[Senate Hearing 110-153]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-153
SECURING AMERICA'S INTEREST IN IRAQ: THE REMAINING OPTIONS
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
----------
JANUARY 10, 11, 17, 18, 23, 25, 30, 31, AND FEBRUARY 1, 2007
----------
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
S. Hrg. 110-153
SECURING AMERICA'S INTEREST IN IRAQ: THE REMAINING OPTIONS
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JANUARY 10, 11, 17, 18, 23, 25, 30, 31, AND FEBRUARY 1, 2007
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
38-033 WASHINGTON : 2007
_____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402�090001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Wednesday, January 10, 2007
WHERE WE ARE: THE CURRENT SITUATION IN IRAQ
Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 2
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Marr, Dr. Phebe, historian, author of ``The Modern History of
Iraq,'' Washington, DC......................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 10
O'Hanlon, Dr. Michael, senior fellow and Sydney Stein, Jr.,
chair, the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC............... 17
Prepared statement........................................... 21
Pillar, Dr. Paul, visiting professor, Security Studies Program,
Georgetown University, Washington, DC.......................... 31
Prepared statement........................................... 34
Said, Yahia, director, Iraq Revenue Watch, London School of
Economics, London, England..................................... 23
Prepared statement........................................... 28
Additional Statements Submitted for the Record
Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator from Maryland, prepared
statement...................................................... 92
Webb, Hon. Jim, U.S. Senator from Virginia, prepared statement... 91
------
Thursday, January 11, 2007 (a.m.)
THE ADMINISTRATION'S PLAN FOR IRAQ
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 95
Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from California, statement..... 128
Poll published in the Military Times......................... 159
Article from the Daily Telegraph............................. 160
Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator from Maryland, statement.. 147
Casey, Hon. Robert P., Jr., U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania,
statement...................................................... 150
Coleman, Hon. Norm, U.S. Senator from Minnesota, statement....... 121
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee, statement......... 126
Dodd, Hon. Christopher J., U.S. Senator from Connecticut,
statement...................................................... 110
Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, statement 123
Hagel, Hon. Chuck, U.S. Senator from Nebraska, statement......... 114
Isakson, Hon. Johnny, U.S. Senator from Georgia, statement....... 146
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, statement.. 118
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 97
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, statement... 143
Murkowski, Hon. Lisa, U.S. Senator from Alaska, statement........ 141
Nelson, Hon. Bill, U.S. Senator from Florida, statement.......... 135
Obama, Hon. Barack, U.S. Senator from Illinois, statement........ 139
Rice, Hon. Condoleezza, Secretary of State, Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 99
Prepared statement........................................... 102
Responses to questions submitted by Senator Biden............ 161
Responses to questions submitted by Senator Lugar............ 170
Sununu, Hon. John E., U.S. Senator from New Hampshire, statement. 131
Vitter, Hon. David, U.S. Senator from Louisiana, statement....... 148
Voinovich, Hon. George V., U.S. Senator from Ohio, statement..... 136
Webb, Hon. Jim, U.S. Senator from Virginia, statement............ 153
------
Thursday, January 11, 2007 (p.m.)
ALTERNATIVE PLANS: TROOP SURGE, PARTITION, WITHDRAWAL, OR STRENGTHEN
THE CENTER
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 175
Carpenter, Dr. Ted Galen, vice president of Defense and Foreign
Policy Studies, Cato Institute, Washington, DC................. 218
Prepared statement........................................... 221
Galbraith, Hon. Peter W., senior diplomatic fellow, Center for
Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Washington, DC............. 177
Prepared statement........................................... 180
Kagan, Dr. Frederick W., resident scholar, American Enterprise
Institute, Washington, DC...................................... 184
Prepared statement........................................... 187
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 176
Additional Statement Submitted for the Record
Serwer, Daniel, vice president, Peace and Stability Operations,
U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC........................ 252
------
Wednesday, January 17, 2007
REGIONAL DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 255
Haass, Hon. Richard, president, Council on Foreign Relations, New
York, NY....................................................... 264
Prepared statement........................................... 268
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 256
Nasr, Dr. Vali R., professor of National Security Affairs, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca.............................. 272
Prepared statement........................................... 276
Ross, Hon. Dennis, counselor and Ziegler distinguished fellow,
the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, DC.. 258
Prepared statement........................................... 261
------
Thursday, January 18, 2007
MILITARY AND SECURITY STRATEGY
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 327
Hoar, GEN Joseph P., USMC (Ret.), former commander in chief, U.S.
Central Command, Del Mar, CA................................... 342
Prepared statement........................................... 343
Keane, GEN Jack, USA (Ret.), former Vice Chief of Staff, U.S.
Army, Washington, DC........................................... 336
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 328
McCaffrey, GEN Barry, USA (Ret.), president, BR McCaffrey
Associates LLC and adjunct professor of International Affairs,
U.S. Military Academy, Arlington, VA........................... 331
Prepared statement........................................... 334
Odom, LTG William E., USA (Ret.), senior fellow, Hudson
Institute; former Director of the National Security Agency,
Washington, DC................................................. 344
Prepared statement........................................... 348
Tuesday, January 23, 2007 (a.m.)
ALTERNATIVE PLANS CONTINUED--FEDERALISM, SIDE WITH THE MAJORITY,
STRATEGIC REDEPLOYMENT, OR NEGOTIATE?
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 401
Gelb, Hon. Leslie H., president emeritus and board senior fellow,
Council on Foreign Relations, New York, NY..................... 404
Prepared statement........................................... 406
Korb, Hon. Lawrence J., senior fellow, Center for American
Progress, Washington, DC....................................... 418
Prepared statement........................................... 421
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 402
Luttwak, Dr. Edward N., senior fellow, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Washington, DC.......................... 410
Prepared statement........................................... 413
Malley, Robert, director, Middle East and North Africa Program,
International Crisis Group, Washington, DC..................... 427
Prepared statement........................................... 431
------
Tuesday, January 23, 2007 (p.m.)
ALTERNATIVE PLANS (CONTINUED)
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 475
Gingrich, Hon. Newt, former Speaker of the U.S. House of
Representatives; senior fellow, American Enterprise Institute,
Washington, DC................................................. 483
Prepared statement........................................... 487
Murtha, Hon. John P., U.S. Congressman from Pennsylvania,
chairman, Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 476
Prepared statement........................................... 480
------
Thursday, January 25, 2007 (a.m.)
RECONSTRUCTION STRATEGY
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 525
Jones, BG Michael D., USA, J-5 Deputy Director for Political-
Military Affairs--Middle East, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, DC................................................. 537
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 528
Satterfield, Hon. David, Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State
and Coordinator for Iraq, Department of State, Washington, DC.. 530
Prepared statement........................................... 534
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
``Families of the Fallen for Change'' letter submitted by Senator
Biden.......................................................... 574
Responses of Ambassador Satterfield to Questions submitted by
Senator Webb................................................... 576
``Contributions From Other Donors'' submitted by the State
Department..................................................... 579
------
Thursday, January 25, 2007 (p.m.)
POLITICAL STRATEGY
al-Rahim, Rend, executive director, the Iraq Foundation,
Washington, DC................................................. 589
Prepared statement........................................... 594
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 587
Dodge, Dr. Toby, consulting senior fellow for the Middle East,
International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, United
Kingdom........................................................ 612
Prepared statement........................................... 615
Kubba, Dr. Laith, senior director for the Middle East and North
Africa, National Endowment for Democracy, Washington, DC....... 606
Prepared statement........................................... 609
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 588
Talabani, Qubad, Representative of the United States, Kurdistan
Regional Government, Washington, DC............................ 597
Prepared statement........................................... 602
------
Tuesday, January 30, 2007
ALTERNATIVE PLANS: THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP
Baker, Hon. James A., III, cochair, Iraq Study Group; partner,
Baker-Botts LLP, Houston, TX................................... 647
Prepared joint statement of James Baker and Lee Hamilton..... 652
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 645
Hamilton, Hon. Lee H., cochair, Iraq Study Group; director,
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington,
DC............................................................. 650
Additional Statement Submitted for the Record
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, prepared
statement...................................................... 695
------
Wednesday, January 31, 2007
IRAQ IN THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT, SESSION 1
Albright, Hon. Madeleine K., former Secretary of State;
principal, The Albright Group LLC, Washington, DC.............. 730
Prepared statement........................................... 733
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 697
Kissinger, Hon. Henry A., former Secretary of State; chairman,
Kissinger McLarty Associates, New York, NY..................... 701
Prepared statement........................................... 704
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 699
------
Thursday, February 1, 2007
IRAQ IN THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT, SESSION 2
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 755
Prepared statement........................................... 756
Brzezinski, Dr. Zbigniew, former National Security Advisor;
counselor and trustee, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Washington, DC........................................ 777
Prepared statement........................................... 780
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 757
Scowcroft, LTG Brent, USAF (Ret.), former National Security
Advisor; president, The Scowcroft Group, Washington, DC........ 759
Prepared statement........................................... 761
------
Appendix
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Barzani, Nechirvan, Prime Minister, Kurdistan Regional Government
of Iraq, Erbil, Kurdistan-Iraq, letter from.................... 797
Morrow, Dr. Jonathan, senior legal adviser to the Ministry of
Natural Resources, Kurdistan Regional Government; former senior
adviser to the U.S. Institute of Peace, prepared statement..... 798
Shafiq, Tariq, director, Petrolog & Associates, London, UK;
chair, Fertile Crescent Oil Company, Baghdad, Iraq,
``Perspective of Iraq Draft Petroleum Law''.................... 802
WHERE WE ARE: THE CURRENT SITUATION IN IRAQ
----------
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 10, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G.
Lugar, presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Biden, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold,
Boxer, Bill Nelson, Obama, Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Webb,
Hagel, Coleman, Corker, Sununu, Voinovich, Murkowski, Isakson,
and Vitter.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Chairman Lugar. Let me call the hearing to order. If we may
have order in the committee room.
To the committee and to all who are assembled, let me
indicate that technically the Senate has not yet acted upon the
new chairmanships, ranking members, and membership of
committees. The Senate will do so fairly promptly this week,
but our business goes on in the committee. And it's my
privilege today, as the outgoing chairman of the committee, to
introduce my friend and great Senator, Joe Biden, who will be
our chairman and will preside over today's hearing. We will
assume he is chairman, and he will act as chairman today and
tomorrow and--through a very vigorous series of hearings on
Iraq and the Middle East that we have planned.
Let me just say that one of the strengths of our committee
has been the commitment of Senator Biden and Democratic and
Republican committee members to bipartisanship, but likewise to
very, very substantial questioning of American foreign policy,
regardless of which party--which President we have served
under. I'm certain that that will continue. It's an important
aspect that the face of America be as united as possible, and
we have attempted to further that idea, I think, with some
degree of success. For example, the India Nuclear Agreement
that was just concluded celebrated a significant strategic
development for our country with an overwhelming vote in this
committee and support of Members of the House of
Representatives who shared this bipartisan ethic.
So, with that introduction, let me just indicate I'm
delighted to welcome our new members to the committee. I'm
certain the chairman will want to do that, too. But it's
especially good to welcome him to the chairmanship, and I turn
over the gavel, which I do not see at the present, Mr.
Chairman. [Laughter.]
But, nevertheless, in due course that will be forthcoming,
too. [Laughter.]
Chairman Biden. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
Chairman Biden. Folks, let me echo the comments made by the
Senator. Technically, we vote in the U.S. Congress on the
organization. I am insisting on an open vote, not a secret
ballot, if you get the meaning of that. There may very well be
a secret ballot. We may keep him as chairman. I may vote for
him. [Laughter.]
One of the things that Senator Lugar emphasized is that all
of us on this committee, under his leadership and the brief
stint before that under mine and now again under mine, is that
we understand that no foreign policy in America can be
sustained without the informed consent of the American people.
And one of the overwhelming responsibilities of this committee,
which has legislative responsibility, but quite frankly, its
role, historically, has been more in playing the role of
providing a platform upon which to inform the American people
of the options--many times, difficult options--that must be
chosen by a President of the United States in order to conduct
the foreign policy of this country.
And this morning we begin the work of the new Congress with
many new Members, including many new members on this committee.
We welcome, today, new members--Senator Cardin, Senator Casey,
Senator Corker, and Senator Webb, and we're delighted they have
joined the committee. We also welcome veteran members of the
U.S. Senate who are new to the Foreign Relations Committee--
Senator DeMint, Senator Johnny Isakson from Georgia, Senator
Bob Menendez from New Jersey, and Senator Vitter, who I don't
see here yet, but I'm sure will be coming.
You join a committee that's tried to remain a place for
sanity and civility in what has been a very partisan and
sometimes polarized Senate over the last decade. We've not
always succeeded, but, quite frankly, when we have, it's
largely been due to the efforts of Chairman Lugar. I don't want
to make this sound like a mutual admiration society, but, to
state the fact, there is no one--no one in the U.S. Senate who
knows more about foreign policy, and no one who has contributed
more to American security than Chairman Lugar.
Today, we're brought together by a question that dominates
our national debate, and it really boils down to a simple
proposition. What options remain to meet our twin goals of
bringing American forces home and leaving behind a stable Iraq?
Over the next 4 weeks, this committee will seek answers to that
question. First, we will hear from the Bush administration,
then we'll hear from experts--left, right, and center--in our
government and out of government, from across the United States
and beyond our borders. Then we'll hear from men and women with
very different ideas, but who are united in their devotion to
this country and their desire to see us through this very
difficult time.
The Bush administration, as well as important private
groups and experts, have developed varying plans on how to
proceed in Iraq. Tonight, I will sit, as will all of you, and
listen to our President, and he will have my prayers and hopes
that his plan will be one that will ease our burden and not
deepen it. But it's a unique responsibility of the U.S.
Congress, and especially and historically the Foreign Relations
Committee in the U.S. Senate, to evaluate these plans, in
public, to help our citizens understand the very difficult
choices this country faces.
That's the best way to secure, in my view, as I said
earlier, the informed consent of the American people. For
without their informed consent, whatever policy we arrive at
cannot long be sustained.
I have my own strongly held views, as the witnesses know
and my colleagues know, about what to do and how we should
proceed in Iraq. There will be plenty of time for me to talk
about them in the days ahead. But, for now, I want to set out
what Senator Lugar and I jointly hope to accomplish as we put
together this agenda for the next several weeks, and how we
hope to accomplish it.
First, let me make it clear what these hearings are not
intended to be about. They are not about an effort to revisit
the past, point fingers, or place blame on how we got to where
we are. The American people spoke very loudly this past
November. They know that we're in a significant mess in Iraq.
But instead of arguing how we got into that mess, they want us
to be proactive and be part of the solution. They expect us to
help America get out of the mess we're in, not talk about how
we got there.
We will start by receiving the most up-to-date unvarnished
analysis of the situation and trends in Iraq and in the region.
As a matter of fact, we began that inquiry yesterday. As all my
colleagues know, and many people in the audience know, we have
a ``Secret Room'' in the Senate. It's called ``S-407,'' where
we're able to have unvarnished discussions with the most
sensitive information, requiring the highest clearance. And
yesterday, all of my colleagues and I sat there for a
considerable amount of time receiving a classified briefing
from all the major intelligence agencies of the U.S.
Government.
We continue that inquiry, the inquiry of determining what
the facts are on the ground today, with the experts who will
assist us in assessing the political, security, economic, and
diplomatic realities that are on the ground today in Iraq and
in the region.
We'll begin with Dr. Phebe Marr, who has given us her
valuable time and scholarship and insight for many years in
this committee and is one of the most welcome witnesses that we
have had in both administrations, all administrations. She is a
preeminent historian of Iraq, and she will provide a historical
overview. It is our view that by illuminating the past, we're
going to be better able to understand the present, and
hopefully better prepared to deal with the present situation.
Michael O'Hanlon, of the Brookings Institution, has also
graced us with his presence in the past, and he will focus on--
I'd put it this way--focus on the numbers. How do we measure
the current situation in Iraq? The trends, in terms of
security, the economy, and public opinion.
And Mr. Said, the director of the Iraq Revenue Watch, will
speak to us on the political dynamics inside Iraq. Who are the
main players? What are their interests? And what possible
scenarios could bring them together?
And then Paul Pillar, the former national intelligence
officer for Near East and South Asia, will address the dynamics
in the region. He has, again, graced us with his presence in
the past, and has been very valuable. The issue that we will
ask him to discuss is: What do Iraq's neighbors want? And how
can they affect the outcome on the ground in Iraq, if they can
affect the outcome?
The goal today, as it was yesterday, is not to discuss
policy options, although there are no limits on what any of the
witnesses can discuss, but it's to get at the facts, as best we
know them. We want this committee and the public to have a
strong foundation upon which to evaluate the principal policy
options that are being discussed in this country today.
Starting tomorrow and over the following 3 weeks, we will turn
to those options and ask: Where do we go from here? Secretary
of State Rice has graciously indicated she is not only ready,
but anxious, to appear before our committee, which she will do
tomorrow, after President Bush announces the administration's
plans, tonight.
The authors of every other major plan for Iraq will present
their recommendations, including those who advocate escalation,
those who advocate withdrawal, partition, federalization,
siding with one side or the other, strengthening the center,
and so on. The major authors of the plans--the authors of those
major plans will come and testify over the next 3 weeks.
As we hear from them, we'll also hear from leading
military, diplomatic, economic, and political experts, and we
will ask this country's senior statesmen and stateswomen,
former National Security Advisors, former Secretaries of State,
to help us put everything we've heard in context as we conclude
what will probably be the first round of hearings on Iraq.
The ultimate question for this committee is the question
that'll be on the minds of every American as we listen to the
President of the United States tonight. Will your plan, Mr.
President, or other plans, put us on a better path in Iraq, or
will it dig us into a deeper hole with more pain, and not much
to show for it? We pray it will be the former. But together we
have a responsibility and, I believe, an opportunity to help
put this country on a better path.
So, let's begin. Let me turn this over now to Senator Lugar
for any comments that he wishes to make.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
thank you for holding this important hearing and for assembling
such an excellent panel.
I would offer a special greeting, as you have, to Dr. Phebe
Marr, who has been a tremendous resource for the committee, and
for me personally. She testified at four different Iraq
hearings during my recent chairmanship, and also appeared at a
hearing held under Senator Biden in August 2002. Dr. Marr's
calm and authoritative analysis on Iraq is grounded in a
prodigious understanding of that country and a nonpartisan
outlook that is badly needed in this debate.
Dr. Michael O'Hanlon has also provided excellent testimony
before our committee in recent years. In 2005 and 2006, I wrote
a series of 15 ``Dear Colleague'' letters to--on Iraq to all
Senators. These letters introduced reports and documents that I
found to be particularly illuminating. The Brookings
Institution Iraq Index, a report overseen by Dr. O'Hanlon,
accompanied the first letter that I sent, and it provides a
remarkably detailed view of the economic and security situation
in Iraq. The Iraq Index is updated regularly, and I continue to
recommend it to any Member of Congress or citizen who wants a
thoughtful grounding in the facts.
I also welcome Mr. Said and Dr. Pillar, who are testifying
before this committee for the first time. We are grateful to
have them as a new resource at this critical moment.
Tonight, President Bush will give a speech outlining his
intended course in Iraq. In recent days, I have had
opportunities to talk to the President about Iraq. Among other
points, I underscored the need for a thorough effort to involve
Congress in the decisionmaking process.
United States policy in Iraq would benefit greatly from
meaningful executive branch consultations with legislators, and
from careful study by Members of Congress, that's directed at
dispassionately evaluating the President's plan and other
options. Members of this committee and the entire Congress must
be prepared to make reasoned judgments about what the President
is proposing.
Initially, the President and his team need to explain what
objectives we are trying to achieve: If forces are expanded,
where and how they will be used; why such a strategy will
succeed; and how Iraqi forces will be involved; how long
additional troops may be needed; what contingencies are in
place if the situation does not improve; and how this strategy
fits into our discussion throughout the region.
The American media is understandably focused on the
possibility of a troop surge in Iraq. But whatever may be the
final conclusion on this point, relative success or failure is
likely to hinge on many other factors and decisions. The
complexity of the Iraq situation demands more of us than
partisan sound bites or preconceived judgments.
With this in mind, this hearing, setting the terms of
reference for what is happening in Iraq, is especially timely.
I look forward to the insights of our distinguished panel and
to working with Chairman Biden and all members of this
committee as we continue our inquiry in the coming weeks.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Biden. Thank you, Senator.
Let me explain to the new Members of the Senate that the
way we proceed will be to hear from all the witnesses--and I'll
announce that order in a moment--and then open it to questions,
based on our seniority here.
This is a very important topic, to say the least. And we
could probably, with some useful benefit to informing
ourselves, spend 2 days with this panel alone. But my staff
tells me, in consultation with the Republican staff, that, as a
practical matter, we're going to limit each of us, including
myself, to 8-minute rounds of questions. I realize that is, in
some sense, is not sufficient to really explore in the kind of
depth you may want to. My experience is, the witnesses are
available to you, personally, after the hearing, and on the
telephone and in their offices, and occasionally, if you ask
them, they will make themselves available in your offices if it
works with their schedule.
So, I apologize in advance that there's not going to be the
kind of exposition that--if we were doing this as a seminar at
a university, we'd be able to spend a whole lot more time. But
the dictates of time make it difficult. So, we're going to
limit it to 8-minute rounds, if I may.
But, first, let me begin. And the order in which I will ask
the witnesses to deliver their statements will be Dr. Marr, Mr.
O'Hanlon, Mr. Said, and Dr. Pillar.
Welcome, again, Phebe, and we're delighted to have you
here. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF DR. PHEBE MARR, HISTORIAN, AUTHOR OF ``THE MODERN
HISTORY OF IRAQ,'' WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Marr. Senator Biden, Senator Lugar, I want to say how
delighted I am to be back again. And I can't commend you and
the committee enough for what I think has been a remarkable job
in the continuing debate on Iraq and in informing the American
public on it. It has seemed to me to be quite a wonderful
effort, I hope will continue with good effect.
I have been asked to address the historical context of this
issue. And let me say that 2007 marks the 50th year that I've
been involved in Iraq. I've done other things besides Iraq, but
it was 1957 when I first went to Iraq. And so, I have the
benefit of some historical hindsight in having actually been on
the ground through all of the regimes, including the monarchy.
Iraq has had a very rich and varied history, but one of the
things that has struck me as I have followed it as a scholar
and personally is the discontinuity of Iraqi history. And,
indeed, we're in the middle of another such period.
Actually, I'd like to address three questions this morning.
The first is: Where is Iraq today? What are the chief political
and social elements we face in Iraq? Second: How can we account
for this situation? To what extent is it historical? And, last:
Is this current situation likely to be lasting? Is it
transient? Is it remediable?
Iraq, since 2003, has undergone not one, but several,
revolutionary and radical changes of a proportion not seen
since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the formation of
the state in the 1920s. And I think the degree and nature of
these changes need to be recognized.
First has been a radical change in leadership. It's not
simply that Iraqi leadership and its dictatorship have been
decapitated, now physically, as well as literally, but that an
entirely new leadership group has come to power. The ethnic and
sectarian composition of that leadership has changed. Shia and
Kurds have replaced Arab Sunnis as the dominant group. And its
ideological orientation has also changed, from one that was
secular, nationalist, and devoted to a unitary Iraqi State to
one with differing visions of where Iraq should go. Overall the
leadership has a view that is far more dominated by religion
than it has been at any time in Iraq's history.
Since the nature and character of this leadership is
critical to our endeavor, I'd like to just take a few minutes
to indicate a few characteristics of these leaders worth
noting. They result from a study that I've been engaged in at
the United States Institute of Peace for the last couple of
years. I've attached a couple of charts to my written
testimony, and I think there's a special report coming out on
the Internet very shortly. But there are three characteristics
I'd like to call to your attention. One is inexperience and
discontinuity in leadership over the past 4 years. Some 75
percent of the current leaders hold national positions for the
first time. This makes for a very steep learning curve in
governance. Second is the divide between the leaders with roots
in the exile community, together with Kurds who have been
living in the north, separate from the rest of Iraq, and those
leaders who remained living inside Iraq under Saddam's rule.
These groups have different narratives of the past and visions
for the future. And third, and most important, the key leaders
today have been shaped by decades of opposition to the former
regime. Many spent years in underground movements or imprisoned
by Saddam, and lost family members to the Baath. Few insiders,
including professionals who simply worked under the Baath
regime, have made it into the leadership. The suspicion,
distrust, and hostility between these two groups is the core
dynamic driving much of the politics in Iraq today, making
reconciliation difficult.
A second fundamental change has been the destruction of
governmental institutions, the bureaucracy and the army, about
which much has been said. The institutions underpinned not just
the Baath regime, but Iraq's Government since its founding in
the 1920s. Both of these institutions were established under
the British, under the mandate, but had their origins in the
Ottoman period. Despite ups and downs and periods of
instability in modern Iraq, these two institutions remained the
backbone of the state until 2003. The collapse of much of
Iraq's bureaucratic and military structure have left a void
that, in my view, will take years, if not decades, to fill and
has left an enormous political, social, and institutional
vacuum. This vacuum is now filled, in part, by militias and a
new mix of parties and factions.
A third radical change is underway as a result of these
events: The collapse of the state as the Iraqis have known it
since its creation under international mandate in 1920. Iraq is
now a failing, if not yet a failed state, with a new central
government that has difficulty cohering and whose reach does
not extend much beyond the perimeters of the Green Zone. The
establishment of a government that delivers services to the
population--chief among them, security--is recognized as the
chief task before Iraqis and its foreign supporters. However
this issue of governance is resolved, the form of the Iraqi
State is likely to change fundamentally. How governance will be
reconstituted, power distributed in the future, is a big
question. But Iraq is not likely to be a unified state
dominated by a strong central government in Baghdad, at least
for some time.
A fourth revolutionary change has been the seemingly
radical shift in identity on the part of the population, which,
in extreme form, has led to this vicious sectarian war in
Baghdad and its environs, and to serious demographic shifts,
and an effort, not yet successful, to make this communal
identity territorial.
Many have seen these identities--Kurdish, Shia, Sunni,
Turkmen, et cetera--as longstanding, even primordial, a bedrock
of Iraqi society. But I think this is a misreading of Iraq's
much more complex and interesting history. The intensity of
these sectarian and ethnic divisions are more the result of a
collapsing order, a vicious incitement of civil war by al-
Qaeda, and political manipulation by politicians desirous of
getting power. They were also exacerbated by an overweening
central government and increasing persecution of the opposition
by Saddam's dictatorship. However, the events of the past year
have solidified emerging communal identities to an extent not
known before in Iraq. And only time will tell whether they can
be mitigated. This is likely to take enormous effort by Iraqis
and by us.
And, last, another profound change is becoming apparent:
The collapse of one of the Arab world's major cities--Baghdad.
Baghdad has played a major role in Iraqi history, not just
since the 1920s, but since its founding in the eighth century.
Iraq, with its two rivers and complex irrigation system, as
well as geographic openness to invasion from foreign territory,
has seldom flourished unless it has had a relatively strong
central government to harness its water resources and protect
its population.
When Baghdad has declined or been destroyed, as it twice
was by the Mongols, Iraq has fallen into long periods of decay.
But one must remember that, ultimately, that city and
Mesopotamia, now Iraq, have always revived.
Greater Baghdad now contains a quarter to a third of Iraq's
population and its highest concentration of skills and
infrastructure. Baghdad, as a city, is not lost, but its
revival and the return of its middle class are essential to
overcoming ethnic and sectarian divisions and the restoration
of a functioning government.
One last thought on the current situation, and this may
overlap a little with my colleague. Major ethnic and sectarian
blocs are already fragmenting into smaller units based on
personal interests, desire for power, differing visions and
constituencies. It's these smaller units, and the leadership of
the larger, better organized and financed parties, also
intermixed with militias, that will be making the decisions on
Iraq's direction. It seems to me that one way out of the
conundrum of communal-identity politics is to encourage
political alliances between these various groups on issues and
interests, such as oil legislation, commercial legislation,
regulation of water resources, economic development, and other
issues. This is a slow, laborious process, but it's probably
the only way in which some of the distrust and hostility
between the leaders and groups can be broken down and a new
political dynamic shaped.
Let me finish up by asking: Given this situation, what
prognosis may be made? I feel Iraq faces three potential
futures in the near and midterm, and it's still too early to
tell which will dominate. Given the grievous mistakes made on
all sides, this process is going to be very costly and time
consuming, and no one should expect a clear outcome in the next
2 years, probably even in the next decade. But helping to shape
the long-term future of Iraq in one direction or the other will
have a profound effect on the region and, I believe, on our own
security.
The first outcome is that Iraq will break up, as I'm
calling it, into its three main ethnic and sectarian
components--Kurdish, Arab Sunni, and Arab Shia--hastened by
ethnic and sectarian conflicts spiraling out of control. Unless
this division is shepherded and fostered by outside forces,
however, I think this outcome is unlikely, on its own. This
division is not historical, but has come to the fore in a
moment of history characterized by political vacuum and chaos,
as I've indicated. Such a division will pose real difficulties
in Iraq and is radical in its implications for a region in
which peace depends on tolerance and coexistence, not just
within Islam, but among ethnic and national groups. While this
breakup may happen, in my view it should not be encouraged or
brokered by the United States, especially if we want to
disengage our forces from the country. It will create more, not
less, instability in the future.
The second outcome is that Iraq may break down, a process
that is well underway. Rather than cohesive ethnic and
sectarian entities, the Iraqi polity will disintegrate into
smaller units. These will comprise political parties and
movements, militias, local tribal leaders, already mentioned.
In reality, this is the Iraq that is emerging, with different
local forces competing in an effort to establish control in
various areas of the country. This scenario, a full-blown
failed state, would cause serious problems for the region and
the United States. Indeed, I feel that the failed-state
syndrome may be spreading throughout the region, as events in
Lebanon and Palestine indicate. We may be seeing the breakdown
of the state system established in the region by the British
and French after World War I.
A third outcome would be to slow and gradually arrest the
decline, and for Iraq to gradually reconstitute a government
that recognizes the new identities that have emerged, but
learns to accommodate them in some new framework that allows
for economic and social development. It'll be easy to rebuild
this framework, I believe, if Iraqis do not divide
indefatigably on ethnic and sectarian lines, but, rather, work
within various groups and parties that are gradually
participating in the political system to achieve mutual
interest. Even if such a government does not control much
territory out of Baghdad or the Green Zone, it's better to keep
it intact as a symbol and a framework, toward which future
generations can work, than to destroy it and try once again to
establish another new and entirely radical framework.
Iraq is very far from achieving a new government that
works, and the collapse we are witnessing is likely to get
worse before it gets better. Only when the participants in Iraq
recognize, in this struggle for power, that they are losing
more than they can gain by continuing it, will it come to an
end. That may be a long time.
In the meantime, the best we can probably do is to help
staunch the violence, contain the struggle within Iraq's
borders, and keep alive the possibility that after extremism
has run its course, the potential for a different Iraq is still
there.
Others in the region should be encouraged to do the same, a
task which should be built on the fact that no state in the
region, or its leadership, wants to see the collapse of the
current state system, no matter how much in need of reform
their domestic governments may be.
Thank you for your time.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Marr follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Phebe Marr, Historian, Author of ``The Modern
History of Iraq,'' Washington, DC
I will be focusing almost entirely on Iraq's domestic politics, my
area of expertise, and hopefully bringing a little historical
perspective to bear, since I have been working on Iraq for some 50
years now. I would like to address three questions today. First, where
is Iraq today? What are the chief political and social characteristics
we face? Second, how can we account for this situation? And lastly, is
the current situation likely to be lasting? Or is it transient? Is it
remediable?
First, what can be said about the situation in Iraq today? Iraq
since 2003 has undergone not one but several revolutionary changes, of
a proportion not seen since the collapse of Ottoman Empire and the
formation of the new Iraqi state in the 1920s. The first has been a
revolutionary change in leadership. It is not simply that a regime and
its dictatorial head have been--not only figuratively but now
literally--decapitated, but an entirely new leadership group has come
to power. This leadership, brought to power essentially by elections in
2005, has now entirely reversed several of the characteristics of the
old Baath regime, and even the transitional regimes that replaced it in
2003 and 2004. It has changed the ethnic and sectarian composition of
the leadership. (It is now dominated by Shia and Kurds rather than Arab
Sunnis.) It has changed the ideological orientation from one which was
secular and nationalist, devoted to a unitary Iraqi state, to one with
different visions but far more dominated by religion. At the same time,
it has brought more women into power and in general is better educated.
The new leaders come, more often, from urban origin, whereas Saddam's
clique were more rural and small town born. But the change has also now
brought new men and women into power. They have three distinct
characteristics worth noting.
First is their inexperience and the discontinuity in their
leadership. Some 76 percent in this Cabinet and Presidency hold such
jobs for the first time. This has meant a lack of experience, a steep
learning curve, and an inability to establish links with one another
and with constituencies. Most have had little chance to gain experience
because of the continual change of Cabinets.
Second, the change has also brought a divide between a group of
leaders with roots in exile who have lived outside of Iraq and Kurds
who have been living in the north separate from the rest of Iraq on the
one hand, and those who remained inside living under Saddam on the
other. The latter include key elements now in opposition, such as the
Baath, as well as the younger generation and the dispossessed who
follow Muqtada al-Sadr. Some 28 percent are outsiders, now mainly from
Middle Eastern rather than Western countries; some 15 percent are
Kurds; only 26 percent are insiders.
Third, and most important, is the fact that the key leaders in
power today have all been shaped by years, even decades, of opposition
to the former regime. The heads of the Kurdish parties and the Shia
religio-political parties, such as SCIRI and Dawa, spent years in
underground movements; were imprisoned by Saddam; lost family members
to the Baath; and even fought the long Iran-Iraq war against the regime
from the Iranian side. Some 43 percent of the current leaders were
active in opposition politics. Since 2003, few ``insiders''--especially
those in any way affiliated with the Baath regime, such as
professionals who worked in education or health, Sunni or Shia--have
made it into the leadership. While many of this group are encompassed
by the insurgency, or support it passively, others in this group would
like to join the political process but are excluded. The suspicion,
distrust, and hostility between these two groups is the core dynamic
driving much of the politics in Iraq today, which makes a
reconciliation process so difficult to achieve.
In conjunction with this leadership change has gone another
fundamental upheaval: The erosion and destruction of the governmental
institutions--the bureaucracy and the army--which underpinned not just
the Baath regime but Iraq's Government since its founding in the 1920s.
Both of these institutions were established by the British under the
mandate, although both had their origins in the Ottoman period. Despite
ups and downs and periods of instability, these two institutions
remained the backbone of the state until 2003. Much has been made of
the destruction (or collapse) of these institutions elsewhere, and I
will not dwell on it here, but the profound impact this has had on the
current situation in Iraq must be appreciated. The disbanding of all of
Iraq's military and security forces, the removal of the Baath Party
apparatus that ran the bureaucracy and the education establishment (de-
Baathification), and, as a result, the collapse of much of Iraq's
bureaucratic structure, have left a void that will takes years--if not
decades to fill. While much of this structure--especially at the top--
needed to be removed, and a good bit of the rest had been hollowed out
and corrupted under Saddam's rule, the sudden and precipitous collapse
of this governmental underpinning and the removal of much of the
educated class that ran it have created an enormous political, social,
and institutional vacuum. This vacuum is now filled in part by militias
and a mix of new and often inexperienced political parties and
factions.
As result of these events, a second radical change is underway in
Iraq: The collapse of the state as Iraqis have known it since its
formal creation under international mandate in 1920. Iraq is now a
failing--if not yet a failed--state with a new central government that
has difficulty cohering and whose reach does not extend much beyond the
perimeters of the Green Zone in Baghdad and which does not, clearly,
command a monopoly over the official use of force. Indeed, outside of
the three Kurdish-run provinces, there is little provincial or local
government yet either. The establishment of government that delivers
services to the population, chief among them security, is now
recognized as the chief task before Iraqis and its foreign supporters.
However, before that is accomplished, the form of the Iraqi state
is likely to change fundamentally. For 35 years under the Baath, Iraq
was a unitary state which was part of the Arab world. Now it is one in
which ethnic and sectarian identities predominate and new and different
subnational groups, including militias, are emerging. The constitution,
drafted and passed in a referendum last year, provides for a radical
devolution of authority to federal regions, an issue on which many
Iraqis are divided and which may or may not come to complete fruition.
How governance will be reconstituted and power distributed in the new
entity that emerges from the current confusion is a large question, but
Iraq is not likely to be a unified state dominated by a strong central
government in Baghdad, at least for some time. In fact, a high degree
of decentralization--or even an absence of formal government in many
areas--may characterize Iraq for some time. The increasing fractures in
the body politic have, of course, raised the question of whether the
Iraqi state can--or even should--continue to exist, or whether it will
be divided into ethnic and sectarian or perhaps subnational components.
Should that happen, the results would be revolutionary indeed, not only
for Iraq but for the entire surrounding region, with implications
likely to reverberate for decades.
There have been other changes in Iraq that are almost as
revolutionary as these changes in leadership and the transformation of
the state. One has been the seeming change in identity on the part of
the population, which, in its recent extreme form has led to a vicious
sectarian war in Baghdad and its environs. This changing identity has
now led to more serious demographic shifts and an effort--not yet
successful--to make this communal identity ``territorial'' by carving
out more purely ethnic or sectarian areas. While the development of a
semi-independent Kurdish entity in the north has been taking shape for
over a decade under the aegis of the Kurdish nationalist parties,
carving out distinct Shia and Sunni areas--even emphasizing Shia and
Sunni identity as the fundamental basis of political loyalty--is new.
Many have seen these identities (Kurdish, Shia, Sunni, Turkman,
Christian, etc.) as longstanding, even primordial, a bedrock of Iraqi
society that has long been submerged, manipulated, or repressed by
foreign (British) or dictatorial (the Baath and Saddam Hussein) rule,
and have now come to the fore as a natural expression by the population
of their political aspirations. I recognize how compelling and
attractive that view is for people looking for an understandable
explanation of what is happening today, but I personally think it is a
misreading of Iraq's much more complex and interesting history. One
should be wary of reading back into the past what is happening today
and of assuming it is the necessary foundation of the future. These
intense sectarian divisions in Baghdad, where mixed marriages were
common, is new and is partly the result of collapsing order, a vicious
incitement of civil war by al-Qaeda, political manipulation by
politicians desirous of getting a Shia majority, and is now driven by
just plain fear and intimidation.
This is not to say that these ethnic and sectarian differences and
identities are themselves new; they go back centuries, but their
strength and their exclusivity have varied greatly over time. Ethnic
and sectarian identity in Iraq has always had to compete with far
stronger tribal, clan, and family ties. As Iraq modernized and joined
the international community in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, a middle
class espoused political ideologies imported from outside
(Nationalism--Iraqi, Arab and Kurdish--as well as Socialism and
Communism) and for years--right through the 1970s when Saddam stamped
them out they were the chief motivating factors of the emerging middle
class. In recent decades, Islamic visions competed with them, often
cutting across ethnic and sectarian lines.
An overweening central government and increasing persecution of the
opposition and repression by Saddam's growing dictatorship in Baghdad
are better explanations for these emerging identities. If Iraq and the
Baghdad government had been more attractive, open, and promising, it is
questionable whether these more exclusive and separatist identities
would have taken root. Kurdish nationalism has always been espoused by
the two Kurdish parties and their leaders (the KDP and the PUK), but
they did not dominate the north--tribal leaders on the payroll of
Saddam's government did--until Saddam's war with Iran and his
subsequent attack on Kuwait so weakened his government that he could no
longer control the north. Much the same could be said for the Shia-
Sunni divide, which he clearly exacerbated by relying on his tribal
Sunni relatives from Tikrit and then killing and repressing Shia when
they rose up in 1991.
Even so, these sectarian identities have never been exclusive nor,
until recently, expressed territorially. It was the power vacuum, and
the innovation of elections on a body politic still unaccustomed to a
peaceful competition for power, that provided the opportunity for
leaders to mobilize a constituency along these lines. Despite this, the
Shia bloc is politically divided. Sunnis, who have identified more with
the state they have dominated in the past, are only now coming to grips
with the idea of a ``Sunni'' rather than an Iraqi or Arab identity,
largely out of fear they will be marginalized or exterminated. The
events of the last year have solidified emerging communal identities to
an extent not known before in Iraq; only time will tell whether they
can be mitigated and overcome in the future. And this is likely to take
enormous effort by Iraqis as well as by us.
Last, a fourth profound change is becoming apparent: The collapse
of one of the Arab world's major cities, Baghdad. Baghdad has played a
major role in Iraqi and Islamic history not just since 1920s, but since
its founding in 762. It can be said that Iraq, with its two rivers and
its complex irrigation system, as well as its geographic openness to
invasion from foreign territory, has never flourished unless it had a
relatively strong central government to harness its water resources and
protect its population. Baghdad is the city that has provided that
function. Its high point came in the 10th century when it was a center
of learning and trade and integrated population and ideas from all over
the known world. When Baghdad has declined or been destroyed (as it
was, twice, by the Mongols in 1258 and 1402), Iraqi cohesion has ceased
to exist and it has fallen into long periods of decay. But one must
remember that, ultimately, the city--and Mesopotamia--always revived.
Today, the capital is in a serious state of erosion--from
insurgency, sectarian warfare, and population displacement and
emigration. Indeed, much of this decline predates our invasion. Since
floods were controlled in the mid-1950s, Baghdad has been inundated
with migrants from rural areas in the north and south, who created
satellite cities--urban villages--which changed the ethnic composition
of the city and diluted its urban core. The growth of Baghdad,
especially in the 1970s and 1980s, drained other areas of population.
Greater Baghdad contains between a quarter and a third of Iraq's
population and its highest concentration of skills and infrastructure.
However, even under Saddam, Baghdad began to lose its skilled middle
class, which is now beginning to hemorrhage.
This strand of Iraq's population, its educated middle class, must
be revived if the country is to get back on its feet. It is this class
which has, for the most part, submerged its ethnic, sectarian, and
tribal identity in broader visions and aspirations--political, social,
and cultural--and has greater contact with and affinity for the outside
world. Intermarriage among sects and even ethnic groups was
increasingly common in this middle class, which staffed the
bureaucracy, the educational establishments, and the top echelons of
the military. Unfortunately, under the long decades of Baath rule, this
class was ``Baathized'' to a degree, in order to survive, and has now
found itself disadvantaged, and under current sectarian warfare,
persecuted. And it is this class in Baghdad that is now fleeing in
droves, not just for other places in Iraq, but outside to Jordan,
Syria, the gulf, and Europe. While educated middle classes exist in
other Iraqi cities--Mosul, Basra, Kirkuk, Irbil--they are much smaller,
less cosmopolitan, and, now, far less mixed. They will not be able to
function as the kind of mixing bowl necessary to create interactions
between and among different groups, so essential in the modern world.
Baghdad as a city is by no means lost, but its revival (in more
modest dimensions) and the return of its ``mixed'' middle class are
essential to overcoming ethnic and sectarian divisions and to the
revival of a functioning, nonsectarian government, all of which is
critical to any decent future outcome in Iraq. However decentralized
Iraq may become in its future iteration, none of its parts will be able
to achieve their aspirations without Baghdad. And the weaker the
central government is, the weaker the economic and social revival will
be.
One last thought on the current situation. Before we give up and
hasten to assume that ethnic and sectarian identity will be the basis
of new state arrangements (either inside a weak Iraqi state or in
independent entities), there is one other political dynamic emerging
that bears notice. The major ethnic and sectarian blocs (the Kurds, the
Sunnis, and the Shia) are already fragmenting into smaller units based
on personal interests, a desire for power, and differing visions and
constituencies. None of the larger ethnic and sectarian units on which
a new regionalized state is proposed are homogeneous. These smaller
units have been galvanized by the three elections of 2005, and have
formed political parties and blocs. These blocs are themselves composed
of smaller parties and groups often now supported by militias. While
the militias have gotten most of the attention, the parties have not.
It is the leadership of the larger, better organized and financed
parties that now control the situation in Baghdad. More attention needs
to be paid to them and to their leadership, since they will be making
the decisions on Iraq's direction.
The most important of these parties are clear. In the north, the
Kurds are divided between two principal political parties: The KDP and
the PUK. Both parties are of longstanding, each with its own separate
military forces and political party hierarchies. Both are led by men
with monumental ambitions and egos. These leaders and parties, now
cooperating in a common constitutional venture, the Kurdish Regional
Government (KRG), have fought for decades in the past and are still not
wholly integrated into a Kurdish government. They could split in the
future. Kurdish society also has an emerging Islamic movement (the
Kurdish Islamic Union is a good example); separate tribal groups with
some stature; and ethnic and sectarian minorities (Turkmen, Christians)
with distinct identities and outside supporters.
In the face of a disintegrating Iraqi state and the chaos and
danger in Iraq, the Kurds have pulled together since 2003 in
confronting the Arab part of Iraq and are increasingly separating
themselves from Baghdad. However, the KRG in the north is not self-
sustaining economically, politically, or militarily, nor can it be for
many decades, and even as it moves in that direction, it faces the
long-term affliction of isolation, provincialism, and hostility from
its neighbors that could thwart its domestic development. Failure in
this experiment or a complete collapse of Baghdad could again fracture
the north and give rise to warlordism and tribal politics, as it did in
the mid-1990s. Kurds need to be given encouragement not only to nurture
their successful experiment in the north, but also to spread it to the
south and to cooperate in reviving Iraq rather than moving in a
direction of separatism.
In the Shia bloc, the UIA, there is even less unanimity. Several
political parties or movements dominate this sector and only pull
together under the increasingly weaker leadership of Aytollah Sistani,
who wants to keep a ``Shia majority'' in Iraq. Whether he can continue
to do so under the pressure of events is a large question. The major
Shia parties are clearly SCIRI, under the cleric and politician Abdual
Aziz al-Hakim, and the Sadrist movement under Muqtada al-Sadr, also a
minor cleric. The Dawa Party of Prime Minister Maliki is a weak third.
SCIRI, formed in 1982 in Iran from Iraqis exiled there, was
originally an umbrella group but has now become a party devoted to
Hakim and the furtherance of Shia interests. It has been heavily
financed and organized by Iran, and its militia, originally the Badr
Brigade (now the Badr organization), was originally trained and
officered by Iran. It has allegedly disarmed. It attracts educated
middle-class Shia, who probably see it as the best avenue to power in a
new Shia-dominated Iraq, but its leadership is distinctly clerical and
has ties to Iran. SCIRI's leanings toward clerical rule are drawbacks
in Iraq, especially for Arab Sunnis and Kurds.
Dawa has legitimacy as the founder of the Shia Islamic movement in
Iraq in the late 1950s, but it was virtually emasculated by Saddam in
the late 1970s and 1980s. Most of its leaders fled to Iran, Syria,
Lebanon, and Europe where they remained in exile for decades. Their
organization is weak and they have no militia to speak of.
The Sadrist movement is not an organized party. Its closest model
would be Hezbollah in Lebanon, and its leader, Muqtada, is erratic,
militant, and sometimes dangerous. He has few religious or educational
credentials, but he draws on his father's name and legacy. (His father,
the chief Ayatollah in Iraq, was killed by Saddam in 1999). More
important, he has attracted a wide following among poor, the
downtrodden and youth, who have not benefited from the changes in 2003.
He has emphasized opposition to the occupation, Iraqi unity, and the
fact that he and his followers are ``insiders,'' not exiles. His
militia, now seen by many in the United States as a major threat to the
new government, is fractured and localized, often under the command of
street toughs, and it is not clear the extent to which he can himself
command all of them. A smaller Shia group, al-Fadhila, also an offshoot
of the conservative Shia movement founded by Muqtada's father,
Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, bears watching; it has influence in
Basra.
These various Shia groups and their leaders are in competition for
power and have been for decades (especially the Sadrists and Hakims),
and it is not clear that unity can be kept between them. They also draw
on different constituencies and have somewhat different visions for the
future of Iraq. SCIRI, for example, espouses a Shia region in the
south; Sadr is more in favor of a unified Iraq. Dawa sits somewhere in
the middle.
The Sunni component of the spectrum is the most fragmented. The
Sunni contingent which has been taken into the Cabinet and controls 16
percent of seats in Parliament (Iraqi Accordance Front or Tawafuq) is
itself composed of several parties without much cohesion. Most
important is the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), a party going back to the
1960s and roughly modeled after the Muslim Brotherhood. While it
represents Sunnis, it is more nationalist than Sunni, and does have a
history and some organization. The second component, known as Ahl al-
Iraq (People of Iraq), is a mixture of secularists, tribal, and
religious dignitaries, such as Adnan Dulaimi. As its name suggests, it
has a nationalist focus. The third component, the National Dialogue
Council, is relatively insignificant. Even if these groups come hand
together on issues, it is not clear how much of the Sunni constituency
they represent. The Iraqi Dialogue Front, under Salah Mutlaq, a former
Baathist, who probably represents some of the ex-Baath constituency,
got 4 percent of the votes and sits in Parliament but not the Cabinet.
Whether these two groups can be said to represent ``Sunnis''--and how
many--is at issue, since much of the Sunni insurgency is still out of
power and presumed to consist in large part of former Baathists,
religious jihadis, and now indigenous Iraqi al-Qaeda elements. Bringing
some of these non-Qaida elements into the process is essential, but
expecting the Sunni community to stick together as Sunnis or to think
and feel as Sunnis is premature. Many Sunnis, long associated with the
state and its formation, think along nationalist lines, and have
ambitions beyond a mere Sunni region.
And one should not forget, entirely, the remnants of the main
secular bloc to run in the December 2005 election: The Iraqiya list,
headed by Ayyad Allawi. This group constitutes the bulk of the educated
Iraqis who think in national, rather than communal or ethnic terms.
Although they only got 9 percent of the vote and have little chance of
forming a government, they have positions in the Cabinet and could help
in contributing to a more balanced, nonsectarian government in the
future.
One way out of the conundrum of communal identity politics is to
encourage new political alliances between individuals and groups on
issues and interests, rather than alliances based on identity. This
will be very difficult, especially for the Shia, who see their identity
as a ticket to majority rule, but it can be done, and, to a certain
extent, already is being done. On issues such as oil legislation,
regulation of water resources, economic development, and some other
issues--even that of federalism and keeping Iraq together--voting blocs
can be created across ethnic and sectarian lines, in ways that benefit
all communities. This is a slow, laborious process, but it is probably
the only way in which some of the distrust and hostility between these
leaders can be broken down and new political dynamics shaped.
To the extent that educated professionals can be brought into
government to help shape these deals and bridge the gap, that will
help. Ultimately, state organizations and institutions can be rebuilt
under new management. While no new grand vision is likely to emerge any
time soon from this process, pragmatism may take root, and with it the
bones of a government which delivers services. If this happens, larger
groups of Iraqis will give their new government some loyalty. It is the
state--and effective governance--which needs, gradually, to be put back
into the equation, to enable ethnic and sectarian loyalties to be
damped down and to curb the insurgency. In this process, no two factors
are more important than reviving economic development (not just oil
revenues) and bringing back an educated middle class which has some
degree of contact with and understanding of the outside world beyond
the exclusive domain of tribe, family, sect and ethnic group.
Given this situation, what prognosis may be made? Is the current
situation likely to last? Or is it a transient stage? What is a likely
long-term outcome and what would be ``best'' for Iraqis, the region,
and the United States?
Iraq faces three potential futures in the near and midterm, and it
is still too early to tell which will dominate. All that one can say,
thanks to grievous mistakes made on all sides, is that the process is
going to be very costly and time-consuming; no one should expect any
clear outcome in the next 2 years and probably not even in the next
decade. But helping to shape that long-term future in one direction or
the other will have a profound effect on the region and, I believe, our
own security.
The first outcome is that Iraq will ``break up'' into three main
ethnic and sectarian components--Kurdish, Arab Sunni, and Arab Shia--
hastened by the ethnic and sectarian conflicts spiraling out of
control, and already indicated in the constitution. Many see this as
inevitable and (in the West) as a possible way to ``fix'' the Iraqi
situation and hence to reduce our deep military involvement. Iraq may
end up with such a division, but, unless it is shepherded and fostered
by outside forces, it is unlikely, for several reasons. This division
is not historical, but has come to the fore in a moment of history
characterized by a political vacuum, chaos, and shrewd political
leaders who have mobilized constituents on this basis--especially the
two Kurdish parties and SCIRI. But such a clear-cut division has real
difficulties in Iraq. One is that it does not correspond to reality.
Even in the Kurdish area--where there is more substance to the claim,
this identity is fostered by two leaders and two parties who have near
total control over their opponents and region. But these parties have
no clear borders recognized by neighbors, or by Arabs to the south, and
they will be challenged by all. And they do not have the economic
wherewithal for maintenance of a sustainable state, either in terms of
economic investment (some 70 percent of their income still comes from
the central government in Baghdad), ability to defend their borders, or
recognition. Independence, as many of their leaders recognize, may come
with a big economic price tag that their constituents may not
ultimately be willing to pay.
Elsewhere in Iraq, there is insufficient sectarian homogeneity to
form the basis of a state or even a region. Shia parties themselves
disagree profoundly on whether a federal state in the south--under Shia
religious control--should be established. SCIRI is forwarding this
project because it wants to control this territory, eclipse Sadrists,
and impose its vision on the Shia population. It is opposed by Sadrists
and other more secular Shia, and they will contest the issue, if not in
Parliament, on the street. Creation of such a Shia entity will pose
questions of its boundaries--and we already see sectarian strife in
Baghdad as a component of the struggle over who will control portions
of the city. This is also a new political principle and dynamic likely
to spread to neighboring states like Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, which
have a mix of Shia and Sunni populations, with immensely destabilizing
prospects. And it is an exclusivist principle. What kind of state will
it be? The leadership of SCIRI, with its strong clerical leadership,
its earlier reliance on its own militia, and its emphasis on a ``Shia''
majority, does not give confidence that it will be any more democratic
than its parent model in Iran. Moreover, getting a stable, recognized,
``Shia'' government in this region will be a long and contentious
proposition providing little stability in the south. If the Kurds are
unable to defend their borders themselves, how will the Shia be able to
do so?
But it is in Arab Sunni areas--with Anbar at its heart--that this
project fails abysmally. First, Arab Sunni Iraqis, whether the more
rural variety inhabiting towns and cities along the Euphrates and
Tigris, or their more sophisticated cousins--urban cousins--in Baghdad
and Mosul, have been nurtured for decades on Arabism and on loyalty to
an Iraqi state, which they helped create since 1920. True, some are
more religiously oriented than secular, but this does not detract from
their sense of nationalism. Getting Iraqi Sunnis to identify as Sunnis
is going to be a long and very difficult task, let alone getting them
to concentrate on governing a truncated ``Sunni'' federal area. And
they are surrounded by neighboring Arab countries with leaders and
populations who agree with them. And, as in the case with the Shia,
where will the borders of this entity be? How much of Baghdad will it
include? Will it divide the city of Mosul with Kurds along the Tigris
River? And what about Diyala province with its Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish
and Turkman populations? How is that to be divided up? While sectarian
cleansing in these areas is underway to an alarming degree, it is by no
means complete and in no way desirable. The results are not going to be
a homogenous Sunni area but a patchwork quilt. Moreover, unless the
sting of the Sunni insurgency is drawn, any map of Iraq shows that the
Arab Sunnis population control strategic portions of Iraqi territory--
which they can use, as they have been doing--to prevent both Kurdish
and Shia progress. Included in this territory are water resources--both
the Tigris and Euprhates; access to neighboring Arab countries, and
communications right across the center of the country, as well as
Iraq's ability to export oil through pipelines.
In the end, the creation of new entities--even regions--based on
Shia and Sunni identity is radical in its implications for a region in
which peace depends on tolerance and coexistence between Islam's two
major sects. I will not mention here the obvious implications for the
geostrategic position of Iran and its role in the region or the equally
obvious reactions from other Sunni-dominated states. While this breakup
may happen, it should not be encouraged or brokered by the United
States, especially if we want, ultimately, to disengage our forces from
the country. I believe it will create more, not less, instability in
the future.
A second outcome is that Iraq may ``break down,'' a process that is
also well underway. Rather than cohesive ethnic and sectarian entities,
Iraqi society will disintegrate into smaller units. These will comprise
the political parties and movements we already see, with their various
leaders and organizations; different militias; local tribal leaders and
warlords, criminal organizations that can control access to resources;
and, in urban areas, a combination of local groups and educated leaders
who command the necessary skills to run things. Some of these groups
and organizations may overlap--especially parties and their militias--
and they will function through some fig leaf of government. But the
territory over which they rule will vary and possibly shift as will
their command over Iraq's resources. This breakdown is almost wholly a
function of a collapse of the central government in Baghdad. The
process of building an alternative regional government in the wake of
this collapse is furthest advanced in the three Kurdish provinces in
the north, but it is not complete there by any means.
In reality, this is the Iraq that is emerging, with differing local
forces competing and engaging with one another in an effort to
reestablish control and primacy in various areas of the country. In
some cases these struggles are violent. But none of these local
warlords, militias, parties, or provincial governments--even if they
can keep a modicum of order in their territory--can achieve the kind of
economic development, security, contacts with the outside world, and
promise of a modern life and a future to which most Iraqis aspire. In
the meantime, organized criminal elements--and a myriad of
freebooters--are increasingly stealing Iraq's patrimony, while its oil
wells and other resources go further into decline. And in some areas,
such as Baghdad, the absence of government has led to a Hobbesian
nightmare of insecurity, violence, and the most vicious personal
attacks on human beings seen anywhere in the modern world. Iraq could
descend further into breakdown, as local warlords, militias, criminal
elements, and others assert control. This scenario--a full blown
``failed state''--is already causing problems for the region and for
the United States. Indeed, the failed state syndrome may be spreading,
as events in Lebanon this summer and now in Palestine indicate.
Needless to say, it is precisely the failed state syndrome that
produces the best opportunity for al-Qaeda and other jihadists opposed
to United States and Western interests to nest in the region.
A third outcome is to slow and gradually arrest the decline, and
for Iraq to gradually reconstitute an Iraqi Government that recognizes
the new divisions which have emerged, but learns to accommodate them
and overcome them in some new framework that allows for economic and
social development. No society can exist without governance, and that
is the root of Iraq's problems today. It will be easier to rebuild this
framework, I believe, if Iraqis do not divide, indefatigably, on ethnic
and sectarian lines, but rather work with the various groups and
parties that are gradually participating in the new political system to
achieve mutual interests. This does not preclude the emergence of new
parties, but none are on the horizon now. Such accommodations will
exclude extremes, such as al-Qaeda, and possibly some--though not all--
Sadrist elements, and it must include many of the Sunnis--ex-Baathists
and others--who are not yet in the government. This aim can be advanced
by pushing leaders in Baghdad to cut deals and make agreements on
issues on which they have mutual interests--across the ethnic and
sectarian divide. It is also essential to expand areas of economic
development; government services (especially security) and to bring
back the middle class and put them in positions of administrative and
military authority. Regardless of who is running politics, an infusion
of educated, experienced technocrats will help moderate the process and
push it toward the middle. Over time, new links and understandings may
become institutionalized and a government in Baghdad gradually take
shape. Even if this government does not control much territory outside
of Baghdad or the Green Zone, it is better to keep it intact as a
symbol and a framework toward which a future generation can work, than
to destroy it and try, once again, to establish a new and entirely
radical framework.
Iraq is very far from achieving a new government that works, and
the collapse we are witnessing is more likely to get worse before it
gets better. Only when the participants in this struggle for power
recognize that they are losing more than they can gain by continuing,
will it come to an end. That may be a very long time. In the meantime,
the best we can probably do is to staunch the violence; contain the
struggle; and keep alive the possibility that after extremism has run
its course, the potential for a different Iraq is still there. Others
in the region should be encouraged to do the same, a task which should
be made easier by the fact that no state in the region--or its
leadership--wants to see the collapse of the current state system, no
matter how much in need of reform is its domestic government may be.
SEAT DISTRIBUTION FROM THE DECEMBER 15, 2005, IRAQI LEGISLATIVE ELECTION
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Party Total seats Percentage
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shia Parties:
United Iraqi Alliance..................... 128 46.55
Progressives.............................. 2 0.73
-------------------------
Total................................... 130 47.27
=========================
Sunni Parties:
Accord Front.............................. 44 16.00
Iraqi Dialogue Front...................... 11 4.00
Liberation and Reconciliation Bloc........ 3 1.09
-------------------------
Total................................... 58 21.09
=========================
Kurdish Parties:
Kurdistan Alliance........................ 53 19.27
Islamic Union of Kurdistan................ 5 1.82
-------------------------
Total................................... 58 21.09
=========================
Secular Nationalist Parties:
National Iraqi List....................... 25 9.09
Iraqi Nation List (Mithal al-Alusi)....... 1 0.36
-------------------------
Total................................... 26 9.45
=========================
Minority Parties:
The Two Rivers List (Assyrian)............ 1 0.36
The Yazidi Movement....................... 1 0.36
Iraqi Turkman Front....................... 1 0.36
-------------------------
Total................................... 3 1.09
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MINISTRIES AND LEADERSHIP POSITIONS BY PARTY, PERMANENT GOVERNMENT, 2006
------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. of
ministries
Party +leadership Percentage
positions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
UIA........................................... 21 45.65
SCIRI..................................... 5 10.87
Dawa...................................... 1 2.17
Dawa Tandhim.............................. 3 6.52
Sadrists.................................. 4 8.70
Islamic Action............................ 1 2.17
Hezbollah................................. 1 2.17
Independent............................... 6 13.04
Kurdistan Alliance............................ 8 17.39
PUK....................................... 4 8.70
KDP....................................... 4 8.70
Tawafuq....................................... 9 19.57
Iraqiya....................................... 6 13.04
Independent................................... 2 4.35
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Editor's note.--The charts presented by Dr. Marr were not
reproducible. They will be maintained for viewing in the committee's
premanent record.]
Chairman Biden. Doctor, thank you. Thank you very much.
Michael.
STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL O'HANLON, SENIOR FELLOW AND SYDNEY
STEIN, JR., CHAIR, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. O'Hanlon. Thank you, Senator. It's a great honor to
appear before this committee today.
Chairman Biden. By the way--excuse me for interrupting--I
note that, in the interest of time, you've been unable to go
through the entire statements each of you had----
Dr. Marr. Oh, yes.
Chairman Biden [continuing]. Your entire statements will be
placed in the record for everyone to have available.
Dr. O'Hanlon. Thank you for the honor to testify today.
I think the numbers in Iraq essentially add up to what we
all, I think, are realizing in our gut more and more, which is,
the state of Iraq today is poor. As a person trying to maintain
an objective database on this for 3\1/2\ years now, I tried
hard not to use that kind of a sweeping conclusion for the
first couple of years. There was always reason to think that
the glass might be half full, or at least the data themselves
might suggest that you could find information that would allow
you to reach that conclusion. And we thought, as providing a
database, it was important for us not to prejudge where things
were headed. But I think it's increasingly clear that in Iraq
the situation is poor, that we are losing. One can debate
whether we've lost. I would agree with Secretary Powell's
characterization, that we are losing, but there is still hope
for salvaging something. And the degree of setback or degree of
an unfortunate outcome matters a great deal, even if we are not
going to wind up where we hope to be, on the scale that we had
hoped. But the data, I think, are very clear, and let me go
through just a couple of points to try to summarize why I say
that.
On the testimony I've prepared today, we have 18 security
indicators, 6 economic indicators, and another half dozen or so
political and public opinion indicators. The latter category
has some hope, has some positive element, but the first two are
almost uniformly bad. Of the 18 security indicators that we're
presenting for you today, 17 of them are either bad or, at
best, stagnant, in terms of the trend lines. Only one can be
said to be positive, and that's the one that I think,
unfortunately, is less important and less--itself, less
promising than we once hoped--which is the progress in training
Iraqi security forces, because even though we are making
technical progress, getting them equipment, getting them
training. We all know that their sectarian trends and
tendencies are growing, and one can't even speak, necessarily,
of a clearly improving Iraqi security force, at this time.
We've tried to guestimate about how many of the Iraqi security
forces may be not only technically proficient, but politically
dependable in some way. Very hard to come up with that kind of
a number. I've talked to people in the military and the
administration on this. I know you all have, too. But I think
that, at best, there are several thousand Iraqi forces that can
be reliably said to be politically dependable, even if there
may be 100,000 or more that pass at least a modest standard of
technical capability. So, the security environment is quite
poor.
On the economic front, of the six categories that we
summarize in our testimony today, only one of them shows any
real positive motion, and that's the GDP. But that, of course,
is essentially a top-down effect from high oil prices and from
foreign aid, and it doesn't necessarily reach all the middle-
class Iraqis that we need to reach.
So, this is why I conclude that things aren't good, and, in
fact, are quite poor, on balance.
Let me identify, very quickly, six categories, and give you
just a little bit of information on each of the six, and try to
do so quickly, because I realize it's easy to swamp people with
data. And, by the way, I should say, by way of background, not
all this data is of equally good quality. Again, those of you--
and most of you who have been to Iraq know how hard it is to
get information from the ground, and we also know that the
numbers--you know, the benchmarks may be off, and the trends
may be somewhat off. But I still think the overall gist of this
is pretty clear.
I should also say, our information is largely U.S.
Government information, but we also try to depend a great deal
on journalists working in the field, on nongovernmental
organizations in the field, and, to some extent, our own
research. But we are not in Iraq, with a lot of interns,
gathering data; we are primarily trying to compile and assess
trends.
First point of the six categories--and this is obvious, but
I'd better make it clear and get it on the table anyway--the
violence levels in Iraq have been escalating dramatically.
We've seen this again in the recent data. There is considerable
disagreement about how many people in Iraq are dying per month,
but it's probably in the range of 4-5,000 civilians a month,
which is at least double what it was just a couple of years
ago. And, frankly, in this broad semantic debate about whether
Iraq is in civil war or not, by that standard Iraq is very,
very clearly in civil war. The sheer level of violence makes
this one of the two or three most violent places in earth. And,
frankly, we're getting to the point where it even begins to
rival some of the more violent periods during Saddam's rule,
which is a terrible thing to have to say. It's not as bad, of
course, as the worst period of the Iran-Iraq war or of Saddam's
genocides against his own people, but it is essentially
rivaling--essentially--what I might say is the average level of
Saddam's level of violence over his 25 years in power, about 4-
5,000 civilians being killed per month.
One backup piece of information on this, or corroborating
statistic, the number of attacks per day that we're seeing from
militias or sectarian groups or insurgents is now almost 200,
which is an escalation of at least a factor of five from a
couple of years ago. So, the first point, again, is fairly
obvious, but, I think, worth emphasizing.
Second point--and Dr. Marr made this point, and we all are
aware of it--is the growing sectarian nature of the violence.
And here, I'm just going to highlight one or two statistics,
which come largely from Pentagon data bases. In the early 2
years of Iraq's war--or of our experience in Iraq since 2003--
there were very few sectarian attacks, maybe zero or one per
day, according to the Pentagon's best effort to tabulate. More
of the attacks were a Sunni-based insurgency against anyone
associated with the government, whether it was our forces,
Iraqi Shia, Iraqi Sunni, Iraq Kurd. The violence was very much
of an insurgent and terrorist nature. And zero or one attacks
per day were assessed as sectarian. Now it's 30 sectarian
attacks a day. Three zero. So, this is a dramatic escalation in
the amount of sectarian violence.
We have a terrorist threat, an insurgency threat, and a
civil war from sectarian violence, all at the same time. And I
don't want to make too much of the semantic issue here. If you
want to call it ``sectarian strife'' or ``large-scale sectarian
strife'' rather than ``civil war,'' I suppose we can still have
that debate, but the sheer amount of violence and the growing
political impetus to the violence from the different sectarian
leaders makes Iraq unambiguously qualified, in my mind, as a
place where we have a civil war today. So, I wanted to
underscore the sectarian nature of the violence.
Third point, related to the first two, is that, if you want
to put it in a nutshell, Iraq is becoming Bosnia. Ethnic
cleansing and displacement are becoming paramount. And here, I
think the statistics have been underappreciated in much of the
public debate, so far. So, let me try to be very clear on one
big, important data point; 100,000 Iraqis per month are being
driven from their homes right now. Roughly half are winding up
abroad, roughly half are moving to different parts of Iraq.
This is Bosnia-scale ethnic cleansing. I agree with Dr. Marr
that it would be preferable--and Iraqis certainly would
prefer--to retain some level of multiethnic society, and that
separation of the country into autonomous zones raises a lot of
tough questions. However, let's be clear about what the data
show. It's happening already. And right now, it's the militias
and the death squads that are driving the ethnic cleansing, and
the movement toward a breakup of Iraq. And the question, pretty
soon, is going to be whether we try to manage that process or
let the militias alone drive it, because it's happening;
100,000 people a month are being driven from their homes. Iraq
looks like Bosnia, more and more. That's my third point.
Fourth point, disturbing--again, not surprising, but
disturbing--middle- and upperclass flight. We have huge
problems of Iraqi professional classes, the people we need to
get involved in rebuilding this country, no longer able to do
so. To some extent, it's a legacy of the issue about de-
Baathification and the degree to which Ambassador Bremer
expanded the de-Baathification approach beyond what was
initially planned, but also, now, Iraqis are being driven from
their homes because of the amount of kidnaping of upperclass
individuals, much of it financially driven. And just one very
disturbing statistic: Physicians in Iraq. We now estimate that
a third of them have left the country or have been killed or
kidnaped in the time since liberation of Iraq from Saddam, 4
years ago. So, one-third of all physicians are out of Iraq and
no longer practicing. And that's probably, if anything, an
underestimate. So, middle-class and upperclass flight, or the
death of many middle-class and upperclass individuals, has
become a real challenge for putting this country back together
in any meaningful way.
Fifth point. And this makes me, I should admit in advance,
sympathetic to President Bush's planned--from what I
understand--planned focus on job creation in his speech
tonight. I think it's overdue. But unemployment is a big
problem in Iraq. And I think the Commander Emergency Response
Program, which we used, on a pilot scale, on a smaller scale,
in the early years, was a very good idea. If you want to call
it ``make work,'' that's fine. If you want to call it ``FDR-
style job creation,'' that's fine. I think that's what Iraq
needs today, because the unemployment rate is stubbornly high.
And even if job creation is not, per se, a good economic
development strategy, it may be a good security strategy,
because it takes angry young men off the streets. So, the
unemployment rate, as best we can tell, is still stuck in the
30-plus-percent range. Now, by developing-country standards,
that's not necessarily without precedent, but in Iraq it fuels
the civil war and the sectarian strife and the insurgency, and
that's the reason why it's of great concern, in addition to the
obvious reasons.
Last point, I'll finish on Iraqi pessimism. For the first 2
years of this effort, Iraqi optimism was one of the few things
we could really latch onto and say that the political process
plus the gratitude of the Iraqis that Saddam was gone--maybe
not gratitude toward us, per se, because they quickly became
angry with us, but gratitude in a broader sense--plus their
hope about the future, provided a real sense that this country
could come together, because the optimism rates about the
country's prognosis, among Iraqis themselves, were in the 70-
percent range for the first couple of years. Those numbers have
plummeted. They're still higher than I would have predicted, to
be honest with you. They still look like they are 40-45 percent
optimism, but they are way, way down from what they used to be.
And if you look at a couple of other indicators of Iraqi public
opinion, especially from a June 2006 poll done by our
International Republican Institute, only 25--excuse me, I'll
put it another way--75 percent of all Iraqis consider the
security environment to be poor--75 percent; and 60 percent
consider the economic environment to be poor. So----
Chairman Biden. Can I ask a point of clarification?
Dr. O'Hanlon. Yes; please.
Chairman Biden. Is that polling data, or that data about
pessimism, does that include the roughly 1 million people who
have been displaced or are out of country, or does it include--
--
Dr. O'Hanlon. It's a very good point, Senator. It does not,
as far as I understand. And, therefore, if you did address
these individuals who have suffered most directly, the numbers
might well be lower. But, in any event, I think the overall
gist, the trendlines, are bad. And when you ask Iraqis about
the security environment or the economic environment, they're
even more pessimistic than they are in general terms.
That's my overall message, and I look forward to the
conversation later.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. O'Hanlon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael O'Hanlon, Senior Fellow and Sydney Stein,
Jr., Chair, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC
The year 2006 was, tragically and inescapably, a bad one in Iraq.
Our ongoing work at Brookings makes this conclusion abundantly clear in
quantitative terms. Violence got worse for Iraqi civilians and barely
declined at all for American and Iraqi troops. And the economy was
fairly stagnant as well.
Despite the drama of Saddam's execution in the year's final days,
2006 will probably be remembered most for two developments inside Iraq.
The first is the failure of the 2005 election process to produce any
sense of progress. In fact, 2006 was the year that politicians in Iraq
did much more to advance the interests of their own sects and religions
than to build a new cohesive country. (In a September poll, Prime
Minister al-Maliki was viewed unfavorably by 85 percent of all Sunni
Arabs, for example.) The second is the related commencement of Iraq's
civil war dating back to the February 22 bombing of the hallowed Shia
mosque in Samarra. While some still question whether Iraq is in civil
war, there is no longer much serious debate about the situation. The
sheer level of violence, and the increasing politicization of the
violence to include many more Shia attacks on Sunnis as well as the
reverse, qualify the mayhem in Iraq as civil war by most definitions of
the term. And the country has become one of the three or four most
violent places on Earth.
It is still possible to find signs of hope in our Brookings
statistics on Iraq: The numbers of Iraqi security forces who are
trained and technically proficient, the gradually improving GDP, recent
reductions in Iraqi state subsidies for consumer goods (which distort
the economy and divert government resources), the number of children
being immunized. But those same children cannot feel safe en route to
school in much of today's Iraq; that GDP growth is a top-down
phenomenon having little if any discernible effect on the unemployment
rate or well-being of Iraqis in places such as Al Anbar province and
Sadr City, Baghdad; reductions in subsidies are not enough to spur much
private sector investment in such a violent country; and those
increasingly proficient security forces remain politically unreliable
in most cases, just as inclined to stoke sectarian strife as to contain
it.
The performance of Iraq's utilities remains stagnant--not bad by
the standards of developing countries, but hardly better than under
Saddam. Oil production and electricity availability remain generally
flat nationwide. Fuels for household cooking and heating and
transportation fall even further short of estimated need than they did
a year or two ago, as does electricity production in Baghdad.
Despite some unconvincing rhetoric from President Bush in the
prelude to the November elections that ``absolutely, we're winning,''
most Americans now agree on the diagnosis of the situation in Iraq.
Former Secretary Baker and former Congressman Hamilton recently warned
of a ``further slide toward chaos.'' Secretary of Defense, Robert
Gates, stated in his confirmation hearings that we aren't winning, even
if he declined to go as far as Colin Powell and assert that we are
actually losing. Former Secretary Rumsfeld himself, in his leaked
November memo, recognized that Iraq was going badly and put out a
laundry list of potential options in Iraq that we may have to consider
to salvage the situation, including a Dayton-like process modeled on
Bosnia's experience to negotiate an end to the civil war.
Iraqis tend to share a similar diagnosis. According to a June 2006
poll, 59 percent call the economy poor and 75 percent describe the
security environment as poor. The security situation in particular has
only deteriorated since then.
Against this backdrop, dramatic measures are clearly needed. At a
minimum, we will likely require some combination of the options now
being proposed by the Iraq Study Group, the Pentagon, and others.
President Bush is likely to recommend several of these in his eagerly
awaited January speech--a massive program to create jobs, a surge of
25,000 more American troops to Iraq to try to improve security in
Baghdad, an ultimatum to Iraqi political leaders that if they fail to
achieve consensus on key issues like sharing oil, American support for
the operation could very soon decline.
Our Brookings data suggest rationales for each of these possible
policy steps, even if there are also counterarguments. Coalition forces
have never reached the numbers needed to provide security for the
population in Iraq, and indigenous forces remain suspect--in their
technical proficiency, and even more so in their political
dependability. These two realities make at least a tactical case for a
surge, if it is really feasible on the part of our already overworked
soldiers and marines. Despite the success of military commanders in
putting Iraqis to work with their commander emergency response program
funds, the administration never chose to emphasize job creation in its
economic reconstruction plans meaning that the unemployment rate has
remained stubbornly high. And for all our happiness about Iraq's
democracy, it is clear that extremely few Iraqi leaders enjoy any real
support outside of their own sectarian group. Trying to force them to
work across sectarian lines must be a focus of our policy efforts, if
there is to be any hope of ultimate stability in Iraq.
Social scientists and military experts do not know how to assess,
rigorously, the probabilities that such steps will succeed at this late
hour in Iraq. Overall, however, it seems fair to say that most have
become quite pessimistic. If the above types of ideas fail, therefore,
``Plan B'' options may well be needed within a year, ranging from a
federalism plan for Iraq that Rumsfeld and Senator Biden have been
discussing to plans that would go even further and help Iraqis relocate
to parts of their country where they could feel safer (as Bosnia
expert, Edward Joseph, and I have recently advocated in The American
Interest). Such an idea is widely unpopular--with Iraqis themselves,
with President Bush, with most Americans who value the notion of
interethnic tolerance. But with 100,000 Iraqis per month being
displaced from their homes, making for a total of some 2 million since
Saddam was overthrown, ethnic cleansing is already happening. Unless
current trends are reversed, the question may soon become not whether
we can stop this Bosnia-like violence--but whether we try to manage it
or let the death squads continue to dictate its scale and its
character.
Although it has been said before about previous new years, it seems
very likely that 2007 will be make or break time in Iraq.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category 11/03 11/04 11/05 11/06
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Security
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S./other foreign troops in Iraq (thousands)............ 123/24 138/24 160/23 140/17
U.S. troops killed....................................... 82 137 96 68
Percent killed by IEDs................................... 24 13 48 54
U.S. troops wounded...................................... 337 1,397 466 508
Iraqi Army/police fatalities............................. 50 160 176 123
Iraqi civilian fatalities................................ 1,250 2,900 1,800 4,000
Multiple fatality bombings (for month in question)....... 6 11 41 65
Estimated strength of insurgency......................... 5,000 20,000 20,000 25,000
Estimated strength of Shia militias...................... 5,000 10,000 20,000 50,000
Daily average of interethnic attacks..................... 0 1 1 30
Estimated number of foreign fighters..................... 250 750 1,250 1,350
Number of daily attacks by insurgents/militias........... 32 77 90 185
Attacks on oil/gas assets................................ 9 30 0 11
Iraqis internally displaced 100,000 since 04/03 (total).. 100,000 175,000 200,000 650,000
Iraqi refugees since 04/03 (total)....................... 100,000 350,000 900,000 1,500,000
Iraqi physicians murdered or kidnapped/fled Iraq......... 100/1,000 250/2,000 1,000/5,000 2,250/12,000
Iraqi Security Forces technically proficient............. 0 10,000 35,000 115,000
Iraqi Security Forces politically dependable............. 0 0 5,000 10,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Economics
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oil production (millions of barrels/day; prewar: 2.5).... 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.1
Percent of household fuel needs available................ 76 77 88 54
Electricity production (in megawatts, prewar: 4,000)..... 3,600 3,200 3,700 3,700
Ave. hours/day of power, Baghdad (prewar: 20)............ 12 12 9 7
Unemployment rate (percent).............................. 50 35 33 33
Per capita GDP (real dollars; prewar: $900).............. 550 1,000 1,100 1,150
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Politics, Public Opinion, Democracy, Law
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. of Trained Judges.................................... 0 250 350 750
Telephone subscribers (prewar: 800,000).................. 600,000 2,135,000 5,500,000 8,100,000
Independent media companies (prewar: 0).................. 100 150 225 400
Iraqi optimism (percent who think things going in right 65 54 49 45
direction)..............................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chairman Biden. Thank you.
Mr. Said.
STATEMENT OF YAHIA SAID, DIRECTOR, IRAQ REVENUE WATCH, LONDON
SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, LONDON, ENGLAND
Mr. Said. Mr. Chairman, Senators, I'm honored to be here,
and I'm pleased by your interest in the situation in Iraq, and
efforts to find a solution that will be helpful to the Iraqi
and American people.
Chairman Biden. As Strom Thurmond used to say, ``Will you
pull the machine closer so everyone can hear you?'' Thank you
very much.
Mr. Said. Some of the statements I'm going to make are
going to echo what was said before, and, in a way, will
confirm, through anecdotal evidence, what has been suggested
through the numbers and statistics.
The conflict in Iraq is not only pervasive, as the numbers
suggest, but it's very complex. And it's very important not to
try to simplify it. The situation in Iraq has suffered, and
policymaking in Iraq has suffered, because the conflict was
reduced to some of its elements rather than looked at in its
complexity. This is not only a conflict between democracy and
its enemies, it's not only a conflict between insurgency and
counterinsurgency, it's not only a conflict between Sunni and
Shia. This is a multifaceted, overlapping series of conflicts
which is a function of the various groups and interests and
agendas. And what I will try to do in my statement is try to
address some of the elements of the conflict, to just
illustrate the complexity of it, and hopefully that will help
inform policymaking. I will also try to address the question:
Why are these conflicts taking such a violent form? And
finally, I will try to address issues of national dialog and
efforts at finding a peaceful resolution to these conflicts.
As the numbers suggested by Mr. O'Hanlon, the insurgency
continues--and by ``insurgency'' I mean attacks against
coalition forces--continues to be a significant part of the
conflict. The majority of attacks continue to target coalition
forces and coalition personnel, and the high numbers of
casualties are evidence to that. But the insurgency is also a
domestic political game. Many groups from the various
communities, from various political directions, engage in the
insurgency to acquire political legitimacy and to acquire,
through that, a right to govern. Indeed, when the Iraqi
Government proposed or suggested the option of an amnesty
lately, insurgents bristled and said, ``They shouldn't be
pardoned for fighting the occupation, they should be rewarded
by being given positions in power.'' The insurgency is also
about many other factors, including money. And it's becoming
harder and harder to distinguish whether a commercial interest
is a goal in itself or is a means to a goal.
The sectarian violence, as, again, the numbers have
suggested, is on the rise, and is tearing at the fabric of
society, but it's not producing the kind of consolidation, the
kind of alignment along sectarian and ethnic lines that some of
the architects of the violence have hoped for. Indeed, as Ms.
Marr has suggested, there is fragmentation. There is
fragmentation within communities, there is fragmentation within
political blocs and individual political parties. There is also
increasing and growing specter of warlordism as rogue military
commanders take control of fragments of militias and even state
security structures. And the evidence for the fragmentation is
everywhere. On my recent trip to Baghdad, a driver from a Sunni
neighborhood complained to me that the Sunni insurgents, the
Sunni fighters, kill more of their own kin than they do of Shia
militias. The fighting between the Sadrists and militias
affiliated with the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in
Iraq, the SCIRI, and security forces controlled by them, have
swept throughout the south of the country, and, over the last
year, the Sadrists have gained control, at least temporarily,
of various cities in the south. Even in Kurdistan the tensions
are not far below the surface.
One of the largest movements--the largest political
movement in Iraq today are the Sadrists, and I think it's
worthwhile to focus a little bit on that component of the
situation in Iraq, because it's also illustrative of the
dynamics. While other political parties control state and
security structures, particularly the SCIRI, the Sadrists
control the streets. But this is a very controversial and
contradictory movement. The Sadrists nurture a nationalist
image. They don't engage in sectarian rhetoric. They have
clashed frequently with coalition forces. At the same time,
they have participated in the political process, they have 30
MPs, 6 ministers currently in boycott.
Many ex-Baathists--Shia ex-Baathists--joined the Sadrist
movement, yet the Sadrist movement has been the most vocal in
calling for revenge and for punishing regime officials. The
Sadrists style themselves after Hezbollah in Lebanon, and seek
to protect their communities and constituents and provide
services. At the same time, their militias are undisciplined
and engage in criminal violence and looting, themselves, and,
of course, man some of the feared death squads.
This is a movement of the poor. This is an
antiestablishment movement. Their grassroots support comes from
the very poor Arab Shia in the countryside and the slums of
Baghdad. And, as such, their natural enemies are not
necessarily the Sunnis, but are the establishment, regardless
of their sectarian or ethnic affiliation. As--and we see that
through their clashes with the Shia establishment, with the
merchant and religious Shia establishment represented by SCIRI.
So, you have one movement that is fighting three conflicts.
It's fighting an insurgency, it's fighting an antiestablishment
revolt, and it's fighting a sectarian civil war.
So, why does the conflict in Iraq take such violent forms?
It does, because there is a political vacuum, as Ms. Marr--
Professor Marr--has suggested. And this political vacuum is
signaling to the various groups and communities the necessity
to protect their interests and achieve their goals through
violent means, because there is no framework for a peaceful
resolution of conflicts, for a peaceful reconciliation of the
diverging interests.
This violence, of course, is also feeding into the collapse
of the state, and you have a vicious circle of political
vacuum, violence, and state collapse.
Now, the political process that took place over the last 3
years was supposed to address that. It was supposed to create
that vehicle for a peaceful resolution of conflict, for ways
for Iraqis to come together and reconcile their differences.
But, unfortunately, and despite a tremendous effort by Iraqis,
Americans, and others, this has not been the case. Indeed, the
political process is defunct, and, as Ms. Marr suggested, the
state also has not emerged. We don't have, in Iraq, a
legitimate public authority that could protect people and
provide them with services.
Why did this process fail? And this is not about pointing
fingers at the past, but it's very important to understand some
of the reasons for the failings. It's tempting to point the
finger at external factors. Indeed, the Iraqis love to point
the finger at external factors. And if you ask them, ``It's the
Americans' fault, it's the Israelis, it's the Iranians, it's
Saddam,'' and everybody possible. But there are, of course,
internal reasons. And one of them is the fact that many Iraqis,
a majority of Iraqis, are sitting on the fence, or, as my
colleague has just suggested, are pessimistic. Iraqis have
little faith in the process--in the political process and its
results, and in the elites that emerge from it. They don't have
confidence in this regime--in the current regime and its
sustainability.
What you have is a pervasive atmosphere--it's two
sentiments that--dominating the situation in Iraq--which is
fear and apathy. And you see that everywhere. And it's these
sentiments that provide the perfect cover for corruption, for
terrorism, for violence, and for sectarian hate. Even
government officials are inflicted by this sentiment, and this
explains how they use their positions to undermine, to
dismantle the machinery of government that has been entrusted
to them. And, indeed, you can hear echoes of that pessimism or
apathy in the Prime Minister's recent interview with the Wall
Street Journal.
Within this atmosphere, we're seeing, now, a hardening of
positions on all sides. There is this mood, if you like, of
going for a last push. And it's not only evident through the
terrorist and the sectarian violence, but also in the
government's own position. Clearly, the model of a full-
spectrum national unity government, which we still have in Iraq
now, has not worked. It has even furthered the dismantling of
the machinery of the state, because it was reduced to farming
out ministries to individual parties and groups. Now the
strongest parties in the government, particularly the SCIRI and
the Kurds, are trying to build a narrower government, and hope
that it would be more efficient and work more as a team. But
there are risks to this approach. These parties don't have
strong grassroots support, and will rely more both on coercion,
but also on continued U.S. support and bolstering. The
execution of Saddam Hussein, and the manner in which it was
carried out, and the rhetoric and the timing and everything, is
indication of this hardening. That event was clearly designed
to intimidate political opponents of the government, and
particularly the Sunni community.
The new security plan and the push for an all-out assault,
in combination with the surge option, is also an indication of
that. There is very little evidence to show, today, that the
Iraqi Government will be able to mobilize the resources
necessary to make this security plan more successful than those
who preceded it. And a temporary surge will also probably not
lead to sustainable outcomes. At the same time, if the plan--if
the security plan is carried out in a one-sided way, and the
Prime Minister has indicated that he views Sunni violence,
terrorist violence, as the primary problem, and that the Shia
militias are a secondary reaction to that--so, if this plan is
carried out in a one-sided way with disregard to human rights,
it can exacerbate the situation and make finding a political
peaceful solution even harder. And, at the end of the day, the
only solution to the situation in Iraq has to come through
dialog, has to come through engagement and ownership of a broad
cross-section of Iraqis, to overcome that feeling of apathy and
disconnection. The dialog has to be genuine--as in, the parties
have to produce real concessions--all the parties. It has to be
broad. It has to involve not only the sectarian protagonists,
but also those who still believe in the viability of the Iraqi
states and in the necessity, as Professor Marr has indicated,
of having a central state in that particular region.
Unfortunately, the government's action, the hardening of
the government's position over the last 6 months--the Iraqi
Government has closed down to opposition newspapers, TV
stations, has issued arrest warrants for leading opposition
figures--do not create a conducive environment for an open and
genuine dialog. So, there is need for international
intervention on that front, and I'll address that later.
Dialog, of course, doesn't mean that one needs to throw out
the results of the political process of the last 3 years. I
think the Constitution--the Iraqi Constitution, with all its
shortcomings, serves as a good starting point for dialog, but
the Constitution needs to be transformed, through genuine
dialog, from a dysfunctional to a rational federal structure.
Oil, and--negotiations on an oil deal, which have
apparently concluded recently, also provide a model for the--
for that rational federalism. The main principles that the
negotiators have agreed on is to maximize the benefit of Iraq's
oil wealth to all Iraqis, to use oil as a way to unite the
nation, and to build a framework based on transparency, which
is very important in a situation of lack--of poor trust, and on
efficiency and equity.
Major issues have been resolved, like having a central
account to accumulate all oil revenues, and manage the oil
revenues on--at the federal level. Apparently, even the issue--
the current issue of contracting, and who has the right to
contract, has been resolved, as well as the structure for a
national oil company.
But there remains issues open, and it's very important not
to let the details derail the negotiations. And it's also very
important to have a professional and open dialog on those
issues, as in involving the proper professionals in the
negotiations, and not reduce them to a political kitchen
cabinet. One needs financial people, one needs economists and
petroleum experts, involved in the debate.
And one of the critical issues is how the revenue-sharing
framework is going to work. Will it be through the writing of
checks, which is unsustainable in the long term? There is no
reason for Basrah to transfer money to the central government
so that it can write checks to the other regions. Unless the
revenue-sharing is carried out through the budget, through an
integral budgetary process, the arrangement will be
unsustainable. So, it's very important to make sure that the
integrity of budgetary process is preserved.
In conclusion, I think policies for Iraq should be informed
by the complexity of the conflict. A surge, or the security
plan envisioned now for Iraq, reduces the conflict to one
between a democracy and its enemies; between democracy and
terror. But if it is carried out with disregard to human
rights, if it is carried out with disregard to the rule of law
and in a one-sided way, it may exacerbate the situation and may
also increase sectarian tensions and undermine the very
democracy it purports to defend.
The withdrawal of U.S. forces also reduces the conflict to
an issue of a fight between an occupying army and a nationalist
resistance. But, at the same time, a withdrawal may spell the
end to the Green-Zone-based Iraqi State, and that could unleash
further spirals of violence.
Segregation, or the various proposals on the table that are
aimed at addressing Iraq through an ethnic prism, reduces the
conflict to one between Sunnis and Shia. But, in that
atmosphere of fragmentations, as Professor Marr has suggested,
that means that we will just replace one civil war with three
civil wars, one failed state with three failed states. And, as
I hope the next speaker will address Iraqi partition or
segregation will lead to unimaginable consequences at the
regional level.
So, the only solution for Iraq will have to be long term
and comprehensive, as Professor Marr has suggested, and will
have to be based on an open and inclusive dialog, but it's
something the Iraqis, on their own, cannot do, and they will
need an international intervention to identify the
protagonists, to bring them to the negotiations table, and to
help prod them to reach compromise. What Iraq needs today is an
internationally sponsored and mediated peace process.
And I will finish at that. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Said follows:]
Prepared Statement of Yahia Khairi Said, Director, Revenue Watch
Institute, London School of Economics, London, England
The conflict in Iraq today is as complex as it is pervasive. This
is a reflection of the various groups and interests at play as well as
the legacies of the past. The conflict can not be reduced to simple
dichotomies of democracy against its enemies, resistance against the
occupation or Shia vs. Sunni. Likewise there is no single universal
solution to the conflict. Neither the current proposal for a ``surge''
nor the proposal to withdraw coalition forces are likely to bring
peace. What is needed is a comprehensive and long-term approach based
on an open and inclusive dialog at national and international levels,
in which the fair distribution of Iraqi oil revenues is used as an
incentive for uniting Iraqis.
THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT
The Insurgency: The targeting of Multinational Forces continues to
account for a significant portion of the violence as evidenced by the
consistently high numbers of coalition casualties. The insurgency is
also an arena of domestic political conflict. Groups from different
ethnic and political backgrounds use the ``resistance'' to legitimate
their claim to power. Sunni insurgents bristled at the government's
offer of an amnesty last year, insisting that they should be rewarded,
not pardoned for fighting the occupation. Al-Qaeda uses videos of
attacks on U.S. troops to recruit and fundraise for its own global war.
Some insurgent attacks are simply a cover for economic crimes. As with
many such conflicts, it is often hard to discern whether the violence
is purely a means to commercial gain or an end in itself.
Spiralling sectarian violence is polarising communities and tearing
society apart. However, it is not producing the consolidation and
political mobilization along ethnic and sectarian lines as intended by
its architects. Quite the opposite, the pervasive violence and
uncertainty is leading to fragmentation within communities, political
blocks, and individual parties. Warlordism is emerging as rogue
commanders assume control of fragments of militias and individual units
of the state security forces.
A resident of a Sunni neighborhood in Baghdad recently complained
to me that Sunni fighters kill more of their own kin than they do Shia
militias. Tribal rivalries broke into open conflict in the Anbar
province this summer pitching Sunni tribes against each other and
against the foreign al-Qaeda fighters. The head of the prominent Tamim
tribe recently expressed a widely held sentiment among fellow Sunnis
when he lambasted the ``Iraqi un-Islamic Party'' which purports to
represent them in government. Likewise among the Shiites, there are
frequent and violent confrontations between the SCIRI-controlled
militias and police forces on one side, and militias associated with
the Sadrist movement, on the other. These confrontations allowed the
Sadrists at various times to briefly seize control of most major cities
in central and southern Iraq. The competition to control Basra's oil
smuggling business among various militias and political parties often
takes the form of street warfare. Less overtly, tensions bubble just
under the surface between the two main Kurdish parties and between them
on one side and Kurdish Islamists on the other. Outburst of separatism
by Kurdish leaders--like the recent spat over the national flag--should
be viewed in the context of competition for power in Kurdistan itself.
The Sadrist Movement is emblematic of the complexities and
contradictions of Iraq's political and security landscape. While SCIRI
and other political groups control government positions and resources,
the Sadrists control the street. They nurture a nationalist image
clashing occasionally with Multinational Forces and deriding the new
elite who came with the invasion. This did not stop them from actively
participating in the political process. The Sadrists have 30 members of
Parliament and 6 ministers. Many Shia ex-Baathists joined the Sadrists
after the collapse of the regime yet the movement is most vocal in
seeking revenge against regime officials. Among Shia groups the
Sadrists are the least likely to employ sectarian rhetoric yet their
warlords are implicated in the worst instances of sectarian violence.
The Sadrists try to emulate Hezbollah in Lebanon by seeking to protect
and provide social services to their constituents and by meting out
vigilante justice against criminals and those engaged in what they deem
to be ``un-Islamic'' conduct. But its militias are undisciplined and
often engage in looting and criminal activities themselves. The Sadr
leadership freely admits to having only indirect control over their
fighters. The Sadrists style themselves as the representatives of the
poor and downtrodden. Indeed their main strength is the support of
millions of poor Arab Shia in the rural south and the slums of Baghdad
who are in a rebellious mood aimed at the establishment regardless of
its sectarian color. As such SCIRI and other Shia groups representing
the merchant and religious elite with strong ties to Iran are the
Sadrists' natural enemy. In short, the Sadrists are simultaneously
fighting a nationalist insurgency, a revolt against the establishment
and a sectarian conflict.
STATE WEAKNESS AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS
The pervasiveness of the violence in Iraq today, the persistent
power vacuum and progressive hollowing out of the state are components
of a vicious circle. State weakness sends signals to the various groups
that they can, and, in fact, need to defend their interests and achieve
their goals through violent means. The political process over the past
3 years was supposed to fill the vacuum by establishing a framework
where Iraqis can reconcile competing interests through peaceful means.
The goal was to establish a legitimate public authority which would
protect Iraqis and provide them with essential services. Despite
enormous efforts, expenditures and sacrifice by Iraqis, Americans, and
others, this goal has yet to be achieved.
It is tempting under such circumstances to blame everything on
enemies and external influences such as al-Qaeda and Iraq's neighbors.
Iraqis habitually blame their woes on the Americans, Iran, Arab States,
Israel, Saddam, and so on. There is no question that external factors,
sometimes by intent and sometimes by mistake, have played a role in
shaping the current predicament. But the roots for such consistent
failure need to be explored and addressed inside society itself.
Despite overcoming great risks to vote in two elections and a
referendum, Iraqis have little faith in the political process and the
leadership it has produced. Indeed political participation for most
Iraqis has been limited to these three votes. There are few in Iraq
today who believe in the viability and sustainability of the new
regime. A substantial majority sits on the proverbial fence. This is
not only a result of the authoritarian legacy or the fact that change
came from the outside. It is also the result of disappointed hopes and
broken promises over the past 4 years.
Fear and apathy are the most pervasive sentiments in Iraq today.
They provide the perfect cover for corruption, crime, and terror and
sap the energy from the enormous task of reconstruction. These
sentiments extend to many officials and politicians who do not shy from
dismantling the machinery of government and the state they have been
entrusted with in pursuit of short-term narrow gains. One could even
hear echoes of this apathy in the recent interview by Prime Minister
Maliki with the Wall Street Journal.
Faced with this predicament, there is a hardening of positions on
all sides and a determination to go for ``one last push.'' This is not
only expressed through the debilitating terrorist and militia violence
but also in the posture of the Iraqi Government.
The model of a full spectrum ``National Unity'' government is
clearly not working and has indeed exacerbated the decline of the
state. The farming out of ministries to individual parties and groups
produced a weak and divided government unable to function as a team.
The strongest parties in government, particularly the SCIRI and the
Kurds, seem resolved to build a narrower coalition government which may
exclude the Sadrists and some Sunni parties. This has already taken
place on the ground with Sunni parties only nominally participating in
government and the Sadrists boycotting it.
Without the Sadrists, however, this coalition has little grassroots
support. It will have to rely more on cordon and will be more
susceptible to external influences. It will be even more dependent on
continuous U.S. support.
The handling of the Saddam execution is illustrative of the
hardening of the government's stance. The rush to execute the former
dictator, the rhetoric preceding it and the manner in which it was
carried out were clearly designed to intimidate the Sunnis.
The government has also hardened its rhetoric and actions against
political opponents, closing down two opposition TV stations and
issuing an arrest warrant for the most prominent opposition figure--the
head of the Association of Muslim Scholars.
SECURITY PLANS
The security plan announced a couple of days ago is the culmination
of this approach. While officially targeted at all militias and armed
groups, the Prime Minister has clearly indicated that he views Sunni
violence as the main source of tensions and Shia militias as a reaction
to Sunni violence.
It is not clear yet whether the government will limit the targets
of the security plan to Sunni groups or whether it will also take on
the Sadrists. Either way it is unlikely that it will be able to muster
the resources necessary to achieve better results than previous
efforts, including the two recent Baghdad security plans. Even a
temporary U.S. surge in support of the plan is no guarantee for
achieving sustainable outcomes. A military offensive--especially if it
fails to protect civilians on all sides--is liable to inflame the
sectarian conflict and make a peaceful settlement even less likely. The
U.S. forces can find themselves embroiled, as a party, in the sectarian
conflict.
There is no doubt that there is an urgent need to confront the
terrorists, criminals, and those spreading sectarian hatred and to
protect civilians from them. This can only be achieved on the basis of
legitimacy and respect for human rights and the rule of law. It is,
therefore, particularly disconcerting when the Iraqi Government insists
on taking over control of the security portfolio in order to fight the
enemies ``our way,'' dispensing with what they view as exaggerated and
misplaced U.S. concern for human rights.
The new security plan and the associated surge option emphasises
the aspect of struggle between a nascent democracy and its opponents.
Yet if it is carried out without regard to human rights and in a way
that exacerbates sectarian tensions, it is only likely to make matters
worse and destroy the very democracy it seeks to protect.
If the conflict in Iraq was primarily about occupation and
resistance then a speedy withdrawal of coalition forces would offer the
best solution. In today's context a withdrawal will cause a spike in
other forms of violence and precipitate the collapse of the last
remnants of the Iraqi state unleashing an open-ended conflict with
unpredictable consequences.
A solution based on ethnic segregation emphasises another aspect of
the conflict. But in the context of fragmentation and warlordism, it is
unlikely to bring any relief. On the contrary it will exacerbate ethnic
cleansing and undermine regional stability.
NATIONAL DIALOG
Ultimately the violence in Iraq can only end through a political
process which unites Iraqis rather than dividing them. For this to
happen it is necessary to engage all constituencies in the shaping of
the new Iraq and provide them with a sense of ownership in the outcome.
This requires open and inclusive dialog and readiness for compromise on
all sides. It will require broadening the political process to include
those Iraqis who still believe in nation-building and coexistence
rather than limiting it to the combatants and extremists on all sides.
Current national dialog and reconciliation efforts have fallen short of
these ideals.
Dialog will clearly require regional and international mediation.
International assistance is needed to help identify the protagonists,
bring them to the negotiations, and encourage them to compromise. In
short Iraq is in need of an internationally mediated peace process.
The International Compact with Iraq offers a platform for such
dialog as well as a framework for mobilizing international assistance
once a settlement is reached. Other initiatives by the United Nations
and the League of Arab States are essential for success in this
context.
The final settlement can not dispense with the achievements of the
last 3 years. Those, including the constitution, will have to serve as
the starting point of any discussion over Iraq's future. The
constitution will need to be reviewed and implemented in a way that
provides a basis for rational federalism. The winners of the political
process will have to be prepared to make real concessions and genuinely
share power and resources if compromise is to be achieved.
Over the past months, Iraqi officials have been negotiating a
framework for the management and sharing of Iraq's oil wealth which can
provide a model for the shape of federalism in the new Iraq.
Negotiators were in agreement that such framework should maximise the
benefit from the wealth to all Iraqis and promote national cohesion. It
should be based on the principles of efficiency, transparency, and
equity. Transparency is particularly important as it helps build trust
among the various parties and prevent abuse.
The negotiators succeeded in overcoming a number of obstacles
agreeing in particular on the federal management and sharing of all oil
revenues, a structure for a National Oil Company and a framework for
coordinating negotiations and contracting with International Operating
Companies. Some details will still need to be worked out, chief among
them is the exact mechanism for revenue-sharing. If the new framework
is to contribute to national cohesion, transparency and accountability
the budgetary process must be the main vehicle for revenue-sharing.
A draft framework along these lines has been developed over the
past months and will shortly be presented to Parliament. It is critical
for the success of this effort that deliberations on the subject are
carried out in an open, inclusive, and professional manner.
Chairman Biden. Thank you very much.
Doctor.
STATEMENT OF DR. PAUL PILLAR, VISITING PROFESSOR, SECURITY
STUDIES PROGRAM, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Pillar. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
thank you very much for the privilege of participating in this
most important set of hearings. And I commend the committee, as
Phebe Marr did in her opening comment, for its approach to
educating the American public on this topic.
You've asked me to address the relationship between the
conflict in Iraq and other trends and developments in the
Middle East. And, in that connection, I would focus on five
major dimensions on which the war has had impact elsewhere in
the region or on the perceptions and concerns of other Middle
Eastern actors. Those five are: Sectarian divisions, extremism
and terrorism, political change and democratization, ethnic
separatism, and the alignments and the relative influence of
other states in the region.
With the violence in Iraq having increasingly assumed the
character of a civil war between Sunnis and Shiites, as
described by my fellow panelist, it has intensified sectarian
sentiment, suspicions, and resentments all along the Sunni-Shia
divide, only a portion of which runs through Iraq. Just as
important, this divide coincides with longstanding and deeply
resented patterns of economic privilege and political power.
The evident conviction of many Iraqi Shiites, who, as we
know, constitute a majority in their country, that their time
for political dominance has come, cannot help but put
revisionist thoughts in the minds of their coreligionists
elsewhere in the region. The conflict in Iraq has made this
sectarian divide more salient, not only for ordinary Shia and
Sunni populations, but also for regimes. It's a concern for
Saudi leaders, for example, because of Saudi sympathy for their
Sunni brethren in Iraq, and because of any possibility of
restiveness among the Saudi Shia minority. Looking out from
Riyadh, Saudis today see themselves as encircled by a Shia arc
that now includes control of both of the other major Persian
Gulf countries--Iran and Iraq. King Abdullah of Jordan has
spoken in similar terms about such a Shia arc.
For the United States, one consequence--not the only one--
but one consequence of this regionwide intensification of
sectarian sentiment is that it is difficult for the United
States to do just about anything in Iraq without it being
perceived, fairly or unfairly, as favoring one community over
the other and thereby antagonizing either Sunnis or Shiites, or
perhaps both, elsewhere in the region.
A second dimension on which the war in Iraq is having
repercussions throughout the Middle East, and, in this case,
even beyond, concerns extremist sentiment and the threat of
jihadist terrorism. Iraq is now the biggest and most prominent
jihad, and may ultimately have effects at least as significant
as those of earlier ones, partly because it is seen as a
struggle against the United States, in the eyes of the
jihadists, the sole remaining superpower and the leader of the
West. I concur, and I think just about any other serious
student of international terrorism would concur, in the
judgments recently declassified from the national intelligence
estimate on terrorism which stated that--in the words of the
estimators--that, ``The war in Iraq has become a cause celebre
for jihadists. It is shaping a new generation of terrorist
leaders and operatives. It is one of the major factors fueling
the spread of the global jihadist movement, and is being
exploited by al-Qaeda to attract new recruits and donors.''
Some of the possible effects within the surrounding region
may already be seen in, for example, the suicide bombings in
Amman, in November 2005, which were carried out by Iraqis from
the al-Qaeda-in-Iraq group.
A third important regional dimension is the possibility of
favorable political change, especially democratization, within
Middle Eastern countries. One hopeful development in the Middle
East over the last few years has been an increase in open
discussion of such political change. And I believe the current
administration, with its rhetorical emphasis on
democratization, deserves at least a share of the credit for
that.
In looking not just for talk, but for meaningful reform,
however, it is harder to be encouraged. What passes for
political reform in the Middle East has generally been, in
countries such as Egypt, slow, fragmentary, very cautious,
subject to backsliding, and more a matter of form than of
substance.
It is difficult to point convincingly to effects, one way
or the other, that the war in Iraq has had on political reform
in other Middle Eastern states, but, in my judgment, the all-
too-glaring troubles in Iraq have tended, on balance, to
discourage political reform in other Middle Eastern countries,
for two reasons. First, the demonstration of what can go
terribly wrong in a violent and destructive way has been a
disincentive to experiment with political change. Middle
Eastern leaders, like political leaders anywhere, tend to stick
with what has worked with them so far when confronted with such
frightening and uncertain consequences of change. And, second,
the identification of the United States with both the cause of
democratization and the war in Iraq has, unfortunately, led the
former subject to be tarnished with some of the ill will and
controversy associated with the latter, however illogical that
connection may be.
The fourth major issue, and an important one for three of
the states that border Iraq, is ethic separatism. And here, of
course, we're talking about the status of the Kurds, the
prototypical stateless ethnic group. Kurdish separatism is a
concern for both Syria and Iran, for example, which have
significant Kurdish minorities. The strongest worries, however,
are in Turkey, where Kurds constitute about 20 percent of the
population and where the organization that has usually been
known as the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, waged an
insurgent and terrorist campaign that left an estimated 35,000
people dead. Ankara has been very sensitive about any
suggestion of independence for Iraqi Kurdistan because of
worries about rekindling separatist sentiment among Turkish
Kurds. Turkey also is unhappy about what it regards as
insufficient action by Iraq or the United States against PKK
fighters who have taken refuge in northern Iraq.
The final set of issues I would highlight concerns effects
on the geopolitics of the Middle East; that is, on the relative
power and the foreign policies of neighboring states. Among the
neighbors the largest winner has been Iran. The war has
crippled what had been the largest regional counterweight to
Iranian influence, not to mention doing away with a dictator
who started a war in the 1980s that resulted in the deaths of
hundreds of thousands of Iranians. Iranians today view the war
in Iraq with mixed motives. The current leadership in Tehran
probably is pleased to see the United States continue to be
bogged down and bleeding in Iraq for the time being, but it
also has no reason to want escalating and unending disorder on
its western border. Tehran has been reaching out and providing
assistance to a wide variety of Iraqi groups. Although some of
this assistance may help to make trouble for United States
forces, it is best understood as an effort by Tehran to cast
out as many lines of influence as it possibly can do, that
whenever the dust in Iraq finally settles, it will have a good
chance of having the friendship of, or at least access to,
whoever is in power in Iraq.
Syria is another neighbor that faces a significantly
changed geopolitical environment as a result of events in Iraq.
The bitter and longstanding rivalry between the Syrian and
Iraqi wings of the Baathist movement had been a major
determinant of Syrian foreign policy for many years. It was the
principal factor that led Damascus to break ranks with its Arab
brethren and ally with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war. The
demise of the Iraqi Baathist regime has changed all this, as
punctuated by the restoration of diplomatic relations just 2
months ago, in November, between Syria and Iraq. Sectarian
considerations also must enter into thinking in Damascus, where
the regime is dominated by the minority Alawite sect, but rules
a Sunni majority. Meanwhile, Syria's main foreign-policy aim
continues to be return of the Golan Heights, which Syrian
leaders realize could come about only through cooperation with
the United States.
I've highlighted what I regard as the main issues that
involve the regional impact of this war. They are not the only
issues, of course. A major concern of Jordan, for example, is
the influx onto its territory of an estimated 700,000 Iraq
refugees. Syria also faces a major Iraqi refugee problem, as do
Lebanon and Egypt, and, to lesser degrees, other neighboring
states.
Oil is another interest for several Middle Eastern states,
given the obvious effects that different possible levels of
Iraqi production and export could have on the oil market, and,
thus, on the finances of these countries.
A concluding point, Mr. Chairman, concerns the United
States directly. Given how much the war in Iraq has become a
preoccupation for the United States, it necessarily colors
virtually all of our other dealings with countries in the
region. It has been one of the chief reasons for the decline in
the standing of the United States among publics in the region,
as recorded by opinion polls by such organizations as the Pew
group taken over the last several years. It has been a reason
for concern and doubt among Middle Eastern governments
regarding the attention and commitment that Washington can give
to other endeavors. And Middle Eastern governments know that it
has, in effect, relegated to a lower priority almost every
other U.S. interest in the Middle East.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Pillar follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Paul Pillar, Visiting Professor, Security
Studies Program, Georgetown University, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the
privilege of participating in this very important series of hearings
related to the conflict in Iraq. I have been asked to address the
relationship between that conflict and other trends and developments in
the Middle East.
Events in other countries in the region will depend primarily on
issues and conditions in those countries; in my judgment, the hoped-for
beneficial demonstration effects that success in Iraq would have had on
the politics of the broader Middle East have always been overly
optimistic. Nonetheless, the development of a multifaceted and
worsening armed conflict in Iraq does have significant implications for
the rest of the region and by implication for U.S. interests in the
region. Unfortunately, conflict and instability tend to have greater
repercussions in a neighborhood than do success and stability.
In the case of Iraq and the Middle East, regional consequences
involve concerns by neighbors about what may yet lie ahead as well as
adjustments that regional actors already have made. The consequences
involve regimes in the region as well as nonstate actors such as
terrorist groups. And they involve direct consequences of the violence
in Iraq as well as more indirect reverberations from the conflict
there.
I want to emphasize how much uncertainty is involved in trying to
analyze the regional impact of the current war in Iraq, much less of
various future scenarios or policy options. It is simply impossible to
predict the full range of important regional effects, partly because of
the uncertainty that clouds Iraq's own future but also because of the
complexity of factors affecting events elsewhere in the Middle East.
Any prognostications that speak with certainty about particular future
effects ought to be met with skepticism.
With that understanding, I would identify five major dimensions on
which--although specific future consequences may be uncertain--the war
in Iraq already has had discernible impact elsewhere in the Middle East
and is likely to have more, and which, therefore, are worthy of
attention as debates over policy proceed. Those five are: Sectarian
divisions, extremism and terrorism, political change and
democratization, ethnic separatism, and the alignments and relative
influence of states in the region.
SECTARIAN CONFLICT
Sectarian divides within the Muslim world deserve to be discussed
first, because the violence in Iraq has increasingly assumed the
character of a civil war between Sunni and Shia. As such, it has
intensified sectarian sentiment, suspicions, and resentments all along
the Sunni-Shia faultline, only a portion of which runs through Iraq. It
would be almost impossible to overstate how strongly this divide, which
the Iraq war has made more salient, stokes feelings and fears among
many people of the Middle East. Rooted in centuries-old disputes over
succession to the Prophet, the conflict manifests itself today in, for
example, the perspective of some Sunnis (particularly the more
doctrinaire Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia) that Shia are not even true
Muslims. Just as important, the sectarian divide coincides with
resented patterns of economic privilege and political power.
The special significance of Iraq is that, although Shiites are a
minority of Muslims worldwide, they are a majority in Iraq (as well as,
of course, next door in Iran). The evident conviction of many Iraqi
Shiites that their time for political dominance has come cannot help
but put revisionist thoughts in the minds of their coreligionists
elsewhere in the region. These include the Shia minority in Saudi
Arabia, who are concentrated in the oil-rich eastern province and see
themselves treated as second-class citizens. They include the Shiites
who constitute a majority in Bahrain but are still under the rule of a
Sunni government. And they include Shiites in Lebanon, who probably are
the fastest-growing community in that religiously divided country and
who believe that current power-sharing arrangements give them an
unfairly small portion of power--a sentiment exploited by Lebanese
Hezbollah.
The conflict in Iraq has made this sectarian divide more salient
not only for Shia populations but also for regimes. The sectarian
coloration of that conflict is an acute concern for Saudi leaders, for
example, because of their own sympathy for Sunni Arabs in Iraq, the
emotions of other Saudis over the plight of their Sunni brethren in
Iraq, and any possibility of restiveness among Saudi Shiites. Looking
out from Riyadh, Saudis now see themselves as encircled by a Shia arc
that includes control of both of the other large Persian Gulf States--
Iran and Iraq--Shia activism in Lebanon, and significant Shia
populations in the Arab Gulf States as well as to their south in Yemen.
King Abdullah of Jordan also has spoken publicly about such a Shia arc.
For the United States, this intensification of sectarian conflict
carries several hazards, only one of which is the specter of direct
intervention by other regional actors in the Iraqi civil war. There
also are issues of stability in the other countries that must manage
their own part of the Sunni-Shia divide. And not least, there is the
difficulty of the United States doing almost anything in Iraq without
it being perceived, fairly or unfairly, as favoring one community over
the other and thereby antagonizing either Sunnis or Shiites, or perhaps
both, elsewhere in the region.
EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM
A second dimension on which the war in Iraq is having repercussions
throughout the Middle East--and in this case even beyond--concerns
extremist sentiment and the threat of international terrorism,
particularly from Islamist terrorists often styled as ``jihadists.''
Other wars in other Muslim lands have served as jihads in recent years,
including in Bosnia, Chechnya, Kosovo, and especially Afghanistan. The
Afghan jihad against the Soviets served as an inspiration to radical
Islamists, a training ground for terrorists, and a networking
opportunity for jihadists of diverse nationalities. We have seen the
effects in much of the international terrorism of the past decade and a
half. Iraq is now the biggest and most prominent jihad. It may
ultimately have effects at least as significant as those of earlier
jihads, because it is taking place in a large and important country
that is part of the core of the Arab and Muslim worlds, and because it
is partly a struggle against the United States, the sole remaining
superpower and the leader of the West.
The effects of the war in Iraq on international terrorism were
aptly summarized in the National Intelligence Estimate on international
terrorism that was partially declassified last fall. In the words of
the estimators, the war in Iraq has become a ``cause celebre'' for
jihadists, is ``shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and
operatives,'' is one of the major factors fueling the spread of the
global jihadist movement, and is being exploited by al-Qaeda ``to
attract new recruits and donors.'' I concur with those judgments, as I
believe would almost any other serious student of international
terrorism.
The full effects on terrorism of the war in Iraq, as of the earlier
anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan, will not be seen and felt for a
good number of years. But some of the possible effects within the
surrounding region may already be seen in, for example, the suicide
bombings in Amman, Jordan, in November 2005, which were perpetrated by
Iraqis who belonged to the ``al-Qaeda in Iraq'' organization. Another
possible effect is the recent use in Afghanistan of suicide bombings, a
tactic not previously part of the repertoire of insurgents there but
perhaps partly exported from, or inspired by, Iraq where the tactic has
been used extensively.
I believe that the most important variable in Iraq in the months or
years ahead as far as the effects on international terrorism are
concerned is the sheer continuation of the war, as well as the
continued U.S. participation in it. ``Jihad'' means, literally,
``struggle.'' What is important to the jihadist, more so than any
particular outcome, is participation in a struggle. As long as the
jihadists' struggle in Iraq is not completely extinguished, it will
continue to inspire the Islamist rank-and-file and to be exploited by
the likes of al-Qaeda.
POLITICAL CHANGE AND DEMOCRATIZATION
A third important regional dimension is the possibility of
political change within Middle Eastern countries, especially change in
the favorable direction of more democracy and more civil and political
liberties in what is still, by most measures, the most undemocratic and
illiberal region of the world. One hopeful development in the Middle
East over the last few years has been an increase in open discussion of
issues of political change. There has been, at least, more talk about
the subject; it has been more of a live topic in more Middle Eastern
countries than a few years earlier. I believe the current U.S.
administration, with its rhetorical emphasis on democratization,
deserves a share of the credit for this.
In looking not just for talk but for meaningful action, however, it
is harder to be encouraged. What passes for political reform in the
Middle East has generally been slow, fragmentary, very cautious,
subject to backsliding, and more a matter of form than of substance.
It is difficult to point convincingly to effects, in one direction
or another, that the war in Iraq has had on political reform in other
Middle Eastern states. Inspired statesmanship should have good reason
to move ahead with reform regardless of what is happening in Iraq. But
most Middle Eastern statesmanship is not inspired. And in my judgment,
the all-too-glaring troubles in Iraq have tended, on balance, to
discourage political reform in other Middle Eastern countries, for two
reasons.
First, the demonstration of what can go wrong--in a very violent
and destructive way--has been a disincentive to experiment with
political change. Middle Eastern leaders, like leaders anywhere, tend
to stick with what they've got and with what has worked for them so
far, when confronted with such frightening and uncertain consequences
of political change. If today's Iraq is the face of a new Middle East,
then most Middle Eastern leaders, not to mention most publics, do not
want to be part of it.
Second, the identification of the United States with both the cause
of democratization and the war in Iraq has led the former to be
tarnished with some of the ill will and controversy associated with the
latter. This connection is, of course, illogical. But it should not be
surprising, given that some in the Middle East had already tended to
view liberal democracy with suspicion as an alien import from the West.
The issue of political change and democratization is important for
many Middle Eastern countries, but I would mention two as being of
particular significance. One is Egypt, the most populous Arab country
and a keystone of U.S. policy in the region. The Mubarak government has
evidently seen the need at least to appear to be open to reform, as
manifested in the holding in 2005 of an ostensibly competitive
Presidential election, in place of the prior procedure of a one-
candidate referendum. But such procedural change has not reflected any
significant loosening of Mubarak's hold on power. A continuing
emergency law helps to maintain that hold, opposition Presidential
candidates have not been treated fairly, and the most popular and
effective opposition party remains outlawed.
The other key country is Saudi Arabia, in which neither the form
nor the reality is remotely democratic, and in which power is still in
the hands of a privileged royal family in alliance with a religious
establishment. King Abdullah appears to recognize the need for reform
if Saudi Arabia is not to fall victim to more sudden and destructive
kinds of change. He faces stubborn opposition, however, not least from
within the royal family. Anything in the regional environment that
makes political reform appear riskier will make his task harder.
ETHNIC SEPARATISM
The fourth major issue, and an important one for three of the
states that border Iraq, is ethnic separatism. This really means the
issue of the Kurds, who ever since the peace of Versailles have been
the prototypical stateless ethnic group. Kurdish separatism is a
concern for Syria, in which Kurds, who are concentrated in the
northeast part of the country, constitute a bit less than 10 percent of
the Syrian population. It also is a concern in multiethnic Iran, where
Kurds in the northwest represent about 7 percent of Iran's population.
Kurdish dissatisfaction led to deadly riots in Syria in 2004 and in
Iran in 2005. The strongest worries, however, are in Turkey, where
Kurds constitute about 20 percent of the population and where the
organization usually known as the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK,
waged an insurgent and terrorist campaign that has left an estimated
35,000 people dead. Ankara has been very sensitive about any suggestion
of independence for Iraqi Kurdistan, because of worries about
rekindling separatist sentiment among the Kurds of southeastern Turkey.
The Government of Turkey also has a strong interest in the status of
PKK fighters who have taken refuge in northern Iraq, and it has been
unhappy about what it considers to be insufficient U.S. or Iraqi
efforts against those fighters.
The views of regional governments toward the Kurds, as events in
Iraq play out over the coming months, will depend at least as much on
the legal and political forms applied to Iraqi Kurdistan as on the
practical facts on the ground. After all, since 1991 the Iraqi Kurds
have enjoyed--and neighboring governments have lived with--what has
largely been de facto independence, despite Kurdish participation in
politics in Baghdad. The situation may be similar to that of Taiwan in
the Far East, in which de facto independence is tolerated but any move
to make it de jure would be destabilizing.
ALIGNMENTS AND POWER OF NEIGHBORING STATES
The final set of issues I would highlight concerns the effects the
situation in Iraq is having on the geopolitics of the Middle East--that
is, the effects on the relative power, and the foreign policies, of
neighboring states. The geopolitical impact stems from at least three
aspects of that situation: The change in the ideological map of the
region resulting from removal of the Iraqi Baathist regime; the
competition of neighboring states for influence within Iraq; and the
debilitating effects of the war itself, which has greatly weakened what
had been one of the stronger states in the area.
Among the neighbors, the largest winner has been Iran. The war has
not only toppled the dictator who initiated an earlier war that killed
hundreds of thousands of Iranians; it also has crippled what had been
the largest regional counterweight to Iranian influence. Meanwhile, the
all-consuming preoccupation that the Iraq war has become for the United
States, along with the growing unpopularity of the war among Americans,
probably has made Iranian leaders less fearful than they otherwise
might have been about forceful U.S. action, including military action,
against Iran. This confidence is tempered, however, by the fact that
the occupation of Iraq has completed a U.S. military encirclement of
Iran, a posture that nonetheless suits the internal political purposes
of Iranian hard-liners as they play off an image of confrontation with
Washington.
Iranians today view the war in Iraq with a mixture of motives. The
current leadership in Tehran probably is pleased to see the United
States continue to be bogged down and bleeding in Iraq for the time
being. But it also has no reason to want escalating and unending
disorder on its western border. Tehran seems determined to exercise as
much influence as it can inside Iraq as whatever process of political
reconstruction there unfolds. It has been reaching out, and providing
assistance to, a wide variety of Iraqi groups, not just its traditional
allies such as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq.
Although some of this assistance may help to make trouble for U.S.
forces, it is best understood as an effort by Tehran to throw out as
many lines of influence as it can so that whenever the dust in Iraq
finally settles, it will have a good chance of having the friendship
of, or at least access to, whoever is in power. Iranian leaders
probably realize that creation in Iraq of a duplicate of their own
system of clerical rule is not feasible, but they at least want to
avoid a regime in Baghdad that is hostile to Iran.
Iranian leaders almost certainly hoped, prior to March 2003, that
they would be able--as was the case in Afghanistan--to work
cooperatively with the United States on the political reconstruction of
Iraq. That, of course, did not happen. But the shared U.S. and Iranian
interest in avoiding escalating and unending disorder in Iraq probably
would make Tehran, despite all the ill will that has transpired over
other issues, receptive to engagement with Washington. The Iranians
would want such engagement, however, not to be limited to any one
issue--be it Iraq, or the nuclear program, or anything else--but
instead to address all matters in dispute.
Syria is another neighbor that faces a significantly changed
geopolitical environment as a result of events in Iraq. The bitter and
longstanding rivalry between the Syrian and Iraqi wings of the Baathist
movement had been a major determinant of Syrian foreign policy. It was
the principal factor that led Damascus to break ranks with its Arab
brethren and to ally with Iran, and later to participate in Operation
Desert Storm, which reversed Saddam Hussein's aggression in Kuwait.
With the demise of the Iraqi Baathist regime, the foreign policy
equation for Syria has changed. Syria restored relations with Iraq in
November 2006. Although the economic ties between Syria and Iran are
substantial, Syria's main reason for its otherwise counterintuitive
alliance with Tehran is over. The sectarian dimension also must
influence thinking in Damascus, because the regime is dominated by the
minority Alawite sect but rules a Sunni majority. The implication of
all these factors is that there is significant potential for coaxing
Syria away from the alignment with Iran and its client Hezbollah, and
toward more cooperation with the United States, with the hope for Syria
of realizing what is still its main foreign policy goal: The return of
the Golan Heights.
Other regional states, including the gulf Arabs, are conscious of
the strength that Iraq once had and that, if it were again to become
stable and united, could be the basis for Iraq once again throwing its
weight around. They also are conscious of the fact that the issues
involved in previous conflicts involving Iraq were not all the creation
of Saddam Hussein. The longstanding enmity between Persian and Arab
that underlay the Iran-Iraq war certainly was not. And Kuwaitis viewing
the turmoil to their north know that the notion of Kuwait as rightfully
the 19th province of Iraq also predated Saddam, and has been part of
the undercurrent of relations with Iraq ever since Kuwait became
independent.
I have highlighted several of the main issues that involve the
regional impact of the Iraq war. They are not the only issues. A major
concern, for example, of another of Iraq's immediate neighbors--
Jordan--is the influx of approximately 700,000 Iraqi refugees. Syria
and other neighbors also are facing a significant Iraqi refugee
problem. Oil is another issue of high interest to several Middle
Eastern states, given the effects that different levels of Iraqi
production and export could have on oil prices and consequently on the
finances and economies of those states.
A concluding point concerns the United States directly. Given how
much the war in Iraq has become a preoccupation for the United States,
it necessarily colors virtually all of our other dealings with the
Middle East and with countries in the region. It has been one of the
chief reasons for the slide in the standing of the United States among
publics in the region, as recorded by opinion polls taken over the last
several years. It has been a reason for concern and doubt among
governments regarding the attention and commitment that Washington can
give to other endeavors. And Middle Eastern governments know that it
has, in effect, relegated to a lower priority almost every other U.S.
interest in the region.
Chairman Biden. Thank you very much. Your collective
testimony has generated a number of questions, and let me
begin.
Dr. Marr and Mr. Said, I've actually--as many have--read
the Iraqi Constitution, and I have it in front of me, and it is
a--if I were to make a comparison, I'd compare it to our
Articles of Confederation rather than the American
Constitution. And it lays out in detail how regions can become
regions; and, if they become regions, what authority they have,
the 18 governates can. Tell me, if you will, Dr. Marr, in light
of your point, on page two or three, in which you say, ``Iraq
is not likely to be a unified state dominated by a strong
central government in Baghdad for at least some time'' and
``the high degree of decentralization called for in the
Constitution.'' How do we square that?
Dr. Marr. I've read the Constitution, too, but, I must say,
not in the last month, so you may have to spark----
Chairman Biden. Well, then----
Dr. Marr. No; I know the whole issue of regionalism--the
question of whether Iraq, or rather federalism, is going to be
defined by large regions is a very controversial one. Now, we
have a clearly formulated region in the KRG, the Kurdish
Regional Government, which, as you know, would like, in my
view, to expand and take in other Kurdish-majority areas,
including Kirkuk, which I don't believe will be done entirely
tranquilly. I think that's a flashpoint that could cause a lot
of difficulty. And I also believe that, within that region,
while the Kurds are cooperating--and I give them high marks on
a lot of things--looking beneath the surface, some of these
differences, some of this fragmentation exists there, as well.
However, the Kurds have a solid region. Now, what is at stake
here is whether there's enough homogeneity among these two
other sectarian groups--``The Shia'' and ``The Sunnis''--to
form a region similar to that in Kurdistan. And one particular
party, SCIRI, Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in
Iraq--I won't say that again--would like to form a nine-
province Shia region in the south, which, of course, they
expect to control.
If we look at that map up there, it looks as though there's
a Shia majority down there, but, in fact, there's much more
fragmentation. I don't believe that that could be accomplished
without quite a bit of controversy with others, for example,
the Sadrists, just to mention one. And, indeed, that piece of
legislation, as you know, the legislation to enable the
Parliament to form that region, was postponed for 18 months,
precisely because people see it as controversial.
When we come to the so-called Sunni region, that's even
more difficult, because the Sunnis, in my view--you can't speak
of them as ``The Sunnis'' because they're very diverse. As a
whole, Sunnis have played the major role in the formation of
the state, and have dominated the state--not exclusively, but
it's been something they feel they've done. Getting Sunnis to
identify as Sunnis rather than Iraqis, nationalists, or even
Arab nationalists, is extremely difficult.
Last, but not least, there are large mixed areas, which are
undergoing a lot of sectarian differentiation. They are a
patchwork quilt. If we look at greater Baghdad, if we had a map
here of where these areas are, Kirkuk, many other areas such as
Diala, they are a nightmare. They include Kurds, Turkmen, Shia,
Sunnis--actually creating borders, dividing them up, would be
very difficult. And, in the end, I think we would have a
system, if we follow through with this, which is, in some ways,
repugnant to many people, that the dominant identity has to be
what you were born with, in----
Chairman Biden. If I can----
Dr. Marr [continuing]. One way or another.
Chairman Biden [continuing]. Interrupt. The dominant
identity, as I read the Constitution, doesn't require it to be
based upon a region, based upon ethnicity. In my seven visits
to Iraq, I meet with people, and they say they want to have
their local policeman running their local areas. They've gotten
along very well. And they don't want a national police force
dominated by a bunch of thugs patrolling their streets.
Question. Do any of you picture, in your lifetime, the
likelihood that a national police force will be patrolling the
streets of Fallujah? It's a serious question. Does anybody see
that in their lifetime?
[No response.]
Chairman Biden. I don't think so. I don't see it, either.
So, it's about time, I think, we, maybe, stop pushing a rope
here.
One of the questions I have, as well, is: What is the role
of Sistani? What influence does he possess now? Anyone. Yes.
Mr. Said. Well, I'll address the issue of Sistani, but I
also would like to come back on the issue of the Constitution.
Sistani has great moral authority in Iraq, and it extends
beyond the Shia community. However, that authority has been
eroding over the past 3 years.
Chairman Biden. Why?
Mr. Said. In part, because Sistani himself has been
manipulated, if you like, by some of the Shia political
parties.
Senator Boxer. I'm sorry, say that louder.
Mr. Said. He has been--the image--the institution of Mr.
Sistani has been manipulated by some of--by the--some of the
Shia parties who have been trying to glean legitimacy from him.
The institution of the Shia Marjiya has been used for political
means to advance narrow party political objectives. And this
has reflected negatively on--has tarnished, has limited--has
reduced the omnipotence of Sistani. At the end of the day, it's
very important to remember that Sistani is an apolitical--is a
nonpolitical religious leader who does not like to meddle in
politics. And he has largely withdrawn from interference since
the last elections.
Chairman Biden. Let me follow up with a question, since my
time is up.
Mr. O'Hanlon, you indicated that--which comports what we've
been told--that there are roughly about 5,000 politically
reliable, as well as well-trained, Iraqi forces. I listened
this morning to Mr. Bartlett, speaking for the President--and
I'm assuming he's going to say what Mr. Bartlett said today--
that, in a surge that will be in conjunction with Iraqi forces,
who will be moved into neighborhoods, who will be the ones,
``going door to door,'' do you believe there are a sufficient
number of reliable Iraqi forces to work with whatever surge
plan the President moves forward, if the President's plan
envisions a significant Iraqi military initiative along with
this surge?
Dr. O'Hanlon. Right now, Senator, I'd say no. I think the
only hope for changing that is if there can be some kind of a
broad political dynamic that's created in the next couple of
months, that's been different from what we've seen in the
past--some resolution on sharing oil, on rehabilitating former
Baathists who don't have blood on their hands, letting them
regain their jobs, all the things that probably should have
been done 2 or 3 years ago. There's some hope of creating--and
it's, of course, a political question. It's less about training
and less about the mathematics of the schedule, and more about
this national need for consensus.
Chairman Biden. Do you all agree that oil has the potential
to be the glue that holds the country together, rather than
splits it apart?
Mr. Said. Definitely. And as the resolution on the oil
negotiation shows, one could come up with solutions that go
beyond the Constitution----
Chairman Biden. Well----
Mr. Said [continuing]. Beyond the----
Chairman Biden [continuing]. There's been no resolution on
the distribution of the revenue. There has been a resolution--
tentative, as I understand it--on who has authority to
determine whether or not investments will be made, in what
wells and where. But if you're sitting out there in the Sunni
province, where you've got a lot of nice sand and shale, and
not much else, you're going to want to know, ``How much is
coming my way?'' in terms of revenue-sharing, and, ``What
guarantees are there to be?'' In my understanding, that's the
point that has not been resolved. Is that correct?
Dr. Marr. I'm not entirely sure of that. But I think
negotiations are going on now, and, to my surprise, I've been
impressed by the fact that there have been some compromises on
this--by the Kurds, for example, who are the most eager to get
going on this. Maybe not enough compromises yet, but there have
actually been some. So, I think it could move ahead in that
direction, but it could also be a point of contention,
depending on how it's done.
Chairman Biden. That's encouraging. My time is up. I thank
you.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the four statements. And I suspect that--I
appreciate them even more having read, in the Wall Street
Journal yesterday, a story called ``Nightmare Scenario,'' which
relates to the U.S. withdrawal from the region. Now, although a
lot of our debate, politically, has been over whether troops
should come in or whether they should come out, and the
timeframe for the coming out, and so forth, the Wall Street
Journal had this paragraph that said, ``The United States is
pushing a wide-ranging strategy to persuade Sunni allies that
are serious about countering the rise of Iran in exchange for
Arab help in Iraq and Palestinian territories. Key to the
effort is to continue to promise to keep United States forces
in Iraq for as long as necessary. But the United States is also
beefing up the U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf, plans to deepen
security cooperation with the gulf allies. The Pentagon has
proposed sending a second carrier battle group to the gulf
region. There are also advanced plans in the way to knit
together the air defense systems of the six smaller states,
including Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates, and to
build a United States-administered missile defense system.
Similarly, the Air Force is laying plans to lay up exercises
with Arab allies in the region. One proposal calls for the
United States to hold combined air exercise with Oman and the
UAE.''
Now, that's a very sizable agenda going on, quite apart
from the debate that we're having as to whether as many as
20,000 troops, in some form or other, get to Baghdad. I want to
raise a question of the panel, of any of you. You've
illustrated the interests of each of the regional governments,
and discussed in your testimony, how critical U.S. presence is
for them. Absent that, they have testified, either publicly or
covertly, that they will take action--the Jordanians, even--to
carve out, maybe, a space to take care of these 700,000
refugees that you have mentioned; or the Saudis, quite overtly,
that they may come to the assistance of Sunnis in Iraq under
certain conditions. Likewise, the Syrians, conflicted, in a
way, because of the nature of their government, but their Sunni
majority has a deep interest in Iraq outcomes. Furthermore, the
Turks, as you have mentioned, quite apart from Iran--
characterized as the big winner--each with important interests
in Iraq.
What if Secretary Rice, as she heads out to the area Friday
to begin a very important and timely tour, were to suggest all
of us need to come together--by ``all of us,'' I mean the
United States and Iraq, the Turks, the Iranians and the Syrians
and the Jordanians, and even the Egyptians and the Saudis--
around the same table to meet rather continuously? This is not
the old debate, ``Should we have negotiations with Syria?
Should we ever talk to Iran?'' Rather, the subject of
conversation question is, each of these countries has an
interest in Iraq, presently, and an interest in us--that is,
the United States presence in the region. What about this
carrier group? What about the six countries with conducting air
exercises over here? What do they think about the United States
having more troops in the general area? Where? What should they
be doing? Now, we may not want to share all of our plans,
although this is pretty explicit in the Wall Street Journal, in
terms of a permanent presence. But absence means chaos for a
good number of people. And you have to consider those who will
take advantage of the situation in ways that, strategically,
may be injurious to the United States and certainly a good
number of other people, including the specter raised in the
article of all-out warfare, which would likely constrict the
supply of oil to everybody in the world, the price goes sky
high, recessions occur--the subject, really not discussed
today, but an implication of this predicament.
Now, is it practical, if the Secretary were to say, ``I'd
like to have a meeting. We can have it wherever you want to
have it, but we'd like to see everybody around the table''--
what would be the response, at this point, of the neighbors?
Would they come together? Would they want to see each other?
Would they want to participate with us? Do you have any feel
about some type of strategy, of grand diplomacy in which we,
sort of, lay all the cards on the table and try to think
through what is happening in this troubled period, which you
all have said is going to take time to evolve--not 6 months or
a year or so forth, but an evolutionary struggle for a state to
evolve in Iraq, in which that kind of time can only be
guaranteed if all the rest of the players are not restive and
aggressive? Anyone have thoughts about this idea? Yes.
Mr. Said. I think you raise a very important point. And
there's a situation of putting the cart before the horse in the
debate about Iraq--surge, withdrawal, troop movement. I think
the decision on troops should come on the back of such
settlement that you have outlined--a comprehensive regional
agreement. Iraq's neighbors will have various attitudes toward
that, because some of them, as has been suggested, are
flourishing--and generally like the current state of affairs,
although they fear deterioration. Others have been crying for
attention. Saudi Arabia, in particular, had been demanding
attention to the situation of Iraq, from the United States, as
well as Turkey. So, there will be various responses.
One problem with having a comprehensive regional conference
to address all the issues in the region, that this is a--quite
a big load for one conference, but there is no doubt that, as
suggested, also, by the Baker-Hamilton Report, that there is
need for a regional approach. Iraq cannot be solved on its own,
Palestine cannot be solved on its own. But the decision on
troops and troop movements should come on the back of such--the
blueprint of such agreement, rather than come ahead of it.
Senator Lugar. Yes.
Dr. O'Hanlon. Senator, I'd like to add one word on this,
and it's sort of a hawkish case for regional engagement, if you
will, which is that, I--Paul Pillar mentioned, earlier, that
Iran's interest here may be trying to maximize its influence. I
think there's also a chance that Iran is trying to deal the
United States a major strategic defeat and try to drive us, not
only out of Iraq, but out of the region, and that Iraq--that
Iran has gotten more ambitious as this war has gone worse.
I would see one purpose of a regional conference as
disabusing Iran of the notion that it can drive us out of the
region, and sitting down and making it clear to Iran that they
should have an interest in some level of stability in Iraq,
because, even if Iraq totally fails, which it might, we are
going to stay committed, to the extent our regional partners
wish, to the Persian Gulf, and that Iran has no chance of
driving us out of the region. I think that message is worth
sending. I'd be very curious--I know people in this room have
been articulate about the need for different options in Iraq,
but I haven't heard anybody say we should get out of the
Persian Gulf. And I think Iran needs to be disabused of the
notion that they could drive us out.
Senator Lugar. And particularly because we have
negotiations with Iran about nuclear weapons. That goes on
somewhere very close to this. And perhaps a feeling, by Iran,
that, in fact, if we are in a withdrawal status would have, I
think, a deep effect upon that set of negotiations.
Dr. Pillar. Senator Lugar, if I could just add to what Mike
said. If you look at the perspectives of, say, the Saudis--and
the issue has been raised about Saudi concern, about the ties
with the United States, and so on--it really isn't American
troops fighting in Iraq that are most important to the Saudis,
as far as their own security is concerned; it has to do with
those other aspects of the U.S. presence, the overall U.S.
security guarantee, and so on.
And my other final comment would be, how the regional
actors would respond to that kind of initiative depends on
other things, as well, such as what the United States is doing
vis-a-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict. And that's the reason the
Iraq Study Group highlighted that issue, as well.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
Chairman Biden. Thank you.
Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
There's so much to try to tackle, and it's hard to do,
obviously, in a short period of time. We appreciate your
testimony this morning.
Let me try to cut to the, sort of--there's a short-term and
a long-term set of interests here. The long-term interests are
enormous. And you've just touched on them. I mean, obviously,
none of us on either side of the aisle--I don't think anybody
in Congress--wants to give short shrift to the large strategic
interests we have in the region. And anybody who's been
talking, like myself, about the need to push the process--and I
recommended an international peace conference in--3 years ago.
Nothing's happened. We've been sitting around not engaging in
this kind of political resolution, while we've continued down
the military side. But none of us have suggested that there
isn't a huge interest in the stability of the region, in the--
in our neighbors, in a whole set of strategic issues. But when
you measure those interests against what Iraq is doing to our
interests, you come out on a real low side of that ledger. Iran
is more powerful. Hezbollah is more powerful. Hamas is more
powerful. ``The Shia Revival,'' as Vali Nasr refers to it, is
more real. I mean, things that weren't staring us in the face
are now staring us in every quarter. We're worse off.
So, our current policy is, in fact, not protecting our
interests, not doing for the forces that we want to support in
those countries, what's in their interest. And, in the end,
we're setting ourselves backward.
Against that, you have to, sort of, ask yourself, OK, so
where do you go here, to put those interests back on the table
and resolve this? No. 1 issue in front of us is this question
of more troops. Now, that speaks, I think, to both short and
long term. Let me just come to it very quickly.
General Abizaid said--and now he's leaving, we understand
there's a transition, but I don't think you could quickly
dismiss his experience, his being in the field, General Casey
being in the field, and what they've observed and learned in
that period of time--and he said, point blank on November 15 of
last year, ``I've met with every divisional commander, General
Casey, the corps commander, General Dempsey. We all talked
together. And I said, `In your professional opinion, if we were
to bring in more American troops now, does it add considerably
to our ability to achieve success in Iraq?' And they all said
no.''
Now, Mr. Said, you just said, yourself, that adding more
troops may, in fact, make it more difficult to get a
resolution. So, my question to each of you, in sum, is: If
there isn't sufficient evidence of this kind of summitry and
diplomacy, if there isn't a sufficient political process in
place--and I want your judgment as to whether or not there is--
will more troops have any chance of, in fact, getting what we
want, or is it going to make matters worse? And, if it does,
where are we, after putting them in, in 6 months, if it hasn't
worked?
Mr. O'Hanlon.
Dr. O'Hanlon. Senator Kerry, very tough question. I like
your idea of a ledger. On the positive side of the troop-surge
proposal, I would say, we all know, tactically, there have
never been enough troops in Iraq to clear and hold. So, that's
the tactical argument for this case. It would have been a much
more compelling argument 3 and 4 years ago than it is today,
but I think it remains, at some level, in the plus column. On
the negative column, of course, we know that there is no
political resolution of these very sectarian divides----
Senator Kerry. Well, hold on a minute. I mean, 30,000
troops or 20,000 troops, is there anybody who imagines,
measured against the task, that that's enough to do the job?
Dr. O'Hanlon. You have to hope that you can get momentum in
Baghdad, or in parts of Baghdad, and then that will begin to
have a spillover effect. So, narrowly speaking, I would say no;
there's no hope you can do it nationwide with 20,000 troops.
Senator Kerry. Go ahead and finish up.
Dr. O'Hanlon. Well, I think--I think, you know, that's the
main tactical argument in favor. Most of the other arguments
say, either there's a danger to this, to our Army and Marines,
to the Iraqi sense of dependency on us, or it's not going to be
enough.
Getting to Senator Biden's question earlier, ``Are there
enough Iraqi security forces to team with us to be
dependable?'' Absolutely not, unless there's a much stronger
political consensus in Iraq.
So, I would not oppose the surge, but I would only support
it if it's in the context of a much broader----
Senator Kerry. Political settlement. And you don't see the
political settlement effort or capacity there now.
Dr. O'Hanlon. Not now.
Dr. Marr. I would ask----
Senator Kerry. Dr. Marr.
Dr. Marr [continuing]. Very carefully, what these troops
are going to do. I have some questions as they get involved in
this complex sectarian situation and other issues. Are they
going to attack simply Muqtada, or are they also going to
attack insurgents? What are the Iraqis going to do? What are
others going to do? What are these troops going to do, and what
is the strategy that is going to be employed?
One other issue, about sending them or not sending them in,
is the question of how we get Iraqis--I don't want to say to
just step up to the plate; that's a very simplistic idea--but,
indeed, Iraqis themselves are the only ones who can ultimately
sort out and move ahead on this sectarian strife issue. And
whether sending the troops in and doing the job for them is
going to provide an atmosphere which enables them to do it, or
whether it's going to delay the hard choice they face. This is
another issue----
Senator Kerry. Do you see the political process in place to
resolve the fundamental differences between an Abdul Aziz al-
Hakim and a Muqtada al-Sadr, between the very--the interests of
the militias, the warlordism that Mr. Said just referred to,
the Sunni reluctance to participate, the Sunni desire to
reemerge as the people who run the country, the interests of
certain individuals with respect to Iran, the Persian-Arab
divide? I mean, all of these things are, it seems to me, so
huge, so historically and culturally deep in this issue, that,
as it further disintegrates into this morass of individual
interests, you can't--our troops can't pull that back together,
can they, Mr. Said?
Mr. Said. No. Troops, alone, can never resolve this. I
mean--well, there's one caveat to that, of course. If you send
500,000 troops to Iraq, you may be able to steamroll the
situation without there being a political consensus, but there
is no--neither the resources nor the will to do that. So, given
the lack of the possibility to mobilize the necessary troops,
the troops need to come on the back of political consensus, on
the back of a political settlement that is internationally
mediated, that is supported by Iraq's neighbors, as well as the
various communities in Iraq.
Senator Kerry. I mean, I want to get your answer, too, Mr.
Pillar, but, as you do, because time runs so fast, could you
just touch on the question of to what degree the presence of
the American troops delays the willingness of people to resolve
those issues, and acts as a cover for people's other interests
to be able to play out to see who's on top and who's on the
bottom?
Dr. Pillar. I think there's a strong sense, both among
Iraqis and with the regional players, the subject of Senator
Lugar's question, that, as long as the United States is doing
the heavy lifting, however much of an interest they have in
eventually resolving the situation, they are not the ones in
the front having to do it. There is an issue of having to
concentrate the minds.
Senator Kerry. Do you want to comment, Mr. Pillar? You said
something about the Green Zone state that struck me. The Green
Zone state might fall. Isn't the fact that it is only a Green
Zone state, kind of fundamental to this question of legitimacy
and of resolving these larger political differences?
Dr. Pillar. I think some--I think that was your----
Senator Kerry. And would you, as you touch on that, tell
me: If the troops start going after the militia--and I'm
reading that they're talking about an evenhandedness in the
application of this--what is the Muqtada al-Sadr response to
that? And where do the Badr Brigade and the Jaish al-Mahdi come
out in that conflict?
Mr. Said. It's speculative, at this point, to judge what
the troops are going to do. The Iraqi Government security plan,
although, declares that all the militias will be attacked, but
also, in the same breath, states that they view Sunni violence
as the primary objective. So, on the back of this security
plan, the surge of U.S. troops can be seen as taking sides in
the ongoing sectarian conflict. The United States may declare
that it will go differently, but, at this point, the agreement,
since the meeting in Amman between the Prime Minister and the
President, seems to have been to go for one last push in
support of the elites that have emerged out of the current
political process and against their enemies. And this could
contribute--if mishandled, and especially if no protection is
offered to all communities, to all Iraqi communities, this
could embroil the United States in a new role in Iraq, as being
a party in the conflict.
Senator Kerry. My time is up, but----
Mr. Said. Thank you.
Senator Kerry [continuing]. But none of you answered the
question--maybe you will as you go along here--of: What happens
if this fails?
Mr. Said. It will make--it will make the negotiations even
harder. I mean, we have a window of opportunity today, and
maybe passing, for a negotiated settlement, including the
region. Further blood, more blood--and, if it's seen as one-
sided--will make negotiations even harder, down the road.
Chairman Biden. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you each for your presentations and your continued
efforts to educate and inform not just the Congress, but the
American people. And that, as we all appreciate, is of great
essence, on probably the most significant issue this Nation has
faced since Vietnam. Not just as you all have said, and each in
your own way, noted, that it is not just an Iraqi issue, it is
far broader, and the consequences are far more significant.
It's a regional issue, and some of us have been saying that for
some time.
As I have listened to your presentations and my colleagues'
questions, no matter the question, no matter the answer, no
matter the issue, the dynamic, it all comes back to one
fundamental thing, and that's the absolute requirement for
political settlement, not just in Iraq, but in the Middle East.
And each of you has been very articulate in framing those
issues in some specificity.
I noted, Mr. Said, in your testimony and comments, if I can
quote--I think you said something to the effect that no
framework for a peaceful resolution exists now in Iraq. You
then further, toward the end of your statement, said, ``What
Iraq needs now is an international sponsored peace process, a
framework.'' You engaged Senator Lugar on this issue, to some
extent. With that in mind, and each of you have noted Professor
Marr's point about: Only the Iraqis, essentially, can settle
their differences. Dr. Brookings--I mean, Dr. O'Hanlon----
[Laughter.]
Chairman Biden. You don't mind Dr. Brookings, do you?
Dr. O'Hanlon. Thank you. [Laughter.]
Senator Hagel. I think your mother was from that side of
the family. [Laughter.]
Dr. O'Hanlon noted that this was going to require a broad
political dynamic. So, if I have listened as attentively as I
think I have to each of you, you all come to the same
conclusion. So, here's the question. We will, tonight, learn,
from the President of the United States, what he is going to
propose to the Congress and the American people, and to our
allies--most specifically, to the Iraqi Government--on where we
go from here. I think it's pretty clear what that proposal is
going to consist of. And you mentioned Baker-Hamilton. I don't
think that there is any great--I'll listen to the President
tonight, carefully, obviously, to find out, but I don't think
there is any great attention in what the President is going to
say tonight that comes from, or a result of, the 79
recommendations that came out of the Baker-Hamilton
Commission--one, specifically, which has been noted here,
engagement with Iran and Syria, and the wider diplomatic
regional focus.
If you all had the opportunity--and I know you all talk to
the White House and decisionmakers--but to focus on two or
three most specific issues, in the President's presentation
tonight, as to what he will be proposing, what would you say
are the most important two or three? Or what would you like to
see are the most important two or three? Or, if you were the
President, what do you think is the essence of where we go from
here, and why? And I know we are limited in our time, but I
have 4 minutes; that gives each of you 1 minute. And we would
start with Dr. Marr.
Thank you.
Chairman Biden. You can go over, on your answers.
Dr. Marr. I would focus on regional cooperation. That is to
say, getting the regional community in, either by a big
conference, which I tend to think isn't going to work very
well, or by a contact group, something that allows us to deal
with them individually--would be very important, and getting
them on board on stablizing Iraq. And, second, on the kinds of
pressures, incentives, other things we're going to have to
undertake, as the group that's providing most of the force in
Iraq, to nudge Iraqis--that means the political parties in
power now--to cooperate, to get on with reconciliation, to deal
with the de-Baathification issue, and other things. Ultimately
that's going to determine what kind of response we get in Iraq.
Senator Hagel. Mr. O'Hanlon.
Dr. O'Hanlon. Senator, I would focus, as Phebe has just
said, on the need for political reconciliation. I think it's
the overwhelming prerequisite to any kind of success, or even
averting complete failure in Iraq, at this point. It's hard for
the President to really create the right mentality in Iraqi
minds, because, of course, he is so committed to this
operation. But it strikes me that the Iraqis need to feel like
2007 is a make-or-break year. Hopefully, they can read our
politics well enough to know that this country may support the
President tonight if he asks for more effort in various ways,
but I think it's probably his last chance to really get that
kind of support from the country, and he may not even get it
this time. And so, I hope that there's a sense of acute focus
among Iraqis on the need to resolve issues like sharing oil
equally, reining in militias, rehabilitating former Baathists
who don't have blood on their hands directly, and dealing with
issues like Kirkuk. If that doesn't work, the President can't
talk about it very easily tonight, but I think the backup plan
is to think about this more like Bosnia and move toward a
facilitated resolution of the civil war, where we move toward
autonomous regions and help people relocate so they're in
neighborhoods where they feel safer. I think that's the obvious
backup plan, and pretty much the only choice we're going to
have within 9 to 12 months, unless things turn around quickly.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Mr. Said.
Mr. Said. For a political settlement in Iraq, Iraqis need
to come together to decide on the shape of the state they want
to live in. That's the essence of a political process that is--
that doesn't exist now. We have the formal mechanisms--we have
elections, we have a constitution, we have a government--but
they are not working. And the evidence to that is the violence
and the apathy that I have spoken about. So, there needs to be
an external intervention, because Iraqi forces, Iraqi political
entities and groups, are clearly unable to reach that consensus
on their own. There is a need for international intervention in
that regard. And it's better that it's multilateral rather than
the United States doing it alone, as it has been trying over
the last 3 years. There is a need to bring in more players, who
can cajole the various actors, who can bring them to the table,
and who can provide the essential support needed to implement
whatever the Iraqis agree on--needed to support whatever the
Iraqis can agree on.
And only on the back of that, one can then decide which
forces stay, which forces leave. Maybe other actors will be
able to bring their own forces to the table after having been
engaged properly.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Dr. Pillar. It is unfortunate that--but true, as you said,
Senator--that what we hear tonight probably is not going to be
drawn much from the Baker-Hamilton Report, so I would just use
the last few seconds to say I endorse strongly both the
approach in the report that the regional engagement, including
engagement with the likes of Syria and Iran, has to be part of
a package, and, second, to support the whole concept of an
approach toward the troop presence in Iraq that let's Iraqis,
as well as the American people, look forward to a future in
which, as the report put it, by the first quarter of 2008,
essentially the combat role by United States troops will be
over.
Senator Hagel. Thank you, to each of you. Mr. Chairman,
thank you.
Chairman Biden. Thank you very much. We usually move--at
least I have been moving based on seniority, but Senator--my
good friend, Senator Dodd, is here, but he suggested that I
move to Senator Feingold.
Senator Dodd. Before you jump too quickly at that, Mr.
Chairman, as a strong supporter of the seniority system--I've,
over the years, acquired the ability to appreciate it--let me
briefly, briefly say--let me congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, on
taking the gavel here--to thank Dick Lugar for tremendous
leadership on this committee. And it's a continuation--a
continuum here. I'm not surprised at all that Joe Biden is
convening a hearing like this, with a distinguished group of
panelists, to talk about the critical foreign policy issue of
the day. It's exactly what Dick Lugar has been doing before.
It's great to see this kind of leadership move back and forth
here, with people who are highly competent, know what they're
talking about, and providing great leadership in the country on
this issue. So, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, very, very much.
Chairman Biden. Thank you.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Well, as an increasingly strong supporter
of the seniority system----
[Laughter.]
Senator Feingold [continuing]. Let me thank Senator Dodd
for his tremendous courtesy in this regard.
Senator Kerry. Ask Senator Webb how he feels about this.
[Laughter.]
Senator Feingold. Thank you all for coming to testify in
front of this committee. And thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
for arranging this and the rest of the hearings we'll be having
over the next few weeks. I know you and your staff have worked
hard to lay out a range of good hearings and witnesses so this
committee can grapple with one of the most significant
challenges, really, in our Nation's history.
Unfortunately, these hearings are taking place in the
context of increasing violence in Iraq, a lack of political
agreement among Iraqi political factions, an overstrained
United States military, and an overwhelming and accurate sense
among the American people that the President's policies in Iraq
are wrong. This really is, of course, a tragic situation. And I
appreciate your candor and insights today on what I hope will
be the first of many open, honest, and candid hearings we'll
have.
My colleagues have already addressed a number of important
issues. I don't want to take a lot of time here today, but I do
want to talk about a critical aspect of the administration's
Iraq policy: What the role of the United States military in
Iraq is, given what you've been talking about, political
deadlock and increasing sectarian violence; what impact the
current United States military presence in Iraq is having on
the political, economic, and security conditions in Iraq; and,
most importantly, what impact our continuing presence in Iraq
is having on our efforts to defeat terrorist networks not just
in Iraq, not just in the region, but around the world. I think
sometimes we forget this isn't a regional issue, it is an
international issue. And I think one of the greatest failings
of our view of this is that we look at this either in--through
the prism of Iraq or even through the prism of the Middle East.
That is insufficient, in light of what happened to us on 9/11,
in light of the challenges to the security of the American
people.
So, let me start with Dr. Pillar. Let me focus on a
statement you made in your testimony. To paraphrase, you said
you concurred with the statements in the declassified national
intelligence estimate published by DNI on September 26, 2006,
that suggested that Iraq could become a ``cause celebre'' for
jihadists, and that it is ``shaping a new generation of
terrorist leaders and operatives,'' and is being exploited by
al-Qaeda to ``attract new recruits and donors.''
First, in speaking generally about your analysis, would the
withdrawal of American troops from Iraq at some point help
counter the ability of al-Qaeda and other jihadists around the
world to recruit new members?
Dr. Pillar. Yes, sir; I believe it would, which is not to
say that it would undo much of the damage that's already been
done. What's taking place in Iraq right now is that the current
prominent jihad mirrors what took place in Afghanistan in the
earlier jihad against the Soviets in the 1980s, where a number
of effects occurred. One, it became a huge inspiration and
propaganda point, a kind of rallying point. Two, it was a
training ground, in a very specific way. Lots of people learned
how to handle firearms and explosives to put to other use. And
third, it was the ultimate extremist networking opportunity, in
which you had people of different nationalities--Pakistanis,
Arabs, what have you--who came together. And we're still seeing
the effects of that today. I think most of the long-term
effects of the jihad in Iraq paralleling that most of those we
have yet to see. What's already occurred cannot be undone. But
the short answer to your question is yes; we can avoid
compounding the damage by reducing, or bringing to a close, our
presence there.
Senator Feingold. Thank you for that direct answer. So,
more specifically, then, is it safe to say that al-Qaeda will
continue to exploit the presence of a significant level of
United States military personnel in Iraq?
Dr. Pillar. There's no question in my mind that it will.
It's been one of the biggest propaganda points that al-Qaeda
has been offered.
Senator Feingold. In your prepared statement, you said
that, ``The most important variable in Iraq in the months or
years ahead is the sheer continuation of the war, as well as
the continued United States participation in it.'' So, for
example, if the United States began redeploying from Iraq, what
would be the long-term impact on al-Qaeda, globally, in your
view?
Dr. Pillar. Senator Feingold, I think you have to bear in
mind that ``jihad'' means, literally, ``struggle.'' What's most
important for the people we're talking about is not a
particular outcome, or what we, back in this country, might
consider, in our lexicon, victory or defeat and what have you.
It's participation in a struggle, and especially participation
in a struggle against a superpower. And with the Soviets no
longer around, that's us. So, just about any outcome that is
within the realm of imagination of anyone in this room, which
would involve at least some violence still in Iraq, is going to
serve that purpose of a struggle. So, that's the most important
thing, not a particular outcome or this side winning or that
side losing.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Doctor.
Dr. O'Hanlon, thanks for your testimony. First, let me
applaud the work that you and your colleagues at Brookings are
doing on Iraq. Your data and analysis are helpful and
insightful. Let me ask you some questions about some of the--
what lies beneath the data.
Your data obviously highlights troubling trends. It shows
that, regardless of the size of United States troop presence in
Iraq--and your data shows that it has gone from 123,000 in 2003
to 140,000 in 2006--Iraqi civilian fatalities, estimated
strength of the insurgency, strength of the Shia militias, and
daily average interethnic attacks and the estimated number of
foreign fighters have all risen over the past 3 years, without
fail. Given that we can't, from this data, draw a connection
between U.S. troop levels and the improvement of any of these
important indicators, can we draw a conclusion with your data
that sending in more U.S. troops will actually have an impact
on any of these key indicators?
Dr. O'Hanlon. No; not from the data, Senator. I think
there's a possibility of constructing a theory that the added
troops could help, especially in the context of a broader
political and economic initiative. But there's no data that
would prove that it would work. And, in fact, I think that, to
the contrary, I would be, while not against the surge proposal,
if done in a broader context, I'd be skeptical, at this point,
that it can make a big difference.
Senator Feingold. As you mentioned, the other big troubling
statistic is shown in the number of Iraqis who are displaced.
This is turning into an incredible humanitarian tragedy.
According to your data, in your view: Would an increase in
United States military personnel in Iraq address any of the
driving factors of their displacement--presumably things like
bombings, growing militias, interethnic attacks? As we
discussed, it appears as if the numbers don't support the
hypothesis that more troops will help settle things down.
Dr. O'Hanlon. Well, again, you can tell a story, you can
construct a theory of how more neighborhood-by-neighborhood
security might help reduce the ethnic displacement. But, again,
we have no evidence from the information, that we've
accumulated over 4 years' time, to prove that. Even in an
earlier period, when there was less violence and less for the
United States and its partners to deal with day to day in Iraq,
we were not able to get things on a positive trajectory. So, I
think, if anything, the data would make one skeptical. Can't
prove it, one way or another, but should make one skeptical
about the prospects.
Senator Feingold. Well, studying your data, what dynamics
or variables, in your view, have had the most significant
impact on reducing violence in Iraq? The top-line numbers
you've given us show, again, pretty consistent increase in the
violence across the board, but do you see any connections or
positive stories in that data that should contribute to
formulating policy proposals?
Dr. O'Hanlon. I see virtually no positive news on the hard
numbers of security or economics. The only good news really is
in the politics and the public opinion, although there's less
than there used to be. Two or three years ago, it was possible
to tell a better story, because 2 or 3 years ago, the Shia
really seemed to believe in the future of Iraq, and that's when
you had the Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani more vocal, trying to
rein in some of the militias. The overall Shia response to the
insurgency seemed to be one of patience, of believing time was
on their side anyway. They stayed optimistic in the polls. They
still seemed to believe in the idea of an integrated Iraq. The
Sunni Arabs were very skeptical all along, and very quickly
soured on our presence, as you know, but the Shia stayed
positive for a long time. Unfortunately, that's gone, to a
large extent, and I don't know how to recreate it.
So, I'm certainly much more pessimistic about the idea of
building an integrated Iraq, at this point, than I have been in
the previous 4 years.
Senator Feingold. Well, thanks, all of you.
And, again, thank you very much, Senator Dodd.
Chairman Biden. Thank you, Senator.
I would note the presence of Chairman Lantos's wife,
Annette Lantos, in the audience. Welcome. I'm glad you've come
over to the other side. Thank you.
Senator Coleman is next, but he is absent.
So, Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, it's an honor to be on this
committee.
Chairman Biden. We welcome you. We're delighted to have you
with us.
Senator Corker. Thank you. And I'm glad to see that, after
Ranking Member Lugar had 35 hearings, you're doing the same.
This is a tremendous service to us in the Senate, to our
country, and I appreciate what you're doing very much, and echo
what Senator Dodd said, a minute ago.
I'm a new member. I'll ask one question and then move on to
other members. But I know that we all want to see a stable
Iraq, and we all want to see our men and women in uniform home
as soon as possible. And I keep hearing that possibly the
addition of troops would be better served after political
settlements could occur. And I guess the question is: Is there
any real thought that political settlements can occur with so
much chaos, with so much lack of security for citizens there in
Iraq today?
Dr. Marr. I'll start by taking a crack at that. I'm not
optimistic either, but I'm a realist. And so, my expectations,
from the start, were perhaps not of the highest.
I think the idea that we're operating in a timeframe where,
in the next year or two, according to our exigencies here, the
situation is going to play out in Iraq is wrong. Their
timeframe--as you can see if you talk to any of these leaders
coming over here--is a much longer one. And I, frankly, think
this chaos, perhaps not with the same level of killing--but
this kind of instability is going to go on for a very long
time, until the population and the political leadership that
either benefits or loses from it comes to the conclusion that
they're losing more than they're gaining. And the settlement is
not going to result from some grand conference, some grand
reconciliation. I'd like to suggest, again, it's going to be
much more mundane and prosaic. And we see it going on at a
local level. It will come from different groups making
different deals with different people across these divides
until something more cohesive emerges. That's going to take
quite some time. And whether our patience with this process is
going to last or not is an open question.
Dr. O'Hanlon. A somewhat different take, Senator, although
I greatly respect Dr. Marr's point and I think there's a lot to
it. I would also say, when 100,000 people a month are being
driven from their homes, the idea that the conflict can stay at
this level indefinitely, and essentially retain a character
like we're seeing today, is not what I would agree with or
prognosticate. I would say that we have a couple of years to
save anything like a multiethnic integrated Iraq. Frankly, I
don't think it's that important to save it. I think stability
is much more important than salvaging the kind of Iraq that's
been there in the past, from America's strategic-interest
perspective. And I think we're going to have to see progress on
that in the course of 2007, in part because of American
politics, but in part because another year's worth of this
level of ethnic cleansing and Iraq starts to look more and more
like three separated regions, where you essentially had a civil
war divide the country. I see Dr. Marr is disagreeing with me,
but that's what the numbers say to me.
And so, I think that we are going to have to view 2007 as
our last best chance to have anything like current strategy
succeed, and, if it doesn't, with or without a surge, I think
within a year we're going to have to start having a
conversation about whether Iraq has to be divided up into a--
what you could call a federal structure or a soft partition--
you know, different phrases can be used--but basically where
oil revenue is shared, but, otherwise, most of the governance,
most of the security is done in three separate provinces, there
is some kind of a loose federal structure, a small federal
army. And, otherwise, you help people relocate, if they need
to, to places where they will feel safer, and help them with
relocation assistance, in terms of housing and jobs.
Dr. Pillar. Well, it is valid to say that--to point out
that the security affects the politics, just as the politics
affects the security. I strongly agree with Phebe Marr's
observations about the timeframe involved and about how Iraqis
are going to keep doing what they're doing until they believe
they don't have a chance to get the upper hand. If you're
looking for an analogy in the Middle East, that I think is
frightening in a way, but perhaps most apt, it was the Lebanese
civil war, which raged on for something like 14 years, from the
mid-1970s to the late 1980s, until all the Lebanese parties--
and that, too, was one characterized by a very complex
sectarian mosaic--until they basically exhausted themselves,
literally and figuratively, and finally, with the help of the
Saudis and the Syrians, reached a peace agreement, even though
that left a number of people dissatisfied. We're seeing the
effects of it today. But that's the kind of timeframe I think
we're dealing with, with regard to resolving, if it's ever
going to be even halfway resolved, the political conflict in
Iraq.
Senator Corker. Well, are you recommending, then, that
things stay as is until they get so bad that people start
making those kinds of deals? Is that what you're recommending?
Dr. Pillar. It wasn't a recommendation, Senator Corker, it
was an analytic observation about the situation we face.
Chairman Biden. Thank you.
I would note that we did not have 135,000 forces in Lebanon
during that period. And I know you're making an accurate--I
think, accurate observation, but--at any rate.
Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. I want to thank Senator Dodd for
understanding my conflict here with the Environment Committee.
I really do appreciate it. And I want to thank----
Chairman Biden. You're a chairwoman of that committee----
Senator Boxer. Yes.
Chairman Biden [continuing]. And he has interests before
that committee, and, don't worry, he's not going to fool around
with you. [Laughter.]
Senator Boxer. I shall never forget the problems of
Connecticut. [Laughter.]
Acid rain and everything else.
Senators Biden and Lugar, thank you for continuing to work
so closely together. And this panel, I think, has been
fascinating. And I find that, you know, as I've listened, a
couple of things are leaping out at me that I think make sense
in a very difficult chaotic situation. And the things I think
make sense happen to be the things that my chairman has been
talking about, and I'm going to pursue what Mr. O'Hanlon has
talked about--which is to try and wake up, smell the roses, and
figure out what is actually happening on the ground. People are
moving toward their ethnic identities. That's not America. This
is what we don't want to see happen. But either we're going to
accept that or our kids are getting killed--and more and more
and more. And if you listen to Dr. Marr--and she's so learned--
she says, ``Only when the participants in the struggle for
power recognize they're losing more than they can gain will
this violence come to an end. This may be a very long time.
And, in the meantime, the best we can do is staunch the
violence, contain the struggle.'' Listen. How many more dead
will that be? And I'm not asking you that, because you're not a
military expert. But I will ask the Secretary of State that.
And I have to say, Dr. Marr, with all due respect, when you
talk about--you see, kind of, an ending, and you say--and you
could be right--``This will end when''--and I'm quoting you--
``different people make different deals across a period of
time.'' How is that better than the idea of accepting the fact
that that dealmaking ought to happen from all the parties
accepting the reality of this, and then doing what Mr. Said
says, which is come to a political agreement, and then figure
out how to enforce that agreement with international forces,
not just on the backs of the American people. I just--and I say
``the American people,'' because their kids are bearing the
brunt of this.
I think it's very interesting--I read, Mr. Said, your
amazing article, December 9, 2002. Is it--am I right that your
family fled Iraq because of Saddam Hussein? OK. And this is
what you wrote in 2002, ``There are many reasons why Iraqis who
have long sought to topple Saddam Hussein are opposed to the
impending war.'' This is before the war started. ``This, after
all, is not the first time the United States has pursued regime
change in Iraq. All previous attempts ended with disastrous
consequences for the Iraqi people.''
But I would add a sentence: And this time, although it
isn't ended, a lot of families here are coping with disastrous
consequences, not only the dead, but the wounded and the post-
traumatic stress and the brain injuries and so on.
Now, Mr. Said, every poll shows us that 60 percent of the
Iraqis today think it's OK to shoot an American. Could you
explain to us why that is the case? Could you--why do you think
that's so?
Mr. Said. I mean, it's understandable. The effect of United
States troops in Iraq today--not the whole consequences of the
invasion, which obviously are--have been catastrophic for
thousands of Iraqis and Americans--is ambiguous, it's a mixed
bag. On one hand, the foreign troops are an irritant, they are
creating a reaction in the form of an insurgency, which
continues to be the bulk of the violence taking place in Iraq
today. And the number--60 percent--confirms that, that for most
Iraqis they view the American presence as an occupation, and
they continue to consider fighting the occupation a legitimate
pursuit.
Senator Boxer. OK. Well, let me----
Mr. Said. However, if I may----
Senator Boxer. Yes. Go ahead.
Mr. Said [continuing]. The presence of United States troops
today is critical for the survival of the Iraqi State and
actually for the physical survival of many Iraqis. The United
States troops in Iraq today have a humanitarian mission, as
well as a----
Senator Boxer. I get it. Why do 70 percent of the Iraqi
people say we should get out, 60 percent say it's OK to shoot?
So, this may be the case, but clearly that message hasn't
gotten through.
Now, Dr. Marr, have you ever read the book, ``The
Reckoning,'' by Sandra Mackey?
Dr. Marr. Yes. I know her. Yes.
Senator Boxer. Both of you make me very proud, by the way,
just as an aside. But I read that book before I voted on
whether or not I wanted to give this President authority to go
to war. She predicted everything that has happened. And one of
the things she said--and I want--and you may not agree with
her--is that after World War I, Iraq was put together, was it
not, as a country?
Dr. Marr. No; I think there were some elements of being
together before that. There was Mesopotamia----
Senator Boxer. I understand.
Dr. Marr. You know, there's a sense of living within that
territory that is more than just throwing a country----
Senator Boxer. But is it not----
Dr. Marr [continuing]. Together.
Senator Boxer [continuing]. So that there was no ``Iraq,''
per se, until after World War I?
Dr. Marr. Yes. That's----
Senator Boxer. And is it not true----
Dr. Marr [continuing]. True of many countries----
Senator Boxer. Well, I'm----
Dr. Marr [continuing]. In the area.
Senator Boxer [continuing]. I'm not talking about other
countries.
Dr. Marr. Yes.
Senator Boxer. I'm talking about Iraq. And isn't it true--
isn't it true that when the British drew these lines, they put
many different ethnic groups inside Iraq who they knew had many
years, perhaps thousands of years, of enmity?
Dr. Marr. I don't even know what you're talking about. They
put----
Senator Boxer. I'm talking about----
Dr. Marr [continuing]. Ethnic groups inside of----
Senator Boxer. I'm saying----
Dr. Marr [continuing]. Iraq?
Senator Boxer. I'm saying: When they drew the lines,
according to Sandra Mackey, they were very clear that they drew
them knowing that it would be a contentious country because of
all the ethnic rivalries. Would you agree with her on that
point?
Dr. Marr. No.
Senator Boxer. You don't agree----
Dr. Marr. It's a----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. With her.
Dr. Marr. It's a long issue. I don't deny ethnic and
sectarian rivalries, but I do want to succinctly address your
issue. There are many other ties--tribal, family--which
frequently override ethnic and sectarian identity, and a
nonsectarian educated middle class, which was very strong in
periods in Iraq--forties, fifties, sixties, seventies.
Education doesn't obliterate, sectarianism, but really reduces
it. It's much more complex. And I didn't want to leave the
impression that I feel that United States troops have to stick
around for years and years while Iraqis solve their problem. I
would favor, if the Iraqis can't get their act together in a
reasonable time, a policy of containment, that is containing
the problems from spilling across the borders of Iraq.
So, don't, please, identify my position with one of
sticking around there----
Senator Boxer. Good, I'm glad you----
Dr. Marr [continuing]. Forever----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. Clarified. I'm really glad.
Dr. Marr [continuing]. While that happens.
But I want to come back to one point. I don't agree with
the reality--I don't think Sandra goes as far as this--that
Iraq is inevitably based on ethnic identity and sectarian
identity which has come to the fore very virulently only
recently. You may think you're going to get stability by
recognizing these divisions, and drawing lines, but who is
going to protect the seams?
Senator Boxer. Well, let me----
Dr. Marr. Which forces----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. Let me--let me address----
Dr. Marr [continuing]. You know----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. That----
Dr. Marr. So----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. Because I think my chairman has
spelled that out beautifully, because we're talking about still
one Iraq with semiautonomous regions, where you can bring in,
you know, the world community to help enforce a political
settlement. But that's OK. I don't need to--you know we
disagree on the point.
And I'll close, because I know my time is up. But it seems
to me that Sandra Mackey was right on every single point that
she made, that what would happen when a war came is that these
ethnic differences would come to the surface, where they were
tampened down before.
Because I think we're missing the point. We haven't really
laid out how we're going to get keeping this country as a whole
and not going with the idea expressed by Dr. O'Hanlon. We
haven't really resolved that question. If you think they're
going to go in and go after al-Sadr, al-Maliki's government
will fall, because he's dependent on Sadr. So then, is it all
going to be against the Sunnis? And then, as Mr. Hakim says,
``Are we in the middle, taking sides in a civil war?'' It's
complex.
I thank you all for your time. And I thank you----
Chairman Biden. Well, I thank you, Senator. I'm sure the
panel would be prepared to answer some questions. We will not
take up the rest of their academic and----
Senator Boxer. No, no, that's not what I meant.
Chairman Biden. But I'm--no, but, I mean, I hope the panel
would consider--and if you could submit through the chair any
additional questions you have. But I'd try to narrow them,
rather than have each of us committing 10 or 12 questions to
them. I know we could do that.
Senator Boxer. That's my only one. Thank you.
Chairman Biden. Yes. No; I would--the panel has no problem
responding to that, I'm sure.
Senator Coleman.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I was in Iraq about a month ago. And just a quick
observation. OK? Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To me, it seemed like there are two battles going on in
Iraq. One is a war in the Anbar province that our Marines are
fighting, and they know who the enemy is. The enemy is the
foreign fighters and the al-Qaeda insurgents. And the Marines
are doing their job, and they're making progress every day, in
the sense of eliminating terrorists. You can measure this
progress. The other battle is in Baghdad, and consists of
sectarian violence. I see our troops caught in the crosshairs
of this sectarian violence in Baghdad. If you see it, it's
almost unbelievable, the extent of it, the depravity of it. And
it seems to me that as our Marines make progress in clearing
areas of terrorists, they need Sunnis to participate in the
police departments in Anbar to hold the territory they've
cleared. The local Sunnis know who the foreign fighters are.
And Sunnis are needed in the army. So it seems to me that the
Iraqis have got to achieve reconciliation in order to end the
violence in the long term. We can't resolve anything in Iraq in
the long term, militarily, without reconciliation among Iraqi
factions. And during my trip to Iraq it didn't appear to me
that the Iraqi leadership were doing all they could to achieve
real reconciliation. I met with Dr. Rubaie, the National
Security Advisor for the Prime Minister, and said that he
didn't think that sectarian violence was a major issue in Iraq.
I was incredulous when I heard that. Yet we continue to face
the problem with Sunnis and the insurgency and I think we saw
some of that in the paper today. When I was in Iraq I didn't
get a sense that Iraqis are done killing each other through
sectarian violence.
And so, my first question is: Does anybody here have a
sense of whether reconciliation can occur in Iraq today? And,
if not, is there a timeline for reconciliation?
Mr. Said. Mr. Coleman, I tried, in my testimony, to
illustrate a complex conflict--and you alluded to that--that
there is an insurgency, for example, taking place in Anbar, and
the sort of the civil strife taking place in Baghdad. Of
course, it's less neat than that, actually. There are
insurgencies and civil wars happening throughout Iraq. There
are only a few pockets of stability in Iraq, including
Kurdistan. But, almost in every province there is a conflict,
whether it's a criminal--criminal gangs or whether it's a sort
of a social revolt against the establishment or whether it's
civil war. In Anbar this summer, there were clashes between
Sunni tribes. Ostensibly, in the media, it was about Sunni
tribes fighting al-Qaeda, but, in reality, these were old
tribal rivalries spilling into open conflict and being dressed
as Anbar tribes fighting al-Qaeda. Inside the Sunni political
representations, there are deep fissures between the Islamists,
on one side, and the Baathists--and unreformed Baathists, on
the other. So, there are no neat groups that one can resort to
or revert to in a partition formula whereby one can say: What
do the Sunnis say? There is a vast difference between the
positions of various Sunni groups. And the differences between
the Shia groups are expressed in real fighting and dead bodies
in the south, throughout Basrah. Every city in the south has
fallen out of government control at one point or the other over
the last 6 months.
So, the Iraqis are not done killing each other, but on the
various bases, under various motivations--there is--we don't
have the luxury to wait out for compromises to emerge from this
chaos. The situation--the pervasive fear and violence is
creating a humanitarian disaster in Iraq, as Mr. O'Hanlon has
described, that needs to be addressed. So, there is an urgency
for a political process, if you like, regardless of the
willingness of the parties to engage. The problem is, the
parties need to be brought to the table. And what needs to be--
to happen is, one needs to bring more parties that are willing
to engage. If the combatants, if the radicals or the extremists
are not willing to talk, then the table needs to be widened,
because there are many Iraqis, as well, who want to see peace
in their country, and want to rebuild their nation. And this is
a role for the international community. There is a need for an
international-sponsored peace process that will bring Iraqis to
the table, including those who are willing to find compromises
and willing to stay together.
Senator Coleman. But, Dr. Marr, I mean, if I could turn to
you on this, if the parties aren't at that point where they
have that fundamental commitment to say, ``We recognize what
the problem is, and we are committed to do those things to
resolve it''--that's my concern as--and I'll listen to the
President, but I'm not--I didn't see, in my time there, in my
conversations, that you've got a commitment on the part of the
Iraqis to do what has to be done that would then justify a
greater commitment of American lives and resources. That's my
problem. If----
Dr. Marr. I agree that that is a problem. And it's not
perhaps either/or. I'm just expressing what I think is a
realistic analysis of what's likely to happen. That doesn't
mean that I like it or there aren't some other things we can
do.
The key issue is: How do you get Iraqis, particularly those
that are going to be in the political process, to reconcile?
And you have pointed out a very good way to do that. You've got
to put pressure, you have to have incentives, you certainly
have to widen the political spectrum. Because one of the things
that's operative here is that political parties and groups who
have power now want to keep it, and their power is fragile. And
widening the spectrum and including others may not be exactly
what they want. We don't want to get caught in that. We, alone,
are not the only ones who need to do this. The regional
neighbors have their own clients, and they need to be able to
exercise pressure but there are numerous ways in which we could
push, nudge, and otherwise try to get this reconciliation.
Now, whether that's going to be successful is a big issue.
And certainly whether we keep troops there and keep on with
this effort, if Iraqis don't rise to the occasion, I have to
say, it is, in fact, one of your jobs----
Senator Coleman. And----
Dr. Marr [continuing]. To decide that.
Senator Coleman. But you have also highlighted the
consequences if we do that, that there are devastating
consequences, in terms of ethnic cleansing, in terms of--Dr.
Pillar, in terms of what's going to happen in the rest of the
region.
And I'm not sure what my time is, Mr. Chairman. If I can
just----
Chairman Biden. No; you have another little bit.
Senator Coleman. Dr. Pillar, the--we're not in this alone.
I mean, Iran has--Iran is pressuring us in--with Hezbollah in
Lebanon; they're pressuring us with Hamas in Gaza; they're
pressuring us with supporting al-Sadr in Iraq. Is there any
appetite on the part of folks in the region to play a
constructive role in trying to resolve this situation?
Dr. Pillar. Yes, Senator; I think there is. And you can
look at past experience. In the case of the Syrians, for
example, just to mention them in passing, they were part of
Operation Desert Storm, back in 1991. In the wake of 9/11 I
believe administration officials would tell you that Syrian
counterterrorist cooperation against the jihadists, about whom
they share with us a concern, has taken place. The State
Department has spoken about that publicly. And in the case of
Iran, we had the experience of very profitable cooperation in
Afghanistan in the wake of Operation Enduring Freedom. And
people like Ambassador Khalilzad and Ambassador Dobbins could
talk to you about that.
There's little doubt in my mind that, in Tehran, there was
at least a hope, if not an expectation, that something similar
would happen with the political reconstruction of Iraq.
Obviously, it did not work out that way. But the short answer
to your question is yes; as demonstrated in the past, even the
likes of the Iranians and the Syrians have shown their
willingness to cooperate.
Senator Coleman. Does any other--is that a unanimous
opinion?
Mr. Said. I think there is opening for engagement, almost
with all parties, without exception. And the question is:
What's the framework? It has to be a multilateral framework. It
has to be seen as a fair framework that will offer everyone
something. Everyone needs something out of the process. It
cannot be just at the expense--you know, it cannot happen at
the expense of some parties and to the benefit of others.
Dr. Pillar. And it has to be, as Senator Lugar put it
earlier in the proceedings, all the cards on the table. You
know, from the Iranians' point of view, they wouldn't want a
negotiation just about Iraq, just as they're not comfortable
with a negotiation just about the nuclear issue. They want to
talk about all issues in dispute with the United States.
Senator Coleman. But you do recognize that they are
fueling--they are fueling the instability, they're doing those
things that are worsening the problem rather than doing
anything to----
Dr. Pillar. As I suggest in my testimony, they are dealing
with a wide variety of groups in Iraq. It may be hard--and
you'd have to rely on your classified intelligence for the
latest story on this--to connect this bit of Iranian assistance
with that attack. Nonetheless, some of that assistance, no
doubt, has facilitated attacks against coalition forces. But,
as I suggested before, the main way to look at that is as a
full-court press by Iran to get as much influence in Iraq as
they possibly can, with all parties.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Biden. Thank you.
Did you want to say something, Mike?
Dr. O'Hanlon. I just wanted to make one other point. And I
hesitate to add a nuance to anything Paul Pillar has said on
this region; he knows it so well. But I am getting worried,
from what we can see from the available evidence, that Iran has
one other aim, which is to deal the United States a major
strategic defeat in the region, which it now thinks is
attainable in a way it did not 3 and 4 years ago, which may
somewhat change the calculus. And it doesn't make me oppose the
idea of negotiation, but it makes me very wary of expecting any
progress or even assuming that Iran wants a stable Iraq as an
outcome in this.
Senator Coleman. And I share those concerns, Dr. O'Hanlon.
Mr. Said. If I may just add, Iran is not a coherent actor,
by the way. Iran--there are various influences and interests in
Iran, and that also gives an opening for dialog.
Dr. Pillar. Yes; we have to see beyond the outrageous
rhetoric of Ahmadinejad. I agree completely.
Chairman Biden. Let me--by the way, the chairman and I have
discussed holding, hopefully, some thoughtful hearings on Iran
and actually what the state of play in Iran is, unrelated to
us, just what's going on in Iran at the moment.
But let me, before I yield to my friend from Connecticut,
indicate that there is going to be--you've been sitting a long
time, and there is going to be a vote at noon, in which time we
will break. Assuming the vote goes off at noon--after Senator
Dodd, we will break for that vote, which will be 15 minutes,
give you a little breather. And then I will confer with the
Senator, and I'll ask the staff to confer with you. My
intention was to continue to go through, to finish, but it's a
much bigger committee. We have a total of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
8, 9, 10, 11--almost 12 more members to go. I'd like you all to
consider, based on your schedules, whether or not you would
want to break briefly for a lunch break from 12 noon to 1
o'clock, to give you an opportunity to have some lunch.
Senator Sununu. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Biden. Yes.
Senator Sununu. If we break when the vote occurs, it does
appear we might have time for one more round on each side.
Being the next in line, I have a particular interest in that
type of arrangement----
[Laughter.]
Senator Sununu [continuing]. If it were possible.
Chairman Biden. Well, based on your comments yesterday, I'm
not going to let that happen. [Laughter.]
Chairman Biden. That's a joke. That's a joke. We will
accommodate you, Senator, notwithstanding your comments.
[Laughter.]
Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I'm going to ask one question, and then I see
colleagues here, and try and provide some time for others
before we break for the vote. Let me also join the chairman in
welcoming our new members to the committee.
Jim, I've sat in that chair you're in, a long time ago, but
it does move, and then it stalls, it seems, for a while.
[Laughter.]
But I was looking at Barack Obama and remembering last year
when he was sitting--and wondering if we'd even notice him at
the end of the table, and moving up very quickly. So, welcome,
all of you, to a very exciting committee with some tremendous
leadership we've had, as I mentioned, with Dick Lugar and with
Joe Biden now, and others. So, it's a good committee to be on,
and your participation is really welcome.
I'd like to just pick up on--picking up off Senator
Coleman's question. We're going to have the Secretary of State
here tomorrow, as you know, coming before us. And I have been
impressed with your comments and your ideas in this thing, and
particularly, Dr. Marr, this issue of reconciliation, how it's
going to come about. I suspect you're probably more--far more
right about that. Despite our desires for something else to
happen in a sort of a conversion on the road to Damascus here
to occur with major political leaders.
But two points here; I'd like you to just quickly comment,
if you can. One is: What can we be doing to help facilitate
this? A question we get all the time, that if you're--if you
believe this is a surge, it's not the right idea, that
increasing military forces doesn't make a lot of sense, that
clearly political resolution here is what everyone seems to
suggest is ultimately going to produce the kind of results we'd
like to see, the question then follows on: What should we be
doing? What should the United States, our allies, moderate Arab
leaders in the region, be doing, specifically?
I just came back from 6 days in the region, as well. I was
there with my colleague from Massachusetts. We were in Lebanon
and spent about 3\1/2\ hours with President Assad in Damascus,
which I've shared, with the Secretary and others, the
conversations and what was offered there. One of the things
that I share with you here is, when I asked, specifically,
``What sort--what do you want to see, in Iraq, occur?''--the
answer, I don't mind sharing with you here in this room, was,
``I'd like to see a pluralistic, stable Arab government. I'm
not interested in seeing a fundamentalist Shia-Iranian state on
my border.'' Now, he said that in English in a private meeting.
It wasn't announced in--in Arabic in a public document. So, I'm
conscious of the fact that these are statements being made, as
Tom Friedman likes to point out, in private, where you may get
less than what the actual policies are. But, nonetheless, I
found it interesting that he pursued, or at least willing to
say those things.
What should we be doing? How should the United States--how
should the Secretary of State be conducting our foreign policy
in the region? And what, specifically, do you think we ought to
be doing to encourage this kind of political resolution that
we're all talking about?
Dr. Marr. That is absolutely critical and difficult, and I
have only a few thoughts; I hope my colleagues have some
others.
First of all, the absence of security and the dreadful
humanitarian situation that Mike O'Hanlon is talking about
needs to be addressed. Insecure people are not willing to make
compromises. But with the political parties, you've got to have
a collection of incentives and disincentives to get them to
come to some terms on these very issues we've identified.
There's a considerable amount of agreement on this.
You've got to say no to some people who may not like it,
and you've got to have a little, perhaps, stick there, in terms
of how long and how much support and troops the United States
is going to be willing to provide.
And, second of all, I like the idea that I just heard--and
I agree with it--of widening the pool. I'm not so sure some of
the parties who now have power, and who feel very fragile, who
feel worried that the Baath might come back or Sunnis might
come back or whatever, are going to be willing to make the
compromises. There used to be a large middle class with a lot
of technocrats. There are not a lot now. Many of them have
fled. They need to come back.
Two things, I think, are very important. One is to get this
Cabinet to act as a Cabinet, not just a collection of fiefdoms
of individual people, and getting the educated middle-class
professionals back who have some of the spirit of, you know,
nonsectarian identity.
So, widening the political pool, getting other people in,
would be helpful. But I think, of course, the neighbors need to
be brought in. We've talked about that. There's no easy answer.
That's the only thing I want to say here. This is going to be
long, laborious, the kind of thing diplomats, politicians do
all the time. But I think our expectation, that somehow this is
going to happen rapidly, needs to be a little more realistic.
Senator Dodd. Anyone else want to comment?
Dr. Pillar. If I understand your very broad question,
Senator Dodd, about approaching the region, I would just
incorporate, by reference, the recommendations of the Iraq
Study Group, and two themes, in particular. One is what we were
discussing a moment ago, which is to talk with everyone. And
that doesn't necessarily mean one big multilateral conference.
I think Phebe made the very appropriate point earlier that
other kinds of engagement are called for. And, No. 2, be
prepared to talk about everything that is on the agenda of the
regional governments, and not just ours. And, again, the Arab-
Israeli conflict comes right to the fore.
Dr. O'Hanlon. Senator, I wanted to make a plug for what I
know many of you do, especially in the bipartisan coalitions or
groups that go to Iraq and talk to Iraqis, because I think
Iraqis need to know American political support is very fragile,
and it's not going to last much longer.
Senator Dodd. We've made that point.
Dr. O'Hanlon. And I'm sure you continue to, but I think
they need to keep hearing it, because I think it's very hard
for President Bush to send that message in a convincing way,
given how much his Presidency depends on this. From what I
understand of the way he's going to talk--tonight, from what
little I've heard from people in the administration, he is, of
course, not going to be able to create this sense. He's going
to try to put pressure on the Iraqis, but he's not going to be
able to say, and not going to want to say, that if they don't
get their act together, we're leaving. You know, that's just
not something that he is in a position to want to say.
But I think you all, collectively, and we, in the think-
tank world, to a lesser degree--we're less visible and less
important in their eyes--we have to send that message, that,
you know, for the reasons across the spectrum, from military
capability of our Army and Marine Corps, to the patience of our
people, to the upcoming Presidential race, and everything else,
our patience for sticking with anything like this strategy is
very limited, and it's probably measured in terms of 9 to 18
months, not years.
Mr. Said. I just wanted to second what Professor Marr has
said, in terms of broadening the political process--if you
like, facilitating national dialog, internationalizing the
Iraq--the Iraq issue, and bringing in more actors to the table.
About the broadening of the political process, this is not
about reversing the outcomes of the political process----
Senator Dodd. Yes.
Mr. Said [continuing]. Of the last 3 years, it's about
enhancing it. It's a process that has some elements that are
good, but it's clearly not working, and it needs to be
enhanced. There needs to be concessions. The winners of the
political process need to make concessions and bring in more
people to the table. And I'm not talking, here, about more
combatants and more extremists, but about bringing people with
a vested interest in a democratic Iraq.
There are also things that the United States will need to
do on the humanitarian level. There is a humanitarian situation
evolving in Iraq today, and the United States needs to keep
engaging on that issue, and maybe also bring in more
international support.
And, finally, again, it's--again, efforts that are already
underway in Iraq, on state-building, on maintaining the
machinery of government, that will be necessary, no matter what
the outcome of the current violence is.
Senator Dodd. Thanks. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Biden. I thank you very much.
Let me suggest that it's possible that maybe all the
Senators who were here will not be coming back, so it may be
more in your interest for us to keep going. But I will do--you
need a break. We'll go to Senator Sununu, and, after his
questioning, I'd ask permission, since Senator Webb has to
preside at 1 o'clock, if the vote hasn't been called by then,
whether or not my friend from Pennsylvania would be willing to
let Senator Webb go next. And then we can make a--then we'll
give you a break, regardless, and then decide whether to come
back in 5 minutes or give everybody a chance to eat lunch. My
guess is, we'll continue to go through, in light of the
rollcall I just got from the committee staff as to who is
likely to come back. So, it may be easier to do it that way.
Senator Dodd. Mr. Chairman, I presume, by the way, opening
statements are going to--you've made an accommodation for that
to be included.
Chairman Biden. Yes; anyone who has an opening statement,
it will be placed in the record.
Senator Dodd. Thank you.
Chairman Biden. Senator Sununu.
Senator Sununu. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
We often say how much we appreciate your time and
testimony, to all of our witnesses, but I think it's fair to
say, today in particular, this has been a great panel. They're
very constructive, very specific, very direct, and I think
that's extremely helpful to us, given the importance of these
issues.
There does seem to be a lot of consensus about the
importance of the climate: Economic issues, political issues,
social issues that need to be dealt with in order for
stability--long-term stability to be realized. There's been
specific discussion, as there was in the Iraq Study Group
report, of things like the oil law, provincial elections, the
training process, and the broader reconciliation process. Those
were all recommendations here. But I think, Mr. O'Hanlon, you,
in particular, emphasize that those would need to be addressed,
or at least referenced, with regard to any change in the
military footprint, military operations, and military
objectives. And I think this, as well, is something that was
contemplated in the Study Group Report, specifically with
regard to an increase in troops. On page 73, it says, ``We
could support a short-term redeployment or surge of American
combat forces to stabilize Baghdad or speed up the training-
and-equipping mission if the United States commander in Iraq
determines that such steps would be effective. We reject the
immediate withdrawal of troops because we believe so much is at
stake.'' So, clearly, this is something that's contemplated by
Baker-Hamilton, but in the context of achieving some of these
other specific objectives.
So, I'd like all the panelists to comment, but we'll begin
with Mr. O'Hanlon, whether or not you feel that some increase
in forces, if used to--hypothetically, for example, stabilize
Baghdad--would make, or could make, a difference in improving
the window for training forces or for the formal reconciliation
process, which began in December, but seems to have slowed a
little bit. I mean, we can talk about those two specific
examples or any others you want to discuss.
Dr. O'Hanlon. I'll give you a somewhat tortured answer,
Senator. I would support a surge, in the context of a much
broader approach, but I'm not sure I could be very confident
it's going to work. So, since I have the opportunity--and
you've given it to me--to speak today, I think that we all have
to be thinking about backup plans very hard, because, with or
without a surge, I think we're likely to see something like the
current strategy not succeed. But I would still think our
chances would improve in the short term, at the tactical level,
at least, with a surge. So, it's a tough situation.
Senator Sununu. If those troops are given a specific
objective, or an objective to support one of these other
political or economic issues, which would it be? Which do you
think their temporary role or security role could be most
effective in enhancing?
Dr. O'Hanlon. I think that they have to create some level
of stability in Iraq, in the neighborhoods, reduce the
violence. If you don't do that, nothing else can work.
Senator Sununu. But, in terms of reconciliation, training,
oil law, provincial elections, we--for example, in the
electoral process, last time a surge was implemented, or two of
the three times that we saw a surge in troops, it was focused
on the elections, with relative success, and most people agree
that those were relatively peaceful.
Dr. O'Hanlon. I think a limited focused approach like that
probably won't work. We're going to--we sort of need a miracle,
politically. We need for Prime Minister al-Maliki, who now has
an 85-percent unfavorability rating among Sunni Arabs, to be
seen as a different kind of leader than he's been seen as so
far. Or maybe we need a new Iraqi Prime Minister, like Allawi,
who at least had a little stronger--you know, linkages across
other ethnic groups. But I think we are beyond the point where
you could say one specific political improvement will be
enough. I think we're going to have to see a whole new ball
game in very short order.
Dr. Marr. Well, it seems to me that if there's any mission
for this additional surge, it's going to be to stop the ethnic
cleansing, sectarian cleansing, or whatever we want to call it,
in Baghdad. It certainly can't address all the problems of the
country. But it's the demographic shift, that Michael has
mentioned, that is so devastating and we want to stop and slow
this. That's what we mean when we say ``providing some security
in Baghdad.'' But I think we've all pointed out how that's
fraught with dangers, because it's so inextricably mixed with
different ethnic and sectarian groups and political parties and
others. I agree, here, that perhaps it's worth giving it a
shot, but our chances of actually turning the whole situation
around on the ground is very slim. We might be able, with our
forces, to hold some neighborhoods or do something militarily,
but, as everybody has pointed out here, the real issue is: What
are you going to do with the time you buy and the increase in
tranquility, presumably, that you get? How are you going to get
Iraqis to begin to address their political problems? That's the
real issue.
Senator Sununu. And that's the point I make. And where I'd
like a little bit of additional comment is: If that time is
created, where might it be best used? And do you even think it
might be used effectively?
Mr. Said.
Mr. Said. I think this is an issue of putting the horse
before the cart. I think the troops are a tool to achieving a
certain objective. We need to agree on the objectives before we
can discuss the tools. And the discussion seems to be having--
that there is this option of a surge on the table, and let's
find a role for it. And I think that's the wrong way of asking
the question, or for putting the question, I think.
Senator Sununu. Well, I--although it would--I think I've
actually asked the question in just the way you want. The
objectives are a reconciliation process--equity in distribution
of oil revenues, so that the Sunnis feel enfranchised
economically, provincial elections, so that the feel
enfranchised politically, so that they have some better voice
in governance. Those are the objectives that will lead to long-
term success. And my question is: Do you see an opportunity for
additional military troops to help achieve a window where those
objectives might be accomplished?
Mr. Said. I think if there is agreement--if there is a
political process that leads to agreement on these issues, if
we--if we have a blueprint for addressing these issues, on the
back of that they may be needed--more troops may be needed or
less troops may be needed. It all depends on the shape of the
agreement. That agreement may bring other troops from other
countries to help with the situation, and it doesn't have to
become a burden of the United States alone. So, there are all
kinds of outcomes from the political process that could lead to
increased or reduced troops.
There's one issue that the others suggested, and I have
emphasized, as well, which is the humanitarian role. There is
one role that the United States can play today, which is
protecting civilians. But that's--this has to be done in an
evenhanded way that is not seen as participating in the
conflict on one side or the other. But protecting civilians is
definitely an important role.
Senator Sununu. Thank you.
Mr. Pillar.
Dr. Pillar. It presumably is the capability of troops,
whether it's part of the surge or any others, to provide
security, not to run elections, not to pump oil, not to do
those other things. But I think the answer to your question,
Senator, if I understand it, is that you cannot focus on any
one thing. You noted the elections before. Well, we've been
through this multistage political reconstruction process in
which there was always something else to look forward to. You
know, the constituent assembly elections or the transfer of
sovereignty or the election of the regular legislature. We're
through all that. And so, there isn't any one thing. It is the
oil. It is the political reconciliation. It's the neighborhood-
by-neighborhood security. It's everything. So, I'm afraid I
would resist giving you a specific answer, because the valid
answer is: All of the above.
Senator Sununu. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Biden. Thank you.
Folks, what we're going to do is give you a little bit of a
break here. I instructed--I suggested that my colleagues go and
vote. We'll adjourn. If Senator Lugar makes it back before I
do, he will reconvene the committee for Senator Webb to be able
to ask his questions. This is an opportunity to get up and
stretch your legs. And I think what we'll try to do is go
straight through rather than have you have to come back this
afternoon.
So, we'll adjourn until the vote is over.
Thank you.
Recess, I should say.
[Recess.]
Chairman Biden. The hearing will come to order, please.
There's an awful lot of things that are going on today,
including a meeting with Mr. Hadley. I see that in order, next,
ordinarily, what would be the case--and I'd just raise this as
a question--my friend from Florida would be next, but Senator
Casey, a new member, is to be down at the White House at a
quarter of 12. I wonder whether or not the Senator would yield
to Senator Casey?
Senator Bill Nelson. Of course I do.
Chairman Biden. And then go back to--I believe the Senator
from Alaska, who's next on this side, but I'm not sure.
Senator Casey, why don't you proceed?
Senator Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman--and I appreciate
your indulgence--Senator Lugar. And thank you, Senator Nelson,
for this opportunity to jump the line a little bit. I will try
not to get used to it.
I have two questions, one that pertains to our troops, and
the other with regard to diplomacy.
I come from Pennsylvania, where Senator Specter and I
represent a State that has lost, right now, the third-highest
amount of troops--just last week went above 140. I'm thinking
of those troops today, and their families, as all of us are,
who gave, as Abraham Lincoln told us a long time ago, the last
full measure of devotion to their country.
One of the questions I have for Dr. O'Hanlon and others--
when it comes to data points with regard to where we are in
Iraq, one that I'm not sure you've been able to track, or
whether you or the other panelists have information about, is
the condition of our troops, in terms of the things we used to
read a lot more about than we do now--body armor, the
protective gear, weapons, all of the indicators that we can
point to that tell us whether or not we're doing everything we
can to support the troops who are in battle right now. Do you
have any information about that or any kind of status? Because,
as you know better than I, many months ago we read about all
the horrors, where families were buying equipment and body
armor and things like that. So, that's the first question I
had, with regard to that data point, so to speak.
Dr. O'Hanlon. Senator Casey, my impression is that most of
these numbers are much better now, but I'm going to focus on
one thing, which I wonder if we should have had a broader
national debate about, which is the type of vehicle we put our
troops in. As you know, there are some vehicles that are built
around the world that are designed to withstand the blast of
mines, or, as we call them in Iraq, improvised explosive
devices, which are now responsible for about half of all of our
fatalities, as our data show. And, of course, other types of
threats exist, and snipers are a worse concern than before in
Iraq, but it's really the IED problem that's No. 1. And I,
frankly, am wondering--it's getting pretty late in the game to
have this conversation, but I am wondering if we should have
had, and maybe still should have, a big debate about whether to
refit a lot of our vehicles with things that look more like
some of the specialized mine-clearance vehicles, that are more
expensive, have--often have V-shaped hulls, different kinds of
suspension, are higher up off the ground. Now, a bigger IED can
always penetrate that, so there's always a countermeasure the
enemy can envision.
But, frankly, that's the one thing I'm still wondering, if,
in broad terms, we really never focused on enough in this
country. It would be very hard to build 10,000 of them fast,
but if you took a World War II-type approach, and you said,
``This is a national emergency, we're going to have to ask
every car manufacturer in the United States to do this for 6
months,'' you could do it. And we simply haven't considered
that. I'm not sure history will judge us very well. And I say
this as being critical of myself, too. I'm a defense specialist
at Brookings, and I wonder if I shouldn't have been thinking
about this more 3 and 4 years ago. It may be kind of late in
the game now, but I--maybe not.
Senator Casey. But, in particular, you're talking about up-
armoring vehicles, or retrofitting or redesigning?
Dr. O'Hanlon. New vehicles. Vehicles that are designed to
have V-shaped hulls, higher suspensions to be able to operate
more effectively on three wheels, even if one's blown out.
Basically, building much of our patrolling fleet around the
same vehicle concept that some specialized mine-clearance
vehicles currently employ in the U.S. military, but that most
of our fleet of Hummers and Bradleys and so forth does not.
Senator Casey. And in the interest of time--and I know
Senator Webb has presiding duties, and I want to be cognizant
of that--the last question is very broad, and it's been asked,
probably, in different ways throughout the morning, but it's
one that I think a lot of Americans are wondering about. We
hear a lot of things that talk about a political solution and
steps to get us in that direction, apart from the military
strategy and tactics on the ground, much of which we'll be
talking about tonight when the President presents his plan. But
just in terms of diplomacy, if you could focus on that with
your collective experience, I think it's good to work with
lists, if we can, if that's at all possible. I know it's very
difficult in this context. But if you had the opportunity to
construct a diplomatic strategy for the next 6 months, say,
what would be the three or four or five things you would do, in
terms of very specific steps that this Government should take
diplomatically--within the region especially, or beyond the
region? Any one of you can weigh in on that, in terms of a
specific list of steps.
Mr. Said. Well, I think there is a need to engage with
Iraq's neighbors, but also with the broader international
community, the permanent five from the Security Council.
Professor Marr suggested a contact group concept. That may be a
good first step. I still believe that we need to work toward a
process--a peace process that will involve some form of a
conference. But, preparations for that, engaging with each of
Iraq's neighbors, trying to address their concerns and their
interests in Iraq, and trying to see how they can contribute to
influencing the situation inside Iraq by working with their
constituencies in Iraq, by working with the groups, by
providing assurances for certain groups in Iraq about their
interests, and encouraging them to achieve compromises.
So, there is scope for active diplomacy in Iraq. And some
of that has taken place in the international compact with Iraq,
which the administration and the United Nations have been
engaged in over the last 6 months. And I had an opportunity to
work on that. That involved intensive diplomacy with the Gulf
States and with the international community, 22 countries or
more, to bring them in Iraq. And there is great interest to get
engaged. There is great interest in the international community
to get engaged in Iraq in a meaningful way so that there is no
hierarchy at levels and sort of a--category A countries and
category B. But really get engaged--China, Russia, the gulf.
And there--and this should be pursued.
Dr. Marr. I had a couple of thoughts at a practical level,
on our Embassy. We need skillful, behind-the-scenes, but
muscular, diplomacy. I like much of what Ambassador Khalilzad
did. And we're getting another very good Ambassador. But two
things are needed for our Embassy there: More Arabic speakers,
of every kind--it's difficult enough, in the security
situation, to get out, but the more we can interact with Iraqis
at every level, the better off we'll be; and more sustained
deployments, not of troops, but of AID people, whoever. The
turnover in personnel, because it's a hardship post, is
abysmal, in terms of intelligence, building linkages, networks,
and so on. That's what everyone complains about. You just get
into the job, you learn who's who, you establish the contacts,
and you're out, and somebody else comes in. So, those are two
practical things that I think would help our Embassy in
Baghdad.
Chairman Biden. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Casey. I'm out of time.
Chairman Biden. Senator Murkowski.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We hear a lot about suggestions that we, here in the United
States, might do or propose, and the President is going to
present his new proposal this evening. We'll listen very
attentively to that. But I think we all recognize that we can
only do so much from the outside, from the United States
perspective, or even from the international-community
perspective. And I appreciate the focus that you all have made
in saying we need to broaden the dialog, bring in more. But we
recognize that the Iraqis have to step up and do their part.
They've got to be the participant.
And, Mr. O'Hanlon, I listened very attentively this morning
as you kind of went down through your various measures, and I
have to admit that they were really very discouraging as you
listen to some of the terminology that you used, and that
others of you used, as well. You know, you used the term
``pessimism'' over and over. We heard of the ``hardening of the
people,'' the word ``fear'' and the ``apathy,'' just the
general environment being ``poor,'' all very negative and
really very discouraging words. We all know that you can't
really engage, you can't get your--the men behind you to engage
in the fight that you must take on if you don't believe. And
the question that I would pose to you, Mr. O'Hanlon, and to any
of the others is: Is there any good-news indicators that we're
seeing from the Iraqis that give us hope to believe that if we
should move forward with, as the President may propose, this
surge, that the Iraqi people feel a degree of optimism, at this
point, that they can be that full participant that we need and
expect them to be? Are there any good signs that you can
report?
Dr. O'Hanlon. Senator, I think you could find some, and we
used to try very hard to try to give them equal billing,
because I used to think that, whether they were 50 percent of
the reality of Iraq or not, they needed to be highlighted. But
they seem to be dwindling in number. But I can still tick off a
few for you.
Some of them are on our last category, of politics and
public opinion. Certainly, Iraqis have a lot more in the way of
communications, whether it's newspapers, TV, telephones,
Internet access. And they use these things, and they relish
them. There's also, from what I understand--I haven't spent as
much time in Iraq as some people on this committee, but there
is more bustle in some of the streets, or at least there has
been. And we can read about a traffic jam, and that's the
negative way to look at it; the upside is that a lot of people
have cars, and there is a sense of people still wanting to be
out and about, despite the risks. So, there is a certain energy
in Iraq that I think may be dwindling, but it's still there.
There are some indicators about public utility performance.
It's confusing to try to track GAO and USAID and figure out
exactly where Iraqi utilities stand today. Electricity is not
very good. Oil production is not very good. Water and sewage
performance, hard to read. I can't quite get confidence in the
data I'm seeing. Things are probably about at Saddam Hussein
levels, though. In other words, we've basically treaded water
for 4 years on that front. But there are some new facilities
coming online. Child vaccinations seem to be up, from what I
can tell. The number of trained judges in the Iraqi political
system, of course, much higher than it used to be.
So, yes, if you want to find things, you can find a number
of indicators that----
Senator Murkowski. We can find----
Dr. O'Hanlon [continuing]. Are possible.
Senator Murkowski [continuing]. Those, but do the Iraqi
people believe that more good is being delivered?
Dr. O'Hanlon. Not now.
Senator Murkowski. Now, Mr. Said, you're kind of shaking
your head no. Can you comment on that?
Mr. Said. Unfortunately, in terms of life of Iraqis on the
street, it's getting progressively worse. And even if you can
find numbers--for example, the numbers on the electricity don't
look so bad, but the reality of it is worse than the numbers.
Water--the Ministry of Water Resources have done a wonderful
job. It's one of the most efficient ministries in Iraq. But,
without electricity, you can't deliver water. So, even where
things are getting better, the overall situation is making it
worse.
However, if you are looking for a silver lining in the
situation, one of the elements is the recent agreement on an
oil management framework. Because that agreement shows that
there has been movement since the time when the Iraqis
negotiated a constitution as a zero-sum game, whereby weakening
the federal government--the strength of the region is only
achieved through weakening the central government. I think the
deal on oil shows that the Iraqis have moved on, have realized,
if you like, that, actually, it doesn't have to be a zero-sum
game, that strong federalism is based on a strong center and
strong regions.
So, there are elements of awakening, if you like, at least
among some Iraqi--Iraq's leaders and politicians, but, in terms
of reality on the ground, it's devastating.
Senator Murkowski. On the oil issue, have you looked at the
Alaska Permanent Fund model as a model to be utilized there,
where you would have a sharing of the revenues among the
people? And, in your opinion, do you think that that would help
with some of the sectarian strife that we're facing now?
Mr. Said. I think there have been proposals for a direct
distribution of oil revenues to the Iraqi citizens. Some people
in the Iraqi Government strongly support that. However, there
has been great opposition to it from the international
financial institutions.
Senator Murkowski. Great opposition, you say?
Mr. Said. Opposition to the direct distribution of
revenues. They fear that it may be inefficient use of
resources, that Iraq needs to invest all its oil revenues, and
so on. I, personally, disagree with that. I think direct
distribution is a good tool to unify Iraqis. I think there is a
lot speaking in favor of direct distribution of revenues to the
citizens, at least a portion--a small portion. Unfortunately,
it is now--it's not happening, simply because of strong
opposition by the IMF, in particular.
Senator Murkowski. Mr. O'Hanlon.
Dr. O'Hanlon. Senator, I think it's a good idea, also. And
I would envision, potentially, divvying up Iraq's oil into
three or four buckets, one of which would be the Alaska model,
direct distribution, one of which would be direct payments to
the provinces, based on population, a third bucket would be for
federal projects or for national-level institutions. But I
think, in responding to the international financial
institutions, the natural thing to do is to keep reducing Iraqi
subsidies, which we all know are still too high. The Bush
administration has had some success in convincing them to
reduce those for various consumer goods. Try to keep reducing
those, and then use the Alaska model, direct distribution
system, as compensation. So, that's a way to avoid, you know,
siphoning off money from investment, and I think it would also
improve the consumer market for many of these goods, which is
being distorted by subsidies right now.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Biden. Thank you very much.
At the risk of generating a revolt here, the most junior
member of the committee is to preside at 1 o'clock. I'll leave
it up to his more senior colleagues to wonder whether you let
him go for 8 minutes, which means it's going to put you all
behind. I will have pushed you back a good 20 minutes.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, I don't mind. Be happy to defer.
At 1 o'clock, I turn into a pumpkin, as well, in handling a
meeting. So, if we can go--let the Senator from Virginia go
ahead, and just let me get in a couple of questions before 1
o'clock.
Chairman Biden. We will try to do that. We've got 15
minutes. If you do less than 8, you'll make more friends, Jim.
[Laughter.]
Senator Webb. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I realize
that I've now incurred a sequence of obligations all the way
down this bench here. And the unfortunate part of that is, as
the junior member, there's not many ways I can repay that----
[Laughter.]
Senator Webb [continuing]. Other than agreeing to preside
on the Senate floor for some of these people, which I won't do.
[Laughter.]
Senator Webb. But I want to thank the witnesses for their
testimony. I thought there were some really fascinating
information for me to be able to put into the thought process
here. I think, as most of you know, I was an early-warning
voice against going into Iraq in this way. I thought that
strategically it was going to harm the country. And I was very
interested to see that there seems to be pretty strong
agreement here that the--for the long-term benefit of Iraq and
the region, the solution here really should be moving from the
outside in, rather than from the inside out. And what I mean by
that is, we do need a regional diplomatic umbrella before we
can, in my view, guarantee the long-term security and stability
of Iraq.
And I know that, Dr. Marr, in your testimony, you mentioned
the notion that there's going to be a high degree of
decentralization for quite a period of time. And Dr. Pillar
mentioned, several places, the specter of direct intervention.
And, you know, Dr. Said, you mentioned the Lebanon model,
which--I was a journalist in Lebanon in 1983, when the Marines
were there. You--there were a number of parallels, other than
simply the idea that people are going to fight it out over a
period of years. Just the notion they had a very weak central
government that was unable to get on its feet. You had all
these different militia elements in constant turmoil. There was
a great deal of middle-class flight, and, you know, people with
high degrees of skills leaving the country. And we're seeing,
in many ways, some of those parallels.
And it occurs to me that, with respect to the players in
this region, that it would be much better to have a United
States-led sponsorship, in a way, that would bring these
players to the table in a constructive way, rather than having
them come in more as a consequence of disarray as things move
forward. I would like your thoughts on that.
Dr. Marr. Let me just say that among people I talk to that
know the region, this opinion is almost unanimous--there is
widespread believe that we need to engage the neighbors, and,
to an extent, the international community, in a variety of
ways. And I would just like to go back to the Iraq Study Group,
because it was interesting that we had a very wide variety of
opinions--on the right, left, middle--and there really was very
widespread agreement that this must be a component,
particularly if Iraq is not going to be successfully stabilized
soon. I keep coming back to at least minimizing the damage to
the neighbors and getting the neighbors to help to put either
pressure or provide incentives to their clients inside. We need
to do that.
Dr. O'Hanlon. Senator, I think it's probably a good idea,
although I'm skeptical of Iran's willingness to participate in
a constructive way. But I think, even under those
circumstances, it's still worth doing. As I've tried to argue,
it's because, in part, you can tell the Iranians, ``Listen,
there's not going to be any great outcome for you here, in
terms of driving us out of the region.'' If you're in a
conference where Saudis and Turks are sitting down with the
United States, we'll have our allies there, too, and it'll be
easier, I think, to convince the Iranians, something which they
need to recognize, which I'm not sure they have, so far,
which--they cannot drive us out of the region the way Britain
left in the early 1970s, for example. Regardless of the
outcome, and regardless of who's elected President in the
United States in 2 years, we are almost certainly going to stay
committed to our traditional allies. And I hope that awareness
could sober Iran a bit about what it's trying to do inside
Iraq. So, even if you take a very, sort of, dire interpretation
of Iran's motives, I think it's still worth talking.
Dr. Pillar. Senator, I agree with your observation
entirely. And just to comment on Mike's comment, Iran's motives
are shaped, in large part, by the United States posture toward
Iran. And insofar as regime change is the main element of--or
is perceived to be the main element of--that posture then the
other side doesn't have much incentive to cooperate. So, that's
a set of incentives that is very much in our power to
manipulate.
Mr. Said. I think, without taking the Lebanon analogy too
far, because, of course, there are also differences there, I
think what is also instructive from Lebanon is the Taif
accords, the peace deal that brought peace to Lebanon. It was
sponsored by Saudi Arabia, and it involved an element of
implementation by Saudi Arabia, as well. And I think there
are--there are instructive elements there that could be
extended to Iraq, whereby a regional process where----
Senator Webb. Yes.
Mr. Said [continuing]. Can not only bring the solution and
the settlement, but also the resources to implement it.
Senator Webb. I have 2\1/2\ minutes left. I have one other
question, and it--it's, sort of, inspired by the chairman's
question earlier about: Do you ever--do you think you would
ever see national police operating on the streets of Fallujah?
Do any of you believe there will ever be true stability in Iraq
if there are American combat troops on the streets of Iraq's
cities? Or while there are?
Mr. Said. No.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Biden. Thank you.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. In deference to my--the Senator from
Florida who has to leave at 1 o'clock also, I'm certainly
willing to let him ask a couple of questions before 1 o'clock.
Chairman Biden. I told you this is the most collegial
committee in the Senate here. Thank you very much. It's kind of
you.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you.
Senator Isakson. As long as he doesn't run over.
[Laughter.]
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, rather than make a speech, I'm
just going to ask questions. How's that?
Senator Isakson. Good.
Senator Bill Nelson. When does the pain of sectarian strife
become sufficient that it finally causes the Sunnis and the
Shiites to start getting serious about reconciliation?
Mr. Said. The pain is already quite serious. The question
is--and if it was just Sunnis and Shiites fighting, there may--
we may have reached that threshold. But what's happening in
Iraq, as has been suggested by others as well, is
fragmentation. This is becoming, gradually, a war of everyone
against everyone. There are criminals on the streets. There are
myriad Shia militias fighting among each other as much as they
are fighting against the Sunnis. There are death squads of
undescribable origin and of undescribable violence. This has
become such a pervasive exercise in violence that there is no
pain threshold that can stop it. This--there are no coherent
sides directing the violence anymore. They are fragmented.
There are warlords acting at the behest of the highest bidders.
There are commercial interests and foreign interventions. Iraq
has passed the point, if you like, where it can pull itself by
its bootstraps. There is a need for an external intervention to
bring peace to Iraq.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right, now, that answer is
particularly appropriate to Baghdad, would you not say? Let's
go outside, to the west of Baghdad, to Al Anbar. I thought that
the Marine commanders made a compelling case to me there, that
additional troops would help them, as they are beginning to get
the Sunni leaders to help them with al-Qaeda, which is the
problem in western Iraq, in Al Anbar. Give me--differentiate
between Al Anbar and Baghdad.
Mr. Said. There are clearly differences, but they could go,
also, the other way around. One of the major sources of the--
the major source of violence in Anbar is the fight between the
Iraqis and Americans. So----
Senator Bill Nelson. Pull that mike----
Mr. Said [continuing]. One can easily----
Senator Bill Nelson [continuing]. To you closer.
Mr. Said. Huh?
Senator Bill Nelson. Pull the mike closer.
Mr. Said. I'm sorry. I'm saying, the main component of
violence in Anbar is the fight--is the violence between the
Iraqis and Americans. So, one can just as well say that a
solution in Anbar can come through withdrawing U.S. forces
rather than increasing them. But, regardless of that, even in
Anbar there is intra-Iraqi violence. It's not Shia versus
Sunni, it's Sunni versus Sunni. And, indeed, the tribal feuds
in Anbar province--old tribal feuds on--over commercial
interests and smuggling routes, have spilled out into this new
coalition of Anbar tribes purporting to fight al-Qaeda. In
reality, there is an--inside that determination, there are old
tribal rivalries that are being used. And, in a way, the United
States is being used by one tribe to bolster its bid against
the other. So, it's never a simple--a black-and-white
situation. But----
Senator Bill Nelson. Right. All right, you----
Mr. Said [continuing]. You are right that, in mixed areas,
that's--the situation is different.
Senator Bill Nelson. With the example you just gave in Al
Anbar, could the Saudis, with their tribal influence, help in
settling down the tribal strife, and, therefore, help with the
stabilization of that western part of Iraq?
Mr. Said. Tremendously. I think the one party if--everyone
speaks about bringing Iran to the table, and Syria--I think one
party that could contribute a lot more significantly than those
two to a political settlement in Iraq is Saudi Arabia. And it's
not being engaged properly.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right. Let's----
Dr. Marr. If I could----
Senator Bill Nelson. Yes, Dr. Marr.
Dr. Marr [continuing]. Just remind people how complex it
is, there are tribes and tribes. And I've talked to people in
Saudi Arabia who don't have any love for the Dulaymis, who are
in Anbar. But I do agree the Saudis have a very vested interest
in the stability of the Sunni region, so that this instability
doesn't spill across the border. And something beside building
a fence should be done.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, Mr. Chairman, I haven't given
you my report, but that's one of the reasons I went and spent
12 days in the region. And I spoke, specifically at the request
of General Hayden, to the Saudis--the King, all of the security
apparatus in Saudi Arabia, and so forth. So, I would ask: How
do you encourage Saudi Arabia properly to get involved?
Mr. Said. I'm sorry. One reason why the Saudis are not
being engaged sufficiently in Iraq is that--is the resistance
on behalf of Iraqi--some of the Iraqi leaders, winners of the
political process, to engage them. Because clearly a Saudi
engagement will bolster the position of some of the opposition
groups, vis-a-vis some of those who are in power; and,
therefore, Saudi engagements needs to be a part of a regional
approach, and it needs to be part of an internationally
mediated settlement for Iraq that goes beyond, if you like, the
pain threshold of the Iraqi Government. I mean, we cannot--this
will not happen if everything happens exactly as to the wishes
of the Iraqi Government. The Iraqi Government needs to be
pressured into accepting Saudi engagement, as well as some of
the other groups need to be pressured into accepting Iranian
engagement.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right. Final question, Senator
Isakson. As I said, I'm not making a speech, I'm asking
questions.
A final question. Bashar Assad says that he has an alliance
with Iran, vis-a-vis Iraq. You all have already testified on
his reasons not to do that. How do we--how do we crack that
door? How do we start to bring him to us instead of to Iran?
Dr. Pillar. I think two main things. One, bear in mind that
his principal objective is still to get what his father
couldn't get, which was return of the Golan, as, obviously,
part of a larger peace process with Israel. And the last time
the Syrian track was active, they came this close to an
agreement. And the second thing is, there are economic ties
that have developed over the years between Iran and Syria, and
there's going to have to be some kind of consideration for how
economic ties with the United States could take part of the
place of that, if they lost any of it.
So, economic issues and Arab-Israeli peace-process issues.
Mr. Said. If I might add, again, I mean, the--there has
been a very strong and constructive, in the region, Syrian-
Saudi alliance that has broken down over the last 10 years. And
that's something that could also be--especially in terms of
economic aid--if Saudi Arabia could replace Syria's dependence
on Iran, one could see a different behavior.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Chairman, a procedural question, if I
may?
Chairman Biden. Sure.
Senator Menendez. I won't be, unfortunately, able to stay
after Senator Isakson. I have an interview I've got to do. What
is the procedure here on questions for the committee?
Chairman Biden. Yes; we'll submit----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Some course of events----
Chairman Biden [continuing]. Them through the Chair to the
witnesses.
And I apologize to my colleague from New Jersey for the way
this has been disjointed a bit here.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
All of you have said, in one way or another, that
reconciliation is absolutely essential to long-range stability
of Iraq. I have read that part of the administration's case may
be--for a surge of troops in Baghdad--may be that you can't
have reconciliation until you first have stability within
Baghdad, relative peace. The question is: If the multifaceted
violence--more than just the sectarian violence, but what you,
Mr. Said, have referred to--if, in fact, a surge does produce a
more peaceful Iraq, without having played a favorite within the
many facets, and was evenhandedly done, can that contribute to
bringing about the reconciliation we're talking about? Or is
the fact that we're going to have soldiers there, present--as
the answer to Mr. Webb's question--make it impossible?
Mr. Said. I think any additional U.S. soldier brings with
him the--or with her--the complexity of the issue. Again, it's
one more occupation soldier, in the eyes of many Iraqis, as
well as a protector for some communities, in the case of the
sectarian violence. So, the--you're asking if the presence of
the troops will produce stability, and I think what we've heard
from me and from the others is that there is skepticism that
the proposed surge will produce the stability and the
protection that the people will get. But to answer your
question directly, yes; if they succeed, if the additional
troops do succeed in protecting more Iraqis and reducing the
threshold of fear, the level of fear that they experience
today, then, of course, that will be--that will contribute to
political settlement.
Dr. Marr. I would just----
Senator Isakson. Yes.
Dr. Marr. I would just like to add, here, that I see the
situation in the Iraqi Government, within the Green Zone, as
one centered on political parties and factions and groups, with
their militias, particularly an alliance between the two
Kurdish parties and SCIRI. Of course, Muqtada al-Sadr is
playing a role. These are political parties with leaders who
have been shaped by certain perceptions. They're new, they're
not entirely stable. And this is the dynamic you have to look
at. They're being asked to make compromises with ex-Baathists,
people--insurgents and people who have perhaps wreaked a great
deal of terror in Baghdad, and who have a history of wanting to
get back in. So, I--put it in a political context here,
because, in fact, it's not just a question of stabilizing
Baghdad. They might use us for that purpose, because, indeed,
that's what they'd like. Better we do it than that they do it.
Even if we stabilize Baghdad, if that should occur, we're going
to have to find ways to get these particular parties, groups,
leaders, operating within this dynamic, to make the compromises
necessary, and to expand the political group. That's the task
that's at hand, and we can think of a variety of ways in which
you can do that. Hopefully, it will work, but it really
requires a strategy, nudging, and instruments, positive and
negative, to get that to occur.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Dr. Marr.
Dr. O'Hanlon, I want to ask you a question, and you can add
on what you were going to say. Sixteen years ago, my son wrote
a master's graduate thesis at the University of Georgia--which
as a father I read--which just occurred to me in your
testimony, it was about the effects of the Dutch disease on the
Middle East. And the Dutch disease, as I remember it from that
master's thesis, is when you have a nation with a singular
source of wealth, which is a raw material--in this case, oil--
that never develops its infrastructure or its economy or its
people, then it--they are rife for problems. Then it went into
investigating each one of these.
The President's recommendation, we are told, is going to
have a $1 billion economic--for lack of a better word, a WPA
program for, I presume, mostly in Baghdad. Does that help,
given this Dutch disease, which Iraq obviously suffers from--
does that--assuming, again, the stability, which is step one--
does that help to bring--to contribute to reconciliation, if,
in fact, they begin being employed in the--there begins some
semblance of a diversified economy?
Dr. O'Hanlon. Senator, I'm a supporter of a job-creation
program, not necessarily because I expect it to contribute to a
stronger Iraqi economy, in the long term, but because I think
it's a good security strategy, in the short to middle term--
takes some of the unemployed angry young men off the street, or
at least gives us some hope that some fraction of them will be
less likely to oppose what we're doing and oppose the Iraqi
Government. So, on those more specific security grounds, I
would support it.
On your earlier question, if I might add on----
Senator Isakson. Please.
Dr. O'Hanlon [continuing]. I think it's fine to imagine,
you know, a surge beginning before a reconciliation, as long as
there's a sense of urgency about the latter. Because I think--
my own sense, this is just guesstimating, of course--but the
best you could hope for out of a surge is to get violence back
to where it was, maybe, in 2004, or, if you're really lucky,
the more difficult parts of 2003. A surge is not going to end
Iraq's problems, it's not going to stabilize Baghdad. That
would be too ambitious of a goal, and it's just not realistic.
So, the most we can hope is that it arrests the deterioration,
maybe stops some of the worst ethnic cleansing, and gets things
back to where they were a couple of years ago. That's obviously
not good enough. That's not a stable endpoint. So, the only way
that could be useful is if there very quickly follows on--
hopefully at the same time, but certainly very quickly
thereafter--a broader political and economic strategy, as well.
Senator Isakson. Yes.
Mr. Said. I think it's a very important question you raise
about Dutch disease. And, indeed, none of the economic policies
promoted by the United States in Iraq under the direct
administration, nor now under the Iraqi Government, are mindful
of that. Indeed, Iraq's dependence, singular dependence, on oil
has increased over the past 4 years. Last year's budget, 94
percent of government revenues came from oil. That's
unprecedented. There is no country in the world that has such
degree of dependence on oil. But, unfortunately, at this point,
it seems that Dutch disease--worrying about Dutch disease is a
luxury that the Iraqi Government cannot afford. And, as Mr.
O'Hanlon suggested, an immediate job-creation program, although
it is clear that it will not offer any long-term economic
benefits, will at least reduce the violence, which is the main
concern.
Senator Isakson. Dr. Pillar, I--first of all, thank you for
your service to the country. You're a retired veteran, served
in Vietnam--I was reading your resume--and, I think, wrote a
book that's title was, in part, ``Negotiating Peace and
Terrorism in U.S. Foreign Policy.'' And when you made your
statement, it was enlightening to me, when you said--talked
about ``jihad depended on struggle,'' and talked about ``the
terrorist networking, given the struggle in Iraq,'' assuming,
for a second--knowing what happened on 9/11, and knowing what
al-Qaeda's stated purposes are, and assuming stability came to
Iraq and we were gone, what would al-Qaeda do to--would it
create more struggles to keep feeding itself?
Dr. Pillar. It would create more struggles. It would lose a
big propaganda point and recruitment tool and networking
opportunity and training ground, which, again, are the things
that parallel what we saw in Afghanistan. It would not be
critical, one way or another, in the survival of al-Qaeda. And
most of what al-Qaeda will continue to try to do would not
depend even on a safe haven, as was once the case in
Afghanistan. One can talk about Iraq, but more important will
be things terrorists do in places like Hamburg and Kuala Lumpur
and flight-training schools in the United States, which is one
of the lessons of 9/11: You don't need a territory. They can do
their dirty business other ways.
Senator Isakson. And I guess my answer to that would be,
they thrive off the continued conflict in Iraq, they have no
interest in reconciliation, or peace, for that matter.
Dr. Pillar. Absolutely. They thrive off of continued
conflict in Iraq, yes.
Senator Isakson. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Said. If I may add, here, also, al-Qaeda is not
necessarily interested in gaining power in Iraq.
Senator Isakson. I know.
Mr. Said. Al-Qaeda is more interested in keeping it as it
is, and keeping the United States in Iraq, where there could be
major confrontation.
Dr. Pillar. Exactly. I agree, completely.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Biden. Senator Cardin, you take what time you
need. [Laughter.]
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it
very much. And I can't tell you how much--how important I think
these hearings are, and the witnesses that we have here,
building upon the opinion that the United States needs to lead
with diplomacy and bringing in the international community if
we're going to be able to complete a mission in our interest in
Iraq.
I want to follow up specifically on one part that is likely
to be in the President's policy, and that is the public works
initiative, significant United States-initiated economic-
development public works in Iraq. And I want to know what your
views are as to the capacity of Iraq to be able to deal with
that type of initiative. All of you are saying that the United
States is viewed as an occupation force, the President's
message tonight is certainly going to get mixed reviews among
the parties in Iraq. It's--it makes more visible, United States
presence in Iraq. There are concerns about security issues
among any public works projects. And I just would like to
know--we've had problems in Congress making sure the money is
used appropriately that we appropriate. And we know that it has
not been the case. So, I guess I have a concern that, yes, we
want to be responsible in building Iraq, the economics and
providing opportunity for the people of Iraq, but--well, what
are your views as to how well that will be used in Iraq, or
what suggestions you might have as to what we should be doing
to make sure that money is properly used in Iraq, understanding
that the package that the President's likely to be submitting
to us is coupled with an escalation of United States presence
in Iraq that certainly will cause some additional problems for
us in that region?
