[Senate Hearing 110-190]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-190
DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: MOVING FORWARDS OR
BACKWARDS?
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 17, 2007
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin, Chairman
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
JIM WEBB, Virginia CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Albin-Lackey, Christopher, Nigeria researcher, Human Rights
Watch, Washington, DC.......................................... 41
Prepared statement........................................... 43
Amosu, Akwe, senior policy analyst for Africa, Open Society
Institute, Washington, DC...................................... 48
Prepared statement........................................... 50
Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin........... 1
Hess, Hon. Michael E., Administrator of the Bureau for Democracy,
Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency for
International Development, Washington, DC...................... 15
Prepared statement........................................... 18
Lowenkron, Hon. Barry F., Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana................ 3
Lyman, Hon. Princeton N., adjunct senior fellow for Africa Policy
Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC.......... 36
Prepared statement........................................... 38
Peterson, Dave, senior director, Africa Program, National
Endowment for Democracy, Washington, DC........................ 61
Prepared statement........................................... 63
Sununu, Hon. John E., U.S. Senator from New Hampshire............ 15
Additional Prepared Statement Submitted for the Record
Rothberg, Robert I., adjunct professor and director, Program on
Intrastate Conflict, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University and president, World Peace Foundation............... 68
(iii)
DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: MOVING FORWARDS OR
BACKWARDS?
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TUESDAY, JULY 17, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on African Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in
room 419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Russell Feingold
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Feingold, Nelson, Lugar, and Sununu.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, U.S. SENATOR
FROM WISCONSIN
Senator Feingold. Good morning. This hearing will come to
order and on behalf of the Senate Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on African Affairs, I welcome all of you to this
hearing on the progress of, obstacles to, and prognosis for
democracy on the African Continent.
I look forward to being joined by my colleague and ranking
member of the subcommittee, Senator Sununu, and of course I'm
delighted to see the ranking member of the full committee,
Senator Lugar, and just after my remarks, I'll certainly look
to Senator Sununu and Senator Lugar for any remarks they have
at the outset of the hearing.
Today marks the third day of ``Captive Nations Week 2007.''
In designating it as such last Tuesday, President George W.
Bush declared--and I quote--``expanding freedom is a moral
imperative,'' and issue a call ``to reaffirm our commitment to
all those seeking liberty, justice and self-determination.''
This is a common theme of the current administration. In his
inauguration speech, President Bush spoke about ``the force of
human freedom'' and stated that it is a policy of the United
States ``to seek and support the growth of democratic movements
and institutions in every nation and culture.''
I agree that democracy and good governance are essential to
achieving stability, prosperity, and legitimacy--particularly
in countries emerging from a legacy of colonization and
conflict, like many of the countries in Africa. Unfortunately,
I'm concerned that despite this administration's strong
rhetorical commitment to freedom, systematic, and often violent
suppression of democratic principles and practices by foreign
governments have been only weakly admonished and are often
overlooked.
This disparity between principle and policy is perhaps most
evident in Africa, where in theory the promotion of democracy
and human rights remains a top United States objective, but in
practice, it receives limited attention and resources and is
frequently subordinated to other strategic necessities.
Although many African countries have little or no
experience with true democracy, people across the continent
have shown unshakable determination to make sure that they have
a voice in their government. Last fall, more than 16 million
citizens in the Democratic Republic of Congo, traveled miles,
waited in long lines and braved torrential rain to participate
in that country's first free Presidential and parliamentary
multiparty elections in almost four decades. Right now,
opposition politicians who were denied fair pulls in Nigeria in
April have renounced violent protests in favor of fighting for
their political rights in court. These are important benchmarks
but as most of you already know, elections are only the
beginning of democratic development and it is what comes after
that is so critical and yet so often overlooked and
underresourced.
The most recent edition of Freedom House's annual survey of
freedom in the world notes that the number of sub-Saharan
African countries categorized as free has grown from just 3, 30
years ago, to 11 today. However, with 48 countries in the
region, 11 is still insufficient. The same report noted that
after several years of steady advances for democracy, sub-
Saharan Africa suffered more setbacks than gains during the
year 2006. This trend of backsliding is worrisome and demands a
reconsideration of United States efforts to promote good
governments and democracy in the region.
The purpose of this hearing is to consider how the United
States can maximize the impact of its resources in advancing
governance, democracy, and the rule of law in African countries
to help achieve a wide range of objectives.
Our first panel of government representatives will help
shed light on where, why, and how United States democracy
promotion resources are distributed and how this assistance is
tailored to address unique challenges in various African
countries.
We are fortunate to have with us Mr. Barry F. Lowenkron,
the Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights and Labor as well as Mr. Michael Hess, the
Assistant Administrator for the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict
and Humanitarian Assistance at the U.S. Agency for
International Development. Both have long histories of service
to the United States in policymaking capacities so I look
forward to hearing their insights and opinions about what the
United States is doing right in terms of our democracy and
government activities in Africa, as well as their ideas about
how we can be even more effective.
We will have a second full panel of distinguished
individuals who will review and seek to derive lessons from
recent elections, including the general success of polls in
Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Mauritania, as
well as from Nigeria's disappointing elections and the
persistent obstacles to free and fair polls in countries like
Angola and Zimbabwe.
The Honorable Princeton Lyman is currently an adjunct
senior fellow for Africa Policy Studies at the Counsel on
Foreign Relations but his distinguished career includes
extensive Africa-related experience including service as the
United States Ambassador to South Africa during that country's
historic transition to democracy. Mr. Christopher Albin-Lackey
is the senior Nigeria researcher at Human Rights Watch and his
most recent work has documented the human rights impact of
local government corruption and mismanagement in the Niger
Delta and pervasive human rights abuse connected to Nigeria's
rigged 2007 elections. As the Open Society Institute's Senior
Policy Analyst for Africa, Ms. Akwe Amosu facilitates links
between Africa-based foundations, initiatives, and grantees and
the international policy community in Washington, DC, after
spending more than two decades as a journalist and radio
producer in leading Africa and Africa-targeted media.
Finally, we will hear from Mr. David Peterson, the senior
director of the National Endowment for Democracy's Africa
Program. Since 1988, Mr. Peterson has been responsible for
NED's program to identify and assist hundreds of African
nongovernmental organizations and activists working for
democracy, human rights, free press, justice, and peace.
Unfortunately, Dr. Robert Rotberg, director of the Kennedy
School of Government's Program in Intrastate Conflict and
Conflict Resolution was unable to join us this morning but he
has written some compelling testimony on lessons from Africa's
most successful countries, which I'd like to submit for the
record now without objection.
We're very glad that you're all here today and we
appreciate your willingness to testify. Thank you and welcome.
The timing of this hearing was designed to promote ongoing
discussion about how best to help Africa nations build
sustainable institutions and create governments that are
elected by and accountable to their citizens. I know that each
of you have valuable insight to contribute to this
conversation. I would argue that the promotion of governance
and democracy in Africa is more than a moral imperative; it is
in our national interest to help burgeoning governments
beginning legitimate dialog with their citizens enhance public
service delivery, strengthen the rule of law, implement and
defend human rights, and improve their reputation at home and
abroad.
Now it's my pleasure to turn to the ranking member of the
full committee who not only is our former distinguished
chairman, but also had a great deal to do with the freedom that
the people of South Africa enjoy today.
Mr. Lugar.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and I
thank you once again for your leadership and your dogmatic
persistence in pursuing the themes in Africa that are so
important. The democratic theme, which is today's hearing, is
one that has intrigued this committee and Senators for many,
many years. The beginnings of the National Endowment for
Democracy were not the beginnings of an interest in democracy
in other countries, but this organized effort, back in the
Reagan administration, brought together the two political
parties, the Chamber of Commerce, and the labor organizations
of this country, in a unique way. During that particular decade
and shortly thereafter, many Senators participated as observers
in the elections efforts, particularly in Central and South
America.
One theme of that period was that all countries, in one
form or another, embraced democracy, held elections, with the
possible exception of Cuba. That theme carried over then with
the breakup of the former Soviet Union and elections that had
been somewhat more difficult have ensured progress in that part
of the world.
But it's also brought a reaction from Russia recently and
those of you who are testifying today are all aware of the
difficulties of the NGOs in Moscow as to their activities as to
whether they are going to be allowed to continue at all. In
other words, there is a pushback now against what seemed to be
almost a given in terms of thoughtfulness around the world for
human rights and expansion of democratic ideals that are a part
of this session today.
I will be curious as the witnesses testify as to how Africa
is the same or different from the Latin American experience or
the breakup of the former Soviet Union and it could very well
be that some of the testimony will simply point out that with
over 40 countries involved, there may be 40 different
backgrounds of experience, that there is not a template for
Africa that necessarily works.
But it's important that we all try to understand this in a
much more sophisticated way and, therefore, I applaud the
hearing. I thank the witnesses for giving us their time and
testimony again. I look forward to hearing from them.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Feingold. Thanks so much, Senator Lugar and now we
will begin with the first panel.
Secretary Lowenkron.
STATEMENT OF HON. BARRY F. LOWENKRON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, DEPARTMENT
OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Lowenkron. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar.
Thank you for holding this hearing on democracy in sub-Saharan
Africa. If I may, I'd like to ask that my full testimony be
entered into the record.
Senator Feingold. Without objection.
Mr. Lowenkron. Thank you. I appreciate the subcommittee's
strong interest in this vast, varied, and vibrant region. The
advancement of human rights and democratic principles is
crucial to stability and development in Africa and I would add,
as you put it, Mr. Chairman, this is not just simply a moral
imperative but also a strategic imperative for the United
States and for our allies and friends.
The United States has committed to forging partnerships
with democracies across Africa that seek to build a continent
of peace and prosperity where the rights of all men and women
are protected. As Secretary Rice noted, in recent years in
Africa we have seen a democratic transformation sweep the
continent.
Indeed, Africa today is home to several strong multiparty
democracies. South Africa, Botswana, Ghana, and Mali. Indeed,
Mali will host a November ministerial meeting with the
worldwide Community of Democracies.
Despite these positive trends, Africa also bears witness to
serious human rights abuses. In Sudan, Zimbabwe, Eritrea, and
Chad, governments trample basic civil and political freedoms.
Now the role models and the reprobates stand out. The rest--and
they constitute the majority of African countries--struggle
somewhere in between. In Africa as in other regions of the
world, gains for human rights and democracy are hard won and
challenging to sustain.
None of us underestimates the challenges that reformers
face in building democratic governance amidst poverty, ethnic
tension, and weak government institutions. But even as we
acknowledge these challenges, we cannot let those who feel
threatened by change use those challenges as an excuse for
authoritarian rule.
Mr. Chairman, democracy is not chemistry. You cannot
concoct democracy using a formula. There are three elements
that are, however, essential to any democracy. One, free and
fair elections. As you put it, Mr. Chairman, that is often the
first step. It's not enough. Two, good governance including the
rule of law. And three, a robust civil society.
If I may, let me illustrate each of democracy's three
essential elements in the context of Africa. First, elections.
Elections in Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and
Mauritania give rise to cautious optimism. Several of our key
partners, however, have held disappointing elections. In April,
Nigeria squandered an important opportunity to improve upon its
flawed 2003 elections and that Nigeria missed this opportunity
is even more disappointing, considering the vibrancy of its
civil society, the influence of its active media, and the
strength of its legal system.
There were a few bright spots. The Supreme Court reinstated
an opposition candidate to the ballot and the former National
Assembly refused to go along with now former President
Obasanjo's attempt to secure a third term. We have stressed to
Nigerian leaders the need for political and judicial reform. We
have also encouraged Nigeria to expedite election tribunals and
to strengthen the independence and the capacity of the
Independent National Election Commission.
The runup to Ethiopia's May 2005 elections was a time of
unprecedented democratic openness. However, the expulsion of
NDI, IRI, and IFES 6 weeks before the Election Day created an
atmosphere heavy with suspicion. As rumors of malfeasance grew
after the elections, the Ethiopian Government responded to
street protests with lethal force and illegally detained
opposition leaders and tens of thousands of their supporters.
In Addis Ababa earlier this year, I raised the issue with
Prime Minister Meles and met with the families of imprisoned
leaders and journalists. To this day, the crackdown cast a
shadow over the Ethiopian Government, though the Prime Minister
announced yesterday that he plans to recommend clemency for the
opposition leaders found guilty on June 11 and sentenced to
life imprisonment.
Let me now turn to the second essential element of
democracy: Good governance. The rule of law must prevail over
politics and personalities and replace cultures of corruption,
which have undermined so many reform efforts in Africa. An
important way we encourage and support good governance is
through the Millennium Challenge Account Initiative enacted by
the Congress in 2004. Only countries that have adopted good
governance principles are eligible for MCA development funding.
Of the MCA compacts signed to date, six are with governments in
Africa for a total of $2 billion in assistance.
Good governance also requires the active participation of
the business sector and civil society. The Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative is a good example of a
private/public anticorruption effort. A number of African
countries have put the initiative's practices into effect, most
notably, Botswana, South Africa, and Namibia.
I will now turn to the third essential element of
democracy, a vibrant civil society. The worldwide push for
democracy is being felt in Africa. As this trend grows
stronger, it is encountering increasing resistance from those
who feel threatened by change. I recall, Senator Lugar, you
chaired a very, very significant committee meeting on the
worldwide pressure against NGOs just last year and Africa is
not exempt from this pressure.
A number of African countries apply restrictive laws and
regulations against NGOs and the media. They subject human
rights and democracy defenders to extrajudicial measures. In
Zimbabwe, as we all know, civil society remains under heavy
siege. Eritrea and Equatorial Guinea enacted burdensome
registration requirements and apply heavy-handed oversight to
make it all but impossible for NGOs to exist. In some cases,
most dramatically in Sudan, when governments persecute NGOs,
what is at stake is not just the preservation of liberties but
the protection of lives.
Mr. Chairman, that brings me to the countries that pose
some of the greatest challenges in the region: Sudan and
Zimbabwe. In March, I traveled to Sudan to assess firsthand the
appalling situation in Darfur. Fear and anxiety permeated the
region. Yet in the hell of the Kalma IDP camp, I also saw
determination. A group of IDPs had organized themselves into a
legal aid society. In the sweltering heat, my team and I talked
with these amazing people and the other IDPs that they were
assisting. One man said, ``I am 37 years old and never knew
what human rights were until I actually came to this camp.''
Before he learned about his rights from this legal aid society,
he said he thought it was normal for police to arbitrarily
harass, arrest, and beat people.
The African Union U.N. hybrid force must be deployed to
Sudan, to Darfur, without delay. And yet again, a new Security
Council resolution authorizing the force is being discussed. As
Secretary Rice noted just last week, we must not let the
Government of Sudan continue this game of cat-and-mouse
diplomacy, making promises and then going back on them.
Yet even as the world's attention focuses on Darfur, it is
imperative that we continue to support the 2005 North-South
Comprehensive Agreement or CPA. That agreement stopped the war
that resulted in the deaths of an estimated 2 million people.
But stopping the war is not the same as securing the peace.
Sudan's election is planned for February 2009. These are
critical elements to the peace process.
In Zimbabwe, it is clear that President Mugabe intends to
do whatever it takes to get reelected. On June 6, the
Government of Zimbabwe violently suppressed a peaceful
demonstration by the NGO Women of Zimbabwe Arise.
This latest aggression against civil society comes on the
heels of violent attacks this spring. In late June, the
government and the opposition agreed on an agenda for
negotiations that includes constitutional and electoral
reforms, security legislation, and rules of political
engagement. It's a good step. But given the behavior of
President Mugabe, none of us dares think that the road ahead
will lead easily to stability, prosperity, and liberty for the
people of Zimbabwe.
Dealing with such challenges requires not only American
support but the energetic engagement of Africa's regional
institutions and the support of other countries and
institutions around the world in helping Africa. We have made
it a priority to intensify our relationships with those
institutions and with the African Union in particular.
The AU architecture is still evolving but it is promising.
It includes the adoption this January of the African Charter on
Democracy, Elections and Governance, and the creation of an
African Court on Human and Peoples' rights. It is very much in
our interest and in the interest of other democracies to help
strengthen the capacity of these AU bodies.
To that end, Mr. Chairman, in March, I met with AU
commissioners in Addis Ababa. I planted the seeds for formal
human rights and democracy consultations with the AU and in the
fall, my Bureau will host the first such consultations.
Mr. Chairman, before I conclude, let me briefly respond to
your request to hear about the human rights and democracy
assistance programs that my Bureau is funding. DRL has
significantly raised its level of programming assistance for
Africa as a result of the congressionally mandated funding for
the Human Rights and Democracy Fund or as we call it, HRDF.
When I arrived in DRL in the fall of 2005, DRL had a little
more than $3 million for all of Africa. With congressional
support, we tripled the level to nearly $10 million and have
expanded our programmatic reach to critical countries like
Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, and Burundi. With 2007 funds, we will
program approximately $10 million for Africa and we have
ongoing FY06 programs that are supporting post-election dialog
in Ethiopia and building the capacity of the judiciary in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, combating gender-based violence
in Ethiopia and Sudan, fighting corruption in Cote d'Ivoire and
Burundi and strengthening civil society efforts in Zimbabwe.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me say that no matter who
suceedes me as Assistant Secretary and no matter what
administration follows the current one, the United States must
continue to respond to the pressing demands of Africans for
dignity and liberty.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lowenkron follows:]
Prepared Statement Barry F. Lowenkron, Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Department of State,
Washington, DC
Chairman Feingold and members of the committee, thank you for
holding this hearing on democracy in sub-Saharan Africa. I deeply
appreciate the subcommittee's strong interest in this vast, varied, and
vibrant region.
The Bush administration has put in place dynamic policies and
programs that demonstrate the American people's generous commitment to
Africa. And I have worked with my counterpart and with the officers of
the Africa Bureau at the State Department to implement that commitment.
Mr. Chairman, as President Bush has said, ``At a time when freedom
is on the march around the world, it is vital that the continent of
Africa be a place of democracy, prosperity, and hope.''
I am sure that my USAID colleague, Michael Hess, will agree that
the advancement of human rights and democratic principles is integral--
indeed crucial--to stability and development in the region. The United
States is committed to forging partnerships with democracies across
Africa that seek to build a continent where there is peace, where there
is prosperity, and where the rights of all men and women are protected.
Mr. Chairman, this will be my last testimony to Congress before I
retire from the Federal Government after 31 years of public service. I
began my government career at the same time the Bureau I now head was
created on the initiative of Congress. During the three decades of the
Bureau's existence, every administration and each of my predecessors
has been able to count on the bipartisan backing of the Congress. Your
support has immeasurably strengthened our capacity to defend courageous
men and women around the globe who work, against great odds and at
great risk, to advance the cause of freedom.
Promoting democracy and human rights in Africa has been one of my
top priorities during the 2 years I have served as Assistant Secretary.
I have no doubt that my Bureau's engagement on these issues will be a
priority for my successor as well, for it remains a priority for
President Bush and Secretary Rice.
As I prepare to depart the Bureau, I take satisfaction in knowing
that I will leave behind a talented, dedicated, and strong Africa team
to carry on this important work. I am proud to say that we have
quadrupled the number of personnel working on Africa issues and we also
now have a separate position devoted to enhancing our cooperation with
the African Union.
Mr. Chairman, in every region of the world--not least in Africa--
increasing numbers of men and women are pressing for their rights to be
respected and their governments to be responsive, for their voices to
be heard and their votes to count, for just laws and equal justice for
all. Indeed, as Secretary Rice has noted: ``in recent years in Africa,
we have seen a democratic transformation sweep the continent.''
Africa today is home to several strong, multiparty democracies.
South Africa, Botswana, Ghana, and Mali serve as models for the
continent by virtue of their free and fair elections, their robust
civil societies, and their respect for the rule of law. Indeed, Mali
will host the next ministerial meeting of the worldwide Community of
Democracies in November. It is apt that Mali has chosen as a major
focus of the meeting the close interrelationship between democracy and
development, underscoring that democracy and development must go hand
in hand, if both efforts are to succeed.
Despite these positive trends, Africa also bears witness to serious
human rights abuses that demand our active attention. In Sudan,
Zimbabwe, Eritrea, and Chad, governments trample basic civil and
political freedoms, violating the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the African Union's own Charter on Democracy.
The role models and the reprobates stand out. The rest, and they
constitute the majority of African countries, struggle somewhere in
between. That should come as no surprise. In Africa, as in other
regions of the world, gains for human rights and democracy are hard won
and challenging to sustain. Even when democratic systems of government
have been established, they take time to deliver on the promise they
hold of a better life for ordinary citizens. Democratic systems with
shallow institutional roots or scarce resources can fall far short of
meeting their commitments to citizens. Steps forward can be marred with
irregularities. Countries where rulers are insufficiently committed to
reform can revert to authoritarian habits. Democratic transitions can
be tumultuous and wrenching. Unbridled corruption can retard democratic
development, distort judicial processes, and destroy public trust.
Insecurity due to internal or cross-border conflict can threaten
advances made for human rights and democratic government.
Progress is seldom linear. That is why, when I meet with Secretary
Rice, the question that comes up the most is: ``What is the
trajectory?'' Is the country more responsive to its citizens? Is a
culture of just laws taking root? Some countries may remain fragile for
quite some time. Others may backslide.
We do not underestimate the challenges that reformers face in
building democratic governance amidst the conditions of poverty, ethnic
tension, and weak government institutions prevalent still in much of
Africa. Africans are engaged today in trying to simultaneously build
their democracies and also their economies, infrastructure, and
national identities. But even as we acknowledge and account for these
challenges, we and the millions of Africans who support democratic
reform cannot let those who feel threatened by change use those
challenges as an excuse for continued authoritarian rule. Democracy
supported by visionary leaders must be a central part of the solution
to the continent's other challenges.
A sustained commitment on our part and that of other democracies in
the region and across the international community also is required. We
fully recognize, however, that democracy promotion is not chemistry.
You cannot concoct democracy using a formula. Three interrelated
elements are, however, essential to any democracy. One element, of
course, is elections. Democratic elections are one of the important
milestones on the long journey of democratization. But a free election
is not a fair election if in the runup to Election Day the playing
field is not level because the political process is manipulated and
basic rights are undermined. A second element must be present for
democracy to work: Good governance, including the rule of law. And the
third essential element in a democracy is a robust civil society that
can keep government honest, keep citizens engaged and keep democracy-
building on track. In a fully functioning democracy anywhere in the
world, all three elements must be present--electoral, institutional,
and societal.
Let me now illustrate each of democracy's three essential elements
in the context of sub-Saharan Africa.
First, elections: Democratic elections can help put a country on
the path to reform and lay the groundwork for institutionalizing human
rights protections and good governance. Africa's record on free and
fair elections is mixed. The good news is that the vast majority of
Africans have embraced the concept of elections as a mechanism for
determining the course that their countries will take.
A number of elections have taken place recently that give rise to
cautious optimism.
After years of civil war that destroyed the country's
infrastructure, Liberia conducted an historic election in November 2005
that led to the selection of Africa's first elected female head of
state. Many Members of this body heard President Sirleaf's
inspirational message on March of last year when she spoke before a
joint session of Congress and declared: ``Our dream has the size of
freedom.''
In 2006, the citizens of the Democratic Republic of Congo went to
the polls for the first time in over 40 years, casting ballots in the
hope of finally putting behind them a legacy of brutal dictatorship and
violent conflict. The elections, judged free and fair by international
observers, were a remarkable feat for a country half the size of the
United States, yet virtually without paved roads. While there have been
setbacks since the elections, and significant work remains to be done
to help Congo through its post-conflict democratic transition, the
elections demonstrated the strong desire of the Congolese people to
live in freedom.
Mauritania, too, held its first fully democratic election in over
40 years in March of this year. The newly elected government has stated
its commitment to enact democratic reforms and we are working to
support Mauritania as it makes its democratic transition.
Several of our key partners in the region, however, have held
disappointing elections.
In April, Nigeria--Africa's most populous nation, an economic
powerhouse, the seat of ECOWAS, and a critical player in matters of
peace and security on the continent--squandered an important
opportunity to improve upon its flawed 2003 elections and live up to
its potential as a democratic leader for the region. That Nigeria
missed this opportunity is even more disappointing considering the
vibrancy of its civil society, the influence of its active media, and
the strength of its legal system.
The elections took place under an ill-prepared and partial
electoral commission, and were marred by reports of voter malfeasance
and vote-rigging. In certain areas of the country, polls opened either
after significant delay or did not open at all. There were, however,
several bright spots: The Supreme Court reinstated an opposition
candidate to the ballot only 5 days before the elections, and the
former National Assembly refused to go along with now-former President
Obasanjo's attempt to secure a third term.
The United States has stressed to Nigerian leaders the need for
political reform and judicial transparency. We also have encouraged
Nigeria to expedite election tribunals and to strengthen the
independence and capacity of the Independent National Electoral
Commission.
The runup to Ethiopia's May 2005 elections was a time of
unprecedented democratic openness, with the ruling party agreeing to a
series of key electoral reforms, and robust civil society engagement on
matters of voter education and mobilization. However, the expulsion of
the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican
Institute, and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems 6
weeks before Election Day created an atmosphere heavy with suspicion.
The expulsions put a halt to valuable training programs for members of
civil society, electoral commission staff, and political party leaders
aimed at increasing confidence in the electoral process.
Election Day was, for the most part, orderly and peaceful. Yet, in
the days and months following the elections as rumors of malfeasance
grew regarding the election results, the Ethiopian Government responded
to street protests with lethal force and illegally detained opposition
leaders and tens of thousands of their supporters. Among those detained
was journalist Serkalem Fasil, the recipient of a Courage in Journalism
Award, who was arrested along with 13 other reporters after publishing
articles critical of the Ethiopian Government. Fasil gave birth in jail
to a son, who was premature and underweight due to inhumane conditions
and lack of proper medical attention. She was released from prison in
April, but is now threatened with re-arrest. If she is found guilty on
charges of treason, outrages against the constitution, and incitement
to armed conspiracy, she could face the death penalty.
Shortly after I arrived in DRL, I began receiving letters from
concerned Members of Congress and the former colleagues of the jailed
Ethiopian democracy advocates and journalists, many of whom have had
distinguished careers here in the United States and relatives who are
United States citizens. Later, when I traveled to Addis Ababa, I raised
the issue with Prime Minister Meles and met with the families of the
imprisoned.
The government has embraced some new reforms, including revising
parliamentary rules of procedure to allow for an increased voice for
the opposition. But to this day, the crackdown casts a shadow over the
Ethiopian Government, though Prime Minister Meles announced yesterday
that he plans to recommend clemency for the opposition leaders found
guilty on June 11 and sentenced to life imprisonment.
