[Senate Hearing 110-367]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-367
IRAQ BENCHMARKS
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 7 AND 11, 2007
__________
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN WARNER, Virginia,
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York JOHN CORNYN, Texas
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
JIM WEBB, Virginia MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Michael V. Kostiw, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
A Report on the Government Accountability Office's Assessment of 18
Iraq Benchmarks
september 7, 2007
Page
Walker, Hon. David M., Comptroller General of the United States,
Government Accountability Office............................... 10
The Situation in Iraq and Progress Made by the Government of Iraq in
Meeting Benchmarks
september 11, 2007
Petraeus, GEN David H., USA, Commander, Multinational Force-Iraq. 166
Crocker, Ambassador Ryan C., United States Ambassador to Iraq.... 192
(iii)
A REPORT ON THE GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE'S ASSESSMENT OF 18
IRAQ BENCHMARKS
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FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:00 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh, Webb, McCaskill,
Warner, Inhofe, Sessions, Collins, Chambliss, Graham, Dole,
Thune, and Corker.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and
John H. Quirk V, security clerk.
Majority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr.,
professional staff member; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff
member; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Michael J. McCord,
professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel;
Michael J. Noblet, research assistant; and William K. Sutey,
professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; Derek J. Maurer, minority counsel; David M.
Morriss, minority counsel; and Lynn F. Rusten, professional
staff member.
Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Kevin A.
Cronin, and Benjamin L. Rubin.
Committee members' assistants present: Vance Serchuk and
Colleen J. Shogan, assistants to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth
King, assistant to Senator Reed; Bonnie Berge and Richard
Kessler, assistants to Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple and
Monica Thurmond, assistants to Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew R.
Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey,
assistant to Senator Bayh; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to
Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb;
Stephen C. Hedger, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Sandra Luff,
assistant to Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to
Senator Inhofe; Todd Stiefler, assistant to Senator Sessions;
Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor
IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Greg Gross and Lindsey
Neas, assistants to Senator Dole; David Hanke, assistant to
Senator Cornyn; and Stuart C. Mallory, assistant to Senator
Thune.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
welcomes this morning David Walker, the Comptroller General of
the United States, to testify on the Government Accountability
Office's (GAO) assessment of 18 Iraqi benchmarks for political
security and economic progress. Again, we thank Senator Warner
for his leadership and I think Senator Byrd was also involved
in getting this language in the bill, which resulted in this
assessment.
Senator Warner. Chairman, I'd like to also credit Senator
Snowe.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Warner. She was very active, I believe, with
Senator Bayh, in getting this provision in.
Chairman Levin. We appreciate the reference to them and we
would surely add them.
We've all been interested in the benchmarks, and those
Senators have taken a leadership role, although they're
obviously not alone in this interest. The question of
benchmarks has been a question which just about every Senator
has become involved in. I will have more to say about what
benchmarks we're talking about in a moment.
The Comptroller General's assessment is one of two
independent reports that Congress required in approving
emergency funding for operations in Iraq. The committee
received the other congressionally-mandated report yesterday,
hearing from retired General Jim Jones, and other members of
the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq. One
of that Commission's findings was that, ``Political
reconciliation is the key to ending sectarian violence in
Iraq.'' Then they said, ``The single-most important event that
could immediately and favorably affect Iraq's direction and
security, is political reconciliation focused on ending
sectarian violence and hatred.'' They ended that paragraph by
saying, ``Sustained progress within the Iraqi security forces
depends on such a political agreement.''
The Jones Commission report provided a independent
assessment of the Iraqi Army and police capability. The GAO's
report, which is the subject of today's hearing, provides an
independent assessment of whether the Iraqi Government has met
the 18 benchmarks which it, the Iraqi Government, specifically
committed to. Fifteen of which, according to the GAO report,
were part of the international compact with Iraq and three of
which were commitments made directly to President Bush.
These assessments of the situation in Iraq, along with the
testimony that we will receive next week from General Petraeus
and Ambassador Crocker, and the President's report which is due
on September 15, are critical to Congress's understanding.
So, the 18 benchmarks, reviewed by the GAO, were not
created by Congress. Those commitments were made by the Iraqi
Government as far back as June 2006. In fact, as confirmed by
Secretary Rice in correspondence with me, 7 of the 18
benchmarks--those comprising the political, security, and
economic benchmarks that are the most important for political
reconciliation, had timelines for their completion, between
September of 2006 and March of 2007.
Now, there's two important facts that I want to single out
from that statement. Number one, sometimes Nouri al-Maliki, the
Prime Minister of Iraq, says that he's not going to be bound by
timelines which the U.S. Congress imposes on him or outsiders
impose on him. That is not accurate. The timelines we're
talking about were adopted formally by the Government of Iraq.
They were approved by the Iraqi Prime Minister and Iraq's
Policy Committee on National Security in September 2006. They
were reaffirmed by the Iraqi Presidency Council, consisting of
the President and two Deputy Prime Ministers, on October 16,
2006. That specific timeline, relative to the seven benchmarks,
was a timeline adopted formally by the Iraqi Government and
attached to Secretary Rice's letter to me.
Now, when President Bush announced his new strategy for
Iraq in January of this year, he stated that the purpose of the
so-called surge was to provide Iraq's leaders breathing space
to make the political compromises necessary for progress.
Again, those were compromises that they had committed to make.
In July, the administration provided its initial assessment
of whether Iraq was making satisfactory progress toward meeting
its political, security, and economic benchmarks, as required
by Congress. The administration's July assessment claimed that
Iraq was making satisfactory progress on 8 of the benchmarks,
mixed progress on 2 others, unsatisfactory progress on 6
benchmarks, and they didn't even provide a rating on 2 of the
18 benchmarks.
The unsatisfactory benchmarks included failing to enact and
implement legislation on de-Baathification, failing to enact
and implement legislation to ensure an equitable distribution
of hydrocarbon resources, failing to allow the Baghdad Security
Plan to be implemented without political interference, failing
to ensure that Iraqi security forces provide even-handed
enforcement of the law, failing to increase the number of Iraqi
security force units capable of operating independently, and
failing to ensure that Iraq's political authorities are not
making false accusations against leaders of the Iraqi security
forces.
Now, that the administration's own assessment of progress
in Iraq. There were no consequences arising from the Iraqi
Government's failure to meet its commitments. Instead, the
President said he'd wait until September to judge what to do
next. Now, the GAO's Report, which we'll hear today, paints
even a more negative picture than the administration's July
report. In carrying out its task, the GAO talked to numerous
military and civilian officials, and gathered information from
a broad range of agencies and organizations, including the
Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of State (DOS), the
Department of Treasury, Multinational Forces Iraq, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, the
National Intelligence Council, and the United Nations. GAO
personnel made multiple trips to Iraq during 2006 and 2007.
By the way, while we're on the subject of the GAO
personnel, we want to thank you, particularly, Mr. Walker, and
your staff for not only the work that they do, which is
thorough and comprehensive, but for the risks that they take
when they make those multiple trips to Iraq.
The GAO report concludes that the Iraqi Government has met
only 3 of the 18 benchmarks. Four others have been partly met.
Nearly 8 months into the new strategy, 11 of the 18 bencharks
remain unmet. The Iraqi Government has met only one of eight
legislative benchmarks, and partly met one other, according to
the GAO report. Key revisions to Iraq's constitution have not
been made, laws have not been enacted on de-Baathification, oil
revenue-sharing, provincial elections, amnesty, and disarming
militias. As a matter of fact, the GAO notes that 15 of 37
members of the Iraqi Cabinet have withdrawn from the Cabinet.
Of the nine security benchmarks, the GAO finds that only
two have been met. It finds that two additional benchmarks have
been partly met, that leaves five of the security benchmarks,
the majority, unmet.
The time is long overdue to make it clear to Iraq's
leadership that there will be consequences to their failure to
live up to their commitments. Failing to hold Iraq to its
commitments is the definition of an open-ended commitment on
our part.
One of the reasons to begin to reduce U.S. forces, is to
put in place an action-forcing mechanism, to get the Iraqi
Government to meet its own benchmarks and to take
responsibility for the future of their country.
I thank our witness for coming before the committee today.
We look forward to his testimony. Again, special thanks to his
intrepid staff for the great work that they do, not only under
some risk in Iraq for this report, but also for the work that
they do in so many other parts of our Government and for this
Congress.
Senator Warner.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll ask to place
my statement into the record, given that we're about to have a
vote in less than an hour.
Mr. Walker, I want to commend you, as does the chairman,
for your work and that of your colleagues. There are risks to
all of us who take these trips over there. But, those trips are
essential.
I've read through your report. I think it's a constructive,
well thought-through contribution to the significant group of
factual information that is being put before Congress and
equally, if not more important, before the American people.
While the President, as Commander in Chief, has to make
these tough decisions, it's helpful to have the American people
get a broad understanding of the complexities of this
situation. I think your report does that quite fairly. So, I
commend you.
Mr. Chairman, I think we should just get underway.
[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming Mr. Walker.
This Government Accountability Office (GAO) report and this hearing
is part of a series of very important reports and hearings that will
help shape the setting for the President, as well as Congress and the
American people, as we evaluate the complex situation in Iraq at this
historic time.
Yesterday we received testimony from General Jim Jones and his
respected team on the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces. Next
week, Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus will testify before
committees in both bodies of Congress and the administration will
submit their second report on Iraqi progress to meet congressionally-
mandated benchmarks. These reports are essential for Congress and the
American people to conduct a full and informed appraisal of the
situation in Iraq.
Eleven months ago, I returned from my 9th trip, and said things
were ``drifting sideways.'' In January, when the President announced
his new way forward in Iraq, I was not fully supportive of all aspects
of that surge. In May, I had a hand in crafting the benchmark
legislation which was intended to set a common starting point and
schedule for the upcoming debate.
This report fulfills a requirement that is contained in legislation
that I had a hand in crafting. The requirement for an independent
assessment of benchmarks by the GAO was originally introduced by
Senators Snowe and Bayh, and eventually included in the bill that the
President signed into law in May.
Public Law 110-28 requires the GAO to provide an assessment of the
``status of achievement of the benchmarks.'' By contrast, the
administration reports whether or not satisfactory progress is being
made toward meeting the 18 benchmarks. As a result, the GAO assessment,
in some cases, differs from the administration report because of
different standards of evaluation. If Congress determines to continue
this benchmark reporting, then we should ensure to reconcile this
difference in standards.
Nonetheless, it is a very important contribution to this historic
debate, if for no other reason than it comes from the GAO, always
regarded as the voice of independence and integrity.
Mr Walker, again, welcome back before this committee and I wish to
thank you and all of those involved in the preparation of this report
on Iraq's benchmarks. We also recognize the personal risks associated
with travel in Iraq by those involved in the preparation of this
report.
Yesterday, General Jones and his team provided a very thoughtful
alternative strategy that involved what they called a ``strategic
shift.'' The ``strategic shift'' would re-task the Iraqis to take more
responsibility for daily combat operations while coalition forces would
transition to ``strategic overwatch'' and the active defense of the
border and critical infrastructure. In addition, I believe the Jones
Commission report made a very forceful argument that all provinces
should be transferred to Iraqi control immediately. I will be very
interested in your thoughts on both of those concepts.
We always appreciate the benefit of the GAO analysis and look
forward to your testimony and the discussions it will generate.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Walker?
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID M. WALKER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Warner,
other members of the Senate Armed Services Committee. I
appreciate the opportunity to be here today to present GAO's
report on the status of the 18 benchmarks relating to the Iraqi
Government's commitments, and related issues.
This is the fourth hearing I've held this week on this
topic, and I really appreciate being able to end with the
Senate Armed Services Committee, a very well-respected
committee. I know you try to work as much as you can on a
bipartisan basis.
As has been mentioned, we did this work because we were
required to do this work. There was a legislative mandate. That
legislative mandate required GAO to report by September 1,
2007, as to whether or not the Iraqi Government had met or had
not met the 18 benchmarks.
These 18 benchmarks, as you properly pointed out, Mr.
Chairman, were not created by Congress, they were the result of
other commitments that the Iraqi Government had made in various
forms over a period of time. I think it's important to keep in
mind that the administration's report in June 2007, used a
fundamentally different basis to evaluate these 18 benchmarks.
They used whether or not satisfactory progress was being made.
That's different than whether or not the benchmark has been
met, or not met, or partially met. It's also inherently
somewhat more subjective. But nonetheless, it's important
information you need to consider, and compare with the report
that's coming up.
In this work, we received an extensive amount of documents,
both classified and unclassified, and we had a team of analysts
go to Iraq again in late July, early August. We interviewed
numerous officials from DOD, DOS, Multinational Forces Iraq,
various intelligence agencies, et cetera. These officials
included General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker.
Importantly, we have issued over a hundred reports and
testimonies on Iraq since May 2003. Our staff have made
numerous trips to Iraq. I, myself, have been to Iraq twice.
Therefore, in addition to the work that we did for these 18
benchmarks, our work and any questions that I might answer are
informed by these 100-plus reports and testimonies, as well as
my personal interaction with my colleagues in Iraq and the
Middle East; as well as my former colleagues who are graduates
of Capstone, for Flag Officers, from which I was also fortunate
to be able to graduate.
I think it's important to note that our report does--in no
way, shape, or form--serve to diminish the courageous efforts
and the accomplishments of our military and those of our
coalition partners. We're reporting on whether or not the Iraqi
Government has met their commitments and to what extent that's
been the case.
In performing our work we used our independent professional
judgment to also use a partially met criteria. I think this is
very important. Because when we looked at the facts and when we
looked at how best to present where things stood, we felt that
there was a number of these benchmarks that we ought to
consider a partially met criteria and, in fact, we did for most
of them. On four of them, we gave a partially met rating
because we think it wouldn't have been fair to say not met,
given the substantial progress that had been made, even though
clearly you couldn't say that it had been fully met.
We've laid out, in our report, clearly-defined,
consistently applied, well-documented, and transparent criteria
as to how we reached our judgments. We think that's important.
Reasonable people can--and will--differ, but it's important
that you be able to make your own judgment based upon what
we've done.
So now, if I can, let me summarize the report and I will
refer to the pages of my testimony where these boards with
charts appear.
On page 4 of my testimony, this chart shows the origin of
the 18 benchmarks that I'm referring to here today. I won't
spend much time on it, but they go back to 2006 and they've
been reaffirmed at various points in time since then.
Next graphic, please. The next one shows, which is on my
left over here, shows the result of our evaluation. As a result
of this, you will see that in the legislative area, one of the
eight benchmarks was met, one was partially met, and six were
not met. In the security area, two were met, two were partially
met, and five were not met. In the economic sector, none were
met, one was partially met, and that's all there was, it was
the only one in that area.
I think it's important to note that we did use partially
met ratings, in order to provide a fair and balanced view. We
also added commentary on the status and in our report, to
provide further contextual sophistication with regard to where
things stand.
Next one over here on my right represents the status of the
legislative benchmarks. Obviously yourselves being Members of
the United States Senate, you understand that the legislative
process has a number of different stages that you have to go
through in order to be able to get a bill to be a law. This
basically demonstrates where things stand, with regard to the
key pieces of legislation that have yet to be enacted. Some
have made more progress than others and hopefully more will be
forthcoming.
The next one shows the level of violence, specifically the
average number of daily enemy-initiated attacks against the
Coalition, Iraqi security forces, and civilians, from May 2003
to July 2007. This is important. We used average daily because
every month doesn't have the same number of days, and so we
want to try to be fair in that regard. We also broke it down
between civilians, Iraqi security forces, and coalition forces
so you can see the differences in those trends. These represent
the total. This does not separate between sectarian and non-
sectarian violence. There is a significant difference of
opinion on the sectarian issue. The primary difference between
us and the military is whether and to what extent violence has
been reduced with regard to sectarian violence.
There is one party that maintains that data. That's
Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I), General Petraeus' group.
They're the only ones that maintain that data. We're aware of
that data. That data does show a decline in sectarian violence.
Just as you can see here, there was a decline in total violence
in July. We haven't seen the final August numbers yet, but
you'll get that, presumably next week, from General Petraeus.
There was an increase up until July, but a decrease in
July. You'll hear next week what the results are in August. We
could not get comfortable with MNF-I's methodology for
determining what's sectarian versus nonsectarian violence. It's
extremely difficult to know who did it, what their intent was,
and therefore, we feel more comfortable looking at total
violence, and breaking it down by civilians versus other
segments. But you'll have to make up your own mind, based upon
the information that you receive.
Next, please. Now, this represents a comparison of GAO's
most recent assessment, the one that I'm conveying to you
today, and the administration's July assessment. As has been
mentioned, they looked at whether or not satisfactory progress
was being made, rather than whether or not the benchmark had
been met or not met, if you will, so that's a different
standard.
But if you look at that, you'll see that in the first one,
there was significant difference of opinion. The rest of them,
either we agreed or we had a one difference in rating. Namely,
of the three possible ratings, there was a rating difference of
one.
Now, next week you're going to hear an updated report. I
would hope that their ratings might be better. We'll see, but I
think it's important to keep in mind we're rating based on a
different standard than they are. You need to consider both.
You need to use your judgment and you need to consider both, as
well as the Jones Commission Report, et cetera.
In conclusion, as of August 30, 2007, based upon our
extensive work, which included receiving information from the
Pentagon right up until the day that we finalized the report,
the Iraqi Government had met 3, partially met 4, and had not
met 11 of the legislative, security, and economic benchmarks.
Importantly, in late August, Iraqi senior Shia, Sunni, Arab,
and Kurdish political leaders signed the Unity Accord,
signaling efforts to foster greater national reconciliation.
The Accord covered draft legislation on de-Baathification
reform and provincial powers laws, as well as setting up a
mechanism to release some Sunni detainees being held without
charges. Time will tell whether or not this Unification Accord
results in progress on the political front, which--as has been
mentioned--is deemed to be key by many parties with regard to
national reconciliation.
As Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, in our view
we believe it's important to consider not just our report, but
also the reports from General Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker, and
the Jones Commission, among others.
You have an opportunity to receive input from a variety of
parties, to compare and contrast what they're saying, and then
to make up your own judgment as to what you feel is
appropriate.
We also think that it's important to consider, not just the
benchmarks, but also military progress and various homeland
security, foreign policy, and other goals of the United States,
including regional goals, national goals, and economic status,
which is not here, what's going on with regard to economics in
the lives of Iraqis on a day-to-day basis. Those are important
factors, we think, as well.
We made three recommendations in our report about what we
thought would be more helpful to Congress going forward, for
the administration to provide a more timely, detailed, and
useful information to you. The administration agreed with those
recommendations and we, along with yourselves, look forward to
receiving that information.
Finally, I too, Mr. Chairman and Senator Warner, would like
to thank our team. We have incredibly capable staff at GAO.
They're highly educated, very dedicated, courageous--although
they don't wear a uniform--and they do a heck of a job for
Congress and the country, and they've done a heck of a job
here.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Walker follows:]
Prepared Statement by David M. Walker
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I am pleased to appear
today to discuss our report \1\ on whether or not the Government of
Iraq has met 18 benchmarks contained in the U.S. Troop Readiness,
Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability
Appropriations Act of 2007 \2\ (the Act). The Act requires Government
Accountability Office (GAO) to report on the status of the achievement
of these benchmarks. Consistent with GAO's core values and our desire
to be fair and balanced, we also considered and used a ``partially
met'' rating for some benchmarks. In comparison, the act requires the
administration to report on whether satisfactory progress is being made
toward meeting the benchmarks. The benchmarks cover Iraqi government
actions needed to advance reconciliation within Iraqi society, improve
the security of the Iraqi population, provide essential services to the
population, and promote economic well-being.
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\1\ GAO, Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security,
and Economic Benchmarks (GAO-07-1195) (Washington, DC: Sept. 4, 2007).
\2\ Section 1314 of P.L. 110-28.
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To complete this work, we reviewed U.S. agency and Iraqi documents
and interviewed officials from the Departments of Defense, State, and
the Treasury; the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and its subordinate
commands; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Central Intelligence
Agency; the National Intelligence Council; and the United Nations.
These officials included Ryan Crocker, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, and
General David H. Petraeus, Commander of the MNF-I. We made multiple
visits to Iraq during 2006 and 2007, most recently from July 22 to
August 1, 2007. Our analyses were enhanced by approximately 100 Iraq-
related reports and testimonies that we have completed since May 2003.
We conducted our review in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
summary
In summary, we found:
The benchmarks were derived from commitments first articulated by
the Iraqi government in June 2006.
The Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and did not meet 11 of
its 18 benchmarks. Overall, key legislation has not been passed,
violence remains high, and it is unclear whether the Iraqi government
will spend $10 billion in reconstruction funds. These results do not
diminish the courageous efforts of coalition forces and progress that
has been made in several areas, including Anbar Province.
The Iraqi government met one of eight legislative benchmarks: the
rights of minority political parties in Iraq's legislature are
protected. The government has not enacted legislation on de-
Baathification, oil revenue sharing, provincial elections, amnesty, and
militia disarmament.
It is unclear whether sectarian violence in Iraq has decreased--a
key security benchmark--since it is difficult to measure whether the
perpetrators' intents were sectarian in nature, and other measures of
population security show differing trends.
As Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it should balance
the achievement of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks with military progress and
with homeland security goals, foreign policy goals, and other goals of
the United States.
origins of the benchmarks
The benchmarks contained in the act were derived from commitments
articulated by the Iraqi government beginning in June 2006 and affirmed
in subsequent statements by Prime Minister Maliki in September 2006 and
January 2007 (see fig. 1). Iraq's commitments to these benchmarks were
most recently stated in the May 2007 International Compact for Iraq.
gao assessment of the 18 benchmarks
As of August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4,
and did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. Overall, key legislation has
not been passed, violence remains high, and it is unclear whether the
Iraqi government will spend $10 billion in reconstruction funds.
most legislative benchmarks have yet to be enacted and implemented
The Iraqi government met one of eight legislative benchmarks: the
rights of minority political parties in Iraq's legislature are
protected. The government also partially met one benchmark--to enact
and implement legislation on the formation of regions; this law was
enacted in October 2006 but will not be implemented until April 2008.
Six other legislative benchmarks have not been met. Specifically, a
review committee has not completed work on important revisions to
Iraq's constitution. Further, the government has not enacted
legislation on de-Baathification, oil revenue sharing, provincial
elections, amnesty, and militia disarmament. The administration's
report cited progress in achieving some benchmarks but provided little
information on what step in the legislative process each benchmark had
reached. We provide that information below.
mixed results in achieving security benchmarks
Two of nine security benchmarks have been met. Specifically, Iraq's
government has established various committees in support of the Baghdad
security plan and established almost all of the planned Joint Security
Stations in Baghdad. The government has partially met the benchmarks of
providing three trained and ready brigades for Baghdad operations and
eliminating safe havens for outlawed groups. Five other benchmarks have
not been met. The government has not eliminated militia control of
local security, eliminated political intervention in military
operations, ensured even-handed enforcement of the law, increased army
units capable of independent operations, and ensured that political
authorities made no false accusations against security forces. It is
unclear whether sectarian violence in Iraq has decreased--a key
security benchmark--since it is difficult to measure perpetrators'
intents, and various other measures of population security from
different sources show differing trends. As displayed in figure 4,
average daily attacks against civilians have remained unchanged from
February to July 2007.
comparison of gao and executive branch assessments
Public Law 110-28 requires GAO to report to Congress by September
1, 2007,\3\ on whether or not the government of Iraq has met 18
benchmarks contained in the act, and the status of the achievement of
these benchmarks. The Act requires the administration to report in July
and September 2007 on whether satisfactory progress is being made
toward meeting the benchmarks. As stated previously, we considered and
used a ``partially met'' rating in several circumstances. Figure 5
compares the two assessments.
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\3\ GAO provided this report to Congress on September 4, 2007, the
first business day following September 1, 2007.
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conclusions
As of August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4,
and had not met 11 of 18 legislative, security, and economic
benchmarks. The Iraqi government has not fulfilled commitments it first
made in June 2006 to advance legislative, security, and economic
measures that would promote national reconciliation among Iraq's
warring factions. Of particular concern is the lack of progress on de-
Baathification legislation that could promote greater Sunni
participation in the National government and comprehensive hydrocarbon
legislation that would distribute Iraq's vast oil wealth. In late
August, Iraq's senior Shia, Sunni Arab, and Kurdish political leaders
signed a Unity Accord signaling efforts to foster greater national
reconciliation. The Accord covered draft legislation on de-
Baathification reform and provincial powers laws, as well as setting up
a mechanism to release some Sunni detainees being held without charges.
However, the polarization of Iraq's major sects and ethnic groups and
fighting among Sh'ia factions further diminishes the stability of
Iraq's governing coalition and its potential to enact legislation
needed for sectarian reconciliation.
Reconciliation was also premised on a reduction in violence. While
the Baghdad security plan was intended to reduce sectarian violence, it
is unclear whether violence has been reduced. Measuring such violence
may be difficult since the perpetrators' intents are not clearly known.
Other measures, such as the number of enemy-initiated attacks, show
that violence has remained high through July 2007.
As Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it should balance
the achievement of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks with military progress and
homeland security, foreign policy, and other goals of the United
States. Future administration reports on the benchmarks would be more
useful to Congress if they clearly depicted the status of each
legislative benchmark, provided additional quantitative and qualitative
information on violence from all relevant U.S. agencies, and specified
the performance and loyalties of Iraqi security forces supporting
coalition operations.
recommendations
In preparing future reports to Congress and to help increase
transparency on progress made toward achieving the benchmarks, we
recommend that:
1. The Secretary of State provide information to the
President that clearly specifies the status in drafting,
enacting, and implementing Iraqi legislation;
2. The Secretary of Defense and the heads of other
appropriate agencies provide information to the President on
trends in sectarian violence with appropriate caveats, as well
as broader quantitative and qualitative measures of security;
and
3. The Secretary of Defense and the heads of other
appropriate agencies provide additional information on the
operational readiness of Iraqi security forces supporting the
Baghdad security plan, particularly information on their
loyalty and willingness to help secure Baghdad.
We provided drafts of the report accompanying this testimony to the
relevant U.S. agencies for review and comment, which we incorporated as
appropriate. We received written comments from the Departments of State
and Defense and technical comments from the Central Intelligence Agency
and National Intelligence Council, which are included in the report.
State and DOD concurred with our recommendations but disagreed with our
assessment of certain benchmarks. Although we analyzed classified data,
including the August 2007 National Intelligence Estimate for Iraq, the
testimony and report only contain unclassified information, as of
August 30, 2007. We issued a classified report to supplement the
information discussed in our report.\4\
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\4\ GAO-07-1223C.
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Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, this concludes my
prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions that you
may have.
contact and staff acknowledgements
If you or your staffs have any questions about this testimony,
please contact me at (202) 512-5500 or Joseph A. Christoff, Director,
International Affairs and Trade, at (202) 512-8979. Key contributors to
this testimony include Stephen Lord, David Bruno, Howard Cott, Timothy
Fairbanks, Mattias Fenton, Whitney Havens, Dorian Herring, Bruce
Kutnick, Judith McCloskey, Tetsuo Miyabara, and Kathleen Monahan.
In addition, Ashley Alley, Monica Brym, Lessie Burke-Johnson, Joe
Carney, Miriam Carroll, Debbie Chung, Thomas Costa, Lynn Cothern,
Aniruddha Dasgupta, Martin de Alteriis, Etana Finkler, Muriel Forster,
Patrick Hickey, Michael Jenkins, Sona Kalapura, Jeremy Latimer, Mary
Moutsos, Sidney Schwartz, Jena Sinkfield, Audrey Solis, Cynthia Taylor,
and Christina Werth provided technical assistance.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Mr. Walker, very much for a very
succinct, direct report and testimony. Let's try a 7-minute
round, the first round here for our questions this morning.
Looking at the origin of Iraqi benchmarks, that particular
chart.
Mr. Walker. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. The second column, you say, is Prime
Minister Maliki's benchmarks, those are the ones that I made
reference to before that were attached to Secretary Rice's
letter. You got a footnote A, relative to that. I just want
you, if you would, to read that footnote, if you have it handy.
Let me read it to you.
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, because I don't have
it.
Chairman Levin. ``Iraq's Policy Committee on National
Security agreed upon a set of political, security, and economic
benchmarks and an associated timeline in September 2006. They
were reaffirmed by the Presidency Council on October 16,
2006.'' I want to make it clear that the title, with that A
after it, makes it clear that those weren't just Maliki's
benchmarks, they were, according to their own footnote, and as
Secretary Rice said, they were reaffirmed by the Presidency
Council. Is that correct?
Mr. Walker. That's my understanding, Mr. Chairman. That's
right.
Chairman Levin. The timeline that was attached to those
benchmarks was the following: that they would agree on an
investment law by September 2006; they'd approve provincial
elections law and set a date for provincial elections by
October 2006; they'd approve a hydrocarbon by October 2006;
they'd approve a de-Baathification law by November 2006; they'd
approve a provincial council authorities law by November 2006;
they would address the question of amnesty, militias, and other
armed forces in the Council of Representatives by December
2006; they'd approve those laws by December 2006; the
Constitutional Review Committee would complete its work by
January 2007; and they'd have referendum on Constitutional
amendments by March 2007. Have any of those commitments been
kept, the ones I just identified?
Mr. Walker. We've noted that those have not been met, based
upon our evaluation, and that there clearly has been a
significant delay in the Iraqi Government being able to meet
its milestones. That's the area of greatest disappointment,
namely, the lack of political progress.
Chairman Levin. In terms of those specific self-adopted,
self-imposed, not just benchmarks, but timelines.
Mr. Walker. The milestones.
Chairman Levin. The milestones that they set out for
themselves, they have not been met, is that correct?
Mr. Walker. That's correct, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. So, that when Prime Minister Maliki rails
against others for trying to impose benchmarks and milestones
on Iraq, is it not accurate to say that they, in fact, have
adopted their own benchmarks, which is part of the compact
commitment that you make reference to in your last column? They
also have adopted timelines, which have not been met?
Mr. Walker. What I don't know, Mr. Chairman, is whether or
not they've modified those timelines, but not published it. But
you're correct, they did not meet those, the timelines that you
refer to.
Chairman Levin. As far as you know, did they ever modify
those timelines?
Mr. Walker. We're not aware of any formal modification to
those timelines.
Chairman Levin. How about informal modifications?
Mr. Walker. We're not aware of any such modification, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Levin. All right. Yesterday we were given a report
by the Jones Commission in which the Commission concluded that
the Iraqi Armed Forces are, ``capable of assuming greater
responsibility for the internal security of Iraq.'' What that
was based on, was a finding that they made--and that has been
made by others--that a majority of the Iraqi Army units, not
police units, Army units--are able either to act independently,
which is so-called category 1, what you were asked to look at,
but also category 2 units, which are characterized as being
able to act in the lead with the support of the coalition.
Those are categories which we use, in our own operational
readiness assessments, we look at four categories. The first
category is the ability to act independently, the second one is
to take the lead, in essence, with the support of coalition
forces.
Now, I believe that you looked only at the category 1
units, the ability to act independently. Is that correct?
Mr. Walker. For benchmark number 15, you're correct, but we
are aware of the other data that you're referring to.
Chairman Levin. You are, okay.
Mr. Walker. We are.
Chairman Levin. Relative to the combined number of category
1 and 2--because that's the unclassified number, that's the
number which our folks are currently using: that number,
according to our statistics, which are given to us by DOD, and
are given to us in accordance with section 9010 of the Defense
Appropriations Act, those figures impact 89 of 159 units that
are at either fully independent or can take the lead,
essentially, are category 1 or category 2. Is that similar to
the information you have?
Mr. Walker. That's consistent with the information that we
have for category 1 and category 2, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Now, let me first give you my impression.
It's my impression--and I believe from the testimony yesterday,
that the Independent Commission would agree with this--that
while over half of the Iraqi units are capable of either acting
independently--which there are relatively few--but also of
taking the lead in operations with the support of coalition
forces, that many fewer are actually either acting
independently or taking the lead with coalition support and
that there's a significant number of units that are not taking
the lead, although they have the capability of doing so with
coalition support. Did you make any finding or do you have
any----
Mr. Walker. We did not, but the data would seem to support
that position.
Chairman Levin. Do you have any finding as to why that is
true, assuming it's true?
Mr. Walker. I think one of the things that people need to
keep in mind is how much support you need for category 2. It
could be considerable support, especially logistical support,
air support, et cetera. Second, it's not just the issue of
readiness, it's also the issue of reliability. By reliability I
mean, they may have the capability to do it, but will they do
it and will they act in a non-sectarian fashion?
Chairman Levin. Is that particularly a problem with the
police?
Mr. Walker. It is clearly a much greater problem with the
police and much less of a problem with the Army. But we would
note, that we had recommended to the Defense Department some
months ago, that in addition to considering traditional
readiness factors, they also consider reliability factors. They
now, in fact, are doing that.
Chairman Levin. Finally, on the Unity Accord, to which you
referred. Senator Warner and I were in President Talibani's
house, actually having dinner with General Petraeus and our
Ambassador when presented to the----
Senator Warner. General Petraeus was not there.
Chairman Levin. I apologize. You're correct. Senator Warner
is correct. Ambassador Crocker was there, but General Petraeus
was not at that dinner. Presented to President Talibani were
these initialed agreements, it was a so-called initialed by,
perhaps, the second-level person in each of those factions.
Then, later on, a couple weeks later, last week or early this
week there was this meeting where the five top folks came
together in this so-called Unity Accord, and I guess signed
what was previously initialed.
Senator Warner. Not all of them.
Chairman Levin. One or more of the items, Senator Warner, I
think is probably correct on that, even though it maybe that
just one of them was going to be immediately presented to the
Assembly and the other two were signed, but not going to be
immediately presented.
But whatever the precise accuracy of that--it's obviously
important--but my point is this: Would you agree that the
ability of the government to achieve the goals laid out in that
Unity Accord is severely undermined by the withdrawal of 15 of
37 members of the Cabinet?
Mr. Walker. It clearly shows that there is significant
strife and significant differences that exist within the
elected government of Iraq.
Chairman Levin. Do you have an assessment on the likelihood
of the Iraqi legislature to enact that legislation?
Mr. Walker. No, we don't, Mr. Chairman. That was really
beyond the scope of what we were asked to do. I wouldn't want
to speculate on that.
Chairman Levin. Would you agree that it's not a done deal
by any stretch of the imagination, given the history of that
assembly?
Mr. Walker. Given the history of any assembly, I would say
it's probably not a done deal.
Chairman Levin. Because that is a parliament where majority
rules?
Mr. Walker. Yes, I understand.
Chairman Levin. Is that correct?
Mr. Walker. Well, but I think the other thing, Mr.
Chairman, as you undoubtedly know, part of the issue is not
whether or not they have the votes, but when do they want to
take the vote, because of the potential implications of that
vote. I can't get into that. I don't know where they stand
there.
But I think only time will tell whether or not this
national Unity Accord will, in fact, result in real legislation
being enacted, which is necessary for reconciliation and for
people to have confidence that it's not a temporary thing, but
that it has a more lasting significance.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, one of my members has a
commitment, so I'm going to yield to Senator Inhofe. But I
would think it important that we place in the record, at an
appropriate place, perhaps directly following my opening
testimony, and quote the law as written and perhaps that will
help clarify the different procedures by which you proceeded.
I note that, having had a hand in writing the basic law,
the provision relating to your organization was in the form of
an amendment. I think if I and others had been a little more
alert we would have seen if we couldn't have had a parallelism
as to the requirements. But nevertheless, I think both reports
do basically reach much of the same conclusions.
Mr. Walker. Senator Warner, I'd also like to mention that
should you desire us to do further work in this area, we would
like to work with this committee for possible refinements on
what we might be able to do to improve the usefulness to this
committee and Congress as a whole.
Senator Warner. We will take that offer.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Warner. That's kind of
my thought too. Mr. Walker, you've done a great job in coming
up with the report that you've come up with. I question if it
really tells me what I know about the progress that's being
made there. What I'm saying, and I'm not being critical at all,
but from my understanding, you were charged with reporting on
the various benchmarks as they have been met. I'm not
disagreeing with your conclusions. You've done exactly what you
were charted to do.
But I am questioning that if this report provides us with
something beyond just a snapshot of where we are today as
opposed to what kind of progress that we've been able to make.
Focusing on a black and white, yes or no report on benchmarks
seems to be a little myopic in its attempt to oversimplify an
extremely complex and dynamic situation.
Actual progress has not been considered under these
standards. Representative Jimmy Saxton (New Jersey, 3rd
District) yesterday said, ``By solely examining whether each
benchmark has achieved without considering the actual progress
being made under each area, it appears that this hearing has
been set up with a goal of providing a negative picture by
failing to accurately reflect the current activities on the
ground in Iraq.'' Mr. Walker, you stated Tuesday, I guess it
was and I agree with this, you said, ``Progress is a highly
subjective issue and by definition, one would expect that there
would be a better rating that would be achieved if one solely
focused on progress.'' I agree with that and that's what I
focus on. I've had occasion to be, not always in Iraq, but in
the Iraqi area of responsibility, 15 times now. Last week was
the last time. So as I go through and I see some of the great
progress that's being made, I don't see that this report
reflects that progress.
I think the Iraqi Government, while not agreeing on
legislative language, has put into an accumulation of
practices, many of the benchmarks. The Iraqi Government is
sharing oil revenues, is taking steps towards the de-
Baathification, it is giving conditional immunity to the Baath
Party members. There's been a 75-percent reduction in religious
and ethnic killings in the capitol between December and August
7.
Along this line, one of the great progresses that I see,
and it was reflected from our intel going to the various
mosques and their weekly meetings and coming back with the idea
that there's been a total abrupt change since this surge took
place, in terms of the programs that are given by the clerics
and Imans in the mosques. Moreover, prior to January, 85
percent of the services were anti-American, by nature, but
since April there hasn't been anything anti-American. I think
that accounts for some of the success that we've had.
We've doubled the seizure of insurgent's weapons caches
between January and August. A rise in the number of al Qaeda
killings and captures, Anbar incidents of attacks are down from
40 per day down to 10 per day at the present time. As far as
economic growth--I'll talk about that in just a minute--but the
markets are open, crowded, and stacked. I know that. I've been
in the markets. I've also been in the same markets several
years, probably each 3 or 4 months. So, it's easy to see the
progress when you're looking at that.
The large hospital projects in the Sunni triangle are back
on track. Three of the provinces were transferred to Iraqi
control on May 30. The Iraqi police are in control inside the
city of Kirkuk. In Mosul, a mixed population of Sunni and Shia
have been turned over to Iraqi control. Only a small U.S.
presence remains in that area. Additionally, the Iraqi Army
continues to perform very well. Although we tend to look at
things by our standards, and sometimes that's rather difficult
to do.
In visiting last week with General Petraeus on the overall
picture, he says less than half of the al Qaeda leaders that
were in Baghdad when the surge began are still in the city.
Half of them are still in the city, less than half. They fled
and are being killed and captured. Seventy-five percent
reductions in religious and ethnic killings. The improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) decreased by the use of advanced IEDs.
In fact, he said the IEDs, really, are dead now, it's the
advanced IEDs that we're having a problem with.
Ambassador Crocker, when we talked about the markets and
about the economy, about the large hospital projects and this
type of thing. Well, up in the Multinational Division North,
Major General Benjamin R. Mixon's, USA, area of responsibility,
progress is being made. It's in the right direction up there.
The only problem is the city of Diyala is where most of the
problems are. I think what's happened is that as the successes
in Anbar have taken place, it's kind of squeezed it up into
that area, and now it's confined to Diyala at the present time.
At least that's my conclusion after being up there.
Patrol Base Murray, the same thing there. I've had a chance
to meet with former Iraqi Army Brigadier General Mustafa Kamel
Hamad Shabib al-Jabouri (better known simply as General
Mustafa), founder of Concerned Citizens, Iraq now three times,
you probably did when you were over there, too. He's the one
who talks about the Concerned Citizen's groups and how
successful they have been. Your report also shows the success
in the joint security stations, 32 of the 34, that benchmark, I
think, is pretty healthy. That reflects a lot of progress.
Lieutenant General Raymond T. Odierno talking about the
progress in Iraq called it, ``Baghdad, back to normalcy.''
All these things are happening. I would also reflect that
even earlier--this is about a month or 5 weeks ago--I observed
progress, and I think a lot of it is due to the, not the
political, but the religious leaders. I've kind of come to the
conclusion that they're more important than the political
leaders. I remember in a hearing in this committee about a
little over a year ago, it was predicted that Ramadi was going
to be the terrorist capitol of the world. Well, now it's under
control and so is Fallujah.
I'd say, the only question I'd have, and you can answer for
the record, since I've gone over my time, can you tell us
better ways that you suggest to measure this benchmark, and how
a snapshot in time can accurately reflect a constantly evolving
situation? In other words, provide more depth to the assignment
that was given to you.
Mr. Walker. Sure. Let me briefly respond. First, we did
what we were asked to do.
Senator Inhofe. I said that already.
Mr. Walker. However, we did use ``partially met'' in an
attempt to be fair and balanced and we provided more
commentary, because even a ``not met'' doesn't mean no
progress, okay? So, you need to understand that.
My personal view and professional opinion as Comptroller
General of the United States is, that these 18 benchmarks need
to be considered, but there are things beyond these 18
benchmarks that you ought to consider. Furthermore, ideally in
evaluating any type of progress, including this type of
progress, it's good to look at where you stand as of a point in
time, what progress you are making, and how does it relate to
the commitments that have been made?
I think having all of that information is relevant in order
to be able to make the fully-informed view. That would be a
suggestion that I would make for your consideration, to the
extent that you want to continue to have GAO do something going
forward.
Senator Inhofe. That's an excellent statement. Thank you so
much.
Chairman Levin. Senator Reed is next, but he has agreed--as
he is always so generous--to switch places in the order with
Senator McCaskill.
So, Senator McCaskill?
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I want to tell you that I appreciate the atmosphere
in which this report is released, is highly politically
charged. I'm not sure that it could be more politically charged
than this particular topic at this particular time with our
Government and with our elected leaders.
In that environment, I want to compliment what you've done
because, as always, what the GAO has done, is you've been a
fact gatherer and a fact reporter. I would challenge anyone in
the administration, in DOD, in the military, in this committee,
or in Congress to find a factual piece of information that you
report here that is a mistake. I know that there has been a
little controversy over your report in the House, when you
testified I think they roughed you up a little bit. Let me tell
you from my perspective, being called an auditor is the highest
compliment that anyone could ever give you. I appreciate the
fact that some of our colleagues in the House called you an
auditor, as if it was a derogatory term.
I have read the facts and I want to state the obvious here.
I have a great respect for General Petraeus too, but I think
everyone needs to understand the differences in your positions.
Who do you work for? Who do you work for, Mr. Walker?
Mr. Walker. I work for the Congress of the United States.
I'm sorry. [Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. There's no doubt in my mind about that.
Mr. Walker. Believe me, I know. I just didn't know it was a
question.
Senator McCaskill. It was a question. Who, in fact, does
General Petraeus work for? Who is his boss?
Mr. Walker. The President of the United States is Commander
in Chief.
Senator McCaskill. His job is much different than yours. I
appreciate that he's going to have additional perspective that
you could never bring to this discussion.
Mr. Walker. Absolutely. He's management, he's responsible
for helping to define and execute the strategy. He's on the
ground, he's extremely capable. You ought to seriously listen
to what he has to say.
Senator McCaskill. Absolutely. I have looked at the nine
benchmarks, I have honed in on the nine benchmarks that
President Bush laid out in his speech to the American people in
January, ``A new way forward.'' This was the President's
decision to lay out these nine benchmarks. It was his attempt
to convince the American people that we were going to provide
accountability. If we were going to put more lives on the line
and go even deeper in debt in order to finance this effort, we
were going to require certain commitments of the Iraqi
Government. This was not anything Congress foisted upon him.
These were his nine he laid out in his speech.
I've looked at your analysis of those nine benchmarks. You
say they have not been met in six instances. You give him
partial credit, partially met for three of those. Six no, three
partial. The President, in July, said four of those there had
been satisfactory progress, four he admitted no, unsatisfactory
progress. So, by his own report in July, four yes, four no, and
then he said one partial. So, I tried to go in and look at one
of those benchmarks in detail, the one where you say partial
and he says it's satisfactory, which concerns the spending of
the $10 billion of Iraqi money.
Now, there are several reasons I honed in on this. One, I
think it will satisfy people because as one House member called
you a bean-counter, this is about the finances, this is about
the ability of the Iraqi Government to spend their money.
Now, when I was in Iraq in June, I asked some of the
Missouri soldiers on the ground what was their biggest
challenge in one of these Provincial Reconstruction Teams. They
said to me, ``electricity.'' They said that these people are
getting 1 hour of electricity a day on average in Baghdad. Now,
how in the world do we ever get to a point that they have any
confidence whatsoever in their government if they can't get
electricity. Spending this money on infrastructure and capital
projects, this $10 billion, a very modest amount--I hate to
count the billions and billions we've spent--ought to be
something that we feel confident that they're moving towards
doing. It shouldn't be that hard to spend money. We manage to
do it around here without blinking an eye.
I looked to see what, exactly, factually you found and what
the President reported. As of the middle of the year, they had
spent, according to the U.S. Embassy, $1.5 billion of the $10
billion--24 percent--leaving 76 percent that had not yet been
spent. But if you look behind that number, you find the
Ministry of Oil's money, you all determined, based on the
Special Inspector General's report, that of the $1.5 billion
that they're getting credit for spending, $500 million of that,
they're not confident that all has been spent. That's because
it was just transferred to the Marketing Division. There wasn't
really any evidence that it had actually been spent. If you
look at the money that's been given to the provinces, there is
no confidence that that money is going to be spent. They
haven't even spent last year's money yet, much less this year's
money, which in this instance, they're not going to be allowed
to carry forward.
I read every word about that benchmark. Now, the
interesting thing is, the President said it was satisfactory
progress. Now, I would like you to speak about that benchmark,
if you would, and talk about the factual basis for the
difference between your findings. You said partially met, which
by the way, I thought was wildly generous, because you're
saying because they've allocated it. For gosh sakes, allocating
money is not spending money. If you would address that
particular benchmark and the difference between the President
and GAO. I'm trying to figure out where the spin is here and I
got to tell you, with this benchmark, I don't think there's
much spin on your side. I think you are being wildly generous
and I think there's a whole lot of spin going on, on the other
side.
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Obviously you've done a thorough job, again, in reading
this report. I appreciate that.
First, I'm proud to be a Certified Public Accountant, to be
an auditor, among other things.
What we did here, is we looked at the language.
``Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for
reconstruction projects, including delivering of essential
services on an equitable basis.'' Now, they have allocated $10
billion. They have transferred some of the money, but clearly
not most of the money. They've obligated even less and we have
a concern as to whether or not this amount is ultimately going
to be spent and whether or not it's going to be spent in a
manner that will result in delivering essential services on a
equitable basis.
The best we could get to was partial. We wanted to give
them credit for the fact that they had allocated the money,
they've transferred some of the money, they've spent some of
the money.
However, our opinion there has also been formed by work
that we've done in many other areas in Iraq, where frankly they
haven't spent, historically, a lot of the money that's been
allocated. We think that, as I said, we based the work on these
18 benchmarks, not just on what we did in the last couple of
months, but what we've done over several years and the track
record that has been established there.
Senator McCaskill. But I want to make it clear that the
facts indicate, that of the $1.5 billion or 24 percent of the
$10 billion, that the U.S. Embassy is saying has been spent,
there is not even concrete factual evidence that we could rely
on as auditors, that all of that money has actually even been
expended, even though it was only 24 percent of the total.
Mr. Walker. Yes, $1.5 billion, of course, would be 15
percent, so there's other money in there, but they've
transferred a certain amount, they've obligated a certain
amount, they've spent a certain amount, but a significant
majority of the funds don't meet any of those criteria.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCaskill.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. I'm going to defer down to Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Walker, I want to talk further with you about benchmark
15, which is a very important benchmark because it's an
evaluation of whether the Iraqi security forces can operate
independently.
Obviously, the scale and the success of the Iraqi security
forces directly affects when our troops will be able to come
home. Your assessment that this benchmark of increasing the
number of Iraqi security forces units capable of operating
independently, is that it was not met. It's not one where you
said there was limited progress or partially met. You say it
was not met, and you even say that the number of capable forces
has actually declined.
This seems at odds with the testimony that we had yesterday
from the Jones Commission. I have a great deal of respect for
both the GAO and the Jones Commission. I am surprised that the
conclusions seem to be so at odds on such a vital issue. I'd
like to have you comment further on why GAO reached such a
different assessment.
Mr. Walker. First Senator Collins, thank you very much for
the question. Because in reality, the reason that we reached a
different conclusion is because we had a different metric that
we had to evaluate.
As Chairman Levin mentioned earlier, if you look at
categories one and two of the four readiness categories, you
get a different number with regard to how many people, how many
units might be able to operate either fully independently or
lead. Our requirement was just to look at those who could
operate fully independently. So in other words, category 1, the
highest category. We've issued a classified report, which I
would commend to you and every member of this committee, that
clearly demonstrates why we put this benchmark in the not met
category. Basically, we are looking only at category 1, because
operating independently is category 1. They either went up, or
they went down, or they stayed the same, and that's in our
classified report.
Senator Collins. Sounds like we need to review the
classified information, as well.
This is an area that Senator Warner has been the leader on
getting this assessment. I hope that the Jones Commission and
GAO can come together on this issue because this is so vital to
the ability of our troops to be able to turn over
responsibility to the Iraqi security forces, and ultimately to
their ability to be able to come home.
There's a broader issue that I want to raise with you to
make sure that this committee fully understands what you mean
by each of your assessments. Of the 18 benchmarks that were
graded by the GAO, your report states that only 7 received a
grade of met or partially met. So, of the other 11 benchmarks,
are you implying that there's been no progress at all? That the
Iraqi Government is no further along on those benchmarks than
they were a year ago? I'm trying to understand the difference
between not met--which can be read as no progress at all, which
I don't think is really what you're saying--versus partially
met.
Mr. Walker. Again, thank you for this question because it
helps add contextual sophistication.
The biggest problem is in the legislative area. One of the
exhibits that we had, which is on page eight of my testimony,
illustrates the progress that has been made. So, on these, the
ones that been met and not met. So, the fact that they're not
met doesn't mean that nothing has been done, but it means that
not nearly enough has been done in order to justify a partially
met rating. As I mentioned earlier, my professional opinion is,
the most meaningful information for Congress would be, not just
to know where things stand as of a point in time, but also what
type of progress is being made.
It's my understanding that Congress may have intended--and
I don't know this for sure, Senator Warner and Senator Levin
would--that it was contemplated that this might end up being a
baseline that could then provide a basis to compare. Even if
that was the case, my personal view is you need to look at
where do things stand and what progress is being made. You need
to look at both in order to be able to consider that. That's
not what we were asked to do.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Thank you, Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. If I could interject, Mr. Chairman. What
amount of time and effort would it take for you to try and
reconcile your data and put it into a format that comports with
what we tasked the President to do, by way of the benchmark
assessment?
Mr. Walker. Well, you asked the President to talk about
progress rather than status. First thing we'd have to do is
define, we'd have to come up with a definition of what's
satisfactory.
Senator Warner. Instead of taking up time getting into
detail, do you think that you could take the criteria we laid
down for the executive branch and apply your own metrics and
come up with conclusions?
Mr. Walker. Mr. Chairman, I'd want to consult with my very
capable staff on what were those metrics, are we comfortable
with those metrics, and what do we think it would take. We will
do that expeditiously.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
Mr. Walker. Get back to you later.
Chairman Levin. Whether those metrics are available to you?
Mr. Walker. Correct.
Chairman Levin. Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to say aloha to Mr. Walker and welcome to you to
this committee.
I would like to first congratulate you and your staff for
the excellent work you've done on reporting the Iraqi
Government's legislative, security, and economic benchmarks. I
believe that the GAO conducted an excellent assessment of the
Iraq benchmarks and I want to convey my appreciation, again, to
you and your staff.
The inability of the Iraqi Government to meet its
benchmarks is one of the main issues in the overall debate
regarding whether to begin redeployment of our troops. This
report will provide us with valuable information in our
deliberations on any future involvement of the U.S. military
forces in Iraq.
I do have few questions to you, Mr. Walker. The GAO's
report states that the Iraqi Government has provided $10
billion in its current budget for reconstruction projects,
including delivery of essential services on an equitable basis,
but that it is unlikely to be spent by the end of this year. As
of July 31, the Iraqi Government had only about $1.5 billion of
the allocated funds.
Now, my question to you is can you tell us what is the
underlying cause of the Iraqi's failure to use their budgeted
resources to rebuild critical infrastructure? In addition to
that, could you describe some of the key projects that will
likely not be accomplished if the Iraqi Government continues at
this current pace?
Mr. Walker. First, whether or not the money will be spent
depends, in great part, on their willingness and ability to
spend that money. We have seen, historically, that amounts have
been allocated, but not transferred. Of the amounts that have
transferred have not necessarily been spent, in the past. Some
of the reasons for that are that Iraq does not have a well-
established capacity, as it relates to acquisition and
contracting. They have a serious problem with regard to having
an adequate number of people with the knowledge, the right type
of systems and controls to get things done.
Some people are concerned about moving too quickly because
of the possibility of being accused of corruption or other
types of activities if they don't dot all the Is and cross all
the Ts. So, I can't comment on their willingness to spend it. I
can comment on the fact that historically they have not had a
good track record and some of that is because of the lack of
enough people and enough infrastructure to be able to make it
happen in a timely manner. I'll be happy to provide, for the
record, some examples of things that might not get done.
[The information referred to follows:]
As we recently reported, the energy sector is critical for Iraq's
economy and for rebuilding the country. Experts estimate that over the
next few years, $27 billion will be needed for the electricity sector
to keep up with needed demand and $20 to $30 billion will be needed for
the oil sector to reach production goals. Since most U.S.
reconstruction funds have been obligated, the Iraqi Government will
need to assume a more prominent role in rebuilding Iraq's electricity
and oil sectors. Major challenges to these efforts include continued
security concerns, lack of expertise to plan for and maintain the
infrastructure, and lack of a legislative framework that would
encourage international investment.
