[Senate Hearing 110-231]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-231
THE FINDINGS OF THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT
COMMISSION
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 6, 2007
__________
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN WARNER, Virginia,
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York JOHN CORNYN, Texas
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
JIM WEBB, Virginia MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri BOB CORKER, Tennessee
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Michael V. Kostiw, Replublican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
The Findings of the Iraqi Security Forces Independent Assessment
Commission
september 6, 2007
Page
Jones, Gen. James L., USMC (Ret.) Chairman, Independent
Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq; Accompanied by
Commissioners GEN John N. Abrams, USA (Ret.); Lt. Gen. Martin
R. Berndt, USMC (Ret.); Gen. Charles G. Boyd, USAF (Ret.); Sgt.
Maj. Dwight J. Brown, USA (Ret.); Hon. Terrance Gainer; Hon.
John J. Hamre; Col. Michael Heidingsfield, USAF (Ret.); ADM
Gregory G. Johnson, USN (Ret.); GEN George A. Joulwan, USA
(Ret.); LTG James C. King, USA (Ret.); Asst. Chief Constable
Duncan McCausland; Lt. Gen. Gary S. McKissock, USMC (Ret.);
Sgt. Maj. Alford L. McMichael, USMC (Ret.); Maj. Gen. Arnold L.
Punaro, USMC (Ret.); and Chief Charles H. Ramsey............... 5
Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of
Iraq........................................................... 66
(iii)
THE FINDINGS OF THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT
COMMISSION
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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m. in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy, Byrd,
Lieberman, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh,
Clinton, Webb, McCaskill, McCain, Warner, Inhofe, Sessions,
Collins, Chambliss, Graham, Dole, Cornyn, Thune, Martinez, and
Corker.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr.,
professional staff member; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff
member; Michael J. McCord, professional staff member; William
G.P. Monahan, counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional staff
member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; Derek J. Maurer, minority counsel; Christopher J.
Paul, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional
staff member; and Dana W. White, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Jessica L.
Kingston, and Benjamin L. Rubin.
Committee members' assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman and
Jay Maroney, assistants to Senator Kennedy; David E. Bonine and
James Tuite, assistants to Senator Byrd; Colleen J. Shogan,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to
Senator Reed; Richard Kessler, assistant to Senator Akaka;
Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew R.
Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey,
assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator
Clinton; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Stephen
C. Hedger, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Richard H. Fontaine,
Jr., assistant to Senator McCain; Sandra Luff, assistant to
Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski and Nathan Reese,
assistants to Senator Inhofe; Todd Stiefler, assistant to
Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator Collins;
Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; and David
Hanke and Russell J. Thomasson, assistants to Senator Cornyn.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. Today we welcome
General Jim Jones and the other members of the Commission on
the Security Forces of Iraq. We thank them for their extremely
important work that they have done for our country.
Service to country is nothing new to these commissioners.
They have all served with great distinction in military or
police capacities in their earlier careers. We very much
appreciate the willingness of the members of this Commission to
risk life and limb during three separate visits of relatively
long duration in a dangerous Iraq to acquire the insights and
to make the important findings and recommendations contained in
this report.
This Commission was established by congressional
legislation which was authored by Senator Warner, who also
consulted frequently with the Commission to ensure that no
roadblocks were hindering the completion of their important
work in time to inform the upcoming critical debates on Iraq
policy.
The Commission was tasked to assess the readiness of the
Iraqi security forces (ISF) to maintain the territorial
integrity of Iraq, to deny safe haven to international
terrorists, to bring greater security to Iraq's provinces in
the next 12 to 18 months, to end sectarian violence, and to
achieve national reconciliation. On that last point, I would
note that the Commission found that the ``Iraqi army and police
services have the potential to help reduce sectarian violence,
but, ultimately, the ISFs will reflect the society from which
they are drawn. Political reconciliation, the Commission found,
is the key to ending sectarian violence in Iraq.''
The Commission also assessed ``the single most important
event that could immediately and favorably affect Iraq's
direction and security is political reconciliation focused on
ending sectarian violence and hatred. Sustained progress within
the ISFs depends on such a political agreement.''
The Commission was further tasked to evaluate the capacity
of the ISFs in key functional areas and to what extent
continued U.S. support is needed by the ISFs. The Commission's
major findings are not surprising to those of us who also visit
Iraq frequently. They're consistent with what we found on our
last trip there, just last month. The Iraqi army is making
progress and is increasingly capable of planning, executing,
and sustaining counterinsurgency operations, either
independently or with coalition support. What is needed to
achieve more independent operations, the Commission finds,
include the ``key enablers of combat support, particularly
aviation, intelligence, communications, and combat service
support, particularly logistics and maintenance functions. For
those, the Iraqi army will continue to depend on coalition
support.''
The Ministry of the Interior and the police, on the other
hand, are, in the Commission's words: ``dysfunctional, and
require a major overhaul.'' They are the creation and tools of
sectarian Iraqi politicians. The question is, of course, how to
convince the Iraqi government to take the necessary steps to
carry out the overhaul.
The Commission believes, and has found, that ``The Iraqi
army is capable of taking over an increasing amount of day-to-
day combat responsibilities from coalition forces, but that the
ISF will be unable to fulfill their essential security
responsibilities independently over the next 12 to 18 months.''
The key word is ``independently.'' However, the Commission also
believes that the coalition forces could begin to be adjusted,
realigned, and retasked as the Iraqi army is able to take on
more responsibility for daily combat operations.
Now, according to the statistics that we have from the
administration's quarterly report to Congress, well over half
of the Iraqi army and police battalions can operate at least in
the lead with coalition support. It's my observation that far
fewer than that number are actually now in the lead. That
raises the question, which I hope the Commission will address,
as to why more Iraqi units should not be given the lead
responsibility that they are capable of now, and why the
adjustment, realignment, and retasking of coalition forces,
which the Commission calls for, should not begin promptly.
One of the most significant Commission statements is the
following, that ``perceptions and reality are frequently at
odds with each other when trying to understand Iraq's problems
and progress.'' Nowhere is this more apparent than in the
impressions drawn from seeing our massive logistics footprint,
our many installations, and the number of personnel, military
and civilian, especially in and around the Baghdad area. ``The
unintended message,'' the Commission writes, ``that's conveyed
is one of permanence, an occupying force, as it were. What is
needed is the opposite impression, one that is lighter, less
massive, and more expeditionary, significant reductions,
consolidations, and realignments would appear to be possible
and prudent.''
So, the key issue that we're all going to be facing is what
reductions in U.S. forces will be the result of the adjustment,
realignment, and retasking of coalition forces which the
Commission calls for.
During our recent visit, one U.S. soldier, who is on his
third deployment to Iraq, told us that the Iraqis will let U.S.
soldiers do the job that they're supposed to be doing forever,
and that we need to let them do it on their own.
It is, indeed, long overdue that we cut the cords of
dependence, push the Iraqis to take more responsibility and
ownership by giving them the lead in counterinsurgency
operations. I believe that is the thrust of the Commission's
recommendations.
Again, I thank the commissioners for their service to our
Nation, for appearing at this hearing today.
Senator Warner will have an opening statement. I, again,
want to thank him for the leadership which he has taken in
putting the language in our law which created this Commission.
At the end of Senator Warner's statement, we'll turn to
General Jones, and then we will have a 6-minute round, because
votes are going to begin at 11:05. We expect up to five votes,
and we're going to have to keep our hearing going during those
votes, as best we can. I'll explain how I think we can best do
that, after General Jones's statement.
Senator Warner.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and
Senator McCain for scheduling this prompt hearing on this very
important contribution to the dialogue and the gathering of a
factual base for the benefit of the President and for the
benefit of Congress, and, most importantly, for the benefit of
the American people. Senator McCain will be here momentarily to
make an opening statement.
But I want to say, right off, my gratitude to Senator Byrd
for joining me in getting this particular piece of legislation,
together with the other framework legislation requiring the
report in July by the President, the report this month by the
President, and to have the appearances of General Petraeus and
Ambassador Crocker. So, I thank you, Senator Byrd.
The reason that we came up with this legislation is that
the foundation of all U.S. policies with regard to Iraq is
predicated on the ability of this sovereign nation to muster
the forces to train and inspire those forces to take over the
security of this fledgling sovereign nation. I felt that,
through the years, this committee, and other committees of
Congress, had interrogated the Department of Defense (DOD) and
other administration witnesses, time and time again, with
regard to the status of the professional ability and the
projections of the security force of Iraq. I'm not here to
criticize those representations, but I felt it was important to
have a totally independent analysis performed by individuals
whose experience, collectively and individually, could bring to
bear this report.
General Jones, I commend you--John Hamre, former Deputy
Secretary of Defense, General Joulwan, former North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) Commander, and Chief Ramsey, whom
I've known through the years--for doing this work and leading
the other gentlemen, who are behind you here today, in this
very important contribution.
On January 10, the President initiated, with a clear
speech, the surge concept. When Senator Levin and I were in
Iraq 2 weeks ago, we saw clear evidence that that the surge had
achieved its goals in some phases, were measurable goals. But,
at the same time, the President laid down in the speech, with
clarity, that it was incumbent upon the Iraqi government to do
the reconciliation, and that, the record shows today, has not
come about.
You have drawn attention to the fact that military forces
have done their role, but, if reconciliation were to take
place, it would bring about a cessation of the hostilities, the
mixture of hostilities--perhaps not al Qaeda, but the mixture
of hostilities between, particularly, the Sunni and the Shia,
that would be equivalent to several brigades of coalition
forces performing their military duties. It's that important,
reconciliation.
So, I thank you very much for your work. It will be studied
carefully by Congress, and, most importantly, the American
people, and I hope it will contribute to the President's
analysis of where we go in the months to come.
I'd like to yield a minute or 2 of my time to Senator Byrd,
if that's alright, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. If there's no objection, we would be happy
to do that. I want to add my thanks to Senator Byrd. I failed
to mention that the language, which created this Commission,
was not just Senator Warner's language, but was the language
that Senator Warner and Senator Byrd, together, worked on. We
add our thanks to Senator Byrd.
Senator Byrd, could you give a few moments of your
thoughts?
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Senator Levin.
I thank my good friend and colleague, that venerable John
Warner, a great Virginian, for his leadership on this issue. It
has been my honor and my privilege to work together with this
man--he is a great man--many, many times over the years, always
with the goal of doing what is best for the country, first and
foremost. It was in that spirit that my friend approached me
about establishing an independent commission to assess Iraq's
security forces. I was proud to join him as a cosponsor of the
amendment to do so.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much.
Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chairman? Could I just make one
comment? Not a statement, but--I will not be able to stay here,
because I am the ranking member of the Environment and Public
Works Committee, and we have a very critical meeting, but I
just want to echo the remarks of Senator Warner, and,
particularly, General Jones, how much I enjoyed being with you
on your last mission there before your retirement. I have to
say this, on my 15th trip, last week, to the area of
responsibility, I just get so excited about good things that
are happening. The surge is having very positive results, and
thank you for all your service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. General Jones?
STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES L. JONES, USMC (RET.) CHAIRMAN,
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE SECURITY FORCES OF IRAQ;
ACCOMPANIED BY COMMISSIONERS GEN JOHN N. ABRAMS, USA (RET.);
LT. GEN. MARTIN R. BERNDT, USMC (RET.); GEN. CHARLES G. BOYD,
USAF (RET.); SGT. MAJ. DWIGHT J. BROWN, USA (RET.); HON.
TERRANCE GAINER; HON. JOHN J. HAMRE; COL. MICHAEL
HEIDINGSFIELD, USAF (RET.); ADM GREGORY G. JOHNSON, USN (RET.);
GEN GEORGE A. JOULWAN, USA (RET.); LTG JAMES C. KING, USA
(RET.); ASST. CHIEF CONSTABLE DUNCAN McCAUSLAND; LT. GEN. GARY
S. McKISSOCK, USMC (RET.); SGT. MAJ. ALFORD L. McMICHAEL, USMC
(RET.); MAJ. GEN. ARNOLD L. PUNARO, USMC (RET.); AND CHIEF
CHARLES H. RAMSEY
General Jones. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, members of the
committee, it's a great honor to be here today, and we all
thank you for the opportunity to address you this morning about
the work of our Commission over the past few months, and to
have a discussion on our assessment.
On behalf of the Commission, I would also like to thank
Senator Warner and Senator Byrd for their vision and their work
to bring about the legislation that enabled this Commission to
come together. It has been a wonderful experience to work with
a great group of professionals, and we're honored to be here
today to share our impressions with you.
Before I begin this morning, I'd like to take a minute to
introduce my fellow commissioners to you. To carry out our
mandate from Congress, we assembled a very highly-qualified
team of 20 prominent senior retired military officers, chiefs
of police, and a former Deputy Secretary of Defense, and, most
importantly, two sergeants major who formed the balance of our
team. This independent team, supported by the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, brought more than 500
cumulative years of military and defense experience, and 150
years of law enforcement experience in the professional
disciplines that it was chartered to examine.
The Commission consists of ten syndicates which examined
each element of the ISF and the principal crosscutting support
issues. So, it's my pleasure to introduce our Commission to
you.
First, let me introduce the members of our Army and Ground
Forces Syndicate: General George Joulwan, United States Army
(Retired), syndicate chair and, joining me at the witness
table; General John Abrams, United States Army (Retired);
General Charles Wilhelm, United States Marine Corps (Retired),
who is not able to be here today, unfortunately; Lieutenant
General John Van Alstyne, United States Army (Retired), also
unable to be here today; former Sergeant Major of the Marine
Corps, Alfred McMichael, United States Marine Corps (Retired);
and Command Sergeant Major Dwight Brown, United States Army
(Retired); Brigadier General Richard Potter, United States Army
(Retired), who examined the Iraqi special forces, and is not
able to be here today. Our Commission also benefited from the
experience of Admiral Gregory Johnson, United States Navy
(Retired), who principally addressed the issues surrounding the
Iraqi navy; General Chuck Boyd, United States Air Force
(Retired), who focused on the Iraqi air force and major
strategic issues.
The Commission benefited from over 150 years of law
enforcement experience, headed by Chief Charles Ramsey, who
joins me at the witness table. Chief Ramsey assembled a
distinguished group of police chiefs: The Honorable Terry
Gainer, who you also know as your Senate Sergeant-at-Arms;
Chief John Timoney, chief of police of the Miami Police
Department, who could not be here today; Chief Michael
Heidensfield, a former contingent commander for the Police
Advisory Mission in Iraq; Assistant Chief Constable Duncan
McCausland, who joined our Commission from Belfast, Northern
Ireland, to complement this extraordinary team of distinguished
law enforcement officials. We also have Lieutenant General
Martin Berndt, United States Marine Corps (Retired), who
focused on the Iraqi border security and the Ministry of the
Interior.
We also had a number of commissioners who examined
crosscutting issues relative to the ISFs: The Honorable Dr.
John Hamre, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, who joins
us at the witness table, focused on resource allocation and
budget issues; Lieutenant General James King, United States
Army (Retired), who focused on intelligence; Major General
Arnold Punaro, United States Marine Corps Reserve (Retired),
who focused on personnel; and Lieutenant General Gary S.
McKissock, United States Marine Corps (Retired), who focused on
logistics.
I'm also grateful and pleased to introduce staff director
Christine Warmuth, from the Center for Strategic and
International Studies. We also had the benefit of a group of
talented strategic advisors: James Locher, P.T. Henry, John
Raidt, Sarah Farnsworth, and Colonel Art White, United States
Marine Corps Reserve.
Ladies and gentlemen of the committee, we were asked to
conduct an independent assessment of the ISFs and to report
back to the appropriate committees no later than 120 days from
the date of enactment. As laid out in our enacting legislation,
our report addresses the readiness of the ISFs in four
principal areas: their ability to assume responsibility for
maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq, their ability to
deny international terrorists safe haven, their ability to
bring greater security to Iraq's 18 provinces within the next
12 to 18 months, and their ability to bring an end to sectarian
violence to achieve national reconciliation.
In addition, the Commission was tasked with an assessment
of ISF capabilities in the areas of training, equipping,
command-and-control, intelligence, and logistics.
Each of the 10 syndicates was led by a senior commissioner
and focused on either a discrete component of the ISFs or a
crosscutting functional area. Syndicate inputs were subject to
review and integration by all Commission members.
During the course of its study, the Commission traveled
widely throughout Iraq, on three separate occasions, spending a
total of 3 weeks on the ground to gather facts and impressions
firsthand.
I will now refer to some charts, and I will also guide you
through where you can find those charts in your individual
reports, just mentioning the pages.
On pages 23 and 24 of your report, figures 1 and 2 will
demonstrate that we made more than 70 site visits in Iraq--as
you can see from the charts--including visits to Iraqi military
and ministerial headquarters in the various command centers,
training facilities, and operating bases. We also visited Iraqi
police stations, joint security stations, and law enforcement
academies, and commissioners traveled to border, port, and
internal security installations, as well as the coalition
facilities designed to assist with Iraqi security training and
transition.
These visits were invaluable, as they allowed us a
firsthand look at the real work being accomplished daily by
members of the ISFs and their dedicated coalition partners.
The Commission met with more than 100 Iraqi officials, more
than 100 U.S. current and former government officials, and more
than a dozen leading nongovernmental experts on the ISFs.
Finally, the Commission examined previous studies and
reports, official data, and documents with any information
relevant to the performance and status of the ISFs.
We examined their rate of progress and their prospects for
fulfilling the responsibilities of a professional and effective
security force.
Before addressing our key findings, I want to emphasize
that the findings and recommendations of this Commission were
unanimous.
I would also like to note that the Commission could not
have performed its work without the generous assistance and
support of many, many individuals. In particular, we're
grateful for the support provided by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Multinational Force-
Iraq, and the entire military chain of command, as well as the
Department of State and Embassy Baghdad. We deeply appreciate
the openness we were shown by many officials in the Government
of Iraq.
Ladies and gentlemen of the committee, the ISFs are
composed of two major components: the Iraqi military and the
Iraqi police. The Commission examined both components and their
governing ministries.
The Iraqi military includes the army, the special forces,
the air force, and the navy, and they operate under the
Ministry of Defense. They number approximately 152,000
personnel today.
The Iraqi police forces includes the Iraqi Police Service,
the National Police, the border forces, the Facilities
Protection Services, and the Coast Guard, and they operate
under the Ministry of the Interior. Their aggregate number is
approximately 324,000 today.
In terms of overall results, the consensus opinion of the
Commission is that the most positive event that can occur in
the near-term to influence progress in Iraq is a government-led
political reconciliation which leads to an end, or a dramatic
reduction, in sectarian violence. Everything seems to flow from
this point, to include the likelihood of a successful
conclusion to our mission. Absent such an event, it will be
more difficult and will take longer to be successful. Our
overall evaluation is that real progress has been achieved,
but, as we will show, it has been uneven across the ISFs.
With regard to the Ministry of Defense, we judge good
progress being made, a strategic vision for the future, an
eagerness to take on more responsibility, thousands of young
Iraqis are now eager to join the armed forces, and are doing
so. We have evidence of a worrisome bureaucracy, from the
standpoint of effectiveness and efficiency, which inhibits the
distribution of equipment and supplies from getting to the
Iraqi front lines. The army is led by four Shia, four Kurdish,
and three Sunni divisions that comprise the Iraqi armed forces.
With regard to the Iraqi army, impressive progress in
ability and willingness to defend against internal threats to
the nation have been noted. Working with police units, where
possible, to bolster their capability shortfalls, they are keen
to take on more missions. This is an army that is now providing
10 operational divisions in the field, going to 13 divisions in
2008.
I refer you to the chart on army growth, on page 57 of your
report, listed as figure 11.
Sectarian problems appear to be minor, as compared to other
institutions that we saw in Iraq. Basic elements necessary to
grow the army appear to be in place, and are functioning. As I
mentioned earlier, there seems to be an unlimited amount of
volunteers to serve in this new army.