Let me now turn to the second essential element of democracy: Good
governance and the rule of law.
Beyond a free and fair elections process, democracies must have
representative, accountable, transparent institutions of government,
including an independent legislative body that can act to ensure that
leaders who win elections govern democratically once they are in
office. The rule of just law must prevail over politics and
personalities, and replace cultures of corruption, which have
undermined so many reform efforts in Africa.
An important way we encourage and support good governance in Africa
is through the Millennium Challenge Account initiative enacted by
Congress in 2004. The initiative is designed to embark on a new
approach to delivering foreign assistance. MCA is a bold progrowth
strategy that aims to lift the most people out of poverty as fast as
possible. The MCA reflects the new international consensus that a
growth-based approach to development assistance works best and that
countries which adopt good governance policies and invest in their
people are the most likely to use their development assistance wisely
and reach their development goals.
Only countries that have adopted good governance principles are
eligible for MCA funding. Of the 12 MCA compacts signed to date, 6 are
with governments in sub-Saharan Africa, for a total of $2 billion in
assistance. We have signed compacts with Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana,
Mali, Madagascar, and this past Friday, Mozambique. Lesotho will sign
its compact next week. Tanzania, Morocco, Namibia, and Burkina Faso
will sign compacts in the coming months, bringing another $2.6 billion
to the continent to fight poverty. Adequate funding from Congress for
the Millennium Challenge effort is critical so that we do not have to
turn away these countries after they have worked so hard to make the
reforms to qualify for Millennium Challenge assistance and to put
together great programs for the fund to support.
Burkina Faso, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia currently
have threshold agreements. All of these governments have made
democratic advances, but they continue to be held back, due, in part,
to endemic corruption, which they are taking steps to combat. For
example, the Tanzanian Parliament passed sweeping anticorruption
legislation in April and Zambia is prosecuting former President Chiluba
on corruption charges.
The Bush administration also is supporting innovative efforts to
strengthen the rule of law across Africa. For example, in 2004,
President Bush allocated $55 million for the Women's Justice and
Empowerment in Africa Program. The program, which will operate in
Benin, Kenya, Zambia, and South Africa, will train police, judges,
prosecutors, health officials, and others on women's rights with the
goal of protecting women from and punishing perpetrators of gender-
based violence. This program also will assist African governments in
developing laws that empower and protect women.
Meeting the enormous challenge of ensuring accountable government,
establishing the rule of law and combating corruption requires an
unprecedented political commitment from African leaders. It also
requires the active participation of the business sector and civil
society.
Multisector initiatives continue to show promise. The Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative, launched in 2002 by the United
Kingdom and formally established in 2003 with more than 20
participating governments and the endorsement of the World Bank, is a
good example of a private-public anticorruption effort. The initiative
aims to increase public information about revenues from extractive
industries such as petroleum to ensure that these public resources are
well spent on the most serious needs of the populations. A number of
African countries have endorsed this effort and put the initiative's
best practices into effect, most notably Botswana, South Africa, and
Namibia. Despite their participation in the initiative, however, both
Angola and the Republic of Congo have cracked down on activists working
to ensure transparency in the oil industry. In February, the Angolan
Government detained a prominent British transparency advocate, Dr.
Sarah Wykes from the NGO Global Witness, and charged her with violating
national security. She was held for 3 days before being released on
bail, and ultimately, allowed to depart the country. The Republic of
Congo continues to harass transparency activists Christian Mounzeo and
Brice Makosso.
I will now turn to the third essential element of democracy: A
vibrant civil society.
The worldwide push for greater personal and political freedom is
being felt in Africa. As this global trend grows stronger, it is
encountering increasing resistance from those in power who feel
threatened by democratic change--2006 was what I call the ``Year of the
Push Back'' and the phenomenon has continued into 2007.
Last December, on International Human Rights Day, Secretary Rice
created a Human Rights Defenders Fund, which will be administered from
my Bureau, to enable the State Department to quickly disburse small
grants to human rights defenders facing extraordinary needs as a result
of government repression. The Secretary also announced 10 guiding
principles regarding the treatment of NGOs by governments. These core
principles are a handy resource for governments, international
organizations, civil society groups, and journalists.
Regrettably, a growing number of countries, including African
countries, selectively apply laws and regulations against NGOs and the
media. They also subject human rights and democracy defenders to
extrajudicial measures for peacefully exercising the rights of
expression, association, and assembly.
In Zimbabwe, civil society--including NGOs, labor unions, and
religious organizations--remain under heavy siege. On March 11,
opposition leaders and civil society members, who had peacefully
assembled for a mass prayer meeting, were brutally attacked by security
forces. One political activist was shot dead; others were kept from
receiving critical medical care.
Eritrea and Equatorial Guinea have enacted burdensome registration
requirements and apply heavy-handed oversight that make it all but
impossible for NGOs to exist. Slightly less burdensome requirements but
continued suspicion and harassment have greatly restricted civil
society in Ethiopia and Rwanda.
In some cases, most dramatically in Sudan, when governments
persecute NGOs what is at stake is not just the preservation of
liberties but the protection of lives. Physical attacks on humanitarian
aid organizations in Darfur, and continued interference in their work,
have rendered their mission of alleviating the suffering of internally
displaced persons ever more difficult.
Mr. Chairman, that brings me to the countries that pose some of the
greatest challenges we face in the region--Sudan, Uganda, Somalia, and
Zimbabwe--and the ways we are working in partnership with African
nations to deal with those challenges, and by so doing, advance
democracy and human rights.
In March, I traveled to Sudan to assess firsthand the appalling
situation in Darfur. Fear and anxiety permeated the region. Not only
were the internally displaced people coping with continuing violence,
international aid workers also were subjected to an unprecedented level
of harassment and attacks. Vital humanitarian assistance was being
obstructed.
Yet, in the hell of Kalma Camp for internally displaced persons, I
also saw determination among its inhabitants. A group of IDPs had
organized themselves into a legal aid society inside the camp. They
endure harassment and even assault to defend the rights of their fellow
displaced. In the sweltering heat, I sat with my team and talked with
these amazing people and the fellow IDPs whom they are assisting. I
particularly remember one man who stood up and said, ``I'm 37 years old
and never knew what human rights were until I came to this camp.'' He
said that until he learned about his rights from the legal aid society
in the camp, he assumed that it was normal for police to arbitrarily
harass, arrest, and beat people. We saw the same hunger for dignity and
justice in a group of women in South Darfur who were working to educate
the young and empower them to defend their rights. These remarkable
women shared more than determination. They also shared the belief that,
as one put it, ``America cares.''
In the months since my trip to Darfur, the situation has gotten
even worse. Just to cite one alarming indicator: Since early May, due
to the unabated violence, the population of Al-Salam IDP Camp near
Nyala has doubled from 14,500 to 30,000.
It is critical that the African Union/United Nations hybrid force
be deployed without any further delay. President Bashir again declared
his commitment to accept the force on June 11 during trilateral talks
with the African Union and United Nations. Yet again, a new Security
Council resolution authorizing the force is being discussed in New
York. The United States is strongly committed to getting that
resolution passed. As Secretary Rice recently noted, ``We must not let
the Government of Sudan continue this game of cat and mouse diplomacy;
making promises, then going back on them. It is our responsibility, as
principled nations, as principled democracies, to hold Sudan
accountable.''
Even as world attention focuses on the horrors of Darfur, it is
imperative that we continue to support the implementation of the 2005
North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA. The peace agreement
stopped a war that had raged for over 20 years and resulted in the
deaths of an estimated 2 million people. But stopping a war is not the
same as securing a peace.
Sudan's elections, mandated by the CPA and tentatively planned for
February 2009, are a crucial element of the peace process. They will be
a key indicator as to whether the country will truly be able to put the
civil war behind it and fulfill the late Dr. John Garang's vision of a
united, peaceful nation. The international community must not lose
sight of this pivotal election and must stay engaged in the runup to
it.
Meanwhile, the continuing crisis in Darfur threatens to destabilize
Sudan's neighbors. Chad, which has its own challenges, hosts
approximately 235,000 Sudanese refugees as well as 50,000 refugees
fleeing conflict in the Central African Republic. One hundred eighty
thousand Chadians displaced by insecurity from Chadian rebels and
cross-border Janjaweit militia attacks from Sudan compound the problem,
creating still more conditions for unrest. One bright spot in this
bleak picture are the prospects for peace in Uganda. For years, the
Lord's Resistance Army rebels found a hiding place in south Sudan while
it terrorized northern Uganda. Today, the Government of Southern Sudan
is an active player in the Juba-based negotiations for peace in Uganda.
The African-led mediation process in Juba has made progress in
addressing the brutal 20-year conflict in Uganda. The key mediators--
Government of Southern Sudan Vice President Riak Machar and Special
Envoy of the United Nations Secretary General, former Mozambican
President Joachim Chissano--are deeply engaged in the process, and have
recently added observers from other African countries and the United
States to the talks, Over the past year, thousands of internally
displaced persons have been able to leave the camps in northern Uganda
and vital commercial corridors in Sudan and northern Uganda have
reopened. The United States, through USAID and the State Department's
Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, conducts a robust program
of humanitarian assistance in northern Uganda.
In Somalia, a country that has seen more than its share of
bloodshed during the past 15 years of civil war, there is some cause
for hope--provided the Somalis take advantage of the window of
opportunity created by the reestablishment of the Transitional Federal
Government with the support of the international community.
Somalia does not have the luxury of time. The Transitional Federal
Government opened a National Reconciliation Congress on July 15 and
recessed to allow time to finalize logistical arrangements, such as the
issuance of identification badges for Congress delegates and to allow
time for additional delegates to arrive in Mogadishu. The United States
agreed to provide $2.25 million toward reconciliation through the
United Nations Development Program, of which $1.25 million already has
been provided and has been used mainly to support the National
Reconcilation Congress. The United States remains the leading donor of
humanitarian aid to Somalia and has already committed over $40 million
for development, humanitarian, and peacekeeping support this year.
In Zimbabwe, it is clear that President Mugabe intends to do
whatever it takes to get reelected. The runup to the 2008 Presidential
elections will be a critical time for democratic nations in Africa to
take a strong stand for democracy in the region. After the brutal
attacks in March that I mentioned earlier, the United States assisted
those working for the release of detainees and to secure medical
treatment for the injured. Our Ambassador to Zimbabwe, Christopher
Dell, made his presence felt at police stations and at the courthouse
to demonstrate our concern for those being held. The international
attention that we helped to focus on the beatings and detentions helped
to secure the early release of the detainees.
We also have condemned the Government of Zimbabwe's violent
suppression of a peaceful demonstration on June 6 in Bulawayo by Women
of Zimbabwe Arise! (WOZA!). Police used batons against some 200
demonstrators, detaining seven activists. Among those detained was
WOZA! National Coordinator Jenni Williams, the recipient of Secretary
Rice's 2007 International Women of Courage Award for Africa, and
denying them access to their lawyers.
This latest aggression against civil society, coming on the heels
of attacks this spring, highlights the need for dialog among all
stakeholders concerned with halting Zimbabwe's political and economic
crisis. The active engagement of Zimbabwe's democratic neighbors will
be key to bringing the government and the opposition together to find a
way forward for the country. The Southern African Development Community
has mandated South African President Thabo Mbeki to mediate
negotiations between the Government of Zimbabwe and the opposition. In
late June, the government and the opposition agreed on an agenda for
the negotiations that included constitutional and electoral reforms,
security legislation and rules of political engagement. This is a good
step. But, given the behavior of President Mugabe, we dare not allow
ourselves to think that the road ahead will soon or easily lead to
stability, prosperity, and liberty for the people of Zimbabwe.
strengthening regional architecture
Dealing with the complex challenges that these strife-riven
countries present requires the energetic engagement of neighboring
African nations and of Africa's regional institutions, as well as the
support of the United States and the broader international community.
We have made it a priority to intensify our relationships with Africa's
regional organizations, and with the African Union in particular on
matters of human rights and democracy.
In late 2006, the United States established a bilateral mission to
the AU--the first of its kind where an AU observer state has had a
separate mission dedicated solely to the AU.
The AU architecture is still evolving, but it is promising. The
AU's 53 member states have committed themselves to an agenda for
advancing democracy and human rights, and they are developing bodies
and mechanisms to move that agenda forward, including:
Peace and Security Commission, similar to the U.N. Security
Council, which approves the scope and duties of AU peace
support operations;
The adoption in 2003 of the African Protocol on the Rights
of Women;
The adoption this January of the African Charter on
Democracy, Elections and Governance, enshrining commitments to
political pluralism, free and fair elections, the rule of law
and good governance; and
The creation of an African Court on Human and Peoples'
Rights to uphold the provisions of the Democracy Charter. The
Court will work in coordination with the AU's existing
Commission on Human and People's Rights.
It is very much in our interest--and in the interest of other
democracies--to help strengthen the capacity of these AU bodies and
mechanisms.
To that end, Mr. Chairman, in March I hosted five members of the
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. We discussed the
importance of engaging with civil society and of addressing urgent
human rights concerns. We also agreed to increase our collaboration.
Later that month, I traveled to Addis Ababa and met with the AU
Commissioners for political affairs, peace and security, and women and
gender development. I discussed a range of issues from democratization
and the need for a vibrant civil society to the U.N./AU hybrid force in
Sudan. I also planted the seeds for formal human rights and democracy
consultations with AU. In the fall, DRL will host the first such
consultations. We will share experiences, define new strategies for
partnership and encourage the forging of relationships between the AU
and civil society. We also will identify concrete ways to assist the
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, the fledgling Court,
and a new AU Elections Observation Unit. The Unit's creation is
particularly timely in light of the upcoming elections in Ethiopia,
Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Sudan. USAID already has a $1 million program with
IFES to support the creation of the Unit.
In May, I met with eight impressive justices from the nascent
Court, who also serve on the bench in their native countries. They are
working pro bono to draft the rules and regulations governing the
Court's operations and get it up and running. By the end of the year,
their hard work should reach fruition and provide an additional layer
of protection for the people of Africa.
Just last week here in Washington, the Organization of American
States, the State Department and the African Union held the first ever
OAS/AU Democracy Bridge Forum--an event that was sponsored by the State
Department. Experts from the AU and OAS, and NGOs from Africa and the
Americas exchanged their experiences building regional democratic
institutions, planned further cooperation, and established
institutional linkages.
Mr. Chairman, clearly there is a lot of work to be done--first and
foremost by African democracies--to fully develop the AU and other
regional organizations. The goal is not to build elaborate
architecture, but to build effective institutions that help lock in
democratic gains and play real roles in protecting the rights and
improving the lives of the people of Africa. As Secretary Rice said
last week to the Chairperson of the AU and former President of Mali,
Alpha Konare, the United States is committed to strengthening the AU,
and we look forward to enhancing our partnership.
drl democracy assistance
Mr. Chairman, before I conclude, let me briefly respond to your
request to hear about the human rights and democracy assistance
programs that my Bureau is funding.
DRL has significantly raised its level of programming assistance
for sub-Saharan Africa as a result of congressionally mandated funding
for the Human Rights and Democracy Fund, or HRDF. HRDF is what I call
the venture capital of democracy programming. DRL uses it for cutting-
edge innovative programming that upholds democratic principles,
supports democratic institutions, promotes human rights and builds
civil society in critical countries and regions. We use this fund for
pilot projects that will have an immediate impact but that have
potential for continued funding beyond HRDF resources. DRL coordinates
closely with the Bureau of African Affairs, other State Department
bureaus, USAID, and our NGO partners to ensure that our HRDF programs
support overall United States foreign policy objectives in the region
and are not duplicative.
When I arrived in the fall of 2005, DRL had a little more than $3
million in HRDF for programming in sub-Saharan Africa. With
congressional support, we tripled the level of DRL assistance to nearly
$10 million and have expanded our programmatic reach to critical
countries like Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, and Burundi.
We are proud of our small, but growing Africa programs portfolio. I
will highlight two which I believe have had a positive impact on human
rights:
My Bureau awarded $1.5 million in HRDF to an NGO to establish
women's centers that focus on gender-based violence in nine IDP camps
throughout Darfur. The NGO estimates that we have reached tens of
thousands of women through these centers, providing a range of services
from medical and psychological support to literacy and basic income
generation skills. The grant also has helped fund a global Gender-Based
Violence Coordinator which has enabled this NGO to conduct rapid
assessments of gender-based violence in emerging conflict situations in
Chad, Lebanon, Colombia, Nepal, and the northern Caucasus.
DRL also funded a program to collect scientific evidence of human
rights abuses committed during the civil war in Sierra Leone. The more
than 3,600 statements from witnesses that were collected should prove
useful to the country's Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
With 2007 funds, we will program approximately $10 million for sub-
Saharan Africa. And we have ongoing FY06 programs that are supporting
post-election dialog in Ethiopia, building the capacity of the
judiciary in the Democratic Republic of Congo, combating gender-based
violence in Ethiopia and Sudan, fighting corruption in Cote d'Ivoire
and Burundi, and strengthening civil society efforts in Zimbabwe.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me just say that no matter who
succeeds me as Assistant Secretary, and no matter what administration
follows the current one, the United States must continue to respond to
the pressing demands of Africans for dignity and liberty. We must
continue to work in partnership with the governments and peoples of
Africa to build a continent of hope and freedom, for their sake, and
for the sake of a safer, better world for us all.
Senator Feingold. Thank you. Before we turn to Mr. Hess,
I'd like to turn to the ranking member of the committee. I
appreciate his being here, and would like to offer Senator
Sununu the opportunity to deliver some opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. SUNUNU, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW
HAMPSHIRE
Senator Sununu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for
arriving a little bit late and I don't have a lengthy opening
statement. I want to thank the Secretary for his comprehensive
evaluation of the process and the challenges that we have in
front of us. I think there is a great deal of opportunity
across Africa for enormous improvements in the political
landscape that was addressed in your opening statement but also
in the areas of economic freedom civil society, which you also
touched on.
Corruption, the rule of law and property rights. These are
concepts that underpin and provide a foundation for creating
economic opportunity and improving quality of life for the
millions of people across the world and especially those in
sub-Saharan Africa. So this is an important hearing. I
certainly appreciate the time devoted to it.
I think one of the most important mechanisms we have for
addressing these issues of governance, civil society, and
economic opportunity is the Millennium Challenge Corporation
and I do want to underscore how important that has been to
changing the approach, the mindset that's brought to
assistance, not just in sub-Saharan Africa but around the
world, because it forces people to look at these institutions
and to think hard about those institutions of civil society or
governance or corruption can undermine all the good efforts
that might come along with funding grants and I think it's
important that we fund the Millennium Challenge Corporation to
the best of our ability. The appropriation mark that's been put
forward is below the President's request and I know a number of
other members of this committee, including Senator Coleman,
have written to encourage a higher level of appropriation in
this area and I think it's one area that ties directly into a
lot of the topics we're talking about today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Senator Sununu, and
now Mr. Hess.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL E. HESS, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR OF
THE BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE,
U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Hess. Thank you, Chairman Feingold, Ranking Members
Lugar and Sununu. It's a pleasure and an honor to appear before
you this morning.
My task today, as the chairman outlined, covers a lot of
territory. Strengths of democratization, trends in Africa,
providing an overview of USAID democracy programming and our
experiences in Africa, including why, how much, how, to whom,
and for what as well as the lessons learned in coordination
with other U.S. Government agencies, such as DRL, other donors
and regional and local actors.
I'll try to address these briefly so that we can get on to
the question and discussion period afterward. I brought two
charts today. One is the map of Freedom House, which I think
you have in front of you, showing the progress of countries and
freedom in the sub-Saharan Africa. As you can see by the green
countries, those are ones that are progressing toward freedom.
The red ink countries are those that are becoming less free and
the yellow ones indicate no change at all. Some of those like
Sudan, you can't get much lower than they are.
The other chart is an interesting graph from 1972, showing
the progress in freedom and what that shows is this is a long-
term event. The U.S. Government cares about democratization in
Africa and, therefore, we must be in this for the long haul and
that graph clearly shows that while we've made progress, it is
going to take a great deal of time to reach our final goals of
democratization across and have those free countries that the
chairman referred to earlier.
In terms of budget and what USAID spends on
democratizations, since 1990, USAID has managed over $9 billion
for democracy assistance globally and Africa, our assistance
has grown from $109 million in 1999 to $138 million in 2005.
USAID currently manages 30 democracy programs on the continent,
including two regional programs. In addition to our own
programs, USAID manages five Millennium Challenge Corporation
threshold country programs totaling more $66 million.
In terms of lessons learned, post-conflict programming is
an area in which we have significantly expanded the scope and
sophistication of our interventions in recent years. Our Africa
programs have drawn from USAID experiences, not only in Latin
America, as Senator Lugar points out, but also from our lessons
learned in Kosovo, East Timor, and Afghanistan.
First and foremost is the primacy of supporting the
implementation of viable peace agreements as the principle
vehicle to restore order and establish a legitimate government.
Where viable agreements have been signed, USAID prioritizes all
its assistance through the lens of supporting successful
implementation of those peace agreements.
We have two examples for you today on post-conflict. First
is Sudan--Southern Sudan. Following the comprehensive peace
agreement that my colleague, Secretary Lowenkron, mentioned, we
worked with the Government of Southern Sudan to draft its
constitution and the state constitutions. We assisted in the
formation of the core government institutions and systems;
helped develop a transparent budgeting and funding mechanism;
and also helped to revise the civil service codes.
In terms of anticorruption, we have worked with the
Ministry of Finance in Southern Sudan to design programs that
curb corruption through the adoption of transparent financial
management and budget practices. We also provide training and
technical assistance to the Government of Southern Sudan's
anticorruption commission and the budget oversight committees
for the Southern Sudan legislative assembly.
We have also provided government in a box technology so
that their institutions have the capability of standing up at
the local, state, and national levels. These provide just the
basic tools so that they can operate and function as they
establish their Government in Southern Sudan.
We cannot talk about Southern Sudan without mentioning
Darfur. Like my colleague, Secretary Lowenkron, I visited
Darfur as recently as last January. It was a week after the
attack of the southern Darfurian police on the NGO compound on
the 19th of January. It was demoralizing for those workers. We
have seen a reduction in humanitarian space in Darfur. We
cannot let that continue. We work constantly with our partners
and increase our visibility so that we can try to increase
humanitarian space so that we can help those people in Darfur.
I also saw programs in south Darfur where we worked very
closely with the people in the Nyala and the camps surrounding
Nyala so that for the first time, they actually met people in
those camps and had an exchange and a dialog so that they
understood why they were there. And for the first time, the
youth groups of those two camps came together and worked on a
mutual solution and understanding in trying to get civil
society growing in that part of the world. It is a difficult
place to work but it's a serious challenge and we need to
continue that effort.
I also want to cite our work in Liberia, another good post-
conflict example. After coming out of 14 years of civil war,
for the first time, there was an election of a President and we
have helped support President Johnson-Sirleaf in the
establishment of her government. We worked very closely in the
beginning out of our Office of Transition Initiatives worked
closely with youth programs, trying to clean up the city just
for the inauguration but we took those programs and expanded
them.
In terms of helping her with the strategic communications
program, where she was able to manage the expectations of the
people of Liberia. Monrovia had been without electricity for 20
years. The people of Monrovia expected that they were going to
get electricity immediately. That obviously was not going to
happen and through a strategic communications program, we were
able to manage the progressive role out of electricity across
the city and expanding across Liberia. We have taken that and
expanded that program into assisting other ministries within
the government and have also helped them reform through
anticorruption programs in Liberia. It's a great program. It's
going to be helping the people of Liberia stand up a successful
democratic government.
On the other end of the democratic spectrum, we support
Africa's consolidating democracies. There are significant
challenges all over Africa's consolidating democracies:
Persistent corruption; uneven commitment to competitive and
fair multiparty systems; limited citizen participation; and
oversight and weak governance capacities.
USAID programs are targeted to help countries like Mali,
Senegal, Kenya, and Malawi continue on the path toward
democratic reform. I should note that the democratic
consolidation in many of these countries is critical to
sustaining advances in health, education and not to mention
opportunities for economic growth that the chairman talked
about, resulting in opportunities for assistance from the
Millennium Challenge Corporation that my colleague, Secretary
Lowenkron, mentioned.
In conclusion, I'd like to point out that the chairman
titled this session, ``Democratic Developments in sub-Saharan
Africa, Moving Forwards or Backwards?'' As the map shows, I
think we're making progress. However, Africa is a large
continent and there are problems. We have seen many examples of
backsliding. We will continue our work to prevent that
backsliding and to help grow civil society at the same time
that we build the capacity of those governments to meet the
demands that the civil society places before it. Whatever the
case, USAID is committed to doing all we can to help Africans
choose their destinies through opportunities that are available
in a democracy.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for inviting me to speak
and for calling this hearing about USAID's democracy work in
Africa and I look forward to responding to any questions that
you and members of the subcommittee may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hess follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael E. Hess, Assistant Administrator, Bureau
for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency for
International Development, Washington, DC
introduction
Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to
appear before you this afternoon. As the USAID Assistant Administrator
for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA), I am
particularly pleased to be able to address you today. My task today
covers a lot of territory, sharing some democratization trends in
Africa and providing an overview of USAID democracy promotion
experience in Africa--including why, how much, and how, to whom, and
for what--as well as lessons learned and coordination with other U.S.
Government agencies, other donors, and regional and local actors. I
will do my best to address this array of issues in my testimony and
look forward to a broader discussion in the question and answer period.
democratization trend in africa--positive, but incremental
Examining the democratization trend in Africa provides some context
for discussing USAID assistance to the continent. Freedom House has
taken measures of civil liberties and political rights for Africa
countries since 1972. The overall trend in these data is encouraging,
with steady progress being made since 1985 (see graphs at end of
statement). There was significant jump in the late 1980s and early
1990s. If one compares the Freedom House scores from 1990 with those
from 2006, 37 countries have become more free and only six have become
less free. However, continued democratic progress has slowed and some
countries have lost ground. In the last 5 years, 22 countries became
more free while 12 became less free.
These trends illustrate important two points. Africa is making
progress in its democratic development, but has a long way to go before
its democracies are consolidated. And, if the U.S. Government cares
about democratization in Africa, which we do, then our commitment needs
to be long-term.
why does the u.s. government care about democratization?
The United States supports democracy and good governance for three
primary reasons. First, we support them as a matter of principle--our
political system and national identity are built on the belief that all
people share fundamental rights. Second, democracy promotion is central
to our national security and the fight to counter terrorism and the
extremist ideologies that can lead to terrorist acts, as outlined in
the President's Freedom Agenda and the National Security Strategy.