Dr. O'Hanlon. Senator, that's a great question. I certainly
think you're right to raise all these concerns, but I still
strongly support the job-creation program, because, again,
unemployment has been such a nagging issue in Iraq, and it
creates more angry unemployed young men who join the Mahdi
Militia, for example, or who join the Sunni-based insurgency.
So, I think it makes sense. But to focus in on one of your
operational questions: How do we provide oversight? What are
the most important things for us to watch? In the spirit of
what I was saying before, and that my colleague, Mr. Said, was
saying also, I think it's, in a way, almost less important what
the Iraqis do on their jobs, and more important that we make
sure the right people get the money. In other words, you don't
want to have this become a slush fund that some jihadist gets
in charge of or some militia member gets in charge of, and then
turns it into a patronage system to reward militia members. You
have to make sure that you are being very careful about the
disbursement of the funds. I don't, frankly, care if they
whitewash the same fence 10 times in a row, as long as it's 10
people who are relatively good-natured and well-intentioned and
are not using that money to funnel to a lot of al-Qaeda or
insurgent or militia operatives.
So, figuring out the mechanism to pay people, I think, is
the single most important thing, and my guess is the right
answer is to build on the military commander's emergency
response program, because our troops in the field are the ones
who are out there in the large numbers who are going to have
the ability to do more vetting and more careful distribution.
They have to be involved, at some level. You can't just rely on
these Provincial Support Teams, Provincial Reconstruction
Teams, that have a couple of dozen people in each province,
because they're going to have to give the money in bucketloads
to Iraqis who, in some cases, may or may not be fully
dependable. That would be my only advice.
Dr. Marr. I'd just like to make three points on this. I
would hope that this money is going to be rapidly funneled to
Iraqis. The whole idea that Americans are going to be there
doing the public works is just, it seems to me, a nonstarter.
Iraqis traditionally are schizophrenic on foreign powers
and occupation, and we perhaps put a tad too much concern on
antiforeign, antioccupation sentiment. Of course that's going
to be there, but Iraqis do need the outside help. And yet, even
when they get it, they're going to rebel against it.
I think there is an issue here, not so much on the public
works and the emergency funds, because the money needs to be
spread for employment, I agree. But in terms of really
developing the economy, getting the electricity going, and so
forth, Iraq used to have a very good technocratic class,
engineers and others, but, as everybody has pointed out,
they're really losing it, not just at the top level, the
engineer, but the technocrats who actually do the work. I
recall a conversation in Basrah, last time I was there, about
some technician who was dealing with something as simple as
filters of some kind on oil installations; and just getting
people to understand that they had to change that filter--it
had to be absolutely clean every day--he said, was very really
a problem. So, this is something we do need to be concerned
about, whether the money is going to be used properly.
And we haven't talked too much about it, but corruption is
a huge problem. Mike probably knows the figures on how much of
the Iraqi oil revenue, the economy, and so on, is siphoned off
to individuals, and doesn't feed into the formal economy or the
government. So, some kind of balance has to be found, in terms
of oversight of the funds, that they're going not just to
insurgents, that goes without saying, but corrupt politicians
and others--there will always be a certain amount of
corruption--versus getting that money and the jobs into the
bloodstream. I think there's always a balance to be achieved
here. But that corruption issue is a real problem.
Senator Cardin. I agree with you. And there's certainly a
desire to get Iraqis employed. And I can appreciate your
pointing that out. But I think, at the end of the day, we want
the water supply to be available to the Iraqis. We wanted this
to be constructive and helping the economy of the country to
lead toward stability of the country. And without the experts
that they need, because they have left, without having the
trained workforce, there's going to be a lot of foreign
interest in helping in Iraq, and, unfortunately, some of that's
not going to be well received, it seems to me.
Mr. Said. I think there are two problems with the job-
creation program that is being proposed. First of all, the
Iraqi Government, last year--this past year--have failed to
spend a lot of the money that it has allocated through the
budget for investment. There is a serious shortage of capacity
to spend, in the Iraqi Government, to--especially for
investment projects. So, to add additional resources, if the
Iraqi Government hasn't been able to spend, is a bit
problematic.
So far, such initiatives have been guided by short-term
interests, particularly addressing the security situation, and
has not fed into a long-term or medium-term strategy. Now,
there is--the Iraqi Government has developed several
strategies--a national development strategy on, currently, the
compact--but there has been--there seems to be continued--
continuing disconnect between the interventions, the aid money
that is being given, and the Iraqi medium-term strategy. So,
it's very important for this particular package to flow through
an Iraqi-owned and -designed planning strategy that looks in
the--to the medium term and is not ad hoc and short term.
Senator Cardin. Well, let me thank, again, the witnesses,
and thank your patience, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Biden. Well, thank you for your patience.
Senator Lugar, do you have anything you want to----
Senator Lugar. Just one followup on Senator Cardin's
question. We've been discussing--and he illuminated this, as
you have--that it would be desirable for this to flow through
somebody in Iraq. But you've all testified the bureaucracy is
decimated, the professionals that were left have gone
somewhere, and there is a protection problem even for those
Iraqis who might be doing these works, quite apart from
Americans or somebody. Physically, how can the billion dollars
be spent? You've said that the Iraqis couldn't allocate maybe a
quarter of their own budget this year, quite apart from $1
billion that comes in from us. I'm just trying to trace,
physically, what happens, in terms of expectations and results.
Mr. Said. This is quite a challenge. I mean, you are
pointing out a serious challenge that the administration will
face in spending these resources. I think the trick is--here is
to help spend at least some of these resources to build Iraqi
capacity to spend, Iraqi capacity to manage and execute
projects, which has been decimated over the last 3 or 4 years.
Senator Lugar. Build the capacity to get those resources to
people.
Mr. Said. Another element of it is to use the emergency
response fund framework that the commanders use, the military
commanders on the ground, with small sums of money, to produce
the kind of relief. But this is not a framework within which
you spend billions of dollars; these are much more small-
scale--however, quite effective in generating short-term
employment.
Dr. Marr. Just one point. I'd like to bring up my favorite
subject, and that's exchanges--education, students, training
people, getting Iraqis out; it doesn't even have to be to the
United States--and working on the visa problem here, to get
them in. I'm hearing all kinds of complaints, still, about
Iraqis not being able to come over, study, and so on. But one
way to help build the capacity is to get Iraqis out, get them
in training, and that helps some of the security problems, as
well.
Senator Lugar. You mean develop a major scholarship program
for 10,000 Iraqis, something of this sort, with a significant
public-relations aspect, and maybe some leadership.
Dr. Marr. Not enough is being--not enough is being done
there, I think.
Chairman Biden. Senator Menendez----
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Biden [continuing]. Welcome back.
Senator Menendez. I'm glad to have been recognized. I
didn't think it was going to be that short, but I appreciate
it. And I appreciate the panelists for their testimony and
their staying power for all this time. And I wanted to get
back, and having sat here all morning I hope that the questions
that I want to pose to you are not repetitive. I stayed here
through the morning, so, maybe on some of the questions and
answers, you may have answered some of this. So, I hope it's
not repetitive, in case I didn't catch it.
As I both read your testimonies and listened to your
testimony here today, and your answers to questions I have a
real concern. I didn't vote for the war in the first place, so
I come from a certain point of view. But, of course, I want us
to succeed. And it seems to me that everything I heard you
collectively say is that this is about, at the end of the day,
a political solution, and that we cannot necessarily accomplish
a military solution.
I hear and read, for example, Dr. Marr, in your testimony,
toward the end, you say, ``Only when the participants in the
struggle for power recognize that they are losing more than
they can gain by continuing will it come to an end. And that
may be''--your sentence goes on, ``that may be a very long
time.'' When I listen to Mr. Said say that, in fact, ``a good
part of the violence is one about power and money'' and when I
hear Dr. Pillar say, which I agree with totally, that ``Iran is
the big winner, at the end of the day''--all of those comments,
and others, in my mind, speak volumes as to why an escalation
is not the solution to our problem. As a matter of fact, from
what I've seen of those who are military experts, including
several of our generals, say is that to have a real ability to
have some military effort--as I think Mr. Said mentioned--is
about half a million troops, over three times the number of
troops that exist in the United States now. And there is no
way, both military, I think, from the U.S. perspective, in
terms of the ability to do that, as well as the support, for
that possibly to happen.
So, having said all of that, the question is: How is it--
and you've all talked, at different points, about the political
process, the regional players but what would you be saying
tomorrow if the Secretary of State comes before the committee?
What would you be saying to her if you were advising her, and
to the President, about what the steps are that we need to take
to get that political process, both internally by Iraqis and as
General Pace said, ``to love their children more than they hate
their neighbors''? That can't be accomplished through military
might, to love their children more than they hate their
neighbors. The question is: How do we have a surge, an
escalation, in a political process that gives us the ultimate
success that we want? What would be the steps that you would be
suggesting in order to accomplish that?
Dr. Marr. Well, I'd kind of like to go back to the Iraq
Study report again, because I think they really did address
this, aside from the surge. And, incidently, I'm not so
pessimistic that I think there are going to be no agreements
between Iraqis for a very long time. We've pointed out to one
area where this long process seems to be beginning, and that's
the oil legislation. There have been some compromises, mainly
from the Kurds, who recognize that they want to get on with
this. I think you have to take a strong stand behind the scenes
and indicate that there's both a carrot and a stick, as the
Iraqi Study Group report said. We're willing to continue aid
and help--not necessarily money, but training, assistance,
support, and so on--if certain milestone steps are taken--
something on the de-Baathification, compromise on the oil law,
and----
Senator Menendez. But this is now--you're saying the United
States saying to----
Dr. Marr. United States talking turkey----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Proactively.
Dr. Marr. Yes; to these----
Senator Menendez. And as part of that----
Dr. Marr. But also negative. If----
Senator Menendez. Uh-huh.
Dr. Marr [continuing]. These things are----
Senator Menendez. That's what I want to----
Dr. Marr [continuing]. Not accomplished--and our patience
isn't exhaustive, as Michael has said--then we're going to
withdraw this support, including military support.
Senator Menendez. Well, I'm glad you said that, because my
followup to the question, and I'd like to hear from others, is:
Isn't it true that benchmarks without timetables or at least
consequences, are only aspirations, as part of that process?
What would your suggestions be?
Mr. Said. I think benchmarks are useful, even without
consequences, because they set goals, they set parameters
according----
Senator Menendez. But we've had those benchmarks, and many
of them have not been met, and----
Mr. Said. Definitely.
Senator Menendez [continuing]. And now we have them as
another excuse for an escalation of troops.
Mr. Said. Definitely. I mean, there is definitely a need
to--for the U.S. Government to take a more assertive role, vis-
a-vis its own allies in Iraq. There is a need to take a more
serious look at----
Senator Menendez. How do we get other regional players to
be involved in a proactive way?
Mr. Said. Beyond that, I thought--I think it's very
important to say that this is not something the United States
alone can make. I think internationalizing Iraq is a very
critical element. To give you just one example, the League of
Arab States and the United Nations have been trying, over the
last 3 years, to build, if you like, the Iraqi delegation to a
peace conference, trying to canvas Iraqi political class and
political elites to identify people who could sit together and
negotiate a peace settlement. This is a role that the United
States cannot play. This is a role that could--that only
trusted international multilateral actors can do. And I think
the United States should encourage such efforts, be it through
the United Nations, through the international compact, or
through the Arab League, to broaden the negotiating table and
bring additional Iraqis to the table, and regional players, to
start working on a settlement and on a political framework.
Senator Menendez. Dr. Pillar, you may have responded to
this previously, but in the twin exercise that the Iranians and
the Syrians have right now, where, in one part they are
enjoying us being bogged down, shedding our blood and national
treasure, and on the other part, they have an interest in the
stability of Iraq, where is the tipping point? Where do we get
them to move in the direction that is more positive than the
negativity they are playing right now?
Dr. Pillar. Well, Senator, we did address, somewhat earlier
in the proceedings, some of the ways of manipulating the
incentives. On the Syrian side, it has to do with their
objectives regarding the peace process, getting the Golan back.
With regard to the Iranian side, Tehran is interested in a
whole host of things--not just the nuclear issue that gets all
the attention, but a whole host of things that involve the
United States, having to do with everything from frozen assets
to developing a normal relationship, and a vague thing that the
Iranians would refer to as ``respect,'' which is kind of hard
to operationalize, but it is important to them.
I think Phebe, I'd go back to the Iraq Study Group as a
reference point to this, because I think their treatment of the
external dimension is excellent. And I would summarize our
earlier discussions in this room and what the ISG says by
saying the diplomatic approach needs to be inclusive with
regard to with whom we are speaking, it needs to be flexible
with regard to the forums and formats--it's not just one big
conference, it's bilateral contacts, it's track-two-type stuff,
it's the indirect incentives that could affect the thinking in
places like Tehran, and it has to be sensitive to what's on the
agenda of those countries. I just mentioned some things of
interest to Iran, for example. We can't just limit it to, ``We
want to talk about stopping your troublemaking in Iraq.'' You
know, if that's our agenda, it's going to go nowhere. It has to
be broader.
Mr. Said. If I may add another element here, which is
violence inside Iran and Syria, Iraq has been--there has been
an element of contagion taking place through Iraq, and there
has been a spike in sectarian violence and ethnic violence in
Iran, both with the Arab minority and the Kurdish minority. And
there have been issues with the Kurdish minority in Syria. And
this could become more serious as Iraq implodes. So, there is a
threshold of pain, if you like, there, as well, that will
encourage them to engage more.
Dr. Pillar. With the Kurds, there were fatal riots in
Syria, I believe in 2004, and similar ones in Iran in 2005, so
they've actually had bloodshed inside their territories over
these issues.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Biden. Folks, the end is in sight. You've been a
wonderful panel.
Let me address, from a slightly different perspective,
several points you've raised.
I believe--it doesn't make me correct, it just made me a
pariah for a while--I believe I was the first one to suggest,
in an op-ed piece over a year ago--that there be an
international conference, and a contact group to follow up on
that conference. It was pointed out, as one of the criticisms,
which is legitimate, in one sense, that if you expand the
participation, not only externally, but internally, within
Iraq, which you're suggesting, you are, by definition,
undercutting the government. There is a ``freely elected
government in Iraq.'' There is a Constitution that the Iraqi
people have overwhelming voted for. ``I was there when the vote
took place,'' the argument goes. Therefore, for the United
States to do anything that goes beyond the governmental
entities that exist now within Iraq, and to do anything without
their permission relative to external forces, is to, in effect,
negate the commitment we made to their Constitution and to the
unity government. How do you respond to that?
Dr. Pillar.
Dr. Pillar. Well, I guess it all has to be portrayed as
help. And when you talk about the regional actors--for example,
Mr. Said made the point about the Arab League's efforts to try
to help the Iraqis do all the functions that a sovereign state
would do--and so, if help can be phrased in those terms, it
doesn't necessarily have to be represented as inconsistent with
Iraqi sovereignty.
Chairman Biden. But if, in fact, the existing Maliki
government says, ``We don't want X, Y, or Z participating in
this conference, internally--they are not elected, they're not
part of the government, they do not hold a ministry,'' et
cetera--then what do we say?
Mr. Said. I mean, a peace process--I'm sorry, a peace
process, by definition, detracts from sovereignty. There is----
Chairman Biden. Detracts from sovereignty?
Mr. Said. Detracts from sovereignty. There is no peace
process anywhere in the world that recognizes 100 percent of
the sovereignty of one of the parties involved. If there is a
need for a peace process, this means there is a problem; and,
therefore, we have to--it's a last--it's a last--it's a last
resort.
Governance, sovereignty, the right, is not a carte blanche,
it's not an open check. If the government is not delivering, in
terms of providing for peace, in terms of providing a peaceful
conflict resolution mechanism, then it loses the right to some
of its sovereignty.
Chairman Biden. Well, that is a new international concept.
I happen to agree with it, but that is a new concept, in terms
of what we'd constitute as the sacredness of sovereignty. I
happen to agree with you, but I just want to make sure we
understand. We mix terms a lot. We--not you--we interchange
terms a great deal. As you all pointed out, it's very complex
in Iraq. There's an insurgency and there's sectarian violence
and there's insurgency and violence within the insurgency and
so on. I would describe the situation in Iraq as almost a
disintegration rather than a civil war, quite frankly.
But, having said that, I think, in order to help us in this
process, think through this process--and one of the things the
chairman and I have, I think, been pretty much in lockstep on
is trying to figure out these practical big-ticket items.
For example, employment. I have made many trips to Iraq, in
relative terms. Two trips ago, I met with General Chiarelli,
the No. 2 guy, who is now leaving.
He said, ``Senator, if I--you ever hear me criticize the--
raise the word `bureaucrat' again, smack me.'' He said, ``There
is no bureaucracy to deal with here in Iraq. We desperately
need one.''
And he gave me the following example. He said, ``You know,
the date palm, the national fruit, national tree, it's a symbol
of Iraq''--he went back through the history of it.
He said--and I'm embarrassed that I don't remember the
varmint that can decimate it, but it's something the equivalent
of the boll weevil to cotton--``you have to spray these every 5
years.''
And, he said, ``If you don't, within that timeframe, you
run the risk of this disease consuming this national treasure,
and also a previous source of income.''
And he said, ``So, I went to the Embassy and said, `You
ought to get them--we ought to spray these things.' ''
And he said--and I'm paraphrasing--he said, ``They said,
`No, that's up to the Iraqis.' '' And he said, ``But I told
them there's no Department of Agriculture that works.''
And he said, ``Well, they said, `It's got to be them.' ''
And he said, ``So, I did what Saddam did. I used my helicopters
and went and sprayed them.''
Which leads me to the second point he raised to me. He
said, ``You know, we have what I call the most expensive water
fountain in all the Middle East, that we built in Baghdad.'' He
said, ``It's great to put some high water--potable water to
everybody in Baghdad.'' He said, ``We built it,'' except we
didn't run the pipes from ``the fountain'' to the homes. That
was up to the Iraqis. Yet there was no mechanism by which the
Iraqis knew how to, or were able to, organize, at least at that
point, actually putting the PVC pipe in the ground from his
term of art, his facetious term, ``the water fountain'' to the
homes.
So, I guess what I'm getting at is this. And this is a
question to you, Dr. Marr. From a historical perspective, how
big a contributor to the economy of Iraq was agriculture in the
1950s, let's say, or the 1940s or the 1960s? I mean, was it a
major component? You hear the phrase ``Iraq used to be the
breadbasket of the Middle East.'' Can you tell me, from a
historical perspective what--
whether or not Iraq was a major exporter of agricultural
products in the past?
Dr. Marr. I have covered that in my previous book, and
there's a very interesting history on that. And let me just
recoup it.
When the British were there, under the mandate, up until
the 1950s, they put a lot of emphasis on agriculture. But you
have to remember, as you know, there are two kinds. There's
irrigation system in the south, which is hugely expensive. You
have to desalinate, you have to put a lot of effort, on dams
and so forth, and you have to have a population that likes
agriculture and wants to work in it. And, in fact, that has
gradually fallen into decay. Growing grains, rice, and other
things grown in the south, Iraqis were able to feed themselves,
were even able to do some exporting, into the 1950s. The rain-
fed agriculture in the north is much easier. The Kurdish area
and some of the areas around Mosul, you don't need that
irrigation. But, frankly, because of political mismanagement
and all sorts of other things, agriculture has fallen into
incredible disarray in Iraq. This migration of the population
from the south to Baghdad and so on has depopulated the area,
and it really has fallen into decline. And not only does Iraq
not export, not just under our occupation or even under Saddam,
but everything went into industry, and you can just chart the
figures where oil and urban service industries, working for the
government, for education, took over and left agriculture
behind.
One word of caution. I'm not sure Iraq can be a
breadbasket. I think there's been too much emphasis on how much
agriculture could do. It could certainly be revived. It would
help to feed the population. But modern agriculture is not
grains and so on; it's vegetables and other things you grow for
commercial agriculture. They could do a great deal more with
that. But a breadbasket for the Middle East, I think, is too
ambitious.
But agriculture, as a percentage of population employed or
any other figure, has declined radically.
Chairman Biden. Well, one of the reasons I raised the
question is, my last trip, over the Fourth of July, it was
suggested to me there was a direct correlation--and, Michael--
or Dr. O'Hanlon, maybe you could speak to this--there was a
direct correlation between the formation of the unity
government and the exponential rise in those participating in
militias, the exact opposite that was predicted. What was
predicted was, there would be a unity government; what that
would do is focus on a unified Iraq; they would have a united
Iraqi Army that was multiethnic; that the police force would be
able to begin to be purged of the death squads and so on. And
the irony was, at least in just pure data, that the number of
people being prepared to get a paycheck and get a weapon to
``fight with a militia'' went up almost exponentially. And so,
two of the generals with whom I sat said, ``You want me to deal
with the militia. Don't give me jurisdiction to disarm them.
Get the Department of Agriculture working, and give them
employment. You want me to deal with reduction of the militia.
Give me the opportunity to provide for employment.'' Because
these are people between the ages of 18 and 30, they've got
nothing to do. The unemployment rates you gave us were very
high. Are they correct? Is there a correlation--are people
joining the militias, in part, because there's nothing else to
do, a la riots in the 1960s in the United States of America, in
center cities where large numbers of teams sat on corners and
had nothing to do, and, therefore, engaged? You were mayor of
Indianapolis, going through that very difficult period of time.
Talk to me about that a minute. I mean, what's the correlation
between the intensity of support for being part of a militia
and the sectarian violence and being unemployed?
Dr. O'Hanlon. I don't think I can create a direct link that
I can prove with the data. But I can agree with your point, in
a broader sense. But it's impression. And the impression is
that when you give a country lack of hope for multiple years--
you know, you have angry young men joining the working-age
population, with nothing else to do--we just have to ask:
What's going to be their psychology? So, it's the
commonsensical answer you gave that I would fall back on,
myself. I can't prove it from the data. And in the small
samples that we have of pilot projects being attempted, I don't
think we have a way to prove that job-creation programs reduce
the support for the insurgency or the militias. But, as you
say, Senator, it's the combination of high unemployment, the
experiment in democracy not really producing reconciliation, 3
years of accumulated violence. All this has added up to a
climate of hopelessness, and we have to attack it in multiple
ways, even if we're not sure of what's going to work.
Chairman Biden. OK. Last point I'll make, and then--unless
the chairman has additional questions, close this out.
I was impressed with, not the dissimilarity, but the
similarity of your testimony today on a number of very
important points. One is that there's no straight line here to
look at, in terms of the disintegration of the situation in
Iraq. It's not totally a consequence, or even primarily a
consequence, of religion, although religion is playing a larger
role. There's an interlocking and complicated connection
between tribal loyalties, religious loyalties, political
parties, the disintegration of the middle class, or at least
the exodus. One thing that I don't want to misrepresent, so I'm
going to ask you specifically--my impression is that there was
total agreement on the need for a political settlement being
the ultimate criteria for stability in Iraq. The real question
that's evolved is one that we've been discussing for a while,
and the Baker Commission discussed, and I have discussed in the
proposal I've made, and others--I'm not unique in this regard--
and that is whether continuing and/or increasing our presence
physically with military in Iraq promotes movement toward
reconciliation, whatever ``reconciliation'' means, or the
looming middle term--not threat, but reality that, over the
next 12 to 18 months, if there's not a correlation between
political reconciliation--if that does not occur, you will see
a correlation with the reduction of American forces, to the
point that we essentially have removed all our combat forces
from that country. And that seems to be the tension. I may not
be explaining this succinctly. But, given the broad choice that
it seems to me the President of the United States has--and it's
a pretty basic choice, it seems to me--does he increase, surge,
escalate, or even just maintain without any threat, if you
will, of significant reduction within a particular timeframe?
Is that more likely to get action along the lines we need it,
which is reconciliation of some sort? Or is it better as the
Baker Commission suggested, by implication anyway, to tell the
Maliki government, and others now, ``Hey, Jack, it's not gonna
last very much longer''?
I was asked, when the President made his secret trip to
Iraq--I was on one of those programs, and they showed a picture
of the President whispering in Maliki's ear. And they said,
``What do you think of that?'' I said, ``It depends on what
he's whispering.'' I wasn't being facetious. If he's
whispering, ``I'm with you to the end, don't worry, we're
staying,'' then we're in real trouble, was my response. If he's
whispering, ``Hey, Jack, listen up here. You've got a limited
amount of time. You've got to make some courageous and
difficult choices. You've got to put yourself on the line. If
you do, we'll help. If you don't, you can't count on it.'' In
very colloquial terms, that's about what the choices are, in
terms of our policy. You can demur, you cannot answer, but if
you're willing, which side of that ledger do you--are more
inclined to come down on? I know nothing is straight-line here,
nothing is black and white. What should be the thrust of our
policy over the next year as it relates to the issue of
encouraging consensus, or a move toward consensus or
reconciliation? By suggesting we're going to be leaving or by
suggesting that we're going to provide the physical stability,
the security, first, before we ask you to make these very
difficult decisions?
Dr. O'Hanlon. Senator, it's a great way of framing the
dilemma. I think the way I would put it is, I would not be
comfortable with President Bush being the only person speaking
for the United States on this issue, because we know anything
he says is going to be interpreted not as a surge, but as a new
level of effort. His whole legacy is linked, as we all know, to
Iraq coming out at least OK. So, I personally, not just
become--not just because I'm a Democrat--I'm happy to see the
Congress in Democratic hands--and, even where Republicans are
having the opportunity, they are asking tough questions and
sending the message--the current policy is not going to be
sustainable. It's not sustainable militarily. The Army and
Marine Corps are already doing too much, even at 140,000. To go
to 160 is really going to something that has to be viewed as a
temporary measure, even if President Bush asked for 50,000 more
troops in the budget this year.
In terms of our politics, we all know, a number of you
running for President, and just running for campaigns in 2008,
are sending a message, ``This can't continue.'' And the Iraqis
have to know that, with 100,000 people being displaced from
their homes every month, it can't continue in their country
either.
So, only if both messages are sent simultaneously can it
work. A surge, by itself, with the implication that it could
continue indefinitely, I think, would be a terrible message to
send. But if it's juxtaposed with this sense of urgency, and
``2007 is the last real chance,'' then I think there may be a
case for it.
Dr. Marr. That is a wonderful question, and I think it is
the nub of the matter. I've asked myself the same thing,
thinking of it from the Iraqi side, What motivates----
Chairman Biden. Right.
Dr. Marr [continuing]. Iraqis? And I wish I had a really
definitive opinion on it, but I think I lean somewhat more to
the Iraq Study Group sense of it, although I'm not hard over.
A couple of points. I think threat is necessary, but not
sufficient, to get the Iraqis to move. And I think we have to
ask ourselves, also, what motivates people. It's not only
threat. If you're always threatening, without some incentive,
you're not going to get anywhere. But there is a sense of not
only so much hopelessness, but passivity, or, ``What can we do
about it?'' in the Iraqi tradition that I'm not sure, even if
we used a threat, it's going to be successful.
Chairman Biden. Yes.
Mr. Said. I think that a threat to withdraw will have two
impacts of opposite direction. On one hand, it may incentivize
people to talk and to seek a settlement. On the other hand, it
may emphasize--encourage them to go for a last push. Indeed,
what seems to be the dynamic, so far, has been that the threat
and the--because people in Iraq realize that the Americans are
not staying--has been to go for a last push.
Likewise, the surge option, particularly if taken out of
context, out of political context, is more likely to produce
negative results than positive.
A third--and it's just a general comment--I don't think
there is an option of a gradual U.S. withdrawal. I think what
you will realize--and this has happened on--in regional bases,
in provincial bases--that attempts to withdraw, especially
British attempts to withdraw, gradually have not materialized.
And, indeed, once you start to withdraw, you'll have to be
ready to withdraw almost immediately. And so, that is also
important to keep in mind.
Dr. Pillar. I will not demur at all in answering your very
clear question, Senator. I would definitely lean in the
direction of letting the Iraqis know we're not going to be
there forever, consistent with the Iraq Study Group report.
I disagree a little bit with the comment Mr. Said just
made. You know, people talk about an immediate withdrawal
versus gradual. I think, just as a matter of military logistics
and force protection and all that, even if you wanted to get
out fast, fast could translate into a matter of months and
wouldn't really be that much different from the timeframe that
the ISG was talking about.
But my basis for answering you that way is, basically, we
have tried other things, even ones that look like surges in the
Baghdad area. They haven't worked. This other thing might not
work, either, but at least it hasn't been tried. And it's also
the option that we know will reduce U.S. costs and casualties.
Chairman Biden. Well, I appreciate it very much. We're
going to hear from the Secretary tomorrow. She's graciously
agreed to be here. And I hope, when she does, we will have
explained that in a sense, ``surge'' is a bit of a misnomer.
Most Americans, I think, when you talk about a ``surge,'' are
thinking of 20 or 25 or 30 or 15,000 folks getting on a boat,
being shipped to the gulf, coming up through Basrah, and
occupying Baghdad. The truth of the matter is, this is going to
be a process, if it occurs. And we're talking about telling the
Marines they've got to go from 6 months to a year in place.
We're going to tell the Army guys and women there, they're
going to go from 12 months to 14 months, we're going to take a
brigade out of Kuwait or out of Qatar and move them in, and so
on. So, this is a process--which I think complicates the matter
even more, in a sense. But that's for another day.
So, I--again, the purpose of this is to educate us--and
you've helped do that today. And hopefully, the American people
and the press have gained as much from listening to all of you
as we have. I truly appreciate your patience. You've been
sitting here since 9:30. It's now a quarter of 2. It's the
drawback from expanding the committee to 21 people. I guess
that's the number we have. But there are so many people in the
Senate so critically interested in this that I overcame my
instinct of making it smaller. I was chairman or ranking member
of Judiciary for 17 years, and my entire effort was to reduce
the size of the committee to make it more manageable. But I'm
delighted with the new members. You can tell the degree of the
concern and participation. And I think you've all noted--you've
testified before--I doubt whether you've ever testified before
where you were any more convinced that as many people were
listening to everything word you had to say. And so, I hope
that's some psychic remuneration for you, for all the work
you've done on our behalf. We promise we'll try to cut the
questions down. We'll kind of see if we have multiple
questions. I don't want you in a position where you're spending
the next whatever having to answer the written questions.
Again, the chairman and I both thank you for your
tremendous input here and your patience.
And the committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:52 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
Additional Statements Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jim Webb, U.S. Senator From Virginia
The series of hearings that we begin today provide a critical
opportunity to forge a new strategic direction for Iraq and the entire
region--one that is long overdue and one I hope all Americans will
eventually be able to rally behind. I would like to express my
appreciation to our panel's witnesses for their appearance today. I
look forward to hearing their assessments, especially as they relate to
the regional implications of the situation in Iraq today.
We went to war in Iraq recklessly; we must move forward
responsibly. The war's costs to our Nation have been staggering. These
costs encompass what we hold to be most precious--the blood of our
citizens. They also extend to the many thousands more Iraqi people
killed and wounded as their country slides into the chaos of sectarian
violence and civil war. We have incurred extraordinary financial
costs--expenses totaling more than $380 billion and now estimated at $8
billion a month.
The war also has diverted our Nation's focus fighting international
terrorism and deflected our attention to the many additional threats to
our national security abroad and national greatness at home--costs
difficult to measure, perhaps, but very real all the same.
The Iraqi Government and the Iraqi people must understand that the
United States does not intend to maintain its current presence in their
country for the long term. They must make the difficult but essential
decisions to end today's sectarian violence and to provide for their
own security. The American people are not alone in seeking that day;
indeed, the overwhelming majority of Iraqi citizens also does not want
our forces present in their country for any longer than is absolutely
necessary.
The key question of the moment is how long the United States should
be expected to keep our forces in Iraq as its government seeks to
assume these burdens? How and when do we begin to drawdown our combat
presence and conclude our mission in a way that does not leave even
greater chaos behind? What is the administration's strategic vision
and, as it relates to our presence in Iraq, its eventual end point?
The answers to these questions are not to be found in Iraq alone.
Achieving our goals in this war requires a coherent strategy
encompassing the entire region. The National Strategy for Victory in
Iraq, published by the National Security Council in November 2005,
principally emphasized how the United States would help the Iraqi
people defeat terrorists and build an inclusive democratic state. This
strategy identified an initiative to increase international support for
Iraq. It did not, however, affirm the need for an overarching
diplomatic solution that is now, more than ever, an imperative if we
are to end the war.
I have said for many months that the United States does not require
a military solution to end the war in Iraq. We must seek a diplomatic
solution immediately--one that engages all nations in the region with
historic and cultural ties to Iraq. Because they are part of today's
problem, Syria and Iran also must be party to tomorrow's solution. This
overarching diplomatic solution, one supportive of a coherent strategy,
will lead to four outcomes. First, it will enable us to withdraw our
combat troops from Iraq over time. Second, it will lead to
progressively greater regional stability. Third, it will allow us to
fight international terrorism more effectively. Lastly, it will enable
us to address our broad strategic interests around the world with
renewed vigor.
During an earlier era in our Nation's history, we were faced with
an unpopular war that had gone on too long. The then-recently retired
General Dwight David Eisenhower spoke out against the conduct of the
Korean war in the summer of 1952. ``Where do we go from here,'' he
asked; ``when comes the end?''
Today, the members of this committee--indeed all Americans--await
answers to these same questions: Where do we go from here? When comes
the end?
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, U.S. Senator
From Maryland
As a new member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I wish
to thank Chairman Biden and Ranking Member Senator Lugar for taking the
initiative to hold today's hearing regarding the war in Iraq. This
hearing is timely and responds to the interest of the public to learn
more up-to-date information about the President's plans and options.
I know the citizens of Maryland are very keen to understand where
we are in Iraq and the implications for our sons and daughters fighting
in Baghdad and other parts of that country. Maryland is home to the
U.S. Naval Academy and other key military installations. For many
reasons, the Iraq war and the return of our troops are of critical
concern to the citizens of my State. Sixty-two Marylanders have lost
their lives in Iraq and many more have suffered life-changing injuries.
In fact, this is one of the reasons I sought a seat on the Foreign
Relations Committee. Marylanders want to be informed about what is
happening in Iraq and other U.S. engagements around the world and I
wanted to be in a position to respond to this interest. To be sure, the
Iraq Study Group Report was an excellent means to begin this process.
The findings and recommendations from the report constitute the most
in-depth study to date of the management of the Iraq war. Specifically,
I agree with the report's recommendation to begin a phased troop
withdrawal of combat brigades.
Today we begin a series of hearings on Iraq designed to give
Members of Congress and the American public a situational overview of
the war and viable options to change our current course to promote
greater security and to bring our military forces home. At the outset,
I am very concerned about media reports regarding the Bush
administration's intent to increase the number of U.S. troops.
In 2002, as a Member of the House of Representatives, I voted
against the war in Iraq and have been critical of the President's
conduct of the war and reconstruction efforts. I have encouraged the
President to change course in Iraq and begin a phased troop withdrawal.
Now, every indication suggests the President plans to do the opposite
and increase American forces.
The escalation in combat forces causes me great concern for several
reasons. First, it is unclear whether we can count on the Iraqi
military/security forces to contribute and participate in the new
security arrangement at a level that will allow U.S. forces to pull
back from Baghdad and to begin troop withdrawal. This was the major
problem in 2006 with ``Operation Together Forward'' Iraq failed to
provide the agreed-upon troop numbers.
Second, there is strong opinion that the increase in U.S. forces by
itself will do little to quelling the violence in Iraq and protect its
civilians. The Iraqis should not be allowed to hide behind robust
American troop levels. Rather, the Iraqis should assume responsibility
to hold areas with American tactical, logistical, and technical
support. It is imperative now for the Iraqi Government to assert
control over its armed forces and security apparatus and finally
institute appropriate command and control structures to credibly fix
many of their identified shortcomings.
Third, with increased security must come greater protection for
civilians and enhanced economic/infrastructure reconstruction efforts.
While I recognize reconstruction is a long-term process, the quicker
the United States and our coalition partners begin this effort, the
sooner we can stifle the insurgents' ability to recruit more Iraqi
citizens into the deadly cycle of violence. Security and reconstruction
go hand in hand and we owe it to the people of Iraq and our troops to
implement a multifaceted approach to rebuild Iraq.
Fourth, it appears the President's new Iraq plan may well raise as
many problems as it attempts to resolve. Troop escalation is a risky
gambit that could increase sectarian violence and contribute further to
Iraq's slide to a larger civil war. I hope this is not the case and I
encourage the President to work with this Congress to create a lasting
solution to the situation in Iraq.
Finally, in that regard, it is critical that an aggressive
initiative be undertaken on the political and diplomatic front among
the countries in the region. The goal of such an initiative must be to
bring about a cease-fire in the civil war and an Iraqi Government that
has the support of all the ethnic communities in Iraq. Military efforts
alone cannot bring peace and stability to Iraq. The United States must
undertake a broader international effort for a political solution to
the civil war in Iraq.
During the coming weeks, the role of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee to inform will be just as important as the role of the
committee itself. This committee must exercise the appropriate
oversight and investigation that the American people are demanding, and
that our troops deserve.
THE ADMINISTRATION'S PLAN FOR IRAQ
----------
THURSDAY, JANUARY 11, 2007 [A.M.]
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R.
Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold, Boxer, Bill
Nelson, Obama, Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Webb, Lugar, Hagel,
Coleman, Corker, Sununu, Voinovich, Murkowski, DeMint, Isakson,
and Vitter.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
Senator Biden. The hearing will come to order.
Welcome to the Foreign Relations Committee, Madam
Secretary. It's an honor to have you here.
Nearly 4 years ago, Congress and the American people gave
the President of the United States the authority to destroy
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, and, if necessary, to
depose a dictator. We know now that the weapons of mass
destruction were not there, and that the dictator is no longer
there, as well. The Iraqis have held elections, and they've
formed a government. But the country and our troops, in my
view, are now embroiled in the midst of a vicious civil war.
As of last night, according to the Pentagon, 3,009
Americans have lost their lives, over 22,000 have been wounded,
and we have spent and committed hundreds of billions of
dollars. And there seems to be no end in sight.
For many months now, the American people have understood
that our present policy is a failure, and they wanted to know,
and continue to want to know, where we go from here.
Last night, like millions of my fellow Americans, I
listened intently to the President of the United States lay out
his new strategy for Iraq. We all hoped and prayed the
President would present us with a plan that would make things
better. Instead, I fear that what the President has proposed is
more likely to make things worse.
We hoped and prayed we would hear of a plan that would have
two features: Begin to bring American forces home and a
reasonable prospect of leaving behind a stable Iraq. Instead,
we heard a plan to escalate the war, not only in Iraq, but
possibly into Iran and Syria, as well. I believe the
President's strategy is not a solution, Secretary Rice. I
believe it's a tragic mistake.
In Iraq, the core of the President's plan is to send
another 20,000 Americans to Baghdad, a city of more than 6
million people, where they will go, with their fellow Iraqi
soldiers, door to door in the middle of a civil war.
If memory serves me, we've tried that kind of escalation
twice before in Baghdad. And it's failed twice in Baghdad. And
I fear it will fail a third time. And the result will be the
loss of more American lives and our military stretched to the
breaking point, with little prospect of success, and a further
loss of influence in the region.
Secretary Rice, this November the American people voted for
a dramatic change in Iraq. The President said, forthrightly, he
heard them. But it seems clear to me from listening to him last
night, he did not listen. And, for the life of me, I don't
understand how he could reject the overwhelming opposition to
his plan from a broad bipartisan cross-section of the country's
leaders--military, civilian, and civic. As I understand it, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed this plan. Our commander in the
region, General Abizaid, opposed the plan. Our commanders in
Iraq, starting with General Casey, opposed this plan. The
Baker-Hamilton Commission opposed this plan. And so did our
greatest soldier statesman, Colin Powell.
They all gave advice to the President that could be boiled
down to two things. First, our military cannot stop the Shia,
the Kurds, and the Sunnis from killing each other. The Iraqi
people have to make very, very, very difficult political
compromises in order for the killing to stop. And all of the
people who gave advice to the President that I've mentioned
suggested that the best way to force the leaders and the people
to make these hard compromises was to start, this year, to
drawdown our forces, not escalate them. The second consensus
point from the advice the President got was that the way to
secure this political solution to secure Iraq--was to secure
support for whatever political solution the Iraqis arrived at
from Turkey, Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and all the neighbors.
And there's a second reason for seeking that kind of support
and consultation. It was that, if, in fact, the civil war
cannot be stopped, at least with a regional consensus, the hope
would be, it would be contained within Iraq.
So, Secretary Rice, to be very blunt, I can't, in good
conscience, support the President's approach. But because
there's so much at stake, I'm also not prepared to give up on
finding a bipartisan way forward that meets the twin goals most
Americans share and, I believe--I don't speak for anyone in
this committee, but I believe most of my colleagues in the
Senate share, and that is: How do we bring American forces home
in an orderly way over the next year and leave behind a stable
Iraq? In all my years in the Senate, Secretary Rice, I don't
think we've faced a more pivotal moment than the one we face
today. Failure in Iraq will not be confined to Iraq. It will do
terrible damage to our ability to protect our interests all
over the world, and, I fear, for a long time to come. That's
why we have to work together for a solution.
I'm aware that the surge is not 22,000 people--or 20,000
people getting into the boat, landing at one moment. The reason
why I think there's still time for us to work out a bipartisan
solution is that this is a process. We need a solution that
will gain the support of our fellow citizens.
I say to my colleagues, maybe because I got here in the
midst of the Vietnam war, toward the end, I think we all
learned a lesson, whether we went or didn't go, whether we were
for it or against it, is no foreign policy can be sustained in
this country without the informed consent of the American
people. They've got to sign on. They've got to sign on. I just
hope it's not too late.
Mr. Chairman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in
welcoming Secretary Rice to the Foreign Relations Committee
once again. I appreciate her willingness to discuss policy on
Iraq with the committee in advance of a very important trip to
the Middle East which I understand commences tomorrow. All of
us listened intently to President Bush's speech last night.
Yesterday I said that, initially, the President and his team
should explain what objectives we're trying to achieve if
forces are expanded, where and how will they be used, why is it
the strategy will succeed, how Iraqi forces will be involved,
how long additional troops may be needed, what contingencies
are in place if the situation does not improve, and how this
strategy fits into our discussion throughout the region. The
President made an important start on this process with his
speech. The elements of his plan require careful study by
Members of Congress. I appreciate the efforts the President has
made, thus far, to reach out to Congress and to the American
people.
I was encouraged by the President's emphasis on a regional
element in his Iraq strategy. Whenever we begin to see Iraq as
a set piece--an isolated problem that can be solved outside the
context of our broader interests--we should reexamine our frame
of reference. Our efforts to stabilize Iraq and sustain a
pluralist government there have an important humanitarian
purpose. But remaking Iraq, in and of itself, does not
constitute a strategic objective. Stability in Iraq is
important because it has a direct bearing on vital U.S.
strategic objectives. To determine our future course in Iraq,
we must be very clear about what those objectives are. In my
judgment there are four primary ones.
First, we have an interest in preventing Iraq, or any piece
of its territory, from being used as a safe haven or training
ground for terrorists. As part of this, we have an interest in
preventing any potential terrorist in Iraq from acquiring
weapons of mass destruction.
Second, we have an interest in preventing a civil war or
conditions of permanent disorder in Iraq that upset wider
regional stability. The consequences of turmoil that draws in
outside powers or spills over into neighboring states could be
grave. Such turmoil could generate a regional war, topple
friendly governments, expand destabilizing refugee flows, close
the Persian Gulf to shipping traffic, or destroy key oil
production and transportation facilities. Any of these outcomes
could restrict or diminish the flow of oil from the region,
with disastrous results for the world economy.
Third, we have an interest in preventing the loss of U.S.
credibility and standing in the region and throughout the
world. Some loss of confidence in the United States has already
occurred, but our subsequent actions in Iraq may determine how
we are viewed for generations.
Fourth, we have an interest in preventing Iranian
domination of the region. The fall of Saddam Hussein's Sunni
government opened up opportunities for Iran to seek much more
influence in Iraq. An Iran that is bolstered by an alliance
with a Shiite government in Iraq or a separate Shiite state in
southern Iraq would pose serious challenges for Saudi Arabia,
Jordan, Egypt, and other Arab governments. Iran is pressing a
broad agenda in the Middle East with uncertain consequences for
weapons proliferation, terrorism, the security of Israel, and
other U.S. interests. Any course we adopt in Iraq would
consider how it would impact the regional influence of Iran.
Now, these are not our only interests in Iraq, but they're
fundamental reasons for our military presence during the last
several years.
I would observe that all four of these objectives are
deeply affected not just by whether the insurgency and
sectarian violence can be abated in Iraq cities and
neighborhoods, but by the action of Iraq's neighbors.
For this reason, I have advocated broader diplomacy in the
region that is directed at both improving stability in Iraq and
expanding our options in the region. Inevitably, when one
suggests such a diplomatic course, this is interpreted as
advocating negotiations with Syria and Iran--nations that have
overtly and covertly worked against our interests and violated
international norms. But the purpose of the talks is not to
change our posture toward these countries. A necessary regional
dialog should not be sacrificed because of fear of what might
happen if we include unfriendly regimes. Moreover, we already
have numerous contacts with the Iranians and Syrians through
intermediaries and other means. The regional dialog I am
suggesting does not have to occur in a formal conference
setting, but it needs to occur, and it needs to be sustained.
Both our friends and our enemies in the region must know
that we will defend out interests and our allies. They must
know that we are willing to exercise the substantial leverage
we possess in the region in the form of military presence,
financial assistance, diplomatic context, and other resources.
Although it is unlikely that a political settlement in Iraq can
be imposed from the outside, it is equally unlikely that one
will succeed in the absence of external pressures and
incentives. We should be active in bringing those forces to
bear on Iraqi factions. We should work to prevent
miscalculations related to the turmoil in Iraq.
Now, finally, much attention has been focused on the
President's call for increasing troop levels in Iraq. This is
an important consideration, but it is not the only element of
his plan that requires examination. The larger issue is how we
will manage our strategic interests in the Middle East, in
light of our situation in Iraq. Can we use the stability that
we offer the region, and our role as a counterweight to Iran,
to gain more help in Iraq and in the region?
I look forward to continuing our examination of Iraq in the
committee's hearings, and especially your testimony this
morning.
Thank you.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
Madam Secretary, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. CONDOLEEZZA RICE, SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Secretary Rice. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lugar. Thank you, members of the
committee.
I look forward to our discussion. And in order to
facilitate that, Mr. Chairman, I have a longer statement that I
would like to have entered into the record, and I will----
Senator Biden. Without objection, your entire statement
will be placed in the record.
Secretary Rice. Thank you.
As I come before you today, America is facing a crucial
moment--indeed, as the chairman has put it, a pivotal moment--
concerning our policies in Iraq and concerning our broader
policies in the Middle East. I think that we all know that the
stakes in Iraq are enormous and that the consequences of
failure would also be enormous, not just for America and for
Iraq, but for the entire region of the Middle East, and,
indeed, for the world. And so, we agree that the stakes in Iraq
are enormous. And as the President said last night, Americans
broadly agree, and we in the administration count ourselves
among them, that the situation in Iraq is unacceptable. On
these two points, we are unified: The enormousness of the
stakes, and the unacceptability of the current situation.
The President has, therefore, forged a new strategy that
speaks both to our stakes in Iraq and the need to change the
way that we are doing things. The Iraqis have devised a
strategy that they believe will work for their most urgent
problem; that is, to return security to Baghdad. We are going
to support that strategy through the augmentation of American
military forces. I think Secretary Gates will say more about
that in his committee. But I want also to emphasize that we see
this not just as a military effort, but also as one that must
have very strong political and economic elements.
In order to better deliver on the governance and economic
side, the United States is further decentralizing and
diversifying our civilian presence. And I will talk a little
bit more about that, and in greater detail. We are further
integrating our civil and military operations. And, as Senator
Lugar has noted, it's extremely important to see Iraq in a
regional context, and I would like to talk a little bit about
the regional strategy that we want to pursue that supports
reformers and responsible leaders in Iraq and across the
broader Middle East.
Let me be very clear. We all understand that the
responsibility for what kind of Iraq this will be rests with
the Iraqis. They are the only ones who can decide whether or
not Iraq is, in fact, going to be an Iraq for all Iraqis, one
that is unified, or whether they are going to allow sectarian
passions to unravel that chance for a unified Iraq. We know,
historically, that Iraq rests on the region's religious and
ethnic fault lines. And, in many ways, due to events in Baghdad
over the last year, Baghdad has become the center of that
struggle.
The Samarra mosque bombing provoked sectarianism, and it
set it aflame at a pace that threatens to overwhelm the fragile
and yet promising process of reconciliation, a process that has
produced successful elections and a new constitution, and
substantial agreement, as we sit here today, on a law to share
Iraq's oil wealth fairly, as well as a commitment to a more
reasonable approach to de-Baathification and to hold provincial
elections. Iraqis must take on the essential challenge,
therefore, that threatens this process of national
reconciliation, and that is the protection of their population
from criminals and violent extremists who kill in the name of
sectarian grievance.
The President, last night, made clear that the augmentation
of our forces is to support the Iraqis in that goal of
returning control and civility to their capital. He also noted
that there are also very important strategic, economic, and
political elements that must be followed up if ``clear, hold,
and build'' is to actually work this way. And so, I want to
assure you that we, in the State Department, recognize the
importance of surging our civilian elements and our civilian
efforts, as well as the surge that would be there on the
military side. This is a comprehensive policy.
Iraq has a federal government. We need to get our civilian
employees out of our Embassy, out of the Green Zone, into the
field, across Iraq. We have had, over the last year and a half,
the establishment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams that are
operating outside of Baghdad. The importance of those teams
should be understood in the following way: It is extremely
important to have an effective and functioning government in
Baghdad, and we have worked with them on ministries, on budget
processes, on the technical assistance that they need, to have
a functioning government. But it is equally important to have
local and provincial governments that can deliver for their
people. And, indeed, this gives us multiple points for success,
not just the Government in Baghdad, but the people with whom we
are working in the provinces.
I might just note that we believe that this is having an
effect in places like Mosul and Tal Afar, but it's also having
a very good effect even in some of the most difficult places.
And one of the other elements of the President's policy last
night was to announce that 4,000 American forces would be
augmented in Anbar, the epicenter of al-Qaeda activity. That
is, in part, because we believe that the efforts that we've
been making with local leaders, particularly the sheikhs in
Anbar, are beginning to pay fruit. For instance, they have
recruited, from their own ranks, 1,100 young men to send to
Jordan for training, and these ``Sons of Anbar,'' as they call
them, will come back to enter the fight against al-Qaeda.
And so, I want to emphasize, we're focused on the need to
return control to Baghdad, but we're also very focused on the
need to build capacity in the local and provincial governments,
and to be able to deliver economic and reconstruction
assistance there.
Finally, let me just say one word about our regional
diplomatic strategy. Obviously, Iraq is central now to
America's role in the Middle East--central to our credibility,
central to the prospects for stability, and central to the role
that our allies and friends and Iraq's neighbors will play in
the Middle East. But we have to base our regional strategy on
the substantially changed realities of the Middle East.
This is a different Middle East. This Middle East is a
Middle East in which there really is a new alignment of forces.
On one side are reformers and responsible leaders who seek to
advance their interests peacefully, politically, and
diplomatically. On the other side are extremists, of every sect
and ethnicity, who use violence to spread chaos, to undermine
democratic governments, and to impose agendas of hatred and
intolerance. On one side of that divide, the gulf countries,
including Saudi Arabia and the other countries of the gulf--
Egypt, Jordan, the young democracies of Lebanon, of the
Palestinian territory, led by Mahmoud Abbas, and in Iraq. But
on the other side of that divide are Iran, Syria, Hezbollah,
and Hamas. And I think we have to understand that that is a
fundamental divide. Iran and Syria have made their choice, and
their choice is to destabilize, not to stabilize.
And so, with all respect to those who talk about engagement
with Syria and Iran, I think we need to recognize that if Iran
and Syria wish to play a stabilizing role for their own
interests, then they will do so. If, on the other hand, they
intend to offer a stabilizing role because they believe that,
in our current situation in Iraq, we are willing to pay a
price, that's not diplomacy, that's extortion. And I would just
ask you what that price might be.
I have a hard time believing that Iran will, on one side,
talk to us about stabilizing Iraq and say, ``Oh, by the way, we
won't talk about what you're doing in the Security Council to
stop our nuclear program.'' That's not part of the price. Or
that Syria will talk about stabilizing Iraq while they continue
to destabilize it, and say, ``Oh, we aren't actually interested
in talking about the fact that we have not reconciled to the
loss of our position in Lebanon or to the existence of a
tribunal to try those who are responsible for the assassination
of Rafik Hariri.'' These two will most certainly come into
contact with each other, the destabilizing activities in Iraq
and the desires of these states to have us pay a price that we
cannot pay.
We do have a regional approach. It is to work with those
governments that share our view of where the Middle East should
be going. It is also to work with those governments in a way
that can bring support to the new Iraqi democracy. It is to
support the very normal democracy that Iraq itself may engage
in with all of its neighbors. And it is to have an
international compact, which is a bargain between the
international community and Iraq, for support in response to
Iraqi reforms, economic and, indeed, some that are political.
In that Iraqi compact, both Syria and Iran have been present,
and will continue to be.
Let me just conclude by saying that we all understand, in
the administration, that there are no magic formulas for Iraq,
as the Baker-Hamilton Commission said. And I'd like you to
understand that we really did consider the options before us.
The President called on advisors from outside. He called on the
advice of the Baker-Hamilton Study Group. And, of course, he
discussed the policies with his advisors, like me, who have
been there from the beginning, and, therefore, bear
responsibility for both the successes and failures of this
policy; and new advisors, like Secretary of Defense Gates, who
came with a fresh eye. After all of that, he came to the
conclusion--and I fully agree--that the most urgent task before
us now is to help the Iraqi Government. And I want to emphasize
``help'' the Iraqi Government--to establish confidence among
the Iraqi population that it will, and can, protect all of its
citizens, whether they are Sunni, Shia, Kurds, or others, and
that they will, in an evenhanded fashion, punish those violent
people who are killing innocent Iraqis, whatever their sect,
ethnicity, or political affiliation.
We believe that the Iraqi Government, which has not always
performed, has every reason to understand the consequences,
now, of nonperformance. They, after all, came to us and said
that this problem had to be solved. They came to us and said
that, yes, they would make the necessary decisions to prevent
political interference in the military operations that need to
be taken to deal with the Baghdad problem. They came to us and
said that, ``This government will not be able to survive if it
cannot reestablish civil order.'' And they gave to the
President, and not just Prime Minister Maliki, but many
leaders, an assurance that this time they're going to make the
difficult choices in order to get it done.
The situation in Iraq is unacceptable, but Iraq is also, at
this point in time, of very high stakes to this Nation. This is
a time for a national desire and a national imperative not to
fail in Iraq. We've faced crucible tests as a country before,
and we've come through them when we have come through them
together. I want to pledge to you, as the President last--did
last night, that we want to work with all Americans, here,
particularly, in the Congress, the representatives of the
American people, as we move forward on a strategy that will
allow us to succeed in Iraq. This is the strategy that the
President believes is the best strategy that we can pursue. And
I ask your careful consideration of it, your ideas for how to
improve it. And, of course, understanding that not everyone
will agree, I do believe that we're united in our desire to see
America succeed.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Rice follows:]
Prepared Statement of Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, Department
of State, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, as I come before you today,
America faces a crucial moment. We all know that the stakes in Iraq are
enormous. And we all share the belief that the situation in Iraq is
unacceptable. On this we are united.
The new way forward that President Bush outlined last night
requires us to do things differently. Most importantly, the Iraqis have
devised their own strategy, and our efforts will support theirs. To do
so, we will further decentralize and diversify our civilian presence in
Iraq to better assist the Iraqi people. We will further integrate our
civilian and military operations. And we will fashion a regional
strategy that supports reformers and responsible leaders in Iraq and
across the Broader Middle East.
Among Americans and Iraqis, there is no confusion over one basic
fact: It is Iraqis who are responsible for what kind of country Iraq
will be. It is they who must decide whether Iraq will be characterized
by national unity or sectarian conflict. The President has conveyed to
the Iraqi leadership that we will support their good decisions, but
that America's patience is limited.
Iraqis are now engaged in a task without precedent in their
history. Iraq rests on the main religious and ethnic faultlines in the
Middle East, and for centuries, Iraqis have settled their differences
through oppression and violence. Now they are attempting to do so
peacefully and politically. This is not easy, and as one could expect,
many Iraqis have deep grievances, which some violent men interpret as a
license to kill innocent people.
Baghdad has become the center of this conflict. We know that al-
Qaeda deliberately sought to provoke sectarian violence in Iraq by
targeting Shia civilians. With last February's bombing of the Golden
Mosque in Samarra, the success of their plan accelerated. Sectarian
passions, incited to violence, now threaten to overwhelm Iraq's
fragile, yet promising, process of reconciliation--a process that has
produced successful elections and a new constitution, substantial
agreement on a law to share Iraq's oil fairly, and commitment to a more
reasonable approach to ``de-baathification.''
To succeed with national reconciliation, the Iraqi Government must
improve security for its people, particularly in Baghdad. Iraqis
themselves must take up this essential challenge. They must protect
their population from criminals and violent extremists who kill
innocent Iraqis in the name of sectarian grievance. The Iraqi
Government must reestablish civil order in Baghdad to regain the trust
of its people and control of its capital. President Bush has decided to
augment our forces to help the Iraqis achieve this mission. Secretary
Gates will have more to say on this.
Success in Iraq, however, relies on more than military efforts
alone; it also requires robust political and economic progress. Our
military operations must be fully integrated with our civilian and
diplomatic efforts, across the entire U.S. Government, to advance the
strategy that I laid out before you last year: ``Clear, hold, and
build.'' All of us in the State Department fully understand our role in
this mission, and we are prepared to play it. We are ready to
strengthen, indeed to ``surge,'' our civilian efforts.
Our political and economic strategy mirrors our military plan:
Iraqis are in the lead; we are supporting them. Improvement in the
security situation, especially in Baghdad, will open a window of
opportunity for the Iraqi Government to accelerate the process of
national reconciliation. We can and will measure whether this work is
being done. We recognize that the trend of political progress in Iraq
is just as important as the end result. On the hydrocarbon law, for
example, Iraqis are transcending sectarian differences and achieving a
national purpose. This is a positive trend, and the process is moving
in the right direction.
Iraqis must also take steps that accelerate economic development
and growth. The Government of Iraq has taken many important steps
already on key economic issues, including policies to open Iraq's
economy more fully and responsibly to foreign investment. The Iraqi
Government must now move urgently, especially in the most troubled
areas, to deliver essential services to its people--programs that
improve lives in meaningful ways, that restore confidence in national
and local governance, and provide a stake in the country's future for
all Iraqis who wish to see an expansion of hope rather than a
continuation of violence. The Iraqi Government is committing $10
billion of its own resources to help create jobs, to break the logjams
to growth in their economy, and to further national reconciliation.
To better disperse these new resources throughout the country,
Iraqis are building new governmental structures. One innovation they
have proposed is the creation of a new National Reconstruction
Development Council, which would enable the Prime Minister to deliver
resources faster and more effectively for major infrastructure
projects. This Council will also help take the place of our own Relief
and Reconstruction Fund. Another Iraqi innovation is the development of
Project Management Units, to help Iraqis use their own resources more
effectively to implement programs.
For these efforts to succeed, our support will be crucial. Since
2004, we have used money from the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund
and other programs to build infrastructure and help the central
government move toward self-reliance. As we enter 2007, despite many
problems, we have substantially and successfully completed this phase.
As Iraqis take charge, we will narrow our focus in how we help their
central government. Using FY 2006 Supplemental funding, we have worked
with the Iraqis to improve their capacity to govern. Now, our advisory
efforts will concentrate on the most vital ministries. We will advise
and invest our resources where we judge that our efforts will be most
effective.
To oversee our economic support for the Iraqi people, and to ensure
that it is closely integrated with our security strategy, I have
appointed Tim Carney to the new position of coordinator for Iraq
Transitional Assistance. He will be based in Baghdad and will work with
Iraqi counterparts to facilitate a maximum degree of coordination in
our economic and development efforts.
As Iraqis intensify efforts to improve lives, the main focus of our
support will continue to shift toward helping the Iraqi Government
expand its reach, its relevance, and its resources beyond the Green
Zone. We will help local leaders improve their capacity to govern and
deliver public services. Our economic efforts will be more targeted on
specific local needs with proven records of success, like microcredit
programs. And we will engage with leading private sector enterprises
and other local businesses, including the more promising state-owned
firms, to break the obstacles to growth.
Our decentralization of effort in Iraq will require a more
decentralized presence. We must continue to get civilians and diplomats
out of our Embassy, out of the capital and into the field, all across
the country. The mechanism to do this is the Provincial Reconstruction
Team, or PRT. We currently have 10 PRTs deployed across Iraq: 7
American and 3 coalition. Building on this existing presence, we plan
to expand from 10 to at least 18 teams. For example, we will have six
PRTs in Baghdad, not just one. We will go from one team in Anbar
province to three--in Fallujah, Ramadi, and Al Qaim. These PRTs will
closely share responsibilities and reflect an unprecedented unity of
civilian and military effort.
Expanding our PRT presence will also enable us to diversify our
assistance across all of Iraq. Iraq has a federal government. Much of
the street-level authority, and much of the opportunity for positive
change in Iraq, lies outside the Green Zone--in local and provincial
governments with party leaders and tribal chiefs. By actively
supporting these provincial groups and structures, we diversify our
chances of success in Iraq. Our PRTs have had success working at the
local level in towns like Mosul, Tikrit, and Tal Afar. Now we will
invest in other parts of Iraq, like Anbar province, where local leaders
are showing their desire and building their capacity to confront
violent extremists and build new sources of hope for their people.
All total, we seek to deploy hundreds of additional civilians
across Iraq to help Iraqis build their nation. And we will ask Congress
to provide funding to support and secure our expanded civilian
presence. We want to give our civilians, deployed in PRTs, the
flexibility to devote extra resources where they can do the most good
at the local level. Our expanded PRT presence will be a powerful tool
to empower Iraq's reformers and responsible leaders in their struggle
against violent extremism. We, therefore, plan to request, as part of
our FY 2007 Supplemental, significant new operating funds for our PRTs
as well as hundreds of million of dollars to fund their programs. When
we add in relevant USAID projects, we hope to approximately double our
resource commitment to help local Iraqi communities through PRTs.
These commitments will not be indefinite. As I said earlier, one of
our main objectives in this phase is to help the Iraqis use their own
money to rebuild their country. The Iraqis have budgeted billions of
dollars for this mission in 2007, and as their efforts become more
effective, we have kept our FY 2008 requests limited. We want Iraqis to
rely more and more on their own resources, their own people, and their
own efforts. Therefore, by 2008 and 2009, the burden of local
assistance should be assumed more effectively by the Iraqi Government.
In the meantime, though, our efforts will be vital.
The final piece of our effort is the development of a regional
diplomatic strategy, which was a key recommendation of the Iraq Study
Group. Iraq is central to the future of the Middle East. The security
of this region is an enduring vital interest for the United States.
America's presence in this part of the world contributes significantly
to its stability and success. So, as we recommit ourselves in Iraq, we
are also enhancing our efforts to support reformers and responsible
leaders in the region--and to deter and counter aggression to our
friends and allies.
Our regional diplomacy is based on the substantially changed
realities of the Middle East. Historic change is now unfolding in the
region, and it is unleashing a great deal of tension, anxiety, and
violence. But it is also revealing a new strategic alignment in the
Middle East. This is the same alignment we see in Iraq. On one side are
the many reformers and responsible leaders, who seek to advance their
interests peacefully, politically, and diplomatically. On the other
side are extremists, of every sect and ethnicity, who use violence to
spread chaos, to undermine democratic governments, and to impose
agendas of hate and intolerance.
This is why the proper partners in our regional diplomacy are those
who share our goals. In this group, I would count, of course, our
democratic allies: Turkey and Israel. I would also count the
governments of the Gulf States plus Egypt and Jordan, or the ``GCC+2.''
We have established unprecedented consultation with this group of
countries. In fact, I will be returning to the region, and to this
process, later this week. I would also count among our key partners the
democratic reformers and leaders in places like Lebanon, the
Palestinian territories, and, of course, Iraq. Our most important goal
now is to use our diplomacy to empower democratic and other responsible
leaders across the region. We must help them show their fellow citizens
that it is they, not violent extremists, who can best protect their
lives, promote their interests, and advance a future of hope.
On Iraq, in particular, our regional diplomacy has several
components. One concerns Iraq's neighbor to the north: Turkey.
President Bush and I have engaged retired GEN Joe Ralston to work with
Iraq and Turkey on concerns about terrorism from the Kurdish Worker's
Party. Those efforts have helped to ease tensions, but we will do more
to protect our ally, Turkey, from terrorist attacks.
Over the last 6 months, we have also supported significant progress
in crafting an international compact between the Iraqi Government and
the international community. Working with more than 40 countries, Iraq
has developed a set of written commitments to action on political,
security, and economic targets. The creation of the compact has been
guided by a diplomatic process that has already met at the level of
Foreign Ministers. This group involves all of Iraq's neighbors--
including Iran--and other states that have invested significantly in
Iraq's future. Iraq has led the compact process. The United Nations has
served as cochair. And the World Bank has assisted. This diplomatic
process also provides a structure that can easily accommodate flexible,
informal meetings of smaller groups of countries about other topics of
common concern.
While many of us are working to strengthen peace in the region, two
governments have unfortunately chosen to align themselves with the
forces of violent extremism--both in Iraq and across the Middle East.
One is Syria. Despite many appeals, including from Syria's fellow Arab
States, the leaders in Damascus continue to destabilize Iraq and their
neighbors and support terrorism. The problem here is not a lack of talk
with Syria but a lack of action by Syria.
Iran is the other. If the government in Tehran wants to help
stabilize the region, as it now claims, it should end its support for
violent extremists who destroy the aspirations of innocent Lebanese,
Palestinians, and Iraqis. And it should end its pursuit of a nuclear
weapons capability. I repeat my offer today: If Iran suspends its
enrichment of uranium--which is, after all, an international demand,
not just an American one--then the United States is prepared to reverse
27 years of policy, and I will meet with my Iranian counterpart--
anytime, anywhere--to discuss every facet of our countries'
relationship. Until then, we will continue to work with the Iraqis and
use all of our power to limit and counter the activities of Iranian
agents who are attacking our people and innocent civilians in Iraq.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I know there are no
guarantees or magic formulas on the question of Iraq. I know that most
Americans are skeptical and concerned about the prospects of success. I
know and share the concern for those who remain in harm's way that all
Americans feel, as well as the heartbreak they feel for the families
who have lost loved ones.
I also know that, over the past several weeks, President Bush and
our entire national security team have carefully considered a full
range of new ideas. The President has heard from those of his advisors,
like me, who have been around from the very beginning, and who bear
responsibility for our policy thus far--its successes and its setbacks.
He has also heard from new advisors who bring a fresh perspective. In
addition, the President has weighed the thoughtful advice given to him
by Members of Congress, by our friends and allies abroad, and by
outside experts like the gracious public servants who made up the Iraq
Study Group.
The conclusion the President reached, with which I fully agree, is
that the most urgent task now is to help the Iraqi Government establish
confidence that it can, and will, protect all of its citizens,
regardless of their sectarian identity, from violent extremists who
threaten Iraq's young democracy--and that it will reinforce security
with political reconciliation and economic support. Implementing this
strategy will take time to succeed, and I fully expect that mistakes
will be made along the way. I also know that violent extremists will
retain their capacity and their appetite to murder innocent people. But
reestablishing civil order--the willingness and the capacity of the
Iraqi Government to meet its responsibilities to its people--is
essential.
The situation in Iraq is unacceptable, and the stakes are
extraordinary--for the United States, for the region, and for the
entire international community. It was, after all, the trouble and
turmoil of the Middle East that produced the violent extremist ideology
of al-Qaeda, which led 19 young men to crash airplanes into our cities
5 years ago on September 11. It is clear that, now and for many years
to come, the crucible of the Middle East will remain the center of
gravity for American and international interests.
There have been other critical times for America, when we have
united as one nation to meet great challenges. Now must be such a time,
for it is a national desire and a national imperative not to fail in
Iraq. This, we believe, is the best strategy to ensure success. And I
ask that you give it a chance to work.
Senator Biden. Madam Secretary, thank you very much. And I
assure you, no one on this committee has any doubt about your
intense concern and the intensity with which you have
deliberated on this and your frank acknowledgment of the
mistakes that have been made. And I don't have any doubt about
us wondering whether or not you care a great deal about this.
I have been told by the staff that the Secretary--she has a
big day today. She has to be here, as well as in the House, and
she understandably will have to leave here by 1 o'clock, at the
latest. According to the staff calculation--and I'm going to
hold everybody to this, including myself--that if we give
everyone 7 minutes, everyone will have an opportunity to ask
her, not all the questions you have, but the most important
questions you think need be asked. We will be holding these
hearings for another 2\1/2\ weeks. There'll be plenty of
opportunities. And, again, the Secretary will be back over the
ensuing months. And so, I hope that that meets with everyone's
approval. Matter of fact, seven may be stretching it, but
that's where we're going to start, if we can.
Let me begin, Secretary Rice. Last night, the President
said, and I quote, ``Succeeding in Iraq requires defending its
territorial integrity and stabilizing the region in the face of
extremists' challenges, and that begins with addressing Iran
and Syria.'' He went on to say, ``We will interrupt the flow of
support for Iran and Syria, and we will seek out and destroy
networks providing advanced weaponry and training to our
enemies in Iraq.'' Does that mean the President has plans to
cross the Syrian and/or Iranian borders to pursue those persons
or individuals or governments providing that help?
Secretary Rice. Mr. Chairman, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs was just asked this question, and I think he perhaps
said it best. He talked about what we're really trying to do
here, which is to protect our forces, and that we are doing
that by seeking out these networks that we know are operating
in Iraq. We are doing it through intelligence. We are then
able, as we did on the 21st of December, to go after these
groups, where we find them. In that case, we then ask the Iraqi
Government to declare them persona non grata and expel them
from the country, because they were holding diplomatic
passports. But what is really being contemplated here, in terms
of these networks, is that we believe we can do what we need to
do inside Iraq. Obviously, the President isn't going to rule
anything out to protect our troops, but the plan is to take
down these networks in Iraq.
The broader point is that we do have, and we have always
had, as a country, very strong interests and allies in the gulf
region, and we do need to work with our allies to make certain
that they have the defense capacity that they need against
growing Iranian military buildup, that they feel that we are
going to be a presence in the Persian Gulf region, as we have
been, and that we establish confidence with the states with
which we have long alliances, that we will help to defend their
interests. And that's what the President had in mind.
Senator Biden. Secretary Rice, do you believe the President
has the constitutional authority to pursue, across the border
into Iraq or Syria, the networks in those countries?
Secretary Rice. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think I would not
like to speculate on the President's constitutional authority
or to say anything that certainly would abridge his
constitutional authority, which is broad, as Commander in
Chief. I do think that everyone will understand that the
American people and, I assume, the Congress, expects the
President to do what is necessary to protect our forces.
Senator Biden. Madam Secretary, I just want to make it
clear, speaking for myself, that if the President concluded he
had to invade Iran or Syria in pursuit of these networks, I
believe the present authorization--which granted the President
the right to use force in Iraq--does not cover that, and he
does need congressional authority to do that. I just want to
set that marker.
Let me move on. How long do you estimate American forces
will be going door to door with their Iraqi counterparts in
Baghdad before they can--I believe the phrase is ``secure''--or
``clear, hold, and build''? What is the estimate of how long
will it take to clear? And how long are we prepared to hold
with American forces in Baghdad that are being surged?
Secretary Rice. Well, I can't give you an exact timetable
on how long operations might take. Let me just note that the
Iraqis are in the lead on these Baghdad operations. And I think
that one reason that it's extremely important that they are
bringing some of their best forces from around Iraq to
participate in this--or to lead this effort is that a good deal
of the establishing of confidence in these neighborhoods has to
be done by Iraqis. We will be in support of them, but I think
that it's extremely important to have an image in mind that it
is Iraqis who are expected to take census. After all, they're
the ones with the linguistics skills to do so. It is Iraqis
that are expected to be in these neighborhoods. The problem
with previous Baghdad security plans is that there weren't
enough forces to hold. I think that it is important that it
will be a combination of Iraqi forces: Army and police--
national police and local police. But we want to be certain,
this time, that the holding phase lasts long enough for the
Iraqis to be able to deal with the perpetrators of the
violence. And so, I don't want to try to put a timeframe on it,
but Secretary Gates said, earlier today, that he expects this
to, of course, be a temporary measure while Iraqi forces are
brought up to----
Senator Biden. Well, Secretary Rice, I think you're right.
It's important to have a visual image of what this means: 6.2
million people, a civil war or a sectarian war taking place.
And here's what the President said last night, referring to our
surge troops, ``The vast majority of them, five brigades, will
be deployed to Baghdad. These troops will work alongside Iraqi
units, and will be embedded in their formations.'' No American
should misunderstand what that means. It means young marines
are going to be standing next to an Iraqi soldier as they break
down a door. So, I'd want to know and you've answered it--my
question related to how long we think these marines and these
five brigades are going to be kicking in doors, standing on
street corners, patrolling neighborhoods, going to second-story
walkups, et cetera. And that was the reason for my question.
But, you're right, it's important we have the correct image of
what this is. And that's what it is.
Secretary Rice. It is important that we have the correct
image that Iraqis want to have this be their responsibility.
Senator Biden. Are you confident--you, personally, Madam
Secretary--this will be my concluding comment--question--are
you confident that Maliki has the capacity to send you a
sufficient number of troops that will stay in the lead, that
will allow American Marines to feel that their physical
security is not being jeopardized merely by being ``with this
brigade of Iraqis''? Are you confident they will send a
sufficient number, and their best?
Secretary Rice. Most importantly, General Casey and our
Ambassador believe strongly that the Maliki government intends
to live up to its obligations.
Senator Biden. But I'm asking you, Secretary Rice.
Secretary Rice. I have met Prime Minister Maliki. I was
with him in Amman. I saw his resolve. I think he knows that his
government is, in a sense, on borrowed time, not just in terms
of the American people, but in terms of the Iraqi people.
Senator Biden. Are you confident?
Secretary Rice. I'm confident.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Secretary--or, excuse
me--Major Secretary----
[Laughter.]
Senator Biden. Senator Lugar--Chairman Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rice, in the New York Times today, columnist
David Brooks wrote a column called ``The Fog Over Iraq.'' I
simply wanted your comment, because you have indicated you have
visited with Prime Minister Maliki. David Brooks references the
meeting of our President with Prime Minister Maliki on November
30 in which, reportedly, Maliki presented a plan in which our
troops, the American troops, would go to the periphery of
Baghdad, and would fight off insurgents, Sunni insurgents or
whoever, trying to penetrate Baghdad. Meanwhile, the Iraqi Army
and police, including Shiites and Kurds, principally, would
take over the responsibility of attempting to clear the city.
Essentially, Brooks says President Bush rejected that plan,
or our Government did, and the President has decided that we
would do the opposite. American troops would be embedded in the
nine police districts in Baghdad, and would, in fact, be more
heavily involved, with a new mandate to secure those areas,
whether door to door or in some other fashion. One thought is,
no, not door to door, that the Shiites go door to door, and
that we are back in the background, advising and supporting,
and so forth. But the article goes on to give the impression
that Maliki and the Kurds and the Shiites had at least an idea
of creating their own kind of stability.
Now, from our standpoint, we may have decided that such a
move rejected the Sunnis as a partner in the process; and,
thus, led to greater destabilization of the country as a whole
on--but let me just ask for your comment as to whether this is
a sequence of events that transpired into the plan that the
President gave last night. And what are the strengths and
dangers of that?
Secretary Rice. Yes, Senator Lugar, the core of the Maliki
plan has really been preserved here. This really is based on
his plan. It is absolutely the case that the Iraqis have wanted
to have responsibility for their own problem, to have their
troops under their command, and to move out. When Prime
Minister Maliki presented the plan, he wanted our people to
look at it with his military people to see how quickly this
could be accelerated so that he could go and take care of the
sectarian problem in Baghdad.
The fact is that it could not be accelerated quickly enough
with only Iraqi forces in order to meet the timeline that he
really felt he had, in terms of dealing with the Baghdad
problem. And so, out of this planning process came, from our
generals, the view that we needed to augment their forces, as
embeds, as, by the way, the Baker-Hamilton Commission
recommends, as people who can help them with, in a sense, on-
the-job training, who can help them to, kind of, solidify their
ability to go after this. But the Iraqis continue to press that
they really need to be the ones interfacing with their
population in a major way, they need to be the ones to deliver
the stability that is needed.
I think you will see that in a relatively brief period of
time as their forces develop, they will take on more and more.
And as the President said last night, the thought is, they
would have all of their forces by November. But there was a gap
in time between the time that they need to get Baghdad under
control and having the capability to do it, even bringing, as
they are, their best and most reliable army forces from around
the country.
So, that's the difference. But I don't believe it was ever
really the Prime Minister's intention that it would be Shia and
Kurds only. I think he understands that one of the problems
that they have is that the Sunni population feels that the
Iraqi Government is not evenhanded in dealing with death
squads.
Senator Lugar. What can you tell us about favorable
reception of some of the sheikhs in Anbar province of our new
policies? Would you describe that situation?
Secretary Rice. Yes. Well, the last time that there was a
kind of formal report about Anbar, I remember some of the
reporting as being the tremendous difficulties in Anbar. And it
is a difficult place, because it is the epicenter of al-Qaeda.
Now what you will hear from our commanders in the area--and
also I have heard directly from my Provincial Reconstruction
Team leader, a very seasoned diplomat--is that the sheikhs have
essentially gotten tired of al-Qaeda, and want them out. They
do not believe that we can do that alone. They have begun to
recruit their own young men to be trained to be a force against
the foreign invaders. They have, for instance, sent 1,100 young
men to Jordan to train for something that they call the ``Sons
of Anbar'' to come back. They will recruit more and send them.
This is also a part of a success, we believe, of a policy with
regional neighbors who have been involved in the Sunni outreach
piece. It is into that--Anbar--that we believe it's important
to surge both civilian and military assets. And so, when the
President talks about 4,000 additional forces sent to Anbar,
this is not because of a sectarian problem, this is because we
think we may be able to support this local effort against al-
Qaeda, and, second, to surge resources into Anbar.
To be very frank, the chairman asked me if I was confident
about the Iraqi Government. I'm confident that they want to do
this. I'm also one who knows that there have been times when
they haven't performed, in the past. And one of the things that
they've got to perform better on is getting economic resources
into some of the Sunni areas, particularly into Anbar. And so,
we are also going to increase the number of Provincial
Reconstruction Teams in Anbar to help with that process.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Dodd.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, U.S. SENATOR FROM
CONNECTICUT
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Madam Secretary. And let me thank you, as
well. We've had some conversations over the last couple of
weeks, prior to the trip Senator Kerry and I took to the
region, and then on the return, as well, and I thank you for
that. And I thank you for being here this morning.
And again, I thank the chairman for holding these set--
these series of hearings that we're going to have on the
subject matter. They'd offer, I hope, an opportunity for us not
only to listen to you, as we did the President last evening,
but also an opportunity for you to hear from us, as well. I
think it's important that there be a conversation here as we
try to sort out this policy and begin to make sense of it. It's
not about Democrats and Republicans, it's about getting this
right. And I couldn't agree more with Senator Biden, I don't
know of another foreign policy crisis that's been as compelling
as this one. Over the past 32 years, as a Member of the House
and as a Member of this body and a member of this committee for
a quarter of a century, I've never been to the region where
I've felt it was more in crisis than it is today, and at
greater risk.
So, I'd like to share just some opening thoughts and
comments, if I can with you, and then--and get to a quick
question.
On the eve of the Second World War, the 20th century's most
daunting and difficult struggle, Winston Churchill explained,
in the following words, a compelling thought, I think. He said,
``There's no worse mistake in public leadership than to hold
out false hopes to be swept away. People face peril or
misfortune with fortitude and buoyancy, but they bitterly
resent being deceived or finding that those responsible for
their affairs are, themselves, dwelling in a fool's paradise.''
Madam Secretary, I'm sorry to say, today--and I think many
hold this view--that a fool's paradise describes nothing as
aptly as our Iraq policy today. I think most Americans know it,
painfully. The Iraqi people, of course, know this, in
compelling numbers.
If the President did grasp, I think, the sad extent of that
failure, I sincerely doubt he would have ordered yet more
troops into Iraq. The President's plan simply strikes me as a
continuation of Operation Together Forward, which has been
described already, which--far from improving Iraq's security
climate, produced the unintended consequences of heightened
sectarian violence.
I fail to see--and I think many others share this view--how
the outcome will be different this time. And that is a true
disservice, I think, to the American troops, who have shown
nothing but professionalism and courage and should not be asked
to risk their lives for an unsound strategy and an unsound and
an unsure purpose.
The Baker-Hamilton Report should have disabused us, in my
view, of the notion that, caught in the midst of sectarian,
ethnic, and religious political hatreds, we can simply bludgeon
our way to victory. As many of us have been saying for some
time now, only political and diplomatic possibilities hold out
any real hope of reversing the spiral into chaos.
The time for blunt force, I think, is long past, and many
hold that view. Instead, we ought to withdraw, I think, our
combat troops from these large urban areas of sectarian
conflict, where they simply are cannon fodder. There are 23
militias operating in Baghdad, alone. It's hard to identify
exactly who is the enemy here. We have Shias and Sunnis, you
have Baathists, you have insurgents, some al-Qaeda elements
here. Asking our military people to sort out who the enemy is
in all of this is extremely difficult, to put it mildly.
Instead, we ought to be focusing our attention on training
reliable Iraqi security forces, providing some security in the
border areas. And, as several of our junior officers that I
talked with in Baghdad suggested, providing the kind of
security around some of these critical infrastructure areas,
and provide the kind of water, sewage, and electrical grids
that are so critical to people having some sense of opportunity
or hope for the future.
If the only solution in Iraq is a political one, then
diplomacy happens to be the weapon that we have left, and must
use. The President's solution to--for all of this--or to all
was, of course, to ignore the most important recommendations
the Iraq Study Group--namely, robust diplomacy--and, instead,
settle on an escalation of our current combat strategy. This is
a tactic in search of a strategy, in my view, and will not
bring us a more stable Iraq.
The American people have spent $14 billion training and
equipping 300,000 Iraqi police and security forces. Yet, as I
said a moment ago, 23 separate sectarian militias operate with
impunity throughout Baghdad, alone. Sectarian killings continue
largely unabated, averaging scores of deaths every day, and
thousands a month. This is not random violence, it is a
targeted civil war complete with ethnic cleansing. Those of us
who have been to Iraq recently have seen it with our own eyes,
heard it with our own ears. Beyond that, the President's own
intelligence experts have told us that the Islamic world is
growing more radical and that the terrorist threat is greater
today than it was on 9/11, not despite, but because of, the
continuing war in Iraq. They conclude it's become both a
physical and ideological training ground for the next
generation of extremists. The wider region has been further
plunged into violence, as we know. Hezbollah has crippled the
Lebanese Government; civil war in the Palestinian territories
now seems more likely than ever; Syria and Iran are more
powerful and emboldened than they have been in recent memory;
we're further away from stabilizing Afghanistan as drug-
traffickers and tribal warfare now threaten to destroy its
nascent democracy, and the Taliban is growing stronger by the
hour.
And perhaps most troubling of all is our standing in the
world. According to the Pew Center for Global Opinion, most
people in Great Britain, France, Spain, Russia, Indonesia,
Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Pakistan, Nigeria, India, and China
think that the war in Iraq is a greater danger to world peace
than either Iran or North Korea, stunning as those numbers are.
The President says that we're in a war of ideas. But how can we
possibly win that kind of a war between democracy and extremism
when so much of the world considers us to be the threat? It's
deeply troubling to me, as I hope it is to you, as well. How
weakened is our standing in the world and our support from
foreign peoples? How many tools have we thrown away? And how
safe are we now?
Senator Lugar raised an important question in his opening
comments that I'd like you to address, if you can, and that
is--none of us are suggesting, at this table, that we engage
Iran or Syria as if they were an ally or a friend or talking
about conferences where we give them a status they don't
deserve. But it's awfully difficult to understand, Madam
Secretary, why we would not try to engage very directly with
people who can play a critical role in providing some
stability. We heard, in Syria, the President say that he's
interested in a secular Arab State operating on his border,
does not want a Shia-dominated fundamentalist state on his
border. That was just a comment to us in the room with Embassy
personnel present. It seems to me it's worthy of examining and
exploring those areas where we can have a common ground here,
rather than just neglecting or ignoring that kind of an offer,
if we're going to bring stability to the region.
I wish you would, once again, address the issue raised by
Senator Lugar in the context in which he raised it, not
diplomacy as a favor or a gift or some acknowledgment that we
agree with these people, but, rather, the necessity for the
United States to lead in a region where we have not been able
to do so.
Secretary Rice. Thank you, Senator.
Let me address the question, first, of Iran and Syria. And
they are different. And I think we need to separate the two.
First of all, on Syria, we did engage, for quite a long
time. Colin Powell engaged. Rich Armitage engaged. Bill Burns
engaged. And, in fact, we got nowhere. And, indeed, I would
argue that the situation, from our point of view, is worse
today, in terms of the terms on which we would be engaging,
than it was at that time.
The terms on which we would be engaging now, and on which
we're being asked to engage, is that we go to the Syrians and
we say, ``Help us to stabilize Iraq,'' or, ``Let's join in our
common interest to stabilize Iraq.'' That's what we would say
to them. The problem, of course, is that if they have an
interest in stabilizing Iraq, I assume that they will do it on
the basis of their national interest, and that they will do it
because it is in their national interest. To do anything more
with them is to suggest that there's a tradeoff that's
possible, ``You help us stabilize in Iraq, and perhaps we will
overlook some of your activities in Lebanon. You help us
stabilize in Iraq, perhaps we can do something to shave some of
the teeth from the tribunal.''
I think it's extremely important to note that we have
talked to the Syrians. We've generally gotten nowhere. And now
we would be going in a way that I fear looks like a supplicant.
Senator Dodd. Could I just ask you, Madam Secretary----
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Dodd [continuing]. Is that speculation on your
part, or has----
Secretary Rice. No.
Senator Dodd [continuing]. That been the reaction you've
heard? It seems to me----
Secretary Rice. I would also just note that an awful lot of
people have engaged the Syrians recently, to no good effect.
The Italians, the Germans, the British all engaged them to no
good effect.
Senator Dodd. Well, but----
Secretary Rice. Senator Dodd, if I really thought that the
Syrians didn't know how to help stabilize Iraq, and we needed
to tell them, then perhaps that would be worth doing. They know
how to stabilize Iraq. They just need to stop allowing
terrorists to cross their borders.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rice. Shall I go to Iran? Because I do think
they're different.
Senator Biden. Yes.
Secretary Rice. When it comes to Iran, first of all,
there's a 27-year history of not engaging Iran, so this would
be a major shift in policy. Of course, we did talk to them
about Afghanistan, when that made sense. But what we're looking
at, again, is an Iran that is engaging activities to try to
kill our troops. They know how to stop that. They know how to
stop it tomorrow. They know how to stop destabilizing the young
Iranian--Iraqi Government. And I assume that if they believe
it's in their interest, they would do so.
But I just don't believe, for a moment, that the
conversation with the Iranians is going to go in the following
way, ``Help us stabilize Iraq,'' and they don't want to talk
about a price on their nuclear program.
We are, I think, dealing with Iran in the proper fashion,
which is to insist, with the rest of the international
community, that any negotiations with Iran are going to be on
the basis of suspension of their nuclear program. We are
reaching out to the Iranian people. We just had a group of
Iranian medical doctors here, in an exchange. We will have some
American sports teams go there. There are banks. We are making
it difficult for Iran to continue its policies of terrorism and
WMD pursuit, because we are sanctioning and designating their
banks that are engaged in those activities, and it is having an
effect on whether people are willing to invest in Iran, whether
they are willing to take the reputational risk of handling
Iranian assets. That's why banks are leaving Iran. That's why
they're having trouble finding a way to support their
investment in their oil and gas industry.
We do have a pretty comprehensive way of dealing with Iran.
I have made the offer. If they are prepared to suspend their
enrichment capability, I'm there with their people at any time
that they'd like and any place that they'd like. But I think
that's the proper context.
And, finally, we do have the opportunity, within the
international compact, to have Iran and Syria play a positive
role in Iraq, if they wish to do it. They are--they've been at
those meetings of the international compact, and they should
play a positive role. And so, I don't think there's an absence
of diplomacy, an absence of a policy toward Iran and Syria;
it's just that direct negotiations on this matter put us in the
role of supplicant, and I think that's a problem.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Biden. Senator Hagel.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, U.S. SENATOR
FROM NEBRASKA
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Welcome, Dr. Rice.
We always appreciate you coming before this committee. And
before I get to my questions, I want to----
[Pause.]
Senator Hagel. I was concerned. I--that doesn't count on my
time. He's not from Nebraska, Mr. Chairman. I----
[Laughter.]
Senator Biden. Would you reset--would you reset the clock?
Senator Hagel. He took the train over from Delaware, that
fellow did. [Laughter.]
Like I was saying, Dr. Rice--it was a little heavy, anyway;
we needed a break----
[Laughter.]
Senator Hagel. We are very appreciative of your trip to the
Middle East tomorrow, because not only does it fit into what we
are discussing today--and I have believed for some time that it
is the centerpiece of the difficulties in the Middle East, as
was noted here by our cochairman--this issue is going to be
with us for some time, as it has been. And you have noted that.
The President has noted that. I would hope that--and I have
reviewed your travel schedule--that we will find, as a result
of those meetings, that we will have locked in place some very
significant followup. And I have been one, as you know--and
I've discussed this with you--that I think the President and
you should think very seriously about some kind of a day-to-day
high-level envoy. You do not have the time and the energy and
the resources and the manpower--I don't need to tell you--to
continue to work this, nor does the President. But if, in fact,
we're going to make progress and move this to some higher
plane, where we are developing some confidence and trust that
we have lost, in my opinion--and I think others share that,
especially recent conversations and poll numbers--this issue
must be addressed, and that means followup. So, thank you for
your leadership.
I want to comment briefly on the President's speech last
night, as he presented to America and the world his new
strategy for Iraq, and then I want to ask you a couple of
questions.
I'm going to note one of the points that the President made
last night at the conclusion of his speech, when he said, ``We
mourn the loss of every fallen American, and we owe it to them
to build a future worthy of their sacrifice.'' And I don't
think there is a question that we all in this country agree
with that. But I would even begin with this evaluation, that we
owe the military and their families a policy--a policy worthy
of their sacrifices. And I don't believe, Dr. Rice, we have
that policy today. I think what the President said last night--
and I listened carefully, and read through it again this
morning--is all about a broadened American involvement--
escalation--in Iraq and the Middle East. I do not agree with
that escalation. And I would further note, that when you say,
as you have here this morning, that we need to address and help
the Iraqis, and pay attention to the fact that Iraqis are being
killed. Madam Secretary, Iraqis are killing Iraqis. We are in a
civil war. This is sectarian violence out of control, Iraqi on
Iraqi. Worse, it is intersectarian violence, Shia killing Shia.
To ask our young men and women to sacrifice their lives to be
put in the middle of a civil war is wrong. It's, first of all,
in my opinion, morally wrong; it's tactically, strategically,
militarily wrong.
We will not win a war of attrition in the Middle East. And
I further note that you talk about skepticism and pessimism of
the American people, and some in Congress. That is not some
kind of a subjective analysis, that is because, Madam
Secretary, we've been there almost 4 years. And there's a
reason for that skepticism and pessimism. And that is based on
the facts on the ground, the reality of the dynamics.
And so, I have been one, as you know, who believed that the
appropriate focus is not to escalate, but to try to find a
broader incorporation of a framework. And it will have to be
certainly regional, as many of us have been saying for a long
time. That should not be new to anyone. But it has to be more
than regional, it is going to have to be internationally
sponsored. And that's going to include Iran and Syria.
When you were engaging Chairman Biden on this issue, on the
specific question, ``Will our troops go into Iran or Syria in
pursuit, based on what the President said last night?'' you
cannot sit here today--not because you're dishonest or you
don't understand--but no one in our Government can sit here
today and tell Americans that we won't engage the Iranians and
the Syrians across the border. Some of us remember 1970, Madam
Secretary, and that was Cambodia. And when our Government lied
to the American people and said, ``We didn't cross the border
going into Cambodia''--in fact, we did. I happen to know
something about that, as do some on this committee.
So, Madam Secretary, when you set in motion the kind of
policy that the President is talking about here, it's very,
very dangerous. Matter of fact, I have to say, Madam Secretary,
that I think this speech, given last night by this President,
represents the most dangerous foreign-policy blunder in this
country since Vietnam, if it's carried out. I will resist it.
Now, let me ask a question about the Maliki government. Is
all of the Maliki government in support of America's
significant escalation of troops and all the other things the
President talked about? And where are our allies? Are they
escalating, as well? It's my understanding that most of our
allies have been withdrawing their troops. My understanding is
that Great Britain intends to have most of their troops, if not
all, out by the end of this year. Are the British escalating
their troops? Are the Poles, the Italians, the South Koreans,
the Australians? Are we finding ourselves isolated--going to
find ourselves isolated? If you would answer those two
questions, thank you.
Secretary Rice. Yes; certainly, Senator.
The first thing, I don't think we anticipate an
augmentation of other coalition forces. But the number of Iraqi
forces that should be growing over the next several months, so
that, in fact, by November, these are the places that Iraq
itself can take care of--we do expect Iraqi forces to fill the
void.
Now, second, let me just go to the question of escalation.
Senator Hagel. Let me ask you to----
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Hagel [continuing]. Answer the second question--
actually, my first question----
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Hagel [continuing]. A little more specifically. The
coalition government of Prime Minister Maliki----
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Hagel [continuing]. The Sunnis----
Secretary Rice. Right.
Senator Hagel [continuing]. Sadr----
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Hagel [continuing]. His 30 members, which leads us
right into, as we put our Marines and Army in Baghdad, another
22,000, or whether that's going to be 15,000, we're going to
then put them in a position to be killing, I assume, militia--
because the militia's the problem there. And, so, that's the
position we're going to put our troops in, and they'll be
killing our troops. Now, are the Sunni-Shia coalition members,
and the Kurds, of Maliki's government, are they all supporting
our new position?
Secretary Rice. Of course Muqtada al-Sadr does not support
coalition forces at all.
Senator Hagel. He has 30 representatives on that----
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Hagel [continuing]. Government. So my--again, is
this a--is this a unified support of--go ahead.
Secretary Rice. Sorry. His 30 people are not even enough.
If you count the two Kurdish parties, the IIP and the other
Shia parties, they are, in fact, a majority. And, indeed, the
President has talked to the leaders of those blocs, prior to
this, to say that they need to support Prime Minister Maliki's
plan. And the augmentation of our forces, of course, is in
support of that plan.
So, I think you will find support among the people who are
supporting Prime Minister Maliki in his desire to end the
sectarian violence, and that is more than Prime Minister Maliki
himself.
Senator Hagel. Well, that's not my question.
Secretary Rice. Well, you asked me to also----
Senator Hagel. My question was the escalation of American
troops in Iraq.
Secretary Rice. But I think you asked who was supporting
it, and I said the Kurdish parties, Prime Minister Maliki and
his Shia allies, and the IIP support a plan to do this, and
they know that the augmentation of American forces is part of
that plan.
Now, as to the question of escalation, I don't see it, and
the President doesn't see it, as an escalation.
Senator Hagel. Putting 22,000 new troops--more troops in is
not an escalation?
Secretary Rice. Well, I think, Senator, escalation is not
just a matter of how many numbers you put in. Escalation is
also a question of, ``Are you changing the strategic goal of
what you're trying to do?''
Senator Hagel. Would you call it a decrease and billions
of----
Secretary Rice. I would----
Senator Hagel [continuing]. Dollars more than you----
Secretary Rice. I would----
Senator Hagel [continuing]. Need for it?
Secretary Rice. I would call it, Senator, an augmentation
that allows the Iraqis to deal with this very serious problem
that they have in Baghdad. This is not a change in what we are
trying to achieve. The Iraqi Government needs to establish
population security. What this augmentation does is to help
them carry out their plan to get population security.
I just want to note, though, of course, that many of the
American casualties actually are taken in places like Anbar,
they're also taken, really, because convoys are moving back and
forth in the city. They are deliberately done by people who are
trying to get us out of the country. They're not because we are
caught in the middle of crossfire between Sunnis and Shia. I
think it is important, again, to use the chairman's word, to
have an image of what's really going on in Baghdad. It is
absolutely the case that Iraqi----
Senator Hagel. Madam Secretary, your intelligence and mine
is a lot different. And I know my time is up here. But to sit
there and say that, Madam Secretary; that's just not true.
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, if you will----
Senator Hagel. That is not true.
Secretary Rice. Senator, if you'll allow me to finish,
there is a point I'd like to make about the Iraqis killing
Iraqis and what that really is.
Senator Hagel. Well, what that really is, it's pretty
obvious what it really is.
Secretary Rice. There are death squads, Senator, that are
going into neighborhoods, and they are killing Iraqis. And,
indeed, the death squads are Iraqis. So, in that sense, it's
Iraqis killing Iraqis.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Secretary Rice. But I think it is wrong to give an image
that somehow all Sunnis and Shia have broken into violence
against one another. What the Maliki government is trying to do
is to reestablish civil order so that the violent groups,
including militias, including death squads, are dealt with by
Iraqi forces, with the aid of American forces. That's different
than saying that all of Iraq has fallen into civil war. And I
just think it's the wrong image. Not all of Baghdad has fallen
into civil war. There are deliberate efforts by organized
groups to go after Sunnis, if they are Shia, and Shia, if they
are Sunnis. What the President said to Prime Minister Maliki
is, ``You have got to be evenhanded in how you go after these
killers, whether they are Sunni or whether they are Shia.'' And
that is the obligation that he undertook, and it is the
assurance that he gave.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Senator Biden. Gentlemen, these are really important
exchanges, but if we're going to get to the junior members
being able to ask their questions, I'm going to have to start
to cut them off. And I'm reluctant to do it, because this is
something the American people should hear and understand. And
so, I'm sorry, but I'm going to try to--try to get us back into
the--into this 7 minutes. OK?
Senator Kerry.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, U.S. SENATOR FROM
MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Kerry. You had to put the hammer down now, huh?
[Laughter.]
Senator Biden. Yes; I'm going to put the hammer down now.
Yes; right.
Senator Kerry. Madam Secretary, welcome. And we appreciate
your being here. I'm going to try and summarize a couple of
comments--of thoughts, quickly, and then, obviously, try to get
some questions. The time is so tight.
With all due respect, I think you were splitting hairs a
little bit in your answer to Senator Hagel. It is true that
Iraq, as a whole, is not engaged in--broadly, as you're saying,
but the trendline is increasingly moving in that direction. And
in places like Basrah, the British are struggling. There's
increasing violence in communities where there wasn't. And the
level of violence, according to most people's standards, the
testimony we had yesterday in this committee, is larger than
classified civil wars in many other places, historically. And
the violence of Sunni on Shia is clearly sectarian, and it is
civil war between them. Low grade, still; but, nevertheless,
civil war.
The Middle East that Senator Dodd and I saw when we were
there a few weeks ago, certainly the Middle East I saw, is very
different from the one that I think you've described here
today. Last night's speech by the President was very important.
It was important for what it said and set out as a policy, but
it was also important, I think, for what it didn't say and
didn't do.
Many of us--as you know, in our own personal conversation,
we've been looking for a bipartisan way to approach this. I
think the President lost an enormous opportunity last night for
that bipartisanship. None of us want failure. There is a road
to success, in the judgment of some people, conceivably. Much
more out of reach than it ever was at any point in time,
because of the failure to make the right choices and to find
that consensus to date.
But last night the President chose, fundamentally, to
ignore the foundation built by the Iraq Study Group, the
foundation built, bipartisan basis here, and knowingly and
willfully has divided the country yet again, and the Congress,
over this issue. We didn't find that bipartisanship. And what
was particularly lacking, in my judgment--and I don't
understand it--was the political-diplomatic approach and
solution here. Every general, you yourself, the President, has
said, there's no military solution. But last night the
President didn't offer the diplomatic and political solution.
And why there isn't a resolution on the oil revenue, why there
isn't a resolution on the federalism, why there isn't a path to
that through the summitry and the diplomacy necessary, is
really beyond a lot of people's understanding, at this point.
The Middle East that we saw is a Middle East--and if you
measure a policy by what it's accomplishing--I mean, I hate to
say it, but this policy is unbelievably off the mark. A
failure. Hamas is stronger than at any time previously.
Hezbollah is stronger than at any time previously. Iran is
stronger than at any time previously. Iraq is more of a mess
than at any time previously. That is the measure of a failure.
And so, the question is--and here, we have, in the New York
Times today, a story, saying that--promising troops where they
aren't really needed, a story about how the government itself
is saying, ``We don't want them,'' and how they would like to
run the war the way they want to, which I thought was the
purpose of this exercise, but we're not going to let them.
Now, I want to get to some questions, and it's hard to do
it in this timeframe. But the President said, last night, that
America's commitment is not open-ended, and, if they don't
follow through, they will lose the support of the American
people and the Iraqi people. I don't want to debate with you
whether or not you--they've already lost the support of the
American people. I think it's pretty evident to most people
that that's where we are. But what does it mean to say it's not
open-ended? What is the accountability measure here? Are you
saying, if it's not open-ended, that you're prepared to
terminate it? Do you agree that it's not open-ended, first of
all?
Secretary Rice. Of course it is not open-ended.
Senator Kerry. All right. If it's not open-ended, does that
mean you're prepared, if they fail, to pull out, to terminate?
What is the--what is the accountability mechanism?
Secretary Rice. Senator, I think it's best to leave the
President's words as the President's words.
I do think that the accountability rests in two places.
First of all, I think the Iraqis now know that if they don't
succeed in returning security to their population, then their
population is not going to support them.
Senator Kerry. And what are we going to do? That's the big
issue to the United States Congress.
Secretary Rice. It's a democratic process. And, second, we
will have an opportunity, as this policy unfolds--it's not
going to happen overnight, to see whether or not, in fact, the
Iraqis are living up to the assurances that they gave us.
Senator Kerry. And what if they don't?
Secretary Rice. Senator, I don't think you go to plan B.
You work with plan A.
Senator Kerry. But that's not a plan B. That's a very
critical issue here.
Secretary Rice. You work with plan A, and you give it the
possibility of success, the best possibility of success. And I
want to emphasize, it's not just about Baghdad. There are other
elements to this policy. And I really think it's important not
to underestimate the importance of relying, of course, on the
Maliki government, in terms of Baghdad, but also relying on the
local councils and the local leaders of Baghdad, through the
expansion of PRTs there, relying on the local leaders in places
like Anbar to do the kinds of things that they've started to
do.
Senator Kerry. But, Madam Secretary, with all due respect--
I mean, all of that is good. I think those PRT teams are
terrific, and I think the effort of those folks out there is
courageous, unbelievable. But they can't do this if Abdul Aziz
al-Hakim and SCIRI have a grand design for a nine-province
state that is Shia in the south, to the exclusion of adequate
support to the Sunni in Baghdad and a central government. You
know that. They can't do it if Muqtada al-Sadr has ambitions
with respect to the country, and the Sunni aren't brought to
the table with a sufficient stake that they feel they're
sharing. That's the fundamental struggle here.
Secretary Rice. I agree, Senator.
Senator Kerry. The President didn't address it.
Secretary Rice. No; the President did address it. He talked
about the need for the national oil law.
Senator Kerry. The need for it, but not how it's going to
happen and why do we have to wait 3 years to have that?
Secretary Rice. It's actually a very difficult thing,
Senator, in a place where they've never solved their problems
by politics, to ask them to take one of the most fundamental
issues facing the country, which is, how are they going to
divide the one strong resource they have--which is oil--and
what's remarkable is that the oil law that they are now close
to finalizing is not a sectarian oil law. In fact, even though
the Kurds might have been expected as some have said they
would--to insist that they will simply control all the
resources themselves, that's not what the oil law does.
Senator Kerry. I understand what the framework for it is.
But the question is: Why is there not the political resolution
on the table that assures Americans that the fundamental
struggle between Sunni and Shia--and the struggle within Shia--
I mean, the President talked last night about this war as if
it's sort of a single war--the Green Zone government struggling
for democracy versus everybody else. Really, there are four or
five--there are several wars.
Senator Biden. Senator, your----
Senator Kerry. There's a war of----
Senator Biden [continuing]. Time is----
Senator Kerry [continuing]. Sunni on Shia. There's a war of
Sunni and Shia on American occupiers. There's a war of Syria,
Iran, engaging with----
Secretary Rice. Senator, I think everybody understands
that, but you asked me about the political reconciliation.
Senator Kerry. Well----
Senator Biden. Senator, I'm sorry, your time is up. We're
just not going to be able----
Secretary Rice. All right.
Senator Biden. If----
Senator Kerry. Well, could you just speak to the----
Secretary Rice. Shall I answer?
Senator Kerry [continuing]. Political piece, please?
Secretary Rice. Yes. The political piece, it is composed of
the following elements: The national oil law, which is a
remarkable law, in that it does not take a sectarian cast; a
new de-Baathification policy, which already has allowed a
number of officers to return to the armed forces, and pensions
to be paid, and there will be further effort on that; a
commitment to provincial elections, which the Sunnis feel will
be important for righting the disproportionally low share of
their representation in provincial councils, because they
boycotted the elections, early on. These are the elements of a
national reconciliation plan. And I don't think, Senator, it
can be imposed from the outside. I do think the Iraqis
themselves, with our help and with the help of others--and, by
the way, with an international compact, where the international
community has, indeed, said, ``Those are the obligations that
you must undertake for support''--that that is how they will
get to that national reconciliation plan. But they're not going
to get there if they're unable to provide population security
in Baghdad, because that is stoking the atmosphere of
sectarianism.
Senator Biden. I realize that generates a lot of questions,
but I'm going to yield now to Senator Coleman.
STATEMENT OF HON. NORM COLEMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rice, first I would say that I do appreciate the
President's candor last night in admitting mistakes. I think it
was important. I share his perspective on the two fronts we
face in Iraq. We're fighting a war against al-Qaeda and foreign
fighters in Al Anbar province. We're winning that war. I was
there just 3 weeks ago. But the problem is that we can't be
successful there in the long term, unless we have Sunnis in the
police force and Sunnis in the army. And that gets back to the
sectarian violence that we're seeing in Baghdad.
The chairman asked the question about capacity. To me, the
issue is not the capacity of the Iraqis to do what has to be
done to deal with this sectarian violence, but their resolve. I
met with Dr. Rubaie, who is the Prime Minister's national
security advisor, and I can tell you, 3 weeks ago he didn't
think the answer to the violence in Baghdad was more American
troops there. The sense I got from Dr. Rubaie was, ``We
[Iraqis] can take care of this--it is our problem.'' You've
indicated that, ``This time, they're going to make the
difficult choices.'' And I'm not seeing that type of resolve in
the Iraqis. It is difficult to ask them to enact an oil law.
It's a lot more difficult to ask our sons and daughters and
fathers and brothers and sisters to be on the front line in
Baghdad, in the crosshairs of sectarian violence when we have
this question about the resolve of the Iraqis to do what they
need to do to end sectarian hatred.
And so, my question to you is: Wouldn't it be wiser to hold
the Iraqis to certain benchmarks, to tell them, ``You have X
number of months to pass an oil law that distributes oil
throughout the region, to put money into places like Anbar
province, that are Sunni-dominated and have been cut off in the
past, and to show a real commitment to a reconciliation''? I
just don't know if the Iraqis are done killing each other. I
don't know if the bloodletting is past the mark where all the
groups are tired of it and willing to pursue reconciliation.
Why wouldn't it be wiser for us today, ``We'll give you 6
months to do this, and if you achieve it, there are a range of
things that the U.S. can do in response''? Why put more
American lives on the line now, in the hope that this time the
Iraqis will make the difficult choices?
Secretary Rice. Senator, you've come to the real crux of
the matter. Is it a matter of capacity or is it a matter of
resolve? If you think it's just a matter of resolve, then I
think that's precisely the strategy that you would pursue. You
would say to them, ``Show us, first, that you're resolved, and
then we'll help you.'' But if you think it's both a matter of
resolve and capability, which our people do, despite the
somewhat bravado of Mr. Rubaie and some others--I think the
Iraqi Defense Minister didn't think that he has the forces to
do what he needs to do. And so, if you think it's a matter of
both resolve and capability, then you want to provide the
capability up front so they don't fail. And that's really what
the President is saying. Then you have to have the resolve. I
am absolutely of the mind, and absolutely committed, that they
have to have the resolve. And, frankly, they haven't always
shown it. But they are moving on a number of fronts that show
that resolve--the oil law, some of the moves on de-
Baathification.
But I think, again, it's important to have a view of what
Baghdad really looks like. First of all, they are going to be
on the front lines, because they understand that sectarian
violence has to be ended by them, not by us. We can support
them; we can't take it on. But all of us remember times in our
history when it was not good to be in a neighborhood when the
police came in. I came from a part of our country where that
was the case. Seeing the police come into Birmingham, AL, when
I was a kid, was not a comforting sight. That's essentially the
case in some of the neighborhoods of Baghdad. And so, what that
government has to do is to reestablish in that population the
confidence that they are going to establish civil order, that
they're not going to let death squads take out neighborhoods,
kill the men, send the women into exile. That's what we're
trying to help them to do. But they've got to be on the front
lines of this, because ultimately only they can solve the
sectarian problem.
Senator Coleman. I think we agree on the outcome. We agree
on what the Iraqi Government has to do. We face the saying,
``Fooled once, shame on you; fooled twice, shame on me.'' What
I have yet to see--even as recently as 3 weeks ago--is that
level of commitment and resolve, so that the Shias are willing
to say, ``We're going to take care of the Muqtada al-Sadrs.
We're going to do those things that have to be done to quell
the sectarian violence.'' And to put the lives of more
Americans in the center of that sectarian violence in Baghdad,
without first having the Iraqis deliver on substantial
benchmarks on reconciliation, something we can point to, other
than just trusting--I'm not prepared, at this time, to support
that. The cost is too great. But it would appear to me that if
we could get some measure of assurance that the commitment is
there on the part of the Iraqis to deliver, that would be
acceptable. What we have now from the Iraqis are promises that
they have failed to fulfill previously, and I think the cost is
too high to make further troop commitments based on the
calculation we are faced with.
Secretary Rice. Thank you.
Senator, may I just say, I understand. We're clear-eyed,
too, about the fact that the Iraqi Government has to perform,
and we're clear-eyed about the fact that they've not, in the
past. But I think it's awfully important to recognize that the
violence--the sectarian violence, which was really accelerated
by Samarra--is threatening to outrun their chance to do exactly
the things that you want them to do, because the atmosphere of
sectarianism is breaking down the very fabric of a society
that, frankly, has a lot of ties between their peoples. Their
tribes are mixed Sunni and Shia. There are intermarried Sunni
and Shia. There are a lot of fibers of the society that are
actually not sectarian. But if what is going on in Baghdad
continues apace, without the government capable of getting
control of it and reestablishing civil order, then you are
going to have the kind of breakdown in the fabric of society to
support the very processes of national reconciliation that
you're talking about. That's why this is urgent, and that's why
we don't have time to sequence it, to let them prove themselves
first and then we will add forces to help them do what they
need to do. As I said, if it's a matter of just resolve, then
the sequencing works. But it's also capability. And that's the
assessment of our military people and of our political people.
We have the ability, of course, to see how they're doing,
in terms of living up to their obligations, because not all
American forces are going to go in up front. Not all will be
ready to go in on day one. And you can be sure that we're going
to be watching very carefully, and we're going to be pressing
them very hard, that their obligations are obligations that, if
they don't meet, this plan cannot succeed. We're also going to
be diversifying our efforts, making sure that we're not just
dependent on the Maliki government for some successes in the
country, but rather on local leaders, of the kind that we're
working with in Anbar. But I just think it's extremely
important to recognize that the threat right now is that that
fabric of a society that is nonsectarian is being stretched to
the limit by what's going on in Baghdad. And they don't have a
lot of time to get on top of it, and we don't have time to
sequence our help to help them get on top of it.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
Senator Feingold.
STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, U.S. SENATOR FROM
WISCONSIN
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Madam Secretary, for appearing before the
committee today. Unfortunately, Madam Secretary, this hearing
is taking place in the context of what has become a true
nightmare for the United States, and quite possibly the
greatest foreign policy mistake in the history of our Nation.
We just heard Senator Hagel, I think, use similar language, and
I thank him sincerely for his candor before this committee.
We currently have 140,000 of our bravest men and women in
uniform in Iraq, stuck in what has become a civil war. Over
3,000 Americans have died. And yet, we continue to see
increases in interethnic attacks and bombings, in the strength
of Shia militias and the strength of the insurgency and
displaced persons and so on. Almost 4 years after this war
began, Iraqis are no closer to a political agreement or to
resolving the underlying political, ethnic, religious, and
economic problems that are ripping the country apart. But the
President wants to send more United States troops to Iraq. His
strategy runs counter to the needs of our strained military,
counter to the testimony of our military's most senior
officers, counter to the need to address the troubling
developments in places like Afghanistan and Somalia, and
counter to the fact that, after 4 years of failed strategies
for victory, the American people have sent a resounding
message, and that message is, it is time to redeploy our brave
troops out of Iraq now.
The American people soundly rejected the President's Iraq
policy in November. They sent a clear message that maintaining
our troops in Iraq is not in the interest of our national
security. They understand that our Iraq-centric policies are
hurting our ability to defeat the enemy that attacked us on 9/
11.
We can't afford to continue this course. I have
consistently called for the redeployment of our military from
Iraq. I was the first Senator, in August 2005, to call for a
timetable to withdraw the troops over a period of time of 15
months, at that time. But that advice has not been heeded. And
now Congress must use its main power, the power of the purse,
to put an end to our involvement in this disastrous war. And
I'm not talking here only about the surge or escalation. It is
time to use the power of the purse to bring our troops out of
Iraq. Over the next several weeks, I--and I hope, many of my
colleagues--will work together to take a hard look at exactly
how we should do that. But it is time to use that power.
Our troops in Iraq have performed heroically, but we cannot
continue to send our Nation's best into a war that was
started--and is still maintained--on false pretenses. An
indefinite presence of United States military personnel in Iraq
will not fix that country's political problems. And sending
more troops to Iraq will not provide the stability that can
only come from a political agreement.
From the beginning, this war has been a mistake, and the
policies that have carried it out have been a failure. We need
a new national security strategy that starts with a
redeployment from Iraq so we can repair and strengthen our
military and focus on the global threats to our national
security.
With that, Madam Secretary, my first question is this. Is
the United States more secure now as a result of our military
incursion into Iraq than we were before we entered Iraq?
Secretary Rice. Senator, I think that we are more secure.
We are more secure, but we're not secure.
Senator Feingold. Are we more secure, vis-a-vis al-Qaeda?
Secretary Rice. We have done a lot to break up al-Qaeda,
the forces that came against us on September 11.
Senator Feingold. But are we more secure, vis-a-vis al-
Qaeda, than we were before we went into Iraq?
Secretary Rice. Senator, I do think that we are more
secure, vis-a-vis al-Qaeda, for a lot of reasons, not just our
policies in the Middle East; the policies we've undertaken
through homeland security improvements.
Senator Feingold. I asked you whether, as a result of our
Iraqi intervention, are we more secure, vis-a-vis al-Qaeda?
Secretary Rice. Senator, the notion about Iraq has always
been that to deal with the short-term problem of al-Qaeda, as
it exists now, is not going to create long-term security. You
can only do that by changing the nature of the Middle East that
produced al-Qaeda. I don't want us to confuse what we are doing
in Iraq with the short-term problem.
Senator Feingold. All right. Well, let me ask about----
Secretary Rice. The longer term security.
Senator Feingold [continuing]. Other things.
Secretary Rice. The longer term issue is how the Middle
East itself evolves.
Senator Feingold. Right.
Secretary Rice. And that's why Iraq is so important, and
that's why it's important that we succeed in Iraq.
Senator Feingold. I understand the argument. I completely
reject it, but I understand it.
What about Afghanistan? Are we better off in Afghanistan
than we were before the invasion of Iraq?
Secretary Rice. I think there's no doubt that we are better
off in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has made a lot of progress
since 2001--when we invaded.
Senator Feingold. That's not what I asked. I asked if we're
better off since the intervention in Iraq.
Secretary Rice. Senator, not everything is related to what
we have done in Iraq.
Senator Feingold. It's a simple----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. We've done----
Senator Feingold [continuing]. Question. Did it----
Secretary Rice. What we've done----
Senator Feingold [continuing]. Help or did it hurt our
situation in Afghanistan?
Secretary Rice. I think that we have been managing what is
going on in Afghanistan as we've been managing what's been
going on in Iraq. I don't actually see the connection that you
are trying to draw.
Senator Feingold. They're not----
Secretary Rice. I don't understand.
Senator Feingold. Well, are we better off, vis-a-vis Iran
and North Korea, than we were prior to the intervention in
Iraq? Is our security situation, vis-a-vis Iran and North
Korea, better than it was before the intervention in Iraq?
Secretary Rice. Well, I don't really think, Senator, that
the North Korean nuclear test has anything to do with Iraq.
Senator Feingold. Well, I think the diversion of attention
from the most important problems in the world has everything to
do with this terrible mistake.
What--let's try something that I think is more direct--what
about our military, the strain on our military? Is our military
better off than it was before Iraq intervention?
Secretary Rice. Senator, we're at war. And when we're at
war, there's going to be strain on the military. I think that's
what General Pace would tell you. But, again, I just can't
agree with you that there's been a diversion of our attention
from all other policy problems. If you look at the progress
that we've actually made on North Korea, with North Korea under
a chapter 7 resolution and with six-party talks about to begin
again, if you look at the progress that we're making on
stopping an Iranian nuclear weapon, that, by the way, has been
entrain for quite some time, if you look at the progress that
we've made--and I have to say, you know, this Middle East that
somehow was so stable before we invaded Iraq is a Middle East
that I didn't recognize in 2000 or 2001 either. That was a
Middle East where Saddam Hussein was still in power, still with
the potential to invade his neighbors, as he had done before,
where Syria was deep into Lebanon, where the Palestinian
territories were governed by a man who was stealing the
Palestinians blind, but couldn't take a peace deal--I don't
see----
Senator Feingold. My time----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. That Middle East as having
been----
Senator Feingold [continuing]. My----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Very stable. So----
Senator Feingold. My time is up, but I see this problem of
our security as an international problem. And I believe the
diversion of attention in Iraq has been absolutely catastrophic
with regard to our national security.
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, I appreciate your views on
that, but I'm the one who, every day, goes to the office and
works not just on Iraq, but on North Korea, on Iran, on the
problems in Somalia, in Sudan. And I think if you look around,
you'll see that the United States has a very active policy
everywhere in the world.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
Senator Corker. And, again, welcome to the committee.
STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I appreciate the
tremendous testimony that you've allowed us to have over the
last 3 days.
And, Madam Secretary, thank you for being here.
I've heard a lot--it seems that people agree--that in Iraq
we need a political solution, that that is what needs to occur.
And it seems to me that what the administration has tried to
put forth is a way for a political process to occur and a
political solution to happen, and that is by causing Iraqis to
actually feel secure, to feel like they can, in fact, go about
a political process in a way that allows people to debate and
come to a solution.
One of the things I've realized with the testimony over the
last 3 days is, there is another school of thought, and that
is, that by some--and I don't mean by anybody on this panel,
specifically--but that, by some who wish to withdraw, they
believe that the only way there's going to be a political
process, a healthy political process, is for there to be an
all-out civil war first, that what we've had is a measured
civil war, and that, by withdrawing, there actually would be an
all-out civil war, and that things have got to get much worse
before they get any better.
I'd like for you to address those two schools of thought,
if you would.
Secretary Rice. Well, thank you, Senator.
First of all, I think you've put it very well, because the
risk of American withdrawal, or, as it's sometimes called,
redeployment--and I think we have to recognize, redeployment's
really withdrawal--then we are dealing with a circumstance in
which the Iraqis are so-called ``left to their own devices'' to
deal with a problem that threatens to overwhelm their political
process. And that is the sectarian violence in Baghdad.
Again, as I was saying to Senator Coleman, it really does
depend on whether you think this is a matter of Iraqi resolve
or a matter of capability, or a matter of both. And the
President and his team thinks it's a matter of both. And so, no
amount of resolve, if they don't have the capability, is going
to help them to deal with the sectarian violence in Baghdad.
That's why we want to augment their capability, so that they
can show that resolve.
When analysts look at what you would be talking about if
you just said to them, ``All right, you just go at one another,
and we'll go to the borders and defend the borders, and we'll
fight al-Qaeda, and we'll do a few other things, but it's
really up to you to resolve this,'' I think it has the wrong
idea of what's really going on in Baghdad. It's not as if,
street-to-street, every Sunni and every Shia is determined to
kill each other. That's really not the case. You do have,
stoked by al-Qaeda, after the Samarra bombing, people--
extremist Sunni and Shia death squads, Sunni and Shia--who are,
in the name of sectarianism, going in to neighborhoods, killing
the men--that's where those bodies are coming from--expelling
the women--that's why there are internally displaced people--
but it is an organized effort to perpetrate violence by Shia
death squads and Sunni death squads. That means that if the
Iraqi Government is actually able to deal with the organized
effort, then they will be able to stem the tide of sectarian
violence. But if they're not able to do that, and to
reestablish civil order, then the fabric of the society, which
has not always been just sectarian--there is a lot of
intermarriage, a lot of--a lot of community between the
groups--that fabric's going to break apart.
And so, that's why the President has outlined what he has.
He did look, Senator, at other options. He did look at the
question of whether or not the Iraqis could be told, ``Go do
this on your own.'' And the assessment of the people on the
ground, both our political people and our military people, is
that they didn't yet have the forces to do it. I think General
Casey said, at one point, it would be the summer before they
were really able to take control of operations in Iraq. Well,
by the summer, if something hasn't improved in Baghdad, then
they're going to be in very difficult straits.
So, as you think about this policy, and whether you decide
to accept it or reject it, I think you have to think about the
consequences of not going down this route. And the consequences
of that is that you leave the Iraqi Government without the
capability to deal with their sectarian problem.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, out of respect for my more
senior junior members on this committee, I'm going to pass
any----
Senator Biden. I'm sure it's appreciated. Thank you very
much, Senator.
Chairman Boxer.
STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER, U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, for me today marks the bipartisan end of a
rubberstamp Senate, and I am proud to be here in behalf of the
people of California.
Madam Secretary, on November 7, the American people voted
for a change in Congress, citing Iraq as the No. 1 issue
affecting their vote. And a week later, General Abizaid told
the Senate Armed Services Committee that he checked with every
single divisional commander on the ground in Iraq, and, to a
person, no one believed that more American troops would improve
the situation, because the Iraqis already rely on us too much.
And then, on December 7, the Iraq Study Group, noting that 61
percent of the Iraqis, who you say support us so much, approve
of attacks on United States troops--they approve of shooting
and killing United States troops--the Iraqi Study Group, in
light of that, recommended that United States combat troops
should be redeployed out of Iraq by early 2008. They also
called for an immediate meeting--international meeting in the
region to find a political solution to Iraq. And one line that
stands out in that Iraq Study Report is, ``Absent a political
solution, all the troops in the world will not provide
security.''
And on January 8, the Military Times--and I'd ask unanimous
consent to place this into the record, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Chairman, may I place this in the record? The Military Times?
Senator Biden. Without objection, it'll be placed in the
record.
Senator Boxer. The Military Times published a poll, which
found that only 35 percent of military members approved of the
way President Bush is handling this war, and only 38 percent
thought there should be more troops.
So, from where I sit, Madam Secretary, you are not
listening to the American people, you are not listening to the
military, you are not listening to the bipartisan voices from
the Senate, you are not listening to the Iraq Study Group. Only
you know who you are listening to. And you wonder why there is
a dark cloud of skepticism and pessimism over this Nation.
I think people are right to be skeptical, after listening
to some of the things that have been said by your
administration. For example, October 19, 2005, you came before
this committee to discuss, in your words, ``how we assure
victory in Iraq.'' And you said the following in answer to
Senator Feingold, ``I have no doubt that, as the Iraqi security
forces get better--and they are getting better and are holding
territory, and they are doing the things with minimal help--we
are going to be able to bring down the level of our forces. I
have no doubt''--I want to reiterate--``I have no doubt that
that's going to happen in a reasonable timeframe.'' You had no
doubt. Not a doubt. And last night the President's announcement
of an escalation is a total rebuke of your confident
pronouncement.
Now, the issue is: Who pays the price? Who pays the price?
I'm not going to pay a personal price. My kids are too old, and
my grandchild is too young. You're not going to pay a
particular price, as I understand it, with immediate family.
So, who pays the price? The American military and their
families. And I just want to bring us back to that fact.
NPR has done a series of interviews with families who have
lost kids. And the announcer said to one family in the Midwest,
``What's changed in your lives since your son's death?'' The
answer comes back, ``Everything. You can't begin to imagine how
even the little things change--how you go through the day, how
you celebrate Christmas''--Mr. Chairman, could I please--``You
can't begin to imagine how you celebrate any holiday or
birthday. There's an absence. It's not like the person has
never been there. They've--always were there, and now they're
not, and you're looking at an empty hole. He has a purple
heart. The flag that was on his coffin. And one of the two urns
that we got back--he came back in three parts, two urns and one
coffin. He's buried in three places, if you count our house.
He's buried in New Jersey. He's buried in Cleveland.'' That's
who's going to pay the price.
And then you have the most moving thing I've ever heard on
a radio station, which is a visit to a burn unit and a talk
with the nurse. Devon suffered burns over 93 percent of his
body, three amputations--both legs, one arm--his back was
broken, internal organs exposed. As the hospital staff entered
the room, they would see photographs on the wall, pictures of a
healthy private standing proud in his dark green Army dress
uniform. ``It's very important,'' says the major, ``that nurses
see the patient as a person, because the majority of our
patients have facial burns and they're unrecognizable, and
they're extremely disfigured.''
So, who pays the price? Not me. Not you. These are the
people who pay the price.
So, I want to ask you, since this administration has been
so clear about how this has been a coalition, and a coalition--
you've already said that we don't have anybody else escalating
their presence at this time. Is that correct?
Secretary Rice. That is correct.
Senator Boxer. That is correct. Have you seen the recent
news that the British are going to be bringing home thousands
of troops in the near future?
Secretary Rice. I have seen the stories about what the
British are going to do. I'll wait for a confirmation from the
British Government about what they're going to do.
Senator Boxer. OK. I would ask unanimous consent to place
into the record the article from today that announces that
that's what they're going to do, is bring home thousands of
troops.
And I want to point out to the American people, we are all
alone. We are all alone. There's no other country standing with
us in this escalation. And if you look at this coalition, the
closest to us--we've got about 130-140,000 troops. I don't know
the exact number. The Brits had 7,200. They're going to be
announcing they're bringing home, as I understand it, more than
3,000 of those. The next-biggest coalition member is South
Korea with 2,300; Poland, with 900; and, after that, Australia,
with 800. No one is joining us in this surge.
Do you have an estimate of the number of casualties we
expect from this surge?
Secretary Rice. No, Senator. I don't think there's any way
to give you such an estimate.
Senator Boxer. Has the President--because he said, ``expect
more sacrifice''--he must know.
Secretary Rice. Senator, I don't think that any of us have
a number that--of expected casualties. I think that people
understand that there is going to be violence for some time in
Iraq, and that there will be more casualties.
And let me just say, you know, I fully understand the
sacrifice that the American people are making, and especially
the sacrifice that our soldiers are making, men and women in
uniform. I visit them. I know what they're going through. I
talk to their families. I see it.
I could never--and I can never--do anything to replace any
of those lost men and women in uniform, or the diplomats, some
of whom have been lost----
Senator Boxer. Madam Secretary, please, I know you feel
terrible about it. That's not the point. I was making the case
as to who pays the price for your decisions. And the fact that
this administration would move forward with this escalation
with no clue as to the further price that we're going to pay
militarily--we certainly know the numbers, billions of dollars,
that we can't spend here in this country--I find really
appalling that there's not even enough time taken to figure out
what the casualties would be.
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator----
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rice. Senator, I think it would be highly
unlikely for the military to tell the President, ``We expect X
number of casualties because of this augmentation of the
forces.'' And, again, let me just say, the President sees this
as an effort to help the Iraqis with an urgent task so that the
sectarian violence in Baghdad does not outrun the political
process and make it impossible to have the kind of national
reconciliation that we all want to see there.
But I just want to say one thing, Senator, about the
placard that you held up. I have to admit, my eyesight's not
what it used to be, so I couldn't actually see the date
underneath, but I think it may have been 2005.
Senator Boxer. October--it was the end of 2005, October--
mid-October----
Secretary Rice. I think----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. 2005. And you had----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. The President----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. Absolutely no doubt----
Secretary Rice. Yes. And I think the President spoke----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. About how great it was going.
Secretary Rice. I don't think I ever said it was going
great, Senator.
Senator Boxer. You thought that our troops would be coming
home.
Secretary Rice. Senator, let's not overstate the case.
Senator Boxer. Well, let's just put----
Secretary Rice. I don't think I said it was going great.
Senator Boxer [continuing]. Let's just put it up again.
Secretary Rice. The point that I wanted to make, Senator,
is that that is October 2005. The President has talked
repeatedly now about the changed circumstances that we faced
after the Samarra bombing of February 2006, because that
bombing did, in fact, change the character of the conflict in
Iraq. Before that, we were fighting al-Qaeda. Before that, we
were fighting some insurgents, some Saddamists. But it was the
purpose of Zarqawi to try and stoke sectarian violence. He
wrote this letter to Zawahiri, told him he was going to do
that. Zawahiri himself was even concerned that this might be a
bad policy. But it turns out to have been a very smart one,
because, in fact, through the bombing of the Golden Mosque, he
accelerated this sectarian violence to the point that it now
has presented us with a new set of circumstances.
Senator Biden. Senator Sununu.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. SUNUNU, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW
HAMPSHIRE
Senator Sununu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, in the President's remarks last night,
there were some things that I was pleased to hear, such as his
emphasis that the burden has shifted now to the Iraqi
Government, both for these political issues that we've heard
talked about today, but also for security, even setting a
timetable for Iraqis taking full responsibility for security in
the outlying provinces by November. There were some areas where
I have a little bit more concern, such as whether or not the
use of the troops he discussed will really be appropriate in
dealing with sectarian violence in Baghdad, and some areas
where I was a little bit more disappointed, such as the failure
to talk about or establish a more formal process for engaging
all of Iraq's neighbors, including those that are already very
supportive and have been helpful, such as Turkey or Saudi
Arabia or Jordan, in a more formal process to provide whatever
support is necessary for Iraq.
But I want to begin with the area of political reform and
change for the Iraqi Government, because--even here, I think
you've sensed a level of frustration, because, while we
understand that a change in the oil law, local elections, a
reconciliation process, are essential to long-term success, and
no matter how we succeed militarily, those gains won't be
sustained unless these political reforms are undertaken, we
still haven't been provided with a lot of clarity there, and
timeframe. And while I think an arbitrary date for removing all
troops from Iraq doesn't make sense militarily or
diplomatically, setting a very clear timetable for these
reforms does make some sense, because it sends the right
message to everyone involved.
And I would further suggest, to you and the entire
administration, if we don't see more specifics, and even, where
appropriate, a timeframe that's established in concert with the
Iraqi Government, then Congress is probably going to step into
the void and start setting a timeframe for the Iraqi
commitments that have been made. I certainly wouldn't prefer
that. I would prefer the former to the latter.
So, I offer that as a very strong suggestion, that we work
to provide much more clarity and specifics, in terms of timing.
And I have two questions about those issues.
First, a very specific question with regard to the oil law.
You referred to the oil law as a ``remarkable law.'' Well, it's
the most remarkable law that no one has ever really seen. Over
the last week, I've had conversations with White House--senior
White House staff about this issue. We had a top-secret
briefing where this was raised in a very specific way. We heard
from scholars yesterday. And what we can gain is that there has
been some agreement on investment issues, and even ownership,
but not on distribution. And, from where I sit, it's
distribution that really matters. Money is power. Money is
power in Washington. Money is power anywhere around the world.
And unless we have a methodology for distribution, we're not
going to be successful.
So, can you give more specifics about these different
government objectives, not just oil law, political elections,
reconciliation process, de-Baathification law? And what about
the oil law, specifically? When are we going to see the area of
distribution resolved?
Secretary Rice. Well, on the first, Senator, I take your
point about needing to understand the timeframe in which the
Iraqis are trying to do the benchmarks that are put before you.
It's a political process for them, just like we have political
processes in the United States. And I think there have been
times when we've missed deadlines on trying to get this
legislative piece done or that legislative piece done. But they
do have a timeframe for moving things forward into their
Parliament and getting the laws passed and so forth. They've
tried to make sure that the laws that they're putting forward
have enough political support so they don't have a problem in
the Parliament. So, they're going about it, I think, in the
right way. But certainly I think we can be more explicit about
how they see the timeframes ahead, and in the days to come,
I'll try to do that.
As to the oil law, actually the sticking point has been
less about distribution. They understand that there needs to be
some distribution on the basis of a formula that has to do with
where the resource came from, the need to distribute it in a
way that is equitable, and, indeed, to deal with the fact that
some parts of the country are particularly underdeveloped. And
so, distribution has actually been less of a problem than the
question of who gets to sign contracts. That's, frankly, been
the one that they've been hung up on.
And so, I think you'll find that it's a law that, in terms
of distribution, in terms of some basic notion of a trust for
the Iraqi people, is actually quite forward-leaning.
Senator Sununu. Well, I understand the point you make, that
investment may have been the sticking point, but I think it's
also important that we fully recognize that, while that may
have been the sticking point in negotiation, that is not the
issue that has the potential to fuel the sectarian violence.
And it's when the Sunnis do not feel that there's an equitable
distribution scheme, when they're not enfranchised
economically, that they're more likely to turn to sectarian
organizations or sectarian groups, because they think that
violence is the only way to ensure that kind of resolution.
So, I understand investment may have been the negotiating
sticking point, but I think equitable distribution is more
important to long-term enfranchisement economically, and,
therefore, to dealing with some of the sectarian problems.
The second question I want to ask is about the PRTs. There
were some comments made, very positive, about the work of PRTs,
or their reconstruction teams, or their potential. But it's my
understanding that many of them are confined to relatively
small compounds, that there are security issues. So, two
issues. One, where will the funding and support come from? Two,
how are we going to address the security issues that confine
them, when we're deploying troops elsewhere? And, third, what
about recruitment? It is my understanding that recruitment has
been a problem, that Baker-Hamilton Commission outlined,
unfortunately, the tragic fact that we have so few Arab
speakers in our--both our State and intelligence personnel in
Iraq. How are we going to address these two issues? Better
recruitment, Arab speakers and security on the reconstruction
teams.
Secretary Rice. Yes. Senator, just so I'm not misunderstood
on the oil law, it does address the question of distribution.
And I think it addresses it in a way that we find hopeful.
Senator Sununu. We had senior intelligence officials, 1 day
ago--2 days ago--that were able to tell us nothing about the
proposed distribution methodology. On Friday Senior National
Security Council staff was able to tell me and others in the
room nothing about distribution methodology.
Secretary Rice. Senator----
Senator Sununu. So, either the right information isn't
being put into the hands of the President's National Security
Advisor and his senior intelligence official for the Middle
East or there's a refusal to share information.
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, let me just say that I will
tell you what we know of the draft law. I will send you a note
about that.
[The information submitted by the State Department
follows:]
The Secretary of State,
Department of State,
Washington, DC, February 14, 2007.
Hon. John E. Sununu,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Sununu: I am writing to follow up on the question you
raised during my testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on January 11 regarding the need for Iraq to establish a
mechanism to share its oil wealth among all its provinces.
l agree with you on the importance of this issue. We have clearly
communicated to the Iraqi government our view that it is critical for
Iraq to pass a hydrocarbon law that reinforces national institutions
and creates a fair and transparent mechanism to distribute revenues
between the central government and the provinces in a way that is
broadly acceptable to all Iraqis.
In August 2006, discussions between the central government and the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) began. Despite marked differences
of approach in the beginning of this process, the parties have made
significant progress and have agreed that Iraq will draft a hydrocarbon
law that sets out the guiding principles and framework for the oil and
gas sector.
In the course of their discussions, the KRG and the central
government have also agreed that the central government should collect
and distribute revenue to the provinces according to each province's
population once a census is completed. The Iraqis have now started
drafting a specific revenue sharing law that will more specifically
codify the collection methods and distribution levels.
We will continue to keep your staff updated as the Iraqis finalize
these important pieces of legislation. Please do not hesitate to
contact me if you have further questions.
Sincerely,
Condoleezza Rice.
Secretary Rice. In terms of the PRTs, now, 98 percent of
our positions are filled. And, as a matter of fact, we've
already filled 68 percent of the positions that would come into
rotation in the summer of 2007. There was a time when we had
some difficulty in recruiting. We had to make some changes in
the way we recruited. I wanted to be sure that we had senior
people leading these PRT teams, not people who were too junior.
And, in fact, I think you will find that we are doing very
well, in terms of getting the right people to the PRTs. And so,
it was--there was a time. We changed some of the incentives. We
changed the way we recruit for them. And we're doing very well
in filling the PRTs.
The absence of Arabic speakers, I'm afraid, is the result
of the national underinvestment in Arabic language skills over
a very long period of time, and we're doing what we can to
improve that. You know, at one time--I think we didn't have
problems, frankly, finding Russian speakers, because the United
States invested in people like me to teach them Russian. We
really haven't done that, as a nation, which is why we have a
critical-languages initiative, which is why we're recruiting
people with mid-level experience who might have those language
skills. And we're going to have to do better at getting Arabic
speakers not just into the PRTs and into Baghdad, but into the
rest of the Middle East, as well.
Finally, one of the things that we're doing is, we're
increasing the training of the people who go into Arabic, so
that they have longer in the training, so that they are more
capable in the language before they go out. So, we're trying to
address that problem.
Finally, as to security for the PRTs, yes, security is
something that I'm very concerned about and take very
seriously. We are now being provided security through the
brigade teams with which we are, in effect, embedded, and we
think that works best. Our people do move around. We just
recently had, for the President, a briefing by four of our PRT
teams. And, yes, they have, sometimes, some difficulty. But
they get out, and they go meet local leaders. One was telling
me--I'll not name the province, for security reasons--but that
he's out at least three, four times a week with the local
leaders. And so, people are getting out. They are experiencing
some of the same dangers that affect our military forces, and I
think it's important to recognize that our civilians are on the
front lines, too. But since we went to this structure of the
PRTs, they are getting out.
Senator Biden. Madam Secretary, let me suggest that--we
want to get you out by 1 o'clock, so--I appreciate your
exposition, but, to the extent that we all can't be shorter,
we're going to be trespassing on your time.
Senator from Florida.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON, U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Bill Nelson. Madam Secretary, I have supported you
and the administration on the war, but I cannot continue to
support the administration's position. I have not been told the
truth. I have not been told the truth, over and over again, by
administration witnesses. And the American people have not been
told the truth. And I don't come to this conclusion very
lightly.
Does General Abizaid support an increase in troops?
Secretary Rice. He does.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, that's at variance, of course,
as you've heard.
Secretary Rice. I think, Senator, first of all, if you look
at his testimony, and you look at the next lines in his
testimony, he talks about the conditions under which troops
might be useful. And, in fact, everybody had hoped that this
would be done with Iraqi forces. It wasn't that we didn't need
more forces; it was hoped that we would do it with Iraqi
forces. And what the Baghdad security plan of the summer showed
was that that wasn't possible.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well----
Secretary Rice. General Abizaid and General Casey have been
involved in the development of this plan. And it--in fact,
General Casey presented this option to the President.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, I'm looking forward to talking
to General Abizaid. He is one of the few that have come before
a number of the committees, that I have the privilege of
sitting on, who I feel like has been a straight-shooter. And
it's my hope that Chairman Carl Levin will call him here, and I
will ask him directly. But, of course, I was one of the ones
that asked him that question, very specifically, when he was
last here in front of the Congress, and he is someone that I
think has credibility. But, sad to say, he's one of the few who
I've felt like that I was getting a straight story from.
Let me pick up on something Mr. Coleman said. Three weeks
ago, we were in Iraq and our mouths about dropped open when the
National Security Advisory, Dr. Rubaie, said--and I think this
is almost his direct quote--``This is not a sectarian war.''
And he went on to talk about how the conflict is extremist al-
Qaeda and how the Baathists who want to come back into power.
And, of course, that's part of the situation. But the two of
us, certainly this Senator, got the impression that they are
not coming to grips with what they must face. And that is that
you've got Sunnis on Shiites, and Shiites on Shiites, and
Sunnis on Sunnis. And until you get that problem being solved,
our efforts are just simply not going to work.
Now, I'll tell you one place where I agree with the
President, when he said last night that he was going to send
additional troops into Anbar province. I was convinced by the
Marine commanders there, as I think Mr. Coleman was, as well,
that there, where you have just a Sunni population and that the
enemy is al-Qaeda, that working with those Sunni tribal leaders
with additional American troops could bring some progress. But
that is not so, in Baghdad. And I'm sad that we've come to this
point.
Let me just conclude by asking you something I would like
for you to amplify upon, although I think it's been said by a
number of people here. Obviously we need an intense diplomatic
effort in the region. One of the points of my trip was, at the
request of General Hayden, to go and talk with the Saudi king,
urging the Saudis to use their tribal contacts in Iraq to try
to get people to come together. Could you outline for the
committee what intense diplomatic effort will be taken, and
will it be taken simultaneously with the President's plan for
additional troops?
Secretary Rice. Senator, it is being taken. I will go out,
tomorrow night. The group that we are engaging, in addition to
all the many bilateral engagements that we have with the
Saudis, with the Kuwaitis, with others who can help, the
Jordanians, who can help, is through a group called the ``GCC-
plus-two.'' That is really the appropriate group. We work also
with Turkey very closely on Iraq. We have a problem on the
northern border with the PKK that General Ralston is trying to
resolve. But I think you would find that, first of all, there
already has been diplomatic effort. We will, of course, try to
intensify that effort to support what the Maliki government is
now trying to do to get its sectarian problem under control.
Frankly, the countries of the region are also watching to
see whether this will be an evenhanded government in dealing
with both Sunnis and Shia. And so, the Maliki government faces,
I think, some skepticism, not just from Americans and from
Iraqis, but also from the region. And we've made that point to
them, that they really must deal with the sectarian problem in
an evenhanded fashion, or they're not going to get support from
the region.
That said, to the degree that we hear from the Saudis and
others that their biggest strategic concern is Iran, then they
have a very strong incentive to help stabilize Iraq, so that
Iraq is, indeed, a barrier to Iranian influence in the region,
not a bridge.
Senator Bill Nelson. What do you----
Senator Biden. I hate to do this, but if the next question
is going to result in a long answer, we're--you're going to be
running out of time, Senator. So----
Secretary Rice. Thirty seconds.
Senator Biden [continuing]. If you want----
Senator Bill Nelson. Well----
Senator Biden. If it's a quick question, please----
Senator Bill Nelson. It's very quick.
We need more than engagement. We need to get these
countries to act. So, how do you get them to act?
Secretary Rice. There's an international compact that
they've all negotiated. We need to finalize it.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
Senator Voinovich.
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, U.S. SENATOR FROM OHIO
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, I'm sorry that I wasn't here for your
testimony or for the other questions that have been asked of
you, so please forgive me if I am redundant. But I met this
morning with representatives from 10 nations who are concerned
about our Visa Waiver Program. I believe that the current
program--and I'm glad the President understands this--needs to
be changed, because these nations whose representatives I met
with are our allies and helping us in Afghanistan and in Iraq.
I think you know that the most important weapon, in terms of
winning the war on terror, is our public diplomacy, which needs
to be improved substantially.
I hope, Mr. Chairman, that we can proceed with the Visa
Waiver legislation early in this session of Congress, so we can
help some of our allies, who are really upset with us that
their citizens cannot enter into the United States because of
this unrealistic and restrictive program we currently have.
You should know that I am skeptical that a surge of troops
will bring an end to the escalation of violence and the
insurgency in Iraq. Many of the generals that have served there
have said they do not believe additional troops will be
helpful--in Baghdad, particularly. And, Madam Secretary, my
faith in Prime Minister Maliki's ability to make the hard
choices necessary to bring about political solutions has to be
restored. There needs to be a political solution between the
Sunnis and the Shiites. I have asked this question now for 2
years: How can there be a unity government--one that is not
dominated by the Shiites that will ultimately get rid of the
Sunnis that are in Iraq--when Muqtada al-Sadr is there? From
everything I understand, he very well tells Prime Minister
Maliki what to do. We have seen evidence that Sadr simply makes
a telephone call and Maliki pulls the plug on whatever he was
previously doing in order to meet Sadr's wishes.
I think that we underestimate the hatred between Sunnis and
Shiites. We're saying that somehow they are all going to get
together and everything is going to be happy. The Sunnis and
the Baathists oppressed the Shiites for many, many years. Now
the Shiites are in the majority. Is there going to be a unity
government, or another theocracy, like there is in Iran? I
think that is what Sadr wants.
So, how can you explain to us that the political divisions
in Iraq are going to be resolved? Probably this article was
discussed already this morning, ``The Fog'' by David Brooks in
the New York Times. Brooks says that the plan we are proposing
does not reflect what Maliki says he wants done. But I would
insist that Maliki stand up and make it clear to the whole
world that he does want this done, that he supports the plan,
and that the United States is not superimposing its wishes onto
him. If he does not make that clear, then everyone is going to
think, ``Here we go again, the United States is in there on its
own.''
Another important question that has been raised here is:
How much help are we getting from our Sunni friends in the
Middle East? What have they done to help us? In addition,
countries that had been our friends are withdrawing support.
Why are our friends leaving? Have they lost confidence that
this dream we had of a democracy in Iraq, which many of us
bought into, will no longer happen, and that Iraq is going to
break down into a civil war? Another major concern I believe we
all have is that we don't want any more of our young men and
women killed in a civil war between two groups that ultimately
are never going to come together.
I send letters out to the families of soldiers, and I tell
them how brave their sons were, and that the work that they are
doing there in Iraq and the casualties we have sustained are as
important as that of the Second World War. But I have to
rewrite the letter today. We're talking now about stability as
our goal. And we're talking about young men and women's lives
at risk for that. This is a very, very important decision, and
I think you are going to have to do a much better job, and so
is the President, explaining this to us. You have seen the
testimony here among my colleagues. I would like to add that I
have supported the President's effort in Iraq, and I bought
into the dream of democracy taking root there, and now I don't
think it is going to happen.
Secretary Rice. Well, thank you, Senator.
I think that we don't have an option to fail in Iraq.
Consequences are too great. And I do think that it is not--I
just don't think that it is true that Iraqi Sunnis and Shia
hate each other to the point that they can't live together. I
don't believe that. I do think that there are long pent-up
tensions and emotions and grievances in that society that come
from years of tyranny, and that it's going to take some time
for them to get over it. And I do think they've had a very bad
set of circumstances by----
Senator Voinovich. Yes, but, Madam Secretary, what
evidentiary fact do we have that Maliki is going to make the
tough political decisions that he has to make, and lose his
support from Sadr and the others?
Secretary Rice. Senator, we have from him these assurances.
He's going to have to act on them. We're going to know very
soon whether or not there's political interference when his
forces--and they're his forces--want to go into a neighborhood.
We're going to know very soon whether or not he is carrying
through with his view--with what he told us, which is that,
``If you are Sunni or Shia, and you're outside the law, and
you're killing innocent Iraqis, then you have to pay a price
for that. You have to be punished.'' We're going to know. And
American forces, as they flow in over time, will only go to
support a policy in which Iraqis are carrying out those
obligations.
But I just want to emphasize again--I've heard everybody
say, ``We cannot fail. We cannot fail. We cannot fail.'' If
they are unable to get a hold of the sectarian violence, to
show that they can control Baghdad, to establish confidence
that they're going to be evenhanded, then it's going to be very
difficult for them to----
Senator Voinovich. How can it happen with Sadr?
Secretary Rice. The Iraqis are going to have to deal with
Sadr. And, to the degree that Sadr is outside of the political
process and his death squads are engaged in violence, then
they're going to have to deal with those death squads. And the
Prime Minister has said, ``Nobody and nothing is off limits.''
We will know, Senator, whether or not they're following
through. But we'd really better give them a chance to get a
hold of this sectarian violence in their capital, where it's
not Iraqis running down the streets killing other Iraqis, Sunni
and Shia; it is organized death squads going into neighborhoods
and killing Sunnis and Shia. That is what is going on there,
and they need to reestablish civil order, and we need to be
able to help them do that. That's the purpose of the
augmentation of our forces.
Senator Biden. Madam Secretary, I'm sure you understand--
you've been around--how profound this--these inquiries are.
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Biden. Senator Obama.
STATEMENT OF HON. BARACK OBAMA, U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS
Senator Obama. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, I'll pursue a line of questioning that we
talked about yesterday in a one-on-one meeting. I expressed
these same views to the President. You know, I think when you
hear the voices of Senator Hagel, Senator Voinovich, others on
this panel, I think you get a sense of how weighty and painful
this process has become.
This administration took a gamble. It staked American
prestige and our national security on the premise that it could
go in, overthrow Saddam Hussein, and rebuild a functioning
democracy. And, so far, each time that we've made an assessment
of how that gamble has paid off, it appears that it has failed.
And, essentially, the administration repeatedly has said,
``We're doubling down. We're going to keep on going. You know,
maybe we lost that bet, but we're going to put a little more
money in, and--because now we've got a lot in the pot, and we
can't afford to lose what we've put in the pot.'' And the
fundamental question that the American people and, I think,
every Senator on this panel, Republican and Democrat, are
having to face now is: At what point do we say, ``Enough''? And
so, this, then, raises the line of questioning that I presented
to you yesterday.
It seems as if a solution to the problem is always 6 months
away. I'll give you an example. Ambassador Khalilzad. He was up
here before this committee in July of last year. He said, ``I
believe, Senator, that this government has about 6 months or so
to bring this sectarian violence under control. And, if it
doesn't, then I think we would have a serious situation.'' I
pressed him on the issue. I said, ``If this government has not
significantly reduced sectarian violence in about 6 months,
then we've got real problems. I mean, if I'm hearing this
correctly, the Iraqi people--at that point, the confidence in
the central government will have eroded to the point where it's
not clear what we do. And I guess the question becomes: What do
we do then? Because you may be back here in 6 months, and I'm
going to feel bad when I read back this transcript and say,
``Six months is up, and the sectarian violence continues.'' He
said, ``Well, what I'd like to say, Senator, is that we have to
work with the Iraqi Government in the course of the next 6
months to bring the sectarian violence under control.'' So on,
so forth.
Six months have passed. The sectarian violence has
worsened. It is now the President's position and the
administration position that, despite these failures, we now
have to put more young American troops at risk.
And so, I--to me, this is the key question. You continually
say that we've got assurances from the Maliki government that
it is going to be different this time. What I want to know is:
No. 1, what are the specific benchmarks and assurances have
been received? Where are these written? How can we examine
them? No. 2, why would we not want to explicitly condition, in
whatever supplemental appropriations legislation that these
benchmarks be met, so that the American people and legislators
who are voting on them have some understanding of what it is
that we expect and it's not a backroom, secret conversation
between the President and Maliki? No. 3, what are the
consequences if these benchmarks are not met? What leverage do
we have that would provide us some assurance that 6 months from
now you will not be sitting before us again, saying, ``Well, it
didn't work. Sadr's militia has not been disarmed. We have not
seen sufficient cooperation with respect to distribution of oil
resources. We are still seeing political interference. We have
lost an additional 100 or 200 or 300 or 400 American lives. We
have spent an additional $100 billion. But we still can't
afford to lose; and so, we're going to have to proceed in the
same fashion, and maybe we'll have to send more troops in.''
What leverage do we have 6 months from now?
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, the leverage is that we're
not going to stay married to a plan that's not working in
Baghdad if the Iraqis are not living up to their part of the
obligation, because it won't work. Unless they're prepared to
make the tough political decisions--and, frankly, we know why
the sectarian violence didn't come down that all had hoped
would. It didn't come down, because there weren't enough
forces, when these areas were cleared, to actually hold them,
because there were not enough reliable Iraqi forces. And we
know that there was too much political interference in what was
going on. That's been changed in this plan, both by the
augmentation of the forces with our own forces and by bringing
forces in from other parts of Iraq. So, we're not going to stay
married to a plan that isn't working because the Iraqis aren't
living up to their end of the bargain.
Senator Obama. Madam Secretary, because I think the
chairman, appropriately, is trying to keep our time restricted,
I want to just follow up on this and be very clear. Are you
telling me that if, in 6 months or whatever timeframe you are
suggesting, the Maliki government has not met these
benchmarks--which, by the way, are not sufficiently explicit to
the public and Members of Congress, for a lot of us to make
decisions, but let's assume that these benchmarks are clarified
over the next several weeks as this is being debated--that, at
that point, you are going to suggest to the Maliki government
that we are going to start phasing down our troop levels in
Iraq?
Secretary Rice. Senator, I want to be not explicit about
what we might do, because I don't want to speculate. But I will
tell you this. The benchmark that I'm looking at--the oil law
is important, the political process is extraordinarily
important, but the most important thing that the Iraqi
Government has to do right now is to reestablish the confidence
of its population that it's going to be evenhanded in defending
it. That's what we need to see over the next 2 or 3 months. And
I think that over the next several months, they're going to
have to show that----
Senator Obama. Or else what?
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Or this plan----
Senator Obama. Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Or this plan is not----
Senator Obama. Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Or this plan is not going to
work.
Senator Obama. The question is not whether the plan is
going to work or not. The question is: What are the
consequences to the Iraqi Government? Are there any
circumstances, that the President or you are willing to share
with the public and/or the Congress, in which we would say to
the Iraqis, ``We are no longer maintaining combat troops--
American combat troops in Iraq''? Are there any circumstances
that you can articulate in which we would say to the Maliki
government that, ``Enough is enough, and we are no longer
committing our troops''?
Secretary Rice. I'm not going to speculate, but I do tell
you that the President made very clear that of course there are
circumstances. That's what it means when he says, ``Our
patience is not limited.''
Senator Biden. Thank you very much----
Secretary Rice. But I do think we need to recognize that
the consequences for the Iraqis are also quite dire, and they
are in a process in which their people are going to hold them
accountable, as well.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary. The
Maliki government will probably be gone by then, but--Senator
Murkowski.
STATEMENT OF HON. LISA MURKOWSKI, U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Secretary Rice, for your time this morning
and for all that you do. I wish you well in your trip, at the
end of this week.
You've clearly heard the skepticism that has been expressed
this morning, from so many of my colleagues, and for good
reason. Skepticism about a lot of things. The assurances that
we may or may not get from Mr. Maliki, an individual that we
all concede has not been able to deliver, or to follow through
with assurances that have been given in the past. There's a
great leap of faith that I think is being made here that he is
going to be able to do that which he promises, in terms of
delivering the number of Iraqi troops, mobilizing, and really
taking on those issues that, to this point in time, he has been
hesitant to do so. Skepticism with the fact that we are going
in alone.
And I will echo the concerns that Senator Boxer raised. On
the broadcast that I was watching last night of the President,
there was a little ticker underneath him as he spoke. And one
of those tickers was the announcement that Britain was
withdrawing 3,000 of their troops from Iraq. And it was--the
visual on that was pretty compelling, because it took me back
to last year, the year before, the year before that, when we
were sitting in this Foreign Relations room asking what the
number of coalition forces were, where they were coming from,
and the administration was citing, and proudly so, to the
number of countries that were engaged with us on this. But your
comment to us this morning is that you don't anticipate an
augmentation of the coalition forces.
You also said--and I think this is where--one area of the
frustration of the American people, that Iraq came to us with
this plan. Maliki came to us, to the United States, with this
plan. And I think there are many in this country who are
saying, ``Well, why did they just come to us? Why is it just
the United States that is shouldering this? Why is Great
Britain pulling back? Why are we the only ones that are moving
forward with this new plan?''
So, I have great concern as to where we are now, in terms
of the world scene, and the fact that it really is the United
States in the Iraq situation, very much alone, a situation that
I had hoped we would not be in.
I want to focus my question this morning on the mission
itself. When the idea of a surge in forces was first presented,
I was one of those that said, ``I have skepticism about it, but
if there is a clear definition for the mission, I think it's
something that we should look at, look at very carefully.'' I
would agree with Senator Hagel that, given the American lives
that have been lost in Iraq, we want to make sure that we have
a policy that is worthy of their sacrifices. And those are his
words, and I think they're very well spoken. But I'm not
convinced, as I look to the plan that the President presented
yesterday, that what we are seeing is that much different than
what we have been doing in the past. You look to the Victory in
Iraq plan that came out in November 2005, and I flipped through
that to compare that with the highlights of the Iraq Strategy
Review from January 2007. And basically, the components that
we're talking about for the security perspective remain the
same: To clear, to hold, and to build. And we, in Alaska, have
paid very close attention to what happens when we try to
increase our forces in Baghdad. We saw that with the extension
of the 172d Stryker Brigade in August for an additional 4
months. The strategy at that point in time was to plus-up the
forces in Baghdad so that we could deal with the security
issue. What we saw then didn't give me much assurance that
plussing-up, or a temporary surge, is going to deliver us
anything more than we have now.
So, my question to you, Madam Secretary, is: How is it any
different if we recognize that part of the problem, as the
President has described, was the restrictions that we had in
place before? Is this ramping up of this 17,500 in Baghdad--
what assurances can you give us that this is going to yield us
a better result, a different result than what we have seen in
the past?
Secretary Rice. Well, of course, Senator, there aren't any
guarantees, but I can tell you why the President, his advisors,
his military advisors, believe that this is going to work. The
plan requires a very different structure for Baghdad, a
military commander for Baghdad, an Iraqi military commander for
Baghdad, two deputy commanders for Baghdad, the division of the
city into nine military governances that have forces deployed
to those sections, Iraqi Army, Iraqi national police, Iraqi
local police, and an American battalion to help them. And so,
the structure is completely different.
But I wouldn't just run over the point that you made. The
rules of engagement really were the problem. Inadequate force
and rules of engagement were the problem. Those have been fixed
in this new plan.
Now, the Maliki government--I understand the skepticism
that people have that they will follow through. But, you know,
they are only 9 months in office. That's not really very long.
And they are dealing with an extremely difficult set of
circumstances in which sectarianism broke out in February 2006
in a very big way, and it's threatening to overrun the process
that they're engaged in. And so, I think the fact that they
didn't act properly in the past does not mean that they won't
act properly in the future. And I think it is something that we
have to give them a chance to do.
Senator Murkowski. And I think the concern that you've
heard today is: How long do we give them that chance? And those
benchmarks are extremely important.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
Secretary Rice. We're going to know very early, Senator,
because they have to act very quickly. Their forces will start
to come in February 1.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you.
Senator Biden. Senator Menendez.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, thank you for your service to the country.
I didn't vote for the war in Iraq, in the first place. I
believe it is one of the best decisions I ever made. And I
simply don't believe that the President's escalation of the war
will work. It seems to me that it's time for a political surge,
not a military escalation. And I also believe it's long past
time that we transition both our efforts in Iraq and our
mission in Iraq, particularly with our troops, and then
ultimately the transition of our troops out of Iraq in order to
have the Iraqis to understand what you've talked about here.
But they haven't given us any benchmarks that one can measure
by. We have to have them understand that they have to make the
hard choices, compromises, negotiations necessary for a
government of national unity.
When I heard General Pace, last year, say to us that, ``We
have to get the Iraqis to love their children more than they
hate their neighbors,'' that's a powerful truism. But that does
not get achieved by military might.
And so, it seems to me, to paraphrase Shakespeare, an
escalation by any other name is an escalation. I know out of
the White House, it came as ``surge,'' but ``surge'' would mean
temporary, and that's clearly not the case here. And a failed
strategy, however repackaged, is still a failed strategy. We
tried this plan before, and it didn't work, when we sent 12,000
troops to Baghdad last summer.
And we heard a panel of witnesses yesterday, and there have
been other military experts, who have said that, at this point,
reliable Iraqi troops aren't there simply to show up. So, you
suggested the President has listened to a wide range of
people--the Iraqi Study Group, the Members of Congress,
different military options, the American people--but if he
listened, I don't think he's heard. I don't think he's heard
that wide range of views.
So, I want to ask you, though, even in the midst of my own
views, trying to understand what is really new about this
effort: Did the President obtain a commitment from Prime
Minister Maliki specifically to use Iraqi troops against
Muqtada al-Sadr's troops?
Secretary Rice. He obtained an assurance from Prime Minster
Maliki that he will go after whoever is killing innocent
Iraqis. And I think they fully understand that the Jaish al-
Mahdi are part of the problem.
Senator Menendez. Did he speak specifically about--and
obtain specific commitments about--going against al-Sadr?
Secretary Rice. He said that whoever they have to go after,
and the military thinks they have to go after, they'll go after
them.
Senator Menendez. The reason I asked this specific
question, is because it's al-Sadr who's keeping his government
afloat right now.
Secretary Rice. Well, actually, al-Sadr and his people
pulled out of the government, and the government hasn't
collapsed. They pulled out, as you remember, because of the
Amman meeting with President Bush. And I think that
demonstrates that, in fact, they can continue to function even
if the Sadr forces are not a part of the government.
Senator Menendez. When the President spoke to these other
different groups--there's a broad misgiving among Shiite
leaders in the government about the Shiites having a deep-
seated fear that the power they want to have at the polls is
going to be whittled away by Americans in pursuit of Sunnis--
did he get their commitment to support Prime Minister Maliki?
Secretary Rice. I'm sorry. ``Their,'' being the other Shia?
Senator Menendez. The other Shia leaders, the other party
leaders.
Secretary Rice. Yes. For instance, the SCIRI supports Prime
Minister Maliki in this effort.
Senator Menendez. In the effort to support him in his
position as Prime Minister?
Secretary Rice. They support him as Prime Minister. They
brought him into power.
Senator Menendez. Well, I find it really hard--unless we
have a specific--I know the general view, that, ``We will go
against anyone,'' but is not, in fact, part of the negotiations
that the President had with Prime Minister Maliki to give him
more operational control? And, in that operational control,
couldn't he circumvent going against al-Sadr?
Secretary Rice. If he circumvents going against the people
who are doing the killing, then he's going to fail, and this
plan is going to fail. And he understands that.
Senator Menendez. And let's talk about that, then. Let's
assume that, for argument's sake--let's not think about the
best; the best would be great--let's assume he fails. One of
the problems is these benchmarks without timelines or
consequences. Even the Iraq Study Group said that, as part of
their recommendation--they specifically said, ``If the Iraqi
Government does not make substantial progress toward the
achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security,
and governance, the United States should reduce its political,
military, economic support for the Iraqi Government.'' But when
I heard your response to Senator Coleman, you said the Iraqis
didn't have--you said--you go with plan A, and if plan A
doesn't work, then you deal with it subsequently. I think
that's been part of our problem here. We have a plan, but even
plan A does not have contingencies. It doesn't have benchmarks.
How can you ask the American people, and the Members of
Congress who represent the American people, to continue to give
you a blank check without benchmarks that are definable,
without benchmarks that have timelines of some consequence,
without consequences to the failure to meet those deadlines?
Because we've seen these benchmarks be repackaged from the
past. They were benchmarks before. They were not met. There are
no consequences. And we continue to create a dependency--by the
Iraqis on our forces.
Secretary Rice. But, Senator, first of all, I think you do
one strategy at a time. But you can tell--and you can adjust a
strategy as you go along. This is not going to unfold all at
once. We're going to know whether or not, in fact, the Iraqis
are living up to their obligations. And we're going to know,
early on. And there are opportunities for adjustment then.
The benchmarks are actually very clear, and the Iraqis
themselves have set forward some timetables for those
benchmarks, because they've got to get legislation through.
They have an international compact that they're trying to
respond to.
But I just want to speak to the word--to the point of
consequences. There are consequences, in that they will lose
the support of the American people, and they'll lose the
support of the Iraqi people.
Senator Menendez. But they're there already, Madam
Secretary, in terms of the support of the American people. The
question is: What will our Government do, specifically, if
benchmarks are not met? What will we do? And that's where there
is no answer. And, therefore, very difficult to be supportive
of any such----
Secretary Rice. Senator----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Policy.
Secretary Rice. I just think that it's bad policy, frankly,
to speculate on what you'll do if a plan fails that you're
trying to make work.
Senator Menendez. Well, you----
Secretary Rice. I just don't think it's the way to go about
it.
Senator Menendez. The President did it in Leave No Child
Behind.
Secretary Rice. But----
Senator Menendez. There are real consequences if you, in
fact, don't meet certain standards. You lose a lot of money.
You get----
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Categorized as a failed
school district. It seems to be a standard that can work here
domestically. We're unwilling to give the government--standards
that ultimately they would have to meet in order for us to be
able to achieve success or, therefore, determine what are the
consequences to failure.
Secretary Rice. Senator, as complicated as education policy
is, I think Iraq--the circumstances of the Iraqis are very
complicated. We're not giving--first of all, we don't expect
that anyone here is giving us a blank check. I understand the
skepticism. And I know that if this doesn't show some success,
there isn't going to be support for this policy. I understand
that.
Senator Biden. Thank you----
Secretary Rice. And we said this to the Iraqis, in no
uncertain terms. They have to start to deliver. They have to
start to deliver now. And if they don't, then I think they know
that we're not going to be able to continue to support them at
the levels that we do.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
Senator Isakson.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON, U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In respect for Senators Cardin and Casey, Webb and Vitter,
I'll be very quick.
In reference to the previous exchange, I would simply say
this. It's been my observation in war and in diplomacy, there
are times you can answer questions and times you can't. I have
great respect for that, and I understand the answers the
Secretary has given, and I respect her being here today.
With regard to that, I hope this hearing is the most
watched television event in downtown Baghdad right now, which
I'm sure it is. And if it is, and Maliki is watching
television, I think he realizes that this--in Kenny Rogers old
song, ``You've gotta know when to hold 'em and know when to
fold 'em,'' it's time for them to deliver on the hand that
they've dealt, and there's no folding that will take place. You
can't go on, ad infinitum.
And I would say, in response to the exchange--I heard, from
the President last night, in the right words, ``This one is for
all the marbles,'' vis-a-vis the Iraqi commitment, and it being
totally across the board, and there be no cover for Muqtada al-
Sadr any more than a Sunni or anybody else that might be
around. That's just a--you don't have to answer that. That's
just my observation.
My second thing, to live up to my promise to my colleagues,
is to say this. Ranking Member Lugar made a very insightful
statement with regard to diplomacy. I--it has not gone
unnoticed to me that John Negroponte has joined your staff as
the No. 2 person, I believe, at State. It also has not gone
unnoticed that, when you answered the questions regarding Syria
and regarding Iran, they were definitive into what you
expected, they were not prospective in what might happen. And I
think there's a burden on Iran and Syria to show that there are
reasons to come to the table that are in the best interest of
the region. The United States is not a nonnegotiable nation. We
may, as history has proven, been the best negotiating nation
that there ever was, but there's a time to negotiate, and it's
after you know what the cards of the other side are going to
be, or at least the first card. And I think, the way you stated
it was appropriate. And I encourage us to pursue negotiations,
but not by giving away, at the outset, what we may have to have
in the end.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Senator. Your
generosity is much appreciated.
Senator Cardin.
STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM
MARYLAND
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Madam
Secretary, thank you.
I certainly want our foreign policy to succeed, including
in Iraq. Several weeks ago, when the President said that he
would reevaluate our programs in Iraq and come out with a new
policy at the beginning of the year, I was encouraged by that,
because I thought: At last, Congress and the President and the
American people would be together on a policy in Iraq. I must
tell you, I'm extremely disappointed. The Iraq Study Group, the
military experts, have all said that it's time to start drawing
down our troops. And yet, the plan will increase the number of
troops. I don't understand that.
They talk about engaging the international community. And
I've listened to your testimony, and I've listened to the
President last night, and it seems like we are making a limited
effort, not an all-out effort, and we certainly are not holding
the Iraqis accountable to stand up to defend their own country.
So, I have one question I want to ask about the troop
numbers; how the 20,000-plus troops numbers were determined. I
must tell you that if we were looking at how many troops are
necessary to quell a civil war that is occurring in Iraq, I
think one would pick a much larger number. If we're looking at
carrying out our current mission, military experts believe that
we should be drawing down, so that we at least give the Iraqis
a message that they have to take care of their own country, and
we start making it clear this not a United States occupation.
So, I am somewhat suspect that this number was determined,
because it's what you have available, that it's not--you don't
have many more that you could bring in at this time without
creating a significant problem to our military. So, please tell
me how this particular number was arrived at.
Secretary Rice. Senator, Chairman Pace answered this
question, earlier today, and the requirement was established in
the field when the mission was established. And the mission
was, first of all, to support the successes that are beginning
to emerge in Anbar--that's where the 4,000 came from; and,
second, to provide assistance to the Iraqis as they bring in
their best forces to be able to deal with the death squads and
the organized violence that is going on against Iraqi
populations.
Yes; if you were trying to quell a civil war, you would
need much larger forces. But if what you're trying to do is to
provide population security in relatively defined areas by
augmenting Iraqi forces, then that's a much smaller number. And
the Joint Chiefs of Staff then resource the plan that is given
to them by the military. That's how the number was determined.
Senator Cardin. All I can tell you is that the information
that we've received from people that have been in command
indicate that they're--that's--it doesn't add up that way.
But, I tell you, I think it's going to be very transparent
to the international community that these numbers are more
symbolic, as far as the numbers of it--it's not symbolic to
those who are going over, not symbolic to those who are putting
their lives on the line--but it won't make a significant
difference as far as the amount of violence in the country
itself, but will be very much an indication that the United
States is increasing its commitment in Iraq.
One more question, very quickly. The President talked last
night about talking to our allies around the world. Can you
just list countries that are in support of what we're doing and
whether any countries are going to come to our help, as far as
providing additional military personnel in Iraq?
Secretary Rice. I think that we don't expect additional
military personnel. In fact, our surge of personnel is to
support the Iraqis in this very specific mission and to leave
behind an Iraqi force that can do this on its own. And so, in
fact, I think it's a temporary matter from our point of view,
to bridge for the absence of Iraqi forces that are capable of
doing this.
We do have allies on the ground with us. We're not alone,
Senator Cardin. We do have, still, Australian forces there,
Japanese forces, Korean forces, lots of forces from----
Senator Cardin. And they all concur with this new plan? I
mean----
Secretary Rice. We have had--Prime Minister Howard was out
this morning saying that this is the right thing to do. We know
that Prime Minister Blair agrees. I talked yesterday with
leaders--with Foreign Ministers from the region. They
understand the need to deal with this.
Senator Cardin. We all understand the need to deal with it,
but----
Secretary Rice. No; they understand what it is we're doing.
Their concern is the concern that I'm hearing here: Will the
Maliki government do this in an evenhanded fashion that goes
both after Shia and Sunni death squads? And that is their
concern, not the number of American forces that may be needed.
Senator Cardin. I'm glad to see this committee is not
alone.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll yield back.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
Senator Vitter.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID VITTER, U.S. SENATOR FROM LOUISIANA
Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Madam
Secretary. Good luck on your upcoming trip.
My main reaction to this initiative and the President's
speech is really to think of a number of significant questions,
so I want to just go directly to those.
I have not heard General Pace's testimony, so forgive me. I
think the President precisely, last night, said ``over 20,000
troops.'' What is that exact number, or what is the upper limit
on that?
Secretary Rice. I think it's around 21,500, at most. But
I'd like General Pace to speak to that, because they have a way
that they intend to flow the troops in that probably affects
that number.
Senator Vitter. OK. I know they have a very specific plan
for those troops, but, broadbrush and to a layman, that is--
what?--roughly 15 percent of what we have there now. So, it is
a marginal increase, as compared to a 50-percent increase. And
so, that does lead to a concern of mine that we may commit the
same mistake I think we clearly have in the past, which is too
little, maybe too late. In light of the past, why shouldn't we
take that number and say we're going to increase it 50 percent,
we're going to increase it 100 percent?
Secretary Rice. I think if that had been the assessment of
the commanders as to what needed to be done, that would have
been the recommendation. But this is a very specific purpose.
Let's leave aside Anbar, which is really to deal with the
positive developments there, in terms of what the sheikhs are
doing. But in Baghdad, it is not to make Americans the center
of police security or of providing population security for
Iraqis in Baghdad, it is to augment Iraqi forces in the lead in
doing that, because we recognize that sending Americans in to
separate people and neighborhoods, or to go door to door and
try to do a census, makes no sense. And so, while there were
obviously very detailed calculations done on what that needed
to be in the nine districts that are being developed, a
battalion per district, and how then to embed people with the
Iraqi forces so that they are trained up quickly.
Senator Vitter. Well, I'm----
Secretary Rice. I think that's where the number comes from.
Senator Vitter. I certainly understand all of that. But my
point about past history is, I assume it was the commanders'
recommendation about numbers in the past that seemed to be--in
many cases, have been too low. So: Does the number take account
of any drawdown of British or other troops?
Secretary Rice. Because it is a very specific mission in
Baghdad to support the Iraqis at this time, it's unaffected by
any drawdown that might take place--for instance, in the south
of the country.
Senator Vitter. But surely, while the British mission in
the south of the country is not what we're talking about,
particularly in Baghdad, I assume we consider it significant,
so that just forgetting about it has some loss or impact.
Secretary Rice. Well, first of all, the British will
continue to be there for some time. But Basrah is being turned
over to Iraqi control. And that, by the way, is happening
throughout the country--the continuing problems are Anbar,
Diala, and Baghdad. In most of the country, responsibility is
being turned over to Iraqis; and, as that happens, then people
can withdraw their forces.
Senator Vitter. OK. And a final question about troops. As I
heard the President, he talked about mostly Baghdad, also some
in Anbar, no increased deployment having to do with the
borders. And it seems to me, personnel and material coming over
the borders is maybe not the dominant problem, but a real
problem. And is part of the new plan going to address that in
any significant way?
Secretary Rice. Well, what the President has done, on
recommendation of his commanders, is to increase our naval and
air presence through the carrier presence, and also to give an
expanded mission, in terms of breaking up these networks. But
we think it's principally an intelligence function, Senator.
Those borders are so long and so porous that I don't think you
want to try to depend on boots on the ground to actually deal
with the borders.
Senator Vitter. OK. I want to turn to Sadr--obviously a big
topic of discussion, for obvious reasons. As I understand the
status of the government, he hasn't quite completely left the
government. They're boycotting it. It's something in between;
correct?
Secretary Rice. Well, he pulled his people out of the
government, but they've never really said they wanted to leave
the government. The fact of the matter is, the government is
functioning without them.
Senator Vitter. But no one different has, for instance,
assumed leadership of those ministries, correct?
Secretary Rice. In fact, there are temporary ministers in a
couple of those ministries.
Senator Vitter. OK. What different scenarios do you see
playing out if, in fact, Prime Minister Maliki is serious and
acts on his commitment? Sadr isn't going to like that, clearly
doesn't agree, is going to react somehow. So, how would you
game out or play out that situation? Because I assume we have
to be prepared for that.
Secretary Rice. Well, the first thing is that these death
squads, wherever they're coming from--and some of them are
being driven by Jaish al Mahdi--have to be dealt with. And Sadr
apparently has said that if his people are doing this killing,
then they ought to be dealt with. We will see whether he holds
to that commitment.
But, ultimately yes, he has, I suppose, the power to
threaten the government. But the government can't be
intimidated by that. And with enough forces that are reliable
and capable, I think they believe they can meet any
contingency.
But, again, it goes back to the question of whether or not
you believe that this is just a problem of will, or is it a
problem of both will and capability? The President, on
reflection on his commanders' recommendation, believes that
it's both will and capability, will and capability to be able
to deal with whatever contingency they face, including
contingencies they may face in Sadr City or from the Sadr
forces.
Senator Vitter. So, in terms of that playing out, I assume
you're fairly confident that the government can continue to
survive without him and with an even more complete and full
opposition by his forces than exist now.
Secretary Rice. Well, there's also the possibility that he
will decide that he wants to continue to be a part of the
political process.
Senator Vitter. Right.
Secretary Rice. That's a possibility.
Senator Vitter. Right. I'm not discarding that. I'm just
asking your analysis of the other possibility.
Secretary Rice. Well, I think it's become such a critical
situation for them that they recognize they've got to take on
anybody who stands in their way of bringing population
security.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Casey.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., U.S. SENATOR FROM
PENNSYLVANIA
Senator Casey. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And thank you for
convening this very important hearing.
Madam Secretary, we appreciate your presence here and your
testimony and your public service.
I represent the State of Pennsylvania, along with Senator
Specter. We've now lost, as of last week, more than 140 in
Iraq. And in a State like ours, apart from the deaths in big
cities like Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, most of the deaths,
most of the loss of life, are soldiers and marines from very
small towns. And, as you can imagine--and I know you appreciate
this--when there is a death like that in a small town, it is
like an earthquake, it's cataclysmic to the community and
obviously to the family. And I think that one of my basic
obligations as a U.S. Senator, when it comes to Iraq, one of
the obligations I have, when it comes to the question of what
we're going to do, going forward in Iraq, is to support
policies that, in fact, will be cognizant of those numbers, the
loss of life, and to do everything I can to make sure that we
reduce, as much as we can, as humanly possible, the likelihood
that another one of our sons or daughters are sacrificed for a
policy that is flawed.
Based upon your testimony today and based upon what I heard
the President say, National Security Advisor--all of the public
record that Americans have been reviewing the last couple of
days, I have to say I'm not convinced that the escalation of
troops that the President formally announced last night has
support in a strategy that will work. And I don't think I can
meet my obligation and support that kind of an increase in
troop levels.
But, I have to say, despite what I might think, I think
it's very important--and some of this will be redundant, I
realize, but I think it's very important that you tell us, once
again, in your own words, but also on behalf of the President
and the administration, What is the nexus--and I have not heard
this articulated well, so far--what is the nexus between the
good news that the Iraqi have developed this plan themselves,
that has its genesis or origin in their work and their
leadership--but what's the nexus between that Iraqi strategy
and the need for approximately 20,000 new troops?
Secretary Rice. Yes. When the Iraqis came to Jordan and
they said they really have to get a hold of this Baghdad
problem, and recognizing that the Baghdad security plan that
had been carried out in the summer did not succeed, they wanted
to do it themselves. To be very frank, they wanted to do it
themselves. They believe that sectarian violence is their
problem, not ours. And I applaud that. I think that's the right
responsibility.
It is true that people like Rubaie, who sometimes are very
enthusiastic, say, ``We can do this on our own.'' But, in fact,
when the experts, including their own defense people, looked at
the capabilities that they had and when those capabilities
would actually mature, which would be in the summer sometime,
there is a gap between the capabilities that will mature by the
summer, when we begin to really transfer operational control to
them over most of their forces, and what needs to be done in
Baghdad now. And so, the President asked his commanders to work
with the Iraqis to see what it would take to be able to
undertake a population protection--get-control-of-the-capital
plan now rather than waiting until the summer, when the Iraqis
could do that themselves. And the plan that came back was for
an augmentation of American forces so that a battalion could be
with each of these nine Iraqi groups that are going to be in
each of these nine military districts. That's where it came
from.
And so, the link, Senator, is--again, if you believe--and I
understand that people don't believe that the Iraqis have the
will, that there's great skepticism as to whether they have the
will--if you believe that it's a matter of will, then we should
do exactly what people are saying, we should draw back and say,
``Go at it. Go at it, and you'd better succeed in getting rid
of this sectarian violence, or you're not going to be able to
continue to govern.'' But you believe that it's both will and
capability, then telling them to do something that you don't
think they're capable of doing is not good policy. And so, the
President's policy is premised on the urgency of getting
Baghdad under control and what Iraqi capabilities there are and
what augmentation we need to do. So, that's how you would think
about the relationship between the two.
Senator Casey. Well, I appreciate your answer, but I do
hope that you and other members of the administration
continually, in the next couple of days especially, make the
case very specifically why you and the President and others
think this is necessary, because I don't think the American
people are hearing that. They're hearing a lot of the same
rhetoric we've heard for a lot of years, in my judgment. The
best efforts to make sure that every sound bite is phrased in a
way that sounds like, ``If we don't do this, it's going to
adversely impact the war on terror,'' which I think the case
hasn't been made, with regard to this particular policy.
So, I'll move on. One more question. With regard to
diplomacy, we hear it all the time--and this is your business--
we hear it all the time. We hear about the necessity of a
political strategy and a diplomatic strategy. Can you very
quickly--and I'd ask you to submit--amplify this for the record
for this hearing, if you could provide that. But, just very
quickly, can you summarize for us specific steps you have
taken, personally, as Secretary of State, when it comes to
dealing with the real crisis that we now have in Iraq, at least
in the last 2 years, just a list, if you can.
Secretary Rice. On the diplomatic front?
Senator Casey. Absolutely.
Secretary Rice. Yes. Well, I have been constantly--whether
it's through bilateral discussions or in the multilateral form
that we've created, the GCC-plus-two--pressing these states to
help the Iraqis send missions to Iraq. And we've succeeded in
getting some of them there; getting the Arab League to go there
in support because one of the problems is, they see, ``Well,
perhaps Iran is too influential, but these Iraqis, the Shia
there are Arabs.'' So bringing them into the Arab fold is
extremely important.
I have worked very hard to get European Union to go in, in
a major way. And, in fact, their commissioner, Benita Ferrero-
Waldner, has gone several times, at our urging. But the most
important thing that we've done is, we've negotiated, over the
last year, almost year now, an international compact for Iraq
which has very specific things that the Iraqis are to do,
including things like an oil law, anticorruption measures, and
so forth, and a series of steps that the international
community would take in response. This is something that we
used very effectively with Afghanistan, and we think we can use
it effectively with Iraq, as well. The debt relief. We've
negotiated, for the Iraqis, 80 percent debt relief from most of
the Paris Club debtors, and 100 percent from ourselves and
several others. We're trying to get the Gulf States to do the
same. So, it's been a very active agenda.
I do think that they've been much more active with Iraq in
the last 6 or 7 months, really engaging--really, the last
year--really engaging and trying to get Sunnis involved in the
process. I suspect that some of the Sunni states have been
supportive of what is going on in Anbar, and have had a role in
helping that come about.
So, that's how we see the diplomacy. And it's not a
question of whether--to my mind, who you talk to; it's a
question of what they're prepared to do. And the states that
have the same vision of the Middle East, and want an Iraq that
is unified, stable, without undue Iranian influence, which is
one of the uniting factors for all of these states, I think, is
the place to be.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Webb, your patience is commendable, and your
experience is extensive.
STATEMENT OF HON. JIM WEBB, U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also realize I am
the last obstacle between you and lunch, and----
Senator Biden. No, no, no, no.
Senator Webb [continuing]. Secretary Rice and the door.
[Laughter.]
So, I'll be as brief as I can.
Secretary Rice, I want to thank you for being here. And I
want you to know my door is always open if you ever want to
come by and discuss any issue or call me or whatever. I'm
looking forward very much to working with you.
I'd like to associate myself with many of the views here,
that you've heard, about what I believe is a necessity for us
to widen the diplomatic approach, in terms of reaching a
solution. I want to make a--just a quick comment that won't
require an answer from you, and then I do have a question about
something that concerns me a great deal.
With respect to the situation in Iran, and with Iran and
the region, there are many, including myself, who warned that
invading and occupying Iraq would, in fact, empower Iran. And
that has become a reality. We also--there was a great deal of
notice and comment recently about the fact that Iran has more
power in Iraq than it has had in a very long--perhaps going
back a couple of hundred years, and that is a reality. And our
options are in--to ignore, to do things informally, as you've
been discussing, or to more actively engage.
And when I'm looking at this, one of the things that sticks
in my mind is a situation that we had with China in 1971. This
was a rogue nation. It had nuclear weapons. It had an American
war on its border. The parallels are not exact, but we went
forward, without giving up any of our own ideals or our
national objectives, and we did a very aggressive engagement
process that, over a period of time, has arguably brought China
into the international community.
And I just hope you will pass on to their President, (a) my
best regards, and (b) that if he were to move in that
direction, he certainly would have the strong support of me,
and perhaps other people.
The question that I have for you goes back to the
Presidential finding on the resolution that authorized force in
2002. And there is a sentence in here which basically says
that, ``This resolution does not constitute any change in the
position of the executive branch with regard to its authority
to use force to deter, prevent, or respond to aggression or
other threats to United States interests outside of Iraq.''
This phrase went to situations outside of Iraq. And this is a
question that can be answered either, you know, very briefly or
through written testimony, but my question is: Is this the--is
it the position of this administration that it possesses the
authority to take unilateral action against Iran, in the
absence of a direct threat, without congressional approval?
Secretary Rice. Senator, I'm really loathe to get into
questions of the President's authorities without a rather more
clear understanding of what we are actually talking about. So,
let me answer you, in fact, in writing. I think that would be
the best thing to do.
Senator Webb. I would appreciate that.
Secretary Rice. But let me just say how we view the
situation currently. We continue to believe that our struggle
with Iran is a long one. It's a strategic one. It has elements
of the fight in the war on terror. It has elements of trying to
stabilize a Middle East in which Iran is a tremendously
destabilizing force. It has, of course, an Iraq dimension. And
it also has an important nuclear dimension. And I think we
believe we have the right policy for dealing with those
matters, through diplomacy.
Now, what the President was very much referring to is, of
course, every American President--and that goes back a very,
very long way--has made very clear that we will defend our
interests and those of our allies in the Persian Gulf region.
And so, there is nothing new in that statement that the
President has made.
The one important new fact here is that, for force-
protection purposes, we have to worry about what Iran is doing.
We all know their activities for these enhanced IEDs and so
forth. And we are going to go after the networks that do that.
I believe that--when you talk to the military advisors,
they believe that is something that can be done in Iraq, that
it is something that is done by good intelligence and by
quickness of action. And, in fact, we've had a couple of those
occasions recently, where we've gone after these networks.
Senator Webb. Right. Well, I think that--I think we both
probably know what the elephant in the bedroom is here. And
I've got a long history of experience in dealing with defense
issues. And there is one pretty profound change since I was in
the Pentagon, in the Reagan administration, and that is the
notion that the executive branch has the power to conduct a
preemptive war, as opposed to a preemptive attack. And the
situations that you're talking about really go to a preemptive
attack against a specific threat, where people on the other
side are being threatened. And the concern that I and a number
of people have is that this would be interpreted as something
broader. So, I'd appreciate it if you could give us something
in writing on that.
Secretary Rice. I will, certainly.
[The information submitted by the State Department
follows:]
U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC, January 31, 2007.
Hon. Jim Webb,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Webb: In the President's January 10 speech to the
American people on the Administration's New Way Forward in Iraq, he
made clear that Iran was providing material support for attacks on
American forces. He emphasized the importance of disrupting these
attacks and interrupting the flow of support from Iran and Syria. The
President also noted our intention to seek out and destroy the networks
that are providing the advanced weaponry and training that threaten our
forces in Iraq. During the January 11 Senate Foreign Relations
Committee hearing on Iraq, you and Senator Biden asked a number of
questions concerning the scope of the President's authority to carry
out these critical missions.
The Administration believes that there is clear authority for U.S.
operations within the territory of Iraq to prevent further Iranian- or
Syrian-supported attacks against U.S. forces operating as part of the
Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) or against civilian targets. Such
attacks directly threaten both the security and stability of Iraq and
the safety of our personnel; they also continue to threaten the
region's security and stability. U.S. military operations in Iraq are
conducted under the President's constitutional authority and the
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002
(P.L. 107-243), which authorized the use of armed force to defend the
national security of the United States against the continuing threat
posed by Iraq and to enforce all relevant United Nations Security
Council resolutions regarding Iraq. The United Nations Security Council
has authorized all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance
of Iraq's security and stability, which encompasses MNF-I conducting
military operations against any forces that carry out attacks against
MNF-I or Iraqi civilian and military targets.
You also ask what authority might be relevant in connection with a
hypothetical military operation in Iran. As this Administration has
said, we are not planning to invade Iran. For over two years, we have
actively pursued a diplomatic strategy to address Iran's nuclear
program, and we remain committed to resolving our concerns with Iran
diplomatically. Of course, the Constitution charges the President to
protect the United States and the American people. As Commander in
Chief, he must be able to defend the United States, for example, if
U.S. forces come under attack. Whether and how to do so in any specific
situation would depend on the facts and circumstances at that time.
Administration officials communicate regularly with the leadership and
other Members of Congress with regard to the deployment of U.S. forces
and the measures that may be necessary to protect the security
interests of the United States and will continue to do so.
We hope this information will be helpful to you and thank you for
your interest in this important issue.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey T. Bergner,
Assistant Secretary,
Legislative Affairs.
Senator Webb. Thank you very much.
Secretary Rice. If I may, just one other point on Senator
Webb's earlier point. Senator, we've gone a long way, actually,
to offer the opportunity for the Iranians to talk to us. We did
it in the context of the nuclear program, because we believe
that's a real near-term threat and if we don't get a handle on
the nuclear program, we've got a real problem. I want to repeat
again--now, if they will stop enriching so that they're not
improving their nuclear capability while they're talking,
they'll find somebody who's willing to talk to them under any
circumstances. But I think short of that, we send a wrong
message about our resolve. And, frankly, it has a cost with
nations in the region that are looking very closely at how we
are conducting ourselves, vis-a-vis the Iranians.
Senator Webb. Right. Well, I think that it's important, as
the Baker Commission was saying, and a lot of people have been
saying, and I've been saying, that when you have a situation
with a nation that constitutes this kind of threat, it's very
important to confront, as well as to engage. And I personally
think it would be a bold act for George W. Bush to get on an
airplane and go to Tehran in the same manner that President
Nixon did, take a gamble and not give up one thing that we
believe in in terms of its moving toward weapons of mass
destruction, our belief that Israel needs to be recognized and
its interests need to be protected, but to maybe start changing
the formula here.
Thank you.
Secretary Rice. Thank you.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Biden. I thank my colleagues for their patience;
and, particularly, I thank the Secretary of State.
Madam Secretary, I'd conclude by just making a few very
brief comments.
One is, one of the things that you've learned here today
from hearing our colleagues is that there is an overwhelming
concern that the reason why we insisted that we not accept the
Maliki plan, as he laid it out, is that what he would do is go
in and take out the Sunnis and we'd exacerbate the civil war.
That may or may not be true, but that's been one of the
potential explanations as to why we insisted we go into Baghdad
when he said they don't need us in Baghdad. I'm not saying
that's right or wrong. Just be aware that that's something
that's going to have to be dealt with, in terms of, I suspect,
people's judgments about how they feel about the
administration's position.
Second, I also want to make it clear, as chairman of the
committee, that I feel very strongly that the authorization of
the use of force, and the provision that the Senator read from
it, explicitly denies you the authority to go into Iran. Let me
say that again. Explicitly denies you the authority to go into
Iran. We will fight that out if the President moves, but I just
want the record to show--and I would like to have a legal
response from the State Department, if they think they have
authority to pursue networks or anything else across the border
into Iran and Iraq. That will generate a constitutional
confrontation here in the Senate, I predict to you. At least I
will attempt to make it a confrontation.
Third point I would make, Madam Secretary, is that I've sat
through a lot of hearings, and you have, too, and, God love
you, you've had to do it in a very different position than I
have, and I commend you for your patience, but I want to say,
again--and I hope you'll convey it to the President, because
I'm sure he has not had time to watch our hearing--I think what
occurred here today was fairly profound, in the sense that you
heard 21 members, with one or two notable exceptions,
expressing outright hostility, disagreement, and/or
overwhelming concern with the President's proposal. And I think
that he will proceed at significant political risk if there is
not a much more intensive and detailed attempt to bring the
U.S. Senate and the Congress into his proposals.
As you point out, this surge is a process. This is not
going to happen in a day or a week or a month. And we will have
time and opportunity to revisit this next month, and in the
next 2 months. Because the President is going to, as I
understand it, Madam Secretary--and my colleague from Virginia
knows more about this than any of us on the committee, having
served in the Pentagon--as I understand it, the decision will
come across the desk of the President of the United States, or
at least through the Secretary of Defense, next week, in 3
weeks or 5 weeks, as to whether he extends 1,500, 2,000, 900,
600, 1,400 marines, sailors, and soldiers. And so, this is a
decision that will necessarily have to be revisited privately
by the President once a week, once a month, from this point on.
And I see my----
Senator Webb. Mr. Chairman, if I may, we saw a notice from
the Marine Corps this morning about a number of units already
having been extended.
Senator Biden. Right. But my point is, a month from now, in
order to keep the troop level up to accommodating this 21,500
additional forces, that decision will have to be made again.
Senator Webb. Right. Yes, sir. This was a part of that----
Senator Biden. Extending. So----
Senator Webb [continuing]. His proposal--or the policy that
he mentioned last night.
Senator Biden. So, the point I'm making is that I don't
want anybody to think--and I hope the administration does not
think--that the President's made a decision, we're going to go
forward with 21,500 people, it's a done deal, that it is
finished. He will have an opportunity to revisit it. We will
revisit it. And you heard from my colleagues, they are, I don't
think it's unfair to say, ranging from skepticism to intense
skepticism to outright opposition to the President's proposal.
And I'll end where I began, Madam Secretary. And I realize
this is not all on your plate. If we can't figure out how to
bring along the American people on this deal, we are--we are in
real trouble. We would be making a tragic mistake that I think
will mortgage the ability of this President and that of the
next President to do what they are going to have to do. And
that is, there will be a requirement to deploy force to other
parts of the world. We will undermine that in a way that I
think will be incredibly damaging to our national interest. So,
that's just one man's opinion.
I appreciate, Madam Secretary, your perseverance, your
willingness to be here, and the fact that we have cut your
lunch hour by 20 minutes. And that's not a minor point. You're
going to have to go and sit down in front of the House, as
well. But I thank you for your courtesy.
Senator Voinovich. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Biden. Yes.
Senator Voinovich. I hope that we make it clear to the men
and women that are serving our country today in Iraq that this
difference of opinion in regard to the President's sending in
more troops----
Senator Biden. It has nothing to do with them.
Senator Voinovich [continuing]. Is that we're supportive of
what they're doing, and we're going to provide them the
resources so they can do their job, and are protected, to the
very best of our ability. Because I wouldn't want anything said
in here today to interpret that we're just----
Senator Biden. I think that's a valid point to raise again,
and we should raise it again and again. In my seven trips to
Iraq--and collectively on this committee there's probably been
50 trips to Iraq--I don't know a single person, having voted
for or voted against the deployment, having agreed or disagreed
with the President, who hasn't been absolutely amazed by the
dedication, the service, and the overwhelming commitment of
those forces on the ground. And if you want to see how that
works, travel to Iraq with a guy that is a noncommissioned
officer, and watch how he relates with these folks on the
streets of Baghdad and Fallujah and Basrah. It is real. They
have our overwhelming support. They have our admiration. And it
should not be read that our disagreement, to the extent we
disagree with the President, is any reflection on their
abilities.
I would close by saying that I also want to thank the
Capitol Police for having done, very skillfully and without
much fanfare, a very good job in keeping order here today. I
want to acknowledge that and thank them.
I want to thank all of you who came to listen, for the
orderly way in which you did. I know there are incredibly
strong feelings about this issue, and as American citizens,
you've conducted yourself in a way that I think makes our
democracy one that's the envy of the world.
Again, I thank you, Madam Secretary.
The committee is--oh, I'm supposed to--also, we're supposed
to begin this afternoon's hearing at 2 o'clock, but I've been
informed by the U.S. Senate that we are going to have two votes
at 2 o'clock, that they are--to use Senate jargon, they've been
agreed to by unanimous consent, which means they will take
place. So, rather than convene at 2 o'clock, we will convene at
2:30. And the list of witnesses we have today are very
prominent people who have different views on--and specific
plans on--how to proceed in Iraq. They include the Honorable
Peter Galbraith, Dr. Frederick Kagan of the American Enterprise
Institute, and Dr. Ted Galen Carpenter of the CATO Institute.
So, I thank you, Madam Secretary.
We stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:23 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
Additional Material and Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record
Poll Published in the Military Times Submitted by Senator Boxer
(1) Are you on active duty?
Yes--100%
No--0%
(Note: Only active-duty responses were counted in remaining
results.)
(2) Service Branch?
Army--46%
Navy--21%
Air Force--23%
Marine Corps--9%
Coast Guard--1%
No response--0%
(3) How many times have you deployed to Iraq?
Once--32%
Twice--12%
Three times--3%
More than three times--3%
Never/no response--50%
(4) How many times have you deployed to Afghanistan?
Once--12%
Twice--1%
Three times--0%
More than three times--0%
Never/no response--85%
(5) In total, I have deployed in support of the war in Afghanistan and/
or Iraq for:
Less than 2 months--3%
3-6 months--17%
7-12 months--25%
13-18 months--11%
19 or more months--9%
Haven't deployed/no response--34%
(6) Should the U.S. have gone to war in Iraq?
Yes--41%
No--37%
No opinion/no answer--9%
Decline to answer/no answer--11%
(7) Regardless of whether you think the U.S. should have gone to war,
how likely is the U.S. to succeed?
Very likely to succeed--13%
Somewhat likely to succeed--37%
Not very likely to succeed--31%
Not at all likely to succeed--10%
No opinion/no answer--8%
(8) How soon do you think the Iraqi military will be ready to replace
large numbers of American troops?
Less than a year--2%
1-2 years--20%
3-5 years--36%
5-10 years--22%
More than 10 years--12%
No opinion/no answer--7%
(9) How long do you think the U.S. will need to stay in Iraq to reach
its goals?
Less than a year--2%
1-2 years--8%
3-5 years--26%
5-10 years--31%
More than years--23%
No opinion/no answer--8%
(10) Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling
the situation with Iraq?
Approve--35%
Disapprove--42%
No opinion--10%
Decline to answer--12%
(11) Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling
his job as president?
Approve--52%
Disapprove--31%
No opinion--6%
Decline to answer--10%
(12) Do you consider the war in Iraq to be part of the war on terrorism
that began Sept. 11, 2001, or do you consider it to be an entirely
separate military action?
Part of the war on terrorism--47%
Separate military action--47%
No opinion--5%
(13) We currently have 145,000 troops in Iraq and Kuwait. How many
troops do you think we should have there?
Zero--13%
0-50,000--7%
50,000-144,000--6%
145,000--13%
146,000-200,000--22%
200,000+ --16%
No opinion/Don't know--23%
(14) We currently have 18,000 troops in Afghanistan. How many troops do
you think we should have there?
Zero--8%
0-10,000--7%
10,000-17,000--4%
18,000--15%
19,000-50,000--27%
50,000+ --12%
No opinion/Don't know--26%
______
Article From the Daily Telegraph Submitted by Senator Boxer
[From The Daily Telegraph, Jan. 11, 2007]
3,000 British Troops To Be Pulled Out of Iraq by May
(By Thomas Harding in Basra and Toby Harnden in Washington]
Thousands of British troops will return home from Iraq by the end
of May, The Daily Telegraph can reveal today.
Tony Blair will announce within the next fortnight that almost
3,000 troops are to be cut from the current total of 7,200, allowing
the military to recover from 4 years of battle that have left it
severely overstretched.
In what will be the first substantial cut of British troops serving
in southern Iraq, their number will drop to 4,500 on May 31. The
announcement will be made by the Prime Minister before he steps down
from office as an intended signal of the achievements the British have
made in Iraq--albeit at the cost of 128 dead.
The plans for the British withdrawal were revealed as President
George W. Bush announced that he was sending an additional 21,500
troops into Iraq.
The primary objective of the five brigades and two U.S. Marine
battalions is to curtail sectarian violence in Baghdad and target Sunni
insurgent strongholds in western Anbar province.
His high-stakes, prime-time television address to Americans last
night signalled a stark divergence of policy on Iraq with that of his
British allies.
In an uncharacteristic admission of errors, Mr. Bush made
acknowledged ``mistakes'' in previous ``failed'' plans to pacify
Baghdad.
The troop ``surge''--bitterly opposed by Democrats and many
Republicans--would bring forward the end of the war, he said. ``If we
increase our support at this crucial moment, and help the Iraqis break
the cycle of violence, we can hasten the day our troops begin coming
home.''
He gave warning to Nouri al-Maliki, the Iraqi Premier, that
America's patience was running out: ``If the Iraqi Government does not
follow through on its promises, it will lose the support of the
American people and it will lose the support of the Iraqi people.''
Mr. Bush's strategy was to be accompanied by a massive influx of
American cash for reconstruction and a commitment from the Iraq
Government to send three brigades into Baghdad.
A senior British officer serving in Iraq said yesterday: ``The U.S.
situation appears to be getting worse because they are sending more
troops while the British are getting out of Basra. But the situation is
different, with the Americans facing a gargantuan problem of sectarian
violence.''
The precise timetable for the U.K. withdrawal has been disclosed to
The Daily Telegraph. Unless there are ``major hiccups'' in the next few
months, 1 Mechanised Brigade will enter Iraq with a much reduced force
when it replaces 19 Light Brigade in June for its 6-month tour.
Military planners are drawing up force levels for when Basra comes
under ``provincial Iraqi control'' at the end of spring, when all
security will be handed over to the Iraqi police and army.
The British Army will then position its troops at a major base that
is being expanded at Basra Air Station, 5 miles west of the city, where
they will be on standby. A small force of 200 men will be left in
central Basra.
By the end of February the volatile Maysan province, patrolled by
the 600-strong battle group of the Queen's Royal Lancers, will be
handed over to the local authorities.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Questions Submitted
by Senator Joseph R. Biden
Question. Does the executive branch believe the objectives set
forth in section 3(a) of Pubic Law 107-243 have been achieved and why?
If the answer to this question is yes, please elaborate on
the authority under U.S. law for the continued use of force by
U.S. forces in Iraq.
If the answer to this question is no--
What is the ``continuing threat posed by Iraq''?
Which United Nations Security Council resolutions
regarding Iraq are United States Armed Forces enforcing?
Answer. Section 3(a) of the Authorization for Use of Military Force
Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (P.L. 107-243) authorizes the use of
armed force to defend the national security of the United States
against the continuing threat posed by Iraq and to enforce all relevant
United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.
To date, the United States, working closely with its coalition
partners, has achieved certain successes in working toward the
objectives in section 3(a) of the AUMF. For example, coalition military
operations resulted in the fall of the former Iraqi regime under Saddam
Hussein. In addition, coalition military operations allowed weapons
inspections that had been blocked for years by the Iraqi Government to
take place. The military has been critical in contributing to the
ongoing democratic transformation of Iraq, including by supporting two
national elections and a referendum that approved Iraq's new
constitution and furthering the development of Iraq's new security
forces. The use of military force also has disrupted the activities of
terrorists plotting acts of violence against Iraqi, American, and other
interests.
While certain progress has been made, U.S. military operations
continue to be necessary and appropriate to defend the national
security of the United States and to eliminate the continuing threat
presented by the current circumstances in Iraq. In his January 10
speech on the administration's New Way Forward in Iraq, the President
underscored that, for the safety of the American people, the United
States must succeed in Iraq. He made it clear that failure in Iraq
would lead to radical Islamic extremists growing in strength and
resolve and gaining recruits. He noted that, as a result, they would be
in a better position to topple moderate governments, create chaos in
the region, and use oil revenues to fund their ambitions. He also noted
that failure would provide our enemies a safe haven from which to plan
and launch attacks on the American people.
As we have consistently made clear in the administration's regular
report to the Congress consistent with the War Powers Resolution, the
United States also continues to use military force to enforce relevant
United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq. As the AUMF
recognizes, the President clearly indicated prior to taking military
action that the United States was committed to work with the United
Nations Security Council to meet the common challenge posed by Iraq.
This commitment has not wavered, and the United States continues to
play a leading role in Multinational Force in Iraq, which the Security
Council authorized in Resolution 1546, inter alia, to take all
necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of Iraq's security
and stability. Moreover, the Security Council has twice unanimously
extended this authorization for the Multinational Force, most recently
in Resolution 1723. This authorization encompasses MNF-I conducting
military operations against any forces that carry out attacks against
MNF-I or Iraqi civilian and military targets. As the Department has
noted in previous reports to Congress, these contributions in
implementation of the Security Council resolutions also assist the
Iraqi people in the development of their political and security
institutions in accordance with the transitional frameworks established
in a series of Security Council resolutions, both of which are critical
to the longer term security of the Iraqis.
In light of the foregoing, the administration believes that there
continues to be clear authority for U.S. military operations within the
territory of Iraq based upon the Authorization for Use of Military
Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 and the President's
constitutional authority.
Question. In his January 10 speech, President Bush said,
``Succeeding in Iraq also requires defending its territorial integrity
and stabilizing the region in the face of extremist challenges. This
begins with addressing Iran and Syria. These two regimes are allowing
terrorists and insurgents to use their territory to move in and out of
Iraq. Iran is providing material support for attacks on American
troops. We will disrupt the attacks on our forces. We'll interrupt the
flow of support from Iran and Syria. And we will seek out and destroy
the networks providing advanced weaponry and training to our enemies in
Iraq.''
Does the administration have plans to cross the Syrian and/
or Iranian border to pursue those persons or individuals or
governments providing that help?
In your opinion, does the administration have the
constitutional authority to pursue networks across Iraq's
borders into Iran or Syria?
Answer. In the President's January 10 speech to the American people
on the administration's New Way Forward in Iraq, he made clear that
Iran was providing material support for attacks on American forces. He
emphasized the importance of disrupting these attacks and interrupting
the flow of support from Iran and Syria. The President also noted our
intention to seek out and destroy the networks that are providing the
advanced weaponry and training that threaten our forces in Iraq.
The administration believes that there is clear authority for U.S.
operations within the tenitory of Iraq to prevent Syrian- or further
Iranian-supported attacks against U.S. forces operating as part of the
Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) or against civilian targets. Such
attacks directly threaten both the security and stability of Iraq and
the safety of our personnel; they also continue to threaten the
region's security and stability. U.S. military operations in Iraq are
conducted under the President's constitutional authority and the
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002
(P.L. 107-243), which authorized the use of armed force to defend the
national security of the United States against the continuing threat
posed by Iraq and to enforce all relevant United Nations Security
Council resolutions regarding Iraq. The United Nations Security Council
has authorized all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance
of Iraq's security and stability, which encompasses MNF-I conducting
military operations against any forces that carry out attacks against
MNF-I or Iraqi civilian and military targets.
This question also asks what authority might be relevant in
connection with a hypothetical military operation into Iran or Syria.
We are not planning to invade Iran or Syria. As this administration has
said, we have actively pursued a diplomatic strategy to address Iran's
nuclear program, and we remain committed to resolving our concerns with
Iran diplomatically. We are also committed to using diplomacy to
address Syria's facilitation of foreign fighters into Iraq, its
harboring of former Iraqi regime elements; and its interference in
Lebanon. Of course, the Constitution charges the President to protect
the United States and the American people. As Commander in Chief, he
must be able to defend the United States if the U.S. forces come under
attack. Whether and how to do so in any specific situation would depend
on the facts and circumstances at that time. Administration officials
communicate regularly with the leadership and other Members of Congress
with regard to the deployment of U.S. forces and the measures that may
be necessary to protect the security interests of the United States and
will continue to do so.
Question. In March 2006, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad announced that
he had been authorized to hold face-to-face talks with the Iranians in
Baghdad. More recently the Bush administration has said that it will
engage with Iran only if it suspends its uranium enrichment.
Does the March 2006 offer still stand? If not, when was it
rescinded and under what circumstances? What led to the change
in the March 2006 policy?
How would you characterize Iran's and Syria's involvement in
the U.N.-sponsored ``international compact''?
Given the administration's stance on engagement with Iran
and Syria, is it supportive of Iran's and Syria's continuing
involvement with the ``international compact''?
Answer. Secretary Rice previously authorized Ambassador Zalmay
Khalilzad to speak directly to the Iranians in an ``ambassador-to-
ambassador'' channel on issues relating specifically to Iraq. For
various operational reasons at the time, we have not used this channel.
Our current offer on the table with the Iranians as announced by
Secretary Rice last May is to review with Iran in the Five-Plus-One
context the whole range of bilateral and multilateral issues, with the
only condition being Iran to suspend its nuclear enrichment efforts
just condemned by the U.N. Security Council. On occasion we also use
our Swiss channel to communicate specific, topical information to the
Iranian Government.
As members of the United Nations, Iran and Syria have both been
briefed on the International Compact with Iraq during a meeting at the
United Nations in September 2006, and we would expect that the United
Nations would invite them to attend future meetings. Neither Iran nor
Syria has participated in any Preparatory Group meetings.
We encourage all of Iraq's neighbors to be responsible stakeholders
in supporting and assisting the Iraqi Government. To that end, we
continue to pressure Iran and Syria to suspend their destabilizing
activities. Like Iraq's other neighbors, Iran and Syria must respect
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq and act in a manner
that supports a stable and democratic future for the Iraqi people.
Launching the International Compact with Iraq has been a joint
undertaking of the Government of Iraq and the United Nations. The
United Nations has hosted two events in New York to engage the
international community with the compact; one on September 18, 2006,
and the other on November 13, 2006. The United Nations invited all U.N.
member countries and the international organizations and financial
institutions that are concerned about Iraq and the compact to these
events. Thirty-eight countries and organizations attended the first
event, and 78 attended the second. Iran and Syria were represented at
both events.
Beyond attending these two events, neither Iran nor Syria has
played an active role in developing the compact.
Question. Do Iran and Syria assess it in their long-term interest
for there to be continuing instability and violence in Iraq?
Answer. Clearly, it should be in the long-term interest of Iran and
Syria--and of the rest of the international community--to have an Iraq
that can govern itself, defend itself, and sustain itself. We can only
infer what Iran and Syria assess is their long-term interest in Iraq by
their behavior to date, which has not been constructive. Iran has
demonstrated by its support for violence and militias that it does not
support a free and democratic Iraq. Iran's continued support for
networks that are using explosive devices to attack coalition and Iraqi
personnel is a demonstration that they must regard instability and
violence as in Iran's interest.
Syria, on the one hand, has a record of supporting Sunni insurgents
and has made insufficient progress in clamping down on foreign
jihadists crossing its borders into Iraq--a major source of continuing
violence and instability. On the other hand, the Syrians have recently
signed a memorandum of understanding with the Iraqis to deal with
terrorism, border, and security problems. Syria must make good on its
commitments to Iraq. We hope that both Iran and Syria will end their
destabilizing behavior and become a positive influence on Iraq.
Question. How would Iran and Syria react to the credible threat of
a United States redeployment from Iraq? Would this prompt them to
further destabilize Iraq? Would this pressure them to seek means to
stabilize the situation for fear of a spillover of violence?
Answer. In the absence of United States and coalition forces in
Iraq, we have no reason to believe that Iran or Syria would suspend
their destabilizing actions. Quite to the contrary, it appears likely
that Iran and Syria would fill the vacuum left by a U.S. withdrawal
from Iraq and increase their unhelpful, destabilizing interference in
Iraq's internal affairs.
Senior Iranian and Syrian Government officials have made clear in
recent statements that they actively seek U.S. withdrawal from not only
Iraq, but also the entire region. We believe that redeploying forces
from Iraq prematurely would thus send the wrong message not only to
Tehran, but also to key gulf allies who feel increasingly concerned by
the Iranian regime's aggressive regional policy.
Question. What steps is the United States Government making to
weaken the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in northern Iraq? What is the
likelihood of a Turkish military intervention against the PKK in
northern Iraq?
Answer. The PKK is a Foreign Terrorist Organization as defined by
U.S. law. We have worked closely with our allies to convince them to
take a tough stance against the organization and dry up its sources of
support.
To intensify our work with both the Turkish and Iraqi Governments,
on August 28 the Secretary appointed a Special Envoy for Countering the
PKK, (Ret.) GEN Joseph Ralston, to focus on this problem. General
Ralston is working closely with his Turkish counterpart, General Baser,
and Iraqi interlocutor, Minister al-Waeli. Since his appointment as
Envoy, General Ralston has traveled repeatedly to the region and
attempted to engage productively with both the Turks and the Iraqis.
General Ralston has engaged the Turkish and Iraqi Governments as
well as officials of the Kurdistan Regional Government. His
conversations have focused on building confidence between Turkey and
Iraq and obtaining cooperation to fight against the terrorist Kurdistan
Workers Party, which is using northern Iraq as a base of support for
attacks against Turkey. Since General Ralston launched his efforts, our
Embassy in Baghdad has worked closely with the Iraqis and Turks. As a
result of these efforts, the Government of Iraq has shut down several
PKK front offices in Iraq and begun closing down Makhmour refugee camp.
We also continue to work with our European allies to curb terrorist
financing of PKK activities.
Turkey remains a close ally of the United States and works with us
on many issues. Turkey is supportive of the President's goal of a
united, stable, and prosperous Iraq. We do not expect Turkey to take
any action that would undermine this goal. In fact, Turkey is working
with us and the Government of Iraq, permiting the transit of military
sustainment cargo, promote trade, and encouraging national
reconciliation.
Question. Three estimates have been produced on the number of Iraqi
civilians killed in violence in 2006. The United Nations Assistance
Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) estimated 34,452; a compilation of data from
Iraqi Health, Interior, and Defense Ministries puts the number at
12,357; another estimate by the Iraqi Health Ministry put the number at
22,950.
Which of these is the most accurate figure in your
estimation and why?
What is the State Department's estimate for the number of
Iraqi civilians killed in 2006?
Does the administration have a quantitative definition for
what would constitute a civil war in Iraq?
Does the administration consider Iraq to be in the state of
civil war?
How many Iraqis have been displaced from their homes since
the February 2006 bombing at the al-Askariya Mosque in Samarra?
How many have been displaced in Baghdad?
Answer. While we are aware of the different estimates of several
organizations and are quite mindful that thousands have died needlessly
at the hands of extremists, the United States maintains no
independently developed assessment of Iraqi fatalities.
The current sectarian violence in Iraq is now the main threat to a
stable, peaceful future. There are several varying academic definitions
for what constitutes a civil war. However, such definitions and labels
are not nearly as important as what we and the Iraqis are doing
together to stop the violence. As President Bush and Prime Minister
Maliki have agreed in their strategy, Iraqi and American forces will
pursue all those perpetrating violence in Iraq, regardless of sect or
party affiliation.
Following the February 2006 Samarra bombings, estimates of new
internally displaced Iraqis range from 360,000 (International
Organization for Migration-IOM) to 500,000 (United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees-UNHCR). This adds to a long-term caseload of
internally displaced persons that both UNHCR and IOM estimate at 1.2
million. In Baghdad alone, IOM has estimated nearly 20,000 Iraqis are
displaced.
Question. In your testimony, you said that Iraq's security
capabilities will mature during the summer of 2007. How do you define
mature? What do you expect the capacity of the Iraqi security forces
will be by the summer of 2007 in terms of their ability to take over
security responsibility from coalition forces?
Answer. The President noted in his January 10 address to the Nation
that the Iraqi Government plans to take responsibility for security in
all of Iraq's provinces by November of this year.
As to timing, a Joint MNF-I and Iraqi committee every month
assesses which provinces and cities are eligible for this transition of
security responsibility to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC). To date,
three provinces have transitioned to PIC: Muthanna in July, Dhi Qar in
September, and Najaf in December.
Capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are one of four
factors considered, and there is not one-to-one correspondence between
ISF capability and GOI assumption of security. The other three factors
are a threat assessment, the capability of Iraqi governance (especially
at the provincial level), and the ability of MNF-I forces to support.
With regard to control of Iraq's military, currently 5 of 10 Iraq
divisions are now under the operational control of Iraqi Ground Forces
Command, and more divisions are expected to transition to Iraqi command
as forces develop. We expect all 10 Iraqi Army divisions to be under
the control of the Iraqi Ground Forces Command by May 2007.
Transfer to PIC and transfer of army divisional command to Iraq
does not happen unless Iraqi forces and command relationships have
matured sufficiently to be in a leading--as opposed to a supporting--
role.
Question. According to the Government Accountability Office, the
number of violent attacks per month in Iraq has increased from a few
hundred in May 2003 to almost 6,000 in October 2003 [sic]. During this
same period the number of trained Iraqi Security Forces has steadily
increased to 323,000, according the State Department's reporting.
Given the sharp increase in the reported capacity of the
Iraqi Security Forces, how do you explain the continued
deterioration in the security conditions in Iraq?
Answer. The deterioration in the security conditions in Iraq are
the direct result of the acceleration of sectarian violence, especially
in Baghdad. Provoking sectarian violence has been a long-held goal of
al-Qaeda in Iraq. With last February's bombing of the Golden Mosque in
Samarra, the success of their plan accelerated. Sectarian passions,
incited to violence, now threaten to overwhelm Iraq's fragile, yet
promising, process of reconciliation; a process that has produced
successful elections and a new constitution, substantial agreement on a
law to share Iraq's oil fairly, and commitment to an approach to ``de-
Baathification'' that supports broad national reconciliation goals.
For specific information about the capacity of the Iraqi Security
Forces, I would refer you to the Department of Defense.
Question. In your testimony you stated that the administration is
``further integrating [its] civil and military operations.'' Could you
explain what this means?
Answer. There must be the fullest possible civilian-military unity
of effort if we are to succeed in Iraq. Reconstruction and economic
development cannot occur in the absence of security. Once security is
achieved, there must be an immediate, targeted civilian effort to
capitalize on that gain to benefit the Iraqi people.
To that end, we will immediately begin deploying greater civilian
resources alongside our military in Baghdad and Anbar province. The
centerpiece of this effort will be the expansion of our Provincial
Reconstruction Teams. We will double the number of PRTs from 10 to 20,
through a three-phase rollout program, but the extent of our deployment
of civilian resources will depend on FY07 budget supplemental funding.
We plan to collocate nine new PRTs with Brigade Combat Teams in Baghdad
and Anbar. We also plan to add a new PRT in North Babil and augment
existing PRTs with specialized civilian technical personnel, based on
local needs. PRTs will leverage both civilian and military resources
against a common strategic plan to sustain stability, promote economic
growth, support Iraqi leaders who reject violence and foster Iraqi
self-sufficiency.
Question. You testified, ``Out of this planning process came, from
our generals, the view that we needed to augment [the Iraqi] forces, as
embeds, as, by the way, the Baker-Hamilton Commission recommends, as
people who can help them with, in a sense, on-the-job training, who can
help them to, kind of, solidify their ability to go after this.''
Will United States forces be under Iraqi command or
operational control?
How will the command arrangements work for embedded American
soldiers?
Answer. All coalition forces and embedded transition teams with
Iraqi Security Forces remain under the operational command and control
of Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) commanders. For further details
regarding the military command and control structure, the State
Department defers to the Department of Defense.
Question. You said in your testimony that ``the rules of engagement
really were the problem'' in Operation Together Forward during the
summer and fall of 2006. Could you elaborate? What were the problems
with the previous rules of engagement and how have they been corrected?
Answer. In 2006, the Iraqi Government placed political limitations
on coalition and Iraqi security operations that undermined the
evenhanded pursuit of those engaged in violence. Some, but not all
extremists, were approved as acceptable targets of security operations.
The President's ``New Way Forward'' is a joint United States-Iraq
strategy for bringing stability to Iraq, with a particular focus on
Baghdad and Anbar province. Prime Minister Maliki has now pledged that
no neighborhood will be beyond the reach of the Iraqi state, that the
central government will pursue all perpetrators of violence regardless
of sect or party, and that there will not be political interference in
security decisions. President Bush and Secretary Rice have both made
very clear that the Iraqi Government must fulfill this pledge for the
``New Way Forward'' to be successful.
Question. In increasing the number of forces in Baghdad, how will
the administration ensure perceptions of evenhandedness in cracking
down on Sunni insurgent and terrorist groups and Shiite militias? How
will American forces avoid becoming embroiled in Baghdad's sectarian
violence?
Answer. It is critically important that Iraqis and Iraq's neighbors
perceive that both Iraqi and American security forces are acting in an
evenhanded manner against all those who perpetrate violence regardless
of sect or party affiliation. Both President Bush and Prime Minister
Maliki are committed to pursuing ``The New Way Forward'' in such an
even-handed manner. Prime Minister Maliki has made it clear, publicly,
to the Iraqi people that security operations in Baghdad will make no
distinction between Shia, Sunni, or other types of illegal militia or
illegal activity. He further stated that the Baghdad security plan will
not permit a safe haven for any outlaws regardless of their sectarian
or political affiliation, nor will there be political influence in
security decisions. President Bush has made similar commitments to the
American people.
American and Iraqi security forces will operate jointly to ensure
that they are pursuing a unified, evenhanded approach to securing
neighborhoods and targeting those engaged in violence. At the highest
levels, American and Iraqi commanders will work together to plan
operations. On the ground, there will be American advisors embedded in
all Iraqi units. The establishment of joint security stations in each
of the nine Baghdad districts to be manned with Iraqi police, Iraqi
Army, and coalition forces should also minimize the likelihood any unit
will act in a sectarian manner.
Question. You testified that during Operations Together Forward I
and II ``there were not enough reliable Iraqi forces.''
How has this problem been remedied?
How many politically reliable Iraqi Army and police do you
assess there to be?
How many Iraqi security forces do you expect will be in
Baghdad as part of the new plan? Which units will participate?
What is the readiness levels and sectarian composition of the
units?
Answer. The President laid out a revised military approach when he
addressed the Nation on January 10 and announced a new strategy, ``The
New Way Forward,'' in Iraq. As part of this joint United States-Iraqi
plan, Prime Minister Maliki has committed to deploy three additional
Iraqi Army Brigades to Baghdad. The Prime Minister has restructured the
command arrangements in Baghdad, with one overall military commander,
two subordinates, and an Iraqi Army Brigade assigned to each of the
nine districts in the city. Joint security stations manned with Iraqi
police, Iraqi Army, and coalition forces should minimize the likelihood
any unit will act in a sectarian manner.
Details of Iraqi unit participation, sectarian composition, and
overall planned force strength in Baghdad have not been released by the
Government of Iraq. I would refer you to the Department of Defense for
readiness levels of Iraqi units, which are assessed by Multi-National
Forces-Iraq (MNF-I).
Question. In June, Prime Minister Maliki offered a 24-point
National Reconciliation Program.
To date, how successful has this program been?
What have been the areas of notable progress and what are
the continuing challenges?
In the light of Prime Minister Maliki's new strategy, does
this 24-point remain operative?
Answer. Since PM Maliki launched his National Reconciliation plan
on June 25, the Iraqi Government, through the Ministry of National
Reconciliation, sponsored three out of four in a series of
reconciliation conferences across Iraq--for tribal leaders, civil
society organizations, and political parties. The fourth conference for
religious leaders is tentatively scheduled for this month. In addition,
the Prime Minister has participated in a conference hosted by the
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) held in Mecca, in which
religious leaders--both Sunni and Shia--have condemned sectarian
violence in Iraq and called for an end to bloodshed.
The conferences have helped to encourage progress on some of the
toughest, unresolved political issues. For example, at the political
parties' conference in December, PM Maliki helped to further de-
Baathifciation reform by reaching out to former Baathists and inviting
them to rejoin the military.
The Government of Iraq is currently drafting a law to submit to the
Council of Representatives that would reform the de-Baathificiation
process by giving thousands of former Baathists the option of returning
to their former government jobs or drawing a pension for their past
government employment. The Constitutional Review Committee, which met
for the first time on November 15, is considering amendments to the
constitution, a process critical to keeping Iraq's Sunni Arabs engaged
in the reconciliation process. The Iraqis are also close to completing
a National Hydrocarbon Law, which we expect they will submit to the
Council of Ministers shortly. A fair and equitable Hydrocarbon Law that
gives all Iraqis a share of their country's abundant wealth will help
support national reconciliation.
In his new security plan, the Prime Minister stated publicly that
he will pursue all those engaged in violence, regardless of their sect
or party affiliation. This evenhanded approach to combating violence is
consistent with the Prime Minister's stated national reconciliation
goals. If the Iraqi Government successfully fulfills its pledge to
pursue all those who perpetrate violence, it will create the conditions
necessary to make additional political progress on critical
reconciliation issues. It will also improve the Iraqi Government's
credibility among its neighbors in the gulf whose support it will need
to create a stable, prosperous future.
Question. In your [Secretary Rice's] testimony you said that ``the
core of the Maliki plan has really been preserved'' in the plan of the
administration. What are the differences in the two plans? What changes
were made to the Maliki plan? What specific commitments has Prime
Minister Maliki made to assure the success of the new Baghdad Security
Plan? What specific commitments has he given to you [S], President
Bush, or other senior members of the administration that he will crack
down on the Jaysh al-Mandi? What public statements has he made
indicating his willingness to crack down on the Jaysh al-Mandi by name?
Answer. The current Baghdad Security Plan is the result of a
collaborative effort. In reviewing PM Maliki's plan, MNF-I assessed
that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were not yet capable of doing all
the tasks, and as a result the current plan has a larger supporting
role for MNF-I than first envisioned.
The Prime Minister assured President Bush that there would be even-
handedness in pursuing all involved in violence. Maliki has said that
his government will make no exception for any group or individual
regardless of sect or party affiliation. We expect him to apply this
principle universally, including to the Jaysh al-Mandi (JAM).
The Prime Minister assured the President that there would be no
political interference with military command decisions.
He also pledged to provide three additional brigades to implement
the new Baghdad Security Plan.
Prime Minister Maliki stated publicly on January 26 that: ``The
Baghdad security plan is now ready, and we will depend on our armed
forces to implement it with multinational forces behind them . . . ISF
will carry out the plan to restore security for Baghdad, will punish
outlaws or those who work according to political or sectarian bias . .
. The ISF will be above politics. Political parties and political
organizations are barred from political activities among the armed
forces . . . Iraq will not allow militias, regardless of sect, to
replace the function of the state or interfere with security.''
Question. In your testimony you spoke of ``surging'' the civilian
efforts of the Department of State. How many American diplomats does
the State Department have in Iraq? By what amount will these numbers
increase? Where will they serve? How many will be placed in Provincial
Reconstruction Teams? How much experience does the average PRT team
leader have?
Answer. Based on the latest staffing figures, there are 334 State
Department employees on the ground at Embassy Baghdad, and an
additional 46 State Department employees in Regional Embassy Offices
and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Other federal agencies,
such as DOD and the Department of Justice also have employees working
at the Embassy and other sites, who serve under Chief of Mission
authority.
We do not anticipate any major staff increases in Embassy Baghdad
at this time, but we are establishing new PRTs in Anbar, Baghdad, and
North Babil. We also plan to augment several existing PRTs in Anbar,
Baghdad, Diyala, Salah ad-Din, Ninawa, Kirkuk, Babil, Dhi Qar, and
Basrah.
We are currently reviewing the requirements, both here in
Washington and with Embassy Baghdad. In total, we expect to add more
than 300 civilian employees in these PRT locations. Some will be State
Department Employees, including 10 Senior Foreign Service Officers and
specialized direct hires, who will establish the new Provincial
Reconstruction Teams. Other team members will come from USAID, DOD,
Federal Agencies, and contractors.
PRT leaders are highly competent Senior Foreign Service Officers
with extensive overseas experience and proven records of leadership.
They can call on the special expertise of their team members, who
include experienced city managers, engineers, and others.
Question. In his January 10 speech, President Bush stated his
intention to seek $1.2 billion in additional economic and
reconstruction funds. According to a January 2007 Government
Accountability Office report, ``as of August 2006, the government of
Iraq had spent . . . 8 percent of its annual capital goods budget and
14 percent of its annual capital projects budget. Iraq's fiscal year
begins on January 1 of each year.'' The report found that in the
Ministry of Oil of a $3.533 billion capital budget only $4 million had
been expended. Given these funding shortfalls on the Iraqi side, what
is the rationale for additional United States reconstruction assistance
for Iraq?
Answer. In his January 10 speech, the President stressed the
importance of our improving the ability of the Iraqi Government to meet
the basic needs of its people, although he did not mention a specific
assistance figure for any future budget requests.
The Iraqi Government must do its part to invest in its own economic
development and to follow through on our joint strategy. The Government
of Iraq is committed to spending $10 billion this year to help create
jobs and further national reconciliation. However, Iraq faces major
challenges in designing and executing its capital budget. Simply put,
Iraq has available assets, the product of last year's underspent budget
and profits from higher than anticipated oil prices, but they do not
have the mechanisms to spend them--especially with the speed necessary
for post-kinetic stabilization in Baghdad and Anbar. Iraq must develop
the means to put its money to use, both for short-term ``build''
efforts and longer term capital investment.
There are several obstacles to better budget execution, including
technical problems, such as the lack of the ability to obligate money
for multiyear projects, and a lack of training and equipment to process
the transactions. The Iraqis are taking steps to address this problem,
such as draft 2007 budget provisions that permit the Ministry of
Finance to reallocate funding from any ministry that is unable to spend
it promptly. If the USG does not continue to provide assistance to the
Iraqi Government, the Iraqis will not be able to develop the mechanisms
they need to spend effectively their own budget. While we cannot spend
their money for them, we must help them get on the path to self-
sufficiency.
To help the Iraqi Government improve budget execution and take on
more responsibility for Iraq's own economic future, Secretary Rice has
appointed Ambassador Tim Carney as her new Coordinator for Economic
Transition. Ambassador Carney is now in Baghdad helping the Government
of Iraq meet its financial responsibilities, specifically on budget
execution, job creation, and capital investment projects.
Continued United States assistance is vital to help Iraq address
these problems and allow it to meet the myriad needs of its people.
Beginning in FY 2006, we have shifted the emphasis of our assistance
away from large reconstruction projects toward programs designed to
increase Iraqi capacity to govern at the national and local level.
Continued U.S. assistance is vital to establish firmly the roots of
democratic and representative governance, to support moderate political
forces, to continue economic reforms, and to establish competent and
representative government. It is a critical component of the
President's ``New Way Forward'' strategy to bring stability to Baghdad
and the rest of Iraq.
Question. How deep is the Iraqi support for both the
administration's new plan and Prime Minister Maliki's security plan?
Which factions have been publicly supportive and which have
opposed?
How much support do the plans enjoy beyond the office of the
Prime Minister?
How much support is there for the plans from the GCC+2?
Answer. PM Maliki, in his role as Iraq's commander in chief, agreed
to the troop increase as part of the Iraqi security plan and on the
basis of advice from his military and defense advisors, including
Minister of Defense Abd al-Qadir al-Mufraji. Other members of the Iraqi
body politic were consulted about the decision, and some leaders, such
as Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, supported the plan, while others
were more cautious.