An alarming development with regard to the existence of
duplicate chains of command and intelligence-gathering
institutions was noted, and, also was noted, the requirement
for needed improvement in cooperation with other ministries; in
particular, the Ministry of the Interior. This Iraqi army
cannot yet operate independently, due to a continuing lack in
logistics, supply, mobility, and effective national command-
and-control.
While it cannot defend against the external threats to the
nation, particularly along the borders of Syria and Iran, it is
able to do more each day in the defense--along the lines of
internal security.
The special forces of the army of Iraq are judged to be the
most capable and professionally effective military unit in
Iraq, as good as any in the Gulf region. However, they continue
to lack in mobility and support systems, as well.
With regard to the navy and the air force, they are in
their early development. It was judged that they are making
satisfactory progress. The Commission recommends consideration
be given to forming a single maritime force for a nation that
has a 36-mile coastline. Currently, the navy and the coast
guard are formed under two separate ministries.
Turning to the Ministry of the Interior, the Commission
judges this ministry to be very weak, despite recent attempts
to change out senior personnel. Little progress has been made
to date with regard to the efficiencies and effectiveness in
discharging its functions. There is evidence of sectarian
partisanship, indications of corruption and of a failed
bureaucracy, little evidence of willingness to cooperate with
other ministries, and evidence that this ministry is influenced
by forces outside of the governmental structures.
I refer you to a chart on the Ministry of Interior Forces
Growth, on page 87 of our report.
The Iraqi Police Service, which is under the Ministry of
the Interior, numbers approximately 230,000 policemen. The
salaries of police are provided by the government, but they
don't always reach the local and regional levels, which fuels
sectarian tension.
Police by local ethnically representative units works best
for the time being. There is an unlimited manpower pool to
choose from, but, overall, the progress of police forces is
judged to be unsatisfactory.
Regarding the National Police, which numbers approximately
25,000, the Commission has recommended disbanding and
reorganizing of the National Police, which is judged to be
overly sectarian, composed 85 percent of Shia policemen, heavy-
handed in their mission execution, not trusted by people of
other ethnic origins, and there are allegations of corruption
that pervade this force, as well.
The Department of Border Enforcement, 37,000, also part of
the Ministry of the Interior, is judged to be weak, poorly
supported by the parent ministry, and unable to make a serious
contribution against border threats, particularly coming from
Iran and Syria.
Finally, the Facilities Protection Services, which is
composed of 140,000 personnel, also suffers from a lack of
leadership, equipment, training, and direction.
So, the overall conclusions, relative to our tasking, are
as follows:
First is that the ISFs, as a whole, cannot yet defend the
territorial integrity of Iraq. This is not necessarily an
alarming conclusion.
Number two, improvement has been noted in the internal
security missions. For example, in denying safe haven to
terrorists. This improvement is likely to continue in the near
future.
Number three, it is judged that the ISFs can bring greater
security to the provinces in the next 12 to 18 months, assuming
a continuing rate of progress.
Number four, the end of the sectarian violence has to be
initiated by the Government of Iraq in order to be effective.
U.S. and coalition support will be required until independent
operational capability to defend against external threats to
Iraq is achieved. Size and mission of coalition military forces
could be altered in the near future as the Iraqi army and the
police force continue to develop.
Mr. Chairman, I'd like to close with a few additional
observations. In addition to our specific mandate, the
Commission desires to add some interpretive context to the
findings and the capabilities pertaining to the ISFs. Our goal
is to be helpful in trying to arrive at a way ahead that will
enable success in this critical mission.
The strategic consequences of failure along national,
regional, and global lines are significant. Similarly, the
strategic consequences of success are equally impressive.
To reiterate, the Commission's overall assessment of the
ISF is that there has been measurable, though uneven, progress.
I'd like to say a few words about the impact of the surge.
Tactical success for both Iraq and coalition forces in the
Baghdad region has been achieved, and I refer you to page 34 of
the report, which has an illustrative figure.
This tactical success has been accompanied by the sudden
loss of support for al Qaeda by the population and tribal
leaders throughout al Anbar province. This has had the result
of gaining approximately 35,000 to 40,000 fighters in support
of the coalition, as opposed to fighting the coalition. I refer
you to page 29 of your report, to look firsthand at some of the
dramatic results that have been achieved in Anbar province.
The sudden rise in the capacity of day-to-day fighting of
the Iraqi army also contributes to a favorable and confidence-
building phenomenon.
You can also witness, by the contribution of the Iraqi
army, unfortunately, a dramatic increase in the ISF casualties.
If you would turn to page 38, you will see a chart that depicts
both the coalition and ISF casualties as a result of the
fighting.
We have achieved limited, but important, police success in
local ethnic neighborhoods, especially in Anbar province. The
positive trends we saw signaled a possibility of a strategic
shift for coalition forces, perhaps commencing in 2008.
Operational attention should be increasingly focused, and is
increasingly required on the defense of the border regions and
on the critical infrastructures of Iraq. The gradual shift of
coalition to strategic overwatch positions, accompanied by
force adjustments, is possible to envision. This is a very
recent development.
The gradual transfer of combat operations against internal
threats to the ISF is possible. Attention is needed to offset
major destabilization efforts of Iran and Syria, which are
ongoing and very worrisome.
The Commission also believes that it's possible to adjust
the image of the coalition as an occupying force in Iraq to
accompany a strategic shift of forces and mission set. This is
an important element in our strategic messaging, both to our
people and to the people of Iraq and the world at large. The
force footprint should be adjusted, in our view, to represent
an expeditionary capability and to combat the permanent-force
image of today's presence. This will make an ultimate
departure--an eventual departure much easier.
It's important to establish an Iraqi coalition transition
headquarters, which would be the single focal point for all
transition efforts, in the broad sense, military, political,
economic, legal and this would show visible and consistent
progress towards transition, which is a crucial message that
people need to understand.
The Commission also recommends that all of Iraq's provinces
should be transferred to Iraqi control, as a matter of policy.
The provincial Iraqi control system, as currently explained, is
that one-size-fits-all, which does not work, in our judgment,
adequately. Full transfer of authority of all 18 provinces
would bolster the Government of Iraq's political reach. I refer
you to page 40 of the report.
Seven provinces have been transferred to Iraqi control, and
there is a projection for others, as well. But the logic of
such a system was not convincing to the Commission, and we
believe that political control of the provinces should be
transferred to the sovereign government, supplementing the
transfer, of course, with mentoring and assistance to enable
success.
To further modify our image as occupiers, the Commission
recommends that consideration be given to enacting the Status
of Forces Agreement as a visible means of reinforcing the
sovereignty of Iraq. This would be consistent with the
agreements that we have with many other nations, and all of our
bases should fly both the U.S. and the Iraqi flags.
Lastly, the Commission noted a internal problem that only
the United States can fix, and that has to do with regard to
our national capacity to generate equipment in a rapid
timeframe identified by U.S. commanders through the Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) Program. This is a problem that requires
some urgent attention. It will, when fixed, measurably
contribute to increasing the readiness and capabilities of the
ISFs.
Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, ladies and gentlemen of the
committee, my colleagues and I are ready to respond to any
questions you might have with regard to our study.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Again, thank you, General and your
colleagues, for your tremendous service to the Nation.
General, I'm going to ask you a series of questions to try
to pinpoint some of the points that you've made in your report.
There are four categories of capabilities by which we
assess the ISFs, is that correct?
General Jones. That's correct.
Chairman Levin. Category one is an Iraqi unit capable of
independent operations. Would that be correct?
General Jones. That's correct.
Chairman Levin. Category two would be a unit which is
capable of being in the lead with coalition support. Is that
correct?
General Jones. Correct.
Chairman Levin. Now, the goal is to get more of the Iraqi
units up to category one or two, is that correct?
General Jones. That's correct.
Chairman Levin. Now, there's few of the Iraqi units at
level one, where they can operate independently, but, according
to the chart that we got from the DOD, the majority of Iraqi
units are already at level two. The figure we had is 89 of 159.
Is that your understanding?
General Jones. I accept that.
Chairman Levin. All right. So that if the majority of the
Iraqi units can already operate at either a one or a two level,
does that not mean that we could transition the lead to Iraqi
units as soon as those units are capable of being in the lead?
General Jones. Senator, if you don't mind, I will ask
General Joulwan to augment my answer, because this is his
specialty. But I think a general answer to your question would
be yes, that we found evidence that Iraqi units are planning
their own missions and executing their own missions, in close
coordination with the coalition. We found that the presence of
advisors and highly qualified teams of coalition members who
are embedded with the units is absolutely the link that makes
it possible. Of course, I come back on the fact that, even at
level two, units of the Iraqi army need considerable combat
support, combat service support, as you pointed out.
Chairmen Levin. Is it your understanding--and, General, you
can just add a quick yes or no--that the majority of the Iraqi
units that are capable of being in the lead is not reflected by
all of those units being in the lead? There are some of those
units that are a category two that are not yet in the lead. Is
that a fair statement? Is that your understanding?
General Joulwan. I would say so, yes.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Now, why is that? General, you were
telling me, in the office, that the Australians, for instance,
had moved much more quickly to put those units of the Iraqis
that are capable of being in the lead, in the lead, with the
Australians being much more in a support role. Why have we not
followed that model?
General Jones. I think the short answer would be that it's
situationally dependent. The criteria that exists in the
province in the north would be completely different than the
province in the south, and I think that metric has to be
applied carefully and as evenly as possible. But without--
again, trying to find a template that you can impose on the
Iraqi army, and then simply walk away from it, is not a good
policy.
Chairman Levin. Right.
General Jones. So, I think you have to be evenhanded, and
you have to do it wherever you can. But the fact that it is
going on is encouraging.
Chairman Levin. Is it not also your recommendation, on page
44, that Iraqi armed forces, ``are capable of assuming greater
responsibility for the internal security of Iraq?''
General Jones. That's correct.
Chairman Levin. Should that not happen as quickly as
possible?
General Jones. Yes, within reasonable prudence, we agree
with that.
Chairman Levin. All right. Now, when this happens, is a
reduction of U.S. forces likely to result as the Iraqis--and
should it result, as the Iraqis assume greater responsibility?
General Jones. I think, of course, that will be the
judgment of military commanders on the ground as they assess
the totality of their mission. I would simply say that what's
encouraging is that the combination of the police units and the
Iraqi army, working together, can take on more responsibility
for the internal threats, but the borders of Iraq, particularly
the Syrian border, the Iranian border, remain very worrisome.
So, what we believe is possible is some retasking, realignment,
readjustment. Adjustment of forces can imply a reduction. But
that would have to be studied as to how exactly to do that.
Chairman Levin. On page 130, your Commission finds--and
you're referring here, as I understand it, to the number of
personnel, military and civilian, as well as to the number of
installations and the logistics. You say that, ``Significant
reductions, consolidations, and realignments would appear to be
possible and prudent.'' Is that your finding?
General Jones. That's correct.
Chairman Levin. That's referring to all of the previous
itemized items, which are logistics footprints, the number of
installations, and the number of personnel, military and
civilian?
General Jones. Correct.
Chairman Levin. So, that is, in your judgment, possible and
prudent?
General Jones. Correct.
Chairman Levin. You made reference to this quote in your
opening statement: ``political reconciliation is the key to
ending sectarian violence.''
General Jones. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Is that a consensus finding on the part of
all the commissioners?
General Jones. It is, sir.
Chairman Levin. Did you make any findings as to why that
political reconciliation has not been achieved by the Iraqi
leaders?
General Jones. No, sir.
Chairman Levin. Was that within your purview?
General Jones. It was a little bit outside of our purview,
just the observed fact that it was not taking place was what we
concluded.
Chairman Levin. My time is up.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to thank
the members of this Commission. I don't think we've ever had a
more outstanding group of people who have served our country
with courage and dedication, such as the members of this
Commission, and I'm grateful for their willingness to again
serve and provide not only this committee and Congress, but the
Nation, with their measured and experienced judgment. I
especially want to thank you, General Jones.
I was especially taken by your concluding thoughts where
you say, ``While much remains to be done before success can be
confidently declared, the strategic consequences of failure, or
even perceived failure, for the United States and the coalition
are enormous.'' I think that's a very important conclusion. I
believe that if we set a date for withdrawal, as we have
debated on the floor of the Senate, and will probably again, we
would do exactly that. Do you believe that, if we set a
timeframe for withdrawal, that that would be in the United
States' interest in the region?
General Jones. Senator, I'll speak for myself on this, but
I think deadlines can work against us. I think a deadline of
this magnitude would be against our national interest.
Senator McCain. I thank you. In your statement delivered to
the committee, you keep pointing out that we have seen
significant recent success. Is that an accurate depiction of
some of your comments?
General Jones. Correct.
Senator McCain. How do you account for that?
General Jones. I think a number of things. I'll just cite
three, to be very brief. One is the statistical success of the
tactic employed, called the ``surge,'' which has had some
impressive successes in the Baghdad region. Number two is the
recent improvement over the last year, just in the last year,
of the capability of the Iraqi army, which has shown itself to
be willing to fight, not only by virtue of the number of
missions it's taken on, but also by the number of casualties
it's suffered. Number three is, in the fight against al Qaeda,
and particularly in the Anbar province, which is a province
that is one-third the size of the entire country--a very, very
encouraging turnaround, where----
Senator McCain. So, part of this success is directly
related to the new tactic or strategy commonly known as the
``surge,'' is that correct?
General Jones. I think the surge is a part of it. I think I
would also ascribe the success that the coalition has had in
training the Iraqi army and also the reversal of al Qaeda,
because of their savagery against the people of the province.
Senator McCain. If we went back, by mandating withdrawals
and reducing our military presence too rapidly, some of the
benefits of the tactic of the surge might be negated
General Jones. I think you have to adjust your force levels
very carefully, make sure that you don't create the conditions
that would have that happen, that's correct.
Senator McCain. In answer to Senator Levin's question, you
would rely to a large degree--not solely, but to a large
degree--on the opinion of the commanders on the ground who are
doing the fighting.
General Jones. Absolutely.
Senator McCain. I think that's important, because there are
a lot of people who are armchair generals who reside here in
the air-conditioned comfort of Capitol Hill, who somehow do not
trust the judgment of some of the finest leaders that our
Nation has produced. There will be various proposals about
troop reductions, announcing withdrawals, which may not comport
with conditions on the ground.
I just have one other question. If we deploy troops to the
Syrian and Iranian borders, that could lead to conflict between
U.S. troops and Syrian or Iranian troops. Have you taken into
consideration that aspect of the redeployment to the borders of
Syria and Iran?
General Jones. Senator, we have. We judge that the goings-
on across the Iranian border, in particular, are of extreme
severity and have the potential of at least delaying our
efforts inside the country. Many of the arms and weapons that
kill and maim our soldiers are coming from across the Iranian
border.
Senator McCain. Are we, sooner or later, going to have to
address the issue of Iran? That may be a little bit out of the
purview of the Commission's charter, but are we, sooner or
later, going to have to address the issue of the Iranian
activities, including a recent statement by the president of
Iran, who said, ``Iran will fill the void in Iraq when the
United States leaves''?
General Jones. That is a worrisome statement, obviously.
But the Commission has concluded that the significance and the
level of Iranian activity in Iraq is of such concern that we
believe that more attention has to be paid to the territorial
integrity of the country and what's going on across the
borders. This will be the next step in the growth of the Iraqi
army. Ultimately, the police will take care of the internal
threats, and the army will defend Iraq. But it is too soon for
them to be able to do that, even though that's one of our
specific charters. They are just now getting to being able to
do stage one, collectively. That's the internal defense. At the
rate of growth that we've seen, they will get to the
territorial issues, but, until then, our assessment is that
coalition forces need to make a statement and move some of the
capability out of the internal regions, which are more capably
handled now, increasingly by the ISFs, to stem the tide of
fighters, resources, weapons, and contraband coming across the
borders.
Senator McCain. Unfortunately, my time is up. I would like
again to thank the members of this Commission, not only for
their present work, but for their past service to our country.
We're very grateful. I think you have given us some very, very
important and useful information and, I think, a realistic
assessment of the situation, at least from what I can
determine.
Finally, General Jones, are you satisfied with the level of
leadership that we have at all levels of our military that is
now in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan?
General Jones. I will speak for the Commission in providing
that answer. We were extremely impressed by the leadership,
both civilian and military, starting with Ambassador Crocker
and General Petraeus, but also the quality of the leadership in
both the mission and in the military organization to do the job
that they're asked to do.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I join welcoming General Jones and our panelists here, just
echoing the sense that many of us who have had the privilege of
being on this committee have listened to all of you at
different times, and your service to the country is enormously
appreciated. The Nation is grateful for your service, and we
thank you for your presentation today.
General, you must be able to understand the confusion of
the American people listening to your testimony today. Here we
have the greatest military that the world has ever seen,
fighting in Iraq, a country of 25 million people, which we
defeated 10 years ago, fighting them now there for 4 long years
and having the casualty rates that we have. Now we're hearing,
``It's really an issue of national reconciliation and whether
the Iraqis are really going to get their act together.'' You
can understand why Americans are confused when they hear
General Casey, in August 2006, say, ``I can see that, over the
next 12 to 18 months, the ISFs progressing to a point where
they can take on the security responsibility for the country,
with very little coalition support.'' They listened to General
Casey tell--they're back home, and they're listening--2006--
General Casey saying, ``12 to 18 months, they're going to be
able to fight.'' Then in June, DOD indicates that a total of
346,000 ISFs have been trained, more and more Iraqi army and
National Police are in the lead in these areas. Then we hear
your report this morning, 25,000 police are in an organization
that's filled with corruption, ought to be disbanded; 37,000
border guards that need a great deal more training, a great
deal more support, unreliable; the facilities protection,
140,000, they're weak. How long have we been training Iraqis
over there? How long have we been training the Iraqi
servicemen? How long has the United States been doing it? We've
been doing it now since the time of the invasion, have we not?
General Jones. Correct.
Senator Kennedy. We did it in the last 3 years,
intensively, now. Don't you think Americans are wondering when
the Iraqis are going to fight for their own country? When you
tell us that it's going to take, now, another 12 to 18 months
for the ISFs to be able to take on the security
responsibilities, and then you indicate to us that, really, the
fundamental issue is the issue political reconciliation. You're
not enormously reassuring about the hopes of having a political
reconciliation. We have the National Intelligence Estimate
(NIE) report that supports just what you're saying. Government
will continue to struggle to achieve a national-level political
reconciliation--talking about months, possibly years.
So, what should the American people understand about when
the Iraqis are going to begin to fight for their own country?
When are they going to be able to relieve American servicemen
who have been fighting nobly, courageously, valiantly--be able
to get a policy that's worthy of their bravery and valor?
General Jones. Senator, you ask a very good question. It's
a very complex situation. We tried to point out that the key to
ending sectarian violence has to be found within the Iraqis
themselves. They simply have to find the means by which they
can lay down their arms. When they do that, the change
internally in the country will be dramatic. That will allow a
much greater acceleration to the end that we all hope we can
achieve.
However, we tried to draw a distinction, which was why we
say there's real progress, but that it's uneven, between the
capabilities we found in the Ministry of Defense and the
emerging Iraqi armed forces, and the Ministry of the Interior
and its force structure of police forces. Our assessment is
that, where the Iraqi army is concerned, the Iraqi army is
fighting. They do have 10 full divisions. They're going to 13
divisions by the following year. We have been to their training
bases. We've seen their new recruits. We've seen their
noncommissioned officer (NCO) schools. We've seen their
academies. We've seen the NATO contribution to training young
officers. We believe that, within their capabilities, such as
they are, they are doing reasonably well and making a
difference. We did not find the same optimism in the Ministry
of Interior and the police forces.
So, our respectful conclusion is that more needs to be done
to change that.
Senator Kennedy. Let me ask you, can the adequate training
continue with less than 160,000 American troops, as proposing?
