and Russia have expressed
    doubts toward the U.S. claim that North Korea has a secret highly-
    enriched uranium (HEU) program that could be used to provide weapons
    grade material even if North Korea stops production of plutonium. What
    is our level of confidence in our assertion that the North Koreans have
    a secret HEU program, and why are we not able to convince China and
    Russia that the program exists?
        General Bell. I assess with high confidence that North Korea has
    pursued a uranium enrichment capability, and I have moderate confidence
    that this effort continues. However, the degree of progress towards
    producing enriched uranium remains unknown.
        China and Russia have not made public their assessments of North
    Korea's efforts to acquire a uranium enrichment capability, therefore,
    it is difficult to assess their conclusions.

        33. Senator Akaka. General Bell, in your statement, you indicated
    that due to the threat from North Korea, the United States has recently
    reaffirmed our commitment to continue to extend to the ROK the security
    of our nuclear umbrella. How is this commitment affected by the
    transition of wartime operational command of South Korean forces to the
    ROK?
        General Bell. Our commitment to the defense of the ROK is founded
    upon our Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954. Forged in the shared experience
    of the Korean War, this commitment has only grown stronger in the years
    since, as our nations' ties have expanded many times over to include
    economic, educational, cultural, and military linkages. The transition
    of wartime operational control to the ROK is another example of the
    growth of both of our nations, but it does not signify a lessening of
    commitment. It also does not signify a lessening of the threat to peace
    on the Korean Peninsula. As such, my opinion is that transition of
    wartime operational control does not affect our commitment to extend
    the security of our nuclear umbrella to the ROK.

        34. Senator Akaka. Vice Admiral Olson and General Bell, in your
    statement, you indicate that North Korea maintains the largest SOF in
    the world. What is your assessment of the capabilities of the North
    Korean SOFs?
        Admiral Olson. [Deleted.]
        General Bell. Current estimates of the North Korean SOF are over
    80,000 personnel. SOF personnel are chosen for political reliability
    and loyalty. North Korean SOF are trained to conduct reconnaissance,
    light infantry, and sniper missions and are found at the strategic,
    operational, and tactical levels. North Korea's SOF has significant
    capability to infiltrate the ROK and can conduct asymmetric attacks
    against a variety of targets.

        35. Senator Akaka. Vice Admiral Olson and General Bell, in your
    opinion, do they have a significant capability to operate outside the
    Korean Peninsula?
        Admiral Olson. [Deleted.]
        General Bell. The vast majority of North Korean SOFs will operate
    within the Korean Theater of Operations (KTO); they have only a limited
    capability to operate outside of the KTO.

                           special operations command
        36. Senator Akaka. Vice Admiral Olson, as indicated in the SOCOM
    posture statement, SOCOM is the lead combatant command for planning and
    synchronizing, and when directed, executing global operations against
    terrorist networks in coordination with other combatant commanders. The
    posture statement states that DOD's global war on terror campaign
    focuses on two essential approaches, direct and indirect. One of the
    indirect pieces of DOD's integrated approach to the global war on
    terror described in your posture statement is that actions are being
    taken to attack the roots of terrorism and eliminate its further
    growth. In SOCOM's role as the lead combatant command for planning and
    synchronizing DOD operations against terrorist networks, please tell me
    who has the lead for activities aimed at attacking the roots of
    terrorism and eliminating its further growth?
        Admiral Olson. The U.S. SOCOM 2007 Posture Statement contains a
    Threat Model that describes how violent extremist organizations operate
    and the numerous ``roots'' of terrorism that impact the populace from
    which such extremists seek support. Addressing these roots requires a
    whole government approach wherein the DOD supports interagency actions.
        Within the DOD, SOCOM has the lead for planning and synchronizing
    this overall effort. In the broader context of our Nation's efforts,
    the Department of State has the lead for international development and
    partner nation initiatives, which in many instances are directly
    relevant to this effort. While there is no agency lead, there are
    extensive interagency coordination efforts underway to combat the
    terrorist threat and the commitment to further strengthen these
    efforts.

        37. Senator Akaka. Vice Admiral Olson, what is your assessment on
    the effectiveness of this part of the integrated strategy so far?
        Admiral Olson. The synchronization efforts led by U.S. SOCOM within
    the DOD are progressing satisfactorily. Interagency coordination is
    improving with time and experience, and is better than it has ever
    been. It could be further enhanced by clarification of responsibilities
    and authorities with respect to roles and missions.

        38. Senator Akaka. Vice Admiral Olson, how is this strategy being
    implemented in countries like Syria and Iran?
        Admiral Olson. The U.S. SOCOM has the lead for planning and
    synchronizing the global strategy and campaign. The Geographic
    Combatant Commanders have the lead for execution of this strategy in
    their areas. Accordingly, I defer Commander, U.S. CENTCOM, to answer
    specific questions about Syria and Iran.

        39. Senator Akaka. Vice Admiral Olson, how is this strategy used to
    deal with historical sectarian grievances, such as those between the
    Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis?
        Admiral Olson. The global strategy deals with historical sectarian
    grievances by generally addressing the core motivations and underlying
    conditions of entire populations in order to separate them from all
    violent extremism.

        40. Senator Akaka. Vice Admiral Olson, DOD is increasing the end
    strength of the SOFs as directed in the QDR. The Army has already had
    to change its recruitment standards in order to meet its recruiting
    needs. For instance, they now accept new recruits up to the age of 42.
    Have the SOFs in any of the Services, Reserve, or National Guard had to
    change any part of their standards in order to meet recruitment
    targets? If so, what are those changes?
        Admiral Olson. No, we have not changed our recruiting standards to
    meet recruitment targets. We take a more holistic approach to end
    strength by focusing on retention. If we can retain our current forces
    at higher rates, there will be less need to recruit. Toward this end,
    we use personnel management tools such as the Critical Skills Retention
    Bonus, Special Duty Assignment Pay, and Assignment Incentive Pay.

        41. Senator Akaka. Vice Admiral Olson, will SOCOM be able to
    recruit to its increased end strength numbers without changing its
    standards for new personnel?
        Admiral Olson. Yes. We are confident that the U.S. SOCOM will meet
    its end strength numbers for personnel without changing its standards.
        SOCOM has invested in its training infrastructure in order to
    increase throughput capacity. Each of the Services has highlighted SOFs
    recruiting and facilitated intra-service transfers to SOF. Improved
    screening processes are ensuring higher quality candidates. The early
    reports are positive, with all of our SOF Service components indicating
    record personnel production numbers.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
       special operations command missions at cannon air force base, new
                                     mexico
        42. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Olson, in May 2005 after 2 years
    of thorough analysis and review, the Secretary of Defense forwarded his
    recommendations for base closures and realignments to the 2005 Defense
    Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission. One of those
    recommendations was to close Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico, which
    would have saved the Air Force over $206 million annually and over $2.6
    billion over the next 20 years. The commission responded by agreeing to
    close Cannon by 2009 if the Secretary of Defense could not find ``other
    newly-identified'' missions to replace the F-16s currently operating
    out of Cannon Air Force Base. The Secretary of Defense announced in
    2006 that Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) units would be
    assigned to Cannon Air Force Base to establish a western base of
    operations for various types of aircraft supporting special operations
    including C-130 gunships, MV-22s, unmanned aerial vehicles, and rotary
    wing aircraft. My concern is that at a time when we are transforming
    bases such as Fort Bragg and Eglin Air Force Base into joint, combined
    arms special operations locations, we have missed a prime opportunity
    to establish a western hub that offers a wide range of joint basing and
    training possibilities for special operations. In your view from a
    joint operations and training perspective, is Cannon Air Force Base the
    best location in the United States to station AFSOC assets? If so, why?
    If not, why not?
        Admiral Olson. [Deleted.]

        43. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Olson, will Melrose Range near
    Cannon Air Force Base provide the capability to conduct the full range
    of special operations training? If not, what are its limitations?
        Admiral Olson. [Deleted.]

        44. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Olson, was the Commander of SOCOM
    involved in the DOD's assessment of alternative locations for AFSOC's
    western hub?
        Admiral Olson. [Deleted.]

        45. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Olson, SOCOM currently proposes to
    spend over $217 million at Cannon Air Force Base for facilities and
    infrastructure to support AFSOC units. Were these costs known by SOCOM
    at the time the Secretary of Defense announced the stationing of AFSOC
    assets at Cannon Air Force Base?
        Admiral Olson. [Deleted.]

        46. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Olson, has SOCOM accomplished any
    type of analysis of alternatives to determine whether another location
    might have resulted in a lower cost for AFSOC facilities?
        Admiral Olson. [Deleted.]

                family housing for u.s. military forces in korea
        47. Senator McCain. General Bell, in your statement, you advocate
    for proposed legislation in the National Defense Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Year 2008 that would amend existing law to increase the amount
    the Secretary of the Army can pay to lease a house for a military
    family stationed in the ROK. The proposed legislation would permit the
    Secretary to pay up to $51,824 per year per house, or $4,319 per month
    per house for 2,800 units. This is about 40 percent more than is
    currently permitted by law. The Congressional Budget Office recently
    determined that this provision, if adopted, would have a budget impact
    equal to $530 million in potential additional expenses. These houses
    will actually be large high-rise complexes built on land owned by the
    Federal Government at a time of a favorable bid climate in Korea. This
    is a very expensive proposal. Has the Government estimate driving the
    legislation been validated by any actual contracting action which would
    allow the market to competitively bid on the lease cost? If not, why
    not?
        General Bell. Yes, U.S. Government estimates and market analyses
    constitute foundational elements of the contracting process for our
    build to lease (BTL) program. The Korean marketplace has validated our
    process as evidenced by successful delivery of a 144 unit senior leader
    quarters (SLQ) facility at K-16 Airbase, which employed the competitive
    bidding process to ensure cost effective contracting for leased
    housing. (BTL projects for senior leader quarters are not subject to
    the legislative caps which currently restrict our ability to pursue our
    family housing BTL requirements in Korea.) Purchasing power for $35,000
    leases used for BTL compares favorably to that of other overseas leases
    when adjusted for inflation and official exchange rate (OER) changes.
    As an example, in fiscal year 2007 Korea's $35,000 lease delivers
    purchasing power and allows the U.S. Government to pay up to $51,824,
    after applying the adjustments for inflation and OER fluctuation in the
    NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 legislative proposal, if approved. In
    comparison, a $25,000 lease in Europe, considering the same factors,
    today results in purchasing power of up to $56,328 in Germany and
    $56,701 in Belgium. As such, a $35,000 lease in Korea is comparatively
    less costly than a $25,000 lease in Europe, given currency fluctuation
    and inflation rate changes. Therefore, we would posit that leases are
    not more expensive in Korea than the United States is willing to pay in
    other overseas markets. These figures are derived from the lease cap
    methodology confirmed by the Office of Installations and Housing of the
    Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment.
    Further, these figures remain consistent in fiscal year 2008, showing a
    favorable comparison of Korea's BTL program requirements and
    authorizations with other existing overseas leasing programs.

        48. Senator McCain. General Bell, do you currently have the
    authority to solicit the public sector for proposals for a build-to-
    lease venture for 2,800 units in Korea?
        General Bell. Yes, the Secretary of the Army has authority to lease
    a total number of 2,800 family housing units in Korea at the existing
    lease cap of $35,000 as a result of several legislative enactments
    between the fiscal year 2003 Authorization and fiscal year 2007
    Authorization to support U.S. commitments to the Yongsan Relocation
    Plan and the U.S.-ROK Alliance. However, the $35,000 lease cap is
    inadequate to attract Korean developers and contractors to build family
    housing to DOD standards based on market analyses and cost estimates
    produced by private sector industry specialists and Army Corps of
    Engineers experts. Without the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 legislative
    proposal, the lease cap after inflation and currency adjustments is
    insufficient to amortize construction costs, utilities, maintenance,
    and operations while providing a reasonable return on investment to
    private firms. The bottom line is that given the current inflexible
    lease caps, all the experts tell us conclusively that no private firm
    will consider constructing family housing for our servicemembers to the
    standards required by DOD.

        49. Senator McCain. General Bell, you state that ``the Army is
    pursuing a range of build-to-lease family and senior officer/
    noncommissioned officers quarters to be sited at the Camp Humphreys
    facility. Army forces cannot displace to Camp Humphreys until these
    units are completed.'' What is your plan to complete these units if the
    legislation is not provided?
        General Bell. Much like in Europe where Congress has supported the
    effort, DOD, Department of the Army, and U.S. Forces Korea have
    determined that BTL is the most viable solution for our overseas family
    housing requirements. Leasing homes instead of using military
    construction (MILCON) has worked well for our military in both Europe
    and Korea. Amortizing future Korea BTL projects over a 15-year window
    is favorable to the upfront cost of MILCON. If not supported by
    Congress, our only option to meet U.S.-ROK bilateral agreement
    timelines and deliver U.S. standard family housing for military
    servicemembers and their families will be MILCON. In the current MILCON
    environment with BRAC, global basing, and grow-the-force initiatives,
    we doubt we would favorably compete for overseas MILCON. Additionally
    and as part of U.S.-ROK Alliance agreements to downsize and transform
    the U.S. military effort to a supporting role positioned in sanctuary
    locations south of Seoul by 2012, we would have to ask Congress to fund
    up to $1.5 billion of MILCON in the next 4 years. This level of MILCON
    front loading seems a poor second choice to the 15-year lease program.
    The Korean National Assembly has already approved to cost share nearly
    $5 billion for our relocation efforts, while annually providing
    additional burden-sharing support amounting to approximately $770
    million this year alone.

                    relocation of marine corps units to guam
        50. Senator McCain. Admiral Keating, over 8,000 U.S. marines are
    planned to be relocated from the island of Okinawa to Guam within the
    next 6 years. This move is estimated to cost the United States over
    $4.3 billion just to provide facilities and infrastructure on Guam for
    our marines and their families. The Japanese Government will also share
    the costs of over $6 billion for additional facilities and housing. In
    the end, we will have a split Pacific Marine Force with part of the 2
    MEF in Okinawa and part in Guam. My concern is that these costs may not
    cover the plans for strategic mobility requirements, including the
    ports, roads, and airfield infrastructure needed to get the marines off
    the island and to their destination in their planned time periods. Has
    PACOM developed a plan with Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) to be
    able to move the forces off Guam during contingencies?
        Admiral Keating. The $10.3 billion agreement between the Government
    of Japan and the United States funds infrastructure costs necessary to
    support the deployment of marines from Guam. PACOM is working with
    TRANSCOM to modify detailed transportation requirements and identify
    shortfalls for future marine contingency movements. Depending on the
    contingency location, the marines may not require additional airlift as
    the southern major air bridge goes through Guam.

        51. Senator McCain. Admiral Keating, if so, what additional
    movement hardware, infrastructure, and facilities will be required to
    move the marines and have the costs for these resources been included
    in the relocation budget?
        Admiral Keating. The $10.3 billion estimate to support the movement
    of marines from Okinawa to Guam includes projects for unit facilities,
    infrastructure, and housing. Ancillary costs such as relocation of
    Marine personnel, facility furnishings, development of training
    facilities in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas
    Islands, and operational deployments are not included in the estimate.

        52. Senator McCain. Admiral Keating, has PACOM reviewed the
    available training ranges around Guam to ensure marines will have
    adequate amphibious assault and combined arms practice areas?
        Admiral Keating. Yes. PACOM and each of the Service components have
    determined training requirements needed in Guam and the Commonwealth of
    the Northern Marianas, to include amphibious assault and combined arms
    practice areas. Additional land and training facilities are necessary
    to meet Marine training requirements. The Joint Guam Program Office is
    incorporating these training requirements into the infrastructure and
    environmental planning process for Guam. Though planning efforts are
    ongoing, meeting these training needs appears feasible.

        53. Senator McCain. Admiral Keating, as opposed to sinking over $10
    billion for infrastructure on the island of Guam, was there any
    consideration given within PACOM to relocating 8,000 marines back to
    established bases in California with Twentynine Palms available for
    training and developed ports of debarkation?
        Admiral Keating. We reviewed a number of options, including
    relocation to California. We determined that in order to maintain the
    right balance of capabilities and ensure deterrence, the marines should
    remain forward based in the Western Pacific region. Guam offered
    optimal position for flexible deployment of those forces for regional
    and global contingencies, with significantly improved response times as
    compared to the west coast. Moreover, we are relocating the marines
    from Okinawa to Guam in the context of U.S.-Japan Alliance
    transformation and alliance capabilities. Japan's agreement to finance
    over $6 billion of Guam's development costs reflects the continued
    relevance of these marines in the region, consistent with U.S. treaty
    commitments to Japan.

        [Whereupon, at 12:14 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2008

                                  ----------

                             THURSDAY, MAY 3, 2007

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                         UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
    SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Bill
    Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Clinton, Pryor, Webb, Inhofe,
    Sessions, Collins, Thune, and Martinez.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr.,
    professional staff member; and Michael J. Noblet, research
    assistant.
        Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
    Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
    staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; Sean
    G. Stackley, professional staff member; and Dana W. White,
    professional staff member.
        Staff assistants present: David G. Collins, Kevin A.
    Cronin, Jessica L. Kingston, and Benjamin L. Rubin.
        Committee members' assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman and
    Jay Maroney, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M.
    Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King,
    assistant to Senator Reed; Christopher Caple, assistant to
    Senator Bill Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh;
    Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; Gordon I.
    Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Jeremy Shull, assistant to
    Senator Inhofe; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator Collins;
    Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Stuart C.
    Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune; and Brian W. Walsh,
    assistant to Senator Martinez.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Today we welcome Admiral William Fallon,
    Commander of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), in
    his first appearance before this committee since his
    confirmation hearing earlier this year. Admiral Fallon's
    command is responsible for U.S. security interests in 25
    nations that stretch from the Horn of Africa (HOA) to the
    Arabian Gulf region into Central Asia. He commands the bulk of
    U.S. troops in combat today and he is responsible for an area
    with a host of security challenges which may at any time erupt
    into violence, requiring further military response.
        However, Admiral Fallon is a diplomat as well as a military
    man. We rely on his judgment and his diplomatic skills to help
    us deter and prevent conflict almost as much as we do his
    military skills when a military response is appropriate. Today
    we will be seeking his counsel on a host of troubling issues in
    his area of responsibility (AOR), predominantly but not
    entirely Iraq.
        In Iraq, Prime Minister Maliki has said: ``The crisis is
    political and the ones who can stop the cycle of bloodletting
    of innocents are the Iraqi politicians.''
        The Iraqis are not meeting the benchmarks that they have
    set for themselves. The Iraqi Assembly Committee considering
    amendments to the Iraqi constitution appears to be as far from
    completing its work as it has always been. Meanwhile, the
    Assembly is apparently planning to go on a 2-month recess at
    the end of June. Incredibly, Hasan Suneid, an adviser to Prime
    Minister Maliki, was quoted in the paper the other day as
    saying that ``Time is irrelevant.'' Well, time is plenty
    relevant to us, our troops, and their families.
        Iraqi military units were promised extra pay and a short 3-
    month Baghdad deployment to gain their acquiescence for the
    mission, while American Army units are being extended for 15-
    month tours. Prime Minister Maliki also promised there would be
    no political interference with the operations, but there are
    recent disturbing press reports of a department, in the Prime
    Minister's office, the office of the commander in chief,
    ``playing a major role in the arrest and removal of senior
    Iraqi army and national police officers, some of whom had
    apparently worked too aggressively to combat violent Shiite
    militias.''
        The report in the Washington Post quoted U.S. Brigadier
    General Dana Pittard, commanding general of the Iraq Assistance
    Group, which provides the military transition teams advising
    Iraqi units, as saying that ``Their only crimes or offenses
    were that they were successful,'' meaning successful against
    the Mahdi Army. Then he goes on to say--and this is our
    general--``I am tired of seeing good Iraqi officers having to
    look over their shoulders when they are trying to do the right
    thing.''
        So Baghdad is burning while the Iraqi politicians avoid
    responsibility for their country's future. Our soldiers risk
    their lives while Iraqi politicians refuse to take political
    risks. We cannot have the lives of American servicemembers held
    hostage to Iraqi political intrigue or intransigence. We need
    to pressure them to make the necessary compromises.
        The situation in Afghanistan poses another major challenge
    to the CENTCOM commander. As the Director of National
    Intelligence, Michael McConnell, told this committee in
    February, this will be ``a pivotal year'' for Afghanistan. Some
    of the trends in 2006 were disturbing. A recent State
    Department report on terrorism states that in 2006 the Taliban-
    led insurgency remained a ``capable and resilient threat to
    stability.'' Overall, attacks on coalition forces are up
    threefold. The use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in
    suicide bombings increased, with militants launching
    approximately 130 suicide attacks.
        Military officials have reported that attacks along the
    Afghanistan-Pakistan border have increased twofold following
    Pakistan's signing of a peace agreement in September with pro-
    Taliban militants in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas
    (FATA). Last year witnessed the growth of narcotics trade in
    Afghanistan. Retired General Jim Jones, former Commander of the
    U.S. European Command (EUCOM), said that narcotics were the
    number one problem in Afghanistan because they provide a
    funding source for the insurgency and contribute to public
    corruption. A November report by the United Nations and World
    Bank concluded that international efforts to combat the growth
    of the narcotics trade have failed.
        In response to these trends, U.S. troop commitments in
    Afghanistan were increased in January and the Department of
    Defense (DOD) has announced its intention to maintain those
    troop levels into next year. In February, the President
    outlined an Afghanistan strategy which includes additional
    assistance for training the Afghanistan security forces and the
    administration has pressed our North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization (NATO) and other coalition partners for additional
    commitments of troops and equipment.
        While I remain concerned about national restrictions that
    some of our NATO allies have placed on the use of troops, other
    coalition partners, including the British, the Canadians, the
    Dutch, the Danes, and the Afghan National Army (ANA) itself,
    are in the fight alongside U.S. troops.
        The challenges facing U.S. CENTCOM also include a broader
    terrorism threat throughout its AOR. In a speech to the U.N.
    General Assembly in September, Afghanistan President Karzai
    said that we must look beyond Afghanistan to the sources of
    terrorism, we must destroy terrorist sanctuaries beyond
    Afghanistan, dismantle the elaborate networks in the region
    that recruit, indoctrinate, train, finance, arm, and deploy
    terrorists.
        Another source of instability throughout the region is
    Iran. Iran's clandestine nuclear activities and its support for
    terrorist organizations pose a threat to peace in the region
    and beyond. I am deeply concerned by reports that Iranian IED
    technology has been found in the hands of insurgency groups in
    Iraq who are attacking American soldiers. The Iraq war has led
    to the strengthening of Iran. The conference beginning today in
    Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, presents an opportunity to confront
    Iran diplomatically in the hopes of improving stability in Iraq
    and in the region.
        We look forward to discussing these and many other critical
    issues with Admiral Fallon and we again thank him for his
    service to this Nation and for the way in which he and his
    troops have shown such steadfastness and courage. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]
                    Prepared Statement by Senator Carl Levin
        Today we welcome Admiral Fallon, Commander of United States Central
    Command (CENTCOM), in his first appearance before this committee since
    his confirmation hearing earlier this year. Admiral Fallon's command is
    responsible for U.S. security interests in 25 nations that stretch from
    the Horn of Africa, through the Arabian Gulf region, into Central Asia.
    He commands the bulk of U.S. troops in combat today, and he is
    responsible for an area with a host of security challenges which may at
    any time erupt into violence requiring further military response.
    However, Admiral Fallon must be a diplomat as well as a military man.
    We rely on his judgment, and on his diplomatic skills to help us deter
    and prevent conflict, almost as much as we do his military skills when
    a military response is appropriate. Today we will be seeking his
    counsel on a host of troubling issues in his area of responsibility--
    predominately, but not entirely, Iraq.
        In Iraq, the Prime Minister has said, ``The crisis is political,
    and the ones who can stop the cycle of aggravation and bloodletting of
    innocents are the politicians.'' The Iraqis are not meeting the
    benchmarks they have set for themselves. The Iraqi Assembly's committee
    considering amendments to the Iraqi Constitution appears to be as far
    from completing its work as it has always been. Meanwhile, the Assembly
    is apparently planning to go on a 2-month recess at the end of June.
    Incredibly, Hasan Suneid, an adviser to Prime Minister Maliki, was
    quoted in the paper the other day as saying that ``time is
    irrelevant.'' Well time is plenty relevant to us, our troops, and their
    families.
        Iraqi military units were promised extra pay and a short 3-month
    Baghdad deployment to gain their acquiescence for the mission, while
    American Army units are being extended for 15-month tours. Prime
    Minister Maliki also promised there would be no political interference
    with the operation, but there are recent disturbing press reports of a
    department of the Prime Minister's office, the Office of the Commander
    in Chief, ``playing a major role in the arrest and removal of senior
    Iraqi army and national police officers, some of whom had apparently
    worked too aggressively to combat violent Shiite militias.'' The
    report, in the Washington Post, quoted U.S. Brigadier General Dana
    Pittard, commanding general of the Iraq Assistance Group which provides
    the military transition teams advising Iraqi units, as saying, ``their
    only crimes or offenses were they were successful''--meaning successful
    against the Mahdi Army. He goes on to say, ``I'm tired of seeing good
    Iraqi officers having to look over their shoulders when they're trying
    to do the right thing.''
        Baghdad is burning while the Iraqi politicians avoid responsibility
    for their country's future. Our soldiers risk their lives while Iraqi
    politicians refuse to take political risks. We cannot have the lives of
    American service members held hostage to Iraqi political intrigue and
    intransigence. We need to pressure them to make the necessary
    compromises.
        The situation in Afghanistan poses another major challenge to the
    CENTCOM Commander. As the Director of National Intelligence, Michael
    McConnell, told this committee in February 2007 will be ``a pivotal
    year'' for Afghanistan. The trends at the end of 2006 were disturbing.
    A recent State Department report on terrorism states that in 2006 the
    Taliban-led insurgency remained ``a capable and resilient threat to
    stability.'' Overall attacks on coalition forces are up three-fold from
    the year before; the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and
    suicide bombings increased four-fold, with militants launching
    approximately 130 suicide attacks. Just as troubling, military
    officials reported that attacks along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border
    increased two-fold, and in some areas three-fold, following Pakistan's
    signing of a peace agreement in September with pro-Taliban militants in
    the federally-Administered Tribal Areas.
        In addition, last year witnessed the growth of the narcotics trade
    in Afghanistan. Retired General Jim Jones, former Commander of U.S.
    European Command, said that narcotics were the number one problem in
    Afghanistan, providing a funding source for the insurgency and
    contributing to public corruption. A November report by the United
    Nations and World Bank concluded that international efforts to combat
    the growth of the narcotics trade have failed.
        In response to these trends, U.S. troop commitments in Afghanistan
    were increased in January, and the Defense Department has announced its
    intention to maintain those troop levels into next year. In February,
    the President outlined an Afghanistan strategy, which includes
    additional assistance for training the Afghanistan Security Forces. The
    administration has pressed our NATO and other coalition partners for
    additional commitments of troops and equipment, While I remain
    concerned about national restrictions that some of our NATO allies have
    placed on the use of our troops, other coalition partners, including
    the British, Canadians, Dutch, Danes, and the ANA, are in the fight
    alongside U.S. troops.
        The challenges facing U.S. CENTCOM also include a broader terrorist
    threat throughout its area of responsibility. In a speech to the U.N.
    General Assembly in September, Afghanistan President Karzai said:

              ``We must look beyond Afghanistan to the sources of
            terrorism. We must destroy terrorist sanctuaries beyond
            Afghanistan, dismantle the elaborate networks in the region
            that recruit, indoctrinate, train, finance, arm, and deploy
            terrorists.''

        Another source of instability throughout the region is Iran. Iran's
    clandestine nuclear activities and its support for terrorist
    organizations pose a threat to peace in the region and beyond. I am
    deeply concerned by reports that Iranian IED technology has been found
    in the hands of insurgency groups in Iraq who are attacking American
    soldiers. The Iraq war has led to the strengthening of Iran. The
    conference beginning today in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, presents an
    opportunity to confront Iran diplomatically in the hopes of improving
    stability in Iraq and the region.
        I look forward to discussing these critical issues with Admiral
    Fallon.

        Chairman Levin. Senator Inhofe?
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator McCain cannot be here today, so I will submit his
    statement for the record.
        Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
        [The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain
        Mr Chairman, thank you, and thank you for holding this hearing.
        Admiral Fallon, welcome back to this committee. We are all grateful
    for your continued service and for taking on this new challenge. I
    would also like to take a moment to thank all of the soldiers, sailors,
    airmen, marines, members of the Coast Guard, and civilians who are
    under your command. They are performing with the utmost courage and
    professionalism. We honor their sacrifices and those of their families.
    You all have our deepest gratitude.
        Last week, General Petraeus provided a candid and forthright report
    on the situation in Iraq. He described the operational environment in
    Iraq as ``exceedingly challenging'' and the ``most complex'' he had
    ever seen. He also reported on some notable successes in the past 2
    months under the new political-military strategy.
        These include killing a key insurgent leader in eastern Anbar
    province; detaining a number of key network leaders; discovering how
    various elements of al Qaeda Iraq operate; disrupting a car bomb
    network that had killed 650 citizens of Baghdad; destroying several
    significant car bomb factories; and, on Tuesday, the possible death of
    Abu Ayyub al-Masri, the latest leader of al Qaeda in Iraq. General
    Petraeus also told of progress in Ramadi, which we all remember in 2006
    was a stronghold of terror.
        Despite these accomplishments, however, he emphasized as well the
    many challenges in Iraq. General Petraeus left no doubt that al Qaeda
    must be stopped for Iraq to succeed, and said that we should continue
    to consider al Qaeda in Iraq a formidable foe. According to the
    general, the enemy is resilient and still possesses the capability to
    produce more horrific attacks, but that al Qaeda's ideology and methods
    have increasingly alienated many Iraqis. He confirmed reports that
    Sunni Arabs in Anbar province and other areas are turning against al
    Qaeda and are joining the Iraqi security forces.
        These are the first signs of progress under the new military
    strategy. It is important to remember that General Petraeus has only
    been executing this new plan for little more than 2 months--with only
    three of the five brigades the plan requires. While there are no
    guarantees of success, there are, for this first time in a long while,
    reasons to be cautiously optimistic. We all certainly hope these early
    signs translate into broader trends.
        Neither a purely military solution nor a retreat will lead to
    victory in Iraq. There must be a political agreement among Iraqis that
    allows all groups to participate in the building of their nation, to
    share in its resources, and to live in peace with each other. As
    Americans and Iraqis sacrifice to provide that security, Iraq's leaders
    must do the hard work of political reconciliation. We can help them get
    there, but we cannot assume their responsibilities. Unless they accept
    their obligations to all Iraqis, we will all fail, and America, Iraq,
    and the world will have to live with the consequences.
        With regards to Afghanistan, we've made formidable progress but
    there is still a great deal to do. I look forward to hearing your
    assessment of Afghanistan's political stability, the Afghan army and
    national police, reconstruction efforts, and counternarcotics
    activities. I am also concerned about the participation of our NATO
    allies. The call for additional troop contributions has not been
    answered enthusiastically by most NATO partners, and national caveats
    continue to restrict the actions of troops from a number of allied
    countries. Given these facts, I'd like to hear your views on the
    performance of our NATO partners and how we can encourage them to do
    better.
        We cannot discuss Afghanistan without talking about Pakistan. There
    seems to be great disagreement about the degree of effort Islamabad is
    making to prevent cross-border infiltration of fighters into
    Afghanistan and to disrupt Taliban command and control on the frontier
    provinces. I was encouraged by Islamabad's recent efforts on my trip to
    Pakistan last month, but the agreements the government has signed with
    rebels in the tribal areas are reason for concern. I'd like to hear
    your assessment on the degree to which Islamabad is being helpful or
    negligent in our Afghan efforts, the effect of the agreements with
    rebels on violence in the border region, and how successful Pakistan
    has been in interrupting Taliban fighters' entry into Afghanistan.
        Admiral Fallon, I don't need to tell you that the United States
    faces many of its toughest challenges and threats in your region of
    responsibility. What we do in Afghanistan and Iraq will have far-
    reaching consequences for America and the world. While the committee
    looks forward to your testimony on the conflicts in Iraq and
    Afghanistan, we also look forward to your testimony on other strategic
    challenges in the Central Command area of operations. These include:
    preventing Iran from going nuclear; the role of Syria and Iran in
    supporting insurgents in Iraq; an assessment of our cooperation with
    Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and others; protecting Israel's security;
    the struggle for Lebanon's independence; and quelling violence and
    genocide on the Horn of Africa.
        I defy any honest observer who believes any of these formidable
    challenges would be easier to confront if the United States accepted
    defeat in Iraq. However the war in Iraq ends, it will have a profound
    influence on the future of the Middle East, global stability, and
    America's security, which will remain tied to that dangerous part of
    the world. I still believe that the war is part of a broader struggle
    in the Arab and Muslim world, between violent extremists and the forces
    of modernity and moderation. I believe it is our responsibility--as we
    have done so many other times in our Nation's brief history--to rally
    to the side of freedom-loving people. We don't do it because it is
    easy. We do it precisely because it is hard--hard, but so incredibly
    important for the security of the region and of our country.
        Again, I would like to say how much we appreciate the enormity of
    the challenges that you, and all members of your command, face each and
    every day. You have our utmost respect and admiration and I look
    forward to your remarks of our guest today.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you.

        Senator Inhofe. Admiral Fallon, you have been a familiar
    face to the Senate for a long time, although fairly new in this
    position. But I can remember many things you were involved in.
    Back when I lost the Battle of Vieques, we had the Fallon-Pace
    Report. I have enjoyed working with you over the years.
        I have had occasion to be in the AOR 13 or 14 times, and
    most recently down in Djibouti and the HOA, where there are
    some problems that you have not really had time to have been
    there long enough to start addressing. I had the opportunity of
    being with General Jones during his last trip to Afghanistan.
        I cannot help but think, and you might be giving some
    thought to this, as to some of the successes there. I can
    recall when the ANA took over their own training and the pride
    that they had in some of their capabilities. I am not sure but
    that would not be a good model for some of the things that we
    are doing in Iraq.
        But today I think primarily we are going to be focusing on
    Iraq. There are many fronts in this war, but Iraq is what we
    are going to be talking about. Now, it has been over 3 months
    since President Bush announced the troop surge. Everyone,
    including the media, has been trying every angle to get an
    early read on the progress.
        General Petraeus' visit last week was a very enlightening
    one. He was here and he had a chance to give classified
    briefings to all of us and also some press conferences. He
    described the situation there as exceedingly challenging, as we
    all know, and very complex. But he also went over a number of
    what he referred to as successes, and in question time I will
    be asking if you agree with some of the things that he said. So
    I will just outline them now.
        He talked about ``Anbar has gone or certainly''--I am
    quoting--``over the last 6 months from being assessed as being
    lost to a situation that now is quite heartening.'' He went on
    to describe that as ``somewhat breath-taking,'' some of the
    progress that has been made there.
        He said we have also done the same thing in Ramadi, quoting
    him, ``has been crucial as we have literally reclaimed the city
    with our Iraqi partners right by our side and sometimes in
    advance of us.'' We are ahead with respect to the reduction of
    sectarian murders in Baghdad, down about one-third. He stated:
    ``We have learned a great deal more about the Iranian
    involvement, a very nefarious involvement, involving funding,
    training on Iranian soil, advice, and the provisions of a lot
    of arms and ammunition, including these explosively formed
    projectiles (EFPs) that have been so lethal against some of our
    armed vehicles.''
        He also mentioned that we have eliminated the security emir
    from al Qaeda in Iraq in eastern Anbar Province and several
    other things.
        Now, since General Petraeus' visit we feel--and I do not
    know what the most recent information is as far as al-Masri is
    concerned, but most people believe that he has been killed and
    was killed by the Sunnis, which is a very significant thing.
        While these accomplishments are remarkable, I believe, we
    still have so far to go and we are just deeply entrenched in a
    very, very difficult situation. To quote General Petraeus, he
    said: ``The situation in Iraq is, in sum, exceedingly complex
    and very tough. Success will take continued commitment,
    perseverance, and sacrifice.'' I believe that is the case and I
    think we have the right people looking after this to make sure
    that does happen.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much. Thank you, Senator
    Inhofe.
        Admiral Fallon, again, welcome and please proceed.

      STATEMENT OF ADM WILLIAM J. FALLON, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED
                         STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