The Prime Minister presented the new Iraqi security plan to the
Iraqi Council of Representatives (CoR), which approved it on January 26
following a vigorous debate. The plan's strongest support came from
Shia and Kurdish blocs. Some Sunnis in the CoR criticized the plan's
details, claiming it specifically targets Sunnis and Sunni
neighborhoods. Prime Minister Maliki, who attended the CoR session to
present his argument for the plan, responded to such criticisms by
explaining that the new security plan targets ``all who stand in the
way of the law,'' despite sect, religion, or nationality. The plan's
ultimate passage, though, demonstrates support within the Iraqi
Government and the Council of Representatives.
During their last meeting, the GCC+2 participants agreed that it
was in the interest of all countries for there to be a stable,
prosperous, and unified Iraq, based on respect for Iraq's territorial
integrity, unity, and sovereignty. They expressed their readiness to
support Iraq's efforts in this regard. While supportive of the security
plan laid out by President Bush on January 10, the GCC+2 have expressed
skepticism about the intentions of the Iraqi Government, and want the
Iraqi Government to demonstrate through its actions on the ground that
it is a truly national, rather than a sectarian, government.
Question. You testified that there is a ``new alignment'' of forces
in the Middle East pitting ``reformers and responsible leaders''
against extremists, of every sect and ethnicity, who use violence to
spread chaos, to undermine democratic governments, and to impose
agendas of hatred and intolerance.
On which side of the divide to place Muqtada al-Sadr? Jaysh
al-Mandi? The Badr Organization?
How would you characterize Prime Minister Maliki's
relationship with Muqtada al-Sadr?
What is the relationship between the Iraqi Ministry of
Interior and the Badr Organization and the Jaysh al-Mandi?
Answer. Any individuals or groups regardless of party or sectarian
affiliation, who reject violence and pursue their agendas through
peaceful democratic means can be part of the new alignment. Supporters
of Muqtada al-Sadr have joined the political process and are part of
United Iraqi Coalition (UIC) of which the Prime Minister and his party,
Dawa Islamiya, are also a part. The Sadrists have about 30 seats in the
Iraqi Parliament and have 6 ministers as part of the Iraqi Government.
Muqtada al-Sadr's supporters have chosen to be part of the political
process and it is up to him to remain a part of the political process.
Sadr appeared to reaffirm his commitment to the political process when
he ordered his members of the Council of Representatives (CoR) to
return after boycotting the sessions in late November.
We assess that Prime Minister Maliki and Muqtada al-Sadr have good
relations. PM Maliki believes the right course is to engage Sadr
politically and to try to engage him constructively in the political
process and to dissuade him from supporting violence. PM Maliki
believes he needs the support of a unified UIC in the Council of
Representatives (CoR), and works closely with all the major factions in
the UIC, including the Sadrists, in order to keep their support. Sadr
himself has not aspired to political office. Instead, he has asked his
followers to support other leaders for office, such as PM Maliki.
The Iraqi Government needs to have a monopoly on the legal use of
armed force. This means that the Jaysh al-Mandi or any militia cannot
continue to take orders from anyone other than the Iraqi Government.
Rogue elements must be reined in. This needs to be done by the Iraqis,
and quickly.
In 2003, the Badr Organization announced it had officially
disbanded its militias. However, reports suggest that elements within
the Badr Organization are still active, and we have raised our concerns
with the senior leaders of the Organization and with SCIRI.
The Iraqi Ministry of Interior has hired former members of the Badr
Organization and members or former members of JAM as part of the police
force. Some elements from both Badr and JAM have infiltrated the
security ministries, in particular the Ministry of Interior. We are
working closely with the Iraqi Government, particularly the Minister of
Interior, to reform the Ministry of Interior and police, and to find
ways to improve the screening process of those who seek to join the
police and security forces in Iraq.
______
Responses by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Questions Submitted
by Senator Richard Lugar
Question. With only the kind of recruiting effort that comes from
phone calls from you, yourself, has State been able to meet its
staffing goals in Iraq.
Other agencies have also had significant challenges in meeting
staffing targets--both budgetary (no international emergency line items
in their budgets) as well as legal (the President cannot order
civilians to war, they must volunteer, adding to the time it takes to
deploy).
Is the President seeking changes to these authorities? What is your
vision for fulfilling the civilian mandate?
Will you or other Cabinet Secretaries begin directed assignments?
Answer. Fully staffing our most critical posts, including Baghdad
and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq, is one of our
highest priorities. We have made changes to our Foreign Service bidding
and assignments process and offered a generous incentive package to
encourage bidders to volunteer for service in Iraq. Even without
personal phone calls, State Department employees have willingly
responded to the call for service and have volunteered to serve at even
the most difficult and dangerous posts abroad.
In the current assignments cycle, we have already filled 89 percent
(156 positions out of 176) of Foreign Service positions in Iraq for
summer 2007. For Embassy Baghdad, we have committed candidates for 117
out of 128 jobs. For the Iraq PRTs, we have 39 committed candidates for
48 jobs. Personnel in Baghdad are also being provided the opportunity
to serve at PRTs and will be able to extend their assignments if they
wish to do so. The Bureau of Human Resources, the Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs, and senior leaders in the Department are reaching out
to potential candidates to fill the remaining positions. We are also
looking at qualified Civil Service employees or Eligible Family Members
to fill some positions in Iraq on limited noncareer appointments. I am
confident that these positions will be filled.
At this time, the Department is not seeking any additional
authorities related to assignments. The administration has sought
various legislative changes to improve the incentives for overseas
service. A number of these incentives were included in the FY 2006
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-234). During this
Congress, the Department will continue to pursue Foreign Service
Modernization to make services abroad more attractive and to reduce the
18.6-percent pay gap for overseas service. Other proposals may also be
forthcoming, as we reevaluate the existing incentives for hardship
service and determine if other legislative changes are needed to
support and compensate our employees who serve in the most difficult
posts overseas.
The Department's FY 2007 supplemental request for operations
includes funds to enable State to reimburse other civilian agencies for
personnel they make available for service in Iraq. We believe that this
will overcome a significant obstacle to recruiting qualified personnel
from other agencies.
To date, we have not had to utilize directed assignments to meet
our staffing needs in Iraq. We are prepared to direct the assignment of
Foreign Service members should that become necessary. Our goal,
however, is continuing to fill the positions in Iraq and in all of our
missions around the world with qualified, willing employees who can
carry out our crucial U.S. foreign policy objectives overseas.
Questions about other Cabinet Secretaries' decisions to direct
assignments of their employees may be best addressed by those agencies
directly.
Question. What are the political trends outside Baghdad? Have the
PRTs been effective in empowering moderate parties? Is that a part of
the mandate?
Answer. Political trends outside of Baghdad vary from province to
province. Parts of Iraq, such as the Kurdistan region, are enjoying
relative security and prosperity. Ninawa, Tamim (Kirkuk), and Salah al-
Din have occasional acts of terrorism, but political life continues
despite this. In Anbar and Diyala, acts of violence are disrupting
political life. In south-central Iraq, sectarian violence is
negligible, but there have been sporadic episodes of Shia-on-Shia
violence between Badr Organization and Jaysh al-Mandi elements, or
involving fringe groups, such as the Soldiers of Heaven just outside of
Najaf. In Basrah, militias and political disputes play a negative role
on the political development of that province.
The President has decided to expand the size and reach of the PRTs
due to their success in building Iraqi capacity and self-sufficiency to
date. Since 2005, PRTs have invested effectively in moderate Iraqi
leaders on the local level by:
Reaching out to local and provincial leaders (including
grassroots groups) who want to make a difference in making
Iraq's democracy work;
Conducting extensive training in governance and municipal
planning for provincial, district, and subdistrict offices;
Working with Provincial Reconstruction Development
Committees to improve the provincial governments' ability to
identify and prioritize systematically the reconstruction and
development needs of their provinces and to improve the
delivery of essential services;
Facilitating better working relationships between provincial
leaders and their counterparts in the central government,
improving their ability to secure funds from the centre to pay
for provincial projects.
A core objective of the President's new strategy is to empower
moderates--those Iraqis who renounce violence and pursue their
interests peacefully, politically, and under the rule of law. The
expanded PRT program will be central to that effort. PRTs will support
local, moderate Iraqi leaders through targeted assistance, such as
microloans and grants to foster new businesses, create jobs, and
develop provincial capacity to govern in an effective, sustainable
manner. The expanded PRT program will be central to that effort. PRTs
will support local, moderate Iraqi leaders through targeted assistance,
such as microloans and grants to foster new businesses, create jobs,
and develop provincial capacity to govern in an effective, sustainable
manner.
Question. Can you describe recent efforts we have heard about in Al
Anbar province to reach out to disenfranchised Sunni Shaikhs? Are these
having any measurable effects politically or against al-Qaeda--Iraq?
How can we keep from being used as one of our witnesses yesterday
suggested may be happening?
Answer. In early 2006, several tribes, including those who have
links to insurgent groups, began efforts to root out foreign militants
in their region. Some of these tribal leaders have met with Prime
Minister Nuri al-Maliki in a show of support for his government and in
an effort to become involved in the political process. Many of these
tribal shaikhs have concluded that they can no longer watch the
destruction of their areas. They see no positive future with al-Qaeda.
Although parts of Anbar remain dangerous, in particular in the
areas immediately surrounding Ramadi, we have started to notice some
improvement, such as additional shops opening and an increase in the
number of the police force in Anbar province in general. USG-sponsored
reconstruction programs have already begun in parts of Anbar. Anbar
province enjoys perhaps the highest level of electricity anywhere in
Iraq. We hope that more tribal leaders will be motivated to join the
process after witnessing the tangible improvements brought about by
reconstruction programs.
Question. In your strategic review, has anyone modeled the negative
economic impacts a precipitous withdrawal and collapsed state would
mean to the region and the world?
Answer. We are unaware of any formal models, econometric or other,
of the negative economic impacts that a precipitous U.S./coalition
withdrawal from Iraq and the (probable) ensuing collapse of the Iraqi
state would mean to the region and the world. The impacts modeled would
depend on the model's assumptions. However, if a U.S./coalition
withdrawal was followed by the collapse of the Iraqi state, then that
would almost certainly cause a serious decline in Iraqi oil output for
some period of time.
International oil markets would be most affected by a collapse
scenario. The loss of Iraq's oil from world markets could have a
serious impact on the world oil market, both from the immediate
shortage and from the higher ``risk premium'' that the market would
demand. However, this could be mitigated by the current excess capacity
in world oil production (e.g., Saudi Arabia's excess production
capacity of about 2 million barrels per day is greater than Iraq's
production for world markets of 1.5 million barrels per day). In
addition, in any serious disruption of oil supplies, one option is that
the members of the International Energy Agency could consider a
drawdown of oil stocks.
Collapse of the Iraqi Government would also almost certainly result
in a major outflow of refugees. The economic consequences for
neighboring countries (Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and
Turkey) would be severe, as they struggled to provide food, shelter,
and security. In addition, Iraq's neighbors export and transship
significant amounts of goods of all types to Iraq and would be affected
by an Iraqi collapse.
Question. One of our witnesses yesterday brought up the Iraq
compact. Can you share specifics on that with us for the record?
Answer. The International Compact with Iraq (ICI) is a framework
for the international community to support the Government of Iraq in
exchange for Iraq making a series of commitments to essential economic
initiatives and reforms--including and extending beyond Iraq's
commitments under its IMF Stand-By Arrangements (SBA). The ICI also
defines the political and security context required for the economic
reforms to succeed. Iraq developed the ICI with the support of the
United Nations, World Bank, IMF, and its major international donor
partners. International contributions for the ICI will come in a
variety of forms, including technical support, debt forgiveness, loans,
private investment, and grants. The ultimate goal of the ICI is to set
Iraq on a path to financial and economic self-sufficiency.
The ICI demonstrates the increasing capabilities and determination
of the Iraqi Government to determine its future. The goals,
commitments, and benchmarks in the ICI were primarily developed by the
Iraqis themselves, and the ICI document has been approved by Iraq's
Council of Ministers. Iraq is already moving forward to implement
aspects of the ICI, for example, its progress to develop a new
hydrocarbons law.
The next step is for Iraq and the United Nations to convene a
meeting to close the text of the ICI documents. At that time, the ICI
document and annexes will be publicly released in final form for review
by the international community in anticipation of a high-level
international conference for formal adoption of the ICI in the near
future.
More information about the work to develop the ICI can be found at
www.IraqCompact.org (a Web site maintained by the United Nations).
Question. Please provide for the committee the latest draft of the
hydrocarbons law and relevant details of negotiations.
Answer. The Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional
Government have made significant progress in narrowing their
disagreements. We expect them to submit a completed draft law to the
Council of Ministers (their Cabinet) shortly and to the Council of
Representatives (their Parliament) sometime in March. However,
differences remain over where to draw the lines of authority for
approving exploration and production contracts. The Iraqi negotiators
are hard at work resolving these differences.
Due to the ongoing nature of the negotiations, the U.S. Government
does not have an up-to-date draft of the law. Based on our
conversations with Iraqi officials, we understand the current version
contains the following elements:
(1) A framework for developing Iraq's oil and gas sector,
based upon free market principles and encouragement of private
sector investment;
(2) A set of governing principles and broad organization of
the sector;
(3) Key principles for revenue sharing, including, that after
funding of its national responsibilities, the central
government will collect and distribute revenue to local
authorities according to a formula that will include population
as a basis.
The law also stipulates that separate, complementary laws will
follow the main hydrocarbon law and will contain the following
elements:
(1) Specific implementation details on revenue sharing;
(2) Definition of the roles of the Iraqi National Oil Company
and the Ministry of Oil;
(3) There could also be subsequent legislation on petroleum
taxation.
Question. Each nation in the region has its own interests in mind
when it comes to a particular outcome in Iraq. Other than Iran and
Syria, what indications do we have from regional leaders that they are
willing to put Iraq's interests first? Are they taking any constructive
steps worth mentioning?
Answer. Iraq does not exist in isolation from the region.
Overcoming governance and security challenges will require the help and
support of its neighbors. On governance issues, the international
community can have a large impact through its participation in the
International Compact with Iraq (ICI). Under the ICI, Iraq has
committed to a series of primarily economic reforms that will allow it
to become self-sufficient over the next 5 years. In exchange, its
international partners will support Iraq through new assistance to
Iraq, debt forgiveness, and investments. The compact provides a
framework for Iraq's economic transformation and integration into the
regional and global economy. We expect the compact to be completed and
signed in the coming months.
On security, Iraq's neighbors can be helpful by supporting the
Iraqi Government and stopping the flow of terrorists elements across
their borders. While we are working with our partners in the region to
strengthen peace, two governments--Syria and Iran--have chosen to align
themselves with the forces of violent extremism in Iraq and elsewhere.
The problem is not a lack of dialog, but a lack of positive action by
those states.
As you know, I recently returned from travel to Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, and Kuwait to urge support for the Government of Iraq and the
new strategy. My interlocutors expressed their strong concern over the
growth of negative Iranian involvement in Iraq and al-Qaeda terror. At
the same time, they made clear their concern that the current Iraqi
Government was acting in a manner that reflected a sectarian rather
than national agenda.
We understand these concerns and we believe the Iraqi Government
understands them as well. Prime Minister Maliki and his government have
pledged not to tolerate any act of violence from any community or
group. That means that all those engaged in killing and intimidation,
whether Shia or Sunni, need to be confronted.
Only through new facts on the ground--tangible evidence of action
against all those who pursue violence can the Government of Iraq
establish the credibility at home and abroad that it needs to chart a
successful future.
Question. An important element in planning successfully is
sequencing. Can we bring the proper resources to focus at the right
time? Can the Iraqis and we maintain the ``hold'' long enough to build?
What should that building entail? As you understand it, would this be
done by uniformed forces, civilians, or Iraqis?
Answer. As you know, the President has decided to augment our own
troop levels in Baghdad and Anbar by 21,500. The mission of this
enhanced force is to support Iraqi troops and commanders, who are now
in the lead, to help clear and secure neighborhoods, protect the local
population, provide essential services, and create conditions necessary
to spur local economic development.
The Department of State is contributing robustly to this effort by
expanding our present close coordination with our military counterparts
in and outside of Baghdad, and with the Iraqi Government to capitalize
on security improvements by creating jobs and promoting economic
revitalization. There must be the fullest possible civilian-military
unity of effort if we are to be successful.
To that end, we will immediately deploy greater resources alongside
our military in Baghdad and Anbar. The centerpiece of this effort will
be our expansion of our Provincial Reconstruction Teams. We will double
our PRTs from 10 to 20, adding more than 300 new personnel. We will
expand our PRTs in three phases with the first phase occurring over the
next 3 months to complement our enhanced military efforts. In that
time, we plan to colocate nine new PRTs--six in Baghdad and three in
Anbar--with Brigade Combat Teams engaged in security operations.
The Department will recruit and deploy senior-level Team Leaders
for these nine new PRTs who will work jointly with brigade commanders
to develop plans for the ``build'' phase of clear, hold, and build.
Well-qualified officers have already stepped forward for these
assignments.
PRTs will target both civilian and military resources, including
foreign assistance and the Commanders' Emergency Response Program, as
part of a strategic plan to sustain stability, promote economic growth,
and foster Iraqi self-sufficiency where we have made security gains.
In the next two phases of our PRT expansion, we will add a new PRT
in North Babil and augment our existing PRTs with specialized technical
personnel, such as irrigation specialists, veterinarians, and
agribusiness development experts, based on local provincial needs.
PRTs will support local moderate Iraqi leaders through targeted
assistance, such as microloans and grants to foster new businesses,
create jobs, and develop provincial capacity to govern in an effective
and sustainable way. We intend to complete all three phases of our PRT
expansion by the end of the calendar year. Completion, however, will be
dependent both on funding levels and circumstances on the ground.
ALTERNATIVE PLANS: TROOP SURGE, PARTITION, WITHDRAWAL, OR STRENGTHEN
THE CENTER
----------
THURSDAY, JANUARY 11, 2007 [P.M.]
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:50 p.m., in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R.
Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Menendez, Bill Nelson, Casey,
Webb, Lugar, Corker, and Isakson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. I apologize
to our distinguished witnesses. As they know, the hearing was
supposed to start at 2 o'clock. They--please sit, gentlemen--
they adjusted their schedules to accommodate us, and,
unfortunately, neither Senator Lugar nor I have control over
the Senate floor. Nor do I want it. But I truly appreciate
their indulgence.
This afternoon, we begin our examination of the various
plans for securing our interests in Iraq. We obviously heard
from ``the plan'' this morning, the plan put forward by the
President of the United States. And I appreciate the Secretary
coming to attempt to make a case for that plan. But, as I said
at the outset of these hearings, in announcing these hearings,
the process here was to get a lay of the land, to get a
historical perspective, an intelligence perspective, which we
did, the previous 2 days. And then we began, with the
Secretary, to hear the credible alternatives that have been
offered--left, right, and center--Republican, Democrat,
Independent, think tank, and individual Members of the
Congress--for example, Jack Murtha, at some point, will come
and testify, and as will, I suspect, former Speaker Gingrich.
So, the whole idea here is for the public to understand what
the various alternatives offered by serious people are, that
are out there, so they understand there is not only a single
alternative--``Either you do this, or we,'' quote, ``leave,''
although that may be a plan, as well.
So, today we'll hear three starkly different, but well-
informed, proposals from thoughtful and very articulate
witnesses. While each of them has very different ideas on how
to proceed from this point out, they're united in their
devotion to this country and their desire to see us through
this difficult time.
We're going to begin today with Ambassador Peter Galbraith,
senior diplomatic fellow with the Center for Arms Control and
Non-Proliferation. He's also, from our perspective and the
perspectives of the people sitting behind me--his greatest
credential is, he was a staff member on this committee in
decades gone by, and we're delighted to have him back.
Ambassador Galbraith argues that we should accept a partition
of Iraq--that has already taken place, withdraw from Arab Iraq,
and redeploy a small force in Kurdistan that can strike at al-
Qaeda if necessary.
Next, we will hear from Dr. Frederick Kagan, resident
scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Dr. Kagan has
authored a recent study that, ``calls for a sustained surge of
American combat forces into Iraq in order to restore and
maintain stability and security in Baghdad, reduce sectarian
violence, protect the Iraqi population, and help establish a
normal life for the Iraqi people.'' I found it very
interesting. I read your entire report, and I'm anxious to hear
you expound on it.
We'll then hear from Dr. Ted Galen Carpenter, the vice
president of defense and foreign policy studies at the CATO
Institute. Dr. Carpenter argues, and I quote, ``The President
should begin the process of removing American troops
immediately, and that process needs to be completed in no less
than 6 months.''
To state again for the record what is obvious: These are
all very well-informed, very bright, and very patriotic
Americans with three, essentially, totally different views as
to how to proceed from this point. And I am confident that
their testimony will help enlighten and inform the committee.
I would now yield to my colleague, Chairman Lugar, if he
wishes to make any opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The President has offered a plan that he believes will
advance United States interests in Iraq and the Middle East. In
recent conversations with the President, I have tried to
underscore the need for a thorough effort to involve Congress
in the decisionmaking process. As we conduct dialog with the
executive branch, Members of Congress have a responsibility to
make informed and reasoned judgments about what the President
is proposing. Congress must carefully study how the President's
plan will affect the welfare of American service men and women,
the prospects for success in Iraq, and the future of our
broader strategic interests.
This morning, our committee had an opportunity to engage
Secretary Rice in a frank discussion about the President's plan
and the situation in Iraq. This afternoon, we will continue our
inquiry, with the help of an impressive panel of witnesses, who
represent competing points of view.
In my comments at the hearing this morning, I outlined what
I believe are United States primary strategic objectives in
Iraq, and they are: Preventing the use of Iraq as a safe haven
or training ground for terrorism; preventing civil war and
upheaval in Iraq from creating instability that leads to
regional war, the overthrow of friendly governments, the
destruction of oil facilities or other calamities; and
preventing a loss of U.S. credibility in the region and the
world; and preventing Iran, finally, from dominating the
region.
I suggest that, given these objectives, the outcome in Iraq
is intimately connected with what happens beyond Iraq's
borders. On this basis, I believe that any plan for Iraq must
include a vigorous and creative regional diplomatic component
that makes use of our strengths, including our stabilizing
military presence in the region.
The options that will be presented by our witnesses center
on fundamental questions of whether the United States should
continue its military presence in Iraq. As you make your
arguments, I'll be interested in how you prescribe the broader
strategic context of the Middle East that is vital national
security. My own view is that we must have a military presence
in Iraq indefinitely and that we ought to inform all the border
countries of that proposition, in addition to Iraqis. The
positioning of those forces is at issue, and hopefully you will
have some comments about that.
I'll look forward to your insights and our experts as they
come along the trail throughout the hearings that Senator Biden
has planned.
And I thank the chairman, again, for holding this hearing
this afternoon.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Galbraith.
STATEMENT OF HON. PETER W. GALBRAITH, SENIOR DIPLOMATIC FELLOW,
CENTER FOR ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Galbraith. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members
of the Committee on Foreign Relations, thank you for the
invitation to testify before this committee on alternative
strategies toward Iraq. It's a special privilege for me to be
here, since the committee was my professional home for 14
years, and it is here where I had a great deal of my education
on Iraq, as some of the more senior members of the committee
may recall.
I have submitted a detailed statement, together with a one-
page summary of my plan, and I hope that they will be included
in the record of these hearings.
The Chairman. Without objection, they will be.
Ambassador Galbraith. And before I begin, I was asked by
the committee staff to clarify my relationship with the
Kurdistan Regional Government. I've sent an e-mail explaining
this. As described in my book, I've been friends with the
Kurdish leaders, and, for that matter, many other Iraqi
leaders, for a very long period of time, but I do not have a
paid relationship with the Kurdistan Regional Government.
Iraq has broken up, and it is in the midst of a civil war.
Reality, and not wishes, must dictate our strategy. President
Bush's new strategy relies on two elements that simply do not
exist: First, an inclusive national unity government in Iraq;
and, second, Iraqi security services--that is, the army and the
police--that are loyal to Iraq and not to their sect or ethnic
group. The Maliki government is a sectarian Shiite government
that is regarded as alien, and indeed even non-Iraqi, by the
Sunni Arabs, and as irrelevant by the Kurds. The government's
conduct--the protection of Shiite militias, its selective
provision of government services, the manner in which it
carried out Saddam's execution--provides no evidence that it
can transform itself into something different from what it is.
But even if Iraq had a genuine government of national
unity, it would be largely irrelevant. There is no part of the
country where the government actually exercises significant
authority.
In the southern half of Iraq and eastern Baghdad, Shiite
religious parties have created local theocracies that use
militias to enforce a version of Islamic law modeled on Iran,
but far stricter. The much-vaunted human rights provisions of
the Iraqi Constitution do not apply.
Kurdistan, in the north, is a de facto independent state
with its own army and its own flag. The Iraqi Army is barred
from the region. Flying the Iraqi flag is prohibited, and
central-government ministries are not present. Further, the
Kurdish people voted, 98.5 percent for independence, in a
nonbinding referendum held in January 2005.
The Sunni center is a battleground between insurgents that
command widespread local support and U.S. forces. And Baghdad
is the front line of the Sunni-Shiite civil war. The Mahdi
Army, the radical Shiite militia, controls the capital's Shiite
neighbors in the east, while al-Qaeda, its offshoots, and
Baathists control Sunni districts in the west. In Baghdad and
in other formerly mixed areas, extremists are engaging in
brutal sectarian cleansing, with a death toll that may well be
in excess of 200 a day.
Iraq's army and police reflect Iraq's divisions. They are
either Sunni or Shiite. The Shiite police include the death
squads that target Sunnis. In Sunni areas, the police are
either insurgent sympathizers or insurgents. Iraq's Army, while
somewhat better, is divided into Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish
battalions. They are ultimately loyal not to the nominal chain
of command, but to their political party leaders or, in the
case of the Kurds, to the Kurdistan Regional Government. Iraq's
security forces are not neutral guarantors of public security,
but combatants in a civil war. United States training has not,
and will not, make these forces into Iraqis; it will only
create more lethal combatants in a civil war.
The goal of a self-sustaining, unified, and democratic Iraq
would require a vast expansion of the United States military
mission in Iraq, to include disarming Shiite militias,
dismantling the theocracies, and policing Iraq's mixed areas in
order to end the civil war. The Iraqi Government has no
intention of taking on the Shiite militias, and Iraq's security
forces cannot police Iraq's mixed areas, since there are no
such forces that are trusted by both Sunnis and Shiites.
The President's plan, in short, does nothing to stop Iraq's
civil war or to build a unified Iraq. The alternative is to
accept the reality that Iraq has broken up, and to work with
its components. We should get out of the business of nation-
building in Iraq and respect the democratic decision of the
Iraqis to have a country of very strong regions and a powerless
center. Iraq's Constitution, adopted by 80 percent of Iraq's
people, is a roadmap to partition. It recognizes Kurdistan as a
self-governing region and permits other parts of the country to
form regions. Iraq's Council of Representatives has already
passed a law paving the way to the formation of a Shiite super-
region in the south in the next 15 months.
Under Iraq's Constitution, regions can have their own
armies, called regional guards, and exercise substantial
control over their natural resources, including oil. Except for
the short list of exclusive federal powers listed in article
110 of the Iraqi Constitution, regional law is superior to
federal law in Iraq. By design, Iraq's Constitution makes it
difficult for the central government to function, and its few
powers do not even include taxation.
The regionalization of Iraq is a fact. It also provides the
best hope for security, and, therefore, opens the way to a
United States withdrawal. Without any significant coalition
presence, Kurdistan has already made itself into the one secure
and reasonably democratic part of Iraq. The south is also
reasonably secure, and will become more so as it forms its
regional institutions. No purpose is served by a coalition
presence in the south, and it should be withdrawn immediately.
Regionalization makes for a more effective strategy in
combating the Sunni insurgency. Right now, U.S. forces battle
Sunni insurgents on behalf of a Shiite-led government and a
Shiite-dominated military. Sunnis see these forces as alien and
dangerous. Too many Sunnis see the choice today as one between
their own extremists and a pro-Iranian Shiite government that
sponsors anti-Sunni death squads. The Sunni extremists are not
trying to kill you, whereas the other guys are. By forming
their own region, Sunni Arabs can provide for their own
security, and there could be economic and other incentives to
combat extremists. In my view, the United States should state
that it will withdraw from the Sunni Arab region when a Sunni
regional guard is established.
So far, the Sunni Arabs have been the strongest opponents
of federalism in Iraq. But with Kurdistan already in existence
and a Shiite region likely on its way, the Sunnis are faced
with a choice between governing themselves or being governed by
a Shiite-dominated central government in Baghdad.
The United States has one achievable overriding interest in
Iraq today, which is to keep al-Qaeda and its ilk from having a
base from which they can attack the United States. If Sunni
Arabs cannot provide for their own security, then the United
States must be prepared to reengage in the Sunni areas. This is
best accomplished by placing a small over-the-horizon force in
Kurdistan. Kurdistan has the Western-oriented aspiring
democracy that the United States once hoped for all of Iraq,
and the Kurds are among the most pro-American people in the
world. They would welcome a United States base, not least
because it would provide them a measure of security against
Arab Iraqis, who may seek revenge against the Kurds for having
collaborated with the United States in Iraq. From Kurdistan,
the United States military could readily move back into any
Sunni Arab area where al-Qaeda or its allies established a
base. The Kurdistan peshmerga would willingly assist their
American allies with intelligence and other support.
By deploying to what is still, nominally, Iraqi territory,
the United States would avoid the political complications in
the United States and in Iraq involved in reentering Iraq
following a total withdrawal. Partition, as noted by the Baker-
Hamilton Commission and by many experts, is not an easy
solution, but many of the worst consequences of partition,
including sectarian killing and an Iranian-dominated Shiite
south, have already happened. And the United States has no plan
to reverse any of this.
Mr. Chairman, I'm often asked: What is the difference
between the plan that you and Les Gelb have put forward and the
plan that I have outlined? We agree that the future of Iraq is
up to the Iraqis. You and Les Gelb are more optimistic that
Iraq may hold together and, if you're right, I think that would
be terrific. I'm pessimistic that the country can hold together
over the long term. But, nonetheless, the fundamental premise
of both plans is that the United States should not be engaged
in nation-building in Iraq; this should be left to the Iraqis.
Partition is an Iraqi solution. It does not require the
United States to do anything, although we can, and should, take
steps, diplomatically and through our financial assistance,
that can smooth the process, and also to try to deal with the
regional consequences.
The alternative to partition is a continued U.S.-led effort
at nation-building that has not worked for the last 4 years,
and, in my view, has no prospect for success. That, Mr.
Chairman, is a formula for war without an end.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Galbraith follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Peter W. Galbraith, Senior Diplomatic
Fellow, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Washington, DC
Chairman Biden, Senator Lugar, members of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, thank you for the invitation to testify before this
committee on alternative strategies toward Iraq. It is a special
privilege to be here since the committee staff was my professional home
for 14 years and it is here where I began my education on Iraq.
GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR U.S. STRATEGY
It is clear that our present strategy for Iraq has failed miserably
both in concept and execution. Any new strategy should, I believe, be
based on the following premises:
First, the United States needs to extricate itself from Iraq as
soon as feasible so that we can address other more urgent threats to
our national security, including from nuclear North Korea and nuclear
ambitious Iran.
Second, any new strategy should focus on the objectives that are
achievable in Iraq consistent with the military and other resources we
are prepared to commit.
Third, the starting point for any new strategy for Iraq should be
the country as it is, not as we wish it were.
IRAQ: BROKEN APART AND IN CIVIL WAR
The reality of Iraq is stark. The country has broken up and is in
the midst of a civil war.
In the southern half of Iraq, Shiite religious parties and clerics
have created theocracies policed by militias that number well over
100,000. In Basra, three religious parties control--and sometimes fight
over--the 100,000 barrels of oil diverted each day from legal exports
into smuggling. To the extent that the central government has authority
in the south, it is because the same Shiite parties that dominate the
center also control the south.
Kurdistan in the north is de facto an independent state with its
own army and its own flag. The Iraqi Army is barred from the region,
flying the Iraqi flag prohibited, and central government ministries are
not present. The Kurdish people voted 98.5 percent for independence in
an informal referendum in January 2005.
The Sunni center is a battleground between insurgents that command
widespread local support and U.S. forces. The Iraqi Army, which we
proclaim to be a national institution, is seen by the Sunni Arabs as a
largely Shiite force loyal to a Shiite-led government that they see as
an ally of national enemy, Iran.
Baghdad is the front line of Iraq's Sunni-Shiite civil war. The
Mahdi army, the radical Shiite militia, controls the capital's Shiite
neighborhoods in the east while al-Qaeda offshoots and Baathists
control the Sunni districts in the west. In Baghdad, and in other
formerly mixed areas, extremists are engaging in brutal sectarian
cleansing with a death toll probably in excess of 200 a day.
TWIN PILLARS OF CURRENT STRATEGY
The Bush administration's strategy for Iraq rests on two pillars:
First, an inclusive and effective national unity government that
represents Iraq's Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds; and, second, the
development of effective Iraqi Army and police that can take over
security responsibilities from U.S. forces.
Iraq does not have a government of national unity. Prime Minister
Nouri al-Maliki pursues a sectarian Shiite agenda, as seen most
dramatically in the manner in which he carried out Saddam Hussein's
execution. The Maliki government is keen to fight the Sunni
insurgents--or to be more precise, to have the U.S. military fight
Sunni insurgents--but has resisted all steps to disband Shiite
militias. But, even if Iraq had a genuine national unity government, it
would be largely irrelevant. There is no part of the country where the
government actually exercises significant authority.
Iraq's Army and police are either Shiite or Sunni. In Baghdad, the
Shiite death squads that target Sunnis are the police. In Sunni areas,
the police are often insurgent sympathizers or insurgents. Iraq's Army,
while somewhat better, is divided into Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish
battalions. These are ultimately loyal not to the nominal chain of
command, but to their sects, or, in the case of the Kurds, to the
Kurdistan Regional Government. In a country in the midst of a civil
war, it is unrealistic to believe that Iraq's security forces can
somehow be different from the country itself.
Iraq's security forces are not neutral guarantors of public
security but combatants in a civil war. U.S. training has not made, and
will not make, these forces into Iraqis. It will only create more
lethal combatants in a civil war.
what would be required to achieve a democratic and unified iraq
To achieve the Bush administration's stated goal of a self-
sustaining unified and democratic Iraq, the United States would have to
undertake two major military missions that it is not now undertaking.
First, it would have to disarm, forcefully, Iraq's Shiite militias
and dismantle the Shiite theocracies that these militias keep in power.
This would bring the United States into direct conflict with Iraq's
Shiite power structure. The Shiites are three times as numerous as the
Sunni Arabs, possess more powerful armed forces, and have in
neighboring Iran a powerful ally.
Second, the United States would have to end Iraq's civil war. This
means deploying U.S. troops to serve as the police in Baghdad and other
mixed areas for an indefinite period of time. These are not tasks that
can be handled by Iraqi security forces since there are no such forces
that are trusted by both Sunnis and Shiites.
The Bush administration has no intention of undertaking either of
these missions which would require many more troops, mean significantly
greater casualties (especially if we tried to use our troops as
police), and probably not succeed.
IRAQ'S CONSTITUTION: A ROADMAP TO PARTITION
The alternative is to accept the reality--an Iraq that has broken
up--and work with its components. We should get out of the business of
nation-building in Iraq and respect the democratic decision of the
Iraqis to have a country of strong regions and a powerless center.
Iraq's Constitution, adopted by 80 percent of Iraq's people, is a
roadmap to partition. It recognizes Kurdistan as a self-governing
region and permits other parts of the country to form regions. Iraq's
Council of Representatives has already passed a law paving the way to
the formation of a Shiite ``super region'' in 15 months.
Under the constitution, Iraq's regions can have their own armies
(called Regional Guards) and exercise substantial control over their
natural resources including oil. Except for the short list of exclusive
federal powers listed in article 110 of the Iraqi Constitution,
regional law is superior to federal law. By design, Iraq's Constitution
makes it difficult for the central government to function and its few
powers do not even include taxation.
WITHDRAW WHERE WE HAVE NO ACHIEVABLE MISSION
By accepting the reality of Iraq, we can see a path to withdrawal.
The Shiite south is stable, albeit theocratic and pro-Iranian. If we
are not going to disband the militias and local theocracies--which we
allowed to become established during the CPA's formal occupation of
Iraq--there is no purpose served by a continued coalition presence in
the Shiite southern half of Iraq. We should withdraw immediately.
In the Sunni center, our current strategy involves handing off
combat duties to the Iraqi Army. Mostly, it is Shiite battalions that
fight in the Sunni Arab areas, as the Sunni units are not reliable.
What the Bush administration portrays as Iraqi, the local population
sees as a hostile force loyal to a Shiite-dominated government in
Baghdad installed by the Americans invader and closely aligned with the
traditional enemy, Iran. The more we ``Iraqize'' the fight in the Sunni
heartland, the more we strengthen the insurgency.
If the Sunni Arabs were to form their own region, they could take
control of their own security. Right now, the choice for ordinary
Sunnis is between what they see as a radical Shiite government that
sponsors anti-Sunni death squads and their own extremists. Within the
establishment of a Sunni region, the choice becomes one between
nationalist and traditional leadership on the one hand and the Islamic
extremists on the other. Outsiders can influence this choice by
providing economic incentives for a more moderate Sunni Arab
government. The United States should state that it will withdraw from
the Sunni Arab region when its Regional Guard is established.
So far, the Sunni Arabs have been the strongest opponents of
federalism in Iraq. But, with Kurdistan already in existence and a
Shiite region likely on its way, the Sunnis are faced with a choice
between governing themselves or being governed by a Shiite-dominated
central government in Baghdad.
BAGHDAD
Because it is Iraq's most mixed city, Baghdad is the front line of
Iraq's Sunni-Shiite civil war. It is tragedy for its people--most of
whom do not share the sectarian hatred that is fueling a killing spree
that is taking several thousand lives a month. Iraqi forces cannot end
the civil war because many of them are partisans of one side, and the
proposed surge of U.S. troops will not end it. There is no good
solution to Baghdad. Ideally, the United States could help broker a
political deal for power-sharing among Sunnis and Shiites (with space
for the much smaller Christian, Mandean/Sabean, Turkmen, and Kurdish
communities). But, the reality is that Baghdad is already divided. A
formal division into Shiite and Sunni sectors may be the only way to
halt the effort by Shiite militias to enlarge the Shiite parts of the
city.
Unless the United States is prepared to assume long-term police
duties in Baghdad, we should withdraw our troops from the city. If we
withdraw, there will be sectarian cleansing of mixed neighborhoods and
sectarian killing. And, this will be the case if we stay with our
current forces or even after the modest surge now being discussed.
KURDISTAN
Kurdistan is Iraq's most stable region. It is the one part of the
country that is the pro-Western, secular, and aspiring democracy that
the Bush administration had hoped for all of Iraq. The United States
should work to strengthen democratic institutions in Kurdistan as well
as the military capabilities of the Kurdistan military (the peshmerga)
which is Iraq's only reliable indigenous military force.
Iraq's Constitution provides for a referendum to be held by the end
of this year to determine the status of Kirkuk and other areas disputed
between Kurds and Arabs. Holding this referendum has the potential to
increase, significantly, violence in areas that are ethnically mixed.
On the other hand, Kirkuk has been a source of conflict in Iraq for
seven decades. Failing to resolve the matter at a time when there is a
constitutionally agreed process to do so is also likely to produce
conflict and is destabilizing over the long term.
Because of our special relationship with the Kurds, the United
States has clout that it does not enjoy elsewhere in the country. The
United States should engage in a major diplomatic effort to resolve the
boundaries of Kurdistan through negotiation wherever possible. The
Kurds, who hold the upper hand in much of this disputed territory,
should be cautioned about the dangers of overreaching. With regard to
Kirkuk, the U.S. diplomacy should focus on entrenching power-sharing
among the governorate's four communities--Kurds, Turkmen, Arabs, and
Chaldean/Assyrians--so that all have a stake in Kirkuk regardless of
the outcome of the referendum.
PREVENTING AL-QAEDA FROM HAVING A BASE
The United States has one overriding interest in Iraq today--to
keep al-Qaeda and like-minded Salafi terrorist groups from having a
base from which they can plot attacks on the United States. If Sunni
Arabs cannot provide for their own security, the United States must be
prepared to reengage.
This is best accomplished by placing a small over-the-horizon force
in Kurdistan. The Kurds are among the most pro-American people in the
world and would welcome a U.S. military presence, not the least because
it would help protect them from Arab Iraqis who resent their close
cooperation with the United States during the 2003 war and thereafter.
From Kurdistan, the U.S. military could readily move back into any
Sunni Arab area where al-Qaeda or its allies established a base. The
Kurdish peshmerga would willingly assist their American allies with
intelligence and operationally. By deploying to what is still nominally
Iraqi territory, the United States would avoid the political
complications--in the United States and in Iraq--involved in reentering
Iraq following a total withdrawal.
WILL IRAQ STAY TOGETHER?
Can Iraq survive as a loose federation? Over the short term, Iraq's
Kurdish and Shiite leaders are committed to the constitutional
arrangements while the Sunni Arabs say that they want a more
centralized state. Both Sunni Arabs and Shiites identify as Iraqis,
although they have radically different visions as to what Iraq should
be. The creation of Sunni and Shiite federal units, therefore, is not
likely to lead to a full separation. Rather, by giving each community
their own entity, federalism can help avoid the alternative where
Sunnis and Shiites fight a prolonged civil war for control of all Arab
Iraq.
The Kurds do not identify as Iraqis. They associate Iraq with
decades of repression and with Saddam Hussein's genocide. Almost
unanimously, Iraqi Kurds want their own independent state. Keeping
people in a state they hate is a formula for never ending conflict of
the sort that has characterized the entire history of modern Iraq. The
United States may--and for the time being probably should--delay
Kurdistan's full independence, but we cannot prevent it. Our real
interest is in preventing the violent break up of Iraq, and not in
holding together a country that brought nonstop misery to the majority
of its people for its entire history.
______
Partition and Withdraw: A Strategy to Get the U.S. Out of Iraq
Summary: Accept the partition of Iraq that has already taken place,
withdraw from Arab Iraq, and redeploy a small force to Kurdistan that
can strike at al-Qaeda if necessary.
Key Facts: Iraq has broken up and is in the midst of a civil war.
Kurdistan in the north is a de facto independent state with its own
army. The Shiite south is governed separately from Baghdad. The Iraqi
Parliament has approved a law paving the way for the formation of a
Shiite ``super region'' in 15 months. The Sunni center is a
battleground and Baghdad is the front line of the Sunni-Shiite civil
war.
Iraq's Constitution ratifies the country's partition, recognizing
Kurdistan as a self-governing region and permitting other parts of the
country to form regions. Under the Constitution, Iraq's regions can
have their own armies (called Regional Guards) and exercise substantial
control over their natural resources including oil. Except for the
short list of exclusive federal powers listed in Article 110 of the
Iraqi Constitution, regional law is superior to federal law. By design,
Iraq's Constitution makes it difficult for the central government to
function and its few powers do not even include taxation. To achieve a
unified and democratic Iraq, the United States would have to use its
military to end the civil war, build a strong central government over
the objections of the Kurds and many Shiites, and be prepared to remain
in Iraq indefinitely. Even so, the prospects for success would be
minimal.
Policy Recommendations:
1. Accept the reality of partition and work with the regions that
emerge to develop stable regional governments with competent security
forces.
2. Use deplomacy to smooth the path to partition by helping resolve
territorial disputes between regions, and notably between Kurdistan and
Arab Iraq over Kirkuk.
3. Facilitate a solution to Baghdad either by devising a plan for
power sharing between Sunnis and Shiites in the city or by dividing it
along current sectarian boundaries.
4. Mitigate the humanitarian consequences of Iraq's civil war with
assistance to displaced populations.
5. Withdraw coalition forces immediately from Iraq's Shiite south
where they are not needed for stability.
6. Withdraw rapidly from most of Baghdad recognizing that the U.S.
military is not prepared to become the police of the city.
7. State that the U.S. will withdraw from the Iraq's Sunni areas at
such time as the Sunnis are prepared to assume security for their own
region.
8. Retain an ``over-the-horizon'' U.S. military force in pro-
American Kurdistan that could intervene against al-Qaeda and other
global terrorist organizations if necessary.
9. Delay Iraq's formal breakup as long as possible while preparing
neighbors to accept peacefully the new reality.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Dr. Kagan.
STATEMENT OF FREDERICK W. KAGAN, RESIDENT SCHOLAR, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Kagan. Mr. Chairman, honorable members of this----
The Chairman. Again, welcome.
Dr. Kagan [continuing]. Committee, I'm very grateful for
the opportunity to speak before you today on this issue that is
of such great importance to our Nation.
Iraq is clearly in a very dire situation right now, and no
objective observer could deny that. And we face, at this
moment, I believe, a series of very difficult choices among
options, none of which are pleasant, none of which can promise
success, all of which carry increased risk, of one form or
another.
I'd like to stress that I do believe that there is an
option that can succeed in at least offering us a chance to
move forward toward a road that would actually be acceptable to
us over the long term. And I do believe that that option is
embodied in the plan that I have presented at AEI, some time
ago, in the report called ``Choosing Victory.''
But I'd like, first, to highlight the fact that I believe
that we have come to a point of bifurcation in the history of
the world. And I don't think that's too strong a statement. I
think that it is impossible to overstate how much rides on the
outcome of the war in Iraq today.
A number of experts from various parties and persuasions
have looked at the possibility and likelihood of containing a
civil war in Iraq that is now underway, and preventing it from
spreading throughout the region, without actually tamping it
down and bringing it under control in Iraq. And the conclusions
are very, very poor; very, very pessimistic.
Judging from past civil wars, ethnosectarian conflicts
around the world, it is very clear that a civil war, allowed to
proceed unchecked in Iraq as the result of a precipitate
American withdrawal, is highly likely to spread violence
throughout the entire region, destabilize Iraq's neighbors, and
may quite possibly lead to regional conflict. This is not
something that the United States could view with any degree of
equanimity. This is not Southeast Asia, this is not a part of
the world that we can walk away from, this is a region that
will always be at the center of America's vital interests in
the world, and not an area where we can simply watch idly as
conflict expands and brings in ever more warriors.
Unfortunately, I think this nightmare scenario is not
improbable if we do not bring the violence in Iraq under
control and work hard to reestablish an Iraqi State that can
govern its territory and maintain its own security and defend
itself against foes, internal and external. And I do believe
that it is possible to do that.
We have not succeeded in Iraq, so far, because we have not
applied sound strategy to this conflict. I think that's very
clear. I've been making that case consistently, honestly, even
since before the war began. Sound strategy requires--sound
strategy in counterinsurgency requires, first and foremost,
providing security to the population. When people have to wake
up in the morning and wonder and worry if they and their
families will live to see the evening, they will not
participate in the political process in a normal way, they will
not participate in economic processes in a normal way, they
will not interact with one another, even with family and
friends and neighbors, in a normal way. That is a fact of human
nature, and it has been seen in many, many conflicts.
It is no surprise to me, therefore, that the Iraqis, thus
far, have not been behaving in the manner that we would like
them to behave in. That is to say, a manner that is
characterized by compromise and civility and inclusiveness.
When the violence has reached the point that we have allowed it
to reach through not working hard enough to bring it under
control, it is natural for Iraqi sects and groups to turn to
them--to turn to their own powers and their own capabilities to
defend each other, and it is, unfortunately, also natural for
them to begin to attack each other.
Iraq does not, in fact, have a long history of vast
sectarian conflict ripping it apart from age to age. The level
of violence that we're seeing now is unusual in Iraqi history,
as it is unusual in the history of most states. I do believe
that we can work to bring it under control, and I do believe
that bringing security to the Iraqi people, in the first
instance, will enable them to begin to make the difficult
choices and compromises that will be so essential to allow them
to move forward to create the sort of stable state that we
desire, and that they desire.
I do not believe that solutions such as partition will be
effective or will be, rather, tolerable. Unfortunately, it is
not the case that Iraq is now divided neatly into three zones
which can simply each be given its own government. Although
there has been sectarian cleansing going on in Baghdad and in
other cities in Iraq, Baghdad remains a mixed city. Many of its
neighborhoods remain mixed between sects. And actually dividing
the country into three zones will require, de facto, an
enormous amount more sectarian cleansing. Another word for this
process, I believe, will be ``genocide,'' as I believe that the
increasing escalation of violence that is the normal part of
any widespread sectarian cleansing generally leads to such
efforts.
I do not believe that the United States can stand by,
purely from an ethical perspective, and watch that occur. And I
would remind the committee that it was the position of
especially the Democratic Party and the Clinton administration
in the 1990s that it was intolerable for the United States to
stand idly by and watch as ethnic cleansing and genocide went
on in the Balkans. I really can't imagine how we could believe
that it could be tolerable now to permit, and, indeed, even
encourage, that to occur, when we are so clearly partially
responsible for the circumstances in which this violence has
developed.
But I want to emphasize, we are not in Iraq, in my view,
for the benefit of the Iraqis; we are in Iraq, in my view, in
pursuit of American national interests. And the national
interest, at this point, is the prevention of the development
of regional civil war and regional violence on a scale that
would be intolerable to us. And I believe that, purely in the
service of our own interests, if nothing else, it is vital that
we work to bring the violence under control.
Now, we have put forward a plan, which we have presented in
great detail, called ``Choosing Victory,'' in which we
recommend the introduction of additional U.S. forces into
Baghdad and into Al Anbar province. We believe that this plan
is workable. We brought together a group of military planners
with significant experience--recent experience--in Iraq. We
were advised, by General Jack Keane, the former Chief--Vice
Chief of Staff of the Army, and lieutenant general, retired,
David Barno, and a number of other officers who gave us their
wisdom. And we looked very carefully at what we believed the
military requirements would be of bringing security to the
vital Sunni and mixed Sunni-Shia neighborhoods in Baghdad as
the beginning of an operation to pacify the entire city, which
would then enable us to move beyond Baghdad into troubled areas
in Diyala, Salah ad-Din, and elsewhere. We also believe that it
was necessary to increase our forces in Al Anbar province,
which is another base of the Sunni insurgency, in order to
prevent insurgents from moving easily back and forth between
that province and Baghdad.
We emphasize that we do not believe that this security
operation, by itself, will lead to success in Iraq. It is,
rather, the essential precondition for moving forward with the
host of reconciliation initiatives, political developments, and
economic development that will be vital, in the end, to
resolving this conflict.
There has been much complaint about the fact that the Iraqi
Armed Forces are not ethnically mixed, not sectarianly mixed.
Of course they're not. You do not--you cannot recruit Sunni
Arabs into a force when the insurgents are terrorizing their
families and killing their family members when they join the
army. As we have seen in Tal Afar and Ramadi and in other
places, when you can bring security to an area, you can then
begin to recruit Sunni Arabs and other ethnicities and sects
into the armed forces and produce a more balanced force.
Security is the precondition.
I will freely say, because I have said it consistently all
along, that the Bush administration has made an error in not
prioritizing the establishment of security in Iraq. I do not
believe--and it was our considered opinion when we studied this
problem very carefully--we do not believe that the situation is
so far gone that no solution is feasible.
People have challenged the numbers of troops that would be
required to do this. I would say they should explain--the
burden is on them to explain what forces they think would be
necessary, and on what basis they make the calculation. We have
been completely open and transparent on the basis for our force
calculations, which are in line with traditional
counterinsurgency practice and also with the experience of
operations in Iraq previously. We believe that these forces
will be adequate to provide security in the areas of Baghdad
that we think is most important.
We recommended a significant reconstruction effort to
accompany this program. We are going to be continuing, in
subsequent phases of this project, to examine changes that we
think need to be made in the training of the Iraqi Army, the
training of the Iraqi police, reconstruction efforts, and the
development of Iraqi governmental structures, and so forth. We
clearly do believe our study is something that will take some
time, and the reconstruction of Iraq is something that will
take some time, but we are absolutely convinced that simply
allowing Iraq to collapse now by withdrawing our forces, or by
trying to carve off some piece of Iraq and protect only that,
is not in the interest of the United States of America and
will, in fact, put us in tremendous jeopardy over the long run,
and possibly even in the short run. And we, therefore, believe
that it is vital and urgent that we work now to bring the
situation under control.
I thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Kagan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Frederick W. Kagan, Resident Scholar,
American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC
Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq--Phase I Report
(A Report of the Iraq Planning Group at the American Enterprise
Institute)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Victory is still an option in Iraq. America, a country of 300
million people with a GDP of $12 trillion and more than 1 million
soldiers and marines, has the resources to stabilize Iraq, a state the
size of California with a population of 25 million and a GDP under $100
billion. America must use its resources skillfully and decisively to
help build a successful democratically elected, sovereign government in
Iraq.
Victory in Iraq is vital to America's security. Defeat will likely
lead to regional conflict, humanitarian catastrophe, and increased
global terrorism.
Iraq has reached a critical point. The strategy of relying on a
political process to eliminate the insurgency has failed. Rising
sectarian violence threatens to break America's will to fight. This
violence will destroy the Iraqi Government, armed forces, and people if
it is not rapidly controlled.
Victory in Iraq is still possible at an acceptable level of effort.
We must adopt a new approach to the war and implement it quickly and
decisively.
We must act now to restore security and stability to Baghdad. We
and the enemy have identified it as the decisive point.
There is a way to do this.
We must balance our focus on training Iraqi soldiers with a
determined effort to secure the Iraqi population and contain
the rising violence. Securing the population has never been the
primary mission of the U.S. military effort in Iraq, and now it
must become the first priority.
We must send more American combat forces into Iraq and
especially into Baghdad to support this operation. A surge of
seven Army brigades and Marine regiments to support clear-and-
hold operations that begin in the spring of 2007 is necessary,
possible, and will be sufficient to improve security and set
conditions for economic development, political development,
reconciliation, and the development of Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF) to provide permanent security.
American forces, partnered with Iraqi units, will clear
high-violence Sunni and mixed Sunni-Shia neighborhoods,
primarily on the west side of the city.
After those neighborhoods are cleared, U.S. soldiers and
marines, again partnered with Iraqis, will remain behind to
maintain security, reconstitute police forces, and integrate
police and Iraqi Army efforts to maintain the population's
security.
As security is established, reconstruction aid will help to
reestablish normal life, bolster employment, and, working
through Iraqi officials, strengthen Iraqi local government.
Securing the population strengthens the ability of Iraq's
central government to exercise its sovereign powers.
This approach requires a national commitment to victory in Iraq:
The ground forces must accept longer tours for several
years. National Guard units will have to accept increased
deployments during this period.
Equipment shortages must be overcome by transferring
equipment from nondeploying Active Duty, National Guard, and
Reserve units to those about to deploy. Military industry must
be mobilized to provide replacement equipment sets urgently.
The President must request a dramatic increase in
reconstruction aid for Iraq. Responsibility and accountability
for reconstruction must be assigned to established agencies.
The President must insist upon the completion of reconstruction
projects. The President should also request a dramatic increase
in Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds.
The President must request a substantial increase in ground
forces end-strength. This increase is vital to sustaining the
morale of the combat forces by ensuring that relief is on the
way. The President must issue a personal call for young
Americans to volunteer to fight in the decisive conflict of
this generation.
The President and his representatives in Iraq must forge
unity of effort with the Iraqi Government.
Other courses of action have been proposed. All will fail.
Withdraw immediately. This approach will lead to immediate
defeat. The Iraqi Security Forces are entirely dependent upon
American support to survive and function. If U.S. forces
withdraw now, the Iraqi forces will collapse. Iraq will descend
into total civil war that will rapidly spread throughout the
Middle East.
Engage Iraq's neighbors. This approach will fail. The basic
causes of violence and sources of manpower and resources for
the warring sides come from within Iraq. Iraq's neighbors are
encouraging the violence, but they cannot stop it.
Increase embedded trainers dramatically. This approach
cannot succeed rapidly enough to prevent defeat. Removing U.S.
forces from patrolling neighborhoods to embed them as trainers
will lead to an immediate rise in violence. This rise in
violence will destroy America's remaining will to fight and
escalate the cycle of sectarian violence in Iraq beyond
anything an Iraqi Army could bring under control.
Failure in Iraq today will require far greater sacrifices tomorrow
in far more desperate circumstances.
Committing to victory now will demonstrate America's strength to
our friends and enemies around the world.
INTRODUCTION
American forces in Iraq today are engaged in the pivotal struggle
of our age. If the United States allows Iraq to slide into full-scale
civil war, characterized by the collapse of the central government and
the widespread mobilization of the population in internal conflict, the
consequences will be epochal. Internal strife in Iraq has already
generated a large displaced population within the country and
significant refugee flows into neighboring lands. Those neighbors, both
Sunni and Shia, have already made clear their determination to enter
Iraq and its struggles if America withdraws and the conflict escalates
into greater sectarian violence or civil war. Iraq's diverse neighbors,
however, have opposing interests in how the conflict is settled.
Consequently, failure in Iraq now will likely lead to regional war,
destabilizing important states in the Middle East and creating a
fertile ground for terrorism.
Success in Iraq, on the other hand, would transform the
international situation. Success will give the United States critical
leverage against Iran, which is now positioning itself to become the
regional hegemon after our anticipated defeat. It will strengthen
America's position around the world, where our inability to contain
conflict in Iraq is badly tarnishing our stature. And success will
convert a violent, chaotic region in the heart of the Middle East and
on the front line of the Sunni-Shiite divide into a secure state able
to support peace within its borders and throughout the region. There
can be no question that victory in Iraq is worth considerable American
effort or that defeat would be catastrophic.
Some now argue that victory is beyond our grasp. America cannot (or
should not) involve itself in civil, sectarian conflicts, they say, and
the troops required to control such conflicts are larger than the U.S.
military could possibly deploy. Neither of these arguments is valid.
The United States has faced ethnosectarian conflict on at least five
occasions in the past 15 years. In Somalia, Afghanistan, and Rwanda,
successive American administrations allowed the conflicts to continue
without making any serious attempts to control or contain them. The
results have been disastrous. Inaction in Afghanistan in the 1990s led
to the rise of the Taliban and its support for Osama bin Laden and al-
Qaeda--and therefore indirectly to the 9/11 attacks. Inaction, indeed
humiliation, in Somalia led to a larger civil war in which radical
Islamists took control of most of the country by the end of 2006. In
late December, the conflict took a new turn as Ethiopian troops invaded
Somalia in support of the internationally recognized transitional
government. A civil war has become a regional war, as civil wars often
do. In Rwanda, civil war and genocide also spread, involving Congo and,
indeed, much of sub-Saharan Africa in widespread conflict and death.
One clear lesson of post-cold-war conflicts is that ignoring civil wars
is dangerous and can generate grave, unintended consequences for
America's future security.
The United States has recently intervened, along with its allies,
to control ethnically and religiously motivated civil wars on two
occasions, however, in 1995 in Bosnia and in 1999 in Kosovo. Both
efforts were successful in ending the violence and creating the
preconditions for peace and political and economic development. The
parallels are, of course, imperfect; much of the ethnic cleansing had
already been accomplished in both areas before the United States
intervened with armed force. In the Balkans, however, the levels of
violence and death as a proportion of the population were much higher
than they have been in Iraq. Additionally, the armed forces of the
states neighboring Bosnia and Kosovo were much more directly involved
in the struggle than those of Iraq's neighbors. Above all, the
introduction of U.S. and European forces in strength in Bosnia and
Kosovo has ended the killing and prevented that conflict from spreading
throughout the region, as it threatened to do in the 1990s. It is
possible to contain ethnosectarian civil wars, but only by ending them.
The United States has the military power necessary to control the
violence in Iraq. The main purpose of the report that follows is to
consider in detail what amount of armed force would be needed to bring
the sectarian violence in Baghdad down to levels that would permit
economic and political development and real national reconciliation.
Before turning to that consideration, however, we should reflect on the
fact that the United States between 2001 and 2006 has committed only a
small proportion of its total national strength to this struggle. There
are more than 1 million soldiers in the Active and Reserve ground
forces, and only 140,000 of them are in Iraq at the moment. Many others
are engaged in vital tasks in the United States and elsewhere from
which they could not easily be moved, and soldiers and marines are not
interchangeable beans. If this war were the vital national priority
that it should be, however, the United States could commit many more
soldiers to the fight. This report will address in greater detail some
of the ways of making more forces available for this struggle.
The United States could also devote a significantly higher
proportion of its national wealth to this problem in two ways. First,
the President has finally called for a significant increase in the size
of the ground forces--the warriors who are actually shouldering much of
the burden in this conflict. The United States can and should sustain
larger ground forces than it now has, both to support operations in
Iraq and to be prepared for likely contingencies elsewhere. Five years
into the global war on terror, the Bush administration has recognized
this urgent need and begun to address it.
Second, the United States can and must devote significantly more
resources to helping reconstruction and economic development in Iraq.
The American GDP is over $13 trillion; Iraq's is about $100 billion.
America's ability to improve the daily lives of Iraqis is very great,
even at levels of expenditure that would barely affect the U.S.
economy. Effective reconstruction and economic development are
essential components of any counterinsurgency campaign and are urgently
needed in Iraq. This report will consider how to improve some aspects
of these necessary programs, which will be considered in more detail in
subsequent phases of this project.
But reconstruction, economic development, national reconciliation,
political development, and many other essential elements of the
solution to Iraq's problems are all unattainable in the current
security environment. Violence in Iraq has risen every year since 2003.
Last year was the bloodiest on record, despite significant military
operations aimed at reducing the violence in Baghdad. The bombing of
the Golden Mosque of Samarra in February 2006 accelerated the sectarian
conflict dramatically, and the fighting has moved beyond insurgents and
organized militias to neighborhood watch groups engaging in their own
local violence. This development is ominous because it signals that
significant portions of the Iraqi population have begun to mobilize for
full-scale civil war. In this violent context, when so many Iraqi
individuals and families must worry about their physical survival on a
daily basis, American proposals that rely on diplomatic, political, and
economic efforts to resolve the crisis are doomed to failure. Such
efforts will not succeed until Iraq's population is secure from rampant
violence. Establishing security in Baghdad, and then in the violent
regions that surround it, must become the top priority of the American
military presence in Iraq today. Securing Baghdad to bring the violence
in Iraq's capital under control must be the centerpiece of a military
operation that should be launched as rapidly as possible. Effective
reconstruction and the building of Iraqi governing institutions will
accompany and follow this military operation. Without such an
operation, America's defeat in Iraq appears imminent, regardless of any
other efforts the United States might undertake. The remainder of this
report will consider the shape and requirements of such an operation,
the likely enemy responses, and the ways of overcoming them.
SECURING THE POPULATION
The recently released military doctrinal manual on
counterinsurgency operations declares, ``The cornerstone of any
[counterinsurgency] effort is establishing security for the civilian
populace. Without a secure environment, no permanent reforms can be
implemented and disorder spreads.'' This statement encapsulates the
wisdom of generations of counterinsurgent theorists and practitioners.
The importance of establishing security is manifold. First, people who
are constantly in fear for their lives and for their loved ones do not
participate in political, economic, or social processes in a normal
way. The fear of violence and death distorts everything they do, think,
and feel, and it often changes how they interact even with neighbors
and friends. When violence reaches a level at which most people feel
themselves to be in danger, as it has in many areas of Baghdad and
Anbar, then political processes largely cease to function.
It is not usually possible to use those collapsing processes to
redress or control the violence, moreover. In Iraq, as in many other
insurgencies, rebel groups take up arms in part to gain leverage that
the political process would not otherwise give them. The Sunni Arab
rejectionists in Iraq have preferred violence to democracy from the
outset because they know that they will not control a truly democratic
Iraq. They have, therefore, hoped to use violence and its threat to
force the Shiite majority to give them a much greater say in governing
Iraq than their proportion in the population would attain. As long as
they believe that violence is providing them with political leverage,
they will continue to prefer violence to dialogue. Encouraging the
Shiite government to negotiate with them without first containing the
violence only reinforces the Sunni Arab rejectionists' belief in the
efficacy of violence to advance their cause.
Ongoing violence within a state, finally saps the legitimacy of
that state's government in the eyes of its citizens. As the U.S.
military's counterinsurgency manual explains, the first indicator of a
government's legitimacy is ``the ability to provide security for the
population (including protection from internal and external threats).''
Providing security for its people is the core mission of any state.
Continual violence and death eliminate the people's support for the
government, leading to an increase in violence as individuals and
groups undertake to protect and avenge themselves independently of
state structures, legal institutions, or government sanction. Allowing
disorder to persist over the long term is extremely hazardous to the
health of any government. And America's objective in Iraq is creating a
secure and sovereign national government elected by the Iraqi people.
The U.S. Government has not given priority to providing security to
the Iraqi population from the outset of the war, however. The
inadequacy of coalition forces at the end of major combat operations to
maintain order is well-known and well-documented now. It is less well-
known that American forces continued to underemphasize the importance
of establishing and maintaining security even after the military
command and the administration recognized that insurgency and low-grade
civil war were erupting in Iraq. America's commanders in Iraq, notably
Generals John Abizaid, commander of U.S. Central Command since mid-
2003, and George Casey, commander of Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I)
since mid-2004, have instead emphasized the need for Iraqis to solve
their own security problems. The leading U.S. commanders have,
therefore, prioritized using U.S. troops to establish and train Iraqi
Security Forces. Indeed, American military commanders have never
pursued the defeat of the enemy even after it became obvious that Iraqi
forces lacked the ability to do so. As a result, the United States has
ceded the initiative to the enemies of the United States and the Iraqi
Government and permitted the steady deterioration of the security
situation.
The basis of the Abizaid-Casey strategy is twofold: American forces
in Iraq are an irritant and generate insurgents who want to drive us
out of their country, and the Iraqis must be able to create and
maintain their own stability lest they become permanently dependent on
our military presence. Both of these arguments contain elements of
truth, but realities in Iraq are much more complex.
The coalition presence in Iraq is an irritant in many areas, and it
has generated a number of insurgents particularly among former
Baathists, al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and Sunni Arab rejectionists.
But this argument is less helpful in evaluating courses of action than
is commonly supposed. U.S. forces in Iraq currently maintain a very
light footprint--140,000 troops in a country of 25 million people. Most
Iraqis surveyed report that they rarely if ever see American forces.
There is no reason to imagine, moreover, that it matters to the
insurgency whether there are 100,000, 140,000, or 200,000 Americans in
Iraq.
Insurgent rhetoric does not count our soldiers; rather, it
denounces the presence of any American troops on Iraqi soil. Osama bin
Laden launched the 9/11 attacks in part because of a far lighter
American presence in Saudi Arabia--a presence similar to what almost
every plan for withdrawal from Iraq proposes to maintain in the country
or the region for years to come. Increases on the scale proposed in
this report are extraordinarily unlikely to lead to any significant
increase in the ``irritation'' caused by our presence, particularly in
the most vivid manifestation of that ``irritation,'' which is the
propaganda of our enemies. We should remember that our enemies in Iraq
try to shift blame for their own mass murder attacks against innocent
civilians to the coalition forces that are assisting the Iraqi
Government. The problem in Iraq is not so much that coalition forces
are perceived as occupiers, but rather that coalition forces are
occupiers who have not made good on their primary responsibility--
securing the population.
The argument that Iraqis must be able to maintain their own
security is also valid but incomplete. American forces can clearly
leave Iraq, successfully, only when there is an Iraqi Government in
place that controls its own forces and maintains the safety of its
people. Training Iraqi Security Forces, both the Iraqi Army and police
forces of various types, is clearly an essential precondition for the
ultimate withdrawal of U.S. troops. It is not true, however, that the
United States should allow the violence in Iraq to continue until the
Iraqi Security Forces can bring it under control on their own or even
with our support.
In the first place, there is a world of difference between training
security forces that can maintain a peace that has already been
established and training those capable of conducting the complex and
large-scale counterinsurgency operations that the situation now
demands. The coalition and the Iraqi Government have been placing
nascent Iraqi units and their soldiers in extremely difficult and
dangerous situations that require sophisticated command structures,
excellent equipment, organization, superior leadership, and exceptional
individual discipline. By focusing on preparing the Iraqis to do
everything, the U.S. military command has set the bar too high. There
are tasks in Iraq, such as clearing enemies out of high-violence
neighborhoods and securing their populations, that only American forces
will be able to do for some time. These tasks will not have to be
repeated if they are done properly the first time. As new, properly
trained Iraqi units become available, they will be more capable of
holding areas that have already been cleared and secured than of
clearing and securing those areas themselves.
In the second place, the emphasis on training Iraqi forces to
establish security, themselves, ignores the transition from insurgency
to nascent civil war now going on in Iraq. Preparing a largely Shiite
Iraqi Army to suppress a Sunni Arab insurgency always posed a number of
daunting challenges--many Shia do not want to march into Sunni lands to
fight; the presence of Shia military units inflames Sunni Arab
sentiment as much or more than the presence of American forces; and
Shia military units are much more open both to corruption and to
committing atrocities that stoke the insurgency than are coalition
forces.
But the United States cannot rely on a primarily Shiite army to
bring order to a land torn by sectarian strife because that policy is
unlikely to end violence in a way that permits national reconciliation.
Shiite military units cannot be seen as honest brokers in mixed Sunni-
Shia neighborhoods. As the violence continues to rise, moreover, the
members of the army--all of whom belong to one sect or another--come
under increasing pressure to desert, commit atrocities, or otherwise
undermine efforts at national reconciliation. Something similar
happened to the large and professional Yugoslav Army in the early
1990s. Rather than keeping the fragmenting state together, the army
itself fragmented, sending weapons and experienced soldiers to the
various warring sides and fueling the civil war. If no external force
works to reduce the violence while the Iraqi Army is training, it is
virtually certain that the army will sooner or later break under the
sectarian strain--and with it will go Iraq's only hope for peace in
this generation.
Indeed, improved security is a precondition for rebalancing the
demographic composition of security forces, which is, in turn, a
prerequisite for preventing their involvement in sectarian or civil war
and establishing their legitimacy with the Iraqi population. The lack
of Sunni representation in security forces stems mainly from the
enemy's ability to hold hostage the families of potential recruits.
Recent efforts to reconstitute the police and recruit soldiers in
predominantly Sunni areas such as Tall Afar and Ramadi demonstrate that
improved security leads to more representative and legitimate security
forces.
The right strategy is to strike a balance among three concerns
rather than between two: The United States should be sensitive to the
danger of flooding Iraq with too many coalition soldiers and of making
the Iraqis too dependent on the coalition to do everything, but America
must balance those fears against the imminent danger of allowing the
security situation to collapse completely.
The strategy proposed in this plan attempts to redress the
imbalance in the United States approach so far. This plan proposes a
moderate increase in American troop levels, but one far below anything
likely to provoke a massive reaction by the Iraqi people. The plan
proposes to continue training Iraqi troops, placing them either in the
lead or in partnership with American units wherever possible. The plan
encourages such partnership efforts as a path to transferring control
of Iraq's security to well-prepared Iraqi forces directed by its
autonomous government, albeit on a more realistic timeline than the
ones currently under discussion. Above all, the plan proposes to
redress MNF-I's continual failure to prioritize securing the Iraqi
people.
MNF-I's strategy so far has focused on increasing Iraqi
capabilities, but the violence continues to rise faster than those
capabilities. Nascent Iraqi forces are not prepared to operate
effectively in areas where the enemy has succeeded in intimidating and
coercing the population or has established a strong defensive
capability. Coalition forces are needed to set conditions for the
development of ISF as well as the introduction of ISF into contentious
areas. The correct approach, embodied in the plan proposed below, works
both to increase Iraqi capabilities and to decrease the violence to a
level the Iraqis themselves can control. This strategy is the only one
that can succeed in creating a secure, autonomous, and democratic Iraq
free of sectarian violence, insurgency, and civil war.
THE CHALLENGE
The challenge facing the United States in Iraq comes primarily from
a series of enemies who are actively trying to stoke violence and
create chaos to destroy the current political and social order. Some
people examining Iraq have become so frustrated and confused by the
complexity of this challenge that they prefer to throw up their hands
rather than attempt to cope with it. The challenge is, nevertheless,
comprehensible. To understand it, one must first consider the geography
and demography of the capital region and then describe the enemy in
some detail.
Geography and Demography
Baghdad is the center of gravity of the conflict in Iraq at this
moment. Insurgents on all sides have declared that they intend to win
or die there. It is the capital and center of Iraqi Government. It is
the base of American power and influence in the country. It is the
largest and most populous city in Iraq. It is home to one of Iraq's
largest Shiite communities, but also to many mixed Sunni and Shiite
communities. Widely publicized American efforts to gain control of the
violence in Baghdad in Operation Together Forward (conducted in two
phases in 2006) connected American success in Iraq overall to success
in Baghdad. For good or ill, the pivotal struggle for Iraq is occurring
in its capital.
Baghdad is a city of some 6 million people that straddles the
Tigris River. Northeast of the Army Canal that divides the eastern side
of the city lies Sadr City, a Shiite slum of more than 2 million
people. Ministries and government buildings line the Tigris on either
side. On the western bank lies the Green Zone, an area secured by
American military forces that houses U.S. military and political
headquarters, critical Iraqi governmental institutions, and bases for
some American soldiers. On the western edge of the city is Baghdad
International Airport (BIAP), home of Camp Victory, one of the largest
U.S. bases in the country. The road from BIAP to the Green Zone is
known as ``Route Irish,'' which has gained notoriety for being one of
the most dangerous stretches of road in Iraq.
Baghdad is a mixed city on many levels. Most of Baghdad's Shiite
population live in and around Sadr City and its two satellite
neighborhoods of Shaab and Ur; many of the Sunnis live on the western
side of the city. But many neighborhoods and districts are themselves
mixed, especially those between BIAP and the Green Zone and immediately
around the Green Zone on both sides of the river. Rising sectarian
violence is changing this demographic pattern, however, and the mixed
neighborhoods are increasingly being ``cleansed'' and becoming more
homogeneous.
Neither the challenges in Iraq nor the solutions even to Baghdad's
problems are contained entirely in Baghdad, however. Anbar province,
the large, mostly desert area to the west of Baghdad, contains the core
of the Sunni Arab rejectionist insurgency. U.S. and Iraqi forces fight
insurgents for control of Anbar's largest cities, Ramadi and Fallujah,
while Marines work to root out al-Qaeda and other insurgent and
terrorist groups throughout the vast province. Insurgents move from
Anbar into Baghdad and back again, linking these two problematic areas
inextricably. Even the insurgents who regularly operate in Baghdad have
bases outside of the city, especially in the villages near Taji to the
north and Iskandariyah to the south. These two settlement belts provide
a great deal of support to the enemy operating in the capital. Diyala
province, which lies to the north and east of Baghdad, is another
important insurgent base. The Diyala River flows through its province's
capital city of Baquba and, finally, into the Tigris River just south
of Baghdad. Sunni rejectionists and al-Qaeda operatives follow the
Diyala River toward Baghdad and then, leaving its course, launch
strikes into the heart of Sadr City. Baghdad is, therefore, a nexus of
violence drawn from a number of regions outside the city. Baghdad also
contains its own internal violent dynamic into which these outside
forces flow.
The Enemy
There is violence in Iraq today because it suits certain groups and
individuals to disrupt the development of normal political and economic
life in that country through intimidation, terrorism, and killing.
Violence on this scale is not historically normal to Iraq (or virtually
any other country, for that matter), and it is not a force of nature.
Too often violent events in Iraq are reported in the passive voice, as
though no agent in particular caused them. This sense of directionless,
almost purposeless violence is one of the major factors hindering the
intelligent consideration of America's options in this conflict. Before
entering into the consideration of one such option, therefore, we must
first consider the enemies of peace and order in Iraq. These can be
broken into six main groups: Three Sunni Arab and three Shiite.
Sunni Arab Insurgent Groups. Sunni Arab violence in Iraq has gone
through three main phases. Even before coalition forces invaded in
March 2003, Saddam Hussein had prepared to sustain a guerrilla war if
he was attacked. He formed the Fedayeen Saddam, fighters trained and
motivated to conduct irregular warfare, and sprinkled them throughout
Iraq (most likely to suppress the Shiite insurgency he expected to
follow an American withdrawal, as had happened after the 1991
invasion). When major combat operations ended without securing much of
the country, these fighters joined thousands of soldiers and officers
of the defeated conventional army in an inchoate resistance. This
resistance was networked but not centrally directed, although Saddam
and his sons, Uday and Qusay, tried to organize it when they were in
hiding. When coalition forces killed Uday and Qusay in Mosul in July
2003 and captured Saddam in December 2003 near Tikrit, the Baathist
resistance was weakened but not destroyed. It continues to play an
important part in generating anticoalition violence, especially in
Anbar and Baghdad.
At the turn of 2004, however, a new force was emerging within the
Sunni Arab resistance--terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda in Iraq
(run by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi until his death in June 2006 and now by
Abu Ayyub al-Masri, also known as Abu Hamza al-Muhajer) and Ansar al-
Sunna. Al-Qaeda in Iraq focused its efforts on more spectacularly
violent and symbolic attacks, rather than conducting the smaller
attacks upon coalition troops using the improvised explosive devices
(IEDs) favored by the Baathists. Al-Qaeda in Iraq also favored
attacking Iraqi civilians and government leaders. Zarqawi struck Iraqis
who were cooperating with the government, but also attacked the Shiite
community aggressively with the avowed aim of provoking a Sunni-Shia
civil war. His efforts culminated with the destruction of the Golden
Mosque of Samarra in February 2006, which incited a dramatic increase
in the level of Sunni-Shia violence in Iraq, an increase that has
continued even after his death.
The increase in sectarian violence has spawned yet another type of
Sunni Arab group--vigilantes who organize as neighborhood defense
militias in Baghdad ostensibly to protect their areas from Shiite
attacks. These groups have formed primarily because American forces
have chosen not to provide security to the population and Iraqis have
been unable to do so; while Shiite militias (which this report will
consider presently) have ruthlessly targeted Sunni Arab civilians.
These groups tend to be self-organizing and to have more limited goals,
although some become tied to al-Qaeda in Iraq, Ansar al-Sunna,
Baathists, or other larger organizations. The rise of these vigilante
groups is in some respects the most disturbing phenomenon in Iraq. It
indicates a dramatic increase in popular participation in the struggle
and is a step on the road to the mobilization of the Iraqi population
for full-scale civil war. This vigilante violence is also more inchoate
and less subject to either negotiation or political control. It is an
extremely dangerous development that must be checked as rapidly as
possible.
The goals of these various groups are divergent but in some
respects complementary. The Baathists initially sought the restoration
of Saddam Hussein or one of their leaders to power. The trial and
execution of Saddam have largely eliminated that goal, but the Baathist
movement has resurrected itself as an Iraqi nationalist front aimed at
ridding Iraq of foreign ``occupying'' forces and restoring the rule of
the Sunni Arabs in some form. Baathists are also posing as defenders of
local populations against Shiite depredations. The absence of security
in Sunni neighborhoods makes this enemy's claim credible to local
populations and enables Baathists to recruit more insurgents to their
cause.
The ideology of al-Qaeda in Iraq and affiliated groups complements
that of the Baathists in some respects, but not in others. These
various groups agree that they want coalition forces out of Iraq and
the Sunni Arabs in control of the country. But whereas the Baathists
pursue a more secularist and nationalist agenda, the aim of al-Qaeda in
Iraq is to establish Taliban-style sharia government in Iraq. They hope
then to use Iraq as a base from which to expand their theocracy to
other Muslim states. Al-Qaeda in Iraq has been working tirelessly since
early 2004 to incite sectarian violence in the belief that it would
energize the Sunni community in Iraq and provide the terrorists with
the recruits they need to triumph there and elsewhere in the Muslim
world. To this end, they have focused on mass attacks against civilians
and major landmarks such as the Golden Mosque, while the Baathists have
focused much more heavily on coalition and Iraqi military targets. The
lines between these two groups are blurring, however, as the first
generation of fighters is being killed off and replaced by Sunni
nationalists with stronger Islamist leanings. It is becoming in some
ways more difficult rather than less to contemplate splitting these two
groups apart.
The aims of Sunni vigilante groups are more disparate and less
clear. Most were formed to protect local Sunni populations from Shiite
attacks, and that security function remains the core of their identity.
Some have taken advantage of opportunities to drive Shiites out of
their neighborhoods or nearby areas, contributing to the sectarian
cleansing in Baghdad. Some are drawn to the Baathist or terrorist
ideologies. These groups conduct small-scale attacks and are not
centralized or highly coordinated.
The Sunni Arab insurgent groups cooperate relatively well despite
disagreements about their ultimate aims. This cooperation results
mainly from their shared sense that the Sunni community is under attack
and fighting for its survival. The secular Baathists, Islamist
terrorists, and vigilante groups could not form a coherent political
program and would not try to do so. Baathists and Islamists cooperate
in attacking coalition targets, but even within the Islamist community
there is growing disagreement about the desirability or morality of
attacking Iraqi civilians--al-Qaeda in Iraq continues to pursue this
approach, but Ansar al-Sunna rejects it. Vigilante groups attack Shiite
civilians in the name of self-defense because of the lack of security
in and around their communities. As long as the Sunni Arabs feel
besieged and beleaguered, attempts to splinter these groups politically
are unlikely to be successful despite the differences in their aims and
targeting preferences. All of them draw great strength and their main
recruiting tools from the violence in Iraq and the growing sectarian
struggle. They are not likely to abandon their own use of force as long
as that violence remains at a high enough level to justify their
actions as attempts to defend the Sunni Arab community from attack
while they further their own ideological objectives.
Shiite Insurgent Groups. The Shiite political community in Iraq is
broken into a number of significant groups and parties, but Shiite
insurgents generally fall into one of three groups. The Jaysh al-Mahdi
(Mahdi Army) is nominally under the control of renegade cleric Moqtada
al-Sadr. This group took to the streets in large numbers in 2004,
especially in its strongholds of Najaf and Karbala, from which it was
cleared by a large scale yet careful coalition military operation. The
Badr Corps is the military arm of the Supreme Council for Islamic
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), of which Abdul Aziz al-Hakim is the leader.
This group was formed and supported by Iran in the 1980s and continues
to maintain close ties to Tehran, although the degree of Iran's control
of SCIRI and the Badr Corps is unclear. The third group of Shiite
fighters is the vigilantes who have sprung up in Sadr City and Shiite
and mixed neighborhoods in Baghdad, much as the Sunni vigilante groups
have grown in this period of chaos.
The Badr Corps and the Jaysh al-Mahdi share some goals and
concerns, but not others. They both seek to establish Shiite sharia law
in Iraq and to ensure Shiite domination of the country. They are both
concerned about Sunni rejectionism and the Sunni insurgency, which has
provided the principal justification for their efforts to recruit and
maintain their militias. Al-Qaeda in Iraq's relentless attacks on
Shiite civilians have powerfully supported their justification and
aided their recruiting.
Hakim and Sadr also agree in principle that the coalition forces
should withdraw rapidly, but they do not agree on the importance of
this objective or the need to take action to secure it. Sadr has long
identified the U.S. presence as an intolerable violation of Iraq's
sovereignty, and his forces have often attacked coalition forces in an
effort to force them to withdraw. Hakim and SCIRI have taken a much
more moderate approach. They understand that the aims of coalition
policy in Iraq would leave the Shiites in control of the country, and
they are more tolerant of the presence of coalition forces that keep
the Sunni insurgency under control. They have been far less aggressive
about attacking coalition forces. Both groups have, however,
consistently supported the killing and torture of Sunni Arabs to
cleanse areas and neighborhoods and create solid blocks of Shiite
habitation.
The Jaysh al-Mahdi and the Badr Corps will be the main military
rivals for power in a post-U.S. Iraq. Both observed the destruction of
Sadr's militia in 2004 and are reluctant to repeat that experience
because of the need to maintain their military force for use against
one another in the expected battle for dominance after the United
States leaves. This rivalry, which is manifested on the political as
well as the military plane, hinders the cooperation of these two
groups, which are also increasingly separate geographically: The Jaysh
al-Mahdi is based in Sadr City, whereas the main strength of the Badr
Corps is in the southern part of Iraq.
The political aims, rivalries, and maneuverings of the Jaysh al-
Mahdi and the Badr Corps are far removed from the aims of most of the
Shiite vigilante groups operating in Baghdad. Like their Sunni
counterparts, these groups are mainly concerned with defending their
neighborhoods against Sunni (especially al-Qaeda in Iraq) attacks. They
also opportunistically engage in sectarian cleansing and ``reprisal''
attacks (often the same thing). The strength and organization of the
Jaysh al-Mahdi and the Badr Corps makes it easier for Shiite vigilante
groups to cohere. Yet, as with all vigilante groups, negotiation and
political accommodation with local fighters is unlikely to be
productive by itself because they are responding to localized violence.
Crime. It is important to understand that a significant part of the
violence in Iraq is not orchestrated by any political group at all, but
is simply the crime and gang violence that flourishes in the absence of
order and government control. This problem is not restricted to Baghdad
or Anbar, moreover. The British raid against the aptly named ``serious
crimes unit'' in Basra in December 2006 underlines the breadth of the
difficulty. Many individuals and groups throughout Iraq have taken
advantage of the government's weakness to organize kidnapping rings,
smuggling rings, and other criminal enterprises. With much of the Iraqi
police force either engaged in sectarian violence or criminality, or
else devoted to the counterinsurgency effort, rule of law in Iraq is
extremely weak. Both insurgents and criminals have deeply infiltrated
the police and partially infiltrated the army, underscoring in a
different way the impossibility of handing responsibility for security
and maintaining the rule of law to either organization very rapidly.
Criminal activity is not merely a problem for civil society in
Iraq, however. It also supports the insurgency. A significant portion
of the insurgency's financial resources comes from criminal activities
of one sort or another--including a variety of scams that divert
revenue from the oil industry into insurgent coffers. Insurgents and
criminals can also hide behind one another, confusing efforts to
identify the agent behind particular murders and other sorts of
attacks. Criminality is an important issue for coalition forces in Iraq
that must be addressed in order to improve the overall security and
political situations.
THE PLAN
No military operation by itself can resolve Iraq's problems.
Success in Iraq can only emerge when political, economic, diplomatic,
and reconciliation initiatives resolve underlying tensions and
grievances and give the Iraqi people reason to accept the legitimacy of
their government. The security situation in Iraq and particularly
Baghdad is so grave, however, that political, economic, diplomatic, and
reconciliation initiatives will fail unless a well-conceived and
properly supported military operation secures the population first and
quickly. The purpose of this operation is to reduce sectarian violence
to levels low enough to permit political and economic development,
reconciliation, and the recruitment and training of an Iraqi Army and
police force with an appropriate regional and sectarian balance. This
report focuses on military operations in and around Baghdad because the
security situation there is deteriorating quickly and requires the
urgent attention of the United States Armed Forces. Subsequent working
groups and reports will consider initiatives vital to allowing the
Iraqis to take control of their country, armed forces, and security;
political developments; and regional issues. The emphasis on military
operations in this first phase of this project does not indicate any
denigration of the importance of the nonmilitary elements of a solution
to the crisis in Iraq.
Why Baghdad?
From the standpoint of security and violence, Iraq consists of
three zones. The Kurdish provinces to the north are extremely secure--
violence is rare and economic development (fueled by the period of de
facto autonomy in the 1990s) is well underway. Most of the Shiite
provinces to the south of Baghdad are very secure, although Basra still
faces a worrisome amount of violence and criminality. The vast majority
of attacks occur in the four provinces of Anbar, Baghdad, Salaheddin,
and Diyala, with Ninawa a more distant fifth. Polling data partially
reflect this distribution of attacks: Iraqis in the Shiite south and
Kurdish north overwhelmingly feel safe in their neighborhoods, while
those in the five violent provinces feel extremely unsafe.
Of these provinces, Anbar, Baghdad, and Diyala are currently of
greatest concern. Salaheddin, which contains Saddam Hussein's hometown
near Tikrit as well as Samarra, has been the scene of a large number of
attacks, but it contains relatively few large concentrated settlements
and is relatively farther from Baghdad. Ninawa is worrisome because it
contains Mosul, one of Iraq's largest mixed cities, but the clear-and-
hold operation that began in Tall Afar in September 2005 has reduced
the violence in this province greatly. Anbar has been a hotbed of the
insurgency almost from its outset, and two of its major cities,
Fallujah and Ramadi, have been centers of the fight against Sunni Arab
rejectionists since early 2004. Anbar serves as a base of Sunni
fighters who move into and attack targets in Baghdad. Diyala has also
become a critical battleground, especially the city of Baquba, where
Zarqawi was found and killed in June 2006. It is a mixed province in
which considerable sectarian cleansing and displacement have occurred;
and it is close enough to Baghdad that fighters on both sides commute
between the two cities. Diyala province is also becoming a significant
al-Qaeda base from which the enemy launches attacks against Shiites in
Sadr City, Baghdad.
Before the effects of the Samarra mosque bombing had become clear,
it might have been reasonable to consider operations along the
Euphrates, Tigris, and Diyala River valleys (that is, in Anbar, Ninawa,
Salaheddin, and Diyala provinces), postponing the more difficult task
of clearing and holding Baghdad. The rise of sectarian violence within
the capital and the repeated declarations of all sides that Baghdad is
the key to victory or defeat have removed this alternative option. The
violence in the central areas of Iraq is now so high that few reporters
venture far from the Green Zone. Consequently, events within a
relatively small area of the capital now disproportionately shape the
world's perceptions of the situation in the country. It is necessary to
focus on securing these areas in order to retain the American people's
support for the war and increase international support. More
importantly, it is necessary to prevent the sectarian cleansing in the
heart of Baghdad from spreading further through the rest of Iraq. The
populations of other mixed cities, such as Mosul, Kirkuk, and Tall
Afar, are watching how the coalition forces and Iraqi Government
respond to sectarian violence in Baghdad. If Baghdad is truly cleansed
and divided, then similar sectarian violence will follow in these other
mixed cities. The result will be a bloody civil war that permanently
destroys any concept of Iraq as a mixed state. For good or for ill, the
decisive struggle in this war will be played out in Iraq's capital.
Any plan for bringing security to Iraq must therefore address
Baghdad first of all, but it cannot entirely neglect Anbar and Diyala
provinces, which are tied so tightly to the challenges of Baghdad. This
report, therefore, identifies Baghdad as the main effort to which all
necessary resources should be devoted, and it identifies operations in
Anbar and possibly Diyala as supporting efforts--secondary operations
that help to accomplish the main effort but receive just enough force
to succeed without compromising the main effort.
Forces Required
Having identified Baghdad as the main effort, we can then consider
the problem of securing that city in more detail. There is considerable
theory and historical evidence about the numbers of troops required to
provide security to a given population in a counterinsurgency. The
military's counterinsurgency manual concludes that a ratio of one
soldier for every 40 or 50 inhabitants provides a good rule of thumb
for such calculations. COL H.R. McMaster and the 3rd Armored Cavalry
Regiment used a ratio of about 1 soldier per every 40 inhabitants to
secure Tall Afar in 2005. American soldiers and marines in Ramadi have
made considerable progress in securing that city, although much lower
force ratios have slowed and limited that progress. MG Peter Chiarelli
put down the Sadrist uprising in Sadr City in mid-2004, on the other
hand, with one division (under 20,000 soldiers) in a population of over
2 million.
The population of Baghdad is around 6 million, which would require,
in theory, around 150,000 counterinsurgents to maintain security. It is
neither necessary nor wise to try to clear and hold the entire city all
at once, however. The Jaysh al-Mahdi based in Sadr City has
demonstrated its reluctance to engage in a full-scale conflict with
American forces, ever since coalition forces defeated Moqtada al-Sadr
and his army in Najaf in the summer of 2004. Rather, the Jaysh al-Mahdi
now needs to preserve its fighters in order to maintain its strength
against the Badr Corps in the struggle for control of post-coalition
Iraq. Attempting to clear Sadr City at this moment would almost
certainly force the Jaysh al-Mahdi, into precisely such a confrontation
with American troops, however. It would also do enormous damage to
Prime Minister Nouri Kamel al-Maliki's political base and would
probably lead to the collapse of the Iraqi Government. Clearing Sadr
City is both unwise and unnecessary at this time.
Many attacks against Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad emanate from
Sadr City. There are two ways to resolve that problem. The first is to
attack Sadr City by targeting known militia bases and concentrations
with discrete strikes. This option initially requires the fewest number
of forces. But such operations would almost certainly provoke a massive
political and military conflagration. They ultimately will demand high
force concentrations and generate instability in the current Iraqi
Government, as described above. This option is, therefore, extremely
risky. It would be better, instead, to secure the Sunni and mixed
Sunni-Shia neighborhoods by deploying American and Iraqi forces into
them and protecting their inhabitants from all violent attacks coming
from any area. This second approach also accords with sound
counterinsurgency practice, which favors defensive strategies aimed at
protecting the population over offensive strategies aimed at killing
insurgents.
The first phase of this plan, therefore, excludes military
operations within Sadr City and focuses on securing the Sunni and mixed
Sunni-Shia neighborhoods around the Green Zone and between that area
and Baghdad International Airport/Camp Victory. This approach
establishes security among a population of perhaps 2 million people,
which would require, according to historical norms, between 40,000 and
50,000 counterinsurgent troops. Generating proper force ratios to
secure the population in these neighborhoods is much more feasible than
generating the force ratios to confront the Jaysh al-Mahdi in Sadr City
or to secure the entire population of Baghdad at once. Yet securing the
population in these neighborhoods is likely to reduce levels of
violence elsewhere in Baghdad.
The working group also calculated the forces required for this
operation in another way. The area we have identified as being the
``critical terrain'' in Baghdad (because of its mixed ethnicity and its
geographic centrality) consists of about 23 districts. Clearing and
holding a city district in Baghdad requires an American force of about
one battalion (approximately 600 soldiers organized into four companies
of about 150 soldiers each). We have considerable evidence about what
force levels are necessary for such operations because of recent and
current operations in Baghdad. There is now about one battalion
deployed in the district of Dora (the area south of the Karadah
Peninsula just south of the Green Zone). Dora is a very dangerous
neighborhood that is difficult to control, and the troops there are
barely managing. Dora would benefit from reinforcements or from having
the adjoining areas brought more securely under control. Many other
neighborhoods that would be cleared under this proposal would require
fewer troops because they are less violent and large; some might
require more. On balance, current operations suggest that one battalion
per district would provide a sufficient overall force level to bring
the violence in these 23 districts under control.
There are three battalions in an Army Brigade Combat Team or BCT,
which, together with all of its supportinng elements, numbers around
5,000 soldiers. Twenty-three districts would require eight BCTs (which
would leave one battalion to spare as a Reserve), or around 40,000
soldiers. Since operations would be going on around the Green Zone and
Camp Victory, it would be necessary to maintain additional forces to
guard and garrison those areas, amounting to perhaps another BCT, for a
total of nine (around 45,000 troops total).
Whether we calculate the forces necessary based on historical
ratios or on units engaged in current operations, the results are very
similar: We can reasonably expect that between 40,000 and 50,000
soldiers could establish and maintain security in the 23 critical Sunni
and mixed districts in the center of Baghdad in the first phase of an
operation aimed at ending violence in the city, securing its
population, and securing Iraq.
Current and Proposed Deployments
The United States currently has approximately 140,000 troops in
Iraq, including about 70,000 in 13 Army Brigade Combat Teams and two
Marine Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs--the Marines slightly smaller
equivalent of brigades). Of the remaining 70,000 soldiers, many are
engaged in the enormous task of providing supplies to coalition
soldiers and to the 134,000 soldiers in the Iraqi Army, who are almost
entirely dependent on American logistics to survive and operate. A
large number of American troops are engaged in securing the long lines
of communication from Kuwait to Baghdad (600 miles) and from there to
U.S. forward operating bases (FOBs) around the country. Around 6,000
soldiers are now involved in training Iraqi Army and police units as
well. The BCTs and RCTs are the forces that would be used in clearing
and holding Baghdad, so the rest of this report will focus on them,
recognizing that the number of these units significantly
underrepresents the total size of the American combat presence in Iraq.
Seven BCTs, the largest concentration of the BCTs and RCTs now in
Iraq, operate in and around Baghdad. Five BCTs operate within the city
itself (although they mostly live on FOBs in the city's suburbs and
drive to their areas of operations to conduct patrols). One BCT
operates in the insurgent belts to the north around Taji and the
remaining BCT operates in the belts to the south around Iskandariyah
(the so-called Triangle of Death). Two Marine RCTs and one Army BCT
operate in Anbar. Their bases are located in Ramadi, Fallujah, and Al
Asad. The remaining five Army BCTs operate mostly to the north of
Baghdad in Ninawa, Salaheddin, and Diyala provinces in cities like
Mosul, Tikrit, Samarra, and Baquba.
An Army National Guard Brigade is stationed in a static defensive
position in Kuwait guarding the enormous supply and training areas
there. Recent news reports suggest that a brigade of the 82nd Airborne
Division has been ordered to Kuwait as well, although the purpose of
that deployment is not clear at the time that this report is being
written. The BCT of the 82nd Airborne Division might be deployed to
Iraq to engage in combat missions there in the near future; the
National Guard brigade could not leave Kuwait without endangering the
security of U.S. supply lines and bases.
The current deployment of U.S. forces in and around Baghdad,
therefore, provides approximately four BCTs (12 battalions or about
20,000 troops in all) for conducting combat operations in the city. The
equivalent of one BCT is required for base security. Such a force level
is evidently inadequate for clearing and holding any sizable portion of
Baghdad. The Army and Marine presence in Anbar is inadequate to
maintain even the most basic security in that province. The situation
in Diyala is almost as dire. Pulling troops from either province to
reinforce operations in Baghdad would almost surely lead to the further
collapse of those regions. Salaheddin is similarly problematic, while
security in Ninawa is extremely precarious. Any attempt to concentrate
forces in Baghdad by moving them from elsewhere in Iraq would
precipitate greater violence in the outlying areas. Such violence would
eventually move down the river valleys to Baghdad and undermine
attempts to succeed in the capital, as occurred in 2004. This plan
will, therefore, require a deployment of at least four Army Brigade
Combat Teams (approximately 20,000 soldiers) into Baghdad from outside
Iraq.
Because of the close relationship between the insurgency in Anbar
and the violence in Baghdad, it would be desirable to address both
areas at once. In reality, the United States simply cannot make
available enough forces to bring Anbar under control at the same time
as it tries to secure the critical neighborhoods of Baghdad. A
deployment of additional troops into Baghdad will, nevertheless, both
generate and suffer from spillover effects in Anbar. This very real
risk calls for a preplanned response. This report, therefore, proposes
to add two additional Marine RCTs to the two RCTs and one Army BCT that
are already in Anbar. This force (five brigade-equivalents, or about
18,000 soldiers and marines) is too small to secure the major cities in
Anbar, let alone the entire province. Five brigade-equivalents would,
however, suffice to cover the roads from Anbar to Baghdad, intercept
insurgents, and prevent the establishment of new rebel strongholds in
the province. Such operations would properly support the main effort in
Baghdad by controlling spillover effects.
The commander on the ground in Iraq could use the two additional
RCTs designated for Anbar elsewhere, of course. It might prove more
important to interdict movement between Diyala and Baghdad than to
reinforce American troops now in Anbar. In the worst case, the
commander could move these regiments into the capital if unexpectedly
high violence erupted in Baghdad itself during the clear-and-hold
operation there. By deploying these two additional RCTs into Iraq, the
commander on the ground will gain the flexibility to respond to
unforeseen difficulties or opportunities in and around Baghdad without
having to accept any additional risk in outlying areas.
The Army Brigade in Anbar, finally, was initially deployed to Iraq
in January 2006. By the time the recommended operations would begin, it
will have been in Iraq for nearly 15 months. This plan, therefore,
proposes to send a fresh Army BCT into Anbar to replace that unit,
which has already had its tour extended. It would require a total
deployment of five Army BCTs and two Marine RCTs in addition to the
forces already in Iraq. In an emergency, of course, the commander in
Iraq could keep the existing brigade in Anbar and use the brigade
designated to replace it as a further Reserve for deployment in Baghdad
or elsewhere. The plan, therefore, commits four additional BCTs into
Baghdad, designates two RCTs for Anbar but makes them available
elsewhere if necessary, and designates one BCT that could be used as a
Reserve in an emergency.
Clearing and Holding
What actually happens on the ground determines whether this or any
plan succeeds or fails. American forces have gained considerable
expertise in clearing and holding operations in Iraq from their
failures, such as the first Battle of Fallujah in April 2004, and from
their successes, such as operations in Tall Afar in September 2005.
(The report discusses the general character and specific phases of
clear-and-hold operations in several sections below.) Recent operations
in Baghdad emphasize the skill with which U.S. troops can clear enemies
from urban areas. In 2006, American forces in Baghdad conducted
Operation Together Forward (OTF) in two phases: The first from June 14
to July 24, 2006; the second from August 1 through October 24, 2006. In
both operations, the clear phase went well. Violence dropped in cleared
neighborhoods and some economic activity resumed.
But the U.S. command committed inadequate combat power to hold
operations, relying instead on Iraqi police and soldiers to maintain
the security that joint U.S. and Iraqi patrols had established. The
United States added two brigades (fewer than 10,000 troops) to support
the first phase of OTF and one brigade (plus additional detachments
coming to around 7,000 soldiers) to support the second. Because there
were too few American troops, and because American commanders wished to
rely heavily on Iraqi forces, U.S. troops did not remain in cleared
neighborhoods either to defend them or to support and improve the Iraqi
forces trying to maintain order there. The different Sunni and Shiite
enemy groups made a point of surging into the cleared but undefended
neighborhoods to demonstrate the futility of the operations, and they
also attacked neighborhoods that were not being cleared by American and
Iraqi troops. Violence overall in Baghdad soared.
The plan proposed in this report would use established practices
for clearing neighborhoods, but would provide adequate American forces
to hold them, in partnership with Iraqi forces. American units remain
in neighborhoods to secure the population and to support and strengthen
Iraqi forces until they are able to hold the area without coalition
support. These undertakings are firmly in accord with recommended
counterinsurgency doctrine.
Clearing operations generally proceed as follows. American troops
partner with Iraqi troops before the operation. They plan the operation
and train for it together. Since American and Iraqi units are already
operating throughout Baghdad's neighborhoods, they gather intelligence
in the targeted area prior to the operation. They determine the enemy's
strength and disposition, how the enemy is organized and conducts
operations, and so on. When the operation begins, joint U.S.-Iraqi
teams isolate the district through checkpoints and other outposts,
patrols, surveillance, and obstacles. American and Iraqi infantry then
sweep through the district. They cordon off each house or apartment
block and then knock on the door, asking to examine the inside. If they
are granted permission, they enter politely and then examine every part
of the structure for weapons caches and evidence of enemy activity. The
Iraqi forces with them provide a vital cultural interface with the
inhabitants both by communicating with them and by sensing
irregularities. On the rare occasions when the occupants attempt to
refuse permission to examine the house, Iraqi and U.S. soldiers enter
by force and continue their search.
When every structure in the district (including every mosque) has
been searched and all weapons caches and suspicious individuals have
been removed, neither the American nor the Iraqi soldiers leave the
neighborhood. Instead, they establish permanent positions in disused
factories, houses, apartments, government buildings, and, if necessary,
schools (although coalition forces prefer to avoid occupying schools
because it sends a bad signal to the neighborhood). American and Iraqi
teams man each position jointly. They allow traffic into the
neighborhood to resume, although they continue to man joint outposts at
critical intersections. They conduct regular joint foot and vehicle
patrols throughout the neighborhood, maintaining contact with the local
population and establishing trust. Over time, U.S. forces will assist
Iraqis in developing comprehensive, sustainable human intelligence
networks in the area.
The tactics described above are illustrative, not prescriptive.
They are based on practices that American units have used in Iraq in
the past. Commanders will apply techniques appropriate to the areas in
which they are operating. Every such combined operation requires that
American forces, Iraqi Army units, and Iraqi police formations all work
toward a common goal and within a single command structure. Unity of
effort is essential for success in this kind of endeavor.
According to military officers who have experience with clearing
operations in Iraq, after 2 weeks of improved security and continued
force presence, the local people typically begin providing the
coalition forces in their neighborhoods with valuable tactical
intelligence. As the enemy attempts to reinfiltrate the neighborhood,
locals report some of them. Savvy Iraqi or even American soldiers note
new faces and begin to ask questions. When bombs or IEDs go off, locals
reveal the perpetrators. Before long, they begin to warn coalition
troops when LEDs have been placed. At that point, violence begins to
drop significantly and economic and political progress can begin.
There is nothing novel about this approach to counterinsurgency. It
has been practiced in some form in almost every successful
counterinsurgent operation. It was successful on a local level in
Vietnam in the form of the Combined Action Platoon (CAP) program, which
many observers felt should have been extended to more of that country.
It has worked in Tall Afar and, insofar as it was applied, even in
Baghdad. It is working now in Ramadi and in south Baghdad. If properly
resourced, it can bring large sections of the capital under control.
Curiously, though proven effective, this approach runs counter to
the current MNF-I concept of disengaging from populated areas and
rapidly handing over security responsibility to Iraqi forces of dubious
capability.
It is vital to sustain the hold part of the operation for months
after the initial clearing operation. Previous failed clear-and-hold
operations in Iraq suggest that the enemy can reinfiltrate a cleared
area in about 90 days. Within 6 months, the enemy can be operating
openly once more. In a dense urban environment like Baghdad, the enemy
can reconstitute even faster. In addition, the enemy in Iraq has
historically pursued a pattern of going to ground when coalition forces
are present and waiting for them to leave. By withdrawing American
troops from the hold phase of an operation too quickly, the United
States plays into this enemy strategy. Any sound clear-and-hold
approach, therefore, will require the presence of significant American
forces in neighborhoods, supporting and strengthening Iraqi troops and
police, for at least 9-12 months after the start of operations.
Training
This long-hold period allows time for Iraqi troops and police to
gain the capability and confidence they need reliably to assume
responsibility for maintaining secured areas. Phase II of this project
will address the challenges of training Iraqi military and police
forces in greater detail, but some observations are appropriate here.
Discussions of military policy in Iraq frequently present efforts
to train Iraqi forces as antithetical to efforts to use American forces
to help bring security to the Iraqi people. The Iraq Study Group report
and several other proposals emphasizing training Iraqis have suggested
increasing the number of U.S. soldiers embedded within Iraqi units and
decreasing the number of Americans actually conducting operations.
These proposals claim that increasing the number of embedded trainers
will accelerate the training of Iraqi units. Such ideas ignore a
critical fact joint, sustained clear-and-hold operations that involve
both Americans and Iraqis working in partnership are one of the most
effective ways to train Iraqi units rapidly and to a high standard.
To begin with, the United States has a small pool of soldiers whose
job is to train indigenous troops--the Special Forces (which was
created in the 1960s to perform this mission). Those soldiers spend
their careers learning how to train others, and they are superb at it.
In the past year, however, Special Forces have come to concentrate more
heavily on what is called ``direct action''--tracking terrorists,
kicking in doors, and seizing enemies. The large size of the Iraqi
Army, furthermore, requires more trainers than the Special Forces can
provide. For both reasons, the training mission in Iraq has been given
to soldiers drawn from the conventional forces, both Active Duty and
National Guard. These soldiers receive some training in how to train
Iraqis and then embed with Iraqi units to accomplish their task.
America's flexible and creative soldiers respond well to this
challenge, but the skills of the conventional forces soldiers detailed
to this task are generally lower than those of the Special Forces
troops specifically trained for it. Although the U.S. Army is now
training more conventional soldiers for these responsibilities, it
cannot do so fast enough to embed enough trained, conventional soldiers
with Iraqi units rapidly. The more the United States tries to
accelerate training Iraqi units by embedding soldiers, the lower the
average quality of that training will be.
This kind of training also takes a much larger toll on the American
ground forces than most people imagine. The number of embedded trainers
is small compared to the total number of U.S. forces in Iraq, but the
effect on the Army is disproportionately high. Training teams have a
high proportion of officers and noncommissioned officers and a
relatively small complement of enlisted soldiers. Each training team,
therefore, effectively removes the leadership cadre of an American
battalion. The enlisted personnel of the battalion will often have
remained behind, and so the battalion is not counted as being
``deployed,'' but neither can it be used for combat without the
replacement of its leadership team. This process is having an important
negative effect on the deployability of units in the Army that would
appear on paper to be usable.
Iraqi units operating together with American units learn a great
deal very quickly. They interact with U.S. command teams as they plan
operations, and then they execute those operations alongside the best
and most professional soldiers in the world. There is no substitute for
this kind of training. It is one thing for an advisor to describe what
to do; it is another to watch a superb soldier and unit do it expertly.
If the only training of Iraqi troops is being conducted by embedded
American trainers, Iraqis will never see what excellence looks like.
When they fight alongside excellent soldiers, they see it vividly and
understand better what to aim for. Combined clear-and-hold operations
are an essential means for bringing the Iraqi Army up to the necessary
levels of capability as quickly as possible.
THE ENEMY'S RESPONSES
The enemy will respond to American and Iraqi efforts to establish
security in Baghdad. No one can predict their response with certainty,
but after nearly 4 years in this struggle planners can observe the
patterns in their behavior that suggest their likely reactions.
Different groups will, of course, respond differently to ongoing
operations. Above all, the action of clearing and holding a large part
of central Baghdad will change the relationship between groups and even
the political dynamics within Iraq. This report will not consider these
second-order effects in detail, but subsequent phases of the project
will do so. For now this report remains focused on the most essential
task facing the U.S. and Iraqi governments today: Defeating enemy
attempts to disrupt our efforts to establish security.
General Enemy Responses
The clear-and-hold operation occurs in four main phases: (1) The
deployment of U.S. and Iraqi forces to their designated areas, (2) the
establishment of those forces in their areas and efforts to acquire
necessary intelligence and physical bases from which to conduct
operations, (3) the clearing of the neighborhoods, and (4) holding
cleared areas. This report first considers the possible reactions of
all enemy groups taken together in each phase and then the possible
reactions of each individual group separately. The report will consider
what each enemy is most likely to do, and what actions each enemy could
undertake that would most endanger the mission and American interests.
Phase I: Deployment and Marshalling of Resources. This phase
extends from the announcement of the President's intention to conduct
clear-and-hold operations until all units involved in that operation
are physically on the ground in and around Baghdad and Anbar. In
general terms, this is a dangerous time. The President will have
announced his intentions, but American reinforcements will not yet have
arrived in theater. Enemy groups might take advantage of this interval
to increase sectarian cleansing and to establish themselves in strong
positions in targeted neighborhoods in the hopes of making the clearing
operations too painful for U.S. forces to conduct. This is the most
dangerous course of action they could take, but it is not the most
likely if the President acts quickly and decisively and forces arrive
in theater before spring. Many enemies in Iraq are fair-weather foes:
Violence generally drops after Ramadan and remains relatively lower
through the winter. It is most likely that the enemy will conduct an
expanded propaganda campaign aimed at intimidating civilians and
raising enemy morale during the first phase of American operations.
The best coalition responses include developing an effective and
clear information campaign that underlines the scale, duration, and
determination of the coming effort; stepping up the ``presence
patrols'' of units already in Baghdad; emphasizing that the aim of
coming operations is to protect civilians of all sects and ethnicities;
and countering enemy disinformation. To prevent sabotage in future
phases, coalition forces must secure the resources needed for
reconstruction and reconstitution of police in the targeted areas.
Phase II: Preparation. In this phase, coalition units begin to
arrive in their designated areas. They start developing intelligence,
establishing relationships with the population and ISF, and assessing
the overall situation. Extremists are likely to respond by increasing
the number of suicide bombings and targeted murders of civilians. Local
vigilante groups are more likely to go to ground and avoid direct
confrontations with coalition forces. Rather, these groups will rely on
indirect attacks on coalition forces, including IEDs and mortar fire.
They may also attack civilians. Some enemy groups may attempt to move
from threatened districts to areas they perceive as safer and wait out
the operation. U.S. forces must anticipate such movements, and units
must be prepared to conduct raids and other short operations to deny
the enemy safe haven in other areas. Most enemies will continue their
efforts to infiltrate the Iraqi Army and police units in their areas.
During this phase, the most damaging actions the enemy could take
would be to surge the level of their violence dramatically in an effort
to discredit the security effort and the Iraqi Government, to complete
sectarian cleansing campaigns, and to intimidate the population. This
course of action is less likely because most insurgent groups have only
a limited capability to surge on short notice, because most will avoid
using up all available fighters and suicide bombers at the outset of a
campaign, and because U.S. and Iraqi forces are already present and
patrolling in Baghdad. The appropriate coalition response is again to
increase presence and patrols throughout the capital, especially in the
areas beyond those designated for clearing operations, in order to deny
the enemy safe havens. The coalition will also have to conduct an
intelligent information campaign that makes clear that the violence is
the result of an increase in insurgent attacks aimed at harming the
Iraqi people, but that future operations will end the violence
permanently. The coalition must also be prepared for humanitarian
efforts to handle increased refugee flows within Baghdad and beyond.
Phase III: Clearing. The insurgents in Iraq have fallen into a
pattern in response to clear-and-hold operations. At the beginning of
such operations, they normally surge their attacks and target both
coalition forces and Iraqi civilians. They bring in specialized
capabilities, such as snipers and IED cells, to inflict casualties on
American and Iraqi forces in order to test their resolve. When it
becomes clear that the coalition intends to pursue the operation, most
enemy groups then go to ground. They use contacts in the Iraqi
Government to attempt to discredit the operation, constrain it, or
cancel it altogether. They expect that any clearing operation will be
short-lived, and that U.S. forces will leave vulnerable Iraqi Army and
police forces unsupported when the operations end. They, therefore,
conserve their fighters and weapons while the Americans are present.
They anticipate unleashing them on the civilian population if political
efforts to forestall the operation fail or Iraqi forces and Americans
leave. This surge--go to ground--surge pattern is the likeliest enemy
response to the clearing operations proposed in this report.
It requires careful consideration and response. First and foremost,
the American Government and the American people, as well as the Iraqi
Government and the Iraqi people, must understand the importance of
seeing the clear-and-hold operation through to its conclusion. If the
operation begins in March and violence begins to wane in May, the
governments and publics cannot, thereby, conclude that the operation
has succeeded beyond expectations and start to wind down. The United
States must continue to maintain its forces to support Iraqi troops in
their hold operations for months after violence in cleared
neighborhoods has begun to fall, because the odds are that the enemy is
trying to husband its resources for a future attack when U.S. forces
leave.
In addition, the American and Iraqi Governments and people must
recognize that a surge in enemy violence later in 2007 is very likely
even if this operation is successful. The insurgents regularly increase
the level of their violence in Ramadan each year. If this operation
begins in March and violence wanes through the summer, it is very
likely that the violence will escalate again in the fall. This pattern
is normal and to be expected. To the extent that a reduction in
violence is the measure of success of this operation, we must be
prepared to compare Ramadan 2007 with Ramadan 2006 rather than with
June or July 2007.
It should be possible, moreover, to mitigate the magnitude of the
late-2007 enemy surge. American forces working with Iraqis in permanent
positions in cleared neighborhoods will acquire a great deal of
intelligence about the enemy. They will be able to identify and stop
many attempts to infiltrate cleared neighborhoods again. As they gain
the trust of the population, they will receive more information about
enemies who escaped when the area was cleared. They will locate more
weapons caches and limit the flow of new weapons into the neighborhood.
Long-term presence will help reduce the enemy's ability to launch new
attacks later in the year.
During the third phase, the most dangerous course of action the
enemy might take is an Iraqi equivalent of the Tet offensive, in which
all or most enemy groups converge on coalition forces in large-scale
and spectacular attacks. Enemy groups conduct mass-casualty attacks on
mixed neighborhoods that coalition forces are attempting to clear,
suborn Iraqi security forces, and launch high-profile attacks in other
Iraqi cities. Some enemy groups might assassinate prominent civil or
religious leaders or destroy important religious landmarks.
This course of action is less likely because it requires the
insurgents to expend most of their fighters and weapons rapidly at the
beginning of the operation, something they have generally avoided in
the past. It can be countered by ensuring that clearing operations
proceed rapidly and simultaneously in multiple neighborhoods. The
coalition must also devote particular attention to protecting likely
high-profile targets in Baghdad and around the country. The United
States must maintain a sizable Reserve to offset the danger that the
enemy might attempt to generate high levels of violence in
neighborhoods or cities that are not being cleared. American commanders
must have uncommitted troops that can be sent to troubled areas rapidly
and on short notice without detracting from the main effort to clear
the designated communities. If U.S. commanders attempt to conduct this
operation with precisely the number of soldiers they think they might
need to clear neighborhoods, but do not retain a substantial Reserve,
they entice the enemy to choose this most dangerous option and severely
constrain their own ability to respond to this contingency. A
significant Reserve (at least one brigade combat team) is an essential
component of this or any sound plan.
Phase IV: Hold and Build. By this phase of the operation, U.S. and
Iraqi forces will have examined every structure in a neighborhood,
removed all weapons caches that they have identified, and detained many
suspicious individuals, some of whom will turn out to be members of
enemy groups. The hold-and-build phase of this operation is one of the
most dangerous for the population of the cleared neighborhood. The
detainment of suspicious individuals involves removing many of the
young, tough, armed men who were defending the neighborhood from
outside attack (whatever violence of their own they might have been
committing). Unless the coalition maintains a robust armed presence in
the cleared area, the remaining inhabitants--disproportionately
including the elderly, women, and children--will be highly vulnerable
to enemy strikes.
Past clearing operations followed by premature American withdrawals
have conditioned enemies to wait for this phase to strike.
Consequently, this plan argues that enemy groups are likely to revert
to their past pattern of surging violently, going to ground, and
subsequently surging very violently. Once the insurgents find that
American forces are remaining in force in cleared neighborhoods, they
will probably adopt a different approach. Surging fighters and weapons
into protected neighborhoods exposes the insurgents to losses without
giving them any benefits. They are more likely, therefore, to increase
the number of high casualty attacks, especially vehicle-borne IEDs
(VBIEDs or car bombs) and suicide bombers. It is extremely difficult to
stop all such attacks, and some will inevitably reach their targets. If
they are relatively low in number and isolated rather than massed, then
they will not likely be sufficient to derail reconstruction and
political development. Active patrolling, intelligence-gathering, and
control of critical access points can help reduce the number and
effectiveness of such attacks.
The enemy is likely, then, to attempt to move into uncleared
neighborhoods and destabilize them by striking less-well-defended
targets. The enemy may also attempt to increase the level of violence
in cities beyond Baghdad, attempt to conduct high-profile
assassinations, or try to destroy prominent religious landmarks. In the
worst case, they may try to surge back into cleared neighborhoods to
demonstrate the futility of the clearing effort.
The most effective responses to such insurgent efforts, once again,
rely on having a readily available Reserve Force. Reserves must be able
to reinforce cleared neighborhoods threatened by large surges of
violence, to control increasing violence in uncleared neighborhoods,
and to address attacks in cities outside of Baghdad. The plan in this
proposal designates one BCT as a Reserve for Baghdad and two RCTs in
Iraq as potential Reserves in case of emergency. The plan calls for
deploying those RCTs into Anbar province in the expectation that
threatened Sunni insurgents will return to their base. It might prove
necessary, however, to deploy one or both of those RCTs into Diyala,
another al-Qaeda base that emerges, or even into Baghdad or its nearer
suburbs.
These decisions can only be made by the commander on the ground in
light of changing circumstances, but his Reserve Forces can only
achieve the effects he desires if they are already near Baghdad. Kuwait
is 600 miles from the Iraqi capital--Reserve Forces held there might
take too long to arrive in response to a crisis. Forces stationed in
the United States, even if alerted for possible deployment, would
almost certainly take too long to respond. Reacting effectively to
likely enemy challenges requires positioning significant Reserve Forces
already near the scene of the fighting.
Specific Enemy Responses
Although the discussion above captures the likely aggregate of
enemy responses, it is important to consider how each individual enemy
group is likely to respond as well, since the particularities of those
responses can have a profound impact on the developing political
situation in Iraq. The major insurgent groupings are the Jaysh al-
Mahdi, the Badr Corps, al-Qaeda in Iraq and associated Islamist groups,
the Baathists and military nationalists, and vigilante groups on both
sides. As we have seen, the Shiite militias share many common aims but
are also rivals for power. They may cooperate in some scenarios, but
there is reason to believe that they can be kept apart in others. The
Sunni groups have cooperated more closely because of their sense of
being beleaguered, but their divergent aims and methods will likely
lead to different responses to the proposed clearing and holding
operations. Despite the conflicting sectarian makeup and aims of the
vigilante groups, on the other hand, their motivations and methods make
it likely that their responses to clear-and-hold operations will be
similar to one another.
Jaysh al-Mahdi. Moqtada al-Sadr's militia, the Jaysh al-Mahdi,
presents one of the greatest dangers to this operation. It is based in
Sadr City, which it largely controls through a Hezbollah model of
providing services, including security, that the local government is
unable to offer. It is impossible to estimate with accuracy how many
fighters the Jaysh al-Mahdi could muster in total, let alone how many
are still under Sadr's control. There are certainly thousands of armed
militiamen, however--more than enough to force a bloody showdown with
coalition forces if provoked or driven to full-scale conflict.
Moqtada al-Sadr himself has also become a force in the political
process, moreover. His 30-seat bloc of parliamentarians is an important
element of Maliki's government (although his recent ``walkout'' from
Parliament underlined the feasibility of forming a coalition government
without him if necessary--which was one of the reasons why his
followers returned to their seats relatively quickly). A full-scale
confrontation with the Jaysh al-Mahdi would not only be bloody, but it
would also be a political crisis of the first order in Iraq. It is thus
highly desirable to avoid such a confrontation if it is at all
possible.
The Jaysh al-Mahdi has been conducting numerous murderous raids
from Sadr City into Sunni and mixed neighborhoods and has caused many
of the American casualties in Baghdad. Clearing operations in Sunni and
mixed districts will lead to conflict with isolated groups of Jaysh al-
Mahdi fighters. Efforts to contain the flow of such fighters from Sadr
City into Baghdad will require coalition forces to patrol the borders
of Sadr City (which they are already doing) and possibly to restrict
access to Sadr City periodically. These actions will place coalition
forces in close proximity to the heart of the Jaysh al-Mahdi's power.
The desire to appear evenhanded by attacking Shiite militias even as
operations bring Sunni-sponsored violence under control also creates
pressure to launch isolated raids into Sadr City itself.
If coalition operations are skillfully conceived and executed, they
will not provoke a full-scale confrontation with Sadr and the Jaysh al-
Mahdi. It is not in Sadr's interest to engage in a full-scale
confrontadon. His experiences in 2004 in Najaf and Karbala made clear
that whatever political damage he might be able to cause through such
violence, American forces will decimate his fighters. He cannot afford
to lose his warriors. He is not popular within the Iraqi political
system and draws much of his political strength from his militia. He
also requires a strong military arm to confront the Badr Corps and
SCIRI in the fight for control of a post-coalition Iraq. Whatever harm
Sadrists might do to coalition hopes for success in Iraq by confronting
coalition forces directly, this path would almost certainly be
political suicide for Sadr. He is unlikely to choose direct
confrontation with the coalition unless it is forced upon him.
Invading or sealing off Sadr City would force Sadr to resist
coalition forces vigorously, regardless of the cost. Even launching
isolated raids in and around Sadr City is dangerous. Such raids might
lead to escalation on both sides and an unintended, major confrontation
that both sides wish to avoid. For that reason, this plan focuses on
responding to Jaysh al-Mahdi attacks by protecting the neighborhoods
they are targeting, rather than by striking at the sources of their
power.
Such defensive operations will, nevertheless, lead to the killing
and capturing of Jaysh al-Mahdi fighters, but they are not likely to
provoke Sadr or his unruly lieutenants into full-scale conflict. For
months, coalition forces have been engaged with Jaysh al-Mahdi fighters
in discrete operations. On each occasion when coalition forces have
captured or killed members of death squads, Sadr and the Jaysh al-Mahdi
leadership have abandoned their compromised militiamen, declaring them
``rogue elements'' or criminals masquerading as warriors. This past
restraint on their part is evidence of their desire to avoid a full-
fledged conflict. As long as coalition forces demonstrate similar
restraint with regard to Sadr City, it is likely that the Jaysh al-
Mahdi will remain relatively quiescent.
If large-scale conflict with the Jaysh al-Mahdi nevertheless
erupts, the plan proposed in this report would require substantial
modification. It would be necessary to abandon much of the effort to
clear and hold Sunni and mixed neighborhoods in central Baghdad in
order to focus instead on clearing Sadr City. Clearing operations in
Sadr City would be bloody--the Jaysh al-Mahdi has had a long time to
fortify the area--but the result is not in doubt. Coalition forces
would destroy the Jaysh al-Mahdi and clear the Shiite neighborhoods.
Depending on the political and security situation, it would then be
necessary to turn back to the problem of suppressing the Sunni Arab
insurgency and securing the neighborhoods in the center of Baghdad.
Large-scale conflict with the Jaysh al-Mahdi would probably lead to
the withdrawal of Sadr from the political process and might lead to the
fall of the Maliki government. Such an occurrence would be unfortunate
but not necessarily devastating. Even if the Maliki government fell,
executive power would remain in the Iraqi Presidential Council, which
could form an emergency government. Iraq would remain a sovereign
state. Conflict with the Jaysh al-Mahdi is clearly undesirable and
dangerous, and every effort should be made to avoid it. It would not,
however, necessarily lead to immediate coalition defeat.
The Badr Corps. Abdul Aziz al-Hakim's Badr Corps is an important
player in Iraqi politics, but it has relatively little presence in
Baghdad, where Sadr and the Jaysh al-Mahdi are the dominant militia
group. Hakim has already manifested his concern that Sadr is gaining
the upper hand in the Shiite community, particularly in central Iraq.
He could do little to influence the fighting in Baghdad directly except
by increasing the flow of Shiite fighters from the south into the
capital.
If coalition operations are clearly aimed at establishing security
in central Baghdad and not attacking the Shiite communities in and
around Sadr City, it is unlikely that the Badr Corps will play a very
large role. If the United States attacked Sadr City, however, Hakim
might make common cause with Sadr and attempt to inflame the south and
all of Shiite Iraq against the coalition. In this worst case, coalition
defeat is very likely--the Iraqi Government could not survive such a
challenge, and coalition forces could not likely handle the military
threat throughout Iraq. This is yet another reason to avoid any direct
attack on Sadr City or actions that are likely to lead to a full-scale
confrontation with Sadr.
It is even less in Hakim's interest to provoke a full-scale
confrontation with the coalition than it is in Sadr's. Sadr has gained
political influence by taking a strong anti-American position. Hakim
has been much more moderate, apparently concentrating on the likelihood
that the U.S. presence will lead in the end to a Shiite state that he
hopes to rule. No part of the plan proposed in this report directly
threatens the outcome he desires. On the contrary, clearing and holding
the Sunni and mixed neighborhoods in Baghdad and suppressing the Sunni
Arab insurgency in Anbar forwards Hakim's goals. It is very likely that
Hakim will publicly protest against Shiite casualties and denounce the
operation, but it is extremely unlikely that he will support Sadr or
throw large numbers of his own fighters into the fray--as long as the
core of the Shiite community is not threatened.
Iran. It is more difficult to estimate likely Iranian actions to
the various possibilities outlined above, but the range of Tehran's
possible responses is rather narrowly constrained. Iran is certainly
unlikely to watch the destruction of the Badr Corps or even the Jaysh
al-Mahdi with equanimity, and would probably increase dramatically the
level of its support for those groups, even including direct support
through Iranian advisors. This is yet another reason why courting a
full-scale confrontation with the Shiite militias in the first stage of
the operation would be unwise. Iran is likely to increase its support
of the militias and other fighting groups in Iraq in response to any
American operation. The impact of such an increase will be muted as
long as the United States sends and maintains an adequate troop
presence to secure and hold designated neighborhoods. Iran is highly
unlikely to court a direct military confrontation with the United
States during such an operation--by sending disguised fighters against
our supply lines in the south, for instance, or taking any other
military action that could be traced directly back to Tehran.
Al-Qaeda in Iraq and Other Islamist Groups. Al-Qaeda in Iraq is one
of the most dangerous enemies facing coalition forces, not because of
its power but because of its goals. Unique among the major insurgent
groups, al-Qaeda in Iraq aims directly at regional objectives and sees
operations in Iraq as merely a steppingstone to achieving larger goals.
This group is also motivated by an apocalyptic vision of the grand
struggle between righteous Islam and ``heresy'' within the Muslim
community (including Shiism), and between Islam and the infidel West.
Zarqawi, the group's leader until his death in June 2006, adopted a
Leninist strategy, according to which ``the worse it is, the better it
is'' for the insurgent groups. Zarqawi used a series of spectacular
attacks on Shiite (and even Sunni) civilians deliberately to ignite
sectarian conflict. This approach drew criticism even from other parts
of the global al-Qaeda movement--Aymara al-Zawahiri, the group's
ideological leader, criticized Zarqawi for his attacks on Shiites.
Other Islamist groups in Iraq, including Ansar al-Sunna, also question
the religious justification for attacking fellow Muslims in such an
instrumental way.
But Zargawi's strategy was effective. The Shiite community in Iraq
endured nearly 2 years of attacks without responding on a large scale,
but the bombing of the Golden Mosque in February 2006 proved too much
for that community to withstand. The cycling sectarian violence in Iraq
owes a great deal to Zargawi's determined efforts to provoke full-scale
civil war and chaotic violence, from which he thought his group would
benefit.
Al-Qaeda in Iraq can be expected to continue to pursue this
approach during the proposed clear-and-hold operation. In general
terms, the group will probably continue to target Shiite civilians,
both ordinary people and key figures in the government and within the
Shiite religious community. It is likely to work to generate more
spectacular attacks like the Golden Mosque bombing or mass-casualty
attacks in Shiite communities. If such attacks succeed in significant
numbers, they will undermine confidence in the clearing operation, spur
the Shiite militias to even greater sectarian violence, and may
ultimately break the Iraqi Government.
It is not clear how, specifically, al-Qaeda in Iraq and associated
groups will respond to the proposed clearing operation. Faced with a
substantial attempt to end the violence in Baghdad, they might embrace
an apocalyptic fight with coalition forces in the heart of the capital,
surging all of their resources against coalition and especially Iraqi
civilian targets. This approach would generate a lot of violence in the
initial phase of the clearing operation, but would not necessarily be
the most dangerous response they might make. By striking the coalition
when coalition forces were most prepared, the Islamists will lose many
fighters and use up their limited supply of suicide bombers and car
bombs. If the U.S. and Iraqi forces pursue the operation to its
conclusion, they will significantly reduce this particular enemy's
ability to undertake subsequent surges of violence, and the prospects
for the success of the operation will increase.
It is more likely that al-Qaeda in Iraq and other Islamist groups
will act as they have in the past: They will increase violence at the
start of the operation and then go to ground either in Baghdad
neighborhoods not designated for clearing or in the surrounding cities
and towns. There, they will hope to reconstitute and prepare for a
major surge of violence after the clearing operations have ended. They
will also prepare spectacular mass-casualty attacks against targets in
Baghdad and elsewhere.
The coalition must maintain great pressure on the Islamists in
Baghdad and beyond. Clearing and holding neighborhoods over the long
term will help mitigate the risks of attacks in those neighborhoods,
but the presence of large Reserves is once again essential to
preventing the Islamists from establishing safe bases elsewhere from
which to prepare devastating attacks. The regions around Taji, to the
north of Baghdad, and Iskandariyah, to the south, merit particular
attention. There are already two American BCTs operating there, one in
each region, and they should not be moved. They may need to be
reinforced. Additionally, because al-Qaeda has bases in Diyala
province, coalition forces may have to seal off the roads from Diyala
into Baghdad or to divert Reserves into Diyala itself. The main al-
Qaeda bases, of course, are in Anbar, which is why the proposed plan
devotes two additional RCTs to that province.
Baathists and Military Nationalists. These groups have sustained a
de facto working alliance with the Islamists because of the perceived
danger to the Sunni Arab community in Iraq, but they disagree both on
objectives and on methods (although the turnover in leadership is
leading to greater convergence, as noted above). The Baathists and
military nationalists include the most experienced insurgent fighters,
many drawn from the ranks of Saddam's army. They have focused their
attacks heavily on coalition forces, including Iraqi Security Forces,
which they regard as legitimate targets, but have eschewed attacks on
Iraqi civilians. They are not in favor of accelerating the civil war
simply for the purpose of generating chaos from which they hope to
benefit--on the contrary, they aim to bring the civil war under control
after they win the struggle, as they expect to do.
The aims of these groups are also confined more narrowly to Iraq.
They are unlikely to be as willing as the Islamists to condemn Iraq to
an annihilating sectarian conflict in the hopes of achieving some
greater regional benefit. They are much more likely, therefore, to
become open to negotiation and political persuasion if they come to
believe that their military struggle is hopeless.
The Baathists pose a significant danger in the first three phases
of the proposed operation. They are likely to launch a significant
propaganda effort during the deployment of coalition forces. They will
attempt to portray the planned operation as an assault on the Sunni
community. They may seek, thereby, to bring regional and international
pressure to bear on the United States to abandon the plan entirely. As
the operation begins, the Baathists are likely to launch increased
attacks against coalition forces. Because the Baathists are the most
militarily skilled among enemy groups, they may pose the most serious
challenge to forces clearing those neighborhoods where they have been
able to establish strongpoints and defensive positions. The worst case
scenarios involve increased cooperation between the Baathists and the
Islamists, including Baathist support for mass-casualty or spectacular
attacks on Shiite targets.
The coalition must counter Baathist propaganda efforts with
skillful information operations that emphasize that the coalition's
goal is to protect the population, both Sunni and Shia, from criminals
and terrorists. Initiating reconstruction activities in the immediate
wake of the clearing operation (a policy considered in more detail
below) will also help offset the impression that this mission is aimed
at harming the Sunnis. Most of Iraq's Sunni neighbors, and many Sunni
states beyond Iraq's borders, have become extremely concerned about the
danger of a spreading civil war. Many are quietly suggesting that an
American withdrawal would be disastrous and are advocating for a surge
aimed at bringing the violence under control. They might posture in
various ways publicly, but they are extremely unlikely to bring any
effective pressure to bear to stop an operation that suits their
interests, regardless of Baathist propaganda.
Greater Baathist cooperation with the Islamists cannot be
discounted, but it is not yet certain. The continual al-Qaeda in Iraq
attacks against Shiite civilians have alienated many insurgents on both
sides, and this trend is likely to continue. The Baathist desire to
rule a unified Iraq clashes with the Islamist willingness to destroy
Iraq in the name of larger regional gains, a fact that will make
increased cooperation between the groups difficult. But as time
elapses, and a younger generation of Iraqi nationalists takes
leadership positions in what was originally the Baathist resistance
movement, they may work more closely than their predecessors with the
Islamists.
Perhaps the most dangerous option the Baathists could choose would
be to try to force Sunni politicians to leave the government, possibly
by moving their base of operations out of Baghdad and into Anbar and
Diyala. The coalition must work to foreclose this option by retaining
control in Anbar and by maintaining a sufficient Reserve to respond to
shifts in Baathist attack patterns and movements.
Vigilante Groups, Sunni and Shia. The main justification for
vigilante groups on both sides is the need to protect their
neighborhoods from sectarian attacks. Many of these groups are also
involved in criminal activity, and some are taking advantage of the
situation to engage in sectarian cleansing of their own. It is highly
unlikely, nevertheless, that members of these groups would actively
resist a large-scale clearing operation. The most radical might join
hardcore insurgent groups. Some might attempt to accelerate sectarian
cleansing before coalition forces arrived in force. Most, however, are
likely to blend back into the population during the clearing operation
and wait to see what happens.
As long as peace is maintained in the cleared neighborhoods during
the hold phase, the members of these vigilante groups are unlikely to
cause much trouble. They retain a latent potential for violence if the
coalition allows a security vacuum to develop. Some of them will be
dissatisfied by the transition from being the big men around town,
protecting their people, to being unemployed youths. Employment
programs and other reconstruction efforts may help, but the coalition
and the Iraqis must also consider ways of addressing individuals' and
groups' loss of honor and prestige during this transition.
Reintegrating members of the vigilante groups into their neighborhoods
is not a simple process. Rather, it requires careful thought,
appropriate planning, and adequate preparation.
Timeline
The operations proposed in this plan would take most of 2007 to
complete. As we shall see, most of the necessary reinforcements would
not arrive in their designated areas until March; active clearing
operations would probably not begin until early April. Past examples
suggest that preparation and clearing operations will take about 90
days, and so should be completed by midsummer. It will then be
necessary to support Iraqi forces in hold-and-build operations through
the end of 2007 in order to continue to degrade insurgent networks,
prevent infiltration of cleared areas again, and mitigate likely enemy
efforts to launch an autumn surge against coalition, civilian,
symbolic, and high-profile targets. By early 2008, it should become
possible to begin moving some American forces out of the cleared areas
of Baghdad, although it is unlikely that large numbers of U.S. troops
could begin to return home until much later in 2008, for reasons
described below.
2007 will be a violent year in Iraq. If this proposal is not
adopted, then insurgent and sectarian violence will continue to
increase unabated, as it has every year since the invasion. If this
plan is adopted, then the pattern of the violence will probably change.
There will be a significant increase in violence as clearing operations
commence, probably followed by a reduction in violence in the summer,
followed by a substantial surge of violence in the fall. If the United
States continues on its present course, American and Iraqi casualties
will be spread more evenly over the year, but all will be wasted
because success is extraordinarily unlikely. If this plan is adopted,
there will probably be higher casualties in the spring and fall, but
far fewer by the end of the year. The coalition, moreover, will have
made significant progress toward establishing security in Iraq's
capital and paving the way for a sustainable transition to Iraqi
control and responsibility.
WHAT IF? WHAT NEXT?
Sound military planning requires considering ``branches and
sequels'': How to handle contingencies that are likely to arise during
the course of operations, and how to prepare for subsequent operations
when the current one has been completed. The consideration of enemy
courses of action above included a number of likely branches to handle
possible contingencies. The most probable branches include:
1. Deploying Reserve Forces into neighborhoods not being
cleared as enemy groups attempt to attack more vulnerable
targets;
2. Restricting movement between Baghdad and either Anbar or
Diyala or both, in order to prevent insurgents from shifting
their bases;
3. Deploying Reserves in areas of Baghdad being cleared to
overcome unexpected resistance;
4. Deploying significant Reserve Forces either to Anbar,
Diyala, or elsewhere in response to enemy efforts to launch
attacks outside of the capital;
5. Reinforcing security for high-profile targets (both people
and structures) in Baghdad, the north, and the Shia areas to
the south.
Less probable branches include:
1. Sealing Sadr City off either from the rest of Baghdad or
from Diyala;
2. Attacking into Sadr City in the event of an unplanned
major confrontation with Shiite militias (although this plan
stresses the desirability of avoiding such a confrontation as
much as possible);
3. Conducting operations against the Badr Corps in southern
Iraq in the event of a major confrontation with SCIRI. (Again,
this can result only from great misfortune or ineptitude on the
part of the coalition, since its aim should be to avoid such a
confrontation.)
Executing the more probable branches requires having a significant
Reserve ready and stationed within Iraq. Forces in Kuwait, let alone
the United States, are too far away to respond rapidly to most of the
likely contingencies. If commanders deploy only the force necessary to
conduct the clearing operation, optimistically assuming that the enemy
will not react or adapt to the clear-and-hold operation, they would be
pursuing an irresponsible and dangerous policy.
The operation to clear and hold the center of Baghdad is only the
beginning of a larger effort to pacify Iraq. It is difficult to predict
with any precision what operations would be necessary upon the
conclusion of this one, particularly since clearing and holding the
center of Baghdad would transform not only the security but also the
political situation in the country. Some sequels are very likely to be
necessary, however:
1. Bringing Sadr City under control (see below);
2. Redeploying forces from Baghdad to clear and hold Anbar,
beginning with Ramadi and Fallujah and then expanding up the
Euphrates and out to the Syrian border;
3. Moving forces from Baghdad up the Diyala to Baquba and
clearing that area;
4. Reinforcing security in the north, particularly in Ninawa,
including Mosul.
It is possible that the successful clearing of central Baghdad will
leave Moqtada al-Sadr and the Jaysh al-Mahdi still defiantly in control
of Sadr City. If that is the case, then U.S. and Iraqi forces will have
to clear that Shiite stronghold by force and disarm the militia. It is
also possible, however, that the clear-and-hold operation in central
Baghdad will weaken Sadr's power base in Sadr City and support a
predominantly political solution to that problem. The sectarian
violence now raging in Baghdad is one of the most powerful recruiting
tools for the Jaysh al-Mahdi, and one of its most potent overt
justifications. If that violence is dramatically reduced, it is likely
that some Jaysh al-Mahdi fighters will begin to fall away from the
group, reducing Sadr's leverage within the Shiite community and within
Iraq as a whole. Such a weakening might well induce him and many of his
followers to enter the political fold wholeheartedly rather than
halfheartedly, as they have so far done. The United States must be
clear, though, that the elimination of the Jaysh al-Mahdi as an
effective fighting force in Baghdad, either through negotiation or by
force, is the essential next step after the clearing of the central
areas of the city.
The sequence of these operations matters a great deal. The
persistence of the Sunni insurgency justifies the strength of the
Shiite militias and continues Maliki's dependence upon them. If the
United States insists on attacking Sadr and his supporters first,
Maliki and the Iraqi Government will have no leverage with him or
justification for permitting that attack, which will look like American
support to the Sunni insurgency. If, instead, the coalition begins by
clearing and holding Sunni and mixed Sunni-Shiite neighborhoods in
Baghdad, as well as conducting more aggressive operations in Anbar, the
United States and the Iraqi Government will show that they are
determined to suppress the Sunni insurgency and to protect both Sunnis
and Shiites. That demonstration will make subsequent operations against
Shiite militias much more politically palatable in Iraq. Eliminating
the raging Sunni insurgency will also eliminate the ostensible
justification for those militias, liberating Maliki to support their
disarmament. The challenges in Iraq are complex, but not an insoluble
puzzle if they are approached in the right order.
RECONSTRUCTION
Military operations alone cannot solve Iraq's problems. Any
complete solution must address a host of political, economic,
diplomatic, and social challenges as well as the security situation.
This proposal emphasizes the military portion of the solution because
it is urgent to bring the violence under control before it tears Iraq
apart completely. Subsequent phases and working groups will examine the
other aspects of the problem in much greater detail. Reconstruction
deserves consideration even at this early phase, even though it will be
addressed again in more detail.
Soldiers, whether American or Iraqi, moving through a neighborhood
to clear it inevitably do damage. Violence flares up, and innocent
people are invariably killed. Past experience shows that many
neighborhoods are willing to accept this price in the hope of having
security and peace thereafter, but it is important to provide them with
a more immediate and tangible compensation for the violence as well. In
addition, it is clear that high levels of unemployment in Iraq create a
pool of potential recruits for militias and violent organizations. The
lack of essential services in many neighborhoods also provides an
opportunity for more organized enemy groups such as militias to usurp
the government's traditional roles (the Hezbollah model).
For all of these reasons, therefore, every clear-and-hold operation
must be accompanied by an immediate reconstruction program. As military
commanders move into neighborhoods to establish security, they should
also reach out to local leaders to find out what essential services
must be restored quickly to permit a basic level of normal life to
resume. The military now encapsulates the most common list of essential
services in the abbreviation SWET: Sewage, water, electricity, and
trash removal. Most neighborhoods will require SWET packages to begin
operating, ideally within hours of the end of combat operations.
Managing this reconstruction effort is an enormous challenge, and
this phase of the report can only suggest some of the complexities
without offering detailed solutions. It is vital that the Iraqi people
associate the Iraqi Government with the reconstruction effort as much
as possible. Defeating the enemy's Hezbollah model requires getting
Iraqis accustomed to looking to their local and central government to
provide essential services. Even when the money and capability to
provide those services are coming from the coalition, therefore, it is
vital that the local inhabitants attribute the provision of the
services themselves to legitimate local leaders.
It is not possible, however, to conduct such efforts through the
Iraqi central government. The responsible ministries are often highly
corrupt and unable to perform their basic functions properly. Some of
the most important ``service'' ministries are controlled by Sadr and
his lieutenants--political figures whom the coalition emphatically does
not wish to legitimate or support. Few ministries actually have
connections to local government, moreover. Providing the ministries
with funds to conduct local reconstruction will most likely result in
strengthening the insurgency.
The American Government is not well organized to oversee extensive
reconstruction projects on a local level, however. Reconstruction
efforts to date have been disorganized. They have generated enormous
friction between responsible agencies, and they have had inadequate
results for the Iraqi people. Resolving these difficulties will require
a significant effort to reorganize the way the American Government does
business in such conflicts (an effort that we must undertake urgently,
since Iraq is not the first and will not be the last place the United
States will have to engage in reconstruction of one sort or another).
In the short term, however, the only organization capable of planning
and executing reconstruction projects in combat zones is the U.S.
military. The essential SWET programs, therefore, must be the
responsibility of local commanders. Those commanders will need
representatives from USAID, the State Department, the Department of
Agriculture, and other government agencies to advise them about
developing and executing their programs, but the responsibility and the
authority to dispense the necessary funds must lie with the commanders.
The absence of security has hampered reconstruction projects
throughout Iraq so far. Reports indicate that as much as 30 percent of
the resources designated for reconstruction projects has been diverted
to providing security for those projects. Insecurity raises the cost in
other ways as well, since local and international contractors and
employees demand higher wages and prices for operating in dangerous
areas. Establishing real security in central Baghdad and then
maintaining it with a large American troop presence will greatly
mitigate these problems, allowing a much higher proportion of
reconstruction funds to go to actually improving the lives of Iraqis
and encouraging them to reject violence.
It is not enough simply to restore essential services in cleared
neighborhoods, however. The American relationship with Iraq has been
deteriorating steadily over the past several months as U.S. leaders
have begun to chastise Maliki and other Iraqis for failing to contain
the violence and the militias on their own. The hectoring and insulting
tone that has entered this discourse is manifested in the notion of
``incentivizing'' the Iraqis to take responsibility for their own
security. Upon examination, however, it becomes clear that all the
incentives commonly suggested are negative: If the Iraqis do not disarm
the militias, then the United States will leave and abandon them to
genocide and civil war. This is not the way to encourage a desired
behavior or to maintain good relations with an ally.
The United States must develop a set of positive incentives to
encourage and reward Iraqis at all levels for taking the desired steps
toward pacifying their country. One such way would be to create a
second tier of reconstruction projects beyond SWET packages. As
commanders discuss with local leaders what essential services to
restore at the end of combat operations, they should also discuss what
reconstruction projects could dramatically increase quality of life in
the neighborhood thereafter. They should indicate that funds for those
projects will be released when the neighborhood fully complies with a
set of requirements to support coalition efforts to maintain peace:
Disarming remaining militias, turning over criminals, reporting
insurgent efforts to infiltrate the neighborhood again, warning
coalition forces about IEDs and imminent attacks, and so on. Any
neighborhood meeting these requirements would receive the Tier II
reconstruction package.
This approach would redress another problem with a reconstruction
program aimed only at restoring services in cleared areas: It allows
reconstruction to proceed in neighborhoods that were stable to begin
with. Giving SWET packages exclusively to cleared areas, in effect,
rewards bad neighborhoods and punishes good ones. A Tier II package
could go to any neighborhood in which basic security prevails and the
inhabitants of which comply with the requirements of the program. Since
the initial focus of operations in Baghdad would be on Sunni and mixed
neighborhoods, a Tier II program would also help to ensure that
Baghdad's Shiites received tangible benefits from the operation as
well.
In addition to these programmed reconstruction activities, Congress
should also fund the Commander's Emergency Response Program at a high
level. This program has proven invaluable since the start of the
insurgency because it allows local commanders to allocate resources on
the spot to critical reconstruction efforts as the need for them
arises. It gives commanders necessary flexibility and allows them to
target funds to projects that directly support ongoing operations or
forestall impending crises.
MAKING THE FORCES AVAILABLE
This plan requires the deployment to Iraq of an additional five
Army BCTs and two Marine RCTs. Any lesser force will entail a much
greater risk of failure. The strain on the Army and Marines of
maintaining even the current level of forces in Iraq is well-known, and
this proposal does not underestimate the challenge of generating
additional forces for the 18-24 months required by this plan. It is,
however, possible to do so within the constraints of the All-Volunteer
Force.
There are currently 13 Army BCTs and 2 Marine RCTs in Iraq. The
Army and Marines have already developed their plans for rotating fresh
units into the country over the course of 2007, and they are as
follows:
One BCT and two RCTs are scheduled to deploy to Iraq in the
first quarter.
Four BCTs will deploy in the second quarter.
Six BCTs will deploy in the third quarter.
One BCT and two RCTs will deploy in the fourth quarter.
Since the aim of this force generation model has been to maintain a
steady state of 15 brigades and regiments in Iraq, the Pentagon has
planned to remove the same number of units from Iraq as are sent in. In
place of this approach, this plan proposes to extend the tours of most
Army BCTs now in Iraq from 12 months to 15 months, and of the Marine
RCTs from 7 months to 12 months. This plan also proposes to accelerate
the deployment of the four BCTs scheduled to enter Iraq in the second
quarter so that they arrive instead in March. These changes in the
deployment schedule would produce a surge of two Marine RCTs and five
Army BCTs in the first quarter and sustain it throughout 2007, using
only Active-Duty Forces already scheduled to deploy to Iraq in that
year.
Sustaining such a large presence through 2008, which is probably
necessary, requires mobilizing about six National Guard brigades that
are not currently scheduled to deploy. The President has the legal
authority to make such a callup, but Pentagon policy has, hitherto,
been to avoid using so many National Guard brigades in Iraq in 2008.
The proposed deployment plan would require a change in Pentagon policy,
but not additional congressional authorization. Even though these
brigades would not deploy until well into 2008 (and into a much more
benign security environment than the active units now in Iraq face),
the military must begin to alert and prepare them right now. Adopting
the plan proposed in this report requires changing Pentagon policy
immediately to grant the chief of staff of the Army full access to the
National Guard and Reserve.
Extending the tours of units and mobilizing the National Guard and
Reserve will place a greater strain on soldiers and their families. If
there were any option that did not threaten to place an unbearable
burden on the military, other than the defeat of the United States,
this plan would propose it. Maintaining anything like the current
course will continue to strain the military badly and will also lead to
failure. Withdrawing forces now will accelerate defeat, violence, and
failure. It is worth considering in some detail what that failure would
look like.
It is possible to surmise what will occur in Iraq when the U.S.
Armed Forces withdraw in the current environment on the basis of what
has happened in the past when U.S. forces have withdrawn prematurely
from areas in Iraq. Enemy groups round up Iraqis who collaborate with
Americans and their own government, then publicly torture and kill
these people, often along with their entire families. Death squads
commit horrific atrocities against one another but most often against
innocent civilians, leaving their mangled corpses on streets and in
yards. To many Americans watching from afar, these are just dead bodies
and evidence of failure. But to the soldiers preparing to withdraw,
they are people the United States has betrayed and abandoned to
horrible deaths.
As soldiers establish themselves in neighborhoods, they work hard
to gain the trust of the locals. That trust is essential in persuading
local leaders and citizens to provide critical information soldiers
need to identify and capture enemies, avoid ambushes and IEDs, and
perform almost any military mission. American soldiers and marines are
well aware of the reciprocal obligation they undertake to protect those
Iraqis who trust them enough to provide intelligence. One of the
greatest frustrations American soldiers are experiencing today is the
inability to fulfill that implicit promise.
American withdrawal from Iraq will be a searing and scarring
experience. U.S. soldiers will be forced to confront the results of
America's defeat on the most personal level. Terrorists will videotape
death squads operating with American troops stacking arms in the
background. Al Jazeera and other Muslim media outlets will play the
tapes endlessly, accompanied by claims that the Americans were
committing or abetting the atrocities. The process of such a defeat
will demoralize the Army and Marines far more dramatically and
permanently than asking brigades to serve a few additional months in
the course of a successful operation that brings the United States
closer to victory. The strain on the Army and Marines is very real and
a serious concern, but it is not correctable with any simple solution--
not even immediate withdrawal.
The President has already embraced an essential element of the
longer term solution for the strain, however: Increasing the end-
strength of the ground forces. It has been clear for some time that the
Active-Duty Army and Marines were too small for the challenges they
face in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the world. The President's call
for enlarging them comes not a moment too soon.
For some time now, skeptics of such enlargement have argued that it
would not be possible to recruit more soldiers in time of war into the
volunteer force, but recruiting does not appear to be the factor
limiting the expansion of the ground forces. Instead, the ability of
the training base to accept new recruits and give them basic soldier
skills before sending them to their units regulates the pace of
expanding the Army and the Marines. Part of the problem is that the
training base is not expansible and has not been prepared for a serious
effort to build the sort of ground forces the nation needs in this time
of crisis. That inadequacy must also change. In addition to making a
national call for young people to serve in the military, the President
must also make a priority of expanding the ground forces training base
as quickly as possible to permit a more rapid expansion of the Army and
Marines. Current estimates suggest that the Army could grow by only
about 7,000 soldiers per year for the next few years. That figure is
wholly inadequate. Many estimates of the appropriate size of the active
Army suggest that the United States needs at least 50,000 more
soldiers--or even more. The United States cannot wait 5 years to
achieve this necessary increase in end-strength. The Secretary of
Defense must make it a priority to create the capability to expand the
Army much more rapidly, and the United States should maintain that
capability indefinitely to avoid finding the country again unable to
add forces rapidly in wartime in the future.
The most serious challenge in accelerating the deployment of
brigades scheduled to enter Iraq this year, however, has nothing to do
with the number of people in the Armed Forces. The Army and Marines
have worn out their equipment. Tanks, Bradleys, and Humvees are not
designed to drive thousands of miles a year, but they have been doing
so for years in extremely harsh conditions. News reports indicate that
many units in the Army are at low levels of readiness because they do
not have enough functioning equipment to take to the field. Units
regularly swap equipment with one another as they prepare to deploy.
Sometimes soldiers getting ready to move to Iraq do not receive the
equipment they need until a few weeks before they start their
deployment.
Congress has recognized this problem and has appropriated funds to
``reset'' the Army and Marines--primarily by buying or repairing the
necessary equipment. But even recent increases in these appropriations
have not brought America's military industry to anything like full
mobilization. Army depots are operating far below their maximum
capability despite this equipment crisis. This situation is
unacceptable. The Department of Defense must request and Congress
should authorize an additional significant increase in funds for
reequipping the military, and all available military industrial
resources should be brought to bear on this challenge as rapidly as
possible.
Many of the proposals in this section can be summed up briefly: The
Nation must be put on a war footing. That does not mean a return to the
draft. It is possible and necessary to maintain a volunteer military
while fighting this war and beyond. It does, however, mean abandoning
peacetime bureaucratic routines within the Pentagon and throughout the
defense establishment. It means that the President must issue a call to
arms. It means that Congress must provide the necessary financial
support. It means that everyone involved in the defense of the Nation
must make supporting the troops fighting this war the number one
priority. It is disgraceful that the Nation has not been placed on a
war footing even this far into such an important conflict, but it is
essential to transform this state of affairs if the United States is to
conduct the operations necessary to avoid imminent defeat and pursue
victory.
OTHER PROPOSALS AND THEIR CHALLENGES
There are a number of other proposals for resolving the crisis in
Iraq, most of which fall into one or more of the following categories:
Train Iraqi forces and transition more rapidly to full Iraqi
control (the current U.S. military strategy).
Increase the training of Iraqi forces and engage Iraq's
neighbors to reduce the violence (the core of the Iraq Study
Group report).
Partition Iraq (Senator Joseph Biden's [D-Del.] proposal).
Withdraw U.S. forces immediately (House Speaker Nancy Pelosi
(D-Calif.] and Senator Carl Levin's [D-Mich.] suggestion).
None of these proposals offers any prospect for success in Iraq;
all, in fact, make defeat and regional war far more likely.
Train and Transition
This is the current U.S. military strategy as outlined repeatedly
by MNF-I commander, GEN George Casey. This approach is at odds with the
``clear-hold-build'' strategy outlined by Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice and President George W. Bush more than a year ago. The
American Military command has never tried to implement clear-hold-build
because it has never given U.S. forces in Iraq the mission of providing
security to the Iraqi people. MNF-I has instead focused on training
Iraqi forces and has used its mobile units reactively to regain control
of insurgent strongholds. The exceptions to this principle proved the
rule: Operations Together Forward I and II used American forces to
clear neighborhoods, but sought to rely exclusively on Iraqis to hold
them afterward--the main reason for the failure of those operations.
The creation of a trained Iraqi Army of more than 130,000 soldiers
in just a few years starting from scratch has been an amazing
accomplishment. The determination of Iraqi soldiers, who put their
lives on the line just to enlist in an environment in which terrorists
regularly target recruiting stations, is astonishing. But as the
capabilities of the Iraqi Army have steadily increased, the sectarian
violence has increased even faster. Unless the United States takes
action to bring the violence down to a level at which the growing Iraqi
Security Forces can control it, then the violence will ultimately
destroy those security forces as well. Although MNF-I has repeatedly
published maps of Iraq with expanding areas of green, denoting regions
that have been ``transitioned'' to Iraqi control, these graphics and
metrics do not correctly indicate whether the United States is
succeeding or failing in Iraq. Despite these transitions, the United
States is on a glide-path to defeat and not victory. The current
strategy has clearly failed and must be replaced quickly.
Train and Negotiate
The Iraq Study Group (ISG) proposed to increase the number of
embedded trainers, eliminate almost all other U.S. combat forces in
Iraq, and negotiate with Iran and Syria to control the violence. This
report has already considered why simply embedding more soldiers with
Iraqi units is not likely to increase the capability of the Iraqi Army
rapidly and may even slow down its improvement by removing
opportunities for the Iraqis to conduct operations together with
America's outstanding soldiers and marines. The ISG report also ignores
the significant delay before new Iraqi forces can take the field, even
with accelerated training. What will happen to the insurgency and
violence in that time? Clearly it will continue to grow. Very likely it
will rapidly grow beyond the point at which any plausible increase in
Iraqi forces' capabilities could control it.
The ISG counters by proposing that the United States and the Iraqi
Government open negotiations with Iran and Syria in an effort to
persuade them to contain the growing sectarian violence. It is beyond
the scope of this report to consider whether the Iranians or Syrians
are likely to be helpful in such negotiations, but there is no reason
to imagine that they could control the violence in Iraq even if they
wished to.
Iran provides Shiite groups of all varieties with weapons,
expertise, advice, and money. Syria tacitly permits the movement of
insurgents across its borders. This assistance to the rebels increases
the overall level of violence in Iraq, as well as the lethality of
certain insurgent attacks. But could the Iranians and the Syrians turn
the violence off?
To begin with, there is ample evidence that the various
insurgencies in Iraq have developed their own multifarious sources of
funding, mostly resulting from criminal activities and corruption that
they siphon off for their own purposes. They also have an ample stock
of high explosives: Saddam Hussein packed his country with ammunition
warehouses for more than a decade. As one observer put it: ``There's
enough high explosives in Iraq now to maintain the current level of
violence for a thousand years.'' If the Iranians cut off their
supplies, the insurgents would still be able to fund their enterprises.
They would still have the wherewithal to make IEDs and car bombs, and
they would still recruit suicide bombers. Outside sources of assistance
help them, but the withdrawal of those resources would not stop them.
Could the Iranians order SCIRI or the Jaysh al-Mahdi to stop their
attacks? It is extremely unlikely. To begin with, although SCIRI and
Jaysh al-Mahdi are Shiites, they are Arabs, not Persians. It will
always be difficult for Iraqi Shiites to obey explicit instructions
from Iranians for cultural reasons. But, above all, the escalating
violence in Iraq results less from Iranian encouragement than from the
internal dynamics of Iraq itself.
The Shiite community in Iraq remained remarkably quiescent under
increasing Sunni attacks through 2004 and 2005, despite rapidly growing
tensions between Iran and the United States. The explosion in sectarian
violence followed the bombing of the Samarra mosque. The recruiting and
propaganda of Shiite groups relies heavily on portraying them as
defenders of the Shiite people against Sunni assaults. It is difficult
to imagine how they would explain abandoning their fight in the face of
continuing Sunni attacks simply because the Iranians tell them to do
so. The vigilante groups that are in some respects the most worrisome
manifestation of the nascent civil war will not listen to the Iranians
at all. These are mostly local, self-organized groups aimed at
preventing and avenging attacks on their communities. The only way to
bring such groups under control is to establish security, thereby
removing their only real reason for being.
And who could bring the Sunni Arab insurgents under control? Syria,
still less Iran, does not control al-Qaeda in Iraq or Ansar al-Sunna.
Such groups take orders from no state and cannot be made to stop their
activities by a diktat from Damascus or Tehran. The Baathists are no
more likely to stop their fighting simply because the Syrians intervene
with them. To begin with, the Baathists are Iraqi nationalists,
unlikely to take orders from foreign regimes. Neither are they
organized into a neat hierarchical system that would facilitate Syrian
discussions with them. When the United States destroyed the Iraqi
Baathist state in 2003, it also destroyed the political and some of the
social hierarchy in the Sunni Arab community. The lack of a clear
hierarchy that controls its followers has severely hindered the U.S.
ability to negotiate with the insurgents during its attempts to do so
and will limit the Syrians no less.
The problem with relying on Iraq's neighbors to control the
violence is less that they will not do so than that they cannot. This
approach is a blind alley that will lead nowhere because it
misrepresents the fundamental nature of the problem in Iraq.
Partition Iraq
This approach takes as its basis the assumption that Iraq naturally
falls into three parts. Supporters of it usually point to one of two
mutually contradictory facts: Iraq has three main social groups (Sunni
Arabs, Shiites, and Kurds), and the Iraqi state was formed in 1921 from
three Ottoman vilayets or administrative districts. Iraq, advocates of
this view say, is an artificial creation that would be more stable if
we allowed it to fall back into its natural, trinary form.
To begin with, the fact that the Ottoman Empire chose to rule what
is now Iraq via three administrative districts does not make the
present Iraqi state an artificial creation. On the contrary, from
prehistoric times the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers and the land between
them have formed a single community, often composed of multiple
ethnicities and religions but functioning as an economic and often
political unit.
Ottoman administrative practice should not convince modern
observers that Iraq is by nature a tripartite state. The Ottomans did
not align territory according to modern concepts of national self-
determination. They divided and conquered, as did most other empires.
The notion of some preindependence Iraqi system in which each social
group controlled its own area in peace is a myth. Any such tripartite
structure would itself be an artificial innovation with no historical
basis.
The Ottoman vilayets (of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra) were not
themselves homogeneous ethnic or sectarian groupings. Mosul, Baghdad,
Baquba, and Kirkuk, four of Iraq's principal cities, have long been
mixed at both the metropolitan and the neighborhood level.
Even now, a high proportion of Iraqis live in mixed communities.
Partitioning the country could only result from the migration of
millions of people. Many would resist. Bloodbaths would ensue. When
this process occurred in the Balkans in the 1990s the international
community called it ``ethnic cleansing'' and ``genocide.'' It is
difficult to imagine how the United States and the international
community could now accept and even propose a solution that they
rightly condemned not a decade ago.
These principled considerations parallel practical concerns. Who
would get Baghdad? The capital is now mixed between Sunni and Shia.
Depriving one group of that city and giving it to another would create
an obvious sense of victory and defeat between the groups--not
something that bodes well for subsequent stability. If the
international community sought to divide Baghdad, where would it draw
the line? The Tigris seems an obvious choice, but it has already become
impossible. There are many Sunnis living east of the river and many
Shiites living to the west. Jaysh al-Mahdi fighters are working hard to
seize more territory on the West Bank and drive the Sunnis farther out.
If the United States allows this process to continue, as advocates of
partition suggest, America will de facto be giving Baghdad to the
Shiites at the cost of the dislocation of 2 or 3 million Sunnis. Again,
this is a process that can only come at the price of hideous suffering
and death. Last, there is the problem of oil. The Kurds have oil
fields. The Shiites have oil fields. The Sunni Arabs do not. Fear of
the loss of oil revenue is one factor driving the Sunni insurgency now.
Partitioning Iraq would make that fear a permanent reality. Why would
the Sunnis stop fighting? They would not. Partition is not only a
historical abomination and an invitation for sectarian cleansing and
genocide on a vast scale--it is also a recipe for perpetual conflict in
Mesopotamia.
Iraq does not break down cleanly into Kurdish, Shia, or Sunni Arab
areas either demographically or historically. Rather, within these
broad categories there are serious fissures and rivalries which have
been exploited by overlords (Ottoman, British, and Iraqi) to maintain
central control. These rivalries will not disappear by a simple ethnic
or sectarian realignment or oil-sharing scheme. Shia factions will war
with each other, and Shia violence could spill into other Arab Shia
tribes in the region. Sunni tribal forces, urban Baathists, Islamic
radicals, and other interested states will not allow a peaceful Sunni
heartland to be established, even if they could somehow be reconciled
to a strip of the upper Euphrates and the Anbar desert. The integration
of Kurds into this realignment, and the minority populations that live
in Kurdish areas, is far more complicated than most observers
recognize, starting with the fact that there are two rival Kurdish
parties now, reflecting important linguistic and tribal distinctions.
Considering the presence of large numbers of Turkmen, Yazidi, and other
minority groups in the lands that a partition would give to Kurdistan
presents another set of problems that partitioning will only
exacerbate.
Withdrawal
Advocates of immediate withdrawal fall into a number of camps. Some
propose pulling American forces out of Iraq because they opposed the
war to begin with. Others argue that we have already lost and that
further efforts to turn the tide are useless. Still others claim that
American interests would be better served by withdrawing to other parts
of region--or withdrawing from the region altogether. Slightly more
sophisticated advocates of this plan argue that the American presence
in Iraq is an irritant and permits a sort of laziness on the part of
the Iraqi Government. Consequently, they say, a U.S. withdrawal would
both reduce the violence and force the Iraqis to contribute more
effectively. Many of these arguments are irrelevant or invalid. All
face a challenge that advocates have an obligation to answer: What will
happen in Iraq and in the region following a withdrawal of U.S. forces,
and why will that be better for America than attempting to win?
The War Was Wrong From the Beginning. This argument for withdrawal
is without any logical foundation. Whatever the wisdom or folly of the
initial decision to invade Iraq in 2003, the problems the United States
faces there now are real and imminent. The lives of millions of people
literally hang in the balance in a country poised on the brink of full-
scale civil war. The issues at stake are far too important to allow
resentment at an earlier decision to prevent a rational assessment of
the best course of action today. America has a responsibility to pursue
its own interests in Iraq, and those interests require establishing
security and a legitimate government. And America has an obligation to
the Iraqi people that it would be immoral and reprehensible to ignore.
The War Is Already Lost. The war is not lost. The legitimate,
elected Iraqi Government remains stable and commands the support of the
majority of the Iraqi people. The Armed Forces of Iraq are at their
posts, training and fighting every day. The levels of violence in Iraq
per capita are far lower than those of Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s,
and the United States was able to contain those conflicts. By any
measure, victory in Iraq is still possible if the United States has the
will and the skill to seek it.
Those who disagree with this assessment still have an obligation,
moreover, to propose a positive strategy for moving forward. Accepting
defeat might solve an immediate problem, but international politics
will not stop when we have done so. What will happen in Iraq? What will
happen in the region? What will the United States have to do? Will that
situation actually be better or worse than attempting to fight through
a difficult time now? Advocating immediate withdrawal without answering
these questions persuasively and in detail is irresponsible.
Many who prefer immediate withdrawal implicitly or explicitly
believe that the United States can find a ``soft landing'' that will
contain the violence and prevent it from spreading throughout the
region. After all, no sensible and responsible person could advocate an
approach that would ignite the entire Middle East in full-scale
sectarian war. A forthcoming study from the Saban Center for Middle
East Policy at the Brookings Institute, whose interim findings have
been publicly presented, casts serious doubt on the likelihood of any
``soft landing,'' however. The study's codirector, Kenneth Pollack,
argues that the history of civil wars strongly suggests that the Iraq
conflict will spill over onto Iraq's neighbors on a large scale. It is
highly likely not only to involve them in Iraq's struggles, but to
ignite secondary civil wars within those states that may spread even
further. He argues that there is no natural checking mechanism that
would build up any sort of resistance to this conflict spreading. On
the contrary, refugee flows from Iraq are already changing the
demographics of the region and will continue to do so. Refugees will
appeal to similar ethnic and sectarian groups in their new host
countries to involve themselves in the larger struggle. War will
spread, involving American interests and allies. It is nearly certain
that the United States will find itself reengaging in the Middle East
on far worse terms than it now faces. Withdrawal promises at best a
partial relief from the immediate pain at the expense of far worse
suffering for years to come.
The United States Could Accomplish Its Regional Goals Better by
Leaving. Various attempts at sophisticated argumentation claim that
America could best regain its lost leverage in the Middle East by
pulling back from Iraq and focusing on other issues. Again, advocates
of this approach rarely consider the likely consequences of withdrawal
and how the prospects of regional war will probably destroy any
leverage the United States might hypothetically gain. They ignore
completely, moreover, the fact that America's defeat in Iraq will
destroy its credibility in the region and around the world for years to
come.
When the United States first invaded Iraq in 2003, the Iranian
regime was clearly frightened. It responded to that fear by lying low
and reducing the level of tension with the West. By mid-2004, Tehran
had decided that the United States was bogged down in a war it was
losing. The Iranians seized that opportunity to move forward
aggressively with their nuclear program despite international
opposition, to court conflict with the United States, and to increase
support for Shiite militias in Iraq. What will happen if the United
States withdraws from Iraq and abandons that country to chaos? The
likeliest outcome is that Iran will seek and possibly achieve hegemony
in the region. Iran is by far the largest and strongest state in the
Middle East, even without nuclear weapons. The creation of a power
vacuum on its western frontier would make it stronger still. With
neither a strong Iraqi nor an American presence, Tehran's writ would
run throughout the gulf region virtually unopposed. It is very
difficult to see how such an outcome restores any degree of leverage in
the Middle East to a defeated United States.
The American Presence in Iraq Is the Problem. This argument is
simply untrue. There are two simple tests to apply: How has the pattern
of violence in Iraq correlated with the size of American forces, and
whom are the insurgents attacking? If the irritating presence of
American soldiers were the primary cause of violence in Iraq, then more
American troops should lead to more violence and fewer troops would
produce less violence. In fact, the opposite has been the case. When
the United States has increased force levels in Iraq in the past in
order to provide security for elections and the constitutional
referendum, violence dropped significantly. When U.S. forces cleared
Tall Afar, Mosul, and Sadr City in 2004, violence dropped. As MNF-I has
attempted to reduce the American presence in Iraq prematurely, violence
has increased. Correlating American presence with violence does not
suggest that American forces are the problem, but rather that they are
part of the solution.
The idea that American troops are the irritant in Iraq does not
explain the fact that attacks by Iraqis on other Iraqis are steadily
increasing. If the American troop presence is causing the bloodshed,
why are Iraqis killing each other, rather than coalition forces, in
growing numbers? This explanation also suffers from the fact that
repeated anecdotes reveal that many Iraqis prefer to see American
troops rather than Iraqi police. Sunnis in Baghdad warn each other that
they should trust Iraqi Government forces only when they are
accompanied by American soldiers. It is difficult to see in such
examples proof of the theorem that the U.S. presence is the source of
the problem, still less that removing U.S. forces would lead to peace.
CONCLUSION
America faces a serious challenge in Iraq today, and there are no
simple or easy solutions. The proposal described in this report is only
the essential first step on a long road. Successful counterinsurgency
strategy requires a skillful blend of military, political, economic,
diplomatic, and social initiatives. Although attempts to suppress
rebellions through brute force have succeeded in the past on occasion,
the methods required to implement them are repugnant to Americans and
have rightly been rejected. The emphasis on military power in this
proposal does not come from any belief that such power can bring
success on its own. On the contrary, the successive phases of this
project will examine various aspects of training the Iraqi Security
Forces, transitioning to Iraqi governmental control, and other
political, economic, and diplomatic developments that are essential
components of any successful strategy.
But there is no prospect for any positive developments in Iraq
today until the security situation is brought under control. Political
processes cannot resolve, absorb, or control communal and terrorist
violence at the current levels. Economic development cannot even begin
in earnest amidst such bloodshed. Diplomatic approaches cannot resolve
a conflict that is driven by internal factors. The top priority of
American strategy in Iraq today must be to secure the population and
bring the violence under control. Making political progress of any sort
a precondition for the start of such an operation will virtually ensure
failure and defeat.
There is risk in any military operation, and America and the Iraqi
Government and people face a number of clever and determined enemies.
The United States has consistently underestimated the skill and
capability of these enemies and relied on overly optimistic assumptions
about what would happen in Iraq. It is time to accept reality. The
fight in Iraq is difficult. The enemy will work hard to defeat the
coalition and the Iraqi Government. Things will not go according to
plan. The coalition and the Iraqi Government may fail. But failure is
neither inevitable nor tolerable, and so the United States must
redouble its efforts to succeed. America must adopt a new strategy
based more firmly on successful counterinsurgency practices, and the
Nation must provide its commanders with the troops they need to execute
that strategy in the face of a thinking enemy. The enemy has been at
war with us for nearly 4 years. The United States has emphasized
restraint and caution. It is time for America to go to war and win. And
America can.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. Kagan.
Dr. Carpenter.
STATEMENT OF DR. TED GALEN CARPENTER, VICE PRESIDENT OF DEFENSE
AND FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES, CATO INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Carpenter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank
the committee for the invitation to offer my views this
afternoon.
I have provided a longer written statement, and I would
request that that be included in the record.
The Chairman. In the case of all of you, if you have a
written statement that exceeded or was different than what your
verbal testimony is, that'll be included in the record.
Dr. Carpenter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Optimism about the United States mission in Iraq has faded
dramatically in the past few months. The bipartisan Iraq Study
Group accurately concluded that the situation was, ``grave and
deteriorating.'' The Pentagon's report to Congress in November
2006 paints a similarly dismal picture, with attacks on United
States troops, Iraqi security forces, and Iraqi civilians all
at record levels. Yet, proponents of the war refuse to admit
what is increasingly obvious: That Washington's Iraq occupation
and democratization mission is failing and there is little
realistic prospect that its fortunes will improve. Something
much more dramatic than a modest course correction is needed.
It is essential to ask the administration and its
supporters at what point they will admit that the costs of this
venture have become unbearable. How much longer are they
willing to have our troops stay in Iraq? Two years? Five years?
Ten years? How many more tax dollars are they willing to pour
into Iraq? Another $300 billion? $600 billion? One trillion?
And, most crucial of all, how many more American lives are they
willing to sacrifice? Two thousand? Five thousand? Ten
thousand? It is time for the supporters of the war to be
specific.
Proponents of the mission avoid addressing such unpleasant
questions. Instead, they act as though victory in Iraq can be
achieved merely through the exercise of willpower, that we can
simply choose victory.
Whether or not one describes it as a civil war, the
security situation in Iraq is extraordinarily violent and
chaotic. Moreover, the nature of the violence has shifted, with
the principal component now sectarian strife between Sunnis and
Shiites. The Iraq Study Group noted that 4 of Iraq's 18
provinces are, ``highly insecure.'' And those provinces account
for 40 percent of the country's population.
A November 2006 U.N. report highlights the extent of the
growing bloodshed. The carnage is now running at at least 120
victims each day. We must remember, this is occurring in a
country of barely 26 million people. A comparable pace in the
United States would be a horrifying 1,400 deaths per day, or
nearly 500,000 a year. If political violence were consuming
that many American lives, there would be little debate about
whether the United States was in a civil war.
In addition to the growing violence, there is mounting
evidence that the majority of Iraqis no longer want United
States troops in their country. The bottom line is that the
United States is mired in a country that is already in the
early stages of an exceedingly complex multisided civil war,
and this is not just a war between Sunnis and Shia, this is a
war with multiple factions, including internal conflicts among
the various sects. It is also a situation where all significant
factions, save one--the Kurds--want American troops to leave.
That is an untenable situation.
Increasing the number of United States troops in Iraq by
21,000 or so is a futile attempt to salvage a mission that has
gone terribly wrong. It would merely increase the number of
casualties, both American and Iraqi, over the short term, while
having little long-term impact on the security environment.
Moreover, the magnitude of the proposed buildup falls far short
of the numbers needed to give the occupation forces a realistic
prospect of suppressing the violence. Experts on
counterinsurgency, for many, many years, have consistently
concluded that at least 10 soldiers per 1,000 population are
required to have a sufficient impact. And, indeed, many experts
have argued that, in cases where armed resistance is intense
and pervasive, which certainly seems to apply to Iraq,
deployments of 20 soldiers per 1,000 may be needed. Given
Iraq's population of 26 million, such a mission would require
the deployment of at least 260,000 ground forces, and probably
as many as 520,000. We simply don't have the troops for that
kind of mission.
A limited surge of additional troops is the latest illusory
panacea offered by the people who brought us the Iraq quagmire
in the first place. It is an idea that should be rejected, and,
instead, the United States needs to withdraw from Iraq.
Proponents of staying in Iraq offer several reasons why a
prompt withdrawal would be bad for the United States. They
argue that al-Qaeda's 1,300 fighters will somehow take over
Iraq, that a United States withdrawal will embolden Islamic
radicals worldwide, that a withdrawal will lead to a regional
Sunni-Shiite proxy war, and that leaving Iraq without achieving
our goals would betray a moral obligation to the Iraqi people.
I deal with all of those allegations, at some length, in my
written statement. Suffice it to say here that those arguments
vary in terms of plausibility. Some, especially the notion that
al-Qaeda will be able to take over Iraq, are farfetched;
others, especially the concern about a regional proxy war, have
some validity. All of them, though, are ultimately deficient as
a reason for keeping United States troops in Iraq.
A decision to withdraw and leave Iraq to its own fate is
certainly not without adverse consequences. America's terrorist
adversaries will portray the pullout as a defeat for U.S.
policy. But staying on indefinitely in a dire and deteriorating
security environment is even worse for our country.
The costs, both tangible and intangible, of a prompt exit
must be measured against the costs of staying in Iraq.
Moreover, even if the United States absorbs the costs of a
prolonged mission, there is no realistic prospect that anything
resembling victory resides at the end of that effort. Indeed,
most of the indicators suggest that we would be merely delaying
the inevitable.
The intangible costs are already considerable. America's
reputation in the Muslim world is at its lowest level in
history, largely because of the Iraq mission. America's
reputation elsewhere in the world, including among longstanding
allies and friends, has, likewise, taken a major hit. The All-
Volunteer Force has been strained to the breaking point, and
the social wounds that the Vietnam war inflicted on our
society, which took so long to heal, have been ripped open. Our
country is, once again, bitterly divided over a murky war. The
longer we stay in Iraq, the worse all of those problems will
become.
The tangible costs are even more depressing. The financial
tab for the Iraq mission is already some $350 billion, and the
meter is running at approximately $8 billion a month, and that
is before the President's new escalation. Furthermore, even
those appalling figures do not take into account substantial
indirect costs, such as the expense of long-term care for
wounded Iraq war veterans.
The United States needs to adopt a decisive withdrawal
strategy, measured in months, not years. A longer schedule
would simply prolong the agony. Emotionally, deciding to leave
under current conditions will not be easy, for it requires an
implicit admission that Washington has failed in its ambitious
goal to create a stable, united, democratic secular Iraq that
would be a model for peace throughout the Middle East. But that
goal was unrealistic, from the outset. It is difficult for any
nation, and especially the American superpower, to admit
failure. However, it is better to admit failure while the
adverse consequences are manageable. Failure in Iraq would be a
setback for the United States, particularly in terms of global
clout and credibility, but one of the advantages to being a
superpower is that the country can absorb a setback without
experiencing catastrophic damages to its core interests or
capabilities. Failure in Iraq does not even come close to
threatening those core interests and capabilities. Most
important, a withdrawal now will be less painful than
withdrawing years from now, when the cost in blood, treasure,
and credibility will be even greater.
The withdrawal needs to be comprehensive, not partial. The
only troops remaining in Iraq should be a modest number of
special forces personnel who would work with political factions
to eradicate the al-Qaeda interlopers in their country. It must
be clear to Iraqis and to populations throughout the Muslim
world that Washington has no intention of trying to maintain a
military presence in Iraq. That has already become a lightning
rod for the Muslim world. Above all, United States policymakers
need to absorb the larger lesson of the Iraq debacle. Launching
an elective war in pursuit of a nation-building fantasy was an
act of folly. It is a folly that policymakers should vow never
to repeat.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Carpenter follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Ted Galen Carpenter, Vice President of
Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute, Washington, DC
Optimism about the U.S. mission in Iraq has faded dramatically in
the past few months. The bipartisan Iraq Study Group conceded that the
situation in Iraq was ``grave and deteriorating.'' The Pentagon's
report to Congress in November 2006 paints a similarly dismal picture,
with attacks on U.S. troops, Iraqi security forces, and Iraqi civilians
at record levels.
Yet proponents of the war refuse to admit what is becoming
increasingly obvious: Washington's Iraq occupation and democratization
mission is failing, and there is little realistic prospect that its
fortunes will improve. Something much more dramatic than a modest
course correction is needed.
It is essential to ask the administration and its hawkish backers
at what point they will admit that the costs of this venture have
become unbearable. How much longer are they willing to have our troops
stay in Iraq? Five years? Ten years? Twenty years? How many more tax
dollars are they willing to pour into Iraq? Another $300 billion? $600
billion? $1 trillion? And most crucial of all, how many more American
lives are they willing to sacrifice? Two thousand? Five thousand? Ten
thousand?
Proponents of the mission avoid addressing such unpleasant
questions. Instead, they act as though victory in Iraq can be achieved
merely through the exercise of will power.
THE DIRE SECURITY SITUATION IN IRAQ
Whether or not one describes it as a civil war, the security
situation in Iraq is extraordinarily violent and chaotic. Moreover, the
nature of the violence in that country has shifted since the February
2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra, one of Shia Islam's
holiest sites. The Sunni-led insurgency against United States and
British occupation forces and the security forces of the U.S.-sponsored
Iraqi Government is still a significant factor, but it is no longer the
dominant one. The turmoil now centers around sectarian violence between
Sunnis and Shiites. Baghdad is the epicenter of that strife, but it has
erupted in other parts of the country as well. The Iraq Study Group
noted that four of Iraq's 18 provinces are ``highly insecure.'' Those
provinces account for about 40 percent of the country's population.
A November 2006 U.N. report highlights the extent of the growing
bloodshed. The carnage is now running at approximately 120 victims each
day. This is occurring in a country of barely 26 million people. A
comparable pace in the United States would be a horrifying 1,400 deaths
per day--or nearly 500,000 per year. If violence between feuding
political or ethno-religious factions was consuming that many American
lives, there would be little debate about whether the United States was
experiencing a civil war.
In addition to the casualties in Iraq, there are other human costs.
The United Nations estimates that some 1.6 million people have been
displaced inside Iraq (i.e., they are ``internal refugees'') as a
result of the fighting. Another 1.8 million have fled the country
entirely, mostly to Jordan and Syria. Moreover, the pace of the exodus
is accelerating. Refugees are now leaving Iraq at the rate of nearly
3,000 a day. The bulk of those refugees are middle and upper class
families. Indeed, there are affluent neighborhoods in Baghdad and other
cities that now resemble ghost towns.
THE COMPLEX NATURE OF THE VIOLENCE
The mounting chaos in Iraq is not simply a case of Sunni-Shiite
sectarian violence, although that is the dominant theme. The Iraq Study
Group notes the complexity of Iraq's security turmoil. ``In Kirkuk, the
struggle is between Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen. In Basra and the south,
the violence is largely an intra-Shia struggle.'' Implicitly rejecting
the arguments of those who contend that the violence is primarily a
Sunni-Shia conflict confined to Baghdad, the members of the commission
point out that ``most of Iraq's cities have a sectarian mix and are
plagued by persistent violence. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki warns
that conflicts in the various regions could be ``Shiite versus Shiite
and Sunni versus Sunni.''
There is also mounting evidence that the majority of Iraqis no
longer want U.S. troops in their country. The bottom line is that the
United States is mired in a country that is already in the early stages
of an exceedingly complex, multisided civil war, and where all
significant factions save one (the Kurds) want American troops to
leave. That is an untenable situation.
ILLUSORY SOLUTION--SEND MORE TROOPS
Increasing the number of U.S. troops in Iraq by 20,000 or so is a
futile attempt to salvage a mission that has gone terribly wrong. In
all likelihood, it would merely increase the number of casualties--both
American and Iraqi--over the short term while having little long-term
impact on the security environment. Moreover, the magnitude of the
proposed buildup falls far short of the numbers needed to give the
occupation forces a realistic prospect of suppressing the violence.
Experts on counterinsurgency strategies have consistently concluded
that at least 10 soldiers per 1,000 population are required to have a
sufficient impact. Indeed, some experts have argued that in cases where
armed resistance is intense and pervasive (which certainly seems to
apply to Iraq), deployments of 20 soldiers per thousand may be needed.
Given Iraq's population (26 million) such a mission would require
the deployment of at least 260,000 ground forces (an increase of
115,000 from current levels) and probably as many as 520,000. Even the
lower requirement will strain the U.S. Army and Marine Corps to the
breaking point. Yet a lesser deployment would have no realistic chance
to get the job done. A limited ``surge'' of additional troops is the
latest illusory panacea offered by the people who brought us the Iraq
quagmire in the first place. It is an idea that should be rejected.
CONSEQUENCES OF LEAVING
Proponents of staying in Iraq offer several reasons why a prompt
withdrawal would be bad for the United States. Those arguments vary in
terms of plausibility. All of them, though, are ultimately deficient as
a reason for keeping U.S. troops in Iraq.
Allegation: Al-Qaeda would take over Iraq
Administration officials and other supporters of the war have
warned repeatedly that a ``premature'' withdrawal of U.S. forces would
enable al-Qaeda to turn Iraq into a sanctuary to plot and launch
attacks against the United States and other Western countries. But al-
Qaeda taking over Iraq is an extremely improbable scenario. The Iraq
Study Group put the figure of foreign fighters at only 1,300; a
relatively small component of the Sunni insurgency against U.S. forces.
It strains credulity to imagine 1,300 fighters (and foreigners at that)
taking over and controlling a country of 26 million people.
The challenge for al-Qaeda would be even more daunting than those
raw numbers suggest. The organization does have some support among the
Sunni Arabs in Iraq, but opinion even among that segment of the
population is divided. A September 2006 poll conducted by the Program
on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland found
that 94 percent of Sunnis had a somewhat, or highly, unfavorable
attitude toward al-Qaeda. As the violence of al-Qaeda attacks has
mounted, and the victims are increasingly Iraqis--not Americans--many
Sunnis have turned against the terrorists. There have even been a
growing number of reports during the past year of armed conflicts
between Iraqi Sunnis and foreign fighters.
The PIPA poll also showed that 98 percent of Shiite respondents and
100 percent of Kurdish respondents had somewhat, or very, unfavorable
views of al-Qaeda. The notion that a Shiite-Kurdish-dominated
government would tolerate Iraq becoming a safe haven for al-Qaeda is
improbable on its face. And even if U.S. troops left Iraq, the
successor government would continue to be dominated by the Kurds and
Shiites, since they make up more than 80 percent of Iraq's population
and, in marked contrast to the situation under Saddam Hussein, they now
control the military and police. That doesn't suggest a reliable safe
haven for al-Qaeda.
Allegation: The terrorists would be emboldened worldwide
In urging the United States to persevere in Iraq, President Bush
has warned that an early military withdrawal would encourage al-Qaeda
and other terrorist organizations. Weak U.S. responses to challenges
over the previous quarter century, especially in Lebanon and Somalia,
had emboldened such people, Bush argues. Hawkish pundits have made
similar allegations.
It is a curious line of argument with ominous implications, for it
assumes that the United States should have stayed in both countries,
despite the military debacles there. The mistake, according to that
logic, was not the original decision to intervene but the decision to
limit American losses and terminate the missions. That is a classic
case of learning the wrong lessons from history.
Yes, al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups apparently concluded that
the Lebanon and Somalia episodes showed that U.S. leaders and the
American people have no stomach for enduring murky missions that entail
significant casualties. They are likely to draw a similar lesson if the
United States withdraws from Iraq without an irrefutable triumph. That
is why it is so imperative to be cautious about a decision to intervene
in the first place. Military missions should not be undertaken unless
there are indisputably vital American security interests at stake.
A decision to withdraw and leave Iraq to its own fate is not
without adverse consequences. America's terrorist adversaries will
portray a pullout as a defeat for U.S. policy. But the cost of staying
on indefinitely in a dire security environment is even worse for our
country. President Bush and his advisors need to consider the
possibility that the United States might stay in Iraq for many years to
come and still not achieve its policy goals. And the costs, both in
blood and treasure, continue to mount.
Allegation: The conflict will spill over Iraq's borders and create
regional chaos
That concern does have some validity. The ingredients are in place
for a regional Sunni-Shia ``proxy war.'' Predominantly Shiite Iran has
already taken a great interest in political and military developments
in its western neighbor. Indeed, Washington has repeatedly accused
Tehran of interfering in Iraq. There is little doubt that Iran wants to
see a Shiite-controlled government in Baghdad and would react badly if
it appeared that Iraq's Sunni minority might be poised to regain power
and once again subjugate the Shiite majority. The current Iraqi
Government is quite friendly to Iran, and Tehran can be expected to
take steps to protect the new-found influence it enjoys in Baghdad.
But Iraq's other neighbors are apprehensive about the specter of a
Shiite-controlled Iraq. Saudi Arabia, in particular, regards the
prospect of such a state on its northern border as anathema, worrying
about the impact on its own Shia minority--which is concentrated in the
principal oil-producing region. There are indications that wealthy
Saudis are already providing funds to Sunni forces in Iraq.
A regional Sunni-Shiite proxy war in Iraq would turn the Bush
administration's policy there into even more of a debacle than it has
already become. Even worse, Iraq's neighbors could be drawn in as
direct participants in the fighting. Washington should take steps to
head off those dangers.
Probably the best approach would be for the United States to
convene a regional conference that included (at a minimum) Iran, Saudi
Arabia, Syria, Jordan, and Turkey. The purpose of such a conference
should be to make all parties confront the danger of the Iraqi turmoil
mushrooming into a regional armed struggle that ultimately would not be
in the best interests of any country involved. Ideally, that
realization might lead to a commitment by the neighboring states to
refrain from--or at least bound the extent of--meddling in the
escalating violence in Iraq
Ultimately, though, maintaining a U.S. military occupation of Iraq
to forestall a possible regional proxy war is simply too high a price
to pay, both in money spent and American lives sacrificed.
Allegation: Leaving Iraq would betray a moral obligation to the Iraqi
people
In addition to their other objections, opponents of withdrawal
protest that we will leave Iraq in chaos, and that would be an immoral
action on the part of the United States. Even some critics of the war
have been susceptible to that argument, invoking the so-called Pottery
Barn principle: ``You broke it, you bought it.''
There are two major problems with that argument. First, unless some
restrictions are put in place, the obligation is seemingly open-ended.
There is little question that chaos might increase in Iraq after U.S.
forces leave, but advocates of staying the course do not explain how
the United States can prevent the contending factions in Iraq from
fighting the civil war they already seem to have started. At least, no
one has explained how the United States can restore the peace there at
anything resembling a reasonable cost in American blood and treasure.
Leaving aside the very real possibility that the job of building a
stable democracy might never be done, the moral obligation thesis begs
a fundamental question: What about the moral obligation of the U.S.
Government to its own soldiers and to the American people? There is
clearly an obligation not to waste either American lives or American
tax dollars. We are doing both in Iraq. Staying the course is not a
moral strategy; it is the epitome of an immoral one.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF STAYING IN IRAQ
Leaving Iraq is clearly not cost-free, but the costs (both tangible
and intangible) of a prompt exit must be measured against the costs of
staying the course. Moreover, even if the United States absorbs the
costs of a prolonged mission, there is no certainty that anything
resembling victory resides at the end of that effort. Indeed, most of
the indicators suggest that we would be merely delaying defeat.
Damage to America's standing in the world
Even the September 2006 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq
conceded that the U.S. occupation of Iraq had served as a focal point
and inspiration for Muslim extremists. Equally worrisome, it had also
served as a training arena for such militants to hone their military
and terrorist skills. An al-Qaeda letter intercepted by the U.S.
military indicates that the organization itself regards a continued
U.S. military presence and, consequently, a long war in Iraq as a boon
to its cause.
A December 2006 Zogby poll of populations in five Arab nations
reveals just how much anti-U.S. sentiment has increased throughout that
region. Opinions of the United States, which were already rather
negative, have grown significantly worse in the past year.
Outside the Arab world, there also has been a hardening of
attitudes toward the United States. Even among longstanding friends and
allies (in such places as Europe and East Asia), the United States is
viewed in a significantly more negative light. The longer we stay in
Iraq, the worse those problems will become.
Straining the All-Volunteer military
Even some hawks are concerned about the negative impact of the Iraq
mission on the All-Volunteer Force (AVF). They should be concerned. In
December 2006, GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, the Army's Chief of Staff,
bluntly told a House committee that the Active-Duty Army ``will break''
unless there was a permanent increase in force structure. And that is
before any contemplated additional deployments to Iraq.
The military leaders are not exaggerating. Already the Army has
struggled to meet its recruiting goals, even though it has diluted the
standards for new recruits, including by issuing waivers in cases where
there is evidence of criminal behavior or mental illness. Indeed, the
Iraq occupation has been sustained to this point only through
extraordinary exertions, including an unprecedented number of ``stop
loss'' orders, preventing military personnel from returning to civilian
life when their terms of enlistment are up, and recalling members of
the Reserves--including some people in their forties and fifties. The
AVF is straining to the breaking point already, and the longer we stay
in Iraq, the worse those strains will become.
Costs in blood and treasure
The tab for the Iraq mission is already more than $350 billion, and
the meter is now running at approximately $8 billion a month.
Furthermore, even those appalling figures do not take into account
indirect costs, such as long-term care for wounded Iraq war veterans.
Except when the survival of the Nation is at stake, all military
missions must be judged according to a cost-benefit calculation. Iraq
has never come close to being a war for America's survival. Even the
connection of the Iraq mission to the larger war against radical
Islamic terrorism was always tenuous, at best. For all of his odious
qualities, Saddam Hussein was a secular tyrant, not an Islamic radical.
Indeed, the radical Islamists expressed nearly as much hatred for
Saddam as they did for the United States. Iraq was an elective war--a
war of choice, and a bad choice at that.
DECIDING TO LEAVE
The United States needs to adopt a withdrawal strategy measured in
months, not years. Indeed, the President should begin the process of
removing American troops immediately, and that process needs to be
complete in no more than 6 months. A longer schedule would simply
prolong the agony. It would also afford various Iraq factions
(especially the Kurds and some of the Shia political players) the
opportunity to try to entice or manipulate the United States into
delaying the withdrawal of its forces still further.
Emotionally, deciding to leave under current conditions will not be
easy, for it requires an implicit admission that Washington has failed
in its ambitious goal to create a stable, united, democratic, secular
Iraq that would be a model for peace throughout the Middle East. But
that goal was unrealistic from the outset. It is difficult for any
nation, and especially the American superpower, to admit failure.
However, it is better to admit failure when the adverse consequences
are relatively modest. A defeat in Iraq would assuredly be a setback
for the United States, particularly in terms of global clout and
credibility. But one of the advantages to being a superpower is that
the country can absorb a setback without experiencing catastrophic
damage to its core interests or capabilities. Defeat in Iraq does not
even come close to threatening those interests or capabilities. Most
important, a withdrawal now will be less painful than withdrawing years
from now when the cost in blood, treasure, and credibility will prove
far greater.
The withdrawal needs to be comprehensive, not partial. The only
troops remaining in Iraq should be a modest number of Special Forces
personnel who would work with political factions in Iraq inclined to
eradicate the al-Qaeda interlopers in their country. It must be clear
to Iraqis and populations throughout the Muslim world that Washington
has no intention of trying to maintain a military presence in Iraq.
Above all, U.S. policymakers need to absorb the larger lesson of
the Iraq debacle. Launching an elective war in pursuit of a nation-
building chimera was an act of folly. It is a folly they should vow
never to repeat in any other country.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. Carpenter.
I'd like to--because my colleagues have been so patient
today, why don't I yield my time and I'll ask questions last on
our side. And I'll yield first to Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate the courtesy.
I want to thank all of the panelists for their testimony.
I'd like to start with you, Dr. Kagan. Did you have an
opportunity to advise the White House about your plan?
Dr. Kagan. Senator, I have not spoken with the President,
but I have spoken with individuals in the White House.
Senator Menendez. Are they senior officials of the White
House?
Dr. Kagan. Yes, Senator.
Senator Menendez. Is the plan that you heard the President
describe last night, would you say it is largely your plan?
Dr. Kagan. Senator, it's very difficult for me to tell. The
President gave a very general speech--the elements of the plan
relating to the change of mission, the new strategy to try to
secure Iraq, the commitment of five additional combat brigades
to Baghdad, certainly those are things that we recommended. I
have not yet seen, in any detail, the actual military proposal
that the President intends to pursue, and so, I can't really
say to what extent this is my plan.
Senator Menendez. Do you agree with the essence of his plan
last night?
Dr. Kagan. Well, I certainly believe that the change in
strategy is essential, that the--we must commit to trying to
establish security in Baghdad first. And I do believe that we
need additional forces in order to do that.
Senator Menendez. So, what is the timeframe for that? How
long do we stay there, under--even under your plan--let's
assume, for argument sakes, this is your plan--how long do we
stay?
Dr. Kagan. Our estimates were that we would be able to
establish security in Baghdad, at least in the neighborhoods
that we were proposing to operate in, by the end of 2007. We
believe that we would need to sustain this higher force level
into 2008 in order to support operations in Al Anbar, Diyala,
and elsewhere. And we believe that somewhere in the 18- to 24-
month period, we would be able to begin turning over
responsibilities to Iraqi forces and withdrawing.
Senator Menendez. OK. Now, we lead--under your plan, we
lead this fight, do we not?
Dr. Kagan. Under my plan, we would be working together with
the Iraqis to clear and hold neighborhoods.
Senator Menendez. But we've heard a lot of testimony,
including before this committee the other day--yesterday I
think--and we've heard from others, that the Iraqis don't have,
at this point, the ability to show up for the purposes that
have been outlined in the securing of Baghdad. Isn't that true?
Isn't that pretty much recognized?
Dr. Kagan. Senator, when we developed our plan, we took
into account the possibility that the Iraqis would not come in
the numbers that might be desirable. And so, we attempted to
define a force level for American troops that would be
adequate, even if the Iraqis disappointed us.
Senator Menendez. You know, it just seems to me that we
need to be honest with the American people in this plan. This
plan, as I see it, including that which is described by the
President, wants to be sugarcoated under the guise that Iraqis
are going to lead, and we are somehow going to follow and give
them assistance. And I clearly have the picture that these
American troops who will lead, will be at the forefront, will
be the targets, and we will have some Iraqis assisting along
the way. And that is a fundamentally different mission than
both the President tried to suggest and I heard Secretary Rice
try to suggest, this morning, in her opening statement. And I
think it's not quite--well, it's not quite honest about what is
taking place.
Now, before I came to this afternoon's hearing, I got a
notice that the New Jersey National Guard troops currently
stationed in Iraq are going to have their tours extended by 120
days as a result of the President's policy to add to the war
effort. And I think there is some release out saying that
extension of troop tours by both the Guard and Reserve is now
going to be part of the policy of the United States for up to
an additional year. Isn't that going to have real consequences
on a military that is already far stretched and cannot meet
these challenges--on morale, on performance in the field, and
ultimately on the very recruitment that we need to build up the
Armed Forces strength of the United States?
Dr. Kagan. Senator, I and the Active Duty and retired
officers who developed this plan are all very concerned about
the strains on the Army and the Marine Corps and the National
Guard and Reserves, but we think that, set against that, we
must also be extremely concerned about the prospect that the
damage that'll be done to the volunteer force by defeat in
Iraq, which we believe will be drawn out, at painful and
extremely emotionally searing event, and we think that it will
actually do much greater damage to the force than the
relatively short----
Senator Menendez. Is there an answer to how many lives and
how much money?
Dr. Kagan. Senator, it was not----
Senator Menendez. Where is it that you define, Dr. Kagan,
and those who advocate along your lines--where is it that you
define that if you do not have success, as you have pointed out
a way that you believe we can achieve success, where is the
tipping point? Because to listen to those advocates who say
that we cannot fail in Iraq and believe that failure, in terms
of the military options, is the driving force in--i.e., to
create security--we have had escalations and they have not
succeeded. Because, in my mind, we haven't had the political
surge to do it. Now, you reject that.
The point being, at what point, when you do not succeed
again, if you do not succeed again--at what point will you come
and tell us, ``Well, if we had another 20, 30, 40,000 troops,
we could ultimately succeed here''? It just seems to me that
we've been through this in our history before. Where is the
tipping point in which you are willing to admit that a
different course, than even the one you suggest, is
appropriate?
Dr. Kagan. Senator, I have high confidence that the plan
that we proposed will bring down the level of violence in
Baghdad, and I believe that that will be a positive good, even
if we ultimately have to withdraw from the country because of
other unfortunate developments in the political realm. I
believe that we need to take this opportunity to try to restore
order and try to get ourselves on a track that will avoid some
of the terrible consequences of defeat. If that doesn't work,
then obviously we will have to reconsider.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Dr. Carpenter, very quickly--I have about a minute left--in
your testimony--in your written testimony, you talk about
bringing others in a regional conference, including Iran, Saudi
Arabia, Syria, Jordan, and Turkey. You heard that maybe--I
don't know if you heard--the Secretary of State's answers to
two of those partners along the way of not having them engage.
Could you give your own reflections on that, and how does
bringing Saudi Arabia and Turkey to the table at the same time,
in a regional context, gives us an opportunity to offset some
of her concerns, and--how do you view that?
Dr. Carpenter. Senator, I think it is absolutely essential
to involve all of Iraq's neighbors in an attempt to try to at
least quarantine the violence in that country and prevent it
from becoming a regional proxy war, or, even worse, a regional
war. That simply cannot be accomplished without involving Iran
and Syria. As distasteful as we rightfully regard those
governments, they are important actors in the region. And one
of the basic lessons I think we need to learn for American
foreign policy generally is that it is not very effective to
refuse to talk to one's adversaries, that the most difficult
task of diplomacy is getting results from regimes that you,
quite frankly, wish didn't exist. It's easy to talk to one's
friends; it is very, very difficult, but ever so necessary, to
talk to one's adversaries. And we are not going to get any kind
of solution, even the limited solution of quarantining the
violence in Iraq, unless we draw in Iran and Syria, as well as
Iraq's other neighbors, into this process.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'm
going to follow your good example and yield to Senator Corker.
The Chairman. If I can interrupt for just one moment, I
would say to my colleagues, if, in fact, you have additional
questions, in light of the relatively small number here, my
intention would be to allow you to go back for a second round,
if the panel would be willing to stick around.
Thank you.
Senator Corker. Thank you, gentlemen. I appreciate it.
I enjoyed your remarks. And, again, I want to thank our
chairman for the distinguished panelists that we continue to
have in these meetings.
I think that we talk a great deal about ending the war in
Iraq and withdrawing our troops, but I think we all know that
the war in Iraq is going to continue for years, in one way or
another, if we leave. And so, I'd like for each of you to
respond, if you will, to us, if we, in fact, do withdraw, if,
in fact, President Bush's plan is not followed--I'd like for
you all to paint the picture--I know there's going to be
tremendous civil strife, tens and thousands of lives will be
lost in the following period--describe to us, if you will, if
withdrawal does occur in a timely fashion--6 months, 9 months--
how you view Iraq to be when that occurs.
Ambassador Galbraith. Let me take a crack at that, Senator.
Certainly, if we withdraw, there is going to be continued
sectarian killing between Sunnis and Shiites. Iran will
exercise enormous influence in Iraq. For decades Iran sponsored
the Shiite religious parties that, as a result of the U.S.
invasion, now control Iraq's government. The central government
will not exercise any more authority than it does now, which is
to say it will have basically no authority. Kurdistan will
continue to be, de facto, independent.
And if we stay in Iraq, all of this will also be the case.
There is a civil war in Iraq which we are not containing that
civil war. There is terrible sectarian killing, and we're not
able to stop it. An increase in the number of troops is not
going to help control the killing. Our troops are not trained
to be police. They don't speak the language. They don't have
the local knowledge. And if they are relying on so-called Iraqi
troops, you have to ask the question: Who are those Iraqi
troops? They are going to be either Sunni or Shiite or Kurdish
peshmerga. If a Sunni or Shiite stops at a roadblock manned by
troops or police of the opposite sect, his life is in danger.
Unless a Baghdad resident knows the local troops or police are
from his own sect, he's not going to feel safe.
So, the short answer is that Iraq after withdrawal and Iraq
today are not going to look very much different. There is just
the one achievable goal, which is one that Senator Lugar
mentioned. We can, I think, disrupt al-Qaeda.
Dr. Kagan. Senator, if I may, I must respectfully disagree.
Iraq, after withdrawal, will look very different. It is not the
case that we are doing nothing at all to contain the civil war,
and we should not delude ourselves into imagining that if we
left, it would simply continue in this similar fashion.
It is certainly true that when Iraqis come to Iraqi
checkpoints manned only by Iraqis, at this point, they're
frequently nervous if those Iraqis are from another sect,
unless there are American soldiers present with them. And right
now, we have been very effective in a number of places in
maintaining order, keeping a lid on things, working together
with Iraqi troops that are there; who do perform infinitely
better when we are there and are much more restrained in their
behavior and much more tolerated and trusted by the Iraqi
population. And you can even see this on Sunni blogs in Iraq,
where Sunnis warn each other, ``If the Iraqi police come by
themselves, we should be very worried about that. If they come
with American troops, it's OK.'' Now, that's obviously not a
good sign for being able to do any sort of rapid transition to
the Iraqi police, but that's hardly news. It does mean, first
of all, that the Iraqis are less hostile to our presence than
many people make out, and it also means that we are playing an
important role.
If we were to withdraw precipitantly, the violence would
increase dramatically--I think, by orders of magnitude. I think
you would end up seeing millions of people displaced. We're
already seeing this process underway, and it's extremely
unfortunate. I believe that Iraq's neighbors would begin to get
involved. They would have to, in terms of self-defense. There
are already 900,000 Iraqi refugees in Jordan, for instance. I
believe that they would attempt to resolve this problem by
moving their own forces forward into Iraq in order to stem the
refugee tides and contain the violence before it reaches their
borders. I think they would be drawn rapidly into the conflict.
I think some of them would seek to be drawn into the conflict
by supporting one side or the other. I think, before very long,
you would find that the regional--that Iraq's neighbors would
see themselves as stakeholders in various parts of the outcome
of this conflict, and would begin mobilizing increased degrees
of military power to back their stakes.
In short, I believe it's very likely that we would find
ourselves in the midst of a regional conflict in a region from
which we cannot leave, in an area which we simply cannot
abandon, and with the stakes much higher, and the conditions
for us much worse, even apart from the humanitarian catastrophe
that would be involved.
Senator Corker. And that sounds a lot like escalation to
me, but--go ahead.
Dr. Carpenter. Senator, first of all, I would agree with
almost everything that Ambassador Galbraith said. I think it's
important to emphasize that the civil war is already underway
in Iraq. We have a situation--I've already cited the number of
people dying on a daily basis: 1.6 million people have been
displaced internally, largely moving from areas where they are
an ethnic minority to one where they are in the majority, so
ethnic cleansing and the sectarian divide is growing almost by
the day; 1.8 million people have already left the country
entirely, and those are primarily the middle-class Iraqis, the
very people that we want as the building blocks for a strong
civil society--they're leaving. This is with the American troop
presence there.
We face the prospect now of trying to play referee in an
ongoing multisided civil war. I can't think of anything that
would be a more futile and frustrating task than trying to play
that role.
And, for Dr. Kagan, I think it's important to stress that
this kind of commitment would be open-ended. We would be
refereeing this conflict, year after year after year. There
would be no discernible end in sight.
As Ambassador Galbraith has already delineated, Iraq has
already fragmented. We're seeing this process proceed. But it
is very, very unlikely that it's going to be reversed.
Senator Corker. Well, thank you for your comments. And I
really do ask these questions without bias. And I know my time
is up, but let me--so, what you're saying is, you would sense
no intensified killing, no escalation whatsoever, whether we
are there or not there. You think it will remain exactly as is
today. That's what Dr. Galbraith said.
Dr. Carpenter. I think we're going to see an
intensification where--whenever we leave, whether that is 6
months from now or 6 years from now. What we need to focus on--
and I agree with him fully--is making sure that al-Qaeda cannot
use any portion of Iraq for a safe haven. I think that danger
is exaggerated, but it's not insignificant. We do have to deal
with that problem. And we need to focus on a limited attainable
objective--namely, quarantining that violence in Iraq so that
it does not become a regional war. And I believe there is a
reasonable prospect of convincing even Iran and Syria that a
proxy war can easily spiral out of control and it would not be
in their best interest to tolerate that kind of development,
that it is better to quarantine this conflict and allow the
dynamics in Iraq to play themselves out. Perhaps, at some
point, the various factions in Iraq will agree on compromise,
either a reasonably peaceful formal partition or a very loose
federation with adequate political compromise, but they have to
determine that. We cannot determine that outcome for them.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
I say to my friend from Florida, I have taken his advice
and--if it's all right with him, right?
Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. I was fully prepared to give back the favor
that Senator Nelson gave me yesterday, but--thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you. And I appreciate this opportunity.
Not that I don't want to see my colleagues, but this is a nice
way to do a hearing. [Laughter.]
You get to this end quicker this way. No; I'm grateful for
this opportunity, and I'm grateful for the three of you
spending the time and providing the scholarship that you
provide for this important discussion today.
My friends in the media should cover this, as they did this
morning's hearing, but that's not the way things are done here.
But let me get right to a couple of basic questions. And I
think I'll direct some of these at each member of the panel,
but, in particular, I guess, the first one, I'd direct in--with
specificity, to Dr. Galbraith--Ambassador Galbraith.
You mentioned the presence of, and the activity of, what
you called ``local theocracies.'' That's the first time I had
heard that kind of pinpoint analysis of what's happening,
really, in neighborhoods, so to speak, on that. You talked
about local theocracies operating, and action taking place at
the local level, which is in contravention of, or in conflict
with, the Constitution. Could you amplify that?
Ambassador Galbraith. Senator, we talk about Iraq as if
there were a functioning Iraqi Government, and that the
violence is somehow directed against that government. But the
reality is very different. Various Shiite political parties
control different parts of the south. In Baghdad, the Mahdi
Army controls the Shiite neighborhoods. These political parties
and militias enforce their own law. If you're accused of a
crime or some offense against the religious law, you don't
necessarily go to the state-run courts but, quite often, end up
before an ad hoc court that will hand out a summary punishment.
Although the sale of alcohol, for example, is not illegal in
Iraq, Christians who sell alcohol have been summarily executed
based upon unofficial religious law.
Nonetheless, the Shiite south is relatively a stable
situation. To get rid of religious party rule would entail a
major military operation involving several hundred thousand
troops.
The one place in the south that is not stable is Basrah
where three different Shiite parties are vying for the control
of the city, and, more importantly, are vying for the control
of the smuggling of oil. I have been told by Iraq's Oil
Ministry that 100,000 barrels less a day enters the pipeline
near Basrah than actually gets on the ships in the Persian
Gulf. And this oil is funding these three parties and their
militias.
Senator Casey. And the next question I have pertains just
to diplomacy, generally. I'll direct it to the Ambassador, but
certainly, Dr. Carpenter, Dr. Kagan, can also weigh in on this,
and you should, if--I think we've got enough time. The question
of diplomacy. Ambassador, if you had a--I want to say ``if you
had a magic wand''--but if you had the opportunity to construct
a diplomatic strategy, starting today and going forward, forget
about the past--there's a lot we could talk about, what I would
judge failures, but let's just start from today, going
forward--what's the best strategy, in your mind, in terms of
dealing with the cards we've been dealt, in terms of an overall
fully engaged diplomatic strategy?
Ambassador Galbraith. Well, first, I think we need to be
clear about our objectives. And even if we wished Iraq were to
hold together, we need to be realistic about what is
achievable. I believe our top priority should be to avoid--or
minimize--the violence that accompanies Iraq's breakup. This
violence could escalate sharply if the regional states were to
intervene. There is a danger Turkey might intervene in Kirkuk,
where a referendum is supposed to be held at the end of this
year. Iran might increase its already large role in Iraq. The
Saudis have threatened to intervene on behalf of the Sunnis,
although I think that's largely an empty threat. Our diplomacy
should be aimed at helping Iraq's neighbors face up to the new
realities in Iraq, try to make whatever is going to develop as
palatable to them as possible.
I don't subscribe to the notion, in the Baker-Hamilton
Report, that talking to Iran or Syria would improve the
situation in Iraq, because Iran, in fact, supports the same
Shiite-led government that we do. The people in power in Iraq
are Iran's best friends. Iran has no desire to undermine the
Iraqi Government, even if it opposes our presence. And Syria is
not a large player; and so, there isn't much to be accomplished
there.
I do believe, however, that we should talk to Iran and
Syria on other issues. As President Kennedy said in his
inaugural address, ``we should never negotiate out of fear, but
we should never fear to negotiate.'' I think this advice is
highly relevant to Iran and Syria. I might add that I also like
this line because it was my father who wrote it for President
Kennedy.
The Chairman. I should be attributing that to your father,
then, rather than President Kennedy. That's a great line, and
it's a good point.
Senator Casey. I wanted to ask one more question, but, Dr.
Carpenter, Dr. Kagan, if you wanted to weigh in?
Dr. Kagan. Sure. I think we have to be realistic about what
diplomacy can achieve and what diplomacy cannot achieve. I'm
not going to say, a priori, that we should or should not
negotiate with any state in the region. What I am going to say
is that the problems in Iraq that we're facing right now are
internal Iraqi problems, primarily. The money for the
insurgency is coming primarily from corruption and crime and
other things that are internal to Iraq. There are weapons that
are coming into Iraq, but, as a friend of mine in the United
States military said once, there's enough high explosive in
Iraq to keep this conflict going at this level for 1,000 years.
There is no real prospect for cutting off supply to this
insurgency or to this violence, and thereby turning it off. And
therefore, with all of the goodwill in the world, I do not
believe that the Iranians or the Syrians are capable of helping
us materially in Iraq, even were we to talk to them.
Neither do I believe that it would be effective to try to
negotiate with the states or the region in order to get them to
hold the ring while their coreligionists slug it out in a
vicious sectarian genocidal civil war. I think, you know, it is
very odd to me that people are ready to say that the Iraqis are
irrational and will not act in their own interests, and that
they're simply hopeless, and yet say that, nevertheless, the
Iranians will be perfectly rational, despite evidence to the
contrary, and other states in the region will behave with
perfect rationality, even as the stakes go up and the
atrocities mount. I find that, frankly, unlikely.
Senator Casey. I know we're out of time. Thank you.
The Chairman. You had one other question?
Senator Casey. One quick one. I don't know if it's a yes or
no. But in terms of the mechanics of constructing a diplomatic
strategy, going forward, what does that mean, specifically, in
any of your opinions? Does it mean Secretary Rice, who's
leaving, I guess, tomorrow, and will be there for an extended
period of time--does that mean she's--in your judgment, stays?
Does it mean an envoy? What does it mean? Does it mean the
President has to have more personal involvement? What are the
building blocks of that kind of a--we can all talk about
diplomacy, but what does that mean, practically, in terms of
time and personnel and attention, if you get my drift?
Dr. Carpenter. There are a number of possible options. I
would suggest putting a special envoy in charge. I think that's
probably the more direct approach. We also have to be
realistic. As much as it might be constructive over the long
term to engage with Iran and other countries on a variety of
issues, the more issues we add to the agenda, the greater the
likelihood of a breakdown. And I speak, specifically, if we
start bringing in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute into the mix.
That almost guarantees failure. I would have a very narrow,
very focused agenda, and that is, let's prevent the tragedy in
Iraq--and it certainly is that--from becoming a full-blown
regional tragedy. That goal, I believe, is attainable. There's
no guarantee that we're going to succeed, but we ought to make
the effort, and I think there is at least a reasonable prospect
we can succeed with that narrow, but extremely important, goal.
Senator Casey. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to ask, of the panel,
reaction to these observations. It would appear that--this may
be over generalized, so correct me if I'm wrong--but prior to
now our United States forces were, if not on the periphery of
Baghdad, were clearly not embedded, as the term is now being
used, in the nine police districts of Baghdad. So, if our
forces acted within the city, they were on patrol or had been
called upon, coming in from the outside, took action, perhaps
alongside the police or the army, and withdrew again to the
outskirts of the city. And this, at least, is the mode of
operations that is being pointed out as permitting a great deal
more Iraqi casualties, irrespective of whether those killings
are civil war or sectarian violence. But the killings escalated
because of certain events. So, it would appear that the plan
now being presented by the President is to have Americans
embedded; although it is yet been revealed, specifically, what
the role of the Americans will be. Some have said, no, it will
not be a door-to-door visit alongside an Iraqi police officer;
rather, we'll be back at the headquarters, we'll be monitoring
the conduct of the Iraqis to make sure that it is neutral with
regard to whomever they might encounter on patrol. And, in this
way, essentially, there'll be, potentially, better goodwill
built among the populace so that the government may have some
chance of operating and coming to decisions.
Now, I would suggest that this may be the most important
goal. But, on the other hand, weigh this against the fact that
some who are arguing this already in the Senate or Congress or
the public would say, ``This is the last chance, this is an
opportunity to stop the unacceptable violence in the Baghdad
area. If it doesn't work, we're out of there.'' And they mean
out of Iraq, not out of Baghdad. Now, this concerns me a great
deal, because I see that domestic political dynamics might very
well lead that way. The President asked for support of his
policy, and should it--for some reason, not work very soon, or
maybe not work very well at all, and people say, ``That's
enough.''
Now, leaving aside the strategies you all have presented
today, in which perhaps you, Dr. Carpenter, have come closest
to advocating a total withdrawal of American forces from Iraq.
Although I suspect you would have disagreement, as to what
American forces do. Some of us have argued that the important
objective, really, is to have Americans in Iraq somewhere, and
for quite a while, largely to reduce the potential for
sectarian violence across the region, and, likewise, to prevent
a series of tragedies that could result. It is also important
for Secretary Rice on her tour now, or subsequent ones, to
convey explicitly that we are going to be there; and,
therefore, they can count on that. It's not a negotiation, but
it's information. Likewise, maybe if she is successful, she
gets a roundtable of all the groups that are involved, the
nations, so they all inform each other of what their intent may
be. Everybody, sort of, hears it, so that the chances for some
regional stability are enhanced in that process.
Now, Ambassador Galbraith has suggested that Americans
might, in fact, reside in Kurdistan as--or the Kurd part of the
country, as at least one place that they are welcomed and
relatively safe as may be in the area, but this could be any
number of places, and I don't want to game that out.
I'm just asking, I suppose, for some advice as to whether,
in this current political situation, not only in Iraq, but in
the Middle East and here, is it not a more prudent step to
think in terms of how we maintain a presence, and that we argue
about that, as opposed to numbers, surges, precisely what the
Americans will do, door to door or in the headquarters?
Does anyone have a general comment on this?
Ambassador.
Ambassador Galbraith. Senator Lugar, the point you make is
very similar to the one that I've made in my testimony. That
is, the United States does have some remaining achievable
objectives. The most important is one that you mentioned:
Namely, disrupting al-Qaeda. That is one reason not to withdraw
completely. There is some advantage to having United States
forces in Iraq as a deterrent. Being in Kurdistan would help
stabilize the situation as between Kurdistan and Turkey. I
think the independence of Kurdistan is inevitable. It may not
be desirable, but it is inevitable. But it's not immediate.
And, in that sense, a United States presence can help bring
stability to that region, and provide reassurance to Turkey, as
well as deter any kind of action that might be taken by the
surrounding states.
The reason I argue for a United States military presence in
Kurdistan is that that's where our forces would be welcome. If
they are anyplace else in the country, they will have to devote
large resources to force protection.
I want to come back to a fundamental problem, which I think
everybody who has a plan for Iraq must address--what happens
after you've done all these things, be it the President's plan
or my proposal for a redeployment to Kurdistan? The situation
in Iraq is not going to change in any fundamental way. The
government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki reflects the will
of the 60 percent of the Iraqi population--the Shiites--who
voted for it. The Shiite electorate wishes to define Iraq as a
Shiite state. And even Sunnis who despised Saddam Hussein are
not going to accept that definition of the state. On the other
hand, the Shiites are not going to give up on it. So, you are
never going to get to an inclusive state. I don't discuss the
Kurds, because, for all practical purposes, they're out of Iraq
already.
Dr. Kagan. Senator, if I could respond, as well. I--first
of all, Ambassador Galbraith has made this point repeatedly,
but I do find it a little bit odd--I understand the Kurdish
perspective, but I find it a little bit odd to say that the
Kurds are out of there already, when the President of Iraq is a
Kurd, and when there is a substantial bloc of Kurdish
representatives in Parliament--in the Iraqi Parliament who have
been extremely active. The Kurds may think that they're out, in
some respects, but they're clearly continuing to play. And I
think the reason for that is that they understand that, at the
end of the day, it is not in the interests of Kurdistan for
Kurdistan to break off from Iraq and have vast sectarian civil
war going on immediately to their south, which will inevitably
push refugees in their direction and involve them in violence
along their borders. That's not in their interest. And I credit
the Kurds with more self-interest--more understanding of their
self-interest than that, than to think that they imagine that
that's going to be a happy scenario for them.
I'm very concerned about the practicalities--the military
practicalities, of a plan for maintaining United States forces
in Kurdistan, with the expectation that they will be doing
things in Iraq. Where will they draw their supplies from? They
certainly can't maintain a supply line the length of Iraq into
Kurdistan without having a very substantial presence that would
run against the concept. They will have to draw their supplies
from Turkey. Well, the Turks might well allow that to happen,
for a variety of reasons, but I'm curious about what demands
the Turks would end up making on the Kurds in return for
support of our presence there. After all, the people who most
adamantly oppose the idea of an independent Kurdistan are the
Turks. And the problems of the PKK and the fear of terrorism
based in Kurdistan, I fear, could lead to a very, very nasty
situation very rapidly.
In addition to that, Kurdistan is far away from any of the
regions where we would have to be most concerned about al-Qaeda
infiltration. And I think we have to ask ourselves: What do we
think the military operations look like? Are we going to fly
our soldiers in helicopters across uncontrolled hostile terrain
spotted with surface-to-air missiles and a variety of other
dangers, to land in unknown places, conduct operations and
leave? Those are very daunting military operations. It's much
harder--if your concern is dealing with al-Qaeda, it's much
harder and more dangerous to our soldiers to undertake those
kinds of operations than it is to attempt to bring the security
situation under control more generally and have a firm base in
Iraq from which you can deal with these things on a local
basis.
I'm also very concerned about the prospect of having
American soldiers flown in, on call, from local Iraqis to deal
with what problems that they report. We've seen that, all too
often, when our soldiers are flying in from afar, coming in
from afar, and do not know the local situation, they can easily
be drawn into actions that are counterproductive. When they're
present, and when they can understand the neighborhood--and to
talk about local knowledge at this point and say that our
soldiers don't have it, when many of them are going back on
their third tours into Iraq, I must say, I think we have a
pretty fair amount of understanding of Iraq in the army, at
this point--our soldiers on the ground are able to recognize
situations that they should not involve themselves in, but only
if they're there.
Dr. Carpenter. Mr. Chairman, if I could respond briefly. In
one sense, the President's new proposal is regressive, in that
it further Americanizes the war, which I think is exactly the
opposite direction that we ought to be going.
There is also an inherent contradiction in his speech last
night. On the one hand, he contends that it would be absolutely
disastrous for the United States to leave Iraq with something
less than a victory; on the other hand, he sets up these
milestones for the Iraqi Government with, certainly, the
implied threat that if the Iraqi Government does not meet those
milestones, our commitment is not unlimited and it's not open-
ended, that we might then withdraw, presumably with something
less than a victory. I would maintain he can't have it both
ways. If it is true that any withdrawal from Iraq with less
than a victory would truly be disastrous for the United States,
then we are stuck in Iraq indefinitely; we have to stay there
even if the Iraqi Government were the biggest collection of
villains or buffoons on the planet, because our own vital
interests would dictate that we stay.
I would argue that, in fact, it would be far less than a
disaster for the United States to leave Iraq, and that,
ultimately, we have a choice of leaving now, having spent $350
billion and 3,000 American lives, or the committee can have a
similar hearing 2 years from now, when the costs may very well
be $600 billion and 5,500 or 6,000 American lives. That's the
choice we really face.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
The Chairman. I'd say to my colleagues, I've just been
informed there is a--is it a vote or a live quorum? There's a
live quorum that just began. I would suggest--it's up to the
Senator from Florida--he can begin his questions, if he'd like
to do that, or we can recess and go, and then I'll ask my
questions last. Are you ready to go?
Well, what I'm going to do is turn the gavel over to the
Senator from Florida, and we'll go vote, and hopefully by the
time he finishes his questions, if we're not back, if you could
recess for 3 or 4 minutes, and we'll take the intervening time,
because I have some questions, and anyone else who has any more
can come back. But I'd like to spend 10 minutes with you. So--
if I may.
So, I--I'm going to go vote. I guess others are, as well.
But the chair is yours, sir. And we'll be back shortly.
Senator Bill Nelson. So, I get to completely run the----
The Chairman. You get to completely run the committee. You
can get unanimous consent for anything you want if you're the
only one here. [Laughter.]
And so--I've always enjoyed it when I was in that position.
Senator Bill Nelson. Can I----
The Chairman. As a matter of fact, you have a lot more
power than any chairman has.
Senator Bill Nelson. You mean I can get unanimous consent
on changing the rules about seniority? [Laughter.]
The Chairman. Yeah, you could probably do that, until I
come back and seek a vote on it. [Laughter.]
But--no, but it's all yours, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson [presiding]. Well, what do you all
think the President meant when he said America's commitment is
not open-ended?
Dr. Carpenter. I have to admit I'm a bit cynical about it.
I think it is an empty threat, it is a bluff, it is an attempt
to get the Maliki government to do what Ambassador Galbraith
has demonstrated pretty clearly it is not either willing or
capable of doing. And this threat is not going to be taken
seriously by the Maliki government. They feel that we are in
Iraq for the long term and that they will not respond to this
setting of milestones without penalties. And, frankly, if you
don't have very specific penalties, milestones become largely
meaningless.
Ambassador Galbraith. We're not far from the day when the
Maliki government might be just as happy to see us go. The
civil war can end either in power-sharing--regionalization is a
type of power-sharing--or it can end in victory for one side.
Scholars who have look at civil wars fought since World War II
note that, maybe, 15 percent have ended with power-sharing
while the other 85 percent have ended with one side winning.
And who's going to win the civil war in Iraq? The Shiites are
three times as numerous, and they have, in neighboring Iran, a
very powerful ally. The Shiites have much larger armed forces
than the Sunni Arabs, and they control the mechanisms of the
state. The Sunni Arab countries that might ally with the Iraqi
Sunnis are relatively weak states. The Saudis have money, but
limited ability to project power. Jordan is far from the
populated parts of Iraq. The Syrian position is ambivalent.
Syria is an ally of Iran, and it's ruled by the Alawites, who
are a Shiite sect, even though Syria is a Sunni majority state.
So, the alternative to power-sharing and regionalization is a
Shiite victory in the civil war which, in turn, might well lead
to the genocide that Dr. Kagan has warned about. But, from the
point of view of the Maliki government, a U.S. withdrawal may
not be the end of the world.
Dr. Kagan. Senator, I think that--I disagree with the
notion that the Iraqis think that we're staying there forever.
I think, on the contrary, that the Iraqi Shia, for the most
part, decided some time ago that we were going to be out
quickly. And I believe that the Iraqi Sunni Arabs have also
decided that we are on the way out. And I believe that the
various intelligence estimates that we heard at the end of last
year suggest that a number of these groups are already ready to
do their victory dances, because they think that they have
defeated us and that we will be, shortly, leaving. And I think
that we have seen the beginning of a dominance dance in Iraq
already, as rival Shia groups begin to position themselves for
a contest that they expect to occur within their own community
over which Shia group will run a Shia-dominated Iraq.
I don't think that the problem is convincing the Iraqis
that we are going to leave at some point. I think that the
Iraqis expect us to leave shortly. And I don't think that the
Maliki government has been failing to do what it is that we
want them to do because they think that we're going to be there
forever and that that's a good thing. I think that they have
not been doing what we wanted them to do, in the first
instance, in many cases, because they were incapable of it,
because we were expecting of them things that were
unreasonable, and the standards that we have set for what we
want the Iraqi security forces to be able to do by themselves,
I've thought, have been unreasonable for a long time, which is
why I think that it's very important that the President come
forward with a plan that recognizes the limitations of those
forces and the importance of having American forces in the
lead. I recognize that's not what he said, but that is what we
recommended, and I believe that that would be the appropriate
way to approach this problem.
There's been a lot of talk about incentivizing the Iraqi
Government. And I have to confess that I have a problem with a
lot of that conversation, because what we're really proposing
to incentivize them with is the threat of unleashing complete
genocide on the Iraqi people by pulling out and allowing the
civil war to escalate unchecked and making no effort to
restrain it. I find that to be a somewhat ambivalent ethical
position to take, to say that, ``If you don't do what we say,
we're going to allow you to plunge into this horrible abyss.''
It also is a strange position to take toward a government that
we wish to regard as an allied government, that our notion of
incentivizing them is hurling repeated threats of such
catastrophe at them.
I think it's worth discussing what we could do to incentive
the Maliki government, either positively or negatively, but I
don't think that it's appropriate for us to throw threats at
them that we will simply withdraw, in spite of our concern for
them, in spite of our ethical position, and in spite of our own
interests, simply as a way of attempting to compel them to do
the things that we think they need to do.
Senator Bill Nelson. What are your expectations of the
Maliki government? And when?
Dr. Kagan. I expect that the Maliki government will, in the
first instance, tolerate the operation that we are proposing,
and they have already shown that they will tolerate it. I
expect them to send Iraqi forces to assist in it, and they have
already begun to do that, as General Pace testified, earlier in
the day. I expect that to continue, although I, frankly, expect
to be disappointed by the number of troops that actually show
up, as we regularly have been. But I expect them to show up in
greater numbers than they have before. I expect them to
cooperate with us actively as we work to establish security for
their people in the capital. And I expect, as that security
proceeds, that they will begin to make important strides in the
direction of the reconciliation initiatives that are going to
be so important to the long-term settlement of this conflict.
I do expect them to undertake those things. I expect that
the process will be arduous, there will be setbacks, and there
will be disappointments.
Senator Bill Nelson. So, you think it will meet the
President's test.
Dr. Kagan. I believe that we will be able to attain a
stable and secure state in Iraq.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, I hope you're right, but I don't
believe it. And that's my impression.
Ambassador Galbraith. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Bill Nelson. And my impression is that increased
troops in Anbar province will help, but not in Baghdad.
Mr. Galbraith.
Ambassador Galbraith. Here's what I expect from the Maliki
government. I expect it to say what it wants us to hear, and I
don't expect it to do very many of those things at all. Perhaps
the best example of this is the Prime Minister's repeated
statements that militias are incompatible with the functioning
of a democratic Iraq, and then he does precisely nothing about
the militias. And that is not because he's weak, that's not
because he's dependent on the Sadrists for support, but it is
because he is part of the system of sectarian Shiite rule that
includes the Shiite militias.
The character of the Maliki government was perhaps best
demonstrated by the manner in which it executed Saddam Hussein.