General Jones. Let me ask General Joulwan, who headed that
syndicate.
General Joulwan. Senator, the quick answer is yes. I think
what is important----
Senator Kennedy. Let me go down the line a little bit.
Can it go down to 100,000, and still have the training?
What's the figure?
General Joulwan. I think what we have seen with what we
call the ``surge is a tactical success creating a secure
environment'' that should have been done 4 or 5 years ago, when
we went in there. We're seeing that now. The issue, to me,
Senator, is, how do you reinforce the tactical success that you
have with the surge over the last few months? That, to me, is
the issue. Remember, the Iraqi army is training and building an
army while they're engaged in war. We dismantled the army, and
they're training and building while they're conducting a war. I
found some very good examples of where they can take the lead.
Their special forces can operate independently right now, as
far as I'm concerned. They need some enablers. I think we have
to understand that.
The issue is--what is the strategy to reinforce the
tactical success on the ground? That, to me, is the fundamental
issue, and we give some examples here.
As to how many forces that's going to take, I think we need
to start transitioning to an Iraqi lead, not a U.S./coalition
lead. Whether it's 6 months or 12 months, I think the signs are
there to do that, and we have to reduce that dependency. How
many Americans that's going to take--as we say in the report, I
think we have become overly dependent on the logistics and
support areas that can be reduced, as well. So, as we go to
what is called the ``strategic overwatch,'' there can be a
reduction. But I would leave that reduction to the commanders
on the ground and the political leadership of what direction
that should go.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much.
General Jones. Senator, if I could please ask Chief Ramsey
to comment because the police aspect of this is extremely
important.
Mr. Ramsey. Thank you.
Senator, the police have not made as much progress as the
military. They are not, at this time, capable of filling the
void that would be left once the military left the province,
having cleared it of insurgents and militia, or at least
neutralized the threat. That's due to a variety of reasons.
When you look at the Iraqi police service, a lot of that is due
to the fact that they're ill-equipped to handle that mission.
They have soft body armor. They're issued an AK-47 and a couple
of uniforms. They're still riding around in thin-skinned
vehicles. The day we were talking to the police chief in
Baghdad, he had two officers killed while we were there. Then,
the day before, he lost three. He lost 550, just out of that
one police station, last year. When we were there in July, the
death count was up to 230 police officers.
So, they're being lost at an alarming rate, because they
just aren't being supported the way they ought to be supported.
I think they can make very rapid progress once the Ministry of
Interior issues are addressed. That's the Iraqi Police Service,
not the National Police. That's a totally different issue.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Kennedy.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, thank each and every one of you for this very
valuable report. I thought your opening presentation covered it
very well, General Jones.
I'd like to return to the issue of the borders. Clearly,
the Iranian influence coming across that border, be it in
weapons or people or trainers or whatever, is a very
significant factor imperiling the ability of our forces to
bring about greater stability.
Now, I draw your attention to page 129, which I think is a
very important part of this report. I'll read it, ``The
circumstances of the moment may continue to present the
opportunity for considering a shift in the disposition and
employment of U.S. forces. This could be characterized as a
transition to a strategic overwatch posture. Such a strategy
would include placing increased responsibilities for the
internal security of the nation on the ISF--especially in the
urban areas.'' I certainly agree with that strongly. Further,
``coalition forces could be retasked to better ensure the
territorial defense of the state by increasingly concentrating
on the eastern and western borders and the active defense of
the critical infrastructures to Iraq''--namely--that's the
power and the electricity. To me, this is the heart of what you
recommend. I'd just simply ask this question, because, in our
private consultations, you have emphasized that the U.S. forces
are better trained and better equipped to handle the mission of
border security than are the Iraqi forces. Now, the Iraqi
forces may be approaching that, but we have special detection
equipment. We have special training. Could one member of the
panel here--General Jones, General Joulwan--emphasize how we
are better qualified to do that border security, and thereby
lessen the Iranian influence, the Syrian influence, which is
leaking across these borders, be it weapons or trainers or
otherwise?
General Jones. Senator, if I may ask Lieutenant General
Berndt to come to the table and--he studied that, particularly,
and I'd like to ask him to respond to your question.
Senator Warner. Thank you, General Jones.
General Berndt. Thank you for the question, Senator.
First of all, if I may, the people that we talk to on the
border, both ISFs and their coalition transition teams, they
want to do a good job. There's no question about that, in our
minds. The problems that they face are significant, however.
The do not have the benefit of the technology, that we would
expect to see, to prevent smuggling and weapons and bad people
from crossing their borders.
On the Jordanian border, for example, the table of
organization calls for 243 people at that port of entry. There
are currently 112. They have two backscatter radars to check
vehicles, neither of which works. They don't have a central way
of checking people's identity to ensure that folks are coming
across that shouldn't, or a means of getting intelligence on
when that may happen.
As a result, while they want to do a good job, they are
just not properly supported to be able to do that, and, in some
cases, the director of the port responsible for that port is
reaching into his own pocket to pay for things like fuel.
Senator Warner. Let's focus on the Iranian border, because
that's where the critical elements are. What is the type of
technology we could provide--what is the type of training our
people have, that can supplement the current security situation
and, hopefully, make a material difference?
General Berndt. Yes, sir. There are several things, I
believe. There are five backscatter radars at the land port of
entry with Iran. At the time that the Commission visited, none
of them were working. You can't really check vehicles if you
don't have the ability to see what's inside that vehicle. So,
they need to be fixed, but there are better systems available.
They are more expensive systems.
Senator Warner. They're in U.S. inventory?
General Berndt. Yes, sir, they can be purchased. It appears
that there's a reluctance to do that, because of the cost. But
some basic things--forklifts, cranes--the type of things you
would expect that people would have at their disposal to check
cargo. We witnessed an 18-wheel truck pulling up full of
bananas, and, on the top of that truck were three Iranian young
men, literally pulling bananas off the top and setting them on
the side so they could see what was in the vehicle. Not a very
efficient way of doing business. By their own admission, 95
percent of the things that come into Iraq come through the
ports of entry.
Senator Warner. Did you bring to the attention--General
Petraeus and perhaps General Odierno, who, incidentally, I
think, is an extraordinarily capable officer--this
recommendation, that in our inventory is the equipment to help
better seal that border, and our forces could possibly do that
job, and supplement it, better than it's now being done?
General Berndt. We did, sir.
Senator Warner. What sort of response did you get?
General Berndt. Not only did we make the recommendation,
the recommendation is being made by the coalition transition
teams that are co-located with those units. As a matter of
fact, from one of the ports of entry I have a 7-page list of
requirements for that particular port of entry that were
submitted up the chain of command. I don't know this for a
fact, so I don't want to get out of my lane here, but the
problem is, with regard to the border, that the requests for
support, infrastructure, improvement of roads, electricity,
water, you name it--they don't seem to go up and then come back
down with something that can be actually used to help those
people do the job that they want to do.
Senator Warner. General Jones, I draw your attention to the
NIE that was issued, and it is, I think, an excellent guidepost
as to our future strategy in Iraq. I'd like to ask if your
Commission concurs with the findings. For example, just the
first finding of the NIE stated that the ISFs have not improved
enough to conduct major operations of the coalition on a
sustained basis in multiple locations, and that the ISF remains
reliant on the coalition for important aspects of logistics and
combat. I think you've already answered, you agree with that.
General Jones. It's generally consistent with our findings.
Senator Warner. Good. The increase in the army end strength
to address critical gaps will take 6 to 12 months, and probably
be longer, to materialize.
General Jones. We would agree, but that's not unreasonable,
in army elements.
Senator Warner. Insurgent militia and insurgent influences
continue to undermine the reliability of the Iraqi force units.
General Jones. Probably true.
Senator Warner. The deployment of ISF units throughout Iraq
to Baghdad in support of security operations marks significant
progress since last year.
General Jones. Concur.
Senator Warner. Political interference in security
operations continues to undermine the coalition and ISF
efforts.
General Jones. General agreement.
Senator Warner. Lastly, the NIE also assessed that changing
the mission of coalition forces from primarily a
counterinsurgency and stabilization role to more of a support
role, would erode security gains achieved thus far. That seems
to be somewhat in conflict with one of your basic findings.
General Jones. It is. I think it's a question of degree and
timing--how you do it, when you do it.
Senator Warner. It's the timing.
General Jones. I think you're not going to turn the page
and all of a sudden, switch to another metric. But our finding
is that, over time, and starting in the relatively near future,
this is the logical next step for how we should use our forces.
Senator Warner. I would hope the President would take in
consideration the valuable findings that you made.
General Jones. Thank you, sir.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Senator Byrd.
Senator Byrd. Thank you, General Jones. Our policy in Iraq
has long been linked to the performance of Iraq's own security
forces. As President Bush said, we would stand down as Iraq
forces stood up. After more than 4 years of this interminable
war, we have yet to see much standing up by the Iraqis.
Instead, we have seen more U.S. troops sent into the line of
fire. A number of us in the Senate have questioned the rosy
assessments routinely provided by the White House about the
readiness of the Iraqi forces. Too often, those reports do not
seem to match reality. That was the reason for establishing
this Commission, to help us get some truth--truth--truth about
the progress of our efforts in Iraq. Your conclusions the
Commission reached are deeply troubling, and, to my mind, call
into question the whole foundation of the administration's
strategy in Iraq. Standing down only after Iraq is ready to
stand up seems to be a recipe for an unending U.S. occupation.
General Jones, your report notes evidence of improvements
in Iraq's security forces which states that they will not be
able to operate independently--independently--for the
foreseeable future. Imagine if, after Pearl Harbor, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs told the President that it would
take him 5 years to raise an army or a navy. It takes us a few
months to turn a U.S. citizen into a combat-ready soldier. In
Iraq, we have been at this effort for more than 4 years. The
reason we are able to train a soldier or a policeman so quickly
is because we have to. No one else will do it for us. As long
as someone else is willing to assume the risk for Iraq's
security forces, I do not see them rushing to fill the breach,
themselves.
General, what incentive is there for Iraq to step up and
take on its own security if we continue to do it for them?
General Jones. Senator, thank you for that question. I
think that, within our report, we tried to express the sense of
the Commission, that in units of the Iraqi army we are seeing
the development of that spirit, of that willingness to fight
for the Nation, and to put their lives on the line. The
statistics show that, at the rate of over three-to-one
casualties being suffered are being suffered by the Iraqi
forces. We find that to be encouraging. We would be much more
happy to sit here and also be able to say the same thing about
the police forces, which is the next critical link that has to
be developed. But, as to the progress of the Iraqi army, I
believe that we are of one mind that we were impressed with
what we saw. As Chief Ramsey mentioned, with regard to the
police force, that if we could get the same type of will and
the same type of support generated for the development of those
police forces, and the Iraqi government could bring about a
reconciliation that would either bring and end or significantly
diminish the sectarian violence, then I think we would be on a
much more rapid road to progress.
Let me ask my colleagues if they're like to add to that.
General Joulwan. What we've seen in the Iraqi army is this
recent tactical success because of, now, creating a secure
environment for them to operate in. They've been afraid to go
back to the homes and villages, because they were targeted.
There is now some progress. It takes time, when you've
dismantled an army like we did, to build and train an army. The
trends are in the right direction. How we build on that
success--incremental though it is--is going to be important.
That is going to take some time. I think we're heading in the
right direction. But, again, it's political clarity that's
important here, to be able to take advantage of the tactical
success that we've had on the military side.
Chief?
Mr. Ramsey. Senator, as far as the Iraqi police service
goes, it's very similar to what was experienced in the army,
trying to rebuild a police force in a time when they're in a
combat situation. It's not an all-bad news story. There are
about 230,000 members of the Iraqi police service. We visited
many of the training sites, and, quite frankly, we were very
impressed with the level of training that was taking place. In
fact, when we visited Anbar province, at Habbaniyah, the
academy there, the courses were being taught by Iraqi
instructors, there was a great deal of enthusiasm on the part
of recruits. People are working very hard.
The problem on the police side is that there simply aren't
enough trainers, and, because of the security environment, they
often are not able to get to training sites on a consistent
basis to provide the training, so they continue to fall behind.
At the provincial level, they're hiring police officers,
not through the normal process, so you have people being hired
that are receiving almost no training at all. So, that's a
constant problem of trying to keep up.
So, there are some positive things going on, but that's not
to say that they don't have significant challenges, because
they do.
Senator Byrd. General, an article in this week's Washington
Post noted that a fundamental problem with Iraq's security
forces is that many are thoroughly infiltrated by sectarian
militias. As one U.S. soldier said, speaking of an Iraqi army
battalion we are training in Baghdad, ``We're trying to get
them to develop enemy targets, but the enemy targets are their
friends.'' Some of the conclusions in your report also
reference this issue, which seems to go to the heart of the
problem in Iraq. No matter how much training and equipment we
may provide Iraq's security forces, we can never, never force
the political and sectarian reconciliation that is ultimately
required from the Iraqis. In fact, we may be inadvertently
supporting one side of a civil war against another.
General, to what extent are Iraq's security forces
contributing to the growing sectarian split in Iraq? Doesn't
this call into question the very core of our strategy?
General Jones. Senator, sectarianism is a endemic problem
in Iraq, and it has to be addressed by the Iraqi government, as
we've said.
Since there are two portions of the ISF, I'll ask General
Joulwan to address the military side of your question, and the
Chief to address the police side.
General Joulwan. Senator, as I said before, it takes time
to build and train an army. I think that's what we're seeing
going on now. The trends--what we're trying to report here--we
think, are in the right direction. It is going to take time.
But, without a political overview, without some political
clarity, without political movement, capacity-building, I would
call it, on the institutional side of political institutions,
much of what success or tactical success we're seeing on the
military side, I think, will not succeed in the end.
General Jones. Before I pass to Chief Ramsey, the overall
conclusion of our Commission was that the sectarianism is a
problem throughout the country, that it is less a problem in
the military, more of a problem in the police.
Mr. Ramsey. Senator, a lot of the problems that you've
identified on the police side are due to very poor vetting
procedures that were followed in the past. It has improved.
They're taking advantage now of some biometrics, retinal scans,
fingerprints, and the like. Their database obviously isn't very
complete, so the results of those checks aren't always that
reliable. But the process is at least beginning.
There is a problem with infiltration of militia and
insurgents in Police. Both the Iraqi police service and, we
believe, the National Police, as well. But the people are aware
of it and are doing what they can to try to rid their ranks of
those individuals, but it's a very difficult situation. For
those that have been there in the past, and have seen this over
time, they say that it is far better than it was. But it still
has a long way to go, and that gets right at the heart of
trust, when it comes to police, the trust on part of the
public, trust on part of the military, trust on part of others,
and information-sharing doesn't take place like it should, I
think, due, in large part, to the fact that people are afraid
if they divulge sensitive information, that information will
get in the wrong hands.
Senator Byrd. Thank you.
General Jones. I'd ask Dr. Hamre, who would like to make a
comment.
Dr. Hamre. Sir, just very briefly. The sectarianism has
crippled the Ministry of Interior, and that ineffective
ministry is the core problem that's keeping us from developing
competent policing.
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Dr. Hamre.
Thank you.
Senator Kennedy [presiding]. As our chairman pointed out,
there is a series of votes now. There's several minutes left,
if there is a member that wanted to stay. I'd be glad to
recognize them at this time, or we'll go into a recess.
Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, I thank the Commission for your work in this
excellent report.
I guess I would follow up, to some extent, on Senator
Kennedy's questions, because clearly this is a very difficult
dilemma that our country faces, and that we, sitting on this
side, face as well. The theory behind the tactic of the surge
was that adding these troops would create the political space
for some kind of political reconciliation--``reconciliation''
maybe too hopeful a term, but certainly political compromise
that could lead to a greater commitment to the stability and
security of the country, and an end to the sectarian and
personal advantages that were being sought. It is clear in your
report, as well as in the NIE, that the Iraqi government will
struggle to continue to achieve such national reconciliation.
What, if any, factors that you assessed in your work on the
security forces leads you to believe that the government will
pursue this political reconciliation?
General Jones.
General Jones. Senator, that question is a little bit
outside of our charter. The only thing the Commission observed
is that, absent such a reconciliation, which has not been
codified, at any rate, even though we were encouraged to hear
that--in our conversations with senior Iraqi officials, members
of the government, that they are working on it, that they
understand the importance of it. But the fact is, it hasn't
happened. We regret that because that certainly is a key to
accelerating the progress that we would all like to see in
Iraq. So, we've identified that, very strongly, as essentially
the starting point for good things to take place.
On the surge, I'd like to just say a few words about that.
The surge had two components to it. One was Iraqi, and the
other was coalition. The surge itself had an effect, but it had
effect in the area where it was concentrated, and that is the
Baghdad region. Two other phenomenon that also happened
simultaneously to enhance the security situation were the
unexpectedly good performance of the Iraqi army, which is a
credit to our trainers and those who have brought them online,
and also the stunning turnaround in al Anbar province, where al
Qaeda lost the popular support of the people, which has
resulted in the country's most violent province becoming one of
the most peaceful.
So, those three things--the surge, the Iraqi army's
performance, and al Qaeda's reversals--have been positive, in
terms of the ISFs. But this progress will always be measured
against the overall sectarian problem in the country, and it
simply has to be a political solution.
Senator Clinton. Of course, that's our dilemma. How do we
get the appropriate pressure on the Iraqi government to do what
we know they must do for the Iraqi people to have any future
and for us to withdraw and hope that there can be some
stability in the region?
I am concerned that we are not getting answers to the
questions that we need from the administration. In fact, I
think it's fair to say that Senator Warner led the effort to
have this Commission created to get an independent judgment,
because we've heard so much contradictory information going
back, now, so many years. I wrote a letter to the President,
yesterday, requesting that General Petraeus and Ambassador
Crocker be prepared to address 20 questions that come from the
NIE, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and your
Commission report, because, at the end of the day, we have to
make judgments on whether or not we believe continuing military
presence by American troops, whether they're in Iraq for a day,
a year, or 10 years, will make any difference to the Iraqi
government and the Iraqi people. I have, obviously, reached a
conclusion that I don't see that difference occurring, I don't
see the Iraqi government responding. If we take away deadlines,
we take away benchmarks, we take away timelines, what is the
urgency that will move them to act? You can have pockets of
stability. We're now seeing, as the British withdraw in the
south, a lot of the militias vying for power within the south.
You're seeing the Iranian proxies and the Saudi proxies and
everybody else's proxies, looking for advantage.
So, I think that your Commission has certainly performed a
great service, but one of the problems is that, in evaluating
Iraqi policy, the administration and the Iraqi government keep
moving the goal posts for success. I am deeply concerned that
we're not going to see any difference in 12 to 18 months, but
we'll see more American casualties, and we'll see the
opportunity costs of our being bogged down in Iraq, with
respect to all of the other challenges we face, from Iran to
the Middle East to China and everywhere else.
So, Mr. Chairman, I greatly appreciate the Commission's
report, and I'd better go and try to get this vote in.
I thank you all very much.
Chairman Levin [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Clinton.
Senator Warner has a quick follow-up if that's all right
with Senator Cornyn.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
Following along Senator Clinton's observation, I made a
similar observation in my opening statement, but I'd like to
have your answer to this question. Is there not a direct
correlation between the level of success of political
reconciliation and the dangers to forces fighting the
insurgents or any other element on the battlefront? Namely, to
the extent you get political reconciliation, in my judgment, it
lessens the danger to the individual troops, or groups of
troops, fighting, wherever it is in Iraq.
General Jones. Senator, you're absolutely right. It
clarifies the whole situation, because if you get a meaningful
reconciliation, which means that the leadership of the three
major ethnic groups tell their militias to lay down their arms,
the landscape of Iraq is transformed immediately, in terms of
the security to our forces and Iraqi forces. The police have an
opportunity to develop into a meaningful force.
If you can impress on the government the need to develop
national institutions that are composed of all ethnicities and
equally represented, and do this in a sensible way, but without
the backdrop of violence and the fear of terror, the
transformation in Iraq would be, I think, very rapid.