        Admiral Fallon. Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, distinguished
    members of the committee: It is a great honor to be here
    representing the men and women of CENTCOM today. Senator Levin,
    you certainly outlined the challenges that we face in this
    region, quite an extensive list of places and issues that beg
    for resolution.
        Senator Inhofe highlighted General Petraeus' meeting with
    you last week and his public comments. I believe that General
    Petraeus painted a very accurate picture, one in which I
    concur, as to the reality of life on the ground in Iraq.
        I would highlight the issue of the complexity of the
    situation. It is daunting from that aspect. But we are blessed
    to have men like General Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker, and
    thousands of other Americans and allies, coalition supporters,
    that are working this problem very hard.
        I would be remiss if I did not begin my comments by telling
    you how remarkably wonderful our men and women in uniform are
    serving day in and day out in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in other
    areas in this region. I have spent 4 of the first 6 weeks on
    the job out in the region, visiting our people, but more
    importantly trying to make sure I have the best understanding
    possible to baseline my ability to assess where we really are
    and the extent to which we can progress in these challenges.
        Since I have been in the command, I have drawn the
    attention of the staff and our subordinate commanders to five
    areas in which we are focusing. Clearly, Iraq is one,
    Afghanistan another, working to degrade these violent extremist
    networks that have proliferated throughout the world, but have
    their sustenance and basic support in the central region,
    working hard to get to know the leaders of the region, to
    solicit their advice. They live there, they have been there.
    They understand this better than we.
        I have been heartened by the openness of leaders from each
    of the countries to sit down with me and talk and explain their
    view of things and their suggestions that they may have to help
    us in Iraq and other places.
        I believe that success in Iraq is dependent on two primary
    things: first; internal, that stability and security in this
    country are essential. But it is not going to be possible
    unless we also have support externally from the neighborhood.
    This place does not exist by itself in another galaxy and the
    influence of the neighbors, certainly very unhelpful from two
    of them in the recent past, but the willingness of others to
    come and assist Iraq is critical. I am happy that as we are
    here today there are two successive conferences going on in
    Egypt at Sharm el-Sheikh, the compact meeting, and then the
    Iraq neighbors conference, expanded Iraq neighbors conference,
    with many representatives, key representatives, including
    Secretary Rice from the United States, to sit down and try to
    help the Iraqi government move ahead.
        The last area that I have focused on is attending to the
    readiness and training of our own forces and their ability to
    not only continue to sustain operations in Iraq and
    Afghanistan, but to be prepared for any future contingencies or
    crises that may arise.
        Mr. Chairman, I have a written statement that I would like
    to have entered for the record, and turn it over to you for
    your questions. Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Fallon follows:]
                Prepared Statement by ADM William J. Fallon, USN
                                i. introduction
        Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: On behalf of the men and
    women of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), I thank you for
    this opportunity to testify on the posture of our command, and to
    provide an assessment of security and stability in our area of
    responsibility (AOR).
        CENTCOM is in its sixth consecutive year of combat operations and
    our region continues to be challenged with insecurity complicated by
    violent extremism. Operations in Iraq are focused on providing security
    for the population while increasing the capacity of the Government and
    Iraqi security forces (ISFs) to defend and secure their people. In
    Afghanistan, efforts continue to assist the young representative
    government with mentoring, training, and governance, as well as counter
    terrorist and security support. Pursuing stability and security in the
    region requires the focused, coordinated application of military power
    and a robust interagency effort. By helping people manage social,
    political, and economic change, we can further the interests of peace
    and representative government.
        In my first 6 weeks as CENTCOM Commander, I have traveled to many
    countries and met face-to-face with leaders to discuss the situation in
    the region and to enlist support for our efforts. A number of
    impressions frame my overall assessment, which is one of guarded
    optimism.
        Our top priority is achieving stability and security in Iraq. The
    ongoing sectarian violence threatens Iraq as well as the region, and
    inhibits essential economic progress. Both security and economic
    opportunity are necessary to convince the Iraqi people that a better
    life is possible. The Iraqi leaders in Baghdad understand that their
    ability to provide confidence to the population is key to success in
    stabilizing the country, and that they must make decisions on
    governance that are representative of the whole population. Though
    sectarian interests are working overtime to try to divide them, large
    numbers of Iraqi people are indicating they are tired of the violence
    and willing to cooperate with Iraqi and coalition security forces.
        In Afghanistan, I believe that the foundation of security and
    governance is in place. The vast majority of people are in favor of
    representative government and prosperity, not Taliban brutality, and
    they are standing up and fighting for their country's future. Capacity
    of the Afghan Security Forces, particularly the Afghan National Army
    (ANA), is growing and the ANA is eager and well led. However, many
    parts of the country have never known centralized governance, lack
    basic social services and infrastructure, and desperately require
    expanded capacity to meet the needs of a populace under pressure from
    the Taliban.
        Though Iraq and Afghanistan need their neighbors to help them, Iran
    and Syria have not cooperated with efforts to combat terrorism and
    promote reconciliation. Their policies and actions threaten the
    internal security of their neighbors and the collective stability of
    the region.
        The Iranian regime provides material support to violent extremists
    in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Palestine. It supplies Shi'a militia
    groups in Iraq with training, funding, and weapons, including
    particularly lethal Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). It also
    continues to provide money and weapons to Hizballah, which threatens
    the legitimate government of Lebanon.
        Iran's most destabilizing activity has been the pursuit of nuclear
    weapons technology in defiance of the international community,
    International Atomic Energy Agency, and United Nations Security
    Council. A nuclear-armed Iran would further threaten regional
    stability, potentially trigger an arms race, and increase the potential
    for extremists to acquire weapons of mass destruction.
        The Syrian government continues to meddle in Lebanon. Its support
    for Hizballah is destabilizing the country and it stonewalls the
    investigation into the Rafik Hariri assassination.
        Over the past 5 years, terrorists, suicide bombers, and foreign
    fighters have traveled through Syria to attack Iraqi and coalition
    forces. The government in Damascus has tolerated the presence and
    operations of Iraqi Sunni insurgents who have fueled the fighting in
    Baghdad and elsewhere in the country.
        Participation by Iran and Syria in the Iraq Neighbors Conference in
    Egypt this week offers an opportunity to make positive contributions to
    regional stability.
        In Lebanon, the government is confronted by opposition groups and
    violent protests, but the Lebanese Armed Forces are maintaining a
    fragile order. Hundreds of thousands of Lebanese have stood up publicly
    against assassination and terror, and for their elected government and
    a peaceful, prosperous future. The international community continues to
    support the popularly elected government in Beirut and its legitimately
    constituted and disciplined security forces.
        In the Horn of Africa, Sudan continues to defy the international
    community and resist the deployment of an effective United Nations
    peacekeeping force to Darfur. Ethiopia and Eritrea have yet to agree on
    terms to demarcate their common border, and Eritrea has imposed
    restrictions on the operations of the United Nations mission there.
    Ethiopia has accused President Isaias Afwerki's government of
    sponsoring insurgent groups and violent extremists in Somalia, where
    the situation remains volatile. The African Union mission to Somalia is
    unable to provide security beyond its garrisons, resulting in a country
    vulnerable to the return of al Qaeda and associated movements.
        These impressions highlight both the challenges and opportunities
    in the CENTCOM AOR. We are heavily engaged in several areas but have in
    place key elements to succeed in advancing U.S. security interests and
    enhance regional stability. Committed soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
    marines, working with interagency and coalition partners, lead the way.
    Staunch allies work with us, and strong partnerships with friendly
    nations facilitate our endeavors. More than 800,000 people of the
    region serve in their nations' security forces, risking their lives to
    combat terror. They are casting a powerful vote for hope, and
    ultimately victory, by fighting, and often dying, to ensure their
    countries do not succumb to extremism and terror.
        As we move forward, our initiatives are organized into five focus
    areas: setting conditions for stability in Iraq; expanding governance
    and security in Afghanistan; degrading violent extremist networks and
    operations; strengthening relationships and influencing states to
    contribute to regional stability; and posturing the force to build and
    sustain joint and combined warfighting capabilities and readiness.
                 ii. setting conditions for stability in iraq.
        CENTCOM's Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) leads nearly 145,000
    U.S. and 12,600 coalition personnel from 26 countries who are working
    to develop critical security and governance capabilities. Our shared
    goal is a representative government in Iraq that upholds the rule of
    law, respects the rights of its people, provides security, and is an
    ally in the war on terror.
        Accomplishing these objectives requires the focused attention of
    all elements of the U.S. Government. The explosion of sectarian
    violence, highlighted by the February 22, 2006, al Qaeda bombing of the
    al-Askariya Mosque in Samarra, has dramatically changed the security
    and political situation. After enduring almost 3 years of attacks
    conducted primarily by terrorists and foreign fighters, Shia militants
    retaliated with a sustained campaign of kidnapping, torture, and
    murder. The ongoing sectarian violence became self-sustaining and
    threatened economic and political progress.
        With the ongoing surge of Iraqi and U.S. security forces and
    renewed interagency commitment, I believe we can establish greater
    security in support of the emerging Iraqi political process. The surge
    of additional military forces into Baghdad in Operation Fardh al-Qanoon
    (Law and Order) has disrupted extremist elements, at least temporarily
    reduced ethnic violence, and has been welcomed by the majority of the
    city's people. The establishment of Joint Security Stations offers some
    enduring promise of improved Iraqi and coalition force coordination and
    presence in neighborhoods. I believe these posts will also improve our
    access to information about insurgent activities.
        That said, I recognize that we have a limited opportunity in which
    to capitalize on the potential offered by the surge. The local populace
    must see tangible results to gain a sense of a more hopeful future, and
    as a result, come to believe in alternatives to extremism.
        Insurgent groups in Iraq have multiple and often competing
    motivations for perpetuating violence. However, a common thread is
    their opposition to U.S. and coalition presence and refusal to accept
    the legitimacy of an inclusive, representative government. Al Qaeda in
    Iraq (AQI) seeks to incite a sectarian war between Sunni and Shia Arabs
    through despicable and highly visible attacks on civilians. There is
    very little popular support for these groups. Some Sunni communities
    appear to be resisting al Qaeda in Iraq's intimidation. Several local
    leaders and their supporters have begun to actively support the regular
    Iraqi Police and Army forces against extremist threats.
        Some Shia militias, especially Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), seek to
    increase their political influence and to expand illegitimate
    activities under the guise of protecting their communities. These
    groups threaten stability and undermine confidence in the ISFs and the
    central government. Their death squads are responsible for the majority
    of the sectarian violence against Sunnis in Baghdad. Infiltration of
    the police by their members is especially problematic, as it undermines
    faith in fledgling Iraqi institutions.
        Neutralizing these groups depends in part on disrupting the support
    they receive through neighboring countries. The transfer of lethal
    technology, weapons, and money from elements in Iran to Shi'a militias
    threatens stability. Similarly, Sunni Arab extremists continue to
    receive external moral, material, and logistical assistance from
    private supporters in Syria and elsewhere. To counter these influences
    and take bold steps to bridge factional divides, the Government of Iraq
    needs steadfast support from the international community and its
    neighbors.
        I do not believe these differing factions in Iraq share a similar
    vision of an inclusive political middle ground, nor do they agree how
    to get there. The Government of Iraq must move toward inclusion by
    passing legislation on reconciliation, sharing of oil and gas revenues,
    and provincial powers. Furthermore, holding timely provincial elections
    and passing constitutional amendments on the matters agreed upon last
    year would reduce incentives for violence.
        I also found that poor budget execution has inhibited
    infrastructure development and the provision of basic services to
    Iraq's citizens. While the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) are
    helping improve local government performance and capacity, it will take
    considerable time to institute long-term good governance. In the near-
    term, communities would benefit from job creation programs, a
    significant expansion of micro-credits, and rehabilitation of viable
    State-owned enterprises that can open for business quickly.
        Development of an effective and self-sufficient ISF continues to be
    a top priority. In January 2006, there were 230,000 members in the
    combined security forces. Today there are more than 330,000 soldiers
    and policemen who have received training and equipment. Although
    overall logistics capabilities are underdeveloped, the ISF is able to
    sustain units below the division level.
        The ISF is improving in capability, expanding command and control
    of operations, and taking an increasing role in confronting extremists
    and criminals. The Police still lag behind the Army in terms of
    individual and unit proficiency and reliability. In both forces, the
    units with strong leadership perform most effectively in combat
    operations.
        As we look to the future, we will continue the transition of
    responsibilities to Iraq's government as conditions allow. This should
    give its people additional confidence to build and sustain their
    institutions.
        Achieving our strategic goals in Iraq will require the focused
    efforts of our government's capabilities, the participation of key
    Iraqi factions, a reduction in external destabilizing influences, and
    most importantly, courageous and consistent good leadership by the
    Government of Iraq.
             iii. expanding governance and security in afghanistan
        Afghanistan's primary insurgent threat, the Taliban, operate mostly
    in the southern and eastern provinces of the country. While they remain
    unpopular in most districts, small pockets of hard-core extremists are
    intent on asserting control and undermining the reform-minded
    government. As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
    International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) expanded operations last
    year into previously uncontested areas, insurgent attacks increased to
    their highest levels since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. Violence
    did, however, level-off in October and remained lower throughout most
    of the winter.
        We expect Taliban activities to increase from now through the
    summer but believe that predictions of a major Taliban offensive are
    overstated. Despite the ability to instigate increased levels of
    localized violence, they are not able to militarily defeat the Afghan
    National Army and coalition forces. While continuing to counter the
    insurgent threat militarily, we will work with other agencies and a
    broadly based international effort to assist the Afghans to expand
    governance and promote economic development.
        Improving Afghan governance, infrastructure, and the economy
    requires a concerted effort. The priorities are roads and electricity,
    followed by agricultural development, micro-credit, job skills, and
    education. ISAF is actively pursuing initiatives in these areas, from
    building schools and providing them with supplies to encouraging and
    stimulating the growth of small businesses.
        Until there are sustainable governmental institutions and a viable
    replacement for the Afghan poppy crop, opium trafficking will be a
    significant part of this country's future. In the interim, CENTCOM
    supports U.S. Government and United Kingdom lead nation counter-
    narcotics activities. These efforts include building infrastructure,
    training border forces and the Counter-Narcotics Police National
    Interdiction Unit (CNPA), and developing a CNPA aviation capability.
        In addition to reconstruction and development activities, efforts
    have focused on the Afghan National Army. Now at 50 percent of desired
    end strength, its 35,000 soldiers enjoy a high level of support from
    the populace, and are growing steadily in competence, effectiveness,
    and professionalism. Though we have made progress in manning the Afghan
    National Police and Border Patrol, currently consisting of
    approximately 46,000 officers, these forces remain several steps behind
    the Army. As the Afghan Security Forces become capable of sustaining
    security and force development, we will hand responsibilities over to
    them and transition to a long-term security relationship.
        Despite positive developments in the Afghan National Security
    Forces, long-term security requires the effective disruption of cross-
    border extremist operations. Essential security cooperation with
    Pakistan is increasing and more needs to be done. While the issues of
    border security and militant safe havens are difficult problems,
    coordination at tactical levels in both countries and with ISAF is
    increasing. This should lead to further confidence building measures
    and more robust joint efforts. Tri-lateral cooperation between ISAF,
    Pakistan and Afghanistan to improve governance, the rule of law, and
    trade in the border regions can also help eliminate extremist
    sanctuaries. Meanwhile, ISAF has retained the initiative, clearing and
    isolating enemy sanctuaries in places like Helmand Province since last
    autumn. In ongoing operations, MEDUSA and ACHILLES, ISAF forces have
    undertaken a multifaceted approach to clearing, holding, and building.
    They have killed and captured several hard core Taliban leaders and cut
    their lines of communications, while aggressively pursuing development
    projects in the surrounding districts. This not only encourages the
    population in these areas to reject the insurgents, it vividly
    demonstrates the contrast between the grim reality of Taliban rule and
    the health and prosperity of government-controlled areas.
        There is a general sense of optimism and determination among the
    Afghan leaders and people. They regularly voice their appreciation for
    our assistance, and believe things have improved since last year. We
    must help them succeed.
            iv. degrading violent extremist networks and operations
        Whether sponsored by Iran, enabled by Syrian destabilizing efforts,
    or motivated by networks such as al Qaeda and its associated movements,
    violent extremism is a serious danger to regional and global security.
    We must identify, mobilize against, and confront this menace as its
    anachronistic world view and murderous tactics threaten people and
    stability worldwide. While our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan
    continue, we will use all available methods to build regional and
    international momentum for moderate behavior while eroding support for
    violent extremist ideology.
        The highest priority in our counterterror efforts is to defeat al
    Qaeda. Part of this effort, but not an end to itself, is the
    destruction of senior al Qaeda leaders. Since the September 11 attacks,
    we and our partners have captured or killed terrorists, diminished safe
    havens, driven leaders underground, and restricted operating space.
    Despite these efforts, challenges continue as our enemies work to
    reconstitute their networks. Critical to countering these violent
    extremists is the denial of their sanctuaries, nation-state support,
    and the lines of communication that sustain them. These militant
    Islamist terrorists attract recruits from a large, worldwide pool of
    disaffected young people. Unfortunately, their tactics and radical
    ideology remain almost unchallenged by voices of moderation. In
    response, we will enhance our intelligence capabilities, develop
    partner nation capacities, strengthen information sharing, disrupt
    illicit lines of communication, and work to prevent terrorist
    organizations from acquiring and using Weapons of Mass Destruction. All
    of these actions will require interagency and international
    coordination and cooperation.
        Equally important to defeating al Qaeda and other extremist groups
    is delegitimizing the underlying social and political movements that
    support them. To diminish the radical social movements from which our
    enemies derive their strength, we must maintain operational pressure on
    their networks while building capacity in governance and security that
    help at-risk societies address problems that foster internal and local
    grievances. This work requires empowering credible experts to expose
    the flaws and internal contradictions of the enemy's ideology; provide
    viable, competing alternative worldviews; and contest the intellectual
    ``safe harbors'' where extremist ideas incubate.
    Strengthening Relationships and Influencing States and Organizations
        To increase prospects for long-term stability and security in the
    region, we are working to strengthen relationships between and among
    regional nations and the United States. We are also trying to influence
    states and organizations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council and
    operational constructs to contribute to regional stability and work to
    ensure the free flow of commerce and positive economic growth.
        The CENTCOM theater security cooperation program is built on a
    foundation of enduring relationships, and to that end, I support the
    Middle East Peace Process. The synchronized efforts of all the elements
    of U.S. and international power are key. We are fortunate to have a
    large number of close, reliable partner nations. Five of these
    countries, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Pakistan, are Major non-
    NATO Allies, and of those, Jordan and Bahrain are Free Trade Agreement
    partners. Our Theater Security Cooperation Strategy enables regional
    stability and advances security efforts that protect vital U.S.
    national interests, and helps partners build capacities to combat
    terror and become self-reliant.
        Theater Security Cooperation programs and combined military
    training exercises strengthen partner military capabilities, increase
    interoperability with U.S. forces, encourage professional development,
    ensure access, and enhance intelligence and information sharing. Most
    importantly, these efforts cultivate personal relationships and build
    mutual trust and confidence between U.S. and partner military
    personnel.
        We continue to support these programs as a matter of high priority.
    Whether they are Department of Defense activities, or paid for with
    Department of State resources, such as Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and
    International Military Education and Training, the assistance we
    provide to our friends in the region is fundamental to building long-
    term security partnerships.
        FMS is particularly useful in helping our partners build modern,
    capable forces that can more easily integrate into coalition
    operations. However, long administrative delays and procurement lead
    times undermine responsiveness to emerging threats. 1206 funding is
    helping to address this problem by allowing the Department of Defense
    to directly fund security cooperation activities. However, expanded
    dollar amounts of 1206 funding and including partner security forces
    engaged in fighting terror would be helpful.
        I will work to strengthen relationships with our international
    partners and allies who are contributing in many important ways to
    building a better future for people in the region. I would now like to
    give examples that illustrate the criticality of our own relationships
    in the region.
        Arabian Gulf States. Gulf Cooperation Council members Bahrain,
    Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are
    important partners in maintaining stability in the Gulf. We will work
    closely with these governments and their security forces to develop
    solid bilateral security cooperation programs and build confidence and
    capacity in their forces.
        Each of these states has been a valuable partner in our mutual
    security efforts. The Bahraini Joint Counter-Terrorism Center has
    helped several agencies of its government to prepare for potential
    terrorist attacks. At its Gulf Air Warfare Center, the United Arab
    Emirates host air exercises that build multilateral cooperation and
    interoperability among the Gulf Cooperation Council, Egypt, and Jordan.
    Qatar provides excellent host nation support to our air operations
    center and the CENTCOM forward headquarters. In 2006, it again hosted
    the multinational crisis response exercise Eagle Resolve, and
    successfully planned, coordinated, and supervised security for the Doha
    Asian Games. Oman, a strategically situated state in the region,
    partners with U.S. forces in exercises and other activities to help
    keep global commerce flowing and secure its extensive coastline and
    borders. In 2006, CENTCOM conducted 38 combined military exercises in
    the Arabian Gulf with these countries.
        Saudi Arabia remains a vital partner, and its campaign against
    terrorists has significantly degraded al Qaeda operations on the
    Arabian Peninsula. CENTCOM will closely link its initiatives to broader
    U.S. Government efforts to work with the Saudis in their efforts to
    defeat threats and promote reform. Eight combined military exercises
    are scheduled for 2007, all designed to increase cooperation and to
    develop the Kingdom's security capabilities. Our security cooperation
    efforts will prove increasingly important as we promote multilateral
    security efforts and counter-proliferation initiatives in the Arabian
    Gulf area. These are aimed at deterring destabilizing influences and
    protecting our friends and U.S. interests from aggression.
        Our partnerships with these states also provide essential basing
    and port access, overflight rights, and additional force protection for
    U.S. units in the region. Our strong partnership with Kuwait has been
    in place for nearly 20 years. Kuwait remains a steady supporter of
    coalition efforts, hosts the Combined Forces Land Component Command,
    and serves as the primary staging point for forces and equipment
    rotating into and out of Iraq. I cannot imagine operations in Iraq
    without the vast support of Kuwait. Bahrain is one of our longest-
    standing partners and it has welcomed the U.S. Navy for 60 years. It is
    also home to U.S. Naval Forces CENTCOM and the United States Fifth
    Fleet. Though not large countries, each contributes greatly to a better
    future for all the peoples of the Arabian Gulf.
    Egypt
        The Arab Republic of Egypt remains a key U.S. ally in the fight
    against extremism in the region. It strongly supports the Middle East
    Peace Process and has deployed forces to preserve stability in the
    aftermath of the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Egypt has been
    a moderating voice in discussions with Syria, Lebanon, Fatah, and
    HAMAS, and was among the first regional countries to send humanitarian
    supplies to Lebanon and to volunteer assistance to the Lebanese Armed
    Forces. Its position as protector of the Suez Canal and gateway to the
    Middle East has contributed greatly to coalition efforts in Iraq and
    Afghanistan. Hundreds of Suez Canal transits and thousands of
    overflights have expedited U.S. military operations in CENTCOM's AOR.
        This year, Egypt will again host the biennial Bright Star combined
    military exercise, CENTCOM's largest training event. In 2005, Bright
    Star included 12 participating nations and more than 30,000 troops.
    This year it will include air, naval, ground, and simulated training
    events that incorporate post-September 11 operational themes designed
    to improve interoperability.
        Unfortunately, Egypt has suffered numerous terrorist attacks,
    including one aimed at the Multinational Force and Observers in the
    Sinai. Egyptian security forces have been diligent partners in
    combating extremist networks. Continued Foreign Military Financing,
    Foreign Military Sales and International Military Education and
    Training funding are needed to develop and modernize forces that
    contribute significantly to stability in the critical Suez Canal area
    and the Levant.
    Horn of Africa and Yemen
        The nations of the Horn of Africa Djibouti, Somalia, Ethiopia,
    Eritrea, Kenya, and the Seychelles, are plagued by border tension,
    insurgencies, corruption, terrorist infiltrations, and poverty.
    Moreover, coalition pressure on al Qaeda and other extremist networks
    in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere increases the potential for some of
    these terrorists to migrate to the Horn as a place to plan, conduct,
    and coordinate terror attacks.
        CENTCOM's Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, with nearly
    1,300 U.S. personnel, works closely with U.S. Embassies in the region.
    It conducts operations, training, and humanitarian missions in the Horn
    and in Yemen to help nations build capacity to combat terrorism and
    prepare for other challenges including natural disasters. Activities
    that it undertakes include training local security forces as well as
    assisting with civic projects such as wells, schools, and clinics, and
    providing medical and veterinary services in remote villages. Security
    capabilities and civil affairs training gained by local forces, coupled
    with the goodwill engendered by numerous humanitarian operations,
    increase the regions' resistance to the spread of extremist ideology
    and fortifies local desires to defeat terrorism before it becomes
    entrenched.
    Jordan
        The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan remains a key and valuable partner
    in the fight against violent extremists and contributes significantly
    to regional stability. Threatened by internal terrorist activities, it
    has led significant counterterror efforts.
        Jordan is a regional leader in security and counter-terror
    training, and hosts major initiatives for developing security
    capabilities. The Peace Operations Training Center has provided more
    than 1,100 U.S. military leaders and soldiers with valuable cultural
    awareness and language training. Meanwhile, the Jordanian International
    Police Training Center has provided training for over 50,000 Iraqi
    police officers, and other Jordanian schools train Iraqi military
    forces, air traffic controllers, and aviation inspectors. Upon
    completion in 2009, the King Abdullah Special Operations Training
    Center will provide a regional capability to train special operations
    forces. These programs are building competent and capable ISFs and will
    help other regional security services improve their effectiveness.
        Jordan's other contributions are also important. Its highly trained
    and disciplined armed forces are a positive example for other
    militaries with high levels of professionalism and combat
    effectiveness. Additionally, I would like to recognize the Jordanian
    doctors and nurses who have established a hospital in Afghanistan and
    treated over 550,000 Afghans and 1,900 coalition members.
        Jordan's strategic location, balanced vision of modernization, and
    well-developed security establishment give it a regional role and
    influence that exceed its size. Our programs of military and economic
    assistance remain vital to encouraging Jordan's continued modernization
    and leadership in the region.
    Pakistan
        Pakistani security forces have captured and killed significant
    numbers of violent extremists, to include high-ranking leaders of al
    Qaeda and the Taliban. They have also suffered extensive casualties.
    Our long-term partnership with the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is
    central to defeating extremist groups in the region, and it is
    difficult to imagine success in that struggle without its support and
    cooperation. We are working together to reduce the tensions stemming
    from the radical and violent presence in the Federally Administered
    Tribal Areas (FATA). Useful initiatives include regular meetings with
    Pakistan's military leaders, and more robust liaison and communications
    among our units operating along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. While
    President Musharraf is working to moderate groups within Pakistan and
    to prevent militants using the FATA for sanctuary, he is faced with a
    backdrop of potent political, social, and ethnic forces within his
    country.
        Pakistan remains a strong partner of the United States, and our
    support for its counterterror efforts will continue with a variety of
    focused programs. Our security cooperation funding and bilateral
    exercise programs help the country's government conduct counter-terror
    operations and enhance its internal stability. Our goal is for Pakistan
    to view the U.S. as a long-term, preferred international partner,
    particularly in our efforts to defeat our common enemies.
    Central Asian States
        Situated at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East,
    the Central Asian States of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
    Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are playing an increased role in global
    energy markets. They are also strong partners in the struggle against
    militant Islamist movements and their Islamic scholars have taken the
    lead in publicly countering extremist propaganda. However, as with
    other areas of the CENTCOM region, the Central Asian States contend
    with a number of threats to stability and security. Restricted oil and
    gas export options limit their income, geography makes border security
    especially difficult, and organized crime, narcotics trafficking, and
    political instability are preeminent concerns. Though local perceptions
    of U.S. involvement in the region are complex, our access to government
    officials is strong.
        Despite the challenges, there are signs of progress in Central
    Asia. Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan have negotiated a series
    of agreements that should improve trilateral border security. Over the
    coming year, CENTCOM will prioritize engagements that sustain logistics
    chains for Operation Enduring Freedom, reform regional defense
    institutions, enhance organic counterterrorist and counternarcotics
    capabilities, further improve border security and disaster
    preparedness, and prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
        vi. posturing the force to build and sustain joint and combined
                     warfighting capabilities and readiness
        Joint and combined warfighting capability and readiness are
    fundamental in our ability to prosecute ongoing military operations,
    maintain a credible presence to deter aggression, and respond
    effectively to contingencies. Because we execute nearly all of our
    activities jointly and in concert with allies, we must cultivate
    effective interservice and multinational ways of doing business.
    Additionally, because our region is filled with uncertainty, we must
    maintain a full spectrum of responsive capabilities through an
    effective forward deployed force structure, thorough planning, and
    realistic combined training exercises. Other critical capabilities
    include the following:
    A Strong Coalition
        At present, we have over 40 partner nations with troops in
    Afghanistan and 26 with personnel in Iraq. They bring important mission
    capabilities, but also significant integration challenges. Blending
    capabilities of these countries into effective action requires, among
    other factors, a command and control infrastructure that accounts for
    remote locations, multiple languages, cultural differences, and
    challenging force protection issues. Our coalition must share
    classified and sensitive information when appropriate, and have the
    networks and infrastructure to facilitate such exchanges.
    Interagency Coordination
        Establishment of security and stability in our region requires the
    application of all elements of national power: military, diplomatic,
    economic, and information. The military instruments can set conditions
    for security but other agencies foster lasting change.
        We are fortunate to have several U.S. Government entities engaged
    in the CENTCOM AOR. The Departments of State, Treasury, Justice, and
    Homeland Security, as well as subordinate agencies including the U.S.
    Agency for International Development, Diplomatic Security Service,
    Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, and
    United States Coast Guard, are actively engaged in our theater. Their
    efforts are helping to protect critical infrastructure, prevent
    terrorist attacks on our homeland, train fledgling law enforcement
    organizations, and rebuild damaged or aging infrastructure. There is
    clearly a need for better integration and more comprehensive
    application of all the elements of national power.
    Flexible Logistics
        Strategic airlift, rapid sealift, prepositioned inventories, and
    access to bases with critical infrastructure are the key logistics
    components which support operational flexibility. Our primary focus in
    this area remains the timely deployment, equipping, and sustainment of
    units engaged in combat operations. There is no better example of the
    importance and flexibility of our contingency air and sealift
    capabilities than the evacuation of over 14,000 Americans from Lebanon
    during last summer's conflict between Israel and Hizballah. We will
    continue working with the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of
    Defense, the Department of State, and partner nations to ensure access
    to the infrastructure we need to support ongoing and future operations.
    Adaptable Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
            Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Capabilities
        Interoperable, high-volume communications systems are essential to
    conducting operations across a dispersed command space. Our systems
    operate near full capacity daily with little surge capability. Because
    many of our needs must be satisfied by commercial providers, access to
    them is critical. The largest challenge we face is integration of
    disparate systems into interoperable and reliable networks. We must
    embrace policies that enable successful integration and technologies
    that result in effective interoperability and efficient information-
    sharing.
        Ultimately our ability to target violent extremists depends on
    precise and actionable intelligence. We continue to evolve our
    techniques and procedures to optimize efforts to ``find, fix, finish,
    and exploit'' targets. Our adversaries have been agile in adapting to
    our operations. We continue to improve battle space awareness, seeking
    greater specificity, detail, and timeliness of intelligence whenever
    possible. We are aggressively seeking ways to manage shortfalls or
    capability gaps in imagery intelligence, wide area coverage, sensor
    integration, signals intelligence, moving target indicators, layered
    intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance architecture, biometrics,
    counterintelligence, and human collectors.
    Responsive Counter Improvised Explosive Device Program
        Insurgents' weapon of choice will likely continue to be the IED, or
    road-side bomb. They are cheap, effective, anonymous, and have been
    adapted to include toxic industrial chemicals such as chlorine. While
    some are crude, our adversaries increasingly use sophisticated
    technology, including Iranian-supplied Explosively Formed Penetrators.
    These weapons have killed or wounded 15,000 military and civilian
    personnel in Iraq, and IEDs are becoming increasingly prevalent in
    Afghanistan.
        To counter this threat, and working with the interagency and our
    coalition partners, we are fielding jammers, specialized route
    clearance vehicles and equipment, and improved vehicle and personnel
    protective armor. These initiatives have reduced IED effectiveness. We
    must continue to develop new technologies, tactics, techniques, and
    procedures. Of particular importance to CENTCOM is rapid fielding of
    Mine Resistant Armor Protected vehicles, and further research and
    development to improve the detection of mines, IEDs, and unexploded
    ordnance.
    Personnel
        Sustained operations in the CENTCOM AOR depend on personnel who
    have foreign language proficiency and cultural awareness competency in
    addition to military skills. Retention is a critical issue, and we
    depend heavily on quality of life enhancements such as Combat Zone Tax
    Relief, Imminent Danger Pay, and Special Leave Accrual. The Rest and
    Recuperation program continues to be a success, serving more than
    470,000 troops to date. Over the past year, we have conducted a
    comprehensive review of the manning of our headquarters, which, after 5
    years of war, is still highly reliant on temporary individual
    augmentation personnel. My subordinate warfighting headquarters are
    also heavily manned with individual augmentees. I am committed to
    working with the Services and the Joint Staff to properly size and
    resource all of these headquarters.
        CENTCOM is also working to address requirements for low density
    skills. Our present inventory of language and intelligence specialists
    (especially human intelligence) and counterintelligence agents does not
    support current requirements. Language expertise is crucial in
    counterinsurgency, counterterrorist, and counterintelligence
    operations, and will continue in high demand. Contracting language
    expertise provides interim capability, but in the long run, we need
    service members and career civilians with the requisite language and
    cultural skills.
                                vii. conclusion
        Despite difficult and often dangerous conditions and lengthy
    absences from home and family, our military men and women in the
    CENTCOM AOR persevere in their efforts and demonstrate courage,
    professional skill and uncommon dedication to duty. Whether engaged in
    combat, providing humanitarian relief, or supporting operations, they
    represent Americans at their very best. While we fight tirelessly
    against those who would do us harm, we also stand equally ready to
    assist those who would help bring peace to this region. The American
    people and Congress have provided staunch and steady support, and we
    sincerely appreciate your advocacy and assistance. I am proud and
    honored to represent the men, women, and supporting families of
    CENTCOM. On their behalf, I thank you for your support, and for this
    opportunity to testify regarding our defense posture.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Admiral Fallon.
        Admiral, as I mentioned in my opening statement, the
    Washington Post reported on Monday that the Iraqi office of the
    commander in chief played a leading role in the arrest and
    removal of some Iraqi army and national police officers who
    apparently worked aggressively to combat the Shia militias. The
    article quotes our General Pittard as saying that the only
    crimes or offenses that they committed were that they were
    successful against the Mahdi Army and that, in his words, ``I
    am tired of seeing good Iraqi officers having to look over
    their shoulders when they do the right thing.''
        Can you comment on that? Is that report accurate, that
    those Iraqi officers were removed because they were doing the
    right thing?
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, I think that, as with most things
    in Iraq, there are a lot of complexities here. I can certainly
    understand the frustration of our people that are working with
    the Iraqi forces, particularly when they see people that are in
    their eyes helpful to making progress, particularly working
    with our people.
        The reports that this office of the commander in chief is
    in fact working behind the scenes to set up a parallel
    organization to the Ministry of Defense is disturbing, because
    it seems to me that if the Iraqi people are going to have
    confidence in their government and their leadership, the
    processes by which these appointments are made is one that is
    going to be indicative of the likelihood of people believing in
    their government.
        There are many Iraqi army leaders that we have been exposed
    to and that our people have met. We are making our own
    assessments of these people in terms of their competence and
    their corruption or lack of and their willingness to actually
    do things. I do not know all the details of the particulars
    that this general was quoted as saying, but I will say that we
    are certainly aware of the continuing stories of this office of
    the commander in chief and in my discussions with Ambassador
    Crocker and with General Petraeus it is our intent to make
    clear to the Prime Minister that this kind of an operation
    would be severely degrading to any attempt to move forward in
    the way that we have been certainly working in that country.
        Chairman Levin. Would that also not be, if those actions
    were taken to remove those officers because they were too
    effective against the Shia militias, would that not also be a
    violation of Prime Minister Maliki's commitment to President
    Bush of ``noninterference in operations'' of Iraqi security
    forces, if they were true?
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, I do not know the details of the
    specifics that we are talking about.
        Chairman Levin. If they were true, if they were removed for
    that purpose, would that not be a violation?
        Admiral Fallon. Clearly the Prime Minister has told us that
    he will try to have people in place that are going to work with
    us to try and reach the security objectives that we would like.
        Chairman Levin. Admiral, you said in your opening statement
    that the most important need in achieving our strategic goals
    would be good leadership by the Government of Iraq.
        Admiral Fallon. Right.
        Chairman Levin. Do you agree that the solution in Iraq has
    to be a political solution based on compromise among the Iraqis
    themselves and that that agreement is essential if we are going
    to end the violence?
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, it is very clear that success in
    Iraq is going to be greatly dependent, and I believe not
    possible without the firm commitment and demonstration by the
    political leadership in that country that they are acting in
    the interests of the entire population. But there is a certain
    requirement for security and stability as a foundation for
    these desires.
        Chairman Levin. Here is what Secretary Rice wrote to me in
    her letter of January 30. She said that ``Iraq's policy
    committee on national security has agreed upon a set of
    political, security, and economic benchmarks and an associated
    time line in September 2006. These were reaffirmed by the
    presidency council on October 16, 2006, and referenced by the
    Iraq Study Group. They also were posted on the President of
    Iraq's web site.''
        Now, these benchmarks included the following: By September
    2006, the Iraqi's were supposed to form a constitutional review
    committee, approve law and procedures to form regions, agree on
    a political timetable, approve the law for an independent high
    electoral commission, approve provincial election laws and set
    date for provincial elections and approve a de-Baathification
    law by November. The constitutional review committee was
    supposed to complete its work by January 2007, and by March
    2007 the constitutional amendments referendum was supposed to
    have been held.
        Were any of those things accomplished as far as you know?
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, they have been working all of
    these issues. There has been progress made, at least from their
    reports to me and my understanding. They are not moving in my
    opinion fast enough to support what we are trying to do in that
    country and I think that making sure that the leadership of
    Iraq understands that we do not have unlimited time, that we
    must move forward, that they are going to have to make these
    tough decisions, is important.
        I understand it is complex. I understand it is challenging.
    But they are going to have to make the kind of progress that
    will give the people in this country the confidence that they
    can believe in this government.
        Chairman Levin. My question was were those specific
    benchmarks met within the timeline that they set for
    themselves?
        Admiral Fallon. Clearly, they have not been able to stay on
    there, what they originally hoped to do there.
        Chairman Levin. It was more than hope. They had set those
    specific timelines, did they not, for themselves?
        Admiral Fallon. My understanding is that they had in
    conversation with our people outlined the things that they
    wanted to do. I have not seen anything in writing on these, but
    all these things have been discussed. I have talked to them
    about the majority of these things when I met with them. They
    tell me they are working these in various committees.
        But it is challenging. For example, the suicide bomber that
    walked into the Council of Representatives (COR) several weeks
    ago, was very destabilizing. I think it indicates the
    challenge, the biggest challenge here, is to make progress in
    the political vein, to have these people make the decisions. We
    have to have a framework of security and stability that gives
    them the confidence to be able to work.
        So it is a daunting challenge. I think we are making
    progress. We have not only a big push with additional forces
    going in there, but the way they are operating we have good
    indications that they are having success on the ground in
    expanding areas of stability and security. But we need the
    parallel effort, as you indicate, to make the political
    decisions to move us forward.
        Chairman Levin. Admiral, assuming that Secretary Rice is
    accurate in her letter, in your judgment have the Iraqis
    fulfilled those commitments? I just want you to make an
    assumption that Secretary Rice in her letter to me is accurate
    as to what commitments were made. On that assumption, in your
    judgment have the Iraqis fulfilled their commitment?
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, I believe they are working on
    them. They have not completed this agenda that they have laid
    out for themselves.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Inhofe?
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First, Admiral, there are two programs I have personally
    been involved in and feel very strongly about throughout the
    Middle East as well as Africa, and they are the International
    Military Education and Training (IMET) program and the Train
    and Equip, sections 1206 and 1207. We have made an effort to
    take off the requirement of the Article 98 from the IMET. I
    think originally it made sense to have that because we viewed
    that program as doing them a favor. I have felt that they are
    doing us a favor by coming over here and training.
        I would like to have your feeling about the IMET program,
    its success, and also the Train and Equip and how it is
    working, such as in the area of Ethiopia.
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, the IMET program is one of the
    most valuable tools we have for engaging with countries around
    the world, for exposing their military leaders to our
    processes, to our standards, to the ways in which they can help
    to build capacity in their countries. There are countless
    examples in which this has been extremely useful for us, so I
    strongly support the program. I think it is terrific. In my
    recent job in the Pacific we were able to use 1206 money in a
    way that was very helpful to achieve our long-term objectives,
    which of course are security and stability. So I really support
    it.
        Regarding Ethiopia, I intend to head down there next week.
    That will be my first visit since I have been in, so I will be
    interested in looking and seeing how things are going in this
    country, which by all appearances prior to my visit is a
    country that is actually trying to help in the HOA.
        Senator Inhofe. I would like to ask you to let someone give
    me a little review of what happens down there. I just got back
    from Ethiopia and they are very proud of the way that they used
    our help in going down to help us again. So I think that is
    perhaps somewhat of a model.
        Just briefly, we are all concerned now about the
    supplemental. That is the current problem that we are having. I
    will go ahead and quote Secretary Gates: ``It is a simple fact
    of life that if the supplemental is not enacted soon the Army
    faces a real and serious funding problem that will require
    increasingly disruptive and costly measures to be initiated,
    measures that will inevitably negatively impact readiness of
    the Army personnel and their families.'' Then he went on to
    elaborate how specifically that would impact negatively our
    efforts in Iraq.
        Do you have any comments to make about that?
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, in my discussions with the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of
    Defense, my understanding is that the continuing funds to
    support our efforts in the CENTCOM are being taken from the
    Services. So the extent to which they can continue to sustain
    the expenditures that we are running on a daily basis, I do not
    know exactly when they are going to run out of money, but I
    know that this has to be detrimental to the Services as they
    continue to support us.
        Senator Inhofe. In your opening remarks you addressed some
    of the foreign impact on al Qaeda. Last week, General Petraeus
    said Iraq is in fact the central front of al Qaeda's global
    campaign. I would assume you agree with that. I would like to
    get a handle and bring out and discuss a little bit about how
    many foreign fighters do you believe are supporting al Qaeda in
    Iraq and where they are coming from, where they are getting
    their equipment, and are there more there now than there were
    in Iraq, let us say, a year ago?
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, I cannot honestly tell you how
    many are there. From the data that I have seen and talking to
    General Petraeus, our commanders there, and our intelligence
    sources, my sense is that there are probably less coming in now
    than were last year. We are working very hard against this.
    There are several factors, I believe. One, there is little
    doubt that there was a pipeline coming through Syria that was
    enabling these people to get into the fight. But in the last
    couple of months, the significant turn to the government and
    coalition side by people in Anbar I believe has to be having a
    detrimental effect on this, because that is the conduit, if you
    would, of where these people were coming by our best
    intelligence assessment. Now that this is not particularly
    hospitable to al Qaeda or foreign fighters, we would expect to
    see some positive results from that.
        Senator Inhofe. That is good.
        African Command (AFRICOM) is working closely with both
    CENTCOM and EUCOM. I would like to get your impression as to
    how you see that working. I was in Djibouti in the HOA
    recently, and I have always felt that they should have their
    own command. That was one that we talked about a number of
    years ago.
        Can you tell me how you think that is going to impact your
    potential there?
        Admiral Fallon. I would expect minimal impact and maybe
    some positive. The expectation is we would have a positive
    effect if somebody is on the staff working this full-time. A
    fair chunk of the existing CENTCOM AOR is in Africa, and as
    this standup occurs we are going to be working closely with
    them to make sure there is nothing dropped in the handoff to
    the new AFRICOM. But I think it should be overall beneficial to
    the countries and our interests in the continent of Africa.
        Senator Inhofe. I think so, too.
        I mentioned being with General Jones on his last trip down
    to Afghanistan. I have always gotten the impression down there
    that there is great progress, but one of the greatest problems
    is corruption at the local level, the fact that you are not
    dealing with some central area that can really impact the
    entire country, but instead you have little areas of corruption
    around.
        Have you had a chance to get in there and evaluate our
    progress there, and would you elaborate on anything in terms of
    Afghanistan that you did not get a chance to talk about in your
    opening statement?
        Admiral Fallon. Sure, Senator. I have been there twice and
    last week spent 3 days in the country. Starting at the top,
    President Karzai is very, very charismatic, a very eloquent
    spokesperson and leader in his country. I think he has a good
    grip on the reality of that place. It is complex. It is
    certainly riddled with corruption. That is a way of life. It
    has been that way for quite a long time and it is something we
    have to deal with.
        There are some very positive signs in Afghanistan. First
    and foremost is my assessment of the people. They are grateful
    for the assistance that we and the coalition have given them.
    They support us by and large. They do not like the Taliban.
    They have had a dose of that and they realize how they treat
    people and what they do and they do not like them. So we have a
    strong support base in the population.
        I am also encouraged by the leadership in their security
    forces, particularly the army, their Minister of Defense,
    Bismillah Kahn, the Chief of the Army. These people are
    instinctively good leaders. They have a good grasp of reality
    in dealing with their people. I was impressed as I looked at
    the quality of the training.
        We have people that are working this very hard. My
    impression of their leadership is one that gives me a lot of
    confidence. We have a ways to go. I do not know what it looked
    like a year ago. I was in Afghanistan, but not really focused
    on the training of Afghan forces. What I see now I like. In
    fact, we have a new commander that is headed to Iraq to take
    over the training there, General Dubik. I called him yesterday
    and asked him if he would please stop in Afghanistan on the way
    to get a sense of this. Afghanistan is smaller, smaller than
    Iraq, in many ways I think easier to get a grip on because of
    the size and complexity issues compared to Iraq. But I am very
    happy with what I see there and I would like him to take note
    of it.
        As we move forward, we have trained substantial numbers of
    people there and that is good. I am very interested now in
    assessing how good they really are and what their capabilities
    are going to be. When I was there we talked about coming up
    with a program that we can accurately do that, and I want
    General Dubik to take a look at it before he goes into Iraq so
    that he can have that baseline. But I am pretty confident.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Admiral, what is the time horizon for your
    operational planning in your command? Several years, 5 years?
        Admiral Fallon. I will tell you that I am trying to push it
    out. I am trying to get the staff to be more focused
    strategically, first of all on this region and the future here,
    and to look down the road at, operationally at Iraq a year, 2
    years, 5 years down the road. The same thing for Afghanistan.
    What kind of relationship do we really want? What do we
    envision for a future? How do these places play in the region?
    So I am trying to get beyond. General Petraeus is working the
    tactical to operational side. I want to work operational to
    strategic.
        Senator Reed. What planning guidance are you giving your
    planners for force levels in Iraq 3 years out?
        Admiral Fallon. I have not gotten to that level of detail.
    Right now we are working very hard to try to give General
    Petraeus the support he needs to complete the influx of forces.
    But I have asked them to start taking a look at alternatives
    for where we might want to be in the future. I envision that we
    will want to be and we will be asked to be in Iraq for some
    period of time with some representation of U.S. capability,
    just as we do in other countries. Now, what that is going to
    be, how soon we transition to what might be an enduring
    presence there to do the kind of things we do in other
    countries, I think is something we need to be thinking about
    right now and start doing at least the initial planning for.
        Senator Reed. In that context, are you developing plans for
    redeploying forces out of Iraq, as a contingency at least?
        Admiral Fallon. I do not have plans right now to do that.
    But it is certainly something that we are going to think about
    and take under advisement, as we should.
        Senator Reed. Do you not think that is a key responsibility
    you have as the CENTCOM commander, to have contingency plans in
    place at all times?
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, we have dozens of contingency
    plans in the region. Yes, sir, we will do that. But right now
    we are focused on trying to do everything we can to make this
    surge successful and to support General Petraeus.
        Senator Reed. One of the criticisms of the operations to
    date, and I think it is with increasing strength, is the fact
    that CENTCOM did have very detailed plans for operations with
    respect to Iraq, but those plans were totally disregarded.
    Improvisational, ad hoc methods were used which turned out to
    be, frankly, disastrous in many cases.
        I do not think we can afford to repeat that experience
    going forward and that is why I would urge that this planning
    process be accelerated and we operate with detailed plans from
    military commanders and not improvisation from political
    appointees here and over there.
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, I do not know the detail of what
    went on in the past, but I can tell you that if we have plans
    on the books my intention is to make sure these plans are
    credible.
        Senator Reed. Admiral, are you satisfied with the
    contribution to date from non-DOD elements that are integral
    parts of this approach, the State Department, other agencies of
    the national government?
        Admiral Fallon. I do not know whether you could ever
    satisfy my desire for more and better assistance, better
    coordinated. I will tell you that we are working it very hard.
    I have met with Secretary Rice and her many assistant
    secretaries with our people in Baghdad to try and coordinate.
    We have thousands of people that are trying to work this issue.
        My sense right now is the biggest challenge for us is to do
    the best job we can to integrate these many capabilities on the
    ground in the near-term so that we can follow up this major
    change in our force disposition and in the way they are
    actually being employed on the ground, with the economic,
    political, and other infrastructure incentives and initiatives
    on the ground. I think it is really important, very complex,
    and I am spending probably as much time looking at that piece
    of it as the strict security piece because I think it is so
    important.
        Senator Reed. It has been my impression as I have gone out,
    and I know you have also, to go down to division commanders and
    brigade commanders who are continually critical of the lack of
    support. They understand the constraints, but that message
    seems to be diluted when it gets here to Washington. Everyone
    is working together and trying to coordinate and harmonize.
        We have reached a point I think where we have to be pretty
    blunt about whether we have all the components in place to
    attempt this proposed strategy.
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, I agree. Time is of the essence
    and it is right now. There have been a lot of changes. I know
    there have been historically complaints about this. There are
    Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in operation. They are
    well-intended. They have tremendous goals. They are working at
    governance and putting in place those structures. My perception
    is that we need actions right now that are going to show
    results in the very near-term, over the next 6 months say that
    can be a direct follow-on to the security push that is ongoing.
        There are now these new PRTs that are being very closely
    aligned to the brigade leadership, the military leadership. In
    fact, General Petraeus and I were talking about this just the
    night before last, and doing everything we can to try to sync
    these people on so that what the security leaders, the military
    leaders, see as they move into these neighborhoods, for
    example, in Baghdad is going to be acted upon, we have the
    capabilities in place to actually have this thing coordinated.
        So I think it is very complex. I think we are much better
    than we were before. But I will believe it when I see the
    results. I want to have this thing much tighter and we are
    working on that right now.
        Senator Reed. Admiral, one potential analysis of what is
    going on in the country is that the Government of Maliki, Shia-
    dominated, has essentially talked down the Shia militias, got
    them to go underground, biding their time, not taking effective
    steps against them but letting them bide their time because of
    political considerations, while at the same time they are quite
    eager to engage the Sunni insurgents, and we are doing that,
    and quite successfully because of efforts in Anbar and
    elsewhere, but the overall goal of this government is simply to
    let us fight their enemies while they consolidate their power
    and emerge at some point down the road dominating Iraq, which
    is contrary to all of the discussions about benchmarks, about
    reconciliation, about fairly distributing oil.
        What is your view on that?
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, I think that is a view. My
    perception from 6 weeks on the job is that certainly Prime
    Minister Maliki and other senior officials are taking a broader
    view of this, that they are trying to address the needs of the
    country as a whole rather than just these narrow sectarian
    views.
        I think it is a real challenge. Just look at the Prime
    Minister himself. He does not come from an experience base of
    dealing with other than his party and his interests. He
    acknowledges the need to do this, to be representative of the
    whole country.
        They are not making every decision that we would like them
    to make, as quickly as we would like them to make it. It is
    pretty easy for me to go over there and say, Mr. Prime
    Minister, if only you would do this, then I think this would be
    better. He reminds me that there are many issues and that there
    is a long history here, a perception in the minds of the now-
    majority Shia that they have been oppressed for a long time by
    Saddam and his Sunni-dominated government, and that in his
    dealing with the country as a whole that he has to take into
    consideration these very strong opinions and memories and the
    reality of the suffering that they have endured.
        So I can see this every day as he tries to balance this. We
    have with our ambassador, Ryan Crocker, and General Dave
    Petraeus there virtually every day, sitting down with the Prime
    Minister, working through him to try to continue to encourage
    him. It is tough with all these special interests that are
    gnawing at him.
        My sense is that, of all the things going on in Iraq, we
    are making some tremendous progress in many areas across the
    country. You look at the provinces as a whole, the number of
    provinces where there is substantial violence ongoing are
    relatively small, 4 or 5 out of the total of 18. I see real
    success with our troops, particularly since this surge and the
    number of forces have really increased in the conflicted areas
    in and around Baghdad.
        The destabilizer is the continuing ability of the Sunni,
    allied with al Qaeda insurgents, to use these big bombs to
    provide or to send a signal of insecurity. The reaction on the
    Shia side is to point to the Prime Minister and say: See, they
    are still at it. This gives them a substantial base in arguing
    to the Prime Minister that he be very careful about reaching
    out to the Sunnis.
        It is the biggest challenge. If we can break this link
    between the Sunni and al Qaeda, I think we will have a pretty
    good chance of a substantial turn. The dramatic shift in the
    atmospherics and the reality in Anbar from 6 months ago to
    today I think is indicative of what could happen in this
    country. Very complex.
        The Shia have not responded in a major retaliatory way to
    these big attacks. We literally hold our breath. I think one of
    the reasons is the Prime Minister and his leadership are trying
    to keep this tamped down. We need to convince him that taking
    steps to give some sense of inclusion to the Sunnis so they
    will then lessen their support, passive or otherwise, for al
    Qaeda would be the biggest and most important thing that could
    happen in the political realm in this country. This is my
    message to the Prime Minister.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        That last discussion you had with Senator Reed is
    important. I just returned from this weekend with Senator Ben
    Nelson's delegation. One of my impressions was that it is
    indeed the spectacular Sunni, but driven, plotted by al Qaeda,
    attacks, often by suicidal persons recruited by al Qaeda from
    outside the country, that is causing the greatest instability
    and insecurity there; and that this lack of security has
    provided a legitimatization of the Shia militia.
        Admiral Fallon. That is exactly right.
        Senator Sessions. Would you agree with that?
        Admiral Fallon. Absolutely right. It gives them an argument
    that I believe has clearly been persuasive to some degree with
    the Prime Minister that this is the insurance policy.
    Regrettably, even though there may be some good intentions with
    these militias to work first and foremost to defend their
    segment of the population, there is little doubt that there are
    very evil, murderous people that are involved in these militias
    as well, they care much more about getting even or getting
    revenge or wreaking havoc on somebody else than they do about
    taking care of people.
        So these competing interests are the biggest challenge.
        Senator Sessions. Al Qaeda and their allies we have to
    assume are just not compromisable. They are just not into
    negotiations. Ideology is pretty much their only way.
        Admiral Fallon. I am not sure I would be that strong. It
    looks like in Anbar there are people who were clearly fighting
    against us who have now stopped doing that and have gone over
    to the other side.
        Senator Sessions. These would be the allies or partners
    with?
        Admiral Fallon. These are disaffected, unhappy,
    disenfranchised Sunnis who were the beneficiaries of certain
    things under the Saddam regime, who when they lost all this saw
    that their best interests were served by fighting the coalition
    and fighting the government. After several years of this, it is
    very clear that they realize this is a mistake, and so they
    have opted to come over and help the coalition and the
    government.
        Now, I do not believe for a minute they have suddenly
    decided that we are the most lovable folks in town and this is
    what they are doing it for, that that is the reason. I think
    the reason is self-interest. Frankly, they see that their
    future, a future with al Qaeda, is a loser and that they have a
    much better chance of now working and trying to influence this
    government to be more representative of them, and that is why
    they are doing it.
        Senator Sessions. Senator Levin, Senator Warner, and I were
    in Al Anbar in October of last year and I was very troubled. I
    have heard reports of major progress as the tribal leaders have
    turned against the al Qaeda and that was confirmed this
    weekend. We met with General Gaskins, the Marine commander
    there in Fallujah. He talked about how they met with tribal
    leaders who said they wanted to cooperate with us and they
    asked our marines what they needed and they said we needed
    young people to join the police and the military, and he said:
    I will have 500 Tuesday. They came Tuesday and there were 550
    who signed up.
        It has been a very real change. Now, that was the area, and
    I guess remains the area of the strongest al Qaeda influence,
    is that correct?
        Admiral Fallon. This has been the traditional support base
    for al Qaeda in Iraq. It has also been the conduit for support
    from the outside in foreign fighters and equipment and no doubt
    money. I was there 6 months ago and found the same thing. It
    was very disheartening, a troubled region, and nobody was on
    our side except our own people.
        Every one of these towns and cities now, the major towns
    and cities, from the Syrian border all the way down to the
    Euphrates towards Baghdad are now largely in the hands of the
    Iraqi security forces and/or U.S. forces, and they are
    remarkably quiet compared to just a few months ago. There has
    been a steady decline in level of incidents in these cities and
    there is tremendous progress.
        I was out 2 weeks ago walking the streets of Haditha, a
    place where I was in December and it was not hospitable in any
    way, shape, or form. I was actually out with General Gaskins
    and General Odierno walking, meeting with the mayor. Very
    encouraging to see that the leadership, the tribal leadership
    in particular, has been forthcoming in encouraging their people
    to join the security forces, because that is going to make all
    the difference.
        Senator Sessions. I certainly agree, and we were told the
    same about Ramadi, a very tough area that now the General said
    they walked the streets and talked to people and it is not
    perfect, but a lot, huge progress has been made there.
        Admiral Fallon. You can see the tremendous difference in
    the population as they now begin to have confidence, they are
    starting to rebuild, do other things. But it is not over yet. I
    will be very honest with you.
        Senator Sessions. It is not over yet, and there are a
    number of concerns that I believe we have. But this is the kind
    of advance that can happen if you work at it and adjust and
    think and conditions change.
        I would just note, our marines, our soldiers, our airmen,
    our Navy personnel, deserve the absolute finest support this
    Congress can give them. But they also have to have support from
    the Iraqi government. We do not need to be doing things here
    that undermine their effectiveness and I think on occasion we
    have. Things that have been said here cannot have been helpful
    to those soldiers on the ground.
        But I am concerned about this government. We were there and
    they kept telling us: We want more time for this and more time
    for that, and a sense that they just would not understand the
    urgency of it. I understand that there is a plan for a 2-month
    summer recess in the Iraqi parliament. Can you give us your
    impressions on that summer recess, which I think is
    unacceptable, and your evaluation of the sense in which this
    government is capable of making the decisions on oil and
    reconciliation that really are important to us?
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, that is the number one question in
    my mind, is their ability as well as willingness to do this.
    The heads are nodding affirmatively, yes, we understand, yes,
    we are going to do this. When these things come up like this 2-
    month holiday, immediately I know Ambassador Crocker and
    General Petraeus have pushed back on it.
        I think it was Dr. Rubai, the National Security Adviser,
    the other day said this will be addressed; they are not going
    to take a 2-month vacation; we are going to get them to work,
    which is clearly necessary. How can we have our people out
    there fighting and dying if they are off on vacation, instead
    of addressing the most pressing issue, which is getting the
    kind of reconciliation sense in the minds of the people.
        Senator Sessions. That certainly worries me, I have to tell
    you. This government has to be functional if we are going to
    support it.
        Admiral Fallon. I think we need to be steadfast in our
    messages from here and from all of our coalition forces that
    the only acceptable behavior here is going to be them stepping
    up to take those tough decisions, however difficult they may
    be, to give their people the confidence that they can trust and
    believe in their government.
        Senator Sessions. Admiral Fallon, I have raised a number of
    times my concern about increasing the system of law in Iraq and
    the need for order and a judicial system and a prison system
    that works. We had a meeting for several hours one night with
    the Iraqi judge, Iraqi lawyers, defense lawyers, Department of
    Justice (DOJ) personnel, General Gardner, who is building the
    prison system there. I just have to tell you that I am of the
    view that we still are not where we need to be.
        General Gardner talked about doubling the prison capacity
    in fairly short order. I think he is committed to that. I
    believe General Petraeus understands that. Probably it needs to
    be more than doubled, and soon. I think that is confirmed by an
    article by Bing West in the Atlantic Monthly of a few weeks ago
    that talked about the catch and release, that 80 percent of
    insurgents that are arrested are usually released, other
    problems.
        Have you been able to examine how critical this is, because
    if the local people see individuals that have murdered their
    relatives or conspired with them be apprehended and then
    released, it has a tremendously demoralizing effect. I just
    cannot stress how strongly I believe that that is critical to
    creating stability in Iraq.
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, I agree, the need for a justice
    system, for law and order, for a host of reasons--as you
    indicated, to give the Iraqi people some confidence that there
    is some real justice going to occur, as well as dealing with
    thousands of detainees right now, is really important. Dave
    Petraeus is trying to jump-start this, as I think you are
    aware. He has stood up or helped to facilitate standing up a
    court system in the Green Zone in a protected area.
        One of the biggest challenges here is every time a person
    of courage stands up to do the right thing in this country he
    becomes immediately the target of those zealots that want chaos
    and do not want a justice system. So they are very vulnerable
    and their families are vulnerable. So Dave is trying to jump-
    start this by setting up a court with a lot of help from folks
    in this country, legal experts and judges and prosecutors and
    so forth, to be able to get something going to address these
    things.
        Senator Sessions. We had discussed that late last year. I
    believe that is happening, where the judges go out to safe
    zones and try cases and come back to Baghdad or otherwise,
    because they are at great risk and cannot live within the
    community if they impose substantial sentences.
        But what I want to say to you, Admiral, is my impression is
    that that is a good start, but it probably needs to be a ten-
    fold increase.
        Admiral Fallon. I agree.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
        Senator Bill Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral, good morning.
        Admiral Fallon. Good morning, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. My question is with regard to Baghdad,
    what is the electricity production as to what is needed at this
    point?
        Admiral Fallon. That is pretty tough to judge. I had this
    same question for my staff and for General Petraeus' folks as I
    flew around Baghdad, over Baghdad at night, in the last couple
    of weeks. I saw quite a bit of light, which was indicative of
    power.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Okay, would you supply that for the
    record, yes, sir?
        Admiral Fallon. Sure, yes, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Baghdad's first quarter average daily demand was  cents2,100 MW,
    with the average daily electricity supply of 897 MW, which supplies a
    first quarter daily average of 5.4 hours of power. The difference is
    due to the large number of generation units that are in scheduled and
    unscheduled maintenance, long-term outages, the inability to provide
    fuel supplies for power generation, and the interdiction of the 400kv
    transmission grid between the Baghdad Metropolitan Area and the power
    production centers in the adjacent regions of Iraq. Since June 2006 the
    Government of the United States has provided +7.6B USD to upgrade the
    Iraqi Electricity Sector, which suffered through +25 years of
    mismanagement and neglect by the previous regimes. The Iraqi Ministry
    of Electricity has developed a long range plan to redevelop and expand
    the power sector to meet the demands of not only Baghdad, but of the
    entire Iraqi nation. Electricity demands of the Iraqi people and
    economy will not be met, however, until the security situation
    improves, until the climate of corruption moderates, and until the
    Iraqi government develops and implements necessary laws to allow the
    massive needed international investment ($20 billion+ USD) to develop
    the power sector.

