[Senate Hearing 110-893]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-893
CONFRONTING THE TERRORIST THREAT TO THE HOMELAND: SIX YEARS AFTER 9/11
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 10, 2007
__________
Available via http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TED STEVENS, Alaska
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHN WARNER, Virginia
JON TESTER, Montana JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
Christian J. Beckner, Professional Staff Member
Brandon L. Milhorn, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Leah Q. Nash, Minority GAO Detailee
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Lieberman............................................ 1
Senator Collins.............................................. 3
Senator Tester............................................... 23
Senator Warner............................................... 25
Senator Coleman.............................................. 27
Senator Voinovich............................................ 30
Senator Sununu............................................... 32
Senator McCaskill............................................ 37
Senator Stevens.............................................. 42
Senator Akaka................................................ 43
Senator Carper............................................... 44
WITNESSES
Monday, September 10, 2007
Hon. Michael Chertoff, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security....................................................... 5
Hon. J. Michael McConnell, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.),
Director of National Intelligence.............................. 10
Hon. John Scott Redd, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Director,
National Counterterrorism Center, Office of the Director of
National Intelligence.......................................... 14
Hon. Robert S. Mueller III, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice...................... 17
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Chertoff, Hon. Michael:
Testimony.................................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 59
McConnell, Hon. J. Michael:
Testimony.................................................... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 73
Mueller, Hon. Robert S. III:
Testimony.................................................... 17
Prepared statement........................................... 106
Redd, Hon. John Scott:
Testimony.................................................... 14
Prepared statement........................................... 93
APPENDIX
Questions and responses for the record from:
Secretary Chertoff........................................... 115
Admiral McConnell............................................ 137
Admiral Redd................................................. 151
Mr. Mueller.................................................. 155
CONFRONTING THE TERRORIST THREAT TO THE HOMELAND: SIX YEARS AFTER 9/11
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MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m., in
Room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I.
Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lieberman, Akaka, Carper, Pryor,
McCaskill, Tester, Collins, Stevens, Voinovich, Coleman,
Warner, and Sununu.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN
Chairman Lieberman. The hearing will come to order. I thank
everyone who is here, including, of course, our four witnesses.
Tomorrow--September 11, 2007--people across our Nation,
and, in fact, in many places around the world, will pause to
mourn and reflect on the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001.
Today in this Committee room, we rededicate ourselves to
the memories of those lost--the families and the Nation that
grieve for them. Today we take time to assess the continuing
Islamist terrorist threat to America and what our government is
doing to protect the American people from an attack like the
one that occurred 6 years ago.
Today we ask: What lessons were learned? Where do we stand
in our ability to detect and deter the next attack that we know
is being plotted? And is our government ready to respond
effectively to mitigate the damage to our citizens and our way
of life should another terrorist attack be carried out?
The ``National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat
to the US Homeland,'' which was issued in July 2007, makes the
continuing dangers clear. ``We assess that al-Qaeda's Homeland
plotting is likely to continue to focus on prominent political,
economic, and infrastructure targets with the goal of producing
mass casualties, visually dramatic destruction, significant
economic aftershocks, and/or fear among the US population.''
While the core of the September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda is
weaker and no longer operates under the cover of the Taliban
government of Afghanistan--and its forces in Iraq are now on
the run--it is clear that the leadership of al-Qaeda has
regenerated itself and its hateful ideology is metastasizing
across the Internet.
In his tape posted over the weekend, Osama bin Laden may
sound like a rambling political candidate of the Internet
fringe, railing against American business, coming out for lower
taxes, expressing concern about high mortgage interest rates,
and then ultimately making clear that mass conversion to Islam
is the best way for Americans to secure our future. Taken by
itself, this statement might seem like the ranting of a weird
but harmless person. But the fact is Osama bin Laden is a mass
murderer who has the blood of tens of thousands of people on
his hands. And I am speaking not just of the more than 3,000
Americans who died on September 11, 2001, or in other
terrorists attacks against the West, but also in the murder of
thousands and thousands of his fellow Muslims--men, women and
children--innocents upon whom al-Qaeda has rained
indiscriminate death in Iraq, Afghanistan, and throughout the
world.
Bin Laden's tape is another shot across our bow. It is the
sound of another alarm which calls us to alertness and duty and
tells us that bin Laden and his ilk are out there, and so long
as they are, the life of every American is endangered.
Consider the most recent plot broken up in Germany--with, I
might say proudly, the help of American intelligence
operatives. This plot, which German officials have said was
professionally organized mostly by native Germans who were
radicalized in Germany, was nonetheless carried out by these
people after they traveled to al-Qaeda camps in Waziristan for
training.
And then remember the actual and foiled attacks that
originated in England, Scotland, Spain, Algeria, Denmark, and
so many other places--all also locally plotted, some aimed at
America and/or American targets.
And then come home and focus on the Fort Dix and JFK
Airport plots, which demonstrated beyond any doubt that there
are people right here in America who have swallowed the
jihadist ideology and are prepared to kill innocent Americans.
These are the evils and dangers of our age that we must live
with and defend against.
Today, we are most grateful to have as witnesses the four
men who are responsible for the protection of the American
people from Islamist terrorism. As I look at the four of you,
it is striking to me that three of you lead Federal departments
or offices that did not exist on September 11, 2001, and were
created in legislation that in part was initiated in this
Committee, passed by Congress with the support of Members of
both parties, and signed by the President, all of which have
been aimed at providing better protection to the American
people than they were getting from their government on this day
6 years ago.
Let me say clearly that the agencies you four administer,
the Federal employees that you lead, and the work that you have
done together have made our country a lot safer than it was on
September 11, 2001. And, in fairness, though they are not here,
of course, I would add the Department of Defense and the
Department of State and all who work for them.
There is undoubtedly some luck in the fact that America--
contrary to all expectations on September 11, 2001--has not
suffered another terrorist attack in the last 6 years. But it
is no mere accident and not just luck. It is in good measure, I
believe, because of the smart, hard work that you and your
agencies have done that we have not been attacked again here at
home.
I say this with gratitude, but with no sense of comfort or
triumph. You and I know there is more your agencies must do--
and do better--and that the enemy remains strong, agile, and
eager to attack us again. But on the eve of the sixth
anniversary of one of the darkest days in American history,
September 11, 2001, it is appropriate that we stop and thank
you and your co-workers for all that you have done in the last
6 years to protect us and our homeland.
When we created the Department of Homeland Security, the
Director of National Intelligence, the National
Counterterrorism Center, and supported Director Mueller's
transformation of the FBI, no one intended them to be static
offices or organizations. We wanted them to be not just strong
and capable, but as agile, flexible, and fast-moving as our
enemies.
We are still in the early days of what will be a long war
against Islamist extremists. Today we want to consider what we
have done and still must do together to secure our homeland and
win this war.
I thank you for being here, and I look forward to your
testimony.
Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Tomorrow is the anniversary of a day that, 6 years later,
still defies understanding. The loss of nearly 3,000 innocent
men, women, and children, the cruelty of the attackers, and the
courage at the Twin Towers, the Pentagon, and on Flight 93
remain beyond the ability of our minds to comprehend fully or
our words to express adequately.
It is appropriate that we are holding this hearing today,
the eve of this somber day of remembrance. If there is one
thing we fully understand about September 11, 2001, it is that
the horror of that day was made possible by what has been
called ``September 10th thinking.'' What the 9/11 Commission so
memorably terms as ``a failure of imagination'' was exploited
by our enemies with devastating effectiveness.
Events in my home State of Maine on September 10, 2001,
illustrate the collision course between innocence and hatred.
On that day, Robert and Jackie Norton drove from their home
in Lubec, Maine, to Bangor, the first leg of a cross-country
trip to the West Coast for a family wedding. Early the next
morning, a commuter plane would take the beloved retired couple
to Boston, where they would board Flight 11.
On that day, James Roux of Portland, an Army veteran, a
devoted father, and a man known for his generosity and outgoing
spirit, was packing for a business trip to California. He left
Logan the next morning on Flight 175.
On that day, Robert Schlegel of Gray, Maine, was
celebrating his recent promotion to the rank of Commander in
the U.S. Navy. He was settling into his new office at the
Pentagon. His office was believed to be the point of impact for
Flight 77.
And on that day, Mohamed Atta and his fellow terrorist
rented a car in Boston and drove to Portland. They checked into
a motel, ate pizza, and made other preparations. When they
boarded their commuter plane for Logan the next morning to
seize control of Flight 11, they left behind a trail of dots--
of financing and training, of global travel and visa
violations, and of known terrorism involvement--that would not
be connected until it was far too late. Complacency, turf
battles, and intelligence failures prevented the coordination
and communication that just might have allowed the September
11, 2001 plot to be detected in time.
Nevertheless, the people of our great country responded to
those attacks with determination, unity, and a sense of
purpose. My concern is that our response may be in danger of
flagging. If we allow ourselves to become complacent, to revert
to September 10th thinking, the next attack will not be due to
a failure of imagination but to a failure of resolve.
Today's hearing is held in the context of the ``National
Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the US
Homeland'' report. This report judged that the United States
will face ``a persistent and evolving terrorist threat over the
next three years.''
The key words are ``persistent'' and ``evolving.'' This
Committee has dedicated itself to anticipating the changing
nature of terrorism and to addressing our vulnerabilities. One
of our concerns is a central issue raised in the National
Intelligence Estimates (NIEs).
That issue is homegrown terrorism. The NIE assessment is
that a growing number of radical, self-generating terror cells
in Western countries indicates that the radical and violent
segment of the West's population is expanding. In our own
country, as the Chairman indicated, the Torrance, California,
case and the Fort Dix and JFK Airport plots all illustrate that
we are not immune from domestic terror cells. Those homegrown
terrorists, inspired by al-Qaeda's hate-filled perversion of
the Muslim faith, will challenge the ability of our law
enforcement and intelligence agencies to respond effectively.
And they pose a challenge to all Americans to be observant and
to not be afraid to report what they see.
This Committee has conducted extensive investigations of
this phenomenon, in particular, the radicalization of prison
inmates, the use of the Internet as a radicalizing influence,
and the lessons learned by our European allies who also face
this threat. I am very interested in discussing with our
witnesses today how we can best counter this clear and
escalating threat.
The NIE also states that al-Qaeda remains driven by an
undiminished intent to attack and continues to adapt and
improve its capabilities. Even more disturbing is what the
report further concludes: That although worldwide
counterterrorism efforts have constrained the ability of al-
Qaeda to attack us again, the level of international
cooperation may wane as September 11, 2001 becomes a more
distant memory and perceptions of the threat diverge.
In other words, we are challenged not just by a ruthless,
calculating, and determined enemy, but also by our own resolve.
The names of Robert and Jackie Norton, of James Roux, of
Commander Schlegel, and of so many others must not become
distant memories. They must always remain a vivid reminder of
the terrible price that was paid for September 10th thinking.
The threat that was so fully and terribly revealed on September
11, 2001, is not a matter of divergent perceptions. It is a
persistent and evolving reality that we must continue to
confront.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much, Senator Collins,
for that statement.
We will now go to the witnesses. Generally speaking,
gentlemen, as you know, we asked you to speak to us this
morning about your evaluation of the current threat environment
and your own self-evaluation of the status of reform at the
agencies that you lead. Obviously, we would welcome anything
else you want to say this morning.
We will begin with Secretary Chertoff.
TESTIMONY OF HON. MICHAEL CHERTOFF,\1\ SECRETARY, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Secretary Chertoff. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you, Senator Collins, and Members of the Committee. It is
a pleasure to appear before you again today as we approach the
sixth anniversary of that terrible day. And it is also an
appropriate time to recommit ourselves and reaffirm our
determination to continue to build on the progress that this
Committee made possible through its earlier rounds of
legislation and that all of us have been working very hard over
the past 6 years to address.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Secretary Chertoff appears in the
Appendix on page 59.
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I would like to recognize, first of all, my colleagues at
the table: Director McConnell, Director Mueller, and Admiral
Redd. All of us meet together frequently. We confer frequently,
and we all share with others--and, of course, ultimately the
President--the responsibility to protect the American people
and, in the words the President has used, ``not to let this
happen again.'' All of us recognize that this is a daunting
challenge and one that requires a partnership with State and
local officials, with the private sector, and with our
international partners.
I would also like to take this moment to thank this
Committee which has really led the charge to build the
institutions that can adapt to 21st Century challenges such as
those posed by this war currently being waged by Islamist
extremists. And once again, as bin Laden's tape disclosed over
the weekend indicates, for our enemies this war is very much a
current concern and very much in the forefront of their minds.
It must remain in the forefront of our mind.
Finally, of course, I have to express my gratitude not only
to the 208,000 men and women who work with me at the Department
of Homeland Security protecting our borders, our sea lanes, our
infrastructure, and our airways, but also my colleagues all
across the government in all of the agencies represented here
and others who work very hard 24/7 to protect the American
people.
Over the last 6 years, we have made some tremendous strides
in making this country safer, and in answer to the question I
often get asked, it is clear to me that we are much safer than
we were prior to September 11, 2001. It is also clear to me
that we have more work to be done because, as you said, Mr.
Chairman, the enemy is not standing still. They are constantly
revising their tactics and adapting their strategy and their
capabilities. And if we stand still or, worse yet, if we
retreat, we are going to be handing them an advantage that we
dare not see them hold.
The fact that we have not suffered another terrorist attack
on our soil in the last 6 years does say something about the
success of our efforts so far. Now, some people do say it is
just because we are plain lucky. I do not believe ``luck'' is
an adequate explanation for this. Others may contend that the
terrorist threat has subsided or that the United States is no
longer in danger, or maybe that the terrorists have lost
interest. But, again, I would just commend the videotape we saw
over the weekend as a refutation of that. I commend to you the
arrests that we saw in Germany and Denmark. The enemy is very
focused on continuing to wage this war. They have not lost
interest, and if we allow ourselves to become complacent and to
think that the threat has diminished, we are going to be
crippling ourselves in our ability to prevent future attacks.
It is not the case that the enemy has not tried to attack
us over the past several years. In December 2001, the Shoe
Bomber tried to blow up an airliner coming to the United
States. Last summer the British, with our help, disrupted a
plot that, had it been carried out, would have resulted in
multiple explosions on airliners flying from the United Kingdom
to the United States. So it is not for want of trying that we
have not suffered a successful attack.
Even in recent months, we have disrupted terrorist plots in
our country: The plot against Fort Dix and the plot against JFK
Airport. Last week German authorities thwarted a serious plot,
as they themselves have acknowledged, directed in part against
Americans in Europe. And Danish police also arrested terrorist
suspects in their country.
These events underscore what the National Intelligence
Estimates (NIEs) made clear, which is the enemy's effort to
continue to focus on the West and to recruit operatives who can
move in the West. And that is one of the reasons that I want to
thank the Committee for the 9/11 legislation, which has now
given us some additional capabilities in plugging the
vulnerability through the Visa Waiver Program. Every day at our
own borders we turn away dangerous people, including
individuals with known ties to terrorism, as well as criminals,
drug dealers, and human traffickers.
So I sum up by saying that I believe the reason that there
have not been successful attacks on American soil is not
because the threat is diminished; it is because we have raised
our level of protection and our level of disruption, both by
undertaking action overseas and undertaking action within our
own borders. It is a testament to the partnership reflected in
part by those at this table, the hard work of the dedicated men
and women who work for the agencies of the Federal Government
as well as State and local officials, and our partnerships
overseas, which I think become stronger every single day.
Now, that is not to say that our efforts have been flawless
or that our work is over with. On the contrary, the biggest
challenge to us is not to lose the sense of urgency which
animated all of us in the weeks and months after September 11,
2001. If we continue to adapt ourselves and continue to feel
the need to move quickly and substantially to meet this threat,
we are maximizing our ability to protect ourselves. But if we
do otherwise, we are turning around and moving in the wrong
direction.
Now, I have provided the Committee with a fairly lengthy
assessment of where I think we are in a number of areas.
I thought what I might take in the next couple of minutes
is the opportunity to look at a few areas where I think we are
now addressing gaps that have not yet been filled. Part of what
we have to do, of course, is not merely plug those
vulnerabilities that have been identified looking backwards,
but we need to look forward. In fact, we need to look around
the corners at some vulnerabilities that have not been spoken
about. And we need to make sure that we are working to address
those as well. So let me talk about a number of those.
The first is general aviation. As this Committee knows, we
have spent a lot of time focused on the question of people
smuggling in weapons of mass destruction through maritime
containers or putting them on commercial aircraft, but we have
not looked at the question of general aviation coming from
overseas as a potential vector through which weapons of mass
destruction or people who are dangerous might be smuggled into
the country. We are now working to plug that threat.
Later today we will be unveiling a plan to begin the
process of increasing our security for overseas general
aviation coming into this country substantially. The first step
of this is to move forward with earlier screening of people who
are on crews and who are passengers in general aviation planes
crossing the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. We are going to use
our authorities to align early reporting of crew members and
passengers before take-off in the same way we now require for
commercial airliners so that we can prevent people from getting
on airplanes and taking off to the United States, and, as
important, or more important, prevent weapons of mass
destruction from getting on airplanes and coming to the United
States on private aircraft. The vision of where we want to go
with this moves beyond simply screening people, but ultimately
looks to a process of physical screening of private aircraft
overseas before they come into the United States.