General Joulwan. Senator, one of the observations that I
came to, when I asked, from the Minister of Defense to his
division commanders on down, whether they were Sunni, Shia, or
Kurd, they would respond to me, ``I'm an Iraqi.'' I think the
army, in particular, there is a possibility to have this
integration. I see trends in that direction. I think it's too
early to tell, but we ought to try to foster that. We saw that
when the NCOs went to the academies, that good NCOs are being
developed in a way that really tries to foster this working
relationship to get away from sectarianism. But it's going to
take time. Remember, we destroyed this army, or dismantled the
army, and we're trying to build it up again.
Senator Warner. I understand that, General, but we have to
understand here at home. Every day that goes by, you do not
have political reconciliation from the top down. Now, there's
some of it beginning at the bottom to come up, like sheikhs and
so forth, trying to resolve problems in their provinces. Until
it comes from the top down, our troops are at greater risk, and
we continue to take our casualties, killed and wounded.
General Joulwan. That ought to come from Washington
straight to Baghdad. You can't expect the military to do that,
Senator.
Senator Warner. No, I'm not suggesting that, because
military witness after military witness, over these years that
this committee has conducted hearings, have constantly said
there is not a military solution to these problems in Iraq. Do
you agree with that?
General Joulwan. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Okay, just a quick fine point on that. You
would agree, I think, from your report, General and others,
that the failure of the Iraqi politicians, the national
leaders, to reach political agreement is costing American lives
and American casualties.
General Jones. I would agree with that, and I would also
add that it's costing Iraqi lives, as well.
Chairman Levin. Of course. Absolutely.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. General Jones, thank you. Thanks to the
entire Commission for your tremendous continuing contribution
to our Nation. You represent a tremendous national resource,
and I want to express my gratitude, along with everyone else,
for your tremendous assistance in helping Congress understand
what we're confronted with and, perhaps even more importantly,
the American people.
I just want to summarize a couple of things in the
assessment, because while it's obviously a mixed bag, it does
represent some good news, as well. I think we can't just ignore
the good news, and that is that you find that the Iraqi armed
forces are increasingly effective and capable of assuming
greater responsibility for internal security of Iraq, and the
Iraqi police are improving, although you've noted a
significantly more serious problem with them. You assess that
over the next 12 to 18 months, there will be continued
improvement in the ISF readiness and capability. You make a
finding that the ``clear, hold, and build'' strategy that
began, but was not really implemented until this summer, is on
the right track and shows potential. You say that the Iraqi
army and Iraqi police service have the potential to help reduce
sectarian violence.
I want to just ask you straight up, General Jones, if you
could speak, either individually or on behalf of the
Commission, in explaining the statement on page 129 of the
report, when you talk about the strategic consequences of
failure. We can all debate, is the glass half full or the glass
half empty? What do we do to encourage political
reconciliation, which we all know is important to bringing our
troops home and maintaining--and achieving stability in the
region. I'm not sure that people understand well enough the
consequences of our failure in the region. The statement here
is that, ``The strategic consequences of failure, or even
perceived failure, for the United States and the coalition are
enormous.'' Could you explain to mothers and fathers, perhaps
watching this on cable news or C-SPAN, why it's important to
them and to the security of the American people? Because I
think some people perceive this as just a risk to the Iraqis or
people in the region. I believe that's not an accurate reading
of the risk. Could you explain that?
General Jones. Yes, sir. I'll give you my personal views on
this, but I would also invite any members of the Commission to
feel free to express their own views.
Senator, to try to be brief but thorough, I believe that
there are three levels of strategic concerns here that are at
play. The first is national, the second is regional, and the
third is global.
On the national basis, the United States has clearly
established itself in the 20th century as a Nation of great
influence, and achieved many, many great things. As a matter of
fact, success on the battlefield and success in the areas of
rebuilding friends and allies, or defeated enemies, if you
will, is part of our history, and one that I think Americans
are justifiably proud of. As a matter of fact, we refer to one
of our generations as ``The Greatest Generation,'' and I agree
with that.
The 21st century announces itself as being a century of
incredible complexities. What was bipolar in the 20th century
is now multipolar. What was symmetric is now asymmetric. The
forces that are arrayed against us and our way of life, as a
freedom-loving people, are significant.
Whether it's Afghanistan or Iraq, these are the
battlefields where this question will be resolved. The answer
to those questions are very complex and very time-consuming,
but nonetheless, very important.
On a national basis, I personally don't believe that the
United States can afford to be perceived as having not been
successful in either Iraq or Afghanistan, and I think the
consequences for such a perception, or such a reality, will be
with us for years to come, in terms of our ability to be the
Nation of great influence in the 21st century. I don't think
it's predestined that we get it for nothing. We didn't get it
for nothing in the 20th century, we won't get it for nothing in
the 21st century. The young men and women who wear our uniform
and who are representing our country in civilian clothes around
the world are doing a magnificent job making sure that doesn't
happen. Iraq just happens to be one of the focal points where
that primacy is being tested, and the national will is being
tested.
So, for all kinds of reasons that have to do with how this
country is perceived around the world in the future--maybe 10,
15, 20 years from now, it's important that we be successful.
There's a regional consideration, as well. Iraq, as a
stable nation, sovereign nation, is important to the security
and the balance of the Persian Gulf. It's important to check
the rise of Iranian influence. It's important to stem the
efforts of the Syrian Government that--across whose borders
about 70 to 80 fighters flow a month, and who are reported to
have training camps. It's important that the regional stability
of the Gulf be maintained, and the United States being
successful on that side of the issue will be a key contributor
to it.
It affects the global strategic issue, in the sense that at
the basic level--the flow of energy and the importance to the
world that the energy from the Persian Gulf and the surrounding
states plays in the economic stability of our economies and the
economies of our friends and allies.
So, there is a great deal at play here--national pride,
national influence in the 21st century, a test of wills--do we
have what it takes to stay the course and be successful?--
regional balance with global implications. I think all three of
those things are very important.
Let me ask my fellow commissioners if they would like to
add to that.
General Joulwan. I would only add, Senator, that, I think,
as we go about this, we have to understand we're not alone in
this venture. How we work with our allies, how we broaden the
base of what we're trying to do, not only in Iraq, but in the
total region, I think, is extremely important. It can't just be
``our way or the highway.'' I think we have to include them in
what we're doing, and build that consensus, political as well
as diplomatic, military, and economic consensus, for the way
ahead. That, to me, is going to be vital in the next year to 10
years.
Senator Cornyn. If we leave Iraq before it has the
capability to defend and govern itself, and it results in a
failed state, does that make America, and Americans, less safe?
General Jones. I think that precipitous departure, which
results in a failed state in Iraq, will have a significant
boost in the numbers of extremists, jihadists, however you want
to call it, in the world, who believe that they'll have toppled
the major power on earth and that all else is possible. I think
it'll not only make us less safe, it'll make our friends and
allies less safe, and the struggle will continue; it will
simply be done in other areas.
So, yes, I think the answer to that question is yes.
Senator Cornyn. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.
General, I want to go back to page 130 of your report,
because it seems to me that what you're recommending there is
critically important to our deliberations.
You've talked about a massive logistics footprint, many
installations, U.S. installations, and the number of personnel,
military and civilian, and you've said that the unintended
message of the size of that is one of permanence, an occupying
force, where what is needed is the opposite impression, one
that is lighter and less massive.
Then, going down a line, it says that you recommend that
careful consideration of the size of our national footprint in
Iraq be reconsidered with regard to its efficiency, necessity,
and cost. Then, to me, the critical line, because this goes to
the heart of what our debate is, that significant reductions--
and, as I asked you before, that includes all three--reductions
in the logistics footprint, the number of installations, and
the number of personnel, military and civilian, that
significant reductions in those--consolidations and
realignments--would appear to be possible and prudent. I want
to put that in what I consider to be a logical order.
First, by my logic, you recommend that we reconsider the
size of our national footprint, for a number of reasons, which
you state. Second, you say it's prudent to make significant
reductions of U.S. military and civilian personnel.
Third, you've said, in another page, on page 44, that Iraqi
armed forces--army, special forces, navy, and air force--are
increasingly effective and are capable of assuming greater
responsibility for the internal security of Iraq.
Now, that leads to the other question, which is the
assumption of that greater responsibility by the Iraqi forces,
you've indicated, should lead to a reduction in the number of
our forces. So far are we together?
General Jones. We're together.
Chairman Levin. Now, what you've done, though, as I
understand it, you have not said what the amount of the
significant reduction of those forces is. You have not put a
numerical amount on that. Is that correct?
General Jones. That's correct.
Chairman Levin. Other than saying it should be significant.
We're together?
General Jones. We're together.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Now, how many of the Iraqi units that
are capable of taking the lead--that would be either a unit--
category 1 or a category 2 unit--are now not in the lead? Do
you have a number for that?
General Jones. I think the reason we're struggling with the
answer is because the definition of what it means to be in the
lead is a little bit soft.
Chairman Levin. Okay. But would you agree--and this is my
clear impression--that there are a significant number of Iraqi
units that are capable of being in the lead now, that are not
yet in the lead? Is that fair?
General Joulwan. Yes, I would say yes. We're talking
enablers, we're talking logistics to help them. But I would
also say, as we try to say in the report, in 12 or 18 months,
which you charged us with, there'll be more of those available.
How many more--but there will be more, and, I would think,
significantly more, if we do certain things.
Chairman Levin. Of course, that's where the enablers come
in.
General Joulwan. FMS.
Chairman Levin. FMS. By the way, we're getting into the FMS
issue, believe me.
General Joulwan. That's important.
Chairman Levin. Believe me, we're going to get into that.
But I want to go back.
The 12- to 18-month charge was what you were asked to look
at.
General Jones. Yes, correct.
Chairman Levin. You were not asked to say how many Iraqi
units, right now, that are either category 1 or 2, could be put
in the lead, that are now not in the lead, and what number of
American troops that would reduce. Is that correct? You were
not asked to do that, or you were asked to do that?
General Jones. We weren't asked specifically to say how
many could be in the lead. We were supposed to assess their
capabilities--12 to 18 months out.
Chairman Levin. Okay. I want to go back to what, to me, is
really a fundamental question. Do we have agreement on that
point, that there are some Iraqi units that are capable of
being in the lead now, that are not currently in the lead? Can
we just agree on that much?
General Jones. I am still not clear as what the term
``lead'' means.
Chairman Levin. That's category 2. Are there currently
category 2 Iraqi units that are not now in the lead in their
operations, that have the capability, but that are not now in
the lead?
General Jones. I think that depends on the situation. For
example, there could be some operations that are launched by
the Iraqi units, independent of the coalition, because they
don't need too much support. Conversely, there are others that
are more complex, where they would need coalition support, and
they might not be in the lead for that aspect of it.
Chairman Levin. All right.
General Jones. So, I don't think there is one answer to
that question.
Chairman Levin. Let me go back to page 44, then. When you
say the Iraqi armed forces--you identify all of them--are
capable of assuming greater responsibility for the internal
security of Iraq.
General Jones. That's correct.
Chairman Levin. That's your finding.
General Jones. That is correct.
Chairman Levin. The next question is: we have that
possibility right?
General Jones. Exactly. We think that it's there. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Now?
General Jones. Now.
Chairman Levin. Okay, and is there any reason why we should
not begin now to transfer that responsibility, and to utilize
that capability? Or is that what you're recommending in this?
General Jones. No, I think there are two answers to that.
One is that, I think, increasingly, that is what's going to
happen. I think we've seen some evidence----
Chairman Levin. Not ``going to.'' Should it happen,
General?
General Jones. I think there is some evidence that it's
happening already, today.
Chairman Levin. Should it happen?
General Jones. I think it should happen whenever possible.
Dr. Hamre. Every single unit we saw still needed to get
fuel, ammunition, and uniforms.
Chairman Levin. I understand. But they have the capability
now. You've said they have the capability now.
General Joulwan. For certain missions, yes, sir, they have
the capability now, and they're doing it.
Chairman Levin. So, in other words, what you're saying is
that they are utilizing, right now, their capability that they
have. Is that what you're saying?
General Joulwan. The special forces brigade, in particular,
is able to conduct, for the most part, independent operations.
Chairman Levin. That's category 1. I'm talking about the
category 2 forces, which you've indicated on your chart there's
a significant number of category 2 forces. Is it not fair to--
which are capable, with our support--with our support, of
taking the lead. I think your report is clear on it. But is it,
or not? Is there not now a significant number of category 2
Iraqi forces capable of taking the lead that are not yet in the
lead?
General Jones. Exactly.
Dr. Hamre. With our support.
Chairman Levin. Capable, with our support, of being in the
lead, that are not now in the lead?
John, let me repeat it. Are there not now a significant
number of Iraqi forces, category 2, which means with our
support, capable of being in the lead, that are not yet in the
lead?
Mr. Ramsey. Yes, I think we say yes.
Chairman Levin. So do I, but is there some reluctance to
say yes here this morning?
General Jones. No reluctance. I think that there's a
question of semantics here between what the chairman means by
``lead'' and what we mean by ``capabilities.''
Chairman Levin. Okay. I'm just saying category 2. You
define it. That's your category, right? Are there not now a
significant number of Iraqi forces that are category 2 forces
that are not yet in the lead, that you believe should promptly
be taking the lead--taking responsibility, assuming greater
responsibility, in your words? Is that not clearly what you're
saying?
General Jones. We're saying that, at level 2, the unit is
capable of planning, executing, and sustaining
counterinsurgency operations, with ISF or coalition support.
Chairman Levin. My question is, are there not now a
significant number of category 2 Iraqi units that have not yet
been put in the lead under those circumstances, under those
conditions?
General Jones. I'd have to defer to the Active-Duty
military, who work with them every single day. My impression is
that if an Iraqi unit is in the level 1, level 2 category, that
they are conducting operations, and frequently in the lead.
Chairman Levin. So, then--when you say that they're
``increasingly capable of assuming greater responsibility''--
what you're saying is that all the category 2 units in Iraq
have now assumed greater responsibility. Is that what you're
saying? Or that they should assume greater responsibility?
General Jones. That, in our judgment, if they reach this
category, they are able to, with help, that they're
increasingly able to take on more and more missions for the
internal security of the country.
Chairman Levin. I understand, and should, therefore, take
on that responsibility?
General Jones. Should take on that responsibility.
Chairman Levin. Have you made an assessment as to how many
of those category units have not yet taken on that
responsibility? Have you made that assessment in your report?
General Jones. No, I don't think we have.
Chairman Levin. Okay.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. General, members of the Commission, we
appreciate and thank you for your good work and your
willingness to come up and present your findings.
General Jones, I have a question dealing with the Interior
Ministry, more with the police force than with the armed
forces, but I know that the Commission was not specifically
tasked to assess the capacity of the Iraqi ministries, even
though you weren't specifically--tasked the Commission does
address it. Since it is so integral to the development and the
readiness and the capability of the ISFs, we appreciate your
good work in that area.
The Commission's report finds that, ``The ISFs, military
and police, have made uneven progress.'' While the Iraqi armed
forces, especially army, have shown clear evidence of
developing the baseline infrastructure that lead to the
successful formation of a national defense capability, the
Iraqi police forces are hampered by--and this, again, a
``corruption and dysfunction within the Ministry of Interior.''
The Ministry of Defense is assessed as being one of the better-
functioning agencies of the Iraqi government, and so my
question is, what can be done to achieve the same level of
success with the Ministry of Interior, since the Iraqi police
force is so essential to the security and stability in Iraq?
General Jones. Senator, thank you. I'll ask Chief Ramsey to
respond to your question, as he did most of the work in this
area.
Mr. Ramsey. Thank you, Senator, for the question.
I think there are a couple of things that can be done.
We've talked a lot this morning about the military surge. As
one of my colleagues, Terry Gainer, mentioned, we need a
similar surge in policing, as well. We need more trainers. For
example, we need to have an infusion of qualified people to
assist the Ministry of Interior in developing the structure it
needs to be more effective. We have to work very aggressively
toward getting rid of some of the issues that really plague
Ministry of Interior, which I think is the biggest reason why
the police progress has been so uneven. The officers in the
field are not getting the equipment that they need, they're not
getting paid on a consistent basis.
There is certainly the perception that sectarian issues are
preventing a lot of these things from taking place. The
National Police, for an example--85 percent Shia, 13 percent
Sunni. I have never, in 38 years of policing, experienced a
situation where there was so much negativity around any
particular police force. It was unbelievable the amount of
negative comments we got, whether we were speaking with Iraqi
army, with Iraqi police service--it didn't seem to matter--
community members--there was almost a universal feeling that
the National Police were highly sectarian, were corrupt, had
been accused of having death squads and the like. A lot of that
perception, I believe, is a carryover to a lot of the feelings
that many had toward some of the issues in the Ministry of
Interior.
I think these are fixable problems, with the exception of
the National Police. We do believe, in our recommendation, that
the National Police be disbanded and reorganized with a
different mission. Part of their problem is the fact that their
mission has been unclear. It's not clear whether they're
supposed to be a light infantry military type unit or a police
unit. They're not very effective, because they lack the trust
that they need in order to perform their jobs, either with
their partners or with the community at large.
The other police force, the Iraqi police service, I
believe, can make very rapid progress once the problems with
Ministry of Interior are addressed. The balance now, in terms
of the Iraqi police service, using al Anbar province as an
example, they are actively recruiting people into the police
force, from the same ethnic background as the people that
they're serving. That seems to be working very well. Sheikhs
are very involved in trying to get recruits. The military, I
think, that are working there, really understand and get it.
They understand the importance of the police being able to get
up to speed to be able to take over some of these
responsibilities. When you go to the Kurdish region, certainly
the same situation exists. They have a little bit of a
headstart, obviously, because they haven't had the degree of
violence that they've had in other provinces. But the police
there are capable of being able to perform as a police force,
and they don't have nearly the problems you see in other
provinces.
But it's the Ministry of Interior that is really holding
back the police, in our opinion. I don't think there's any
question, in my mind. I think that the National Police, it's
beyond repair, even though I know there are people who don't
agree with that. But we were unanimous in our assessment, as
police leaders, that their mission needs to be redefined.
Senator Thune. The challenges that the Iraqi government
faces have been described as building an airplane while you're
flying it--and, in this case, also getting shot at. But the
question I have is, given those challenges facing the ISFs, is
it possible to remove some of the sectarianism that you have
talked about from the ranks without requiring a complete
overhaul of the Iraqi police force?
Mr. Ramsey. I think--with the Iraqi police service--and
I'll approach these from two different standpoints, because I
think the two groups are quite different--with the Iraqi police
service, I think what you're starting to see now, at the
provincial level, is recruiting of officers from that province
that understand that community and that are trusted. You don't
have nearly the problems that you have with the National Police
forces being brought into different provinces, and you don't
have the conflict that comes from that sort of thing taking
place. So, with the Iraqi police service, I don't think that
they are, for the most part, that far away from establishing
themselves as a viable police force. Most of their problems,
again, stem from their inability to get equipment, to be
trained on a consistent basis, because, in some cases, the
environment is such that trainers cannot get to academies in
order to train; the vetting process that they're using is
getting better, but has a long way to go, so they have been
infiltrated by criminals, by militia, by insurgents. Even
though, in many instances, we're seeing where that's being
weeded out, still it is a serious problem. The National Police,
on the other hand, I think, because of its composition and
because of the opinion that many have toward the National
Police, I don't think the same things can be effective. I think
they need to have their mission redefined, and that's what
we're recommending.
Senator Thune. What's the feasibility of moving the Iraqi
police force under the Defense Ministry?