Mr. Walker. But as Senator McCaskill said before, they
include reliable electricity and adequate, safe water, and
appropriate levels of oil production. These are basic things
that I think are important that they be measured. From a
professional standpoint, I believe it's important they be
measured and reported on.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Walker, GAO credits the Iraqi Government
with meeting benchmark 16, ``Ensuring that the rights of
minority political parties in the Iraqi Legislature are
protected.'' However, the report then states that because of
the security situation, Iraqi legislators interviewed by GAO
insisted that the situation in their communities has a direct
bearing on their work in the legislature, their freedom of
movement to and from the legislature, and their ability to
engage fully in Iraq political life.
If I understand the report correctly, the Iraqis have met
this benchmark because their constitution has provisions
guaranteeing minority party rights. However, in practice, this
benchmark is not actually being met because minority rights are
still being violated. Is my understanding correct?
Mr. Walker. My understanding, Senator Akaka, is the reason
we showed this as met is because, in fact, they have enacted a
constitution that provides for minority rights. There are
issues, you talked about two. One, security--whether or not
there's adequate security for people to be able to get to the
parliament to be able to exercise their rights. Second, there
are significant sectarian issues. I mean, there are significant
sectarian issues between the Shia, the Sunni, the Kurd, there
are also significant issues within those segments, especially
the Sunni segment. So, we assessed it, based upon the fact that
they've done what they have to do, as a matter of law. But, let
me come back to an issue I've mentioned before.
One of the issues that they have to think about is how do
they execute? The Shia have 60 percent of the population, the
Kurds have 20 percent of the population, and the Sunnis have
20. Well, the Sunnis are used to running things on a
totalitarian basis for awhile, but now they have only 20
percent in the democracy. On a vote basis, they're not there. I
think that's one of the issues that you ought to try to find
out more about, as to whether and to what extent that's had a
practical problem in being able to move forward in some areas
where, otherwise, people might want to, and may even have the
votes.
Senator Akaka. I'd like to ask about the impact the surge
has had. If we have not improved the protection of minority
rights of legislators, then it suggests that a fundamental
tenant of the surge is not being met. Is there any evidence
that the surge has improved the protection of the rights of
minority members of the legislature?
Mr. Walker. We didn't look to that level of detail, Senator
Akaka. I think that one can say is the surge has had an impact
in at least two areas.
First, Anbar Province, and the efforts that we're taking
there to combat al Qaeda. Second, in the efforts of U.S. and
Iraqi forces to try to be able to provide additional security,
in major portions of Baghdad, including these joint security
stations and related activities there. Those are the areas
where I think the surge has had the most impact so far.
But, keep in mind that one of the reasons for the surge was
to provide, one of the Senators mentioned, ``breathing room,''
to make political progress. So far, that political progress has
not been made. Hopefully, it can be and it will be, but so far,
it has not.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Walker, for your
responses.
Chairman Levin. Senator Chambliss?
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be brief
so others can have a chance to make comments or ask questions
before the vote.
Mr. Walker, first all let me thank you for doing a great
job. Your staff, too. Most everybody on this committee--not
all, but most of us--have been in theater, we know the
difficulties that you encounter there, and your staff is to be
commended for taking the time, making the efforts, and really
getting down to the core of some of the issues that need to be
called to our attention, and addressed. It's information like
this that, I think, does provide us with the background to be
able to make the decisions that we're going to make, relative
to the situation in Iraq.
That being said, you have highlighted something that has
concerned me from day one over there, and the more I'm in Iraq,
the more I talk with people who are in theater, and I frankly
agree with you about the issue of the lack of movement by the
government. That's the weakest aspect of what's going on over
there.
I was pleased to hear you say that ``not met'' in your
chart, doesn't mean that there's been no progress, because
actually, I could probably argue with you, but it's immaterial
as to whether or not the ``not met'' is correct on a number of
these. But, the fact is, I think you have fairly stated what's
going on over there, from the standpoint of the government not
moving forward.
By the same token, if you had assessed the commitments made
by the current majority back in December, and done an
assessment at the end of 6 months, I daresay it wouldn't have
looked very positive. It's not just the current majority, you
could take the previous majority in any Congress, and assess
the activity of Congress, and I don't think we would have
scored very well on a points chart, like you've been tasked to
do.
So, I think you've done a good job in making the point that
they have failed to achieve some of these benchmarks. But, it
does appear from your report that they are moving forward.
The one chart that you had up there, relative to the level
of violence, brings to mind a charge that we saw yesterday from
General Jones, that's probably the most significant I've seen
relative to the conflict in Iraq. It was a chart which, unlike
yours which simply shows the number of incidents of violence,
and whether it had gone up or down, and that could be a suicide
bomber walking in and blowing up 100 people, or it could be a
few rifle shots, on incidents of violence.
What General Jones' chart showed was the decrease in
violent activity in the City of Baghdad. He took it over a
timeframe of several months. What that diagram showed, that the
incidences of violence are shrinking. The area where the
incidents of violence are occurring, is shrinking. That bears
out exactly what I expect to hear from General Petraeus next
week, and what I have personally seen on the ground in Iraq
when I've been there, and that is that we are making great
strides from a military perspective, and that our men and women
wearing the uniform are doing a terrific job.
General Petraeus is also, I think, going to validate what
you have reported to us, that the government has a long way to
go.
In summary, I just want to say, I think you've done a good
job of coming forward with facts, with telling us, you're
giving us a report of your investigation of the benchmarks that
we have tasked you to address. I look forward to seeing
additional reports like this, Mr. Chairman, as we move forward,
under whatever scenario we undertake, after General Petraeus
and Ambassador Crocker's report.
Mr. Walker, thanks to you and your folks. We commend you
for a job well done.
Mr. Walker. Senator Chambliss, so I can mention quickly,
for your benefit and the benefit of the other members of the
committee--this graphic is just total activity, it's not
lethality--there's a difference as to what type of casualties
might cover.
Senator Chambliss. Yes.
Mr. Walker. In our classified report, we do have
information on Baghdad, versus overall. I would commend our
classified report--as well as a classified report from the
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) to you to look at. I
think, though, they're both important.
Senator Chambliss. Yes, I agree. I think that's much more
meaningful than just a diagram showing spikes up and down.
Mr. Walker. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
General, let me thank you--not only for your work, and for
your staff's work, but your staff is not unaccustomed to
dealing with these issues. In fact, not only their expertise
individually, but their experience over the last 4 or 5 years,
with this topic in particular, is outstanding.
This is not a drive-by evaluation. These are people, I
presume, who are deeply, on a daily basis, involved. They have
a perspective, as well as the expertise to look at these
issues, and I thank you for that.
I think one of the critical issues that we're going to have
to address is the issue of these numbers, the accuracy of
numbers. You point out, there's a difference in methodology,
that you differ with General Petraeus' command. In that line,
there was an article yesterday in the Washington Post that
pointed out that DOD, in their releasing death counts,
dramatically shifted the results from last year to this year.
They had a report released in March which showed a peak in
December 2006 of approximately 1,200 and then they had a June
report that showed that to increase. General Petraeus is using
that as his baseline, the increased numbers. Can you comment,
at all, about the General's methodology, or the issue of
whether these numbers are accurate?
Mr. Walker. We're generally comfortable with the approach
that's taken on Figure 4 which is on page 10.
Senator Reed. Right.
Mr. Walker. I would commend to you, Senator, and the other
members of this committee, our classified report, that
supplements this non-classified report, because there's
information in it that's directly relevant to our concerns with
regard to data on sectarian violence. There's a lot of emphasis
on that, and I think you need to look at that.
Senator Reed. I appreciate that very much, and certainly we
don't want to intrude publicly here, today. But, we're going to
have a very public debate. General Petraeus will make public
statements about the decrease in violence, about the level, et
cetera, and if there are details in that classified report that
we can't divulge, then we, frankly, are disadvantaged.
I just wonder, from your perspective, without broaching the
security which we all recognize, do you have a comment on the
accuracy? The methodology?
Mr. Walker. Well, let me give you a comment that would be
non-classified. First, his (General Petraeus') data will show
that sectarian violence is going down, in recent months. He
will show that. Second, we are not comfortable with the
methodology that's used to determine, of total violence, which
is sectarian-related, and which is non-sectarian-related. It's
extremely difficult to do that, since people don't necessarily
leave calling cards when certain things happen. Even if there
is some type of attempt to leave information, you don't know
the accuracy or reliability of it.
So, we've said that his data will show it's gone down.
We're not comfortable with the methodology, and please read the
classified report, because it's not just our view.
Senator Reed. I will do that, but let me ask you another
question, which I think is appropriate. Your data, as I look at
your chart, suggests a decrease in violence over the last month
or so, is that fair?
Mr. Walker. Correct. It showed an increase in violence,
overall, up until June----
Senator Reed. Right.
Mr. Walker. The surge reached its full level in mid-June.
It shows a decrease since June, and the level at the end of
July of total violence is roughly the same as it was in
February 2007.
Senator Reed. General Petraeus' methodology shows a much
steeper decrease, is that fair?
Mr. Walker. His sectarian data, I think, shows a more
dramatic decline. I don't have it in front of me, and I can't
get much more specific than that.
Senator Reed. If this dramatic decline is urged upon us, at
least from a methodological basis, you have questions about
that?
Mr. Walker. We have questions about it. The other thing you
have to look at is, is it sustainable? You'll have to ask the
General that and you'll also have to look at what's going on--
this is in our classified report, too, which you need to look
at. You need to look at what migration has been taking place.
If you look at what Baghdad looks like today, versus 4 years
ago, with regard to which portions of the city are mixed, and
which portions of the city are predominantly Sunni or Shia,
you'll see there's been considerable migration, and you'll also
know that there is more difficulty in movement between one area
to another.
Senator Reed. You've anticipated my next line of
questioning, which is ethnic cleansing. One of the consequences
is perhaps because they succeeded in pushing people out of
these neighborhoods, that the intimidation, the violence, the
killing has gone down a bit that's not a good sign, that's just
a consequence of the facts on the ground, is that the case?
Mr. Walker. Our classified report has more information on
it.
Senator Reed. Can I ask you, this might seem like a dumb
question, but why is this classified? I mean, who are we trying
to keep this information from, the American people?
Mr. Walker. Well, we're not the ones that decide whether or
not it's classified, and we've expressed concerns in the past
as to whether or not there's over-classification.
Senator Reed. The only people who are not getting this
information, frankly, are the American people, and Congress, in
an open session, where we can honestly and fairly debate these
issues with people who have access to this information, and can
choose to divulge what they want, or not.
Mr. Walker. I would respectfully request, Senator Reed, you
ought to ask the administration witnesses that. Because the
administration is the one that decides whether or not to
classify data--whichever administration it is, that's not new,
it's been that way for a long time.
Senator Reed. Your point about ethnic cleansing was one
that I wanted to address, and that is--this might be peripheral
to the benchmarks you've looked at. But, I presume from what
you've said, your conclusion is that there's been a significant
ethnic displacement within Baghdad.
Mr. Walker. There's been significant migration within
Baghdad, correct.
Senator Reed. Also, migration out of the country, internal
displacement, unrelated to Baghdad, all over the country?
Mr. Walker. Correct, and we have data on that, and others
have data on that. Again, I think our classified report, and
the NIE classified report are two things, for sure, you need to
read.
Senator Reed. I guess the final point, and it's more of a
comment than a question, is that, we've had, I think, a very
important debate about, one, why should it be classified, and
two, what's the difference between the different methodologies.
My presumption would be that, for the Iraqi citizen, this is
all very immaterial. They're living in a very violent
atmosphere which undermines their trust in their government,
and undermines the ability of the government to function, and
not much has changed in that regard, even as we debate the
nuances of sectarian versus non-sectarian.
Mr. Walker. Well, in my professional opinion, I think one
of the things that Congress needs to consider is whether or not
the relevant benchmark should be sectarian violence or total
violence. It's difficult to be able to determine the
difference, and to some people, a casualty, is a casualty, is a
casualty.
Senator Reed. Final point--and this might go more for
anecdotal responses. My impression is that many of these
sectarian, ideological groups, also engage deliberately in
criminal activity, and so that the same person could be taking
you out, because he wants your money, and an hour later, taking
you out, because he doesn't like your religion, or your
politics, or your clothes. Is that, sort of, fair?
Mr. Walker. There's significant criminal activity, there's
significant corruption that exists, as well, in Iraq.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Walker, you said, just to clarify one
point of Senator Reed's that you don't do the classification?
Mr. Walker. That's correct, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Who did the classification of Benchmark 13?
Mr. Walker. DOD.
Chairman Levin. All right. I think that that was the
specific benchmark that you were referring to.
Mr. Walker. I think so, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. What we will be doing is making an urgent
request to the Secretary of Defense to reconsider the
classification of that benchmark, and any other benchmark, or
part of that document which any member of this committee wants
to add to the request. So, we're not just limiting the request
to one benchmark.
So, if by 3:00 this afternoon, any member of the committee
wants to seek reconsideration of any part of the classified
part of the GAO report, kindly let our staff director, Rick
DeBobes, know and we will include that in an urgent request,
that over the weekend there be reconsideration of this
classification. I briefly looked at this, and I don't quite
understand the reason for the classification.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Mr. Walker. Mr. Chairman, you're correct, it is number 13.
Also, I would point out for 13, there are two levels there,
first the level of sectarian violence, and second, eliminating
militia control of local security--both the administration and
we are in agreement, there has not been elimination of militia
control of local security, and we've already talked about the
sectarian violence issue.
Chairman Levin. All right, now, Senator Warner, again, you
would be next.
Senator Warner. I'm going to defer to Senator Thune.
Chairman Levin. Senator Thune, let me ask you--have you
voted?
Senator Thune. No.
Chairman Levin. I don't mean to intrude on your privacy,
here. The vote, I think, only is for a few more minutes. I'm
happy to recognize you if you want to stay here, but that's a
risk that you carry. If not, would you--when you're finished--
just simply recess for the call of the chair.
Senator Thune [presiding]. I will be happy to recess it,
Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, General, and your
staff for an excellent work product, and for the very thorough
and detailed way in which you go about this.
The one distinction you made that I think is a very
relevant one, when you said that you're tasked with determining
status as opposed to progress. I think that standard is a
little bit different for our benefit and use. I think it would
be very helpful if you can have apples-to-apples comparisons
with this report, and some of the other reports that are being
made, and just so that there is some, I guess, standard
threshold that we're all using when we evaluate whether or not
we are making headway and making progress.
There's one in particular that I would like to question,
I'd like to draw to your attention, with regard to that issue,
and that is, yesterday the committee received testimony from
the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) Assessment Commission, the
Jones Commission, that the ISF was made up of two parts--the
Iraqi Army and the Iraqi police. Benchmark 11 in your report,
does that apply to both the Iraqi Army, and the Iraqi police
force? I guess my question is, in assessing the benchmark, how
did you define Iraqi security forces?
Mr. Walker. My understanding is it's both forces.
Consistent with what you heard from the Jones Commission
yesterday, there's a much greater problem with the police
forces than with the Army.
Senator Thune. In writing your assessment of this
benchmark, you said you lumped them together? You put them
together?
Mr. Walker. That's correct.
Senator Thune. In other words, you did not differentiate or
distinguish between the two, and clearly, I think, in terms of
at least their testimony yesterday, there is a very clear
difference between the progress that's being made, and the work
that's being done by the Iraqi Army, versus the Iraqi police
force?
Mr. Walker. Senator, I think one of the things that we
would like to have the opportunity to work with this committee
on, if you want us to do additional work, going forward, is how
these benchmarks might be refined, and how they might be able
to be enhanced, and coming back to where you started--the best
type of information that you would have from my professional
opinion, would be where do things stand on relevant benchmarks,
and what progress is being made? You could require all parties
to do the same, and then you have an apples-to-apples
comparison that you can deal with and reach your own judgment.
Senator Thune. That would be very useful, and I know, even
with regard to the, the violence numbers, the casualty numbers,
and there are sort of different metrics that are being used,
but I think it would be extremely helpful if there was some way
in which these metrics could be applied in the, essentially,
same way.
Mr. Walker. I think they can be, they should be, we can
help you if you want to do that. But again, we did what we were
asked to do, but we did provide more information, in order to
help you get a sense as to whether, and to what extent,
progress has been made, both in the areas that we assessed as
not met, as well as those areas where we assessed as partially
met.
Senator Thune. I guess one of the reasons I say that is, at
least the way this is being interpreted out there by the media
and the public and others, are this report is very much at odds
with the other reports. I'm not sure there is as much
difference there as is being reported, but it's primarily, in
my view, because you were tasked differently than some of these
other Commissions have been.
Mr. Walker. We've tried to make that very clear, right up
front, at the beginning of the report, on the highlights page,
at the beginning of my testimony. We stand behind our report. I
think next week when General Petraeus comes, and you need to
seriously consider what he and Ambassador Crocker have to say.
The biggest area of disagreement will be on the sectarian
violence issue. We've already talked about that, and our
classified report has a lot more information you need to look
at there, I think.
Senator Thune. I appreciate that. I have to run and vote,
thank you again for your good work.
Mr. Walker. We'll be in recess, from what I understand.
Senator Thune. I will slam the gavel and put us in recess
until the chairman is able to return. Thank you.
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Senator. [Recess.]
Senator Webb [presiding]. The committee will be in order.
We're going to continue the testimony, Senator Graham has
another engagement. He's asked to give his questions now, so
we'll begin with Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Senator Webb, that's very kind
of you. I appreciate you letting me do that so I can catch my
flight.
Mr. Walker, I'd just add my high opinion of you to the list
of people who said nice things about you. I have to work with
you and your staff on Social Security. You all really do a good
job for us.
Now, your paycheck, I think, comes from Congress, is that
right?
Mr. Walker. It comes from the Treasury, but I work for
Congress.
Senator Graham. Work for Congress, and you've come to
Congress many times, saying things about entitlement reform, I
think, that Congress needs to hear. So, the fact that you're
employed by this body, I've never once thought for a second
that you would say anything other than what, professionally,
you've arrived at, and I hope people believe that about General
Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, because I think you all have
that in common. You just have different universes from which
you come.
But this information you're giving Congress is important,
and I think the American people want to know where we're at in
Iraq, and what does it look like going forward.
Now, the political reconciliation part, is the prize. You
can have a million troops in Iraq, it is not going to change
things in a permanent fashion until the government reconciles
itself. What is your belief regarding a breakthrough in the
next 60 days regarding legislation called de-Baathification, or
provincial election legislation being passed in Baghdad?
Mr. Walker. Senator Graham, I don't think it would be
appropriate for me to try to give you odds on that. I will tell
you, as I noted in my testimony, based on our work, that was
part of the National Unity Accord that's been signed.
Senator Graham. That was about 2 weeks ago, right?
Mr. Walker. That's correct.
Senator Graham. How do you evaluate that Unity Accord? Is
that a significant event for you?
Mr. Walker. It is a significant event, but it states
intent, and as you can see from this graphic here, there are
lots of steps you have to go through, in the legislative
process, in order to make it a reality.
Senator Graham. Would you agree with me, that when Congress
really wants to do something, it will do it, and when it finds
reasons not to, it won't?
Mr. Walker. There are lots of reasons not to move things,
but when there is agreement, broad-based agreement, things can
happen quickly.
Senator Graham. From your visit, did you sense a war-
weariness among the Iraqi people that you met with, that they
were tired of the killing and the dying?
Mr. Walker. We really were focusing on meeting with
officials necessary to do this assessment rather than
individual Iraqi citizens on the street.
Senator Graham. Okay, now when it comes to sectarian
violence, whether it's going up or down--I remember very
graphically, when it was being reported out of Iraq that
sectarian violence is spiraling out of control, about a year
ago. Do you remember that?
Mr. Walker. I remember when it was a major concern, in
fact, as you remember, Senator Graham, undoubtedly that one of
the primary reasons that the President proposed the surge is to
try to be able to try to get sectarian violence under control,
in order to give breathing space for political progress.
Senator Graham. Right. How did we measure sectarian
violence then?
Mr. Walker. My understanding is, it was MNF-I, as it is
now. But, it's in the classified briefing.
Senator Graham. Yes, no one seemed to argue with the fact
that the numbers had gone up. I'm just curious as to why
somebody would question the same methodology if they show a
drop?
Mr. Walker. Yes, I don't know.
Senator Graham. Okay.
Mr. Walker. We're not saying they're wrong--we're just not
saying they're right. It's very difficult to be able to
determine.
Senator Graham. You could say that about whether or not
they'd spiked, I guess.
Mr. Walker. Well, that's true.
Senator Graham. Yes, right.
Mr. Walker. If they're using the same methodology now that
they were then, which I can't say right now then I would have
had the same concerns.
Senator Graham. Right, right. Yes, but the bottom line is,
if it's the same methodology, one could argue that they were
wrong when the numbers went up, you could argue they're wrong
when they're coming down, but if it's the same methodology, at
least you're comparing apples to apples.
Mr. Walker. Correct.
Senator Graham. Okay. Now, the idea of using the
information is, obviously, it's for every Senator to determine
how to put this puzzle together, and you're part of the puzzle.
General Jones' testimony, and then we'll have Ambassador
Crocker, and General Petraeus and your report, and we'll have
to put this puzzle together.
One of the questions that drives me the most is--if we
decided now to withdraw a large number of troops at a date
certain, and we declared it, that we would reduce our forces by
half, say, in 6 months--do you have any idea how that would
affect future progress?
Mr. Walker. Senator, it would be speculation for me to say
that.
Senator Graham. Okay.
Mr. Walker. That's beyond the scope of what we were asked
to do.
Senator Graham. Right, right. Well, thank you very much for
your service, and for giving us the information that you've
provided to the committee about a snapshot of where we stand,
based on some areas. Did you look at the police at all?
Mr. Walker. We did look at the police as it relates to the
security forces, for example, even-handed enforcement of the
law--any place where it talked about security forces. Our work,
not just with regard to this particular report, but past
reports, have shown significant differences between challenges
associated with the police and the Army.
Senator Graham. I certainly agree with that. I don't know
why the police are more sectarian, why they're so far behind,
but they certainly are.
Mr. Walker. In many cases, Senator Graham, it's because the
police are hired at the provincial or local level rather than
at the national level.
Senator Graham. That doesn't bother me, if you have local
policeman policing the local area, that's okay. But the
National Ministry of Interior seems to have a bias that is
unhealthy. Did you look at the judiciary at all?
Mr. Walker. No, we did not look at the judiciary.
Senator Graham. Can I ask, Senator Levin, the next time we
do a benchmark, that we consider looking at the rule of law
from the judicial side? The detention policy side? Because, I
have seen some progress, but I'll be honest with you, Senator
Levin, there are many concerns there, and this is an area where
I think Congress can reinforce some gains we've made, and I'll
just put that on the table, that maybe we'll add that to our
list next time.
Chairman Levin [presiding]. Senator Graham, you've made
that very compelling point for a long time, and I think most of
us have, hopefully, soaked in what you and a few others on this
committee have talked about in terms of the lacking
infrastructure in the justice area.
Senator Graham. Right.
Chairman Levin. Of course, Senator Warner is also the
author of the benchmark legislation, but I'm sure the next
round it could, and should, be added.
The focus of these benchmarks, though, just to kind of
remind everyone--is that these are the self-adopted benchmarks
by the Iraqi government.
Senator Graham. Right, I understand, I understand.
Chairman Levin. So, we were trying to judge them by their
own standards.
Senator Graham. Absolutely, absolutely, absolutely.
Chairman Levin. I agree with you that there are other
indications, such as yours, which need to be added.
Senator Graham. Thank you for sharing this information with
us, and to your staff who made it possible, and went over there
to Iraq, we appreciate their service, too. Thank you.
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Walker, I first would like to echo my agreement with
something that Senator McCaskill said. There are so many
different components here that are being brought forward to us
in order to attempt to make an evaluation of the situation that
we face. The scope of what you were asked to do, really, is
pretty much a result of what the administration laid forward as
to what they said they were going to do.
I go back, first of all, to the speech that the President
made in January when he announced the surge. These are things
that the Iraqis said they were going to do. One of the major
components of that was--and I'm going to directly quote his
speech, that they would ``establish its authority, the Iraqi
government plans to take responsibility for security in all of
Iraq's provinces by November.'' Did you see any indication that
that actually is going to occur?
Mr. Walker. It's unrealistic to expect that Iraqi Security
Forces will take total control of every province by November of
this year.
Senator Webb. Did you get any feeling from the reports that
you got as to how many of those provinces would be fully
controlled by the Iraqi?
Mr. Walker. No, Senator Webb, that was beyond the scope of
what we were asked to do.
Senator Webb. Okay.
Mr. Walker. So, we did not.
Senator Webb. One of the other points that I think is
important here, at any time that we have these sorts of
emotional, and politically-driven debates, it's very important
to understand the facts. I think we can argue about conclusions
all we want, but I think facts themselves need to be fully
understood before we can proceed to the argument beyond them.
I'm saying that because yesterday, one of the set of facts
that sort of jumped out at me, when General Jones and his
Commission were reporting, was they said at least three times
in their testimony that the Iraqi casualty rate was higher,
significantly higher, than the American casualty rate, and they
had a chart that showed the same kind of chart that you have on
the Average Daily Enemy-Initiated Attack Incidents. But, when I
sat down and added up the numbers of Iraqis that they were
including, operationally--the Iraqi military, the Iraqi police,
the territorial forces, et cetera, the people under their
Ministry of Interior--when you added those up, there were 3.6
times as many Iraqis, notionally, at risk as there were
Americans in Iraq, and if you played that back into the data,
it showed that the Iraqis were not taking casualties at a rate
higher than we were, the American forces, and in fact, I would
venture--they didn't have the data available yesterday--but I
would venture that if you took the police casualties out of
that formula, that you would see markedly higher American
casualties actually out in the operating environment.
I say that as an example of how we need to really look at
facts before we reach conclusions. Now I have a question with
respect to the chart, and I know, I watched your opening
statement from my office before I came down here, and I saw the
caveats that you were putting in to this chart, but I'm just
wondering here--on the one hand, what we're measuring in your
chart, Figure 3, as it's in front of me, the Average Number of
Daily Enemy-Initiated Attacks, showing that they went up, and
now that, there's a drop at the very end of this chart, that it
could be argued that the average number of attacks are down,
but how does that play out in terms of casualties? I'm not
seeing casualties? The reason that I ask this is--there are two
reasons that I ask this, and I think it's very important, at
least from my understanding of where we're going on this. The
first is that we're seeing more sophisticated methods of
attack. In fact, I think you even mentioned that, the
sophistication of the IEDs and that sort of thing. I think it
was you that had mentioned that----
Mr. Walker. It wasn't me, it was a Senator.
Senator Webb. --but, with a more highly sophisticated
device, you're going to have fewer attacks, but they're going
to be more effective. So, that doesn't mean that fewer attacks
mean fewer casualties.
The second reason I'm asking this, is because there was an
article in the Associated Press (AP) about 10 days ago, that
said that the average number of civilian deaths in Iraq
actually was double this year than last year--went from 30 to
62, according to this AP article. Would you comment on that
with respect to your chart?
Mr. Walker. Well, Senator, I would respectfully suggest
that you should consider several things. First, our chart,
which is on page 10, which talks about the average number of
daily enemy-initiated attacks against the coalition or Iraqi
security forces and civilians. As you can see, there's a
significant difference in the incidents of attacks on the
coalition forces, which includes our forces--primarily our
forces--versus the Iraqi security forces. There are a lot more
attacks on coalition forces than there are Iraqi security
forces.
Second, I think you also need to consider lethality. In
other words, this is the amount of attacks, but there are
different natures of attacks. Some are more effective than
others, so I think you ought to consider that as well, and you
ought to break that down based on coalition, Iraqi security
forces, and civilians.
Senator Webb. Exactly. That's exactly my point. Now, you
have a chart that indicates--this goes a little bit to the
point that Senator Reed was trying to make earlier about how we
need to be able to articulate actually what's going on in this
debate that we're going to have. We have this chart that shows
the number, average number of daily attacks, but I don't see a
chart that shows the casualty implications.
Mr. Walker. We have some additional data in our classified
report, but what I would respectfully suggest, Senator Webb,
for you and any other member of this committee, if there are
things that you don't have in there that you want, let me know,
and we'll see what we can do.
Senator Webb. So, you don't have any information that would
illuminate the AP article about the doubling in the number of
average casualties?
Mr. Walker. We have some more information in our classified
report, and candidly, I'm a little bit uncomfortable in
recalling which of this is classified and nonclassified--that's
why I'd rather deal with it offline, if we can.
Senator Webb. All right. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb, Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I'd like to draw the witness's attention to a
matter that you and I observed on our trip. I'm not sure that
in the course of your work, Comptroller General, that you
examined this. But, it's a question of the foreign military
sales problem, which Senator Levin and I received a briefing on
by the senior ranking officers in Iraq. That this system has
failed to deliver in a timely fashion a great deal of essential
military equipment, required both by the Iraqi Army, and the
Iraqi police. I think I speak for my chairman--both of us were
astounded. Because we keep trying to push both of these
organizations to train and prepare, and to take up a greater
burden--did you have an opportunity to look into that issue?
Mr. Walker. Not as part of this engagement, Senator Warner.
But I will, as soon as I get back to the office, find out if
we're doing anything else on it, outside of this engagement and
get back to both of you and let you know.
Senator Warner. Fine.
You join me in that request?
Chairman Levin. I do. As a matter of fact, our staffs have
drafted for us the letter which we will----
Senator Warner. Letter that we're sending today.
Mr. Walker. It sounds like we will be soon doing work
there. It's very worthwhile.
Chairman Levin. We will send you a copy of that letter, so
that you can tell us whether or not you could add to this
inquiry, because it is a very serious business.
Mr. Walker. Be happy to do that, Senator. We look forward
to taking a look at it.
[The information referred to follows:]
Foreign Military Sales. CG commits to provide additional
information to the committee regarding any ongoing GAO work.
The Iraqi Government is making an effort to address longstanding
procurement and contracting problems by procuring items for its
security forces through the U.S. foreign military sales program (FMS).
To date, the Government of Iraq has committed about $3.3 billion for
U.S. military sales. According to the Multi-National Security
Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), these funds are being used lo
procure a variety of items such as small arms, ammunition, uniforms,
body armor, vehicles, aircraft, and other items.
According to U.S. Government officials, the Iraqi Government has
expressed concern about the length of time it takes to procure items
through the FMS process. However. MNSTC-I and Defense Security
Cooperation Agency (DSCA) officials stated that Iraqi Government
officials had unrealistic expectations regarding FMS processing time
frames leading to an ``expectations gap.'' Officials also noted that
efforts to expedite the current FMS process are hindered by a number of
factors, including Iraq's difficulty in defining military requirements,
insufficient U.S. and Iraqi staffing, the absence of an Iraqi
Government multiyear acquisition strategy to guide future procurement
efforts, and competing demands for similar equipment for U.S. and Iraqi
security forces, such as M-16 rifless. To address these issues, the
military departments, DSCA, MNSTC-I, and others have initiated efforts
lo help the Iraqi Government better define requirements, increased
security assistance office staffing and training, and implemented a new
tracking system to provide increased visibility over FMS procurements
for U.S. and Iraqi Governments officials, among other efforts.
Senator Warner. Also, in the report yesterday by that very
distinguished group, headed up by General Jones, they talked
about the need to have a more rapid transfer of authority,
security responsibilities and the like, to the various
provincial governments. I think 6 of them, now, have been given
the authority, 6 out of the 18. It seems as though the
distressing chapters of fact that we have received here in the
past week or 10 days, indicate less and less hope respecting
the ability to have reconciliation at the top, again to work
down, and more the administration and others are putting
emphasis on the importance of the small, but nevertheless,
significant, reconciliation that's growing up, particularly in
the al Anbar province and elsewhere, amongst the Sheiks and so
forth, now working with the coalition forces, and trying to cut
down the sectarian violence, and reinforcing our efforts
against al Qaeda.
But, it seems to me, the more we bring upon the Federal
system, such as it exists, the Maliki Government, to begin to
accelerate the transfer of authority--they call it the
Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) Program--down to these regional
authorities, the faster this, somewhat, interesting growth of
bottom-up reconciliation. I tell you the public has to be
confused about all of these terms. Because we all started off
on reconciliation at the top on January 10, and if we do the
surge, and secure the military operations, Maliki will have in
place a whole framework of achievements on reconciliation
down--well, it's not happening.
So, back to the question. Did you address the advisability
of the PIC Program, and accelerating it to move authority down?
Mr. Walker. That was beyond our scope, Senator Warner. I
will note that, as I said before, there has been progress in al
Anbar province, in particular with regard to combating al
Qaeda. Al Anbar province is about 5 percent of the population
of Iraq and is not a mixed population, it's overwhelmingly a
Sunni population.
Senator Warner. Also, did you make reference as sort of a
benchmark to the important contributions provided by the NIE,
which is the consensus of 16 of our intelligence organizations,
with regard to certain, they sort of laid them out as
benchmarks?
Mr. Walker. We did consider input from the intelligence
agencies. We did read, were aware, and did consider that, and
we also commend to you the classified version of that, which
I'm sure you've probably already read.
Senator Warner. Yes.
Mr. Walker. I would encourage other members to read it.
Senator Warner. Oh, yes. Well then, just for this record, I
wondered if we could ask these questions. If your research and
findings support the Intelligence Community findings contained
in the unclassified key judgments of the NIE on Iraq issued
last month. The first one, was the Intelligence Community
assesses that ``to the extent that coalition forces continue to
conduct robust counterinsurgency operations and mentor and
support the Iraqi security forces, that Iraq security will
continue to improve modestly during the next 6 to 12 months.''
Mr. Walker. We did not, Senator Warner, project where we
think things were going from here. Because our task was to
assess where things stood as of a particular point in time.
Senator Warner. Right.
Mr. Walker. So that's beyond what we were asked to do.
Senator Warner. All right. The next one, ``the Intelligence
Community assesses that the Iraqi Government will become more
precarious over the next 6 to 12 months.''
Mr. Walker. Again, we did not attempt to project where we
think things were going.
Senator Warner. All right.
Mr. Walker. We felt that was beyond our scope. I will note
for the record, Senator Warner, that there are a number of
aspects of the unclassified version of the National Intelligent
Estimate on Iraq that we do concur with and I'm happy to----
Senator Warner. Well, I tell you what. If you could provide
for the record those findings of the NIE with which you have
concurrence and, more specifically, if there are findings with
which you have a professional differences of view.
Mr. Walker. Within the scope of what we were asked to do?
Senator Warner. Within the scope.
Mr. Walker. We will do that.
Senator Warner. There's one very important one. The NIE
also assessed changing the mission of Coalition forces from a
primarily counterinsurgency and stabilization role to more of a
support role, ``Would erode security gains achieved thus far.''
Now, that might fall within the parameters of your metrics.
Mr. Walker. We'll take a look at it, Senator, and we will
be happy to do what we can.
Senator Warner. I thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Just to clarify that request, however, if
it doesn't fall within in your scope, make it clear.
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That's a good point.
We'll do that.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Government Accountability Office can provide some additional
classified information on this issue. However, this briefing will
require codeword clearance.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Bayh.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to begin by
thanking you and, particularly, Senator Warner, for his kind
remarks about Senator Snowe and myself.
Senator Warner. I remember you came up to me on the floor
and you felt that this was an important element. Since we're in
a posture here in Congress of trying to facilitate the maximum
amount of information that can be utilized by Congress in
making its decisions--as well as the general public--and
hopefully some of these constructive findings by this
organization, General Jones, and others can contribute to the
President's and synthesis of all this information, and his
final remarks with regard to such strategy changes as he deems
appropriate.
Senator Bayh. Well, that was exactly our intent, and I
think that is going to be the result of the GAO's report. But
it wouldn't have happened without you, Senator, so I want to
thank you and the chairman for your support.
Since the outset of this undertaking with the weapons of
mass destruction situation, we've struggled to get accurate
information upon which we can base our decisions. Issues of
credibility have been raised because some of the reports
previously have been inaccurate about things. Your report is
very helpful, serving as an objective marker against which to
measure other assessments and to compare other assessments,
just as Senator Warner was doing with the declassified versions
of the NIE. We're going to hear from General Petraeus, as well,
and we heard yesterday from General Jones, and so forth. So
thank you for helping the American people and those of us as
policymakers get access to the facts so we can make the best
decisions possible.
Mr. Walker, I really enjoyed your interaction with Senator
McCaskill, one accountant to another--I'm going to ask you to,
perhaps, help us, not only ascertain the facts, but perhaps
draw some lessons from them. It may, at times, go close to
going beyond the scope of your report, but you're an
intelligent man and I'd appreciate your opinion, whether
personal or official.
The first is the progress--as you noted--has so far just
not been made on the political front. Everyone agrees that,
ultimately, we've made some security gains, our troops are
behaving heroically. If success in Iraq was solely up to them,
we'd be doing very well. But it's not solely up to them.
Ultimately, we can not create a country for the Iraqis. They
have to do their part and that involves political
reconciliation, and it just hasn't been happening.
I'm wondering if you've developed an opinion in the course
of compiling this report and assessing that the political
progress has not been adequate, why that has been. I mean,
their country is at risk of falling apart. They're dying, we're
dying. Why not the progress? Where's the sense of urgency?
What's holding this up?
Mr. Walker. Well, first Senator Bayh, I would not express a
personal opinion because I don't think it's appropriate to
separate my position as Comptroller General of the United
States from my personal opinion. Therefore, to the extent that
I comment, it will be based upon our work and my personal
interaction.
Senator Bayh. I'm just asking for your assessment to the
extent you have one.
Mr. Walker. Yes. I think what I would suggest is, the level
of complexity in Iraq is much greater than the level of
complexity in the United States with regard to getting things
done, because of the sectarian differences, because of the
newness of their Republic, and a variety issues.
Senator Bayh. Historic enmities, and the cycle of violence,
and the neighbors intruding, and the list goes on and on and
on.
Mr. Walker. We don't have the type of activity in our
streets, thank God.
Senator Bayh. Here's the direction I'm going with this
question. Is it possible, in your opinion, that in spite of our
best efforts, and the heroic sacrifices of our military and
others, that since this is ultimately up to them and the
process of political reconciliation, given the challenges that
they face, it just may ultimately not be doable for them.
Mr. Walker. I think only time will tell. I think one of the
things that one has to keep in mind is that with the Sunnis
having 20 percent of population, but accustomed to being in
charge, with the Kurds having 20 percent, and with the Shia
having 60--of which that's not a single block--they may be, and
I don't know this for a fact, doing scenario analysis. Each
group may be doing scenario analysis as to how do we come out
based on this course of action versus an alternative course of
action. I can't put myself in their minds.
Senator Bayh. It would frankly be reassuring to know that
they were going through such a rational process.
Mr. Walker. I can't say whether they are or they aren't,
but that's human.
Senator Bayh. As I mentioned, this is our third hearing.
We're going to have one next week. We sit in rooms like this
and talk about decisions that we make and if we do this what
will happen, if we do that what will happen. Based upon the
information you gleaned in the process of putting together this
very good report, shouldn't we have a fair amount of modesty
when it comes to our own assessment of our ability to influence
events there? I mean, based upon your answer to my previous
question. They're making their calculus and their decision
based upon a whole lot of factors, in addition to what we do.
Now, we can affect things, but shouldn't we be a little bit
modest in our assessment of our ability to drive events in
Iraq?
Mr. Walker. I'll say it a little bit differently. We have
made a difference on the security front, and our military has
done everything they've been asked to do. We've made a
difference there. But part of the reason that we've used our
military in that regard, is to provide the space for political
progress. Only they can decide that they want national
reconciliation and do what it takes to make that happen.
Senator Bayh. Well, let me ask you about that.
Mr. Walker. So far they haven't. Hopefully they will.
Senator Bayh. That's what I'm driving at here. Let me ask
you if you've developed an opinion about what, if anything, we
can do to expedite the process of reconciliation, to the extent
we can, which in my own opinion is, we can operate at the
margins, but ultimately it's up to them. Let me ask you about
the conundrum that we've wrestled with here. If we stand by
them in an attempt to build up their security and their
confidence in the hope that they'll make tough compromises in
the process of reconciliation, a sense of urgency seems to
dissipate and they back-off, they have kind of a comfort zone
there. If on the other hand, we set timelines and insist upon
consequences for their failure to act, well then they retreat
into their sectarian corners and begin to prepare for the
aftermath when we leave. Either way, it seems that our action,
either staying or threatening to go, doesn't expedite the
process of political reconciliation. How would you address that
conundrum?
Mr. Walker. Let me just say, without getting into details,
I found that in order to achieve positive results in a
sustainable fashion, you have to have a framework that deals
with three things. A plan that provides appropriate goals,
objectives, metrics and milestones, and incentives for people
to do the right thing. Second, adequate transparency to provide
reasonable assurance that people will do the right thing
because somebody's looking. Third, appropriate accountability
and consequences if people don't deliver on their commitments.
I think there's more that can be done with regard to those
elements here without getting into a lot of detail.
Senator Bayh. I think that's a very important statement.
General Jones sitting in the chair that you're occupying today,
yesterday, said in his opinion he thought that deadlines would
be counterproductive. I asked him, ``What about consequences,
what about accountability?'' He's a good man, but there wasn't
much of a direct answer to that.
Mr. Walker. I think there's a difference between a
milestone and a deadline. I mean, there is a fundamental
difference. When you have goals, objectives, metrics, and
milestones, if you don't hit the milestones then there should
be some explanation and accountability for why you didn't, and
then you'll have to make a judgment as to whether or not things
are likely to change. That's different.
Senator Bayh. Let me ask you then. We have these benchmarks
you've reported on here. Most of them haven't been met,
correct?
Mr. Walker. That's correct.
Senator Bayh. What are the consequences going to be for
them not having been met?
Mr. Walker. Yet to be determined.
Senator Bayh. I think the honest answer is none. None that
I'm aware of. So we can talk about deadlines or milestones or
however we want to split that hair, but ultimately there will
have to be some kind of consequences, as you say, otherwise
behavior doesn't change. So, we're struggling with what those
consequences, if any, should be. Some of us have concluded that
we're long past the time where there at least need to be some,
otherwise they're not going to take us seriously.
Mr. Walker. Well, and I think one of the things that this
committee needs to consider, as well as Congress, is what
should our goals be, what should our objectives be, what should
the metrics and milestones be, what type of reporting and
mechanisms will be there to try to make sure we're making
progress. But I think one of the subsets is, what should the
role of our military be? I mean, it's going to be there for a
while. What should their role be? Consistent with the goals and
the objectives and all these other factors.
Senator Bayh. Just a final couple things, Mr. Walker. I
think your last statement there was very important about the
three things that you mentioned about how to go about
influencing behavior there. I hope that we'll adopt as the
policy of this government, but to date we've been requesting
and suggesting and pleading and they've given lip service to
that but nothing has happened. There has to begin to be some
consequence for that. I think your statement was very
important.
Two final quick things. General Jones, yesterday, in his
testimony indicated the belief that the Iraqi security forces
over the next--I can't remember the period--6 to 12 months or
12 to 18 months, over a period of either 6 months to a year and
a half, would have improved their capability sufficiently that
we could begin the process of adjusting, redeploying, however
you want to characterize our presence in Iraq. I asked him
about his confidence level that they would achieve that
sometime next year, that would enable us to begin the process
of redeploying. His expressed in his words ``a high degree of
confidence'' in that judgment. Do you share that high degree of
confidence?
Mr. Walker. Senator, we did not attempt to project forward
as to what we think is going to happen. That was beyond our
scope, and I really don't think it's appropriate for me to do
that.
Chairman Levin. Senator, if I could interrupt on that
point.
At the end of the conversation yesterday with General
Jones, he made it clear because I asked him to clarify this
question. In answering the questions that this could happen,
with a high degree of confidence, in 6 to 12 months, that was
his task, what could occur in 6 to 12 months. I point blank
asked him, ``Well couldn't that transition occur sooner than
that?'' He said, ``Yes. I'm not trying to imply it can't occur
sooner, but my task was to say what could be achieved in 6 to
12 months.'' It's a very significant difference. It's like, if
I asked you, ``Could you be back in Indiana in 6 to 12
months?'' Your answer would be, ``Sure.'' That's what his
answer was yesterday. But if the question was, ``Does that mean
you can't be in Indiana this weekend?'' The answer is, ``No, I
can be there this weekend, too.''
Senator Bayh. Perhaps he didn't understand my question. I
read from the section of his report, quoting the language
expressing his beliefs that they would achieve that, and asked
him, ``Well, what's your confidence level in that assessment?''
He said he had a high confidence.
Chairman Levin. That's correct, but that does not suggest
that it can not occur before 6 to 12 months.
Senator Bayh. Of course.
Chairman Levin. Because of what he was tasked to do, that
was the way it was phrased. I just commend you on the question,
but also that you get that Q&A with him, so there's not a
suggestion, which the press kind of picked up, I think,
erroneously. Well, that means that it could not happen before 6
to 12 months. That's not what he was saying.
Senator Bayh. I understand and I agree. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
One last question. Is it possible for you to render an
opinion about whether the security gains, which our military,
our forces have secured over the last several months, can
persist in the absence of political reconciliation? In other
words, some of us are trying to determine whether the progress
on the security front that apparently has been achieved is
transitory or whether it is more permanent. Some of us believe
that it has set the stage, but without political
reconciliation--which according to your report, just doesn't
seem to be happening--it will either be transitory, or it could
only be maintained with an indefinite commitment of our
security forces.
Mr. Walker. Well, the unclassified NIE makes it pretty
clear the political process is essential in order to ultimately
achieve the current objectives that are outlined by the
administration in Iraq. Second, it also shares our concerns
with regard to the lack of political progress. Furthermore, it
notes that while the military can make a difference, it can't
get the job done. One of the issues that, by itself, no matter
how great of effort they do and no matter what the results are
there, and they are performing courageously in getting results.
I think one of the questions you have to ask yourself, and
potentially General Petraeus next week is, what has happened so
far on the military front. There has been progress, how much of
that experience is sustainable and how much of it is
transferable is not yet known. I think both are relevant and I
think, obviously, he's on the ground, he's in the best position
to give you an opinion.
I come back to what I said before. We need to rethink about
what the goals ought to be, the objectives, what the metrics
and milestones should be. We need to have the three elements
that I talked about. Then when people tell you things,
periodically you'll come back and find out what actually
happened, and ask them, ``Why didn't it happen?'' or
``Congratulations that it did happen,'' or, ``What's the reason
for the variance?'' and ``What's going to change in the next 3
months?'' We need to get on a track here so that you can make
some more informed, timely, and considered judgments.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Walker. That exhausts my
questions.
I just want to, again, thank the Chairman and, Senator
Warner.
I want to thank you for having performed a real public
service. Your analytical framework here, the objectivity you've
brought to this can really help clarify the decisions that we
need to make. So thank you very much. I'm sure it was a real
labor for you.
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Senator Bayh.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Bayh.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Warner. If I could say something.
You really framed in your last closing remarks, what is so
important. You point out the expectations that we had with
regard to benchmarks, to political reconciliation from the top
down. That information is now coming up, corroborated, in many
instances, by the various panels and sources coming before
Congress. It then goes to the President. With no disrespect
whatsoever to the President--he's faced with one of the most
difficult decisions any President has ever faced--namely, one
of them is that the military witnesses have repeatedly said
this problem can not be solved by military force, that
political reconciliation from the top down is an essential
element. I think there's consensus that top-down political
reconciliation is no longer a foundation for what strategy we
begin to pursue in the next months, days, whatever it may be. I
just hope the President will address this because you used the
word accountability. The President has to address that very
question. It is at the heart of what we're trying to determine
as how America and the other coalition forces, what strategy do
they follow in the next 6 to 12 months.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. Senator Sessions?
Let me interrupt if you're beginning, Senator Sessions. I'm
going to have to leave. I want to leave with my thanks to you,
Mr. Walker. Senator Bayh has to leave, so Senator Warner can
take over while, from here on in and if he leaves, Senator
Sessions, would you close it off or turn it over to anyone
else. Thank you so much.
Senator Warner [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, we'll
do that.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Walker, for your and GAO's contribution to
this national discussion that we're having now. We had General
Jones and his crew yesterday. You now are giving your report.
We'll have General Petraeus giving his report next week. It's
appropriate and fitting that this Nation undertake a national
discussion of Iraq, honestly, with the best information we can
get and make the tough decisions we have to make that serve our
national interest, serve the world's interest, our allies, and
our security and safety of the American people.
I don't doubt the value of what we're doing. I totally
support it. I think all of us need to rise above politics and
we need to try to do the right thing for our country at this
difficult time. Thank you for participating in this discussion.
I would tend to agree with Senator Bayh, who says we should
be somewhat modest about creating a government in an area of
the world that's never had one before, that's never functioned
in a decent way before. It's very hard, it's just very hard.
Let me ask one thing, for the record. You've complimented
the military on a number of occasions and it's something of
which I'm proud. They go out every day to execute the policies
we ask them to execute. They put their lives at risk for us.
But would you tell us, in the hierarchy of command in Iraq,
what agencies of our Government are responsible for negotiating
and encouraging and facilitating political reconciliation in
Iraq, electricity, water, and that kind of thing.
Mr. Walker. It depends upon the issue, Senator Sessions.
Responsibility in Iraq is generally divided primarily between
DOD and DOS, depending upon what the particular issues are, if
you will. That's why it's appropriate that you're going to be
hearing, next week, from both General Petraeus, who's our
Commander on the ground, but also from Ambassador Crocker.
Senator Sessions. But the real truth is that it's not our
military, our DOD that is charged with the primary
responsibility for working with the Iraqi leaders to assist
them in creating a more progressive and effective government.
That's DOS's responsibility.
Mr. Walker. You raise a good point. One of the concerns
that we've expressed, based upon our past work, is an adequate
number of advisors, both from the U.S., as well hopefully from
the international community, to be able to help Iraq help
itself be able to stand up a fully-functioning government that
can deliver reliable electricity, enough safe and potable
water, safer streets, education, health care. This is really
important. In many cases what's happened is the military has
been asked to do things that, quite frankly, they're willing to
step up to the plate and do what they can, but they don't
necessarily have the expertise. The fact that you have somebody
in the uniform doing it, even though it's a non-military
matter, doesn't necessarily send the right kind of signal, as
well. So I think you've touched on an important issue that
we've highlighted in some of our prior work, prior to this 18
benchmark report.
Senator Sessions. Well, if you're looking at it from a
management responsibility, I think you would say that the
military is making progress--at least I would and General Jones
did--but the areas that are lagging behind are the
governmental, which are not the military's primary
responsibility. I just kind of want to make that point.
Mr. Walker. I think our report supports that.
Senator Sessions. Looking at the numbers about violence,
we've had an upward trend, according to your chart on page 11--
for some time I guess--from January 2006, now to September
2007, a general upward trend in violence. But it does appear
that, according to your chart, that maybe about June, in both
attacks on the coalition and overall attacks, there has been a
decline. Your report ends in July. Maybe July it begins to
drop--June, July area--and it does show a rather sharp
reduction. How far that will continue, I don't know. You did
not evaluate the month of August, as far as violent trends, did
you? At least this chart does not.
Mr. Walker. We asked for data and were briefed on data
through August 15. We then asked for the data for the month,
but it is yet to be provided to us. Hopefully it will be
provided to you, next week, when General Petraeus speaks. As
you can see, there was a significant decline between June and
July, but two important notes there. Number one, it was
primarily attributable to attacks on Coalition forces. In other
words, that's where most of it was. In the other areas it's
roughly about the same, civilian and attacks on Iraqi security
forces. Second, the overall level of violence in July 2007 was
roughly the same as February 2007.
I think it's going to be important for you to be able to
get what the numbers are for August. We also have to keep in
mind that Ramadan starts this month. Hopefully the past is not
prologue with regard to Ramadan. In the past, the tendency has
been for somewhat less violence right before Ramadan and
escalating violence during Ramadan. Hopefully that won't occur
this year, but I just note that, because it is an important
fact that you need to keep in mind.
Senator Sessions. Well, I certainly don't think these are
balanced numbers that we should be celebrating, or assuming are
going to continue indefinitely, this trend downward. But I do
believe that the numbers will probably show that August
continued a decline, which is certainly better than showing an
increase. We ought not to disregard that.
The administration evaluated benchmarks and you evaluated,
I guess, their evaluation. Was that required by the mandate?
Mr. Walker. Well, not really. What they did is, they looked
at the benchmarks in July, and they evaluated them based upon
whether or not they felt satisfactory progress was being made.
We looked at the benchmarks as of August 30, 2007 and
consistent with the statutory mandate, noted whether or not
they had met or not met, but used our independent professional
judgment to be able to also use some partially met ratings.
Furthermore, consistent with some of the language in our
mandate, we provided a lot of commentary so you got a sense as
to what kind of progress was made. Of the ones that were not
met, was any progress there or not? In many cases there was
some, but just not a lot.
Senator Sessions. I think that's fine and I think people
here are concerned about it and we want the best information
and multiple sources of information, multiple perspectives, and
thank you for sharing that. I guess it would be fair to say you
did not find, in their report, their evaluation, things that
were plainly false or dishonest in that report?
Mr. Walker. We didn't evaluate theirs. But what we did do
is, as I have in one of the exhibits--the last exhibit, I
believe, that has been provided as part of my testimony--we did
do a comparative analysis of what we found as of August 30, and
what the administration asserted as of July.
Now, presumably they're going to give you a new one next
week. I would hope that they'll give you a new one next week,
and we'll see what's changed on theirs between July and
September.
Senator Sessions. Well, we have a challenge. I think it's,
the administration report was not particularly rosy, either.
This is a difficult challenge for America, that's what I
understand. I have no doubt of it. It's not going to be easy.
We need to be able to draw our troop levels down as soon as we
possibly can, but after we've committed so much, we've worked
so hard, our soldiers have risked so much, we ought not to do
it in a way that is unwise, that's precipitous, that acts based
on politics rather than what's in the long-term national
interest of America. So, that's where I am. I thank you for
your contribution to that effort, and my time is up.
Senator Bill Nelson [presiding]. Thank you.