We also remain mindful of the threat to our ports not only
from containers in commercial cargo vessels but from small
boats and privately owned oceangoing vessels which could seek
to duplicate a USS Cole-style attack on our ports or again to
smuggle dangerous weapons, materials, or people into the
country. We have been working with small-vessel owners,
principally through the Coast Guard and Customs and Border
Protection, to assess what those risks are and to come up with
a strategy that will help us efficiently but also protectively
to address the risk presented by smaller boats and privately
owned oceangoing vessels to our country.
We have, for example, in the last week launched a program
in Seattle to work with local authorities to conduct
vulnerability and risk assessments with respect to the
smuggling of nuclear materials into the port of Seattle through
private vessels. Part of this involves the deployment of
radiation detection technology and equipment to key maritime
pathways and choke points so that we can begin the process of
radiological scanning of small vessels that might bring nuclear
materials into the port of Seattle. As we evaluate how this
works in an operational environment, we look to expand this
capability from Seattle to places like the port of San Diego
and also New York City as well.
I am also committed, as are my colleagues at the table, to
particularly focus on those kinds of challenges and weapons
which could have a truly catastrophic effect on the United
States, and that means, of course, nuclear or dirty bomb-type
attacks.
We recognize that our first and most urgent priority is to
prevent nuclear weapons from coming into this country and
preventing dirty bombs from being constructed and detonated.
And that is, of course, where we put most of our attention. But
we do have to recognize that, should our actions fail, nuclear
forensic and attribution capabilities would be critical in
protecting against a follow-on attack, and also in making sure
that we responded to anybody who launched nuclear bombs against
us using terrorists as the delivery vehicle.
Therefore, even before an attack occurs, our ability to
demonstrate that we have real and robust forensic and
attribution capability will give us a significant measure of
deterrence value, particularly against any state actor that had
it in mind to use terrorists as a disguised method of
delivering a nuclear bomb against the United States. That is
why we have created the National Technical Nuclear Forensics
Center, which is an interagency center focused on forensics and
attribution, and it is housed within our Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office. I had an opportunity last week to meet with
the Interagency Leadership Executive Committee of that center.
It is dedicated to continuing to develop and improve and to
sustain a rapid and credible capability to support attribution,
conclusions, and potential responses to a nuclear attack or a
dirty bomb in this country. I think that is a critical element
of our protection and response to a catastrophic attack.
The Nuclear Forensics Center involves partnerships all
across the Federal Government, including very deep partnerships
with my colleagues at the table here today--DNI, FBI, and the
NCTC.
Of course, our improvements to screening, critical
infrastructure protection, and intelligence fusion and sharing
have to continue. We have to continue sharing intelligence
horizontally and vertically. Again, I want to commend the
Chairman and the Ranking Member for their leadership on
information sharing in past sessions of Congress, and we are
dedicated to being a full partner in the Information Sharing
Environment about which more will be heard later this morning.
Finally, I would like to observe that, again, one of the
cutting-edge elements of this information sharing has to do
with biological threats. Providing early warning
biosurveillance on human and animal health, protection, and
vulnerabilities of the food and water supply, and the
environment in general as it relates to biological conditions
is a critical element in getting early warning and rapid
response to a biological threat, whether that be a natural
threat or a manmade threat.
We have recently established the National Biosurveillance
Integration Center which will fuse clinical data, intelligence
information, and what we get from our Biowatch sensors into a
comprehensive analysis of biological threats and events. While
considerable work needs to be done to get this center fully
deployed and fully operational, we have made some considerable
progress, particularly in the last year. And, again, this is a
classic example of an interagency effort, including not only
those at this table, but the Departments of Defense, State,
Interior, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and
Transportation.
Let me conclude by saying that as we honor the victims of
September 11, 2001, tomorrow, I hope that the anniversary of
that day is not merely an opportunity to commemorate the loss
of life or to celebrate heroism, but also an opportunity to
rededicate ourselves to the struggle and to recognize the most
important lesson is ``Never again,'' at least to the limit of
our human abilities.
I would like to thank the Committee for your ongoing
support and for the opportunity to testify at the hearing. I
look forward to continuing our important work in protecting the
American people.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much, Secretary
Chertoff, for an excellent statement. I particularly want to
thank you for those announcements toward the end of your
statement about what you are doing to try to raise the security
with regard to private aviation and boats coming into the
country, as well as the development of a center to make sure
that we have the forensic capability to consider rapidly the
aftereffects of a nuclear attack. This is a gruesome business,
but as Senator Collins said and the 9/11 Commission said, it
was a failure of imagination, which is to say a failure to
imagine that anyone could possibly do what the terrorists did
on September 11, 2001, that created part of the vulnerability
we had on that day. And I think you are imagining now what our
enemies might do to attack us, and you are attempting to close
those vulnerabilities. So I appreciate it very much.
The Department of Homeland Security, as we know, was
created out of Congress. The next two agencies we are going to
hear from are the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI) and the National Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC), who were the two leading recommendations of the 9/11
Commission, the so-called Kean-Hamilton Commission. It strikes
me that since they are both headed now by retired admirals, we
may have to revise MacArthur's old statement and say that ``Old
sailors not only do not die; they do not even fade away.''
[Laughter.]
They come back and serve their country, and for that we are
extremely grateful.
Admiral McConnell, the Director of National Intelligence--
--
Senator Warner. Add me to the list.
Chairman Lieberman. Senator Warner is added to the list as
well. You are not calling yourself an ``old sailor'' are you?
Senator Warner. You better believe it. I am older than
these guys.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Lieberman. Admiral McConnell, go ahead.
TESTIMONY OF HON. J. MICHAEL MCCONNELL,\1\ VICE ADMIRAL, U.S.
NAVY (RET.), DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Admiral McConnell. Sir, Senator Warner was the Secretary of
the Navy when I was briefing him as a young lieutenant, so
thank you, sir.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Admiral McConnell appears in the
Appendix on page 73.
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Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, and Members of the
Committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to appear
before the Committee to provide a status of our efforts to
confront terrorist threats to the Nation. I also appreciate the
opportunity to describe the implementation of the reforms
mandated by the Congress and the President since September 11,
2001, and, as has been mentioned, 6 years ago tomorrow.
My biggest concern, as mentioned by Senator Collins, is
going back to September 10th thinking by many in our country.
As stated in our July National Intelligence Estimate, the level
of focus and commitment may wane in time. The threat is real,
and we must remain vigilant.
As noted, in July my office released the National
Intelligence Estimate, the intelligence community's most
authoritative judgment on a particular subject, and this was on
the terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland. In our key
judgments, an unclassified version of which has been mentioned
here and is posted on our website, for the 3-year period of the
estimate, we assess that our Nation faces and will continue to
face a persistent and evolving threat, mainly from Islamic
terrorist groups and cells, and most especially al-Qaeda.
The terrorist threat without question is real. I will share
with you today how we in the intelligence community are working
to counter these threats. I also have submitted a more
comprehensive overview in my statement for the record, and I
ask that it be submitted to the record.
Chairman Lieberman. Without objection.
Admiral McConnell. To confront today's threats, we have
made many changes in the way we conduct intelligence, law
enforcement, homeland security, and diplomatic and defense
activities. Our greatest progress can be concentrated, I
believe, in four areas: First, by improving our organizational
structures to meet the new threats of this century; next, by
fostering greater information sharing to provide the right
information to the right people at the right time, largely
driven by this Committee; third, strengthening our intelligence
analysis; and, fourth, implementing the necessary reforms that
allow us to build a dynamic intelligence enterprise that
promotes diversity to gain insight and to sustain a competitive
advantage against our adversaries.
First let me touch on the structural improvements in the
intelligence community. One of our challenges was integrating
foreign and domestic intelligence, that is, foreign
intelligence collected inside the United States. We are
ensuring that we collect the right information to most
accurately and objectively reflect the threats inside the
United States. We are better able to do this with the
establishment of the FBI's National Security Branch (NSB). The
NSB integrates the FBI's counterterrorism, counterintelligence,
weapons of mass destruction, and intelligence programs,
allowing for a coordinated focus on collecting foreign
intelligence within the United States. And, of course, as
mentioned, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) uses all
that information with foreign collected information to provide
a more comprehensive picture.
Second, with regard to our structure, creation of the
National Clandestine Service at CIA to guide all clandestine
human operations across the community with the most effective
leadership allows for better oversight and coordination we did
not have before.
Third, we are working to dismantle stovepipes, the
stovepipe mentality inside the intelligence community. This
mind-set is where an agency can produce, and limit within its
walls, vital national intelligence. One way we promote greater
collaboration is by using cross-community mission managers to
identify intelligence priorities, gaps, and requirements.
Mission managers engage in strategic planning and collection
management against our hardest targets. Today we have mission
managers for North Korea, Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela,
counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and
counterintelligence.
Finally, with the support of this Committee, we have
established a Program Manager for the Information Sharing
Environment to enhance our sharing of terrorism information not
only among Federal but also among State, local, tribal
governments, as well as the private sector.
Let me turn now more specifically to information sharing.
Our efforts to improve information sharing mechanisms are of
special significance, given that the failure to do so
contributed to our inability or our failure to prevent the
September 11, 2001 attacks. In our July National Intelligence
Estimate, we assess that al-Qaeda is planning to attack the
homeland, is likely to continue to focus on prominent
political, economic, and infrastructure targets, with a goal of
producing mass casualties, visually dramatic destruction, and
significant economic shocks. And, of course, as mentioned by
the Chairman, the intent is to create fear among our
population.
To counter this, we must depend not only on the 16 agencies
of the intelligence community, but also on the eyes and ears of
our State and local partners across the country. And more than
depending on them, we must be willing to share threat
information and work with them to protect our Nation. We
believe that State and local partners can no longer be treated
only as first responders, but also as the first lines of
prevention. In the past 6 years, the Program Manager for the
Information Sharing Environment has led the charge to transform
our policies, processes, procedures, and, most important,
workforce or workplace cultures to reinforce sharing terrorist
threat information as the rule, not the exception. I have also
made improved information sharing a centerpiece of the DNI's
strategic planning going forward.
Although the effort to implement the Information Sharing
Environment is well underway, it is essential that the
implementation activities take place within a broader strategic
context of enhancing our Nation's ability to combat terrorism.
The ultimate goal is not simply information sharing for the
sake of sharing. The objective is to improve our national
capacity to protect our Nation from future attack. We are
working very hard to do just that.
Let me now turn to analysis. We are in the process to
fundamentally reform our analytical process. In addition to
focusing on improved formal training and analytical rigor, we
are moving the intelligence community toward implementing a
community-wide information technology architecture that allows,
among other things, analysts to better share and to
collaborate. This means community-wide computer connectivity
and standardized information-sharing policies. So whether you
are an analyst in Hoboken or Honolulu, a special agent in the
FBI, or a soldier on the front lines, we will be able to
contribute to and benefit from accurate and timely
intelligence. This is balanced, of course, so that we do not
compromise operational security, consistent with our
responsibilities to protect sources and methods.
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence is also
developing virtual communities for analysts who can securely
exchange ideas and expertise across organizational boundaries,
to find, access, and share information to make their analytical
judgments. We are better engaging with outside professionals
who can challenge our analytical assumptions, provide deep
knowledge, insights, and new ways of thinking. We conduct red-
teaming and alternative analysis to ensure we have examined all
possibilities in our analytical process.
We also have taken steps to ensure the impartiality of our
analysis and our analytical products. As mandated by the
Intelligence Reform Act, we established an Assistant Deputy
Director for Analytical Integrity and Standards. This person
serves as a focal point for analysts who wish to raise concerns
regarding politicization, bias, lack of objectivity,
appropriate alternative analysis, or dissenting views.
We also have made qualitative improvements to our analysis,
specifically our National Intelligence Estimates. Key judgments
are written to explore more thoroughly the implications of our
critical underlying conclusions. Appendices and annexes now
provide full transparency in our analytical judgments by
describing the analytical train of reasoning we used to arrive
at our conclusions. And the main text now highlights the full
range of analytical judgments and their implications, bringing
dissenting opinions to the fore so policymakers, such as
Members of this Committee, can have the benefit of the full
analytic picture.
Let me move now to implementing necessary changes in our
policy and our practices. I will turn to the policies we have
enacted across the intelligence community as well as policies
we are currently pursuing through our recently completed 100-
day plan and the upcoming 500-day plan. These reforms will
allow us to better confront threats to the Nation as we go
forward.
In June, I signed a directive mandating civilian joint duty
for intelligence officers across the intelligence community.
This initiative was started by Ambassador Negroponte as far
back as 2005. It was difficult to get agreement, but it is now
passed. Now it is up and running. If an up-and-coming officer
aspires to be serving at the senior reaches of the community,
he or she will have to serve a tour of duty at a different
agency outside their parent agency during their career. The
experience provides the officer with broader perspective and
brings the community towards a higher level of collaborative
behavior. Our approach was patterned after the successful
Goldwater-Nichols bill of 1986 that moved DOD to military
jointness.
We also have been working to recruit intelligence officers
with the needed background and skills that will strengthen our
abilities. We are developing programs to recruit young people
from all walks of life, including first-generation and second-
generation Americans and members of traditionally
underrepresented groups with language skills and cultural
understanding that we need for the insights and for our
analysis. Recruiting new and talented employees means little,
however, if we are unable to get them through our security
process. Therefore, we have a pilot project with the Department
of Defense to see if we can go much faster using an automated
process, commercial best practices, and then a new approach for
life-cycle monitoring once you are on the inside.
We have accomplished a great deal, but we still have a lot
more to go. To better integrate the intelligence community, we
initiated a deliberate planning process based on the principles
of transparency, accountability, deadlines, and deliverables.
The first phase of these efforts was spelled out in our 100-day
plan. They were designed to jump-start the necessary reforms in
the community to build momentum. The next phase, our 500-day
plan, started in August. It is intended to sustain and
accelerate the momentum with an expanded set of initiatives and
greater level of participation. Our plan was developed through
a community-wide effort through the use of working groups,
blogs, and wikis to solicit inputs from the community.
I am happy to report that enthusiastic participation by the
community allowed us to put together what we think is a
comprehensive plan. This plan will be executed through cross-
organizational and community-wide engagement. Our primary
emphasis is improved collaboration across the community.
Working groups from each of the areas will focus on the key
issues and engage the key stakeholders. Our intent is to
integrate the intelligence community and enable cross-
organizational collaboration across critical mission areas to
serve our customers better but, more importantly, to better
protect the Nation. We must continue to accelerate our efforts.
In closing, we have come a long way over the past 6 years
developing a more integrated, more collaborative community. I
believe the result is a stronger community better able to
protect the Nation. I think the Nation is better protected
today than it was 6 years ago, but we must remain vigilant, and
we must remain engaged.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared remarks. I look
forward to your questions.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Admiral McConnell. I
have a few questions that I hope we can build on during the Q&A
period. Particularly, I appreciate your last thoughts there,
which is that you are moving toward an integrated,
collaborative intelligence community, which is part of what we
did not have on September 11, 2001.
Admiral Redd, thanks for being here. Thanks for your
service. I will just say in introducing you that more than a
year ago, Senator Collins and I went out and spent a good part
of a day at the National Counterterrorism Center, and it was
one of those occasions when you have the satisfaction of
actually seeing something that was called for in legislation,
enacted and carried out. And I remember we said to each other--
I went home that night and said to my family, ``I was at the
NCTC today, and you all have reason to feel more secure tonight
as a result of what is happening out there.'' So I thank you
for that, and we welcome your testimony now.
TESTIMONY OF HON. JOHN SCOTT REDD,\1\ VICE ADMIRAL, U.S. NAVY
(RET.), DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Admiral Redd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and that is a very
good point, that words do eventually mean something, and they
do translate into tangible things, and NCTC is a very tangible
example of that.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Admiral Redd appears in the Appendix
on page 93.
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Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, distinguished Members
of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify
before you today on our Nation's efforts to confront the
terrorist threat to the homeland since September 11, 2001. I
also have a short oral statement and would ask that my longer
written statement be submitted for the record.
Chairman Lieberman. Without objection.
Admiral Redd. And before we leave the old sailors analogy,
I would note that Director Mueller, as a former Marine, is a
member of the Department of the Navy, which is probably about
as far as we can take that discussion without getting into
trouble here.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Lieberman. Remember, we are looking for
collaboration.
Admiral Redd. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mueller. Our liaison just broke down.
Admiral Redd. In the 6 years since September 11, 2001, the
U.S. Government has taken significant steps to improve our
understanding of the terrorist threat and our ability to combat
it, and many of those steps are indeed the result of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, which was
championed by this Committee. And for that, sir and madam, we
are in your debt.
While I am going to focus today on the progress we have
made, I would just start with a comment that none of what I say
should obscure the real and significant challenges that we
continue to face. We are in a long war, and our enemy is
determined and dangerous. Our counterterrorism efforts have
disrupted many of the enemy's plans and diminished certain
capabilities. But the events of the last days and the last
weeks clearly demonstrate the clear and present danger which
continues to exist.