In his rush to execute Saddam for a 1982 crime against
supporters of his Dawa Party, Maliki cut short Saddam's ongoing
trial for the Kurdish genocide, a case that involved a thousand
times as many dead as did the Dujail case. He acted over the
protests of the Kurds and, in the rush to execution, did not
follow Iraq's constitutional procedures that require all three
Presidents to ratify a death sentence. He allowed the Mahdi
Army militiamen to participate in the execution. That wasn't
incompetence, that was the way his government is.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Carpenter. Just a minute, and then
I'm going to have to run to make this vote.
Dr. Carpenter. I would take a position roughly midpoint
between what Ambassador Galbraith has said and what Dr. Kagan
has said. I think the Maliki government will participate, with
some vigor, in operations to crack down on the Sunni insurgents
and Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad, and it will do little or
nothing when it comes to operations to crack down on the Shiite
militias. This is a sectarian government, as much as the Bush
administration really doesn't want to admit that reality, and
it is a participant in the ongoing civil war. It is not a
neutral arbiter. We have to understand that point.
What I worry about is the American troops increasingly
being embedded with Iraqi security forces. I think that was one
of the worst proposals of the Iraq Study Group; and,
unfortunately, it's one of the main things the Bush
administration has adopted. One of the reasons we have been
able to keep----
Senator Bill Nelson. Why? Why, on the embedding?
Dr. Carpenter. Why they adopted it? Or why is it----
Senator Bill Nelson. Why do you disagree with the
embedding?
Dr. Carpenter I think one of the reasons that we've been
able to keep casuality rates relatively low is the American----
Senator Bill Nelson. OK. So, you think it would increase
American casualties.
Dr. Carpenter. It makes them more and more vulnerable.
They're going to be dependent on their security on their Iraqi
counterparts.
Senator Bill Nelson. OK.
The committee will stand in recess, subject to the call of
the Chair. Thank you all very much.
[Recess.]
The Chairman [presiding]. We'll come back to order.
I thank you for your patience. I know the Ambassador, after
14 years up here, knows what it's like here. The reason why
Senator Lugar and I hung around over there, we were told there
was going to be an immediate vote, and they're still--it
probably won't occur til tomorrow morning. But, I apologize.
Gentlemen, I--the reason I asked you to stay is, I've been
impressed with what you've written in the past and how cogent
your arguments are for your various positions. And, as I said
earlier, my intention, along with Chairman Lugar, is to try to,
as thoroughly and as clearly as possible, lay out for our
colleagues what options people--bright people think exist out
there, because I don't think any one of us would suggest
there's any, ``good answer'' left. I know what each of you are
proposing is not what you would do if you could wave a wand and
come to a--what you would think would be the best outcome for
Iraq and for the United States.
But let me start off with a broad question and ask each of
you to respond--in any order. And that is--tell me, if you
will--and this may be a way to meet my objective of trying to
focus, for my colleagues and for me, the alternatives--how does
what you are proposing differ--and why--from what the President
has proposed? In other words, maybe starting with you, Dr.
Kagan, I read your report, ``Choosing Victory: A Plan for
Success in Iraq.'' I may be mistaken, but it seems as though
what the President proposed has the elements of what you have
proposed, but not, if I may, the weight of how you proposed it.
And you very clearly lay out that the first stage in the
process is the Sunni neighborhoods, if I'm not mistaken--is it
19 or--you list a specific number.
Dr. Kagan. Twenty-three, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Twenty-three. Then Sadr City, then Anbar
province--which makes sense to me. I mean, if you're going to
adopt the proposal, or if you think the best outcome, and the
way to achieve it, is to surge force, you have been, in my
view, the most thoroughly honest, in the sense of laying out,
from beginning to end, what you think has to happen for there
to be success.
And so, why don't we start--as succinctly as you can, but
take what time you need. Tell me how--and I'm not looking for
you to criticize the President. I'm just--I'm just trying to
have everybody understand where the gaps are, so that when they
take a look, they know what they're talking about, what's being
said. Tell me how what you have proposed, in broad strokes or
as specific as you can get, is different than--not just what we
heard last night, but the actual plan, which obviously the
President didn't have a chance to go into every jot and tittle
of his plan--how it differs, as best you know it.
Dr. Kagan. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much for your
kind remarks about our report and also for the opportunity to
speak with you about this.
I will answer your question directly, but I would like to
offer a couple of caveats. First of all, I don't feel like I
know what the President's plan is, in any great detail. We can
look at some----
The Chairman. Fair enough.
Dr. Kagan [continuing]. Of the things that he said.
The Chairman. I'm not sure, either.
Dr. Kagan. And I'd also like to make the point that we are
going to have, apparently, a change of command in Iraq shortly,
from General Casey to General Petraeus, I hope--a man for whom
I have a tremendous amount of respect.
The Chairman. I share your view about Petraeus.
Dr. Kagan. And when General Petraeus takes command, he will
have to look at the situation afresh and develop a plan that
he's going to be comfortable executing. He's certainly not
simply going to take the plan that has been developed, you
know, before he got there, and execute it. So, I would expect
to see some changes, even in the plan that has been outlined so
far, when the actual commander gets there. That would be
normal.
Having said that, I think that the plan that the President
outlined, insofar as he did, is similar to ours in its large
aspects, apparently differs from ours in some more tactical
details, which I think are extremely important.
He did say that he would change the strategy and that he
would change the mission of United States forces in Iraq from
having the primary goal of training and transitioning to having
the primary goal of establishing security. And I think that's a
terrifically important change in strategy. It is the one that
we recommended.
And I'd like to make a point that people are focusing on
the number of additional troops that will be sent in as being
the delta between what we've been doing and what we will be
doing. And that's actually not right. We have, already,
something like 20 or 25,000 American soldiers in and around
Baghdad. They have not had it as their primary mission to
establish and maintain security in Baghdad for most of the
time. That will now become their mission. So, we're actually
talking about an increase of, you know, more like 40 or 50,000
American soldiers dedicated to this mission over what we've had
previously. And so, the change is actually rather more
significant than people have been focusing on. And that is in
accord with what we recommended.
He did say that he would send five additional combat
brigades to Baghdad as rapidly as they can get there. And that
is also what we recommended. And that is the size of the force
that we recommended.
There's been some confusion because of the way the
administration has presented numbers to match the brigades, and
I believe that that has to do with--there are different ways of
counting how many troops there are in a brigade. So, we gave a
total force increment for Iraq of 35,000. The President is
talking about 20-some thousand. I think that's a difference in
counting, more than anything else, because we recommended five
additional Army brigades and two additional Marine regimental
combat teams. The President said that it would be five American
brigades and one regimental combat team. So, the forces that
he's proposing are very parallel in size to the forces that we
proposed. And we think it's very important to have all of those
forces. And, if it were me, I would continue to fight for the
additional regimental combat team, as well, because I think
it's important to have reserves available for this operation.
Now, the President did say that the Iraqis would be in the
lead. He did talk about our forces supporting them. And he did
talk about increasing the number of our forces embedded in
Iraqi units conducting these operations. Those statements are
not in accord with what we had recommended. We believe that, in
the first instance, this has to be an American-led operation,
simply because there are not enough Iraqi forces, and they are
not trained adequately to be in the lead. And so, that is an
area of divergence.
The Chairman. If I could interrupt for a moment, we heard
testimony yesterday from a counterpart of yours, different
organization, but--Mr. O'Hanlon, and asked him how many,
``politically reliable,'' not just trained, but politically
reliable combat forces he thought were available from the Iraqi
side right now, and he gave a number of 5,000. What is your
sense of the number of available trained Iraqi forces that
could be, ``counted upon'' to fill the mission you have
envisioned for them?
Dr. Kagan. I'm sorry to say that it's not really possible
to answer that question with any degree of precision, because
I'm not sure that that knowledge actually exists.
The Chairman. Well, quite frankly, I would have been
disappointed if you had--had you given me a number, because I
share your view. I don't know----
Dr. Kagan. Right.
The Chairman [continuing]. How anybody knows that number.
Dr. Kagan. And that's why we--that's why we--when we sat
down to look at this operation, we attempted to design an
operation that could succeed even with a very low level of
Iraqi participation.
The Chairman. Gotcha.
Dr. Kagan. We think that the Iraqi participation is
important, not so much because it will provide bodies, but
because we need the--we need to have an Iraqi face on the
operation, as much as possible, and the Iraqis to interact with
their own populations, as much as possible, with our forces
present. But we are not relying on large numbers of Iraqi
forces coming, and we certainly do not want them to be
operating on their own----
The Chairman. Quite frankly, that was my reading of your
report. The second thing is--it leads me to this point, I hope
I don't come across as being cynical here, but I believe the
reason why the President and his team rejected Maliki's plan,
which was, ``You Americans stay outside the city, we'll go in,
you essentially reinforce us''--is that they feared one of two
things, probably both: That they would not be competent to do
the job, and they would essentially be Shia--I don't want to be
too--Shia forces cleansing Sunni areas, and that what we would
be doing is indirectly giving a green light to what would be
further sectarian violence rather than limiting or eliminating
sectarian violence.
Dr. Kagan. Mr. Chairman, of course, I don't know--I don't
know the details of the plan that Maliki presented or why the
administration----
The Chairman. All I know is----
Dr. Kagan [continuing]. Reacted as it did.
The Chairman [continuing]. What was characterized by----
Dr. Kagan. I understand.
If I had been presented with such a plan by the government,
I would have opposed it, on more or less precisely those
grounds.
The Chairman. Yeah. OK.
And you mentioned Tal Afar as an example in your report,
and I think you did in your statement. And in 2005, we had
roughly 5,000 American forces, with some Iraqi forces--but
5,000 American forces, if memory serves me--in a city, in a
population of about 200,000. We're talking about--and I
understand your point, I think it's a fair point--there are
roughly 25,000 American forces in and around Baghdad with a
mission other than the one that's now being assigned them. So,
it's arguably--it's intellectually credible to say that, since
the mission is being changed, the multiplier effect here is--
add those 25,000, that have been there, to the 15 or 16 or 17,
whatever the number comes to--to President's total of 21,500,
and--at least that's what the Secretary said today, four going
to Anbar. So, let's say you're adding, on top of that--you're
talking roughly--you could argue, 40,000 folks with a new
mission. Because I was wondering how you get to the
counterinsurgency ratio that most of the military people with
whom I have spoken, as far back as 3 years ago with General
Donovan, who was very frustrated that he wasn't getting the
support--the number of troops he needed, and his talking about
Anbar province--I remember him saying--and I'm paraphrasing--
that every officer learns in war college that the ratio needs
to be, and then he named it and said--not 100 to 1, not 150 to
1, and so on.
So, if you were to use your numbers in the multiplier, my
word--since it's a different mission, arguing you actually have
more people moving here is in the 25,000 range already, then I
assume that's how you make your argument that the
counterinsurgency ratio required is closer to what is taught at
the academies and the war college and--than it otherwise would
be. Is that----
Dr. Kagan. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I think if you look at the
population of the area that we were proposing to clear and
hold, in the first instance, it's something under 2 million----
The Chairman. Right.
Dr. Kagan [continuing]. Which would call for a force ratio
of between 40 or 50,000 in----
The Chairman. Right.
Dr. Kagan [continuing]. Order to meet that. And that is the
force ratio that we--that our plan would bring into that area,
because we would make full use of the forces that are already
there----
The Chairman. Gotcha.
Dr. Kagan [continuing]. And this increment.
The Chairman. I will not belabor this, but this is helpful
to me--one further apparent difference is--the President said,
last night, and I asked the Secretary today, and others did, as
well, that they are not limiting this effort to the 23
neighborhoods. Now, I don't know whether they answered the
question for political reasons or if substantively it's
correct. I'm not sure which. When it was asked, ``Do they have
the green light to go into Sadr City? Do they have the green
light to deal with the militia?''--the answer was, ``Yes; that
would be the case.'' But is your understanding that the first
phase, or the phase the President is talking about, or Petraeus
may be talking about, is more in line with your plan--to only
focus on the 23 neighborhoods, 2 million people, as opposed to
the totality of Baghdad and 6-plus-million people?
Dr. Kagan. Mr. Chairman, we've been explicit, on a number
of occasions, that our plan does see, in the initial phase,
focusing on the 23 Sunni and mixed Sunni-Shia neighborhoods and
not going into Sadr City, in the first instance. Now, that was
predicated on a number of assumptions about the difficulty that
would be entailed in going into Sadr City--in part, assuming
that the Maliki government would not be forthcoming with
support for doing that. If, in fact, the Maliki government is
going to be forthcoming with that support, then that would
change the equation, but we have not had the opportunity to go
back and reevaluate, you know, what our force ratio assumptions
would be in that circumstance.
The Chairman. Well, I'd respectfully suggest, if that is
the case, the force ratios are a little out of whack, and
you're going to be dealing with the different situation.
The last question on this point, and again, I have so many
questions. My temptation would be to keep you here all night,
all of you. Where Petraeus has been successful--and he has
been--in the past, north of Baghdad, in dealing with an
insurgency, it's been an insurgency, as opposed to sectarian
strife and a civil war. Say it another way. A mixed
neighborhood in Baghdad is different than going into Tal Afar,
where the insurgents are the former Baathists, Saddamists, et
cetera, and/or al-Qaeda, and their target being us and/or
government troops. When you go into a neighborhood--and I want
the public to understand we're not talking about a neighborhood
of 500 people, we're talking about neighborhoods that are tens
of thousands of people--when you go in a neighborhood where the
problem is within the neighborhood, if it's a mixed
neighborhood, people are, figuratively speaking, crossing the
street, killing each other, and/or if it's not an integrated
neighborhood, primarily a Shia neighborhood, you have death
squads wearing uniforms and/or the Mahdi Militia coming in and
taking them out. That's a little different circumstance than
dealing with an insurgency, isn't it?
Dr. Kagan. Mr. Chairman, I have to, respectfully, disagree
with your premise. Tal Afar actually is a mixed city. It is
mixed Sunni/Shia. It's also mixed between Arab and Turkoman and
Kurd. And all of those factions were, in fact, shooting at one
another, and H.R. McMaster, the commander of the unit that
cleared Tal Afar in 2005, has described, in great detail, there
would be circumstances where Sunni snipers would climb turrets,
fire into Shia neighborhoods to commit casualties, and then
those same Sunni snipers would actually climb down, cross over
into the Shia neighborhoods and fire back into the Sunni
neighborhoods to commit atrocities in precisely the same sort
of effort, to incite sectarian civil war within Tal Afar. And
so, it actually was very similar to what's going on in Baghdad,
and, in many respects----
The Chairman. Had the mosque--had the Samarra mosque been
taken out, at that point?
Dr. Kagan. No, Mr. Chairman; it hadn't. And, even so, there
was this very high level of intersectarian violence. And, in
addition to that, the Sunni insurgents had established real
strongholds in Tal Afar. They had video booths where they would
tape their messages and beheadings. I mean, they had a real
professional apparatus, and were ready to receive us.
The Chairman. Gotcha.
Dr. Kagan. Because we've been operating continually in a
lot of the Baghdad neighborhoods that we're talking about going
into, in most of those areas they don't have anything like the
same degree of preparation. But, no; I think we actually
already have seen success in dealing with this sort of
sectarian conflict.
The Chairman. OK. Last question for you, if I may. We
heard, this morning, about the successes that are taking place
in Anbar province, according to the Secretary. And she cited
that certain of the tribal chiefs, very upset with the al-
Qaeda, have sent their sons to Jordan to be trained to come
back, ostensibly, and be a resistance to al-Qaeda intervention,
and, I suspect, to not be as cooperative with the insurgency,
the former Saddamists and Baathists. Can you tell me if you
know anything about that?
Dr. Kagan. Mr. Chairman, only what I've seen in newspapers
and what I've heard about. I mean, it does appear that some of
the sheikhs in Anbar have become frustrated with the ongoing
civil war. And I think it's very important to understand that
the Sunni Arab insurgency is not monolithic, either.
The Chairman. No.
Dr. Kagan. And there is divergence of views even within the
Islamist wing. Al-Qaeda in Iraq says that it's OK to kill Iraqi
civilians. Ansar al-Sunna has taken the position, often, that
it isn't. There are disputes among these groups about tactics,
techniques, goals, and so forth. And I think what we're seeing
in Anbar province is the beginning of a splintering of this
movement. Now, I think if we continue the process of
establishing security to make it possible for these guys to
participate more directly, and if the Maliki government will
reach out in a situation of improving security, to offer the
necessary reconciliation to bring them into the fold, I think
it's possible that we can see significant political progress.
The Chairman. Question for the three of you. And you need
not answer it, if you choose not to. If you had to take a bet,
how many of you would bet that Maliki is the Prime Minister in
November of this year?
Dr. Carpenter. The answer to that question, Mr. Chairman,
depends very much on whether we are serious about pressing the
Maliki government to take on the Shiite militias and to
neutralize Muqtada Sadr. If we are serious about that, I think
that places Maliki in an almost impossible position and that
that will severely undercut his political base. It would make
it very likely that he would not be Prime Minister by November.
If this is merely a rhetorical flourish on the part of the Bush
administration, and this is substantively an effort to go after
the Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad, and to suppress the Sunni
insurgency, and the talk of going after the Shia militia is
just political cover, then I think Maliki may be a skillful
enough politician to survive and be Prime Minister at the end
of the year.
The Chairman. Ambassador.
Ambassador Galbraith. I think Dr. Carpenter's analysis is
as good as any. The problem is that the Maliki government rests
on a narrow margin within the I'tilaf, within the Shiite
Alliance. In the electoral battle between Abel Abdul Mahdi and
Jaafari, Jaafari prevailed by one vote. And other elements,
notably the Kurds, but perhaps some of the Sunnis, might well
prefer Mahdi to Maliki. Indeed, the Bush administration may
tire of Maliki, because he's not much more effective than
Jaafari. Although he doesn't have some of Jaafari's annoying
personal traits, he hasn't been much more effective as a
leader.
No matter who is the Government of Iraq we're going to get
tired of them, because they're not going to be effective,
because they don't have the agenda that we want them to have,
and they don't exercise the power that we wish they would.
The Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, let's just ask: In your
partition scenario, what happens to Iraqis' oil wealth?
Ambassador Galbraith. The Iraqis are on the verge of
concluding a deal that will, at least for some period of time,
share the oil revenues on the basis of population. The
distribution of oil revenues has never been a central issue.
The central issue has been who controls the oilfields. And that
has been central for the Kurds, and some of the Shiites,
because they do not want to go back to the situation where
Baghdad cuts the check and Baghdad has all the power.
The Chairman. Right.
Ambassador Galbraith. Like any federal system, frankly,
they understand that it works only when there are local sources
of revenue. But, in terms of how that revenue is distributed,
there is a broad consensus to share it. Now, if Iraq does not
hold together as a state, then you----
The Chairman. Well, under your scenario, it's not a state,
correct?
Ambassador Galbraith. Well, it--my view is that, over the
long term, it will not survive as a single state.
The Chairman. Right.
Ambassador Galbraith. Which, incidently, doesn't mean that
I think it's going to split into three states. If you asked
them, both Sunnis and Shiites would say, ``Yes; we're Iraqis.''
The trouble is, they have such radically vision of what that
means that I believe it is better to do what the Shiites want
to do and what the Sunnis still resist, which is to have their
own regions. But that's really a decision for the Sunnis to
make. The Kurds, it's entirely different. They----
The Chairman. No, I----
Ambassador Galbraith [continuing]. They don't want to be
part of Iraq.
The Chairman. No; I got that, about the Kurds. My concern
is that I don't see, absent essentially letting a civil war
rage from Anbar province down through Basrah, and let the
outcome dictate who runs the show in those two areas--short of
that, I don't know what's left for the Sunnis. I mean, if they
end up with three different states, in effect, the inclination
to share oil ain't gonna be around, and there's nothing there,
there in Anbar province.
Ambassador Galbraith. First, if the Kurds actually leave,
they will take with them a percentage of Iraq's oil reserves
that is approximately the same as their share of Iraq's
population. So, that's----
The Chairman. Right.
Ambassador Galbraith [continuing]. That's not a big issue.
So, the issue is in Arab Iraq.
The Chairman. Right.
Ambassador Galbraith. Will the Shiites be prepared to give
to the Sunni region a percentage that is equal to the Sunni
percentage of the population? I don't know the answer to that.
Right now, the Shiites have agreed to such a formula. That
they'll continue to be generous toward the Sunnis in conditions
of an ongong civil war, or if the civil war intensifies, is not
likely. And, in fact, it----
The Chairman. Right.
Ambassador Galbraith [continuing]. Could have a very bad
ending. And that is why, with regard to Arab Iraq, I believe
that the plan that I've put forward and that you have put
forward is the only way to go. It is a plan that protects the
Sunnis by allowing them to have their own region, to provide
for their own security, and, if it's implemented soon, would
come at time when there is still enough political will there to
guarantee them a share of revenue. This revenue-sharing should
be done through legislation--as has already been agreed--and
not by trying to change the Iraqi Constitution, which is as
difficult to change as our own. But if the Sunnis don't move to
establish their own region, if the civil war spins on for
another year or two, I think it's unlikely----
The Chairman. Just--let me just--one of things I want to
get straight here, make sure I understand it. The legislation
that's already agreed to is agreed to, in principle, by a
committee, a group of people meeting. There has not been any
legislation introduced, there has not been any legislation
passed, am I correct in that? The Iraqi Parliament has not
passed any legislation saying that--I remember, I was in--over
the Fourth of July, I met with Mr. Maliki in his office, and I
asked him about two issues. One was federation or regionalism,
as their Constitution calls for, and the second was about
allocation of oil revenues. He said, ``Aw, the Constitution has
already taken care of that.'' And I said, ``Well, with all due
respect, Mr. Prime Minister, you and I may be the only two who
have read the Constitution. It doesn't say that. It says
`equitable share,' or some such language, but there's no
guarantee what that means.'' Said, ``There's no need for
that.''
So, I just want to be clear that whether or not there is--
if you know if there is, or is about to be introduced--
legislation that the tribal chiefs in--the tribal leaders in
Anbar province can say, ``I know I'm now going to get''----
Ambassador Galbraith. Well, the----
The Chairman [continuing]. ``20 percent of the revenue, or
whatever.''
Ambassador Galbraith [continuing]. The legislation that is
pending is an oil law, and it's a very complicated law that
entails many compromises. It's one thing to say, as does the
Constitution, that the regions have control over new oil, but
to implement that, in terms of----
The Chairman. It's very hard.
Ambassador Galbraith [continuing]. Pipelines and everything
else is difficult. But the oil law will do this and it is
mostly agreed. Some issues remain between Kurdistan and Arab
Iraq, but there's a good chance that they'll be resolved.
The Chairman. Well----
Ambassador Galbraith. It also includes the provisions for
revenue-sharing, which, however, will be done in a separate
law. The problem is this. The Sunnis do not consider 20 percent
to be their share of the population, and they don't consider
it, therefore, to be their fair share of the oil wealth. And,
furthermore, until 2003, they got 70 to 80 percent of the oil
wealth.
The Chairman. Oh, I know that. That was----
Ambassador Galbraith. So, 20 percent is--even if we think
it's fair, they don't think it's fair.
The Chairman. Well, you know, it's amazing how people's
attitudes change when faced with the realistic alternatives
they may face. In my meeting with major oil executives--not
just American-based companies, but foreign companies--I don't
understand why, 3 years ago, the President didn't bring some of
these guys in, and bring in the major informed elements of the
three communities, and say, ``Look, you know, you're not--
listen to these guys, they're not going to invest the $40
billion you need to develop your fields unless you have a
national oil policy, unless you have some reason to make them
believe you're going to be able to do this without any real
prospect of them being blown up.'' But that goes another way.
Let me ask another question, and I won't keep you much
longer. Up until recently--and I'm not sure what I think right
now, but up until recently, I have come away from my visits to
Iraq with the following sense of things: That, from 2004--
really, early 2005, up until mid-2006, the Kurds, although
overwhelmingly wanting independence, reached the tentative
conclusion that--if they seek independence, or if the nation
falls apart, and they are able to declare themselves
independent because there is an all-out civil war--that they
are not about to give up on Kirkuk, and the Turks aren't about
to let them have their way in Kirkuk; and that, although, on
the one hand, they would look like they're in pretty good
shape, they would be inviting both the Iranians and the Turks
to come after them. And so, it's better for them to be in a
position where this gets played out over a longer haul, as long
as they're able to maintain the autonomy they now have; and
that the Sunnis, at least the tribal leadership, has reached
the conclusion they're not going to be in control like they
were--I mean, 70 percent of the oil, 90 percent of the power,
et cetera--in their lifetimes, and it's better to work out some
accommodation where at least they're secure, as long as they
actually have a source of revenue. And the Shia, although they
now have met their expectation and desire to be the dominant
political force, absent some kind of ultimate arrangement, they
are not going to be in a position to be able to prevent,
``their mosques'' from being blown up over the next decade, and
more. And so, there was the possibility of a political
accommodation.
But I'm not sure that prevails anymore, because, talking to
these folks, I think the Shia think they can take out the
Sunnis, the Sunnis think they can take out the Shia, and the
Kurds think they could probably negotiate, literally negotiate,
their independent status without having a full-blown conflict
with the Turks and the Iranians.
Give me your sense of what the mindset, in your view, is.
And I realize that there's Shia on Shia, as well as Shia on
Sunni, and so on. I realize there will be competition within a
Shia region, if it were to be voted. I think that's one of the
reasons why Sadr sided with the Sunnis in voting against the
legislation to allow for the regional system to come into play
18 months from now. But, what do you think--how do you think
they view their equities, each of the parties, the major
parties, in an all-out conflict?
Dr. Kagan. I think we need to address that question in two
ways, because I think, right--there is how they feel about that
now, and there's the question of how they would feel about that
if we actually could get the security situation under control,
because I think it's not possible to overestimate the impact
that the current violence has on everyone's attitudes, and also
that everyone's beliefs about our intentions have on their
attitudes. I think that current Shia attitudes are heavily
fueled by the fact that the Sunni insurgency is not under
control and they are under continual attack, and by the belief
that we are not going to bring the Sunni insurgency under
control, and that we are, in fact, going to leave, shortly,
which I do believe is their actual mindset, or had been, to
this point.
Now, if we make it clear that we actually are going to
bring the Sunni insurgency under control and we are going to
provide them with a basic level of security, and, therefore,
we're going to eliminate the need for them to go out and do
that on their own, which does pose significant challenges and
costs to them--and I think we should keep that in mind--I think
that much as Maliki might lean in that direction if no other
solution is presented to him, he does have to recognize that
even a Shia victory, in that context, will be unutterably
bloody for him and will impose all sorts of costs on his
government and on different factions within the Shia groups,
will compromise their ability to form a subsequent stable
government, and so forth, and will lead to perennial
instability.
So, I think the issue is: How will they feel about that,
when we have offered them an alternative, when we have made it
clear that we are going to bring the Sunni insurgency under
control, and that they don't have to do that? I believe that
that will change their attitudes pretty fundamentally. Now, I
believe, in addition to that, that there is evidence,
especially, as you've brought up, in Anbar from among the
tribal sheikhs and elsewhere, and even from things that I hear
from the--my former students, who are now in Baghdad and who
tell me about popular attitudes that they're encountering as
they patrol the streets--and some of them actually are living
in the neighborhoods now--among the Sunni. And there is some
evidence, I think, that this--there is beginning to be a
weariness of this conflict and a willingness to end it in a
more reasonable way if they could be assured that they were not
going to be under continual attack by Shia militias.
And so, I think the issue is, we have to be able to imagine
what Iraq looks like when we have brought the violence in the
mixed areas of Baghdad actually under control. I believe we
can. We can have an argument about whether we can or not. But
if we do, then that will change the political equation very
fundamentally, in my view.
The Chairman. That's the basic premise of your position.
Dr. Kagan. Yes; exactly.
Dr. Carpenter. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Yes.
Dr. Carpenter. I think that's the crux of the disagreement.
I do not believe there is a realistic prospect that we can
achieve a secure environment, that we can suppress the Sunni
insurgency, at least that we can do so at anything resembling a
reasonable cost, in terms of blood and treasure, to our own
country. Yes; if we occupied Iraq with a very large army, 4 or
500,000 troops, and were willing to stay for many, many years,
we would have a chance of stabilizing the security environment.
But we don't have that option. I don't think there would be 1
American in 20 who would favor paying the price that would be
required to achieve that result. Absent that result, what we're
seeing in Iraq is this ongoing civil war, where the Shia have
concluded this is their moment, this is when they can reverse
decades, generations, of subjugation by the Sunnis. They are
not going to pass up that opportunity, and they are not likely
to be gentle when they do achieve full power.
The Sunnis increasingly are in defensive mode. Rather than
having as the primary objective--driving American forces out of
Iraq--it is the terrible fear that, if they don't forestall the
establishment of a Shia-dominated government on a permanent
basis, that they are faced with, at best, massive
discrimination, third-class citizenship in their own country,
and, at worse, ongoing ethnic cleansing and terrible
consequences in that regard.
The Kurds are off with their own agenda. What we're going
to see is Kurdistan become the Taiwan of that part of the
world. It will be an independent country in everything except
extensive international diplomatic recognition, but it will be
an independent country. The danger for the Kurds is what you
have identified--that they could overreach. If they insist on
gaining the oil riches in and around Kirkuk, they create the
risk of outside intervention, certainly by Turkey, perhaps by
Iran. Where we can play a constructive role there is to
convince Turkey, especially, that this would be an unwise move,
that it is, in fact, in Turkey's best interest to have a
stable, democratic Kurdistan as a buffer between Turkey and
what is likely to be ``Chaos-stan'' in the rest of Iraq. That
is, again, an achievable objective, I think, if we work hard at
it. And Kurdistan may be able to have a reasonably stable and
peaceful existence. The rest of Iraq is going to be a cauldron
of chaos unless we are willing to pay a huge price, over a very
long term, in both blood and treasure.
Ambassador Galbraith. First, I think I agree with what Dr.
Carpenter has just said, so I won't repeat it. But I agree with
your point that the space for political compromise has
diminished and perhaps disappeared. But the fundamental problem
is that Maliki represents a Shiite constituency that wants to
define Iraq as a Shiite state. And, for the Sunnis, there is no
way--even for those who despise the insurgency--that they can
accept that definition of Iraq. It does not include them. They
see Iraq's Shiite rulers as alien. On the gallows, Saddam
Hussein spoke for many Sunnis when he warned against ``the
Persians'' by which he clearly meant Iraq's Shiite leaders.
With differences that are so deep, these other fixes, such as
sharing oil revenue, are not going to satisfy the Sunnis.
With regard to the Kurds, my view is simple, and certainly
influenced by my experience in the Balkans, which is where you
have people who unanimously don't want to be part of a state,
you can only keep them in that state by brute force. Now, the
fortunate thing that distinguishes Iraq from Yugoslavia in
1991, is the Kurds--unlike the Slovenes and Croatians--are bent
on a headstrong rush to immediate independence. So, I think
there's a period of time to work out many of the problems could
result from full independence. I think what Dr. Carpenter said
is right; Kurdistan is already Taiwan. Just as, if Taiwan would
declare itself independent if the opportunity arose, so will
Kurdistan. The Kurds believe this time will come and they won't
do anything precipitate.
My final point relates to the major outstanding issue for
Kurdistan, namely boundaries of Kurdistan? Disputes between
Kurds and Arabs over these boundaries could, by the end of this
year, be a whole new source of violence in Iraq. Now, this is
an issue on which the United States can do something
diplomatically, and yet has been totally absent. Why can we do
something diplomatically? Because we actually have influence
with the Kurds. We can help Kurds and Arabs draw lines that
both see as fair. But, I also think we can use our influence
with the Kurds to caution them against overreaching on the
territorial issue, because, at the moment, they have the upper
hand.
That, then, leaves the issue of Kirkuk. There is, in Iraq's
Constitution, a formula for solving Kirkuk through a
referendum. Kirkuk has been a source of conflict in Iraq for
the entire history of Iraq. I don't see any merit in postponing
or getting rid of this provision. The issue needs to be
settled. But what can be done in advance of the referendum is
to entrench power-sharing in Kirkuk among its four
communities--the Kurds, the Turkomen, the Arabs, and the
Christians--so that after the referendum, none of these
communities feel that they're losers. But, again, the time to
do that is now. Once you have the referendum and it's part of
Kurdistan, which is what I expect, or it's not, then the
possibilities for compromise are much worse. After the
referendum is too late.
The Chairman. Gentlemen, there is a lot more I'd like to
ask you. I wish I could say there will be no need to call you
back, but my guess is that we'll need your advice and input
several months from now, as well. And, again, I genuinely
appreciate the amount of time, effort, expertise, and
commitment you've all applied in arriving at your various
positions.
I thought this morning's hearing was--the term is overused,
to say it was historic, but I thought it was extremely
significant, in that it would be impossible for anyone to have
listened to it this morning and not come to the conclusion that
there is very little support for the approach the President is
pursuing. And I hope he'll be willing to adjust, as he moves
forward. My prayer would be his proposal is right, it works,
everything works out. That would be my prayer, but that is, I
think, just that; a prayer.
Let me also note that I was informed by my staff that our
bad fortune is Dr. Galbraith's good fortune, and that is that
Nancy Stetson, who has been a senior member of this committee
for a couple of decades, is--is that--am I correct?--is
joining--oh, I thought you were joining it. I'm sorry. I'm
sorry. I'm sorry. I thought--actually, our bad fortune is your
missed opportunity. [Laughter.]
I thought, Nance, the note I got, to show you how smart I
am, I thought it said you were joining Ambassador Galbraith.
They got a--you had a better offer, OK. I--well, I'm getting
out of this negotiation, I tell you right now. [Laughter.]
Anyway, Nancy, we're going to miss you. You've been an
incredible, incredible resource for the committee, and for me,
personally, and so, you'll be joining the ranks of the famous
no-longer-employed Foreign Relations Committee staffers, and I
hope your success is as stellar as the Ambassador's has been.
Ambassador Galbraith. And, if I may add, we'll be seeing
her in New England, where we also expect to be seeing you.
The Chairman. Well, you will be seeing me in New England. I
don't know--guessing the outcome of that is probably easier
than guessing the outcome of Iraq.
But, anyway, at any rate, I thank you all very, very much.
I thank the audience for your interest here. There's a lot at
stake. And, as I said, this has been very helpful.
We will adjourn.
[Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Statement Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Daniel Serwer, Vice President, Peace and
Stability Operations, U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC *
TROOPS ALONE ARE NOT THE ANSWER--CIVILIAN EFFORTS IN IRAQ NEED
STRENGTHENING
As vice president for peace and stability operations at the U.S.
Institute of Peace, I have, for 3 years, supervised a congressionally
funded peacebuilding effort in Iraq, after a decade spent on Balkans
peacebuilding efforts both at the State Department and USIP. I also
acted as executive director of the Iraq Study Group last year. But I
offer you today only my personal views--I do not speak for USIP or for
the Study Group.
Vital American interests should determine our future course of
action in Iraq. I would list them in the following order:
1. Stabilize a united Iraq and the region. We have to tamp
down the civil conflict and prevent it from spreading to, or
involving, Iraq's neighbors.
2. Prevent terrorist threats to America and its allies. We
must ensure that Iraq does not become a platform for operations
abroad by al-Qaeda or other terrorists.
3. Restore flexibility in the use of U.S. forces. Our
military is overcommitted today; we need to rebuild its
capacity to react to events elsewhere in the world.
4. Return America to a preeminent global position. We need to
regain moral, military, and diplomatic standing in a world that
views us as compromised, weakened, and ineffective.
Let me also mention interests we should renounce: We need no
guaranteed access to oil or permanent bases, and we must not take sides
in a civil war or a broader Sunni-Shia conflict.
No simple solution
There is no simple course of action that will satisfy our vital
interests. Precipitous withdrawal of American forces from Iraq might
help us regain flexibility, but would not prevent parts of Iraq from
being used as a terrorist platform. Nor would withdrawal stabilize the
country or the region. Breaking Iraq up into sectarian zones would
likewise allow parts of Iraq to be used by terrorists and would
destabilize the region.
I am not a military expert, but to me additional U.S. forces make
sense only in support of a broader civilian peacebuilding effort aimed
at political reconciliation and economic stabilization, and only if
there is a target date for turnover of combat responsibilities to Iraqi
forces. The political situation in Iraq and in the United States will
not permit American forces to continue combat for several years. Nor
will the global situation, which requires U.S. forces to be available
for contingencies elsewhere. In any event, Sunni and Shia both need the
wakeup call that a target date will provide.
Increasing troop levels will not suffice--we need a broader approach
So much attention has been paid to troop levels that other
requirements to stabilize Iraq are not being discussed. The grave and
deteriorating situation in Iraq is not due to military failure. Our
troops have fought well and hard. It is due to indigenous political
forces largely beyond our control, as well as planning, diplomatic and
economic failures, all of which are civilian responsibilities. If we
only beef up U.S. troop presence, without intensifying civilian
efforts, the situation will continue to deteriorate.
Additional civilian resources are required. Only a small fraction
of the funds Congress has appropriated for Iraq has gone to civilian
efforts--less than 10 percent. Future funding should include $5 billion
for civilian peacebuilding. Five times the current level--below $1
billion per year--this is still a small percentage of the total.
What can be done with new civilian resources? The primary goal
should be national reconciliation through strengthening rule of law and
the moderate center. Holding Iraq together will require increasing
governing capacity at the central, regional, and provincial levels
including the judicial as well as the executive and legislative
branches--and building up civil society. We should support the many
courageous Iraqis who are willing to reach across sectarian lines to
build a democratic Iraq.
The U.S. Institute of Peace has been engaged since early 2004 in
this work, devoting a modest but productive $5 million per year
provided by Congress to prevent sectarian violence, build up the rule
of law, and educate and train a new generation of leaders. For example,
we support a network of 25 Iraqis who undertake intersectarian dialog
efforts in their own communities, demonstrably reducing violence. Does
it make sense that USIP's appropriation for Iraq has been cut 40
percent? Similar cuts are affecting the work of other organizations
doing vital reconciliation work in Iraq.
What about the economic front? I do not believe jobs will prevent
terrorism. I also doubt the ability of the U.S. Government to create
jobs in the private sector at home, much less abroad. The best we can
do for the Iraqis is to help with their oil sector, which they should
run as a commercial enterprise in the interests of the whole country.
We should also provide microcredits to small enterprises and funds to
our military commanders, embassy and provincial reconstruction teams,
for small-scale improvements to stabilize local situations. But I would
not suggest a massive national jobs program, which would likely be
exploited by insurgents and militias for their own purposes.
Neither politics nor the economy in Iraq will go far on American
money alone. The Iraqis need to take on far more responsibility. Prime
Minister Maliki's ``milestones'' have now been published: We have
target dates for passage of the oil law, rolling back de-
Baathification, and a clampdown on militias. He is already at risk of
missing several of them. We need to convey a much more serious message
about the need to meet milestones, and our willingness to assist, while
remaining flexible about timing and realistic about the capacity of any
leadership in Iraq today to meet expectations.
Diplomacy is an essential ingredient
Neither military nor civilian efforts will be successful inside
Iraq without a diplomatic component. We need help from our friends and
allies as well as self-interested cooperation from Iraq's neighbors,
two of which are our adversaries.
Our diplomatic strategy should be multilateral: We need a ``contact
group'' that includes all of Iraq's immediate neighbors. It is within
this multilateral forum that we should talk with Syria and Iran, as we
are doing with North Korea in the six-party talks.
The purpose of talking with Damascus and Tehran is to discover if
there are areas of mutual interest, in particular in stabilizing Iraq
as U.S. troops begin to withdraw. Both Syria and Iran stand to lose a
great deal if Iraq comes apart. Neither is likely to be able to seal
itself off from refugees and internal unrest (at the least among the
Kurds and possibly among other groups, including the Sunni majority in
Syria). Neither Iran nor Syria is in good shape to meet these
challenges. While their concept of what contributes to stability may
not coincide with ours, there is a real possibility of finding some
areas of mutual interest, as we did with Iran on Afghanistan.
The only reason for not talking with Damascus and Tehran is hope
that the regimes will soon change for the better. I am not in principle
opposed to regime change--I played a role in conceptualizing the effort
that brought down Slobodan Milosevic peacefully. But I see no evidence
that regime change is imminent.
Conclusions
Let me summarize in conclusion the course of action I would propose
for the United States in Iraq today, and that I hope might find support
on both sides of the aisle in Congress:
1. Washington should commit itself to an intensified
diplomatic, political, economic, and if necessary, military
effort over the course of this year to stabilize Iraq and to
lay the basis for beginning to drawdown U.S. combat troops by a
date certain.
2. Civilian resources for Iraq should be increased sharply to
$5 billion per year, with a multiyear commitment to
strengthening Iraqi institutions at all levels and supporting
those in civil society prepared to contribute to peacebuilding.
3. The political effort should focus on reconciliation--
helping the Iraqis to meet clearly defined milestones and
building up governing capacity at all levels.
4. The essential diplomatic component should be multilateral
and include direct talks with Damascus and Tehran. A
Presidential envoy--someone whom the President trusts to pursue
U.S. interests with vigor--should be appointed for this
purpose.
I hasten to add that if my suggestions were fully adopted, the
likelihood of even relative success would increase only marginally. We
are in deep; getting out is not going to be easy, painless, or quick.
Nor can we get out completely: We will have to remain engaged in Iraq
for years to come, and in the region for the foreseeable future. How we
handle Iraq will have repercussions for many years to come. We need to
use the next year for a last, best effort to achieve relative success.
After that I see no alternative to phasing out the U.S. combat role and
allowing the Iraqis to cope for themselves, with--conditions
permitting--training and other military assistance and a robust,
continuing civilian assistance effort.
* (Note.--This testimony presents the personal views of the author, not
those of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not take
positions on policy issues.)
REGIONAL DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY
----------
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 17, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden,
Jr. (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold, Bill
Nelson, Obama, Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Webb, Lugar, Hagel,
Coleman, Corker, Sununu, Murkowski, Isakson, and Vitter.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order, please.
Today, we continue our comprehensive examination of the
remaining options in Iraq. And our witnesses today have
multiple talents, but they're going to focus, I hope, on
helping us evaluate the role of regional diplomacy and what
role it can play, if any, in stabilizing Iraq or in containing
the fallout within Iraq if stability within Iraq proves
elusive.
It is one thing to call for regional diplomacy, as many
have. It's another thing to actually do it. And it seems to me
we have to start with answers to some very critical questions,
or at least a shot at them.
One is: How do Iraqis' neighbors see their interests? And
do these interests overlap or conflict with ours? Is it
possible to devise a framework that would encourage Iraq's
neighbors to work cooperatively to stabilize Iraq? Can Iraq's
neighbors influence groups within Iraq with whom they have
close ties? And what role, if any, should the United States
play in forging this regional cooperation? Is there a price for
such cooperation? And, if so, what is it? And is the
alternative to cooperation a regional proxy war?
As we explore the answers to these questions, I'd like to
make one thing clear at the outset so I don't fly under any
false colors here. I have trouble accepting--as a matter of
fact, I don't accept--the notion that there is a direct linkage
between the situation in Iraq and the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The Arab-Israeli conflict, peace between the Arabs and the
Israelis or Palestinians, is obviously worth pursuing, worth
pursuing vigorously, and worth pursuing vigorously on its own
merits. But, even if a peace treaty were signed tomorrow, I do
not believe it would end the civil war in Iraq. And maybe our
colleagues can speak to that connection, if there is any.
To help guide our discussion today, we're joined by a very
strong panel of witnesses, and that is not hyperbole. They have
tremendous experience in the region. It's doubtful we could get
three people with stronger views and more serious high-level
experience in the region.
Ambassador Richard Haass is the president of the Council on
Foreign Relations, and, from 2001 to 2003, he was the director
of the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department. He's also
a very good friend of this committee, and I consider him a
friend, if that doesn't hurt his reputation. But every member
on this committee, I suspect, feels the same way. He's also the
author of a first-rate article entitled, ``The New Middle
East,'' in the recent issue of Foreign Affairs magazine. I
recommend it to everyone.
Ambassador Dennis Ross' name is synonymous with the Arab-
Israeli peace process. For more than 12 years, spanning two
administrations, one Republican, one Democrat, he led our
Nation's efforts to secure a lasting peace in the Middle East.
He's currently a counselor and the Ziegler distinguished fellow
at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
And Dr. Vali Nasr is a professor of national security
affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. His recent book,
which I read with great interest, ``The Shia Revival,'' has
made, I think, a significant contribution to our understanding
of the forces that have been unleashed by the war in Iraq.
We are incredibly fortunate to have these three men with us
today, and I look forward to hearing their testimony.
I'll now yield to Chairman Lugar.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this
hearing, which I believe is one of the most important ones in
our series.
National debate on Iraq is focused intensely on what the
role of United States forces should be at this stage of the
war. The stakes surrounding this decision are particularly
high, as American service men and women have made enormous
sacrifices in Iraq during the last 4 years. Should we attempt
to expand neighborhood-level security in Baghdad or elsewhere?
Can such a strategy help establish order and create space for
the government and the security forces to solidify themselves?
Should we increase troop levels to achieve such a mission?
We have heard testimony from experts with a wide range of
opinions on these questions. Some back the President's plan to
commit more troops, others suggest this is a waste of time and
resources, or that the President's remedy will fall far short
of what is needed. But, even as we debate specific issues of
military policy and troop deployment, we must see the broader
picture. And whenever we begin to think of Iraq as a set piece,
an isolated problem that can be solved outside the context of
our broader Middle East interest, we should reexamine our frame
of reference.
The underlying issue for American foreign policy is how we
defend our interests in the Middle East, given the new
realities that our 4 years in Iraq have imposed. This hearing
will focus on this broader question. Both our friends and our
enemies must know we are willing to exercise the substantial
leverage we possess in the region in the form of military
presence, financial assistance, diplomatic context, and other
resources. Although a political settlement in Iraq cannot be
imposed from the outside, it is equally unlikely that one will
succeed in the absence of external pressure and incentives.
Some strategists within our Government saw the intervention
in Iraq as a geostrategic chess move designed to remake the
Middle East. But even if the President's current plan
substantially improves conditions in Iraq, the outcome in that
country is going to be imperfect. Iraq will not soon become the
type of pluralist unified democratic bulwark in the center of
the Middle East for which some in the Bush administration had
hoped.
Developing a broader Middle East strategy is all the more
urgent, given that our intervention in Iraq has fundamentally
changed the power balance in the region. In particular, the
fall of Saddam Hussein's Sunni government opened up
opportunities for Iran to seek much greater influence in Iraq.
An Iran that is bolstered by an alliance with a Shiite
government in Iraq, or a separate Shiite state in southern
Iraq, would pose serious challenges for Saudi Arabia, Jordan,
Egypt, and other Arab governments. Iran is pressing a broad
agenda in the Middle East, with uncertain consequences, for
weapons proliferation, terrorism, the security of Israel, and
other United States interests. Any course we adopt in Iraq
should consider how it will impact the regional influence of
Iran.
Despite our current focus on Iraq, the President and the
Congress must be preparing the American people and our allies
for what comes next. We should recognize that conditions of
national fatigue can impose severe limits on our
decisionmaking. If the President's Iraq plan is not successful,
calls for a rapid withdrawal from Iraq will intensify. If a
withdrawal eventually does occur, it may happen in an
atmosphere in which American fatigue with Iraq deployment
limits our ability to address issues of vital national urgency
elsewhere in the Middle East. We need frank policy discussions
in this country about our vital interests in the region.
The difficulties we have had in Iraq make a strong presence
in the Middle East more imperative, and not less. Our Nation
must understand that, if and when we withdraw, or redeployment
from Iraq occurs, it will not mean that our interests in the
Middle East have diminished. In fact, it may mean we will need
to bolster our military, diplomatic, and economic presence
elsewhere in the Middle East.
Regardless of decisions on troop levels in Iraq, we must go
to work now on a broader Middle East strategy that reveals
critical relationships in the region, includes an attempt to
reinvigorate the Arab-Israeli peace process. We should also be
planning how we can continue to project military power in the
Middle East, how we bolster allies in the region, how we
protect oil flows, how we prevent and react to terrorist
threats. This will require sustained engagement by our
Government. Secretary Rice has begun that process with her
current trip to the region, and I'm hopeful she will get the
support and priority that she needs to accelerate our diplomacy
in the Middle East.
I am also hopeful our Government will be aggressive and
creative in pursuing a regional dialog. Inevitably, when anyone
suggests such a diplomatic course, it is interpreted as
advocating talks with Syria and Iran, nations that have overtly
and covertly worked against our interests and violated
international norms. As I stated at the hearing with Secretary
Rice, the purpose of talks is not to change our posture toward
those countries, nor should we compromise vital interests or
strike ethereal bargains that cannot be verified. But if we
lack the flexibility to communicate with unfriendly regimes, we
increase the chances of miscalculation, undercut our ability to
take advantage of any favorable situations, and potentially
limit the regional leverage with which we can confront Iran and
Syria.
We should be mindful that Iranian ambitions, coupled with
disorder in Iraq, have caused consternation in many parts of
the Arab world. Under certain scenarios, Arab governments may
become more receptive to coordination with the United States on
a variety of fronts. In addition, though Iran--or, rather,
though Iran and Syria cooperate closely, their interests
diverge, in many cases. And the regional dialog I am suggesting
does not have to occur in a formal conference setting, but it
needs to occur, and it needs to be sustained.
I welcome, along with the chairman, a very distinguished
panel, and we look forward to your insights.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator.
With the chairman's permission, I think we'll limit our
rounds to 8 minutes, and try to get through. And I will suggest
to our witnesses that, since it's only 8 minutes, when the
clock begins, I may direct questions to you individually. Each
of you are fully capable of answering every one of the
questions I have, but, in order to try to get more questions
in, quite frankly, I'm going to just put one of you in the
barrel each time, if that's OK with you.
I asked the staff what the protocol here is, that both
Richard and Dennis have had significant positions in the
administration. I don't know who goes first, so I decided to go
with age. So, we're going to start with you, Dennis, first,
and----
[Laughter.]
The Chairman [continuing]. And then we'll go to Richard,
and then we'll go to Dr. Nasr.
And welcome, again. We're delighted to have you here.
STATEMENT OF HON. DENNIS ROSS, COUNSELOR AND ZIEGLER
DISTINGUISHED FELLOW, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST
POLICY, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Ross. Thank you. I'm always happy to be the
oldest one to present first. [Laughter.]
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And it's--I think it's an
important time to be here. And I think this is an--a
particularly important part of the way of looking at this
issue.
I'm looking at this from the standpoint of what will be the
regional dimension and its impact on Iraq; less, really, the
impact of Iraq on the region, although I'll touch on that
somewhat.
I have submitted a longer statement for the record, but I'm
going to highlight my comments in a number of areas.
The Chairman. And the entire statement will be placed in
the record.
Ambassador Ross. Thank you.
First, I start with a premise that the solution to Iraq is
going to be found within Iraq, not outside of Iraq. If we got
every one of Iraq's neighbors to do exactly what we wanted them
to do, what we would be able to do, I suspect, is to contain
the conflict within Iraq, and to defuse it, which is very
important, but we would not be able to settle it. The salvation
for Iraq is going to be found inside Iraq, not outside of it,
No. 1.
No. 2, I think the assessment of Iraq's reality in the Iraq
Study Group was first rate and, I think, reveals lots of
insights. I think its discussion of the region, I find much
less compelling. The argument that every issue in the region is
inextricably linked, I think, belies the reality in the region,
tends to put too much of an emphasis on the outside, and
especially on the Arab-Israeli conflict, which is not to say,
as you were saying before, Mr. Chairman, that this is an issue
that doesn't affect the whole region. Of course it affects the
region. It affects the climate in the region, it affects the
perception of what we're doing, it affects the perception of
who's up, who's down in the region, radical Islamicists exploit
the Israeli-Palestinian issue to recruit new followers, to
manipulate anger against us. But if you solve the Palestinian
problem tomorrow, you are not going to change what's happening
in Iraq, you are not going to affect the Sunni insurgency in
Anbar province, you are not going to affect the Shia militias
who are fighting a sectarian war, maybe, in their eyes, for
defensive reasons. If you solve this problem, maybe you affect
our standing, but you don't affect that reality.
There's another, I would say, mythology that's going around
that says, you know, we would get Sunni governments in the
region to do much more in Iraq if only we could take the
Palestinian problem off their back. And, here again, I would
say this is a mythology. The Saudis have a stake in what's
going on in Iraq, and the proof of that is, they're
contemplating a $12 billion security barrier along their
border. The Jordanians have a stake of what's going on in Iraq.
They have absorbed 750,000 Iraqi refugees. They can ill-
afford to absorb any more. They clearly have a stake in what
happens in Iraq. The reason they are not as active--all the
Sunni governments are not as active in Iraq as we would like,
from a political standpoint, from an economic standpoint--is
because they are concerned about promoting Shia dominance in
Iraq, not because they're held back, in some fashion, by the
Palestinians. They may well intervene in Iraq if the situation
in Iraq becomes much worse. We face an irony. The worse the
situation gets in Iraq, the more they're likely to intervene,
not necessarily the way we would like.
If you look at the Syrians and the Iranians, here again I
would say, they also have leverage, although I would not put
the Syrians and the Iranians in the same category. The Iranian
points of leverage are much greater than the Syrian points of
leverage. It's pretty well known they played a major role, at
least in the past, in organizing, training, financing, and
arming the Shia militias. I would say their leverage, in some
respects, is going up, not down, because, as power within Iraq
becomes more diffuse, as there's fragmentation within the
militias, as we see power devolve more and more to the local
levels, the Iranian points of access increase.
That said, if tomorrow the Iranians decided that they were
going to cut off the militias, the militias, at this point,
have their own means of financing and have enough weapons to
continue to fight, and they probably would. So, Iran has
influence, but they don't have control.
Are either the Iranians or the Syrians prepared to change
their behavior today? I would say no. I don't think they're
particularly unhappy with what's going on there. Could they be
induced into changing their behavior in Iraq? I doubt it. Are
we in a situation where they would be more inclined to pull our
chestnuts out of the fire? I don't think so, unless the cost to
them, in their eyes, was to go up dramatically, or,
alternatively, if they began to believe that, in a sense, their
own chestnuts within Iraq were somehow at stake.
And, here again, we begin to see another one of the
ironies. The worse the situation gets in Iraq, the more the
incentive for intervention from the outside goes up. It can be
negative intervention, it can be positive intervention. The
reality is, all of Iraq's neighbors are afraid of a convulsion
within Iraq. All of them understand that if you suddenly had a
convulsion, you could have millions of refugees, you could have
instability within Iraq that would bleed across the borders,
you could have every one of their neighbors become competitors,
in terms of creating and turning Iraq into a platform for
potential threats to them.
So, they have a stake in preventing the worst in Iraq. The
problem is, today they have a situation that is basically
tolerable, either the Iranians actually find it good, because
it keeps us tied down, or, at this stage, they don't believe
that it imposes enough of a risk to them for them to change
their behavior.
The paradox, interestingly enough, is, if you take a look
at all of the neighbors, if they suddenly thought the situation
became much more dangerous to them, they might have an
incentive in coming together in some fashion to try to at least
contain that reality. One thing I can tell you from all my
experience in the Middle East, nothing good in the Middle East
ever happens on its own. Plenty of bad things happen on their
own, but nothing good ever happens on its own. So, if you
wanted to orchestrate this, you probably would need--and I know
you've called for this, at one point--you probably would need
some kind of regional conference, which, again, would have to
be orchestrated. It couldn't just be established as a big photo
op. You'd have to prepare the ground before you went there,
you'd have to work on it when you got there.
But, even here, I would caution and note that this is not
likely, right now, to work the way we might want, because,
again, the realities on the ground have to change to the point
that what's going on there isn't tolerable for everybody. And
I'm afraid, today, that it is.
In a sense, I think, also, there's a parallel here with
what's happening on the inside. No one on the inside within
Iraq, none of the--not the Iraqi leadership, not the current
Iraqi Government, not the different sectarian leaders, find the
situation sufficiently intolerable--as bad as we might think it
is, none of them find it sufficiently intolerable to change
their behavior. Prime Minister Maliki has now made a series of
commitments to President Bush, ranging from increasing the
number of Iraqi forces, to protecting Sunni and Shia
neighborhoods equally, to finally working out a sharing of oil
revenues, producing a fair process for the amendments to the
Constitution, a new law on de-Baathification, providing
reconstruction moneys, including to Anbar province. I could go
on and on and on. All of these commitments are very important.
Had any of them taken place before, we wouldn't need a surge
right now. The reality is, here, I don't have high expectations
it's going to work, because, once again, unless, in fact, Prime
Minister Maliki is convinced that he's on the brink of great
danger if he doesn't act, I don't think we're going to see
either Prime Minister Maliki or other leaders take what are,
for them, excruciating decisions and change their behavior,
unless they feel they have to.
In the case of the Sunnis, they haven't made the emotional
adjustment to being, in a sense, subordinate to the Shia. In
the case of the Shia, the Shia operate on the premise that
they're a majority, but they could lose their power at any
moment. Because they fear that, they continue to act the way
they do.
And, in a sense, this brings me to a broader conclusion,
and that broader conclusion is, we face an unfortunate paradox.
The unfortunate paradox is, so long as we keep the lid on
within Iraq, everybody on the outside of Iraq and everybody on
the inside of Iraq has no reason to change their behavior. The
paradox for us is that we have very good reasons to keep the
lid on, because we don't have an interest in seeing a major
convulsion within Iraq, we don't have an interest in seeing a
free-for-all there, we don't have an interest in seeing the
instability there radiate outward. But, unfortunately, unless
we can somehow convince everybody that the lid is going to come
off, I don't believe that any of them are going to change their
behaviors, whether we're talking about any of the neighbors or
we're talking about those on the inside.
And I'll stop there.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Ross follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Dennis Ross, Counselor and Ziegler
Distinguished Fellow, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
Washington, DC
I have been asked to discuss Iraq in a regional context. I
interpret the request to be less about how Iraq fits in the region and
more about how the region may affect Iraq and its future.
I take this view largely because most Americans--and I presume this
committee--are principally concerned with how we are going to manage
the best possible outcome in Iraq. The starting point for achieving the
best possible outcome, or more accurately the least bad one, is
understanding that the future of Iraq is going to be determined by
Iraqis. While Iraq's neighbors certainly have influence on different
sectarian groups within Iraq, their influence is limited.
The Iraq Study Group's assessment of the internal reality of Iraq
was extraordinary in its candor and its insights. Its emphasis on the
role of the outside world was far less so. Saying that all issues in
the Middle East are inextricably linked belies reality and placed a
misleading focus on the role of Syria and Iran and the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.
It is certainly fair to say that the different conflicts in the
area affect the broader climate, the expectations of different regional
leaders and publics, the likelihood of who is on the defensive and who
is on the offensive, and whether or not it pays to be an American
friend or foe. From that perspective, it is certainly true that
settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would take away a basic
source of grievance that Islamists exploit to recruit new followers and
to manipulate anger against the United States.
Beyond that, the Israeli-Palestinian has precious little relevance
to Iraq. If there were no Palestinian conflict, we would still face a
Sunni insurgency in Anbar province. We would still face Shia militias
determined to protect against Sunni insurgent attacks and to wreak
vengeance either in response to, or unfortunately, in anticipation of
such assaults.
While I support intensive efforts to defuse the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, I do it for reasons completely unrelated to Iraq. I do it
because it is right to try to reduce the violence and settle the
conflict on its own merits. It is right to remove a source of
radicalism in the region. It is right not simply to deny Islamists a
grievance, but also the ability to transform what has been a national
conflict into a religious conflict--almost assuredly what could happen
if Palestinians come to believe that there is no possibility of
settling the conflict and Hamas comes to dominate the Palestinian
future. It is right also to correct the impression that much of the
Muslim--and certainly nearly all the Arab--world have presently of the
United States: That given the Bush administration's disengagement from
the peace process for the last 6 years, the United States is simply
indifferent on an issue that matters deeply to them.
But there should be no illusions. Our efforts to settle the
conflict are not going to materially change the challenges we face in
Iraq. Moreover, the notion that if we do more to settle the Palestinian
conflict, the Saudis and Jordanians will become more helpful on Iraq is
also illusory. Both have a stake in what happens in Iraq. Neither can
be indifferent. The Saudis are contemplating a $12 billion security
barrier along their border with Iraq, fearing the spillover of terror
or refugees or instability otherwise. Similarly, Jordan has already
absorbed 750,000 Iraq refugees. It cannot absorb more--and yet an all-
out convulsion within Iraq would certainly confront Jordan with the
prospect of having to absorb thousands more.
Neither the Saudis nor Jordanians want to see Iraq fall apart; nor
do they want to see a Shia-dominated state with very close ties to
Iran. Today, they seem to be more concerned about the latter than the
former. They see Sunnis under constant assault from Shia militias; they
see Sunnis being driven from their homes in mixed neighborhoods; they
see Iran with increasing presence and influence. It is not the
Palestinian issue that has led the Saudis, Jordanians, and other
leading Sunni countries and leaders to hesitate in providing the kind
of support they could to the Iraqi Government. What holds them back is
their dislike for what they see emerging in the new Iraq.
One development that might trigger far greater involvement by the
Sunni regimes is a negative one. The more they see the Sunni tribes
threatened by the Shia, the more likely the Saudis and Jordanians are
to intervene. Until that point we can push and cajole, but I suspect,
with marginal affect.
We are led back again to Iraq and its internal dynamics. The
Palestinian-conflict cannot affect these dynamics; but could Iran and
Syria? Again, the answer is probably more as spoilers rather than as
fixers, though Iran is undoubtedly more of a problem in this connection
than Syria. Bear in mind that Iran has unmistakable links to the Mahdi
Army and to the Badr organization, and has helped to arm, organize, and
finance both. While today neither of these militias is any longer
primarily dependent on Iran for money and weaponry, given their access
to governmental and nongovernmental coffers, Iran can certainly wield
influence with these militias and with different Shia political
figures. Moreover, as power and the militias have become more diffused,
localized, and less hierarchical, Iran's capacity to be a spoiler has
probably increased, particularly as militias and criminal gangs merge
at local levels and as Iran can provide them material support.
What this suggests is that all the neighbors--Saudi Arabia, Jordan,
Kuwait, Turkey, Syria, and Iran--can probably add to Iraq's problems.
They are far less capable of being the key to Iraq's salvation; only
the Iraqis can provide that. Only Iraqis can decide whether they will
forge a national compact. To date, they have done little to indicate
that national reconciliation is a serious priority. And, unfortunately,
the Maliki government chose to handle the execution of Saddam Hussein,
not as a moment for reconciliation but, instead, for conveying to the
Sunnis that the Shia now ruled, that the Sunnis were powerless in the
new Iraq, and that the Shia would act without regard for Sunni
sensibilities. While the execution could have been seized by the Maliki
government as an opportunity to send a message to the Sunnis that now
was a time to end a chapter of Iraqi history in which all sides had
been brutalized and chart a new future together, it preferred to signal
its dominance and its need for vengeance.
This is the context in Iraq in which the President has made his
decision to increase our forces in Baghdad and Anbar province. Maliki's
commitment to act on a new security plan and to treat Shia and Sunnis
similarly, no longer favoring Shia militias, is unlikely to be believed
within Iraq. Previously, he has said he would not tolerate lawlessness
or the militias and not only never acted against them, but has
consistently turned a blind eye to the infiltration of the militias in
the Interior Ministry and the police forces. In the eyes of the Sunnis,
he has tacitly supported Shia death squads and the depopulation of
Sunnis in the mixed neighborhoods of Baghdad.
Words won't convince Sunnis that Maliki is serious about a new
strategy to provide protection to all Iraqis regardless of sect. There
will need to be demonstrations of his national, not sectarian,
commitment. It won't take long to know whether his commitments are real
or merely rhetorical. Will Iraqi forces join ours in the numbers the
security plan calls for? Will they protect Shia and Sunni populations
equally? Will legislation finally be adopted on sharing oil revenues
with a mechanism for implementing these shared provisions according to
population? Will there be a fair process finally for dealing with the
amendments to the constitution? Will the Iraqi reconstruction moneys
materialize and be available also in Anbar province? Will former Baath
officials below the highest levels be rehabilitated and integrated back
into ministries?
Without even confronting the Mahdi Army, which I doubt is realistic
for the time being, all the actions implied in the answers to these
questions would signal a profound change--and President Bush, in
effect, has offered all of these as measures of why the surge will work
now as opposed to all previous efforts. To be sure, Iraq's neighbors
could make these behaviors more likely if they were prepared to make a
collective effort to use their respective leverage. In theory, Iran
could press both Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and Muqtada al-Sadr--given their
weight within the Parliament and their leadership of competing Shia
militias--to support Prime Minister Maliki in taking such steps. The
Saudis and Jordanians could use their connections with the leading
Sunni tribes to get them to show they will meet the Prime Minister part
way and to reciprocate when the Maliki government takes steps toward
them. The Syrians could make it easier for Sunni tribal leaders to
reach out by working to prevent jihadists from crossing into Iraq and
threatening them.
But turning theory into reality seems highly improbable at this
time. Unless the Iranians and Saudis are prepared to forge a deal on
Iraq, I suspect that Iraq's neighbors will not contribute to defusing
tensions among the different sectarian groups. Indeed, the only
circumstance in which I see Iran and Saudi Arabia behaving differently
is if they both became fearful that a precipitous U.S. withdrawal might
trigger a real convulsion in Iraq. Potentially millions of refugees on
the move, instability bleeding across Iraq's borders, and competition
to bolster their friends in Iraq that intensifies and proves very
expensive to both the Saudis and Iranians could conceivably create
enough of a convergence of interest in Iraq to lead the two to explore
a possible deal.
There is irony here--only if the reality in Iraq threatens to be
far more costly to both the Saudis and Iranians are they likely to
contemplate some limited understanding on Iraq. I don't have high
expectations. Iran may think they are more insulated from spillover of
instability in Iraq and in any case they would rather back 60 percent
of the population than the 20 percent the Saudis would be supporting.
Nonetheless, the Saudi capacity to underwrite the Sunnis could give the
Iranians pause.
I would support a regional conference with the neighbors, including
Iran and Syria, not because I expect much to come of it, but because
all sides might come to see some value in tempering their spoiling
instincts. The U.S. role at such a conference might be to see whether
there is a potential for some understandings on Iraq, and to cultivate
them even between the Saudis and Iranians if we deem them to be of any
value.
While worth considering, I don't believe that any such deals are on
the horizon. In fact, I suspect that at this point they are about as
likely as seeing Iraqis begin to act on national reconciliation. In
either case, it will take discomfort to get Iraq's neighbors or Iraq's
Government and sectarian leaders to transform their behaviors. The
situation may be objectively terrible in Iraq, but it has not been
sufficiently bad to catalyze a change in behavior of Iraq's leaders and
Iraq's neighbors. By keeping the lid on with our forces, and preventing
a real collapse, we make it safe enough for everyone--next to and
within Iraq to avoid taking what they regard as excruciating decisions.
It is not an accident that Iraq's leaders have avoided the hard
choices required to create a national compact. Sunnis continue to
resist at least emotionally that they must be subservient to the Shia.
The Shia are a majority who act as if they believe they will lose their
dominant position in governing Iraq unless they hold the line every day
against the Sunnis. Insurgent attacks justify the maintenance of
militias, which in the eyes of Shia, protect them when no one else
will.
In my experience, leaders don't cross thresholds in historic
conflicts because they are induced into doing so. They may approach the
thresholds given certain promises about the future, but they don't
cross them unless they see the costs--as they measure them--if they
fail to act.
President Bush has now established the key measures that will show
whether the Iraqi Government and its Shia leaders are prepared to
change their behavior in a way that also produces Sunni responses. If
there is no consequence for the Iraqi Government for failing to meet
their commitments, I believe that neither the different Iraqi leaders
nor their counterparts in the neighboring states will perceive that the
United States will decide to give up our readiness to keep the lid on
in Iraq--regardless of the cost to us.
The great paradox of Iraq today is that our fear of an Iraqi
collapse keeps us there and reduces the need for either Iraqis or their
neighbors to change course.
The Chairman. Thanks.
Mr. Secretary.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD HAASS, PRESIDENT, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, NEW YORK, NY
Ambassador Haass. Thank you, sir. Thank you, again, for
having me back and for testifying on the situation on Iraq.
To the extent one is judged by those one testifies with,
I'm flattered by being with Dennis Ross and Vali Nasr.
What I'd like to do is just make some remarks and put the
full statement in the record----
The Chairman. The entire statement will be placed in the
record.
Ambassador Haass [continuing]. And just to make clear that
my views also are my own and I'm not speaking on behalf of the
Council.
I won't take your time, Senator Biden, rehearsing how we
got to where we are in Iraq, other than to say the United
States continues to pay an enormous price for the decision to
attack Iraq and for subsequent decisions made in the aftermath
of its liberation. The decision to attack, in 2003, was a
classic war of choice, and it's been followed by any number of
bad choices since. And the result is an early end to the era of
American primacy in the Middle East and the emergence of a
region more likely to do damage to itself, the United States,
and the world. And this is the context in which we have to look
at Iraq, which has now become a hybrid. It's become part civil
war, part failed state, and part regional conflict. All of this
has real consequences for the United States.
Let me take a step back. Foreign policy must always be
about achieving the best possible outcome. Iraq is not going to
be a model society or a functioning democracy anytime soon. We
should expunge such words as ``success'' and ``victory'' from
our vocabulary. Ambitious goals are simply beyond reach, given
the nature of Iraqi society and the number of people there
prepared to kill one another. It would be wise to emphasize not
what the United States can accomplish in Iraq, but what it can
avoid.
In this context, I believe there are two reasons to support
a surge, in principle. One is the possibility that it may work,
that it may provide the time and space for Iraqi authorities to
introduce power and revenue-sharing and improve the quality of
Iraq's military and police. And the second argument, in
principle, in favor of surge, is that if it fails--if it fails
to turn things around and Iraq descends further into chaos, it
will help make clear that the onus for Iraqi's failure falls on
the Iraqis themselves. And such a perception would be less
costly, all things being equal, for our reputation than a
judgment that Iraq was lost because of a lack of American
staying power.
There are, however, several downsides to the decision to
surge forces. And, to begin with, a surge is not a strategy,
it's simply a tactic. And the premise behind it seems to be
that all the Iraqi Government requires is a few months to get
its house in order. But if the Iraqis were prepared to do what
was needed, a surge would not be necessary. And if they're not
willing to do what is called for, a surge will not be enough.
This, to me, suggests what may be the fundamental flaw
implicit in the new policy. The United States goal is to work
with Iraqis to establish a functioning democracy in which the
interests and rights of minorities are protected. But the goal
of the Iraqi Government is different. It appears to be to
establish a country in which the rights and interests of the
Shia majority are protected above all else.
A second drawback of the surge is that it will entail real
costs--economic, military, and human. A surge is not an
abstraction. It will change the lives of tens of thousands of
individuals and families in this country.
And, third, a drawback I would mention is that if a surge
in U.S. forces cannot alter the fundamental dynamics of Iraq,
as Senator Lugar mentioned, calls will mount here at home for
U.S. military withdrawal, based on the judgment the United
States has done all it can and that doing more would be futile.
So, ironically, doing more in the short run will make it more
difficult to sustain a United States presence in Iraq in the
long run.
All those drawbacks notwithstanding, let me also add that
opposition to a surge does not constitute a strategy. A rapid
withdrawal of U.S. forces would certainly intensify the civil
conflict, produce humanitarian disaster, provide a sanctuary
and a school for terrorists, and draw in many of Iraq's
neighbors, turning the country, and possibly the region, into a
battleground. In addition, a rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces
would also increase the cost to U.S. foreign policy worldwide,
as it would raise questions everywhere about U.S.
predictability and reliability.
I do think there is an alternative to both a surge and to
near-term withdrawal. It would entail reductions in U.S. force
levels. It would call for less participation in Iraq's civil
fighting. It would require more emphasis on training and
advising of Iraq military and police. It would continue work
with local leaders to forge compromise. And it would involve
invigorated diplomacy at the regional level. I would call it
some version of ``Iraqification,'' with a diplomatic dimension.
Let me make clear, in advocating this, though, that such an
approach would not solve the Iraq problem. It's premised,
rather, on the notion that Iraq, at best, will remain divided
and messy for years, and the most the United States can achieve
is to keep open the possibility of normalcy until such a time
most Shias and Sunnis in Iraq are willing to embrace such a
notion and take steps to bring it about.
In that context, let me make clear that it's not at all
apparent to me that widening the war to Syria or Iran would
accomplish more than it would cost. Any attack on either Syria
or Iran would run the risk of leading either, or both,
countries to intensify their unhelpful actions in Iraq,
including the risk to United States personnel. And there's no
reason to assume that their responses would necessarily be
limited to Iraq.
More important, it's not clear to me why the administration
continues to resist the suggestion, put forward by the Iraq
Study Group and others, that it support the creation of a
regional forum. What makes the most sense is a standing
mechanism akin to the so-called ``Six Plus Two'' forum used to
help manage events in Afghanistan. In such a forum, the United
States and others could challenge Syria to do more to make it
difficult for terrorists to cross into Iraq. And we obviously
could challenge Iran, as well.
Why should we involve Iran and Syria? Let me suggest three
reasons. Neither Iran nor Syria has an interest in an Iraq that
fails or falls apart. The cohesion of both is potentially
vulnerable to Kurdish nationalism. The economies of both would
be burdened by refugees. But also, neither would benefit from
conflicts with neighbors that could easily evolve out of an
intensified civil war in Iraq.
With Syria, in particular, there is an opportunity. Syria
might be open to persuasion and compromise if the scope of
talks were expanded. One could imagine Israel returning the
Golan Heights to Syria in return for a peace treaty, diplomatic
relations, and a major reduction in Syria's support for both
Hamas and Hezbollah. The United States, in that context, would
reduce Syrian sanctions. And, as part of that, Syria, then, in
turn, would have to do a better job of policing its border with
Iraq. And I would simply suggest that the United States should
give Israel its blessing to explore this possibility.
Iran is more difficult, though, again, I can imagine a
broad package that would place an extremely low ceiling on
uranium enrichment activity that Iran could take in exchange
for accepting the most stringent of inspections. Iran would
gain access to, but not physical control of, nuclear fuel for
purposes of electricity generation. Sanctions could be reduced,
depending upon Iranian willingness to curtail its support for
terror and its opposition to Israel. If we take such an
approach with Iran, which I think we should, we should make our
position public.
The Iranian public needs to know how it would benefit from
normal ties. And the Iranian public needs to know how they pay
a price for the foreign policy of their government. The
Achilles heel of the Government in Iran is their mismanagement
of the Iranian economy, and, on a regular basis, we, as
outsiders, should make clear to the Iranian people the price
they pay, the better standard of living they could enjoy. That,
I believe, is the best way to put pressure on the clerics
running the country.
Implicit in all this is two things. One is, the United
States should let go of its regime-change ambitions, in the
short run, toward Iran and Syria. Regime change is not going to
come about in either country soon enough to affect U.S.
interests. I could be wrong in this, but no one can count that
I am wrong. We cannot conduct foreign policy on the hope that
regime change will come soon enough to solve our problems for
us.
The United States should also jettison preconditions to
sitting down and talking with either country. The fact that
both are acting in ways we find objectionable is not a reason
not to negotiate, it's a reason to negotiate. What matters is
not where you begin a negotiation, it's where you come out.
And I say all this, acknowledging that there's no guarantee
that diplomacy would work. That said, it's not clear to me how
the United States is worse off for having tried. The failure of
diplomatic initiative, one that's perceived as fair and
reasonable, would actually make it less difficult for the
United States to rally domestic and international support for
harsher policies toward either Syria or Iran.
Let me just quickly talk about the Palestinian issue. I
would simply say that history suggests that negotiations tend
to succeed only when leaders on all sides are both willing and
able to compromise, and it's not clear that such leadership now
exists. And, in this context, what I would argue for is that
the United States should articulate publicly its views of final
status. We've done this, in part, vis-a-vis, Israel. The United
States should also do this, vis-a-vis the Palestinians. For
example, we should say that any peace would be based on the
1967 lines, that the Palestinians would receive territorial and
other forms of compensation whenever there were deviations, and
that they would also receive economic compensation.
Let me just make clear that I'm not suggesting that
negotiations be started now. The situation is not ripe for
that. But the United States can begin to alter the debate
within Palestinian society. Hamas needs to be pressed to
explain why it's resisting negotiating with Israel and why it
persists in violence, when an attractive diplomatic settlement
is available. The goal should be either to strengthen Abu Mazen
or to create conditions in which Hamas evolves away from
violence.
Let me echo the words of Dennis Ross and others, that
progress in the Palestinian issue will not affect the situation
in Iraq. Iraqis, we all know, are killing themselves for any
number of reasons, but promoting a Palestinian state is simply
not one of them.
Beyond the Middle East, there's an entire foreign policy
agenda that could benefit from greater attention, from North
Korea to climate change to trade negotiations, to Darfur, to
Afghanistan--where the situation is deteriorating--to homeland
security to energy policy. I would simply say that Iraq gets in
the way of much of this.
The military commitment we are making in Iraq leaves the
United States with little leverage and little capacity to use
elsewhere. Iraq is also absorbing economic resources. It
contributes to anti-Americanism and makes it more difficult for
the United States to drum up support. It requires a great deal
of time and political capital that could be better spent on
other policies. An emphasis on Iraq also carries with it a
long-term risk. If things continue to go badly, it will be more
likely that we will suffer an ``Iraq syndrome'' that will
constrain our ability to be active everywhere.
In short--and I will end with this, Mr. Chairman--I would
suggest the time has come for the post-Iraq era of American
foreign policy. This remains an era of extraordinary
opportunity for the United States. We're free to devote the
bulk of our resources to dealing with the global challenges of
our era. What's more, we have the potential to enlist the
support of the other major powers in tackling these challenges.
But, so long as Iraq drains American resources, distracts its
attention, and distances others from us, we will not be able to
translate this opportunity into reality. Worse yet, this
opportunity will soon fade. As others have pointed out, it will
be Iraqis who will largely determine their own fate, but only
by reducing our own investment in Iraq and by refocusing our
energies elsewhere will we place ourselves in a position to
improve our own fate.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Haass follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Richard N. Haass, President, Council on
Foreign Relations, New York, NY
Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the situation in Iraq
and, in particular, on regional and global aspects of current U.S.
policy in Iraq. I will not rehearse here today how we got to where we
are--other than to say that the United States and the American people
are paying a substantial price for the decision to attack Iraq and for
subsequent decisions made in the aftermath of Iraq's liberation. The
decision to attack Iraq in 2003--a classic war of choice--was followed
by numerous bad choices.
The result is an early end to the era of American primacy in the
Middle East and the emergence of a region far more likely to do damage
to itself, the United States, and the world. To be sure, we now have an
Iraq that is no longer ruled by a dictator and one in which the
population has had an opportunity to vote on several occasions for
either candidates or a constitution. But the more significant result is
an Iraq that is violent, divided, and dangerous. The debate over
whether what is taking place there constitutes a civil war is not
productive. The reality is that Iraq is an unattractive hybrid: Part
civil war, part failed state, and part regional conflict.
The Iraqi Government is weak internally and challenged from without
by terrorists, Sunni insurgents, and Shia militias. Shia domination of
the south is near complete and growing in the center given ethnic
cleansing and emigration. The Kurds are living a separate life in the
country's north. The Sunni minority sees itself as discriminated
against; one consequence is that the bulk of the instability centers on
the capital area and the west.
The recent execution of Saddam Hussein is at once a reflection of
the reality that has come to be Iraq and a development that exacerbated
sectarianism. It reveals a lack of discipline and professionalism on
the part of Iraqi authorities. What we saw represented more the
politics of retribution than the rule of law.
All of this has important consequences for the United States.
Foreign policy must always be about achieving the best possible
outcome. At times this can translate into lofty goals. This is not one
of those times. It would be wiser to emphasize not what the United
States can accomplish in Iraq but what it might avoid. Iraq is not
going to be a model society or functioning democracy any time soon. We
should expunge such words as ``success'' and ``victory'' from our
vocabulary. Ambitious goals are beyond reach given the nature of Iraqi
society and the number of people there prepared to kill rather than
compromise to bring about their vision of the country's future. We can
let historians argue over whether ambitious goals were ever achievable;
they are not achievable now.
ASSESSING THE SURGE
This is the context in which President Bush chose to articulate a
new policy, one with an increase or surge in U.S. forces at its core.
There are two reasons to support a surge in U.S. forces. One argument
in its favor is the possibility it may work, that it might provide time
and space for Iraqi authorities to introduce needed power and revenue
sharing and to increase the quantity and, more important, improve the
quality of Iraq's military and police forces. To do this, a surge would
have to be implemented in a manner that was nonsectarian and open-
ended.
The second argument in favor of a surge is that if it fails to turn
things around and if Iraq descends further into violence and chaos, it
will help to make clear that the onus for Iraq's failure falls not on
the United States (and not on any lack of U.S. commitment) but on the
Iraqis themselves. At least in principle, such a perception would be
less costly for the reputation of the United States than the judgment
that Iraq was lost because of a lack of American staying power or
reliability.
There are, however, several downsides to the decision to increase
the number of U.S. forces in Iraq, including the basic problem that it
may not achieve a meaningful improvement in stability and security for
Iraqis. A surge is not a strategy; it is a tactic, a component of a
larger policy. The premise behind the new policy seems to be that all
the Iraqi Government requires is a few months to get its house in
order, to introduce much-needed political and economic reforms that
will assuage most Sunnis and military and police reforms that will make
the country safer. But if the Iraqis were prepared to do what was
needed, a surge would not be necessary. And if they are not willing and
able to do what is called for, a surge will not be enough.
More broadly, the United States requires an Iraqi Government that
is willing and able to take advantage of the opportunity a surge is
designed to provide--and by ``take advantage'' I do not mean exploit it
so as to strengthen Shia control. This may, in fact, be the fundamental
flaw of the surge decision and U.S. policy. The U.S. goal is to work
with Iraqis to establish a functioning democracy in which the interests
and rights of minorities are protected. The goal of the Iraqi
Government appears to be to establish a country in which the rights and
interests of the Shia majority are protected above all else.
A second drawback of a surge is that it will entail real economic,
military, and above all, human costs. It is important to keep in mind
that a surge is not an abstraction. It will change the lives of tens of
thousands of families and individuals in this country--and bring to a
premature end the lives of an unknown number of American men and women.
A third drawback to a surge in U.S. forces is that if (as seems
likely) it cannot alter the fundamental dynamics of Iraq, calls will
mount here at home for a U.S. military withdrawal based on the judgment
that the United States had done all it could and that doing more would
be futile and costly. Ironically, doing more in the short run will make
it more difficult to sustain a U.S. presence for the long run.
There are, thus, good reasons to question the new U.S. approach to
Iraq. But we should be no less clear about the drawbacks to the
principal alternative. Opposition to a surge does not constitute a
desirable strategy. A rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces would almost
certainly intensify the civil conflict, produce a humanitarian
disaster, provide a sanctuary and a school for terrorists, and draw in
many of Iraq's neighbors, turning Iraq and, potentially, much of the
Middle East into a battleground.
A rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces would also increase the costs to
U.S. foreign policy more generally, as it would raise questions in the
minds of friends and foes alike about U.S. predictability and
reliability. Even some of the most vocal critics around the world of
U.S. policy would be critical of a sudden end to U.S. involvement. And
for good reason, as terrorists would be emboldened, countries such as
Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela would be more prone to act
assertively, and friends would be more likely to decrease their
dependence upon the United States, something that could lead them
either to reach new accommodations with others or to build up their own
military might, including possibly reconsidering the utility of
developing or acquiring nuclear weapons.
There is, however, an alternative to both a surge as defined by the
administration and near-term withdrawal. It would entail gradual
reductions in U.S. force levels, less participation in Iraq's civil
fighting, more emphasis on training and advising of military and police
units, continuing work with local political leaders to forge
compromise, and diplomacy designed to influence the behavior of Iraq's
neighbors. Call it ``Iragification'' with a diplomatic dimension.
Such an approach would not attempt to ``solve'' the Iraq problem.
To the contrary, it is premised on the view that there is no major
breakthrough to be produced by a surge or any other change in U.S.
policy. It is similarly premised on the notion that Iraq will remain a
messy and divided country for years, and the best and most the United
States can hope to achieve is to keep open the possibility of something
approaching normalcy until such a time most Shias and Sunnis are
willing to embrace such a notion and take steps that would bring it
about. In short, this third approach would buy time and give the Iraqis
a chance to improve their lot--and in the process reduce the direct and
indirect costs to the United States and to U.S. foreign policy.
In considering the alternatives it pays to keep in mind that
outsiders have three options when it comes to civil wars. One is to
smother them. Alas, this has proven not to be achievable in Iraq. A
second is to help or simply allow the stronger party--in this case
Iraq's Shia majority--to prevail. This would be a terrible conclusion
to the U.S. intervention. It would strengthen Iranian influence, cause
a humanitarian tragedy, and likely lead to a regional conflict given
concerns throughout the Arab world for their Sunni brothers and
opposition to Iranian hegemony. A third option would be to accept that
civil fighting will continue until it burns itself out, either from
exhaustion or from a realization by most Iraqis and their external
benefactors that no victory is possible and that peace and stability
are preferable to continued conflict. Such an outcome will likely take
many years to evolve. The best thing that can be said about it is that
it is preferable to the scenario of a one-sided victory.
THE REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF U.S. POLICY
As the above makes clear, Iraq cannot be viewed in isolation. The
President was right to recognize the regional component of Iraqi
security. He was also right to claim that both Iran and Syria have
acted in ways that have contributed to the challenges confronted by
Iraq's Government and its people.
But it is not at all apparent that widening the war to either or
both countries would accomplish more than it would cost. Any attack on
Iran or Syria runs the risk of leading either or both countries to
intensify their actions in Iraq, including increasing the risk to U.S.
personnel. And there is no reason they would be limited to reacting
within Iraq. Iran in particular has the ability to act throughout the
region and beyond given its ties to groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas.
More important, it is not clear why the administration continues to
resist the suggestion put forward by the Iraq Study Group and others
that it support the creation of a regional forum that would have as its
mission to stabilize the situation in Iraq. What makes the most sense
is a standing mechanism akin to the so-called ``Six Plus Two'' forum
used to help manage events in Afghanistan. An Iraq forum--consisting of
Iraq, its six immediate neighbors (Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia,
Syria, and Turkey), and selected outsiders (possibly the five permanent
members of the U.N. Security Council)--would provide a forum in which
outside involvement in Iraq could be addressed. In particular, the
United States and others could challenge Syria to do more to make it
difficult for terrorists to enter into Iraq and Iran to curtail its
support for terrorism.
Why should the United States involve Iran and Syria, two countries
that have more often then not exacerbated matters in Iraq? To begin
with, neither has an interest in an Iraq that fails. The cohesion of
both is vulnerable to Kurdish nationalism; the economies of both would
be burdened by floods of refugees. Neither would benefit from conflicts
with neighbors that could all too easily evolve out of an intensified
civil war in Iraq that left the Sunnis vulnerable.
Syria might be even more open to persuasion and compromise if the
scope of talks were expanded to address concerns beyond Iraq. One can
imagine a negotiation in which Israel would return the Golan Heights to
Syria in return for a peace treaty, diplomatic relations, and a major
reduction in Syrian support of both Hezbollah and Hamas. The United
States would reduce or end economic and political sanctions in a
context that included Syrian-Israeli normalization and enhanced Syrian
efforts to police its border. The United States and Israel would also
benefit from the cooling in Syrian-Iranian ties that would result. The
United States should give Israel its blessing to explore this
possibility with Damascus.
Iran is a more difficult challenge, although here, too, one can
imagine a broader package that would place an extremely low ceiling on
any uranium enrichment activity Iran could undertake in exchange for
the most stringent inspections. In exchange for such restraint, Iran
would gain access to (but not physical control of) nuclear fuel for
purposes of electricity generation. Other economic and diplomatic
sanctions could be reduced depending on whether Iran was willing to
curtail its support for terror and its opposition to Israel. Making
such offers public--making it clear to the Iranian public how they
would benefit from normal ties and how much they pay for Iran's radical
foreign policy--would place pressure on the government and increase the
odds it will compromise.
Implicit in all this is that the United States is willing to let go
of its ``regime change'' ambitions toward Iran and Syria. This makes
sense, because regime change is not going to come about soon enough to
affect U.S. interests in Iraq or beyond. The United States should also
jettison preconditions to sitting down and talking with either Syria or
Iran. The fact that they are acting in ways the United States finds
objectionable is reason to negotiate. What matters is not where you
begin a negotiation but where you come out.
There is, of course, no guarantee that these or similar diplomatic
initiatives would bear fruit. Obviously, it would have been wiser to
have approached both countries several years ago when the price of oil
was lower and when the U.S. position in Iraq was stronger. Still, it is
not clear how the United States would find itself worse off for having
tried now. To the contrary, the failure of a diplomatic initiative
widely perceived as fair and reasonable would make it less difficult
for the United States to build domestic and international support for
other, harsher policies toward Syria and Iran.
The other regional matter that is garnering a great deal of
attention of late is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Obviously,
progress here would be welcome and applauded. No one--Palestinians,
Israelis, or Americans--benefits from the current impasse. History,
though, strongly suggests that negotiations tend to succeed only when
certain critical elements are in place. In addition to a process and a
formula that parties must be prepared to accept, there needs to be
leaders on all sides who are both willing and able to compromise. It is
not clear that such leadership currently exists on either side of this
divide. The Olmert government is weak as a result of the widely judged
failure of last year's Lebanon incursion. The leadership of the
Palestinian Authority appears willing to compromise but it is not clear
it is strong enough to do so given the political and armed opposition
of Hamas. Hamas, by contrast, might well be able to make peace if it so
chose; the problem is that there is no evidence it is so disposed.
In this circumstance, the most valuable thing the United States
could do is to begin to articulate publicly its views of final status.
This could be done either as part of phase 3 of the roadmap or apart
from it. The United States has already done some of this, making clear
in a letter to then-Prime Minister Sharon that the territorial
dimension of any peace agreement would have to reflect Israeli security
concerns and demographic realities, and that any Palestinian ``right of
return'' would be limited to Palestine. It would be proper to state
publicly as well that any peace would be based on the 1967 lines, that
Palestinians would receive territorial compensation whenever there were
deviations, and that they would receive economic compensation (and
assistance more generally) to help deal with the refugee problem and
more broadly the challenge of establishing a viable state. The United
States could indicate its own readiness to be generous and gain pledges
from Japan, the European Union, and Arab governments to more than match
American largesse.
In suggesting this I want to be clear about two things. First, I am
not recommending that negotiations be started now. Again, the situation
is not ripe for that. But by articulating such commitments, the United
States can alter the debate within the Palestinian society. Hamas needs
to be pressed to explain why it resists negotiating with Israel and
persists in violence when an attractive diplomatic settlement is
available. The goal should be to strengthen the hand of Abu Mazen--or
to create conditions in which Hamas evolves and moves away from
violence. If and when such changes occur, prospects will improve for
diplomacy between Israelis and Palestinians.
Second, progress in the Palestinian issue will not affect the
situation on the ground in Iraq. Iraqis are killing one another for
many reasons, but promoting a Palestinian state is not one of them.
Still, investing more in this issue makes sense on its merits and as
one way of giving America's Sunni friends a positive development to
point to, something that will bolster their domestic standing and make
it less difficult for them to be seen to be cooperating with the United
States.
It is also important to look beyond the immediate region of the
Middle East. The United States could enter into bilateral talks with
North Korea and present it with a comprehensive proposal that would
attempt to induce it (as well as pressure it) to give up its nuclear
program. The United States could introduce ideas about how to slow
climate change. Trade negotiations are stalled and could be jump-
started. There is a genocide in Darfur that needs to be stopped.
Afghanistan is deteriorating; economic, military, and diplomatic
resources are needed urgently if that country is not going to resemble
Iraq in several years time. Much more can and should be done to enhance
the security of the American homeland. And there is the crying need for
an energy policy that will reduce American use of oil and gas and
reduce our dependence on imports (U.S. vulnerability to both price
hikes and supply interruptions) and slow the flow of dollars to
governments that in many cases are carrying out policies inimical to
U.S. interests.
Iraq gets in the way of much of this. It is simply absorbing too
many, resources. The military commitment there leaves the United States
with little leverage to apply elsewhere and little capacity to use if
situations warrant. Iraq is also absorbing economic resources,
resources that could and should be used for everything from military
modernization to other pressing domestic and international needs. Iraq
contributes to anti-Americanism and makes it more difficult for the
United States to drum up support for its policies. It also requires a
great deal of time and political capital, time and effort that could
better be spent on building support at home and abroad for other
policies. And an emphasis on Iraq also carries with it a longer term
risk: If things continue to go badly, it becomes more likely that we
will suffer a collective allergy (an ``Iraq syndrome'') that will
constrain the ability of this country to be as active in the world as
it needs to be.
In short, the time has come for the post-Iraq era of American
foreign policy to get under way. Such a transition is long overdue. I
have written at length on the proposition that this moment of history
is one of unprecedented opportunity. Not having to worry about the
prospect of major power conflict, the United States is free to devote
the bulk of its resources to dealing with the local, regional, and
global challenges of our era. What is more, it has the potential to
enlist the active support of the other major powers--China, Europe,
India, Japan, Russia, and others--in tackling these challenges. But so
long as Iraq drains American resources, distracts its attention, and
distances others from us, we will not be able to translate this
opportunity into reality. Worse yet, the opportunity will fade. We
should keep in mind that it will be Iraqis who will largely determine
their own fate. Only by reducing the American stake in Iraq and by
refocusing our energies elsewhere will we place ourselves in a position
to improve our own.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Professor.
STATEMENT OF DR. VALI R. NASR, PROFESSOR OF NATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS, NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, MONTEREY, CA
Dr. Nasr. Good morning. Let me begin by thanking Mr.
Chairman and the committee for inviting me to testify here.
I've submitted my full statement for the record, so I
will----
The Chairman. It will be placed in the record.
Dr. Nasr [continuing]. Raise some of the issues here--in
particular, focus on the implications of the sectarian violence
in Iraq, for that country and for the region.
There's no doubt that the year 2006 has marked the
emergence of sectarianism as a major divide in Middle East
politics. It's now the single-most important factor in deciding
Iraq's future, but it's no longer just limited to Iraq. In
Lebanon, last summer, we saw that war between Israel and
Hezbollah very quickly opened a sectarian rift in that country
between the Shias and the other communities, which has only
been deepening as Hezbollah has been trying to overthrow the
government in Beirut. The competition over Lebanon and in Iraq
has intensified tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which
has, in recent months, taken increasingly sectarian tone.
In the coming years, one, we can expect that sectarianism
is going to play a much more important role in deciding
regional alliances and how our allies and adversaries are
likely to array themselves in various arenas of conflict in the
region. At a popular level, we should also expect that
sectarianism is going to be a radicalizing force in the Middle
East. At a time where we're still involved in the global war on
terror. Shias and Sunnis, on both sides, as they gravitate
toward militias, are likely to resort to more and more radical
ideas to demonize one another and also to compete in the anti-
American/anti-Israeli arena for the support of the Arab street.
I think there is, at this moment in time, also a very
serious threat that sectarianism may become endemic, much more
embedded to the conflicts in the region, and, more importantly,
that it will also entangle the United States Middle East policy
in this problem. The potential is increasing, partly because in
Iraq the United States is now poised to become far more
directly immersed in that country's sectarian conflict, and
also because it is contemplating a much more confrontational
approach with Iran at a time--in alliance with Sunni Arab
regimes who are defining the rivalry with Iran, at this point
in time, in, very clearly, Shia, Sunni, and sectarian terms.
Embarking and embracing the posture of the Arab governments at
this point in time as a mantra for American policy in the
region will only confirm and perpetuate what I see to be the
most violent and divisive trend that has emerged in that
region, and it potentially will be a source of problem for the
United States.
And, in Iraq, two things in 2006 happened. One is that we
saw sectarianism grow. The second trend was that we had a
distancing of relations between Americans and the Shias, who
initially welcomed and supported the American involvement in
Iraq. This had, in the first place, to do with the bombing in
Samarra, but it also had to do with an American decision in
2006 to shift its focus from fighting the insurgency to
policing the sectarian politics in Iraq. For better or for
worse, the Shia saw these shifts as a threat to their sense of
security, and also, the bombing put to question whether
reconciliation with Sunnis is at all possible. And in this
environment, their politics turned to radicalism, following
militias and people like Muqtada al-Sadr. I think, given the
mood and--on the Shia street, it is clear that the United
States is not going to get cooperation from the Maliki
government unless it first make progress on the insurgency
issue, and others address security concerns on the other side.
And in this context, a surge that could potentially take on
Shia militias directly can actually open a completely new
front; namely, a direct confrontation between the United States
and the Shias, and potentially a Shia insurgency in Iraq,
something that we have, so far, not seen in that country.
Now, Iran is also connected to this discussion--2006 also
saw the dramatic turn for the worst in Iran's relations with
its neighbors and the United States. The hard-line President
adopted a much more unbending position on the nuclear issue and
escalated tensions with the United States and Israel
deliberately. This confident and provocative attitude is
reflective of a change in the environment of the region. Iran
feels a lot more bullish and confident after the fall of the
Taliban and Saddam Hussein, and the disruption of the Arab--of
the Iraqi Army, which means that there is no military bulwark
in the region in Iran's immediate neighborhood to contain
Iranian military power. Iran today very clearly has hegemonic
ambitions and would like its influence to--all the way from
Central Asia to Persian Gulf to Lebanon to be recognized,
essentially to view these areas as its ``near abroad,'' to use
a term from the Russian vocabulary.
Now, Iranian hegemony is a concern to countries around
Iran, and to Saudi Arabia, in particular. And intensification
of rivalry between the two of them will threaten regional
stability. And, more so, I think, it will also fuel radical
pro-al-Qaeda jihadi activism.
When the last time--mainly because Sunni governments view
and use extremism and sectarianism in order to confront
Hezbollah and Iran's popularity on their own streets, these two
countries had the rivalry similar to, today, in the 1980s and
1990s. The consequence of that was al-Qaeda, Taliban, and 9/11.
So, that threat once again is looming as we're seeing the
specter of sectarianism rise.
And I think, for the United States, containment of that
rivalry rather than taking part in it should, of a singular
more important objective, in bringing stability to the region
and confronting the issue of terrorism and extremism.
Now, the question before Washington for a long time has
been how to deal with an ascendant bullish aggressive Iran, to
engage it in order to influence its behavior or to confront it.
There's no doubt, in the past 3 years Iranian involvement in
Iraq has been an irritant, in many regards, to the United
States. Many in this country have suggested that securing
Iranian cooperation would be important to stabilizing Iraq, and
success in that arena may translate into success in other
arenas, such as the nuclear issue.
Iraq presented a particularly opportune opening, mainly
because, even as we speak, U.S. interests and Iranian interests
still, on many issues in Iraq, seem to be converging. Iranian
influence and assets in Iraq are very important to the
stability of that country because of the depth and breadth of
cultural, political, social, and economic relations between
Iran and the majority of Iraq's population to the south, which
are the Shia. So, whether or not it is possible to leverage
that influence to U.S.'s--to serving the U.S.'s interest is
something that should be explored.
Second, as Ambassador Haass mentioned, Iran does not want
Iraq to fail or to break up, mainly because it doesn't want a
Kurdish state in their north. Iran does not want a costly civil
war next door to it. And Iran also wants the Shia government in
Baghdad to succeed, and the Shias to consolidate the powers
that they have gained since 2003. In fact, for that reason it
has supported the political process in Iraq--elections,
governments, et cetera--since then, although it must be said
that the environment of distrust and tensions with the United
States has led Iranians to follow a policy of controlled chaos
in Iraq; namely, keep it on a sufficient boiler so that the
United States will be preoccupied and the American people will
lose appetite for any kind of military engagement in Iran.
Now, despite the potential for having an opening over Iraq,
it hasn't materialized. And, in fact, it seems that the policy
is likely to be that rolling back Iranian influence in Iraq and
the rest of the region is seen as a solution to the myriad
Middle East problems we're facing from Lebanon to the
Palestinian issue, all the way to Afghanistan. Now, the--a
policy that's focused on Iran rather than Iraq, and is built on
the Arab Iranian Sunni-Shia divide in the region, will only
escalate conflict in Iraq by making Iraq into a battleground
between Iran and the United States, and, ultimately, Saudi
Arabia and Iran. This is not something for the future. In fact,
an attempt to exclude Iran from Iraq will likely provoke this
rather than the departure of the United States from Iraq. And
it also will not remain in Iraq, it will spread to the rest of
the Middle East. It will entrench sectarianism and deepen
American involvement in the Middle East.
Now, this is somewhat reminiscent to a policy that was
followed in the 1980s and 1990s to contain the Iranian
revolution, at which time the United States supported an Arab-
Sunni alliance to contain Iran in the region. However, there
are some important differences to be noticed. One is that Iran
was far weaker than it is today, particularly on the nuclear
issue. Second, containment of Iran in the 1980s and 1990s
rested on Iraq's military capability. And third, success of
this strategy of containment of Iran during those decades owed
a good deal to the presence and importance of Taliban, jihadi
activists, and all of those who were ultimately responsible for
9/11.
Today, there is no Iraqi military bulwark. The task of
militarily confronting and containing Iran will fall on the
United States shoulders in a long-term situation. Moreover, we
saw the cost, in 2001, of a policy of the region, trying to
mobilize radical Sunni ideology in order to confront Shia
influence. If we are to revert to that containment strategy one
more time, given the array of forces in the region, given the
weakness--military weakness of countries around Iran--we ought
to contemplate that we're going to be in the Persian Gulf, as
well as the rest of the Middle East, for a very long time, and
this is a long-term commitment that would require us to deploy
in various arenas of conflict.
Now, it also would place the United States squarely in the
middle of regional conflicts, and at a time when we're going to
be seeing ideological extremism and terrorism to be escalating.
The consequences on open conflict and attack, as was also
mentioned by Ambassador Haass, are, I think, very great. First
of all, today I think the Iranian regime, despite all of its
negative behavior, sees stability in the Persian Gulf to be in
its interests. It abandoned the goal of exporting revolution
about a decade ago, and has, so far, sought to increase its
influence within the existing regional power structure. It
improved its relations with its neighbors. It normalized
relations with Saudi Arabia. It supported stabilization of
Afghanistan in 2001, and that of Iraq, at least in the initial
phase, by supporting elections and the government.
Now, an open conflict with Iran will reverse this. It will
entrench and strengthen the Iranian regime. It will rally the
Iranian population to the flag. It will weaken the drive in
Iran for democracy, and will divert attention of the Iranian
people from economic and social problems. It will also
radicalize the Iranian regime and make it far more dangerous to
its neighbors. It will, without a doubt, become far more
dependent--determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction
and to destabilize the Middle East and try to spread the United
States and its Arab allies in as many arenas of conflict as it
can--it is possible.
Now, confronting Iran directly, particularly if it ends up
in a military situation, I think, will also worsen the
situation in Iraq, and it also will spread to other arenas of
conflict--in Afghanistan, in particular, the Persian Gulf,
Palestinian territories, and Lebanon. It will also inflame, I
think, anti-Americanism across the Muslim world.
There are serious disagreements between the United States
and Iran, most notably over the nuclear issue, and it is very
important for the United States to address that. However, for
so long as Iran sees benefit in stability in the Persian Gulf
and accepts the governments in Afghanistan and Iraq, engagement
could provide a path to influencing its behavior for the
better. Although, as was mentioned, engagement is not likely to
quickly or cheaply yield results, it has the benefit of
continuing to deepen Iranian involvement in its own region
rather than give it an incentive to stabilize that region.
I think, at this point in time, no two countries matter
more to the future of the Middle East than the United States
and Iran. In many ways, the future of that region will be
decided in the crucible of competition, cooperation,
engagement, or confrontation between these two countries. And I
think a policy that will bring stability to that relationship
will both--will most effectively serve our purposes in conflict
in Iraq, in stabilizing the Persian Gulf, as well as preventing
a further escalation of tensions in Afghanistan, Lebanon, and
the Palestinian territories. And I think, talking about
linkages, it is not so much that--as was mentioned, that the
Palestinian issue is a solution to Iraq and to the problem with
Iran, it's the other way around, that Iran and Iraq, and
stability there, is more important, in terms of also having
achievements in the Palestinian arena.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Nasr follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Vali Nasr, Professor of National Security
Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, and Adjunct Senior Fellow, Council
on Foreign Relations, Monterey, CA
Since 2003 Shia-Sunni conflict has emerged as a major divide in
Middle East politics, and radically changed the regional context for
U.S. policy. Sectarian violence is no longer just limited to Iraq, but
has expanded in scope to influence regional development from the
Persian Gulf to Lebanon, adding new complexity to the conflicts in the
region and presenting a serious foreign policy challenge to the United
States. Taking stock of the risks and visible dangers that this change
presents is a significant challenge facing U.S. policy in the Middle
East.
In Iraq sectarian violence has derailed the effort to build a
viable state, and is today the single most important threat to the
future of that country. In Lebanon following the summer war between
Israel and Hezbollah a sectarian rift opened between Shias on the one
hand, and Sunnis and Christians on the other. That rift is deepening as
Hezbollah pushes to unseat the Sunni-led government in Beirut. Lebanon
and Iraq have in turn escalated tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
The competition between the two regional rivals has in recent months
taken an increasingly sectarian tone. The sectarian competition even
extends to extremist jihadi organizations associated with al-Qaeda.
These groups have supported al-Qaeda elements in Iraq, and have
intensified their anti-Shia rhetoric and attacks in the Middle East and
South Asia.
All this suggests that Iraq has introduced sectarianism to
conflicts and rivalries in the Middle East. The Shia-Sunni rivalry in
religious, as well as secular arenas, will likely be an important
factor in the near future. This trend was clearly evident during the
war in Lebanon last summer when Hezbollah's growing influence elicited
a sectarian reaction from Arab capitals as well as a number of
extremist jihadi Web sites. The condemnation of Hezbollah as a Shia
organization indicated that although the conflict itself was not new,
the response to it was not decided by the Arab-Israeli issue alone but
sectarian posturing.
For the United States the rising sectarian tensions present a
number of challenges:
1. Sectarian violence will determine the fate of Iraq and what that
will mean for U.S. standing and interests in the Middle East.
2. Sectarianism will play an important role in deciding regional
alliances in the Middle East and how various states and substate actors
will act. Sectarianism will compete with, as well as interact with,
other concerns such as the Arab-Israeli issue: Political and economic
reform, and support for U.S. policies, most notably the global war on
terror. This will complicate the management of U.S. interests.
3. Sectarian conflict will color relations of Middle East states,
but conflicts where they occur are likely to be waged by nonstate
actors--militias and political organizations. This will contribute to
regional instability and increases the likelihood of violence.
4. Sectarian conflict is a radicalizing force. Shia and Sunni
militias will inevitably gravitate toward more radical ideas to justify
their actions. In Iraq, the greatest violence against Shias was
perpetuated by the Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his al-
Qaeda forces. In the Arab world and Pakistan violent anti-Shiism is the
domain of radical pro-al-Qaeda clerics, Web sites, and armed groups.
Sectarianism--especially among Sunnis--is a driver for radical jihadi
ideology. Among the Shias in Iraq sectarian violence has had a similar
effect. It has shifted power within that community to the radical
forces of Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army. The specter of U.S.
confrontation with Shia militias and Iran will likely accelerate this
trend.
5. The sectarian dimension of regional politics is of direct
relevance to the growing tensions in United States-Iran relations.
Conflict between the United States--in alliance with Sunni Arab regimes
who view the Iranian challenge in sectarian terms--and Iran will
exacerbate sectarian tensions, and further embed them in regional
conflicts.
ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM
Shias and Sunnis represent the oldest and most important sectarian
divide in Islam, the origins of which go back to the seventh century to
a disagreement about who the Prophet Muhammad's legitimate successors
were. Over time, the two sects developed their own distinct conception
of Islamic teachings and practice which has given each sect its
identity and outlook on society and politics. Shias are a minority of
10-15 percent of the Muslim world, but constitute a sizable portion of
those in the arc from Lebanon to Pakistan--some 150 million people in
all. They account for about 90 percent of Iranians, 70 percent of
Bahrainis, 65 percent of Iraqis, 40 percent of Lebanese, and a sizable
portion of the people living in the Persian Gulf region. Despite their
demographic weight outside Iran the Shias had never enjoyed power.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ
No where was the plight of the Shia more evident than in Iraq.
Under Saddam Iraq was a sectarian state that had routinely brutalized
Shias. After the first Iraq war in 1991 the Kurdish areas of Iraq were
removed from Saddam's control. In the Arab south that he ruled, the
Shia portion of the population is even larger, approximating 80
percent. After that war the Shias in the south rose in a rebellion
which was brutally suppressed with as many as 300,000 Shias dying and
many more escaping to Iran. Between 1991 and 2003 Saddam's rule was
sustained by suppression of Shias. The sectarianism that we see in Iraq
has its roots in the sectarianism that was practiced by Saddam's
regime.
The U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003 was of symbolic
importance to the Middle East. The war ended minority Sunni rule in
Iraq and empowered Shias, and this has in turn led to a Shia revival
across the Middle East that as a cultural and political force will
shape regional politics. Iraq has encouraged the region's Shias to
demand greater rights and representation, but also to identify
themselves as members of a regionwide community that extends beyond
state borders. The Shia revival has also raised Iran's status as the
region's largest Shia actor. It was for this reason that Shias
initially welcomed America's role in Iraq--the most important Shia
spiritual leader, the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani encouraged the
Shia to embrace the political process introduced to Iraq by the United
States by voting and joining the newly established security forces.
However, the shift in the sectarian balance of power met with Sunni
resistance, first in Iraq but increasingly in Arab capitals. The fall
from power of Sunnis in Iraq has ended their hegemonic domination of
regional politics and diminished the power of Sunni regimes and ruling
communities. This has led to a Sunni backlash that is reflected in the
ferocity of insurgent attacks in Iraq since 2003, criticism of U.S.
policy in Iraq in friendly Arab capitals and unwillingness to help the
new Shia-led Iraqi Government, and growing anti-Shia and anti-Iranian
tenor of radical jihadi propaganda.
The insurgency that the United States confronted during the first
two years of the occupation was largely Sunni in character. It drew on
the Sunni belief in manifest destiny to rule, anger at loss of power in
Baghdad, and the resources of Sunni tribes, foreign fighters, radical
ideologies, and Baath Party and former Sunni officer corps to wage a
campaign of violence against the U.S. occupation and also to prevent
the Shia consolidation of power in the belief that a hasty U.S.
departure will lead to a collapse of the current government and
restoration of Sunni rule.
For the first 2 years of the occupation the Shia showed great
restraint in the face of insurgent attacks on Shia targets, heeding the
call of Ayatollah Sistani not to ``fall into the trap of a sectarian
war,'' but also trusting that the United States would defeat the
insurgency. All that changed in 2006 as Shias abandoned restraint
favoring retaliation. Radical voices of the like of Muqtada al-Sadr
drowned Sistani's call for restraint and moderation. Two developments
were instrumental in changing Shia attitude:
1. The bombing of the Shia holy shrine in Samarrah in February
2006. The Samarrah bombing was a psychological turning point for Iraqi
Shias. It gravely threatened the Shia's sense of security and put to
question the feasibility of reconciliation with Sunnis. It also raised
doubts in Shia minds about the United States ability and willingness to
defeat the insurgency--whose violent capabilities and ferocious anti-
Shiism was undeniable. Many also questioned the wisdom of exercising
restraint, arguing that it had only emboldened the insurgency. The
doubt provided an opening for Shia militias to step into the breach to
provide security to Shia communities, but also to establish a ``balance
of terror'' by attacking Sunni civilians. Iraq never recovered from the
impact of Samarrah and fell victim to the vicious cycle of sectarian
violence. The political process failed to focus the country back on
reconciliation.
2. The Shia anger and reaction to the Samarrah bombing was
aggravated by a shift in U.S. strategy in Iraq that would alienate the
Shia and deepen their distrust of the United States. This would in turn
reduce American influence over Shia politics--now at its lowest point--
and raise the stock of anti-American forces of Muqtada al-Sadr, and his
Mahdi Army, which would escalate attacks on Sunnis as it spread its
control over Baghdad and the Shia south.
The United States had hoped that the December 2005 elections would
turn Iraq around. The United States had persuaded Sunnis to participate
in the elections and join a national unity government, hoping to,
thereby, end or at least damp down the insurgency, but that did not
come to pass. Hoping to win the support of Sunni politicians Washington
began to distance itself from the Shia. It pressured the Shia on the
issue of their militias, as well as the unpopular notion of amnesty for
former Baathists. Shias resisted. Especially after Samarrah they saw
the insurgency rather than their own militias as the problem--Shia
militias, they pointed out, were often the only forces effectively
defending Shia neighborhoods against car bombs. Shias also saw the
overt U.S. push for a national-unity government as coddling the Sunnis
and, worse yet, rewarding the insurgency. With the insurgency in full
swing, Shias worried that American resolve was weakening. This
convinced them more than before that they needed their armed militias--
reflected in their cool reception to the surge of 20,000 troops
announced by the administration.
2006 proved to be a turning point in U.S.-Shia relations. U.S.
strategy during that year became one of shifting the focus of its
military operations from fighting the insurgency to contain Shia
militias in the sectarian fight in Baghdad. The Shia saw this as a tilt
away from them toward the Sunnis--addressing their security demands
rather than those of Shias. That this happened at a time of great
anxiety in the Shia community following the Samarrah bombing did not
help the U.S. position. In particular, that a year on the U.S. strategy
of working more closely with Sunnis had not weakened the insurgency--
which still by some estimates accounts for 80 percent of U.S.
casualties in Iraq--nor had it reduced the rate of attacks on Shia
targets. What it achieved was to create doubts as to whether the United
States was a reliable ally. Those doubts benefited Muqtada al-Sadr and
weakened moderate Shia voices.
It is now clear that Shias are not willing to give up on their
militias--which they believe is the only credible bulwark against
sectarian attacks by the insurgency without security guarantees from
the United States. That means that the United States will get
cooperation from Shias on the issue of militias only after it has shown
gains in containing the insurgency. Shias will resist disarming so long
as the insurgency is a threat.
The radicalization of Shia politics is likely to worsen if the U.S.
military directly targets Shias forces in Baghdad. That could provoke a
Shia insurgency in Baghdad and the Iraqi south--among the largest
population group in Iraq--which would present the United States with a
vastly broader security challenge, one that can overwhelm U.S. forces.
The United States today is hard-pressed to defeat the insurgency that
it is facing, but runs the danger of provoking a potentially larger
one.
BROADER REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS
The radicalization of Shia politics in Iraq has coincided with
developments elsewhere in the region to make 2006 the fateful year
during which the sectarianism that began in Iraq turned into a regional
dynamic. That the United States was slow to understand the convergence
of sectarianism and regional politics accounts for its limited ability
to coherently manage the cascading conflicts in Lebanon, Iraq, and over
Iran's nuclear program.
In summer 2006 the war with Israel emboldened Hezbollah just as it
divided Lebanon along sectarian lines. The Lebanon war marked the
regionalization of sectarian tensions that were manifest in Iraq. The
reaction of Arab governments and a number of pro-al-Qaeda jihadi
leaders and Web sites to Hezbollah's campaign was unexpectedly
sectarian, departing from the customary unity against Israel. Since the
war Lebanese politics has taken an increasingly sectarian tone as
Hezbollah's drive to topple the Lebanese Government has viewed as a
Shia power play by Lebanon's other communities; and since the regional
reaction to developments in Lebanon has pitted Iran against the
traditional Sunni power brokers in the region: Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi
Arabia.
What is evident in the aftermath of the Lebanon war is that the
sectarian rivalries that first surfaced in Iraq now compete with the
Arab-Israeli conflict to determine regional alliances and political
attitudes of ordinary people. Hezbollah and Iran would prefer to focus
the region on the Arab-Israeli issue and to gain support as champions
of the Palestinian cause. However, they have faced resistance in
pursuing this agenda from regimes and radical Sunni groups who see Iran
and the sectarian issue as more important. In this environment the
intensification of sectarian conflict in Iraq and its growing regional
dimension has led Hezbollah and Iran to intensify their campaign
against Israel in the hope of diverting attention from the divisive
role that Iraq is playing in the region.
2006 also witnessed a dramatic turn in U.S.-Iran relations. In 2005
Iran elected a hard-line President, who invigorated Iran's
determination to pursue its nuclear program just as he escalated
tensions with the United States and Israel. This confident and
provocative attitude is reflective of change in the strategic
environment in the region, and Iran's belief that it enjoys a stronger
position than it did in 2003. Iran benefited from regime changes in
Afghanistan and Iraq. The fall of the Taliban and the Saddam regime
provided Iran with greater space to assert its influence in the region,
and the destruction of the Iraqi Army removed a significant bulwark
against Iranian ambition and influence in the Persian Gulf. The
occupation of Iraq has depleted American power and prestige making it
harder to contain Iran, which has seized the opportunity to spread its
wings. Rising Iranian clout has fed, and been fed, by the Shia revival
that swept across the Middle East in the wake of the Iraq war. Iran
today has hegemonic ambitions in the Persian Gulf and sees itself as a
great power, and it views nuclear capability as the means to attain
that goal. What Iran seeks is for the United States to accept Central
Asia, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf as Iran's ``near abroad''--a
zone of influence in which Iran's interests would determine ebbs and
flows of politics--and to recognize Iranian presence in Syria and
Lebanon.
The specter of Iranian hegemony has been a source of concern for
Iran's neighbors. Saudi Arabia, in particular, has viewed Iran's gains
in Iraq and its growing influence in Lebanon and over the Palestinian
issue with alarm. Intensification of the rivalry between the two
threatens regional stability, and more importantly can fuel pro-al-
Qaeda jihadi activism. The rivalry between the two in Afghanistan and
South Asia in the 1980s and 1990s served as the context for
radicalization that ultimately led to 9/11.
There is no doubt that managing Iran poses an important challenge
to U.S. foreign policy, one that extends beyond the nuclear issue and
the threat to Israel. The question before Washington has been whether
to engage Iran to influence the course of its development or to contain
it. In the past 3 years, Iranian involvement in Iraq has been an
irritant to Washington. Many, including the Iraq Study Group, have
suggested that securing Iranian cooperation is important to stabilizing
Iraq--and success in that arena may translate into success in dealing
with the nuclear issue. Iraq presented an opening in part because U.S.
and Iranian interests in Iraq, even today, appear to converge on key
issues: Iran does not want Iraq to fail or break up (fearing an
independent Kurdish state), and a civil war in Iraq is worrisome to
Tehran. Iran wants the Shia government in Baghdad to succeed, and for
Shias to consolidate the gains that they have made since 2003. In fact,
since 2003 Iran has supported the political process--elections,
constitution, and governments--that the United States introduced to
Iraq. The possibility of engagement, despite the potential for positive
benefits for Iraq, has so far remained remote, and now seems to be
disappearing altogether.
It now appears that U.S. policy is gravitating toward confrontation
with Iran, not only in Iraq but across the region. Washington appears
to see rolling back Iranian influence as the key to resolving various
regional problems. A policy that is focused on Iran rather than Iraq
will escalate conflict in Iraq and across the Middle East, thereby
deepening American involvement in the region with the potential for
adversely impacting U.S. interests.
This policy is reminiscent of the containment strategy of the 1980s
and early 1990s when the United States rallied Iran's neighbors to
contain the spread of the Iranian revolution. However at that time,
Iran was weaker, and containment of Iran was anchored in Iraq's
military capability, and Taliban and radical Sunni ideology's ability
to counter Shia Iran's influence. But today the Iraqi military bulwark
is no longer there. The task of militarily confronting and containing
Iran will fall on U.S. shoulders. Moreover, in 2001 it became evident
that the cost of Sunni containment of Shia Iran was the rise of radical
Sunni jihadi ideology, al-Qaeda, and 9/11.
Reverting to the old containment strategy today, given the current
capability of Iran's neighbors in the Middle East and the balance of
power in the region, would mean a long-time American commitment to
staying in the Persian Gulf and deploying to other arenas of conflict
in an environment of growing radicalism. It would place the United
States at the heart of the region's conflicts and vulnerable to
ideological extremism and terrorism, all of which will likely only
escalate as a consequence.
The consequences of conflict with Iran will be grave for the region
and U.S. interests. Conflict will radicalize the Iranian regime, and,
more important, the Iranian public. Conflict will adversely impact
political developments in Iran, entrenching and strengthening the
Iranian regime, which will rally the population to the flag. Anti-
Americanism and ideological radicalism has not been a staple of popular
politics in Iran for some time now. It has been the quest for democracy
that has dominated Iranian imagination--sharply contrasting with the
popular mood in the rest of the Middle East. That trend will likely be
reversed in the advent of conflict.
The Iranian regime today sees regional stability in its interest.
Iran abandoned the goal of exporting its revolution to its Persian Gulf
neighbors at the end of 1980s, and has since acted as a status-quo
power. It seeks influence within the existing regional power structure.
It improved its relations with its Persian Gulf neighbors throughout
the 1990s, and in particular normalized relations with Saudi Arabia.
Iran supported stabilization of Afghanistan in 2001 and that of Iraq
during the early phase of the occupation. Conflict will change the
direction that Iranian foreign policy has been following. The process
of greater engagement of Iran with the region, and its inclusion in its
political and economic structures that has characterized the past
decade will be reversed. Iran will likely become more dangerous to its
neighbors, a trend which the United States will be hard-pressed to
control or reverse without escalating conflict even further and
committing itself to greater presence in the region.
Confrontation with Iran will likely worsen the situation in Iraq,
but its impact will not remain limited to Iraq. It will unfold in
different arenas across a large expanse of territory from Afghanistan
to the Persian Gulf, the Palestinian territories and Lebanon, as well
as in various forms outside of the Middle East. It will inflame anti-
Americanism in the Muslim world. The costs of such a conflict will far
exceed what the United States confronts in the region today, in
particular if the conflict leads to a war with Iran--a country that is
vastly larger and more populous than Iraq. Conflict will also make Iran
more determined to acquire WMD and to destabilize the Middle East. That
will expand the scope and intensity of conflicts that impact U.S.
interests, as well as reverse gains made so far in the war on terror.
There are serious areas of disagreement between the United States
and Iran over the nuclear issue, and Iran's role in Lebanon, the
Palestinian conflict, and Iraq. U.S. concerns with Iranian ambition and
policies must be addressed. However, for so long as Iran sees benefit
in stability in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf, engagement
could provide a path to influencing its behavior to serve U.S.
interests and those of its neighbors. Although engagement is not likely
to quickly or cheaply yield what the United States wants from Iran, it
still has the benefit of deepening Iranian involvement in, and
commitment to, the regional order that the United States is seeking to
bolster.
CONTENDING WITH THE CHALLENGE
U.S. interests would be best served by a policy approach that is
premised on the following:
1. In Iraq, it is imperative to work for a political settlement
that would limit the scope of sectarian violence. The chaos in Iraq is
a consequence of the absence of a credible political process and
roadmap to sectarian peace and state-building. The violence cannot be
brought under control through military means. Only a political plan of
action, which can credibly move the fighting parties toward compromise
will remove the incentive for violence and change the dynamic on the
ground.
The national unity plan that was conceived at the end of 2005 was
put before Iraqis at a different time when violence had not deepened
animosities on both sides and when the United States had much more
leverage with Shia leaders as well as their followers. The time for
that plan has passed, and pressuring the Iraqi Government by placing
benchmarks before it will not change that fact. If national unity is
still attainable it will have to come through a new plan.
There exists a danger that in the coming months the ``surge
strategy'' will extend the scope of the conflict by provoking a Shia
insurgency. Shia militias have so far not been fighting U.S. troops;
but direct confrontation can transform their sectarian war into a Shia
insurgency--something Iraq has so far not faced. The majority of Iraq's
population, especially in the critical Arab regions, is Shia. An anti-
American Shia insurgency, at a time when the Sunni insurgency
continues, will significantly increase the burden on the U.S. military
in Iraq. It will also further radicalize Shias in the region.
Radicalization of Shias--will mark a significant expansion in the scope
and intensity of threat to U.S. security and interests, and will
adversely impact the global effort to contain radicalism and terrorism.
Shia militias are a problem for Iraq, but an escalation of the conflict
by turning them into an anti-American force will benefit neither Iraq
not the United States.
2. Anchoring United States Middle East policy in containing Iran
will expand the scope of the conflict in the region rather than reduce
it. It will also increase the scope of the terrorist threat to the
United States rather than reduce it. Such a policy will also require a
long-term U.S. presence in the Middle East. The United States should
rather seek to deescalate tensions in the region by promoting political
solutions to crises in the Palestinian territories, Lebanon, Iraq, and
the nuclear standoff with Iran. The United States should not tie all
these conflicts to the challenge of Iranian hegemony, and not view a
broader conflict with Iran as a solution to challenges facing the
Palestinian issue, Lebanon and Iraq. No two countries matter more to
the future of the Middle East than the United States and Iran. The
importance of stability in U.S.-Iranian relations for the future of the
Middle East cannot be overemphasized. Engagement rather than conflict
presents the most realistic chance for achieving that goal.
3. The United States must take steps to discourage regional actors
from using sectarianism as a foreign policy tool. Investment in
sectarian voices and especially radical Sunni organizations of the al-
Qaeda type most closely tied to sectarian ideology and violence will
not only intensify the conflict but promote extremism to the detriment
of the broader U.S. interests in the region. As great a challenge as
Shia ascendancy and Iranian aggressiveness is to the United States and
its allies strengthening the ideological and organizational bases of
Sunni extremism will only further threaten U.S. interests.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
I'm going to yield for a moment to Chairman Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman, let me indicate that a number
of Republican Senators, including some members of this
committee, have been invited by Steve Hadley, our National
Security Director, to meet with him immediately in the
Roosevelt Room at the White House. I'm among those that have
been invited, and feel that I need to accept that invitation.
And so, I apologize for the absence of some members from the
committee, at this point, but we----
Senator Kerry. We should bring Hadley up here to listen to
these guys.
Senator Lugar. Well, we have had some remarkable testimony,
and I appreciate your yielding to me.
The Chairman. If you would like to--I'd yield to you, if
you want to ask a couple of questions----
Senator Lugar. No; I think I----
The Chairman [continuing]. Before you leave.
Senator Lugar [continuing]. I will depart, at this point--
--
The Chairman. OK.
Senator Lugar [continuing]. To make this engagement. Thank
you very much.
The Chairman. Well, thank you, Senator. I fully understand
it, and I think it's important you all do go down and see Mr.
Hadley.
And let me begin by thanking you all for your testimony.
And I'd like to focus, at the outset here, on when the
Secretary of State was before us--and I'll address this to all
three of you; if you can give me a short answer, I'd appreciate
it--she indicated that direct negotiations with Syria and Iran
would be--her words were, ``puts us in a role of supplicant'';
it would be, ``extortion,'' not diplomacy. You've spoken to
this. Can you tell me why there are those--and because these
are very bright, respected people--why they would view it as
extortion and/or us being a supplicant? You've all indicated we
should engage, in some form or another. So, I mean, what's the
motivation--I'm not being a wiseguy--I mean, what's happening
on the other side of the divide here that views this as
extortion--a pretty strong word--and as us being a supplicant?
That seems to me to set the bar pretty high to get to the point
where you now say, ``Well, yeah, we can now move to
discussion.'' Is it a negotiating gambit or--what do you think?
Richard. Mr. Secretary.
Ambassador Haass. I don't think it's a negotiating gambit.
I think it comes from an assessment of the relative standing or
position of us vis-a-vis them, or, to use an old Soviet
concept, Senator, I think the concern in the administration--
it's odd for me to talk for them now, I'm not sure I could talk
for them when I worked for them, but let me try--I think the
concern in the administration is that the so-called
``correlation of forces'' has moved against the United States.
Because of the situation in Iraq, because of the price of
energy, because of what happened this summer in Lebanon,
there's a concern that a negotiation involving Iran and Syria
would give us precious few cards to play, and, again, finds
them in the driver's seat. Needless to say, I disagree with
that. It ignores some tremendous strengths that we have. It
also ignores the possibility that if we don't like what we can
negotiate, we can just walk. And, as I said before, I always
think negotiations have two real purposes. One is to
potentially reach an agreement. The other is to clarify. If
they don't succeed, and if it turns out that Iran and Syria are
being outrageous in their demands, then that can be quite
useful to the Secretary of State and others as they go about
trying to build regional and global support for some sort of a
sanction.
So, I don't understand, I don't agree with the reluctance
to negotiate, but I do believe it largely stems from an
assessment that our relative position has worsened.
Let me say one other thing very quickly. There's an irony
here, because when our relative position was quite strong
several years ago, we also refused to negotiate.
The Chairman. Yeah.
Ambassador Haass. And the----
The Chairman. Well, I was about to point that out, but I--
--
Ambassador Haass. There was a reluctance to negotiate,
then, because people felt it was not necessary and regime
change was going to come.
The Chairman. Well, look, the reason I ask it is--the
purpose of these hearings is to try to enlighten us, as well as
the American public. I start with the premise that there are
some very bright people in this administration, so it's not
just pique that it's suggesting, and I think it's an important
explanation.
Dennis, you wanted to comment on that?
Ambassador Ross. I do, because I've had some exchanges,
because I wrote an article in which I made a case for why we
should be talking to the Syrians, although I do believe dealing
with the Syrians and dealing with the Iranians requires what I
call a stick-and-carrot approach, not necessarily a carrot-and-
stick approach. They have to know what they lose to concentrate
the mind, but then they have to know, if they're prepared to
change their behavior, what they get for it. So, it has to be
both dimensions.
What I've heard from the administration is, I think, three
points. First is that, basically, the Syrians have made their
choice; they feel that they have made their strategic choice
with the Iranians, and there is--you're not going to be able to
affect them, No. 1. No. 2 is their fear that the only thing the
Syrians want is Lebanon, so you'll go in there, and immediately
what you're doing is you're talking about Lebanon, and we don't
want to be--we don't want to look like we're talking about
Lebanon. And, No. 3--and they're certainly hearing it from the
Saudis, especially in the aftermath of Bashar Asad's speech in
which he referred to ``half-men,'' and the Saudis interpreted
that as being, shall we say, more than a slur against them.
They've heard, from the Saudis, that the worst thing in the
world that we could be doing right now is sending the signal
that we're prepared to go talk to them at a time when they
think they're riding high.
The Chairman. Gotcha.
Ambassador Ross. Those are the--I think, the factors that
influence them.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Let me go to--only a few minutes left here--Dennis. You
indicated--and I happen to agree with you--that the only thing
that's going to change the behavior of the Iraqis internally
and work out--or attempt to work out some of the real risks
each of the parties would have to take to deal with this
sectarian violence--would be a real change. And I was asked,
some time ago, when the President was whispering literally in
the ear of Maliki, you know, ``Do you think it's a good
thing?'' And I said, ``It depends on what he's whispering in
his ear.'' If he's saying, ``Hey, Jack, if you don't straighten
things out, we're leaving,'' that might get his attention. If
it's, ``We're with you, don't worry. We'll send in
reinforcements,'' then we're probably in trouble.
I think everybody agrees, here, there needs to be a change,
that there has to be, that old expression, there's nothing like
a hanging to focus one's attention. This conundrum here, we,
basically, it seems to me, have to send a message that we ain't
hanging around for a long time. I assume that's why Richard and
you and others, and the Iraq Study Group, and I all said we
have to start to drawdown to send that message.
Does the mere fact that we have sent in a surge, even
though, quite frankly, he could have moved these troops around
without going through all this--does that have--does that delay
the inevitable, forcing the Iraqis to have to look at what they
have to do in order to be able to deal with this issue?
Ambassador Ross. It does, unless somehow you would
condition the surge. In other words, we've got the first
tranche of it beginning. If it became very clear that,
``Nothing else happens unless we now see you begin to fulfill
all the commitments you've now said you're prepared to make,
whether it's the sharing of oil revenues or it's the de-
Baathification''----
The Chairman. I asked that question. They made it clear
that, no, there was no absolute conditioning. Now, I understand
if an administration wouldn't say that publicly, but I don't
understand an administration not saying that privately.
Let me conclude. I don't want to run over my time; it may
be, with the reduced number, we may be able to have a second
round--but, Professor, as I said, I read your book with great
interest. I thought your testimony was enlightening. I find one
irony here, though. At the very moment the administration is
getting involved in a ``surge,'' the argument I'm hearing from
my contacts within Iraq that my staff and I keep after our
seven trips over there--is that it's viewed as--by the Sunnis,
at the moment--as a pro-Shia effort, that we are going after
the Sunnis and leaving the Shia alone, and we are taking sides.
The irony is, outside of Iraq the argument is we're siding with
the Sunni states against the Shia. How does that play in the
neighborhood?
Dr. Nasr. Well, even within Iraq, many Shias have the same
complaint; namely, that the troops should not have come to
Baghdad at all, they should have been--the surge should have
been at Al Anbar. And, in fact, I think Prime Minister Maliki
tried to have his own security plan ahead of the announcement
of the new strategy in order to avoid having--sending the
troops in. That's exactly that--the dilemma, Senator. We're in
an environment in the region, where, increasingly, there is a
divide, in terms of opinion on a host of issues, and we're
seeing that public opinion is following, in many of these
issues, along sectarian lines. Part of the problem with the
surge is that there is a military solution here, with no
political plan to back it up. It would have been possible to--
--
The Chairman. Exactly.
Dr. Nasr [continuing]. Assuage the fears of both sides if
there was a new political plan that would have shown a roadmap
to peace with, I think, a step-by-step about how the United
States can actually get the two sides to make the compromises,
rather than just putting benchmarks at it. So, as a result, I
think nobody believes that there is a political solution here.
They see the--they see that this is essentially an effort to
decommission their military assets at a time in which--where
there's political uncertainty for them, and they're sort of
circling the wagons.
The Chairman. A cynical view expressed by some editorial
boards, and, I must admit, by me and others, is, it could also
be just to hand this off, just keep this going. But I'm not
sure.
My time is up. I'll come back, Professor; I want to ask you
about specific Shia leaders and the degree to which they
support, or don't support, this new effort.
But, with that, let me yield to Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And, to each of
you, thank you for your continued contributions to helping, not
just the Congress, but the American people, understand the
depth of this issue.
Mr. Ross, you ended your testimony almost like a book,
chapter one. And it just kind of fell off the table with a not
particularly optimistic view of not only Iraq, but the Middle
East. So, my question to each of you is: Where do we go from
here? We have heard, this morning, an inventory of consequences
of bad decisions made over the last 4 years. And I thought the
three of you presented not only the past issues, but the
current dilemmas and challenges rather clearly. But I'm
interested now in asking the three of you: In your opinions,
where do we go from here, addressing such issues as the
resources that we now have in Iraq, the investment that we have
made in Iraq? Where best can we maximize those resources to
have some influence over the outcome in Iraq and the scope of
the Middle East? Recognizing, as the three of you have said,
that we don't have many good options, if we have any options at
all. We are dealing with many uncontrollables, many dynamics
that are well beyond what we can influence.
So, Mr. Ross, begin with you. Thank you.
Ambassador Ross. Well, I guess with regard to Iraq, I would
offer two suggestions. The first is, in a sense, what I was
implying with the chairman before, at least the first part of
the surge is already done, because forces are en route or
already there. I would condition any further implementation of
the surge on whether or not the Iraqi Government is living up
to the promises they've made. There's a whole--in a sense, the
President's now laid out a series of measures by which you can
evaluate whether they're doing what they said they were going
to do or not. If they're not prepared to do what they say, you
know, we could be providing a lot--much larger numbers of
forces and it wouldn't make a difference. I completely identify
with what Vali was saying about the issue of, if you don't have
a political plan, it doesn't matter what you're doing in the
security area. So, that's point one. I would condition further
implementation of the surge on whether or not, in fact, the--
Prime Minister Maliki is living up to what he said he would do.
No. 2, if, in fact, he's unlikely to do--which is fulfill
those promises, which is my fear, not my--certainly not what I
want to see, but what I'm afraid of--then I think we should
also take--we should take--we should be aware of what's
happening on the ground in Iraq that is already beginning to
move toward a kind of fragmentation, or at least changing the
realities on the ground. About 100,000 Iraqis a month are being
displaced, which means that the whole nature of the mixed
areas, that previously was the reality on the ground, is being
changed. So, maybe we're moving toward what could be a Bosnian
kind of outcome, in which case, forces should be there to
facilitate that, you should develop it in stages. You might
find it easier to internationalize the presence in a
circumstance where you were dealing with a Bosnia kind of
outcome. That strikes me as being a better way to try to manage
what will happen in Iraq.
Look, I think having Iraq devolve into some kind of
convulsive state is hardly in our interest. I don't know how
much capability we're going to have to prevent that over the
long haul. I don't think you justify staying in Iraq just
because the situation gets worse. That becomes a trap forever.
So, one alternative way of managing a transition, it seems to
me, is, recognize what's already taking place on the ground,
try to make it safer by approaching it more in terms of a
Bosnia approach, try to internationalize the presence in light
of that, because the objective is suddenly changing.
Third, you know, obviously, I've identified a major part of
my life's work as being involved with trying to resolve or deal
with the Israeli-Palestinian issue. I would do it, as I said,
not because it's going to have the slightest impact on Iraq.
It's not going to have the slightest impact on Iraq. But one of
the mistakes the administration made is, it sent a message of
indifference on this issue. Here was an issue that, from the
standpoint of the Arab and the Muslim world, they considered to
be a core grievance. The last thing in the world we ought to be
doing is sending a message that what they consider to be very
important, we consider to be unimportant.
So, I would make an effort, like what Richard said earlier;
I don't think this is a time you're going to be able to resolve
the issue. We have a divided Palestinian leadership. We have an
Israeli Government that does not have a great deal of public
support. To think that those leaderships, at this point, are
going to take on the core issues of the conflict that go to the
heart of self-definition and identity, issues like Jerusalem
and refugees and borders, I think, is just unrealistic. But,
you know, that doesn't mean you sit on the sidelines. The
consequence of sitting on the sidelines for the last 6 years is
that the situation has gotten dramatically worse.
I think there's a great deal that can be done right now,
even in the context of what's happening among Palestinians.
There's a competition right now for what is going to be the
future identity of the Palestinians, and it's between Fatah
independence and Hamas. And, at this juncture, I think, I've
seen--having just come back from the area, I can tell you I've
seen, for the first time, a lot of the Palestinians in Fatah
and around--and, I would say, the independents are determined
now to compete, because they realize what Hamas has in mind is
an Islamic State. Now, I think the more they compete, the more
you may also end up splitting Hamas.
So, I think the more that we could orchestrate--and the
very active effort to try to affect that competition, which
involves Arab States, which involves the Israelis, which
involves the Europeans and ourselves, that's one thing that's
very important. Clearly, the Israelis also have a stake in what
that competition is, so you have to try to promote much greater
coordination between, I think, the Israelis and Abu Mazen, and
the people around Abu Mazen. I think that gives you a chance to
begin to affect this. It doesn't mean, by the way that you
don't at least talk about a political horizon, because, again,
if you want those in the Palestinian world who believe in
coexistence to succeed, they also have to be able to point to
the fact that there is a possibility and a sense of hope that's
out there. So, I'd work at two different levels. But don't
focus on a political horizon to the exclusion of what's
happening day to day on the ground, especially from an American
standpoint. After 6 years of having disengaged, we will not
have credibility on a political horizon if the day-to-day
realities aren't changing, because we don't have a whole lot of
credibility right now.
I'll just close. In terms of Iran, I, too, believe that
it's important to engage Iran, but it's important to think
about how best to do it. When I said, before, that the
combination of sticks and carrots is an important combination,
I put it in that order deliberately. We have a very interesting
debate going on in Iran right now. If you take a look at what's
happening, in terms of what's happening on the state radio, if
you look at, in the past week, within the media within Iran,
criticisms of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in terms of what he's saying
publicly and how it's isolating Iran and putting them at risk,
it suggests to me that there is a potential to change the
balance of forces within Iran. It's very important that, in
fact, Ahmadinejad not look like his way of confrontation works.
It's very important that, in a sense, there's an unmistakable
cost to pursuing the pathway that he's on. But it's also very
clear that they have to see that they can gain something if
they change their behavior.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Dr. Haass.
Ambassador Haass. Three things. On the diplomatic side, I
would support a regional forum modeled on the Afghan
experience; American support, rather than resistance, to an
Israeli-Syrian dialog; and, third, I would favor unconditional
bilateral talks with Iran.
But, beyond the diplomatic, let's talk about Iraq for a
second, Senator.
There are three potential goals for U.S. policy now. One is
to try to stop the civil war, or reduce the civil war. That's
been the dominant one. The second is to try to prevent a
regional war. The third is to protect the United States
reputation for reliability around the world, despite Iraq.
I believe that stopping, or significantly affecting, the
civil war is probably beyond our capacity. With this surge,
we're going to face a terrible dilemma. Either we essentially
have an anti-Sunni bias which runs the risk of strengthening
the Iranian and Shia hold on things, and turning things into a
regional war, because, ultimately, regional states will not
stand by while their Sunni kith and kin get hammered; or we end
up going after, much more, the Shia militias, which is taking
on a much larger mission, and we would not have the Iraqi
Government as a partner anymore--and, again, it would put
United States forces in the middle of something much larger.
Again, my principal problem with the surge is that it
reinforces the interaction between American forces and the
Iraqi civil war. I'm not sure that's a smart place for us to
be. To the contrary, I am increasingly persuaded it is where we
don't want to be. So, we need to think about how we have a
presence in Iraq and avoid some of the risks of what a
withdrawal would bring about. But we need to design a presence
for Iraq that plays for the long haul, that does not get us in
the middle of a civil war. This means less troops; it means
pulling back from Baghdad, thinking more about the borders,
thinking more about training, essentially playing for time.
Civil wars take time. Either one side wins or they burn out. At
the moment, the only side that could conceivably win is the
Shia. That's not an outcome we would want. And so, this may
simply take time. I don't like sitting here saying this. The
idea that the best we can help manage is an Iraq in which civil
conflict goes on for several years or longer is not a very
attractive thing to say before this or any other committee.
That said, it is my analysis that that's probably, now, the
best outcome--or the least bad outcome, let's be honest about
it--the least bad outcome that we can realistically hope for.
So, what I'm trying to do is design a United States presence
that reduces the direct and indirect cost to the United States
of a civil war in Iraq, which, again, means trying to limit the
scale of the civil war, but, again, more than anything else,
preventing the civil war from going truly regional, and trying
to avoid a situation where Iraq undermines United States
foreign policy worldwide.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Professor.
Dr. Nasr. Yes, thank you, Senator.
First of all, I don't think we should expect much in terms
of cooperation from the current Iraqi Government, from the
Maliki government, for the reason that I think that pressure
below from his community on him is not in the direction of--to
making the necessary compromises on oil revenue, on power-
sharing, on an amnesty law, and the like. I mean, he's caught
between pressure from Washington, pressure from below, and in a
very fractious alliance that he has to maintain just to survive
in office, so I think he's trying--he will do just sufficient
amount to keep Washington backed off, but we shouldn't really
expect much movement at all.
And, second, he is being pushed to work off of a plan that
was conceived a year ago, at December 2005, for national unity
and reconciliation, in a very different environment in Iraq.
And the environment's changed, the plan hasn't changed, and
this current government probably will not be able to operate on
the back of that. And, as Ambassador Ross mentioned, there's no
other plan on the table that he would move forward. So, we
essentially should come to terms with the fact that, no, we
shouldn't invest our hopes in a political solution by this
government in Baghdad, if it survives. And if it doesn't
survive and collapses, it actually will compound the problem.
Second, I would say that a war that has changed the
region--and we all attest to that; everybody in the region
would say that this war has changed everything--their
perception of one another, the calculus--how could that war be
resolved without that region having the buy-in? I mean, we
almost want to recreate Iraq and put the Humpty Dumpty back,
without having anybody's buy-in. I think we--our focus has not
been on a final solution that the region, all of Iraq's
neighbors, will be willing to accept. We constantly say,
``Well, stability's in their interest.'' Yes; it is. But
they're--that, they all agree on. Nobody wants chaos in Iraq.
What they don't agree on is: What is the final shape of Iraq?
And we have had no conversation, and they have had no
conversation--other than Iranians and the Turks, I don't know
of any other real, you know, adversaries that actually are
talking about: What is the final shape? And I think when--back
to Senator Biden's question, when we say: Are we going to be
supplicants with the Iranians and Syrians, and is this
extortion?--that's really at the level of when we want
specifics from them. So, what do we barter, for specifics, like
stopping arming of the Mahdi Army?
But I think the larger issue of, would Iran or Syria or
Saudi Arabia be able to arrive at an agreement, in terms of
power-sharing--how much would the Sunnis get, how much the
Shiites would get, how much the Kurds would get--I think--I
don't think that would put us in a supplicant position, or the
Iranians and the Syrians will be in a position not extort
anything for that. And the region is familiar with that kind of
a thing. They did it in Lebanon over the tariff agreement. They
continuously have these kinds of discussions about other
conflicts.
So, I think, for us, we should, sort of, accept that we're
not going to--we're not going to get a political solution for
Iraq out of the current plan on the table. There is no
incentive on the ground for this Iraqi Government to support
us, given the pressure it's feeling from below. And I should
say the same for the Sunnis. You could say the insurgency has
been winning, it's been bending the U.S. will, it's been
changing our strategy. Why would they change course, at this
point in time?
And I think, at the regional level, I do agree with both my
copanelists, that it's extremely important, but I think our
focus should not be on bartering over specific issues, it
should be on getting a regional buy-in for a final shape of
Iraq.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Senator Dodd [presiding]. Thank you. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Biden had to step out for a few minutes, and so, I
have become the acting chairman of this committee, and I yield
myself an hour and a half. [Laughter.]
Rare moments you get, here, to be--take a few minutes.
Well, thank you all very, very much for your testimony.
I want to commend Dick Lugar, as well. I know he made his
opening statement this morning, but he had some comments in
there that are really worth repeating again, and he emphasized
the points that were made by our panelists here: ``The purpose
of talks is not to change our posture toward these countries,''
talking about Iran and Syria, principally, ``nor would we
compromise vital interests or strike the ethereal bargains that
cannot be verified, but if we lack the flexibility to
communicate with unfriendly regimes, we increase the chances of
miscalculation, undercut our ability to take advantage of any
favorable situations, and potentially limit the regional
leverage with which we can control Iran and Syria.'' And I--
there are other statements in there, but--I think that was a
very thoughtful comment by Senator Lugar, and--and it makes the
point that all of you have made this morning, as well, and I
just want to thank you for it.
There are several comments in here, and I thought the
comment, Richard, that you made in here, in just--``What
matters is not where you begin a negotiation, but where it ends
in that process.''
Just for the sake of conversation, Senator Kerry and I were
in the region, back in the middle part of December, and spent--
here he is now--we spent some time with President Assad, along
with the United States Embassy personnel in the room, so this
has been reported back to the State Department, as well as our
own conversations, and asking President Assad what he wanted to
come out of Iraq. And my colleague from Massachusetts can share
some thoughts on this, as well. And, as I heard him talking
about, he--now, again, it was said in English--as Tom Friedman
likes to point out, if they don't say it in public and in
Arabic, it may mean less, but, nonetheless, I'll tell you what
he said in English. He wanted a pluralist Arab State on his
border. He had no interest seeing a Shia, Iranian-dominated
fundamentalist state. And that didn't come as any shock to me.
That would seem to be sort of a rational conclusion by
President Assad. But it seems to me it's worthy, then, of
exploring that question.
I don't know how widely it's been reported, but, for the
first time in a quarter of a century, Baghdad and Damascus
are--exchanged Ambassadors. President Talibani, I think, was in
Damascus the other day. Prime Minister Maliki spent a good part
of his exile in Damascus, as President Talibani spent a good
part of his time in the Kurdish areas or in Iran. I mean,
there's a lot of history here that goes back over a long time.
The world didn't begin on the day that we went into Iraq, and
unraveling this situation requires a good understanding of the
history of the background.
I would hope, by the way--and I just raise this here,
because we've talked about it--that we would have a debate like
this, ourselves, rather quickly, as we discuss this new
proposal on the surge. And I agree with you, Richard, it's a
tactic, not a strategy here, but it's an important issue, and
the rationale for it is completely different than the rationale
we were offered back several years ago, when the original
authorizing resolution came up here, and it dealt with the
issue of weapons of mass destruction, it dealt with Saddam
Hussein and terrorism. There's a whole new set of circumstances
that we ought to be considering as we go forward with this. And
so, whether or not you agree or disagree with it, the fact of
the matter is, the Senate of the United States ought to take
some time out to do exactly what this committee is doing here,
to talk about these very issues that I think are critically
important to us. And my hope is we'll get beyond, sort of, the
nonbinding resolution, which is a way to express something up
here, but, rather, have a good debate, require a new
authorization and a discussion of exactly what the implications
are.
Let me ask a couple of quick questions, if I can. I, again,
thank you for your testimony. It's very, very good. And you may
have implied this, as I went through the comments. And I'll
begin with you, Dr. Nasr. Tell me about--the quick question--we
have no problem--I have no problem seeing President Assad--I
think we should have been talking--I'd have a real problem in
sitting down with Ahmadinejad, frankly. The idea that I'd sit
down with someone who has said the things he has--my father was
a prosecutor at Nuremberg, and--and wrote my mother, every day,
these letters, talking about what went on--400 letters during
that year and a half in 1945 through the end of 1946. The idea
that you'd have a head of state denying the existence of the
Holocaust was stunning to me. And the idea I'd be sitting in a
room with this individual is abhorrent to me. Who should we be
dealing with in Iran? There are many different levels, it seems
to me, in Iran, that we could be talking or at least opening
some doors with. Where would you suggest we begin a process? If
you're not going to necessarily want to sit down with the
President of the country, but you wanted to access some other
centers of influence, of power centers, where would you suggest
we begin that conversation?
Dr. Nasr. Well, a lot of the conversation in the West that
actually has been with the head of Iran's National Security
Council, Ali Larijani, who's also been the main negotiator with
Javier Solana over the nuclear issue. He was the one, actually,
Iran appointed when there was a potential for a conversation
over Iraq, to travel to Iraq, to meet with Ambassador
Khalilzad, at that point.
Ultimately, our interest in Iran is to influence the top
decisionmaking in the country. Ahmadinejad is only one
component of that.
Senator Dodd. Right.
Dr. Nasr. But the real levers of power in Iran are held by
the Supreme Leader, as well as major power centers within the
military and the political establishment.
Senator Dodd. So, your point is, there are other places we
could--opening up those doors, without necessarily focusing
exactly on the--Ahmadinejad.
Dr. Nasr. I think, actually, focusing Ahmadinejad has been
a mistake by American media and the American administration.
It's actually empowered him. About a decade ago, when Iran had
a reformist President, the attitude in Washington was, ``There
is no point talking to the Iranian President, because he's
not--doesn't really hold any power.'' And ever since
Ahmadinejad's become President, we have seen him as everything
in Iran. And that's a mistake, as well. In fact, the elections
in Iran, the dissent in Iran, which Ambassador Ross was
pointing to, suggests that this is not our typical
dictatorship, where, like in Syria, there's one man ruling. He
is vulnerable. He has staked his ground. And the more we focus
on him, actually, the more important we make him and his
position within Iran itself. We ought to--we ought to have an
approach that we have a policy toward Iran, not toward the
Iranian President.
Senator Dodd. Good point.
Dennis or Richard, do you want to comment on that?
Ambassador Ross. Yes, I would--I would echo a lot of that.
I would simply add that the easiest way for us to begin an
engagement would be through a regional conference on Iraq----
Senator Dodd. Yes.
Ambassador Ross [continuing]. Where you'd have a built-in
multilateral forum, where you wouldn't be dealing with
Ahmadinejad, and where you have an area where there could be a
convergence of interest, if they have enough fear about what
may be happening in Iraq. I don't think they have it right now,
but I think, in fact, it could, in fact, be something that
begins to emerge. That would be how I would suggest it.
I would add one qualifier in what Vali said. I don't think
you can let what Ahmadinejad says go without response. I don't
think, you know, these kinds of statements can somehow be
dismissed because of, ``Well, the Iranian President isn't
important.'' The Iranian--because there is a kind of
interesting elite, and there is a difference of opinion in that
elite, it's important that they understand the consequences of
that kind of behavior.
Senator Dodd. Yes.
Ambassador Ross. And you're seeing it, as I said--as Vali
knows, if you look, in the last week, at the commentary in
different Iranian newspapers, he's being attacked precisely
because of what he says. So, I would say it's important that we
find ways to do that, as well.
Senator Dodd. Yes. And the economic issues--I think,
Richard, you point out--are very important, as well, to
highlight the failure there. But----
Ambassador Haass. Too often, diplomats think of diplomacy
as something which is done in secret and in private. I actually
think, with the Iranians, we would be far wiser to put it out
there--again, to put pressure on the government. And also,
given that there are competing centers of political authority--
--
Senator Dodd. Yes.
Ambassador Haass [continuing]. We ought to contribute to
that competition.
I'd just say one other thing, Senator. There's a time
urgency here--partially related to Iraq, even more related to
Iran's nuclear program. Our options will get narrowed, given
that Iran is gradually accumulating the capacity to enrich. And
time, in that sense, does not work in our favor. So, sooner
rather than later, we need to decide what it is we are prepared
to do, in terms of a diplomatic outcome, because otherwise the
alternatives tend to be either living with an Iran that
accumulates a nuclear capability or having to use military
force. I would suggest that neither is a terribly attractive
option. So, again, to me, it highlights the need for us to get
squared away on a diplomatic approach.
Senator Dodd. I couldn't agree with you more--in fact, I
intended to open my remarks by saying: In the 25 years I've
been a member of this committee and a Member of this body,
having traveled to the region on a number of occasions, not
anywhere near the numbers that our panelists have, but I have
never seen it as bad, nor have I ever seen it with as many
opportunities. I think some--one of you made that point in your
prepared remarks. But what I sensed, more than anything else,
was the absence of our engagement. I must have heard that a
thousand times; the sort of benign participation in what's
going on. And that concerns me. And I'm glad the Secretary is
there now, but I'd often hoped that we might have done
something a little bit more, given the complexity of the issues
and the importance of the moment, to have someone on the ground
on more of a permanent basis there that would be able to really
help us manage these events and be around to take advantage of
these opportunities as they come up.
Let me ask one or two quick questions, because I want my
colleagues to get to--I was very impressed with--Fareed Zakaria
wrote a piece the other day in the Times about the surge issue,
and he said one of the--if I paraphrase him correctly, he said,
``It's not so much that you may be opposed to the surge, what
we ought to be worried about is, it may succeed.'' And I think
one or both of you made this point, and that is that if it
succeeds, in the sense it contributes to a further alienation
of the very people we're trying to get together, the
designation of 17,000 troops in the streets of a city of 6
million people, with 23 militias and a variety of other
factions operating there, well, we're invariably going to be
having to take on--in fact, we've been urging taking on the
Mahdi Militia, and Sadr--his point being, that this--if it
succeeds, it actually moves us further away from exactly the
point I think most are arguing here, and that is a political
solution. I wonder if you wanted to comment on his conclusions
in that.
Ambassador Haass. Well, it's one of several dilemmas we
face. And let me suggest some others, though, in addition to
what Fareed is writing about. And, by the way, a lot of them
come down to the fact that at the end of the day, we and the
Iraqi Government don't share the same end state. And I would
simply suggest that's one of the reasons we don't have as much
leverage as we thought. The idea of withholding a surge may not
necessarily be something they would be that upset over. If you
think that the goal of the government is to consolidate Shia
primacy, then a surge doesn't necessarily help their short-term
objectives. So, I'm not sure we have that much influence, in
terms of regulating our presence there, because, again, they've
got a set of objectives that is fundamentally different than
ours in terms of the end state they envision for their own
country.
Senator Dodd. Yes.
Ambassador Ross. I would just say, I--on the issue of
withholding the surge, it's--that has to be part of a larger
strategy. You don't just withhold the surge; you withhold the
surge, and then I basically think you send the message, ``OK,
we're going to change course now, fundamentally.''
Senator Dodd. Yes.
Ambassador Ross. And I have favored the idea of not simply
imposing a deadline and pulling out, but saying to them, ``All
right, we're now going to--we're going to negotiate a
withdrawal with you.'' You concentrate their mind. You know the
reality's going to change.
I don't think that, you know, the--it's true, I think, what
Richard said, they have a different end state in mind. I don't
see any indication of this government, regardless of its
commitment, is serious about national reconciliation. I think
the message they sent with the execution of Saddam Hussein was
just the opposite. Here was an opportunity for them to say to
the Sunnis, in particular, ``You know, we're going to put that
chapter in our history behind us. We were all brutalized by
him. We all suffered from him. Now we're going to write a
common history--we're going to write a common future
together.'' They didn't do that. They sent the message, ``We're
in control.'' And so, I think, you know, if they feel that
somehow being in control is put at risk, that might change
their behavior.
Senator Dodd. Yes. Well----
The Chairman [presiding]. I know that having you in control
means you're 4 minutes over. [Laughter.]
Senator Dodd. No; I apologize. I was actually going to take
an hour. [Laughter.]
But I think the point is really worthwhile, but my sense of
it is--to just end up on this point, is that--quite the
opposite. I think the surge really does exacerbate and delay
the decisionmaking process, for various reasons. My view is, I
think, you know, the Shias have a reason why they want us there
without a clear mission, in that we can consolidate power for
them. The Sunnis think we might be able to protect them or get
them back in the door. And as long as we're failing to start to
talk about an endgame and how this works, then I think the
political realities haven't set in. And the sooner they set in,
the more likely, I think, you're going to get the kind of--at
least the progress that we're talking about here. And I think
you've both--all three of you have articulated that well,
that--don't expect a conversion here to happen overnight; but
to move it on a road, it seems to me that we've got to--we've
got to change the paradigm here, the dynamic, pretty
considerably, and we're not doing that at all, it seems to me;
we're just perpetuating a strategy here that is not producing,
in any likelihood, the results that we'd all like to see.
But, great testimony, and I wish there were more time,
myself, to talk with you here.
But I thank you immensely for your contributions, not just
today, but over the years. You've all been tremendously helpful
to us, and I thank you.
I thought, Richard, your piece in Time magazine was
excellent, by the way.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Will the conversion take place on the Road to
Damascus? That's the question here. But--
Senator, welcome, again, and----
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman----
The Chairman [continuing]. The floor is yours.
Senator Corker [continuing]. Thank you, sir.
I do wonder, in light of the testimony today and just the
tremendous focus that you've caused this committee to have on
Iraq, rightfully, does it make any sense for us to consider
asking General Petraeus--I know he has a war to fight, I know
that taking him away from that could be frowned upon, but he
does have to be--he does have to come before the Senate, at
some point, anyway, and I'm wondering if it makes any sense,
especially with Dr. Nasr's presentation regarding the Shia
situation in Iraq and its relationship to Iran, to possibly
have testimony? I just ask that question.
The Chairman. Well, we are--that's a very good question,
Senator. I haven't been the mayor of a big city. You're--you
had the great good fortune to be able to set policy. There's
jurisdictional webs up here. I have talked to Senator Levin,
the chairman of the Armed Services Committee. I think it would
be good to have some cross-pollenization here, to have General
Petraeus, and, for that matter, to have the Secretary of
Defense here, as well, and to have State Department officials
testify there. That's not been worked out yet, but I think your
suggestion is a very good one. And I have found, in my many
meetings and exchanges with General Petraeus, he's a
forthcoming guy, he's a straightforward guy, and he really is
one of the best we have, in my view, and it would benefit us
all if he were able to be here. I will follow up on that.
I'd ask to put a little bit more time back on the clock for
the Senator, since that was a question directed to the Chair.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, again, I want to thank you
for these excellent hearings. And I want to thank this
outstanding panel. I think you all have all done an excellent
job.
And, you know, because I've asked my questions in these
panels in a sort of civil way, I think some people think I have
a leaning as to which direction I think we ought to go. I
really don't. Fortunately, I was--unfortunately or
fortunately--I was a mayor of a city when these decisions were
being made. I have no personal feelings, and truly think that
the type of testimony that you've given, and others have given,
allow us, in public, to discuss our policies and really calls
the American public, themselves, to think about what ought to
be done. And so, Mr. Chairman, again, I thank you for that.
And, Richard, I thank you for taking the time, while I was a
lowly candidate, to meet with me. I did read your book, and I
appreciate that.
And I just--I want to ask three questions, one to each of
you. There's no question that the civil war that is taking
place in Iraq today is one that we, in essence, by virtue of
our involvement, created. And I know there's been a lot--a
school of thought that says that we should--that maybe what
we're doing is allowing a muted civil war to take place, not an
all-out civil war. I don't think that there's been enough
discussion publicly about what allowing an unmuted civil war
might mean. And the Americans are used to going out and solving
problems; that's what the American way of life and psyche is.
And I just wonder if you could address--and I know you all are
here to talk about relations surrounding Iraq--if you could
address, you know, how you think it might be, if you will--
you're someone that's been highly in foreign policy for
Americans, based on what you presented a minute ago--to watch,
sort of, passively, if you will, an all-out civil war take
place, as opposed to us going in and trying to be involved
proactively, as now has been put forth by the administration.
Dr. Nasr, I appreciated very much--I really was interested
in what you were saying as it relates to us getting involved in
Baghdad, in essence, and getting involved in--more fully in
this sectarian violence, and how that might, in essence, tie us
more closely to confrontation with Iran. And you mentioned
something about seeing a change in behavior by Maliki and the
Iraqi Government. And I really am having a hard time--and in no
way criticize that comment--but I don't--I'm having a hard time
understanding how we caused that change of behavior to truly
take place.
And then, Mr. Ross, just the whole issue of causing them to
live up to their promises. There's a timeframe--I, too,
question their ability to live up to the promises. I think
that's the weakest part of what has been discussed over this
last 10 days. I'd love to hear, you know, more discussion about
that.
Ambassador Haass. Well, thank you, Senator. I like your
phrase, ``muted civil war.'' And what you say about the
penchant for solving foreign policy may be American, but it
also may be beyond reach in this situation. And management is
not a very sexy idea, but sometimes it's the best you can do.
And I actually suggest, in this case, we'll be fortunate if we
can manage, at all, the course of events. But my own analysis
is that we will consider ourselves fortunate, moving forward,
if we can help limit the civil war to what you call a muted
situation. If it becomes all-out, you would have not simply a
humanitarian tragedy on a scale greater than we are seeing, but
the odds grow exponentially for it becoming a significant
regional war. Sunni governments around the region, and Sunni
nongovernmental organizations and individuals around the
region, are going to sit back and see a degree of Shia
domination in Iraq that many of the Shia in Iraq seem to want.
So, unless we can keep the civil war, in some ways muted, we
could see competition between Iraq's neighbors in Iraq, but
also growing conflict between and among Iraq's neighbors beyond
Iraq. I can imagine a scenario where there would be Sunni-Shia
outbreaks of violence in many other countries, in which there
would be terrorist attacks, perhaps fomented or supported, one
way or another, by various governments. You know people always
like to say that things have to get worse before they get
better. One of the two pieces of wisdom I have in the Middle
East is that things often get worse before they get even worse.
And that possibility, I would suggest, can't be dismissed.
So, we need to, in some ways, recalibrate our policy toward
muting, to use your word again, the violence, which, again, to
me, raises questions about the logic of a surge and putting us
in the middle of things. It does put an emphasis on regional
diplomacy, meant to adjust inflows of arms and money and
volunteers. It puts an emphasis on dealing with Syria to try to
close down the Syrian-Iraqi border more than it has been. And
it means, again, playing for time, because only when Iraqis
come to the conclusion that this game is not worth the candle,
only when Iraqis basically get exhausted or decide that they'd
actually rather have a degree of normalcy, will this begin to
fade significantly.
The United States needs to avoid extreme foreign policies
until that happens. And, to me, the two extremes are either
trying to totally smother the civil war, working with the
government to try to eliminate it, which is not realistic, or
pulling the plug, which would exacerbate things in Iraq and
raise all sorts of questions about the United States worldwide.
So, I'm trying to see if there's a needle to thread here,
where we can find some middle course. I'm not comfortable with
it. It's not pretty. But my hunch is, we need to find the
strategy, one at lower costs and a lower level of involvement,
that we can sustain for years, until this begins to play itself
out. And, coming back to what you said, that's not a solution,
but that's probably the best available option.
Dr. Nasr. Thank you, Senator.
The issue of the behavior of the Maliki government, or its
perception of the U.S. position, you're correct, I mean, it's--
in many ways, is counterintuitive for many Americans. I think
the issue to--is key--as Ambassador Haass said, is the demand
or desire for Shia domination, which is really the prevalent, I
think, political attitude in the Shia community. I think many
of them--we, maybe, were slow to take stock of this after the
February bombing of Samarra--concluded there's not going to be
reconciliation in this country, and they began to sort of think
of a different endgame, which was to maximize control of
territory, particularly Baghdad, and assert Shia domination.
And I think part of our dilemma is where we don't see the
same endgame as the Iraqi Government, is that we're still
operating on the assumption that, (a) reconciliation is
possible, (b) that the Shias want it, and (c) that this
government somehow can even rise above its own community and
constituency to follow a policy course that may not be--may not
be popular.
Nothing I have seen from the Maliki government in the past
several months suggests that it can act independent of its core
constituency, or that it's willing to do so. I think it's more
driven by survival within that coalition, and it's more driven
by the public opinion, which, unfortunately, is not, right now,
in a conciliatory mood. And I think if we listen to, say, the
statements of Maliki's partners in his own coalition, in his
government, in the Parliament, not to say the mood in the
street, it's far more sectarian and hard-line than what we hear
from him. And I think that his value right now is for the UIA
government to manage Washington's expectation without giving
the house away. But I don't see the kind of shift in attitude
that is necessary for this government to wholeheartedly back a
unity plan. And I don't think it's a function of, necessarily,
his personal caliber or opinion. It's a matter of the political
mood in a country that has become deeply divided because of
the--because of the violence, and also, I think, indicative, at
some of the diplomatic discussion we had, that we cannot do it
alone. We take two steps in the direction of the Sunnis, as
Senator Biden mentioned, about the issue of the surge, the
Shias get angry; we move two steps in the direction of the
Shias, the Sunnis accuse us of bias. And we're, sort of, caught
in a situation that--you know our endgames are not those of
these communities, and they will likely pursue their own
agendas, despite what we will be saying.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me thank the panelists for their exceptional and
insightful testimony. I really appreciate it.
I want to start with Ambassador Ross. And I think it's
worthy of quoting from some of your written testimony, because
it's the preface to the question I want to ask you.
You say, ``The only circumstance in which I see Iran and
Saudi Arabia behaving differently is if they both become
fearful that a precipitous U.S. withdrawal might trigger a real
convulsion in Iraq, and then the consequences of that would
create, possibly, a convergence of interests in Iraq to lead
the two to explore a possible deal.'' And then you go on to
say, ``There is an irony here. Only if the reality in Iraq
threatens to be far more costly to both the Saudis and Iranians
are they likely to contemplate some limited understanding in
Iraq.'' And then you say, ``By keeping the lid on with our
forces and preventing a real collapse, we make it safe enough
for everyone next to and within Iraq to avoid taking what they
regard as excruciating decisions.'' And finally, ``In my
experience''--this is, again, your testimony--``leaders don't
cross threshold in historic conflicts because they are induced
into doing so. They may approach the thresholds, given certain
promises about the future, but they don't cross them unless
they see the costs, as they measure them, if they fail to
act.'' And that's where I want to start.
You know, when we had Secretary Rice here, I asked her
questions about benchmarks, consequences, and deadlines. It
seems to me--and, of course, she rejected all of those
propositions--it seems to me that, if we are going to hope for
the Iraqis to love their children more than they hate their
neighbors, that this actually is not about military action, but
a whole host of other issues--reconciliation, diplomatic,
power-sharing, and revenue-sharing issues. So, isn't the
question really--if we're going to change the direction here,
isn't it about having benchmarks with consequences and
deadlines? I've heard, I think, all of you say the Maliki
government has shown nothing that leads us to believe they're
truly going to change the course. So, aren't those some of the
things that we should be doing? And what accelerant can we add
to the equation to get others, outside of Iraq, to come to that
conclusion that you said will be necessary for them to find
some convergence of interest?
Ambassador Ross. Look, I think the key--and it--we've--you
hear, in the skepticism on all of us--is: How do you create a
sense of consequence for nonperformance? Up until now, there's
been no consequence for nonperformance. In fact, your question
was about the promises and my skepticism about the promises.
People tend to forget that Prime Minister Maliki, when he came
in--what was his first big initiative, immediately? It was
security for Baghdad. That was his first big initiative. Now,
we're on, I think, by my count, his third national
reconciliation plan. Each time we see these commitments are
adopted, and there's never a consequence for not fulfilling the
behavior or changing the course.
So, everyone has become conditioned to a certain reality
that we will keep the lid on. And, as bad as the situation is,
it's not intolerable for them, on the inside, because the
choice--and this is why I used the word very consciously,
``excruciating decisions,'' and I do have some experience
negotiating with people who have to make what are excruciating
decisions, as they measure them, because they have to take on
history and mythology. In Maliki's case, what makes it so
difficult for him is partly the reasons that Vali was talking
about: The structure of the situation, who his allies are, his
own instinct. But I would even say it goes beyond that. The
Shia, today, in Iraq are a majority, but they act as if they're
a minority. They act as if they're completely vulnerable,
because they have a history that tells them they are
vulnerable. They've been oppressed. So, they're not going to
change their mindset unless, in fact, they see there's a
consequence out there that threatens what they want.
Our current position today, in a sense, allows everybody to
live with a situation that isn't good, but it's certainly
better than having to take these excruciating decisions. So, if
there isn't--in my mind, if there isn't consequence, if we
aren't, at this point, going to say, ``All right, believe it or
not, we're not going to be here to allow you to pursue what you
want,''--that's why I say, I don't want to leave in a--leave
them in a lurch where you impose a deadline, because then
everybody simply invests in their own militia, anticipating
what's coming, which is the kind of scenario that Richard was
talking about. And everybody on the outside, then, sort of
positions themselves, as well.
The trick for us is to convince them the lid is going to
come off, and be very clear when it's going to happen, but in a
way where they have the potential to affect it, they have the
capacity to affect it, so then they have to make a choice. Up
until now, we have freed them of having to make a choice. Until
they have to make a choice, they won't.
Senator Menendez. So, that means benchmarks with
consequences.
Ambassador Ross. Absolutely.
Senator Menendez. How do you get the world to look at--you
suggested, in the Bosnian-type situation--how do you get the
rest of the world to buy into that?
Ambassador Ross. I think, actually, if we--and this gets, I
think, again, to something all three of us have been--at least
been implying, if not stating explicitly. We have to be much
clearer on what it is we're trying to achieve. As long as we
say we're going to succeed, but we don't define, really, what
``success'' is in anything but in a level of abstraction, no
one is going to sign on. We have to look at what are the
choices. Richard suggested maybe the best choice, to borrow the
Senator's term, is a kind of muted civil war, where you contain
it. I outlined the--a kind of, Bosnia situation, because it's
not as bad as that, and it is--it could be a situation where
you have a transition to that. I think if we were to spell it
out and say, ``This is what we're going for,'' and have quiet
conversations in advance, which is the essence of diplomacy--
the essence of diplomacy is, you don't spring big initiatives
out in public unless you've done your work in advance with
everybody to condition them to what you're trying to do. You
have enough private conversations to talk about how you refine
the concepts that you're laying out. I would at least try this,
at this point. It may be too late. But the fact that you've
got, as I said, 100,000 Iraqis a month being displaced says
that you're already having population transfers take place--
unfortunately, in the worst circumstances.
So, maybe you try to make a virtue of necessity. I think
all of us are in a position where--and I use this language also
in my written testimony; Richard used it, as well--I don't
think we can look for a good outcome in Iraq; we're looking for
the least bad outcome.
Senator Menendez. Ambassador Haass, let me ask you--I see a
sense you want to comment on that, as well, but let me ask you
one thing. One--you said, in a recent article, ``One thing is
certain: The American era in the Middle East is over.'' And
then you went on to talk about, ``The Iraq war, more than
anything else, has caused this fall.'' Could you expound upon
that for us on what that means?
Ambassador Haass. The reason I'm not comfortable with the
Bosnian solution is that while it may reflect the changing
demographic realities--ethnic cleansing, call it what you will,
is going on, on a daily, hourly basis now--I don't believe that
creates the basis for an enduring political and economic
framework. The Sunni minority is not going to be content. It's
not simply a physical question, it's a question over control--
sharing of resources, sharing of political power, and so forth.
And so, unless there's a major political conversion by the
majority, there can't simply be a narrow territorial or
demographic solution, which is where the Bosnian parallel, I
believe, doesn't work.
The reason I've suggested that, ``The United States era in
the region is over, more than anything else, because of Iraq,''
is a reflection on how history has evolved in this part of the
world. The modern history in the Middle East goes back about
200 years, since, essentially, Napoleon entered Egypt at the
end of the 18th century. Since, there have been a number of
eras, beginning with the Ottomans, a Colonial era or European
era, the cold war, and then an American era. And the height of
the American era was the end of the cold war and the previous
Iraq war, where you had this degree of American dominance that
was quite extraordinary, including an ability to put together
coalitions, deal with Iraqi aggression, promote a peace process
in ways that were historically unprecedented, and so forth.
What concerns me now is we have put a disproportionate
share of our resources, broadly defined, in Iraq, which leaves
us with less resources to do other things. We've lost the
principal counter to Iran, which was Iraq. So, we've lost the
local geopolitical balance. Iran, meanwhile, is feeling that
it's ``riding high,'' thanks to relatively high energy costs,
their strategic accomplishment, this summer with Hezbollah, the
loss of the Taliban, and what's happened in Iraq. So, they're
feeling strategically advantaged. And you add all this up, and
it seems to me that we're entering an era where the United
States has less resources that are discretionary and available
to make things happen, that Iran has dramatically improved its
position, and that many of the things that the United States
would want to bring about in the Middle East we're simply
unable to. And what this means to me is, it's not simply an era
where America's influence has gone down, but rather than we
need to think of the Middle East as a qualitatively different
foreign policy challenge.
Indeed, if I were going to paint with broad strokes, the
U.S. Government faces two great strategic challenges as it
looks forward. One is dealing with Asia--its economic success;
the translation of economic success into political and military
power; all these great powers, regional and global, in the
absence of regional mechanisms for managing them; old-fashioned
disputes in many cases going back to World War II. So, we've
got this challenge of dealing with Asian dynamism. The Middle
East could not be a more different challenge. It's the
challenge of negative energy, it's the challenge of
proliferation, it's the challenge of terrorism, it's the
challenge of failing states, it's the challenge of Iranian
imperialism, it's the challenge of leftover, unresolved issues
like the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. Virtually no government
has come up with a concept of legitimacy. It hasn't figured out
its relationship with its own people. There's no regional
mechanisms worthy of the name. All this takes place where we
have to deal not simply with the terrorism of the region, but
also with the region's energy. So, when you think about
American foreign policy, you've got these two tremendous
strategic challenges. The one in the Middle East is a negative
challenge. Our capacity to cope with it is dramatically down.
We don't have the partners on the outside. The Europeans, the
Chinese, the Russians don't see it the same way. We certainly
don't have the partners on the inside. And there's simply more
sources of instability than I've ever seen emerge at once.
So, all this adds up to be an extraordinarily difficult and
dangerous and worrisome era for the United States. It is no
surprise that we're having this kind of a conversation today.
And my prediction and fear is that we'll continue to have
conversations like this for many years to come. We're in for an
extraordinarily difficult period. I don't know whether it's 3
years, 5 years, 10 years, or longer, but I honestly believe,
Senator, that the potential for American foreign policy to be
weakened and distorted by the Middle East has never been
greater.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
these hearings.
Mr. Ross, you were cut off before you could answer Senator
Corker's question, and you had that look of anticipation in
your eyes. Would you like to say what you were going to say?
Ambassador Ross. No, I actually did answer it with Senator
Menendez, because I--the real issue was: Why do I have
skepticism about why Maliki will now live up to the commitments
that he's made? And it's because none of them are new. We've
heard all of them before, whether it's security for Baghdad or
it's national reconciliation or it's de-Baathification law or
it's the amnesty issue. Every single one of these, we've heard,
in one form or the other, before, and the only thing that would
make it different now would be if, in fact--and this gets back
to what Senator Biden was saying--if the President has
whispered in his ear and said, ``You know, I'm not going to say
this publicly, but I'm telling you, you've got 6 months. And,
at the end of those 6 months, let me tell you what's going to
happen. We will no longer be in a position to basically keep
the lid on and protect what you want''--if he's doing that in
private, then maybe--maybe there'll be a ``Conversion on the
Road to Damascus.''
Senator Isakson. Thank you.
I am new to this committee, and appreciate very much these
hearings, because I'm learning a lot, at a rapid rate. But I've
got a lot to learn.
I didn't get to hear your testimony, but I read all of the
statements last night, and your editorial in the Washington
Post, which seemed to be something that you all found some
agreement in. If I remember correctly, basically, all three of
you, in one way or another, were saying that we need to get all
the people in the region together, because we have an
interesting situation. All of them don't like us being there,
because of what they perceive our vision of victory is, but
none of them want us to leave, because they won't--don't want
the regional civil war. Is that a fair statement, without
speaking for all of you?
Ambassador Ross. It is for me, yes.
Senator Isakson. OK. My question is this, on the diplomacy
side and on the regional forum, I think, that you referred to.
If it is--if the worst outcome, for both those who like us and
those who don't, is an all-out regional civil war, and if that
is the most likely outcome--and I think Mr. Haass said the
least bad outcome is to avoid having a regional civil war, is
that correct?
Ambassador Haass. Avoid having a regional conflict.
Senator Isakson. And none of them want that--if some forum
was created where all the players, who are contiguous to Iraq
and in the region, were invited to a forum, is it almost not
somewhat incumbent upon them to both come and try to
participate in some meaningful way? Yes. And you can all three
respond to that.
Ambassador Ross. Yes; I think it could be put together,
but, again, having some experience doing diplomacy, I don't
think you launch this kind of initiative unless you do your
homework first, and that means you go around and you--you have
to develop an agenda in advance. You don't go there not knowing
how this thing is going to evolve once you get there. So, you
develop an agenda in advance, with some specific, I think,
criteria and items on that agenda. I think you have to also
create the impression that, again--it's not enough for us to
say, ``Our patience has limits.'' We're going to have to--we
are going to have to make it clear that there comes a point at
which this stops, because the only way you're going to
concentrate everybody's mind and realize that what we're
talking about is no longer a set of abstractions is for them to
realize how soon the danger that they're afraid of could begin
to emerge.
The problem we have right now is that--and I said it in the
written testimony--we've created a circumstance--not by design,
but by consequence--where no one is sufficiently uncomfortable
with the current situation. And until they become sufficiently
uncomfortable with the current situation, they won't change
their behavior. And if you want a regional forum to work,
you're also going to have to not just prepare it, you're going
to have to create a context where they understand there's a
danger out there that they understand, in their own terms; we
don't have to explain it to them.
Ambassador Haass. Could I just disagree slightly? Not on
the regional forum; obviously, I'd like to see that. As I hear
Dennis talk, there's a certain train of events that could be
set in motion if the Iraqi Government doesn't meet these
benchmarks or conditions. The United States would then do
dramatically less. I'm not sure that would necessarily
disappoint the Iraqi Government that much, given their agenda
of possibly consolidating Shia primacy. But, also, I worry
about the chain of events it could set in motion. Dennis has
what you might call--the word ``optimism'' is rarely used in
Iraq--a potentially optimistic prediction that if we give
Iraqis a glimpse into this dark future, they will then begin to
act more responsibly. I wish that were so. I'm not so
optimistic. It's quite possible that if we give them a glimpse
into a dark future, they will take it. And by that, I mean we
will move toward a regional conflict, where Sunni governments
and other groups around the region will go and help the Sunni
minority in Iraq, and essentially we will regionalize what's
now a largely if not entirely an internal conflict. So, if
you're asking me, ``Are you prepared to run that risk?''--I
would say ``probably not.'' And that's why, again, coming back
to what Senator Corker was saying, a more realistic and in some
ways a safer goal for U.S. foreign policy is to try to prevent
the worst from happening rather than adopting a more ambitious
diplomacy, which while it could succeed, has a high downside.
The potential exists of leading to a chain of events that could
regionalize this far more. So, I, for one, would be quite wary
of going down that path, unless I had understandings,
understandings that are probably not obtainable, that the other
actors would act in a far more responsible way than, shall we
say, history suggests they are prepared to act.
Senator Isakson. I think--well, maybe I missed this--I
think what--I wasn't thinking about whether Maliki actually
would go along, but whether all the others--regional players--
--
Ambassador Ross. Yes.
Senator Isakson [continuing]. Have they--they probably
would go along.
Ambassador Ross. Yes. Look, I don't have high expectations.
My point is, I can see the path we're on, and I can see where
that's headed. So, I would try to create different categories
of outcomes. One outcome is one that has the potential of
changing behavior on the inside of Iraq. The other outcome is
changing the behavior outside Iraq. You change the behavior on
the outside of Iraq, you produce your containment model,
Richard. You change the behavior inside Iraq, and you actually
have a chance to change the realities there. I'm not hopeful,
but I'm--I want to exhaust every possibility before we go to
the least bad of all the outcomes.
Senator Isakson. You believe containment is more likely
than internal stability?
Ambassador Ross. That's my fear, yes.
The Chairman. Do you all agree on that?
Dr. Nasr. Yes.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Obama.
Senator Obama. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, to the panelists. I'm sorry that I arrived late,
although I've been following some of the conversation over C-
SPAN.
Obviously, we're at a critical juncture in Iraq; nobody
denies that. I've expressed very strong skepticism for the
President's approach he articulated several weeks ago. I have
indicated that taking up the Iraq Study Group's recommendation
of reaching out to the Iraqis and the Syrians makes some sense,
understanding that the prospects for success are going to be
limited. And I'm just curious as to your assessments of if we
were to pursue that--although it doesn't appear that the Bush
administration is willing to at this point, but this is
something that may be coming up in the future. This issue may
arise if, as I anticipate, the surge strategy does not prove to
be one that changes that dynamic significantly. I am interested
what conditions or what framework or what approach you would
use to structure these conversations, in very practical terms?
And maybe I can start with you, Ambassador Ross. You know, how
would we frame these conversations so that it was most likely
to succeed, understanding that there's a possibility that Iran
and Syria both decide it's not worth it to them to pursue a
constructive strategy, as it is better off to just let the
United States flounder in the situation that it's in right now?
Ambassador Ross. I would say--I'd make a couple of points--
first is to understand that both Syria and Iran are more
capable of being spoilers within Iraq than fixers. Second,
don't single them out; treat them as a part of a collective.
They should be there in a regional forum. The fact of the
matter is, all the neighbors are going to be able to make
certain kinds of contributions. Probably the two most important
neighbors, I would say, in this regard, are probably Saudi
Arabia and Iran. So, the question is: In a regional context, a
regional forum, is it possible, for their own reasons, to help
to facilitate what could be some understandings between the two
of them so that they would use their influence--the Iranians on
the Shia militias, the Saudis on the Sunni tribes? So, I'd try
to put it more in a regional context.
There can be other reasons to be talking to the Syrians and
to the Iranians on other questions. I wouldn't put that in the
regional forum. But if we're focused on Iraq and we're trying
to get them to change their approach to Iraq, we need to be
realistic about what they can do and what they can't do. We
need to put it in this larger context. We don't want to
exaggerate their significance, but we also don't want to ignore
the kind of role that they can play.
Senator Obama. And, in terms of what's on the table and
what's not on the table for discussion, would you lay out some
very clear parameters? Are there some things that you would try
to cordon off that--we're just going to talk about Iraq here,
and we're not going to add a whole bunch of other issues to the
agenda.
Ambassador Ross. I would, yes; and I think, in the--at
least--again, if you're going to put together a regional forum,
if you don't have a very precise agenda, it will suddenly
become completely unmanageable, and you're going to have a lot
of issues where, necessarily, we're not going to be real
thrilled to be talking about them in that kind of a setting.
You create a regional forum in that circumstance, and the
Iranians could basically decide, ``All right, we're not going
to do anything in Iraq until we're satisfied on what's going to
happen for the Palestinians.'' Suddenly, you've created a forum
where you can't focus on what you need to focus on, and it's
their agenda rather than yours. So, I would try to--I would
certainly focus it that way.
Again, if you're going to deal with them, you're going to
engage them on a bilateral basis--by definition, that's in a
different setting, and you have a very different kind of basis
on which to proceed.
Dr. Nasr. I have--just quickly--I think, actually, it--at
least in terms of having this scenario succeed, it's not
productive for the United States to show up at the regional
setting as part of one team--namely, part of Saudi Arabia's
team. I think, particularly in Iraq, it's important that,
because everybody has a vested interest and you want to arrive
at a solution where everybody can live with, that this be a
genuinely regional forum. I think probably the direction that
we're going right now has made it more difficult for the
Iranians to come to a regional environment, because the
perception is that the United States is going to be doing what
Saudi Arabia wants, which I think, going to Ambassador Ross's
point, is actually remove the kind of fear that would have made
the Saudis really be cooperative.
And I also think that even though, in the back of our
minds, there are larger issues, like the nuclear issue, like
the issue of Iran's regional power, if the Iraq forum is going
to succeed, those issues, including the Palestinian and the
Lebanese issue, should not be on the table. The purpose of an
Iraq forum should not be containment of Iran. Iranians would
have absolutely no incentive participating in a forum and in a
foreign policy agenda that is not directed at stabilizing Iraq,
but as--directed as--at downsizing them.
Senator Obama. Good.
Richard.
Ambassador Haass. I'd say a few things. The United States
should not be the one calling for the diplomatic forum. I would
suggest something like the United Nations. We'd need to have a
powerful endorsement from the Iraqi Government. You could not
have this be, if you will, a reluctant exercise. You'd include
the six neighboring countries of Iraq, possibly the permanent
members of the Security Council or the Europeans could be
represented by the European Union. What you'd want to do on the
agenda is have such things as border security, and the
responsibility of every neighbor to police its borders. You'd
want to have certain rules and standards about things coming
across the border--arms, money, so-called volunteers of any
sort. You'd want to have a coordination and pooling of economic
resources. Again, we've had a pretty good model, which is the
Afghan ``six plus two.'' I was involved in it, for a time, as
the U.S. Representative, and it worked at my mid-level and at
the level of the Secretary of State. And we actually were able
to cooperate with Iran and others at trying to regulate some of
these issues, vis-a-vis Afghanistan, to bolster the Government
here.
Now, I'll be honest with you, it will be more difficult
now, given that 3 or 4 years have elapsed. I'm sorry we didn't
set this up before the liberation of Iraq. This is the sort of
thing that could usefully have been in place as part of getting
ready to manage----
Senator Obama. Right.
Ambassador Haass [continuing]. An aftermath. So, as usual,
we're playing catchup. And, again, not everyone's going to come
to the table, needless to say, with the same agenda. But I do
think we have some experience with this kind of a standing
group. The agenda is not beyond the wit of man to work out. And
what I like about it is is that it sets up clear standards that
we can measure, and it gets it out from under the United States
and Iran. Coming back to Vali's point, we want this to be an
international undertaking that actually puts the focus or the
spotlight on Iraq's neighbors and is designed to help a
government that needs help.
Senator Obama. Yes.
Mr. Chairman, how am I doing on time? I wasn't clear.
The Chairman. You've got 8 seconds. [Laughter.]
Senator Obama. I have 8 seconds? That's enough to get one
question in. This question may have already been addressed, in
which case, let's skip over it.
The Chairman. You're out of time, but go ahead. [Laughter.]
Senator Obama. But--that was a quick 8 seconds. What risks
exist in a well-structured, well-designed forum of the sort
that you are describing? And, again, if this has already been
answered, I apologize. But if it hasn't I've been curious as to
the resistance to taking this approach. Part of it apparently
is the administration's belief that not talking to a country is
punishment and somehow gives us additional leverage. I think
that's absolutely wrongheaded.
The Chairman. In the interest of time, gentlemen, would one
of you--you have answered that question already, but----
Senator Obama. OK.
The Chairman [continuing]. But would one of you answer it,
very briefly so other Senators can get questions in before the
caucuses begin?
Ambassador Haass. The consensus here, Senator, is that
there's not great risk. At worst, you would try it and it
wouldn't succeed; at best, you would try it and it would be
stabilizing for the situation. And I think there's a consensus
here that you want to keep it narrow, if you will, Iraq-
specific, and that, under those circumstances, it's worth
trying, though, people's expectations are modest.
Senator Obama. Good.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. I'd point out that, a year ago,
not just I, but Secretary Kissinger and Secretary Schultz and
others, all suggested this. It's interesting to hear you all
say that it really should be something coming out of, in my
case, I think, the Permanent Five of the United Nations, but,
if it doesn't come from above, that ends up with a contact
group, in effect, being left behind, it's not going to go very
far.
Senator Vitter. Thank you----
Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman [continuing]. For your patience.
Senator Vitter. Thanks to all of our witnesses.
I want to pick up on two things you've been discussing
recently. One is this regional forum focused very specifically
on Iraq, not every grievance everybody has in the region, and
the second is the idea of clearer benchmarks for our continued
involvement.
It seems to me that both of these ideas could be possibly
useful additions to the sort of things the President has
announced, and they aren't directly in conflict with it.
Without asking you to endorse anything the President has
announced, does that strike you as the case, that they aren't
diametrically opposed, but they can be part of the same general
approach? All three of you, quickly.
Ambassador Ross. Yes; I don't see it as being in
competition. You might find it more difficult to put together a
regional forum, on the part of some, if they feel that they're
somehow endorsing what we're doing. But I think the fact is,
it's not in competition.
Dr. Nasr. I would say that it actually can be beneficial if
such a forum would actually provide the missing piece of this
strategy, which is a political plan that then can actually
bring some stability.
Ambassador Haass. Setting up a regional forum should not
preclude the United States from also introducing bilateral
dialogs with both Syria and Iran. There are things that could
be introduced in a bilateral framework that could have
consequences that conceivably could also help Iraq in ways that
a regional dialog wouldn't. And on benchmarks we need to think
about our reaction if and when benchmarks aren't met. We don't
want to get into the situation where we aim the gun at our own
head. And so, we need to think through: What's the sanction?
Because, again, doing less, beyond a certain point, might be
the sort of threat we may not want to follow through on because
of the consequences.
Senator Vitter. On benchmarks, because I wanted to hit
that, too----
Ambassador Haass. I'm sorry.
Senator Vitter. Strikes me that benchmarks are probably a
very good idea. It also strikes me that they should probably be
very clear, but private and not public. Can all three of you,
very quickly, react to the idea of private versus publicly
announced benchmarks?
Ambassador Ross. On that one, I would prefer to see them in
public, because I think we've had plenty of private benchmarks.
And, again, my experience in the Middle East--and I've done a
lot of negotiating out there--whatever is done in private,
unless the--who you're dealing with knows there's a public
consequence, it never changes their behavior.
Senator Vitter. Let me just follow up on that. Isn't there
a danger that public benchmarks give the enemy, whose clear
focus is to outlast us, a clear indication of what they have to
do to beat us, to outlast us?
Ambassador Ross. Well, yes, that's true, but we're now 3\3/
4\ years into this. If we were at the beginning of this, if we
were having this discussion 3\3/4\ years ago, I would say I
agree with you. At this point, though, we're 3\3/4\ years into
it, No. 1; No. 2, the President, in his own--in his speech,
when he laid out the--his explanation for the surge, he's
identified a serious of benchmarks, which are now in public.
So, I think, in a sense, we've already passed that point.
Dr. Nasr. I would say public benchmarks are important,
because the Iraqi Government's very different from any other
Middle East government we're dealing with. It actually is
functioning in a coalition that the Prime Minister has to be
able to move with him if it's going to make any steps. And I
personally think this is not just about Maliki. It's much more
about, you know, the will of the entire Iraqi ruling coalition,
and I think they ought to know where the United States position
is. And if--and, therefore, they would be more supportive of
the Prime Minister in making that----
Ambassador Haass. Senator, let me give you a slightly
different answer, though. I agree that any benchmark made in
private would become public in around 30 minutes. You have to
ask yourself: What's the purpose? Are these benchmarks designed
to help the Iraqi Government succeed, or are these benchmarks
to set them up for failure? They will likely fail, in which
case it gives you a rationale for doing less, possibly nothing
at all. That's one rationale for benchmarks, which would then
place the onus of collapse and failure on the Iraqis. A
different approach to benchmarks might be, ``We think that by
setting these, we're more likely to get them to actually meet
these benchmarks, possibly in the context of a regional
conference.'' But that's a far more ambitious foreign policy.
Senator Vitter. Yes. I also want to touch on the difference
that we've sort of talked about between multilateral regional
talks, very narrowly focused on Iraq, and maybe bilateral talks
with Iran or Syria, whomever. It seems to be a big difference
between the two. I can understand the usefulness--potential
usefulness of the former. I see some clear dangers of the
latter. And I specifically want to go to, Mr. Ross, one of your
comments, looking at the situation in Iran now, noting some
real debate. Isn't that--some of that debate at least partially
the result of our attempt to isolate the government, and sort
of somewhat of a validation of avoiding those direct bilateral
talks that are going to go straight to their nuclear program,
or whatever?
Ambassador Ross. Yes; I think it is. And my view on the
negotiations is, I start with the regional context, and that
also becomes an interesting way of measuring whether or not you
see a value, in terms of moving to a bilateral forum with each.
You know, in each case you also have different kinds of
options. I'll give you an example. Let's say that we wanted to
begin to start a discussion with the Syrians. Well, maybe we
would start it through the Europeans, right now. The Europeans
have forces on the ground in Lebanon. I believe that there is a
flashpoint coming. I think that we could see a reemergence of
the war in Lebanon in about a year's time, because Hezbollah's
being resupplied, nothing is being done to stop that. Now, the
Europeans, having forces on the ground in Lebanon, have a huge
stake in ensuring there isn't a flashpoint. We could coordinate
an approach with the Europeans on how we would deal with the
Syrians, and it could involve our coming and joining it, at a
certain point. You can be creative, in terms of how you
approach it. I wouldn't start with us rushing to bilateral
negotiations with either the Syrians or the Iranians right now,
but I think it's a mistake to think that talking, itself, is a
sign of weakness. Talking, itself, is not a surrender. It's
only a surrender if you choose to surrender when you talk. So,
we should pick the time when it's most advantageous and when
you're also not sending a message to them, either the Syrians
or the Iranians, that current postures that we think are the
wrongheaded postures are not, in fact, working.
Senator Vitter. Final question, Mr. Chairman. Go back to
benchmarks. Again, I can see the usefulness of benchmarks, but
another part of me reacts as follows. As an American citizen, I
don't begin to understand the notion that it isn't patently
obvious to the entire world that this is it. I mean, we're
debating whether there's going to be a final chance, and it
seems beyond debate that there's not going to be a chance
beyond this possible final chance. Am I missing something? I
mean, aren't we making a little bit much of these benchmarks?
Isn't that obvious to everybody?
The Chairman. Good question.
Ambassador Ross. I don't know, there's a lot of things
about Iraq that I would have thought were--would have been
obvious a long time ago, so I'm not so sure.
The Chairman. Senator, thank you. Thank you very much.
The Senator from Florida.
Senator Bill Nelson. OK. Was the Senator from Massa-
chusetts----
The Chairman. He's already asked his questions.
Senator Kerry. I haven't----
The Chairman. Oh, you--I'm sorry. I beg your pardon. I beg
your pardon. [Laughter.]
Senator Bill Nelson. Is there----
The Chairman. I beg your pardon.
Senator Bill Nelson [continuing]. Is there something rare
at this table among competition?
The Chairman. No, what's rare is, I got up to make two
phone calls, and I'm sorry, I thought you already had gone,
John.
Senator Kerry. It's fine. I----
The Chairman. I apologize. I apologize.
Senator Kerry. No problem. No problem. Is that OK? Are you
comfortable--thank you.
I apologize, because I've been in and out of the hearing,
and I apologize for that to our witnesses, because we've had a
competing Finance Committee markup right across the hall, so--
on the minimum wage tax bill.
Let me just confirm, if I can, quickly--first of all, thank
you, all of you, for being here. Thank you for your experience
that you bring to the table. And if I can just confirm what
Ambassador Ross said, I just came back a few weeks ago from the
Middle East and from Lebanon, among other places, and it was
really shocking to me, and an eye opener to me, the degree to
which we're missing the boat there, too. For all of the talk of
democracy and democracy-building, there you have this
struggling democracy and Hezbollah is, indeed, not just being
rearmed from Syria and Iran, but is receiving some
extraordinary $500-million-plus, equivalent, coming in to
rebuild it. So, Hezbollah is doing a better job of rebuilding
Lebanon than we are, and yet, we profess to care about the
democracy and those struggling for it. The Seniora government
stood up remarkably, by many people's judgment, to this press
by Hezbollah and Nasrallah and company, to throw them out, and
we're not doing half enough to do this. So, I mean, you compare
the billions of dollars going into Iraq, and the first line, I
think, of confrontation is in Lebanon; the second line is going
to be Hamas and what's happening on the West Bank; and the
third, indeed, is Iraq. So, we are missing the boat in every
regard, as far as I'm concerned.
Dr. Nasr, I want to congratulate you on your book. I read
your book before I went over. I wish I'd done it a long time
ago. I wish that book had been written some time ago. It's a
superb, superb presentation of the foundation of this
confrontation. And everybody here ought to understand it in
that context. I want to ask you a few things about that, and
all of you, about that.
As we think about, you know--I mean, I was listening to
this conversation about benchmarks and where we are and where
we find ourselves. You know, this thing is obviously--the clock
is more than ticking, this is running out, big time. And I
think you would agree with that. And if--the first question is:
Are the consequences of whatever chaos flows out of here as
serious as they are being described, or is there some sort of
fallback position, where you have troops in the desert, you
have troops in Kuwait, you sort of make it clear to Iran
there's no big move here, but you allow these forces that have
been released, that Dr. Nasr so aptly described in the Shia
revival, to sort of play out what they're going to play out
that we can't necessarily stop? So, there are several questions
there. Are the stakes as high as everybody says? And is there a
fallback position that reduces the consequences? And is this a
civil war that may have to be fought?
Dr. Nasr. Thank you, Senator.
I think, you know, we can--without a doubt, I think the
ripple effects of Iraq are going to be with us. And I think the
worse the endgame in Iraq is, the more likely we're going to be
dealing with a lot of fallout across the region. And I think we
won't be able to deal with that without having some kind of a
regional framework or understanding that would help us. And I
think Iraq is the place, other than the stability of Iraq, that
there is certain understanding between the main players in the
region, in terms of where their interests lie. And----
Senator Kerry. But let me just ask you about that. When you
say that--the main players in the region are Sunni.
Dr. Nasr. Well, also including Iran. You know, I think, in
some ways, in terms of at least current military assets, size
of population, geography, in many ways, Iran is the big asset.
So, the question for us is that, you know, in managing this
region, do we do so in continuous confrontation and containment
with the largest force there, or we will try to establish some
kind of stable environment in dealing with it?
The second issue that I think we often don't note is that,
you know, the physical outcome of Iraq, in terms of wars, civil
wars, some of which Ambassador Haass pointed out, to--it comes
to the question of what kind of assets we have. How thin can we
get spread and still handle it? And how long are we really
willing to have large numbers of troops deployed in the Persian
Gulf? But there is also a--an ideological fallout coming out of
Iraq, which we are only beginning to see; namely, the kind of,
you know, extremism that is now brewing both on the Sunni and
on the Shia side. It ultimately is--if Iraq ends up escalating
further, is not likely to remain contained over there, and is
likely to spread out of the region. And that's something that,
you know, has been----
Senator Kerry. But the only way to not have it spread--and
I want to get--I mean, the only way to not have it spread, it
seems to me, is, you've got to resolve the fundamental stakes
between the parties. Now, what you described in your book so
aptly is centuries of a force that has been released by giving
the Shia, at the ballot box, what they've never been able to
achieve otherwise, and they're not about to give it up. I mean,
I met with Mr. Hakim; he wants no changes to the Constitution.
Muqtada al-Sadr has his ambitions. What are--how do you resolve
those stakes in a way that then addresses the Sunni presumption
of right to rule and of restoration?
Dr. Nasr. We will not be able to do that, Senator. It's--
looking at it the other way around is probably more
appropriate. How can we prevent it from becoming worse than it
is? And I think American foreign policy not falling into the
trap of sectarianism itself is a beginning. I mean, not taking
sides, not playing the sectarian card, not sort of--and
actually, I think it's in our interest for the main
protagonists here at the regional level--Saudi Arabia and
Iran--that don't go down the path of an intensified competition
in the Persian Gulf. We're not going to be able to build this
thing from bottom up, as you said.
Senator Kerry. But do you believe that--any of--again, I
want to get the rest of you into this--are oil revenues and
federalism going to resolve that difference? It seems to me
they're not.
Dr. Nasr. No; they're not.
Senator Kerry. So, if they're not, aren't you left with two
parties for whom the presence of our forces is now empowering
them to basically play out their power struggle under the cover
of our security blanket?
Ambassador Haass. I wouldn't put it quite that way, because
if we were to leave, it's quite possible that they would play
out their power struggle on a more intense level.
Senator Kerry. Well, we're not talking about leaving. We
talked about----
Ambassador Haass. OK, reducing, right.
Senator Kerry [continuing]. Ways of----
Ambassador Haass. Sure.
Senator Kerry [continuing]. Redeploying that prevent that
from happening and still protect our interests. But if you
can't resolve them to stop them from killing the way they are
today, my question is: Can you stop them?
Ambassador Haass. No. I won't speak for my two colleagues,
I'll just speak for myself, Senator, but that's where I think
we are and where we're heading. I simply can't see the
ingredients here of solving the political dispute that's at the
basis of things. I don't think you can come up with a political
choreography that--how would I put it?--is enough for the
Sunnis and is not too much for the Shia. I simply don't believe
that you can thread the needle that way.
Senator Kerry. Well, that's a recipe for a long struggle
between them, isn't it?
Ambassador Haass. Yes, sir. And I believe that there will
inevitably be a long struggle. And, coming back to Senator
Corker's point before, what we may need to think about, then,
is a long-term strategy, where we try to keep a lid on events
in Iraq, at the lowest possible human, military, and economic
cost for ourselves. I was involved for years with Northern
Ireland, and one of the things you realize in looking at these
disputes that go for years or decades, is they have a certain
life cycle. And at some point you need a large percentage of
people on the various sides of the dispute to essentially get
up one morning and say, ``Hey, this isn't worth it. We've got
to start compromising. I am tired of this being my life.'' And
in Northern Ireland, thanks to a decade and a half or two
decades of British, Irish, and American diplomacy, we are right
on the cusp of that point. It may take years--indeed, it will
take years--for Iraq, and for the Shia and Sunni and the Kurds
in Iraq, to reach that political point where they're prepared
to compromise in order to move away from a reality that's
become awful. But it will take years to get to that point.
Ambassador Ross. I would just echo that, I guess. Part of
what you--the question you're asking, Senator: Is there a way
to contain this, and contain all the worst consequences of what
could be a real convulsion? If you don't contain it, I do think
that it's a disaster. I mean, there's no question, you'll have
every neighbor intervening in Iraq to carve out their own niche
or to promote their own ally. So, somehow you have to see if
you--through a regional forum, you can reach some baselines of
understanding to contain it. You reposition our own forces in a
way designed to contain it. And you probably realize, even
though--I mean, I'm a little--I'm pessimistic, but I'm a--I
haven't--Richard knows it's my nature not to give up, so I
still think there is a--there may be a possibility, if you can
sharpen the consequences on the inside, at a time when I think
we do keep the lid on in a way that makes it safe enough for
everybody to avoid the hard decisions, maybe you can yet
produce something politically. If you don't produce something
politically, nothing's going to change. The alternative may
well be--which is what I've also feared--we're going to see a
15-year civil war--a 15-year civil war, and, at the end of that
time, there may be a level of exhaustion, where everybody wakes
up and says, ``All right,'' you know, ``now we'll agree to work
out some basis of sharing the oil revenues. We'll have some
kind of extensive autonomy within the provinces. We'll have a
central government with limited powers.'' You know, the hope
was to try to create a transition--this is basically what you
were talking about--create a transition to that that is much
more peaceful, much less costly. The reality may be, we're
headed toward this long, painful, brutal internal civil war,
and the question is: Given the danger of not containing it,
what do you have to do to be able to contain it?
Senator Kerry. My time is up, but, if I could just close
out by saying that the frustration for a lot of us here is that
what seems obvious has been ignored and simply shunted aside
for years now by the administration, which is why none of us
have any confidence about these steps that are being taken.
Senator Biden and I, and a few others, not many, have been
advocating for almost 3 years for this contact group, slash,
forum, slash, summit, whatever you want to call it, that only
reluctantly are they even, you know, still talking about it,
let alone embracing it. It's kind of shocking to see your own
Secretary of State of an administration go to the Middle East
and discover--and--that the Middle East peace process needs to
be accelerated and put on the table. It's a little shocking to
have your new Secretary of Defense go to Afghanistan and find
what we've been saying for almost a year or more: We need more
troops there. I mean, it--it's just stunning to me that
commonsense step after commonsense step has not crossed the
threshold of this administration, and we're paying a stunning
price for it. And it's tragic for those kids who are over
there.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator.
Are you ready, Senator? I was trying to get you prepped
there earlier by calling you first. [Laughter.]
Go to it, it's yours.
Senator Bill Nelson. There is frustration coming out of
this, Senator, over concern about the troops. A bipartisan
commission comes forth and says what we ought to do, and they
do this in a very methodical, substantive, bipartisan way, and
the administration ignores this, and, as a result, puts our
troops in greater harm's way in the middle of a religious war,
while, at the same time, for the long run, depleting our
ability to replenish our Reserves, our National Guard, and our
equipment. It is quite frustrating. And you all, all three of
you, have testified that you don't see the need for this troop
increase.
Let me ask you this. Ambassador Ross, you had previously
said that you don't see any change happening, unless the United
States were to say privately to Maliki, ``You've got 6 months.
We can't keep the lid on any longer without results.'' So, if
the administration is not saying this privately--and comment on
that, if they are saying it privately--but if they're not
saying it privately, what then can we, as representatives of
the people say publicly to push the Iraqis to deliver in a
timely fashion?
Ambassador Ross. Well, I would--I am hoping the
administration is saying that privately. My own preference has
been that we would announce that we were prepared to negotiate
a timetable for our withdrawal, which gives them a chance to
have an input into it, which gives them a chance to perform and
have us change how we approach the timing. But the
administration hasn't done that. I don't have high expectations
that they're saying privately what I would wish they were
saying. So, I think the most important things for you to be
saying are that, since the President has now established that
he has these commitments from Prime Minister Maliki, that if--
and we're in a position now to judge whether these commitments
are going to be upheld or not--and if they're not, you make it
clear there has to be a consequence, you make it clear that our
policy's going to change.
You've heard a slight difference in opinion between us
about whether that can be used to get them to take political
steps that they haven't been willing to take up until now,
which is the key to changing Iraq. And if they can't, then you
move toward more of a containment strategy to try to contain
what is, I think, the sort of disaster that all of us would see
taking place if there is an all-out civil war because we simply
withdrew. Or what I would also say is--something as bad--I
think it's a mistake for us to stay in the midst of a civil
war. And we can't--I said it earlier, we can't simply stay
there because it's going to get worse if we don't. That's a
prescription for being stuck there forever and being thrust
into the middle of a civil war, where our forces become the
target of both.
I would add just one last point and then turn it over to my
colleagues. One of the concerns I've had about the surge from
the beginning is that we run the risk that each side is going
to see us putting forces in to protect the other. And when each
side sees us putting forces in to protect the other, what that
means, we'd become a target for both.
Ambassador Haass. Senator, could I just say one thing?
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Secretary.
Ambassador Haass. What's often important, as you know, is
not simply what happens, but how it happens and how it's
perceived to have happened. And you asked what Congress should
do in this circumstance. I understand the frustration, but my
concern would be that Congress not do things that would change
the widespread perception of causality away from Iraqis toward
Americans. I think that would be----
Senator Bill Nelson. Such as cutting off funding for the
troops.
Ambassador Haass. Yes, sir. I think that would be wrong,
because it would make us the issue, and it would increase,
dramatically, the repercussions of Iraq for American foreign
policy around the world.
Senator Bill Nelson. I agree with you. I want to stand up
for the troops, and I want to stand up against the President's
wrongheaded policy.
Let me go back to this question of containment. What about
Chairman Biden's idea of a tripartite arrangement?
Ambassador Haass. I've long admired the chairman's idea. It
is also put forward by my predecessor. The problem is not the
idea. The idea is a reasonable idea. It is a good idea. The
problem facing the idea is that it's a reasonable idea that's
been introduced into an unreasonable political environment. If
Iraqis were willing to sign on to this idea of distribution of
political and economic power and federalism, all Iraqis would
be better off, and a large part of the problem would fade. The
problem is that we can't get Iraqis to sign onto a set of
arrangements that would leave the bulk of them better off. We
can't force them to be reasonable. And, at the moment, they
have embarked on a path that is, in some ways, self-
destructive. The flaw is not inherent in the idea; it's just
the very reasonableness that's at the heart of the chairman's
idea is rejected virtually across the board by Shia and Sunnis,
because they can't agree on the precise balance of political
and economic power within their society. At the moment, there
is no federal scheme they would sign onto.
Ambassador Ross. The only thing I would say, though, as
I've noted before, with 100,000 Iraqis being displaced a month,
you're beginning to create the outlines of that on the ground.
So, I was actually in favor of the idea before, and I think it
may have more of a potential now, because of that reality.
Senator Bill Nelson. When does the pain between the Sunnis
and the Shiites get so bad that they finally say, ``It's time
for us to reconcile''? Can we even answer that question?
Dr. Nasr. It's clear, at least, Senator, it's not now. And
I think both sides have a perception that they can win
militarily on the ground. And I think, you know, that's one
point Ambassador Ross and Ambassador Haass raised, that unless,
you know, they actually see a limit to their strategy that
there's not going to be a victor, they're not likely to look at
the consequence. In fact, one of the problems being every
measure, every benchmark that we've put on the table has
actually accelerated the attempt for an endgame and more ethnic
cleansing, more capture of territory.
Senator Bill Nelson. And, all the time, our boys and girls
are getting killed.
What do you think about the Iraq Study Group's
recommendation that we go and embed advisors? Last week, I
asked Secretary Gates, sitting right at that table, ``How are
we going to protect the embedded advisors?'' And so, we have to
have troops in there to protect the embeds. But what do you all
think about that recommendation.
Ambassador Haass. My own emphasis would be far more on
training than advising. I'm just worried that advisors are
going to get caught in extraordinarily messy situations. And I
just don't know, then, how we can look after the physical
security of advisors. If we really talk about distributing them
among every conceivable Iraqi unit, my concern would be a lot
of American advisors are going to become casualties. So, again,
I would put far greater emphasis on training because training
need not happen right in the center. Regarding advising--and
I'm not enough of an expert, and I see several people up here,
like Senator Hagel and Senator Kerry who would be--we need to
consider ways of structuring advising so that individuals are
not put in highly vulnerable positions. We may have to cluster
them in certain ways or have certain rules of engagement or
operations, so our advisors are not put in such an
extraordinarily vulnerable position. It may be one of those
ideas that sounds better than it is actually possible and easy
to implement.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I would note, in
closing, that at that very table, last week, the Secretary of
Defense answered the question: ``When are we going to know if
these troops are working in Baghdad--not Al Anbar, but
Baghdad?'' And he said, ``We should know, within 2 months, if
the Maliki government is getting its act together.'' Last night
on the news--I don't remember who the official was, it may have
been Secretary Rice--now has changed that to 6 to 8 months. And
this is more of the rope-a-dope that is already emerging. It's
this Senator's intention to hold the Department of Defense and
Secretary Gates to that 2-month time limit.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator. I think the
whole Nation's going to do that, as well, but----
Senator Casey, you guys are probably wondering why I talked
you into coming on this committee, after this long, but I'm
delighted you did. I hope we haven't caused you to second-guess
your judgment about joining this committee.
Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Not for a minute, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
And I'm going to be real focused, on my time, because
Senator Webb wants to get questions in, as well. But I'm
grateful for this opportunity, and I want to thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for assembling yet another great panel. We appreciate
your expertise and your patriotism by the work that you do.
And, at the risk of violating one of the ground rules for
this series of hearings that Chairman Biden laid out, where he
told us very directly--and I'm glad he did--to focus as much,
or more, on the future as the past. I'm going to violate that,
temporarily. And he will gavel me down if I do this the wrong
way, but I don't think he will. Because I want to take a little
bit of a look back, but also to look forward.
And I represent a State, Pennsylvania, which is now third
on the list of the death toll--third highest death toll--and it
has a traumatic effect, as I said to Secretary Rice before
questioning her--it has a traumatic, and almost cataclysmic,
effect on very small towns and small communities in our State,
as everyone here knows. But it--despite that horror and despite
the heartache that these communities and these families feel, I
think they know in their gut that this is as much about
diplomacy and politics and--as it is about military strategy.
So, I'm not going to ask questions about the surge today--the
``escalation,'' as I think it's more aptly called--but to focus
on a broad question for each of you, and then to have a couple
more specific questions.
The first broad question, which I address to each for you
is: Looking back at just two calendar years, 2005 and 2006, how
would you--and I'll let you choose this, because sometimes
these can be too simplistic--but how would you rate or grade or
assess this administration's diplomatic strategy, just for
those 2 years? And then, the second part of the question is: In
calendar year 2007, coming up, what would you recommend as a
strategy, as specifically as you can? And I realize that giving
letter grades to past performance can sometimes be misleading,
but I'd like to hear each of you, on 2005 and 2006, and then
what you'd recommend as a strategy for 2007.
Ambassador Haass. Gee, thanks, guys.
Let me push back slightly. It's surprising that you chose
2005 and 2006, because I would have said that by then, a lot of
the die was cast. If there were moments to do things, it was
2003, sir. And it ought to have been put in place before the
battlefield phase of the Iraq war or immediately afterward.
That would have been the time, for example, to have set up a
regional forum, and I believe it could have played a much
larger role.
Or consider Iran, when oil was far cheaper than it is
today, when you had a leadership that was more moderate than
the current leadership is, before the United States got as
bogged down, as it has, in Iraq. We had far more leverage then.
So, whatever diplomatic initiatives we would have launched, I
believe, would have fared much better.
We have paid a price in 2005 and 2006, as well as both
before and since, for our policy of isolation, particularly
with the Iranians and the Syrians. Diplomacy or dealing with
problem states is not like laying down a good bottle of French
wine that tends to get better with the passage of time. I don't
see where either of these problems have evolved in ways where
we find ourselves with more options. To the contrary, Iran is 5
or 6 years farther along on its path toward developing a
nuclear capability. We've now seen coming into power in Iran a
far more radical individual. Syria and Iran have both
exacerbated the problems in Iraq. There was an argument for
dealing with them, both bilaterally and collectively, then,
before 2005-06, during 2005-06, and in 2007. We are denying
ourselves one of our tools of national security, and it just
seems to me it tends to be a strategic error to place so much
emphasis on the military tool and not to place a greater
emphasis on the diplomatic tool. You never know if it will work
or it would have worked. All I'm saying is, it might have, and,
if it hadn't worked, that would have clarified things, that
would have been useful, because then we would have understood,
then, more clearly than we now do, what our options were.
Senator Casey. Thank you.
Dr. Nasr. I would, very briefly, say that when you talk to
people in the region, they would characterize this period of
one of nonengagement by the United States, and also a
perception that the region has no solutions or no participation
in the events that are unfolding. Many of them think that this
marks a time period where they had very little influence in
Washington. That's among allies themselves.
I also think it's a period where the Middle East itself
changed very dramatically, in terms of Iranian power, in terms
of the situation in Iraq, but our foreign policy, because of
its nonengagement, was still tailored to an earlier timeframe.
And I think, looking forward, right now we're entering a phase
where we're trying to play catchup. In other words, we'll deal
with the consequence of having followed the foreign policy that
was at odds with the reality on the ground and a consequence of
nonengagement.
Ambassador Ross. I'd make a few points. One, picking up on
what Vali said, I am in the region a lot, and I would tell you,
the perception of nonengagement is overwhelming, and it comes
from everybody, those who would like--who, in fact, identify
themselves as our friends. So, it's pretty hard to give a
passing grade, when, in a sense, there's a perception of
complete nonengagement.
I would say one of the basic problems would be that we
never identified objectives that were very realistic. We did an
assessment that didn't seem to fit what was going on in the
area. We didn't frame issues in a way that others could
identify with and decide that the purposes that we were
pursuing were the right ones, which makes it easier, therefore,
to persuade them to join with us.
When you look at specifics--take a country like Syria--I
think our policy toward Syria has been ``speak loudly and carry
a small stick.'' We've been very tough rhetorically and very
soft practically. I would like to reverse that order. I think
our bigger problem has--continues to be one that we're not seen
as working on the issues in the region that matter to most of
the people within the region. So, one of the reasons--I mean,
I'm obviously someone who believes we should have been much
more active on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, as I said
earlier, not because of Iraq, because it's not relevant to
Iraq, but because here is an issue that many, certainly
throughout the Arab and Muslim world, identify as being a kind
of core grievance. And for 6 years, we've sent the message that
we're indifferent to it. So, on something that matters
fundamentally to them, what they see from us is a kind of
indifference, and that's going to cost you. And I'm afraid it
has.
Senator Casey. And I'm almost out of time. Real quickly,
based upon what you know already and what you've seen transpire
just in the last couple of days with regard to Secretary Rice's
trip, what's your evaluation of what you know about her
intentions there, and her schedule, and what you're seeing, in
terms of positively impacting this? Do you think she's on the
right track? Do you think she's on the wrong track? I know
we're out of time, but just quickly.
Ambassador Ross. Well, I think it's good that she is--she
has said publicly, ''I've heard people say we need to be much
more engaged, and I've heard them.'' So, that's a good sign.
Again, the question is going to be, when you become engaged, be
sure that it's based upon a realistic set of assumptions, be
sure you've done the kind of analysis and you understand what's
possible and isn't possible, and be sure you begin to prepare
the ground behind the scenes with people to get them
conditioned to what you're going to do and put the focus on
what it is they can do. I mean, one of the problems we face in
the area is, too often, I think, over the past several years,
we kind of lecture to people about what they should do, but we
don't listen nearly as much as we ought to.
Senator Casey. I know we're out of time. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Finally, Senator Webb----
Senator Webb. We have again----
The Chairman [continuing]. The floor is yours.
Senator Webb [continuing]. Reached the--we have again
reached the end of the road, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.]
And I want you to know it's a privilege to be on this
committee. And one of the advantages of having to wait so long
is to able--being able to listen to the superb testimony of
people like these immensely qualified witnesses, and it
certainly helps my understanding of the issues and the
approaches.
In an ideal world, I will be able to ask two questions
here. I would like to, first, state my agreement with the
notion that we do need to move toward some sort of a regional
forum on these issues. And it is true, on the one hand, as
Ambassador Ross pointed out, that salvation in Iraq will take
place only inside Iraq, but, at the same time, because of so
many things that have happened, the instruments for that
salvation are unavoidably regional, at this point--a weak
central together, very similar, in my mind, to the Lebanese
situation there. And the reality that the centrifugal forces
from this chaos have expanded into the region indicate that we
have to move toward some sort of a regional conference in order
to resolve this.
The first question that I have was just alluded to a bit by
you, Ambassador Ross, when you talked about this need for an
approach on the Israeli-Palestinian situation. I'm very
concerned about some of the perceptions of why that's important
in our debate--the perceptions in our debate about why that's
so important. At the beginning of this process, there were
three different issues on the table, as we know. There was the
Israeli-Palestinian situation, there was the issue of
international terrorism, and there was the issue of Iraq. And,
in many ways, we sort of conflated them at the same time, to
use your words in response to Senator Hagel, by sending out a
message of indifference. And it just seems to me that a
vigorous approach in that area, not in the sense that it would
apply directly to a solution in Iraq, but because it would
apply generally and very importantly in terms of the perception
of the United States as being evenhanded, would affect the
region because of its impact on issues such as recruitment for
terrorism and that sort of thing. And I'm just not--I'm not
quite sure why this isn't happening in a way that it happened
in past administrations where you were taking such a strong
position, in terms of leadership. Do you have any idea of why
this isn't on the table?
Ambassador Ross. Well, my feeling is that when the
administration came in, it looked at what had been done in the
Clinton administration by the President, by me, as something
that was noble, but futile, and that if you were really going
to change the region, it made much more sense to deal with the
rogue states. They would affect other moderates, or at least
moderate states, if they saw that the rogue states were going
to be either changed, in terms of their behavior, or, more
likely, the regimes were changed, you would have much more of a
geopolitical effect, you'd establish a kind of strength, and
that--the presumption was that with Prime Minister Sharon in,
with who Arafat was, diplomacy would--couldn't lead anyplace,
so why put more good money after bad? And the problem with that
assessment was that it tended to view the problem in, what I
would say, completely polarized terms, that either you have war
or you have peace. And the problem is, when you set up the
equation that way, since you're not going to produce peace,
then you're going to guarantee war. I said, at the time, when I
was briefing, as--before I left--I said, ``Look, our challenge
now is not to make peace, it's to be sure that we engage in a
kind of management of the situation so it doesn't get much
worse, because,'' I said, ``I promise you, it'll get much
worse.'' One thing I've--the analogy I always used, in terms of
the Israelis and the Palestinians, is, with a peace process,
it's like riding a bicycle, as long as you're pedaling, at
least you preserve something; as soon as you stop, you crash.
And you see what happens when you crash. The perception of us
as being indifferent has taken root. The--both sides have come
to believe that the other has no interest in peace and isn't a
partner for it. So, now, trying to dig out of the hole is
vastly more difficult than if we had contained this and created
an environment where peacemaking was going to be possible later
on. I think it was a mistaken assessment that was made. I think
that's what accounts for it.
Senator Webb. Thank you.
The second question is--would be asked generally to all of
you--when I watched, from the third row in the bleachers last
year, the Israeli incursion against Hezbollah, I noticed that,
at the beginning of it, it--there was a moment--there was a
moment there that we may have lost, in terms of regional
realignment, where there were early condemnations from the
Saudis and others against Hezbollah. And we did not take
advantage of this moment, as--the administration did not take
advantage of this moment. And there is a potential there, I
believe, if those types of moments are taken advantage of, that
you could see different realignments in the region. Would you
have any comment on that?
Dr. Nasr. I would say, you know, that had to do somewhat
with, also, this--both the sectarian divide and the Saudi-
Iranian rivalry.
Senator Webb. Right.
Dr. Nasr. I think that moment, sort of, passed, because the
war ended up popularizing Hezbollah on the Arab street. But it
also points to another dynamic we're likely to see, is that the
more the Shias and Sunnis begin to fight, the more they're
going to escalate the heat on the issue of Israel in their
competition for popularity and support on the Arab street. And
in that sense, it's not going to be very easy for the moderate
Arab governments to now come out and support, sort of, a
realignment without having to guard their flank against
Hezbollah and Iran.
Ambassador Haass. I think, Senator, there also may have
been something else. As you point out, in the initial phases of
the summer's conflict, there was Arab condemnation of
Hezbollah--in part, because of the terrorism, in part, because
of the Iranian backing. Israel, and also the United States,
rather than grasping that opportunity and translating that into
something political, essentially got more ambitious at that
moment. The two governments were hoping that over the next days
and weeks, that you would actually have a strategic weakening
of Hezbollah, which would produce a bigger political
opportunity. One lesson that came through is that when one goes
up against the sort of organization that Hezbollah is, some of
the classic calculations of what can be accomplished militarily
and how that translates into political gain simply don't work.
That opportunity just came and went.
Senator Webb. Not dissimilar in concept to your remarks
about the failure to engage Iran when we were in a position
that was more powerful, rather than to having to face that in a
position when we've become weakened.
Ambassador Haass. Timing counts for a lot in life. And in
diplomacy, just to give one other example, going back to
Senator Casey's question about 2005-06, and I said 2003 was
more important, there were moments in the initial aftermath of
the battlefield victory, when the initial looting took place,
when I believe that, had the United States acted with more
forces in a more assertive way, we may have changed the course
of political and physical behavior in Iraq from that point on.
That said, you can't go back. You can't recreate those moments.
And, you know, it's always less difficult to identify critical
moments in retrospect. Your rearview mirror tends to be clearer
than your windshield; I understand that. But, still, we've got
to understand what we are getting into and think ahead, what
are likely to be the turning points. Because this is not the
first time we have faced these sorts of situations.
Ambassador Ross. I would just add to what Richard was
saying. I think that timing in diplomacy is like location in
real estate: It's everything. If you don't seize the moment--
and in the Middle East, I will tell you, every time you miss an
opportunity, you're always worse off. If you hadn't had the
opportunity at all, you'd be better off than to have missed one
that's come along. And we missed one. In the first week of the
fighting between Hezbollah and Israel, all of the--almost all
of the Arab leaderships, with the exception of Syria, came out
against Hezbollah. It was absolutely unprecedented. We needed,
in that week--and, by the way, this is not a rearview mirror
view; there were many of us who were saying, ``You have an
opening. Go mediate between the Saudis and the Israelis. Go to
the Saudis and basically say to the Saudis, `You want to get us
to produce a cease-fire there? You produce a plan, an Arab
plan, and you have the Prime Minister of Lebanon, who's calling
for an Arab plan.' '' And Hezbollah, in the first week, was
completely on the defensive within Lebanon.
Senator Webb. For the record, I was saying the same thing
on the campaign trail. Well, thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Gentlemen, your testimony has been remarkable, in the sense
that all the testimony we've had, with the single exception--
and I'm not being facetious--of the Secretary of State, has
agreed on certain basic fundamental premises as it relates to
Iraq and the region. I mean, it is amazing, because we've had
testimony, as you know, from men and women who have specific
plans. And we're going to hear more from others who are going
to come forward with specific plans, proposals of how to
proceed from here. And it's remarkable that everyone agrees
that there is--at a minimum, there's no good solution. The idea
of a liberal democracy in Iraq is not going to happen within
our lifetime, and we should get on with understanding what a
more realistic, optimal solution would be, and it's far less
than that.
Second, Iraq occupies and consumes all of our attention,
the bulk of our military, the significant portion of our
resources, and our diplomatic flexibility, at this point. Today
I met with a very bright woman who was down in Nicaragua,
coincidentally, at the time Ortega was being sworn in, and she
said to me, ``None of you are talking at all about anything
happening in Latin America,'' and she's right. And Secretary
Haass talked about, you know, there are really some big issues
out there, like places like Asia, you know, there are a few
things going on there; the subcontinent, Africa. And so,
everybody agrees that it's sapping our emotion, our intellect,
our resources, our military.
But the third thing everybody agrees on--it seemed to me,
and I ask my colleagues if they have a different view--is that
the solution lies within Iraq, that the Iraqis have to come to
the point where their sense of vengeance and paranoia and
desire has to somehow expire so they get to the point where
they're willing to make some real, genuine compromises. And
nobody thinks any of these compromises any of the parties have
to make are easy. I mean, these are really hard. And unlike
compromises we make, these men and women are going to have to
put their lives on the line to make the compromises. It's not
like: Make a compromise, and if it doesn't work, I get a
pension. Make a compromise, if it doesn't work, I get killed.
But everyone agrees on that.
Everyone seems to agree that precipitous withdrawal would
be a serious mistake. It would make bad things even worse,
although everyone also acknowledges that we can't sustain this
in a midst of a civil war. As I've said a thousand times, my
colleagues are tiring of hearing it, no foreign policy can be
sustained without the informed consent of the--the important
word, ``consent''--of the American people. It's just not gonna
happen. A year from now, I promise you, this ain't gonna be
where it is today. It may be much worse, it may be better, but
I promise you, the President will not have 10 votes in this
place to continue ``stringing this out,'' whatever that means.
And the other thing everyone agrees with is that,
regardless of whether or not it can affect internal Iraqi
machinations, there is a need for a regional--if not agreement,
a regional consensus on containing what may spiral out of
control beyond what it is within Iraq, because everyone fears,
in the region, the total disintegration of Iraq. But what that
leads me to is this--and, by the way I'm repeating, but the
conclusion that, sort of, reemerges--is that you can't stay in
the midst of a civil war, and there's a need for us to stay in
the region.
So, what I have observed, hanging around here as long as
some people--I got here when I was 29, and trying to absorb
what--and I mean this literally and sincerely--what experts
like you have been saying off and on over the years, is that we
used to have a--I used to have a nun in grade school--this is
going to sound colloquial, but I think it makes the point.
Every time you'd get engaged in someone else's problem and you
end up disrupting the class, you'd stay behind after school--
and those of you who have gone to Catholic school remember,
nuns used to make you write on the board, you know, when you
stayed after school, in detention, a certain saying. And one of
the ones that they would say we had to write--I'd have to write
a lot--is that, ``Everyone can solve a problem except he who
has it.'' And I've not seen any circumstance, Mr. Ambassador,
where parties in the midst of a life-and-death struggle--coming
out of environments where there have not been, for decades upon
decades, any stable government representing a democratic
instinct--I've not seen where they've been able to come up with
what is even in their own interest. And there's always a need
for some catalyst.
And the last thing you all agree on is, we can't be the
sole catalyst, at this point; we've, sort of, eaten our seed
corn here. And so, we've got to get some portion of the
international community to be that catalyst.
Which leads me to what seems to me to be sort of a reality
that everybody seems to ignore. I mean, everybody. And that is
that we're pretty far down the road here in Iraq. We embraced,
we promoted, we helped put together, and we pushed a
constitution that the Iraqis, in a vote--for sectarian reasons,
I would argue, but overwhelmingly endorsed. So we have a
constitution that's in place there. There's two truisms that
everyone except you, Dennis, recently--and maybe just you, me,
and Gelb think this is possible--but seem to ignore; one is
that there's already overwhelming ethnic cleansing taking place
in Iraq. We've got millions now displaced. How many fit the
absolute definition of being ``cleansed'' is another question,
No. 1. No. 2, the Iraqi Constitution lays out, specifically,
certain benchmarks. When it's defining what a ``region'' is, it
says, in article 115, ``The federal system in the Republic of
Iraq is made up of a decentralized capital, regions, and
governates, and local administration.'' And it says--the next
article says--by the way, first--of the article 116, first
clause, says, ``We're agreeing ahead of time that Kurdistan is
already a region. That's not negotiable.'' And then it says,
second, ``The Constitution shall also allow for new regions to
be set up.'' And the Iraqi Parliament went ahead and voted. It
set up the mechanism to provide for those new regions.
And so, at the end of the day--and I'll conclude with
this--at the end of the day, if we all agree that surging and
embedding and--inside placement of troops outside Baghdad,
inside, are all tactics, not a strategy, not a plan. I don't
know how we get from where we are to the prospect of avoiding
the worst case. And that is a civil war that metastasizes,
spreads beyond its borders, that becomes a regional war, that
imperils a whole lot of our interests, and the world's
interests--unless you get more than us to agree to an outcome
within Iraq that is preferable, and use as much collective
pressure as we can on those parties to accommodate the
inevitable. Because it seems to me, it is inevitable, without
the Sunnis having a guaranteed share of revenue and without the
Shia being able to have some part of the region become a
``region,'' there's no way to stop this spiral, and the
American people aren't going to hang around.