Mr. Ramsey. There's a couple of things that I personally--
and our syndicate--feel, and we're aware that that was a
recommendation, but we're opposed to it, for a couple of
reasons. One is that a civil police force ought to be overseen
by civilians, not by military. I think that that's very
important. I also think that one of the most critical factors
is that, when you have the Ministry of Defense--and, although
they're doing a lot better than the Ministry of Interior,
they're still very fragile--to put that added burden on them
could cause problems for them, in general. It also creates an
imbalance, I believe, of power within Iraq, when you look at
the military already being in the Ministry of Defense, and if
you add police on top of that, that could cause some long-term
problems.
We have to find a way to get the Ministry of Interior up to
speed. The Iraqi government has to fix the Ministry of
Interior. Moving a problem from one ministry to another is not
going to fix the problem. The baggage that the National Police
are carrying is such now that it doesn't matter where you put
them, they're not going to be trusted, they're going to be
highly ineffective, because they don't have the trust of the
people that they have to work with and the people that they
have to serve.
General Jones. Dr. Hamre would like to say a word.
Dr. Hamre. The Ministry of Interior was captured, really,
by the Shias as something to protect themselves, for fear of
the rise of the Sunni again. Because the ministry is so
dominated by Shia sectarian factions, it is impeding the
development of a real police force. The law allows the local
provinces to hire the cops, but only the Federal Government
gives them money. It's this tension--this is like the State of
South Dakota hiring policemen, but only Washington can give you
a budget, and if you have party differences that they're using
to try to leverage each other--that's what's going on. We have
to fix that.
If you were to move it over to the Ministry of Defense, it
would be like adding a cup of vinegar to a barrel of wine. It
would poison the whole barrel. We have to fix it.
Senator Thune. Thank you.
I see, Mr. Chairman, my time is expired. But thank you for
your response.
Senator Lieberman [presiding]. Thanks, Senator Thune.
General Jones, thank you very much, and thanks to the
members of the Commission. I think you've done an extraordinary
piece of work here, and a real service in this debate, which is
at a historic turning point, about Iraq.
You were asked to do an independent report. It is
independent. It's totally nonpolitical. I think that's what
gives it its weight.
As I was reading the press on it this morning, and
listening to some of my colleagues, respectfully, this is the
old story of, ``What you see is--depends on where you stand.''
This is not all good news, but, I must say, on balance, I find
the report to be extremely encouraging. It wasn't so long ago
that the testimony we had about the Iraqi military portrayed it
as pretty much a rag-tag army, where, on the day that they got
paid, they basically all went home, and stayed home for 2 or 3
weeks, and then came back close to the next payday. I think
you're showing us, also, that--when we asked how many of the
units were rated at the levels 1 or 2, according to the metric
we have, very few. Today, we can say that more than half--a
good, sizable majority--are at that level.
So, I'm encouraged about this, particularly--and I
appreciate very much the metaphor that the report uses, where
you say that building the ISFs in Iraq's exceedingly diverse
and complex security environment is roughly akin to trying to
build an airplane in midflight while being shot at. That sounds
right to me, and that makes it all the more encouraging that
the Iraqi military has made the progress it has.
I want to ask you a few questions, consistent with that.
Your report notes, ``noticeable improvements in the Iraqi
army's ability to conduct counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism operations,'' and, again, ``even when American
units are absent, the Commission observed indications that
Iraqis are taking the fight to the enemy.`''
So, I ask you, is it accurate to say that the development
of the Iraqi army, in your opinion, has made significant
progress over the past 12 months, and will, in all likelihood,
in your estimation, continue to make progress over the next 12
months?
General Jones. Senator, with your permission, I'd like to
call General Abrams to the witness table for the answer to your
question.
Senator Lieberman. That would be a great honor.
General Jones. He's done an awful lot of work on this
particular issue and, we feel is well-qualified to represent
the Commission.
Senator Lieberman. Good to have you here, General Abrams.
General Abrams. Good to see you again, sir.
Senator Lieberman. You've been drafted again by General
Jones on this occasion.
General Abrams. These friendships go for a long time. Some
days they're up, and some days they're down. [Laughter.]
But it has been an honor to be a part of this.
Just by way of introduction, most of us traveled, not
through the staffs, but were able to talk to the people on the
ground doing the work on both sides of this. I think General
Jones and I came away with a shared experience in one incident,
and it was this--presence of this Australian battle group in al
Nasariyah. What I would share with you is, in terms of
progress, what came to us is the confidence of our people that
are embedded from the coalition, with these units. This was an
environment where Shia-on-Shia battles were occurring. This
province had been turned over--basically, had been provincial
Iraqi controlled, and that you had, frankly, a U.S. presence
and overwatch and both the political action team and an
economic team directly involved in, not only the communities,
but also the military structure.
What we got out of the exchange is that, increasingly, the
Australian battle group's view--who was charged with the
responsibility to provide overwatch--was not only the ability
of the army, but, in this specific instance, the ability of the
police force and the army to work together, to develop
intelligence on likely targets, to go after this very complex
environment of Shia-on-Shia engagements, were able to sort that
out. They did describe to us, in terms of limitations of
logistics and fire support and the like.
For what we took away from that model, if you will, that
experience down there, this was what we considered to be a very
difficult series of operations, done day and night over
sustained periods of time. We saw evidence of this occurring in
other areas, where the coalition was not in a dominant role. It
was, in fact, in a support role. Those that had visited over
there in the course of the last 3-plus years, that accompanied
us and were a part of the Commission, felt confident that this
was a new horizon of their ability to lead, to direct, and to
engage in what were sophisticated operations.
We found, as we traveled the hotly contested area in
Baghdad, which, quite frankly, is where we saw the emergence of
this--what the Commission is referring to as counterterrorist
capability--we view that capability in terms of military-force
application at the highest end and degree of difficulty to be
able to pull off.
The special operations units of the coalition referred to
this brigade, in many instances, as an equal partner that had
the ability to go into these neighborhoods, work on targets
that were directly either al Qaeda or directly linked to
providing sanctuary to al Qaeda, and do it at a comparable
level. We found that to be a significant departure in the
performance, not only of that brigade and its leadership, but
the autonomy of the decisionmaking process that was outside of
the coalition to be able to properly employ that. Those would
be representative examples, that I would share with you on
behalf of the Commission, that give indications that we
witnessed, during our 3 weeks, a context of capability that,
frankly, I think, has been borne out by the very difficult
investments that have been made by our troops and our leaders.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Abrams. We were very confident by it.
Senator Lieberman. General, I appreciate that firsthand
recollection very much. It's powerful, and it's dramatically
different than what we heard not so long ago. If I can ask the
indulgence of Senator Webb, I just want to follow up with a
quick question, building on that. One of the papers today had
the headline on your report, ``ISFs Won't Be Ready for 12 to 18
Months.'' In the report, you say, ``coalition forces could
begin to be adjusted, realigned, and retasked as the army is
able to take more responsibility for daily operations.'' Your
specific conclusion is that, ``it is reasonable to believe that
such adjustments could begin in early 2008, depending on the
continuing rate of progress of the ISF''--in other words, not
ordered by us, but depending on what the judgments are. I take
it that the connection between those two--the fact that some
people grabbed on to ``12 to 18 months'' and--to operate
independently, and still you're raising the possibility that
the Iraqis will be able to take on enough that we may be able
to reassign or bring home some of our troops--is based on the
fact that they don't have to operate independently to take on
some of the responsibility that American coalition forces have
now, as General Abrams just described. Do I have that right?
General Jones. I think you do, Senator. I think you have
that right. I would like to just leave it, in the mindset of
people who are listening or watching, that there are two levels
of progress here, at least from our Commission's standpoint.
One is the capability of ISFs, which is the army and the police
together, to take care of the internal problems--the violence,
the crime, the sectarian problems, al Qaeda inside Iraq--and
then there's the larger problem--or the second level of problem
of the army coming into its full maturation of defending the
borders of Iraq against nation-states outside of Iraq. That
second level is where the Iraqi army will eventually get to. I
believe that it's not realistic to expect that they could be
there in 4 years, but, at the rate they're going, they're going
to get there. So, what we're suggesting is, because of the
increased ISF capability inside the country to take care of
internal matters, recognize that's still significant, that
there is a possibility to consider that other forces of the
coalition could begin to pay a little bit more attention to the
critical infrastructure and the borders, which are very porous
and are significantly affecting the recovery, internally, in
Iraq, as a result of the smuggling and----
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that, and--so that some of
the ISFs, without being able to operate independently,
nonetheless would be able to take on, in partnership with
coalition forces, some of the responsibility the coalition
forces have now.
General Jones. Correct.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you very much.
Senator Bayh is next.
Senator Webb. Unfortunately, when I indulged you, Senator
Lieberman--I not only lost my place, but we have a 10-minute
vote, and it appears that I'm going to have to go vote. If I
may just make a quick statement.
Senator Lieberman. Sorry. I apologize to you. I owe you
one.
Senator Webb. I wanted to be here to give my appreciation
to the people who did this work. Unfortunately, you know the
process, all of you, and this is an amendment that I'm actually
a cosponsor of, I'm going to have to run down and vote on.
As quickly as I can in the time that we have, I want to
make sure, for my own understanding, that I am getting the data
right on your report. In the executive summary, the ISF is
defined as ``the military, the Iraqi police, and the Department
of Border Enforcement.'' The last two, I assume, administered
by the Ministry of Interior. Is that correct?
General Jones. Correct.
Senator Webb. The numbers that have been thrown around are
152,000 military, 194,000 for the Department of Border
Enforcement, and then, Chief Ramsey, you mentioned, I believe
it was 230,000 police. Is that correct?
Mr. Ramsey. As far as the police go, Senator, the 230,000
refers to the Iraqi police service. There's another 25,000
National Police in addition to that.
Senator Webb. Okay. But those three are additive, right?
So, if we put them together, that's a minimum of 576,000
individuals counted in the ISF.
General Jones. That's correct. In my opening remarks, I
said 324,000 make up the totality of the police forces, the
coast guard----
Senator Webb. I have to run--when you're talking about the
casualties in your report, and the percentage of those
casualties, as measured against the Americans, what you
basically are having--if you take that number and put it
against even the top number in the surge, 3.6 times the
American forces. So, what you're seeing still is probably--and
also depending on where these casualties are taking place,
because so many of them, as Chief Ramsey pointed out, have been
police being knocked off in their local environments--that I
would just submit that, in and of themselves, the casualty
numbers do not indicate that the Iraqis are out in the same
places and doing the kinds of things that the Americans are--
for the record, since I have to leave.
General Jones. If you play the percentages and you accept
that we're comparing the army of Iraq against the coalition,
which is probably a fairer metric, simply because we don't have
policemen over there, you could come up with different
conclusions.
Senator Webb. I would say, there are ways to----
General Jones. There are different ways----
Senator Webb. This has been used by your group.
General Jones. Right.
Senator Webb. That's why I think it needs to at least be
put into some perspective, because even the Americans--they're
a deployed force, but a huge percentage of the American force
is in the logistical tail on this.
General Jones. Exactly.
Senator Webb. So, just for the record, I think the Iraqis
still have a long way to go, in terms of the types of things
you're talking about. I regret I don't have a full amount of
time here to have a further discussion.
General Jones. Thank you.
Senator Webb. Thank you.
Senator Sessions. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your
insight and the time and effort you've given to this, and the
expertise you bring to it.
I believe General Petraeus's phrase was, when he testified
before us before he went over to do the surge, he defined the
challenge as difficult, but not impossible.
General Jones, how would you see the long-term view of
Iraq, just based on your commitment? I'll ask the others if you
briefly would share your thoughts to the American people, is
this a hopeless thing? What are our realistic prospects for a
long-term situation in which there's some stability and a
functioning government that's not threatening to the United
States?
General Jones. Senator, I think that General Petraeus's
words were correct. I think it is a difficult situation, it's
multifaceted. I think most of my colleagues have been involved
in other situations like this, unfortunately, nationbuilding
and reconstruction and the like. Generally, whether you look at
Kosovo or Bosnia or other places like that, it's a generational
problem, it's not a, necessarily, generationally military
problem. But what we're looking for is that balance--or that
moment in time when the balance goes from the big ``M'' in
military to the big ``P'' in political reconstruction, and
there's a handoff. We saw that in Bosnia, we've seen that in
other places. But it is a generational problem. So, it's about
bringing about, in Iraq, not only safe and secure conditions,
but a completely different method of government, jumpstarting
an economy, rule of law, the whole aspect of transition is just
enormously complex.
Regardless of how we got there, we are where we are. It is,
strategically, enormously important, not only nationally, but
regionally and globally, for this to come out to and be seen as
a success. Our report is, I think, not only unanimous, but very
hardhitting in certain areas, intentionally, to make the point
that there are some good things happening, and we are all
excited to see that's certainly encouraging--but that there's
more work that needs to be done, and we wanted to be very
specific about where it is we think that work should be done.
It doesn't mean it can't be done.
Senator Sessions. Did any of your Commission members, or
any significant number of them, conclude that this could not
work, it was a failed effort, and we just ought to figure a way
to get out, regardless of the consequences?
General Jones. I don't believe that there is a commissioner
who feels that way.
Senator Sessions. I think maybe a year or so ago, when so
much bad news was occurring, that American people began to
doubt that, could we be successful? Were we going to have a
realistic chance? I think they will consider being supportive
in the future if we can say, honestly, that, yes, it's
difficult--and it is difficult, and I will admit that--and I
think the biggest error we made is underestimating how hard it
is to take a dysfunctional government and create a functioning
government. That is a very difficult thing. If you look at
history, it's been done very few times. Yes, Germany, and, yes,
Japan, but those are hierarchical, unified societies in ways
that Iraq is not, and had traditions of law and order that they
didn't have, and it was just not quite the same, to compare
Iraq to Germany or Japan.
Chief Ramsey, I've been interested in the police situation
for some time. I think being western as compared--the lack of
prison space in Iraq to New York's prison system--I did the
numbers, before that, for Alabama, and I concluded that Alabama
has--with 4 million people, has 38,000 beds. I believe that now
there's about 24,000 in Iraq. On a per-capita basis, that
number, to be at Alabama's level, would be pushing 200,000. So,
you've been a chief, you've dealt with police officers. What
does it do to a police officer who goes out and arrests a no-
good criminal, and they turn him loose the next day? What does
it do to the neighborhood and community if you can't detain
people who need to be detained?
Mr. Ramsey. Senator, let me just say that we did not look
specifically at corrections while we were in Iraq. Terry Gainer
and I did visit one location, where some prisoners were being
held. We had an opportunity to talk to a few of them about
their treatment and the like, but we did not really study that
particular issue while we were in Iraq. The whole system needs
to be reviewed, and we do mention that in our report, that it's
not just the police, we do have to look at prosecution, we have
to look at the judges, we have to look at corrections. You have
to look at the entire criminal justice system and make it
function properly if you hope to see any long-term gains and
success.
Senator Sessions. Which is hard to do.
Mr. Ramsey. Very hard.
Senator Sessions. Hard to be in a country that hasn't had a
tradition of doing that correctly. I want to move away from
that to ask you, next about the National Police. This is a very
delicate thing. We solved it in the United States,
historically. We have local sheriffs, we have local police
chiefs, and we have Federal Bureau of Investigation and U.S.
Marshals on the Federal side, and all of these things. But it's
a mix. My time is about up, so I would just ask this question,
the average policeman that's walking the beat in Baghdad, is
paid for by the national government, but he answers to
supervision that's local.
Mr. Ramsey. Right.
Senator Sessions. That's an odd way to maintain order. Dr.
Hamre?
Dr. Hamre. Yes, that's the central problem. That does not
work. Our police force over here in the United States is paid
for locally. Over there, all the money is coming from the
Ministry of Interior. It's captured by the Shia militias. So,
the money is not getting out to these provinces. Over half of
their budget was left on the table last year, they didn't
distribute it to the police. This is a problem.
Senator Sessions. It's a difficult challenge for them, to
walk a beat by yourself in an area where you and your family
could be assassinated if you enforce the law. So, it's a
challenge to the police.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator
Sessions.
Senator Bayh, would you, if you're alone at the end of your
questions, recess until we get back? There will be a few of us
coming back. Thank you.
Senator Bayh [presiding]. With the assistance of our able
staff, I would be delighted to, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you very much for your service and this
report, and for your patience here today. Let me, at the
outset, apologize if any of the questions that I am about to
put to you have been asked previously, because I was absent,
voting. So, if it is a little bit redundant, I apologize in
advance for that. It's an occupational hazard in this line of
work, when we have votes going on and hearings, simultaneously.
In assessing the kind of forces and the configuration of
forces necessary to achieve security in Iraq, of course you
have to assess the kind of threats that they're facing,
internally and externally. I'd just like to ask you, General,
just very briefly--our intelligence services and other experts
have indicated, publicly, that, in their opinion, 2 percent or
fewer of the adversaries that we're facing in Iraq, and that
the Iraqis are facing in Iraq, are foreign jihadis, are al
Qaeda and Iraq affiliates, that 98 percent or more are Iraqis
fighting amongst Iraqis over the future of Iraq. Is that
consistent with your understanding?
General Jones. I think we would agree with that. Let me ask
General Berndt. Yes.
Senator Bayh. You've offered a number of good opinions
here, and a number of other opinions. Let me transition to a
series of questions you had with Senator McCain and some
others.
You indicated it was your personal opinion, somewhat beyond
the purview of the Commission, about the advisability of
setting a deadline, timelines, that sort of thing. Your
consensus is that political reconciliation among Iraqis is the
key to long-term security. I think you used words, ``it may be
more difficult, it may take longer,'' but, in essence, without
that, this is probably never going to work out very well. Isn't
that the bottom line? So, one of the questions we face is,
what, if anything, can we do to promote the process of
political reconciliation?
General Jones. No, this is very important, and it certainly
is going to make things much harder, and take much longer,
without it.
Senator Bayh. Indeed, security in that country, without
political reconciliation, is probably not achievable.
General Jones. Probably.
Senator Bayh. Right. So, here's my question. We've pursued
a strategy over the last 3 or 4 years of trying to build up the
competence of the Iraqi political leadership so that they would
be more likely to make the hard decisions, the tough
compromises necessary to achieve political reconciliation. We
felt that confident people were more likely to do that than
insecure people. Doesn't seem to have worked real well. Your
report indicates that that process is not going adequately. So,
some of us have concluded that trying to force them in a better
direction, with some notions of accountability, consequences
for failure to act, some notions of timelines, that sort of
thing, are more likely to make the process of political
reconciliation come about than simply just saying, ``If you
don't do it, that's okay, we're still with you, no
consequences,'' which is what we've had for the last 3 or 4
years. So, I'm interested in your opinion about why--I guess my
own view would be--to continue enabling their dysfunction is
the appropriate course of action? Why not accountability? Why
not consequences? Why not some timelines?
General Jones. Senator, you're correct, that's a little bit
outside of the scope of our taskings, but----
Senator Bayh. I'm only asking, because you offered your
opinion.
General Jones. I understand. I'll be happy to continue to
develop that opinion.
First of all, in terms of what we're trying to achieve
here, what the coalition is trying to achieve in Iraq, is a
long-term proposition. Three and 4 years, in terms of the
magnitude of what we're trying not do--frequently
simultaneously--building an army while it's being shot at,
whatever metaphor you want to use--this is hard work, and it's
going to take a long time.
Iraqis, the citizens themselves and their government, are
going to play an increasing role in this, and they're just
getting used to what that means, I think. However it comes out
in the long run, national reconciliation and putting an end to
sectarian violence is one thing that has to happen. A decade
ago, we were having similar discussions about----
Senator Bayh. Should there be no consequences for their
failure to act, where's the sense of urgency on their part?
They're dithering while their country is in great distress.
General Jones. Of course. A decade ago, we were having the
same type of discussion about Bosnia and the ethnic killings
and the murders and assassinations that were going on, and
seemingly out of control. I think you're absolutely right, I
think there should be consequences. I think it's up to
coalition governments to express themselves in the way that
only governments can. Certainly a commission can't do it,
except to point out the fact that this is one of the hurdles
and obstacles that is delaying the progress that we all think
will be possible once you clear this hurdle. The fact that it
hasn't been done yet doesn't mean it won't be done. I hope that
it will be.