Failed or authoritarian states pose a threat to the security of the
United States, in the near and long term. Finally, U.S. support for
democracy and better governance is an integral part of our broader
development agenda. Functioning, democratic states directly contribute
to sustainable development, economic growth, and the provision of
crucial services. This is particularly important in Africa where our
democracy and governance programs enhance the effectiveness of the very
substantial health and education investments that United States is
making in the continent.
how much?
Since 1990, USAID has managed over $9 billion of democracy
assistance. In Africa, USAID currently manages 27 democracy programs.
Our assistance has grown from approximately $109 million in FY 1999 to
approximately $138 million in FY 2005. In addition to our own programs,
USAID is managing five MCC Threshold Country Programs totaling more
than $66 million that address democracy and governance issues.
how, to whom, and for what?
Our Africa democracy programs span a wide range of country
situations, including post-conflict and fragile states,
semiauthoritarian and authoritarian regimes, as well as consolidating
democracies. Because of this, there is no cookie-cutter approach to
promoting their democratization. A core principle of USAID democracy
programming is that activities must be designed to address the specific
democratic challenges facing each country. In post-conflict and fragile
states, our aim is to achieve democratic stabilization while addressing
the democracy and governance-related causes of conflict and fragility.
In consolidating democracies, USAID programs address on-going
democratic challenges and strengthen institutions of democratic and
accountable governance. In semiauthoritarian and authoritarian states,
we focus on opening political space for democracy supporters. To get
from these general tenets to country-specific programs, USAID conducts
thorough assessments that identify the core democracy problems as well
as the actors and institutions through which our assistance is most
likely to effect positive change.
Democracy Programs in Post-Conflict and Fragile States
Many of our higher profile Africa democracy programs are in post-
conflict and fragile states, including Sudan, Liberia, Democratic
Republic of Congo, and Somalia. These programs are vital tools for
rebuilding the political, economic, and social fabric of conflict-
affected countries and failed states, as well as for mitigating
potential slides into conflict or state collapse.
Post-conflict programming is an area in which we have significantly
expanded the scope and sophistication of our interventions in recent
years. Our Africa programs have drawn from USAID experience both in and
out of the region, learning lessons from Kosovo, East Timor, and
Afghanistan as well as from other Africa programs. First and foremost
is the primacy of supporting implementation of viable peace agreements
as the principle vehicle to restore order and establish a legitimate
government. Where viable agreements have been signed, USAID prioritizes
all its assistance through the lens of supporting successful
implementation. A second example is our expanded public administration
assistance. USAID is once again fully engaged in this sector after
having deferred for a time to other donors such as the World Bank. The
ability of post-conflict governments to deliver benefits of peace,
particularly to marginalized populations whose grievances may have
driven the conflict, is clearly critical to maintaining peace and too
important for any major donor to ignore. Supporting improved financial
and personnel management, as well as leadership development, are core
components of our Sudan and Liberia programs. Other unique aspects of
USAID conflict and post-conflict programming include an emphasis on
stakeholder consensus-building around major peace implementation
issues; access to independent information; supporting civil society,
and not just former warlords, participation in peace processes; and
focusing on transparency and accountability from the outset to reduce
opportunities for corruption.
Sudan
In Sudan, the democracy program is designed to support the
successful implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)
between the north and south. As such, our priorities are the
establishment of an effective and accountable Government of Southern
Sudan--the GOSS--and the conduct of free and fair national elections in
2009 as called for in the CPA. To that end, USAID has supported the
drafting of the GOSS Constitution as well as state constitutions, the
formation of core government institutions and systems, transparent
budgets and funding mechanisms, and a revised civil service. Our
assistance to the Ministry of Finance is designed to curb corruption
through the adoption of transparent financial management and budget
practices. To same end, USAID is providing training and technical
assistance to the GOSS Anti-Corruption Commission and budget oversight
committees in the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly. In addition to
technical assistance, USAID has issued 22 ``government-in-a-box'' kits
to local, state, and national level offices. These kits provide
furniture, supplies, and in many cases a prefab office building, to
county governments.
Two critical milestones in CPA implementation are the national
census, scheduled for 2008, and national elections, anticipated in
2009. USAID is providing on-going support for the southern portion of
the census. Data from the census will be used to adjust power-sharing
percentages in the Government of National Unity and will be a critical
ingredient to delimiting election constituency boundaries. We have also
been working with the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and
other southern political parties to assist their transformation into
competitive democratic political parties.
USAID recognizes that civil society development must complement
strengthening governments. In Sudan, our civil society focus is on
women-led organizations and organizations that support marginalized
groups. We are also supporting increased access to and availability of
public information through media outlets, radio distributions, and
radio campaigns to spark public discourse about the CPA, the
constitutions, peace-building, tolerance, anticorruption, and the rule
of law.
Liberia
Liberia's emergence from two decades of civil conflict under new
and democratically elected leadership presents opportunities for
peaceful development, rather than destabilization in West Africa. USAID
recognizes the importance of improved governance and the rule of law to
enhance Liberia's stability, help address the needs and aspirations of
Liberians, and create the foundation for investment and economic
growth. Ongoing support to the Governance and Economic Management
Assistance Program (GEMAP) has been successful in helping the Liberian
Government control and manage its public finances, a critical departure
from the grand corruption that characterized the government under
Charles Taylor. At the same time, USAID assistance focuses on
establishing the rule of law and supporting security sector reform to
address the personal insecurity that has dominated the country for
decades. As a complement to these activities, USAID is providing
assistance to the Liberian legislature, in conjunction with the House
Democracy Assistance Commission initiative, and continues to help civil
society organizations develop the capacity to hold the Liberian
Government accountable between elections for their actions.
USAID also provided important assistance for the historic
transition elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo. These were
the first democratic elections in over 40 years, and Congolese citizens
turned out in great numbers to choose their President and members of
their National and Provincial Assemblies. To help the Congolese
overcome enormous political and logistical challenges, USAID-funded
technical advisers who served as resource persons in the creation of
the electoral framework and who supported the Independent Election
Commission. In addition to providing election administration expertise,
technical assistance included strategic communications and public
outreach, which were especially important for counteracting popular
mistrust about the electoral process provoked by repeated delays in the
electoral calendar. USAID-funded civic education reached 2.1 million
Congolese throughout the country and we supported mobilization of tens
of thousands of Congolese election monitors. These activities helped
ensure that the multiple rounds of elections were credible and largely
peaceful, leading to the inauguration in December 2006 of President
Joseph Kabila, a reconstituted National Assembly, and Provincial
Assemblies which are a brand new institution in the Congo. In addition,
Senators and Governors were indirectly elected over the last year as
well, creating for the first time a bicameral legislature. Now on the
horizon is the draft law on decentralization and ensuing municipal
elections, which are expected in 2008.
USAID is now in the midst of developing programs to stand up these
new institutions and give them a fighting chance to deliver on promises
to build a democratic, inclusive DR Congo, where government is held
accountable by the people. Elected leaders are new; their positions are
new; and even many of the institutions of governance are brand new. As
in many post-conflict situations, there are tendencies to consolidate
control in the hands of the Executive. USAID is moving quickly with the
supplemental funds that Congress recently made available. We will focus
on ending the lingering conflict that persists in the East as well as
on building the institutions of legitimate governance in the
overwhelming majority of the country that is stable. For example, we
will help build the capacity of the Provincial Assemblies--some of
which do not even have tables and chairs, and we will promote the
transformation of the Electoral Commission into a permanent and truly
independent body. Our work over the next few years will also include
broad citizen civic education, reinforcing links between elected
authorities and constituents, and helping Congolese define what good
governance means in their country. I would like to note that USAID and
the Department of State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
are coordinating closely to ensure that our programs in the Congo
effectively complement each other.
Somalia
Somalia, unfortunately, is not as far along in its peace and
reconciliation process. In such fragile states, the USAID strategic
approach is to promote stabilization, reform, and recovery by building
institutions of democratic and accountable governance and the rule of
law while also addressing causes of fragility such as ethic grievances
and economic exclusion. For Somalia, the first challenge is to
establish a federal government that enjoys legitimacy among all the
major clans. In the immediate term, we are providing support to
implement the National Reconciliation Congress, which is due to start
in the coming days and which the U.S. Government hopes will constitute
an effective venue for clan representatives and other stakeholders to
strengthen political inclusiveness of the Transitional Federal
Government and stabilize the country through peaceful dialog. The USAID
program is also launching support for the Transitional Federal
Parliament, as the transitional institution that may be said to have
the widest basis of support; the program will build the Parliament's
capacity with a particular focus on its role in conflict management and
its responsibilities under the Transitional Federal Charter.
We are also helping to form and build the capacity of local
governments which will be seen as legitimate by local populations and
the leadership of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). These
governments will have a critical role in delivering social services,
such as health, education, and water, as well as promoting local
economic growth. USAID is also poised to provide extensive capacity-
building to the TFG itself, but it is critical that questions of TFG
inclusiveness be resolved before we launch such assistance on a large
scale.
In addition to these efforts, USAID has supported Somali media and
civil society for several years. Our current program provides funding
and training for civil society and media to actively participate in
peace-building and governance. Among its objectives are to build civil
society and media networking capacity, strengthening their ability to
operate effectively in a stateless environment, and to support advocacy
for media and civil society regulatory frameworks acceptable to our
partners and government authorities. The rapidly evolving political
landscape presents significant challenges and places heavy demands on
civil society. USAID support is aimed at enabling civil society to
manage the political space in order to reduce the risk of violent
conflict and promote dialog. USAID partners have acted to protect free
media across Somalia, including in cases of media closures in Mogadishu
and journalist arrests in Somaliland. USAID continues to support civil
society engagement in local councils' formation in Puntland and support
for decentralization in selected municipalities. USAID civil society
partners are heavily engaged in collaboration with other civic and
business actors in a series of initiatives in Mogadishu in attempts to
reduce tensions and build platforms for dialog leading up to the
National Reconciliation Congress. In Somaliland, the USAID democracy
program focuses on building the conflict management and institutional
capacity of the Parliament and building democratic political parties
with an eye toward a second round of free and fair Presidential and
parliamentary elections in 2008.
Democracy Programs in Support of Consolidating Democracies
On the other end of the democratic spectrum is support for Africa's
consolidating democracies. These programs are tremendously important
for African democratization. Recent work by a team of researchers from
Vanderbilt University and the University of Pittsburgh has shown that
successful democracies have a significant positive influence on the
democratization paths of countries in their neighborhood; this positive
``diffusion'' effect was shown to have a greater impact on a country's
democratization than its GDP growth. Significant challenges are present
in all of Africa's consolidating democracies: Persistent corruption,
uneven commitment to competitive and fair multiparty systems, limited
citizen participation and oversight, and weak governance capacity.
USAID programs are targeted to help countries like Mali, Senegal,
Kenya, and Malawi continue on paths of democratic reform. I should note
that democratic consolidation in many of these countries is critical to
sustaining advances in health and education, not to mention
opportunities for economic growth resulting from Millennium Challenge
Corporation compacts.
The overall theme of our lessons learned in these countries is that
democratic consolidation is a long process. Corruption is deeply
engrained in most African countries. It is telling to note that all
five of the democracy-relevant MCC Threshold Country Programs USAID
manages focus on anticorruption. While dramatic improvements in
election administration have been made, building competitive,
pluralistic political systems takes longer. Several more advanced
African democracies remain dominated by a single political party or by
a handful of charismatic leaders. Finally, resource constraints,
underdeveloped infrastructure, and human resource limitations pose
long-term challenges to both governments and civil society groups as
they strive to improve their institutional performance.
Mali
Mali's democracy is one that inspires reformers throughout the
region. In fact, Mali is moving from a regional to a global role model
this year by hosting, with support from USAID, the Fourth Ministerial
Conference of the Community of Democracies in November. In addition to
this special assistance, the USAID democracy and governance program
focuses on ensuring that Mali's decentralized system of government
delivers for all citizens at the local level. Activities promote
citizen participation in, and oversight of, local governments;
strengthen local government financial management skills; develop
policies that support the success of decentralized government; and
increase women's role in decisionmaking. As a result of USAID programs,
citizens are demanding that local governments account for their tax
revenue and some local governments have seen their tax revenues go up
with increasing citizen confidence that it is being used well. Mali's
democracy was also strengthened through election support activities,
resulting in free and transparent Presidential and legislative
elections. USAID women leadership activities contributed to a 120
percent increase in the number of female candidates running for office
in the 2007 local government elections over the previous election. The
Mali program also provides access to information by building community
radio stations and training local radio producers in the production of
radio programming on governance and decentralization, health
(especially HIV/AIDS and malaria), education, and conflict prevention
topics. Today, there are 205 private community radio stations in Mali
(44 of which were financed by USAID), and USAID trained over 1,500
radio producers and presenters in the production of development-related
programs. Because of these efforts, 89 percent of Malians have access
to at least one community radio station, and for a majority of these
citizens, radio is their only source of information. The mission has
emphasized radio coverage in Mali's fragile and northern areas, where
radio programming focuses on preventing or mitigating conflict and
broadcasting vital counterterrorist messages.
I am proud to point out that during the past decade USAID Democracy
and Governance programs have helped countries like Mali achieve the
effective governance needed to qualify for and take advantage of the
opportunity of an MCC Compact Agreement. However, we need to remember
that effective and accountable governance is an ongoing challenge for
all countries, including those in Africa that have risen above their
peers to qualify for MCC assistance. We must not assume that just
because a country has qualified for a Compact Agreement--let alone a
Threshold Agreement--that it has solved all of its governance problems.
There remains an important role for USAID DG programs to help these
countries consolidate and build upon the progress they have made.
Democracy Programs in Authoritarian and Semi-Authoritarian States
The toughest environments for us to work in are authoritarian and
semiauthoritarian states. The major challenge facing USAID is how to
foster political competition where leaders are opposed to meaningful
reform and prepared to use the resources of the state to cling to
power. The USAID strategic approach in these countries is to strengthen
democratic activists outside of government by working with groups such
as democracy and human rights NGOs, watchdog groups, independent media,
and opposition political parties. When possible, USAID also supports
pockets of reform within government, often times within the judicial
branch, independent electoral or anticorruption commissions, and local
governments.
Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe, unfortunately, falls among such countries and is of
particular concern for USAID. Our Zimbabwe program is designed to help
civil society organizations express their views despite the
government's efforts to tighten restrictions on independent media and
journalists and curb the work of nongovernmental organizations.
Activities include advocating to Parliament and local authorities,
building an effective committee system within Parliament, and
supporting local authorities to be more capable and open to citizen
input. USAID support also helps Zimbabwean civic activists maintain
their networks of support and communication with the broader human
rights community in Africa, which is bearing witness to the
deteriorating situation in Zimbabwe and planning for a return to
democracy when Mugabe eventually leaves the scene.
nigeria
An important African country that I have not yet mentioned is
Nigeria. Nigeria is a country that defies categorization. The second
Obasanjo administration made important gains in increasing
transparency, yet corruption and patron-client politics continue to
dominate. The country has transitioned, for the first time in its
history, from one civilian leader to another without a military coup,
but the election was widely condemned as failing the Nigerian people,
so ridden by fraud that results could not be said to reflect their
will. On-going community violence, particularly but not exclusively in
the Niger Delta, leads to casualty levels rivaling some civil wars.
As Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer
noted in her recent testimony before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs' Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, we were profoundly
disappointed with the deeply flawed elections. Secretary Frazer rightly
identified the need for political commitment on the part of the
Government of Nigeria for electoral reform, including substantial
reform of the Independent National Electoral Commission. Without
political commitment, USAID technical assistance will not lead to
improved elections.
In this context, USAID conducted a thorough review of its democracy
strategy in Nigeria in the fall 2006. We commissioned an independent
country analysis by country experts to assess democratization trends
since the transition to civilian government in 1999, current democracy
challenges, and opportunities to support democratic reformers. This
analysis helped us chart a way forward to address the primary challenge
in Nigeria, the lack of accountability in a political system with an
overly powerful executive and high levels of corruption. Our new
program focuses on bolstering Nigerian efforts to increase
accountability at both the national and subnational level, reinforcing
areas where political commitment has emerged in the last few years. At
the national level, this entails supporting increased oversight of the
federal budget by the National Assembly to combat corruption, greater
independence and capacity in the federal judiciary to promote the rule
of law, and strengthened civil society advocacy and oversight to
increase government accountability. At the local level, we are
launching a program to enable citizens to hold their local governments
accountable for delivering the social services long-awaited as a
``democratic dividend.'' The importance of accountability is only
heightened after this year's elections, which dramatically undermined
the Nigerian people's ability to express their will through the ballot
box. Given the leading role Nigeria plays on the continent, bolstering
Nigerian democratic reformers remains a critical priority.
evidence that usaid democracy and governance programs work
Having discussed USAID approaches to democracy in the various
country situations we face in Africa, I would like to discuss the
impact of our programs. Beyond anecdotal evidence, how do we know if
the USAID approach to democracy promotion is effective or not? To
answer this question, we now have underway some of the most exciting
and significant work ever carried out to evaluate the impact of the
USAID democracy assistance programs, and it is providing some answers.
In this endeavor, we are working closely with the academic community,
other donors, and the National Academy of Sciences to develop new
methods that will lead to findings on what works and what does not and
to make recommendations to expand successful programs and stop
ineffective ones.
The first stage of this research was a quantitative, cross-national
analysis to see whether researchers could detect any impact of USAID
democracy assistance. We were very pleased when researchers from
Vanderbilt University and the University of Pittsburgh found that every
$10 million of USAID democracy assistance generated a five-fold
increase in the rate of democratization in a given country, in any
given year, over the period from 1990 to 2003. While this overall
finding is tremendously encouraging, we have asked the team to delve
further, exploring finer-grained impact in particular program areas.
This research will complement country-specific studies being launched
now, as well as the body of knowledge USAID has amassed on lessons
learned and best practices in specific areas of democracy programming.
With the findings from these efforts, missions will have at their
finger tips information on which types of democracy programs are most
effective and on how those programs can be designed and implemented in
a way that will yield the biggest impact in a given environment.
conclusion
You titled this hearing with a question, ``Democratic Developments
in Sub-Saharan Africa: Moving Forwards or Backwards?'' I would answer
that question by saying that Africa is a large continent, and we can
find progress and backsliding at the same time. Whatever the case,
though, USAID is committed to doing all we can to help Africans choose
their own destinies through opportunities that are only available in a
democracy.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for inviting me to speak about
USAID's democracy promotion work in Africa. I look forward to
responding to any questions that you and members of the subcommittee
may have.
Senator Feingold. I thank both the members of the panel and
we'll begin with 7-minute question rounds. I'll start with Mr.
Lowenkron.
How does the State Department coordinate its democracy
promotion activities with other U.S. agencies and
representatives on the ground as well as with other donors and
national authorities, international and regional organizations,
and civil society organizations?
Mr. Lowenkron. As regards our parts of democracy funding,
we sit down with our colleagues in the State Department and
with AID and we thrash out, what are the areas that we could
best apply our funding? We then craft proposals and we put them
out for open competition for our own NGOs. Once we get their
proposals, we then sit together the regional bureaus, AID, and
my Bureau--and then we make decisions over which programs that
we will fund. That's how we do this internally.
In terms of what we do with our partners, we have very good
consultations with the European Union, which devotes a lot of
time, energy, and resources to try to develop democratic
institutions in Africa itself.
Second, we also work--we are also laying the groundwork
because there is a lot of work to be done, to support the role
of the African Union to take on more and more responsibilities
as well as the subregional organizations such as SADC in
Southern Africa as well as ECOWAS. So we do have these
relationships with them. We do talk about our programs and we
do try to hammer out, what are our objectives? Often times, it
means that we work with our own NGOs to fund their NGOs and
step backward and let them take the lead on our programming.
Senator Feingold. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, can you
highlight some of the notable steps the United States has taken
to support democratic principles and institutions and reform
efforts beyond elections across Africa to ensure, as we've both
discussed, that democratic development does not end with
multiparty polls?
Mr. Lowenkron. Well, several areas. No. 1, for example, we
have a program to help train legislators in Liberia. We have a
program to help train judges in DROC. We have a program to work
with various NGOs on gender-based violence in Sudan and
Ethiopia and we want to use that as the model and reach beyond
Africa to other parts of the world that are experiencing
gender-based violence but they're not connected in some sort of
a net where they could learn from one another. So these are
some of the examples that we've used for our program.
Senator Feingold. Very good; thank you. Mr. Hess, I was
pleased to hear that USAID is demanding that Somalia's
Transitional Federal Government demonstrate a genuine
commitment to inclusiveness before providing extensive
capacity-building assistance. What observable indicators are
you looking for and how are you communicating these
expectations to the TFG?
Mr. Hess. There's a couple of mechanisms, Mr. Chairman,
that we're using to communicate. First, through our post,
through Ambassador Ranneberger, who has conversations and
connections with the TFG. We have delivered the message that we
want to make sure that they are inclusive, especially including
all members of the society, not just friends of the TFG. We
have worked very closely with them on the funding of the
reconciliation Congress, which began yesterday. That's an
important first step in being inclusive and by supporting that
through our funding, we think that's a step in the right
direction. But again, we want to make sure that they understand
that this has to include all parts of Somali society if it's
going to be successful.
Senator Feingold. This is obviously complex and
unfortunately, many other donors have not put these kinds of
conditions on their support for the TFG. How are you
coordinating with them to ensure that international support
does not have the effect of merely emboldening or entrenching
the TFG?
Mr. Hess. That's a very good point as I met in January with
the members of the EU and DFID, who are probably two of the
largest supporters. Norway and Germany have come a long way in
terms of providing support bilaterally as well. But I met with
our representatives and their representatives in Nairobi when
we were talking about this very issue, about conditionality
that the TFG has to be more inclusive and I think the EU has
come a long way in recognizing this and so has DFID in terms of
the message that they are delivering.
It's important that we work as a donor community in lock
steps so that we send the same message and we don't present
conflicting messages to this government right now. This is a
crucial time. Things don't look good in Somalia right now but
this is an opportunity and we want to seize this opportunity.
We also work very closely with the United Nations in
delivering this message. UNDP has done a very good job of
helping organize this congress and the message that they are
sending, likewise to the Transitional Federal Government is one
of inclusivity--that's not a word, is it?
Senator Feingold. Fair enough. We, as Senators on this
committee, should take whatever opportunities we have to
reinforce this when we have contact with representatives of
those donor countries.
Finally, before I turn to the other Senators, Mr. Hess, on
Sudan, which you talked about in your testimony. Local
elections are set to be held in 2009 and these elections are
expected to pave the way for the critical 2011 referendum where
the Southern Sudanese, of course, have the option to vote for
independence. In order for the 2009 elections to take place, a
census in South Sudan needs to be undertaken and this has not
happened. Why? What is the administration doing to push this
forward, and finally, what is the administration doing to
prepare for the 2009 election?
Mr. Hess. That's a very good point, sir. We've seen that
example in a number of other elections around--in other places
that I've mentioned, such as in Bosnia or in Kosovo. The census
is key.
[Additional written testimony by Mr. Hess follows:]
There are three major political milestones that are critical to
successful implementation of the CPA: The census, the elections, and
the referendum. The census is now due to take place from February 2-16,
2008. Given that the rainy season starts in April, if this date slips
beyond March 2008 it will have a detrimental impact on the election
timeline. The Government of National Unity (GNU) has delayed in
providing their portion of funding for the census, sowing doubt about
whether they will honor their commitment.
USAID provides both short- and long-term technical assistance to
the South Sudan Commission for the Census, Statistics and Evaluation
and will be providing a substantial amount of equipment in the next few
months.
Since September 2004, USAID has obligated $47,082,000 to support
election preparations. Components of the overall program have supported
civic education, free and independent media, electoral law development,
political party development, and preparations for the national census.
Mr. Hess. One challenge is there are millions of IDPs who
have still not returned to Southern Sudan. So we have to begin
that registration process in the IDP camps while we're trying
to do it down south. We're also working very aggressively with
our partners in the United Nations to make sure that that IDP
return happens. It is not happening as quickly as we want it to
happen so we're trying to facilitate that so that they can go
home. Unfortunately, those are simultaneous processes. We have
to make sure that they get back safely to their homes where
they are going to reside. There are also still a number of
refugees that reside in northern Uganda, who have not returned
home. So while we try to get the IDPs back to their homes, we
continue to prepare for a comprehensive census.
Senator Feingold. Thanks so much.
Senator Sununu.
Senator Sununu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I'd like
to begin by asking each of you to comment on what you see as
best practices. Just give one or two examples in each of the
following areas. First, election processes. Where can we find
some of the best practices and best examples in sub-Saharan
Africa just for the process of elections, either at the
national or the local level?
Second, judicial independence, which was, I think,
mentioned
by both of you as being really essential to maintaining and
sustaining improvements in the democratic process, and third,
property rights. If I could ask each of you to comment or give
an example or two in each of those three areas and then comment
generally on whether or not we're doing a good job of
highlighting the best practices, either to promote support from
institutions here in the United States and around the world, or
to share information with other countries and other reform-
minded groups in sub-Saharan Africa.
Mr. Lowenkron. I would start with the best practices for
the electoral process with Liberia. I think that was a case in
which we had a synergy with our aid and with our diplomacy with
nongovernmental organizations and with a very, very clear
message that Ellen Johnson certainly presented, which is, in
essence, the time has come to have a clean and honest election.
She mobilized civil society. We supported civil society and the
thrust of her campaign was, we've got to get governance right.
So I go back to the model of the three elements of democracy.
So I would use Liberia, probably as the most successful.
I would also just add a comment saying that even though
there were many problems, as the chairman put it, I think what
happened in DROC was extraordinary. It was challenging. It was
an extraordinary election and I think that the people in that
country should be given credit for pulling together an
election, the first election in over 40 years.
I would say in terms of judicial independence and this may
seem a little odd at the outset. I would actually look at the
strength of the judicial courts in Nigeria, which at the 11th
hour, said, ``No, you cannot disallow somebody from being on
the ballot,'' and which even today, are raising questions about
some of the corruption of the Nigerian governors and I think
that we need to highlight the importance of the role of the
judiciary, especially in the areas where we had hoped to see
greater progress and where they have been besieged. So I would
use that as an example.
I'd have to think a minute about property rights. In terms
of sharing our experiences and engaging in dialog, this is one
of the reasons why we have started this dialog with the African
Union and why we also have quiet dialogs with countries, with
governments on the sub-Saharan continent. It is not enough for
us to negotiate and to discuss and debate among ourselves what
a best practice is. We need to bring them to the table.