        Senator Bill Nelson. Now, with regard to Baghdad, my
    impression here is that you think that the surge is working in
    Baghdad. This is not a question about Anbar; it is a question
    about Baghdad.
        Admiral Fallon. In and around Baghdad, I can see very
    positive effects of the additional forces and the methods and
    the way that they are being used with the Iraqi forces. There
    are substantial areas of that city that are now no longer under
    the influence of the kind of daily chaos that was going on 3 or
    4 months ago.
        Senator Bill Nelson. The judgment on whether or not it did
    or did not work in Baghdad would be rendered when?
        Admiral Fallon. There is still another couple of months to
    go before the total of the forces that have been allocated for
    that area, before they are actually in place. So I could not
    imagine even trying to make a judgment until after they have
    been in place for a couple of months. So I think by the end of
    this summer we will have a pretty good feel for how we are
    really doing.
        The challenge, Senator, that I see is I can see the
    momentum, I have been there, I have gone on the streets and I
    have seen what is going on, and our people are reaching out and
    steadily making these neighborhoods more secure. But the
    destabilizers again are these big bombs and the ability of
    zealots to penetrate that security and to make people feel
    insecure.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Are these mixed neighborhoods that
    they are going in, securing, and then they hold?
        Admiral Fallon. The areas that were less mixed have been
    easier to deal with. We are now, General Petraeus and General
    Odierno and his teams are tackling these mixed neighborhoods,
    which are more of a problem, because this is where the zealots
    on both sides are still hard at work and they are still
    intimidating the population and they are the toughest nuts to
    crack right now.
        Senator Bill Nelson. The ones that have been cleared, are
    they held?
        Admiral Fallon. In fact, I was looking with my staff
    yesterday at the metrics that we have been using and the way we
    have been depicting this, and I gave them my opinion that that
    might have been good prior, but right now it is not enough
    because it does not give me enough context, a sense of how well
    we are actually doing, once we think we have cleared these
    areas what is really going on.
        So it is a work in progress. I could show you at a
    classified level a depiction of Baghdad with General Petraeus'
    assessment right now, but I think we are digging down deeper in
    that to see how well we are really extending the security.
        Senator Bill Nelson. For the committee what I am trying to
    understand is that originally the theory was clear, hold, and
    build.
        Admiral Fallon. Right.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Now, going into this surge we were not
    even getting to the build part. We were going to clear a
    neighborhood and then we were going to hold it. So my question
    is, of the neighborhoods that you have cleared, are those same
    neighborhoods being held?
        Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Are they being held by the Iraqi army?
        Admiral Fallon. In large measure, yes, with a very strong
    U.S. presence.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Can you give a percentage? Is it 60-
    40? Is it 70-30?
        Admiral Fallon. I would be winging it. I do not want to
    give you a percentage, but there are substantial Iraqi forces
    and U.S. forces in these areas.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Are there any areas or neighborhoods
    that we cleared that we are not holding?
        Admiral Fallon. I think it is too simplistic to say just
    holding. Have we eliminated all incidents and all violence in
    these neighborhoods? No. Has the level of violence gone down
    dramatically? Yes. There are some that I feel pretty confident
    that I do not have to look at day to day to see how much
    bloodshed is going on, that other areas are the focal point.
        These are really big neighborhoods and lots of stuff going
    on.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Right.
        Admiral Fallon. But generally, we have had very good
    success in many of these neighborhoods so far.
        Senator Bill Nelson. You want to give us a concept of how
    many?
        Admiral Fallon. No, I do not want to. I think I would
    rather wait a little bit and get the rest of our forces in
    there.
        Senator Bill Nelson. No, I am talking about how many we
    have cleared.
        Admiral Fallon. Oh, in terms of numbers?
        Senator Bill Nelson. That is correct.
        Admiral Fallon. I believe you cannot just look at Baghdad
    because you have to take this; it is not an isolated entity
    here. There are lots of lines of communication in and out of
    there. My sense is, first glance, about half of the area looks
    dramatically improved and levels of violence lessened. There is
    a distinctly active area of mixed neighborhoods that runs
    generally west of the Green Zone, that is certainly an area in
    which we are working very hard right now. The level of
    incidents is up, but there is little doubt that one of the
    reasons for those levels of incidents is because we are pushing
    very hard into these neighborhoods with the Iraqi forces.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I think that would be
    most helpful to the committee as we are trying to evaluate, to
    what degree in what was laid out to us by General Petraeus,
    this clear and then hold, to what degree has it been
    implemented and where has it been, the degree of progress. It
    is hard for us to evaluate without having some specifics.
        Admiral Fallon. I understand.
        Chairman Levin. Would you provide those, Admiral?
        Admiral Fallon. We will work on it. Senator, I do not think
    it is appropriate to declare that we have done this and we have
    gotten this percentage until we get the rest of the force in
    there, because this is a work in progress. As additional forces
    come in, there are different things taking place at the
    tactical level that are very significant in regard to these
    neighborhoods.
        Senator Bill Nelson. You have said within a couple of
    months you are going to have all of your troops deployed, and
    so at that point clearly we would want to know. But we do not
    want to wait 2 months to get this information to get an idea.
        Admiral Fallon. I will get back to General Petraeus and we
    will give you an assessment of where we think we are right now.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Since Operation Fardh Al-Qanoon began in February 2007, 146
    neighborhoods (muhallas) have been cleared by coalition forces and
    Iraqi security forces and are now in the ``control'' or ``retain''
    status. This represents 32 percent of the total number of neighborhoods
    (457) in Baghdad. Currently Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B) is
    in the process of clearing 155 neighborhoods (34 percent) through a
    combination of operations conducted from the division through company
    level. MND-B is shaping the remaining 156 muhallas (34 percent) through
    disruption operations. These muhallas will either be cleared or
    transition directly to control status.
        MND-B classifies all muhallas within its area of responsibility
    according to a categorization scheme that identifies each mulhalla as
    in the ``disrupt,'' ``clear,'' ``control,'' or ``retain'' status. MND-B
    executes disruption operations to keep enemy forces off balance until
    sufficient clear and control forces are available. Clearing operations
    seek to remove enemy forces and organized resistance within an assigned
    area. An area transitions to control status when coalition and Iraqi
    forces can maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent
    its use by insurgent forces and protect the populace. Finally, an area
    enters retain status when friendly actions render the area free of
    enemy influence. The doctrinal reference for these tactical terms is
    Army Field Manual 3-90 (Operations). The categorization of each
    mulhallah is set using assessments made by the coalition force brigade
    commander responsible for that area.

        Senator Bill Nelson. Alright. What is your strategy to
    combat the terrorist threats in Africa?
        Admiral Fallon. I am headed to the HOA on Monday to go down
    and look at it first-hand. Africa is a huge area. We are
    focused on the HOA. Somalia has been pretty much ungoverned for
    many years. It is clear that this is a lawless territory which
    is fertile ground for terrorists. We are trying to pay
    attention to what is going on there.
        The Ethiopian Government has sent troops in to try to
    disrupt some of the more harmful elements there. There is an
    African Union force that has gone on the ground in Mogadishu to
    try and put some semblance of stability in there. My sense is
    from a distance that they are having some effect, but not great
    effect. So I am interested in going down myself to visit some
    of these places and get my own assessment.
        Senator Bill Nelson. That is my question, your strategy in
    preventing al Qaeda from strengthening its presence. So since
    you need to take that trip, I would appreciate it if you would
    respond to us after that particular factfinding trip.
        Admiral Fallon. I sure will.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Martinez.
        Senator Martinez. Admiral, it is good to see you again. I
    know how proud we are in Florida to have CENTCOM in our State
    and we are delighted to have you there and look forward to you
    continuing to be one of our most distinguished citizens.
        I wanted to begin by framing where we are. We started a
    Baghdad security plan a couple of months ago under the
    leadership of General Petraeus. We had an increase in troop
    strength relating to that plan, which is still incomplete. In
    other words, the troop strength will be fulfilled in another
    couple of months.
        Would it be not a little difficult to assess the success of
    a plan that is still in the process of being implemented?
        Admiral Fallon. Sure, which is why it is really very
    difficult. I can give you a snapshot, but I am not sure how
    useful that snapshot would be until we get the full force of
    our intended changes in place. So it is going to be a couple
    months to get the forces there and then I think I would
    certainly be interested in letting them have the full effect of
    that force and the follow-on non-military aspects of this plan
    before we really make an assessment or a judgment on how we are
    really doing.
        Senator Martinez [presiding]. That is called the Baghdad
    security plan, which is really focused on Baghdad itself,
    correct?
        Admiral Fallon. It is Baghdad and environs.
        Senator Martinez. Now, the success we have had in Al Anbar
    Province, and to be sure there has been significant success
    there----
        Admiral Fallon. True.
        Senator Martinez.--is unrelated to the Baghdad security
    plan. Of course, it is part of what we are trying to accomplish
    in the whole country, but it is a success that is somewhat
    unrelated, is it not?
        Admiral Fallon. I think they are related and that the
    degree to which we can capitalize on the change of sentiment
    and the changes on the ground in Anbar will be very telling in
    Baghdad, because the al Qaeda-Sunni connection has by every
    indication primarily been down through Anbar and into the
    Baghdad area. So making progress in changing the ability of the
    enemy to use this area as a sanctuary and as a means to funnel
    people and equipment down into Baghdad I think is going to be
    very telling on the situation.
        Senator Martinez. Al Qaeda was using Al Anbar as a staging
    area, safe area if you will, a place of headquartering their
    operation?
        Admiral Fallon. It got support from the population.
        Senator Martinez. Right. But then they were operating
    outside of that area, including in Baghdad, correct? Al Qaeda
    even then and today continues to operate in Baghdad as well?
        Admiral Fallon. They will try to go anyplace they can in
    the country.
        Senator Martinez. But in fact, do they go into Baghdad?
        Admiral Fallon. They do.
        Senator Martinez. When we are fighting in Baghdad, we are
    at times fighting al Qaeda?
        Admiral Fallon. It is our belief that they are the primary
    instigators of terror, particularly the suicide bombings.
        Senator Martinez. Part of this new strategy, this new
    security plan that is in the process of implementation, had a
    political component. I know you were asked this morning about
    some of the benchmarks that the Iraqi government had set out
    for itself, obviously some of them unmet. It does seem to me
    that it has been very difficult for the Iraqi government to
    come together and operate as a nucleus of a unity government. I
    was struck when I was in Baghdad how disjointed it was and
    about the influence in some ministries by those who really did
    not have the same goals as perhaps the Prime Minister.
        Why is it so difficult for the Iraqis to come together
    politically? What is it that has made it so difficult for there
    to be the political success that is so integral to the overall
    success of Iraq?
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, my understanding is and belief
    that the sectarian differences that divide this country are
    quite significant. The short version is that a Sunni minority
    has dominated the country for decades under Saddam Hussein.
    They inflicted a lot of pain on the Shia majority and that has
    now been reversed in a representative process. Since the Shia
    outnumber the Sunni, they are the dominant political entity in
    the country.
        The Sunni are feeling the pain of being the former top dogs
    and now they are not. They enjoyed many benefits under Saddam
    that they certainly do not enjoy now. This is very difficult
    for them to accept.
        The Shia, on the other hand, having been persecuted and
    severely maligned by the prior government, in some respects
    certainly want to enjoy the benefits of being the majority and
    to get things that they would like to have done to their part
    of the country and their people. There is certainly a segment
    of the population that is out for revenge and would like
    nothing better than to try and settle scores.
        You have a Kurdish part of the country in the north that
    has its own special interest related to itself, and the ability
    of these three major factions to work together is going to be
    the tale of the tape here. This is challenging for them because
    they have historically only looked after their own interests.
    There have not been national leaders who have a broader view
    that would, I think, take into consideration all the interests
    and desires of the population. That is what Prime Minister
    Maliki is trying to do.
        My sense is that most of the leaders understand that, but
    they have a lot of difficulty in making the decisions that are
    going to be necessary to really move forward. It is clearly a
    work in progress. The idea that they have benchmarks and they
    have not met them, it is like many other things, even our own
    government: We set goals and objectives; sometimes we make
    them, sometimes we do not.
        The intent is to work towards these goals. I have not had
    any of the senior leadership tell me that they are not
    interested in working. There is no doubt that there are people
    in this country, in that country, that feel this way, but the
    senior leadership has told me they understand, they know what
    they need to do, and they are going to continue to work it, but
    it is difficult.
        Senator Martinez. We in the U.S. Senate understand about
    benchmarks not met in terms of goals of what we can achieve.
        But I think no doubt that the political dilemma that they
    are in would be much easier dealt with in an atmosphere of less
    violence, which is what our hope is and part of our strategy, I
    suppose.
        Admiral Fallon. This is why the enemies, they understand
    this very well. They are now working hard to focus their
    activities on things that would be destabilizing and things
    that would undermine the confidence of the leaders to make
    those decisions.
        Senator Martinez. Admiral, we are going to have to adjourn
    the hearing at this time so that I might go vote in the 2
    minutes that I have left to get to the floor. So we thank you
    and we stand adjourned.
        Admiral Fallon. Thank you, Senator.
        [Recess.]
        Senator Webb [presiding]. The committee will come to order.
        I would first just like to say that I was pleased to
    support your confirmation, Admiral Fallon. I think that you
    have unique credentials and from my perspective you were
    dropped into the middle of what I view to be the results of an
    abysmal strategic failure, with constantly shifting
    justifications for our involvement, vague objectives, and
    overuse of our military, as opposed to a tandem diplomatic
    process that should have been in place, that hopefully we are
    now getting into place.
        The great strength of your more recent background
    particularly has been your diplomatic skills. I think that
    anyone who observed your previous tenure knows of those
    strengths and of the approaches that you took, particularly
    with our relations with China; and that this is something that
    has been sorely lacking in our approach to the situation in
    Iraq. I think that, absent a small percentage of people in this
    administration, there is a genuine acceptance of the fact that
    this is the direction that we need to go.
        I spent a good bit of time yesterday with Iraq's ambassador
    to this country, and we obviously did not agree on everything,
    but it was surprising to me the things that we did agree on.
    One of those was his belief, and I think this is the belief of
    most of the people involved in the Iraqi governmental process,
    that you simply cannot resolve this problem inside Iraq, that
    for all the talk about the reconciliation of the factions
    inside Iraq, that this is only going to be resolved with the
    strong participation of other countries internationally and
    particularly countries in the region.
        He spoke to me of the efforts of this current Iraqi
    government to reach out in their own missions to Tehran and
    Syria and the difficulties that they were having, quite
    frankly, being taken seriously. This only strengthened my view
    that the solution that is going to come about is going to have
    to come about through strong diplomatic participation.
        I say this at a time when we know that Secretary Rice for
    the first time is at a conference, the first time in 28 years,
    a conference where at a minister level the United States and
    Iran are present. I think it is properly a multilateral
    conference.
        But I am curious as to your viewpoints on this and what you
    see as the prospects for the outcome of this conference and
    this approach.
        Admiral Fallon. Thanks very much, Senator. I share your
    conviction that real success, not just in Iraq but in the
    region, is going to require engagement and help from countries
    out there. My initial impression is after speaking with the
    leaders from Egypt to Pakistan, and throughout the Gulf area,
    there is a general feeling that we have not paid much attention
    or enough attention to the opinions of the folks there.
    Whatever happened in the past, we have to deal with today. So a
    solution for Iraq in the positive manner in which we would like
    to see it is going to need help from the neighborhood.
        In general terms, there is a lot of anxiety and I think it
    has probably not been ever too much different over there. But
    most of the Gulf countries on the Arabian Peninsula are very
    concerned about Iran, about Iranian intentions, about the
    growth in power and the implications for their countries. There
    is a sense that because the majority government in Iraq now is
    a Shia government that the alignment or potential alignment
    with Iran would be to the detriment of other countries, is one
    of their major concerns.
        There is a skepticism about the Maliki government based on,
    I think understandably in many respects, that Maliki's track
    record is as a representative of a party rather than a country.
    There is a certain affinity amongst these Gulf nations for the
    Sunni in the west of the country, and it goes on and on. There
    is an hour's worth of issues here.
        Be that as it may, my message to each of these leaders has
    been, after listening carefully to their recommendations and
    their complaints in many cases, is to ask for them to help.
    They do not necessarily need to be doing earth-shattering
    things, but the most useful thing would be some overt support
    to the Maliki government, which would give them some sense of
    their own importance and credibility.
        They are very nervous about their neighborhood as well
    because they sense this feeling of distrust. I think it is a
    really good sign, to segue into these two meetings this week,
    that the meetings are being held in Egypt. When I spoke to
    President Mubarak about this and encouraged him to not only
    host these meetings, but to meet with Maliki to give him some
    encouragement to proceed and to stand up as a representative
    for the whole country of Iraq, he agreed. I am very pleased to
    see that that meeting did occur. No earth-shattering,
    monumental declarations after that, but just the image of the
    two of them sitting down and talking. At the time, of course,
    it gives the President an opportunity to impart a message to
    Prime Minister Maliki that he needs to be looking out for these
    minorities in his country.
        Senator Webb. I would suggest also that the image of the
    United States at a ministerial level having some sort of
    discussions with people that this administration has refused to
    deal with is a very powerful, symbolic message as well. That is
    one thing that I was hearing even from the Iraqi ambassador
    yesterday, that Iran, Syria, do have an interest in stability
    in Iraq and that it is up to us to overtly push that and bring
    them to the table as a part of a solution.
        I wanted to ask you two other things really quickly here.
    One is, when President Bush announced the surge in January he
    said: ``The Iraqi government plans to take responsibility for
    the security in all of Iraq's provinces by November.'' Is that
    still your goal?
        Admiral Fallon. We are working towards the turnover of each
    of these military districts to Iraqi leadership and as fast as
    we can get this accomplished I think the better off we are
    going to be. This is not without challenge.
        Senator Webb. Would you say that it is still the
    administration's goal to do that by November?
        Admiral Fallon. I have not heard anything to the contrary,
    Senator.
        Senator Webb. The other is a comment about the dialogue
    that has been going back and forth with respect to al Qaeda and
    the Sunnis. I mentioned to you when I started the frustration
    that I and so many other people have had with the constantly
    changing justifications for our involvement, from the pre-
    invasion rhetoric about weapons of mass destruction and Saddam
    Hussein. The average troop who went into Iraq thought they were
    going to be there 3 months. The average person who planned this
    figured we were going to be there for 30 years. People like
    myself and others were saying that at the time.
        Now we have yesterday the President saying it is not
    whether we ought to take sides in a civil war, it is whether we
    stay in the fight against the same international terrorist
    network that attacked us on September 11. I think the truth of
    the matter is that network was not even actively operating in
    Iraq until we got there. In fact, their philosophy went against
    the grain of Saddam Hussein's secular government, even though
    it was a violent and repressive government.
        What we are seeing really is the Sunnis as the people in
    the middle here. It is good news that they have decided more
    overtly to go after al Qaeda, but there is not really a natural
    alignment between the Sunnis in Iraq and al Qaeda, in that the
    old saying in this region, the enemy of my enemy is my friend.
    I think that what the Sunni insurgency has apparently decided
    is that they will cooperate with us to the point of getting rid
    of an entity that really was not dominant in their communities
    before we got there. That is good, but I think they would like
    to see us leave, too. They want us both out.
        Admiral Fallon. We would like to dramatically change the
    presence we have in this country as well. If I could go back to
    your first comment, it has been fascinating to me to get into
    this and to find how interesting the arrangements are between
    various groups and factions. Some pretty unlikely alliances
    here or least cooperation between factions that on the surface
    you would think have absolutely antithetical views of life.
        But look at the reality of Lebanon and the fact that
    Hezbollah have been supported and sustained by the Iranians,
    working through Syria, who appear to be on two different
    religious levels, and then the reality of terrorists working
    together inside Iraq, indications that potentially al Qaeda may
    be working with Iranian elements that are destabilizing areas
    in the country, the fact that in Afghanistan we are seeing
    Iranian support to the Taliban, again at the opposite ends of
    the ideological spectrum.
        Senator Webb. I take your point. My time has run out. Just
    to finish on that point, however, that is one thing I saw in
    Lebanon when I was a journalist there in 1982, is that people
    used to sit back and say, do not get involved in a five-sided
    argument. You could have a firefight start between, say, the
    Druze and a piece of the Lebanese army and all of a sudden the
    Syrians would be over here and then the Christian Falange would
    be shooting at the Syrians. In microcosm that is what we are
    seeing right now.
        Thank you for your testimony. I am sorry that my time has
    run out.
        Chairman Levin [presiding.] Thank you, Senator Webb.
        Senator Ben Nelson.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Fallon, I have one question to start with and some
    other things I would like to talk about. The commander of the
    Multi-National Force-Iraq may soon have to submit reports to
    the President and to Congress regarding progress on certain
    conditions for staying in Iraq. On that note, where does the
    authority lie in submitting recommendations for troop
    redeployment? Who has the authority for troop redeployment or
    troop withdrawal?
        Admiral Fallon. I would expect General Petraeus would make
    recommendations to me.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Recommendations, yes, but who would
    have the authority?
        Admiral Fallon. I would make the recommendations to the
    Secretary.
        Senator Ben Nelson. The Secretary of Defense would have the
    authority for redeployment and/or withdrawal?
        Admiral Fallon. It is my understanding. I am sure he would.
        Senator Ben Nelson. I am not saying he would do it. I am
    just saying he would have the authority to make that decision.
        Admiral Fallon. I believe so.
        Senator Ben Nelson. As Senator Sessions said, we went on a
    trip to Iraq this last weekend, and we were definitely
    encouraged by what we saw in Al Anbar Province with the
    cooperation of the sheiks with our military against the al
    Qaeda. It is very remarkable, but I suppose it was bolstered by
    the fact that there are no Shia down there to have any kind of
    sectarian violence of any consequence or civil war. Is that
    accurate?
        Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir.
        Senator Ben Nelson. So when we went to Baghdad we should
    not have been surprised to find out that the sectarian violence
    or civil war type sectarian violence was well under way; is
    that fair?
        Admiral Fallon. The vast majority of violence is along the
    sectarian fault lines, where the instigators on both sides are
    trying to antagonize the other to retaliate, and in their view
    out of this chaos they somehow achieve their objectives.
        Senator Ben Nelson. That is the center, but like the spokes
    of a wheel it radiates out of Baghdad as much as anything; is
    that fair?
        Admiral Fallon. Large areas of the north, west, and south
    are predominantly one sect. The mixed areas are Baghdad,
    Diyallah, the Fiya areas.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Those areas could be more quiet and
    have less internal strife, is that fair?
        Senator Ben Nelson. Where you have a single sectarian
    population, you do not end up with this same sort of thing that
    you have in Baghdad?
        Admiral Fallon. Competition, yes, sir. They are pushing,
    each of them, particularly the Shia and Sunni, to try to expand
    their areas, to basically control as much of the territory as
    they can.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Now, with respect to the surge, which I
    supported, in large number for the Al Anbar Province at the
    time that we talked about it earlier this year, and still do
    support any kind of additional military support to help the
    sheiks defeat the al Qaeda there, for obvious reasons. I did
    not support and do not support the surge as it relates to
    Baghdad because I have not been able to square the circle of
    how you put our troops, not coalition troops but our troops, in
    between the Sunnis and the Shias and not have our troops have
    to have the primary responsibility, even though they may have
    Iraqi troops with them, the primary responsibility for that
    combat mission.
        Is it not accurate that they have the primary
    responsibility for that combat mission?
        Admiral Fallon. We are trying to enable the Iraqi security
    forces to be the dominant guarantors of security in this area.
        Senator Ben Nelson. How long will that take?
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, it is a work in progress right
    now.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Are we looking at 1 year or 2 years, or
    do we know?
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, we are going to make every effort
    to, several months after we get this, the rest of the surge
    force in place, to make our best assessment of how we are doing
    and make our recommendations from there.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Is it fair to say that during this
    period where we build up the surge, because of the location of
    our troops in between the Sunnis and Shias, that we will most
    likely take on even more casualties than we have so far?
        Admiral Fallon. I do not know about that.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Percentage wise.
        Admiral Fallon. We are certainly heavily engaged in this
    now in and around Baghdad. There are a lot of moving parts. We
    are working hard to, at the same time that we are providing the
    backbone for security and stability, bring and put the Iraqi
    security forces in the lead here. They are doing a remarkable
    job in some areas.
        Senator Ben Nelson. I support the backbone. I support what
    General Dempsey told us in terms of helping the Iraqis build an
    infrastructure so that they can use their own money to buy
    their own equipment, because they were unable to do that, with
    no structure in place that would permit them to do it. If they
    had $100 to buy equipment, by the time it all got pilfered off
    they might buy it with $40. Now we are getting 97 cents out of
    every dollar going for, out of their money, the purchase of
    equipment and setting themselves up so that they can have the
    competence to manage the equipment as well as buy it. Is that
    fair?
        Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir.
        Senator Ben Nelson. That is the backbone of the kind of
    support that makes a great deal of sense for the Iraqi army and
    for us to support the effort.
        When we met with, let us see, two deputy vice presidents,
    Tariq Al-Hashimi and Adil Abdul Mahdi--Hashimi is a Sunni,
    Mahdi is a Shiite--we also met with Deputy Prime Minister
    Saleh, a Kurd, and Prime Minister Maliki. My conclusion after
    sitting in those meetings was that there was a question of
    competence or a question of willingness to move forward to
    develop a reconciliation process that could be successful.
        From what I hear from you today, you have some questions
    about how fast things are moving. Do you have an opinion about
    whether it is willingness or competence?
        Admiral Fallon. Each of these people appear to be competent
    in a number of areas.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Individually.
        Admiral Fallon. Individually. They acknowledge and have
    told me, because I have met each of them myself, that they are
    willing to work towards accommodation, reconciliation, noble
    objective. This is a real challenge. To make the accommodations
    in the near-term that are going to start them down the road to
    reconciliation I think is critical.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Deputy Prime Minister Hashimi does not
    feel that there is any significant movement toward
    reconciliation or accommodation. He feels isolated from Prime
    Minister Al-Mari and largely ignored.
        Then in the conversation with the Prime Minister, I could
    not determine whether--although I did suggest it was a question
    that people were asking about the ability of his government--he
    had the capability of doing it or whether he had the
    willingness to do it. I told him the American people were
    looking and I think Congress is looking for three things from
    their government: the commitment, the effort, and results or
    progress; and that the benchmarks that will in my opinion
    ultimately be in the package will be the conditions for
    staying. General Petraeus' reports will be the report cards and
    the consequences of what happens will depend on what those
    report cards show about commitment, effort, and progress.
        Is that a fair way to analyze what you think we should be
    doing?
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, I think that is a pretty good
    summary. I would make a couple of comments. Hashimi is a Sunni
    and I have talked to him as well. He feels that his minority is
    not being given the recognition and things that would make them
    feel comfortable in this environment. The Prime Minister, on
    the other hand, says: ``I recognize that we need to work with
    them,'' and so forth.
        I think it is not just willingness or competence. It is an
    ability to actually forge the kinds of compromises, and this is
    all politics, that will be successful in pulling these people
    close enough to be able to work their way down the road. I
    think it is challenging to look at this. Easy for us to push.
    We know what we want and we want results, there is no doubt
    about it. Let us go guys; get moving. Their ability to craft
    these kinds of compromises--these are not like gentlemen and
    ladies like yourselves, who have much experience and a
    tremendous legacy which we inherit in a process. They have none
    of this.
        So to expect them to be able to just stand up and tomorrow
    say, ``okay, we will cut this deal,'' is definitely a
    challenge. It is not competence, it is not willingness, as much
    as it is their ability to actually get this job done.
        Senator Ben Nelson. How confident are you of their
    acquisition of the ability to be able to do this? Because I
    think that is the question about the government ultimately.
        Admiral Fallon. That is something that every time I go to
    meet with them I am evaluating and getting my own sense of how
    well we are doing. When I feel that I have this thing to the
    point where I feel comfortable in making a judgment on it, I
    will be very happy to tell you, sir.
        Senator Ben Nelson. You will volunteer that to us? We will
    not have to pry it out of you, I am sure.
        Hopefully you will help them be able to understand that the
    American people are not going to sit by while they play king of
    the hill and look down on the Sunnis at the present time,
    unable to work out an oil revenue agreement, all the other
    things, rights of the minority parties, everything that we are
    looking at in benchmarks.
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, I agree. As you speak to each of
    these people individually, they are more forthcoming in their
    fears and concerns about the others. I think a good sign is
    when they get together in a group with a mixed sectarian
    audience, at least their remarks in public are more
    conciliatory, and hopefully that can be leveraged into the kind
    of results we need.
        Senator Ben Nelson. I do know that I must have gotten
    through to the Prime Minister because after our meeting he
    issued a terse news bulletin that he would not be pushed around
    by foreign interests. So I do know that he heard what I said.
        Admiral Fallon. Yes, he heard it.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Admiral.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Clinton.
        Senator Clinton. Admiral, during your confirmation hearings
    as we discussed my and the committee's concerns with the level
    of force protection currently available at the time for our
    troops that were going to deploy as part of the President's
    announced escalation, we discussed that as Commander of Pacific
    Command you had been asked to review your equipment stocks in
    order to identify what items could be cross-leveled with
    CENTCOM. In fact, since that dialogue Admiral Keating has
    testified that prepositioned equipment sets in the Pacific had
    been depleted to fill your new command's requirements.
        You mentioned that you and General Petraeus would review
    the issue and determine whether the right sets of equipment
    were available and if the current process for equipment
    transfers were in place.
        Within the last 2 months, there have been two attacks where
    Americans have lost their lives while exposed in vulnerable
    joint security outposts. These two attacks were with vehicle-
    borne suicide bombs and small arms fire. Last week's attack
    resulted in nine paratroopers killed as a result of the
    attackers penetrating the perimeter of the outpost.
        Admiral, now that you have had some time to review the
    situation in your new command, can you give us any thoughts as
    to what additional steps can be and will be taken to provide
    the required force protection and to mitigate the risks from
    these new kinds of deployments and the devastation of these
    attacks?
        Admiral Fallon. Really good question, Senator. There are
    several factors here. One is the ability of our enemies to
    observe carefully and to calculate and adjust to our changing
    tactics on the ground, and they are really good at this and the
    ability to take note of what we do and to try to adjust to it
    is pretty remarkable.
        On the other hand, we are pushing hard. First of all, there
    is some risk. There is no doubt about it that as we implement
    this new strategy, the tactical aspects of it on the ground,
    that by leaving the big forward operating bases, or FOBs, as
    they call them, and getting out and about in the population
    there are some additional risks.
        The calculation going into this, the assumptions are that
    those risks are going to be offset by the potential gains of
    actually being out there and amongst the population. This
    tragic attack you referenced, in which we lost nine Americans
    last week, I was up with those troops 2 days before that
    happened in Diyallah, talking to them and getting their
    perspectives on just how this could work and what we might do
    in the way of adjustment. I do not want to get into the
    tactical adjustments now, but we are taking really three, three
    lines here I will talk to you about generally.
        One is to look at these joint security stations. These are
    great ideas in theory because we have our forces, Iraqi forces,
    Iraqi police forces, and they are out in neighborhoods or areas
    and towns where we should be able to have a presence that
    people can see and then take advantage of that by having our
    people network with folks there and get their confidence so
    they will start telling us more about the enemy, so we can
    neutralize it.
        Another thing, though, is that as we put these places out
    there is a bit of a dilemma here, because the desire clearly is
    to be able to integrate and get information from the people as
    well as provide the confidence of our presence, our visible
    presence. We still have to protect our people. So how we do
    this is an interesting challenge for the tactical forces. They
    are working on this and as we evolve this we are going to be
    doing a couple of different things to show them some different
    faces.
        In the business of protection for our troops in these
    vehicles, it is very clear that the enemy has taken note of the
    most ubiquitous vehicle over there, the Humvee in its various
    varieties, and their approach to this has been to come up with
    bigger and bigger IEDs.
        We have information now that indicates, and data that
    proves this, that certain designs of our own can mitigate a lot
    of the effects of these heavy blasts. I just last week got a
    request for a review of this entire business from General
    Odierno, endorsed by General Petraeus, and we have sent it on
    just today to try to adjust the acquisition system to try to
    get more of these, which appear to be much more effective.
        Is this going to be the end of the day? Of course not.
    There are going to be adjustments made on the part of the
    enemy, and the emerging challenge is this different type of
    projectile that is being used by, clearly coming with Iranian
    support, the so-called EFPs, which are a different thing
    altogether.
        But back to the business of the joint security stations and
    trying to link up with the people, it seems to me that we are
    going to be adjusting and trying to figure out the best way to
    do this, and it is probably going to vary by neighborhood and
    by town. We have to get general security in the area and then
    to the best of our ability the intent is to open this up and
    get Iraqi forces primarily in the lead, but with us backing
    them up, to be able to get in with the people.
        Senator Clinton. Thank you, Admiral.
        I would like to turn now to Saudi Arabia. In your prepared
    testimony you state that Saudi Arabia remains a vital partner
    and its campaign against terrorists has significantly degraded
    al Qaeda operations on the Arabian Peninsula. But as we all
    know, the Saudi King recently told the Arab League that in Iraq
    ``The bloodshed is continuing under an illegal foreign
    occupation.'' Just this last week, King Abdullah declined to
    meet with Prime Minister Maliki to discuss the critical issue
    of political reconciliation, the point that my colleague
    Senator Nelson was speaking about a few minutes ago.
        Admiral, I would like to ask about our relationship with
    the Saudis. I know this is a delicate area of inquiry, but let
    me, if I can, ask you to comment about the King's recent
    statements and what impact they have in Iraq and in the region,
    and whether you believe that the Saudis share the American goal
    of a stable Iraq in which the Shiites, the Sunnis, and the
    Kurds share both power and oil revenue; and finally, whether
    you think the Saudis are doing all they can to promote
    stability in Iraq, including preventing the cross-border flow
    of weapons, money, and foreign fighters that support the Sunni
    insurgency?
        With respect to that last question, what is the identity,
    insofar as it can be determined, of the suicide bombers in
    vehicles and in vests, and of the Sunni insurgent fighters
    associated with al Qaeda whom you either capture or kill?
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, to Saudi Arabia first, I believe
    that the Saudi government, certainly the King, shares with us a
    common interest in security and stability in the region. I also
    believe that they recognize the importance of a stable Iraq as
    a linchpin of security in this region. But then there are
    differences of opinion.
        I spent about an hour and a half with King Abdullah a
    couple of weeks ago subsequent to his remarks at the Arab
    summit. I think we had a very frank discussion. He told me
    several times in the course of that discussion his opinion that
    our policies had not been correct in his view. He also told me
    that he had severe misgivings about the Maliki government and
    the reasons for that.
        He felt, in his words, that there was a significant linkage
    to Iran. He was concerned about Iranian influence on the Maliki
    government. He also made several references to his unhappiness,
    uneasiness with Maliki and the background from which he came.
        Nonetheless, we agreed on the importance of trying to work
    whatever way we can together to get stability in this area. For
    my part, I encouraged him very strongly to at least show some
    support of the Maliki government. He does not have to like
    them. I know he does not really have a lot of trust there. I
    think it was my opinion it is unrealistic to expect us to
    change that government. We are not going to be the puppeteers
    here. It also, given the many constraints that we are under,
    that it was not very realistic to expect that a new government
    is going to do any better in a short period of time.
        Although he has made public statements and he also made--
    apparently declined to meet with Maliki, on the other hand it
    is my understanding that they are in the process of agreeing to
    waive a very substantial part of the debt that they hold for
    Iraq. That is extremely useful in my opinion. So out of this
    compact meeting that is going on today in Sharm el-Sheikh, I
    certainly hope that we can get that behind-the-scenes
    cooperation that will provide a foundation to Maliki and his
    government.
        They are craving some kind of recognition from the Sunni
    majority in this region so that they can have some confidence
    to move ahead. I tried to explain my view to the King: Your
    Sunni minority within Iraq would benefit from some signs of the
    Sunni governments in these neighboring countries that give some
    support to the government. It may not be the best government.
    It may not last beyond whatever the term is. But they have to
    start down this road, and to date they have largely just been
    sitting on the sidelines, just watching this.
        I tried to make the point that unless they get engaged we
    are not going to be successful and you are going to have a good
    chance of an unstable Iraq that will lead to one thing. So it
    is encouraging to see in recent weeks that in fact they are
    doing some things that I think hopefully--there were three
    items that were on the agenda for this neighbors conference.
    One is dealing with the refugee problem. There has been an
    outflow of millions of people from the troubles in Iraq.
        There is another real need, a practical need to do
    something to be able to get fuel sources. It is really ironic,
    is it not, that this country of Iraq which has this vast
    resource of oil and gas and exports billions of dollars and
    they have billions sitting in the bank still cannot get enough
    fuel to run their automobiles and for heating and for cooking
    and things. So there was an agreement to at least approach this
    issue and hopefully there will be progress here this week to
    actually make some arrangements from the neighbors. Again, it
    is the neighbors. We cannot succeed, I believe, by isolating
    Iraq. It is going to have to include the neighbors.
        Anyway, I am talking too long. But I find this is an
    amazing requirement for just dialogue. People need to sit down.
    They need to talk. They need to hear the other views and at
    least to make some recognition and accommodation to those other
    views. I think anything is possible if they can get there. This
    is the Middle East. There are many different vectors, many
    concerns, but people have had a history of making deals with
    one another for centuries and I think there is no reason why we
    could not expect to have something, enough come together right
    now to give this fledgling government of Iraq a start, and then
    take it a step at a time.
        Senator Clinton. Admiral, what about the identity of the
    suicide bombers and others?
        Admiral Fallon. Our belief is that the vast majority of
    these are al Qaeda-connected. It is tough because most of them
    are suicide bombers now and there is not much left when they
    are over. But the fingerprints, maybe not literally, are
    certainly indicative of al Qaeda, connected to Sunni. There is
    no doubt. You look at the targets, the big targets are all Shia
    targets.
        Senator Clinton. Are they mostly non-Iraqi?
        Admiral Fallon. I cannot tell you that. Instincts are that
    if they are not Iraqi--if they are not foreign fighters, then
    they are certainly people that have been somehow coopted by al
    Qaeda into doing these things.
        Senator Clinton. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Clinton.
        Admiral, I was a little troubled by your reluctance to
    acknowledge that the benchmarks which the Iraqis set for
    themselves, the ones that I enumerated specifically, were not
    met within the time line that the Iraqis set for themselves.
    That is a question of fact.
        I must tell you, that reluctance troubles me for a number
    of reasons, but not the least of which is if we are really
    serious, as you even say, that the Government of Iraq must move
    towards inclusion by passing legislation, and if Ambassador
    Crocker says that the Iraqis need to make progress on national
    reconciliation and to make it fairly quickly, and as the
    Secretary of State says in her letter to me, that the Iraqis'
    policy committee on national security agreed upon a set of
    benchmarks and an associated time line in September 2006, and
    that these were reaffirmed by the presidency council on October
    16, 2006, I do not understand your reluctance to acknowledge
    that, number one, the benchmarks were adopted by the Iraqis and
    that the ones that I identified and read to you have not been
    met. That is number one.
        Why that reluctance? It is a factual issue.
        Admiral Fallon. I am not sure--the Iraqis have certainly
    laid out an agenda and set goals for themselves.
        Chairman Levin. I read that.
        Admiral Fallon. They have had difficulty meeting those
    goals.
        Chairman Levin. Why not say they have not met them? Why the
    reluctance? Because that message then to the Iraqi leaders is
    that we are not willing to at least tell them what they have
    not done that they committed to do. My heavens, how are we
    going to get them to adopt benchmarks and meet them and have
    consequences if they do not meet them, if we are not even
    willing to tell them they have not met the ones that they set
    out for themselves according to a timetable that they set out
    for themselves?
        Again, I do not know why that reluctance.
        Admiral Fallon. I guess we in our own institutions have
    schedules and we set goals and objectives and dates by which we
    would like to have things, like a budget, and we fail for one
    reason or another to achieve those. There should be no doubt
    that my opinion and my message is to the Iraqi leadership is
    they need to make these things happen. They need to push as
    hard as they can to achieve these as quickly as they can.
        Chairman Levin. That message does not carry much weight if
    you will not even tell them they did not live up to the
    benchmarks they previously set for themselves, according to a
    timetable which they set for themselves, if you cannot tell
    them that. That is history. Why can you not tell them that and
    tell us that?
        Admiral Fallon. I would have liked to have seen them
    achieve all these things. I would like to see all of these
    pieces of legislation passed. I would like to see the enabling
    legislation passed.
        Chairman Levin. So far we are with you. We all would like
    that. But you cannot take the next step, which is factually
    correct, that they have not met those benchmarks that I laid
    out for you?
        Admiral Fallon. They have not enacted the legislation in
    each of these areas that apparently is necessary to move them
    forward.
        Chairman Levin. That they set out for themselves in their
    own, according to Secretary Rice? These are benchmarks,
    economic, security, and political benchmarks with an associated
    time line, that were reaffirmed by their presidency council on
    October 16. It is on their web site, at least was. That is what
    troubles me, because it seems to me you at least have to be
    willing to tell them, ``folks, you have not carried out the
    commitments you made.'' If you cannot start with that, then the
    rest of your message it seems to me is muted because it is, you
    have to do this, unless you tell them what the consequences are
    if they will not or do not meet the benchmarks, or at a minimum
    be willing to tell them that they have not met their
    commitments that they made for themselves.
        I think your message is very much weakened and it is
    troubling to me because you meet with the leaders of Iraq.
        Admiral Fallon. I do not pass up any opportunity to not
    only encourage them, but tell them they really need to continue
    to work and they have to get this done.
        Chairman Levin. If they do not? Do you ever tell them
    consequences?
        Admiral Fallon. We do not have an open-ended support. We
    just are not going to be there forever.
        Chairman Levin. What does it mean unless there is
    consequences? What does it mean to them? It is open-ended
    because they made the commitments before. The President told
    them we will be there as long as you need us. The President has
    told them that. The President on another occasion told them we
    will be there as long as you want us.
        They set benchmarks for themselves. We did not impose these
    on them. They set these. Their presidency council adopted it.
    But it is as a matter of fact open-ended. You can rhetorically
    say it is not. But as a matter of fact, reality, it is if there
    are no consequences other than, we want you to do it, you need
    to do it. But if you do not set out consequences--but even more
    fundamentally, if you are unable to tell them that they have
    not met their previous commitment--and that is what you are so
    reluctant to say. Your message is hollow, I believe, unless you
    can at least state the historic facts as well as what they need
    to do, and I believe on top of that that there will be
    consequences if they do not in terms of our response and our
    behavior.
        Admiral Fallon. I think they understand that there are
    going to be consequences. They can watch, they have watched
    this debate and discussion in Washington.
        Chairman Levin. It has not had consequences so far, except
    a veto of a bill which said that we were going to begin to
    reduce forces in 4 months.
        By the way, in that regard, I think you also let them off
    the hook when you say that--you used the words ``expecting them
    to cut a political deal tomorrow is unrealistic.'' I think that
    is not what anybody expects. I think we expect them to make
    political compromises, as they have promised to make them--they
    have not--and then to set a realistic timetable to make those
    compromises, not tomorrow, but within X number of days, a
    couple months, to do things that they have not done as promised
    before.
        I think that you diminish the pressure when you talk about
    we should not expect them to cut a deal tomorrow, because I do
    not think anybody does. We do expect them to cut a deal within
    a reasonable period of time. We set 60 days since these
    commitments have been made to have been carried out already,
    and to keep the pressure on them to do it and to identify that
    there is going to be consequences if they do not.
        Do you not think that is a fair amount of pressure to put
    on people who for year after year after year have not carried
    out the commitments that they have made and have not had a
    political settlement in terms of amending their constitution?
    Is that not a fair kind of amount of pressure to put on them,
    not in terms of dictating to them, because we do not dictate
    the benchmarks. These are their benchmarks.
        What we do say, it seems to me have to say, is in terms of
    our actions there will be consequences in terms of what we do
    if you folks do not carry out your own commitments. Is that not
    a fair message to deliver to them?
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, we are trying to balance
    encouragement and strong messages to enact the kinds of
    legislation which is the majority of the things I think you are
    talking about, as a necessary measure to move this country
    forward. The down side of this is if they get the perception
    that we are not going to stand by them, that we are going to
    walk away from them, then this just encourages the factional
    militias, among others, to stay in being as a way to preserve
    the interests of these more narrow interests.
        Chairman Levin. The way you say that message, the way you
    state that message, it is that we are going to stand by you
    even if you do not carry out your commitments. Do you want them
    to get that impression?
        Admiral Fallon. No, sir. We want them to move forward. We
    are trying to help them in every way possible. They want us
    there. They want us to help. They have to figure out the way to
    make these political compromises. These are political actions
    of political leaders and this is an area that I think we need
    to all encourage them in every way we can to take the right
    steps as soon as they can, because every day that they do not
    costs us in blood and treasure.
        Chairman Levin. You have to add what consequences will take
    place if they do not do what is so essential, and that is what
    is missing in your testimony and in the administration's
    position.
        Senator Thune.
        Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral, thank you for being here, for your testimony, and
    for your leadership. You had mentioned I think in your written
    testimony the destabilizing effect that Iran and Syria play in
    Iraq and the role that cross-border operations launched by
    extremists from Pakistan play in Afghanistan. It seems that we
    consistently are hampered because of inadequate border
    security, and I guess I would like to have you describe the
    steps that the coalition forces in conjunction with the Iraqi
    border police and the Afghan border patrol are taking to
    mitigate the negative effects of illicit border activity.
        Admiral Fallon. Two different cases. I will talk to Iraq
    first, Senator. There is little doubt that the insurgency and
    the terrorists' activities in Iraq have been supported and in
    many ways sustained by route lines that run into Syria. With
    the change in the situation on the ground in Anbar, there is
    every expectation that that support is going to be made more
    difficult. The fact that the Iraqi security forces are now
    deployed and operating in numbers along that border is also
    helpful, and we have put ourselves in an overwatch situation on
    the ground where we are backing them up and working hard to
    reduce this infiltration from Syria.
        The Iranian influence is a little more difficult to get a
    grip on. It is very troubling because of the lethal
    consequences of the type of material support that the Iranians
    are evidently supplying to the militias on the Shia side. The
    overall impact in destabilizing the country so far has been
    much greater with the Sunni al Qaeda influence from the west. I
    think it is a good sign that Syria is participating in the two
    external conferences that are taking place this week, and the
    reports that I have seen today indicate that Secretary Rice may
    have a meeting with her counterpart foreign minister from
    Syria, which might lead to at least an explanation of an
    understanding of how we might go forward here.
        The situation in Afghanistan is very interesting on the
    Pakistani border. I spoke to President Musharraf when I was out
    there recently about this and asked for his cooperation, as we
    have consistently. Secretary Gates was out there a couple of
    months ago. The reports that I have from our commanders on the
    ground tell me that there has been an improvement certainly in
    cooperation along the Afghan-Pakistani border.
        There is in place now a tripartite arrangement whereby we
    from the U.S. side, working through International Security
    Assistance Force, the NATO international command there on the
    ground, is set up to regularly meet with Pak and Afghan
    counterparts and the three discuss and actually go on the
    ground on both sides of the border to address issues of
    concern.
        Now, the information I have from our commanders there, U.S.
    commanders, is that there has been an improvement in this
    situation, in that the Paks have been much more forthcoming in
    providing information and support and communication between our
    forces. There was an acknowledgment of this challenge by
    President Musharraf to me. He indicated that he had authorized
    the Pak army to delegate decisions to be able to exchange
    information down from the central government to the battalion
    level.
        Our commanders tell me that this is in fact what is
    happening. We have common radios that have been distributed to
    the commanders and there have been several instances in the
    past couple of weeks where we have received information that
    has enabled our people to put themselves in a position to cut
    off some of this infiltration.
        So I see progress along those lines. This is still a work
    with a lot yet to be done. You may have seen that a couple of
    weeks ago there was a substantial fight on the Pakistani side
    of the border between foreign fighters, al Qaeda-linked folks
    who had taken up residence in the FATA just inside the
    Pakistani border. There was a major push by the local tribes to
    get rid of these foreign fighters, and evidently quite
    successful by the accounts I have seen in South Waziristan. It
    would be wonderful from my view if this kind of activity
    continued in the north, and we might be able to talk about that
    in a different setting.
        But my sense is there is a lot to be done, but there are
    significant signs of increased cooperation and results along
    this border right now.
        Senator Thune. I was encouraged too by some of the
    reporting that came out of Waziristan, but that has been a real
    concern, and that the Pakistani government because of these
    previous agreements was just letting that ungoverned space go.
    That is a real problem.
        Admiral Fallon. I do not think they are letting it go. This
    is a challenge for Pakistan. This is an area in which they have
    never had government influence, certainly from the Musharraf
    government. This place has been semi-autonomous for a long
    time. It is very tribal. There has been a reluctance to get
    engaged. I think there are bigger fish here in this whole
    business.
        My perception of the situation in and about Pakistan is
    that the major issue with them is still India and the Indian
    border, which consumes most of their military's attention, and
    the majority of their forces are along the line of control with
    India. I see another sign of movement in the right direction,
    though, is that President Musharraf directed that two brigades
    of troops be pulled out of that eastern area and moved to the
    west, and in fact my understanding is they are in position just
    outside the FATA--again, I think a pretty good sign. This is a
    tough issue for Musharraf and the Government of Pakistan.
        Senator Thune. It is a tough area to police, but it is also
    ripe for all the kinds of shenanigans of the foreign fighters
    and the terrorists and the Taliban and all the organizations
    that are active in that region. So I am glad they are stepping
    it up and hopefully that will meet with some ongoing success.
        On April 29 the New York Times published an article
    describing the alliance of U.S. forces and Sunni tribal leaders
    as ``an uneasy alliance.'' That alliance, as you have noted,
    seems to be the result of Sunni leaders who are recognizing
    that their alliance with al Qaeda is not beneficial to either
    Anbar Province or to Iraq as a nation.
        In order to resist al Qaeda, the Sunni leaders have formed
    the Anbar Salvation Council, which has sought assistance from
    both Iraqi and American governments. Are you familiar with that
    council and, if so, are you confident that their goal is to
    resist al Qaeda in Iraq?
        Admiral Fallon. I do not know the details of that council
    or the makeup of it. But when I was out in Anbar, I spoke with
    our military commanders out there and they were actively
    engaged with the tribal sheiks to get their allegiance to work
    together cooperatively to fight al Qaeda and to help spread
    security and stability, so the people out there had a chance.
        So the commanders were very optimistic that they are making
    progress and they are working on the remaining tribes that have
    still not come over and thrown their support. I think the most
    telling aspect of this to date has been the willingness of the
    leaders there to offer their sons to join the Iraqi security
    forces, which they absolutely refused to do until just a few
    months ago. I think that is the most encouraging thing because
    that is betting on the future.
        Senator Thune. The last time I was there it was a dramatic
    improvement over that, which has been several months now, I
    think December. But even at that point it was starting to turn.
    We were getting the buy-in.
        Admiral Fallon. I was there in December. It was not pretty
    at all. I was just out there now twice in the last few weeks
    and it is really moving.
        Senator Thune. The President vetoed the emergency
    supplemental because he disagreed with the troop withdrawal
    language. If for the sake of argument, if that troop withdrawal
    language were adopted, could the Sunni leaders defeat al Qaeda
    without coalition support?
        Admiral Fallon. I think that is just a piece of the
    challenge in Iraq, and getting them to be able to prevail over
    the terrorists and al Qaeda in one area is certainly helpful,
    but we need a bigger solution. We need the whole country of
    Iraq. We need funding to carry out the plans that we have and
    we are going to need a solution for the whole country, not just
    a piece of it.
        Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
        I understand that Senator Sessions had yielded to Senator
    Martinez for questions.
        Senator Martinez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
    Senator Sessions. I will be very brief.
        Admiral, I just thought I would point out, my understanding
    is that the Maliki government has been in place something in
    the order of 9 months; is that correct?
        Admiral Fallon. Less than a year.
        Senator Martinez. Less than a year. It is also correct that
    he does not enjoy the governance over either an established
    government or even a government of national unity, but that
    there are factions within the government, not all of which
    necessarily coincide in points of view on the way forward?
        Admiral Fallon. This is certainly not a national unity
    government. It is a representational government of many
    factions within the country.
        Senator Martinez. It is also true that the principal
    officer in charge of dealing with the political side of the
    Iraq situation would be our Ambassador Crocker on the scene?
        Admiral Fallon. Sure.
        Senator Martinez. So with respect to the overall plan for
    Baghdad, I failed earlier in my line of questioning to get to
    the third part--which is the economic reconstruction. What can
    you tell us in the update on that situation during your recent
    visit and did you observe whether that is making the kind of
    progress that we would hope?
        I know it is difficult, particularly in an unsecured area,
    but how much progress are we making on the PRTs and other
    civilian reconstruction type efforts?
        Admiral Fallon. My opinion is there is a tremendous amount
    of good that can come out of these PRTs. They are certainly
    dedicated people. They have the best interests of the Iraqi
    government and our objectives at heart. The challenge I see is
    that we need results in the near-term. We have to have things
    that happen on the ground in the next several months to
    complement the security initiatives of our military and the
    Iraqi security forces, so that the people gain the confidence
    that this government and their future, particularly their
    future, is going to be better than the past.
        So as we move forward we are working very hard to see how
    we can best coordinate the activities of the PRTs, the new PRTs
    that have been assigned to the combat, U.S. military combat
    brigades, working through our ambassador the many initiatives
    that have already been begun to try to optimize the delivery of
    improved services and economic benefits to the people of this
    country.
        My engagement with the Iraqi people when I recently visited
    Baghdad and went out, I went to one of these markets that had
    been provided barricades to enable people to come back in and
    use them without fear of the big suicide bombs. I was swamped
    with people, Iraqi citizens, who probably had no clue who I
    was, but assumed an old guy with grey hair and a bunch of
    people carrying guns must have some message here. I was
    interested to see how they reacted to me. They swarmed me.
    There was not a single person that said, ``we want you to go
    away, get out of here.'' Every one of them said to me what they
    really need is more security, because they want to go about
    their daily lives.
        I had requests, ``do you think it is safe now that I can
    open my store? Can I restock my shop? Can my wife and children
    come here? Is this going to get better? Will your people really
    be successful in giving us''--that was the line of questioning.
        It is very clear to me they are eager for it, they are
    ready for it. The degree to which the government can reinforce
    that or provide the major message to them that their future is
    going to be enhanced over what they had in the past is really
    critical. There are a lot of initiatives that are being
    considered. This is a delicate decision in trying to make sure
    we have enough security so they can go forward with these
    economic incentives.
        But I saw a dozen, quite a number of initiatives that I
    thought looked pretty interesting, that were Iraqis actually
    doing things on their own, Iraqis improving their neighborhood,
    Iraqis that were engaged in commerce. There were a lot more
    people on the streets and a lot more people, particularly in
    these protected areas, that appeared to be doing things that
    were closer to normal life than had been in the past.
        The degree to which we can expand this and quickly is going
    to be very, very influential, I think, in turning the tide in
    Baghdad.
        Senator Martinez. Admiral, thank you for your service and
    through you I want to thank all of the men and women who serve
    in the CENTCOM and, frankly, all of the allied forces. It is
    always reassuring to come to the CENTCOM and see a variety of
    uniforms from all over the world if our coalition partners that
    are there working side-by-side with our men and women in
    uniform. So thank you very much for your service.
        Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I had a markup
    in the Judiciary Committee that I had some matters on and I am
    sorry to miss some of the hearing.
        I talked to a mother recently and had an email from her
    son, who is in Baghdad. He said: ``they do appreciate us here;
    the women and children, they feel safer when we are in the
    neighborhood and I feel like this is a good cause.''
        But we are leaders and we have to make evaluations about
    whether we can continue to ask our soldiers to serve in a
    situation like this. So I guess my question to you in that
    regard is, what about this idea that we are in a civil war? My
    impression is that most people want peace and security and do
    not participate in killing their neighbors. But we had a surge,
    and it was destabilizing, of murders, primarily I believe from
    Shia militias in retaliation to attacks from Sunni Baathist al
    Qaeda attacks, killed people in Baghdad.
        How would you evaluate the change in that level of violence
    and killing as the surge has gone forward, recognizing we still
    have another brigade or two that has not arrived on the scene?
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, the data I have shows that there
    is a substantial decrease from the last year as we began to
    move new forces and take this new approach to the Baghdad area.
    I think the reason for that is very clear, the presence of our
    forces and the Iraqi forces in large numbers in these areas
    have reduced the opportunities for people to do this.
        Senator Sessions. You were asked a bit about other agencies
    and I remain troubled by what I think is either a lack of
    coordination or a lack of ability in other agencies to be
    effective. I am just going to ask you frankly--I think I know
    the answer, but let us take these PRTs. That is in design a
    State Department public reconstruction community support
    effort, is that correct?
        Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir, although there are some PRTs--in
    fact, I visited one in Afghanistan just the other day and it
    was actually lead by a U.S. Navy officer, of all things. They
    are primarily led by Department of State folks.
        Senator Sessions. But tell us frankly, is it not a fact
    that the staffing of those PRTs are overwhelmingly military
    personnel?
        Admiral Fallon. I know that there have been substantial
    numbers of reservists that are manning these things. Whether
    that is the majority or not, I do not know.
        Senator Sessions. My impression is that most of the PRTs,
    virtually you may have one or two State Department leaders
    sometimes, but most of the work is by the military.
        Admiral Fallon. There are a lot of other interagency folks
    there. As I go to Baghdad, I try on every trip to ask to meet
    with or see one of the other PRTs. As I get around, the senior
    spokesperson for each has been a Department of State employee.
    But they have also introduced me to other members from many
    other agencies in addition to DOD.
        Senator Sessions. I felt good and have encouraged the
    President and the White House to select someone to be a
    coordinator. They have referred to it as ``the Iraq Czar,'' but
    someone who can be a point of contact to ensure that there is
    prompt response from various agencies.
        I think one of the problems is when you are in Baghdad and
    if the military is given the responsibility of security and the
    Department of Justice is given the responsibility of courts and
    the courts become a key matter in the life and safety of our
    troops and the success of our mission, we are not always--since
    it is not the military's responsibility, it could be
    undermining the military mission if that does not move along
    rapidly.
        Do you think some sort of leadership coordinator would be
    helpful?
        Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir, I think it would be very helpful
    to provide the day-to-day attention, provided the person had
    the influence, access, cooperation, and guidance from the
    Commander in Chief to get this done.
        Senator Sessions. I am glad the President seemed to be
    interested in that. I hear he has talked to people and some
    have declined apparently to take the job. I think it could be
    very helpful and I hope you will pursue that.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Sessions.
        Admiral, thank you. It has been a long morning. It has been
    very helpful to us and I very much appreciate your coming by
    and your service. We all are grateful to you and the troops
    that you command. Thank you. We are adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
                               regional conflict
        1. Senator Akaka. Admiral Fallon, in his January 10 speech
    regarding the surge, the President stated that we will ``interrupt the
    flow of support from Iran and Syria,'' and that ``we will seek out and
    destroy the networks providing advanced weaponry and training to our
    enemies in Iraq.'' During your confirmation hearing, I indicated my
    concern that Iraq could escalate into a regional conflict, and I asked
    you if you believed that we can interrupt Iranian and Syrian support
    from within the borders of Iraq. I believe your response indicated that
    you believed we could isolate the flow of support from Iran and Syria,
    but that you felt we needed to engage other nations in the region, so
    that we could utilize the full range of options available to accomplish
    this task. What have we done to interrupt the flow of support from Iran
    and Syria to the insurgents, and what is your assessment on how we are
    doing?
        Admiral Fallon. [Deleted.]