So, I am not married to ``the Biden/Gelb plan.'' And I
admit, Richard, a year ago it made more sense, in terms of its
possibilities, than it did 6 months ago and a month ago, but
the irony is, I think it may be becoming so obvious that
something along those lines has to happen. When we had the
experts and historians in here, from Phebe Marr to others who
were on that panel, they all said, ``You know, gosh, no one in
the region likes it.'' I agree with that.
But I think part of the reason no one likes it is because
no deal works if one party really likes it. But there seems to
me to be enough of the Sunni leadership that might see their
way to swallowing a regional system, as called for in the
Constitution, if they were guaranteed they got a piece of the
action. And, conversely, there's enough of the Shia population
and leadership that is beginning to look down this very
narrowing hole and conclude that giving up a little more of the
revenue gets them a whole lot more, at the end of the day, in
revenue, as well as stability.
So, I guess--those of you who have negotiated before and
those of us who serve in public life, I think that optimism is
an occupational requirement. I think if we don't think it is
possible, then we're in real trouble. But I am hopeful that the
President's plan will run its course, very rapidly--and I think
it will, by the way. I think we're going to know something
pretty soon. I agree that one thing that kind of confused--that
I suspect that if Maliki is able to restrain the Mahdi
Militia--and he doesn't control it, I realize--that this may
look like progress for a while. That is possible. But I would
hope that the administration is thinking about a plan B. I know
they can't say it publicly, but I pray to God they're
listening. I hope they are trying to reach some kind of
consensus, because the one thing, understandably, in the
interest of time, no one mentioned today, imagine what happens
in France, in Germany, just those two European countries, if
this is a full-blown civil war--14 percent of your population,
or 10, depending upon which you pick--Arab, not satisfied;
Kurds, looking if they're going to have to flee--it's going to
be Germany--I mean, you talk about attracting the interest of
the region.
And I'll end with one little story. Our harshest critic has
been Chirac. Most of my trips--I can't remember which of the
seven trips--to Iraq, I try to stop by and see Chirac on the
way back, with others. And I can say this now, a year and a
half ago or 2 years ago, Chirac said, ``The worst thing America
could do is leave.'' And I said, ``Mr. President, I think until
you're aware we're going to leave, you're not going to act very
responsibly.''
So, I guess what I'm saying is that you all have laid out--
and I welcome any comment anybody would wish to make about my
closing comments here--but there seems to me to be certain
inevitable things. Leaving right away is a disaster. Limiting
the number of troops makes it difficult; even, practically, How
do you do that? Staying in the midst of a civil war is not
tolerable. I don't ever remember when we've asked the American
people to stay and accept casualties to prevent something worse
from happening. Not a victory, just--we're doing this to
prevent--I don't know that that's ever happened, and I know it
can't be sustained. And so, we'd better coalesce around
something pretty quickly, and that is why I'm working very,
very hard, at the front end of this, to try to generate some
bipartisan--and I mean this sincerely; this is not the usual,
``Let's love and embrace each other and be bipartisan.'' The
only thing that's going to change this President's mind is if
he realizes folks on this side of the table are as dissatisfied
with his initiative as the folks on this side of the table,
because then prices begin to be paid beyond Iraq policy for
them.
So, again, I can't tell you how much I appreciate your
testimony. The public should know that your service to the
country is not merely you showing up here. Probably every one
of us has called on your time, hours and hours of your time,
over the last months and years. So, it has been helpful. Let me
end with that and invite any closing comment any of you would
like to make. And you need not make one, but I would invite it,
if you wish.
Ambassador Haass. Let me just make one brief one, Senator.
And thank you for having us today. You are right in
highlighting the debate that has to happen here about what it
is we do. But I do think there has also got to be a major
debate in Iraq. And in order to maintain good relations, not
simply with you, but with my predecessor, let me quote that
famous strategist, Shakespeare, ``Ripeness is all.'' And the
real question is whether Iraq is reaching a point of ripeness
or not, when the sort of compromise you and others are
suggesting has a chance of taking root. We would all love it to
be the case.
The Chairman. To make it clear, I'm not sure it is the
case.
Ambassador Haass. And we would like it to be the case. The
question is: Are there things we can say and do to slightly
increase the odds? And a lot of the benchmarks conversation is
about that.
Iraq, though, is a society of 20-odd-million people, and it
doesn't take a very high percentage there of spoilers to make
it very, very rough. And I simply don't think that enough
Iraqis are psychologically and politically ready to make the
sort of compromises that are in their own self-interest. An
awful lot of history is about individuals and groups pursuing
policies that are diametrically opposed to their self-interest.
That's why history is as messy as it is. And my concern is that
Iraqis are not yet there.
And so, it comes back to the American debate. If they are
not there, and it may take them some painful time to get there,
it raises extraordinarily difficult questions for how we
nurture that process to both get them there sooner than they
would otherwise get there by themselves, and how we limit the
fallout in that process. That is the next phase of our foreign
policy debate.
The Chairman. I couldn't agree with you more. There's no
straight line here. Who knows what actions we take will impact
on actions they take or don't take, and impact on actions the
rest of the world looks at. This is a very complicated process.
The only conclusion I would come to at this point is--that as
the debate takes place here, it is better to start, if
possible, from a bipartisan perspective on the things we can
agree on.
Ambassador Ross. I agree. I just would add that I think the
key is: How do we sharpen choices both within Iraq and outside
Iraq? And how do we do that in a way that still preserves
containment as an option? Those are the two measures, I think,
that you have to establish and try to orchestrate.
The Chairman. And I hope that--I think you will see there
is an overwhelming consensus on this committee to begin some
version of engaging the region. I think it has to come from,
essentially, the United Nations or from the Permanent Five or
the major powers, but, whatever reason, to do that. And it's
dawning on people, I think, Dennis, that it's not so much
because it may be able to affect, directly, the events within
Iraq, but will be able to deal with the failure in Iraq, if
that is what--so, there are two reasons for it.
Dr. Nasr. If I may add, Senator, in closing, that I agree
with Ambassador Haass that people in Iraq are not there. But
partly it is, I think, because both the Shiites and Sunnis have
an exaggerated sense of their own regional capabilities. And I
think partly the regional engagement or the international
engagement's benefit would be to bring them down to Earth, that
this is as good as it gets. And if we're going to go down the
course of the plan that you mention, I think there has to be a
deflation of expectations on both Shiites and Sunnis, in terms
of how much the region will help them.
The Chairman. I couldn't agree with you more. And, by the
way, I want to make it clear, if anybody's got a better plan
that is more likely to be accepted, now, next week, next month,
next year, or 5 years from now, I am wide open to the plan. But
it seems to me the only real value remaining in our plan is
that it's mirrored in reality, it's mirrored in what's
happening.
Again, I thank you all very, very much. I thank my
colleagues, particularly the new colleagues. And, I might add,
I think we have, on this committee, picked up some really,
really, really serious Senators who seriously engage this, know
about it, care about it. And so, I'm looking for this committee
to be a very productive vehicle for, at a minimum, this kind of
discussion, because, again--I will end where I began--you all
know better than I do that this is not a great legislative
committee. We can't legislate foreign policy. But it seems to
me our minimum responsibility is to expose our colleagues to
the best alternatives available and to give the American people
a better look. Not that everybody is watching this. This is a
process, and a lot of people are going to find this boring. But
I'm going to continue this, continue this through the next 2
years or as long as I'm the chairman, because I think it is a
process, and we owe it to the American people to conduct it.
Anyway, thank you, gentlemen, you've been very generous
with your time.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
MILITARY AND SECURITY STRATEGY
----------
THURSDAY, JANUARY 18, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Feingold, Boxer, Nelson, Menendez,
Casey, Webb, Lugar, Hagel, Coleman, Corker, Sununu, Voinovich,
DeMint, and Isakson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
Hey, General, how are you?
General Odom. Good morning.
The Chairman. Yesterday, Mr. Chairman, I introduced a
sense-of-the-Senate resolution, along with Senators Hagel,
Levin, and Snowe, expressing opposition to the President's plan
to, from our perspective, deepen the military involvement in
Iraq. And that resolution, Senate Concurrent Resolution 2, was
referred to this committee. As you and I have discussed, it was
my intention to schedule a committee action on that resolution
today, but you have asked me, totally appropriately, to hold
this matter over until next week. And unless something has
changed--which is totally consistent with the practices of this
committee--we'll honor that request and it will be held over
until next week, if that's appropriate.
Senator Lugar. Yes; until next Wednesday----
The Chairman. Until next Wednesday.
Senator Lugar [continuing]. On the schedule, I think.
The Chairman. And last night, I say to our colleagues, we
issued a notice of a business meeting for next Wednesday at 9
a.m. to consider this resolution.
Gentlemen, welcome. What a distinguished panel.
Our focus today is on the military strategy that must
complement a political and diplomatic strategy in Iraq. We have
a profound appreciation for the sacrifices and courage of the
men and women you led, and that are being led by others now,
have made for this country, in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and
elsewhere, but particularly focusing today on Iraq. They have
done everything--in my seven trips over there I've seen it with
my own eyes--they've done everything that's been asked of them,
they have done it incredibly well, and they've done it without
question.
But their efforts do not take place in a vacuum. Were Iraq
purely a military conflict, we would have prevailed a long time
ago. But, as we all know, the situation is far more complex. It
combines elements of classic insurgency, fundamentalist
terrorism, criminality, and, increasingly, an intensifying
sectarian civil war.
All of this occurs against the backdrop of a fragmenting
country and a failing state. I, quite frankly, think I worry
more about the fragmentation of the country than the civil war.
I realize it is hard to make these clear distinctions in what
constitutes what. But it's clear to me that--well, let me put
it this way--I'm not at all certain we have a clear and
coherent mission for the U.S. Armed Forces in such an
environment, and I'm not sure I've heard one yet.
What's the proper sequencing of military and political
efforts? Is security a prerequisite for political settlement,
or is a political settlement a prerequisite for military
success? What stresses are multiple rotations in Iraq placing
upon our Armed Forces? And what are the implications for our
ability to respond to future crises?
To help us answer these and other questions, we are joined
by four witnesses with formidable records in leading our Armed
Forces.
GEN Barry McCaffrey served as the director of the National
Office of Drug Control Policy from 1996 to 2001. The poor guy
had to deal with me almost every day when I was chair or
ranking member of the Judiciary Committee, but it was a great
pleasure for me. Prior to that, he served as the commander in
chief of the Southern Command. The recommendations he has
presented after his trips to Iraq over the last couple of years
have been valuable and, in my view, farsighted.
GEN Jack Keane served, until 2003, as the Vice Chief of
Staff of the Army. He has contributed to a recent report, which
I have read in whole, which lays out a plan to increase United
States troop levels in Iraq in order to stabilize Baghdad.
GEN Joseph Hoar, who has always made himself available to
this committee and the Congress, and me in particular, is a
very familiar face. He retired from the Marine Corps after a
distinguished career in 1994. In his last 3 years of active
service, he was commander in chief of the U.S. Central Command.
And GEN William Odom, who we've called on many times and
received the benefit of his wisdom, retired as Director of the
National Security Agency in 1988. He is a senior fellow at the
Hudson Institute and teaches at Yale University. Perhaps most
relevant for our discussion today, was his role in planning and
assessing the ``National Pacification Plan'' during the Vietnam
war.
We look forward to the testimony of all our highly
distinguished witnesses. And I will turn to my colleague
Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
this hearing and for the ongoing series of hearings in which
we're trying to come to grips with our situation in Iraq.
As this committee continues inquiries, Congress is
contemplating nonbinding resolutions disapproving of the
President's strategy. It appears, however, to me, that such
resolutions are unlikely to have an impact on what the
President does. Even as Congress begins to stake out political
turf on the Iraq issue, the President is moving forward with
his troop surge. In recent days, both the President and Vice
President have asserted that, irrespective of congressional
reaction to the President's, the administration will proceed
with additional deployment of United States troops in Iraq.
Although many Members have genuine and heartfelt opposition
to troop increase, it is unclear at this stage that any
specific strategy commands a majority of informed opinion
inside or outside of the Congress. One can find advocates for
the President's plan for troop increases larger than the
President's plan, for partition of Iraq, for an immediate
withdrawal of American forces, for a phased withdrawal, for
recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, and for other plans.
In such a political environment, we risk having reasoned
debate descend into simplistic sloganeering. Notions of,
``protecting democracy'' or, ``achieving victory'' mean little
at this point in our Iraq interventions. Nonbinding resolutions
may be appropriate, but, in the face of a determined Commander
in Chief, their utility for American policy is likely to end
with their passage. If Congress is going to provide
constructive oversight, we must get into the weeds of the
President's current policy in ways that do more than confirm
political opposition against it. And regardless of how we vote
in a given resolution, we will still be confronted with a
situation in Iraq that requires our attention and our
participation.
Yesterday, we tapped diplomatic experts to discuss the
regional context of our efforts in Iraq, and next week we'll
explore the necessary economic elements. Today, we have the
benefit of an outstanding panel of former military commanders
who have given much thought to Iraq. They bring with them many
decades of combined experience in our Army and Marine Corps.
The discussion that will unfold today may have some
familiar rings. On February 11, 2003, this committee, the
Foreign Relations Committee, assembled a panel of military
experts, including one former CENTCOM commander, to analyze the
military situation in Iraq. I stated, on that day, ``Success in
Iraq requires that the administration, the Congress, and the
American people think beyond current military preparations and
move toward the enunciation of a clear post-conflict plan for
Iraq and the region. We must articulate a plan that commences
with a sober analysis of the costs and squarely addresses how
Iraq will be secured and governed, and precisely what
commitment the United States must undertake.''
These statements, which Chairman Biden and others echoed,
still hold true today. The President has presented his plan to
the American people, and it has been further articulated in
hearings by Secretary Rice, Secretary Gates, and General Pace.
But I don't believe that we have, yet, an adequate
understanding of what is intended militarily, how this military
strategy translates into Iraq political reconciliation, and how
the plan will be adjusted when it encounters obstacles.
As veteran military planners and strategists, our panel's
opinions will be helpful as we analyze the President's proposal
and attempt to provide responsible oversight. And we're
grateful for this opportunity to pose fundamental questions
about our capabilities and our tactics on the ground in Iraq.
To begin with, I would ask our experts to give us their
views of the military significance of the President's planned
deployment. Can 21,500 additional American troops make a
discernible difference in Iraq? Can this boost in our
capability stabilize Baghdad? Quite apart from political
constraints, how long can the United States sustain this
deployment militarily? Have we accounted for the likely
obstacles to military success?
Now, the President intends to embed troops with the Iraqi
units, a recommendation of the Iraq Study Group. In this--is
this strategy likely to succeed? And to what extent are Iraqi
units infiltrated by officers and by enlisted personnel whose
primary loyalty is to a militia, a tribe, or an ethnic group?
What risk do these competing loyalties pose for U.S. troops
embedded with those units? Any long-term stabilization
strategy, other than, perhaps, the deliberate partition of
Iraq, depends on the training of Iraqi forces. This has been
true for several years now, and members of this committee have
focused much effort on getting accurate answers to questions
related to Iraqi troop training? But are we making progress in
training the Iraqi Army? And do Iraqi units have the capability
to undertake difficult missions on their own? Perhaps more
importantly, what rational evidence exists that an Iraqi Army
will be cohesive and will operate under the limitations imposed
by the central government? Dr. Michael O'Hanlon, of the
Brookings Institution, testified, in our first hearing of this
series, that there are only about 10,000--10,000 politically
reliable forces in the Iraqi Army. Do Iraqi units have
sufficient equipment and logistics capability to operate
effectively? And, if not, can we safely remedy those
deficiencies? How much U.S.-provided equipment is being
transferred to militias now?
Congress has a duty not just to express its views, but also
to ensure that the Commander in Chief's course is scrutinized
in anticipation of funding requests and other policy decisions.
Our committee is committed to this course, and I remain hopeful
that the President and his team will engage us in a meaningful
way. And we thank our witnesses today for helping our
understanding.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Gentlemen, let me begin by making two points
before I call on the witnesses.
One, there have been some positive comments made about the
quality of the witnesses that we've had before the committee. I
want to make it clear that this has been a total joint
exercise, that Senator Lugar's staff and mine, and Senator
Lugar and I, have been cooperating I mean, either one of us
could have been chairing this and we would get to the same
place. I think it's important for people out there to know
that.
And No. 2, Senator, I wish more than the few people on this
committee had paid heed to your opening salvo back when we were
contemplating going into Iraq. We might not be where we are.
I know I have four high-ranking military guys before me,
and I want to make sure that I go according to protocol here.
I'm just an Irish kid who's not real big on protocol. I've
never learned it very well. But I understand, General Keane,
that you technically outrank McCaffrey, but McCaffrey was in
the Cabinet, so we're going to start with McCaffrey first.
General McCaffrey, General Keane, General Hoar, and General
Odom, I invite your testimony in that order. I know we're
always telling you to hurry. I don't care whether you hurry. I
think what you have to say is very, very, very important to us.
We'll put your entire statements in the record, but I don't
want you to feel too constrained to try to spit it all out in a
few minutes here. We're really anxious to hear what each of you
has to say.
So, General McCaffrey.
STATEMENT OF GEN BARRY McCAFFREY, USA (RET.), PRESIDENT, BR
McCAFFREY ASSOCIATES LLC AND ADJUNCT PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS, U.S. MILITARY ACADEMY, ARLINGTON, VA
General McCaffrey. Well, Senator Biden, Senator Lugar, and
the other committee members, it's really an honor to be here. I
will briefly try and make seven points, and I'll look forward
to responding to your own questions.
As you know, I am in and out of Iraq and Afghanistan and
Pakistan and Kuwait, and I've tried to follow this issue
closely, partially from a position as a faculty member at West
Point, so I've been using that position to try and stay engaged
and objective and nonpartisan on both home security and
national security--international security issues.
Seven comments.
The first is, it seems to me that the situation in Iraq is
clearly desperate, but is not terminal. I see no reason why
this beleaguered nation of 27 million people, with all of its
problems, couldn't be turned around by sensible strategy and
the sensible application of resources.
Now, having said that, if you take a snapshot on what's
going on in Iraq today, which is well known to all of us in the
room, there is, you know, looking at the situation, 26,000
killed and wounded, maybe $400 billion expended, probably 3,000
Iraqi civilians murdered per month, hundreds of thousands of
internal and external refugees, a brain-drain flight of the
middle class and professional classes of Iraq out of the
country. Our allies are leaving us--make no mistake about
that--and will be largely gone by the coming summer. And when
you look at Iraq's six neighbors, none of them, with the
exception of the Saudis and the Kuwaitis, perhaps, have
positively engaged in support of the ongoing situation; and,
indeed, are unlikely to do so.
How would you characterize the ongoing struggle? And there
has been what some term a semantics distinction on: Is it a
civil war? What's the nature of the struggle? Are they dead-
enders? Are they Baathists? Is it only the Saddamites trying to
come back into power?
I'd say there's four struggles going on, only two of which
are crucially important to U.S. national interests. There's no
question there's massive criminality and a dysfunctional police
force, meaning urban neighborhood police forces. And if you're
an Iraqi mother, that may, indeed, be the most significant
challenge you have: Fearing abduction of your children,
extortion, robbery, the lawlessness of the streets. It's not a
strategic interest to the United States.
A second comment, which I may be a lone voice in, although
there is a foreign-fighter jihadist element in Iraq. As a
general statement, I do not believe we are generating
international terrorism inside Iraq that remains a direct
threat to the United States or our Western allies. And, indeed,
when you look at the operations of the tier-one special forces
units, in particular, we have been devastating in our
effectiveness against these foreign fighters. By and large, 70
to 100 a month come into the country, and they're dead within 2
weeks. So, I would argue that is not a strategic concern of the
United States.
Third, there is, no question, a Sunni insurgency against
what--in sort of a legal fiction--is an established government,
to regain power. So, there's an element of insurgency there,
and I would assume that, a decade from now, Anbar province will
still be in a state of lawless insurgency.
Finally, fourth, regardless of how we parse the phrases, in
my judgment Iraq has been in a civil war darn near from the
time we went in there. It's a struggle not just for political
power, but for survival in the world that will exist after the
expected U.S. withdrawal. In my judgment, the Iraqis and I have
come to a similar conclusion that we're going to be out of
there, by and large, in 36 months. And so, they're watching the
backfield in motion. I apologize for the sports metaphor.
They're saying, ``How do I live through the next phase of
Iraq's existence?'' And it's difficult for them to sort that
out.
Second observation: The Iraqi Army. Michael O'Hanlon, who,
along with Tony Cordesman, may be two of the most astute people
watching this issue--I'm disturbed by the notion of ``10,000
politically reliable troops.'' I've been in a lot of Iraqi Army
battalions that I think are patriots, they're courageous,
they're mixed Shia and Sunni, largely Sunni officers, in many
cases, with Republican Guard backgrounds. They do lack
training, they do lack a political legitimacy for the
government that they allegedly are supposed to fight for. But I
would also underscore, they are grossly inadequately equipped
and resourced. And so, if somebody wanted to talk about a surge
of United States support for Iraq, I would question why our
Iraqi infantry battalions have 30 Toyota trucks, a collection
of junk Soviet small arms, no artillery, no helicopters, no
tactical airlift, and the numbers, which I've been banging away
at for the last 3 years, are 5,000 light-armored vehicles, a
couple of hundred United States helicopters, 24 C-130s, all-
United States small arms, at least a battery of artillery per
Iraqi division, and the pushback will be--and some of it's
legitimate--``Wait a minute, we're concerned about the ensuing
large-scale civil war.'' The other pushback is, ``Look, we're
not talking about fighting maneuver warfare against our
neighbors, this is internal counterinsurgency.'' Can you
imagine the commander of the 1st Cavalry Division being told to
hand over his light-armored vehicles, ``Don't operate with
counterbattery fire at the FOBs that are under nightly rocket
and mortar attack.'' We've got to equip the Iraqis. If we're
going to spend $8 billion a month fighting these people, why
wouldn't we consider a shot, over the coming 3 years, of
equipping them so they can replace us as we withdraw? And we
will withdraw.
Point No. 3: Economic reconstruction. There is a good
argument you can't do economic reconstruction effectively
unless you have security. I understand that linkage. I cannot
imagine--you--the Congress provided 18-billion-dollars-plus in
economic reconstruction aid. Much of it was badly spent, badly
supervised. And, by the way, much of it was implemented by
85,000 contractors. Maybe that's a right number, maybe 600 were
killed, maybe 4,000 were wounded. Without that contractor
effort, this war would have ground to a halt 2 years ago. But
when you look at it, the President's current proposal says $1
billion in CERP money, which is well received by our battalion
and company commanders who want to do small projects and engage
local Iraqi political authorities, but, I would argue, if we're
not willing to put a 10-billion-dollars-a-year pledge for 5
years into Iraq--we've said the only option we're moving
forward with is the U.S. Armed Forces. So, again, I would say
we must stand with the Iraqis. And the answer you're getting
out of the administration is, ``Our allies have pledged $13
billion; they've got to come through.'' That's silly, they're
not going to come through. And a lot of it's loans, not
pledges, anyway.
Bullet No. 4, there's much discussion on the hopelessness
of a political dialog with Syria and Iran, the hopelessness of
really negotiating with Sunni insurgents who see their survival
at stake. I respect and understand that. Many of us in this
room have been involved in hopeless negotiations that went on
for a decade or longer and eventually bore fruit. So, I would
argue, there must be an Iraqi lead and an internal political
dialog; I say ``internally''----
The Chairman. I beg your pardon. You said ``Iraqi lead?''
General McCaffrey. Iraqi lead, not United States. The Iraqi
Government needs to be compelled, shaped, encouraged to open a
dialog, perhaps in a safe place, like Saudi Arabia, and talk to
their internal factions, as well as their neighbors.
Bullet No. 5: I'm privileged to teach, at West Point,
policy classes, American Government. I always remind the
cadets, Article 1 of the Constitution--and I don't mean to
sound like I'm lecturing--says the Congress of the United
States has a responsibility to raise and equip an Army and
Navy. That is not the responsibility of either of the other two
coequal branches of Government. Your Army, somewhat the Marine
Corps, are broken, our equipment is broken. Hundreds of our
armored vehicles are lined up at depots. It has been grossly
underresourced. We are in a position of strategic peril. In my
judgment, our manpower is inadequate. I've been saying 80,000
troops short in the Army, 25,000 in the Marine Corps. Our
recruiting is faltering. There is unquestionably, on the bottom
end, a decrease in the quality of the kids coming into the U.S.
Army now. We're encountering all sorts of problems we didn't
see some years ago. You must fix the Army and the Marine Corps,
or we will be incapable of responding to the next crisis.
Bullet No. 6: Our Air Force and Navy play a vital, but
modest, role in the ground combat in Afghanistan and Iraq. They
are the primary, in my view, deterrent force to greet the
Chinese as they emerge into the global arena as a major
economic, political, and military power. Fifty-five billion
dollars, minimum, have been drained out of Air Force and Navy
budgets and gone into small arms ammunition to shoot at Iraqi
insurgents and Afghans. We must fix the Air Force and the Navy,
or, a decade from now, we will rue it.
A final notion. I personally think the surge of five U.S.
Army brigades and two Marine battalions, dribbled out over 5
months, where, potentially, they might start drawing down in
November, and where their mission allegedly would be to get
down to detailed granularity to fight a counterinsurgency
battle in a city of 6 million Arabs who are murdering each
other with 120 mortars, drills, and car bombs, is a fool's
errand. However, I don't think it's the most significant part
of going forward, which, I would argue, is equipping an Iraqi
force and economic reconstruction and political dialog.
I would argue very strongly, though, that this guy,
Secretary Bob Gates, who comes in with modesty, international
connections, experience; GEN Dave Petraeus, who may be the most
talented person I ever met in my life--he is one terrific
soldier; and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, who I've observed in the
U.S. Embassy Pakistan--he may be the best ambassador I ever
saw--that the three of them ought to be allowed to get in there
and exercise discretion. Sort of, the response is: I would urge
the Senate to be cautious in giving steering instructions to
our wartime commanders, and to allow them to assess the
situation and tell the administration and the Congress what
tools they need. I don't mean political sense, but I mean
steering instruction in which we try and modify the tactics or
the operational guidance.
On that note, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity
to share these ideas, and I look forward to responding to your
own questions.
[The prepared statement of General McCaffrey follows:]
Prepared Statement of GEN Barry McCaffrey, USA (Ret.), President, BR
McCaffrey Associates LLC and Adjunct Professor of International
Affairs, U.S. Military Accademy, Arlington, VA
A collapse of the Iraqi State would be catastrophic--for the people
of Iraq, for the Middle East, and for America's strategic interests. We
need a new political and military approach to head off this impending
disaster--one crafted with bipartisan congressional support. But Baker-
Hamilton isn't it.
Our objective should be a large-scale U.S. military withdrawal
within the next 36 months, leaving in place an Iraqi Government in a
stable and mostly peaceful country that does not threaten its six
neighboring states and does not intend to possess weapons of mass
destruction.
The courage and skill of the U.S. Armed Forces have been awe
inspiring. Our soldiers, Marines and Special Operations forces have
suffered 25,000 wounded and killed, with many thousands permanently
maimed, while fighting this $400 billion war.
But the situation in Iraq is perilous and growing worse. Thousands
of Iraqis are killed each month; hundreds of thousands are refugees.
The government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is largely
dysfunctional. Our allies, including the brave and competent British,
are nearly gone. Baghdad has become the central battlefield in this
struggle, which involves not just politically inspired civil war but
also rampant criminality and violence carried out by foreign jihadists.
Shiite and Sunni Arabs overwhelmingly anticipate and endorse a U.S.
strategic withdrawal and defeat.
We could immediately and totally withdraw. In less than 6 months,
our 150,000 troops could fight their way along strategic withdrawal
corridors back to the sea and the safety provided by the Navy. Several
million terrified refugees would follow, the route of our columns
marked by the burning pyres of abandoned military supplies demolished
by our rear guard. The resulting civil warfare would probably turn Iraq
into a humanitarian disaster and might well draw in the Iranians and
Syrians. It would also deeply threaten the safety and stability of our
allies in neighboring countries.
There is a better option. First, we must commit publicly to provide
$10 billion a year in economic support to the Iraqis over the next 5
years. In the military arena, it would be feasible to equip and
increase the Iraqi Armed Forces on a crash basis over the next 24
months (but not the police or the Facilities Protection Service). The
goal would be 250,000 troops, provided with the material and training
necessary to maintain internal order.
Within the first 12 months we should drawdown the U.S. military
presence from 15 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), of 5,000 troops each, to
10. Within the next 12 months, Centcom forces should further drawdown
to seven BCTs and withdraw from urban areas to isolated U.S. operating
bases--where we could continue to provide oversight and intervention
when required to rescue our embedded U.S. training teams, protect the
population from violence, or save the legal government.
Finally, we have to design and empower a regional diplomatic peace
dialog in which the Iraqis can take the lead, engaging their regional
neighbors as well as their own alienated and fractured internal
population.
We are in a very difficult position created by a micromanaged
Rumsfeld war team that has been incompetent, arrogant, and in denial.
The departing Defense Secretary, in a recent farewell Pentagon townhall
meeting, criticized the alleged distortions of the U.S. media, saying
that they chose to report a few bombs going off in Baghdad rather than
the peaceful scene he witnessed from his helicopter flying over the
city. This was a perfect, and incredible, continuation of Donald
Rumsfeld's willful blindness in his approach to the war. From the
safety of his helicopter, he apparently could not hear the nearly
constant rattle of small-arms fire, did not know of the hundreds of
marines and soldiers being killed or wounded each month, or see the
chaos, murder, and desperation of daily life for Iraqi families.
Let me add a note of caution regarding a deceptive and unwise
option that springs from the work of the Iraq Study Group. We must not
entertain the shallow, partisan notion of rapidly withdrawing most
organized Marine and Army fighting units by early 2008 and substituting
for them a much larger number of U.S. advisers--a 400-percent
increase--as a way to avoid a difficult debate for both parties in the
New Hampshire primaries.
This would leave some 40,000 U.S. logistics and adviser troops
spread out and vulnerable, all over Iraq. It would decrease our
leverage with Iraq's neighbors. It would not get at the problem of a
continuing civil war. In fact, significantly increasing the number of
U.S. advisers in each company and battalion of the Iraqi Army and
police--to act as role models--is itself a bad idea. We are foreigners.
They want us gone.
Lack of combat experience is not the central issue Iraqis face.
Their problems are corrupt and incompetent ministries, poor equipment,
an untrained and unreliable sectarian officer corps (a result of
Rumsfeld's disbanding the Iraqi Army), and a lack of political will
caused by the failure of a legitimate Iraqi Government to emerge.
We need fewer advisers, not more--selected from elite, active
military units and with, at least, 90 days of immersion training in
Arabic. Iraqi troops will not fight because of iron discipline enforced
by U.S. sergeants and officers. That is a self-serving domestic
political concept that would put us at risk of a national military
humiliation.
All of this may not work. We have very few options left. In my
judgment, taking down the Saddam Hussein regime was a huge gift to the
Iraqi people. Done right, it might have left the region and the United
States safer for years to come. But the American people have withdrawn
their support for the war, although they remain intensely committed to,
and protective of, our Armed Forces. We have run out of time. Our
troops and their families will remain bitter for a generation if we
abandon the Iraqis, just as another generation did after we abandoned
the South Vietnamese for whom Americans had fought and died. We owe
them and our own national interest this one last effort. If we cannot
generate the political will to take this action, it is time to pull out
and search for those we will hold responsible in Congress and the
administration.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Jack.
STATEMENT OF GEN JACK KEANE, USA (RET.), FORMER VICE CHIEF OF
STAFF OF THE U.S. ARMY, WASHINGTON, DC
General Keane. Thank you, Senator Biden, Senator Lugar, and
members of the committee, for inviting me.
My judgments today are informed by multiple trips to Iraq,
and also--a member of Secretary Rumsfeld, when he was the
Secretary of Defense Policy Board, and received continuous and
update briefings on Iraq and very aware of what the
intelligence situation there is for the last 3-plus years.
I want to start by making some assumptions; and some of
these are obvious, but they still need to be made. One is that
obviously we're facing a crisis here in Iraq. You know, time is
running out. This government, as imperfect as it is, is on its
way to being fractured, an all-out civil war--we don't have to
debate whether there is one or not; it will be obvious to
everyone, and also leading to a failed state. With that, it
requires a relook at what we are doing.
And it--the second assumption is that security is the issue
that subsumes all other issues in Iraq. It is a necessary
precondition, now, to be able to make political progress,
economic progress, and social progress. That's the harsh
reality of it. Look at the political strategy we had--has
failed. And that's the truth of it. We underestimated the
political culture in Iraq. The fact is that the Iraqis do not
compromise. When you lose, you lose forever. For an educated
society that they are, the level of violence that they choose
to resolve their problems is staggering. And we underestimated,
I think, the psychological impact of what 35 years of
repression meant to the Shias, for the most part; to the Kurds,
to a lesser degree. And we--while we all know about the Shia-
Sunni schism that existed for hundreds of years, certainly
truly understanding what that meant, in political terms, is
another reality.
So, this country is not ready for what we tried to achieve
politically. That's the truth of it. And that political
strategy has failed. And, with that failure, we have to accept
the recognition that the Sunni insurgents who are the main
issue here--and by that, I mean is--they decided to not accept
the occupation, they decided to not accept a new form of
government, and they are enabled by the al-Qaeda. I agree with
my esteemed colleague, Barry McCaffrey, that the al-Qaeda is
not as much a threat as we make it out to be, and we have done
considerable damage to it. But, nonetheless, what it could
become, in terms of an al-Qaeda sanctuary, is something we all
have to be concerned about.
This Sunni insurgency, since the winter of 2004--I'm
talking November-December--the Sunni insurgents believed that
they were winning in Iraq. And then they raised the level of
violence in 2005, and then, in 2006, when they saw the
government coming, after the constitutional referendum in
October and the general election in December, they, enabled by
the al-Qaeda, provoked the Shias, getting the--what is
predictable, an overreaction on their part, to the level of
violence that they introduced by the mosque bombings we're all
aware of, and the assassination squads that they inflicted on
the Shia. It was predictable what they got, and they welcome
that, because they want to fracture this government.
So, when we say, ``You''--as part of our political
strategy, ``We have to reconcile the Sunnis, bring them to the
reconciliation table, throw amnesty on the table in front of
them, put oil in front of them,'' they want none of that,
because they believe they want all the oil, and they believe
they're going to get it. They want--they believe they're going
to get back control of this country.
Now, whether we think that's realistic or not is sort of
irrelevant. The fact is, they believe it. And we see that by
reading the documents that they're exchanging with each other,
listening to their conversations with each other, and we know
where they're going.
So, Maliki has no leverage with this Sunni insurgency. That
is the harsh reality of it. So, the political strategy has
failed.
The military strategy has failed, because we put our
emphasis primarily on training the Iraqi security forces. We
made a conscious decision, in the summer of 2004, when we
changed from Sanchez to Casey and we developed our first
campaign plan--the truth be known, for 2003 and part of 2004,
we were, by and large, conducting conventional operations
against an insurgency. And then we brought a new commander in,
and he developed a new strategy, and it had a number of
components to it.
The military component, and central to the strategy, was:
Train the Iraqi security forces so they could defeat the
insurgency. It was never, ever our mission to defeat the
insurgency. This was full of risk, but it was achievable. It
overrelies on a political strategy to work; that is, attempt to
bring the Sunnis into the government and they will not seek
their objectives through armed violence.
But the fact is, what? The enemy never bought it. They
didn't agree with it. And we have always underestimated this
enemy. If there is one constant we have here, it is we have
underestimated this enemy from the beginning. In 2005, they
raised that level of violence over what it was in 2004. And
they believe they're well on their way to doing what they want
as a fractured state. And that put at risk our strategy. Why
did it put at risk our strategy? Because it raised the level of
violence way beyond the capacity of the Iraqi security forces
to cope with it. In my judgment, even if they were fully
trained and fully equipped, they will not have the capacity to
deal with this level of violence. And so, we keep chasing this
thing, and we can't get there. And we should have adjusted that
strategy sometime in 2005. I think there was enough evidence. I
was still supporting it in 2005, so I'm not hiding behind, you
know, some continuous criticism here. I did not start to make a
change in my thinking--while I had concern in 2005, when I
started publicly talking about it, and privately with leaders,
was in the summer of 2006. So, I'm part of the problem, as
well, in terms of not adjusting to a--to the strategy. But when
you look at it harshly, the fact is, we should have made some
accommodation in 2005, knowing that the Iraqi security forces
will never be able to reach this ever-increasing level of
violence.
Now, all the things we want to do with the Iraqi security
forces make sense--fully equip them, give them better trained
advisors, give them more advisors, and make that force a lot
larger than what it is, and embed U.S. forces in it. All of
that makes sense. Problem is, we can't solve that Iraqi
security-force problem in time, dealing with this crisis that's
in front us. The government will fracture before we get the
Iraqi security forces to a high enough capacity level to cope
with the problem.
And those two points I'm making are essential to
understanding, you know, my perspective on this.
As part of the strategy, the military strategy, if we made
the decision not to defeat the insurgency, we made a conscious
decision not to protect the population, and that was a
conscious decision. So, our emphasis has been on training the
Iraqi security forces, not securing the population. We left
that to the Iraqis. And what has happened in 2006, and very
clear to us, is that the Iraqis cannot protect the population.
We have never chosen to protect the population ourselves. So,
we have a problem, because the Shias are running wild, and they
waited 2\1/2\ years. And I think there's something to work
with, given the fact that they did wait 2\1/2\ years. Other
than some selected death squads that came out in 2004 and a
couple of other incidents, for the most part since the
inception the Shias held their fire, thinking that the Iraqis
and us would protect that population. After the mosque bombing
in February and the level of violence that the Sunnis and the
al-Qaeda inflicted on the Shia, they were provoked.
Maliki has no instrument to deal with the Shias. And that's
the truth of it. When we say we've got to put pressure on
Maliki to get the Shias to heel, what can he use? He has a
conversation with a Shia leader, al-Hakim or Muqtada al-Sadr.
We know who these people are. We know they're seeking political
advantage. We know what they're doing is horrific. And I'm not
dismissing any of that. But what is Maliki's political leverage
over these people? They look at him right in the face and say,
``What are you talking about? You can't protect us, and the
Americans choose not to. What are we going to do? We have to
protect ourselves.'' So, not only are they protecting
themselves, they've gone on the offense. We have got to give
Maliki some leverage to be able to use with those leaders. That
is an assumption that we have to consider.
And the other one is: Hard is not hopeless. This thing is
complex, to be sure. I mean, the Sunni insurgency is not a
monolithic. The Shias are not a monolithic. They fight among
themselves. You have the al-Qaeda in there, and we have huge
amounts of criminality. So, it is a complex human problem, but
it is a human problem. And when you break it down into its
components, I believe it's also resolvable by humans. We do not
have to wring our hands and say, ``This is hopeless. This is
too hard, and we can't resolve it.'' I believe this can be
resolved, and it certainly is worth trying.
So, it begs the question: What can we do? Well, while the
purpose of this discussion here is military, and I will focus
on that, clearly a comprehensive strategy to deal with the
political, economic, and diplomatic is very important, the
other elements of national power. Iraq should be looked at as a
regional problem with global implications, and using the
resources in the region to help it. I'm not going to spend time
discussing that, because I think your interests are other here,
and I'd be more than happy to take that in Q&As.
But, in terms of the military strategy itself--so, can we
do something, or is it just too late? And do we have enough
forces to do it? When I look at that problem and analyze it,
the answer is yes. The Iraqis--the insurgents and the Shias
chose the--Baghdad as the center of gravity, driven mainly by
the Sunni insurgency. Al Anbar would have been a place to start
to change the mission and the strategy, but Baghdad is the
center of gravity; we have no choice, we have to start there.
And the mission and the change is: Secure the population.
Why? Because that will bring down the level of violence. And it
helps you to focus on truly what is really important, which is
driving the problem in Iraq--the Sunni mainstream insurgency is
driving this problem. That is why the al-Qaeda is there, to
help enable it, and they provoked the Shia violence that we're
dealing with today. And I'm not saying you just focus on them.
Far from it. But you have to stay focused on what is really the
issue so you can get to the Sunnis eventually and solve the
problem.
The military problem is one--and the mission is: Secure the
population in Baghdad. And when you look at Baghdad, it's 6
million, for sure. But where do you start? In my judgment,
there is key terrain in Baghdad, and the key terrain is the
Shia-Sunni mixed neighborhoods. Before they redistricted, just
recently--those are 23 districts, east and west of the Tigris
River where the Sunnis and Shias lived, and there are--as you
know, there's some cleansing going on in there today, horrific
as it is. But that is a good place to start. The population is
1.8 million--1.8 million. And you look--go into those
neighborhoods, and your operation on the ground is different.
Now, we're going to get a little tactical here so you can
understand it, the operation itself. And I think you want to
understand it.
The--what we have done in the past--we have been in Baghdad
before, so the reference is, ``Well, we have done this in the
past. Why are we doing it again?'' It looks like more of the
same, and that's a reasonable point. The place and the location
is the same, but what we're going to do is very different.
We were never able to secure the population in Baghdad.
Why? We never had enough resources to do it. We never had
enough United States resources to do it, and we never had
sufficient Iraqi resources even to get close to it.
So, what we have--what we did in Baghdad in those two other
operations, and what we have done, similarly, in Fallujah,
Samarra, Ramadi, is, we went in there, as you know, and we
cleared out the insurgents or the Shia death squads from the
neighborhoods. That was step one. We never had the resources to
stay there and protect the people. We took the resources we
used to clear out that neighborhood, and we would go to another
neighborhood. And then what happened is predictable, as it has
happened in the major cities we've done this, in the
neighborhoods in Baghdad the same thing happened. The death
squads, the insurgents, and the al-Qaeda came back, as well as
criminals, to terrorize and intimidate, and also to assassinate
those who had been cooperating with our forces or with the
Iraqi security forces.
This mission, we would clear out of that neighborhood, but
we would fold in the neighborhood Iraqis and United States
combined, and they would stay in the neighborhood 24/7 and not
go back to their bases. Their mission would be to protect and
secure the population.
Now, why is protecting and securing the population so
important? Why are we so focused on this? Because the--the
simple reality is, when you protect that population, it is the
population themselves, then, that begin to isolate the thugs
and the killers that have been preying on them. They begin to
give it up. It takes time to do this. This is not done in a few
weeks. You have to bring in an economic package, as well. And I
thought an economic package would be basic services, and then a
tier-two package, which would have an incentive with it, only
based on cooperation, for enhanced quality of life. And that
connection you make with that population through local
officials starts to begin to isolate the insurgents in that
neighborhood. We're there to protect them, and they begin the
isolation of them because they want no part of them. They start
to have some connection to their local government and also to
their direct--to the central government, indirectly. And I
don't want to be Pollyannaish about it, certainly the central
government is very problematic.
But that's the basic nature of the issue. So, you begin
with 1.8 million. You're not dealing with 6 million. And the
force ratios--we've done the analysis--are right to deal with
that. Five brigades there, four brigades that are already
there, United States. Now, where I part with this plan a little
bit is, I--why we would put the Iraqis in the lead here makes
no sense to me. I don't understand that. The--I know the Iraqis
want to do that. Why we would do that, when we're trying to
conduct the most decisive operation we've done yet----
The Chairman. General, do you think they mean that? I'm not
being facetious.
General Keane. That's a good----
The Chairman. Put the Iraqis in----
General Keane [continuing]. Question. I think they do mean
it. I think it--it's fraught with problems, and I--it just
makes it that much more difficult for Petraeus and Odierno to
work out something militarily.
Here's what we--when we say ``Iraqi in the lead,'' that
means the Iraqis have a chain of command on the same streets
that the United States has a chain of command on, and we do not
have unity of command; therefore, you don't have unity of
effort. And every time we do something like that--and all these
guys sitting at the table could cite examples of it--we have
military problems. So, Petraeus, Fallon, and Odierno, have got
to resolve that.
But the fact is, is that we--the force ratios are right to
be able to deal with that problem, and it relies on the United
States, principally, to solve this problem. Make no mistake
about it. It may not be--that's not being said politically, but
the reality is, it relies on United States forces to help solve
this problem, assisted by Iraqis, to be sure.
The--that's the basic nature of the military application of
this strategy.
Now, what about Sadr City? And what about the rest of Iraq?
Well, the rest of Iraq--the Sunni enclaves to the west, when
you analyze it, there's not a lot of violence there. We need to
put minimum force there and provide economic packages to them
to assist to raise up their quality of life.
To the east is the problem with the Shia militias and Sadr
City. And it is a problem. I would think this. If we can
resolve that problem politically, and not militarily, let's try
it. And by that, I mean, if we go in and secure the 1.8 million
people who are Shias and Sunnis in the mixed neighborhoods, and
we have demonstrated an evenhanded approach to doing this, and
we're--al-Hakim and Sadr and the vigilante groups will know
whether we're successful protecting their people in a number of
weeks. At some point, in the spring or summer, if we're
effective here, Maliki, for the first time, has leverage with
Sadr and al-Hakim, in the sense that now he's protecting his
people. And it would seem to me he has leverage over them, at a
minimum, to get them to pull back from offensive operations. It
would be too ambitious to think he could begin to disarm them
at that point, because they're not going to buy that, but at
least to stop offensive operations, pull back behind his
barricades. He gets political leverage to do that. That is
worth a try.
If that doesn't work, then we have to deal with that,
militarily. I mean, it's feasible to deal with it, it's not
desirable to deal with it. What you will do is, you will unite
the Shia militias. They're not united now. If we go in to
densely populated Sadr City with a military force to do what
we're doing in the mixed neighborhoods, they will unite, and it
will be a much larger problem that we have to deal with. I
think it's avoidable, and we should certainly try to avoid it
if we can.
So, that is the basis of what we're talking about. There's
a supporting operation in Al Anbar, mainly because that's the
sanctuary for the al-Qaeda, that's the Sunni mainstream
insurgency's base. And it occurs to you, when you look at this,
you need a supporting operation, not to secure the population
in Al Anbar--we don't have enough resources for that, but to
conduct aggressive offensive operations to disrupt, to
interdict, and to challenge that insurgency that's in Al Anbar
so that they cannot undermine the operation in Baghdad. That's
the basis for it. And you need additional resources to do that
so that you can have more aggressive military operations than
what we have right now.
I need to emphasize the importance of the economic package
to the success of this operation, and also to the use of the
other elements of national power. The military leaders'
frustration, when you hear them speak about it, they--and many
of you who have visited to the region know this--they have--
believe that their activities, while central in Iraq, in terms
of military operation--they realize that--but it's
disproportionate, in terms of effectiveness, from the other
elements of national power, in terms of the political,
economic, and diplomatic. And the interagency effort in Iraq
has been a failure. And that's the truth of it. We've got to be
honest about it. So, there's still a concern now as to how
effective are we going to be, at this point, with the things
other than the military. And that is a concern that many of us
have. And it remains to be seen. There is a plan, but that
doesn't mean that we're going to have the kind of execution
that we need, because, in the past, the execution hasn't been
what it should be.
So, in wrapping that up, the--that is essentially the
military outline of what we would do in Iraq. The leaders to do
that--and General Odierno, who is the operational commander,
has been in command about a month--wants to do this, knows how
to do this, and is working on detailed plans to do it, assisted
by the Iraqis.
Second, General Petraeus--and I agree with General
McCaffrey's comments about him; he's extraordinarily well-
qualified to do this, very thoughtful, and wants to do this,
and agrees with the plan, and he can speak for himself. And I
think Fox Fallon, ADM Bill Fallon, who is, hands down, the best
combatant commander we have right now--and I applaud the
administration for taking their best guy and putting him in the
most difficult neighborhood, even though he's working with a
challenging neighborhood, himself, with China and North Korea
and radical Islam in Indonesia, et cetera--but clearly, taking
the best we have and putting them in this command, and also
with the new Ambassador--I think this new team that's going in
there is as important as the strategy is, itself. And I truly
believe they're going to make a difference. And I know you're
going to enjoy working with them.
I thank you for the opportunity to make some comments, and
I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you, General.
General Hoar.
STATEMENT OF GEN JOSEPH P. HOAR, USMC (RET.), FORMER COMMANDER
IN CHIEF, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, DEL MAR, CA
General Hoar. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, distinguished
members of the committee, I thank you for this opportunity to
appear before you for the third time to discuss the war in
Iraq.
This administration's handling of the war has been
characterized by deceit, mismanagement, and a shocking failure
to understand the social and political forces that influence
events in the Middle East.
In August 2002, I cautioned this committee about the lack
of war termination planning. There was no phase-four planning,
and we saw the results of that. At the time, I used the
metaphor, ``What happens when the dog catches the car?'' An
axiom to take home is, ``Wars don't end until the losers decide
that they end.'' And we are very much in that category today.
During my last testimony, I indicated we were looking into
the abyss. Sadly, the new strategy, deeply flawed solution to
our current situation, reflects the chronic inability of this
administration to get it right.
The courageous men and women of our Armed Forces have been
superb. They have met all the challenges of this difficult war.
Unfortunately, they have not been well-served by the civilian
leadership.
I returned from the Middle East 2 days ago; I've also had
the opportunity, before the holidays, to speak with several
senior active duty members of our Armed Forces. In virtually
every case, knowledgeable people--military, political,
academic. The solution to solve this civil war in Iraq is
political, not military. There is an acknowledgment in
Washington that it is, after all, political.
Having said that, the proposed solution is to send more
troops. And it won't work. The addition of 21,000 troops is too
little and too late. This is still not enough to quell the
violence, and, without major changes in command and control of
forces within Baghdad, the current setup for shared control is
unsatisfactory.
The centerpiece of a change of direction should be to
demand that the Iraqi Government make significant changes in
policy: To constrain Muqtada al-Sadr; to disarm militias; to
purge the police; and to move rapidly on a host of other
pressing issues. If Mr. Maliki's government can show progress
by stepping up to meet these political changes, then the issues
of more troops would merit some consideration.
Insurgencies are resolved by attacking root causes. Today,
among the root causes is the presence of American forces. The
Economist magazine, this week, quoting a survey, indicates that
61 percent of the Iraqis approve of attacking coalition forces.
Recently, the Secretary of State, in response to a question
of this committee, indicated there was no alternative plan to
the President's current strategy. I urge this committee to
insist that an alternative plan be developed and briefed to the
relevant committees of Congress. It should include diplomatic
engagement with Syria and Iran. It should also include a
significant role for the Gulf Cooperation Council countries,
plus Egypt and Jordan. These countries reluctantly supported
the invasion of Iraq. If we fail, the consequences for Iraqis'
neighbors are dire.
President Mubarak said, ``The invasion of Iraq was a
catastrophe. Early departure will be even a greater
catastrophe.''
Hamad bin Jassim, the Foreign Minister of Qatar, said,
recently, that, ``The GCC was not consulted in the surge
strategy. It's time we took our friends in the region into our
confidence.''
The goal of the plan should be to prevent the Middle East
from falling into chaos, should Iraq become a failed state.
Victory, in the conventional sense, is no longer possible. Our
goal today in Iraq should be to achieve a paradigm shift that
will give the people of Iraq an assured degree of stability and
justice.
A final thought. T.E. Lawrence, better known as Lawrence of
Arabia, was an advisor to Winston Churchill when he was the
Secretary of Colonial Affairs and presiding over the British
debacle in Iraq in the 20th century. Lawrence told Lord Curzon
and other members of the British Cabinet the following, ``You
people don't understand yet the hole you have put us all
into.''
Gentlemen, lady, we are in a hole. In the Marines, we say,
``When you're in a hole, stop digging.''
I'd be happy to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Hoar follows:]
Prepared Statement of GEN Joseph P. Hoar, USMC (Ret.), Former Commander
in Chief, U.S. Central Command, Del Mar, CA
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, distinguished members of the
committee, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you for the
third time to discuss the war in Iraq.
This administration's handling of the war has been characterized by
deceit, mismanagement, and a shocking failure to understand the social
and political forces that influence events in the Middle East.
In August 2002, I cautioned this committee about the lack of ``war
termination'' planning. At that time, I used the metaphor, ``What
happens when the dog catches the car?''
During my last testimony, I indicated we were looking into the
abyss. Sadly, the new strategy, a deeply flawed solution to our current
situation, reflects the continuing and chronic inability of the
administration to get it right. The courageous men and women of our
Armed Forces have been superb. They have met all the challenges of this
difficult war. Unfortunately, they have not been well served by the
civilian leadership.
I returned from the Middle East 2 days ago. I've also had the
opportunity before the holidays to speak with several senior active
duty members of our armed forces. In virtually every case,
knowledgeable people--military, political, and academic--state that the
solution to solving this civil war in Iraq is political; not military.
There is an acknowledgement in Washington that it is, after all,
political. Having said that, the proposed solution is: Send more
troops, and it won't work .
The addition of 20,000 troops is too little too late. This is still
not enough to quell the violence and without major changes in the
command and control of forces within Baghdad, the current setup of
shared control is unsatisfactory.
The centerpiece of a change of direction should be to demand that
the Iraqi Government make significant changes in policy, to constrain
Muqtada al-Sadr, to disarm militias, purge the police, and move rapidly
on a host of other pressing issues.
If Mr. Maliki's government can show progress by stepping up to meet
these political changes, then the issue of more troops would merit
serious discussion.
Insurgencies are solved by attacking root causes. Today, among root
causes is the presence of American forces. The Economist indicates that
61 percent of Iraqis approved of attacking coalition forces.
Recently the Secretary of State, in response to a question before
this committee, indicated that there was no alternative plan to the
President's current strategy. I urge this committee to insist that an
alternative plan be developed and briefed to the relevant committees in
the Congress. It should include diplomatic engagement with Syria and
Iran. It should also include a significant role for the Gulf
Cooperation Council countries, plus Egypt and Jordan. These countries
reluctantly supported the invasion of Iraq. If we fail, the
consequences for Iraq's neighbors are dire. President Mubarek said,
``The invasion of Iraq was a catastrophe. Early departure will be a
worse catastrophe.'' Hamad bin Jassim, the Foreign Minister of Qatar,
says the GCC was not consulted about the surge strategy. It's time we
took our friends in the region into our confidence.
The goal of the plan should be to prevent the Middle East from
falling into chaos should Iraq become a failed state.
Victory in the conventional sense is no longer possible. Our goal
today in Iraq should be to achieve a paradigm shift that will enable
political changes sufficient to give the people of Iraq an assured
degree of stability and justice.
A final thought. T.E. Lawrence, better known as Lawrence of Arabia,
was an advisor to Winston Churchill, then the Secretary for Colonial
Affairs who presided over the British debacle in Iraq. Lawrence told
Lord Curzon and other members of the British Cabinet the following:
``You people don't understand yet the hole you have put us all into.''
In the Marines, we say, ``If you're in a hole, stop digging.''
I'd be happy to answer your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
General Odom.
STATEMENT OF LTG WILLIAM E. ODOM, USA (RET.), SENIOR FELLOW,
HUDSON INSTITUTE; FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY
AGENCY, WASHINGTON, DC
General Odom. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for this
opportunity. It's a grave responsibility to testify before you
today, because the issue, the Iraq war, is of monumental
importance.
You have my written statement, and----
The Chairman. It will be placed in the record.
General Odom [continuing]. It deals with a lot of the
questions that the--particularly, Senator Lugar raised. And I
want to direct mine more to some that you raised and try to
create a strategic framework against which you test any of
these ideas that are being advanced. And I think you can test
some you've heard here. Some I think you will find persuasive
in that regard; and others, not so.
Four points seem to me to define the realities we have to
deal with and to make us realize that we are creating
contradictions in the way we look at this by saying things
like, ``It will be a catastrophe beyond all belief if we
withdraw,'' et cetera. It is a catastrophe because we're there.
But let me go further and explain why this is the case and why
unraveling this paradox involves doing some things we might
otherwise think would not bring that outcome.
The first is the contradiction in war aims and what we're
trying to achieve politically in the region. The war aims, if
you recall, that the President stated were: Destroy WMD,
overthrow Saddam's regime----
Senator Boxer. Could he bring the mike closer?
General Odom [continuing]. And create a liberal democracy--
--
The Chairman. General, can you pull that mike closer to
you----
General Odom. Yes.
The Chairman [continuing]. If you don't mind?
General Odom. The three----
The Chairman. That's great, thank you.
General Odom. Yeah.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
General Odom. The three war aims the President set were to
overthrow Saddam, find WMD, and create a liberal democracy,
pro-American state there. The first two--one of the first two
is irrelevant, because there was no WMD. The second one has
been achieved. And the third one is creating a disaster.
Why is it creating a disaster? That takes us to the second
point. If these war aims don't serve U.S. interests, and we're
committing forces to pursue goals that don't serve our
interests, who's interests are served? The interests that are
primarily being served by our invasion are, first, Iran's. No
one could have been more pleased to see us overthrow Saddam,
and no one has been more supportive of our program to create a
democracy there; in fact, the Iranians were advising the
Shiites all along, ``Do what the Americans tell you''--that's
why the Shiites initially didn't enter this insurgency fight--
``because the Americans are putting you in power.'' And now,
that is becoming obvious to everybody, and if you want to
understand why we're not going very far with any kind of troop
increases out there, I think that's sort of the crux of it.
The other party whose interest is being served is al-Qaeda.
Osama bin Laden's list of people to destroy did not have the
United States, or at least for a long time did not have the
United States up very high. All secular Arab leaders were ahead
of us. So, we have knocked one over for him and opened up a
country and given him a training ground for cadres that did not
exist before.
Now, I've gone back and been reading my Clausewitz on this,
and I could cite numerous passages to make the point, but
instead, let me sum up and say the following: There is no way
to win a war that's not in your interest. And that's what we're
trying to do. And once you understand that, then a lot of other
things become clear.
The third thing is to understand that the war is not
confined to Iraq. We, in the military, try to do order of
battle, figure out how many enemy are against us. One of the
great problems in Vietnam, one of the great problems in Central
America and other places where we had client states dealing
with these insurgencies, was a failure to look at the order of
battle beyond the boundaries of those countries.
We face, at a maximum, 26 million Iraqis. They're not all
against us, but, as you heard, General Hoar said 61 percent are
for attacking us, others are not happy to have us there. So,
the potential order of battle on the other side is several
millions against our 156,000 or 160,000 after the surge.
We should also include a large portion of the Iranians.
They may not be directly involved, but the Iranian state can
provide an enormous amount of resources and influence on this
area. They're not in there, big time, now. They could get in.
So, when you start adding Iranians to the order of battle, many
other sides are also involved here, and their capacity to
change the order of battle in the region is next.
You can be sure that the so-called ``moderate Arab States''
are not benignly sitting aside and watching this. I cannot
believe that resources are not flowing from some of them into
the Sunni coffers, and supplies are not coming their way,
certainly from Syria, but probably other ways as well.
So, when you start beginning to add up who we could be
facing, we could be facing several states--populations in
states where the regime may be on our side, but the public is
not--of scores of millions against us. That's just not a good
situation to be in.
Now, let me move to my third point. My third point is that
the United States does need to have other countries involved in
solving this. That's the only way you'll change the order of
battle significantly in our favor. I don't think we will have
very effective cooperation from the states around Iraq until we
withdraw. To me, that is a precondition to getting any kind of
cooperation. Why should they--why should Iran cooperate with us
while we're suffering so? Why should some of these other people
cooperate with us while we're suffering so? I mean, they're
wallowing in Schadenfreude over this. But when we start pulling
out, their view of the world will experience a polar shift.
Iran doesn't want a highly unstable Iraq, nor do most other
countries want an unstable Iraq. If we provided a forum, after
we left, I have a feeling that diplomats from these countries
might show up if you invited them. None of them could hold a
conference and get the others to participate. They may not like
us, but they might find us, pragmatically, a useful host.
I would say this is also true in Europe. The Europeans have
been delighted to see us suffer in Iraq. Not all of them, but
some. Why should they change? They've been proven right. We got
ourselves into a hole they warned us not to get into.
I think if we get out, they will soon realize that they are
going to suffer the aftermath of this fiasco earlier and
probably even more severely than we do. Therefore, a withdrawal
is not the road to defeat; it's the precondition for reframing
our strategy for interests that are truly ours--for a campaign
that is in our interest. And I want to say that we can overcome
the political, strategic, and military, and diplomatic
paralysis by beginning to withdraw. As long as we're in, we
don't have much room to maneuver.
Now, let me suggest a new strategy. And it's not a new one;
it's a return to an old one. I was the planner in the Carter
administration for the so-called Persian Gulf security
framework, and I had to look at that region and think about
what it meant when the Shah fell. After the Shah's collapse we
began to try to figure out what to do next. Well, as I looked
back, I could see that, clearly, since the 1950s, we had, if
not an explicit, at least an implicit American strategy of
keeping a foot in three camps: The Arab camp, the Israeli camp,
and the Persian/Iranian camp. As long as we had a foot in all
three camps, the military requirements for maintaining a
balance in the region were not high. When we lost our footing
in the Iranian camp, they became very high, and that's why the
Persian Gulf's security framework's key component was the
Central Command. There were many other aspects to this.
President Carter understood clearly that we needed it. He also
understood something else: That need for greater military power
should be temporary, because it was costing us more to
stabilize by having Iran as an opponent. We saw that
reestablishing some sort of cooperative relationship with Iran
was very much in our interest. And there were also many
objective interests for Iran to restore a relationship. Every
administration since then, until this one, I think, has
realized this fact. The Reagan administration made some very
clumsy and feckless efforts to engage with Iran, but the
strategic aim was right, even if the operational tactics and
diplomacy were wrong.
I think the first Bush administration didn't pay a lot of
attention to it until the gulf war, and then they knew they had
to do something about it then. The Clinton administration also
tried. Maybe not enough. But when the present administration
found itself fighting the Taliban, it found Iran highly
cooperative.
So, I could add additional objective reasons why Iran
should come around to cooperate with us.
There's another factor that argues for having Iran back in
the game on our side: It would remove Russia's negative
influence. Iran is being used by Russia now in a most unnatural
alliance. It's very unnatural for Russians and Iranians to
ally. There's no precedent for that in their history, and I
think the Iranians pay a large price for that. It gives the
Russians a spoiling lever in the region.
So, a new strategy has to have as its aim not winning a
victory in Iraq, per se, but reachieving regional stability.
And any strategy that doesn't set regional stability as its
goal and then begin to allocate diplomatic efforts and military
efforts to reachieve that strikes me as seriously wanting. The
problem with the administration's strategy in Iraq is that the
means they have used to pursue regional stability has undercut
regional stability. Both spreading democracy and the techniques
of nonproliferation have accelerated proliferation and added to
instability. Therefore, I don't think you can get yourself out
of that muddle militarily, diplomatically, any other ways, by
parsing these things into particular military, political,
economic components. You have to come back to the tough reality
and understand that withdrawal from Iraq now on some
responsible phased schedule, but a serious and irreversible
schedule, is the only thing that will change the polarity of
the situation to give this President an opportunity to design a
strategy that has some prospect of victory.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Odom follows:]
Prepared Statement LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.), Senior Fellow,
Hudson Institute; Former Director of the National Security Agency,
Washington, DC
Good afternoon, Senator Biden and members of the committee. It is a
grave responsibility to testify before you today because the issue, the
war in Iraq, is of such monumental importance.
You have asked me to address primarily the military aspects of the
war. Although I shall comply, I must emphasize that it makes no sense
to separate them from the political aspects. Military actions are
merely the most extreme form of politics. If politics is the business
of deciding ``who gets what, when, how,'' as Boss Tweed of Tammany Hall
in New York City once said, then the military aspects of war are the
most extreme form of politics. The war in Iraq will answer that
question there.
STRATEGIC OVERVIEW
The role that U.S. military forces can play in that conflict is
seriously limited by all the political decisions the U.S. Government
has already taken. The most fundamental decision was setting, as its
larger strategic purpose, the stabilization of the region by building a
democracy in Iraq and encouraging its spread. This, of course, was to
risk destabilizing the region by starting a war.
Military operations must be judged by whether and how they
contribute to accomplishing war aims. No clear view is possible of
where we are today and where we are headed without constant focus on
war aims and how they affect U.S. interests. The interaction of
interests, war aims, and military operations defines the strategic
context in which we find ourselves. We cannot have the slightest
understanding of the likely consequences of proposed changes in our war
policy without relating them to the strategic context. Here are the
four major realities that define that context:
1. Confusion about war aims and U.S. interests. The President
stated three war aims clearly and repeatedly:
The destruction of Iraqi WMD;
The overthrow of Saddam Hussein;
The creation of a liberal democratic Iraq.
The first war aim is moot because Iraq had no WMD. The second was
achieved by late spring 2003. Today people are waking up to what was
obvious before the war--the third aim has no real prospects of being
achieved even in 10 or 20 years, much less in the short time
anticipated by the war planners. Implicit in that aim was the belief
that a pro-American post-Saddam regime could be established. This too,
it should now be clear, is mostly unlikely. Finally, is it in the U.S.
interest to have launched a war in pursuit of any of these aims? And is
it in the U.S. interest to continue pursuing the third? Or is it time
to redefine our aims? And, concomitantly, to redefine what constitutes
victory?
2. The war has served primarily the interests of Iran and al-Qaeda,
not American interests.
We cannot reverse this outcome by more use of military force in
Iraq. To try to do so would require siding with Sunni leaders and the
Baathist insurgents against pro-Iranian Shiite groups. The Baathist
insurgents constitute the forces most strongly opposed to Iraqi
cooperation with Iran. At the same time, our democratization policy has
installed Shiite majorities and pro-Iranians groups in power in
Baghdad, especially in the Ministries of Interior and Defense.
Moreover, our counterinsurgency operations are, as unintended (but
easily foreseeable) consequences; first, greater Shiite openness to
Iranian influence and, second, al-Qaeda's entry into Iraq and rooting
itself in some elements of Iraqi society.
3. On the international level, the war has effectively paralyzed
the United States militarily and strategically, denying it any prospect
of revising its strategy toward an attainable goal.
As long as U.S. forces remained engaged in Iraq, not only will the
military costs go up, but also the incentives will decline for other
states to cooperate with Washington to find a constructive outcome.
This includes not only countries contiguous to Iraq but also Russia and
key American allies in Europe. In their view, we deserve the pain we
are suffering for our arrogance and unilateralism.
4. Overthrowing the Iraqi regime in 2003 insured that the, country
would fragment into at least three groups: Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds.
In other words, the invasion made it inevitable that a civil war would
be required to create a new central government able to control all of
Iraq. Yet a civil war does not insure it. No faction may win the
struggle. A lengthy stalemate, or a permanent breakup of the country is
possible. The invasion also insured that outside countries and groups
would become involved. Al-Qaeda and Iran are the most conspicuous
participants so far, Turkey and Syria less so. If some of the wealthy
oil-producing countries on the Arabian Peninsula are not already
involved, they are most likely to support with resources, any force in
Iraq that opposes Iranian influence.
Many critics argue that, had the invasion been done ``right,'' such
as sending in much larger forces for reestablishing security and
government services, the war would have been a success. This argument
is not convincing. Such actions might have delayed a civil war but
could not have prevented it. Therefore, any military programs or
operations having the aim of trying to reverse this reality, insisting
that we can now ``do it right,'' need to be treated with the deepest of
suspicion. That includes the proposal to sponsor the breakup by
creating three successor states. To do so would be to preside over the
massive ethnic cleansing operations required for the successor states
to be reasonably stable. Ethnic cleansing is happening in spite of the
U.S. military in Iraq, but I see no political or moral advantage for
the United States to become its advocate. We are already being blamed
as its facilitator.
Let me not turn to key aspects of the President's revised approach
to the war as well as several other proposals.
In addition to the President, a number of people and groups have
supported increased U.S. force levels. As GEN Colin Powell has said,
before we consider sending additional U.S. troops, we must examine what
missions they will have. I would add that we ask precisely what those
troops must do to reverse any of these four present realities created
by the invasion. I cannot conceive of any achievable missions they
could be given to cause a reversal.
Just for purposes of analysis, let us suppose we had unlimited
numbers of U.S. troops to deploy in Iraq. Would that change my
assessment? In principle, if 2 or 3 million troops were deployed there
with the latitude to annihilate all resistance without much attention
to collateral civilian casualties and human rights, order might well be
temporarily reestablished under a reign of U.S. terror. The problem we
would then face is that we would be opposed not only by 26 million
Iraqis but also by millions of Arabs and Iranians surrounding Iraq;
peoples angered by our treatment of Muslims and Arabs. These outsiders
are already involved to some degree in the internal war in Iraq, and
any increase of U.S. forces is likely to be exceeded by additional
outside support for insurgents.
I never cease to be amazed at our military commanders' apparent
belief that the ``order of battle'' of the opposition forces they face
are limited to Iraq. I say ``apparent'' because those commanders may be
constrained by the administration's policies from correcting this
mistaken view. Once the invasion began, Muslims in general and Arabs in
particular could be expected to take sides against the United States.
In other words, we went to war not just against the Iraqi forces and
insurgent groups but also against a large part of the Arab world,
scores and scores of millions. Most Arab governments, of course, are
neutral or somewhat supportive, but their publics in growing numbers
are against us.
It is a strategic error of monumental proportions to view the war
as confined to Iraq. Yet this is the implicit assumption on which the
President's new strategy is based. We have turned it into two wars that
vastly exceed the borders of Iraq. First, there is the war against the
U.S. occupation that draws both sympathy and material support from
other Arab countries. Second, there is the Shiite-Sunni war, a
sectarian conflict, heretofore, sublimated within the Arab world but
that now has opened the door to Iranian influence in Iraq. In turn, it
foreordains an expanding Iranian-Arab regional conflict.
Any military proposals today that do not account for both larger
wars, as well as the Iranian threat to the Arab States on the Persian
Gulf, must be judged wholly inadequate if not counterproductive. Let me
now turn to some specific proposals, those advocated by independent
voices and the Iraq Study Group as well as the administration.
SPECIFIC PROPOSALS
Standing up Iraqi security forces to replace U.S. forces. Training
the Iraqi military and police force has been proposed repeatedly as a
way to bring stability to Iraq and allow U.S. forces to withdraw.
Recently new variants, such as embedding U.S. troops within Iraqi
units, are offered. The Iraq Study Group made much of this technique.
I know of no historical precedent to suggest that any of them will
succeed. The problem is not the competency of Iraqi forces. It is
political consolidation and gaining the troops' loyalties to the
government and their commanders as opposed to their loyalties to
sectarian leaders, clans, families, and relatives. For what political
authority are Iraqi soldiers and police willing to risk their lives? To
the American command? What if American forces depart? Won't they be
called traitors for supporting the invaders and occupiers? Will they
trust in a Shiite-dominated government and Ministry of Interior, which
is engaged in assassinations of Sunnis? Sunni Arabs and Kurds would be
foolish to do so, although financial desperation has driven many to
risk it. What about to the leaders of independent militias? Here,
soldiers can find strong reasons for loyal service: To defend their
fellow sectarians, families, and relatives. And that is why the
government cannot disband them. It has insufficient loyal troops to do
so.
As a military planner working on the pacification programs in 1970-
71 in Vietnam, I had the chance to judge the results of training both
regular South Vietnamese forces and so-called ``regional'' and
``popular'' forces. Some were technically proficient, but that did not
ensure that they would always fight for the government in Saigon. Nor
were they always loyal to their commanders. And they occasionally
fought each other when bribed by Viet Cong agents to do so. The
``popular forces'' at the village level often failed to protect their
villages. The reasons varied but in several cases it was the result of
how their salaries were funded. Local tax money was not the source of
their pay; rather it was U.S.-supplied funds. Thus these troops, as
well as ``regional forces,'' had little sense of obligation to protect
villagers in their areas of responsibility. For anyone who doubts that
the Vietnam case is instructive for understanding the Iraqi case,
recommend Ahmed S. Hashim's recent book, ``Insurgency and
Counterinsurgency in Iraq.'' A fluent Arab linguist and a Reserve U.S.
Army colonel, who has served a year in Iraq and visited it several
other times, Hashim offers a textured study that struck me again and
again as a rerun of an old movie, especially where it concerned U.S.
training of Iraqi forces.
U.S. military assistance training in El Salvador is often cited as
a successful case. In fact, this effort amounted to letting the old
elites, who used death squads to impose order, come back to power in
different guises. And death squads are again active there. The real
cause of the defeat of the Salvadoran insurgency was Gorbachev's
decision to cut off supplies to it, as he promised President George H.
Bush at the Malta summit meeting. Thus denied their resource base, and
having failed to create a self-supporting tax regime in the countryside
as the Viet Cong did in Vietnam, they could not survive for long. Does
the administration's new plan for Iraq promise to eliminate all outside
support to the warring factions? Is it even remotely possible? Hardly.
The oft-cited British success in Malaysia is only superficially
relevant to the Iraq case. British officials actually ruled the
country. Thus they had decades of firsthand knowledge of the local
politics. They made such a mess of it, however, that an insurgency
emerged in opposition. A new military commander and a cleanup of the
colonial administration provided political consolidation and the
isolation of the Communist insurgents, mostly members of an ethnic
minority group. This pattern would be impossible to duplicate in Iraq.
An infusion of new funds for reconstruction. A shortage of funds
has not been the cause of failed reconstruction efforts in Iraq.
Administrative capacity to use funds effectively was and remains the
primary obstacle. Even support programs carried out by American
contractors for U.S. forces have yielded mixed results. Insurgent
attacks on the projects have provoked transfers of construction funds
to security measures, which have also failed.
A weak or nonexistent government administrative capacity allows
most of the money to be squandered. Putting another billion or so
dollars into public works in Iraq today--before a government is in
place with an effective administrative capacity to penetrate to the
neighborhood and village level--is like trying to build a roof on a
house before its walls have been erected. Moreover, a large part of
that money will find its way into the hands of insurgents and sectarian
militias. That is exactly what happened in Vietnam, and it has been
happening in Iraq.
New and innovative counterinsurgency tactics. The cottage industry
of counterinsurgency tactics is old and deceptive. When the U.S.
military has been periodically tasked to reinvent them--the last great
surge in that industry was at the JFK School in Fort Bragg in the
1960s--it has no choice but to pretend that counterinsurgency tactics
can succeed where no political consolidation in the government has yet
been achieved. New counterinsurgency tactics cannot save Iraq today
because they are designed without account for the essence of any
``internal war,'' whether an insurgency or a civil war.
Such wars are about ``who will rule,'' and who will rule depends on
``who can tax'' and build an effective state apparatus down to the
village level.
The taxation issue is not even on the agenda of U.S. programs for
Iraq. Nor was it a central focus in Vietnam, El Salvador, the
Philippines, and most other cases of U.S.-backed governments embroiled
in internal wars. Where U.S. funding has been amply provided to those
governments, the recipient regime has treated those moneys as its tax
base while failing to create an indigenous tax base. In my own study of
three counterinsurgency cases, and from my experience in Vietnam, I
discovered that the regimes that received the least U.S. direct fiscal
support had the most success against the insurgents. Providing funding
and forces to give an embattled regime more ``time'' to gain adequate
strength is like asking a drunk to drink more whiskey in order to sober
up.
Saddam's regime lived mostly on revenues from oil exports. Thus it
never had to create an effective apparatus to collect direct taxes.
Were U.S. forces and counterinsurgency efforts to succeed in imposing
order for a time, the issue of who will control the oil in Iraq would
become the focus of conflict for competing factions. The time would not
be spent creating the administrative capacity to keep order and to
collect sufficient taxes to administer the country. At best, the war
over who will eventually rule the country would only be postponed.
This is the crux of the dilemma facing all such internal wars. I
make this assertion not only based on my own study but also in light of
considerable literature that demonstrates that the single best index of
the strength of any state is its ability to collect direct taxes, not
export-import tax or indirect taxes. The latter two are relatively easy
to collect by comparison, requiring much weaker state institutions.
The Iraq Study Group. The report of this group should not be taken
as offering a new or promising strategy for dealing with Iraq. Its
virtue lies in its candid assessment of the realities in Iraq. Its
great service has been to undercut the misleading assessments, claims,
and judgment by the administration. It allows the several skeptical
Republican Members of the Congress to speak out more candidly on the
war, and it makes it less easy for those Democrats who were,
heretofore, supporters of the administration's war to refuse to
reconsider.
If one reads the ISG report in light of the four points in the
strategic overview above, one sees the key weakness of its proposals.
It does not concede that the war, as it was conceived and continues to
be fought, is not ``winnable.'' It rejects the rapid withdrawal of U.S.
forces as unacceptable. No doubt a withdrawal will leave a terrible
aftermath in Iraq, but we cannot avoid that. We can only make it worse
by waiting until we are forced to withdraw. In the meantime, we prevent
ourselves from escaping the paralysis imposed on us by the war, unable
to redefine our war aims, which have served Iranian and al-Qaeda
interests instead of our own.
I do not criticize the report for this failure. As constructed, the
group could not advance a fundamental revision of our strategy. Its
Republican and Democrat members could not be said to represent all
members of their own parties. Thus the most it could do was to make it
politically easier for the administration to begin a fundamental
revision of its strategy instead of offering a list of tactical changes
for the same old war aim of creating a liberal democracy with a pro-
American orientation in Iraq.
what would a revised strategy look like?
How can the United States recover from this strategic blunder? It
cannot as long as it fails to revise its war aims. Wise leaders in war
have many times admitted that their war aims are misguided and then
revised them to deal with realities beyond their control. Such leaders
make tactical withdrawals, regroup, and revise their aims, and design
new strategies to pursue them. Those who cannot make such adjustments
eventually face defeat.
What war aim today is genuinely in the U.S. interest and offers
realistic prospects of success? And not just in Iraq but in the larger
region?
Since the 1950s, the U.S. aim in this region has been ``regional
stability'' above all others. The strategy for achieving this aim of
every administration until the present one has been maintaining a
regional balance of power among three regional forces--Arabs, Israelis,
and Iranians. The Arab-Persian conflict is older than the Arab-Israeli
conflict. The United States kept a diplomatic foothold in all three
camps until the fall of the Shah's regime in Iran. Losing its footing
in Tehran, it began under President Carter's leadership to compensate
by building what he called the Persian Gulf Security Framework. The
U.S. Central Command with enhanced military power was born as one of
the main means for this purpose, but the long-term goal was a
rapprochement. Until that time, the military costs for maintaining the
regional power balance would be much higher.
The Reagan administration, although it condemned Carter's Persian
Gulf Security Framework, the so-called ``Carter Doctrine,'' continued
Carter's policies, even to the point of supporting Iraq when Iran was
close to overrunning it. Some of its efforts to improve relations with
Iran were feckless and counterproductive, but it maintained the proper
strategic aim--regional stability.
The Bush administration has broken with this strategy by invading
Iraq and also by threatening the existence of the regime in Iran. It
presumed that establishing a liberal democracy in Iraq would lead to
regional stability. In fact, the policy of spreading democracy by
forces of arms has become the main source of regional instability.
This not only postponed any near-term chance of better relations
with Iran but also has moved the United States closer to losing its
footing in the Arab camp as well. That, of course, increases greatly
the threats to Israel's security, the very thing it was supposed to
improve, not to mention that it makes the military costs rise
dramatically, exceeding what we can prudently bear, especially without
the support of our European allies and others.
Several critics of the administration show an appreciation of the
requirement to regain our allies' and others' support, but they do not
recognize that withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq is the sine qua non
for achieving their cooperation. It will be forthcoming once that
withdrawal begins and looks irreversible. They will then realize that
they can no longer sit on the sidelines. The aftermath will be worse
for them than for the United States, and they know that without U.S.
participation and leadership, they alone cannot restore regional
stability. Until we understand this critical point, we cannot design a
strategy that can achieve what we can legitimately call a victory.
Any new strategy that does realistically promise to achieve
regional stability at a cost we can prudently bear, and does not regain
the confidence and support of our allies, is doomed to failure. To
date, I have seen no awareness that any political leader in this
country has gone beyond tactical proposals to offer a different
strategic approach to limiting the damage in a war that is turning out
to be the greatest strategic disaster in our history.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, General.
Impressive testimonies. Thank you very, very much.
We'll do 8-minute rounds, if that's OK. And if our
colleagues have an opportunity to stay, maybe we can have a
second round. I know everyone's not here, but--is that all
right with you, Mr. Chairman?
What I've tried to do with these talented panels that we've
had is, as you've spoken, and as I've read your statements,
I've tried to discern where there are points of agreement and
points of departure. So, we can sort of start from there. At
least it helps my mind order things a little better.
There's universal judgment here that the mission--the
strategy and the mission--and they're separable--have, thus
far, been a failure, that there's a need for a new strategy and
a more clearly defined mission for the region. You all say the
region is important, so you can't just view Iraq as a stand-
alone proposition. And, second, that the mission inside Iraq
has to be more clearly defined. And the third thing you all
agree on, I think--correct me if I'm wrong--is, the allies are
leaving; this is a wholly owned American subsidiary here. I
mean, there's--there really isn't anybody else in the deal, as
a practical matter, and no one's coming. If anything, people
are going, correct?
Another thing that you all seem to agree on is that
somewhere between ``if we surge, we really have to do it and
stick around,'' and ``we shouldn't even be surging, we should
be using a different method, announcing or, in fact, beginning
to withdraw''--we need a real plan, from General Odom's
standpoint, to begin to shift the burden more clearly, or to
enable Iraqi forces, as General McCaffrey says. General, I've
been there seven times, and, talking to our men and women on
the ground, they say they wouldn't do what we ask the Iraqis to
do. They wouldn't get in a Toyota pickup truck and--you know,
and arrive at such-and-such a place or go to such-and-such a
deal.
General Odom, your strategic vision here is, I think, not
only fascinating, but I think I agree with it. The irony of all
ironies is, the underlying rationale, not just for Iraq, but
for the region, has been a mistake. The way we were going to
have our interests solidified and sustained and increased was
to deal with the word you didn't use, ``regime change.'' The
way to deal with the Iranian situation, we no longer have a
foot in the Persian camp, so get rid of the foot--get rid of
the present Persian camp.
General Odom. I would even go so far as to say--I'd pay the
price of saying I'm not going to oppose, all that strongly, the
Iranian nuclear weapons program if Iran becomes our ally.
The Chairman. Yeah. And----
General Odom. I'd pay that price, I would buy that deal,
it's so important.
The Chairman. So that--so, let me ask some specific
questions that we get asked a lot--I get asked a lot.
General Keane, I've read what you've written--in the past,
as well. This is not--I'm not going to be Tim Russert and flip
up the chart and say, ``This is what you said last time.'' But
the essence of what you said here today, if I read your
testimony correctly, is that you do think that pacification of
the population, which has not been a mission--by the way, I
agreed. The irony is, 2 years ago in this committee, and 2
years ago on the ground with General Chiarelli and General
Casey and General Abizaid--and, before that, with their
predecessors, and O'Donovan, a marine--my argument was: Why
aren't we protecting the populations? Because I'd get in a
Humvee, and we'd fly through a neighborhood at 35 miles an
hour, and the Iraqis looked at us as a distraction or as a
problem, not as if anyone who's flying through the neighborhood
is going to have a cop on the corner to protect them. It wasn't
going to enable their kid to go, as I used to say, from their
home to the equivalent of the corner store to bring back the
milk. But General, I think that we have passed that point.
And so, my question for you, General Keane, is that we're
told, surging 21,000 troops, 17,000 of which would go into
Baghdad into those 23 neighborhoods--although they're saying
they're limited to the 23 neighborhoods; I know politically,
they're saying that--and they're saying that it'll be Iraqi-
led. The Secretary of State was very precise about, ``There's
not going to be any American knocking on the door; it's going
to be an Iraqi, and we're going to be in a background
situation. And this is a short duration.''
Can a surge plan work with those parameters--Iraqis in the
lead--if that's true--Iraqis in the lead, a short duration? As
one of you said, 5 months to ramp it up to that peak of an
additional 17,000, and then start to draw it down in November.
Is that workable, or should we tell the American people that,
from your perspective, the only way it can work is if we make a
significant commitment here for a significant amount of time,
meaning at least the next year or so?
General Keane. No. No; that's not workable. The--when you
analyze this, it--it'll take you 3 to 4 months to clear the
neighborhoods, to get them--to bring the level of violence
down. And then you bring in a protect force that will stay in
those neighborhoods, both Iraqi and United States. And then,
that'll take months, as well, to be able to change the attitude
of those people in there to--where their quality-of-life
experience starts to change rather dramatically and they're
getting back to some sense of normalcy. So, you're--now you're
into the fall and winter of the year, in Baghdad alone----
The Chairman. Yeah.
General Keane [continuing]. To be able to do this. Now,
will there be some progress where people will see it, and--some
near-term progress? I would think yes.
The Chairman. But that only----
General Keane. But----
The Chairman [continuing]. Works if----
General Keane. But----
The Chairman [continuing]. If they stay, if you all stay.
General Keane. Only if you stay. And then----
The Chairman. You've got to stay around.
General Keane [continuing]. The economic packages have to
come in. And Baghdad is a beginning, not an end.
The Chairman. Yeah. Well----
General Keane. So, you have to go to Al Anbar and secure
that population. And I think you're doing that in 2008.
The Chairman. Yeah. Well, I think my colleagues are tired
of hearing me say this, but no foreign policy can be sustained
without the informed consent of the American people. You just
can't sustain it. And so, if we're going to do this thing, this
surge, we should just tell the American people what is the only
possibility of it working. In my humble opinion, in listening
to you and some of your colleagues in and out of uniform,
you've got to do more of it if you're going to do it. If it has
any shot, you've got do more of it, and you've got to do it for
a longer period of time. You've got to sustain it, and you've
got to expand it beyond Baghdad. I----
General Odom. I don't agree.
The Chairman [continuing]. Happen to be in your----
General Odom. I don't----
The Chairman [continuing]. Camp, General Odom. I think the
only way you get any movement is, you've got to be moving the
other direction to change the dynamic here. But----
General Odom. Well, I'm a dissenter on increasing anything
now.
The Chairman. No, no; I understand that. All I'm----
General Odom. OK. I just----
The Chairman. No, no; what I'm----
General Odom [continuing]. You said I had agreed to that.
The Chairman. I understand that----
General Odom. All right.
The Chairman. Those whom I've spoken to who say increase,
say: If you're going to increase, you better have a plan to
increase that has multiple pieces to it. One, that it is
sustainable for an extended period of time, because you've got
to go, clear, hold, maintain, build up, and so on, and that
takes time. And two, you're then going to have to move from
those 23 neighborhoods to Anbar province, and God only knows
what we may or may not have to do relative to Sadr City,
depending on how they accept or don't accept this as
confirmation that we're good guys, and we're not going to hurt
them, and we're helping their cause.
The other side of the equation is whether or not you
drawdown. And the perils of drawing down create this
catastrophe where we have a regional war that spreads across
the borders as a consequence.
General McCaffrey, why do you think that--well, let me just
say it, and then I'll ask you to respond. In my trips to Iraq--
I haven't been there since the Fourth of July--speaking off the
record, because a lot of you guys in uniform at the time are in
a difficult spot with a guy like me and others coming over
there. You have a mission stated by the Pentagon. You may or
may not agree with it, so you're in a tough spot. When I ask,
General, several folks with more than one star on their
shoulder, why we weren't equipping the Iraqis more, they gave
me the answer that we may just be equipping death squads and
equipping competing factions of the civil war, and we may come
to regret it. Do you think that's the reason we haven't
equipped? Or do think there's another reason, or other reasons?
General McCaffrey. Well, I think, first of all, it's a
silly response, because it implies, ``I believe we're going to
lose, and, therefore, I won't start a program that's a
prerequisite to success, because I don't think it's going to
work,'' which, again, would argue for beginning withdrawal and,
``Let's give up on this thing.''
I'm not sure that equipping the Iraqi Army is going to
work, providing 3,000 to 5,000 light-armored vehicles and 150
U.S. helicopters and decent small arms, but I do know that
we're not going to pull the 1st Cavalry Division out of Baghdad
until there's an Iraqi Army that can go--they took 12,000
killed last year, for God's sakes. We're asking them to take on
a mission for which they are inadequately resourced.
I think the--you know, the second argument that you've--
that I've heard is, ``Come on, these are simple people, they
don't understand how to do U.S. small arms,'' which is
ridiculous. These people had the fourth largest air force on
the face of the Earth. They're flying MIG-29 fighter aircraft.
They're pretty clever people. Of course they can operate this
equipment.
I think there was another argument that said, ``You'd be--
you don't understand the nature of the struggle. It's really--
they're not here to threaten the Syrians and the Iranians,
they're here to conduct counterinsurgency.'' But, again, you
know, the tools that we're using--we're pretty good at this,
actually. You know, counterinsurgency operations in urban areas
up in Tal Afar, where the--this very bright colonel, we did a
classic job, but we did it trying to minimize U.S. casualties.
And then, the final argument, that I actually think is the
major argument--and I don't pretend to be an economist, but if
we've got giant United States internal domestic budget problems
with decreasing taxes and increasing expenses, and you're
shooting up $8 billion a month in Iraq and a billion or more in
Afghanistan, when I--the first time I came back, 3 years ago,
and argued for equipping the Iraqis, a Wall Street Journal
reporter--in fact, I came down to see you, sir, if you----
The Chairman. Yes.
General McCaffrey [continuing]. Remember.
The Chairman. Oh, I remember.
General McCaffrey. He added up all the numbers----
The Chairman. Got me in trouble. I argued for equipping
them, too.
General McCaffrey. Well, they added up all----
The Chairman. I happen to think we should.
General McCaffrey [continuing]. The numbers, and they said,
``That's silly. It's something like $5 billion to do what he's
suggesting.'' But the illogic of shooting $8 billion a month at
them and not being capable of equipping people so you could get
out just escapes me.
So, I think the generals who are over there are in a box,
and if you ask them the question, ``Have you got enough
equipment?'' they'll say yes. The real question is, to the
distinguished OMB Director Rob Portman, ``Why haven't we paid
for this program, and why hasn't the Congress authorized it?''
The Chairman. Well, my time is up. Matter of fact, it's the
first time I've gone over here. I apologize. I agree with you
about Petraeus and Crocker. I spent 5 days with Crocker in
that--I think 3 or 5 days after which he opened up the
Afghanistan Embassy that had been closed in Kabul. He is really
a serious, serious guy, and I don't know anybody better than
Petraeus. That's the only thing that gives me pause about this,
that he supports it. But I still don't get it.
I yield to Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
As I've listened to you, I'm not certain that any of the
four of you--and you can correct me if I'm wrong--believes that
the so-called ``benchmarks'' that are being suggested by our
new policy can be met; certainly not within a period of a year,
or maybe 2 years. By the ``benchmarks,'' I mean coming to
resolution on the oil law, including revenue distribution and
the manner in which new fields will be developed; the autonomy
and federalism issues--that is, which provinces are going to
join together to form regional governments, and, therefore,
what will the role of the central government be, vis-a-vis
these autonomous regions. And perhaps a third point, and that
is, can there be recognition, of the roles and responsibilities
of national army, that would be maintained by the central
governmenttoward these autonomous regions? And, of course the
others: De-Baathification and amnesty agreements,
constitutional amending process and a subsequent referendum,
the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces, and what have
you.
Now, as we have heard rhetoric with regard to our plan, the
thought is that Maliki and/or the government that he heads,
must meet certain benchmarks, and it must do so fairly
promptly, the implication being that, if the benchmarks are not
met, that we will withdraw.
Now, maybe so, maybe not. The question, really, I have of
you is: Politically, is it conceivable that President Maliki
and his government could meet any of these benchmarks within a
year or two? And, second, is it conceivable, picking up General
Keane's point, that there is a citizenry that, in the event
that we get rid of the malefactors for a period of time, and
hold the territory, that citizens will, in fact, discourage the
insurgents, discourage people from arming themselves? From what
I'm listening to from the others, I would gather that you feel
there are inclined to be many people who are going to continue
to arm themselves, because they see this as a terminal problem,
that either somebody prevails or does not, and that there is
not a good government ethic, for the moment, in trying to pull
together, to somehow back a central government or Maliki or
somebody else. If that is the case, then, perpetually people
will be arming themselves and will be shooting at each other.
Now, in--whether it's Baghdad or wherever else they try to
resolve their situations.
The third question I want to ask, and then I'll retire for
your responses, is: In the event that we get into a withdrawal
strategy, should the withdrawal be complete or should we, in
fact, retain some forces in Iraq, as opposed to the general
region, on the basis that we would still like to try to help
the training or equipping of an Iraqi Army and some forces for
the future, and/or that we offer a sense of stability to the
surrounding countries that they would not need to intervene
immediately, whoever they may be and for whatever purposes,
because we are still there? Furthermore, our presence, even
diminished in terms of numbers, allows an opportunity, if not
to engage the neighborhood in diplomacy, at least to have a
better basis on which to conduct diplomacy, vis-a-vis Iraq or
the Middle East. Or should the withdrawal be complete--staged,
orderly, but out of there altogether? In essence, troops and/or
ships of the fleet or air units or what have you in the region,
but not in Iraq?
Do any of you want to try on any of those for size? Yes,
General McCaffrey.
General McCaffrey. Senator Lugar, the last point,
withdrawal, was one of the things that really got me energized
out of that Baker-Hamilton report. It scared me half to death.
The notion that--we've got a domestic political problem. It's
hard to--going to be difficult to ask either political party to
explain, in 2008, what they did about this mess. So, we will
pull out our combat forces, except for some unspecified over-
the-horizon, modest, rescue cavalry presence, we'll put 30,000,
40,000, 50,000 Americans scattered about Iraq, we'll embed them
in squad-sized units at Iraqi company level, not speaking
Arabic, not having a support structure, and, therefore, our
casualties, our political vulnerability will disappear, and
we'll be out of there. That, it seems to me, is a recipe for
disaster on the order of what happened in Mogadishu, except,
instead of 150 casualties, it'll be 5,000 to 15,000. So, I have
urged the President, personally, and others, that, as you
drawdown--I arbitrarily picked a floor--you've got 15 brigades
there now, you think you're going up to 20--that our lowest
floor should be 7 brigades in Iraq--a couple of Army divisions
and a Marine regiment. If you decide to go below that level--
you can pull them out of the urban areas and get them in
concentrations--get out of Iraq--I think it will--we are
inviting a major disaster, you know, and I feel very strongly
about it.
So, again, the withdrawal, in the short run, I think,
precipitous withdrawal, would probably be a terrible blow to
our interests in the region.
Senator Lugar. Well, just following up that, if the
benchmarks are not met--if you can't meet these markers, then,
is the President's logic that we withdraw, as you understand
his plan?
General McCaffrey. I don't think there's--we have--the
current administration, I don't think, has any intention of
withdrawing from Iraq. They're going to----
Senator Lugar. Benchmarks or not.
General McCaffrey. They're going to try and muscle this
thing out in the next 24 months with an urban counterinsurgency
plan that I personally believe, with all due respect, is a
fool's errand. So, I'm looking for the economic component, the
peace negotiation component, and the army--the Iraqi,
component, as a way to cover our withdrawal from Iraq.
Senator Hagel. Senator Lugar, may I intervene to ask you a
question, and our panel? Because I don't think you answered the
question, General. We're threatening consequences? What are the
consequences?
General McCaffrey. There are none.
Senator Hagel. No, what----
General McCaffrey. Nor are there any----
Senator Hagel [continuing]. What are the consequences, in
your opinion? I know he has not, I suspect, asked you that, but
what Senator Lugar's asking, then, he's--this rhetoric, ``You
either do this, or else.'' We heard Secretary Rice say this.
So, in your opinion, what are those consequences? Do we pull
out?
General McCaffrey. Well, if you don't have an economic
incentive, you can't withdraw it. If you're not equipping their
military forces, you can't stop equipping them. If there's no
peace dialog to be enforced or encouraged with our good
offices, you're left with 15 Army and Marine combat teams
fighting among 27 million angry Arabs. So, I personally think,
in the short run, the current strategy is nonsensical.
Senator Lugar. General Hoar.
General Hoar. Yes, sir. I'd like to, first of all, say that
I agree with General McCaffrey. But there is a larger issue,
and that's the regional issue. The countries in that region
that have supported us are scared to death of the possibility
of a failed state that is aligned politically with Iran. And
while Bill Odom, I think, makes some very good points, there
may be an interim step in there, where you have an Iraqi
Government that is responsive to the Iranian Government. And
so, we must stay in the region. The possibilities of
destabilizing Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, are quite large--
--
Senator Lugar. By ``region,'' you don't necessarily mean
Iraq, right?
General Hoar. That's right. This is quite different from
Iraq.
Senator Lugar. We might still get out of Iraq, but stay in
the region.
General Hoar. My crystal ball would say that in 2008, the
Presidential candidates are all going to favor getting out.
Senator Lugar. General Odom.
General Odom. Yeah. The benchmark business, I think, you've
pretty well unraveled. It's a charge or a demand that you can't
implement. And it reminds me of Vietnam. When you start these
metrics, what it tells you is, you don't have the indigenous
political apparatus to run the country, and you're trying to
run it by ventriloquy. And I----
[Laughter.]
General Odom [continuing]. In a book I wrote, ``On Internal
Wars,'' that was what I called most U.S. cases of supporting
client states against insurgencies. You know, we can't own them
like the British owned Malaysia, because we don't have
colonies, so we pay them to say and do what we think that they
should do. And, of course, we eventually lose, or we've pasted
over, in some way, so that it looks like a success. I've heard
some people say that El Salvador is an example of a success.
I've looked around for a case that you could say is a precedent
for having any optimism about Iraq. Well, if you look more
closely at El Salvador, you discover that the real reason the
insurgency dried up there was that President Bush, the first
Bush, got a deal with Gorbachev to cut off the outside support.
And we allowed was elections in which the old death-squad
parties changed their label and won the elections; the
insurgents weren't running their own tax structure as the
Vietcong did in Vietnam, so they dried up, and the death-squad
people are back in power today.
No; you know, if you want to side with the Sunnis and their
organizational capability and--in this war--you might have some
success in Iraq. But that makes you say, ``Well, where's Saddam
when we need him?'' Saddam was stabilizing. You know, getting
rid of Saddam ensured that domestic order would come unglued.
Now, will the population stop fighting if we give them
security? And if we give them an economic package? Look,
politics is about who gets what, when, and how. Military
action, or war is merely the most extreme form of politics,
when the military will determine who gets what, when, how in
Iraq. And what is there to be got? Huge oil revenues. And we
can't offer an economic package that's going to match that. So,
the idea that we're going to have some economic package that's
going to get us out of this strikes me as just not looking at
what's at stake. The order of battle is just not properly
developed here, what you're against. And the leaders who get
the oil will have to run the country with an iron-hand regime.
They can't have a democracy or a pro-U.S. Government. That's
another thing we ought to understand now. Nobody can rule Iraq,
and keep it from fragmenting, who's pro-American. So, you know
that a priori. It's like as if we were in the middle of our
civil war and somebody parachuted in from Britain and said,
``Well, we're going to resolve this. You people must
negotiate,'' et cetera. We would think they were crazy.
And, finally--I want to make this point on withdrawal,
complete or partial withdrawal. I agree with General McCaffrey:
If you start getting out, then get out all the way. You can
stay in the region. You can stay in Kuwait. We can stay on
carriers or--we can keep a force that can be airlifted in.
Force projection back into the region was a central element of
the CENTCOM from its very beginning, and has been, on up until
today. So, the notion that you'll get out of Iraq does not mean
you're leaving the region. We should never leave any mistake
about that.
Senator Lugar. General Keane.
General Keane. Yes. In reference to the benchmarks, I think
it's within Maliki's capability to certainly offer
reconciliation and amnesty to adjust the de-Baathification
program, to some of the mistakes that have been made with it,
and certainly to do something about the oil law. The problem
with all of that is, is that the Sunnis aren't coming to that
table. That's the reality of it, and we have to face that
reality. The Sunnis absolutely believe that they are winning.
And these measures, though prudent from our perspective, are
not going to be persuasive to them, when they believe that they
can fracture this government and they can begin to have their
way. It's unclear, you know, how you go from fractured
government to civil war to failed state and return to Sunni
power. I mean, they don't describe that. But, clearly, they
want to leverage that. So, I don't think that benchmarks are
going to have any impact on the Sunnis, is my point.
Security on the streets. Establishing security on the
street is an achievable issue. I mean, the fact that we just
throw up our hands and say, ``People are always going to kill
each other, and a population in a given city, in that place, in
that world will always be at risk.'' I don't accept that. We
can provide security. We provide it for our own people. We can
provide security in Baghdad, despite some of the horrors of the
conflicts that are taken. It is a definable problem that can be
achieved. It has to do with resources, obviously, to be able to
do it.
The withdrawal strategy, certainly the--what would happen
to us during a withdrawal is--one is, we're going to be--we
will be shot at going out as that country begins to fracture
around us. That--that's the issue. And Brookings has done a
thoughtful analysis, and it may be someone you should consider
bringing over here, if you haven't done it already--Ken Pollack
did an historical analysis of, When you do have a civil war,
what is the spillover effect, and what are some of the
conditions that drive a spillover effect that lead to a
regional war? And is Iraq one of those that could lead to a
regional war? He admits, when they started this process, they
thought maybe not, but, when they finished the historical
analysis, he and his colleagues agreed that Iraq, in all
likelihood, would spill over into a regional civil war because
of the conditions in the countries around them and their
interests in--and the stakes that are there.
And then we have a much larger problem. And this is where I
part company with General Odom. If we have a regional civil war
raging there, we brought that on by our precipitous withdrawal,
and what are our challenges then, and what are our options, in
terms of dealing with that? Do we have a stake and an interest
in it? We are sitting on top of the second largest oil reserve
in the region, and it puts the other oil reserves in the region
also at risk. These are realities that we have to deal with, in
terms of our own economic interest.
So, those are huge problems, I think. Again, the
benchmarks--in the end, it's not going to work. Strategy is
achievable on the streets. And withdrawal, in my mind, does
lead to a fractured state, civil war, with the likelihood that
we will have a regional conflict then.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
General Odom. May I make a brief comment? We already have a
regional civil war. We've got one right now.
The Chairman. As I understand your position, General,
you're saying that if, in fact, we start to withdraw, that will
wake up the surrounding nations to their interest and avoid
that war.
General Odom. Yes. I said, we don't have enough military
power in the region to prevent the war, and, to get enough
power, we have to start getting out in order to gain allies.
The Chairman. I realize we've done it a little bit
differently here, folks. I've let people go over, and even the
questions of mine. I will do that for each of you, as well. I
mean, we try to end your questions by 8 minutes, but I find
this, and I hope you all find it equally as enlightening,
hearing them disagree.
General Keane, there's a famous expression attributed to
G.K. Chesterton. He said, ``It's not that Christianity has been
tried and found wanting. It's been found difficult and left
untried.'' That, to me, is the dilemma I have about Iraq,
whether we've actually tried.
But, Senator Boxer--Chairman Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for what
you're doing--and Senator Lugar--in allowing us to take our
time and listen to these wise people.
Each of us may have different opinions as to who is
responsible for this horrific situation in Iraq, but I know all
of us agree that our military troops have done every single
thing they've been asked to do. Their work made three elections
possible--actually, two elections and one referendum possible--
in an amazing show of strength, I think. And now, there's an
Iraqi Government that's been freely elected. And so, the
question before us today is how much more our brave men and
women in uniform should be asked to sacrifice in order to
support the Iraqi Government, when 70 percent of the Iraqi
people want us to leave within a year and 60 percent--61
percent of the Iraqis say it's OK to shoot an American soldier.
And, General Odom, I really thank you for mentioning that
statistic, because it amazes me how many people just ignore it.
They say, ``Oh, the Iraqi Government wants us here and there.''
What about the Iraqi people? Over 60 percent of them say it's
OK to shoot an American soldier. And now, our President wants
to send more of our own into that circumstance. I believe,
personally, our military personnel have sacrificed enough. I'm
staunchly opposed to the President's plan for the surge,
because, to me, it's time, as the Iraqi Study Group said, for a
major conference--and this is also something my chairman has
called for, for a very long time--to find a political solution
to a civil war.
Now, instead, this new policy that we thought was coming
turns out to be, really, a military surge. That does not a new
policy make. So, it seems to me we're asking our troops--or the
President is, and I'm hoping that a majority of Senators will
not agree with it--the President is asking them to do the
impossible, to rectify the gross failures of political leaders,
in both the United States and in Iraq, and to turn Iraq around
using military means, when almost everyone I know agrees we
need a political solution. This is far more than unfair, it's
an enormous risk.
And we should listen to General Schoomaker, the Army's
Chief of Staff, who recently told Congress that the burden on
the Army is simply too great, and that, at the current pace of
deployments, ``We will break the active component.'' I mean,
that's stunning. And the strain on our servicemembers is
intensifying.
During a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing with
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, I asked a pretty simple
question, that got a lot of notoriety, which is, ``Who pays the
price?'' And so, I'm going to continue asking that at today's
hearing, and offer up some facts.
Clearly, servicemembers suffer horrific injuries, lose
their buddies in combat. It's the military families who have to
learn to adapt to a severely wounded servicemember or the fact
that their loved one is never coming home. It's the soldiers
who are being sent on multiple tours--two, three, four--and are
spending years away from their families. Marines are making
similar sacrifices. And it's the servicemembers who are facing
problems as a result of their experiences, their combat
experiences.
One area I've been focusing on, Mr. Chairman, has been
mental illness, including post-traumatic stress. Both are
skyrocketing. And I won't go into all the stats, except to say
the rate of suicide for the Army nearly doubled between 2004
and 2005. I became so concerned about mental health problems
among our men and women in uniform, that, with the support of
Senators Warner and Levin, I was able to establish the Defense
Task Force on Mental Health. The task force, which is headed by
Army Surgeon General Kevin Kiley--if you don't know him--he is
quite a wonderful man--is currently in the process of
conducting hearings around the Nation.
I mention the task force because I want to briefly tell you
about one mother, who testified before the task force, whose
son committed suicide after returning from his second tour in
Iraq. His mother spoke of conversations she had with her son.
And I'm not going to go into the details of this, it's too
graphic, but suffice it to say his reaction to seeing dead and
blackened bodies in Iraq, and seeing his own commander killed
in front of him--I understand that these are the horrors of
war. I am not naive about that. Indeed, I know these are the
certainties of war. And that is why making mistakes in a war
have an immeasurable cost. You cannot put a number to it. It is
not like making a mistake in politics, it is not like making a
mistake in business, it not like making a mistake on the
football field.
And so, this brings me to my first question, and I'd like
to ask it to General Odom. I am concerned about the will of
many individuals in the current Iraqi Government to truly
pursue a policy of national reconciliation. And in this month's
Atlantic Monthly, in an article called ``Streetwise,'' the
author, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense, details the
pervasive security problems that are destroying Iraq and the
failures of the Iraqi Government to effectively confront them.
In particular, the author details the refusal of Prime Minister
al-Maliki to take on the Shiite militias who, we know, are
orchestrating horrific sectarian violence against the Sunni
population. One lieutenant colonel is even quoted as saying he
knows of, ``police chiefs who have been relieved of duty by the
Maliki government for cracking down on militia members.'' How
confident are you, General, that Nouri al-Maliki and other
Shiites, particularly the hard-liners in the Iraqi Government,
are truly committed to national reconciliation with their
counterparts?
General Odom. I don't think they're committed to it at all.
And I think, as General Keane said here, the Sunnis certainly
are not committed to it. And I don't think the Shiites have
ever been committed to it. I was very impressed with Ahmad
Hashim's book on the insurgency--counterinsurgency in Iraq, a
man who's spent quite a bit of time there and is a Reserve Army
colonel, who said that his many discussions throughout Iraq was
that the Shiites revealed that they feel it's their turn to own
the country and to own the oil. They're not about to give that
up.
Senator Boxer. Well, this is very----
General Odom. I think, also--I'd make one other point
about----
Senator Boxer. Please.
General Odom [continuing]. Mr. Maliki and the government.
They live in the Green Zone. If you want to see who owns and
runs Iraq, look at the people who do not look to the United
States for security and live outside the Green Zone. Otherwise,
you don't have any troops, you have a government that has no
administrative capacity to implement. So, if you tell them to
implement these things, you're asking them to do the
impossible. That's why most all of these economic and other
programs that we propose have not the least prospect of
success.
Senator Boxer. Well, thank you, sir. I have just a little
bit of time left, so I will ask one more question, but I wanted
to say, this is the point that my chairman has been making over
and over and over again. He has said--asked very specifically:
Can you ever imagine a situation where a police force that's
dominated by the Shia are going to go into a Sunni neighborhood
and actually be able to patrol? And not one person, no matter
what their views on this, has ever said, ``I can imagine it.''
So, I worry--I fear--we know these things. This is--these are
things we know. And yet, we're going to take our young people,
already stressed to the point--to a terrible point--and put
them in such a circumstance, where they're partnering with a
partner who we're really very nervous about.
So, my last question, because of time, I want to ask
General Hoar this question. What does it mean when only 35
percent of servicemembers approve of the way that the President
is handling the Iraq war?
General Hoar. I've noticed, here in Washington, a change,
Senator, among senior military people. I think there is a
growing disillusionment among the senior people. I attribute it
to the mismanagement of this war, and, more specifically, to
the fact that the civilian leadership is tone deaf. The
execution of Saddam Hussein on this--the first day of the Sunni
feast day, of Eid--these kinds of things should never happen;
and yet, you can't expect us to be successful unless we have an
understanding of the culture. And I think that our colleagues
on active duty have come to the conclusion that we're not up to
the task.
There was an editorial last week in the--one of the
English-language Egyptian newspapers, that blamed the United
States for the execution of Saddam Hussein. And among the Shia
population throughout the Middle East, he has become a hero and
a martyr. And that's because, again, of our inability to see
the consequences of particular actions in the region.
Senator Boxer. Did you mean among the Sunni?
General Hoar. Yeah.
Senator Boxer. Because you said ``Shia.''
General Hoar. I'm sorry, I----
Senator Boxer. Among the Sunni, he's become----
General Hoar [continuing]. I mean the Sunni.
Senator Boxer. Well, I just want to thank you for very
much. I--after listening to this, I'm just--I'm hopeful that,
with a bipartisan surge here in the Senate, maybe we can turn
this around.
The Chairman. Senator, thank you very much.
I want the witnesses to know--and I don't know how much
time they have, but--the freshman members--we have a remarkable
group of new people on this committee--are required to attend
an 11:30 meeting, at least on the Democratic side. They ought
to be able to be back within, I'm told, 20 minutes to half an
hour. And I think it'll take that much time anyway before we
get there, but if you're able to stay til they get back, which
will be around 11 o'clock--excuse me, around 12, they have some
very good questions. If you're able to do that, I'd appreciate
it.
And I just want to explain, as they get up, it's not lack
of interest. It's another obligation. Is that correct, General?
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Yeah.
So, Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Gentlemen, as I was sitting listening attentively to each
of you--being an old Army sergeant, I always listen attentively
to generals and respect generals--I was thinking, Mr. Chairman,
this panel before us represents, I suspect, around 150 years of
distinguished service to this country. That's pretty
remarkable. And you all deserve, certainly, our thanks, but
also remarkable is the fact that you are each still engaged on
behalf of this country and are willing to come before the
people of our Nation, through the appropriate congressional
committees, and state your concerns, your thoughts, your
solutions. And for that, this country owes you a great deal.
So, thank you.
Mr. Chairman, as we all know on this panel, these are not
only military leaders, these are some of the best geopolitical
thinkers in our country. They have had to be not only very
acute geopolitical thinkers, but practitioners of all of these
dynamics in the commands that they have held and the successful
careers that they have accomplished.
We could spend hours--and I suspect, if that it was up to
the chairman, he would--keeping you all here; but we don't have
hours, and I have a limited amount of time, and I do have a
couple of questions. But I want to go to a point that General
McCaffrey made, and I think all three would agree. I believe
you said, General, you are concerned that we are putting our
generals in a box, in Iraq. I, too, am concerned about that.
And, as we sit here and lavish great deserved praise on Crocker
and Petraeus and Fallon and others who will be the new team for
us, we are putting them in a box, because if the policy is
flawed, it won't make any difference how brilliant and
wonderful and dedicated and smart they are. They are doomed for
failure if the policy is flawed. I think our policy is flawed.
I appreciate the four of you articulating some very
specific areas where that flaw exists. And I wish our country
could hear this, because this is not about politics, this is
not about theory, this is not about bean-counting, this is
about something very real for our short-term and long-term
interests in the country. And I--and, to that point, here's a
question for each of you.
You noted, I suspect, this morning, in the front page of
all the papers, that, in an interview yesterday, the Prime
Minister of Iraq was quite critical of the President of the
United States, was quite critical of the Secretary of State of
the United States. One specific thing he mentioned about
Secretary Rice--I believe she made that comment before this
committee last week--that the Maliki government was living on
borrowed time. Well, if I was the Prime Minister of Iraq--
specifically, Prime Minister Maliki--I might have some issue
with that, as well. I'm not certain that was a particularly
astute thing to say, but Secretary Rice can answer for herself.
Surprisingly enough, we say a sovereign government,
sovereign country, so the Prime Minister of this sovereign
country, a sovereign Prime Minister, takes some issue with its
strongest ally, Secretary of State, saying, ``This guy's living
on borrowed time.''
President Talibani said, a couple of weeks ago--and this
goes right back to the number of points that you each have
made--in particular, you, General McCaffrey, being quite
critical of this administration--in training Iraqi troops, not
providing Iraqi troops with equipment, not doing the things
that President Talibani believes, at least--and I suspect he
speaks for a number of Iraqis--that we should have been doing.
Well, does that not present to all of us some sense of
disconnect or contradiction or some dynamic here in--on one
hand, we are about to make a commitment of at least 22,000 more
troops in the most dangerous parts of Baghdad, where there will
be more casualties, and billions of dollars of more money going
in, but yet, we have a government that is sovereign saying
these things about our leaders. Now, that may not strike you as
strange. It strikes me as strange.
So, how can, then, you put these great people that we are
putting over there, all our military, asking them to do the
things that they are doing, and have done brilliantly, as has
been noted here today, with that kind of disconnect with the
two governments? How does that possibly work? How can that
work? We talk about--poll numbers and confidence of the
American people and the Iraqi people has been also noted here
this morning. Well, no wonder. Does that not confuse both
publics? Does that not confuse the people of the Middle East,
when we have these major criticisms of each other publicly? You
all have noted, in some detail, some of the other specifics.
So, I would like each of you, in the time I have, to
reflect on that. I do not know how this country can execute any
kind of a policy when you have two different governments,
supposedly sovereign--we say they're a sovereign government,
but we're in the shadows over here, threatening them; we're in
the shadows over here, saying, ``Well, we will pull out
security''--question that Senator Lugar asked, which was a very
important question, What are the consequences? Words have
consequences. Words have meanings. We should have figured that
out 4 years ago, before we got ourselves in the hole, as you
all have suggested. We should have thought about that. We did,
on this committee. A lot of us asked tough questions, and many
of you came before this committee and gave us some pretty good
answers. We didn't listen. We are where we are. We're not going
to go back and unwind the bad decisions.
We can't, obviously, leave the Middle East, just as all of
you say. That's a false choice. That makes no sense, and that's
silly, and those who try to make a political dynamic out of
this do a great disservice to this country, in both political
parties. This isn't a political issue, this is a--the most
significant, divisive issue facing this country since Vietnam.
Since Vietnam. And we are in a box, just as General McCaffrey
said. And we are putting our soldiers and our Marines in even
more of a box and asking them to do things that they can't
possibly do.
Now, if you would each respond to that observation about
the two governments being in conflict and thinking that somehow
we're going to be able to move forward and hold hands with the
constant bludgeoning and public humiliation of our so-called
sovereign allies--how that--will that play out, then, with the
new policy that the President announced on Wednesday? Can it
work with that kind of a relationship?
I'll just start right at the front end and--General
McCaffrey--and go down the line. Thank you.
And thank you, again, each of you, for your service and
coming before us today.
General McCaffrey. I've listened, Senator Hagel, very
closely to General John Abizaid throughout this war. I've
admired him for 30 years. You know, I love to introduce the
guy. He's bilingual in Arabic, and, you know, a Stanford fellow
and an Olmsted Scholar, and on and on. He--plus, you've got
the--he's a real fighter, Ranger company commander, airborne
battalion commander, in combat. And for--you know, from the
start, I think he understood this conflict, tried to be candid
in his dealings with the civilian leadership, and then loyally
followed his instructions.
Where we are now, looking at a snapshot of the notion of
largely withdrawing our combat forces and embedding trainers,
minus the equipment, minus the economic piece, minus the peace
negotiations, it's almost an out-of-body experience to me to
listen to that argument as to why it would work, why you would
be putting 10 U.S. Army soldiers, at company level, 40-50 in a
battalion, they don't speak Arabic, there's dual chains of
command--what--why would you think that's going to work? Why
would they operate as police storefront stations in the nine
districts of Baghdad? Where is their support base? And, you
know, I've listened--out-of-body experience--getting denounced
by former Attorney General Meese and Vernon Jordan on CNN, that
I obviously didn't understand the nature of combat advisors and
why this really was----
The Chairman. Well, that's obviously clear.
General McCaffrey [continuing]. Going to work.
The Chairman. That's clear. You haven't had much
experience.
General McCaffrey. Well, you know, I--it struck me----
The Chairman. By the way, for the record----
General McCaffrey [continuing]. As novel----
The Chairman [continuing]. That is an attempt at--a very
poor attempt at humor. [Laughter.]
General McCaffrey. But it struck me as novel that, you
know, I--one of my earlier combat tours, a 1st--2d Vietnamese
airborne battalion, they spent 10 months getting us ready to
go, to include language training. We clearly weren't there to
inspire and take command of those battalions, we were a liaison
element to U.S. logistics, intelligence, combat power, et
cetera. I think that's the only useful role we will play with
well-equipped and reliable Iraqi Army forces. So, the notion
that we will take a--it'll be like the Sepoy rebellion of
India, we're down there with our guys, sort of, subverting
their own chain of command, and they're going to do the right
thing. It strikes me as laughable that we would think that
would work.
What I think might work--and, again, like you, I'm
searching for--given where we are, what's the best outcome? Get
them more--more legs to this stool--economic and political and
equipment--and start getting out at some measured pace, which,
hopefully, we would communicate to the Iraqis and not to our
enemies. I don't--since we can't keep a secret, I--I don't see
how that would work, but I do think we're coming out.
General Hoar said, next President's pulling the plug on
this operation. I don't think there's much doubt about that.
So, how can we get it where it looks like it's sort of working
in 24 months? And that's Petraeus's challenge.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
General Hoar.
General Hoar. Sir, I've had some experience with advising,
as well, in Vietnam, and I agree with Barry's assessment. But,
to the specific question that you raised, I think there's two
elements of this. One is that Maliki is, in fact, the Prime
Minister, and he is feeling his own position as being the
senior political person in the country, and certainly would
take umbrage when he is criticized by the President and the
Secretary of State, which, in my judgment, is unfortunate.
I think the next issue down, though, is to watch Maliki and
see what he has to say about what we've asked him to do. I
think the first indicator is, he's apparently appointed a
lieutenant general from the south, a Shia, a guy that has not
got a good reputation with working with U.S. military. I think
that's an indication of where this thing is going. And I think
day by day we will see the decisions that he makes in order to
meet the requirements the President of the United States has
put on him. And I don't think we're off to a good start.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
General Odom.
General Odom. Well, I think you've framed the issue very
clearly. And the only thing I could add was, this was eminently
foreseeable. Once you crossed the border to invade this
country, this kind of outcome was inexorably going to be the
case. And we're just now getting around to it. The issue is not
whether that's the case, the issue is whether you're going to
face up to it or continue to buy a stock that is falling. I
think this is a sunk-cost proposition, to put it in economic
terms. If you want to lose more money, keep buying the stock.
This place is headed to bankruptcy.
Senator Hagel. General Keane.
General Keane. Thank you.
Well, I think that's a great question. And it really is,
you know, Who is Maliki and who is the Maliki government? And I
don't believe our Government--I don't pretend to speak for
them, but I--I don't believe our Government truly knows that
answer. I mean, is Maliki genuinely interested in a unified
government with the Sunnis participating in it, at some level
of consequence for the Sunnis, or is he truly interested in a
Shia-dominated government and living on the emotion and
psychological energy from 35 years of repression, and appealing
to that power base? I don't think we really know that answer,
to be honest.
This government's been in power less than a year. His
criticism, I think, is flapping his wings. He's got a--
probably, a right to make criticism like that. I'm more
interested in what he does, what are going to be his political
steps here forward. We have an opportunity to strengthen his
hand here. And remember this military operation; its only
intended purpose is to seek a political solution. That's what
this is all about. So, hopefully this will strengthen his hand
so that he can move in the right direction, but I don't know,
myself, you know, who he really is and what that government
really is.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. May I--I'm sorry. No; go ahead.
Senator Hagel. No; I'm done, thank you.
The Chairman. Would you fellows like a 5-minute break? Why
don't we break for 5 minutes, and you can take a break back
here, if you'd like, and the staff can show you--if you need
the phone or anything else.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. If we could come back to order.
Senator Feingold, please.
Senator Feingold. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, again,
for all of these hearings and for what you're doing here.
And let me thank all of you, Generals, for testifying in
front of the committee today on such an important issue. You
are all outstanding citizens, and I sincerely appreciate the
service you've given to our country.
Before I get to my questions, let me say that I was struck
by your opening statements. While you differ about how we can
best address the profound implications of the conflict in Iraq,
you have all highlighted, directly or indirectly, how damaging
this administration's present course in Iraq is to our national
security. Each of you, directly or indirectly, highlighted how
important it is for our Government to change course in Iraq,
and each of you alluded to the fact that the solutions in Iraq
will not come from military efforts or from maintaining such a
sizable military presence there indefinitely.
I respect, of course, the opinion you've shared with us,
and I'd like to spend a few minutes with you talking about how
we can start preparing, strategically, to redeploy our brave
troops from Iraq. So, what I want to do is, without debating
about when redeployment should occur, I think this is a
valuable forum to share your thoughts, as retired senior
military officers, on how we should plan and execute a
redeployment strategy that will protect the safety of our
troops in Iraq and that will help position our forces and our
Government for success in other efforts--including
counterterrorism efforts--throughout the region and the world.
Again, I'm not interested in debating, today, when or why we
should redeploy. I'm operating under the assumption that we
should at least prepare to do so and that each of you will have
valuable insights as to what we should be thinking about and
how we can best do that, while protecting our troops and
strengthening our national security.
So, let me begin with a general question for all of you.
Putting aside the political debate about whether or not the
United States troops should remain in Iraq, and for how long, I
think we can all assume that the United States will, at some
point, begin a redeployment or a drawdown or a phased
withdrawal from Iraq. Clearly, this is something we need to
plan for. So, I'd like each of you to briefly discuss what you
feel would be the important elements of a redeployment plan on
how we can redeploy U.S. military personnel safely, while
mitigating any negative impact on the Iraqis and our allies in
the region.
General Hoar.
General Hoar. Yes; thank you, Senator.
I think that there are several things. First of all, as a
preface to your point, I think it's essential that we go ahead
and talk to Syria and Iran about the region and what can be
done. I think Syria is the easier of the two. I think, while we
still have a very serious problem with respect to Lebanon, we
have a country that, right after 9/11, when they were helping
us, was willing to open up to the peace process, and we
rebuffed them. I think that we would help solve some other
problems in the Middle East if we could come to some agreement,
as we had, early after 9/11, with Syria.
With respect to Iran, we have allowed the Brits, the
French, and the Germans to work with Iran. We are the only
country that has any traction with respect to--we have their
money, we have them embargoed, we have not given them political
recognition. We have a lot of things that we could offer.
Beyond that, within the region, we already have a sizable
presence in Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE, and Qatar. We need to stay in
the area. We need to keep combat troops in the area. We have
the capacity for over 10,000 troops in Kuwait, and we could
keep them very close to that area if we needed to. But we need
to engage the neighbors, all of them. And, of course, that
includes the GCC plus the two, Egypt and Jordan, but should
also include Turkey, because they have a dog in this fight, as
well.
Senator Feingold. So, the notion I'd take would be to
safely redeploy troops to some of the places you've mentioned.
General Hoar. To stay engaged in the region.
Senator Feingold. OK.
General Hoar. But we need to engage the other countries in
the neighborhood.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
General McCaffrey.
General McCaffrey. Well, Senator, if--one caution. It seems
to me that the idea that--with 150,000 troops in combat in Iraq
who are failing to achieve our political and military purpose--
that we can actually start thinning out and we can perch on
lily pads in the region and maintain influence, I think, is
nonsense. The Kuwaitis, the Persian Gulf coast states, the
Saudis, and others, if they see is in a determined strategic
withdrawal, are not going to be inclined to give us an
alternative. They will now find ways to accommodate Iranian
influences and others. So, I don't believe, and I've heard
people suggest, that--and clearly we ought remain engaged--
10,000 troops, Kuwait, maybe a brigade, a Marine battalion
afloat, that kind of thing, but if we start coming out, our
military power in the region will go down to a percent or so of
what it is today, not that today is necessarily useful.
Second, I think that clearly the only part of the
redeployment that's easy is get out of the Iraqi cities, get
into brigade- and division-protected positions in the south, in
Tallil Air Base and--out at Balad and out in the western
province of Anbar, and protect yourself and be a force in
readiness to protect the Iraqi Government in the event of a
coup, intervene, threaten the Syrians and Iranians by our
presence. So, getting out of the cities, not taking part in
urban warfare, is step one.
And then, finally, I would be--and, again, it's a caution--
I'd be very careful as either a retired military officer or a
Member of Congress, to get involved in the tactics of
disengagement. The political question is the important one for
the Congress to answer.
Senator Feingold. That's fair, General.
General McCaffrey. And it's----
Senator Feingold. Let me just say----
General McCaffrey [continuing]. Not clear to me what that
answer is.
Senator Feingold. If I could respond to that, I think
that's a fair point. In order for someone to responsibly vote
for the policy, we want to know, from people like you, that it
can, in fact, be done. And so, that's the spirit of it, not
being----
General McCaffrey. I think----
Senator Feingold [continuing]. Interested in trying to----
General McCaffrey. I think we could----
Senator Feingold [continuing]. Micromanage it, or me making
a decision.
General McCaffrey. Right.
Senator Feingold. But I want to know, from these hearings--
and I think it's one of the reasons it's so good the chairman
is doing it----
General McCaffrey. I think we could come out----
Senator Feingold [continuing]. That this is something----
General McCaffrey [continuing]. And 6 months----
Senator Feingold [continuing]. That can be done.
General McCaffrey. I wrote a--I left a Washington Post op-
ed I wrote with you, and I think, you know, literally, we could
be out of there in 6 months, close down the whole thing, set
fire to our ammunition stockpiles, fight down corridors back to
the sea and the U.S. Navy, and withdraw. The consequences of
that might be catastrophic, but the withdrawal could clearly--
--
Senator Feingold. I understand----
General McCaffrey [continuing]. Be achieved.
Senator Feingold [continuing]. Your feelings on that, but I
do appreciate your practical observations, as well.
General Odom.
General Odom. There are two levels from which to approach
this, and I think, at the level of practical implementation,
the issue is which question to ask. You've got to go back and
ask the questions that they're raising, and I think you've got
to ask how much sea and airlift we have, and the inventory of
other places in the region you can keep U.S. troops. Then the
issue comes up as to whether our troups still will be welcome
when we pull out. And I don't think that's something we can
answer today but these are the questions that should be put to
the Joint Chiefs and to the CINC on a contingency basis. They
should, in my view, have already been put to the Pentagon. The
Joint Chiefs need to think about all scenarios, from an
uncontested withdrawal down to fighting our way out. And I
think the kinds of concerns about whether the Saudis and
others--Kuwaitis--will want us to remain open, and that talking
about that with them early and what we'll do about the Iranian-
Arab conflict that's really going to be serious after this,
that's got to be dealt with, and you've got to talk to those
people so that they understand what you're willing to do, and
they've got to let you know what they're willing to do in order
to begin to develop a strategy.
In my earlier remarks, I made that point. That's one of the
things that must be developed. Once we start getting out, if
other countries in the region are not asking the kinds of
questions you are to the American Government, we should be
asking them.
Senator Feingold. Well, I really appreciate that comment,
because, you know, as I said to some people at the Intelligence
Committee hearing, you know, since we didn't have a real plan
getting in, we'd darn well better have a plan to get out, and
talk about it a little bit. It doesn't mean that everybody
agrees, but we ought to have a plan, instead of just being in--
--
General Odom. I would add one last point about this. You
know, everybody sees this so-called catastrophe--there's just
going to be a big bloodbath, all sorts of awful things. Well, I
heard that about Vietnam, and it wasn't nearly as bad as a lot
of people thought it would be. And I'm prepared, for strategic
reasons that I gave earlier, if there is a terrible disaster,
we're just going to have to accept that. That's a cost we're
going to have to bear. My own guess is that it won't be quite
that bad, because it will not be in other countries' interest--
the neighbors' interest to have the region destabilized. I
don't think they'll want that, and, therefore, they will not
immediately launch into the fight and expand it without some
other provocations.
Senator Feingold. I think that's a very insightful remark,
thank you, General.
General Keane.
General Keane. Thank you, Senator.
Well, you know, I would--I disagree with the withdrawal
policy and the consequences that would take place, but, from a
military practitioner's point, certainly that's a military
operation, we know how to conduct it. Certainly, the--I would
keep nothing in the south. I would go north to Balad, where
there's a very good base there. I would pull everything out of
the Green Zone in Baghdad. I would pull out of Victory, except
for a very small security detachment there to maintain the--
keep the airport running. And if we could contract that out,
we'd probably contract it out and let them do it, pull us out
of there. I'd also pull out of Al Anbar, as well.
So, you would pull back from the major contentious areas.
And I agree with General McCaffrey, probably, in 6 to 8 months
you could execute a military operation to do that. You'd be
concerned about the safety of your forces, certainly, while
you're doing this, so it would be preeminent for you. But it is
a military operation. We know how to do it. And military had
the mission, they would develop the plans to do it and execute
it properly.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Generals. I thought your
answers were very helpful and responsive, and I appreciate it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you. I congratulate the chairman
for the hearings that he's been having on this issue.
And I thank you very much for being here today.
Mr. Chairman, one of the books that largely affected my
decisionmaking on Iraq, was ``The Threatening Storm: The Case
for Invading Iraq'' by Ken Pollack. I don't know whether you
have read it, but I would be really interested to get Mr.
Pollack here before the committee to share with us what his
opinion was then and what his observations are now that we've
been involved in Iraq.
The Chairman. Senator, I think that's a good idea. I want
to make it clear, these aren't going to be the totality of the
hearings we're going to have on Iraq. These are the important
opening salvo. So I think that's a great idea. I will pursue
that.
Senator Voinovich. The other influential book that I read--
is ``The War for Muslim Minds'' by Gilles Kepel, which I read
that about 2 years ago. After reading it, I concluded that we
were completely misreading this area of the world and need to
learn a lot more about it. Moqtada al-Sadr and his family have
been revolutionaries for a long time. They are populists, and
their goal in life is to assume power over Iraq. In his mind, I
believe Sadr wants to be the next Ayatollah of Iraq, and,
ultimately, wants to create a theocracy there. Because of my
concerns, I continue to ask questions in the committee's closed
sessions about Sadr. For example: How can there be a unity
government with Sadr? He is the dominant figure there. And I
really don't know where Sistani is anymore. He seems to have
disappeared from the scene.
But, as I analyze the situation, the Shiites were
previously out of power, and only the Sunnis ruled--but now the
Shiites are in, and I think they will want a Shiite-dominated
government. So then the question is: What happens to the Sunnis
if the Shiites take over?
The Sunnis are still there, and I think one of you
mentioned that Saddam is now their hero. What we failed to
realize, at least from what I read, is that this struggle
between the Shiites and the Sunnis has transpired for many,
many years.
The central question is: If America leaves Iraq and things
start to unravel, what's going to happen? Pollack says there
could be a regional confrontation that spirals out of Iraq.
From what I understand, both Shiites and Sunnis want to
dominate the area, from a religious point of view. Saddam
Hussein was a Sunni, and the Sunnis are trying to draw even
more Sunnis to the region to fight in the conflict.
So will there be a regional conflict? The most important
question I want to address is: If the leaders in the region,
Shiite and Sunni, understand that utter chaos could very well
erupt, what incentives do they have to work together on
reaching a political solution in Iraq? Are there enough
incentives for them to get involved there? There are currently
700,000 refugees and probably more to come, which creates a
refugee problem. There's a lot of disruption going on in these
respective countries. And if the Shiites fight the Sunnis, will
the Saudis be forced to intervene? Is there any way the Saudis
could avoid getting involved if this happens?
How do we leverage incentives to involve regional leaders?
When should an effort be made to do so? We're discussing a
military surge and some argue that we should engage in regional
diplomacy after the military surge. But if it were my decision,
I'd work on the regional diplomacy immediately, because I think
the real challenges are political. We need to focus on the
associated political incentives so we can get the regional
parties involved in bringing stability to the region.
General.
General Hoar. May I give a crack at that, Senator?
I would say, first of all, that the countries you mentioned
are all--the governments are dominated by the Sunni, they all
have substantial Shia minorities, and they're all terribly
worried about this. My understanding today is that the
Secretary of State is traveling in the region to encourage
these governments to put pressure on the Sunni in Iraq to
support the central government, which is quite different from
the question that you asked, which is the bigger one, What are
they going to do when this thing goes to a catastrophe? And I
think this is why we need to be talking to them right now. The
Saudis' answer to this question is to build a wall, which, in
my judgment, will be as--about as successful as our efforts to
put a barrier along the DMZ in Vietnam or the current planned
one between Mexico and the United States. Barriers don't work.
The point is, we need to be engaged with them and explain
to them that they are in serious trouble if Iraq craters, and
they need to get involved in taking some steps now to protect
their own political arrangements in their own countries.
Senator Voinovich. General Odom.
General Odom. I think you've put your finger on a key issue
which I tried to highlight in my opening remarks, that the war
was never in our interest, that it actually was undercutting
our interest in the region: Regional stability. Because by
going in and knocking off Saddam, we ensured that this kind of
conflict would eventually come about. And what we've been
trying to do ever since is evade the inevitable. And I tried to
explain that the alignment of forces is such that no matter how
much we surge in Iraq, other surges from outside, with money or
people themselves, can more than counter that. So, I think
you're exactly right. And the only option left open to us, if
we're going to get back and try to achieve regional stability,
is to get out. And it may cost us a lot, it may not cost us as
much, but we can't turn our strategy around unless we do.
That's the precondition. So, I agree with you, and I think it's
really hard--it's the thing that has everybody stopped in this
debate. If they once realize that you don't have a choice to
stay in there and get what was originally defined as victory--
victory would be a liberal, democratic, pro-American Iraqi--if
you realize that's a mirage, then maybe you'll wise up and
realize that you've got to adjust to those realities. So----
Senator Voinovich. That----
General Odom [continuing]. It seems to me that is the crux
of the issue we're facing. The issue just at what point do you
say, ``That's a mirage and we're not going to pay any more in
pursuit of it''?
General Keane. Well, you have to remember that the Sunnis
really do want it to blow. I mean, that--the armed conflict
that they are--that they are prosecuting is to fracture this
government and create the conditions for all-out civil war in a
failed state. That is what they want. So, I mean, the issue is,
can we do anything----
Senator Voinovich. General, excuse me, how could the Sunnis
conclude that they could win, militarily?
General Keane. It--I agree with that, it makes no sense----
General Odom. I don't. But go ahead.
General Keane. It makes no sense, but, nonetheless, that is
what they believe. Out of the anarchy of a failed state, they
believe it suits their political objectives better than any
course they have right now. That's a fact.
So, is there something to work with there? Right now,
there's nothing to work with. That's a fact. And you've got the
Sunni Arab States that are cheerleading the insurgency, not
direct aiding and abetting, like Syria is the insurgency and
the Iranians, in terms of the militias, but, nonetheless,
cheerleading it. You have to change that. You have to deal with
the Sunnis and convince them that their political objectives
cannot be achieved by armed violence. And I think we can do
that. We can start to change that equation, and then you have
something to work with. Right now, there's nothing to work
with. They're not monolithic; I'm not suggesting that they are.
And there are different groups there, as we all know. And their
former regime element, the Saddamists, are clearly different
than some of the other more mainstream. But the fact is that
they want a fractured government. So, we have to stabilize this
situation, bring this level of violence down, convince them
that they cannot achieve their political objectives by armed
violence. Then Maliki has something to work with. And the
question is: Is Maliki willing to work with it?
Senator Voinovich. Well, you just said--and I wrote it
down--that you're not sure who Maliki is exactly: Does he want
a unity government? Does he want a government that's just
dominated by the Shiites? You've indicated that we've got some
real reservations about this guy.
General Keane. We do. And, at the same hand--time, I don't
think we just pull the plug and deal with the consequences.
What I'm suggesting is, despite those reservations, despite the
fact we don't know--and I don't think anybody truly does know--
we should strengthen his hand. And----
Senator Voinovich. But the question----
General Keane [continuing]. We had an opportunity to do
that.
Senator Voinovich. The question I've got is--I was out at
Bethesda Naval Hospital 2 days ago and visited a soldier who
was in Baghdad. He was responsible for several men in Iraq and
he described how he gets up every morning with the goal of
keeping them alive. They were in one of the neighborhoods in
which houses were unoccupied. So he and his soldiers would go
on patrols to check them out. They would get information from
people about what they ought to look into. But in doing so, he
said they would take several potshots from the enemy, who would
never directly engage them. He said that he doesn't know how it
happens, but the improvised explosive devices constantly show
up on the streets, and they have to just deal with it. Well, he
has dealt with one of them, and now he's not sure if he will
ever see again, and what will happen with his arm. He told me:
``Look, this is my third term over here. I've got two kids out
in California. I'm getting out.''
General Keane. Yeah.
Senator Voinovich. We also forget, sometimes, what impact
these tragedies have on the generals and how they feel about
the way things are going. There were times when I saw General
Abizaid at the end of the meetings--there weren't tears, but he
was emotionally involved in this issue. He was really
concerned, and he just felt frustrated. I know he was. He would
take a beating from us with these questions. So, how do the
tragedies impact these people? And how does it impact the men
that we're calling to go into the war, when there are so many--
--
General Keane. Well, I----
Senator Voinovich [continuing]. Questions about whether or
not this whole thing is going to work, and they're putting
their lives on the line?
General Keane. Well, the human dimension of this in--is
certainly staggering, and all of us have been around this most
of our adult lives, and, you know, we have a sense of what this
is. Their sacrifice is--they represent a body of people in the
United States that have true honor, in every sense of the word.
And it--when you ruck up and become a soldier, a marine, an
airman, or a navy guy, I mean, you're always going to get some
orders that you don't like, but being a soldier is about
following your orders, regardless.
Senator Voinovich. Yeah, but the fact----
General Keane. And----
Senator Voinovich. The fact is, we have a civilian control
of the military----
General Keane. Sure.
Senator Voinovich [continuing]. In this country. We, as
civilians, have something to say about that.
General Keane. And you do. And all I'm saying is, is that
their performance is absolutely extraordinary. What I'm trying
to suggest is that we, for the first time, give them some of
the conditions so that they can be successful. And I don't
believe they've had those conditions. And that's one of my----
Senator Voinovich. Let me ask you----
General Keane [continuing]. Concerns, that----
Senator Voinovich [continuing]. This. If you gave our
military the conditions to make success possible and you took
them in there, but you really believed in your heart that the
end result was going to be a Shiite-dominated government, that
they're going to take over, and that Sadr and company are going
to be in charge and maybe end up with theocracy--if that's what
you really believed was going to be the end result, then why
would you stick them into a----
General Keane. We wouldn't.
Senator Voinovich [continuing]. Temporary situation that
means that a lot of them are not going to not come home?
General Keane. If we knew that for a fact, then we
probably--we'd have no business doing it. It would be
absolutely irresponsible to do what I'm suggesting or what the
United States is about to do. That would be irresponsible, if
that's what we knew.
And by the way, in terms of General Abizaid, there--what a
magnificent leader he truly is, and the sacrifice that he's
made, and the--and we probably haven't had a smarter guy put
his mind on this problem. And certainly, it is a really
difficult problem. So, the emotion that you see there is a
reflection of that. Every question that you've asked him, he's
probably asked himself many, many times, over and over and over
again. And that's why I think you see some of that emotion,
because he knows what he represents. He represents the honor of
all those men and women who serve him so loyally and so
dedicated.
The Chairman. Senator.
Senator Voinovich. Is--anyone else want to comment?
General McCaffrey. Well, a quick comment.
Senator Voinovich. Is that OK?
The Chairman. Yeah, sure.
General McCaffrey. It seems to me that I would define
success in Iraq, from where we now are--successful outcome
would be that we're there for 10-15 years with 50-75,000
troops, we're out of the urban area, there's a loose federal
structure of government in which the Shia and the Kurds mostly
have autonomy for internal security in their areas, and that
our primary role there is to deter outside active intervention,
to guarantee against a countercoup, and to protect the Sunnis
from the justifiable rage of the Shia. That, to me, would be a
successful outcome. It wouldn't mean $8 billion a month, it
wouldn't be 1,000 killed and wounded a month, but it would be
an enormous commitment of U.S. resources and power.
If we're not willing to see that as an option, if we don't
think it's worth it, then I personally would flip over and
start arguing for a measured, but deliberate, withdrawal from
this current strategy, because I don't--do not believe we are
there to fight a counterinsurgency campaign or to win the
hearts and minds of the Iraqi people. We're trying to stand up
a government, get the economy going, get a security force in
place, and get out of there.
The Chairman. General, I want a clarification on the last
point you just made. The political incentive you indicated--the
political dynamic--that needs to be in place for that outcome
to occur is, essentially, that the Constitution let them form
regions, like the Kurds have, where they have local control
over their local police, their local security, correct?
General McCaffrey. Already happened.
The Chairman. Oh, I know. It's the plan I've been
promoting, and everyone, up to now, has been saying----
General McCaffrey. Well, I think there's always anxiety
about the notion----
The Chairman. Yeah. I just think it's inevitable. It's
already done. I mean----
General McCaffrey. Right.
The Chairman. I'm not suggesting that it works, but I don't
know how anything works without those two pieces in it.
Yes, General.
General Odom. I'd like to comment on both the----
The Chairman. Oh, I'm sorry, I beg your pardon. I didn't
realize you didn't comment.
General Odom. No; the--I'd like to add something to
what's----
The Chairman. I realize I'm going over it, General. I want
you to----
General Odom [continuing]. Been said about the Sunnis.
The Chairman [continuing]. Go over it as well.
General Odom. I think General Keane is quite right about
most of what he said about the Sunnis, but I'd like to ask--add
another dimension to understanding their behavior as to why
they're determined to try to do this, no matter what, and that
the odds may not look very good to them.
The alternative for them is to be decimated by Shiites. All
U.S. policies are empowering the Shiites. They've done it from
the day we came in there. And now we're in this position: Do we
side with the Shiites, and win? Well, you don't want that,
because you don't want an Islamic government. And why should
the Sunnis sign up for that? I would say, don't count the
Sunnis out. The Baathist Party is based on Leninist-Stalinist
organizational principles. That organizational administrative
capacity is lacking on the Shiite side. And a minority could
eventually win the struggle. I'm not saying it will. I don't
think anybody knows who can win. But we've been too quick to
count the Baathists out, and we're too quick to attribute far
too much administrative political capacity to the Shiites. I
see it in some--in Sadr and some of these limited groups, but
not in the aggregate.
I would make one last point, on the partition business. The
problem with that is, you end up presiding over ethnic
cleansing, which we're doing anyway.
The Chairman. No; it's not partitioning. If you read the
Constitution----
General Odom. No; but if you start that way, it won't stop
with the Constitution.
The Chairman. Well, General, no, I understand, but my
problem is, they voted for a constitution. The Constitution
explicitly says----
General Odom. Well, that----
The Chairman [continuing]. Anybody--any governate can
decide to be a region, and, when you are, here are the
authorities and powers you have. They already wrote into the
Constitution that the Kurds have that status. They've already
written into the Constitution that, in fact, this is how it
would proceed. They've already voted for the enabling law to do
that. It's like pushing a rope. I mean, you know, if we want to
change something, we'd better change it. But I agree with the
overarching principle, the strategic notion you've laid out.
I'm now trespassing on my colleague's time in a way that I
won't. I've let everyone go over, so that----
Senator Bill Nelson. Well----
The Chairman. Let me make one last point, administratively.
I want to explain why we don't have an afternoon hearing. We
were going to have Congressman Hamilton, and Secretary Baker
initially indicated he did not want to participate in these
hearings. He subsequently has called and indicated that he
would be prepared to do that. And Congressman Hamilton
indicated that he would think it best that they appear as the
chairpersons of the Iraq Study Group. And we've worked out a
common time, which I think is the 30th, where they're going to
be here. I want you to know that's the only reason the
afternoon schedule has changed. That's bad news for you guys,
because if you can, I'd like you to be able to stay--not
through the afternoon, but maybe well into the lunch hour, to
answer these guys' questions.
But, anyway, my friend from Florida, the clock is yours.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, before you get to the clock,
could General Odom--he was continuing to answer, and I wanted
to hear the remainder of that answer, about----
The Chairman. Well, sure.
Senator Bill Nelson [continuing]. About the partition.
General Odom. Well, the--constitutions don't necessarily
have to be written on paper. And I'm--I've always been
impressed with a Russian proverb that Stalin loved, ``Paper
will put up with anything written on it.'' [Laughter.]
So, you don't have a constitution until the rules have been
agreed on by the elites. Who are the elites? Anybody with
enough guns or money to violate the rules with impunity. If the
elites agree, the constitution will stick. If they don't, it
won't. The elites don't agree in Iraq; therefore, you don't
have a constitution, and you will have violence until somebody
wins out. That may be a long time, but, until somebody can
restore order on part of the terrain or all of it, you won't
have an order.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I've said this to you
privately, and I just want to say publicly, that this an
outstanding series of hearings that you are doing, and I am
very grateful, particularly because of the candor that we are
hearing from different points of view at that table. And that
is in marked contrast to the lack of candor that we have had in
witness after witness representing the administration over the
last 6 years. I erupted, in this committee last week, with the
Secretary of State, saying that time and time again I have not
been told the truth.
Now, I want to ask you all a question, because I want to
understand this. How can, over and over, the representatives at
the highest level of the U.S. military come in here and say
what they are saying to us? And I would say that the one
exception--and it's not just here, it's also on other
committees, including the Armed Services Committee--the one
exception is General Abizaid. You all have achieved the highest
levels in the U.S. military. We're supposed to be getting the
truth from the military. And we haven't. Over and over. Why?
General Keane. I'd like to take that on. Well, first of
all, I think you have got the truth from them. Look, if John
Abizaid and George Casey put together a strategy in Iraq, that
was principally theirs. And that strategy had a political
objective to it, and it had this military objective to it that
we've discussed, which was transition to the Iraqi security
forces. And they believed in it. There's a thought in this town
that this is really Secretary Rumsfeld's strategy and he's
forced it on these generals and that's one of the reasons why
they never asked for more troops. Well, I think John Abizaid--I
find that very insulting to these generals to think that, that
they wouldn't have the moral courage to stand up and tell the
Secretary, one, the strategy is--needs to be changed, or, two,
they need more troops as a manifestation of that change. They
believed in the strategy they were executing, and they thought
it would work. And I believe that. And I think when John or
George talk about they don't need more troops, I think they've
been very sincere about that, that that's their belief. I don't
think they're shading the truth whatsoever. And I find it
insulting to suggest that they are.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, you didn't hear what I said. I
said the one exception is General Abizaid.
General Keane. Uh-huh. I heard that.
Senator Bill Nelson. And, indeed, he sat at that table
last--it was November or December--and said that he did not
think that they needed additional troops.
General Keane. And I believe that's their conviction.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, I believe it, too. But, for the
last 6 years, we haven't been--over and over, we've had
generals come up here and say, ``The war is going very well.
Victory is right around the corner. We have 350-400,000 Iraqi
troops that are trained.'' You all have worn that uniform, you
knew that wasn't true. Why are they saying that?
General McCaffrey. You know, this is a very difficult
subject, certainly for us to address, and there--I might add,
there's a good reason why I was never the Chairman of the JCS.
But let me, sort of, underscore, there's a bit of unfairness to
how you characterize this. First of all, if you pick up the
phone or visit a senior military officer in the field, and you
say, ``Off the record, tell me what you think,'' you will get
100 percent of what they think. And so, throughout the last 4
years, the Congress has unmistakably heard from field-level
officers right through general officers--you know, Senator
Biden's been in and out of there, they talk to him explicitly
every time he's on the ground, so you knew what was going on,
and you allowed the Secretary of Defense and his senior people
to come over here and baldly mischaracterize the situation,
that there is no insurgency going on, this is just like Germany
in 1945, just like the American Revolution, it's crime rate in
D.C. The denial of the evidence in front of their eyes has been
preposterous. The broken Army equipment--the country is
currently at strategic peril, and it was the Congress's job to
raise and equip an Army and Navy, and people were telling you
that. So, when you had Dr. Chu come over here and say, ``We're
not having a problem on recruiting''--we're now taking 42-year-
old grandmothers into the Army, and their current health is so
good that, unlike 40 years ago, there's no degradation in
standards, while we quadruple the number of non-high-school
graduates, quadruple the number of people with moral and
criminal waivers, and clearly had degraded the input to the
Army--so, again, I wouldn't focus on the obedient generals and
admirals who made their views known to the Secretary and his
people and then came over here and signed up to support the
President's budget and his strategy. I think----
Senator Bill Nelson. Is that----
General McCaffrey. I think there's been a huge failure in
the U.S. Congress, in both parties, to speak up and provide
oversight on this disastrously incompetently mismanaged war.
Senator Bill Nelson. I'm asking, because I admire each one
of you--going ahead in the future so that we can get correct
information in--upon which to make, hopefully, correct
judgments: Is it the responsibility of an admiral or a general
to sit at that table and be silent when the Secretary of
Defense says that the Iraqi Army is well-trained and they have
all these thousands of troops that are ready to do the battle?
Is it the responsibility of admirals and generals to sit there
and be silent when the Secretary of Defense and others in the
civilian positions say that we're meeting our recruiting goals
and we don't have a problem in the Reserves and in the National
Guard? Help educate us----
General Odom. Can I----
Senator Bill Nelson [continuing]. To understand, so that
we'll have a filter with which to sort out truth from nontruth
in the future.
General Odom. May I try and answer that?
Senator Bill Nelson. Please.
General Odom. I used to discuss this issue with the late
General Goodpaster, because, when I was in Vietnam, I
understood that we were fighting a war the strategic
consequences of which were much more in the Soviet interest
than ours, namely the containment of China and of North
Vietnam. So, it was very analogous to the present situation,
where we've charged off on a war that achieves our enemy's
goals, and not ours.
Now, I was really upset in that war. We never heard from
senior generals, and I used to think that generals were a
menace to the national security because they didn't speak up.
One retired general did speak out, Marine General Shoup. And I
remember him extraordinarily well for that. He faced--he stood
up and then took the heat for it.
And you've had a young officer, a very outstanding young
officer, H.R. McMasters who's written a book, ``Dereliction of
Duty,'' in which he lays the blame on the Joint Chiefs for not
standing up to McNamara. And when I pressed General Goodpaster
as to how to come down on this--and I think this is a real
dilemma, particularly ones that senior officers face--do you
break with the policy and put out the unvarnished truth, and
quit, or do you say, as Goodpaster said, ``Isn't it also
professional integrity to stay with these political leaders and
try to help them in spite of themselves?'' In other words,
you're really copping out if you don't do the best you can, and
try to save the day.
So, I don't think there's a clear-cut answer to this, but
in this war it seemed to me, as it was in the Vietnam war,
after you'd been there for a while and quite a few things were
becoming pretty clear, the argument for abandoning ship and no
longer doing the best you can to help our political leaders
would be reached, but each individual has to decide what he
thinks is professional integrity in that regard.
General Hoar. I'd like to add to the comments that have
been made. I think that all of us agree that civilian control
of the military is an immutable concept. There's no question
that the President and Vice President and the people that they
have appointed, with the advice and consent of the Senate, are
the people that make these decisions. The difficult question
is: How do you break with your boss when you don't agree with
him? I would like to think that all of us would stand up and be
counted, but I don't think it's that easy.
Because I have written and spoken repeatedly in the last 4
years about my objection to the way this war has been handled,
I find that, in some forums, this question comes up. There are
a lot of active duty officers that believe they are not
responsible for speaking up, that they have to follow the
leadership of the civilians that are over them. I don't think
that's true, but I think it would be an interesting question in
the Senate Armed Services Committee, when a man is--or a woman,
for that matter--is nominated for a third or a fourth star, to
ask this question.
Eric Shinseki, to the President of the United States,
voiced his discontent with the plan to invade Iraq, and he was
publicly demeaned for that. I'm not sure, given that kind of
behavior, how people respond to this. I would prefer not to go
into individual cases and circumstances, but I don't think, in
all cases, people have been entirely candid.
Senator Bill Nelson. In the last 6 years, we've had a
credibility problem. And what I'm trying to get at is the
truth. And I'm asking four generals who have given
extraordinarily candid testimony today about how to solve this
problem going forward. I'm not talking about those officers
lower down in the chain of command, I'm talking about the
officers that come here and present testimony to us and sit by
as if corroborating the testimony of their civilian bosses.
General Hoar. I think it would help if you could frame the
question in a way that you would ask them their personal
opinion of the value of a particular course of action. I think
that's how General Shinseki first went public, in my
recollection. He was asked, in the Senate Armed Services
Committee, if there were enough troops, and some other
questions, and he gave his honest response.
Senator Bill Nelson. I asked him the question, and the
question was: How many will it take, and for how long? And he
said several hundred thousand for several years. And for that,
he was significantly--well, we know the rest of the story.
General Hoar. I think that's the key, though, Senator. If
you have enough understanding of the issues to ask the hard
questions directly, I think you have a better chance of getting
the answer.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman, for
this extraordinary panel.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank all of the generals for their service,
individually and collectively, to our country, and for their
insights today. I had another hearing, but I read all of your
testimony last night, and I got a synopsis of some of your
answers, and I want to pursue some questions.
And I would say, to my distinguished colleague from
Florida, that one of the things, I would think, that would make
it easier is to put witnesses under oath, in which case they
would feel compelled to make sure that they gave an answer that
would not put them in violation of the law. And that might be
something that the chairmen of the committees, when
appropriate, might consider.
You know, General Keane, let me start with you. I
understand--and correct me if I'm wrong--based upon press
accounts, that you and Dr. Kagan are sort of like the
architects of the President's latest plan. Is that a fair
characterization?
General Keane. All I can attest to is that I made a
recommendation to the President, and I'll let him speak in
terms of what he thought of that. I do know that the plan, as
the administration has announced, is remarkably similar to what
we had talked about, you know, Fred and I. But I wasn't privy
to their, you know, staff deliberations and----
Senator Menendez. You made those recommendations directly
to the President, did you not?
General Keane. I made a recommendation to the President,
yes.
Senator Menendez. And were there others? Was the Vice
President involved?
General Keane. Yes.
Senator Menendez. And in the recommendations that you
made--in addition to the escalation, did you offer a form of
benchmarks that you thought needed to be established, and
consequences for benchmarks not achieved?
General Keane. No. Did not.
Senator Menendez. Now, let me ask you this. I understand
that, during your answer to some of the questions, you said
that Iraqis should not be in the lead on this mission. Is that
correct?
General Keane. Well, yes; I have problems with it, because
one--what that really means, when you say Iraqis are in the
lead, is that we're going to have two chain of commands. The--
obviously, we're not going to work for the Iraqis, so we'll
have our own chain of command, and the Iraqis will have their
own chain of command. That has not been the case in the
operations that we've been conducting in Iraq to date. The
Iraqis have been responding to us when we're working combined
operations together. So, we've made a conscious decision here
to make this their operation, and we're in support of it.
My problem with that is, we're talking about a partnership.
I think that's a business term, it's not a military term. It
doesn't have much application on a street where you have
soldiers from the Iraqi military who are responding to orders
from a different chain of command than the United States
soldiers are responding to. And that doesn't make a lot of
sense to me, militarily. Politically, it probably makes lots of
sense, but militarily, it does not.
Senator Menendez. Let me ask you this. Does it matter
whether the Iraqis show up or not, for our purposes of
executing this plan?
General Keane. It does matter that they show up.
Senator Menendez. Does it matter that they show up in the
quantities that we have been told that they need to show up
if----
General Keane. We can afford for them not to show up in
some of the quantities that are expected. This plan takes into
account that the Iraqis may not be able to meet all of their
expectations, as they have in the past failed to meet those
expectations, as well.
Senator Menendez. Does it matter about the quality of the
troops that will show up on the Iraq side?
General Keane. Well, certainly it does. Certainly it does.
And the Iraqis, as you well know, are a mixed group. Some
perform well, and some do not perform well at all.
Senator Menendez. Here is my concern, in addition to my
opposition to the war and my vote against it, and my opposition
to this escalation--even as I try to understand it, I cannot
fathom, for the life of me, how it is that every administration
witness that has come here--Secretary of State, most pointedly,
but others, as well--have clearly made the case that the
administration has tried to sell this, that this is an Iraqi
initiative, that Iraqis will be at the forefront, that they
will conduct the missions, and we will be in support of them.
And I just don't understand, when I hear--and I will give you
the title of the ``architect of the plan''--how it is possible
that we are being told by the administration that the Iraqis
will finally be at the forefront of the fight for their own
security, and we will be in a supporting role. You have just
described your concerns about it, which are exemplified by a
New York Times article, this Monday, in which the United States
and Iraqis are wrangling over the war plans and exactly who
commands what. When there's a dispute, what happens? And then
we see today's article, or NPR story, where Kurdish soldiers
are being sent as part of this overall effort. And the Kurds
don't know the area, they don't speak Arabic, and their
deployment is a question of extreme popularism. Even one of the
commanders of a team of American military advisors say there
have already been desertions and that out of the battalion of
1,600 Kurdish soldiers, he only expects a few hundred to show
up.
So, we are being told by the administration that, in fact,
this is an Iraqi plan, Iraqis are going to take the lead,
they're going to show up en masse, and that we are in support
of that. Yet everything that we see unfolding shows that we
clearly are in the lead; we clearly are going to be at the
greatest risk. And if that's the truth, versus what we are
being told--aren't we rolling the dice--General, when you say--
and I think it's a very true comment--when you say that, in
fact, we don't know what Maliki is all about, we don't know
what his true desires are. Why are we rolling the dice for
someone and something that we're putting a lot of capital into,
both in lives and money, without knowing where it's headed? And
why would the Sunnis--why would the Sunnis, based upon
everything that we're doing? Even listening to you, where you
suggest that the Sunnis want an all-out civil war, a failed
state; it's a better course than anything they have right now--
it's a better course than anything they have right now because
they're not doing very well under the present political
process. So, if that's the case, we sound like we are going to
be at the lead--we are going to be at the lead of helping Shias
ultimately suppress Sunnis, under the goal that that will put
them into submission so that they will ultimately accept
whatever deal is granted to them. That, to me, is not a recipe
for success. Now, tell me where I'm wrong in this.
General Keane. No; I agree with you. And, as I said, I
think there are real problems there.
What I would ask you to do is, in terms of the operation
itself and--is pause a little bit. Let's get General Petraeus
into this country--get him confirmed up there, get him into the
country, let him be able to analyze this, himself. I mean,
obviously, he's doing it from afar here, but it's not the same
as the fidelity he will have there. He knows a lot of these
Iraqis, himself. And I think he's capable of working out a much
better command-and-control relationship than this appears to be
right now, and resolving some of those differences so that we
do not have problems, you know, on the streets of Baghdad, or
in Al Anbar, because of who's in the lead and who's not. I
think it's resolvable, and I would ask you to give him an
opportunity to resolve it and get on top of this situation.
Senator Menendez. But not resolvable is taking a roll of
the dice with the lives of America's sons and daughters and its
national treasure on a government that we have no idea whether
they are committed to the political reconciliation that's
necessary.
General Pace, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
said to us--in an answer to a question in a briefing, he said,
``We need to get to have the Iraqis love their children more
than they hate their neighbors.'' That's probably a powerful
truism, but it doesn't come through military might, achieving
that--that they love their children more than they hate their
neighbors. And so, it goes beyond military equation and whether
or not we have a partner who is truly willing, with the
benchmarks and consequences for not meeting those benchmarks,
to move in the political process. We are also risking the lives
of America's sons and daughters for a venture that has already
gone bad and doesn't seem to change.
And I find that to be a problem. And I'd love to hear any
of the other generals' views on this, if they have any, as a
final question.
General Hoar. I think your questions are well founded,
Senator----
Senator Menendez. General, you and I met a while back----
General Hoar [continuing]. About Mr. Maliki.
Senator Menendez [continuing]. And one of the things you
said is about standing up--getting Iraqis to ultimately stand
up as Iraqis--it seems to me that a good part of this mission
needs Iraqis to come together and stand up as Iraqis. How do we
get them to have that national spirit, versus the sectarian
spirit they have right now?
General Odom. Well, that's a--that's an issue that T.E.
[sic] Lawrence faced, it's an issue the British faced, it's an
issue that Saddam faced, and----
Senator Menendez. And it's an issue we face.
General Odom [continuing]. What the answer was. Fear,
terror, and repressive organizations.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Do you have any more
questions? You have time for another one.
Senator Casey, thank you.
Senator Casey. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I want to reiterate
what was mentioned before about the way these hearings have
proceeded and the panels you've put together, in concert with
Senator Lugar, and we're grateful for that.
And I know we have much more to do, but in particular today
when I look at this panel and listen to what you've said--I've
heard most of it, probably 80 percent, in and out of here, for
other committee obligations--but it brings to mind something my
father said when he was Governor of Pennsylvania, the night
before the 1991 gulf war. He was talking about the troops and
obviously asking the people of our State to pray for the
troops, but he also said something I'll never forget. He said,
``We pray for the troops, but we also pray for ourselves, that
we may be worthy of their valor.'' And I think, by your service
and your own valor, you have proven yourselves worthy of that
on the battlefield, as well as the testimony today and the
dedication you bring to these issues, and the scholarship you
bring.
And I'd love to talk to each of you about politics and
diplomacy, because you bring a lot more to this table than just
your military experience and knowledge, but, because of limited
time and because of your experience, I want to focus on the
military questions, as best I can in the limited time.
I have one question about Iraqi security forces'
preparedness, but I guess the underlying premise of my question
is in itself a question--is this issue that we've read about in
the press over the last couple of years, but it doesn't get
much attention--as much attention now as before--level-one,
level-two readiness, based upon Pentagon definitions--(a) is
that kind of measuring stick operable, still, today, and, (b)
if it is, from--based upon your information, your knowledge,
how many Iraqi security forces do we have trained at level one,
meaning, in my layman's term, that they can take the lead
independently, and level two, meaning that they take the lead,
with American forces supporting them? So, General Keane, if you
could start, and----
General Keane. I can't get at the number. I've been briefed
on it, a number of weeks ago, and, you know, I just can't
refine the number, in terms of who's level one and who's level
two.
Look at the--the command in Iraq was using these different
levels as a measuring stick to measure the capacity of these
forces, not just in terms of their performance, but in terms of
the number of people they had in it: Where had they been
trained? Did they get through those gates, in terms of officer/
NCO training? And how much time did they have in operational
units? What is their equipment status? It's a--it's something
very similar that United States units go through every single
month in assessing their own readiness. So, it was not too
surprising that officers who grew up with that system imposed
that as a basis for making an evaluation. And I think what it--
where it serves a useful purpose is in attempting to allocate
resources, and realizing, you know, where you're having your
shortfalls. And for that, I think it had some merit. I think we
also got too bogged down by it, you know, bureaucratically, in
terms of what it meant to us, and made far too much of it, in
my judgment.
But the--look, it--the overall issue dealing with the Iraqi
security forces is, they still are not at the level where they
can cope with this violence, certainly by themselves, and will
not be for some time. That's the harsh reality that we have to
deal with, and that's the problem I have with just turning it
over to them, because they--the level of violence will go up in
2007. It's actually predicted to go up in 2007, unless we do
something about it. So, that would mean an even further step
toward a fractured state and anarchy.
So, what this is about is bringing it down to a level where
they can cope with that reality. And it buys time for their
growth and development. They--we need to improve those forces.
All the things that have been suggested by the ISG in that make
sense to me, in terms of strengthening our advisory program,
making certain they're better educated, our advisors, that they
have much more cultural awareness than they currently have
before they go over there, there's more of them, embed some
U.S. forces with them, as well. And I would grow the size of
the Iraqi security forces, also. So, I mean, your emphasis is a
right one. The Iraqi security forces truly do matter. I mean,
they are our exit strategy. We have to turn this over to them
at a level where they can perform. But to help them, we must
bring the violence down, in my judgment, so they can cope with
it.
Senator Casey. Can you just put two numbers on this, if you
can: (a) Do you know any kind of a rough estimate of how many
forces you think--or forget level one or level two, just
generally--do you think we're prepared to take on this
responsibility? And, (b) whatever that number is, what do we
need to get to? I mean--because I think--I'm like a lot of
Americans, we need to have some kind of standard where we can
say, at some point, in terms of troop numbers and readiness,
depending on how you define that--we're at a point now where we
can have consequences that flow from that, in terms of our own
troops. And I know it's not always easy, you can't do a
numerical specific or precise numerical determination, but, I
mean: How are we doing, in terms of identifying the number of
troops they have to take on this responsibility? Are we way
off? Are we halfway there? Is there any way you can put a
number on that?
General Keane. Well, I still think--the administration--you
know, where we are is 325,000, and that totals every--all of
it. Out of that is--about 125,000 would be United--Iraqi
military forces; the rest are broken down into police and
national police and border guards, et cetera. In my own mind,
the best organization of the Iraqi security forces is their
army. They have performed the best. And even they have serious
problems. Sixty-five percent of them, on average, show up any
single day for duty. Some of them are on leave, and some of
them are just not showing up for duty. We call it Absent
Without Leave, or deserting. So, that's still an issue, and
will continue to be an issue.
I think that you have to grow the size of this force, the
military piece of this force, at 125,000. I think it has to go
beyond 300,000, itself, and we would need advisors to do that.
The army size of the force, while it is their strongest
institution in Iraq, the numbers of that force is inadequate.
The quality of the force is improving. It's not satisfactory
where it is. That's the truth of it. And I think that
strengthening it with our advisory program and some of the
other steps we're going to take, certainly with better
equipment, and, most importantly, the appropriate equipment,
all make sense. But that still will take time to get them to
where they need to be.
Senator Casey. Thank you. And I wanted to leave some time
for the others to respond to that----
General McCaffrey. Well, I might just add to----
Senator Casey [continuing]. Series of questions.
General McCaffrey [continuing]. That, I--because I
basically agree with Jack Keane.
We should never, by the way, run too quickly to conclusion.
I've been in Iraqi battalions that I thought were patriots,
courageous, convinced that they're going to create a new Iraqi
nation. And, so far, not an Iraqi Army battalion has flipped
over to the other side, so that at 2 o'clock in the morning,
suddenly they seize their advisory group and they declare
themselves to be Shia militia. That's good news, and we
shouldn't discount it.
I also believe that there has been such deliberate
deception on the part of the Secretary of Defense and his
senior people over the caliber, the status of these forces,
that it boggles the mind. Callous----
Senator Casey. In terms of the----
General McCaffrey [continuing]. Open, disingenuous
explanation, putting Iraqi protective security forces as part
of total numbers, inventing a force that was growing at 100,000
per 60 days. How could that be true? Where is the equipment? It
was utter nonsense.
Senator Casey. But you mean deception, in terms of
numbers----
General McCaffrey. Sure, numbers----
Senator Casey [continuing]. In saying where we are?
General McCaffrey [continuing]. Caliber, equipment,
reliability. They were making it up.
Now, where are we today? Probably--and I've watched numbers
out of Cordesman very closely, because I think he tries to be
objective and neutral. I think there's less than 100,000 Iraqi
soldiers who show up on a given day to defend the country.
There's 27 million of those people. It is a tiny force. It's
much smaller than the U.S. military presence in country. Many
of the other services are either inadequate, incompetent, or
uniformed terrorists under the control of one faction or
another. So, you've got less than 100,000.
Their equipment status is so bad that, were they U.S. units
on this mission, they would be declared ineligible for military
operations. They have no equipment appropriate for their task.
And then, finally, going forward--because I've been saying,
``Look, you know, 3 years from now we're going to be gone,''
and we're going to be gone, make no doubt about it. Who's going
to be flying helicopters in Iraq? It's not going to be the U.S.
Army. We--I think we've got probably 1,000 aircraft there right
now. It probably takes 36 months, on a crash basis----
The Chairman. Right.
General McCaffrey [continuing]. To manufacture a Black
Hawk, train the crew, put them in the field, and have them
flying. Have we started that process yet? And the answer is no.
And, therefore, 3 years from now, there will be no solution,
there won't be an Iraqi security force adequate to maintain
internal order.
Now, final thought, because I--you know, I think the five-
brigade surge is a surge of the wrong stuff, but if I was a
three-star commander--General Odierno, a terrific soldier--I'd
want five more brigades, because in a Sunni neighborhood in
Baghdad today--and I got this directly from General Abizaid,
the neighborhood will beg us to not leave. So, having a U.S.
Army battalion or a Marine battalion there clearly dampens down
the violence. It's a good thing. They're honest kids, they're--
you know, they're spending CERP money, they're--lots of good
things comes out of it. So, my only question is: How do we
create a condition so we can leave? The presence of U.S. forces
is a boon to Iraq, is a gift to take that monster out of power
and hang him. All that was a good thing. Now we're trying to
figure out: How do we stand up a state and get out of there?
And the prerequisite is not to just say, ``We're going to go in
and clear and hold neighborhoods in Baghdad with U.S.
privates.''
Senator Casey. Thank you.
General Hoar. I can't add anything to Barry McCaffrey, sir.
Senator Casey. Yes, General.
General Odom. I would ask you to ask a prior question. Do
you know any examples where you've had weak governments, where
foreigners have gone in and stood up their military and it was
a success? I don't know of any.
General Hoar. The United States.
General Odom. When you try to get--well, you--there was
political leadership. The Congress was in charge through the
whole revolution. You could have said it pulled a coup, but it
was Americans standing up, it wasn't other countries coming in
and do it--doing it by ventriloquy. So, I think it's a bit like
trying to put a roof on a house before it has the walls built
up.
Senator Casey. You mean, the----
General Odom. Dealing with training up Iraqis.
Senator Casey [continuing]. The civilian government is the
foundation of the house. Yeah.
General Odom. The way it happens in most places. And very
often, the military--I mean, there were so many military
regimes in the world, because military power is political
power. And if you stand up the military first, there's a high
chance you'll have a practorian, or military, regime take over.
That's what we found all through Africa and South America in
our 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, with military assistance programs to
these areas.
Senator Casey. I have lots more, but I know I'm over.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, I am the last person between these people and lunch,
but I appreciate all of you hanging around. I appreciate your
testimony. I've been able to know some of you personally, read
articles and editorials that have been written about this
issue, written by people at the table over the years. I want to
know--I want you to know that I respect the service of everyone
at the table, and I certainly respect the integrity of everyone
at the table. And the--no matter where their views are on this,
that this political/military interface that we've been debating
is probably the hardest issue, in terms of how our government
works. I've dealt with it every way you can deal with it, I
think, in my lifetime.
General Odom, I would like to say to you that I very much
appreciate your writings over the past several years. They have
been invaluable, I think, in providing a strategic umbrella
under which we're able to examine the implications of our
policy. This is a challenge that is not simply in Iraq. It's--
as you have written and as other people have said, this
challenge can only be addressed regionally and beyond. It
relates to the stability of the region. It relates to our
ability to fight the war against terrorism elsewhere. It
relates to strategic challenges that are in other than the
region, and we really do need to address this for the well-
being of our military and our country, I believe.
And, General Hoar, I'd like to say to you, first of all,
General Keane mentioned a phrase, a little while ago, ``moral
courage.'' One of my great heroes was GEN Bob Barrow, who was
Commandant of the Marine Corps, and used to say, frequently,
``There's physical courage and then there's moral courage, and
moral courage is quite often harder than physical courage.''
And the courage that you showed, standing up, speaking out
about this early, along with people like Tony Zinni, who also
commanded CENTCOM, people like General Shinseki, General
Newbold, who I admire greatly, and General Van Riper, and
others, I think is going to stand as a mark when history looks
at where we have gone and how we, hopefully, will get out of
this in a way that retains our national esteem around the
world--or regains our national esteem around the world.
General McCaffrey, I want to clarify one thing that you
said about the Constitution. You said it twice. And I'm not a--
I'm not a constitutional lawyer, I am an attorney. But the
language in the Constitution, about armies and navies, is--it
comes from two separate phrases in article 1, section 8. And
this is important, I think, when we examine what our
responsibilities are, in terms of looking at how the military
has been used in this war.
The Constitution empowers the Congress to ``raise and
support armies,'' but to ``provide and maintain a navy.'' And
the distinction was put there for a reason, with the historical
experiences in continental Europe, with turning over standing
armies to monarchs and having militaries used for adventurism.
And so, when I look, even at the issue right now, of increasing
end strength in the Army and the Marine Corps--and I'm very--I
had a lot of experience, when I was ASD, in looking at Army
force-structure issues, and, as you know, I'm intimately
familiar with the force-structure difficulties in the Marine
Corps right now. But my cautionary note has been that I don't
want to put a vote in place that will ratify what I believe has
been the lack of strategy, just through the momentum of the
fact that we have troops at risk. I mentioned that to Secretary
of Defense Gates last week. He told me that there were off-
ramps, as he called them, in case our troop levels in Iraq went
down, but that's one question that I'm going to be asking. And
I hope my colleagues will be asking, is that the justification
for these increases in end strength should take into account,
hopefully, what I would see as a reduction in force structure.
I have two questions. The first is, General McCaffrey, on
your proposal to--or your suggestion that $10 billion a year be
put into development programs, I know that you have a good bit
of experience in this, and you're on the boards of--according
to your bio, of companies that are more than likely doing
business in Iraq. I'm concerned about accountability on the
funds that have been spent. I'm also concerned about where this
money would come from. Are you suggesting a reprogramming or an
addition to the budget?
General McCaffrey. By the way, I am on the board of
directors of one company, DynCorp, that is very heavily
involved in providing 3,000 or 4,000 people in Iraq, and
several hundred, I believe, in Afghanistan. And I frequently
make a point to underscore, because there's the debate inside
the profession on how come contractors are on the battlefield,
providing almost all of our long-haul communications, our
logistics? For God's sake, it's incredible. I'd prefer to have
an active military force that does most of these functions, but
the facts of the matter are, they're not there, and, without
these contractor operations, we would grind to a halt
immediately.
So, I'm inclined to say, let's treat them with respect,
because they're getting killed and wounded in huge numbers. And
they actually, when you talk to these kids, or older single
women, they see themselves doing a patriotic bit--KBR,
Halliburton, et cetera. So--but that's an aside.
I think, back to your central question, the notion of
``development program,'' I'm not sure you can spend $10 billion
a year successfully in Iraq. The Congress provided $18.6
billion; it's all gone, essentially. The President just said he
wants a billion more CERP funds, local employment. I don't know
that, given the lack of security, given the nature of the
Maliki government, that that would work. I am confident that if
our only trick in this game is, ``let's put five more brigades
in downtown Baghdad and fight neighborhood by neighborhood,''
this is a loser. So, I told the President, 2 years ago, ``When
the development money runs out, and when Congress won't provide
more, that's the day you lost the war.'' So, I would have great
oversight of $10 billion a year, or $1 billion a year. Is it
going to be spent effectively? You've clearly got to look at
waste, fraud, and abuse on U.S. or other contractors, but I
think it's just a vital aspect of moving forward.
Senator Webb. Yeah, I obviously am new to this position,
but that's one of the concerns that I've had, looking at this--
the conduct of the war----
General McCaffrey. A legitimate concern.
Senator Webb [continuing]. Throughout the past several
years. It----
General McCaffrey. Right.
Senator Webb [continuing]. Trying to figure out where all
this money has gone already.
This is a general question, but I'll go first--General
Keane, your comments very heavily involve the Sunni--you know,
the need to stand up to the Sunni insurgency. And one of the
concerns that I've had on that is, given the divisions--the
obvious divisions in the country, that we're almost in what
would be called a strategic mousetrap here, where the harder we
fight against the Sunni insurgency, the more the Shia
population is empowered and the more influence Iran has in
Iraq. And so, I'm interested in the views of all of you about
the notion of that mousetrap.
General Keane. Well, I think it's a concern, certainly. I
just mention that, because when you try to define the problem,
it's--I find it useful to go back and understand how we got
here. And it was the Sunnis who were rejecting the--our
occupation and rejecting what we believe is a new form of
government. And they started this, and the al-Qaeda enabled it,
and now we have, obviously, considerable sectarian Shia
violence that's provoked by the Sunnis.
You have to--certainly, if we go into these neighborhoods,
as I believe we will, we're going to deal with al-Qaeda, we
will deal with Shia, and we will deal with Sunnis, to be sure,
at the tactical level. And--we'll have the capacity to deal
with all of that. Your question is much more of a strategic
one, in terms of: Are we picking sides here? And what is the
implications of that?
We are where we are. We have a government--and that
government is a fledgling government, at best, trying to find
itself--that's grown out of a consensus, and it has factions in
it. And by anybody's definition, it's weak. What I think we
need to do is help it and strengthen it. And by doing so, and
working with the Sunni insurgency, we can get the Sunnis to
participate in a way that they're not willing to do now.
And I'm absolutely convinced we can push back on the Shia
violence by truly protecting the people. We can't be
Pollyannaish about this. We know that Sadr and others are using
the violence against their people to seek their own political
advantage and leverage in the country. That's a given. But the
reality is, also, that by bringing that violence down, you
start taking their issue away for--from them that justifies
what they're doing.
So, I'm hopeful that we can do something that's very
constructive here in--and it is a military application of force
designed singularly to get a political solution. It's the only
reason why we're doing this. You buy time for the growth and
development of Iraqi security forces, which helps in our
ability to exit the country, and then you strengthen Maliki's
hand, both with the Sunnis and with the Shias, so that we can
get a better form of government, in terms of representation,
and move the Sunnis to that table and take away what is now
their single option and what they believe is their only option,
which is: Continue the armed violence.
So, you have to deal with them, but certainly you also have
to deal with the Shia violence that's there and the incredible
level of it that took place. I recognize the mousetrap, but I
still think we have to go ahead and work this, because it's the
only thing we can do, I believe, that will strengthen the
government that we currently have. The benchmarks, by
themselves, to me, don't mean a lot. I don't think you're going
to get anything out of it.
Senator Webb. General Hoar.
General Hoar. Yes, sir. I hesitate to recite history to
you, but when the two principal institutions in that country,
the armed forces and tribalism, were destroyed or dismembered
as a conscious policy of this Government, you automatically
reduce the possibility of finding good outcomes. Ninety-five
percent of the people in Iraq belong to a tribe. And tribes
transcend religion and ethnicity. The armed forces is a no-
brainer, that there should have been a de-Baathification at the
top end, and retain that--all of that, that went with it. So,
we have few institutions to fall back on. And so, as a result,
we're trying to build from the bottom up; and, in my judgment,
you can't get there from here. It's too late, we're asking too
much of what needs to be done.
Senator Webb. General McCaffrey, you have a thought on
that?
General McCaffrey. The--I think I'd actually agree with
General Odom's characterization, and maybe--perhaps come to a
slightly different conclusion. When you step into Iraq, took
out a cruel ruling elite, maybe 15 percent of the population
that had dominated the military, the intelligence service,
business, academics, et cetera, and you said, ``We're going to
institute democratic reforms,'' then you gave the government to
a Shia-Kurdish overwhelming majority who had been abused for
hundreds of years, if not for 30-plus by Saddam and his
criminal regime. So, that was the outcome we understood when we
set foot in the country.
I'm not sure that's necessarily unacceptable, if we
maintained a presence to ensure that there wouldn't be a
violent decimation in retribution against the Sunnis, if we
kept peace with their neighbors. I'm not quite sure why a
Government of Iraq that was more closely aligned, by far, with
Iran than Saddam's 7-year war against the Iranians--I'm not
quite sure why that doesn't suit our own interests.
I do think that we ought to have a regional focus. Our
focus should be peace and some form of stability, and that
our--as you have said, though, the current mousetrap, in my
view, is, our strategy is failing and our current responses, it
seem to me, will not break out of the box.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Gentlemen, I just have a few closing questions, if I may. I
can't tell you how much I appreciate your perseverance, as well
as your answers.
To continue with the conundrum that my friend from Virginia
has mentioned, one of the reasons I always have trouble--and
I'm not being facetious--with this administration, is
understanding their strategic objective. Internally in Iraq,
the premise is, as stated clearly and articulately by General
Keane, that if we gain control of the insurgents who are
needlessly going after our troops, but also fomenting this
sectarian war by going after Shia indiscriminately, that
somehow the Shia will feel they can stand down, and the
political process can begin. Let's assume that's true.
At the same time, I don't know whether this is true, but it
seems clear, overall--the administration and the President
clearly stated that he is going to do all he can to deal with
Syria and Iran, but particularly Iran.
Now, everything I read--and I've been here 34 years; I've
learned to read between the lines. I don't always read it
accurately, but there is always a message between the lines.
The President didn't have a throwaway phrase about Iran in his
speech for nothing. That was the red light that went on for me,
beyond the surge. Of the things that concern me about the
speech, more than anything else was the emphasis on Iran.
And, again, it seems to me, to raise the conundrum
mentioned, or the mousetrap, whatever you want to say, is that
at the very time we are taking on the Sunnis, which, I can tell
you from my personal discussions, upsets our allies in the
region--they are very uneasy about that in Saudi Arabia and in
Egypt and other places--at the very time that's happening
internally, the Shia, who seem satisfied with that, are very
upset that we seem to be focusing on the Shia influence in the
region, outside the country. So, I don't know how you square
that. I don't understand, strategically, how you can accomplish
both objectives. Am I missing something? Or am I overreading?
Anyone?
Yes, General.
General Hoar. Right on. That's the short answer, sir.
[Laughter.]
The longer answer is, there are people--Seymour Hersh among
them--that have been writing, for the last 8 or 10 months, in
the New Yorker about the plan to attack Iran. I think that
replacing an officer with ground combat experience in CENTCOM
with an admiral, by sending a second carrier battle group into
the gulf,
by sending Patriot batteries into the region, are--I would use
a slightly different word than you, but ominous, nonetheless.
I would tell you a story that I believe to be true. Hamad
bin Jassim, the Foreign Minister of Qatar, went to Tehran. He
told the Iranians that, while his government had supported
United States efforts in Iraq, that he would not--their
government would not support any adventurism toward Iran. The
Iranians told him that he had it all wrong, that they do not
have the capability to strike the United States, but, if
attacked by the United States, they would attack infrastructure
targets up and down the gulf among those countries that have
supported the United States.
If I were going to do this, I would assuage the concerns of
my friends in the region by bringing Patriot batteries in. I
don't know why you have two carrier battle groups in the gulf,
when fixed-wing air, while an essential part of any campaign,
doesn't require a lot of airplanes on a day-to-day basis, and
why you would have an admiral in charge of CENTCOM, when you
have two essentially ground combat operations going on in two
separate campaigns, would all indicate to me that there's
something moving right now toward Iran.
The Chairman. I happen to agree with that. You would know,
much better than I would, what these moves meant. That's how I
read it. But I'm trying to get at the more fundamental
question. I never can understand--there seems to be no
coherence to the strategy of this administration, from the
beginning. We seem to have a little of this, a little of that;
and the objectives, the stated objectives, the stated missions,
seem at odds with one another.
Again, let's assume it made sense to go into Iran. Here,
you have the present Shia-dominated government opening up
meetings with, trying to establish a diplomatic relationship
with, Tehran, trying to extend a relationship to Syria, as
well, at the very moment we seem to be trying to satisfy them
internally by staying out of Sadr City, focusing on the Sunni.
But at the same time at odds with their stated, or at least
apparent, foreign policy--regional policy. It seems like we are
our own worst enemy, in terms of the strategic notions that we
have. They seem inconsistent.
General McCaffrey. The--I think you, again, pose another
principal strategic challenge we're facing. I personally have
been to see the Secretary of State, my travels in the region,
listening to our allies in the Persian Gulf--and I used, with
General Hoar, a corny story. I started with my first platoon
Sergeant in the 82d Airborne. He said, ``Sir,'' he said,
``don't you ever threaten people in public, but make sure, if
you do threaten them, you can carry out your threat.''
The Chairman. Bingo.
General McCaffrey. So, we've had a combination of public
threats to the Iranians, which has horrified our allies, which,
it seems to me, from a strictly military perspective, are sheer
insanity that we would try and end a nuclear capability of the
Iranians, take down their air defense in the process of doing
it, neutralize their naval threat to the Persian Gulf oil
supplies, and to do it while we have 150,000 GIs stuck 400
kilometers up into Iraq, with our lines of communication back
to the sea and the safety of the Navy--going through 400
kilometers of Shia population. So, this doesn't make any sense.
I hope it's just a lower-level notion, ``Well, you're
always supposed to put a carrier out there to empower your
ambassador demarche, but if it goes beyond that, this is truly
the most significant blunder in strategic thinking we will have
seen since World War II.
General Odom. One----
The Chairman. Yes, General.
General Odom [continuing]. One brief comment. I'd like to
commend you for bringing up that paradox and putting this light
directly on Iran. If I were in your position, or members of
this committee, I would be thinking about how I will vote when
an apparent Iranian terrorist attack occurs against the United
States, not necessarily in the United States, but against some
of its interest in the future--and the war cries for bombing
Iran go up.
The Chairman. Well, quite frankly, General, I'm thinking of
going farther than this. I haven't discussed this with my
colleagues yet. I'm in the process of trying to draft
legislation that would make it clear that the authorization for
the use of force that was passed, which I think is essentially
no longer relevant. It was put forward to take out Saddam. It
was put forward to deal with weapons of mass destruction. If
they were there, they ain't there now; they never were, in my
view. And he's gone. So, what's the raison d'etat for this? I
want to make it clear, I've been around here too long--I take
the President seriously when he says things that seem to me to
be outrageous. I'm not being a wise guy now, I--I'm not trying
to be disrespectful, I give you my word. But I take it
seriously, because the first time out, when we gave the
President the authority to move forward, Lugar and I had a
resolution that was much more restrictive than the one that
passed in the authorization of the use of force. And remember,
everybody--not you guys, but everybody has sort of a selective
memory about the moment. The moment we were voting on that, the
issue was: Do we lift sanctions on Saddam, which the rest of
the world was pushing, or do we give the President the
political clout to demonstrate to the world that we stood with
him in insisting they stay on by giving this authority to use
force, if need be? And we had assurances, ``No, no, no, no, no;
we're not going to use the force, we're not going to move
forward.'' And then the writing began to be on the wall, when
every time it looked like Powell was making progress
diplomatically, there would be a deliberate effort to undercut
that, coming from the administration.
And the press now says, ``It was obvious to everyone that
these guys were going to do that.'' It wasn't obvious. They
acted responsibly on Afghanistan. They did it in the right way.
They marshaled authority, they had the bill of particulars,
they put forward the indictment, they sent folks out around the
world, to the world capitals, including our friends and enemies
alike, they dealt with Iran. I mean, it was done logically, and
it was done rationally, and it gave some of us hope--and
remember what was being written at the time, gentlemen. I know
you do remember. I was having scores of interview requests, and
some of you were also being asked, ``Has the administration
become internationalist? Has the President changed his mind?
Has he moved from neoisolationism to engaging the rest of the
world?'' Remember that? And there were all these articles
written in December, after we gave him the authority, but
before we went to war. And so, the idea that everybody knew
they would be, in my view, as incredibly irresponsible as they
were is--
Matter of fact, back in the days when I was chairman,
again, not a whole lot of difference between Senator Lugar and
me on these things--we held a series of hearings, and it was an
extensive series--before the authority was given. Not ``What
happens the day after Saddam?'' The title of the series was,
``The Decade After.''
Now, the reason I bother to state this, gentlemen, is that
it seems to me that we still don't quite have a strategy. But
let me get into a tactical question, and then, with one other
question, let you all go. I really appreciate you doing this.
From a military perspective, again, I spent a lot of time,
as I think General McCaffrey knows--a lot of time with General
Petraeus--in theater, in e-mails. I mean, I find the guy to be
exactly what you all advertise him to be. That's my impression
of him, a really smart guy. Well, it's often suggested by my
friends who have a different view about ``the surge,'' who
think it's a good idea, that, ``Look what he was able to do up
in the north.'' And my instinct is, we're comparing apples and
oranges here. And that's what I want to ask you, a tactical
question.
Is there a difference between fighting foreign jihadis and
domestic insurgents--Baathists, Saddamists, et cetera--and
trying to stop a sectarian war? In the north, where Petraeus
did so well, in Mosul and in Tal Afar, my recollection was,
there was not a civil war. It wasn't predominantly Shia killing
Sunni, Kurds killing Shia, et cetera. It was dealing with an
insurgency trying to kill American forces and prevent an Iraqi
Government from becoming a reality. Now, I may be wrong. You
don't all have to comment, but you are welcome to. But tell me:
Is there a difference?
General McCaffrey. I think you summarized it correctly. I
remember going up to see Dave Petraeus in his command post in
Mosul, and he had an unbelievable grasp of the--of how you go
about--economically, politically, militarily--jump-starting the
region. He had incredible interpersonal relationships with the
Arab leadership. It was a phenomenal performance. He understood
the disastrous judgments of Mr. Bremer, et al., in the central
government, standing down the army, firing the officer corps,
de- Baathicizing the country. He goes back to a totally
different situation.
The Chairman. Absolutely.
General McCaffrey. I'll guarantee you, he understands that.
The Chairman. Well, I have no doubt that he does. Let me
put it this way. I've thought there is a fundamentally
different circumstance, and, if it is, I'm confident he
understands it. I am just perplexed as to what happens.
My prediction, for what it's worth--and I obviously am not
a military man, but I do know a fair amount about policing--as
you know, General, I've become a student of that for 35 years--
what's needed here is, essentially, community policing, and
that is a long, long investment. That is gigantic--even in a
metropolitan city in America, where there's not a civil war--
and I don't know whether we have the stomach for it, or the
capacity.
And my guess is, you're going to see Sadr being smart
enough to stand down, take his folks out of uniform, put them
in civilian clothes, drop the checkpoints, take away the
rationale for the U.S. military to move on Sadr City, hopefully
we--to use your point, General--go do their work in the Sunni
areas, and then step up. Who are we benefiting? But that's
neither here nor there.
Last question, and it really is the last question,
gentlemen. Underlying--the underlying issue here, for me, is:
Assume I buy into the rationale that you need a military
solution to create an atmosphere in which a political solution
can emerge. I've said, at the outset, in my strong opposition
to this surge, that if you somehow convince me there is a
connection and a correlation and an agreement between an
underlying political objective and the military--I could see
the possible rationale for it. But here's my problem. When you
talk about ``To give the Iraqis some breathing space by
bringing order in Baghdad to allow for a political settlement
to emerge,'' is there any evidence anywhere that, even if
tomorrow we dropped 500,000 troops into Iraq, completely shut
down the civil war temporarily, that that is going to change
the conditions that are required for the Sunni and Shia to make
some serious, serious, serious and dangerous political
concessions?
What makes us think that that would have SCIRI or Dawa
conclude that we're going to give a big chunk of the revenues
to the Sunnis? What would make us think that the Sunnis are
prepared to sign on to essentially a Sunni constituency
equivalent to Kurdistan? What makes us think that these giant
dividing issues are going to be resolved? Is there any reason
to think that, even if there is not a single Iraqi killed in
the next 6 months, there's incentive to make these very
difficult political decisions that have to be made to allow
this country, once we lift the siege, to live together? I've
not seen any. There may be.
That's the question I have, and that's the last question.
And, as I said, I've really trespassed on your time, but you're
all so darn good, I can't resist.
Senator Casey. Senator, let me--can I just----
The Chairman. Sure.
Senator Casey. I want to make sure I understand what you're
asking. Your--and I was thinking about this before, and I ran
out of time--your question is basically: Will restoring order
automatically trigger political momentum?
The Chairman. Will restoring it--or not even
automatically--will--is there any evidence that restoring order
will make the Dawa-SCIRI parties, Sadr's party, the Sunni
tribal leaders and the Sunni party more inclined to settle what
everyone acknowledges is the underlying problem: Their
significant political differences? And, if so, what are those
differences that have to be resolved so that, when we do step
back and say, ``It's yours, fellows,'' that it's not going to
immediately return to the sectarian chaos that exists today?
General Odom. Can I give a--I'll give you a fairly short
answer. I don't think there's any evidence for that. The
question, as you've posed it, has been addressed since the
fall--the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, and there have been
efforts, again and again, to give somebody time to put it
together. It always failed.
In Vietnam, I used to address this issue with the--in the
Pacification Development Program. The country field submission
for more money for Vietnam would come out from the Embassy to
the MACV Headquarters for staffing, and they'd say, ``Well,
they need more time, they're not ready to take over yet, so we
can't give them all they want, but let's give most of what they
want.'' So, we--you know, leave an incentive for them to--``We
won't give everything, but we won't let them fall.''
So, I pulled the files out for the last 6 years, and every
year, you had the same argument, and every year, the amount of
money they wanted, and we were willing to give them, went up.
Well, I caused a little disturbance by suggesting that to do
this is like advocating that a drunk man drink more in order to
sober up.
And then, I've since seen a lot of literature on other
countries, cases that suggest that the worst thing you can do
to help a client against an insurgency in an internal war is to
give them help. It--an internal war is about who's going to
rule, and who's going to rule is the guy who can tax and
control the resources. And if you give these guys time, through
money and resources, they will use you as their tax base, and
their opponents will take over the domestic tax.
The Chairman. I love that quote--and I must admit, I
thought I was a relatively good student of the Communist
revolution, but I love that quote, ``Paper will put up with
anything written on it.'' That was Stalin's, I guess you said?
General Odom. Well, it's an old Russian proverb.
The Chairman. An old--oh, a Russian proverb. I----
General Odom. He loved that.
The Chairman. I must admit, I had not heard it before. But,
having said that, there still is a paper with stuff written on
it out there called a constitution. And if you look at the
Constitution, interesting thing, the central government, as
envisioned by the Iraqis, has no taxing power. There is no
taxing power.
General Odom. Then it's a joke.
The Chairman. I had this little debate with Prime Minister
Maliki, who--for the sake of discussion, I'll acknowledge he
has this overwhelmingly difficult job, and it may be putting
too much on him, et cetera, but we were meeting, and I asked
him about what he was going to do about such and such? He said,
``That's already taken care of in the Constitution.'' I said,
``Mr. Prime Minister, you and I''--this was in Baghdad, on July
7, 8, 9, 10; I don't recall exactly which day it was--I said,
``Mr. Prime Minister, you and I may be the only two people who
have read the Constitution.'' It's fascinating. The strong
central government our Government keeps insisting on--under the
organizing principle of that government, the Constitution, the
central government has no power to tax. Explicitly. Explicitly.
And it explicitly states that governates, the 18 of them, have
explicit power, if they choose the title ``region'' rather than
``governate,'' to maintain their security.
And in Kurdistan, if I'm not mistaken, General, you can't
even fly the Iraqi flag, and no Iraqi forces are allowed within
what is now called Kurdistan. You understand----
General Keane. Can I have one comment?
The Chairman [continuing]. My frustration.
Yes, please, General.
General Keane. You know, to accept the premise that you
just suggested is--you know, that insurgencies, irregular
warfare, internal conflicts, when they're challenging like
this, and they're difficult, that it's hopeless, that there's
no way to be able to resolve it--and I don't suggest, for a
minute, that this is not very difficult, and certainly General
Petraeus is fully aware of what his challenges are in front of
him, and they are very different than what he faced in Mosul,
much more--much more difficult--but the reality is that you can
use military force to compel people's wills. You can change
their will, using force. You can begin to set some conditions
to get some political results.
The question that will remain--I'm convinced we can do
that--the question remains, for me, which--I've tried to be as
straightforward about it as I can----
The Chairman. You have been.
General Keane [continuing]. Is the government itself,
where--even if we do that, where will--their political will
would be. I would like to think that after we have strengthened
his hand, and then he can bring the Sunnis to the table, and
the Shias are back behind their barricades, and the violence
has gone down, that those benchmark things then make sense. But
that remains an open question. I'm not going to try to put a
spin on this; it's not my style. But----
The Chairman. Well, I'm not suggesting you were, General. I
think you've been straightforward----
General Keane [continuing]. But the fact is, is that I
believe you can establish some conditions to get some results.
It'll still be Maliki and his government, whether they're
committed to those results or not.
The Chairman. Anyone else?
General Hoar. Sure. I think that many people in this
Government--or they don't understand the depth of enmity that
exists between Shia and Sunni. This is big-time and real, and
it has been for centuries, as we know. And my view, as I
indicated to you earlier, is that if you got some political
movement on the part of Maliki, then you could perhaps talk
about troops, but if he's not committed to make hard choices
early on, there is no chance of pulling this thing out, in my
judgment.
The Chairman. Gentlemen, you've been incredibly generous
with your time, your knowledge, your wisdom, and your
straightforwardness. It is refreshing. It is welcome. It is
needed. I thank you all for allowing us to take you through the
lunch hour.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:33 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
ALTERNATIVE PLANS CONTINUED--FEDERALISM, SIDE WITH THE MAJORITY,
STRATEGIC REDEPLOYMENT, OR NEGOTIATE?
----------
TUESDAY, JANUARY 23, 2007 [A.M.]
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:20 a.m., in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R.
Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Feingold, Boxer, Nelson, Obama,
Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Lugar, Hagel, Corker, Voinovich,
Murkowski, and Isakson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
The Chairman. Hearing will please come to order.
This morning, we begin our third week of hearings on the
remaining options in Iraq. Today, we'll have two distinguished
panels of witnesses presenting alternative proposals of the way
forward in Iraq.
I'd like to take a moment to outline, briefly, the schedule
over the next 2 weeks, if I may.
Tomorrow, we'll take a break, of sorts, from our hearing
schedule to hold a business meeting in which we'll consider a
bipartisan resolution on Iraq. We will return to our hearings
on Thursday morning with a panel on the administration's new
reconstruction strategy, followed by an afternoon panel
focusing on Iraq's internal politics.
A week from today, we'll hear from Secretary Baker and
Congressman Lee Hamilton, and the following day, we'll be
joined by Secretaries of State Kissinger and Albright. We will
close this series on Thursday of next week, with three former
National Security Advisors: General Scowcroft, Dr. Brzezinski,
and Mr. Berger.
And let me return to today's hearings.
We have with us four articulate experts who will present
specific recommendations regarding our policy in Iraq.
Les Gelb is a president emeritus and board senior fellow at
the Council on Foreign Relations. He and I have put forward a
plan for a political settlement in which the unity of Iraq is
preserved by creating three or more regions, as provided by the
Iraqi Constitution. The plan would guarantee the Iraqi Sunnis a
fair share of oil revenues, and it urges the creation of a
contact group to support the political settlement among the
Iraqis. And finally, it calls for the redeployment of most of
American troops over the next 18 months.
Edward Luttwak is a friend and a senior advisor to the
Center for Strategic International Studies. He argues, and I
quote, ``Only with United States disengagement can Iraqis find
their own equilibrium. Twenty thousand U.S. troops in desert
bases suffice to deter foreign intrusion.''
And we have Robert Malley, who is the director of the
Middle East Program at the International Crisis Group. He
advocates, and I quote, ``a clean break in the way the United
States deals with the Iraqi Government and the region. The
United States should seek to enlist broad international support
for a new political compact among Iraqis, cease treating the
Iraqi Government as a privileged partner and start seeing it as
a party to the sectarian war, and engage in real diplomacy with
all Iraqis' neighbors, Iran and Syria included.''
And Larry Korb, who is a senior fellow at the Center for
American Progress and a senior advisor to the Center for
Defense Information. Mr. Korb has testified many times before
this committee. His plan calls for, and I quote, ``a diplomatic
surge and the strategic redeployment of our military forces.
U.S. troops would redeploy completely from Iraq in the next 18
months, remain in the region, and be increased in
Afghanistan.''
We look forward to the testimony of all the witnesses. And
now I'll turn to Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, again, for
holding this important hearing.
Today, we will have an opportunity to broaden our focus
beyond the President's plan as we explore an array of
strategies in Iraq. The variance among the plans offered at
this hearing underscores the complexity of the situation in
Iraq and the need to provide close oversight of the
administration's policies.
Although the President is committed to his approach and has
initiated steps to implement it, planning by the administration
must continue. We must plan for contingencies, including the
failure of the Iraqi Government to reach compromises and the
persistence of violence despite United States and Iraqi
Government efforts.
Last week, our committee had the opportunity to engage
military experts on the President's plan, as well as military
conditions in Iraq. Our panel of four distinguished retired
generals voiced deep concerns about how we translate our
military position in Iraq into political gains. It remains
unclear how expanded, continued, or reduced United States
military presence can be used to stimulate Iraqi political
reconciliation.
Wide, though not unanimous, agreement exists that our
military presence in Iraq represents leverage, either because
it can be expanded or because it can be withdrawn, but there is
little agreement on how to translate this leverage into
effective action by the Iraqi Government. Some commentators
talk of ``creating space'' for the Iraqi Government to
establish itself, but it is far from clear that the government
can or will take advantage of such space.
In a previous hearing, Secretary Richard Haass highlighted
a fundamental disconnect that we must overcome for any plan to
work, when he observed, ``The U.S. goal is to work with Iraqis
to establish a functioning democracy in which the interests and
rights of minorities are protected. The goal of the Iraqi
Government appears to be to establish a country in which the
rights and interests of the Shia majority are protected above
all else.''
In such a situation, even if additional troops have a
discernible impact on the violence in Iraq, this progress in
the street may be immaterial to achieving political
reconciliation. If this is true, all we would gain with a surge
is a temporary and partial reduction of violence in Baghdad.
That would have some salutary benefits for some Iraqis, but it
would not help us achieve our strategic objectives.
If we undertake the tremendous investment that sending more
American soldiers to Iraq represents, it should be in support
of a clear strategy for achieving a negotiated reconciliation.
We should not depend on theories or hopes that something good
may happen if we dampen violence in Baghdad.
Thus, as the administration increases troops, it becomes
more imperative to develop a backup plan and aggressively seek
a framework for a political solution. It is not enough to set
benchmarks to measure the progress of the Iraqi Government. If
the Iraqi Government has different timetables and objectives
than we do, such benchmarks will not be met in a way that
transforms the politics of the nation.
Backup plans must be synchronized with a wider strategic
vision for the Middle East. The fall of Saddam Hussein and the
rise of the Shia majority in Iraq have opened possibilities for
broader conflict along sectarian lines. Sunni Arab regimes in
the region are deeply concerned about the influence of Iran and
its growing aggressiveness. An Iran that is bolstered by an
alliance with a Shiite government in Iraq or a separate Shiite
state in southern Iraq would pose serious challenges for Saudi
Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and other Arab governments. The
underlying issue for American foreign policy is how we defend
our interests in the Middle East, given the new realities that
our 4 years in Iraq have imposed. We need frank policy
discussions in this country about our vital interests in the
region. The difficulties we have had in Iraq make a strong
presence in the Middle East more imperative, not less.
I welcome, along with you, Mr. Chairman, our distinguished
guests, and we look forward to a very thoughtful hearing.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
We'll begin in order--starting with Mr. Gelb, Luttwak,
Korb, and Malley.
The floor is yours, Les. You have to press that button
there to turn this thing on.
Dr. Gelb. Oh, there we go.
The Chairman. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. LESLIE H. GELB, PRESIDENT EMERITUS AND BOARD
SENIOR FELLOW, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NEW YORK, NY
Dr. Gelb. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Former Chairman, member of the
committee, permit me a moment of reflection.
I know well the bipartisan power of this committee. I
worked here over 40 years ago for Senator Jacob Javits, and, in
1966, this committee conducted hearings on Vietnam that really
changed the course of the debate in the United States about
that war. It illuminated the situation in Vietnam, and our
choices. Those hearings were a monument to bipartisanship and
to democracy.
I am honored to be here to present the proposal, strategic
alternative, developed by the chairman and myself, now almost a
year ago. And since we first put it forward, it has been so
misrepresented, maligned, and attacked that my wife now calls
it ``The Biden Plan.'' [Laughter.]
The essence of the idea, as the chairman just outlined it a
moment ago, is that if there is to be a settlement of this
war--and we may be beyond that point--it has to be a political
settlement based on a power-sharing arrangement. And there are
two kinds of power-sharing arrangements. One can strive for a
strong central government or one can strive for a decentralized
or federal system. The administration has tried for over 3
years now to build a strong central government. It has not
worked, it will not work, because there are not sufficient
common interests and there's almost total lack of trust. That
government is inefficient and corrupt.
Most of the ministers--and I know you've all been there--
don't even leave the Green Zone to go to their ministries to
run their departments. So, the alternative for the Iraqis is a
decentralized system. And I say ``for the Iraqis,'' because
they themselves, as the chairman noted, have called what they
have a federal system, and in their Constitution, they put
forward a federal structure and provide for provinces joining
with other provinces to form regional governments. This is not
an invention of Chairman Biden and myself; it is in their
Constitution. They also passed implementing legislation a few
months ago to make this happen, though they deferred it.
Now, what would a government like this look like? Why is
there opposition to the idea of actually getting it done,
implementing the federal system? And finally, how would you
overcome that opposition and resistance?
The government would look like this. The central government
would be based on the areas where there are genuine common
interests among the different Iraqi parties; that is, foreign
affairs, border defense, currency, and, above all, oil and gas
production and revenues. I'll come back to that in a moment.
But that's where they share real interests.
As for the regions, whether they be three or four or five,
whatever it may be--it's up to--all this is up to the Iraqis to
decide--would be responsible for legislation, administration,
and internal security. Very important. Because they would
defend themselves. They have that interest in taking care of
their own people.
Now, 80 percent of the Iraqi people approved that
constitution and that federal system. Eighty percent of the
national assembly backed the idea of moving forward on the
federal system because it's a way of letting the different
communities run their own affairs and, at the same time,
keeping the country together.
So, why the opposition? The opposition comes principally
from the Sunnis and principally because they've been used to
running that country for hundreds of years, and they still view
themselves as the natural rules of the whole country; they
don't want to give it up. And they are backed in that desire by
their Sunni Arab neighbors, who like the idea of the Sunnis
running Iraq, don't like the idea of the Shiites running it,
and don't want to see Iraq broken up in any fashion whatsoever,
because it's a bad precedent for them. And they're, in turn,
backed by the Bush administration and by most of the Middle
East experts in this country, who tend to follow the Sunni way
of thinking on this.
There are Shiites opposed to this, too. And those Shiites
are opposed to it because they think it's now their turn to run
all of Iraq, so they don't want to see it federalized to weaken
their power. And they've resisted it on those grounds.
The Kurds are all for it, and, for almost 13 years, they've
been running their own regional government, and very
successfully.
Now, how do you overcome their resistance? This is a big
problem, and it may not be doable, but here is what the
chairman and I have put forward.
First and foremost, you try to make the Sunnis an offer
they can't refuse. You let them run their own region. And they
have to see that that's preferable to their being a permanent
minority in a government run by the Shiites and the Kurds. This
way, they can run their own affairs, and it's their last chance
to do so.
Second, you've got to make it economically viable for the
Sunnis to have their own region. And the only way you can do
that is by changing the Constitution so that it guarantees the
Sunnis 20 percent--based on their proportion of the
population--20 percent of the oil revenues, present and future.
Right now, they're guaranteed nothing.
How do you convince the Shiites? Basically, you've got to
convince them that, if they try to run the whole country,
they're going to be faced with endless insurgencies,
themselves; they'll have to pick up the civil war, they'll
never be able to enjoy the riches of that country of Iraq.
But those arguments, even though they make sense, aren't
enough, and we've got to go further. The second element of the
plan is how you use United States military withdrawals and
redeployments, both within Iraq and within the region, to
reinforce the kind of political settlement we would hope the
Iraqis could reach. The chairman and I have a little
disagreement over what that military plan should look like,
because I don't see it in terms of any fixed timetables, I see
it more as a process that we ask our military to arrange with
the Iraqi military over the course of, say, 2 years, where we
can make adjustments according to the situation.
Now, the withdrawal process opens up political doors for us
that reinforce this decentralization, or federal idea. In the
first place, it allows us to move toward an alliance with many
of the Sunnis in the center of that country--with the
Baathists, with the sheikhs, and with the secular leaders of
that society--because once they see we're not going to be there
and remain their central enemy, they can band with us against
the common enemy, the terrorists in their midst, the jihadis,
the al-Qaeda people, and they are the common enemy for both of
us. Those are the people who are destroying the homes of most
of the Sunnis in the center of the country, destroying their
lives. And once they see that we're not there as a permanent
military factor in the center of that country, we can begin to
make that alliance with them. The same goes with the Shias.
Once they see that we're in the process of leaving, we can
develop common interests with them, as well.
These are, in the last analysis, Iraqi Arab Shias, not
Iranian Persian Shiites. And there's an important historical
difference there. And we can play on that in order to develop a
relationship with the Shia that will help us advance a new
government.
There's also a difference in religious tradition, where the
Iraqi Shias are much less willing to have their high clergy be
involved directly in government than the Iranian Shiites. So,
there's area for us to work with once they see we're not going
to be a permanent military presence.
The diplomacy is the final factor here. And as we see the
diplomacy, it is not something that can create a solution, nor
should we try to create or impose one on the Iraqis. The
diplomacy can't solve the problem within Iraq, but it can
reinforce any kind of arrangement that the Iraqis themselves
are moving toward. The Iranians or the Saudis are not going to
impose a settlement on their allies within Iraq, but they'll
support something they themselves want to achieve.
Now, finally, Mr. Chairman, members, I know it's very
fashionable to talk about the United States being in a weak and
waning position in the Middle East and the gulf, and that Iran
is in the ascendancy. I think this is nonsense. The United
States is a great power, the Iranians are a puny power. Their
importance in that area is temporary and based on the fact that
the people of that area, the leaders, don't see a coherent
policy from the United States of America. When we have a
coherent policy, those countries will come to us.
After the Vietnam war--and it ended in an awful way--
President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger had a coherent
strategy, and the nations of Asia rallied to the United States,
because they did not want to see United States weakened in
their part of the world. They understood that they could not do
what they wanted economically and protect their security
without a strong United States, and they rallied to us. The
same will happen in the Middle East and gulf once the leaders
and peoples of that area of the world believe we have a
sensible strategy and have returned to a commonsense approach
to the area.
I thank you very much for your attention.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Gelb follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Leslie H. Gelb, President Emeritus and Board
Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, NY
we're fighting not to lose
(By Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts, director of Columbia
University's Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies--The
Washington Post, Jan. 14, 2007)
Iraq is not Vietnam, yet history seems intent on harnessing them
together. Three years ago this seemed an unlikely pairing; surely
President Bush would not take the United States down the same trail as
Lyndon B. Johnson. Yet, even though Iraq's story is far from complete,
each day raises the odds that the U.S. fate in Iraq could eventually be
the same as it was in Vietnam--defeat.
The differences are clear. The policy consensus over the Vietnam
war ran deeper and lasted longer than on the Iraq conflict. While
Johnson and his advisers slogged deeper into Vietnam with realistic
pessimism, Bush and his colleagues plunged ahead in Iraq with reckless
optimism. And in Vietnam, U.S. leaders made most of their mistakes with
their eyes wide open, while it is impossible to fathom exactly what the
Bush team thought it was doing after the fall of Baghdad.
Twenty-eight years ago, we wrote a book, ``The Irony of Vietnam:
The System Worked,'' which argued that although U.S. policy in that war
was disastrous, the policymaking process performed just as it was
designed to. It seems odd that a good system could produce awful
results, but the subsequent declassified documents and the public
record showed it to be true. U.S. officials generally had accurate
assessments of the difficulties in Vietnam, and they looked hard at the
alternatives of winning or getting out.
On Iraq the insider documents are not available, but journalistic
accounts suggest that Bush's policy process was much less realistic.
The President did not take seriously the obstacles to his goals, did
not send a military force adequate to accomplish the tasks, failed to
plan for occupation, and took few steps to solve the underlying
political conflicts among Iraqis.
Despite these different paths, Bush now faces Johnson's dilemma,
that of a war in which defeat is unthinkable but victory unlikely. And
Bush's policy shift last week suggests that he has come to the same
conclusion as Johnson: Just do what you can not to lose and pass the
problem on to your successor.
In both cases, despite talk of ``victory,'' the overriding
imperative became simply to avoid defeat.
How did these tragedies begin? Although hindsight makes many
forget, the Vietnam war was backed by a consensus of almost all
foreign-policy experts and a majority of U.S. voters. Until late in the
game, opponents were on the political fringe. The consensus rested on
the domino theory--if South Vietnam fell to communism, other
governments would topple. Most believed that communism was on the march
and a worldwide Soviet-Chinese threat on the upswing.
The consensus on Iraq was shallower and shorter lived. Bush may
have been bent on regime change in Baghdad from the start, but in any
case a consensus emerged among his advisers that Saddam Hussein was on
the verge of securing nuclear weapons capability--and that deterrence
and containment would not suffice. That judgment came to be shared by
most of the national security community. Congress also saluted early
on. The vote to endorse the war was less impressive than the Gulf of
Tonkin resolution, which passed almost unanimously, but many Democrats
signed on to topple Hussein for fear of looking weak.
As soon as the war soured, the consensus crumbled. Without the
vulnerability of middle-class youth to conscription, and with the
political left in a state of collapse since Ronald Reagan's Presidency,
the antiwar movement on Iraq did not produce sustained mass protests as
Vietnam did by the late 1960s. But the sentiment shows up just as
clearly in the polls.
Consensus held longer over Vietnam because few in or out of the
government had ever expected a quick and easy resolution of the war.
Officials knew what they were up against--the force of nationalism
embodied by Ho Chi Minh, and a succession of corrupt, inefficient, and
illegitimate South Vietnamese governments. Officials usually put on a
brave face, but they understood that Washington was in for the long
haul. In the Bush administration, by contrast, a gap opened almost
immediately between senior political leaders on one side, and most
military and diplomatic professionals, as well as the media, on the
other. The steady optimism of the former in the face of the reporting
of the latter quickly undid public confidence in the Pentagon's and
White House's leadership.
By 1968, Johnson understood that victory was not in the cards at
any reasonable price, but that defeat would be catastrophic. The war
had reached a deteriorating stalemate. If victory were possible, it
would require all-out use of military force against North Vietnam, a
move that the administration believed ran the risk of war with the
Soviet Union and China. If the United States were defeated, however,
the dominos would fall, and one of those dominos would be the occupant
of the White House. Periodically, top officials concluded that events
in Vietnam had taken another turn for the worse, and to prevent defeat
they had to dispatch more troops and do more bombing--and so the steady
escalation proceeded without lasting effect on the balance of power in
Vietnam.
Constrained against achieving victory or accepting defeat, Johnson
and his aides chose to do the minimum necessary to get through each
crunch in Vietnam and at home, hoping that something would turn up to
save them. In the end, Johnson made the ultimate political sacrifice
and declined to run for reelection. But as he announced a halt of the
bombing and the offer of negotiations with Hanoi, he also increased the
number of U.S. troops in Vietnam. Even as he was leaving office, he had
no intention of being ``the first American President to lose a war.''
By contrast, Bush never had to worry that escalation would bring an
all-out global war; the United States is the world's sole superpower.
Nonetheless, until last week, he never chose to increase the combat
commitment significantly; the ``surge'' announced last week is but the
latest experiment with a temporary increase in forces. At the beginning
this was probably because he did not believe more troops were needed to
win. As the venture went bad, the Volunteer Army was stretched too thin
to provide an option for massive escalation. But now it is clear that
Bush does not believe he can possibly win with anything close to the
number of forces currently committed. The President certainly perceives
the risks of losing, and at this moment of truth, he is repeating
Johnson's decision pattern--doing the minimum necessary not to lose.
Whatever the similarities in the way Washington dealt with Vietnam
and Iraq, there were few similarities between the two wars themselves.
Vietnam was both a nationalist war against outside powers--first the
French, then the Americans--and a civil war. In Iraq, the lines of
conflict are messier. The main contest is the sectarian battle between
Arab Shiites and Arab Sunnis. The Kurds, so far, are mostly bystanders,
while the Americans struggle to back a weak yet balky government they
hope can remain a secular alternative.
Combat in Vietnam was a combination of insurgency and conventional
warfare, and the conventional element played to U.S. strengths. By
contrast, Washington's massive firepower advantages are nullified in
Iraq because the fighting remains
at the level of guerrilla warfare and terrorism. Iraq is harder for our
military than Vietnam was, yet we eventually had 540,000 troops in
Vietnam compared with barely a quarter of that number in Iraq. The
current U.S. footprint in Iraq is much smaller--only about one-tenth
the density of U.S. and allied forces per square mile in South Vietnam
at the height of U.S. involvement, and with an Iraqi population 50
percent larger than South Vietnam's. Consequently, the security
situation was never as bad in Vietnam as it is in Iraq today. In
Vietnam, Americans could travel most places day and night, while in
Iraq it is dangerous to leave the Green Zone. Even Bush's planned
21,500-troop increase will not make a lasting difference if the host
government does not become far more effective. As in Vietnam after the
Tet Offensive of 1968, the enemy can lie low until we stand down. In
both countries, U.S. forces worked hard at training national armies.
This job was probably done better in Vietnam, and the United States
certainly provided South Vietnamese troops with relatively better
equipment than they have given Iraqis so far. South Vietnamese forces
were more reliable, more effective, and far more numerous than current
Iraqi forces are.
In both cases, however, the governments we were trying to help
proved inadequate. Unlike their opponents, neither Saigon nor Baghdad
gained the legitimacy to inspire their troops. At bottom, this was
always the fundamental problem in both wars. Americans hoped that time
would help, but leaders such as South Vietnam's Nguyen Van Thieu and
Iraq's Nouri al-Maliki were never up to the job.
Americans have not stopped arguing about Vietnam--about whether the
war could have been won if fought differently, or was an impossible
task from the outset, or about who was to blame. Hawks claim that the
United States could have won in Vietnam if the military had been
allowed to fight without restraint. Supporters of the war in Iraq say
that the United States could have prevented the resistance if it had
been better prepared for occupation after the fall of Baghdad. Doves in
both cases say that the objectives were never worth any appreciable
price in blood and treasure.
After Vietnam, recriminations over failure became a never-healed
wound in American politics. Now Iraq is deepening that wound. With some
luck, Washington may yet escape Baghdad more cleanly than it did in the
swarms of helicopters fleeing Saigon in 1975. But even if the United
States is that fortunate, the story of the parallel paths to disaster
should be chiseled in stone--if only to avoid yet another tragedy in a
distant land, a few decades down the road.
______
UNITY THROUGH AUTONOMY IN IRAQ
(By Joseph R. Biden, Jr., and Leslie H. Gelb--The New York Times, May
1, 2006)
A decade ago, Bosnia was torn apart by ethnic cleansing and facing
its demise as a single country. After much hesitation, the United
States stepped in decisively with the Dayton Accords, which kept the
country whole by, paradoxically, dividing it into ethnic federations,
even allowing Muslims, Croats, and Serbs to retain separate armies.
With the help of American and other forces, Bosnians have lived a
decade in relative peace and are now slowly strengthening their common
central government, including disbanding those separate armies last
year.
Now the Bush administration, despite its profound strategic
misjudgments in Iraq, has a similar opportunity. To seize it, however,
America must get beyond the present false choice between ``staying the
course'' and ``bringing the troops home now'' and choose a third way
that would wind down our military presence responsibly while preventing
chaos and preserving our key security goals.
The idea, as in Bosnia, is to maintain a united Iraq by
decentralizing it, giving each ethnoreligious group--Kurd, Sunni Arab,
and Shiite Arab--room to run its own affairs, while leaving the central
government in charge of common interests. We could drive this in place
with irresistible sweeteners for the Sunnis to join in, a plan designed
by the military for withdrawing and redeploying American forces, and a
regional nonaggression pact.
It is increasingly clear that President Bush does not have a
strategy for victory in Iraq. Rather, he hopes to prevent defeat and
pass the problem along to his successor. Meanwhile, the frustration of
Americans is mounting so fast that Congress might end up mandating a
rapid pullout, even at the risk of precipitating chaos and a civil war
that becomes a regional war.
As long as American troops are in Iraq in significant numbers, the
insurgents can't win and we can't lose. But intercommunal violence has
surpassed the insurgency as the main security threat. Militias rule
swathes of Iraq and death squads kill dozens daily. Sectarian cleansing
has recently forced tens of thousands from their homes. On top of this,
President Bush did not request additional reconstruction assistance and
is slashing funds for groups promoting democracy.
Iraq's new government of national unity will not stop the
deterioration. Iraqis have had three such governments in the last 3
years, each with Sunnis in key posts, without noticeable effect. The
alternative path out of this terrible trap has five elements. The first
is to establish three largely autonomous regions with a viable central
government in Baghdad. The Kurdish, Sunni, and Shiite regions would
each be responsible for their own domestic laws, administration, and
internal security. The central government would control border defense,
foreign affairs, and oil revenues. Baghdad would become a federal zone,
while densely populated areas of mixed populations would receive both
multisectarian and international police protection.
Decentralization is hardly as radical as it may seem: The Iraqi
Constitution, in fact, already provides for a federal structure and a
procedure for provinces to combine into regional governments.
Besides, things are already heading toward partition: Increasingly,
each community supports federalism, if only as a last resort. The
Sunnis, who until recently believed they would retake power in Iraq,
are beginning to recognize that they won't and don't want to live in a
Shiite-controlled, highly centralized state with laws enforced by
sectarian militias. The Shiites know they can dominate the government,
but they can't defeat a Sunni insurrection. The Kurds will not give up
their 15-year-old autonomy.
Some will say moving toward strong regionalism would ignite
sectarian cleansing. But that's exactly what is going on already, in
ever-bigger waves. Others will argue that it would lead to partition.
But a breakup is already under way. As it was in Bosnia, a strong
federal system is a viable means to prevent both perils in Iraq.
The second element would be to entice the Sunnis into joining the
federal system with an offer they couldn't refuse. To begin with,
running their own region should be far preferable to the alternatives:
Being dominated by Kurds and Shiites in a central government or being
the main victims of a civil war. But they also have to be given money
to make their oil-poor region viable. The constitution must be amended
to guarantee Sunni areas 20 percent (approximately their proportion of
the population) of all revenues.
The third component would be to ensure the protection of the rights
of women and ethnoreligious minorities by increasing American aid to
Iraq but tying it to respect for those rights. Such protections will be
difficult, especially in the Shiite-controlled south, but Washington
has to be clear that widespread violations will stop the cash flow.
Fourth, the President must direct the military to design a plan for
withdrawing and redeploying our troops from Iraq by 2008 (while
providing for a small but effective residual force to combat terrorists
and keep the neighbors honest). We must avoid a precipitous withdrawal
that would lead to a national meltdown, but we also can't have a
substantial long-term American military presence. That would do
terrible damage to our Armed Forces, break American and Iraqi public
support for the mission, and leave Iraqis without any incentive to
shape up.
Fifth, under an international or United Nations umbrella, we should
convene a regional conference to pledge respect for Iraq's borders and
its federal system. For all that Iraq's neighbors might gain by picking
at its pieces, each faces the greater danger of a regional war. A
``contact group'' of major powers would be set up to lean on neighbors
to comply with the deal.
Mr. Bush has spent 3 years in a futile effort to establish a strong
central government in Baghdad, leaving us without a real political
settlement, with a deteriorating security situation--and with nothing
but the most difficult policy choices. The five-point alternative plan
offers a plausible path to that core political settlement among Iraqis,
along with the economic, military, and diplomatic levers to make the
political solution work. It is also a plausible way for Democrats and
Republicans alike to protect our basic security interests and honor our
country's sacrifices.
The Chairman. Thank you. I still want to be associated with
the plan.
Dr. Luttwak.
STATEMENT OF DR. EDWARD N. LUTTWAK, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Luttwak. I, of course, am honored to be before you
today.
I emphatically agree with Mr. Gelb's closing remarks. The
Iranians stride around as if they have won great victories, but
this generation of Pasdaran, of Iranians, have only fought one
war, with Iraq, which they lost. I'd agree that they are not a
great power.
Further, I believe that, inadvertently, what we have done,
and what certain Iranians have done, has brought about a
fracture in the Middle East. The ancient quarrel between the
Shia interpretation and the Sunni interpretation of Islam has
been activated and turned into a dynamic conflict. This has had
all kinds of unexpected consequences.
I notice that, for the first time in all the years I've
followed foreign affairs, the Saudi Government has become a
real ally of the United States. Back in 2000, some Saudis
supported al-Qaeda, funded it, others let it operate, others
winked at al-Qaeda. Today, the Saudis are real allies in
Lebanon, where they are helping Prime Minister Siniora to block
the Hezbollah.
The Jordanians are very active. They were, in the past,
too, but not as much.
The Egyptians were also real allies in the past but are
much more active today. Why? Because they're afraid of the so-
called Shia ``crescent'': It starts with Iran, extends to a
Shia-dominated Iraq and the Alawite-dominated government of
Syria--they are not Twelver Shia and would be persecuted in
Iran, but nevertheless cooperates politically with Iran, and
then, of course, the Hezbollah of Lebanon. That is the famous
Shia ``crescent'' from Iran to the Mediterranean. The Sunni
states are afraid of it, partly because of their own Shia
minorities, and the result is an unfriendly equilibrium between
Shia and Sunni states, but of course inside Iraq there is Shia-
Sunni violence instead of a strategic equipoise. Whether we
want it or not, the Bush administration--which certainly never
intended it--has brought about a classic situation that critics
might describe as ``Divide and Rule.'' It is not what anyone
wanted, but this equilibrium means, in my view, that the risks
and the costs of whatever we do in Iraq are much less than they
seem. Many people say that the war in Iraq has brought about a
tremendous geopolitical disaster in the Middle East. I would
simply say that it's brought into existence a new equilibrium,
where the Shia of Iraq absolutely need American power, because,
as Les Gelb correctly pointed out, the Sunnis, minority as they
are, they have always ruled Iraq, for a reason because the Shia
are always so divided. So, the Shia of Iraq need the United
States, absolutely. And that's why we've had the spectacle of
Mr. Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, son of a radical Ayatollah, himself a
radical--the same al-Hakim, who spent 23 years in Iran, where
many times he declaimed ``Death to America''--coming to the
White House and sitting with President Bush to ask for American
help. So, in Iraq, the Shia need us; outside Iraq, the Sunnis
need us. This is called ``divide and rule,'' whether you wish
it or not. You don't have to be Machiavellian, you do not have
to be a Metternich; it just happens quite naturally. No great
cleverness brought it about, no great cleverness is needed to
operate it in our interest. It means that the costs and risks
of whatever we do are much less than they would have been 5
years ago.
This is the context in which I recommend disengagement. It
is a context, which I do not see as tragic and disastrous,
because it is an equipoise. Disengagement is not withdrawal, it
is not the leap in the dark of abandonment. Disengagement means
just that, that is, you don't patrol the villages and towns,
you don't outpost, you don't checkpoint the roads but still
remain in Iraq with a fraction of the present force.
I should inform you, parenthetically, that primarily I made
my living as a tactical consultant all these years, dealing
with such things as how to organize patrols and I have field
experience. Therefore, I am acutely aware of the difference
disengagement would make.
Disengagement is not withdrawal. What does it mean? You
don't patrol, you don't outpost, but you don't leave the
country; you stay, for example, in ``Camp Victory,'' the
Baghdad International Airport. You might stay in the Green
Zone, at least transitionally. You would certainly stay in a
major logistic base, which already exists in western Iraq which
is largely desert. Saddam Hussein, helpfully, built a couple of
good bases there that can easily be rehabilitated, they just
need some plumbing work done on them.
So, the United States would be there with what? With a
force-level that has to be determined, but it should be of the
order of one-tenth of the force we now have.
And what would that force do? Well, it would give general
political backing to the elected Government of Iraq. It is an
elected government, it deserves our general political backing.
It would stop any invasions or rather, deter any invasions. And
if anybody--let's say that some al-Qaeda-type extreme groups
takes over a town and starts going around with flags and making
itself visible, a strike force could sally out and hit it.
At the present moment, as you all know, we are not
expending a lot of ammunition in Iraq; and, therefore, the
enormous costs of the Iraq war have to do with the logistics. A
lot of it is contractor-protected logistics, it's moving things
around to supply things to all our forces scattered in what is,
in fact, a vast country. With disengagement, the remaining
bases would be, supplied the way bases are now supplied, which
is primarily by Air Force C-130s from Kuwait, bringing the
supplies. And, therefore, there would be no U.S. traffic on the
roads. Once in a while, heavy equipment would be moved with
road transporters. Once in a while, there would be a rare
convoy, unannounced, heavily protected, and so on. This is
not--these are not all ways of reducing casualties, although
that is, indeed, very important. These are ways to reduce our
intrusions in the life of the Iraqis.
Politically, disengagement would end what we are now doing.
And what are we doing now? We are interposing ourselves between
the peoples in Iraq. We are preventing the Iraqis from having
their own history, from doing their own thing. We are
protecting the Shia, as a whole, from the Sunnis. We are
protecting them so well that some of the Shia, mostly the Jaish
al-Mahdi, politically headed by Muqtada al-Sadr, feels free to
attack Americans and British troops. Disengagement would stop
that--they would be busy defending themselves.
As for the wider context of disengagement, I believe the
Iranian strategy has failed. They tried to become the leaders
of the Middle East by being more anti-American than anybody
else, more anti-Israeli, and, indeed, more anti-Jewish, with
the Holocaust provocations of Ahmadinejad. The Sunni arabs have
not been persuaded to follow Iran. They call them Persians--
Ajamis, which implies by the way, pagan Persians, because when
the Arabs first encountered them, they were pagans, and today
they are pagans again. Because according to any orthodox
interpretation of Sunni Islam--and I don't mean fundamentalist
or extremist, just orthodox--today's Twelver Shias of Iran with
their Ayatollah-saints and temporary marriages have become
apostates, unlike most Shias in the past. So, the entire
Iranian strategy has failed. They are not gratefully accepted
as leaders by the Arabs. They are feared as enemies.
Given all of this, I respectfully disagree with any plan
that would seek to manage, micromanage, macromanage, or
minimanage the Iraqi reality. It is very complicated. Even the
supposed facts are misleading. For example, some of the Kurds
are Shia. Some are Sunni fundamentalists. They're a small
minority, but they happen to be the toughest of all the
extremists that we have encountered in Iraq--they have
accounted for some of the worst attacks. Some of the Kurds are
not Muslim at all, they are Yazidis. People talk about Shia and
Sunni, meaning Arab Shia Arab Sunni, but, in Kirkuk, the No. 1
problem is the Turkmen, who are supposed to be mostly Shia. The
Turks claim they are Turks. They are not, they are Azeris; and
they are not Twelver Shia, they are mostly Alevis. So, the fact
is that the situation is extremely complicated. And in this
complicated situation, to talk in a facile manner, or even in a
well-pondered and serious manner, the way the chairman and Dr.
Gelb have done, is really risky.