With that in mind, let me turn briefly to the role the
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) plays and continues to
play in the war on terror. Today, as directed by the
legislation, NCTC has two roles, two fundamental roles. In
military terms, I wear two hats. The first is a very familiar
one to everyone, and that is intelligence, and in that hat I
report to Admiral McConnell, the Director of National
Intelligence. The second hat is to do with a thing called
``strategic operational planning,'' which is a new and I
believe revolutionary capability in our government. And in that
hat, I report to the President.
Let me first turn to NCTC's role in counterterrorism
intelligence. As envisioned in the legislation, analysis is the
heart and soul of NCTC's intelligence mission. More than half
of our government workforce, which is about 400 people, is
devoted to this effort. I would submit that today NCTC provides
the best example of all-source, integrated analysis in the
intelligence community. There are two primary reasons for that,
some of which have been alluded to here.
First, NCTC is the only place in the U.S. Government where
all intelligence, both foreign and domestic, comes together.
Second, we are, as indicated and directed in legislation, a
truly joint organization. Virtually all of our analysts come
from other Federal agencies, and this allows them to leverage
the diverse skills and backgrounds of their co-workers in
reaching their analytic conclusions.
In addition to producing analysis, NCTC also has a mandate
to integrate analysis across the intelligence community. The
net result of this effort is a full spectrum of intelligence
product for policymakers and operators. These range from raw
intelligence products, such as our threat matrix, which is
designed to provide immediate situational awareness of an
impending threat, to more in-depth types of analytic products,
which, for example, the President's Daily Brief (PDB).
Significantly, virtually all of the reports for senior
policymakers are coordinated through NCTC as the DNI's mission
manager. The purpose of that is to ensure that differing views
are not only represented but that they are also put in context.
So how was all this played out in the real world? Perhaps
one of the best examples occurred a year ago during the U.K.
aviation threat. In this, the most significant threat to the
homeland since September 11, 2001, NCTC worked hand in glove
with DHS, FBI, CIA, NSA, and others to share intelligence and
provide integrated analysis in a very dynamic environment. When
the President and the National Security Council met, NCTC gave
the intelligence briefing, combining both foreign and domestic
information. In my view, and in the view of others, that is
exactly what the legislation had in mind when you established
NCTC.
Another key function of NCTC is information sharing. Let me
give you three examples now of how we have improved information
sharing, I believe dramatically so, since Septemer 11, 2001.
The first is NCTC Online. Simply put, this is the Nation's
premier classified website for counterterrorism intelligence.
Maintained by NCTC, this highly classified electronic library
contains over 7 million counterterrorism documents--or
terrorism documents. These reports come into NCTC on over 30
networks from over 60 organizations, and it is instantly
available to around 8,000 analysts around the world.
The second example of information sharing is what we call
the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment. You have to have
a good acronym, so it is TIDE. Today, the U.S. Government has
one central knowledge base of all known and suspected
terrorists. It is maintained by NCTC and is based on all-source
classified information. Every day we distribute a sensitive but
unclassified extract, which is the basis of various screening
activities. We send that to Bob Mueller's folks at the
Terrorist Screening Center, and that becomes the information
which provides for entry checks at borders, Secretary
Chertoff's business, consular checks for visa applications in
the State Department, and TSA's no-fly list.
The third example of information sharing deals with
situational awareness. Every day NCTC chairs three secure video
teleconferences--8 o'clock in the morning, 3 o'clock in the
afternoon, and 1 o'clock in the morning. There are partipants
from across the community to make sure everybody is on the same
page. Our Watch Center is open 24/7, passing information as
events occur, again, around the intelligence community. Also,
significantly, we are physically collocated with the FBI and
CIA's Watch Centers for Counterterrorism. And of great
significance to those who have been in the intelligence
business, there are no doors between those Watch Centers.
Let me now turn briefly to NCTC's second role in the war on
terror: Strategic operational planning. In this role, we lead
an interagency planning effort that brings all elements of
national power to bear in the war on terror. This effort also
involves a spectrum of activities from deliberate, long-range
strategic planning to more dynamic, short-range operational
planning efforts. An example of the former is the National
Implementation Plan (NIP), which was approved by the President
last year. NIP serves as the Nation's strategic blueprint for
the war on terror and it integrates the full weight of our
diplomatic, homeland security, law enforcement, financial, and
military activities, as well as intelligence. At the other end
of the planning spectrum are more operational planning efforts,
including those established to address specific threats. The
interagency task force, which deals with the current heightened
threat environment, is an ongoing example.
So where does all this leave us? Despite continuing and
significant challenges, I believe that today, 6 years after
September 11, 2001, the United States is better prepared to
fight the war on terror than at any time in our history. Let me
give you seven reasons why I say that.
First, our intelligence is better. Terrorists are a tough
target, but our collection, our analysis, and our production
are significantly improved.
Second, we have made major strides in information sharing
and getting intelligence to the people who need it to take
action.
Third, we are taking the fight to the enemy and have
achieved significant successes in the field. Thousands of
terrorists have been taken off the field of battle, and dozens
of plots have been disrupted.
Fourth, we are attacking every element of the terrorist's
life cycle, including terrorist travel and terrorist finance.
Fifth, and very importantly, this is not only an American
effort. We are working more closely and more effectively with a
greater number of allies around the world to defeat the
terrorists.
Sixth, and of special interest to this Committee, we have
taken significant steps to make the homeland a hostile place
for terrorists to enter and operate.
Finally, through a new strategic planning effort, we are
laying the groundwork to take the efforts already underway to a
new level of integration and effectiveness.
All of this means to me that we are safer today than we
were on September 11, 2001. But we are not safe, and nor are we
likely to be for a generation or more. We are in a long war. We
face an enemy that is adaptable, dangerous, and persistent, and
who always has a vote. While we have won many battles since
September 11, 2001, there are many battles yet to be fought,
and we must anticipate that there will be setbacks along the
way. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Admiral Redd, for that
excellent testimony.
Director Mueller, obviously the FBI is the senior
institution at the table, pre-existing September 11, 2001, but
under your leadership it has gone through quite a significant
internal transformation to meet this new threat to our
homeland. So I thank you for being here, thank you for what you
have done, and look forward to your testimony now.
TESTIMONY OF HON. ROBERT S. MUELLER III,\1\ DIRECTOR, FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Mueller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning,
Senator Collins and Members of the Committee. I also appreciate
the opportunity to be here today to discuss the terrorist
threats facing our Nation, as well as those steps, measures the
FBI has taken to confront those threats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Mueller appears in the Appendix
on page 106.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After September 11, 2001, the FBI's priorities shifted
dramatically. The FBI's top priority is and will continue to be
the prevention of another terrorist attack. By joining our
traditional collection expertise with our expanding
intelligence capabilities, we have had a number of successes in
the war against terror. Several have been mentioned here today,
from Portland, Oregon; Torrance, California; to Chicago; to the
recent Fort Dix and JFK plots. Indeed, the development of a
mature intelligence and national security infrastructure is and
will continue to be a key to our success.
We have established the National Security Branch, and the
Directorate of Intelligence has dedicated and integrated
intelligence services within the Bureau. And beginning
immediately after September 11, 2001, we have made significant
strides in reshaping the way we meet our mission. We have
doubled the number of intelligence analysts on board, tripled
the number of linguists, set up field intelligence groups
comprised of FBI, Federal, State, and local partners in each of
our 56 field offices. And today intelligence is woven
throughout every FBI program and every operation.
While much of the U.S. Government's attention is focused
on--and rightfully so--al-Qaeda's reach from abroad into the
United States, homegrown radicalization also exists. The role
of our law enforcement partners is absolutely critical to
identifying individuals and groups presenting this threat,
especially through the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forces, of
which there are over 100 today. And, moreover, outreach to
Muslim and South Asian communities plays an essential role in
helping the FBI to identify violent extremists within those
communities. To that end, I periodically meet with members of
major Muslim and Arab community-based organizations, civil
rights groups, as do senior executives at FBI headquarters.
Special agents in charge of all of our 56 field offices
conduct town meetings with members of Arab and Muslim
communities, and members of the Arab American community attend
the FBI's Citizens' Academy, an 8-week program designed to give
community leaders an overview of the FBI and the Department of
Justice procedures and operations.
And while the FBI and other members of the intelligence
community, several sitting here today, and State and local law
enforcement partners have been successful to date in preventing
another major terrorist event within the homeland, we cannot
rest easy. al-Qaeda and other extremist groups continue to have
the will and the ability to attack us, and we must all continue
our vigilance, commitment, and efforts to keep America safe.
The FBI was created nearly 100 years ago to address crime
crossing State boundaries. The threats we now face are global,
and technology is moving more quickly than we could have
foreseen just 10 years ago. And we together, those of us at the
table and in the FBI, must continue to protect the security of
our Nation while upholding the civil rights guaranteed by the
Constitution.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, Members of the Committee, I
appreciate the opportunity to testify this morning, and I look
forward to answering your questions.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Director Mueller.
Gentlemen, I would say that my impression, as I listened to
the four of you--and I hope that others across the country will
be able to do so--is the picture of a great Nation that was
attacked on September 11, 2001 in a way that we simply did not
anticipate, now marshaling our enormous resources and
patriotism to defend against another such attack. So, again, no
one at the table, no one up here is feeling comfortable because
the enemy is out there. But I think the composite picture is of
enormous progress that has been made to close the
vulnerabilities that existed on September 11, 2001, and again
for that I thank you.
We are going to have a 6-minute round here at the
beginning. Votes will go off at 11 o'clock, but I am going to
keep the hearing going and just ask us to take turns going over
to vote and coming back.
I want to talk in specifics about the collaboration. The 9/
11 Commission and others, in looking back at September 11,
2001, pointed to the gaps particularly between the CIA and the
FBI in sharing information, some of which came from a historic
pre-September 11, 2001 mind-set about where the responsibility
of each was and how you could not have anybody involved in
foreign intelligence work with domestic law enforcement.
Obviously, we are in a different kind of war now where the
lines between foreign and domestic are effectively blurred, if
not eliminated, and I wanted to ask both Director Mueller and
Director McConnell if you would just address briefly whether
you think that the gaps that existed between the two
communities have been effectively closed since September 11,
2001. Admiral Redd, sometimes a picture is worth a thousand
words. When we were out at the NCTC, we noted that there was no
door between the CIA desk and the FBI desk. But beyond that,
are you sharing information, Admiral McConnell?
Admiral McConnell. Sir, I think the gap is significantly
less than it was. I think we are still closing it. It is the
process of transforming cultural--or human behavior. As you
mentioned, the wall between us that was generated in a period
of the 1970s, 1980s, the difference between foreign
intelligence and domestic activity, was significant. In my
view, that was one of the things that contributed to our
failings at September 11, 2001. So while legislation has
changed so we can now talk to each other, as opposed to going
one way, it can go back and forth. We have created the National
Security Branch in the FBI to actually have an intelligence
mission more focused on this sort of thing.
So I think we are significantly better, but I would not
want you to take away from this that we have done everything
that we need to do. It is truly cultural transformation. This
means human behavior. That is one of the reasons we pushed the
joint duty approach to get people to serve in the other
person's organization.
Chairman Lieberman. Fair enough. Director Mueller.
Mr. Mueller. I would support what the Admiral said. I had
mentioned three things. The impediments to sharing that there
were before September 11, 2001, have been removed. The PATRIOT
Act is in some large part attributable or responsible for
breaking down those walls. Second, the NCTC as a mechanism for
sharing has worked exceptionally well. There are no doors,
there are no walls in terms of the exchange of information, the
quality and caliber of the analysis that is done there. And,
third, the exchange of personnel. Now that the wall has been
broken down, the ability to trade personnel and information, we
have established the National Security Branch, the No. 2 person
in the National Security Branch, Phil Mudd, is from the CIA, as
an example of the exchange of personnel and the importance we
all recognize of sharing information, exchanging information,
integrating information, whether it be collected overseas or
collected domestically.
And, finally, I would say that I would agree that we have
made substantial strides, but we have a ways to go.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks. The other respect is that
intelligence gathered overseas may directly relate to
intelligence that we need here at home to protect against an
attack on our homeland. We are, as we have all said, at war,
and in this war, even more than in traditional wars,
intelligence is critically important to prevent enemy attacks.
Part of what we are trying to do is adjust our intelligence-
gathering system and our technologies to that new reality.
Admiral, before we broke for the August recess, we had
quite a go-round about FISA, and we adopted legislation. I
wanted to ask you to speak for a moment about that, and if you
can in this open setting--there have been some press
suggestions, media suggestions that the United States through
your office, was able to assist the German Government in the
apprehension of those plotting terrorist attacks against
American targets in Germany. Could you comment on that
specifically and more generally on how the system we adopted in
July, early August, is going?
Admiral McConnell. Yes, thank you, Senator. With the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act under consideration for
updating, we found ourselves in a position of actually going
backwards, losing capability because of the interpretations of
the law.
Chairman Lieberman. By courts.
Admiral McConnell. Yes, sir, by the FISA Court. Looking at
the requests, it was actually taking us too much time, and
because of the interpretations we were losing ground. So the
approach we took was to ask for basically three things: First
of all, do not require the intelligence community to obtain a
warrant when we are targeting a foreigner, a terrorist, in a
foreign country. We had found ourselves in the position where,
based on the interpretation of the law, we were being asked to
get warrants against terrorists operating in a foreign country.
So we asked for relief for that.
The second thing, for those private entities that assisted
us, we needed to have some protection for them with regard to
liability.
And the third thing, quite frankly, was in the interest of
protecting civil liberties and the privacy of Americans, we
felt it was appropriate to be required, as we were in the old
FISA legislation, to have a warrant anytime we targeted a U.S.
person. That would include even a foreigner in this country
suspected of being a terrorist. So we thought it had the right
balance.
It was passed, as you well know, and we are very pleased
with that, and we are better prepared now to continue our
mission--specifically Germany, it made significant
contributions. It allowed us to see and understand all the
connections with regard----
Chairman Lieberman. The newly adopted law facilitated that
during August?
Admiral McConnell. Yes, sir, it did. The connections to al-
Qaeda, the connections specifically to what is referred to as
the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), an affiliate of al-Qaeda.
Because we could understand it, we could help our partners, and
through a long process of monitoring and observation, realizing
that the perpetrators had actually obtained explosive liquids,
hydrogen peroxide which they would condense or try to condense
to an explosive. And so at the right time when Americans and
German facilities were being targeted, the German authorities
decided to move.
[Information provided for the Record from Admiral McConnell
follows:]
INFORMATION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
During the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs hearing on September 10, 2007, I discussed
the critical importance to our national security of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), and the recent amendments
to FISA made by the Protect America Act. The Protect America
Act was urgently needed by our intelligence professionals to
close critical gaps in our capabilities and permit them to more
readily follow terrorist threats, such as the plot uncovered in
Germany. However, information contributing to the recent
arrests was not collected under authorities provided by the
Protect America Act.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Admiral Redd, you recently said in an
interview with Newsweek, ``We are going to get hit again.''
Secretary Chertoff talked today about some of the possible
lines of attack that he is working on, for example, general
aviation, small boats.
When you look at the intelligence, what kind of attack do
you believe we should be preparing for?
Admiral Redd. Thank you, Senator. First of all, there were
two parts of that interview, which, as you know, sometimes get
conflated. One is the heightened awareness or the heightened
threat environment in which we are right now. And the second is
the statement, which I also made in my oral statement, that
over time, over a 40-year generational period, just
statistically batting a thousand would be very difficult, and
that is why I said we may get hit again.
The short answer is you cannot focus on any one of those.
We watch very carefully what al-Qaeda is saying. We watch their
planning. There is a certain sense at which they tend to come
back and be persistent and try the same things again. As was
indicated in the NIE, they are focused on large elements or
large reaction to things like our transportation system,
particularly aviation. But we cannot just look at one of those.
We have to look across the board.
Senator Collins. Secretary Chertoff, if you look at the
recent plots that were thwarted in this country, if you look at
Germany just last week, at Scotland, London, the JFK plot, it
appears that terrorists still are looking at bombs and that
they are looking at IEDs as the weapon of choice.
What is DHS doing in the area of IEDs?
Secretary Chertoff. Well, Senator, I think you are correct
that the attack weapon of choice still is the IED, and we are
doing a number of different things, all of which I think will
soon be captured in a strategic document directed both by
Congress and the President. But let me go through some of the
major elements of what we are doing.
Of course, we begin with detection. We want to detect and
prevent something from going off. One element of that, of
course, is technology. Through our Science and Technology
Directorate, we are doing research in such things as technology
that will enable us to detect liquid explosives even when they
are in a container, and to detect those liquid explosives
rapidly and accurately in an operational environment.
With respect to other kinds of technological issues, of
course, the Defense Department is doing a lot of work based on
what they are seeing in Iraq and other places overseas. We get
the benefit of that.
And then through our Office for Bombing Prevention, which
is part of the Directorate of Infrastructure Protection, we
actually educate State and local bomb detection and bomb
prevention units in what they ought to look for and how they
can deal with these threats.
A second element, of course, is detecting someone who is
trying to bring a bomb onto an airplane or into transit or some
other part of infrastructure. Part of the process of doing
that, of course, is deploying the existing technology. Part of
it is an enhanced use of what we call VIPR Teams, which are
teams with canines and other hand-held detection equipment that
we can surge into mass transit. We do that in response to a
particular threat. We do it in response to a high-profile
event, like the Super Bowl or something of that sort. And we do
it on a random basis.