Senator Bayh. I have a couple of other things I want to ask
about. We all want to be successful, we all know that political
reconciliation is essential to bringing that about. The debate
that we're having is, what is most likely to encourage the
Iraqis in that direction? It has seemed to some of us that the
strategy we've pursued for 3 or 4 years hasn't born much fruit,
and that perhaps a different approach is worth trying. That's
the essence of what I'm trying to say.
Here in your concluding section, which I thought was good
and interesting--``Concluding Observations,'' under ``Strategic
Shift''--you make the statement--``coalition forces could begin
to be adjusted in early 2008.'' Now, there's a lot assumptions
that underlie that. I'd like to ask you, what confidence level
do you place in that assumption?
General Jones. I think our Commission felt that, based on
the measured and observable progress of the Iraqi army, in
particular, and hopefully some of the accompanying progress by
Iraqi police forces, that, if this continues on the current
glide slope that we've seen, that the Iraqis will be able to
take on more and more of the day-to-day responses to the
internal----
Senator Bayh. Would you say your confidence level is high,
medium, or low?
General Jones. I would say that it's high, that it's going
to continue over the next 6 months to a year in a very positive
direction.
Senator Bayh. In a direction that would enable us to begin
to adjust our troop levels?
General Jones. That will give us some options with what we
can do with our forces in a different way, yes, sir.
Senator Bayh. That would be about contemporaneous with the
spring estimate of--we're running up against the 15-month
deployment period.
General Jones. We said early 2008, but we'd certainly defer
to the local commanders and authorities.
Senator Bayh. The British have withdrawn substantial
numbers of their forces from the south, and I was reading,
recently, that they are basically withdrawing to their
principal base there in the south. Now, it's different there.
You have fighting among Shia groups, as opposed to Shia-Sunni
fighting down there. But there are rivalries and so forth. What
lessons, if any, can we learn from the British redeployment
there, about the future of Iraq as we, according to your high-
confident assessment, may begin to also redeploy our forces in
the springtime?
General Jones. I think the overall lesson learned with
regard to Iraq is there is no template that you can apply to
Iraq and have it be valid for the region. The situation in the
north is dramatically different from the south; the situation
in the west and the east is also different; central Baghdad has
its own dynamics.
The thing that troubled us, as members of the Commission,
was the degree to which Iranian influence is exerting itself in
the southern part of the country. Four provinces in the south
have been transferred to provincial Iraqi control, and we
believe that that doesn't mean that you should not pay
attention to those regions and be careful about what's going on
there, because it is worrisome. But the Shia-on-Shia fighting
is essentially a reflection of the fact that the majority of
Iraqis seem to want an independent Iraqi, they don't want to be
dominated by a neighboring country, and most of the Iraqis that
we spoke to in that region said that they are going to take
care of this problem, ultimately, themselves. I think that
we're going to have to pay attention to the border questions,
to make it more difficult for Iran to exert as much influence
as it has in the internal affairs of Iraq in the coming years.
Senator Bayh. Thank you gentlemen, I'm about to miss a
vote. So, I apologize.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. General Jones, I want to talk to you about
two different issues. The first is the recommendation in the
report having to do with the National Police. I would welcome
Chief Ramsey's comments on that, as well. When I first read
your assessment of the National Police as, essentially, being
ineffective, and the subsequent recommendation that it be
disbanded, it brought to mind what I think was a disastrous
policy decision to disband the Iraqi army in the early days of
the war, thus creating a large number of trained, armed,
alienated, and unemployed men who subsequently joined the
insurgents or the militias. In talking to you before the
hearing, I learned that that is not really an appropriate
parallel.
For the record, so that everyone has the benefit of the
discussion that you and I had, could you or Chief Ramsey
describe exactly what percentage of the police force you're
talking about and the fact that the National Police is a
smaller group among the security forces?
Chief Ramsey?
Mr. Ramsey. Yes, Senator. Thanks for raising that issue,
because there is a lot of confusion around that particular
recommendation.
The National Police consists of about 25,000 members. The
Iraqi police service has 230,000, roughly. So, it is not the
entire police force that we're talking about. We're talking
about a separate department that is significantly smaller than
the Iraqi police service.
We also are not talking about total disbandment, to the
point where people are just going back out into provinces and
become armed insurgents and all that sort of thing. We're
talking about redefining their mission. We believe that there
are many functions within policing that are highly specialized,
require a great deal of skill and training, that the provincial
police may not be able to sustain, long-term, such as explosive
ordnance disposal or bomb squads, SWAT teams or emergency
response teams, urban search-and-rescue, which in the United
States is largely fire-centric, but, obviously, police could
perform that particular function, river patrols, air support.
All those kinds of functions could be performed by a group,
national in scope. That's what we're recommending. Small groups
in the provinces, but being controlled centrally.
That would take about 6,000 people, roughly, maybe perhaps
a few more, of the 25,000. The remaining people could go in
either the army or to the Iraqi police service, where there's
still help needed.
Counterinsurgency is obviously very important in Iraq. For
now, the National Police, that is probably one of their
principal functions, as they are currently organized, which has
led to a lot of issues, quite frankly. Last October they
disbanded an entire brigade because of 26 Sunnis allegedly
kidnapped, 7 of which were later murdered, and the National
Police--or at least a brigade within the National Police--
believed to be responsible for that. Those are very serious
allegations, and it's highly sectarian, and our sense was that,
if they were given a real police mission--and right now, their
mission is unclear, whether it be a military unit or a police
unit--that that would solve a lot--or at least lessen--of the
issues and problems surrounding the National Police.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
General Jones, the second issue I want to bring up with you
concerns the transition to a new mission that you've described
in your report. Your report suggests that coalition forces
could begin to be adjusted, realigned, retasked as the Iraqi
army becomes more and more capable. You look ahead to the first
quarter of 2008, when this might be able to be accomplished.
This is very similar, in many ways, to the new mission proposed
by the Iraq Study Group and also proposed by Senator Nelson and
I in a proposal where we've suggested that our troops focus on
border security, counterterrorism operations, training and
equipping of Iraqi troops, and protecting Americans and
American infrastructure.
My question for you is, how soon do you think we could
begin that transition to a new mission for our troops? I'm not
talking about setting a timetable or deadlines for withdrawal,
but transitioning the mission, I believe, is important. I think
we need to do that as soon as possible. Could you give us more
guidance on when you believe the kind of realignment that you
recommend could begin to take place?
General Jones. Senator, thank you for that question. I
would just simply say that such a transition is probably going
to be incremental. It will not be a certain date, when the
mission changes dramatically, but accomplished over time,
depending on the situation, the capabilities of the units, the
progress that we hope will continue to be made by the ISFs. But
we saw some evidence, in some areas, that it has actually
already started. General Abrams mentioned Nasariyah province,
with the Australian brigade down there, and their relationship
with the Iraqi police and the Iraqi army has already begun to
show signs of instituting that kind of overwatch transition.
So, I think it will be sequential, but our report suggested
early 2008, but, really, the commanders on the ground can
determine that, the transition of the mission.
Dr. Hamre. I'd defer to my colleagues who studied the
military mission more directly, but we recommended that we
stand up a transition command that would help facilitate this
very thing. I don't know if my colleagues would care to comment
on it, but it's one of our recommendations, that we
institutionally lead this with structure at the top, in a
command.
General Jones. I'm glad Secretary Hamre raised that issue.
I believe we feel very strongly, as a Commission, that what is
lacking in the briefing sets that one gets when you go to
Baghdad is a sense of the center of mass of transition. You can
get answers to a transitional question if you ask the military
or if you ask the Justice Department or if you ask other
aspects of the government, but you don't get a sense of
transition being discussed, in the broad sense, in any one
place. So, we recommended, as one of our suggestions, that such
a place be established. It sends a good, clear intent of what
we're there to do, and it also is a place where you can measure
the progress that we're making with regard to transition. It
goes beyond simply the police and the military. It would
include legal reform, economic reform, unemployment, the
services--political reforms that governments must go through,
and how the ministries are working. Capturing all that in a
center, so that people can see where we were a year ago, where
we are today, and what the plan is for the future, we think is
an important message to send forward, and that's why we made
that recommendation. So, built into that would be the military
aspect of it.
Senator Collins. General?
General Joulwan. In my view, what is needed for this
transition is a political surge to match the military surge.
That is beyond the scope of what--our soldiers and the Iraqi
soldiers have provided an opportunity here for that to take
place. How we do that is going to be very critical in the next
4 to 6 months, and I think it's very important, at least from
my view, that you understand that.
Senator Collins. Thank you for your great work.
Chairman Levin [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Jones, I've been interested in violence in Iraq.
The reason for that is, there's been some differences on
reports, and even some dispute on those differences. In the
Commission's report, it cites that there are signs of
improvement in the security situation in Baghdad, based on
reductions in the average number of daily attacks and the daily
number of sectarian killings. Experts from the GAO, however,
dispute the accuracy of those conclusions. The data that forms
the basis for the military's conclusions have not been publicly
released.
General, did the Commission review of the data on violence
independently arrive at the conclusion that the levels of
violence have decreased? Or did it rely on the military's
previous assessment of the levels of violence?
General Jones. Senator, we relied on the data that we were
provided by both Iraqi authorities and also our own authorities
in Baghdad. We have no reason to doubt the validity of those
figures. Clearly, anytime you inject 30,000 U.S. troops in a
capital region that is, in this case Baghdad, you're going to
affect the level of violence. It's going to go down, I
guarantee it. The other participant in the surge was a
significant number of Iraqi police and Iraqi troops in the same
region, so, thankfully, that surge--that tactic did result in
the numbers going down significantly.
I can't swear to their absolute accuracy, down to the
individual, but I'm certainly confident in--and the Commission
is unanimous in--the feeling that it did have that effect.
Senator Akaka. General, many of the Commission's
recommendations rely on continued U.S. military presence in
Iraq. The Commission's report states that the Iraqis would not
be able to assume responsibility for their own security for the
next 12 to 18 months. The Iraqi logistics organization has
estimated to need even longer time to fully develop. We've
heard differently on that, as well.
General Jones, what kind of U.S. troop levels would be
needed to provide the support recommended by the Commission?
How long would those troop levels need to be sustained?
General Jones. Senator, our mandate was to evaluate the
capabilities of the ISFs and the likelihood of their continued
progress over a defined period of time, and we did not get into
the scope and the structure of U.S. forces, with the exception
of coming to some conclusions that would suggest, as we said in
our concluding remarks, that some sort of reassignment,
remissioning, retasking of those forces would be possible as a
result of the progress that the Iraqi army and the security
forces are making. That was about as far as we could go in the
90-day timeframe, without doing considerably more analysis. I
presume that the military authorities that are presently
executing the mission can give you a better answer than we can.
General Joulwan. Can I just add, on that--which is a point
I think we all agreed on. On the logistics side, for example,
it was clear to us that there is an Iraqi way and then there's
an American way. Many of us felt that we're trying to impose an
American way on logistics and other areas, when an Iraqi way
may be good enough. We mentioned that in the report, and I
think we need to go back and look at that. We've mentioned that
to the commanders on the ground, that perhaps the Iraqi way may
suffice, and that may, indeed, in the long-term, work better.
So, I wanted to bring that out, because I think that's
important in our discussions as we consider the way ahead.
Dr. Hamre. They have never failed to make payroll. When
it's something important to them, they get it done.
General Joulwan. We forget, they moved large corps on the
battlefield in the 1980s--on a front wider than the central
front of Europe in World War II, and they did that in the
1980s. So, I think there's something here to go back and look
at; is there an Iraqi way of doing this?
Senator Akaka. Thank you for that.
General, it appears that the longer our military has spent
in Iraq, the more it is viewed by the Iraqis, and possibly by
other countries in the region, as an undesirable occupation
force, and culturally, as you just mentioned--that could be
part of the reason.
General, in the Commission's assessment of the security
situation in Iraq, and in developing its recommendations, to
what extent did the Commission consider the long-term effects
of our presence in Iraq on the Iraqi citizens and how it might
affect their cooperation with U.S. and coalition forces? What
were the Commission's conclusions on that?
General Jones. Senator, we did assess that, and our
findings are contained in the last chapter of our report, which
suggests that we should do a number of things to lessen the
perception that we are, in fact, an occupying force. We believe
that it is time to look at our footprint, it is time to look at
the number of bases we have, our disposition, the number of
forces, to make sure that we have the right number of personnel
there, but not an excessive number, and that we are sensitive
to the perceptions that, rather than being an expeditionary
force, which is temporary, we might inadvertently be giving the
impression that we are, in fact, an occupying force. We've made
several recommendations to that effect. We believe that
transferring control of all the provinces to the sovereign
government would be a good thing. We believe that a transition
headquarters would be a good thing. We believe that taking a
look at our footprint, and reducing it, rescoping it wherever
possible, would be a good thing. If you take all of those
things together, it would lessen the image of the coalition
being an occupying force.
Senator Akaka. I know, as you pointed out, you particularly
were dealing with the Iraqis. Is there any evidence that the
Iraqis are sympathetic with the administration's claims that we
have to fight terrorists over there and that we do not have to
fight them here?
General Jones. I think that we've seen evidence that, at
least in certain parts of the country, they would feel that
way. I think my overall personal conclusion is that I came over
there with the fact that the Iraqis that we spoke to, be they
Shia, Sunni, or Kurd, are desirous of an independent nation
able to stand on its own. We think that there are some
impediments to that happening, and some of them are internal,
but we also believe that the destabilizing factors brought into
play by Iran and Syria do play a significant role in this, as
well.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, General Jones.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, let me just echo what others have said, and that
is to thank you, as well as all the members of the Commission,
for the great work you've done. I can't think in my 13 years in
Congress of a more important Commission than this group of
individuals, nor a more important issue to consider than this
particular issue. I commend all of you for taking the time,
obviously giving it the great effort that you've given it, and
we thank you for that.
You touched on an issue in your opening comments, and you
allude to it in your report, that has been pretty obvious to me
from the start, at least when we began trying to train the
Iraqi soldiers and the security police, and that's the issue of
leadership. I've been concerned about parallels and the fact
that we can take a young kid out of a high school in the United
States and send him to Fort Jackson or Fort Benning or any of
our training installations, and we make a soldier out of him
pretty quickly, but we haven't been able to do that over there.
In one of the early hearings that we had, I was told by one of
your former colleagues that that was an issue that we were
going to have to face, because these people had never been able
to exhibit leadership. If they were under the rule of Saddam,
if they showed some form of leadership or wanted to be a
leader, unless they agreed with Saddam, they had their head cut
off or their family was threatened, intimidated. I think,
obviously, that has been the case, and it's been very difficult
to get the gut feeling out of a large group of these folks to
be able to develop themselves as leaders. I'm not sure how we
do that, but I want you to expand on it.
I was thinking, as you were introducing everybody from
General King down to my buddy General Punaro that every one of
these folks is a great leader in their own respect, and somehow
we have to be able to develop that leadership within the
grassroots of the Iraqi army, the security police, as well as
the government side. I don't see it, and I'm wondering if
there's anything I'm missing, or is there anything that we
ought to be doing that we're not doing to try to move that ball
down the field with respect to leadership?
General Jones. Senator, thank you very much for that
question.
We were privileged to have as members of this Commission
two very distinguished sergeants major, Sergeant Major Brown
and Sergeant Major McMichael. With your permission, I'd like to
ask Sergeant Major McMichael to come to the table and respond
to that grassroots-level question about the basic Iraqi
leadership at the NCO level that he observed. I think you'll be
interested by his answer.
Senator Chambliss. Sure.
Sergeant McMichael. Good morning, sir, and thank you for
the opportunity to respond to your question.
It is obvious, with our assessment and having the
opportunity to observe the Iraqi NCO corps, that they have a
great need for an effective NCO corps, and that will take them
down to the grassroots. The problem is the ability to allow
them to be properly trained. As we had the ability to, and the
opportunity to, observe their academies and their training--
entry-level training--we have great training facilities and
great teams there that are providing the training. The problem
is that they have to be able to understand the training, and we
have to adjust the training to their level. As we have said
here on the panel earlier today, it is not a U.S. model, it is
not a NATO model, it is the right model. We're trying to
provide them with that.
We have seen that they are grasping the training. Without
the NCO piece, it would be very difficult to have a military
that has the cohesion or the effectiveness not only to respond
to orders, but to follow them effectively.
We have to understand that the NCO corps that we have in
our great military, in our great country today, did not happen
overnight. It took a while to build what we now know as
sergeants majors or chief master sergeants or master chiefs.
They did not develop in a microwave effect, of ``pop it in, and
they popped out.'' They grew from the grassroots up. They have
to have that same opportunity. But, in growing their NCOs, they
also have to have the ability to train their officer corps
along with it to accept this new entity that their NCOs will
bring to the table. To train the NCO to be effective, and then
put them back into the forces and not allow them to do what
they've been trained, will allow no progress whatsoever.
Senator Chambliss. Do you have confidence that that can be
done in the short-term, versus long-term?
Sergeant McMichael. I have confidence, sir, that it can be
done. The terms of effectiveness will be how effective we are
providing the training and their willingness to accept it. To
put a timeline on it will actually not be able to mirror what
we are confident of what we do every day, because we come from
a great educational background and system. Many of their
individuals in their military have a fourth-grade education.
That does not indicate that they're not intelligent enough to
grasp it, because if we observe their training, both in weapon
training and other small-unit-level training, they had no
remedial courses. To me, that meant that they were grasping the
training and the information as it was provided for them.
Senator Chambliss. Gentlemen, again, thank you very much
for a job well done, once again, we appreciate it.
General Jones. Senator, if I could just piggyback on the
Sergeant Major a little bit, at the officer level, we are very
much watching the development of the next generation of Iraqi
officers. Frankly, this will be no surprise, but the younger
officers really get it, but they're going to have to wait their
turn, although it'll probably be accelerated as the older
generation moves out. But this is the generation that is going
to make the difference in Iraq. On that score, we were pretty
optimistic by what we saw.
Senator Chambliss. Good. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, not only for your work on this
Commission, but for your lifetime service to the Nation in many
different capacities.
General Jones, General Joulwan, you probably know as much
about the force structure of the Army and the Marine Corps as
anyone, and my understanding is that, given our present force
structure, unless we take draconian steps to increase
deployment times overseas, that by next April the surge, the
additional 30,000 troops, approximately, will end. Is that a
fear? Or is that your understanding?
General Jones. My understanding is that there will be a
point when the surge will end, yes sir.
Senator Reed. Roughly next spring?
General Jones. I think it's forecasted for that, but I
don't know, exactly.
Senator Reed. So, in one sense, really, reducing the forces
is not an option, it's a reality. The question, I think, is,
when is that date? Is it March? Is it April? Is it June? Is it
May? Which raises, I think, one of the more fundamental
questions here. The increase in forces would justify a mission
of population control. Those forces go away next year sometime.
So, what are the missions that a smaller force cannot only
support, but would be more central to our interest in Iraq?
General Jones, General Joulwan, do you have any thoughts?
General Jones. We've suggested that assuming the continuing
rate of progress in the Iraqi army, and a renewed effort with
regard to the police forces, which would result in being able
to handle the internal threats to the country, and hopefully,
some evidence of national reconciliation that diminishes
sectarian violence, then the rate of progress can be enhanced.
But, having said that, with regard to what's going on right
now, the rate of progress in the Iraqi army seems to be
improving to the point that we can consider, not only alternate
missions, but alternate force structures to take on some of the
things that are not being done very well, and that is the
territorial defense, the border defense, the critical
infrastructures of the country upon which the government relies
on for its popularity--electricity, water, all kinds of
services. So, we think that, assuming a steady rate of
progress, that the coalition, over time, could be retasked
towards that mission, and that would mean new numbers and new
capabilities; hopefully, fewer.