What I see now happening in Iraq is that we have an
emerging equilibrium. Civil war is a terrible thing, but it
does bring civil peace by burning out the causes and
opportunities of civil war. Mosul is mostly quiet. Two and a
half million people, the American presence being less than
2,000, and Mosul is relatively quiet. You can actually visit
Mosul. You go to Kurdistan, you take a taxi, and you go to
Mosul.
The Basrah area has seen relatively little violence, except
when the al-Mahdi Militia attacks the British to generate
publicity for themselves.
And, of course, as the chairman has pointed out, Kurdistan
is mostly quiet. Kurds, with all their divisions--tribal,
linguistic, religious--are in equilibrium.
So, what is going on? There is a civil war in the remaining
areas where the populations haven't been sorted out yet.
Sorting out is what civil wars do, and, when they finish, the
civil war ends and there is civil peace. The United States had
a civil war. England had a civil war. Even the Swiss
Confederation had a civil war before it attained its perfect
peace. And I believe that by interfering with the civil war, we
are prolonging it. And by trying to direct it and decide how
Iraqis should organize their affairs, we are intruding in
matters that we cannot manage successfully. Therefore, I
believe that disengagement is the right way to go. I believe
that disengagement is also sustainable. Surge is not
sustainable.
A few final tactical comments. Even if we had 400,000
troops, the canonical number, it would not make a big
difference. What actually do soldiers do? They outpost and go
on patrol. That is effective insofar as U.S. troops are
successfully turned into a Mesopotamian constabulary; that is,
that they walk along, people come out and tell them things. If
people don't tell them things, the patrol is useless.
As for outposting, that is useful when you know what to
look for and you can tell the difference between local and
foreign Arabs, between Sunni and Shia, not if you have just
arrived and you're sitting there seeing people that you don't
recognize and don't know.
So, even if we had 400,000 troops in Iraq it would be hard
to use them effectively. Intelligence is to counterinsurgency
what firepower is to conventional war. We don't have local
intelligence, because our soldiers are not an efficient
constabulary. Precisely because they are very good combat
soldiers they are not a good constabulary, they don't even
speak the languages of Iraq.
So you can send troops to Iraq, but you cannot tactically
use them well. When generals say, ``We don't need more troops
in Iraq,'' it is not that they were patsies playing along with
the administration policy at the time. They did not want more
troops because they could not employ them usefully--you cannot
patrol without intelligence. And, unfortunately, Central
Intelligence doesn't provide it.
We have raiding forces in Iraq which could be tremendously
effective. They are hardly ever used, because to make a raid,
you need intelligence, and we don't have the intelligence. That
is why even if you knew nothing of the politics or the strategy
or the theater strategy, purely at the tactical level you would
say, ``Don't send me more troops. Reduce them.''
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Luttwak follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Edward N. Luttwak, Senior Fellow, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC
Given all that has happened in Iraq to date, the best strategy for
the United States is disengagement. This would call for the careful
planning and scheduling of the withdrawal of American forces from much
of the country--while making due provisions for sharp punitive strikes
against any attempts to harass the withdrawing forces. But it would
primarily require an intense diplomatic effort, to prepare and conduct
parallel negotiations with several parties inside Iraq and out. All
have much to lose or gain depending on exactly how the American
withdrawal is carried out, and this gives Washington a great deal of
leverage that should be used to advance American interests.
The United States cannot threaten to unleash anarchy in Iraq in
order to obtain concessions from others, nor can it make transparently
conflicting promises about the country's future to different parties.
But once it has declared its firm commitment to withdraw--or perhaps,
given the widespread conviction that the United States entered Iraq to
exploit its resources, once visible physical preparations for an
evacuation have begun--the calculus of other parties must change. In a
reversal
of the usual sequence, the American hand will be strengthened by
withdrawal, and Washington may well be able to lay the groundwork for a
reasonably stable Iraq. Nevertheless, if key Iraqi factions or Iraq's
neighbors are too short-sighted or blinded by resentment to cooperate
in their own best interests, the withdrawal should still proceed, with
the United States making such favorable or unfavorable arrangements for
each party as will most enhance the future credibility of American
diplomacy.
The United States has now abridged its vastly ambitious project of
creating a veritable Iraqi democracy to pursue the much more realistic
aim of conducting some sort of general election. In the meantime,
however, it has persisted in futile combat against factions that should
be confronting one another instead. A strategy of disengagement would
require bold, risk-taking statecraft of a high order, and much
diplomatic competence in its execution. But it would be soundly based
on the most fundamental of realities: Geography alone ensures all other
parties are far more exposed to the dangers of an anarchical Iraq than
the United States itself.
PRECEDENTS
If Iraq could indeed be transformed into a successful democracy by
a more prolonged occupation, as Germany and Japan were after 1945, then
of course any disengagement would be a great mistake. In both of those
countries, however, by the time of the American occupation the
populations were already well educated and thoroughly disenthralled
from violent ideologies, and so they eagerly collaborated with their
occupiers to construct democratic institutions. Unfortunately, because
of the hostile sentiments of the Iraqi population, the relevant
precedents for Iraq are far different.
The very word ``guerilla'' acquired its present meaning from the
ferocious insurgency of the illiterate Spanish poor against their
would-be liberators under the leadership of their traditional
oppressors. On July 6, 1808, King Joseph of Spain and the Indies
presented a draft constitution that, for the first time in the Spain's
history, offered an independent judiciary, freedom of the press, and
the abolition of the remaining feudal privileges of the aristocracy and
the church. Ecclesiastical overlords still owned 3,148 towns and
villages, which were inhabited by some of Europe's most wretched
tenants. Yet the Spanish peasantry did not rise to demand the immediate
implementation of the new constitution. Instead, they obeyed the
priests who summoned them to fight against the ungodly innovations of
the foreign invader, for Joseph was the brother of Napoleon Bonaparte,
placed on the Spanish throne by French troops. That was all that
mattered for most Spaniards--not what was proposed, but by whom.
Actually, by then the French should have known better. In 1799 the
same thing had happened in Naples, whose liberals, supported by the
French, were massacred by the very peasants and plebeians they wanted
to emancipate, mustered into a militia of the ``Holy Faith'' by
Cardinal Fabrizio Ruffo, coincidentally scion of Calabria's largest
land-owning family. Ruffo easily persuaded his followers that all
promises of merely material betterment were irrelevant, because the
real aim of the French and the liberals was to destroy the Catholic
religion in the service of Satan. Spain's clergy repeated Ruffo's feat,
and their illiterate followers could not know that the very first
clause of Joseph's draft constitution had declared the Roman Apostolic
Catholic Church the only one allowed in Spain.
The same dynamic is playing itself out in Iraq now, down to the
ineffectual enshrinement of Islam in the draft constitution and the
emergence of truculent clerical warlords. Since the invasion in 2003,
both Shiite and Sunni clerics have been repeating over and over again
that the Americans and their mostly ``Christian'' allies are in Iraq to
destroy Islam in its cultural heartland as well as to steal the
country's oil. The clerics dismiss all talk of democracy and human
rights by the invaders as mere hypocrisy--except for women's rights,
which are promoted in earnest, the clerics say, to induce Iraqi
daughters and wives to dishonor their families by aping the shameless
disobedience of Western women.
The vast majority of Iraqis, assiduous mosque-goers and
semiliterate at best, naturally believe their religious leaders. The
alternative would be to believe what for them is entirely
incomprehensible--that foreigners have been unselfishly expending their
own blood and treasure to help them. As opinion polls and countless
incidents demonstrate, accordingly, Americans and their allies are
widely hated as the worst of invaders, out to rob Muslim Iraqis not
only of their territory and oil, but also of their religion and even
their family honor.
The most direct and visible effects of these sentiments are the
deadly attacks against the occupiers and their Iraqi auxiliaries, the
aiding and abetting of such attacks, and their gleeful celebration by
impromptu crowds of spectators. When the victims are members of the
Iraqi police or National Guard, as is often the case these days,
bystanders, family members, and local clerics routinely accuse the
Americans of being the attackers--usually by missile strikes that
cleverly simulate car bombs. As to why the Americans would want to kill
Iraqis they are themselves recruiting, training, and paying, no
explanation is offered, because no obligation is felt to unravel each
and every subplot of the dark Christian conspiracy against Iraq, the
Arab world, and Islam.
But it is the indirect effects of the insurgency that end whatever
hopes of genuine democratization may still linger. The mass instruction
of Germans and Japanese into the norms and modes of democratic
governance, already much facilitated by preexisting if imperfect
democratic institutions, was advanced by mass media of all kinds as
well as by countless educational efforts. The work was done by local
teachers, preachers, journalists, and publicists who adopted as their
own the democratic values proclaimed by the occupiers. But the locals
were recruited, instructed, motivated, and guided by occupation
political officers, whose own cultural understanding was enhanced by
much communing with ordinary Germans and Japanese.
In Iraq, none of this has occurred. An already difficult task has
been made altogether impossible by the refusal of Iraqi teachers,
journalists, and publicists--let alone preachers to be instructed and
instruct others in democratic ways. In any case, unlike Germany or
Japan after 1945, Iraq after 2003 never became secure enough for
occupation personnel to operate effectively, let alone carry out mass
political education in every city and town as was done in Germany and
Japan.
NO DEMOCRATS, NO DEMOCRACY
Of course, many Iraqis would deny the need for any such
instruction, viewing democracy as a simple affair that any child can
understand. That is certainly the opinion of the spokesmen of Grand
Ayatollah Sistani, for example. They have insistently advocated early
elections in Iraq, brushing aside the need for procedural and
substantive preparations as basic as the compilation of voter rolls,
and seeing no need at all to allow time for the gathering of consensus
by structured political parties. However moderate he may ostensibly be,
the pronouncements attributed to Sistani reveal a confusion between
democracy and the dictatorial rule of the majority, for they imply that
whoever wins 50.01 percent of the vote should have all of the
government's power. That much became clear when Sistani's spokesmen
vehemently rejected Kurdish demands for constitutional guarantees of
minority rights. Shiite majority rule could thus end up being as
undemocratic as the traditional Sunni-Arab ascendancy.
The plain fact is that there are not enough aspiring democrats in
Iraq to sustain democratic institutions. The Shiite majority includes
cosmopolitan figures but by far its greater part has expressed in every
possible way a strong preference for clerical leadership. The clerics,
in turn, reject any elected assembly that would be free to legislate
without their supervision, and could thus legalize, for example, the
drinking of alcohol or the freedom to change one's religion. The Sunni-
Arab minority has dominated Iraq from the time it was formed into a
state and its leaders have consistently rejected democracy in principle
for they refuse to accept a subordinate status. As for the Kurds, they
have administered their separate de facto autonomies with considerable
success, but it is significant that they have not even attempted to
hold elections for themselves, preferring clan and tribal loyalties to
the individualism of representative democracy.
Accordingly, while elections of some kind can still be held on
schedule, they are unlikely to be followed by the emergence of a
functioning representative assembly, let alone an effective cohesive
government of democratic temper. It follows that the United States has
been depleting its military strength, diplomatic leverage and treasure
in Iraq to pursue a worthy but unrealistic aim.
Yet Iraq cannot simply be evacuated, abandoning its occupation-
sponsored government even if legitimized by elections, to face
emboldened Baath loyalists and plain Sunni-Arab revanchists with their
many armed groups, local and foreign Islamists with their terrorist
skills, and whatever Shia militias are left out of the government. In
such a contest, the government, with its newly raised security forces
of doubtful loyalty, is unlikely to prevail. Nor are the victors likely
to peacefully divide the country among themselves, so that civil war of
one kind or another would almost certainly follow. An anarchical Iraq
would both threaten the stability of neighboring countries and offer
opportunities for their interference--which might even escalate to the
point of outright invasions by Iran or Turkey or both, initiating new
cycles of resistance, repression, and violence.
HOW TO AVOID A ROUT
The probable consequences of an abandonment of Iraq are so bleak
that few are willing to contemplate them. That is a mistake, however;
it is precisely because unpredictable mayhem is so predictable that the
United States might be able to disengage from Iraq at little cost, or
even perhaps advantageously.
To see how disengagement from Iraq might be achieved with few
adverse effects, or even turned into something of a success, it is
useful to approach its undoubted complications by first considering the
much simpler case of a plain military retreat. A retreat is notoriously
the most difficult of military operations to pull off successfully. At
worst, it can degenerate into a disastrous rout. But a well-calculated
retreat can not only extricate a force from a difficult situation, but
in doing so actually turn the tide of battle by luring the enemy beyond
the limits of its strength until it is overstretched, unbalanced, and
ripe for defeat. In Iraq the United States faces no single enemy army
it can exhaust in this way, but rather a number of different enemies
whose mutual hostility now lies dormant but could be catalyzed by a
well-crafted disengagement.
Because Iraq is under foreign occupation, nationalist, and pan-Arab
sentiments currently prevail over denominational identities, inducing
Sunni and Shiite Arabs to unite against the invaders. And so long as
Iraqis of all kinds believe that the United States has no intention of
withdrawing, they can attack American forces to express their
nationalism or Islamism without calculating the consequences for
themselves of a post-American Iraq. That is why Muqtada al-Sadr's
Shiite militia felt free to attack the U.S. troops that, elsewhere,
were fighting Sunnis bent on restoring their ancestral supremacy, and
why the action was applauded by the clerics and Shiite population at
large. Yet if faced by the prospect of an imminent American withdrawal,
Shiite clerics and their followers would have to confront the equally
imminent threat of the Baath loyalist and Sunni fighters--the only
Iraqis with recent combat experience, and the least likely to accept
Shiite clerical rule.
That is why, by moving to withdraw, the United States could secure
what the occupation has never had, namely the active support of its
greatest beneficiaries, the Shiite clerics and population at large.
What Washington needs from them is a total cessation of violence
against the coalition throughout Iraq, full cooperation with the
interim government in the conduct of elections, and the suspension of
all forms of support for other resisters. Given that there is already
some acquiescence and even cooperation, this would not require a full
reversal in Shiite attitudes.
THE NEIGHBORS
Iran, for its part, has much to fear from anarchy in Iraq, which
would offer it more dangers than opportunities. At present, because the
Iranians think the United States is determined to remain in Iraq no
matter what, the hard-liners in Iran's Government feel free to pursue
their anti-American vendetta by political subversion, by arming and
training al-Sadr's militia, and by encouraging the Syrians to favor the
infiltration of Islamist terrorists into Iraq.
Yet anarchy in Iraq would threaten not merely Iran's stability but
also its territorial integrity. Minorities account for more than half
the population, yet the Government of Iran is not pluralist at all. It
functions as an exclusively Persian empire that suppresses all other
ethnic identities and imposes the exclusive use of Farsi in public
education, thus condemning all others to illiteracy in their mother
tongues. Moreover, not only the Bahai but also more combative heterodox
Muslims are now persecuted. Except for some Kurds and Azeris, no
minority is actively rebellious as yet, but chaos in Iraq could
energize communal loyalties in Iran--certainly of the Kurds and Arabs.
An anarchical Iraq would offer bases for Iranian dissidents and exiles,
at a time when the theocratic regime is certainly weaker than it once
was; its political support has measurably waned, its revolutionary and
religious authority is now a distant memory, and its continued hold on
power depends increasingly on naked force--and it knows it.
Once the United States commits to a disengagement from Iraq,
therefore, a suitably discreet dialog with Iranian rulers should be
quite productive. Washington would not need to demand much from the
Iranians: Only the end of subversion, arms trafficking, hostile
propaganda, and Hezbollah infiltration in Iraq. Ever since the 1979
revolution, the United States has often wished for restraint from the
theocratic rulers of Iran, but has generally lacked the means to obtain
it. Even the simultaneous presence of U.S. combat forces on both the
eastern and western frontiers of Iran has had little impact on the
actual conduct of the regime, which usually diverges from its more
moderate declared policies. But what the entry of troops could not
achieve, a withdrawal might, for it would expose the inherent
vulnerability to dissidents of an increasingly isolated regime.
As an ally of longstanding, Turkey is in a wholly different
category. It has helped the occupation in important ways--after
hindering the initial invasion--but it has done less than it might have
done. The reason is that Turkish policy on Iraq has focused to an
inordinate extent on the enhancement of the country's Turkmen minority,
driven not by a dubious ethnic solidarity (they are Azeris, not Turks)
but by a desire to weaken the Iraqi Kurds. The Iraqi Turkmen are
concentrated in and around the city of Kirkuk, possession of which
secures control of a good part of Iraq's oil-production capacity. By
providing military aid to the Turkmen, the Turkish Government is,
therefore, assisting the anti-Kurdish coalition in Kirkuk, which
includes Sunnis actively fighting Americans. This amounts to indirect
action against the United States at one remove. There is no valid
justification for such activities, which have increased communal
violence and facilitated the sabotage of oil installations.
Like others, the Turkish Government must have calculated that with
the United States committed to the occupation, the added burden placed
on Iraq's stability by their support of the Turkmen would make no
difference. With disengagement, however, a negotiation could and should
begin to see what favors might be exchanged between Ankara and
Washington in order to ensure that the American withdrawal benefits
Turkish interests while Turks stop making trouble in Iraqi Kurdistan.
WITH FRIENDS LIKE THESE . . .
Even Kuwait, whose very existence depends on American military
power, now does very little to help the occupation and the interim
Iraqi Government. The Kuwaiti Red Crescent Society has sent the odd
truck loads of food into Iraq, and a gift of some $60 million has been
announced, though not necessarily delivered it. Given Kuwait's
exceptionally high oil revenues, however, not to mention the large
revenues of Kuwaiti subcontractors working under Pentagon logistics
contracts, this is less than paltry. The serious amounts of aid that
Kuwait could well afford would allow the interim government to extend
its authority, and help the post-election government to resolve
differences and withstand the attacks destined to come against it. In
procuring such aid, it would not take much reminding that if the United
States cannot effect a satisfactory disengagement, the Kuwaitis will be
more than 10,000 miles closer to the ensuing anarchy than the Americans
themselves.
As for the Saudi regime, its relentlessly ambiguous attitude is
exemplified by its July 2003 offer of a contingent of ``Islamic''
troops to help garrison Iraq. Made with much fanfare, the offer sounded
both generous and courageous. Then it turned out that the troops in
question were not to be Saudi at all--in other words, the Saudis were
promising to send the troops of other, unspecified Muslim countries--
and these imaginary troops were to be sent on condition that an equal
number of U.S. troops be withdrawn.
In the realm of action rather than empty words, the Saudis have not
actually tried to worsen American difficulties in Iraq, but they have
not been especially helpful either. As with Kuwait, their exploding oil
revenues could underwrite substantial gifts to the Iraqi Government,
both before and after the elections. But Riyadh could do even more. All
evidence indicates that Saudi volunteers have been infiltrating into
Iraq in greater numbers than any other nationality. They join the other
Islamists whose attacks kill many Iraqis and some Americans. The Saudis
share a long border with Iraq along which there are few and rather
languid patrols, rare control posts, and no aerial surveillance, even
though it could be readily provided. And the Saudis could try to limit
the flow of money to the Islamists from Saudi Jihad enthusiasts, and do
more to discourage the religious decrees that sanction the sanctity
killing of Americans in Iraq.
As it is, the Saudi authorities are doing none of this. Yet an
anarchical Iraq would endanger the Saudi regime's already fragile
security, not least by providing their opponents all the bases they
need and offering Iran a tempting playground for expansion. Here too,
therefore, hardheaded negotiations about the modalities of an American
withdrawal would seem to hold out possibilities for significant
improvements.
The Syrian regime, finally, could also be engaged in a dialog, one
in which the United States presents two scenarios. The first is a well-
prepared disengagement conducted with much support from inside and
outside Iraq, that leaves it with a functioning government.
The second is all of the above reinforced by punitive action
against Syria if it sabotages the disengagement--much easier to do once
American forces are no longer tied down in Iraq. For all its anti-
American bluster, the Syrian regime is unlikely to risk confrontation,
especially when so little is asked of it: A closure of the Syrian-Iraqi
border to extremists, and the end of Hezbollah activities in Iraq,
funded by Iran but authorized by Syria.
Of all Iraq's neighbors only Jordan has been straightforwardly
cooperative, incidentally without compromising any of its own sovereign
interests.
THE ULTIMATE LOGIC OF DISENGAGEMENT
Even if the negotiations here advocated fail to yield all they
might, indeed even if they yield not much at all, the disengagement
should still occur--and not only to keep faith with the initial
commitment to withdraw--the United States cannot play diplomatic parlor
games. Given the bitter Muslim hostility to the presence of American
troops--labeled ``Christian Crusaders'' by the preachers--its
continuation can only undermine the legitimacy of any American-
supported Iraqi Government. With Iraq more like Spain in 1808 than
Germany or Japan after 1945, any democracy left behind is bound to be
more veneer than substance in any case. Its chances of survival will be
much higher if pan-Arab nationalists, Islamists, and foreign meddlers
are neutralized by diplomacy and disengagement. The alternative of a
continuing garrison would only evoke continuing hostility to both
Americans and any Iraqi democrats. Once American soldiers leave Iraqi
cities, towns, and villages, some might remain awhile in remote desert
bases to fight off full-scale military attacks against the government
but even this might incite opposition, as happened in Saudi Arabia.
A strategy of disengagement would require much skill in conducting
parallel negotiations. But its risks are actually lower than the
alternative of an indefinite occupation, and its benefits might
surprise us. An anarchical Iraq is a far greater danger to those in or
near it than to the United States. It is the time to collect on that
difference.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Dr. Korb.
STATEMENT OF HON. LAWRENCE J. KORB, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR
AMERICAN PROGRESS, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Korb. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, thank you very much
for inviting me here today to talk about where we should go in
Iraq. And I commend the committee for holding these hearings. I
can't think of a more critical issue facing this country and
the world.
Let me begin by saying that, given why we went in, the
reasons that we were given, which turned out not to be true,
and the way in which we've conducted the occupation, there are
no good options. No matter what we propose--and my
distinguished colleagues here have proposed various things--no
one can guarantee that the outcome will be what we want.
Therefore, I think it's important to keep in mind that what we
have to do is select an option that gives us the best chance of
protecting overall American security interests.
And I would argue, as I do in my prepared statement, that
surging militarily for the third time in a year is the wrong
way to go, we should surge diplomatically. I put myself--I
support the comments that were made to you last week about a
further--a military surge, by Generals Hoar and McCaffrey, that
it's too little, too late, and a fool's errand, because what it
would mean, in my view, is merely repeating a failed strategy.
We've seen that when that, when we've surged twice in the
last 6 months, the violence and death of Americans and Iraqis
has increased dramatically. An increased surge would only
create more targets, put more American lives at risk, increase
Iraqi dependence on the United States, further undermine the
precarious readiness of our ground forces, and, if we send all
the troops that are supposed to go, we will have no Strategic
Reserve left in the United States, and this will be contrary,
not only to the wishes of our commanders on the scene in Iraq--
and to the American people and to the Iraqi people. Keep in
mind that more than 70 percent of the Iraqis think we're
causing the violence; they want us out within a year, and, more
ominously, 60 percent think it's OK to kill Americans. Rather
than escalating militarily, the United States should
strategically redeploy all American forces from Iraq over the
next 18 months, and we should not keep any permanent bases.
I first put forth this proposal in September 2005 with my
colleague at the center, Brian Katulis. Since then, it has been
completely mischaracterized. People have called it ``cut and
run,'' they've talked about that it would undermine U.S.
security, they've called it ``retreat.'' When you use military
force, it must enhance the security of the United States. And
if we do not strategically redeploy our forces from Iraq over
the next 18 months, our security is going to be undermined. We
need more troops in Afghanistan. If, in fact, you send these
21,500 more to Iraq, you simply cannot put more troops in
Afghanistan without really causing unfair burdens on our
existing ground forces.
I commend the President for finally agreeing to increase
the size of our ground forces, but this is something that
should have been done several years ago.
If, in fact, we do redeploy our forces, this will also
allow us to bring our National Guard forces home here to focus
on homeland defense, which is a critical security mission.
If, by strategically redeploying, we can gain control over
our own security interests--in many ways we have put our
security in the hands of the Iraqis by saying, ``We will stand
down when you stand up,'' and, in my view, it's the only real
leverage that the United States has to get the Iraqis to make
the painful political compromises necessary to begin the
reconciliation process. As has been mentioned here, these
compromises involve balancing the roles of the central and
provincial governments, distribution of oil revenues,
protecting minority rights. Until that process is completed,
the United States can put a soldier or a marine on every street
corner in Baghdad, and it would not make a real difference.
I would remind the committee that when President Reagan,
the President I had the privilege of serving, left from
Lebanon, we did not leave the area. We maintained our interest
in the Middle East. And our strategic redeployment plan would
do the same. We're not going to leave the region. We can keep
forces in Kuwait. We can put a Marine expeditionary force in a
carrier battle group in the gulf.
Let me explain to you how I think this would work. And it
has worked.
When Zarqawi was killed, the intelligence came to the
Iraqis, the Iraqis told us, and we sent in combat aircraft to
attack them. We could still do that. If, after we leave, Iraq
should become a haven for al-Qaeda, or a country like Iran
should decide to invade, we would be able to deal with that
situation.
Now, the diplomatic surge that we urge would involve
appointing an individual with the stature of former Secretary
of State Colin Powell or Madeleine Albright as a special envoy.
This individual would be charged with getting all six of Iraq's
neighbors--Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and
Kuwait--involved more constructively in stabilizing Iraq. It's
important to note that all of these countries are already
involved, in a bilateral self-interested and disorganized way.
And, in addition, this distinguished envoy should convene a
Dayton-style conference to get all of the factions in Iraq, as
well as all the countries in the region, together.
Now, a lot of people will argue: Why would countries like
Iran and Syria, whose interests are not identical to ours, want
to get involved in such a conference? Remember that, after we
leave, and if we set a date, date certain, they do not want
Iraq to become a failed state or a humanitarian catastrophe
that would involve sending millions of refugees into their
country or a haven for terrorists--remember that if Iraq should
become, as some people argue, that--when we leave, a haven for
groups like al-Qaeda, this would not be in the interest of a
country like Iran. And remember that the Iranians have been
very helpful to us in Afghanistan, not because their interests
are--they want to help us, but because they do not want to see
the Taliban come back to power. The Iranians have given close
to $300 million in aid to the Karzai government. They're
building roads and highways. They furnished us intelligence
when we went in there. They were helpful in Iraq, according to
Secretary Gates, until early 2004. So, the idea that somehow
they would not be helpful, to me, is simply mistaken.
We--I would expect this high-profile envoy to also address
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the role of Hezbollah in
Syria and Lebanon, and Iran's rising influence in the region.
Now, this--the aim would not necessarily be to solve all these
problems immediately, but prevent them from getting worse, and,
most importantly, to show the Arab and the Muslim world that we
share their concerns about the problem in the region.
Now, let me be very specific here. I think we have to take,
with a grain of salt, the advice of those inside and outside
the government arguing for further military escalation, not
only because it's the wrong strategy, but because most of those
people urging this military surge are the same people who got
us into the quagmire in the first place. They told us the war
would be a cakewalk, we'd be greeted as liberators, we could
rebuild Iraq at a cost of $1.5 billion, and we could reduce our
military strength to 30,000 by the end of 2003.
I think we should also take, with a grain of salt, what the
administration is saying to us. The President assured us, as
recently as October, that we were winning. And if you look at
his State of the Union Address a year ago tonight, when he
talked about how good the Iraqi security forces were, how Iraq
was close to democracy, how, in fact, our policy would allow us
to withdraw, because the Iraqi security forces were getting so
well. And this idea that somehow things began to go downhill
with the bombing of Samarra last February--simply not true.
Things were going downhill in 2005. The Shiite death squads
were already exacting revenge on the Sunnis.
Now, let me conclude by saying that this committee and this
Congress has a responsibility to the American people to take a
greater role in shaping our Iraq policy. And although we all
understand that you must provide the funding for the troops
already in Iraq, there are things that you can do to assert
control over the policy.
For example, you can make it very clear that if the
administration wants to mobilize Guard and Reserve units again
that have already been, that they must come back to the
Congress. The law allows them to mobilize them for up to 2
years, as long as it's not consecutive. But this idea of
sending them back for a couple of days and bringing them back
seems to me contrary to the desires of the people who wrote the
law and also would allow, again, the administration to get
around whatever controls you put on the number of active
forces.
I think that you should require a new NIE, as you have
asked for, that talks about whether Iraq is in a civil war, a
recertification by the President that the war in Iraq does not
undermine the war on terror. Remember that this was in the
authorization that was passed, back in 2002, allowing the
President to go to war.
And finally, that you should base funding and assistance on
Iraqi performance.
Let me conclude by saying that one more military escalation
in Iraq offers little hope for stabilizing the country, risks
doing permanent damage to our U.S. ground forces, and could
undermine U.S. efforts to defeat what the President called the
``global terrorist networks'' that were responsible for
attacking us on 9/11. The only responsible path forward is a
new forceful integrated strategy that marshals the right assets
for the challenges the United States faces not only in Iraq,
but the Middle East and around the world.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Korb follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Lawrence J. Korb, Senior Fellow, Center for
American Progress, Senior Advisor, Center for Defense Information,
Washington, DC
Chairman Biden, Senator Lugar, and members of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you
to discuss the war in Iraq. I cannot think of a more critical issue
facing the Nation at this time.
It is important to note right upfront that, because of numerous
mistakes made during the last 46 months, no good options now exist. As
the Iraq Study Group (ISG) report noted, the situation in Iraq is
``grave and deteriorating,'' and no one can guarantee that any course
of action in Iraq at this point will stop the sectarian warfare, the
growing violence, or the ongoing slide toward chaos. Inaction is drift,
and sticking with the ``current strategy'' is not an acceptable option.
In 2003, the Bush administration made a fundamental strategic
mistake in diverting resources to an unnecessary war of choice in Iraq
and leaving the mission unaccomplished in Afghanistan. This error has
allowed the Taliban to reconstitute in Afghanistan, weakened the
position of the United States in the world, and undermined the fighting
strength of U.S. ground forces. It also diverted critical U.S.
resources from effectively addressing the Iranian nuclear threat, the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the situation in Lebanon.
Today, the United States once again finds itself at a strategic
crossroads. This time, however, there are at least nine key lessons of
the past 4 years of failure that make choosing the right path forward
abundantly clear. These nine lessons point to the obvious--it is time
to strategically redeploy our military forces from Iraq and begin a
diplomatic surge not a further military escalation as the President has
proposed.
1. The fundamental security challenge in Iraq is a violent struggle
for power among empowered Shiites, embittered Sunnis, and secessionist
Kurds.
The United States cannot solve Iraq's problems militarily. No
matter how long the United States stays or how many troops are sent,
Iraq will never become a stable, peaceful state unless the Iraqis
themselves make the painful political compromises necessary to create a
new Iraq. These compromises are hard because they involve balancing the
power of the provincial and central governments, sharing oil revenues,
and protecting minority rights. Only when the reconciliation process is
complete will the Iraqis be willing to disband their militias and cease
their support for the insurgency. Until then, American forces,
augmented or not, can no longer stop the civil war.
More than a year after its most recent national election, during
which time the United States has lost the equivalent of 13 battalions
killed or wounded soldiers and marines, Iraq's leaders remain
internally divided over critical issues of political and economic
sharing. The national unity government has not achieved sufficient
progress on addressing the key questions that drive Iraq's violence. A
fundamental challenge in today's Iraq is that too many Iraqi political
leaders are hedging their bets: They halfheartedly support the national
government while simultaneously maintaining their independent power
bases through ties to militias and other groups based on sect or
ethnicity.
War is the most extreme form of politics. Since Iraq's current
government is neither taking control of the chaos swirling around it,
nor settling disputes over key issues that might bring an end to the
sectarian bloodbath, more and more Iraqis are turning to violence.
Resolving Iraq's civil war requires a new political strategy, such
as a Dayton style peace conference supported by the international
community and Iraq's neighbors. In 1995 it would have been impossible
for the United States and its allies to bring peace to Bosnia without
engaging Serbia and Croatia, the two states responsible for the civil
war in that country.
As Generals Abizaid and Casey, the commanders conducting the war,
and the majority of Iraq's elected leaders agree, additional military
escalation, as proposed by the President, runs a high risk of only
inflaming Iraq's violence and increasing American casualties and Iraqi
dependence on the United States.
2. The open-ended U.S. combat deployment fosters a culture of
dependency in Iraq.
Iraqi leaders will have no incentive to undertake these painful
steps unless the United States and the international community apply
significant pressure on Iraq's leaders. The best way to press Iraq's
leaders is to set a plan that aims to complete the U.S. military
mission by a certain date, thereby creating incentives for Iraq's
leaders to settle their disputes and assume greater control of the
country. Given our moral obligation to the Iraqis and the practical
considerations involved in redeploying about 150,000 troops, a
reasonable target date for completing the U.S. combat mission should be
18 months from now, or the summer of 2008. If the Iraqis do not make
these difficult choices over the next 18 months, they will have to live
with the consequences. It would then be their problem, not just ours.
In the weeks before his dismissal, even former Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld, a fervent supporter of staying the course and only standing
down when the Iraqis stand up, and a key figure responsible for the
Iraq quagmire, finally admitted that last October, ``The biggest
mistake would be not to pass things over to the Iraqis. It's their
country. They are going to have to govern it, they're going to have to
provide security for it, and they're going to have to do it sooner
rather than later.''
Further military escalation, or a so-called ``surge'' or
augmentation of additional U.S. troops, would only continue to prevent
Iraqis from taking greater responsibility and settling their disputes.
3. Iraq's neighbors are already involved in Iraq and must be part
of the solution.
Iraq's six neighbors--Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia,
and Kuwait are already involved in some fashion in Iraq. This
involvement is bilateral, self-interested, disorganized, and not
channeled toward a constructive purpose that benefits the common good
of all Iraqis, in large part because of the internal divisions among
Iraqis on full display in the daily violence in Iraq's streets.
Moreover, the spillover effects of Iraq's civil war on the region have
been growing throughout 2006 and into 2007, with Jordan, Lebanon, and
Syria receiving about 2 million Iraqis fleeing the violence. Leaders
throughout the region, not only on Iraq's borders, fear the ripple
effects of the chaos on their immediate horizons.
To end Iraq's civil war, the country's neighbors need to be
involved more constructively. These countries have an incentive to
participate, and one way to increase those incentives is to send a
clear signal that the United States is setting a target date for
completing its military mission in Iraq and will not maintain any
permanent bases in Iraq. None of the countries in the region including
Iran, want to see an Iraq that becomes a failed state or a humanitarian
catastrophe that would lead to it becoming a haven for terrorist groups
like al-Qaeda or sending millions of more refugees streaming into their
countries.
Even U.S. adversaries such as Syria and Iran will have to alter
their policies once the United States begins to redeploy its military
forces from Iraq. Both countries recognize that, with the United States
mired in the Iraq quagmire, it has reduced its ability to confront
Damascus and Tehran. These countries will continue to have every
incentive to work together to keep U.S. forces bleeding as long as we
keep increasing our forces.
Moreover, despite the fact that Syria and Iran do have different
agendas than the United States and are contributing to the problems in
Iraq, both of these nations have demonstrated a willingness to act in
their own self-interest even if the United States is also a
beneficiary. For example, in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the Syrians
contributed troops to the American-led coalition that evicted Iraq from
Kuwait. In 2001, the Iranians worked with us by providing extensive
assistance on intelligence, logistics, diplomacy, and Afghan internal
politics that helped to oust the Taliban from Afghanistan. The Iranians
also developed roads and power projects and dispersed more than $300
million of the $560 million it pledged to help the Karzai government.
Moreover, in 2003, the Iranians sent Washington a detailed proposal for
comprehensive negotiations to resolve bilateral differences and
according to Secretary Gates were helpful in Iraq as recently as 2004.
The administration's refusal to deal with Syria and Iran, without
preconditions, not only harms U.S. strategic interests in the Middle
East--it is deadly. To refuse to talk to Syria and Iran, unless they
change their foreign policies, means that many Americans will die
needlessly. This lack of confidence in the U.S. ability to assert its
interests diplomatically only further weakens the U.S. position in the
Middle East.
As 2007 begins, the absence of a new diplomatic and political
strategy is a missing link in getting Iraq's neighbors to play a more
constructive role.
4. The United States must deploy its full diplomatic weight to
address the problems in Iraq and the Middle East.
A new political and diplomatic surge is necessary to address Iraq's
civil war and the growing instability in the Middle East. So far, the
United States has not deployed all of the assets in its arsenal to
address the growing strategic challenges in the Middle East. It is
still relying too much on its military power rather than integrating
its military component with the diplomatic component.
Sporadic trips to the region by Secretary of State Rice are
necessary but not sufficient. The Bush administration should send a
signal of its seriousness by appointing an individual with the stature
such as that of former Secretaries of State Colin Powell or Madeleine
Albright as special Middle East envoys. Former Presidents Bill Clinton
and George Bush have advanced U.S. interests and improved the U.S.
standing in the world by addressing the aftermath of the 2004 Asian
tsunami. Individuals like Colin Powell and Madeleine Albright can help
the United States address the geostrategic tsunami that has been
unfolding in Iraq and the Middle East during the past 4 years.
As special envoys, the former secretaries could spearhead a new,
forceful diplomatic offensive aimed at achieving peace in Iraq and
making progress on other key fronts in the Middle East, including
efforts to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the role of
Hezbollah and Syria in Lebanon, Iran's rising influence in the region,
and the concerns that many traditional allies, such as Jordan and Saudi
Arabia, have about the shifting dynamics in the region.
This diplomatic surge must also focus on getting support and
assistance from other global powers like European countries to provide
more political and economic support in Iraq than they have over the
last 4 years. U.S. diplomats must make clear to the world that no
nation anywhere in the world can escape the consequences of continued
chaos in the Middle East.
5. Further U.S. military escalation in Iraq will not make Iraq more
secure.
Doubling down on a bad hand as we have done repeatedly by sending
more troops to Iraq will not change the outcome. Statements by
President Bush and other top officials that the United States is ``not
winning but not losing,'' are misleading. In asymmetrical guerilla
warfare, the insurgents win if the occupying power does not. The
situation in Iraq has reached a point at which even former Secretary of
State, Henry Kissinger, a leading advocate of invading and staying the
course, has acknowledged that military victory is no longer possible in
Iraq.
The additional 21,500 U.S. troops that would be sent in over the
next 5 months represent a marginal increase in the U.S. combat presence
in Iraq, not a decisive number. Even if the United States had the
necessary number of men and women with the technical and language
skills available to operate as a true stabilizing force or to embed
with the Iraqi units--which it does not--the additional troops would
likely be unable to significantly improve Iraq's security situation,
certainly not without a major shift in political and diplomatic
strategy.
Iraq now has more than 300,000 members in its security forces which
do not lack the necessary training to quell the violence. In fact, some
of them have more training than the young soldiers and marines the
United States has sent to Iraq. Iraq's security forces are not tasked
with fighting a major conventional war against a significant military
power. Rather, what they need to do is essentially police work, that
is, to stop Iraqis from killing other Iraqis.
The central problem with Iraq's security forces is not skill-
building or training. It is motivation and allegiance. Most of the 10
divisions in the Iraqi Army are not multiethnic. They are staffed and
led by members of their own sect. The problem is that the units are
reluctant to take military action against members of their own groups
who are perpetrating the violence.
Case in point: Only two of the six Iraqi battalions ordered to
Baghdad this fall by the Maliki government actually showed up. What
leads us to believe that three brigades now promised will show up or
take military action against their own sect? And what will we do if
they fail to fulfill their promises? Moreover, many of the security
forces have been infiltrated by the insurgents and criminals who tip
off the enemy and that are supervised by corrupt and incompetent
ministers who purge the most effective commanders. As a result, the
units then often employ the weapons and tactics furnished by the United
States against their sectarian enemies, not those of the Iraqi State.
During the last 6 months the United States has increased, or
``surged,'' the number of American troops in Baghdad by 12,000, yet the
violence and deaths of Americans and Iraqis has climbed alarmingly,
averaging 960 a week since the latest troop increase. This ``surge,''
known as Operation Together Forward, failed to stem the violence. This
past October, Army MG William Caldwell IV said that the operation ``has
not met our overall expectations of sustaining a reduction in the
levels of violence.''
As U.S. military commanders in Iraq have acknowledged, the United
States could put a soldier or marine on every street corner in Baghdad
and it would not make a difference if the Iraqis have not begun the
reconciliation process.
Sending more troops now will only increase the Iraqi dependence on
us, deplete our own Strategic Reserve, force the United States to
extend the tours of those already deployed, send back soldiers and
marines who have not yet spent at least a year at home, and deploy
units that are not adequately trained or equipped for the deployments.
Colin Powell, the former Secretary of State and former Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, summarized the situation on December 19, 2006, when he
said that the Active Army was just about broken and he saw nothing to
justify an increase in troops.
Powell's comments echo those of LTG Peter Chiarelli, the deputy
commander of the Multi-National Corps in Iraq, who said that deploying
more U.S. forces will not solve Iraqis problems. A further U.S.
military escalation will not tackle these core problems and would
likely further exacerbate the situation and make the challenges more
difficult to address.
6. The U.S. military escalation in Iraq will undermine the fight
against global terrorist networks.
The brave soldiers and marines are not fighting the violent
extremists who supported the attacks of September 11. They are
essentially refereeing a civil war. It is time to redeploy U.S.
military assets where a real military surge is desperately needed, like
Afghanistan.
As President Reagan found out in Lebanon in the 1980s, U.S.
military forces cannot serve as referees in a civil war. It is a no-win
situation militarily. The United States will end up serving as little
more than a lightening rod for the blame. According to recent measures
of Iraqi public sentiment, more than 70 percent of the Iraqis believe
that American troops are responsible for the violence and 60 percent
think it is acceptable to kill Americans. A majority of Iraqis want
U.S. troops out of the country within a year.
If Iraqi leaders veto requests by U.S. military commanders to take
on Shiite militias as happened this fall, and if Iraqi judges are
frequently demanding the release of captured insurgents, U.S. troops
will continue to face an impossible situation--no matter how qualified
and motivated they are. As Senator Gordon Smith (R-OR) recently noted,
a policy that has U.S. soldiers and marines patrolling the same streets
in the same way and being blown up by the same bombs day after day is
absurd.
The al-Qaeda insurgents are no longer the main problem in Iraq. We
are not (if, in fact, we ever were) fighting them over there so we will
not have to fight them here. Military intelligence estimates they make
up less than 2 to 3 percent of those causing the chaos. Only 5 percent
of the Iraqis support the philosophy of al-Qaeda, and once U.S. forces
leave, the Iraqis will turn against al-Qaeda as they have in the past.
The vast majority of the violence is caused by nearly two dozen Shiite
militias and Sunni insurgents who are maiming and killing each other
mainly because of religious differences that go back over a thousand
years. Meanwhile, the real al-Qaeda problem in places like Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Somalia is not being addressed adequately.
A phased strategic redeployment of U.S. troops from Iraq should
include sending 20,000 additional troops to Afghanistan leaving an Army
brigade in Kuwait, and a Marine Expeditionary Force and a carrier
battle group in the Persian Gulf. This will signal to the countries in
the region that we will continue to be involved. Moreover, this force
will have sufficient military power to prevent Iraq from becoming a
haven for al-Qaeda or being invaded by its neighbors. A good example of
how this would work is illustrated by the killing of Zarqawi, the
leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Iraqi citizens provided the intelligence to
Iraqi security forces, who in turn informed us. The United States then
sent F-16's to bomb the hideout, something that we could do after we
implement a strategic redeployment.
7. Many of the proponents for the proposed U.S. military escalation
of 21,500 troops got us into the Iraq quagmire.
The Congress and the American people should ignore the advice of
those who got us into this mess in the first place and pay attention to
those who cautioned us not to get involved in this misadventure, among
them GEN Colin Powell, Vice President Al Gore, and Senator Barack
Obama.
Supporters of U.S. military escalation in Iraq in 2007 are among
the same pundits and so called experts who assured the country and the
American people that the U.S. invasion was necessary; that the war
would be a cakewalk; that we would be greeted as liberators; that we
could rebuild Iraq at a cost of $1.5 billion a year; that we could
reduce our troop strength to 30,000 by the end of 2003. In addition
many of these same experts did not speak up for General Shinseki before
the invasion; made misleading assertions about mushroom clouds,
yellowcake, and ersatz meetings in Prague; and told us as late as 2005
that the situation in Iraq was positive and in 2006 that we needed a
surge of as many as 80,000 more troops.
Now many of these same pundits, who apparently seem to have no
sense of shame about their previous errors, are telling us to ignore
the bipartisan recommendations of the Iraq Study Group to begin to
withdraw combat troops, open a regional dialog with Iran and Syria, and
take a comprehensive diplomatic approach to the region. Instead, they
want to throw more good money after bad, by sending more troops to
achieve their version of victory in Iraq; i.e., a stable democratic
Iraq that will transform the Middle East.
8. The 110th Congress has a responsibility to the American people.
Any new proposal must have the support of the American people and
the international community. It is difficult, if not impossible, for
the United States to wage a war of choice, effectively, if it does not
have the support of the American people. After all it is they who must
send their sons and daughters, husbands and wives into the conflict and
spend their hard earned dollars on waging this conflict.
The American people made it clear in the congressional elections
and in recent public opinion polls that they do not favor further
military escalation but want a diplomatic surge, and want us to begin
to withdraw.
Similarly without international support, the ability of the United
States to get other nations to share the human and financial burden
declines. Even our closest allies, the British, refuse to join us in
the latest military escalation and will continue to withdraw. By May
the British will reduce the number of their soldiers and marines from
7,000 to 3,000. In 2003, there were more than 20,000 coalition troops
in Iraq. Today there are less than 10,000 and all will be out by this
summer. Even when the American people supported the initial invasion
they did so on the condition that it be multilateral.
The President may say that he does not have to listen to the
American people. The Congress should not let him ignore this most
fundamental principle of democracy.
The President will soon submit a supplemental funding request to
the defense budget of at least $100 billion to fund the cost of the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan through the end of FY 2007. This is in
addition to the $70 billion bridge fund Congress has already provided,
bringing the total cost of the wars for this fiscal year to $170
billion, more than $14 billion a month, the vast majority of which is
for Iraq.
The 110th Congress should heed the American people and fulfill
their obligation to protect American security by preventing a military
escalation in Iraq. They can fulfill this obligation in several ways,
and one vehicle will is the supplemental funding request President Bush
will present to Congress for an additional $100-$150 billion to fund
military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a coequal branch of
government, Congress can place conditions for funding additional
deployments to Iraq. While Congress should not move to cut off funds
for troops already deployed, it can exercise its constitutional powers
to halt President Bush's proposed military escalation with amendments
to the budget request:
A. Require clarification on the law that allows the President to
mobilize Guard and Reserve units for up to 2 years. Congress can
condition funding for a military escalation on a measure that makes
clear that the total mobilization of Guard and Reserve units beginning
on 9/11 cannot exceed 2 years in total, even if they are not
consecutive. This will prevent the administration from calling up Guard
and Reserve units for a second time without congressional approval.
B. Require a new National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's internal
conflict. Last summer, congressional leaders requested that the
Director of National Intelligence prepare a National Intelligence
Estimate that includes an assessment on whether Iraq is in a civil war.
The 110th Congress can condition funding for a military escalation on
receiving this updated estimate and submitting a declassified version
to the American public.
C. Require recertification that the war in Iraq does not undermine
the war against global terror networks. The joint resolution of 2002,
authorizing the use of force in Iraq, required the Bush administration
to certify that the Iraq war would not harm the effort against
terrorism. Congress can condition funding for a military escalation on
a recertification that the Iraq war does not undermine the war in Iraq.
D. Traunche funding and assistance on Iraqi performance. The 110th
Congress can require a transparent, verifiable plan that conditions
funding for a military escalation on the performance of Iraqi leaders
to fulfill their commitments and responsibilities. Congress can mandate
that the Bush administration may not obligate or expend funds unless
periodic verification and certification is provided on key metrics for
progress, including: (1) Steps to disband ethnic and sectarian
militias; (2) measures to ensure that Iraqi Government brings to
justice Iraqi security personnel who are credibly alleged to have
committed gross violations of human rights; and (3) steps toward
political and national reconciliation.
9. We must change course now.
The United States cannot wait for the next President to resolve the
problems in Iraq. In fact, we have already waited too long. Nor should
they heed the dictates of a President who has mislead us about this war
for almost 4 years, most recently on October 24, 2006, when he told us
we were winning the war, constantly reinvents history, and now has
proposed yet another strategy for victory. We now know that the
President knew that the situation in Iraq was deteriorating 6 months
ago, but waited until after the election to change course. The 110th
Congress has a special responsibility to assert its constitutional role
and make sure that the Bush administration does not sink the country
deeper into Iraq's civil war by escalating failure.
A U.S. military escalation in Iraq as proposed by President Bush
holds little hope for stabilizing the country, risks doing permanent
damage to U.S. ground forces, and would undermine U.S. efforts to
defeat the global terrorist networks that attacked the United States on
9/11. Choosing this course would be, as Senator Smith notes, is absurd
and maybe even criminal. The only responsible path forward is a new,
forceful strategy that marshals the right assets for the challenges the
United States faces in Iraq, in the Middle East, and around the world
and redeploys our forces, strategically, over the next 18 months.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Malley.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT MALLEY, DIRECTOR, MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH
AFRICA PROGRAM, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Malley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar. Thank
you very much for having me here today.
You've heard now, for some time, many descriptions of how
calamitous the situation is in Iraq and in the region, and I
don't need to expand on that. But I think what's important,
given all that, is to cut to the chase and to be blunt and
frank.
It's very hard today to imagine a positive outcome to this
war. What we do know is that mere tinkering is not going to
lead to success. And what we do know is that only a clean
break, a dramatic change in our approach to Iraq, to its
government, and to the region presents a possible chance of
getting out of this in a stable way. So, either we undertake a
clean break or we should stop the illusion.
If we're not prepared--if the administration is not
prepared to undertake a clean break, of if the--our Iraqi
allies are not prepared to undertake a clean break, we should
stop pretending that we're in Iraq for a useful purpose, we
should stop squandering our resources, we should stop losing
the lives of young men and women; we should bring this tragic
episode to a close.
Unfortunately, the plan that President Bush put on the
table does not meet the test of a clean break. There are some
welcome changes, most of them overdue, but, in its underlying
assumptions, it basically is stay-the-course-plus-20,000--its
underlying assumptions about the Iraqi Government, about our
role, and about the region. In other words, it's an inadequate
answer to a disastrous situation that, at best, is going to
delay what only a radical course correction could prevent.
Three basic flaws that I then want to address, in terms of
the plan that the International Crisis Group has put on the
table.
The first flaw is that it relies on military tools to
resolve a political problem. A lot of people have said that,
but I think it's worth emphasizing. This may not be a war of
all against all in Iraq, but it certainly is a war of many
against many, not just Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds, but within
the Shiite community, within the Sunni community. The
government itself, we know, is supporting militias. We know
they're part of the conflict. And, therefore, this is not a
struggle in which our goal is to strengthen one side to defeat
another, it's to see whether all sides can reach a political
compact, or else decided this is simply not solvable at this
time.
The other problem with using a military tool to resolve a
political problem is that it's a short-term answer to a long-
term issue. And we know--and we're seeing it already--that the
militias may melt away, they may choose other places to go,
rather than Baghdad. And so, the administration's strategy of
``clear, build, and hold'' is no answer to the insurgents' and
the militia strategy of ``recoil, redeploy, and spoil.''
No. 2. To end the sectarian fighting, the President's plan
relies on the Iraqi Government and our allies in Iraq, who are
party to the sectarian conflict. And that's been evidenced, to
us at least, for at least the last 2 years. It hasn't started
only in 2006, as Larry Korb rightly pointed out. There is no
government of national unity. We may talk about it; there is no
such thing. It's not a partner in our efforts to stabilize
Iraq. It hasn't been a partner in our efforts to stem the
violence. It's one side in a growing and every-day-dirtier
civil war.
We need to be--impose real conditionality, real toughness,
including on those who we brought to power--in particular on
those that we brought to power--and we need to get them to
adhere to a real vision for Iraq, or, again, we should get out
of that business.
The third problem with the President's plan is that its
regional strategy is at war with its strategy for Iraq. If the
priority today is to stabilize Iraq and to get out of there
with our vital interests intact, we can't, at the same time,
try to destabilize Iran and Syria. We have to choose what our
goals for the region are. And right now, unfortunately, the
President's plan has us going in two different directions at
once. It's not as if the region has played a determining role
in leading us to where we are, but it's hard for me to see how
we can get out of where we are if we don't enlist the support
and cooperation of all countries in the region.
So, what is our proposal? The International Crisis Group,
which I have to say is based not on simply my abstract thinking
at all, it is--we have analysts and consultants who have been
in Iraq nonstop since 2003. Many of them have met with members
of your staff. They go there, they meet not only with members
of the government, but with insurgents and militia groups. And
what I'm saying now reflects, to the best of my ability, what
they have said to me. And, again, what they say is that only a
radical and dramatic policy shift, which entails a different
distribution of power in Iraq, a different vision for the
country, and a different set of outside pressures and
influences exercised within Iraq, has a possibility of
arresting the decline.
Three--the three assumptions that the President's plan has,
and which we disagree with, is, No. 1, we think that the Iraqi
Government and the parties that we support are one of the
actors in the sectarian violence and not partners in fighting
extremists. We believe that the entire political structure that
has been set up since 2003 has to be overhauled and not
strengthened. And we believe that the United States must engage
with all parties, rather than isolate those who precisely have
the greatest capacity to sabotage what we're trying to do.
And so, what we need is a strategy that does, for the first
time, what has not been done since the outset, which is a
strategy that puts real pressure on all Iraqi parties to try to
do the right thing. It really is the last chance to see if we
could salvage Iraq today as a state.
It won't be done simply by dealing with the government, for
the reasons I expressed before. And, to expand on it a little
bit--and I think you'll hear about it more next week, or
tomorrow, when you have testimony on the internal situation in
Iraq--though parties, the politicians who are supporting, have
turned out to be warlords who are lining their pockets, who are
promoting their own interests, who are advancing their own
personal party agendas, they've become increasingly indifferent
to the country's interests as they prepare to strengthen their
own position within their community, against other communities,
and within their own communities. They're preying on state
coffers, and they're preying on the reconstruction funds that
our taxpayers, in particular, have been paying for.
So far, our strategy has been to provide unconditional
support for them, which gives them the best of both worlds.
They can act like warlords and they could have the appearance
of being statesmen. We have to tell them to choose. It's either
warlord or it's statesmen, it can't be both. To achieve that,
we propose three interrelated steps, many of which echo what
the Iraqi Study Group has--says, many echo what Larry Korb just
said.
The first thing is to try, for the first time, to get all
Iraqi stakeholders around the table and to see whether we can
come--they could come up with a consensus plan. And that means
not treating the government as a privileged party, but as one
of the actors in this conference. And it means not to support
the Iraqi Government, but to support Iraq.
And we know the compromises that need to be made, whether
it has to do with the distribution of resources, with
federalism, with de-Baathification, with amnesty, with the
rollup and integration of militias into the security forces,
and, of course, with the timetable for the withdrawal of our
own forces. And that has to be done, as I said, not only with
the Iraqi Government, but with members of militias, insurgent
groups, civil society, political parties, to the exclusion of
the jihadist al-Qaeda group, but, other than that, erring on
the side of inclusiveness rather than narrowness.
How do we get to do that? The second point we need to
emphasize is that we need, as I said earlier, regional and
international support. We can't do this alone. And it's not a
matter of whether the United States has become a weak party in
the Middle East, although I would submit that we've lost a lot
of our credibility and a lot of our leverage in the region
because of our policies over the last few years, but it has to
do with the fact that Iraq today has become such a fragmented
country in which there is no central state institution and in
which militia groups, insurgent groups, and others build on
this--on their ties to outside actors, and outside actors can
always, if they want to, destabilize the situation by promoting
the agendas of any group within Iraq. So, we need the help of
anyone in the region who is prepared to do so. The neighbors
didn't instigate the crisis, it's hard for me to imagine that
the crisis can be resolved without them today.
The third point, which is essential in order to get a
multinational strategy, is to engage with all parties in the
region--and that means Iran and Syria, in particular--and to
revive the Arab-Israeli peace process. It was a core
recommendation of the Iraq Study Group. It was one of the first
to be summarily dismissed by the President. But let me explain,
again, why I think--and I think Larry Korb made some of those
points--why we need to engage with Syria and Iran despite all
the skepticism that one may have about it.
Both of them have huge ability to spoil the situation in
Iraq. We know that. We know that they have ties to tribal
groups. We know that they have ties to Sunni Arabs, in the case
of Syria; with Shiite militias, in the case of Iran; and they
could do much worse than they've done already, and they use
their leverage to help if they were brought to the table and
they had that interest. And, again, if we don't bring them in,
we know all the harm they can do.
Why revitalize the Arab-Israeli peace process? And, Mr.
Chairman, I know--I've read your remarks about how you don't
believe that by resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, it's going
to make any bit of difference between how Sunnis and Shiites--
--
The Chairman. No; I--just for clarification, that's not
what I said. I said settling it----
Dr. Malley. Yes.
The Chairman [continuing]. Does not settle the other.
Dr. Malley. No, no.
The Chairman. It would positively impact, but it does not
settle.
Dr. Malley. OK. And I agree, I was going to say, I agree
with that. Of course, the notion that, because Arabs and
Israelis are going to be at peace, Sunnis and Shiites would be
at peace, is a fantasy. I do think that if we want to have a
strategy that gains credibility in the region, we need to
revitalize, as I know you agree. I also think it's very
important to revitalize the Syrian-Israeli track, both because
Syria plays a critical role in Iraq, vis-a-vis Hamas, vis-a-vis
Hezbollah, but because it also is quite ironic that, for the
first time, at least in my memory, the United States is
standing in the way of an Arab country that wants to negotiate
with Israel.
If--and I think this is an important part--I've put on the
table the three components that we need. If this is not
undertaken by the administration, or if it's undertaken and our
Iraqi partners are not prepared to cooperate, then we should
bring this adventure to an end. And I say that aware of the
moral and political responsibility the United States has. We
played a critical role, if not the determining role, in
bringing Iraq to the situation in which it finds itself today.
And it's a heavy responsibility to say today, ``Well, because
the Iraqis are not behaving the way we expected them to, even
though we're at fault, we're going to get out of this.'' But
there is no possible justification for an open-ended commitment
in a failing state, and there certainly is no possible
justification to be complicit in the nefarious acts of our
allies in Iraq.
A word about troop levels, which has consumed a lot of the
attention and the debate here as a result of the President's
request for a surge. It's the wrong question at the wrong time,
disconnected from realities. A troop surge, independent from a
political strategy, won't make any difference. I think everyone
today has agreed with that. Maybe it will make a marginal and
temporary difference, but, if you don't affect the underlying
structural dynamics--at best, the violence will resume the day
this troop surge comes to an end; at worst, the violence will
simply move to other places.
If, on the other hand, a new compact can be reached, if we
find that the Iraqi actors, all of them, are prepared to turn
the page, then part of the dialog that they need to have with
us is how to negotiate a troop withdrawal. I don't think the
United States should stay there a long time, in any event, but
we should negotiate it, we should negotiate the timetable, we
should talk--use it as leverage to ensure that they hold their
commitments. If, on the other hand the compact is not reached,
or it's reached but it's not implemented, then, of course, we
should significantly accelerate the withdrawal of our forces,
perhaps maintaining some forces to maintain--to protect our
vital interests, in terms of border security.
In conclusion, I want to emphasize, again, this is really
not only a last opportunity, it's a feeble hope. I think we
have to be candid about it. It's a hope that's dependent on the
fundamental shift on the part of Iraqi actors who have shown
themselves to be mainly preoccupied with short-term gain. It's
a hope that's dependent on the radical rupture on the part of
an administration that's shown itself reluctant and resistant
to pragmatic change. It's a hope that's dependent on a
significant change in our relationship with countries in the
region--in particular, Syria and Iran--a relationship that's
been marked by deep distrust and strategic competition. And,
finally, it's a hope that's dependent on involvement by
international actors who, so far, have seemed to be more
content staying on the sidelines.
But it is the only hope, at this point, that would justify
remaining in Iraq in the way we--the administration intends to
remain. It's the only possible justification for investing our
resources and the lives of our men and women. And it's
certainly the only justification for not bringing this
misbegotten, tragic adventure to a close. If we cannot do what
I've laid out, I think it's time to end this chapter.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Malley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert Malley, Middle East and North Africa
Program Director, International Crisis Group, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, first, let me express my deep appreciation for the
invitation to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. By
now, you have had many days of important testimony; virtually all your
witnesses have emphasized the gravity of the situation in both Iraq and
the region. The United States unmistakably is at a crossroads. If it is
poorly managed, our Nation will have to live with the consequences of
regional instability, rising extremism and diminished American
credibility for a long time to come.
It is difficult, at this late stage, to imagine a positive outcome
to this war. But to have any chance of success, mere tinkering will not
do. What is needed today is a dramatic change in our approach toward
both Iraq and the region, so that we seek to enlist broad international
support for a new political compact among Iraqis, cease treating the
Iraqi Government as a privileged partner rather than an integral party
to the sectarian war; and engage in real diplomacy with all Iraq's
neighbours, Iran and Syria included.
To be clear: If the administration is not prepared to undertake
such a paradigm shift, then our Nation has no business sending its men
and women in harm's way. It has no business squandering its precious
resources on a growing civil war. And it will be time to bring this
tragic episode to a close through the orderly withdrawal of American
troops in a manner that protects vital U.S. interests with some
remaining to contain the civil war within Iraq's borders.
Unfortunately, the plan announced by President Bush does not
reflect the necessary clean break. It adheres to the same faulty
premises that have guided its approach since the onset of the war and,
therefore, suffers from the same fatal contradictions. In its essence
it amounts to ``stay the course plus 20,000''--an inadequate answer to
a disastrous situation that at most will delay what only radical course
correction can avert. Under the best case scenario, it will postpone
what, increasingly, is looking like the most probable scenario: Iraq's
collapse into a failed and fragmented state, an intensifying and long-
lasting civil war, as well as increased foreign meddling that risks
metastasising into a broad proxy war. Such a situation could not be
contained within Iraq's borders.
There is abundant reason to question whether the administration is
capable of such a dramatic course change. But there is no reason to
question why we ought to change direction, and what will happen if we
do not.
Mr Chairman, at the outset it is important to begin with an honest
assessment of where things stand. My assessment is based on the
longstanding field work performed by the International Crisis Group's
staff and consultants who have been in Iraq repeatedly, outside of the
Green Zone, in contact with militiamen and insurgents, almost without
interruption since the war.
Two key factors are critical in understanding the country's current
condition. One is the utter collapse of the state apparatus which
created both a security and managerial vacuum that 3\1/2\ years of
reconstruction have failed to overcome. The security vacuum has been
filled by autonomous, violent actors--militias linked to the Shiite
Islamists (the Badr Corps and Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army), as well as
an array of smaller groups, among them Mahdi Army offshoots,
neighbourhood vigilantes, private sector contractors guarding
politicians as well as oil, power, and other key facilities and
criminal mafias. The armed groups' and militias' most important source
of legitimacy and power has become the conflict's very radicalisation:
The more they can point to the extreme violence of the other, the more
they can justify their own in terms of protection (of one's community)
and revenge (against another). In the absence of a state apparatus
capable of safeguarding the population, civilians are caught in a
vicious cycle in which they must rely on armed groups.
The other factor is the rise of a class of politicians,
predominantly former exiles and emigres enjoying little legitimacy
among ordinary Iraqis, who have treated the country and its resources
as their party or personal entitlement, have encouraged a communal-
based political system that has polarised the country and, in some
cases, have advanced separatist agendas that are tearing the nation
apart. Political actors have accentuated differences through their
brand of identity politics and promotion of a political system in which
positions are allocated according to communal identities. With few
exceptions, the parties and individuals that came to represent these
communities--themselves internally divided--carved out private fiefdoms
in the ministries and institutions they acquired, preying on state
coffers and reconstruction largesse to finance their militias and line
their pockets. The absence of politics also raised the stock of both
Sunni and Shiite clerics and, over time, the more radical among them,
at the expense of secular minded forces.
Not unlike the groups they combat, the forces that dominate the
current government thrive on identity politics, communal polarisation,
and a cycle of intensifying violence and counterviolence. Increasingly
indifferent to the country's interests, its political leaders gradually
are becoming local warlords when what Iraq desperately needs are
national leaders.
And so, hollowed out and fatally weakened, the Iraqi State today is
prey to armed militias, sectarian forces, and a political class that,
by putting short-term personal concerns ahead of long-term national
interests, is complicit in Iraq's tragic destruction.
The implication is clear and critical: The government--by which I
mean the entire institutional apparatus set up since the fall of
Saddam--is not and cannot be a partner in an effort to stem the
violence, nor will its strengthening contribute to Iraq's stability.
The Sunni Arab representatives it includes lack meaningful support
within their community and have no sway with the armed opposition
groups that are feeding civil war dynamics. Conversely, its most
influential Shiite members control the most powerful militias, which
also are involved in brutal sectarian violence. Given the depth of
polarisation, the United States must come to terms with the fact that
the current government is merely one among many parties to the
conflict. The manner of Saddam Hussein's execution was only the latest
and most vivid illustration: It was Green Zone meets Red Zone, the
pulling of the curtain that revealed the government in its rawest,
crudest form.
One additional comment: It has been argued that the ongoing
sectarian division of the country could be a pathway toward Iraq's
eventual stabilisation through a rough division into three entities.
There is little doubt that Iraq's territory is being carved up into
homogeneous sectarian zones, separated by de facto front lines. What
were once mixed neighbourhoods--and whose identity as chiefly Sunni or
Shiite areas would have been impossible to presume prior to the war--
are in the process of being consolidated according to a single
religious identity.
But there remain countless disputed areas, resolution of which
would entail far greater and more savage levels of violence than
currently is occurring. Even in Baghdad, the mosaic has not
disappeared; it has evolved. Sunni and Shiite neighbourhoods are
gradually being consolidated, but the process is far from complete, and
in any event these neighbourhoods are still intermingled. Current
confessional boundaries will be fiercely fought over; minority enclaves
will be the targets of bloody assaults. Moreover, the violence is
taking place within communities, with intrasectarian tensions giving
rise to fratricidal clashes. In other words, Iraq's division may soon
become inevitable. But it will not be a tidy three-way split and it
will entail violence on a scale far greater than anything witnessed so
far. It may become the final outcome. It should not be a U.S. goal.
The absence of an effective central state, coupled with Iraq's
growing fragmentation and increased power of autonomous groups and
militias, has enhanced the role of outside actors both as potential
spoilers and as needed partners in any effort to stabilise the country.
This is an issue over which there has been considerable confusion, but
the reality is simply this: The fact that Iraq's neighbours did not
instigate the crisis does not mean they could not sustain it if they so
desired, nor that it can be resolved without their help. Given how dire
things have become, it will take active cooperation by all foreign
stakeholders to have any chance to redress the situation.
Regrettably, opposite dynamics today are at play. As it approaches
its fifth year, the conflict has become a magnet for deeper regional
interference and a source of greater regional instability. As the
security vacuum has grown, various neighbours and groups have sought to
promote and protect their interests, prevent potential threats and
preempt their counterparts' presumed hostile actions. In principle,
neighbouring countries and other regional powers share an interest in
containing the conflict and avoiding its ripple effects. But, divided
by opposing agendas, mistrust and lack of communication, they, so far,
have been unable to coordinate strategies to that effect. Most damaging
has been competition between the United States and Iran and the
conviction in Tehran that Washington is seeking to build a hostile
regional order. As a result, instead of working together toward an
outcome they all could live with (a weak but prosperous and united Iraq
that does not present a threat to its neighbours), each appears to be
taking measures in anticipation of the outcome they all fear--Iraq's
descent into all-out chaos and fragmentation. By increasing support for
some Iraqi actors against others, their actions have all the wisdom of
a self-fulfilling prophecy: Steps that will accelerate the very process
they claim to wish to avoid.
Iraq's sectarian tensions are also spreading throughout the region.
They are exacerbating a Sunni-Shiite divide that is fast becoming the
dominant lens through which Middle East developments are apprehended.
The most serious repercussions are felt in confessionally mixed
societies such as Lebanon, Syria, and some gulf countries. One of the
more perilous prospects is that of renewed conflict along an Arab-
Persian divide. The more it develops, the more Iraq will become the
theatre of deadly proxy wars waged by others. Should this happen, the
United States will be fighting a difficult and highly unpredictable
battle.
Mr. Chairman, the President's newly announced approach can only be
properly assessed in light of this assessment. And it is in light of
this assessment that its fundamental flaws and contradictions become
clear: It seeks to provide a military solution to a political crisis;
it leaves the political dimension to an Iraqi Government that is an
integral party to the sectarian conflict; and it seeks to stabilise
Iraq without offering a regional strategy or engagement with pivotal
neighbours without which such a goal simply is unattainable.
1. The President's plan essentially relies on military means to
resolve a political problem: Iraq may not be experiencing a war of all
against all, but it is at the very least a war of many against many.
Government-supported militias as much as Sunni insurgents are part of
this confrontation, and intersectarian fighting mixes with
intrasectarian struggles. The implication--critical in terms of
devising an effective response--is that this is not a military
challenge in which one side needs to be strengthened and another
defeated, but a political one in which new understandings need to be
reached. Even if the addition of several thousand U.S. troops quells
the violence in Baghdad--an uncertain proposition at best--insurgent
groups and militias are likely to focus their efforts elsewhere and/or
to melt away. The President's plan is at best a short-term answer to a
long-term problem: The moment the U.S. ``surge'' ends, violent actors
will resume their fighting. In short, Washington's contemplated
strategy of ``clear, build, and hold'' is no response to the
insurgents' and militias' strategy of ``recoil, redeploy, and spoil.''
2. To end the sectarian fighting, the President's plan depends on
an Iraqi Government that has become an integral party to the sectarian
war: The President repeatedly describes the Iraqi Government as one of
national unity. It is nothing of the sort. It is not a partner in an
effort to stem the violence nor will its strengthening contribute to
Iraq's stabilisation. The administration must come to terms with the
fact that the current government has become one side in a growing dirty
war. It is incapable of generating the compromises required to
restabilize the country and rebuild institutions that have decayed,
been corrupted, and are today, unable to either provide security or
distribute goods and services.
This does not mean, as sometimes is suggested, that the United
States should engineer another Cabinet change, trying to forge an
alliance that excludes Sadr and may ultimately sacrifice Maliki. Maliki
and the Cabinet are symptoms, not causes of the underlying problem: The
core issue is not with the identity of Cabinet members; it is with the
entire political edifice put in place since 2003. No Prime Minster
operating under current circumstances could do what Prime Minister
Maliki has not. Structural, not personnel changes, are now needed.
3. The President's plan is premised on contradictory and self-
defeating regional goals. One cannot simultaneously stabilise Iraq and
destabilise Iran and Syria. Although neither Tehran nor Damascus is at
the origins of, or even plays a major part in, Iraq's catastrophe, the
situation has reached the point where resolution will be impossible
without their cooperation, as both states have the ability to sabotage
any U.S. initiative and as both are needed to pressure or persuade
insurgents and militias to pursue a political path. Former U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State, Jim Dobbins, no stranger to successful
U.S. efforts at conflict resolution, put it well: It has never been
likely that the United States could stabilise Iraq and destabilise Iran
and Syria at the same time. As long as the United States continues to
operate at cross purposes with nearly all its neighbours, and
particularly the most influential, American efforts to promote peace
and reconciliation are unlikely to prosper. In refusing to combine
coercion with communication in its dealings (or nondealings) with
Iraq's neighbours, the Bush administration is making peace in Iraq less
likely, and increasing the chances for war throughout the surrounding
region.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The International Herald Tribune, 18 January 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In lieu of talking to Iran and Syria, the administration is
proposing a different kind of engagement: Military threats addressed
toward Iran, combined with attempts to build an anti-Iranian coalition
of pro-Western Sunni Arab governments. Besides raising the most obvious
question (How can the United States rely on Iranian allies in Baghdad
at the same time as it is developing a tough anti-Iranian strategy for
the region?), this approach runs the risk of promoting internecine
conflict and, possibly, all-out and unwinnable civil wars in Lebanon
and Palestine--yet another series of catastrophes in the making.
At this late stage, only a radical and dramatic policy shift--
entailing a different distribution of power and resources within Iraq
as well as a different set of outside influences mobilised to achieve
it--can conceivably arrest the spiralling decline. In contrast to the
President's plan, the International Crisis Group bases its own on the
belief that the Iraqi Government is one of actors in sectarian
violence, not a partner in fighting extremists; that the entire post-
2003 power structure must be overhauled, rather than strengthened; and
that the United States must engage with all relevant regional actors,
rather than seek to succeed alone and isolate those who, in response,
are most likely to destabilise Iraq.
The International Crisis Group's proposal aims to meet the three
most important challenges: To end the civil war, reconstruct the state
and its institutions, and prevent dangerous regional spillover. This is
not something the United States can do alone nor is it something it can
count on the Iraqi Government achieving. It needs to reach out widely
to seek collaboration from friends and foes alike. That will require
not only requesting others to play a part in implementing a new policy
but also giving them a key role in shaping it. Crisis Group advocates
three essential and interrelated steps:
1. A new forceful multilateral approach that puts real pressure on
all Iraqi parties: The Baker-Hamilton report was right to call for the
creation of a broad International Support Group; it should comprise the
five permanent Security Council members, Iraq's six neighbours, and the
United Nations represented by its Secretary General. But its purpose
cannot be to support the Iraqi Government. It must support Iraq, which
means pressing the government, along with all other Iraqi constituents,
to make the necessary compromises. It also means defining rules of the
game for outside powers vis-a-vis Iraq, agreeing on redlines none would
cross, and, crucially, guiding the full range of Iraqi political actors
to consensus on an acceptable end-state. This does not entail a one-
time conference, but sustained multilateral diplomacy.
The absence of an effective Iraqi State apparatus, the fragmented
nature of Iraqi society, and the proliferation of self-sustaining
militias and armed groups underscore the urgency of a much more
substantial role for the international community, and in particular for
neighbouring states. The United States, unfortunately, no longer
possesses the credibility or leverage to achieve its goals on its own
and Iraqi actors are unlikely to budge without concerted effort by all
regional players with influence and leverage over them. Although what
happens in Iraq will depend, above all, on the creation of a new
internal momentum, such momentum cannot be sustained without
cooperation from neighbors who each possess considerable nuisance and
spoiling capacity.
2. A conference of all Iraqi and international stakeholders,
modeled after the Dayton conference for Bosnia and the Bonn conference
for Afghanistan, to forge a new political compact: A new, more
equitable and inclusive national compact needs to be agreed upon by all
relevant actors, including militias and insurgent groups, on issues
such as federalism, resource allocation, de-Baathification, the scope
of the amnesty, the structure of security forces, and the timetable for
a U.S. withdrawal. This can only be done if the International Support
Group brings all of them to the negotiating table and if its members
steer their deliberations, deploying a mixture of carrots and sticks to
influence those on whom they have particular leverage.
Indeed, if enlarging the scope of international players is one
essential pillar, enlarging the range of Iraqi actors and injecting new
momentum in national reconciliation efforts must be another. Much of
the past few years of diplomacy have had an extraordinarily surreal and
virtual quality: Pursuit of an Iraqi political process that is wholly
divorced from realities on the ground through dealings between the
United States and local leaders who possess neither the will nor the
ability to fundamentally change current dynamics--who, indeed, have
been complicit in entrenching them. The present government does not
need to be strengthened--say, by expanding Iraqi security forces; it
needs to have a different character and pursue different objectives.
The time has come for a new, more inclusive Iraqi deal that puts
rebuilding a nonethnic, nonsectarian state at the top of its
objectives.
The conference should include all Iraq's political stakeholders--
leaders of parties, movements, militias, insurgent groups, tribal
confederations, and civil society organisations across the political
spectrum. The point is to exercise pressure from above--through foreign
supporters of local groups--and below--by enlisting the far more
reasonable and conciliatory aspirations of most ordinary Iraqis. The
conference's objective should be to guide Iraqi actors toward an
internal consensus on the principal issues of dispute and amend the
constitution accordingly.
3. A new U.S. regional strategy, including engagement with Syria
and Iran, and to end efforts at forcible regime change and
revitalisation of all tracks of the Arab-Israeli peace process: Polite
engagement of Iraq's neighbours will not do. Rather a clear
redefinition of U.S. objectives in the region will be required to
enlist regional, but especially Iranian and Syrian help. The goal is
not to bargain with them but to seek agreement on an end-state for Iraq
and the region that is no one's first choice, but with which everyone
can live.
Engagement with Iran and Syria was one of the core recommendations
of the Iraq Study Group, and one of the first to be summarily dismissed
by the President. Seriously engaging Syria and Iran will not be easy;
bringing them around will be even harder. But the United States has no
workable alternative if its objective is to restore peace in Iraq and
defuse dangerous tensions threatening regional stability. On top of
refraining from damaging steps, there is much Iran and Syria can do to
help: Enhance border control; using Damascus's extensive intelligence
on, and lines of communication with, insurgent groups to facilitate
negotiations; drawing on its wide-ranging tribal networks to reach out
to Sunni Arabs in the context of such negotiations; and utilising
Iran's leverage to control SCIRI and its channels in southern Iraq to
convince the Sadrists they have a stake in the new compact.
Given current U.S. policy, neither Iran nor Syria today sees much
to gain from helping us extricate ourselves from Iraq. The question is
not whether either side will surrender to the other. The question is
whether there exists some accommodation that, while short of either
side's ideal outcome, nonetheless meets each side's minimum vital
interests. The answer is at best uncertain, given the considerable
mistrust that currently prevails. But there are considerable costs for
all sides with continuing along the present course: A deepening crisis
for the United States in Iraq, the prospect of further international
sanctions and isolation for Iran and Syria, and dissolution of the
Iraqi State with potential harmful consequences for all. In other
words, the most powerful inducement for a compromise are the risks
associated with the status quo.
The issue of troop levels, which has consumed so much of the debate
and to which the administration has offered its response, is the wrong
question, disconnected from ground realities. On its own, and in the
absence of significant political change, the addition of troops will
have only marginal and temporary impact on the intensity of violence.
Without fundamental changes in Iraq and in U.S. policy, a continued
American presence serves little purpose. In fact, it risks making
Washington complicit in the worst excesses of the Iraqi Government,
providing it with both public excuses and the security to operate with
impunity.
Rather, the issue of U.S. troops can only be properly understood in
relation to whether or not a new Iraqi political compact is reached. If
it is, then what are needed are negotiated arrangements for a
relatively rapid coalition military withdrawal. The coalition's
military roles, rules of engagement, and withdrawal schedule should be
an item for discussion at the Dayton/Bonn-like conference, an
instrument of leverage for the United States and a means of ensuring an
orderly withdrawal. The coalition presence would be conditioned on this
compact being reached and implemented; the schedule for its withdrawal
should be agreed and, in any event, should be completed within a
reasonable time period, probably not more than 2 to 3 years. If a
consensus emerges for longer stay, that could then be considered.
Should the consensus back a more rapid withdrawal, it should, of
course, be carried out.
But, and by the same token, if the compact is not reached or not
implemented, the United States should significantly accelerate the
withdrawal of forces that then will have lost their main purpose. A
residual number may remain, for example at the borders in order to
contain the conflict within Iraq. Any such withdrawal raises difficult
political and even moral issues, as the United States undeniably bears
responsibility for Iraq's current calamity. But there can be no
possible justification for an open-ended investment in a failing state.
Mr. Chairman, implementation of the plan put forward by the
International Crisis Group would present one last opportunity. It is at
best a feeble hope, dependent on a fundamental shift among Iraqi
political leaders who have long been preoccupied with only short-term
gain; on a radical rupture by an administration that has proved
resistant to pragmatic change; on a significant alteration in relations
between the United States and key regional countries that have been
marked by deep distrust and strategic competition; and on involvement
by international actors that have warily watched from the sidelines.
But it is the only hope to spare Iraq from an all-out disintegration.
And it would be the only possible justification for continuing to
invest our troops and our resources in this misbegotten adventure.
The Chairman. Thank you all very much.
You know, this is one of those cases where I wish we had a
mandatory session in this Senate, and all of you sat in the
well, and all four of you spoke to 100 Senators. They're all
very busy. They all have other committee assignments. And they
don't have the benefit of hearing the detail we just heard. I
think the testimony this morning has been really very
enlightening.
Let me say, we'll do 8-minute rounds. And, if possible,
depending on the time of--the availability of the witnesses and
on the participation here, maybe have a second round.
Let me start, if I may, by suggesting that as I listened to
all of you, there is agreement on at least three or four items.
One; the surge is not a good idea. Matter of fact, it's a very
bad idea. Two; if we should begin to redeploy American forces,
the timeframe over which that redeployment should take place,
whether things are going well or poorly, is a frame that begins
now and has an outside life of about 18 months. Three; that we
need some regional interaction that is--engages all the
neighbors. And four; that the United States has vital interests
in the region.
Now, the reason I mention these is, the first three are in
direct odds with the administration. It's not merely the
redeployment that's at odds with this administration's
strategy. It is all three of the areas of agreement that I've
mentioned. I know some of you better than others, but I know of
all of you, and one of the problems that you recognize, but
that the vast majority of the public has understandable
difficulty recognizing, is: We don't get to formulate foreign
policy here. We get to react to it. We can, hopefully,
influence it, but that's not always certain. And most times
we're left with Hobson's choices here. The other thing you all
agree on is, there's no, really great choices here. None of you
are bullish on the notion that there is a good way out, a good
way to resolve the situation in Iraq. And we're left with an
administration who's not likely to listen, thus far, and a
government in Iraq that left us with a constitution that, as
Les points out, 80 percent of the Iraqis voted for. And yet,
with the exception of Les, basically the three of you are
saying we should basically disregard that constitution. I'm not
suggesting I'm certain that is wrong, but that's basically what
you've all said.
Now, one of the things that the Constitution says is--and
we essentially helped write it--in article 115, ``The federal
system in the Republic of Iraq''--I'm quoting--``is made up of
decentralized capital regions and governates and local
administration.'' And to go back to your point, Les, this
administration has continued to push a rope here, they
continue--and all of you point out--to insist on a strong
central government that we would put our full faith and credit
behind and support, yet there is nothing I have seen in the
Constitution or in the conduct of the Iraqis that they're
inclined to support a strong central government, which the very
Constitution doesn't even call for.
So, my question is this: Do we essentially try to
accommodate this Constitution functioning, or do we just
pretend like it doesn't even exist, as we move from this moment
on, in terms of ``a clean break, a different policy, et
cetera''?
Let's start with you, Les. Do we----
Dr. Gelb. I completely agree with your question, Mr.
Chairman. There is no way we can get out of this without a
disaster without at least trying to help them to reach a
political settlement. They put themselves on a road to a
federal or decentralized alternative, and every time we raise
this, people talk as if we're trying to stuff this down their
throats. I think a majority of Iraqis would want to live this
way, would want to be able to run their own affairs in their
own regions. I've talked to them, too, and I do not ignore the
fact that 80 percent voted for that Constitution, or that 80
percent voted for that implementing legislation. The support is
there. The resistance is also there. But unless we help them
toward this kind of political agreement, nothing is going to
happen except trouble, and worse trouble than we've had.
Now, I don't disagree with Ed Luttwak about our inability
to transform other societies, but I do disagree that the United
States shouldn't interfere in the domestic politics of another
state, particularly where we have such deep involvement and
where we have real responsibility. That's really what foreign
policy is all about. Foreign policy, serious foreign policy, is
the interference by one country in the domestic politics of
another country. And if you don't interfere successfully, you
don't have a successful foreign policy.
But, in the end, this will work, or not, depending upon
whether the Iraqis want to do it. But we have the
responsibility, I think, to lean on them and to work with them.
One final point, quickly. I stress ``to work with them,''
because there's got to be working at two ends here. First of
all, working between you folks on this committee and the
administration for a real bipartisan approach. It hasn't
happened. And, second, between our administration and the
Iraqis. And it hasn't happened. A 2-hour visit by a senior
official to Baghdad is not the way to work out a common
strategy or to move these issues forward.
The Chairman. Now, let me say, since my time is up, I don't
want to start by asking a question that gets everyone involved,
and I end up spending 15 minutes, and my colleagues don't get
to ask questions, so I'll go back to ask you all to illuminate
on that, as well. I would like, in the minute I have left--
there are several proposals put forward so far. One is to try
to accommodate a bipartisan foreign policy, a bipartisan
approach here to demonstrate to the administration to cease and
desist from what they're doing. It looks like there's
overwhelming support for that, in the sense that you have the
proposal put forward by me and Levin and Hagel and Olympia
Snowe. And then you have a proposal that says almost the same
thing being put forward by Warner and leading Republicans. So,
my guess is, there'll be an overwhelming rejection on the
record of this President's continuing, as was stated by one of
you, to ``stay the course with 20,000 more,'' or whatever the
phrase was that was used.
But there are also other proposals that I'd like to ask
your input on. There are proposals just to cap the number of
forces in Iraq and make that law. There are proposals to cut
off funding for the ``war in Iraq.'' Would you, each of you, as
briefly as you can, respond to the efficacy of setting a cap?
And what does that mean in Iraq, in the region? What are the
consequences of that? Hard number. And two, the idea of cutting
off funding, generically, for ``the war in Iraq.'' And I'll
start with you, Ed, and then end up with Les.
Dr. Luttwak. I really believe that this committee, led as
it now is by people of unparalleled experience and seriousness,
can acquire enough authority with your colleagues in the
Congress--enough authority to guide policy the right way
without the--what I--you know, the arbitrary cutoffs and
putting yourself in a position where you, yourself, might
hesitate about the absolute nature of it, and so on. I think
that, you know, Senators Lugar and Biden and the--all their
colleagues--as a voice of moderation, can guide them in the
right direction. But I would really be opposed to these drastic
sort of measures.
The Chairman. Mr. Korb.
Dr. Korb. I think that you can cap the forces, which
doesn't mean that the President can't send more, but he has to
come back to you to justify what more. And I would recommend
that right now, given the situation, you put a cap, say, at
150,000, which would allow him to send more troops, because you
don't want to hamstring him from having to deal with situations
that occur, and for what military commanders want. But that
certainly would enough. After that--and I think it's been
misunderstood--people say, ``Well, if you cap him, you're
undermining the authority of the Commander in Chief.'' No, you
just ask him to come back and justify why it has to go more
than 150,000.
I think you can also condition the funding, not, you know,
this year, but you're going to take up--my understanding is,
when they submit the 2008 budget, they're also going to submit
the supplemental for 2008, it's all going to be together--you
can--you know, can condition the funding in fiscal 2008, where
the administration provides verification and certification on
key metrics for progress in Iraq, that they've talked about.
After all, remember, Secretary Gates has said, ``If they don't
do what we said, we may not even send all of the--all of the
troops.'' So, I think that you can require steps to disband the
ethnic and sectarian militias, measures to ensure that the
Iraqi Government brings to justice Iraqi security personnel who
are alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights,
and steps toward political and national reconciliation.
You can't run foreign policy from here, but you can put the
onus on the administration to demonstrate why their policy is
the right policy.
The Chairman. The cap that's being discussed is a cap to
prevent the troops from being able to be sent, so the cap is at
135 or whatever the number is. Would you support that?
Dr. Korb. Not right now, because, again, you started with
132, you got one brigade in there, another one's--to go. I
mean, because it seems to me--I don't know what could happen
there, but you don't ever want to put yourself in a position
where the place goes to hell in a handbasket and you stop the--
--
The Chairman. And you can't--that would also prevent
brigades we have in the outlying countries from being able to
surge----
Dr. Korb. That's right. And the other thing that I
recommended, if you constrain their ability to mobilize Guard
and Reserve units for the second time, they're the ones that
are supposed to replace the forces that have been sent, so this
would give you an opportunity, again, to present this surge----
The Chairman. That's a different----
Dr. Korb [continuing]. From going on.
The Chairman [continuing]. Way than capping.
Dr. Korb. Yes.
The Chairman. OK. And, Mr. Malley, the cap and cutoff----
Dr. Malley. Well, let me start by saying I'm very
comfortable, as Les said, intervening in the domestic politics
of other countries, much less comfortable dealing with the
domestic politics of the Democratic or Republican Party. So,
I--not going to get into the--I don't think----
The Chairman. Well, there are people on both sides support
all of these things.
Dr. Malley. No; exact--but--and my view is that right now
the main priority is to send a message about what is not right,
and that that plan that was put on the table is not right. And
then you need to have an open discussion about what is right.
And talking about numbers and troops, as I said earlier,
abstracted from the political strategy, is an exercise in
fantasy. I mean, let's get the political strategy right, then
we would know what kind of troops we need. If we don't get the
political strategy right, any talk of capping or anything else,
for me, is surreal.
The Chairman. I agree. But--
Les, you have a final word? And I'll yield the floor.
Dr. Gelb. I'm in favor of serious bipartisan consultations.
The initiative for that has to come from the administration.
The only decent way out of this situation is for the two
parties and for the two branches to share responsibility for
the very tough decisions that have to be made. And if the
administration won't seriously consult, then I think these
resolutions are the least you can do.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate not only the advice you have given with regard
to foreign policy, but the advice you have given to this
committee, and perhaps to advise our consultations with the
President.
There could be, certainly, difference of judgment in this
committee, how effective we can be. My hope is that, picking up
the theme that you have just enunciated, Les Gelb, that is
possible to work out, on a bipartisan basis, the best strategy
for America, and a perception on the part of the rest of the
world that we have the capability of doing that.
Now, the chairman has been pursuing that. I have been
pursuing it, in my own way, and I would just report, without
breaching confidentiality, that I had an opportunity, with
Senator Warner, to sit down with the President for 15 minutes
to talk about the things we have talked about today, I
presented, as precisely as I could, most of the arguments that
you have. We had another meeting 4 days later with at least
eight other members of the Republican leadership, joined by the
Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and so
forth. Then, last week, we met with Steve Hadley, our National
Security Director, with eight or nine Republicans sitting
around the table. And I'm sure other meetings have occurred
with Democratic Members of the Senate and the House. At least I
hope that's the case. But I would just say that these have been
opportunities, at least, to make the case, to hear the
President, to hear his advisers.
Now, I don't think we have been necessarily overwhelmingly
convincing in the arguments that we have made, although
sometimes in politics persistence and the ability to stay the
course is important. But let me just say, the President's
arguments, as I have jotted down this morning--if he were here,
perhaps he would say the same thing--is that he has a feeling
there is going to be a large human loss. People might well be
killed in Baghdad by the forces of the army or the police or
the militia. He feels that, in essence, without an American
presence in the nine police districts, there is going to be a
great deal of killing perhaps, of Shiites by Sunnis, and that,
as a humanitarian situation, although there has been counseling
on the part of you and me and maybe others for, if not a
withdrawal, at least a disengagement from Baghdad. Let's keep
from sending our people out on patrol or into the various
stations as you've talked about, Dr. Luttwak. The President
believes that this is probably the only way that this killing
is to be mitigated.
You have argued that might be the case for a while. A surge
denotes a discreet period of time. And to execute a proper
``clear and hold,'' probably many more troops than 21,500 would
be needed--but, nevertheless, giving the argument its due,
there is, on the part of our President, a humanitarian feeling
here with regard to people that are going to be lost without
our intervening.
And, second, he believes that the democratic structure of
the country is unlikely to be perfected without there being
substantially more American intervention in this process, that
the Iraqis have got it right, in terms of various elections and
constitution-building and so forth, but that without these so-
called benchmarks, these messages, essentially, to Maliki or to
others, the rest of the job is unlikely to be perfected very
well, if at all, and democracy is very important to our
country, very important to the objectives, at least, that the
President has stated. So, he sees that faltering badly without
our being more involved.
There is also--I believe I fairly state the President's
point of view--a feeling that there is now an impression that
our military might is not as effective as it should be, or
should have been, and that it is important to establish that
impression, that we cannot be pushed around, that the assertion
of these forces at this particular time is important, once
again, in terms of credibility of our military.
And, finally, the President argues, both publicly and
privately, that if we are not successful in this new strategy,
it will be a setback in our overall war against terror. He
brings up, frequently, the thought that we, here in the United
States, may feel the impact of our failure to back our
military, to perfect democracy, to take a view of humanity.
What I would like to explore for a moment with you, Dr.
Luttwak, is the intriguing ideas that you have about
disengagement. In essence, without being cynical about it, you
suggested, in your testimony using the Spanish example, back in
1800 or so, and indicate that they were on the threshold of
democracy, or at least some felt that way, but there were
others in the country with religious motivation, other
leadership, who delayed that democracy for several decades, if
not longer. They felt that the time was not ripe, given the
demographics of the country or the religious affiliation, and
that the situation in Iraq now is much closer to that of Spain
in 1800 than it was to Germany and Japan in 1945, for example.
Therefore, disengagement, as you are suggesting, is a
sophisticated process in which, as a matter of fact, you might
find some bases in the desert, which you say were identified
before. For a while, you keep out the invaders, you probably
help continue training of Iraqi forces. You have an influence
on democracy--but albeit from afar--and you allow the fact that
some civil war might occur, that this is almost inevitable,
given the artificial contrivance of the country to begin with.
And that, finally, you have some basis to negotiate with all
the parties, either all eight at the same time, or two plus
six, or however you want to do it.
Nevertheless, all the parties in the region understand that
we are going to be a force in the Middle East for a significant
time to come. If not in the Iraqi desert, then certainly close
by; but before we get out of the desert, we at least have made
sure we have provided for safe passage out of the country,
rather than in a haphazard, expeditious manner.
You bring up an intriguing set of suggestions, and that's
why I underline it again. But why do you feel that the civil
war is inevitable, and that, unhappily, a very large amount of
killing, bloodshed, and so forth, even if not our own, is
almost inevitable, which we must accept from afar, from the
desert or from the boundaries, or so forth, of Iraq?
Dr. Luttwak. Senator, you have, indeed, presented many of
my ideas in such an effective way that I don't want to repeat
them. Instead, I'd like to address the specific point.
In the written statement, which will be submitted just
after this hearing, I specifically address, as I must, the
impact of disengagement on civil violence. I cannot sit here
calmly in Washington and advocate a policy that will lead to
the death of many people.
I believe that disengagement will not increase the level of
violence, that reducing troop levels will not do it. And why is
that? The reason is not philosophical, but, again, very
tactical. As you all know from long experience,
counterinsurgency without intelligence is a form of
malpractice, because you are there, you're visible, you're
spending money, you're moving around, you're wearing the right
boots, but you're not doing the work. Now, you also know that
the enemy is elusive, that he's low contrast, as they call it
technically. You also know that there are so many different
insurgent groups that normal processes of penetration cannot
work. Moreover, when groups are very unstable, even when you
penetrate a group, the group dissolves. There was a recent
case, with a lot of work to penetrate the group; all members of
that group essentially went out of business. So, without the
intelligence, counterinsurgency is not effective.
Now, in a broader sense, what we're doing is interposition.
We are trying to interpose ourselves, and yet, we cannot
prevent the attacks. Why? Because the attacks are carried out
by elusive, unstable, low-contrast targets that we cannot
identify even when we see them. We cannot stop them. They go
right through the checkpoints because they look like anybody
else, and then they kill people.
If I believed that the current troop level would prevent
mass death, I would never recommend its reduction. If I
believed a surge could reduce deaths, I would be very hesitant
to speak against it. On humanitarian grounds, that would be our
duty.
However, I am convinced that because of tactical reasons,
there is no relationship between U.S. troop levels and the
number of Iraqi casualties and victims. And, moreover, I note
that the fighting that's taking place, the terrorism that's
taking place is over disputed zones. And by interposing
ourselves, we are preserving those disputed zones. That's why
you can take a taxi, right now, from Arbil, got to Mosul--it
takes a few hours--and drive around a quiet Mosul, because the
Arab Shia have gone from Mosul, it is dominated by Arab Sunnis.
Now, the final point--and, again, you take seriously the
President's concerns as I think we should--we certainly do not
want to disengage or withdraw, whatever the words are, and
leave a vast zone where, let's say, groups such as al-Qaeda can
run around. Well, the fact is that in Mosul Arab Sunnis are
running the show; they don't want competition. The foreign
jihadis who call themselves al-Qaeda are Sunnis themselves, but
they happen to be of a different strain of Sunni. They are not
nationalists at all. They believe that nationalism is a sin,
that there should be the undivided Ummah of the Muslim nation.
So, if you're an Iraqi nationalist, you are their enemy. If
you're a Baathist, you are their enemy. They never forget that
Baath was founded by Michel Aflaq, a Christian. And, therefore,
there is no al-Qaeda Mosul. Al-Qaeda exists in disputed areas
created by our own interposition. That's why I'm convinced that
disengagement and the refusal of the surge would not increase
deaths in Iraq.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much.
Dr. Luttwak. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I would note one thing. My last trip to Iraq I flew out to
an airbase called Al Asad Airbase. Middle of nowhere. If you
all look at that map, those two lakes that you see up there--it
was from Fallujah north and west. And all of a sudden, I looked
out there, Ed, and I saw these--looked like two superhighways
in the middle of this vast desert. And there are two 10,000-
foot runways sitting there in pretty good shape. We landed
there. There was a small fire brigade for fire suppression, in
case someone landed. We had a young general, a very impressive
guy, and a few troops out there. And he pointed out that the
nearest city was a place called Baghdadi, which was only--was
about, I don't know, 20, 30, 40 kilometer--I can't remember how
far--6,000 people. And he pointed out that he thought there
would be an awful lot of American forces there in the not-too-
distant future. Is that the kind of prepositioning you guys are
talking about, to drop 10-20,000 American forces there, with
the surge capacity to go other places? Is that what you're
talking about?
Dr. Luttwak. Sir, first of all, the places where Americans
would remain must have airports, because the supply must be
done by C-130, with the shuttle, which already exits, out of
Kuwait, with no routine road convoys, because otherwise we
would still be there, still interfering, still taking
casualties. Any remote base would be suitable for a raiding
force that would sally out to deal with any bad guys who show
themselves, al-Qaeda and such.
The Chairman. All right, thank you.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me first, again, thank the chairman for holding these
hearings. They are very important. They are measured, with
excellent witnesses. And I have been mostly in listening mode
at these hearings, as I was at the excellent hearings that
Senator Biden and Senator Lugar held in 2002, where people like
you came before this committee. And, frankly, I couldn't
imagine how anyone could possibly have voted for the war, after
I listened to those 2 days of testimony. It made no sense to
me. None of my questions were answered.
Well, we know the history since then, and we know that the
President made a terrible mistake here. We know that that
mistake continues. But let us remember that the Democrats were
in the majority of the U.S. Senate when this was approved. So,
anyone who thinks that Congress gets off scot-free here is
wrong.
This is the moment. We are going to decide whether we take
the most narrow view of our constitutional powers to end this
or a reasonably broad view, based on history, based on the use
of the power of the purse in the past, whether it be Cambodia
or Somalia in the early nineties. I have to raise a concern. To
the extent these hearings are used as a way to quell or limit
Congress's responsibility and role, I have a problem. It is
entirely reasonable to look at whether it's caps or fencing or
using the power of the purse to try to bring this disaster to
an end. And it is our historic responsibility in this committee
and in this Senate to stand up now and not let this taboo, this
notion that you can't reasonably talk about using congressional
power. It is irresponsible, and it puts us in the position of
continuing a very unwise war that will cost many more American
lives unnecessarily.
Let me use the rest of my time to ask a question that puts
that aside, in terms of whether it's a good idea or not,
putting aside the political debate about whether or not United
States troops should remain in Iraq. I think we can all assume
that the United States will, at some point, begin to redeploy
troops from Iraq. So, leaving alone the issue of when that
deployment should begin or end, I'd like each of you to briefly
discuss what you feel would be the important elements of a
deployment plan, and how we can redeploy our United States
military personnel safely while mitigating the impact on the
Iraqis and our allies in the region.
Let's start with each of you. Go ahead. Korb.
Dr. Korb. I think you are quite right that if--when the
history of this war is written, you will find out that lots of
institutions in this country didn't play their proper role--not
only the Congress; I think, the media; I think, the generals
who didn't back General Shinseki; members of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff who didn't speak out; and even my own profession, the
academic profession, many of whom glossed over the real
problems that you would have.
Now, in terms of leaving, let me make a--I think that we
should leave, and I--take 18 months. Actually, I recommended
September 2005, but it hasn't happened yet, so I think--all
right. And I think the way to leave in a responsible way is
simply not to replace the units that, when their time is up,
they come home. And I don't think this is going to involve any
risk to the troops. And if you go 18 months, that's roughly
about 8,000 troops a month. The reason I pick 18 months, I
think you can do that without endangering the troops. It also,
I think, fulfills our moral responsibility to the Iraqis. As
has been pointed out, we broke it, we have some responsibility.
And I think 18 months is a reasonable time. That would mean
we'd be there to the middle of 2008, which is more than 5
years, which would--should be enough time for them to basically
get their act together. And I think leaving troops in the
region protects American interests. Putting more troops in
Afghanistan, which is really the central front in the war on
terror, putting our National Guard back home here to provide
for homeland defense, overall will increase our security.
Let me quote a surprising person, Bill Buckley, editor of
the National Review. He said, ``Had we not left Vietnam, we
would have lost the cold war.'' If you don't leave Iraq, you're
not going to win the war on terror.
Senator Feingold. That's just an excellent answer.
Mr. Malley.
Dr. Malley. So, I agree with what Larry said. I want to say
one thing about your first comments. As I said in my testimony,
I believe that if we don't take the political steps that are
needed, then there is no justification for remaining in Iraq,
and we should leave. And, at that point, I think this
committee, the Congress, needs to do what it needs to do to
ensure that that takes place.
The issue of withdrawal, for me, is intimately tied to what
happens politically in Iraq, and all the scenarios would
dictate something different. Under any scenario, I think the
withdrawal should not last more than a few years--2 years,
perhaps, at the outer limit, depending, again, on what happens
in Iraq and what Iraqis themselves say they want from us and
whether they're taking the steps that we believe are consistent
with a residual or remaining United States presence.
Senator Feingold. Do you think it's possible to construct a
plan to bring the troops home safely over that time period?
Dr. Malley. I would believe so. I would defer to military
experts, but I would believe that it's--from what I've heard,
that it is--that it is possible. But, again, I would defer to
others on that.
Senator Feingold. Dr. Luttwak.
Dr. Luttwak. Senator, in spite of my rather weak-kneed
response previously, I'm aware of the fact that, historically,
a very sharp congressional intervention, a very rigid one,
worked out very well. That famous case was El Salvador.
Congress set a limit of 55 advisors, and that was the key to
victory, because it forced responsibility on the Salvadorians,
who rose up to it--militarily, because they fought like hell
instead of standing back waiting for our troops to fight; and
politically, because eventually, as you know, everything was
resolved.
So, I'm not unsympathetic. It's only that, in this context,
because of the considerations mentioned by Senator Lugar,
placing the President under some mechanical constraint could be
damaging in a broader sense. But I think that congressional
action that would prescribe a gradual withdrawal without an end
date, without a final exit date could work, if presented
properly and with bipartisan support.
The Chairman. Gelb.
Dr. Gelb. I've studied these matters all my life, and I
don't know how to answer your question. I would have to sit
down--and, if I were in this administration, I would sit down--
with our military and work out, first and foremost, what our
missions would need to be over the next couple of years, and
then I'd work with them on how to redeploy troops within that
country, and withdraw them from the country, in order to
fulfill that mission. I don't believe this is the job for
professors and senior fellows at Washington think-tanks.
Senator Feingold. And that's fair enough. And I--you know,
just the theme I'm trying to pursue during these hearings,
which, again, I appreciate, is that, since we did not appear to
have a plan when we went into Iraq, isn't it time that we
construct a plan for the possibility that we might be leaving
Iraq, at some point----
Dr. Gelb. Yes, I----
Senator Feingold [continuing]. Instead of acting as if it's
some kind of thing that'll never happen? That--and I'm--this
isn't directed at you.
Dr. Gelb. Absolutely.
Senator Feingold. This is what's going on. People don't
want to talk about redeployment in a serious way, they want to
talk about taking the little steps that may lead to that. But
we need a full plan, with all the considerations of what it
means for the troops, what it means for the region. And these
need to be open discussions from all of our people.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you very much, Senator. I
happen to agree with you.
Senator Boxer, I guess.
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for these
hearings.
I want to place in the record the eight times Congress used
the power of the purse to stop U.S. casualties. Could I do
that?
The Chairman. Without objection.
I might add, not on your time, all the statements, as
submitted, will be placed in the record in full, in addition to
your oral testimony. I did not do that little mechanical thing
at the front end.
Senator Boxer. OK. I'd like to start all over again,
please.
I'd like to place in the record, at this time, the eight
times the Congress used the power of the purse to stop
escalation of wars.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[The information submitted by Senator Boxer follows:]
Congress's Historical Role in Policing Military Escalation
On numerous occasions over the past several decades, Congress has
exercised its constitutional authority to limit the President's ability
to escalate existing military engagements by capping the number of
American military personnel available for deployment and by refusing to
release appropriated funds. It is incumbent upon Congress to exercise
that authority to ensure that our men and women are not put in harm's
way unnecessarily or without a plan worthy of their great sacrifice.
In the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, P.L. 93-559, enacted
during the Vietnam war, Congress limited the number of American
military personnel in South Vietnam to 4,000 within 6 months
and 3,000 within a year of the act's enactment.
The Lebanon Emergency Assistance Act of 1983, P.L. 98-43,
required the President to ``obtain statutory authorization from
the Congress with respect to any substantial expansion in the
number or role in Lebanon of the United States Armed Forces,
including any introduction of United States Armed Forces into
Lebanon in conjunction with agreements providing for the
withdrawal of all foreign troops from Lebanon and for the
creation of a new multinational peacekeeping force in
Lebanon.''
Through the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1985,
P.L. 98-525, Congress prohibited the use of funds appropriated
in the act or in subsequent acts from being used to increase
the number of U.S. military personnel deployed in European
nations of NATO. The act provided that Congress might authorize
increased troop levels above the prescribed ceiling upon the
Secretary of Defense's certification to Congress that the
European nations had taken significant measures to improve
their defense capacity.
In the Military Construction Appropriations Act of 2001,
P.L. 106-246, Congress limited the involvement of U.S. military
personnel and civilian contractors in counternarcotics
activities in Colombia by prohibiting the use of appropriated
funds to expand their presence above specified levels.
The Second Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1973, P.L. 93-
50, specified that none of the funds appropriated by the act
were to be used ``to support directly or indirectly combat
activities in or over Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam, and South
Vietnam or off the shores of Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam and
South Vietnam by United States Forces and after August 15,
1973, no other funds heretofore appropriated under any other
act may be expended for such purpose."
Congress authorized the use of U.S. Armed Forces in Somalia
in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1994, P.L.
103-139, but set a deadline after which appropriated funds
could no longer be used to pay for their involvement. The act
specified that the deadline could only be extended if requested
by the President and authorized by the Congress.
In the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1995,
P.L. 103-335, Congress required congressional approval of ``any
change in the United States mission in Rwanda from one of
strict refugee relief to security, peace-enforcing, or nation-
building or any other substantive role'' and blocked funding
for continued participation of the U.S. military in Operation
Support Hope beyond a specified date.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998,
P.L. 105-85, provided that no funds appropriated for fiscal
year 1998 or any subsequent year could be used for the
deployment of any U.S. ground combat forces in Bosnia and
Herzegovina after a specified cutoff date unless the President
first consulted with Congress and then certified to Congress
that certain conditions existed in the field.
Senator Boxer. And that started in the 1970s, and it--the
most recent one was in 2001. So, all this talk about, ``Oh, my
God, you can't do it''--I want to commend Dr. Korb for laying
out what I think is a very smart and straightforward idea. You
cap the forces. What you cap it at is something that has to be
debated. I would discuss it with the military people. And then
you say to the President, ``Come back to us and tell us why it
makes sense to redeploy some of our people who have been there
three and four times.''
I wanted to thank you for that clarity, because I sense a
lot of weaving and bobbing among a lot of people, you know, on
this point.
Congress has the power of the purse. And, God forbid, if we
didn't, because there's checks and balances in the
Constitution. Our chairman's an expert on the Constitution. He
teaches. And I would say that, particularly in a democracy like
ours, which is being tested every day, when people go the
polls, Mr. Chairman, and they register dissent, which I believe
they did, and then, in the polls, they register their very
strong dissent with this President's policies, and then the
Iraq Study Group registers its dissent with this President's
policies and says, ``Change from a combat role to a support
role''--and I could just go on--all the generals on the ground,
including General Abizaid said, ``This escalation makes no
sense.'' They call it a ``surge,'' whatever term is used, the
same thing. It's more of my people, and our people, being put
in the middle of a civil war, which, as people know, I express
myself every day on, because a lot of times we have these
hearings and no one talks about who's paying the price. And
that's why I raised it with Secretary Rice, and that's why I
raised it last time we had the experts. Who's paying the price?
It's all well and good for us to talk about this in an abstract
way, but who's paying the price? And I always come back to
that.
Dr. Luttwak, I have a question for you, because you talked
about our enemies, and you were eloquent on the point. Do you
think an enemy of America would be someone who says, ``If an
American troop is standing in my town, it's OK to kill that
American''? Is that person an enemy?
Dr. Luttwak. Yes; certainly. But in Iraq today, there are
not just friends and enemies. In Iraq, there are many different
groups that have many different orientations, some of which
have been on our side from the beginning very consistently, and
others, who are not against us, but don't do anything for us,
because we are doing the fighting for them.
Senator Boxer. Yes.
Dr. Luttwak. So, what's happening now, as I see it--and you
draw attention to our casualties--I've had my nephew in Iraq--
is that our troops are actually having very little affect on
the situation.
Senator Boxer. OK. Excuse me, sir. I value your further
explanation, but I'm running out of time, and I want to get to
that point, because I'm glad you said, if somebody says it's OK
to kill an American soldier, that they should be considered an
enemy. And I would go to Dr. Korb's testimony, and I would
thank him for pointing out that 61 percent of the Iraqi people
say it's OK to kill an American. So, you know, we can make
excuses for those folks--you didn't; you said, ``Yeah, that's
an enemy''--you are now admitting what I believe to be the
case, where we're in a country where 61 percent of the people
say it's OK to kill an American, 70 percent say we should get
out in a year. So, you know, sometimes I think we need a
reality check of what we are doing. It's--we get so caught up,
you know, in, you know, a lot of minutia here, when I think we
need to keep our eye on what we're trying to do. We're trying
to bring a stable Iraq, and, instead of working on a political
solution, as many of you have called out very eloquently for
today, and my chairman has called out eloquently for, for a
long time, we're sending our troops in the middle of a
situation where 61 percent of the people say, ``Yeah, it's OK.
Kill that soldier.'' And I just cannot sit back and say,
``Well, I don't know that I could vote to cap the troops,
because the executive branch should have the ability''--I think
we have a responsibility here, through this committee, and I
think that these hearings are giving us this opportunity.
I want to make the point that even the most far-reaching
bring-the-troops-home resolution, which is the Feingold-Boxer
resolution, keeps our troops there, without a timeframe, to
deal with the terrorism--for example, al-Qaeda in Anbar
province--to deal with training the Iraqis, to deal with
protection of our forces. So, there isn't anyone here--and I
heard the word ``irresponsible''--that basically says,
``Tomorrow, we're all leaving.'' So, I think that's an
important point.
Now, the other thing is, no one conceived to tell us what
the casualty numbers will be. We've tried to get that. And it
seems to me, if you're going to turn over a new page, which is
the President's point, ``This is a new policy''--of course, I
don't really think it is--you at least owe that to the American
people.
And, Dr. Luttwak, I was confused, you said you didn't see
increasing human cost by the surge. What did you, exactly,
mean?
Dr. Luttwak. I said that rejecting surge would not lead to
increasing casualties.
Senator Boxer. I'm sorry.
Dr. Luttwak. What I said was that if you oppose the surge--
--
Senator Boxer. Yes.
Dr. Luttwak [continuing]. Nobody can say that you have,
thereby, caused increased casualties for the Iraqis, because
our troops--because the enemy is so elusive, so transient,
cannot be seen, has no contrast, cannot be penetrated, because
of the instability of the insurgent groups, there is no
relationship between troop levels and the number of Iraqis who
will die. Therefore, we are not, in fact, containing the
insurgency. And if you argue that you want to reduce troop
levels, nobody can say that it will cause more deaths for
Iraqis because our troops are not preventing the deaths for
Iraqis. We have----
Senator Boxer. Because there's a civil war going on. Is
that----
Dr. Luttwak. Our--we have----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. Correct?
Dr. Luttwak [continuing]. Conventional forces in Iraq,
structured to attack visible, high-contrast conventional
forces. And they cannot see the enemy, they cannot intercept
him, they cannot detect him; therefore, the--at the tactical--
that's why these generals, for the last few years, have been
saying, ``No, don't send us more troops.'' It was not because
they were insincerely lying patsies to the administration. They
actually know that, at the tactical level, when you send a
platoon to a locality, you don't know what to do with that
platoon, because it's not a constabulary. Constabulary walks
down the street, people talk to the--to them and tell them,
``You know, there's a bad guy around the corner.'' When nobody
talks to you, the patrol is blind and achieves nothing. Hence,
surge, in detail, or the entire deployment as a whole, cannot
achieve the tactical effect, cannot reduce Iraqi casualties.
Therefore, if you oppose surge, people can criticize you, but
they cannot say, ``Now you will be responsible with death
of''----
Senator Boxer. Well, I don't--you're talking politics to me
about something that we're trying----
Dr. Luttwak. It is not politics----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. To get beyond----
Dr. Luttwak [continuing]. At all. I'm----
Senator Boxer. We're trying----
Dr. Luttwak [continuing]. I'm addressing a very serious
issue, that anybody who makes recommendations, one way or the
other, must carry the burden.
Senator Boxer. OK.
Dr. Luttwak. The burden. And I'm saying there is no burden,
because our--there is no relationship between our troop
presence and casualties.
Senator Boxer. Dr. Korb, could you respond to that?
Because--this is interesting, because when I met with General
Casey--it was a year and a half ago--he said our troop presence
was fueling the insurgency. So, I--is that what you're saying?
Our troop presence is fueling the insurgency? That--am I
missing what you're saying?
Dr. Luttwak. No, Senator, what I'm saying is----
Senator Boxer. So, he's not----
Dr. Luttwak [continuing]. That our troop presence is, of
course, fueling the nationalist reaction, and, therefore, the
insurgency.
Senator Boxer. You are saying----
Dr. Luttwak. But--yes--at the same time--you see, whenever
you introduce troops anywhere in the world, you will cause some
national reaction. But you, nevertheless, introduce them,
because they achieve tactical operational purposes. Iraq is
different. That is, by being there, you evoke a nationalist
reaction, but you're not getting the tactical payoff, because
they cannot even see the enemy.
Senator Boxer. Well, sir----
Dr. Luttwak. And that is the reason why the position is
taken by Senator Biden and by all--by many people, including
our generals, that we should not have more troops, but less
troops.
Senator Boxer. Yes.
The Chairman. He's agreeing----
Dr. Luttwak. And be----
The Chairman [continuing]. With you.
Dr. Luttwak [continuing]. Less visible.
Senator Boxer. I appreciate that.
Dr. Luttwak. Yes.
Senator Boxer. Dr. Korb, anything? And then I'll stop. I'd
just like your response.
Dr. Korb. Well, I think that Ed makes a terrific point
here, and that the generals were correct that more troops will
not stop more Iraqis from dying. And one of the things I think
we have to be very careful of--I see this undercurrent from the
administration and some of their supporters, blaming Casey and
Abizaid for the failed strategy. No; they had the right
strategy, and to put them up and to blame them, to me, is
simply irresponsible. What I do think is, more American troops
will mean more American casualties, rather than the question
that Ed talks about with the Iraqi casualties.
The Chairman. So, I understand that you both agree with the
Senator, that we should not surge, and a reduction in troops is
more likely to lead to a positive outcome than a negative
outcome.
Dr. Luttwak. Yes, sir.
Dr. Korb. Yes.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
The Chairman. There you go. Governor.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to say
that I congratulate you and Senator Lugar for the hearings that
you've had on Iraq, because I think it's one of the most
important issues that have come before us, and it will have a
longstanding impact on our national security and peace in the
world.
You all agree that we need to engage more in the region,
and get more parties involved in Iraq, but what is the best way
to do that? Do you agree that we should sit down at a summit or
a conference and talk about Iraq, or should it occur
bilaterally? Should the Iraqis lead this process, or should the
United States? Should America reach out to Syria and Iran? Most
of you have said that we should. Is it possible to talk with
Iran without involving Iran's President? And how would
engagement with Iran and Syria affect the internal political
situation in Iraq?
So, there is a series of things I'd like you to comment on.
And the last one is the question I've been asking for 2\1/2\
years studying the history of Muqtada al-Sadr and his family.
How can there possibly be a unity government with Sadr, who,
from everything I read, wants to be the next Ayatollah of Iraq,
and who has very close family connections with the Iranians--
though some of you have said that the Shiites in Iraq are
somewhat different from those in Iran?
Dr. Malley. Senator, as you know, I--as I said in my
testimony, I believe that a multilateral strategy of engagement
with the region is absolutely critical to success, not because
the region--the neighbors play--have played a critical role in
instigating the crisis, but because the crisis has gone so far
that, without the help of all the actors who have leverage,
influence, contacts, whether with tribes, militias, groups in
Iraq, it's simply going to be impossible to stabilize the
situation.
Senator Voinovich. And what are the incentives for regional
parties to come to the table to help stabilize Iraq?
Dr. Malley. I think there are two series of incentives.
Some of them already exist. Basically, I don't think any
country in the region has a real incentive in seeing Iraq
collapse into civil war. We're already seeing--we have a
presence in Syria, and we're already seeing the--some Syrians
being very worried about the impact of having a civil war in
Iraq, possible civil war in Lebanon, a minority Alawite regime
in Damascus. That's not a comfortable position for them to be
in. So, they are already built-in incentives that the status
quo is dangerous for them. But that's not going to be enough. I
think we know that both Iran and Syria, if nothing else
changes, would prefer to see instability in Iraq rather than a
United States victory there--United States success there. So,
there's going to have to be--if we really want to engage the
region--and, in particular, Iran and Syria--a revisiting of our
strategy toward those two countries.
Now, that's doesn't mean, as Secretary Rice has said, that
we're going to give in to extortion or that we're going to
surrender to them. This is what diplomacy is about, and you've
had a lot of testimony over the last few weeks of people who
have been saying that. That's what diplomacy is, it's to try to
put our interests on the table and see whether there's a way
that their interests could also be taken into account. It may
not work. I--just one more--it may not work, but at least it
has to be tried. And for the last 6 years, we've given up
diplomacy in the region, on the assumption that talking to
people we don't agree with somehow is a sign of weakness.
Dr. Luttwak. I respectfully disagree with this. I note that
it's been espoused by the most distinguished people, but I
still disagree. Our cooperation with Iran, which was very real
over Afghanistan, took place situationally. They had been
supporting the Northern Alliance, keeping it alive. We needed
to go in. They had their own interest in the Hazara and Herat.
They were very concerned about the Hazara, because they are
Shia. You know, they are the so-called oriental Shia of
Afghanistan who were killed by the Taliban. In this context, we
didn't discuss, we didn't negotiate. If we had negotiated with
Iran at the time, we would not have had cooperation, because
whoever Iranian would have negotiated with us would have been
immediately attacked in his own country as a traitor and
undermined because he talked to us. Formal diplomacy does not
work in a situation where the politics within the ever-
narrowing group of extremists who run Iran, mandates that
whoever talks to the Americans is a traitor. So, formal
diplomacy advocated by so many people--and I'd defer to their
great experience and high reputations--is bound to fail----
Senator Voinovich. So----
Dr. Luttwak [continuing]. We've had with----
Senator Voinovich. So, you----
Dr. Luttwak. Yes; you talk to them, you get nowhere, but--
--
Senator Voinovich. So, you would not talk with Iran, but
you would talk with the Saudis and with the Egyptians and
with----
Dr. Luttwak. Again, it is not the talking--it's the
situation that is driving things. We negotiated and talked to
the Saudis for decades, and they were never our true allies.
But when the Shia ``crescent,'' as they call it, from Pakistan
to the Mediterranean, emerges, suddenly here are the Saudis,
spending hundreds of millions of dollars in Lebanon to help
Prime Minister Siniora hold up the Hezbollah with one finger.
He's holding them with one finger, because of--the Saudis are
behind him. The Saudis have cut off Hamas. The Saudis are
really cooperating, for the first time, because they're
terrified of the Shia. Similarly, the Iranians cooperate in
Afghanistan because of the objective circumstances. The moment
you sit down and talk to them, you are entering in a
negotiating process in which the internal dynamics of it make
it difficult or impossible for them to really cooperate with
you.
So, what we have to do is to continue to handle the
situation. We did not create this division between Sunni and
Shia. You could argue that it was implicit as soon as the
Sunnis became fundamentalists, the emergence of the Shia
identified as heretics and apostates----
Senator Voinovich. All right.
Dr. Luttwak [continuing]. Was inevitable. The situation
is----
Senator Voinovich. So, you're saying that you wouldn not
even gather the different regional parties and factions
together to talk about----
Dr. Luttwak. What happens is that we--you are gathering,
you are influencing, you're achieving an equilibrium. You
disengage American forces. You don't abandon, you don't run.
You disengage. And you force responsibility on people. You see,
you can sit and talk--you see, there are complexities here. For
example, you mentioned Muqtada al-Sadr.
Senator Voinovich. Yes.
Dr. Luttwak. The Sadr family has historically been in a
feud with the al-Hakim family, which is the so-called Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. And that's how we
saw the spectacle of al-Hakim coming to the White House and
talking to President Bush--a man who spent 23 years in Iran
declaiming ``Marg Barg America,'' death to America. He was in
Washington, talking to President Bush. That's the reality
level.
You manage the situation, and then you have the substance
of diplomacy.
Senator Voinovich. All right, let me just----
Dr. Luttwak. But the act of talking destroys the substance.
Senator Voinovich. Let me get back to the last question. In
your opinion, can there be a political deal that achieves a
unified Iraq, with the presence of Muqtada al-Sadr?
Dr. Luttwak. Well, Sadr--you said that Sadr is pro-Iranian.
Actually, Sadr's polemic in Arabic, is constantly attacking
Ayatollah Sistani for being an Iranian. As you know, Sistan is
the most remote province of Iran, on the Pakistani border. He's
saying, here we have a remote Persian who is supposedly the
leader of the Shia in Iraq. That's his polemic. So, again,
there are great complexities.
As you would not want to go and manage the school board
politics in Mississippi because of complexities beyond you,
similarly we should not be going and trying to manage the
complexities of Iraq. By disengaging, we are imposing
responsibilities on everybody, including the Iranians,
including the Syrians. The Alawite regime in Damascus is not
even Shia, they're only nominally Shia; they're Nusayris, who
are considered apostates from Islam, and pagans by orthodox
Sunni Muslims. Once we withdraw, the Syrians will stop
cooperating with the bad guys. So, in other words, the
substance of diplomacy, but not its formality.
Dr. Gelb. Senator, if I may respond to your question?
Dr. Korb. Well, let me----
Senator Voinovich. Yes.
Dr. Korb [continuing]. Go. I missed my chance here. It went
right by me. I was about to go, and Ed took the microphone
here.
Once we announce that we're leaving and we don't want to
have any permanent bases in Iraq, the countries in the region,
as well as the Iraqi people, know that it's no longer just our
problem, it's theirs. None of the countries, including Iran and
Syria, want to see Iraq become a failed state or a haven for
al-Qaeda. And so, therefore, I think, if you appoint a high-
level envoy of the stature of somebody like Colin Powell or
Madeleine Albright, they will be able to get the countries in
the region together.
I don't know if it's true, I've seen reports that the
Saudis may have been responsible for the missile that shot down
the American, you know, helicopter. We--so, they're involved,
as well. They're not going to let the Sunnis lose, however you
want to define that. So, they all have an interest in
stability, and once they know that we will not be there
forever, they're going to be willing to cooperate. Now, the
form, I think, you know, becomes immaterial.
In terms of Sadr, it's very interesting, what Sadr has said
is he's coming back into the government, but he wants an
American withdrawal, he wants us, you know, to set a date to--
you know, to get out. Remember that Maliki was not the original
choice of the Iraqis. We did not like the original choices of
the Iraqis. Jaafari and we put pressure on them to come up with
someone else, so we're partly responsible, you know, for this.
But, again, I think, once you set a date to get out and they
know you will not be there permanently, a lot of the people
will not continue to fight. Many of the people over there are
fighting simply because they see this as an American
occupation, and they will not, as has been pointed out here,
ally themselves with al-Qaeda. They don't like al-Qaeda. Less
than 5 percent of the Iraqis support them. So, once it's clear
we're getting out, the violence, I think, should diminish.
But let me conclude with this on negotiations. Every time I
hear people say, ``Well, you shouldn't negotiate, it's a sign
of weakness,'' I remember what the late Yitzhak Rabin said when
they asked him, ``Why are you negotiating with Arafat? How can
you negotiate''--and he said, ``You've got to negotiate with
your enemies. It's your friends you consult with.''
Dr. Gelb. If I may, Senator, briefly, although your
question deserves a long answer--and you may want to devote a
session to the diplomacy of the region, it's worth it. To me,
diplomacy is absolutely essential, but you can't talk about
diplomacy as if to do it represents American weakness. And I
think that's a fundamental mistake that the administration is
making. Diplomacy is going to give us answers to questions we
don't really have good answers to right now. That's why you
engage. We've engaged with some of our worst enemies throughout
our history, and we prevent some things from getting worse, and
we begin to use American power through diplomacy. And we
shouldn't be afraid of doing it.
On the issue of Muqtada al-Sadr, I think none of the
parties are going to give up their militias. They just aren't
going to do it. You don't have any trust and confidence. You
have hatred. And the militias protect the various sectarian
groups, so they're not going to give them up. I think the only
way to deal with them is in the context of a decentralization
or federal system where the Shiites would be responsible for
dealing with Muqtada. And I think they're better able to do it
than we or the Sunnis or the Kurds. Muqtada is going to be a
real problem, but let him be the Shiite problem, not ours.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Appreciate the time.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Obama.
Senator Obama. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, to all the panelists. This is an illuminating
discussion.
I would just like to summarize what I've heard. Because we
have a very practical decision that Congress is facing, and
that is, how do we approach the administration's proposal to
escalate troop levels. And so, I just want to be focused on,
and make sure that I'm hearing your testimony properly.
Is there anybody on the panel who thinks that it is the
right approach for us to escalate troop levels, at this point?
[No response.]
Senator Obama. As far as I could tell, I didn't hear
anybody suggest that increasing troop levels would be the
correct approach. So, the second question I have is: Would
everybody be in agreement with this premise that initiating
some sort of phased redeployment or withdrawal of our troop
levels--understanding that some United States troops would
remain for force protection, training of Iraqi security forces,
and counterinsurgency activities--would be more likely to
result in a better outcome than the course that we're on right
now? Is there anybody who disagrees with that?
[No response.]
Senator Obama. Since that is the case, I would like to note
that one of the difficulties that all of us here are grappling
with is that the tools available to Congress to force the
administration's hand are quite limited. So, an issue that I'm
interested in is the panel's assessment as to how quickly we
could potentially begin a phased withdrawal in a responsible
fashion. And I'm wondering if anybody has opinions on that. I'm
interested if any of you have a timetable that you would feel
comfortable with, saying, let's say, in May or June, that we
would begin some phased redeployment to send a clear signal to
the Iraqi Government, and to the factions involved, that
they're going to have to move forward on a political solution.
Anybody want to address that question?
Dr. Gelb. My opinion is that we sit down with our military,
on an urgent basis, and get an answer to your question.
Senator Obama. OK.
Dr. Korb. I think that you should begin to withdraw right
now, take out about 8,000 troops a month, so you'd be there
over the next 18 months. When we withdrew from Vietnam, we took
out 10,000 troops a month to get the number down to what it was
at the time of the Paris Peace Accords, which was about 21,000.
I think that can be done safely. I think it helps us fulfill
our moral responsibility to the Iraqis. It gives them time to
do what they need to do. And it also improves our ability to
deal with our other strategic interests around the world.
Senator Obama. Good.
Dr. Malley. Senator, two points. First, I think it's not
only a matter of withdrawing. I mean, it is withdrawing, but
also changing the task that our troops are currently involved
in. The other point, which I emphasized in the testimony, is I
think it's--the administration is taking this backward--it's
not a matter of deciding the troop level, it's having a
political strategy that you could then adapt your troop
presence to. We could withdraw, but that needs to be attached
to a political strategy. If there is no political strategy, I
think you accelerate the withdrawal far more----
Senator Obama. OK. So, let's shift gears to address the
political strategy. I'll start with Mr. Gelb. I know you and
Senator Biden have put forward a proposal that I believe makes
some persuasive points.
The only question I have on a more active federalist
strategy of the sort that you're pursuing is whether that's one
that we should be initiating, as opposed to letting that unfold
as a consequence of us putting more pressure on the Iraqis to
figure out their problems. In short, if we begin a phased
withdrawal, it strikes me that this places pressure on the
Iraqis to forge and subsequently own a political settlement
that is going to work. And, at that stage, then, it might be
that the proposals that you and the chairman have suggested are
the ones around which we arrive at an Iraqi consensus. But is
there a concern that if we predetermine what that consensus
should be, and push that too hard, that there might be
significant suspicion on the part of the Sunnis that this is
just a strategy to disadvantage them?
Dr. Gelb. Well, we haven't predetermined it. It's in their
Constitution.
Senator Obama. OK.
Dr. Gelb. And the chairman read from their Constitution, a
moment ago.
Senator Obama. Right.
Dr. Gelb. It explicitly calls it a federal system, it
explicitly provides for provinces to unite with other provinces
to create regional governments. Eighty percent of the country
approved. Eighty percent of the national assembly approved
implementing legislation for it, although they've deferred that
because of the opposition. The opposition is based on some
legitimate arguments, because everything is hard. People say
it's going to lead to partition. But what's happening now is
producing partition. People say it's going to lead to ethnic
cleansing. But that's what we've been witnessing for the last
several years.
When you can't reach reconciliation politically on the
basis of a strong central government, the historical
alternative has been decentralization and federalism. We can't
shove it down their throats, obviously, but we can help them to
reach the conclusion that I think the majority of Iraqis want
to reach; namely, stay together as a nation, with the central
government performing certain essential functions, but with the
regions doing the legislating and administering according to
their own ethnic and religious wishes.
Senator Obama. OK.
Dr. Luttwak. May I?
Senator Obama. Please. Why don't we just go down the line,
and then----
Dr. Luttwak. Yes.
Senator Obama [continuing]. I will just listen and ask no
followup questions.
Dr. Luttwak. Senator, I don't like the word ``withdrawal.''
I like the word ``disengagement.'' It means you don't patrol
the villages and towns, you don't interfere, you don't go
through their underwear searching for items in their houses.
You do stay in bases, and the number, therefore, you require--
if you had no concern with numbers and you had an infinite
number of troops, you still would not want more than 12,000,
15,000. And then, you allow the normal processes of politics to
take place and allow the Iraqis to have their own history. I'm
very uncomfortable about this talk of a federal constitution
based on the principles of Locke, Burke, and Madison, which
are--in the society that is tribal, that is multiethnic,
multireligious, and which is in a completely different
situation. And I believe that the act of disengagement will
force responsibility on the Iraqis. And I believe that all
their different politics will not result in areas of Iraq where
you're going to have al-Qaeda living comfortably, because they
want to rule in their own homes. And I additionally believe
that the process will not increase the number of people who die
in the process.
Senator Obama. Thank you.
Dr. Korb. I think that they may end up in the situation
described by Chairman Biden and Les Gelb, but I think we have
to be careful that it doesn't look like a ``Made in America''
type of solution. I think, as I suggested in my testimony, that
we convene a Dayton-style conference, get the parties together,
let them work out the arrangements that are most amenable to
them. And it--and as long as those--that arrangement involves
the--deciding what the provincial government should do, what
the central government should do, the oil revenues are
distributed fairly, minority rights are protected, the role of
religion in society--as long as those issues are handled, the
way they handle them really has got to be up to them.
Senator Obama. Thank you.
Robert.
Dr. Malley. Four quick points.
First, we've not tried, really, to create a political
reconciliation between the parties. What we've done is, we've
worked with a select group, many of whom, in fact, had as an
explicit or implicit agenda, the division of the country and
their own personal private interests, as I said, acting--
earlier--acting as warlords rather than statesmen.
Second, yes; there's going to have to be, if you want
reconciliation, an amendment to the Constitution. I think,
actually, the Gelb-Biden plan does include amendments to the
Constitution. A constitution that is rejected almost en bloc by
20 percent of the population defined through sectarian--in
sectarian ways, is not a constitution that could bring the
country together. We know that, and--we should know it from our
own history.
The third point is--and this is not in the Gelb-Biden plan,
but there are some who are appealed--attracted to the notion
that Iraq could simply devolve into a three-way confederation.
Let's not kid ourselves, that's going to be extremely bloody,
the lines are still shifting, it's a mosaic, but it's a mosaic
that's continually being redefined. There are clashes within
communities that sometimes are as vicious as between
communities. It may be the outcome. I think that's something
that we've all agreed with. It may be that the country just
collapses. But it's not something that we should be a party to,
it's something that we should--if it happens, we should stay
away from.
Senator Obama. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank all of the panelists for their tremendous
insights.
Let me just ask--I'll start with you, Dr. Korb, but also
anyone who wants to respond--it seems to me, whether it's
disengagement, strategic redeployment, or even the
administration's plan, which I oppose, the question is: Don't
we need benchmarks that have consequences? We had the Secretary
of State here, and she clearly did not have that view. But it
seems to me that benchmarks without some form of consequences
are merely aspirations. And we have seen, already on several
occasions, where benchmarks without consequences have come and
gone. And it just seems to me that they're critical, both in
our context for the Congress, in keeping people accountable,
particularly in Iraq and its leadership. Do you believe that we
need to have benchmarks with consequences?
Dr. Korb. Very definitely, because if we do not, then the
Iraqis will avoid making these painful political compromises
that we spoken--because they are difficult, they want to remain
in power and keep the government together. So, without these
benchmarks, they'll continue as they have.
Let me make a point which I think is very important. They
had their elections over a year ago. In that time, we have lost
a battalion's worth of soldiers and marines, killed or wounded,
while they have been dithering. They promised to modify the
Constitution 4 months after the election. We're now 13 months.
We have seen, for the last 5 years, ``Give us 6 more months,
give us 3 more months, and things will change.'' How many times
do we have to do it? So, I think, yes; you need to have
benchmarks. If you don't, there's no way in which you can use
whatever leverage we have left to get them to do what they need
to do.
Senator Menendez. Now, National Security Advisor Hadley
seems to be, sort of spinning the escalation plan by discussing
the idea of benchmarks. He said on Friday, ``It's going to be a
little bit pay-as-you-go,'' which is a budgetary provision we
have here, or we should have here, but we don't have it right
now--and it's going to depend a lot on Iraqi performance. But
without benchmarks to determine what those performances are,
and consequences, it really isn't very much pay-as-you-go. Is
that a fair statement?
Dr. Korb. Very, very definitely. I mean, one of the most
interesting things I've seen on this is a column by Charles
Krauthammer in the Washington Post on the 19th of this month,
where he basically said, ``We need to find a redeployment
strategy that maintains as much latent American strength as
possible, but with minimal exposure. We say to Maliki, `Let us
down, and we dismantle the Green Zone, leave Baghdad and let
you fend for yourself. We keep the airport and certain
strategic bases in the area.' '' And he goes on and on with
other things. And I think that's the key thing. We've got to
put pressure on him.
Senator Menendez. Yes.
Dr. Malley. If I could add, I think this is the key point.
It's benchmarks, it's accountability, it's conditionality,
things that have been completely lacking so far. And the
problem in the way that I'm seeing the administration doing it
is we're first giving--we've said we're going to send the
troops, we say we're going to continue support, before having
gotten from them the kind of commitments and the kind of proof
that they're acting in the way they need to act. And I think
that's taking it backward and upside down. We need to make sure
that they are acting in the way that they need to act, and we
need to condition any support on them delivering on those
promises.
Senator Menendez. Now, Dr.----
Dr. Gelb. May I respond to the question, too----
Senator Menendez. Surely, yes; please.
Dr. Gelb [continuing]. Senator? Two things. First, on the
issue of conditionality--to me, there's only one condition, and
that is political reconciliation. I think if they don't achieve
that, nothing else is going to be possible. They can go through
kabuki acts about dismantling militias, and arrest 400 militia
from Muqtada al-Sadr, and then release them 2 weeks later. The
only thing that's going to work is political reconciliation, a
political power-sharing agreement.
Meantime, I think the way to reinforce this and help bring
it about is to start the withdrawal process.
Senator Menendez. Even under political reconciliation, you
could have benchmarks to determine whether you're moving in
that direction.
Dr. Gelb. You could. It's hard to define them, but I think
we'd know it when we see it.
Senator Menendez. Yes.
Dr. Korb, let me just take a moment--because I think one of
the legacies here, one of the consequences of escalation, as
the Congress thinks about its position on the votes that will
be upcoming on the President's plan, is the consequences and
the legacy of what happens to both our Armed Services and
Reserve. And since you were an Assistant Secretary of Defense,
particularly on manpower and Reserve affairs, and have written
on some of that, it seems to me that one of the important
legacies of this war of choice for the American people and its
leaders is--to wrestle with for the foreseeable future--is the
consequences on our force structures, our Reserves and our
Guards. And I'd like to ask you to comment on that. I know you
were quoted, in December, talking about a post-deployment death
spiral. Maybe you could speak a little bit to that. Also, what
are the consequences of the President's plan, increasing the
number of troops in Iraq, on both the Armed Forces and the
Guard and Reserves, both in the short and the long term? I
think those are real consequences, when we think about national
security in an even broader context with some of our other
challenges in the world as we debate Iraq, specifically.
Dr. Korb. I--if, in fact, you--this surge becomes
permanent, it becomes--you're going to keep 21,500 more troops
in Iraq over the long term, you're going to have to mobilize
Guard and Reserve units who have already been mobilized at
least once. When--as they say, when I was in the building, our
policy was not to mobilize them for more than 1 year out of
every 5, because the data showed, if you do that, you're going
to lose a lot of the people. If you take a man or woman who's
in the Guard, and you want to take more than 20 percent of
their time away from their civilian career, they're simply not
going to stay, they might as well join the Active Forces. So,
you're going to have to mobilize units again that have already
been mobilized at least once for close to 2 years, since
September 11. And I think, if you do that, that will bring
about this death spiral.
In my testimony, I urge Congress to clarify the law and
force the President to come back if he wants to remobilize
those units again and present the--present the reasons.
Let me put it very bluntly. I think it's--we have missed
something in this whole war. When we created the volunteer
military, the idea was that we would have a small Active Army,
and that Guard and Reserve would be a bridge to conscription,
to the draft, if we had a long ground war. That was the idea.
What has happened is, the Guard and Reserve have become an
adjunct to the Active Force, and we haven't even thought about
going back to--going back to the draft. It's important to
remember, this is the first extended conflict we've ever had
where we have not had conscription and we have actually lowered
taxes, not raised taxes.
And so, I say, you know, as look at this, you cannot--you
need to understand, you've misused the Guard and Reserve. This
was not what we intended for the Army Guard and Reserve. The
first Persian Gulf war was the way the volunteer military was
constructed, not the second Persian Gulf war.
And then, finally, one of the reasons I urge redeployment
is, the Guard, particularly, has a role in homeland defense.
This has become a new critical area of security. If they are
spending their time away from--they're not going to be able to
fulfill that. Remember, now, that you've taken a lot of the
equipment, from the Guard particularly, sent it to Iraq, left
at Iraq. The people home here do not have enough equipment to
train on. So, you had not only--that's why I talked about the
death spiral--it's not just the personnel, it's also the
training of these units.
Senator Menendez. And, very quickly, several of the
testimonies we've had here talks about--including the
architects of this plan--talk about several years more of
engagement, in a military context. If that is the case, how
long can we continue to go through the present structure,
engage for several years, and not, at some point, look at the
question of whether conscription is necessary?
Dr. Korb. Well, the President has belatedly agreed to raise
the size of the ground forces. This is something that should
have been done, and many of us urged, right after September 11.
That was the time when you could have gone and won. I don't
think you can continue to maintain 150-or-so-thousand troops in
Iraq, whatever--you know, 20-30,000 in Afghanistan,
indefinitely without breaking your volunteer ground forces. You
would have to really consider going back to some form of
conscription. After all, if people are registering for the
draft, and you don't use it now, when will you use it? I mean,
why--we go through this thing about having people register. And
I have urged the Congress to take a look at Congressman
Wrangle's proposal. It doesn't mean you have to adopt it, but I
do think it needs to be debated. And the American people have
no emotional involvement in this conflict, and, because of
that, I don't think that, even though they voted one way,
they're going to be as involved as we were, for example, back
in Vietnam.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have been in the confirmation hearings on General
Petraeus. And, of course, this same issue has been discussed
quite extensively.
Thank you all for coming, and thank you for your expertise,
thank you for your public service.
With every mistake that has been made, we are where we are.
I guess the essential question I want to ask is: What do we do?
Aggressive diplomacy? Bring the people and countries in the
region in to help us solve the problem? Reach out to those who
have been ignored, with aggressive diplomacy? And, possibly,
Senator Biden's plan of trying to separate the various sectors,
to try to bring stability to the region? Please comment.
Dr. Luttwak. Should I----
Dr. Gelb. Please.
Dr. Luttwak. Senator, many things have happened since this
war started. Unplanned, unwanted. But some of the things that
have happened have gone in our way and not against us. The
ancient quarrel between Sunni and Shia has become a dynamic
conflict. That has terrible consequences, but it also gives us,
for the first time, real allies. Sunni states that, before,
were taking our aid and support, but never did anything for us,
are now working for us in Lebanon, they're working for us with
the Palestinians--for example, the Saudis have finally cut off
Hamas because of it, because they see how much it aligned with
Iran, and anybody that's aligned with Iran is out. Another
unexpected consequence is that this entire campaign by the most
extreme element in Iran, to become leaders of the Middle East
by being the most anti-American, anti-Israeli, and anti-Jewish
has entirely failed. Now they are no longer considered Middle
Eastern fellow brothers, they are called Ajamis, which are
apostates and so on.
Senator Nelson. So, on the----
Dr. Luttwak. So, in all these----
Senator Nelson. Let me just make a----
Dr. Luttwak. Sure.
Senator Nelson [continuing]. Parenthetical that will
corroborate what you said. As I was sitting with King Abdullah,
and he was talking about the threat of Iran, if I had closed my
eyes, he could have been saying almost word for word what
Benjamin Netanyahu had said about the threat in the region by
Iran, only 7 days earlier.
Dr. Luttwak. Indeed. And this is--has consequences. And, at
the same time, within Iraq, the different Shia groups rely on
us to protect them from the Sunni revival, because, as you
know, even though the Sunnis have always been--the Arab
Sunnis--a small minority in Iraq, they've always ruled, because
of--the Shia are fragmented hopelessly. Now, in this
environment, if we remove and reduce--without disappearing or
abandoning, we just withdraw our active presence, we
disengage--we will impose on them the obligation and necessity
of resolving these issues. And we have large areas of Iraq
which already are at peace. And I mentioned the big city of
Mosul, most of Basrah--Basrah, most of the time, and the areas
are narrower and narrower. So, I think that the situation is
not catastrophic, and I believe that if we just disengage our
forces, we will allow more of this natural equilibrium to arise
and that we'll be able to retain our influence.
I remember, in Vietnam--most of you are too young to
remember this, but when we had United States forces in Vietnam,
there was a ``Hanoi Hilton,'' the prison where they kept
American POWs, mostly pilots. Today in Hanoi, there is a Hilton
and a Sheraton and a Marriott, and they're all coming up. In
other words, the situation is not so bad as it is, and
paradoxically--and there, I agree with the entire panel in
every respect--by being, ourselves, active in the environment,
we are generating negative elements, and that is why surge is a
bad idea, why disengagement will bring, I think, positive
results.
Dr. Gelb. Senator, if I would answer your question very
briefly, it is that we--if we have any chance of doing
anything, given all the blunders that have been committed, it's
got to be a strategy where politics is in the lead, where
political settlement is the first thing we try for, and where
we put forward a realistic way of doing it; namely, a
decentralized federal system. I don't think anything else will
work. And the military withdrawals, which ought to be taking
place as soon as possible, and the diplomacy, should be in
support of that political settlement.
If that doesn't happen, if the Iraqis don't want to do it,
and we can't help them to do it, then we're going to have to
think of more direct means to disengage.
Dr. Korb. Senator, I think you're right that we are where
we are; however, I hope that we've learned the lessons, over
the last couple of years, that will guide as the way to go
forward. It's also important to keep in mind, as I mention in
my testimony, that, given where we are, there are no good
options. If we knew what to do, we--you know, there would be
complete agreement in the country. The question is, Do you pick
an alternative that maximizes the chances of protecting overall
American security interests and fulfills our moral obligation
to the Iraqis? And as my colleagues have said, it's got to be
not a military surge, but a diplomatic surge. And I would argue
for a phased redeployment that gets completed by the summer of
2008. And, while I recognize that taking all of our troops out
of there could have some potential drawbacks, the fact of the
matter is, there are many people in Iraq who don't believe
we'll ever leave, many people in the Middle East that think we
see Iraq as another base to project American power, and I think
it would diminish that. And I am also convinced that once we're
out of Iraq, al-Qaeda will not get the support from the Iraqi
population. Ninety-five percent of the Iraqis don't like al-
Qaeda, and they're about 2 to 3 percent of the problem there
right now.
Senator Nelson. Before Dr. Malley comments--I just want to
say, regarding lessons learned, you're absolutely right, Dr.
Korb. And, sadly, one of the questions I had to ask General
Petraeus today--and I told him, before, I was going to ask him
this--``Will you sit silently by your civilian superiors when
you know that they are giving incorrect and misleading
information?'' In answer to that question, he said no; he would
not. But I had to ask that question.
Dr. Malley. Senator, first let me say, even though it may
end up that we disengage, as Ed Luttwak said, I don't think we
should look at that complacently. We've rolled the dice once by
going in. Rolling the dice by coming out is--could be a very
risky venture. I'm not quite as optimistic about events in the
region. I think the sectarian strife in Iraq is fueling
sectarian tensions outside of Iraq, and vice versa, and that is
not a very optimistic picture, I think, for U.S. interests.
That's why I would argue--and along with what Les Gelb said, I
think he said it very well--we have one last chance now to try
to see whether we can achieve a political reconciliation,
whether the Iraqis can achieve a political reconciliation. And
that means using two tools we haven't used so far--multilateral
diplomacy, diplomacy in the region, and a far more inclusive
approach to Iraqis, not simply playing with those who we've
played with so far, whose agendas have been, as I've said
earlier, very personal partisan agendas rather than having an
inclusive strategy in Iraq itself--and trying to reach a new
political compact, and giving a real choice to those in Iraq
who we've put in power, ``Either you act in a national interest
or we're going to cease supporting you.''
If we take that chance, I think we should develop it
immediately and see whether it can work, and then use our troop
presence or withdrawal as leverage to achieve that end. If we
don't, if the administration chooses not to, or if our Iraqi
allies are not prepared to do it, then I think we need to very
quickly accelerate our withdrawal and end this sad chapter in
our history.
Dr. Korb. Senator Nelson, if I may, you raised the point
about General Petraeus, and I made it before, I do not want to
see this administration blaming the generals there for the
policy. And General Abizaid and Casey were very honest with
you, and it looks to me that now people are, you know, blaming
them for being honest. So, I think it's important to keep in
mind, it's not that the predecessors haven't been honest--and I
assume that General Petraeus will be as honest, as well--but
that you ensure that people are not being punished for being
honest and testifying forthrightly before the Congress.
Dr. Gelb. Both General Abizaid and General Casey, I think,
have been incredibly up front on the central point of this war;
namely, that there is no military solution to it, there is
only, if we can do it, a political solution. And they've said
it week after week.
Senator Nelson. I agree with you about both Abizaid and
Casey. And I was often the one asking the question of both of
them, particularly Abizaid, because as I would tell him, ``I
trust you. I trust your judgment''--I'm referring to 6 years of
the Secretary of Defense sitting at the table and saying such-
and-such about troop levels, saying such-and-such about the
cost of the war, saying such-and-such about weapons of mass
destruction, saying such-and-such about sectarian violence. And
it wasn't the truth. About the reenlistments, about the state
and readiness of equipment of the Guard and the Reserves. And,
often, generals were sitting there silently. That's what I'm
referring to.
Dr. Korb. If I may, I think one--and I mentioned this
before, and I think it's very important--when General Shinseki
was asked by Senator Levin how many troops we needed, there
were other generals sitting at the table who did not support
him, and I think that is a very, very critical issue. And, as
you know, that he basically was told he didn't know what he was
talking about by civilian leaders in the Pentagon. And I don't
remember, at that time, even people who now are urging more
troops, speaking up for General Shinseki.
Dr. Luttwak. Sir--Senator, it's not just General Shinseki,
although what was said is completely accurate. My own
experience was, I was working with the Marine Corps in the
preparation for the war. There was a consensus--there were
young Marine officers in Quantico who had all the facts about
Iraq. They knew about the fact that, in addition to Sunni and
Shia, there are Yazidis. They knew about the situation of the
Turkmen in Kirkuk. They knew about the correct force level.
There was a consensus. In fact, our system worked. Their system
worked. The professionals who were supposed to know these
things knew them. So, if you want to draw a lesson from it, it
is: There was a disconnect here between the policy level, that
was much more optimistic and dealt in general categories called
freedom and democracy, and the people who actually had to worry
about what they called ``rear-area security.'' Because the
actual territorial control was viewed under the heading of
``rear-end security.'' That's how General Shinseki came up with
the number, because General Shinseki didn't think you needed
400,000 troops to defeat Saddam Hussein, it was the consensus
that it would be very easy to defeat him. There was no
disagreement. It was about how many troops you would need to
control the environment. And I got myself labeled as a racist,
by a nameless policy person in the Pentagon, because I said
that our troops would have to guard everything including
protecting hospitals and schools from the people who use those
same hospitals and schools. I was labeled a racist. But that
was the consensus view of all the military officers I was
dealing with professionally. So, that was a mistake. And today,
the consensus is against surge, simply because the enemy is low
contrast, unstable, cannot be seen. And we didn't listen to
them before, we should listen to them now.
Dr. Gelb. You know, Senator, I feel the military are in a
particular bind on these questions. I sat and listened to your
description of what they did while Rumsfeld testified, and it
was heartaching, because you know that they felt very
differently than he was testifying. But they're torn between
telling what they believe is the best military advice and the
need to salute the Commander and have a can-do attitude. And
they're torn between that all the time.
Senator Nelson. But we are entitled to the truth.
Dr. Gelb. Indeed. Indeed----
Senator Nelson. And the making----
Dr. Gelb [continuing]. You are.
Senator Nelson [continuing]. Of policy is not just the
executive branch with a compliant Congress. The making of
policy is with a separate, but equal, branch of government
asserting itself in the making of policy.
Dr. Gelb. It's true. And you know the bind they're in, in
dealing with it.
Senator Nelson. And that's why I had to ask him the
question.
Dr. Gelb. Absolutely.
Dr. Luttwak. Well, General Petraeus is the author of the
new counterinsurgency manual, and that counterinsurgency manual
writes, page after page, chapter after chapter, how you can do
this and you can do that and do the other, but the actual
historical experience is that the only people who do
counterinsurgency well are the ones who can out-terrorize the
terrorists, that we absolutely cannot do, must not do, will
never consider. In fact, counterinsurgency is a form of
malpractice. And there are issues here, beyond the can-do-ism
and the desire to be loyal, and the desire to tell the truth.
Counterinsurgency worked for the Germans in World War II. They
sent a dispatch rider into a village, and he was killed, they
went and killed everybody in the village. That village and 50
villages round about were safe for the next--years. We cannot
do that. We will never compromise our values to win a war or
anything of the kind. It's unthinkable. And hence, we have a
problem beyond honesty, beyond can-do-ism, and that is a
specific issue called counterinsurgency.
Dr. Korb. Senator, if I might, because you raise something
important, in terms of military people. They have an obligation
before you, that's why you gave them fixed terms in office, so
they could be honest. One of the things that concerns me is
them showing up on Sunday morning talk shows, you know, and
things like this. And, for example, let me read you this,
``Today, approximately 164,000 Iraqi police and soldiers--of
which about 100,000 are trained and equipped--and additional
74,000 facility protection forces, are performing a wide
variety of security missions. Six battalions of the Iraqi
regular army and the Iraqi intervention force are now
conducting operations. Iraqi national guard battalions have
also been active in recent months. Some 40 of the 45 existing
battalions are conducting operations on a daily basis, most
alongside coalition forces, but many independently.'' That was
said--written in the----
Senator Nelson. By General Petraeus.
Dr. Korb [continuing]. By--in September of 2004.
Senator Nelson. 2\1/2\ years ago.
Dr. Korb. Why was he writing that?
Senator Nelson. I asked him that. I asked him that, this
morning. And I said, ``You say that they were trained, but
they're not, so tell me: How do you think they're going to be
trained any better today? And how many do we have trained?''
And I didn't get a clear answer.
The Chairman. What we have here is a failure of
communication.
Senator, we went almost 10 minutes over, because it was
worthwhile.
Let me yield to the chairman, if you have any questions,
and then I know Senator Boxer has another question, and I have
a few as well. No?
Senator Boxer, I'll yield to you.
Senator Boxer. Yes; thank you so much. This has been really
illuminating.
I can't thank you enough. It's a hard time, when there are
no good choices, there are no great choices, and I think that's
the--frankly, the worst kind of leadership, is when you're left
with no good choices, but we'll leave that for another time.
When I was in Iraq, I rode in a--in an armored vehicle with
General Petraeus. And I just want to underscore, Senator
Nelson, what you were saying. When I was in Iraq, 18 months
ago, I rode with General Petraeus, and he showed me his whole
thing he was doing to train the Iraqis. We went out on the
field, and they were driving around, and they were simulating a
hostage-taking, and they jumped out of the truck, and it was
impressive. And then he had all the soldiers there, and he
said, unequivocally, he was very, very, very high on the
quality of these soldiers. And when I came back, I said,
``Terrific, let's get out, because General Petraeus said''--and
remember that joke?
The Chairman. I do remember.
Senator Boxer. General Petraeus said, ``This is fabulous,
we've got 200,000-plus, trained, ready to go,'' and General
Casey said, ``The bigger our footprint, the worse off we are.
We're fueling the insurgency.'' Now, the tragedy is, as I hear
you--you're not the tragedy, you're helping us try to find the
way here--I wrote down the things I take away, which is exactly
what I took away 18 months ago, that our presence is fueling
the insurgency--and whether you use the word ``disengage,''
which I respect your view on that, or ``get out'' or some
fancier word, ``redeploy,'' it doesn't matter--that's part of
the solution. And I take that away from you.
Now, I think one of the things that we never say, so I'm
going to say it--and I always get myself in trouble for saying
the truth; I'm going to say it--is that we do have to increase
the end strength. But one of the reasons is a lot of our folks
are gone--3,000-plus dead, and, I just asked, 10,000 of our
wounded, out of the 20, cannot come back to fight. So, when we
talk about increasing the end strength--and I understand
Defense Secretary Gates says 65,000--I hope we don't lose sight
of--one of the reasons we have to do this is because some
people can't come back. So, I want to put that out there.
The question I had--and I so very much--I have two
questions, and I'll ask them now, and be quiet and let you
finish, because I've got 5 minutes left.
The Chairman. You can take your time.
Senator Boxer. I have not heard--and please correct me if
I'm wrong, because if I'm wrong, I'll be happy--I have not
heard Prime Minister al-Maliki ever say--and he's a leader of a
country that is going through hell--when we look at the
pictures of the Iraqis, we feel a pang, whether it's at a
supermarket, whether it's at a mosque, innocent children,
babies, mothers, men, women, old, young, screaming in pain, and
running from the scene--I have never heard him use the word
``Cease fire. Let's come around the table. This is one
country.''
Now, I would like you--if I am wrong on this, please
correct me, because that's the kind of leadership I'd like to
see. If, in fact, it is one country, which leads me to my
comments about the Biden-Gelb idea--which I think is gaining
ground, Mr. Chairman; I hope you don't give up, because I
think, at the end of the day, it's the only way, it's already
happening--but I would say to Dr. Gelb, when you talked about
it, you said, ``Ethnic cleansing, well, it's already
happening.'' I would use the word--yours isn't ``ethnic
cleansing,'' it's ``ethnic separation,'' to avoid ethnic
cleansing. So, I hope you'll go back and read what you said and
correct the record, because I--no, I feel you said ``ethnic
cleansing is already happening,'' but I think the point is,
your plan and the chairman's isn't for--it's to stop ethnic
cleansing.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Dr. Gelb. Absolutely.
Senator Boxer. Yes. And I think you should stick with it
and--listen, I'm someone who knows how people can pound on you
and pound on you and pound on you. You know, you have a
solution, a political solution--and I agree--somebody said,
``It shouldn't look like it's `Made in America.' '' One person
said that. Fine. Better than a war that's ``Made in America.''
OK? Better that a solution percolates from America than this
war continues without end in the face of world opposition.
So, I guess I have--if you can comment if I'm wrong on al-
Maliki. If anyone says I'm wrong, I'd like to know. And my
question deals with a poll that just came out in--Tuesday,
January 23.
Mr. Chairman and Senator Lugar, I don't know if you've seen
this, ``Global opinion of U.S. foreign policy has sharply
deteriorated in the past 2 years, according to a BBC poll
released today. Three-quarters of those polled in 25 countries
disapprove of U.S. policies toward Iraq.'' Seventy-five percent
of those polled in 25 countries. They asked 26,000 people, and
the GlobeScan president said, ``It's a horrible slide,'' and,
``If this keeps up, it's going to be difficult for the United
States to exercise its moral suasion in the world.''
Now, you are much wiser than I am on the whole big picture,
but this, to me, is frightening, because--we were attacked on
September 11, 2001. The whole world was with us. Mr. Chairman,
do you remember that? The whole--and I remember going down to
the floor of the Senate, just shaking and trembling after what
had happened, and saying, ``There's only one thing I could see
that--a piece of sun--and that is that the world is with us,
and, in this war against terror, we can lead with moral
authority and get the whole world to stand with us.'' Now we
have a world, because of the Iraq war--mostly, although there
are other reasons, too--is against us.
So, I guess my question to you is: Could you respond to
this poll? Does it alarm you? What is it going to take for us
to turn around world opinion? Because it's a global economy,
it's a global war on terror. Everywhere you look, it's global,
global, and this is where we are.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the courtesy.
The Chairman. Very good questions, Senator. I'm anxious to
hear their answers.
Dr. Luttwak. I'd like to refer you to the testimony of
Secretary Condoleezza Rice, not her testimony now, but what she
said at the very beginning of the Bush administration. She said
that American foreign policy needs humility. The argument is
that American economic, technological, and media power is so
great that the world could not also tolerate very assertive
U.S. policies, let alone much military action. That is to say,
the moment a country is so inherently powerful in so many
different dimensions of life, starts using its military force,
you immediately evoke a reaction, even by people who are not
anti-American, simply because they want to safeguard their
independence, their sense of independence. So, reducing our
profile, reducing our level of activity, could paradoxically
increase our real leverage. And different--I think the Biden
plan, the Gelb-Biden plan, whichever way your wife calls it, is
part of----
The Chairman. Depends on the outcome of this hearing.
Dr. Luttwak [continuing]. Is recognizing, is disengaging
the--allowing equilibrium to emerge naturally. Iraq is, indeed,
a divided country; it will not be a unitary country, unless
it's an evil dictatorship. So, I think that there's a remedy,
Senator, to the very real situation that you have outlined, and
the remedy is to go back to the original intention of the Bush
administration, which was to follow a low profile foreign
policy of humility, where you oblige others to come to us here
in Washington, say, ``Please intervene, please help out in this
multilateral venture or that.''
The Chairman. I think he's right.
Dr. Korb. To pick up on what Ed said in the debate between
then-Governor Bush and Vice President Gore, he said he wanted a
humble foreign policy, which I think underscores what Ed has
said. It's not just Iraq, because we went in there without
waiting for a second U.N. resolution, not allowing the
inspectors to do their job, but it's other things, like in
saying we're not bound by the Geneva Conventions, the
renditions, Guantanamo. All of those things, I think, have hurt
us. And the real key thing is, we're not going to prevail in
this war on terror without convincing people around the world
that what these al-Qaeda-like groups say about us is simply not
true, and it is a war of ideas, and--with a poll like this, it
doesn't help us. Look how our opinion went up when we sent the
Marines to help Indonesia after the tsunami. Look how the
opinion in a Muslim country went up. And I think that that
answers your question.
Dr. Malley. Senator, you raised several issues I want to
address. First, on the issue of training, I think one of the
big misconceptions of--from the beginning of the war is this
notion that by training the Iraqis in the abstract, it's going
to make a difference. That's--it's a question of loyalty and
allegiance that matters, and if they are--if they're loyal to
their group or to their militia, it doesn't matter how well
trained they are, and that's why so often trained troops have
not performed.
Second, on the issue of Maliki, I don't know if he said--if
he called for a cease-fire. Frankly, even if he did, I'm not
sure what difference it would make. But I think that they
would--it would be wrong right now to focus on the person of
Maliki. And there's some whispering about, ``Well, maybe he'll
be changed, maybe we'll bring in a different alliance, with
SCIRI and the Kurds and some Sunnis, for a different form of
government.'' It's a structural problem. And if you just shift
these actors, you're not going to make a difference. So, maybe
Maliki today, Jaafari yesterday. And I remember when Maliki was
appointed, and people were saying, ``Well, he's much better
than Jaafari.'' I'm not sure we see any difference. The next
person won't be different unless you change--unless you reach a
political reconciliation.
And finally, on the issue of United States image, which has
been something I've been deeply preoccupied with for some time,
of course Iraq is, in great part, responsible. There are other
things, as well. I think our diplomacy in the Middle East has
been notoriously absent. I think our disengagement from Arab-
Israeli peacemaking has been extremely irresponsible. And I
think there are things that we're going to have to do.
Unfortunately, at this point, because of our lack of
credibility, even good things we might do risk being perceived
in a very negative way, so I think it's a very uphill battle,
but we need to start.
The Chairman. Senator Boxer, thank you very much.
I'd like to ask a question, if it's OK.
Gentlemen, again there's been a remarkable consensus on the
big issues that have to be addressed relative to Iraq, not just
from you gentlemen, who are among the brightest people we have
in the foreign policy establishment, but, quite frankly, from
former generals we had last week. We had a remarkable panel, I
thought, of four generals representing about 15 stars, and
there was remarkable consensus across the board of all the
testimony we had, except from Dr. Rice. And I'm trying to be
facetious. I mean, when she testified--I've been here a while,
I was here during the tail end of Vietnam--as you know, Ed,
that's when you and I met. And I've never attended a hearing
that said as much by the response, universally, of a 21-member
committee to a major initiative from a President presented by
his Secretary of State. I mean, it was truly, in that sense,
historic. I can't think of any time in the 34 years I've been
here where there was such an outright range from skepticism to
hostility toward the proposal being put forward.
But one of the things that you all said here--and it
relates to what Senator Boxer raised, is that in order to have
any salvageable best-case outcome of the bad outcomes that are
likely, and there's no great outcome that's likely--there must
be a political reconciliation in Iraq. Now, I keep trying to
find points of common agreement here, not just with you all,
but across the board. Political reconciliation, either as a
consequence of a civil war, where the objectives of the warring
parties finally get resolved on the battlefield, or a
reconciliation brought about by nudging from the international
community, a reconciliation brought out of just self-interest
being realized among the parties--does anybody picture that
reconciliation, by any means, resulting in a strong central
government in Iraq?
Dr. Malley. Let--just--and, obviously, it's a difficult
question to answer. What do you mean by a ``strong central
government''? I think----
The Chairman. I mean what the administration is talking
about, a central government--that's a democracy--where you have
a majority population--meaning that over 60 percent of it is
likely to be represented by the Shia, controlling the security
of the entire country and controlling the security of each
hamlet with a national police force which is now envisioned--
not just national army, a national police force. You know what
I mean by a ``strong central government.''
Dr. Malley. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would--I think it's--and
it's in our plan, it's in, I think, everyone's plan, at this
table at least, the notion of federalism. It's been what the
Iraqis want, themselves.
The Chairman. No, no--now, please answer my question.
Dr. Malley. OK.
The Chairman. Can anybody envision a strong national
government, as has been pushed by the administration for the
last 5 years?
Dr. Luttwak. Every Arab country, Senator, from Morocco to
Iran, has a strong central government. But that is a strong
central government, because the--any--there are plenty of local
autonomous tendencies of different entities--are simply
suppressed by dictatorship.
The Chairman. Right.
Dr. Luttwak. Therefore, whoever advocates a strong central
government in Iraq is advocating dictatorship.
The Chairman. Well, you've----
Dr. Luttwak. Unless we are ready to install our own
dictatorship--I mean, Saddam Hussein is no longer with us. I
notice that he seemed to be in good health before he died, and
so on. Unless we are prepared to find a Saddam Hussein and
install him in Baghdad, there cannot be a strong central
government in Iraq.
The Chairman. Well, you've said it better than I asked it.
In other words, is it possible to have a strong central
government without a dictatorship or an authoritarian regime in
Iraq? Is it possible for that to happen?
Dr. Korb. No, sir.
The Chairman. OK. Now everyone I've asked that question to
but the administration has stated that. I find it interesting
that there is this sort of nuance as to what constitutes a
federal system. Whatever it is, the idea that, in the next
decade, I would say, that there is an ability to have a united
Iraq without an authoritarian government rests upon the notion
that there is local control over their own personal security. I
mean, does anybody think there's any time in the next 10 years,
without an authoritarian regime in Baghdad, that you're going
to have a national police force patrolling Fallujah without
there being war, without there being civil chaos? Does anybody
think that's possible? And I haven't found anybody who does.
So quite frankly--I'm expressing my own frustration about
the plan that used to be spearheaded by Gelb, but now is, I
guess, just Biden--I'm joking. But this is why I find it so
fascinating that people seem to fixate on whether or not we're
splitting up a country, why I find it so fascinating whether or
not what we're calling for is just what the Constitution says.
And what it says--again, I know you all know this, but it's
amazing how few people have read this document--it says in
article 116, ``This Constitution shall appropriate the region
of Kurdistan.'' It sets in place, in the Constitution, that
Kurdistan is a region, right from the get-go. Then it says,
``This Constitution shall establish new regions in accordance
with the provisions.'' Then it goes on to state what power it
gives you if you decide to be a region. And it merely says what
you've all been saying, ``regional authorities shall have the
right to exercise executive, legislative, and judicial
authority in accordance with this Constitution, except for the
powers stipulated to the central government,'' which Les laid
out. Two; in the case of contradiction between regional and
national, national wins. Three; region and governate shall
allocate an equitable share of the national revenues. Four; the
regions and governates shall establish offices and embassies
and diplomatic missions. I mean, this is even beyond our
Articles of Confederation, 200 years ago. And regions shall be
responsible for all administrative requirements in the region,
particularly the establishment and organization of internal
security forces.
So, why do we keep pushing a rope here?
Dr. Luttwak. Senator, I would not be frustrated, if I were
you, because it is an iron law of politics all over this planet
that when you have strongly constituted ethnic and religious
identities, you can only have one of two modes, either some
form of decentralization, federalism, and so on, or an
oppressive dictatorship. Indeed, if and when Iran becomes a
democracy, in the full sense, you will see that Iran, too, will
have to go federal, because they have the Azeri--population, 20
million, they have the Kurds, they have the Baluch, they have
some--even some Tajiks, and they will have to be federal. So,
you're going to win. Your proposal shall be reality whenever
there is no dictatorship--in Iraq, as in Iran. So, this will
succeed, and you shouldn't be frustrated.
The reason there has been some hesitation even at this
table--Larry, for example--is the notion that we would
prescribe a very specifically written constitution----
The Chairman. Gotcha.
Dr. Luttwak [continuing]. That, as I say, is redolent and
has connotations. You can see, you know, Locke, Burke, Madison,
and these other strange creatures in it who do not correspond
to their culture and their history. And, you know, people like
Sistani, in their Web sites, have little notes about politics
in which they evoke discussions about democracy conducted in
the ninth century----
Dr. Gelb. But, Edward, I would just note that Locke did not
write the Iraqi Constitution.
Dr. Luttwak. No. [Laughter.]
I will stop, then.
Dr. Gelb. OK.
The Chairman. Well, I obviously cannot speak for Les Gelb,
and I'll ask you to respond to this, Les, but I suspect that
neither Les nor I would quarrel with the idea that there would
be some other way in which reconciliation takes place. The
central point of what we are--we have been attempting to do,
and it seems to be a consensus without people willing to state
it's a consensus--is that we've got to get off this wicket of a
strong central government, led by Maliki or anybody else, who's
going to be in total control of the security of the whole
country, and who is going to be able to decide, at a majority
vote in the Parliament, how to distribute revenues, when they
feel like distributing them--in terms of oil--and expect
anything to happen positively within Iraq.
I can understand--and I'll conclude with this--if you did
not think that a political solution and reconciliation was the
key to moving beyond the quagmire we find ourselves in, then I
would say it is rational and reasonable to argue that there's
still some basis for suggesting that a military solution might
be appropriate. But nobody thinks it can be solve militarily. I
just hope my colleagues, as well as the administration--and I
think my colleagues are way ahead on this--understand that the
elements of reconciliation relate to a little bit of political
breathing room, a little bit less of forcing all the parties
together under a strongly constituted central government, which
the Constitution doesn't call for, and some way to work out
giving each of the major constituencies a reason to buy in to
the notion of a united Iraq.
And I think I'll conclude by saying, Ed, I am always
impressed by your--I'm not being facetious--you talked about
your tactical input--by your strategic vision here. I happen to
agree with you on one overarching point, the same point made by
Les--that Iran is somehow this new, emboldened superpower in
the region, or, second, that a disintegration of our efforts in
Iraq will result in an international catastrophe in the region
that requires us, even when we're ``losing,'' keep American
forces in Iraq.
And so, the last point I'd like to ask each of you to
comment on, as briefly as you can: If all fails--meaning that
the administration does not budge over the next 2 years on
insisting that a military solution has to predate the
possibility of a political solution--if, in fact, the surge is
as counterproductive as all of us--well, five of us, anyway--
think it's likely to be, and if the result will be--which I
predict, as Senator Boxer said--the American public will not
sustain this effort for 2 more years, I predict that you will
see a whole cadre of people running, in both parties--new
people, as well--in 2008, who will not only be calling for us
to get out of Iraq, they'll be calling for us to get out of the
region. And I think that would be a real problem.
Here's my question. What is the worst case that you can see
if, in fact, we end up having to, absent any political
solution, disengage from Iraq? I refer to ``disengage and
contain,'' and I don't think it's the end of the world. If all
this fails, what do you see as the downside? Is it as bleak as
the President paints it for our interests in the region and the
country and the world?
Dr. Korb. Oh, I think he's well overstating the danger to
American foreign policy. I mean, when he talks about Iraq being
the central front on the war on terror, and somehow, if we
leave Iraq, you know, they're going to come over here and
attack us, I mean, that assumes there's a sort of a finite
number of terrorists, and they're all in Iraq, and so we keep
them busy there, they won't--they will not come here.
To me, the real danger is the one you pointed out, is that
Americans will tire of bearing their responsibilities around
the world, they will not trust their political leaders when
they tell them about danger. And that's why I think it's
important that we have to stay involved in the region, because
we do have strategic interests. I think the worst thing that
could happen is that you would have even more violence than you
have now, though when people say, ``Gee, if we leave, there
will be a civil war.'' Well, what's going on now? I mean, in
terms of the number of--the number of casualties. And as long
as we're in the region, we can prevent that from undermining
regional stability.
The Chairman. Thank you. Anyone else want to comment?
Dr. Gelb. If I may, Mr. Chairman. And, again, thank you
very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Former Chairman, for this
opportunity.
I think the real catastrophe would be staying the course.
That's the main thing causing all these problems. And they've
been listed ad nauseam from the beginning of this hearing and
from the beginning of your hearings on this subject. And it's a
catastrophe, in my point of view, that the President and the
White House keep saying there are no alternatives. There are
alternatives. And until you recognize the legitimacy of these
alternatives, you can't have a decent dialog. And that dialog
is absolutely essential if we're to have a bipartisan foreign
policy on Iraq, and that bipartisanship is essential for making
the very tough decisions that lie ahead.
I would only remind the committee what I know many of you
remember. In the waning days of the Vietnam war, President
Nixon said that losing would make the United States a pitiful
helpless giant. Well, heaven forfend, we did lose, or the South
Vietnamese lost, and we took Americans off the rooftops of our
Embassy in Saigon, and we all shuddered at the thought. But
then, having predicted the worst, having created the most
fears, President Nixon and Henry Kissinger set about to do
diplomacy to blunt this. They opened the door to China, they
created the trilateral diplomacy to put pressure on both Moscow
and Beijing. They strengthened our relations and our security
relations with the countries of Asia. And 3 years after we
lifted our people off the rooftops of the Embassy in Saigon,
the United States position in Asia was stronger than it had
been at any time since the end of World War II.
This country is still the paramount power in the world.
We're not a hegemon. We can't order anyone else around. But
others still look to us to prevent great harm and to do good.
And that is a basis for recovering from the horrors of these
blunders of the last 3 years.
Dr. Malley. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. If you can do it briefly, if you would.
Dr. Malley. OK. Mr. Chairman--oh, you want to add something
there?
Mr. Chairman, first, on the issue of the internal
disposition of Iraq, I think the main issue on which there is
consensus from all of us is that the key is reconciliation,
however the Iraqis choose to reach their compromises on
federalism, on a weak central government, but on keeping their
country together, hopefully, in some fashion.
The worst-case scenario, as you said, would be to stay the
course and then end up, a year or 2 years from now, doing what
people are calling for us to do today, but in a far weaker
position. I don't think we should underestimate the damage
that's already been done by the years we've been there. No
doubt about it, I think, in the region, there has been damage.
We may not be a weak power, but we are a weaker power. But, if
in fact, we chose to listen--if we try to do a political
reconciliation, and it doesn't work, and we choose to leave
more quickly, then our emphasis needs to be on reengaging
diplomatically in the region, something we haven't done, to
prevent the breakdown in Iraq from spreading to the rest of the
region. And I think we can do that.
Dr. Luttwak. There is now a so-called way of jihad, whereby
you go to Jordan, or you go to Syria, and then you go to Anbar
province, and then you enter the jihadi group. They are not the
largest group, but they are the ones we are most troubled by.
There is no doubt that, if there is no way of jihad leading to
Anbar, there will be people who will attack elsewhere. So,
Senator, I think that you have an opportunity here, with
Senator Lugar, of exercising great influence over this policy
and bringing everybody to their senses, because I want to show
you that the Bush administration is full of people who agree
with you two. Full of it. They're--so, our--but I don't think
one should give hostages to fortune and totally ignore the
considerations that Senator Lugar presented, which he got from
his encounters with President Bush. Yes; there could be dangers
in some. But I believe that Les Gelb is entirely accurate, the
fundamental global equilibria are what they are. Iran is not a
great power. We are more than a great power. And, moreover, my
concept of the division of the Middle East giving us
equilibria. So, I don't think, in the macrosense--but there's
no reason to give hostages to fortune here, because there is a
bit of a mechanical factor, which is: Right now, if you're a
jihadi anywhere in the world, you want to go to Anbar. You
close down Anbar, they'll find some other places. But the
totality of it will be trivial, as opposed to the--what's
happening now.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. I hope we keep focus on
the big picture here. Your testimony has been incredibly
helpful.
I was told, if it really is a brief question--do you have
one question left, Senator? Would you mind asking it briefly,
and maybe we can let these folks go to lunch? Because we're
back here at 2:30 again.
Senator Nelson. I just wanted to say to Dr. Korb, in you
quoting the article by General Petraeus from 2\1/2\ years ago,
specifically, when I asked him that today, ``How many do you
think we have trained today?'' And he said 300,000. And I said,
``How many of them are reliable?'' And he said he didn't know.
And I said, ``Well, can you put a percentage on it?'' And he
said, no; he couldn't.
Now, I'm going to insist, as a member of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, that we get an answer from the Government
of the United States as to how many, or what percentage, do we
think, of the Iraqi Army and police force, are trained.
The other thing I wanted to ask was--I went to Syria as
part of the Iraq Study Commission. And, of course, the White
House roundly criticized me. In this aggressive diplomatic
initiative that you all have been discussing, what part do you
think Syria can play in that, in helping us in our situation in
Iraq?
Dr. Malley. Senator, I think I was in Syria the same time
as you, and, certainly from my discussion with Syrian
officials, they claim that they are prepared to do things if,
in fact, there's reciprocation.
I think there's a lot they can do because of the links they
have to Sunni Arab tribes. I think there's a lot they can do
because of links they have to the insurgents. I think there's a
lot they can do because of their historical links with the
Baath Party. So, there are things they can do in the context of
a political reconciliation that is led by us in which they can
then play a part. In the absence of that, and if they don't see
any engagement with them, then I think we could be pretty sure
that they won't be doing too much good to help us stabilize the
situation.
Dr. Korb. One good thing is, we have this--all the parties
in the region together, and the United States is clear that
we'll be leaving. We're going to break this axis, if you will,
between Syria and Iran, because one is Sunni, the other is more
Shia. And so, I think, based upon what Rob said, you can get
them involved, but you've got to get all the countries
involved, because even the Saudis, if we can believe the press
reports, are causing problems there now with the money that
they are sending in.
And if I can briefly--think--the problem with the Iraqi
security forces is not training, it's motivation. That's the
real key. And you won't have that motivation until they make
these political compromises.
The Chairman. Ed, if you make it brief, OK?
Dr. Luttwak. Yes; just very briefly. The word ``militia''
describes somebody who is in a group that he believes in, that
he identifies with. He's for real. It's the army and police who
are not for real.
Senator Biden's plan--one of the reasons his plan will
succeed, unless it becomes a brutal dictatorship, is because,
in effect, there'll be these regional forces which are true to
their identity. So, this--whenever I hear people now--and Larry
made the same point, I think everybody agrees--talking about
numbers, numbers are irrelevant. They really are. The only ones
I trust are the militias, which is the militias reaching an
equilibrium in what will be a decentralized system.
The Chairman. Well, gentlemen, I'm never going to get you
all back here if I don't let you go. I would say to my
colleagues and anyone who's listening, we'll reconvene here at
2:30, and we'll have Congressman Murtha and former Speaker
Gingrich, who will be testifying.
I thank you for your input. It's been invaluable.
We are recessed til 2:30.
[Whereupon, at 12:37 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
ALTERNATIVE PLANS (CONTINUED)
----------
TUESDAY, JANUARY 23, 2007 [P.M.]
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m., in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R.
Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Dodd, Feingold, Boxer, Menendez,
Casey, Lugar, Coleman, Corker, Isakson, and Vitter.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
The Chairman. The hearing will please come to order.
Let me suggest--we've got two very important witnesses who
are also significantly well grounded in the ways of the House
and Senate. There's a vote at 2:45. What I'd like to suggest we
do when that vote comes is to recess the committee so we all go
and vote and all come right back, because it's too important
what these two gentlemen have to say to let this sort of go on,
you know, one at a time.
I also want to say to Senator Casey before I begin, when it
comes time to question, I'm going to yield my spot to you
first, because you had waited all this time to question our
early morning panel. You had to speak and preside, and so, I
will do that, just so no one's surprised.
I have consulted with Chairman Lugar's staff. He has no
opening statement and suggests that we get going right away. I
have a very brief opening statement.
This afternoon, we continue our thorough examination of the
remaining options in Iraq, and we're very honored--and we are
honored--to have with us Chairman Murtha and Speaker Gingrich.
Both are men of stature, both are patriots, and both have
offered serious and provocative ideas that have helped frame
this debate on Iraq and our overall national security policies.
We will hear specific recommendations today. We have heard
specific recommendations from 18 witnesses in the past 2 weeks,
and we'll hear specific recommendations over the next 2 weeks--
so much for Vice President Cheney's assertion that Members of
the Congress ``have absolutely nothing to offer'' in place of
the current policy.
The White House has grown accustomed to policy debates in
an echo chamber. Dismissing competing ideas has become a matter
of routine, but it's a dangerous way to govern and conduct this
war. And that's the most partisan thing I've said since these
hearings began, but I want to make it clear--make no mistake--
there are a number of very serious people with very specific
alternatives that have been offered.
Our goal in these hearings is to strike a different tone,
it's to start from the proposition that all of us are united in
our devotion to this country and our desire to help see it
through a difficult time. I believe no foreign policy can be
sustained unless there are two essential elements. First, it
must be bipartisan, and, second, it has to have the informed
consent of the American people. I think both are lacking right
now.
Our policy today lacks these fundamental ingredients, in my
view, and it's my hope that the hearings we have held the last
2 weeks and the next week and a half will help generate that
bipartisan consensus on key elements of a successful strategy
in Iraq.
Our witnesses today are going to contribute to that effort
mightily. Chairman Murtha single-handedly shifted the debate--
and I can't emphasize that enough; whether you agree or
disagree with him, he single-handedly shifted the debate in
Iraq when he had the courage to challenge a policy that was
clearly failing. No one's said it more clearly, whether you
agree with him or not. And, I might add, Mr. Chairman, we've
had a score of witnesses--I mean, left, right, center,
Democrat, Republican, military, retired military, et cetera--I
have not heard anybody--I've never heard the word ``redeploy''
used as much as when you said it, what, a year and a half ago,
or however long ago it was. And so--
Speaker Gingrich is one of the most eloquent spokesman of a
strategy on foreign policy. And he's argued eloquently about
what's at stake in Iraq. He's offered creative proposals to
succeed there and in other foreign policy challenges
confronting this Nation.
I just want you to know, if you call his cell phone, you're
not going to get through. I left four messages on your cell
phone to come and testify. I don't want you to think, Newt, I
wasn't trying to get you here, because I think it's real value-
added, having you here, and I appreciate it very much.
Senator, do you have anything you'd like to say?
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to
hearing from two good friends. I'll forego another opening
statement, so we could expedite the hearing.
The Chairman. Great.
Let's start with you, Chairman Murtha, and then--take what
time you need, and we will--when we get to questioning, we'll
limit it to 8-minute rounds again, and if there's time, and the
witnesses' physical constitution will bear it, we may ask them
a second round, if that works, based on their schedules.
So, Jack, it's all yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN P. MURTHA, U.S. CONGRESSMAN FROM
PENNSYLVANIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE, COMMITTEE ON
APPROPRIATIONS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Chairman, I'm delighted to be here. And I
want to say that I won by 122 votes in my first election, and
Joe Biden came to Johnstown--he just had been elected Senator--
and he swung the election. I attribute my election to him. So,
anybody that's got criticism can criticize Joe Biden, because
he got me elected. [Laughter.]
The Chairman. Well, Mr. Chairman, if you don't mind the
point of personal privilege here, the word was, you would have
won by 1,022 votes had I not shown up. [Laughter.]
The Chairman. But, at any rate, thank you.
Mr. Murtha. And Senator Lugar and I went to the
Philippines, and, I have to say, we changed the election in the
Philippines. We made sure--we convinced President Reagan that--
what was that guy's name that had to go? Marcos had to go,
yeah.
And, of course, I'm delighted to be here with Bob Casey,
who's such a good friend, his dad and his family have been such
a good friend, and two distinguished Senators.
So, let me say, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, for the past 5
years, the United States has had an average of 130,000 troops
in the ground in Iraq. The Pentagon reports that the Iraqi
security forces have grown in number, nearly reaching their
goal of 325,000 equipped and trained. The Iraqis have a
constitution and have held national elections.
These milestones have been met, yet security in Iraq
continues to deteriorate. The past 4 years, the Iraq war has
been plagued by mischaracterizations based on optimism instead
of realism. Reality dictates that conditions on the ground are
simply moving in the wrong direction. There are limits to
military power. And I've said this over and over again. There's
no military solution to Iraq's civil war. It's up to the
Iraqis.
Beginning in May 2005, after 2 years of
mischaracterizations and misrepresentations, the Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee required the Department of Defense
to submit quarterly reports to the Congress on facts necessary
to measure stability and security in Iraq. Since July 2005,
we've received these reports. They are dismal, and they
demonstrate a clear lack of progress in the vital areas of
concern. Electricity, oil production, employment, and potable
water are all below prewar level. The average weekly attacks
have grown, since I spoke out last year--from 430 per week, in
July 2005, to well over 1,000. Iraq casualties have increased
from 63 per day to 127 per day, to date. The latest polls show
that 91 percent of the Sunni Iraqis and 74 percent of the Shia
Iraqis want the United States forces out of Iraq. In January
2006, 47 percent of Iraqis approved of attacks on United
States-led forces. Now it's 61 percent approve of attacks on
U.S. forces. Support of the American public continues to erode,
and there's little confidence in the current strategy. Today,
less than 30 percent of Americans support the war, and only 11
percent support the President's plan to increase troop levels.
February 2006 polls showed that 72 percent of American
troops--and I picked this up long before I saw it in the
polls--in Iraq believe the United States should exit Iraq
within a year; and 42 percent said that their mission was
unclear; they didn't understand what they were doing.
Wars cannot be won with slogans, there must be terms for
measuring progress, and a clearly defined purpose, if success
is ever to be achieved.
General Schoomaker said, in a recent hearing, that in order
for a strategy to be effective, we have to be able to measure
the purpose, yet the President sets forth a plan with no
defined matrices for measuring success, and a plan that, in my
estimation, is simply more of the same plan that has not
worked. A new strategy that is based on redeployment, rather
than on further military engagement, and one that is centered
on handing Iraq back to the Iraqis, is what is needed. I do not
believe that Iraq will make the political progress necessary
for its security and stability until the United States forces
redeploy.
Now, here's what I believe, if we're going to achieve
stability in Iraq and in the region. I believe the first step
is to redeploy American forces; the execution of a robust
diplomatic effort and a restoration of international
credibility; the repairing of our military readiness, and the
rebuilding of our Strategic Reserve to face future threats--and
this is probably as important as anything else that I have
found in my hearings that I've just concluded in the last week
or so.
Now, redeployment of United States forces in Iraq. To
achieve stability in Iraq, I believe we first must have a
responsible phased redeployment of U.S. forces. General Odom,
Army retired, recently testified, ``We're pursuing the wrong
war. Stability and security in the region should be the
overarching strategy, not a victory in Iraq.'' I agree with
General Odom, and I believe that regional stability can only be
accomplished through redeployment.
Who wants us to stay in Iraq? I am convinced, in my
opinion, that Iran and al-Qaeda, because we intensify the very
radical extremism we claim to be fighting against, while, at
the same time, depleting our financial and human resources.
As long as the United States military continues to occupy
Iraq, there'll be no real security. Maintaining United States
troop strength in Iraq, or adding to the strength in specific
areas, has not proven effective in the past, it didn't work
recently in Baghdad. We just put 10,000 to 15,000 troops in
Baghdad, increased the strength, and the violence has increased
substantially. Nor do I believe it will work in the future. The
Iraq war cannot be won by the United States military,
predominantly because of the way our military operates. They
use overwhelming force--and I advocate that--to save American
lives. But, let me tell you, that makes enemies. When you go
and kick down the doors--and we have to do that in order to
protect our people--when you use mortars and all the ammunition
we have to use to protect our Americans, you kill the enemy,
you kill other people, and inadvertently kill civilians, and
34,000 people have been killed--not by Americans, but have been
killed in this civil war--and it doesn't help us to win the
hearts and minds of the people.
Now, how would you redeploy? I recommend the phased
redeployment of U.S. forces from Saddam's palaces. That's where
we are. We're in the palaces. I've told them that when I was
over there, ``Get them out of the palaces.'' Then from the
Green Zone, get them out of the Green Zone. The Green Zone is
surrounded by Iraqis who have no electricity, no water, none of
the things they need, and yet, inside the Green Zone, they have
everything that they need. They have electricity, they have all
the food that they want, and everything else.
Next, from the prime real estate, redeploy from the prime
real estate of Iraq's major cities--out of the factories and
universities. We own the best in the cities. We go in and take
it over. Finally, out of the country altogether.
We need to give the communities back to the Iraqis so they
can begin to self-govern, begin economic recovery, and return
to some sort of normality. I recommend the adoption of United
States policy that encourages and rewards reconstruction and
regional investment, and one that is dictated and administered
not by the United States, but by the Iraqis.
Restoration of international credibility. I think this is
just as important. I believe that a responsible redeployment
from Iraq is the first step necessary in restoring our
tarnished international credibility. Since the United States
invasion of Iraq, our international credibility, even among
allies, has plummeted. Stability in Iraq is important, not only
the United States, but it is important to the region and
important to the entire world.
Just this morning, the BBC released a poll showing that
nearly three-quarters of those polled in 25 countries
disapproved of United States policies toward Iraq. More than
two-thirds of those polled said the U.S. military presence in
the Middle East does more harm than good. And 29 percent of
respondents said the United States has a general positive
influence in the world, down from 40 percent 2 years ago--29
percent.
How do we restore international credibility? I believe that
it's necessary for the United States to completely denounce any
aspirations of building permanent United States military bases
in Iraq. I believe we should shut down Guantanamo detention
facility. We must bulldoze Abu Ghraib, just because of the
symbolism of it. We must clearly articulate and demonstrate a
policy of no torture, no exceptions, and directly engage
countries in the region with dialog instead of directives. This
includes allies, as well as our perceived enemies.
Repairing our military readiness. Now, that's the business
I'm in. Our annual defense spending budget is currently in
excess of $450 billion. Above this amount, we are spending $8.4
billion a month in the war in Iraq. And yet, our Strategic
Reserve is in desperate shape. While we are fighting an
asymmetric threat in the short term, we have weakened our
ability to respond to what I believe is a grave, long-term
conventional and nuclear threat. At the beginning of the Iraq
war, 80 percent of all Army units, and almost 100 percent of
Active combat units, were rated at the highest state of
readiness. Hundred percent. Today, virtually all of our Active-
Duty combat units at home, in the continental United States,
and all of our Guard units are at the lowest state of
readiness, primarily due to equipment shortages resulting from
the repeated and extended deployments to Iraq.
In recent testimony given by a high-ranking Pentagon
official, it was reported that our country is threatened
because we lack readiness at home. Our Army has no Strategic
Reserve. None. No Strategic Reserve. And, while it's true that
the U.S. Navy and the Air Force can be used to project power,
there's a limit to what they can achieve. Overall, our military
remains capable of projecting power. We must be able, also, to
sustain that projection. In this regard, there's no replacement
for boots on the ground.
How do we repair readiness and rebuild our Strategic
Reserve? We must make it a national priority to restrengthen
our military and to repair readiness. I advocate an increase in
overall troop strength. The current authorized level is below
what I believe is needed to maintain an optimal military. In
recent testimony, the Defense Subcommittee I chair, the Army
and Marine Corps commanders testified that they could not
continue to sustain the current deployment practices without an
adverse effect on the health and well-being of servicemembers
and their families.
For decades, the Army operated on a deployment policy that,
for every 1 year of deployment, 2 years were spent at home.
This as considered optimal for retraining, reequipping, and
reconstituting. Without relief, the Army will be forced to
extend deployments to Iraq to over 1 year in country. It will
be forced to send troops back with less than 1 year at home.
The Army reported that a 9-month deployment was preferable.
Medical experts testified, that, in intensive combat,
deployments of over 3 months would increase the likelihood of
servicemembers to develop post-traumatic stress syndrome. We
must invest in the health and well-being of our servicemembers,
providing the right amount of troops for the appropriate
deployment and rotation cycles.
Our military equipment inventories are unacceptably low.
The services report that at least $100 billion more is needed
to get them back in a ready state. In doing so, we must not
neglect the investment in military technologies of the future.
While we remain bogged down in Iraq, the size and
sophistication of other militaries are growing. We must not
lose our capability to deter future threats.
And let me conclude by saying, historically, whether it's
India, Algeria, or Afghanistan, foreign occupations do not
work. In fact, they incite civil unrest. Our military remains
the greatest military in the world, but there are limits to its
ability to control a population that considers them as
occupiers. And I've said this before, and I continue to say it,
there are essentially only two plans. One is to continue an
occupation that has not worked and has shown no progress toward
stabilization, and the other, which I advocate, is to end the
occupation of Iraq, redeploy and restrengthen our military, and
turn Iraq over to the Iraqis.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Murtha follows:]
Prepared Statement of Congressman John P. Murtha, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of
Representatives
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, and distinguished members of this
committee, for the past 5 years, the United States has had, on average,
over 130,000 troops on the ground in Iraq. The Pentagon reports that
the Iraqi Security Forces have grown in number, nearly reaching their
goal of 325,000 trained and equipped. The Iraqis have a constitution
and have held national elections. These milestones have been met, yet
security in Iraq continues to deteriorate. The past 4 years of the Iraq
war have been plagued by mischaracterization based on unrealistic
optimism instead of realism. Reality dictates that conditions on the
ground are simply moving in the wrong direction.
There are limits to military power. There is no U.S. military
solution to Iraq's civil war. It is up to the Iraqis.
Beginning in May 2005, after 2 years of mischaracterizations and
misrepresentations by this administration, the Defense Appropriations
Subcommittee required the Department of Defense to submit quarterly
reports to Congress on the facts necessary to measure stability and
security in Iraq. Since July 2005 we have received these reports. They
are dismal and demonstrate a clear lack of progress in vital areas of
concern. Electricity, oil production, employment, and potable water
remain at woeful levels.
The average weekly attacks have grown from 430 in July 2005 to well
over 1,000 today. Iraqi casualties have increased from 63 per day in
October 2005 to over 127 per day.
The latest polls show that 91 percent of Sunni Iraqis and 74
percent of Shia Iraqis want the U.S. forces out of Iraq. In January
2006, 47 percent of Iraqis approved of attacks on U.S.-led forces. When
the same polling question was asked just 8 months later, 61 percent of
Iraqis approved of attacks on U.S-led forces.
The support of the American public continues to erode and there is
little confidence in the current strategy. Today only 30 percent of
Americans support the war and only 11 percent support the President's
plan to increase troop levels in Iraq. A February 2006 poll showed that
72 percent of American troops serving in Iraq believed the United
States should exit Iraq within the year and 42 percent said their
mission was unclear.
Wars cannot be won with slogans. There must be terms for measuring
progress and a clearly defined purpose, if success is ever to be
achieved. General Peter Schoomaker, Chief of the United States Army,
said in a recent hearing that in order for a strategy to be effective
we ``have to be able to measure the purpose.'' Yet the President sets
forth a plan with no defined matrices for measuring success and a plan
that in my estimation is simply more of the same plan that has not
worked. A new strategy that is based on redeployment rather than
further U.S. military engagement, and one that is centered on handing
Iraq back to the Iraqis, is what is needed. I do not believe that Iraq
will make the political progress necessary for its security and
stability until U.S. forces redeploy.
In order to achieve stability in Iraq and the region, I recommend
(1) The redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq;
(2) The execution of a robust diplomatic effort and the
restoration of our international credibility; and
(3) The repairing of our military readiness and the
rebuilding of our Strategic Reserve to face future threats.
Redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq
To achieve stability and security in Iraq, I believe we first must
have a responsible phased redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq. GEN
William Odom (U.S. Army, Retired) recently testified, ``We are pursuing
the wrong war.''
Stability and security in the region should be our overarching
strategy, not a ``victory in Iraq.'' I agree with General Odom and
believe that Regional Stability can only be accomplished through the
redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq.
Who wants us to stay in Iraq? In my opinion, Iran and al-Qaeda,
because we intensify the very radical extremism we claim to be fighting
against, while at the same time depleting our financial and human
resources.
As long as the U.S. military continues to occupy Iraq, there will
be no real security. Maintaining U.S. troop strength in Iraq or adding
to the strength in specified areas, has not proven effective in the
past (it did not work recently in Baghdad) nor do I believe it will
work in the future. The Iraq war cannot be won by the U.S. military,
predominantly because of the way our military operates. They use
overwhelming force, which I advocate to save American lives, but it is
counter to winning the hearts and minds of the people.
How to redeploy
I recommend the phased redeployment of U.S. forces, first from
Saddam's palaces, then from the Green Zone. Next, from the prime real
estate of Iraq's major cities, out of the factories and universities,
and finally out of the country all together. We need to give
communities back to the Iraqis so they can begin to self-govern, begin
economic recovery, and return to some type of normality. I recommend
the adoption of a U.S policy that encourages and rewards reconstruction
and regional investment and one that is dictated and administered, not
by the United States, but by the Iraqis themselves.
Restoration of international credibility
I believe that a responsible redeployment from Iraq is the first
step necessary in restoring our tarnished international credibility.
Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq, our international credibility, even
among allies, has plummeted. Stability in Iraq is important not only to
the United States, but it is important to the region and to the entire
world. In a 2006 world opinion poll, France, Russia, Turkey, Pakistan,
India, and China believed that the United States presence in Iraq was
more of a danger to world peace than Iran, North Korea, or the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. In 2002, public opinion in Great Britain was 75
percent favorable toward the United States; today it is 56 percent
favorable. In France, it was 63 percent favorable in 2002 and is now 39
percent favorable. Germany has gone from 61 percent to 37 percent,
Indonesia 61 percent to 30 percent, and Turkey now has only a 12-
percent favorability rating of the United States.
How to restore our international credibility
In order to restore international credibility, I believe it is
necessary for the United States to completely denounce any aspirations
of building permanent U.S. military bases in Iraq; I believe we should
shut down the Guantanamo detention facility; and we must bulldoze the
Abu Ghraib prison. We must clearly articulate and demonstrate a policy
of ``no torture, no exceptions'' and directly engage countries in the
region with dialog instead of directives. This includes allies as well
as our perceived adversaries.
Repairing of our military readiness and rebuilding our Strategic
Reserve to face future threats
Our annual Defense spending budget is currently in excess of $450
billion. Above this amount, we are spending $8.4 billion a month in the
war in Iraq and yet our Strategic Reserve is in desperate shape. While
we are fighting an asymmetric threat in the short term, we have
weakened our ability to respond to what I believe is a grave long-term
conventional and nuclear threat.
At the beginning of the Iraq war, 80 percent of all Army units and
almost 100 percent of Active combat units were rated at the highest
state of readiness. Today, virtually all of our Active-Duty combat
units at home and all of our Guard units are at the lowest state of
readiness, primarily due to equipment shortages resulting from repeated
and extended deployments to Iraq. In recent testimony given by a high-
ranking Pentagon official it was reported that our country is
threatened because we lack readiness at home.
Our Army has no Strategic Reserve, and while it is true that the
U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force can be used to project power, there is
a limit to what they can achieve. Overall, our military remains capable
of projecting power, but we must also be able to sustain that
projection, and in this regard there is no replacement for boots on the
ground.
How do we repair readiness and rebuild our Strategic Reserve
We must make it a national priority to restrengthen our military
and to repair readiness. I advocate an increase in overall troop
strength. The current authorized level is below what I believe is
needed to maintain an optimal military. In recent testimony to the
Defense Subcommittee that I chair, the Army and Marine Corps commanders
testified that they could not continue to sustain the current
deployment practices without an adverse effect on the health and well-
being of servicemembers and their families.
For decades, the Army operated on a deployment policy, that for
every 1 year of deployment, 2 years were spent at home. This was
considered optimal for retraining, reequipping and reconstituting.
Without relief, the Army will be forced to extend deployments to Iraq
to over 1 year in-country and will be forced to send troops back with
less than 1 year at home. The Army reported that a 9-month deployment
was preferable. Medical experts testified that in intensive combat,
deployments of over 3 months increased the likelihood for
servicemembers to develop post traumatic stress disorders.
We must invest in the health and well-being of our servicemembers
by providing for the right amount of troops and for appropriate
deployment cycles.
Our military equipment inventories are unacceptably low. The
Services report that at least $100 billion more is needed to get them
back to ready state. In doing so, we must not neglect investment in
military technologies of the future. While we remain bogged down in
Iraq, the size and sophistication of other militaries are growing. We
must not lose our capability to deter future threats.
Let me conclude by saying historically, whether it was India,
Algeria, or Afghanistan, foreign occupations do not work, and, in fact,
incite civil unrest. Our military remains the greatest military in the
world, but there are limits to its ability to control a population that
considers them occupiers.
I have said this before and I continue to say that there are
essentially only two plans. One is to continue an occupation that has
not worked and that has shown no progress toward stabilization. The
other, which I advocate, is to end the occupation of Iraq, redeploy our
military, and turn Iraq over to the Iraqis.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I say to the Speaker, there's about 9 minutes left in this
vote; because I think it's important we all hear you, I'd like
to suggest, Mr. Chairman, we recess to go vote, and get back
here as quickly as we can to hear the Speaker.
We'll recess until the call of the Chair.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. Hearing will come to order.
Mr. Speaker, thank you for your number, as well as for your
time. I have never been in your presence when I haven't learned
something, and so, I'm anxious to hear what you have to say,
for real. Welcome. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. NEWT GINGRICH, FORMER SPEAKER OF THE U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES; SENIOR FELLOW, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE
INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Gingrich. Thank you very much.
And I just want to start by both commending you and
reminding you that almost ruined my career, I think, the last
time I was before this committee, by recommending I become the
Ambassador to the United Nations. So, I'm hoping there's
nothing----
The Chairman. It was a good idea----
Mr. Gingrich [continuing]. Nothing I say----
The Chairman [continuing]. And it's still a good idea.
Mr. Gingrich [continuing]. Today will reinforce those kind
of thoughts.
But I want commend you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Lugar, for
going through these kind of hearings. And I want to build on a
comment you made earlier, which is that in the larger war--
getting beyond Iraq for a moment--in the larger threat that
faces us, from North Korea to Iran and Syrian to Venezuela,
having the kind of effort to reach out and develop a bipartisan
national strategy, in the way that Democratic President Truman
and Republican Senator Vandenberg laid the base for a 44-year
containment strategy, I think, is probably the most important
national security challenge this country faces, and these
hearings, which I am well aware of, at times, contentious, are
a part of that dialog and a part of that process. And I really
want to thank both of you for your joint leadership in working
together in trying to move this entire process forward.
I also want to say that, while I disagree with Chairman
Murtha on some things, which I'll get to, I could not agree
with him more strongly on the need to develop and strengthen a
larger military, and particularly a larger Army and Marine
Corps. And there, I think those who have advocated a larger
system have proven to be entirely right, and those who are
trying to defend getting along with an inadequate system have
been proven, I think, decisively wrong. And I commend the
chairman for that.
The real danger we face, if I can frame my comments, writ
large, and come down to Iraq, is that we live in a world in
which the combination of nuclear and biological weapons,
combined with a set of dictators who hate the concept of
freedom because it threatens their dictatorships, and a
religiously motivated movement that is irreconcilable with the
modern world, creates a danger that Americans have not yet come
to grips with. I believe it is entirely possible that, in our
lifetime, we will lose three or more cities to nuclear weapons,
and I believe that my two grandchildren, who are 5 and 7, are
in greater danger of being killed by enemy activity than I was
at any time when I was--throughout the cold war.
I first wrote on the danger of terrorists and nuclear
weapons in 1984, in a book called ``Window of Opportunity.'' I
participated, working with President Clinton, on the Hart-
Rudman Commission, which, in March 2001, warned that the
greatest danger to the United States is a weapon of mass
destruction going off in an American city, probably by
terrorists. And I think we have to start with the following
observation.
We find ourselves in a world in which there are determined
deadly enemies. Iraq is a campaign in that larger contest. It's
more like Sicily as a part of the Second World War, rather than
an isolated war on its own.
Let me say, bluntly, that Iraq is currently a mess. This is
not something from me that is new. In December 2003, I publicly
said we had gone off a cliff during the summer of 2003, and,
both in a long Newsweek interview and in an appearance on Meet
the Press, I was very explicit about how much I thought we were
on the wrong track.
Where we find ourselves is very hard. And I think there are
largely three paths, two of them at this table, and the third
in the White House.
The first path, the White House path, is to stay the
course, with marginal change. I believe, frankly, that that
will fail. And I'll come back to that.
The second is to accept that we have not succeeded, to try
to manage the defeat, and to try to think through how you would
reassure our allies, deal with people who might be--have their
lives threatened, and try to restabilize the system after the
world comes to recognize that we have, in fact, been defeated.
The third is to determine that we will take whatever
changes are necessary to defeat our enemies.
Let me start by saying that I think the present course is
inadequate, and is based on an inherently confused argument. As
I cite in my--and I ask permission to submit for the record my
much longer testimony.
The Chairman. If the Speaker will yield, I failed to
mention, both your written statements will be placed in the
record as if delivered. Congressman Murtha has submitted--and
I'll make them available to all Senators--a chronology of
statements and comments made on this issue, which will also be
put in.
[Editor's note.--The submitted material mentioned above was too
voluminous to include in the printed hearing. It will be
retained in the permanent record of the committee.]
Mr. Gingrich. In that context, in the written statement, I
have a much longer section, I'm not going to use in detail, of
just quoting--quote after quote in which President Bush says
that Iraq is a matter of vital national security of the United
States, and then ends up by saying, ``And we're going to do as
well as the Iraqi Government lets us do.'' Now, they can't both
be true. If Iraq is genuinely a matter of vital national
interest, then, as Americans, we have an obligation to do what
it takes to win. If Iraq is so unimportant that it's up to a
new, relatively incompetent and untested Iraqi Government, then
why are we risking a single young American? They can't both be
true. We did not say, in the Second World War, that as soon as
the Free French liberated Normandy, we would be glad to land.
And this is the core problem the administration faces, that it
has a harder problem than it wants to confront, and, therefore,
it doesn't undertake the scale of change it needs.
Now, Chairman Murtha outlines a legitimate strategy that
has, I think he would agree, some hard consequences and would
take enormous management, but it's--it is, nonetheless, a
legitimate reaction to where we are.
I'm going to outline a different strategy, but I want to be
clear, up front, it's equally hard. I think there are no easy
solutions in Iraq.
Essentially, what I want to suggest is that we can insist
on defeating the enemies of America and the enemies of the
Iraqi people, and we can develop the strategies and the
implementation mechanisms necessary to force victory, despite
the incompetence of the Iraqi Government, the unreliability of
Iraqi leaders, and the interference of Syria and Iran on behalf
of our enemies. But it will be difficult. I would commend to
all of the Members of the Senate, General Petraeus's comments
this morning in front of the Armed Services Committee, which I
think are candid and which indicate this is a hard road, and
which also indicate that most of what we have to get done is
not combat military kinetic power. And I want to emphasize
that. So, I want to very briefly, without going into great
detail--and I'll be available for questions, obviously--outline
18 steps. And they're basically a sentence each.
One, place General Petraeus in charge of the Iraq campaign
and establish that the Ambassador is operating in support of
the military commander. That's how Eisenhower ran the Second
World War in Europe; that is how Wellington ran the campaign in
Portugal. You cannot have two people trying to collaborate in a
setting like this.
Two, since General Petraeus would now be responsible for
victory in Iraq, all elements of achieving victory are within
his purview, and he should report daily to the White House on
anything significant which is not working or is needed.
Three, create a Deputy Chief of Staff to the President and
appoint a retired four-star general or admiral to manage Iraq
implementation for the Commander in Chief on a daily basis.
Four, establish that the second briefing after the daily
intelligence brief that the President gets every day is from
his Deputy Chief of Staff for Iraq Implementation.
Five, establish a War Cabinet, which will meet once a week
to review metrics of implementation and resolve failures and
enforce decisions. The President should chair the War Cabinet
personally, and his Deputy Chief of Staff for Iraq
Implementation should prepare the agenda for the weekly review
and meetings.
Six, establish three plans, one for achieving victory with
the help of the Iraqi Government, one for achieving victory
with the passive acquiescence of the Iraqi Government, one for
achieving victory even if the current Iraqi Government is
unhappy. The third plan may involve very significant shifts in
troops and resources away from Baghdad and a process of
allowing the Iraqi central government to fend for itself if it
refuses to cooperate.
Seven, communicate clearly to Syria and Iran that the
United States is determined to win in Iraq and that any further
interference, such as the recent reports of sophisticated
Iranian explosives being sent to Iraq to kill Americans, will
lead to direct and aggressive countermeasures.
Eight, pour as many intelligence assets into the fight as
needed to develop an overwhelming advantage in intelligence
preparation of the battlefield.
Nine, develop a commander's capacity to spend money on
local activities sufficient to enable every local American
commander to have substantial leverage in dealing with local
communities.
Ten, establish a job corps or civil conservation corps of
sufficient scale to bring unemployment for males under 30 below
10 percent. And I have attached an op-ed that Mayor Giuliani
and I wrote on this topic.
Eleven, expand dramatically the integration of American
purchasing power in buying from Iraqi firms, pioneered by
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Paul Brinkley, to maximize the
rate of recovery of the Iraqi economy.
Twelve, as--and here, I think I'm totally in agreement with
Chairman Murtha--expand the American Army and Marine Corps as
much as needed to sustain the fights in Iraq and Afghanistan,
while also being prepared for other contingencies and
maintaining a sustainable rhythm for the families and the
force.
Thirteen, demand a war budget for recapitalization of the
military to continue modernization while defeating our enemies.
And, here again, I want to associate myself with Chairman
Murtha. They should quit trying to fund this war with
supplementals, be honest up front about the total budget, fight
over the total budget, and have a rational track of spending. I
would point out that, as big as the dollars sound, the current
national security budget is lower, as a percentage of the
economy, than at any time from Pearl Harbor through the end of
the cold war. It is less than half the level Truman sustained
before the Korean war.
Fourteen, the State Department is too small, too
undercapitalized, and too untrained for the demands of the 21st
century. There should be a 50-percent increase in the State
Department budget and a profound rethinking of the culture and
systems of the State Department so it can be an operationally
effective system.
Fifteen, the Agency for International Development is
hopelessly unsuited to the new requirements of economic
assistance and development and should be rethought from the
ground up. The Marshall Plan, and Point Four, were as important
as NATO in containing the Soviet empire. We do not have that
capability today.
Sixteen, the President should issue executive orders, where
possible, to reform the implementation system so it works with
the speed and effectiveness required by the 21st century.
Seventeen, where legislation is needed, the President
should collaborate with Congress--and let me reemphasize those
words, because I think the chairman will find them interesting
words--the President should collaborate with Congress in
honestly reviewing the systems that are failing and developing
new merits--new metrics, new structures, and new strategies.
Eighteen, under our Constitution, it is impossible to have
this scale of rethinking and reform without deep support from
the legislative branch. Without Republican Senator Arthur
Vandenberg, Democratic President Harry Truman could never have
developed the containment policies that saved freedom and
ultimately defeated the Soviet empire. The President should ask
the bipartisan leaders of Congress to cooperate in establishing
a joint legislative/executive working group on winning the war,
and should openly brief the legislative branch on the problems
which are weakening the American system abroad. Only by
educating and informing the Congress can we achieve the level
of mutual effort and mutual support that will be needed for a
generation if we are to save this country from the threats that
exist.
And I appreciate very much the chance to offer these ideas.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gingrich follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Newt Gingrich, Former Speaker of the U.S.
House of Representatives; Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute,
Washington, DC
Chairman Biden, Ranking Member Lugar, and members of the committee,
thank you for allowing me to testify.
This is an extraordinarily important series of hearings on a topic
of enormous national importance.
The United States finds itself in a global struggle with the forces
of Islamic fascism and their dictatorial allies.
From a fanatic American near Chicago who attempted to buy hand
grenades to launch a personal jihad in a Christmas mall, to 18
Canadians arrested for terrorist plots, to the Scotland Yard disruption
of a plot in Britain to destroy 10 civilian airliners in one day that
if successful would have shattered worldwide confidence in commercial
aviation and potentially thrown the world into a deep economic
contraction.
We are confronted again and again with a worldwide effort to
undermine and defeat the system of law and order which has created more
prosperity and more freedom for more people than any previous system.
The threats seem to come in four different forms:
First, from individuals who are often self-recruited and randomly
inspired through the Internet, television, and charismatic social and
religious friendships.
Second, from organized nonstate systems of terror of which al-
Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Hamas are the most famous. Additional groups have
sprung up and provide continuity, training, and support for terrorism.
Third, from dictatorships in the Middle East, most notably Iran and
Syria who have been consistently singled out by the State Department
(including in 2006), as the largest funders of state-supported
terrorism in the world. These dictatorships are investing in more
advanced conventional weapons and in chemical and nuclear weapons.
Fourth, from a strange assortment of anti-American dictatorships
including North Korea, Venezuela, and Cuba.
This coalition of the enemies of freedom has growing power around
the world. Its leaders are increasingly bold in their explicit
hostility to the United States.
To take just two recent examples: Ahmadinejad of Iran has said
``[t]o those who doubt, to those who ask is it possible, or those who
do not believe, I say accomplishment of a world without America and
Israel is both possible and feasible.'' He has also said that Israel
should be ``wiped off the map.'' Chavez of Venezuela, just last week in
a joint appearance with the Iranian leader in Latin America, announced
a multibillion-dollar fund to help countries willing to fight to end
``American imperialism.''
Both of these statements were on television and are not subject to
misinterpretation.
Similarly, there are many Web pages and other public statements in
which various terrorists have described in great detail their
commitment to killing millions of Americans. I described these publicly
delivered threats in a speech on the fifth anniversary of 9/11 which I
gave at the American Enterprise Institute. The text of this speech is
attached to this testimony.
[Editor's note.--The attached speech mentioned above was too voluminous
to include in the printed hearing. It will be retained in the permanent
record of the committee.]
These threats might be ignored if it were not for the consistent
efforts to acquire nuclear and biological weapons by these enemies of
freedom.
I first wrote about the extraordinary increase in the threat to our
civilization from nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists in
``Window of Opportunity'' in 1984. Attached to this testimony is a copy
of the relevant pages from this book.
It is not accurate to suggest today that people were not aware of
terrorism or were not warning about the threat to America's very
survival prior to 9/11.
Many sophisticated observers and professional military and
intelligence officers have been issuing these warnings for two decades.
What has been amazing to watch has been the absolute inability of
our system of government to analyze the problem and react effectively.
It is this collapse of capacity for effectiveness which is at the
heart of our current dilemma.
The United States is now in a decaying mess in Afghanistan and an
obviously unacceptable mess in Iraq.
While this language may seem harsh to defenders of the current
policy, it is sadly an accurate statement of where we are.
Efforts to think through and solve the problems of Afghanistan and
Iraq have to be undertaken in a context of looking at a wider range of
challenges to American leadership around the world and potentially to
our very survival as a country. These larger challenges are described
in my attached presentation entitled ``The Real World and The Real
War.''
[Editor's note.--The attached presentation mentioned above was too
voluminous to include in the printed hearing. It will be retained in
the permanent record of the committee.]
With these caveats I want to focus on the challenge of Iraq.
two very hard paths forward in iraq
America is faced with two very hard paths forward in Iraq.
We can accept defeat and try to rebuild our position in the region
while accommodating the painful possibility that these enemies of
freedom in Iraq--evil men, vicious murderers, and sadistic inflictors
of atrocities will have defeated both the millions of Iraqis who voted
for legal self-government and the American people and their government.
Alternatively, we can insist on defeating the enemies of America
and the enemies of the Iraqi people and can develop the strategies and
the implementation mechanisms necessary to force victory despite the
incompetence of the Iraqi Government, the unreliability of Iraqi
leaders, and the interference of Syria and Iran on behalf of our
enemies.
Both these paths are hard. Both involve great risk. Both have
unknowable difficulties and will produce surprise events.
Both will be complicated.
Yet either is preferable to continuing to accept an ineffective
American implementation system while relying on the hope that the Iraqi
system can be made to work in the next 6 months.
the inherent confusion in the current strategy
There are three fundamental weaknesses in the current strategy.
First, the strategy relies on the Iraqis somehow magically
improving their performance in a very short time period. Yet the
argument for staying in Iraq is that it is a vital American interest.
If we are seeking victory in Iraq because it is vital to America then
we need a strategy which will win even if our Iraqi allies are
inadequate. We did not rely on the Free French to defeat Nazi Germany.
We did not rely on the South Koreans to stop North Korea and China
during the Korean war. When it mattered to American vital interests we
accepted all the help we could get but we made sure we had enough
strength to win on our own if need be.
President Bush has asserted that Iraq is a vital American interest.
In January 2007 alone he has said the following things:
``But if we do not succeed in Iraq, we will leave behind a
Middle East which will endanger America in the future.''
``[F]ailure in one part of the world could lead to disaster
here at home. It's important for our citizens to understand
that as tempting as it might be, to understand the consequences
of leaving before the job is done, radical Islamic extremists
would grow in strength. They would be emboldened. It would make
it easier to recruit for their cause. They would be in a
position to do that which they have said they want to do, which
is to topple moderate governments, to spread their radical
vision across an important region of the world.''
``If we were to leave before the job is done, if we were to
fail in Iraq, Iran would be emboldened in its pursuit of
nuclear weapons. Our enemies would have safe havens from which
to launch attacks. People would look back at this moment in
history and say, what happened to them in America? How come
they couldn't see the threats to a future generation?''
``The consequences of failure are clear: Radical Islamic
extremists would grow in strength and gain new recruits. They
would be in a better position to topple moderate governments,
create chaos in the region, and use oil revenues to fund their
ambitions. Iran would be emboldened in its pursuit of nuclear
weapons. Our enemies would have a safe haven from which to plan
and launch attacks on the American people. On September 11,
2001, we saw what a refuge for extremists on the other side of
the world could bring to the streets of our own cities. For the
safety of our people, America must succeed in Iraq.''
``Iraq is a central component of defeating the extremists who
want to establish safe haven in the Middle East, extremists who
would use their safe haven from which to attack the United
States, extremists and radicals who have stated that they want
to topple moderate governments in order to be able to achieve
assets necessary to effect their dream of spreading their
totalitarian ideology as far and wide as possible.''
``This is really the calling of our time, that is, to defeat
these extremists and radicals, and Iraq is a component part--an
important part--of laying the foundation for peace.''
The inherent contradiction in the administration strategy is
simple. If Iraq matters as much as the President says it does (and here
I agree with the President on the supreme importance of victory) then
the United States must not design and rely on a strategy which relies
on the Iraqis to win.
On the other hand if the war is so unimportant that the fate of
Iraq can be allowed to rest with the efforts of a new, weak, untested,
and inexperienced government then why are we risking American lives.
Both propositions cannot be true.
I accept the President's analysis of the importance of winning in
Iraq and, therefore, I am compelled to propose that his recently
announced strategy is inadequate.
The second weakness is that the current strategy debate once again
focuses too much on the military and too little on everything that has
not been working. The one instrument that has been reasonably competent
is the combat element of American military power. That is a very narrow
definition and should not be expanded to include the noncombat elements
of the Department of Defense which also have a lot of difficulties in
performing adequately.
The great failures in the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns have been
in noncombat power. Intelligence, diplomacy, economic aid, information
operations, support from the civilian elements of national power. These
have been the great centers of failure in America's recent conflicts.
They are a major reason we have done so badly in Iraq.
The gap between the President's recent proposals and the required
rethinking and transforming of our noncombat instruments of power is
simply breathtaking.
No military leader I have talked with believes military force is
adequate to win in Iraq. Every one of them insists that the civilian
instruments of power are more important than the combat elements. They
all assert that they can hold the line for a while with force but that
holding the line will ultimately fail if we are not using that time to
achieve progress in nonmilitary areas.
This failure of the noncombat bureaucracies cannot be solved in
Iraq. The heart of the problem is in Washington and that brings us to
the third weakness in the current strategy.
The third weakness in the current strategy is its inability to
impose war-time decisionmaking and accountability in Washington.
The interagency process is hopelessly broken.
This is not a new phenomenon. I first wrote about it in 1984 in
``Window of Opportunity'' when I asserted:
[W]e must decide what sort of executive-branch planning and
implementation system are desirable.
At a minimum, we will need closer relationships between the
intelligence agencies, the diplomatic agencies, the economic
agencies, the military agencies, the news media, and the
political structure. There has to be a synergism in which our
assessment of what is happening relates to our policies as they
are developed and implemented. Both analyses and implementation
must be related to the new media and political system because
all basic policies must have public support if they are to
succeed.
Finally, once the professionals have mastered their
professions and have begun to work in systems that are
effective and coordinated, those professionals must teach both
the news media and the elected politicians. No free society can
for long accept the level of ignorance about war, history, and
the nature of power which has become the norm for our news
media and our elected politicians. An ignorant society is on
its way to becoming an extinct society.
In 1991 my concern for replacing the broken interagency system with
an integrated system of effective coordination was heightened when GEN
Max Thurmond who had planned and led the liberation of Panama told me,
unequivocally, that the interagency process was broken.
In 1995 that process was reinforced when General Hartzog described
the failures of the interagency in trying to deal with Haiti.
As early as 2002 it was clear that the interagency had broken down
in Afghanistan and I gave a very strong speech in May 2003 at the
American Enterprise Institute criticizing the process.
By the summer of 2003 it was clear the interagency was failing in
Iraq and by September and October 2003 we were getting consistent
reports from the field of the gap between the capability of the combat
forces and the failure of the civilian systems.
No senior officer in the Defense Department doubts that the current
interagency cannot work at the speed of modern war. They will not
engage in a fight with the National Security Council or the State
Department or the various civilian agencies which fail to do their job.
But in private they will assert over and over again that the
interagency system is hopelessly broken.
It was very disappointing to have the President focus so much on
21,500 more military personnel and so little on the reforms needed in
all the other elements of the executive branch.
The proposals for winning in Iraq, outlined below, follow from this
analysis.
key steps to victory in iraq
1. Place General Petraeus in charge of the Iraq campaign and
establish that the Ambassador is operating in support of the military
commander.
2. Since General Petraeus will now have responsibility for victory
in Iraq all elements of achieving victory are within his purview and he
should report daily to the White House on anything significant which is
not working or is needed
3. Create a Deputy Chief of Staff to the President and appoint a
retired four star general or admiral to manage Iraq implementation for
the Commander in Chief on a daily basis.
4. Establish that the second briefing (after the daily intelligence
brief) the President will get every day is from his Deputy Chief of
Staff for Iraq implementation.
5. Establish a War Cabinet which will meet once a week to review
metrics of implementation and resolve failures and enforce decisions.
The President should chair the War Cabinet personally and his Deputy
Chief of Staff for Iraq implementation should prepare the agenda for
the weekly review and meeting.
6. Establish three plans: One for achieving victory with the help
of the Iraqi Government, one for achieving victory with the passive
acquiescence of the Iraqi Government, one for achieving victory even if
the current Iraqi Government is unhappy. The third plan may involve
very significant shifts in troops and resources away from Baghdad and a
process of allowing the Iraqi central government to fend for itself if
it refuses to cooperate.
7. Communicate clearly to Syria and Iran that the United States is
determined to win in Iraq and that any further interference (such as
the recent reports of sophisticated Iranian explosives being sent to
Iraq to target Americans) will lead to direct and aggressive
countermeasures.
8. Pour as many intelligence assets into the fight as needed to
develop an overwhelming advantage in intelligence preparation of the
battlefield.
9. Develop a commander's capacity to spend money on local
activities sufficient to enable every local American commander to have
substantial leverage in dealing with local communities.
10. Establish a jobs corps or civil conservation corps of
sufficient scale to bring unemployment for males under 30 below 10
percent (see the attached op-ed by Mayor Giuliani and myself on this
topic).
11. Expand dramatically the integration of American purchasing
power in buying from Iraqi firms pioneered by Assistant Secretary Paul
Brinkley to maximize the rate of recovery of the Iraqi economy.
12. Expand the American Army and Marine Corps as much as needed to
sustain the fights in Iraq and Afghanistan while also being prepared
for other contingencies and maintaining a sustainable rhythm for the
families and the force.
13. Demand a war budget for recapitalization of the military to
continue modernization while defeating our enemies. The current
national security budget is lower as a percentage of the economy than
at any time from Pearl Harbor through the end of the cold war. It is
less than half the level Truman sustained before the Korean war.
14. The State Department is too small, too undercapitalized, and
too untrained for the demands of the 21st century. There should be a
50-percent increase in the State Department budget and a profound
rethinking of the culture and systems of the State Department so it can
be an operationally effective system.
15. The Agency for International Development is hopelessly unsuited
to the new requirements of economic assistance and development and
should be rethought from the ground up. The Marshall Plan and Point
Four were as important as NATO in containing the Soviet empire. We do
not have that capability today.
16. The President should issue executive orders where possible to
reform the implementation system so it works with the speed and
effectiveness required by the 21st century.
17. Where legislation is needed the President should collaborate
with Congress in honestly reviewing the systems that are failing and
developing new metrics, new structures, and new strategies.
18. Under our Constitution it is impossible to have this scale of
rethinking and reform without deep support from the legislative branch.
Without Republican Senator Arthur Vandenburg, Democratic President
Harry Truman could never have developed the containment policies that
saved freedom and ultimately defeated the Soviet empire. The President
should ask the bipartisan leaders of Congress to cooperate in
establishing a joint legislative-executive working group on winning the
war and should openly brief the legislative branch on the problems
which are weakening the American system abroad. Only by educating and
informing the Congress can we achieve the level of mutual understanding
and mutual commitment that this long hard task will require.
Thank you for this opportunity to share these proposals.
______
[From the Wall Street Journal, Jan. 12, 2007]
Getting Iraq to Work
(By Newt Gingrich and Rudy Giuliani)
The American mission in Iraq must succeed. Our goal--promoting a
stable, accountable democracy in the heart of the Middle East--cannot
be achieved by purely military means.
Iraqis need to establish a civil society. Without the support of
mediating civic and social associations--the informal ties that bind us
together--no government can long remain stable and no cohesive nation
can be maintained. To establish a civil society, Iraqis must rebuild
their basic infrastructure. Iraqis must take control of their destiny
by rebuilding houses, stores, schools, roads, highways, mosques and
churches.
But the constant threat of violence, combined with a high
unemployment rate estimated between 30 percent and 50 percent,
fundamentally undermines that effort. This not only sustains the
fertile breeding ground for terrorist recruiters but has the same
corrosive effect as it would in any city--raising the likelihood of
further violence, civic decay, and a crippling sense of powerlessness.
A massive effort must be made to engage in a well-organized plan to
rebuild Iraq. The goal: An infrastructure to support and encourage a
strong, stable, civil society.
The week before Christmas, the Pentagon asked Congress to approve a
supplemental $100 billion for military operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, on top of the estimated $500 billion spent to date. The
administration should direct a small percent of that amount to create
an Iraqi Citizen Job Corps, along the lines of FDR's civilian
conservation corps during the Great Depression. The Job Corps can
operate under the supervision of our military and with its protection.
The Army Corps of Engineers might be particularly helpful in directing
this effort. It will place our military in a constructive relationship
with the Iraqis--both literally and figuratively.
Today, Iraq has almost 200 state-owned factories that have been
abandoned by the governing authorities since the outbreak of war in
2003. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Paul A. Brinkley has led a team
to 26 of those facilities, traveling far beyond the Green Zone to idled
plants from Fallujah to Ramadi. Mr. Brinkley believes that under
Department of Defense leadership, at least 10 of these facilities could
be reopened almost immediately, putting more than 10,000 Iraqis to work
within weeks. This should be done without delay--and it is only the
beginning.
The wages that these thousands of gainfully employed workers
receive will be used to purchase goods and services that will employ
other Iraqis. Those goods and services must be produced by still other
Iraqis. These are the first steps in creating the requisite conditions
of a stable functioning economy and the best hope of displacing
retribution and violence with hope and opportunity.
We must try to achieve constructive and compassionate goals through
conservative means--jump-starting civic improvement and the individual
work ethic in Iraq, without creating permanent subsidies. The goal is
to get more Iraqis working, especially young males, who are most
susceptible to the terrorist and warlord recruiters.
There are many lessons from the successful welfare reforms in New
York City that can be readily applied in Iraq. In the early 1990s, New
York City suffered an average of 2,000 murders a year while more than
1.1 million people--one out of every seven New Yorkers--were unemployed
and on welfare. Too many neighborhoods were pervaded by a sense of
hopelessness that came from a combination of high crime, high
unemployment and despair. ``Workfare'' proved an excellent method to
change this destructive decades-long paradigm. It required able-bodied
welfare recipients to work 20 hours a week in exchange for their
benefits. In the process, we reasserted the value of the social
contract, which says that for every right there is a responsibility,
for every benefit an obligation.
As many as 37,000 people participated at a single time, working in
the neighborhoods that most needed their help, cleaning up streets with
the Sanitation Department, removing graffiti from schools and
government buildings, or helping to beautify public spaces in the Parks
Department.
More than 250,000 individuals went through our Workfare Program
between 1994 and 2001, and their effort helped to visibly improve the
quality of life in New York City. Many of them moved on to permanent
employment. This change from welfare to work did as much as the New
York Police Department Compstat Program to keep reducing crime. A
similar model can work in Iraq.
There is an opportunity not only to increase employment by
rebuilding roads, houses, schools, and government buildings, but also
to engage the Iraqi people to participate in laying the foundation for
a civil and prosperous society.
The population of Iraq is roughly 30 million with a prewar median
annual income equivalent to $700. Subsidizing unemployed Iraqis with a
meaningful wage in exchange for meaningful work rebuilding their
society is well within the means of the United States and its allies.
The entire effort will help stabilize and grow the Iraqi economy.
It should be open to all willing Iraqis--Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds--as
a means of helping to create a common culture through shared
participation in work projects to rebuild and take ownership of their
nation.
One word of caution: The program should be overseen by the U.S.
military, not private contractors, to avoid unnecessary delays in
deployment or accusations of cronyism in the bidding process. Our
military will still be devoted to its primary role of hunting down
terrorists and patrolling the streets, but administering a jobs program
would be a direct extension of their effort to secure law and order.
After the program has been started and becomes successful, it can be
transferred to a civilian authority within the Iraqi Government.
The creation of an Iraqi Citizen Job Corps will help expedite the
establishment of a more stable civil society and improve the growing
Iraqi economy through the transforming power of an honest day's work.
______
Window of Opportunity
(excerpts on terrorism and strategic effectiveness)
The fact is that we stand on the brink of a world of violence
almost beyond our imagination.
* * * * * * *
The picture is sobering indeed. Imagine the more extreme elements
in any terrorist movement with weapons of mass destruction. It is a
prospect likely to gray the hair of any reasonable person.
* * * * * * *
Just as the comfortable Russian landowner before Stalin could not
imagine the horrors of collectivization and the comfortable bourgeois
German Jew really could not believe Hitler was serious in his speeches,
so it is hard for us to believe that these kinds of nightmares are
possible. We keep rejecting information about the world around us
because it is too far outside our personal experiences, our historical
experience, and our shared general view of the world.
It is the refusal to think seriously about the violence we see each
night on television and to develop a new explanation for the world we
live in which keeps us at a level of shock and surprise. Watch your own
reactions the next three or four times you see really violent news
reports about a terrorist or a war or the latest atrocity somewhere.
We are going to have to develop an intellectual split-vision which
allows us to accept both the reality of our peaceful neighborhood and
the reality of a horribly dangerous outside world. If we don't develop
a new sophistication to analyze and deal with the dangers from abroad,
we will find those dangers creeping closer and closer to our
neighborhood. If we don't learn to take serious precautions and to be
honest with ourselves about all levels of violence--from individual
terrorist-criminal all the way up to a Soviet-American nuclear war--
then we increase the danger that these events will occur.