A third element is the use of behavioral observation. This
is a technique which we see overseas sometimes at airports. The
Israelis use a version of this. We actually use it at the
border. We train people in how to observe a behavior in a way
that tips off somebody who might be planning to do us harm. And
so as we have increased training and deployment of behavioral
units at our airports and other locations, that has given us
another element.
So we use the whole spectrum of tools, whether it be
advanced scientific research, widespread deployment of existing
technology, use of dogs, and training of our screeners and of
State and local officials in how to detect different kinds of
components and suspicious behavior.
Senator Collins. Director Mueller, there was a report last
week by the Inspector General of the Department of Justice that
was very critical of the terrorist watch list that is
maintained under your direction. On the one hand, the IG found
that there were several known or suspected terrorists who were
not listed appropriately, and the IG was also critical that
there were innocent people on the list and that it was very
difficult for them to be removed from the list. All of us have
had examples of constituents who have been on the list because
their name is similar to someone who should be on the list.
What is your response to the DOJ IG's criticism of the
watch list? This obviously is an important tool, but its
usefulness is lessened if it is not as accurate and complete as
possible.
Mr. Mueller. Well, we absolutely agree with that, that it
has to be as up-to-date as possible with the latest
information. The IG's report gave us some credit for having
made substantial strides since his previous report, but still
focused on two areas in which we have still got a great deal of
work to do. The first is in terms of redress. Since his last
report, we have established an Office of Redress. It is
operating. I think both the IG as well as ourselves would like
it to operate faster. But it is operating successfully.
The second area is in the quality assurance of the
information that we get, assuring that it is updated so that
persons who may have been on the list at some point in time
when we have additional information are removed from the list.
And, again, as is often the case, it is a question of money and
personnel, and we are putting money and personnel into assuring
and upgrading our quality assurance.
The IG made 18 recommendations. We are following up on
every one of those recommendations. I pointed to a computer
glitch--I will call it a computer glitch--writ large in terms
of the individuals that in a particular instance, but it was
over a period of time, did not make it on the list, and that
has been remedied. So we have taken each one of the
recommendations from the IG and are working on those
recommendations.
One more recent example is we have been able to go through
and scrub the no-fly list and cut it in half. And so we are
making progress in terms of the goals that we share with the IG
in assuring the quality assurance on the list. But it is and
has been exceptionally successful in terms of doing what it was
established to do, and that is, identifying persons whom we do
not want to let into the country, identifying persons who may
be in the country, and giving us some indication as to where
they are and what they are doing.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Collins.
As is the custom of the Committee, we call in order of
appearance, so the next three Senators are Senator Tester,
Senator Warner, and Senator Coleman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TESTER
Senator Tester. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate
the panel's coming here today and testifying before us.
I want to add my voice to the many colleagues and witnesses
in remembering the horrors of September 11, 2001. They are real
stories of bravery, cops, firefighters, regular folks who
performed acts of heroism that inspired us then and inspire us
now. We should truly give thanks to those folks whose actions
represented the best of what this Nation is truly about.
Six years ago today, I was a regular farmer in Montana,
unprepared for what was going to be happening the next day. And
today I am still a farmer, although I spend a little less time
on the farm. But it is interesting to hear today about how our
Nation has made advances, but still needs to strive for better
preparedness.
In listening to the testimony this morning, we have made
some progress, most impressively in first responders and
sharing of information to deal with potential threats and
actual emergencies. In other areas, we still need improvement.
Some of it is due to new agencies. Secretary Chertoff as well
as your predecessor have built a new agency, and I understand,
Admiral McConnell, that the DNI has only existed for 2 years.
But in too many areas, we have seen a real lack of urgency.
The fact that there appears to be no real effort to track
individuals who overstay their visas, for example, is
particularly shocking and troubling to me, especially when we
try to address the immigration problems we face, as well as the
homeland security problems we face.
The fact is there are still gaps, huge gaps. The security
of our food supply needs to be addressed. Director Mueller and
others, I think that you folks have got it absolutely right
when you talk about the threat of complacency in this world
post-September 11, 2001.
I would like to also talk a little bit about the men and
women of our Customs and Border Patrol. I have had a chance
over the years to visit with many of them who work the Northern
Border that Montana shares with Canada. They work very hard,
but too often many of them are overwhelmed with staff shortages
and other personnel matters that can limit their ability to do
their job. As you gentlemen point out, they need to be right
every time, while a terrorist only needs to be lucky once.
We have seen the GAO investigators that have been able to
bring certain radiological materials across the Northern
border, and we have seen potential terrorists attempt to cross
into the United States through the Northern border. And as I
understand it, we are about 1,722 Customs officers and 488
Border Patrol officers short on the Canadian line. I can tell
you, my staff and I have heard a lot of complaints from folks
trying to cross the border, DHS employees, from constituents
traveling through these border crossings.
I will start my questioning with Secretary Chertoff, and
that is, from your perspective as head of the Department of
Homeland Security, what is the plan for getting staffed up at
the Northern border?
Secretary Chertoff. Well, first let me say, Senator, that
we--I guess when the President started his term, we had about
9,000 Border Patrol agents. As of last week, we are at about
14,400, and we are on track to being at 18,300 by the end of
next year. So we are going to be doubling it.
Obviously, the largest element of the Border Patrol has
gone to the Southern border, and that is because between the
ports of entry 98 to 99 percent of the illegal crossings are
the Southern border rather than the Northern border.
What we try to do on the Northern border is use air asset
sensors and high-tech equipment as a way of getting a broader
sense of who is crossing the border so we can deploy assets
more efficiently.
I think we are on the way to having several air wings stood
up along the Northern border, which will give us better
coverage in terms of airframes.
I do envision some number of the new Border Patrol agents
who are being added will be going to the Northern border,
although I will tell you that the lion's share of those will be
going to the Southern border.
What is particularly promising is as we work on what we
call our SBInet, which is a combination of ground-based radar
and cameras, we are currently operationally testing down at the
Southern border. That will eventually be a tool that we use at
the Northern border as well.
Senator Tester. And I appreciate those efforts. I can just
tell you that--and I know the focus is on the Southern border
and for good reason. But I live 100 miles south of Medicine
Hat, which is about 70 miles south of the Canadian border, 60
miles south, and I can tell you that it is fairly common
knowledge, I mean, there is work that needs to be done there.
So I really appreciate your efforts in that.
You talked a little bit about general aviation. You talked
a little bit about containers. There has been some conversation
about that. Can you give me any sort of idea on the containers
that are coming in, commercial containers? What percentage of
those are being tested? And do we need to put more emphasis on
that?
Secretary Chertoff. By the end of this year, we will be
scanning virtually every container that comes into the United
States by sea, at least at the port at which it enters the
United States. Also, pursuant to the SAFE Port Act, we have
agreements with seven overseas ports to do the radiation
scanning over there. We are operational in three of them,
including one in Pakistan. And pursuant to the new legislation,
we are going to try to put as much of this offshore as
possible. But first things first. We are at a minimum going to
get it done, as I said, virtually 100 percent by the end of
this year. I should say by the end of next year we will be
scanning virtually 100 percent of all the containers coming in
through the land ports of entry, including from Canada as well.
Senator Tester. That is good. I appreciate those efforts.
My time has expired. Hopefully I will not get waylaid and I
will be able to get back here.
Chairman Lieberman. I hope so. Thanks, Senator Tester.
We are going to go to Senator Warner and then to Senator
Coleman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WARNER
Senator Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First, I would like to say that all of us remember
September 11, 2001 but I remember it particularly because I
remained on Capitol Hill with a small group of Senators, and
this fine gentleman, Robert Mueller, came up with the Attorney
General to brief us. My recollection was it was early
afternoon, and you shared with us everything you knew at that
time. And I look back on what few facts you were able to
convey, and I see before us today a team of four of the finest
public servants, most of whom have come in from other positions
to serve once again in public office. And I have a great deal
of confidence in this team and their ability to protect
America.
I, for one, think we are going a long way towards
protecting this country, certainly much beyond what you were
able to convey on the morning of September 11, 2001. Am I not
correct, Mr. Mueller?
Mr. Mueller. Yes, and thank you for your comments, sir.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
Gentlemen, I hold up here two cards: One is my Virginia
driver's license and the other is my Senate ID. Now, this
license is not unlike those in all the other States, and it was
skillfully fabricated by several of the September 11, 2001
perpetrators. This Senate ID involves high-tech and, as far as
I know, cannot be fabricated.
Now, the question comes about the REAL ID program. I
consider it one of the highest priorities. I join with my
colleagues Senator Collins, Senator Voinovich, and others to
try to get the funding necessary to help the States begin this
program.
We lost by only six votes. A swing of four votes could have
made that difference. I hope that we repeat that effort in the
near future, but I would like to ask each of you, given your
dramatic statements here this morning, particularly about al-
Qaeda and the threat to this country, where you ranked the REAL
ID Act as a priority program. And do you fully or equivocally
endorse it? Secretary Chertoff.
Secretary Chertoff. Well, Senator, as you know, under the
REAL ID Act, we are bound and we are pushing very hard to get a
nationally secure identification. We also have a similar
complementary program for travel within the Western Hemisphere
called the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative. I think this
is one of the three or four really big items I want to get well
launched before the end of this President's term. I think it is
at the highest rank of priority, and----
Senator Warner. That will help me. I want to try and get
each one's opinion here. Admiral McConnell.
Admiral McConnell. Sir, fully endorse. It is absolutely
needed.
Senator Warner. High priority?
Admiral McConnell. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. Admiral Redd.
Admiral Redd. Same thing. Fully endorse. We need to get to
the point where we can tell yes or no, this is the individual.
Senator Warner. Director Mueller.
Mr. Mueller. Anyone who has read the 9/11 Commission report
understands the utility that the hijackers put to use these
IDs, would understand the necessity and the importance of this
program. I absolutely support it.
Senator Warner. Highest priority?
Mr. Mueller. High priority.
Senator Warner. We have discussed al-Qaeda here this
morning, and several of us serve on the military intelligence
committees. We have a lot of discussion about that
organization, and you have mentioned it, certainly, each of you
today. Can each of you tell us what you can so that the
American public has a little better understanding to what
extent they are making efforts to take actions here in this
country, and to what extent, if any, they have, should we say,
chapters or splinter groups or self-appointed al-Qaeda in the
United States? Let's start with you, Secretary Chertoff.
Secretary Chertoff. To be brief, Senator, they are still
intent on carrying out acts against the United States,
preferably in the homeland; if not, against American interests
elsewhere. I think they are looking both to develop operatives
so that they can launch from overseas. They are also, I think,
hoping to radicalize those within this country. They have been
less successful in the latter respect here than they have in
Europe, but it is a growing issue.
Senator Warner. Fine. Admiral McConnell.
Admiral McConnell. Sir, they have committed leadership that
can adapt. They have safe haven for training. They have middle
management for organization, training, and preparation. The
thing they need the most are operations personnel. We watched
them recruit. We watched them bring them to Pakistan, that
border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan, to train them in
things like liquid explosives and so on.
So the intent is clear. They have not yet been successful
infiltrating back in the United States.
Senator Warner. As an organization, do you think they are
as strong as they were on September 11, 2001, or much stronger?
Admiral McConnell. They have regained a significant level
of their capability. I do not think they are as strong because
they commanded so much and were so much larger before the
invasion of Afghanistan, and they had a country to operate
freely in. So they are in an area that makes them difficult to
get to, so I would say significant capability but not as strong
as September 11, 2001.
Senator Warner. And due to the successful efforts of our
military and many others.
Admiral McConnell. Yes, sir. Our military, and
collaboration also with the Pakistani military.
Senator Warner. Admiral Redd.
Admiral Redd. I would just agree that this strategic intent
is unchanged, and in terms of the homeland or groups here
inside the homeland, obviously that is what we spend every day
looking at. If we know they were here, obviously they wouldn't
be here, they wouldn't be effective. But we work extremely
close with the FBI and across the intelligence community to
make sure that any piece of information--and it may come from
somewhere well outside our borders, which could indicate that.
Senator Warner. In the domestic arena, Director Mueller,
what can you share with us?
Mr. Mueller. I look at it in three tiers: Core al-Qaeda in
Waziristan, the border area, Afghanistan, and between
Afghanistan and Pakistan where individuals were being trained;
and the desire of al-Qaeda to insert such individuals in the
United States as being a tremendous concern.
Second, you have loosely affiliated groups who may get some
training but do not have the planning necessarily,
orchestration from core al-Qaeda. The takedown in Germany,
Denmark most recently, London, and Madrid are examples to a
certain extent of loosely affiliated groups, of which we have
got concern.
With those two groups, the biggest concern we have is those
coming in from Europe who may have been trained and be inserted
either by core al-Qaeda or undertake attacks in the United
States without the planning or financial backing of core al-
Qaeda.
And the last tier is those who are self-radicalized, those
in the United States who do not have ties overseas with al-
Qaeda, but adherence to that ideology. Miami and the Fort Dix
plot are just a couple of examples of that.
We do have individuals in the United States who adhere to
that ideology, that extremist ideology, and we work with our
counterparts to make certain that we identify. We, after
identification, determine to what extent there are other
participants either here or overseas, and then work to disrupt
those plots, and we mentioned some examples of that.
Senator Warner. I thank the panel. I thank the Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.
Senator Coleman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLEMAN
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to
associate myself with the comments of my colleague from
Virginia, and thank you, gentlemen, for your service.
We have clearly gotten past the silo mentality, and I think
it should raise the level of confidence, understanding that
this is a race without a finish line. I remember, Secretary
Chertoff, in your confirmation when you said you have got to be
right 100 percent of the time, and a single failure is
something we cannot afford.
Let me follow up on the question that my colleague from
Virginia talked about, the level of the threat. Director
Mueller, you kind of broke it into three parts. When we look at
homegrown, which is I think what we were seeing in Germany,
first let me step back. Do we have the tools, do you have the
tools that you need to identify the threats early on? Is there
anything that you need in terms of the ability to surveil, the
ability to respond, that you do not have today that this
Congress should offer you? Secretary Chertoff.
Secretary Chertoff. I think at this point, from the
standpoint of my agency--and I think Director Mueller can maybe
talk a little bit more specifically about the Bureau--we do
have the tools we need, including information and our ability
to screen. I worry, however, that those tools not get taken
away from us. I worry that people not start to degrade what we
have spent time building up.
Senator Coleman. Is that in particular the PATRIOT Act?
Secretary Chertoff. Well, I am thinking particularly about
some of our capabilities with respect to screening people as
they come to the border, our ability to move to more biometric,
fingerprint-based screening, and what Senator Warner said about
identification cards. I mean, we are moving to get more secure
identification. If we move backwards, that is going to make it
harder rather than easier to detect problems.
Senator Coleman. Admiral McConnell, we just dealt with
FISA, which is a temporary piece. That is not a final fix. Do
you have the tools? And if not, what else do you need?
Admiral McConnell. Sir, that is what I was going to
mention, FISA, and it was a temporary fix. Some are of the
belief that this community is spying on Americans, doing data
mining and so on; that is simply not true. And so the debate
with FISA gave us partially what we needed. So that debate is
going to continue over the next few months, and if we lose
FISA, we will lose, my estimate, 50 percent of our ability to
track, understand, and know about these terrorists, what they
are doing to train, what they are doing to recruit, and what
they are doing to try to get into this country.
Senator Coleman. Admiral Redd.
Admiral Redd. I would agree, obviously, with all these
comments. I would just mention there is another way that we can
lose tools, and that is through leaks. These are methods which
are extremely sensitive, and we have to be very careful,
particularly when we have had a success somewhere, that people
do not start thinking that it is okay to talk about how we did
it because those are very sensitive and very fragile in some
cases.
Senator Coleman. Director Mueller.
Mr. Mueller. I would not talk so much in the way of tools
as such, but in terms of understanding the importance of State
and local law enforcement to our success, it is often
overlooked because it is perceived in some way as being
quintessentially a Federal problem. But every one of the cases
we have made have been made by Joint Terrorism Task Forces
where State and local law enforcement are absolutely essential
participants.
To the extent that we develop sources in communities, it is
State and local law enforcement that assist us developing those
resources.
Senator Coleman. I was going to follow up with that
question. By the way, let me ask you, are those efforts
adequately funded?
Mr. Mueller. I would say that we have to keep an eye that
they continue to be adequately funded, particularly with the
uptick around the country for violent crime. If you talk to a
police chief or a sheriff, their concern is responsiveness to
their community on violent crime, but it is absolutely
essential to our success to harness the 700,000-plus State and
local law enforcement around the country through the Joint
Terrorism Task Forces or other mechanisms. And so I do believe
as there is momentum to provide funding to address violent
crime, we should not forget the necessity of utilizing and
funding efforts by State and local law enforcement to continue
to address the terrorism threat.
Senator Coleman. In addition to the State and local law
enforcement focusing on the homegrown or even loosely
affiliated--my background is as a former prosecutor--prisons
are breeding grounds for gang violence. Are we looking at
prison grounds as a breeding for terrorist activity? And do we
have the tools to deal with that? Secretary Chertoff.
Secretary Chertoff. Actually, that is one of the first
areas that we did look at because we had exactly the same
insight that you did, that has traditionally been an area where
you bring together people who are predisposed to break the law,
many of whom are violent. They have time on their hands, and
this can be a dangerous mixture.