        2. Senator Akaka. Admiral Fallon, what specific strategies have
    been developed to protect our troops if the conflict in Iraq escalates
    to a regional conflict?
        Admiral Fallon. [Deleted.]

                                  deportation
        3. Senator Akaka. Admiral Fallon, the British Broadcasting
    Corporation reported on May 2, 2007 (as did the Washington Post on May
    3, 2007), that the U.N. estimates that Iran has deported 36,000 Afghans
    back to Afghanistan in the previous 10 days. In addition, it appears
    that they intend to deport an additional 14,000 of what they call
    ``illegal'' Afghans. Have you received any confirmation that this mass
    deportation is occurring? If so, what are the repercussions to our
    operations in Afghanistan from Iran's sudden deportation of large
    numbers of Afghans?
        Admiral Fallon. We at Central Command (CENTCOM) are concerned about
    the forcible expulsion of Afghans by Iran. Fortunately, the Office of
    the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees has the assets in country to
    mitigate the risk and prevent it from having a noticeable effect on the
    coalition or U.S. forces, or from becoming a humanitarian crisis.
    Initially, it appears there are minimal impacts on International
    Security Assistance Force. Negotiations are underway between the
    governments of Iran and Afghanistan to alleviate the refugee situation.
        We assess that a significant increase in forcible expulsions from
    Iran could pose a risk of destabilizing the larger cities and towns in
    western and southern Afghanistan. The speed and circumstances of these
    forced repatriations could potentially overwhelm authorities. Since
    Afghanistan's economy has so little absorption capacity, the influx
    could further exacerbate the very high current unemployment rate, as
    well as the housing shortage. While few returnees from Iran are likely
    to join the Taliban, large numbers of unemployed single males could
    significantly contribute to crime rates. It will be critical to
    successfully reintegrate returning refugees to avoid further risk to an
    already fragile security situation.
        Finally, Afghanistan's government has itself been severely affected
    by these humanitarian issues. The Ministers for Refugees and Foreign
    Affairs each lost no-confidence votes, and the issue has stressed the
    government's ability to function.

        4. Senator Akaka. Admiral Fallon, there are an estimated 1.5
    million Afghans living in Iran. If Iran is deporting large numbers of
    Afghans, and continues to do so, what would the impact be on coalition
    or U.S. operations in Afghanistan?
        Admiral Fallon. Any shortfall in the Government of Afghanistan's
    ability to absorb a large influx of displaced persons may, in the long
    run, be measurably detrimental to coalition and U.S. operations.
        We assess that a significant increase in forcible expulsions from
    Iran could pose a risk of destabilizing the larger cities and towns in
    western and southern Afghanistan. The speed and circumstances of these
    forced repatriations could potentially overwhelm authorities. Since
    Afghanistan's economy has so little resiliency, the influx could
    further exacerbate the very high current unemployment rate, as well as
    the housing shortage. While few returnees from Iran are likely to join
    the Taliban, large numbers of unemployed single males could
    significantly contribute to crime rates. It will be critical to
    successfully reintegrate returning refugees to avoid further risk to an
    already fragile security situation.

                                   resources
        5. Senator Akaka. Admiral Fallon, do our troops, or the coalition
    forces, need additional resources? If so, what do they need?
        Admiral Fallon. Robust coalition participation in Operations
    Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom remains critical to our success in
    both campaigns. Enabling our partners by supporting coalition support
    funds ensures their successful participation in key military
    operations.
        CENTCOM requires continued and additional support of train and
    equip authorities to ensure we have fully enabled coalition members
    helping advance our shared security interests abroad. Building states'
    capacities to secure and govern their own countries is a central task
    in the larger war on terrorism.
        Our ability to succeed is also enhanced by key military
    construction authorities. These in turn depend on continued
    congressional support of the Contingency Construction Authority, and
    raising the Minor Unspecified Military Construction limits.
        Lastly, increases to the DOD Rewards Authority will provide me with
    the flexibility, agility, and responsiveness I need to tailor my
    rewards program for greater success in the CENTCOM area of
    responsibility. It will allow me to rapidly adjust rewards
    authorizations to address emerging threats, and is essential to the
    program's operational effectiveness and tactical implementation.

                                    strategy
        6. Senator Akaka. Admiral Fallon, according to a new State
    Department report, terrorists are changing their tactics. Specifically,
    the report states that ``Early terrorist attacks were largely
    expeditionary. The organization selected and trained terrorists in one
    country, then clandestinely inserted a team into the target country to
    attack a pre-planned objective.'' The report further states that ``We
    have seen a trend toward guerilla terrorism, where the organization
    seeks to grow the team close to its target, using target country
    nationals.'' Finally, the report states that there is a ``shift in the
    nature of terrorism, from traditional international terrorism of the
    late 20th century into a new form of transnational non-state warfare
    that resembles a form of global insurgency. This represents a new era
    of warfare.'' This report suggests that the battlefield for the war
    against terror is not limited to Iraq and Afghanistan. This concept of
    terror turns the entire world into a battlefield. How do you think this
    change in strategy from the terrorists affects our military strategies
    in Iraq and Afghanistan, and what are we doing to adapt?
        Admiral Fallon. Our current military strategy in Iraq and
    Afghanistan allows us to constantly assess and adapt our capabilities
    in response to this extremely flexible and tenacious enemy. Expanding
    on these efforts, I recently met with a select group of subject matter
    experts drawn from inside and outside the military to examine our way
    forward. They helped me develop five major focus areas to anchor and
    prioritize our short- and mid-range efforts. The first three directly
    address efforts to deny terrorist objectives and combat their methods
    in Iraq and Afghanistan. Specifically, we are concentrating on setting
    the conditions for stability in Iraq, expanding governance and security
    in Afghanistan, and degrading violent and extremist networks, with the
    priority being to defeat al Qaeda. These focus areas allow us to
    prioritize our efforts, and to respond to changes in the enemy's
    behavior that we perceive from constant feedback in both Iraq and
    Afghanistan. In addition to addressing this most recent evolution in
    the enemy's methods, focusing on top priorities in this way will help
    us adapt to whatever they try next.

        7. Senator Akaka. Admiral Fallon, what changes to our overall
    national strategy in the global war on terror would you recommend?
        Admiral Fallon. The current National Security Strategy specifically
    addresses the war on terrorism. Its premise is that deterrence alone is
    not enough, that we must take the fight to the terrorists, and that we
    must also deny them safe havens, financial support, and support and
    protection from certain nation-states.
        The enemy is continually changing how he operates, therefore we are
    always reviewing our tactics, operational plans, and strategies. The
    principles of the National Security Strategy are the foundation for the
    CENTCOM theater and regional war on terrorism strategies. These are
    based on four pillars. First, we must improve our relationships with
    national and international partners and our interoperability with their
    security forces. This includes a range of activities from synchronizing
    war on terror responsibilities within DOD, to building partner
    capacity. Second, we must promote development and cooperation among
    nations, foster international collaboration, and improve intelligence
    sharing. Third, is to actively deter state and transnational
    aggression. And fourth, is to do more to promote regional security and
    stability.

        8. Senator Akaka. Admiral Fallon, in recent months, the British
    have announced their intention to withdraw 1,600 troops from Iraq. In
    addition, Denmark announced their intention to withdraw their 450
    troops from Iraq. I understand that Lithuania is also considering
    pulling completely out. What impact do these withdrawals have on our
    operations in Iraq?
        Admiral Fallon. [Deleted.]

        9. Senator Akaka. Admiral Fallon, what additional risk do they
    place on our troops?
        Admiral Fallon. [Deleted.]

        10. Senator Akaka. Admiral Fallon, have we requested these
    countries to consider utilizing their troops to assist in the surge? If
    not, why not? It seems that their assistance could minimize the need to
    extend deployments of our troops.
        Admiral Fallon. All three countries' military establishments were
    contacted through their Senior National Representatives. All three
    declined to offer additional troops and forces, on the grounds that
    this is a matter that must be taken up at the diplomatic level and not
    military-to-military. We value each partner's contributions, and
    regularly review each nation's participation according to each one's
    total contribution to the coalition. This means valuing not only
    military resources, but also political and economic assistance, both to
    operations in Iraq and to other war on terror efforts.
        The nature of each nation's involvement changes over time,
    commensurate with its available resources. Our strategy is to maximize
    overall international contributions to Iraq. As the Iraqi security
    forces assume greater responsibility, some coalition forces have
    shifted from the direct security mission to training and support,
    whereas others have redeployed to their home stations. Contributors
    have also changed the nature of their involvement, but continued their
    partner relationships. At the same time, other countries have increased
    their troop contributions. For example. Georgia is deploying an entire
    brigade later this year; Australia has recently increased their troop
    commitment; and Tonga will again deploy troops to Iraq.

                           iraqi military and police
        11. Senator Akaka. Admiral Fallon, who has the greater numbers in
    Iraq, the Iraqi military or al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)?
        Admiral Fallon. The Iraqi military is the better armed. However,
    AQI has ample arms, access to military ordnance, and the ability to
    make homemade explosives with which to wage protracted, asymmetric
    warfare.

        12. Senator Akaka. Admiral Fallon, which organization is better
    armed, the Iraqi military or AQI?
        Admiral Fallon. The Iraqi military is the better armed. However,
    AQI has ample arms, access to military ordnance, and the ability to
    make homemade explosives with which to wage protracted, asymmetric
    warfare.

        13. Senator Akaka. Admiral Fallon, who has greater numbers, the
    Iraqi police or AQI?
        Admiral Fallon. [Deleted.]

        14. Senator Akaka. Admiral Fallon, which organization is better
    armed, the Iraqi police or AQI?
        Admiral Fallon. [Deleted.]

        15. Senator Akaka. Admiral Fallon, what is your current assessment
    of the morale of the Iraqi military and the Iraqi police?
        Admiral Fallon. [Deleted.]

        16. Senator Akaka. Admiral Fallon, who has the greater support
    within the country of Iraq, the government or AQI?
        Admiral Fallon. The government has far greater support than AQI.
    Demographically Iraq is over 60 percent Shia, a population that has
    been routinely targeted by AQI with high-profile attacks in order to
    aggravate the sectarian divide. The elected officials chosen by the
    populace are mostly Shia as well. The Kurds enjoy relative stability in
    their semi-autonomous state, and have no interest in AQI's violence.
    They arc much better served through legislative action. Even Iraq's
    Sunni Arabs, many of whom tacitly supported AQI for nearly 4 years,
    have been rejecting local terrorists in the overwhelmingly Sunni
    province of al-Anbar. Tribal sheikhs have turned to the Iraqi
    government for equipment and training to defeat AQI, and Prime Minister
    Maliki has supported their efforts.

        17. Senator Akaka. Admiral Fallon, it has been reported that the
    Sunnis are no longer allied with AQI and are assisting coalition forces
    with fighting against AQI. Can you confirm this?
        Admiral Fallon. [Deleted.]

        18. Senator Akaka. Admiral Fallon, has AQI allied itself with
    either the Kurdish or the Shiite factions in Iraq?
        Admiral Fallon. [Deleted.]

                                  iraqi people
        19. Senator Akaka. Admiral Fallon, is it your opinion that the
    people of Iraq would prefer to live under a terrorist regime?
        Admiral Fallon. The vast majority of Iraqis do not prefer to live
    under a terrorist regime. However, there is a very small minority of
    people in Iraq that want their government to implement a very strict
    interpretation of Sharia law.

        20. Senator Akaka. Admiral Fallon, in your statement, you indicated
    that insurgent groups in Iraq have multiple and often competing
    motivations for perpetuating violence. However, you indicate that they
    are united in opposition to U.S. and coalition forces, and their
    refusal to accept the legitimacy of an inclusive, representative
    government. If we were to remove U.S. and coalition forces from Iraq,
    would that strengthen or weaken their unity against the government?
        Admiral Fallon. [Deleted.]

                                  redeployment
        21. Senator Akaka. Admiral Fallon, is it your professional opinion
    that if the United States were to begin phased redeployment of our
    troops out of Iraq, then AQI would likely defeat all other parties in
    Iraq and assume control of the country, creating a terrorist state? If
    so, why?
        Admiral Fallon. It is unlikely AQI would defeat all other factions
    and assume control of the country. However, under certain conditions it
    might be able to establish and maintain a sanctuary in a Sunni majority
    area, from which it would be able to conduct terrorist operations
    locally, regionally, and globally. In so doing, AQI would attempt to
    replicate the conditions its parent organization enjoyed in Afghanistan
    prior to Operation Enduring Freedom.

                                   insurgency
        22. Senator Akaka. Admiral Fallon, you indicate in your posture
    statement that insurgency groups in Iraq have multiple and often
    competing motivations for perpetuating violence; however, they are
    united by two things: opposition to U.S. and coalition forces; and
    refusal to accept the legitimacy of an inclusive, representative
    government. Why is it that these groups are unwilling to accept the
    legitimacy of an inclusive, representative government?
        Admiral Fallon. For over 38 years the former Baathist regime
    enforced national unity to facilitate control and national pride, and
    to serve its regional ambitions. After Saddam was overthrown, Iraqi
    unity was fractured.
        The various Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish insurgency groups differ in
    their motivations for violence, and their acceptance of the
    government's legitimacy. Fear is each group's defining quality.
    However, they're afraid of different outcomes, and the goals of each
    group can stoke the fears of another. Sunnis fear political
    marginalization and domination by the Shia, whom they consider to be
    agents of Iran. Shia fear a loss of control over the Government of Iraq
    (GOI), a Baathist (Sunni) resurgence, a loss of the ability to protect
    of Shia holy sites, and losing control of national resources. Kurds
    fear the loss of their semi-autonomy and their ability to control
    Kirkuk. The disputes over the status of Kirkuk and the boundaries of
    the Kurdish region are likely to be significant sources of violence in
    the future.

        23. Senator Akaka. Admiral Fallon, what have we done to try and
    bring these groups to the table to discuss their differences, and
    potentially address the underlying problems causing their resistance?
        Admiral Fallon. Coalition forces in al-Anbar have approached local
    tribal sheikhs and imams to garner support, but until recently this
    effort has made little progress. Now with the changing atmosphere in
    places like Ramadi and Fallujah, these efforts are becoming more
    successful. However, in the long-term such initiatives will require
    support from the GOI in the form of essential social services,
    agricultural support, and infrastructure construction for the
    population of al-Anbar. Iraq's leaders must continue to engage all
    groups and overcome the perception that they do not represent Sunnis.
    Otherwise, local groups and tribes may resume acts of violence towards
    the coalition and the government.
        The religious, tribal, and secular actors/politicians must all come
    to an agreement on the role of the central government, distribution of
    the country's wealth, and other political and economic issues before
    the central government is widely accepted as legitimate. The Iraqi
    Constitution addresses the role of the central government, but to many
    in the country it is only a document, at least for now. The GOI must
    provide fairly for essential needs of all Iraqi citizens, and not
    disproportionably favor one or two groups. Insurgents will come to the
    table when an outcome is demonstrated to be in the best interests of
    their respective communities.

                                    al qaeda
        24. Senator Akaka. Admiral Fallon, yesterday, the President gave a
    speech in which he said that the al Qaeda terrorists in Anbar are ``the
    same people that attacked us in America,'' apparently referring to the
    September 11 attacks. Is there evidence that Osama bin Laden is
    providing direct support to AQI? If so, what kind of support is being
    provided, and what level of confidence do we have in the supporting
    evidence?
        Admiral Fallon. [Deleted.]

                                     raids
        25. Senator Akaka. Admiral Fallon, Reuters reported on May 2, 2007,
    that President Karzai has stated that Afghans are losing patience over
    killing of civilians by western forces hunting Taliban guerrillas.
    According to the report, ``Around 50 civilians have been killed in
    raids by U.S.-led troops in the past week, Afghan officials say,
    sparking 4 days so far of anti-American, anti-Karzai protests.''
    Reuters further reports that ``Karzai said he had repeatedly told U.S.
    and North Atlantic Treaty Organization commanders to coordinate their
    anti-Taliban raids with his government, stop searching civilian houses,
    and exercise caution to avoid civilian deaths.'' Can you confirm the
    information in this report? If so, can you explain what the problems
    are that are getting so many civilians killed in our raids on the
    Taliban, and what is being done to fix the problem?
        Admiral Fallon. President Karzai did state on 2 May that Afghans
    arc losing patience with civilian deaths but we have discovered no
    evidence to corroborate the Reuter's report that 50 had been killed
    during the week in question.
        We go to great lengths to prevent civilian casualties incidental to
    our operations. We operate in compliance with the law of armed
    conflict, and take great pains to avoid collateral damage. Our strict
    targeting process accounts for and mitigates the risk to civilians. To
    better safeguard them, we carefully review that process and investigate
    all relevant actions when we receive reports of civilian casualties.
    During this specific engagement, and in nearly every such instance,
    contact is initiated by insurgents deliberately using civilians as
    shields, with the intent of causing the civilian casualties that they
    can then exploit in the media.

        26. Senator Akaka. Admiral Fallon, are we coordinating our raids
    with the Afghan government per President Karzai's request? If so, why
    is he speaking out? If not, why not?
        Admiral Fallon. All of our operations have an Afghan component--and
    in many we are in support of Afghan forces--and are coordinated with
    Afghanistan's government authorities. Prenotification with the
    Afghanistan authorities is not always possible when combat is initiated
    by the enemy. In those cases we leverage the Provisional Reconstruction
    Teams to help inform Afghan leaders at the earliest possible time.
        Afghans believe it is President Karzai's job to voice their
    grievances to western nations, and to prevent civilian casualties. When
    civilians are killed or injured, President Karzai quite rightly speaks
    out, and any failure to do so could weaken popular support for his
    administration and international forces.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Pryor
                              brigade combat teams
        27. Senator Pryor. Admiral Fallon, the 39th Brigade Combat Team
    (BCT) of the Arkansas Army National Guard was recently alerted to
    prepare for another deployment to Iraq. The BCT modular force concept
    is a standardized, stand-alone, larger, more powerful, more flexible,
    and more rapidly deployable force that allows the Army to effectively
    transform the way it operates. Its success, however, depends largely on
    its unity, cohesiveness, and collective training. The 39th is only one
    of 15 National Guard BCTs, and its maneuver battalions are currently
    vulnerable to being broken up, deployed to different locations, and
    tasked with missions for which the unit was not designed. What is the
    strategic significance of this action, and is this common practice for
    deployed Active Duty BCTs as well?
        Admiral Fallon. This mission is common practice for at least one
    BCT in Iraq. Tasking of BCTs within Iraq is done based on the
    capability that each BCT brings to the force and not necessarily
    National Guard, Reserve, or Regular Army BCT, BCTs deployed to Iraq are
    given specific tasks according to their level of training and organic
    structure. The 39th BCT from Arkansas will be employed as a Security
    Force Brigade. Its mission will require it to conduct decentralized
    operations at several locations within Iraq. The modular nature of the
    39th BCT makes it ideal for this mission as it is able to conduct
    operations as a BCT, Battalion Task Force, or any level deemed
    appropriate by the 39th BCT Commander. The operational requirement to
    provide security at numerous locations while simultaneously retaining
    other organizations at full combat capability is critical to retain the
    lines of communication security as well as freedom of maneuver for
    friendly forces. The strategic impact of this mission not being
    accomplished is far reaching and will have an adverse impact on our
    ability to retain the initiative across the Iraq theater.

                                   body armor
        28. Senator Pryor. Admiral Fallon, personnel and equipment issues
    for our forces deployed in combat overseas have been the topic of much
    debate in the Senate. I have received phone calls from concerned
    mothers and fathers from Arkansas whose sons and daughters are deployed
    to the Middle East, and who believe the current body armor in use today
    is inadequate. Are our troops operating with a full complement of
    effective body armor on the battlefield?
        Admiral Fallon. Yes, U.S. military servicemembers and U.S.
    Government civilian personnel are operating with a full complement of
    effective body armor. The Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) consists of one
    outer tactical vest, two small arms protective inserts, a set of
    deltoid and auxiliary protectors, and a set of side ballistic inserts.
    As of 01 March 07, the CENTCOM area of responsibility is supplied to
    100 percent of the requirement for IBA.

        29. Senator Pryor. Admiral Fallon, have you ever heard of Dragon
    Skin body armor? If so, what is your opinion of its effectiveness and
    feasibility?
        Admiral Fallon. Yes, I have heard of the Dragon Skin body armor
    produced by Pinnacle Armor. Over the past 18 months, elements within
    the Department of Defense have expressed concerns about the
    effectiveness of Dragon Skin. It is my understanding that the Program
    Executive Office soldier and the Army Test and Evaluation Command have
    conducted tests on the Dragon Skin body armor but have yet to release
    the final results.

                                   iraqi army
        30. Senator Pryor. Admiral Fallon, how many Iraqi army personnel
    are trained and capable of fighting today?
        Admiral Fallon. [Deleted.]

        31. Senator Pryor. Admiral Fallon, how far is the Iraqi army from
    being certified as a self-sustaining military force?
        Admiral Fallon. [Deleted.]

        32. Senator Pryor. Admiral Fallon, what are the capabilities of the
    Iraqi military leadership?
        Admiral Fallon. The Iraqi military leadership is capable of small
    scale, relatively simple operations. At the most senior level, the
    Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Joint Headquarters do not yet have the
    capability to independently plan, conduct, or support large, complex
    operations. The new Iraqi army is only 3 years old, and there remains a
    lack of confidence among some of its senior leaders. This can result in
    a reluctance to delegate authority without a specific directive from
    the most senior level.
        However, the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) controls six Iraqi
    army divisions and the Baghdad Operational Command (BOC) controls two
    more. All divisions arc expected to fall under Iraqi control by the end
    of 2007. With significant coalition assistance, the IGFC and BOC direct
    Iraqi-led operations, which are in turn conducted by these divisions
    and their subordinate units. Iraqi ground forces' recent tactical
    successes, and the successful execution of a complex relief in place
    and transfer of authority in Baghdad, demonstrate their increasing
    capabilities.
        On the small unit level, capabilities vary greatly from unit to
    unit. However, we are seeing progress in the development of a capable
    leadership corps, as leaders are more often promoted based on merit and
    capability rather than personal connections.

        33. Senator Pryor. Admiral Fallon, where is the Iraqi military
    leadership in the decisionmaking process during combat operations?
        Admiral Fallon. Iraqi leadership is involved at every step of
    planning and execution. Transition teams teach, coach, and assist, and
    partnered units mentor the leadership. But the Iraqis make the
    decisions. As each unit's commander and staff mature, its assessment
    ratings will increase and the amount of coalition assistance required
    will decrease.

        34. Senator Pryor. Admiral Fallon, how prepared is the Iraqi
    military leadership to lead troops in battle?
        Admiral Fallon. [Deleted.]

                                troop embedding
        35. Senator Pryor. Admiral Fallon, what significance has General
    Petraeus' concept of embedding troops within the local populace had on
    civil and military operations?
        Admiral Fallon. The concept of embedding is already having positive
    effects throughout Iraq. It has led to increased trust in Iraqi and
    coalition forces by the populace, drawing them closer to their
    government, while at the same lime severing linkages to anti-coalition
    forces. The constant presence of coalition forces amongst the
    population enables this, yet is also dependent upon the GOI to provide
    essential services equitably to all communities.

                               irregular warfare
        36. Senator Pryor. Admiral Fallon, our military forces whose
    conventional capability was designed to fight on the western shores of
    Europe are now assigned to fight in irregular warfare. How closely are
    our troops prepared for what they are asked to do in the global war on
    terrorism?
        Admiral Fallon. In conducting the war on terror, our conventional
    forces conduct counterinsurgency tasks while our Special Operations
    Forces conduct counterterrorism tasks. In both cases, our troops have
    received the preparation they need to be exceptionally capable and
    effective.

                          improvised explosive devices
        37. Senator Pryor. Admiral Fallon, the Air Force has stated that
    ``C-130s are doing a magnificent job reducing the improvised explosive
    device (IED) threats by removing 9,000 ground troops and 3,500 convoys
    from the road each month.'' What impact has this had on our ability to
    counter the IED threat?
        Admiral Fallon. [Deleted.]

        38. Senator Pryor. Admiral Fallon, are we consequently seeing less
    IED attacks?
        Admiral Fallon. The answer is no. IED attacks continue to increase,
    resulting in increased causalities and fatalities.

        [Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2008

                                  ----------

                             THURSDAY, MAY 17, 2007

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                         UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:18 a.m. in
    room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Bill Nelson, E.
    Benjamin Nelson, Webb, Warner, Inhofe, and Thune.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Evelyn N. Farkas,
    professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional
    staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine,
    general counsel; and William G.P. Monahan, counsel.
        Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
    Republican staff director; Derek J. Maurer, minority counsel;
    and Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member.
        Staff assistants present: David G. Collins, Fletcher L.
    Cork, and Benjamin L. Rubin.
        Committee members' assistants present: Benjamin Rinaker,
    assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant
    to Senator Webb; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; and
    Stuart C. Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
        General Craddock, we want to welcome you. We had a meeting
    with the Secretary of Defense, which is the reason we are
    starting later than usual, and we also are going to have a
    couple of votes that are coming up, I believe, at 10:30 a.m. or
    10:45 a.m., which is going to make this even a more complicated
    session than usual.
        We appreciate, not just your being here today, we
    appreciate your long service to this Nation. You've been before
    this committee on a number of occasions, so you're familiar
    with the way in which our schedule operates, but this is the
    first time that you appear before us as Commander, U.S.
    European Command (EUCOM) and the Supreme Allied Commander
    Europe, so we will welcome your insights into the developments
    within your area of responsibility (AOR) and within the North
    Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as new missions and new
    challenges face both NATO and EUCOM.
        I normally try to set out some of the parameters for our
    hearings, but I'm not going to do that today, because of the
    late start and because of the votes, which will interrupt us in
    a few minutes. I think we're all familiar with the large AOR
    that you cover, the huge number of challenges that you have,
    and we look forward to your testimony.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]
                    Prepared Statement by Senator Carl Levin
        General Craddock, welcome and thank you for your patience while the
    committee met with the Secretary of Defense. You have testified before
    the committee on a number of occasions, so you are familiar with how
    this institution operates.
        Today, however, is the first time General Craddock appears before
    the committee as Commander, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and Supreme
    Allied Commander Europe. We welcome your insights into developments
    within the EUCOM's area of responsibility (AOR) and within the North
    Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as the alliance takes on new
    missions and transforms itself to meet today's challenges.
        First among these challenges in General Craddock's AOR is the
    mission of bringing security and stability to Afghanistan. Last year
    the security situation in Afghanistan steadily deteriorated: overall
    attacks on coalition forces were up three-fold in 2006 over the
    previous year; the number of roadside bombs almost doubled; suicide
    attacks jumped nearly five-fold. A recent State Department report on
    terrorism states that in 2006 the Taliban-led insurgency remained ``a
    capable and resilient threat to stability.''
        In response, earlier this year the NATO-led International Security
    Assistance Force (ISAF), and Afghan National Security Forces launched a
    major operation in the south to counter an anticipated spring
    offensive. The committee would be interested in getting an update on
    the security situation in Afghanistan, and whether coalition and Afghan
    forces have begun to create stability in the provinces.
        A critical question has been whether U.S. and coalition forces
    levels in Afghanistan are sufficient for the mission. British General
    David Richards, former ISAF Commander, wrote this spring that ``Our
    force levels in 2006 were just sufficient to contain the insurgency. .
    . . As a result of too few forces, we have found it difficult to
    maintain security where we have gained it. . .'' In January, Secretary
    Gates increased U.S. troop commitments in Afghanistan, and the
    Department of Defense (DOD) has announced its intention to maintain
    those troop levels into next year.
        One of General Craddock's first tasks as Supreme Allied Commander
    was to review and assess what level of troops and equipment the NATO-
    led ISAF needed to carry out its mission in Afghanistan. When General
    Craddock made his recommendations in February, he said that to succeed
    in Afghanistan, ``you must clear, you must hold, you must build.''
    According to news reports, General Craddock's recommendations included
    increasing NATO troop levels and equipment, in particular helicopters
    and transport aircraft. We would be interested in hearing this morning
    whether NATO members have made the necessary commitments of troops and
    equipment to meet your recommendations for NATO's military
    requirements; if not, what shortfalls remain; and whether those
    commitments have come with strings in the form of national
    restrictions, or caveats, placed by NATO members on the deployment of
    their troops or equipment in Afghanistan.
        We would also like your assessment of the readiness of Afghan
    Security Forces, and whether current ISAF and Afghan Security Force
    levels are sufficient to clear and hold areas to prevent the Taliban
    from returning.
        An important component of our strategy for building a more stable
    Afghanistan are the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) deployed
    throughout the country. The PRTs are working to expand the authority of
    the Afghan Government through reconstruction and development
    operations. I am concerned, however, that efforts to build the support
    of the Afghan people are being undermined in a number of ways. These
    include the explosive growth in the drug trade; public corruption
    within the Karzai government; the lack of economic opportunity; and
    growing popular resentment over reports of civilian casualties
    resulting from U.S. airstrikes and other operations.
        Another major issue in EUCOM's AOR is the proposed deployment of
    long-range missile defense interceptors in Poland and a high-power
    radar in the Czech Republic. The administration is requesting $310
    million this year to start this proposed deployment. The total cost of
    the proposed European missile defense deployments is $4 billion through
    fiscal year 2013, all of which the administration proposes the United
    States should pay. I gather from General Craddock's prepared testimony
    that there may be additional expenses--as yet undetermined--for these
    proposed deployments.
        However, there are a number of problems with this requested
    funding. First, the United States is just beginning the negotiations
    with the governments of Poland and the Czech Republic and if the
    negotiations are successful, the Czech and Polish parliaments would
    have to give final approval before the deployments could proceed.
        A second problem with the missile defense funding request is that
    the interceptor proposed for deployment is a new missile that has not
    yet been developed and is not even planned to be tested until 2010.
        Third, this proposed deployment while apparently designed to
    counter a potential future threat from Iran, does not address the
    existing and real threat of short- and medium-range missiles Iran has
    today, which could target our forward-deployed forces, allies, and
    friends.
        Fourth, there are concerns within NATO about this proposal.
    According to the NATO Secretary General, ``NATO is the right place to
    have this discussion on missile defense.''
        The United States finds itself at odds with Russia not only over
    missile defense but also over the issue of Kosovo. Russia continues to
    oppose Kosovo's independence from Serbia, but Secretary Rice in Moscow
    this week delivered the message that keeping Kosovo part of Serbia
    would be ``impossible.'' The 16,000-strong NATO force is likely to be
    called upon to provide security as U.N. administration of the region
    ends and Kosovo makes the transition to its new status.
        An additional challenge within the EUCOM AOR is the growing
    strategic importance of Africa. The Department has recognized this
    strategic shift and, in February 2007, announced the creation of U.S.
    Africa Command. According to the Department, this new command will be
    fully operational by the end of September 2008. In the mean time, the
    vast majority of Africa remains within EUCOM's responsibilities.
        Africa is growing in strategic importance. At the same time, unrest
    in some African nation states, like Nigeria, is also growing. The
    recent Nigerian elections, widely regarded as rigged, threaten to stir
    up even more violence. In response, the U.S. Navy has increased its
    footprint in and around the Gulf of Guinea and has begun working with a
    number of nations along the coast of West Africa on maritime security.
        On the issue of readiness in the European theater, this committee
    has learned, in a series of hearings since the beginning of this year,
    that personnel and equipment shortages in nondeployed units assigned to
    EUCOM exacerbate the challenges of meeting our security commitments and
    challenges in Europe and Africa, or in other areas where EUCOM forces
    may be deployed. Lower basic readiness in our nondeployed forces
    increases the costs and time required to get ready for worldwide
    contingencies and increases the likelihood of deploying our forces
    underprepared or unprepared. This increases the risk that we fail to
    accomplish our missions, and almost certainly means increased
    casualties. This situation is what former Army Chief of Staff, General
    Schoomaker, described when he talked about the U.S. military's lack of
    `strategic depth.' I hope to hear from General Craddock how he
    evaluates and manages this risk.
        The committee looks forward to receiving your testimony.

        Chairman Levin. Senator Warner.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I associate myself
    with your remarks. I had a very pleasant visit, a very
    informative visit, with General Craddock yesterday in my
    office.
        But you have taken on a very, very major responsibility, as
    you full well know. Even in the brief period that you've been
    there, there have been some rather dramatic unfolding events,
    particularly in Afghanistan. So, we'll proceed to hear from
    you.
        But, Mr. Chairman, I think you want to clarify, for members
    who may be following, that we might continue after the vote, if
    other members were not able to get here before the vote?
        Chairman Levin. Oh, no, we will be working right through
    the votes, if we can. Otherwise, we'll have to recess until
    after the votes, because I expect those votes will start in
    about 10 or 15 minutes.
        Senator Warner. How many votes are there?
        Chairman Levin. I think there are two votes. So, we'll have
    to try to work around them the best way that we can. Our
    statements will be made part of the record.
        We now call upon you, General Craddock.

      STATEMENT OF GEN BANTZ J. CRADDOCK, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
     STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND, AND SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE

        General Craddock. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, and distinguished members
    of this committee, it's indeed a privilege to appear here today
    before you as the Commander of the United States EUCOM.
        Mr. Chairman, I've submitted a written statement that I ask
    be made a part of the official record.
        Chairman Levin. It will be.
        General Craddock. If you would permit me, I'd like to
    introduce my senior noncommissioned officer in the EUCOM,
    Command Sergeant Major Mark Farley. Mark, would you stand up,
    please?
        Chairman Levin. Welcome.
        Senator Warner. Welcome.
        General Craddock. I think it's important he's here today.
    He represents all the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines,
    and he is, as the senior enlisted advisor, continually out and
    about in the command, checking on quality-of-life, training
    conditions, and, every day, is very essential to all the
    leaders in the command and what we do. So, I'm glad to have
    him.
        Chairman Levin. We're grateful for your service, and
    appreciate your being here.
        General Craddock. Since taking command of EUCOM, I've been
    struck by the command's expanse and diversity, the dedication
    and the quality of our servicemembers, the transformation of
    NATO in the 21st century, and our Nation's commitment to this
    great alliance. EUCOM is conducting a broad range of activities
    to assure both EUCOM's and NATO's continued relevance.
        I will provide a brief overview of our activities,
    highlighting the vital role EUCOM servicemembers play in this
    vast theater.
        While support for the global war on terror is our
    overarching priority, EUCOM is also focused on sustaining
    Europe as a global partner and furthering the U.S. security
    relationship with Africa. The EUCOM's strategy of active
    security seeks to defeat transnational terrorist entities and
    violent extremists who threaten the United States, its allies,
    and our interests. We will do that by denying our enemies
    freedom of action and access to resources, and by building
    partner-nation capabilities that promote stability.
        Security cooperation remains the cornerstone of this
    strategy. Our programs represent a proactive approach to
    building able partners. From airborne to nonlethal weapons
    training, EUCOM personnel and facilities provide practical and
    state-of-the-art education and training that assist our allies,
    and our partners, in developing their capabilities to conduct
    effective peacekeeping and contingency operations as well-
    trained disciplined forces. These efforts mitigate the
    conditions that lead to conflict, prepare the way for success,
    and reduce the need for substantial U.S. involvement.
        Security cooperation programs, such as the international
    military education and training, foreign military financing,
    foreign military sales, the Georgia Sustainment and Stability
    Operations Program, and the Section 1206 Security Assistance
    Program, are just a few of the critically important tools that
    you provide, and resources you provide, to execute our security
    cooperation activities throughout Europe, Eurasia, and Africa.
        EUCOM's ongoing transformation initiatives highlight the
    military effectiveness of forward-based and rotational forces
    that are powerful and visible instruments of national
    influence.
        In addition to our conventional forces, Special Operations
    Forces (SOFs) are essential. They enable EUCOM to develop and
    maintain trust and long-term relationships with partner nations
    as we help build their capabilities and their capacities.
        NATO remains an alliance committed to the collective
    security of its member states and, increasingly, to a broader
    and more comprehensive view of security in an interdependent
    world where the threats are increasingly nontraditional and
    more global in nature.
        While political consultations among the 26 nations help
    sustain a unity of purpose, the men and women of the alliance,
    plus 17 other troop-contributing nations, are redefining NATO's
    role by their actions and operations across Afghanistan, the
    Balkans, the Mediterranean, Iraq, the Baltics, and Africa.
        Today, over 50,000 NATO military forces are deployed in
    support of NATO operations. This is a visible and effective
    demonstration of NATO's resolve to meet those security
    challenges, both in Europe and in areas of strategic distance.
        In the current strategic environment, collective security
    is an essential factor in achieving national security. NATO,
    with the proper resources and political will, remains the
    preeminent security alliance in the world. It is in our
    national interest to ensure that NATO succeeds. The leadership
    and the capabilities our Nation contributes to the NATO
    alliance remain fundamental to preserving the Transatlantic
    Partnership.
        Continued congressional support for our efforts is
    essential to ensure that the EUCOM remains capable of effective
    engagement throughout our AOR, that we can provide sustained
    support to the NATO alliance and to our regional partners, and
    that EUCOM meets the broad tasks set forth in the national
    military strategy. The dedicated men and women of the United
    States EUCOM are committed to achieving our national goals and
    objectives.
        Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing, and I
    look forward to the opportunity to address your questions.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of General Craddock follows:]
                Prepared Statement by GEN Bantz J. Craddock, USA
                                  introduction
        United States European Command (EUCOM) area of responsibility (AOR)
    comprises 92 diverse nations in Europe, Eurasia and most of Africa. The
    forward defense of the United States largely depends on our ability to
    work with our partners and allies to ensure common security. EUCOM's
    theater Strategy of Active Security supports the national defense
    strategy through a series of broad cooperative and engagement
    initiatives.
        As the EUCOM Commander, I believe there are fundamental priorities
    that characterize our involvement in this AOR. While support to the
    global war on terror is the overarching priority, EUCOM is dedicated to
    retaining Europe as a global partner and furthering the U.S. security
    relationship with Africa through a new unified command. Embedded in
    these strategic priorities are our efforts to transform ourselves into
    a more expeditionary command, while cultivating and sustaining
    relations with numerous regional security organizations, such as the
    North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the African Union (AU), and
    the European Union (EU).
        In addition to my role as Commander EUCOM, I have responsibilities
    as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, commanding all operational
    NATO forces. While these two roles have distinct mandates, there are
    many linkages between them. One fundamental linkage is transformation--
    both EUCOM's and NATO's transformation efforts are aggressive,
    ambitious, and geared toward realizing agile, flexible, and
    expeditionary forces capable of operating at strategic distances.
        To fully capture how EUCOM will address these priorities I will
    provide an overview of the strategic environment in which we operate,
    explain our strategy and initiatives, highlight the contributions and
    requirements of my component commanders, and underscore the importance
    of the transatlantic security relationship.
                             strategic environment
        EUCOM's AOR is a vast geographic region covering over 21 million
    square miles and 16 time zones, extending from the Barents Sea in the
    north to the waters stretching south to Antarctica, and from Greenland
    to Russia's Pacific coastline (See Enclosure 1). The scope and
    diversity of these 92 sovereign nations include approximately 1.4
    billion people, constituting 23 percent of the world's population.
    These 1,000 plus ethnic groups speak more than 400 languages, profess
    over 100 religious affiliations, and encompass the full range of human
    conditions and governments. The trends and issues which define the
    current environment in our theater include terrorism in all its forms,
    frozen conflicts, unresolved territorial disputes, complex geopolitical
    relationships between Russia and the Nations of the former Soviet
    Union, the use of energy as a tool of foreign policy, weapons of mass
    destruction (WMD), and illegal immigration.
        Because the challenges in this theater are not confined to a single
    nation, EUCOM takes a regional approach at analyzing this strategic
    environment. Our analysis is structured around three European and five
    African regions (See Enclosure 2). Europe's regions are Western Europe,
    Southeast Europe, and Eurasia. Africa's regions are North Africa, West
    Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, and South Africa.
    Political Geography
        Western Europe is home to some of our oldest and closest allies.
    For six decades, its mature democracies have experienced an
    unprecedented period of security and stability. A major contribution to
    this stability lies in the NATO Alliance and multinational institutions
    that have successfully addressed numerous security challenges over the
    past almost 60 years. NATO remains Europe's premier security
    organization and the international security instrument of choice.
    However, not all trends are positive. The defense budgets of many of
    these NATO nations have fallen to levels that jeopardize their ability
    to make long-term strategic military commitments to meet the Alliance's
    21st century ambitions.
        In Southeastern Europe, the political and military situations are
    improving, but there are unresolved issues which could destabilize the
    region. The Balkans remain somewhat volatile as new democratic
    governments attempt to deal with suppressed ethnic tensions,
    corruption, illegal immigration, and assimilation of citizens from
    different cultural backgrounds. The United Nations (U.N.)-led process
    to determine the future status of Kosovo is now in its critical and
    concluding stage, with discussions ongoing in the United Nations
    Security Council to address the Comprehensive Proposal for a Kosovo
    Status Settlement. Agreement and successful implementation of the
    provisions of a Status Settlement will be essential in maintaining
    stability in the Balkans.
        As a regional leader, Turkey's European orientation for political
    and military security, along with its enduring relationship with the
    U.S., make it a catalyst for stability in Southeast Europe, the
    Caucasus, Afghanistan, and the Black Sea region. Its key international
    lines of communication and proximity to Iran, Iraq, and the Russian
    Federation ensure Turkey will continue to play a vital role in
    international efforts to combat terrorism.
        In Eurasia, some nations are at a decisional crossroads in terms of
    economic, political, and military reform. Other nations, such as
    Azerbaijan and Georgia, continue to pursue a positive trend towards
    economic sector, military, and political reform. After decades of life
    under the Soviet model, nations of this region struggle with balancing
    the challenging process of reform and the fundamental need for
    stability and predictability. Some nations have elected to freeze,
    stall, or reverse reform, placing a greater priority on the maintenance
    of political power, internally and externally. Economic turmoil,
    unsettled interstate conflicts, insurgency, deteriorating
    infrastructure, and negative demographic trends exacerbate an already
    difficult and complex process of reform.
        Despite continuing tensions from historical and unresolved ethnic
    and national enmity, the Caucasus is striving to gain regional
    stability and is of growing strategic importance to the U.S. and its
    allies principally due to its geostrategic location and the increasing
    flow of Caspian Sea hydrocarbons to the world energy market. In close
    proximity to Iran and Russia, Azerbaijan's geostrategic location is key
    for access to Caspian Sea energy resources. An example of Azerbaijan's
    and the region's growing importance to the global energy market is the
    recently opened Baku-T'blisi-Ceyhan Pipeline, bringing oil from the
    Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean. Additionally, the future Caucasus
    pipeline currently under construction will carry natural gas along much
    of the same route.
        Regional security in the Caucasus and Moldova is challenged by four
    frozen conflicts: Azerbaijan and Armenia's dispute over the status of
    Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia's separatists' attempts to
    gain independence from Georgia, and Transnistria's movement to separate
    from Moldova. Left unresolved, these conflicts remain the most
    significant obstacle to long-term stability in the Caucasus and have
    the potential to ignite into a high-intensity conflict in Europe's
    neighborhood.
        As the dominant regional power in Eurasia and central Asia,
    Russia's cooperation with the U.S. and NATO is a strategic element in
    fostering security in the Euro-Atlantic arena. Progress has been made
    in engaging the Russian military to build interoperable capabilities,
    instill western operational concepts, and strengthen the bilateral
    military relationship. Russia demands specific concentration not only
    because of its influence in its ``near abroad'' border nations, which
    affects European stability, but globally because of its formidable
    nuclear capability, an extensive weapons trade program and influence on
    the international energy market.
        While military-to-military relations with Russia are for the most
    part positive, much work remains to enhance cooperation and mutual
    understanding on key 21st century issues such as threats posed by
    ballistic missiles, WMD proliferation, terrorism, and the disruption of
    energy supplies. Russian objections to U.S. missile defense plans and
    programs will require continued U.S. Government consultation and
    engagement. Additionally, recent Russian strategies to exert influence
    run counter to U.S. and NATO security. As the world's largest producer
    of natural gas and a critical supplier of energy to Europe, Russia has
    demonstrated that it is prepared to use its position in the energy
    sector to impose its will on other nations. Also, Russia's recent
    aggressive tactics with Georgia and Ukraine raise concerns about its
    long-term security intentions. It is unclear to what future extent
    Russia may use energy or its military as leverage to achieve foreign
    policy goals, but it is a dynamic that needs to be monitored closely.
        Ukraine's strategic location, contributions to international
    operations, and policy of Euro-Atlantic integration make it an
    increasingly important regional ally. Ukraine is at the nexus of its
    Cold War past and achieving western standards of political, economic,
    and defense reform. Internal and external opposition since the 2004
    Orange Revolution have slowed the pace of Ukraine's reform efforts.
    Ukraine's ability to attain its reform objectives remains a central
    focus of both U.S. and Alliance efforts.
        In the Middle East, Israel is the U.S.'s closest ally that
    consistently and directly supports our interests through security
    cooperation (SC) and understanding of U.S. policy in the region.
    Providing a platform of stable governance in the region, Israel
    steadfastly promotes democratic ideals and pro-western economics and
    values. A steward of the largest Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
    program with well-established agreements with the U.S. Government,
    Israel is a critical military partner in this difficult seam of the
    Middle East.
        On the Continent of Africa, we face a complex environment with
    enormous challenge and potential. While Africa is rich in both human
    potential and mineral resources, it has historically struggled with
    relatively unstable governments, internal political strife, and
    economic problems. Many states remain fragile due to a variety of
    factors, including corruption, endemic and pandemic health problems,
    historical ethnic animosities, and endemic poverty.
        In North Africa, broad expanses of minimally governed areas remain
    havens for extremists, terrorists, and criminals. Authoritarian
    political structures inhibit political progress and reform on the
    continent. Developing economic systems have difficulty meeting the
    needs of a youthful and growing populace, hindering the emergence of an
    economically independent middle class. Additionally, an increasing
    percentage of Europe's oil and natural gas imports come from North
    Africa, tying European security to North African stability.
        In West Africa, specifically the Gulf of Guinea, the energy
    potential defines this as a region of emerging U.S. strategic interest.
    West Africa now supplies over 16 percent of U.S. hydrocarbons and by
    2015 it is estimated that it will supply more than 25 percent. In the
    next 10 years the Gulf of Guinea will provide the bulk of U.S. imports
    of sweet crude oil. Threatening this potential are corruption, economic
    privation, political instability, and the challenges of potential civil
    unrest. This scenario has played out most recently in the crisis in
    Guinea. The civil unrest, subsequent martial law, and resultant
    departure of U.S. citizens highlight the fragile nature of democratic
    systems throughout the region. Ethnic and religious violence within and
    across porous borders also threatens Gulf of Guinea stability. With
    only marginal adherence to the rule of law and with no meaningful legal
    structures or political will present, the maritime security challenges
    in this region become almost insurmountable. Additionally, the security
    situation in the Niger Delta and other ``promising'' areas has been
    historically unstable and continues to demonstrate symptoms indicative
    of future problems. Violence between criminal gangs, often backed by
    powerful political or ethnic figures, makes the delta one of the most
    violent places in the region. Conflict will likely escalate further as
    the country approaches presidential elections in 2007.
        Much of Central Africa and East Africa have been mired in armed
    conflicts that have defied the international community's capacity for
    crisis response and management since the mid- to late-1990s. Numerous
    wars have been fought there, causing massive human suffering as well as
    political and economic stagnation. The Rwandan genocide of 1994, in
    which over 800,000 people lost their lives, left a devastated country
    in its wake and had a profoundly destabilizing effect on the region.
    Rwanda's neighbor Burundi, embroiled in ethnic warfare between 1993 and
    2003, has completed its political transition and entered a critical
    peace-building period. Meanwhile, the Democratic Republic of Congo,
    facing the end of its postwar transition, remains plagued by active
    militia, insufficient infrastructure and poor governance practices.
    Hopes for long-term peace in the long-running conflict between the
    government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army rebels were given
    new life in August 2006 after a cessation of hostilities between the
    two sides. However, many significant stumbling blocks remain.
        Southern Africa's great potential is threatened by widespread
    corruption and unequal distribution of resources, which undermine
    efforts to develop a transparent and healthy economy. While AIDS
    affects the entire continent of Africa, Southern Africa is the most
    HIV-AIDS afflicted region in the world, with HIV infection rates
    averaging in the high 20 percent range. According to U.S. Population
    Reference Bureau estimates, South Africa's population will decline from
    44.2 million to 41.9 million in 2009. The human costs aside, the AIDS
    epidemic has a direct negative impact on the region's stability and
    security. Security forces are being decimated as key personnel are
    lost, the ability to conduct operations is reduced, and nations are
    hard pressed to field and deploy healthy soldiers for participation in
    peacekeeping operations.
    Transnational Terrorism in EUCOM's AOR
        Like all combatant commands, EUCOM is dealing with terrorism in all
    its forms. Many terror networks are integrally tied to criminal and
    smuggling networks. Illegal activities such as drug smuggling, document
    forgery, and credit card fraud help fund extremist operations while
    Europe's open borders facilitate their travels across the region.
        In Northern Africa, al Qaeda-affiliated groups exploit ungoverned
    spaces to gain sanctuary, recruit, indoctrinate, train, equip, transit,
    and mount operations. The Trans-Sahara region, in particular, offers
    sanctuary to Islamic extremist terrorists, smugglers of drugs and
    contraband, and insurgent groups. There is evidence of an increasing
    trend of North Africans being recruited as foreign fighters in Iraq; in
    addition, we are seeing increasing collaboration between al Qaeda and
    North African terrorist groups. These negative developments are
    occurring despite many successful host nation security efforts. In the
    Trans-Sahara region, violent extremists continue to coordinate
    activities and interact with their associated networks in Europe. These
    groups take advantage of vast ``ungoverned'' spaces to attack their
    host governments and advance their anti-moderate, anti-western agendas.
        Western Europe, Southeast Europe, and Eurasia are increasingly used
    as a sanctuary and logistics center for extremists. Due to the
    exploitation of well-established civil liberties and the capacity to
    travel freely across many borders, Europe's ability to identify,
    arrest, and prosecute transnational terrorists is an important element
    in the global war on terror.
        Another key characteristic of terrorism in the EUCOM AOR relates to
    the low-risk/high-consequence aspect of the use of WMD. With the
    majority of the world's nuclear weapons in the EUCOM AOR, the loss of
    control of any associated weapon or material could lead to catastrophic
    results, making the security of these items a significant aspect of the
    EUCOM WMD effort.
    Demographic Trends within Africa
        Changing population demographics increasingly challenge good
    governance. Rapid population growth, particularly a disproportionate
    ``youth bulge'' in the developing world, especially Africa, will
    significantly strain governments' ability to provide basic goods,
    services, and jobs. This could lead to a large pool of undereducated
    and unemployed youth presenting a potential source of instability and a
    lucrative target for violent extremist exploitation in countries where
    governments fail to meet the public's needs.
    Immigration Issues
        Europe has become a magnet for people who see European countries as
    lands of refuge as well as lands of plenty. Inevitably, with 15 million
    people unemployed in the EU alone, the influx of outsiders has been
    resented in some areas. Over 100,000 illegal immigrants enter Europe
    from Africa each year. Many EU citizens fear that asylum seekers are
    too great a burden for their countries' social welfare systems to bear.
    Others voice alarm that economic migrants may take their jobs. Some
    resent the dilution of traditional local culture from the influx of new
    arrivals. Coupled with legal immigration challenges are those
    associated with illegal immigration.
    Criminal Issues
        Directly connected to both immigration and organized crime is human
    trafficking. Human traffickers make annual profits of some $7 billion
    in prostitution alone. Only the drug trade is more profitable. In
    Europe, human traffickers run the spectrum of criminal organizations.
    From complex networks like the Italian and Russian organized crime
    elements to countless small ``freelance'' family groups, modern slavery
    continues to be a big-profit business.
        Around Africa, vast coastal areas provide havens for smuggling,
    human trafficking, illegal immigration, piracy, and oil and fisheries
    theft. Piracy and theft are major concerns along the nearly 2,000
    nautical miles of the Gulf of Guinea coastal area. Large-scale illegal
    oil theft in the Niger Delta has become significant over the last
    several years. Industry analysts estimate up to 200,000 barrels of oil
    per day are siphoned from pipelines in a process known as ``hot-
    tapping'' and sold to Nigerian or foreign buyers at approximately $15 a
    barrel--well below world oil price levels. Shipping ports, transit
    areas, harbors, oil production, and transshipment areas are largely
    uncontrolled, raising concerns regarding vulnerability to attacks by
    terrorist groups, criminal gangs, or separatist militias. Corruption
    and complicity in local, regional, and national governments only serve
    to exacerbate this problem.
        A key challenge is drug use in Western Europe, and smuggling of
    drugs through Western Africa and Eurasia to the area of consumption.
    European cocaine use is at an all-time high (1.5 million users) and
    Europe is now the second most important destination for cocaine in the
    world.
    Weapons of Mass Destruction
        On the periphery of the EUCOM's AOR, Iran's continued nuclear
    program poses a potential risk to U.S., NATO, and partner interests.
    Ballistic missile threats to the EUCOM AOR are well-researched. Russian
    ballistic missile programs are historically documented, well
    understood, and continually reviewed for changes. Evolving threats from
    nations such as Iran pose new challenges. Furthermore, in Europe and
    Eurasia, there are stockpiles which are vulnerable to international and
    internal threats posed by corruption, criminal activity, or rogue
    actors. Strategic weapons, including conventional missiles, WMD, and
    weapons of mass effect are capabilities sought after by our adversaries
    who desire the capability to attack the U.S., its allies, and its
    strategic interests.
                             u.s. european command
        The U.S. EUCOM's developing Strategy of Active Security addresses
    the unique problems of EUCOM's nations and regions and the illegal
    networks that span those nations and regions. The goal is to
    marginalize the enemies of peace and foster the growth of good
    governance, strong institutions, and civil society that promotes
    lasting security and stability. Our strategy addresses theater
    challenges and opportunities by employing the full range of military
    activities, from building and sustaining peace to prosecuting war if
    necessary.
    EUCOM's Support to the Global War on Terror
        EUCOM's number one theater-wide goal is to defeat transnational
    terrorist entities and violent extremists that threaten the U.S., its
    allies, and interests. We seek to do this by denying them freedom of
    action and access to resources, building partner capacity to combat
    terrorism, and working with partners to promote regional stability and
    diminish the conditions that foster violent extremism. We focus on
    deterring and defeating these imminent threats across our AOR,
    stretching from the Caucasus, through U.S. Central Command's (CENTCOM)
    Middle East, across North Africa and into the Gulf of Guinea.
    Regional War on Terrorism
        Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS) is the Department
    of Defense component of the Department of State's Trans-Sahara Counter
    Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP). TSCTP is a ground-breaking program that
    seeks to leverage the capabilities of those U.S. Government agencies
    involved in building security on the African continent, with an
    emphasis on counterterrorism (CT) in North Africa. TSCTP seeks to
    maximize the return on investment by implementing reforms to help
    nations become more self-reliant in security and more stable in
    governance. OEF-TS--the military component--uses Special Operations
    Forces (SOFs) to train partners on the conduct of CT operations.
        The need for TSCTP stems from concern over the expansion of
    operations of Islamic terrorist organizations in the Sahel region, a
    region that approximates the size of the United States. OEF-TS is a
    preventive approach to combat terrorism and enhance partner nation
    border security and military capabilities in Trans-Saharan Africa. It
    is designed to assist governments seeking better control of their
    territories and to prevent terrorist groups from utilizing the vast
    open areas as safe havens.
        TSCTP's overall approach is straightforward: to build indigenous
    capacity and facilitate cooperation among governments in the region.
    Participating nations: Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger,
    Senegal, Nigeria and Tunisia. These countries have joined in the
    struggle against Islamic extremism in the Sahel region. OEF-TS builds
    upon the successful 2002 Pan-Sahel Initiative which helped train and
    equip forces in four Sahel states: Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad.
    OEF-TS is a follow-on complementary effort, more ambitious in both
    programmatic and geographic terms.
        This cooperation strengthens regional counterterrorism capabilities
    and assists participating nations in halting the illegal flow of arms,
    goods, and people through the region. OEF-TS has the added effect of
    institutionalizing cooperation among the region's security forces and
    reinforcing the military's subordinate role to democratic governance.
    It also helps nations better protect vast borders to contribute to
    common security.
        In the past, instability in Africa has often required costly,
    reactive, and repeated interventions (e.g., Liberia). An upheaval in
    one nation has often resulted in destabilizing neighboring states.
    Today, in an age of globalization, the damage individual states or
    groups within those states can do is unprecedented. For a relatively
    small investment, TSCTP has the potential to produce significant,
    positive results in countering terrorism. It can be a powerful brake on
    future terrorist expansion.
    Security Cooperation
        Security Cooperation (SC) programs remain the cornerstone of our
    Strategy of Active Security to promote common security, which
    ultimately supports national objectives in the global war on terror.
    These programs contribute to building key relationships which support
    U.S. strategic interests, enhance partner security capabilities,
    provide for essential peacetime and contingency access and en-route
    infrastructure, and improve information exchange and intelligence
    sharing.
        Our SC programs represent a proactive approach to building
    partnership capacity with the aim of enabling emerging democracies to
    defend their homelands, address and reduce regional conflicts, defeat
    terrorist extremists, develop common economic and security interests,
    and respond to emerging crises. From airborne to nonlethal weapons
    training, EUCOM personnel and facilities provide practical and state of
    the art training. Assisting our allies and partners in developing their
    capabilities to conduct effective peacekeeping and contingency
    operations with well-trained, disciplined forces helps mitigate the
    conditions that lead to conflict, prepares the way for success, and
    reduces the potential burden of U.S. involvement.
        EUCOM SC efforts require consistent, predictable investment in
    order to impact the multitude of strategic, security, economic, and
    political challenges we face.
    Security Cooperation Activities
        Key among U.S. combatant commands' SC tools are programs which
    provide access and influence, help build professional, capable
    militaries in allied and partner nations, and promote interoperability.
    We execute larger security assistance programs using our 44 Offices of
    Defense Cooperation in concert with U.S. Embassy Country Teams, while
    smaller programs are executed by Defense Attaches and Embassy Offices.
        International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Expanded
    IMET (E-IMET) provide education and training opportunities for foreign
    military and civilian personnel. The EUCOM portion of the fiscal year
    2008 IMET request is approximately $40.5 million. IMET remains our most
    powerful SC tool and proves its long-term value every day. For a
    relatively small investment, IMET provides foreign military and
    civilian leaders' access to U.S. military training, builds
    relationships, and enhances influence. Indeed, today's IMET graduates
    are tomorrow's Chiefs of Defense, Ministers of Defense, and Heads of
    State. Today, we continue to see the value of this program in the
    professional development and transformation of militaries in such
    establishing partners as Poland, Tunisia, Romania, and many other
    countries. In Africa, we assess IMET and E-IMET to be the most
    successful programs in promoting democracy and human rights.
        However, we face stiff competition in Africa, most notably from
    China. Beijing clearly understands the importance of building
    relationships to help shape the future landscape of the continent. The
    importance of IMET cannot be overstated, and we seek Congress' help in
    sustaining this excellent program.
        FMF provides critical resources to assist strategically important
    nations without the financial means to acquire U.S. military equipment
    and training. This year's FMF request for nations in the EUCOM AOR
    totals approximately $2.5 billion, of which more than 93 percent is
    earmarked for Israel. FMF is an essential instrument of influence,
    building allied and coalition military capabilities, and improving
    interoperability with U.S. and allied forces. When countries buy U.S.
    military equipment through the FMF program, they buy into a long-term
    commitment with the U.S. for spare parts and training. If FMF funding
    is reduced or forfeited as a result of U.S.-imposed sanctions, long-
    term military ties may be affected. A number of strategic EUCOM
    countries face this situation as a result of the American
    Servicemembers Protection Act. An example is the deterioration in our
    SC relationship with South Africa.
        In 1965 and 1978, the U.S. sold C-130 and Boeing 707 aircraft,
    respectively, to South Africa. Due to ASPA sanctions against South
    Africa, we are no longer able to provide spare parts or training under
    the FMF program. One consequence is that South Africa now has very
    limited capability to transport AU peacekeepers into Darfur and other
    peacekeeping missions in Africa. As a result, the U.S. and a number of
    allies must provide air transport at great cost. Another consequence is
    the compromise of our once-solid relationships due to a perception that
    the U.S. is an unreliable and mercurial security partner over the long-
    term.
        Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS)
    demonstrate our Nation's continued commitment to the security of our
    allies and partners by allowing them to acquire U.S. military equipment
    and training. FMS and DCS sales are vital to improving interoperability
    with U.S. and NATO forces, closing capability gaps, and modernizing the
    military forces of our allies and partners.
        Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act, to Build
    the Capacity of Foreign Military Forces, is an experimental initiative
    provided by Congress in 2006. It couples the authorities of the
    Department of State with the resources of the Department of Defense to
    rapidly build and enhance military capacity of our key allies and
    partners. In 2006, EUCOM was provided over $11 million to build
    intelligence-sharing capacity for Pan-Sahel countries along with
    maritime domain awareness systems for countries in the Gulf of Guinea.
    In 2007, EUCOM has requested funding for innovative Train and Equip
    programs for partners interested in assisting the U.S. in the global
    war on terror and to provide security and stability throughout the AOR.
    This bold effort has laid the foundation upon which SC reform can be
    built. The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) continues to
    be one of our most effective SC programs. By linking our States and
    territories with designated partner countries, we promote access,
    enhance military capabilities, improve interoperability, and advance
    the principles of responsible governance. The unique civil-military
    nature of the National Guard allows it to actively participate in a
    wide range of SC activities. For example, the National Guard conducted
    over 89 SPP events and members of the National Guard and Reserve
    participated in over 50 of 150 Joint Contact Team Program activities in
    2006 alone. Both National Guard and Reserve personnel have added depth
    and breadth to our effects in the EUCOM AOR.
        In 2006, Serbia and Montenegro entered into SPP agreements with the
    Ohio National Guard and the Maine National Guard, respectively.
    Enclosure 3 details countries in the EUCOM AOR that have active SPP
    partnerships. Like the comprehensive SPP programs in place in Europe,
    we strongly encourage National Guard units to expand the number of SPP
    relationships with Africa.
        Combating WMD is among our highest priorities as the majority of
    the world's nuclear weapons are located in the EUCOM AOR. In some
    cases, these weapons and their related systems and technology are
    inadequately secured or maintained. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency
    (DTRA) works in concert with EUCOM to cover the entire spectrum of this
    unique mission: Cooperative Threat Reduction programs address the
    nonproliferation of known WMD; detection programs address
    counterproliferation, particularly interdiction of unknown items; and
    DTRA's exercise programs address our consequence management
    responsibilities, reassuring our partners and allies regarding EUCOM
    capabilities.
        Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program focuses on
    enhancing the capabilities of military forces to assist in preparing
    deployments in support of U.S.-led coalition and NATO Operations. The
    utility of this program has been proven in Georgia. U.S. and Georgia
    have developed a solid, cost-effective partnership dedicated to
    promoting peace and stability and countering terrorism. With three land
    force brigades forming the core of their armed forces, Georgia is the
    largest per capita contributor of forces to Operation Iraqi Freedom
    (OIF) after the U.S. Additionally, for the past 3 years, USAREUR has
    provided tactical human intelligence (HUMINT) collection and management
    training to our NATO Allies, to include Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia.
    Recently, this initiative led to the training of the HUMINT force in
    the Romanian Army and for the last two Balkans rotations has allowed
    Romanian HUMINT teams to be embedded within the U.S. Task Force. We
    look forward to expanding this program to other countries eager to
    build needed military capabilities.
        HIV-AIDS Prevention Programs continue to be an activity of key
    importance within our AOR. EUCOM works with DOD and other governmental
    and nongovernmental HIV-AIDS programs to improve the health and medical
    well-being of the African people. We advocate projects and programs
    sponsored by the country teams and work to incorporate these into our
    theater SC plans. These programs are designed to stem the spread of
    HIV-AIDS and improve the readiness levels of African military units.
        EUCOM is an active participant in the U.S. Humanitarian Mine Action
    (HMA) Program, executed by Departments of Defense and State and the
    U.S. Agency for International Development. HMA assists in relieving the
    plight of civilian populations experiencing adverse effects from
    landmines and explosive remnants of war. EUCOM's efforts span 15
    nations on 3 continents, with a focus on training the trainer and
    providing a mine action force multiplier capacity.
        EUCOM's Clearinghouse Initiatives ensure that U.S. SC actions are
    coordinated with other nations involved in the same region or issue.
    Clearinghouse Initiatives help deconflict programs to avoid duplication
    and find ways to collaborate on matters of mutual interest. They are in
    place for Africa, the South Caucasus, and Southeast Europe, and enable
    interested countries to share information about security assistance
    programs. The goal is to capitalize on limited resources by merging
    various SC programs into a comprehensive, synchronized regional effort.
        Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) is a Department of State
    program, planned in consultation with, and implemented by DOD to train
    and equip peacekeepers. In Africa, GPOI funds supplement the existing
    Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program
    to provide training, equipment, and logistical capability to meet
    U.N.'s peace operations standards. The bulk of GPOI activities in EUCOM
    lies within the framework of ACOTA, which assists 19 ACOTA ``partners''
    in developing the ability to participate in peace support operations.
        In the coming months, the ACOTA program will provide multilateral
    battalion and brigade-level training for African sub-regional
    organizations. It will also increase training support to the AU staff
    and forces in joint operations.
        ACOTA remains a crucial African engagement program, directly
    supporting U.S. national objectives of promoting stability,
    democratization, and military professionalism in Africa. GPOI funding
    sustains African peacekeeping forces to enable these units to address
    the multiple crises on the African continent.
        With Caspian Maritime SC, EUCOM seeks to coordinate and complement
    U.S. Government maritime SC activities in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.
    Our maritime SC efforts enhance the capabilities of Azerbaijan and
    Kazakhstan to prevent and, if needed, respond to terrorism, nuclear
    proliferation, drug and other trafficking, and additional transnational
    threats in this littoral.
        We are working with U.S. CENTCOM, the DTRA, the Department of
    State, and the Department of Energy to improve Azerbaijan's and
    Kazakhstan's capacities in these vital areas of mutual interest.
    Related projects include providing maritime special operations training
    and equipment as well as WMD detection and response training and
    equipment. We are also assisting in the upgrade of operations centers,
    naval vessels and communications in order to develop rapid reaction
    capabilities. Finally, we are building their capacity to counter
    narcoterrorism and conduct border control training, naval
    infrastructure development planning, and inter-ministry information
    exchange.
        EUCOM has regional centers providing professional development of
    emerging civilian and military leaders, reinforcing ideals of
    democratic governance and stable apolitical militaries, and
    facilitating long-term dialogue with and among current and future
    international leaders. The George C. Marshall European Center for
    Security Studies and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS)
    play a central role in our engagement strategy by building trust and
    cooperative relationships with the leaders of nations across Europe,
    Eurasia, and Africa.
        The Marshall Center, co-sponsored by and located in Germany, is the
    preeminent transatlantic security and defense educational institution.
    In addition to offering a robust resident program, the Center is
    working to expand its non-resident activities to provide increased,
    shorter-term focused events conducted in nations across the AOR. The
    Marshall Center alumni network includes approximately 5200 graduates
    from 89 nations who are linked through the Regional International
    Outreach Web site. This network preserves partnership capacities for
    the future with minimal additional investment. Since its inception, 92
    graduates have been promoted to general officer or serve in civilian
    equivalent or senior positions.
        The ACSS counters ideological support for terrorism, fosters
    regional cooperation on security issues, promotes democracy and good
    governance, and assists nations in improving their security. However,
    as the ACSS is located in the U.S, its effectiveness would be enhanced
    by a permanent presence in the region it is designed to influence. A
    significant increase in the effectiveness of the ACSS was achieved in
    the Fall of 2006 when a small regional office was established in Addis
    Ababa, Ethiopia. This office will serve to demonstrate our purpose and
    give Africans a sense of ownership. Additionally, committing personnel
    and resources in these regions enhances relationships with African
    leaders, the AU, and sub-regional organizations by providing a
    continuous, efficient, low-cost presence on the African continent.
        EUCOM's Maritime Domain Awareness initiatives are designed to
    assist partner nations in their efforts to address numerous maritime
    challenges. The West Indian Ocean and Gulf of Guinea regions of Africa
    demonstrate complex maritime challenges such as illicit and criminal
    activity, piracy, environmental and fisheries violations, resource
    theft, and trafficking.
        The nations of the West Indian Ocean region of Africa, with over
    4,750 miles of coastline, have only 25 boats to provide maritime
    security. The region possesses virtually no capability to interdict
    fishery theft, piracy, narco-trafficking, or any other illicit activity
    in the maritime domain. Like the Western Indian Ocean region, the Gulf
    of Guinea region lacks significant naval forces, coastal security
    forces or security structures to provide any meaningful or realistic
    deterrent to the lawlessness that is currently the status quo. These
    threats are particularly relevant to U.S. national strategic interests
    given the Gulf of Guinea's energy potential.
        EUCOM is committed to building strategic partnerships in order to
    expand our warfighting capabilities. Through funding activities such as
    the Coalition Warfare Program, we expect to extend our relationships
    with existing allies, and develop new relationships with countries
    eager to become members of the transatlantic alliance.
        In short, though each region's issues are unique, their needs for
    comprehensive maritime security and domain awareness solutions are the
    same. Through these maritime security initiatives, EUCOM is assisting
    partners to build the naval capacity to effectively combat and counter
    these threats.
    Strategic Theater Transformation
        EUCOM is also applying our Active Security strategy towards our
    ongoing transformation. This strategy relies on a mix of forward-based
    and deployed U.S. presence to provide security and stability with
    governments and countries located in the AOR. Our forward-based and
    rotational forces are powerful and visible instruments of national
    influence. Central to EUCOM's efforts is the continuation of our
    Strategic Theater Transformation (STT) plan. This involves a basing
    strategy that seeks to sustain and leverage commitments to our long-
    standing allies and U.S. operations in other theaters, such as
    Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and OIF.
        EUCOM's STT plan, in execution since 2002, ensures that operational
    forces and prepositioned logistics are correctly postured to meet
    current and potential challenges. We have consolidated forces from
    broadly dispersed locations to Main Operating Bases and Forward
    Operating Sites in the United Kingdom (U.K.), Germany, Italy, Spain,
    Turkey, Greece, Belgium, The Netherlands, Bulgaria, and Romania.
    Currently approved EUCOM plans include retaining two permanently
    stationed brigade combat teams in Germany and Italy respectively along
    with eight fighter aircraft squadrons in the U.K., Germany, and Italy.
    Despite recent political turmoil within Italy, we expect the government
    will continue to abide by its agreement with the U.S. and avoid any
    unnecessary delay in approving infrastructure projects. We will
    continue to monitor the situation closely. EUCOM has requested
    rotational forces in Romania and Bulgaria for Joint Task Force-East
    (JTF-E) using the Global Force Management Process (GFMP).
        The EUCOM AOR has experienced numerous changes in the security
    dynamic. Over the past 4 years since decisions to adjust U.S. Force
    Posture in Europe were made, the Defense Department has embraced
    Theater SC and issued a strategy to guide our operations. The global
    war on terror is now guided by established and approved regional plans.
    NATO is no longer a static defensive alliance, but has commenced a
    transformation in its approach to new and emerging threats that has
    resulted in operations at strategic distance and a serious effort to
    transform its nations' military forces. Our current operations in Iraq
    and Afghanistan have also altered the calculus in EUCOM's ability to
    source forces to address our theater's operational requirements.
    Finally, the decision to establish a combatant command in Africa will
    ensure that our current robust engagement on that continent, especially
    OEF-TS, achieves tangible results.
        These dynamics, individually or in combination, compel us to review
    the previous assumptions and document changes in the security and geo-
    political environment to ensure our planned posture fully supports the
    tasks and missions we have been given--to include assessments on
    effectiveness and efficiency.
        In addition to our conventional forces, SOFs help enable EUCOM to
    develop and maintain trust and long-term relationships with partner
    nations as we help build their capabilities and capacities. Rotational
    SOF reinforces our ability to meet operational requirements and conduct
    large-scale exercises involving multiple partners.
        EUCOM Transformation is not only happening in Europe, but in Africa
    as well. EUCOM has identified 13 Cooperative Security Locations (CSL),
    four of which have recently been utilized in support of OEF-TS. These
    CSL's secure our ability to respond to actual or potential future
    instability. CSL sites such as Libreville, Gabon, are located in
    nations where traditional examples of bilateral cooperation exist.
    Sites have also been established through fueling contracts in places
    where EUCOM is seeking increased engagement. CSLs in Africa represent
    minimal investment in infrastructure/operating cost, but provide access
    and broad freedom of action in times of crisis.
        With STT, contributions of the Reserve component (RC) are
    increasingly important in maintaining EUCOM's operational capability.
    On any given day, 4,500 members of the RC, which includes 10 percent of
    the uniformed personnel on the EUCOM staff as well as over 50 percent
    of the community law enforcement for U.S. Army theater-wide
    installations are deployed across the theater.
        EUCOM's STT has been closely synchronized with the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, Services, and NATO to
    ensure that global efforts of other combatant commands, NATO, and the
    results of the Base Closure and Realignment Commission process in the
    United States are mutually supportive. We have closed 43 bases and
    installations and returned approximately 10,000 servicemembers and
    13,800 family members to the U.S. Subject to developments in the geo-
    political environment, by 2012, current plans anticipate the closure of
    several hundred bases and installations, and the return of over 44,000
    military personnel and over 57,000 family members, and the downsizing
    of 14,500 DOD civilians and host nation employee positions.
        Strategically, relocating our forces at the Joint Multinational
    Training Center (JMTC) and at CSL's within our AOR, and establishing
    JTF-East in Eastern Europe, better positions EUCOM forces to conduct SC
    activities and operations with our allies and partners.
    Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
        As highlighted in the strategic environment, an increasingly
    important aspect of EUCOM's Strategy of Active Security is to defend
    against threats posed by emerging ballistic missile capabilities in
    Southwest Asia. EUCOM is working with the Joint Staff, U.S. Strategic
    Command, and the Missile Defense Agency to help field capabilities,
    consisting of a mix of interceptors, sensors, and command and control
    that will counter this threat. The right combination of these systems
    is vital to protecting U.S. interests and sending a strong signal to
    our partners and allies as well as potential adversaries.
        EUCOM is planning to assist in the deployment of long-range Ground-
    Based Interceptors and supporting radars to Europe to enhance the
    defense of the U.S. homeland, U.S. forces stationed in Europe,
    partners, and allies from Intercontinental and intermediate range
    ballistic missiles. While the acquisition and planned/projected
    deployment of these systems to the Czech Republic and Poland will be
    funded through the Missile Defense Agency, the infrastructure
    requirements to support personnel and other site requirements remain
    undetermined. Once resolved, future military construction requirements
    will need to be programmed within the Department of Defense and
    submitted to Congress for its consideration. Additionally, we are
    planning for the potential deployment of AEGIS ballistic missile
    defense capable ships, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense Fire Units,
    and other systems to provide expanded coverage and improved levels of
    protection against Medium and Intermediate range threats. Finally, the
    planned upgrade of PATRIOT forces from PAC-2 to PAC-3 will improve
    EUCOM's ability to defend against short-range ballistic missiles
    significantly.
    Component Command Activities
        U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR)
        For the past several years, USAREUR has aggressively pursued two
    initiatives to strengthen the combatant commander's ability to execute
    the global war on terror and interoperability between the U.S. and our
    allies and partners. First, EUCOM is restructuring the Army posture
    further south and east in Europe to ensure strategic access to
    geopolitically unstable areas and protect lines of communication
    critical to sustaining operations on the front lines of the global war
    on terror. Second, we are promoting the transformation of European
    ground forces into effective expeditionary partners through military-
    to-military engagement activities, exercises, and exchanges.
    Substantial progress has been made in both areas despite heavy
    commitments to ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
        USAREUR remains heavily engaged supporting the global war on
    terror. During the past year, more than two-thirds of the soldiers
    assigned to USAREUR were either preparing to deploy, were deployed, or
    had recently returned from a deployment. V Corps, the warfighting
    headquarters of USAREUR, deployed to OIF as the Multinational Corps-
    Iraq Headquarters. The Southern European Task Force (SETAF) served as
    joint task force headquarters, along with the 173d Airborne Brigade
    Combat Team (ABCT) in Afghanistan from March 2005 to February 2006, and
    returns to Afghanistan in June 2007.
        Since 2005, USAREUR has integrated an infantry company into a
    Romanian Infantry Battalion in Afghanistan. USAREUR soldiers have
    conducted two 6-month deployments to the Republic of Georgia to train
    three Georgian Infantry Battalions in support of OIF.
        In line with the transformation of EUCOM's strategic posture, we
    are consolidating the 173rd ABCT at Vicenza, Italy. Additionally,
    USAREUR is establishing FOSs in Romania and Bulgaria to accommodate the
    rotational presence of a brigade-size unit. The JTF-East headquarters
    will represent USAREUR and U.S. Air Forces, Europe (USAFE) in Eastern
    Europe and provide the command, control and support for rotational
    forces. SETAF will man the headquarters for the ``proof of principle''
    phase of JTF-East in the summer of 2007. The First of the Ninety-fourth
    Field Artillery (1-94 FA) (MLRS) will serve as the training unit for
    that rotation. Subsequent rotational forces will be scheduled through
    the Department of Defense's GFMP. From these FOSs, U.S. rotational
    forces will conduct SC activities and training exercises with our NATO
    allies and partner nations in both bilateral and multinational training
    exercises. When this rebasing process is complete, two-thirds of
    USAREUR's maneuver forces will be positioned in southern and eastern
    Europe, closer to areas of instability in the Caucasus, the Balkans and
    Africa.
        As USAREUR's transformation continues, the end-state will be a
    smaller, strategically mobile force postured to meet the needs of EUCOM
    and other geographic combatant commanders through the GFMP. Future
    transformation efforts include combining USAREUR and V Corps
    Headquarters into a single headquarters--7th Army. In addition to the
    main 7th Army Headquarters, the objective command and control structure
    includes two rapidly deployable JTF capable headquarters. Combat
    capability will be provided by two permanently assigned combat
    brigades, the 2d SCR in Vilseck, Germany, and the 173d ABCT in Vicenza,
    Italy. These two brigades, along with a combat aviation brigade, an
    engineer brigade, a military police brigade, a sustainment brigade, an
    air defense artillery battalion, and a rocket artillery battalion
    comprise the in-theater Army forces that are available for the GFMP.
        Along with the arrival of the 2d SCR in Vilseck, Efficient Basing
    Grafenwoehr (EB-G) project consolidates a majority of the remaining
    permanently stationed Army forces in Germany and co-locates them with
    the Army's best training facilities in Europe. Completion of EB-G
    infrastructure investments will allow for the repositioning of 3,500
    soldiers and begins the closure of non-enduring installations.
        The Government of Italy (GOI) appears committed and approves the
    U.S. plans to base the 173rd Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Joint Task Force
    at Vicenza, Italy. The explicit technical approvals should be signed by
    the GOI in the near future. Plans are in place for the consolidation of
    the six battalions of the 173d ABCT from their current positions in
    Vicenza, Italy, Bamburg and Schweinfurt, Germany, into new facilities
    at Vicenza once all required MILCON has been completed by fiscal year
    2011. This consolidation better positions U.S. forces for SC in regions
    to the south and east of Western Europe. The 173d ABCT expanded into a
    full modular Airborne Brigade Combat Team in 2006. This conversion
    doubled the size of the brigade creating a greater capability for rapid
    deployment and forced entry operations and enhances the brigade's
    ability to sustain itself during joint and coalition operations.
        Additionally, our land forces transformation efforts include
    returning Army personnel, family members, and units from Europe to the
    United States. One brigade of the First Infantry Division headquarters
    returned to the U.S. in 2006. A First Armored Division Brigade and the
    Third Corps Support Command will return to the U.S. in 2007. The
    headquarters and remaining units of First Armored Division will return
    to the U.S. when preparations for receiving installations are complete.
        A key initiative for USAREUR is assisting European ground forces in
    their efforts to break from the Cold War model and become more
    expeditionary. USAREUR is playing a leading role in their
    transformation through a wide variety of SC programs, mission rehearsal
    development assistance, OIF deployment assistance, noncommissioned
    officer development, senior leader interaction, unit partnerships, and
    intelligence sharing. The conversion of USAREUR's training center in
    Germany into the Joint Multinational Training Command (JMTC) has
    greatly contributed to the acceleration of European ground force
    transformation. The JMTC exports high quality collective training, such
    as International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission rehearsal
    training to prepare NATO staffs to direct and conduct combat operations
    in support of OEF. The NATO Observer Mentor Liaison Training mission
    trained teams from Germany, The Netherlands, France, Italy, Norway,
    Sweden, Croatia, Slovenia, and Afghanistan to enable them to operate
    and survive in a counterinsurgency environment. This training and
    logistics support has been indispensable to allies and partners which
    have deployed units to Iraq and Afghanistan.
    U.S. Naval Forces, Europe (NAVEUR)
        In 2006 NAVEUR moved forward rapidly in executing the vision to
    develop partner nation maritime capability and capacity in areas south
    of the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea to the east and will
    accelerate that trend in 2007.
        Africa continues as an area of increased Naval emphasis. Last year
    our naval presence in Africa was nearly continuous in contrast to 2004,
    a presence limited to some 20 days. The 2006 engagements include the
    deployment of the U.S.S. Emory S. Land, which provided training to
    eight Gulf of Guinea countries, consisting of over 750 African military
    personnel in a variety of subjects, such as: small boat maintenance,
    leadership, and C2 organization. Coupled with Mobile Training Teams,
    these deployments are representative of our future cooperation with
    these nations. Additionally in August 2006, U.S.N.S. Apache conducted
    harbor survey operations in the Port of Monrovia, Liberia, to
    significantly increase the port's capacity to support commercial
    maritime trade. In the summer of 2007, NAVEUR will serve as a test bed
    for the Global Fleet Station concept with the long-term deployment of
    an amphibious ship to the Gulf of Guinea to provide the U.S. an
    opportunity to build upon previously established relationships.
        NAVEUR has made significant progress in the military-to-military
    cooperation with Gulf of Guinea countries. Working with the U.S.
    Department of State, EUCOM, and the ACSS, NAVEUR led a ministerial
    level conference on Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea
    that was attended by representatives from each of the 11 Gulf of Guinea
    nations. The resulting communique provided a framework for future
    regional initiatives with commitments from these countries at the
    ministerial level. The overall goal of these efforts is to develop the
    capacity of Gulf of Guinea nations to provide regional maritime safety
    and security solutions.
        Much of NAVEUR's focus is centered on activities designed to
    positively demonstrate our commitment to maritime safety and security
    by educating and exposing partners to issues and potential solutions.
    These missions require non-traditional skill sets of U.S. Navy
    professionals. Language and cultural training for Navy personnel will
    remain priorities in preparing them for service in the strategically
    important areas of Africa and the Black Sea.
        Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is a key building block of maritime
    safety and security. Critical to the success of MDA is the information
    sharing among participating nations on the detection and identification
    of possible maritime threats at sea. The Automatic Identification
    System (AIS) is the first step to achieving MDA and will provide a
    critical foundation to the U.S. Navy's ``Global Maritime Partnership.''
    AIS shares data similar to the International Civilian Aeronautical
    Organization system used by civilian and military aircraft throughout
    the world. NAVEUR's goal is to bring this system to all maritime
    nations in the EUCOM AOR. Improving MDA and Maritime Interdiction
    capability will result in improved maritime safety.
        In addition to engagement activities, NAVEUR conducts traditional
    naval operations. This was demonstrated in August 2006 when a
    substantial portion of the NAVEUR staff embarked on the Sixth Fleet
    flagship, U.S.S. Mount Whitney, to form the core of EUCOM's Joint Task
    Force-Lebanon (JTF-L). JTF-L took over from U.S. Naval Forces, CENTCOM
    Task Force 59, with the mission of supporting the U.S. Ambassador in
    Beirut during the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict in southern Lebanon. As
    the noncombatant evacuation operation drew to a close, JTF-L provided
    U.S. Embassy Beirut with security, logistical support, and contingency
    evacuation capability, ensuring the U.S. Embassy could continue
    operating throughout the crisis.
        Like its fellow components, NAVEUR is maintaining its ability to
    execute its missions while continuing force transformation. NAVEUR has
    reduced its end strength from 14,000 in 2004 to nearly 8,000 today. The
    departure of the U.S.S. Emory S. Land this October and the pending
    closure of NSA La Maddalena continue NAVEUR's transformation.
    U.S. Air Forces, Europe (USAFE)
        Over the last year, USAFE continued comprehensive transformation
    efforts: restructuring and streamlining its major command headquarters;
    enhancing and improving its warfighting headquarters support of EUCOM;
    working on joint transformation initiatives, while continuing to
    conduct current operations and support the global war on terror. USAFE
    also continued to foster Theater SC relationships in key geographical
    areas.
        In 2006, over 4,500 USAFE airmen deployed in support of OIF and
    OEF. USAFE's number one priority continues to be providing
    expeditionary-ready airmen. In addition to providing forces, USAFE
    infrastructure plays a major role in supporting global war on terror
    operations in the EUCOM AOR as well as in support of CENTCOM. For the
    majority of aircraft entering and exiting CENTCOM's AOR, USAFE
    installations serve as the primary en-route support for combat
    aircraft, as well as the mobility aircraft that sustain our ongoing
    operations. Ramstein Air Base, and specifically the 435th Contingency
    Aeromedical Staging Facility, processed over 61,000 patients since
    March 2003, supporting our servicemembers hospitalized at Landstuhl
    Regional Medical Center as well as those returned to the U.S.
        USAFE supported JTF-Lebanon by deploying personnel to man the JTF
    Headquarters and provided medical support with initial primary care
    capability, a level II resuscitative surgery team, and aerial port
    operation, to include air terminal operations center, joint inspection,
    load team, in-transit visibility and equipment maintenance, and was
    prepared to provide KC-135 aerial refueling and C-130 transport
    aircraft. In November 2006, 3rd Air Force and its associated Air
    Operations Center effectively deployed personnel, equipment and
    aircraft to the Baltics to support NATO's Summit in Riga, Latvia.
    Augmenting and enhancing NATO's air policing function in the Baltics
    again demonstrated USAFE's ability to rapidly adapt to multinational
    airspace command and control.
        USAFE, together with USAREUR, is providing warfighter integrated
    constructive simulations with virtual and live fire instrumented
    ranges. This provides theater forces and NATO allies training
    opportunities in both joint and combined operations at the operational
    and tactical level. By linking warfighters in live, virtual or
    constructive scenarios, the Warrior Preparation Center and Joint and
    Multinational Training Center is able to link warfighters from across
    Europe and around the world to each other in conducting exercises and
    training initiatives.
        Consistent with EUCOM's shifting focus to the south and east, USAFE
    has joined with USAREUR in leading the way toward establishment of JTF-
    E in Romania and Bulgaria. Leveraging 2002 OIF investments to
    infrastructure in Romania, USAFE will provide a small number of forward
    stationed personnel to support Air Force, joint and combined air and
    ground operations as well as to stage bilateral and multilateral
    engagement exercises.
        USAFE's leadership in SC and the Joint Exercise Program support
    EUCOM's Strategy of Active Security. In 2006, USAFE participated in 438
    SC events in 61 countries, including 24 Joint Staff-sponsored
    exercises. A key example of USAFE's SC engagement was Exercise Medflag
    06, supporting Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) and
    the Gulf of Guinea region. This USAFE-led joint and combined exercise,
    with strong Reserve component participation, provided medical outreach
    and humanitarian assistance to approximately 14,000 patients in Ghana,
    Nigeria, Benin, and Senegal. Bilateral medical and civil assistance
    training was also conducted with 355 host nation and ECOWAS staff
    personnel.
        SC also extends to the operational arena. In order to further
    interdependence and extend the capacity of limited U.S. Intelligence,
    Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets, USAFE has taken a two-
    pronged approach to SC. First, it has almost doubled its traditional
    intelligence exchanges and added new contacts with our partner nations.
    Second, because USAFE currently operates a limited number of airborne
    ISR assets in this theater, it has aggressively pursued working with
    partner nations who have or are developing airborne ISR capabilities.
    ISR collection shortfalls can be partially mitigated by building
    relationships and working with these nations to standardize tactics,
    techniques, and procedures while simultaneously pursuing methods to
    integrate ISR architectures and leverage coalition assets to satisfy
    mutual requirements.
        As part of NATO assistance to the AU in Darfur, USAFE conducted
    airlift for African nations participating in peacekeeping operations.
    In February and April, 2006, USAFE supported the Botswanan Defense
    Force (BDF) with operational airlift mission planning, maintenance
    contingencies, airfield site surveys, and logistics efficiencies. These
    efforts directly supported successful joint BDF and USAFE airlift
    missions to Darfur in September 2006.
        USAFE has added depth to its engagement with the Russian Federation
    Air Force. Starting with a visit to Moscow and their main fighter
    training base, USAFE is developing that high-level relationship that
    will lead to more cooperation along with improved transparency and
    trust.
        USAFE's comprehensive transformation program, critical
    infrastructure, development, wide-ranging SC initiatives, coupled with
    a focus on the joint and combined prosecution of the global war on
    terror, continue to make lasting contributions to EUCOM's efforts
    throughout the AOR. USAFE will continue to be a leader of air, space,
    and cyberspace for EUCOM, its allies, and partners.
    U.S. Marine Forces, Europe (MARFOREUR)
        With a small headquarters of approximately 100 personnel, but no
    permanently assigned forces, MARFOREUR integrates its active duty and
    civilian staff with Reserve marines to augment its headquarters
    activities. MARFOREUR supports EUCOM's theater initiatives in OEF-TS;
    participates in numerous SC activities; assists with troops and
    equipment transiting the theater; facilitates strategic pre-positioning
    programs; supports the Regional Medical Center in Landstuhl, Germany;
    and serves as EUCOM's Executive Agent for non-lethal weapons.
        Supporting EUCOM's efforts in OEF-TS, MARFOREUR has been
    instrumental in helping to build the operational-level capacity of the
    militaries in the countries of Chad, Niger, Mali, Senegal, Algeria and
    Morocco. MARFOREUR instituted an intelligence capacity building program
    to close the gap between unit-level intelligence training provided by
    SOF, and the headquarters-level expertise needed to employ those
    tactical forces. MARFOREUR is also providing tactical level support to
    this year's Exercise Flintlock, the premier SOF training exercise in
    OEF-TS.
        MARFOREUR's SC activities provide maximum impact with minimal
    forces. In Africa, efforts are focused upon stability and capacity
    building in key countries through the Department of State's ACOTA
    program where MARFOREUR is one of the largest military contributors.
    MARFOREUR is an important participant in EUCOM's military-to-military
    programs, focusing its efforts in the OEF-TS countries, West Africa,
    the Gulf of Guinea states, and in the Black Sea/Caucasus region. In
    fiscal year 2007, MARFOREUR is expanding its involvement in Africa, and
    plans to conduct two to three events per month over the course of the
    year. MARFOREUR will also provide support to the Humanitarian Mine
    Action program and the International Military Assistance Training Team
    in Sierra Leone.
        Conducting exercises involving units up to the battalion/squadron-
    sized level, MARFOREUR supports EUCOM's Joint Exercise Program which
    relies largely on the Marine Corps Reserve. This exercise program
    offers U.S.-based reservists unique annual training opportunities,
    while offsetting the impact of limited Active-Duty Force availability.
    Major exercises conducted by Marine forces include Exercise Shared
    Accord in Senegal, Exercise African Lion in Morocco, and Exercise Sea
    Breeze in Ukraine. Additionally, MARFOREUR was the most active
    component in Exercise African Endeavor, which conducted
    interoperability and capacity building training in the area of
    communications.
        MARFOREUR also facilitates Marine operations in support of OEF and
    OIF. The majority of deploying Marines and Marine equipment and
    supplies pass through Europe--via both air and maritime means--and is
    expedited by the MARFOREUR headquarters staff. In fiscal year 2006,
    some 91,000 marines and 4,000 tons of equipment and supplies flowed
    through the EUCOM AOR. MARFOREUR has also assisted with the deployment
    of our coalition partners to Iraq in support of U.S. efforts in OIF,
    having last year moved 1,150 troops and 40 tons of equipment and
    supplies from Republic of Georgia to Iraq. The two strategic
    prepositioning programs managed by MARFOREUR are largely committed to
    OIF and OEF. Of note, MARFOREUR has facilitated the current deployment
    of about 65 percent of the equipment from the Marine Corps Geo-
    Prepositioning Program-Norway (MCPP-N) to the CENTCOM AOR. MARFOREUR
    also helped deploy equipment from the caves of Norway in support of
    JTF-Lebanon.
        The first faces that our wounded Marines see after being evacuated
    out of Iraq and Afghanistan are the MARFOREUR Hospital Liaison Team at
    Landstuhl Regional Medical Center. This extraordinary team facilitates
    the in-theater visits of family members with their wounded marines.
    Since January 2003, approximately 930 marines have been treated at
    Landstuhl.
        As EUCOM's executive agent for nonlethal weapons, our forces enjoy
    a wider range of flexible response options. Nonlethal weapons provide
    another tool to help foster cooperative relationships with countries in
    the AOR. We will continue to expand our nonlethal weapons program
    through Mobile Training Teams, Professional Military Education, and the
    introduction of new and improved technologies.
    U.S. Special Operations Command, Europe (SOCEUR)
        Throughout 2006, SOCEUR remained focused on the global war on
    terror. By executing a series of synchronized humanitarian, train and
    equip, and information operations under OEF-TS, the command enhanced
    the security capabilities of partners in the Trans-Sahara region of
    Africa and thereby enabled them to better enforce their sovereignty
    across ungoverned border regions. SOCEUR deployed an assessment and
    advisory team to Chad in response to a crisis in April 2006. SOCEUR
    performed a key role in the interagency effort to ensure security of
    American citizens during the Winter Olympics in Turin, Italy.
    Additionally, SOCEUR components and staff continue to deploy in support
    of Operations OEF, OIF, and the International Security Assistance Force
    (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Finally, SOCEUR has a commitment to the NATO
    Response Force and will soon lead the transformation of NATO's SOF
    capability.
        SOCEUR's main effort in 2006, and for 2007, is support of the
    Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership through EUCOM's OEF-TS.
    SOCEUR completed its Phase I assessments and analysis and established a
    Joint Special Operations Task Force-Trans-Sahara (JSOTF-TS) that will
    command and control all U.S. and assisting outside partner nation
    military elements participating in OEF-TS. In addition, liaison
    elements in U.S. embassies and Joint Planning and Advisory Teams linked
    to host nation counterterrorism units have been very successful at
    facilitating coordination, solidifying partner nation relationships,
    and ensuring continuity of effort. The austere geographic conditions
    and challenging political nature of working in Africa make the
    environment ideal for specialized SOF. U.S. Army Special Forces and
    Navy SEALs are continuously engaged in the role of training, advising,
    and assisting host nation forces to build capacity and to patrol and
    control vast desert regions. Marine Special Operations Command Foreign
    Military Training Units are adding to security capabilities in the
    theater and the Air Force Special Operations Command is increasing the
    number of Aviation Advisor forces to assist partner Air Forces. SOCEUR
    also deployed Military Information Support Teams to several African
    countries in support of U.S. public diplomacy efforts and conducted
    various Humanitarian Assistance and Civic Action projects targeted at
    reducing the underlying conditions that contribute to violent
    extremism.
        In 2006, SOCEUR conducted a major European counterterrorism
    exercise in the Baltic States to improve multi-national
    interoperability with these new NATO members, further improving
    SOCEUR's contingency response capabilities. In 2007, SOCEUR plans to
    deploy almost 1,000 personnel to Africa for Exercise FLINTLOCK to work
    with our African partners on eliminating terrorist sanctuaries within
    their borders. With major operations ongoing in U.S. CENTCOM's AOR,
    SOCEUR has focused its SC efforts on coalition SOF development. In
    fiscal year 2006, SOCEUR executed 19 Joint Combined Exchange Training
    (JCET) events in 11 different countries, building the capability of
    U.S. and partner nations' Special Forces. The JCETs as well as other
    bilateral and multi-lateral engagement events, targeted primarily OEF-
    TS nations, with secondary emphasis on Caucasus and Baltic regional
    partner development and traditional NATO cooperation. In fiscal year
    2007, SOCEUR plans to conduct 47 events with 21 countries across the
    EUCOM AOR.
        SOCEUR continues to promote theater transformation, in particular
    the transformation of NATO SOF. Recently, SOCEUR's role was expanded to
    become the chief proponent for efforts to establish a NATO SOF
    Coordination Center and NATO Federation of SOF Training Centers, both
    intended to develop, organize, and train interoperable SOF across the
    Alliance.
        As SOCEUR recognizes that many of its successes to date have
    resulted from the trust earned from partner nations through focused,
    consistent engagement, we are working closely with U.S. Special
    Operations Command to plan the transition from forward-stationed SOF to
    the new rotational Joint Special Operations Groups under the Global SOF
    Posture. This planning will ensure that rotational SOF are ready to
    support our need for persistent presence in priority countries,
    operational flexibility to respond to emerging crises, and supporting
    our NATO SOF transformation initiatives.
    Theater Investment Needs
        Theater Infrastructure
        EUCOM's ability to transform and achieve U.S. national security
    objectives depends in large measure on the investment provided for
    military construction. This investment will also enable the U.S. to
    continue the recapitalization of our Main Operating Bases (MOBs), as
    well as establish new and, by design, relatively austere FOSs in
    Eastern Europe. We are not investing MILCON resources in non-enduring
    installations.
        To continue EUCOM's effort to transform the theater in concert with
    the Department's Global Defense Posture, the fiscal year 2008
    President's budget requests a total of $645.6 million in military
    construction (MILCON) funds for EUCOM (Enclosure 5). This investment
    will enable us to continue the recapitalization of our enduring MOBs,
    as well as establishing new, austere FOSs along the Black Sea. It also
    includes projects that will pay dividends as we divest non-enduring
    bases and consolidate our forces into more efficient communities.
        STT and Operational Programs
        The fiscal year 2008 MILCON request includes $400.1 million for
    five significant STT and operational programs:

             $173 million for completion of Army infrastructure at
            MOB Vicenza, Italy, and continued consolidation of the 173rd
            Airborne Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), the only split-based
            brigade in the Army;
             $73.6 million for completion of expeditionary Army
            infrastructure at FOS Mikhail Kogalniceanu (MK) Air Base,
            Romania and to establish a FOS in Bulgaria in support of Joint
            Task Force-East, (formerly called Eastern European Task Force
            (EETAF));
             $62 million for completion of Army operational
            facilities at MOB Grafenwoehr and to complete the Efficient
            Basing-Grafenwoehr (EB-G) program;
             $50.5 million for five USAFE operational projects at
            MOB Ramstein, Germany and MOB Lakenheath, U.K.;
             $41.0 million for National Security Agency (NSA)
            infrastructure improvements at MOB Menwith Hill, U.K.