Senator Warner. Well, I would say to my distinguished
colleague, I have a high degree of confidence that we will not
do anything unwise, respecting any withdrawal policy. We owe it
to the men and women and their families who've made enormous
sacrifices. I have confidence that the President would not let
that happen, and Congress would not let it happen. So, I want
to conclude on the note that we might have situation which
would be characterized as an unwise decision.
Senator Sessions. I would just say that I think the report
yesterday and the report today reflects a good, honest,
constructive, bipartisan discussion of a difficult challenge
this country faces.
Senator Warner. I observe the presence of our distinguished
colleague from Florida. The floor is yours if you so like.
Senator Levin has had to depart.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, it looks like I'm the cleanup
hitter.
Senator Warner. Well, you've been known to do that before,
and very admirably. So, take over.
I thank you very much, and your staff.
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Senator Warner. Thank you.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Walker, thank you for your long
and dedicated public service. Is this a fair statement that
political reconciliation in Iraq is a key to reducing the
sectarian violence?
Mr. Walker. There are a number of authorities that have
come to that conclusion, to say that that is essential. The
work that we've done doesn't go forward as to whether or not
that's likely to happen, but we've noted the importance of
that, and we've noted the lack of progress, to date, in that
area.
Senator Bill Nelson. Certainly that's what General Jones'
Commission said yesterday. I have certainly thought that it's
the key to reducing sectarian violence, but I will just give an
editorial comment here, that having observed what's been going
on, having been there, having talked to the parties, having
read a bit of history, in that this sectarian violence has been
going on for 1,327 years, since the Battle of Karbala in 680
A.D., that, I just think it's going to be very, very hard for
political reconciliation. If that is the key to stabilizing
Iraq, then it seems to me that we have a very difficult time
ahead of us.
Now, earlier today, you stated that you think that General
Petraeus, next week, is going to testify to us that sectarian
violence is down.
Mr. Walker. That's correct.
Senator Bill Nelson. Then the question, as you earlier
discussed this morning is, what is the definition of sectarian
violence?
Mr. Walker. Correct.
Senator Bill Nelson. As we receive his testimony, how would
you recommend that we try to determine that?
Mr. Walker. Well, I think you need to ask him, how does he
define sectarian violence and what methodology does he use in
order to try to ascertain the rate of sectarian violence and,
those are very relevant questions. We could not get comfortable
with the methodology that is used in determining sectarian
violence versus non-sectarian violence. We're comfortable with
overall violence, we're not comfortable with that split.
As has been mentioned previously in this hearing, that data
went up, it's now gone down. We haven't been confident with how
you differentiate during any of the time. So, you should ask
him.
Senator Warner. But could I interrupt to clarify?
Senator Bill Nelson. Certainly.
Senator Warner. Because at some point, you're talking about
the methodology that presumably DOD and therefore, General
Petraeus is going to use.
Mr. Walker. It's my understanding, Senator Warner, that the
MNF-I, of which General Petraeus is the commander, is the one
that maintains this data.
Senator Warner. Correct.
Mr. Walker. It's my understanding that's the basis of
whatever he might testify to.
Senator Warner. But did you have full access to the
methodology that they're using?
Mr. Walker. We did, we were briefed on the methodology.
We're not comfortable with the methodology and we fully expect
that it will show a decline.
Senator Bill Nelson. Let me ask you a couple more questions
about the readiness of the Iraqi brigades, specifically with
regard to the Baghdad operations. You looked at that, and you
came to a conclusion different from the administration. What
were the different standards of readiness that were used?
Mr. Walker. Well first, there's additional information,
Senator Nelson, that's in our classified report that I would
commend to you on that. Second, with regard to number nine,
which I presume you're talking about, which is providing three
standing-ready brigades to support Baghdad. Is that the one
you're talking about?
Senator Bill Nelson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Walker. Okay good. There are three issues there. Number
one, did they supply the requisite number of troops? The answer
is yes. The second question is, what was the level of readiness
of those troops? That is in our classified report. Third, what
about the reliability of those troops, which in our classified
report. Reliability meaning things like even though they may
have the capability, are they willing to execute that
capability and are they willing to execute that capability in a
non-sectarian way, in other words, sectarian-neutral manner.
Senator Bill Nelson. Your conclusion there was?
Mr. Walker. We had concerns with regard to the last element
the most, and the second element the next most. So, the troops
were provided, many of them, in fact, have a high level of
readiness and that is noted in there. So our concern was really
more about the reliability issue than it was the readiness
issue.
Senator Warner. That's expressed in your classified annex
to the reports we received?
Mr. Walker. Correct, Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Available to all Senators of the committee
to examine.
Senator Bill Nelson. So, in putting that in other words,
your conclusion would be that those brigades of the Iraqi Army
in and around Baghdad would not be capable of operating
independent of the U.S. support?
Mr. Walker. That's not what we're saying. In fact, when you
look at the classified material, you'll see the level of
readiness there. Senator Nelson, there are four levels of
readiness from level 1 to 4 and I think it'll speak loudly.
We're not saying that, no.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well for the public record here, can
you give an opinion about their ability to operate
independently of the U.S.?
Mr. Walker. Yes. The numbers are classified. There are a
significant number of those units that are in the top
category--can't say that? Okay. I would commend to you our
classified report.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. Well, then I would just concur
with the Chairman and Senator Warner that we need to make that
classified report public. I understand that the leadership of
this committee has so requested that of DOD.
Senator Warner. That's my understanding, that the chairman
intends to do so--I have read through this, and I think it
would be beneficial.
Senator Bill Nelson. Now, are you reading from the
classified?
Senator Warner. I'm not going to read from it.
Senator Bill Nelson. No, no. But I mean that's what you're
referring to.
Senator Warner. That's correct.
Mr. Walker. It has information that is directly relevant to
your question, Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. It's very important for us to know and
it's important for the American people to know, because the
question is, can Iraq do it on their own?
Mr. Walker. Senator Nelson, earlier when Senator Levin was
here he said--and I'm sure the very capable staff of this
committee has probably already taken it down --that by 3
o'clock today he wanted to know if there was any additional
information that members, such as yourself, wanted to try to
seek to have declassified, that is in our classified report.
Obviously you're noting at least one piece of information you'd
like to be in that category.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay.
Senator Warner, are you going to adjourn the meeting or am
I?
Senator Warner. If I might just ask a question.
Senator Bill Nelson. Certainly.
Senator Warner. Then obviously you can, you have the
authority.
I've read so much in the last 48 hours in preparation for
Jones' report and this one, that I can't put my hands on this
statement in public, that there's a difference in criteria as
to casualties. When the authorities in Iraq--be it our military
authorities or local or whatever, find a deceased person in the
street, which is the unfortunate incident that happens daily,
unfortunately hundreds of bodies are discovered from time to
time--some of the metrics being used by certain parts of, I
presume whether it's the Iraqi Government our Government, but
I'm going to find out. If the cadaver indicates that loss of
life was attributed to a bullet that came into the forehead, it
is put in the category of, should we say murder, wanton murder.
If the skull is penetrated from the rear by a bullet, then that
should be put into the category of sectarian violence because
there's been certain patterns of how sectarian violence has
been carried out, in terms of rendering death to an individual.
Have you seen that?
Mr. Walker. I have not personally seen it, but some of my
staff has seen it. You're talking about some of the issues that
are in our classified report. We couldn't get comfortable with
the methodology.
Senator Warner. This is in open literature. This is open
literature.
Mr. Walker. I understand. I know what you're talking about
now is open, but there are more details in our classified
report. You're noting some of the concerns that we have as to
how can you reliably say that this type of casualty is
sectarian and this type of casualty isn't?
Senator Warner. I don't know. I've had some experience in
the past. I used to be a prosecutor and had to go the morgue a
number of times to accompany those making analysis. I find that
a rather curious thing that I'm going to try to get to the
bottom of. That is what you were pointing out.
Senator Bill Nelson. I hope you will, Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Well, thank you again, very much. As you
may know, Chuck Bowser occupied your position at one time. He
and I were in the Navy Secretariat during the war in Vietnam. I
may have been the Secretary and he the assistant, but I tell
you, he was a power force and one that was highly respected in
this profession. You've had a very proud lineage of individuals
who have taken on these important responsibilities of the GAO.
I commend you and your staff.
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Senator Warner. He's a friend and
obviously my predecessor and I'm pleased to say that as of
today, Elmer Staats who was his predecessor, is still with us
and hopefully will be for a while, but, at 93.
Senator Warner. I remember Elmer Staats, worked with him
many times during those periods in Vietnam. Thank you very
much.
Mr. Walker. Thank you.
Senator Bill Nelson. The hearing is adjourned.
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Senator, and I want to just thank
our staff for the record. Thank you.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
variance between dod and gao methodology
1. Senator Akaka. Mr. Walker, the media has reported about the
dispute between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) regarding the accuracy of DOD's claim that
the ``surge'' has successfully resulted in a reduction in violence. Can
you elaborate on the differences in the methodologies used by DOD and
GAO to estimate the levels of violence in Iraq?
Mr. Walker. According to the administration's September 2007 report
to Congress, MNF-I data showed a decrease in sectarian violence,
particularly in Baghdad, since the start of the Baghdad security plan.
The report concluded that the Iraqi government, with substantial
coalition assistance, had made satisfactory progress toward reducing
sectarian violence. However, GAO could not reliably determine whether
sectarian violence in Iraq had been reduced because measuring such
violence requires understanding the perpetrator's intent, which may not
be known. Instead, it would be useful to consider broader measures of
population security when assessing levels of violence in Iraq. For
example, the number of attacks targeting civilians and population
displacement resulting from sectarian violence may serve as additional
indicators. As we reported in our September 2007 benchmark report, the
average number of daily enemy-initiated attacks against civilians
remained high relative to attacks on coalition forces. In addition, as
we reported in October 2007,\1\ the decrease in total average daily
attacks through September is largely due to a decrease in attacks on
coalition forces rather than civilians.
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\1\ GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: GAO Audits
and Key Oversight Issues, GAO-08-231T (Washington, DC: Oct. 30, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our benchmark report also noted that the violence in Iraq has
resulted in a large number of Iraqis displaced from their homes. A
report by the Iraqi Red Crescent Organization found that internally
displaced persons increased from about 499,000 in February 2007 to
about 1,128,000 in July 2007. The United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that an additional 1.8 million Iraqi
citizens were displaced to nearby countries, primarily to Jordan,
Syria, Lebanon, Iran, and Egypt. The UNHCR predicted that 40,000 to
50,000 people will continue to be displaced each month even if the
security plan succeeds in solving the displacement problem. Currently,
the number of displaced persons is increasing at an average of 80,000
to 100,000 each month, according to the Red Crescent. The August 2007
National Intelligence Estimate for Iraq also stated that population
displacement resulting from sectarian violence continues, imposing
burdens on provincial governments and some neighboring states. Where
population displacements have led to significant sectarian separation,
according to the August 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, conflict
levels have diminished to some extent because warring communities find
it more difficult to penetrate communal enclaves.
2. Senator Akaka. Mr. Walker, in your opinion, is the DOD
methodology for evaluating the levels of violence in Iraq inadequate
for the purpose of identifying trends in the level of violence? If not,
why not?
Mr. Walker. As previously stated, it is inherently difficult to
judge trends in sectarian violence because this requires an
understanding of the perpetrator's intent, which may not be known.
Instead, as discussed in question 1, broader measures of population
security should be considered when assessing trends in violence in
Iraq. For example, as we reported in September 28, 2007, MNF-I data on
enemy initiated attacks provide a reasonably sound depiction of general
security trends. However, according to the DIA, the incidents captured
in military reporting do not account for all violence throughout Iraq,
such as incidents of Shi'a militias fighting each other or attacks
against Iraqi security forces in southern Iraq.
3. Senator Akaka. Mr. Walker, General Petraeus indicated in his
testimony on September 11, 2007, that the current methodology has been
used for over a year, which implies that the methodology was changed
just prior to the surge. Did GAO's auditors find evidence that DOD had
revised either its methodology for estimating violence or its
definitions of the different types of violence? If so, what was DOD's
explanation for the revising the methodology?
Mr. Walker. The methodology we assessed took effect in August 2006.
We did not assess the methodology used prior to this time.
4. Senator Akaka. Mr. Walker, does the change in DOD methodology
prevent comparisons of the recent data against data from previous
years?
Mr. Walker. We have no basis for responding to this question as we
did not assess the previous methodologies used to assess trends in
sectarian violence.
effectiveness of the surge
5. Senator Akaka. Mr. Walker, as noted in GAO's report, the purpose
of the surge was to reduce sectarian violence and provide the Iraqi
government with breathing room to allow them to address political
reconciliation. The benchmarks evaluated in this report were identified
by the Iraqi government in June 2006. In theory, we should have seen
the Iraqi government become more effective once the surge started.
Instead, it seems that several groups have recently, or are currently,
boycotting the government. It seems to me that its unclear as to
whether they can really accomplish anything right now. Can you tell us
how many of the benchmarks that have been completed or partially
completed were accomplished by the Iraqi government since the arrival
of additional troops for the surge in February of this year? In other
words, did we see any improvement in the government's performance once
the surge started?
Mr. Walker. As we recently reported,\2\ the Iraqi government has
made limited progress in meeting eight legislative benchmarks intended
to promote national reconciliation. As of October 25, 2007, the Iraqi
Government had met one legislative benchmark and partially met another.
Specifically, the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi
legislature were protected through existing provisions in the Iraqi
Constitution and Council of Representatives' by-laws. In addition, the
Iraqi Government partially met the benchmark to enact and implement
legislation on the formation of regions; this law was enacted in
October 2006 but will not be implemented until April 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ GAO-08-231T.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The benchmark requiring a review of the Iraqi Constitution has not
yet been met. Fundamental issues remain unresolved as part of the
constitutional review process, such as expanded powers for the
presidency, the resolution of disputed areas (such as Kirkuk), and
power sharing between Federal and regional governments over issues such
as the distribution of oil revenue. In addition, five other
legistlative benchmarks requiring parliamentary action have not yet
been met.
6. Senator Akaka. Mr. Walker, would you provide a copy of Figures 1
and 2 from the report revised to show the completion dates for each
item shown as complete?
Mr. Walker. Figure 1 - The electoral commission legislation was
passed in January 2007.
Figure 2 - Committees were established in support of the Baghdad
Security Plan in February 2007.
Figure 2 - Joint security stations were established by August 2007.
change of definition of success
7. Senator Akaka. Mr. Walker, footnote 4 for Benchmark 15, ``Iraqi
Security Forces Operating Independently'' states, ``In 2006,
Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) changed the definition of a Level 1
unit. Previously, in guidance provided to coalition transition teams
for use in evaluating Iraqi security forces, a Level 1 unit was said to
be fully capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent
operations. In 2006, MNF-I removed the words 'fully' and 'independent'
from the definition. DOD officials could not provide a rationale for
the change.'' Although DOD could not provide an explanation for the
change, did GAO determine the net effect on the performance metric? In
other words, did the number of Level 1 units go up or down as a result
of the change?
Mr. Walker. GAO did not determine how the change in definition
affected the performance metric. As of September 2007, MNF-I reported
that only about 10 of 140 units of the Iraqi security forces are
capable of operating independently.
8. Senator Akaka. Mr. Walker, when was the change implemented?
Mr. Walker. The new definition of a level-1 unit was implemented in
April 2006.
iraq budget spending
9. Senator Akaka. Mr. Walker, during the hearing, I pointed out
that GAO's report states that the Iraqi government has provided $10
billion in its current budget for reconstruction projects, including
delivery of essential services on an equitable basis, but that it is
unlikely to be spent by the end of the year. In addition, as of July
31, the Iraqi government had only spent about $1.5 billion of the
allocated funds. One of the questions I asked you during the hearing
was if you could you describe some of the key projects that will likely
not be accomplished if the Iraqi government's spending continues at the
current pace. Consistent with your response to my question, could you
please provide more specific information on the types of projects not
being accomplished due to the Iraqi government's inability to spend
their budgeted resources?
Mr. Walker. As we reported in our May 2007 report, Rebuilding Iraq:
Integrated Strategic Plan Needed to Help Restore Iraq's Oil and
Electricity Sectors (GAO-07-677), the energy sector is critical for
Iraq's economy and for rebuilding the country and the Ministries of Oil
and Electricity have budgeted substantial sums for future
reconstruction. Experts estimate that over the next few years $27
billion will be needed for the electricity sector to keep up with
needed demand and S20 to $30 billion will be needed for the oil sector
to reach production goals. Although significant funds have been
allocated to the Ministries of Oil and Electricity for critical
infrastructure repair, the ministries have had persistent difficulties
spending these funds on critical oil and electricity sector projects
due to poor procurement and budgeting practices, and the ``brain
drain'' resulting from high levels of violence in Iraq.
______
[Annex: The report from Government Accountability Office,
``Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq,'' follows:]
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[Whereupon, at 11:44 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
THE SITUATION IN IRAQ AND PROGRESS MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ IN
MEETING BENCHMARKS
----------
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:14 p.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy, Byrd,
Lieberman, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh,
Clinton, Pryor, Webb, McCaskill, McCain, Warner, Inhofe,
Sessions, Collins, Chambliss, Graham, Dole, Cornyn, Thune,
Martinez, and Corker.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and
Brian F. Sebold, receptionist.
Majority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr.,
professional staff member; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff
member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Mark R.
Jacobson, professional staff member; Michael J. McCord,
professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel;
Michael J. Noblet, research assistant; and William K. Sutey,
professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member;
Derek J. Maurer, minority counsel; David M. Morriss, minority
counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member;
Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten,
professional staff member; and Dana W. White, professional
staff member.
Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Kevin A.
Cronin, and Jessica L. Kingston.
Committee members' assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman and
Jay Maroney, assistants to Senator Kennedy; David E. Bonine and
James Tuite, assistants to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey
and Vance Serchuk, assistants to Senator Lieberman; Richard
Kessler, assistant to Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple,
assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to
Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton;
Terri Glaze, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson and
Michael Sozan, assistants to Senator Webb; Stephen C. Hedger,
assistant to Senator McCaskill; Richard H. Fontaine, Jr.,
assistant to Senator McCain; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator
Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe;
Lenwood Landrum and Todd Stiefler, assistants to Senator
Sessions; Jan Alonso and Mark J. Winter, assistants to Senator
Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss;
Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; David Hanke and
Russell J. Thomasson, assistants to Senator Cornyn; Stuart C.
Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune; Brian W. Walsh, assistant
to Senator Martinez; and Paul B. Palagyi and Bradford T.
Sellers, assistants to Senator Corker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good afternoon, everybody. Today we welcome
General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker for their update on the
situation in Iraq. We thank both of you for your service to
this country, the men and women that you both command and lead.
You're doing so under very, very difficult circumstances. We
ask both of you to pass along to the men and women who you do
lead in this endeavor, our heartfelt thanks, particularly those
who risk their lives on a daily basis.
While people here have different views on the war and will
continue to vigorously debate the strategy, tactics, and
policies relating to the war--we are united in our admiration
and appreciation for those who serve there, for their families
who love them, and who support them.
There's much disagreement relative to the facts on the
ground in Iraq, on the issue of whether or not the surge has
produced significant progress in terms of security. Recent
public opinion polls in Iraq indicate that Iraqi citizens feel
even less secure than before the surge.
According to an ABC News analysis, ``The surge broadly is
seen to have done more harm than good, with 65 to 70 percent of
Iraqis saying it's worsened rather than improved security in
surge areas, security in other areas, conditions for political
dialogue, the ability of the Iraqi Government to do its work,
the pace of reconstruction, and the pace of economic
development.'' Is Baghdad, itself, actually safer for citizens
to go about their normal business? Or are large sectors of
Baghdad, in electricity and fuel distribution, controlled by
the Mahdi Army and neighborhood militias as detailed in last
Sunday's New York Times?
While the facts relating to security are debated and are
debatable, there seems to be little dispute on three key points
that go to the heart of the matter.
First, the stated purpose of the surge, to give Iraqi
politicians breathing space to work out a political settlement,
has not been achieved.
Second, there will be no end to violence until Iraqi's
national leaders work out their political differences. As the
Commission headed by General Jones reported last week,
political reconciliation is the key to ending sectarian
violence in Iraq.
Third, the Iraqi politicians haven't done that. They
haven't kept the commitments that they made a year ago, to set
the date for provincial elections, to approve a hydrocarbon
law, to approve a de-Baathification law, and to submit
constitutional amendments to a referendum.
General Petraeus said 3 years ago that Iraqi political
leaders were, ``Stepping forward, leading their country
courageously and making progress,'' in his words. Well, if they
were, progress sure has stalled politically.
Ambassador Crocker told Congress yesterday and today that
Iraqi leaders have the ``will'' to tackle the nation's pressing
problems and ``approach the task with the deep sense of
commitment and patriotism,'' even though those leaders ignore
their own benchmarks. The Ambassador inappropriately compares
Iraq's sectarian strife and slaughter to this Nation's Civil
Rights movement.
So the administration's message to Iraqi leaders continues
to be that they're doing just fine. That's exactly the wrong
message to send the leaders who dawdle while their nation is
torn apart by sectarian strife and while their people are
killed and forcibly ejected by sectarian militias or killed if
they refuse to be ethnically cleansed. The Iraqi politicians
dawdle while our casualties and our expenditures keep climbing.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) told us last
week that most of the key promises of Iraq's political leaders,
the benchmarks that they set for themselves, with relevant
timetables, have been ignored by those leaders.
On January 14 of this year, President Bush said, ``America
will hold the Iraqi Government to the benchmarks that it has
announced.'' Those words ring hollow. There have been no
consequences for the Iraqi political leaders' failures to do
what President Bush said they must do. Year after year, the
President and the administration have touted progress in Iraq
and called for patience.
It has been a litany of delusion. Just listen to President
Bush's repeated claims of progress. October 2003, he said,
``We're making progress about improving the lives of people
there in Iraq.'' September 2004, the President said, ``We're
making steady progress in implementing our five-step plan.'' In
October 2005, the President said, ``Iraq has made incredible
political progress.'' In May 2006, the President said, ``We're
making progress on all fronts.'' In March of this year, the
President said, ``There's been good progress.'' On July 4, the
President said that, ``Victory in this struggle will require
more patience.''
Well, there's been little progress on the political front
and the American people's patience with Iraq's political
leaders has run out. Success in Iraq depends on Iraqi leaders
finally seeing the end of the open-ended American commitment.
Success depends on doing what James Baker, Lee Hamilton, and
the rest of the Iraq Study Group said we should have done a
year a ago, that the United States ``should not make an open-
ended commitment to keep large numbers of American troops
deployed in Iraq. If the Iraqi Government does not make
substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on
national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United
States should reduce its political, military, or economic
support for the Iraqi Government.'' That was before the surge
level was increased.
Success also depends on a transition of missions. According
to the Iraq Study Group, ``By the first quarter of 2008,
subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on
the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force
protection could be out of Iraq.'' At that time, the Iraq Study
Group said, ``U.S. combat forces in Iraq could be deployed only
in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid reaction and
special operations teams, and in training, equipping, advising,
force protection, and search and rescue.''
Finally, presenting Iraq's political leaders with a
timetable for transition of our forces, from mainly combat to
mainly support roles, as opposed to a timetable for ending the
surge--which is a fact of life, which is going to happen by
necessity anyway--presenting those political leaders with a
timetable for transition is the only hope that Iraqi leaders
will realize that their future is in their hands, not in the
hands of our brave men and women who proudly wear America's
uniform.
Establishing a timetable for the transition of missions
will also recognize another fact of life, that the stress on
our forces, especially the wear and tear on the Army and Marine
Corps, must be reduced. Telling the Iraqis that the surge will
end by the middle of next year, and then we will make a
decision as to whether to reduce our troop level from the basic
pre-surge level of 130,000, does not change our course in Iraq.
It presents an illusion of change to prevent a real change of
course from occurring. It is aimed at taking the steam out of
the engine of change.
I hope we are not deterred from continuing to press for
true change and that the momentum for true change of course is
not diffused. It must continue until, by our deeds, we get the
Iraqi political leaders to understand, that for our security
and theirs, the American presence in Iraq needs to be
significantly reduced after 4\1/2\ years of U.S. sacrifice, and
that the future of their country is in their own hands.
Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the witnesses. All of us are aware that
you've been literally nonstop testifying for the last day and a
half, and we thank you for your willingness, not only to
discuss with Congress, but with the American people, this very
critical issue.
With your testimony, a debate of historic proportions
begins in the United States Congress. The choices that we make
now, whether to build on the success of the surge and fight for
additional gains, or whether to set a date for American
surrender in Iraq, will affect the security of all our
countrymen for decades to come.
As we all know, the American people are saddened,
frustrated, and angry over our past failures in Iraq. I, too,
have been made sick at heart by the terrible price we've paid
for nearly 4 years of mismanaged war. Some of us, from the
beginning, warned against the Rumsfeld strategy of too few
troops, insufficient resources, and a plan predicated on hope,
rather than on the difficult business of stabilization and
counterinsurgency.
We lost years to that strategy and we lost that which is
most precious to us--the lives of the brave men and women who
fight on our behalf.
But the question today is not whether we can recover those
4 years--we cannot--but whether we end this effort in
frustration and accept thereby the terrible consequences that
will ensue. I believe we cannot choose to lose in Iraq and I
will do everything in my power to see that our commanders in
Iraq have the time and support they request to win this war.
The distinguished strategist Ralph Peters summed up the
state of affairs well in a column today, noting that Congress's
failure to support General Petraeus, ``would be a shame, since
after nearly 4 years of getting it miserably wrong in Iraq,
we're finally getting it right.''
We're getting it right, because we finally have in place a
strategy that can succeed. A counterinsurgency strategy which
some of us have argued we should have been following from the
beginning, which makes the most effective use of our strength,
and does not strengthen the tactics of our enemy.
We must, as General Petraeus intends, keep this strategy in
place. It is the only approach that has resulted in real
security improvements in Iraq.
Anyone who has traveled recently to Anbar, or Diyala, or to
Baghdad can see the improvements that have taken place over the
past months. As our witnesses will testify, violence is down,
commerce is on the rise, and the bottom-up efforts to forge
counter-terrorism alliances are bearing tangible fruit.
There are many challenges remaining, and the road ahead is
long and tough. The Maliki Government has not seized the
opportunity presented by our efforts to move ahead with
reconciliation, and is not functioning as it must. Violence,
having declined significantly, remains high.
As Ambassador Crocker has noted, no one can be certain of
success. We can be sure, however, that should the United States
Congress succeed in legislating a date for withdrawal, and thus
surrender, then we will fail for certain.
Make no mistake, the consequences of American defeat in
Iraq will be terrible and long-lasting. There is, in some
corners, a belief that we can simply turn the page in Iraq,
come home, and move onto other things. This is dangerously
wrong.
If we surrender in Iraq, we will be back in Iraq, and
elsewhere, in many more desperate fights to protect our
security, and at even greater cost in American lives and
treasure.
Last week, General Jim Jones testified before this
committee and outlined what he believes to be the consequences
of such a course. A precipitous departure which results in a
failed state in Iraq, he said, will have a significant boost in
the number of extremist jihadists in the world, who will
believe that they will have toppled a major power on earth, and
that all else is possible. I think it will only make us less
safe, it will make our friends and allies less safe, and the
struggle will continue. It will simply be done in different,
and other, areas.
Some Senators would like to withdraw our troops from Iraq
so we can get back to fighting what they believe to be the
``real'' war on terror, which is taking place somewhere else.
This too is inaccurate. Iraq has become the central front in
the global war on terror, and failure there would turn Iraq
into a terrorist sanctuary in the heart of the Middle East, and
a host for jihadists planning attacks on America. The region
could easily descend into chaos, wider war and genocide, and we
should have no doubt about who will take advantage.
The Iranian President has stated his intentions bluntly,
saying, ``Soon we will see a huge power vacuum in the region.
Of course, we are prepared to fill the gap.'' We cannot allow
an Iranian-dominated Middle East to take shape in the context
of a wider war and terrorist safe havens. All of us want our
troops to come home, but we should want them to return to us
with honor--the honor of victory that is due all of those who
have paid the ultimate sacrifice.
General Petraeus and his troops ask just two things of us:
the time to continue this strategy, and the support they need
to carry out their mission. They must have both, and we should
fight to ensure that they do.
Soon this debate will move from hearing rooms to the Senate
floor, where we'll see again attempts to legislate a withdrawal
from Iraq. Given the enormous human and strategic costs such a
defeat would impose on Iraq, the region, and Americans for
years to come, Congress must not choose to lose in Iraq. I will
do everything in my power to ensure that we do not.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Our welcome to both of you, our thanks to both of you, and
to your families that provide essential support for you in
extraordinarily difficult circumstances in which you both work.
We're indebted to you for your appearance here today, and
for the fact that this is the third of three long hearings for
you.
General Petraeus?
STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA, COMMANDER,
MULTINATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ
General Petraeus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain,
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
provide my assessment of the security situation in Iraq.
Chairman Levin. May I interrupt you for one moment?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. If you choose, both of you, or each of you,
may reduce and summarize, if you so choose, because of the fact
that your statements have been given in full before the other
committees. I'm not asking you to do that, we'll leave that up
to you.
General Petraeus. Mr. Chairman, I've actually cut it down a
bit.
Chairman Levin. All right. [Laughter.]
It didn't take much suggesting, then, to do that.
General Petraeus. But it's still----
Chairman Levin. That's fine--do it as you wish.
General Petraeus. Thank you for the opportunity to provide
my assessment of the security situation in Iraq, and to discuss
the recommendations I have provided to my chain of command for
the way forward.
As I stated in testimony to the two House committees
yesterday, and to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this
morning, this is my testimony. Although I have briefed my
assessment and the recommendations in it to my chain of
command, I wrote this statement myself, and did not clear it
with anyone in the Pentagon, the White House, or Congress.
Today, I will provide a summary of the full written
testimony to each of you, and for the record. As a bottom line,
upfront, the military objectives of the surge are, in large
measure, being met. In recent months, in the face of tough
enemies, and the brutal summer heat of Iraq, coalition and
Iraqi security forces have achieved progress in the security
arena.
Though improvements have been uneven across Iraq, the
overall number of security incidents has declined in 8 of the
past 12 weeks. During this time, ethno-sectarian violence has
also been reduced, and the number of overall civilian deaths
has declined, although both are clearly still at troubling
levels.
The progress is a result of many factors--coalition and
Iraqi forces have dealt significant blows to al Qaeda-Iraq, and
have disrupted Shiite militia extremists.
Additionally, in a very significant development, we and our
Iraqi partners are being assisted by tribes and local citizens
who are rejecting extremism, and choosing to help secure Iraq.
Iraqi security forces have also continued to grow, and to
shoulder more of the load--albeit slowly--and amid continuing
concerns about the sectarian tendencies of some elements in
their ranks.
Based on all of this, and on the further progress we
believe we can achieve over the next few months, I believe that
we will be able to reduce our forces to the pre-surge level of
brigade combat teams by next summer, withdrawing one-quarter of
our combat brigades by that time, without jeopardizing the
security gains that we have fought so hard to achieve.
Beyond that, while noting that the situation in Iraq
remains complex, difficult, and sometimes downright
frustrating, I also believe that it is possible for us to
achieve our objectives in Iraq over time, though doing so will
be neither quick, nor easy.
Having provided that summary, I would like to review the
nature of the conflict in Iraq, recall the situation before the
surge, describe the current situation, and explain the
recommendations I have provided to my chain of command.
The fundamental source of the conflict in Iraq is
competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power
and resources. This competition will take place. The question
is whether it is resolved more, or less, violently.
This chart shows the security challenges in Iraq--foreign
and home-grown terrorists, insurgents, militia extremists and
criminals all push the ethno-sectarian competition toward
violence.
Malign actions by Syria, and especially by Iran, fuel that
violence, and lack of adequate governmental capacity, lingering
sectarian mistrust, and various forms of corruption add to the
challenges.
In January 2007, in response to the horrific ethno-
sectarian violence that spiraled out of control in 2006, and to
an assessment in December 2006 that we were failing to achieve
our objectives, a surge of forces began flowing into Iraq,
focusing on protecting the population, and reducing sectarian
violence, especially in Baghdad.
In so doing, these forces have employed counterinsurgency
practices, such as living among the people they are securing.
In mid-June, with all of the surge brigades in place, we
launched a series of offensive operations in partnership with
Iraqi security forces. These operations focused on expanding
the gains achieved in the preceding months in Anbar Province,
pursuing al Qaeda in the Diyala River Valley and several other
areas, clearing Baqubah, several key Baghdad neighborhoods, the
remaining sanctuaries in Anbar Province, and important areas
around Baghdad. With coalition and Iraqi forces located among
the populations they are securing, we have sought to keep areas
clear, and to help Iraqis in rebuilding them.
All the while, we have engaged in dialogue with insurgent
troops and tribes, leading to additional elements standing up
to oppose al Qaeda and other extremists.
The progress our forces have achieved with our Iraqi
counterparts has--as I noted at the outset--been substantial.
While there have been setbacks, as well as successes, and tough
losses along the way, overall our tactical commanders see
improvements in the security environment.
We do not, however, just rely on gut feeling or personal
observations. To gauge progress and determine trends, we also
conduct rigorous and consistent data collection and analysis.
In fact, two U.S. intelligence agencies recently reviewed our
methodology, and concluded that the data we produce is the most
accurate and authoritative in Iraq.
As I mentioned up front, and as the chart before you
reflects, the level of security incidents has decreased
significantly, since the start of the surge of offensive
operations in mid-June, declining in 8 of the past 12 weeks
with the level of incidents in the past 2 weeks the lowest
since June 2006.
Civilian deaths of all categories, less natural causes,
have also declined considerably, by over 45 percent Iraq-wide,
since the height of the sectarian violence in December. This is
shown by the top line on this next chart, and the decline by
some 70 percent in Baghdad is shown in the bottom line.
Periodic mass casualty attacks--car bombs by al Qaeda--have
tragically added to the numbers, outside Baghdad, in
particular. Even without the sensational attacks, however, the
level of civilian deaths is of serious concern.
As the next chart shows, the number of ethno-sectarian
deaths, an important subset of the overall civilian casualty
figures, has also declined significantly since the height of
the sectarian violence in December. Iraq-wide, as shown by the
top line on this chart, ethno-sectarian deaths have come down
by over 55 percent.
In Baghdad, as the bottom line shows, ethno-sectarian
deaths have declined by some 80 percent since December. This
chart also displays the density of sectarian incidents in
various Baghdad neighborhoods, and it both reflects the
progress made in reducing ethno-sectarian violence, and
identifies the area where more work must be done.
As we have gone on the offensive in former al Qaeda and
insurgent sanctuaries, and as locals have increasingly
supported our efforts, we have found a substantially increased
number of arms, ammunition, and explosive caches.
As this next chart shows, we have so far this year already
found and cleared over 4,400 caches, nearly 1,700 more than we
discovered in all of last year. This may, in fact, be a factor
in the reduction in the overall improvised explosive device
(IED) attacks in recent months, which as this next chart shows,
has declined sharply, by about one-third since June.
The change in the security situation in Anbar Province has,
of course, been particularly dramatic. As this next chart
shows, the monthly attack levels in Anbar have declined, from
some 1,350 in October 2006, to a bit over 200 in August of this
year. This dramatic decrease reflects the significance of the
local rejection of al Qaeda, and the newfound willingness of
local Anbaris to volunteer to serve in the Iraqi Army and the
Iraqi police service.
To be sure, trends have not been uniformly positive across
Iraq, as is shown by this next chart, depicting violence trends
in several key Iraqi provinces.
The trend in Ninevah Province in Northern Iraq, for
example, has been much more up and down until a recent decline,
and the same is true in Salah ad Din Province, also north of
Baghdad, and the site of Saddam's former hometown, though
recent trends there and in Baghdad have been in the right
direction.
In any event, the overall trajectory in Iraq, a steady
decline of incidents in the past 3 months, is still quite
significant.
The number of car bombings and suicide attacks has also
declined in each of the past 5 months. The total from a high of
some 175 in March, as this next chart shows, to about 90 this
past month. While this trend has been heartening, the number of
high-profile attacks is still too high, and we continue to work
hard to destroy the networks that carry out these barbaric
attacks.
Our operations have, in fact, produced substantial progress
against al Qaeda-Iraq. As this next chart shows, in the past 8
months we have considerably reduced the areas in which al Qaeda
enjoyed sanctuary. We have also neutralized 5 media cells,
detained the senior Iraqi leader of al Qaeda-Iraq, and killed
or captured nearly 100 other key leaders, and some 2,500 rank-
and-file fighters. Al Qaeda is certainly not defeated. However,
it is off-balance, and we are pursuing its leaders and
operators aggressively.
Of note, these gains against al Qaeda are a result of the
synergy of actions by conventional forces, intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance assets, and special operations
elements. A combination of these assets is necessary to conduct
effective operations against terrorist elements.
In the past 6 months, we have also targeted Shiite militia
extremists, killing or capturing over 1,400 senior leaders and
fighters. It is increasingly apparent to both coalition and
Iraqi leaders that Iran--through the use of the Iranian
Republican Guard Corps Quds Force--seeks to turn these Shiite
militia extremists into a Hezbollah-like force to serve its
interests, and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and
coalition forces in Iraq.
The most significant development in the past 6 months
likely has been the increasing emergence of tribes and local
citizens rejecting al Qaeda and other extremists. The success
in Anbar is an example of what can happen when local Iraqis
decide to oppose al Qaeda and reject its Taliban-like ideology.
While Anbar's model cannot be replicated everywhere in
Iraq, it does demonstrate the dramatic change in security that
is possible with the support and participation of local
citizens.
As this next chart shows, other tribes have been inspired
by the actions of those in Anbar, and have volunteered to fight
extremists, as well. Over 20,000 such individuals are already
being hired for the Iraqi police, thousands of others are being
assimilated into the Iraqi Army, and thousands more are vying
for a spot in Iraq's security forces.
As I noted earlier, Iraqi security forces have continued to
grow, to develop their capabilities, and to shoulder more of
the burden of providing security for their country.
Despite concerns about sectarian influence, inadequate
logistics and supporting institutions, and an insufficient
number of qualified commissioned and noncommissioned officers
(NCOs), Iraqi units are engaged around the country.
As this next chart shows, there are now nearly 140 Iraqi
Army, national police, and Special Operations Forces (SOF)
battalions in the fight, with about 95 of those capable of
taking the lead in operations, albeit with some coalition
support.
Although their qualitative development have not always kept
pace with their quantitative growth, all of Iraq's battalions
have been heavily involved in combat operations that often
result in the loss of leaders, soldiers, and equipment. Despite
the losses, a number of Iraqi units across Iraq now operate
with minimal coalition assistance.
In order to take over the security of their country, the
Iraqis are rapidly expanding their security forces. In fact,
they have some 445,000 assigned to the Ministries of Interior
and Defense now, and we believe that they will be close to
480,000 by year's end.
Significantly, in 2007, Iraq will--as in 2006--spend more
on its security forces than it will receive in security
assistance from the United States. In fact, Iraq is becoming
one of the United States' larger foreign military sales (FMS)
customers, committing some $1.6 billion to FMS already, with
the possibility of up to $1.8 billion more being committed
before the end of the year.
Here, I'd like to say that I appreciate the attention that
the chairman and other members of this committee have recently
given to speeding up the FMS process for Iraq.
To summarize, the security situation in Iraq is improving,
and Iraqi elements are slowly taking on more of the
responsibility for protecting their citizens. Innumerable
challenges lie ahead, however, coalition and Iraqi security
forces have made progress toward achieving sustainable
security. As a result, the United States will be in a position
to reduce its forces in Iraq in the months ahead.
Two weeks ago I provided recommendations for the way ahead
in Iraq to the members of my chain of command, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (JCS). The essence of the approach I recommended is
captured in its title, ``Security While Transitioning: From
Leading, to Partnering, to Overwatch.'' This approach seeks to
build on the security improvements our troops and our Iraqi
counterparts have achieved in recent months. It reflects
recognition of the importance of securing the population and
the imperative of transitioning responsibilities to Iraqi
institutions and Iraqi forces, as quickly as possible, but
without rushing to failure.
It includes substantial support for the continuing
development of Iraqi security forces. It also stresses the need
to continue the counterinsurgency strategy that we have been
employing, but with Iraqis gradually shouldering more of the
load. It highlights the importance of regional and global
diplomatic approaches.
Finally, in recognition of the fact that this war is not
only being fought on the ground in Iraq, but also in
cyberspace, it also notes the need to contest the enemy's
growing use of that important medium to spread extremism.
The recommendations I've provided were informed by
operational and strategic considerations. The operational
considerations include recognition that military aspect of the
surge have achieved progress, and generated momentum. Iraqi
security forces have been slowly shouldering more of the
security burden in Iraq. A mission focused on either population
security, or transition alone, will not be adequate to achieve
our objectives. Success against al Qaeda-Iraq and Iranian-
supported militia extremists requires conventional forces, as
well as SOFs, and the security in local political situations
will enable us to draw down the surge forces.
My recommendations also took into account a number of
strategic considerations. That political progress will only
take place if sufficient security exists. Long-term U.S. ground
force viability will benefit from force reductions as the surge
runs its course.
Regional, global, and cyberspace initiatives are critical
to success, and Iraqi leaders, understandably, want to assume
greater sovereignty in their country, although, as they
recently announced, they do desire continued presence of
coalition forces in Iraq in 2008, under a new U.S. Security
Council resolution, and following that, they want to negotiate
a long-term security agreement with the United States and
others.
Based on these considerations, and having worked the
battlefield geometry with Lieutenant General Ray Odierno, to
ensure that we retain and build on the gains for which our
troopers have fought, I have recommended a drawdown of the
surge forces from Iraq. In fact, later this month, the Marine
expedition, our first unit deployed as part of the surge, will
depart Iraq. Beyond that, if my recommendations are approved,
this will be followed by the withdrawal of a brigade combat
team without replacement in mid-December, and the further
redeployment without replacement of four other brigade combat
teams, and the two surge Marine battalions in the first 7
months of 2008, until we reach the pre-surge level of 15
brigade combat teams by mid-July 2008.
Force reductions will continue, beyond the pre-surge levels
of brigade combat teams that we will reach by mid-July 2008. In
my professional judgment, however, it would be premature to
make recommendations on the pace of such reductions at this
time. In fact, our experience in Iraq has repeatedly shown that
projecting too far into the future is not just difficult, it
can be misleading, and even hazardous.
In view of this, I do not believe it is reasonable to have
an adequate appreciation for the pace of further reductions and
mission adjustments beyond the summer of 2008, until about mid-
March of next year. We will--no later than that time--consider
factors similar to those on which I based the current
recommendations, having by then, of course, a better feel for
the security situation, the improvements in the capabilities of
our Iraqi counterparts, and the enemy situation.
This final chart captures the recommendations I have
described, showing the recommended reduction of brigade combat
teams as the surge runs its course, and illustrating the
concept of our units adjusting their missions, and
transitioning responsibilities to Iraqis as the situation and
Iraqi capabilities permit.
It also reflects the ``no later than'' date for
recommendations on force adjustments beyond next summer, and it
provides a possible approach we have considered for the future
force structure and mission set in Iraq over time.
In describing the recommendations I have made, I should
note, again, that like Ambassador Crocker, I believe Iraq's
problems will require a long-term effort. There are no easy
answers or quick solutions. Although we both believe this
effort can succeed, it will take time. Our assessments
underscore, in fact, the importance of recognizing that a
premature drawdown of our forces would likely have devastating
consequences. That assessment is supported by the findings of a
August 16 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report on the
implications of a rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq.
Summarizing it in an unclassified fashion, it concludes
that a rapid withdrawal would result in the further release of
the strong centrifugal forces in Iraq, and produce a number of
dangerous results, including a high risk of disintegration of
the Iraqi security forces, rapid deterioration of local
security initiatives, al Qaeda-Iraq regaining lost ground and
freedom of maneuver, a marked increase in violence, and further
ethno-sectarian displacement and refugee flows, alliances of
convenience by Iraqi groups with internal and external forces
to gain advantages over their rivals, and exacerbation of
already-challenging regional dynamics, especially with respect
to Iran.
Lieutenant General Odierno and I share this assessment, and
believe that the best way to secure our national interests and
avoid an unfavorable outcome in Iraq is to continue to focus
our operations on securing the Iraqi people, while targeting
terrorist groups and militia extremists and, as quickly as
conditions are met, transitioning security tasks to Iraqi
elements.
Before closing, I want to thank you and your colleagues for
our support of our men and women in uniform in Iraq. The
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardsman with
whom I'm honored to serve are the best-equipped, and very
likely the most professional force in our Nation's history. All
of us appreciate what you have done to ensure that these great
troopers have had what they have needed to accomplish their
mission, just as we appreciate what you have done to take care
of their families, as they, too, have made significant
sacrifices in recent years.
The advances you have underwritten in weapons systems and
individual equipment, in munitions, in command, control, and
communications (C3) systems, and intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, in vehicles and counter-
IED systems and programs, and in manned, and unmanned aircraft,
have proven invaluable in Iraq.
Additionally, your funding of the Commander's Emergency
Response Program has given our leaders a critical tool with
which to prosecute the counterinsurgency campaign.
Finally, we appreciate as well your funding of our new
detention programs and rule of law initiatives in Iraq.
In closing, it remains an enormous privilege to soldier,
again, in Iraq, with America's new greatest generation. Our
country's men and women in uniform have done a magnificent job
in the most complex and challenging environment imaginable. All
Americans should be very proud of their sons and daughters
serving in Iraq today.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of General Petraeus follows:]
Prepared Statement by GEN David H. Petraeus, USA
Mr. Chairman, ranking members, members of the committees, thank you
for the opportunity to provide my assessment of the security situation
in Iraq and to discuss the recommendations I recently provided to my
chain of command for the way forward.
At the outset, I would like to note that this is my testimony.
Although I have briefed my assessment and recommendations to my chain
of command, I wrote this testimony myself. It has not been cleared by,
nor shared with, anyone in the Pentagon, the White House, or Congress.
As a bottom line upfront, the military objectives of the surge are,
in large measure, being met. In recent months, in the face of tough
enemies and the brutal summer heat of Iraq, coalition, and Iraqi
security forces have achieved progress in the security arena. Though
the improvements have been uneven across Iraq, the overall number of
security incidents in Iraq has declined in 8 of the past 12 weeks, with
the numbers of incidents in the last 2 weeks at the lowest levels seen
since June 2006.
One reason for the decline in incidents is that coalition and Iraqi
forces have dealt significant blows to al Qaeda-Iraq. Though al Qaeda
and its affiliates in Iraq remain dangerous, we have taken away a
number of their sanctuaries and gained the initiative in many areas.
We have also disrupted Shiite militia extremists, capturing the
head and numerous other leaders of the Iranian-supported Iraqi Special
Groups, along with a senior Lebanese Hezbollah operative supporting
Iran's activities in Iraq.
Coalition and Iraqi operations have helped reduce ethno-sectarian
violence, as well, bringing down the number of ethno-sectarian deaths
substantially in Baghdad and across Iraq since the height of the
sectarian violence last December. The number of overall civilian deaths
has also declined during this period, although the numbers in each area
are still at troubling levels.
Iraqi security forces have also continued to grow and to shoulder
more of the load, albeit slowly and amid continuing concerns about the
sectarian tendencies of some elements in their ranks. In general,
however, Iraqi elements have been standing and fighting and sustaining
tough losses, and they have taken the lead in operations in many areas.
Additionally, in what may be the most significant development of
the past 8 months, the tribal rejection of al Qaeda that started in
Anbar province and helped produce such significant change there has now
spread lo a number of other locations as well.
Based on all this and on the further progress we believe we can
achieve over the next few months, I believe that we will be able to
reduce our forces to the pre-surge level of brigade combat teams by
next summer without jeopardizing the security gains that we have fought
so hard to achieve.
Beyond that, while noting that the situation in Iraq remains
complex, difficult, and sometimes downright frustrating, I also believe
that it is possible to achieve our objectives in Iraq over time, though
doing so will be neither quick nor easy.
Having provided that summary, I would like to review the nature of
the conflict in Iraq, recall the situation before the surge, describe
the current situation, and explain the recommendations I have provided
to my chain of command for the way ahead in Iraq.
the nature of the conflict
The fundamental source of the conflict in Iraq is competition among
ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources. This
competition will take place, and its resolution is key to producing
long-term stability in the new Iraq. The question is whether the
competition takes place more--or less--violently. This chart shows the
security challenges in Iraq, Foreign and home-grown terrorists,
insurgents, militia extremists, and criminals all push the ethno-
sectarian competition toward violence. Malign actions by Syria and,
especially, by Iran fuel that violence. Lack of adequate governmental
capacity, lingering sectarian mistrust, and various forms of corruption
add to Iraq's challenges.
the situation in december 2006 and the surge
In our recent efforts to look to the future, we found it useful to
revisit the past. In December 2006, during the height of the ethno-
sectarian violence that escalated in the wake of the bombing of the
Golden Dome Mosque in Samarra, the leaders in Iraq at that time--
General George Casey and Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad--concluded that
the coalition was failing to achieve its objectives. Their review
underscored the need to protect the population and reduce sectarian
violence, especially in Baghdad. As a result, General Casey requested
additional forces to enable the coalition to accomplish these tasks,
and those forces began to flow in January.
In the ensuing months, our forces and our Iraqi counterparts have
focused on improving security, especially in Baghdad and the areas
around it, wresting sanctuaries from al Qaeda control, and disrupting
the efforts of the Iranian-supported militia extremists. We have
employed counterinsurgency practices that underscore the importance of
units living among the people they are securing, and accordingly, our
forces have established dozens of joint security stations and patrol
bases manned by coalition and Iraqi forces in Baghdad and in other
areas across Iraq.
In mid-June, with all the surge brigades in place, we launched a
series of offensive operations focused on: expanding the gains achieved
in the preceding months in Anbar province; dealing Baqubah, several key
Baghdad neighborhoods, the remaining sanctuaries in Anbar province, and
important areas in the so-called ``belts'' around Baghdad; and pursuing
al Qaeda in the Diyala River Valley and several other areas.
Throughout this period, as well, we engaged in dialogue with
insurgent groups and tribes, and this led to additional elements
standing up to oppose al Qaeda and other extremists. We also continued
to emphasize the development of the Iraqi security forces and we
employed nonkinetic means to exploit the opportunities provided by the
conduct of our kinetic operations--aided in this effort by the arrival
of additional Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
current situation and trends
The progress our forces have achieved with our Iraqi counterparts
has, as I noted at the outset, been substantial. While there have been
setbacks as well as successes and tough losses along the way, overall,
our tactical commanders and I see improvements in the security
environment. We do not, however, just rely on gut feel or personal
observations; we also conduct considerable data collection and analysis
to gauge progress and determine trends. We do this by gathering and
refining data from coalition and Iraqi operations centers, using a
methodology that has been in place for well over a year and that has
benefited over the past 7 months from the increased presence of our
forces living among the Iraqi people. We endeavor to ensure our
analysis of that data is conducted with rigor and consistency, as our
ability to achieve a nuanced understanding of the security environment
is dependent on collecting and analyzing data in a consistent way over
time. Two U.S. intelligence agencies recently reviewed our methodology,
and they concluded that the data we produce is the most accurate and
authoritative in Iraq.
As I mentioned upfront, and as the chain before you reflects, the
level of security incidents has decreased significantly since the start
of the surge of offensive operations in mid-June, declining in 8 of the
past 12 weeks, with the level of incidents in the past 2 weeks the
lowest since June 2006 and with the number of attacks this past week
the lowest since April 2006.
Civilian deaths of all categories, less natural causes, have also
declined considerably, by over 45 percent Iraq-wide since the height of
the sectarian violence in December. This is shown by the top line on
this chart, and the decline by some 70 percent in Baghdad is shown by
the bottom line. Periodic mass casualty attacks by al Qaeda have
tragically added to the numbers outside Baghdad, in particular. Even
without the sensational attacks, however, the level of civilian deaths
is clearly still too high and continues to be of serious concern.
As the next chart shows, the number of ethno-sectarian deaths, an
important subset of the overall civilian casualty figures, has also
declined significantly since the height of the sectarian violence in
December. Iraq-wide, as shown by the top line on this chart, the number
of ethno-sectarian deaths has come down by over 55 percent, and it
would have come down much further were it not for the casualties
inflicted by barbaric al Qaeda bombings attempting to reignite
sectarian violence. In Baghdad, as the bottom line shows, the number of
ethno-sectarian deaths has come down by some 80 percent since December.
This chart also displays the density of sectarian incidents in various
Baghdad neighborhoods and it both reflects the progress made in
reducing ethno-sectarian violence in the Iraqi capital and identifies
the areas that remain the most challenging.
As we have gone on the offensive in former al Qaeda and insurgent
sanctuaries, and as locals have increasingly supported our efforts, we
have found a substantially increased number of arms, ammunition, and
explosives caches. As this chart shows, we have, so far this year,
already found and cleared over 4,400 caches, nearly 1,700 more than we
discovered in all of last year. This may be a factor in the reduction
in the number of overall improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in
recent months, which as this chart shows, has declined sharply, by
about one-third, since June.
The change in the security situation in Anbar Province has, of
course, been particularly dramatic. As this chart shows, monthly attack
levels in Anbar have declined from some 1,350 in October 2006 to a bit
over 200 in August of this year. This dramatic decrease reflects the
significance of the local rejection of al Qaeda and the newfound
willingness of local Anbaris to volunteer lo serve in the Iraqi Army
and Iraqi Police Service. As I noted earlier, we are seeing similar
actions in other locations, as well.
To be sure, trends have not been uniformly positive across Iraq, as
is shown by this chart depicting violence levels in several key Iraqi
provinces. The trend in Ninevah province, for example, has been much
more up and down, until a recent decline, and the same is (rue in Sala
ad Din province, though recent trends there and in Baghdad have been in
the right direction. In any event, the overall trajectory in Iraq--a
steady decline of incidents in the past 3 months--is still quite
significant.