We have discussed this with the European Union. I would
also add something else, which I found quite extraordinary and
something we need to build on and that is that last week, there
was an extraordinary event here in Washington. There was a
Democracy Bridge between the African Union and the Organization
of American States, headed by both leaders of those
organizations to exchange views on best practices and to talk
about their--the elements of their Charter. The OAS Charter was
in 2001. AU came 6 years later but I think it is important for
us to do all that we can in order to support the efforts of
what I call south-south dialog in exchanging best practices on
democracy promotion.
Senator Sununu. Thank you. Mr. Hess.
Mr. Hess. Unfortunately, I have to agree with my colleague
that Liberia is a great example, for all the reasons that Barry
mentioned. We worked very hard building civil society, trying
to manage those expectations and to deliver good governance for
Liberia.
I also want to reinforce though, the DRC. Forty years
without free elections. A country the size of the United States
of America with only four airports, no roads, very little
communication infrastructure that's virtually impossible to
navigate. But yet, they went through two rounds of elections
and for the first time, elected a President in 40 years. I
mean, that's just a remarkable story and shows the
determination of the people in the Democratic Republic of
Congo, to actually participate in the process and carry it
through. It's just an excellent story that we try to tell in
many other places around.
The judicial independence, obviously it is the Nigerian
electoral judiciary. It did a great job of standing up in the
face of what was pretty severe pressure to cave in and they did
stand up.
In terms of property rights, I'd like to cite a couple of
examples. One is Kenya and the other is Ethiopia. In both of
those places, we're looking at land tenure issues because of
agricultural development in both of those areas. As you know,
we've had some difficulties in the northeast sector of Kenya
for the pastorialists. We've worked very closely with the
legislatures in both those countries to try and revise their
property rights and help the pastoralists and the farmers in
those regions so they can be more productive. Again, we work
with our donor partners to convey those issues.
We also have sessions with our NGOs where we try to
exchange those ideas and we've had two recently on backsliding,
for example, to try and reinforce those messages.
Senator Sununu. I want to close with a question to each of
you about moving from best practices to a more disappointing
process, which were the elections in Nigeria. Three brief
questions here. First, what preelection messages did the United
States deliver to the Nigerian Government regarding concerns
and in malfeasants heading into the elections? What was the
response from the United States regarding the outcome and do
you think that the criticisms of the U.S. response as being
muted were fair? Do you think that we could have been more
forceful in responding to the many reports of election abuses?
Secretary.
Mr. Lowenkron. In terms of our preelection message, we
reiterated time and again, this is an opportunity. This is an
opportunity for the country of Nigeria. We expressed concerns
that we did not believe that the Independent National Electoral
Commission was up to speed in terms of carrying out a
successful election. We were concerned about the efforts to
rewrite the constitution to allow for a third term. So we had a
series, a series of conversations with the Nigerian Government,
to say, this is an opportunity. We had our NGOs on the ground.
We had NDI, IRI, and others on the ground as well as
representatives of the European Union.
And it was disappointing. Our reaction to that was built on
policies and the statements we made to the Nigerian officials,
which is, this was a historic opportunity and you missed it. It
is disappointing. It's not just the issue of free elections,
it's not what happens on election day alone. It's what happens
in the lead up to the election and every step of the way, we
found problems, significant problems on that.
I believe that our response to the Nigerian election was
clear. This was a disappointment. What we have also stressed to
them is, you need to do the following things. You need to allow
the courts to adjudicate the electoral disputes, No. 1 and No.
2, you really, really, really have to tackle your National
Electoral Commission because it was wanting. The problems that
were there still remain.
Mr. Hess. Obviously, we worked very closely with DRL in the
whole electoral process and the messaging is synchronized, as
Barry alluded to in the beginning. When we start these
operations, we don't do it independently. We do them together.
So the messages were--our messages were the same as the State
Department's messages and they were delivered by the
Ambassador.
One of the areas that we've been working on since then,
though, is we believe that you also have to continue to work
with the local governance and civil society organizations. Yes;
we had a disappointing result at the national level but we're
going to continue to push that message through our partners
that are working in the region but we have to continue to build
the local networks and the local organizations that will build
from the bottom up, a successful election next time.
Senator Sununu. Thank you.
Senator Feingold. Thank you. Before I turn to Senator
Lugar, just a comment on the issue of the third term for the
President of Nigeria. I guess we forget sometimes, what impact
we can have without passing legislation. I simply sent a letter
to the head of the Parliament there, saying that we hope they
would not pass legislation allowing an additional term, and
they were apparently having a huge altercation and he stopped
the proceedings and read my letter, and apparently, that calmed
things down. So we forget that we really can impact leaders and
policies in these countries, without seeming heavy-handed. It
was merely a request that they not make the mistake so many
countries have made of allowing somebody to continue to run
time and time again. With that, I turn to Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to pursue
the comments that you've made about the Millennium Challenge.
The press accounts of this are sympathetic and point out that
the very nature of the process calls for a great deal of study,
and, most importantly, emphasize participation by officials in
the countries that might be assisted, and, maybe even beyond
the officials to those in opposition or others that may be
helpful.
One of the dilemmas of all of this is that after a decision
is made--and you point out that 6 of the 12 favorable decisions
have been for African countries--then the process of dispensing
the money depends likewise upon decisionmaking, bureaucracy,
and leadership in the particular countries. The net result of
all this has been, according to at least one account, only
about $71 million has been dispensed by MCC out of several
billion dollars that have been awarded. As you have observed in
this committee, as we've had at least two hearings a year on
MCC and how things are moving, there has been great impatience
by some members of our committee who are saying: Why in the
world are we pursuing this type of thing as opposed to simply
foreign aid as we used to do it? That is, when we voted money
that went out to the country and by and large, it got spent.
Somebody might be helped by that method. In that process, why,
a lot of local participation is occurring and democracy-
building perhaps, or something. But not much is occurring here,
with the result that, as Senator Sununu pointed out, the
administration's request, which was already well below the $5
billion level that the President had talked about earlier, is
down now to less than two. And this is not the first year that
that has been the request and who knows what the outcome of
that will be and some would suggest that at the end of this
administration, there may be a reversion back to the old
system.
Now, I've gone through all of this because I agree with the
philosophy of those who are testifying this morning that the
undergirdings for the democratic progress that we hope for,
have to come with some building of institutions, institutions
to make decisions about roads and dams and education and health
care and whatever may be the application the country felt was
most important for it. And it requires individuals who can
dispense the money. As we're seeing in Iraq, for example--not
an entirely different situation. Money is accumulating in the
bank but there is not an infrastructure even of government to
dispense the money in any respect, democracy or not.
What comment can you make as professionals who are dealing
with MCC as well as with democracy, as to what we need to do,
in the Congress or the administration or on the ground in
African countries; not necessarily to hurry up the process.
Some have suggested that the very fact that money isn't
dispensed very fast is a very good discipline that it's not
being splashed around. We're not having consequent
investigations as to who misspent the money or sequestered it
or put it in a foreign bank account. There is this transparency
that is so important in all of these democracy movements. But
can you discuss generally, just in a few minutes, whether the
MCC--how does it fit into this situation, not only with the six
countries but with others that are candidates and some who
might be?
Mr. Lowenkron. Senator, first of all, I agree with you on
the issue that we have been slow. This was a revolutionary
concept in many ways, the MCC, and I think that we spent a lot
of time getting the structure right precisely because we wanted
to ensure that if we went down this path, we would do the
following: We would be able to build this infrastructure and be
able to tackle corruption and we'd be able to account to the
Congress and the American people where the money is going.
Now, under Ambassador Danilovich, this has been accelerated
and I think it's critical that this program continue. I do not
see this program, in any way, shape, or form, as holding up
some of the other critical work that we do--supporting NGOs on
democracy promotion, tackling aid under the PEPFAR or ensuring
distribution, enough food to the critical parts of Africa, even
the countries that are incredibly mismanaged, regimes like in
Zimbabwe.
But it's a change in culture, it's a change in attitude.
It's a notion that, yes; we will support country X and
government Y, but you've got to be serious about tackling
corruption. You've got to demonstrate, what is your plan to
build the infrastructure and by the way, we should be willing
to threaten to suspend from the MCC, as has been the case with
some other countries outside of Africa. So this is very much--
this is a significant piece of work. It's still a work in
progress. I share the frustration of those who say, this has
been up and running. We need to see more results. I do think
the trajectory is good. It is getting better. There are
countries in Africa and elsewhere around the world that not
only finally get it but they are also competing to get into the
program.
Senator Lugar. Um-hmm. Mr. Hess.
Mr. Hess. I'd like to add a little bit to that. I think it
is important to recognize that we do work together and the fact
that we do work together, both State AID and the MCC. If we
weren't working together, then perhaps they would be dispersing
funds without the capacity being there and without our
anticorruption programs being effective and in place and I
don't think that's what we want to do.
As Barry points out, we don't want to be seen as giving
money and as you pointed out, Senator Lugar, and having it end
up in some Swiss bank account some place. It is a new program.
It is the new structure. There are new coordination mechanisms
on which we are working to ensure that the capacity of that
country is there, the decisionmaking processes are in place.
These are decisions that Africans have to make about their own
money. These aren't decisions that we're going to make for
them. We want them to have that capacity. We want them to be
able to do that and then to have the accountability and the
responsibility for those programs. Those aren't our issues.
Those are their issues and we have to train them, give them the
capacity to do that while we work on these anticorruption
programs. And if we weren't in sync, maybe we would be
dispensing the money without having these capacities in place
and I don't think we want that.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Feingold. Thank you. Senator Lugar, I note that the
pretty good attendance at this hearing, I think, is a sign of
the growing interest in the Senate on issues relating to Africa
and I appreciate all my colleagues being here, including
Senator Nelson, who certainly has shown strong interest in
these matters and I think has traveled there recently.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Good morning, gentlemen. Let me just
say that in my travels, I have been enormously impressed with
USAID and I have seen some very dedicated folks that basically
have exceptional hardship tours and I commend you for that.
I'd like to know, what do you think, does official U.S.
silence in response to an undemocratic state have--how does
that impact our interest in the country in the question and in
the region, when we turn our head? I'm talking about official
U.S. silence.
Mr. Lowenkron. In every day that I have been Assistant
Secretary of State for Democracy, I have a voice and a vote in
our policy and I have insisted that these issues be very clear.
They are clear in terms of--clear in our----
Senator Bill Nelson. Hold on. Try again. Can you use the
other microphone?
Mr. Lowenkron. Let's try that. Does that work better?
Senator Bill Nelson. No. Turn yours off.
Mr. Lowenkron. Mine's off.
Senator Bill Nelson. OK, try the one on your left.
Mr. Lowenkron. Better? Thank you. I don't think we should
ever be in a position to remain silent when elections fall
short. When I meet the Secretary of State, our conversations
are always about trajectories. Where is a country going in
terms of elections? where is it going in terms of civil
society? where is it going in terms of corruption? and our
policy is to try to push them in all three of these areas. A
lot of these states are fragile but we need to speak out
clearly when there are shortcomings.
Senator Bill Nelson. Have we done that in Zimbabwe?
Mr. Lowenkron. I think we've been very, very forceful in
Zimbabwe. I think we have spoken out against the attacks on the
opposition in March, against the Women of Zimbabwe Arise
Organization; that happened in early June. We also quietly
worked with our friends and allies and partners in Africa and
the European Union. We've requested that the AU shine a
spotlight on the issues in Zimbabwe.
Now, I hasten to add, there are some on the outside who
think--some who believe that this may be counterproductive and
that we need to lower our voice in Zimbabwe. I'm not one of
those. I think that when people are being clubbed to death,
when people are being arrested, when you have a regime that
when two people meet, that's tentatively called a meeting and
they've got to have 7 days advance notice in order to get
permission. And when you have a rate of inflation that is just
beyond one's imagination, then I do think we need to speak out.
Senator Bill Nelson. What about Nigeria?
Mr. Lowenkron. We have flagged the fact that Nigeria had a
historic opportunity and they missed it. They missed an
opportunity to advance on their democratic development.
Senator Bill Nelson. What's your assessment of the job that
the new President is doing?
Mr. Lowenkron. Well, I have to say--I mean, I don't want
his first steps--his first steps I would applaud. He has done a
public disclosure of his own finances and he wants that as a
model for other leaders. He is not standing in the way of the
judiciary in terms of adjudicating the electoral disputes and
the governors. There have been some prosecutions of some
governors on the basis of corruption and he has indicated his
intention to tackle the rather weak National Election Council,
the NEC. It's early but at least a few of those signs are
positive.
Senator Bill Nelson. I would agree with that. But there's
one where we have a lot of personal interest involved because
we get about 12 or 15 percent of our daily oil from Nigeria.
But they just can't seem to get their hands around all those
kidnappings down there in the Delta.
Mr. Lowenkron. Well, I would say, Senator, part of that is
because of the culture of corruption in that country and the
culture and the practice in which the wealth of Nigeria does
not extend to all the Nigerian people and that fuels a lot of
it, which gets back to the issue that the election was an
opportunity that was missed and we have to also focus on, can
we press the new President, can we press the Nigerians to get
serious about tackling corruption.
Senator Bill Nelson. What about Ethiopia? Yesterday--you
know what happened yesterday. The opposition that protested the
last year's elections ended up getting sentenced to life
yesterday. Now we've certainly gotten along a lot better with
this government than we did with the Mengistu government.
Mr. Lowenkron. Absolutely.
Senator Bill Nelson. A lot more cooperation. There is a
whole new spirit compared to 25 years ago. But what are we
going to do when opposition is squelched with life sentences?
Mr. Lowenkron. Well, Senator, we have to press. The Prime
Minister of Ethiopia said that he will move to give these
individuals clemency but that doesn't really roll the clock
back to pre-2005 and say everything is fine. What's important
is that as they head toward elections next year, is there, or
is there not, going to be a level playing field? Can these
individuals and others step forward and engage in an open,
competitive, and honest political process? When I was in Addis
Ababa in March, I had 90 minutes with the Prime Minister and
about 85 minutes of that were precisely on the state of
democracy in Ethiopia. And he kept reiterating that we take
this decision because it's in the interests of the people of
Ethiopia. And I told him, it should be in the interests of all
the people of Ethiopia, even those that are in prison and need
to be let out. So we have to keep pressing, privately and
publicly, in order to get the trajectory right in that country.
Senator Bill Nelson. If I were you, I'd raise some cane
about this and I'd do it through our Ambassador. We have an
excellent Ambassador there. He's a real pro.
Mr. Lowenkron. He is.
Senator Bill Nelson. But you need to back him up.
Mr. Lowenkron. Senator, I was told by a foreign official
that unlike my colleagues who do economics or political/
military officials, when I arrive in a country, the news is not
good and my job is to raise cane and when I was in Ethiopia, I
met with the families of those who were in prison. I met with
organizations. I met with the media. It's part of my job and it
is a bully pulpit that all of us use--the Congress, every
administration has to use. I cannot agree with you more.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, I'd raise more than cane.
Mr. Lowenkron. OK.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Senator Nelson and I was in
Ethiopia in December and met with the Prime Minister as well
and I want to strongly agree with what Senator Nelson just said
in his own style, that we cannot tolerate a country like that
moving in the wrong direction, if they want to have the kind of
relationship with us that they want to have and that we want to
have with them. I just want to make sure the record is very
clear. Despite the comments that I'm sure were appropriate with
regard to the actions of the new leader of Nigeria, these
elections were deeply flawed. There is a serious question of
the legitimacy of those elections and of this administration
and the chairman of this committee certainly is not giving a
free pass of any kind nor am I sure--I'm also certain that Mr.
Lowenkron is not either, that this does not erase the enormous
failure of getting it right and there is much more to be said
about the problems in Nigeria. I don't know what's more than
raising cane, Senator Nelson, but I'd say whatever you can come
up with, that's what needs to happen with regard to the
Nigerian election. If there are no other questions for this
panel, we will now thank the panel and move to the next panel.
Mr. Lowenkron. Thank you.
Senator Feingold. All right, we'll come to order. I was a
little more generous with the time with the first panel but we
are running short on time, so I'll ask that the second panel
please keep their comments to under 5 minutes if they could and
we'll put their full statements in the record.
Let us begin with the Honorable Princeton Lyman.
STATEMENT OF HON. PRINCETON N. LYMAN, ADJUNCT SENIOR FELLOW FOR
AFRICA POLICY STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Lyman. Thank you very much, Senator. Thank you for
having this hearing. Thank you, Senator Lugar, very much. I
will try to be brief because a lot of the issues have come up
already.
I think this hearing is very timely because with
developments in the Middle East and elsewhere, people are
beginning to debate whether the support of democracy should be
an objective of U.S. policy. I'd like to say at the beginning
that I think in Africa, it's a terribly important objective and
it's very important to all our objectives on the continent. The
reason is that Africans are very much engaged in pursuit of
democracy and open government. After a generation of
disappointing political and economic developments, most
Africans know that without a more open political system and
better economic management, they are not going to be able to
address the deep problems of poverty. Those two issues,
democracy and development, are related. I want to come back to
that in light of the discussion on the Millennium Challenge
Account (MCA).
But let me just emphasize this point right up front, about
the importance of African leadership. We talked a little bit
earlier in the hearing about South Africa and I am glad you
recognized Senator Lugar's major role during that period. It
was the South Africans who were in the lead in the
negotiations. They were the ones who wanted to develop not only
a peaceful transition but a democratic constitution. In that
environment, the United States could play a very active role.
The United States, in fact, spent a lot of money during
that period of transition. We spent tens of millions of dollars
surrounding the process with all the support we could give it,
with experts and training, in building capacity in civil
society. When the election came along in 1994, Mr. Chairman, we
spent $25 million in support of that election, in voter
education and all other aspects of support. It was a worthwhile
investment. South Africa is a strong and vibrant democracy
today.
The United States has not made that kind of commitment
elsewhere in Africa. Turning briefly to Nigeria, you have
talked about the crushing disappointment when President
Obasanjo who was so promising in the beginning of his
administration oversaw an election in 2007 that was really a
disgrace. What bothered the Nigerians, I think, more than
anything, was the brazenness with which the rigging and other
malpractices took place. Nigeria is right now no longer a
paragon of democracy.
But if you look at U.S. support to the electoral process,
and I have all due respect for all those in our administration
who work hard on democracy issues, I think in all honesty, the
administration, heavily engaged in Darfur and Somalia, took a
relatively benign view of the developments in Nigeria. There
was an attitude that, ``Yes, there are a lot of problems there
but the Nigerians will muddle through, nevertheless. There will
be a lot of grumbling. People will be disappointed but things
will go on.''
Although one cannot say the United States could have
changed the outcome, because there were a lot of reasons that
President Obasanjo proceeded the way he did, I think we missed
an opportunity. The administration had allocated only $15
million over 3 years for democratization programs in Nigeria.
That was just not enough to make a dent in the situation. Even
though our Ambassador and others spoke out on this issue, there
was not a sufficiently strong commitment to engaging the
Obasanjo government on the importance of elctoral reform and to
helping improve the electoral preparations. Now we have an
administration in Nigeria that has to prove its legitimacy and
capability. In sum, I think we missed an opportunity.
There are other setbacks. Mr. Chairman, you mentioned
Ethiopia and the problems in Ethiopia. Because of our
engagement on Somalia and other counterterrorism policies in
the region, and our dependence in this regard, if you will, on
Ethiopia, I think our influence on those domestic issues is
relatively limited. That is a very serious problem. There was
an opening to democracy in Ethiopia in the elections of 2005.
That opening could be closing. The question for the
administration is how important is that democracy versus some
of these other policies and programs in which we are engaged?
There are other countries that do not get enough attention
that deserve our support during the period. I would mention
Angola. If I can put in a commercial there is a Council on
Foreign Relations report that has recently been released on
Angola. The report emphasizes how important it is for the
United States to engage now with Angola as it moves out of
civil war and toward, hopefully, more democratic government.
The DRC is another critically important country. The United
States has not paid enough attention to that vastly important
country. In addition to what the other witnesses have said
about the election there, we should pay respect to the role of
the United Nations in helping make that election possible.
There was a tremendous job done by the United Nations during
that period.
I want to come back just to this question of the
relationship of democratization and development because the
poverty issues are critical in Africa. I would support what
Senator Sununu said about the Millennium Challenge Account. I
recognize there have been a lot of problems getting that
instrument up and running. But when you have countries moving
into the right direction--Benin, Ghana, Mali, Tanzania,
Mozambique, and many more--the degree of support from the donor
community for those transitional countries with regard to
economic development is going to make a difference in their
ability to solidify the democratic process.
The Millennium Challenge Account is a unique instrument for
exactly this purpose. It puts up a lot of money and it puts it
up front and says it's guaranteed if the country follows
through on its commitments. MCA grants are not tied to security
or similar kinds of consideration. Thus they represent the best
of American principles. I hope therefore we can continue to
support the MCA. I hope the Congress will relook at the budget
decisions being made on it because I think it is quite an
important instrument.
In conclusion, the trend--and you have heard all the data--
the trend in Africa is positive, probably more positive on the
African Continent over 15 or 20 years than in any other
continent. This despite the problems that still exist and the
backsliding. There have been over 80 leadership elections since
1990. There are several countries where the opposition has won
elections and taken control peacefully. Civil society is
growing very strong in Africa. There are real partners there to
work on. We need to support that and we need to support it with
good, solid economic programs for those countries doing the
right thing.
Finally, wherever we see a serious, serious challenge to
that process, especially in countries as important as Nigeria
or Angola and Ethiopia, we have to make clear that this is
running counter to their interests and our own.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Lyman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Princeton N. Lyman, Adjunct Senior Fellow,
Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for asking me to
testify on this most important subject, the development of democracy in
Africa.
This hearing is timely, because there is a growing debate in the
United States about how and to what extent the United States should
make the support of democracy a principal element of our foreign
policy. Disappointment with the developments in the Middle East and
elsewhere has raised doubts about this objective. I want to say at the
outset that the support of democracy in Africa is not only important
but justified by the desire and support for democracy by Africans
themselves. Africans, in Benin, Mali, South Africa, Zambia, Malawi,
Kenya, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and other countries
have advocated, demonstrated, sometimes risked, indeed often lost,
their lives, and stood in long voting lines to establish democratic
systems of government. These systems are not perfect, and there has
been some serious backsliding in Africa. But the trend has been more
consistent and impressive than in any other region. From 1960 to 1990,
there were hardly any peaceful changes of leaders in Africa. Since
1990, there have been more than 80 leadership elections in more than 40
African countries, several instances of power passing to opposition
parties, and only a handful of military coups, almost all of them
quickly reversed. The Africa Union, the predecessor organization of
which was once a clique of military or otherwise autocratic rulers,
today will not seat a government that comes to power by
nonconstitutional means and has intervened on several occasions to
reverse coups and restore elected government.
This demand for democracy has been sustained because after a
generation after independence of failed political and economic
policies, most Africans came to the conclusion that only an open
political system, and a free market economic system, can generate the
growth necessary to overcome Africa's deep problems of poverty. Thus
support for democracy goes hand in hand with programs to address
Africa's poverty. That should be an important element in United States
policy.
I stress the importance of Africans' own commitment to democracy.
In South Africa, the negotiations to end apartheid, and to establish
one of the strongest and most democratic constitutions anywhere in the
world, was led throughout by South Africans. In that environment, the
United States was able to play an important supportive role, and a most
active one. Because the process was fragile, and subject to continuing
violence, it was important to take every possible opportunity to
strengthen it. Thus the United States spent tens of millions of dollars
in the period of 1990-94 to strengthen civil society, to provide
expertise to the negotiators on every aspect of constitutional debate--
e.g., federalism, fiscal management, affirmative action--to support
conflict resolution programs being run by South Africans throughout the
country, and to train the new leadership. In support of the 1994
election alone, the United States spent $25 million on voter education
and related support. It was a worthwhile investment. South Africa
remains a vibrant and strong democracy. Unfortunately, we have not made
a similar commitment elsewhere.
Nigeria is Africa's most populous country and with South Africa a
bellwether of Africa's movement to democracy and good governance.
Nigeria has been under military rule for most of its independence.
Twice civilian government was snuffed out by military coups. But in
1999, military rule ended with the election of Olusegun Obasanjo, and a
process of true civilianization of leadership has since been under way.
Nigeria's transition to democracy is especially important. Together
with South Africa's Thabo Mbeki, President Obasanjo helped fashion the
commitment to democracy by the African Union and the principles of good
governance and human rights embodied in the New Partnership for African
Development (NEPAD) that the AU has adopted. Obasanjo personally
intervened in Guinea-Bissau, Togo, Mauritania, and Sao Tome and
Principe to reverse coups or threats to elected government. It was thus
a crushing disappointment when his government failed to assure a
credible or even reasonably fair election in 2007 to select his
successor. There were plenty of warning signs. The so-called
Independent Election Commission was neither independent nor competent.
Preparations were woefully inadequate. A fierce dispute between
Obasanjo and his Vice President roiled the political process and upset
the election preparations. What perhaps most discouraged Nigerian and
international observers was the brazenness with which rigging,
intimidation, ballot stuffing, and outright fraud took place during the
election itself. Nigeria went from being a paragon of the
democratization process to being an uncertain political entity.
It is not certain that external activity could have changed this
outcome. Nigeria was flush with oil money and not in need of foreign
aid. Obasanjo was absolutely determined, at virtually any cost, to be
sure that his political rivals would not take power and, therefore,
relatively immune to pleas about the election disaster that was
looming. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the Bush administration,
heavily engaged in the crisis in Somalia and the ongoing humanitarian
situation in Dafur, took a relatively benign position with regard to
the impending election in Nigeria. There was a feeling that Nigeria,
with all the problems ahead, would ``muddle through,'' that Nigerians
would grumble, demand better elections next time, but that there would
be no major crisis afterward. By contrast to the $25 million the United
States spent in support of the 1994 election in South Africa, the
administration provided only $15 million over 3 years for
democratization programs in Nigeria. Despite the growing electoral
crisis that was developing in 2006-2007, the administration did not
increase this level. Civil society and other democracy advocates in
Nigeria could have used much more support.
Nigeria is not falling apart. And the newly elected President,
Umaru Yar'Adua, has made some good moves in reaching out to the
opposition and addressing the insurgencies in the oil-producing delta
region. But Nigeria as a force for democracy has been weakened. Nor is
it yet clear that this new leadership will have the legitimacy and
support necessary to carry out badly needed reforms in Nigeria nor the
ability to cut through entrenched interests and bureaucracies to make
the desperately needed investments in power and other infrastructure
that would keep Nigeria from slipping further into unemployment and
poverty. The United States can now ask for some signs of good
governance, electoral reform, and sound economic management as
benchmarks for future cooperation. But the United States missed an
opportunity to speak out strongly and with conviction on democracy when
it was being bruised so badly in such an important country.