        EUCOM Quality of Life (QoL) construction investments affirm our
    commitment to our servicemembers and families. Our request for Family
    Housing renovation and replacement projects and unaccompanied service
    member facilities will ensure our forces are afforded quality housing
    and barracks. Investment in medical facilities ensures our
    servicemembers and their families receive first-rate medical care. In
    addition, continued investment in our Department of Defense Education
    Activity (DODEA) schools provides high quality education facilities for
    tomorrow's leaders.
        Quality of Life
        We are requesting the following QoL projects in the fiscal year
    2008 MILCON request:

             $166.8 million for family housing renovation and
            replacement:
             $52.0 million in MILCON funds to construct 138
            replacement housing units at MOB Ansbach, Germany;
             $114.8 million for new construction and renovation of
            688 housing units to meet the family housing requirements at
            MOB Ramstein, Germany; FOS Incirlik, Turkey; and FOS Croughton,
            U.K.
             $14.9 million for unaccompanied dormitory at MOB
            Ramstein, Germany;
             $1.8 million as the U.S. cost-share for construction
            of a dormitory at Albacete, Spain;
             $30.1 million to construct a replacement medical/
            dental clinic at MOB Spangdahlem, Germany;
             $6.0 million for construction of a gymnasium and
            classrooms at Brussels, Belgium;
             $5.4 million for construction of a gymnasium and
            expansion of a multi-purpose room at MOB Ramstein, Germany;
             $20.5 million for expansion and renovation of
            classrooms at MOB Wiesbaden, Germany.

        Family Housing in the EUCOM AOR will meet Defense Planning Guidance
    Standards with an additional investment in fiscal year 2009. NAVEUR and
    USAREUR continue to improve their housing inventory through the Build-
    to-Lease (BTL) program. USAREUR is in the progress of constructing over
    1,600 BTL houses in the Grafenwoehr area and is planning to construct
    over 215 in Vicenza. All Service components continue to explore
    additional BTL housing opportunities throughout Europe to meet our
    housing requirements.
        EUCOM continues to aggressively pursue the common funding of
    operational facilities for U.S. forces that support approved NATO plans
    through the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP). NSIP has a long
    history of supporting NATO infrastructure in Europe. In the future it
    will be key to leverage the necessary resources to strategically
    transform NATO from a static posture to one that is flexible and
    expeditionary, able to meet emerging security threats thousands of
    miles from Europe.
    Quality of Life (QOL) Programs
        Taking care of our most precious resource, our people, is
    fundamental to the character of the American Armed Forces and a key
    combat multiplier that positively affects our warfighting
    effectiveness. The global war on terror has called for significant
    sacrifices on the part of our servicemembers and places a tremendous
    burden on their families. As we transform our defense posture in
    Europe, our military communities must continue to be able to provide
    predictability and capacity to meet the needs of our soldiers, sailors,
    airmen, marines, civilians, and their families.
        While there are many facets to QOL, few are more important to our
    servicemembers, and their continued service to our Nation, than those
    affecting their families. EUCOM's QOL focus continues to identify and
    improve critical family issues. One identified area of need involves
    providing needed child, youth, and teen services. To that extent, we
    are requesting $3.2 million in ``direct,'' non-construction
    supplemental funding to support the higher costs of doing business in a
    high deployment, transforming environment with few off-base options and
    unique joint service challenges. Off-base child care subsidies at
    remote sites and joint youth/teen summer camps to support at-risk youth
    would benefit from these funds. We are committed to executing MILCON
    requirements by identifying joint support options and construction of
    purpose-built facilities at enduring locations for school age, youth
    and teen programs which promote easy access to services and support
    healthy lifestyles and fitness.
        Family member access to both health and dental care is challenging
    as military facilities must ensure a ready military force. Family
    members must often use services in a local community characterized by a
    different culture, language and medical practice standards.
    Additionally, family members are required to navigate complex insurance
    claim systems which can involve costly upfront payments. These unique
    circumstances overseas dictate reliance on U.S. medical care
    professionals and liaisons to assist in accessing care in an often
    cumbersome system. Our ability to strengthen programs and deploy
    beneficiary awareness campaigns will lead to a healthier community.
        The EUCOM operational tempo has increased counseling service needs
    and thus created shortfalls across disciplines for servicemembers,
    spouses and children. Supplementing overseas counseling through off-
    base providers is extremely challenging due to language differences,
    standards of care and the inability to access the OSD sponsored
    Military One Source counseling referral program. We look forward to the
    DOD Mental Health Task Force team visit to the EUCOM theater to assist
    in determining our counseling shortfalls or needed improvements. We
    will continue to provide any service men and women, their families, and
    our support personnel the right services.
        Overseas spouse education and career opportunities remain a
    concern. As employment opportunities are limited and not expected to
    grow, EUCOM and the Department of Defense have partnered in the past
    year to broaden the focus on improving both programs and resources. As
    a result, the Spouses to Teachers program has expanded to include
    European Theater spouses. While that is a step in the right direction,
    there is much more that can be done. Family readiness, and ultimately
    force readiness, can be best served by improving tuition assistance and
    targeted scholarship options for OCONUS spouses.
        The quality of the Department's dependent education programs is a
    major contributor to the quality of life of EUCOM servicemembers. The
    2006 TeraNova standardized test results show DODEA students scored 10
    to 26 points above the national average in all subject areas at all
    grade levels tested (3rd through 11th grades). We are very proud that
    this system is recognized as a benchmark for other public school
    systems and we need your continued support and funding to ensure high
    educational standards are maintained.
        Education is not only important to our students, but also to our
    national interests and our NATO partners. We are most grateful for
    Congress' help to provide educational support for school-aged family
    members of foreign military personnel assigned to Supreme Headquarters
    Allied Powers Europe, in Mons, Belgium, which demonstrates your
    commitment to furthering our joint nation partnership. An international
    education begins the process of bridging diverse cultures and creating
    a joint mission-focused team.
    Theater C2, Communications Systems, and ISR
        In much of the EUCOM AOR, terrorist groups and support networks
    exploit international lines of communication with limited interference
    from U.S. and allied security. Moreover, the threat of a potential
    surprise attack on U.S. and partner nations remains very real. To
    minimize an adversary's use of these lines of communication and the
    likelihood or impact of an attack, command and control (C2) and
    communications systems, as well as ISR assets, provide necessary
    preventative and responsive safeguards against such threats. A critical
    investment need relates to the dissemination, analysis, and sharing of
    information. It is imperative that our C2 and communication system
    requirements include information sharing, electromagnetic spectrum
    access, assured information networks, and a robust and reliable
    satellite communications (SATCOM) architecture to operate in today's
    environment.
        Our theater transformation plan places operational forces in
    regions not currently supported on a day-to-day basis by the DOD Global
    Information Grid (GIG). Establishing and sustaining a network and
    information sharing capacity with our allies and partners is a critical
    step to mitigate this problem. We need long-term investment in
    persistent ISR capability with assured electromagnetic spectrum access.
    Using up-to-date collection technologies to find, track, and interdict
    mobile and technologically competent terrorist groups and platforms
    operating within the vast regions of Africa, Europe, and Eurasia,
    including both air and maritime environments, is key to achieving
    information dominance with regard to ongoing and future contingencies.
        SATCOM is a critical enabler to both our information sharing
    initiatives and ISR capabilities. However, with aging military
    communications satellite constellations and the high and growing
    demands on limited satellite availability, all combatant commanders are
    burdened with greater risk in their areas of operation. We need to
    maintain funding for SATCOM programs that meet both near-term
    requirements and the longer term goals of Transformational
    Communications Architecture, maintaining the continuity of current and
    future services.
        Interoperability is crucial in the current operational environment
    because the likelihood of deploying unilaterally is low. EUCOM
    continues to execute the largest command, control, communications, and
    computer interoperability SC events in the world through Exercises
    Combined and African Endeavor. Both the U.S. and partner nations
    successfully used experiences/lessons learned from Exercise Combined
    Endeavor to integrate multinational command, control, and
    communications in Iraq, ISAF, and U.N. Humanitarian Relief missions.
    Likewise, Exercise African Endeavor participants successfully used
    skills developed to support OEF-TS C2 integration efforts. Long-term
    funding is essential to sustain the Endeavor series of exercises which
    enhance multinational interoperability and prepare partner nations for
    U.S.-coalition deployments with 71 of the 92 nations in our AOR.
    Specifically in Exercise African Endeavor, we are working with Africans
    to develop and plan collaborative communications links, as well as
    developing a leadership capable of organizing C2 planning, execution,
    and modernization. In coordination with the Joint Interoperability Test
    Command (JITC), we provide all Endeavor exercise participants a
    resource guide that identifies all known compatibility issues between
    their collective architectures and systems. Groundwork laid today
    through documentation of technical interoperability issues and exercise
    of C2 architectures will prove to be a key enabler to future success
    with multinational forces.
        We need to address the chronic shortage of information assurance
    personnel and the tools needed to defend networks that are critical to
    enabling theater command and control, both for warfighting and
    stability operations. All information professionals must be trained and
    certified to manage DOD networks securely. Information assurance tools
    must be procured in an enterprise-wide managed manner that operates
    across spectrum of conditions.
    Strategic Mobility and Maneuver
        Our ability to respond rapidly to crises depends greatly on
    strategic lift. The distance from central Europe to southern Africa is
    equivalent to that between Europe to California. This vast distance,
    combined with limited civilian rail, road, and air transportation
    infrastructure, constrains the full range of EUCOM engagement and
    contingency activities. Due to the expanse of the African continent and
    our desire to engage in Eastern Europe, we are expanding our enroute
    infrastructure system to respond to emerging contingencies in the
    underdeveloped regions of Africa and Eastern Europe.
        The requirement to deploy troops and cargo rapidly across Africa
    and Europe has increased dramatically. The size of the EUCOM AOR and
    our operational experience requires strategic reach for intra-theater
    operations. EUCOM's fleet of C-130s does not possess the range or
    capacity to support rapid movement of forces throughout our theater.
    Prepositioned Equipment
        Continued support of the Services' Prepositioned War Reserve
    Materiel (PWRM) programs demonstrates commitment through presence and
    provides a broad spectrum of traditional crisis response and irregular
    warfare options globally. As EUCOM and the Services transform and
    transition to a more expeditionary posture, there is a heightened need
    for PWRM equipment sets in strategically flexible locations.
        All four Services maintain PWRM in EUCOM's AOR, either on land or
    afloat. Attesting to the value of this program, and as validation of
    its continuing requirement in the EUCOM AOR, much of these stocks have
    been drawn down to support OEF and OIF and will not be reset prior to
    the end of combat operations. Over two-thirds of the Marine Corps
    Prepositioning Program-Norway (MCPP-N) and the Maritime Prepositioned
    Force (MPF) programs have directly supported OIF and OEF with weapon
    systems, ammunition, and equipment. Additionally, the Department of the
    Army's Heavy Brigade Combat Team prepositioned set at Camp Darby near
    Livorno, Italy, has also been used to support OIF and OEF.
    Reconstitution and reconfiguration of these programs are essential to
    support future contingency operations while improving our flexibility
    to support irregular warfare and Theater SC initiatives.
        Continued service investment against this capability is necessary
    to ensure that a fully flexible range of options remains available to
    combatant commanders globally. EUCOM is actively involved in DOD-led
    studies examining the global disposition of PWRM and is working to
    ensure our strategic direction and operational requirements are
    incorporated in the study reviews and ultimately in an overarching DOD
    PWRM strategy.
    Enhancing EUCOM's Mission
        Congressional support enables EUCOM to perform a wide range of
    operations and engagement that advance U.S. national interests
    overseas. Beyond the provision of budgetary funding and authorities,
    your oversight has been and will continue to be indispensable as EUCOM
    continues to represent U.S. commitment to its European and African
    allies and partners.
        There are three principal areas where legislative assistance would
    yield a considerable increase in the capabilities of combatant commands
    to affect change and achieve goals throughout the AOR: support a U.S.
    long-range Ground-Based Missile Defense site in Europe, provide
    combatant commanders budgetary flexibility, and reform the current SC
    structure to allow for more rapid and responsive activities.
        Long-Range Missile Defense, a U.S. long-range Ground-Based Missile
    Defense site in Europe is necessary to enhance the defense of the U.S.
    homeland, U.S. forces stationed in Europe, partners, and allies from
    intercontinental and intermediate range ballistic missiles. The
    Department of Defense recommends continued congressional support to
    provide funding for a ground-based interceptor site and supporting
    radars in Europe. Congressional support for associated MILCON will also
    be needed once planning has progressed to the point that detailed
    estimates are available.
        Combatant Command Budgetary Authority Flexibility is essential to
    maximize combatant command responsiveness and agility in confronting
    the constantly changing geostrategic landscape in which we operate.
    Budgetary authority flexibility does not require an increase in the DOD
    top line, but rather a redirection of resources to align the financial
    authorities with the operational responsibilities of the theater
    commander.
        One recent example of this is the Department of Defense's
    consolidation of joint training resources to establish the Combatant
    Commander's Exercise Engagement and Training Transformation (CE2T2)
    program under a single Defense-wide account. The DOD, the Joint Staff
    and COCOMs believe this will effectively align joint training
    initiatives that enhance the ability of the COCOM to conduct necessary
    joint training. This initiative may provide an example for how to
    provide more effective constructs for future COCOM resource
    flexibility.
        Reform of the SC Structure is crucial to streamline the process
    where geographic combatant commanders (GCCs), in coordination with the
    interagency, plan and conduct SC activities. We need reforms that will
    significantly improve our ability to help friendly nations develop
    capabilities to better govern and defend themselves and to work
    effectively in concert with our forces. A reformed SC structure must
    increase the speed and efficiency with which we can start programs to
    meet emerging requirements and ensure we have the right material on
    hand. It must assist our partners deploying alongside or instead of our
    own forces with logistical support and equipment. It must enhance
    mutual understanding and build relationships by increasing shared
    education, facilitating common doctrine, and increasing our ability to
    work closely with allies through international institutions. It must
    also increase our flexibility for both planned humanitarian and
    stabilization activities and for commanders to provide immediate
    assistance during operations to meet the critical needs of local
    populations.
        There are a number of programs and activities over which the GCC
    currently has been assigned responsibility for execution but it has
    little to no influence or control due to its inability to control
    prioritization and allocation of resources. Additionally, there exist
    government and nongovernmental organization (NGO) programs of which the
    GCC has limited visibility. Better synchronized policy and legislative
    lines of authority are necessary to achieve greater efficiencies within
    the interagency. This synchronization will lead to a more effective SC
    process.
        Specifically for the combatant commander, SC initiatives
    conceptualized in the field often require nearly 3 years to move
    through the interagency approval and resource allocation process.
    Additionally, our unwieldy SC processes are increasingly compelling
    nations to turn elsewhere for their security assistance needs, thereby
    reducing America's overall influence in the region and providing
    ``strategic opportunities'' for near-peer competitors, especially in
    Africa.
        Legislation geared toward streamlining current title 10 and title
    22 SC authorities would certainly increase the agility and
    effectiveness of the designated agency responsible for executing these
    programs. Section 1206, Building Capacity of Foreign Military Forces,
    legislation enacted in 2005, is a step in the right direction and could
    serve as a framework for a more comprehensive SC reform effort. An
    improved process will better achieve our Nation's foreign policy
    objectives.
                            africa command (africom)
        Africa is becoming a continent of increasing strategic importance
    to the U.S. and our allies. Africa's vast potential makes African
    stability a near term strategic imperative. It is in our national
    interest to help Africa achieve broadbased and sustainable economic,
    security, political and social development. The DOD, in collaboration
    with other U.S. agencies, is seeking more effective ways to mitigate or
    respond to humanitarian crises, sustain African unity and stability,
    and improve cooperation on such transnational issues as terrorism and
    HIV-AIDS. There is little doubt that Africa will occupy an increasingly
    larger amount of our national attention in the years ahead.
        As announced by the President and the Secretary of Defense on
    February 6, 2007, the U.S. will work aggressively with our interagency
    partners, allied nations, and African regional organizations to advance
    our common interests and values through the establishment of a new
    Unified Command focused on the African continent. We are currently in
    the throes of considering adaptive and nontraditional options to
    optimize collaboration with interagency and coalition partners,
    regional security organizations, international organizations, and NGOs.
    This headquarters is projected to contain an innovative mix of U.S.
    military, DOD civilians, U.S. Government, and international partners.
        While the eventual goal is to establish Headquarters, U.S. Africa
    Command on the African continent, there are no plans envisioned in this
    effort to base operational U.S. forces in Africa. The kinds of
    rotational forces deployed will be largely based on the capabilities
    needed to counter the challenges Africa faces--among them humanitarian
    assistance, disaster relief, security sector reform, and
    counterterrorism. They will work with host nations to build up African
    militaries, as well as reinforce the importance of civilian control
    over the military.
                                 eucom and nato
        We recognize that many of the challenges in the current security
    environment exceed the capacity of any one nation to resolve and that
    today's threats require a comprehensive approach by the international
    community, involving a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments.
    EUCOM's efforts are coordinated and complementary with a broad range of
    national, international and regional actors. Most notably, EUCOM is the
    focal point of the U.S. military commitment to the NATO Alliance.
    Across the NATO Military Command Structure, U.S. military leaders are
    privileged to hold key positions of influence, helping to develop the
    Alliance agenda and execute its operations (See Enclosure 6).
    Operational Imperatives within the Alliance
        NATO's contributions to both current and future security challenges
    consist of a wide range of initiatives and practical activities. While
    political consultations among nations help sustain a unity of purpose,
    men and women of the Alliance plus 16 other troop-contributing nations
    are essentially redefining the role of NATO by their actions in
    operations across Afghanistan, the Balkans, the Mediterranean, Iraq,
    the Baltics, and Africa. The 50,000 deployed NATO military forces
    currently under my command as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)
    are a visible and effective demonstration of NATO's resolve to meet
    both in- and out-of-region security challenges collectively.
        International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) remains NATO's most
    important and challenging mission. With over 36,000 forces, including
    almost 15,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines from the United
    States, the Alliance has responsibility for ISAF operations throughout
    Afghanistan. Working alongside an additional 12,000 U.S.-led coalition
    forces of OEF and other international actors, ISAF's mission is to
    provide security and stability until Afghan National Security Forces
    (ANSF) are trained and capable of doing so. The 25 Provincial
    Reconstruction Teams (PRT) under ISAF are the leading edge of NATO's
    efforts for security and reconstruction, supported by military forces
    capable of providing the security and stability.
        The Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission continues under NATO leadership,
    with the U.S. contributing just over 10 percent of the 15,800 KFOR
    troops currently in Kosovo. KFOR remains committed to maintaining a
    safe and secure environment while the political process to determine
    the future status of Kosovo continues to run its course. U.N. Special
    Envoy Ahtisaari has presented his final report with the proposed Status
    Settlement to the U.N. Security Council for their consideration. NATO
    forces are prepared to respond quickly to security contingencies and
    fully expect to play a significant role in the implementation of the
    security provisions of a Status Settlement. We expect that NATO forces
    will remain in Kosovo as the designated International Military Presence
    (IMP) to provide a safe and secure environment, in conjunction with the
    International Civilian Presence (ICP) and in support of Kosovo
    institutions, until such time as those institutions are capable of
    assuming responsibility for Kosovo's security.
        Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), the only operation currently
    conducted under Article V of the Washington Treaty, is focused on
    defending against terrorist-related threats in the Mediterranean.
    Maritime forces of OAE are patrolling sea lines of communication,
    sharing relevant intelligence and information with littoral nations,
    escorting ships, and conducting compliant boarding of suspect ships,
    when required. The first non-NATO contribution to this mission occurred
    in September 2006, when a Russian frigate was employed as part of a
    NATO Task Force. Additionally, we expect to integrate Ukrainian assets
    in OAE in 2007. Algeria, Israel, Morocco, Georgia, Croatia, and Albania
    are also involved in exploring ways they may contribute to this
    mission.
        NATO's Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) The Alliance supports Iraqi
    security forces through training, both in Iraq and at educational
    facilities across Europe. Its training efforts complement the work of
    the U.S.-led Multinational Security Transition Council (MNSTC-I). NATO
    focuses on strategic and operational level training, strengthening the
    Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command, and providing command and staff
    training for mid-level and senior officers. Additionally, NATO has
    facilitated the acquisition and delivery of military equipment donated
    by NATO nations for use by Iraqi security forces. We expect that future
    efforts will likely include gendarmerie training.
        African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) NATO has assisted the AU with
    expanding its AMIS peacekeeping mission in Darfur by providing airlift
    for troop rotations of peacekeepers, and staff capacity-building
    activities in key AU headquarters, and deploying mobile training teams
    to work with their AU counterparts. NATO's capacity-building approach
    to increase stability and security on the continent complements EUCOM's
    efforts to deliver long-term effects with minimal, focused resources.
    NATO Transformation
        In parallel to EUCOM's transformation, NATO is embracing an
    ambitious transformation agenda to develop more agile, flexible, and
    expeditionary military forces. Allied Command Transformation (ACT),
    NATO's strategic headquarters based in Norfolk, Virginia, has the lead
    role in developing concepts and managing NATO transformation programs.
    It is in our Nation's interests to ensure that our collective efforts
    are complementary and contribute to joint and multinational
    interoperability.
        The NATO Response Force (NRF), an initiative proposed by the U.S.
    and adopted by the Alliance at the 2002 Prague Summit, is a vital part
    of the Alliance's ability to rapidly respond to emerging crises and
    conduct the full range of military missions at strategic distances.
    This joint and multinational force further serves as a catalyst for
    transformation and interoperability, improving NATO's expeditionary
    capability in key areas such as multinational logistics and deployable
    communications. Following a comprehensive and successful live exercise
    in June 2006, with further contributions of critical capabilities by
    nations, NATO declared at the Riga Summit the NRF to have attained Full
    Operational Capability (FOC). At FOC, the NRF is capable of deploying
    at strategic distance and supporting the full range of potential
    Alliance missions, to include evacuations and disaster management,
    counterterrorism, and acting as an initial entry force for a larger,
    follow-on force. The future viability of the NRF, as it is currently
    structured, will depend on member nations' willingness to resource the
    necessary forces and commit to a more realistic structure of common
    Alliance funding to support the NRF. Challenges remain in securing
    adequate Alliance commitments to fill future 6-month NRF rotations,
    particularly with respect to critical logistics, communications, and
    support capabilities. EUCOM provides a substantial part of the U.S.
    force and operational enabler contributions to the NRF.
        At the 2006 Riga Summit, NATO nations approved the SOF
    Transformation Initiative, aimed at increasing the capabilities of SOF
    forces throughout the Alliance. EUCOM's Special Operations Command
    (SOCEUR) actively leads this effort to achieve closer cooperation, more
    effective training, and increased interoperability with the intent of
    strengthening NATO's SOF capacity.
        EUCOM has additionally served as the lead agent in establishing an
    Intelligence Fusion Center, co-located with the U.S. Joint Analysis
    Center at Molesworth, England. This multi-national center, formally
    activated in 2006, will improve information and intelligence sharing in
    support of Alliance operations.
        One of NATO's most significant transformation initiatives is the
    decision to develop new capabilities for strategic airlift. In 2006,
    nations agreed to purchase three, perhaps four, C-17 aircraft to be
    flown by multinational crews with a multinational command and control
    structure. The goal is to receive the first C-17 aircraft in late 2007,
    with full operational capability in 2009, operating out of Ramstein Air
    Base in Germany. The 16 nations participating in the program will use
    the aircraft to address national airlift requirements. While these
    airlift missions will often be used for requirements of a strictly
    national character, they will also support NATO operations or other
    international obligations.
    Partnerships and Engagement
        As with U.S. national engagement initiatives, there is a strategic
    value to NATO's partnership framework. The varied partnership
    mechanisms in place continue to deepen and broaden to meet both NATO's
    new priorities in the evolving security environment as well as the
    aspirations of the Nations with which the Alliance engages. Partnership
    programs and initiatives cover the full spectrum of efforts, to include
    promoting dialogue with interested nations, building stable democratic
    structures, and developing defense capabilities that are interoperable
    with those of NATO. EUCOM provides the preponderance of U.S. forces
    that contribute to the success of many of these Alliance programs, most
    notably the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Building upon the success of
    the program to date, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Montenegro are now
    full members of the PfP.
        NATO additionally maintains special relationships with Russia and
    Ukraine. NATO's establishment of Military Liaison Missions in Moscow
    and Kiev has improved communications and facilitated day-to-day
    coordination of activities. Notably, Russia, a Partner Nation, has a
    full delegation of personnel permanently assigned to my NATO
    headquarters at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. The U.S.
    military-to-military relationship with Russia, both bilaterally and in
    the NATO-Russia context, aims to develop and institutionalize the
    ability of Russia to operate alongside NATO forces to address common
    security issues, such as the defense against terrorist threats. Our
    ambitious agenda for practical cooperation with Russia has not yet been
    realized, in part due to the failure of the Duma to ratify the PfP
    Status of Forces Agreement, which would allow Alliance forces to
    exercise on Russian territory.
        NATO remains an Alliance committed to the common defense of its
    member states. It increasingly recognizes the concept of common
    security, a broader and more comprehensive view of security in an
    interdependent world where the threats are non-traditional and more
    global in nature. In a strategic environment marked by terrorism,
    failed states, and the proliferation of WMD, common security is an
    absolutely essential factor in achieving individual national security.
    NATO is well-placed and, with the proper resources and political will,
    capable of accomplishing great things. It is in our national interest
    to ensure that NATO succeeds.
                                   conclusion
        The United States EUCOM is fully and actively engaged in addressing
    the challenges of this diverse and expansive AOR. Even as EUCOM
    supports combat operations in other theaters, we are transforming our
    posture to shape the evolving security landscape in our AOR.
        While the U.S. military can help set the conditions to create a
    stable environment, it is but one part of the effort required to
    achieve lasting, effective solutions. New and deepened partnerships
    within the U.S. Government and among combatant commands are required to
    more dynamically counter the transnational trends and issues which
    define our theater: threats of terrorism and WMD, frozen conflicts,
    unresolved territorial disputes, complex geopolitical relationships,
    humanitarian needs, and disease. Moreover, global partnerships are
    required to better counter the threats to our collective security.
    EUCOM remains committed to working with European, African, and Eurasian
    partners in collaborative efforts that meet our common security
    challenges. Finally, the leadership and the capabilities our Nation
    contributes to the NATO Alliance will remain fundamental to preserving
    trans-Atlantic security, now and into the future.
        Global posture shifts and U.S. military transformation have
    fundamentally changed our strategic positioning in the EUCOM theater.
    These efforts will culminate in a force posture capable of operating
    across the broad spectrum of conflict. The success of our engagement
    hinges on ensuring the presence of relevant capabilities in our
    theater. In parallel to EUCOM's transformation, NATO is restructuring
    itself to become more expeditionary and able to operate at strategic
    distance, as evidenced by its current deployments of over 50,000 troops
    on 3 continents.
        Continued congressional support for our efforts is essential to
    ensuring EUCOM is capable of effective engagement and sustained support
    to the Alliance and our regional partners to meet the broad tasks
    assigned to EUCOM in the National Military Strategy. The assistance of
    the members of this committee is essential in ensuring EUCOM's
    effectiveness in its ongoing programs, operations, and initiatives. The
    dedicated men and women of the United States EUCOM are committed to
    achieving our national goals and objectives.

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        Chairman Levin. Thank you so much.
        I think we'll try an 8-minute round and see how it goes,
    before we're interrupted by votes.
        General, in testimony before the House Armed Services
    Committee--I believe it was in March 2007--you expressed
    reservations about the significant proposed reduction of U.S.
    forces that were stationed in the EUCOM AOR. Under the
    restructuring plan that had been announced in 2005, the number
    of U.S. troops stationed at the main operating bases in Europe
    would be cut from over 100,000 to around 60,000 soldiers. Since
    then, your command has been committed to providing forces in
    support of rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
        There is going to be an increase, we believe, in the size
    of the Army and Marine Corps, and the Army proposes to create
    six new light infantry combat brigades. Given the role of our
    forces in Europe, and the role that they play in operations in
    Afghanistan and Iraq, would it be in our strategic interest to
    base one or more of those six additional brigades in Europe,
    where they are easily deployable to the Central Command
    (CENTCOM) region, or perhaps to the new Africa Command
    (AFRICOM) region?
        General Craddock. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I have asked--and tasked, actually--the staff of EUCOM to
    do a study to determine--I call it a troop-to-task study--if
    the forward-deployed forces available to EUCOM are adequate to
    the task and missions assigned by the Department. When I took
    over--knowing that we were in the midst of a theater
    transition, in terms of downsizing, I acknowledge that--the
    first few months, as I went about my duties and visited other
    countries, I was continually asked questions, struck by the
    engagement with chiefs of defense and ministers of defense of
    nations of NATO, primarily, among others, as to why it is that
    we were still not--``we,'' EUCOM and the components there--not
    exercising and engaging, exchanging troop units on a regular
    basis for training, as we had done in the past. This was not
    occasionally, this was a persistent theme, both with the new
    NATO states and others.
        I then looked at the exercise schedule over the past
    several years that the components and that EUCOM does, and I
    looked at the reduction in the number of exercises, and I
    looked at the cancellation rate in the execution year of the
    number of exercises. I became concerned that right now the
    major task assigned to EUCOM is theater security cooperation,
    and that is building partner-nation capacity, in Europe,
    Eurasia, and Africa. I was uncertain at the time, and remain
    uncertain, that we have adequate forces to do that. As you
    said, we are providing forces for Iraq and Afghanistan. So,
    I've tasked the command to study that, to come back and
    validate the assumptions made, and the assessment of the impact
    of the changing geopolitical system. I expect the results of
    that within about the next 10 days, and then I will look at
    that, and, if we have adequate forces, then we will go about
    engaging, to the maximum extent; if not, I'll report to the
    Secretary of Defense my findings.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you. Relative to Afghanistan, now,
    are there shortfalls in meeting NATO's Afghanistan mission
    requirements?
        General Craddock. Yes, Mr. Chairman, the requirements for
    troops is governed by a combined joint statement of
    requirements. There is a troop list there. It has not been
    fully sourced by the NATO nations. We continue to engage with
    the nations routinely, both personally, my engagement with
    chiefs of defense, and through Supreme Headquarters Allied
    Powers Europe, my headquarters, with national entities, to gain
    further subscription by NATO forces to fill up that
    requirement.
        Chairman Levin. How far short are you?
        General Craddock. I don't want to get into numbers.
        Chairman Levin. All right, that's fair.
        General Craddock. But roughly three to four battalions, I
    think, would be main force, and there are some other shortages.
        Senator Warner. Could he give the percentage, then, of the
    total projected force, what that represents?
        General Craddock. Senator, it's very difficult, because
    we're dealing in capabilities here, and oftentimes, there are
    very small units that have enormous enabling capabilities, such
    as forward air controllers.
        Chairman Levin. Are we saying roughly 5 to 10 percent?
    Would that be a fair estimate of the shortfall?
        General Craddock. I would say, as a minimum, 5 to 10
    percent.
        Chairman Levin. As a minimum, all right.
        One of your first tasks as Supreme Allied Commander Europe
    was to provide an assessment of military requirements, as we've
    just talked about. The assessment which was made was promised
    to us--it was called a combined joint statement of
    requirements, and that was promised to us at a March 1 meeting,
    where I think Senator Warner requested that the committee be
    provided with a copy of that assessment. Can you make sure that
    we get a copy of it?
        General Craddock. I will, Mr. Chairman.
        [The information referred to follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman Levin. All right.
        I'd like to ask you a question about civilian deaths.
    There's been a series of incidents involving U.S. air strikes,
    or attacks by SOFs, that are reported to have resulted in the
    deaths of at least 90 civilians over the last month. According
    to the news reports, the issue of civilian deaths is leading to
    tensions between our commanders and the NATO commanders who are
    concerned that NATO forces are being blamed for deaths
    resulting from U.S. counterterrorism operations. In early May,
    President Karzai, of Afghanistan, declared that his government
    can, ``no longer accept the civilian casualties resulting from
    U.S.-led operations.'' Are you concerned about this issue, this
    problem, and by the reports of growing Afghan resentment and
    NATO tension over civilian deaths? What steps are you taking in
    response to those concerns?
        General Craddock. I am always concerned about noncombatant
    deaths. Obviously--I hope it's obvious, it is to me and to the
    chain of command--we work very rigorously to ensure that the
    coordination that is needed is done in every instance. The fact
    that it happens in a combat zone is unfortunate, but it is a
    very complex combat zone, with asymmetrical attacks by forces
    that oftentimes are hard to identify, because they are not
    uniformed and they're not conventional forces. I do not think
    that there is a tension--I'm unaware of a tension, if you will,
    between coalition and NATO commanders. I think that there is
    always room for greater cooperation and coordination, and
    that's what we need to focus on. I know of no fingerpointing.
    But I do know that there are occasions where, when one or the
    other of those forces is surprised and engaged in an operation,
    and they need to call for assistance from the other force, then
    we have to do so, we have to coordinate it, and work it to the
    best of our ability. So, we've redoubled our efforts to do
    that. I've talked to the Commander of International Security
    Assistance Force (ISAF). I have talked to Admiral Fallon at
    CENTCOM. We both agree we need to ensure we retain good
    visibility on that, that we bore into the tactics, the
    techniques, and the procedures for that.
        Now, the last part is, with regard to the feelings of the
    Afghan President Karzai.
        Chairman Levin. Just add to that part of President Karzai--
    it would seem to me that these casualties would harm our
    efforts to win the hearts and minds of the people of
    Afghanistan for the mission. I'm sure that it's being used by
    the Taliban in support of their goals. Can you talk about
    whether or not these civilian losses have made it more
    difficult for our hearts-and-minds effort?
        General Craddock. It's my assessment that they have. I
    think that we need to redouble our efforts to avoid that. We
    need to ensure there is no collateral damage, to the extent
    that we can ever ensure that. I think we are working towards
    that end. We do know--it's documented--that people of
    Afghanistan are now talking about the Taliban using their homes
    and their villages as a safe haven when they're under duress.
    So, this is not a black-and-white situation, and we just need
    to understand it better and make better decisions.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you. My time is up.
        A 15-minute roll-call has just begun. We just need to keep
    that in mind, and see how this works out here.
        Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to follow on the chairman's question about the
    civilian deaths and the impact on the image of our Nation and
    other NATO nations who are trying to work towards supporting
    the sovereignty of Afghanistan.
        Are not some of the contributing causes in this complex
    formula, one, the shortfall in the full complement of NATO
    forces, and those forces were primarily ground-operated forces,
    so they could be doing ground operations. Given that shortfall
    and the complexity of the national caveats preventing those
    ground forces from performing the tough assignment of
    extracting Taliban from villages and houses, thereby
    necessitating a greater use of air assets, and the utilization
    of the air assets that apparently is contributing to a
    significant part of the deaths of civilians. I just see all of
    this interrelated.
        Now, do you find it interrelated?
        General Craddock. Senator, to an extent, yes, I do. I agree
    with your first point, the shortfall of NATO forces. If we had
    full sourcing of the statement of requirement, I believe that
    would provide commanders greater flexibility, where they would
    have contingency reaction forces available. It is just recently
    that we have, for the Commander of ISAF, a theater reserve that
    he has available for such use, in extremis use. So, I think
    that is, indeed, part of it. We find that, oftentimes, when
    forces are out on patrol, and they are ambushed or under
    attack, that, because of the vast distance, because of the need
    for air mobility--and we're short of helicopters in part of
    that requirement--that there is not time, then, to move, by
    ground, a reaction force, and we have to call in either rotary-
    or fixed-wing air support. It is less precise, obviously, and
    that becomes an in extremis situation at high altitude, and
    it's more problematic. So, I agree.
        With regard to caveats, the nations have agreed in Riga
    that there would be no caveats for in extremis support.
    However, as I said, it's a large country, and there is a time-
    distance factor that, even though there is no restriction on
    moving some unit from the north to the south in extremis to
    help a unit that's in contact, the time and distance will
    likely preclude that, so we will then default to close air
    support. So, there are contributing factors there.
        Senator Warner. It is a difficult equation for you to
    manage, and we've simply got to resolve it, because it's not
    fair to the U.S. soldier to bear the heavy burden, whether he's
    operating an aircraft as an airman or on the ground, that the
    deficiencies of NATO partners could be contributing to this
    problem. That's a combination of caveats and not having a full
    complement.
        How do you view NATO as a whole in terms of their
    contributing forces, training forces, and particularly the
    necessary equipment to bring NATO up to its projected standing
    and capabilities? What is the curve? Is it a less and less
    emphasis on military training and conscription in these NATO
    countries? Or is it about level? Or is there some increase?
    Because NATO is a composite of all of the nations, and it can
    be really no stronger than the contributions being made.
        General Craddock. Senator, there is a diversity among the
    nations, in terms of their equipment and level of training.
    However, when they commit to the NATO mission in Afghanistan,
    to the ISAF mission, there are some stringent requirements, in
    terms of training and equipment, that are provided to them,
    they must meet. By and large, they do that.
        Now, the newer nations that may not have the depth of a
    budget, obviously turn to the United States or to Great Britain
    for support and equipment and training. That is provided. So
    that when they come in--after days and weeks of coordination--
    they come in capable, by and large, assuming a mission in the
    area of which they are given. Partner nations, non-NATO, that
    come in, also go through the same process. So, I think, from
    that perspective, that they are very capable and can do the
    job. The question becomes the caveats that they come with from
    their capitals, and the impact of those caveats, then, on the
    flexibility of the commander on the ground.
        Senator Warner. All right. We have pretty well addressed
    that.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Warner, if you could then put us in
    recess when you're done.
        Senator Warner [presiding]. Going back to NATO, as a whole,
    as an entity, is it growing stronger? Is there more fervor
    among the nations of NATO to keep it strong and viable? Or are
    they just accepting it, and there's really no basic threat on
    the European continent, and they're not really beginning to
    make it a strong, viable operation? These are intangibles, but
    we all watch it. We look at the contributions, we look at the
    defense budgets. They've been on a decline, the NATO nations,
    for some many years.
        General Craddock. Senator, I've said this in other forums
    before, I think the level of ambition of NATO is not matched by
    its political will. I think there is again, among the nations,
    a different level of ambition, some matched with will, and
    others not. I think the fact is that only 6 or 7 of the 26
    nations meet the 2 percent benchmark we've put on the defense-
    budget-to-GDP, that we think is about right. We have a couple
    of benchmarks. NATO has decided it would like to see armed
    forces of the nations have about 40 percent of their force
    available for deployment, and be able to sustain 8 percent of
    their force over time in a sustained deployment such as ISAF or
    Kosovo. That is a mixed bag. We have probably, right now--I
    don't know the exact numbers, but as many do that as not, so we
    are continually going in to work with nations and ask them,
    ``Here are your numbers, here's what we know you have as your
    capabilities. We need your contributions.'' We need to do that.
    Sometimes we're successful. Since Riga, we have either had
    additional contributions to ISAF, on the ground or en route, of
    between 7,000 and 8,000 additional soldiers in various type
    units, some of them very capable and needed. That's a big plus.
    The majority of that is not the United States.
        Senator Warner. You recognize full well that NATO's on
    trial. This is their first significant out-of-area, truly-
    combatant situation. If they don't measure up, I think that
    it's going to require a very serious and in-depth reexamining
    the nations of NATO.
        Now, let's turn to the Balkans. You have a problem up there
    in Kosovo. Where do you fit in that situation?
        General Craddock. Thank you, Senator.
        The Ahtisaari proposal has been submitted to the U.N. They
    have it under consideration. The Security Council
    representatives have had a factfinding visit to Europe, Serbia,
    Kosovo. I would tell you that, from my headquarters, my
    perspective is that a resolution soon is a good thing, sooner
    rather than later, will be helpful.
        Senator Warner. What do you mean by ``resolution''?
    Resolution on what?
        General Craddock. The U.N.
        Senator Warner. The issue of statehood?
        General Craddock. The U.N. resolution affirming or adopting
    the Ahtisaari proposal on future status.
        Senator Warner. Right.
        General Craddock. That would be helpful. Then there will be
    other events that may or may not occur. But the point is we're
    now operating under a U.N. resolution, 1244, that we know that,
    upon adoption of the Ahtisaari, will be outdated, and we will
    have to transition to a new mode of operation for NATO. I
    believe that the longer the resolution is delayed, the longer
    it takes to come to closure in the Security Council, the
    greater the opportunity for mischief, and the more likely there
    will be civil disturbance and violence in Kosovo.
        Senator Warner. Do you have adequate forces under your
    supervision and control to meet the contingencies of the level
    of insurrection that might occur?
        General Craddock. Senator, at this time, we have about
    16,000 NATO forces, no caveats. They are well-led, well-
    trained, arranged properly, and they are capable.
        Senator Warner. Thank you.
        I must depart for the vote. I hope to return, and thank you
    very much, General, for your outstanding service, and that of
    your family.
        General Craddock. Thank you. [Recess.]
        Chairman Levin [presiding]. We'll be back in order again.
        General Craddock, thank you for your understanding of the
    way the Senate operates.
        Senator Inhofe?
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me time myself
    here.
        General Craddock, I'll repeat what everybody else said,
    thank you for the individual time you've given me and the rest
    of this panel.
        As we talked about before, I have an intense interest in
    both Vicenza and Aviano. I was there--and, Mr. Chairman, you're
    probably not aware of this--in 2003, when they had to deploy
    the 173rd to Northern Iraq, since we could not get through
    Turkey--and the staging area, of course, for Vicenza, is down
    in Aviano. We were down there when that happened. It occurred
    to me that they were sitting out in this open field. If it had
    been raining, we couldn't have done it, I don't believe. I
    asked the question, How could we do this if it's really bad
    weather? We couldn't. Since then, we came back right after that
    and inserted into the authorization bill the deployment
    processing facility, which I went over and viewed last week.
    It's a beautiful thing. It's much better and bigger than I
    thought it would be. It appears to me it has the capacity to
    take care of our long-term needs in the way of staging over
    there. Would you comment on that? How do you see the future of
    that?
        General Craddock. Thank you, Senator.
        No, I agree. The facility, as designed and implemented, is
    exactly what's required. There has been some concerns here
    recently over the receptivity and the approval now for the
    permission to proceed with the expansion of the airborne
    brigade into the Dal Molin facility near Vicenza. I, right now,
    today, would tell you I'm encouraged. I think that there's been
    much engagement. I think the misunderstandings, to a great
    extent, have been resolved. There will always be those who
    disagree. We understand that.
        Senator Inhofe. Disagree with what?
        General Craddock. With the expansion of the brigade into
    the Dal Molin facility.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay.
        General Craddock. In the business we're in, there will be
    competitors for resources and scarce facilities that obviously
    might have a different perspective. However, I think there's
    been a good engagement. I think there's an understanding by the
    Italian Government that it is in probably their best interest,
    and it will support U.S. forces there. They know that, and I
    think that we will see their agreement very shortly.
        Senator Inhofe. I hope so. As I mentioned to you before, I
    think if they see all this new construction taking place,
    they're thinking, ``You know, there's no threat that they'd
    leave.'' We have to communicate to them that we need to have
    their cooperation. We went through this when we were trying to
    replace the live range at Vieques.
        General Craddock. Right.
        Senator Inhofe. I think it was down at southern Sardinia,
    and at that time we were not getting cooperation.
        But, anyway, I think those are great facilities. I always
    say to these guys that are stationed over there, they are
    really in a pretty good area.
        Now, I want to get you on record on a couple of things that
    are important, because these are programs that I have been
    active in.
        First of all, International Military Education and Training
    (IMET). Since you currently have most of Africa--and we're
    going to talk about that new command in a minute--when we first
    started the IMET program, it was almost as if we were doing
    them a favor, these countries, when, in fact--and so, we had
    restrictions, like in Article 98. Unless they'd sign an Article
    98, we would not allow them to be in the IMET program. Now we
    see other countries, like China, that if they're not in our
    program, they're going to be in their program. This has worked
    since we took away that obstruction. I'd like to have a comment
    by you, in terms of the IMET program, and then also the 1206
    and 1207 program, particularly as it works in Africa.
        General Craddock. Senator, the IMET program may be the most
    important instrument in theater security cooperation. It is our
    ability to work with friends and partners, to have them come to
    our institutions, understand our culture, understand democratic
    institutions. We learn from them, they go back, they have built
    relationships that last for years and years. I have seen that
    in my previous assignment as the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)
    Commander. I'm convinced that when we bring those people here,
    when we engage in that program, everyone involved is a winner.
    We need to ensure we sustain it, and, where possible, we can
    add to it. It is critically important; again, the most
    important tool in the theater security cooperation toolbox.
        Senator Inhofe. All right.
        General Craddock. It should be sustained. I think there
    will be opportunities in the future, potentially, in certain
    areas, to grow up even more.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay.
        General Craddock. 1206/1207, again, another important new
    addition, if you will, that I've found critical to the ability
    for us to build partner-nation capability. It gives us some
    authorities where we can provide capabilities, training, some
    levels of equipment that we did not have before. I would hope
    it is sustained. From my perspective, it should be enlarged,
    because it is so important, both from the perspective of
    building the capability, but also sustaining over time.
        Senator Inhofe. How about the Commanders Emergency Response
    Plan (CERP)?
        General Craddock. In Afghanistan, the difference between
    the haves and the have-nots is startling. Those nations who
    provide a CERP-like capability, the quick-reaction capability,
    for their military forces are doing such a favor for them; and,
    in giving them such a critical enabler, that it's startling,
    the difference. If you would look at regional commanders where
    U.S. forces are, and the CERP investment and what it has done
    in reconstruction and development, and what it has done
    combined with the security effort, and look where that's not
    there, it is startling. Every nation's military who doesn't
    have it is jealous and wants it. We are trying to get a NATO
    fund in place to provide that type of capability. But it is
    critically important. Again, it's, in many cases, better than
    bullets.
        Senator Inhofe. The fact that you can get to it, the
    commander has the discretion, he can get to it immediately.
    Would you agree with the statement that a dollar in that
    program is probably worth $5 if you have to go through the
    process in--of going to--wait until you can really get
    something done? It's a good program. You have answered the
    question. I appreciate it.
        General Craddock. I would agree, and that's the problem
    with other techniques. There's too many levels of approval and
    too much red tape; it's not instantaneous.
        Senator Inhofe. I am very interested in the IMET, the 1206/
    1207, and the CERP programs.
        Now I am also interested in Africa. I've spent a lot of
    time there, and I've always thought it was confusing. My last
    trip, which was about a week ago in Africa--it was Ethiopia,
    Uganda, Kenya, Djibouti, and Tanzania. Now, half of those were
    in one command, and half in another command. So, I'm anxious
    for this to take place. It's my understanding that it's going
    to be October 2008 by the time you actually have a segregated
    command. Is that about right? Is that what we're shooting for?
        General Craddock. Yes, Senator, that's the target date. In
    between October 2007 and October 2008, there will be a transfer
    of task, consecutive conceding over time, from EUCOM to
    AFRICOM. But by about October 2008, they will have the mission
    set complete.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay. You're going to be in charge of
    almost all of it, except up in the Horn, during that time. Do
    you want to make any comments about what is ongoing there right
    now that is in the current command that you have assumed, in
    terms of the African brigades, how they're coming along, and so
    forth?
        General Craddock. EUCOM has worked for many years with the
    African Contingency Operations Training Assistance, which
    targets several countries to build battalions, then into
    brigades for peacekeeping operations. We have trained over the
    years about 75,000 African soldiers. We are now in the mode
    where we provide mentors to their trainers. We've trained their
    trainers. It's a consistent follow-up effort, if you will, to
    make sure that the standards are maintained, the equipment is
    maintained, and the effort is enduring. So, that continues, and
    that will transfer over to AFRICOM once they are fully mission
    capable.
        In addition, in northwest Africa we have Operation Enduring
    Freedom Trans Sahel. It's a counterterrorism work that we're
    doing to build capacity with nations there. There's about nine
    nations throughout that region, where they have some terrorism
    problems. We nest that underneath the counterterrorism program
    with the State Department for that area, so that is providing
    some combined effects and working well.
        Then, throughout the remainder of the region, the
    subregions, whether it's the south, the east, central Africa,
    we are working with unique either functional or geographical
    efforts, then, for train-and-equip, if you will, and some
    mentoring and advice to the militaries there.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes, I know what you're doing in Uganda,
    and it's working real well all the way down.
        Mr. Chairman, my time is expired, but, just for the record,
    I'd like to have him tell us his opinion as to the cuts that
    took place in both missile defense and Future Combat System, in
    the record.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
        General Craddock, you would supply that for the record,
    please?
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The ballistic missile threat from Southwest Asia to U.S. forces,
    interests, and allies is significant and growing. The EUCOM AOR
    requires a mix of systems (interceptors, radars, and command and
    control) that provide defense against short, medium, intermediate and
    intercontinental missiles in all phases of flight (boost, mid-course,
    and terminal). Recent European Site Initiative missile defense funding
    reductions impede U.S. efforts to put a system in place before the
    arrival of longer range missile threats from Southwest Asia. It could
    also damage important, ongoing diplomatic initiatives with the Czech
    Republic and Poland. In addition, these reductions call to question our
    credibility within NATO and could make the U.S. approach more difficult
    for NATO to accept. Cutting funds also sends the wrong message to
    Russia--that its campaign to use missile defense as a wedge between the
    U.S. and our allies is working.
        I defer to the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the Army
    regarding funding cuts to Future Combat Systems.