The number of car bombings and suicide attacks has also declined in
each of the past 5 months, from a high of some 175 in March, as this
chart shows, to about 90 this past month. While this trend in recent
months has been heartening, the number of high profile attacks is still
too high, and we continue to work hard to destroy the networks that
carry out these barbaric attacks.
Our operations have, in fact, produced substantial progress against
al Qaeda and its affiliates in Iraq. As this chart shows, in the past 8
months, we have considerably reduced the areas in which al Qaeda
enjoyed sanctuary. We have also neutralized 5 media cells, detained the
senior Iraqi leader of al Qaeda-Iraq, and killed or captured nearly 100
other key leaders and some 2,500 rank-and-file fighters. Al Qaeda is
certainly not defeated; however, it is off balance and we are pursuing
its leaders and operators aggressively. Of note, as the recent National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq explained, these gains against al
Qaeda are a result of the synergy of actions by: conventional forces to
deny the terrorists sanctuary; intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance assets to find the enemy; and special operations
elements to conduct targeted raids. A combination of these assets is
necessary to prevent the creation of a terrorist safe haven in Iraq.
In the past 6 months we have also targeted Shiite militia
extremists, capturing a number of senior leaders and fighters, as well
as the deputy commander of Lebanese Hezbollah Department 2800, the
organization created to support the training, arming, funding, and, in
some cases, direction of the militia extremists by the Iranian
Republican Guard Corps' Qods Force. These elements have assassinated
and kidnapped Iraqi Governmental leaders, killed and wounded our
soldiers with advanced explosive devices provided by Iran, and
indiscriminately rocketed civilians in the International Zone and
elsewhere. It is increasingly apparent to both coalition and Iraqi
leaders that Iran, through the use of the Qods Force, seeks to turn the
Iraqi Special Groups into a Hezbollah-like force to serve its interests
and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and coalition forces in
Iraq.
The most significant development in the past 6 months likely has
been the increasing emergence of tribes and local citizens rejecting al
Qaeda and other extremists. This has, of course, been most visible in
Anbar Province. A year ago the province was assessed as ``lost''
politically. Today, it is a model of what happens when local leaders
and citizens decide to oppose al Qaeda and reject its Taliban-like
ideology. While Anbar is unique and the model it provides cannot be
replicated everywhere in Iraq, it does demonstrate the dramatic change
in security that is possible with the support and participation of
local citizens. As this chart shows, other tribes have been inspired by
the actions of those in Anbar and have volunteered to fight extremists
as well. We have, in coordination with the Iraqi Government's National
Reconciliation Committee, been engaging these tribes and groups of
local citizens who want to oppose extremists and to contribute to local
security. Some 20,000 such individuals are already being hired for the
Iraqi Police, thousands of others are being assimilated into the Iraqi
Army, and thousands more arc vying for a spot in Iraq's security
forces.
iraqi security forces
As I noted earlier, Iraqi security forces have continued to grow,
to develop their capabilities, and to shoulder more of the burden of
providing security for their country. Despite concerns about sectarian
influence, inadequate logistics and supporting institutions, and an
insufficient number of qualified commissioned and noncommissioned
officers, Iraqi units are engaged around the country.
As this chart shows, there are now nearly 140 Iraqi Army, National
Police, and Special Operations Forces Battalions in the fight, with
about 95 of those capable of taking the lead in operations, albeit with
some coalition support. Beyond that, all of Iraq's battalions have been
heavily involved in combat operations that often result in the loss of
leaders, soldiers, and equipment. These losses are among the
shortcomings identified by operational readiness assessments, but we
should not take from these assessments the impression that Iraqi forces
are not in the fight and contributing. Indeed, despite their shortages,
many Iraqi units across Iraq now operate with minimal coalition
assistance.
As counterinsurgency operations require substantial numbers of
boots on the ground, we are helping the Iraqis expand the size of their
security forces. Currently, there are some 445,000 individuals on the
payrolls of Iraq's Interior and Defense Ministries. Based on recent
decisions by Prime Minister Maliki, the number of Iraq's security
forces will grow further by the end of this year, possibly by as much
as 40,000. Given the security challenges Iraq faces, we support this
decision, and we will work with the two security ministries as they
continue their efforts to expand their basic training capacity, leader
development programs, logistical structures and elements, and various
other institutional capabilities to support the substantial growth in
Iraqi forces.
Significantly, in 2007, Iraq will, as in 2006, spend more on its
security forces than it will receive in security assistance from the
United States. In fad, Iraq is becoming one of the United States'
larger foreign military sales (FMS) customers, committing some $1.6
billion to FMS already, with the possibility of up to $1.8 billion more
being committed before the end of this year. I appreciate the attention
that some Members of Congress have recently given to speeding up the
FMS process for Iraq.
To summarize, the security situation in Iraq is improving, and
Iraqis elements are slowly taking on more of the responsibility for
protecting their citizens. Innumerable challenges lie ahead; however,
coalition and Iraqi security forces have made progress toward achieving
sustainable security. As a result, the United States will be in a
position to reduce its forces in Iraq in the months ahead.
recommendations
Two weeks ago, I provided recommendations for the way ahead in Iraq
to the members of my chain of command and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The essence of the approach I recommended is captured in its title:
``Security While Transitioning: From Leading to Partnering to
Overwatch.'' This approach seeks to build on the security improvements
our troopers and our Iraqi counterparts have fought so hard to achieve
in recent months. It reflects recognition of the importance of securing
the population and the imperative of transitioning responsibilities to
Iraqi institutions and Iraqi forces as quickly as possible, but without
rushing to failure. It includes substantial support for the continuing
development of Iraqi security forces. It also stresses the need to
continue the counterinsurgency strategy that we have been employing,
but with Iraqis gradually shouldering more of the load. It highlights
the importance of regional and global diplomatic approaches. Finally,
in recognition of the fact that this war is not only being fought on
the ground in Iraq but also in cyberspace, it also notes the need to
contest the enemy's growing use of that important medium to spread
extremism.
The recommendations I provided were informed by operational and
strategic considerations. The operational considerations include
recognition that:
military aspects of the surge have achieved progress
and generated momentum;
Iraqi security forces have continued to grow and have
slowly been shouldering more of the security burden in Iraq;
a mission focus on either population security or
transition alone will not be adequate to achieve our
objectives;
success against al Qaeda-Iraq and Iranian-supported
militia extremists requires conventional forces as well as
Special Operations Forces; and
the security and local political situations will
enable us to draw down the surge forces.
My recommendations also took into account a number of strategic
considerations:
political progress will take place only if sufficient
security exists;
long-term U.S. ground force viability will benefit
from force reductions as the surge runs its course;
regional, global, and cyberspace initiatives are
critical to success; and
Iraqi leaders understandably want to assume greater
sovereignty in their country, although, as they recently
announced, they do desire continued presence of coalition
forces in Iraq in 2008 under a new U.N. Security Council
Resolution and, following that, they want to negotiate a long-
term security agreement with the United States and other
nations.
Based on these considerations, and having worked the battlefield
geometry with Lieutenant General Ray Odierno to ensure that we retain
and build on the gains for which our troopers have fought, I have
recommended a drawdown of the surge forces from Iraq. In fact, later
this month, the Marine Expeditionary Unit deployed as part of the surge
will depart Iraq. Beyond that, if my recommendations are approved, that
unit's departure will be followed by the withdrawal of a brigade combat
team without replacement in mid-December and the further redeployment
without replacement of four other brigade combat teams and the two
surge Marine battalions in the first 7 months of 2008, until we reach
the pre-surge level of 15 brigade combat teams by mid-July 2008.
I would also like to discuss the period beyond next summer. Force
reductions will continue beyond the pre-surge levels of brigade combat
teams that we will reach by mid-July 2008; however, in my professional
judgment, it would he premature to make recommendations on the pace of
such reductions at this time. In fact, our experience in Iraq has
repeatedly shown that projecting too far into the future is not just
difficult, it can be misleading and even hazardous. The events of the
past 6 months underscore that point. When I testified in January, for
example, no one would have dared to forecast that Anbar Province would
have been transformed the way it has in the past 6 months. Nor would
anyone have predicted that volunteers in onetime al Qaeda strongholds
like Ghazaliyah in western Baghdad or in Adamiya in eastern Baghdad
would seek to join the fight against al Qaeda. Nor would we have
anticipated that a Shia-led government would accept significant numbers
of Sunni volunteers into the ranks of the local police force in Abu
Ghraib. Beyond that, on a less encouraging note, none of us earlier
this year appreciated the extent of Iranian involvement in Iraq,
something about which we and Iraq's leaders all now have greater
concern.
In view of this, I do not believe it is reasonable to have an
adequate appreciation for the pace of further reductions and mission
adjustments beyond the summer of 2008 until about mid-March of next
year. We will, no later than that time, consider factors similar to
those on which I based the current recommendations, having by then, of
course, a better feel for the security situation, the improvements in
the capabilities of our Iraqi counterparts, and the enemy situation. I
will then, as I did in developing the recommendations I have explained
here today, also take into consideration the demands on our Nation's
ground forces, although I believe that that consideration should once
again inform, not drive, the recommendations I make.
This chart captures the recommendations I have described, showing
the recommended reduction of brigade combat teams as the surge runs its
course and illustrating the concept of our units adjusting their
missions and transitioning responsibilities to Iraqis, as the situation
and Iraqi capabilities permit. It also reflects the no-later-than date
for recommendations on force adjustments beyond next summer and
provides a possible approach we have considered for the future force
structure and mission set in Iraq.
One may argue that the best way to speed the process in Iraq is to
change the Multinational Forces-Iraq mission from one that emphasizes
population security, counterterrorism, and transition, to one that is
strictly focused on transition and counterterrorism. Making that change
now would, in our view, be premature. We have learned before that there
is a real danger in handing over tasks to the Iraqi security forces
before their capacity and local conditions warrant. In fact, the
drafters of the recently released NIE on Iraq recognized this danger
when they wrote, and I quote, ``We assess that changing the mission of
coalition forces from a primarily counterinsurgency and stabilization
role to a primary combat support role for Iraqi forces and
counterterrorist operations to prevent al Qaeda-Iraq from establishing
a safe haven would erode security gains achieved thus far.''
In describing the recommendations I have made, I should note again
that, like Ambassador Crocker, I believe Iraq's problems will require a
long-term effort. There are no easy answers or quick solutions. Though
we both believe this effort can succeed, it will take time. Our
assessments underscore, in fact, the importance of recognizing that a
premature drawdown of our forces would likely have devastating
consequences.
That assessment is supported by the findings of a 16 August Defense
Intelligence Agency report on the implications of a rapid withdrawal of
U.S. forces from Iraq. Summarizing it in an unclassified fashion, it
concludes that a rapid withdrawal would result in the further release
of the strong centrifugal forces in Iraq and produce a number of
dangerous results, including a high risk of disintegration of the Iraqi
security forces; rapid deterioration of local security initiatives; al
Qaeda-Iraq regaining lost ground and freedom of maneuver; a marked
increase in violence and further ethno-sectarian displacement and
refugee flows; alliances of convenience by Iraqi groups with internal
and external forces to gain advantages over their rivals; and
exacerbation of already challenging regional dynamics, especially with
respect to Iran.
Lieutenant General Odierno and I share this assessment and believe
that the best way to secure our national interests and avoid an
unfavorable outcome in Iraq is to continue to focus our operations on
securing the Iraqi people while targeting terrorist groups and militia
extremists and, as quickly as conditions are met, transitioning
security tasks to Iraqi elements.
closing comments
Before closing, I want to thank you and your colleagues for your
support of our men and women in uniform in Iraq. The soldiers, sailors,
airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen with whom I'm honored to serve are
the best equipped and, very likely, the most professional force in our
Nation's history. Impressively, despite all that has been asked of them
in recent years, they continue to raise their right hands and volunteer
to stay in uniform. With 3 weeks to go in this fiscal year, in fact,
the Army elements in Iraq, for example, have achieved well over 130
percent of the reenlistment goals in the initial term and careerist
categories and nearly 115 percent in the mid-career category. All of us
appreciate what you have done to ensure that these great troopers have
had what they've needed lo accomplish their mission, just as we
appreciate what you have done to take care of their families, as they,
too, have made significant sacrifices in recent years.
The advances you have underwritten in weapons systems and
individual equipment; in munitions;.in command, control, and
communications systems; in intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance capabilities; in vehicles and counter-IED systems and
programs; and in manned and unmanned aircraft have proven invaluable in
Iraq. The capabilities that you have funded most recently--especially
the vehicles that will provide greater protection against IEDs--are
also of enormous importance. Additionally, your funding of the
Commander's Emergency Response Program has given our leaders a critical
tool with which to prosecute the counterinsurgency campaign. Finally,
we appreciate as well your funding of our new detention programs and
rule of law initiatives in Iraq.
In closing, it remains an enormous privilege to soldier again in
Iraq with America's new ``Greatest Generation.'' Our country's men and
women in uniform have done a magnificent job in the most complex and
challenging environment imaginable. All Americans should be very proud
of their sons and daughters serving in Iraq today.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General.
Ambassador Crocker?
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR RYAN C. CROCKER, UNITED STATES
AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ
Ambassador Crocker. Mr. Chairman, since I have circulated
my statement and delivered it in previous hearings, in the
interest of the committee's time, if it's agreeable to you, I'd
be prepared to go straight to questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Crocker follows:]
Prepared Statement by Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker
introduction
Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and members of the committee: Thank
you for the opportunity to address the Senate this week. I have
considered it a privilege and an honor to serve in Iraq at a time when
so much is at stake for our country and the people of the region--and
when so many Americans of the highest caliber in our military and
civilian services are doing the same. I know that a heavy
responsibility weighs on my shoulders to provide the country with my
best, most honest assessment of the political, economic, and diplomatic
situation in Iraq and the implications for the United States.
Americans, in this chamber and beyond, are looking for more than an
update on the latest events. They want to know the answers to some key
questions. Are our objectives realistic? Is it possible that Iraq will
become a united, stable country with a democratic government operating
under the rule of law? What is the trajectory--is Iraq, on the whole,
moving in the right direction? Can we expect more and under what time
frame? Are there alternative courses of action for our country which
are superior?
These are sensible questions to be asked by a nation investing in
and sacrificing for another country and people. In asking these
questions, however, we must not lose sight of the vital interests the
United States has in a successful outcome in Iraq.
My intention today is to give you an assessment of political,
economic, and diplomatic developments in Iraq. In doing so, I will not
minimize the enormity of the challenges faced by Iraqis, nor the
complexity of the situation. Yet at the same time, I intend to
demonstrate that it is possible for the United States to see its goals
realized in Iraq and that Iraqis are capable of tackling and addressing
the problems confronting them today. A secure, stable democratic Iraq
at peace with its neighbors is attainable. In my judgment, the
cumulative trajectory of political, economic, and diplomatic
developments in Iraq is upwards, although the slope of that line is not
steep. The process will not be quick, it will be uneven, punctuated by
setbacks as well as achievements, and it will require substantial U.S.
resolve and commitment. There will be no single moment at which we can
claim victory; any turning point will likely only be recognized in
retrospect.
This is a sober assessment, but it should not be a disheartening
one. I have found it helpful, during my time in Iraq to reflect on our
own history. At many points in the early years, our survival as a
nation was questionable. Our efforts to build the institutions of
government were not always successful in the first instance. Tough
issues--such as slavery, universal suffrage, civil rights, and state
rights--were resolved only after acrimonious debate and sometimes
violence.
Iraq is experiencing a revolution--not just regime change. It is
only by understanding this that we can appreciate what is happening in
Iraq and what Iraqis have achieved, as well as maintain a sense of
realism about the challenges that remain.
context
Evaluating where Iraqis are today only makes sense in the context
of where they have been. Any Iraqi under 40 years old--and that is the
overwhelming majority of the population--would have known nothing but
the rule of the Ba'ath party before liberation 4\1/2\ years ago. Those
35 years were filled with crimes against humanity on every scale.
Saddam Hussein ruled without mercy, not hesitating to use lethal force
and torture against even those in his inner circle. His genocidal
campaign against the Kurds and savagery toward southern Shi'a are well
known. But he also used violence and intimidation as tools in the
complete deconstruction of Iraqi society. No organization or
institution survived that was not linked in some way to regime
protection. He created a pervasive climate of fear in which even family
members were afraid to talk to one another.
This is the legacy that Iraqis had as their history when Saddam's
statue came down on April 9, 2003. No Nelson Mandela existed to emerge
on the national political scene; anyone with his leadership talents
would have not survived. A new Iraq had to be built almost literally
from scratch, and the builders in most cases were themselves reduced to
their most basic identity, ethnic, or sectarian.
Much progress has been made, particularly in building an
institutional framework where there was none before. But rather than
being a period in which old animosities and suspicions were overcome,
the past 18 months in particular have further strained Iraqi society.
The sectarian violence of 2006 and early 2007 had its seeds in Saddam's
social deconstruction and it had dire consequences for the people of
Iraq as well as its politics. Extensive displacement and widespread
sectarian killings by al Qaeda and other extremist groups have gnawed
away at the already frayed fabric of Iraqi society and politics. It is
no exaggeration to say that Iraq is--and will remain for some time to
come--a traumatized society.
national politics
It is against this backdrop that developments in Iraq must be seen.
Iraqis are facing some of the most profound political, economic, and
security challenges imaginable. They are not simply grappling with the
issue of who rules Iraq--but they are asking what kind of country Iraq
will be, how it will be governed, and how Iraqis will share power and
resources among each other. The constitution approved in a referendum
in 2005 answered some of these questions in theory, but much remains
uncertain in both law and practice.
Some of the more promising political developments at the national
level are neither measured in benchmarks nor visible to those far from
Baghdad. For instance, there is a budding debate about federalism among
Iraq's leaders and, importantly, within the Sunni community. Those
living in place like al-Anbar and Salahaddin are beginning to realize
how localities having more of a say in daily decision making will
empower their communities. No longer is an all-powerful Baghdad seen as
the panacea to Iraq's problems. This thinking is nascent, but it is
ultimately critical to the evolution of a common vision among all Iraqi
leaders.
Similarly, there is a palpable frustration in Baghdad over the
sectarian system that was used to divide the spoils of the state in the
last few years. Leaders from all communities openly acknowledge that a
focus on sectarian gains has led to poor governance and served Iraqis
badly. Many claim to be ready to make the sacrifices that will be
needed to put government performance ahead of sectarian and ethnic
concerns. Such ideas are no longer controversial, although their
application will be.
Finally, we are seeing Iraqis come to terms with complex issues not
by first providing a national framework, but instead by tackling
immediate problems. One such example is how the central government has
accepted over 1,700 young men from the Abu Ghurayb area west of
Baghdad, including former members of insurgent groups, to be part of
the Iraqi security forces. Another is how the government, without much
public fanfare, has contacted thousands of members of the former Iraqi
army, offering them retirement, return to the military, or public
sector employment. So without the proclamation of a general amnesty, we
see amnesty being granted, and deba'athification reform in advance of
national legislation. In both instances, the seeds of reconciliation
are being planted.
We have come to associate progress on national reconciliation as
meaning the passage of key pieces of legislation. There is logic to
this, as the legislation we are urging the Iraqis to produce does--in
one way or another--have to do with the question of how to share power
and resources among Iraq's many communities. This legislation also has
to do with the vision of the future Iraqi state. The oil and revenues
sharing laws, for instance, deal with deeper issues than simply whether
Iraqis in oil producing areas are willing to share their wealth with
other Iraqis. What is difficult about the oil laws is that they take
Iraq another step down the road toward a Federal system that all Iraqis
have not yet embraced. But once again, we see that even in the absence
of legislation there is practical action as the central government
shares oil revenues through budget allocations on an equitable basis
with Iraq's provinces.
In many respects, the debates currently occurring in Iraq--de-
Baathification and provincial powers--are akin to those surrounding our
civil rights movement or struggle over states rights. On de-
Baathification, Iraqis are struggling to come to terms with a vicious
past. They are trying to balance fear that the Baath party would one
day return to power with the recognition that many former members of
the party are guilty of no crime and joined the organization not to
repress others but for personal survival. With provincial powers, they
are grappling with very serious questions about what the right balance
between the center and the periphery is for Iraq. Some see the
devolution of power to regions and provinces as being the best
insurance against the rise of a future tyrannical figure in Baghdad.
Others see Iraq, with its complex demographics, as in need of a strong
central authority.
In short, we should not be surprised or dismayed that Iraqis have
not fully resolved such issues. Rather, we should ask whether the way
in which they are approaching such issues gives us a sense of their
seriousness and ultimate capability to resolve Iraq's fundamental
problems. Is the collective national leadership of Iraq ready to
prioritize Iraq over sectarian and community interests? Can and will
they come to agreement about what sort of Iraq they want?
I do believe that Iraq's leaders have the will to tackle the
country's pressing problems, although it will take longer than we
originally anticipated because of the environment and the gravity of
the issues before them. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and the other
Iraqi leaders face enormous obstacles in their efforts to govern
effectively. I believe they approach the task with a deep sense of
commitment and patriotism. An important part of my assessment was the
effort made by the leaders this past summer. After weeks of preparatory
work and many days of intensive meetings, Iraq's five most prominent
national leaders from the three major communities issued a communique
on August 26 that noted agreement on draft legislation dealing with
deba'athification and provincial powers. This agreement by no means
solves all of Iraq's problems. But the commitment of its leaders to
work together on hard issues is encouraging.
Perhaps most significantly, these five Iraqi leaders together
decided to publicly express their joint desire to develop a long term
relationship with the United States. Despite their many differences in
perspectives and experiences, they all agreed on language acknowledging
the need for a continued presence by the multinational forces in Iraq
and expressing gratitude for the sacrifices these forces have made for
Iraqis.
provincial and local politics
At the provincial level, political gains have been more pronounced,
particularly in the north and west of Iraq where the security
improvements have been in some places dramatic. In these areas, there
is abundant evidence that the security gains have opened the door for
meaningful politics.
In al-Anbar, the progress on the security side has been
extraordinary. Six months ago, violence was rampant, our forces were
under daily attack, and Iraqis were cowering from the intimidation of
al Qaeda. But al Qaeda overplayed its hand in al-Anbar and Anbaris
began to reject its excesses--be they beheading school children or
cutting off peoples' fingers as punishment for smoking. Recognizing the
coalition would help eject al Qaeda, the tribes began to fight with us,
not against us, and the landscape in al-Anbar is dramatically different
as a result. Tribal representatives are on the provincial council,
which is now meeting regularly to find ways of restoring services,
developing the economy, and executing a provincial budget. These
leaders are looking for help to rebuild their cities and talking of
attracting investment. Such scenes are also unfolding in parts of
Diyala' and Ninewa, where Iraqis have mobilized with the help of the
coalition and Iraqi security forces to evict al Qaeda from their
communities. The world should note that when al Qaeda began
implementing its twisted vision of the Caliphate in Iraq, Iraqis, from
al-Anbar to Baghdad to Diyala', have overwhelmingly rejected it.
Shiite extremists are also facing rejection. Recent attacks by
elements of the Iranian backed Jaysh al-Mahdi on worshipers in the holy
city of Karbala' have provoked a backlash and triggered a call by
Muqtada as-Sadr for Jaysh al-Mahdi to cease attacks against Iraqis and
coalition forces.
A key challenge for Iraqis now is to link these positive
developments in the provinces to the central government in Baghdad.
Unlike our states, Iraqi provinces have little ability to generate
funds through taxation, making them dependent on the central government
for resources. The growing ability of the provinces to design and
execute budgets and the readiness of the central government to resource
them are success stories. On September 6, Iraq's senior Federal
leadership traveled to al-Anbar where they announced a 70 percent
increase in the 2007 provincial capital budget as well as $50 million
to compensate losses in the fight against al Qaeda. The support of the
central government is also needed to maintain hard-won security in
areas like al-Anbar through the rapid expansion of locally-generated
police. The Government of Iraq has placed some 21,000 Anbaris on police
roles.
economics and capacity building
Iraq is starting to make some gains in the economy. Improving
security is stimulating revival of markets, with the active
participation of local communities. In some places, war damage is being
cleared and buildings repaired, roads and sewers built and commerce
energized.
The IMF estimates that economic growth will exceed 6 percent for
2007. Iraqi ministries and provincial councils have made substantial
progress this year in utilizing Iraq's oil revenue for investment. The
2007 governmental budget allocated $10 billion (nearly one-third Iraq's
expected oil export revenue) to capital investment. Over $3 billion was
allocated to the provinces and the Kurdish Region for spending. The
latest data show that spending units (national ministries and
provincial councils) have proceeded to commit these funds at more than
twice the rate of last year. Doing the best are the provincial
authorities, in the process gaining experience with making plans and
decisions, and running fair tenders. In so doing, they are stimulating
local business development and providing employment. Over time we
expect the experience with more responsive local authorities will
change Iraqi attitudes towards their elected leaders, and of the
provinces towards Baghdad.
At two conferences in Dubai in the last 2 weeks, hundreds of Iraqi
businessmen met an equal number of foreign investors newly interested
in acquiring shares of businesses in Iraq. An auction of cell phone
spectrum conducted by Pricewaterhouse Coopers netted the Government a
better-than-expected sum of $3.75 billion. The Minister of Finance
plans to use the funds, along with all the country's oil revenue, to
apply to its pressing investment and current expenditure needs.
Overall, however, the Iraqi economy is performing significantly
under potential. A lack of security in many parts of the countryside
raises transport costs and especially affects manufacturing and
agriculture. Electricity supply has improved in many parts of the
country, but is woefully inadequate in Baghdad. Many neighborhoods in
the city receive 2 hours a day or less from the national grid, although
power supplies for essential services such as water pumping stations or
hospitals are much better. The Minister of Electricity said last week
that it would take $25 billion through 2016 to meet demand
requirements, but that by investing the $2 billion a year the Ministry
is now receiving from the government's budget, as well as private
investment in power generation, that goal could be met.
We are deploying our assistance funds to make a difference to
ordinary Iraqis and to support our political objectives. Military units
are using Commanders Emergency Response (CERP) funds to ensure that
residents see a difference when neighborhood violence declines. U.S.
Assistance for International Development Community Stabilization Funds
provide tens of thousands of jobs. With the recent apportionment of
2007 supplemental funds, we are putting ``Quick Response Funds'' in the
hands of our Provincial Reconstruction Team leaders to build
communities and institutions in post-kinetic environments. Vocational
training and microfinance programs are supporting nascent private
businesses. In Baghdad, we are increasing our engagement and capacity
building efforts with ministries.
regional and international dynamics
On the diplomatic front, there is expanding international and
regional engagement with Iraq. In August, the UN Security Council, at
Iraq's invitation, provided the United Nations Assistance Mission in
Iraq (UNAMI) with an expanded mandate through U.N. Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR) 1770. The work of the International Compact with
Iraq moves forward, jointly chaired by Iraq and the U.N. Seventy-four
countries pledged support for Iraq's economic reform efforts at a
Ministerial Conference in May. The U.N. has reported progress in 75
percent of the 400 areas Iraq has identified for action. Later this
month, the Iraqi Prime Minister and the U.N. Secretary General will
chair a ministerial-level meeting in New York to discuss further
progress under the Compact and how UNSCR 1770 can be most effectively
implemented.
Many of Iraq's neighbors recognize that they have a stake in the
outcome of the current conflict in Iraq, and are engaging with Iraq in
a constructive way. A neighbors' ministerial in May, also attended by
the P-5 and the G-8, has been followed by meetings of working groups on
security, border issues, and energy. An ambassadorial level meeting
just took place in Baghdad, and another neighbors' ministerial will be
held in Istanbul in October.
Against the backdrop of these new mechanisms, the business of being
neighbors is quietly unfolding. For the first time in years, Iraq is
exporting oil through its neighbor, Turkey, as well as through the
Gulf. Iraq and Kuwait are nearing conclusion on a commercial deal for
Kuwait to supply its northern neighbor with critically needed diesel.
Jordan recently issued a statement welcoming the recent leaders'
communique and supporting Iraqi efforts at reconciliation. Saudi Arabia
is planning on opening an Embassy in Baghdad--its first since the fall
of Saddam.
Syria's role has been more problematic. On one hand, Syria has
hosted a meeting of the border security working group and interdicted
some foreign terrorists in transit to Iraq. On the other hand, suicide-
bombers continue to cross the border from Syria to murder Iraqi
civilians.
Iran plays a harmful role in Iraq. While claiming to support Iraq
in its transition, Iran has actively undermined it by providing lethal
capabilities to the enemies of the Iraqi state. In doing so, the
Iranian government seems to ignore the risks that an unstable Iraq
carries for its own interests.
looking ahead
2006 was a bad year in Iraq. The country came close to unraveling
politically, economically, and in security terms. 2007 has brought some
improvements. Enormous challenges remain. Iraqis still struggle with
fundamental questions about how to share power, accept their
differences and overcome their past. The changes to our strategy last
January--the Surge--have helped change the dynamics in Iraq for the
better. Our increased presence made besieged communities feel that they
could defeat al Qaeda by working with us. Our population security
measures have made it much harder for terrorists to conduct attacks. We
have given Iraqis the time and space to reflect on what sort of country
they want. Most Iraqis genuinely accept Iraq as a multi-ethnic, multi-
sectarian society--it is the balance of power that has yet to be sorted
out.
Whether Iraq reaches its potential is of course ultimately the
product of Iraqi decisions. But the involvement and support of the
United States will be hugely important in shaping a positive outcome.
Our country has given a great deal in blood and treasure to stabilize
the situation in Iraq and help Iraqis build institutions for a united,
democratic country governed under the rule of law. Realizing this
vision will take more time and patience on the part of the United
States.
I cannot guarantee success in Iraq. I do believe, as I have
described, that it is attainable. I am certain that abandoning or
drastically curtailing our efforts will bring failure, and the
consequences of such a failure must be clearly understood. An Iraq that
falls into chaos or civil war will mean massive human suffering--well
beyond what has already occurred within Iraq's borders. It could well
invite the intervention of regional states, all of which see their
future connected to Iraq's in some fundamental way. Undoubtedly, Iran
would be a winner in this scenario, consolidating its influence over
Iraqi resources and possibly territory. The Iranian President has
already announced that Iran will fill any vacuum in Iraq. In such an
environment, the gains made against al Qaeda and other extremists
groups could easily evaporate and they could establish strongholds to
be used as safehavens for regional and international operations. Our
current course is hard. The alternatives are far worse.
Every strategy requires recalibration as time goes on. This is
particularly true in an environment like Iraq where change is a daily
or hourly occurrence. As chief of mission in Iraq, I am constantly
assessing our efforts and seeking to ensure that they are coordinated
with and complementary to the efforts of our military. I believe that,
thanks to the support of Congress, we have an appropriate civilian
posture in Iraq. Over the coming year, we will continue to increase our
civilian efforts outside of Baghdad and the international zone. This
presence has allowed us to focus on capacity building, especially in
the provinces. The number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams has grown
from 10 to 25 this year. In support of these goals, we will be asking
Congress for additional economic assistance including additional quick
response funds for capacity building. We will also seek support for two
significant proposals that hold the prospect of creating permanent jobs
for thousands of Iraqis. One would be the establishment of an ``Iraqi-
American Enterprise Fund,'' modeled on our successful funds in Poland
and elsewhere in Central Europe. Such a fund could make equity
investments in new and revamped firms based in Iraq. The second would
be a large-scale operations and maintenance facility based on our
Highway Trust Fund. On a cost-sharing basis, such a fund would train
Iraqis to budget for and maintain important public sector
infrastructure (power plants, dams, roads). Over time, the cost-sharing
would phase down and out, leaving behind well-trained professionals and
instilling the habits of preventative maintenance.
We will continue our efforts to assist Iraqis in the pursuit of
national reconciliation, while recognizing that progress on this front
may come in many forms and must ultimately be done by Iraqis
themselves. We will seek additional ways to neutralize regional
interference and enhance regional and international support. We will
help Iraqis consolidate the positive developments at local levels and
connect them with the national government. Finally, I expect we will
invest much effort in developing the strategic partnership between the
United States and Iraq, which is an investment in the future of both
countries.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. That's your call, Ambassador.
Thank you.
General Petraeus, General Jones and his very distinguished
Commission, and very experienced and independent Commission
said that political reconciliation is the key to ending
sectarian violence in Iraq. Do you agree?
General Petraeus. I do, yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. The Commission also said that Iraqi armed
forces, excuse me for interrupting myself here--but I will say
that we'll have an 8-minute first round of questions--this is
for our colleagues, I've talked to Senator McCain about it, we
have a huge night, I think everyone is probably here today, so
we'd all like more time, but we'll limit the first found to 8
minutes.
General, let me ask you another question, then, about the
Independent Commission which was headed by General Jones. They
also wrote that the Iraqi armed forces are capable of assuming
greater responsibility for the internal security of Iraq. Do
you agree with that?
General Petraeus. I do. I would want to talk about which
units, but that is correct.
Chairman Levin. Now, in your testimony and your charts
indicate that there are approximately 95 of the Iraqi
battalions--Army, police, and SOFs battalions that are capable
of taking the lead in operations, albeit with some coalition
support, is that correct?
General Petraeus. That is correct, yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. I believe from our own statistics given to
us by the Department of Defense (DOD) under section 9010, that
89 of those battalions are in the Iraqi army, does that sound
about right?
General Petraeus. That sounds about right, I don't know if
they have the Special Operations elements in that----
Chairman Levin. I think they are.
General Petraeus.--but I think that's about right. Yes.
Chairman Levin. I think they are, that includes Special
Operations.
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Now, after talking with soldiers during a
recent visit to Iraq, it was my impression that many of the
Iraqi units that have the capabilities to be in the lead, are
not yet in the lead. From their testimony last week, I believe
that General Jones, and Jawr, speaking for that Independent
Commission, agree that there are many Iraqi units that have
that capability of being in the lead again, with support from
the coalition, that are not yet in the lead. Would you agree
with that?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir, I think I would, right.
Chairman Levin. Can you tell us, about how many of the 89
Iraqi units that are capable of taking the lead with the
support of the coalition are not yet in the lead?
General Petraeus. Sir, I can not. If I could take that for
the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
As of September 2007, there were two Iraqi Army battalions that had
recently reached Operational Readiness Assessment Level 2 that had not
yet assumed Iraqi Army Lead. The status of these two battalions had
recently been upgraded and once the conditions on the ground and
opportunities permit, these battalions will be placed in the lead.
It remains our policy to ensure that units are rated as capable of
operating in the lead or of conducting their own independent operations
before being given responsibility for their own battlespace. Once they
are rated as such, we transfer responsibility as soon as conditions
allow.
Chairman Levin. It's a very important point.
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Obviously, for those of us who believe that
we have to begin to reduce our forces, and to turn over
responsibility to the Iraqis, both politically and militarily,
where they have that capability that is still not being used. I
would appreciate that, if you would promptly get us that number
for the record.
General, British troops withdrew from Basra to a position
outside of the city. Now, of the 40,000 British troops that
were deployed to Iraq after the invasion, only 5,500 remain,
and they are, again, posted outside of the city of Basra. Prime
Minister Gordon Brown called the move part of a British
strategy to shift from combat to an overwatch role. The role of
securing the four provinces in the region, then, is left to the
Iraqi security forces. Did you agree with the British decision
to redeploy their troops out of Basra?
General Petraeus. Sir, I did, and they had already
withdrawn from Maysan Province, that was transitioned to
provincial Iraqi control some months ago. The Australian forces
are in one of the other four provinces, Dhi Qar and Al-Muthanna
Province transitioned to provincial Iraqi control, actually,
last year. So, they really are, what it really is,
transitioning the security of the palace in Basra City to Iraqi
elements that were trained and equipped and certified for that.
Chairman Levin. Did you agree with the reduction in British
troops?
General Petraeus. I did, yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. General, there was a lengthy article in
last Sunday's New York Times that assessed the surge, I don't
know if you've had a chance to read that article?
General Petraeus. I have not, sir.
Chairman Levin. The article was a result of work of 20
reporters who repeatedly visited 20 neighborhoods in Baghdad.
They found that of the residents had been killed or driven away
from their homes in Baghdad, more than 35,000 Iraqis had left
their homes since the surge began, that of nearly all of the
Shiite-dominated areas of Baghdad, the Mahdi Army has expanded
and deepened its control of daily life in Sadr City. The
residents say the Mahdi militants control neighborhood
security, gas stations, water supplies, and real estate, and
now Baghdad residents say the market is now controlled by the
Mahdi Army in Sedia--once middle-class and mixed, and
relatively peaceful--crackdowns in nearby Sunni areas led to an
influx of hardline Sunni insurgents. Shiites turned to their
own militias, principally the Mahdi Army. Most residents have
left, fleeing death squads from both sides. One of the most
alarming findings of the article is that Sunnis and Shiites
fear each other at the top levels of the government, and in the
sweltering neighborhood of Baghdad, hatreds are festering, not
healing.
Do you have any reaction to that summary? It's a long
article, but you didn't mention any specifics about the
provinces. I'm just wondering if anything I read strikes you as
being erroneous?
General Petraeus. No, there are certainly all of those
situations to be found in Baghdad, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. All right. Now Ambassador Crocker, in your
opening statement for the record, you provided a positive
judgment on the Iraqi political leaders, including Prime
Minister Maliki. Yet, according to Joe Klein, in an article in
the September 3rd edition of Time Magazine, you told him that
the fall of the Maliki Government, when it happens, might be a
good thing. Were you accurately quoted?
Ambassador Crocker. What I have said, when I have been
asked that question--and it's come up several times--is that in
Iraq now, with its democratically-elected parliament, questions
about any government--the Maliki Government or any other, are
going to be determined by the Iraqi people. There is a
mechanism for voting ``no confidence'' in their parliamentary
system, there are several ways they can do that, and it's up to
them.
Chairman Levin. I think we all agree with that. But that's
not my question. My question is, were you accurately quoted
when you were quoted as saying that it might be a good thing if
the Maliki Government falls? Is that an accurate quote?
Ambassador Crocker. My answer is that when I have been
asked that question, I respond in the manner that I just laid
out for you.
Chairman Levin. Are you saying, then, that you did not say
that when it happens, it might be a good thing?
Ambassador Crocker. I do not recall saying that, no, sir.
Chairman Levin. Now, Mr. Ambassador, the New York Times
reported that Prime Minister Maliki flew to Najaf to meet with
Grand Ayatollah Sistani on September 5, 2 days after Mr. Maliki
met with the President in Western Iraq. Mr. Maliki is quoted as
having stated that, ``I raised before Ayatollah Sistani my
viewpoints to form a government of technocrats.'' Now, did you
discuss that with Mr. Maliki, that conversation that he had
with Ayatollah Sistani?
Ambassador Crocker. I did not discuss that conversation,
because I was on my way back here that night. I have had
discussions with the Prime Minister on questions of how the
government functions, the problems in governmental
functioning--there is a lot of frustration over that, on our
side, of course, and on the part of Iraqis, and including the
Prime Minister himself. He has previously spoken of one
alternative, being the formation of a technocratic government.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, my time is up.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, again, thank you.
General Petraeus, you have stated that Iraq is now the
central front in the war on terror, is that a correct quote?
General Petraeus. That is correct, sir.
Senator McCain. Why is that?
General Petraeus. It is based on my conversations with the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and
Lieutenant General McCrystal, the Joint Special Operations
Command Commander who has assessed that it is a central front
for al Qaeda, and they have based that on communications and
other things.
It is possible that the loss of momentum--to some degree--
in Iraq by al Qaeda may be shifting that, we've actually been
looking at that to see if there are indicators of a reduction
in support for al Qaeda-Iraq or not, and there is not something
conclusive yet, but it is certainly something that we are
looking at very hard.
Senator McCain. Ambassador Crocker, in my statement I
mentioned, and I'm sure you heard the Iranian President stated,
``Soon we will see a huge power vacuum in the region. Of course
we are prepared to fill the gap.'' Did you hear that comment?
Ambassador Crocker. I did, I did hear that comment, yes,
sir.
Senator McCain. Your conclusion from that?
Ambassador Crocker. At least the President of Iran has one
virtue of being honest. Because that is already very apparent
to those of us in Iraq, as Iran's intention.
Senator McCain. General Petraeus, it's astonishing the
number of things that people come up with, one of the latest
statements is that the surge had nothing to do with Anbar
Province, and the rather stunning success we've had there. How
do you respond to that?
General Petraeus. The success in Anbar Province, correctly,
is a political success. But, it is a political success that has
been enabled, very much, by our forces, who have been enabled
by having additional forces in Anbar Province. The tribes,
indeed, stood up, started outside Ramadi last October or so,
Colonel McFarland of the Army with some great Marine forces and
some Army forces in Ramadi made the decision to back him, that
began to build some momentum, got some Iraqis trained, and all
of a sudden by mid-March, they felt that they could go ahead
and launch a----
Senator McCain. Could it have happened without the surge?
General Petraeus. It would not have happened as quickly
without the surge, and I don't know whether we could have
capitalized on it in the way that we have without the surge.
Senator McCain. Ambassador Crocker, there's now a lot of
conversation about a ``soft partition'' of Iraq, and that
Baghdad is already partitioned, and Kurds are doing things
locally--and others. What is your response to a proposal to a
``soft partition'' of Iraq?
Ambassador Crocker. Iraqis have to figure out what their
state will look like in the future. One of the promising
indicators we're seeing right now is, in fact, a discussion
among all Iraqis--including Sunnis--about a decentralized
federal system. These will be their choices to make. That kind
of outcome--which is provided for in the constitution, is not
soft partition, it's not partition of any form. Partition, in
my view, is not a viable outcome for the situation in Iraq.
Baghdad--in spite of all of the violence it has seen, and all
of the population displacements--remains a very mixed city.
Sunnis and Shiite together. Any notion that that city of over 5
million can be neatly divided up, or painlessly cleansed of a
huge number of people, is just incorrect.
Senator McCain. Some argue that that ethnic cleansing is
already taking place?
Ambassador Crocker. There clearly has been a substantial
displacement of--mainly of Sunnis--but also of Shiite. You know
to be candid, there is still some of that going on, as the New
York Times article suggests. That is going to be one of the
challenges ahead for the Iraqis, and for us in support of them.
Senator McCain. Why not let it just continue?
Ambassador Crocker. Because this is occurring in its
current form, pushed by militias and death squads, at a
tremendous human cost. We've brought that down. The surge has
brought that down, but it hasn't ended it. To simply say,
``This is a good thing,'' would be, I think, in both practical
and moral terms, roughly equivalent to some of the ethnic
cleansing we saw in the Balkans.
Senator McCain. General Petraeus, we agree that the
national police have been a colossal failure. What are we going
to do about it? How many people are we talking about in the
context of the overall national police force, as it is?
General Petraeus. Senator, there's no question that certain
national police elements were hijacked by sectarian interests--
particularly during 2006--and became part of the problem
instead of part of the solution. The Ministry of Interior has
recognized that, this Minister has taken steps, and we have
supported those steps, needless to say. But it includes
replacement of the overall national police commander, both
division commanders, all 9 of the brigade commanders, and 17 of
27 battalion commanders.
In addition, there has been a retraining process for them
of a month-long course, where they're pulled out of the line,
literally, and sent to a location Southeast of Baghdad for
retraining. With some of the units, this has appeared to work,
there are some others about which we still have continuing
concerns. I believe that Prime Minister Maliki himself has
gotten much greater concern about militia activity in general,
and has publicly said now that the militias must be dissolved
over time.
I am going to bring in some individuals to take a look at
this, together with the Ministry of Interior, in fact, shortly
after I get back.
Senator McCain. There's an argument that the success in
Anbar Province, because it's strictly Sunni, cannot be
replicated throughout Iraq.
General Petraeus. Sir, it can't be replicated exactly,
except of course in locations that are exactly Sunni-Arab. Now,
actually, there are neighborhoods in Baghdad where this has
been replicated, in other areas, including Abu Ghraib where
some, well over 1,500 men have been put on hiring orders by the
Ministry of Interior, almost all Sunni-Arab, I assume, and some
are former insurgents, Jaish al-Islami--the Iraqi Government
knows this, they did it with their eyes wide open, because they
saw that it would be better to have these individuals fighting
al Qaeda, instead of part of al Qaeda.
Senator McCain. So, this can be and is being replicated
throughout Iraq?
General Petraeus. It can be replicated in a number of
different locations where it's needed to be replicated. The
truth is, in some areas you have sufficient security forces now
to combat--and it's not just al Qaeda, it's also, of course,
militia extremists. But, if you look at the province of Dhi
Qar, for example, one of the four provinces for which the
British are responsible, in that province, there's a pretty
strong Iraqi element, and each time the militia has gotten out
of hand, that element has been able to deal with it--on some
occasions with some help with a special forces team, that is in
that area, and that can provide some close air support, as
required.
Senator McCain. Ambassador Crocker, what is your degree of
confidence that the Maliki Government can do the things that
we've been asking them to do for a long time?
Ambassador Crocker. My level of confidence is under
control. We saw in the course of the summer a serious effort on
the part of Prime Minister Maliki and other leaders to try to
work out some of the national level issues among them, and that
led to a communique on August 26 in which they announced
agreement in principle on two pieces of legislation--de-
Baathification reform and provincial powers--committed
themselves to convening regularly to deal with issues of
strategic significance to the nation, and also announced
agreement on issues relating to detainees and armed groups.
These are modest achievements, but I nonetheless find them
somewhat encouraging as an indication of, certainly, the
intention of the leaders of the three main communities to work
together, and their ability to produce some results.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the witnesses for their service.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I
thank General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, as others do,
for your service.
Ambassador Crocker, you've given us a rather ominous
prediction, when you say that your level of confidence in terms
of the political resolution decision, reconciliation is--you
used the words ``under control.'' We've heard from General
Petraeus, we've heard from General Jones, we've heard from the
President of the United States, that military action and
political reconciliation have to go hand-in-hand--you'd agree
with that, would you not?
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, I would agree that political
reconciliation has to be the end state, but I would not,
myself, suggest that they go hand-in-hand.
Senator Kennedy. All right.
Ambassador Crocker. I think the military surge can create
the conditions under which political reconciliation is
possible.
Senator Kennedy. All right, well they can create the
conditions. The real issue and question is, with the surge, are
those conditions being created? General Petraeus pointed out in
his counterinsurgency statement and book published last
December, ``the tactical actions that must be linked, not only
to strategic and operational military objectives, but also to
the host nation's essential political goals. Without those
connections, lives and resources may be wasted for no real
gain.'' Without those connections--military and political--
lives and resources may be wasted for no real gain. So, General
Petraeus, in looking at the surge, and being mindful of the GAO
report, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report, that
point out that the most important benchmarks that are essential
to achieve national reconciliation, end the violence, have not
been met, and are not likely to be met any time soon--how do we
have any real confidence that these political judgments are
going to be made by the Iraqi political leadership? The Iraqi
political leadership--they're the ones that are going to have
to make the judgments on political reconciliation. We've had
the surge now. We've read the GAO report, we know what
President Bush has said, that if the benchmarks have not been
achieved, he's going to hold the Iraqis accountable--we've seen
no evidence of that. I'd suggest that the Iraqi political
leadership is holding hostage American service men and women in
Iraq. If they are not going to move, if they're not going to
make judgments, if they're not going to make a decision, what I
hear from you is that the American commitment is going to be
open-ended. It's going to be open-ended into the future. I'm
not sure the American people are willing to buy into that.
General Petraeus. Senator, what gives me some confidence is
actions beyond those of the inability to gain agreement on the
benchmark legislation. An example is the fact that, although
there has not been agreement on the oil revenue-sharing law,
although they have actually sent it forward, I believe is the
latest status--they have been, in fact, sharing oil revenue. In
fact, giving provinces budgets that are commensurate with what
they likely will be given if this law were passed.
Similarly, in terms of--there is no general amnesty law,
but there is, essentially conditional immunity that Prime
Minister Maliki--through the National Reconciliation
Committee--has fostered in reaching out to these groups that
have raised their hand to support al Qaeda, and supporting them
by putting them through training, and on the payroll of the
Ministries of Interior and Defense.
Senator Kennedy. Just to remind ourselves, the NIE, which I
think most of us have had the opportunity to read, said the
political reconciliation--I think they used the word
``elusive''--the GAO, the establishment of benchmarks which are
basically benchmarks by the Bush administration have not been
effectively achieved and accomplished. We hear now that
Ambassador Crocker says that he has called the idea of
political reconciliation, he is keeping ``under control'' his
degree of enthusiasm, or interest, or belief that that's going
to happen. We have to know why we should believe that the
Maliki Government or the politicians in Baghdad are going to
make the tough judgments or decisions that are going to provide
the national reconciliation and the political stability of that
country, which--as you pointed out in your book--says is
absolutely essential if we're going to end violence, and have a
country that's going to have some degree of independence.
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, I described a few minutes ago
the efforts that Prime Minister Maliki and other members of the
leadership made in the course of the summer that does give me
some encouragement, both of their resolve and, to a certain
degree, their ability to get things done.
There are other indications----
Senator Kennedy. They're not in the GAO report.
My time is just going out--General, if I could ask you, on
your last chart that you have over here, this is the last
chart?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. It shows the gradual reduction of American
personnel over the period--these are the numbers, the brigades
that are going down, this has it eventually flattening out to
virtually nothing, it's the chart over here. What is the
timeline between these various bars that we have in this chart
that's on this--on the chart that you have over here, and that
you've distributed here?
General Petraeus. Senator, as I mentioned in my testimony,
the next decision--per my recommendations, at least, it would
be in mid-March, which would be to recommend the subsequent
drawdown--the pace of the subsequent drawdown beyond that we
would reach when we had hit the 15 brigade combat teams. We
would continue to do that as we go along.
Senator Kennedy. So, we shouldn't conclude, we shouldn't
draw any conclusions from that chart over there on the phasing
down, in terms of the American troops, what those bars mean,
and when the years will come out--do you have any estimate?
General Petraeus. I cannot offer you that. What that does
represent is our thinking on conceptually, how we would adjust
our mission set, and also the numbers of brigade combat teams
over time. Again, the over time--my best professional military
advice is that, again, I have to do that as we get closer to
each of those times.
Senator Kennedy. My time is up. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Thank you, Senator Kennedy.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to join all of us in saying that I have felt your
appearances--which I've followed very carefully, I was in
attendance at the House yesterday--have been very productive.
They've been forceful statements, they've been objective
statements, and I think, very credible statements, and I
commend you for this public service that each of you are
performing.
This is a critical time in our contemporary history of this
country, and we're on the threshold of a very important message
that our President will deliver regarding the forward strategy.
He'll deliver that, presumably, in the coming few days.
General Petraeus, I've followed with great interest your
career and I've gotten to know you quite well. I value our
professional association. You wrote a letter to your troops, it
says as follows, ``Many of us had hoped this summer would be a
time of tangible, political process at the national level, as
well. One of the justifications for the surge, after all, was
that it would help create the space for Iraqi leaders to tackle
the tough questions, and agree on key pieces of national
reconciliation legislation.'' You concluded with this simple
sentence: ``It has not worked out as we had hoped.''
On what facts did you predicate the hope that you had?
General Petraeus. Sir, I guess on the projections that were
made by--in many cases--those who came before us. There were
plans laid out of when certain pieces of legislation would be
dealt with and the plain and simple fact is they were not, and
I needed to level with our troops, and tell them that was the
case.
Senator Warner. Good. Let me go on, quickly. You value
intelligence, as a military man.
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. We have, I think, a very fine system of
intelligence now. Listen to what they said in January 2007 with
the NIE, and I quote them, ``Even if violence is diminished,
given the current winner-take-all attitude and sectarian
animosities infecting the political scene, Iraqi leaders will
be hard-pressed to achieve sustained political
reconciliation.'' Now, in January, there was a very positive
message to all, including you.
Now you come to August of this year. The NIE assesses that,
``Broadly-accepted political compromises required for sustained
security, long-term political process and economic development
are unlikely to emerge unless there is a fundamental shift in
the factors driving Iraqi political and security.'' The NIE
went on to say, ``That the Iraqi Government will become more
precarious over the next 6 to 12 months.''
How has this intelligence report--which I'm sure you
respect----
General Petraeus. I do.
Senator Warner. How has this shaped your message to
Congress, and your advice you're now giving the President of
the United States?
General Petraeus. For one, it has made it realistic, and as
I have mentioned to the other committees, I am not a pessimist
or an optimist at this point, I am a realist about Iraq, and
Iraq is hard. What gives, again, some hope, is the willingness
of Prime Minister Maliki--although it's difficult for him to
cobble together all of the different elements that are required
to agree on legislation--but he has given direction, the
formation of the National Reconciliation Committee, that works
with the engagement cell that the Ambassador and I have
created--a British two-star and a senior diplomat--to try to
embrace and facilitate these local initiatives, being connected
to the national government. That has been the positive----
Senator Warner. General, I have to tell you my own personal
view is that I think the local activities, of what they call
``bottom up'' reconciliation, are just coming into being, it's
just come into the lexicon, the debates that we've had, in
these 5 years, we've never seen it before. It's a little too
early, I think, to put much credit on it. But let them, let's
think for the future positively.
We have to have bottom up--I mean, top down, not bottom up,
reconciliation to meet the maxims that we've operated on, and
witnesses at that table have said for years, there is no
military solution to this, it has to be a political
reconciliation to have a unity government.
That brings you up, Mr. Ambassador. Again, you're giving
advice to the President. The President's message is going to
take this debate--as it should--from the halls of Congress into
every city, village, town, and crossroads in this country, into
most of the capitols of the worlds, and most particularly, in
the Middle East. Credibility of the United States is on the
line, and we have to help the President--all of us, in my
judgment--to get it right.
I don't feel that this current status of the Iraqi
Government, and I'm not going to use all of the adjectives; is
dysfunctional. It's all been laid out, very carefully, by each
of you over these days. But in January, the President, in that
January 10 message--and I've read it, and re-read it many
times--it is clear that that reconciliation was a concept, it
was a building block to justify going forward with the surge.
I do not think that the forward strategy that will be
announced by the President in a matter of days can once again
use the concept of top-down reconciliation as a building block
for that strategy he will announce to our Nation. Do you agree
or disagree with that?
Ambassador Crocker. Sir, as you and others of your
colleagues have remarked, and as we have said, and national
reconciliation, political reconciliation is ultimately what
success will be all about in Iraq, if it's achieved. So, I
think whether it is top-down or bottom up, or--which is
actually the case, both, that remains critically important.