General Joulwan. Senator, implicit in your question was,
somehow we may have time, early 2008, to the issue of, will the
troop deployments, because stretched thin or not, they're not--
at least my standpoint, that was not our intent. We based that
on what we saw in development, in our professional judgment. I
want to make that clear, that I think it's important here that
we see tactical success. How we build the strategy now to build
on that strategy is key, and we think, going to a strategic
shift of some sort, we can see possible reductions next year.
Senator Reed. This is where you sit is what you're seeing,
basically, and I understand, your mission was to evaluate the
ISF, to see what progress--independent of any other factor.
But, at the same time--and I think we're all aware of this--
there are huge strains on the land forces--on Army and the
Marine Corps--and that--everything I have heard, from the
people that I respect and admire and were being quite
forthright, are indicating that, by next spring, unless you
increase the deployment time to 18 months, call up Reserve and/
or National Guard units at a much more accelerated rate, then
this surge will end. Essentially, that's what General Petraeus
told me in Baghdad about a month ago. So, I think we have to be
realistic about what happens. Regardless of the progress of
your folks on the ground, our troops are coming down. What are
the missions?
But let me ask you, a different way, something I think is
critical. This is not central to your mission, but you were
there, you have a sense of it, I think, and you have great
expertise.
The real question here, I think, is, when those troops come
down--April, May, June--how reversible are the tactical
successes that we're seeing today on the ground? Where is the
force that's going to come in and replace them? Where is the
political coherence and the political infrastructure that will
build on these gains? How long will it take--and we've seen
this repeatedly--as our forces are drawn down--necessarily, by
the force-structure constraints--will it take for the
insurgents to begin to backfill, to begin to express theirself?
General Jones. The rate of progress that's forecast for the
Iraqi army is to grow to 13 divisions in 2008, from the 10 that
they have now. So, assuming they're able to do that--and we see
no reason to believe that they can't--manpower is available,
the volunteers are standing in line to join, the training bases
are established, the schools are up and operating, the
equipment is in the pipeline--they should be able to grow to 13
divisions, and that's 3 more than they have now, and they'll be
tested, and they'll be taking over more and more of that
internal security. Under that scenario, that ultimate reduction
of our forces is commensurate with the increase in theirs, and
that's the challenge the commanders would have to face.
Senator Reed. So, you don't anticipate at least a temporary
period of time in which our force is drawn down, the Iraqis
forces that you've looked at closely, are getting up to a level
of expertise, but a gap in which, once again, the insurgents
can exploit a decrease in our forces and the inability of the
ISF? You don't anticipate that at all?
General Joulwan. I think you always have to anticipate
different options, but if we see the continued improvement that
we've seen on the ground during our visits, if we can speed up
the foreign military sales, the equipment, they have $2 or $3
billion in the bank in New York ready to buy things that's
plugged up. That's our problem, not their problem. So, if we
give them the means, there may be substantial improvement by
next spring in the ISFs, particularly the army. We ought to
say, how can we facilitate that--stay out of the political side
of it, but, how can we facilitate that? That's incumbent upon a
lot of folks here in Washington. But I think there's
opportunity here. I think we ought to try to see if we can
capitalize on it.
Senator Reed. My time's expired. I think, as you pointed
out, the resources are growing, there are resources we have to
provide. Particularly, this foreign military sales issue is, to
me, a disaster. We've known about it for a year, we can't get
equipment to them they pay for. But the real question which
resonates throughout your report and throughout your testimony
today is--do the Iraqi people have the will to do these things?
Frankly, after 4 years--I would poll you individually, but my
time's expired--that's a highly debatable point.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Jones. Senator, if I could respond to that, though,
because I think that's an important thing.
One of the things that the Commission did is, we actually
took a poll of the Multinational Force commanders, all eight
commanders, and we asked General Petraeus to do this for us.
It's a poll that is unsigned, but we asked some interesting
questions, and I'd like to share some of the responses. These
are the most senior commanders on the ground--eight,
representing the coalition.
The assessment of the progress that has been made by the
ISFs towards attaining the capabilities required to protect the
territorial integrity of Iraq. The choices were: excellent,
satisfactory, or unsatisfactory. Within the MOD, six responded
``satisfactory,'' and only two ``unsatisfactory.''
With regard to attaining the capabilities required to deny
international terrorist safe havens: seven ``satisfactory,''
one ``unsatisfactory.''
Assessing what progress has been made by ISFs towards
attaining capabilities required to bring greater security to
the province in your area of operations: seven
``satisfactory,'' zero ``unsatisfactory,'' one ``not
applicable,'' for some reason.
Assessment of the progress that had been made by ISFs
towards ending sectarian violence and achieving national
reconciliation--this is, again, the Army, only--six
``satisfactory,'' two ``unsatisfactory.''
Ethnic composition of sectarian and its impact on
performance: two ``moderate,'' five ``negligibly.''
Capabilities required to significantly enhance independent
direct combat operations against the al Qaeda and other forces
hostile to the government of Iraq--choices: 12 to 18 months, 18
to 36, or more than 36--three said ``12 to 18 months,'' four
said, ``18 to 36,'' and one said ``more than 36.''
Finally, the assessment of the progress that has been made
by ISF towards creating the administrative, financial,
training, and other institutions needed to sustain the force:
``satisfactory,'' four, ``unsatisfactory,'' three.
So, just to give you a flavor that--the response to these
questions--very important--by the people--by the commanders who
are actually running the Multinational Forces on the day-to-day
basis, working with the Iraqis. The trend lines are favorable,
and I think this is a meaningful finding.
Senator Reed. My time's expired, but, again, gentlemen,
thank you for your service and your comments.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I also want to add my thanks to your service. The panel has
provided us a lot of insight. I'm sorry if I'm asking questions
already asked. That's the way the Senate is. That's the price
you pay to come here, I guess.
The old strategy, as I understood it, was: keep the
military footprint fairly low, train, transfer power, and
leave. It seems to me that the insurgents benefited from that
old strategy, because they grew in power and influence. Is that
a fair statement about what we did before the surge? Did we
have enough troops? Did we make a fundamental mistake after the
fall of Baghdad I guess is what I'm asking?
General Jones. This Commission started on a certain day,
and we didn't visit the details of the past. But, obviously, I
think, if you polled each one of us, we'd all have our own
opinions, but certainly everything didn't go quite the way we
visualized it collectively. But I think our consensus is that,
regardless of what may have happened in the past, that there's
some indications that things are moving in the right direction
in some quarters, and that's encouraging. That's the first bit
of, I think, positive news that I think that we've heard in a
long time.
Senator Graham. General?
General Joulwan. Personally, I think that you're correct.
If we had it to do over again, I think the planning would have
been different, that what we would try to do is create a secure
environment after Baghdad fell, and we didn't. But we are where
we are. I think what we're doing now is trying to assess where
we are, what we can recommend for the future.
Senator Graham. For what it's worth, my assumptions were
wrong. It's okay to say that around here. I thought it would
be, after the fall of Baghdad, that the model we had would
work. But it was pretty clear to me, after about 6 months, it
was going in the wrong direction. After about 3 years, it was
crystal clear we were going nowhere fast. So, the new strategy
seems to have paid some dividends.
Rather than talking about just all the good news here from
our side--the police have always worried me. I was there for
the election, and I came back to the White House with Senator
Biden, Senator Chambliss and--four of us went over. The one
thing that struck me was how the Iraqi army viewed the police.
The Iraqi army did not have a very high opinion of the police.
I have been over there eight times now, and I think the
Ministry of Interior is one of the most sectarian groups--maybe
this new guy is making improvements. Do you see any
improvements on his watch in terms of firing some of the
battalion commanders?
General Jones. We've noticed the recent actions. Our report
is fairly critical of the Ministry of the Interior and
everything that flows from that ministry. So, the ability of
the ministries to work together is virtually nonexistent.
You're right, police and and military didn't work together.
Senator Graham. I think you're dead-on. I've been saying
that in different capacities--when you sit down--done a little
legal work over there, and you're sitting across the table with
some Ministry of Interior folks, they just don't give you a
warm, fuzzy feeling about--the judges are different. Did you
spend any time with the judiciary?
General Jones. Unfortunately, we did not.
Senator Graham. Did you get to go to the Rule of Law Green
Zone, by any chance?
General Jones. Yes, we did.
Senator Graham. Okay. That's a compound where they're
trying to secure the judges, and I think hats off to General
Petraeus there.
Why is the Ministry of Interior so different?
Dr. Hamre. You have to remember the election, the Sunnis
sat out the election. So, the people that really helped
populate the first part of the government were the Shia. The
Shia have felt victimized by the Sunni for years. So, they
looked at the Ministry of Interior as a bulwark of support for
them, for fear of the rise----
Senator Graham. Why not the army? Why didn't they look at
the army the same way?
Dr. Hamre. They didn't. I can't explain that. They
basically turned the National Police into a praetorian guard.
It is a Shia praetorian guard.
Senator Graham. Is there something about the army that's
different, in terms of its command structure or history, what
do you think, General? I think that's an important question.
Why not the army? Why the police?
General Joulwan. Senator, I watched this from my work for
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in the 1980s, where the Iran-
Iraq War was fought on--as mentioned earlier--a very large
frontage, and they were Iraqis fighting Iranians. They were
Sunni, Shia, Kurds. There is a national identity here. As I
mentioned when we talked to commanders from the Minister of
Defense on down, and I said, ``Are you a Sunni, a Shia''--he
said, ``I'm an Iraqi.'' So, I think within the armed forces--
the army, in particular--there is this identity. I think we
need to build on it. That's, at least, the point we're trying
to point out.
Senator Graham. Do you have any confidence that the
Minister of Interior that they have now will turn this around?
Dr. Hamre. He doesn't go to the ministry.
Senator Graham. Let me just do a poll. Does anyone thing
the guy in charge now can turn it around--has the desire to
turn it around?
General Jones. I think he should be given credit what he's
already done. But he certainly has not had enough time to
either say he will or he won't. But there's no doubt in our
minds that it has to be done. It's not negotiable.
Senator Graham. So, this guy, in your opinion, could do it.
He has the willingness to try?
General Jones. The actions that he took to take out a
significant number of leaders because they were sectarian, and
the fact that it happened, is encouraging, but there's an awful
lot that needs to be done.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
General Joulwan. Senator, there was a great comment made to
me, that the Sunnis know that they have lost, the Shias haven't
realized they've won.
Senator Graham. Yes, I think that's pretty true. I'll just
end on this thought. One of the things that strikes me very
disturbing is that there are a lot of Sunnis that are qualified
to join the police, they just can't get hired.
General Jones. That's correct.
Senator Graham. All over Baghdad, when I was there doing
some Reserve duty, working on rule-of-law issues, there's 1,700
qualified Sunni police candidates who have been vetted by us,
in parts of Baghdad that are out of control, that could really
make a difference, and we can't get the government to hire
them. Did you find that to be a problem?
General Jones. Yes, we did find that.
Mr. Ramsey. Yes. Senator, when we took a look at the
police, we did see that as a serious issue. There's really no
reason why that's not taking place. The National Police, in
particular, 85 percent Shia, only 13 percent Sunni. Most of the
problems lie right there with the National Police. Not to say
that the others aren't having some issues, but most of the real
criticism and problems are really with the National Police.
That has to change.
The other point that you made earlier that I think is a
difference between the army and the police, the police are
basically being led by former military leaders that don't have
a background in civil policing. Whereas, the coalition has
done, I think, a remarkable job of putting quality training
together, doing the best they can to really try to bring people
up to speed, it takes time to really understand to operate as a
police force in a different where you do have a rule of law. It
is just totally foreign to them, and it's difficult, and it's
going to take a little time before they're able to really, I
think, be effective. With the National Police, they're under
strength in their officer corps by about 45 percent. So,
command and control becomes an issue. So, there's just a lot of
issues and problems that are impacting the police, and that's
not even talking about the dysfunction of the Ministry of
Interior, which is, I think, the overriding problem that they
have. But all those things, combined, are just retarding the
growth of both the Iraqi police service and, certainly, the
National Police, with their other problems.
Dr. Hamre. Sir, and the revenues come through the Ministry
of Interior to all the police, and that's the central problem.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Senator Corker.
Senator Corker: Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.
I want to echo the comments made when this hearing began.
We are all honored that you are here, and deeply appreciative
of the service you've provided, both in the past and today.
I've prided myself on never asking a question that's
already been asked. I'm not sure I can do that today, the way
this hearing has gone, with votes in between. I'm sure this
actually has been asked. But, when I left the hearing, there
was discussion about the border and discussion about some of
the basic equipment necessary to secure the border, especially
between Iraq and Iran.
I've been in General Odierno's office twice this year, and,
on his cocktail table in his office, he has there a lot of
Iranian arms, if you will, that have come in from there, and
it's basically on display so that everyone who comes into his
office knows that arms, if you will, are coming into Iraq from
Iran, which, obviously, everybody thinks is a big, big issue.
Could you expand a little bit on the border issue? It just
seems so elementary, especially when it relates to the
equipment pieces. We're spending $10 billion a month. I know I
had conversations with General Hadley early on about making
sure General McCaffrey had been before us, in the Foreign
Relations Committee, talking about the lack of expenditures on
equipment, the fact that if we'd just spend some basic dollars
on equipment, we could really lessen the effort, if you will,
that we were having to do by our own men, militarily, because
we'd be giving them the equipment to do the things they need to
do. I wondered if you could just expand on that a little bit,
and I apologize, I'm sure somebody else has asked that
question.
General Jones. Glad to do it, Senator. If I could, I'd like
to call on Admiral Johnson, who also spent time on the border--
General Berndt is also our expert--but to give Admiral Johnson
a chance to respond to that very important question.
Admiral Johnson. Thank you, Senator.
Indeed, we have gone over some of this ground before. Fact
of the matter is, we got a late start on border security force.
It's only been in the last year to 18 months that we've given
it a fairly serious effort to help them establish a security
force.
It's under the leadership of the Ministry of Interior, and,
as has been discussed previously, that's one of the more
ineffective ministries we have in the Iraqi government.
The force is some 37,000. They are making progress. They
seem very eager. We visited three different border-crossing
facilities. I visited one on the Iranian border. General Berndt
visited one on the Jordanian border and one on the Syrian
border. All the forces were eager. But there's no standard
operating procedure, they have a very rudimentary capability.
They don't have modern-day equipment that can examine cargo,
such as backscatter arrays that can look inside of cargo vans.
There were five of them at the Iranian site that we visited,
none of them worked. They don't have the more modern gamma-ray
facilities. They didn't even have cranes or forklifts that
would lift cargo off so they could examine it.
Furthermore, this is the primary Iranian-Iraqi border
crossing, and, since the war began, the Iranians made the
trans-shipment point on their side of the border, put up berms
and walls so the Iraqi trucks go over to the Iranian side of
the border, behind this berm, transload the equipment or
whatever the goods and services are that are being imported
into Iraq--onto Iraqi trucks, no one sees what takes place
there or what transpires. They drive over to the Iraqi side. We
witnessed a few people crawling over the trucks, maybe looking
into them, looking at whatever manifest the driver might have,
but that was the extent of the effort taking place there. That
was all the capability they had.
So, we have a long way to go in this area.
Senator Corker. We've been training servicemen now for 3 or
4 years. This is one of those things that you would think you
could solve in a week or 2 weeks. This is infuriating to know
that this is happening, and that, truly, I think that two of
you, with a few folks--one of you, probably, with a few folks--
could figure out a way to solve this problem, like, yesterday.
Is that simplifying this thing?
Admiral Johnson. It probably is simplifying, a little bit.
I think that there could be a much greater sense of urgency in
this particular area, and it would have some impact. But this
is a very long border. It's roughly equal to what we have with
Mexico in the United States. So, even if you had better
equipment at the border crossing points, to be able to zip up
the border is a monumental task.
What General Jones has referred to, maybe, as transition
takes place in the coming months, we could help and exert a
greater effort in this particular area, which is of a strategic
importance to us to tighten up that border. But they need a lot
more training. They need standard operating procedures--and
they need more modern and technical equipment. The Personal
Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System
(PISCES), there's no real list of who should be allowed into
the country. Many of the passports that are used are not
scanable passports anyway, even if they had a PICSES site
system and they had electrical power to run it. So, there are
some rather significant challenges there.
Senator Corker. I know a big part of the problem is that
people are coming and going, and that's something that's very
difficult to contend with. We have the same problem here in our
own country, and has been around for a long time.
Admiral Johnson. We were reminded of that frequently.
Senator Corker. Yes. The issue, though, of equipment coming
and going, of arms coming and going, seems to me to be
something far simpler to resolve. You don't have to have
documents to know that there are explosive devices on the back
of a truck. Could you speak to the order of magnitude of that
problem, as it relates to affecting us in a negative way in
what we're doing in Iraq itself--the order of magnitude of
those arms, those munitions, those weapons coming across the
Iraqi border into their country?
Admiral Johnson. I think the display on General Odierno's
table there in his office speaks to that. The stuff comes every
day. I haven't even begun to talk about the sea border, which
is also very porous, particularly down in the Basrah area,
where it's controlled by Shia militia. So, I'm not saying that
we can't make progress, and we can make a dent in it, but to be
able to zip up that border so that stuff can't get in, I think,
is nearly impossible. So, what you're going to have to do is
internally take away the ability of people who are so inclined
not to be able to use that stuff. I think that that's the
approach we need to take, at the same time we continue to build
up the capacity of the border security force and
professionalize them. There's also the whole issue of
corruption, which we haven't discussed, which is very severe in
this particular area of government capacity.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Chairman Levin. Senator Corker, thank you so much.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Gentlemen, I think you should depart with the sense of
mission accomplished here, if I can use that phrase, in terms
of--you've fulfilled the charter that Congress specified, in my
judgment, and you did it admirably, individually and
collectively. I thank you.
General Jones. Thank you.
Senator Warner. But, as I look at the future, there's an
awesome decision that has to be made by our President, under
his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief, as to what
changes should be made in our strategy as we look at the
future. Certainly, we've covered, clearly, the troop
requirements and how the leading will begin to fall if we
maintain the current deployment, which I rigidly would adhere
to, no deviation in the current length of time these able
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are serving.
Anyway, back to my point--and then you look at General
Petraeus. I was trying to think of the parallels in history
when a single officer has had to make a decision that is so
determining of the future, not only of this military operation
in Iraq, but the determination of the future of our Nation's
status in that region, our credibility, our ability to deal
with Iran in nuclear power, in nuclear weapons as they're
dealing with, and all of the other decisions. So, we're at a
very major pivotal point in this conflict. I think back to
Eisenhower, trying to struggle with the decision of when and
how we would initiate Operation Overlord to go into Europe with
our forces. It really is extraordinary. I join with you and
others, saying that I think that General Petraeus can make
that.
But strategy of the future, it seems to me, can no longer
be based on a predicate of the reconciliation that you've
emphasized from the top on down. I see no signs of that coming
into place in a timely or an effective manner to really begin
to affect this strategy. It'll be a missing component of the
decisionmaking. That's why I'm drawn to your recommendation, on
pages 130 and 131, about provincial Iraqi control--since it's
not functioning at the top, at least give the provinces the
measure of autonomy under the existing constitution in Iraq to
govern and do things for themselves. You say, ``For the sake of
Iraqi sovereignty, and to lessen the perception that we are
occupiers, all provinces should be transferred to Iraqi control
immediately.'' That's a very profound finding, and I support
that.
I'm interested, what reaction did you get from the
administration, particularly General Petraeus and others, when
you brought forth that recommendation?
General Jones. Senator, we did touch on that in our
briefings, and it was received with interest and, I think, the
seriousness with which something like that should be
considered. I think it's being discussed in various centers at
DOD and the National Security Council (NSC).
Senator Warner. All right. I think that's sufficient. They
took it, did not reject it.
General Jones. Took it.