        Chairman Levin. Senator Nelson?
        Senator Ben Nelson. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Craddock, thank you for being here today, and for
    your service to the United States and to our efforts to keep
    the world free.
        I'd like to go to the missile defense system, because that
    is an area of some interest, particularly since I'll be leading
    a congressional delegation to Russia over the Memorial Day
    weekend. In connection with the missile defense system, the
    House Armed Services Committee tied further advancement of the
    European sites with reaching agreements with the host countries
    and further engagement of NATO. Now, will this slow down the
    process? But, if it does slow down the process, will it build
    stronger support for the sites? That's my first question.
        General Craddock. Senator, thank you.
        Obviously, much of the groundwork for the missile defense
    in Europe went on before I assumed command 5 months ago;
    however, I don't know if it will slow down. I think there has
    already been some official acceptance for the proposal from
    both the Czech Republic and Poland. Now it's a matter of
    continuing to cement the agreement, and then, from my
    perspective, EUCOM, we would work in a team to develop a
    defense cooperative agreement and then the technical
    arrangements under that.
        I think if there were--again, this is my opinion--a
    perception of wavering support for such an effort in the United
    States, it may well create wavering support in those countries.
    I don't know that. But that could slow things down.
        With regard to NATO, the Secretary General held a series of
    meetings, the end of April and early May, with the North
    Atlantic Council. He indicated that the allies are in agreement
    with regard to the nature of the threat. I think that's a
    significant thing in a consensus organization. So, my sensing
    there is, that's in the political arena of North Atlantic
    Council, but agreement among 26 is a positive indicator.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Now, earlier this week the Washington
    Post quoted Secretary Rice, who is in Russia this week, as
    saying that ``no country could veto''--and that's a quote--
    ``U.S. plans to set up a missile defense system in Europe.''
    It's my understanding that both Poland and the Czech Republic
    were chosen as sites, because they're optimal locations for
    combating, at least in part, some sort of an Iranian long-range
    ballistic missile attack.
        Are you concerned with respect to Russia's position
    regarding this, the location in the Czech Republic, as well as
    the location in Poland, for those sites?
        General Craddock. Obviously I'm concerned when any nation
    has the vehement disagreement with the proposal that we have
    heard.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Excuse me, do you think their
    disagreement is vehement? Because I'll be with the Russian
    Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov.
        General Craddock. Lavrov, yes. Senator, I'm not going to
    want to judge the political arena. I think, from a military
    perspective, there has been transparency in consultations with
    the Russian military. I think the physics and the geometry of
    this are understood. Now I think it's a political issue, not a
    military issue.
        Senator Ben Nelson. This would call for a political
    resolution on your part, but if you were in my shoes, going to
    see Foreign Minister Lavvov, what would you suggest that I say
    to him?
        General Craddock. Oh, goodness. Is this on the record? No,
    just kidding. [Laughter.]
        Senator Ben Nelson. I ask you not to lie, but it's going to
    be difficult to tell the truth, as well.
        General Craddock. Well, I don't know. Again, I'm not in the
    political arena. That's very difficult.
        Senator Ben Nelson. What I was thinking is--apart from the
    politics, is there anything, in terms of the metrics here, or
    the--as you say, the geometry and the physics of it, that would
    argue against their concerns about the location? In other
    words, does this represent any significant threat to them? Or
    is there less threat because of the location?
        General Craddock. Again, I wasn't there, but, as I
    understand, when the initial consultations occurred between the
    Missile Defense Agency and the Russian experts--and I think
    there will be more of those expert group meetings--it was laid
    out as to where and why--the geometry, the physics--and there
    was very little pushback. The notion that the location and the
    orientation of this is a threat to a Russian strategic
    capability is mindless. It's just not there.
        Senator Ben Nelson. That's what I'm getting at, yes.
        General Craddock. It's just not there. The notion that 10
    interceptors would make a difference against the Russian
    strategic capability, again, is baseless.
        Senator Ben Nelson. So, really, the logic behind the
    placement is for the purpose that we've stated, and that is to
    protect against something coming from Iran.
        General Craddock. Indeed.
        Senator Ben Nelson. That should be demonstrable to the
    Russians, so there may be political considerations, as you have
    suggested, for their position right now.
        General Craddock. That's what I personally believe. Again,
    I have not been involved in the discussions and the dialogue
    personally, but I can't come to any other conclusion than that,
    and, because, again, as I've been told by those who were there,
    initial consultations and discussions were not of this nature.
        Senator Ben Nelson. That's the main question that I had, to
    ask you today.
        In terms of the House, the House Armed Services Committee
    cut $160 million, which was mostly construction funds, as I
    understand it, from the proposal. But that, apparently, was on
    the basis of some criticism from some of the NATO allies about
    the system. Or is that information not accurate?
        General Craddock. I'm not aware of the rationale for the
    cut. According to the Secretary General, the fact that the NATO
    North Atlantic Council was in agreement on the threat, I think,
    is a significant indicator with regard to, then, any other NATO
    reason for being against it--would have to be location. I'm not
    aware of that at all.
        Senator Ben Nelson. It certainly doesn't involve not having
    had discussions and seeking a consultation with the NATO
    allies.
        General Craddock. There have been several. I know
    Ambassador Edelman, the Under Secretary for Policy, has been
    there; Defense Missile Agency Director, General Obering--there
    have been several, recently and prior. So, this has been
    ongoing and, as I said, late April/May, quite a few consecutive
    meetings.
        Senator Ben Nelson. In your opinion, what will happen with
    a reduction from $310 million cut by $160 million, leaving a
    balance there of, really, less than half of what was requested?
    What does that do to the program?
        General Craddock. Directly, it will delay implementation.
    How long will be dependent upon how much is restored and how
    fast the recovery could be. I think indirectly there may be
    some problems created with regards to perceptions of how
    serious we, the United States, are about this effort.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Is the cut so significant that you
    can't use the balance to go ahead with construction, pending
    additional money coming at a later time?
        General Craddock. Senator, I don't know, because we have
    yet to receive the full concept for logistics implementation,
    in terms of how the Missile Defense Agency would want to do it,
    whether it would be a government-owned/government-operated or a
    government-owned/contractor-operated facility.
        Senator Ben Nelson. So, restoration is really what you
    would be seeking.
        General Craddock. To stay on a timeline.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Yes.
        General Craddock. Again, the Missile Defense Agency has
    laid out, I don't know that restoration would allow recovery. I
    would have to see where the cuts were, and then have the
    Missile Defense Agency, the Department, decide how to do that,
    then we would know--EUCOM--how to proceed, then, with the
    technical agreements to implement that.
        Senator Ben Nelson [presiding]. Thank you, General.
        Senator Webb.
        Senator Webb. Thank you, Senator Nelson. General, welcome.
        I'd like to ask you a few questions, General, about the
    implications of some of these international power shifts that
    are going on, and how you perceive some of these pressures from
    the perspective of your command. Actually, the best starting
    point would be to carry on a little bit from what Senator
    Nelson was asking about the Russian situation. We might--or
    there may be among us people who believe that it's mindless, to
    use your word, for the Russians to perceive missiles in those
    countries as a threat, but, at the same time, there's a lot of
    history in play when we see NATO expansion into those countries
    that traditionally have been buffer nations, or viewed by the
    Russians as buffer nations. It's a whole lot closer to Russia
    than it is to Iran, when you have a missile in Poland. So,
    while, on the one hand, the size of those deployments, and the
    nature of them, we may see as rather benign. I think certainly
    there's some logic from their perspective, in terms of history,
    that there's something of a threat of one nature or another
    going on. Actually, before I even heard that exchange, it was a
    note that I made myself that I wanted to ask you to give me
    your thoughts on the impact, in military terms, of United
    States/Russian relations as a result of these NATO expansions
    that have gone into areas that are fairly close to Russia.
        General Craddock. Thank you, Senator.
        It is, indeed, a complex issue. We've had, from my
    perspective over the past several years, reasonably good
    military-to-military relations. There are obviously lingering
    tendencies from days past, at old-timer levels like me, guys
    who have been around a long time and spent many years on the
    ground in Europe, looking across the border, and now those days
    are over, and we want to work together and establish those
    relationships to complement each other.
        I know that, indeed, there is this NATO expansion and a
    concern that--from the Russians--they are being surrounded by
    NATO, if you will. I, quite frankly, look at NATO, and every
    nation there is a democracy. If I'm concerned about being
    surrounded by democratic nations, I don't know why. It may be,
    again, these age-old tensions and beliefs, that we have to get
    over.
        Senator Webb. We are seeing an escalation of rhetoric from
    the political leadership of Russia; it's undeniable--would you
    say that, since 2004, with the latest NATO expansion, that
    there has been any visible increase, in terms of the military
    attitudes of Russia? You mentioned this old-time and I'm
    wondering what we're seeing on the ground.
        General Craddock. I don't think there's been an increase of
    any tension or shrillness, militarily. I would say there maybe
    has been not as much progress as we would like to have, maybe a
    stagnation of progress that we had in years before that, I felt
    we were moving. Again, my time, previous assignments, we were
    engaging, we had some more exercises. Now we've been a little
    bit stalemated, and it's not that we're regressing or more
    shrill, but we're having to work harder to push the ball
    farther. Now, EUCOM, right now, is having a bilateral meeting
    with Russian Federation officers--we do this routinely--in
    Stuttgart, I believe, now. So, we have some things on our
    table, exercises we need to work through, arrangements. How can
    we engage? It's not getting any easier, but we're holding our
    own.
        Senator Webb. Would you see any visible difference in the
    evolution of relations with other European countries, as
    opposed to the United States, vis-a-vis Russia?
        General Craddock. I'm not sure I understand the context of
    ``visible relations with.''
        Senator Webb. The attitudinal environment, in terms of how
    Russia is dealing with the militaries of other European
    countries as opposed to the United States.
        General Craddock. I think there are some tensions.
    Obviously, Estonia, here recently, with a statue and some
    tensions that were raised over that--I don't know of any
    military-to-military tensions, if you will, or degradation of
    relations. But, again, I guess my assessment would be, I don't
    see a strengthening or an increasing embrace of those
    relations.
        Senator Webb. I've followed for a long time with alarm the
    way that China has been evolving into a world power. I've been
    speaking, for some 20 years really, about China's conscious
    strategic axis with the Muslim world, that was very apparent to
    a lot of people who have spent time in Asia, as I have. I've
    been watching, along with a lot of others, the economic
    expansion of China into Africa, which you mentioned in your
    testimony. I'm wondering if you are seeing any military
    implications that are coinciding with this economic expansion
    in Africa.
        General Craddock. Senator, I have not got the level of
    detail in the African continent now to be able to determine if
    the economic expansion and engagement is paralleled by
    military. I expect it is, and I'll dig into it to find out in
    the coming days and months. But let me harken back, in my
    previous assignment, U.S. SOUTHCOM, South America. My judgment
    there is, yes, there was significant military engagement, and
    it paralleled the economic engagement. The Chinese were
    economically engaged throughout the region, the Caribbean
    Basin, South America, not in Central America, because most of
    those nations still recognize Taiwan. There was considerable
    economic engagement, but not necessarily investment. It was
    extractive in nature--foodstuffs or minerals--resources.
    Generally, the Chinese come in, they bring their own workers,
    they execute the contracts that they have, they extract
    whatever product it is they're after. Sometimes the workers
    leave, and sometimes they stay. They're engaged in several--
    throughout the region--humanitarian projects that provide some
    services or capabilities to nations who have no other way to
    get that. Parallel with that, there was an engagement,
    militarily, very few strings, mostly nonlethal, in terms of
    equipment that was provided, and a robust training capability,
    which essentially opened up the doors in China for South
    American leaders and military forces to go to China and train.
    When I checked into it, I found out that the Cubans were the
    translators in the schools, providing the translation between
    Chinese and Spanish.
        Senator Webb. Fine. I have been following South America, as
    well, and I would agree with your assessment. Although I think
    that what you're going to be seeing more of is, with the
    incredible trade surplus that China has, and the cash reserves
    that they have on hand, you're going to see a lot more direct
    investment, even in South America.
        What I would appreciate is, perhaps, rather than asking for
    something for the record, which sometimes happens and sometimes
    doesn't quite happen the way we anticipate that it might, if I
    might get a visit from someone on your staff who could do a
    look at what's going on in Africa with this respect, and come
    in and sit down with me and my staff so we can gain an
    understanding of where things are.
        General Craddock. Absolutely.
        Senator Webb. Thank you very much. Thank you for your
    testimony.
        Chairman Levin [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Webb.
        I just have a few additional questions. If you have a few
    additional questions, Senator Webb, we'll just turn it right
    back to you. Or are you all set?
        Senator Webb. Mr. Chairman, I'm fully satisfied. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. On the question of missile defense
    agreements with Europe which has been raised here, the estimate
    of the Missile Defense Agency is that the parliamentary
    approval could take until 2009 to be completed. Does that sound
    about right?
        General Craddock. Mr. Chairman, I don't know. I can't opine
    on that.
        Chairman Levin. All right.
        The interceptor which is proposed for deployment in Poland
    has not been developed yet, as I understand it. Is that your
    understanding, or are you not familiar with that aspect of it?
        General Craddock. I know there's been several tests of an
    interceptor. I don't know if that's the model tested or not.
        Chairman Levin. Right. I don't think it's even planned to
    be tested for a year, or a couple of years, at any rate. So,
    we're not going to know for, actually, several years whether
    it's going to work effectively. As a military man, would you
    want to have confidence that the interceptor would be
    operationally effective before we would deploy it?
        General Craddock. Yes, I'd want it to work.
        Chairman Levin. The question of the cost, if this is going
    to happen, the Missile Defense Agency's estimated the cost of
    the European missile defense deployments at $4 billion through
    2013. I think your prepared testimony indicated there may be
    some additional costs related to undetermined infrastructure
    requirements. So, the cost could even be higher. Have there
    been any discussions with NATO about NATO burden sharing or
    NATO paying a portion of the cost if there's going to be this
    defense that is going to be deployed on their territory?
        General Craddock. Not to my knowledge. Again, there have
    been discussions here recently. I don't know if it's gotten
    into the next step, which is not what to do, but how to do it.
    Essentially, you said ``deployed on their territory,'' you're
    right, but that's Poland and Czech Republic territory.
        Chairman Levin. Correct.
        General Craddock. As opposed to NATO territory.
        Chairman Levin. Oh, I'm sorry. Okay. But it's a part of a
    NATO defense system.
        General Craddock. But it's a sovereign issue with the
    Czechs and the Poles both.
        Chairman Levin. With both. No, I respect that very much.
    That's why we talked about parliamentary approval.
        General Craddock. Right.
        Chairman Levin. But in terms of payment, in terms of any
    kind of apportioning of cost, of burdensharing, it's either
    going to be a NATO burdenshared, because it's proposed for NATO
    as a weapons system, or a defensive system. Before I even get
    to the individual countries, shouldn't there be discussion,
    either within NATO or those individual countries, or both,
    about paying the cost for the defense of territory, which is
    Polish and Czech territory, and which is part of a NATO defense
    system?
        General Craddock. If NATO, again, these are political
    decisions in North Atlantic Council, but if NATO embraces this,
    and approves this, and wants to be a part of it, then it would
    be eligible for common funding, it would seem to me. I don't
    know if that'll be the decision.
        Chairman Levin. Okay. We've heard some testimony here about
    some real readiness problems faced by our ground forces, and
    the efforts of the Army and Marine Corps, in particular, to
    deal with these readiness challenges. I'm just wondering--and
    you're familiar, I know, with the situation, up close and
    personal--what impacts have the readiness degradation had on
    your accomplishing, or you ability to accomplish missions?
        General Craddock. Mr. Chairman, in looking at the forces
    from EUCOM that rotate through, there are--Operation Iraqi
    Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom are largely Army and Air
    Force--I would say that the effects on readiness of those
    forces has been minimal. The effects--because these forces are
    rotating on a continual basis into Iraq and Afghanistan, then
    they come back for their dwell period. There's adequate
    equipment to train, to get back, then, for the next rotation.
    Obviously, time is always the issue. The training areas are
    adequate in Germany at the U.S. Army training facilities there.
    So, from that perspective, I think that even though there is
    high tempo, and it is a burden, I think it's adequate, because
    we are in a little bit of a different set there with the
    overseas posture. Beyond that, I think that the fact that they
    are rotating through creates fewer forces available to do some
    of our traditional missions--theater security cooperation, the
    engagement. We have to work through that. Oftentimes, then, we
    request forces back from continental United States Reserve
    Forces, obviously, to do those types of missions, when we can
    program it out to do that. So, I think the wear and tear, if
    you will, is probably more on the manpower of the force than on
    the equipment and the training areas.
        Chairman Levin. Okay, thanks.
        Back to Afghanistan and Pakistan. In February, the Director
    of National Intelligence, Mike McConnell, in his written
    testimony to the committee, said that the elimination of the
    safe haven that the Taliban and other extremists have found in
    Pakistan's tribal areas is a necessary step to end the
    insurgency in Afghanistan. It's not a sufficient step, but it's
    a necessary step. Would you agree with Director McConnell's
    assessment that eliminating extremist sanctuaries in Pakistan's
    tribal areas is necessary to end the insurgency in Afghanistan?
        General Craddock. I don't know that that will end it, but
    it will be a necessary step to enable us to end it, yes.
        Chairman Levin. Do you believe that Pakistan can do more to
    eliminate those sanctuaries?
        General Craddock. Mr. Chairman, I believe they are doing
    more, recently; and I think they can continue to do more.
        Chairman Levin. They could do even more than they're now
    doing?
        General Craddock. I believe so.
        Chairman Levin. Again, thank you for your testimony, for
    being here today, for your service. You have a huge
    responsibility, and we are very grateful for the way you attend
    to it.
        General Craddock. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        We stand adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
                       redeployment of troops from europe
        1. Senator Levin. General Craddock, in testimony before the House
    Armed Services Committee in March, you expressed reservations about the
    Department of Defense's (DOD) plans to significantly reduce the number
    of U.S. forces stationed in the European Command's (EUCOM) area of
    responsibility (AOR). Under the DOD base-restructuring plan announced
    in 2005, the number of U.S. troops stationed at main operating bases in
    Europe would be cut from over 100,000 to around 60,000 soldiers. Since
    then, your command has been heavily committed to providing forces in
    support of rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, the
    administration has announced plans to increase the size of the Army and
    Marine Corps. As part of this increase, the Army proposes to create six
    new light infantry combat brigades. Given the role our forces in Europe
    have played in operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq, do you believe
    it would be in our strategic interest to base one of more of these six
    additional brigades in Europe where they are easily deployable to the
    Central Command (CENTCOM) region, or the new Africa Command (AFRICOM)
    region?
        General Craddock. I have directed EUCOM to conduct a ``Troops to
    Task'' assessment to reconcile the assigned missions and tasks of EUCOM
    and its components with planned force strength levels and composition.
    The inspiration for the study comes from the recent National Military
    Strategy Risk Assessment in which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff (CJCS) stated, ``We will continue to build partner capacity and
    strengthen unity of effort with our interagency and international
    partners to defeat common enemies.'' To ensure EUCOM is ready to meet
    the Chairman's expectations, I tasked my EUCOM staff to determine if
    the troops available to EUCOM were adequate to meet the demands of the
    tasks implied in the CJCS risk assessment.
        The study consists of two parts, first the study determined if the
    assumptions and conditions that served as the basis for the 2001-2003
    force structure decisions remain accurate. Where assumptions and
    conditions have changed, the study will identify the implications of
    those changes. Second, the study focuses on the capabilities required
    to support EUCOM missions in the future. When possible, it identifies
    actual forces required to meet those missions. In addition to those
    specific missions addressed in EUCOM Contingency Plans (CONPLANs), this
    study reviews requirements to execute other EUCOM missions such as
    Theater Security Cooperation. The study also addresses requirements
    associated with the maintenance of U.S. leadership in the North
    Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The results of the study will be
    informed by the ongoing development of campaign plans for the EUCOM
    Theater Strategy for Active Security. The study is not finalized at
    this time.

        2. Senator Levin. General Craddock, what role are you playing in
    the decision of how many, if any, of these additional 65,000 Army
    personnel should be based in Europe?
        General Craddock. Those decisions are up to the Department of the
    Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The Troops to
    Task assessment will identify required capabilities, not particular
    units or end strengths. We will then ask the Service components to
    provide those capabilities as needed. It will be a Secretary of Defense
    and Military Service Department's decision for how best to provide the
    capabilities required for EUCOM.

        3. Senator Levin. General Craddock, is DOD going to make a
    recommendation on where to base these forces before we make any
    irrevocable decisions to return property in Germany?
        General Craddock. I cannot comment on this for the DOD. I will
    provide my study findings to the CJCS and the Secretary of Defense.

        4. Senator Levin. General Craddock, do you believe the DOD's base
    restructuring plan for Europe needs to be reexamined?
        General Craddock. EUCOM continually conducts internal assessments
    of base restructuring plans in Europe. The results of EUCOM's
    assessments may form the basis for the Secretary of Defense to
    reexamine the basing plan, resulting in adjustments to the size and
    composition of forces slated to remain in Europe under Global Defense
    Posture Phase I. Any adjustments to the original base structure will be
    communicated to Capitol Hill.

                                   readiness
        5. Senator Levin. General Craddock, the lower basic readiness in
    our nondeployed forces has increased the costs and time required to get
    ready for worldwide contingencies. As EUCOM Commander, you are facing
    the increasing likelihood that ground forces deployed at your bases in
    Europe or from the United States will be slower to arrive and less
    prepared than your current CONPLANs assume. This lack of strategic
    depth in our ground forces carries significant operational risk that it
    would take longer to achieve a military victory and that would result
    in increased casualties. What are your views of the readiness
    challenges faced by our ground forces and the efforts of the Army and
    Marine Corps to deal with them?
        General Craddock. Unit readiness and the resultant impacts on rapid
    response and the deployability of our forces are current challenges and
    are a concern to all the combatant commanders (COCOMs), myself
    included. This situation is not one that can be overcome quickly, but
    the Department, General Conway, and General Casey are addressing these
    challenges through the end strength increases and readiness funding
    authorized by Congress. The specifics of how and when we will be able
    to mitigate these challenges are of interest to me, but best
    articulated by the Army and the Marine Corps.

        6. Senator Levin. General Craddock, how do these challenges impact
    your ability to accomplish your missions today? Is the risk acceptable
    and how will you know when it crosses a line and becomes unacceptable?
        General Craddock. The risk is significant, given the size of the
    EUCOM AOR, the numbers and types of activities ongoing, the continuing
    instability in a number of our countries/regions, and the operations
    that we feel are critical in meeting our Theater Strategy of Active
    Security. As I noted in an earlier response, the forces required to
    execute missions essential to our Theater Security Cooperation
    requirements are in the most part unavailable due to current and
    projected deployments of EUCOM assigned forces to support Operation
    Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).
        The net result, initiatives either unexecuted or delayed, truncates
    both the progress we have made to date and hinders our ability to
    commence new actions with partners who desire improved capabilities. In
    real terms this denies us the leverage to either bring along others who
    are willing to operate with us in the Middle East or those who need our
    training and support to address issues within their own borders--
    thereby reducing the overall future demand signal for direct U.S.
    military involvement. With respect to our NATO partners, activities and
    exercises that bolster our relationship within the alliance are
    adversely affected by our inability to fully participate in bilateral
    events that reinforce our commitment, that promote NATO operational
    transformation, and that foster stronger relationships with key
    nations.
        Given the current mission set U.S. EUCOM is tasked to support, the
    risk to our ability to address those emerging threats and challenges
    within the EUCOM AOR with minimal forces and resources has dramatically
    increased. It is important to emphasize that providing the necessary
    resources and capabilities now greatly reduces the very likely
    possibility of a significantly greater resource requirement in the
    future because we are unable to adequately address current threats and
    emerging challenges. Ongoing requirements for OIF and OEF, while real
    and necessary, have severely impacted our Theater Security Cooperation
    activities--what I see as my priority mission in this AOR.

        7. Senator Levin. General Craddock, what are the long-term
    implications of these lower levels of readiness for your command? What
    are you doing to manage this risk and at what cost? How long can you
    sustain this level of risk, assuming it does not get worse before it
    gets better?
        General Craddock. The risk is manageable, but only in the short-
    term. The lack of adequate forces in EUCOM needed to conduct a rigorous
    Security Cooperation (SC) program threatens our leadership role in NATO
    and with the Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations. We were able to
    secure the robust contributions of Poland and Romania to OIF because we
    had acted decisively to help them rebuild their militaries from the old
    Soviet model to one compatible with NATO. We used U.S. forces already
    in Europe to develop habitual relationships with the PfP nations that
    built trust between our Nation's military and those of the PfP nations.
    These interpersonal relationships continue to be very important in
    securing partner cooperation. If we do not continue these programs we
    risk not having capable and willing partners in the future.

                          troop levels in afghanistan
        8. Senator Levin. General Craddock, British General David Richards,
    former International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Commander, has
    recently written that as a result of a shortage of forces in 2006,
    coalition forces ``found it difficult to maintain security where we
    have gained it, and we were using the Afghan security forces (ASF) more
    than is ideal for its development and growth.'' The town of Musa Qala
    in Helmand Province was overrun by Taliban forces after British troops
    withdrew under an agreement with local elders. Last month, it was
    reported that Afghan soldiers and police retook an Afghan town
    approximately 100 miles from Kabul, a town which had been overrun by
    Taliban fighters earlier. Do we have sufficient ISAF and ASF to be able
    not only to clear Taliban forces from provincial towns but also to hold
    on to those areas once they've been secured? If not, what steps are you
    recommending to address this shortfall?
        General Craddock. With the forces currently available, Commander,
    ISAF (COMISAF) generally has the ability to initially ``secure'' an
    area but must rely on Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to
    ``hold'' it. The Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) for
    ISAF still has significant shortfalls, to include maneuver battalions
    in the southern region, air-transport capability, counterimprovised
    explosive device (C-IED) equipment, and intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance assets. One of our most significant shortfalls and my
    highest priority lies in commitments of observer, mentor, and liaison
    teams (OMLTs), which are central to building the Afghan National Army
    (ANA) capacity to provide security for their own country. In my
    experience as SACEUR, I am continuously--along with subordinate NATO
    leaders--engaging with NATO members and partners for greater ISAF
    contributions.

                                missile defense
        9. Senator Levin. General Craddock, the long-range missile defense
    system proposed to be deployed in Europe would be part of the Ground-
    based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, designed to defend the U.S.
    Homeland against long-range ballistic missiles. The GMD system was
    never designed to be integrated into any NATO missile defense system.
    It is designed to be controlled by the United States, from the United
    States. On April 19, 2007, the NATO Secretary General said that all 26
    NATO allies share the view that ``any U.S. system which will be
    negotiated with our Polish and Czech colleagues, should be
    complimentary to any NATO missile defense system.''
        The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has estimated the cost of the
    proposed European missile defense deployments at $4 billion through
    fiscal year 2013. Your prepared testimony indicated that there may be
    additional costs related to undetermined infrastructure requirements.
    If so, the cost would presumably be higher. So far, it appears that the
    United States is expected to pay the full cost of this proposal to
    defend European territory. How will the proposed long-range U.S. system
    be integrated with NATO missile defense systems?
        General Craddock. OSD and the MDA are leading U.S./NATO Ballistic
    Missile Defense (BMD) cooperation. EUCOM has not received authorization
    or guidance from OSD/Joint Staff to engage in BMD cooperation
    activities with NATO.
        The United States fully supports designing the U.S. missile defense
    assets in Europe to be compatible with future NATO BMD system. The NATO
    Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program will
    provide a common command and control architecture to integrate systems
    for defending NATO deployed forces against short- and medium-range
    ballistic missile threats. Since the United States is considering a
    long-range missile defense system, whereas the ALTBMD program is
    focused on shorter-range systems, the U.S. system could be used to
    complement the NATO layered defense program. The United States has
    consulted closely with NATO allies and staff throughout this process
    and will continue to do so as we move forward.

        10. Senator Levin. General Craddock, what role would EUCOM and NATO
    have in decisionmaking about the operational use of the proposed long-
    range system?
        General Craddock. Due to the short flight time of ballistic
    missiles (approximately 15 minutes from the Middle East to Central
    Europe), operational commanders are unlikely to have time to consult
    with NATO and host country authorities in real-time before engaging a
    threat. As an integral part of the U.S. BMD system tasked to protect
    the United States and allies both within and outside of NATO, U.S. BMD
    assets fielded in Europe would remain under U.S. command and control to
    allow them to address these multiple commitments. The United States
    will continue to consult with NATO and host countries in advance to
    share perspectives on operational issues such as command and control of
    U.S. interceptors based in Europe.

        11. Senator Levin. General Craddock, have there been any
    discussions of NATO burdensharing, or NATO paying a portion of the
    costs for the defense of their territory? If not, why not?
        General Craddock. Burdensharing has been an important topic for the
    alliance over the years. For example, the emergence of a European
    Security and Defense Identity within NATO was prompted by alliance
    discussions in the 1990s on Europe taking on a greater share of the
    defense burden. NATO expenditures for command structure, routine and
    crisis management operations, and infrastructure are funded commonly by
    the NATO nations, with the share of funding determined by a preset
    formula. National defense budgets are not set by NATO, although defense
    spending of 2 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) within the
    alliance is an agreed upon target. In this context, national defense
    spending or alliance expenditures are a regular topic of discussion
    within the North Atlantic Council.

             impact of potential military counternarcotics mission
        12. Senator Levin. General Craddock, my understanding is that the
    U.S. military does not currently have a counternarcotics mission in
    Afghanistan. Our forces have been instructed to seize narcotics and
    destroy labs that they come across during the course of their normal
    operations, but they do not have an explicit order to seek and seize or
    destroy narcotics, drug lords, or narcotics labs. Should U.S. forces
    have an explicit counterdrug mission in Afghanistan?
        General Craddock. Other than the forces assigned to the ISAF
    mission, U.S. military units come under the control of CENTCOM. I will
    therefore defer to Admiral Fallon on the issue of direct use of U.S.
    military forces in counterdrug activities.
        The Government of Afghanistan (GOA) is responsible for planning and
    programming the overall Afghan National Counternarcotics strategy and
    law enforcement elements of the counternarcotics campaign. The
    international community supports the GOA through a variety of bilateral
    and multi-national programs. NATO/ISAF supports Afghan counternarcotics
    efforts through the sharing of information/intelligence, logistics and
    transportation, and can assist with training ANSFs in related skills.

        13. Senator Levin. General Craddock, if the U.S. military were to
    take on the mission of capturing drug lords and dismantling drug labs
    in Afghanistan, what would be the impact on the drug trade in
    Afghanistan?
        General Craddock. EUCOM defers to CENTCOM on matters concerning
    non-ISAF U.S. military units operating in Afghanistan.

                     shift from eradication to interdiction
        14. Senator Levin. General Craddock, in November 2007, the United
    Nations (U.N.) and World Bank released a report on the drug industry in
    Afghanistan that concluded that international efforts to combat opium
    production--including almost $400 million just in DOD counternarcotics
    funds have failed. The report recommended focusing on interdiction, and
    targeting opium refining facilities and wealthy drug lords. Last month
    a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report on
    Afghanistan also recommended shifting the effort from eradication to
    interdiction and paying farmers for poppy, and not to grow poppy. Have
    you read these reports, and do you agree with their conclusions?
        General Craddock. I have read both the CSIS and U.N./World Bank
    studies and believe that while many of the study's recommendations have
    merit, a balanced approach to confronting the drug industry on all
    fronts is required. As I have stated above, the United States and NATO
    play a supporting role to the Government in Kabul which will craft a
    national counterdrug strategy.

        15. Senator Levin. General Craddock, should international forces
    focus on interdiction, capturing drug lords, and destroying drug
    facilities?
        General Craddock. The international community agreed that, in its
    support to Afghanistan, the British would undertake lead nation efforts
    in counterdrug activities. While the results thus far have been less
    than desired, success in countering this highly destabilizing condition
    will require the assistance of all nations committed to seeing
    Afghanistan succeed as an independent and capable partner in the
    future.

      american servicemembers protection act--impact on foreign military
                               financing program
        16. Senator Levin. General Craddock, in your written statement you
    assert that a number of countries forfeit Foreign Military Financing
    (FMF) from the United States because a lever used by the U.S.
    Government in the American Servicemembers Protection Act (ASPA) is
    prohibiting countries from receiving FMF if they have ratified the
    Treaty of Rome establishing the International Criminal Court without
    also signing a so-called ``Article 98'' agreement exempting U.S.
    personnel from being brought before that court by their governments.
    Could you elaborate on the impact of the ASPA restriction on FMF in
    your AOR?
        General Craddock. The ASPA restrictions on FMF have both direct and
    indirect negative effects on our SC program in the EUCOM AOR. It has
    directly cut some countries out of the program. More significantly, it
    has indirectly discouraged countries from participating in FMF
    programs. Flexibility in applying its restrictions would help EUCOM's
    SC actors build partnerships that achieve our country-specific and
    regional goals and increase host nation support to the global war on
    terror.
        From 2001-2003, Croatia, Malta, and Moldova, all with significant
    existing SC programs, received a total of $27 million in FMF funds.
    Since the enactment of ASPA, they have received none, to the detriment
    of our cooperative relations.
        In Africa, following a similar pattern, more than $330,000 in
    allocated FMF funds were unable to be executed due to ASPA
    restrictions. These restrictions have put a damper on relations with
    key African coastline nations, such as South Africa and Tanzania.
        Most directly, ASPA sanctions on FMF punish a country's military,
    which often has little influence over the political structure of that
    country. More importantly, sanctions on FMF can severely restrict our
    ability to positively influence events in a country and gain or
    strengthen U.S. strategic access.

         global peace operations initiative--sudan and recent missions
        17. Senator Levin. General Craddock, the Global Peace Operations
    Initiative (GPOI) was initiated by the President in 2005 in order to
    ensure that the available pool of peacekeepers would be increased,
    especially in Africa. To your knowledge, how many of the countries who
    have participated in the GPOI have sent peacekeepers trained under the
    program to U.N. peacekeeping missions, and how many of them do we
    believe will contribute to the U.N. mission in Sudan or other upcoming
    missions?
        General Craddock. Currently 19 African countries are partners in
    the GPOI African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program
    and 18 of them are currently supporting U.N. peacekeeping missions. Of
    these 18 countries, 15 are supporting the U.N. mission in Sudan. There
    continues to be a considerable amount of support for this program and I
    believe contributing countries will continue the U.N. mission in Sudan
    and/or other upcoming missions. Current GPOI countries include: Benin,
    Botswana, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Malawi, Mozambique,
    Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania,
    Uganda, Zambia.

                                 africa command
        18. Senator Levin. General Craddock, in the coming months, you and
    your partners on the AFRICOM transition team will be working to
    finalize how this new Combatant Command will operate, the composition
    of its command structure, and the interagency model that it follow. The
    committee staff has been told that the new command will have a State
    Department civilian in the position of deputy commander. What is your
    opinion of this proposal?
        General Craddock. I strongly support this proposal. Having a senior
    State Department official in the position of deputy commander is an
    innovative way to synchronize defense activities with diplomatic and
    development efforts. This is a critical function for a command whose
    mission includes unity of effort towards security, stability, and
    peaceful development.

        19. Senator Levin. General Craddock, do you think a State
    Department official should be in the military chain of command?
        General Craddock. Our intent is that a senior State Department
    official will hold one of two deputy positions as the Deputy Commander
    for Civil-Military Affairs (DCMA), on par with the Deputy Commander for
    Military Operations (DCMO). The DCMA will direct and serve as the focal
    point for policy, planning, and execution for AFRICOM regional Theater
    Security Cooperation, including humanitarian assistance, disaster
    relief, peace and security programs, medical and health assistance, and
    strategic outreach.
        Per title 10 of the U.S.C., the DCMO will assume command
    responsibility in the absence of the commander and will issue military
    orders.
        We will also place other interagency personnel into leadership and
    management positions within the headquarters structure to direct the
    activities of the command, but, by law, they will not be able to issue
    military orders.

        20. Senator Levin. General Craddock, what decisionmaking authority
    do you believe interagency members of the command should be given?
    Should they be more than liaison officers?
        General Craddock. Decisionmaking authority for interagency members
    of the command should be the same as that of military staff, i.e.,
    commensurate with their position, rank, and expertise. They will be
    more than liaison officers--they will be command staff, undertaking
    command duties and functions, as well as providing needed perspective
    and expertise from their respective home agencies. Interagency
    personnel in leadership and management positions will direct and guide
    activities within the scope of the responsibilities of their position.
    Interagency staff will not have special authority over home agency
    personnel, programs, or resources, unless that authority is granted by
    the home agency.

        21. Senator Levin. General Craddock, what roles and
    responsibilities should the interagency members of this command have?
        General Craddock. Interagency members of AFRICOM will hold
    positions in areas where military activities overlap with the expertise
    of civilian agencies; e.g., in areas of Theater Security Cooperation,
    including humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, peace and security
    programs, medical and health assistance, and strategic outreach.
    Interagency personnel will be in functional, advisory, and management
    positions within the command. As with military and DOD civilian staff,
    their responsibilities will be commensurate with their position, rank,
    and expertise.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
                             missile defense system
        22. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, the Russians are not happy
    about the administration's plan to build a missile defense system in
    Poland and the Czech Republic. Administration officials have stated
    publicly that the system is relatively small and designed to protect
    the United States and its allies from a missile attack from Iran.
    Russian officials, however, have stated their suspicions that the
    system could ultimately be expanded and become a defense against
    Russia's huge strategic missile forces. Secretary Rice said the United
    States would build the system with or without Russia's agreement,
    although she says we want to do it ``in a cooperative way.'' Have you
    had any discussions with senior Russian military officers regarding the
    proposed missile defense system? If so, have they indicated any
    concerns to you from the military perspective?
        General Craddock. EUCOM's discussions with Russian military
    officers have been focused on practical bilateral cooperation and
    developing military interoperability. During the U.S.-Russia General/
    Flag Officer Consultations 22-23 May 2007, leadership from both sides
    agreed to leave discussion of the U.S. Europe-based BMD initiative to
    the political level.

        23. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, in your opinion, has there
    been any impact on the military-to-military relations between our two
    countries since we announced our intention to build these systems in
    Europe?
        General Craddock. EUCOM has not noted any substantive impact in our
    practical military-to-military relations with Russia since we announced
    our intentions to establish a BMD system in Europe. Despite media
    reporting on the Europe-based BMD issue, the Russian legislature
    approved observance of the NATO-PfP Status of Forces Agreement on 23
    May 2007. President Putin signed this agreement and it will enter into
    force 1 month after submission to the Department of State. During U.S.-
    Russia General/Flag Officer Consultations 22-23 May 2007, the senior
    Russian delegate (a two-star general) stated that U.S.-Russia military
    cooperation continues on a positive trend.

        24. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, if you were a Russian general,
    what do you think your reaction would be to our plan to build this
    system next door to your country?
        General Craddock. [Deleted.]

        25. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, in the spirit of building the
    system ``in a cooperative way,'' what type of assurances do you think
    we could give the Russians that might reduce their discomfort over the
    plan to build this system in Europe?
        General Craddock. The United States has consulted with the Russians
    at senior levels on numerous occasions regarding U.S. BMD plans,
    including the NATO-Russia Council and several bilateral discussions. In
    those discussions, the United States offered to explore Russian
    participation and contributions to missile defense initiatives. The
    U.S. consultative process has been transparent and has actively engaged
    Russia regarding our missile defense policy, plans, and programs. The
    proposed European system is not technically capable of threatening
    Russia's ballistic missile assets. Russia's ballistic missiles could
    easily overwhelm the United State's limited number of deployed
    interceptors. Also, the physics and trajectories of Russian launches
    toward the United States make it clear that interceptors placed in
    Central Europe could never catch a Russian missile. European MD assets
    are designed to address a threat that comes from the Middle East, not
    from Russia. Of particular note, Secretary of Defense Gates recently
    sent a letter to Minister Serdyukov asking him to carefully consider a
    U.S. invitation for Russian experts to visit missile defense facilities
    in the United States Secretary Gates also suggested that a Russian
    expert-level delegation provide the United States with Russian views
    about possible areas of missile defense cooperation.

        26. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, in a March 26 interview with
    Der Spiegel Online International (see attached article), Philip E.
    Coyle, who had been in charge of weapons testing and evaluation under
    President Clinton, indicated that he had strong reservations about the
    administration's deployment of anti-missile systems in Europe.
    Specifically, when asked ``who would a U.S. missile defense system in
    Poland protect? Europe or the East Coast of the United States?'', he
    responded, ``For all we know, neither one. The missile defense systems
    already deployed in California and Alaska have not demonstrated the
    capability to destroy enemy missiles under realistic conditions. The
    equipment to be deployed in Poland is no different.'' When the
    interviewer pointed out that ``The U.S. military claims that the system
    has been tested and works fine,'' he responded that, ``all you have to
    do is look at their most recent test. It was successful, but it was
    also the least difficult test they have ever conducted. They are no
    further along today than they were back when I was in the Pentagon
    during the Clinton administration.'' Do you agree with the statements
    made by Mr. Coyle? If not, why not? If you do agree, then do you
    believe that it is a good policy to risk antagonizing the Russians (and
    potentially the Chinese) in order to field a system that has not been
    demonstrated to be very effective?

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        General Craddock. I am not familiar with the allegations made in
    this article, nor can I question the methodology the MDA employs to
    design the most effective missile defense systems possible. However,
    based on the threat we face, I believe it is vital that we field and
    continue to update/improve missile defense technology as it becomes
    available to ensure we are doing everything within our power to protect
    U.S. interests at home and overseas.

        27. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, in your view, is deployment of
    two of these systems to Europe, as well as in Alaska, really an
    effective use of tax dollars? If so, please explain why.
        General Craddock. The EUCOM AOR requires a mix of systems
    (interceptors, radars, and command and control) that provide defense
    against short, medium, intermediate, and intercontinental missiles in
    all phases of flight (boost, mid-course, and terminal). The European
    Site Initiative, one component in this ``mix of systems,'' would
    supplement defense of the United States and defend most of Europe,
    deployed forces, friends, and allies from emerging long-range ballistic
    missile threats in Southwest Asia.

        28. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic
    Missile (ABM) treaty was developed between the Soviet Union and the
    United States in order to reduce nuclear proliferation. The idea being
    that if we and the Soviets were not developing ABM systems, we would
    not need to keep increasing the numbers of intercontinental ballistic
    missiles (ICBMs) in our inventories in order to maintain a capability
    to overwhelm the opponent's ABM systems. It seems safe to say that
    history has shown this to have been an effective treaty. Strategic
    deterrence or fear of nuclear retaliation prevented aggression between
    the two nations. The administration has changed the U.S. posture on ABM
    systems, withdrawing from the ABM treaty and developing a layered
    approach to missile defense. What are your views of the changes in our
    missile defense policy?
        General Craddock. Withdrawal from the ABM treaty 5 years ago was
    not a change in our missile defense policy as it pertains to Russia--
    the United States remains committed to limiting the strategic
    inventories of both nations, and is not intending to pursue ABM systems
    to defend against Russian missiles. As is stated in the question,
    historically, it was the threat of strategic retaliation that prevented
    aggression between Russia and the United States, not the development of
    ABM systems. The impracticality of any ABM system to defeat a nuclear
    inventory such as is possessed by Russia has been acknowledged by both
    nations. This is still true today, and any current or future ABM system
    would therefore not logically be designed for defense (or conversion to
    offense) against an overwhelming number of Russian missiles.
        Withdrawal from the ABM treaty was a recognition of, and response
    to, an entirely different and new threat--that of missile attack by
    rogue nations and/or terrorist organizations. Pursuit of a missile
    defense program is an appropriate and necessary response to this
    threat. Although the treaty was with Russia, we withdrew from it not to
    develop weapons against Russia, but to free us to develop defenses
    against a very real and emerging threat.