I'd make just a couple of quick points--first, as General
Petraeus said, Iraq is hard, and reconciliation is hard,
particularly when you're looking at it against the backdrop of
the levels of violence the country has experienced over the
last year and a half.
Senator Warner. Simply, do you think it's going to be a
part of the fundamental factual basis of support for the new
strategy? We're betting on it happening at some point in time.
Ambassador Crocker. I think that the essence of success in
Iraq, for Iraqis, as well as for our own goals, centers around
a successful national reconciliation process that is going to
have both bottom-up and top-down elements.
Senator Warner. That's what's been said at this table for a
long time, sir. I respect you, but it hasn't happened.
I want to ask one last question to the General. Again, with
my respect for you, and how I've come to know you, you feel
very deeply about every single soldier, airman, marine, and
sailor that you have under your command. I think back about
George Marshall in World War II, when he was faced with
decisions in every respect, you face the same tough decisions
that he and Eisenhower and others faced in that period.
He said in his diary, ``I was very careful to send to
President Roosevelt every few days a statement of our
casualties. I tried to keep before him, all the time, the
casualty results. Because you get hardened to these things, and
yet you have to be very careful, to keep them always in the
forefront of your mind.'' Interesting, fascinating. I'm
confident that you do that. You're advising our President now
on a strategy, and we don't know what it will be. But I hope
that if--in any way you disagree--that you will so advise him.
Second, I hope in the recesses of your heart, that you know
that strategy will continue the casualties, the stress on our
forces, the stress on military families, the stress on all
Americans. Are you able to say at this time, if we continue
what you have laid before Congress here as a strategy, do you
feel that that is making America safer?
General Petraeus. Sir, I believe that this is, indeed, the
best course of action to achieve our objectives in Iraq.
Senator Warner. Does that make America safer?
General Petraeus. Sir, I don't know actually. I have not
sat down and sorted out in my own mind. What I have focused on
and been riveted on, is how to accomplish the mission of the
Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I). I have not stepped back to
look at the--and you've heard with other committees, in fact,
I've certainly taken into account the impact on the military,
the strain on our ground forces in particular, has very much
been a factor in my recommendations.
But I have tried to focus on doing what I think a commander
is supposed to do, which is to determine the best
recommendations to achieve the objectives of the policy from
which his mission is derived. That is what I have sought to do,
sir.
Senator Warner. Once the President makes his statement, I
hope you do consider very carefully--as I know you will. I
thank you, General.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.
Senator Byrd.
Senator Byrd. General, a lot of your testimony is focused
on al Qaeda in Iraq, even though the underlying problem in Iraq
is the sectarian conflict that stems back over 1,000 years.
I don't think it's a coincidence that this important
hearing is taking place on the anniversary of the September 11
attacks. This seems to be another attempt to make--in the mind
of a confused public--the war in Iraq to the attacks
perpetrated on us on September 11 by al Qaeda. Is this just a
big sales job? Please answer this clearly and succinctly, so
the American people can understand. Is there, and was there,
any connection between the attacks of September 11, 2001, and
Iraq?
General Petraeus. Not that I am aware of, Senator.
Senator Byrd. General Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker, it's
getting to be like the change of seasons around here. Every few
months someone from the administration comes up and says,
``Just give us 6 or 12 more months and things will look
better.'' Your argument for the surge back in January was that
military success would create space for political progress.
That didn't work. Now the new buzz-word is ``bottom-up.'' You
talked about military success, but by the President's own
reckoning, that success is meaningless without political
reconciliation. Are 6 months or 12 months really going to make
a difference on the big questions? Why should we keep giving
you more and more time? Why? Why should we keep giving you more
and more time?
Ambassador Crocker. I think there are a couple of things
that we have to keep very much in our minds here. First, what
are we seeing in Iraq on the ground. General Petraeus has
talked about the developments in the security situation. On the
political level, we are seeing some signs of encouragement, and
at the national level, I talked about with the leaders
announced in August.
We're also seeing something we hadn't seen before, which is
efforts to link bottom-up developments, such as those taking
place in Anbar, to the central government.
Just before I came back to Washington, for example, the top
leaders of the central government in Baghdad, the two Vice
Presidents, and the Deputy Prime Minister, that's a Sunni, a
Shiite, and a Kurd, went out to Ramadi to announce that the
central government was increasing the budget for Anbar Province
by $70 million for 2007, and was also providing $50 million in
compensation for losses suffered in Anbar in the fight against
al Qaeda.
In addition to the monetary amounts, I think this was
important, again, as a signal that the central government is
engaged with Anbar, and is working to cement relations with
this province, as Anbar takes its own steps to deal with al
Qaeda and establish security.
So, the answer I would give is that we are seeing some
encouraging signs out there, both at the provincial level, at
the Federal level, and between the two. I don't want to
overstate what's going on, but I think it is certainly
something that is encouraging to me.
Senator Byrd. General Petraeus, you've touted success in
Anbar Province. Just a few months ago, the tribes in Anbar
Province were shooting and killing Americans. Recently, they
decided they dislike the terrorists there more than they
dislike Americans, so they're cooperating with us for the time
being, while we give them money and arms.
This recalls, in my mind, our policy in the 1980s in
Afghanistan of arming the Taliban to fight the Soviet Union. We
all know how that short-term policy hurt our long-term
interests.
What guarantee can you give us that the tribes in Anbar are
not going to turn around and use the guns that we gave them
against our troops, once they feel we no longer serve their
interests? Isn't that a short-sighted policy?
General Petraeus. Senator, first of all, we are not arming
the tribes. We have not provided weapons to them. What we did
initially is, basically give a thumbs up when they asked if it
would be okay if they pointed the weapons they did have--they
were already well enough armed--at al Qaeda, because they had
come to reject the Taliban-like ideology and barbarity of al
Qaeda in the Euphrates River Valley.
At this point, their salaries in Anbar Province of the vast
majority of these individuals are being paid by the central
Iraqi Government, because they've been picked up as members
that have either joined the Army, or have joined local police
forces up and down the Euphrates River Valley. So, there is a
connection to a national chain of command, and to a national
salary structure that does give considerable leverage to the
national government over those individuals.
Very significant, again, that they have taken on al Qaeda,
because although I have not sought to connect al Qaeda with
September 11, al Qaeda is very much part of the sectarian
violence. They're really the most barbaric and lethal
accelerant on the Sunni-Arab side. Within Baghdad, in
particular, the element that has--had been trying to carry out
the displacement of Shiite, and kill--in fact our forces have
increasingly dealt with and there's still work to be done in
those neighborhoods against al Qaeda, and certainly very much
against Shiite militia, as well.
Senator Byrd. Ambassador Crocker, we're hearing that
political reconciliation can't take place without security. But
there will be no security without political reconciliation.
This circular dilemma sounds a lot like the dog chasing his
tail. A breeder would tell you that this is not the puppy to
pick. ``Don't pick that one.''
I'm not looking for an explanation about satisfactory
progress. I want to know when Iraq will step up to its
responsibilities, as have so many of our service men and women,
and what you're going to convey to the Iraqis that there is an
urgency for them to act now. When can we expect to see the
benchmarks that you were charged to report on? The benchmarks
originally proposed by the Iraqis themselves?
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, the benchmark process has been
deeply frustrating, certainly to us, and frustrating to a lot
of Iraqis.
At the same time, I think we have to maintain a certain
flexibility in our approach, and note that in some respects,
we're seeing action on the objectives of the benchmarks,
without actual national legislation.
We've mentioned, for example, revenue-sharing taking place
without a revenue-sharing law. It's being done on a reasonably
equitable basis to all of Iraq's provinces--that's all oil
revenue that's being shared.
De-Baathification reform--there is not yet legislation in
place, yet the government has reached out to a number of former
military officers, many of whom were members of the Baath party
to offer them reinstatement in the service, to offer them
pensions, or to offer them the choice of other public sector
employment. So, that is, indeed, progress on reconciliation,
without achieving the national benchmark.
Similarly, on amnesty, as General Petraeus mentioned. The
fact that the Government of Iraq was prepared to bring 1,700
young men from the Abu Ghraib area, just west of Baghdad into
the police force--even though some of those individuals had
been involved with Sunni insurgent groups in the past--is, if
not a general amnesty, it's clearly a conditional immunity.
So, while I certainly cannot tell you when Iraq will
achieve these benchmarks, formally, I can tell you that we're
seeing some interesting progress on the objectives behind the
benchmarks, which is reconciliation.
Senator Byrd. Thank you Mr. Ambassador.
Thank you, General Petraeus.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Byrd.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker,
having been over and visited with you on the ground over there
on a couple of occasions, I have to say here, publicly, that
you two are the right people at the right time.
I listened to your testimony, General Petraeus, and I'm not
sure why I did--I knew, pretty much, what you were going to say
when you came here, because these are things that we
experienced, those of us who have been over there--particularly
who have been over there recently.
You talked about Ramadi--there's no question that the
successes there, no one would have believed a year ago when
they declared that that very likely was going to be the
terrorist capitol of the world, and Fallujah, as we all watched
with great anxiety, the door-to-door Marine operations, and now
Fallujah is secure, just like Ramadi is. But the interesting
thing is, it's secured by the Iraqi security forces, as opposed
to ours.
You talked about Patrol Base Murray, south of Baghdad,
where they're doing things, the neighborhood programs that are
providing for their own security, the volunteers that are there
on the ground, we watched these programs, with the concerned
citizens programs take place in Anbar province, now it's
reaching some of the other areas, so that the successes are not
confined to Anbar province. The citizens who go out and mark
the undetonated IEDs--they're taking a risk. This is something
that wasn't happening just a few months--well, it wasn't
happening before the surge.
What's happening in the mosques is just really remarkable,
while the Imams, the clerics, and the mosques had been giving
their anti-American reports--I think we said that 85 percent of
the messages were anti-American, and we really haven't had
anti-American messages since about April. Now, I think that's
having a huge effect on the people over there in the region,
we're getting so much of the cooperation that we weren't
getting before.
Joint security stations, even a very critical report said
that we were almost to the anticipated number of 34, we have 32
now. When you talk to the troops, and when you talk to the
Iraqi troops about the relationships that are being developed,
it's a huge success story.
Ambassador Crocker, you talked about some of the economic
victories that were there, you talked about the markets, about
the kids in the playgrounds and these things. Some of us have
been there, and we've gone through the markets, so we know that
those successes are very real.
I have to say--and to apologize to the two of you for what
you've had to undergo--the moveon.org was bad enough, but I
think we know who was behind that, but when my old friend,
Congressman Tom Lantos, came out and said, ``We cannot take any
of this administration's assertions about Iraq seriously
anymore, no amount of charts and statistics will increase its
credibility,'' I think it's appropriate for you to repeat
something that you're probably tired of repeating. That is, the
report that you've brought to us and to the American people and
to Congress that you've been able to articulate in the last
couple of days. Just one more time, tell us the genesis of that
report--who put it together, and who's responsible for it.
General Petraeus. Senator, I have a brain trust of bright
guys, they wrote two drafts of it, and I took control of the
electrons last week, or 2 weeks ago and basically rewrote it,
and wrote that myself. Obviously, I shared it back and forth
with them, but what I delivered here today was very much, by
and large, my testimony, and it certainly had not been cleared
with--nor even shared with anyone----
Senator Inhofe. At the Pentagon, the White House, or
Congress.
General Petraeus. The White House, the Pentagon, or
Congress.
Senator Inhofe. All right.
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that, very much.
I say to both of you that the adversaries, those who had
been opposed to the war, those who are, generally, opposed to
this President, have been very outspoken for a long period of
time. But, I also noticed that some of the adversaries, once
they go over there, and they see firsthand what we have seen,
change their minds.
I was really shocked when I saw the article in the paper by
Michael O'Hanlon and Kenneth Pollack, in the New York Times on
the 30th of July. These are two journalists, fine people and
all that, with the Brookings Institute, but they've been very
critical. They came back and wrote the article, ``A War We Just
Might Win.'' I was in shock to see that. Katie Couric, who has
certainly been no friend of the President's, or of this effort,
came back from actually going over and visiting--Fallujah was
one of the deadliest cities in this country with terrible
fighting. But what happened is, al Qaeda came in, the tribal
leaders realized they did not want to live under a brutal al
Qaeda regime, so they enlisted the help of the U.S. soldiers--
suddenly, these former enemies had a common enemy, worked
together, and now Fallujah is relatively calm, reconstruction
efforts are underway, and it is really being considered a
crowning achievement.
I can't help but think, I would suggest that both Senator
Kennedy and Senator Byrd go over there, and they may experience
the same type of conversion.
Now, when that statement was made, trying to draw a
relationship--or trying not to draw a relationship between Iraq
and September 11--I think it's important to bring out the fact
that there were very major terrorist training camps in Iraq. In
place like Sarda, Ramadi, Samarra, and Salimin Paq. In Salimin
Paq there was a training camp where they actually had a
fuselage of a 707, training terrorists how to hijack
airplanes--there's no evidence that those who performed that
duty on September 11 were trained there, but nonetheless, these
were terrorist training camps. Are there any left in Iraq now?
General Petraeus. There are certainly areas in which al
Qaeda still has local sway, if you will. But one of the big
efforts during the surge has, in fact, been to wrest control
from them of many of the areas that were formerly sanctuaries,
including not--also Ramadi, Baqubah, Arab Jaboor, a number of
other neighborhoods in Baghdad, and so----
Senator Inhofe. The point I want to make and want to get
into the record, is that there are terrorist training camps
that were there, most of which are not there anymore.
There's been a lot of discussion about the various ``cut
and run'' resolutions, and what would happen if we
precipitously left. We have a lot of people we can quote, but
one that has not been in the record so far was Iranian
President Ahmadinejad, when he said at a press conference in
Tehran just a matter of a few days ago, he said, ``soon,''--
believing that we might pull out, he said, ``soon we will see a
huge power vacuum in the region, of course, we are prepared to
fill that gap.'' Ambassador Crocker, do you think they'd do
that?
Ambassador Crocker. Sir, I think they've already shown that
that is their intention. Iranian involvements in Iraq, support
for extremist militias, training, connections to Lebanese
Hezbollah, provision of munitions that are used against our
forces, as well as the Iraqis, are all--in my view--a pretty
clear demonstration that Ahmadinejad means what he says, and is
already trying to implement it to the best of his ability.
Senator Inhofe. I'd appreciate one last question, as my
time is just about expired.
General Petraeus, I probably wouldn't have gone quite as
far as you went, in terms of what you're anticipating could be
in the troop level in the future, because I think that's a
difficult thing to do, but in your assessment, I would like to
have you respond as to what factors should be used to determine
that date and the size of troop withdrawal. What kind of
factors would we be looking at? Instead of using specific
withdrawals, and withdrawals and dates.
General Petraeus. Sir, certainly the conditions in local
areas are hugely important, and it's not just the conditions of
the local security forces, it's also, actually, local political
conditions. Because when you have a real sea change, as we have
had in some of the Sunni areas, where they have decided to
oppose al Qaeda, needless to say, the job just became quite
more manageable. That's a very important factor.
I will continue to factor in the strain on our ground
forces, I think that's something in a strategic sense that I do
have to take into account. It is an area, in fact, in which
I've looked at what the impact of this is on our country?
To come back to that, if I could--let me be very clear--I
believe that if we can achieve our objectives in Iraq, that is
obviously a very good thing for the United States, and would
make us safer. The converse, I think, is also true, depending
on how it turned out.
To go on further, as I said, the Iraqi security forces
become of considerable importance in that area, the
institutional underpinnings for them at that time become
important, and those are the key factors that we would look at,
as we take this forward.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
General Petraeus. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General and Ambassador. It strikes me, as I
watched your testimony over the last 2 days that you left the
real war in Iraq, and came over onto the battlefield of the
political war here in Washington about Iraq. I would say, on
this battlefield, you have gained considerable ground over the
last 2 days.
I say so because, too often on this battleground, the
forces are divided according to partisan loyalties, and there's
a lot of hype and spin. You have given testimony that is
thoroughly non-partisan, non-political, and realistic. It's
quite obvious just today, this afternoon, that all of the
answers you have given have not been answers that the
administration would have wanted you to give. But, you're
straight-shooters, you're both professionals--a soldier and a
statesman who have served your country, and are serving it most
admirably today. I thank you very much for that.
I also thank you for the encouraging report that you have
given, and I hope that it effects opinions here on Capitol
Hill--I'm confident it will effect the opinions of a lot of
people across America, because of the credibility that you've
gained in giving it. You've said to us, the military objectives
of the surge are, in large measure, being met, and as a result,
the forces can be reduced by 7,500 troops by the end of this
year, and 30,000 by about, less than a year--by next summer.
``Without jeopardizing,'' I'm quoting you, General, ``the
security gains that we've fought so hard to achieve.''
I suppose one of the things that has surprised me most over
the last 2 days is that every Member of Congress, regardless of
our opinion about the way forward in Iraq, hasn't cheered when
you said that, thanked you for it. Because, I can tell you that
the 30,000 troops and their families are thrilled to hear that
announcement, and I appreciate it very much. In the best of all
worlds, I'd like to think people around here would take ``yes''
for an answer, and we'd go on and look forward to your next
report in the spring.
It's probably not going to happen. So, I want to ask you a
few questions, General, about some of the amendments and
proposals that we're likely to have put before us on the floor
of the Senate.
First, some may attempt to take your ``7,500 by the end of
the year, 30,000 by next summer,'' and mandate it without
regard to conditions on the ground, what would you say to that?
General Petraeus. I would be uncomfortable with that.
Again, I think that we have to have our eyes wide open as we go
forward with this. We are making projections about what we
believe will be the case, they're not hopes, but they are where
we think we will be, and that is the basis for our decisions.
In fact, if it can go the other way, we could even make it
sooner. But, what we should do, again, is the objective about
our assessments as we move along and ensure that we do not
surrender a gain for which we've fought very, very hard by
being locked into a timetable like that.
Senator Lieberman. I take it that your answer would be the
same to a proposal that would accelerate the troop withdrawal,
mandate a larger troop withdrawal sooner, perhaps switching
over to a different kind of mission early next year that would
be counterterrorism, training the Iraqi troops, and protecting
our troops there?
General Petraeus. First of all, to do counterterrorism, as
I mentioned very briefly in the statement, requires
conventional, as well as all types of SOFs and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. We've found, in fact,
this is very effective.
We had been banging away in Ramadi with our very high-end,
SOFs for years, and we did disrupt the enemy in there, we did
take them down, various times, a few pegs. But it was not until
courageous marines and soldiers truly cleared Ramadi in mid-
March, now augmented by these Iraqi security forces, former
tribal members who joined in the fight against al Qaeda in the
Euphrates River Valley, that we were truly able to take that
sanctuary away from al Qaeda-Iraq.
The same has been true in other areas--you do have to clear
the area, and that is something that is not done just by
counter-terrorist forces, per se, those that we normally
associate with a counter-terrorist mission, but by conventional
forces as well.
In fact, one of the things we've worked very hard to do is
diffuse the intelligence that support all of these different
operations, and also, to coordinate and to try to achieve a
synergy between the effects of these different types of assets.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you for that answer, which I take
to be a negative to an earlier accelerated reduction of troops,
to switch the mission earlier.
I want to go to Iran--both of you have focused on the very
destructive role that Iran is playing through its Quds force in
Iraq, by most counts responsible for the murder of hundreds of
American soldiers and thousands of Iraqi civilians and
soldiers.
Ambassador Crocker, I know you've met twice with the
Iranian Ambassador to Baghdad. I know that some of my
colleagues and others have called for a diplomatic surge with
Iran, to engage in negotiations with them. In your view, based
on those two meetings, are the Iranians responding to that
diplomatic initiative that you commenced with them?
Ambassador Crocker. Sir, we have seen nothing on the ground
that would suggest that the Iranians are altering what they're
doing in support of extremist elements that are going after our
forces, as well as the Iraqis.
Senator Lieberman. General, do you feel that you have all
of the authorities that you need, from a military point of
view, to deter, disrupt, and respond to the Iranian attacks on
our troops, and Iran's efforts to destabilize Iraq?
General Petraeus. I do, Senator. Again, keeping in mind
that my area of responsibility is limited to Iraq. So, it does
not include going into Iran.
Senator Lieberman. Let me ask you about that, because I
know your military spokespeople in Baghdad have made very clear
that we have evidence that Iran is taking Iraqi extremists to
three training camps outside of Tehran, training them in the
use of explosive, sophisticated weapons, sending them back into
Iraq where they are responsible for the murder of American
soldiers. Is it time to give you authority, in pursuit of your
mission in Iraq, to pursue those Iranian Quds force operations
in Iranian territory in order to protect America's troops in
Iraq?
General Petraeus. Sir, I think that really the MNF-I should
just focus on Iraq, and that any kinds of operations outside
the borders of Iraq would rightly be overseen by Central
Command (CENTCOM).
Senator Lieberman. My time's up.
Thank you both. God bless you in your extraordinary
service, and we all wish you well and success. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank both
of you for your service to America, your commitment to
executing the policies, not only of the President, but of this
Congress, as we voted, over three-fourths voted to authorize
the actions in Iraq.
I think it's a healthy discussion, I really do. Last week
we had General Jones' Commission, where 20 experienced people
came and gave their views. We had the GAO give us their
evaluation of where we are, and today you front-line officers,
representing the government, are sharing your thoughts with us
today, and we thank you for that.
Ultimately, it is Congress' role to decide whether or not
to fund this activity. I hope after this discussion, we can
reach a bipartisan agreement, even though maybe it won't be a
unanimous vote, but once an agreement is reached, I hope that
we can all work together in a way that helps us achieve the
decided-upon policy, and does not in any way make it any more
difficult to achieve the policy that this Nation will have
decided upon in this democratic fashion.
Bing West has been to Iraq a number of times and written
extensively about it--I believe two books--recently said this,
General Petraeus, and I think you should be complimented, he
said, ``The new military team has infused the effort with
energy and strategic clarity, and seize the initiative. In this
war, the moral, psychological element outweighs the physical by
20 to 1. On the two primary battlefields--Anbar and Baghdad--I
see a common characteristic, U.S. momentum.'' I think that's
indicated in your comments, and I just wanted to share that,
because some things have happened there.
General Petraeus, you have--after having two full tours in
Iraq, you came back and completed writing the DOD
Counterinsurgency Manual--I see a copy of the big manual over
there someone has. Would you tell us some of the tactics and
principles you're applying that might have been different from
those before, that you think can be effective against
insurgents?
General Petraeus. Sir, I think one of the most important
initiatives has been to ensure that the idea of securing the
population by living among it, is one of the tactics,
techniques, and procedures that we practice. This manifests
itself in the form of the joint security stations that are
combinations of Iraqi and coalition forces, jointly manning,
generally commanding control, and also, typically some forces
there as well. Locations are in Baghdad, they're also in a
number of other cities.
There are also, however, patrol bases and combat outposts
that have been established--again, to ensure that our soldiers
and Iraqi forces are in the neighborhoods, are in the areas.
You cannot commute to this fight. You can't secure a population
by driving through it a few times in a day. You have to be
there 24/7.
This has, in fact, had positive developments. The
intelligence that you get from this can actually be
overwhelming at a certain point when they realize you're there
to stay. It's worked exceedingly well in Ramadi and Fallujah,
and in a number of other cities----
Senator Sessions. Speaking of intelligence, this is when
the local people give information of value to the American, or
the Iraqi soldiers?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir. In fact, that's a big factor in
the number of additional weapons caches. The locals are helping
us to those, we also have more forces on the ground, we also
have more presence throughout the countryside, throughout
cities, and so forth.
Particularly, as the locals sense a degree of momentum,
then they want to get on board, they're now happy to have the
mortar cache in their vegetable garden taken out, as it's no
longer needed.
So, those are the types of practices that we have sought to
employ, and a number of others in terms of this fusion of the
intelligence--a lot of these are evolutions. But, I do think
that, yes, we have made mistakes along the way, we have learned
lessons very much the hard way, but I think that our
institutions--the Army, the Marine Corps, the other Services--
have made a number of changes that have helped ensure that our
leaders not only have the experience to draw on that many of
them have already had in Iraq, sometimes one or two tours
before--but also have had a preparation for deployment, the
road to deployment, as it's called--that has the DOD
Counterinsurgency Manual, or a host of other field manuals that
have been revised, the detainee operations one is another
significant one--and then the education system for our
commissioned and NCOs has been completely overhauled. The
Combat Training Center, mission rehearsal exercises out in the
desert in Nevada, in Central Louisiana and Germany--all of
this. In starting off, in fact, with a seminar on
counterinsurgency, as they begin the road to deployment.
So, the institutions themselves have already made a lot of
changes. We have a counterinsurgency center, in fact, in Iraq
that General Casey started that has a superb element in this as
well, all leaders, instead of sitting down in Kuwait as our
forces come through the port, actually are flown up to a base
North of Baghdad, where they go through a week at the
counterinsurgency center there. In fact, I address them.
General Odierno and a number of others all sit down and talk to
them about the latest developments, because it does continue to
evolve.
So, there are a lot of these efforts to try to do what we
have learned is the right thing to do in Iraq. I think that,
our leaders in particular--commissioned and NCO leaders really
do get it, about this in a way that perhaps we have not had in
the past.
Senator Sessions. I would thank you for those comments, and
I guess the point of that answer is that you didn't just take
30,000 more troops and patrol more in Baghdad. You have a new
strategy, a complex strategy, that teaches an alteration in
their approach to the nature of this combat and conflict, is
that what I understand?
General Petraeus. We are trying to employ the forces in
very appropriate ways. The truth is that some cases are doing
what you might identify as counterterrorism, really. Targeted
raids, other cases it really is classical counterinsurgency,
and in some cases it's almost peace enforcement, in others it's
nation-building--but that is what counterinsurgency is today,
and that's what we tried to capture, in fact, in the
counterinsurgency field manual.
Senator Sessions. I think that's important. There's no one
area of that country that's exactly like another----
General Petraeus. That's correct.
Senator Sessions.--and each one has to be treated
differently, does it not?
General Petraeus. That is correct, sir.
Senator Sessions. You have that complexity in mind as you
develop this strategy--I think it does give us a cause for
belief that we can make progress.
General Petraeus, when you came before us in January,
before you went to Iraq, you had told me previously that no
matter what happened, you would tell Congress the truth. I
asked you that, that morning, and you committed to tell the
American people the truth as you see it. Have you--to the best
of your ability--told this Congress the truth about the
situation in Iraq today?
General Petraeus. I have, yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. General Petraeus, in your opinion, is
there a circumstance in which this effort in Iraq is such that
we cannot be successful, that we would be putting more effort
in a losing cause if we continue it? Or, in your opinion, do we
have a realistic chance to be successful in this very important
endeavor?
General Petraeus. Sir, I believe we have a realistic chance
of achieving our objectives in Iraq.
Senator Sessions. I would just say, Mr. Chairman, when I
asked General Jones last week, did a single member of his 20-
member Commission believe that our effort in Iraq was hopeless,
and that we should withdraw promptly, he indicated not a single
one did. So, I believe the American people are concerned about
that question, and I value your honest answer to it.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Sessions.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Petraeus, have you ever recommended or requested
the extension of troop tours to 18 months, or the accelerated
deployment of National Guard and Reserve Forces?
General Petraeus. I've certainly never recommended
extension beyond 15 months. In fact, General Odierno and I put
out a letter that said that unless things got completely out of
control, that we would not even think of extending beyond 15
months.
Senator Reed. Having done that, doesn't that virtually lock
you into a recommendation of reducing troops by 30,000,
beginning in April, and extending to the summer? Regardless of
what's happening on the ground?
General Petraeus. Depending on what can be taken out of the
Reserves. I don't know what is available in the National Guard
and the Reserves. I do know that the Active-Duty Army, in
particular, that the string does run out for the Army to meet
the year-back criteria.
Now, what we have done, of course, as I mentioned, Senator,
is actually, in fact, to take some elements out short of their
15-month mark, because of our assessment of the situation----
Senator Reed. I understand that, and I think basically, my
sense is that the overriding constraint you've faced is not
what's happening on the ground in Iraq, but the reality--unless
you did recommend, request, and succeed--that unless tours were
extended, 30,000 troops are coming out of there beginning in
April of next year, regardless of the situation on the ground.
General Petraeus. Again, certainly the active brigade
combat teams were going to come out of there. Again, I'm not
aware of what is available in terms of battalions, brigades, or
what have you----
Senator Reed. My sense is that the Reserve and National
Guard Forces are not available to----
General Petraeus. I think that's the case, but again, I
don't know because I have not asked.
Senator Reed. Let me go to an issue which I think is
essential to, not only where we are, but where we're going--
that's the reversibility of the progress you've reported with
respect to the surge. I think in that context, I look at the
situation in Basra, which the Chairman alluded to.
The British conducted Operation Sinbad for about 6 months,
goals very similar to the surge--reduce the violence in Basra,
the second-largest city in Iraq, bring down the level of
violence, prepare for redeployment of forces. They've begun
their redeployment, and yet the situation in Basra, I think,
has deteriorated significantly. Is that accurate?
General Petraeus. Actually, in the last month, the level of
violence has come down fairly significantly. In part because as
I mentioned, there's been a four-star general put in place
there several months ago, changed the police chief, and again,
reached some political accommodations among the three parties
that are down there. Also, did some release of some Jaish al-
Mahdi detainees, as well, who are not ones--by the way--who are
in league with Iran.
Senator Reed. But, the presence there of Iran is quite
significant in the southern part, particularly in Basra.
General Petraeus. There is a very real concern about
Iranian activity in the southern provinces, and in Basra, in
particular.
Senator Reed. Yet, you've agreed--as you said earlier to
the chairman--that the reduction of British forces was
appropriate. In that regard, too, do the current British forces
have a population protection mission?
General Petraeus. They do not. Really, Operation Sinbad was
very different from our surge, in the sense that it was
conducted to reach some relatively short-term goals, and
actually all along, intended to come back to their bases. They
did, then, train--for example--the force to secure the palace
over the course of the last couple of months, it's certified,
took it over, and in fact has done an adequate job in
maintaining security of that palace there. It has been the
stand-up of some additional Iraqi forces down there, including
Iraqi SOFs. There are additional forces--literally, as we
speak--that are moving there to strengthen the position of
General Mohan, the four-star general there.
Senator Reed. If the British forces are operating there
with, essentially, a force protection mission, and you've
described--in your terms--progress because of political
adjustments, why can't U.S. forces begin to adopt a force
protection counterterrorism mission, and nonpopulation
protection mission? Or, alternatively stated, why do certain
elements in your command--American units--have a population
protection mission, and the British don't?
General Petraeus. It's largely because that's a Shiite
area, and there has not been the kind of sectarian violence,
there's just basically one sect. There is a pocket of Sunnis
down there, but there has been general co-existence down there,
by and large. So you, literally, just don't have the same--that
particular challenge--in Basra, or in the other southern
provinces. There is intra-Shiite fighting that goes on, but
that is something that, in general, the Iraqis have shown an
ability to resolve in a way that they have not been able to
deal with, the very heightened sectarian violence, in
particular, that took off in the next areas, in the wake of----
Senator Reed. But let me return to my initial--you've
argued that lately, at least, that the progress in the south
seems to be taking some hold. Principally because of the non-
sectarian element. Yet, out where you are operating, where you
will reduce forces next spring, there is a significant
sectarian Shiite-Sunni clash. Yet, you're still confident that
these gains will stand up?
General Petraeus. There are a number of areas in which we
are actually doing fine in mixed areas--or, in which, a better
more accurate to say, Iraqi security forces are holding their
own, are shouldering their share of the burden. Again, not to
come back to Anbar, but Anbar is one of them, certainly. You
see, not only were we going to bring the Muhone out of there,
and not ask for it to be replaced, but we actually moved an
Army battalion out of Anbar Province, as well, to another area,
in fact, where it was needed more. But there are other
locations like that--Kirkuk, Mosul to a degree--other locations
where you can thin, because of the additional--in many cases--
local volunteers who have seen what has happened in Anbar
Province, and have sought to have some of that in their areas.
Senator Reed. Any strategy has objectives and resources to
gain those objectives. Included in that is timed troops. So,
given the present strategy that you've adopted, how long, and
at what maximum strength, do you anticipate American forces
being in Iraq?
General Petraeus. What I can see so far, with any clarity
in terms of time, as I said, is to the mid-July figure of 15
brigade combat teams. We have the concepts to take us beyond
that, but as I mentioned in my testimony, I can't--with any
confidence or clarity--then project beyond that time, other
than to say that we will draw down. What I cannot say is the
pace of the drawdown, beyond that 15 brigade combat team
structure.
Senator Reed. Ambassador Crocker, to date the nation-
building effort in Iraq has faulted, dramatically. It seems the
emerging strategy is one based on tribalism. Do you think that
is a long-term and appropriate approach to stabilize the
country?
Ambassador Crocker. Again, Senator, it's hard to do nation-
building or reconciliation in the face of widespread sectarian
violence, which has been the situation over the last 18 months.
As you've seen from General Petraeus' charts, it's really just
been in the last few months that we've seen a significant
reduction in that.
I think that nation-building, reconciliation in Iraq is
going to take a lot of forms. In certain areas, the tribal
dimension is key. If you're dealing with Anbar, you're dealing
in tribal terms, and what is interesting, and somewhat
encouraging to me there, is those tribal elements that have
emerged have shown a considerable interest with linking up with
the central government in Baghdad.
About 10 days ago, the leader of the Anbar Awakening,
Sheikh Sittar, came to Baghdad, I spent some time with him, and
his main purpose, though, was to meet with the Prime Minister,
and establish a relationship, and see what might develop out of
that.
In other parts of the country, it's going to be a somewhat
different story. Diyala, for example, the Baqubah area, you
have tribal elements, but given the inner-mixture of Sunni,
Shiite, and Kurds--unlike Anbar which is all Sunni--you also
have a very complex sectarian element. So, the dynamic is going
to work differently in Diyala.
Similarly, in the south, there is a tribal dimension there,
it has a different form and shape than the tribal dimension in
the predominantly Sunni areas. But there, too, we're seeing
some signs of a desire on the part of Southern Shiite tribes,
to connect with us, to connect with their own central
government in the face of violent extremism practiced by
elements of Jaish el-Mahdi.
In Baghdad, the tribal dimension is less dominant, although
in many areas, still present. But, we're also seeing--as
General Petraeus has pointed out, in some Sunni Baghdad
districts, the same kind of backlash against al Qaeda, the same
desire to step up, and cooperate with our forces, and then to
go the next step, for these neighborhood watches to link up
with their own central government, and come under the authority
of the Ministry of Interior.
So, again, it's very complex. It's going to vary from place
to place. The tribes are part of it, different areas are going
to have different dynamics.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Now, I'm going to call on Senator Collins. We are in the
middle of a roll call vote. There apparently are--how many
minutes left, 10 plus 5 left in the roll call vote. After
Senator Collins' turn, of 8 minutes, we will automatically
stand in recess 20 minutes to give our witnesses a break. They
haven't asked for one, but we're going to provide it anyway.
[Laughter.]
So, Senator Collins, then we'll stand in recess until 20
minutes to 5 p.m.
Senator Collins. Mr. Chairman, I will say that we've had
this experience before, for those who were on the Governmental
Affairs and Homeland Security Committee, and I hope the vote
really is going to go the full amount of time.
Senator Warner. I'll go down and protect you.
Senator Collins. I hope I'll be protected on that, since
I've never missed a vote.
General, Ambassador, let me begin by thanking you for your
courageous service.
General, you've testified three times now that, ``The
fundamental source of conflict in Iraq is competition among
ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources.'' As
you've stated in your confirmation hearing--and reaffirmed here
today--success in Iraq requires a political, as well as a
military, component. So, let's look ahead a year from now.
If a year from now the Iraqi Government has still failed to
achieve significant political progress, what do we do? How long
should we continue to commit American troops, American lives,
American treasure, if the Iraqis fail to make political gains
that everyone agrees is necessary to quell the sectarian
violence? I'm going to ask both you and the Ambassador this
question.
General Petraeus. Senator, if we arrived at that point a
year from now, that is something I would have to think very,
very, very hard about. That is my honest answer to you right
now. That would be a very, very difficult recommendation to
make at that point in time. Because, on the one hand, we have
very real national interests that extend beyond Iraq. They are
true American national interests. On the other hand, there
clearly are limits to the blood and treasure that we can expend
in an effort. I am keenly aware of that, and, as I've mentioned
a couple of times, that awareness did in fact contribute to
these recommendations.
Senator Collins. Ambassador?
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, what I said in my testimony
yesterday and today, is that it is my judgment that cumulative
trajectory of political, economic, and diplomatic developments
in Iraq is upwards, although the slope of that line is not
steep. As we move forward, I will be constantly reviewing and
assessing--with myself, my team, General Petraeus and members
of his command--how we see things developing on the political
level. I can't say what I'll be seeing a year or even 6 months
from now, but what I can tell you is that I will make the same
objective, honest objective, honest assessment that I've tried
to do for this testimony.
Again, if I should--at some future point--come to the
judgment that, instead of a slight upward trend, we have a line
moving in a downward direction, I'll be clear about it.
Senator Collins. Ambassador, the first chart that General
Petraeus showed us listed the major threats to Iraq. It talked
about foreign fighters coming in from Syria, the possibility of
Turkey coming in, and the concern about the Kurdistan Worker's
Party. From Iran, we've had lethal aid training and funding,
there are also foreign fighters coming in from Saudi Arabia.
The Iraq Study Group's major recommendation--in addition to
a change of mission--was for a diplomatic surge. To undertake a
major diplomatic effort, to involve Iraq's neighbors, and to
deal with all of these threats. I know that you have met with
the Iranians, but there really has not been a consistent,
ongoing effort to engage all of Iraq's neighbors. Should we be
doing more on the diplomatic front?
Ambassador Crocker. It's a great point, Senator, because
the reality is that while Iraq's problems in their own context
are extraordinarily difficult, Iraq also exists in a region,
and as that slide demonstrates, the neighbors can make a hard
situation that much worse. That has to be part of the overall
strategy.
We're doing two things on that. One is the neighbors
initiative, if you will. There was a ministerial meeting in
Sharm El Sheikh in May that involved all of Iraq's neighbors,
plus the P-5 and the G-8. Since then there have been meetings
of three working groups, among the neighbors, to focus on
border security, refugees, and energy. We were observers at
those.
There was a meeting of the neighbors representatives in
Baghdad, at the level of Ambassadors, on September 9, and there
will be another ministerial at the end of October, or the
beginning of November in Istanbul.
There is also a proposal out there to establish a permanent
secretariat, so that there will be an ongoing, coordinating
mechanism for some of these difficult issues. So, that's at one
level.
The other thing we're doing is--and we coordinate together
on this--bilateral initiatives--demarches, and capitols, and so
forth, and we will continue to do that, as well.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
I am going to go run for the vote. Senator Akaka, I believe
is here, and I think--okay, we're going to recess until 4:40, I
believe.
Thank you very much.
General Petraeus. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Chairman Levin. The committee will come back to order, and
Senator Akaka is next. Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I've been very concerned about placing the responsibility
of the new Iraqi Government back in the hands of the Iraqi
people. In his speech on January 10, the President said, ``I've
made it clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq's other leaders
that America's commitment is not open-ended. If the Iraqi
Government does not follow through on its promises, it will
lose the support of the American people, and it will lose the
support of the Iraqi people. Now is the time to act. The Prime
Minister must understand this.'' The President further stated,
``America will hold the Iraqi Government to the benchmarks it
has announced.''
Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, can you explain to
me why we are not holding the Iraqi Government accountable for
failure to meet their benchmarks, as the President said we
would? We've heard reports from the Commission and reports from
GAO pointing this out. But we have not heard about what we're
going to do about it. I'm asking the question, why are we not
holding the Iraqi Government accountable for this?
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, the benchmark exercise, the
failure of the Iraqi Government to fully implement a number of
the benchmarks has been very frustrating to us, to me
personally. It's frustrating to the Iraqis, it's frustrating in
the Iraqi Government. These are, in many cases, very complex
legislative initiatives that are difficult to do, particularly
in conditions of significant violence. It's really been in the
last few months that we've actually seen the violence trend
down in a substantial way.
My own view is that while the benchmarks are clearly
important--while they are Iraq's own benchmarks, they are the
ones who established them--the reality has been that in many
cases, it has been simply too hard to do as a straight-up,
national-level, legislative initiative. That doesn't mean that
they should quit, or that we should stop pressing them. Neither
is the case. It's a regular part of our discussions with the
Iraqi leadership. But I think we have to be realistic here.
They haven't been able to do them in the time that they and we
agreed they should. They have done, as I discussed earlier,
some practical things, creating the effect of benchmarks
without having a national-level legislation. We see that in
amnesty and de-Baathification and in revenue-sharing, just to
mention three.
So, I guess the final point I would make, sir, is that we
have to keep in mind that benchmarks themselves are a means to
an end. That end is reconciliation. If reconciliation is being
achieved without full implementation of benchmarks, we should
not lose sight of that as a measure of progress.
Senator Akaka. General?
General Petraeus. Senator, let me talk, if I could, about
the security-related benchmarks. Frankly, the Iraqis have done
better there. They did provide the three brigades worth of
forces. Yes, they're not all operational readiness assessment
(ORA) #1 because some of them are short equipment, or short
NCOs, or something else, but they are in the fight in Baghdad,
those forces are there. They are involved. In fact, some of
them have really gained a good bit of respect of our coalition
forces. Interestingly, one from Basra that is actually
operating in the Sunni area. So Shiite, predominantly Shiite,
of course from a Sunni area--in a Sunni area and the coalition
commander actually wants that force to stay.
In addition, Prime Minister Maliki has not limited
operations anywhere in Iraq. There was a time my predecessor,
as you may recall, was in the press, was directed or asked to
remove some check points, for example, around Sadr City at one
point. We have not had restrictions after a couple months after
I got there and we talked our way through this, and also after
Prime Minister Maliki came to understand, again, the real
challenge that the sectarian--the Shiite militia extremists, in
particular--posed to the new Iraq and also the militia threat.
It's something that he became much, much more concerned about
over time. So again, in that regard, there is a more positive
level of performance.
It is mixed in some other areas. One of those, talking
about the sectarian influence or influence in targeting or
things like that. Again, Maliki himself has done the right
thing in this area. But here we have some concerns about
others, either in his office or in other echelons of command.
Therefore, they have not done what we had certainly expected
that they would do.
But, on the security side again, I think it's fair to say--
a more positive assessment than with respect to the big
legislative items.
Senator Akaka. We have had faction problems and violence as
well, General. Anthony Cordesman, an Iraq expert at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies here in Washington, has
said that, ``In the 6 months the surge has been underway, we
have lost about 40 percent of the country to Shiite factions.''
In Basra for example, the withdrawal of British troops seems to
have led to an increase in Shiite on Shiite violence outside
government control.
General, do you agree with this, with his assessment, and
if not, how much of the country do you believe is now under the
control of Shiite factions?
General Petraeus. I haven't sat down and figured out a
percentage of the country that might be under Shiite militia
control. There are certainly large neighborhoods, Sadr City for
one, that obviously, in which there is considerable, enormous
Shiite militia influence, several others in Baghdad. Again,
Prime Minister Maliki has actually taken steps to address this
in certain locations, in particular, and also in certain
ministries. Because sectarian, the Sadr movement really
hijacked some of the ministries as well. He's taken some fairly
courageous steps--detained the Deputy Minister of Health,
detained the Brigadier General in charge of the Facility
Protection Security Forces of the Ministry of Health--and
replaced the Facility Protection Security Forces around Medical
City.
Then I would have to walk down through the Shiite south,
there has certainly been serious challenges by Shiite militia,
including the assassination of two governors in southern
provinces. But I would not say--by and large--that there are
entire provinces, by any means, that are completely under the
sway of the Sadr militia.
In most of those provinces, Iraqi security forces, by and
large, have control. Certainly Dewaniya is a bit dicey, but
they've actually rolled back some of that. But others, as you
walk your way down--and then Basra, as I explained earlier,
really is in the throes of a, both the establishment of a
pretty strong security operational command under General Mohan,
a four-star general, and a new police chief, repositioning
forces. Really an Iraqi solution down there, a Shiite-Iraqi
solution to an Iraqi problem that right now seems to be doing
reasonably well.
But we hosted Tony Cordesman in Iraq, have a great deal of
time for him and for the piece that he had, this latest one was
titled, ``The Case for Strategic Patience.'' It poses, it lays
out many of the challenges that we have described here, but
also, as I said, does, at the end of the day, make this case
for strategic patience, given the national interests that are
involved.
Senator Akaka. Thank you for your response.
General Petraeus. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me echo the thanks of everybody else here to you
gentlemen. Number one, for providing the kind of leadership in
a very complex world at a critical point in the history of the
world, the kind of leadership that's really needed right now,
and also compliment you on what you've had to go through for
the last 24 hours.
You've been worn down and asked every conceivable question
that could have been asked about what's going on in your part
of the world. But there are a couple of things that I want to
get to.
But first, General Petraeus, we're very pleased to have you
stop by Georgia on your way from Baghdad to Washington and to
visit Fort Benning over the weekend and to see the next
generation of Petraeus airborne-qualified as he graduated from
jump school. I know you're just as proud of Stephen as he is of
his Dad, so congratulations to you there.
One other thing I want to say to you, General. I get a lot
of emails from soldiers on the ground because of the fact I've
been there so many times, and we have so many soldiers from the
3rd Infantry Division at Fort Benning and Fort Stewart that are
over there.
I got an email back in January, shortly after you were
confirmed and went to Baghdad. That e-mail was from a young
soldier who had been on the ground for several months. He said,
``Senator, I just want you to know how refreshing it is to have
new leadership on the ground in Iraq that is committed to
winning this war.'' He sent me a copy of a memo that you had
sent out to all of your commanders in the field. He highlighted
one phrase in that memo, which said, ``Be relentless in your
pursuit of the enemy,'' and he said, ``We haven't heard this
before. With General Petraeus here now, it has boosted the
moral of the soldiers on the ground like I've never seen.'' So
that's a great compliment to you and it is the kind of
leadership that we need if, in fact, we are going to prevail.
I want to go back to what Senator Lieberman was talking
about, with this issue regarding Iran. We know that the Iranian
influence is strong, particularly in the southern part of Iraq.
We know that there are explosively formed penetrators (EFPs)
being manufactured in Iran, or perhaps the parts being shipped
from Iran into Iraq and manufactured. EFPs are more deadly than
the IEDs, so we know the Iranians are having a significant
influence on American's lives.
What are we doing, Ambassador Crocker, from the diplomatic
standpoint, with the fact that you have already said, in
response to Senator Lieberman, that you didn't get much in the
way of a positive reaction on the other side. From a diplomatic
standpoint, is our discussion with the Iranians dead, are we
pursuing it any further, or does it even merit pursuing it any
further?
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, I think that it's an option
that we want to preserve. Our first couple of rounds did not
produce anything. I don't think that we should either,
therefore, be in a big hurry to have another round, nor do I
think we should say we're not going to talk anymore. Things
have strange ways of developing out in that part of the world.
It may be, for example, that in the wake of the pronouncement
by Mokdul Sadr a week or so ago, calling on the Jaish al-Mahdi
to stand down in operations against both Iraqi and coalition
forces, after the negative reaction that Sadr and the Jaish al-
Mahdi received because of their violence in Karbala during a
religious festival--it could lead to some recalculations in
Tehran. I don't know.
But I think we want to see how this plays out and see,
again, whether the Iranians are ready to make another
calculation of where their interests really lie. Because I
would submit that for Iran, whose people suffered more than
anyone else from Saddam, except the Iraqis themselves, that a
stable, secure Iraq that doesn't threaten its neighbors is in
their long-term interest.
We'll see if they get to that calculation. I have
absolutely no assurance that they will, or not even very much
confidence, but I do believe it's important to keep the option
for further discussions on the table.
Senator Chambliss. General Petraeus, what about from a
military standpoint? Obviously, there's a very long border
between Iran and Iraq. What action are we moving on to try to
make sure that we slow down the shipment of arms from the
Iranians to the Iraqis?
General Petraeus. First of all, Senator, we have conducted
a number of operations against individuals connected with the
EFP shipment process. In fact, we captured the Iraqi head of
the Shivani Network, as it's called, that is one of the major
arms smuggling networks.
A number of others along the way, we just picked up a large
EFP cache in the last 24 or 36 hours. In addition, obviously
we're focusing a good deal of intelligence on this, and we're
working very closely with the Iraqi security forces and now,
the Georgian Brigade, the country of Georgia--not to be
confused with your great home State, but the country of Georgia
that has just deployed a brigade into Iraq--very keen to
operate outside the wire. It is going to work hard to interdict
and disrupt the flow of weapons and other assistance from Iran.
They're in a very strategic location in Kut, southeast of
Baghdad, astride the road that comes up from Maysan, and also
in from the border crossing that is to the east of Kut. That,
we believe, can have a positive affect as well, and very much
thicken and reinforce the actions of the Iraqis in that area.
Senator Chambliss. Is there any consideration given to, or
being given to, establishing a larger military presence, in the
form of some sort of small base?
General Petraeus. Sir, there's actually a very large base
already at Kut. It's a base that had been used by the
Multinational Division Center South, and that is, in fact,
where the Georgian Brigade has deployed. We have a small U.S.
headquarters there that works with them as well, a Provincial
Reconstruction Team standing up and then some border transition
teams also working out of that location. We may well put a
patrol base or a combat outpost just to the west of the border
crossing in that area as well to assist and to get eyes on,
really, what is being done at that border entry point.
Senator Chambliss. My time is up, but I thank both of you
again for being very straightforward and honest in your
assessment, as well as your presentation over the last 2 days.
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Ambassador, earlier today I asked
you about Iran. Does Iran support, in your talks with the
Ambassador, do you get any indication that they support the
Shiite government in Iraq?
Ambassador Crocker. Their stated policy is to support
Iraq's new government and the efforts of that government to
build a secure, stable, democratic Iraq. Their actions run
pretty much to the contrary and that is a fact that the Iraqi
Government itself is aware of. The Foreign Minister of Iraq,
speaking at a gathering of Iraq's neighbors on Sunday, publicly
spoke over his concerns on intervention by the neighbors, by
some of the neighbors in Iraq with a negative security impact,
and it was clear that he was talking about Iran. So again, you
have a stated policy of support that simply is not borne out by
reality on the ground.
Senator Bill Nelson. General, if I may, earlier in
conversation that you had with Senator Reed, the question was
raised, can you sustain 130,000 troops, which you have set as a
benchmark at the end of next summer. Can you sustain that? You
tell me if I'm correct. I understood your answer to be, you
would have to be able to sustain that, not with the regular
Army, but with the Reserves.
General Petraeus. No, sir, I was talking about the surge.
Had we, if I had requested to extend the surge forces, the
Active brigade combat teams in the Army could not, with a 15-
month tour lane, have sustained that beyond, again, the 15
months of those particular deployments.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay.
General Petraeus. It would have taken forces from another
component, from either the Reserves or the National Guard. I'm
just not familiar enough with what the two Services--the Army
and the Marine Corps--have available in that regard, and I
haven't requested it.
Senator Bill Nelson. As the field commander, do you think
that if you have a 15-month requirement for soldiers, that
there should be 15 months off?
General Petraeus. Senator, as I mentioned this morning,
what I want as a field commander is the maximum possible, but
again, my job is not to determine the dwell time for the Army
or the Marine Corps, it really is to establish the requirements
for the achievement of the objectives that we are trying to
achieve.
Senator Bill Nelson. Certainly, I would assume that you
would have an opinion on that, because it would affect morale,
rest, and recuperation.
General Petraeus. Sir, again, if I said the longer the
better, I mean again, the longer the better, but again, it's
just something that's not on my plate.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay, I understand. So, let's assume
that Congress enacts a requirement that if you're going to have
15 months in-country, you have to have 15 months that you're
not in-country. So now, looking down the road at your goal of
130,000 by the end of next summer, can you sustain that? Can
you sustain that 130,000?
General Petraeus. Sir, I don't know. I'm not----
Senator Bill Nelson. You don't know.
General Petraeus.--again, the service chief, I've seen
discussions of this. My sense is that we could not, but again,
I'm not the one to ask about that, I'm afraid. That's really a
question for the Army Chief of Staff.
Senator Bill Nelson. We will certainly ask that and there's
no mystery that the Reserves and the National Guard had
difficulty with regard to enlistments.
General Petraeus. Sir, could I clarify one point as well?
Because that is--again, I'm not sitting here saying we're going
to sit at 130,000 again, what I have said is that we will
continue to come down. What I don't know is what recommendation
I can make about the slope of that line, if you will.
Senator Bill Nelson. Correct me if I'm wrong, I clearly got
the impression this morning that you think what we will have is
130,000 of our U.S. troops over there by the end of next
summer.
General Petraeus. Sir, what I have said is we will have 15
brigade combat teams and then we'll have to shape what the rest
of the force is at that time because we've actually had to
bring some additional forces in above and beyond this because
of detainee operations, IED Task Force, and some other things
that are there.
What I want to do is to get as low as we can. I've already
charged the chief of staff of the MNF-I to pull together the
teams, to start determining where we can achieve savings and
combining functions of the two headquarters, the logistics, a
whole host of other areas, wherever we can, we want to send
folks home, and not keep them over in Iraq.
Senator Bill Nelson. Can you venture a guess or a wish----
General Petraeus. Sir, I have not----
Senator Bill Nelson.--by the end of the year? Not this
year, the end of----
General Petraeus. I cannot, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson.--after the summer?
General Petraeus. I cannot, sir. Again, what I've said is
that, with any confidence at all, I cannot predict the level of
the continued force drawdown beyond that point in mid-July. But
that's what I've pledged to do, is to assess that and make a
determination, recommendations no later than mid-March.
Senator Bill Nelson. Of course, a lot of that would depend
on whether or not there's political reconciliation.
General Petraeus. That's an important factor, both
nationally and locally, and other factors as well, obviously.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do you see any indication, thus far,
of political reconciliation?