* * * * * * *
Yet our problem will not come only from terrorist, illegal
organizations. There are bandit nations willing to operate outside the
tradition of modern international behavior. The three most obvious
current bandit governments are North Korea, Libya, and Iran. The
leaders of all three countries are inner-directed and likely to do what
they personally decide is appropriate. All three leaders have proven
themselves risk-takers willing to subsidize terrorist organizations and
willing to kill innocent people in the pursuit of their goals. The
thought of them having nuclear weapons is daunting indeed.
. . . Furthermore, we must remember that it is only in the West
that we focus military power on military engagements. There is every
reason to believe that Middle Eastern ideologies will strike at the
American heartland rather than at our military power if we threaten
them directly.
* * * * * * *
We have been surprised again and again by other nations because we
refuse to study their habits, their culture, and their history. Five
hundred years before Christ, Sun T'zu stated, ``know the enemy and you
have won half the battle. Know yourself and the battle is yours.'' We
have a passion for knowing about technology, hardware, and management,
but we disdain knowing much about either the capacity of others or
ourselves to endure (e.g. Vietnam) or our opponents' techniques and
approaches.
Only this willful ignorance can explain our underestimation of the
Japanese before Pearl Harbor. Bernard Fall warned us again and again in
the early 1960s who Ho Chi Minh was and how long he would fight, but we
continued to underestimate the North Vietnamese until they defeated us
just as Fall had predicted. We underestimated the Lebanese-Syrian-
Iranian-Soviet terrorist connections which had already used vehicle
bombs and produced numerous young fanatic volunteers willing to die for
their cause, and 241 U.S. Marines died as a result.
Because we reject history as a serious preparation for
understanding and operating in the work at large, we find ourselves
consistently underestimating how difficult, how intractable, how brutal
and violent that world can be. History is powerful precisely because it
carries us outside our peaceful neighborhoods and our calm communities.
At its best, history can open our minds to possibilities which we would
never encounter in our own family or surroundings. The world that has
been can be again.
Americans in general tend to underestimate the savagery of the
world, but Liberals in particular carry the tendency to extremes.
Liberals seem to have an ideological block against accepting the notion
that there really are dangerous people out there who will do evil
things unless they are stopped.
* * * * * * *
If we do not become practical and candid about the nature of the
dilemma we face, we will lose many more men, women, and children to
bombings, and we will begin to experience an erosion of civilization
here at home. We must develop a doctrine which states clearly American
policy toward violence aimed at the destruction of our society. We must
take the steps necessary to prove that no terrorist organization can
kill Americans with impunity.
The long-term struggle against terrorism will be a dark and bloody
one, involving years of vigilant counterterrorism--a level of
surveillance and spying that Liberals will call intolerable--and a
willingness to strike back with substantial force at the originators of
the action rather that the foot soldiers of the terrorist movement.
A free, open society cannot survive by trading violence for
violence. If we kill an Iranian extremist every time Iranians kill an
American soldier, we will lose the struggle. In the end, no free
society can keep pace in enduring pain with a fanatical terrorist
organization. We must develop a doctrine which severely and directly
threatens the leaders of terrorist movements that they refrain from
attacking the United States because they fear personal consequences.
Any other policy is an invitation to a blood bath in which we will
certainly be losers.
The need to develop doctrines and tactics of aggressive
counterterrorism goes against the grain of the American historical
memory as taught in modern schools. By blotting out the wars against
the Indians, the Barbary Pirates, the pacification of the West, and the
campaigns against guerrillas in the Philippines and Central America, it
has been possible for the Wilsonian intellectual tradition to
dominate--a tradition that argues for a sharp and vivid distinction
between war and peace. Liberals dominated by this tradition declare war
on a country or are impotent to challenge it; they have no capacity for
a long and difficult struggle in the twilight zone of low-intensity
conflict.
* * * * * * *
Only when our professionals master their professions can we begin
to design structures that will work. Then we must decide what sort of
executive-branch planning and implementation system are desirable.
At a minimum, we will need closer relationships between the
intelligence agencies, the diplomatic agencies, the economic agencies,
the military agencies, the news media, and the political structure.
There has to be a synergism in which our assessment of what is
happening relates to our policies as they are developed and
implemented. Both analyses and implementation must be related to the
news media and political system because all basic policies must have
public support if they are to succeed.
Finally, once the professionals have mastered their professions and
have begun to work in systems that are effective and coordinated, those
professionals must teach both the news media and the elected
politicians. No free society can for long accept the level of ignorance
about war, history, and the nature of power which has become the norm
for our news media and our elected politicians. An ignorant society is
on its way to becoming an extinct society. It is to be the two great
centers of political behavior, the news media and the politicians, that
we must now turn.
The Chairman. I appreciate very much the breadth and the
depth of your recommendations.
I might note that one of the things I've been quoting--
someone in the press asked me to make sure I was quoting it
correctly. I want to say it again. I have quoted General
Petraeus over the last several months about armies of
occupation when he was first in Iraq. And in July 2004, he
said, ``An army of liberation has a certain half-life before it
becomes an army of occupation.'' And for those who have asked
me that question, that's the answer. And my rhetorical question
is: Has that half-life passed? I think it has. But that's
another question.
I'm going to proceed, Mr. Chairman, on my side, with--and I
will ask questions last--I'm going to yield to my friend from
Pennsylvania, because he sat through the whole morning, and, by
the time it got his time to question, he had to preside over
the Senate. And that will not mean I will usurp my other two
colleagues. I will ask after my other two colleagues on this
side, as well.
So, the floor is yours, Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for that
point of personal privilege, but also for your leadership of
this committee and the great hearings we've had already; and
Senator Lugar, you, as well. And I just want Senator Biden to
know that he's made me look really good in front of the dean of
our delegation to the Congress of the United States.
But first of all, I want to commend both Chairman Murtha
and Speaker Gingrich for your presence here, for your
patriotism, and for your public service over many years. We're
grateful for all of that.
I want to add a few personal comments, even though it's
against my time, I think it's important that I say hello and
welcome in a formal way to Chairman Murtha. I know that Speaker
Gingrich is a native of Harrisburg. He was born there. And
I'm--we're all a little bit Pennsylvania on this committee
today, I guess. But I'm grateful to Congressman Murtha for his
leadership on the issues that surround the important question
of what we do in Iraq, for the leadership he's shown over many,
many years, not just on the battlefield, as a solder, but also,
of course, in the Congress of the United States. And I wanted
to direct my first question to Chairman Murtha.
You talked, at the outset here today, about a couple of
very important points about readiness, specifically on pages 7
and 8 of your testimony. I didn't want to read all of that,
obviously, but I was struck by what you testified to and what
you wrote. You wrote that--this is in the middle of page 7--at
the beginning of the Iraq war, 80 percent of all Army units and
almost 100 percent of Active combat units were rated at the
highest state of readiness. Today, virtually all of our Active-
Duty combat units at home, and all of our Guard units, are at
their lowest state of readiness, primarily due to equipment
shortages resulting from repeated and extended deployments in
Iraq.
If you had a chance to expound on that, because I think
that's critically important, in terms of our ability to
confront threats all over the world. And I just wanted to give
you that opportunity, if you----
Mr. Murtha. I appreciate that, Senator.
I want to say to the committee that there's nothing more
important to our subcommittee than trying to get the readiness
back. If Gingrich were still the Speaker, this wouldn't have
happened, he would not have allowed this to happen, because the
money we're spending in Iraq was diverted from the spending of
the money at home. There's no question, if you go to any unit
in the United States today, in continental United States, Guard
and Reserve, no units are above the lowest state of readiness.
The Active-Duty units I'm talking about, our Strategic Reserve,
is well below any deployment level, partly because of
equipment, but also because of changed standards, also because
the families are disrupted by these continued deployments. But
the biggest thing is the equipment shortages. For instance, I'm
the one that found the shortage of body armor when I went to
Iraq in the first place. We sent insufficient forces with
inadequate equipment to Iraq in the first place. Then, during
the war, we made sure that they had everything they needed in
the war zone, but then, back at home, we started to deplete the
resources of our Strategic Reserve.
The Air Force and Navy aren't so bad, but we only bought
six ships last year, so we are beginning to dissipate our
ability to act in the future, not only to deter a war, but to
project and sustain a war. As serious as the deployment
schedule is, one of the most serious problem we have, is this
depletion of our Strategic Reserve. And we're going to fix that
as quickly as we can. That's one of the things the subcommittee
is working on.
Senator Casey. I think I have two more. One that I'll hold
for last. I'll go to Speaker Gingrich on the second one. I
wanted to ask you two, but I may not have time for two.
I was struck by the list of recommendations you made, and
we could spend a lot of time on each of them, but I wanted to
focus for a moment on diplomacy, No. 14, where you assert the
State Department is too small, too undercapitalized, too
untrained for the demands of the 21st century. I just wanted to
have you expound on that, if you could, because a lot of what
we're trying to grapple with here on this committee, as
everyone across America is, is not just how we get the military
strategy right, but also in terms of the politics and the
diplomacy involved. And I just want to give you a chance to
expound on that.
Mr. Gingrich. Well, I think that--let me tell you a very
simple example. If you go to a senior military command, Central
Command in Tampa, the quality of their videoconference
capabilities, their ability to have secure conferences across
the world, is a stunning ability to improve our communications,
our leadership, our decisionmaking. If you go to the average
embassy, they are operating on 25-year-old capabilities. And
so, you can't have, for example, in a region, a videoconference
capability to get seven ambassadors to talk with each other on
a regular basis, to just share the problems. And just take that
one capital investment as an example.
Second, if you look at the career track of a rising
military person, they have time to go off to school, they have
time, on occasion, to be interns and do fellowships. The
Foreign Service is--and you can imagine, for a right-wing
Republican, how difficult this conversation is--the Foreign
Service is simply too small to have the level of professional
development necessary for the kind of ongoing complexity we
need.
So, just take those two examples. And I must say, by the
way, I think that Secretary Powell did an extraordinary job in
recognizing how badly underfunded the Department was. And I
would have to say that the Republican Congress, when I was
Speaker, was part of that problem, because what happens is, if
you're conservative, you don't like many aspects of the Foreign
Service, although you really wish we were more effective
overseas, and if you're liberal, you, kind of, don't want to
reform the Foreign Service, because you like it. And so, the
result is, they stay permanently underfunded and permanently
too small. And I think Secretary Rice is working in this
direction, but I also think that they need, frankly,
dramatically more resources than she feels comfortable asking
for. And I would strongly urge this committee to look at
comparative investment between DOD and State, and look at the
notion of bringing State up to the quality of information flow,
and also the quality of training, which inherently requires a
larger State Department.
Senator Casey. Thank you.
One last question. I'll make it very brief. We're going to
listen to the President tonight on a whole range of topics,
very important issues. The one part of his--what he calls a
``surge,'' what others call an ``escalation''--the one aspect
of it, I think, that doesn't get enough attention, to some
degree, in the press--but, in terms of your--both of you, in
terms of your understanding of the reality on the ground in
Baghdad, in neighborhoods, from what you've heard of the
President's plan and what you know about it, can you just
describe--and I know we only have less than a--less than half a
minute now--just describe, as best you can, in a few seconds,
what that means for the--for a combat soldier on the ground,
going door to door. What does that mean--the reality of that,
apart from the deployment--what does that mean, kind of, hour
to hour, day to day? What are they going to be doing on those
streets?
Mr. Murtha. Let me tell you, I go to the hospitals almost
every week. I go to Bethesda and Walter Reed. I've been to all
the hospitals--Landstuhl--and the problem is--and we have tried
to disassociate the policy from the guy on the field. We try to
make sure they understand we support them. But they go out in
the most intense situation, where somebody in front of them
gets blown up, somebody behind them gets blown up, and the
mental anguish that they go through is absolutely unbelievable.
IEDs or sniper fire, whatever it might be--this is much more
intense than Vietnam, much harder emotionally. We're going to
have a lot of problems, a lot of money we're going to have to
spend afterward for----
The Chairman. Mr. Chairman, did you say harder than in
Vietnam?
Mr. Murtha. Oh, I believe----
The Chairman. And you were in Vietnam.
Mr. Murtha. Yes. I believe this is much more intense, much
harder, because you just never know--you don't have any idea
who the enemy is. You're walking down the street, and somebody
pops out or you don't even see anybody and they're blown up. In
talking to the troops--and I tell them, ``Look, I was wounded
in Vietnam, but let me tell you something, I believe this is
much worse than Vietnam.''
Senator Casey. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Gingrich. Let me just say, for 1 minute--my dad was a
career infantryman in the U.S. Army in World War II, Korea, and
Vietnam. I agree with Chairman Murtha, that--I think urban
policing and warfare is far and away the most intense thing you
have going. I suspect, if you were to ask a number of the
majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels, they would tell you
that the additional troops will probably be useful, but they
are, by themselves, not an answer. They will tell you that
they're proud of what they're doing, and the reenlist rates
prove they're willing to walk those streets, but they, frankly,
deserve dramatically larger changes in our policy if we're
going to stay, and, if we're not prepared to make the larger
changes, then, frankly, I think we have to look seriously at
what Chairman Murtha is saying, because--and General Petraeus
said this, this morning. The core to the--the key to this is
not simply military power, it's an entire range of things, many
of which have to be driven from the White House if they're
going to be effective.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman, let me begin by making a
comment on Speaker Gingrich's thought that we ought to manage
defeat. Now, I have a problem here, because clearly the idea of
victory and defeat, success and failure, and so forth, bring
forward emotions, and my thought here is to quote a very novel
interpretation of what has occurred that Ed Luttwak gave us
this morning. He said, ``The Iraq war has, indeed, brought into
existence a new Middle East in which Arab Sunnis can no longer
gleefully disregard American interests, because they need help
against the looming threat of Shiite supremacy, while in Iraq,
at the core of the Arab world, the Shias are allied with the
United States. What past imperial statesmen strove to achieve
with much cunning and cynicism the Bush administration has
brought about accidentally, but the result is exactly the
same.'' Now, President Bush might not accept this as victory or
success, but Ed Luttwak says, inadvertently, accidentally,
whatever the case is, there is progress here. And this is what
I want to emphasize, in a way.
I appreciate very much both of you stressing the Truman-
Vandenberg relationship, and the 44 years of strategic
bipartisanship that flowed from their mutual vision of the
security imperatives our nation faced and which enabled
American power to express itself magnificently. This is a
necessary part of our current predicament. And this morning, I
tried to indicate, without breaking confidence, conversations
with the President about this, one involving Senator Warner and
myself, for 50 minutes, talking about some of the things that
you've talked about. I won't characterize the conversation as
victory or defeat, or successful or unsuccessful. I would say
it's ongoing. It has to be ongoing, because everything is very,
very serious for our country, quite apart from our President or
the Congress or the prestige of any of us.
Now, tomorrow we will have a debate about various motions,
and I appreciate the need for members to vent their feelings
about this. Some want to get on record, tweaking the President
and others will defend the President. My own view is that this
is probably not particularly helpful, in that essentially what
needs to happen is something you have suggested. Whether we do
it in twos or fours or as a group, there will have to be a
coming to grips with the predicament, which is, as you've
suggested, the need for a long-term strategy that talks about
our whole Armed Forces and the civilian components of the
government. How many people do we need, men and women under
arms, really, to do the job for America everywhere against the
war on terror or instability or however you wish to
characterize it? What sort of appropriate equipment is going to
be required to fulfill these missions? You've mentioned
specifically what kind of diplomacy is going to be required, an
upgrading of the people on the ground, whether it's the State
Department or Commerce or Interior or whoever else is going to
be required if we are involved, really, in technical issues.
In other words, what I'm talking about is how we provide a
complete situation with our military, our diplomacy, and
comprehensive intelligence. We had testimony this morning that
it's very difficult to succeed in quelling an insurgency, or in
this case in surging into cities--where you are putting forces
on the street to secure neighborhoods--without adequate
intelligence. There is doubt that we do not have adequate
intelligence, and we will need to perfect that a great deal
more.
So, I would simply hope that there would be the potential
for a development that we would recognize over the course of
time, and that we would say, essentially, that, for the moment,
we want to provide presence--a long-term presence in the Middle
East. We want to do this so that economic development might
occur, and provide greater hope for the people. We want to do
this so that democratic development might occur over time,
albeit incrementally. We want finally, at least by having a
presence there, to be able to prevent al-Qaeda from developing
training camps or prevent others who are able to gather in
subversion; and, that we have bases for our forces and improved
intelligence capacities.
Now, if you come at it from that standpoint, then we've had
all sorts of testimony as to where our troops might be
emplaced. Some suggested there were desert locations in Iraq,
in Al Anbar and elsewhere, that are being used and have been
used before. We might establish striking or reaction forces so
if there are difficulties on the border or if there's lack of
confidence of our allies, we can respond and reassure.
Now, I go through all of this, because it's--it appears to
me that we need to have a dialog. For the moment, this evening
in fact, the President may present another program to the
Nation. But some of us do not accept that that's the end of the
affair. The dialog, engagement and consensus-building with the
Congress and with the Nation as a whole on what is to happen in
Iraq and the Middle East must continue.
Now, with all that precis, let me just ask either one of
you: Do you accept the fact that we ought to have a presence in
the Middle East in an attempt to develop relations with all of
these countries in a long-term pattern, and that, essentially,
our basic objective ought to be that, to have a presence, which
is welcomed, or at least supported, because that will be
required for us to fight the war on terrorism in the long term,
as well as to advance Middle Eastern people, who, for the
moment, don't like us, indicate frequently, as they have an
opportunity, that they would prefer not to be dealing with us?
Mr. Murtha. I think the Middle East, Iraq, the whole area
is absolutely essential, not only to the United States, but to
Europe. I think we have to restore our credibility by opening a
dialog with them and getting suggestions from them, absolutely.
I think we need a presence there, I just don't think we
necessarily need a presence in Iraq itself. So, I absolutely
think it's important that we have an influence, because of the
resources they have in the Middle East, and because of our
allies there.
Senator Lugar. But, Jack, would you accept, though, the
thought that, by having a presence in Iraq, we are in a better
position to keep the borders stable, to keep others from
intervening, even if we are not in the middle of Baghdad, in
the nine districts?
Mr. Murtha. No; I think the opposite. I think if we don't
get out, if we stay there, we increase the intensity of the
opposition. I think there's a civil war going on. I know a lot
of people don't define it that way, but I see it, and we're
caught in that civil war. Our troops are caught in that civil
war. I think the Iraqis will get rid of al-Qaeda. There's not
that many al-Qaeda, and they weren't there before we invaded.
So, I'm convinced that, when we leave, the Iraqis themselves
will get rid of al-Qaeda. There'll be instability, but I just
think we're adding to the instability by being in Iraq itself.
So, my phased withdrawal, I think, is the answer to this thing.
Mr. Gingrich. Let me comment briefly. I think you've put
your finger on, maybe, a fundamental challenge. Let me say,
first of all, we do not have adequate intelligence. There is no
reason to believe we're going to have adequate intelligence. We
are no more than 10 percent into the process of reforming
intelligence, and it is a fundamental problem, and should be a
fairly large-scale scandal, how bad our intelligence is, still.
OK? That's an institutional problem, not a Bush administration
problem, and it is a deep American problem.
Second, there's riots underway in Lebanon today. Hezbollah
has been rearmed in south Lebanon. Hamas is being paid for by
Iran. The Taliban elements in northwest Pakistan are stronger
than they were a year ago. This is a really dynamic, dangerous
environment. And I want to make two points about it that I
suspect will be controversial.
The first is, the notion that Iran and Syria are going to
be our allies--and I'm not against talking with them, but I
would talk with them rather bluntly about what they need to do
without us hurting them. We can hurt them in lots of ways that
don't involve ground troops, and in lots of ways that don't
involve bombing. Now, there's a virtue to having the largest
navy in the world, and there are many things you can do to make
life stunningly harder for very weak dictatorships. But this
idea that Iran and Syria, which are consistently listed by the
State Department as the largest supporters of state terrorism
in the world, and an Iranian leader who comes to Venezuela to
announce publicly the creation of a joint Venezuelan-Iranian
fund for the end of the American empire, and who says publicly
he wants to wipe Israel from the face of the Earth and defeat
the Americans, the idea that we're now going to find a way to
have a dialog that will lead them to be nice to us or help us
win in Iraq just strikes me as a fundamental misunderstanding
of the dynamics of the war that we're in. The bigger war, not
just the Iraq war.
Second, historically, there is an enormous danger from the
psychology of defeat. In 1977, I was in the Vice Chief of Staff
of the German Army trying to get them to help me with
something, and that morning they had announced that we were
shifting a brigade to Bremerhaven, and there was a lot of
turmoil in Germany, and I said, ``Oh, they're worried that
we're securing the brigade like Dunkirk.'' He said, ``No, like
Saigon.'' And I think we underestimate what defeat--al-Qaeda
and the world, including the BBC, which is often worse than al-
Qaeda, will define an American-forced withdrawal from Iraq as a
defeat, no matter how you describe it. The last time we were
seen as weak in the Middle East, we had a 444-day hostage
crisis in Iran, the American Embassy in Pakistan burned, and
the American Ambassador in Afghanistan killed. A Marine general
told me recently, ``If we are perceived as having lost our
nerve, there are not enough Marine detachments to evacuate the
number of embassies he suspects will be under siege.''
And finally, if the Chinese conclude we've lost our nerve,
Taiwan is going to suddenly become a dramatically more
dangerous place. What we are talking about here--and the
Congress has every right to debate this, and if the Congress
decides to cut off the funding, the Congress has the legitimate
constitutional right to do so, but what we're talking about
here will be perceived in the world as defeat, and defeat in
the world is a very dangerous commodity if you are the leading
guarantor of the system.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Dodd indicated he's prepared to yield
to Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
Senator Dodd, of course.
These have all been great hearings. This is a particularly
distinguished and unique panel. And I have really enjoyed
listening to you.
Congressman Murtha, you have been tremendous on this issue.
You and I haven't just been on the same page for years, we've
been on the same sentence. Everything you have said about this
has rung true for me, and I thank you for your leadership.
And Speaker Gingrich, you and I don't always agree, but I
am impressed by your candor about the Foreign Service, about
the State Department, the examples you give. This is what I
observe, as well. And perhaps on a bipartisan basis, we can
work together to address some of those issues. So, I have
limited time, so I want to get directly--despite your different
perspectives that you come from, I want to get right to this.
Both of you have been critics of this President's handling
of this war, and you've talked about the strain it's put on our
national security. So, what does Congress need to be doing
right now to ensure that the President does not continue to
pursue a course in Iraq that is putting such a strain on our
national security and that, obviously, has not brought
stability in Iraq?
Congressman Murtha.
Mr. Murtha. What I'm trying to do is to build a case in the
subcommittee for rebuilding our Strategic Reserve. I worry
about defeat in Iraq, but I worry more about the fact that
we're going to get out at some point. It doesn't make any
difference if it's going to be tomorrow or it's going to be the
next day--the way things are going, I see no way that this is
not going to ultimately lead to the United States having to
redeploy. But to restore our Strategic Reserve is absolutely
essential. And then, I think we have to look at how we restore
international credibility, and I listed some of the things I
think are important. I think we need to close the Guantanamo
detention facility. I think we need to bulldoze Abu Ghraib. And
I think we need to stop torture--when I say ``stop torture,''
we need to make sure that the world knows we're not torturing.
Our poll numbers are so low, we can't get anybody to cooperate.
I think there's a diplomatic element to this. And I've said
this from the very start. We have to use diplomacy, and
diplomacy is going to be the key in the end. And how we manage
getting out or redeploying is going to the key to how
successful we'll be in the end.
But events on the ground are going to control what happens.
And, so far, they've gotten worse and worse. Everything I
predicted, unfortunately, has turned out to be true. It hasn't
gotten any better.
So, we need to find out how we can reinvigorate our
Reserves, our Active-Duty Reserves, our Strategic Reserves. So,
it's not an easy problem. It's going to be very expensive. But
when you're spending $8 billion a month--$2 billion just to get
equipment back and forth--we've got to find a way to reduce
that expense.
Senator Feingold. Speaker Gingrich, what should Congress be
doing right now about this?
Mr. Gingrich. Let me say, first of all, as I indicated
earlier, I mean, the Congress does have constitutional
authority, if it wants to exercise it, but that is, (a) not
very likely, and (b) an enormous acceptance of responsibility.
I think General Petraeus has made an offer which is unique
and very important, in that he has indicated a willingness to
brief the Congress directly. I have a hunch that Secretary
Gates is much more open to the kind of genuine dialog I
described in my earlier comments.
And I think that there are two large-scale strategies that
people up here should be exploring. And I tried to define them
earlier. And I don't--I--they're--neither one's easy. One is:
What will it take us to succeed? And here, we disagree on
whether it's even possible, but what would it take? But the
other is: If we are determined--if we decide, for whatever
reason, that we truly cannot succeed, then how do you manage
the consequences? I think sometimes the debate gets to be
bunchball about Iraq--you know, 21,000 troops, more or less,
frankly, in the end, is irrelevant. I mean, it's not going to
decide this. What's going to decide this is either a dramatic
change in the capacity of the American system to be effective
or a decision that we have lost, and, therefore, we'd better--
and we will still be the most powerful nation in the world,
even if we lose. I mean, our ability to rebuild our relations
in the region will be nontrivial, but may involve, frankly,
greater violence, in the long run.
But I think that--it's important for you, up here, to
explore, you know, and to bring in experts and to--and,
frankly, to send delegations to the region to find out from
people who are our allies, ``If X happens, what's your reaction
going to be? If Y happens, what are you going to do?'' And,
again, I mean--and I'm not--I'm talking, here, to some of the
people who have traveled the most in the history of the Senate.
You all know every single one of these people intimately,
personally. Because we've got to be prepared, I think, almost
like an option playing football--we've got to be prepared
either to drive to victory or to manage the cost of defeat and
understand, you know, that this is just the nature of the world
we're caught in.
Senator Feingold. Well, I--Mr. Speaker, I certainly agree
with that, as I've said at a number of these hearings, since we
didn't have a plan when we went into Iraq, we sure as heck
better have a plan for getting out. And that gets me back to
Congressman Murtha, where you said what I believe is, obviously
there is going to be a redeployment at some point, whether it's
sooner or later. And you've studied the approach, and you've
talked with senior military commanders. Can you say a little
bit more, in terms of detail, about how a redeployment would
actually work and how we can be sure that the lives of
Americans will be protected as we redeploy? The--of course, the
statement that's always made is, ``Well, this will endanger the
troops.'' Well, you know, could you talk about that a little
bit?
Mr. Murtha. Yeah.
Senator Feingold. Isn't there a safe way to redeploy the
troops?
Mr. Murtha. Absolutely. And I think the first thing that
I've heard from all the experts--not necessarily just the
military experts--is, ``Get out of Saddam Hussein's palace. Get
out of the Green Zone.'' We have everything you need in the
Green Zone. We have all the amenities. The troops are eating
the best food, they have electricity, they have all the things
that they need. And right around them, people have 5 or 6 hours
of electricity in Baghdad. So, the psychological impact of
getting out is so important. Then you phase it out of the city
itself, and then you phase them out of Iraq.
The military can plan a redeployment, and it won't be any
problem at all. What I worry about more is restructuring our
Strategic Reserve. That's where it's going to take a lot of
money. And the minute the war ends, we're not going to have the
money to do that, and that worries me as much as anything else.
These supplementals, I don't like them. But the minute the
war's over, money for defense will be cut even more. And I can
remember when Cheney was Secretary of Defense, he said it ought
to be 5 percent over GDP. Well, he's the Vice President, and
it's a helluv a lot less than 5 percent. We need more troops to
change the redeployment schedule.
But the big thing is, if you start redeployment, I think
that starts us on the road to reintroducing some dialog,
reintroducing credibility to the United States, and then these
other things that I've mentioned need to be done. I don't think
there's any problem at all with the redeployment.
Senator Feingold. And if you could just elaborate, finally,
as my time expires, on your proposal for what the force
presence should be in the region. Could you be a little more
specific about what you envision there?
Mr. Murtha. I think it's very difficult to know what it
ought to be in the region. I think it could be much less. I
think a division, at the most, in the periphery, whether it's
Kurdistan or whether it's Bahrain or Qatar, wherever it is--or
over the horizon. And I don't advocate going back in, unless it
affects our national interests or the interests of our allies.
I mean, I don't get involved in the civil war. So, I think we
could reduce our presence substantially and have the forces
necessary to go in if it affects our national security.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Senator Dodd, again.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Let me say, to the chairman and to the witnesses, it's
possible, in the next 10 minutes, I may have to leave and
hopefully come back, but, if I do not, Senator Dodd is able to
stay. He will ask his questions, but Senator Boxer has
graciously indicated she would stay and chair this, if that
becomes necessary. So, if you see me get up, gentlemen, it's
not out of a lack of respect. I just want you to know why.
Senator Coleman.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I have great respect for you, though we
probably disagree on a number of things. And Speaker Gingrich,
I find myself consistently being on the same page as you. I
appreciate the broad view that you take on this issue, and your
mayor-like approach--from my perspective as a mayor--to getting
things done.
Chairman Murtha, where I agree with you is on the
rebuilding of the Strategic Reserve of our Armed Forces. I
think there is broad bipartisan support for that. What I'm
struggling with is the consequences of failure in Iraq. I'm one
of those who is concerned about whether 20,000 extra American
troops in Baghdad is going to make a difference in the midst of
sectarian battle. On the other hand, when I visited with
General Zilmer in Anbar, I saw that our Marines are doing what
Marines do well there--they are killing the enemy, and they're
making progress on stifling the insurgency there. If the
General needs more support in Anbar, I'm not going to stand in
the way of that. And I have consistently heard, in the
discussions we've had here, praise for General Petraeus. I
don't know if there's a finer military leader than him. But we
still face major challenges in our military campaign in Iraq.
I just want to be clear--as I understand, Mr. Chairman,
when you talk about redeployment, you are talking about an
American troop withdrawal. You want us out of Iraq. Is there a
timeframe for that withdrawal for you?
Mr. Murtha. I've never set a timetable. I said, obviously
they could do it within 6 months if the military decides it's
going to do it. But that's purely an arbitrary figure that I
said. I'm just saying that I don't think there's anything that
can stop the momentum in the direction it's going now. I think,
at some point, we're going to have to get out, and I think the
lack of support of the American public--and I don't think the
21,000 troops are going to make any difference, because an
increase in Baghdad for 5 months made no difference; everything
got worse.
What we measure it by is what we--the committee asked--
electricity production, which is below prewar level, oil
production, water, all those kind of things, we measure. And,
of course, unemployment is 30 to 60 percent. So, I see no way,
the direction it's going now, that we can recover from this.
So, I say we're going to have to get out, but we have to do it
in a way that protects our troops the most, and put them in the
periphery, where, if something happens that affects our
national security, they can go back in.
Senator Coleman. The concern that I have is with your
statement that somehow we restore credibility through a U.S.
withdrawal. The Iraqi Study Group said this, ``A premature
American departure from Iraq would almost certainly produce
greater sectarian violence and further deterioration of
conditions, leading to a number of the adverse consequences
outlined above. The near-term results would be a significant
power vacuum, greater human suffering, regional
destabilization, and a threat to the global economy. Al-Qaeda
would depict our withdrawal as a historic victory. If we leave
and Iraq descends into chaos, the long-term consequences could
eventually require the United States to return.''
I would ask both of you: Do you agree or disagree with that
statement?
Chairman Murtha.
Mr. Murtha. Well, I have a great regard for the Study
Group, and I don't doubt that they may be accurate, but I've
heard so many predictions about how it was going, and none of
them turned out to be true. As the Speaker said, our
intelligence has been abysmal. And so, these predictions have
been abysmal. No matter what the predictions were, they turned
out not to be true.
My predictions, unfortunately, have been accurate in
everything that I've predicted. I'm not happy that that's
happened, but I saw--in talking to the military commanders, in
talking to wounded, I saw there's no way this thing can come to
a happy conclusion for us. So, we have to find a way, I think,
to restore our credibility. Now, how do we restore it? I think
we have to do the things that I listed before to restore part
of our credibility. But I think redeployment is the first step.
We, at first, were liberators, now we're the enemy. And we're
the enemy because of the way we have to operate.
The military cannot win this. This is what I've said over
and over again. The military tactics that we have to use when
we go into--overwhelming force. I advocate that. I want to save
American lives. I want to protect American lives. But you make
enemies when you do that. If you fly a Black Hawk in, and they
use missiles, if you send mortars in, or artillery to protect
Americans, you kill people inadvertently, and we become the
enemy. Even if they kill each other, we get blamed for it. So,
I just don't see any way that we're not going to have to
redeploy, at some point.
Senator Coleman. I don't think there's much disagreement on
that point. Speaker Gingrich talked about Iraq being ``a
mess.'' But the question gets back to the consequences of our
actions in Iraq--and the consequences of withdrawal that the
Study Group laid out are not only from intelligence analysts. A
broad cross-section of military folks, diplomats, and others, I
think, would clearly come to the conclusion Speaker Gingrich
provided when he described the consequences of defeat. I just
want to make sure we understand that the price that has been
laid out here with regards to an immediate withdrawal is pretty
dramatic.
Speaker Gingrich, do you have a perspective on that?
Mr. Gingrich. Yeah; I want to--I mean, first of all, I do
think it's important to emphasize that, no matter how clever we
think we are, if we are driven out of Iraq--and Chairman Murtha
may be right, we may be driven out of Iraq--the world will see
that as a defeat. And so, we need to think through how you
manage, on a world basis, all the different implications of
that.
Second, I think where I disagree--and I apologize, I've--I
had a very hard time figuring out how to say this--I don't
think it's a question of staying or leaving, because staying,
without a--without the drive and the energy and the toughness
to win, is a dead loser in the long run. I mean, presence is
negative. And I agree entirely. I was deeply opposed to an
American occupation. That's why, as early as the fall of 2003,
I spoke out so angrily, because I really believe that that
system was doomed to failure, and did fail. The question is:
Now that we are where we are, is it possible to win? Now, it
may not be possible. Let me be clear. I think the odds are--
they're never 100 percent, because the enemy gets a vote.
I believe, with the 18 specific suggestions I brought
today, on top of what the President wants to do--if the
President were driving the system, if he was genuinely
Commander in Chief, and if he had a Deputy Chief of Staff with
genuine ability to drive the system, we would have at least a
three-out-of-four chance of winning.
But nobody should kid themselves. I mean, General Petraeus,
General Mattis, General Odierno, these are first-rate people
who will do the best they can do. These are people who are very
good at their job. But in the end, if we can't fix our
systems--and I would argue, the American bureaucracies are a
bigger problem than the Iraqi bureaucracy, and the American
inability to deliver economic aid, the American inability to
get things done in a timely way, is a bigger problem, because
you can't manage the Iraqis if you can't manage yourself. And I
just think we're faced with a lot of problems.
I just wanted to say one other thing, Senator. One of the
reasons I--and I think we're a lot like Lincoln, in 1862, when
the Union Army kept getting beaten in the east all the time, or
like Lincoln in August 1864, when he really thought he was
going to lose reelection and was trying to figure out what they
would do to try to save the Union after they lost--after they
lost the election. I mean, history is dynamic, you can't be
sure what's going to happen. But what worries me as much as
anything is if we accept defeat, we will never fix the large
bureaucracies of our own system that are failing--the
intelligence bureaucracy, the State Department bureaucracy, the
noncombat parts of defense, the problems in the interagency,
the problems with all the civilian agencies that refuse to
cooperate. And the next time we get hit, it'll be worse. And I
think that if we don't force ourselves to fix these systems
now, we will someday, down the road, pay a horrendous price for
our growing bureaucratic incompetence.
Senator Coleman. I know my time is up--are we going to have
a second round, Mr. Chairman?
Senator Dodd [presiding]. Well, I won't be here, but I'm
sure you can.
Senator Coleman. There is so much more that I want to
inquire about, but I appreciate your perspective, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Dodd. Thank you, and I'll--thank you both, two of my
favorite people in public life. I agree with one more,
probably, than the other, but always--to listen to Newt
Gingrich and not be provoked and to think is--there's something
wrong with you. I appreciate your passion, Newt, and it's good
to have you. Jack, always good to see you, and thank you for
coming before us.
Sort of related questions, in a way. Chairman Murtha, I
went to the barber in Deep River, CT, the other day, and the
barber's son is going to his fourth tour in Iraq. And I know
that's probably the exception right now, but if you take the
argument that many are putting forth, and implicitly--and Newt
will correct here on this--but the idea the three options here,
the third being that we sort of have to do it whether the
Iraqis like us or not. Do we have the capacity to do that? Even
if the President, tonight, decided that he was going to
massively increase the number of people in this surge, decide
that he really has to do what should have been done, many
argue, at the outset--give us a very specific reality-check, as
to whether or not, even if that were an option we'd want to
exercise, are we capable of exercising that option tonight if
we wanted to?
Mr. Murtha. We're not capable of substantially increasing
the number of troops. But I don't think we can win it
militarily anyway. I think the military tactic we have to use
in an occupied country to protect our military--and I agree
with the tactic we use, but I don't think they work. We just
can't win it militarily. But as far as the facts are, we don't
have a Strategic Reserve. We have none of the units in the
United States that are up to what I would call the top level of
readiness. As a matter of fact, 80 percent are not at the top
level. None of the National Guard units are.
We're extending troops in Iraq, but we're also sending
troops back that have not had a year at home. They like 2 years
at home to rebuild and rehabilitate them. But the next tranche
is going to be less than 1 year, they're going to have 9 months
at home. So, we're stretched so thin--now, if we had to deploy
a substantially larger number of troops, it would be
impossible, because we don't have the equipment to do it, and
we have to build up the equipment. We have a $100 billion
shortage of equipment. So, we could not increase it more than
the surge. I would assume the President probably asked the
question, ``Could I send in 40,000,'' and the military said,
``You cannot.'' And this is going to be a stretch, even to do
it this way. We can't sustain it, even if we were able to
deploy 20,000 troops, we won't be able to sustain that
deployment without using National Guard and Reserve forces who
now, in this country, are below the readiness level to be
deployed.
Senator Dodd. So, as a practical matter, even if they
wanted to do it, they really could not.
Mr. Murtha. They couldn't do it, that's exactly right.
Senator Dodd. Newt, you were on the Defense Policy Board,
going back, with Don Rumsfeld, back earlier, and this
transformational doctrine that he embraced. Share with us your
views, at the time that discussion was going on--were you
supportive of it, not supportive of it? What was your reaction
to that approach that became at least the tactical approach
that the administration took in 2003?
Mr. Gingrich. Well, let me----
Senator Dodd. If you want to comment on----
Mr. Gingrich. Yeah; let me also comment, just for a
second--I--in my 18 recommendations, I don't recommend any
increase in forces, except for intelligence. I don't think
combat forces are the key to this, although I think you can
reorganize them some. And I agree with Chairman Murtha, that
they should be repositioned in certain ways, although I'd
reposition them in the country, not out of it. But I think
there are things you can do to have more effective forces. But
I think most of the major changes we need are, in fact--and
I'll give you a specific example. We currently have tolerated
an Iraqi policy of releasing people we arrest as terrorists and
as insurgents. So, we have a catch-and-release policy--and I've
been told about this by lieutenant colonels and colonels for
the last 2 years--where we pick up the same person seven times.
Well, that's not a number-of-troops problem, that's a policy
problem. And there are a whole series of things like that, that
could be reformed pretty dramatically, I think.
Let me draw a distinction about transformation. And I think
this is a legitimate argument. I was with General Zinni the
other night, reminiscing about plans they had at CENTCOM when
he was there. And I know you've talked with him and have had
testimony from him. I think transformation is real. I think
that there are amazing things we are doing today, you couldn't
have done 5 or 10 years ago. And I think it gives us
capabilities that are pretty remarkable.
It is not a substitute for the right strategy in the right
circumstance. Transformation clearly worked in Afghanistan,
where a much smaller land force was successful than anybody
would have predicted historically. Transformation worked
reasonably well up through capturing Baghdad. I mean, 23 days
is about as good a campaign as you're going to get.
What didn't work was that you had--you had to do one of two
things immediately after you occupied Baghdad. You either had
to hire the Iraqi Army, which is what I favored, and
immediately--because I didn't want an occupation--or you had to
do what Central Command had always planned, which is put about
400,000 people in, so you had physical presence everywhere.
They adopted the worst of both worlds. They had the right size
army to not be an occupation, and then sent in Ambassador
Bremer to be an occupied leader, giving speeches on television.
I mean, if you're going to do that, you'd better be so
overwhelmingly dominant that nobody becomes an insurgent
because it's physically impossible.
So, we literally created a mess that was unnecessary. But
it wasn't because of transformation. It was because, at the key
moment, when people like, by the way, David Petraeus, Jim
Mattis, were doing exactly the right things--Petraeus hired
15,000 Iraqi soldiers, put them on the payroll, had them busy.
Then the Coalition Provisional Authority reversed virtually
everything.
So, I wouldn't put the--I wouldn't get in--personally,
would not associate transformation as part of the problem. The
problem was a fundamental mistake made, I presume, in the end,
by the Commander in Chief. I'm not picking on Paul Bremer. He
reported, ultimately, to the Commander in Chief. It was a
fundamental mistake about the nature of what you do in a
country once you've won the campaign.
Senator Dodd. Thanks for that. And I'll yield in a minute.
I was in Baghdad about a month ago. Senator Kerry and I were
there, in the region. We were in Lebanon and Syria and Jordan
and Israel, as well. I just want to share with both of you and
my colleagues one of the--about 5 o'clock one evening, as our
helicopter came down in the Green Zone, a young man walked up
to both of us and introduced himself. I haven't used his name.
I will now. Brian Freeman was his name. He was a West Point
graduate, a captain. And he pulled us both aside, Brian did,
and said, ``I want to share with you what I'm concerned
about.'' In these days, it was just a discussion of this surge,
nothing had been laid out very specifically--but he warned us
about it, and said, ``This is a very bad idea.'' And he said,
``Look, I'm sending 19-year-olds, and their mission is to go
out on a patrol and be shot at or blown up and come back, not
to hold anything, not to secure anything, not to defend
anything. Their mission is really to become a target.'' And he
said, ``I can't do this much longer. I'm being asked to do
State Department jobs I was never trained to do.'' And he was
just very impressive, about 6,2", 6,3"--he's about as handsome
a kid as you'd ever see.
We lost him on Saturday. I spent last evening talking to
his parents, his wife. He's got a 14-month-old and a 3-year-
old. And losing the Brian Freemans of this world just cannot go
on. This is crazy. And I would hope the President, tonight and
in the coming weeks, would listen to people like John Warner,
listen to people like Norm Coleman, listen to others who--good,
card-carrying strong Republicans who have no interest in seeing
this President fail at all. But he needs to get this message.
This has got to stop. And my hope is, he'll listen to people
like you, Newt, and others.
I don't want to hear about any more Brian Freemans--a
remarkable young man, with a bright, bright future, who had the
guts to come up and talk to two Senators about what he thought
was wrong.
John.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Senator Dodd.
Jack, I--first of all, it's great to see you again. And I
want to apologize, I'm not going to ask you a question, because
I've known Newt Gingrich for 33 years, when we both entered
politics in Georgia in 1974, and this is the first time I've
had control of 8 minutes when he and I were in the same room,
so----
[Laughter.]
Senator Isakson [continuing]. This is a real treat for me,
and I want to be able to do that. But, Jack, it's a privilege
to have you here.
Newt, you--we have heard a lot of testimony in the last 2
weeks regarding what happens if we withdraw, redeploy, et
cetera, but don't escalate our troop force in Baghdad. And to--
and the ones I've heard--and I haven't heard all of them--
almost to the one, they've suspected that the violence has
gotten so bad, the sectarian violence, both inter- and
intrasectarian violence, that there would be an increase in
violence--in Baghdad, in particular--if we did. Do you agree
with that? Or do you have an opinion on that?
Mr. Gingrich. Well, I think it's likely--I mean, you know,
when people talk--and I agree with Chairman Murtha, we can
arrange an American withdrawal in a way which protects our
troops reasonably well. What we can't do--and we did this in
Vietnam; we didn't lose many people, leaving--what we can't do
is protect all the people who help the United States, who are
going to get slaughtered. And you--people just need to think
through the cost of defeat. I mean, it's a legitimate strategy
to say we can't win, and cutting our losses is better than
continuing to get beaten up. But when we make that decision,
we're going to watch a lot of people killed.
I also believe the odds are at least even money that you'll
immediately have the Shia attempt to massacre the Sunnis, who
they outnumber by better than three to one, and you will then
have the Saudis finance the Sunni, who are better organized,
who will then promptly countermassacre the Shia, and you will
have Lebanon times 50, in terms of sheer violence. And I
think--there's a lot to think about in this region. It's a very
hard region. And my only point is, is that--is not that I think
the President did the wrong thing--here, we obviously would
have some arguments--but that the administration has
consistently underestimated how hard this region is and how
difficult it is to get these things done, and that we need to
be dramatically more determined--because I agree entirely with
what Senator Dodd said, I don't think a single young American
should be sacrificed if we're not serious about winning. And,
therefore, my reaction is to say I think we should--we should
be very serious about doing everything it takes to fix our own
systems so these young men and women have a reasonable chance
to actually accomplish the mission.
Senator Isakson. I don't want to put words in your mouth,
but you correct me if I'm wrong. What I have heard you say is
that the President's recommendation is incomplete, in terms of
dealing with the situation in Iraq, and, in the absence of
substantially all, if not all, of the 18 recommendations, then
it is problematic that it will be successful. Is that a fair
statement?
Mr. Gingrich. Yes. I had somebody I trust a great deal who,
like Chairman Murtha, has had long, sad experience of being
correct in their negative predictions, who said to me the other
day that he thought, in its current form, that we had about one
chance in six of succeeding, and that, as I walked him through
these 18 recommendations, he thought it got you up to about
three out of four. You never get much above that in this kind
of a conflict, because the other side gets to vote, too. I
mean, you can, in a Second World War kind of environment, where
you just drown the other side and crush them, but we're not
prepared to do that. But I do not think the President--I think
the President's intentions are correct, and I would rather take
the gamble of trying to win than take the gamble of trying to
manage defeat. But I would hope that those members of the House
and Senate who believe we should be successful in Iraq would
insist that the President take very seriously profound changes
in Washington, because most of the biggest implementation
problems that General Petraeus is going to face are going to be
Washington problems, not Baghdad problems.
Senator Isakson. Well, you've led me to where I had hoped
that we would go in this ``managing defeat'' versus
``winning''--and I put ``winning'' in quotation marks--vis-a-
vis the Iran and Syria question. And item seven in your
recommendations was for us to make it clear--I believe; I'm
restating this--would make it clear to Iran and Syria that we
are determined to win, and call on them to behave. And I
think--and, if they don't, it'll lead to direct and aggressive
countermeasures. That was your statement. There have been some
on Capitol Hill in recent weeks that have been suggesting we,
in Congress, get into directing policy or resolutions not to
engage either Iran and Syria on any pretense, no matter whether
there's provocation or not. Is that a faulty mentality for us
to take at this time?
Mr. Gingrich. Well, I'm not opposed to talking with them,
if what we say to them is stunningly clear. But I think when
you have evidence, as was reported last week by Government
officials, that there are Iranian sophisticated explosives
being sent into Iraq for the purpose of killing Americans, and
we don't do anything about it, there's just something
fundamentally wrong.
Senator Isakson. Well, the----
Mr. Gingrich. And we have enormous capacity to make life
extraordinarily difficult for both of these fragile
dictatorships; and, for a variety of reasons, we are
psychologically immobilized. The Syrian dictatorship is a
family-owned monopoly of power on behalf of 15 percent of the
country, the Alawites. The Iranian dictatorship routinely has
to stop people from running for office, because the fact is
there are thousands of candidates they kick off the ballot
because they are moderates who are disgusted with the regime.
And they're already suffering severe economic problems. They
import 40 percent of their gasoline, because they don't have
adequate refinery capability. And the idea that Iran is
powerful and can bluff us, and we are weak and timid and cannot
bluff them, is entirely a figment of Washington's imagination.
Senator Isakson. Well, lastly--and I guess this is a
combination of a comment and a question. Your opening sobering
remarks about the potential dangers to this country, vis-a-vis
terrorism, and, second, your acknowledgment--and I--again, I
think I'm right--that this is a battle in the overall war on
terror, makes it very important that whatever we do--I think
Chairman Lugar is very correct in encouraging diplomacy all the
time, and he is an absolute first-rate gentlemen of that, and
has been in this Congress for years--but we should not, as a
Senate, preclude, by policy, the administration from taking
measures that are appropriate against any country if they're
going to be out to destroy us or to do harm to our citizens. Is
that not a fair statement?
Mr. Gingrich. Well, I think all I--along that line, all I
would leave for the Senators to contemplate is--we told the
North Koreans, this summer, that missile tests were
unacceptable, so they picked the Fourth of July to fire seven
missiles, which we then accepted. We then told the North
Koreans that a nuclear test was unacceptable, so they set off a
nuclear weapon. Now, if you're the rest of the planet watching
this dance, what you begin to learn is that it's absolutely
irrelevant what the Americans say and that they will put up
with almost anything. So, you end up with Chavez's grotesque
speech at the United Nations, followed by the performance, this
last week, where he and Ahmadinejad created a fund for the
defeat of the United States, publicly. And, over time, these
dances have consequence. And all I would suggest is that--if
anything, my concern with the administration is that it zigzags
back and forth, that--I can't figure out what their policies
are toward North Korea, Iran, and Syria right now. I mean, are
they countries we should be talking with to try to find out
what they mean, or are they countries that we know what they
mean, and we should be doing something to stop them? Are they
actually helping kill young Americans, or are they people we
should be chatting with to help us solve Iraq? I mean, which
country are they? And my experience, looking at the open press,
is that they're actually pretty straight. These are
dictatorships who hate us and are determined to drive us out of
the region, and are defined by our own State Department as the
two largest financers of terrorism in the world. Now, what--so
I would agree with Senator Lugar, there's nothing at all wrong
with talking to them, but I would talk to them in a fairly
direct way, and have consequences to the conversation as part
of that process.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Speaker. And thank you,
Jack.
Senator Boxer [presiding]. OK. I will ask some questions,
and then we'll go back to Senator Vitter, and then to--have you
already asked questions? I think Senator Menendez is coming
back.
Thank you both for being here. This has been really
important for us.
Congressman Murtha, I've known you for a very, very, very
long time, worked with you since 1983. It's hard to believe.
You always have been tough. You've always been direct. You've
always been the best friend the military's ever had. I think,
in presenting your views, and when you presented them, you were
tough, you were direct, but, to me, you were correct. And to
the vast majority of the American people, who now agree with
what you're saying. And I want to thank you from the bottom of
my heart. When history is written, you have a place in it, a
very important place in it.
Now, anyone who takes the time to read your testimony will
have hope, because--here's the point. I love to write. I used
to be a newspaper reporter and an editor. This is direct. This
is clear. You tell the truth. You don't use, as the Speaker
would say, bureaucratic, you know, dodging. You're just right
there. And everything you say makes sense, ``The past 4 years
of Iraq have been plagued by mischaracterization based on
unrealistic optimism instead of realism. The conditions on the
ground are simply moving in the wrong direction.'' Who could
argue with it? ``There are limits to military power. There is
no U.S. military solution to Iraq's civil war. It's up to the
Iraqis.'' Now, there--there may be a disagreement with the
Speaker, because I read his, and his is very strong for a
military solution. I'm going to get to that. But I think most
people agree with you, that if there's not a political
solution, there'll never be an end to a civil war. Never. And
there are some great ideas out there. My chairman has, I think,
a very sound idea about following the Constitution, looking at
semiautonomous regions, getting the neighbors to sit down, and
so on.
So, I could go through this, and I--I won't go through
everything, but I think your point that you made today, which
Dr. Korb made this morning, 61 percent of Iraqis approve of
attacks on United States-led forces. Now, I don't know how
anyone, in good conscience, I swear--and I must be missing
something--could send our troops to help liberate a country and
rebuild it when 61 percent of the people say it's OK to shoot
our soldiers. I just don't get it. And that's, I think, one of
the reasons why you see, in the Army Times here, which I've
talked about before, now only 35 percent of the troops approve
of the way this war is being handled. And if you--if Speaker
Gingrich is right, and the only way to win--and he talks about
winning; I want to talk about winning--is to have a good--and,
Speaker, if I don't say this right, please correct me--that
people are strong for winning, that they feel good about the
mission, they want to stay there, and the public supports it,
and the troops support it--if that's the only way to win, then,
unless something major happens, this is a problem.
Now, I take a little different view about winning and
losing, and I'd like to put this out here. Maybe it's because I
think I've negotiated a lot of issues in Congress and in my
household, where everyone comes out a winner, which is what
good leadership is. Everyone comes out a winner. Now, I would
ask both of you to comment on this, really tell me if I'm onto
something or not.
If I were to have told both of you, years ago--let's say,
like, 5 years after gulf war one, that Saddam would have been
overthrown by the Americans, that there were--we were sure
there were no weapons of mass destruction, because our people
could assure us of that, that things were such that there--that
the American military was able to make sure that there could be
not one, not two, but three elections where the turnout was
huge and people were excited about it and showed their purple
dot on their finger--two elections, one referendum--if I were
to tell you that in the mid-1990s, and say, ``This is what
America did for this country: The tyrant is gone, they've had
their elections, and there are no weapons of mass
destruction,'' would you say--would you have said, ``What an
accomplishment''? I just wonder if you would have said that, in
the--if somebody came up and said, ``This is what's going to
happen in Iraq,'' would you have said that was an
accomplishment?
Mr. Murtha. Well, I'll tell you what they look at. They
look at the amount of electricity they have. They look at the
employment. They look at potable water. They look at the basic
things that our people in the United States look at. And that's
why it's been so distressing to go from very popular to
unpopular. So, those things are certainly important, from an
overall standpoint, but not near as important as insecurity,
increased incidence, unemployment, and electricity----
Senator Boxer. OK. So, if I had said to you, that, in the
1990s, you would have said, ``Well, that's good, but how's
their daily life?'' Is that what you would have said at that
point in the mid-1990s? Or would you have said, ``Barbara,
there's no way to get rid of Saddam. It would have been too
hard. There's no way he could have had three elections.'' See,
I think it's a huge accomplishment by our military. And that's
why, when Newt Gingrich talks about losing, losing, losing, I
don't look at what we've done there as a loss. I just think
it's been changing missions. ``Mission accomplished,'' was
stated----
Mr. Murtha. Let me tell you----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. At a time when it wasn't--it
wasn't right to say that. But the bottom line is, it depends on
your mission.
Mr. Murtha. I thought we could prevail in Vietnam. When I
came back, in 1967, they had an election right after that, and
President Johnson said, ``It's all over. We had an election--
Vietnam had an election. Everything's going to be all right.''
We lost 35,000 people after that. There's no question in my
mind that I was mistaken. I went to Vietnam, asked by Gerry
Ford to go there--and I found that there was going to be a
bloodbath. I said there's going to be a bloodbath in Cambodia,
and that we'd have a terrible problem--that's going to happen.
There's nothing we can do about that, because we are not
prevailing, and it's getting worse.
So, yes; I agree with you, those kind of accomplishments
are magnificent. Our military did a marvelous job. But we can't
win this, militarily. We're considered occupiers, and the way
we have to operate is to use overwhelming force, and that
forces us into a position where we----
Senator Boxer. OK.
Mr. Murtha [continuing]. Kill people.
Senator Boxer. So, just going a little further, if I were
to just summarize what I think you said to me, it's that, yes,
the military did some magnificent things, in terms of getting
rid of Saddam and in terms of allowing the people to freely
choose their leaders, but, in your opinion right now, that
can't be perceived as a win.
Mr. Murtha. Well, I think the polls and internationally,
we're looking at it as being defeated. I understand what you're
saying, but I think there's no question in my mind that
internationally and in the United States people are fed up with
it, they've lost confidence, they want out. That's what they're
saying. Now, that's not necessarily the reason to leave, but I
just don't see any chance of prevailing. I understand what
you're saying, and I praise the military all the time. Nobody
has a higher regard for the military than I do. But they can't
prevail in this thing, because of, just, the guerrilla war and
the type--Algeria, India, Afghanistan--the Russians had----
Senator Boxer. Well, I totally agree. The only place we
disagree is--I feel, just from my seat, what the military did
was amazing win for a people.
Mr. Murtha. It is.
Senator Boxer. And the question is what they do with it. If
they choose not to treat each other the way they should and
have a country that can work, I don't think we can fix it.
But--so, I don't like to see things as losing and winning,
which you and Newt, I think, agree on, that it's--if we leave,
it's a loss. You agree it would be a loss. The situation is a
loss.
So, I--my time has run out, but I'm going to ask, just,
Newt, this one question, then I'm going to go to Senator
Vitter.
I read your 18 key steps to victory in Iraq. I notice that
you say something here, ``Establish three plans, one for
achieving victory with the help of the Iraqis, one for
achieving victory with the passive acquiescence of the Iraqis,
one for achieving victory even if the current Iraqi Government
is unhappy.''
If the current Iraqi Government said, ``Get out. You're
making things worse for us, you're fueling the insurgency,
you're fueling al-Qaeda, and we just want to deal with our own
country, ourselves,'' would you not leave, at that point?
Mr. Gingrich. Well, I think if the current Iraqi Government
said, ``Get out,'' we would leave.
Senator Boxer. But you say--but you say a plan--we should
have a plan. It seemed to me you're implying that we would
stay, because you say, ``achieving victory even if the current
Iraqi Government----
Mr. Gingrich. Well----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. ``Is unhappy,''
Mr. Gingrich [continuing]. Let me draw a distinction----
Senator Boxer. And before, you said, ``Leaving is defeat.''
So, explain that to me.
Mr. Gingrich. Well, I think--I think, as a practical
matter, in the modern world, if you have a sovereign
government, and the sovereign government asks you to leave
you'd have a relatively difficult time staying. The question
would be: What would be the odds that the Iraqi Government
could, in fact, achieve clarity of asking you to leave, if all
of your allies inside the Iraqi Government were blocking them
from doing so? So, you could end up in a situation where
Maliki's unhappy, but is very constrained.
And the only reason I raised this is--I don't--I don't
think you can deal with Iraq in isolation. If you don't wake up
every day and look at Iran first, Syria second, international
terrorism third, and say to yourself, ``What's the implication
of our defeat on all of these various moving parts?''--and I
think if the United States is defeated in Iraq, that the
consequences, in terms of an Iranian surge in the Persian Gulf
and an Iranian belief that their model of terrorism will work,
will be extraordinary and will be very, very violent.
Senator Boxer. Well, you know, it's interesting, because a
lot of things were said about Vietnam that would happen, and
now the President went there, and he is just thrilled to be
there, and he's thrilled with what they're doing. So, I think,
you know, we all heard that before. But I think--but I just
worry a lot about this. If I--you know, you set up a War
Cabinet. I don't see anything about a political solution. I
don't see anything about a postwar solution here. And I just
would urge you--because, you know, a lot of these things are
good and I do agree with, but I don't see anything here that
leads you to political solution. And I think right now the
biggest winner is Iran. My gosh, we're doing for them what they
were unable to do for themselves. And that's a disaster.
Senator Vitter.
Senator Vitter. Thank you, Senator Boxer.
And I join all my colleagues in thanking the two of you for
your service and ideas, and for being here. I deeply appreciate
it, as well.
Chairman Murtha, I believe a few minutes ago you talked
about a ``phased withdrawal,'' and you used that term, but
resolution 18, which you introduced, says withdrawal, ``at the
earliest practicable date.'' And neither of those is really
precise about time, but they sound different to me. So, would
you advocate a phased withdrawal, or would you advocate getting
our troops out as quickly as is consistent with their safety?
Mr. Murtha. Yeah, I would advocate getting out as quickly
as possible, but I think it still has to be phased. I've always
believed that the military could set the timetable, and that
would give the incentive to the Iraqis to take over their
responsibility. For instance, I said earlier that they first
ought to get out of the palaces. You've been there, and you
know the palaces are where Saddam Hussein was. Then they ought
to get out of the Green Zone. Then they ought to get out of
Baghdad. And then they ought to get out of the country itself.
I believe we need stability in the Middle East, there's no
question about that. I think it's absolutely essential to our
international interests, but I believe that both are
consistent. A phased withdrawal is something that it would have
to be. I don't think you could protect our troops if you didn't
do it that way.
Senator Vitter. So, what I'm hearing is: Relatively
quickly, consistent with the troops' protection.
Mr. Murtha. Exactly.
Senator Vitter. Is that fair to say?
Mr. Murtha. Exactly, yeah.
Senator Vitter. What--none of us have a crystal ball,
obviously, but what would your prediction be about the level of
violence and sectarian conflict following that in Iraq?
Mr. Murtha. Well, I think there would be instability. And I
don't think any of us can predict how much there'll be. And
I've heard all kinds of estimates. But they're going to have to
do this themselves. Just like our own Civil War, we had to
settle it ourself, and nobody else can settle it for us. Our
troops are caught in the middle of a civil war; you call it
``sectarian violence.'' That's the thing that worries me the
most. We can't do it militarily. The way we have to operate
militarily is overwhelming force, and that makes enemies.
Senator Vitter. Right.
Mr. Murtha. And so, I just believe that--even though there
will be instability--now, we should be----
Senator Vitter. Would you expect that violence, following
our relatively quick withdrawal, to go up, or not?
Mr. Murtha. I don't know that I could predict whether it
would go up or down, but one thing I do predict is: The longer
we're there, the more troops are going to be killed, and we're
not going to make any more progress. And so, I believe the
sooner we get out, the better off we'd be, and the violence is
going to come, whether we get out now or we get out 6 months
from now or a year from now. Unless, what the Speaker said, we
were to put an overwhelming force into place, 4 or 500,000
troops----
Senator Vitter. Well, I guess the biggest reason I ask is
because you say, ``Well, we might have to go back in if certain
things happen.'' And so, therefore, it seems pretty important
to me to understand the likely consequences of whatever action
we're going to take. None of us have a crystal ball, but it
seems pretty important to try to figure out if violence would
surge following a relatively quick withdrawal, or not.
Mr. Murtha. Yeah; I appreciate that question, because what
I've said is, we wouldn't go back in unless our national
interests were affected.
Senator Vitter. Right.
Mr. Murtha. I wouldn't go back in to interfere in the civil
war, and that's where our troops are caught now.
Senator Vitter. Right.
Mr. Murtha. So, I would have a very small force stationed
in Okinawa, even, which is a long ways off, but we could get
back there in a short period of time, and the periphery, even
Kurdistan, I would----
Senator Vitter. In that scenario, would our national
interests be affected if Iraq was being controlled by clearly
extremist elements which had a violent worldwide agenda, like
other of our enemies do?
Mr. Murtha. Well, Iraq is an old established civilization,
and I don't think they're going to fall under the purview of
Iran or anybody else. I know that's what everybody thinks. I'm
worried about Iran. I've always worried about Iran.
Senator Vitter. Let me clarify. I'm not talking about Iran.
I'm talking about forces within Iraq that I think we would all
agree to characterize as extremist elements with a violent
agenda.
Mr. Murtha. Yeah, I see what you mean, and I think the
Iraqis will handle that. I think the al-Qaeda presence is
minimal compared to the sectarian violence that's going on. I
absolutely believe that they will get rid of them. In the Sunni
areas----
Senator Vitter. Well, again, I'm--and I'm not trying to cut
you off, but I do have limited time.
Mr. Murtha. Yeah.
Senator Vitter. I'm not talking only about al-Qaeda either.
I'm talking about, for the most part, religious-motivated,
ultraextremist groups who would have an anti-American violent
agenda.
Mr. Murtha. Well, the longer we're there, the more
possibility of that happening, in my estimation. The sooner we
redeploy, the less chance of that happening.
Senator Vitter. OK. Another scenario. Would it be in our
national interest if--to get reinvolved directly in the
situation if that sectarian and other violence was spilling
over to the broader Middle East region?
Mr. Murtha. Well, I think it depends on which countries
you're talking about, and that certainly is something that we'd
have to decide whether it's in our national interest. The oil
reserves are so important to everyone. And this is why we need
to get the Europeans involved; they're the ones that have as
much stake as we do. In the first gulf war, you remember, we
had 170,000 troops from the coalition. They paid for it
themselves. They understood the importance of the Reserves in
that country. And that's the same thing today. But they haven't
gotten involved, because we've tried to do it on our own. We
need their involvement. I'm saying redeployment is the first
step to get them involved, and then a heavy diplomatic effort,
working with them and doing some of the things that I've
suggested.
Senator Vitter. But you'd admit, certainly, that if that
violence was spilling to the Middle East more broadly, it--
something like that could get into that category you're talking
about, where it involves our national interests.
Mr. Murtha. If it affected Saudi Arabia, if it affected
Israel, if it affected our allies in that area, certainly we'd
have to think about getting involved.
Senator Vitter. OK. Mr. Chairman, you seem to be saying
that it's inevitable that the presence of United States forces
cannot be successful in Iraq. Is it also--is part of reaching
the conclusion you've reached that it is inevitable that this
attempt to have a stable democracy in Iraq is a failure, or is
that still a possibility?
Mr. Murtha. I think--that's a possibility, but I think the
longer we occupy Iraq--for instance, the examples I used, in
Afghanistan and India and countries like that, where their
occupation created civil unrest--I think the sooner we get out,
the more chance we have of democracy in Iraq.
Senator Vitter. So, you would allow for some possibility of
that success of a stable democracy.
Mr. Murtha. Absolutely. They've had an election. They
wanted an election. They want to have a stable government. But
they have to settle it themselves. We cannot prevail,
militarily, in Iraq. There's a limit to military power, and
we've reached that limitation by not getting it under control
earlier.
Senator Vitter. Mr. Speaker, let me--I'm running out of
time, but let me pick up there with you, at least quickly.
Senator Boxer. This is the last question, because we need
to vote and----
Senator Vitter. Sure.
Senator Boxer [continuing]. Senator Menendez still needs a
turn.
Senator Vitter. That's fine. Sure.
You start your column with Mayor Giuliani saying that our
goal promoting a stable, accountable democracy in the heart of
the Middle East cannot be achieved by purely military means. I
think we all agree with that. I assume you would also agree
that achieving that goal takes, under the present
circumstances, some military security component.
Mr. Gingrich. Absolutely. It takes a--it takes a
substantial advantage in intelligence, it takes a capacity to
impose security, it takes a requirement to grow the Iraqi
security forces so that they're capable, on their own, of
helping implement security. But if you read General Petraeus's
testimony this morning to the Senate Armed Services Committee,
he is equally clear that the military, by itself, cannot
succeed. I mean, even those of us who are optimistic about the
opportunity of success believe that there are very substantial
elements of the American Government, outside the combat
military, that have to be effective for us to be able to have
any hope of succeeding in Iraq.
Senator Vitter. Right. Thank you very much, to both of you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much, Senator, for being so
mindful that Senator Menendez has been waiting. And please go
ahead.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Let me thank both of you. I had the privilege of serving
with both of you in the House and appreciate your commitment to
our country and your leadership. Chairman Murtha, I always
appreciated all of the insights and the plain-spokenness with
which you brought powerful arguments in our caucus and to the
Congress, and so I appreciate you coming over here today to
share your insights.
Mr. Speaker, I will probably concern some people back in
New Jersey by saying there's a lot I agree with in the
statement that you gave, and particularly in the written
statement. I want to read from part of it, as a preface to a
question.
You said, ``The second weakness is, the current strategy
debate once again focuses too much on the military and too
little on everything that has not been working. The one
instrument that has been reasonably competent is American
military power, but that's a very narrow definition and should
not be expanded to include the noncombat elements of the
Department of Defense, which also have a lot of difficulties in
performing adequately. The great failures in the Iraq and
Afghanistan campaigns have been in noncombat power:
Intelligence, diplomacy, economic aid, information, operations,
support from the civilian elements of national power. These
have been the great centers of failure in America's recent
conflicts. They are a major reason why we've done so badly in
Iraq. The gap between the President's recent proposals and the
required rethinking and transforming of our noncombat
instruments of power is simply breathtaking.'' And I agree with
you on all of that.
So, as I look at your 18 points for success in Iraq, I ask:
If one were to accept that all of those 18 points were vital to
success in Iraq, how long do you think that would take to
accomplish?
Mr. Gingrich. Let me say, first, that what is truly
discouraging is--I included, as an appendix, some things I
wrote in 1984 on the fact, that the interagency was broken, and
I reported on conversations, that Chairman Murtha will
remember, with very fine people--General Thurmond, after the
1990 Panama campaign, and General Hartzog, after Haiti, in
which they both reported that the interagency was broken. I
mean, this is a longstanding reality.
I believe--and, again, General Petraeus talked about this
some this morning--I believe that it is possible, with luck,
that, within a year, there will be fewer American casualties,
and there would be a dramatically greater Iraqi capability. And
I believe, if you did all 18 points, which includes a great
deal of economic breakthrough and a great deal of effort to
change the tone and the quality of life for the Iraqi people,
that you would have the beginnings of moving in the right
direction. But----
Senator Menendez. But the----
Mr. Gingrich [continuing]. But I think----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. The implementation of your
18 points would take a significant amount of time to achieve,
certainly----
Mr. Gingrich. No; look----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Some of them.
Mr. Gingrich. Here's the great dilemma of the American
system. And I have to say, as somebody who spent 20 years
representing Georgia, that, in fact, we ended our Civil War not
by political discussion, but by defeat, as seen from a Georgia
perspective. I mean, there are moments in history--Yankees may
not always fully appreciate this view, but there are moments in
history when, in fact, you just have to drive through. Lincoln
changed things every day. George Catlett Marshall, when he was
creating the American Army of the Second World War, changed
things every day. If this President were to bring in a Deputy
Chief of Staff who is a senior retired military person of the
right background and were to genuinely drive the system, 90
days from now we would be in a different system, we'd have--
and, by the way, if he also brought in the Congress, something
that I mentioned when you weren't here, I think----
Senator Menendez. I did----
Mr. Gingrich [continuing]. OK--and genuinely worked, on a
bipartisan basis, on those aspects of the law which are
genuinely destructive--I mean, they're not Republican or
Democrat, liberal or conservative, they're just stupid----
Senator Menendez. I don't mean to interrupt you, but----
Mr. Gingrich [continuing]. I think, that Congress would
help pass it.
Senator Menendez [continuing]. But the--I looked at your 18
points. Some of them clearly could be done by executive
prerogative and order, but there is a fair number there that
would take a very significant restructuring, which means time.
And so, my question is: In your defeat or victory, what is
the price of victory, as defined by you? How many American
lives, how much money, how much time? Because I think the
American people need to have a sense--in the honesty that you
were talking about before, when I was listening to your
testimony and your answer to questions--I mean, we are being
told that this plan is the Iraqis'--we're following the Iraqis
somehow. But I don't believe it for a moment. We're being told
that we're following the Iraqis, Iraqis are going to take the
lead, we're going to be there in a supportive context, and
that's what makes this plan so fundamentally different than
every other plan the President has had in the past as it
relates to surges or escalations in the process. And yet the
reality is that when we listen to all the other expert
testimony--there's no way that that's going to happen, if we're
going to have any degree of success--and I oppose the
escalation--but if we're going to have any degree of success,
it certainly is not going to be under that scenario.
So, the question is: Isn't it fair for the American people
to know, for those who advocate that, ``We cannot accept a
defeat, in classic terms, that, therefore--and we must strive,
at all costs, to have victory''--what is the quantifiable
aspects of victory, in both lives and national treasure?
Mr. Gingrich. Well, I want to--I think, first of all, you
shouldn't underestimate that it will cost lives. I think it'll
cost money. I think it will cost time. I think the total lives
engaged would probably be less than 1 percent of the lives
we'll lose when we lose an American city. I think that the
amount of money we lose will be dramatically less than it will
take us to build one American city. And I think that anybody
who can make a decision on Iraq without worrying about nuclear
war and the degree to which our opponents in Iran, North Korea,
Syria, Venezuela, and elsewhere, are emboldened by our defeat
are kidding themselves. So, I would say to you, Senator, how
much do you think it's going to cost in American lives when the
terrorists around the planet are emboldened?
Senator Menendez. That's if one accepts your proposition
that----
Mr. Gingrich. And----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. In fact, that's what happens
in Iraq, as defined by you, in terms of success, means the loss
of an American city.
Chairman Murtha, do we lose an American city, thousands of
American lives, because we follow your plan in Iraq?
Mr. Murtha. No; I think, actually, we reduce the intensity
in the recruiting that goes on in Iraq. We have become the
enemy, and that's actually increasing the intensity of the
recruiting against us. So, I really believe the first step to
rehabilitating ourselves is to redeploy our troops and to
lessen this intense aggravation and hate that they have toward
Americans. The BBC just did a poll showing the whole world says
we're making a mistake. They believe we're more dangerous than
Iran. This is people, ordinary people, of course. But, no, I
don't think that solves the problem at all. I think we've got
to reduce our presence, and that is the start of stability in
Iraq.
Senator Menendez. Isn't it fair to say security is worse
today than it was before?
Mr. Murtha. When I spoke out, there were 400 incidents--
that's over a year ago--400 incidents a week, and now there's
over 1,000 a week. That's attacks. So, it's much worse than it
was. Plus, the things that I measure, the things that our
subcommittee asked them to measure, is potable water,
electricity, oil production, and unemployment. All those are
worse than they were--or less than prewar.
Senator Menendez. Well, I'll close by simply--and I see my
time's now up--by saying that General Pace was giving a
briefing here, about 6 months ago, I guess it was, and he said
something that was fundamental. He said, ``We have to get the
Iraqis to love their children more than they hate their
neighbors.'' And that's probably a very powerful truism, it's
just that it doesn't happen by military might.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Boxer. Thank you so much, Senator.
The reason I'm trying to move us along is because of a vote
that's coming. And I know Senator Coleman wants to take a
round. I'm going to give you 4 minutes, I'm going to give you 4
minutes, Senator, and I'll take 4 minutes, and we'll be done.
I just wanted to recognize the military Reservists who are
here from all the different services. Will you just raise your
hand? You're attending a course, at the National Defense
University, on national security and policy development. Well,
we hope that this is so clear today that you come away with a
very good feeling that we're getting it together. But I think
we are, and this is democracy, and this is important in this
great free country. And that's why it breaks my heart that we
were able to offer this up to a country that doesn't seem to be
able to want to deal with it. And--well, we'll move on.
Senator Coleman, you have 4 minutes, please.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Madam Chair. This is a good
discussion.
What are the consequences of failure? What's the--is there
a path to success? I share the Speaker's concern about failure.
I remember the al-Zawahiri letter to al-Zarqawi, where he says,
``Here's what we're going to do. Americans are going to lose
heart in Iraq. We'll establish a caliphate, take over the rest
of the region, destroy Israel, and then destroy you--destroy
the West.'' Take him at his word.
On the other hand, what's the path to success? I don't know
if putting 21,000 more troops in the midst of what's going on
in Baghdad, without the Iraqis showing that they're going to
take greater responsibility--I don't know if that will do
anything.
I have two questions, then, for the Speaker.
No. 1, so--do I understand--does your 18-point plan--does
it necessarily involve an upsurge of--an increase in troops in
order for us to achieve some kind of victory?
Mr. Gingrich. I think it accepts, as part of the plan, the
President's increase in forces, and it does suggest that a lot
more intelligence people would be used in the area.
But if I could ask your indulgence, Senator, I just want to
make a point that I think is very hard for Americans to accept.
If you have people who hate you enough----
Senator Coleman. Let me--before you comment--I want you to
do this, in my 2 minutes, but maybe the second question----
Mr. Gingrich. Good.
Senator Coleman. Fit it right in. You talk about achieving
a bipartisan, and Congress--is there any way to get the
American people to understand the cost of failure? And can we
get the--right now, there is not support for this war--is that
at all possible? And maybe your response can, kind of, tie
those two together.
Mr. Gingrich. Well, I--first of all, as I said a while ago,
I mean, in the American Civil War, Abraham Lincoln fully
expected to lose, as late as August 1864, and didn't think he'd
get reelected. I mean, wars are hard. People don't like wars.
People shouldn't like wars. They're terrible. And they're hard
to sell, in that sense. So, I don't know that that's what we
should do.
The only point I wanted to make, because I think,
intellectually, the American leadership has to come to grips
with this--what if you have enemies, as we discovered this
summer in Britain, when Scotland Yard arrested a couple who
were going to use their 8-month-old baby to disguise the bomb
as baby milk--if you have enemies who are prepared to kill
their 8-month-old baby as long as they get to kill you, you're
up against a hard problem.
And one of the places I guess I disagree with some of my
friends is that the Baker-Hamilton Commission was very clear
that they believe that a defeat in Iraq will lead to a
substantial increase in terrorist recruiting worldwide and a
substantial increase in terrorist aggressiveness.
And, last, I would say, every American should simply be
shown what Ahmadinejad, the Iranian leader, says publicly and
routinely about eliminating Israel from the face of the Earth
and defeating the Americans, and just ask: What do you think
they mean? And that's why I think this is--this is a very
serious period, where we're making decisions that may affect
the lives of our children and grandchildren for a very, very
long time.
Senator Coleman. And is there any question in your mind
that precipitous withdrawal would embolden Iran in its effort--
would embolden the enemies of the United States? Any question
in your mind?
Mr. Gingrich. There's no--first of all, I don't want to
disagree with my good friend, Chairman Murtha, with
``precipitous.'' There's no question in my mind that if we are
perceived as having been defeated, that the Iranian hard-
liners, the Syrian dictatorship, and the terrorists of al-
Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and others will all feel a surge of
jubilation, increase their recruitment dramatically, and be far
more aggressive in pushing us than they have been up till now.
I have zero doubt that, historically, that's what will happen.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Boxer. Thank you so much. And I guess I will have
the last word, because I'm the last one here and I have the
gavel.
But I want to thank both of you very, very much. It's been
very provocative, very interesting. And I'm going to make my
comments on what I see here.
The greatest country in the world needs to respond to every
threat to its national security with all the power and force
that we have, if necessary. That's why I think Congressman
Murtha is so on the right track, because what happened, when we
went into Iraq and stayed there too long, was that we took our
eye off the terrorism ball. I agree with everything that
Speaker Gingrich says about the enemy we face with the
terrorists. That's why it was shocking to me, as someone who
voted to go to war against Osama bin Laden--and every Senator
did--every Senator did--that suddenly we turned away from that
and find ourselves in a situation where we're stretched thin.
And that's why I think what Congressman Murtha is doing--and I
would posit--and this is always up for debate--that of all the
people in this room who are elected people, knows more about
the real thing of war than any of us do. I may be wrong on
that. Maybe reading books is important, too. We all do that.
But I've got to say, brings this credibility, as someone who's
known to fight with every fiber in his body for our fighting
men and women. And when he came out, as he did--I'll tell you,
it was a turning point with the American people, because of the
credibility.
So, I would argue, the kind of plan that you have put out--
and Russ Feingold and I have a similar--a bit different--we--I
think we stay right over the horizon to--with a force that
could quickly respond to terrorism, training the Iraqis, and
protecting American forces. But, other than that, it's pretty
similar. Nobody says precipitous. I mean, I think, in your
plan, it's done in an orderly way, and you've laid that out,
how you would even do it; you've gone that far.
So, what we would do, by redeploying our troops and
changing the mission from combat to support and freeing our
troops up, is make us stronger in the world.
The world, right now, doesn't think much of us. This is
true. And Speaker Gingrich says, ``Oh, my God, if you lose, you
lose the support of the world.'' Well, the world doesn't
support what we're doing. As you pointed out, Congressman
Murtha, the latest poll shows--it's unbelievable. Even in
Indonesia, where we were way up there, we've slipped, even
after what we did for them.
So, I would say that your plan makes us stronger, gets us
ready for everything that's to come, stops fueling al-Qaeda,
stops fueling the insurgency, and, if we do this right, we can
still have a rapid-reaction force to go where we need to go,
especially if things get out of hand, which you talked to
Senator Vitter about.
So, I think--you know, I look at where we are. Thirty-five
percent of the military now supports the President. I think
that's shocking. The people don't support this war, which I
think--
Speaker Gingrich, I didn't hear you make the point, but I think
one of the things we did learn after Vietnam is that the people
have to be behind it. You can't--you can't--this is not a
dictatorship, this is a democracy. People's voices have to be
heard.
But I think what you have put before us is the best. And I
just--I'd like to just close, asking you one quick question,
Congressman, about this surge. According to the Baltimore Sun,
21,500 troops, who will be ordered into this escalation
strategy, will not have access to specialized blast-resistant
armored vehicles, because they're in such short supply. The Sun
also reports the Army is 22-percent short of the armored
Humvees it needs in Iraq for the troops currently there. I want
to know if you agree with this assessment and if you have
looked into what we're going to do about sufficient equipment
if we do not succeed in stopping this surge.
Mr. Murtha. We're looking into, right now, whether those
figures are accurate.
Senator Boxer. OK.
Mr. Murtha. We don't know, and we'll find out. You
remember, we sent troops in, the first time, 44,000 of them
didn't have adequate armor, Humvees weren't armored, all kinds
of problems. So, we're looking into that. We're going to make
sure that we point out whether that's true or not. I just don't
know whether it's true or not.
Senator Boxer. Well I would really appreciate it if you
would keep in touch with us----
Mr. Murtha. Yeah.
Senator Boxer [continuing]. And let us know the fruits of
your research.
And I just want to say, there's 5 minutes left in the vote.
We have made the most of every minute of your time. Speaker
Gingrich, Congressman Murtha--Chairman Murtha--we're just
honored that you've spent so much time with us, and I think
this has been very productive.
And the hearing stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:58 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
RECONSTRUCTION STRATEGY
----------
THURSDAY, JANUARY 25, 2007 [A.M.]
U.S. Senate,
Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden,
Jr. (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Feingold, Obama, Cardin, Webb,
Lugar, Hagel, Coleman, Corker, Voinovich, Murkowski, Isakson,
and Vitter.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
I apologize to my colleagues, as well as the witnesses and
the press for starting a few minutes late. Since I commute
every day on Amtrak from Wilmington, DE, as my colleagues--
especially Senator Lugar, after the last three decades--used to
say, ``Well, the train was late.'' Well, the truth of the
matter was, I stayed down here last night, and I was late. But
I do apologize, it's not Amtrak's fault this time.
Ladies and gentlemen, let me begin by saying to my
committee members that, regardless of the outcome of the vote
we had yesterday on the resolution, I want to say how proud I
was to be a member of this committee. The way in which my
colleagues on both sides of the aisle were so articulate in
expressing their concerns I think was truly impressive.
And, one of the things that the chairman and I have talked
about in the different contexts over the years is that, what
happens here, more and more because of the rush of business
regarding who is in charge on the floor, and the like, we don't
have much real live interaction with one another on the floor,
or in the committee.
And I was enlightened yesterday, and I really mean it--I
don't want to hurt anybody's reputation, but I was really
impressed with Senator Murkowski. I was impressed with Senator
Cardin, I was impressed with all of you, the way you
articulated your positions. And I hope that doesn't sound
gratuitous, but I genuinely mean it. I was proud of the
committee. And I want to thank you.
And that is not self-congratulatory. The only guy who
wasn't so good yesterday was me. You all were really
impressive, and I appreciate it. Hopefully we can continue in
the same spirit this has started, and I'm confident we can.
Today we're going to wind down the third week of intensive
hearings--intensive, that's a self-serving, self-descriptive
adjective--but the serious hearings we've had here on Iraq, and
continuing the pattern set by Chairman Lugar.
This morning, we're going to hear from the administration
about its reconstruction strategy in Iraq. We go back in this
committee to hearing about reconstruction, legitimately, back
to the first ``$87 billion vote'' on reconstruction. It's been
a long haul. It's been a tough road, and there were a lot of
obstacles put in the way of this effort on the ground.
This afternoon, we're going to hear from experts on Iraq's
internal political dynamics, and appearing before the committee
now, Ambassador David Satterfield, Senior Advisor to the
Secretary of State, and Coordinator for Iraq at the U.S.
Department of State. A man that I've come to respect and know,
and I'm delighted he's here.
And BG Michael D. Jones, the Deputy Director for Middle
East Political-Military Affairs of the J-5 on the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, probably the toughest staff job on the joint chiefs,
and we're delighted he's here. Both men have long,
distinguished careers, but most importantly, they have both
also spent a lot of time on the ground in Iraq, which is a
different dynamic.
Ambassador Satterfield served for more than a year as
Deputy Chief of Mission in Baghdad. We crossed paths, I think,
three times, during his tenure in Iraq. And he was always,
always straightforward and helpful and informative to the
delegations that I was a part of.
From June 2003 until March 2005, General Jones served as
the Assistant Division Commander for the 1st Cavalry. I think
he may not remember, but when General Chiarelli gave us that
first briefing, I think he was--I may be mistaken, General, but
I think you were an integral part of that. And I was impressed
then, and came away convinced that if--it's a heck of a thing
to say--if the military had more leeway in terms of those
funds, we might have gotten even further. But you guys did a
great job with what you were given.
General, I'd like to offer you, as I said, a special word
of appreciation for your willingness to appear before the
committee on such short notice.
General Jones. I'm honored, sir.
The Chairman. In light of that, we understand that you
didn't have time to prepare a detailed witness statement, and
if you get questions today that you would rather answer in
writing, that's fine too. We're just trying to get the facts as
best we can.
To this point, we have not been successful in our mutual
desire--and in some cases Herculean efforts--to rebuild Iraq as
we had hoped we could. Three and a half years ago, we held a
similar hearing to this one. Ambassador Paul Bremer sat where
you are sitting now and told us about the administration's need
for an $18.4 billion in reconstruction money.
Here's what he said; he said, ``We have a plan, with
milestones, dates, and benchmarks. No one part of this $87
billion supplemental is dispensable, and no part is more
important than any other. This is a carefully considered,
integrated request. This request is urgent. The urgency of
military operations is self-evident. The funds for nonmilitary
action in Iraq are equally urgent. The link to the safety of
our troops is indirect, but no less real.''
Mr. Ambassador, General--$14.7 billion of that integrated
$18.4 billion strategy that Ambassador Bremer presented has now
been distributed. And, as you know better than I do, the
results aren't pretty.
Let me just cite two examples: Before the war began, Iraq
pumped an average of 2.5 million barrels of oil per day. The
administration's initial goal was 3 million barrels per day,
later reduced to 2.5 million barrels per day. Three and a half
years later, we have never met this reduced goal, to the best
of our knowledge. The average crude oil production last week
was only 1.7 million barrels per day, a third less than the
prewar levels.
Of this total, according to an article in yesterday's
Washington Post, 200,000 barrels are siphoned off and smuggled
out of Iraq, with much of the proceeds ending up fueling Iraqi
violence.
Before the war began, Iraq's electricity production was
about 4,000 megawatt/hours. Ambassador Bremer warned the
committee, unless Congress quickly approved the
administration's reconstruction proposal, and I quote, ``Iraqis
face an indefinite period of blackouts, 8 hours per day.'' The
goal was to raise that level to 6,000 megawatts by July 2004.
This month's electric production is averaged 3,600 megawatts,
below prewar levels. Last week, the average Baghdadi only had
4.4 hours of electricity a day, and the average Iraqi had an
average of 7.7 hours of electricity a day. At this point, the 8
hours of daily blackouts that Ambassador Bremer warned about
would be a dramatic step in the right direction.
The reconstruction efforts have not been a total failure, I
might add. The administration is moving toward small-bore
reconstruction projects. I can remember, and I think it,
coincidentally, was the three of us sitting here in a row, who
were in Baghdad shortly after the statue fell, and I think--
I'll speak for myself--my recollection is that then, and
subsequent to that, I made--and I think my colleagues did as
well, but they speak for themselves--arguments that we should
focus a lot more on small-bore projects, rather than mega-
projects.
General Chiarelli, your former commander, that was one of
his mantras. I remember him saying to us that, you know, we've
got a tertiary sewage treatment plant that's being built that's
going to cost X hundreds of million or billion dollars, it's
going to take Y years, he said, ``Just give me some PVC pipe,
let me hook it into the back of these homes,'' and he showed us
your Humvees going through, in Sadr City going through--up to
their hubcaps, you may remember, I know you know this better
than I do--up to their hubcaps in raw sewage. Literally,
stepping off the front porch of homes. And then he showed us 12
and 15 feet of piles of garbage that were unable to be
collected. And he said, ``Let me drain that swamp, let me--I
know it's not environmentally sound, but it's urgent--let me
put some PVC pipe in the back of the homes, and get it to the
Tigris River,'' and you know, he said, ``I'll quiet this
neighborhood, let me clean up this garbage.''
So, the fact of the matter is that we're now moving to
smaller bore projects that involve Iraqis in tribal areas,
doing this stuff themselves, as I understand it.
A first, General, in my seven trips to Iraq, I've been--as
I've said--highly impressed by the Commander's Emergency
Response Program, which you will speak to. This program allows
our soldiers to fund low-cost, commonsense projects, which can
potentially produce big results, such as building wells, buying
textbooks, or fixing up health clinics.
Second, the decision to focus on local capacity development
with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, I believe, still has
some promise.
Third, the USAID Community Action Program--which partners
with communities in determining their own needs, I think, has
had impressive results. And I hope the program is going to
continue.
I understand the President's going to ask for an
additional--I don't know this for a fact--but an additional
$1.2 billion in reconstruction funds for Iraq. Though, in
principle, I believe these programs are vitally important to
our efforts in Iraq, I hope that we will hear today some
concrete details of why these funds will achieve better results
than we've been able to achieve before.
Gentlemen, I want to thank you for being here. You are in
front of, not a hostile, but a friendly committee who wants
very much to make this work, but some of us have become very
skeptical of your capacity to organize this, and the capacity
to actually implement it. At least, speaking for myself, and I
think some of my colleagues. But again, welcome, and I now
yield to Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would
echo your thoughts about the importance of our meeting
yesterday, and the conduct of all members. That was at the
highest level, I'm sure that will be true today.
Although, I would just say, at the outset, that my opening
comments will echo, I suspect, in a bipartisan way, many of the
thoughts that you have expressed so well.
Let me just reflect, that since the war in Iraq started,
the United States has allocated more than $35 billion for
reconstruction assistance. We have achieved some successes:
Children are being immunized, the deepwater port near Basra has
been rebuilt, and thousands of schools have been rehabilitated.
But overall, the results have been disappointing to the
Iraqi people, to Congress, and to American taxpayers.
Electricity remains in short supply, oil production is far
below its potential, scores of health clinics remain
unfinished, and most roads still need repair. The economy is
encumbered by high unemployment, high inflation, widespread
poverty--all of which contribute to conditions that intensify
the insurgency.
I would just say the Minister of Industry of Iraq visited
with us last week, estimated unemployment at 40 to 45 percent,
described how difficult it is--even for Iraqis--to fix the grid
system, given restrictions maybe they have imposed, or we have
imposed.
The security situation, including deliberate sabotage, has
played a major role in these failures. But so, too, has the
inadequate performance by U.S. Government agencies, including
poor planning, shifting priorities, insufficient integration of
civilian and military activities, and uncertain lines of
authority.
President Bush has said that as part of his decision to
send more troops to Iraq, he will ask Congress for another $1.2
billion in reconstruction initiatives. This gives us a new
opportunity to review the basis for the President's new request
and we look forward to exploring how the new funds might help
us reach our reconstruction goals, and what measures should be
put in place to ensure that they will be spent effectively.
The President's proposed funding includes $350 million for
the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), which has
proven effective in the past. This program allows American
military officers to distribute development grants at the local
level. Another $400 million is designated for the civilian
version of CERP. This funding must be accompanied by an
effective sequencing plan, so that the benefits flow quickly to
neighborhoods in the wake of any security progress made by
United States or Iraqi forces.
Also, the President has suggested adding $414 million to
nearly double the number of Provisional Reconstruction Teams
that operate outside of Baghdad. This is designed to widen the
effectiveness of these teams, which have seen mixed results to
date, and have struggled to recruit qualified staff.
As we consider this reconstruction boost, Congress must
know the administration's procedures for ensuring that funds
are not stolen or siphoned off for other purposes. This plan
must achieve a difficult balance between anticorruption
measures, and excessive redtape. Reports indicate that
bureaucratic obstacles and long delays have occurred because
both Iraqi and American officials are afraid of being accused
of corrupt practices. And this is one reason why, according to
some news reports, Iraqis last year were able to utilize only
about 20 percent of their $6 billion capital budget.
Oil production is at the heart of the Iraqi economic
potential. Iraq is still pumping less oil than it did before
the war. What is necessary to achieve an Iraq oil production?
We surely must find this. And under the best-case scenarios,
how soon can we expect a significant increase in oil revenue
for the Iraqi Government? When is it likely that the new Iraqi
hydrocarbon law will take effect? What impact will the law have
on oil production, and on foreign investment in the petroleum
sector, absent any significant change in the security
situation? Is there reason to believe that this law could
improve the security situation by guaranteeing the Sunnis a
portion of the oil revenue?
Finally, one must ask how President Bush's request fits
into the larger picture of getting the Iraqi economy on its
feet, which is the ultimate purpose of reconstruction. Is there
a plan that will lead to a sustainable economic growth? To
complement the proposed United States funds, Prime Minister
Maliki has committed $10 billion of Iraqi funds for
reconstruction, including a jobs program. Are these make-work
jobs that will expire when the funds dry up? Or will they serve
to prime the pump to create long-term employment? Is this Iraqi
program well-coordinated with the United States efforts? And is
it dependent on Congress appropriating all of the funds the
President will now request?
I welcome, as you do, Mr. Chairman, our distinguished
panel, we look forward to our discussion with you today. Thank
you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Gentlemen, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID SATTERFIELD, SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE
SECRETARY OF STATE AND COORDINATOR FOR IRAQ, DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Satterfield. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar,
members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to
appear before you today. And I would like to talk about the
reconstruction efforts that we are currently undertaking, as
well as our plans for the future in the light of the
President's strategy, enunciated on January 10. And I would ask
concurrence in my more lengthy written remarks being entered
into the record.
The Chairman. They will be placed in the record.
Ambassador Satterfield. On January 10, the President
outlined the need for a new way forward in Iraq, and on January
11, Secretary Rice provided further detail on how we would be
pursuing this strategy.
I'd like to reiterate briefly both the premise of the
strategy she and the President outlined and then expand
further. And in response to your specific questions during the
course of the hearing today, on how we plan to bring our
civilian resources into the fight.
There are five core principles underlying our strategy.
First, the Government of Iraq is in the lead. It is not a
question of putting them in the lead, or encouraging them to
take the lead--it is a recognition of reality. They are
responsible for their country, they are a sovereign government,
and they have to act as such. Success will not, in Iraq, be
dependent primarily on United States resolve and effort,
however strong they are. It will depend on the commitment, the
performance, the will, and the skill of the Iraqi Government.
Second, we will support the Government of Iraq's efforts to
stabilize that country, to bolster their economy, to achieve
national reconciliation. Here again, Iraqis are in the lead,
but we recognize they require help in certain critical areas.
Third, we will decentralize; we will diversify our civilian
presence and our civilian assistance to the Iraqi people. While
we will continue to work closely with the central government in
Baghdad--Baghdad is the center of gravity, both for
governments, but also for the sectarian violence now affecting
that country. But we also have to reach beyond the Green Zone.
We have to reach to help local communities and leaders
transition to self-sufficiency, and to encourage moderates
throughout that country.
Fourth, we will channel our targeted assistance to those
Iraqi leaders, regardless of party or sectarian affiliation,
who reject violence and pursue their agendas through peaceful,
democratic means. We must isolate extremists, we must help
empower moderates throughout the country.
Finally, we will be engaging in reinvigorated regional
diplomacy, beginning with the Secretary's recent trip to Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, to try and strengthen support for the
Government of Iraq. Iraq cannot emerge from its current
situation without the positive influence, without the positive
role being played by its neighbors.
We're going to be applying these principles I've just
articulated on three critical fronts: Security, economic, and
political. All of which are inextricably tied to the others.
As you know, the President has decided to augment our force
levels in Baghdad and Anbar by 21,500 forces. The mission of
this enhanced force is to support Iraqi troops and commanders
who are in the lead, to help clear and secure neighborhoods,
protect the local population, provide essential services, and
create conditions necessary to spur local economic
development--the ``build'' part of Clear, Secure, Build.
The Department of State is contributing robustly to this
effort, by expanding our present, very close coordination with
our military counterparts in and outside of Baghdad, and with
the Iraqi Government, to capitalize on expected security
improvements by creating jobs and promoting economic
revitalization. There has to be the fullest possible civil-
military unity of effort, if we are to be successful. That is
what our mission in Baghdad, that is what our missions at the
existing PRTs, are committed to achieve.
But to help make this possible, we are immediately
deploying greater resources alongside our military, first in
Baghdad and Anbar province. The centerpiece of our efforts will
be the expansion of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, the
PRTs, which will be doubled from a current number of 10 to 20.
We will be adding more than 300 new civilian personnel, and
will be expanding our PRTs in three phases.
The first phase is going to occur over the next 90 days and
it will coincide with, and complement, our expanded military
efforts. We hope to colocate nine new PRTs, six in Baghdad,
three in Anbar, with the brigade combat teams engaged in
security operations there.
Now, the Department of State will be recruiting and
deploying senior-level team leaders for these new Provincial
Reconstruction Teams. They will work closely with their brigade
commander counterparts, to develop plans for that critical
``build'' part of Clear, Secure, Build. Well-qualified State
Department officers have already stepped forward for these
assignments.
The PRTs will target both civilian and military resources,
including foreign assistance in the commanders emergency
response program, against a common of a jointly developed
strategic plan to sustain stability, promote economic growth,
and foster Iraqi self-sufficiency where we have made security
gains.
In the next two phases of our PRT expansion, we're going to
be adding a new PRT in North Babil; we will augment our
existing PRTs in the country with specialized technical
personnel, such as irrigation specialists, veterinarians, and
agricultural development experts based on local needs. And I
want to talk a little bit here about how we developed our sense
of what was needed, who was needed.
This didn't come from Washington. It was not a top-down
process. It was developed from the ground up, in consultation
between our brigade commanders, our existing PRT figures,
through divisional command, to Baghdad and then came back to
here. This is a real-world, ground-based assessment of what is
needed, province by province, area of operation by area of
operation--it is designed to affect the greatest possible
synergy between our military and our civilian experts.
The PRTs will have a role beyond simple development
assistance. They will support local, moderate Iraqi leaders
through targeted assistance such as microloans and grants to
foster new businesses, create new jobs, and develop provincial
capacity to govern in an effective, sustainable manner. We
intend to complete all three phases of our PRT expansions by
the end of this calendar year. Completion, I would note,
though, is dependent both on funding levels and on
circumstances on the ground.
And with respect to funding levels, I'd like to express a
particular note about funding. While we are currently applying
fiscal year 2006 funds to begin implementation of this new
strategy, we will need additional funds very shortly. Under the
continuing resolution, we are now requesting $538 million to
avoid a shutdown of mission-critical programs--programs
directly related to the ``build'' phase of Clear, Secure, and
Build. Delaying funding of these programs until future budget
requests would undermine our ability in a very real sense, to
support our military counterparts and our Iraqi partners.
Now, those Iraqi partners must do their part, to invest in
their country's own economic development, and follow through on
our joint strategy.
The Government of Iraq, as the chairman noted, is committed
to spending $10 billion to help create jobs, and to further
national reconciliation. Serious progress has been made on the
National Hydrocarbon Law, which we expect will be completed
very shortly, and then submitted to the Council of
Representatives.
The Council of Representatives has taken the first steps
toward holding provincial elections, and drafting de-
Baathification reform legislation. They have also agreed to an
impressive set of very far-reaching and comprehensive economic
reforms, as part of the International Compact with Iraq. We
expect that compact to be completed formally in the coming few
weeks.
The most pressing challenge facing Iraqis on the fiscal
side, however, is budget execution. Simply put, the Government
of Iraq has available assets--the product of last year's and
previous year's underspent budgets, and profits from higher-
than-anticipated oil prices. But they do not have the
mechanisms to spend those funds, especially with the speed
necessary for post-kinetic stabilization in Baghdad and Anbar.
Iraq must develop the means to put its money to use, both for
short-term build efforts, and longer term capital investment.
To help the Iraqi Government face this challenge and take
responsibility for its own economic future, Secretary Rice has
appointed Ambassador Tim Carney as her new coordinator for
Economic Transition. Ambassador Carney will head to Embassy
Baghdad in the days ahead, to help the Government of Iraq meet
its financial responsibilities, especially on budget execution,
job creation, and capital investment projects.
A note about the environment which Iraq faces, we face, in
the region as a whole. Iraq doesn't exist in isolation from its
neighbors. It will require the help and support of the region
to have a stable, prosperous, and peaceful future. While we are
working with our partners in the region to strengthen peace,
two governments--Syria and Iran--have chosen to align
themselves with the forces of violent extremism in Iraq and
elsewhere. The problem is not a lack of dialog, but a lack of
positive action by those states.
As you know, Secretary Rice recently returned from travel
to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, to urge support for the
Government of Iraq and for our new strategy. Her interlocutors
expressed their very strong concern over the growth of negative
Iranian influence in Iraq, and al-Qaeda terror. At the same
time, they made equally clear their concern that the current
Iraqi Government was acting in a manner that reflected a
sectarian, rather than a national, agenda.
We understand these concerns. We believe the Iraqi
Government understands them as well. Prime Minister Maliki and
his government have pledged not to tolerate any act of violence
from any community or group. That means that all those engaged
in killing, and intimidation--whether Shia or Sunni--need to be
confronted. We have already begun to see positive steps taken
by the Iraqi authorities in this regard. Notably, Iraqi
security forces in recent weeks have detained more than 600
Jaysh al-Mahdi fighters. They are currently in detention,
including over a dozen senior leaders, responsible for
organizing and ordering sectarian attacks against innocent
Sunnis.
Iraqi forces are operating in all areas of Baghdad,
including Sadr City. We will need to see more sustained, robust
action in the weeks and months ahead. And in this regard, Prime
Minister Maliki delivered a speech this morning to the Council
of Representatives in Baghdad in which he stated his support--
strong political support--and that of his government, for the
security efforts being undertaken in the joint security plan
now unfolding in Baghdad. He noted that there would be no
quarter for any involved in violence against civilians, that
there would be no immunities granted to Sunni or Shia mosques,
that all those engaged in killing would be confronted and would
be stopped. This is a very positive step.
Only through fact on the ground--tangible evidence of
action against all those pursuing violence--can the Government
of Iraq establish the credibility at home, abroad, and here in
the United States that it needs to charter a successful future.
The President's strategy is intended to lower the level of
sectarian violence, and to ensure that Iraq's political center
has the space it needs to negotiate lasting political
accommodations through Iraq's new, democratic institutions.
But, ultimately, Iraqis must make the difficult decisions that
are essential to the success that is so critical for Iraq and
the United States. We know there are no silver bullets, no
guarantees regarding the question of Iraq. We know that most
Americans are deeply concerned about the prospects for success
there. But the situation now in Iraq, and the stakes for the
United States, the region, and the international community are
extraordinary. We believe that the strategy the President,
after deep reflection and consultation, has outlined, is the
best approach possible to serve our vital national interests.
We ask for your support and time for this new course to
work. I thank you very much, and look forward to your
questions.
[Prepared statement of Ambassador Satterfield follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador David M. Satterfield, Senior Advisor
to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for Iraq, Department of
State, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lugar, members of the committee, ladies and
gentlemen, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss implementation of the President's new strategy for Iraq, to
review what we have achieved with the foreign assistance Congress has
provided and to highlight the steps we have taken to improve its
administration.
new way forward
On January 10 the President outlined the need for a New Way Forward
in Iraq. On January 11, Secretary Rice provided further detail on how
specifically we will pursue our new strategy. I would like to reiterate
briefly both the premise of the strategy she and the President outlined
and then expand further on how we plan, specifically, to bring our
civilian resources to the fight.
There are five core principles underlying our strategy.
First, the Government of Iraq is in the lead. Success will not be
dependent primarily on U.S. resolve and effort, but on the commitment
and performance of the Iraqi Government.
Second, we will support the Government of Iraq's efforts to
stabilize the country, bolster the economy, and achieve national
reconciliation. The Iraqis are in the lead, but they require our help
in certain critical areas.
Third, we will decentralize and diversify our civilian presence and
assistance to the Iraqi people. While we will continue to work closely
with the central government in Baghdad, we must reach beyond the Green
Zone to help local communities' and leaders' transition to self-
sufficiency.
Fourth, we will channel targeted assistance to those Iraqi leaders
regardless of party or sectarian affiliation who reject violence and
pursue their agendas through peaceful, democratic means. We must
isolate extremists and help empower moderates throughout the country.
Fifth, we will engage in reinvigorated regional diplomacy to try
and strengthen support for the Government of Iraq. Iraq cannot emerge
from its current predicament without the positive influence of its
neighbors.
We will apply these principles on three critical fronts--security,
economic, and political--all of which are inextricably linked to the
others.
implementation
As you know, the President has decided to augment our own troop
levels in Baghdad and Anbar by 21,500. The mission of this enhanced
force is to support Iraqi troops and commanders, who are now in the
lead, to help clear and secure neighborhoods, protect the local
population, provide essential services, and create conditions necessary
to spur local economic development.
The Department of State is contributing robustly to this effort by
expanding our present close coordination with our military counterparts
in and outside of Baghdad, as well as with the Iraqi Government, to
capitalize on security improvements by creating jobs and promoting
economic revitalization. There must be the fullest possible civilian-
military unity of effort if we are to be successful.
To that end, we will immediately begin deploying greater resources
alongside our military in Baghdad and Anbar. The centerpiece of this
effort will be our expansion of our Provincial Reconstruction Teams. We
will double our PRTs from 10 to 20, adding more than 300 new personnel.
We will expand our PRTs in three phases with the first phase occurring
over the next 3 months to complement our enhanced military efforts. In
that time, we plan to colocate nine new PRTs--six in Baghdad and three
in Anbar--with brigade combat teams engaged in security operations.
The Department will recruit and deploy senior-level team leaders
for these 9 new PRTs who will work jointly with brigade commanders to
develop plans for the ``build'' phase of Clear, Hold, and Build. Well-
qualified officers have already stepped forward for these assignments.
These PRTs will also include USAID development advisors, as well as
civil affairs officers and bilingual advisors from the Department of
Defense. Although State will have the lead in recruiting and hiring
staff, full interagency support and robust interagency contributions
will be necessary to deploy the new staff to Iraq as quickly as
possible.
PRTs will target both civilian and military resources, including
foreign assistance and the Commanders' Emergency Response Program,
against a common strategic plan to sustain stability, promote economic
growth, and foster Iraqi self-sufficiency where we have made security
gains.
In the next two phases of our PRT expansion, we will add a new PRT
in North Babil and augment our existing PRTs with specialized technical
personnel, such as irrigation specialists, veterinarians, and
agribusiness development experts, based on local provincial needs.
PRTs will support local moderate Iraqi leaders through targeted
assistance (e.g., microloans, vocational education, and grants) to
foster new businesses, create jobs, and develop provincial capacity to
govern in an effective and sustainable way. PRTs will continue to play
a leading role in coordinating several U.S. programs funded by the
Congress, including Iraqi Provincial Reconstruction Development
Councils (PRDC) and USAID's local governance, community stabilization,
and community action programs.
We intend to complete all three phases of our PRT expansion by the
end of the calendar year. Completion, however, will be dependent both
on the level of funding appropriated in the FY07 supplemental (and its
timing) and circumstances on the ground in Iraq.
iraqi efforts
The Iraqi Government must also do its part to invest in its own
economic development and to follow through on our joint strategy. The
Government of Iraq is committed to spending $10 billion to help create
jobs, to remove impediments to economic growth, and to further national
reconciliation. Serious progress has been made on the vital national
hydrocarbon law, which we expect will be completed very shortly and
then submitted to the Council of Representatives. The Council of
Representatives has taken the first steps toward holding provincial
elections--essential to ensuring full participation in local governance
by all of Iraq's communities--and drafting de-Baathification reform
legislation. They have also agreed to an impressive set of far-reaching
and comprehensive economic reforms as part of the International Compact
with Iraq. We expect the compact to be completed formally in the coming
weeks.
The most pressing funding challenge facing Iraqis is budget
execution. Simply put, the Government of Iraq has available assets, the
product of last year's underspent budget and profits from higher than
anticipated oil prices, but they do not have the mechanisms to spend
them--especially when money must move rapidly, as is the case with
post-military action stabilization in Baghdad and Anbar. Iraq must
develop the means to put its money to use, both for short-term
``build'' efforts and longer term capital investment.
To help the Iraqi Government improve budget execution and take on
more responsibility for Iraq's own economic future, Secretary Rice has
appointed Ambassador Tim Carney as her new Coordinator for Economic
Transition. Ambassador Carney will head to Embassy Baghdad in the days
ahead to help the Government of Iraq meet its financial
responsibilities, specifically on budget execution, job creation, and
capital investment projects.
regional diplomacy
Iraq does not exist in isolation from the region. It will require
the help and support of its neighbors to have a stable, prosperous, and
peaceful future. As you know, Secretary Rice recently returned from
travel to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait--where she met with the
Foreign Ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) plus Egypt and
Jordan to urge support for the Government of Iraq and the President's
new strategy. Her interlocutors expressed their strong concern over the
growth of negative Iranian involvement in Iraq and al-Qaeda terror. At
the same time, they made clear their concern that the current Iraqi
Government was acting in a manner that reflected a sectarian rather
than national agenda.
We understand these concerns, and we believe the Iraqi Government
understands as well. Prime Minister Maliki and his government have
pledged not to tolerate any act of violence from any community or
group. That means that all those engaged in killing and intimidation,
whether Shia or Sunni, need to be confronted.
We have already begun to see some positive steps taken by the Iraqi
authorities on this front. Notably, Iraqi security forces in recent
weeks have detained more than 400 JAM fighters, including some high-
level leaders responsible for ordering sectarian attacks against Sunni
innocents. Iraqi forces have operated in all areas, including Sadr
City. However, we will need to continue to see more sustained robust
action in the weeks and months ahead.
Only through new facts on the ground--tangible evidence of action
against all those who pursue violence--can the Government of Iraq
establish the credibility at home and abroad that it needs to chart a
successful future.
While we are working with our partners in the region to strengthen
peace, two governments--Syria and Iran--have chosen to align themselves
with the forces of violent extremism in Iraq and elsewhere. The problem
is not a lack of dialog, but a lack of action by those states. As the
President and Secretary Rice have stated, we will continue, in
particular, to work with the Iraqis and those who support peace and
stability in the region, using all our power to limit and counter the
activities of Iranian agents who are attacking our people and innocent
civilians in Iraq.
supporting physical infrastructure and democracy with the iraq relief
and reconstruction fund (irrf)
While our focus is on the way forward, we are also determined to
manage, as effectively as possible, the remaining funds for Iraq
reconstruction.
In fiscal years 2003-04, we received $20.9 billion in the Iraq
Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). This funding was intended to
kick start the Iraqi economy, and focused primarily on helping to
reestablish the Iraqi security forces and police; restore essential
services like water, electricity, and oil; and improve health and
education. Despite challenges, including insurgent attacks, IRRF
projects have made significant improvements in Iraq. We have increased
access to clean water for 4.2 million Iraqis and to sewerage for 5.1
million; installed, rehabilitated, or maintained 2,700 MW of
electricity; and helped Iraq increase oil production over prewar
levels. Democracy programs also helped Iraq hold three elections and
provided advisers to support the drafting of the constitution.
We have obligated 98 percent, or $18.08 billion of IRRF II, and, as
of January 9, have disbursed $14.7 billion (79.9 percent). The
remaining funds under IRRF II are ``expired,'' and will be used to
cover any unanticipated increases in costs in ongoing projects. We
expect to complete most ongoing IRRF II projects during the course of
2007.
We have made significant improvements in essential services
available to the people of Iraq, of which U.S. taxpayers and the
Congress can be proud. But we know that not every project has
progressed as we would have wished. Some projects have deservedly
attracted attention, including from the Congress and from Special
Inspector General for Iraq (SIGIR), with whom we work very closely. In
all such cases, we have taken action to get them moving back in the
right direction and have moved over the past 18 months to put in place
management oversight structures to help ensure that similar problems do
not occur.
supporting iraq's transition to self-sufficiency with the fy06
supplemental and fy07 budget request
We carefully designed the FY06 supplemental and the FY07 budgets as
two parts of a coordinated whole. The FY06 supplemental was designed to
be integrated with the military's counterinsurgency operations,
recognizing that economic development cannot take place without a
secure environment, and that better economic and political prospects
would undermine the recruiting efforts of the insurgency. The FY06
supplemental addressed the urgent programs needed to support military
counterinsurgency programs, while the FY07 budget contained the
programs needed to create and sustain economic, political, and rule-of-
law improvements.
We received $61 million in the FY06 budget, and an additional $1.6
billion in the FY06 supplemental budget at the end of FY06. Of total
funding in FY06 (base and supplemental), we have obligated $1.4 billion
(86 percent) for programs in the security, economic, and political
tracks of the President's strategy. Of this funding, more than $500
million is allocated to support programs coordinated by the Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to build the capacity of local and
provincial governments to provide services for the Iraqi people. Over
$300 million is being used for programs to enhance the rule of law;
governance, civil society, and political party development; and Iraqi
ministerial capacity. Other programs in the FY06 supplemental are also
helping Iraq improve the protection of its critical oil and electricity
infrastructure.
We directed the $771 million in the FY07 budget request to support
a new phase of policy engagement with the first full-term Government of
Iraq (GOI) on a range of programs, including rule of law, democracy,
and economic reforms essential to Iraq's transition to self-reliance.
need for fy07 foreign assistance
While we are currently applying FY06 funds to begin implementation
of our new strategy, we will need additional funds very soon. Under a
continuing resolution (CR), we are now requesting $538 million to avoid
a shutdown of mission critical programs for which we requested funding
11 months ago.
Delaying funding of these programs until future budget requests
would undermine our ability to support our military counterparts and
our Iraqi partners. Without funding for our PRT expansion and programs
to support economic development and assistance to moderate Iraqi
leaders, it will be difficult to achieve the unity of effort we need to
be successful.
achieving success
The Iraqi Government must meet the goal it has set for itself--
establishing a democratic, unified, and secure Iraq. We believe the
Iraqi Government understands very well the consequences of failing to
make the tough decisions necessary to allow all Iraqis to live in peace
and security. President Bush has been clear with Prime Minister Maliki
on this, as have Secretary Rice and other senior officials. We expect
the Prime Minister to follow through on the pledges he made to the
President to take difficult decisions.
A political solution in Iraq is indeed critical to long-term
success, but since al-Qaeda launched the Samarra attack a year ago,
extremists and terrorists have been able to hold the political process
hostage. The President's strategy is intended to lower the level of
sectarian violence and to ensure that Iraq's political center has the
space it needs to negotiate lasting political accommodations through
Iraq's new democratic institutions.
The President has made clear to Prime Minister Maliki that
America's commitment is not open-ended. The Government of Iraq must--
with our help, but with their lead--articulate and achieve the
political, security, and economic goals that are essential to the
success that is so critical for Iraq and for the United States.
Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions and ideas.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
General.
STATEMENT OF BG MICHAEL D. JONES, USA, J-5 DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR
POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS--MIDDLE EAST, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,
WASHINGTON, DC
General Jones. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, and members of
the committee, I'm honored to be here. And, Mr. Chairman, I do
vividly remember your visit to Baghdad and I just want to say--
to all of the members of this committee--how grateful the
military is for the numerous trips that you all have made to
Iraq to listen to the commanders and the servicemembers on the
ground about the situation there. It means a great deal.
And also, to thank you for your steadfast support of the
men and women in uniform, and providing them the tools that
they need to accomplish their mission. And I'd be remiss if I
didn't also say, thank you for your support of our civilians
who serve with us side-by-side and are exposed to the same
dangers. So, thank you very much for your support, and I look
forward to answering your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
We'll begin with 8-minute rounds of questioning, if that's
all right with my colleagues.
Let me, Mr. Secretary, begin with one of the things that I
still find factually conflicting, and I don't know who's
correct. You quoted, and it's been quoted repeatedly in the
last week or so, that to demonstrate that the Prime Minister is
going to be even-handed in dealing with the bad guys, that I
think you said 600 and some members of the Mahdi Militia have
been arrested.
Now, Sadr, when confronted with these numbers, indicated
that it was really 425 that had been arrested, and of that 425,
96 had been arrested in 2006, and the remainder had been
arrested in 2004, after the uprising in Najaf. So, for a point
of clarification, if you know, and if you don't, submit it for
the record--how many of these 600 and some Mahdi Militia have
been arrested in the last 2 months, or thereabouts?
Ambassador Satterfield. Mr. Chairman, there are some 600
Jaysh al-Mahdi figures currently in coalition custody as a
result of joint Iraqi-United States operations. I will get back
to you with the details on the timing of their detention. What
I can tell you is that a very significant portion of those 600
were detained in operations that have been undertaken over the
course of the recent past.
The Chairman. Recent past meaning weeks? Or years?
Ambassador Satterfield. Recent past meaning weeks.
The Chairman. Well that would be----
Ambassador Satterfield. I'll get you the numbers, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. That'd be very useful, because, as you know,
that matters, because a lot of us have seen--have thought we
have seen an erosion of the willingness of the government to
deal with Sadr--as a matter of fact, it seemed to me in 2004
there was a greater willingness to deal with him than there was
in 2005, than there was in 2006, and the question is: ``What
about 2007?'' Anyway, that was the first question.
[The information supplied by the State Department follows:]
As Vice President Cheney said on January 28, Iraqi forces have
rounded up as many as 600 members of the Jaysh al-Mahdi in the last
couple of weeks. This number is changing due to ongoing operations. For
the most current figures, we recommend you contact the Department of
Defense.
Second, the supplemental that is being requested, $238
million--how much of that supplemental, if you know, will go to
private security for contracts, and how much of that is
actually going for specific reconstruction projects? In other
words, labor costs and material, versus private--and I'm not
suggesting there's anything wrong or nefarious about hiring
private security contractors--but as we know, as your office
has reported to us over the last year--a significant portion of
the reconstruction money has not gone to physical bricks and
mortars and paying employees, but it's gone to private security
forces. Can you give us some sense, of the supplemental, what
portion of that is really going to security, as opposed to
bricks, mortar, and labor costs?
Ambassador Satterfield. Certainly, Mr. Chairman, we will
get you those specific breakdowns.
[The information submitted by the State Department
follows:]
U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC, February 1, 2007.
Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: In response to your question to Ambassador David
Satterfield during his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on January 25, we would like to provide you with the
following information.
You asked about project security costs. Under the Iraq Relief and
Reconstruction Fund (IRRF), security costs represent 16-22 percent of
the overall cost of major infrastructure reconstruction projects in
Iraq. For nonconstruction projects such as national capacity
development or policy reform, USAID's security costs represent 18-22
percent of overall costs, but can be as low as 4-5 percent. The U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers estimates that security costs are only 5-10
percent for nonconstruction projects, such as infrastructure
sustainment or technical training.
Please note that we do not plan to use the FY06 Supplemental funds
for new, large-scale infrastructure construction. Therefore, given the
current security environment, we expect that the great majority of
funding (80-90 percent) will be used for direct costs and project
management costs, and the remainder for security costs.
The President's forthcoming foreign assistance requests are also a
critical part of our strategy to assist Iraq's transition to self-
reliance, providing crucial support for programs in democracy, economic
growth, community stabilization, rule of law, and other critical areas.
We look forward to working with the committee to answer any questions
you may have on this or any other matter.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey T. Bergner,
Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.
The Chairman. Third, are you able to report to us at this
time what progress is actually being made on de-Baathification?
Again, I have vivid memory of my second trip, and being with
Ambassador Bremer, and him very proudly announcing to our
collective surprise that we were going to shut down all of the
government-run factories, and some of us pointed out that this
wasn't Poland, and Jeffrey Sachs wasn't the economist running
the show, and second, that there was basically total de-
Baathification, including teachers and anyone that had ever
belonged to the party. And a number of us in this committee,
including the chairman, thought that was maybe not the smartest
thing to do, and so we've been trying to climb back out of that
hole.
But then again, we've had our great ally in charge of de-
Baathification, the man who gave us all of the inside
intelligence as to what we're going to find in Iraq--Ahmed
Chalabi. Is he still in charge of de-Baathification? And has
he--as they say in the southern part of my State, has the boy
had an alter call? Has he figured out anything?
Ambassador Satterfield. Mr. Chairman, de-Baathification
reform is a critical element in any meaningful national
reconciliation. The effect of how de-Baathification has been
applied is to exclude from participation in national life,
large classes of Iraqis who have no individual criminality
associated with them. They need to come back into national
life, for a number of different reasons related to the future
of that country.
The Chairman. That's a welcome change in our policy, it's
been changed for awhile.
Ambassador Satterfield. Yes; it has.
The Chairman. Now, can you tell me what progress--you said,
I don't want to put words in your mouth, I got the impression
you were optimistic about reforms that were going to take place
within the present unity government to deal with de-
Baathification in the sense that--say, commonsense terms, more
folks will be brought in out of the cold. Can you tell us
anything about that progress?
Ambassador Satterfield. Yes; I can Mr. Chairman. The
Parliament is responsible, the Council of Representatives, for
de-Baathification. Ahmed Chalabi is indeed in charge of the
committee responsible for this program. The initial outlinings
of the reforms proposed, frankly, are not adequate to meet the
needs of meaningful national reconciliation--they need to be
changed. We have had very direct conversations with Mr. Chalabi
and others on this issue; the Prime Minister has articulated
publicly a very expansive intent with respect to de-
Baathification reform, but that expansive intent needs to be
translated from rhetoric into reality and it needs to happen
soon.
The Chairman. Well, if it goes through Chalabi, it will be
a cold day in Hades before I have confidence in anything he
undertakes. Just for the record--I want to emphasize it, I
can't emphasize it enough--I have zero, zero, zero confidence
in anything Mr. Chalabi undertakes, just to be on the record. I
find him to be a duplicitous individual. And I have no faith,
and I think he's one of our giant problems, and continues to
be. But as you can see, I have no strong feelings about it.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I might add my
absolute agreement, and would the record show that I support
everything you've said. I find it astounding. I find it
astounding--it's not my time to question--that this man is
still on the American payroll. You might, when I get my chance
to question, recite Mr. Chalabi's record on behalf of this
country.
Ambassador Satterfield. Mr. Chairman, if I could just----
Senator Hagel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, it's your question.
Ambassador Satterfield [continuing]. Comment. Ahmed Chalabi
is not on the American payroll.
The Chairman. That's good news.
Senator Hagel. No; that's a question, but what I'm saying
is, when I have my opportunity to question you, Mr. Ambassador,
I would like a reflection of his record, on our payroll, all
the money we've given him, what he did to us, the bad
information, the mischaracterization of what was going on--I'll
ask that for the record, but you might want to be thinking
about that, as well as you, General, if you can offer anything.
Thank you very much, I'm sorry that----
The Chairman. No; that's OK. We have a small enough group
here that I don't mind at all any of this interchange.
I'll just conclude, though, by asking you, General. I
wasn't being solicitous when I said, I have been so impressed--
so incredibly impressed--with the talent of our uniformed
military, working with the American civilians who--as you
pointed out, are risking their lives.
I can remember my son, when he was in, as a civilian--he's
now in the military--but a civilian working in Kosovo for the
Justice Department, he was a representative for the U.S.
Justice Department. And I remember him coming back, and the way
he talked about the military and what they did. As a matter of
fact, you guys were a bad influence on him. He got back and at
32 years old, he joined the military. He's now the attorney
general of the State of Delaware, and he's joined the military.
You guys. My wife will never forgive you for being so good.
But, my point is this, and I'm not joking about this--the
efficacious way in which you have used the funds in what is--
what's the term of art again? It slipped my mind, the fund
available to the military for reconstruction?
General Jones. CERP funds, sir?
The Chairman. CERP funds. How much is plussed up on those
funds? What portion of this supplemental, what portion of the
billion, if it is--it might turn out to be $2 billion--are they
in the same basket, or are they separate accounts? Can you tell
us how that works?
General Jones. Sir, my understanding is that all of the
CERP funds are out of the DOD portion of the supplemental, and
they're designated as such.
The Chairman. So the $538 million supplemental would not
cover any of the CERP funds?
Ambassador Satterfield. Mr. Chairman, the $538 million is
continuing resolution moneys.
The Chairman. No; I'm sorry, that's what I meant to say.
Ambassador Satterfield. Under the supplemental, we will be
requesting a significant amount of funding, which the Secretary
will be enunciating when she comes up before the Congress
shortly, for what amounts to a civilian CERP program, with a
request for the kinds of authorities to spend those funds on
the ground, as the military commanders now have.
We view the military CERP program as an outstanding
success. We want to help augment, supplement, and expand along
the purposes of the military CERP with a civilian CERP
administered in large part, through the new PRTs, the existing
PRTs, with their military columns. So, there will be a
significant request coming.
The Chairman. I'm about 20 seconds over, if you'll indulge
me for one more quick question. One of the things that all of
us have talked about on this committee, and both parties, I
think, is the need to get more talented civilians on the
ground.
Under the leadership--and I'm not being solicitous here--
sometimes, I think people think we're just being solicitous,
saying nice things about this guy. Let me be precise--the
chairman had hours and hours and hours of meetings with
Democrats and Republicans, former high-ranking administration
officials in previous administrations. The best that he could
muster, and we agreed on, the most talented people we've worked
with, I'd say, in the last I don't know how many years, and the
idea the chairman had, and I hope you will expand on this, and
I don't want to suggest what he should question, but I hope he
talks about at some point, was the recognition that the missing
ingredient--among other things--and such a massive undertaking
as we did in Iraq, was to have a readily available cadre--
essentially a civilian army--of people with real, genuine
skills, interagency cooperation. As the retired generals before
you went in said to us in our July 2002 hearings: Look, the
problem we have with the proceedings in Iraq--of course this is
before we went in--is that we need as many talented civilians,
military police, civilian experts going in with the military to
have any chance of making it work in Iraq.
And so the chairman came up with a very, very thoughtful
proposal that we ended up getting into the State Department
legislation. The President referenced it in the written
document, and I guess, now that I say it, I'm a minute and 20
over--I'll withhold, because it will take awhile for you to
answer that question. But I want to come back and have you
speak, for the record, to what the President talked about. It
comports with the legislation from the Senator from Indiana,
and I was happy to cosponsor, and put it forward. And what that
means in terms of a reorganization, is that we have to have a
different mindset about us when we project force into another
country. That's a more complicated, longer subject, but the
real quick question that relates to that is, you indicated that
you were pleased that some talented State Department people
have signed up to step into the breach and go into Iraq. From
our discussions in Iraq, at the Embassy, inside the Green
Zone--between you and me and others, I know firsthand that
there are some very talented people at the State Department.
I asked the same question 6 months ago, about agriculture
people, about Commerce Department people, about people who are
in the public works side of this event. The agencies that are
basically--according to General Chiarelli--incapable. A great
line I heard from the General, ``Senator, if you ever hear me
criticize a bureaucrat again, pop me.'' There's no bureaucracy
here.
And he gave an example about you guys going out and
spraying the date palms because the Agriculture Department did
not do it and the State Department wasn't particularly
interested in it, other than letting them do it. So, my
specific question, and I'll cease--is how many State Department
personnel are we talking about that are going to be moving from
the building in town to Baghdad to help implement this new or
more informed reconstruction effort?
Ambassador Satterfield. Mr. Chairman, the State Department
currently has over 140 Foreign Service officers in Baghdad,
over 50 in the existing PRTs--that's the largest presence of
the Foreign Service in any country in the world.
The Chairman. Right, I know that.
Ambassador Satterfield. We have an additional large number
of individuals contracted through the State Department who
serve as full-time employees working with IRMO and other
entities in the country. As a result of this surge, some dozen
additional State Department officers will be heading the new
PRTs; but the skill sets, of the over 300 civilians whom our
brigade commanders, our own PRT staffs want out there, are not
skill sets which one finds within, typically, the Department of
State. They're camel vets----
The Chairman. Right.
Ambassador Satterfield [continuing]. They're agricultural
irrigation specialists. They are very highly----
The Chairman. Are they contractors, or are they out of the
Department of Agriculture? Are they out of----
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, we are going to be
working--and are working now--with the Department of Defense as
well as with other agencies, including Agriculture, when
identifying who and when bodies will be produced. I can tell
you that for the initial surge, the majority of the individuals
that we will be bringing in--let's look at the next 6 to 9
months, period--where we've got to get guys on the ground--will
be coming out of Department of Defense resources. They can
tap--they can move people with these skills.
The Chairman. Contractors? Contract personnel? That's not
bad; I just want to understand what we're talking about here. I
mean----
General Jones. Sir, I believe that between the two
Secretaries what they've discussed are actually reservists who
have skill sets which in our Reserve component----
The Chairman. That's what I thought.
General Jones. They're very talented.
The Chairman. So, you're talking a total of roughly a dozen
State Department officers----
Ambassador Satterfield. To head the PRTs.
The Chairman. Head the Department. OK; thank you. I've gone
well over my time, 5 minutes, and I apologize.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I just wanted to carry on in that area, is that Senator
Biden has generously referenced our meetings with people from
various Departments. The total view was that in the old days we
were not involved in ``nation-building.'' And some people feel
we should still not be involved, but we are, in fact, and we're
talking about this very explicitly today. And in order to have
the Civilian Reserve Corps that we need--whether lawyers,
attorneys, economists, engineers, health workers, and so
forth--this is going to require a lot of organization.
Now, we didn't raise the question of who does it. But, at
some point--and I was intrigued, as Senator Biden was, when the
President in his State of the Union Message mentioned this
Civilian Reserve Corp. We are not asking you today to flesh
this out, but it almost is as revolutionary as the year before
when the President said we were addicted to Middle East oil. In
other words, it was an extraordinary breakthrough.
Now, bureaucrats, or even the Secretaries may not
understand what the President has in mind yet. I hope that they
do. There is no possible way in which the United States can
become successfully involved in one country after another,
without having a huge number of people who are willing to serve
in a Reserve capacity, willing to go when called, and who have
skills.
When the three of us were in Baghdad at the time the
chairman has referenced, fortunately, the security was better.
We were venturing out into neighborhoods. We visited a
neighborhood council meeting in which people raising concerns
about what was going to happen in their schools, or what was
going to happen in the neighborhood group, and so forth.
Now, unfortunately, in one of these meetings, there was a
brilliant second lieutenant----
The Chairman. That's right, yeah.
Senator Lugar [continuing]. Who was, really, serving almost
like the superintendent of schools for this area. For that
matter, he had legal training, he was able to advise these
people, they had extraordinary confidence in him. And I
thought, thank goodness, somehow or other, in the course of all
of this, somebody like this arrived quite by chance as it was
explained to us.
But we really cannot always guess that this will happen,
and this, in fact, was an Army reservist as I--and he was going
to be gone in 3 months, and so, you know, we're back to ground
zero. And I just ask you not, today, to produce, in response to
this question, all the explicit details, but please, you know,
for the record, give us some idea of how serious the
President's proposal is going to be taken? The legislation we
passed last year, in 2006, that several of us cosponsored, is
there for the taking, and we'll have another go at it
legislatively and hopefully see it pass the House this time
around. But ultimately, someone in the administration has to
act upon it--and really press the action.
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator and Mr. Chairman, because
you both referred to the same concept--this is an
extraordinarily good idea; it's a very necessary thing. State
Department Foreign Service officers are commissioned officers,
the military are commissioned officers, we can order service.
The Department of Agriculture doesn't have the ability to order
its civilians to deploy to a combat zone. There needs to be a
reserve of talented individuals in a database that can be
tapped--not just for Iraq--but for other situations like this.
And we very much want to move forward on this, it's very
necessary.
And just a word on the date-palm spraying--this was an
extraordinary example of civilian military coordination. The
Iraqi agriculture authorities were unable in the end to
organize themselves to obtain the necessary spraying equipment
for this vital undertaking. Through close work with our
military, the Corps, General Chiarelli, our Embassy in Maldova,
I was directly involved in this--we mobilize the delivery of
the helicopters necessary--but this was very much a State
Department and military joint undertaking.
Senator Lugar. Well, I'm--we congratulate you on that
coordination.
Let me just say, getting back to the beginning of your
statement as you talked about the $538 million and the
continuing resolution to avoid the shutdown--quite apart from
the additional moneys--what, I've found, at least in our
oversight thus far, is that the State Department is not unique
in this, but today I'll--since you're here, Secretary
Satterfield, I would just say, there's never been very much
explicit detail as to how many persons were going, what they
were doing, and so forth.
In other words, we have on the one hand, now, a much more
explicit detail in terms of the armed services, how many
persons are going where, and almost detailing neighborhood by
neighborhood--but when it comes to the civilian side, this has
never been quite so explicit.
My general feeling is from the tenor of the conversation we
had around the table yesterday, that this committee, maybe
others, in terms of our oversight, are going to request
frequently--if not weekly, biweekly--what's happening? In other
words, this is not a situation now in which we go on from year
to year and we take a look back a couple of years ago, and see
how it all went. This is very much on the minds of the American
people now. As to, physically, who gets there, and where they
go and what they do. So I--once again, you cannot furnish a
book today for us, but I'm really asking you to begin to
prepare something that is much more detailed, in terms of the
precise amounts of money. Otherwise, the $538 in the minds of
many--hopefully not around this table, but elsewhere--will be
lumped with the military, somewhere, as just additional funds.
And, in fact, you've tried to give an explicit way in which
these, other than military procedures, are going to progress.
And we're going to have to try segregate those in our minds,
and the minds of press people who cover this and the audience
that witnesses, because it's very important.
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, I appreciate that point,
and it's a very good one. And it is very germane to what we
will be doing along with our military colleagues with this
committee, and I think with others, here and in the House, over
the time ahead.
There is a synergy between our request, and programs, and
what the military is requesting and doing on the ground.
Senator Lugar. Exactly.
Ambassador Satterfield. But, there is also a distinction.
And we know that there is a requirement, that we not only
explain heading in what we want these funds for and what they
will do, but explain to you as time progresses what is
happening on the ground. We are full scale and we do have a
report on this, which we will look forward to discussing in
great detail.
Senator Lugar. That would be important, and there is a
distinction between--they're all a part of a synergy, but
nevertheless, we need to know the facts.
My office has been sending out the facts that you, or
others, produce monthly to all of our colleagues. So, we know
how many barrels of oil, how many kilowatts in Baghdad--we're
trying to finally get down to the facts, as opposed to some
generalization about the country. Having more details would be
extremely important here.
Now, finally, let me just say, we like to know the facts
about what Ambassador Tim Carney will actually do. Now, we want
to know whether his role will be different, say, from the
Office of Strategic Effects, the Reconstruction Management
Office, the USAID Mission Director--in essence, there are
people doing various things. And it does not occur to some of
us what they do, either. But now that we're explicitly sending
Ambassador Tim Carney, and I think that's a very important
move. What is his authority? What will he do? Does he supervise
the rest of this crew? Or, if not--try, if you can, in some
additional testimony for the record, so that we have some idea
of how to follow him. How oversight can occur with regard to
this very important appointment.
Ambassador Satterfield. Certainly, Senator, we will get
back to you with more detailed commentary on Ambassador Carney
and his role, but if I can, I can summarize it very shortly.
Ambassador Carney will be going out to oversee Iraqi
performance and to help coordinate United States performance
with all of the entities, all of the offices now responsible--
IRMO, AID, our own economic section working closely with MNF-I
and MNC-I on execution of the economic ``build'' part of the
current security undertaking. This is not the job which existed
before this surge; it is something very much related to making
effective what Iraq has to bring to the fight, and coordinate
what we are bringing to the fight. It is to bird-dog, if you
want to use that term, Iraqi performance in a constant dialog.
You need a dedicated person, a single person to be focused on
that effort, and to have the resources and the data from our
side, collectively, on what we're bringing in, to make sure the
two work together. That, in a nutshell, will be Ambassador
Carney's role.
Senator Lugar. Will you be able to share his reports with
us, in other words, as a part of this oversight, what he's
going to be seeing, what you've just described he's going to be
doing. It's tremendously important for all of us to know. Is
there likely to be some reporting flow, in which you get
information from the Ambassador and you can share that for us?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, he will be under Chief of
Mission authority, reporting through the Deputy Chief of
Mission and the Ambassador back to the Department of State, and
we'd be delighted to keep you updated on the progress of those
undertakings.
Senator Lugar. Well, that would be great, hopefully
whatever he has to say will not be muffled by the rest of this.
In other words, we really want to know from somebody on the
ground, what the Iraqis are doing, what they're contributing,
the whole raft of questions, others will ask about that, but
maybe Ambassador Carney can be illuminating.
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, if I could just comment a
moment longer on what you just raised--what's happening on the
ground? What are Iraqis doing? And I'll be expansive in this
response.
Whether it is on the security side, the political side, or
the economic side, the American people--we in the Government--
will demand an updating on what is actually happening. Are
Iraqis doing what they need to do? They've got to be held to a
standard, which is ultimately not ours. But the standard the
Iraqi people demand. That information will be available, and it
is something we will all be following very closely.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Obama.
Senator Obama. Let me defer to Senator Webb.
The Chairman. Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, Mr. Chairman,
I ask you a question, I'm new to this committee, although I did
work as a committee counsel for a number of years on the House
side, and I'm curious about the general rules in the committee
about when testimony is supposed to be submitted? Witness
testimony?
The Chairman. Well, generally, I think it's 24 hours, 24
hours before. But, in the case of General Jones, I'm told we
went to him, we got to him fairly late, is that correct?
Senator Webb. Well, Ambassador, we got your testimony, I
think, after 7 o'clock last night? That makes it very difficult
for myself and my staff to prepare. And I hope that you can
show us a greater courtesy in the future.
I'd like to first make a statement, a statement of strong
concern here. I'm new to this committee, I'm not new to the
issues, I spent 4 years on the Defense Resources Board, going
through these kinds of programs. I'm a data guy, I intend to
really develop some energy--devote some energy to these
programs, not only the State Department side, but I'm on the
Armed Services Committee as you know, and on the Department of
Defense side.
The administration's Iraq construction programs have been
plagued by miserable planning. Iraq is, obviously, not a safe
or an easy place to work, but according to the Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, as well as numerous
public reports, this has been the most poorly managed
reconstruction program in recent memory.
The inspector general has dozens of cases pending,
regarding fraud and abuse. The worst blunders have been made by
the CPA in the Department of Defense. I want you to know that I
am not inclined to support any additional funding in this area
without strong assurances that this sort of mismanagement has
been alleviated.
I've got a number of reports that have been provided to me
by staff, and by the way, this is not anecdotal, and I don't
think it's below the belt to make that comment. Report after
report, oil revenues are in the billions, but Iraq is failing
to spend them--they don't know how to spend the money. I know
this is a chaotic country, but I don't think that really
answers the mail on this kind of stuff.
Idle contractors add millions to Iraq rebuilding. The
highest proportion of overhead--and this is from the New York
Times--overhead costs have consumed more than half of the
budget of some of these reconstruction projects. The highest
percentage was incurred in oil facility contracts--one by KBR,
a Halliburton subsidiary which frequently has been challenged
by Congress--more than half of their money is oversight, just
housing people.
The United States has said to fail on tracking arms shipped
to Iraqis. We don't know, in some cases, whether the weapons we
are sending them are actually ending up in the hands of the
insurgents.
I've got a Special Inspector General Report here on Iraq
reconstruction--I'm sure you're aware of it, I intend to go
through it in detail. I have a GAO study, and what I would like
to ask of you, first of all, here, is that you can make
yourselves available, and if you are otherwise occupied, key
members of your staff. I would like to meet in other than a
committee forum, and to talk with you about these issues.
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, we are delighted to meet
with you to discuss these issues. And we can certainly bring
the staff that is necessary to----
Senator Webb. I appreciate that.
Ambassador Satterfield [continuing]. Explore in detail
these reports.
Senator Webb. When you address your fourth point in here,
you say that you will target, or you will ``channel targeted
assistance to Iraqi leaders, regardless of party or sectarian
affiliation who reject violence and pursue their agendas
through peaceful, democratic means,'' how are you going to
measure this? How are you going to quantify that?
Ambassador Satterfield. There's a very simple test: Are
individuals engaged in violence as a pursuit of their political
or individual ambitions? Or are they working through a
political process?
Senator Webb. Who makes that determination? Who's going to
make that determination?
Ambassador Satterfield. It is the U.S. officials on the
ground--civilian and military--in their direct contact on the
ground who make that determination.
Senator Webb. It's a fairly vague standard, wouldn't you
agree?
Ambassador Satterfield. No; I think it's a very crisp
standard. I think it is very clear who is engaged in violence,
and who is engaged in the political process.
Senator Webb. It's only clear if you have adequate
intelligence.
Ambassador Satterfield. That's correct, Senator, and we do
have intelligence.
Senator Webb. I think we've pretty well demonstrated,
throughout this war, that on the ground there is frequently
inadequate intelligence.
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, the purpose of the
expansion of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, the
additional pairing with our brigade commanders, is to enhance
our ability at a finer and finer level. To have a better
sense----
Senator Webb. I understand. I understand that.
Ambassador Satterfield [continuing]. Of development on the
ground----
Senator Webb. I understand that.
Ambassador Satterfield [continuing]. For exactly this
reason.
Senator Webb. I understand that, Ambassador. I understand
that. These are judgments, though, right? These are going to be
judgments by people on the ground?
Ambassador Satterfield. They are, of course, judgments by
people on the ground.
Senator Webb. OK. So, are you gonna let us know exactly
what kind of standards are being used?
Ambassador Satterfield. We certainly can discuss with you
the kinds of criteria, the kinds of information that we use in
making these determinations.
Senator Webb. You know, basically saying--and having been
in that environment, in this environment, not only in the
military, but as a journalist--including in Afghanistan in
2004, basically saying that someone has rejected violence, to
me, is just a vague standard. We don't know--unless you can
document that in some way--unless you have some assurance.
You're going to be giving people money other than, sort of,
some vague form of payola?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, we take very seriously,
the issue of who U.S. funding----
Senator Webb. I understand the intention, Ambassador.
Ambassador Satterfield. It is based upon a best and better
assessment----
Senator Webb. I understand the intention, and I agree with
the intention. What I'm asking for is some assurance that, in
carrying out that intention, there are measurable standards
that we can apply with respect to intelligence.
Ambassador Satterfield. I can certainly give you that
assurance.
Senator Webb. OK. Can you tell us what percentage of the
funding in these programs has gone to American companies?
Ambassador Satterfield. For the extended IRRF funds?
Senator Webb. For the reconstruction programs.
Ambassador Satterfield. We can get you that information.
Senator Webb. Particularly the construction programs.
Ambassador Satterfield. We can get you that information.
Senator Webb. You don't know that at this moment?
Ambassador Satterfield. I don't have those numbers in front
of me. What I can tell you is that the majority of the funds in
the initial phases of execution went primarily to American and
other multinational design/build companies. That has turned
around, almost completely. The majority of that funding is now
going over 80 percent to Iraqi firms. That is part of a
fundamental reform, from the bottom up, of the reconstruction
program undertaken over the last 18 months. It is a different
program than the program that was initiated in 2006.
Senator Webb. So, in terms of the funding that has been
going forward from what point? Are they now principally Iraqi?
Ambassador Satterfield. Particularly in the course of the
last year, but really, the last 18 months, there has been a
steady shift in funds away from the large design/build
multinationals, including United States firms, to Iraqi
contractors.
Senator Webb. And so you can provide us the information in
terms of the aggregate amounts, and then where your present
contracts are?
Ambassador Satterfield. We can indeed, sir.
Senator Webb. OK; I would like to see that.
Ambassador Satterfield. You will, sir.
Senator Webb. And, again----
The Chairman. You will submit that for the record?
Ambassador Satterfield. Certainly, sir.
[The information supplied by the State Department follows:]
U.S. State Department,
Washington, DC, March 16, 2007.
Hon. Jim Webb,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Webb: In response to your question to Ambassador David
Satterfield during his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on January 27, we would like to provide you with the
following additional information.
You asked for a breakout of reconstruction funds that have gone to
American firms vs. local Iraqis. In our interim response we provided
general information about the evolution of U.S. implementing agencies'
contracting practices. We also undertook to investigate your question
more thoroughly and to provide additional information.
From October 2003 to December 2005, an average of 5.4 percent of
all USG-funded contracts was awarded to Iraqi contractors. However, in
the last 6 months this average has increased to approximately 80
percent. This change reflects a major shift from large, multi-year
contracts implemented by international firms, including U.S. and
regional firms, to small contracts awarded to Iraqi firms.In addition,
many international contractors, including U.S. firms, employ local
staff to execute projects; this should be considered when evaluating
where contract dollars are spent to benefit local employment.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey T. Bergner,
Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.
Senator Webb. And I--as I said--I would reiterate my desire
to be able to meet with you, or your key members in an, other
than a committee setting, so that we can try to get into this
data and try to get a--from my perspective, being a new member
on a committee, an examination of where this past money has
gone.
Ambassador Satterfield. Certainly, sir.
Senator Webb. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator.
There is a vote on, and I'm happy to yield to the Senator
from Tennessee. He'll have time to do his 8 minutes, and then
what we'll do if, by that time, anyone is back from having
voted, we'll just continue the hearing. If not, we'll recess
very briefly.
I want to point out for the record that a number of
Senators who couldn't be here today have expressed the desire
to submit questions in writing, and so, with your permission,
we will submit those to you.
And I hope that the response is quicker than--and I ask you
to make it quicker--than those Senators submitted last July,
which weren't received until December. So, we're not going to
overburden you, but we expect you to answer them in 10 days or
so. By the time we get the answers, they're almost no longer
relevant.
And one last point before I yield is that, I'm going to
enter into the record, there's two very distinguished people in
our audience today--Paul and Rosemary, Paul Schroeder and
Rosemary Palmer--who are parents of Marine LCpl Edward
``Augie'' Schroeder, who was killed on August 3, 2005, near
Haditha. They formed an organization called Families for the
Fallen for Change. It's a nonpartisan organization representing
an awful lot of people.
And I'd like to submit, for the record, for the edification
of all of you, the letter that they addressed to me, but it is,
I think, worthy of every member on the committee having it
available to them. And there's just one quote I'd like to read,
``In our last conversation with Augie,'' that is their son,
``In our last conversation with Augie, he said, `Pop, the
closer we get to leaving, it's clear this is less and less
worth the cost.' '' That's really the question I think we're
all wrestling with here. Is it worth the cost?
Senator Voinovich. Senator, I'm really pleased that you're
submitting the letter from these parents to the record. The
Schroeders are from Ohio, I've met with them----
The Chairman. Oh, is that right? I apologize; I should have
let you do that.
Senator Voinovich. I'm meeting with them today again, and
they're very serious people, they're very concerned, and I
think they've got some questions, it's constructive to hear
from them.
The Chairman. They're here today, I'm corresponding with
them, and I'm glad to hear you say that. We welcome them, and
they have our deepest sympathy.
With that, let me yield now to my friend from Tennessee,
and I'm going to go vote, and come back.
Senator Corker. I'm going to let you're--I think we're
under 6 minutes now on the vote, and I don't know if it's
practical to actually----
The Chairman. All right. Well, as you all know, we never
let the vote go off on time, but I think you're probably right.
Maybe what we should do is recess, recall the chair, and when
Senator Lugar gets back, or whomever gets back, we'll yield
immediately to the Senator from Tennessee, and so we'll
temporarily recess. I thank the witnesses.
[Recess at 10:42 a.m.]
[Reconvened at 11:02 a.m.]
Senator Lugar [presiding]. For the sake of continuity, the
chairman has asked me to continue the meeting, and I'll
recognize now Senator Hagel for his questions.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Gentlemen, thank you, for your time this morning, as well
as your good work and your efforts on behalf of our country,
and please, relay to your colleagues that we appreciate your
efforts and your good work.
I wanted to go back, Mr. Ambassador, briefly to the point I
made regarding the chairman's reference and question regarding
Mr. Chalabi. I don't want to take any of my time dealing with
Mr. Chalabi, but what I would request if you and General Jones
could provide some history of Mr. Chalabi's relationship with
this Government, with this country, including the contracts
that our Government had with him, how much money he got per
month, what was he required to do for that money, and some
history of his record, involvement with the Iranians, and other
pertinent issues that would be helpful to this committee, and I
appreciate that very much. Both DOD and State Department, thank
you.
[The information supplied by the State Department follows:]
In response to your question, we have reviewed this matter and have
determined that the relationship between Dr. Chalabi and the U.S.
Government was addressed in considerable detail by the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) in a report entitled ``The Use by the
Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National
Congress,'' issued September 8, 2006, in both unclassified and
classified versions. Specifically, section II of the report, entitled
``Background on IC Relationships With the INC,'' contains a history of
the U.S. Government's relationship with the INC and Dr. Chalabi,
beginning in May 1991 through May 2004, when the Department of Defense
announced a termination of its funding relationsip. As this is a report
of the Senate Select Committee, I do not wish to comment on its overall
findings. Nevertheless, the Department of State provided extensive
information for that report and made numerous officials available for
interview by the committee. except for some minor issues and omissions,
we find this report, particularly the classified version, a factually
accurate account of the USG's relationship with Dr. Chalabi.
Since the termination of the relationship with the DOD in 2004, the
U.S. Government has maintained contacts with Dr. Chalabi, as we do with
Iraqi officials and other influential members of Iraqi society. Dr.
Chalabi was from 2005 to 2006 the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and has
been a member of the Higher National de-Baathification Commission from
its inception to the present. Since 2004, however, Mr. Chalabi and the
Iraqi National Congress have not received any direct or indirect
funding from the U.S. Government.
We have coordinated this response with the Department of Defense,
the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council
staff.
[The information supplied by DOD follows:]
Elements of the USG maintained contacts with a wide variety of
individuals and groups opposed to Saddam Hussein's regime prior to
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, including Dr. Chalabi and the Iraqi National
Congress (INC). The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) did not have a
relationship with Dr. Chalabi personally, but rather with the INC, a
coalition of Iraqi opposition parties in which Dr. Chalabi served as
the chairman. DIA's routine points of contact with the INC in the
United States were Mr. Intifadh Qanbar and Frances Brooke, the INC
representatives in Washington. DIA maintained contact prior to the war
and in Iraq with Mr. Arras Habib Kareem, Chief of Intelligence for the
INC, in the INC offices in London and Baghdad. DIA was directed by the
Department of Defense to establish an overt Information Collection
Program with the INC, which began in October 2002 and lasted until May
2004. Prior to October 2002, this program was managed by the Department
of State.
DIA did not have any contracts with Dr. Chalabi and therefore he
was not provided any funds. The INC was provided $350,000 each month to
their INC bank account for operational expenses. They submitted a
monthly voucher/expense report that was audited by the DIA Inspector
General's office, and there were no findings.
(U) Like almost all groups opposed to Saddam Hussein's regime, Dr.
Ahmad Chalabi dealt with the Iranians prior to operation IRAQI FREEDOM
as a means to operating in Iraq and surviving Saddam's tyrannical
regime. [Deleted]
Senator Hagel. As I listened carefully, as I always do,
Ambassador Satterfield, to what you have to say, you are one of
our most respected and senior diplomats, and for those years of
service, we appreciate it.
You talked, in your testimony, in fact it was a subheading,
``Regional Diplomacy,'' and you went into a paragraph saying,
``While we are working with our partners in the region to
strengthen peace, two governments--Syria and Iran--have chosen
to align themselves with the forces of violent extremism in
Iraq and elsewhere. The problem is not a lack of dialog, but a
lack of action by those states.'' My question is this: What new
diplomatic U.S. initiatives are we putting forward in the
region, as you have noted here, Regional Diplomacy, trying to
build, focus on a regional strategic framework that would be, I
hope, a rather significant part of what the President is
talking about in his total package.
And, I would add to that, in way of addressing this,
somewhat directly to you, General Jones, as General Petraeus
assumes his new, critically important position in Iraq--and we
all have the highest regard for General Petraeus--he, as you
know, has recently finished rewriting our counterinsurgency
field manual.
And, in that I have not read every page of it, I have read
some of it, in that he notes that probably the most significant
part of success in dealing with counterinsurgencies, is to have
and employ a political strategy. In fact, I think he says
something to the effect that it's almost more important than a
military strategy.
So, with that added into the mix of my question, I would
very much appreciate your thoughts, and if you could enlighten
our committee on what new diplomatic efforts, regarding what
you said here, the United States is taking, and General Jones,
I'd like to hear from you on this, as well. Thank you very
much.
Ambassador Satterfield. Thank you, Senator.
Secretary Rice, commencing in September of the past year,
has been working with our partners in the gulf, with Jordan and
with Egypt to construct a new framework, we call it the GCC for
Gulf Coordination Council, plus two--Jordan and Egypt--as a
framework in which strategic issues can be discussed in a
strategic frame, rather than purely in bilateral fashion.
The Secretary has had several meetings with the GCC-plus-
two Foreign Ministers, most recently this past week in Kuwait.
The topics discussed there were broad: Iraq, Iran--Iran, not
just with respect to its threats to Iraqi security and
stability, but also Iran in a broader regional context, the
Palestinian-Israeli issue--and you know the Secretary had just
been involved prior to her visit to Kuwait in rather intense
diplomacy that established a meeting to take place between
Prime Minister Olmert and President Abu Mazen--as well as the
issues of Lebanon, broad discussion of how those in the region
who are committed to a political process can be strengthened,
can be invigorated, against those radicals who are using
violence; whether that violence is in Palestinian territories,
in Lebanon, in Iraq, or elsewhere, to achieve their ends.
The GCC-plus-two is a very good format for this, because
there's enormous receptivity to the strategic view of the
region, rather than taking each issue independently. I said in
my oral remarks, Iraq can't be considered in isolation from the
region, Iran can't be considered solely as an Iraq-related
issue, either. They need to be addressed comprehensively.
We are seeing progress made, this is the beginning, it's
not the end, of a long process. But we have seen the beginning
taken. But I will note again, with respect to Iraq, there is a
significant impediment to moving forward in mobilization of
real and effective support from the Gulf States for Iraq. And
that is the perception that this government in Baghdad is not
acting from national motivations, but indeed is pursuing a
sectarian agenda.
This is a reality. Whatever one discusses on reality versus
perceptions, it is what they see. And they need to change what
they see. That is why it is so important for the Iraqi
Government, and the conduct of the Baghdad Security Campaign,
in the political initiatives which the government itself is
committed to undertake, that it shows it is a national
government, and is not operating from sectarian motives.
Senator, we can say--the Secretary, the President--all we
want, to our colleagues in the gulf. But they're going to
watch, and what they're going to pay attention to is what
happens on the ground, in Baghdad and elsewhere. And this is a
message we believe Prime Minister Maliki and the senior leaders
around him understand as well.
Senator Hagel. Well, let me follow up a little bit on what
you've said. If I'm hearing this correctly then, what you're
saying there is that there's not going to be a military
solution to this, it's the Iraqi Government, representing the
Iraqi people, representing the various sectarian factions that
must come together to bring stability, security, and peace to
their nation. Is that right?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, there is no question that
the ultimate resolution in Iraq, on security as well as on
other issues, has to be political. But there are real security
deficits right now, because of the sectarian violence focused
in Baghdad that are affecting the ability of Iraqis to move
forward to that political solution.
Senator Hagel. What are the regional partners doing in the
way of, for example, the President laid out a plan to increase
our troop levels--Americans--by 22,000, roughly. Tens of
billions of dollars of new American taxpayers' money going in.
What are we getting from our regional partners? For example,
our coalition of the willing, and you, General, tell me this is
not correct, the Ambassador certainly knows this one way or the
other, but put it on the record. The British are pulling out
their troops, most all of our allies have been there are
withdrawing troops, or have gone.
I asked Secretary Rice when she was here a week and a half
ago, who is putting more troops in, for example. Unless
something's changed, no one is. Who is putting more billions of
dollars in? Who is putting more investment in? Who is doing
more? If you'll answer that, I'd appreciate it, because I do
not see, or have not been told that anybody is doing anything,
other than United States putting more of its blood and treasure
into Iraq. But yet, as you have just noted, Ambassador, this is
Iraqi--this is an Iraqi issue that will be resolved by the
Iraqis. I understand the security issue, and I don't think
there's anybody who doesn't quite get that. But when we talk
about regional diplomacy and regional issues, and working with
our partners, what are our partners doing?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, and I'll defer to my
colleague, General Jones, for specific commentary on the
military side.
What we are doing is trying to mobilize on two different
fronts. To mobilize both politically and in terms of meaningful
economic support--primarily through debt forgiveness, but also
private sector investment. Support, not just from the region,
the primary debtholders we're talking about are in the gulf--
but also from the broader international community, including
Asia and the European Union.
The Iraqis have moved forward with a very bold, very
progressive, economic statement of principles, much of which
have already been implemented, or are being implemented, and
deserve quite a bit of praise. But the ability to rally
meaningful support in the face of these positive steps on
macroeconomic issues by the Iraqis is colored by the security
situation on the ground in Baghdad, and with respect to the
Gulf States, by this perception of sectarian/vice-
national agenda, and that needs to be addressed by Iraqis.
On the coalition side, the coalition remains intact. Our
critical partners, the United Kingdom, which has indicated a
desire over the course of the next several months to reduce
force levels to, I believe, 4,500, but to keep forces in Iraq
at least through the end of this year. Poland, which is
similarly committed to retaining its forces, El Salvador, the
South Koreans, our key partners are not moving.
But they are not engaged----
Senator Hagel. They are moving; they're reducing their
forces.
Ambassador Satterfield. But they are not leaving.
Senator Hagel. But they're not increasing, like we are, and
that's my overall question: Who is putting more investment in,
like we are? Who is putting more dollars? Who is putting more
of their reputation, their treasure, their blood, their
investment, in? That's my question.
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, there is--the Baghdad
Security Plan augmentation is U.S., it is not a coalition
issue. And that's based upon our own commander's assessment of
the kind of forces, the numbers of forces and the timing for
the application of those forces required.
On the economic side, there is continued fund flow from
partners, such as the European Union, from Japan, from others,
but not directly associated with this surge.
Senator Hagel. Well, my time is up, and I've gone over and
I appreciate that, and if we have another round, I'll have a
chance to come back.
Ambassador Satterfield. Certainly.
Senator Hagel. But, General Jones, I know you've not had a
chance to answer, but we'll come back.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Senator Hagel.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, General Jones and Ambassador
Satterfield, thank you for coming today.
Ambassador, let me take a minute to thank the men and women
who work at the State Department. At this and other hearings
we, of course, appropriately and often recognize the sacrifices
and valor of U.S. military personnel in Iraq, and rightly so.
We should not forget the dedication and determination and
courage of the members of the U.S. Foreign Service and civil
servants, that they have displayed in Iraq.
State Department personnel are accustomed to hardship
assignments--which are now becoming almost the norm in the
world--and these mostly, unarmed, individuals are working hard
in Iraq under the most dangerous of circumstances. My
colleagues and I appreciate the U.S. Foreign Service and their
families, and the civil servants at the State Department for
their unique efforts in Iraq, and around the world.
Ambassador and General, let me move to some questions.
Given the fact that the topline indicators in Iraq--things like
the number of displaced persons, and attacks on civilians, and
the strength of militias, just to name a few--are all
increasing, it appears that our efforts in Iraq--whether
political, military, or economic--have yet to yield significant
results.
Can you explain how, given this rising instability, the
administration is adjusting or calibrating its efforts to
continue reconstruction efforts in the future? More
specifically, what are you going to do differently, in the
President's, so-called, ``New Wave Forward'' that we've heard a
lot--we've heard a lot about these kinds of things before,
including the PRTs.
Ambassador.
Ambassador Satterfield. Certainly.
Senator, first let me thank you for your kind remarks
regarding the Foreign Service and our civilian colleagues, and
I'd just like to note, five of those colleagues perished this
week from BlackWater in a shoot-down that was attendant to
their efforts to secure one of our reconstruction officer's
safety as he moved from one of his official meetings back to
the Embassy compound. And we remember them, as well as our
other colleagues who have sacrificed so much in Iraq, both from
the military and civilian services.
With respect to your question--we have radically
transformed--and I use the term radically in an advised
fashion--over the course of the last 18 months. And we will
continue that reformation of how and what we do with taxpayer
moneys in Iraq.
We took the IRRF program--that's the large $20 billion
reconstruction program launched in 2003--we reexamined it from
the bottom up, starting in the late summer of 2005. We relooked
at where we could reallocate funds to achievable projects, to
Iraqi-contracted projects, rather than multinational or design/
build contracts, to place greater responsibility and
accountability into Iraqi hands and to ensure that we had--the
U.S. Government--a much greater ability than the admittedly,
very defective oversight mechanisms which existed during the
earlier part of the IRRF program. And with the good work of Stu
Bowen, and the SIGIR, we have been able to affect very
significant changes.
We're going to continue those because, Senator, we're
getting out of the reconstruction business in Iraq. Over the
course of 2007, the calendar year, at the latest, the beginning
of 2008, the remaining unspent, but obligated, IRRF funds will
burn through. They will be spent on projects.
What we are asking money for is not more reconstruction.
Iraqis need to take charge of reconstruction of their country;
the international community needs to come up to the table on
reconstruction, as they always have needed to do.
We're going to be focused on programs like community
support. Working with local leaders, local figures, local
projects that are Iraqi-designed, that have Iraqi stakeholders,
that are designed to improve the situation at a local level.
Obviously, we're not ignoring Baghdad. There is a critical
post-kinetic stabilization requirement in Baghdad as we move
from Clear and Secure, to Build. And there will be a similar
need in Anbar province. And we've asked for the resources in
terms of people and in terms of money to do that.
But it's not going to be big-ticket reconstruction anymore.
It's going to be small projects, microenterprise lending, job
generation. And the chairman asked a question about: What kind
of jobs are we talking about here? Well, we're talking about,
on the Iraqi and the United States side, in the immediate term,
after you clear and secure a neighborhood, getting people back
to work. That's a short-term undertaking. But short-term, 60/
90/128 job programs really can't be sustained over time, and
they're not good to sustain over time. You need a longer term,
employment generating program that brings meaningful jobs to
people--not just picking up trash, not just rebuilding damaged
roads.
And that's where the Iraqis kick in. Their $10 billion
needs to be applied, in large measure, to those longer term
programs. We're working with them on the kinds of training,
structures they will need to generate those kinds of jobs in
Baghdad, Anbar, and other troubled areas.
Senator Feingold. General.
General Jones. Senator, first of all, I would endorse this
change in direction that the Ambassador just outlined, in terms
of the types of projects and the effect that they will have.
Essential to that, I believe, are the PRTs, as well as the
Minister of Capacity Development that is going on, because as
we do this shift, what I believe is important is Iraqi
capacity.
The reconstruction teams, one of--if I had to say what I
thought their most important contribution will be--is in
helping the Iraqis to develop capacity of their government to
do the things to, for instance, spend this $10 billion in a
productive way that's going to make a real difference in the
country for its people.
So, I think the renewed emphasis by the Iraqis on using
their money to do reconstruction will make a significant
change, as well as our commitment to helping them develop the
capacity to spend it well.
Senator Feingold. But, you know, I hear the ideas of a
different approach, but let me just ask you this: I've been
given this horrible story, Ambassador, you just told about
trying to secure a reconstruction site--does the administration
have a contingency plan? If security and economic and military
efforts don't work in this President's New Way Forward?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, I'll answer that in two
different parts.
First, with respect to the specific funding that we will be
requesting--the projects, the kinds of purposes we were
applying those moneys to very much reflect the reality, the
stark reality of the security situation on the ground. We're
not engaging in projects we don't believe can be completed, and
completed by Iraqis under the conditions that prevail today.
We're trying to change those conditions, but we're not blue-
skying this. This is a very reality-based set of programs.
The second answer to your question, which is really--if I
can take it--what's the plan B? We're focused on making plan A
a success, we believe it can succeed, and we're not going to
discuss the alternatives, that is, the plan for a less than
successful option while we are trying now to initiate the steps
necessary to make our primary strategy succeed.
Senator Feingold. Well, I hope you'll consider that,
because I think one of the problems we have here is that we,
obviously, hope things work out, and this has to do with the
whole mission, with the whole military issue. But I think we do
have to think at two different levels at the same time and have
a contingency plan.
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, we appreciate----
Senator Feingold. Because there's so many things that have
been tried haven't worked. So I would urge you to do both, I
know you have a lot on your plate.
And just, again, on the PRTs you said that the State
Department plans on doubling the number of PRTs, and sending an
additional 300 new personnel to staff them.
Given that these have worked pretty well in Afghanistan,
why has it taken so long to get PRTs up and running in Iraq? I
know there's security concerns, but why hasn't it been made
more of a priority in the past?
Ambassador Satterfield. Several issues here, Senator. The
Baghdad, or I'm sorry, the Iraqi PRTs--going back to their
launch in late summer of 2005/early fall 2005, are
fundamentally different from the Afghan PRTs, both in their
structure--the Afghan PRTs are almost entirely military--they
are very small scale. The Baghdad and the non-Baghdad PRTs in
Iraq are very large entities, they are located in areas which
are often contested, they are active combat zones, and they are
very much a civil military undertaking. They are a much more
sophisticated and complex set of bodies.
They have taken off. The 10 PRTs that exist today have been
up and running for some time, they've got a lot of successes
under their belts, and we're moving these next 10 PRTs,
starting with the critical nine in Anbar and Baghdad very, very
swiftly. This is a 60-to-90-day up and running timeframe.
Senator Feingold. My time is up, but General, do you want
to quickly respond to that?
General Jones. Yes, Senator. I'd reinforce that they are
two significantly different situations. In Afghanistan, a lot
of what the PRTs are doing is trying to create those efforts in
order to tie into what has been a very weak central government
in that country.
In Iraq, you have a fundamentally opposite problem, and
that is overcentralization of the government, so now the PRTs
need to help create capacity in provinces and in municipalities
where before, they didn't have the authority or the resources
to be able to function. So, there are significant differences
between the two.
Senator Feingold. Thanks to both of you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much.
Senator Coleman.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First I want to associate myself with the praise that my
colleague from Wisconsin has offered to the State Department
folks for their service and their sacrifice--you've got some
extraordinary people there. In Iraq I met with Ambassador Joe
Saloom, who is overseeing reconstruction efforts--I don't know
if there's anybody better in that area. And Bob Murphy, dealing
with rule of law and Par Sido and others, and they're really
extraordinary folks.
Ambassador Satterfield. Thank you.
Senator Coleman. And I hope they know how much we
appreciate their service, and the challenge of their service.
Let me talk a little bit about oil production. I think it
was the chairman who noted in his opening comments that we may
be looking at 200,000 barrels a day of what I call ``corruption
leakage'' from the production output. When we were there, in
the briefings we received, it was indicated that it's hard to
distinguish between the common criminals, the terrorists, and
the government folks. And I'm wondering if we have a New Way
Forward in terms of dealing with the oil production issue,
dealing with the security issue, dealing with the corruption
issue. Is there a New Way Forward in protecting oil production,
a New Way Forward in dealing with the corruption leakage?
I believe that this ``corruption leakage'' from the oil
production is clearly, at least in part funding some of the
violence in Iraq. It is funding the extremist killings that are
taking place. So this is a critical element, I think, of
security. Not just the economy, but security. I would like to
be updated as to what our plan is to do a better job of
protecting oil production and limiting corruption associated
with it.
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, oil production has
steadily increased, and at a sustainable figure over the course
of 2006. And, in fact, both production and export levels are up
over all but the 2 weeks that immediately preceded the March
invasion of Iraq. Over the average of production and exports
from Iraq in 2002, and that's a very positive sign. Because oil
remains the primary money earner for the Iraqi economy, and
frankly, will for some time to come.
Corruption robs Iraq of a considerable share of what should
be national resources, national revenues. It is a critical
problem; indeed, it is one of the fundamental problems
affecting the economy, along with execution skills.
There are two aspects to this corruption. First is the
northern oil sector, second is the south. In the north, the
sector is essentially shut down for export purposes, and has
been for some years. The attacks on the pipelines which feed
the export routes to Turkey have been so consistent, so
professional, so well done, that our very good efforts, Iraqi
good efforts to build new pipelines, to get old pipelines in
operation, are thwarted at just the moment when we're ready to
start moving product, or crude, through those lines.
If you'd asked us 2 years ago: What's the major source of
those attacks? We would have answered insurgency. They are
ideological and insurgency-motivated. That's not our answer
today, they're criminal. They may well involve insurgents, but
profit's the motive here. It's redirecting product or crude to
another place where it can be profited from.
How do you get at this? I could tell you it's by fighting
corruption in Iraq, but that's going to be a generational
undertaking, and a very significant one.
But there's a more immediate way to get at it, and that is
by disincentivizing oil sector corruption, by raising the
prices of fuel and product to a level that at least matches
regional prices. When it pays a smuggler to move a small
quantity of crude or refined product to Kuwait, to Iran, to
Saudi Arabia, because it's at a cheaper price in Iraq, then
they're going to smuggle it. When you raise market prices, then
you not only increase revenues to the central government, you
disincentivize smuggling.
The Iraqi Government has moved over the course of the past
year-plus, to double the price, the market price, of crude and
products. They need to take additional steps now, we want to
see it come up fully, at least to the regional market price,
and that's a big step forward.
Senator Coleman. I presume there's a political challenge to
increasing the market price of oil in Iraq. You've got a
populace in Iraq that had gotten used to subsidized oil, and
now all of a sudden the price is increased. Oil was so much
cheaper under Saddam's regime because it was given away. Do the
Iraqis have the political will to meet this challenge?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator----
Senator Coleman. To do what has to be done?
Ambassador Satterfield. Yeah.
Senator Coleman. To deal with this market price issue, so
as to undercut some of the corruption?
Ambassador Satterfield. They have, indeed, the picture is
very positive on that.
The Iraqis moved, as I said, over the course of the last
year to meet and exceed the standard set by the IMF by the
standby arrangement on fuel price increases. There's another
increase which is due now, very shortly, which they will need
to meet as well. But, yes, they have taken those steps.
But you touch upon a very important issue, and it's a
public issue. When people were used to free electricity, to
free gasoline, they're willing to pay a black marketer
outrageous prices to get it. But when the government comes in,
they expect it to be free. That's a mentality, that's a
mindset, not just in Iraq, but elsewhere in the region, that
very much needs to change. And that's something where the
government needs to take the lead.
Senator Coleman. General Jones, is there more we can be
doing on the military side to deal with the terrorism that is
disrupting the oil production?
General Jones. Senator, that's a very good question. And,
in fact, over the course of the last year, there have been a
lot of work that's been done in order to try to reduce the
number of attacks, and in fact, it has happened. If you look at
the attack trends, the attack trends are down significantly.
And I'd be happy to take that for the record, and provide that
information to the committee.
Senator Coleman. I would appreciate that.
Can we just turn, in the time left to electricity? It is a
somewhat similar issue to that of oil production. I'm a former
mayor, and it is these kind of basic needs such as electricity
that keep people satisfied with their local government. If
people have electricity, they feel better about a lot of
things. On the electricity front, one of the things that I
heard when I was in Iraq is that there is a profit issue there,
too. Folks don't want electricity flowing from one region into
the other. I also observed, for the first time, a kind of black
market electricity operation. You fly over Baghdad at night,
and you'll see lights on, even though the electricity is shut
off for the city. And I understand that there are private
generators. In my conversations in Iraq I was told that some of
the folks on the private side cut the government lines, because
they don't want the government to be providing electricity. How
do you deal with that?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, there are overlapping
issues that affect electricity, particularly in Baghdad. The
first is, the provinces are reluctant to shed electricity to
the capitols--the opposite of the system Saddam built, where
provinces could only send their power into Baghdad, and Baghdad
had to shed back out again. That system was physically
destroyed in 2003.
The provinces now, Anbar province, enjoys perhaps the
highest level of electricity anywhere in Iraq--they don't shed
to Baghdad. Baghdad has suffered from--here it is an insurgent
campaign to cut off both power-line supplies and fuel supplies
for the plants in Baghdad as a metropolis, deliberately to deny
the government the ability to be seen as providing essential
services to that capitol.
O&M has been badly mismanaged by Iraqis. We have put in,
taxpayer money has put in, half--2,500 megawatts--of generation
capacity in Iraq. That is very significant, but it's
underutilized because of O&M issues, wrong fueling issues, and
then because of the effect of the insurgency on supplies. And
an entrepreneurial body has, indeed, arisen. Perhaps some 2,000
megawatts a day of power in Baghdad are supplied by the black
market, by private entrepreneurs.
It is a significant problem, how do you get to that? You
get to it by a government that is committed rationally to using
the generation facilities it has, to applying the right
resources to protecting those facilities, and to putting those
involved in the black market out of business, because the
government shows that it can deliver a product more cheaply.
Senator Coleman. And again, I think my time is up.
But General, the question I had, for you to think about, is
whether there is a military piece to the issues we've described
here? Do we need a new way to deal with things like oil
production and electricity production? These are things where
the indicators aren't where we'd like them to be and if they
were raised, I think the situation would be much better.
General Jones. Senator, I'll just take that for the record,
and give you a written response, if that's OK.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, General.
[The information previously referred to follows:]
The U.S. military is engaged in training and equipping Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) responsible for securing critical infrastructure.
Coalition forces work side by side with the ISF along critical
infrastructure nodes. Part of this effort includes developing 17
Strategic Infrastructure Battalions; units which did not exist prior to
2005. Infrastructure hardening projects have been accomplished to
increase physical security measures along infrastructure corridors.
Additional hardening measures are planned or underway. Attacks on
infrastructure were down to 1.4 attacks per week from 6.7 per week in
2004. However, attacks on infrastructure have continued to result in
disruption of services. In addition, weak ministerial oversight,
ineffectual rapid-repair teams, and criminal harvesting of
infrastructure assets (e.g., copper from power lines) have proved to be
major impediments to improving the supply of essential services.
Coalition forces are actively supporting Embassy Baghdad's Anti-
Corruption Strategy for Iraq, which includes initiatives in the energy
sector. Working closely with the Government of Iraq and Iraqi Security
Forces, MNF-I advisors are assisting the Iraqi Army with their security
operations supporting ground transportation of petroleum products to
facilitate careful accounting of the quantities of product at both
departure and arrival points. Most corruption in the Ministry of Oil
and Ministry of Electricity is not observable by military advisors of
security forces, and is therefore in the domain of Embassy Ministerial
Advisory Teams. For greater detail on Iraq's efforts toward market
reform, financial transparency, and public integrity in their energy
sector, we recommend you contact the Department of State.
Coalition forces are determined to work closely with the ISF, the
Ministries of Electricity and Oil, and U.S. Embassy Baghdad to resolve
issues related to the security of Iraq's critical infrastructure.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you very much. The Senator
from Georgia.
Senator Corker, have you already gone? I didn't see you
there. I apologize.
Senator Corker. No; no problem.
Thank you, gentlemen, both for being here, I would like to
say that General Jones is a constituent of mine. He was
educated in Tennessee and, more importantly, met his wife in
Tennessee, and my understanding is he votes in Tennessee. Don't
know how he votes, but thank you for your--thank you for being
here.
Listen, I--we're looking at the economic efforts that are
underway. And Ambassador Carney is in this new position, I
guess, to coordinate those efforts.
And yet there's been a lot of discussion about the fact
that security depends a great deal on Iraqis having jobs that
take them away from being part of sectarian violence, take them
apart from criminality. And yet, it does seem that there's a
lot of impatience, if you will. That, in essence, people are
focusing on this effort as something that needs to take place
in a very short amount of time as far as showing results.
And I look at our own country, you look at what happened in
Louisiana and Mississippi, and here we are a sophisticated
society with everything working and bureaucrats to deal with
these kind of things that certainly do a good job at what they
do, and yet, we have trouble ourselves doing that. We have a
very low-functioning government in Iraq today.
Talk to us about the realities, if you will, of those
moneys actually doing the kind of good that people are placing
a lot of faith in happening in a very short amount of time?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, we're going to be asking
the administration, Congress and the American people through
the Congress to approve an extraordinary thing. To approve a
significant amount of assistance to a country that has
significant resources, financial resources of its own. We do
this very rarely, if at all.
We're justifying this request in the case of Iraq for a
reason directly related to the question you posed. Iraq does
have fiscal resources; it has money in the bank, some $12.5
billion from unspent prior budget years, and also a certain
amount from windfall profits from unexpected oil prices. They
lack the resources, the mechanisms to move that money within
their own budget. On an urgent basis, they lack it, frankly, to
move it on even a year budget-cycle basis. And we're working
with them on developing, over the course of this year, the
mechanisms to do that.
But, when we look at Clear, Secure, Build, at the
employment generation part of it, at the nonemployment
generation, but financial part of that picture--money has to be
moved quickly. We are the body to do that, in this immediate
time ahead.
Now, the Iraqis have to be in the fight as well, both on
developing budget execution mechanisms, and also moving moneys
of their own as rapidly as possible for the ``build'' part of
things. But we have a critical obligation here, to make our
military strategy--our joint military strategy--succeed over
the long run. And that requires an economic plan as well.
So, we do believe we have the ability to move these
resources out of the box, onto the street, rapidly in the days
and weeks that follow the ``secure'' part of Clear, Secure, and
Build. We need the support of Congress, though, both in
approving those moneys, and moving them out expeditiously so
that we and our military colleagues have them available at the
right time in Baghdad and in Anbar.
Senator Corker. And so you're talking about timeframes
where 30, 60 days after approval, the moneys will be on the
streets, in people's hands.
Ambassador Satterfield. We are talking, ideally, Senator,
of a situation in which if--on a given day, a neighborhood has
been cleared and secured, we--the U.S. Government, and to the
maximum extent, the Iraqi Government--are able to move moneys
to begin employing people, taking them out of their houses,
putting them onto the streets, in a positive sense, working,
and then to build longer term, sustainable projects to give a
stake in the economy, those areas, those neighborhoods.
General Jones. Senator, if I could, just as an example. We
had a significant fight in Sadr City in the August/September
timeframe of 2004. About the southwest third of that city, we
had very good control of, and even during that fighting, we
were continuing to employ and to do projects in that part.
What we saw was a difference in the population, in terms of
their response to the Mahdi Militia--in the April 2004
timeframe, in those same areas, in those same fights, when we
would have an engagement, generally a militiaman would run back
through a house, go into an alley and we would lose them.
After we had worked those construction projects, worked
with those people, developed confidence, when they went to
houses, they found doors locked. So, it makes--you can, as
close as you can to where military operations are being
conducted, have integrated the economic part of this; it is a
combat multiplier from a military perspective.
Senator Corker. I know that this is not our subject today,
but I know that based on your backgrounds you both know much
about this.
A lot has been said about the fact that the Iraqi Army is
way underequipped. We had General McCaffrey in the other day
and talked about the fact that we're spending $8.4 billion a
month, and yet have been--have decided not to actually equip
the military side of the Iraqi operations the way that they
need to be equipped. He suggested a number of $5 billion
necessary to actually cause them to have a helicopter, the
tanks, the things they need to actually be an army.
I've had other comments made offhanded that actually are
stunning, I referred to those yesterday. I'd like for you all
to just, if you will, talk a little bit about what really is
happening there. Whether there are, in fact, serious
deficiencies as it relates to having an army, in Iraq, by the
Iraqi people that really has people, but not the equipment
resources to actually defend themselves, secure themselves, do
the things that we're depending upon them to do.
General Jones. Yes, Senator, I can address that.
In terms of the equipment that the Iraqi forces have, the
thinking that they are somehow out-gunned or somehow out-
equipped by the people that they fight, I believe, is
erroneous. The, typically--the kinds of insurgents that the
Iraqi Army has been fighting has small arms, machine guns, on
occasion you see body armor or something, but rarely. The Iraqi
Armed Forces are not nearly as well equipped as United States
forces. There are no forces I know of that are as well equipped
as U.S. forces. But, in addition to those kinds of things, they
have body armor--we started to design this force as a
counterinsurgency force, which is relatively light infantry
with some mechanized capability.
We have adjusted over time, to give them increasing
capabilities for the counterinsurgency force that we are
building, based on the enemy's increase in attacks, increase in
capabilities. We are fielding up-armored systems--they do have
tanks, they do have armored personnel-carrier kinds of
vehicles--not in the quantities it takes to have a defense
force, where they can defend their country from outside
aggression. That plan is in the works, and will be a future
fielding plan that will have to happen in order to transition
them once they have succeeded against the insurgency.
I will say, however, that in terms of equipment, the Iraqis
have, in fact, stepped up to the plate. I believe they've
committed about $700 million--and I'll get the numbers for the
record, if it's OK, Senator, but I think it's about $700
million of their own funds to buy additional equipment. They
also have, I believe, $1.5 billion in a foreign military sales
account in order to buy additional equipment that they think
will help them meet needs.
[The information submitted by DOD follow:]
Answer. The GoI has committed nearly $1.2B of CY06 Security Funding
against Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases for equipment requirements.
There are additional cases for infrastructure and sustainment
requirements which total approximately $500M. Furthermore, the GoI is
on the verge of committing approximately up to $1B of its currently
available CY07 Security Funding against additional equipment,
infrastructure, and sustainment FMS cases.
So, I think that we have had to adapt because the situation
has changed, I think that they are absorbing equipment at the
ability that they have, and we have not fielded some types of
systems like aircraft, and other kinds of things that are much
more sophisticated, because we've given priority to the
insurgency fight that they're in, where those kinds of assets
aren't quite as important.
Senator Corker. I think my time is up, but I want to thank
you both for your testimony, for your service, and what you're
doing on behalf of our country, thank you.
General Jones. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to echo what Senator Feingold, Senator Colman,
and others have said about the State Department. In my
experiences around the world where I have encountered State
Department people, they're the unsung heroes of America around
the world, and we appreciate very much what you do.
In your printed testimony, Ambassador Satterfield, you
said, ``Serious progress has been made on the vital national
hydrocarbon law,'' and then in the answer to Senator Coleman
you said, I believe you said, and I want to make sure I heard
this right, or it gets corrected if I heard it wrong, you
virtually said, at this time we can't secure the oil pipeline,
because of the criminal element more than the insurgents, is
that correct?
Ambassador Satterfield. With respect to the northern oil
production----
Senator Isakson. Right.
Ambassador Satterfield [continuing]. At the northern oil
export facilities, it has been an exceedingly difficult task of
securing that in a sustained fashion over the last several
years; yes, Senator.
Senator Isakson. And you then said that the best hope to
secure it is to increase the price, so there's not profit to
attract the criminal element. It would seem like, to me, that
it's equally important that this hydrocarbon deal become
completed. The Middle East--and I said this in one of the other
testimonies--suffers, and Iraq principally suffers, from what's
known as the Dutch Disease, where the governments have run off
the profit of oil, the countries have not developed, because
they have a rich, natural resource. People aren't used to
entrepreneurship, running businesses or anything else, and one
of the key things to stability in that country is going to be
for the people themselves to get a piece of the action, which
is petroleum.
So, my first question is how: How serious is the progress
and what are the obstacles that remain for them to complete the
deal?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, the progress is critical,
just as you have outlined. It's critical to developing a free
market economy in this critical sector. There are many
investors outside Iraq who want to come in, if they see a
stable, economic framework--business framework--for their
investments.
The law that is under consideration is a very progressive
one. It is part of a set of laws that will reform the
hydrocarbon sector in Iraq, but it's the beginning, it's the
frame. And it's a framework that contemplates several very
important principles.
First, that oil is a national resource. It should be
maximized for the benefit of all Iraqis. That the central
government is responsible in the first instance for receiving
revenues, and then distributing revenues back out, because that
avoids the chaos of revenues being managed at a local level
entirely.
But, it has the important corollary principle, that the
federal government, the central oil authority will redistribute
revenues to local authorities, and that local authorities will
have the initial responsibility for soliciting investment
opportunities, for working on a national model of working
contracts, which will then be submitted for some form of
national consideration.
And on that last point, Senator, lies the essential
controversy, or dispute that has held up moving this law
forward this law. What will be the nature of the relationship
between a national oil authority, and local oil authorities
with respect to either disapproval, or approval--and there's a
difference between the two--of contracts that are set. We
believe the road is open to a resolution of this issue within
the coming days, if not weeks.
Senator Isakson. Well, I think this is probably the most
critical thing that needs to be accomplished, personally.
I'm going to send you a paper that a constituent of mine,
who is a distinguished citizen of Georgia and has been in the
bond business for the better part of 30 years, has written.
It's an intriguing suggestion, dealing with the deployment of
capital, and the difficulty you referenced the Iraqis have.
If we could get an oil deal, and we had a reasonably secure
situation in Iraq, you could actually bond the Iraqi oil
production to front-end the flow of money in the world
marketplace and get it deployed almost immediately, rather than
on a cash-flow basis. His name is John Mobley, and I'm going to
send you that information, because it is very intriguing. I
know Senator Clinton and Senator Murkowski and some others have
talked about some way to get that benefit to the people; Mr.
Mobley has an outstanding proposal, and I would like for you
to, at least, get it in the right hands and see if it has some
merit.
Mr. Chairman, if I could ask you a question while I've got
my time----
The Chairman. Take what time you need, there are not many
people here.
Senator Isakson. Have we scheduled, yet, a hearing on John
Negroponte?
The Chairman. Yes. We have scheduled it. Tuesday, at 9:30.
Senator Isakson. I want to commend the Chair--although the
mind can only absorb what the seat can endure--I've enjoyed all
of our hearings, and being here, listening to everything that
we've heard. But in particular, I appreciate that, because I
think John Negroponte comes to the State Department at a
critical time. When you talk about the accountability measures,
you talk about the civilian and the military efforts that are
going on, you talk about the difficulty the centralization of
the Iraqi Government as it is right now, and makes it somewhat
stodgy and removed from the people, we have in Negroponte
somebody who's been there and done that. And I had the
privilege of being in Iraq when he was there, and I think he
will bring a wealth of knowledge to State as you're involved
with the Department of Defense and everyone else in this plan.
Last, I guess, my final point is: I can't stress how
important I think the accountability factor of this New Way
Forward is. For whatever the reasons that we haven't had good
accountability on the part of the Iraqis, I have said in my
statements that the New Way Forward is also to me, the last way
forward, or the last best way forward. And, its success is
going to be dependent on the Iraqis and them delivering. And, I
want to commend you on what you're doing, and commend the
general on what the Joint Chiefs are doing to see to it there's
meaningful accountability on the Iraqis, because if they drop
the ball on their part, then there's no way we can have the
type of success that we need to have to ultimately have the
reconciliation in that country. And that's not a question,
that's just a comment.
Ambassador Satterfield. We fully agree, sir.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I just have one question, Mr. Ambassador. Last July when we
met in Baghdad, you indicated to me you'd provide the committee
with a plan to build the capacity of the Iraqi Ministries. And
then I asked the Ambassador that question later, and before
these hearings, he said he would provide such a plan as well.
And, I haven't received it--is it because there isn't one, or
there is a plan and you don't want to share it with us? Or
there is a plan and you thought you shared it with us?
And I will say that, from an unclassified report, I don't
know the exact date, but during early 2005, you attempted to
take all of the Ministries of Iraq, from Finance through
Agriculture--Finance, Oil, Electricity, Municipalities, Water
Resources, Justice, Education, Health, Planning and
Development, Agriculture--and you gave them a rating, based on
a color chart, of whether or not they had performed--from red,
essentially no capacity to perform the function, to green,
indicating developed capacity to perform ministerial functions.
And you broke it down by leadership, strategy and planning,
partnership, resources, program, budget, et cetera.
Can you tell us, do you have a plan to build capacity in
the Iraqi Ministries that have so far shown very little
capacity to function on their own?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, we certainly do, and we
certainly have, and I will follow up on----
The Chairman. Can you follow up within the next 3 days?
Ambassador Satterfield [continuing]. Standing request which
I thought had been answered.
The Chairman. No, within the next 3 days? If you have a
plan, you ought to be able to get it to me, literally, you
ought to be able to e-mail it to me in the next 2 hours. We
waited now for 6 months, and I would truly appreciate it.
You talk about these new plans, though I've yet to find out
what you have underway already. Quite frankly, it undermines my
confidence in what you all are doing.
[The information supplied by the State Department follows:]
U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC, January 30, 2007.
Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: In response to your question to Ambassador David
Satterfield during his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on January 25, we would like to provide you with the
following information.
You asked for information about our Ministerial Capacity Strategy
and related progress chart (from July 2006 and a current version). You
also asked for information on metrics or indicators used to measure
progress. The interagency Embassy team in Baghdad has developed a
robust Ministerial Capacity development program, which began with a
baseline assessment of the capacity of ten key Iraqi Ministries in nine
areas, such as leadership, strategy and budgeting. Ambassador
Satterfield's staff has contacted your staff to arrange a more detailed
briefing on the details of these programs.
Continuing these efforts to build Iraqi ministerial capacity to
perform core functions, such as design and execution of budgets, will
be a key component of ``The New Way Forward'' announced by the
President.
I hope this information is useful for you.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey T. Bergner,
Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.
The Chairman. The second half of that question is: Is there
a relationship between, I ask you both this question, between
the potential efficacy of this new plan with regard to PRTs and
their backup capacity to go in and build, et cetera; and the
capacity of the Iraqi Ministries? In other words, we're going
in there, and you're bringing in folks who are going to try to
get potable water to every part of the city, and other places;
you're going to try to get their electricity and educational
systems back up and running. But is our doing this going to
improve the capacity of the Iraqis to be able to eventually run
their own government?
Ambassador Satterfield. Absolutely, Senator.
The Chairman. What is it?
Ambassador Satterfield. There's a very material
relationship, and it falls into two categories. One encompasses
all of the Iraqi Ministries, and its budget execution--it's
their ability to move their own moneys out, onto the street,
into the field, in Baghdad and beyond. Which is very, very
defective, and deficient and we are focusing, perhaps, the
largest share of our ministerial capacity efforts, right now,
on budget execution governmentwide, but focused on the critical
Ministries. Finance, above all, Planning, Oil, Electricity.
That's the first step.
The Chairman. Beyond moving the moneys out, what about the
operational control of whatever it is you're moving them out
for? Increasing the effectiveness of the electric grid, getting
more oil pumped through the pipeline, so that the central
government has resources, et cetera. What is the relationship?
Do you have confidence that you have a partner in the Iraqi
Ministries that you can essentially hand this off to?
I mean, I'll give you one example. Your former commanding
officer, General Chiarelli, used a specific example, and I'll
not belabor the point, it was along the lines of what Senator
Webb was talking about. He said, ``We build a first class,'' he
called it, ``the biggest water fountain in the Middle East.''
He talked about how we had successfully built within Baghdad a
water facility that could provide potable water to all of the
city. But, we decided--if I understood him correctly--that it
was up to the Iraqis to connect--what he referred to as the
fountain--to Iraqi homes. And that meant laying pipe. That
meant laying the facility to get the water from the facility to
the spickets of Iraqi homes. And he talked about the
ineffectiveness of the Iraqi Ministry to get that done.
So, these are very practical considerations. And tell me, I
would like for the record, if you're willing, to update us on
the present status of these Ministries? Because to go back to
what Senator Webb and also, I think, Senator Lugar talked
about--we're not even rebuilding, sufficiently, New Orleans.
We're not rebuilding, we're surging into Baghdad, and we're
surging police out of American cities as the crime rate rises.
We're eliminating the crime bill, we're eliminating funding for
local law enforcement, or drastically cutting it by $2 billion
a year.
And so, we want to help--I speak for myself--I want to
help. But it's kind of hard to go back and explain to my
constituency why I am conceding to the President's request for
another, total this calendar year, as it will turn out, year
and a half, probably a billion and three-quarters dollars. You
know, your $588 million supplemental, your billion, two or
three, whatever. It's a big number. It's a big number, and that
billion dollars would go a long way to providing housing in the
ninth ward. It would go a long way to reinstate the cops in the
34 largest cities in America. It would go a long way to provide
interoperability to cities that have no interoperability if
another hurricane or disaster strikes.
So, we have to get down to the weeds. Not now, I'm not
asking for an answer, unless you want to provide one, I'd like
one in writing, where you're able to demonstrate to us that
we're going to go in, risk American lives to clear, we're going
to risk American lives, as stated, to hold, and then we're
going to build. Once we build, we've got to turn it over to
somebody. And is there any reason for us to believe this time
out that there no longer exists, what I believe to be, an
almost totally ineffectual ministerial bureaucracy in almost
all of the Ministries?
Now, I may be dated here, maybe things have really
progressed in the last year or 6 months. But we need some hard
data. We need your best assessment to pile onto what my friend
from Virginia is saying, we need some metrics. We want to know
what it is you are basing it on. Because I do agree, and I'll
conclude with this, there is a correlation between the standard
of living for Iraqis increasing, and the likelihood of them
wanting to shoot at our men and women in uniform. I do think
there's a correlation.
And thus far--and I don't want to go back, I said these
hearings would not be about the past, but about the future--I
am very skeptical of taking very limited resources and
assigning them to a worthy goal without much, much, much harder
data. Much tighter reasoning, and much closer oversight on a
monthly basis as to what's going on. And I think you will find
that it's not just Senator Webb who is knowledgeable about
these things due to his past duties at the Pentagon, but I
think you're going to find a lot of us are equally
knowledgeable, on both sides of the aisle.
Senator Webb. Mr. Chairman, if I may?
The Chairman. Please.
Senator Webb. I--Mr. Ambassador, I want to clarify the
concern that was behind the questions that I asked, and the
exchange that we had. I have a great deal of respect for your
career of focusing on this region and the positions that you've
held, and at the same time, I'm very mindful that you're here
as a member of the administration. And these kinds of concerns
are not simply whether the programs are working inside Iraq--
although there is a great deal of concern. And the questions
that I asked about where these contracts have gone, you know,
to American companies, and et cetera, I think they are relevant
to the way that we're trying to examine fairness, misuse of
funds, those sorts of things.
And it's not only how this impacts the region. It's how
we're trying to look at fairness in terms of situations like
the aftermath of Katrina, and the obligations that we have. And
so, one of the questions, really, honestly at this point, is to
what extent is the United States actually responsible for the
full reconstruction of Iraq--this is not a question for you,
it's just a clarification of what I was saying before--and to
what extent the Iraqis themselves are ultimately going to have
to be responsible. They have a long history of entrepreneurial
activities, notwithstanding some of the more recent events
under Saddam Hussein, so you know, for me looking at this and
coming here, and having heard again, and again, and again, on
the campaign trail and through the course of this war, about
the misuse of money, and the favoritism that went into
contracts, and a lack of performance, and these sorts of
things.
I believe that a lot of arguments that are fueled by
emotion are best resolved by going to the facts. And that's the
motivation behind my questions, and I'm looking forward to
being able to sit down, again, as I said, with you, or someone
who is a representative of your office, and also with people
from the Department of Defense and let's start breaking down
the facts, and reporting to the American people.
Ambassador Satterfield. Mr. Chairman, Senator, we'll
certainly respond, Mr. Chairman, to the various questions that
you posed.
But, the last point that you raised--confidence in
execution because that's really, if I take it, what you're
asking.
The Chairman. At the end of the day.
Ambassador Satterfield. In the ability of Iraqis and the
United States to execute the critical economic steps necessary
to build a success. We would be happy to brief you on the
considerations that have gone into our planning, how we are
working with the Iraqi Government on this score because it is
the fundamental challenge, and it's the fundamental element in
success on this part.
Which leads me, Senator Webb, to your question--are we
responsible, the United States, the American people, for the
reconstruction of Iraq? Absolutely not.
In 2003, the World Bank estimated the reconstruction figure
for Iraq to be something around $100 billion. With all of the
generosity of the American people and the U.S. Congress, the
$20 billion that was allocated--and those portions of it that
were actually applied to reconstruction--were only intended to,
if you will, jumpstart, other than security, efforts in oil,
electricity and certain other sectors. There was every
expectation that the Iraqis themselves, the international
community, the region, would come to the table and play their
part.
And I can assure you, Senator, there is more than an
expectation right now that Iraqis are, and must be, responsible
for the reconstruction of their country. They need help from
outside, they should get that help, but they are going to have
to take the lead on this. This is not a U.S. challenge.
The Chairman. The jumpstart--I'm sorry, General, please.
General Jones. I'm sorry.
The Chairman. No----
General Jones. Mr. Chairman, the Department of Defense is
responsible for two Ministries--Ministry of Interior and
Ministry of Defense--and we will provide you those assessments
promptly.
[The information provided on the slides submitted by
General Jones follows:]
The Chairman. I appreciate that because I know that it's
beyond. I appreciate, Mr. Secretary, your willingness to sit
down and further discuss with us these issues. But you all have
produced, in making this assessment, specific data. We'd like
to have the data. Not just the explanation, generically, of why
you've arrived at the conclusions you have reached.
And, in terms of the international community, I was voting
when Senator Hagel was questioning, but my understanding from
my staff was that there was some discussion about whether this
is a wholly owned American subsidiary here. Whether or not we
really are getting cooperation from a consortia of other
countries.
I noticed we are rightfully dropping the charade of
speaking of Coalition Forces--the Brits are on their way out,
in large part. They only have 7,000 folks there, and you add up
every other force from every other country in the region and
you don't get as many people as are in the Washington, DC,
police force.
So, I guess what I'm trying to say is, it goes down a
little bit to truth in advertising here. For me to go back to
my home constituents and justify voting, again, for
``reconstruction'' moneys, I'd better have a much, much tighter
understanding of the process and be able to demonstrate with
specificity to my constituents why I think this may work.
With regard to the international community--my observation,
and it may not be complete--my observation is that there is an
awful lot of people sitting on their hands. It seems to me
there would be an overwhelming interest on the part of the
Saudis who are awash in oil money to commit moneys to the
reconstruction of Iraq. The Saudis who have more money than the
Lord Almighty these days, and for them to commit $10, $20, $30
billion would not take up a month's profit. Whether it's
literally a month's profit or not, I don't know--but this is
not a heavy lift for them financially. I guess it is a heavy
lift in terms of diplomacy and politics, and the question is:
How are we going to feel if, in fact, there is continued
financial assistance and outreach from the existing government
of Iran? Iran has a fair amount of money right now because of
oil.
And so, I hope at some point we'll be able to discuss that.
So, I'm not asking you to respond, but I'd invite your
response, if you could tell us about, or if you'd rather do it
for the record--about what are the hard donor commitments,
other than from the United States Government, for the
reconstruction of Iraq.
And I'll conclude by saying, the World Bank has concluded
that we're talking about $100 billion, thereabouts. Well, if it
takes $100 billion to rebuild it, and we spend $10 billion to
rebuild it, we're not likely to succeed. And so, if we're
pouring our $10 billion into an empty bucket here, that there's
no prospect of Iraq and the international community keeping the
pace to get to $60 billion, $100 billion, or $120 billion. It
makes you sort of reassess the investment.
So, that's why I ask the question, but if you want to
respond to the participation of the international community,
feel free. My time is up and I will close the hearing after
this, unless my friend has more questions.
Ambassador Satterfield. Mr. Chairman, we'll respond on the
hard commitments and the delivered commitments.
We've got some significant partners--the Japanese, the
Canadians, the Italians, the European Union--have all moved
forward with significant amounts of economic assistance.
The Chairman. Can you give me a sense, have they moved
forward----
Ambassador Satterfield. And we can give you the specifics
on that, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. When you say ``significant amounts'' could
you be more specific, because without specifying we'll leave
this public hearing believing that the international community
is contributing ``significant amounts'' of economic assistance
to the reconstruction effort. When you say significant amounts,
I suspect the average Senator watching this in their office, or
their staff, or the public watching it, thinks that means
``significant,'' like us. That means, you know, hundreds of
millions, billions of dollars, combined. Is that what we're
talking about?
Ambassador Satterfield. In the aggregate, it is in the
hundreds of millions.
The Chairman. Hundred of millions?
Ambassador Satterfield. Hundreds of millions.
The Chairman. Yeah?
Ambassador Satterfield. But, there are very significant
donor pledges which have not been fulfilled, that date back to
the Madrid Conference, and as significantly, there are tens of
billions of debt forgiveness from the Gulf States, over $30
billion from Saudi Arabia alone.
The Chairman. How much from us?
Ambassador Satterfield. Which we're pledged. We have
forgiven all of Iraq's debt.
The Chairman. But how much did that add up to?
Ambassador Satterfield. It was around $4 billion, I
believe, Senator. I will get you the precise number.
But, those commitments remain to be fulfilled.
The Chairman. OK, I thank you.
Senator Webb, do you have any further questions?
Senator Webb. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
testimony of the witnesses.
The Chairman. And I thank you and look forward to your
written comments, as well as to the reports we've requested. I
thank you for your cooperation, and--to state the obvious--we
hope it works. We hope it works.
We are recessed. Adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:06 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
``Families of the Fallen for Change'' Letter Submitted by Senator
Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Families of the Fallen for Change,
Cleveland, OH, January 15, 2007.
Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
Chairman and Members, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Mr. Chairman and Committee Members: Recognizing error, cutting
losses, altering course, is not something governments are good at.
Changing course requires considerable self-confidence on the part of
leaders, something we are hoping you have today.
We are the parents of Marine Lance Corporal Edward ``Augie''
Schroeder who was killed August 3, 2005, near Haditha, Iraq, while
deployed with the Third Battalion, 25th Marines, a Reserve unit based
in Brook Park, Ohio.
In November 2005 we founded Families of the Fallen for Change, a
non-profit organization that seeks to bring about change in overall
Iraq policy and strategy. Today, Families of the Fallen for Change has
more than 1,500 members nationwide, half of whom are veterans.
Though we are not novices at foreign relations (one doctorate in
international relations and several years of living and working
abroad), we remain amateurs in Middle East affairs in comparison to
those who have testified and are scheduled to testify before the
committee.
Thus we do not speak from the head, so to speak, but from the
heart, and our hearts are broken. Though family members of American
service men and women who have been killed in Iraq may differ on the
validity of American efforts there, I am certain that their hearts,
too, are broken.
We grieve as each additional American KIA is announced, for we feel
the pain of each new broken heart added to the list.
Further, we understand that the families and friends of the 140,000
or so Americans remaining in Iraq--and those of others about to be
deployed--are living each day with the anxiety that comes from fear
their loved one may be killed or grievously injured.
In our last conversation with Augie, he said, ``Pop, the closer we
get to leaving, it's clear this is less and less worth the cost.''
He described his unit's repeated efforts to clear the same cities
and towns of insurgents, only to leave and let the insurgents come
back. Augie said: ``We don't have enough troops to do this. We can't
hold these places.''
He went on: ``Two guys were killed walking past a wall. The wall
just blew up. We all walked past that wall everyday. It could have been
any one of us. It's just a crap shoot.''
We heard the fear in his voice. We've seen a haunted expression in
some of the last photos taken of him. We felt the helplessness of being
unable to do anything to take care of our only son.
Augie's KIA number was 1,824 if we go alphabetically (he died with
13 comrades in a single explosion). Today, that number is 3,020. In
Augie's estimation, the efforts in Iraq were not worth the cost nearly
1,200 deaths ago. In his estimation, survival for American marines and
soldiers in Iraq was ``just a crap shoot.'' To be sure, this is the
case in any war, and we believe that at times war is necessary. But in
the case of Iraq, it was not.
It is obvious from the reaction of many committee members and
others in Congess that you understand the human costs of this war. For
the sake of urgency, however, there is a need to consider these costs
in terms of what lies ahead. At the current daily Killed-in-Action rate
of 2.34 since the war started (according to http://icasualties.org/oif/
):
Number 4,000 will be recorded on or about March 7, 2008.
That is an additional 982 American lives as of today.
The death toll on January 1, 2008 (first day of troop
withdrawal recommended by the Iraq Study Group--first quarter
next year), will be 3,846. That is an additional 828 American
lives as of today.
The death toll on January 20, 2009 (Inauguration Day), is
4,747. That is an additional 1,729 American lives as of today.
These estimates do not consider that attacks on American troops
could escalate, which would push the daily KIA rate higher. It also
does not consider the hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians who have
been killed, wounded, or displaced.
Nonetheless, additional American lives will be lost after a
majority of the American public, the American military, and Members of
Congress have recognized that this war cannot be won militarily and
that a political solution must be sought as soon as possible.
These lives are worth much more than Secretary of State Rice's
concern about negotiating a political solution from a ``supplicant''
position.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is long past time to
withdraw our troops. It is a moral imperative that we do so.
In the last 18 months, we have given a lot of thought to one
question: Why did our son die?
We don't mean the manner of his death. We don't mean the reasons
why he joined the Marines. And we don't mean the specifics of why and
how we got involved in Iraq in the first place.
We're trying to get at the larger Gestalt, the historical, perhaps
even the philosophical reasons that prompted his death.
Augie is part of that long line of ghosts whose lives were taken by
the folly of governments.
The lessons of history are seldom heeded. Samuel Taylor Coleridge
said that ``passion and party blind our eyes, and the light which
experience gives us is a lantern on the stern, which shines only on the
waves behind us.''
Barbara Tuchman, in her book ``The March of Folly: From Troy to
Vietnam.'' (1984, Michael Joseph, Ltd.) wondered why governments pursue
policies that are clearly not in the best interests of their nation or
the people.
She identifies three stages of folly.
First is a standstill, when principles and boundaries governing a
political problem are fixed.
Second, failure and criticism begin to appear, which in her words
``rigidify'' those principles and boundaries.
It is here that changes in policy are possible, but Tuchman calls
them ``rare as rubies in the backyard.''
More typical in this stage are increased investments along with an
increasing need to protect egos that make a change in course next to
impossible.
In the third stage, the pursuit of failure enlarges the damages
until it causes the fall of Troy or the American humiliation in
Vietnam.
So Augie is dead because of folly. American folly that all the
world sees. Iraq is just another chapter in Barbara Tuchman's book.
How sad that we haven't come any further than the Trojans, who let
that horse into the gates. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
we have a request.
These two parents--and a large number of other parents with whom we
have spoken--turn to you and all Members of Congress to consider the
lives now at risk. Consider the additional families and the broken
hearts they will suffer by inaction or delay.
As soon as possible, bring 'em home Senators, bring 'em home.
Thank you.
Paul E. Schroeder,
Rosemary A. Palmer,
Families of the Fallen for Change.
______
Responses of Ambassador David Satterfield to Questions Submitted by
Senator Jim Webb
Question. Please provide a description of measurable standards--
criteria used by the USG to award reconstruction contracts and
prioritize and control distribution of funds.
Answer. After consultations with the administration, Congress
provided specific funding levels for sectors under the Iraq Relief and
Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). This allowed Congress to give the initial
legislative direction on the prioritization of funds. Following the
closure of the CPA, the State Department, through the Iraq
Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO), determined specific USG
implementing agencies for IRRF sector projects, within guidelines
established by Congress. The primary IRRF implementing agencies are the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division (USACE-GRD) and the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).
The more than 13,000 IRRF projects vary widely in their scope and
purpose. Some are relatively simple contracts for procurement of goods
and services, while others involve the construction of large, complex
electricity, oil, and water facilities. For more complex construction
projects, the implementing agencies write detailed scopes of work for
projects, which form the basis for requests for proposals from
contractors. Depending on the nature of the project, these scopes of
work tend to be very detailed, and are project specific. The
implementing agencies follow their relevant Federal Acquisition Rules
governing contract award, which allow a range of procurement
approaches. For example, the Department of State has asked contractors
to comply with FAR competitive contracting to the greatest extent
practicable in a post-conflict environment.
IRMO prioritizes and manages funds by developing and coordinating
the Iraq foreign assistance budget request. The implementing agencies
make every effort to monitor the contracts for compliance with the
specific requirements, and verify that work has been completed
satisfactorily before disbursing payment. They also work closely with
our auditors, including SIGIR and GAO, to ensure that we are conducting
adequate project oversight. While SIGIR and GAO have identified
specific problems, SIGIR has consistently noted that most U.S.
reconstruction projects have been completed satisfactorily. Finally,
reporting mechanisms are in place to assist implementing agencies and
IRMO in identifying early any potential issues with project progress
and compliance.
Over the last 3 years, we have learned a number of lessons in
managing our reconstruction contracts in Iraq. Although we initially
awarded large contracts to international design-build contractors, we
have increasingly shifted our focus toward specific, fixed-cost
contracts, which we have awarded to regional and Iraqi contractors in
larger numbers. Along the way, we have improved our management
capabilities, including on-sight inspections and financial tracking.
These efforts contributed to improved distribution of funds by
providing greater information on which reform and reconstruction
efforts may require greater or lesser resources to achieve U.S. policy
objectives. We will continue to work closely with our auditors to
improve our project management as we complete the remaining IRRF
projects.
Question. Please provide a breakout of reconstruction funds that
have gone to U.S. companies versus local Iraqis. Ambassador Satterfield
said 80 percent of assistance is now going to Iraqis. Since when?
Answer. We are currently working with IRMO and the agencies
responsible for implementing IRRF projects to compile a specific
response to your inquiry, and we expect to respond more completely by
February 16.
As a general matter, early in the reconstruction effort U.S.
implementing agencies entered into contracts with large American
international design-build contractors. Later, in an effort to complete
reconstruction projects more effectively and at lower cost, the
implementing agencies shifted toward direct fixed-price contracts with
Iraqi and regional firms and labor to the greatest possible extent.
This allowed quicker disbursement of funds while reducing security
risks to Americans, lowering overhead costs and increasing employment
opportunities for Iraqis.
Question. Please provide a chart of all Iraq reconstruction funds
to reflect how much has been appropriated, obligated, expended, and for
what activities.
Answer.
IRRF FINANCIAL SUMMARY--JANUARY 30, 2007
(In millions of USD)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Committed Obligated Disbursed
Sector Apportion -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Last week Current Change Last week Current Change Last week Current Change
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Security and Law Enforcement............................... $5,002.59 $4,988.66 $4,988.17 ($O.49) $4,986.19 $4,986.19 0.00 $4,715.92 $4,716.47 $0.56
Electricity Sector......................................... 4,239.51 4,222.70 4,224.34 1.64 4,079.16 4,080.91 $1.75 3,016.61 3,029.57 12.95
Oil Infrastructure......................................... 1,724.70 1,678.03 1,678.03 0.00 1,584.47 1,584.47 0.00 1,318.17 1,318.28 0.12
Justice, Public Safety and Civil Society................... 1,304.15 1,303.93 1,303.93 0.00 1,297.72 1,297.72 0.00 981.13 982.42 1.28
Democracy.................................................. 1,001.85 1,001.71 1,001.74 0.03 1,001.71 1,001.74 0.03 893.05 893.61 0.55
Education, Refugees, Human Rights, Governance.............. 401.50 401.33 401.26 (0.08) 401.33 401.26 (0.08) 343.90 354.55 10.65
Roads, Bridges and Construction............................ 333.60 331.94 331.95 0.00 325.84 324.59 (1.26) 209.56 209.55 (0.01)
Health Care................................................ 818.90 817.57 817.61 0.04 801.69 801.76 0.07 614.47 621.37 6.90
Transportation and Communications.......................... 464.12 464.11 464.11 0.00 458.23 458.30 0.068 339.70 339.69 (0.01)
Water Resources and Sanitation............................. 2,131.08 2,121.16 2,119.78 1.38 2,049.75 2,048.37 (1.38) 1,436.47 1,444.08 7.61
Private Sector Development................................. 813.95 813.91 813.95 0.04 813.91 813.95 0.04 764.90 765.96 1.06
Admin. Expense (USAID, State).............................. 213.00 212.45 212.45 0.00 212.45 212.45 0.00 164.05 164.24 0.19
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total................................................ 18,448.95 18,357.52 18,357.33 (0.19) 18,012.46 18,011.71 (0.74) 14,797.93 14,839.79 41.85
====================================================================================================================================
IRRF II Construction....................................... 10,573.40 10,573.21 (0.19) 10,250.09 10,249.35 (0.75) 8,027.37 8,053.62 26.25
IRRF II Non-Construction................................... 6,782.41 6,782.38 (0.03) 6,760.65 6,760.62 (0.03) 5,877.51 5,892.56 15.05
IRRF II Democracy.......................................... 1,001.71 1,001.75 0.03 1,001.71 1,001.75 0.03 893.05 893.61 0.55
====================================================================================================================================
IRRF I Total......................................... 2,473.30 2,473.30 2,473.30 0.00 2,232.30 2,232.30 0.00 2,139.00 2,139.00 0.00
====================================================================================================================================
Grand Total IRRF I & II.............................. 20,922.25 20,830.82 20,830.63 (0.19) 20,244.76 20,244.01 (0.74) 16,936.93 16,978.79 41.85
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
______
Contributions From Other Donors Supplied by the State Department
U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC, February 1, 2007.
Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: In response to your question to Ambassador David
Satterfield during his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on January 25, we would like to provide you with the
following information.
You asked about the latest information on non-United States
international donor contributions to the reconstruction of Iraq. We are
therefore including the most recently relevant edition of the October
2006, 2207 Report. As you will note, significant progress has been made
on the International Compact for Iraq.
More recent and updated information will be included in the new
2207 Report set for release early this year.
We look forward to working with the committee to answer any further
questions you may have on this or any other matter.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey Bergner,
Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.
Attachment: Appendix II
APPENDIX II
Contributions From Other Donors
international resources for the reconstruction of iraq
During this past quarter, the United States has been continuing to
work very closely with Iraq and international donors to broaden and
deepen international assistance for Iraq. A major development was the
launching on July 27 of work on a new International Compact for Iraq
that is similar to the International Compact for Afghanistan that was
adopted in January 2006. Iraq and the United Nations, in close
cooperation with the World Bank, share the lead in developing this new
agreement between Iraq and the international community. Under the
Compact, the Iraqi Government will undertake a series of economic
reforms and initiatives for good governance (for example, to combat
corruption) in return for commitments of financial and other forms of
foreign assistance. On September 18, 2006, at sessions held to inform
about the Compact held alongside the U.N. General Assembly and IMF/
World Bank Annual Meetings in New York and Singapore to inform the
international community about the Compact, the Foreign and Finance
Ministers of more than 35 countries and international organizations
expressed their support for the Compact. Final work on the Compact is
expected to be completed in time for formal adoption before the end of
November 2006, by Iraq and an even larger group of countries and
organizations. Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Robert Kimmitt and
State Department Counselor Philip Zelikow are co-leads in USG efforts
in support of the Compact.
At the October 2003 Madrid International Donors' Conference, donors
other than the United States pledged over $13.5 billion in assistance
for the reconstruction of Iraq. This includes $8 billion in assistance
from foreign governments and $5.5 billion in lending from the World
Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF)--all to be disbursed between
2004 and 2007. In January 2006, $3.2 billion of the pledges of non-U.S.
assistance had been disbursed. By August 2006, disbursements of non-
U.S. assistance had increased significantly, to about $3.7 billion;
approximately $3 billion of this was from other donor governments,
either in bilateral projects, or through the World Bank and U.N.-
administered International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq
(IRFFI). (Currently, United Nations and World Bank projects in water,
electricity, education, health and other areas are in various stages of
completion.) By the end of August 2006, of a total of $1.16 billion
deposited in the U.N. Trust Fund, $861 million had been committed to
specific projects and $534 million disbursed. Of the $456.8 billion
pledged to the World Bank, $395 million had been committed and $67.5
million disbursed. The IMF approved $436 million in balance-of-payments
support in September 2004 and an additional $685 million of such
support in December 2005.
Since Madrid, donors have pledged an additional $652 million. A
number of countries and institutions have disbursed assistance above
and beyond what they pledged at the 2003 Madrid Conference, including
Australia, the European Commission, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Norway.
Donor government disbursements are defined here as funds that have
left government treasuries. Because, however, much of the assistance is
being channeled for implementation through trust funds, contractors,
NGOs, international organizations and Iraqi institutions, there is
normally some time between disbursement by the donor and impact on the
ground in Iraq.
Donors committed an additional $235 million in new contributions to
the IRFFI at the July 2005 meeting of the IRFFI Donors' Committee at
the Dead Sea in Jordan. Most of this was new pledges since Madrid, and
most has already been deposited in the IRFFI. The Islamic Development
Bank agreed that it would make $300 million in new concessional
financing available in November 2005. The World Bank and Iraq agreed in
principle on an up to $500 million framework program for concessional
IDA lending. The World Bank Board has approved two IDA loans under this
program: A $100 million education project and a $135 million
transportation project, approved in June 2006, that will help
rehabilitate roads and bridges. In December 2005, the IMF agreed to a
Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with Iraq that makes $685 million available
for balance-of-payment support.
the international reconstruction fund facility for iraq (irffi)
The Madrid Conference authorized the establishment of the IRFFI,
which gives donors a multilateral channel for their Iraq assistance--in
addition to their bilateral efforts. The IRFFI contains two primary
trust funds, one managed by the World Bank, the other by the United
Nations. Funds channeled through the IRFFI come from donors' pledges
made at the Madrid Conference and those made subsequently. There are
currently 116 IRFFI projects (103 United Nations, 13 World Bank) in
various stages of completion. Details on the IRFFI can be found at
www.irffi.org.
Current donor commitments to the IRFFI total about $1.6
billion. Of this amount, $491 million is from Japan; $620
million from the European Commission; $127 million from the
United Kingdom; $69 million from Canada; $40 million from
Spain; $36 million from Australia, $29.8 million from Italy;
$13.7 million from Norway; $12.9 million from the Netherlands;
$16.4 million from Sweden; $15 million from the Republic of
Korea; $10 million each from the United States, Denmark,
Germany, India, Iran, Kuwait, and Qatar. Belgium, Finland,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, and Turkey
have committed varying amounts under $10 million.
Of the approximately $1.6 billion in commitments, donors
(including the United States) have deposited $1.54 billion in
the IRFFI trust funds as of August 31, 2006.
The United Nations and World Bank submit their project
proposals for approval to the Iraqi Strategic Review Board
(ISRB). The ISRB is an Iraqi coordinating body chaired by the
Minister of Planning and Development Cooperation that reviews
requests for and offers of external donor assistance.
The IRFFI Donors' Committee held its fourth meeting at the
Dead Sea in Jordan, on July 18-19, 2005. The Donors' Committee
consists of 18 countries that have committed at least $10
million to the fund facility and two rotating representatives
(currently Finland and Turkey) from countries that have
committed less than $10 million. As of the end of September
2006, the implementing U.N. agencies have legally committed
$644 million and disbursed $546 million of total approved
projects amounting to $861 million. So far in 2006, the IRFFI
has received approximately $168 million in new commitments
($152 million from the European Union, $10 million from
Germany, $2.4 million from Spain, $1.5 from Australia, $1.1
from Luxembourg, $1 million from New Zealand and smaller
contributions from Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, the
Netherlands, and Norway). Canada continued its chairmanship of
the IRFFI Donors' Committee, which it assumed from Japan in
February, 2005.
At the Dead Sea meeting, the Iraqi Transitional Government
(ITG) assumed its central role in soliciting and coordinating
international support for Iraqi reconstruction. It presented an
updated National Development Strategy and a series of new donor
coordination mechanisms on the ground in Iraq. Together these
efforts represented an important shift toward an Iraq-led
reconstruction process, strongly supported by the international
community. Chaired by the ITG, but supported by the United
Nations and World Bank, these new coordinating bodies, which
include a ``Baghdad Coordination Group'' of all donors on the
ground and ``Sectoral Working Groups,'' have been holding
meetings since August 2005. So far, Sectoral Working Groups
have been established for Health, Education, Rule of Law, and
Electricity.
The next IRFFI Donors' Committee meeting will be scheduled,
after close consultation with the new Iraqi Government, and
depending on developments with the International Compact with
Iraq. The Donor Committee will discuss how to best align IRFFI
with the Compact Process.
updates on selected major donors
The January 2004 report to Congress included a table of pledges
made at the Madrid International Donors Conference. Since that report,
donors have begun disbursing and implementing their assistance. Below
are major donor highlights:
Japan
Japan has pledged and disbursed more assistance to Iraq than any
other country except the United States. By May 2005, Japan had entirely
obligated the $1.5 billion of grant aid that it had pledged in Madrid.
Japan is currently in discussions with Iraq on the first projects to be
implemented from its $3.5 billion concessional loan program. Moreover,
based on the agreement of the Paris Club concerning the treatment of
Iraq's debt, the Government of Japan and the Government of Iraq agreed
upon the details of the conditions for debt relief. Notes to this
effect were exchanged on November 24, 2005, in Tokyo between both
Ministers for Foreign Affairs.
The debt will be cancelled by 80 percent in three stages, which
amounts to a reduction of approximately US$6 billion. In late March,
Japan announced and notified the Iraqi side of its intention to provide
yen loans up to the total amount of 76,489 million yen (approximately
$655 million) toward three projects in Iraq. On June 18, Japan
confirmed with the new Iraqi Government the decision to extend yen-loan
up to 3,348 million yen (approximately $28 million) for implementing
another project in Samawah. Exchange of Notes will be signed with the
new Iraqi Government regarding the provision of these loans. The four
projects are:
Umm-Qasr Port Sector Rehabilitation Project ( $259 million):
To dredge the port and surrounding shipping lanes, remove
wrecked ships and rehabilitate the port facilities, as well as
to provide equipment and materials such as dredgers and other
items. This project aims to reconstruct the Port of Umm-Qasr
and its function as the transportation and distribution network
hub.
Irrigation Sector Loan ( $81 million): To provide irrigation
drainage pumps and equipment and materials for maintaining the
operation of irrigation channels in some sites where
agriculture is important, including in the Governorate of Al-
Muthanna. This sector loan aims to improve the agricultural
production and increase employment in Iraq.
Al-Mussaib Thermal Power Plant Rehabilitation Project ( $315
million): To rehabilitate the existing Al-Mussaib thermal power
plants (units 1 and 3), located in the Baghdad suburbs. This
project aims to improve the power supply mainly targeting
Baghdad.
Samawah Bridges and Roads Construction Project ($28
million): To construct a new bridge (Samawah North Bridge),
rebuild provisional bridges (Mandi Bridge and Hillal Bridge) to
cross over the Euphrates and construct their connecting roads
in Al-Samawah and its vicinity.
In December 2005, Japan decided to extend a grant of $14.4 million
to UNDP for the Iraqi Reconstruction and Employment Program and
Electricity Network enforcement Program in Al-Muthanna.
In earlier disbursements of its grants assistance, Japan deposited
a total of $491 million to the IRFFI ($361 million to the U.N. fund and
$130 million to the World Bank fund). Japan has also deposited $10
million to the International Finance Corporation's (IFC) Small Business
Financing Facility. In addition, Japan has disbursed $116 million
directly to international organizations to implement projects such as
restoration of water and sewage systems, garbage collection and
sanitation. The balance of Japan's disbursements, $938 million, have
been in direct bilateral projects or channeled through Iraqi
institutions and NGOs for implementation. Major Japanese contributions
(in grants):
Electricity: Rehabilitation of four electrical power
stations (Taji Gas Turbine, Mosul Gas Turbine, Mosul
Hydroelectric and Hartha Power), construction of a diesel power
station and provision of generators in Samawah, rehabilitation
of the National Dispatch Center and provision of 27 mobile
electricity substations.
Water and Sanitation: Provision of 38 water tankers, 311
water tanks and 6 water treatment units in the Al-Muthanna
governorate. Provision of 30 compact water treatment units in
Baghdad and rehabilitation of water and sewage facilities in
schools in Baghdad and Nineveh.
Health: Grant assistance for Japanese NGO projects to the
Samawah Maternity and Children's Hospital, which have provided
medical equipment, including infant incubators, phototherapy
units for incubators and electrocardiographs to the only
children's and maternity hospital in the Al-Muthanna
Governorate. Medical supplies and equipment also have been
provided to the Samawah General Hospital and Al-Rumaytha and
Al-Khidhur hospitals and to 32 primary health centers in the
Al-Muthanna governorate. Rehabilitation and equipping of four
general hospitals (Nasiriyah, Najaf, Diwaniyah and Samawah) in
southern Iraq, four more in northern Iraq (Kirkuk, Erbil,
Mosul, and Dahuk) and three in Central Iraq (Baghdad, Amarah,
and Kut).
Roads and Bridges: The repair of roads between Al-Khidhur
and Darraji and between Mandi and Sawa and other roads in Al-
Muthanna governorate as well as the provision of construction
equipment to restore damaged roads and bridges in the
governorate. Rehabilitation of 90 kilometers of roads in Al-
Muthanna governorate.
Education and Culture: Contributions to UNESCO, which are
building capacity at the Ministry of Education and restoring
the Iraqi National Museum's restoration laboratory. Through
HABITAT, assistance for rehabilitation of about 200 schools in
Basrah, Samawah, Nashiria and Amra and of about 3,000 houses
and community facilities in Baghdad, Samawah and Kirkuk.
Security: Donation of 1,150 police vehicles, 150 police
buses, 500 police motorcycles and 20 armored vehicles. Donation
of 70 fire trucks to Baghdad, Basrah, and Al-Muthanna. Donation
of 742 ambulances.
Capacity Building: Training over 1,200 Iraqis, including
Iraqi diplomats, staff of the Al-Muthanna TV station, museum
officials, statisticians, election officials, medical staff,
and hospital directors.
The United Kingdom
At Madrid, the United Kingdom pledged 296 million ($545
million) for the Iraq reconstruction effort for 2004 through 2006. This
was included in the United Kingdom's total pledge of 544
million ($920 million), which counted the United Kingdom's previously
announced assistance for the humanitarian effort and its assessed
portion of the European Commission's assistance. As of September 2006,
the United Kingdom had disbursed 277 million ($521 million)
of its Madrid $545 million reconstruction pledge.
The United Kingdom has disbursed approximately 193
million ($360 million) for projects in support of reconstruction in
southern Iraq, governance and economic capacity-building, the justice
sector, independent media and civil society. The United Kingdom's
Department for International Development (DFID) is responsible for
these projects. The United Kingdom also deposited $127 million in the
IRFFI--$71 million to the World Bank Trust Fund and $56 million to the
U.N. Trust Fund.
The DFID program in 2006-2007 is entirely bilateral and focuses on
economic reform; infrastructure (improving power and water services in
the south); governance and institutional-building in Baghdad and in the
south; and support for civil society and political participation.
In southern Iraq, the United Kingdom has provided support to
rehabilitate emergency infrastructure, working closely with the United
Kingdom military; an infrastructure project to deliver improved power
and water services; support to build the institutional capacity of the
four southern governorates and private sector development; a team of
technical specialists to advise local councils, U.K. military and other
donors on infrastructure rehabilitation and construction; and support
to strengthen independent broadcasting.
In central Iraq, the United Kingdom has supported the Iraqi
Government on economic reform issues; supported the Center of
Government Program to improve functions of government; supported the
justice sector; provided funds for a Civil Society Fund (CSF) to
develop legitimate and representative Iraqi NGOs; and provided funds
for a Political Participation Fund (PPF) to encourage poor and
marginalized sections of Iraqi society to engage in the constitutional
process. Major U.K. contributions:
Electricity: Repaired transmission lines from Hartha Power
station to Basrah city, securing electricity supplies for 1.5
million residents; improved power distribution to 13 areas of
Basrah. U.K. support will add or secure an additional 470 MW of
power equivalent to a 24-hour supply to over 235,000
households.
Water and Sanitation: Replaced 800 km of water mains,
repaired over 5,000 leaks, cleared out 7,000 septic tanks and
cleared over 40 kms of drains across the four southern
governorates; constructed a water training center in Basra to
increase the skills of Iraqi engineers in water treatment and
leakage repair, and improved water supply to 60,000 people in
Al Amtahiyah. Current activities include refurbishing a reverse
osmosis unit, building water towers and reservoirs, and
refurbishing a pump station. These will directly benefit up to
1 million people in Basra.
Capacity-Building: Supported new Provincial Development
Committees which produced Iraq-led draft Provincial Development
Strategies, which included resource statements to bid for
funding from the central government. Trained 216 Iraqi judges,
lawyers, and prosecutors in human rights, international
humanitarian law and independence of the judiciary. Trained 182
journalists, editors and media managers on humanitarian and
independent reporting. New, independent TV and radio programs
in southern Iraq went on air during summer 2005 through DFID
funding.
Supporting Iraqi Humanitarian Response: DFID consultants to
the IIG Fallujah Core Coordination Group from December 2004
helped set up mechanisms for the Iraqi Government to respond to
future crises.
Macroeconomic Reform: Assisted the Iraqi Government in
drawing up its 2006 budget, reaching agreement with the IMF on
a $436 million Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance package,
negotiating the Paris Club debt reduction deal and drafting a
National Development Strategy.
Support to the Political Process: Helped to promote the
political process through support for the electoral commission
($10 million plus advisers on security and public information),
civil society organizations ( $8.7 million) and public
participation in the elections ( $12.6 million). Helped to set
up the Prime Minister's office and the Cabinet and Committee
system. Helped achieve continuity in the transition to the new
elected administration.
Further information on the DFID program in Iraq, including
quarterly updates, is available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/
asia/iraq.asp.
Canada
Canada has pledged C$300 million (about $230 million) for Iraq's
humanitarian relief and reconstruction, including C$245 million ($187
million) pledged at Madrid and C$55 million ($42 million) in urgent
humanitarian relief disbursed through multilateral relief agencies in
response to the U.N. Humanitarian Appeal. Canada became Chair of the
IRFFI Donors' Committee in 2005. Canada has committed C$100 million
(about $76 million) to the IRFFI, of which it initially deposited C$60
million ($44.7 million) equally divided between the United Nations and
the World Bank trust funds. In September 2004, Canada deposited another
C$20 million ($15.3 million) in the U.N. trust fund to be used to
support Iraqi elections. In December 2005, an additional C$10 million
(about $8.5 million) was deposited to support United Nations support to
elections and human rights.
In addition to funding to IRFFI, Canada has allocated over C$100
million in other, non-IRFFI assistance. This includes C$40 million
(about $34 million) to UNICEF for social sector funding and bilateral
assistance through CARE Canada for reconstruction work to improve basic
services in water and sanitation, basic health and education and child
protection. CIDA also allocated C$3 million (about $2.6 million) to
assist in the restoration and management of the ecological health of
the ``Mesopotamian Marshes.''
In the area of governance, human rights and civil society capacity-
building, Canada is supporting a number of projects including: C$15
million (about $12.8 million) for the Rapid Civilian Deployment
Mechanism for capacity-building, including governance; C$10 million
(about $8.5 million) for a civil society capacity-building fund,
including media and human rights training; C$5 million (about $4.2
million) to the Middle East Good Governance Fund; $C2 million (about
$1.7 million) for human rights and diversity management training; C$2
million (about $1.7 million) for support to the constitutional process
and federal systems; C$700,000 million (about $600,000) to UNDP for
research on governance questions; and a small fund for building a
culture of human rights in Iraq and the Middle East. Canada also
supported elections with an additional C$7 million (about $5.8 million)
allocated to the International Mission for Iraq Elections. In the
security sector, Canada allocated C$10 million (about $7.9 million)
over 2 years for deployment of Canadian police instructors to assist in
the training of Iraqi police at the Jordan International Police
Training Center (JIPTIC) as well as funding to deploy senior police
advisors to the Ministry of Interior. Since January, Canada has
provided an additional C$7.5 million (about $6.4 million) to these
activities. Total Canadian assistance to the security sector is now
C$17.5 million (about $15 million). Canada plans to focus the remainder
of its assistance on good governance and the promotion of human rights
including women's rights.
More details on Canadian assistance to Iraq are available at
www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/iraq.