We have done a lot of work with the Bureau jointly in
places like California and New York, which are also doing a lot
of work themselves, and we are working also with correctional
systems not only at the Federal level, but in other States to
talk about first of all identifying the problem, figuring out
ways to reduce the problem, making sure there is adequate
screening of people who are coming into prisons claiming to be
religious leaders, to make sure they are not there actually
promoting a brand of indoctrination that would create a danger.
And I think this is an area of continued concern for all of us.
Senator Coleman. Anybody else want to respond to that?
Director Mueller, is that an area you are looking at?
Mr. Mueller. Yes. We, for several years, have had an
initiative that looks not just at the Federal system, which is
fairly easy to take care of, since they are also in the
Department of Justice, but in the various prison systems at the
State and local level. And in several of our Joint Terrorism
Task Forces, we have representatives of the State prison
systems that participate on a daily basis to address that
ongoing concern.
Senator Coleman. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. I have a
whole other area of inquiry on smuggling nuclear material. We
are going to have at least a second round here?
Chairman Lieberman. I hope so. Yes, indeed.
Senator Coleman. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Please come back. Thanks, Senator
Coleman.
Admiral McConnell, at the risk of editorializing, which is
a risk I will assume, I just want to come back and say by way
of punctuating what you have said this morning, you said in
response to my question earlier that the authority that the
FISA reform law gave you helped you--us--assist the Germans in
breaking up that terrorist group in Germany.
Second, you have just testified in response to Senator
Coleman's question that if you lost the FISA authority, you
would lose 50 percent of the information capacity you have to
gather about what terrorists are doing and planning to do to
us. That is very compelling testimony.
I want to yield to Senator Voinovich because we are on the
clock, but I want to thank you for it. Senator Voinovich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As Woody Hayes once said, ``You win with people.'' In my
mind, the real issue is having the right people with the right
knowledge and skills at the right place and at the right time.
And I think anybody listening to the four of you this morning
has to be impressed with what we have heard.
During consideration of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, I underscored my belief that
the interpersonal skills and the relationships between the
leadership within the intelligence community was just as
important as the organizational structure.
I want to commend all of you for working together. I am
concerned about the continuity our intelligence community will
have over the next several years as we transition to a new
administration. I think this is something that all of us should
give a great deal of consideration to.
Several years ago, we had testimony from State and local
enforcement representatives who observed poor information
sharing between Federal, State, and local government. I want to
tell you there has been considerable improvements in this area.
The Joint Terrorism Task Forces in Cincinnati and Cleveland are
examples of this improvement, and you all ought to feel very
good about that, Director Mueller.
Even with the increased resources and better information, I
think that we must remember that in 1998 Osama bin Laden made a
fatwa, or a religious decree, effectively declaring war on the
United States. He declared war on us in 1998, stating ``The
ruling to kill Americans and their allies--both civilian and
military--is an individual duty for every Muslim who is able,
in any country where this is possible.''
After reading the National Intelligence Estimate, we know
the threat continues. I sometimes look back and wonder if we
had taken the resources that we put into Iraq and had sent them
to Afghanistan how far ahead we would be today from where we
were then--although we have made, according to what you have
said to us, some real progress.
My concern is how our Federal agencies are working together
to reduce radicalization in the United States while at the same
time ensures our democractic principles are unheld. Director
Mueller, I have spent a lot of time talking to Muslims in Ohio,
and one of their big complaints is on that. They feel that they
are being unfairly profiled. I think that this is something
from a dignity we must continue to work on.
[The prepared statement of Senator Voinovich follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Collins, I commend you both for
convening today's hearing regarding our national security and the
threats posed by terrorism to the U.S. homeland. On the eve of the
sixth anniversary of the tragic and violent terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, I know the question on many Americans' minds is:
``Are we safer?'' Although security is difficult to measure or
quantify, the American public should be reassured that we are indeed
safer.
The United States is at war against a transnational terrorist
movement fueled by radical extremists who seek to harm us and our way
of life. These individuals will continue to adapt and attempt to find
new ways to disrupt our security. It is our responsibility as Members
of Congress to thwart their efforts by providing the necessary tools to
our national security personnel for mission success. This investment
will continue to yield great dividends, as I strongly believe that
strengthening our intelligence gathering capabilities is the first and
best line of defense against potential terrorist activity.
Woody Hayes often said that, ``you win with people.'' If you do not
have the right people, with the right skills, in the right job, at the
right time, no organization will meet its goal. The men and women of
our law enforcement and intelligence communities have made great
strides in cooperation in pooling resources to better counter threats
posed by terrorists. The public is aware of at least several recent
instances of intelligence and law enforcement personnel successfully
disrupting terrorism plots including at John F. Kennedy Airport in New
York and at Fort Dix in New Jersey. The U.S. homeland has been free
from attack for six years; a fact we surely owe in part or in its
entirety to the men and women working for the agencies represented
today.
While we can enact legislation and authorize funding to minimize
risk, it is an uncomfortable truth that we can never fully eliminate
it. Thus, we must use common sense in developing future legislation to
ensure our limited resources are allocated based upon risk assessments
grounded in credible intelligence and analysis.
Several years ago, this Committee heard testimony from state and
local law enforcement representatives who observed poor information
sharing between the Federal, State and local government. Since that
time, we have witnessed the positive development of State and local
fusion centers throughout the country, with Federal agencies engaged in
counterterrorism activities working together on a larger and more
productive scale then ever seen before. For example, in my home State,
the Ohio Strategic Analysis and Information Center, which partners with
DHS and the FBI, has been positively regarded as a ``one stop shop''
for terrorism-related law enforcement information.
Even with increased resources, better information sharing and
cooperation among agencies and across all levels of government, the
threat remains real, and we must remain vigilant. In 1998, Osama bin
Laden made a fatwa, or religious decree, effectively declaring war on
the United States. He said: ``The ruling to kill Americans and their
allies--both civilian and military--is an individual duty for every
Muslim who is able, in any country where this is possible.'' Almost a
decade later, the threat from Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda is still
very real.
A significant challenge that remains is improving the Federal
Government's ability to recruit and train skilled translators and
linguists to meet our national security needs. Significant progress has
been made in this area, but we need to do more to raise the proficiency
of our intelligence and law enforcement personnel in critical foreign
languages and cultures. Earlier this year, the Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government held a hearing to examine our national level of
foreign language proficiency. Unfortunately, the hearing revealed a
shortage of Federal employees with proficiency in critical languages.
Thus, I am anxious to hear from our witnesses about progress in this
area.
In addition, our clearance processing system remains broken,
limiting the ability of our national security agencies to meet their
heightened mission requirements. The Subcommittee on Oversight of
Government Management began its oversight work on the security
clearance process during the 109th Congress because of our concern with
the long standing backlog of security clearances and the cumbersome
process that hampered the Federal Government's ability to clear highly
skilled employees in a timely manner. I would remind my colleagues that
this program has been on the Government Accountability Office's High-
Risk List since 1990. The first timeliness milestones set forth in the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act for security clearance
reform are behind us, but we still have a long way to go if we are to
make meaningful improvements in this critical area. Accordingly, I look
forward to learning when the new process outlined in Director
McConnell's 100 Day Plan will be operational.
I would like to thank our distinguished panel for sharing their
thoughts and time with the Committee.
Senator Voinovich. I would like to hear more about what
other things are we doing to try and eliminate this receptivity
to Muslims in various parts of the world to Osama bin Laden's
extremism.
Admiral Redd. Senator, I could give you sort of a top-down
view, if that would help. I mentioned, too, in my remarks the
National Implementation Plan, which is, for all intents and
purposes, the Nation's war plan, if you will, for the war on
terror. As you expect, it has stuff like protect and defend the
homeland and go after the terrorists, but one of the key
pillars in there is countering violent Islamic extremism. And
so, that is recognized as one of the strategic musts or
imperatives, for us as a government. If you go through that
plan and you look at all the tasks that are assigned to the
various Cabinet officers, almost 30 percent of them or a third
of them are assigned to the State Department for exactly that
reason.
So the short answer is yes, it is recognized. It is, as you
understand, a very difficult problem. We have an analytic group
at NCTC which works with the rest of the community in terms of
what the messaging is. And as you indicated, there is no
surprise in al-Qaeda's ideology. They have been very clear
about it and very public about it from the very beginning. But
in terms of how you message that and how that is broken down, I
would say the State Department in fairly recent times has stood
up a group called the Counterterrorism Communications Center
whose job is, on a more tactical basis, to take a look at what
is going on around the world and to start to get our side of
the message out.
But as you well understand, this is not just a U.S. effort.
You and I cannot do very well in terms of countering a fatwa by
Osama bin Laden. It has to come from Muslim clerics who have
that capability in other parts of the world. I think that we
are starting to see in many cases a resurgence--not a
resurgence, but the emergence of an understanding of that and
effects beginning, but this is going to be the generational
part of the war, in my view. This is why this is going to be
like the Cold War in really only two respects: One, it is going
to last a long time; and, two, it has a strong ideological
component.
So I would say we recognize it, working to go in that
direction, but this is a fairly new beast for us.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
Senator Collins [presiding]. First let me say it is
wonderful to be Chairman again.
[Laughter.]
However briefly. Senator Sununu.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SUNUNU
Senator Sununu. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Director Mueller, there was an earlier question about the
terrorist watch list, and I wanted to follow up on that a
little bit to get a little bit more specific information about
the recommendations of the IG and objectives for implementing
their recommendations.
They made 18 suggestions. You indicated that you are
already underway in implementing some of those suggestions.
Could you speak to the two or three that you think are the most
significant and describe the way that you think they will
improve the integrity and usefulness of the watch lists?
Mr. Mueller. Well, the two that I have mentioned before, I
think, areas where we need to spend more effort, and that is in
the area of quality assurance of the information. We have
information coming through from a number of agencies that
results in an individual's name being put on the watch list.
What we have accomplished over the last several years, I guess,
is put into place a quality assurance program that scrubs that
information. It was pointed out by the Inspector General, and
that was not working as well as it should. What we are looking
at is adding personnel, improving training, and assuring that
scrub is more effective and efficient than it has been in the
past.
The second area is in redress, giving those who are stopped
and believe that is as a result of their name being improperly
placed on this watch list, is to give those individuals an
Office of Redress where you can go and determine--and ask the
questions about whether or not your name is on it and get some
redress. We established that office----
Senator Sununu. How often does that happen?
Mr. Mueller. I would have to get back to you, but I believe
it is several hundred, the last figures I saw.
Senator Sununu. Over a one-year period, several hundred
times?
Mr. Mueller. I believe it was over a one-year period. And
what the IG focused on, it is good that you set up an Office of
Redress. What is happening is it takes too long to get that
accomplished. And that is an area that, again, with resources,
personnel, and training we hope to do better at.
Senator Sununu. Is there any particular area of law
enforcement or particular source of information where names are
being provided to the watch list that really should not be? In
other words, any specific areas where the quality of the
information provided has been especially poor?
Mr. Mueller. No. I cannot pick any particular entity that
contributes to the watch list and say this is more problematic.
The problem comes in identifiers, and the problem comes if the
name can be identifiers, dates of birth can be identifiers, and
you can have with one individual a number of names; you can
have a number of dates of birth associated with that particular
name. And sorting out the information that may come in from
overseas or may come in domestically and identifying it with a
particular person with particular identifiers is a substantial
challenge.
I will tell you, I believe the latest figure I saw,
approximately 90 percent of the names on the watch list are
individuals outside the United States.
Senator Sununu. You mentioned increased staffing a couple
of times. How many more people do you expect to add to this
task? And what is your timeline for implementation of the
majority of the 18 recommendations?
Mr. Mueller. I would have to get back to you on that, sir.
Senator Sununu. OK. Please do.
Secretary Chertoff, Senator Collins and others on this
Committee have been very concerned about the process of
implementing the REAL ID program. As you well know, my personal
preference would be to have pursued aggressively the negotiated
rulemaking, the collaborative rulemaking that was underway back
in 2004 and 2005 prior to the passage of the REAL ID mandate.
At the moment, however, the proposal is to publish the
final rule in October, and October is also the deadline for
States to file for an extension for implementation. That would
not seem to give the States a fair amount of time to really
assess the scope, the costs, and the changes that are necessary
for compliance in implementation. How are you going to address
that administrative train wreck?
Secretary Chertoff. Well, first of all, we did put a
preliminary rule out, and we did indicate that we would be
quite reasonable in terms of granting extensions. The current
plan would be in theory to have next spring be the point at
which the process of people signing up for REAL ID licenses
would begin. But we have indicated that we anticipate extending
that to the end of 2009 upon a request and indication that
States want to move forward and do that. And I think, frankly,
a lot of States have now begun the process and have been
seriously engaged with us in talking about what their plans
are, including many of the major States--States like
California, Arizona, and I think Virginia.
So I envision that this is not going to be a problem. I do
think if a State does not want to participate, obviously, and
they give us notice about that, that is not so much an
implementation issue as it is a resolve issue.
Senator Sununu. As I understand, one of the requirements of
the preliminary rule is that the data fields that are collected
through the ID process would have to be made available in a
database to all other States. That naturally raises privacy
concerns, and I would like you to describe the way in which at
the Federal level you intend to protect the private
information, which I think everyone would understand needs to
be protected in a very aggressive way.
Secretary Chertoff. Well, first, let me make clear that we
have tried to design this so as to maximize privacy. We
specifically avoided creating a new Federal database that would
accumulate information that is otherwise not there. And we have
also worked very closely with the Association of Motor Vehicle
Administrators. There is a model for doing this kind of sharing
with respect to commercial driver's licenses where there is
cross-checking among States. So we envision using that model.
It is basically a distributed model in which States would be
able to have access to other States' databases for purposes of
checking, but we would not create a new database.
I might add that one of the positive privacy benefits of
the new rules is the requirement of background checks in DMVs.
That is going to elevate the level of privacy. I can tell you
historically as a prosecutor, I remember cases where people
abused their access to existing systems for criminal reasons or
because they saw an attractive woman going down the highway and
they wanted to get her phone number. So we are actually curing
that problem by putting these background check requirements in
place.
Senator Sununu. I appreciate your candor, and I would
underscore that the privacy issues are issues that need to be a
very high priority. I believe that they are with the work that
you are doing, but it is always worth underscoring that we need
to continue to maintain that priority status.
Second is dealing with the cost. This is a Federal mandate.
You mentioned a new database is not being created, but there is
a requirement that the information be shared, and that costs
money and carries with it risks. So we have got to recognize
the costs associated with the program and do everything
possible to minimize those costs. There are some people that
would like to use the fact that it is a mandate as an excuse to
simply increase the size of the role or the responsibility at
the Federal level. I think that the focus should be on
minimizing the costs, and I hope you take that to heart.
And the third is the concern of unintended consequences,
and that is probably my biggest concern with a program like
this: Not that it cannot be implemented in a reasonable way,
but that it will provide a foundation for others to use the
program at a later date in ways in which it just was not
intended. And it is very difficult to sit here today and to
look 2, 3, or 4 years, or 10 or 20 years down the road and try
to come up with ways that the program might be misused or
misapplied or expanded in an inappropriate way. But I think
that is something we all need to be conscious of, most of all
those who are working to structure the program today. Thank
you.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Secretary Chertoff. I think that is reasonable. If I might
just for one moment.
Senator Collins. Yes.
Secretary Chertoff. The actual deadline for requesting
extensions is going to be February 2008, so there will be some
time to assimilate----
Senator Sununu. There will not be an October deadline to
request an extension, but a February deadline?
Secretary Chertoff. Correct.
Senator Sununu. Thank you.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Sununu, for
bringing up that very important issue. That is a major issue in
both Maine and New Hampshire, as the Secretary is well aware. I
think the Department went a long ways by setting up the new
process, but I also hope that the Department is following
through on a more collaborative approach, bringing in State
officials, privacy experts, and technological experts to make
sure this is being done in a way that will minimize privacy
concerns as well as the rather extraordinary costs.
Is that process underway as well, sort of a negotiated
rulemaking after the fact before you get to a final rule?
Secretary Chertoff. Well, we have done a lot of
consultation in the run-up to the final rule that is going to
be issued in the fall, and that includes with State officials,
the Motor Vehicle Association, and privacy people.
I might add as well, this kind of complements the Western
Hemisphere Travel Initiative, and in particular, our efforts to
get States to come up with enhanced driver's licenses that
would satisfy that. I have myself in the last few months dealt
with the governors of Arizona, California, New York, Michigan,
Minnesota, and Vermont on all these issues, and States are
increasingly signing up for enhanced driver's licenses, which
will actually operate along a system that is very similar and
scalable to REAL ID.
So what I think we are now beginning to see is not only do
we have increased engagement with the States, but we have
increased enthusiasm on behalf of most States for biting the
bullet to get involved with this process.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Director McConnell, I want to bring up the issue of
information sharing further with you. I think you have made
real progress, but this was a major recommendation of the 9/11
Commission. And when the Commission did its report card, it
gave the government's efforts only a D as far as improving
information sharing. Now, that obviously was before your time.
Recently, several technology companies have told my staff
that there are technological solutions to the barriers that
prevent intelligence agencies from more easily sharing
information, and there have been recent reports that the NSA,
for example, is linking databases to encourage information
sharing.