General Petraeus. What I've seen, again, as I mentioned
earlier, Senator, is the Prime Minister himself, in his office,
reaching out again, to Sunnis in Anbar Province--we haven't
talked at all about what he did in Salah ad Din Province. We
actually flew him up to Tikrit the other day, he got off, went
and met with a number of Sheiks up there, and have a similar
initiative to what has gone on in Anbar Province. Now, it's
going to take a while for that to reach critical mass, it's at
the very early stages. But that is an important accommodation,
if you will, and it is a tangible representation of a form of
national reconciliation, short of, certainly, the legislative
items that represent national reconciliation.
We've talked about the fact that there's no oil revenue-
sharing law, but there is oil revenue-sharing going on. It's
actually pretty decent. In fact, when I left Iraq in 2005, the
provinces had no budgets whatsoever. I came back in the early
part of this year. They actually had fairly substantial budgets
and, in fact, even better, because last year they didn't spend
them. They didn't spend about $10 billion. This year they're
spending them, which--and again, in a country that is really a
command economy in many respects, certainly there's some free
market areas, but the government spending is just hugely
important in Iraq, because that is what does so much good for
the people in a country with an enormous social safety net, but
one that has had a lot of holes torn in that safety net because
of the sectarian violence, sectarian activities, and so forth.
Senator Bill Nelson. Looks like my time is up.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm not so sure 2
days of this is Geneva Convention-compliant, but we'll keep
going.
Let's just put on the table as honestly as we can, what
lies ahead for the American people and the U.S. military if we
continue to stay in Iraq. Now, I know you can't predict with
certainty the numbers we're going to have, but can you agree
with this statement, General Petraeus? It's highly likely that
a year from now, we're going to have at least 100,000 troops in
Iraq.
General Petraeus. That is probably the case, yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Okay. How many people have we been losing a
month, on average, since the surge began, in terms of killed in
action?
General Petraeus. Killed in action is probably in the
neighborhood of 60 to 90, probably on average 80 to 90,
average, killed in action.
Senator Graham. Right.
General Petraeus. That does not include the American
soldiers, for example, tragically killed last month in a
helicopter accident.
Senator Graham. But here's what lies ahead for the American
military. If we stay in Iraq and continue to support the surge
through July, we're going to lose somewhere in the neighborhood
of 60 military members, most likely hundreds more.
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. We're spending $9 billion a month to stay
in Iraq, of U.S. dollars. My question for you, is it worth it
to us?
General Petraeus. The national interests that we have in
Iraq are substantial. An Iraq that is stable and secure, that
is not an al Qaeda sanctuary, is not in the grips of Iranian-
supported Shiite militia, that is not a bigger humanitarian
disaster, that is connected to the global economy, all of these
are very important national interests.
Senator Graham. Would that be a yes?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir. Sorry.
Senator Graham. So you're saying to Congress that you know
that at least 60 soldiers, airmen, or marines are likely to be
killed every month from now to July, that we're going to spend
$9 billion a month of American taxpayers' dollars, and when
it's all said and done, we'll still have 100,000 people there.
You believe it's worth it, in terms of our national security
interests, to pay that price?
General Petraeus. Sir, I wouldn't be here and wouldn't have
made the recommendations that I have made if I did not believe
that.
Senator Graham. Don't you think most soldiers who are there
understand what lies ahead for them, too?
General Petraeus. Sir, I believe that's the case and I have
discussed the reenlistment rates there. They know the sacrifice
that may be required of them during the tour of their next
enlistment.
Senator Graham. Knowing what's coming their way, how is
morale?
General Petraeus. Sir, I, as a general characterization,
let me just say that it's solid. Because, and you've heard this
before, I believe that morale is an individual thing. Morale is
the kind of day that you are having. If you lost a buddy that
day, if I was the commander, if we have sustained losses that
day, it's not a good day and morale's not great. But that
doesn't mean that you don't have enormous determination and
commitment to this very, very important endeavor, one which
they all recognize as hugely important to our country. I think
that one reason that they do reenlist, it's not just these tax-
free bonuses, trust me. Those are wonderful, we are very
grateful to Congress for funding those, but this is about
continuing to commit yourself to something that is bigger than
self.
Senator Graham. General, I hear this statement more than
any other statement from troops. ``The reason I'm here is I
don't want my kids to have to come back.'' Do you hear that?
General Petraeus. I do, sir. I have a kid who, as you
heard,----
Senator Graham. Who's going to go, probably.
General Petraeus.--pin jumplings on and he may well. Yes,
sir.
Senator Graham. There's no ``may well.'' He'll either be in
Iraq or Afghanistan. You know that, don't you?
General Petraeus. Sir, I do.
Senator Graham. The recommendations you're making make it
more likely that your own son is going to go to war. You know
that, don't you?
General Petraeus. In Iraq.
Senator Graham. Anywhere.
General Petraeus. That's correct, sir.
Senator Graham. Yes, in Iraq.
General Petraeus. That's right.
Senator Graham. Ambassador Crocker, what's the difference
between a dysfunctional government and a failed state?
Ambassador Crocker. In a democratic system, governments--or
in a parliamentary-democratic system, such as Iraq has--there
is a mechanism for the removal of governments that people get
tired of. Parliament can simply vote, no confidence. So it's, I
think----
Senator Graham. Would you agree with me that Iraq is a
dysfunctional government at this moment in time?
Ambassador Crocker. Certainly it is a challenged
government. I would not----
Senator Graham. You called it dysfunctional.
Ambassador Crocker. If dysfunctional means it doesn't----
Senator Graham. You could say we're dysfunctional and you
wouldn't be wrong. The point I'm trying to make, is to anybody
who's watched this, this government is in a dysfunctional
state. The point I'm trying to make, there's a difference
between still trying and not trying. What's the worst case
scenario for the United States in Iraq, as you see it?
Ambassador Crocker. The worst case scenario would be a
failure, either a complete failure on their part, where
dysfunctional government leads to a failed state.
Senator Graham. What are the consequences of a failed
state, to the United States?
Ambassador Crocker. Just to finish my thought, that's one
avenue. The other is simply a decision on our own part, that we
no longer want to sustain our commitment. I think either way,
you have a failed state in Iraq.
That, in my view, has the gravest conceivable consequences
for our own interests. As I mentioned in my statements, and as
Ahmadinejad has made clear, Iran would seek to fill the void.
Senator Graham. Is a failed state still possible in Iraq?
Ambassador Crocker. Yes, sir, it is a possibility.
Senator Graham. Do the actions we take in Congress, in your
opinion, affect that outcome one way or the other?
Ambassador Crocker. Yes, sir, they certainly could.
Senator Graham. General, what's the worst case scenario
militarily for the United States regarding Iraq?
General Petraeus. Again, it is the consequences of a failed
state, of failing to achieve our objectives and really to
support the Iraqis achieving their objectives. Again, it could
include al Qaeda regaining lost ground and its freedom of
maneuver. It would certainly be a very, very heightened ethno-
sectarian level of violence. These alliances of convenience
with outside forces, that would certainly flow from that, a
humanitarian disaster of enormous proportions, for which we
would share responsibility. Possibly some dislocation in the
global economy, depending on what happens, obviously, with the
flow of oil.
Senator Graham. Why do you think Bin Laden's so worried
about the outcome in Iraq?
General Petraeus. I think again as I mentioned earlier, it
has been regarded by al Qaeda Senior Leadership, AQSL, as the
central front. They are trying to give us a bloody nose, which
would be an enormous shot of adrenaline in the arm of
international jihadists. If they had a sanctuary that close,
where they could, again, export elsewhere, I don't know what
would happen, in terms of the fighters who are there, whether
they would then turn to Afghanistan in a bigger way or go to
source countries or--again, that's a good question for the
intelligence folks. But a lot of these scenarios are obviously
pretty grim.
Senator Graham. Thank you both for your service.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me add my appreciation, publicly, to you both for your
service.
Before the surge in Baghdad, do we know what the mix was of
residents of Sunnis, Shiites, and others, approximately?
General Petraeus. What we have, Senator, is a map that
shows reasonably where there were predominantly Sunni,
predominantly Shiite, predominantly mixed, and we have
continued to track that. Tragically, one of the outcomes of the
ethno-sectarian violence has been hardening of those certain
areas into either more exclusively Shiite or Sunni and the
diminution of some of the mixed neighborhoods.
Senator Ben Nelson. In addition, has it resulted in a loss
of Sunni residents in Baghdad, as well?
General Petraeus. There have been displacements of Sunnis
from Baghdad, throughout the sectarian violence and of course,
again, this is why we have focused on that subset that I
mentioned, of overall deaths, the ethno-sectarian deaths,
because that is the cancer that just keeps eating at the fabric
of Iraqi society and it won't stop if it is not stopped. It's
not going to stop until something does, in fact, stop it. In
this case, it is coalition and Iraqi forces stabilizing those
neighborhoods and then trying to achieve a sustainable
situation for the way ahead.
Senator Ben Nelson. Do we know what the percentage of loss
of Sunnis is, in the Baghdad area?
General Petraeus. Sir, I don't have the----
Senator Ben Nelson. Is it a 10 percent, 20 percent loss?
General Petraeus. I could not hazard a guess. There have
been substantial Sunni-Arab displacement from Baghdad. There
has also been a tragic displacement of Assyrian Christians from
Baghdad. Those two probably most of all.
Senator Ben Nelson. Out of the south, out of the southern
Shiite region as well, it's my understanding there's been an
exodus of Christians from the south. Were you aware of that?
General Petraeus. Sir, I am less aware of that and more
aware of the challenges to Assyrian Christians in Baghdad and
also in some of their former areas in northern Iraq.
Senator Ben Nelson. I've heard that there have been
displaced as many as 800,000 Christians in the Shiite regions
in southern Iraq. Ambassador Crocker, do you know anything
about that?
Ambassador Crocker. No, sir, I don't. I'll certainly check
into that. We are in regular touch with Christian
representatives, and I am, myself. Their concerns have been
focused on Baghdad and the areas to the north. I've never heard
them raise a problem in the south.
Senator Ben Nelson. It's my understanding that the problem
is with the militias, and the ethno-cleansing that's going on
there, as well.
General Petraeus. Sir, I think, literally, it may be south
Baghdad. There's one area, in particular, of southeast Baghdad,
that was, in fact, the Dura area, an Assyrian Christian--or
Christian, in general--enclave from which there has been tragic
displacement.
Senator Ben Nelson. I think they really had a reference to
both, so if you would check, that would be very helpful.
[The information referred to follows:]
There have been a substantial number of Christians displaced from
southern Iraq. However, given that the total population of Christians
in Iraq is estimated at less than 1 million, the number cited--
800,000--seems high. Many of the Christians who have become internally
displaced are relocating to northern Iraq, particularly the Kurdish
region and Ninewa province. Embassy officials and the Provincial
Reconstruction Team in Ninewa meet regularly with representatives of
these communities, and ensure that their concerns are raised with the
appropriate Iraqi local and national government officials. Christian
communities in need also benefit from U.S. Government assistance
programs. These include the Iraq Community Action Program, which works
with underserved communities to form grassroots groups that develop
community driven projects, and humanitarian aid programs aimed at
improving the quality of child health services and filling gaps in
emergency assistance in Ninewa.
Senator Ben Nelson. You mentioned that when it comes to the
south there has been a loss of a couple of Governors; former
Governors sitting here thought that might be fairly
significant, but----
General Petraeus. It is very significant, sir, and Prime
Minister Maliki----
Senator Ben Nelson. I'm being light-hearted about it.
General Petraeus. Right.
Senator Ben Nelson. But it does represent a significant
level of violence in the south, as well.
General Petraeus. Sir, what it represents is really very
targeted militia activity against Governors who had--in one
case, definitely, in another case, sort of stood up to the
militias.
Interestingly, it may be another case, as the Ambassador
mentioned, of the militia overplaying their hand. Because where
there was a willingness to have some accommodation in the past
between the militia--really, the party that the militia
represents, and so forth, some of the Governors and other
political figures, there is less willingness for that now. That
also is a result of the violence in Karbala, which Prime
Minister Maliki took very personally. In fact, he personally
led the column of military vehicles down there to sort it out.
Senator Ben Nelson. Ambassador Crocker, you said when
looking at the Government of Iraq in terms of trying to meet
the underlying goals of the benchmarks, that we shouldn't get
lost in the benchmarks, we should try to evaluate whether or
not they're achieving success.
Would you agree that there are three things that you need
to look for, in connection with that? Is there a commitment to
do it? Is there effort being made to do it? Because it's quite
possible there's a commitment and there's effort, but the
results become more difficult, because as you both have said,
Iraq is hard. It's hard for us, and it's obviously hard for
that government. But, can we make that analysis, is there
commitment to reconciliation?
I've talked to some, and I've heard from others that they
question whether that is the case. It's ``winner-take-all'' in
many respects. Now, you're suggesting, General, that the Prime
Minister's getting outside of Baghdad and going into other
areas, I think that's a very positive, positive step.
But isn't it the case that in Iraq they're going to have to
have a Sunni, a Shiite, or a Kurd somewhere in the top
position. While they may not believe that they get an honest
broker, will they be satisfied with an effective broker, that
seeks equity among all of the groups. Is that fair?
Ambassador Crocker. That's a great point. There has been
effort--the trip with the Prime Minister up to Tikrit, Saddam's
old hometown, additional budgetary resources for Anbar, and the
visit of the Shiite Vice President and the Kurdish Deputy Prime
Minister to Anbar, illustrate that.
Then going to your main point there. The question came up
earlier as to whether the reports were true that when Prime
Minister Maliki visited Ayatollah Sistani a few days ago, that
he had raised the possibility of a technocratic cabinet. The
minister's chosen--not because of their sectarian or ethnic
identify, but because of their ability to do their jobs.
Senator Ben Nelson. That would be more equitable in dealing
with the people--would you agree?
Ambassador Crocker. Absolutely, sir. One thing we have seen
is a lot of frustration among the Iraqis, and even within the
Iraqi Government, over where this heavy focus on sectarian and
ethnic balance in cabinet has taken the country, in terms of
effective governance.
So, if it has brought them to the level of frustration,
where the key leaders are prepared to say, ``Good governance is
more important than strict sectarian and ethnic balance.'' That
I would consider progress.
Senator Ben Nelson. You used the word ``if'' several times
there, so I suspect that it's hypothetical at the moment, but
hope for results in the future.
Finally, let me say that as we look at the surge, several
of us didn't necessarily support the surge going into Baghdad.
I think I communicated that when we met. No reservations about
going into al Anbar with the surge.
What are your thoughts about transitioning the mission out
of Baghdad, in terms of the troops for over a 6-month period to
drawdown--out of Baghdad, not withdrawing or anything of that
sort--but standing up the combat-capable troops that Iraq has,
to begin to take over that responsibility, so that they can
secure themselves, they can govern themselves. Again, if not,
it's not going to be very difficult.
Then, make the mission stronger in going after the bad guys
in the north, where we're having cooperation from the local
Sheiks, tribal leaders, and others. Also, because as we've
driven al Qaeda and the bad guys out of Baghdad, they've gone
elsewhere, go after them. Then go to the south and work
diligently to get the local forces there, to work with us in
reducing the sectarian violence, and the other violence that
just comes from Shiite versus Shiite to the constant militias.
What are your thoughts about that suggestion?
General Petraeus. Senator, as I mentioned, the title of the
recommendations, if you will, ``Security While Transitioning,''
captures the idea that we certainly want to hand off as quickly
as we can. But, as was stated in the December 2006 assessment
that was done by Ambassador Khalilzad and General Casey, when
they determined that the effort at that time was failing to
achieve the objectives, the emphasis that it put on was
reducing the sectarian violence, in Baghdad in particular--
because of that being the center of gravity for so much of
Iraq. So, what we want to do, certainly, is to try to achieve
sustainable situations in these neighborhoods, and then
obviously to hand off over time.
I don't think that we need to put U.S. forces in southern
provinces, other than, say, some SOF teams or occasionally
sending something down to help out. But, by and large, in the
south what we want to do there is to develop these special
units, if you will, in each province--and every province has
them, the special tactics unit in Nasiriyah, for example, which
is supported by one of our SOF teams, although they don't live
with it, but when that unit, on occasion, a couple of times in
the last, I don't know, 6 or 7 months has needed some
assistance, and then our team links up with it, if it's close
air support or what have you, unmanned vehicle or whatever it
may be--it provides that enabler, but otherwise that force on
the ground has been capable of doing what it's needed to do.
We're trying to do that in other areas, as well, without
increasing the conventional combat footprint in those
particular areas.
Senator Ben Nelson. In the process of doing that, it's
quite likely that your force needs will reduce in Iraq. What
are your thoughts in terms of having a second piece of that
phasing-out of Baghdad, also establishing the residual force
that is going to be there for a significant period of time, as
in the case of Korea, Japan, and Germany--I don't know that
it's time to establish what it is in its entirety--but moving
to the borders for border protection, protecting our assets
there, both the private assets of the contractors that are
rebuilding, protecting the Iraqi Government and continuing to
support them in the development of their security forces--
including, perhaps as the Jones Commission report said, firing
all of their police officers and starting over. It's a major
job, but it's going to be an ongoing job for a long time, and
could require a smaller force, ultimately, which I think would
enable a reduction in the number that are there, take pressure
off the operational tempo, to get to a level where it is
sustainable in the future.
General Petraeus. Sir, the CENTCOM Headquarters, my boss
Admiral Fallon--and with, very much, our support from the MNF-I
staff, because we're frankly where a lot of the expertise,
needless to say, resides--did a recent look at the request of
the Secretary of Defense at what a long-term force might look
like, literally, that down at the lower end there in that
stair-step that you saw.
So, we have looked at that, looked at the force mix, looked
at the task mix, and so forth--the challenge is getting there
from here, and trying to do it as expeditiously as we can, but
again without rushing to failure along the way.
Senator Ben Nelson. I think we'll have to leave that there.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Dole.
Senator Dole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker, you're coming up on 8
hours of testimony, today alone. I thank you very much for your
excellent presentations, and I thank you both for your
tremendous service, and your leadership in our country.
Let me say at the outset that all of us here, and all
Americans, want to see our brave young men and women come home
as soon as possible. My home State of North Carolina, for
example, has 37,000 currently-deployed troops, a total of
151,000 personnel have been deployed. Our shared heartfelt
concerns in the Senate for our troops and for the safety and
security of our country should draw us toward consensus. But,
as we all know, a conspicuous gap exists between two policy
positions--namely, a long-term military commitment on the one
hand, and mandated withdrawal on the other. Gentlemen, we must
seek common ground based on a set of shared principles.
A growing number of our fellow Americans oppose a long-term
U.S. military commitment. At the same time, many understand the
profoundly negative long-term security implications for our
country, and for the Middle East of a premature withdrawal,
before Iraqi security forces are able to independently conduct
security operations across their country.
The difficulty of the current American and Iraqi situation
is rooted, in large part, in the Bush administration's
substantial failure to understand the full implications of our
military invasion, and the litany of mistakes made at the
outset of the war.
Regardless, our task must be to see the way forward, to
agree upon a policy that the majority of Americans will
support, and one that provides the American and Iraqi people
with the greatest opportunity for success.
I believe that a requisite level of security must be a
precondition for political reconciliation, and we know that
security has improved in substantial areas of the country. The
continued failure of the Maliki Government to achieve
reconciliation, and the fact that current U.S. force levels are
not sustainable beyond next spring, compels me to support what
some have called ``action-forcing measures.''
General Petraeus, I strongly agree with your recommendation
to begin withdrawal of the equivalent of six brigades between
this month and next July. I would hope--consistent with your
security assessment--that many units not withdrawn could be
reassigned, beginning next spring, to conduct border security
operations, to reduce the flow of Iranian arms--particularly
EFPs and other military supplies--to more effectively deny
entry to foreign fighters through Syria, to supplement the
training of additional Iraqi security forces, to conduct
support operations, or to back up Iraqi forces that,
increasingly, should have the lead in security operations.
A recent Wall Street Journal article described that the
Pentagon is preparing to build its first base for U.S. forces
near the Iraq-Iran border, in a major new effort to curb the
flow of advanced Iranian weaponry to Shiite militants. Of
course, there must be more, which has been discussed in the
recent questioning. I certainly would like to see more secure
borders, and more activity along the long border, and of course
on the Syrian border, as well, as we move people out of the
Baghdad region, and more into the border areas.
But let me ask a question about neighboring Arab countries.
Why have neighboring Arab countries that have profound vested
interest in a stable Iraq--Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States,
Jordan, Kuwait, Egypt, Lebanon--not stepped up to the plate,
both diplomatically and economically? Recent diplomatic
successes are welcome, but are modest, relative to the need.
Could you both discuss this matter for me, please?
Ambassador Crocker. Yes, ma'am, it's an important part of
an overall strategy for success in Iraq. We have been engaged
with Iraq's Arab neighbors, and they've engaged with each
other, and with Iraq, that's the whole point of the neighbors'
exercise----
Senator Dole. Right.
Ambassador Crocker. --the meeting that took place on
Sunday, the ministerial that will occur in Istanbul.
We have pressed these states on issues such as debt relief,
they hold billions of dollars in Iraqi debt from the days of
the Saddam regime in the Iran-Iraq war. By and large, now, they
have agreed to afford Paris Club terms to Iraq, which is 80
percent debt forgiveness, we would like to see that move to 100
percent, for example.
There have been some other steps with the neighbors. Saudi
Arabia is planning to re-open its embassy in Baghdad, that will
be the first step for them since the fall of the Saddam regime,
and we would hope it would show the way to other Arab
neighbors, that the time has come to resume an active
diplomatic presence in Baghdad.
There is a negotiation that is just about to conclude
between Iraq and Kuwait that will provide for the supply of
Kuwaiti diesel to Iraq, and that's critical for power
generation. We've also been in direct touch with the Arab
neighbors on security-related issues, particularly on foreign
fighters. While the flow is through Syria, the origins are from
other Arab states in the Gulf. We have strongly urged steps,
for example, for these states to prevent easy travel by, say,
young men on one-way plane tickets, heading for Damascus
airports. Indeed, I think one of your recent detainees, a Saudi
picked up in Iraq, had to get from Saudi Arabia to Syria by
bus, because he wasn't allowed to fly out.
So, we're going to continue a diplomatic strategy that is
focused on the neighboring states, and particular the Arab
states. They are starting to do more, I think they are starting
to accept that they have critical equities on how things turn
out in Iraq, and are moving beyond the state they've been in
for the last several years, of just not wanting to engage to
accepting that, the outcomes are important to them, and they
can affect the outcomes.
General Petraeus. Senator, Jordan, first of all, has always
been really quite supportive, and has worked very hard to limit
foreign fighter flow to ensure that support for al Qaeda is
disrupted as much as possible from there. Syria may have taken
some steps against some of the foreign fighter facilitators in
its country--it is something that we are literally looking at
very hard to see how much they have done. But, they do
recognize, we believe, that al Qaeda poses a very serious
threat to them. That, should al Qaeda have success in Iraq, the
next one you turn on might be that minority government in
Damascus. We see signs that they recognize that, and have taken
some steps, again, to make it more difficult.
As the Ambassador mentioned, some of the source countries
have made it more difficult for military-aged males also to
travel on a one-way plane ticket to Damascus. But again, the
more that can be done in that regard, or at large, in any way,
to limit the flow of individuals from source countries through
Syria, in particular, into Iraq, is something that helps Iraq
enormously. Because a number of these end up being the suicide
bombers that have created such horrific casualties on certain
occasions in Iraq.
Senator Dole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is expired.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Dole, thank you.
Senator Bayh.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you. I want to express my appreciation for
your service to our country.
In a democracy, having a dialogue like this, questioning
your recommendations, even your judgment, is entirely
appropriate. I don't believe that questioning your integrity
is. So I appreciate your candor, and your service, and your
presence here today.
Let me begin--you've had to go for 8 hours, this is our
fourth hearing over the last several days--we heard from the
GAO, from General Jones, we heard about the NIE, and now we
have the benefit of your thinking.
Let me give you what I have concluded is the collective
bottom line in all of this, and get your response. The bottom
line in all of this is, the American people--particularly our
service men and women, but also our taxpayers--will be required
to continue to sacrifice in Iraq for an indefinite period of
time to allow Iraqi politicians to get their act together to
make the tough decisions that only they can make to hopefully
begin the process of reconciliation. What's your reaction to
that?
Ambassador Crocker. There is a process underway that we've
talked about in the course of the afternoon. It's bottom-up, to
some degree, it's top-down to some degree, and it's linkages
between them. It's the beginnings, if you will, of a
reconciliation process that obviously needs to go much farther,
if it is to carry Iraq to a position of security and stability
over the long run.
Senator Bayh. Ambassador, there's a question behind my
observation, and you mentioned the process, bottom-up, top-
down, so let me get to it.
For several years now, the progress has not been adequate,
I think we'd all agree on that. The theory has been, ``Look,
insecure people don't make hard decisions. We need to try to
increase their confidence, their security, so that perhaps
they'll begin to make the hard decisions.'' It just doesn't
seem to have worked that way. They dither, they delay, and so
we face this dilemma. If we stand by them, they tend to take
our support for granted, and seem a little more comforted by
that, and don't make the hard decisions. Yet, your advice as I
understand it is timelines would not be helpful.
So, my direct question to you is--what about accountability
for taking these hard steps? What about consequences if they
don't? Sixty to 70 troops every month, $9 billion to $12
billion every month--they're not doing what they need to do,
when do we say, enough already? Have some consequences when
they don't?
Ambassador Crocker. Again, it's important to bear in mind
the recent past--2006 up through early 2007 was an extremely
bad period in Iraq, and not only were things not moving
forward, they were sliding back, in political terms, economic
terms, and above all, security terms. Iraq came pretty close, I
think, to just unraveling in the course of that year that began
with the February bombing of the Golden Dome Mosque in Samarra.
Senator Bayh. There is some history in Iraq before that
timeframe you just mentioned, and they weren't making progress
then, either.
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, the challenges are immense,
the failures are there, too, on the Iraqi side. It is
frustrating to me, I'm out there. We are pushing them
constantly in all sorts of ways. But, I have to be honest--this
is going to take more time.
Senator Bayh. I think we all need to be honest with
ourselves, Ambassador, and I've appreciated the General's
comments about modesty in making predictions is in order, and
overemphasizing our ability to control events needs to be
guarded against. Isn't it possible, at the end of the day, in
spite of all of our efforts, support and encouragement--this
just may be beyond them, for a variety of reasons--outside
interference, historic enmities, a lack of leadership, all of
those kinds of things. Don't we constantly need to be
evaluating their capabilities and whether they can get this
done, to justify the continuing sacrifices that we're making?
Ambassador Crocker. I think, clearly, that's the case.
We're here before you today to give our best assessments in
four lines of operation, where we see things standing now.
Senator Bayh. What you're hearing from a lot of us is, so
often these last several years, we've tried to give their
political leadership the benefit of the doubt, and now only
doubt remains. So there we are.
General, I hope--but I think you have to be a little
skeptical about it at this point, too, and that's why I come
down on the side of consequences, some accountability, because
a gentle encouragement doesn't seem to have gotten the results
that we want, if in fact, they can be gotten.
General, I'd like to turn to you, I thought you had an
excellent, very candid response to Senator Warner's questions,
and that was--he asked you, going forward, the recommendations
that you're making, will that make America safer? You said that
you could not answer that question because that was beyond the
scope of your responsibilities.
General Petraeus. I thank you actually, Senator, for an
opportunity to address that, frankly. Candidly, I have been so
focused on Iraq, that drawing all the way out was something
that, for a moment there, was a bit of a surprise. But, I think
that we have very, very clear and very serious national
interests in Iraq, achieving those interests has very serious
implications for our safety----
Senator Bayh. Let me ask you about those interests----
General Petraeus. --and for our security. So I think the
answer really--to come back to it--is yes. But again, frankly,
having focused down and down and down, that was something that
really on first glance I would let others----
Senator Bayh. I judged by your response to Senator Graham
that you had given that a little additional thought.
General Petraeus. Immediately after, actually. Thank you.
Senator Bayh. It happens to all of us, including those of
us on this side of the table, as well.
Let me ask you about those interests, then. You referred to
the DIA, and then you referred to things that we picked up
about how al Qaeda views Iraq, as being the central front in
the war on terror, and so forth.
But, let me refer to some other public statements of our
intelligence services, and then ask you this question, about
the importance--which we all agree upon--of Iraq not becoming a
platform from which terrorists can operate against us, or other
countries. That's why almost every responsible person thinks we
need to keep a capability there to deal with that. So, let me
tell you what the CIA's experts on radical Islam have indicated
in public testimony.
They have indicated that it is their assessment--on a
global, not just on an Iraq-specific--basis, our presence in
Iraq is generating more radicals and terrorists than we are
eliminating in Iraq. So, on a net basis, we're actually
creating more enemies than we are eliminating.
They've also indicated that al Qaeda is reconstituting
itself in Afghanistan, and perhaps in the tribal areas in
Pakistan, and their assessment of the radicals in Iraq, the al
Qaeda-Iraq members--I asked them this question directly,
General, I said, ``Who do they hate more? The apostates or the
infidels? Once we've reduced our footprint, and aren't as
obvious a target anymore, where is their enmity going to be
turned?`` The response was, ``Well, they'll turn on the Shiite.
They really hate them more than they hate us.''
So, my question to you, as my time's going to run out
here--isn't it at least possible that looking at this from a
global perspective, that the strategy we've pursued in Iraq,
and indeed our presence there and the magnitude that we
currently are there, is in fact, somewhat counterproductive in
the global war against terrorism, and making America safer?
General Petraeus. Senator, I think again, if al Qaeda was
to be able to retain a substantial presence in Iraq,
particularly a sanctuary in the order of what they had in
certain areas, in fact, prior to the surge that that would be a
very serious threat. I don't know where they would go next.
Some have speculated that, in fact, they might focus more on
Afghanistan, others more in the particular region there, to go
after some of the other countries in that particular region.
But, I think again, based on their own communications, that
the CIA and the Joint Special Operations Command commanders
assessment--this is their central front on the global war of
terror that they are carrying out. It has been, at least.
Again, it is hard to tell whether they will continue to regard
it that way because of the loss of some momentum there.
I am not sure that it is true that they are still
generating more radicals in Iraq. I think, again, one of the
big changes, as I've reported in the past 6, 8, 12 months if
you will, stating all the way back, certainly, to October of
last year when the first of these tribal oppositions to al
Qaeda emerged, is that the Sunni-Arabs in al Qaeda--and that is
the area in which they had been able to find sanctuary and so
forth--have in large numbers turned against al Qaeda. They've
gotten over the fact that they're not going to run Iraq again,
they've gotten over the fact that they're disrespected, in
their view, dispossessed, whatever it may be--and now want to
make the Euphrates River Valley a decent place to live, work,
and raise a family, and maybe even open up the border, and now
they have a police academy again, and the rest of that, and
rebuilt Ramadi and some of these other places, and others have
seen the same. What they really want now is a seat at the table
in Baghdad. They want adequate representation, they want their
share of this ethno-sectarian competition for power and
resources. They want their share of the resources.
That's why it is significant--as the Ambassador reported--
on the Anbar big summit that was held out there the other day,
the second of these, where the national government has reached
out to them in such a substantial way. So, I think how al Qaeda
plays out in Iraq is of enormous importance to our country, and
to the overall international jihadist movement. Failing to
achieve our objectives there would be just an enormous shot of
adrenaline to them, I'm afraid.
Senator Bayh. Gentlemen, thank you again, my time is
expired. I would just conclude by saying, we all want to be
successful in Iraq. We all hope that these signs you indicate
come to fruition, but there's a lot of history here. We have to
ask ourselves, ``What if they do not?'' How do we go about
securing the national security interests of our country if, in
fact, that is the course that events take.
General Petraeus. Yes, sir. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Bayh.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, Mr. Ambassador--you have my respect and
admiration, and I appreciate your service to our country,
particularly in the challenging jobs that you have, you are
performing now.
It's because of my respect and admiration for both of you
that I was particularly shocked and chagrined when I happened
to open the New York Times on Sunday to see this ad, purchased
by moveon.org--I don't know if I've ever witnessed a more
reprehensible slander of a public servant and a patriot than as
represented in this ad. It's my hope that members of this
committee will join me--and, in fact, all Members of the United
States Senate--will join together, without regard to partisan
affiliation, and condemn this ad, and restate our confidence in
General Petraeus, the same confidence that was manifested when
he was confirmed by a unanimous vote of the United States
Senate this last January.
It's a pretty tough environment, I know you're working in
Iraq--it's a pretty tough environment here, in Washington, in
another way. General, when you were confirmed in January, you
were announced not only as a new leader there, you announced a
new strategy in Iraq, something people had been calling for,
for a long time. People had been asking for some signs of
progress in the security situation. You've come back here today
as the Jones Commission did last week, as did the NIE did in
August, and report that some security progress being made in
Iraq, positive news in any other context.
You've announced here today that you would likely recommend
significant cuts in troops over the next year--something that
people in this room and on Capitol Hill have been calling for,
for a long time. You would, again, think that that would be met
with some appreciation, some gladness.
Ambassador, there have been those who have said that we
weren't doing enough to talk to the people in the neighborhood,
Iran, Syria, and others. Indeed, since that time--since
January, since General Petraeus was confirmed--that's happened,
and you've reported on that. Here again, something I would
think that would be met with an appreciation for the progress,
or at least the effort that entails.
Then, of course, there were those, General, that announced
shortly after the President announced the surge of troops into
Iraq, they announced it a failure, or predicted a failure at
the outset, before the surge had even occurred, and I guess it
just goes to show that it's a bad bet to bet against the men
and women of the United States military, because it has
demonstrated some significant successes.
So, I guess this is an unusual case, General and
Ambassador, where you come bringing what otherwise might be
regarded as good news, or at least progress, and it's the first
case I've seen, I guess, of shooting the messenger for bringing
good news. It's a strange time we find ourselves in, it's a
strange environment here in Washington.
But my question, what I want to ask you about in
particular, are the consequences of failure. Because it seems
to me there, too often, is a debate in the abstract about
what's happening. General, you've already said that you believe
what we're doing in Iraq is making us safer here at home, but I
would like to ask, if we embraced the suggestion of some, here
on Capitol Hill, that we would pull out our troops before the
Iraqis are able to govern and defend themselves, what the
consequences would be? I know we've talked about providing a
failed state, a power vacuum into which al Qaeda would fill,
you've talked about Iran. But, in particular, I'd like to get
your assessment General, and Ambassador, about the humanitarian
crisis that would like occur. Could you speak to that, please?
General first?
General Petraeus. Senator, first of all, there has already
been a humanitarian crisis in Iraq. The estimates run as high
as 2 million that have left the country, and perhaps that
number that has been displaced within the country. So, this is
already a tragic situation.
One of our areas of focus has, as I mentioned, been to try
to stabilize and to reduce the ethno-sectarian violence that is
really the engine of that displacement. Some of that has
continued. Some has risen to the level of cleansing. But in
many areas, again, it has stabilized it, and has kept it from
continuing. Because, this is not something, again, that just
stops of its own accord. It doesn't reach the highway to the
airport, let's say, and say, ``That's it.'' It then hops over
and keeps on going.
So, that has been a big effort, and we have a lot more work
to do in that regard, as I mentioned up front, very clearly.
We're not at a point that is at all satisfactory, but the trend
line, again, is good.
But, the level to which that could go if it got out of hand
again, and got even worse, obviously could be horrific.
Senator Cornyn. I believe the figures I recall, off the top
of my head, about genocide in Darfur, roughly 400,000 people
killed there. Would this be, would rival or exceed the
magnitude of that sort of death by ethnic cleansing?
Ambassador Crocker. Sir, it's obviously very difficult to
predict. My previous experience, for example, in Lebanon in the
early 1980s, I was there at the time of the massacres and the
Palestinian camps following our withdrawal in 1982. When those
massacres took place, I knew that some very bad consequences
were likely to be set in train, but I couldn't have begun to
predict where we'd be a year later, for example, with the
resurgence of Hezbollah, and the bombing of both the embassy
and the Marine barracks with horrendous consequences for us. I
had a failure of imagination. I don't think in the intervening
years, my imagination has gotten any more accurate or strong.
But, I would be very concerned that in a context in which
the United States was seen to be definitely backing away--and
backing away in a sense that projected a signal in Iraq and
elsewhere that we were not coming back, there's not going to be
a second surge, it's over for us--I think the prospects of a
truly catastrophic humanitarian disaster would be considerable.
Senator Cornyn. In the order of hundreds of thousands, or
millions?
Ambassador Crocker. It could be that, sir. Because it could
be a situation that would be so, so dramatic, that it would
bring in neighboring states. Then you would have a failed
state. You would have, basically, a meltdown inside Iraq, and
the ensuing violence within Iraq, plus ambitions of some of
Iraq's neighbors, like Iran, could bring these states in, and
we could be looking at regional conflict, as well as a horrific
humanitarian disaster. I can't say that's going to happen, I
can't predict that's going to happen, but it certainly is
something that could happen.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Senator Cornyn, thank you.
Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. I want to thank both of you, General
Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker, for your long and distinguished
service to our Nation. Nobody believes that your jobs or the
jobs of the thousands of American forces and civilian personnel
in Iraq are anything but incredibly difficult.
But today you are testifying about the current status of
our policy in Iraq, and the prospects of that policy. It is a
policy that you have been ordered to implement by the
President, and you have been made the de facto spokesman for
what many of us believe to be a failed policy.
Despite what I view as your rather extraordinary efforts in
your testimony both yesterday and today, I think that the
reports that you provide to us really require the willing
suspension of disbelief. In any of the metrics that have been
referenced in your many hours of testimony, any fair reading of
the advantages and disadvantages accruing post-surge, in my
view, end up on the downside.
I started my morning today at ground zero in New York City,
where once again, the names of the nearly 3,000 victims of the
attack on our country were read solemnly in the rain. We have
seen Osama bin Laden reappear on our television sets,
essentially taunting us. We have the most recent reports out of
Germany of terrorists plotting against American assets who have
been trained in Pakistan. We get very little comfort from the
fact that the mastermind of that mass murder is at large,
neither captured nor killed, and that the Taliban and al Qaeda
are resurging in Afghanistan, and their network is certainly--
if not tightly organized, a loose confederacy--that has grave
consequences for us.
With respect to Anbar province, a lot has been made of the
coalition's work with the Sheiks, but that was going on before
the surge. General, in your testimony during your confirmation
hearings, you referenced the fact that the Sheiks were coming
over, that there was already a decision by a lot of the tribal
leaders that they would no longer tolerate the extraordinary
brutality of the al Qaeda elements in al Anbar province.
With respect to violence in Iraq, although the charts tell
part of the story, I don't think they tell the whole story. If
you look at all of the evidence that's been presented, overall
civilian deaths have risen. The number of car bombings is
higher. May was the deadliest month in 2007 with 1,901 civilian
deaths. American military casualties are greater in every month
in 2007 than in the same month in 2006, leaving us with a total
thus far, through August, of 739 Americans killed.
The Iraqi reconciliation process is now described as
relying on bottom's up efforts, which are anecdotal, which have
very little hard evidence to support what needs to be
accomplished. Senator Warner's very specific questions of what
is happening from top-down, certainly lead to the conclusion
that not very much is occurring that can give us comfort that
the Iraqi leadership is yet ready to put aside their sectarian,
commercial, and personal interests for some kind of greater
Iraqi political reconciliation.
Iraqi public opinion, according to an ABC, BBC, NHK poll
released September 10, shows that since the escalation began,
Iraqi opinion has starkly turned against the occupation, as
most Iraqis see deepening dissatisfaction with conditions in
Iraq, lower ratings for the national government, growing
rejection of the U.S. role there. For example, 65 to 70 percent
of Iraqis say the escalation has worsened, rather than
improved, security. Thirty-nine percent say their lives are
going well, down from 71 percent in November 2005, and 47
percent now favor immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces, a 12
point rise since March. Overwhelming majorities give negative
ratings to electricity, jobs, and access to health care.
So, I give you tremendous credit for presenting as positive
a view of a rather grim reality, and I believe that you and
certainly the very capable people working with both of you,
were dealt a very hard hand. It's a hand that's unlikely to
improve, in my view.
General, I want to ask you about what appeared to be a
contradiction in your testimony. Earlier today you were asked
by Senator Biden if, in fact, the circumstances on the ground
are exactly what they are today in March of next year, will you
recommend the continuation of somewhere between 130,000 and
160,000 American troops being shot at, killed, and maimed every
day. Your answer, ``I would be hard-pressed to recommend that
at that point in time.''
In response to Senator Collins, who asked, I thought, a
very important question about what if, in a year from now,
there has been very little progress, your answer was, ``Well,
we would have to consider what to do at that time.'' General,
don't you think the American people deserve a very specific
answer about what is expected from our country in the face of
the failure of the Iraqi Government to pursue its own required
political agenda, that they have essentially been unwilling or
incapable of doing so?
General Petraeus. Senator, I don't see quite as big a
difference in the answer, but I will stand by the answer that I
gave earlier, which is that I would be very hard-pressed at
that time to recommend a continuation.
This policy is a national policy that results from policies
put forward at one end of Pennsylvania Avenue with the advice
and consent and resources provided at the other. I would,
obviously, provide recommendations to that. Again, I would just
say, I would be very hard-pressed, at that time--it's an
awfully big hypothetical, and it is not something that I would
want to try to determine right here, right now, about a year
from now without having some sense of all of the other
variables, that I think, understandably, would go into a huge
recommendation like that.
Senator Clinton. Ambassador, it's not only the Iraqi
Government that, in my view, has failed to pursue a coherent
strategy, I think our own has, as well. You've been tasked--as
I understand it--with carrying the only contact with the
Iranians and others in the region, and many of us have long-
advocated that our government needed to be much more engaged in
a robust diplomatic effort.
Do you believe that if the full force and effect of the
American government were brought to bear on the region, and
more broadly on countries that have a stake in the future of
Iraq, even beyond the region, that there was some process
established that could begin to try to sort out what was or
wasn't possible, that that would be an additional benefit to
your efforts, going forward in Iraq?
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, engaging the region and the
international community more broadly in support of Iraq is
important. That is ongoing and it's accelerating. This fall
we'll have at least two ministerial-level meetings on Iraq, the
one that I mentioned involving the neighbors, plus the P-5 and
the G-8 in Istanbul, and then in a little less than 2 weeks, in
New York, the Secretary General of the U.N. and Prime Minister
Maliki will jointly chair an international ministerial-level
meeting to review progress on the international compact with
Iraq, and also to focus on how the new U.N. mandate for Iraq,
the expanded mandate for Iraq, can most effectively be
implemented.
So, I think we're seeing an increase in regional and
international diplomacy in support of Iraq. We're also starting
to see, I think, some change in attitudes. I talked a little
bit earlier about some positive developments among some of
Iraq's Arab neighbors. I think we're also seeing a new look at
Iraq on the part of at least some of the European states.
During a 10-day period, for example, at the end of August,
we had the visits of Bernard Kouchner, the Foreign Minister of
France, and then right after that, Carl Bildt, Foreign Minister
of Sweden--the first time, really, since 2003, we have seen
major European states send their foreign ministers into Iraq to
assess where Iraq is, and how they can, perhaps, more
effectively engage for the future.
So, I think we're seeing that kind of diplomatic initiative
now gain some further momentum.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Clinton.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your
extraordinary service, and thank you for your indulgence in
being here today. I know both of you, Ambassador and General,
are runners. I know, General, you are a marathon runner, and I
want you to know that when you get to this point at the dais at
a hearing, you're like on mile 23 in a marathon, you're almost
there. We appreciate very much your patience.
I also want to convey our appreciation to the men and women
who serve under your command. Please let them know how grateful
we are for their service. They are the best of the best.
What I would like to do, General, is Senator Graham asked a
question about the morale of our troops over there, which you
answered--and by the way, your testimony here and report has
probably been the most hyped event in this city for a long
time. Many of us for months now, have been saying that we're
waiting to hear this report, and I will have to say that you
have not disappointed. Your report has been full, it's been
comprehensive, it's been factual, it has been objective and
independent, and you've not sugar-coated things. I think that
we appreciate very much your willingness to give us an
assessment, an honest assessment on where things stand.
I want to hone in on the whole question of the Iraqi
troops, in general, what is the morale of the Iraqi troops? Are
they taking ownership of this mission?
General Petraeus. As I mentioned in the testimony, sir,
there is an unevenness to it. The Iraqi forces range from
extremely good to high-end, Iraqi SOF brigade with a counter-
terrorist force commando battalion that is now multiplying. The
National Emergency Response Unit, the Special Tactics Unit--
these forces are absolutely superb, they are in operation just
about every night, if not more--and every day--and we are now
positioning them around the country, as well, including some in
Basra.
There are other special forces in just about each of the
provinces. Again, as I mentioned in many cases, how our own SOF
teams work with them, and those are viewed very highly, as
well.
The Army, by and large, a professional force, national
force, again--by and large--and performing credibly and in a
number of areas, in many cases, literally by themselves
already, regardless of their ORA. Again, that does not hold up
the provincial Iraqi control process completely, it is a factor
in it, but in many cases those forces are doing quite well.
Then it goes all the way down to--as you heard from General
Jones' Commission--concerns about the sectarian tendencies of
some elements still in the national police. We continue to have
concerns about several of the units there. Again, we have
raised those to the Prime Minister, those are--and the Minister
of Interior--really, who is grappling with this issue, and
working their way through the change-out of leaders, the
retraining of a number of the organizations, and now even
bringing in the Italian Carabinieri to train some of them. At
some point, there may be a point at which some of those units
will have to be disestablished, that is certainly not where
Iraq wants to go right now, given just the sheer need for
forces and for boots on the ground in a host of different
areas, which is one reason why they're expanding so rapidly.
But, so again, it runs the gamut--all the way and there is
a substantial effort ongoing to improve the leader development
in the Iraqi security forces to build the institutional
structures that are, frankly, very hard to build, the military
academies, junior and senior staff colleges, war colleges, and
these may not sound all that exciting, but they are the types
of institutional assets that have made our own Army and Marine
Corps and other Services the truly professional forces that
they are, and it takes that level of investment. That is
ongoing, but again, it is something that does take time. It
just doesn't spring out of the desert floor with infrastructure
and structures and all of the support for it. But that is
ongoing.
Senator Thune. The first time I met with you was in Iraq, I
think, back in February 2005 when you were leading the training
mission there. I think you talked about the need to build
leadership capacity within the Iraqi security forces.
General Petraeus. Right.
Senator Thune. But that--are they, to me, this doesn't work
until that really happens. Is that happening?
General Petraeus. It is happening, but frankly, some of
this took a step backward--in some cases a substantial step
backward--during the height of the sectarian violence. When
certain units, literally, were taken over by sectarian
interests, and became part of the problem instead of part of
the solution. Retrieving some of those units is still ongoing
in some cases, and again, of course, a big part of that had to
be to reduce the level of sectarian violence, and threats, and
so forth, so that these individuals didn't feel as though they
had to side with one or the other, but could be truly
professional, all commissioned and NCOs.
That is something, again, that Prime Minister Maliki is
very much concerned about confronting and dealing with. In
fact, as I mentioned earlier, replacing wholesale, the facility
protection security force that guarded the medical city.
So, there are numerous challenges out there like that, but
there are also just dozens and dozens of Army battalions and
special operations units in particular, that are doing very
credible work, and are very much going after the enemy. I
mentioned the example of the unit in Mosul that killed the Emir
of Mosul with its own intelligence, in fact, it was actually
the intelligence officer who we believe was the one that fired
the shot that did kill this individual where there was a
confrontation.
Senator Thune. I know that they've prevented some attacks
in Mosul, they have acted rapidly in restoring security in
Karbala, they've had some successes, and I guess my question
is--if and when the Iraqi security forces are ready to take
responsibility for the security of Iraq, if that happens before
the political process has yielded a political solution, is our
job done there?
General Petraeus. First of all, Senator, let me just----
Senator Thune. Those aren't on the same tracks.
General Petraeus. Sure, let me just be clear--they have
already taken over.
Senator Thune. In some areas.
General Petraeus. Again, in these provinces that have
transitioned to provincial Iraqi control, there are no
coalition forces in Maysan Province, Muthanna, Karbala, Najaf
and some others. Karbala will go to provincial Iraqi control in
about a month. Then there are some others who are very much,
certain areas where we still have to be in the lead.
Again, we can hand off as long as that local situation is
sufficiently connected to Baghdad to enable us to do that.
That's what we have done, again, in a number of cases,
regardless of the fact that there may not be the agreement on
the laws that we see as so important to ultimate national
reconciliation. But, the fact is, there's a Ministry of
Defense, there's a Ministry of Interior, there are varying
degrees of functionality in different areas, and certainly,
we're still having to help a great deal on the logistical
arena, especially, because that's just proven very difficult.
Senator Thune. I understand that, and I know we've made
headway, and I know that there are areas that are now totally
under the control of the Iraqi security forces, and in some
cases we're in the lead and they're supporting, or they're in
the lead and we're supporting.
But, I guess the bigger question is, is the mission
complete when they can take over the fight, even if the
political component, if we haven't gotten some Western-style
democracy imposed in terms of a political solution there--are
we done? Is that where we can say, ``mission accomplished''?
General Petraeus. Again, it depends how far along you are.
I think we obviously have to have some degree of confidence
that it wouldn't unravel. So, again, I think you have to ask
where are we? There is national-level leadership and direction
at this point, it does exist, Prime Minister Maliki is the
commander in chief, he does issue orders.
Another very important case was the celebration of the
Seventh Imam Commemoration in Baghdad. This is one of the
holiest Shiite celebrations, it focuses on a shrine in Kadamia,
north central Baghdad. That's the one that you'll recall--I
believe it was 2005--where there were nearly 1,000 of the
pilgrims that were killed when there was a stampede due to
either rumor of action, or possibly actually enemy action. The
other 2 years around that, there have been dozens of Iraqis
killed.
This particular year, the Iraqi Baghdad Operational Command
oversaw the operation, the Ministry is very much invested in
it, it involved not just army and police, but also emergency
services, transportation ministry and a whole host of other
ministries that all would be involved in this, and to our
knowledge there was not a death caused by enemy action, which
is really a fairly extraordinary accomplishment.
Senator Thune. Again, my time is expired, as well, but many
of us have concerns about some of the national interests that
you've articulated with regards to our efforts there,
particularly the possibility of an Iranian-supported Shiite
state that would exercise more influence, and would obviously
put not only that region, but I believe, our country at risk as
well. We thank you for the efforts that you're making, and
encourage you, there are a lot of us who are cheering for you,
hope you succeed. But you've been exposed to a political
dimension of the debate that occurs here in Washington over the
past few days that, on a level that's regrettable, but
notwithstanding that, I think a majority of Americans and a lot
of us up here want to see you succeed, so thanks again for your
service.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to start, if I could, with a question for both of
you. That is, after 2 days on Capitol Hill, are you two ready
to get back to Baghdad? [Laughter.]
Ambassador Crocker. Baghdad's never looked so good,
Senator. [Laughter.]
Senator Pryor. No, seriously, I have a couple of questions
for you, General Petraeus, about the slides that you showed
earlier, and one is just a real basic question, and that is on
slide number 5, which is the caches found and cleared that you
had--I just have a quick question in that.
I remember in the early days of us being in Iraq, we found
a lot of caches that were former Saddam Hussein caches. I look
at January to September 2007, some big numbers there--are these
weapons old Saddam weapons, or are they new weapons?
General Petraeus. They're a mix, Senator, and now they
often include something called HME, which means Home Made
Explosives, which is a mix of fertilizer and nitric acid that
is mixed up and often put sometimes in 5-gallon or even as much
as 55-gallon drums.
But, again, it runs the gamut. It includes, in some cases,
weapons that clearly are traced back to Iran in terms of
certain rockets, the EFPs, and some mortars, to items that
certainly may have come from the Saddam weapons storage sites,
or have come in from other countries over time.
Senator Pryor. I assume you're seeing a fairly healthy mix
of Iranian weapons caches?
General Petraeus. Again, there are certain ones that are
signature weapons, without question--the EFPs. The rockets,
mortars, the rest is, it's just hard to tell where it came
from.
Senator Pryor. I understand, okay.
Let me ask about the second graph I wanted to ask about and
that's your Iraqi security forces capabilities, and that's
number 12. Down at the bottom this, in most cases, the shortest
part of the bar graph where they're fully-independent forces,
and then you see this yellow band on top. I assume one of the
fundamentals that you're talking about here in your report this
week in Washington, is you're trying to have a yellow to green
policy, you're trying to turn this yellow area into green
areas, is that fair to say?
General Petraeus. It is, and candidly, it is proving very
difficult, because the requirements to be green in terms--they
can get the strength up, that is not really an issue now.
They're starting to--I think, strength for most Iraqi Army
units is really quite good and it is climbing.
The challenge is the fill of NCOs and commissioned
officers. As the number of units grows, as they take casualties
and tough combat, they're very challenged to find those
experienced soldiers who can step into those positions, they
just don't have a large pool of that, and that's a limiting
factor. Also, the equipment, again, when they take losses, they
do not have a good resupply, and that's fairly absolute. So, if
you don't have a certain mix of equipment, you're just not
going to be ORA-1. The truth is, it doesn't mean that you may
not be conducting independent operations--this is very
important, because it's something we work to. Obviously, we
want to get them the right mix of equipment, we want to help
them develop the leaders, the strength, again, and so forth,
and to fix their logistical systems. But, the fact that they're
not ORA-1 does not mean that they may not be operating
independently. Again, there are places where that actually
happens.
Senator Pryor. That's one of the things that concerns me,
is really, there isn't a clear trend that the green is going up
and the yellow is going away.
General Petraeus. It's a tough standard to meet. Especially
when you're in combat, and losing soldiers, equipment, and
leaders.
Senator Pryor. Do you have sense----
General Petraeus. Don't have a great logistical support
structure.
Candidly, this is something that Senator Levin and Senator
Warner are helping us with. They have put a lot of stock in
FMS, and we have to come through for them. We talked to Senator
Levin about that, and to Senator Warner when he was chairman--
we really have to take this on. This cannot be a peacetime
approach to FMS. I mentioned, they've put about, I think it's
$1.6 billion already into it, it could be that much and a bit
more by the end of the year. But we have to come through for
them, and it can't be business-as-usual. It has to be, really,
moved very quickly.