The United States faces an even more difficult situation in
Ethiopia. This country, with such a sad history of brutal dictatorship,
war, and poverty, had a brief window of opportunity for democratization
in the elections of 2005. The opposition did very well, adding
substantially to seats in the Assembly. But the results were hotly
contested by the opposition which insisted that it had, in fact, won
the election. Demonstrations grew violent and many demonstrators were
killed. The Ethiopian Government arrested 38 opposition leaders and is
now threatening to execute them. In the context of the Somalia
situation, and Ethiopia's central role in United States
counterterrorism policy in the Horn, U.S. influence on the domestic
political situation in Ethiopia is very small. What seemed like a
democratic opening in one of Africa's most important countries, the
home of the Africa Union, seems thus to be rapidly closing.
These disappointments, and others in Zimbabwe and Uganda, should
nevertheless not deter us from support for democratization across the
continent. The trend is basically in favor of democracy. Civil society
is vibrant, and growing stronger each year. But much support is needed
to move beyond elections to true democratic transformation. Parties are
weak, the press is in need of training and legal protection,
judiciaries need to be strengthened, and electoral systems improved. In
sum, there is much to do. But there are allies in Africa for doing so.
The connection to our other major objective in Africa, overcoming
poverty, is also clear. Without question autocratic governments in
Africa have almost all failed economically. When the donor community
acts in concert with African democratic movements and economic reform,
the results can be dramatic. Benin, which sent the first shock waves of
democratic revolt through Africa in 1990, benefited from a conjunction
of political reform and strong donor economic support to establish a
solid democracy. Ghana is doing the same, as can Mali, Mozambique, and
other African countries.
For this reason, I would stress that in addition to programs
directed specifically to democracy, the United States maintain a strong
economic support program for democratizing and reforming countries. In
this regard, I urge the Congress to rethink its negative attitude
toward the Millennium Challenge Account (MCC), threatening to cut the
President's FY 2008 request in half. It may be that in oil rich
countries like Nigeria and Angola, or in countries embroiled in
counterterrorism programs, this instrument is not relevant. But in
democratizing countries like Ghana, Benin, Mali, Mozambique, Tanzania,
Kenya, and potentially many others, the availability of truly
substantial economic support can enable democratic administrations to
demonstrate real economic progress and thereby solidify public support.
The MCC is an exceptional instrument, more potent in many ways than the
sums for democratization alone, and far beyond normal aid levels. Not
encumbered with security considerations, and linked to political and
economic reform, it represents the best of American intentions and
principles. We should capitalize on it as one of the strongest
instruments in support of democracy.
In countries not appropriate for the MCC, we need different
instruments. I would call your attention to a recent report by the
Council on Foreign Relations on Angola. Angola, a major oil producer,
has emerged from decades of civil war with the potential to become both
economically strong and a force for stability in the region. But the
prospects for steadily more open and democratic governance are
uncertain, yet critical to Angola's long-term stability. The report
calls for a mix of public and private efforts by the United States to
help steer that country through the post-war period and toward a more
democratic governing system. The DRC represents another special
challenge, being at the very center of Africa and drawing the interests
and involvement of all its neighbors. Years of civil war have taken a
devastating toll, causing over 4 million deaths.
Yet, against all the odds, the DRC has just come through a peaceful
and credible election, thanks to strong U.N. leadership and the
determination of the Congolese people. This most fragile movement
toward democracy, in a country of vast economic and political
importance, and extraordinarily complex internal challenges, deserves
special attention. Investing in the stability and steadily improved
governance of the DRC should be among the U.S.'s highest priority. I am
pleased that the Secretary of State has put the DRC on her itinerary
for her upcoming Africa visit. Up to now the DRC has not commanded
nearly the attention in the United States that it deserves.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, Africa is perhaps the best region for the
United States to pursue its freedom agenda, its commitment to
democracy. Public support in Africa is strong, the trends are positive,
the opportunities great. So too are the challenges. While the
administration has put democracy as one of its priorities in Africa,
and dedicated certain amounts to that cause, the vast bulk of United
States funding for democracy goes elsewhere. In FY 2005 USAID
democratization programs in Africa did reach $138 million, with another
$66 million for democratization within five MCC grants. Nevertheless,
given the number of countries in Africa, and the opportunities, the
United States could well dedicate much more to this cause in Africa. It
would reap results. There also needs to be more response capacity,
i.e., to increase resources when critical situations arise. We should
also be prepared to provide substantial economic support when the
conditions are right. And wherever in Africa, we should not let another
situation like that in Nigeria in 2007 develop without a stronger
reaction and a more vigorous preventive effort.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. You've been a
tremendous resource in the 15 years that I've been on this
committee and I appreciate it.
Mr. Albin-Lackey.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER ALBIN-LACKEY, NIGERIA RESEARCHER,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Albin-Lackey. Thank you. I'm going to focus my remarks
mainly on Ethiopia and Nigeria because I think that both of
those countries provide a very stark example of a basic failing
of U.S. policy toward many different African countries and that
is that while the United States has consistently shown itself
to be a very willing and helpful partner in engaging with
African governments that are interested in promoting democracy
and human rights, there is often not nearly as good a job done
of designing constructive ways to deal with governments that
stand as obstacles to promoting those objectives.
Both Nigeria and Ethiopia are very good examples of that
problem. I think there are three basic areas where things could
be approached differently in ways that would make a very
dramatic difference and are completely feasible.
First, the administration should focus more deeply on
engaging with underlying human rights issues as opposed to
dramatic one-time events, including elections, which cannot, by
themselves, ever equate to democracy. In Nigeria's case, the
disastrous April elections were not just an anomaly, they were
a reflection of a broader crisis in governance in that country.
Irresponsible, corrupt, and abusive leaders have been thrown up
at all levels of government by fraudulent elections in 1999, in
2003, and now in 2007. That has crippled the capacity of
government to deal with serious underlying problems and to
improve upon respect for basic human rights.
It's also worth pointing out that the problem in Nigeria
that tends to get the most international attention, the crisis
in the Niger Delta, also has its roots in this very same crisis
of governance. Many of the militants and criminal armed gangs
in the Delta that are responsible for the wave of kidnappings
and other acts of violence, got their start as gangs who were
funded by politicians seeking to rig themselves into office
during the 2003 elections. All of those politicians have
escaped with complete impunity, even as the details of their
involvement with these groups have become very well known over
the past 4 years.
In the case of Ethiopia, the government's crackdown on
leaders of the opposition has received a great deal of
international attention but again, that isn't an anomaly. In
fact, Ethiopia is governed in a way that is characterized by
patterns of repression, harassment of the opposition, many
cases of arbitrary detention, and torture. This is especially
true in rural areas and it exists at a level that's so
pervasive that many Ethiopians' day-to-day experience with
government is such that political activity or political speech
is simply not possible. In fact, what was unusual about
Ethiopia's elections was not the harsh response of the
government to protests in the wake of the polls but rather, the
limited opening--in terms of time and in terms of scope--that
appeared before those elections. What's going on with the trial
of opposition leaders is, in fact, much more connected to the
basic reality of governance in that country than anything else.
It's also very important that the United States display
greater willingness than it has done in leveling forthright
public criticism and finding ways to mobilize other forms of
pressure against governments like Nigeria's and Ethiopia's that
show willingness to disregard basic human rights and a
disinterest in promoting democracy and better governance.
One of the earlier panelists said that our message to the
Nigerian Government in the runup to the elections was that they
had a historic opportunity and that our message after the
elections was that they--the government--had missed that
opportunity. But I think the basic problem with that approach
is that the Nigerian Government didn't miss an opportunity so
much as perceive a very different kind of opportunity sitting
before it. Many people in Nigeria's ruling party saw an
opportunity to run roughshod over Nigeria's own constitution to
derail its electoral process and to expect that they could do
so free of any meaningful international criticism or response.
Unfortunately, given the muted nature of not just the United
States but the response of other key allies of Nigeria as well,
they have thus far largely been proven right in that very
cynical assumption.
This problem is perhaps even more apparent in Ethiopia,
where the administration has been unwilling to criticize
patterns of human rights abuse, including Ethiopia's systematic
and indiscriminate bombardment of civilians in Mogadishu, which
caused up to 400,000 people to flee that city in a matter of
weeks this spring--and this was after the administration's
tacit encouragement helped propel Ethiopia to invade that
country to begin with.
I'm running out of time so I'll just close by also saying
that even where the administration has urged improvement in
human rights, it's often the case that standards are set far
lower than they should be. Many of the governments that we're
discussing often complain about setting unrealistic
expectations but in fact, those criticisms are exaggerated.
Nigeria can't be expected to stamp out corruption and Ethiopia
can't necessarily be expected to become a perfectly
functioning, multiparty democracy overnight. But it's certainly
not out of line to demand that Ethiopia refrain from
imprisoning the leaders of its opposition or suppressing
dissent or massacring its own civilian populations and it's not
unrealistic to demand that Nigeria refrain from subverting its
own law enforcement agencies and electoral institutions to
prevent free and fair elections from happening or to hold those
responsible accountable.
Thank you again for the opportunity to speak. I'm sorry for
running over.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Albin-Lackey follows:]
Prepared Statement of Christopher Albin-Lackey, Nigeria Researcher,
Human Rights Watch, Washington, DC
Thank you, Chairman Feingold, and members of the committee, for
inviting Human Rights Watch to participate in this hearing. My name is
Chris Albin-Lackey and I am a senior researcher with the Africa
Division of Human Rights Watch. For the past 2 years, I have worked
documenting Nigeria's deplorable human rights record across a range of
issues. I was in Nigeria before, during, and after April's general
elections. Previously, I covered Ethiopia for Human Rights Watch,
including during the runup to its May 2005 elections.
This hearing could not be timelier, and Nigeria and Ethiopia both
stand as clear examples of the reasons why. The course of events in
both countries today has laid bare some basic failings of U.S. policy
toward Africa. Nigeria's failed elections in April were a terrible
setback for hopes of democratic reform--and a stark reminder of the
disastrous state of governance in that country. The Ethiopian
Government's deplorable human rights record has now manifested itself
in military atrocities against its own people in Somali region and
against Somali civilians in Mogadishu. In both cases, the
administration's uncritical acceptance of systemic human rights abuses
has weakened rather than strengthened the incentives for reform.
There is no reason why these failed policies cannot be changed in a
way that would allow Washington to play a more constructive role in
promoting human rights and democracy in Nigeria, Ethiopia, and
elsewhere across the continent. Doing so would require a deeper
engagement with underlying human rights issues--and a realization that
the mere act of holding elections does not by itself lead to either
respect for human rights or genuine democracy. It would also require a
shift away from policies that have seen the United States avoid
opportunities to level forthright public and private criticism, and in
some cases targeted diplomatic pressure, around human rights issues.
And finally, the administration must abandon a tendency to set
standards so low that governments can meet them without respecting
their basic human rights obligations at all.
nigeria's 2007 elections
Nigeria's rigged April polls were not unique--all of Nigeria's
elections since the end of military rule in 1999 have been marred by
widespread fraud and violence. But this year's elections were
particularly shocking because they were brazenly stolen with the
collusion of the very government institutions charged with ensuring
their credibility, including Nigeria's electoral commission and police
force.
Many Nigerians were cynical about the government's intentions long
before the elections were held, arguing they had been ``programmed to
fail'' from their inception. They felt the process was more
``selection'' than ``election.'' Nonetheless, many of the Nigerians
with whom I have spoken were truly dismayed at how insulting and hollow
the voting process was in the end.
Another Human Rights Watch researcher and I spent the better part
of February through April in Nigeria and observed the gubernatorial and
Presidential polls in four states. We witnessed ballot boxes stuffed in
plain view; gangs of ruling party toughs interfering with vote
collation; voters chased away from their polling units by gangs armed
with cudgels; legions of small children casting ballots; and myriad
other abuses. These observations mirrored those reported by other
international and domestic observers.
The real tragedy of the elections was best symbolized by the futile
courage many Nigerian voters, police officers, and others displayed in
trying to salvage the process. At one polling station in Katsina State,
I watched a large group of voters hold their places in line even after
becoming enveloped in a cloud of tear gas. Policemen had misfired a gas
canister aimed at a gang of thugs menacing the polling station and the
voters continued to stand in line even though finding it difficult to
breathe or open their eyes.
At another polling station, a frantic police officer pulled me
aside to tell me that the government was stealing the election and to
ask if there was anything that could be done to stop it. And an
election observer in Rivers State told me that a group of ruling party
thugs had come to her polling station, chased away everyone waiting in
line, and demanded that the young man in charge hand over the ballots.
When he refused, the thugs locked him and the ballots in the trunk of
their car and drove away laughing as he screamed in panic.
Elsewhere the elections simply did not take place. In Rivers,
groups of would-be voters sat outside all day at their designated
polling centers, waiting despondently for ballot materials and polling
officials to arrive. Unfortunately they never did. The next weekend in
a town called Dutsi in Katsina State, I spent hours trying to track
down electoral officials because all the ballot papers had disappeared.
In the end, it turned out that large quantities of ballot materials had
been diverted to the home of the local government chairman. Elsewhere,
ballot boxes had been stuffed and votes counted hours before the polls
were scheduled to close. The official results reported an overwhelming
majority for the PDP even in places where voting did not take place at
all.
Overall, the elections period was extraordinarily violent, claiming
an estimated 300 lives between the campaigns and 2 days of actual
voting. Throughout much of the country, gangs of thugs--sponsored by
local politicians--attacked polling stations, sending voters fleeing as
they carted off ballot materials. Sometimes, they simply sat alongside
the road stuffing ballot boxes in clear view of passers-by. In Gombe
State, my colleague interviewed a young man who was attacked with
machetes and left for dead by PDP thugs who suspected that he was
trying to persuade his elderly grandmother to vote for the opposition.
And in Oyo State, voters were held hostage to the whims of a notorious
political ``godfather'' who openly sponsored armed gangs to roam the
streets attacking opponents of the ruling party and its candidates.
The United States Government Reaction
In the wake of Nigeria's April polls, the State Department issued a
statement that expressed ``regret'' at the conduct of Nigeria's April
elections and also reaffirmed the administration's eagerness to build
upon its ``excellent bilateral relations'' with Abuja and to work with
the Nigerian Government to improve the conduct of future elections.
This would have been an appropriate reaction if Nigeria's April polls
had merely been ``flawed.'' But in fact the conduct of the polls
displayed a determination on the part of Nigeria's ruling party not to
allow Nigerians any real say in choosing their next President. This in
turn leaves little hope for real democratization, accountable
governance, or greater respect for human rights.
The administration's expressions of concern over April's open
display of contempt for democratic principles have been so timid that
Nigeria's new government will see no reason to take them seriously.
That reaction seemed to express the very low expectations the
administration placed upon the elections in the first place; many
diplomats with whom I spoke in Abuja were privately deriding the
process as an ``election like event'' months before the first ballot
was cast. If anything, the message sent by the administration's
response is that countries like Nigeria can avoid international
criticism simply by going through the motions of holding periodic sham
elections.
These disturbing events should concern the administration enough to
formulate a more robust and effective response than it has previously.
One in seven Africans is a Nigerian; it is not possible to talk of
promoting democracy and human rights in Africa and ignore Nigeria.
Further, the lack of any meaningful international reaction to Abuja's
open abandonment of democratic principles threatens to resonate far
beyond Nigeria's borders.
moving forward: lessons from current failures
Rhetorically, support for human rights and good governance is a
central component of U.S. policy in Africa. Too often, however, the
administration's efforts to promote democracy and accountable
governance have proven scattered, inconsistent, and unnecessarily
timid. The U.S. Government has consistently proven itself a willing and
helpful partner to African governments that are genuinely interested in
the promotion and protection of democracy and human rights. But the
administration has not succeeded in dealing with governments that
display a palpable hostility toward suggestions of greater political
openness or respect for the rights of their citizens to participate in
politics. Washington could begin to address that failing, and have a
more positive impact across the continent, by focusing on three
distinct policy goals:
(1) A Sustained Focus on Broader Human Rights and Governance Issues
Too often, U.S. policy has eschewed complex and sustained
engagement with deeper processes of reform and democratization in favor
of a simpler but ineffective focus on dramatic one-time events such as
elections. It has also placed too much emphasis on maintaining good
relationships with often-abusive African heads of state while glossing
over systemic problems that run far deeper than any one individual. In
some cases, policymakers give the impression that this is due to
resource constraints precluding the development and implementation of
more holistic policies. The end result is shallow policies that simply
do not work.
In Nigeria's case, April's disastrous elections were largely a
reflection of a broader crisis in governance that has originated from
rampant corruption, human rights abuses, and a basic lack of
accountability on the part of government at all levels. Nigeria's
overall human rights record remains deplorable. Corruption has hobbled
the capacity of government to spur progress despite booming oil
revenues. Nigeria's police engage routinely in extortion and torture of
criminal suspects and ordinary civilians. Politicians foment political
and ethnic violence with complete impunity, recruiting armed gangs
themselves or turning religious and ethnic divisions to their political
advantage.
From 1999 until Nigeria's April elections, U.S. policy focused on
encouraging improvement in Nigeria's electoral processes and expressing
support for President Olusegun Obasanjo, partly on the basis of his
perceived commitment to reform and democratization. The current
administration did not condemn underlying patterns of human rights
abuse and corruption. Instead, it essentially treated widespread
patterns of human rights abuse and corruption as, in the words of one
U.S. diplomat in Abuja, ``bumps along the road'' to progress instead of
what they actually were: Evidence of deep, systemic problems that the
Nigerian Government was doing nothing to resolve. The dividends of that
approach were on display last April as Nigeria's Government made a
mockery of its own pretenses to democratic governance through its
brazenly rigged elections.
A similar approach and corresponding results have occurred in
Ethiopia. Ethiopia's Government is one of the most repressive in
Africa. The Ethiopian military has been responsible for crimes against
humanity in Gambella region and is committing serious abuses in
neighboring Somalia and its own Somali region. Security forces
routinely subject suspected government opponents to harassment,
arbitrary detention, torture and in some cases, extrajudicial
execution. Local officials, especially in rural areas, subject
Ethiopians to surveillance and impose a climate of fear and
intimidation that discourages free speech of any kind, much less active
participation in politics. Neither the administration nor any other
foreign partner of Ethiopia has engaged robustly with those issues in
the years since the current government came to power. This partly due
to a feeling that Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was a reformer and a
reliable international partner in spite of his government's record on
the ground.
(2) Criticism, Confrontation, and Pressure
The United States should display a greater willingness to publicly
criticize abusive governments in Africa and mobilize other forms of
leverage to create pressure for reform. There is never any ``magic
bullet'' in Washington's arsenal, but strong public and private
criticism of serious human rights abuses can lend momentum and
credibility to the efforts of domestic reformers and human rights
defenders. And Washington does have more tangible forms of leverage
over many African governments, such as the power to condition military
aid on meaningful human rights improvements. But these tools are often
not deployed and in some cases the administration's refusal to defend
human rights principles, even rhetorically, has reached harmful
extremes.
Again, Nigeria and Ethiopia are good examples of the scale and
importance of the problem. Washington has often treated these
governments as reliable partners in the promotion of human rights and
democracy rather than determined impediments. Not only has this policy
failed, but it has also emboldened leaders who have shown a willingness
to undermine basic human rights.
The administration is in no way to blame for the failure of
Nigeria's 2007 electoral process, but its refusal level meaningful
criticism against Nigeria's corrupt, abusive, and unaccountable
government sent the wrong signals. The administration reacted to rigged
and violent elections in 1999 and 2003 with uncritical acceptance. It
also failed to urge in forceful terms that the 2007 elections be more
credible than its predecessors.
The administration's acquiescence regarding the rigged elections of
years past is likely connected to the open and shameless manner in
which the 2007 elections were stolen. Fearing no criticism from
Washington or other key allies, the Nigerian authorities made little
pretense even of concealing the deed. Worse, Nigeria was proven right
in its cynical assumptions about the level of U.S. interest in free and
fair elections; the administration issued only muted criticism
following the 2007 debacle. The U.S. Government has also not applied
any significant pressure on the new administration of President
Yar'Adua to ensure accountability for past abuses or prevent similar
ones from occurring in the future.
The U.S. Government has also not subjected Nigeria's Government to
meaningful criticism about more systemic patterns of human rights abuse
since the end of military rule in 1999. To name just a few of the most
glaring examples: Since 1999, the Nigerian military has burned several
communities to the ground and murdered several hundred Nigerian
civilians. The Nigerian police routinely indulge in the practice of
torture and extortion. And Government corruption has actively fueled
conflict in the Niger Delta because federal authorities turned a blind
eye to the efforts of Delta politicians to arm criminal gangs to help
them rig the 2003 elections. None of these abuses has triggered any
significant public criticism or other action on the part of the U.S.
Government.
Policies marked by an even greater unwillingness to level criticism
or apply diplomatic pressure have equally failed to yield positive
results in Ethiopia. The United States and other partners of Ethiopia
have not publicly called upon the Ethiopian Government to reverse and
remedy systematic patterns of repression. Ethiopia held elections in
2005 that were eagerly embraced by the administration as a sign of
progress in spite of overwhelming evidence that patterns of
intimidation, harassment, and violence had made political activity
impossible across much of the country. This spring, Ethiopia's
systematic and indiscriminate bombardment of Mogadishu, which caused up
to 400,000 people to flee the city in a matter of weeks, failed to
generate any condemnation from Washington--and this after the
administration's tacit support helped propel Ethiopia toward its
decision to invade the country. Just last week, after the
administration was presented with news that Ethiopia's Government would
seek to impose death sentences on Ethiopia's most prominent opposition
leaders, it only went so far as to express its ``surprise'' at the
news.
The Arguments Against Speaking Out
Some U.S. officials argue that criticism and attempts at deploying
leverage are certain to prove ineffective at mobilizing change. But
those sentiments are exaggerated. Washington may not have the power to
bring about change on its own in most countries but it can often lend
more significant momentum to reform than any other single actor. Just
as importantly, the administration's greater willingness to speak out
publicly on human rights issues and use what leverage is available to
advance human rights principles will lend greater credibility to U.S.
policies across the continent.
The United States is Ethiopia's largest bilateral donor of aid that
includes substantial IMET and FMF military assistance. Washington is
also a key international ally of both Ethiopia and Nigeria. This does
not mean that the United States can or should dictate policy to either
country, but it does guarantee that its opinion will be taken seriously
and that public criticism could lend moral support to individuals and
groups working for positive change within those countries.
By the same token, U.S. silence on human rights issues often
undermines the prospects for change by demoralizing domestic activists.
Many Nigerians were dismayed at the lack of any appreciable U.S.
reaction to the stolen April polls. Ethiopians hoping for greater
freedoms will not be encouraged by the fact that the United States will
not even publicly condemn Addis Ababa's stated goal of executing its
most prominent opposition leaders on trumped-up charges.
In some cases U.S. officials have also argued against applying
targeted diplomatic pressure or criticism against governments like
Ethiopia and Nigeria because of a fear of damaging relations or
``isolating'' those countries. Ethiopia is regarded as a key regional
ally in the global war on terror, while Nigeria is an increasingly
important source of oil, as well as a partner in regional diplomacy and
peacekeeping efforts.
It is certainly true that the United States relationship with
countries like Ethiopia and Nigeria involves real and important
interests beyond the promotion of human rights. But it is not true that
the only alternative to the status quo is ``isolation'' or a complete
and sudden breakdown in bilateral relations. Too often it appears that
such fears are reflexively trotted out as a boogieman to justify an
indefensible policy of doing and saying nothing. And in some cases the
situation is even worse than this; Ethiopia is a good example. Because
the administration supported Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia, its
uncritical acceptance of the brutal ongoing military crackdown on
civilian populations in the Ogaden and of abuses in Mogadishu appears
to place Washington squarely on the side of a brutally oppressive
government. This in a part of the world the administration already
worries may emerge as a stronghold for terrorist organizations hostile
to the United States.
(3) Higher Standards
When Washington does express concern to abusive and unaccountable
African regimes about their human rights records, the bar is often set
so disappointingly low that intransigent regimes can clear those
hurdles without registering any meaningful progress at all. President
Bush has decried what he calls a ``soft bigotry of low expectations''
at home in U.S. education policy, but this phrase is an apt description
of the administration's policies toward key African partners regarding
human rights.
Again, Ethiopia and Nigeria each offer a case in point. Officials
within both governments have argued that human rights criticisms of
their administrations are based on unrealistic and undeliverable
expectations--that countries require time to adopt human rights and
governance practices akin to what Western critics can expect in their
own countries.
Such criticisms lack merit. It may be unrealistic to insist that
Ethiopia's Government transform itself into a functioning multiparty
democracy overnight. It is not out of line, however, to demand that the
Ethiopian military stop staging attacks against civilian populations in
Gambella and in the Ogaden, or that Addis Ababa refrain from executing
the leaders of its opposition.
Likewise, it may be unrealistic to call upon Nigeria to stamp out
corruption and poor governance with a stroke of the pen. But it is not
unrealistic to demand that politicians who openly recruit and arm
criminal gangs for the purpose of rigging elections be held to account
for the resulting abuses. Nor is it unrealistic to demand that
Nigeria's Federal Government refrain from manipulating its own law
enforcement agencies and electoral institutions for the express purpose
of ensuring that free and fair elections do not take place.
country-specific recommendations
There are some obvious first steps the administration could take in
improving the promotion of human rights in both Nigeria and Ethiopia:
Nigeria: Nigeria's new government came to power in elections that
made a mockery of the democratic process. The administration should
strongly urge Abuja to undertake urgent reforms with a goal of making
government more accountable and to avoid a similar debacle in 2011.
That task is formidable but there are some obvious starting places. The
administration should publicly and privately urge the Yar'Adua
government to:
Reform its electoral commission to make it more transparent,
inclusive, and independent.
Act to restore credibility to its Economic and Financial
Crimes Commission (EFCC), whose reputation was badly tarnished
by its harassment of the President's political opposition
before the 2007 elections. Nigeria should also conduct
transparent and far-reaching inquiries into allegations of
corruption leveled against former Governors by the EFCC that
were allowed to drop. Where allegations have sufficient
substance, they should result in prosecution.
Conduct a transparent investigation into allegations of
election-related corruption and improper political manipulation
involving the upper echelons of its police force and electoral
commission.
Secure passage of Nigeria's long-delayed Freedom of
Information law, a key piece of legislation that could tear
away the cloak of secrecy that conceals the shameful details of
many government abuses. The bill was effectively vetoed by
President Obasanjo during his last days in office.