But, unfortunately, we have also heard from the Program
Manager for the Information Sharing Environment that the
barrier is not really technological, that it is cultural; and
that although a lot of progress has been made, that there still
is a hesitation to share information particularly with State
and local law enforcement.
Do you still believe that there are significant cultural
barriers to be overcome before we have the kind of seamless
system that will encourage the sharing of information that
could be absolutely vital to thwarting and uncovering a
terrorist attack?
Admiral McConnell. Yes, ma'am, there are still significant
cultural issues, and where we find ourselves is attempting to
create a situation that would adapt to the current needs. By
that we have a responsibility to protect sources and methods.
We have a responsibility to protect those who have agreed to
cooperate with us in spying on someone else, whose lives would
be at risk if the information were compromised.
So the way I try to describe it when we are having this
dialogue and debate in the community is we are committed to
information sharing, but we also have a responsibility to
protect sources and methods. So we want to try to create a
situation where there is tension in the system. We cannot be
prescriptive to get the perfect answer for every situation, but
if we can create a culture where the analytical community is
not thinking about--I have information, you have to demonstrate
a need to know it, but my attitude as an analyst is I have a
responsibility to provide--that puts tension in the system to
share.
Now, for those who recruit spies or operate very sensitive
systems or capabilities that, if compromised, we would have a
loss of life or lose a capability, there are people who want to
not be as willing to share. So it is managing that cultural
dynamic that is the big challenge. We recognize it, we are
addressing it, and we are being very aggressive in attempting
to transform this culture to get us to the right place.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman [presiding]. Thanks very much, Senator
Collins. Do you want to finish the time or are you okay?
Senator Collins. I thought that since Senator McCaskill had
not questioned----
Chairman Lieberman. That is good of you. The remaining
Senators who have not asked questions are Senators Akaka,
Carper, Pryor, and McCaskill.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCASKILL
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, thank you all. I listened to all of your testimony
at a different location, even though I was not physically here,
and I do want to congratulate all of you for putting in the
effort and the time that you do every day to try to do the very
best job we can in terms of making this country safe.
Unfortunately, the issue of whether or not we are safer or
not has become colored with the brush of politics, as so often
happens in our government, and that is unfortunate. And as I
said the other day in a hearing, we cannot really say that we
have not been attacked because of what we have done, because
that is not true. Because if we were attacked tomorrow, the
people who say that we were attacked because we failed, that
would not be true either.
The truth is somewhere in between. We are safer, but there
are still gaping holes. There are still major problems, whether
it is communication, whether it is technology, whether it is
the struggle for ideas that we seem to be failing at around the
world, whether it is our image in the moderate Muslim world and
how that is undermining the ultimate struggle we have, which is
the radicalism that we find in some parts of the Muslim world.
I would like to focus for a minute on transportation
security, and the reason I would like to focus there is that I
used to say a long time ago when I was in the courtroom all the
time that the courtroom that really mattered in terms of how we
treated people was municipal court because that is where all
the people came. Most people's contact with our judicial system
has to do with going to court on a speeding ticket or something
like that. They never have contact with what I call the
``rarified atmosphere'' of those rooms with all the lawyers
around a deposition table or the litigation arguments that go
on in big Federal courthouses around the country.
As people consider whether or not we are safer, really the
face of our security many times is what they encounter when
they travel. And that is where they are made to feel whether
they are safer or not. And, Secretary Chertoff, I have been
confused and I think the American people have been confused
about what I would consider an inconsistent and a stutter
start-stop in many different areas of airport screening and
transportation security. And this seems to be a trivial
example, but it is a great example of what I am talking about.
We all were taking liquids until one day no one could take
liquids anymore. Didn't we know liquids were dangerous before
that date? And if we didn't, why didn't we? And why did it
appear that it was a knee-jerk reaction instead of something
that was an overarching, consistent policy that had been well
thought out?
Buried in that policy, after we decided liquids were
dangerous, seems to be some kind of nonsensical thing that
happened. And now, I was on a flight just yesterday where
mothers were comparing notes:
``Well, I got my apple juice through. Did you get your
apple juice through?''
``I got my formula through that was already mixed. Did you
have to mix yours?''
And then the one that bugs women across America,
particularly those of us who travel a lot, the mascara. I know
it seems small, but for most people in America, they do not
understand why mascara is a problem. It does not appear to be
consistent or have any kind of rhyme or reason to it, and the
reason I think that is important is because it is the face. It
is the face that the traveling public sees. In fact, it is the
face most Americans see.
So I would appreciate a little bit of input on that, and
then I would like to ask some specific questions about advanced
baggage screening and airlines' ability to pre-screen
manifests.
Secretary Chertoff. I think you have basically asked two
questions: Why did we suddenly put in place a ban on liquids,
which we then modified slightly? And then some particular
elements of the ban.
We knew that liquids were a vulnerability prior to the
attack in London, or the attempted attack in London. We also
were working hard to come up with a technology that would
separate out dangerous liquids from non-dangerous liquids, and
we had not found and have not yet found a technology that will
do that in real time, meaning we can do it if you take a bottle
and put it in a device, but if you multiply that by the
millions of people who travel every day, it would be
impossible.
What I think the London plot brought home to us was that
the enemy had not only focused on liquids but had come further
along in coming up with ways to defeat the measures we were
using of a non-technological basis to detect potential
problems, and that was in particular a focus on detonators as
opposed to liquids themselves. And some of the measures we were
taking to inspect liquids, without getting into too much detail
here, were clearly--the enemy had figured out a way to
potentially defeat it.
So having recognized where the enemy was, we determined
that at that point the risk balance had changed. Our initial
response was, of course, to make this happen very quickly. It
had to be done in about 6 hours in a very--in an overnight
session which I participated in. And then ultimately, after
some careful study, again balancing the risk, we determined
that a 3-ounce rule where you put 3-ounce containers in a 1-
quart clear plastic bag was the right mix. It made it
impractical to smuggle in explosives, but would allow people to
bring in things that they like to have on airplanes. We did
coordinate this, by the way, with the Europeans, and I think
this will remain in place until such time as we are confident
enough operationally that we have detection equipment that we
can loosen up.
Now, I can tell you, for example--let me say two things.
The general rule is if it pours or smears, it is a liquid, and
it has to go in that plastic bag. That is the simplest way I
can put it. Sure, you can always come up with an example of
something that is at the margin, but we have to come up with a
rule that can be applied consistently across the board.
Do people sometimes succeed in smuggling things past the
screeners? Sure they do. People sometimes smuggle drugs into
the country. No system works 100 percent. But even if we are
working 90 percent, that is a huge barrier to the enemy which
is planning to try to smuggle something on an airplane.
So I think we have the balance struck right there. We
obviously would love to get the technology in place, but I am
not going to do it until I am confident it meets operational
requirements.
Senator McCaskill. Can you briefly, since I am just out of
time, talk about why we are now estimating that it is going to
be 2024 before we get advanced baggage screening in place
across this country? And what about the airlines being able to
effectively screen their manifests with the sharing of
information?
Secretary Chertoff. Well, the first thing is that we
obviously do screen all the baggage currently now that goes in
the hold of the airplane. We do it in a variety of different
ways. Some of it is in line; some of it is not in line.
One of the challenges we have that is probably a little bit
beyond the scope of the hearing is recognizing that the
technology is changing and we need to find a method of
financing and acquiring the technology that does not require
billions of dollars in investments in equipment that becomes
obsolete in 3 or 4 years. It is a little bit like having to
keep buying your PC over and over again. It gets irritating
after a while.
On the issue of screening the manifests, under Secure
Flight, assuming Congress funds the request that we have made
in the current budget, by the end of next year we should be
doing all the manifest screening ourselves as you take it in,
which will eliminate one of the real irritants, which is that
when we take people off the watch list, the airline does not
necessarily do it. So assuming we get the money from Congress,
we should get that done by the end of next year.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator McCaskill.
I have been impressed, as others have this morning, by the
reports that the four of you have given us about the progress
we have made in closing some of the operational gaps on our
side and in adjusting to meet an ever-changing enemy, and part
of that is obviously prevention.
There is another side to this prevention of acts of
terrorism carried out by Islamist extremists, and that is what
has come to be called the battle of ideas, the battle for the
hearts and minds of the Muslim world.
I know there are some programs in the State Department that
are directed toward entering that battle globally, but what
about here at home? I do not know that any one of you is
expected to play that role. I must say I have been impressed,
Director Mueller, in our own series of hearings on the threat
of Islamist radicalization here in the United States that the
FBI has done some very significant outreach to the American
Muslim community.
But let me start at this end of the table and work back to
Secretary Chertoff. Are we effectively fighting the battle of--
maybe I should go back one step further. You alluded to this in
your opening statement. Do we have a problem of Islamist
radicalization here at home? And if we do, what are we doing as
the government working with the Muslim community to try to
engage on the level of ideas and ideology? Because this is a
war, but it is ultimately a war against and with an ideology
that is inimical to our own values of freedom, tolerance, and
diversity.
Mr. Mueller. To the question of whether we do have a
problem, I would say we do. It would be irresponsible to say
that we do not. And if you look at some of the groups that we
have investigated over the last couple of years and ultimately
disrupted and prosecuted, you have to say yes, we do have a
problem, particularly with the ubiquity of the Internet now and
the ability for one to access anyone around the world who spews
this radical ideology.
In terms of programs, as I have alluded to and I think you
have held a hearing on--since September 11, 2001, we have had
any number of ways that we undertake outreach to the Muslim
American community, Arab American community, and Sikh American
community. And that has been effective in the sense of working
with these communities to understand the FBI, but also working
with communities to develop ways, generally in local
jurisdictions, to address the radicalization issue.
When I meet with Muslim leaders, the one point that we try
to make is that the worst thing that could happen to the Muslim
community here in the United States is another attack such as
September 11, 2001. And so a great deal of activity that has to
be undertaken to address this has to be done by the Muslim
community itself and a recognition by the Muslim community,
99.9 percent is as patriotic and American as anybody else in
this room or elsewhere, but to identify those individuals who
may be subjected to that type of tutoring and the like, and to
address it themselves or alert us that this may cause a
problem. And that is within our particular bailiwick.
Chairman Lieberman. Let me ask you this, and then I will
move on to anyone else on the panel who wants to answer. Do you
take it to be in any sense the responsibility of the FBI to
engage in this battle of ideas here at home within the Muslim
American community?
Mr. Mueller. Put that way, I would say no, that it would
not be our responsibility for any religion to engage in the war
of ideas. I do think it is our responsibility to explain that
once one goes over the line and it becomes not a war of ideas
but a criminal offense, this is what you can expect, and to
elicit the support of those in whatever religious community to
assist us in assuring that those who cross that line are
appropriately investigated and convicted.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks. Admiral Redd or Admiral
McConnell, do you want to add anything on this subject, which
is the battle of ideas?
Admiral Redd. I would just make the point, which I think we
had another discussion, that if you understand that this is
obviously a long-term issue which is going to be with us for
some time, and the fact that strategic planning, the strategic
operational planning is not very glamorous, nonetheless what we
have done as a government is something which is, I think, very
foundational, and gone through and laid out the war on terror,
and one of the four pillars in that war actually is countering
violent Islamic extremism, the war on ideas. It goes through,
lists a number of tasks, assigns those tasks to different
Cabinet officers----
Chairman Lieberman. Who is doing them domestically?
Admiral Redd. The domestic part is probably the hardest
part, and as you have just noted, we do not have a home office,
per se, as the Brits do.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes.
Admiral Redd. Primarily it is DHS and the FBI in their
various roles. But overseas and obviously the other problem is
how do you split this apart because something that is on the
Internet does not stop at the water line, obviously.
Chairman Lieberman. Correct.
Admiral Redd. So as you know, the State Department in
recent days or recent months has stood up a group to get our
counter-messaging out. But, again, the key to this thing is,
one, it is going to be a very long battle; two, it is not just
an American issue. It has to have the support of governments
and of Muslim clerics around the world.
Chairman Lieberman. Admiral McConnell, Secretary Chertoff,
my time is running out, but I want to give you each a chance
briefly to respond.
Admiral McConnell. Senator, I think it is an excellent
question and a very critical question, and the community I
represent is primarily limited to foreign. If it doesn't have a
foreign nexus, foreign focus----
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Admiral McConnell. Even if there is a domestic situation,
the intelligence community would only be engaged if the
domestic situation was in contact with, influenced by someone
in a foreign dimension. So our community is focused on foreign.
We contribute analytically to understanding. We would make
that information available to policymakers who may be able to
use it. But we are for the most part limited to foreign.
Chairman Lieberman. Secretary Chertoff.
Secretary Chertoff. I do not want to repeat what others
have said. Let me be specific about what we do.
We have what we call an Incident Management Team, which is
chaired by the head of our Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Office. When there is an event in the world at large or
domestically that we think will have an impact on the Islamic
community because there is a terrorist element to it, we in
advance, to the extent we can, of it becoming public, convene a
group of community leaders, give them a heads-up, work with
them to try to make sure that the community is reassured that
this is not going to become a general problem for the community
at large.
In addition, we do quite a bit of aggressive outreach. I do
it personally. I meet with community leaders. We had a group
of, I guess, people in their early 20s that we convened for a
conference that I had an opportunity to deal with, as well as
going around and traveling around the country.
I will say I have kind of a bottom-line thing I say to the
community. It is a battle of ideas, and in the end, when you
are trying to counteract radicalization that is directed at
people within the Muslim community, the people who are best
situated to counteract that is the community itself.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Secretary Chertoff. They do not want to hear the government
argue theology. What they want to hear are community imams and
community leaders arguing theology. And so one of our big
pushes is to get the community to step up and get more involved
in the process of counter-radicalization.
Chairman Lieberman. I could not agree more. When somebody
like bin Laden puts out a tape, or Zawahiri, obviously it is
one thing for somebody from the U.S. Government to respond, but
the really credible response would come from some leadership
within the Muslim community. I thank you for your answer.
Senator Stevens, I know you are in the middle of another
meeting, but I would be happy to call on you now.
OPENING STATEMENT FOR SENATOR STEVENS
Senator Stevens. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
am, and I wanted to come to ask the Director one specific
question, and that deals with the attempts to give some type of
immunity to those providers of telecommunications to respond to
the government's requests for information. What is the status
of that, Mr. Director? And how important is it for us to finish
that and make a decision on that?
Admiral McConnell. Senator, thanks for the question. It is
absolutely essential, and the status currently is we have a
temporary reprieve that is prospective, meaning going forward.
So in the law that was passed and signed by the President on
August 5, there is liability protection for those in the
private sector who assist us going forward. We do not, however,
have liability protection for the carriers or the private
sector that assisted us in the past, and that is the key
element we have to address in the coming months.
Senator Stevens. Have you lost any of the cooperation you
had in the past because of that hiatus?
Admiral McConnell. Not at this moment, but we are on a path
to lose all that cooperation. That was clear as we were
negotiating over the summer.
Senator Stevens. What is the deadline? We are marking up
the defense bill this week, I believe, and other bills that
have looked at this issue before.
Admiral McConnell. Yes, sir. If we could get retroactive
liability protection in the current time frame, it would put us
in a very good position going forward. That is the key issue.
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Stevens.
Now, still on a first round for a couple of our colleagues,
Senator Akaka, you would be next, followed by Senator Carper.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Even at
this time I want to add my welcome to our witnesses here, and I
would like to ask Secretary Chertoff about the DHS proposal to
create a National Applications Office.
Let me preface my remarks by saying that I recognize the
value of using imagery to improve our ability to prepare for
and respond to disasters. It was at my initiative that the
Office of Geospatial Affairs was created in the Department.
Leaving a blueprint of critical facilities is important to our
first responder community. However, at this point in time, I am
concerned about the privacy impact of the new proposal to
expand the Department's surveillance in the United States. I am
also disturbed by the Administration's failure to consult with
relevant committees of Congress, including this one.
After press reports revealed this program several weeks
ago, my Committee staff asked for a briefing on the issue, but
to date, the Department has failed to respond to this request.
This raises further suspicions concerning the Department's
intent. It is not clear what this new office will do.
Do national applications mean national technical means? As
you know, national technical means include a much broader range
of capabilities than just satellite imagery. Is this the case,
Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Chertoff. I am glad, Senator, for the opportunity
to clarify something which has probably become a little bit
more obscure than it needed to be.
First of all, I apologize if there has been a delay in
briefing you. I know well in advance of this rolling out, a
number of committees were briefed. We probably did not brief
all that we should have briefed, but we did brief the
intelligence committees, the appropriating committees, and I
want to make sure we complete that process.
This is really less of a big deal than it has been made to
appear. There has always been something called the Civil
Applications Committee, which is basically a way in which when
customers in the civil domain want to use our satellites to get
imagery, they operated through this committee to task the
satellite to do the work. And as you pointed out, the vast
majority of that was natural disasters, things of that sort.
I think the recommendation by outside consultants with some
experience with the imagery a couple of years ago was that we
were not being systematic and disciplined in the way we
deployed these assets, and so the determination was made to
take the cost of the Civil Applications Committee and have DHS
become the executive agent, basically essentially Executive
Secretariat of what used to be the Civil Applications Committee
but what is now going to be renamed the National Applications
Office. It is chaired jointly by Director McConnell and myself,
and it will involve the participation of all the stakeholders.