        29. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, if fear of a nuclear
    retaliatory response from the United States was enough to keep the
    Soviet Union from attacking the United States, and the Soviets were a
    super power, why do you think that rogue nations like Iran and North
    Korea would be unafraid of the same type of response were they to
    launch a missile against the United States? In other words, why is
    nuclear deterrence an inadequate policy for protecting our Nation now
    when it was a central basis for our security for decades?
        General Craddock. Against the Soviet Union, nuclear deterrence was
    based on the assumption that both sides, when faced with the potential
    consequences of nuclear conflict, would make the rational and
    responsible decision that the outcome of such a conflict would leave
    both sides devastated. The Soviets could be trusted to ``do the right
    thing.'' Whether or not nuclear deterrence was by itself responsible,
    the fact is that not only were there no nuclear engagements, there also
    were no direct conventional conflicts between the two nations. It could
    be said that nuclear deterrence forestalled any conventional conflicts
    over fears of escalation.
        In today's environment, the threat of rogue nations and terrorist
    organizations cannot be dealt with in the same manner as the Soviet
    Union because they cannot be counted on to act according to the U.S.
    concepts of rationality. There is a significantly lower confidence
    level in the idea that the threat of a nuclear retaliation by the
    United States would prevent an attack, nuclear or otherwise, on our
    country, our allies, or our interests by a rogue nation or nonstate
    actor. In fact, we have been attacked despite the fact our enemies knew
    of our nuclear strike capabilities. There is less reason to believe a
    non-state actor or even perhaps a rogue nation would not employ weapons
    of mass destruction (WMD)--if not by a rogue nation directly, then via
    the transfer of such weapons to entities with little to lose by using
    them. Deterrence will not work against an adversary that has nothing to
    lose. We therefore must focus our efforts on nonproliferation and
    defense against potential attacks. Such efforts will provide a layered
    alternative to nuclear retaliation.

        30. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, in your opinion, does our
    backing out of the ABM treaty have any negative consequences? For
    instance, what does it tell our allies, or other nations in the world,
    when we back out of a successful anti-proliferation treaty, such as the
    ABM treaty?
        General Craddock. The ABM treaty was not directly a
    nonproliferation treaty. It was not designed to prevent the spread of
    nuclear weapons to other countries, but rather to maintain the balance
    of power between the United States and Soviet Union and prevent the
    need for massive weapons buildup, as was stated in a previous question.
    In any event, our withdrawal from the treaty occurred 5 years ago and
    at the time it seemed the biggest potential consequence was that
    without the treaty, the events it was designed to prevent would begin
    to occur. This has not happened. The most significant impact has been
    the perception by Russia and a few others nations that the United
    States wishes to gain an advantage, and that perception has created
    some negative political ramifications. In the 5 years since the end of
    the treaty, we have been able to, through dialogue and by our actions,
    convince most parties that we only want to respond to the emerging
    rogue and terrorist threats we now face. The current need for a missile
    defense system affects not only us but our allies and partners,
    including Russia. We want to work together on this issue, and as a
    result we continue to invite a cooperative approach.

                                 eucom and nato
        31. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, what are the views of our NATO
    allies (both military and civilian) regarding our missile defense
    actions implemented under the Bush administration?
        General Craddock. I believe that there is a shared perception
    amongst allies of a common threat from ballistic missiles and that any
    U.S. and NATO systems deployed should be complementary. The issue of
    missile defense is not new to NATO and the position of the alliance is
    clear. NATO is pursuing a three-track approach to missile defense, to
    include: (1) the ongoing NATO project to develop by 2010 a `theater
    missile defense' for deployed troops; (2) NATO's 26 nations have agreed
    to assess by February 2008 the implications for the alliance of the
    U.S. missile defense system; and (3) NATO will continue its existing
    cooperation with Russia on theater missile defense as well as on
    related issues.

        32. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, according to a new State
    Department report, terrorists are changing their tactics. Specifically,
    the report states that early terrorist attacks were largely
    expeditionary, with terrorists selected and trained in one country,
    then secretly inserted into the target country to conduct their attack.
    The report further states that the new trend is toward guerilla
    terrorism, where the terrorist team is grown close to its target, using
    target country nationals. Finally, the report states that this trend is
    a shift in the nature of terrorism, from traditional international
    terrorism into a new form of transnational, non-state warfare that
    resembles a form of global insurgency. According to the report, this
    represents a new era of warfare.
        This report, as well as information you provided in your statement,
    suggests that the battlefield for the war on terror can no longer be
    limited to Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed, while our military is tied
    down in Iraq and Afghanistan, the terrorists are expanding the
    battlefield throughout the world. How do you think the change in
    terrorist strategy should affect our military strategies in Iraq and
    Afghanistan, and what do you think we should do to adapt?
        General Craddock. I would refer the committee to Commander, U.S.
    CENTCOM, regarding evolving threats in Iraq and Afghanistan and any
    intended changes in the U.S. approach. Throughout the 92 sovereign
    countries in EUCOM's AOR, we are actively engaged with allies and
    partners to defeat violent extremist organizations and their supporting
    infrastructure.
        In North Africa the U.S. Government is currently focused on
    capacity building activities aimed at changing the strategic
    environment in order to deny terrorists freedom of action and access to
    safe havens. As a supporting element of the Department of State's
    Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Program, EUCOM near-term efforts are
    focused on the nine OEF Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS) nations, building their
    capability to combat terrorism and promoting regional stability. EUCOM
    continues to conduct operations and activities in support of Combined
    Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa. Throughout the EUCOM AOR, our SC
    activities continue to support U.S. Government efforts to address
    sources of instability and populations susceptibility to extremist
    messaging and calls to violence.
        In the long-term, I recommend a forum between U.S. Government
    agencies and key partners be established to develop solutions to the
    expansion of operational trans-national networks. The U.S. Government
    must also strengthen legal institutions to better enable countries to
    prosecute terrorists. We will be successful through effective
    cooperation with partners and allies, and with unity of effort across
    all elements of U.S. national power.

        33. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, has EUCOM's or NATO's
    strategies in the war on terror adjusted to the new terrorist tactics?
    If so, how? If not, why not?
        General Craddock. EUCOM recognizes that the war on terrorism is
    continually evolving. In studying the diverse characteristics of the
    EUCOM AOR, I am convinced that EUCOM has to make a strategic shift from
    ``prediction'' to ``positioning.'' The strategic shift to positioning
    includes not only predicting where the next event will occur but also
    postures the U.S. Government to act in an agile and flexible manner
    with the appropriate authorities. Additionally, the U.S. Government
    strategy to combat the global terrorist must encompass more than just
    largely a DOD approach--it will take a full governmental effort, over
    time, to preclude the conditions that give rise to terrorist
    organizations and activities.

                       eucom and the global war on terror
        34. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, what changes to our overall
    national strategy in the global war on terror would you recommend?
        General Craddock. We will be successful through effective
    cooperation with partners and allies, and with unity of effort across
    all elements of U.S. national power. In January 2007, the National
    Security Council's Counterterrorism Security Group directed the DOD and
    the Department of State to lead interagency efforts to develop regional
    priorities for the global war on terror. EUCOM supports efforts aimed
    to: make hard, logical choices for where and how to focus U.S.
    Government efforts in a world of scarce resources; define regional
    priorities according to violent extremist threat and capability, U.S.
    interests, and the capabilities of partner nations; and integrate
    regional prioritization into agency budget formulation processes and
    the Office of Management and Budget review of agency budgets.

        35. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, since September 11, the United
    States has relied heavily on our military for prosecuting the war on
    terror. Our invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq have placed a heavy toll
    on the readiness of our military, and on the ability of the National
    Guard to provide disaster relief at home. What has been the impact of
    the Iraq and Afghanistan wars on the readiness of troops in the EUCOM
    AOR?
        General Craddock. The question for EUCOM is more one of
    availability versus readiness. The frequent deployments and need to
    provide adequate dwell time affect all forces sourced to OEF and OIF.
    However, in this case EUCOM is actually more fortunate than other
    commands in that we have excellent facilities at Grafenwohr and
    Hohenfels for our units to conduct their pre-deployment training. The
    negative impact upon EUCOM is that forces are unavailable to conduct
    Theater Security Cooperation with potential partner nations. We cannot
    expect these nations to continue to support us in Iraq and Afghanistan
    if we cannot provide training and equipment they need to fight
    effectively alongside the United States and other wealthy NATO nations.
    To build partner capacity we must have forward positioned forces able
    to set the example and train with our partners. By stationing them in
    Europe, our forces develop the habitual relationships that build the
    trust and confidence so vital in combat operations. When we take these
    units out of Europe to conduct operations in the short-term, we give up
    many times their number in partner nation capacity in the long-term.

        36. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, the United States does not
    have unlimited resources to fight the war on terror. As such, I am
    interested in your views on our approach to the global war on terror so
    far. In your opinion, has the war in Iraq been the most effective and
    efficient use of our taxpayer resources in fighting the global war on
    terror?
        General Craddock. We will be successful in fighting the global war
    on terror through effective cooperation with partners and allies, and
    with unity of effort across all elements of U.S. national power. In
    January 2007, the National Security Council's Counterterrorism Security
    Group directed the DOD and the Department of State to lead the
    interagency effort to develop regional priorities for the global war on
    terror. EUCOM supports efforts aimed to make hard, logical choices for
    where and how to focus U.S. Government efforts in an environment of
    constrained resources; define regional priorities according to violent
    extremist threats and capabilities, U.S. interests, and the
    capabilities of partner nations; and integrate regional prioritization
    into agency budget formulation processes and Office of Management and
    Budget review of agency budgets.

        37. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, do you think we have
    implemented the best possible strategy for this war? For instance, do
    you think we might have gotten a bigger bang for our buck by using an
    alternate strategy instead of using the military as the primary weapon
    against terrorists?
        General Craddock. The military has an important role in supporting
    U.S. Government efforts to disrupt or defeat violent extremist attacks
    at home, to disrupt their networks and support infrastructure abroad,
    to deny them possession or use of WMD and associated technology, and in
    building partner capabilities. The aim of these efforts is to establish
    a global environment inhospitable to violent extremism. While the DOD
    has an important role to play, the U.S. Government will be successful
    in fighting the global war on terror through effective cooperation with
    partners and allies, and with unity of effort across all elements of
    U.S. national power.

        38. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, could we have utilized our
    limited resources more efficiently by stepping up our efforts in other
    areas, such as law enforcement, intelligence, and support to allies and
    partner nations, to fight terrorist organizations, with surgical use of
    our military to make strikes when needed (e.g., for destruction of
    rogue nation weapons production facilities, terrorist training
    facilities, or WMD research facilities, et cetera)? In your answer, I
    would like you to consider not only the monetary and military readiness
    impacts of the war in Iraq, but the effect that U.S. efforts in the
    Iraq war has had politically and militarily on our allies in the EUCOM
    AOR and their willingness to support us in the war on terror.
        General Craddock. I would defer to Admiral Fallon, Commander U.S.
    CENTCOM, to address specific questions on Iraq.
        There remains considerable support for U.S. efforts in the global
    war on terror. Most recently, the Government of Georgia announced plans
    to increase their military presence in Iraq--nearly tripling the number
    of Georgian coalition forces providing support to OIF. Additionally,
    all 26 NATO member nations have deployed personnel to support the ISAF
    in Afghanistan. However, our time there is finite--the military
    capacity of the Afghanistan government must at some point be capable of
    defending itself and its people. Getting the Afghanistan government on
    its feet is the fundamental prerequisite to our eventual exit from that
    country.

        39. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, the President says we must
    fight them in Iraq or else they will follow us back. Given the
    successful al Qaeda attacks in Spain and the UK, as well as attacks
    that have been foiled, it seems they have already followed us back. Do
    you agree? If not, why not?
        General Craddock. Our nation is at war with violent extremist
    organizations who pose a threat to our security and to that of all
    societies that cherish the principles of pluralism and self-government.
    As evidenced by numerous attacks and disrupted plots, violent extremist
    organizations continue to seek weakness in the national security
    structure of the United States and our allies. Where they find such
    weakness, I am confident they will seek to strike with all means at
    their disposal.

                    international security assistance force
        40. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, how much are the national
    caveats placed on allied forces in the ISAF hindering the effectiveness
    of the operations in Afghanistan compared to what ISAF capabilities
    could be if there were no national caveats?
        General Craddock. The effects of caveats have been reduced in the
    past year, providing Commander ISAF (COMISAF) with more flexibility.
    COMISAF has been able to work around existing caveats to successfully
    conduct his mission. Caveats regarding in-extremis support were removed
    by all nations and provide for a greater degree of security for NATO
    forces in Afghanistan. Removal of all caveats would provide COMISAF
    with greater flexibility in the conduct of ISAF's mission.

        41. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, why have our allies placed
    caveats on the use of their troops in support of ISAF operations in
    Afghanistan?
        General Craddock. The reasons for caveats vary from nation to
    nation. In general there are several major reasons:
        Use of a force only in a specific area:

             Too expensive/no logistic mechanism to support the unit at a
            distance from their home base
             Inability to provide effective command and control at
            extended distances from their base

        Use of force for specific types of missions:

             National decisions on the types of missions they provided
            their forces to perform--security, support for development, et
            cetera

        Use of force only in conjunction with another specific country's
    force:

             Some nations lack the enablers to support their forces in
            theater; therefore, they made bilateral agreements with another
            nation for support
             Some nations have confidence in working with other nations
            due to previous experiences, shared languages, or shared
            cultures.

        42. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, have you, your staff, or your
    predecessors attempted to negotiate with our allies to have these
    restrictions lifted or reduced? If not, why not? If so, what has been
    the basis for our allies refusing to remove or relax these
    restrictions?
        General Craddock. Deputy SACEUR, the SHAPE staff, together with the
    Military Committee Chairman, the Secretary General, and I work
    continuously with representatives of NATO member nations to reduce or
    remove caveats, where possible. In some cases, nations have very
    specific reasons why they apply a caveat to their force contribution.
    See Question 41 above.

        43. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, have we placed similar
    restrictions on the use of our troops in support of U.N. peacekeeping
    missions?
        General Craddock. I know of no similar restrictions placed on U.S.
    troops assigned to support U.N. peacekeeping missions. U.S. command
    over U.S. forces is maintained while supporting U.N. peacekeeping
    missions and all details concerning U.S. participation, as to logistics
    and rules of engagement (ROE) (to include required supplements--may
    allow the use of riot control agents and various forms of mines, for
    instance) is in place prior to U.S. forces execution of the mission.

        44. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, during the hearing, you stated
    that our allies had not fully resourced the statement of requirements
    for the ISAF, and that you believe that being under-resourced may have
    contributed to the significant number of recent Afghan civilian
    casualties incurred while the United States is conducting operations
    against the Taliban. Please provide a list of unfilled requirements
    from the statement of requirements. Include which nations were
    committed to filling each requirement and what their original scheduled
    deadline was.
        General Craddock. Force generation by NATO is an ongoing process,
    with nations producing and deploying capabilities to the theater on a
    constant basis. The statement of requirements is a document approved by
    NATO nations of forces needed to execute the mission. It, too,
    undergoes modification over time as my strategic headquarters reviews
    and updates the CJSOR in coordination with ISAF headquarters. The
    current CJSOR for ISAF still has significant shortfalls, to include
    maneuver battalions in the southern region, air-transport capability,
    counter-IED equipment, and intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance assets. One of our most significant shortfalls and my
    highest priority lies in commitments of OMLTs, which are central to
    building the ANA capacity to provide security for their own country.
    With regard to commitments from nations--it is not a case of
    unfulfilled promises by individual nations, but rather a case of no
    nation signing up for some specific requirements.

        45. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, have you inquired with our
    allies as to why they have not fulfilled their commitments? If so, what
    was their explanation?
        General Craddock. NATO nation contributions to NATO agreed
    operations vary with each nation, as do the reasons behind their
    respective level of contribution. Several common reasons include:

             Nations may simply not have the needed asset
             Nations do not have the financial ability to support the
            requested force in theater
             Nations do not have the backing of their people for further
            support--risk aversion
             Nations resources are committed to other NATO and non-NATO
            operations

        The formal decision to commit and sustain forces to a NATO
    operation is a national one, taken at the highest levels of civilian
    and political leadership of our respective nations. In addition to our
    efforts to work with allied militaries to determine the most effective
    resources and means to accomplish the missions assigned by our
    governments, I would encourage members of this committee to talk to
    their counterparts in allied and partner parliaments, urging them to
    contribute to our common objectives.

                        deportation of afghans from iran
        46. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, the BBC reported on May 2 that
    the U.N. estimates that Iran had deported 36,000 Afghans back to
    Afghanistan in the previous 10 days. In addition, it appears that they
    intended to deport an additional 14,000 of what they call ``illegal''
    Afghans in the near future. Have you received any confirmation that
    this mass deportation occurred? If so, what are the repercussions to
    our operations in Afghanistan from Iran's sudden deportation of large
    numbers of Afghans?
        General Craddock. The return of displaced Afghans is a complicated
    economic, social, and political process. This matter requires the
    concerted effort of all governments involved and international
    organizations that wish to assist and facilitate the return of Afghans.
    It would be unwelcome and unfortunate, if this process of returning
    Afghans to Afghanistan would also facilitate the insertion of militants
    or opposition military forces with the goal of destabilizing the
    important gains achieved by the international community in Afghanistan.

        47. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, do our troops, or the ISAF,
    need additional resources? If so, what do they need?
        General Craddock. Speaking from a NATO perspective, I believe that
    the greatest current equipment need for ISAF is intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to support our expanding
    operations. ISAF air-transport capability, both fixed wing and rotary
    wing, are highly valuable in this operation and always in need. NATO
    nations could also enhance their national forces deployed by improving
    their C-IED equipment, and expanding their armored truck capacity. With
    respect to the NATO Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), the non-
    U.S. PRTs could benefit from increased financial resources to fund
    reconstruction and development projects similar to the way U.S. PRTs
    use Commanders Emergency Response Program funds for quick impact
    projects.

        48. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, there are an estimated 1.5
    million Afghans living in Iran. If Iran is deporting large numbers of
    Afghans, and continues to do so, what would the impacts be on ISAF or
    U.S. operations in Afghanistan?
        General Craddock. Speaking from a NATO perspective, I believe the
    return of displaced Afghans is a complicated economic, social, and
    political process. This matter requires the concerted effort of all
    governments involved and international organizations that wish to
    assist and facilitate the return of Afghans. It would be unwelcome and
    unfortunate if this process of returning Afghans to Afghanistan would
    also facilitate the insertion of militants or opposition military
    forces with the goal of destabilizing the important gains achieved by
    the international community in Afghanistan.

                    impact of civilian deaths in afghanistan
        49. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, Reuters reported on May 2 that
    President Karzai stated that Afghans are losing patience over killing
    of civilians by western forces hunting Taliban guerrillas. According to
    the report, approximately 50 civilians were killed in raids by U.S.-led
    troops in the previous week, sparking 4 days of anti-American, anti-
    Karzai protests. Reuters further reported that ``Karzai said he had
    repeatedly told U.S. and NATO commanders to coordinate their anti-
    Taliban raids with his government, stop searching civilian houses, and
    exercise caution to avoid civilian deaths.'' Can you confirm the
    information in this report? If so, can you explain what the problems
    are that are getting so many civilians killed in our raids on the
    Taliban, and what is being done to fix the problem?
        General Craddock. I have read these press reports, but cannot
    confirm the specific information referred to in the 2 May report.
    Speaking from a NATO perspective, civilian casualties are an important
    matter to the Afghan government and for ISAF. During ISAF planned
    operations, ISAF conducts a very rigorous process to avoid civilian
    casualties. ISAF has cancelled or postponed military operations when
    they clearly posed a risk to civilians. While every attempt is made by
    our soldiers to predict and ascertain the location of civilians,
    unforeseen situations occasionally occur, which find a civilian in an
    unexpected location. In these ``in-extremis'' situations ISAFs are
    invariably at risk of injury, death, or capture. We rely on the
    judgment and ability of commanders and soldiers on the ground to
    operate with the ISAF ROE and use proportional force to maneuver out of
    the situation. Our priority must be to maintain their safety while
    doing everything possible to minimize civilian deaths. We review every
    incident, and in all cases our reviews have shown that ISAF has
    operated within the approved ROE.

        50. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, have we coordinated our raids
    with the Afghan government as requested by President Karzai? If not,
    why not?
        General Craddock. Speaking from a NATO perspective, I believe that
    COMISAF, his staff, and regional commanders work and coordinate with
    Afghan forces to ensure that their operations are conducted in harmony
    with ISAF operations. ISAF operations routinely include ANSFs which are
    increasingly capable of both supporting ISAF, and conducting more
    independent operations. There is extensive consultation with senior
    Afghan military officials on ISAF and ANA operations, and numerous,
    routine meetings between COMISAF and Afghan Ministry of Defense and
    Chief of Defense staff. As the ANSFs grow in capability and competence
    they will conduct more independent operations.

             security situation in the eucom area of responsibility
        51. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, on May 22, Reuters reported
    that the leaders of Belarus and Iran pledged to act jointly to counter
    attempts to exert pressure on either of the individual nations. In your
    opinion, does this pact potentially impact the security situation in
    the EUCOM AOR? If so, what is your assessment of the impacts?
        General Craddock. Belarus and Iran's pledge will not significantly
    affect security in the EUCOM AOR. Minsk and Tehran continue to
    strengthen financial, political, and possibly military ties. Their
    collaboration will likely include restrictions on diplomatic ties with
    western countries involved in the disruption of oil/gas supplies
    through its territory to Europe or suspension of trade with U.S. allies
    altogether. The current poor state of Belarusian finances, its already
    strained relations with the west, and existing western sanctions
    preclude Minsk from responding with a significantly economically
    damaging response.

        52. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, what is your assessment of the
    recent cyber attacks on the Estonian government? Are there implications
    for regional security? If so, what are they?
        General Craddock. The Estonian cyberspace attacks are best
    characterized as a Cyber Riot, an emotional and violent response by
    ethnic-Russian professional and amateur hackers inside Estonia and
    Russia, instigated in response to Estonia's decision to move a Russian
    World War II memorial. Attacks were launched at three categories of
    targets: Web sites and internet servers operated by the government of
    Estonia, Information Technology (IT) infrastructure owned and operated
    by telecommunications firms, and commercial targets such as online
    retail banking Web sites and news corporations. Overall, effects of the
    Cyber Riot were moderate. Web sites were defaced or briefly taken off
    line, there were brief outages of network routers, and some sites
    suffered sustained denial of service attacks. Since peaking on 9 May,
    the attacks have diminished in intensity and the combined efforts of
    the government of Estonia and its commercial partners are sufficient to
    mitigate the attacks' effects. Most Estonians have not been affected by
    the attacks and likely would not have been aware of the attacks absent
    press reporting. Finally, the intensity of attacks did not rise to a
    level sufficient to pose a serious threat to Estonia's internet
    operations. Although the Kremlin's direct role as facilitator is
    unknown, there are indications that Moscow has resorted to cyber
    attacks during previous disputes with other countries. Future disputes
    between Russia and its neighbors will likely involve similar cyber
    attacks, particularly if the issue resonates with the Russian populace.
    However, the frequency and sophistication will probably be limited and
    carry little implication for regional security.

        53. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, it was recently reported that
    President Nursultan Nazarbayev was effectively declared Kazakhstan's
    president-for-life in a move condemned by the nation's opposition as
    undemocratic. The Kazakhstan parliament voted overwhelmingly to allow
    Nazarbayev, in power since 1989, to run for the presidency an unlimited
    number of times. Kazakhstan has never held elections considered to be
    free and fair by western monitors. Could you please provide your
    assessment of the significance of this move by the Kazakhstan
    government?
        General Craddock. I would defer to Admiral Fallon and the CENTCOM
    assessment on this with respect to specific military equities as
    Kazakhstan lies in the CENTCOM AOR.

                                     russia
        54. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, Vladimir Putin has also taken
    actions to consolidate his power in recent times, obviously having a
    negative effect on democracy in Russia. How many other former Soviet
    states are pulling back from democratic principles, and is this a trend
    over which you believe we should be concerned?
        General Craddock. [Deleted.]

        55. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, with democratic principles
    being threatened in Russia and other former Soviet states, Putin's
    willingness to use energy as a weapon, Russia's problems with some
    former Soviet states (e.g., Estonia), and Russian relations with the
    United States and NATO becoming ``frosty'' over our anti-missile
    system, is there potential, in your opinion, for U.S.-Russian relations
    to slide back into a Cold War mode?
        General Craddock. [Deleted.]

        56. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, what is your assessment
    (political and military) of the implications for EUCOM regional
    security, if Russia follows through on its threat to withdraw from the
    Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe?
        General Craddock. [Deleted.]

        57. Senator Akaka. General Craddock, what is your assessment of the
    implications if Moscow follows through on its threat to opt out of the
    treaty with the United States banning intermediate-range missiles?
        General Craddock. [Deleted.]
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
                      quality-of-life and family readiness
        58. Senator McCain. General Craddock, the Subcommittee on Personnel
    and the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support had a joint
    hearing this year on military family readiness. It is clear from the
    testimony received that families and volunteers, though resilient, are
    under high stress as a result of 5 years of war, and multiple,
    lengthened deployments. Could you comment on the impact of funding
    family readiness programs principally through supplemental
    appropriations, rather than in the core budget of the Services; the
    need for additional professional counseling services; and the
    perception that when resources are stretched, family readiness support
    programs suffer?
        General Craddock. While families, volunteers, and community support
    staffs continue to shoulder the burden of maintaining supportive, safe,
    and productive communities in the wake of extended deployments, they
    cannot continue to do so while programs and resources are impacted by
    Services' mission resource priorities. Additional and consistent
    support is needed in the European theater for Chaplain-led marriage and
    reintegration retreats, Family and Community Support Center staffs,
    Family Readiness Group assistants, Ombudsmen, as well as child, youth,
    and teen programs, particularly in the area of clinical child and
    adolescent mental health services, to help children deal with longer
    and more frequent deployments of their parents. Such programs are the
    first line of defense to ensure families are supported. The impact of
    funding such programs through supplemental appropriations results in
    uneven levels of support and uncertainty regarding the future of these
    programs. The perception that family readiness support programs are
    suffering directly impacts troop readiness and retention. While
    Services are forced to make hard choices in stretching core budgets to
    meet competing mission priorities, we are asking much from our
    servicemembers and their families.

        59. Senator McCain. General Craddock, do you agree with these
    concerns, and how are you addressing them in EUCOM?
        General Craddock. I strongly agree with these concerns and will
    continue to stress the need for the consistent support of programs such
    as those discussed above. One specific action taken by EUCOM earlier
    this year was to identify the need and ask the OSD for an allocation of
    $3.2 million to provide additional child, youth, and teen program
    support. EUCOM is working with OSD to ensure appropriate programs and
    activities are available for children of deployed servicemembers,
    improve current childcare resources, and extend support resources for
    children of wounded servicemembers.

            military health and mental health care assets in europe
        60. Senator McCain. General Craddock, your testimony indicates that
    families are having problems accessing health care services overseas,
    and that increased counseling services are needed. What are your
    overall requirements for health and mental health care? Are the medical
    facilities adequately maintained?
        General Craddock. EUCOM military healthcare professionals are doing
    an outstanding job balancing the medical requirements of preparing our
    warfighters for deployments while simultaneously serving the needs of
    our beneficiary community. Due to our own medical deployments, military
    treatment facilities experience fluctuations in appointment
    availability--particularly in the specialty areas--and rely on host
    nation medical facilities and providers to fill appointment voids.
    While overall access to healthcare is good, the challenge is for our
    beneficiaries to understand their local country's cultural differences.
    We continue to strengthen awareness programs through the media and
    health care access marketing campaigns.
        In the area of counseling, EUCOM has utilized several Quality-of-
    Life Conferences, Tiger Teams, and the recent EUCOM Deployment and
    Community Counseling Support Conference to identify, resource, and
    process requirements to improve counseling support to servicemembers
    and their families. Our early analysis has been provided to the DOD
    Mental Health Task Force, but current clinical child and adolescent
    mental health resources are not sufficient to meet the growing need as
    children deal with the deployment of their parents. Throughout the
    EUCOM AOR we closely monitor and assess the condition of our
    facilities.

        61. Senator McCain. General Craddock, where are the shortfalls in
    facilities or services? How can the committee assist in meeting those
    shortfalls?
        General Craddock. In addition to funding currently planned medical
    military construction projects, clinical mental health resources
    supporting servicemembers, spouses, and dependents dealing with the
    deployment of their parents, are not sufficient to meet the growing
    need. As in the United States, we are caring for a population under
    stress that is beyond the norm. Additionally, by being in Europe, we
    have unique challenges in hiring the professionals needed to supplement
    our mental health specialists. While we rely on host-nation healthcare
    partners, the particular nature of mental and behavioral health
    requires special dependence on both cultural and language familiarity.
    EUCOM and our components have developed an initiative to contract child
    care and adolescent mental health special needs. Finally, we continue
    to seek improvements in the healthcare process to better manage
    appointment systems and track access. This ensures family members get
    timely healthcare services they need when not available on base because
    of the deployment of our medical servicemembers.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Mel Martinez
                         morocco and the western sahara
        62. Senator Martinez. General Craddock, last month, Morocco
    announced a plan for autonomy of the Western Sahara region, a proposal
    that the State Department characterized as ``a serious and credible
    proposal to provide real autonomy for the Western Sahara.'' I share the
    view of the international community that the Western Sahara dispute is
    long overdue for settlement. Morocco receives considerable United
    States SC assistance. Can you comment on the military-to-military
    relationship we have with the Moroccan armed forces?
        General Craddock. The United States and Morocco maintain a strong
    military-to-military partnership, with annual and biannual joint force
    exercises including land, sea, and air forces, and a model State
    Partnership Program executed by the Utah National Guard. The United
    States has completed 19 military-to-military events with Morocco and 11
    more are scheduled for the remainder of this fiscal year. The Utah
    National Guard State Partnership Program sponsored 13 of the 30 events.
        Morocco is the United States' oldest ally in North Africa. It
    possesses a significant regional military capability and the ability to
    operate in a multi-national environment, as demonstrated by its
    participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations worldwide. Morocco
    currently supports the U.N. missions in Democratic Republic of Congo,
    and Ivory Coast. Earlier Moroccan peace keeping operation deployments
    went to Zaire (current Democratic Republic of Congo (DROC)), Somalia,
    Bosnia, Haiti, and Kosovo. Additionally Morocco sent troops to support
    Operation Desert Storm.

        63. Senator Martinez. General Craddock, can you give any insight on
    the possibility for compromise based on what you are seeing on the
    ground?
        General Craddock. I do not expect settlement of the Western Sahara
    issue in the near-term. However, Morocco's formulation of a viable
    autonomy plan and the commitment of the Saharawi Arab Democratic
    Republic (SADR) government and the leadership of the POLISARIO Front
    (Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia El-Hamra y Rio de Oro) to
    participate in bilateral talks with the Government of Morocco to
    discuss these issues is a major breakthrough and can serve as the basis
    for an eventual compromise.
        The SADR government and POLISARIO continue to express their
    opposition to any imposed solution that does not involve their ability
    to exercise the right of self-determination. The status quo favors
    Morocco and I believe the SADR and POLISARIO recognize this and are
    formulating a strategy to move things in the direction of an eventual
    settlement.

                      military spending in nato countries
        64. Senator Martinez. General Craddock, in your testimony, you note
    with concern that the defense budgets of many of our NATO partners have
    fallen to levels that jeopardize their ability to meet their
    commitments to the alliance. Can you give an update on the effort to
    get the members of NATO to invest adequately in their defense
    structure?
        General Craddock. NATO nations have agreed to a defense budget
    target of 2 percent of GDP. These national defense budget decisions are
    taken by sovereign nations at the highest level of government. NATO
    nations are frequently encouraged to meet the agreed 2 percent target
    during North Atlantic Council meetings at the level of defense
    ministers. However, a very small number of nations within the alliance
    meet this 2 percent target and inadequate defense budgets can directly
    and indirectly impact on NATO's collective ability to meet alliance
    goals with respect to `useable land force' targets of 40 percent and 8
    percent for the deployability and sustainability (commitment to
    operations). These ambitious `useable force' goals, combined with
    national force transformation objectives, require substantial defense
    budgets to maintain capabilities and finance the necessary
    transformation of national forces to meet 21st century security
    requirements. Defense spending and the need to meet the 2 percent
    target will continue to be an essential part of the transatlantic
    security dialogue.

        65. Senator Martinez. General Craddock, can you give some examples
    of how this lack of investment may be constraining the alliance in
    Afghanistan or elsewhere?
        General Craddock. Robust defense budgets that meet the 2 percent
    targets of GDP would be better able to sustain modern force
    capabilities, including those forces that are deployable for NATO
    operations, and adequately finance the transformation of national
    defense structures. NATO nations have unevenly implemented defense
    transformation, and in so doing not fully developed the capabilities to
    meet and sustain deployable force levels. For operations like those in
    Afghanistan, modern forces capable of operating at strategic distance
    are required. NATO's force requirements for the ISAF mission are
    significant and diverse. PRTs, observer, mentor, and liaison teams,
    rotary wing aircraft, fixed-wing transport aircraft, and maneuver
    battalions are examples of the diverse force capabilities identified to
    support the ISAF mission. Unfortunately the alliance has been unable to
    source all the forces and capabilities for the overall operation.
    Enhanced defense budgets would contribute to addressing shortfalls in
    the ISAF pool of forces and capabilities, including those capabilities
    and infrastructure projects that the alliance funds on a common basis.

        66. Senator Martinez. General Craddock, how can Congress assist in
    gaining further support from NATO member countries?
        General Craddock. Members of the U.S. Congress could provide
    assistance in U.S. efforts to convince the 20 of 26 NATO alliance
    nations that do not spend the agreed upon 2 percent of their GDP on
    their militaries to increase defense spending. Members of Congress
    should take advantage of opportunities, including NATO Parliamentarian
    Assembly meetings, to articulate the alliance's military spending
    goals, both in public and in private. These opportunities also include
    office calls during congressional delegation trips to Europe,
    conferences with alliance leadership in both the United States and
    Europe (such as the annual Davos World Economic Forum and the Munich
    Security Conference), and meetings Members of Congress take from
    European leadership visiting Washington, DC. Additionally, submission
    of editorials by influential Members of Congress to European newspapers
    such as the International Herald Tribune (U.S.), Financial Times (UK),
    the Times of London (UK), Corriere Della Sera (IT), Le Monde (FR), and
    Der Spiegel (GE) could influence the European public and leadership.

     legislative assistance with united states security assistance programs
        67. Senator Martinez. General Craddock, you note in your written
    statement that you have three concerns that you would appreciate
    congressional assistance with. One area of concern is that the SC
    system structure needs to be streamlined. You note that you are
    concerned that the current system is slow and inefficient. It is not
    clear what the problems are or how to fix them. You note that there are
    a number of U.S. Government Security Assistance programs and activities
    that the COCOM is assigned responsibility for execution of that you
    have little or no influence/control of. It is well known that the U.S.
    Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system is slow and cumbersome. Is that
    what you are referring to? How would you recommend changing the current
    arrangements?
        General Craddock. My concerns regarding TSC reform extend beyond
    that of FMS. The FMS process is complicated by statutory requirements
    (Foreign Assistance Act, Arms Export Control Act, and annual
    appropriations acts) as well as being impacted by foreign affairs
    issues (e.g., human rights). In addition, technology transfer issues
    can delay major system sales in both FMS and Direct Commission Sales.
    The processing time requirements within different agencies have
    extended some FMS cases over 1 year. This time needs to be shortened.
    There should be one person selected for the oversight and management of
    a program from initiation to completion.

        68. Senator Martinez. General Craddock, if your concerns are more
    than FMS, then what are those concerns and what would you like to see
    change?
        General Craddock. EUCOM lacks the ability to efficiently and
    effectively meet TSC objectives due to legal restrictions, complex
    funding sources, and multiple program authorities. Reforming our TSC
    processes would promote greater efficiencies, and expand U.S.
    influence, agility, and competitiveness in accordance with the National
    Military Strategy and OSD Security Cooperation Guidance (SCG). Within
    DOD, a variety of strategic guidance documents, including the SCG and
    Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), are being merged into the Force
    Employment Guidance (FEG) to better integrate planning activities and
    streamline objective prioritization and resource allocation.
        We need to create unity of effort with respect to title 10 and
    title 22 authorities to allow efficient execution of train and equip
    programs. Title 22 FMF/IMET money is bilateral, so if regional
    priorities change, the GCC does not have the authority to redistribute
    funds as necessary. The GCC needs expanded discretionary authority to
    fund emergent needs within the AOR. The long lead time of budgetary
    processes coupled with the current legislative restrictions limits
    COCOM flexibility.
        GCCs have insufficient influence over the vast majority of SC
    funding and require more visibility among TSC activities within their
    AORs. An interagency process that synchronizes strategies and
    engagement plans would be indispensable for effective TSC execution.

                                      iran
        69. Senator Martinez. General Craddock, while Iran is not in the
    EUCOM AOR, it is in your area of interest, since its policies and
    actions affect the countries in your AOR. Can you outline your
    assessment of the threat Iran poses today in terms of sponsoring
    terrorist organizations, and in the future as they continue their
    effort to develop nuclear weapons?
        General Craddock. The main threat to EUCOM from Iran's continued
    sponsorship of terrorist organizations is from Lebanese Hizballah.
    Since the 1980s, Hizballah, as Iran's proxy, has historically directed
    its actions against Israel, though we cannot rule out operations
    against other countries at Iran's behest. Today, Iran remains
    Hizballah's main source of funding and supplies and some militias
    receive training in Iran. However, the Iranian-Hizballah relationship
    has evolved past the point where Hizballah's Secretary General
    Nasrallah takes direction from Iran's Supreme Leader and would not act
    unless directed by Supreme Leader Khamenei. Today, the relationship is
    much more of a partnership. I would agree Nasrallah does take some
    direction from Khamenei, but I would also say in some situations
    Nasrallah will act in Lebanese Hizballah's best interest even if that
    means going against Iranian desires.
        Additionally, it is likely Iran has other proxy networks worldwide
    capable of conducting terrorist operations upon Tehran's orders.
        Regarding the Iranian nuclear threat, I will focus my response on
    the most probable systems which could be used to strike targets within
    EUCOM. Currently, the Iranians possess an indigenously produced
    missile, the Shahab-3, which is based upon a North Korean missile
    design. Depending upon the specific variant and payload, the Shahab-3
    has a range of 1,100-1,500km, which at the outer ranges would enable
    Iran to target Turkey, Cyprus, and Israel as well as Egypt and Saudi
    Arabia in CENTCOM. Taken in conjunction with Iran's nuclear program,
    the Shahab or the acquisition of other medium range ballistic missile
    systems represent a clear and serious threat.

         competition for military-to-military relationships from china
        70. Senator Martinez. General Craddock, in your testimony, you
    express concern about the effort that China is making to establish
    relationships with the countries/militaries in the EUCOM AOR. Can you
    give an update on China's effort to establish military-to-military
    relationships in your AOR?
        General Craddock. China is using enhanced military relationships
    with African states as a means to pursue its economic and diplomatic
    interests. China uses a range of military programs, including arms
    sales, military training, exchanges of military attaches, military
    infrastructure projects, medical and maintenance assistance, and
    contributions to African peacekeeping missions, to gain access to
    natural resources (oil, copper, cobalt, et cetera) and markets, and
    political leverage in many African states in support of these
    interests.
        Although Beijing was sub-Saharan Africa's number one supplier of
    military arms and equipment from 2002 to 2006, China is not
    intentionally creating, encouraging, or supporting conflicts in Africa
    or seeking to start a regional arms race.
        Chinese military sales, programs, and development projects rarely
    compete directly with U.S. initiatives in Africa, but they sometimes
    interfere with U.S. objectives by undermining sanctions against rogue
    regimes and increasing the military options of some African rulers.
    African countries prefer the higher quality western and U.S. military
    equipment, but they often opt for China's low-to-mid technology
    weapons, including aircraft, heavy weapons, small arms, and patrol
    boats. Most African countries only consider the initial purchase cost
    as the primary criteria, and long-term maintenance is often not taken
    into consideration.
        China's training and military assistance in Africa includes
    equipment maintenance programs, professional military training,
    education, aviation training, barracks construction, and sending
    Chinese doctors to military hospitals. Chinese training tends to be
    superficial, designed to engage foreign military officers more than to
    develop military skills. Additionally, China supports all ongoing U.N.
    peacekeeping operations in Africa. 1,300 of the 1,800 Chinese U.N.
    peacekeepers are in Africa, mostly in engineering, transportation, and
    medical units.

        71. Senator Martinez. General Craddock, where is China focusing
    their efforts to compete for access to the militaries in your AOR?
        General Craddock. Within the EUCOM AOR, China is also focused on
    Africa, although Chinese military sales, programs, and development
    projects rarely compete directly with U.S. military initiatives.
    African needs are so great for the kinds of assistance favored by the
    United States, such as capacity building, professionalizing militaries,
    and technical assistance, that African states cannot afford to refuse
    either American or Chinese help. Given a choice, most African states
    show a strong preference for U.S. and other western equipment and
    training.
        Since China uses military engagement activities as one tool to gain
    access to African resources and markets, it focuses those efforts on
    countries with the most resources and mature markets. Topping the list
    are Sudan, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea and Angola for their
    hydrocarbons, and Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
    Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia for their minerals. Among these, Nigeria,
    Angola, and Kenya, along with South Africa are important trading
    partners and markets for Chinese goods and businesses. Many of these
    countries, especially the energy rich states, have strained or, as in
    the case of Sudan, hostile relations with the west.

        72. Senator Martinez. General Craddock, is our cumbersome FMS
    system part of the handicap you face?
        General Craddock. It is true that the current FMS system is often
    slow, cumbersome, and, at times, unwieldy. However, the FMS system was
    not designed as a contingency procurement process. Instead, it was
    designed to ensure that technology is protected and sensitive items are
    safeguarded from inappropriate release.
        A military-to-military FMS program can often be delayed by a single
    approval authority in the chain. The need for a deliberate process is
    understandable and justified given the frequent importance of swift
    action and the nature of the items sold. Without question, the current
    security environment requires a more responsive and flexible system and
    the recent authority given to COCOMs in section 1206 comes closest to
    providing that responsiveness. The section 1206 program allows the DOD
    to address urgent and emergent needs in the realm of SC. This tool
    enables ``phase zero'' operations that alleviate the underlying
    conditions for terrorism by addressing the capacity of partner nations
    to ensure their own defense. By allowing rapid employment of resources,
    through an integrated interagency approach, section 1206 funding
    enables the U.S. Government to adapt and respond to the rapidly
    changing threat environment characteristic of the global war on terror.
        EUCOM is successfully using this authority to fund infrastructure
    improvements for information sharing among partner nations in Africa
    collaborating with the U.S. on counterterrorism. Additionally, it has
    enabled certain African nations to build maritime awareness
    capabilities along the West African coastline.
        Improvements to the FMS process to make it more transparent and
    valuable are still required. Managers at every step of the process need
    to be empowered with the ability to interface with both the requestors
    and providers to rapidly correct data and correspondingly adjust
    decisions. As an example, a sale of unmanned aerial vehicles to a NATO
    partner is facing delays of up to 2 years over communications security
    issues. Such delays directly affect the ability to enhance partner
    capacity. This capacity is vital to the sustainment of both coalition
    contributions to the global war on terror, as well as the U.S. ability
    to interoperate with willing partners.

        73. Senator Martinez. General Craddock, are China's moves primarily
    commercial or political or both?
        General Craddock. China's main interests in Africa are both
    commercial and economic. Chief among these are gaining and maintaining
    access to the natural resources needed to drive China's rapidly growing
    economy. As the world's second largest oil consumer (behind the United
    States), hydrocarbon interests dominate China's agenda in Africa. China
    leads the world in the demand for copper, cobalt, steel, and aluminum,
    and it is investing heavily in the mineral sectors of Africa's mineral
    rich countries. China uses military arms sales, military grant aid,
    training, and other programs to build good will and gain favor with the
    elites of those countries to facilitate access to Africa's oil and
    mineral wealth.
        While China's political and diplomatic interest is promoting its
    ``One China'' policy, it no longer dominates Beijing's agenda on the
    African continent. In Africa, China has largely succeeded in isolating
    Taiwan as only five of the 50 African states recognize Taiwan
    diplomatically. China also looks to Africa to shore up its influence in
    the Non-Aligned Movement and in the United Nations, where Africa
    comprises about a third of the General Assembly.

       military-to-military relationship with the armed forces of georgia
        74. Senator Martinez. General Craddock, we have in place a robust
    SC program with the Armed Forces of Georgia (Georgia Sustainment and
    Stability Operations Program). It appears that this is a successful
    program and I note that Georgia is the largest per capita contributor
    of forces to OIF. Can you give an update on the successes of our SC
    programs with Georgia and tell about progress on Georgia's NATO
    Membership Action Plan?
        General Craddock. The success of our SC programs in Georgia has
    allowed Georgia to increase its OIF contribution from 858 to 2,000
    personnel. When this force deploys this summer, Georgia will not only
    be the largest per capita contributor, but they will also be the third
    largest coalition contributor (behind the United States and United
    Kingdom). The Georgian brigade will be integrated as a complete brigade
    within a U.S. infantry division area of operation and be able to
    execute any missions that could be assigned to a U.S. brigade. We
    intend to build upon this success by training and equipping Georgia's
    Special Forces battalion for service in Afghanistan, training the
    Afghanistan National Army. We are also enhancing the capabilities and
    infrastructure of Georgia's national training center at Krtsanisi,
    giving them the capacity to sustain their training and to eventually
    utilize this facility to help train other coalition members for future
    operations.
        Georgia continues to make significant progress in achieving its
    NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) objectives in pursuit of
    receiving a NATO Membership Action Plan. Georgian units are operating
    successfully as coalition members in Iraq and Kosovo. Moreover, Georgia
    has made important improvements across a broad range of the defense
    sector to include financial management, training, logistics, and
    infrastructure.

        75. Senator Martinez. General Craddock, how close is Georgia to
    meeting the military requirements of being admitted to NATO?
        General Craddock. NATO is pleased with the progress Georgia is
    making in achieving its IPAP objectives. Georgia is making significant
    headway in establishing systems for English language skills training,
    human resources management, and defense planning, programming, and
    budgeting, though more work is still required. Moreover, they have made
    noteworthy improvements in establishing civilian control of the
    military and restructuring their joint staff. Georgia is also enhancing
    their professional military education system and developing the
    necessary concepts and training to establish a professional
    Noncommissioned Officer Corps. If Georgia maintains this level of
    commitment, the potential for NATO membership is good. That decision
    is, of course, one of political nature by member nations.

                           ballistic missile defense
        76. Senator Martinez. General Craddock, we've heard a lot in the
    news and you mention in your testimony about the proposed missile
    defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic. Our friends in
    Russia have made their displeasure with our plans quite apparent and it
    has even been claimed that our efforts will plunge the world back into
    a second Cold War. Could you outline why the proposed missile defense
    sites are not a threat to Russia?
        General Craddock. The United States has consulted with the Russians
    at senior levels on numerous occasions regarding U.S. BMD plans,
    including the NATO-Russia Council and several bilateral discussions. In
    those discussions, the United States offered to explore Russian
    participation and contributions to missile defense initiatives.
    Contrary to Russian public claims, the United States has been
    transparent and actively engaged with Russia regarding our missile
    defense policy, plans, and programs. The Russians have been told on
    numerous occasions that the proposed European system is not technically
    capable of threatening their ballistic missile assets. Russia's
    ballistic missiles could easily overwhelm the U.S. limited number of
    deployed interceptors. Also, the physics and trajectories of Russian
    launches toward the United States make it clear that interceptors
    placed in Central Europe could never catch a Russian missile. European
    missile defense assets are designed to address a threat from the Middle
    East, not from Russia. Of particular note, Secretary Gates recently
    sent a letter to Minister Serdyukov asking him to carefully consider a
    U.S. invitation for Russian experts to visit missile defense facilities
    in the United States Secretary Gates also suggested that a Russian
    expert-level delegation provide the United States with Russian views on
    possible areas of missile defense cooperation.

        77. Senator Martinez. General Craddock, how do these installations
    differ from those built during the height of the Cold War?
        General Craddock. The European Site Initiative is purely defensive
    in nature and focused on a ballistic missile threat from a specific
    geographic region, Southwest Asia. Cold War-era installations were
    generally offensive or both offensive and defensive in nature and were
    designed to defend against or counter a range of threats.

        78. Senator Martinez. General Craddock, do you feel that this line
    of defense will adequately protect our allies and interests in the
    region from rogue states?
        General Craddock. The EUCOM AOR requires a mix of systems
    (interceptors, radars, and command and control) that provide defense
    against short, medium, intermediate, and intercontinental missiles in
    all phases of flight (boost, mid-course, and terminal). The European
    Site Initiative, one component in this ``mix of systems,'' would
    supplement defense of the United States, and defend most of Europe,
    deployed forces, friends, and allies from emerging long-range ballistic
    missile threats in Southwest Asia.

                                     russia
        79. Senator Martinez. General Craddock, in late April, Russian
    President Vladimir Putin proposed a moratorium on the treaty on
    Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. This is a concerning action by the
    Russian government and could be viewed as a response to our plans to
    build ABM sites in Poland and the Czech Republic. Do you believe that
    the Russian President's comments are potentially threatening to our
    interests abroad and those of our allies?
        General Craddock. Russia has consistently stated that it values the
    CFE Treaty as much as the Europeans and wants to move on to the Adapted
    CFE Treaty. Russia argues that any loss of the Treaty's viability is
    due to U.S. moves. Despite these comments, there has been no impact
    thus far on CFE Treaty implementation activities.
        Political consultants in Russia have noted that President Putin is
    just tired of perceived accumulated U.S. slights, including: missile
    defense, Secretary Gates' testimony placing Russia and North Korea in
    the same threat category, U.S. criticism over Russian efforts to
    transition Belarus to market prices for gas, and western failure to
    condemn Estonia's removal of the Soviet-era World War II monument as
    feeding this anger. Despite the rhetoric, President Putin continues to
    characterize the United States as a friend, to dismiss anti-Americanism
    as harmful, and to reiterate his respect and friendship for the
    President.

        80. Senator Martinez. General Craddock, should we be concerned that
    President Putin may desire to increase Russian military presence on the
    European continent?
        General Craddock. [Deleted.]

        [Whereupon, at 11:39 a.m., the committee adjourned.]