The United States does not have substantial economic leverage over
the Nigerian Government. Nigeria does however value its place as a
respected member of the international community. The realization that
the government's corrupt and abusive behavior at home could impact its
standing around the world will matter in Abuja. Until Nigeria
demonstrates a serious commitment to reform by at least beginning to
make tangible efforts at fundamental reform like those listed above,
there should be no bilateral meetings between Presidents Bush and
Yar'Adua, and relations overall should not be as warm as they have been
since 1999.
Ethiopia: The administration should abandon its current policy of
what amounts to a kind of ``quiet diplomacy'' on human rights issues,
which has yielded no tangible dividends. Instead the administration
should:
Ensure that the provisions of the ``Leahy Law'' are fully
adhered to, by verifying that no U.S. military assistance to
Ethiopia is benefiting military units that violate human rights
with impunity.
Demand that Ethiopia not pursue the death penalty against
opposition leaders and activists convicted of undermining
Ethiopia's Constitution, and insist that the rights of all
detainees to due process be respected.
Publicly call for investigations into and accountability for
ongoing human rights abuses committed by the Ethiopian military
in Somali region and Somalia, as well as past abuses in
Gambella.
Publicly call upon Ethiopia to end systemic patterns of
political repression including harassment, arbitrary detention,
and torture of suspected government opponents.
The United States must also abandon its practice of cooperating
with the Ethiopian Government in secret renditions of people fleeing
the conflict in Somalia and call on the Ethiopian Government to
acknowledge the real number of detainees and permit access to these
individuals by independent international monitors. No U.S. message
about human rights abuses in Ethiopia will be taken seriously so long
as the administration is also asking Ethiopia to cooperate in the
illegal detention and abusive interrogation of terrorism suspects.
conclusion
Nigeria and Ethiopia represent two very different contexts where
the same set of administration policies has failed to promote human
rights and genuine democracy. Abusive, corrupt, and authoritarian
governments there and in other parts of Africa will only be emboldened
if these policies are continued. Washington does possess the means to
play a more positive and prominent role in advocating and advancing
democratic reform and respect for human rights across the continent. If
the administration begins to speak out about on-going abuses, insist on
higher standards of respect for human rights, and engage more deeply
with the broader human rights issues instead of just elections, there
is a real opportunity to play a central role in bringing about change.
And if the administration did take that stand, it could set an example
that other key countries in Europe and elsewhere could follow in
reforming their own equally flawed policies.
Senator Feingold. Well, I appreciate your comments and let
me just say again, with regard to Nigeria, that our
administration's efforts, both prior to the election and after
the election, were not absent but they were insufficient with
regard to warning Nigeria about what these elections had to
look like and with regard to the disastrous results of the
election. So I think your comments are right on target.
With regard to Ethiopia, when I met with Prime Minister
Meles, I strongly urged him not to invade Somalia in the way he
did, and he has now admitted that it was a mistake, publicly
and frankly. At least parts of our government did not seem to
be sufficiently discouraging him. So there is a real disconnect
between what's happening on the ground and what we--those of us
on this committee--can see happening and what the
administration is doing, and somehow this government has to
come together with regard to these issues and put the proper
pressure where it needs to be.
So I appreciate your comments very much and of course, the
chairman had to leave in order to meet with the Secretary
General of the United Nations, so I appreciate his attendance.
The next witness is Ms. Akwe Amosu.
STATEMENT OF AKWE AMOSU, SENIOR POLICY ANALYST FOR AFRICA, OPEN
SOCIETY INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Amosu. Thank you very much. We very much appreciate the
opportunity to testify today and I'd like to request that my
full written statement is made a part of the record.
In that statement, I have given our views at length on the
course of democratization in Africa over the past two decades
and made suggestions for how we think the United States can
reduce contradictions in its Africa policy and strengthen its
support for democracy and human rights.
But I'm going to, because of pressure of time, restrict my
remarks to Zimbabwe right now and talk about ways that I think
the United States can help to bring about a positive outcome to
the crisis.
As you know, they are due for a Presidential election in
March 2008 and the mediation effort is being led by South
African President Thabo Mbeki on behalf of SADC and the
objective of that mediation, I would say, is to try and get to
the point where the opposition MDC, it's two factions, can
agree sufficiently to participate in a contest and agree on the
outcome.
The problem is that as that mediation continues, the
government is attempting to reshape the political landscape
through legislation by changing the number of parliamentary
seats and changing the electoral rule. Also, a violent campaign
of arbitrary arrests and torture is continuing, being waged by
security forces against the MDC and civil society activists,
which also makes it very difficult for the opposition or the
civil society groups to respond to the mediation process.
Then, of course, and this is dominant in everybody's mind,
the economic situation is spiraling downward. We have seen that
the government's response to that is to print more money and
launch predatory attacks on the private sector. The speed of
deterioration is so great that even cautious observers are
speculating that the regime is unlikely to last another year
and some would say even as soon as Christmas.
Whenever there is finally a collapse or a crunch, the
people who are trying to manage this crisis, I think, are
trying to achieve a number of objectives. First of all, to try
and achieve as smooth a departure from power as possible for
Robert Mugabe and to replace him with a team, an administration
that is motivated to restore order and stabilize the political
environment.
Second, to negotiate an agreement with international
donors, a financial package that can fund economic
stabilization, manage the hyperinflation and restore bank and
investor confidence. Third, to depoliticize and
reprofessionalize the security forces and the ZANU-PF militias,
that are so key to President Mugabe's control of the present
situation. Fourth, to repeal the repressive laws that make free
association and open contestation and political life
impossible, and fifth, to try and attract home the many
hundreds of thousands of Zimbabweans, particularly the middle
classes so that they can help rebuild.
It's important to say that President Mugabe has been very
successful at playing the race card throughout this period and
that that has made international engagement much more
complicated. I'd say that even his neighbors are nervous about
being accused of being puppets of Western imperialism and,
therefore, have not been nearly as critical as they could have
been. But it does seem to be extremely important that the world
should not be intimidated by that. No nation that wishes to
speak up in defense of human rights should be intimidated from
doing so and in that regard, the United States, which is one of
the primary butts of Mugabe's rhetoric, should not lie low as
is so often recommended and was alluded to earlier.
The civil society organizations that we work with have
repeatedly pointed out to us that Ambassador Dell's loud
critique of what is happening has been absolutely vital in
protecting the safety of many of the individuals who have been
targeted by the Security Forces and so we would strongly
recommend that this continue.
We also hear from our civil society partners on the ground
that they believe that the U.S. support for democracy and human
rights groups on the ground is very, very important. They want
it to continue and indeed, to increase. They feel very
embattled and as the months go by, they become more embattled.
We see two scenarios ahead. One is that there is an
economic collapse before the mediation is able to accomplish
anything. In that situation, we--although obviously suffering
on the ground will increase, on the other hand, I think it will
open opportunities to find individuals and previous loyalists
who are willing to enter negotiations and in the meantime, we
don't think that the United States should accede to the demand
that they lift sanctions and indeed, we would like to see the
United States continue its international advocacy, particularly
with the EU, ahead of the summit in December, to get everybody
to hold the line on Zimbabwe.
The other side--the other scenario, is that the mediation
proceeds and that there is an agreement before an economic
implosion. I think on that front, our alarm would be that a
quick fix solution is what is agreed between the opposition
politicians and ZANU-PF government and it's extremely
important, we believe, that there should be a thorough going
transformation. This isn't just about moving the deck chairs on
the Titanic. This is about trying to reorganize the political
space so that all, particularly the nongovernmental actors,
feel that they are operating freely and able to pursue free
association. From that point of view, we feel strongly that
it's important for the United States and other international
partners to make that point to the South Africans and to the
people in the region.
I know I've run out of time but one final point; I think
for the United States, one very major contribution that can be
made is to help donors put together the economic package that
will be so critical to managing a smooth transition out of this
crisis. That particularly requires that countries that have
previously supported Zimbabwe, like China, should be integrated
into that package so there are not alternative channels through
which the ZANU-PF government can find ways to avoid complying
with the international will and managing a safe transition out.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Amosu follows:]
Prepared Statement of Akwe Amosu, Senior Policy Analyst, Open Society
Institute, Washington, DC
introduction
My name is Akwe Amosu and I am a senior policy analyst at the
Washington office of the Open Society Institute. I work across a range
of African issues and bring to my job a history of over 20 years as a
journalist focused on African affairs, mostly at the BBC World Service
but also at allAfrica.com, the Financial Times and West Africa
magazine. During my career I have traveled extensively in Africa,
living at different times in Nigeria, South Africa, and Ethiopia, and
reporting on and interviewing key individuals and newsmakers. My
remarks are founded on those years of observation and analysis and draw
greatly on the expertise of my Africa-focused colleagues in the Soros
Foundation Network.
advances toward open societies in africa
Africa today is a very different place than it was at the end of
the cold war, a time of military coups, stage-managed and stagnant
politics and personality-led regimes propped up for decades without
change by outside sponsors. As the world's two superpowers lost
interest in controlling African allegiances, a political thaw began,
and their local clients lost their power to maintain absolute control
over the political terrain.
By the early 1990s what has come to be seen as a ``wave of
democracy'' was sweeping the continent, starting in western,
francophone Africa with 1991's Benin landmark election and resulted in
26 countries holding Presidential elections within the next 3 years.
The end of apartheid in South Africa removed the last and most
entrenched bastion of repression. By 1994 there was not a single one-
party state left in sub-Saharan Africa.
Although political transformation in the 1990s proved to be of
variable intensity and longevity, often turned out to be new wine in
old bottles, the change on the continent has been lasting. The
incidence of military coups has dropped so far as to become negligible
and there is an indisputable increase in functional democracies. In
1989 only three countries in Africa could claim to have democratic
governments. This coming November, 13 African countries are expected to
be invited to the ministerial meeting of the Community of Democracies
in Bamako, Mali, and a further six, seen as close to meeting the
standard, invited as observers.
As I will discuss below, this is not to say that all is well; much
of Africa continues to struggle with major deficits in governance and
poverty and the early momentum for change, so evident in the early mid-
1990s, has slowed significantly. But we need to recognize what has been
achieved as much as we need to identify the barriers to further
advance.
An additional critically important development has been the advent
of a new generation of intracontinental institutions, above all the
African Union, but also the New Partnership for Africa's Development,
NEPAD, and its self-assessment program, the African Peer Review
Mechanism (APRM); the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights;
the Pan-African Parliament; and the forthcoming African Court, to name
only a few. As research and debate have thrust governance issues to the
fore, progress has been made in developing normative frameworks for
democratic governance at national, subregional, and continental levels.
Africa now has some of the most progressive constitutional provisions
in the world. Human rights and electoral standards have been developed
at subregional and continental levels, most notably with the recent
adoption of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.
Where the Organization of African Unity was barely more than a club
for the ``big men'' first of African independence and then of cold-war
politics, with a gentleman's agreement not to interfere in each others
affairs, the African Union is an institution whose statutes affirm the
importance of substance, of accountability, of human rights, and the
obligation to uphold those rights not only at home but in your
neighbor's back yard too. Undoubtedly in practice, these aspirational
standards are often not met and the development of these institutions
is a work in progress; but the challenge is no longer the lack of
standards but enforcement.
Interstate and civil war, long seen as a huge brake on African
progress, has surged at various periods during the past 15 years, yet
the levers for challenging and bringing those conflicts under control
are more numerous, the constituencies pressing for peace are vocal and
more powerful and their leverage is greater. Specifically we have seen
cessation of major violent conflicts in countries such as Mozambique,
Angola, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Southern Sudan, Liberia, the DRC, and
Cote d'Ivoire. The United States has played a significant and
contributory role in support of conflict resolution, mitigation, and
prevention during the past 15 years. Thus, even as we lament the
suffering and demand a just peace in Darfur, the DRC or northern
Uganda, we may also agree that levels of African mobilization,
diplomatic effort, and engagement for peace in Africa are
unprecedented.
civil society unleashed--a critical development
For the Soros Foundation Network, committed as we are to open
societies, perhaps the greatest advance of this period has been the
birth and growth of civil society, the nongovernmental actors and
groupings that we believe are essential to the functioning of a
democracy.
Effectively suppressed by censorship and repression during the
cold-war era, would-be activists for women's rights and a host of other
issues, professionals seeking to raise their standards, lawyers seeking
to test and improve their country's jurisprudence, citizens demanding
information about government expenditure have all come out into the sun
and continue to expand their engagement, commitment, and skills to hold
politicians and rulers to account. Their emergence has had a
galvanizing effect on wider society.
The importance of this development cannot be overemphasized because
despite the positive political developments listed above, there is a
very long way still to go. The continent continues to be the site of
gross injustice, poverty, sectarianism, and graft. Alarmingly, as
globalization advances, some of the gravest problems seem to entrench
and become worse. In particular, countries that are endowed--many would
say cursed--with fossil fuels and other high-demand minerals, are
demonstrating poor governance of the worst kind. But as we acknowledge
this, we also note that one of the most effective, fastest growing
civil society networks in Africa today is the Publish What You Pay
coalition. Its constituent members across the continent work intensely,
daily exchanging information and strategies with each other to get
transparency laws passed or gain access to government information,
training themselves to interpret budgets and disseminate information
about corporate and government malfeasance.
One significant trend has been toward the ``indigenisation'' of
leadership and staffing in many of the international NGOs that work in
Africa. From their old incarnation as foreign-led charities seeking to
ameliorate suffering, they are increasingly advocacy organizations,
seeking to become smarter and get at the root of problems wherever in
the world they may be found, and working collaboratively with local and
international partners.
It is important not to romanticize the growth in civil society and
to acknowledge that alongside the domestic thrust, international
donors' priorities and dollars have played a significant role in
driving the sector. Furthermore, donor enthusiasm for funding the
nongovernmental sector has in some contexts damaged and undermined the
state's capacity to deliver services, and has sometimes given
unaccountable NGOs too much power in a landscape of weak and
underresourced institutions. That said, the enabling of a cadre of
skilled and highly motivated Africans in multiple sectors to contribute
to their countries from outside the official sphere is a huge dividend
of the past two decades, shining a light into places and onto issues
that are often not in government, or indeed donor interest, to
acknowledge.
persistent governance challenges
Some African countries stand out in the strides they have made
toward better governance, for example Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde,
Ghana, Mali, Mauritius, Senegal, and South Africa. Others, such as
Mozambique, Madagascar, Kenya, and Liberia are moving in the right
direction. But even as we praise the momentum and achievements in these
countries, we must acknowledge the huge deficits in others that seem to
be going in the opposite direction.
The honeymoon euphoria that accompanied the first ``wave of
democratization'' is now over. In some countries democratic transition
has been stalled, in others it has been actively blocked, and in yet
others it has produced flawed outcomes. In most instances, the African
state is a primary route to resources and rent for ambitious
individuals; this is mostly the case because the institutions that
theoretically protect a state from being captured in this way prove
unable to do their jobs. Institutions of democratic governance such as
legislatures, political parties, and civil society formations are
usually subordinate to an overbearing and predatory executive, with a
negative impact on policymaking and implementation.
More than half Africa's countries remain highly autocratic, despite
sometimes distracting attention with the fig-leaf of elections and
other democracy-associated exercises. Nowhere is this more evident than
in countries with mineral wealth. They are strengthened in their
political choices by huge incomes, and assiduous courting by foreign
governments--whether from the West or East--that wish to gain access to
their oil. Oil-rich countries make up nearly half the continent's
authoritarian or autocratic governments including Angola, Chad,
Republic of the Congo (ROC), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),
Equatorial Guinea (EG), Gabon, Guinea, Libya, Tunisia, and Sudan.
These countries present a predictable mix of contrasting
statistics. On the one hand they display ``growth rates'' far higher
than those of nonproducers of petroleum, sometimes of the order of 20
or 30 percent. Equatorial Guinea, one of the most deplorably
underdeveloped countries anywhere on the planet can nonetheless claim
to have the second highest per capita income in the world ($26,000),
after Luxembourg. On the other hand, such riches benefit no one except
a tiny elite at the top of the political food chain. Over half
Equatorial Guinea's 520,000 people have no access to safe drinking
water and three-quarters live on less than $2 a day, despite annual oil
revenues of over $2.7bn per year.
Also typical is a variable degree of political oppression and lack
of security for citizens. At the extreme end of the scale, Equatorial
Guinea, for example is ranked by Freedom House alongside countries such
as Uzbekistan, Haiti, and Zimbabwe and boasts an extensive and
documented record of human rights abuses. Arbitrary detention, torture,
execution, and stifling of political comment or debate are the order of
the day. EG was, in June 2007, added to the U.S. human trafficking
black list as a ``tier 3'' country for failing to do enough to prevent
mainly women and children being captured and used as slave labor or in
forced prostitution. Other oil-producing countries present a less
extreme picture, but demonstrate major political and human rights
deficits nonetheless. In most of these locations it is hard to find
major advances in democratic development.
Of all the countries on the continent, oil producer Nigeria's
commitment to a democratic path is the most critical. For better or for
worse, it is seen as a leader. Eight years under President Olusegun
Obasanjo began with great hope for reform but ended in profound
disappointment and anger. Some reforms were important and of lasting
value, particularly in the financial sector, including a vigorous
anticorruption agency which is nonetheless tarnished by clear partisan
bias against the former President's enemies. For the most part,
however, there has been little change. Obscene poverty has continued
despite soaring oil and unprecedented oil receipts ($223bn during
Obasanjo's tenure--some two and a half times the receipts of the
preceding 8 years, according to Nigeria analyst Professor Jean
Herskovits); the professional middle-class battles to survive as their
sectors are starved of investment or support and infrastructure
continues to deteriorate. Major cities limp along without adequate
power supply as the country struggles to meet even a fraction of the
demand for refined fuel products, leading to constant shortages;
agriculture which should be the backbone of the economy is largely
neglected, and there is negligible support for indigenous industry--
resulting in large-scale closures (1,800 since 1999 according to the
Manufacturers Association of Nigeria) as cheap imports deliver a final
knock-out punch.
The Obasanjo government, like its predecessors, failed to share the
benefits of the enclave economy, while allowing politicians to steal
mind-boggling volumes of cash. At the end of the Obasanjo era 31 of the
36 state governors had been investigated for corruption by the Economic
and Financial Crimes Commission and now that the official immunity is
ended, charges are beginning to be laid. The EFCC has been widely
quoted as saying that $400bn in state revenues has been wasted or lost
to corruption in the 47 years since independence.
A review of Nigeria's much criticized 2007 poll, the preelection
period and the voting exercise itself brings into relief the venality
afflicting parts of the political class, the strong impulse in the
incumbent party toward one-party rule and the capacity deficits--or
malfeasance--of some government officials. The course of the election
and nature of its failure is extensively documented elsewhere and will
be dealt with by another witness at this hearing so I will not go into
further detail. However, it is worth noting, in line with the points
made about the importance of civil society above, that the numerous
nongovernmental organizations engaged in trying to monitor and
strengthen the political transition process played a vital role in
exposing malpractice and defining the standard.
The Alliance for Credible Elections, ACE, a coalition of nearly 20
organizations focused on religion, gender rights, human rights, legal
issues and other sectors, articulated the problems besetting Nigeria's
political system, ensuring that the leading voice of the critique is
domestic and preempting the standard defense used by African
governments that they are the victim of foreign prejudice and
imperialist designs. Further, some of the most impressive individuals
who ran for office have a long history of working in civil society
structures, including activism and leadership against military
dictatorship. Without their participation and commitment, there would
be greater doubt about Nigeria's chances of eventual progress toward
true democracy.
limitations on u.s. africa policy
With the strong message from the start of the Bush administration
that the United States would seek to strengthen and promote democracy,
it might be expected that the African human rights and democracy
advocates would win strong support from Washington. Indeed, U.S. policy
is in many ways excellent: As stated by the State Department's Bureau
of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL), the intention is to
strengthen and where necessary, defend good governance and associated
transparent and accountable institutions under the rule of law, free
and fair election processes, and robust civil society and independent
media. The introduction this year of a Human Rights Defenders Fund and
ten guidelines in support of NGOs were valuable additions to the policy
framework and toolset.
In some key locations and instances, the United States has played a
key and positive role in supporting a transition from conflict to
peace. The U.S. investment in the peace process in Southern Sudan
immediately comes to mind, as does the solid support given to Liberia
and to Sierra Leone. There appear to be some challenges, however, in
the delivery of stated policy that seem to be rooted in conflicting
U.S. interests on two fronts in particular.
The ``War on Terror''
The first is the ``War on Terror,'' which impacts relationships in
Africa on a number of levels. At one extreme, it can result in serious
policy incoherence as one part of the administration pursues an
essentially political approach while another adopts a military one, as
in Somalia. In another example the administration apparently faces a
dilemma as it tries to decide which aspect of its relationship with the
Sudanede Government should take precedence, that of intelligence
collaboration with the Sudanese National Security and Intelligence
Service, or pressing Khartoum to end the Darfur conflict.
Countries that have made a point of overtly aligning themselves
with U.S. narratives and policies regarding terrorism appear to have
benefited not only from financial and military support but seem
successfully to have diverted attention away from their internal poor
governance and human rights abuse, or, at least, have managed to water
down complaints. The contrast between heavy international criticism of
the Meles government in Ethiopia when over 190 unarmed civilians
protesting over contested election outcomes were killed by security
forces and the comparatively mild critique from Washington registered
widely. Collaboration between the United States and Ethiopia during the
latter's invasion in December of Somalia is often cited as the other
side of the same coin. The conclusion widely drawn is that U.S.
commitment to human rights and good governance is pragmatic. The
suggestion is that Washington is willing to take a strong stand on
human rights where it has little or no interest at risk, as in Zimbabwe
for example, but it will not do so with conviction where it has other
pressing goals that call for an emollient approach.
Such tensions are evident in the U.S. relationship with Egypt
(which in the African Union is very much viewed as an African country),
a U.S. ally in the War on Terror. Egypt's record on democracy and human
rights according to DRL is profoundly flawed: The State Department's
2006 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices states that ``The
government's respect for human rights and the overall human rights
situation remained poor,'' going on to cite ``persistent and credible
reports of abuse and torture at police stations and prisons, and police
violence.'' The government made ``no significant progress'' on its own
program of political reform; instead a culture of impunity protected
security personnel accused of abuse, the judiciary was under pressure
from the executive, there are arbitrary and mass arrests, corruption
and lack of transparency, to name only some of the complaints.'' Yet,
as reported in the Washington Post on Sunday June 10, in a major speech
on democracy, President Bush's avoided mention of such deficits,
commenting only that Egypt ``has a great distance to still travel.''
Such a mild remark should have provoked such a furious response from
Cairo is its own comment on the level of U.S. critique in the past.
African governments that flout human rights norms repeatedly delay
elections, use violence and repressive laws against opposition voices,
and refuse to be held accountable have drawn their own conclusions.
If the ``War on Terror'' makes Washington sometimes ambivalent
about its priorities in relation to African governments, it conversely
tends to harden public attitudes. Global perceptions that the United
States is anti-Islam and hostile to Muslim nations are echoed in
Africa. For example, in the recently published Pew Global Attitudes
Survey only 32 percent of Nigerian Muslims, (down from 38 percent in
2003), have a favorable view of the United States, compared with 89
percent of Christians. While the two groups differ in their viewpoints
on other issues, nowhere is the gap as wide or polarized as in their
attitudes to the United States. Undoubtedly local tensions between the
two communities are revealed in these statistics but such low approval
ratings in such a large sector of the population of a country seen as
so important to the United States should give policymakers pause for
thought. Further, in 2003, public support in Nigeria for the War on
Terror stood at 60 percent, a particularly high figure by comparison
with other non-Western countries, but apparently boosted by the
strongly supportive Christian population. By 2006, support had tumbled
to 49 percent.
Too few surveys of public opinion are carried out in Africa to give
a reliable indicator of views across the continent. However if
commentary carried in media in dozens of countries gives any indication
of public sentiment, U.S. unilateralism, U.S. responsibility for the
Iraq war and the perceptions of anti-Muslim bias are widely held.
The oil factor
A second major area of contradiction lies in U.S. relations with
Africa's oil-rich nations. The U.S. Government is frank about the
importance it assigns to oil supplies, and particularly to the need to
diversify toward sources outside the Middle East. The Gulf of Guinea is
a critically important alternative source from where the United States
intends to source some 25 percent of its petroleum needs by 2020. That
imperative has acquired a sharper edge, in the light of China's intense
interest in the same zone for the same reason.
For illustration, we can examine further the case of Equatorial
Guinea. This state has long been associated with some of the worst
governance abuses in Africa, so notorious that the United States had
cause in the 1990s to close its Embassy there. A Senate enquiry in 2004
into the role of Riggs Bank in providing financial services to EG's
ruling Obiang family revealed graft of striking proportions. To confirm
that this continued to be the pattern we might note that only this
year, news has emerged of the President's son purchasing a Malibu
mansion for $35m; there can be little doubt that the national treasury
was the ultimate source of the funds. The State Department's Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices complains that the government of
President Obiang has both committed and condoned serious abuses,
including: ``Abridgement of citizens' right to change their government;
torture, beating, and other physical abuse of prisoners and detainees
by security forces; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions;
impunity; arbitrary arrest, detention, and incommunicado detention;
harassment and deportation of foreign residents; judicial corruption
and lack of due process; restrictions on the right to privacy; severe
restrictions on freedom of speech and of the press restrictions on the
right of assembly, association, and movement; government corruption;
violence and discrimination against women, trafficking in persons;
discrimination against ethnic minorities; restrictions on labor rights
and child labor; and forced child labor.''
Yet despite all this, in the same year that these abuses were
recorded, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice posed for photographers
with President Obiang in Washington telling him on April 12, 2006,
``You are a good friend and we welcome you.'' In response he told her:
``We have extremely good relations with the United States. Our country
has had good relations with the United States for a very long time and
my visit here is simply in order to consolidate and also to establish
further ties of cooperation with your country.'' Why should the
Government of the United States which has so strongly proclaimed its
commitment to democracy and human rights, seek to do business with
Equatorial Guinea? The obvious answer is oil; but for many, it is
difficult to square stated U.S. policy and the pragmatic imperative.
In the case of Nigeria, too, the United States appears keen not to
alienate that country's rulers. Reviewing the U.S. position on the
just-ended two terms of President Olusegun Obasanjo, particularly the
clear departures from democratic standards that accelerated toward the
end of his term, one is unavoidably led to the conclusion that
Washington either pulled its punches or failed to deliver them at all.
Perhaps this might have been excused in the first term. There was
an international perception at the time of the 1999 election that
deficits in that poll were acceptable if a successful transition away
from military rule was accomplished. President Obasanjo benefited from
enormous confidence expressed by the U.S. Government in that endeavor.