And what it is designed to do is create a disciplined way for
prioritizing how these imagery assets are used when they are
requested by a civil agency.
Here is the critical point from a privacy standpoint. None
of this changes any of the authorities or restrictions that are
applied to the use of these means one iota. There is no
suggestion here that this Applications Office is going to make
it--is going to lift any restrictions or create any exceptions
or circumvent any of the existing rules that currently govern
the use of these means in various kinds of contexts.
Lawyers have been involved in designing this from the very
beginning. Lawyers will be involved in the process of dealing
with any request to use these means. And the bottom line is the
authorities and restrictions that are currently in place will
remain in place in every respect moving forward.
Senator Akaka. Secretary Chertoff, the domestic use of
national technical means raises very serious privacy and civil
liberty issues. As you know, privacy and security safeguards
must be built into any program at the beginning. While I
understand that DHS' Chief Privacy Officer has issued a Privacy
Impact Assessment, which is now being revised, I am curious as
to whether the DHS Privacy Advisory Committee has reviewed and
commented on the program. If so, what were its views?
Secretary Chertoff. Well, as I said, the Privacy Officer
and the DNI's Civil Liberties and Privacy Officer were involved
as of last fall in designing this program. Now, obviously the
program is classified so the ability to share the details of it
on the outside is a little bit restricted. But, again, let me
try to make clear that the vast majority of uses one can
envision here involve uses that have been of long standing.
They involved, for example, imagery of things that people are
doing out in the open in places that are visible to the naked
eye or to an airliner flying overhead. And, in fact, although I
think we are better than Google Earth, I do not think it is
terribly different than Google Earth.
So I do not think any of these raise novel privacy issues.
What we have tried to do, though, is build a process and to
make sure that if we should wind up with an unusual
application, we do not step over the line. And the process is
built to have lawyers reviewing this at every stage of the
process, much the same way as any other methodology or
technique we might use for purposes of homeland security or law
enforcement.
Senator Akaka. Thank you for your responses. Mr. Chairman,
thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Akaka. Senator
Carper.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER
Senator Carper. Thanks very much.
Gentlemen, thank you for joining us today and for your
stewardship, for your service for our country, some for many
years.
Mr. Mueller, you talked a little bit about the no-fly list,
and I think you said--and I think it is a quote almost--that we
scrubbed the no-fly list and cut it in half. And to that I can
only say good for you. We have any number of people in my State
who have the misfortune of being given the wrong name by their
parents, and they have ended up on the no-fly list and have
gone through all kinds of trouble and turmoil, which I
mentioned to at least one of you before. And every now and then
I hear from them now, and they send not bouquets but thank-you
notes, and it is a lot better than what we had before.
I realize how important it is to have no-fly lists and to
make sure that they are accurate, but I also appreciate the
fact that the work has been done to scrub it and clean it up.
The second thing I want to say--I think it was Admiral
Redd, I believe it was during your comments, your testimony,
not in response to a question. One of the things you said is
our intelligence is better. Almost a verbatim quote: ``Our
intelligence is better.'' And I want you to go back and talk to
us about how is it better as it relates to the ability to get
better human intelligence. What are we doing better in that
regard, both inside this country and out?
Admiral Redd. Well, I think it is hard to talk very far
into that, obviously, for all the reasons you understand. I
think if you saw the Washington Post yesterday, you saw that
there were an awful lot of folks who had been taken out of
circulation, or taken off the battlefield. I think that is one
of a number of instances which there was basically
demonstration of the fact that our intelligence has gotten
better. It is not only human intelligence, it is also signals
intelligence and other stuff. But it is very difficult to go
into many details. And as I mentioned in another comment, we
have to be very careful about that because some of those
sources are very fragile.
So I guess I would have to say look at the results. The
terrorists are--I also said they are a very difficult target.
You are talking about individuals. All the things we have been
talking about here, how do you stop a single individual from
coming across, and you do it by going after every element of
the terrorist life cycle, starting with recruitment but through
travel, communications, training, all the things that go on.
In open session--it is very hard to go much deeper than
that, sir.
Senator Carper. I understand. As an old air intelligence
officer in the Navy, I can appreciate what you are saying. Let
me follow it up, though, with a related question. I think since
September 11, 2001, we have heard on any number of occasions
that a shortage of folks with key language skills has been a
problem. I just want to ask what, if any, progress has been
made in recruiting and retraining key intelligence and other
personnel with some knowledge of Arabic or other languages that
are useful in counterterrorism.
Admiral Redd. I want to defer that one, if I could, to
Director McConnell, since that is more along his line in terms
of the training of the community. I will just say in general
that not only in language but in analytic capability, writ
large, obviously we have been growing a lot of folks. And as
you will recall from your earlier days, if you want a petty
officer with 10 years' experience, it takes 10 years. We have
been trying to stuff 10 years into 4 or 5 years. But in the
analytic community, we have had to bring an awful lot of folks
on line.
I will let Admiral McConnell talk about the language----
Senator Carper. Admiral McConnell, are you willing to
answer that question?
Admiral McConnell. Yes, sir, I am.
Senator Carper. Before you do, let me just add, maybe give
you a second half to the question. Do you know of anything that
we are doing to encourage more students to take up some of
these languages early on?
Admiral McConnell. Let me combine your questions, sir.
Senator Carper. That would be great.
Admiral McConnell. You asked specifically about Human
Intelligence (HUMINT). We are on a path to double our HUMINT
capability, so from September 11, 2001 until now, doubling the
number of case officers and capability in the field.
The second thing I would comment is focus----
Senator Carper. Over what period of time? Any idea?
Admiral McConnell. Since September 11, 2001, until in the
current time frame, it will double. And as Admiral Redd
mentioned, just adding a body is one thing, but adding a
trained body who speaks a language is another thing. So with
the language capability, significantly improved, not enough
yet. One of the things that we have decided to do or that we
are attempting to do is to recruit more first-generation
Americans. They have never been specifically ruled out by
either law or policy, but by practice and custom. So we are
trying to change the cultural approach inside the community. So
if we have a first-generation American who speaks a language,
understands the culture of the area of concern, that we would,
in fact, bring them into the community and make them a part of
it. So there are a number of initiatives to----
Senator Carper. Any luck on that?
Admiral McConnell. Yes. We have had significant luck, and
we have had a lot of focus on training in languages, like Urdu,
Farsi, and Arabic and so on. So much better than we were. We
still have some distance to go, but that is our objective, to
keep us focused on this particular problem because it is the
most significant threat we face.
Senator Carper. Good. Thanks. Thanks for that report.
At a hearing last week, Comptroller General David Walker--I
call him ``General Walker''--of GAO reported that maritime
security is one of the areas where the Department of Homeland
Security has had some of its best successes in recent years,
and this is probably more for you, Secretary Chertoff.
Witnesses from the GAO and the Department both testified that
some of the reasons for the success are the fact that Congress
did get involved and that the Department was able to work with
us to devote some significant time and resources to the effort.
I would ask are there other areas where we can see some similar
progress or the potential for progress where that kind of
attention on our part, as well as yours, can leave the kind of
success that we have enjoyed with maritime security, or maybe
chemical security, for example.
Secretary Chertoff. Well, there is, of course, as you know,
Senator, one gap in the chemical security legislation that we
had. Now, we are currently on the verge of issuing Appendix A,
which is going to be very specific to people in the chemical
sector about what is required from them in terms of self-
evaluation, what are considered to be the high-risk chemicals
and the quantities at which they have to begin to submit
themselves to regulation.
Wastewater treatment plants and water treatment plants were
exempted from this, so that is an area where we are currently
internally looking at the question of what are our authorities,
if we need to use authorities. I have certainly argued to
people in that sector that they need to be mindful of the fact
that chlorine is a very dangerous chemical and it can be used
in a variety of nefarious ways. And, therefore, securing
chlorine against theft is something that they have to make
their business.
Another area where we are, again, certainly looking at
regulatory action, if not congressional action, is, as I said
earlier, general aviation, in particular, private jets coming
from Europe and Asia, where we want to make sure we have the
ability to screen for weapons of mass destruction in the way we
are doing with containers. And, finally, small boats is the
area we are doing some work in now.
Again, I believe we have ample authorities through the
Coast Guard, but I also want to make sure Congress works with
us, first to make sure we are adequately funded to do what we
need to do; and, second, to make sure we do not have
backsliding. Sometimes the industry pushes back when we try to
put security measures in place, and it is important to make
sure that if we do put measures in place with respect to small
boats we do not wind up getting pushed backwards.
Senator Carper. Okay.
Admiral McConnell. Could I follow on, if I may?
Senator Carper. Please, yes.
Admiral McConnell. You asked me things you could focus on.
We are about to start a debate this month on a very important
piece. If you think about it at a summary level, a major piece
in the intelligence community, what do we do? We take pictures.
We have human-to-human interaction--HUMINT, you mentioned
earlier. Or we listen to other people's communications. That
other people's communications is called ``signals
intelligence.'' We are going to debate that this month about
whether to change or modify the law that was passed in August.
It is very important that we retain that capability because it
is a significant portion of what we are able to do with regard
to foreign threats to the country.
Senator Carper. I would just say in closing that we had a
tough vote on the night of August 3, and some of us on our side
voted with the majority on the other side. And I have
personally taken--I would suggest to some of you I have taken a
fair amount of flack from folks who are concerned about civil
liberties, potential abuses to civil liberties. And I am
encouraged to hear that the vote that we took was one that may
have led to a better outcome in Germany than would otherwise
have been the case.
I would just urge us, I would urge my leadership and I
would certainly urge you in the Administration to work with us
to find--let's not wait until January or the end of the year.
Work with us now in the weeks ahead to find the right common
ground so that we could go after the bad guys, do the right job
there, protect civil liberties. There is a way to do both.
Admiral McConnell. There is a way to do both.
Senator Carper. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Carper. For my part,
may I say that any flack you receive on that issue is wholly
undeserved. I really believe it. I think this is intercepting
communications between those who are not in the United States,
and if it hits an American, Admiral McConnell and his folks go
to court. I just think it self-evidently covers--that is what
we need to do to protect the American people and also protect
their liberties.
You have been very encouraging this morning, the four of
you. I want to give you a small piece of encouragement. We
promised that we would not keep you beyond 12:30, and we will
not. So there will be a few other questioners, but we want you
to be able to get back to your assigned responsibilities.
Senator Collins and I have already had our time on the
second round, so in order of original appearance, we go now to
Senator Coleman and Senator Voinovich.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me talk about
the capacity to bring nuclear material into this country.
Secretary Chertoff, you talked about the ability to screen
perhaps 100 percent of the cargo coming into this country and
the efforts you are doing on cargo before it comes into this
country, which is really ultimately where we need to be. I
mean, God forbid a device went off in the port of Long Beach or
New York, something like that. My question, though, has to do
with the ability to detect shielded special nuclear material in
lead pipes. I asked the question before about the resources
that you need to do what has to be done. There are some
difficulties even with the systems we have with certain types
of nuclear material. Can you talk a little bit about where we
are at in being able to truly screen that kind of material? Are
there research issues, financing? I just want to know what we
are doing to make sure that you have the tools that you need to
prevent nuclear material from getting into this country.
Secretary Chertoff. The current operational technology, you
are right--and I want to be careful how I say this--is much
more challenged when it deals with heavily shielded material.
It depends on what the nuclear material is. The greater the
emitter, the harder it is to shield. But with respect to
certain kinds of materials that can be used in a nuclear bomb,
it is possible to shield it.
Currently, therefore, the way we deal with shielding is we
really want to have a combined system where we both passively
test for emissions, but we also actively test to see if there
is dense material in the container which could be suggestive of
shielding. And the constraint we face, which we are tapping
overseas by building an integrated system, is how do you make
sure you can pass containers through passive and active at the
same time.
While we are building out a system to use both of those
techniques, which is partly an issue of money, but it is also
partly an issue of having foreign ports agree to do this and
having them have a geographical footprint that allows us to do
this, we are working on technology, which I cannot say is
imminent, that would allow us to detect even rather heavily
shielded material. But that is a bit of a ways off.
I would also say I would not underestimate the importance
of intelligence in helping us focus and target on those
containers where there might be a higher risk, where we might
actually want to open the container or at least pull it out and
do a much more active interrogation.
Senator Coleman. I would hope when we talk about
intelligence that it is one thing to rely upon detectors, which
may or may not do what they need to do; it is another thing to
be able to lock down nuclear material wherever it is to make
sure that it is not in the hands of the bad guys. If I may say,
one of our challenges with Iran, trying to figure out where
they are at. It is one thing if they are depending upon their
own abilities to generate material that can be used for atomic
weapons. It is another thing if there is material out there on
the market that they can have access to.
Admiral McConnell, in terms of that issue, of using
intelligence to ensure that there is not nuclear material being
bought or sold on the black market, where are we at with that?
Admiral McConnell. I am very focused on that because we
have information that al-Qaeda, as an example, has stated an
intention to try to acquire nuclear material. So it is an area
of intense focus. I wish I could be more optimistic to tell you
that we have great confidence that we could always detect it.
There are always potential work-arounds, but an area of focus,
we have some sensors that would aid us in that capability, but
it takes the entire panoply of intel resources to be able to do
this. You have to penetrate targets. You have to have human
agents. You have to be able to find places on a map, take the
pictures, and also do the signals intelligence part. But it is
an area of focus.
Senator Coleman. Let me just shift gears. It has been
interesting with this panel here. The latest Osama bin Laden
tape, first, is that his beard? It is a different-looking guy.
Can you give me an assessment of what that tape is all about?
Is there a purpose to it? Do we expect--is it a signal? I am
not sure what we can talk about here, but I would like to get a
better understanding of what we know after viewing that tape.
Admiral McConnell. So far we do not think there has been a
signal. He has done this periodically, as has Zawahiri, and
there has not been a correlation necessarily between one of
these tapes or a public statement and a particular event.
The big question in the community this morning is: Is that
beard real? Because, as you know, just a few years ago, the
last time he appeared, it was very different. So we do not know
if it is dyed and trimmed or real, but that is one of the
things we are looking at. But no specific message. It does
reflect intent, and the big change for me as an intelligence
analyst in the community, back in the Cold War it was very easy
to do capability and always difficult to determine intent. In
this situation, it is very difficult to capture the capability,
a single human being in a given place, nuclear material, or
whatever. So capability is the challenge, but intent is clear.
Senator Coleman. Again, my time is very short. Just
following up on that, much of the discussion was American
politics. Do we have a sense of someone who we assume is in a
cave somewhere, do we have any sense of his ability to be
tracking what happens in daily American politics?
Admiral McConnell. Sir, the Internet has revolutionized
that process, so we have good evidence that the al-Qaeda
leadership reads the press, particularly the editorials, and--
--
Senator Coleman. And some of the things that are said in
Congress.
Admiral McConnell. And the Congress, no doubt. Every part
of the debate, it is all watched very closely. And remember,
there is an American in that group in Pakistan who is an
adviser, I am sure. But there is a very close focus on this
Nation because we are so open in what we do and what we say and
where it might take someone.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Coleman. Senator
Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. Director McConnell, Senator Akaka and I
have held hearings on the security clearance process as part of
our responsibility for the Oversight of Government Management
Subcommittee. The security clearance system has been on GAO's
high-risk list for quite some time. In the last hearing we had,
Clay Johnson indicated that you were going to undertake a new
system that would get the job done as part of your 100-day
plan. Currently, I understand there is a wait time of 203 days
for individuals awaiting clearances.
What is the status of the new system? Have you discussed it
at all with Comptroller General Walker, who will be determining
whether or not our security clearance system should be removed
from the high-risk list? What is your strategic plan? Are there
metrics that will be used to judge whether or not the new
system in place is effective?
Admiral McConnell. Sir, first of all, it would be fair to
say that there is a debate. Some would argue that we need to go
faster and do better with the current system. General Jim
Clapper and I, in DOD, representing all the intelligence
capability in the Department of Defense, and me on the DNI
side, we have agreed to run a pilot, and our fundamental
premise is we want to re-engineer the process. You mentioned
203 days. General Clapper and I believe we should be able to do
that process in 30 days or less.
Why do we believe that? We can look at the commercial
models where they clear people very quickly, people that handle
billions of dollars of transactions. What is the difference? If
you can automate the process and clear people quickly, and then
change the way we do business, that we monitor the life cycle
of the employee, we can get to faster in the front and better
protection in the back.
I would submit, of the spies we know about, all but one or
two of them did it for money. And of the spies that we know
about, almost every one of them did not know they were a spy
when they came in on the front. So the key is life-cycle
monitoring. So we are trying to run the pilot to make it go
much faster and hopefully be much more effective. We will know
more about the end of this pilot in some months.
Senator Voinovich. Will we know about it before this
Administration leaves office?
Admiral McConnell. Yes, sir. If we are going to have any
impact at all on the system, we have to do it before this
Administration----
Senator Voinovich. How soon?
Admiral McConnell. It is months, sir. It took us a period
of time to agree to it. This was one of the issues, when I came
back in the government, that was very important to me as having
been on the outside struggling with it. So I made it a
priority. We got the agreement from the Defense Department. We
worked with Clay Johnson. We are running the pilot, and in some
matter of months, we will be able to tell you if it is working
or not.