Senator Pryor. I guess it's hard to say how long it will
take you to go from yellow to green, but you're trying to get
there as quickly----
General Petraeus. We are trying to get there. You can see
they took steps backward, because, again, the hard fighting
that took place to get this, to deal with the sectarian
violence, and then to get it down. That's the unknown,
unfortunately, is just what kind of losses will they take, what
kind of equipment will they lose.
Senator Pryor. Let me change the question, here, if I can,
General Petraeus, and let me just see if you agree with this.
First, I'd say our military efforts in Iraq are very important,
and our men and women in uniform in Iraq are doing an
outstanding job in some very difficult circumstances, would you
agree with that?
General Petraeus. Certainly, yes, sir.
Senator Pryor. Our military efforts are only part of the
solution there. We must work very hard on four broad fronts--
diplomatic, economic, military, and political. Would you agree
with that?
General Petraeus. In fact, those are the Lines of Operation
(LOOs) in our Joint Campaign Plan. There is an MNF-I Embassy
Joint Campaign Plan, and those are, in fact, the LOOs in it.
Senator Pryor. Ambassador Crocker, do you agree with that,
as well, that we need a broad effort--not just on military--but
also on diplomatic, economic, and political?
Ambassador Crocker. Absolutely.
Senator Pryor. My fundamental concern with the surge
strategy, is that if we don't have the diplomatic, the
economic, the political efforts, and progress in place, then
the surge, I'm afraid, won't make a long-term difference in
Iraq. So, that's a concern I have.
In August, all of us went home to our home States, and I
spent all month in Arkansas, and my sense of the Arkansas'
general public their view of Iraq would be this: First, they're
very patriotic. Second, they want to support--they're going to
support the war fighter, regardless, no questions asked. Third,
I'd say, they want for the United States to leave Iraq in a
better condition than what we found it. They also need some
assurance that the sacrifice we're making, that this country's
making, is worth it. They need that assurance from the
President, first and foremost, and from Congress, and from you
all. But, I'll say this, too--there's a sense with people I
talked to back home is that the goal posts keep moving in Iraq.
I do have a concern about the report, and the stuff that we're
hearing today, is that the goal posts have moved again. We
talked about the surge, initially, being maybe 6 months, and
now it looks like it may be a year-plus before we get back down
to the pre-surge numbers, so I think people want to support
what we're doing there, but they need some assurance on it, and
they also desperately want to make sure that when we leave
Iraq, we leave it in a better condition than what we found it.
Last thing I have, Mr. Chairman, is a number of us, 15 of
us in the Senate have been working on a bill to try to
implement the Iraq Study Group recommendations. I just want to
leave a copy of this bill with you all, it's an effort in
working with the Iraq Study Group and bipartisan group of
Senators, 15 of us--I believe it's 8 Democrats, 7 Republicans.
From my standpoint, it's really the only truly broadbased,
bipartisan bill in Congress, in the House or Senate. I know we
talk about needing political consensus in Baghdad, which we do,
but we also need it in Washington, DC, you all have had a taste
of that this week. So, I'm going to leave this with you, and
I'd love to get your comments, either from you or your staffs,
at some point in the very near future. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]
As the Commander of Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and a
professional military officer, I do not comment on current legislation
or draft legislation; I execute the policy and missions that are
assigned to MNF-I to execute. I cannot, therefore, comment on the draft
Iraq Study Group (ISG) legislation that you have referenced, but I can
provide you with our assessment of the ISG's recommendations and a
comparison of these recommendations with our Joint Campaign Plan.
The ISG recommended changing the coalition strategy, specifically
drawing down coalition combat power (although it noted that a temporary
increase was an option) while placing greater emphasis on: (1)
training, advising, and equipping the Iraqi security forces; and (2)
conducting counterterrorism operations. Early this year, the
President's New Way Forward established a different strategy, placing
priority on protection of the Iraqi population to establish the
security conditions that would enable economic and political progress
and gradual transition of security responsibilities. This strategy
required a temporary increase of coalition combat power--the surge of
forces that deployed to Iraq this past spring.
Despite the difference in prioritization outlined above, we have
still implemented many of the ISG's recommendations. Of the 79 ISG
recommendations, 40 are within the purview of MNF-I and United States
Mission-Iraq either to implement or to influence the Government of Iraq
to implement, and 36 of those 40 recommendations are effectively being
implemented. More detailed information on the status of those 36
recommendations is as follows:
a. Diplomatic. Recommendations 1-12 focus on a comprehensive
Diplomatic Offensive and an Iraq International Support Group.
No such support group has been formed, but the elements of the
diplomatic offensive are being pursued in multilateral,
bilateral, and international (to include the U.N.) frameworks.
Particularly important are the Neighbors Working Groups on
Borders and Security, Refugees, and Energy and Fuel. Membership
of these groups includes Iraq's neighboring states and other
regional Arab partners as well as the five permanent members of
the U.N.
b. Political. The coalition's current campaign plan
establishes the primacy of the Political Line of Operation and
effectively implements the ISG's recommendations regarding
political action.
i. Recommendations 19-31 deal with legislative
initiatives, including constitutional review, de-
baathification reform, oil revenue sharing, provincial
elections, amnesty/reconciliation, and the status of
Kirkuk. Joint Campaign Plan 07 outlines the
aforementioned initiatives as priority political goals.
Recommendation 24 states that these milestones should
be complete no later than first quarter of 2007. While
we did not meet that target date, the coalition
continues to assist the Government of Iraq in working
to achieve resolution of these difficult legislative
issues.
ii. Recommendations 35-36 and 38-39 deal with
engaging Iraqis of all sects and supporting
disarmament, demobilization, and reconciliation.
Similarly, Joint Campaign Plan 07 emphasizes
engagement, transition, and reintegration of militias.
c. Economics. Recommendations 62-63, 65, and 68 deal with
improving Iraq's oil industry and improving coalition
reconstruction programs. Through mechanisms such as the Energy
Fusion Cell and by assisting in the creation of Iraqi Army
Strategic Infrastructure Battalions, MNF-I is effectively
implementing the recommendations relevant to the oil industry.
The coalition is also implementing recommendations in
reconstruction through negotiations focused on more foreign
investment and involvement and by making full use of the newly
developed Quick Reaction Fund (QRF).
d. Security. Recommendation 45 suggests leaving excess
equipment behind as coalition forces depart and encouraging
acceleration of Iraqi use of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
program. Although only limited deliveries have occurred thus
far, Iraq has invested significantly in FMS. Also, as forces
depart, MNF-I will continue to study the feasibility of leaving
equipment behind. We are working closely with the Department of
the Army and Office of the Secretary of Defense to transfer
8,500 M1114 Up-armored HMMWVs to the Iraqi security forces
under a FMS-like case with greatly reduced costs per vehicle.
These 8,500 HMMWVs become excess when the MRAP vehicles flow
into country and are put into the fight with American units.
e. Rule of Law. Recommendations 52-55 and 57-61 cover
expanding Iraqi police capability to control crime,
transforming the Ministry of Interior, controlling the
Facilities Protection Service, and training the National and
Border Police. Through the efforts of the U.S. Embassy Rule of
Law section, the Law and Order Task Force, and the Coalition
Police Assistance Transition Team, the coalition is effectively
implementing these recommendations. Recommendations 57, 60, and
61 all assume the Department of Justice will take the lead for
Iraqi Police training, as recommended in Recommendation 56
(which is beyond MNF-I/USM-I purview). While these
recommendations are being implemented by a mix of civilian and
military trainers, they are not being done so under a
Department of Justice lead.
Four recommendations of the ISG Report are not being implemented at
this time. More detailed information is as follows:
a. Recommendations 50 and 51 deal with the transfer of the
National Police and Border Police from the Ministry of Interior
to the Ministry of Defense. This concept continues to be
evaluated as part of the long-term evolution of the interior
forces, and the ultimate decision will eventually be made by
the Government of Iraq.
b. Recommendation 42 requires the United States to complete
Iraqi security force training and equipping by the first
quarter of fiscal year 2008. As the Government of Iraq
continues to define its requirements, ISF development will
likely not be complete by the first quarter of fiscal year
2008.
c. Recommendation 43 discusses changing the coalition
priorities to focus on counterterrorism and ISF development.
While both activities are important, the current coalition
strategy assigns different priorities. Counterterrorism is a
coalition priority, but its effective execution requires
significant conventional combat forces for intelligence
collection and complementary conventional operations, not just
options normally associated with counterterrorist elements. In
fact, the success of the current counterterrorism program would
be impossible without broad conventional support. Also,
although population protection has a higher priority within the
current MNF-I strategy, we are also working with the Iraqis to
improve the capability of the Iraqi security forces, through
training and equipping programs and robust partnering and
advisory efforts. Notably, the partnering effort would not have
been as effective with the reduced coalition presence
recommended by the ISG.
The remaining 39 ISG recommendations are directed toward the U.S.
Government and, as such, are beyond the scope of either MNF-I or USM-I.
Of the recommendations that are out of the purview of MNF-I or USM-I,
recommendations 13-18 focus on the Arab-Israeli conflict;
recommendation 37 focuses on ensuring U.S. executive and legislative
branch actions do not undercut Iraqi amnesty proposals; recommendations
40-41, 44 focus on national policy statements and DOD personnel
assignments; recommendations 46-49 focus on resetting the force;
recommendation 56 assigns Department of Justice lead for Iraqi police
training; recommendations 64, 66-67, 69-71 deal with U.S. national
economic policy decisions; and recommendations 72-79 focus on U.S.
national budgetary, personnel, and intelligence policy.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Pryor.
Senator Martinez.
Senator Martinez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you very much. I appreciate your hosting
me in Baghdad a few days ago. I got an advance, I think, of
what we have seen in your report, and I want to tell you that
between what I've heard from you, and also what I was able to
perceive by visiting several places, and seeing and talking to
our troops, that I have a very positive view of your report. I
am astonished that some may be so invested in failure that they
cannot see the very positive signs that you're bringing to us.
I had the privilege of visiting Patrol Base Murray, south
of Baghdad, and I saw there, myself, this is the last brigade
of the surge. They've been there since late-May or early-June.
They've been in the fight in a very tough neighborhood south of
Baghdad, and they have been rooting out al Qaeda. I talked to
Iraqis there, who are so thankful that our troops were there,
that are working with them in partnership, and the enthusiasm
that I saw from our men and women in uniform, there performing
admirably, sustaining some difficult losses of their own
troops, is what leads me to think that this strategy is
succeeding in the neighborhoods where it matters, and turning
the situation around. So while I understand the difficulties
ahead, and the difficulties that we've had in the past, I must
say that I am encouraged by what I saw there, and by what you
report to us here, as well.
I know we've been talking about this for a long, long time,
but I wonder if you would, General, define for me who it is
that our enemy is in Iraq? Who are we fighting?
General Petraeus. At the outset, actually if I could just
point out first, you'll be heartened to hear that the al Qaeda
in the area of Arab Jabour was killed in the last several days
as well, and that's in the Arab Jaboor area there, and that was
in an area that was a sanctuary for al Qaeda, southeast of
Baghdad, in an area in which operations are planned, set up and
then run into Baghdad. So, it is a significant accomplishment
by those at Patrol Base Murray.
Senator Martinez. It's like the conduit to Baghdad, isn't
it?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir. Sir, I use the term that the
enemy, the wolf closest to the sled, is al Qaeda-Iraq because
it is the enemy that has, in the past, ignited the enormous
escalation in ethno-sectarian violence by some of its actions.
The bombing in February 2006 of the Golden Dome Mosque in
Samarra are foremost among those, the enemy that causes the
most horrific casualties, the most sensational attacks, and
again has an effect at times, or tries to have an effect of
pouring gas on burning embers, wherever they can find them.
They're the ones responsible for the bombings of the four
Yazidi villages several weeks back, of some Turkomen villages
prior to that, south of Kurkuk, in trying all the time, again,
to conduct more of those types of attacks.
Beyond that, certainly the militia extremists supported by
Iran are very much a growing concern. I mentioned earlier,
we've learned a great deal about them after capturing the head
of the special groups and the Lebanese Hezbollah operative who
was supporting them, with Iran and a number of others over
time, quite a few brigade commanders, in that particular
structure. Again, the impact that they have is very significant
because it can eat at neighborhoods. In many respects, it is
the militia extremists at this point in Baghdad that are the
cause of the ethno-sectarian violence, more so than are al
Qaeda or any other Sunni extremist affiliates.
Senator Martinez. Slide number 10, in my view, gives a
great graphic portrayal of the success that you've had against
al Qaeda-Iraq and we can add to this chart, now, the Amir that
you just mentioned from my old friends at Patrol Base Murray,
God bless them.
General Petraeus. Sir, and again, that is significant
success against al Qaeda. They're off balance, we're in the
pursuit mode against them, certainly in many, many more places
than we were before and had to take some tough casualties to go
into areas that they had controlled before, Baqubah, and a
variety of Baghdad neighborhood, Arab Jaboor, and other
locations.
Beyond that, I think the other enemies are less kinetic,
but more just the challenges of institutions, again, that just
aren't fully functioning. Certainly, residual sectarian
influences, and even the degree of corruption that is still in
certain elements in Iraq, those present big challenges, as do a
variety of these different issues that we have to deal with in
trying to stand up the security forces, in getting their
logistical systems working, getting the institutional
structures established, getting the sectarian activities out,
and so forth.
But that lays out, I think, the major challenges--the two
big ones, again, being al Qaeda and its affiliates. There are
still, certainly, Sunni insurgents out there, loosely
affiliated, or not in some cases, and then the Shiite militia
extremists who have caused such challenges in recent months.
Senator Martinez. Thank you, sir.
On your chart 13, as you talk about the stepping, you also
are talking about mission shift. First of all, what would the
shift be? You mention at the bottom, leading to partner to
overwatch. Would you define those terms, and then also, is
there any way to forecast when the shifting mission might also
kick in? Because I presume that would have some impact of the
level of casualties that our own forces sustain.
General Petraeus. Senator, it already has. As I've
mentioned, we certainly have a number of places where brigades,
or the majority of brigades, are in the lead, but there are
other phases where we are very much in partnering or have
already moved to some form of tactical or operational
overwatch, where we're not located with that unit, we're away
from it. What we provide is quick reaction force, perhaps some
other combat enablers, as required in a pinch.
The way this will happen is, there will actually be, an
entire brigade I don't think will go from, say leading to
partnering and then partnering to tactical overwatch, because
the brigades are fairly disbursed. There will be units within a
brigade that may actually already be at a partnering or a
tactical overwatch situation, where others may still be not as
far along, depending on again, the units with which they are
working. So, it is something we want to move as rapidly as we
can, but again, we don't want to rush to failure.
Senator Martinez. Ambassador Crocker, I just wanted to
comment that I think that political communique is an important
consideration and may be a foretelling; I know how we legislate
here sometimes, sometimes it takes people getting in a room,
agreeing on something, and then ultimately you see it become a
bill and passed.
If you could just quickly, my time is up, but I would like
to hear from you, Ambassador, as to--we talked a lot about the
grim realities of a precipitous withdrawal--what is the upside,
what is the potential if we were to just succeed in Iraq in the
way that I think is envisioned and possible. What could be the
upside potential for Iraq and the region, if you could do it
just briefly, because my time's expired.
Chairman Levin. Please be brief, because we have three more
questioners and we're going to have votes, I think at 7
o'clock.
Ambassador Crocker. Yes, sir. It would be a fundamental
change in the region because Iraq, for decades, has been a
source of instability and threat in the region and beyond, to
Iran, to the Gulf States, and to Syria. So this would be almost
an unprecedented situation, certainly for the last 3-plus
decades, something we hadn't seen. I guess I just leave you
with that. I wouldn't try to go beyond that. Again, my weak
imagination fails me, but it would be a situation we have not
seen. An Iraq that is a source of stability rather than
instability and threat. Literally something we haven't seen
since 1967.
Senator Martinez. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Martinez.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentleman, welcome to mile 25. I've been with you all the
way, but you've been running a lot harder than I have.
I would like to make just two comments about some of the
testimony that preceded me and then try to get quickly to two
questions.
The first, to echo something that Senator Clinton said, as
a result of a question that was posed by Senator McCain. I
think it's important to point out for the historical record,
that the situation in al Anbar did turn around before the surge
began. I mentioned this in the Committee on Foreign Relations,
but I think it's important to mention it here. Also, it's a
matter of, on the one hand, I think, personal loyalty. My son
is an infantry Marine, he was in the 1st Battalion 6th Marines,
and through that period at the last 4 months of last year, in
particular, they were knocking back Ramadi block by block and
street by street. I think, number one, they deserve credit, and
number two, you don't want your staff to have to throw hands
with the 1st Battalion 6th Marines, if somebody were trying to
take credit for what they did.
The second is, when we talk about consequences of failure,
Ambassador, I sadly point out, that so many of these
consequences were what people, such as myself, General Zinni,
and General Scowcroft were trying to point out as the
predictable consequences of an invasion. We have basically
scrambled the egg here and we're all struggling to try to find
a way to bring the United States out of this in a way that will
bring further stability to the region, but I think it's fair to
point that out.
I want to renew, briefly, General Petraeus, my comments
that I began at the end of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee hearing about this dwell-time situation. You can see
how divided we still are here in trying to come to grips with
the policy. As we continue this debate, I just very strongly
believe that we need to put some sort of a safety net under our
troops. The one inarguable result of this policy has been the
disruption of the rotational cycles of deployment, when we
accelerated the deployment cycles. Its policy has resulted in
extended tours, 15-month deployments, and also an acceleration
of other situations like stop-loss and, on the Marine Corps
side, the going into the pool of the Individual Ready Reserve
in a way that they had not done in previous years.
On a personal note, my number two daughter's long-time
boyfriend of 7 years, when I was an embedded journalist in
Afghanistan in 2004, I was able to get up to where his unit
was, one of the nine stops that I made. He did 4 years in the
Marine Corps, infantry corps, pulled two tours in Afghanistan,
out a year and a half, finally got a good job, and then last
Friday he gets the news he's been recalled, he's going back to
Iraq.
This is the kind of situation that people up here really
aren't seeing because of the bifurcation that began back in
Vietnam between the people who are making policy and the people
who are carrying it out, quite frankly. I'm really glad to see
so many members of this committee have been able to go on
congressional delegations and come over and, even if it's just
a brief period of time, see what the United States military
looks like, even see what a combat environment looks like. But
we need some advocates up here for a situation that is really
having a dramatic impact on the men and women who are having to
go through these repeated cycles.
I was out of the room when Senator Nelson of Florida asked
about this. I am told, General, your response to him was that
this is more a matter for a Chief of Staff of the Army, in
terms of dwell-time. Is that correct?
General Petraeus. Senator, I, again, am very concerned
about the strain on, and sacrifice of, our soldiers. Obviously,
what a commander in the field wants, is soldiers who have had
maximum time between deployments. They'll obviously perform
better, they'll have had more time to prepare, presumably, and
be rejuvenated in a way that they would not if it has been a
shorter dwell-time. So again, I very much want that and I
stated that, I believe at that time, I certainly did earlier
today.
What I meant by that is, again, I'm just not any, have been
away from the Army sufficiently, that I just don't have a feel
for what that kind of policy would mean to the Army. It has a
responsibility, as a force provider, and I again, don't know
what that would do in that sense to the Army. That's why I say
that it's just one I think I have to defer to the Chief of
Staff of the Army. Having said that, I'd love to, again, have
some experience in this myself, in the past 6 years, I think
it's coming up on 4 of those 6. So, I am all for maximum dwell-
time.
Senator Webb. Right. I think, I related to you a
conversation that I'd had with the Chief of Staff of the Army,
when the tours went to 15 months, where his comment to me was
that he is feeding the strategy. So, somewhere in here, we need
to find a balance, and that's the reason that I introduced the
amendment that I did. There are times, perhaps, when Congress
needs to weigh in and kind of be a referee.
The other question I wanted to be able to ask you,
Ambassador, it's something that I've thought a lot about and I
would like to get your perceptions on--I was a journalist in
Beirut in the 1980s, you spent a long time there, I spent some
time there, not in any way the sort that you did, but I see a
lot of similarities in the situation, from Lebanon in the 1980s
and Iraq today. Although, Iraq is sort of macrocosmic, but with
the notion of a weak central government that can't get its feet
on the ground and very strong armed militias around them that
are not going to obey the edicts that come out of them. We had
a very bad situation there. We did leave. What do you draw from
this, in terms of how we're trying to fix the situation in
Iraq?
Ambassador Crocker. It's a great question, Senator, and
certainly something that's preoccupied my mind. I spent a total
of 6 years in Lebanon, two different tours, and neither of them
at really great times, given levels of violence.
You don't want to overstate the similarities, or at least I
certainly don't. Iraq is a vastly bigger country, substantially
greater strategic importance, I would argue. There are some
other important differences too, just in terms of internal
conditions, that Lebanon was, without question, an all out
civil war in the late 1970s, early 1980s. The Army, as you
recall, split and disintegrated. With all of the problems in
Iraq, we're not seeing something to that level. In fact, it's
kind of the opposite, security forces actually expanding and
improving, even as they're engaged in a fight, and many aspects
of that fight against other Iraqis, but they're hanging
together.
One element of similarity that we have to keep in mind,
because our adversaries most certainly are, and that is the
roles of Iran and Syria. Iran and Syria came together, as you
recall, to engage in Lebanon in the early 1980s. They worked
together to create Hezbollah in 1982, for example, and they're
still working together in Lebanon. Damascus airport, just as it
channels foreign fighters into Iraq, also serves as a main
supply hub for supplies going to Hezbollah from Iran. So, we
need to look at it in those terms, because certainly, in Tehran
and Damascus, the coordination and the cooperation that they
have brought to bear in Lebanon, in somewhat different ways,
they're also bringing to bear in Iraq.
Senator Webb. My time is up in 30 seconds--one event that
sticks in my mind, and I was there when it happened, was when
the United States picked a side, even though it was the
Lebanese Army, when we supported the Lebanese Army in the
Battle of Sug el Ghard with naval guns, then all of the other
factions decided that we were fair game and that, could be
argued, led to the destruction of the building at the airport
and the deaths of 241 marines. It's very difficult when you get
involved in a five-sided argument.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
you both. I know we began together 9\1/2\ hours ago in the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and I want to thank you for
your tone, your directness, and certainly again, for your
service and I certainly have appreciated the meetings we've had
in Iraq, itself.
Earlier last week General Jones testified about some border
issues. Four, 5, 6 months ago, General McCaffrey had been in
here talking about equipment issues and getting the Iraqis with
the type of equipment they need to carry out their functions.
One of the things that was discussed was the lack of equipment
at the border itself, where Iraqis checking vehicles that are
coming and going are going through those by hand. They don't
have forklifts, they don't have the basic equipment, if you
will, to really leverage our efforts, to make sure that
munitions and other types of destructive gear would be coming
into our country. General Petraeus, I wonder if you might
comment on that or anything that may be happening in that
regard, to alter that.
General Petraeus. Senator, it's a great question because
what we want to do is to focus on the ports of entry and to
improve the equipment at those locations and to, for example,
ensure that everyone has a back scatter X-ray that can look at
these kinds of cargos, without having to unload all of them.
Biometric devices, the Pisces system and some others also have
transition teams out there overseeing them and making sure
that, in fact, we're helping the Iraqis to do the right thing,
if you will, at those border points of entry.
It is hugely important on the Syrian border, again, to try
to cut down on the flow of foreign fighters. Sometimes some of
them undoubtedly just drive in and that's something that we
have to try to interdict, obviously, at those ports of entry.
Then, on the Iranian side, what we want to do is similar, and
also to have some additional backstop to that on some of the
key routes that lead to Baghdad, so that again, we can
interdict more of the arms and ammunition that come in from
Iran.
Senator Corker. That's something that's urgently being
pursued?
General Petraeus. It is, indeed. Yes, sir. In fact, if it's
important to the military, there's a set of slides and they
have stoplights and we have that for the ports of entry, in
particular.
Senator Corker. I want to thank you for the exemplary model
you all set up. I think you all have a common wall between your
offices and work together on a daily basis, both diplomatically
and militarily to achieve our goals here. I know it seems to be
an evolving thing we focus on. We focused on diplomacy a great
deal 3 or 4 months ago, it was upgrading of troops and
obviously, and for good reason, it's been the lack of the
central government's progress politically, certainly at this
point in time.
Ambassador Crocker, talk to us about the nature of the
conversations that you have privately, if you will, with the
Prime Minister, the President, and the Deputy President, just
about the fact that those things are not happening that need to
happen, certainly, to create the top-down reconciliation that
Senator Warner was referring to.
Ambassador Crocker. In the course of the last couple of
months, we've had an extensive and intensive series of
discussions with all of the Iraqi leadership as part of the
effort they were making to come together and to work on both
specific substantive issues and to work on processes. That's
what led to the communique at the end of August, in which they
announced agreements on several areas, among the five principle
leaders of Iraq.
What may be more important in the long run are the
substantive achievements on de-Baathification reform,
provincial powers, detainee issues, and how to handle armed
groups that no longer want to fight against the coalition or
the central government. What may be even more important than
that was the announcements that the five made, that they would
continue to work together, both at their level, through a
mechanism involving the President, the two Vice Presidents, and
the Prime Minister, but also at a preparatory level, where
their deputies would continue to meet as they did for a number
of weeks during the summer, to wrestle with the hard issues of
reconciliation and try to hammer out issues to the point where
the leadership could effectively deal with them. Again, that
involved multiple meetings on the part of me and my staff with,
again, all of Iraq's leaders, as they moved toward this.
One other outcome, incidentally, of that meeting, was a
statement, declaration, by the five that they wanted to reach
an agreement with the United States on a long-term strategic
partnership. I find that noteworthy, again, particularly in
light of the reports that Iraqis want us out, that these five
individuals, who all have constituencies and whose
constituencies are the main communities of Iraq, Shiite, Sunni,
and Kurd, all wanted that in the communique.
So, these are the kinds of things we're engaged in, on a
daily basis. We worked very closely, again, with the combined
leadership to ensure that the Anbar Development Forum that we
talked about a little bit earlier, that took place on September
5, that the central government came forward with the kinds of
financial support and with the presence in Anbar of its Shiite
and Kurdish, as well as Sunni, leadership, that they followed
through on that commitment. Because that too, is an important
part of reconciliation.
So, it's no exaggeration, sir, to say that in the course of
the week I will be engaged--if not on a daily basis, something
close to it--again with all of Iraq's principle leaders.
One of the good things is, I don't have to do it by myself.
I have this gentleman here, General Petraeus, who's very much a
part of that. When there are meetings with the Prime Minister,
we normally go together and depending on the issues, we'll even
adjust our seating. I'll go through an agenda and then move
over and General Petraeus will take forward his.
Senator Corker. I don't know if Senator McCaskill is coming
back. My guess is she is.
Senator Warner [presiding]. She is to come and then we're
going to conclude the hearing.
Senator Corker. Let me just end my day with you on the note
I guess we started with and that is, in both of your
estimations, do you believe that Iraqis want to be Iraqis?
General Petraeus. Yes, I definitely do, Senator. I think
the interesting reflection of that was when the Iraqi soccer
team won the Asian Cup Championship. Even though, horrifically
and tragically, when they won the semifinal, a suicide vest
bomber had caused casualties in one of the celebrations, there
was nothing keeping them off the streets for that. It was
Sunni, Shiite, and Kurd. Everyone was proud to be an Iraqi that
day. There is an Iraqi identity and I think it's really quite,
quite a strong one.
Ambassador Crocker. I would agree with that, Senator. The
Iraqi identity is deeply-felt and there is a strong sense that
it's something that they've literally had to fight for over the
years. The 8-year war with Iran, I think, really intensified
that sense of Iraqi identity among both Sunnis and Shiites.
With respect to the Kurds, it's significant to me and
encouraging, how Kurdish political leaders have clearly
indicated their interest in Iraq, as a whole. The Iraqi
President is Kurdish, as is Iraq's Foreign Minister. They have
been very effective, the Foreign Minister's been a very
effective spokesman for Iraq, in dealing with the international
community. The President is a very constructive force in trying
to bring about elements of reconciliation within the country,
as is the Deputy Prime Minister, who oversees economic affairs
and who was out in Anbar with us, on September 5. So, for all
of the strains, violence, tension, and history, I think there
is a strong sense of Iraqi identity.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Corker. I know my time is up. I want to say to both
of you, I have a deep respect for the service you provide and I
want to thank you for that, and also for your time and patience
and directness today. Thank you very much.
General Petraeus. Thank you.
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you.
Senator Warner. Gentlemen, you have an extraordinary
performance, not only in the context of your testimony, but
your endurance throughout this day. Senator Levin will be back
momentarily to conclude the hearing. He's asked that I cover a
few points here, which we feel should be put into the record.
If Senator McCaskill returns, she'll have her time and that
will conclude the hearing.
So, if you'll bear with me a minute. We just got started,
Carl.
That last comment of yours, Mr. Ambassador, indicating the
group of five; would that agreement of the U.S. forces be a
status of forces-type agreement?
Ambassador Crocker. It is obviously still to be determined,
but yes, it could be that.
Senator Warner. I think it's important that we do it.
That's a well recognized instrument between the nations in this
situation.
Second, I did a little research, which I think is quite
interesting. Almost 5 years ago, three other Senators and I,
there were four of us who worked on Public Law 107-243, October
16, 2002, titled; ``Use of Military Force Against Iraqi
Resolutions.'' In it, in section 2, it makes a number of
references to one of the reasons that we went in on this
invasion, and that is ``the Congress of the United States
supports the effort by the President to strictly enforce the
United Nations Security Council relevant resolutions. The
President is authorized to use armed forces that he determines
to be necessary in order to: (1) defend the national security
of the United States against the continuing threat posed by
Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security
Council resolutions regarding Iraq.'' It's an interesting piece
of history. It brings me to the question, what role do you
foresee the United Nations playing in the future, Mr.
Ambassador?
Ambassador Crocker. It's an excellent question,
particularly in light of the new Security Council resolution,
Resolution 1770, that establishes a significantly expanded
mandate for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq
(UNAMI). New mandates for UNAMI include facilitating national
dialogue and political----
Senator Warner. Let me interrupt you to say, you can finish
your answer for the record on this question, but I judge that
you're somewhat optimistic that they will take a stronger role,
particularly as it may be with the bordering countries to get
their involvement in a positive way. Would that be correct?
Ambassador Crocker. That is correct. That is the clear
intention of the Secretary General.
Senator Warner. Then amplify that in the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
We have been working with the Iraqi Government, Iraq's neighbors,
and the broader international community in an effort to increase
international support for Iraq. The U.N. has demonstrable experience in
areas such as humanitarian assistance, rule of law, and conflict
resolution, and we believe it is well-positioned and ready to take a
larger role in helping to stabilize Iraq. The U.N. Security Council
renewed and expanded the mandate for the U.N. Assistance Mission Iraq
(UNAMI) in resolution 1770 (August 10), and the mandate now encourages
U.N. engagement with Iraq on political reconciliation, economic and
electoral reform, humanitarian assistance, and regional dialogue.
We are pleased that U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon expressed
clear interest in increasing U.N. involvement in Iraq by cohosting with
Prime Minister Maliki a September 22 U.N. High Level Meeting on Iraq.
This international gathering was a notable success. The Secretary
General endorsed efforts to provide additional staff to implement the
expanded UNAMI mandate and including the establishment of a support
mechanism for the neighbors process. Furthermore, the Secretary General
appointed a new Special Representative of the Secretary General for
Iraq, Staffan de Mistura, who will launch his efforts by attending the
November Expanded Neighbors Ministerial in Istanbul. In an effort to
encourage regional support for Iraq, de Mistura will then embark on a
consultative tour of neighboring countries thereafter.
The road to stabilizing Iraq will likely continue to be a difficult
and sometimes uncertain one. However, we believe that we are on the
right course as we work with the international community, under the
auspices of the U.N., to help build a more secure, stable, and
prosperous Iraq.
Senator Warner. The next question I have is, the Jones
Commission report, I thought was a very satisfactory
contribution. Do you agree with that?
General Petraeus. I do, sir.
Senator Warner. Mr. Ambassador?
Ambassador Crocker. Yes, I do.
Senator Warner. One provision in there, page 129,
``Circumstances of the moment may continue to present the
opportunity for considering a shift in the disposition in
deployment of our forces. This could be characterized as a
transition to a `strategic over-watch' posture. Such a strategy
would include placing increasing responsibilities for internal
security on the Iraqi forces, especially in urban areas.
Coalition forces could be retasked to better ensure the
territorial defense''--that's the border--``of Iraq, and
increasingly concentrating on the Eastern and Western borders
and the active defense of the critical infrastructures
essential to Iraq,'' namely their water, their power, their
electricity, and so forth.
Now I judged in your comments and testimony you took a
reference to that, but I judged from what you said, that there
could be a point in time when that type of transition might
well be employed by the forces under your command. Is that
correct, General?
General Petraeus. Sir, it certainly is possible. We want to
get to an overwatch situation. Now where the forces deploy to
or, whether they go home or take on those other mission, I
think, is something that we need to look at very hard.
Senator Warner. Lastly, General, there's been a good deal
of comment in the press--I can't ascribe the accuracy--that
various segments of the chain of command, the President,
Security Council, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Fallon,
yourself, as to different viewpoints. I was privileged to have
many years of experience in the Pentagon and here on this
committee, I think that's healthy that the different views were
assessed and will eventually be presented to the President. But
I assume that you feel, and I think you've said this for the
record, that you did work within the chain of the command, that
you did listen to your colleagues and the Chairman of the JCS,
member of the JCS, and others, as well as Admiral Fallon, and
all of it was brought to bear on the testimony that you've
given us today.
General Petraeus. Sir, that's correct. Actually Secretary
Gates really, I think, sheparded quite a process that took
place with a number of different briefings to the Chairman, to
the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs, and eventually to the
President. I have been told that there is support for what I
have recommended. Certainly Admiral Fallon has assured me of
that, as well as the Chairman and the Secretary.
Senator Warner. Right, and that will be brought to the
President as he prepares to state the----
General Petraeus. That is correct, sir. In fact, the JCS
had a session separately with him the day after I briefed him,
I believe was the chronology.
Senator Warner. You had a session when he visited your
home?
General Petraeus. Sir, we also had that session. I gave my
recommendations, actually, several days prior to that and then
there was the additional session in Anbar province as well.
Senator Warner. Did this trip back provide any opportunity
for further work in that area?
General Petraeus. Sir, I have not talked to the President
at all since I have been back. My conversation with the
Secretary merely was, ``Good luck.'' I have talked to Admiral
Fallon on several occasions and basically, and he just assured
me that he supports the recommendations that I have put
forward.
Senator Warner. Thank you very much, General.
Chairman Levin [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you. It's a much quieter and
smaller room than when we began. I'd like to point out what is
obvious about me being the last questioner. That is how I got
here.
I ran against an incumbent in the United States Senate, who
was 100 percent supportive of the President's policies in Iraq,
had never really asked a tough question during his time on this
committee of any of the men and women who sat at that table,
justifying why we were going and what was happening when we
were there.
So, as our democracy works, the people of my State made a
decision whether or not they wanted to send him back to
Washington to continue to support the policy, or whether they
wanted someone different.
I'm blessed, they decided they wanted someone different and
I'm here. So, I too want to echo everyone's comments about our
respect for you and the work you do. But I also feel a mandate
from my election to disagree, to challenge, and to ask the kind
of questions that I think most Americans want asked right now.
The benchmarks came to this discussion by virtue of the
commander in chief. It was the commander in chief that gave the
speech in January, that said ``We will judge the success of
this strategy by the benchmarks.'' We've had a lot of
discussion today about the benchmarks and bottom-up, top-down,
and I don't want to repeat anything that's been done. But I
went back and read the testimony, General Petraeus, when you
were confirmed. You had an exchange of questions and answers
with Senator Levin about those benchmarks and about the
leverage we could use. There was discussion about what could we
use as leverage and there was discussion about, from you, that
we could withhold things, we could withhold our support, we
could provide support.
I guess my first question to you, and if you could answer
it very briefly, I would appreciate it, what leverage do we
have? Because clearly, it does not appear to be working. Why is
it not obvious to the American people that we're exercising any
of the leverage that we have? This just appears that we have to
take on faith, that this last date is not 2030, or 2025, or
2040. That's where I think my frustration lies, is I see no
effective use of leverage to force the Iraqis to come back from
vacation. Either of you? Leverage that we can use?
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, we clearly do have leverage
and we use it. At the same time, national reconciliation, I
think by definition, is not something that can be forced from
outside. It, just by, again, definition, means people in
conflict agreeing to work through differences and to come
together.
So, we can facilitate, we can pressure to some degree, but
ultimately, national reconciliation has to be an Iraqi process.
I have expressed my view that, to state to the Iraqis that if
they don't do A, B, and C, for example, on reconciliation, that
we are then going to withdraw forces, has a very high risk of
being counterproductive, that it will cause them to be less
likely to compromise, rather than more. So I think we have to
be very careful about that.
I wish there were simple answers. I wish there were clear-
cut things that we could do to get them to do the things that
result in national reconciliation. But there aren't. In my
experience and I've been there about 6 months now, it is a
long, slow, hard grind that may now become easier because of
the effects of the surge in reducing violence. It's because, I
am convinced that it is only when violence comes down and shows
every indication of staying down, that you create the climate
in which hard compromises, if not becoming easy, at least
become possible.
General Petraeus. Senator, I mentioned earlier, I don't
know if you were here, but at one time, in an earlier
assignment, I did actually withhold support for an element in
the Major Crimes Unit in the Ministry of Interior after they
were found to have been mistreating detainees. We have looked
at some of that type of action. We have actually discussed
this. At one point we actually even prepared a letter with
respect to something like that. At this point, we just haven't
reached the point, literally, where we think that that would be
more productive than less productive.
On the other hand, there are some carrots, as well, that
can be used. For example, right now, the Major General who
oversees our Detainee Operations is working closely with the
Sunni-Arab Vice President to try to facilitate the release of
those Sunni-Arabs who have been in the system, have been
prepared for release, guarantor pledges by individuals who we
view as responsible and a judge is participating in this, and
to try to accelerate that process. That is one of their big
concerns in the Sunni-Arab community. That has actually
generated some positive responses, in terms of engagement with
the national process.
So, there are areas like that where we cannot just use
stick but occasionally use carrot as well. That's just one
example of that, although obviously, we have to find some more
examples to get them to come to grips with the really big
issues.
Senator McCaskill. I don't want to belabor the difference
of the opinion of the Armed Forces. I think they're doing a
magnificent job, but I noticed Senator Martinez talked about
talking to the troops. When I was there in June, I had an
opportunity to talk to a number of Missourians and I got all
different opinions. Some of them stuck in my mind, but one I'll
never forget, and that was a young man who was telling me about
the biggest problem they face. That was 1 hour a day of
electricity and what a terrible, difficult situation that was,
to get the confidence and the participation of the Iraqi
people, because of 1 hour a day of electricity.
I said to him, ``But what if we pulled out, if we began to
pull out in a meaningful way, wouldn't it be chaos?'' He looked
me right in the eye, and he said, ``Ma'am, this is chaos.'' So,
that stuck with me and it probably always will.
I would like to close today on a subject matter we haven't
talked about today, but it's one that's near and dear to my
heart, and that's the money. I spent most of my time in Iraq in
June looking at contracting. My background is an auditor. I
have yet to sense a feeling of urgency among the Active
military, among the folks at DOD, about the way money has been
spent in this conflict, particularly as we have dealt with
privatization at a level we've never had privatization before,
in a contingent operation. We have privatized much more than we
ever have, in terms of not just reconstruction, but obviously
in troop support and logistics.
I would certainly appreciate, briefly, if the Chairman will
indulge me at this point, your sense about that. I think that
all of this is about choices and none of them are easy, but I
do think people need to understand that the price tag for 1
month pays for health insurance for 800,000 American children.
That is a startling reality of what we're doing. The
President's going to ask us for another $50 billion of debt,
and now we have borrowed most of the money for this conflict.
The strength of our military not only relies on the incredible
leadership that we develop within our military and the brave
and courageous acts of our military men and women, but it
depends on the economic status of our Nation and the strength
and security of our economy. I would like, briefly, from both
of you, your reflection on the heartbreaking news that we had,
that even someone in the Active military was involved in fraud,
and stealing money from the American people, the kind of
contractor abuse, the kind of overspending we've seen, the kind
of money that's been spent that we can't account for. What, if
anything, is being done on a day-to-day basis to address the
incredible amount of money that's being spent and a sense of
urgency about making sure that every dime of it is spent
wisely?
General Petraeus. First of all, Senator, a very important
step is the support for the continuation of the Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), which I
think is very important and has proven very, very useful. The
formation of the Joint Contracting Command Iraq, I think over
time, has improved very much the process that is conducted over
there. The Iraqi First Program Initiative is also one that not
only gets us, in many cases, lower costs and lower salaries,
but gets the local people invested in our success, as well. But
those are just a couple of initiatives that I would mention.
Ambassador Crocker. Certainly, on the mission side, I would
echo the importance of the SIGIR and the wisdom of the decision
to continue that function. The Inspector General, Stuart Bowen,
and his staff, he's been with this from the beginning. He's
acquired a considerable amount of expertise and is, I think,
extremely important in being an assurance to you and to us that
resources are being used as wisely as possible and are
accounted for in a comprehensive manner.
With respect to privatization, I know that your comment was
in the military context, but it also applies----
Senator McCaskill. Absolutely.
Ambassador Crocker. --on this side, as well. The reality
is, for example, on the security function, much of our
security, most of our security is provided by contractors, it
is overseen by diplomatic security officers, Foreign Service
Officers, but there is simply no way at all that the State
Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security could ever have
enough full-time personnel to staff the security function in
Iraq.
There is no alternative except through contracts, and I
would have to say that the capability and courage of the
individuals who provide security under contract is worthy of
respect of all Americans. One of Blackwater's helicopters went
down yesterday, a hostile fire incident, fortunately no one was
killed in that accident, but over 30 of our contract security
Americans have been killed keeping the rest of us safe. So it
is something that we have to do because we don't have enough
people in the State Department to do this, but I think it's
being done very well.
Senator McCaskill. I think privatization is the future. I
just think we need to work harder at getting it right. I don't
question that they're very brave and courageous people. I think
most of them are former United States military. They learned it
right in place. So, I appreciate that, but I do think we have a
long way to go, in terms of the accountability piece on the
privatization issue.
Thank you both very much. God bless you and
congratulations. I think, with the exception, if the Chairman
has some questions, you're at the finish line.
Chairman Levin. We have one more question.
Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
This goes to General Petraeus. I want to clarify something.
You've testified that the force reductions will continue
beyond, which I understand means below, the pre-surge levels of
15 brigade combat teams that you'll recommend we reach by mid-
July 2008. You've testified that you won't decide on the pace
of those reductions until mid-March 2008. I understand from
your testimony, that when the pre-surge level of 15 combat
brigade teams is reached in July 2008, that you intend to keep
on with the troop reductions. The decision that you are
reserving to mid-March is the pace of those continuing
reductions. Do I have it straight? Am I right?
General Petraeus. You do, sir. Again, what I have
recommended is making a recommendation in mid-March of the pace
of the continued reductions at that time.
Chairman Levin. But it is your recommendation and intention
that those reductions would keep on going after the July 2008
level of 15 combat brigade teams is reached?
General Petraeus. That is correct. As I said, we will
continue to reduce it at that point.
Chairman Levin. It's intended not just that you will, in
some future year, but that you intend to continue those
reductions at that point, reserving the pace of the reductions
beyond 15 combat teams, reserving that decision to mid-March.
General Petraeus. Recommendation, yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Recommendation.
Your testimony, Ambassador Crocker, will be made part of
the record. I did not say that. Thank you for your
presentations, both of you here today. I think we all deeply
appreciate it. I hope that appreciation to you and the men and
women that you lead comes through here very loud and clear,
because we all have that strong belief that you are, indeed,
not only patriots, but that you are expending beyond the call
of duty your own energies and your families' in leading the men
and women under your command and under your leadership. Thank
you both.
General Petraeus. Thank you, Senator.
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. We will stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert Byrd
iraqi tribes
1. Senator Byrd. General Petraeus, what assurance can you give that
the tribes in al Anbar province--who until recently were shooting at
American soldiers--will not resume their attacks against us once they
feel we no longer serve their interests?
General Petraeus. Both Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and the
Government of Iraq recognize that there are many benefits, but also
some risks, associated with the newfound participation of tribes and
other concerned local citizens. As you pointed out in your question,
many of these individuals at best condoned acts aimed at coalition and
Iraqi forces and at worst actively fought against us. As such, we are
working with the Government of Iraq to create a viable strategy that
mitigates the risks, especially the risk of these concerned local
citizens turning against coalition forces and the Government of Iraq,
but that also allows us to seize this fleeting opportunity. Our
strategy aims to do this by not just working with local citizens and
tribes in Anbar and throughout Iraq, but more importantly by
solidifying their support for the long-term.
There are a number of ways we are doing this. We are putting these
individuals under short-term security contracts, collecting their
biometric data, ensuring they are fit for long-term service, and having
them swear allegiance to the Government of Iraq. We are also working to
place these volunteers into permanent positions in the Iraqi security
forces or other forms of governmental employment. Specifically, we are
filling available authorizations in the Iraqi police, so that these
volunteers, once trained, can then provide security for their local
communities. After all local security is in their interests, the
Government of Iraq's interest, and our interest. Moreover, by being
employed by a governmental agency or as a member of the Iraqi security
forces, these concerned local citizens will remain tied into the
central government, as it provides their salaries and other financial
resources.
2. Senator Byrd. General Petraeus, during the hearing you noted
that we are not directly supplying the tribes with weapons or money,
but that does not alter the underlying point that we are now
cooperating with groups that a few short months ago treated us as
enemies. I fear that we are touting a short-term success while
potentially doing damage to our long-term interests. Please confirm
that we are not supplying arms or funding to the tribes; and why you
believe that our new allies in al Anbar province today will not be our
bitter enemies tomorrow, and that this policy is in our long-term
interests.
General Petraeus. MNF-I is not arming tribes. In truth, most tribes
were armed long before our arrival. We have, however, provided non-
lethal equipment such as cell phones and uniform equipment to identify
concerned local citizens, many of whom come from tribal elements, as
being under security contract and cooperating with coalition and Iraqi
security forces. We have also provided training in topics such as safe
weapons handling procedures, human rights, law of land warfare, and
proper reporting procedures. Additionally, MNF-I provides funding to
groups of concerned local citizens through lawful contracts as part of
the Commander's Emergency Response Program. While the majority of this
funding has gone to Sunnis to date, we are seeing an increasing number
of Shiite citizens volunteer as well, given their rejection of
extremist Shiite militias and Iranian influence. These contracts are
for a specified length of time and a specified mission, such as
providing security for a critical piece of infrastructure or a stretch
of roadway. By using contracts, we have been able to provide these
local citizens and tribal elements with a legitimate way to assist
coalition and Iraqi forces in securing their areas as well as provide
them with a stipend so that they can provide for their families. As we
move forward, we will begin transitioning the responsibility for these
security contracts to the Government of Iraq.
As I stated above, we are mindful of the risks but believe we have
a sound policy in place to mitigate these risks and take advantage of
this important opportunity. Also, it is important to point out that by
having these previously disaffected individuals provide security and by
integrating them into Iraqi security forces, Iraq is taking the first
steps toward turning bottom-up accommodation into national
reconciliation. Helping to foster national reconciliation is critical
to developing sustainable security in Iraq, which is one of our
principal long-term interests.
military mission in iraq
3. Senator Byrd. General Petraeus, please tell me in your own words
why our soldiers are in Iraq, what their military mission is, what the
Iraqi military needs to do, and how long you expect it to take?
General Petraeus. The mission of the soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines, and coastguardsmen of MNF-I, in partnership with the
Government of Iraq, is to secure the population of Iraq and employ
political, security, economic, and diplomatic means to help the people
of Iraq achieve sustainable security and commensurate political and
economic development in order to foster continued reconciliation. I
believe our troopers are here in Iraq building sustainable security
because it is in our Nation's interest to do so. A stable and secure
Iraq will deny extremist enemies a safe haven, prevent further Iranian
influence, be a stabilizing influence in a fragile region, and allow
Iraq's natural resource blessings to benefit its citizens and the
greater global community.
Within the mission statement listed above, our troopers are focused
primarily on the security line of operation, performing tasks such as
clearing, controlling, and retaining neighborhoods; capturing and
killing irreconcilable enemies; developing Iraqi security forces; and
partnering with concerned local citizens. However, our troopers also
contribute considerably to Embassy-led efforts on the political and
economic lines of operation. Indirectly they do so by increasing
security, which allows the time and space for political and economic
progress. They also work directly with their Iraqi partners to build
governance capacity, execute reconstruction projects, improve essential
services, and increase the economic opportunities in their areas of
operation. Lastly, our troopers are taking part in advancing
reconciliation. As I explained above, the bottom-up accommodation
taking place is critical to the overall reconciliation effort, and our
troopers are providing important assistance in moving bottom-up
accommodation forward, separating those that are reconcilable from
those they are not and helping their Iraqi counterparts to integrate
the reconcilables--the concerned local citizens--into their efforts to
secure neighborhoods and areas across the country.
The Iraqi security forces, both the Iraqi military and the Iraqi
police, work with our coalition troopers to clear, control, and retain
neighborhoods and capture and kill irreconcilable enemies. As the
capabilities of the Iraqi security forces continue to increase and
based on conditions on the ground, we will begin transferring to our
Iraqi partners responsibility for population security. As we do so,
coalition forces will assume an overwatch position, providing quick-
reaction force support, intelligence, and other key enablers, as well
as transition teams to support the development of Iraqi forces.
Based on the security improvements we have made and additional
improvements we expect to make, we have already recommended a drawdown
of the five surge brigades, two Marine battalions, and Marine
Expeditionary Unit. We believe that we will be able to execute this
reduction in forces without jeopardizing the security gains that we
have fought so hard to achieve. Further reductions and potential
changes to our mission will take place, but in my professional military
judgment, it is premature to make those recommendations at this time.
By mid-March of next year, we believe we will have an adequate
appreciation for the pace of further troop reductions and mission
adjustments beyond the summer of 2008. By then, we will know more about
the enemy situation, the capabilities of the Iraqi forces and the
concerned local citizens, and further improvements to the security
situation, and will then be prepared to make recommendations for
additional drawdown and potential change in mission.
As we move forward, we must remain mindful of the fact that the
accomplishment of our mission in Iraq will not be quick or easy. Doing
so will take continued time, commitment, and resources on the part of
our country. Our plans call for sustainable security to be established
nationwide by the summer of 2009, but that does not end the commitment
of American forces, which I would expect to continue well into the next
administration, though at a reduced level over time. I expect long-term
force levels will be determined by a long-term strategic relationship
that will be negotiated between the Government of Iraq and our own
government.
4. Senator Byrd. General Petraeus, what are our specific military
goals, and precisely what is required from the U.S. military to achieve
them?
General Petraeus. In the near-term, by summer 2005, our goal is to
protect the population and create a baseline of local security.
Specifically, this includes the neutralization of irreconcilable armed
groups, the containment of militias, the reduction of large-scale
sectarian violence, the protection of infrastructure, and the further
development of the Iraqi security forces. In various areas throughout
the country, coalition forces will be leading and partnering with or in
overwatch of their Iraqi counterparts. The baseline of localized
security they create will ensure the population is protected, thus
enabling political and economic progress and fostering reconciliation.
In the intermediate-term, by summer of 2009, our goal is to create
sustainable security. Specifically, this includes a greatly diminished
level of violence that the Iraqi security forces will be able to
sustain largely on their own and for the long-term. This includes not
only the capabilities of the Iraqi units themselves, but also the
abilities of the Ministries of Interior and Defense to effectively
perform their institutional functions on their own. Coalition forces
will largely be in an overwatch position by this point, responsible for
monitoring developments and providing quick-reaction force support,
intelligence, and other key enablers. Transition teams will also
continue to support the development of Iraqi forces. While in
overwatch, should a situation develop that is beyond the capacity of
Iraqi forces to handle on their own, coalition forces will be readily
available to back up our Iraqi counterparts. Overall, this diminished
level of violence will create the conditions for further political and
economic progress.
In the long-term, our goal is Iraqi security forces that are
capable of protecting the population and controlling their borders and
that are able to sustain themselves. Ministries of Interior and Defense
that are capable of performing their institutional functions, and a
coalition forces presence, one large enough to continue to provide a
contribution in accordance with an agreed-upon long-term security
relationship that is mutually beneficial to our Nation and to Iraq.
Achieving local security, then sustainable security, and then
ultimately a long-term security relationship will require a continued
commitment of time, resources, and personnel, not just from the U.S.
military but from other members of the interagency. However, in the
future, we project that the number of personnel and resources required
will be far smaller than at present time. As I stated above, we have
already begun to transition responsibilities and draw down the surge
forces, and we plan to make further recommendations on troop decreases
and potential mission shifts in mid-March.
contractors in iraq
5. Senator Byrd. General Petraeus, please tell me the total number
of private contractors in Iraq serving in combat, combat support, and
security roles who are funded by the U.S. Government. Please break down
the numbers of each and describe the range of duties that private
contractors are involved in.
General Petraeus. There were 136,655 contractors supporting MNF-I
as of the most recent CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census, which was
conducted in July 2007. The next census will be completed by the end of
this month. MNF-I's contractors perform two principal missions:
supporting coalition operations and supporting Iraqi reconstruction
operations, and they do this through combat support and security roles.