But after serious malpractice in the 2003 election, the administration
failed to issue any trenchant condemnation despite multiple critical
reports from international observers and Nigerian civil society
monitors. This year, months before the 2007 vote approached there was
clear evidence of intent to rig the outcome, yet no strong warnings
were issued in Washington. At the poll itself, monitors saw an exercise
of such manipulation, conducted with such impunity, that they could
barely bring themselves to call it an election. Only mild criticism
followed from Washington, and come the inauguration of the newly
(s)elected President Yar'Adua, Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs Jendayi Frazer traveled to Abuja to attend. Days later,
President Yar'Adua flew to Germany as a guest of the G-8 before the ink
was dry on the falsified returns.
The cynicism in Nigeria about the election outcome was already so
deep, not much could have made it worse. There is, of course,
acknowledgement of the huge importance to the United States of
maintaining good relations with its most important ally and oil
supplier in the Gulf of Guinea but nothing has been said by Washington
that clearly locates the blame for what happened and the U.S.'s stated
commitment to democracy in Nigeria is seriously undermined. Although
the State Department has promised to engage vigorously with the
Nigerian Government to help it improve its elections in the future, the
record of the past undermines the credibility of such pledges. The rush
to consolidate relations with the new regime represents a lost
opportunity that could have been used to get commitment on remedial
work and a ``to do list'' that could have gone some way to restoring
confidence. It is not too late for the U.S. Government to make a more
trenchant critique than it has thus far made of the deficits of recent
election in Nigeria and to propose a more thorough-going program of
political and electoral reform, both nationally and in the oil-
producing Delta, than so far elaborated.
how the united states can strengthen its approach
So how should the U.S. Government respond to democratic reversals
and autocratic repression in Africa? The practically minded will assert
the U.S. Government has no choice but to be pragmatic. Up to a point
this is true but the law of diminishing returns seems to be in force.
The more loudly the USG proclaims its commitment to democracy and human
rights, the more potential there is for damage if its subsequent
actions and alliances contradict the stated policy.
Perhaps, too, it is worth asking whether the United States is
defining its interests appropriately. It may be understandable that
concern to guarantee oil supplies or seize a security opportunity leads
the USG to prioritize the short-term advantage and there is doubtless a
reasonable chance that some of the advantage gained can be converted to
longer term assets. However the tradeoffs, as described above, can set
back the cause of democracy in these countries and lower U.S.
credibility and leverage elsewhere; in the long run, and this may prove
to be the more significant loss.
The recommendations below are made with a view to reestablishing
credibility and confidence in a consistent message of commitment from
the United States to building African democracy
At home
(a) Define U.S. interests over the long term. There is strong
evidence to suggest there would be greater advantage for the United
States in taking a long view in its Africa relations. The problem of
making African political economies more functional, more efficient, and
more stable is essentially a challenge of governance. In their book,
``The Democracy Advantage,'' Morton Halperin, Joseph Siegel, and
Michael Weinstein demonstrate that democratic or quasi-democratic
systems function better across a range of indicators than autocracies
and authoritarian governments. The more effective political or service
institutions and business and financial systems, and the freer the
press, the more balanced and sustained a country's economic growth will
be; and the less vulnerable the state will be to hijack by sectional
interests who may well be opposed to the United States and its goals.
Conversely, systems that allow or indeed rely on wholesale
corruption, and opaque administration, ethnic or other exclusion,
censorship and restrictions on fundamental freedoms, are inherently
unstable systems that may at worst encourage armed rebellion and civil
conflict, but at best, hemorrhage funds that are needed for development
and generate politicians that have too little connection with, or
commitment to, the electorate. Hoping such states will turn into
democracies is in vain, whatever rhetoric emanates from their capitals.
These are not articles of faith but demonstrable facts, underpinned
by solid data. While many factors need to be in alignment for forward
progress to be achieved, the longer a country is on the right track,
the less likely it is, the research shows, to slide back. The United
States and other foreign governments that, in their own interest as
much as anyone else's, wish to see African countries develop along the
democratic path need to commit to a long-term process. Repeated changes
of direction according to short-term imperatives and shifting alliances
will not advance the cause.
(b) Adopt policies that will help the United States to rebuild
political capital and standing in Africa. There is thus an urgent need
for Washington to get behind some clear and principled positions in at
least some key problem areas in Africa and stick to them. This also
implies working more openly through multilateral institutions and
frameworks so as to be seen to be upholding those positions, rather
than risking the perception that principles are being traded
bilaterally behind closed doors for mutual advantage.
The United States has suffered a serious loss of political capital
in recent years, partly because prodemocracy rhetoric is so often
undermined by other perceived imperatives. The gap between what
Washington says and what it does has widened, indicating to the least
democratically minded that principles can be bargained away. The
related loss of goodwill and convening power is serious, particularly
since it comes as new powers such as China and India are rising,
offering weak African states alternative alliances.
This need not mean inevitable loss of leverage. The United States
remains the most powerful nation, and most African states will wish to
maintain good relations even on tougher terms than are currently being
applied. Only in this way will the United States regain the respect and
convening power it used to have; and nowhere is this truer than in
relation to the oil-rich states of the continent.
(c) Address perceived policy incoherence at home. Diverse
objectives being pursued by a mix of Washington agencies present a
contradictory picture in Africa. The most obvious example is that of
Somalia where it can be difficult to tell whether the United States is
trying to stabilize the country or pursue a low-level war.
There is also a need for greater clarity about whether military or
civilian objectives are defining U.S. policy in particular settings,
and whether the appropriate agency is in the driving seat. Unease about
this issue was aired in Senator Lugar's report last December to the
Committee on Foreign Relations on ``Embassies as Command Posts in the
Anti-Terror Campaign.'' He noted the apparent expansion in the mission
of DOD activities in line with increased funding and expanding volumes
of foreign assistance delivered by the military; he cited other
countries' concern, revealed in SFRC staff research, about a possible
militarization of U.S. engagement in their countries thanks to the
``War on Terror'' and warned that this could be damaging to the United
States interests and reputation. I believe this danger exists in Africa
where civil society groups I have spoken with express anxiety about the
possibility of a greater U.S. military focus on Africa, particularly
given the advent of the Africa Command.
In Africa
(d) Where a crisis of governance is evident, admit it and uphold
consistent standards. There is a need for Washington to speak out more
firmly on poor practice wherever it is found, and to be more frank even
when its allies are under the spotlight. Equatorial Guinea's failure to
address its people's poverty and respect their human rights is
deplorable. Repression and immiseration in Zimbabwe are similarly
deplorable. Yet, to judge from U.S. public utterances in relation to
the two countries, EG's transgression pales into insignificance
compared with Zimbabwe's. The reality is that the Obiang regime, with
its unconvincing election victories, massive diversion of public funds
for planes, luxury cars and mansions in fashionable locations, and a
horrific record on torture and political repression deserves to be
excoriated by Washington yet its President is soothed with flattery
while the language used about President Mugabe is exceptionally harsh.
Not only does this undermine U.S. credibility with African
observers, but other major oil-producing states such as Angola, Gabon,
and the Republic of Congo take note of the contrast and gain confidence
that their own malpractice will be similarly swept under the carpet. In
Nigeria, the pattern of progressively worsening impunity in the three
past elections suggests that a failure to make clear critiques and
demand genuine improvement effectively encourages worsening practice.
If the avoidance of criticism is intended to protect U.S. access to
Nigerian oil, the evidence does not seem to suggest it is working; as
graft and poor governance inflame protest and rebel violence in the
Delta, with the attendant damage to production (down over a fifth in
2006), the opposite effect may result.
(e) Incentivise change and commitment toward democratic policies.
USG aid should seek to reinforce and strengthen indigenous efforts to
fix problems, rather than impose externally originated solutions. Where
foreign aid is offered as a carrot, or withheld as a stick, the
objective should clearly relate to the recipient's own interests rather
than Washington's.
In nonemergency contexts, the United States should strengthen
programs like the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) that offer incentives and rewards
for those countries that want to free up their economies and political
environments. The MCA program should be expanded rather than having to
struggle for funds. This kind of assistance rewards success and ensures
that countries that do the hard work to improve their systems can see
the benefits. In line with the MCA approach, the United States could
invest in helping to make the AU's peer review mechanism work well,
with a view to making it the eventual basis on which eligibility for
aid is decided. This is the approach that is taken in the EU strategy
for Africa adopted in December 2005 and the European Commission's
August 2006 Communication on Governance in the European Consensus on
Development. The policy documents propose a shift from
``conditionality'' to ``ownership'' with regard to governance such that
the EU decides to work with countries that seek to implement their own
reforms and meet their own high standards rather than those imposed
from outside.
In situations where stabilization assistance is appropriate, the
United States should restrict any conditionality to requiring the
recipient's policies to align with good governance principles and
approaches. Aid, or denial of aid should not be used as a lever to
persuade recipient governments to align or comply with the U.S.
security or other objectives (as with ``Article 98'' case when U.S.
military aid was made conditional on governments agreeing not to
extradite U.S. soldiers to the International Criminal Court. Long
lasting negative feeling toward the United States was generated by this
measure, both among those governments that signed and those who
declined to do so).
(f) Support African regional institutions to play a positive role.
The African Union is an organization with a mandate to advance good
governance and political stability and promises that its members will
intervene to ensure that not only they but their neighbors comply. The
AU and the subregional organizations such as ECOWAS, SADC, and others
are crucial to making progress on governance and development. While
they do not always go as far as the United States would like, or act
with conviction, and while capacity is not as skilled or bold as
necessary, much has been and is being achieved. Institutions are taking
decisions that break new ground in Africa and particularly help to set
standards and norms for democracy and human rights. While the United
States has done well to appoint an Ambassador to the AU it should put
increasing effort into supporting and building Pan-African institutions
to play a stronger role vis-a-vis national entities.
One obvious target is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in
which African governments subject themselves to self-examination by
their own teams and by bodies outside government, across a range of
fronts. OSI's African Governance Monitoring and Advocacy Project
(AfriMAP), a program that among other things seeks to track the
effectiveness of the APRM, has concluded that this program is, despite
some setbacks, a serious effort by African leaders to improve
governance on the continent and that peer review has not turned out to
be the paper exercise that some anticipated. The APRM is seen by
African leaders as an indigenous program, not one imposed by the World
Bank or other donors. It urgently requires more staff and more
engagement from outside donors. Assistance of this nature clearly
avoids suspicion of political manipulation.
challenges for states in transition: the case of zimbabwe
The commentary above has sought to frame a set of opportunities and
challenges for overall democratization in Africa. I believe it is
similarly important the United States adopts broad principles in
support of countries exiting from crisis, conflict or a period of
regression and entering transitions critical to the implantation of
democracy.
The most significant transition currently unfolding is that of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo whose transition program is proving
long and slow but has registered real progress. Even though the
election is over and a newly elected government is in charge, it is
critical that the United States and all other international partners
continue to collaborate in a multilateral framework with the insistence
that the Kabila government allows space for the opposition and is
serious about restoring security. In this context, making assistance
conditional on compliance is reasonable; the huge international
investment made to help the DRC get onto a healthy path to development
in an open society should not be put at risk because of a reluctance to
dictate from outside. Sovereignty is important and must be respected
but a country in transition, with institutions that are not robust,
often fails to fulfill its responsibilities. Aid should not flow where
the new incumbent seems intent on reversing such hard-won gains in
favor of consolidating his power; international donors should not
abandon their multilateral approach and revert to bilateral negotiation
since this will doom attempts to apply pressure.
Perhaps the challenge that should most concern policymakers,
however, is the crisis in Zimbabwe. Formally, elections are due for
March 2008 and a mediation effort led by South African President Thabo
Mbeki, mandated by the regional body, the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) is supposed to persuade President Mugabe and his ZANU-
PF party and the opposition in the form of the two factions of the
Movement for Democratic Change to agree on the terms of a political
contest that puts the country on a new path. However even as the
mediation effort continues to apparently little effect, the Mugabe
government is attempting to rewrite the political landscape with
legislation aimed at expanding the number of parliamentary seats and
changing electoral rules. A campaign of arbitrary arrest and torture
has been waged against MDC leaders and civil society cadres making it
difficult for the party to respond effectively to the mediation
process. All this against a backdrop of the economy's accelerating
downward spiral, featuring serious food and fuel shortages, which the
government addresses by printing more money and launching predatory
attacks on the private sector. The speed of deterioration is leading
even cautious observers to speculate that the Mugabe regime is unlikely
to survive another year.
However and at whatever stage the political economy unravels, those
hoping to arrest the crisis are seeking to achieve a number of
objectives:
Achieve a smooth departure from power of Robert Mugabe and
his replacement with a team and administration motivated to
restore order and with the authority and ability to stabilize
the political environment. A transfer of authority is widely
assumed to be possible through the election scheduled for March
2008 but this imposes a deadline that might not provide
sufficient time for a thoroughgoing transition to be achieved.
Negotiation of an agreement with international donors of a
financial package that can fund overall economic stabilization,
end hyperinflation and restore bank and investor confidence
this will allow for service delivery to be restored and get
basic consumer goods and fuel back into circulation.
Depoliticisation and reprofessionalisation of the security
forces, the judicial system and parastatals controlling key
services in the economy; demobilization of militias and hit
squads responsible for terrorizing civilians.
Repeal of the repressive laws that make free political
association and open contestation impossible; inauguration as
soon as practicable of a new constitution providing a level
playing field.
Attract the return of Zimbabweans, particularly middle-class
professionals, who have fled to other parts of Africa and
further afield to staff the recovery.
President Mugabe's successful playing of the race card throughout
his desperate campaign to remain in power has made international
engagement more complicated and highly contested. Even neighboring
Southern African governments suffering negative impact from the chaos,
particularly in being forced to host millions of refugees, are
reluctant to be critical for fear they become identified as puppets of
``Western imperialists.'' Unfortunately, the deionization of the United
Kingdom and United States from Harare has found fertile ground in a
broader international antagonism toward the United States in relation
to the war in Iraq and regime change. This in turn must affect U.S.
leverage.
So how can the United States make an effective contribution to
ensuring Zimbabwe's transition back to economic and political stability
in a democratic system?
No nation that wishes to speak up in defense of human rights should
be intimidated from doing so; in that regard, arguing the United
Kingdom and United States, as primary butts of Mugabe's rhetoric,
should lie low cannot be right. Zimbabwean civil society organizations
have repeatedly made the point that outgoing U.S. Ambassador
Christopher Dell's leadership and insistence on bearing witness to
security forces action has probably saved the lives of some opposition
individuals. However Mugabe's use of divisive ideology to confuse
discussion on the Zimbabwe crisis calls for a sophisticated strategy
that, while it may include some trenchant criticism, also implies work
behind the scenes to undermine the racial and sectarian messaging that
has effectively extended Mugabe's political life.
The United States, working with other international donors,
supplies food aid and also support and training for civil society
groups and opposition voices seeking to improve governance.
The message from groups on the ground is that they wish the latter
support to continue, or indeed increase. Civil society organizations
have played a major role in guarding the little space for assertion of
democratic values that remains in Zimbabwe today. They are now under
siege. Capacity has diminished with many young activists leaving the
country due to practical considerations of survival.
Even if Washington has been disappointed by the weak progress of
the SADC initiative to date, there needs to be recognition that the
United States has few interests and therefore limited leverage over
Zimbabwe and the wider region. For that reason, there are few
alternative frameworks through which to work and it is important to
keep up diplomatic efforts to engage the SADC governments, African
governments elsewhere on the continent and the African Union Commission
on the Zimbabwe issue.
One possible scenario is that the mediation effort is preempted by
economic collapse; in practical terms the government runs out of
strategies to extract the resources it needs to maintain the political
patronage and repression that is keeping it in power. The closer we
come to that situation, the more likely the divisions already evident
in the ruling elite will widen. While this carries risks it may also
increase the incentive for reform as hitherto loyal individuals bail
out.
The United States should not accede to demands that it lift
sanctions. Even though they are narrowly targeted and do not affect the
economy despite the government's claims, they are having an effect on
morale, as borne out by the loud denunciations. U.S. advocacy in Europe
to hold the line is also valuable.
The alternative scenario is that the mediation proceeds to a
conclusion and its outcomes are applied. In that case, the most
important contribution the United States can make is to work to ensure
that those outcomes will genuinely improve the situation, rather than
perpetuate the current disfunctionality under a new guise.
One important function for Members of Congress and the European
Parliament is to monitor the mediation's progress. Civil society groups
in Zimbabwe fear that the SADC-convened process will lead to a ``quick
fix'' political solution in which ruling party and opposition
politicians may be accommodated but nongovernmental voices hoping for
more thorough-going constitutional reform will be disappointed.
As the mediation stutters on, there is growing skepticism in the
region that an election in March 2008 can produce a legitimate result.
This is partly because there must be serious doubt as to the
feasibility of mounting a fair electoral contest in so short a time. It
is also because the ZANU-PF government continues to push through
legislation rewriting the already manipulated constitution to become
even more favorable to Mugabe and disenfranchise voters. Any election
run under the new rules would be illegitimate. Further, the continuing
use of political violence to demoralize and weaken the opposition and
breakdown in rule of law provide a context in which a fair election
would be impossible.
While it is natural to show respect for the South African-led
mediation process, the United States can and should express the view
conditions do not exist for a legitimate voting exercise in 8 months
time unless under external supervision, whether regional or
international supervision.
There is also scope for the United States to lend support to
efforts already underway in multilateral settings, working with both
governments and civil society organizations in the global south.
Engaging countries that cannot be described by African stakeholders as
imperialist, yet who believe that Africa should be doing more to end
the crisis is one way forward. In one recent example, a Brazilian NGO
lobbied members of the Brazilian Parliament to take a stand on the
issue with the result that ratification of an accord with South Africa
was delayed in protest at the lack of progress out of the SADC
mediation.
The other major contribution that the United States can make at
this time is to work intensively to support SADC efforts to construct
an economic rescue package backed by international stakeholders. It is
important that as wide a group of donors and partners, including
countries such as China that have provided support to the Government of
Zimbabwe, are persuaded to come together; such a plan will provide an
incentive to the political class to abandon the present disastrous
course and support a return to rule of law. The package will need to be
broad and tackle diverse problems such as the loss of confidence and
skills in the agricultural sector, revitalizing employment (some 80
percent of Zimbabweans are without jobs), stabilizing the currency and
attracting investment (and discouraging asset stripping). International
donors should allow SADC to manage eventual delivery of the package;
but it is reasonable to make supply of the funds conditional on the
terms and goals of the plan being met.
At OSI and in our African foundations we continue to believe, in
common with our civil society partners, that there can be no stable and
robust future for Zimbabwe without a new constitution and a thorough
overhaul of the country's key institutions and those who manage them.
The process and sequencing by which this can be achieved, given the
actors involved, remains obscure. Some regional governments and
external players may hope to get away with a more superficial
transition, but this runs the risk of entrenching injustices and
mismanagement that may undermine the recovery and do lasting damage to
the people's belief in their nation. We will continue to work for a
genuine transformation--not a mere transition--for Zimbabwe.
conclusion
We can take satisfaction in knowing that crisis of the proportions
seen in Zimbabwe is relatively rare on the continent today and where it
exists is strongly associated with armed conflict, rather than merely
poor or repressive governance. Reviewing the past 20 years in Africa it
is clear that there has been considerable progress and that there is
far better human and institutional capacity in Africa to address
challenges than in the past.
Africa faces a chicken and egg problem; the obstacles to greater
democracy and human rights lie in the lack of development--and vice
versa. This conundrum has spawned much argument about whether forward
progress most depends on improving governance or injecting resources--
aid or investment--into the mix. Yet it is precisely the multifaceted
nature of Africa's problems and the need to achieve forward motion on
several fronts simultaneously that constitutes the greatest challenge.
If the U.S. Government can design its policy with that in mind and
recognize the only sure way to secure democracy is to invest in its
long-term development, U.S. interests in the region will be protected.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Ms. Amosu. I'd certainly agree
with Ambassador Lyman's general comments about the many
positive things that have happened in Africa but on this one, I
am so pleased that you devoted your time to Zimbabwe.
I visited there in December 1999. I had a terrible meeting
with President Mugabe, which was a sign of things to come, but
we also met with a civil society group, which was one of the
finest group of people I've ever met with, and I often think
about the pressure and brutality that has been foisted upon
these people in these past 8 years. This is a real disaster.
Now, I believe that this country is going to come out of
this, but it must be one of our highest priorities.
Mr. Peterson.
STATEMENT OF DAVE PETERSON, SENIOR DIRECTOR, AFRICA PROGRAM,
NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Peterson. Thank you, Senator Feingold. It's really an
honor to be able to testify here this morning. I want to echo,
first off, Ambassador Lyman's comment that I think the general
trend in Africa is positive. I recently came back from a tour
of West Africa and saw Liberia and Ghana, even in countries
like Togo, there is real democratic progress and I think we
can't forget that.
However, on that same tour, I did travel to Nigeria where I
monitored the elections with the NDI team and as all of the
observer missions have said, those elections were a shamble. I
think it's important to remember that for most of my Nigerian
friends anyway, it was not a surprise. They have lived in this
country and have seen the way the politicians work. They know
the corruption, the problem with oil and I think that it is
possible to find some silver lining there, as has been noted.
The independence of the judiciary, the independence of their
legislature there, the dynamic civil society that continues to
gain strength. All is not lost in Nigeria and I think that if
you're talking about whether democracy is moving forward or
backward, I think Nigeria is, in fact, moving forward but
certainly not fast enough.
When we come to Ethiopia, which is the other country I was
asked to discuss, I think we do have a situation where they are
slipping backward. The Endowment has had a very difficult time
finding civil society partners to support there. One
organization that we supported for many, many years, the
Ethiopian Human Rights Council, has been decimated by the
recent repression. The president of that organization, Mesfin
Wolde Mariam, is one of those who was sentenced to life in
prison and I think that although we understand the American
strategic interest in Ethiopia that there does need to be a
more forceful statement of American interests in the human
rights situation in that country.
Finally, I was also asked to talk about Zimbabwe and
ironically, although the Government of Zimbabwe has much worse
relations with the United States than Ethiopia does, the
Endowment has actually been able to build a successful program
in support of civil society there, including to the media,
political parties, and the trade unions.
There have been some very difficult challenges, such as the
legal restrictions against NGOs and the monumental inflation
there but I think another issue, in fact, that I was asked to
address, is the question of the conflict between democracy
assistance and national sovereignty. I think this is
particularly relevant in the case of Zimbabwe. It is not the
Endowment's mission to promote regime change. As distasteful as
governments such as ZANU-PF and Robert Mugabe may be to some,
our program is committed to democratic reform, no matter who is
in power, nor is the Endowment exporting some secret
imperialist American agenda, as is sometimes alleged. NED is
strictly committed to peaceful, open and transparent methods of
political engagement. We are guided by our partners on the
ground.
Every one of our grants, including the recipient and the
amount of funding can be found in our annual report and on our
Web site.
Another key aspect of the Endowment's program in countries
such as Zimbabwe is our independence. For example, through the
American Center for International Labor Solidarity, we've been
able to support the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, which is
arguably the most important civil society institution in
Zimbabwe. And yet, the ZCTU has been very careful to remain
nonpartisan and has avoided direct assistance from the U.S.
Government.
The Endowment has a number of--about a dozen other partners
in Zimbabwe, such as--I don't if it's one of them that you may
have met when you were there, the Zimbabwe Electoral Support
Network, the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, the Media
Institute, which I think OSI also supports, the Crisis
Coalition and many others. They appreciate our willingness to
support them with their vital core costs. It's the salaries,
rent, equipment, which allow them to continue despite the
hardship.
These groups have monitored the elections, monitored human
rights abuses, advocated for constitutional reform and press
freedom and kept the hope for democracy in Zimbabwe alive.
Compared to the other three countries, I would say that
perhaps Zimbabwe has reached the low point of its democratic
development but I would also echo the statement of Ambassador
Dell, things will change soon. The Zimbabwe Government has
complained about American inference in their country's
political affairs, has passed legislation intended to restrict
the activities of human rights and democracy organizations, has
beaten up and imprisoned activists, has effectively prevented
the operations of NDI and IRI in Zimbabwe and has steadily
decreased the political space of Zimbabwean citizens.
Yet, the Endowment has demonstrated it is welcome in the
country, that civil society activists are still doing
courageous work against the odds and that they deserve and need
our support.
Once again, I thank you for this opportunity to testify and
I'm happy to answer questions.
[Prepared Statement of Mr. Peterson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dave Peterson, Senior Director, Africa Program,
National Endowment for Democracy, Washington, DC
It is a great honor for me to testify this morning before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs
concerning the topic of Democratic Development in Africa. In the long
and medium term I can state unequivocally that Africa's democratic
development continues to move forward. When I began work at the NED
almost 20 years ago there were just a handful of small countries that
could lay some claim to being democratic: Botswana, Gambia, Senegal,
Mauritius, and ironically, Sudan. These were all essentially liberal,
one-party dominant regimes, with the exception of Sudan, which then had
a multiparty system struggling to end a civil war. But since the
Republic of Benin's historic sovereign national conference in 1990, the
continent has been transformed. All of Southern Africa with the
exception of Zimbabwe; and most of West Africa, with just a few
exceptions, now enjoys democratic, if often imperfect, government. In
Central Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo achieved its first
democratic elections last year; and in East Africa, Kenya and Tanzania
may now be considered full-fledged democracies. Even in those African
countries that remain dictatorships or semiauthoritarian regimes, most
have much greater pluralism, press freedom, opposition political
activity, and respect for human rights than was the case just two
decades ago. And I am confident the trend will continue.
But in the short term there have been some disappointments
recently, and throughout the continent, democratic development must be
considered a work in progress. It was suggested that I focus my
comments this morning on three country case studies, Nigeria, Zimbabwe,
and Ethiopia, with particular emphasis on the role of civil society and
the media in the runup to national elections and their immediate
aftermath, as well as the more general contribution of these
organizations and key individuals in advancing governance and democracy
objectives. It was suggested that I provide a brief analysis of how NED
and other U.S. Government implementing organizations seek to support
and empower local civil society and what lessons could be drawn from
our experience. Last year, with a budget of some $7 million, NED made
grants to more than 200 African civil society organizations, many of
which are at the forefront of the democracy movement in their
respective countries. I was also asked to highlight the problem of the
conflict between democracy assistance and national sovereignty. This
has long been an issue with which NED and our partners have had to
contend.