Senator Voinovich. I would suggest also that your people
spend some time with the Government Accountability Office
because during this Subcommittee's hearing last week, Mr.
Schneider from DHS and Comptroller General David Walker spent
about 20 percent of their time quibbling over the definition of
what the metrics were to determine whether or not DHS had done
what it was supposed to do.
Is there anyone that is really working on this whole issue
of winning the hearts and minds of Muslims here in the United
States and around the world? This is not a new issue. And,
quite frankly, I am not confident that anybody has really sat
down to figure out a major effort in this area to win the
hearts and minds of people not only here in the United States
but around the world. Could you comment on that?
Secretary Chertoff. Yes, let me venture into this. Although
I do not think there is a single person, we do have a
committee, and I think it is actually chaired by the head of
our Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Office, that looks at that
issue in the United States. I think the Bureau and the
Department of Justice are represented on it. We do not deal
with the overseas element. We deal with the domestic element of
it. And a lot of it is outreach, and it is from the top level
down to the regional and local offices to get people from the
government out into the community trying to recruit individuals
to come into government service. I do not mean as informants. I
mean to occupy positions in government service so that the
community feels they are part of the process of homeland
security and law enforcement. Part of it is giving notice to
community members when something is happening in the world so
they can reassure the community. And some of it is just a lot
of outreach to get the community engaged in the process of
counter-radicalization.
This is all supported by research that we do. We do a lot
of research through our Intelligence and Analysis Directorate
looking at studies. Some of them are academic studies; some of
them are studies we get from overseas as to what causes
radicalization. I think the FBI does a lot of that as well, and
they tend to be maybe a little more focused on individual
cases. We tend to be maybe a little bit more general.
So we do have a very focused strategy on this issue. I
should say--and I have to be a little careful here because the
First Amendment does limit us to some extent in getting into
the area of what I would call too upfront efforts to persuade
or convince. I think we generally feel, at least in our
Department, that we are best served by getting the community
itself to get out there and----
Senator Voinovich. What would give me comfort is to see how
these efforts are linked. I recently met with Imam Abdul Rauf,
who has organized a forum of Muslim religious scholars to work
on connecting democracy and the U.S. Constitution to the
foundations of Islam to show that they are compatible.
I think that much greater effort has got to be made in this
area. We are on the defense, and we are trying to secure the
country. But I think that unless we recognize the challenge
that we have got on this other side, our success will be
limited. We need to have an offense here, and I am not sure we
have one.
Admiral Redd. Senator, if I could comment on that. As I
mentioned earlier, we have built this thing called the National
Implementation Plan, which is the overall blueprint. One of the
four pillars of that is exactly that--countering violent
Islamic extremism. And it goes through and lays out a number of
tasks, assigns those tasks to different Cabinet officers. You
have heard about the domestic part of it, and you are correct,
the State Department has a lead for the overseas piece of it.
And we are starting up--Karen Hughes has an operation, as you
know, the Counterterrorism Communications Center, which is
designed to be on a very tactical basis to respond to things
that happen around the world.
But clearly this is tough. This is new for us. Some people
try to compare it to the public diplomacy thing we did during
the Cold War. But even that is significantly different because
we were basically talking to Western or similar cultures in
those days.
But it is not just an American issue, obviously. As you
mentioned, it is going to take people who have credibility in
the area, whether it is here in the United States or overseas.
I would say that a lot of foreign governments have obviously
woken up to this and are becoming more involved. But it is
going to be a long--it is going to be a generation----
Senator Voinovich. I have taken enough time, but all I can
tell you is from my perspective how well we do in that regard
will have a major impact on how long this war against Islamic
extremist religious fanatics goes on. I really bring to all of
your attention that something should be done to pull everybody
together and figure out a master plan on how this thing is
going to work.
Admiral Redd. I could not agree with you more, sir.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Voinovich.
Senator Akaka, we will have a last round, and then Senator
Collins did not use all her time, so I am going to have her ask
one last question.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral McConnell, more than a year ago, we learned that
the CIA had closed the bin Laden issue station, a unit that had
focused exclusively on finding Osama bin Laden and his top
lieutenants. At that time the CIA said that it did so partly
because al-Qaeda had changed form, evolving from a hierarchical
organization with bin Laden at the helm to one characterized by
a collection of splinter cells. However, both were testimony
that the July 2007 NIE stated that bin Laden and his deputy
have been able to regenerate al-Qaeda and key elements of its
homeland attack capability.
Given this assessment, do you believe that a unit dedicated
to finding, capturing, or killing Osama bin Laden and his top
officials should be re-established?
Admiral McConnell. Sir, it is established. I would say it
is probably a matter of semantics, but we have such a unit.
Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri are our No. 1 and No. 2 priority,
very strong and significant focus. And so we are pursuing it
with significant resources.
Senator Akaka. Admiral, if bin Laden has reconstituted the
al-Qaeda organization so that it looks similar to its original
pre-September 11, 2001 form, then do you believe that finding
him should be the top priority?
Admiral McConnell. Top priority; yes, sir. And I would add
another dimension. You mentioned splinter groups a moment ago.
I would describe it a little differently. There are extremists
in virtually any country. What al-Qaeda has been successful in
doing is linking them. So now if you start across Northern
Africa, in Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Lebanon, all the way
across, there are groups now that affiliate with and some even
change their names to be al-Qaeda. So it almost takes on the
connotation of a franchise.
So I think the reasoning maybe a year ago was splintering,
but the fact that they have sanctuary in that tribal area
between Afghanistan and Pakistan has allowed them to adapt and
morph. With the sanctuary and committed leadership, they have
rebuilt the middle tier. What they do not have is the vast
numbers of recruits to carry out the acts they would like to
perpetrate. So that is where we have our focus, is to try to
cut off the head of the snake.
Senator Akaka. Admiral Redd, in early 2004, then-CIA
Director George Tenet said that al-Qaeda's leadership was
seriously damaged and had continued to lose operational safe
havens. Today we have a different picture of al-Qaeda, one in
which the organization has become resurgent and is rebuilding.
What in your opinion has changed? And why hasn't the United
States been more successful in heading off such a resurgence?
Admiral Redd. I think if you look back, Senator, at the
history from September 11, 2001, it has been a series--as all
warfare, if you do not mind me using the analogy--of puts and
takes, or pressure and response. And I would say the single
most critical factor over the last year, year and a half, has
been the resurgence of that safe haven in the tribal areas of
Pakistan.
Senator Akaka. Do you believe that, as currently
configured, the Executive Branch agencies are well placed to
help reverse that tide?
Admiral Redd. I think, sir, the whole thrust of our
testimony has been that the agencies are working together in
ways that we have never worked together before, whether it is
across attacking terrorists or protecting and defending the
homeland. But the short answer is you never stop on that, and
you keep moving, you keep trying, and you keep pushing. And
that is clearly one of our highest priorities.
Senator Akaka. Admiral McConnell and Admiral Redd, the July
report issued by the National Counterterrorism Center stated
that the key to al-Qaeda's resurgence has been the use of
ungoverned spaces in Pakistan and, in particular, areas along
the Pakistan-Afghan border. Yet I understand that Pakistan
restricts the deployment of American troops in these areas in
hot pursuit of those terrorists' networks.
As long as these safe havens exist, what is there to
prevent the continued resurgence of al-Qaeda? Admiral
McConnell.
Admiral McConnell. If the safe havens continue to exist, we
will continue to have this problem. About a year ago, the
leadership in Pakistan made a decision as a way to address the
problem is to form an alliance or a peace treaty, if you will,
with the tribal leaders in this area. Remember, this area has
never been conquered by anyone, not even Pakistan--never been
controlled by Pakistan. It is a separate enclave in their
constitution, so it is an independent region in that border
area.
So the leadership in Pakistan decided they would make an
accommodation with the leadership to force the foreigners--to
be expelled. That did not work. We counseled against it. It did
not work.
Now, what has changed since that time? President Musharraf
has moved two additional divisions into the area, is applying
additional pressure. We are cooperating with the Pakistanis,
providing information, intelligence. We are working it from the
Afghan side of the border, working with Special Operations
Forces and so on. So intense focus, but as of this point in
time, we have not been able to eliminate it. But it is our No.
1 priority.
Senator Akaka. Would you comment, Admiral Redd.
Admiral Redd. I would just agree with Director McConnell. I
mean, we clearly understand the high priority of this. The
cooperation out there is significant. I think it is fair to
note, too, that the Pakistanis themselves are also victims of
al-Qaeda's violence. It is not just the United States. But it
is a longstanding issue, and it is one which has a lot of
policy dimensions to it. It is being worked very hard.
Senator Akaka. Thank you for your responses. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Akaka.
We have reached 12:30, but Senator Collins did not use her
whole time, and Senator Carper, who is a very effective
advocate, has asked to ask one more question. If any of you
have an urgent need to depart, we will understand. If not, two
more questions.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you. That is, we will understand if
it is after our questions.
This Committee has worked diligently to try to identify
shortcomings and gaps in the legal authority that you have as
we try to fight this war against terrorism. Last year, for
example, Secretary Chertoff, you told us that we needed
authority in the area of chemical security, and we passed
legislation giving you that. More recently, Admiral, you came
to us on the FISA issue.
I would like to ask each of you to identify any legislative
reforms or authority that you need to more effectively do your
job as we battle terrorism. Secretary Chertoff, we will start
with you, and we will just go down the panel.
Secretary Chertoff. I did mention the issue of wastewater
and water treatment, and I think we are contemplating what we
might do to address that issue and whether we ought to make a
suggestion to Congress.
If I might, I would like to request the opportunity to
actually think about that and come back with a little bit more
of a comprehensive answer than I give just off the table.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Admiral Redd.
Admiral McConnell. Like Secretary Chertoff, I need to give
you a more deliberative answer, but I have been back only a few
months, as you are aware, and the title is Director of National
Intelligence. I think ``Director'' may be a little bit of a
misnomer. I am more of a coordinator. So when I want to make a
hard decision, it is a little bit like this body. As opposed to
deciding, you get to engage in dialogue and debate and so on.
It was made reference earlier that it is interpersonal skills.
Well, mine have been tested quite a bit to try to get hard
decisions made.
So at some point, I will formulate some recommendations
about do we need to make some adjustments to how we are
organized. We did not create a Department of Intelligence. We
created a Director of National Intelligence who has a
responsibility of coordinating a community of 15 of 16 agencies
who work for another Cabinet officer. So there is a challenge
or two embedded in that.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Admiral Redd.
Admiral Redd. As you know, I wear the two hats on the
intelligence sides. Obviously, in fact, I am actually part of
the DNI, and the DNI has actually used his authorities to help
us out in some cases. So I think I would certainly identify
with everything Admiral McConnell said.
I think there is a question which is not now but is
probably a year or so down the road, on the other race to
strategic operational planning. As you know, when the 9/11
Commission came out, they had in mind a much more, shall we
say, aggressive or directive view of that. I do not think we
are far enough down the road to know whether that is desirable
or even doable. We are working together. But I think that is
something that in a couple of years the Congress may want to
come back and look at.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Director Mueller.
Mr. Mueller. One of the areas we are concerned about and
have been for some time is, first of all, the lone wolf actor
who is not tied in with any particular group overseas, and we
addressed that in legislation a year or so ago. But as you have
self-radicalization growing and radicalization in the United
States, where it does not have any foreign component, we
operate under Title III, the criminal side of the house. And
over a period of time, as technology has improved--and the
statutes focus on facilities, a particular facility as opposed
to the target. One of the things I would like an opportunity to
get back to you on is the possibility of making modifications
to make it easier with appropriate safeguards to do
interceptions of those individuals who might be self-
radicalized and intent on undertaking terrorist attacks as
opposed to other criminal activities within the United States,
without any foreign nexus.
Senator Collins. Thank you. And let me just conclude by
thanking you all for your extraordinary service. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Collins. Those are
important answers. Senator Carper.
Senator Carper. I would second that closing comment from
Senator Collins.
Secretary Chertoff, I am going to telegraph my picture and
let you think about this while I make a comment or two. It is
rare that you come before us that I do not ask you about rail
security and transit security, and that will be my question, to
ask you for an update. We have talked here today a little bit
about maritime security and chemical security, but I want,
before we leave, for you to give us a bit of an update on how
we are doing with respect to security for people who ride
trains and people who take transit, especially rail transit.
I want to go back to Senator Akaka's questioning of you,
Admiral McConnell, and he focused a good deal on Osama bin
Laden, and you mentioned--I think what you said is, ``Our focus
is to cut off the head of the snake.'' I urge you to maintain
that focus.
Secretary Chertoff, your Department is going through a
rulemaking with respect to potentially establishing reporting
requirements for those who have significant quantities of
propane on their properties. You probably heard a little bit
about this. On the Delmarva Peninsula, we have hundreds of
chickens for every person who lives there. There are 300
chickens for every person who lives in Delaware. We have a lot
of chicken farms, and we have tens of thousands of them around
the country, and your agency has been intent on trying to
establish some kind of reporting requirement for chicken
farmers who have significant quantities of propane.
I think we are in the process of trying to infuse some
common sense into that argument. I would say good and we look
forward to the final outcome.
One of our chicken farmers on the Delmarva Peninsula said,
``The worst thing that could happen if they blow up my propane
in my chicken house is we end up with barbecued chicken.'' So
he did not think it was all that bad. But I would just ask that
we focus more on where the real threat lies. I do not think
that is where it lies.
Your name has been in the news as a potential Attorney
General. I do not have any question that you would be a very
fine Attorney General. I heard last week that you had asked not
to be considered, and I think we need in your Department
continuity. Not worst things that could happen, but one of the
not so positive things that could happen would be to just add
to that turmoil, so I applaud your decision. I hope the
President was listening.
Here is your opportunity to respond to my question: How are
we doing on transit security, rail transit security in
particular?
Secretary Chertoff. First, just on the issue of propane,
let me make clear that there was a preliminary rule that was
put out. It is put out precisely for the reason that we do want
to get comments back, and it is not uncommon and it is pretty
easy to anticipate that we are going to take those comments
into effect.
It is going to be a line-drawing issue. There is going to
be an amount of propane that is large enough and close enough
to a major population area that we will have to regulate it.
But we really do not want to regulate chicken farmers. We are
not worried about barbecued chicken.
With respect to rail security, as you know, Senator, we put
out not only a round of grants earlier this year, but then a
supplemental round. So we have got several hundred million
dollars out there, and we would be very focused on a risk-based
approach in which we look at those elements of the rail system
that are the most vulnerable. If we are talking about passenger
rail, that tends to be a highly populated mass transit,
particularly where you are dealing with track that is
underground or underwater. And, frankly, that is where we are
putting most of our money and most of our effort.
At the same time we are doing a couple of other things. We
are working to increase the number of what we call VIPR Teams.
These are combined teams of TSA personnel, and now we are
adding in some Coast Guard and Custom Border Patrol personnel
that we surge into a train station or we went onto the Seattle
ferries last month, with canines, with handheld devices. They
are not meant to be steady state, but they are meant to be
random surge operations, similar to what the New York Police
Department does where every week or so they put a whole bunch
of police cars out and they surge into an area and in a
counterterror operation. So we are proceeding with that, too.
The third thing is we are looking at different kinds of
systems that would be used to potentially detect explosives
without putting into place in train stations what we have at
airports, which would not work architecturally. That is a
technological challenge. I promised Admiral Cohen I was going
to use this word in a hearing, and I am now going to use it.
Muon technology, which involves the subatomic particles, is
apparently a promising technology but some distance off; that
if, in fact, it is capable of being implemented, would allow us
to detect in a stand-off way explosives in a confined area,
like a train station or something.
So we are proceeding on all of those tracks, and it is a
very high priority for us.
Senator Carper. Mr. Chairman, thank you for giving me that
opportunity. One last quick thing I would say is Senator
Voinovich was talking about how do we defuse some of the hatred
and animosity toward our country, and he, I thought mentioned--
in the back-and-forth some good ideas were discussed. I would
suggest that one of the things that needs to be done is for a
real serious effort to be made in support of what is going on
in the dialogue between the Israelis and the Palestinians on
the West Bank. That by itself is not going to solve this
problem, but to the extent that the Palestinians could end up
with a homeland of their own and the Israelis could end up with
peace and secure borders, that would sure help.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Senator Carper.
Thanks to the four of you. I must say, Senator Collins and
I just said before she had to go that while the first part of
what we asked you to do today, which is to assess the current
threat environment, obviously your assessment is serious, it is
sobering. This is an alarming and persistent threat
environment. But the second part, which is to give us a report
on the status of institutional reform to deal with the threat,
has been, in my opinion, greatly encouraging, understanding
that we all know that we have got a lot more to do.
I would add that the four of you each bring tremendous
experience and talent to this assignment. You are impressive in
your individual capacities, and you give the definite
impression that you are working well together as a team. And I
will note with some particular appreciation in this capital
city that you seem not to let your egos get in the way of
carrying out your assigned responsibilities to protect our
homeland. So we thank you for all that, with the understanding
that we have got a lot more to do. We look forward to doing it
together to protect our country and its people.
The record of the hearing will remain open for 15 more days
for additional questions and statements. I thank you all again.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:43 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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