Senator Warner. My last question would be, in your report,
you talk about transferring our forces to perform critical
infrastructure security. That translates into the very basic
needs of water, removal of sewage, electricity, all of those
things by which the average Iraqi citizen can judge that his
nation is moving forward or remains basically stagnant, as it
is now. All these years, all of the investment that this
country has made into trying to bring up those essential
services for decency of living and existence have not
materialized. Now, how would we undertake that security
operation differently than what we have to assume is the
ineffective security now being provided by a combination of
whatever coalition forces and Iraqi forces is taking place? How
would we go about augmenting that such that electricity and
water and sanitation and other essentials can be given equally
to the Iraqi citizens, no matter where they live?
General Jones. Senator, as the ISFs become more able,
obviously the result of that would be that they would take on
more of the problems associated with the internal security
threats that we currently experience. Having more troops
available means that some of the other issues that we have not
been able to devote, as much as we would like to have done, to
that aspect of external security and assuring the safety and
security of the most critical infrastructures of the country,
could be accomplished.
Senator Warner. By our forces as they transition from
overwatch----
General Jones. Could be as part of the strategic----
Senator Warner. Right.
What would we do differently than is being done today? Is
it just the size of the forces, the technology we would bring,
the equipment?
General Jones. I think it's the availability of forces to
do those kinds of things. I think Admiral Johnson and General
Berndt spoke about the critical situation along the borders.
That's one aspect of it. Obviously, if terrorists can keep
impeding the flow of progress, in terms of electricity and
water and other basic elements of life, that is very
destabilizing and contrary to our mission. So, as you get more
mass and more capability, we can do more of these things. That
will help, certainly, turn the attitude of the average Iraqi
citizen, in support not only of the coalition, but in support
of his own government.
Senator Warner. I thank the witness.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
This is the beginning of an important fall discussion
dealing with the commitment we've made in Iraq, what we're
going to do, what our level of commitment will be, and what the
prospects are for success. I thank you very much for your
wisdom and mature judgment on these issues.
I take away a few things. One, that the situation is not
hopeless. I think some of our constituents may have just felt
like throwing up their hands, and, ``There's no way we're going
to be successful.'' I do not believe that, and I'm pleased that
you do not, because a failure would be a very bad thing for our
country, as you note in the report.
I think it's important--General Jones, you noted that--you
conclude that the Iraqi people do want a unified Iraqi
government. They would like that as a goal. I think that's
important, fundamentally, as to whether or not we can be
successful. You've noted it would take a long time. I just want
to pursue that a little bit. I agree, it's going to take a long
time to have an established government here. But that does not
mean, when we convey that to the people of this country who
provided the soldiers and the resources to fight it, that we
have to maintain the same level and the same expense level,
does it?
General Jones. Right.
Senator Sessions. You're providing us some ideas about how
we can begin to draw down that expense and that troop-level
commitment. Is that fair to say?
General Jones. That's absolutely correct, sir.
Senator Sessions. So, that would certainly be my vision and
hope, that we could draw down our commitment, have more of the
burden carried by the Iraqi people, and that we can end up with
a stable, decent government that's an ally to the United
States, and not a base for terrorist activities, and would not
result in the kind of end that would embolden the enemy and
would cause them to make a decision where would they attack
next. If they're successful here, the next thing that they
would do is to decide where next they're going to attack. I
think we would be on the defensive.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the hearing.
I would just note, I believe the press have previewed your
report a bit more negative than I hear it today. I hear yours
as a fundamental, wise evaluation that gives us a cause for
belief that we can prevail here. Likewise, I think the spin on
the GAO report was more negative than it deserved. But we
certainly face difficult, difficult challenges. It's not an
easy thing. This is a very difficult thing. But, given where we
are, I think your report is very helpful.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Corker, do you have any additional questions?
Senator Corker. The gentleman said that we haven't delved
into even the issue of corruption yet. Has there been much
discussion of that as it relates to security today in this
hearing?
General Jones. Not specifically.
Senator Corker. I'd like for you to expand a little bit on
that and how that is affecting what's happening on the ground.
I'd like to begin by asking if the oil that is coming out of
the ground in Iraq--is it metered?
Dr. Hamre. Sir, the estimate is that about 400,000 barrels
of oil is pilfered every day.
Senator Corker. 400,000 barrels is pilfered. Are there
meters--which, again, is a basic elementary step--are there
actually meters on those wells?
Dr. Hamre. I don't know the answer to that.
Admiral Johnson. I can't speak for the well heads, but I
visited the offshore loading platforms, and the modern one, the
new one that we have just poured a considerable amount of money
in, is state-of-the-art. It's one of the top six, in terms of
capacity, in the entire world. It does have modern-day metering
capacity on it, with telemetry back to the Ministry of Oil in
Baghdad, so they can see precisely how much is being shipped
every day.
Now, I might add that, when we were there, the U.S. Navy
security folks that were resident on this platform told us, as
a sidebar, that the Iraqi Southern Oil Company people, who are
also resident on there, are urging the construction company,
who has put in this telemetry and metering equipment as they
finish up the project, to shut it off before they leave. So,
that speaks to some element of corruption and what have you, as
an example. But, right now, I can tell you that there's very
good telemetry.
Now, the northern rig does not have telemetry, and there's
some conjecture of where that oil that gets shipped out of
there--it's a very small amount compared to the southern
facility--but that doesn't have telemetry.
So, they don't have a good feel for exactly what's being
shipped, except from the modern one, today, which they have
very good----
Senator Corker. The estimate of the number of barrels of
oil that are being pilfered is what?
Dr. Hamre. Between 200,000 and 400,000 a day. It's been
steady at that rate.
Senator Corker. Are those funds, that are obviously being
generated by someone, being used to counter our efforts there?
Or are they funds that are being used--I hate to say this--
to help our efforts there? What is happening with those 400,000
barrels?
Dr. Hamre. Sir, you see a combination--and, actually,
General King should speak to this--but I think you'll see a
combination of criminality and insurgency that gets blended
unevenly. Some of this is just pure criminal activity, and some
of it is definitely flowing into the hands, into the resources
of insurgent and militia elements.
Jim, why don't you come up here, speak to that? I think
it's important.
General King. Sir, I think we could just define, also, that
an amount of this does lead itself into terrorism being
financed, and to be used against the coalition forces. However,
because of the criminal element being so tightly tied in with
Shia-on-Shia or Sunni of various factions with it, it is hard
for us to give an accurate assessment about the flow of funds,
although we do know that the flow of funds that goes out of the
country does enable forces to come back in.
Senator Corker. It would seem to me that figuring out how
much oil was coming out of the ground is like the border
question a minute ago. Figuring out the amount of oil that was
coming out of the ground, and where it was going, would be a
more elementary solution than some of the more difficult issues
of sectarian violence that we are dealing with that involve
human behavior. Again, these things are mathematical and can be
metered. Is there a reason that we've not employed methods to
keep 400,000 barrels of oil, which is indicated to be the case,
from going into the wrong hands or into hands that are not
legally holding those oil reserves or oil?
General King. I'm not capable of answering that statement
fully, or accurately, but I would offer that, just as the way
that the coalition forces have been now, it depends on where
you have to use your forces. What would it take to be able to
do that? I think that we would find that, in partial, with some
of the oil and other things that are going out, that would be
simultaneous with the border security, both going out through
Turkey as well as through other areas.
Senator Corker. These don't have to be army personnel. We
have, I'm sure, people around the world in civilian activities
that figure out how much oil is coming out of the ground and
who's paying for it, right?
Dr. Hamre. But, sir, the black marketing really started
during the years of embargo on Saddam. That's how he raised
$400 million a year to build palaces. There's this very
elaborate, large black-market activity that's very mature in
this country. So, a guy pulls up, he says, ``Okay, only write
down 1,500 gallons in my tanker truck,'' and you put in 3,000,
and he's taking the other 1,500 off into a diversion. This is
very widespread. This is a big, heavy-duty black-market
activity in this country.
Senator Corker. Are you saying the reason that we're not
intervening is that that would create other issues, other
revolts for us to deal with, and this is just a common
practice, and, to try to intervene creates other issues that we
would have to deal with as a country?
Dr. Hamre. Sir, I shouldn't comment on that. My sense is
that we have had our hands full with a whole range of things,
and this was a problem, but it wasn't as imminent and immediate
as people shooting at us.
Chairman Levin. Let me just conclude with a few clarifying
questions. I hope this will be brief.
On page 46 of your version, you've indicated, again, that,
``The armed forces of Iraq are capable''--and that's present
tense--``of assuming greater responsibility for the internal
security of Iraq.'' I think each of us have noted that, and the
importance of that conclusion. That seems to be one of your
thrusts, is that we want them to take over greater
responsibility, and that they are presently capable of assuming
greater responsibility. Would you agree with that?
General Jones. Correct.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Now, on page 60 of our version, 62 of
your version, there's a statement that, ``There is rising
confidence that progress is being made at the rate that will
enable Iraqi army tactical formations and units to gradually
assume a greater leadership role in counterinsurgency
operations.'' That's totally consistent with what you said on
page 46.
General Joulwan. In the next 12 to 18 months.
Chairman Levin. That's the part that's confusing. Page 44
is present tense, that they are presently capable of assuming
greater responsibility. Am I correct that the reason the words
``12 to 18 months'' are in there is because that was your
mandate, that's what you were tasked to do?
General Joulwan. Correct.
Chairman Levin. ``Could this happen in the next 12 to 18
months?'' and your answer is yes.
General Joulwan. Yes.
Chairman Levin. But you're not saying that that cannot, and
should not, occur promptly, as soon as that capability is
established. You're not saying you want to delay that.
General Jones. We're not saying that, no, sir.
Chairman Levin. Okay.
On page 61 of the binder, ``Without continued training,
mentoring, and key combat enablers from the coalition, it would
be difficult for the Iraqi army to progress to a point where it
can conduct effective, independent counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism operations. Further, it is likely that hard-
won progress made to date would atrophy.''
That is ``without continued training, key mentoring, and
key combat enablers.'' Would the slight rephrasing also be true
that ``with continued training, mentoring, and key combat
enablers from the coalition, that the Iraqi army will be able
to progress to a point where it can conduct effective
independent counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations,
and that, under that circumstance, it is likely that hard-won
progress to date could be sustained``? In other words--do you
see what I'm saying?
General Jones. Yes, sir.
General Joulwan. Yes, I agree.
Chairman Levin. Okay, you agree with that.
General Jones. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. General Jones, to you and your colleagues,
again, this was a little bit of an unusual thing. The Senate's
always unusual, but this is more unusual than usual, because of
what we had to do, in and out, but you've handled it very, very
well, and I think my colleagues have. Some of my colleagues who
clearly were here to ask questions were aced out when somebody
who had a prior preference suddenly appeared. I apologize to
them, but I think we all understand it. We know you're old pros
around here, you understand this, too, and we're not only
appreciative of your effort here in this report, but also of
your patience with the way in which this had to be handled,
given the five votes that interrupted this proceeding.
Thank you very much for your service, and we'll stand
adjourned and hope you get lunch.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Evan Bayh
THE SURGE
1. Senator Bayh. General Jones, in your view, how much of the
military success the administration is reporting the surge has wrought
is sustainable?
General Jones. The surge is the combined effort of coalition and
Iraqi security forces (ISF); the U.S. contribution to the surge was
only fully realized in the summer of 2007. It is too early to fully
assess the effects of the surge, but there are signs of encouraging
tactical successes in the Baghdad region. Violence levels in Baghdad
have decreased measurably during the period of the surge. The average
number of sectarian killings in Baghdad has decreased, and the average
number of daily enemy attacks has decreased as well. At the same time
violence is still a fact of life in Iraq and in Baghdad in particular.
The Commission found that the ``clear, hold, build'' strategy being
implemented by the ISF as part of the surge and as part of the broader
counterinsurgency campaign is heading in the right direction and shows
real potential, but noted that neither the Iraqi armed forces or the
police forces could execute these kinds of activities without coalition
support.
If the coalition continues to provide key enabling support and
training to the ISF over the next few years, the Commission believes
the ISF will be able to build on the military results of the surge and
bring increased security to more areas in Iraq, which in turn could
lead to a more durable security environment in that country.
2. Senator Bayh. General Jones, how much of that success could be
transferred to Iraqi forces?
General Jones. As noted in the Commission report, the ISF can bring
greater security to the provinces in the near-term, but neither the
Iraqi armed forces nor the Iraqi police forces can provide security and
stability without significant coalition assistance. The Iraqi armed
forces are growing more able to combat Iraq's internal threats, and
over time they will be able to take on more responsibility for daily
combat operations. If the ISF continue to progress as they have during
the last year, the Commission believes that the coalition could being
adjusting its forces, realigning them and re-tasking them to more of a
``strategic overwatch'' posture, beginning as soon as early 2008.
3. Senator Bayh. General Jones, what timeline would that transfer
take place?
General Jones. See answer above.
SECTARIANISM
4. Senator Bayh. General Jones, can sectarianism be rooted out of
the security forces absent a broader political reconciliation between
Iraqi sects?
General Jones. The Commission emphasized in its written report and
in its testimony before Congress that the most important step toward
progress in Iraq is a political reconciliation process led by the
Government of Iraq. While the Iraqi armed forces and police services
have the potential to help reduce sectarian violence, these forces
reflect the society from which they are drawn. Absent a political
reconciliation process, it is unlikely that the ISF will be immune to
sectarianism.
SUPPORT
5. Senator Bayh. General Jones, what would happen to the Iraqi army
and police if U.S. forces were not providing the backbone of logistic,
transport, and equipment support?
General Jones. In its report, the Commission concluded that the
Iraqi armed forces are becoming increasingly effective and are capable
of assuming greater responsibility for internal security. It also
concluded that while the Iraqi police are improving, this progress is
not occurring at a rate sufficient to meet their essential security
responsibilities. In the near-term, neither the Iraqi armed forces nor
the Iraqi police forces can operate independently or provide security
over time without relying on coalition forces for combat support and
combat service support.
6. Senator Bayh. General Jones, how do coalition and American
strategies differ in terms of providing combat support and combat
service support assistance to the ISF?
General Jones. During its trips to Iraq, the Commission did not
observe significant differences among members of the coalition in terms
of how forces provided combat support and combat service support
assistance to the ISF.
7. Senator Bayh. General Jones, is the United States in danger of
providing too much of a crutch to the ISF in terms of logistical,
communications, and transportation assistance?
General Jones. In its written report, the Commission did note
specifically that both the Iraqi armed forces and the Iraqi police
forces need to develop functioning logistics and maintenance systems.
The Commission observed that in some areas coalition experts may be
pushing the Iraqis toward solutions that are more complex and elaborate
than is necessary.
8. Senator Bayh. General Jones, how can we help ensure that this
doesn't happen?
General Jones. Identifying the tipping point between assistance and
dependency is a challenge, particularly when the presence or absence of
coalition assistance can make or break ISF participation in actual
operations. The Commission observed that in many instances, coalition
forces are sensitive to the dangers of dependency and are working
closely with ISF to help them become self-sufficient.
For instance, when the Commission visited the Baghdad Police
College, leaders of the school asked coalition representatives to
reconsider their decision to terminate the coalition's contract for
``life support'' services in November 2007, but coalition
representatives held fast and reiterated the need for the Police
College to become self-reliant. In the area of logistics, where
development of functioning Iraqi systems is particularly important, the
Commission recommends that the coalition work with ISF to develop an
``Iraqi solution'' that gets the job done to an adequate level, even if
that solution does not result in optimal efficiency and speed.
IRAQI SPECIAL FORCES
9. Senator Bayh. General Jones, why have the Iraqi Special
Operations Forces (ISOF) been so much more successful than other
components of the ISF?
General Jones. The ISOF have been more successful than other
components of the ISF for several reasons. The determining factor in
ISOF's success has been the ability of U.S. Army Special Forces since
2003 to continuously exercise their specialty of training foreign
counterparts, building trust through repeated tours, shared operations
and hardship, and carefully selecting operations that build the
capabilities and confidence of Iraqi units.
Foreign internal defense and force development-force multiplication
have for 50 years been an Army SOF mission set; and this mission set
has been executed to the best of their ability in Iraq. The coalition,
working and living closely with ISOF, has been able to ensure that ISOF
is capable of missions and tasks other Iraqi forces are not--including
logistics and maintenance. The ``student to teacher'' ratio allows the
coalition to focus on a range of tasks that trainers involved with the
regular Iraqi Army cannot. Also, members of the U.S. Army 5th Special
Forces Group and 10th Special Forces Groups are back in Iraq on their
fifth or even sixth tour, rotating in and out of country every 7 months
and providing remarkable continuity in building long-term relationships
with Iraqi counterparts. This has also allowed U.S. Army SOF to build
up a strong junior officer and noncommissioned officer corps in ISOF,
through continued mentoring and instruction. Resident U.S. Army Special
Forces Teams assigned to ISOF live with, train, provide combat
enablers, accompany on operations, and provide a continual U.S. Army
Special Forces presence and commitment to the success of ISOF. This has
created a Special Forces coalition effort with shared hardships,
operational time, soldier and leader bonding, and exposure during
combat operations.
Because of the relatively small size of the ISOF--at present, a
single brigade--its leaders are able to cull the recruit pool. In a
smaller group, it is also easier to inculcate a shared culture of
national service and pride. ISOF not only have strong capabilities, but
they have confidence in their capabilities. U.S. Army SOF have put into
place an operational paradigm of detailed planning, rehearsal, combat
operations, after action discussions, and training again to address any
shortfalls.
10. Senator Bayh. General Jones, why are they so much farther ahead
of the Army? Is it due to the small size of the force?
General Jones. The response to question number nine explains why
the ISOF are in many cases ahead of the Iraqi Army in their
development. In brief, ISOF training began in 2003 and there has been
remarkable continuity in this effort, including the rotation in and out
of country of the same U.S. Army SOF teams. Unlike the military
training teams working with the Iraqi Army, the U.S. trainers working
with the ISOF consistently fight alongside Iraqis and share the same
living spaces. Moreover, the ratio of U.S. trainers to Iraqi special
operations soldiers is higher than it is for the military training
teams working with the Iraqi Army because the overall size of the ISOF
is much smaller than that of the Iraqi Army.
11. Senator Bayh. General Jones, who is the force comprised of and
what is their training? Who are their trainers?
General Jones. The ISOF is the operational component of the Iraqi
Counterterrorism Command. The ISOF is a brigade-size force composed of
approximately 1,500 soldiers: a counterterrorism battalion, a commando
battalion, a support battalion, and a special reconnaissance unit.
The ISOF is trained by U.S. Army Special Operations Forces (5th and
10th Groups), as outlined above in more detail. Their training is
mostly in direct action missions against targets in semi-permissive and
non-permissive urban environments. They train continuously in a ``shoot
house''--an indoor tactical shooting range that mimics an urban housing
complex and allows soldiers to practice forced entry and marksmanship,
even under pitch-dark conditions (using night vision equipment).
A key component in developing an Iraqi counterterrorism capability
is the ongoing effort to double the number of soldiers in the ISOF.
According to the U.S. Department of Defense, this expansion will
include an additional commando battalion with forward-based commando
companies in Basra, Mosul, and Al Asad.
12. Senator Bayh. General Jones, how can lessons learned with ISF
Special Forces translate into better successes for the Army and
National Police?
General Jones. Translating best practices and lessons learned from
Special Forces to regular forces is a challenge even for U.S. forces.
The best lesson to draw from the ISOF experience is that Iraqis can
take the lead and operate at a high level of proficiency. ISOF are
among the best special forces in the Middle East, and that is testament
to what Iraqis can accomplish when provided the right training,
equipping, and leadership development. Many of the best practices in
training that the U.S. Special Forces have applied to ISOF have already
been transferred in some measure to the regular forces through Military
Training Teams and Police Training Teams.
______
[Annex: The Report of the Independent Commission on the
Security Forces of Iraq follows:]
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[Whereupon, at 1:45 p.m., the committee adjourned.]