Their breakdown is as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total
Service Provided Contractors Percentage
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Security............................... 9,702 7.1
Combat Support: Construction........... 39,057 28.6
Combat Support: Base Support........... 65,195 47.7
Combat Support: Transportation......... 6,012 4.4
Combat Support: Communications Support. 5,362 3.9
Combat Support: Translator/Interpreter. 8,120 5.9
Combat Support: Other.................. 3,207 2.4
--------------------------------
Total................................ 136,655 100
------------------------------------------------------------------------
None of our contractors are in combat roles in the same way our
infantry or armor soldiers are. The closest our contractors come to an
actual combat role is our 1,237 armed contractors who serve in personal
security details and our 371 armed contractors who conduct convoy
escort missions. In addition to those individuals, some of our other
contractors inevitably do leave the confines of our bases, and when
then they do, they--like all our troopers--are at risk of exposure to
enemy contact such as small arms fire or improvised explosive devices.
Their purpose in leaving the base, however, is to complete their combat
support or security tasks such as getting to their reconstruction site,
acting as an interpreter, or driving logistics supplies to another
base, and not to perform specific combat tasks such as patrolling a
street or conducting a raid.
The Department of State (DOS) will be able to provide information
on the quantity of personnel under DOS contracts and the specific roles
those contractors perform.
iraqi national police
6. Senator Byrd. General Petraeus, the Report of the Independent
Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq noted that the National
Police are ``operationally ineffective'' and riven with sectarianism,
and recommended that the entire force be disbanded and reorganized.
Iraq's police forces are central to the long-term establishment of
security in Iraq. Do you agree with the Commission's assessment of the
National Police and its recommendation to disband it? Why or why not?
General Petraeus. I respectfully disagree with the recommendation
to disband the National Police. The National Police remain the part of
Iraqi Security Forces of which we are most concerned, and we may, in
time, recommend that some units be disbanded by the Government of Iraq.
However, we also believe that overall, we have a viable strategy to
assist the National Police in overcoming their two principal
challenges, sectarianism and insufficient training, and that we are
making progress in developing the National Police into a viable
paramilitary force. Disbanding the National Police writ large would
leave a significant gap in security capability, as there are currently
about 32,000 National Police performing security operations across
Iraq, and the vast majority operate within the Baghdad security belt in
support of Operation Fardh al-Qanoon.
There has been considerable effort, led by the National Police
leadership and supported by coalition forces, to overcome the
challenges of sectarianism within this force. Numerous individuals who
promoted sectarian agendas have been removed and replaced, to include
17 of 27 battalion commanders, 9 of 9 brigade commanders, and other key
officers. National Police units have undergone ``re-bluing'' training
programs, which have shown positive results in many units in building a
more professional National Police force. This training is now being
complemented by Italian Carabinieri-led training. Also, National Police
units are advised, coached, and mentored by Coalition Force National
Police Transition Teams and they often partner with coalition forces on
operations. These partnerships remain crucial to our ability to
strengthen the capabilities and professionalism of the National Police.
Ultimately, our goal is to help the Ministry of Interior transform
the National Police into a national, rapidly deployable, paramilitary
police force operating in support of the Iraqi Police Service, under
the command of the Ministry of Interior and when appropriate, under the
direction or in support of the Provincial Governors in order to provide
the Government of Iraq with a proportional response option and bridging
capability between the Iraqi Police Service and the Iraqi Army.
Achieving this goal will take considerable time and continued effort,
and some units may, indeed, need to be disbanded, but the right
strategy is in place to get there.
army retention rates
7. Senator Byrd. General Petraeus, in 2003, only 18 percent of West
Point graduates quit the force. This low attrition rate has been
attributed to the memories of September 11, the successful war in
Afghanistan, and the fact that war in Iraq was just under way. Duty
called, and it seemed a good time to be an Army officer. However, last
year, when the 905 officers from the class of 2001 had to make their
choice to stay or leave, 44 percent quit the Army. It was the Service's
highest loss rate in 3 decades. Some have suggested that there is a
``trust gap'' between junior and senior officers. Others have suggested
that we are on a quixotic quest in Iraq to reach an unreachable goal,
leading to disillusionment among our young officer corps. Some of the
combat-tempered junior and mid-level officers have charged the general
corps, many of whom lack combat experience because they attained their
rank in peacetime, with demanding the impossible and providing too few
resources to achieve success. The result is that the military is
losing, at record rates, the very individuals that can best lead our
Armed Forces. How does this exodus of the future leaders of the
military weigh on your decision-making in attempting to achieve
military objectives and goals in Iraq?
General Petraeus. As Commander of MNF-I, my responsibility is to
develop and execute a strategy focused on achieving our goal of
sustainable security in Iraq. As such, the recommendations I presented
before your committee were based on my view of how we are faring as we
build sustainable security and what means are required to meet our
stated goal. However, as a senior leader of our Nation's Armed Forces,
I am also acutely aware of the strain being put on our ground forces as
a result of our ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This
understanding informed, but did not drive, my recommendations.
Undoubtedly, to be successful--not just in the short-term, but more
importantly in the medium and long-term--our military needs top-quality
leaders. Today's junior officers, who will be tomorrow's senior
leaders, are probably the most combat experienced generations of
officers in the history of our Nation. Most Army and Marine Corps
lieutenants and captains have deployed multiple times and learned
first-hand what it takes to succeed in an exceedingly challenging
environment. Now, many of these same leaders are choosing to leave
military service because of, among other reasons, the high operational
tempo. I am in my fourth year or longer deployment since September 11
and my family and I intimately understand the strain placed on our
troopers and their families through repeated and lengthy deployments.
Ideally, through both the expansion of the force as well as a gradual
decrease in the number of our forces deployed, our military will be
able to return to a more manageable deployment cycle, with at least
double the time at home compared to the time deployed. In the meantime,
the Army has recently released other initiatives designed to retain our
junior officers, including expanded offers of graduate school and a
retention bonus. Additionally, as I go out and visit with subordinate
commanders across Iraq, I encourage them to mentor their junior
officers and communicate to them their worth to this fight and to the
long-term health of our organization. I do the same, taking the time to
personally talk to company commanders (captains) on nearly every trip I
take to see troops, listen to their concerns, and remind them that they
matter a great deal--to all of us.
u.s. armed forces
8. Senator Byrd. General Petraeus, what is the long-range impact of
the war in Iraq on the U.S. Armed Forces?
General Petraeus. At this stage of an ongoing conflict, it is
difficult to predict what the long-range impact will be on the Armed
Forces, but we do have some indicators already. On the positive front,
we now have one of the most experienced combat forces in our Nation's
history, complete with a core of battle tested leaders, many of whom
have multiple tours and often have served in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
Our military has also demonstrated an ability to change doctrine and
adapt training to the current fight, to become proficient at new tasks,
and to field needed new equipment. While these adaptations did not
necessarily happen fast enough during the early years of our operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan, they are now occurring much more quickly. We
can see the difference: more than ever before, I am convinced that our
troopers and especially our leaders get it--they understand how to
operate in the exceedingly challenging environments they face in places
like Iraq and Afghanistan.
There are negative impacts we're watching closely as well, in
particular the stress on our ground forces--most importantly on the
mid-grade noncommissioned officers and junior officers who have that
wealth of combat experience on which we will draw in the decades ahead.
There are other stresses as well, such as stresses on equipment that
has seen much wear and tear over 4+ years of sustained combat and
stresses on the ability to train for other tasks. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff and individual Services are endeavoring to put policies in place
to alleviate the stress on our troopers and on our equipment as much as
possible and they are working to reset, reconstitute, and revitalize
the All-Volunteer Force, while also ensuring our troopers are prepared
to deploy and succeed in the current operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
budgets
9. Senator Byrd. General Petraeus, in the budgets for the global
war on terror that the President sent to Congress in February, he did
not request one thin dime for the cost of the troops serving in Iraq as
a result of the surge. Can you explain to me, the Chairman of the
Senate Appropriations Committee, why 8 months later, the President has
still not asked for funds for the troops that have gone to Iraq as a
result of the surge?
General Petraeus. I am not able to provide insight into the details
of the budgetary process. I respectfully recommend this question be
addressed to the Office of Management and Budget.
10. Senator Byrd. General Petraeus, during the hearing you
essentially asked Congress for patience to allow the military strategy
in Iraq time to work. We have heard these requests virtually since the
war began. Can you offer any evidence that 6 or 12 more months are
going to make a significant difference on the only important issues:
achievement of the benchmarks and genuine progress toward national
political reconciliation?
General Petraeus. We are hopeful that over the next 6 to 12 months,
we will see continued progress toward resolving the ongoing competition
for power and resources among Iraq's ethnic and sectarian communities.
This resolution will in turn help achieve the benchmarks and allow for
genuine progress toward national political reconciliation.
Significantly, the gradual improvements to the security situation
arc providing Iraqi leaders with the time and space to resolve their
difficult political issues, foster reconciliation, and strengthen their
economy. During the height of sectarian violence late last year, Iraqi
leaders focused their energy simply on quelling the violence. Now that
the levels of violence are more manageable--though admittedly still too
high--Iraqi leaders are able to focus their energies on the key tasks
that only they can solve. The 26 August communique released by Iraq's
senior leaders was a heartening step towards resolving their difficult
issues, and now that the Council of Representatives is back in session,
it is up to Iraqi leaders to ensure the promises set forth in the
communique are translated into laws. Also, the groundswell of bottom-up
support is forcing Iraqi leaders to deal with difficult issues
involving reconciliation, and their actions, to include conditional
immunity in some areas, represent the first steps toward national
reconciliation. In another sign of progress, other ongoing actions are
also outpacing the laws. For example, the Government of Iraq has not
yet passed a provincial powers law, a hydrocarbon law, or de-
Baathification reform. Still, the central government is allocating
budgets to the provinces and the provinces are spending their money;
oil revenue is being shared in a manner generally consistent with what
we believe the hydrocarbon law will codify; and, as I stated above,
conditional immunity is beginning to occur. Such developments are
tangible signs of political progress and are hopefully indicative of
more progress to come in the coming months.
11. Senator Byrd. Ambassador Crocker, we are hearing that political
reconciliation cannot take place without security, but there will be no
security without political reconciliation. This is a singularly
circular argument, but the bottom line is we have yet to see any real
political reconciliation. I am not looking for an explanation about
``progress''; I want to know when Iraq will step up to its
responsibilities, as have so many of our servicemen and women, and what
you are doing to convey to the Iraqis that there is an urgency for them
to act now. When can we expect to see the benchmarks you were charged
to report on--benchmarks originally proposed by the Iraqis themselves--
achieved?
Ambassador Crocker. Like U.S. servicemen and women, Iraqi
officials--including politicians, judges, and security forces--are
stepping up and putting their lives at risk on a daily basis to sustain
a democratic, Federal Iraq and continue progress on political
reconciliation.
Beyond benchmarks, the Government of Iraq is pursuing political
reconciliation by `latching up' the national and provincial
governments. For example, on September 30, Iraq's Finance Minister,
Bayan Jabr, announced that the portion of the capital budget that goes
directly to the 18 provinces would increase to nearly $4 billion next
year. Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister, Barham Salih, also announced that
Babil Province would be rewarded for its effective budget execution
with $70 million for a major loan program for small businesses and
individuals. Previously, Vice Presidents al-Mahdi and al-Hashimi and
Deputy Prime Minister Salih announced a 70 percent increase in the 2007
provincial capital budget as well as $50 million in compensation for
losses suffered in Anbar in the fight against al Qaeda.
While not yet meeting the legislative benchmark of passing a
Hydrocarbon Law, sharing of hydrocarbon revenues is taking place
equitably while deliberations over a revenue-sharing law continue.
Further, U.S. leaders have stressed the importance of passing national
hydrocarbon legislation during meetings with both Prime Minister al-
Maliki and President Talabani.
12. Senator Byrd. Ambassador Crocker, the U.S. taxpayer has been
called upon to provide hundreds of billions of dollars to support the
war in Iraq. What specific assurances can you give, contrary to many of
the other official reports we are receiving, including some from your
own Department, that this war is making us safer here in the United
States?
Ambassador Crocker. Our efforts in Iraq make the United States
safer at home by helping to stabilize the region and by confronting al
Qaeda. Should the United States abandon or drastically curtail its
efforts, Iraq could fall into chaos or civil war and become a safe
haven for terrorists who could strike America at home and abroad. Civil
war in Iraq would also likely trigger the intervention of regional
states, all of which have a vital national interest in Iraq's future.
The Iranian President has already announced that Iran will fill any
vacuum in Iraq.
In partnership with courageous and dedicated Iraqis, we have
weakened al Qaeda in Iraq and reduced its ability to carry out acts of
terrorism. A growing number of communities in Iraq have joined the
fight against al Qaeda in Iraq. Should the United States quit Iraq
prematurely, the gains made against al Qaeda in Iraq and other
extremist groups could easily be reversed.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
military presence in iraq
13. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus, the President's Chief of
Staff, Josh Bolten, was quoted in an interview with USA Today last week
as saying President Bush wants to make it ``possible for his
successor--from whichever party that successor is from--to have a
sustained presence in the Middle East, and have America continue to be
a respected and influential power in the Middle East.'' Was maintaining
a long-term military presence in Iraq an objective provided to you by
the Commander in Chief, or any member of his administration, when you
took command of the Multinational Force in Iraq?
General Petraeus. It was not a specific objective. Developing a
long-term relationship with Iraq, though not specified to a particular
military relationship of any set size, has been a strategic goal. The
10 January 2007 NSC Iraq Strategy Review defined the administration's
strategic goals and objectives (page 5 of attached unclassified
briefing). The strategic goal was established before I took command and
has not since been changed: A unified, democratic, Federal Iraq that
can govern itself, defend itself, and sustain itself, and is an ally in
the war on terror.
The NSC noted that, ``While our strategic goal requires a long-term
relationship with Iraq, we are at a new phase in the effort and must
sharpen the objectives we believe are achievable in the next 12-15
months.''
The following objectives are where we have focused the energies of
MNF-I in coordination with our Embassy and Iraqi partners:
1. Defeat al Qaeda and its supporters and ensure that no
terrorist safe haven exists in Iraq.
2. Support Iraqi efforts to quell sectarian violence in
Baghdad and regain control over the capital.
3. Ensure the territorial integrity of Iraq and counter/limit
destructive Iranian and Syrian activity in Iraq.
4. Help safeguard democracy in Iraq by encouraging strong
democratic institutions impartially serving all Iraqis and
preventing the return of the forces of tyranny.
5. Foster the conditions for Iraqi national reconciliation
but with the Iraqi Government clearly in the lead.
6. Continue to strengthen Iraqi Security Forces and
accelerate the transition of security responsibility to the
Iraqi Government.
7. Encourage an expanding Iraqi economy including by helping
Iraq maintain and expand its export of oil to support Iraqi
development.
8. Promote support for Iraq from its neighbors, the region,
and the international community.
MNF-I is focused on achieving the objectives outlined above.
Conditions in Iraq and a coordinated agreement with the sovereign
Government of Iraq will dictate our future presence or lack of
presence.
14. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus, if not, were you aware that a
sustained presence in Iraq was desired by the President?
General Petraeus. See answer to question 13.
15. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus, was the President's desire to
maintain a sustained presence in Iraq beyond the end of his term in
office a factor in your evaluation of recommended troop levels in Iraq?
General Petraeus. No. My recommended troop levels in Iraq until
next July were based on my professional assessment of what it will take
to accomplish the mission. My assessment was also informed by the
strain on the ground forces, though that was not a determining factor.
We do believe that accomplishing the mission will take until well into
the next administration, but that belief is predicated on a realistic
assessment of the situation on the ground in Iraq and the objectives we
have been given to accomplish.
16. General Petraeus, have you, or DOD, taken any steps to
facilitate sustaining our long-term military presence in Iraq, such as
building of permanent bases or negotiating long-term lease deals with
the Iraqi government?
General Petraeus. Currently, MNF-I basing is governed by the
authorities of the existing United Nations Security Council Resolutions
and Coalition Provisional Authority Orders. In recognition of the
sovereignty of the Government of Iraq, and as we move forward in
support of the Government of Iraqi's request for DOS's work on the
Long-Term Security Relationship, MNF-I will establish a dialogue with
the Government of Iraq to reach a mutual agreement on the future basing
needs for coalition forces. In accordance with United States Central
Command instructions, the military construction that has been conducted
in Iraq has been and continues to be temporary in nature.
u.s. security
17. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus, the war in Iraq, which has
lasted over 4 years with a cost of over $500 billion before the end of
next year, is having a major impact on our armed services in terms of
their readiness and capability to respond to other potential crises. If
our military is less ready to respond to other crises, then I suggest
to you that our country has been made less safe.
By not eliminating Osama Bin Laden and ``al Qaeda Central,'' a
recent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) concluded that we have
allowed them to reconstitute their organization in to a level equal to
or greater than just prior to September 11, 2001. Since we have allowed
our enemy to gain its full strength back, then I suggest to you that
our country has been made less safe. We have diverted significant
resources unnecessarily into Iraq instead of focusing on ``al Qaeda
Central,'' and because we do not have unlimited resources, we have
reduced the total resources available to conduct the global war on
terror. As Chairman of the Veterans Committee, I know that we will be
paying for this war for many decades to come as we care for our wounded
veterans. These costs also reduce our available resources for battling
terrorist networks. Since our decision to go to war in Iraq has caused
us to have less resources to utilize in the war on terror, I suggest to
you, that our country has been made less safe.
The April 2006 NIE concluded ``The Iraq conflict has become the
``cause celebre'' for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of U.S.
involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the
global jihadist movement.'' It further concluded that the ``global
jihadist movement--which includes al Qaeda, affiliated and independent
terrorist groups, and emerging networks and cells is spreading and
adapting to counterterrorism efforts.'' The July 2007 NIE concludes
that ``al Qaeda Central is and will remain the most serious terrorist
threat to the Homeland.'' These conclusions from our intelligence
agencies demonstrate that the Iraq war is fueling a growth in terrorist
networks throughout the world, not just in Iraq, and I suggest to you,
that this has made our country less safe. In your opinion, is the Iraq
war making America safer? If so, why?
General Petraeus. I recognize that there are many arguments as to
whether or not the invasion of Iraq was the correct policy, but from
where we are right now, pursuing our objectives in Iraq is making
America safer. I believe this because of the effect we are having on
the al Qaeda-Iraq, which al Qaeda Senior Leadership has determined as
their central front in a global effort and which the July 2007 NIH
noted in relation to al Qaeda Senior Leadership as ``its most visible
and capable affiliate and the only one known to have expressed a desire
to attack the Homeland.''
I also agree with the findings in the April 2006 NIE that Iraq was
an attractive cause for global jihadists. From that finding, the NIE
also concluded that ``should jihadists leaving Iraq perceive
themselves, and be perceived, to have failed, we judge fewer fighters
will be inspired to carry on the fight.'' We have done considerable
damage to the global al Qaeda network by the killing and capturing of
hundreds of skilled terrorist leaders, many of them foreigners to Iraq
who would have been free to operate elsewhere if they were not in Iraq.
The decrease in foreign fighters coming into Iraq in recent months may
indicate that Iraq is losing its attractiveness to al Qaeda and
affiliated terrorists, though it also likely reflects actions in source
countries, as well as action in Syria and Iraq.
There is no doubt that the enemy we face constantly adapts to our
efforts. At the same time, because of our experience in Iraq, I believe
we are farther along in learning how their networks are organized, how
they fund their activities, how they communicate, how they train, and
how they recruit new members than we would have been without the past 4
years of learning on the battlefield. We continue to get better and
adapt as well, by fine-tuning the synchronization of conventional and
special operations, by improving our tactics and enhancing our
technology, by fusing intelligence and by the accumulation of
experience.
The July 2007 NIE noted al Qaeda central as the most serious
terrorist threat to the Homeland, as it was before September 11, but
also stated, ``We assess that greatly increased worldwide
counterterrorism efforts over the past 5 years have constrained the
ability of al Qaeda to attack the U.S. Homeland again and have led
terrorist groups to perceive the Homeland as a harder target to strike
than on September 11.'' I believe our efforts in Iraq are a part of
that equation and an important reason we must continue to work with our
Iraqi partners to defeat terrorist networks here in Iraq.
18. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus, every year our troops are in
Iraq, the costs to our country are huge: thousands killed in action,
thousands more permanently disabled or maimed, and hundreds of billions
of dollars. With the money we have spent we could have contributed to
rebuilding our aging transportation infrastructure, retooling our
educational system to train our children to compete in the global
market place, and strengthening the security of our borders. So we have
a responsibility to this country to assess whether or not the mission
is worth the cost: a cost measured in American lives, in foregone
programs in America, in the health and welfare of our military, and in
the risk if other areas of the world demand our military resources.
Even if the mission is worth the cost, we must assess whether or not we
can continue to afford to pay it. In your opinion, is the cost worth it
and what does America gain for the expense?
General Petraeus. Ultimately, this is a question for the national
leadership of the United States. In my professional opinion, we have
substantial national interests in Iraq. Failure in Iraq would mean that
important American and global interests in Iraq and the region are not
achieved. Should Iraq collapse into violence (and we got a glimpse of
that during the height of ethno-sectarian violence in 2006), many of
our vital and important national interests would be negatively
affected.
A withdrawal before achieving sustainable stability would result in
the further release of the strong centrifugal forces in Iraq and would
likely produce a number of dangerous results, including a high risk of
the disintegration of the Iraqi security forces, a rapid deterioration
of local security, a marked increase in violence, further ethno-
sectarian displacement and refugee flows, alliances of convenience
among Iraqi groups and other internal and external forces to gain
advantages over their rivals. The recent DIA report confirms my
assessment of the consequences of withdrawal. A failed state in Iraq
would also allow al Qaeda-Iraq to regroup and regain the sanctuaries
they had established and that Iraqi and coalition forces have secured
in the past months. Al Qaeda writ large would also benefit from the
psychological and recruiting boost to their cause that would be derived
from the perceived failure of American policy. Beyond al Qaeda, Iranian
hegemonic ambitions could be encouraged. Additionally, the developing
nexus between Iraq, Tehran, Damascus, and Lebanese Hezbollah would
solidify and exacerbate the underlying Sunni-Shiite conflict already in
the Middle East. There is a significant risk that Iraq would be the
catalyst for broader regional turmoil as Turkey, Iran, Syria, and other
neighbors acted to defend their interests. These consequences would
have an adverse impact on the global economy, as potential
interruptions in the export of oil from Gulf Region would impact global
economic markets. Such results would, in my view, constitute failure in
Iraq; our shared vision of a stable and secure Iraq would not be
achieved and American and global interests in Iraq and the region would
not be protected.
To be sure, the situation in Iraq remains complex, difficult, and
frustrating, but I believe that it is possible to achieve our
objectives in Iraq over time through our continued efforts, though
doing so will not be quick, inexpensive, or easy. The costs of staying
in Iraq are high, but the costs of withdrawal before achieving
sustainable security may well be much higher.
I believe that the best way to secure our national interests and
avoid an unfavorable outcome in Iraq is to continue to focus our
operations on securing the Iraqi people while targeting terrorist
groups and militia extremists and, as quickly as conditions are met,
transitioning security tasks to Iraqi elements.
troop levels
19. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus, you expressed concern in your
opening statement about ``the implications of a rapid withdrawal.'' I
am troubled by this characterization because I have not heard any
Member of Congress who supports ending the war say that our withdrawal
should be rapid. In fact, I believe that most of us advocate a gradual
or phased drawdown that would lessen the shock of our troops' departure
on the Iraqi citizens and government, and give them an opportunity to,
using the words of the President, ``stand up.'' Please define what you
mean by a ``rapid'' drawdown.
General Petraeus. I would describe a rapid withdrawal as any
withdrawal that is solely time-based and fails to consider the
operational environment and the current mission. The reduction of MNF-I
forces that I proposed in my testimony matches our ability to secure
U.S. national objectives in Iraq with the operational environment and
available resources at an acceptable level of risk. This plan also
allows for the orderly repositioning of equipment and personnel
currently in Iraq. Any significant acceleration of this schedule
without a significant improvement in the operational environment would
constitute a rapid drawdown because it would fail to balance the
mission and force level with the security conditions on the ground.
20. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus, if you were to conduct a
``gradual'' drawdown of our presence in Iraq, at what pace would you
recommend reducing our troop levels?
General Petraeus. I do not recommend a ``paced'' reduction of troop
levels. My recent recommendation to reduce the surge force of five
BCTs, a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), and two Marine Infantry
Battalions, taken in consultation with Ambassador Crocker and my chain
of command, represents how I recommend reducing coalition forces
against the progress we have achieved in Iraq and the operational
environment. The recommendation reflected an assessment of a number of
conditions, namely the security environment, the state of Iraqi
security forces, and progress in governance and the Iraqi economy. The
term ``pace'' infers a time-based drawdown of troop levels that
provides the enemy greater predictability of our actions and cedes
initiative. Adhering to a time-based drawdown with a specific ``pace''
would almost certainly jeopardize security and other gains we have made
in Iraq.
Our forces levels can and will come down further beyond the levels
reduced in July 2008. As I testified, however, I cannot predict the
pace of drawdowns past next July and therefore have offered pledges to
present my assessment and recommendations in March 2008 for the way
ahead after July 2008.
safe havens
21. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus, I am concerned about reports
that there are some areas of Baghdad where coalition forces are not
going. In effect, possibly establishing safe havens for our opponents.
For example, there is one joint security station in Sadr City which is
located not in the interior of the neighborhood but on the border with
another district. Are there areas of the city in which our troops do
not go?
General Petraeus. There are districts in which we try to minimize
our visible force posture, such as some of those in Sadr City, but
coalition forces execute operations in every neighborhood and security
district of Baghdad, including Sadr City. There arc Iraqi Police and
National Police units responsible for daily policing within Sadr City
and many other neighborhoods of Baghdad, but no areas of Baghdad can be
considered a safe haven for the enemies of the Iraqi people. While we
strive to conduct all of our operations with our Iraqi partners if they
are not operating independently already, we can and do operate in any
neighborhood of Baghdad as the mission requires it to ensure that no
place in Iraq is knowingly left as a safe haven for extremists.
22. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus, wasn't the intention of the
Baghdad Security Plan to eliminate safe havens?
General Petraeus. Yes, and we largely have. Coalition forces
execute operations in every neighborhood and security district of
Baghdad. Sustained precision strike operations that selectively target
extremists and criminals continually reinforce the fact that there is
no safe place for the enemy in Baghdad. Kinetic strikes are then
reinforced by nonkinetic programs designed to bring clean water,
electricity, fuel, and sewer service to the populace in order to build
their allegiance to the Government of Iraq and to get them to reject
extremist militias and terrorists who cannot provide basic services,
though much work remains to be done in this category. In addition, we
continue to work with over 52.000 Iraqi security forces that operate in
the Baghdad Security Districts, a number that is increasing, as this
will lay the long-term foundation for sustainable Iraqi security.
iraqi tribes
23. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus, I understand that there are
over 150 tribal groups in Iraq. During your hearings on September 10
and 11, 2007, you specifically denied media reports that you were
arming Sunni tribes in al Anbar to assist them in fighting al Qaeda.
However, I am still concerned about other forms of assistance that
might be provided. You did not, for instance, discuss if you are
providing any other kind of support to the tribes, such as funding and/
or training. My concern is that we may provide them with support that
could be utilized against the Shiites or, even our own troops once they
are through battling al Qaeda. After all, some of these tribes were
previously killing Americans. In addition, the appearance that we are
favoring some tribal groups over others could exacerbate sectarian and
ethnic conflict. I understand that assisting the Sunni tribes helps put
al Qaeda on the defensive; however, I must caution that we must do so
with great care in order to avoid unintended consequences. Please
describe what resources and/or training you are providing to the Sunni
tribes in any province to support their efforts against al Qaeda, and
how you are ensuring that anything you provide is not used against our
troops, the Shiites, or the Kurds.
General Petraeus. I appreciate your well-founded note of caution,
and this is indeed an area where we have had to accept some risk,
though not without what we consider sufficient mitigation. In
separating the armed tribes who are willing to work with us from
extremist individuals and irreconcilable groups, we can gain two
tangible benefits: we reduce the number of opponents on the
battlefield, and we gain contributing partners who have staked their
families' well-being on working together with coalition and Iraqi
security forces.
As I testified, coalition forces are not arming tribes. Tribal
members are already armed for the most part due to the Iraqi policy
that allows every household to maintain one AK-47 assault rifle. The
support of coalition force for Sunni tribes is focused on supporting
community watch groups trying to rid al Qaeda elements from their midst
and on providing basic skills to tribal members who agree to monitor
key infrastructure or transportation routes in order to prevent its
destruction or the emplacement of improvised explosive devices. Before
any training takes place, a plan is developed that clearly defines the
responsibilities for all parties, outlines the limitations of
authorities, and explains the consequences if any person violates the
agreement. The tribal sheikh or neighborhood leader selects and vets
candidates who also sign an agreement and swear an oath to the Iraqi
Government. Once the agreements are signed, the coalition forces' Iraqi
security forces in process and screen the candidates including the
collection of biometric data, cross-matching with the biometrics
database against criminal databases, and recording the serial numbers
of candidates' personal weapons. We then work with the Iraqi Government
to get formal hiring orders for their integration into Iraqi security
forces.
The training provided to these groups covers defensively oriented
skills such as checkpoint operations, detainee handling procedures,
human rights, Law of Land warfare, safe weapons handling, and proper
reporting procedures. The equipment provided to the Iraqis in these
situations generally involves a uniform (usually a t-shirt and arm
band), cell phones, a phone card, and materials such as reflective
belts, chemical lights, and, in some cases, GPS systems that help
provide identifying information and locations to improve coordination
and reduce fratricide.
24. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus, if you are providing funding
to the Sunnis tribes, please describe the purpose of the funding, and
how you are ensuring that the funds are used as intended.
General Petraeus. The funding we are providing to Shiite as well as
Sunni tribal volunteers covers the initial costs of the broader
Concerned Local Citizens (CLCs) movement, in which there are now some
65,000 individuals participating. The majority of these CLCs are Sunni
at the present time, though we are seeing rapid growth in the number of
Shiite citizens who are also forming groups to reject extremist Jaish
al Mahdi and Iranian influence in a similar manner that Sunni tribes
rejected al Qaeda. We estimate that approximately $35 million will be
spent on these citizen groups through the end of the year, which is a
wise investment both in getting a large number of military age males
into employment and in the dramatic reductions in violence we see in
the areas in which active CLCs are present. In fact, just the reduction
in vehicle losses due to battle damage more than offsets the cost of
the CLCs. The next step, which is crucial, is developing with the
Government of Iraq the mechanism by which the CLCs go onto Iraqi
payrolls. This effort is in its nascent stages now, and I expect to
report more on it in the future.
american-iraqi relations
25. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus, Dennis Ross, who is a leading
Middle East expert, who served in several Republican and Democratic
administrations, has stated that, ``It is an illusion to believe that
the new Iraq is going to act as our partner in the war on terrorism.''
How sure are we that a new independent Iraq--even one at peace with
itself--is going to be pro-American, especially given the pervasive
influence of Iran on the dominant Shiite leaders, and what is the basis
for your conclusion?
General Petraeus. I cannot guarantee success in Iraq or even if we
arc successful, that the new independent Iraq will remain pro-American.
However, a free and independent Iraq is most likely to be a stabilizing
force in the Middle East, and given that it is Shiite-led, and largely
Arab, it is at least likely to oppose al Qaeda in Iraq in many areas,
as well as Iran, based on historic suspicions and fighting. What I can
say is that the building of a strong strategic partnership with the
Iraqi Government is in our best interest and that Ambassador Crocker
and I are both committed to making this happen. Recently, Iraqi
officials indicated that they wanted the United Nations Security
Council to extend the mandate of the MNF-I through the end of 2008.
Once that mandate extension expires, we believe that senior Iraqi
leaders intend on seeking a long-term bilateral security agreement with
the United States, an agreement similar to those that exist with Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Egypt.
iraqi refugees
26. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus, it seems to me that the number
of internally displaced people (IDP) is an indicator of sectarian
violence. I understand that about 1.8 million Iraqis are now refugees
in other countries and that the number of IDPs has increased from
499,000 in February to over 1.1 million in July. Do you agree that the
increasing number of IDPs is an indicator of increasing sectarian
violence and rising ethnic tensions?
General Petraeus. As Ambassador Crocker and I testified, the
fundamental source of conflict in Iraq is competition among ethnic and
sectarian communities for power and resources. This competition will
take place, and its resolution is necessary to produce long-term
stability in the new Iraq. The question is whether the competition
takes place more or less violently. Tragically, one of the by-products
of this power struggle is the number of Iraqis and families that are
displaced from their homes as a result of sectarian threats and
violence. The surge of operations has led to increased security for
Iraqis throughout the country and, while the number of displaced people
remains far too high, we have seen positive signs: citizens beginning
to return to neighborhoods and an Iraqi government that is working to
guarantee the property rights of those who were displaced in order to
help reintegrate them into civil society. All indicators are that
overall sectarian violence in Iraq is significantly lower now than it
was in the winter of 2006 and 2007.
27. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus, the pace of IDPs does not seem
to have been slowed by the surge. How do you respond to the criticism
that this is further evidence that the surge has failed?
General Petraeus. The military objectives of the surge are, in
large measure, being met. Though the improvements in security have been
uneven across Iraq, the number of incidents, such as attacks and ethno-
sectarian violence, has decreased since June. This decrease in
sectarian violence and terrorist attacks, and the associated enhanced
security that the surge enabled, have given government and community
leaders valuable time to try and resolve pressing political, economic,
and sectarian issues. As incidents continue to decline and confidence
in the security situation stabilizes, many displaced Iraqis will
eventually return to their homes and communities. In fact, as I
mentioned above, we are beginning to see a small but significant number
of families moving back into neighborhoods that have been secured by
coalition and Iraqi security forces.
benchmarks
28. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus, in its report on the Iraqi
government's progress in meeting its benchmarks, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) asserted that it could not confirm that
there has been a reduction in sectarian violence since the surge, as a
measure of sectarian violence is difficult since the perpetrator's
intent is not always clearly known. The report further stated that the
average number of daily attacks against civilians remained about the
same over the last 6 months, and that the decrease in total average
daily attacks in July is largely due to a decrease in attacks on
coalition forces rather than civilians. How is the MNF-I determining
which killings or attacks are sectarian violence, and which are not?
While some may be obvious, I am sure that many are not.
General Petraeus. Ethno-sectarian violence is defined as an event
and any associated civilian deaths caused by or during murders/
executions, kidnappings, direct fire, indirect fire, and all types of
explosive devices, identified as being conducted by one ethnic/
religious person/group directed at a different ethnic/religious person/
group, where the primary motivation for the event is based on ethnicity
or religious sect. Analysts review each event to determine the
ethnicity and/or religious sect of the victim(s), the entity being
attacked, the demographics of the area where the attack occurred, and
the method of attack to determine whether a particular event should be
included as ethno-sectarian violence. As you correctly point out, many
of these events are obviously ethno-sectarian in nature, while others
are less obvious until the full range of circumstances are closely
examined.
MNF-I employs a methodology that is consistent, rigorous, and
thorough. We have shared our methodology with the CIA and DIA, and they
concur with our system of measurements. In large part, the GAO's
criticism is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of our
methodologies. We have always welcomed outside audits and will continue
to do so and we continue to stand by our metrics.
29. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus, you stated in the hearing that
the current methodology has been used for over a year. From this, I
conclude that the current methodology was changed approximately 3 years
into the war. How long exactly has this methodology been in use, and
why was it changed?
General Petraeus. I have attached to this response the document
``MNF-I Ethno-Sectarian Violence Methodology'' which outlines the
definitions and methodology we use to determine if violent acts should
be classified as ethno-sectarian. This methodology has not changed
since July 2005. MNF-I defines ethno-sectarian violence as ``an event
and any associated civilian deaths caused by or during murder/
executions, kidnappings, direct fire, indirect fire, and all types of
explosive devices identified as being conducted by one ethnic/religious
person/group directed at a different ethnic/religious person/group,
where the primary motivation for the event is based on ethnicity or
religious sect.''
The only significant change to the reported level of ethno-
sectarian violence is one that resulted from our receipt of backlogged
data from the Iraqi National Command Center in March 2007. After
verifying the data, we updated previous accounts of the levels of
sectarian violence with these reports to ensure we had the most
accurate depiction of the sectarian violence we are measuring. This
additional data did not arrive in time for inclusion in the March 9010
Report to Congress, but was reflected in the June 9010 Report. Since
then, MNF-I has worked hard to improve our coordination with our Iraqi
counterparts to ensure we receive Iraqi reports in a timely and
consistent manner. We believe that using verified Iraqi data adds to
the accuracy of our statistics.
30. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus, how can you use this
methodology to evaluate trends in sectarian violence against previous
years when the methodology was changed?
General Petraeus. The methodology for measuring ethno-sectarian
violence has not changed since it was implemented in the summer 2005.
Additionally, the rigorous methodology deals with interpreting data,
rather than collecting it. Thus, when comparing data from different
years, MNF-I analysis apply the same methodology to the entire data set
to make the most accurate trends assessments possible. Prior to 2005,
we weren't as focused on ethno-sectarian violence as we are today. In
fact, prior to the bombing of the Mosque of the Golden Dome in early
2006, ethno-sectarian violence was limited. The bombing of the mosque
literally tore the fabric of Iraqi society, pining sects against one
another and plunging neighborhoods into violence.
31. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus, because of the inherent
difficulties in attempting to determine the intent of a killing, your
method of measuring sectarian violence in Iraq seems subjective to me.
Why not use objective measurements such as total civilian killings or
average daily attacks to assess levels of violence?
General Petraeus. We do, in fact, use total civilian deaths and
daily attacks as metrics on which we focus. However, due to the damage
done by sectarian violence, we do focus on that, as well. In fact, due
to its divisive nature, sectarian-motivated violence poses the greatest
threat to the long-term goals of reconciliation among the Iraqis. While
no violence is acceptable, measuring the level of sectarian violence
helps assess progress toward reconciliation.
Sectarian violence is thus an important subset of total levels of
violence as it is an indicator of the level of civil unrest among the
various sects within Iraq. We therefore scrutinize various indicators
and develop specific methods for accurately measuring the level of
sectarian violence. We use a number of indicators to determine the
levels of violence in Iraq. These include subjective assessments as
well as objective measurements. While total civilian casualties and
daily attacks are part of that set of measurements, those two
indicators alone are not enough to determine if a violent act was
sectarian-motivated. Therefore, our analysis teams review reports in
detail, searching for the signs that suggest sectarianism.
Securing the population from both internal and external threats is
a priority and it is therefore essential to accurately measure trends
in violence. Ultimately, I believe we are best able to do this by
assessing a wide spectrum of violence indicators, including, as I noted
earlier, total civilian deaths and average daily attacks. The nature of
the conflict in Iraq is exceedingly complex and we use a variety of
tools to measure it.
weapons caches
32. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus, in your slides that you
provided with your opening remarks at the hearing, you provided a slide
on the numbers of weapons caches found. What percentage of the weapons
caches found are weapons from: 1) Saddam Hussein's military forces; 2)
U.S. military weapons; 3) Iranian weapons; 4) Syrian Weapons; and 5)
weapons from other nations?
General Petraeus. While we attempt to collect as much information
as we can to gain greater situational awareness, to include forensic
data that is then shared with and analyzed by other governmental
agencies such as the FBI, it is very difficult to assess the sources of
weapons we have found in caches. Most of the weapons we are finding in
theater are made from a variety of different countries. Due to the
commonality of the type of weapons and the variety of different methods
of entrance into Iraq, we cannot accurately track sources of origin.
Further, the condition of the weapons caches we are finding vary
greatly, from some that have been secured for long periods of time and
lack markings to some that have just been recently emplaced. These
factors make it extremely difficult and often nearly impossible to
assess the weapons' sources.
u.n. resolution 1723
33. Senator Akaka. Ambassador Crocker, United Nations (U.N.)
Resolution 1723, the mandate under which coalition troops currently
operate in Iraq, expires in December 2007, and would, therefore,
require renewal to support continued coalition operations in Iraq. Have
any efforts been made by the Iraqi Parliament to block the renewal of
U.N. Resolution 1723?
Ambassador Crocker. No efforts have been made by the Iraqi
Parliament to block the renewal of U.N. Resolution 1723. We are
currently working with the Government of Iraq, coalition members, and
members of the United Nations Security Council to renew UNSCR 1723. We
have received assurances from the Government of Iraq that it supports
this effort.
34. Senator Akaka. Ambassador Crocker, if so, what actions were
taken by the Parliament, what further actions do they have planned, and
what is the intent and current status of their efforts?
Ambassador Crocker. See answer to question 33.
maliki government
35. Senator Akaka. Ambassador Crocker, on August 22, 2007, Time.com
reported that Nouri al-Maliki's government was teetering on the verge
of collapse, and that ``Baghdad's Green Zone is humming with political
maneuverings by Iraqi politicians who want his job.'' The next day,
CNN.com's Political Ticker reported that former Iraqi Prime Minister
Ayad Allawi had hired a Washington, DC, lobbying firm to begin a public
campaign to undermine the Maliki government and replace him with
Allawi. In your opinion, how likely is the Maliki government to
survive?
Ambassador Crocker. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki continues to
enjoy the support of his party and its coalition partners. Al-Maliki
demonstrated his political tact through his success in achieving
agreement on the principles of reconciliation contained in the August
26 communique by top Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish leaders. He enhanced his
international support at the U.N. General Assembly in September and he
will be attending the Expanded Neighbors Conference in Istanbul on
November 2-3. The United States is fully committed to continuing its
work with Prime Minister al-Maliki to sustain a united, Federal, and
democratic government in Iraq.
36. Senator Akaka. Ambassador Crocker, if the government were to
fall and new elections held, how long would that set back negotiations
for political reconciliation?
Ambassador Crocker. It is impossible to determine what the exact
impact on political reconciliation would be should the current
governing coalitions in Iraq fall and new elections be held. As I
stated in a previous response, Nouri al-Maliki continues to enjoy the
support of his party and its coalition partners. Al-Maliki demonstrated
his political tact through his success in achieving agreement on the
principles of reconciliation contained in the August 26 communique by
top Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish leaders. He enhanced his international
support at the U.N. General Assembly in September, and he will be
attending the Expanded Neighbors Conference in Istanbul on November 2-
3. The United States is fully committed to continuing its work with
Prime Minister al-Maliki to sustain a united, Federal, and democratic
government in Iraq.
37. Senator Akaka. Ambassador Crocker, in your opinion, is Ayad
Allawi actively working to undermine the Maliki government, and
hindering the Prime Minister's efforts to achieve political
reconciliation?
Ambassador Crocker. Competition among politicians and among
political parties is part and parcel of democracy. Iraq's democratic,
Federal governance system has, for the first time, allowed for
competing political parties to publicly express different political
views without fear of government retribution. Individual leaders,
including Allawi, establish positions and pursue platforms which they
believe will attract political support. Rather than seeing that
competition of ideas as a challenge to reconciliation, I see it as an
indispensable part of the political process, and one that helps ensure
that the Iraqi people's desire for reconciliation will be fulfilled.
state-owned businesses
38. Senator Akaka. Ambassador Crocker, in the last 4 years the
United States has obligated nearly $370 billion to Iraq--as the GAO
points out. We have been pouring money into state-owned plants which do
not seem to be able to generate much business. It has been suggested
that rather than trying to prop up state-owned businesses, the Bush
administration should switch to supporting the private sector and
letting the markets take over. What is your assessment of this idea?
Ambassador Crocker. Supporting private sector development is a key
goal of our economic policy in Iraq. A dynamic and varied private
sector will provide the source of long-term economic growth that
generates employment and spurs innovation. To this end, the Embassy in
Baghdad has been working for 3 years with the Iraqi Government on a
range of initiatives to improve the business climate and facilitate the
creation of Iraqi firms. This includes helping to streamline the
business registration process, passing a landmark investment law, and
creating a one-stop investment promotion center. The Embassy has also
focused on helping Iraq improve laws and regulations to improve
specific sectors that are key to private enterprise, such as
telecommunications.
In support of an emerging Iraqi private sector, USAID's micro-
credit program has also been very successful in helping thousands of
businesses start up. More than 55,000 loans have been issued over the
past 3 years. USAID has also offered vocational education programs and
business education initiatives.
At the same time, DOD's Task Force to Improve Business and
Stability Operations in Iraq, led by Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
Paul Brinkley, is working to revitalize certain state owned enterprises
(SOEs), with the aim of increasing employment, kick-starting economic
activity (including in related private companies) and attracting
private investment in those SOEs, leading to their eventual
privatization.
We are working with DOD to fully integrate this initiative into our
broader engagement with the Iraqi Government to promote the kinds of
reforms Iraq will need to develop its economy. This initiative was
conceived to play a part in creating short-term gains to improve the
prospects for job creation and broader Iraqi economic growth. This
should come within the context of an overall focus on promoting private
sector development and supporting free-market enterprise.
insurgency in iraq
39. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, Admiral
Fallon, in his testimony before this committee on May 3, 2007, stated
that ``Insurgent groups in Iraq have multiple and often competing
motivations for perpetuating violence. However, a common thread is
their opposition to U.S. and coalition presence and refusal to accept
the legitimacy of an inclusive, representative government.'' Do you
agree with Admiral Fallon's point?
General Petraeus. First, I agree with Admiral Fallon that insurgent
groups, terrorists, militias, and criminals have multiple and often
competing motivations for perpetuating violence. There are a wide range
of individual motivations and group dynamics that justify violent acts.
Some of the motivations include anger, sense of disrespect and loss,
fear of Iranian influence, fear of a Baathist return, anti-Western
xenophobia, religious extremism, concern for the future, and the need
to protect and provide for a family. A recent survey of detainees
showed that the majority were drawn to the insurgency for economic
reasons. On a larger scale, the violence we see today is driven by a
complex mixture of destabilizing forces that include insurgency and
terrorism; communal power struggles; and regional interference and
foreign-fueled proxy war, all compounded by weak and divided
institutions. That said, the conflict remains predominantly a
reflection of a communal struggle for power and survival, with elements
of both inter- and intra-sectarian violence, as well as al Qaeda-
sponsored terrorism.
A major driver for violence in Iraq for the Sunni Arab-based
insurgency had been the rejection of what the Sunnis perceived as the
disproportionate empowerment of the Shiite and Kurdish communities that
occurred as a result of coalition force operations. For many
insurgents, the coalition presence was a primary target because
coalition forces enabled major societal and political changes at their
expense. However, over the past several months, many Sunni Arab
political, tribal, and religious leaders, as well some of the insurgent
groups, have demonstrated increased pragmatism and willingness to
assist in the suppression of violence, to work with the coalition force
and Iraqi security forces to defeat al Qaeda, and to help secure their
neighborhoods with Local Citizens Groups.
In contrast to the spring of 2006, I would say that more and more
Sunni Arabs, including insurgents and former insurgents, increasingly
understand the value of our presence. In point of fact, the Sunni Arab
Awakening movement has expanded well beyond al Anbar province,
reflecting an increased willingness to work within the parameters of
the current political process. Many have now reconciled themselves to
the idea that the future of Iraq will be determined by political
efforts rather than at the handle of a gun and what they really want is
a seat at the table in Baghdad. It will take some strong confidence
building measures to get many of the Shiite--who don't know they have
``won'' to get over the years of Sunni suppression. The struggle to
define legitimacy and a representative government is taking place, and
its resolution is required to produce long-term stability in the new
Iraq. The question is whether the competition takes place more--or
less--violently.
Ambassador Crocker. While many insurgents in Iraq oppose the
coalition presence and refuse to accept an inclusive and representative
government, the Iraqi insurgency is dynamic and diverse. As Admiral
Fallon stated, different groups have different motivations for their
actions. Thus, the level of an insurgent's opposition to either the
coalition or the Iraqi government may vary dramatically based on that
individual's cultural, ethnic, political, and religious orientation as
well as his or her interpretation of recent history.
One commonality among insurgent groups in Iraq is the increasing
popular opposition they are facing from Iraqis who have grown weary of
violence. These citizens would rather cooperate with an inclusive,
representative Iraqi government and coalition force than suffer
continued violence and economic privation.
40. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, it is
entirely possible that our presence in the region is fuel to the fire,
and that the resistance to the government is because it is seen as an
extension of the American occupation force. Has anybody seriously
researched the underlying cause for opposition to our presence?
General Petraeus. There is undoubtedly an element of resistance to
perceived occupation that adds ``fuel to the fire,'' particularly given
Iraqi xenophobia, but overall I believe we are more of a stabilizing
force than an irritant, as seen by the decrease in sectarian violence
as additional coalition forces were brought into the country. I believe
the resistance to the government stems more from internal Iraqi
politics in that groups representing the diversity of the Iraqi
populace are for the first time fairly competing for political power.
Iraq is the one of the most complex and challenging situations we
have ever faced as a nation, and perhaps one of the most thoroughly
examined. In 2007, there were two in-depth NIEs, not to mention other
government agency reports, academic and think tank studies, and, of
course, our partnership with the Iraqis, all providing valuable
insights into the motivations of groups opposing the Government of
Iraq.
Ambassador Crocker. For some insurgent groups U.S. presence is an
underlying reason for resistance to the Government of Iraq. Some view
Iraqi security forces as extensions of the coalition forces that are
helping to train and equip them. Others, like al Qaeda, are against any
governmental system not based strictly on what they assert is the only
true understanding of Islamic law. These extremists are violently
opposed to the governments of most Muslim nations, regardless of
outside influences. Still others simply wish to take control of power
and resources for their own profit, seeking to subvert any force that
would block their access.
Among the studies devoted to this topic, the bipartisan Iraq Study
Group, led by James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton, made some
relevant observations. According to their research, ``Sectarian
violence causes the largest number of Iraqi civilian casualties.'' They
note that, far from calling for quick withdrawal of forces, many Iraqis
see the coalition presence as a crucial buffer against opposing sects--
for Sunni leaders, a buffer against Shiite militias and, for Shiite
leaders, a buffer against al Qaeda and former regime elements. For that
reason, the study warned that any premature withdrawal of coalition
forces would likely lead to much higher levels of violence.
41. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, has
anyone spoken with leaders from the warring factions/insurgent groups
to determine whether or not the removal of most of our troops might
actually cool things down and facilitate acceptance of the government?
General Petraeus. MNF-I has engaged in dialogue with warring
factions and insurgent groups. On issues of potential security
accommodations, we insist that no expedient agreement can be made that
undermines the sovereign Government of Iraq. Over time, as sufficient
Iraqi security forces are trained and equipped, they will increasingly
allow us to thin our forces, which could potentially be used in
bargaining with some warring factions/insurgent groups. It is our
understanding, however, that many of these groups would fully support
the removal of most of our troops in order to increase their relative
power, which would not necessarily translate into support of the
government.
On a broader scale, we recognize that in many cases Iraqi public
opinion favors the removal of coalition forces when the question is
broadly asked. More nuanced polling elicits responses that indicate a
hesitance to have coalition force leave before reaching a sustainable
level of security and stability. Additionally, the coalition is seen as
a fair arbiter in facilitating the reconciliation process, regardless
of Iraqi opinion of coalition presence.
Ambassador Crocker. Coalition forces are serving in Iraq under a
U.N. mandate and at the invitation of the democratically elected
Government of Iraq. Accordingly, while the United States puts a
priority on understanding the motivations and operations of the warring
factions/insurgent groups, the United States consults first and
foremost with the Iraqi government about policy regarding the
withdrawal of forces or overall troop levels in Iraq. We have, however,
engaged select insurgent groups, most notably in Anbar province, with
positive results. Ultimately, it would be a mistake to assume there is
a direct relationship between the level of coalition forces and the
level of violence. For example, in some areas where there is a
declining coalition presence, we have seen an increase in the level of
violence among various militia groups as well as criminal gangs.
Violence in Iraq and the motivations behind it are varied and dynamic.
42. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, the
goal of this research would be to identify what is the underlying
objection to our presence, which would provide us with the information
we need to develop a successful strategy for resolution. If a study of
this nature has been conducted, how was the research done, and what
were the results? If not, why have we not studied this possibility?
General Petraeus. As described above, we recognize that our
presence is not an ``either-or'' proposition: we will be an irritant at
the same time we are a stabilizer. We conduct all of our engagements
with the Government of Iraq and Iraqi citizens with this understanding.
Our own analysis of this problem is buttressed by other governmental
and nongovernmental agencies that use differing methodologies for their
research on Iraq. Through these broad approaches, we attempt to gain a
nuanced understanding of the motives and objectives of the large number
of diverse groups with whom we deal.
Ambassador Crocker. As I noted to your earlier question on the
subject, Iraqi insurgent groups are dynamic and diverse, as are their
reasons for opposing U.S. presence or the Government of Iraq, and it
would be a mistake to assume that there is a direct relationship
between the level of coalition forces and the level of violence. The
level of an insurgent's opposition to either the coalition or the Iraqi
Government may vary dramatically based on that individual's cultural,
ethnic, political, and religious orientation as well as his or her
interpretation of recent history. Among others, the bipartisan Iraq
Study Group, led by James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton, examined
the underlying objection to U.S. presence in Iraq. It noted that many
Iraqis see the coalition presence as a crucial buffer against opposing
sects--for Sunni leaders, a buffer against Shiite militias and, for
Shiite leaders, a buffer against al Qaeda and former regime elements.
This is critical because sectarian-based violence is one of the key
sources of violence in Iraq. For that reason, the study warned that any
premature withdrawal of coalition forces would likely lead to much
higher levels of violence.
43. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, should
we not be assessing all of our options to determine the best course of
action?
General Petraeus. MNF-I's planning efforts do examine all plausible
options to develop the best courses of action. As we refine our plans,
we take into account realities on the ground, such as the recent
outburst of Concerned Local Citizens across Iraq, and endeavor to put
into place solutions that are feasible in execution and sustainable by
Iraqis over time. We continually assess our progress, options, and
possible outcomes. Our in-depth assessment process uses resources that
include think tanks, Red Teams, panels, experts, and staff from all
sectors of society and government.
Ambassador Crocker. U.S. diplomatic and military officials
continually examine all policy options to ensure the best course of
action to go forward in Iraq. This examination is done in consultation
with the Government of Iraq and other coalition partners and focuses on
options that protect and advance U.S. interests and the U.N. Chapter
VII mandate to maintain security and stability in Iraq.
[Whereupon, at 7:35 p.m., the committee adjourned.]