A few months ago, I did a quick tour of West Africa, assessing the
democratic progress that has been made and the role of our civil
society partners. After years of devastating civil war, I can report
that Sierra Leone and Liberia have both made tremendous strides, and
despite the challenges of weak governance and continuing economic
hardship, both countries are at peace, and their citizens are enjoying
open and democratic government. I'm proud to say that NED's partners in
the human rights movement and the media, such as the National
Accountability Group and the Center for Democracy and Human Rights in
Sierra Leone and the Press Union, National Youth Movement for
Transparent Elections, and Foundation for Human Rights and Democracy in
Liberia, as well as more than 20 other indigenous partners have made
important contributions to the popular awareness and respect for
democracy and human rights in these two countries in the runup and
aftermath of elections.
I stopped off in Ghana, which has made remarkable political, as
well as economic, progress in recent years. Working with local partners
such as the Institute for Economic Affairs, NED's Center for
International Private Enterprise has made a tangible difference in
improving governance in Ghana, and I would also commend the assistance
IFES provided there in helping to build a model electoral system. I
strongly endorse Ghana's being awarded by the Millenium Challenge Fund.
In addition, when I was in the region, I heard about Mauritania's first
successful democratic elections, which received critical assistance
from NDI; and I learned about the potential breakthrough parliamentary
elections soon to be held in Togo, where NED is supporting a handful of
domestic observer groups. Benin, Mali, and Senegal recently held free
elections, and I would consider them robust democracies. Even in
troubled Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea, one can find cause for optimism. NED
partners are making real headway in these countries. In fact, I was
beginning to feel as if all of West Africa had become a democratic
bastion.
Then I arrived in Nigeria, where I observed the Lagos state
elections with one of NED's domestic partners, the Transition
Monitoring Group, and the national elections with the NDI team. I had
observed the 1999 and 2003 elections, which left a lot to be desired,
but these were by far the worst yet. Despite the heroic efforts of
Nigerian civil society, including more than 30 nongovernmental
organizations supported by NED, despite the millions of dollars
contributed by the United States and other international donors,
despite all of Nigeria's oil wealth that was invested into the effort,
despite the country's enormous human resources and talent, despite all
the warnings and studies and diplomatic demarches, despite the clear
desire of Nigerian voters to participate--we saw massive
disorganization and incompetence, blatant corruption and rigging,
state-sanctioned repression and violence, chaos, and in the end, a huge
blow to the democratic aspirations of Nigerian citizens. All the
domestic and international reports were unanimous: The elections were a
shambles. In response to all the criticism, the Nigerian Electoral
Commissioner, Maurice Iwu, simply denounced the observers as
``conspirators, they do not mean well for us''; and insisted that the
elections were fine. The new government of Umaru Musa Yar'Adua was
installed, at least, and as usual, Nigeria seems to be muddling
through.
Why, after all the impressive progress in most of the rest of West
Africa, did Nigeria, with all its assets and advantages, fail? A
consortium of Washington-based think tanks held an excellent series of
events before and after the Nigerian elections that have sought to
address this question. I would also recommend an article that will
appear in the forthcoming issue of NED's Journal of Democracy by Rotimi
Suberu that provides a more thorough analysis of the problem than I can
do justice to in the few minutes I have this morning. Nigerian oil, and
its corrupting influence in the country, was certainly a significant
contributing factor. Few of my Nigerian friends were particularly
surprised by the elections; they had been predicting the outcome for
some time. They knew the personalities, the inadequacy of preparations,
the competing interests, the way things work in Nigeria. Obviously,
there are limitations to the impact that international assistance can
have, and perhaps the bigger the country, the more limited the impact.
Yet, like my Nigerian friends, I can also recognize the progress that
is still being made, such as the greater independence of both the
judiciary and the legislature, the growing awareness among the
grassroots, and the increasing capacity of civil society and the media.
NED has been supporting indigenous human rights, democracy, and media
organizations in Nigeria for almost 20 years, and especially during the
dictatorship of Sani Abacha, the repression was intense, many of our
partners were in jail, and the situation seemed pretty hopeless to many
on the outside. Today, very few Nigerians want a return to military
dictatorship, and almost everyone appreciates the greater political
space the country now enjoys. So, in the case of Nigeria at least, one
might even say that the country is not necessarily moving backward; it
is just moving forward much more slowly than it should be.
Ethiopia is another story. Democratic development there has
definitely slipped backward. Less than 2 years ago, the country seemed
to be on the verge of a democratic breakthrough, when opposition
political parties made dramatic gains in national elections. But in the
runup to the elections, as I testified before the House Africa
Subcommittee at the time, both of NED's sister institutes, NDI and IRI,
were expelled from the country. Afterward, when opposition protests
became threatening to the government, a brutal crackdown ensued. NED
has supported the Ethiopian Human Rights Council since 1994, and due to
its human rights monitoring and advocacy, the group has intermittently
been harassed, including having its bank account frozen. But in the
wake of the current crackdown, most of the leadership is either in
prison or exile, and its operations have been largely stifled, despite
our best efforts to help them. Few other civil society organizations or
media have been able to find much space to work with in Ethiopia, and
as a result, although the country remains a priority target for NED, we
have found it difficult to find much to support.
The Ethiopian Government has emerged as a strategic partner of the
United States, but I would urge greater attention to the domestic
political environment. Too often in Africa, our relationships have been
based on the personalities of individual leaders, rather than the
nations they govern. It is the Endowment's special role to promote
democracy around the world, cultivating the respect and goodwill of
Africans as something that is in the long-term interests of the United
States, rather than being concerned only with maintaining friendly
relations with the regime of the day. The Ethiopian political
environment is extremely complex, and I would not be so presumptuous as
to claim that NED has all the answers to the problem of democratic
development there, but I do believe that in the last elections the
great majority of Ethiopians expressed their desire for greater
freedom, and that resistance to this sentiment would be unwise.
In the case of Zimbabwe, a government which has much worse
relations with the United States than Ethiopia, NED has been much more
successful in building a strong and vital program of support to civil
society, including the media, political parties, and trade unions. But
there have also been difficult challenges, such as legal restrictions
on NGOs and Zimbabwe's incredible inflation. In addition, the question
of national sovereignty is perhaps most acute here. NED has long
resisted any notion that it is involved in ``regime change.'' As
distasteful as governments such as that of ZANU-PF and Robert Mugabe
may be to some, our program is committed to democratic reform, no
matter who is in power. NED is also strictly committed to peaceful,
open and transparent methods of political engagement. Every one of our
grants, including each recipient and the funding amounts, can be found
in our annual report and on-line. Another key aspect of the Endowment
is our independence. Thus, through the American Center for
International Labor Solidarity, NED is assisting the Zimbabwe Congress
of Trade Unions, arguably the leading institution of civil society in
Zimbabwe. Yet the ZCTU has been careful to remain nonpartisan, and has
also avoided direct assistance from the U.S. Government.
NED's local grantees, such as the Zimbabwe Electoral Support
Network, the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, the Media Institute,
and the Crisis Coalition, among others, also appreciate our willingness
to support vital core costs, such as salaries, rent, and equipment,
which allow groups to survive despite severe hardship, and enable them
greater freedom to identify other sources of funding and support. These
groups have been able to continue to monitor elections and human rights
abuses, advocate for constitutional reform and press freedom, and keep
the hope for democracy in Zimbabwe alive. Perhaps Zimbabwe has reached
the low point of its democratic development, but I would echo the
opinion of the recently departed American Ambassador, Christopher Dell,
``things will change soon.'' The Zimbabwean Government has complained
about American interference in the country's political affairs, has
passed legislation intended to restrict the activities of human rights
and democracy organizations, has beaten up and imprisoned activists,
has effectively prevented the operations of NDI and IRI within
Zimbabwe, and has steadily decreased the political space of Zimbabwean
citizens. Yet NED has demonstrated that it is still possible to operate
in the country, that civil society activists are still doing courageous
work against the odds, and that they need and deserve our support.
Senator Feingold. Mr. Peterson, I thank you for your good
remarks as well and I thank all of the panel members. I have
limited time--this has been a good hearing--but I'm going to
ask a few questions.
Ambassador Lyman, given limited country-specific
information and presence, what do you believe is the best
approach to deriving and applying lessons learned for promoting
governance and democracy in African countries?
Mr. Lyman. Senator, I think as several people have
mentioned here, you want to find and work with the African
individuals, institutions, and organizations that are
themselves pressing for democracy. There is a lot of civil
society out there, there are a lot of governments in which
people are working to improve their own democratic performance.
There are a lot of ways to lend support to that, with
expertise, with political backing, with organizing training,
and organizing conferences in those countries that promote the
principles and practices of democracy.
I'll give you an example from Nigeria. About a year before
the election, there was a major conference on electoral reform
led by a number of Nigerian groups and in collaboration with
some American institutions. The conference produced a solid set
of recommendations for changing and improving the electoral
system. On the American side, we wanted to follow that up with
the Nigerian Government, the major political parties, and
Nigerian civil society. But there was no funding for followup.
I think had we been able to do so, it would have helped keep up
the momentum within Nigeria for electoral reform.
Support for the judiciary is terribly important. I also
hope we can continue to find ways, because we don't do it as
much anymore, to improve the operations of a free press. I
remember an opposition politician in Kenya telling me about the
investigations of corruption in Kenya. If it weren't for the
free press, he said, it would not have happened.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, sir. Ms. Amosu, there are
reports that elements of the Zimbabwean judiciary remain
independent. Are those reports accurate? Which elements are
these and what role could they potentially play in achieving
democratic reform in that country?
Ms. Amosu. Well, I think you're looking at something that
to some extent, varies from person to person. The suggestion
has been made that the regime has been effective at managing
elements of the Magistery and has frightened away or driven
away more senior members of the judiciary out of the country
and those are the methods by which manipulation has been
achieved.
But there certainly are examples of strong judges and
individuals working the judicial system who have stood up for
the rule of law and have made sure that individuals who have
been victims of security follow that action are protected and I
think it is critical, over the coming months, that both members
of the judiciary who have been intimidated or have been forced
not to practice in Zimbabwe are able to return and to fulfill
their rightful place as judges and senior members of the
community.
Senator Feingold. How can the United States and
international community help empower these elements and
strengthen other players in the struggle for freedom in
Zimbabwe?
Ms. Amosu. I think that it's difficult because the United
States does not have extensive interests and leverage in that
region and, therefore, to some extent, must work through
multilateral institutions and efforts in order to be effective.
That said, I think there's enormous international consensus on
the crisis and what's needed to try and make a difference and
great leverage is provided through the need to assemble a major
economic package for restabilizing the country. The funds have
to come from somewhere. The United States certainly is in a
position to be a leader in pulling those funds together and
certainly, it would be my view that it is appropriate and
necessary that there are conditions attached to funds that are
supplied for this purpose. SADC does need--the Southern African
Development Community does need to make an effective job of
this economic restabilization. It's going to cost a lot of
money and these reports suggest as much as $3 billion are going
to be needed through whatever mechanism, however the fund is
put together and it seems to me that there, there is great
opportunity to set conditions and to negotiate terms for the
reconstruction of the country.
Mr. Lyman. Can I----
Senator Feingold. Yes, sure.
Mr. Lyman. Can I add a comment on Zimbabwe? You know, I
think--and I certainly support everything that has just been
said--but, to be honest, we are not going to get a change in
the direction of Zimbabwe as long as Robert Mugabe is
President. He is not going to turn around and become a democrat
tomorrow or even share power. The question is: At what point do
his supporters in ZANU who are the real power holders, find a
way to have him step down? And in that regard, what incentive
is there for them to do that? Because some of the people who
are likely to take over are not great shakes either. So what
incentive is there for them to really change the system. That
is where I think we have to be going. We have to work with the
Southern African countries on incentives to the power brokers
to come to the conclusion, ``OK, this country is really going
to the dogs. If we take over, it might get worse. What kind of
change are we prepared to make, politically and economically?''
In that context, the incentive packages that we and others put
together become important. The inventives have to be clear and
there have to be understandings about what is required from
Zimbabwe. But the incentives could help move what has to be
moved. That is, for the power brokers in ZANU to say, ``Mr.
Mugabe, it's time to step down.''
Senator Feingold. And I've often thought, in working on
this for 15 years, the good news and bad news is that the
United States, in general, was not a colonizing power in
Africa. Of course, we would not want to have been there but the
bad aspect of it historically is, as Ms. Amosu suggests, we
don't have the kind of leverage and relationships in many
places that other countries do. On the other hand, the positive
layer, I think, can outweigh it. It's what we do now,
positively, post-Mugabe, that will determine how the United
States is seen in that part of the world. Perhaps we'll be
regarded better, with less suspicion, and as more forward-
looking compared to the focus on protection of long-term
economic and other interests that the colonial powers have had.
So I tend to look at it as a glass-half-full kind of
situation in some of these places and I think it presents
interesting opportunities for the United States if we could get
adequately engaged in them.
With that, I'll ask a final question for both Mr. Albin-
Lackey and Mr. Peterson. It is clear, as you both note, that
democratic developments in Ethiopia have been backsliding in
recent years. You've spoken about this at length and I'm
pleased it has been discussed today. Why do you think this has
occurred? And what should the United States, particularly given
our longstanding relationship with the Ethiopian Government, be
doing to ensure that it doesn't slide any further?
Mr. Peterson.
Mr. Peterson. Well, of course, Ethiopia has had a long
history of authoritarian rule through a series of Emperors and
a virtual Communist dictatorship and so I think the democratic
culture there is still very weak and I think a lot needs to be
done in terms of creating the sort of demand for democracy at
the grassroots in Ethiopia. I think the United States can
insist that nongovernmental organizations be allowed to operate
freely, that political prisoners be released from jail, that
opposition political parties be allowed to function openly. I
think, as we've seen in many other African countries, where
civil society is allowed, the freedom to organize and to work
with the grassroots that a democratic culture and discourse
begins to develop.
It has, I think, always made a big difference. So I think
that would be one thing that the United States could really
focus on.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, sir. Mr. Albin-Lackey, you can
conclude.
Mr. Albin-Lackey. I think in some ways, the goal should be
getting back to a situation something like what was obtained in
the run up to Ethiopia's elections in 2005. There was no way
that those elections were going to be anything like free or
fair in most of the country but in some parts of the country,
particularly in the capital, the government had allowed a much
greater degree of political openness than it had in the years
prior to that. It was clearly open to some sort of
experimentation with greater political openness and
unfortunately, the entire thing, as we all know, ended in
catastrophe with the intractable disagreements between the
government and the main opposition party about the results of
those elections.
But where Ethiopia is today, it's difficult even to think
about bringing about a situation anything like what any of us
here would probably like to see. The starting point, I think,
would be with some very basic steps. Allowing Ethiopian civil
society groups that have been trapped in a much more confining
space since the fallout from the elections to operate more
freely than they can now. Some kind of real government
commitment to ending military atrocities against civilians in
the Somali region in particular, and to hold people accountable
for similar abuses carried out in Gambella and other parts of
the country, without which any talk of political freedoms is
really quite meaningless. And in general, simply to insist that
the Ethiopian Government begin to roll back some of the very
repressive and hard-handed measures that it has put into place
in the last few years.
Senator Feingold. Thank you. I thank all of you. I think
this hearing covered a lot of ground and I also think that we
now have a chance to send some fairly strong messages in a few
places that I really sincerely hope will be more strongly
reflected through the administration's own communications and
efforts with regard to each of the countries that we talked
about.
Thanks so much and that concludes the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 11:49 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Robert I. Rotberg, Adjunct Professor and
Director, Program on Intrastate Conflict, Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University and President, World Peace Foundation
Seven of mainland sub-Saharan Africa's 45 nation-states are widely
regarded as being success stories. This written testimony summarizes a
much longer and much more detailed evaluation of those successes. The
mixed conclusions of this analysis are instructive in understanding the
dynamics of political and economic achievement in sub-Saharan Africa as
a whole.
Africa's seven most successful countries are all growing reasonably
rapidly. Yet, job creation still lags behind promises and expectations,
underlining the persistence of serious levels of poverty. Moreover,
where there is some indigenous wealth, there are also severe income
inequalities. Several countries will be benefiting from new resource
finds, and broad improvements in GDP could eventually flow into our
seven countries from such discoveries. But the exploitation of these
finds, and other commercial advances, is being deterred in every case
by serious shortages of electric energy. Every country has outrun its
available power supplies; several years will pass in each case before
these shortages can be met. Moreover, nearly all, except Botswana and
South Africa, have road and rail networks that are inadequate for the
industrial and agricultural growth on which their economic advances
depend. Likewise, each country in our sample is being dragged down
economically by the scourges of tuberculosis, malaria, and HIV/AIDS.
Good governance is essential for economic growth and the avoidance
of conflict. Among our set of seven countries--Botswana, South Africa,
Zambia, Ghana, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Uganda (in order of 2006
annual GDP per capita)--we show diverse results. There are countries
that demonstrate steady good governance, lapsed good governance, and
questionable levels of good governance. Four are well unified, with few
sectional issues. A few exhibit serious leadership deficiencies. Only
in Botswana is the bureaucracy thoroughly reliable. On the World Bank's
Ease of Doing Business rankings, Botswana, South Africa, and Uganda
rate above the others. Reasonably high levels of corruption persist in
all but one nation.
Chinese influence is a new factor in the region, especially in
Mozambique and Zambia. Chinese investors will be contributing
significantly to the economic development of both countries, as
conceivably in Tanzania as well. In Mozambique and Zambia, the way in
which China operates colonially, extracting and exploiting, has
elicited major protests. Throughout the region, the flood of
inexpensive Chinese imports has also undercut domestic industry.
Botswana has achieved a deep-rooted political culture of genuine
democracy. It has institutionalized good governance. Politics is
largely fair and participatory under the country's current leadership.
Rule of law is observed. These truisms will all be tested, however,
when Ian Khama becomes national President in early 2008. He has
authoritarian tendencies that may rile Botswana's much vaunted and much
deserved reputation for due process and toleration.
Very poor at birth, Botswana is one of the very few African
countries that has managed its resource treasures well, and to the
benefit of the nation. Growing at 5 and 6 percent a year, as it has
done systematically for almost two decades, Botswana nevertheless still
has relatively high unemployment rates. It has also tried to diversify
its economy away from diamonds and other minerals, but with little
success (except for tourism). By African standards, corruption is
minimal, held in check by a national framework of accountability and by
a persuasive national ethos of integrity.
Although HIV/AIDS is highly prevalent in Botswana, the government
provides broad social and medical services, and is one of the few
countries in Africa that has the resources and the will to treat the
disease medically as well as seek to prevent its spread. Botswana is
conscious, too, of the need to overcome the sense of stigma that most
AIDS sufferers experience.
As deft as South Africa's handling of the threat of inflation has
been in this century, it has been less successful in terms of job
creation, small business development, and overall economic growth. It
is still growing less rapidly than planned and less rapidly than it
needs to do to empower all of its citizens. Its growth is uneven, too;
pockets of vast new indigenous wealth exist amid wastelands of
aspiration and unfulfilled opportunity.
South Africa has always enjoyed the best infrastructure in Africa--
its ports, airports, and rail and road transport systems are advanced
by developing world standards. But, because of poor governmental
investment decisions, South Africa is as short of electric power
capacity as any of the other six countries discussed in this report.
Given its level of industrialization and prosperity, to be hampered by
faltering electricity supply is no testament to good leadership.
Indeed, within the past 2 weeks, South Africa exceeded all records for
power usage, bumping up against full capacity. Load-shedding was
apparent, and sections of Johannesburg lost power for long periods. It
will be 5 years, if then, before South Africa constructs the new
capacity that it needs for a growing economy.
Although South Africa is one of Africa's handful of democracies,
with a strong rule of law tradition and an independent judiciary,
President Thabo Mbeki's government frequently seeks to exert executive
prerogatives over civil society, its parliamentary opponents, the
media, and--recently--judges. South Africa is much more centralized and
statist than it was a decade ago. Privatization of state enterprises is
going forward very slowly and, in some areas, that machinery has ground
to a halt. Although Mbeki personally championed the new African Union
and the New Partnership for Africa's Development--NEPAD--the latter's
much touted peer review mechanism is being distorted and undermined
within South Africa itself.
But the components that hinder South Africa's successful emergence
as an independent, fully free, nation are two: Crime and corruption.
With one of the highest murder and major assault records anywhere, year
after year, and with police services that are underpaid, understaffed,
and inept, it is no wonder that tourists and investors cringe.
President Mbeki promised this year to do something about crime, but it
will doubtless be left to his successor to seek serious results in this
difficult and intractable area.
If crime reflects poverty and diminished expectations, then
corruption reflects enhanced expectations and greed. If everyone is
doing it, underlings see taking advantage of their positions as their
rightful due. Stanching this drain of public goods is impossible unless
good leadership exerts itself. In South Africa, as with so many other
issues of concern, too much that is shoddy has been tolerated, and--
other than the former Deputy President too few individuals have been
singled out for censure and criminal investigation. Official corruption
has grown significantly in the last decade, especially during Mbeki's
Presidency. Its scale is particularly worrisome at the provincial and
municipal levels, although national parliamentarians and some ministers
have enriched themselves equally and notoriously.
Thanks to very high prices for copper, Zambia is growing rapidly.
Its annual per capita GDP figures trail only Botswana and South Africa
in this seven-country sample. Chinese investments in mining and in
other sectors could help cushion the country when commodity prices
fall, but Zambia has had too little success so far in diversifying its
economy away from copper and cobalt. It lacks electric power capacity.
Agriculture and tourism could conceivably contribute more significantly
to national income in the future; the government is committed to
spending increased sums on agricultural improvement (and on irrigation
equipment), but more than half of all Zambians live in cities.
The current government of President Levy Mwanawasa has largely
retrieved the political, economic, and social forward momentum that was
lost in the 1990s under President Frederick Chiluba. But Mwanawasa was
elected on rural votes and his more populist opponent championed the
urban poor. This split will continue to hinder nation-building and
unity. Any dramatic fall in copper prices could imperil Zambia's
assault on HIV/AIDS, on poverty, on new social services, and on
employment creation--all necessary achievements if Zambia is to sustain
its recent income and governance gains and improve its human
development indicators. Doing more than at present to reduce high
corruption levels would also strengthen Zambia's attempt to make
progress.
Ghana is recovering from about 40 years of bad governance--from the
Kwame Nkrumah era through the Jerry Rawlings period of strong-man rule.
Its recovery is proceeding under the sensible leadership of President
John Kufour. Its GDP growth per year has been averaging close to 6
percent, and inflation has been reduced substantially. But half of all
Ghanaians still subsist on less than $1 a day. Ghana's annual per
capita GDP is a tenth of Botswana's, and when the prices of gold and
cocoa--the country's chief exports--fall, Kufuor's so far credible
efforts to achieve national reconciliation and economic advance may
well falter. Already, persistent shortages of electric power cripple
the gold mining industry and hinder the opening of new mines.
Furthermore, Ghana's recovery from previous leadership abuses of
power is not yet sustainable. Most of the key governance indicators are
now trending upward, although corrosive corruption has not been
contained and rule of law is often honored in the breach. Even more
worrying for most Ghanaians, Kufuor's steady and popular hand on the
tiller of state will end at the close of 2008. His potential
replacements need not articulate the same broad and statesmanlike
policies; several of his possible successors could take Ghana backward,
especially if world commodity prices slump. Bitter competition in the
national elections could also widen Ghana's north-south divide, opening
up sectional fissures in a country now united.
The last three of the African success stories discussed in greater
detail in the full report are all still poor, per head (in the $300
range), but Mozambique is growing at more than 7 per cent per year
thanks to its aluminum smelter, hydropower exports, and discoveries of
oil and gas; Tanzania benefits from high world prices for gold. Because
Uganda is dependent on coffee and fish, and has serious electricity
weaknesses, its growth has slowed recently. Uganda is also still at
war, in the north and west, and its efforts at national reconciliation
have been faltering.
Leadership has been a reason for success, and now less success, in
each of these three cases, as well as in the other four. In Uganda, the
once lavishly praised leadership efforts of President Yoweri Museveni
have been dissipated by his personal failures to strengthen democracy,
mitigate corruption, and rule less autocratically. Uganda was once a
success economically (it still welcomes investors), a victor over HIV/
AIDS, and a country improving governance and building democratic
institutions. Invading the Congo, running roughshod over the
constitution, and repressing the political opposition have all reduced
Museveni's local and international appeal and reduced the sparkle of
Uganda's achievements since 1986.
Disappointment may also be growing in Mozambique, where the
Presidential successor to Joaquim Chissano, the gentle Marxist turned
democrat, is operating in a more authoritarian manner. He has returned
the ruling political party that he heads to the centerpiece of
government and become more intolerant than his predecessor of dissent
and of opposition. Corruption, always rife in Mozambique, is growing
under President Armando Guebuza.
It is also undiminished in Tanzania, not least in nearly autonomous
Zanzibar. In all three countries, anticorruption legislation,
commissions, and talk from on high achieves little by way of actual
reduction. Nor are many senior officials ever caught and prosecuted.
Corruption hinders improvements in economic productivity in all
three countries, as well as in the others. One estimate suggests that
half of all budgeted sums in Uganda are lost to such theft and fraud.
When these theoretically eradicable drags on GDP are coupled to
infrastructures that are still fragile--especially in Tanzania--porous
social safety nets, questionable rules of law, and weak leadership, it
is no wonder that the prospects in these countries for sustainable
political and economic advances are still problematic.
Success is relative. Although all of the seven countries are
growing, nearly all are dependent on primary commodity exports, not on
invisible earnings or manufactured products. Unlike the Asian tigers,
and arguably Botswana, none has entered a steady state of
sustainability, not even South Africa (where population growth
continues to outstrip net new job creation). The Asian tigers perform
well for their peoples--they provide quantities and qualities of the
seven essential political goods. In the seven African cases, only
Botswana and South Africa begin to match such levels of performance,
and South Africa's high crime rate makes it the most insecure country
among the seven.
The seven African examples are successes only as compared to the
rest of Africa, where good governance is rare, corruption common, and
poverty endemic. However, Ghana, Mozambique, and Zambia should be
rewarded particular accolades. They have made spectacular recoveries
from the ravages of war and mismanagement. Uganda might have received
the same praise today if it were not still mired in conflict and if its
blemished leadership had not slowed the pace of political and economic
advance.
Looking ahead, in every country successors to the current
leadership have yet to take office or be chosen. Because leadership
remains critical to the destinies of each of these countries, and of
all countries in the developing world, and because either current
leaders or their potential successors exhibit less-than-fully-
democratic traits, the gains made for governance need not be sustained
beyond the near term. The institutional strength and dominant political
cultures of South Africa and Botswana should prevent too much slippage
after 2008, but in the other five countries the institutionalization of
good governance is still in process, with continued success unproven.