The European Commission (EC)
There have been several notable developments in EC assistance to
Iraq. Since April, the EC has prepared a communication entitled, ``The
EU and Iraq: A Framework for Engagement,'' which is intended to provide
the basis for an EU-wide strategy and proposes EU support to the new
Iraqi Government in five areas:
To further an inclusive democracy;
To strengthen rule of law and respect for human rights;
To support basic services and job creation;
To economic recovery and reform; and,
To the development of a functioning administration.
Additional information on the EU Framework for Engagement can be
found at: http://europa.eu.int.
Following discussions among member states, 120 million euros of the
EC's =200m allocated for 2006, was designated for IRFFI, to support
provision of basic services, as was previous financing. At the same
meeting, a 6-million-euro proposal to provide a technical assistance
facility was agreed upon. The EC will be entering into discussion with
member states on the balance of the 200 million euro pledge for 2006
later in October 2006.
The Head of the EC Delegation has been in Baghdad for the past few
months and the Commission is in the process of training and deploying
additional staff. In addition, with the new Iraqi Government in place,
the EC soon expects to launch negotiations for a Trade and Cooperation
Agreement.
United Nations (U.N.)
As of August 31, 2006, donors had committed approximately $1.1
billion to the U.N. trust fund of the IRFFI. Of this, about $1 billion
had been deposited. The United Nations has developed a strategic
planning framework and organized their programs into ``clusters'' with
various U.N. specialized agencies working together under a cluster lead
agency in each. Originally comprised of 11 clusters, the United Nations
reorganized the clusters into 7 lettered clusters adopted in July 2005.
The clusters are:
A. Agriculture, Food Security, Environment and Natural Resource
Management
B. Education and Culture
C. Governance and Human Development
D. Health and Nutrition
E. Infrastructure Rehabilitation
F. Refugees, IDPs and Durable Solutions
G. Support to Electoral Process
As of August 2006, the United Nations had developed 103 projects,
valued at $861 million, all of which have been approved for
implementation by the Iraqi Government. Among these projects, the
United Nations has provided school supplies, rehabilitated schools,
provided vaccines, supported internally displaced persons (IDPs) and
refugees, conducted capacity-building training programs for Iraqi
officials and assisted in the elections. In January 2006, the U.N.
trust fund had legally committed $564 million and disbursed $430
million of the total approved funding. By the end of August 2006, the
U.N. trust fund had obligated $644 million in binding contracts for
implementation and had disbursed $546 million. A full list of the
U.N.'s IRFFI projects is available at the www.irffi.org Web site.
World Bank
As of September 2006, donors had pledged approximately $457 million
to the World Bank trust fund of the IRFFI, of which approximately $454
million had been deposited. With these deposits, the World Bank is
implementing the following 13 projects amounting to US$401 million:
[In millions of dollars]
Projected
Operation costs
Emergency Textbooks........................................... $40
Emergency School Rehabilitation............................... 60
Emergency Baghdad Water Supply and Sanitation................. 65
Emergency Water Supply, Sanitation and Urban Reconstruction... 90
Emergency Health Rehabilitation............................... 25
Emergency Private Sector Development I........................ 55
Capacity Building I........................................... 3.6
Capacity Building II.......................................... 7
Emergency Community Infrastructure............................ 20
Emergency Disabilities........................................ 19.5
Emergency Social Protection................................... 8
Emergency Household Survey, Technical Assistance.............. 1.5
Emergency Household Survey & Policies for Policy Reduction.... 5.1
Ten of the thirteen World Bank trust fund-financed projects, valued
at US$388 million, are grants implemented directly by Iraqi
governmental authorities. Three projects, amounting to US$12 million,
are capacity-building and technical assistance activities implemented
by the World Bank.
Through these projects, the World Bank has financed more than 79
million textbooks, rehabilitated or constructed more than a hundred
schools, trained hundreds of Iraqi officials, and rehabilitated dozens
of rural irrigation or drainage schemes. The World Bank is also
rehabilitating and upgrading hospitals, centers for the disabled, and
telecom and water supply systems in Iraq. The latest World Bank ITF-
financed projects focus on helping Iraq develop strategic approaches to
reducing poverty, protecting the vulnerable, and designing sustainable
economic programs. These new projects support the Bank's core objective
to help Iraq develop institutional frameworks, policies, and systems
for more effective and transparent use of Iraq's resources.
The World Bank relies mainly on a cadre of high-level Iraqi staff
providing daily support in Iraq to protect management teams. The Bank
also has two contracted international staff in Baghdad's International
Zone, and is in the process of further strengthening its presence in
Baghdad. The Bank has several video-conferencing facilities in Baghdad
and an office in Amman that supports the Iraqi program.
The World Bank places a major emphasis on capacity-building, policy
advice, and economic and sector work, which are funded from the Bank's
own budget. The Bank has prepared policy papers for the Iraqi
Government on a wide range of topics, responding to urgent Iraqi
Government requests for policy advice. In July 2006, the Bank provided
the Iraqi Government with a Briefing Book on core reforms, which was
prepared in close cooperation with Iraqi authorities. The Briefing Book
gives priority to strengthening governance and institutions,
modernizing social safety nets, and accelerating economic reforms. The
Bank is currently providing technical support to the Iraqi Government
in the formulation of the International Compact. In 2007, the Bank
plans to undertake, in partnership with the Iraqis, a Public
Institutional and Expenditure Assessment to outline the steps for
strengthening the transparency and accountability of Iraq's public
finance policies and institutions, and help Iraq meet the goals set in
the Iraq Compact.
At Madrid, the World Bank announced an anticipated lending envelope
of $3 to $5 billion, conditional on Iraq's creditworthiness. In
December 2004, Iraq cleared its arrears to the World Bank, one of the
requirements to resume lending. The World Bank provides a framework for
up to $500 million of IDA (International Development Association)
concessional lending. The strategy also provides for up to $500 million
in IBRD (nonconcessional) lending, assuming Iraq makes critical
progress regarding IBRD creditworthiness. In November 2005, the World
Bank Executive Board approved the first $100 million IDA loan within
the $500 million program. The $100 million Third Emergency Education
Project (TEEP) will help the Government of Iraq alleviate school
overcrowding and lay the groundwork for educational reform. In June
2006, the Bank approved a $135 million IDA transportation project that
will help rehabilitate Iraqi roads and bridges.
IMF
At the Madrid Donors' Conference, the IMF pledged to provide over
$2.55 billion in lending to Iraq. On September 29, 2004, the IMF Board
approved an Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance (EPCA) package that
provided Iraq SDR 297.1 million (about $430 million) in balance-of-
payments support. The main goals under the EPCA were to maintain
macroeconomic stability and lay the groundwork for a long-term
development and reform program. On December 23, 2005, the IMF approved
a Stand-by Arrangement (SBA) for Iraq that provides SDR 475 million
(about $685 million) in balance-of-payments support. The 15-month SBA
provides a comprehensive framework of policies for economic reform and
growth in coming years. The first tranche of the SBA, worth $114
million, became available to the Iraqi Government at the time of SBA
approval. To date, Iraq has not drawn against the funds in either the
EPCA or SBA programs. The IMF was to do quarterly reviews of Iraq's
progress under the SBA. The first such review, scheduled for March
2006, was postponed because of the lengthy Iraqi Government formation
process. IMF Executive Board consideration of the combined first and
second quarterly reviews is now scheduled for August 2.
Reaching the SBA also triggered the second 30 percent tranche of
debt reduction under Iraq's agreement with the Paris Club. To obtain
the final 20 percent tranche of Paris Club debt relief, Iraq must
complete 3 years of successful performance under the SBA.
The IMF also provides technical assistance to Iraq, including
training in such policy areas as public expenditure management, fiscal
federalism, tax policy, tax and customs administration, monetary
operations, banking supervision, payments system reform and statistics.
Some of this training has been done jointly with the World Bank. The
IMF has assisted in coordinating macroeconomic training with the other
major providers: The World Bank, the United States, and the United
Kingdom.
debt forgiveness
Reduction of Iraq's external debt burden to sustainable levels,
another top priority for Iraq's economic development, is a key
component of U.S. donor coordination. In November 2004, the Paris Club
group of creditors agreed to forgive, in phases, 80 percent of
approximately $40 billion in Iraqi debt held by its members. As of July
2006, 17 of 18 Paris Club signatories of that agreement have signed
bilateral debt agreements with the Iraqis implementing the 2004
agreement. Russia is the only remaining Paris Club signatory not to
have signed a bilateral debt agreement with Iraq; Russia has indicated
it could conclude an agreement soon. The United States itself went
beyond Paris Club terms and has forgiven 100 percent of the $4.1
billion in U.S.-held Iraqi debt. In total, over $30 billion in Iraqi
debt either has been forgiven, or will be, by Paris Club and several
non-Paris Club countries, provided Iraq meets agreed-upon conditions,
including 3 years of successful performance under the SBA. The United
States continues to encourage non-Paris Club countries to provide debt
reduction to Iraq at terms at least comparable to those offered by the
Paris Club. The terms for forgiveness of what Iraq owes to non-Paris
Club countries and commercial creditors are closely tied to the Paris
Club deal. Iraq has completed a debt exchange with its commercial
creditors on terms comparable to the Paris Club deal. One hundred
percent of eligible large commercial creditors contacted accepted
Iraq's offer. Iraq offered smaller creditors cash for debt, rather than
new debt. Altogether, an overwhelming majority of commercial claimants
has accepted Iraq's offer, covering about $20 billion in debt, which
will result in approximately $16 billion in debt reduction over time.
other major efforts
With the help of U.S. advisors, the Ministry of Planning and
Development Coordination has completed plans to eliminate the major
hurdles faced by donors on the ground in Baghdad. Plans are being
implemented to provide security, housing and office space to potential
donors inside the International Zone. The accommodations, called
``Donor Village,'' are inside the secure Army Corps of Engineers/PCO
compound. Donors can occupy space, and they will reimburse the USG for
billeting arrangements, office space, and meals. The cost-prohibitive
nature of setting up individual offices and providing security for
accommodations had previously been a major impediment to obtaining
further donor assistance, and this integrated plan has been well
received and coordinated.
useful references for international donor assistance to iraq
The Donor Assistance Database: http://www.mop-iraq.org/dad.
The UNDG Iraq Trust Fund and the World Bank Iraq Trust Fund
Newsletters, updated every 2-3 months and both accessible at:
http://www.irffi.org.
POLITICAL STRATEGY
----------
THURSDAY, JANUARY 25, 2007 [P.M.]
U.S. Senate,
Commitee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:47 p.m., in
room SD-628, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R.
Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Menendez, Casey, Webb, Lugar,
Isakson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
This afternoon's hearing may be one of the most important
in the series of hearings we've had, and I'm not being
solicitous to the witnesses that are here. We've heard
repeatedly that there can be no stability in Iraq absent a
political settlement. And I don't say what I'm about to say
being critical of anyone particular. But, we are--find
ourselves in a part of the world where our experience is not
that deep. And where a lot of people formed opinions about what
our policy should be in this capital without knowing, not just
some of the basic history, but also the nuances based on
religion, ethnicity, tribalism--very complicated. And although
I'm sure everyone in this body and the press covering it was
fully aware of the nature of the formation of what is now the
Republic of Iraq and World War II, the panel we have before us
today are eminently familiar with the intricacies of Iraqi
politics. They are going to help us understand the likelihood
of what everyone is saying is needed. We say it, everyone says
there is no military solution, even those who are strongly
supporting the President's new mission. And there's a need for
a political solution.
We have asked the panel prior to their being here, to offer
their assessment of the main elements of what any such
political solution, assuming they believe one is possible,
would look like. What compromises would be required and by
whom. And what is a reasonable timeframe, if any, in which a
settlement could be achieved, a political settlement.
What are likely to be the main sticking points? Has, as
they say, too much water gone under the bridge to be able to
get to the point where there is a possibility of a political
solution? And we're very interested in their views on influence
capacity and will of the main political actors to bring about
national reconciliation. We also want to better understand the
political objectives of the various actors, such as the
insurgents, the terrorists, the jihadis, the militia groups,
some of the religious leaders, Sunni and Shia alike, Arab and
Kurd.
And finally, we have asked the witnesses to comment on the
role the United States and the international committee can
play, if
any, in facilitating a political settlement. And our witnesses
are uniquely qualified to address these questions.
Not necessarily in this order, but first we will have the
executive director of the Iraqi Foundation and senior fellow at
the U.S. Institute of Peace, Ms. Rahim. The fact is she served
as Iraq's representative to the United States. In 2003 and 2004
she testified before this committee, back in August 2002, and
Madam, we welcome you back. It's a delight to have you here.
We also have the director for Middle East and North African
Affairs of the National Endowment of Democracy, who has served
as a spokesman for the Government of Iraq during the tenure of
Prime Minister Jaafari. And we appreciate his interrupting his
trip to London to fly. Doctor, thank you for literally having a
little bit of a detour here. It's a significant detour to join
us.
And, Mr. Talabani is the Washington representative of
Kurdistan Regional Government, and we welcome you here today.
You were kind enough to host Senator Hagel and me several years
ago in Kurdistan, in what turned out to be a very bumpy ride
for 7 hours through the mountains to get to that hospitality,
and we appreciate it very much.
And Dr. Toby Dodge is a consulting senior fellow for the
Middle East at the International Institute for Strategic
Studies. He is the author of two similar books that I would
strongly recommend to everyone. I'm not even asking for a share
of the royalties. ``Iraq's Future: The Aftermath of Regime
Change,'' and ``Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building
and a History Denied.'' He has testified before this committee
previously. He is articulate and insightful, and we want to
thank him for coming today. It's not like he walked across the
street. He had to come from London to do this and alter his
schedule, and we truly appreciate it. So, I look forward to the
testimony from all of you.
And I now yield to Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank
you, again, for holding this hearing, and for the continuing
series of hearings that we are enjoying on Iraq.
During the last several weeks, the Foreign Relations
Committee has had the opportunity to engage policy experts and
administration officials in a wide range of questions related
to Iraq, including military strategy, economic reconstruction,
regional dynamics. We have reviewed the President's current
plan, and at least half a dozen alternatives. We have discussed
what impact these plans might have on United States national
security. We have examined our obligations to our troops, to
the American people, and to our Iraqi allies.
Virtually all these inquiries have confirmed that the
outcome in Iraq will hinge on whether a political
reconciliation can be achieved in that country. As I have said
on many occasions during the last several years, it depends on
whether Iraqis want to be Iraqis. Will various factions and
subfactions within Iraq buy into a political compromise, and
can such a political deal create stability and prevent violent
fragmentation of the country? Can the Maliki government manage
this process effectively and lead the nation, rather than act
as representatives of the Shiite majority?
These questions are especially vital to our current policy
discussions because the President's plan depends on the premise
that reducing violence in Baghdad will create political
stability that is a precondition for political reconciliation.
In previous testimony, Secretary Richard Haass, highlighted the
fundamental disconnect with which we are contending when he
observed, and I quote from Secretary Haass, ``The U.S. goal is
to work with Iraqis to establish a functioning democracy in
which the interests and right of minorities are protected. The
goal of the Iraqi Government appears to be to establish a
country in which the rights and interests of the Shia majority
are protected above all else.''
In such a situation, even if additional troops have a
discernable impact on the violence in Baghdad, this progress in
the streets may be immaterial to achieving political
reconciliation. And if this is true, all we can gain from a
troop surge is a temporary and partial reduction of violence in
Baghdad. That would have some salutary benefits for some
Iraqis, but it would not help us achieve our strategic
objectives.
In the absence of a clear connection between additional
troops and political reconciliation, we might be better served
by a course in which United States forces in Iraq are
redeployed outside urban areas. From such positions they would
still be a source of stability in the region and a deterrent to
terrorism, adventurism by Iraq's neighbors, or a broader
regional war.
We are grateful to our panel for joining us to discuss
these critical questions this afternoon. We look forward to a
thoughtful discussion about whether a political reconciliation
in Iraq is possible. Whether the United States can affect the
chances for such a reconciliation and whether the President's
plan, or other alternatives, offer the best hope for
accelerating that process.
I welcome the witnesses and look forward to their comments.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. With such a
distinguished panel I always--the Chairman is better than me at
knowing what the protocol should be, but I think on two
measures, Ms. Rahim, you should begin first, and then with your
permission we'll move to Mr. Talabani, then to Dr. Kubba, and
then to Dr. Dodge. And I still love your books and I like you
best. Anyway, very seriously, thank you for being here, Ms.
Rahim, and the floor is yours. We look forward to your
testimony.
STATEMENT OF REND AL-RAHIM, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE IRAQ
FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Ms. Rahim. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before your committee and it's certainly
a pleasure to see you, and Senator Lugar again. I want to say
that the views I express here are mine alone, they are not the
views of any of the institutions with which I am affiliated. I
was asked to speak for 8 minutes, which is an incredibly short
period of time.
The Chairman. If you need to speak for more, you go ahead.
Just try to----
Ms. Rahim. I will make short remarks. A written statement
is filed for the record and I----
The Chairman. It will be entered in--all of your written
statements will be placed in the record.
Ms. Rahim. And I'm hoping that in the question-and-answer
period, we'll be able to elaborate on more issues and I can
talk about it in my presented statement.
I want to focus on the Shia-Sunni relationship in Iraq
because I believe that, at present, this is the nexus of the
problem that we have.
The situation in Iraq is indeed bleak, and as General
Batraiz said, dire. We have an insurgency that is composed of
many groups with different agendas. We have sectarian violence
in which the actors are shadowy and the motives are murky. We
have a political structure that feeds on and strengthens
sectarian and ethnic divisions. We have political deadlock and
a national reconciliation process that is going absolutely
nowhere, state institutions that are undercapacitated or
downright dysfunctional and a government that is ineffective in
its primary task of serving the people.
Despite this, we should not fall into the fallacy of post
hoc ergo propter hoc. The situation we have now in Iraq is not
the inestimable result of the collapse of Saddam Hussein's
regime. Instead, it is my firm view, that the political
structure that was adopted by the CPA, in the early days, along
with policies that were flawed and decisions that were
disastrous for the country taken by the CPA--and I might add
with the support of many Iraqi actors made the outcome that we
see today virtually certain.
The cardinal and root error committed by the CPA with Iraqi
collusion was to place Iraqi politics along purely sectarian
and ethnic lines. This was a gross oversimplification of Iraqi
society, arising from ignorance and intellectual laziness. And
it ignored the complex texture and weave of the Iraqi social
fabric.
This reductionist model served certain vested interests
amongst Iraqi political groups. And yet the structure also
increased religious, sectarian, and ethnic fanaticism in the
country. It has entrenched the groups in their positions and
deepened the divides instead of bridging the gaps.
What should our goals be in Iraq now? There is some short-
term goals and some medium-term goals and the short-term I
would single out the following very broadly: The reduction of
violence in Baghdad and in the surrounding five governorates is
essential; a political settlement that can give confidence to
all groups in Iraq is absolutely indispensable; and, the
strengthening of Iraq's national institutions is an essential
component of building a viable state. Those are our three broad
goals.
There are some medium goals that I will not go into in my
oral statement, but I want to point out here that the vast
majority of Iraqis want coexistence. They want a national
political agenda, as opposed to a sectarian agenda. However, as
in most countries, the majority is disempowered and voiceless.
I also want to address a misconception common today in
Washington, which is that Sunnis and Shias in Iraq have been
fighting it out for centuries. That is not accurate. The
incidents of sectarian violence in Iraq's history is rare.
Certainly nothing like the religious wars that raged in Europe
intermittently for many centuries. The fighting we see today in
Iraq is absolutely the worst in Iraq's history.
While it's true that the solutions to Iraq's problems are
political, the violence impedes the quest for a political
settlement. The violence in Baghdad and surrounding areas
exacerbates the political tensions and deepens the sectarian
divide. This level of violence also blinds the politicians, and
the public, and saps the national will for reconciliation and
for compromise. We need to reduce the level of violence in
order to move the reconciliation process forward. We need to
break the vicious cycle that currently dominates Iraqi politics
and turn it, if possible, into a virtuous cycle in which a
reduction of violence leads to a step in the right direction in
politics and a step in the right direction in politics reduces
the violence and so on and so forth. This is the opposite of
what we have now.
So, instead of thinking of ending the violence, I would
like to speak about breaking the cycle of violence in order to
give Iraqis the opportunity to address and implement political
objective.
Moreover, the model of ``Clear, Hold, and Rebuild,''
although frequently annunciated has never actually been
implemented. This needs to be implemented now. And whenever
possible, Iraqi troops should be in the forefront of the
rebuild phase of the Clear, Hold, and Rebuild because Iraqi
forces need to be seen rebuilding in order to gain the trust of
the people and to build their own confidence in themselves.
Simultaneously, the Government of Iraq should substantially
increase the size of the Iraqi Army, and with multinational
assistance, improve training, equipment, and command and
control structures.
Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that there is ever a
possibility of handing over to the Iraqi forces unless there is
a serious effort, and the accomplishment of a much larger, much
better trained, much better equipped Iraqi Army. At present, it
is my view that the Iraqi forces that we have are simply unable
to take over.
I spoke about broad objectives and I want to single out
some of the prerequisites for a successful dialog. Iraqi
political leaders have to abandon the ``winner takes all''
concept of politics. And for the time being politicians must
abandon majoritarian and minoritarian modes of thinking. The
Shia must accept that--however large their majority--they must
share the territory, the resources, and the State of Iraq with
all the others. The Shia leaders must change their rhetoric,
which currently swings between victimhood and triumphantism.
The Sunnis on the other hand must relinquish the power they
have been accustomed to and accept that there is a new order in
Iraq. And the Sunni leaders have to declare against the
insurgency and condemn the violence in a way that they have
failed to do so far. They need to be squarely within the
political framework, and can not continue to straddle both
sides of the fence.
In practice, there are several areas that will contribute
to national reconciliation. The first one is a constitutional
revision. The current Constitution, Mr. Chairman, is not
conducive to a viable state. And furthermore, it enshrines many
of the problems that plague the Iraqi political process right
now, and that divide the communities from one another. The
Constitution has to be redrafted, both in terms of individual
articles, and in terms of the architecture of the state that it
envisions. The Sunnis were not involved in the writing of this
Constitution to any significant measure. They need to have a
strong say in what kind of constitution they are going to be
living under. So, a constitutional revision must be an
important element of the political framework, and it has to be
started as soon as possible.
There is a committee that was established to review the
Constitution, but I know that there is a certain level of
resistance to such a review, both from some Shia groups and to
some extent by the Kurds. And I think if we have this
resistance continue, we are going to be in serious problems.
Another element of national reconciliation is a legislative
agenda. And within that there is a de-Baathification law that
needs to be revised. There is a new draft, but that draft has
not gone to Parliament, and has been languishing in the de-
Baathification committee.
An amnesty law has been talked about, but to my knowledge
an amnesty law has not been drafted. Both of these need to be
drafted, voted on by Parliament, and they need to be very
closely linked to a credible judicial process. These laws
should not be an excuse either for scapegoating or for allowing
Baathis criminals back into politics. So a judicial process
that is linked to those laws is essential.
At the same time we ought to have laws against hate speech
and incitement to violence. A further element of legislation is
that the Constitution talks about a bicameral Parliament.
Nothing has been done to create a Iraqi Senate so far. It is my
view that an Iraqi Senate, which does not depend on
proportionality, and does not depend on majorities and
minorities can be an important element in creating national
consensus and in creating a forum for dialog and for
problemsolving. I would urge the Iraqi Government to move
forward with legislation on a Senate as quickly as possible.
On the issue of disarming the militias, I think a great
deal has been said about this, but I do not think that it's
possible to disarm the militias at this stage. Operationally
the Iraqi Government does not have the forces to disarm the
militias. Much more seriously, the political parties, which are
all important, don't have the will for disarming the militias.
All the political parties have their own militias, and if we
start disarming one we must disarm all. There is simply no
appetite in Iraq for doing that at present.
I think the best thing that we can do, for the moment, is
to go after the renegade elements of the militias, to go after
the criminal elements, to seize those and to curtail their
activities. And as far as the orderly militias that are
actually answerable to political parties, we should put
pressure on the political parties to reign in those militias,
to keep them at home, and to put them under strict discipline.
The eventual disbanding of militias is going to be essential in
Iraq's future. However, that will have to wait until a time
when we do have a political compact, when Iraqi institutions
are credible and powerful, and furthermore, when we have an
economic cycle that can ensure jobs and an economic life for
the members of those militias.
A further point in national reconciliation is reaching out
to Sunnis, and I mean here, those Sunni groups that have not
entered into the political process yet. The Iraqi Government
and different Iraqi political parties have, from time to time,
made an effort to reach out to those groups of Sunnis who are
perhaps part of the insurgency or who are certainly supportive
of the insurgency.
This in itself is a very important undertaking, but it has
yielded limited outcome so far. The contacts have not resulted
in an abatement of insurgency activities and have not promoted
a national dialog with those insurgent groups. The demands of
militant groups are frequently unrealistic and they cause deep
concern particularly to the Shia. We should certainly not make
national dialog contingent on the participation of militant
Sunni groups, but we must accept those Sunni groups if they
voluntarily wish to participate in political dialog.
Very quickly, I want to address some of the impediments to
a national reconciliation. First of all, we should say that the
Prime Minister has expressed a national reconciliation plan. He
presented one back in June and it was very laudable, but we
haven't seen very much happen. We can only assume that the
Iraqi Government has the desire to affect such a national
reconciliation, but we are not sure as to its ability.
And I think here we should not think about Prime Minister
Maliki, himself, and we should not personalize it. The will and
the capability has to come from a much wider group of political
leaders. They as a totality, as a collective, have to have a
will for this national reconciliation.
However, as far as the Shia are concerned, they are
reluctant to relinquish any of their newfound power, and they
are intellectually still afraid of the return of the Baathis in
any guise or form, and although they will not admit that, this
really--they are afraid of the Sunnis as being a broad cover of
a return of the Baath.
The Sunnis, on the other hand, approach the political
process with great distrust. They can not reconcile themselves
yet to their loss of status and they have watched their
position erode in state institutions that are built on
proportionality and ethnicity and sectarianism. As a
consequence, the Sunni political groups tacitly, or even
openly, support the insurgency as their ultimate insurance
policy.
Another major problem is the way that these groups view the
nature of the Iraqi State. The Sunnis wish to see a stronger
national government, which has the ability to acquire income
and distribute income. The Shia prefer a much weaker government
in which they could have a strong southern federation and they
can order their own affairs. They have access to huge oil
resources, they have agricultural resources, and importantly,
they have access to ports. The Shia also want to have their own
social and religious system in the south, and they want minimal
interference in the government. Unfortunately, the Sunnis view
such a system of government as depriving them of all resources
and relegating them to the poor cousins in the countryside.
Mr. Chairman and Senator Lugar, I do not want to take the
time from my colleagues. I would like to stop here, but I will
be very glad to answer questions on a host of other issues.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Rahim follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rend al-Rahim, Executive Director, The Iraq
Foundation, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before your
committee. The views I express are mine only, and not those of any
organization with which I am affiliated.
I will focus on the impact of Shia-Sunni relations on the situation
in Iraq, as I believe this to be the nexus of the problems.
At present the situation in Iraq looks bleak. We have,
An insurgency composed of many groups with different
agendas.
Sectarian violence in which the actors are shadowy and the
motives are murky.
A political structure that feeds on and strengthens
sectarian and ethnic divisions.
Political deadlock and a national reconciliation process
that is going nowhere.
State institutions that are undercapacitated or downright
dysfunctional
A government that is ineffective in its primary task of
serving the people.
Despite this, we should not fall into the fallacy of post hoc ergo
propter hoc: The situation we have now is not the inevitable result of
the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime. Instead, the political
structure that was adopted by the CPA in the early days, along with
flawed policies and decision on the part of the CPA and Iraqi political
actors, made this outcome virtually certain. The cardinal, root error
committed by the CPA was to define and build Iraqi politics along
purely sectarian and ethnic lines. This was a gross oversimplification
of Iraqi society arising from ignorance and intellectual laziness, and
it ignored the complex texture and weave of the Iraqi social fabric.
Unfortunately, this reductionist model was encouraged by some Iraqi
political groups that had a vested interest in promoting a sectarian or
ethnic agenda. This structure has in turn increased religious,
sectarian, and ethnic fanaticism in the country. It has entrenched the
groups in their positions and deepened the divides instead of bridging
the gaps.
In this regard, I would like to quote from a report I wrote in
September 26, 2003:
[When] the CPA appointed the GC, it promoted a blueprint for
sectarian and ethnic proportional representation, rather than
political representation.
The sectarian and ethnic basis of the political process in
Iraq and the prevalence of a clientage system are contrary to
the establishment of democracy in Iraq based on a common and
equal Iraqi citizenship. This puts Iraq well on the road to
Lebanonization, a prospect (allegedly condemned by Iraqi
politicians) that carries with it the seeds for grave future
dangers in Iraq. As in Lebanon, it paves the way for future
friction and the interference of external influences, two
dangers that a still vulnerable Iraq is ill-equipped to face.
The constitutional process that is taking shape is likely to
entrench the flawed nature of this political process. Unless
this tendency is countered by the emergence of national,
recognizable political parties, particularly from the
democratic center, the prospects for a true democracy are
limited.
What should our goals in Iraq be? In the short term, we should aim
for:
1. Reduction of violence in Baghdad and the five central
governorates;
2. A political settlement that can give confidence to all
groups in Iraq;
3. Strengthening of national institutions.
For these short-term goals to be sustainable, we need to set
medium-term goals:
4. An end to zero-sum politics;
5. The development of national political platforms in lieu of
sectarian and ethnic platforms;
6. A rational system of devolution of power to provinces or
federated regions.
I would like to underline that the vast majority of Iraqis want
coexistence, want a national political agenda, and are opposed to
sectarian violence. However, as in most countries, the majority is
disempowered. May I also address the misperception common today in
Washington, that the Sunnis and the Shia in Iraq have been ``fighting
it out for centuries.'' That is not accurate. The incidence of
sectarian violence in Iraq's history is rare: Certainly nothing like
the religious wars that raged in Europe intermittently for many
centuries. The fighting we see today is the worst it has ever been in
Iraq's history.
BREAKING THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE
While it is true that the solution to Iraq's problems is political,
the violence impedes the quest for a political settlement. The violence
in Baghdad and surrounding areas exacerbates the political tensions and
deepens the sectarian divide. Whether perpetrated by insurgents or
death squads, every killing calls forth an act of revenge in an endless
bloody cycle of retaliation and counterretaliation. Every bombing in a
Shia market inflames the Shia community against the Sunnis. In the
mayhem, a Shia backlash against innocent Sunnis is inevitable.
This level of violence blinds the politicians and the public and
saps the national will for reconciliation and compromise. It is
imperative to reduce the level of violence in order to ease sectarian
tensions and launch a credible reconciliation process. We need to break
the vicious cycle that currently dominates Iraq and turn it into a
virtuous cycle, in which lower levels of violence encourage
reconciliation efforts, and more compromises reduce the violence.
Instead of thinking in terms of ``ending the violence,'' it may be
more useful to think of ``breaking the cycle of violence,'' especially
in Baghdad, in order to provide an opportunity for Iraqis to address
and implement political objectives. The model of ``clear, hold, and
rebuild'' has never been fully implemented because of lack of assets,
and needs to be implemented now. Whenever possible, Iraqi troops should
be in the forefront of the ``rebuild'' phase, to gain the trust of the
people and build up their own confidence.
Simultaneously, the GOI needs to substantially increase the size of
the Iraqi Army and, with multinational assistance, improve training,
equipment, and command and control structures. But operational
improvements alone cannot do the job: The Iraqi Army has to be infused
with a sense of national mission, determination, and pride. Such
intangible buildup is best provided by Iraqi commanders.
ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION
National dialog in Iraq is overdue. Iraqi political actors need to
enter into a meaningful national dialog aimed at national
reconciliation and a political compact. So far, there have only been
large conferences full of fanfare and feel-good speeches in full view
of the media. The dialog must be sustained, serious, and far-reaching
in confronting differences and resolving disagreements.
There are prerequisites for a successful dialog:
Iraqi political leaders have to abandon the ``winner takes
all'' and ``loser loses all'' mentality.
For the time being, politicians must abandon
``majoritarian'' and ``minoritarian'' thinking.
The Shia must accept that, however large their majority,
they must share the territory, the resources, and the state of
Iraq with others.
Shia leaders must change their rhetoric, which currently
swings between victimhood and triumphalism.
The Sunnis must learn to relinquish the power they have been
accustomed to and accept the new political order.
Sunni leaders have to declare against the insurgency and
condemn violence. They need to be squarely within the political
framework, and cannot continue to straddle both sides of the
fence.
Constitutional revision
More specifically, revision of the Constitution is a central
component of national reconciliation. The present Constitution is not
conducive to a viable state and it enshrines many of the problems that
plague Iraqi politics now. It has to be redrafted in terms of
individual articles and in terms of the structure of the state it
projects. Additionally, the Constitution was written by the Shia and
the Kurdish parties; the Sunnis were invited into the process late and
did not have a significant input. The Sunnis have deep fears about
aspects of the Constitution, and their concerns must be addressed.
Legislative agenda
Specific laws have to be revised or enacted that bolster confidence
among the different social groups. Among these are the de-
Baathification law and an amnesty law, both of which should be tightly
linked to a credible judicial process. There cannot be national
reconciliation while Sunnis continue to be eyed with suspicion and
stereotyped as covert Saddam loyalists. At the same time, laws against
hate speech and incitement to violence must be enacted to reassure the
Shia and ease their fears. The Constitution provides for a bicameral
Parliament. An Upper House can serve as a forum for national dialog and
provide a much needed counterweight to the sectarian and ethnic
dynamics governing Iraqi politics today. The Iraqi Parliament should
begin looking at models and drafting legislation for a second chamber
that is not based on demographic proportionality or electoral
majorities and minorities.
Disarming the militias
Most political groups in Iraq have militias. The political groups
need the militias not only for protection; they are a means to
political power, territorial control, and economic control. In
addition, there are local gangs that have acquired the status of
militias. The GOI should not pick and choose: If it disbands one, it
must eventually disband all. This is the principle that only the state
has the legitimate use of force.
Operationally, the Iraqi Government does not have adequate army
forces; the troops are not sufficiently equipped and trained, and their
resolve in such politically sensitive operations may waver. Shia army
troops may be reluctant to seize and disarm Shia militias. Sunni troops
may have the same problem. Far more important, the GOI needs the broad
support, consensus, and cooperation of the political parties in order
to disarm the militias. Although everyone pays lip service to the need
to eliminate militias, currently there is no visible political support
for disarming or disbanding them.
At present, it is perhaps a more realistic strategy to pursue and
eliminate the renegade groups that are guilty of crimes rather than
attempt a wholesale policy toward militias. This, in fact, is happening
in Baghdad, Basra, and other cities. In the meantime, the more orderly
militias should be contained. Eventually, the demobilization and
disarming of militias will require a political compact, easing
sectarian tensions, economic recovery, job-creation, and a number of
other transformations in political and economic life that are not
available now.
Broadening outreach to Sunnis
The GOI has made efforts to reach out to groups of Sunnis who have
so far stayed out of the political process and who may be part of, or
supportive of, the homegrown elements of the insurgency. This in itself
is an important undertaking, but it has yielded limited outcomes. The
depth of the problem is demonstrated by the nomenclature: The Sunnis
call these groups ``the honorable national resistance,'' while the Shia
call them ``terrorists.''
In Anbar province, and to some extent in Diyala, local tribes have
indeed been battling al-Qaeda, but this may be because of local
conflicts of interest and tribal divisions rather than an outcome of
national outreach. The insurgency has not abated as a result of dialog
with Sunni militant groups. The demands of militant groups are
frequently unrealistic and cause deep concern to the Shia. We should
certainly not make national dialog contingent on the participation of
militant Sunni groups, although they should be welcomed if they choose
to join.
IMPEDIMENTS TO NATIONAL RECONCILIATION
Shortly after taking office, Prime Minister Maliki presented an
ambitious national agenda which included a 24-point reconciliation
plan, a proposal for a national amnesty law, a decision to disband the
militias, and a commitment to reform the Ministry of Interior. To date,
the national reconciliation project has been confined to the level of
rhetoric; the revised de-Baathification law has not been presented to
Parliament; the militias are still going strong; and the Ministry of
Interior still has a long way to go.
Because of the PM's statements, we must assume that the Government
of Iraq has the desire to achieve these objectives. The reality is that
it is under severe constraints, some of which are operational but the
more important ones are of political.
The phrase ``Iraqi leadership'' rightly refers to a collective that
lies beyond the institutions of the state, and includes the leaders of
the major political groups in Iraq, who may or may not be members of
state institutions. The government's ability to execute policy is
contingent upon the willingness of others to support and help implement
policies. Without the support of this broader leadership, the
Government of Iraq is seriously hampered.
Thus a national compact is not dependent solely on the will of the
government. Political actors have to reach agreements, but at present
even the parameters of a national dialog are in dispute.
After decades of disenfranchisement, the Shia are now enjoying the
spoils of victory, and are reluctant to give up any of their new-found
supremacy. Intellectually, the Shia concede that not every Sunni is a
Baathi and Saddam supporter, but viscerally their suspicions linger.
They are mortally afraid of the return of the Baathis to power, even
under other names and other guises, and, therefore, the de-
Baathfication law and the amnesty law present difficulties.
Sunnis approach the political process with distrust and misgivings.
They cannot reconcile themselves to their loss of status, and they have
watched their position erode in the institutions of the state under a
system of sectarian and ethnic proportional representation. They fear
that they will be the new underdog and will be subject to persecution
and revenge measures by the Shia. As a consequence, they tacitly or
openly support the insurgency as their insurance policy.
From these central reciprocal fears stem a host of subsidiary
problems that impede national reconciliation. The Shia and the Sunnis
do not agree on who should be included in the national dialog.
Currently the Baath Party is banned in Iraq. Can a reformed Baath Party
be part of the political process? Should any of the armed Sunni groups
be included and on what conditions?
Another major problem is the nature of the Iraqi State. The Sunnis
wish to see a stronger national government, whereas some Shia religious
parties want a weak one. These Shia groups see an enormous advantage to
a grand federated state in the south, with huge oil resources,
agricultural opportunities, and access to ports. They also want to
organize their social and civic affairs along religious lines, and want
minimal interference by the national government. Should Iraq have loose
federations in the north and south, with little national authority to
earn income and distribute revenue, they will be bereft of resources.
Despite these difficulties, national reconciliation must proceed at
full speed. The alternatives: Continued bloodshed, ethnic cleansing,
civil war, are horrific and the spillover into the region is
inevitable.
MEDIUM-TERM STRATEGIES
Iraq is too important to United States strategic interests to be
allowed to descend into chaos. In order for a national compact to take
root and for the state to function effectively, the nature of politics
of Iraq must be changed from a sectarian/ethnic base to a base of
cross-sectarian, multiethnic national parties. It will be essential to
develop national institutions that have both capacity and credibility.
The responsibility for carrying this out obviously lies, first and
foremost, with this and successive Iraqi governments, but the United
States, Iraq's neighbors, and the international community must
recognize that they have a role to play if only for their own self-
interest.
Senator Lugar [presiding]. Thank you very much.
Mr. Talabani.
STATEMENT OF QUBAD TALABANI, REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED
STATES, KURDISTAN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Talabani. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator
Lugar, distinguished members of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee for the opportunity to testify on the topic of a
political strategy for Iraq.
I'd also like to take the opportunity to thank the chairman
and Senator Lugar for your leadership and support throughout
the years, when we were in the opposition, and today.
I'd also like to take this chance to thank the chairman for
introducing to the debate on Iraq, the modalities of a plan
that I believe will work. A plan that is not too dissimilar
from what most Iraqis actually want.
Key components of the so-called Biden-Gelb plan are viable,
because there is in it an appreciation of history, and of
modern-day reality. Let me also take this opportunity to thank
all those--whether civilian or military--that were, and are
still part, of this noble effort to liberate and rebuild Iraq,
as well as express the Kurdistan Regional Government's
appreciation for the support and sacrifice of the American
people and Government.
On that note, a special note must go out to the outgoing
Ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad. The Ambassador's work was as
unique as it was effective. Many in the Iraqi leadership,
including Iraq's President are sad that Ambassador Khalilzad
will be leaving us at this critical time, and while everyone is
looking forward to working with Ambassador Crocker, if he is
approved, Zal--as we've all come to know him by--will be sorely
missed.
Allow me to open by stating that, while many of you may
know me as the son of Iraq's President, I'm in no way
representing his, or the Government of Iraq's view, in this
testimony. I am testifying in my official capacity as the
representative of the Kurdistan Regional Government to the
United States.
A political strategy for Iraq must be just that--political.
We are still too focused on the military aspect of this
strategy. The talk of a potential escalation, or deescalation
in Iraq has overshadowed what really needs to be done in Iraq,
and by whom. A successful strategy in Iraq that will alter
Iraq's current, deteriorating situation, must come from within
Iraq, and not Washington.
It is precisely for this reason that the Iraq Study Group
report was met with such visceral opposition by Iraqis on the
ground. An imposition of a policy from the outside, especially
one that ignores the glaring realities on the ground, will
always lead to failure. Only a sound political and economic
strategy, combined with a military strategy, if implemented,
will greatly improve Iraq's security situation.
There can be no successful strategy to resolve Iraq's
problems, however, if Iraq's leaders themselves do not wish to
reach a resolution. If they desire reaching a political
settlement and wish to end the violence--and I believe that, at
least some do--then they must begin to act as leaders, and come
to the realization that they are on the brink to leading Iraq
to failure. The failure of successive Iraqi regimes to rule
justly has created irreparable divisions, and insurmountable
insecurities within Iraq. It is precisely these insecurities
that exacerbate the mistrust between Iraq's Sunni-Arab, and
Shia-Arab communities. Iraq's Kurds, not lacking insecurities
of our own, have gone to great lengths to attempt to ease the
tension between these groups. We have led most, if not all, the
negotiations between the conflicting parties, and continue to
lead efforts to resolve the outstanding issues.
A sustainable political settlement in Iraq cannot be
reached unless certain issues are tackled--swiftly, and by
Iraqis. These include: Resolving and passing Iraq's national
oil, revenue-sharing, and budget laws, all of which are
critical to national reconciliation. Revising and implementing
a sound de-Baathification policy that does not exclude all
members of the outlawed party from public service, just those
that, because of the crimes that they had committed, could
never be accepted back into government.
Also, as Rend Rahim stated, that devising an amnesty
program that separates terrorists from those that have
legitimate grievances, and could be encouraged to return to a
political process. We must take necessary steps at disarming,
and bringing to justice death squads and rogue militias that
act outside of the law. We must also address, once and for all,
the issue of Kirkuk and its future.
Rather than coming up with solutions to our problems, the
United States should work harder to foster and nurture the
ongoing negotiations on these issues. The United States must
have a comprehensive strategy, that does not deal with the
various communities in isolation. Simultaneous messages must be
related to both Iraq's Sunni-Arab, and Shia communities. Sunni-
Arab leaders must be warned that if they continue along this
path of using both violence and politics, that they will lose,
and that the United States will not be there to save them.
At the same time, it is critical to pressure Iraq's Shias
to follow for a genuine, inclusive political process for a
system of government that shares power, and the country's
wealth, equitably.
International pressure can be applied to Iraq's unity
government, by making assistance programs, and the World Bank
and IMF assistance packages contingent on good governance.
Iraq's leaders must be held accountable for the actions of
their constituents. Their legitimacy, and that of the
government's, in the eyes of the international community must
hinge on a strong and tangible commitment to accountability.
There can be no political settlement without addressing the
issue of federalism. Federalism as defined by Iraq's
democratically ratified Constitution, and further put into law
by Iraq's Parliament, should not be met with fear or suspicion
in Washington. Although it will be initially met with
skepticism, it will, over time, in my opinion, foster success
stories similar to that which we see in the Kurdistan region.
Iraqi-Kurdistan stands today as a federal region with its
own government, security structure, and development plan.
Indeed, it is one of the few successes in Iraq.
In this instance, it is not about what the United States
should do, but rather what the United States should not do. If
other Iraqis want to federalize the rest of the country,
providing that such steps are taken democratically, and with
the support of the people who live in those regions, then we
must stand on the side of the Constitution, and not obstruct
democracy. As long as the political prize remains Baghdad, and
all of the decisionmaking powers rest within a central
authority that is not trusted, then there will remain violence.
No federal system can succeed without a sound natural
resources policy. Cooperation on Iraqi oil production and
revenue-sharing presents an opportunity to bring peace and
stability to Iraq. Significant progress has been made in
establishing a cooperative agreement on oil. A draft oil law
was prepared in December last year, which includes the creation
of an intergovernmental entity, the Federal Council for Oil and
Gas, with both federal and regional membership. This will be
the supreme body for establishment of petroleum policy in Iraq.
A revenue-sharing law will soon be prepared, that will
ensure that all petroleum revenues in Iraq are forwarded,
again, to this intergovernmental body, and shared equitably
across Iraq, based on population. We must guarantee that the
flow of oil revenues to parts of Iraq that lack oil resources--
including the so-called Sunni Triangle--which is the source of
so much violence today.
These two laws will each constitute major achievements. I
am proud to say that the KRG has been at the very forefront of
these drafting efforts. Importantly, these two laws will
contain major concessions by the Kurdistan Regional Government.
Although the Constitution of Iraq gives us the sole authority
to develop new fields, and receive revenues from those fields,
we have agreed to share those revenues with the rest of Iraq.
It is--we have also agreed to share information with the
central government about future petroleum contracts, and
provide it with the ability to object to those contracts, based
on economic or technical grounds.
However--and this is important--this cooperative agreement
will depend on it respecting the right of the regions to make
the final decision on petroleum contracting in the region,
while at the same time, respecting the right of the regions to
receive its proportionate share of the national revenue. Let me
be very clear, that while we are prepared to cooperate fully,
there will be no Iraqi law or revenue-sharing law that violates
these rights.
The KRG very much looks forward of receiving the advice of
international institutions on the creation of a transparent,
corruption-free, Iraq revenue-sharing system that can guarantee
the viability of the central government, and the right of
regions to their proportionate share of the revenue.
A sound national development plan is also critical for
Iraq's stability. Advancements in the political process and
security will not, alone, bring peace and prosperity.
Collectively, we must devise an approach that expands on the
successes of the stable parts of the country, in order to
isolate the trouble spots, and spread the circles of stability
across the country.
If successful, citizens will see that the government is
actually working to provide the basic services, and is putting
money into development. In turn, the population will have more
to lose by turning a blind eye to the terrorists. As part of
national reconciliation, we must turn the Iraqi citizens
against al-Qaeda, and other extremists.
National reconciliation can never be reached, unless the
status of Kirkuk is resolved. Kirkuk, a governorate that
underwent decades of ethnic cleansing of Kurds and Turkomans by
Saddam's regime symbolizes Iraq's tragedy today. While we are
bringing to justice the perpetrators of ethnic cleansing, their
racist handiwork remains intact. Significantly, Iraqis
themselves have devised a process to rectify this injustice,
committed by the former regime.
It would be wise for the United States to allow this
process to progress naturally, and according to a timetable
that Iraq's leaders have agreed upon. Imposing a delay on the
proposed referendum that determines whether Kirkuk will be
administered by the Kurdistan Regional Government or by the
central government, will only raise the risk of the situation
erupting out of control. The grim reality is, that whether we
tackle this issue now, or 10 years from now, the final outcome
will still be messy. The longer we delay the process, the
greater the tensions will become, and the uglier the fallout
will be.
To conclude, whether or not a political settlement in Iraq
can be reached will depend largely on Iraq's leaders
themselves, and not on a strategy imposed from the outside. If
all sides involved can come to the realization--and most have--
that a centralized system of governance cannot and will not
work in Iraq, and that a sound federal system is set in place,
then we can begin to take steps to reduce the people's
insecurities.
The international community, and in particular, the United
States can be helpful in managing and nurturing this dialog,
not dictating it. We must be pressured to implement our own
national reconciliation plan. All sides must make compromises:
Sunnis must compromise on their demands for a unitary state,
Shiites must compromise by loosening their grip on power, and
we Kurds have to come to an agreement with a central government
on certain mechanisms of governance and revenue-sharing, as has
been done thus far.
Having just returned from a trip to my homeland, where I'm
happy to say we no longer have to take the 7 bumpy hours'
drive, we can fly directly from many European cities, I would
like to take this opportunity to express some of the grievances
of the people of Kurdistan. Most, if not all Kurds feel, that
all of goodwill shown by the Kurdish side, and its proactive,
positive engagement in the new Iraq have yielded limited gains
for our people.
While clearly no longer fearing that Saddam Hussein or his
regime cannot commit genocide against us is not insignificant,
certain United States policies continue to irk the whole
community in Iraq that most closely shares American values, and
considers the United States a close friend and partner.
The United States development strategy for Iraq is a case
in point. Of the $21 billion or so put aside for Iraq
reconstruction, a comparatively small $600 million has been
spent in the Kurdistan region, a figure of 3 percent, a figure
that bemuses our citizens. While, in some areas, we are
advanced, we still lack the critical infrastructure and the
industries that exist elsewhere in Iraq.
During a talk that I gave at the University of Suleimani in
Iraqi-Kurdistan last week, I was constantly asked this
question, ``When Iraq fails, and the United States leaves, what
guarantee is there that they--the United States--will protect
our hard-earned gains?'' It is fair to say that both the Kurds
in Iraq and the United States have put all our eggs in one
basket, that is Baghdad. I fear that this basket will burn in
the fire of that city, and all that we have accomplished
together over the past 15 years will be in jeopardy.
Distinguished Senators, the Kurds will remain forever
grateful for the protection provided under Operation Northern
Watch, and for the ouster of Saddam and his regime. However, we
still remember the American abandonment of 1975, and the
miscalculation of 1991. And while we will continue to commit to
do all that we can to ensure a viable, political solution for
Iraq, including not breaking away from Iraq, we cannot
guarantee that Iraq will not break away from us.
In such a scenario, resulting also in a likely American
withdrawal, we seek a guarantee that our success story--one of
the few that the United States has helped with in the Middle
East--will be protected. After all the Americans and the Kurds
have been through, a relatively democratic and open Kurdistan
in the heart of the Islamic Middle East, should be protected.
It is in the United States interest, and should be the moral
obligation.
I will end with four goals for which our people seek your
support. And one is, to provide an American security guarantee
to the people of Iraqi-Kurdistan no matter what happens in
Iraq. And a commitment that the United States spend at least 17
percent of congressionally appropriated funds intended for
Iraq's development in the Kurdistan region. This goes in line
with the Government of Iraq's own economic policy, of
allocating the Kurdistan region the 17 percent of revenues
gleaned from sale of oil.
We also seek a commitment to assist in the development--
developing greater public/private partnerships between the
United States and the Kurdistan Region. We feel that our region
has not--the United States has not used our region enough, to
the fact that it's stable and secure, to promote greater
business investment that could ultimately help all of Iraq, and
not just the Kurdistan region.
And finally, I call on all Members of Congress visiting
Iraq to move beyond the Green Zone, and come visit us up in the
North, to see some of the successes that you've invested so
much in.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Talabani follows:]
Prepared Statement of Qubad Talabani, Representative of the Kurdistan
Regional Government of Iraq to the United States, Washington, DC
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, distinguished members of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, for the opportunity to testify
on the topic of a political strategy for Iraq. I would also like to
take this opportunity to thank the chairman and Senator Lugar for your
leadership. Your support to Iraq goes back to the days when we were in
the Iraqi Opposition. While I am grateful for the many visits committee
members have taken to Iraq, I do hope that congressional delegations
will visit Iraq's Kurdistan region as well. As you know, Mr. Chairman,
an accurate analysis of Iraq requires visits to every region of the
country.
I would also like to take this chance to thank you, Mr. Chairman,
for introducing to the debate on Iraq the modalities of a plan that I
believe will work. Key components of the so called ``Biden-Gelb'' plan
are viable because there is in that plan an appreciation for history
and modern day reality. Indeed, we must understand Iraq's faulty past
to reach a political settlement that sticks in the future, while
recognizing that Iraq has changed as a country and new realities have
become facts on the ground. I commend you for offering an alternative
approach.
Let me take this opportunity to thank the brave men and women of
the U.S. Armed Forces who are serving or who have served in Iraq as
well as the American diplomatic corps and civilian employees who labor
tirelessly with Iraqi officials to ensure that the fruit of our
partnership is a prosperous and peaceful Iraq. A special note must go
to Ambassador Khalilzad. The Ambassador's work was as unique as it was
effective. Many in the Iraqi leadership, including Iraq's President are
unhappy that Ambassador Khalilzad is leaving at this critical time.
While everyone is looking forward to working with Ambassador Crocker,
Zal, as we have all come to know him, will be sorely missed.
Allow me to open by stating that while many of you may know me as
the son of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, I am in no way representing
his, or the Government of Iraq's view in this testimony. I am
testifying in my official capacity as the representative to the United
States of the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). I was also
asked by the committee staff to provide a quick description of my post.
In my capacity, I work closely with the executive and legislative
branches of the U.S. Government as well as the media and research
institutions, providing analysis and up-to-date information about the
situation in Iraq and the Kurdistan region. Finally, there may be
instances during the question and answer segment when it would be more
advantageous to committee members that I speak in a closed session. I
would be happy to do so.
Distinguished Senators, excuse me if I appear blunt in some of what
I say today. There is a time for more diplomatic speeches, but given
the gravity of the situation, and the fact that American and Iraqi
lives are being lost every day, now is not such a time.
A political strategy for Iraq must be just that, political. We are
still too focused on the military component of the Iraq debate. The
talk of a potential escalation or deescalation in Iraq has overshadowed
what really needs to be done in Iraq and by whom.
The reality is that upon handing over sovereignty in June 2004, the
ability of the United States to effectively direct the situation on the
ground has been reduced. This means that a successful strategy in Iraq,
one that will alter Iraq's current deteriorating situation, must come
from within Iraq, not Washington. It is precisely for this reason that
the Iraq Study Group (ISG) report was met with such visceral opposition
by Iraqis. An imposition of a policy from outside, especially one that
ignores the glaring realities on the ground will lead to more failure
and more bloodshed in Iraq.
There are, of course, aspects of any strategy for Iraq that must be
coordinated between Baghdad and Washington, such as the roles and
responsibilities of the U.S. Armed Forces in theater, and their
interaction and coordination with Iraq's developing security forces.
But in my honest opinion, it will be a sound political and economic
strategy, not a military strategy alone, which, if developed and
undertaken, will greatly improve Iraq's security situation.
There can be no successful strategy to resolve Iraq's problems if
Iraqi leaders themselves do not wish to reach a resolution. If they
desire reaching a political settlement and wish to end the violence,
and I believe that at least some do, then they must begin to act as
leaders and come to the realization that they are on the brink of
leading Iraq to failure.
Iraq is a country, that in the eyes of many, was founded on faulty
logic. It was founded on a principle that a representative of a
minority can rule a multiethnic and multisectarian society. Such logic
could have succeeded if Iraq's past rulers had ruled justly, treating
all as equal. However, successive Iraqi regimes have failed to do just
that, creating irreparable divisions and insurmountable insecurities
within Iraqi society.
Today, insecurities run deep within all segments of Iraqi society.
Indeed, it is precisely these insecurities that exacerbate the mistrust
between Iraq's Sunni Arab and Shiite Arab communities; a mistrust that
has resulted in the violence we see today. Iraq's Kurds, not lacking
insecurities of our own, have gone to great lengths to attempt to ease
the tension between these groups. We have led most, if not all,
negotiations between the conflicting groups. We have and will continue
to bridge the many significant and potentially damaging differences
that exist within the Iraqi polity today, sometimes to the disadvantage
of our interests and against the wishes of our own constituency.
A sustainable political settlement in Iraq cannot be reached unless
certain issues are tackled swiftly, and by Iraqis. These include:
Resolving and passing Iraq's national oil, revenue-sharing,
and budget laws--all of which are critical to national
reconciliation;
Revising and implementing a sound de-Baathification policy
that does not exclude all members of the outlawed party from
public service, just those that, because of crimes they had
committed, will never be accepted back into government;
Devising an amnesty program that separates terrorists from
those that have legitimate grievances and could be encouraged
to return to a political process;
Taking necessary steps to disarm and bring to justice death
squads and rogue militias;
Addressing, once and for all, the tense issue of Kirkuk and
its future.
Rather than coming up with solutions to our problems, the United
States should work harder to foster and nurture the ongoing
negotiations on these key issues.
The United States must have a comprehensive strategy that does not
deal with the various communities in isolation. Simultaneous messages
must be related to both Iraq's Sunni Arab and Shiite communities.
Sunni Arab leaders must be warned that if they continue along this
path of using both violence and politics, they will lose, and the
United States will not be there to save them. A political settlement
will more likely be reached if and when our Sunni Arab brothers come to
the realization that they will no longer hold the ascendancy in Iraq.
Our American friends must help to make Iraq's neighbors aware of this
reality. The days of a minority dominating all aspects of Iraqi
politics are over. At the same time, it is critical to (1) alleviate
the insecurities of Iraq's Shiites by clarifying that the United States
and the West do not see them as Iranian proxies, and (2) pressure them
to allow for a genuine inclusive political process through a system of
governance that shares power and the country's wealth equitably.
International pressure can be applied to a Shiite-led unity
government by limiting assistance programs and/or restricting World
Bank and IMF assistance packages. Pressure must also be applied to the
Shiite leadership to stand up to rogue militias and death squads that
have fueled this ever-increasing sectarian bloodshed. Leaders of both
Shiite and Sunni communities must be held accountable for the actions
of their constituents. Their legitimacy, and that of the government's,
in the eyes of the international community, must hinge on a strong and
tangible commitment for accountability.
There can be no political settlement without addressing federalism.
Federalism in Iraq will be key to ensuring a longer term, sustainable
political settlement.
The creation of federal regions, as defined by Iraq's
democratically ratified Constitution and further put into law by Iraq's
Parliament, should not be met with fear or suspicion in Washington.
Allowing Iraqis the right to determine their own future by devolving
power to communities governing their own areas will most probably be
met with skepticism at first. Over time, in my opinion, this approach
will foster success stories similar to those that we see in Iraqi
Kurdistan. Iraqi Kurdistan stands today as a federal region with its
own government, security structure, and development plan. Indeed, it is
one of the few successes in Iraq. As long as the political prize
remains, Baghdad and all decisionmaking powers rest within a central
authority, there will remain violence, especially as there exists today
very little trust between the various communities in Iraq.
In this instance, it is not about what the United States should do,
but rather what the United States should not do. If other Iraqis want
to federalize the rest of the country, providing such steps are taken
democratically and with support of the people who live in those
regions, then we must stand on the side of the Constitution, and not
obstruct democracy. Attempts to impose an unworkable unity, merely for
the sake of addressing the concerns of Iraq's neighbors or for the
purpose of creating an illusion against the will of its people, will
lead to disaster.
No federal system can succeed without a sound natural resources
policy. Cooperation on Iraqi oil production and revenue-sharing
presents an opportunity to bring peace and stability to Iraq. This has
been the constant message of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
leadership, and particularly its Minister for Natural Resources, Dr.
Ashti Hawrami. It is excellent to see in Washington that others are
reaching the same conclusion. Oil revenues, if managed well, can ensure
both a viable federal government as well as strong, self-sustaining
federal regions, as the Constitution of Iraq envisages. There is an
opportunity to guarantee the flow of oil revenues to parts of Iraq that
lack oil resources, including the so-called Sunni Triangle, which is
the source of so much violence.
Significant progress has been made in establishing this cooperative
agreement. A draft oil law was prepared in December last year that
includes the creation of an intergovernmental entity, the ``Federal
Council for Oil and Gas,'' with both federal and regional membership.
This will be the Supreme Body responsible for petroleum policy.
Significantly, under that law there will be a role for private sector
petroleum investment, to maximize the speed and size of the returns to
the Iraqi people. A revenue-sharing law will soon be prepared that will
ensure that all petroleum revenues in Iraq are forwarded--again to an
intergovernmental body--and shared equitably across Iraq based on
population. These two laws will each constitute major achievements.
They are achievements, I might add, which are genuine Iraqi agreements,
and not the product of outside influence or pressure. I am proud to say
that the KRG has been at the very forefront of these drafting efforts.
Indeed, it is Kurdistan's own investor-friendly legislation that is
serving as a model for the Iraq-wide regime.
Importantly, these two laws will contain major concessions by the
KRG. Although the Constitution of Iraq gives the KRG the sole authority
to develop new fields and receive revenue from those fields, the KRG
has agreed to share those revenues with the rest of Iraq. It has agreed
to share information with the central government about future KRG
petroleum contracts, and provide it the ability to object to those
contracts on technical or economic grounds.
However--and this is important--this cooperative agreement will
depend on two things. First, it must respect the right of regions to
make the final decision on petroleum contracting in the region.
Second, it must respect the right of any region to receive its
proportionate share of the national revenue. (These rights are
contained in articles 110, 112, 115, and 141 of the Constitution.) Let
me be very clear: While the KRG is prepared to cooperate fully, there
will be no Iraq oil law or revenue-sharing law that violates these
rights. Reports that arose last week that there will be a new oil law
that ``centralizes'' control of Iraq's oil are incorrect. From now on,
in Iraq, petroleum policy will be a cooperative agreement, not one that
is imposed from Baghdad or anywhere else. The oil law that was prepared
last December has not been altered and will hopefully be finalized as
quickly as possible. And as we begin our talks on the revenue-sharing
law, the KRG very much looks forward to receiving the advice of
international institutions on the creation of a transparent,
corruption-free Iraq revenue-sharing system that can guarantee the
viability of the central government and the right of regions to their
proportionate share of revenue.
A sound national development plan is also critical to Iraq's
stability; advancements in the political process and security will not
alone bring peace and prosperity. The Iraqi Government should work
closely with the U.S. Government as well as other nations and
international institutions to devise an approach that expands on the
successes of the Kurdistan region as well as parts of the south and
east. Working in areas of the country that are more stable and
accommodating will isolate those in trouble spots that seek only to
attack reconstruction projects and everyday services. Certainly, such
an approach is a better use of U.S. taxpayer dollars. Successful
development projects will increase the circles of stability and
progress across the country. Indeed, citizens will see that the
government both provides services and is putting money into
development, and in turn the population will have more to lose by
turning a blind eye to terrorists and criminals.
National reconciliation can never be reached unless the issue of
Kirkuk is resolved once and for all. Kirkuk, a governorate that had
been ethnically cleansed by Saddam's regime, where several hundreds of
thousands of Kurds and many Turkomans had been evicted from their homes
purely because of their identity, symbolizes Iraq's current tragedy. It
is a tragedy because communities have been pitted against one another.
While Baath leaders are facing trial in Baghdad, and the head architect
of a policy of genocide in Kirkuk, Saddam Hussein, is no longer with
us, his racist handiwork remains intact.
While we are bringing to justice the perpetrators of ethnic
cleansing, Iraqis themselves have devised a process to rectify the
injustices committed by the former, criminal regime. It would be wise
for the United States to allow this process to move forward naturally
and according to a timetable that Iraq's leaders agreed upon in the
most important document: The nation's constitution. Imposing a delay on
the proposed referendum that resolves the status of Kirkuk--i.e.,
whether it will be administered by the KRG or by the central
government--will only lead to increasing, already high tensions and
will raise the risk of the situation erupting into full-scale
bloodshed. The grim reality is that whether we tackle this issue now or
in 10 years, the final outcome will still be messy. However, the longer
we delay the process, the greater the tensions will become, and the
uglier the fallout will be. We have kicked this explosive can down the
road for too long.
Finally, a word about Kirkuk's oil. In advance of the referendum on
Kirkuk, the KRG has taken great care to ensure that tensions are not
raised on Kirkuk's petroleum. Even at such time when Kirkuk becomes
part of the Kurdistan region following the referendum, the KRG has
confirmed, and here I will reaffirm, that it has no unilateral claim to
the rights or revenues on the Kirkuk oil fields. Under the Iraq
Constitution--which must always be our guide--the management of those
fields is to be shared by the central government and the region, and
the revenues shared throughout the country.
To conclude: Whether or not a political settlement in Iraq can be
reached will depend largely on Iraq's leaders, and not a strategy
imposed from outside. Iraq's leaders, except by and large the Kurds,
have yet to demonstrate a true willingness to reach across ethnic or
sectarian boundaries and offer compromises that will lead to a calming
of the situation.
If all sides involved can come to the realization, and most have,
that a centralized system of governance cannot and will not work in
Iraq and a sound federal system is set in place, then we can begin to
take steps to reduce the peoples' insecurities.
The international community, and in particular the United States,
can be helpful in managing and nurturing this dialog, not dictating it.
All sides must also make compromises. All or nothing polices will
inevitably lead to failure. Sunnis must compromise on their demands for
a unitary state. Shiites must compromise on loosening their grip on
power. And we Kurds have to come to an agreement with the central
government on certain mechanisms of governance and revenue-sharing as
has been done thus far.
Having just returned from Kurdistan, I would like to take this
opportunity, as the KRG representative in the United States, to express
the grievances of the people of Kurdistan. Most, if not all, Kurds feel
that time after time they have been taken for granted by the U.S.
Government. All the good will shown by the Kurdish side in its
proactive, positive engagement in the new Iraq has yielded limited
gains for our people. It is significant that the fear of Saddam
Hussein's regime and its genocide are gone. However, certain policies
and statements by senior United States Government officials continue to
irk an entire community in Iraq that most closely shares American
values and considers the United States a close friend and partner.
The American development strategy for Iraq is a case in point. Of
the $21 billion or so put aside for Iraq reconstruction, a very small
$600 million has been earmarked or spent in the Kurdistan region. That
is 3 percent, a figure that bemuses our citizens precisely because the
Kurdish population in Iraq is closer to 20 percent. While in some areas
we are advanced, we still lack the critical infrastructure and
industries that exist elsewhere in Iraq. The U.S. Government's official
line on Iraq reconstruction, of working by sector not region or
province, has never sat well with the Kurdish leadership or our ever
increasingly frustrated population.
We hope that with the opening of the Regional Reconstruction Team
(RRT) in Erbil, thanks in great measure to the United States, we will
begin to see a change in strategy that takes into account the efforts
and the hard work of the Kurdish side and translates into significant
improvements in the region's development. One stark example: After all
that has been achieved, the Kurdistan region only gets 2-3 hours of
electricity a day. The region is constantly touted as a success story
and given Iraq's current predicament one can say that we are. However,
we are a success because of, and I'm sorry to say sometimes despite of,
U.S. foreign policy.
I will end by sharing a story. During a talk I gave at the
University of Suleimani, in Kurdistan, I was constantly asked, ``When
Iraq fails, and the United States leaves, what guarantee is there that
they--the United States--will protect our hard-earned gains?'' It is
fair to say that both the Kurds of Iraq and the United States have put
all our eggs in one basket. That is, Baghdad. I fear that our basket
will burn in the fire of that city, and all that we have accomplished
together over the past 15 years will be in jeopardy. Distinguished
Senators, the Kurds will remain forever grateful for the protection
provided under Operation Northern Watch, and for the ouster of Saddam
and his regime. However, we still remember the American abandonment of
1975, and the miscalculation of 1991. While we will continue to commit
to do all that we can to ensure a viable political solution for Iraq
including not breaking away from it, we cannot guarantee that Iraq will
not break away from us. In such a scenario, resulting also in a likely
American withdrawal, we seek a guarantee that our success story--one of
the few that the United States has helped with in the Middle East--will
be protected. After all that Americans and Kurds have been through,
good and bad, a relatively democratic and open Kurdistan, in the heart
of the Islamic Middle East, should be protected. It is in the U.S.
strategic interest and should be your moral obligation.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Talabani.
The Chair will recognize now, Dr. Kubba.
STATEMENT OF DR. LAITH KUBBA, SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR THE MIDDLE
EAST AND NORTH AFRICA, NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY,
WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Kubba. Thank you, Ranking Member Lugar, distinguished
members of the committee.
Thank you for the opportunity to address the committee on
Iraq at such a critical moment. And, I am aware of the
difficulties facing decisionmakers who have to strike painful
balances between so many conflicting demands.
Without repeating some of the views my colleague Rend Rahim
had mentioned, I'd like to focus more on how to deal with the
Iraqi politics, on the future rather than the past, and make,
maybe one or two recommendations in view of the prognosis of
Iraqi politics. I will be brief, for the record, I do not
oversee the Iraq Program at the National Endowment for
Democracy, and the views I express are mine, and not those of
the endowment.
I want to start by emphasizing the obvious, and that is,
failure in Iraq is not an option, that the essence of the
problem is political, and that the responsibility is mainly
with the Iraqi Government and its elected politicians. My main
remarks will be more, or mainly, on Arab-Iraq and, to a lesser
extent, on the Kurdish-Iraq or Kurdistan.
Iraq faces multiple, interwined challenges, ranging from
violence, sectarianism, terrorism, to developing the economy,
expanding the job market, to controlling and influencing--
controlling the influence of Iraq's neighbors. Most of these
challenges have been complicated by one cause--the breakdown of
the Iraqi State, and the continued absence of an effective
government.
Iraqi politicians, and its government could and should do
more. But under current circumstances, they will not. They are
dug deep in a zero-sum survival game--survival struggle--and
are prepared to go down, and take Iraq down with them. However,
to leave Iraq or simply hand over the problem to the Iraqi
Government will make it even worse.
There are huge hidden dangers, and suggestions to encourage
dividing Iraq or pulling back troops to safe areas, where Arab
Shias and Sunnis militias exhaust themselves and the country to
death in their fights. Iraq's current mess has already happened
on America's watch, and more should not be allowed to happen,
as such.
Whatever the plans might be, the United States needs, in
the Iraqi Government, a partner who is willing and capable to
rebuild Iraq as a nation-state. The government currently lacks
such a collective will, and/or vision on how to do it. It is
yet to build its own effective army and democracy above
communal loyalties and sectarian politics. Without such
collective will and shared vision, Iraqi politicians and the
government cannot build a strong, functioning institution.
Millions of Iraqis suffer the consequences of a
dysfunctional state, controlled by ethnoreligious politics,
with many regional ties. It is wishful thinking to assume that
the threat of withdrawal--American withdrawal--or suspending
financial aid to Iraq will pressure the Iraqi Government into
the right course. Only through much closer and accurate
diagnosis of the predicament of Iraq--of Iraqi politics--the
United States can find the right pressure points that will
force politicians into compromise.
It is unrealistic to expect the Prime Minister, the Iraqi
Prime Minister, alone, to change the nature of the Iraqi
Government or the politics behind it. Prime Minister Maliki, I
think, is a willing partner who shares a vision of building a
state above identity politics. Firm statements of U.S. support
and troop surge, recent troop surges in Baghdad, have
strengthened his hand. But this will not be sufficient to
change the behavior of elected Iraqi politicians.
With the best of his will and ability, and with the maximum
support the United States can afford, and maximum pressure the
United States can put on Prime Minister Maliki, there is
obviously a very clear limit to how far he, and his government,
can go. By design, the Prime Minister's position is weak, and
controlled by the politicians, who will not loosen their grip
over the State, having tasted its privileges, and the power
that comes with it.
I would like to sum the predicament of the Iraqi State
Government and its politics. Since June 2003, the United States
effort in Iraq focused on three tracks--delivering a political
process, ensuring security, and developing the economy. The
political process was real and successful. It brought about
important and valuable outcomes, an elected legitimate
Parliament, and a coalition government. However, this
successful political process took place while Iraq had no
effective state institutions to deliver security and services
to all citizens.
The state was dismantled in April 2003, and since then, all
attempts to rebuild it took place parallel to formulating a
democratic process. Nearly all Iraqi administrative and
security problems branched out of an absent state. Without a
functioning state, identity politics flourished.
There was a rapid emergence of communal, tribal, religious,
and ethnic politics. The prolonged absence of the state led to
the emergence of militias and alternative power centers.
Identity politics today dominates Iraq.
Iraq's democratic political process is now seriously
undermined by the weakness and absence of the state from
citizens' lives. People left to their own devices, they rallied
naturally behind their ethnic, tribal, and religious leaders.
Today, a new class of politicians thrive, they play on identity
politics, hating and fearing the other.
Elections, unfortunately, legitimized and empowered them.
They control Iraq, its resources, and its people, and will
continue to fight their own narrow agendas over turf and
resources, and expose the whole country to the consequences.
Today, Iraq is in a vicious circle, where rebuilding the
state requires national politics, but that in turn, requires
the presence of a strong state. The past investment in
rebuilding the state failed because of the ethnosectarian
politics. More of the same will not work: More time, more
trained Iraqi police and army, more resources--all of these
previously tried measures may be necessary, but surely
insufficient.
It is clear by now that Iraqi politics needs a fix, without
which, a surge in security measures can bring temporary relief,
but not a cure for the problem. It is unrealistic to assume
that the threat of withdrawal from Iraq would pressure
politicians into political compromise, cooperation, or better
behavior. Some would welcome it.
Due to the geographical, historical, and political factors,
I would suggest that the prospect of involving Iraq's
neighbors, resolving Iraq's security problems, has the
potential to force Iraqi politicians to make the necessary
compromises, and take the right course. The Prime Minister
needs United States support to lead a roundtable conference for
Iraq's neighbors to agree a compact on security, to include
border controls, the flow of cash and arms to communities, and
rebuilding Iraq.
Only through the prospect of such a regional involvement,
Iraqi politicians will compromise their positions, and work out
a shared vision on future Iraq. Only a united Iraq, with an
effective government, and an agreement with its neighbors can
deny al-Qaeda its breeding grounds in lawless Iraqi cities, and
end sectarian violence.
The stakes could not be higher for America, and hence
domestic politics, regional concerns, and any other special
interest must all be balanced to ensure success in Iraq.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Kubba follows:]
Prepared Statement of Laith Kubba, Senior Director for the Middle East
and North Africa, National Endowment for Democracy, Washington, DC
Chairman Biden, Ranking Member Lugar, and distinguished members of
the committee, let me begin by expressing my appreciation for the
opportunity to address the committee on Iraq at such a critical time,
and as an Iraqi American, to express my appreciation to you, Mr.
Chairman, for your thoughtful insights and firm commitment to ensure
that America succeeds in Iraq. In 2005, I took a leave of absence from
the National Endowment for Democracy to become the spokesman for the
former Iraqi Prime Minister, Ibrahim Jaafari. I had the pleasure of
meeting you, Mr. Chairman, and many of your distinguished colleagues
during your frequent visits to Baghdad. For the record, I do not
oversee the Iraq program at the National Endowment for Democracy and
the views I express today are mine and not those of the Endowment.
At the outset, I would like to express my respect, appreciation,
and admiration to all the men and women, military and civilians, Iraqis
and Americans, who are trying hard to make Iraq succeed. I have seen
the difficulties facing decisionmakers who have to strike painful
balances between so many conflicting demands. I would like to focus on
the future rather than the past, and make recommendations in view of a
prognosis of Iraqi politics.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to start my testimony by stating the
obvious.
President Bush rightly reminds us that victory in Iraq is a vital
U.S. interest and failure is not an option. Sustaining such message is
critical. Leaving Iraq torn with violence and sectarianism is not an
option. Al-Qaeda will expand in the ruins of Iraqi cities and torn
communities. In a failed Iraq, al-Qaeda will become stronger, recruit
more terrorists, advance its training and carry out more 9/11s. Simply
put, Iraq is a zero-sum equation between the United States and al-
Qaeda.
Iraq faces multiple intertwined challenges, ranging from violence
and sectarianism to developing the economy and expanding the job market
to controlling the influence of its neighbors. Most of these challenges
originated from one cause, the breakdown of the Iraqi State, and they
have become difficult to resolve because of the continued absence of an
effective government.
Disarming the militias is a case in point. Shia militias filled the
streets in districts left exposed to persistent al-Qaeda attacks. Under
the watchful eyes of a dysfunctional government, the militias displayed
their arms, exploited Shia needs for protection and grew unchallenged
in most districts. Similarly, Sunni districts suffered the wrath of
Shia militias revenge and were not protected by the Iraqi police. Local
Sunni-armed groups saw the need to collaborate with insurgents in order
to protect themselves in a brutal mad conflict. Not surprisingly, most
Sunni politicians and some armed groups have welcomed the recent surge
in American troops as means to disarm rival militias. Without expanding
and elevating the Iraqi Army and police force above sectarian, ethnic,
and political loyalties, all security measures remain short term and
unsustainable.
Building modern state institutions transcending ethnoreligious
lines has been the U.S. goal for the past 3 years. All opinion polls
showed that throughout 2003, 2004, and 2005, Iraqis wanted a central
government with strong national institutions controlling arms,
intelligence, and borders and strong local administrations providing
services and jobs. The United States has provided enormous technical
assistance to build Iraqi ministries and bureaus. The United States
acted on good faith that a legitimate political process would
eventually bring peace and national unity. The political process
successfully delivered a legitimate government but failed to bring
either an effective government or a government of national unity. This
failure lies today exclusively in the hands of post-Saddam Iraqi
politicians, who have risen to power in deadly exceptional
circumstances. It is dangerously misleading to assume that the problem
is historically rooted in Iraqi communities or externally caused by
rouge neighbors.
Iraq's predicament is found in its current electoral laws and in
fundamental disagreement among its communal leaders over the concept of
the state and the design of government. Under current electoral rules,
Iraq will always have a weak executive and a fragile coalition
government, where the Prime Minister cannot hire and fire incompetent
or corrupt ministers without causing a political crisis. It took months
to form a Cabinet whose success is not defined by services but by
continuity. It is formed without a shared vision but with a complex
quota system dividing ministries. Inevitably autonomous ministers are
more accountable to their party bosses and less to the Prime Minister.
Such a system will not deliver an effective government.
Changing the current system to bring about a strong government
requires prior agreements and a high level of trust between its
communities. There is little reason to believe that Iraqi politicians
will reach agreement by themselves. Today there are two Iraqs, Kurdish
and Arab, and three main parliamentary blocs with tens of political
groups. Kurdish Iraq is stable, prosperous, and determined to expand
and maximize its control to ethnically mixed areas beyond its current
regional border. Arab Iraq is at war with itself and approaching a
full-blown civil war. The Kurds can factor in this effort in as much as
they may help or hinder rebuilding Arab Iraq. The key to bringing
stability back to Iraq depends on Shia and Sunni agreement on how to
govern Iraq. So far, there are no signs of any agreement.
Last June, Iraq's Prime Minister Maliki launched a reconciliation
initiative to reach out to Sunni insurgents and consolidate his
government of national unity. He solicited support from Gulf States,
supported reconciliation conferences in Baghdad and Mecca, and pledged
that only government forces will bear arms. His Ministries of Defense
and Interior have no ties to armed political groups and militias and he
started his campaign against the al-Mahdi Militias. However, such
measures and gestures are helpful but dwarf in significance compared to
the challenge of bringing unity of vision among the three main
communities in Iraq (Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds) to agree on
constitutional amendments.
Iraq passed the Constitution in a national referendum in October
2005 despite Sunnis' overwhelming rejection. Only the promise and hope
of future constitutional amendments brought back the Sunnis to
participate in December 2005 elections and Maliki's government. Since
then, no progress has been made on constitutional amendments. Behind
the political paralysis is a lack of clear ideas on how to reconcile
differing views. Pushing amendments without prior agreements will
escalate the political crisis and violence even further and deny Iraq
its last chance to resolve constitutional differences. If the minimum
of Sunni hopes in amendments are not realized, then the country will
sink into more violence. Without accommodating Sunni grievances and
fully engaging them in rebuilding the state and running the government,
it would not be possible to separate al-Qaeda and criminal networks
from the rest of the insurgency.
IS COMPROMISE POSSIBLE?
Differences run deep among the three major groups on nation-state-
building. Behind their commitment to national unity are different
visions on how to build Iraqi governing institutions, in particular on
the nature of the state, the mandate of central government, and the
control of security and natural recourses. Reconciliations are
difficult because of hardened positions, zero-sum perspectives to
politics, historical grievances, mistrust, inflated assumptions about
negotiating positions, and lack of experience. A closer look at their
differences suggests that not all can easily or quickly be resolved.
Arab Sunnis, who are most experienced in administrating a central state
and least in negotiating with local politicians, seek the return of a
centralized Iraq with an autonomous Kurdish administrative region.
Kurds, who secured a constitutionally recognized and highly empowered
federal region with strong hold in Baghdad, will not accept any
rollback from such position. Moreover, they expect to add Kirkuk to
their region. Arab Shias, with least experience in government, have
mixed positions about the return of a centralized state without the
Kurdish region. Some groups are pushing toward a southern federal
region, similar to the Kurdish one. The parliamentarian committee to be
tasked with drafting amendments has not brought forward new ideas on
how to proceed. The future of Kirkuk and the prospect of forming a
southern region are perceived by Arab Sunnis as most problematic. At
dispute are articles on the control of natural resources and the
concept of citizenship and state institutions. If Iraqis fail to agree
peacefully through parliamentary daytime debates, they will fight
street battles outside Parliament at night.
Iraq's destiny is in the hands of elected politicians who have no
incentive to compromise. They thrive on hard-line identity and communal
politics. They are deeply linked to militias and illicit siphoning of
Iraq's petro-dollars. They have adjusted to violence, established
supply lines to a prolonged conflict, and shielded themselves from the
suffering of ordinary people. Iraq awaits the move of these politicians
to compromise and come to agreement on their differences, work toward a
shared vision, and allow technocrats to rebuild the state. Without
pressure, Iraqi politicians will not move. The United States can bring
in additional leverage over Iraqi politics through Iraq's neighbors.
The threats of bringing in the neighbors will change the dynamic and
force compromises. Unlike the United States, Iraq's neighbors are there
to stay and Iraqi politicians fear their intervention. Sunnis, Shias,
and Kurds are all exposed to the influence of neighbors, who have
legitimate concerns about the deteriorating security conditions in
Iraq. The alternative to direct discussions with the neighbors is war
by proxy and indirect and unregulated competition over Iraq. This can
provide sufficient deterrent and incentive to affect Iraqi politicians
and community leaders. Iraq can call its neighbors to a conference on
border security, disarming militias, and reconstruction.
The most important and urgent issue in such a conference is
restoring the ability of the state to control all armed groups and
exert authority all over Iraq. The government has to negotiate
disarming militias whose loyalties--ethnic, religious, or political--to
their leaders are above their loyalty to the state. The top three
militias are the Kurdish Peshmerga, who are the best trained and
disciplined; the Shia Bader Brigade with its extended networks of
social organizations; and the least organized and most thuggish, the
Mahdi Army. Integrating members of these groups into Iraqi units must
come through rigorous selection and training procedures. Some Sunni
armed groups are tribal but most are not affiliated with Sunni
political leaders.
The United States should continue to be involved in security
planning and leverage its political influence to ensure a buy-in from
all parties to Iraq's national security policies. In confronting
complex networks of kidnappers, smugglers, white collar criminals, and
financers of armed groups and political parties, Iraq needs U.S.
advanced technical support and expertise. Iraq also needs to revive its
own security agencies and measures that were effective in fighting
crime under the previous regime. For example, the previous regime ran
successful undercover security agency to expose white collar corruption
in all ministries.
THREATS OF CIVIL WAR
Fixing Iraqi politics is the most important challenge but putting
down the rapidly spreading sectarian violence has become most urgent.
Iraq did not have communal conflicts in its history, and until 2003,
Iraqis prided themselves with the extent of mixed marriages and
neighborhoods. For more than three decades, Saddam played communities
against each other, elevated mistrust between citizens and caused
communal tensions. Still Iraqis blamed the government but not each
other for Saddam's repression of Shias and Kurds and refused
sectarianism. Some Iraqi exile leaders with external influence fed
ethnoreligious agendas into Iraqi politics and institutionalized
sectarian quotas at all state levels. For obvious political gains,
they, too, pushed sectarianism. That partially explains the passive
slow reaction of some Iraqi political elites to growing sectarian
conflicts.
Until recently, al-Qaeda was the number one threat to Iraq,
followed by the other two deadly forces: Sunni insurgency and
sectarianism. Although it exploited Sunni political isolation and
dysfunctional government security agencies, al-Qaeda failed to block
the political process and the emergence of an Iraqi national unity
government. The killing of Zarqawi was a severe blow. As al-Qaeda and
Saddam loyalists were running out of time, they unleashed their most
devastating weapon: Sectarianism. For the past 3 years, they have been
trying to stir up Arab Shia-Sunni violence. They brutally beheaded
Shias, blew up their mosques, and destroyed their most holy shrine.
Now, their fire of sectarian violence is spreading and threatening the
whole process. Iraqi police and army units can easily get sucked into
sectarian violence. Without agreement with Iraq's neighbors on ending
sectarianism, Iraq's modest political progress and the unity of its
Armed Forces may not survive long.
Within this fragile and problematic political setting, al-Qaeda
succeeded in unleashing sectarian violence with far reaching
consequences. Sectarian violence has seriously undermined the political
process and changed Iraq's landscape. Persistent communal violence and
politicians' failure to agree on constitutional amendments will bring
about a de facto breakdown of Iraq along communal lines. Such an
outcome will prolong the conflict and sew seeds of additional communal
and regional violence
LOWERING EXPECTATIONS
This Iraqi Government has a long way to go before making any
noticeable difference. The alternative to a national unity government
is a full meltdown into violence and chaos. Iraq needs help in both
tracks: Security and politics while the United States can no longer
instruct the Iraqis on how to govern, the security of the government
and the delicate balance among Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish parliamentary
blocs still hinge on U.S. support. This gives the United States
significant influence and leverage over the course of Iraqi politics
and the development of its security.
Only a united Iraq with an effective government and in agreement
with its neighbors can deny al-Qaeda its breeding grounds in lawless
Iraqi cities and end sectarian violence. The stakes cannot be higher
for America and hence domestic politics, regional concerns, and special
interests must all be balanced to ensure success in Iraq.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Dr. Kubba.
Let me mention that rollcall votes are anticipated at 3:45,
and this is always an unfortunate occurrence as we proceed
through hearings, but we'll have time for your testimony, Dr.
Dodge, and then the chairman will probably return, and we will
make some determination as to how to proceed so that we can ask
questions of you, and continue the hearing.
Dr. Dodge.
STATEMENT OF DR. TOBY DODGE, CONSULTING SENIOR FELLOW FOR THE
MIDDLE EAST, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES,
LONDON, UNITED KINGDOM
Dr. Dodge. Thank you.
First, can I say that it's an honor to be here today.
Second, I've submitted a longer written testimony that I'd like
to be placed on the record.
I think that the publication of the Iraq Study Group report
in early December, and the President's major policy speech on
Iraq on January 10, marked a decisive change in attitudes
toward Iraq here in Washington. The acceptance in policy
circles of clear-eyed, realistic, and necessarily pessimistic
assessment is clearly to be welcomed.
However, acknowledgement that the situation is dire, and
getting worse, conceals both disagreement and confusion about
the underlying causes of the violent civil war, and how it
dominates the country, and hence, possible solutions.
What I want to do this afternoon is run through the major
drivers of the conflict, and suggest that neither the Baker-
Hamilton report, nor President Bush's new policy, fully deal
with the causes of the problem. To explain the evolution of
violent instability in the wake of regime change, the collapse
of the Iraqi State is of much greater importance than the
existence of communal antipathies, or indeed, the ineptitude of
Iraq's new ruling elite.
The entrance of U.S. troops into Baghdad triggered 3 weeks
of violence and looting that destroyed the state's
administrative capacity. As we know, 17 of Baghdad's 23
ministry buildings were completely gutted.
Finally, de-Baathification removed what was left--its
institutional memory, and a large section of its skilled
personnel. This, along with the disbanding of the Iraqi Army
resulted in the acute security vacuum that we have today.
Second, the lack of the Iraqi Government capacity and
coherence, has taken away the legitimacy that began to accrue
to the government after the elections of 2005. The collapse of
the state, and the resulting security vacuum that has driven
Iraq into civil war has created--or at least empowered--three
distinct sets of groups deploying violence for their own ends.
The first are the industrial-strength criminal gangs, who
terrorize what is left of Iraq's middle class. The persistent
reports of crime is as big a problem for the citizens as Basra,
as Baghdad, indicates that the State's inability to impose and
guarantee order is a general problem across large swathes of
southern and central Iraq, going well beyond the government's
inability to increase electrical output, or stimulate the job
market, the continued ability of criminals to operate is
indicative of a failed state.
The second type of organization capitalizing on the
collapse of the state are the myriad groups that make up the
Iraqi insurgency, thought to have between 20-50,000 fighters in
their ranks.
The violence that erupted following the destruction of the
al-Askariya Mosque in the city of Samarra on February 22, 2006,
saw a third group of who have capitalized on the failure to
impose order. The militia is estimated to hold between 60 and
102,000 fighters in their ranks.
The militias themselves can be divided into three broad
categories, depending on their organizational coherence and
relation to national politics.
The first, including the most disciplined group, consists
of the two Kurdish militias associated with the Kurdish
Democratic Party, and the Party for the Union of Kurdistan.
The second set of those that were created in exile, and
brought back to Iraq in the wake of Saddam's fall. The most
powerful of these is the Badr Brigade, the military arm of the
Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, estimated to
have roughly 15,000 fighters in its ranks. It is the Badr
Brigade's colonization of large swathes of the security forces,
notably the police and paramilitary units associated with the
Ministry of Interior, which has done so much to delegitimize
the already extremely limited power of state-controlled law and
order.
Jawad al-Bulani, the Minister of Interior since May 2006,
has clearly struggled to reform this Ministry. He has
reportedly sacked more than 3,000 employees, but the Ministry
is still dogged by repeated allegations that its forces and
prisons are using murder and torture with impunity.
The third group of militias that dominate society are those
that were created in Iraq since regime change. The largest and
most coherent of this is the 50,000-strong Jaish al-Mahdi, set
up by Muqtada al-Sadr.
Now, the speed with which the militia itself was built, and
the two prolonged conflicts it's had with the U.S. military,
has taken its toll on its coherence. Muqtada militia commanders
have become more financially independent of Sadr through
hostage-taking, ransom, and the smuggling of antiques and
petroleum. In spite of Sadr's repeated calls for calm, it was
the Muqtada army that was blamed for the majority of the
violence in and around Baghdad, following the destruction of
the al-Askariya Shrine in February.
The Badr Brigade and the Muqtada army are in competition to
control Iraq's Shias. This has led to a low-level civil war
between them. This struggle erupted in Basra in April and May
2006, and then again in Amarah in October. The fighting in
April was not caused by religion, or even ideological
differences, but money. Basra is the center of Iraq'a oil
exports, and the conflict was primarily concerned with the
division of the spoils.
The fighting in Amarah in October was again about the
dominance of the town, once British forces had left. In each
case, none of these groups involved were strong enough to win
outright, and so the conflict simmers on, erupting
periodically, triggered either by competition, or Iranian
interference.
The dominance of the militias was not an inevitable result
of regime change, but a direct response to the collapse of the
state. If Iraq is to be stabilized, if central government--a
central government with a monopoly on coercion must be rebuilt
with administrative capacity to give it legitimacy. Sadly,
there's no shortcut to this end-state. If it's possible at all,
it could take many years, and a great deal of resources to
achieve.
Ever since 2003, when Paul Bremer signed a November the
15th agreement, the U.S. Government has subcontracted this
complex job of rebuilding the state to a small group of
inexperienced, formerly exiled Iraqis who were long absent from
the country.
Two elections and a referendum in 2005, were meant to give
Iraq's new political elite democratic legitimacy. However, the
nature of the electoral system chosen, the way the parties
decided to fight the elections, and the constitutional position
of the Prime Minister in their aftermath, have all combined to
break the political coherence and administrative efficiency of
this government.
The Office of Prime Minister has become the main vehicle
for delivering government coherence. However, the Prime
Minister is in a very weak position, both constitutionally, and
electorally. Real power is vested in the parties who fight the
election.
For the parties, electoral success within larger coalitions
is rewarded by dividing up the spoils of government, cabinet
portfolios, and the jobs and resources they bring. Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki has acted as a broker, facilitating
negotiations within his own coalition, the United Iraqi
Alliance, between it, the American Ambassador, and the other
coalitions. The Prime Minister's decisions are based on the
comparative power of the parties, and the coalitions he's
negotiating with, not on his own political vision, or agenda
for rebuilding the Iraqi State.
The Cabinet, instead of acting as a vehicle for national
unity and state-building, has become a mechanism for dividing
up the spoils of electoral success. If government ministers are
answerable to anyone, it's to their party bosses, not the Prime
Minister, or beyond him, the electorate. The ministries these
politicians now run have become personal and party fiefdoms. At
best, and this is at best, scarce government resources are
diverted to build party constituencies, with each minister
clearing out the payrolls of their ministries to appoint
friends, followers, and faction members. At worst, there is
little or no Cabinet responsibility or administrative
oversight. This system encourages both personal and political
corruption to flourish.
Against this background of state collapse and the resultant
civil war, both the Iraq Study Group, and President Bush argue
that only Iraqis can end the sectarian violence and secure
their people. However, once state capacity has collapsed, civil
society's ability to positively influence events quickly
disappears.
The Iraq Study Group's main suggestion is a dramatic
empowerment of Iraq's current governing elite. However, the
current governing elite is not coherent enough to fulfill this
role. It does not act with anything approaching unity, and
Prime Minister Maliki's position is not strong enough to impose
his will, or indeed, the United States will in this disparate
group of, basically, squabbling politicians.
President Bush, on the other hand, favors a dramatic
increase in United States troops to impose some order on
Baghdad and northwest Iraq, adding a further 21,000 troops to
the current, roughly, 132,000 American troops in the country.
Even with a new total of 153,000 troops, U.S. troops, this
number would be far short of the number needed to impose order
on the country.
President Bush's new approach would see a total of 32,000
U.S. troops in Baghdad, a city of roughly 6 million. This gives
commanders one American soldier for every 184 Baghdadians. This
new, enlarged number of U.S. troops is still well below even
the 50 per 1,000 that the new Army and Marines field manual on
counterinsurgency recommends.
In addition, simply flooding one area of Iraq--in this
case, Baghdad--with troops, neglects the subtler aspects of
counterinsurgency doctrine. For a surge in troops to Baghdad to
be sustainable, it has to be married with the second stage of
the process. After areas have been cleared of insurgents, the
government needs to reconstitute sustainable security, building
up its administrative capacity, and then establishing the rule
of law.
The Iraqi Government, I would argue, is neither willing nor
able to follow up the ``clear'' phase of counterinsurgency with
the ``build'' stage. First, in the aftermath of a successful
U.S. counterinsurgency operation to gain control of the
northern city of Tel-Afar, the Iraqi Government proved
remarkably reluctant to secure this victory by employing
enhanced government resources.
Second, in a country dominated by the collapse of the
state, the ability of the government to build up its capacity
across a sustained geographical area is highly limited. There
is a distinct danger that neither President Bush nor the Iraq
Study Group's proposals for extracting the United States from
Iraq recognize the root cause of the violence.
The origins of the Iraqi civil war lie in the complete
collapse of both the administrative and coercive capacity of
the state. It is the United States inability to date to
reconstruct them that lies at the heart of the Iraqi problem.
If, and until, the state's capacity is substantially rebuilt,
then Iraq will continue to be a wellspring of violence and
instability.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Dodge follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Toby Dodge, Consulting Senior Fellow for the
Middle East, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London,
United Kingdom
INTRODUCTION: STATE COLLAPSE IN IRAQ
The publication of the Iraq Study Group (ISG) report in early
December 2006 and President George W. Bush's major policy speech on
Iraq in January 2007, marked a decisive change in attitudes in
Washington. The acceptance in policy circles of a clear-eyed,
realistic, and necessarily pessimistic assessment of Iraq, is clearly
to be welcomed. However, acknowledgement that the situation is dire and
getting worse, may conceal both disagreement and confusion about the
underlying causes of the violent civil war that now dominates the
country.
To explain the evolution of violent instability in the wake of
regime change, the collapse of the state is of much greater
significance than the supposedly transhistorical existence of communal
antipathies or indeed the ineptitude of Iraq's new ruling elite. The
entrance of U.S. troops into Baghdad in the first weeks of April 2003,
resulted in the death of the Iraqi State. Faced with the widespread
lawlessness that is common after violent regime change, the United
States did not have the numbers of troops needed to control the
situation. After 3 weeks of violence and looting, the state's
administrative capacity was destroyed. Seventeen of Baghdad's twenty-
three ministry buildings were completely gutted. Looters first took
portable items of value such as computers, then furniture and fittings.
By the time I reached Baghdad, a month after U.S. forces, they were
systematically stripping the electric wiring from the walls of former
government buildings, to sell for scrap. Following the destruction of
government infrastructure across the country, de-Baathification purged
the civil service of its top layer of management, making between 20,000
and 120,000 people unemployed. The administrational capacity of the
state was shattered by over a decade of sanctions, three wars in 20
years and then 3 weeks of uncontrolled looting. Finally de-
Baathification removed what was left: Its institutional memory and a
large section of its skilled personnel.
Iraq today finds itself in a situation of state failure. Against
this background instability is driven by two interlinked problems,
which have caused the profound insecurity and violence that now
dominates the country. The complete collapse of state capacity and the
U.S. disbanding of the Iraqi Army resulted in an acute security vacuum.
This was seized upon by myriad groups deploying violence for their own
gain. Organized crime became a dominant source of insecurity for
ordinary Iraqis. For coalition and Iraqi security forces, it is the
diffuse groups fighting the insurgency in the name of Iraqi
nationalism, increasingly fused with a militant Islamism, that have
caused the highest loss of life. But in early 2006, a new crisis arose
with even greater potential for destabilization: Civil war. The
explosion that destroyed the al-Askariya Mosque in the Iraqi city of
Samarra, on February 22, 2006, marked a watershed, exacerbating already
mounting sectarian violence and the resultant population transfers.
The second problem that has dominated the politics of the country
since the fall of Saddam Hussein, is the question who should rule? How
to find Iraqis who after 35 years of dictatorship have both the
technical capacity and national legitimacy to rule over a country of 26
million people? 2005 was dominated by the struggle to build a
representative government that could act as a rallying point for the
country; allowing the population to invest hope and legitimacy in a new
ruling elite that could stabilize the nation and move toward rebuilding
the state. For Iraq to stabilize a regime change to be a success,
sustained progress will have to be made in two areas: The building of
countrywide state capacity and the growth of a legitimate and competent
governing elite.
STATE COLLAPSE LEADS TO CIVIL WAR
The collapse of the state and the resultant security vacuum that
has driven Iraq into civil war has created, or at least empowered,
three distinct sets of groups deploying violence for their own ends.
The first are the ``industrial strength'' criminal gangs who terrorize
what is left of Iraq's middle class. Although there is a clear overlap
between simple criminality and politically motivated violence,
especially where kidnapping is concerned, the continuing crime wave is
a glaring example of state incapacity. The persistent reports that
crime is as big a problem for the citizens of Basra as Baghdad,
indicates that the state's inability to impose and guarantee order, is
a general problem across large swathes of southern and central Iraq.
The high levels of criminal activity indicates that violence is driven
primarily by opportunity, springing from state weakness, not the
antipathy of competing groups within Iraqi society. Crime is obviously
instrumentally driven, primarily noncommunal and a key factor
delegitimizing the new Iraqi ruling elite. Exceeding the government's
inability to increase electrical output or stimulate the job market,
the continued ability of criminal gangs to operate is indicative of a
failed state.
The second type of organization capitalizing on the collapse of the
state are the myriad groups that make up the Iraqi insurgency. In the
aftermath of regime change, the insurgency was born in a reactive and
highly localized fashion, as the U.S. military's inability to control
Iraq became apparent. This process saw the creation of a number of
small fighting groups built around personal ties of trust, cemented by
family, locality, or many years of friendship. Disparate groups, formed
to rid the country of U.S. forces are estimated to consist of between
50 and 74 separate autonomous units, with between 20,000 to 50,000
fighters in their ranks. Over the past 3 years they have been
innovative in the technology they deploy and the tactics they use.
Since 2005 however, the insurgency, has to some degree, consolidated
around four or five main groups. These organizations include the
Islamic Army in Iraq, the Partisans of the Sunna Army, the Mujahidin's
Army, Muhammad's Army, and Islamic Resistance Movement in Iraq. As
their names suggest, political violence has been increasingly justified
in religious terms. Over the last year these main insurgent groups have
found ideological coherence by fusing a powerful appeal to Iraqi
nationalism with an austere and extreme Sunni Salafism: The attraction
of the Salalfist doctrine for the insurgents is that it allows a
distinction to be drawn between those involved in the jihad or struggle
(the true believers), and those who are not. Under Salafism those not
backing the struggle can be branded nonbelievers and as such be killed.
This Salafist approach has also lent itself to the increased use of
sectarian violence. Shias can be murdered both because they do not
follow the ``true path of Islam'' and because they form the majority of
those staffing the security forces against whom the violence is
directed.
The numbers and role played by Arabs from neighboring countries and
beyond them the organizing capacity of al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, is
estimated by the U.S. military to be between 5 and 10 percent of the
total. These foreign fighters have played a disproportionately large
role in the insurgency's ideological coherence. It is al-Qaeda in
Mesopotamia that has driven the rising influence of Salafist doctrine
and has claimed responsibility or been blamed for the majority of the
violence that has increased sectarian tensions in the country. This
dynamic reached it peak with the destruction of the al-Askariya Mosque.
Although the city of Samarra has long been dominated by the insurgency,
the destruction of the mosque, one of Shia Islam's most important
shrines, was an act calculated to outrage Shia opinion.
The violence that erupted following the Samarra bombing saw
criminals and insurgents combine with a third group who have
capitalized on the failure of occupation forces and the Iraqi
Government to impose order. The plethora of independent militias is
estimated to hold between 60,000 to 102,000 fighters in their ranks.
The militias have overtly organized and legitimized themselves by
reference to sectarian ideology. Their existence is testament to the
inability of the Iraqi Government to guarantee the personal safety of
Iraqis on the basis of equal citizenship, not sectarian identity.
The militias themselves can be divided into three broad groups,
depending on their organizational coherence and relationship to
national politics. The first and most disciplined group consists of the
two Kurdish militias of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The second set are those that were
created in exile and brought back to Iraq in the wake of Saddam's fall.
The most powerful of these is the Badr Brigade, the military arm of
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), estimated
to have 15,000 fighters in its ranks. The Badr Brigade along with SCIRI
itself, was set up as a foreign policy vehicle for the Iranian
Government. Indeed the Badr Brigade was trained and officered by the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard, at least until their return to Iraq. It
remains comparatively disciplined and responsive to its senior
commanders. However it is the Badr Brigade's colonization of large
swathes of the security forces, notably the police and paramilitary
units associated with the Ministry of Interior, which has done so much
to delegitimize the already limited power of the state-controlled
forces of law and order. Badr's dominance of the Ministry of Interior
reached its peak when one of its former commanders, Bayan Jabr, served
as a minister under the Jaafari government. The Ministry's Wolf Brigade
commandos were repeatedly accused of acting as a death squad,
frequently resorting to extra-judicial execution and torture.
Complaints reached their peak in November 2005, when U.S. forces raided
a Ministry of Interior detention facility and found 170 detainees ``who
had been held in appalling conditions.'' However SCIRI's dominance of
government was such that Jabr was not removed until the end of May
2006. His replacement, Jawad al-Bulani, a nonaligned politician, has
struggled to reform the Ministry. He has reportedly sacked more than
3,000 employees, but the Ministry is still dogged by repeated
allegations that its forces and prisons are still using murder and
torture with impunity.
The third group of militias that dominate society in the absence of
a state are those that have been created in Iraq since regime change.
They vary in size, organization, and discipline, from a few thugs with
guns controlling a street or a neighborhood to militias capable of
running whole towns. The largest and most coherent is the 50,000-strong
Jaish al-Mahdi, set up by Muqtada al-Sadr. The core of the Mahdi
militia is organized around the offices of Sadr's religious charity,
the Martyr al-Sadr. Each office is run by a cleric appointed by Sadr's
headquarters in Najaf, with full-time fighters paid as much as $300 a
week. However, the speed with which the militia was built after regime
change and the two prolonged conflicts with the U.S. military have
taken a toll on its organizational coherence. Mahdi militia commanders
have become more financially independent of Najaf through hostage-
taking, ransom, and the smuggling of antiquities and petroleum. Sadr
has repeatedly tried to instil discipline but, as one of his own
commanders admitted, ``Even when Sadr fires the brigade commanders,
their soldiers follow them and not Sadr. Now Sadr fires commanders
every month, so their fighters will not become too loyal to them.'' In
spite of Sadr's repeated calls for calm, it was the Mahdi Army that was
blamed for the majority of violence in and around Baghdad following the
destruction of the al-Askariya shrine in February.
The Badr Brigade and Mahdi Army both claim to represent the same
constituency, urban Iraqi Shias. They have both tried to legitimize
their coercive role in terms of defending this section of the
population against violence and instability. However the instrumental
basis to their actions, capitalizing on the absence of the state, as
opposed to their alleged position as protectors of the Shia population,
has been highlighted by the low-level civil war they have been fighting
against each other. This struggle erupted in Basra in April and May
2006 and then again in Amarah in October. Basra has a very small Sunni
population, the fighting in April that was responsible for the deaths
of 174 Iraqis was not caused by religious or even ideological
differences, but money. Basra is the centre of Iraq's oil exports and
the conflict was primarily concerned with the division of the spoils.
The fighting in Amarah in October was again about the dominance of the
town once British forces had left. In each case, none of the groups
involved were strong enough to win outright and so the conflict simmers
on, erupting periodically, triggered by rival machinations and Iranian
interference.
Once a state has failed, once its coercive and administrative
capacity is removed from society, the population has to seek new local
ways to survive, to gain some degree of day-to-day predictability. This
is the quest that has haunted the majority of Iraq's population since
regime change. The result has been the rise of the militias. The
quality of an individual Iraqi's life depends on the discipline,
organizational coherence and central control of the militias that
dominate their streets, neighborhoods, and towns. In the areas of
northern Iraq, the Kurdish militias of the KDP and PUK, since fighting
a civil war against each other in the mid-1990s, have centralized and
largely institutionalized their military forces. Elsewhere in Iraq, the
militias who came into existence after regime change are far more
unstable, prone to criminality and divided loyalties. Although the
militias were formed as an instrumental response to the security
vacuum, they have attempted to legitimize themselves by the deployment
of hybrid ideologies; sectarian, religious, and nationalist. This has
caused the ethnic and religious cleansing across the country from
Kirkuk in the north, to Basra in the south, but most powerfully in
Baghdad. This was not an inevitable result of regime change but a
direct response to the collapse of the state. If Iraq is to be
stabilized, a central government with a monopoly on coercion must be
rebuilt with administrative capacity to give it legitimacy. Sadly there
is no shortcut to this end-state, if it is possible, it could take many
years and a great deal of resources to achieve.
IRAQ'S NEW POLITICAL ELITE: PART OF THE PROBLEM
Ever since 2003, when Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition
Provisional Authority, signed the ``November 15 agreement,'' the U.S.
Government has subcontracted the complex job of rebuilding the state to
a small group of inexperienced, formally exiled Iraqis who were long
absent from the country. Their task was to erect a sustainable and
legitimate post-regime change political order. This has been hampered
by the two dominant facts of Iraqi politics today. The major political
problem they face is the legacy left by 35 years of Baathist rule.
Before the imposition of sanctions in 1990, Saddam Hussein used oil
wealth and hitherto unheard of levels of state violence, to break any
organizing capacity within Iraqi society. Those who were active in
antiregime politics were murdered, imprisoned, tortured, or driven into
exile. Those who stayed in the country increasingly realized that
survival and economic well-being were directly linked to complete
political passivity. Consequently indigenous political organization
beyond the Baath did not exist in any measurable form. There was no
civil society in Iraq before the U.S. military reached Baghdad. Iraqi
politics began from scratch in April 2003.
The Iraqi politicians subcontracted by the Americans to rebuild the
state have been active in indigenous politics for less than 4 years.
The majority were also long absent from the country. Hence they have
had to battle against indigenous hostility and suspicion since their
return. The intense political process that stretched across 2005 was
meant to overcome these two hurdles: Anointing Iraq's new political
elite with the legitimacy of two electoral mandates and a constitution
approved by popular referendum. However the nature of the electoral
system chosen, the way the parties decided to fight the elections, and
the constitutional position of the Prime Minister in the aftermath, all
combined to break the political coherence and administrational
efficiency of the government created by this process.
Iraq's new electoral system, based on large multiparty coalitions,
is one of the major problems dominating the politics of government.
Whilst the President fulfills a mainly ceremonial role, the office of
Prime Minister has become the main vehicle for delivering governmental
coherence. However the Prime Minister is in a weak position both
constitutionally and electorally. Real political power is vested in the
parties who fight the elections. For them, electoral success within
larger coalitions is rewarded by dividing up the spoils of government,
Cabinet portfolios, and the jobs and resources they bring. The Prime
Minister does not dominate the Cabinet as first among equals. Instead
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has to act as a broker, facilitating
negotiations within his own coalition, the United Iraqi Alliance and
between it, the American Ambassador and the other coalitions. The Prime
Minister's decisions are based on the comparative power of the parties
and coalitions he is negotiating with, not his own political vision or
agenda for rebuilding the Iraqi State.
In the aftermath of the December 2005 elections Prime Minister al-
Maliki's task was to build a government of national unity. This
involved rewarding the main coalitions while also seeking to balance
electoral achievement with the identity politics that the main parties
claim to personify. In addition, al-Maliki had to move ministers who
under his predecessor, Ibrahim al-Jaafari, were too inefficient,
scandal ridden, or controversial to continue in office. The Cabinet
that was created sacrificed the needs of a population traumatized by
the invasion, occupation, collapse of the state, a crime wave, and the
growing civil war, at the altar of party politics and electoral
outcomes. An unintended consequence of this system was to prevent the
Prime Minister sacking incompetent or corrupt ministers without the
agreement of their party bosses. Even when this was possible, party,
coalition, and sectarian mathematics meant that other senior party
figures replaced them.
The limitations placed upon the Prime Minister's powers of
appointment were personified by his relations with Bayan Jabr. Jabr is
a key member of SCIRI and a former commander in its militia, the Badr
Brigade. As Minister of Interior in the Jaafari government, he was the
focus of sustained criticism for politicizing the Ministry of Interior,
sacking longstanding members of staff, only to replace them with loyal
lieutenants from his own militia and party. Maliki eventually succeeded
in moving Jabr from the Interior Ministry, replacing him with the
nonaligned Jawad al-Bulani. However the weakness of the Prime
Minister's position meant that Jabr could not simply be sacked from the
Cabinet, but was instead moved sideways, to become Minister of Finance.
In his new job Jabr has been accused of obstructing reconstruction
initiatives, designed to rebuild support for the government in the
Sunni neighborhoods of Baghdad following the counterinsurgency
operation Together Forward II, in the summer and autumn of 2006.
During 2005 Iraq did indeed hold two comparatively successful
elections and a referendum for the new Constitution. However the
government and Cabinet that this electoral process delivered are unfit
for their purpose: Rebuilding the Iraqi State. The weakness of a Prime
Minister in a system dominated by parties has directly undermined the
coherence of the government. The Cabinet, instead of acting as a
vehicle for national unity and state-building has become a mechanism
for dividing up the spoils of electoral success. If the ministers that
al-Maliki appointed are answerable to anyone it is to their party
bosses, not the Prime Minister or the electorate. The ministries these
politicians now run have become personal and party fiefdoms. At best,
scarce government resources are diverted to build party constituencies,
with each minister clearing out the payrolls of their ministries to
appoint friends, followers, and faction members. At worst, with little
or no Cabinet responsibility or administrational oversight, this system
encourages both personal and political corruption to flourish.
Under the transition from regime change, 2005 was meant to give
Iraq's new ruling elite the legitimacy to rule the country. However the
way that electoral mandate was delivered, through large multiparty
coalitions, has directly hindered the government's main and crucial
task: The rebuilding of the Iraqi State. Instead the Cabinet has become
highly fractured. Ministries have been turned into party fiefdoms
directly breaking governmental coherence. In the aftermath of each
election, politicians were locked away within the fortified Green Zone
in the centre of Baghdad. They became quickly removed from the everyday
concerns of a population struggling to survive in the midst of an
increasingly bloody civil war. The new government has followed the path
of its two predecessors; it has become mired in the incestuous politics
of zero-sum party competition. The state, both coercively and
administrationally, is still largely irrelevant to the Iraqi
population's lives. As such, it is hastening Iraq's further descent
into intercommunal strife and collapse.
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Against a background of state collapse and the resultant civil war
both the Iraq Study Group and President Bush argue, ``Only Iraqis can
end the sectarian violence and secure their people.'' However once
state capacity has collapsed, civil society's ability to positively
influence events quickly disappears. The Iraq Study Group's main
suggestion is a dramatic empowerment of Iraq's current governing elite.
They would be forced to take on the role of state-builders by the
application of both carrots and sticks; greater and speedier devolution
of power, increased funding but also the threat of reduced aid or
complete U.S. withdrawal. Under these policy proposals the United
States would exercise influence over the Iraqi Government in two ways.
First, it would make Iraq's rulers understand that America's commitment
to the country was not open-ended. U.S. troops would be reduced and
eventually withdrawn from Iraq, irrespective of the progress made on
the ground. The minds of those in the Iraqi Government would be focused
by a clear and unambiguous time limit placed upon U.S. support for the
country. They would have no American safety net. If the current ruling
elite failed it would be their own lives that would be put at risk.
More immediately the Iraq Study Group suggested the imposition of
strict conditionality on further U.S. aid. If specific milestones were
not reached by the Iraqi Government over the next 2 years, then U.S.
troops and money would be reduced incrementally, until Iraqi Government
policy was changed for the better.
Given that the Iraqi governing elite play such a central role in
the ISG's recommendations, their response is instructive. The Iraqi
President, Jalal Talabani, gave the government's most sustained and
detailed reaction stating, ``as a whole I reject this report.''
Talabani rejected the report's suggestion of embedding up to 17,000
U.S. advisers across the Iraqi Army and police force. This he claimed,
``is not respecting the desire of the Iraqi people to control its army
and to be able to rearm and train Iraqi forces under the leadership of
the Iraqi Government.'' Talabani also minimized the potential for aid
conditionality to influence the government. Overall, Iraq's President
saw the ISG's recommendations as a negation of Iraq's hard-won
sovereignty and thus unacceptable to his government.
Hoshyar Zebari, the Foreign Minister, and Mowaffak al-Rubaie, the
National Security Adviser, developed a much more cautious critique of
the report. Speaking at the International Institute for Strategic
Studies' Manama Dialogue in Bahrain, al-Rubaie broadly agreed with the
change in the U.S. military mission suggested by the ISG. The
government, he argued, has been asking for the accelerated training and
equipping of Iraqi security forces. Zebari claimed that on the military
front the ISG recommendations were in line with the agreement recently
reached between President Bush and Prime Minister al-Maliki at their
meeting in Amman. This was to accelerate the transfer of security
responsibilities to Iraqi troops in command and control, training,
arming, and equipment.
However, the final response to the report was not at all positive.
If the ISG's recommendations on national reconciliation were meant to
be perceived as an olive branch to the insurgency then the reaction of
the Baath Party cannot have given its author's much room for optimism.
The Baath Party, in its official response, saw the ISG report as
confirmation of America's dire position in Iraq, commenting that the
United States had been defeated and ``the Iraqi national resistance has
achieved a practical victory. This much was clear from the Baker
report. Now Bush has also admitted that America had failed.''
The ISG's report selected the ruling elite of Iraq as the best tool
available to the United States, to shape events on the ground. However
the logic of two nationwide elections and a constitutional referendum
since the invasion works against this strategy. It means that Iraqi
politicians like Talabani feel they have developed a large degree of
autonomy from the U.S. Government who originally put them in power.
This explains why the ISG's call for conditionality was rejected in the
name of Iraqi sovereignty and the government's electoral mandate.
Amongst both American diplomats and Iraqi politicians working in the
Green Zone, there is a recognition that the negative consequences of a
precipitous American withdrawal from Iraq would be as great for the
U.S. Government as it would be for the Iraqi ruling elite, many of whom
are very lightly attached to their country. This gives Iraqi
politicians a good deal of leverage over their American colleagues.
Their response to the ISG report has been to call America's bluff, not
taking seriously either its demands for conditionality or threats of
withdrawal. This means Iraqi politicians will continue to squabble
amongst themselves directly undermining the coherence of the government
and the rebuilding of the state.
President Bush, on the other hand, favours a dramatic increase in
U.S. troops to impose some order on Baghdad and the northwest of Iraq,
adding a further 21,500 troops to the current 132,000 troops in the
country. His desire for greater numbers of U.S. troops in Iraq has been
shaped by the military and political difficulties faced by the most
recent attempt to control Baghdad, operation Together Forward II. This
operation began in August 2006, with plans to deploy 7,000 extra U.S.
troops in combination with a similar number of Iraqis. However the
Iraqi Government found itself unable to deliver the troops or
reconstruction assistance it had promised. Several battalions refused
orders to deploy to Baghdad. In addition, U.S. commanders had to
counter sustained political interference in their operations from the
highest levels of the Iraqi Government.
President Bush's new proposals for a surge in troops may also
suffer from logistical and strategic shortcomings. Even a new total of
153,500 U.S. troops would be far short of the numbers needed to impose
order on the country. A technocratic study on state-building published
just after the invasion concluded that occupying forces would need 20
security personnel, (both police and troops), per thousand people. It
estimated that coalition forces should have had between 400,000 and
500,000 soldiers to impose order on Iraq. Even this figure compares
unfavourably to the estimated 43 per 1,000 that sustained Saddam in
power. President Bush's new approach would see a new total of 32,500
U.S. troops in Baghdad, a city of 6 million people. This gives
commanders 1 American solider for every 184 Baghdadis. This new
enlarged number of U.S. troops is still well below even the 50 per
1,000 that the new Army and Marines field manual on counterinsurgency
recommends.
In addition, simply flooding one area of Iraq, in this case parts
of Baghdad with troops, neglects the subtler aspects of
counterinsurgency doctrine. A surge in troops to Baghdad may be
understood as the beginning of an ``oil spot'' strategy. But to be
sustainable this has to be married with the second stage of the
process. After areas have been cleared of insurgents the government
needs to reconstitute sustainable security (particularly police
forces), build up its administrative capacity, establish the rule of
law, and transform its despotic capacity for violence into an
infrastructural power for governance. The Iraqi Government is neither
willing nor able to follow up the clear phase of counterinsurgency with
the infrastructural build stage. First, in the aftermath of a
successful U.S. counterinsurgency operation to gain control of the
northern city of Tel Afar, the Iraqi Government proved remarkably
reluctant to secure this victory by deploying enhanced government
resources. After the clear phase U.S. forces found themselves overtly
cajoling the Iraqi Government, in an effort to get funds released for
the area, while trying to stop covert attempts at undermining the whole
operation. Second, in a country dominated by a collapsed state, the
ability of the government to build up its capacity across a sustained
geographical area is very limited.
CONCLUSIONS
There is a distinct danger that neither President Bush nor the
Iraqi Study Group's proposals for extracting the United States from the
debacle that Iraq has become have recognized the root causes of the
violence and instability that has plagued the country since April 2003.
The origins of the Iraqi civil war lie in the complete collapse of both
the administrative and coercive capacity of the state. The Iraqi State,
its ministries, civil servants, police force and army ceased to exist
in a meaningful way in the aftermath of regime change. It is the United
States inability to reconstruct them that lies at the heart of the Iraq
problem. If and until the state's capacity is substantially rebuilt,
then Iraq will continue to be a wellspring of violent instability, with
the population dominated by the Hobbsian nightmare that their lives
will be nasty, brutish, and short.
The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you very much, Doctor.
Let me explain and apologize to the two witnesses I didn't
hear. I was on the phone with one of the former Secretaries of
State who was supposed to testify--he will testify--trying to
work out a scheduling problem, and I apologize for my absence
during your testimony.
We've just been told that the vote that was supposed to
take place at 2:45 has been pushed back a little bit, and
again, since my colleagues are always so patient, I'm going to
begin by yielding to the Senator from New Jersey, to give him a
chance to ask questions first.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it.
Let me say----
The Chairman. We'll do 8-minute rounds today.
Senator Menendez. Let me say that, having sat through all
of these hearings, and they've all been incredibly instructive,
and I appreciate you and Senator Lugar bringing us together on
this, I don't know which one has created a greater frustration
for me.
Having listened to what you all had to say, which was very
insightful, I'm trying to reconcile what you all had to say,
and I think there's some elements that I heard that have a
common thread. I was also reading as you gave your more concise
statements, which are in conflict with what I've heard from
other panels.
And that is--I've heard time and time again, particularly
from the administration, that in essence, this government, the
Maliki government, is now ready to deal with the substantive
and political issues that are critical for the possibility of a
government of national unity to be realized, if it can be
realized--regarding the deployment of Iraqi troops, as it
relates to the President's escalation of the war and seeking
security in Baghdad, as it relates to the political issues, as
it relates to the economic issues, on the oil revenues
redistribution--all of these things. And yet, I listened to
what I think was the one thread that unified your testimony--
that the political players beyond the Maliki government that
obviously have enormous impact here, are not quite at the table
and have not been incentivized by either the inclusion of
regional partners or by other ways, to come to the process of
what is necessary to move forward on the possibility of a
national agenda, and reconciliation, reconstruction, and moving
forward.
If that is the case, then everything we hear from the
administration about that the way in which we are going to
achieve success is not possible because it depends on a
government that you, Dr. Dodge, described as basically
incapable, because of the structural way in which we took
action after the invasion.
And then I listened to several of the other testimonies
talk about how the political players are not there, or are not
incentivized and have reaped the benefits of being in power
through their party process and the powers of appointment,
Cabinet positions, and what not. And then, listening to Mr.
Talabani--tell me: How do we move this forward? Because we're
being asked to send 22,000 of America's sons and daughters into
a fight, an escalation of a fight, in which the political will
doesn't seem to be there to accomplish what is--at least at
this point in time--what is necessary on behalf of its own
people, and possibility of its own nation? And yet, we are
being told that's the very essence of what we should do. So
that we can give them all the wherewithal to achieve that. I
don't hear it, in all of your respective testimonies. So, I
open it to whoever wants to comment.
Dr. Dodge. You've got my message exactly right, and I think
Laith and at least two of my colleagues probably wouldn't
disagree with the sentiment, if not the way it was delivered.
I think it is the electoral system, I think the electoral
system has deliberately structured a weak Prime Minister, I
think once the representatives of the parties get hold of their
ministries, they do what they please with them. And the course
of what--that the painful example of this is by in Jaabar,
first in Interior, and now in Finance. There was a series of
scandals in the Interior Ministry, highlighted by the U.S.
military in, I think, November 2005, finding detention centers
which were truly horrific, but it was not until May 2006 that
anyone could remove that minister from his post, and then he
wasn't removed, he was shifted sideways into anything, a more
important job in the Finance Ministry. What does that tell us
about the government? It's not fit for purpose.
Now, I could explain it by detail I have in my testimony,
what it is about the electoral system that's delivered this,
but I think, if the surge has one positive aspect, it is in
protecting--on a very flat terrain--the one institution of the
Iraqi Government that is, at the moment, coherent, and is not
politicized or sectarianized to the degree that the others are,
the Iraqi Army. By pumping in these new troops to Baghdad, what
you're doing is putting an American shield round the only
institution that has the capacity to deliver services to the
Iraqi population that it needs: Law and order.
So, I think, although I've criticized the surge for being
too small, and actually, for neglecting the second phase of
counterinsurgency, it may have, possibly the unintended
consequence of protecting the Iraqi Army from the way that the
rest of the institutions theoretically----
Senator Menendez. This is an institution that is, at least
at this stage, clearly not delivering on behalf of the Iraqi
people. It doesn't seem to have the political will to do what
is necessary to achieve real delivery service. How is it--as
you answer these questions, I would ask, in my time that's
left--tell me how is it that you would change the dynamics?
What is it that we can do to change the dynamics, externally or
internally, in order to move the political players to a much
higher calling?
Dr. Dodge. Well, I think when you look at President's
Talabani's response to Baker-Hamilton, all Baker-Hamilton was
merely suggesting, and I think, on a misunderstanding of the
Iraqi Government, the Iraqi Government must do specific things
for the money that it's being given, and that it must accept
large number of American trainers into the Iraqi Army.
President Talabani said, ``I reject this report. I won't have
anything to do with this report.''
So, you have a problem that those two elections and that
referendum have given a degree of perceived autonomy and
sovereignty to the Iraqi politicians who are not doing their
job.
Dr. Kubba. If I may, I just want to remark--irrespective of
how we go there today, we have a reality, that political
landscape that has its hold over the State, it's stagnant and
we can spend the next 3 years going round and round. The
country is rich enough, it's pumping oils, there are
beneficiaries that are controlling this state, they will not
let it go. Even if 4 million Iraqis are displaced as refugees
and hundreds are killed every week, they will not let go.
In my understanding, the only way is to change the dynamic
of the Iraqi politics. The only way I can see it, is something
strong enough that will make them shift and seriously think
about it, they know the neighbors are not going to go away,
unlike American troops, which are bound to go away. They know
that the neighbors have influences over them, and they do not
want them in Iraq at all. Maybe that thing they fear most can
be leveraged to bring a real change in dynamic, and force
them--if they want their country, then work toward it, and do
not run it down.
Ms. Rahim. Mr. Chairman, may I add? I agree with my
colleagues, but I want to add one or two points.
First of all, the Prime Minister is constrained both
constitutionally, and also by the fact that he is head of a
coalition government. As Prime Minister, in the Constitution,
he already doesn't have very many powers. But as the head of a
coalition government, he has even fewer powers.
I can tell you that the Prime Minister cannot fire any of
his ministers. He has been talking about firing three ministers
since last July, and has not been able to do so. So, that is a
given. However, we also have a National Emergency Law, which in
my view, we have not taken advantage of fully. And I think we
ought to be looking at that law, and seeing whether the Iraqi
Government, the Iraqi Cabinet and Prime Minister Maliki,
specifically, can actually use that law to give himself some
greater capacities than he already has.
That's one point. The second point is that we need to
pressure--the United States needs to pressure--not just Prime
Minister Maliki. The pressure has to be applied on all those
recalcitrant political actors who are unwilling to make
concessions and compromises. And, in order to do so, I think
the United States needs to do something that we really have not
done a good job of, and that is assess our leverage.
What is United States leverage in Iraq today? Where does it
reside? Where are the points where the United States can
actually make an impact on the political process? Now, it seems
to me that there definitely has to be leverage with 150,000
troops there, but I do think we've done a very good job of
identifying where it is, specifically, and we perhaps should be
engaging in that kind of exercise.
Mr. Talabani. I think, Senator, if I could just add. The
problems are clear for all to see. There is a major mistrust
between the people that are, today, sitting around the table,
deciding the future of this country. It is not the fact that
it's a faulty political system, or it's a faulty electoral
system, or it's a faulty constitution that has got us to this.
It is about bad leadership, politically immature leadership.
And this cannot, most of the people that are in government
today were in the opposition. Few have had experience at
administering, and one of the reasons of the Kurdistan region
today is a little more stable than the rest is because we've
had 15 years of administering our affairs. If you look back at
the Kurdistan region in the early nineties, it was as bad as
Iraqis today--the parties were fighting each other, there was
mistrust, there were rivalries about money, about power.
Eventually, as we saw a larger goal, the mistrust began to
go away, and it ultimately was a major role of the United
States that brought the two Kurdish parties together, sat them
down at the table and gradually--slowly but surely--trust began
to develop.
Now, I don't think Iraq has 15 years to wait before the
trust can begin to develop, and that just shows you what a
major task we have ahead of us, to eliminate centuries of
mistrust that has existed within Iraqi society, the mistrust
between Sunni-Arab and Shia-Arab communities hasn't just been
created since the removal of Saddam's regime--these are deep-
rooted insecurities. And you cannot address these people's
insecurities with a policy or a strategy. It ultimately has to
come about by leaders leading. And reaching beyond their ethnic
and sectarian boundaries, and I don't know how we do it, to be
honest with you, sir.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. There are about 5 minutes left of the vote.
Senator Casey, I believe, is coming back, and possibly Senator
Webb. I would like to come back and ask you some questions.
If you would like to continue for a few, if you have
anything you want to finish up with, I----
Senator Menendez. Well, sure.
The Chairman. Because I don't want to make you have to come
back again.
Senator Menendez. I would--you know, you spoke of, is it,
Ms. al-Rahim? You spoke of us assessing what leverage we have,
and making a decision to use it on the other political players
within Iraq. Do you, would you have any suggestions in that
regard?
Ms. Rahim. Senator, it's not really up to me to make those
decisions, I think that American policymakers ought to sit down
and assess what kinds of leverage they can have.
But while I have the opportunity, I want to recall
something, and that is, I believe way back when I testified
before this committee in 2002, I spoke about a date in process
that was required in Iraq, that we really need to bring the
Iraqi players.
And I don't see, necessarily, just the United States
bringing the players, but there has to be some way by which we
can persuade, and put pressure on those players to come
together and say, ``OK, you've got, you know, we've got a
week,''----
The Chairman. What do the rest of you think about that idea
of a date in process?
Excuse me for interrupting.
Senator Menendez. Sure, no, absolutely.
The Chairman. Because it wasn't the United States just
bringing them together. Russia was there, France, I mean, there
were other nations. It was a major effort--what do you all
think about that notion?
Dr. Dodge. I think I've written at length about, and when I
testified before this committee last time, spoke about the
desperate need to multilateralize. But on two levels.
First, I think, undoubtedly, no one around this table would
disagree that certain neighbors, and I think, increasingly more
neighbors will start to play into Iraq with destabilizing
effect. So, you need to put the neighbors in a multilateral
framework that convinces them that collective cooperation as
opposed to individual machinations will be to their benefit.
But you need, certainly, to bring the United Nations back
in, maybe not for the structure of the United Nations, but for
the resources that the Permanent Five can deploy, and also the
diplomatic cover that it would give to the United States, it
would be much more muscular in Iraq.
Over a period of 2 months I met three very senior Iraqi
politicians who'd been in the first two governments, and then
had left government, and they were the most haunted and
profoundly depressed individuals who said, ``You know what you
did? You gave us power back too soon.'' And I think the Iraqi
people are reaping the hell of that mistake around the November
15, 2003.
So, I think the United Nations, or at least a multinational
framework needs to be, Iraq needs to be inserted within that,
to bear the burden of state-building.
The Chairman. Mr. Talabani, Dr. Kubba. Briefly, if you can,
because I think we've got about a minute left in the vote with
the time.
Mr. Talabani. Sure, I think some sort of international
process could be helpful, but only if it helps to alleviate,
again, the concerns of the various players in the country. I'm
skeptical of how much pressure could be applied by the United
States, by an international body. It's not about pressure--it's
about some sort of incentives that will ultimately help create
some sort of rational thinking and wise judgment that doesn't
exist today.
Dr. Kubba. I clearly see that the pressure point that can
come is from Iraq's neighbors for--on many grounds. They can
contribute to security, they can assure the communities, or
have the opposite effect on others. But more importantly, I
think if the Iraqi Government takes the lead, with the support
of the United States, the focus on bringing Iraq's neighbors
would definitely bring the right change in the environment, and
some results.
The Chairman. Well, thank you, we're going to recess, with
your permission, for about--it takes about 10 minutes to get
over, and there's two votes in a row, but one vote is almost
out, and the other we'll vote at the front end, so with a
little bit of luck, we'll be back here at about a quarter
after, OK?
We'll recess until the call of the Chair.
[Recess 4:05 p.m.]
[Reconvened at 4:28 p.m.]
The Chairman. The hearing will please come to order.
I thank the panel for their indulgence. Because of so much
happening on the floor of the Senate now, I'm not sure who's
going to be able to come back, but I do have some questions,
with your forbearance here, if I may.
I'm going to ask some pretty broad questions, if I may, and
they're going to sound--well, I won't characterize how those
sound, you can make a judgment. What happens if the United
States just gets up and leaves? What happens if the United
States of America announces that over the next 6 months we're
going to engage in an ``early'' withdrawal, we're leaving Iraq.
What happens?
Rend, I'll start with you----
Ms. Rahim. Mr. Chairman. Yes----
The Chairman [continuing]. And work our way across.
Ms. Rahim. Looking almost exclusively at U.S. interests in
the region, I would say it would be catastrophic. There would
be----
The Chairman. Catastrophic for U.S. interests?
Ms. Rahim. For the--for the United--yes; for U.S.
interests.
The Chairman. In what sense? How would it be catastrophic?
Ms. Rahim. The----
The Chairman. I'm just being the Devil's advocate here. I
like----
Ms. Rahim. Yes, yes. And we'll parry here.
The situation in Iraq will deteriorate into total chaos and
mayhem, there will be--if we're not now in civil war, we will
be definitely in civil war. I believe that neighboring
countries will not stand by, they will intervene in that civil
war, either by sending in their own forces, or by funding and
facilitating. I think the civil war----
The Chairman. A cynic would say that's already happening,
funding and facilitating.
Ms. Rahim. Well, even more so.
And I would also suggest that this civil war may actually
spill over into some neighboring countries, particularly in
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, perhaps Syria, Jordan, so on. So, I don't
think we can contain what goes on in Iraq if it deteriorates.
Obviously, oil flows will be disrupted and----
The Chairman. In addition to Iraq, they'll be disrupted in
other countries as well?
Ms. Rahim. Yes; oh, absolutely.
Of course, we will also be giving major players that we are
not necessarily friends with, such as Iran, the ability to
manipulate Iraqi affairs, even, to an even greater degree than
they are doing now. And I don't think that's a desirable
outcome.
So, I think we need to think very, very carefully about
consequences of withdrawal.
The Chairman. Dr. Dodge.
Dr. Dodge. I agree with President Bush on this, he said it
would force a collapse of the Iraqi Government, tear the
country apart, and result in mass killings, I think that,
that's--I think he's spot on there.
I think the--if we look at the comparison with the Lebanese
civil war, the region was comparatively successful in
containing this struggle, but what resulted? As the region, and
more importantly, the international community invariably turned
its back on Lebanon, one state through murder, bribery or
whatever, dominated Syria. So, I think the example would be as
the United States draws out, pulls out, the Iranians will come
in and dominate the terrain through nefarious means, and
through violence. So, I think it would be disastrous for Iraq.
It may not spread the civil war beyond the boundaries, but Iraq
would then become a regional cockpit where Iran and Saudi
Arabia, Jordan would then fight this so-called presence of
crisis war for----
The Chairman. Including Kurdistan?
Dr. Dodge. Pardon?
The Chairman. Including Kurdistan?
Dr. Dodge. Well, I think it depends on the Turkish general
staff there, doesn't it? And one hears two different arguments,
one that the opinion in membership is a constraining factor,
but two, all of the opinion poll data coming out of Turkey
suggests that Turks have waited too long, and are turning away
from the Holy Grail of Europe, which means Turkey then would,
as it turns back to the region, have greater capacity to pursue
its interests in the North.
Mr. Talabani. I think----
The Chairman. Mr. Talabani.
Mr. Talabani. Mr. Chairman, the only thing I would add to
my esteemed colleagues' comments, which I agree with in their
entirety, is the free access that would be given to al-Qaeda to
come in a benefit from this failed state. And wreck havoc,
really, from a failed state like Iraq.
The Chairman. How would that happen, since each of the
major constituencies have no interest in al-Qaeda occupying any
part of their territory?
Mr. Talabani. I think they will most likely benefit the
western part of the country. They will use their ability to
move around in the western part of the country to impose on the
people in that part of the country a rule of fear. They won't
have success in Kurdistan, they won't be able to walk around
freely in the southern part of the country, but I think we will
see an emergence of an extreme Taliban-style way of life in
western Iraq.
Dr. Kubba. If I may, Senator, the--I think the communities
are more or less prepared for that eventuality in the worst
possible way, which is going to lead to, naturally--to suck in
the neighbors into Iraq. Iraq's immediate neighbors have their
own national interest tied with what happens in their country,
if the United States was to abandon it, abandon a weak Iraq
without a state to defend itself, it's basically inviting
neighbors to step in, and the communities will rush to
neighbors to find protection.
So, for sure we're going to have a much prolonged war
within Iraq that involved the neighbors. And I think in the
atmosphere of ruins and no government, al-Qaeda will flourish.
They'll find fresh grounds for recruits, for training people,
creating networks of murderers, it will just be ideal grounds
for them.
The Chairman. Now, let me ask you a second question. Does
the leadership among the Sunnis and the Shia and the Kurds
understand that that's going to be an inevitability if things
don't start to straighten up? Does anybody think that the
United States of America, forget what I think, is going to, 18
months from now--there's a lovely woman in here with a shirt
that said ``3061'' on her chest. Do they think they're going to
let it go to 6058? With no maturation of the political system
or circumstance? What do you think they think?
Dr. Kubba. My belief is that they are prepared for it. They
think they are in a survival game, very much as Euros fight,
and they are prepared for it. The Sunnis have their strategic
depth in other countries, they think the flow of money and
volunteers will continue, the Shia have their strategic depth
in Iran, and I think the Kurds are fairly strong in their
region to face that eventuality if it comes.
The Chairman. So, then, we talked about earlier, Ms. Rahim,
the notion that the United States has to figure out where its
pressure point is, where its--I forget the exact phrase you
used for Senator Menendez, and he asked you what that was, and
you said, obviously, that's for us to determine as a country,
not for you to presume. But it seems to me you all are
painting--and I'm not taking issue, I'm just trying to
understand, a fairly bleak picture here.
If, in fact, we do not stay and keep ourselves interposed
as sort of ``apartheid cops'' keeping things from blowing out
of control fully, we will reap the whirlwind. That, if we stay,
there's very little prospect to think that any of the present
actors who are the major players in determining outcomes,
whether it's the militia, whether it's the political parties
they're attached to, whether it's the political leadership that
exists in the so-called central government now, that they have
no incentive to see things change. And, because of the reasons
you've stated, Dr. Kubba. And so it is a bit of, as I say, a
conundrum here.
And, one of the things I've observed is, and Dr. Dodge,
you're a historian and you, and all of you may know better than
I, but I can't think of a circumstance in the 20th century
where a nation has been willing to continue to have its blood
and treasure bled for the express mission of just keeping
things from getting worse. I don't know when that's ever
happened.
And so, I know you all fully understand, I mean, you've
said things, and as you know--I'm not being solicitous, I have
great respect for you all--you've all laid out the elements of
what, if it occurred, would be the building blocks for the
United States to be able to, over time, leave Iraq without
leaving chaos behind, and having some sense of stability in a
country that did not invite the neighbors in, was secure within
its own borders, not a haven for al-Qaeda, and not a threat to
its neighbors.
But all of the things you have stated, and all of you have
used the same kind of terminology, and you've cited the same
goals--you basically all say, with the exception of Mr.
Talabani, that the system that was set up, the governmental
system, is broken. It is not, it cannot carry the weight of the
change that's required. Yes--and I happen to agree with your--
some of your criticism about how we got to where we got to--but
as an old bad, tried expression goes, ``We are where we are.''
You have this overwhelming portion of Iraqis voting for a
constitution, that everyone who comes and testifies before us
says, basically, ``Ignore it, ignore it.''
That's--when you cut through all of the terminology with
notable exceptions like Mr. Talabani, most people say, ``Hey,
the political vehicle that's in place, that's designed to bring
about political accommodation, makes political accommodation
impossible, so, therefore, ignore it.'' And the international
community has put its stamp of approval on this thing called a
constitution, and the Constitution calls for regionalism, and
locks, Mr. Talabani, it locks the Kurds into a position--which
they want--a position of regional autonomy. It says it straight
out in the Constitution, and then it says, I forget, I think
it's section 115, or article 115, and it says right below that,
subsection--or part two of that--I should have it committed to
memory like my own Constitution, I've read it enough--but it
says that any other governorate can determine it should be a
region, and it defines what the responsibility of a region is.
What authority they have. And it says that it cannot contravene
the laws of the national government, but the laws of the
national government, as you point out, there's a weak Prime
Minister, and a weak national government, the national
government can't even tax. There's not even the power in
Baghdad to tax.
And that's the system set up, and yet, every expert that
comes before us, with notable exceptions says, ``You can't have
these regions, you allow these regions to occur and you have
chaos, and you just increase the sectarian identity, and you
increase the--'' and you know, it goes on.
We have an expression that, I think, comes from you Brits:
It's like pushing a rope. So, I mean, tell me, straight up--do
we disavow the Constitution, say, ``from this moment on, the
United States of America does not think that implementing the
terms of the Iraqi Constitution are in the interests of the
Iraqis or the United States?'' Do we say that?
Mr. Talabani. Mr. Chairman, if I can.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Talabani. Iraq has been a failed state since its
inception. It's been a failed state, because its been ruled by
a minority from a center that has imposed its will, through
fear and terror, on the majority of the country. This has
created the situation that we have today. It wasn't Ambassador
Bremer that created this situation.
The Chairman. No; I didn't say that, as you know.
Mr. Talabani. The CPA made many mistakes, we made many
mistakes, but it's the fact that Iraq's history has created the
situation. The mistrust that exists between these communities.
So, people have come forward and have put forward a
system--a proposed system of government, through a federal
structure that takes away the insecurities. It tells the Sunni-
Arab that no longer will the Shia dominate them. It tells the
Shia that no longer will the Baathis dominate them. It tells
the Kurds that no longer will we be deprived of our own oil. It
puts in place sound mechanisms for coexistence. It is the only
way that we can keep this country together.
The country today stands divided, Mr. Chairman. And through
a federal structure, and through creating regions that can
administer their own affairs, we can keep Iraq as one country.
The Chairman. As one of my friends says, ``Let's get up to
30,000 feet here, and look down.'' It has been argued by some
equally bright and dedicated people who have been before this
committee in the past 3 weeks, with regard to a failed state,
if it is, and was, there's generally only two prescriptions.
One is a strong man, and/or an empire being able to govern it,
or two, federalization. Federalize it. That there is very
little prospect of transitioning from a strong-man/empire-
dominated country constructed by an Englishman drawing a pen
along a piece of paper representing the map of the world--
there's no way to get from here to there. There's no way to get
to a strong, central government that does not rely on ethnic
and/or religious blocks as the instruments of political
accommodation, that allows you to have a unified, central
government. So, the transition, if there is any, has to be to
an imperfect regional government--not necessarily a
Balkanization, not necessarily. Not necessarily splitting up
the country. But at a minimum, a very loosely federated
government. What's the alternative?
Ms. Rahim. Mr. Chairman, I think that Iraqis have accepted
the principle of federalism. I don't think there are many
Iraqis that will oppose federalism, it is what kind of
federalism, and at what pace, and what are the residual----
The Chairman. Let me define it so we can get into it, OK?
Ms. Rahim. OK.
The Chairman. What the Constitution says is: If you seek to
participate and become a player in the federal system, any
governorate on its own or joining another can become a region,
a term of art in the Constitution, and it's very explicit about
the powers of the region.
One of those powers, I think it's section 5, if anybody has
a Constitution, section 5 says--let me make sure, he just
handed me the whole Constitution here, but let me find the
exact part. I'm looking at it--section 6, article 109,
subsection--is this right? I'm sorry, I beg your pardon.
Article 113, subsection, it's listed sixth: ``To formulate
public,'' excuse me, let me find the right section here,
because I've got this backward.
Where's that section about control over security? Oh, here
it is. I unfortunately know more about this than my staff,
which worries me.
Article 120, they talk about having the responsibility if
you choose to be a region. And the fifth section says, ``The
regional government shall have responsibility for all
administrative requirements in the region, particularly the
establishment and organization of internal security forces for
the region, such as police, security forces, and guards of the
region.'' Now that's pretty basic stuff. Article 120 lists a
total of six, excuse me, five powers that inure to a region if
a governorate chooses to become a region or part of a region.
Article 119 says, ``the region shall adopt a constitution
that defines the structure of the regional government, it's
authorities and mechanisms for exercising those authorities,
provided they do not contradict with the constitution.''
Article 120 says, first, ``regional authorities shall have
the right to exercise executive, legislative,'' and it defines
them. But the fifth one is pretty profound. Every expert and
every historian we've had here said, ``Whoa, you can't do that.
You can't let these guys have control over, like you do, with
the pesh merga, the total security of your country.'' We all
act like we're, you know, we're in Alice in Wonderland here.
These guys are up there saying, ``By the way, you can't
even put the Iraqi Army in my neighborhood, unless we agree.
The Constitution says, they can say, your dad can say,
``Nobody; forget it. General so-and-so, you cannot.'' You can't
even fly the Iraqi flag if you all don't want them to fly it in
your territory. And you all are talking about a united Iraq,
like somehow there's going to be a strong, central government,
where we pretend there isn't anything having to do with these
sectarian and regional, ethnic, and tribal differences. So,
what are we talking about here?
Dr. Dodge. Mr. Chairman, if you'd let me blunt----
The Chairman. I'd like you to be, believe me. I need
bluntness right now.
Dr. Dodge. The Constitution is irrelevant to Iraq.
The Chairman. All right.
Dr. Dodge. It's like rearranging the deck chairs of the
Titanic as it slips between the icy waves of chaos and
violence.
But basically, we have a representative from the Syrians in
the audience, apparently the Syrians have been promised Ninewa.
Who is going to protect them when they're given Ninewa. What
are they going to do with Ninewa?
And the point that I--in my testimony about the----
The Chairman. I'll tell you one thing. Americans don't want
to die over Ninewa, while you all are figuring it out.
Dr. Dodge. The point about Badr and Sadr's low-level civil
war, it goes straight to your point. You divide the country up,
you give the South to who? The Iraqi people don't care about a
constitution, what they care about is the day-to-day struggle
to survive, which is getting more and more difficult in the
chaos that's Iraq.
The Chairman. Let me play Devil's advocate. Let's assume
that the law passed by the Parliament, suspended for 18 months
now, what, 10 months left?
Mr. Talabani. Ten months, yes.
The Chairman. Or 12 or whatever months left, allowing these
regions to be set up. You come along and what happens is two,
three, five, seven governorates in the south made up of a Shia
coalition that's at odds with itself, becomes a region. Well,
if I'm sitting in Kurdistan, and if I'm sitting in the Sunni
province, I think, ``You know, the good thing is, Sadr's going
to have to go kill somebody in that outfit that I don't like
anyway, that the SCIRI part that was trained by the Iranians,
the Badr Brigade. At least they're not in my neighborhood
killing me.''
Dr. Dodge. But they will be as well, won't they?
The Chairman. Why?
Dr. Dodge. Because Baghdad is 6 million people, the most
ethnically mixed city in Iraq.
The Chairman. Again, being the Devil's advocate, you've got
a million, 200,000 people already headed out. You've got ethnic
cleansing already occurring in a race. I mean, it is a deluge
that's occurring without any regional government being set up
except Kurdistan. And so, again, I'm trying to figure out--I
agree with you, the ideal thing is to have a Democratic central
government that has figured out a mechanism for sharing the
oil, for controlling the militia, from allowing the neighbors
to interfere in internal affairs. That is what I'd like to see.
Now I sit here and say--and I'll end with this and yield to
my colleague--I sit here and say, ``Do I continue to vote to
keep somewhere between 135,000 and 160,000 forces, while all
you Brits are heading home real quick?'' You're packing up and
leaving, no one else is in the deal. I mean, if you notice, no
one talks about the coalition forces anymore. At least they
have the good grace to drop the facade, that there's a
coalition force.
And I say, ``But I tell you what, I'm going to send my son,
who is in the National Guard, let him go on over there, and let
him take care of helping you guys from killing each other, even
though we may have been the reason you started killing each
other. And we're going to do this for awhile, and we have no
real hope that you all are going to get together, but we're
going to do this, because we think a central government is a
good idea.''
Mr. Talabani. Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Rahim. Mr. Chairman, may I----
Mr. Talabani. Please.
Ms. Rahim. May I say a couple of things about this?
First of all, I have two problems with this scenario, or
three.
The Chairman. I got a bunch.
Ms. Rahim. One of them is that the--if the National
Government has dysfunctional institutions, I can assure you
that with the exception of Kurdistan the other provincial
governments are nonexistent. They are----
The. Chairman. I agree.
Ms. Rahim [continuing]. Even more dysfunctional, if that
were possible. And so what is there to federate to? I am a
proponent of federation in Iraq, and not only of Arab-Kurdish
federalism, but a more complex federal system. It is just that
I think this is not the way to go about it because those
provinces simply are not ready. There is nothing there, there.
The Chairman. Do you agree with Dr. Dodge that the
Constitution that exists in Iraq is really, you know--someone
told me there's a famous phrase that a paper can hold anything
that's written upon it, or some phrase like that--do you think
it means anything?
Ms. Rahim. I think this Constitution does not make for a
viable state.
The Chairman. So does the United States come along and say,
``We're changing your Constitution?''
Ms. Rahim. No.
The Chairman. So what do we do to change the Constitution?
Ms. Rahim. But I think we ought to have a constitutional
convention in Iraq. And this must be, ours must be, or the
Iraqi Constitution----
The Chairman. Now who's going to do that? I apologize for
being precise here. You say we should have a constitutional
convention; don't disagree with you.
Mr. Talabani. We've already had that, though.
The Chairman. That's my point.
Mr. Talabani. We've already been through this.
The Chairman. Who's going to show up? Who's going to call
it?
Mr. Talabani. The Constitution today is a compromise, it's
a compromise by those that sat there and fought for days to try
to get something out of this. It's not that we haven't tried
this. It's not that we haven't tried to create a central
government. It's the fact that central governments have failed
in Iraq. It's failed because Iraq is a multiethnic,
multisectarian society, which has complete and immense mistrust
within it.
And I think that in 1992 when we came down from the
mountains into Kurdistan, we had nothing. There were no
administrative structures in Kurdistan. The Iraqi regime had
pulled out completely. We encountered a completely decimated
region. And it took us time to develop the political
institutions. We held elections, they weren't the best. We had
a government, it wasn't the most competent. But in time, after
even some skirmishes, we built what we have today.
And I don't think that this can't be done in the south. I
don't think this can't be done in other parts of the country,
but all I can tell you is centralized governments have failed
in Iraq. And I think they'll continue to fail, and will lead to
more bloodshed the more we try to create something for the sake
of illusions over the sake of pleasing the Iraq's neighbors.
The Chairman. I yield to Senator Casey, but Dr. Kubba, you
wanted to say something and the floor is yours, sir.
Dr. Kubba. Mr. Chairman, Iraq today is two Iraqs. There is
Kurdish Iraq, which is stable, prosperous running itself in a
very good position. And there is the rest of Iraq, Arab Iraq,
which is very much on fire. And I can understand every reason
for the Kurdish region absolutely to try consolidate what has
been achieved after a long period of struggle.
Putting that out of the equation, we need to focus on where
the problem is. And the problem is very much in Arab Iraq. The
current Constitution allows all the 15 remaining provinces,
even to come up and be one region if they want to. The real
problem is political, it's not to do with the Constitution. And
the way the politics is set at the moment, unless we push
that--change the dynamic that governs the politicians--they're
going to drag Iraq and the rest of the region down with them.
My own assessment, left to the Iraqis alone, they will not
do it. The United States can not brighten open chat and do it
indefinitely. I do firmly believe time has come to call up for
a roundtable conference where Iraq's neighbors who have genuine
interest in the stability of their neighborhood, be
participants and they pull the rug from underneath the players
who think they have the strategic depth and can play neighbors
to their advantage. I believe if we do not do this now, we will
be forced to do it at much worse conditions later.
The Chairman. I happen to agree with you, but--Senator
Casey.
Senator Casey. Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity
again.
This is, as the panelists may know and the audience knows,
one of many great hearings we've had in this committee and I
appreciate the chairman's work on that, putting these together.
This is a rare opportunity because we have probably more
time than I'd get otherwise, but I'll try not to press too
long.
The Chairman. But take your time.
Senator Casey. He's been very generous with our time.
My first question, I guess, Doctor, is I want to pick up on
where you just left off. In terms of this, we've heard and we
read in American newspapers all the time, the need for--
obviously to get the military strategy right, the political
strategy, and the diplomatic initiatives right. I think the
administration has fallen short on all three in one way or
another. We've heard a lot about, in the last couple of weeks
now about, and experts have sat at a similar table talking
about military aspects.
You're here talking mostly about the politics and
governance, and that's why it's important we're here listening.
But pick up where you just left off from two vantage points.
One, and I'd also open this up to other panelists, when you
talk about getting the politics right on the ground and having
an effort in the region. (A) How should that work? If you had a
magic wand, so to speak, if you could charter a course that
would be, in your judgment, the best.
And then second, how has this Government, the Government of
the United States, done or not done things in the last couple
of, certainly the last 2 years, to move that forward? Just the
political effort. Start with the ideal, and then move to an
evaluation of what our Government has done or not done
effectively to make that happen.
Dr. Kubba. Well on the realistic----
Senator Casey. I know it's broad, but----
Dr. Kubba [continuing]. On the realistic ideal, I wouldn't
say just abstract ideal, I think what can be done now is for
the Iraqi Prime Minister, with the clear support from the
United States, calls for a roundtable for Iraq's neighbors
directly to discuss security, not only control over borders,
but political, financial, and other forms of interaction taking
place between the different players in Iraq and the neighbors.
The United States ought to be clearly present in that meeting,
and I do believe if we can reach a compact with Iraq neighbors
on these issues, this will put a ceiling to how far Iraqi
politicians can indulge while the country is on fire.
So, I think this is something feasible--doable--it takes,
including Iran and Syria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Kuwait, Jordan,
all these countries, six of them must be involved to very much
the displeasure of the Iraqi politicians, but to the need to
save Iraq. I think this ought to take place.
Senator Casey. I just want to interrupt you for one second
just so I'm hearing you right. You called that a roundtable. Is
that the term you used?
Dr. Kubba. Yes.
Senator Casey. And you think that should be called by whom?
Dr. Kubba. The Iraqi Prime Minister, the Iraqi Government.
Senator Casey. OK; so let's say Prime Minister Maliki calls
that kind of a roundtable. You're saying at that table should
be which countries.
Dr. Kubba. I think America and Britain because of----
Senator Casey. Right.
Dr. Kubba [continuing]. The size of their involvement. Of
course, not only the Iraqi Government led by the Prime
Minister, but the six of Iraq's neighbors, all of them.
Senator Casey. OK. So that's a specific step that could be
taken.
Dr. Kubba. Yes.
Senator Casey. Let me, and I don't want to press too hard
on the details, but I think it's important. The American people
pick up their newspaper everyday, they turn on the television
set, and they see something very specific on the military part
of this. They see that the President has proposed having a
surge, what I and many others call an escalation of troops. So,
it's something specific and it's got a number on it. It's very
easy to understand that, right?
But then they hear all this, it's kind of murky when it
gets to these others steps that are diplomatic and political.
That's very helpful just to identify that step that you just
pointed out.
So, let's say in this ideal situation that the Prime
Minister calls that kind of a roundtable, that's one. What else
do you think you'd put on your list in terms of a next--let's
say it's reasonably successful, and try to play this out as
best you can. And I know this is hypothetical, but believe me,
it helps. Because we don't have enough of this.
Dr. Kubba. Well, I believe if that takes place, of course
that will be step one to create a mechanism to build not only
trust, but to look at specific measures, maybe and building a
confidence, working issues on security, which is a collective
interest shared by everybody, all of----
Senator Casey. Right.
Dr. Kubba [continuing]. Iraq's neighbors. This can happen.
It can start a process. And I am certain if this was to be
triggered then Iraqi politicians, themselves, would rush
against the clock to try to come up with their own visions
because they all will be threatened by the prospect of losing
control of the situation at the moment. I believe this can take
place.
The issues on constitutional amendments, how to resolve
other issues, I do have specific proposals, but I believe it's
not for the United States to do it for the Iraqis. It must come
from the Iraqis themselves. What the United States can do is
create a better environment and help change the dynamic of
Iraqi politics. This is something doable and the United States
not only has an interest in seeing it done--the alternative if
it's not done, I think the United States can not simply pack
and leave.
The Chairman. Senator, would you tell me, specifically, how
would the United States do that?
Senator Casey. Yes.
Dr. Kubba. I think, again, to be specific, there are two
channels. Publicly, I think the United States ought to make it
clear to Prime Minister Maliki that it is important to hold a
conference with Iraq's neighbors, specifically on the issues--
--
The Chairman. And if he says no?
Dr. Kubba. My own information; he is for the idea.
The Chairman. Well, let's just assume, like most other
things we've suggested, he says no. Now you may have inside
information and I'm not being facetious, You may very well. I
don't doubt that.
Dr. Kubba. I think, Mr. Chairman, the next best step is for
the United States to talk directly to Iraq's neighbors and that
will then send a clearer and louder message. If you're not
going to fix your country, we'll bring others to fix it for
you.
The Chairman. Now we asked for that, and the others say,
``You're on your own. We like it the way it is.'' Iran says,
``It's kind of nice. You're there and you're spending $8.5
billion a month. You're losing thousands of Americans. You're
not able to rally any military capacity to threaten us, and we
kind of like it just the way it is.''
Dr. Kubba. If that fails, I have no answers.
Dr. Dodge. Mr. Chairman, if I can just add----
The Chairman. Thank you for your honesty. I'm sorry,
Senator, go ahead.
Senator Casey. I want to get other reactions too, but often
when we, in America, when people out there who aren't sitting
through hearings and don't have, frankly, the luxury that we
all have up here to listen and to ask a lot of questions.
When they hear that someone says in order for the Iraqis to
do what they must do politically, the Americans must create--
and you used these words, Doctor; everyone has used similar
words--but create a better environment, OK?
Now most people hearing that--when I hear it as well--this
is how it's translated to me, ``create a better environment''
means boots on the ground, so you can stabilize things. It's
the foundation of the President's escalation, OK? But let's set
that aside for a moment.
Creating a better environment, because it seems like
nothing's going to happen unless Americans take the lead on
something like this, even if it's in the political sphere. What
do we have to do, other than having the President of the United
States call Prime Minister al-Maliki and saying, ``Please
convene a roundtable,'' or ``I'm directing you,'' or ``I'm
urging you,'' whatever way he conveys that. Other than that
kind of a communication of the Prime Minister, what does the
Government of the United States have to do, or if not directly,
how else do you create a better environment?
Should we have an envoy there who has sustained
involvement, or do you need an envoy just to do diplomacy and
then another person, pick the term, envoy or assistant to the
President who's on the ground every day pushing and pushing and
pushing relentlessly on the politics? I'm just trying to get a
sense of very specific things we can recommend here.
Dr. Kubba. Senator, I served nearly 1 year at the Prime
Minister's office in Baghdad. I think the American Embassy is
one of the largest in the world. I know for sure, not only
through the Embassy, but through so many other channels,
America has a lot of influence over Iraqi politicians. I know
that many Iraqi groups acknowledge that influence and know that
in the long term they need to keep good relationship with the
United States. I believe all these assets can be put in an
effective way if there was a strategy that is mainly political
that looks at the big picture, and, of course, not only at
troop level.
Senator Casey. I want to give others a chance, but I'm,
I'll ask another question later. I want to go down the list so
you don't----
Mr. Talabani. Thank you Senator.
Senator Casey [continuing]. I don't dominate here.
Mr. Talabani. Senator, I think that we tried something
collectively with the United States and the Iraqis and to try
to bring in the region and that was the International Compact
for Iraq. This was a, quite and ingenious idea that Iraq would
receive certain economic assistance or debt relief and positive
engagement from the region and the international community,
only if Iraq met certain benchmarks, certain criteria, economic
criteria, governance criterias, economic reforms.
And it was, it created quite a bit of excitement. And a lot
of the region were interested. The United States did a major
diplomatic offensive to try to get Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan,
some European countries interested in this. And there was quite
a bit of interest. And I think certain actions by the
Government of Iraq over the last 4 or 5 months have caused that
situation, the way that Saddam was executed, for example, made
many of the countries in the region kind of back off this idea.
And this idea is somewhat dead in the waters now, as we speak.
I think that we have to be strategic in the way we think
about how we include the region, and our neighbors. We have to
be realistic to think that many of our neighbors are strong
today because Iraq is weak. And deep in their minds they may
not want Iraq to one day regain the strength that it had in the
region. So we have to be somewhat cynical of the motives of
some of our neighbors.
Not to say we shouldn't rule out some sort of international
dialog. I wouldn't limit it just to our neighbors. I would
bring in other major powers. Japan has major influence, and has
donated a lot of funds to Iraq, for example. Korea has made a
significant investment. And I think if we do have some sort of
forum, it's got to be along the lines and the thinking that
existed with the international compact where it's not just
assistance given to Iraq, it's assistance given to Iraq, only
if Iraq meets certain benchmarks and certain standards.
Senator Casey. Thank you.
Doctor.
Dr. Dodge. I think Laith's suggestion is explicitly
designed to scare the politicians of Iraq into some
constructive dialog, constructive movement and I think that
we've got to this, that it needs to be external to do that. And
I think that's right. So if there is a future for Iraq, it's
external, it's not in the Green Zone amongst those squabbling
politicians.
Now, two things need to be done. First, I would agree
exactly with calling not a roundtable, but a regional
conference. And, you know, Iraq is, the United States major
foreign policy issue for a generation. Their regional policy,
Iraq, regional United States policy should tie Iraq into the
wider region and a regional conference should say to Iran,
``Yes, we'll talk to you, but on the basis of a quid pro quo
that you give us cooperation on Iraq,'' same with Turkey,
Saudi, and especially Syria.
So there needs to--Hamilton was right on that basis, that
Iraq needs to be the primary issue for the United States in the
region, and the United States needs to get behind a major
regional conference.
Second, conditionality, I think, my colleague has said
that--that money, troops, advisors should be delivered with
specific demands tied to them. And if that means riding rough-
shod over the Constitution or the precious, but largely
irrelevant sovereignty of the Iraqis, that should be done.
Because Iraq doesn't exist without United States forces and
United States money and those forces and money should be
deployed to some positive end, which they're not being done at
the moment.
Ms. Rahim. Senator.
Senator Casey. I have more, but----
The Chairman. Take your time, you keep going.
Ms. Rahim. May I address----
Senator Casey. Sure.
Ms. Rahim. First of all you mentioned, should the United
States take the lead? Indeed the United States must take the
lead. Nobody else will and we need that. The other thing is
about this roundtable, regional, or whatever. Remember we not
only have had the meeting called ``Iraq's Compact,'' which was
an international meeting. Before that we also had Arab League
meetings----
Senator Casey. Right.
Ms. Rahim [continuing]. About Iraq. Unfortunately, none of
these meetings have yielded anything and although I am not
against a regional meeting, I am in favor of one, but it has to
be used as a tool toward another end. And what we need to use
that regional meeting for, is to pressure the Iraqi political
leaders to then talk to each other and solve their problems.
I think it is much more useful to force the Iraqi
politicians to sit together and solve their problems. If we can
do that without a regional meeting, so be it. If we think that
the regional meeting is a good vehicle, good pressure point, in
order to force the Iraqis to sit together, then by all means
let's do it through this regional meeting. But that is not
going to solve the problem. Unless the Iraqi politicians sit
down together and resolve their differences, they will, they
are likely to ignore all those meetings.
They have ignored the Iraq compact, they have ignored Arab
League meetings, they've ignored the Conference of Islamic
State meetings on Iraq, and so on and so on. They have
entrenched, vested, interests that they are finding it very
hard to overcome.
So this is, the other thing that I want to caution against
and please don't misunderstand me, I'm in favor of a regional
roundtable. I am highly doubtful that our neighbors, and
particularly Iran, will be willing to help--let's forget about
the United States--I am doubtful that they are willing to help
Iraqis resolve their differences. I think many countries in the
region are just very happy to see where Iraq is now, provided
it stays where it is now. In other words, they've got us
exactly where they want us. Both the United States, and in
terms of Iraq, it's just what they want to see. So, let us not
overestimate the willingness of our neighbors and particularly
Iran, to step forth and make concessions or come up with
solutions and provide assistance. I think that is a little bit
of a Pollyannaish approach. However, I want to insist, I think
we should also take that tact and see what it yields and use it
as a vehicle and a point of pressure if possible.
Senator Casey. Well let's assume that that won't happen or
they try and it doesn't work. What's plan B? Because I think a
lot of people in this country have had the patience of, it's
almost Biblical--Joab, pick your figure--tremendous patience
and, with an awful lot of sacrifice. And you know the story, I
don't have to repeat it, about the sacrifice of this country,
not to mention the horror that the people of Iraq have
suffered.
But let's, I think what people expect is, OK, if A's not
going to work we want to see plan B. If B's not going to work
we want to see C, D, E, and F. They want to go down, somewhat
down the alphabet, so to speak, but they're getting pretty
desperate now, I think, in terms of their willingness to allow
this to go on much longer. They've kind of reached their
boiling point.
So say that doesn't work, what's plan B in terms of getting
the Iraqis to get it right politically? What can this country
do to incentivize that, to nudge it along, to push it along?
Give us some ideas.
Ms. Rahim. Well----
Senator Casey. Which you've already given by the way, I
know.
Ms. Rahim. If I may say that, we have to assume that our
goal is to get the Iraqis to reach a political settlement
amongst themselves. That's the goal.
Senator Casey. Right.
Ms. Rahim. And then we say, OK, what are the tools, what
are the mechanisms that are most likely to get us to that
point. Now one tool could be this regional conference. Another
tool could be an international conference. Conditionality of
aid, and so on could be other tools. I have mentioned possible
points of pressure that the United States can apply in
different ways other than money, and so on that could be
applied. All of these are different ways that we can try.
Also none of these are mutually exclusive. We could use
several of them at the same time. And I think we should, in
fact, not be trying one item at a time and going down the list.
This is no time to work consecutively. We need to work
simultaneously.
Senator Casey. And I know you have those in your testimony.
Dr. Dodge, any?
Dr. Dodge. I think plan C will come into action when the
next President of the United States comes into power. He will
be, he or she, sorry, will be greeted with a sigh of relief in
Europe and, to be frank, in the Security Council in the United
Nations. She or he will then say, as you've said, ``the
patience of Joab is ending. We've suffered enough. Last time we
looked Iraq is on the edge of Europe, not on the edge of the
United States, and we need to multilateralize because we can't
do it anymore.'' And then we'd be seeing a tipping point, one
would hope, in Europe and in the Security Council and we'd step
forward.
Now one of the many things Senator Biden said that I didn't
have time to pick up on was, failed states are rebuilt by
strong men or empires. What I would be describing then is a
temporary multilateral empire under the legal agreement of the
United Nations. I think that's the only way to go.
Now plan D, by the way, if that fails and I'm not very
optimistic, is not emirates or regional fragmentation, it's
fragmentation down to streets and house level. It's the
complete fracturing of Iraq. This won't fall into easy pieces;
it will fall into a vicious war against all, all against all.
Now, to a certain extent, the North because of the strides
it's made and the fact that it's finished its own civil war in
the nineties can, to some extent, immunize itself from that.
But the rest is an absolute--is absolute chaos at the heart of
the most strategic and economically important area in the
world. Now the tipping point may happen in Washington, but one
would hope it would happen Paris and New York at the same time.
If we get that out of sequence, as Laith has said, then we will
revisit Iraq, but 10 years down the line when the situation is
much, much worse and there's no stomach whatsoever for doing
anything about it. Somalia or Afghanistan is then the
comparative example I have in mind.
The Chairman. Someone suggested to the Senator, that
Kurdistan is the example. They had their civil war. They
exhausted that. They figured out that--some very smart people
here, people you know, not in this Chamber, but foreign policy
gurus, as they say here in town, have suggested that until they
exhaust--the civil war is exhausted, there's not much that's
going to happen, and they point to Kurdistan. I remember going
into Kurdistan, as I said, before the war began.
Mr. Talabani. Two thousand and two.
The Chairman. The reason I went was, quite frankly, we
didn't know whether or not the Talabani and Brazani were going
to, in fact, join us, whether they really wanted us to
overthrow Saddam, and whether or not they had reached an
accommodation, because 2 years earlier it wasn't so sure.
Ms. Rahim. Senator, in 1998, as I recall, and my colleague
Qubad can correct me, the war amongst the Kurdish parties was
actually ended by very strong U.S. intervention and at the time
the, Secretary Albright, asked those--the parties to come to
Washington and, in a sense, the United States, I won't say
enforced, but----
Mr. Talabani. Brokered.
Ms. Rahim [continuing]. Brokered a peace agreement between
the two.
The Chairman. We had an incredible incentive. There was a
thing called no-fly zone. You didn't come, we wouldn't fly.
Ms. Rahim. So I want to say that----
The Chairman. So there was an overwhelming incentive. So I
think it's totally irrelevant, the example you just gave, with
all due respect. Totally completely irrelevant, because we had
what you were talking about now; leverage. There was
overwhelming leverage. So we didn't fly, you had a problem. So
guess what? There's nothing like a hanging to focus one's
attention, as Ben Johnson said, or some version of that.
Anyway, I apologize. I truly am not being dismissive of
your suggestions, but you understand the frustration, and it's
getting very hard to convince the American people that other
major investments in what is--by any stretch of the
imagination. Let me ask you another way: Do any of you think
there's going to be a national police force in Iraq that
patrols the streets of Ramadi in your lifetime? Raise your
hand.
Dr. Kubba. Mr. Chairman, police is always local and I can
not see it other than being local.
The Chairman. It is not now.
Dr. Kubba. It's not now. I can not envisage Iraq, for
example, not having a national intelligence agency, but I can--
--
The Chairman. That's a different issue.
Dr. Kubba. I can't envision Iraq having local police, not
necessarily all under one administration.
The Chairman. You all agree with that?
Ms. Rahim. Senator----
Mr. Talabani. Yes.
Ms. Rahim [continuing]. Actually we do have local police
now, and not just in Kurdistan. If I may say something here. We
do have local police, and we have a national police force. But
local police is the way to go and that is part of the
federalism and evolution of power that we all believe in
fervently.
But, if I could just say something here that hasn't been
said. Eventually, Iraq can not survive unless we change the
course of politics. If we continue on the path of ethnic,
sectarian politics the end result is civil war inevitably, just
as happened in Lebanon. This always ends in the same way.
We must, in the medium term, and the reason I didn't raise
this is because we're looking at a very short window of time,
but in the medium term we must foster a brand of national
politics, national agendas, national platforms. And if that can
take root in Iraq, then indeed some of the police force could
be a national police force. It may not be necessary, but it
would be possible. But we have to work----
The Chairman. Senator Casey, I will not interrupt again.
Why don't you finish up.
Senator Casey. He didn't interrupt, I stopped. I was trying
to think of some other questions. One question I had, and this
is a question that some of you may have a sense of or maybe
it's very hard to determine the answer to this question, but
let me try.
We've had an ambassador there and he's gotten pretty good
reviews and my sense of him is that he's had a significant
amount of respect. I know that's in transition now, but answer
me this question: Do you think that the normal structure we
have in place--meaning this government has an ambassador in
this country, in this case Iraq--do you think that's enough?
And do you think that more traditional structure works?
In other words, do you think that the Prime Minister or any
significant leader in Iraq thinks that that ambassador is
vested with real power or has a direct line to the President?
And if that's not the case, is there some other--in other
words, do you think the Iraqi Government looks upon that
structure as something that really isn't connected to the
reality of how decisions are made in the White House or by the
President? In other words, do we need someone, even if you have
an effective ambassador in place, do you need yet another
person that has, I don't know, the perception of a more
stature, or more experience, or more clout? I just throw that
out as a--because you know what it's like in the halls of the
government over there.
Dr. Kubba. Senator, I can tell you that the chronic problem
of Iraq that is branching out and mushrooming into other
problems, is we do not have effective government institutions.
Including one which is the Foreign Office and the other
embassies, including the day to day running of all these
missions.
The reason why we have spent so much money and put so much
effort in the last 3 years, yet we do not have an effective
government, because the block of politicians who are
controlling Parliament, who are running government by coalition
do not share a vision on what sort of state they want to build.
So, everything is on--ongoing mode and more or less every
minister is a government, or every minister is an island on its
own. And there is really no coherent effective government. And
the main cause why we don't have that, because the politicians
are not really interested in doing that. They are interested in
other benefits they are getting.
Senator Casey. And you are talking the Iraqi ministries,
the governorates.
Dr. Kubba. Correct.
Senator Casey. And I guess I'm thinking more along the
lines of what our Government can do to foster a political
settlement, even apart from what the ministries do day-to-day.
Just in terms of the Ambassador, our State Department, which I
think is something that doesn't get enough attention, but, I'm
sorry.
Talabani.
Mr. Talabani. Senator, I think, obviously Ambassador
Khalilzad, when he was there, was treated with much respect and
people knew that when they were speaking with him, they were
speaking with the U.S. Government. I think he fostered a very
good relationship with everybody and earned the trust of a lot
of people, as well.
I can say that something that, if I'm allowed to be a
little critical, and that is that sometimes the--especially in
the past--the interagency battles that took place in Washington
have had a very negative impact on the situation on the ground.
We do see that less these days, but certainly in the early part
of post-Saddam Iraq that kind of interagency tension was quite
prevalent and was quite visible to the Iraqis on the ground.
Senator Casey. Doctor, anything?
The Chairman. Senator, I think maybe we should----
Senator Casey. We have to vote again.
The Chairman [continuing]. Begin to wind up. We're going to
vote, and let the witnesses go. So, I'm not, I don't want to
cut you off, but if you have additional questions I think it
would be a good time, but we'll promise we'll have you out of
here at 5:30 or thereabouts, OK? I know we trespass on your
time a lot and it's important to us that we hear what you have
to say and we appreciate it.
Senator Casey. No, Mr. Chairman, I thank you and I thank
the panel. I appreciate your scholarship and what you
contributed here today.
The Chairman. Let me conclude by thanking you all. It's
hard to disagree with the aspirational notions you've all put
forward. It's a lot harder to figure out the means to
accomplish those aspirational goals. And, but that's the nature
of what we do, and as one of my colleagues said the other day,
``If you don't want to make difficult decisions, sell shoes.''
Well, that sounds like there's some difficult decisions there,
too.
But let me conclude by reading from today's New York Times.
And I know you know it, but it's important to get a sense of
why so many Americans are wary of the new proposal of the
President to provide this breathing space by establishing
security in order to allow a political settlement, a
germination of a political settlement.
``Baghdad, January 24: In the battle for Baghdad, Haifa
Street has changed hands so often that it has taken on the feel
of a no-man's land, the deadly space between opposing trenches.
``On Wednesday, as American and Iraqi troops poured in, the
street showed why it was a sensitive gauge of an American, of
an urban conflict marked by front lines that melted into
confusion. Enemies with no clear identity, and allies who
disappear or do not show up at all. In a miniature version of
the troop increase, the United States hopes to secure the city.
American soldiers in armored vehicles raced into Haifa Street
before dawn to dislodge Sunni insurgents and Shia militia
who've been battling for a stretch of the ragged slums and most
abandoned high rises.
``But as the sun rose, many of the Iraqi units who were
supposed to do the actual searches of the buildings did not
arrive on time, surprise. Forcing the American's to start the
job on their own. When the Iraqi units finally did show up, it
was with the air of a class outing. Cheering and laughing, as
the Americans blew locks off the doors with shotguns. As the
morning wore on, and the troops came under fire from all
directions another apparent flaw in this strategy became clear.
As empty apartments became lairs for gunmen who flitted from
window to window and killed at least one American soldier with
a shot in the head.
``Whether the gunfire was coming from the Sunni or Shia
insurgents, or the militia fighters, or some of the Iraqi
soldiers themselves who had disappeared into the Gotham-like
cityscape, no one could say. `Who in the hell is shooting at
us?' shouted Sergeant First Class Marc Biletski, whose platoon
was jammed into a small room off an alley that was being swept
by sniper bullets. `Who's shooting at us? Do we know who they
are?'
``Just before the platoon tossed smoke bombs and sprinted
through the alley to a more secure position, Sergeant Biletski
had a moment to reflect on his spot, which the United States
has now fought to regain from a mysterious enemy at least three
times in the last 2 years. `This place is a failure. Every time
we come here we have to come back.' He paused there and said,
`Well, maybe not a total failure, since American troops have
smashed opposition in Haifa Street each time they have come
in.' ''
Hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:31 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
ALTERNATIVE PLANS: THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP
----------
TUESDAY, JANUARY 30, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:05 p.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden,
Jr. (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Dodd, Menendez, Cardin, Casey,
Webb, Lugar, Hagel, Coleman, Sununu, and Voinovich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
First of all, I want to thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being
here, and thank you, Congressman Hamilton.
I want to say, from the outset, both of these gentlemen
were prepared to be here. The problem is, they have very, very
busy schedules. And I want to thank the Secretary for extending
his schedule here in Washington, and Congressman Hamilton for
adjusting his and changing the timing. Last week, the Secretary
was just not able to be here. And so, it's very important
you're both here, and we thank you.
I also want to explain to you, as you both know this place
well, there will be people coming in and out in order to
accommodate their schedules. We are starting the afternoon
session earlier than we usually would, because it's so
important to have both these distinguished men before us. So,
Senator Lugar, for example, is required to be in his leadership
caucus, party luncheon that's going on now, as others are. And
so, there will be a little bit of in and out.
I'm going to urge my colleagues, as they come in, and their
staffs to let them know, that I told the witnesses, again, we
would try to see that they're out of here by 3 o'clock. They
have planes and trains and commitments to meet, and this is not
their first testimony before the U.S. Congress.
But having said all of that, we'll try our best--Lee, you
know how the place works but, so far, we've had some
considerable cooperation.
We begin the fourth and final week of the hearings on the
remaining options for the United States in Iraq. And these will
not be the last hearings we hold, because we're going to be
engaged in vigorous oversight for the remainder of this
Congress, which I think everyone expects.
But we're privileged today to be joined by Secretary James
Baker and Chairman Lee Hamilton, who are cochairs of the Iraq
Study Group, and the country owes both of you an enormous debt.
Your willingness to seek a bipartisan solution, which is a
dangerous thing to do in this town, to take on that
responsibility, to our most urgent and vexing national security
problem is appreciated by everyone, and your statesmanship has
been obvious.
The bipartisan commission produced a very worthwhile
document. Bipartisan commissions are often criticized for
producing the lowest common denominator, but your report broke
new ground and changed the debate in this country. I don't
agree with every detail of it, and I have proposed a different
plan for Iraq, but I am in total agreement with your central
recommendations.
To quote the report, ``The most important recommendations
call for new and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in
Iraq and the region and a change in the primary mission of
forces that will enable the United States to begin to move
combat forces out of Iraq responsibly. We believe that these
two recommendations are equally important and reinforce one
another.''
The report goes on to recommend that, ``By the first
quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the
security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not
necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq.''
You also state, ``The recommendations should not be
separated or carried out in isolation.'' As you said, Mr.
Secretary, ``This report should not be treated as a fruit
salad.''
Unfortunately, it appears to be exactly what's happening
here, and I hope we get a chance to pursue some of the debate
that is now swirling around the report and the President's
present posture relative to Iraq.
We're very anxious to hear your thoughts, as well, on how
we can contain Iraq's civil war in the event your
recommendations are not implemented and the situation continues
to deteriorate, which we hope it won't, but we have to be
prepared.
So, I thank you.
In the absence of the distinguished ranking member, Senator
Lugar, I would like to invite Senator Hagel, if he wishes to
make any opening comments.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I would just add my
welcome to our distinguished witnesses and to say, again, how
much we appreciate your continued service to our country and
important contributions at, I believe, one of the most
critically important and defining times in our history. So,
thank you. I look forward to your comments.
The Chairman. By the way, I should add as they say, a
housekeeping measure. On Wednesday, we will hear from former
Secretaries Kissinger and Albright, who will testify
separately. And on Thursday, we'll hear from National Security
Advisors Brent Scowcroft and Zbigniew Brzezinski, who will also
testify separately. So, there will be two more days of
hearings.
Mr. Secretary, the floor is yours. And, again, thank you
for accommodating the schedule.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES A. BAKER III, COCHAIR, IRAQ STUDY
GROUP; PARTNER, BAKER-BOTTS LLP, HOUSTON, TX
Mr. Baker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Senator
Hagel and distinguished members of the Committee on Foreign
Relations. It's an honor for me to be before you this
afternoon, as I'm sure it is for cochairman, Lee Hamilton.
I'll take the first part of our written statement, Mr.
Chairman, and Lee will take the second part.
I'll begin by thanking you for the opportunity to appear
and to discuss our recommendations. We'd like to begin, I
think, by noting some common elements in the Study Group Report
and the President's speech of January 10. For example, we agree
with President Bush that the situation in Iraq is unacceptable
to the American people, that the consequences of failure would
be severe, that it is clear that we need to change our strategy
in Iraq, and that only Iraqis can end the sectarian violence
and secure their people.
We support increasing the number of American advisors
embedded in the Iraqi Army, with the goal that the Iraqi
Government will assume control of security in all provinces in
Iraq by November 2007, as the President stated.
We support the benchmarks President Bush outlined for Iraq,
and we agree that now is the time for the Iraqi Government to
act.
As part of our testimony, we've attached a joint statement
that we released right after the President's speech on January
10.
Now, the report of our Study Group, Mr. Chairman, has been
analyzed at length, so we would like to be fairly brief, and we
will concentrate on a few points: First, the security mission;
second, benchmark performance; third, diplomacy; fourth,
economic assistance; and fifth, the Iraqi Government.
There are some very important points of similarity between
the Study Group's Report and the President's plan for security.
Both of them keep rapid-reaction and special-operations forces
available to undertake force protection and strike missions
against al-Qaeda in Iraq, as well as for other missions
considered vital by the United States commander in Iraq. Both
increase the number of United States personnel embedded with
Iraqi Army units, and both emphasize the mission of training
Iraqi troops.
The President said, ``We will accelerate the training of
Iraqi forces, which remains the essential U.S. security mission
in Iraq.'' To accomplish that goal, the President intends to
double the number of advisors that are embedded with Iraqi Army
units.
The Study Group Report stated, ``The primary mission of
U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the
Iraqi Army, which would take over primary responsibility for
combat operations.'' The Study Group suggested that such a
mission could involve 10,000 to 20,000 American troops.
The Study Group stated that the United States should not
make an open-ended commitment to keep large numbers of American
troops in Iraq. We rejected an immediate withdrawal, because we
believe that so much is at stake.
The Study Group further stated, ``While these training and
supporting efforts are building up, and as additional Iraqi
brigades are being deployed, U.S. combat brigades could begin
to move out of Iraq.'' And we said, ``By the first quarter of
2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security
situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for
force protection could be out of Iraq.''
But the Study Group set no timetables, and we set no
deadlines. We believe that military commanders must have the
flexibility to respond to events on the ground. We also
believe, however, that if the important recommendations of the
study group are implemented, it will enable the United States
to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly.
The Study Group Report recognizes that even after the
United States has moved all combat brigades out of Iraq, we
would maintain a considerable military presence in the region
with our still-significant force in Iraq and with our powerful
air, ground, and naval deployments in Kuwait, Bahrain, and
Qatar, as well as an increased presence in Afghanistan. These
forces would be sufficiently robust to permit the United
States, working with the Iraqi Government, to avoid the Iraqi
Government's collapse and the disintegration of the country.
They would be sufficiently robust to fight al-Qaeda and other
terrorist organizations in Iraq using special-operations teams
and to train, equip, and support the Iraqi security forces, and
sufficiently robust to deter even more destructive interference
in Iraq by Syria and Iran.
With regard to the military planning of the United States
and Iraq and the region, the Study Group said, ``The United
States must make it clear to the Iraqi Government that the
United States could carry out its plans, including planned
redeployments, even if Iraq does not implement its planned
changes.'' And we further said, ``America's other security
needs and the future of our military cannot be made hostage to
the actions or the inactions of the Iraqi Government.''
The President's plan does not mention the possibility of
combat troops moving out of Iraq as the training mission
proceeds. The President's plan makes clear that United States
forces will be sent to Baghdad to help Iraqis clear and secure
neighborhoods. That means combat operations, including,
possibly, door-to-door sweeps.
The Study Group made the assessment that the security of
Baghdad is crucial to security in Iraq, more generally. And
while we were in Baghdad at the end of the summer, Iraqi and
American leaders told us that, ``as Baghdad goes, so goes
Iraq.'' We state in our report that there is no action the
American military can take that, by itself, can bring success
in Iraq. To reduce the violence in Baghdad and in Iraq,
national reconciliation is essential.
To provide for the long-term security of the Iraqi people,
the Iraqi Government must step up and take responsibility for
the security of its citizens. The Study Group, however, did
state that it could support a short-term redeployment or surge
of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad or to speed up
the training-and-equipping mission, if the United States
commander in Iraq determines that such steps would be
effective. Our soldiers have the ability to undertake both
missions. It is critically important, however, that the
training mission not suffer while the United States military is
engaged in a surge for Baghdad.
The Study Group believes the training mission should be the
primary mission. Otherwise, United States risks delays in the
completion of the training mission, in the handover of
responsibility to the Iraqis, and thereby in the departure of
United States forces from Iraq. No security plan can work,
however, in the absence of national reconciliation.
The Study Group Report stated that the United States forces
cannot stop the violence, or even contain it, if there is no
underlying political agreement among Iraqis about the future of
their country.
The Study Group, the President, and Prime Minister Maliki
agree on key measures that the Iraqis need to take, and they
include: Legislation to share oil revenues among all Iraqis;
provincial elections later this year; reform of the de-
Baathification laws; and a fair process for considering
amendments to Iraqi's Constitution.
The Study Group Report calls on the United States to
consult closely with the Iraqi Government to develop additional
milestones which are tied to calendar dates. The Iraqi
Government's words on behalf of these measures have been good,
Mr. Chairman, but its performance has been weak.
We commend the President's statement in which he made clear
to the Prime Minister and Iraq's other leaders that America's
commitment is not open-ended. If the Iraqi Government does not
follow through on its promises, it will lose the support of the
American people and it will lose the support of the Iraqi
people. Now is the time to act.
We believe the administration must hold Iraqi leaders to
those specific benchmarks and those specific dates for
performance. The United States needs to use its leverage to get
Iraqi leaders to perform. We use conditionality, Mr. Chairman,
with many other recipients of United States assistance, and we
should do so with Iraq.
The Study Group stated in its recommendation No. 21, ``If
the Iraqi Government does not make substantial progress toward
the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation,
security, and governance, the United States should reduce its
political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi
Government. Conditionality is necessary to press the Iraqi
Government to perform. Conditionality is necessary to press for
national reconciliation. In the absence of national
reconciliation, there will be sectarian violence without end.''
And now, Mr. Chairman, Chairman Hamilton will present the
balance of our joint statement.
But, before he does, let me just say to you and other
members of the committee that it has been a great pleasure for
me to work with Lee on this matter. I need not tell this
committee that passions in this country on Iraq understandably
run very, very high. But, thanks to Lee Hamilton's broad-gauged
and steady commitment to our effort, we have been able to
maintain/sustain a bipartisan approach from the beginning of
our efforts.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
STATEMENT OF HON. LEE H. HAMILTON, COCHAIR, IRAQ STUDY GROUP;
DIRECTOR, WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Chairman Biden, Senator Hagel, and other
distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for
letting us appear before your committee this afternoon to talk
about the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group.
Chairman Biden, I remember that you were instrumental in
the rollout of the Iraq Study Group, way back, early last year,
and we deeply appreciated that.
Let me also say what a great privilege it has been for me
to work with Secretary Baker. He is easily one of the most
distinguished public servants of our generation, and I found,
in every respect, at times when we agreed and at times when we
disagreed, that it was a genuine pleasure to work with him.
But both Jim and I would say that we were merely the
chairmen, and that each of the members of the group made very
important contributions to the report.
I take up with diplomatic recommendations.
We were encouraged by the President's statement that we
will use America's full diplomatic resources to rally support
for Iraq from nations throughout the Middle East. We believe
there are additional steps, specific steps, that should be
taken.
The President did not endorse a diplomatic effort including
all of Iraq's neighbors. The Study Group took the view that the
United States should engage directly with Iran and Syria in
order to try to obtain their commitment to constructive
policies toward Iraq and other regional issues. We recognize,
of course, that dealing with Iran and Syria is controversial,
but it is clear that Iran and Syria have influence in Iraq.
They are part of the problem. It is also our assessment that
neither Syria nor Iran have a long-term interest in a chaotic
Iraq which could negatively affect their own national security
interests. Accordingly, it was our view that the United States
should try to make them a part of the solution.
Sometimes, the argument is made that Iran has momentum in
the region, and the United States should not negotiate until it
has more leverage over Iran. We disagree. We negotiated with
the Soviet Union during the cold war. We can negotiate with
Iran on behalf of stability and our interests in Iraq. The
United States and Iraq cooperated in Afghanistan, and they
should explore replicating that model.
The Study Group also calls for a renewed and sustained
commitment by the United States to an Arab-Israeli peace on all
fronts. The group laid out specific and detailed steps that
should be undertaken in order to achieve a comprehensive peace
on all fronts, including Israeli-Palestinian, Israeli-Lebanese,
and Israeli-Syrian.
Secretary of State Rice has been traveling in the region.
Her efforts to launch informal talks between Palestinian and
Israelis are a positive development, but they do not yet
include the Israeli-Lebanese and the Israeli-Syrian tracks of a
comprehensive peace. We feel particularly strong that the
United States is missing an opportunity to promote its goals in
Iraq and the broader region by not talking to Syria.
Some have asked us: What does the Arab-Israeli conflict
have to do with the war in Iraq? Why make one problem harder by
taking on two? The answer is simple. It is difficult to
establish regional stability in the Middle East without
addressing the Arab-Israeli issue. We want other countries,
especially the Sunni Arab countries, to help us. When we go to
talk to them about Iraq, they will want to talk about the Arab-
Israeli conflict.
The United States says it wants to empower moderate
Muslims, yet the only way to empower the moderates is to take
away the most potent grievance of the extremists, that the
United States does not care about the Palestinians. A
comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace would deal the extremists a
blow in Baghdad, Beirut, the Palestinian territories, and
elsewhere. It would certainly bolster America's prestige. And,
above all, it would guarantee the long-term security of
America's ally: Israel.
All of us understand that the peace process is difficult,
that results will be measured in years, not months, but a
sustained and comprehensive effort counts. A sustained effort
will help us with Iraq and will win us important diplomatic
leverage across the board in the Middle East and elsewhere.
The President asked for over $1.1 billion in additional
economic assistance for Iraq. That, too, is a step in the right
direction. The Study Group believes the commitment should be
substantially larger, $5 billion per year. We need to do many
things right in Iraq if we're going to succeed. We certainly
need to devote resources to job creation and capacity-building.
The President has stated that Iraq will spend $10 billion
of its own money on reconstruction and infrastructure projects
that will create new jobs. We agree that job creation is
necessary to give some hope and purpose to young Iraqis. Too
many of them are frustrated and cannot provide for their
families. Too many have turned to militias and the insurgency.
Our commitment to job creation should include the Commander's
Emergency Response Program, but it must be broader; we need to
help Iraqis restart their many idle factories.
Capacity-building is also necessary, because the Iraqi
Government is weak. It cannot deliver the basic services of
government. It falls short in providing electricity and water,
it falls short in providing security. The current Government of
Iraq can succeed only if it starts to win the confidence of
those it governs. Capacity-building means technical assistance
and advice, it means better procedures in government agencies,
including a greater delegation of authority and better internal
controls.
The Secretary of State has named a reconstruction
coordinator in Baghdad. That will be helpful, but that will not
address another problem we described in our report. The problem
of coordination is interagency. It is most acute in Washington.
The new coordinator is capable, but he is the Secretary of
State's appointee, not the President's appointee. He cannot
make other agencies do what he tells them to do.
Mr. Chairman, the President has decided on a new strategy.
Much of the attention right now is on the troop surge. To some
degree, that is understandable. We are all concerned when more
of our young men and women are put in harm's way. The
political, diplomatic, and economic pieces of our policy are
just as important as the military piece.
The Study Group was explicit on the importance of a
comprehensive approach. All elements of our policy should be
pursued at the same time. National reconciliation cannot wait.
Make no mistake, the violence in Baghdad will not end without
national reconciliation. The violence will not end unless
Iraq's leaders step up and make difficult decisions about the
future of their country.
The President correctly stated that only the Iraqis can end
the sectarian violence. We are placing all of our bets on the
performance of the Iraqi Government. The rhetoric of the Iraqi
Government has been good. Its performance has been
disappointing. Too often, Iraqi leaders have acted in their
sectarian interests, not the national interests.
The Study Group believes in a comprehensive military,
diplomatic, economic, and political approach: Training as the
primary United States military mission in Iraq; engaging Iraq's
neighbors and the international community on behalf of
stability in Iraq and the region; building the capacity of the
Iraqi Government, and focusing on job creation as a part of a
robust economic program; and, of course, holding the Iraqi
Government to performance benchmarks, particularly on national
reconciliation.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for
your attention. We would be pleased to respond to your
questions.
[The prepared joint statement of Mr. Baker and Mr. Hamilton
follows:]
Prepared Joint Statement by Hon. James A. Baker III and Hon. Lee H.
Hamilton, Cochairs of the Iraq Study Group
Chairman Biden, Ranking Member Lugar, distinguished members of the
Committee on Foreign Relations, it is a distinct honor to appear before
you this afternoon. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the
recommendations of the Iraq Study Group report.
introduction
We would like to begin by noting some common elements in the Study
Group report and the President's recent speech. We agree with President
Bush:
The situation in Iraq is unacceptable to the American
people;
The consequences of failure would be severe;
It is clear that we need to change our strategy in Iraq; and
Only the Iraqis can end the sectarian violence and secure
their people.
We support increasing the number of American advisors embedded in
Iraqi Army units with the goal that the Iraq Government will assume
control of security in all provinces in Iraq by November 2007, as the
President has stated.
We support the benchmarks President Bush outlined for Iraq, and
agree that now is the time for the Iraqi Government to act.
As part of our testimony, we have attached a joint statement that
we released after the President's speech on January 10.
The report of the Study Group already has been analyzed at length.
So, we would like to be fairly brief in our opening remarks and
concentrate on a few points:
The security mission;
Benchmark performance;
Diplomacy;
Economic assistance; and
The Iraqi Government.
the security mission
There are important points of similarity between the Study Group
report and the President's plan for security. Both keep rapid reaction
and special operations forces available to undertake force protection
and strike missions against al-Qaeda in Iraq, as well as for other
missions considered vital by the U.S. commander in Iraq. Both increase
the number of U.S. personnel embedded with Iraqi Army units. Both
emphasize the mission of training Iraqi troops.
Training. The President stated: ``. . . we will accelerate the
training of Iraqi forces, which remains the essential U.S. security
mission in Iraq.'' To accomplish that goal, the President intends to
double the number of advisors embedded with Iraqi Army units.
The Study Group stated: ``The primary mission of U.S. forces in
Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi Army, which would
take over primary responsibility for combat operations.'' The Study
Group suggested that ``such a mission could involve 10,000 to 20,000
American troops.''
Troop Levels. The Study Group stated that ``the United States
should not make an open-ended commitment to keep large numbers of
American troops in Iraq.'' We rejected an immediate withdrawal because
we believe that so much is at stake.
The Study Group stated: ``While these (training and supporting)
efforts are building up, and as additional Iraqi brigades are being
deployed, U.S. combat brigades could begin to move out of Iraq. By the
first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the
security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for
force protection could be out of Iraq.''
The Study Group set no timetable and set no deadlines. We believe
that military commanders must have the flexibility to respond to events
on the ground. We believe, however, that if the important
recommendations of the Iraq Study Group are implemented, it ``will
enable the United States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq
responsibly.''
The Study Group recognizes that ``even after the United States has
moved all combat brigades out if Iraq, we would maintain a considerable
military presence in the region, with our still significant force in
Iraq and with our powerful air, ground, and naval deployments in
Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, as well as an increased presence in
Afghanistan. These forces would be sufficiently robust to permit the
United States, working with the Iraqi Government, to avoid the Iraqi
Government's collapse and the disintegration of the country; fight al-
Qaeda and other terrorist organizations in Iraq, using special
operations teams; train, equip, and support the Iraqi security forces;
and deter even more destructive interference in Iraq by Syria and
Iran.''
With regard to the military planning of the United States in Iraq
and the region, the Study Group recommended, ``The United States must
make it clear to the Iraqi Government that the United States could
carry out its plans, including planned redeployments, even if Iraq does
not implement its planned changes. America's other security needs and
the future of our military cannot be made hostage to the actions or
inactions of the Iraqi Government.''
The President's plan does not mention the possibility of combat
troops moving out of Iraq as the training mission proceeds.
Troop Surge. The President's plan makes clear that U.S. forces will
be sent to Baghdad to ``help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods.''
That means combat operations, including possibly door-to-door sweeps.
The Study Group made the assessment that ``the security of Baghdad
is crucial to security in Iraq more generally.'' While we were in
Baghdad at the end of the summer, Iraqi and American leaders told us
that as Baghdad goes, so goes Iraq.
We state in our report that, ``there is no action the American
military can take that, by itself, can bring about success in Iraq.''
To reduce the violence in Baghdad and in Iraq, national reconciliation
is essential. To provide for the long-term security of the Iraqi
people, the Iraqi Government must step up and take responsibility for
the security of its citizens.
The Study Group did state that it could ``support a short-term
redeployment or surge of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad,
or to speed up the training and equipping mission, if the U.S.
commander in Iraq determines that such steps would be effective.''
Our soldiers have the ability to undertake both missions. It is
critically important, however, that the training mission not suffer
while the U.S. military is engaged in a surge for Baghdad. The Study
Group believes the training mission should be the primary mission.
Otherwise, the United States risks delays in the completion of the
training mission, in the handover of responsibility to the Iraqis, and
thereby in the departure of U.S. forces from Iraq.
performance on benchmarks
No security plan can work in the absence of national
reconciliation. The Study Group report stated that U.S. forces ``cannot
stop the violence--or even contain it--if there is no underlying
political agreement among Iraqis about the future of their country.''
The Study Group, the President, and Prime Minister Maliki agree on
key measures the Iraqis need to take. Those measures include:
Legislation to share oil revenues among all Iraqis; provincial
elections later this year; reform of the de-Baathification laws; and a
fair process for considering amendments to Iraq's Constitution. The
Study Group calls on the United States to consult closely with the
Iraqi Government to develop additional milestones tied to calendar
dates.
The Iraqi Government's words on behalf of these measures have been
good, but its performance has been weak. We commend the President's
statement: ``I have made clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq's other
leaders that America's commitment is not open-ended. If the Iraqi
Government does not follow through on its promises, it will lose the
support of the American people and it will lose the support of the
Iraqi people. Now is the time to act.''
We believe the administration must hold Iraqi leaders to those
specific benchmarks and specific dates for performance. The United
States needs to use its leverage to get Iraqi leaders to perform. We
use conditionality with many other recipients of U.S. assistance. We
should do so with Iraq. The Study Group stated in its Recommendation
21: ``If the Iraqi Government does not make substantial progress toward
the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and
governance, the United States should reduce its political, military, or
economic support for the Iraqi Government.''
Conditionality is necessary to press the Iraqi Government to
perform. Conditionality is necessary to press for national
reconciliation. In the absence of national reconciliation, there will
be sectarian violence without end.
diplomacy
We were encouraged by the President's statement that ``We will use
America's full diplomatic resources to rally support for Iraq from
nations throughout the Middle East.''
We believe there are additional specific steps he should take. The
President did not endorse a diplomatic effort including all of Iraq's
neighbors. The Study Group took the view that ``the United States
should engage directly with Iran and Syria in order to try to obtain
their commitment to constructive policies toward Iraq and other
regional issues.''
We recognize that dealing with Iran and Syria is controversial. But
it is clear that Iran and Syria have influence in Iraq. They are part
of the problem. It is also our assessment that neither Syria nor Iran
have a long-term interest in a chaotic Iraq which could negatively
affect their own national security interests. Accordingly, it is the
view of the Study Group that the United States should try to make them
part of the solution.
Sometimes the argument is made that Iran has momentum in the
region, and the United States should not negotiate until it has more
leverage over Iran. We disagree. We negotiated with the Soviet Union
during the cold war. We can negotiate with Iran on behalf of stability
and our interests in Iraq. The United States and Iran cooperated in
Afghanistan, and they should explore replicating this model.
The Study Group also calls for a renewed and sustained commitment
by the United States to an Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts. The Study
Group laid out specific and detailed steps that should be undertaken in
order to achieve a comprehensive peace on all fronts, including
Israeli-Palestinian, Israeli-Lebanese, and Israeli-Syrian. Secretary of
State, Condoleezza Rice, has been traveling in the region. Her efforts
to launch informal talks between Palestinians and Israelis are a
positive development, but they do not yet include the Israeli-Lebanese
and Israeli-Syrian tracks of a comprehensive peace. We feel
particularly strongly that the United States is missing an opportunity
to promote its goals in Iraq and the broader region by not talking to
Syria.
Some have asked us: What does the Arab-Israeli conflict have to do
with the war in Iraq? Why make one problem harder by taking on two?
The answer is simple. It is difficult to establish regional
stability in the Middle East without addressing the Arab-Israeli issue.
We want other countries, especially the Sunni Arab countries, to help
us. When we go to talk to them about Iraq, they will want to talk about
the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The United States says it wants to empower ``moderate Muslims.''
Yet the only way to empower the moderates is to take away the most
potent grievance of the extremists: That the United States does not
care about the Palestinians.
A comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace would deal the extremists a blow
in Baghdad, Beirut, the Palestinian territories, and elsewhere. It
would bolster America's prestige. And, above all, it would guarantee
the long-term security of America's ally: Israel.
All of us understand that the peace process is difficult, and that
results will be measured in years, not months. But a sustained and
comprehensive effort counts. A sustained effort will help us with Iraq
and will win us important diplomatic leverage across the board in the
Middle East and elsewhere.
economic assistance
The President asked for over $1.1 billion in additional economic
assistance for Iraq. That is a step in the right direction. The Study
Group believes the commitment should be substantially larger--$5
billion per year. We need to do many things right in Iraq if we are
going to succeed. We need to devote resources to job creation and
capacity-building.
The President has stated that Iraq will spend $10 billion of its
own money on reconstruction and infrastructure projects that will
create new jobs. The Study Group agrees that job creation is necessary
to give some hope and purpose to young Iraqis. Too many of them are
frustrated and cannot provide for their families. Too many have turned
to militias and the insurgency. Our commitment to job creation should
include the Commander's Emergency Response Program, but it must be
broader. We need to help Iraqis restart their many idle factories.
Capacity-building is necessary because the Iraqi Government is
weak. It cannot deliver the basic services of government. It falls
short in providing electricity and water. It falls short in providing
security. The current Government of Iraq can succeed only if it starts
to win the confidence of those it governs. Capacity-building means
technical assistance and advice. It means better procedures in
government agencies, including a greater delegation of authority and
better internal controls.
The Secretary of State has named a reconstruction coordinator in
Baghdad. That will be helpful, but that will not address another
problem we described in our report. The problem of coordination is
interagency. It is most acute in Washington. The new coordinator is
capable, but he is the Secretary of State's appointee, not the
President's appointee. He cannot make other agencies do what he tells
them to do.
conclusions
Mr. Chairman, the President has decided on a new strategy.
Much of the attention right now is on the troop surge. To some
degree, that is understandable. We are all concerned when more of our
young men and women are put in harm's way.
The political, diplomatic, and economic pieces of our policy are
just as important as the military piece. The Study Group was explicit
on the importance of a comprehensive approach. All elements of our
policy should be pursued at the same time.
National reconciliation cannot wait. Make no mistake: The violence
in Baghdad will not end without national reconciliation. The violence
will not end unless Iraq's leaders step up and make difficult decisions
about the future of their country.
The President correctly stated that only the Iraqis can end the
sectarian violence. We are placing all of our bets on the performance
of the Iraqi Government. The rhetoric of the Iraqi Government has been
good. Its performance has been disappointing. Too often, Iraqi leaders
have acted in their sectarian interest, not the national interest.
The Study Group believes in a comprehensive military, diplomatic,
economic, and political approach:
Training as the primary U.S. military mission in Iraq;
Engaging Iraq's neighbors--and the international community--
on behalf of stability in Iraq and the region;
Building the capacity of the Iraqi Government and focusing
on job creation as part of a robust economic program; and
Holding the Iraqi Government to performance benchmarks,
particularly on national reconciliation.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, we would be pleased to
respond to your questions.
______
Appendix No. 1
statement of the cochairs of the iraq study group, james a. baker iii
and lee hamilton, january 11, 2007
We are pleased that the President reviewed the report of the Iraq
Study Group carefully and seriously. Some of our recommendations are
reflected in the new approach that he outlined Wednesday, while others
have not been adopted.
We agree with President Bush that, ``the situation in Iraq is
unacceptable to the American people,'' the consequences of failure are
severe, and ``only the Iraqis can end the sectarian violence and secure
their people.'' As the President said, ``the essential U.S. security
mission'' in Iraq is the training of Iraqi forces. We support
increasing the number of American advisors embedded in Iraqi Army units
with the goal that the Iraq Government will assume control of security
in all provinces in Iraq by November 2007. We recommended many of the
benchmarks President Bush outlined for Iraq, and agree that now is the
time for the Iraqi Government to act.
We hope the President and his administration will further consider
other recommendations of the Iraq Study Group. The President did not
suggest the possibility of a transition that could enable U.S. combat
forces to begin to leave Iraq. The President did not state that
political, military, or economic support for Iraq would be conditional
on the Iraqi Government's ability to meet benchmarks. Within the
region, the President did not announce an international support group
for Iraq including all of Iraq's neighbors, nor mention measures we
suggested to reach a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement.
The Iraq Study Group indicated that it could ``support a short-term
redeployment or surge of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad''
complemented by comprehensive political, economic, and diplomatic
efforts. Questions, of course, remain about the nature of the surge. We
are encouraged by the President's statement that ``America's commitment
is not open-ended'' and Secretary Gates' statement that the addition of
21,000 troops would be viewed as a temporary surge. The violence in
Baghdad will not end without national reconciliation.
America's political leaders have a responsibility to seek a
bipartisan consensus on issues of war and peace. We want to be helpful
in forging that unity of effort. We welcome President Bush's commitment
to form a working group with congressional leaders that will work
across party lines in pursuit of a common policy.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
We'll go 8-minute rounds.
And let me begin by asking either, or both, of you to
expand on what is throughout the report, that it is not in the
interest of Iran for there to be chaos in Iraq. That has met
with overwhelming skepticism by the administration and many
others. Could you be more specific? Why is it that Iran would
not be interested, ``in more chaos in Iraq''?
Mr. Baker. Well, Mr. Chairman, I'll take a shot at that,
and then Lee can add to it.
Iran has many disparate elements in its polity, and they
have differing views among those elements. If there were
absolute chaos in Iraq, Iran could be expected to be overrun by
literally thousands of refugees, in our opinion. With respect
to Iraq--and so, I think that's the main reason that they would
not have an interest in a chaotic Iraq. Having said that,
there's no doubt but what they are--they take great pleasure in
seeing the United States tied down there and the United States
facing difficulties there.
And with respect to Iran, generally, may I just say that
the recommendation in our report regarding talking to Iran is
really a recommendation about talking to them in the context of
the formation of an international Iraq support group. That is,
a group of nations--a coalition, if you will--that would help
us with some of the difficulties we have in Iraq, including all
of Iraq's neighbors.
I was authorized by the President to approach the
Government of Iran as we were conducting our Study Group's
efforts. We did so. We broached this possibility to them that
you've heard us articulate here this afternoon--that is, they
helped us in Afghanistan when we approached them, it was to the
joint benefit of both Iran and the United States that they did
so; and our view is, we ought to try to replicate that
situation. But we make--we take great pains to point out we
should not--we are not talking about a broad-based dialog with
Iran that would, for instance, include her nuclear efforts,
which we specifically say in the report, should remain in the
United States--in the U.N. Security Council.
When I approached a representative of the Government of
Iran, the answer came back that they would have little interest
in participating to help because of the attitude of our
Government. We say, however, in our report, we still think we
ought ask them, and, when they refuse, alone, we think, among
all of Iraq's neighbors, we can hold them up for--to be the
rejectionist government or state that they really are.
The Chairman. We heard today from the----
Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Chairman, let me just----
The Chairman. I'm sorry.
Mr. Hamilton [continuing]. If I may, add to that.
The Chairman. Sure.
Mr. Hamilton. Of course, I agree with what Jim has said. We
tend to look at Iran as a very monolithic state, which it is
not. A little under 50 percent of the Iranian population is
Persian, but about 24-25 percent of the population is Azeri.
There are a lot of Kurds in that country. All you have to do is
read the press in the last 2 or 3 days to see that there are a
lot of centrifugal forces operating inside Iraq today.
If you had a territorial disintegration in Iraq, if you had
chaos there, you could certainly inflame sectarian tensions in
that region, which would be very, very adverse to Iran. So,
we----
The Chairman. In what way? Again, I know--I believe--I
share your view, and I think I know the answer, but we use
those phrases, because we're involved in this foreign-policy-
speak a lot. The administration made it clear today, and has
made it clear throughout, that merely having them part of a
support group would enhance their influence in the region. We
don't want to enhance their influence. So, when you say this
disintegration would cause great difficulty, beyond population
flows of refugees, what other aspect with----
Mr. Baker. Regional--the possibility of regional
conflagration, I think, Mr. Chairman. I mean, if you had a
chaotic situation in Iraq, you're much more likely to have
Iraq's neighbors move in there to--each to protect its own
particular interest.
The Chairman. The argument that is made again by
administration supporters, is that's exactly what Iraq would
want, to allow them to essentially annex the Shia territories,
which make up 60 percent of the population and a considerable
part of the territory.
Mr. Hamilton. Let's take a look at present policy today,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Make it clear, I agree with you guys, but
it's----
Mr. Hamilton. I understand that, but----
The Chairman [continuing]. Important that this be
discussed.
Mr. Hamilton [continuing]. Let's make it clear that the
current policy is not working. There's a big article on the
front page of the Washington Post about that today. We've tried
to isolate Iran, we've tried to isolate Syria, and it simply
hasn't worked. What's happened? Iran has become the most
powerful country in the region. It continues to support
terrorist organizations, it's continuing to develop its nuclear
potential. How can anyone say, today, that our policy toward
Iran is working? It is not.
Likewise, Syria--Syria has certainly been a negative force
in Iraq. It continues to support terrorist organizations in
Lebanon and the Palestinian territories.
But our policy of isolation is not working. We don't have a
lot to lose, frankly, by engaging these countries. Now, Jim and
I are not starry-eyed about this. We don't think you sit down
with these folks and immediately come to solutions. There isn't
any country on the face of the Earth that has caused us more
heartburn over the last several decades than Iran has. So,
these solutions are going to come hard.
We do not view talking as appeasement. And the argument you
mentioned a moment ago is that we enhance their influence when
we sit down with them.
The Chairman. That's what is being stated by----
Mr. Hamilton. I understand that. But, my goodness, surely
we have enough confidence in American diplomats to know, or to
think, that if they sit down with Iran, we are not putting our
stamp of approval on Iran, nor are we agreeing to concessions.
Look, you sit down to talk to people for a lot of different
reasons, and among those is to collect intelligence, to dispel
misunderstandings, and to explain our policies and a lot of
other reasons. The Iranians have a lot of influence in Iraq
today. And they are certainly part of the problem, but they
also have to be part of the solution, as well.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Baker. Mr. Chairman, we don't think they'll help us, as
I indicated. We say that in our report. On the other hand, the
engagement we're talking about is a very limited engagement,
it's to do the same thing with us that they did in Afghanistan.
And, as you probably know, the Iranians were--are members of
the so-called ``compact.'' They attended the meetings in New
York, the Iranian Foreign Minister and our Secretary of State.
So, we're not----
The Chairman. I----
Mr. Baker [continuing]. Going much----
The Chairman. Gentlemen----
Mr. Baker [continuing]. Beyond where we are.
The Chairman [continuing]. I agree with you completely. My
time is almost up.
Let me just conclude by asking you--you point out that you
would support a short-term redeployment or surge of American
combat forces to stabilize Baghdad, but you condition it in two
ways. The remainder of that sentence says, ``complemented by a
comprehensive political, economic, and diplomatic effort and if
the commanding officers ask for it.'' When you write the
report, the commanding officers were explicit that they did not
want it. General Abizaid and General Casey were explicit that
they did not want the surge. Did that in any way color your
recommendation? And do you think there is the necessary
complementary, comprehensive economic and political effort
going on? Obviously, the diplomatic is not. What about the
other two?
Mr. Hamilton. Well, Mr. Chairman, it makes all the
difference, when you talk about a surge, how it is done, for
how long it is done, for what purpose it is done, and in what
context it is done. And where we clearly say that we can
support a surge for Baghdad, or, we put it in the alternative,
for training, we also put it in the context that there must be
an effort at national reconciliation at the same time.
Now, one of the major differences we have here with the
administration, at this point, is highlighted in Mr. Hadley's
article this morning. He has this----
Mr. Baker. Yesterday.
Mr. Hamilton. Yesterday, thank you. He says, ``Ultimately,
a strategy for success must present a realistic plan for
bringing security to the people of Baghdad.'' Then, this is the
key sentence, ``This is a precondition to advancing other
goals.'' In other words, he is saying that you must have
security before you can advance other goals.
Our approach in the Iraq Study Group was that you've got to
deal with these problems comprehensively, and that if you are
focused solely on the question of security, you're not going to
get there, because you cannot isolate that security from the
other aspects of the----
The Chairman. Thank you for making----
Mr. Hamilton [continuing]. Problem.
The Chairman [continuing]. That very, very important
statement.
Mr. Baker. But let me add to that, Mr. Chairman, if I
might, the comment that I think I made in my portion of our
formal statement, and that is, when we were in Baghdad,
everybody told us--everybody told us that, ``As Baghdad goes,
so goes Iraq.'' And we believe that our forces are able to
undertake both a surge in Baghdad, under the conditions we laid
out--short term, and provided the commander on the ground
authorizes it--and the training of Iraqi forces. Our report, I
think, makes that clear, and I need to say that, because----
The Chairman. Well, it doesn't sound like that's what
Congressman Hamilton is saying.
Mr. Hamilton. Well, there's another point here that's very
important, Mr. Chairman. I'm sorry to go on and----
The Chairman. No, this is--this is the key distinction, and
it's worth you----
Mr. Hamilton. We say----
The Chairman [continuing]. Taking time----
Mr. Hamilton [continuing]. That the training of the Iraqi
forces must be the primary mission. By ``primary mission,'' we
mean we have to put the highest priority on training the Iraqi
forces. The sooner you get to that, the sooner you do it, the
sooner you are able to withdraw American forces. I don't think
you're going to be able to withdraw American forces until you
train the Iraqis. So, the highest priority is training Iraqi
forces.
Now, if your focus is all on the surge, as it has been,
frankly, up to this date--if it's all on the surge, you make
secondary the training of Iraqi forces. And we said the primary
mission has to be the Iraqi forces.
Now, I think it's a positive thing that, in Mr. Hadley's
article, he uses the words ``training and supporting Iraqi
troops will remain our military's essential''--that's what the
President said--``and primary mission. My concern about this
article, frankly, is that he then goes on to talk in some
detail about the surge and what you do to get the security of
Baghdad. He does not give us any detail about what he means by
``the primary function of training.''
Mr. Baker. At the same time, we do know that the
President's plan contemplates doubling the number of our combat
forces engaged in the training mission, so there has been an
enhancement of the training function, as we recommended. Excuse
me.
Mr. Hamilton. That was for embedding forces, I think.
The Chairman. I would love to continue this, but my time is
up.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
And, again, gentlemen, we are grateful, this country is
grateful, for the contributions that you and your eight
distinguished colleagues made, and continue to make, who served
on the Iraqi Study Commission.
In pursuing the conversation that the two of you are having
with Chairman Biden, the question of: Well, why would Iraq be
interested in cooperating?--and you both have answered it, I
think, clearly. And I would be remiss if I didn't say, which I
have a number of times, that I am strongly supportive of what
your commission has recommended.
There's an old saying, that you all are both aware of,
because you are practitioners of this business, and that is,
``Nations respond in their own self-interest.'' There is
something rather reassuring about that. That means that there's
some consistency and continuity. As you both know, what is most
dangerous is the unpredictable. And we have that, I think, in a
constant state of play with North Korea.
Now, if, as you have both articulated, that it would be in
the interest of Iran to find some solution, resolution for
their interest--not that they would like to help us out,
necessarily, we know that's not the case; and, as Secretary
Baker said, you both come at this, as your commission, very
clear-eyed; I don't think anyone would ever accuse Ed Meese,
for example, of being a squishy person on these kinds of
things--and, as you have each said, as has been framed in the
commission's report, that a comprehensive Middle East peace
deal must be part of this--you've used, a number of times,
``comprehensive''--your 79 recommendations, ``comprehensive''--
you talk about maybe a surge of troops, training, primary
mission--but what, in my opinion, has been dangerously missing
from what the President laid out the other day is that I see no
new diplomatic initiatives. I see no diplomatic focus or
efforts. Take the Hadley piece that Chairman Hamilton has just
referred to; it is all military, it is all surge. There is
training, but where is the diplomatic focus and effort?
I find it almost incomprehensible, when you talk about Iraq
and Iran and America's policy, that we won't talk with them, we
won't engage them, when, in fact, our allies, the sovereign
Government of Iraq, is engaging the Iranians. The Prime
Minister of Iraq, the President of Iraq, in and out of Tehran,
meeting. You all saw this piece in the New York Times a couple
of days ago regarding the Iranian Ambassador to Iraq saying
that the Iranians are going to deepen their political,
economic, and security ties with Iraq. But yet, the
contradiction, at least in my mind, is our Government, that we
are supportive of, in Iraq, is going down one path with the
Iranians and we're going down another.
Now, you have said, both of you today and in--again in your
report, that the outcome in Iraq is not going to come from the
military, it's going to come from a comprehensive policy, which
you've articulated rather clearly. But, again, what I heard
from the President--another carrier battle group in the Persian
Gulf, Patriot antimissile batteries going in, more troops--as
well as the Hadley piece. And I think there's rather
significant evidence of further focus on this administration's
policy.
So, my question is, then: If all of this is playing out, as
the two of you have noted today and is articulated quite
clearly in your commission report, then what do you believe is
the outcome? It seems to me folly to believe, as Chairman
Hamilton has said--the Iranians are already in there, they
already have an immense amount of influence--that we can't stop
that. That is part of it. I mean, let's be real here. Many of
the senior Iraqi Government officials were exiled in Iran
during Saddam Hussein's time. So, I think we somehow are
getting a foggy sense of this.
So, my question to each of you is: If all these dynamics
are in play, as you have just noted, then where is this going?
Where is this going without any American diplomatic effort
here, or initiative, to try to frame up the very things that
you have all focused on in your 79 recommendations?
Mr. Baker. Well, Senator, there are diplomatic efforts.
That's mentioned, of course, in Steve Hadley's piece. And, by
the way, before we say that that piece only deals with surge,
let's remember that there are resolutions pending up here to,
in effect, say the surge is not a national interest, so, quite
naturally, he's going to concentrate on the surge in his piece.
The President has said that the training is the essential
mission for our--us in Iraq. And Steve has said that training
and supporting Iraqi troops will remain our military's
essential and primary mission. Now, I think we ought to take
that--take them at their word, and we ought to be glad that
they are, in effect, reiterating one of the principal
recommendations of our Iraq Study Group.
But, you know, when we talk about ``talking to Iran''--and
neither Lee nor I are suggesting that you just talk to them
about incentives. We say, in fact, in here, that when we
contemplate talking to Syria or Iran, we talk about using
incentives and disincentives. I think, to some extent, that's
what you're seeing happening now, when you talk about carrier
battle groups and so forth.
And our report also makes clear, Senator Hagel, that we
don't think Iran will talk to us about helping in Iraq, the way
they did in Afghanistan, even though they might fear a chaotic
Iraq. We don't think it's going to happen. But we still think
we ought to make the proffer. And, as I indicated earlier, we
have sat down with Iran, in the compact group, at the level of
Foreign Minister, so it's not as if nothing's being done.
Where I think we're missing the boat, if I might jump ahead
a little bit--and I know Lee probably has comment on this,
too--where I think we're really missing the boat is Syria. I
think we have tremendous opportunity here to perhaps move them
away from a marriage of convenience with Iran. And in our
report, on page--let me refer you to page 56 and 57--we lay
out, in specific detail there, Senator Hagel, what we ought to
be talking to Syria about. And it's--there are a lot of issues.
But they're things that Syria is--has to deal with. We lay it
all out there. And I really hope that, if you haven't focused
on that--the committee--that you'll focus on it. I think
there's a real opportunity there to move them away from Iran
without giving up anything, where--you know, as Lee said, we're
not talking about starry-eyed naive--talking to them about
giving them this or that without getting something that's
really important for us. But if we were able to flip Syria away
from Iran and back toward where I think they would like to be,
based on a 2\1/2\- to 3-hour discussion I had at the--with the
President's approval--with the Syrian Foreign Minister, I think
they're ready to come back. And what could we do? We could get
them to get Hamas, which is headquartered in Damascus, to
recognize Israel's right to exist. Boy, would that be a step in
the right direction. You'd give Israel a negotiating partner on
the Palestinian track. I think we could cut off the flow of
arms to Hezbollah, because Syria is the transit point for all
of those. And I'm not--we're not suggesting you give up
anything. Certainly you hold their feet to the fire on the
investigations going on with the assassinations in Lebanon; you
get them to stop screwing around in Lebanon, to the degree and
extent that they have been; you get them to do a better job of
closing their borders.
So, that's a long-winded answer to your question, and I
know Lee wants to add to all of it.
Mr. Hamilton. Let me just----
Senator Hagel. Before I ask the chairman to respond, Mr.
Secretary, you still didn't answer the question. But what's
interesting about your point is, you used the term ``if'' more
than once--``if Syria''--and I--by the way, I agree with
everything you've just said. But that isn't the case, that's
not reality, unless this administration changes, rather
significantly, its direction. So, your ``ifs, ifs, ifs'' are
not the reality of what we're dealing with.
Mr. Baker. The ``ifs'' relate--that's why we have to talk
to them, Senator.
Senator Hagel. I'm a--I agree with you. Is the President
listening to this? He--as of today at 1 o'clock, what you have
just talked about--``if, if, if''--that isn't where the
administration is going.
Mr. Hamilton. Senator----
Mr. Baker. Well, I didn't suggest that it was. I----
Senator Hagel. I asked you----
Mr. Baker. I know that.
Senator Hagel [continuing]. What you thought was the
outcome of the reality of where we're going. And--but that
isn't reality, when you say, ``Well, if we would do this, if we
would do this.''
Mr. Baker. Well, they aren't--the administration is--they
are pursuing a diplomatic approach, not the one, necessarily,
that we lay out in here, perhaps----
Senator Hagel. Well, can you----
Mr. Baker [continuing]. Not as----
Senator Hagel [continuing]. Define that diplomatic
approach?
Mr. Baker. Yes. They're lining up our historic allies in
the region to enlist them in adopting the same policy toward
Iran that we have, which is a policy of isolation. Now, they
are doing that. And they are also doing--Secretary Rice has
lined up--I think it's confirmed--a meeting between President
Abbas of the Palestinian National Authority, and Prime Minister
Olmert, so she's working the Israeli-Palestinian track, not
working the Israeli-Syrian or -Lebanese track right now, but
they are--they are pursuing diplomacy, it's just not as broad
and extensive as what we recommend.
Senator Hagel. Well, thank you. And I know I'm over my
time, but I do want to get the chairman's point on this.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Hamilton. Well, let me make one point, very quickly,
about talking with Iran. In today's context, part of the reason
for talks with Iran is to prevent the unnecessary inadvertent
escalation of tensions. That can become hugely important in the
days ahead.
Now, in listening to your question, Senator, I think you've
got it right when you understand that in order to be effective
in Iraq, you have to integrate all of the tools of American
power. You cannot just emphasize the military and expect to
succeed. You cannot just emphasize diplomatic. You cannot just
emphasize political and economic. You have to integrate. And
this is the tough challenge in Iraq.
Now, part of the use of the tools of American power is the
tool that Secretary Baker--Jim--has been talking about, and
that is the diplomatic offensive. I want you to take a careful
look if--you've probably already done it--at our
recommendations on the new diplomatic offensive. We recommended
that it be launched in December; in other words, immediately.
We believe there is a genuine urgency about it. And then, look
at the countries that we talked about. All of the attention, of
course, has been on Iran and Syria, for understandable reasons.
But when we're talking about this new diplomatic initiative,
we're talking about engaging the Arab League, we're talking
about engaging all of the key regional states, we're talking
about the states bordering Iraq, we're talking about the
European Union, possibly Germany, Japan, South Korea. In other
words, we need a lot of help in stabilizing things in Iraq. And
we think there is a high degree of urgency needed on a
diplomatic offensive.
I take the initial steps by Secretary Rice to be positive.
I think they're very modest, but they're positive. But we
certainly need to build on them, and we need to build on them
with a much, much greater sense of urgency than I see.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Senator Dodd [presiding]. Thank you.
Senator Biden's out of the room momentarily, so I'm now in
command here. I'm going to deal myself several hours, here, of
questioning. [Laughter.]
Well, thank you both. And you've heard this repeatedly from
others, and I'm sure you'll convey this to your colleagues who
did the work over these 9 or 10 months, it was a tremendous
effort, and I think all of us in the country are grateful to
both of you for putting your time and effort.
I've read this so many times, I can almost quote it without
reading it, but it just deserves being repeated over again. The
opening sentence in your executive summary in December, ``The
situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating.'' That sentence
is a compelling sentence. And, skipping down to the next
paragraph, ``Our most important recommendations call for new
and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the
region and a change in the primary mission of U.S. forces in
Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to move its
combat forces out of Iraq responsibly. These recommendations,
the two recommendations, are equally important and reinforce
one another.''
I'd want you to--to come back to Syria in a minute, and I
want to thank Secretary Baker for talking about it. We were in
Syria, Senator Kerry and I, in December, and we were in
Lebanon, as well as Jordan and Israel, and in Iraq. And we had
Embassy people in the room there. This was obviously a
conversation, but, as I said, what went on there, the offer to
really work with the United States and others--the first time
in 24 years you have an exchange of ambassadors between Baghdad
and Damascus. Maliki, the Prime Minister, was in exile in
Damascus during much of that period of Saddam Hussein's rule.
They were exchanging ministers back and forth. And I don't want
to exaggerate the point, but when asked, to Assad, what his
goals were in Iraq, his answer was, ``I want a pluralistic Arab
State. We're not interested in having an Iranian Shia-dominated
fundamentalist state.'' Now, it was said in English in a
private meeting. I'm repeating what he said to us in that room,
and it was reported in cable traffic back. I'm not going to
verify for the voracity of the statement, but it seems to me if
two United States Senators, in the presence of Embassy
personnel, have a President of Syria saying this is what he's
interested in, why wouldn't you pursue that, in my view? I
called the State Department when I got back, and repeated
privately what the answer was. This was now 2\1/2\ months ago.
You could prove me wrong. Maybe he was just saying that for our
consumption, maybe it was a political trick. I don't know what
the purpose was. It also may have been true, in which case, it
seems to me, we are wasting valuable time to get someone with
whom we have significant disagreements on a variety of issues,
but who may agree with us on this issue, to play a constructive
role.
And so, I, at some point, would like both of you to respond
to whether or not you believe the situation is still as you
describe it in the first sentence, or maybe worse, today, as we
approach the month of February; and, second, as a practical
matter, on the surge question, putting 17,000 young men and
women in a city of 6 million people where there are 23 militias
operating, not to mention Baathist insurgents, maybe some al-
Qaeda elements--how is this in any way going to enhance the
recommendations you make here, given the goal would be to
either arrest or engage Shia or Sunni militias, which, in an
article written by Fareed Zakaria, it talks about failing or
succeeding absolutely makes the goal of political
reconciliation maybe that much more difficult, even if it
succeeds, because, once we've engaged these elements, rather
than figure out ways to bring them together, you get further
away from the strong recommendation you make about internal
reconciliation, political reconciliation.
So, I'd like you to respond to how, in any way, you can see
this surge contributing to the very recommendations, the most
serious recommendations you make in your report.
So, on Syria--and, Secretary Baker, you might just, for the
purpose of discussion here, share with us your experience back
in October--it was--1991, the gulf war. I know I've heard you
talk about 15 trips to Syria. I think you said it was the 15th
trip.
Mr. Baker. I made 16 trips.
Senator Dodd. Well, it might be----
Mr. Baker [continuing]. Senator----
Senator Dodd [continuing]. Constructive just to talk about
that and how long it took and why you did it.
Mr. Baker. Let me just say that, at the time, it was not
particularly popular to talk to Syria. On the 16th trip, Syria
changed 25 years of policy refusing to sit down to negotiate
peace with Israel, and they came to the Madrid Conference and
sat down and negotiated peace with Israel. Syria, at that time,
was on our list of states that sponsored terrorism, but we
talked to them, we spent a lot of time, we practiced diplomacy
full time, and it paid off.
Senator Dodd. On the 16th trip.
Mr. Baker. On the 16th trip. Now, let me just say, with
respect--one other thing with respect to Syria and your comment
about it--their exchanging ambassadors with Iraq----
Senator Dodd. Yes.
Mr. Baker [continuing]. And that they--and that Assad wants
a secular Iraq, which is quite true. But Syria, if we could--if
we could--and I believe we can--move them away from their--
again, their marriage of convenience with Iran, that would do a
lot--that would do a lot more than, I think, we are able to do
right now to marginalize Iran.
Senator Dodd. Right.
Mr. Baker. And it would--and it would really help us with
Hezbollah and Hamas. If the Syrian Foreign Minister--and I have
no reason to think he is not right--if he's right that Hamas
officers are in Damascus, if they could get Hamas to come--to
recognize Israel's right to exist, maybe they could get a unity
government with Fatah, and then you'd have a negotiating
partner for Israel with the Palestinians. It would be a huge
step in the right direction.
Senator Dodd. He also added, by the way--and I just say
this to you--we asked about a direct negotiation between Syria
and Israel. In the past, the Golan has been the precondition.
Mr. Baker. That's right.
Senator Dodd. He said, ``I'm dropping the precondition. I'd
negotiate without--I want the Golan back,'' he said, ``but I'm
not going to make it a precondition.''
Mr. Baker. That is the key, of course, to an ultimate
peace. There--someday--and hopefully in my, and in your,
lifetime, Senator--there will be peace between Israel and
Syria. I believe there will be. That will be the key. We
mention that in our report, but we go further--further, I
think, than any other--than any administration has gone to
date--and we suggest that we give Israel a United States
security guarantee in order to assuage their concern--their
security concerns in the event that they were to trade the
Golan for a full, complete, and secure peace with Syria.
Mr. Hamilton. Senator, let me make a few comments, if I
may, first of all on the Syrian matter. I think there are a lot
of indications coming out of Syria today, including your
conversations, which indicate that they're very, very
interested in engagement with the United States. Not all of
those are official contacts, like yours, but there are many,
many contacts in the nonofficial private sector. They are
sending signals to us.
Now, when you stop to think about it, the alliance between
Syria and Iran is an unnatural one. Syria is Sunni, Iran is
Shia. And it's not something that is bound to stay permanent.
And we ought to be, as Jim has said, ready to exploit that.
You also asked about the trend line since the Iraqi
report----
Senator Dodd. Right.
Mr. Hamilton [continuing]. Was issued. I don't think the
trends have gotten much better. December was the deadliest
month of the year for 2006. We had 108 fatalities in that
month. The United Nations reported, recently, 3.7 million
refugees since we issued our report. That's one in eight
Iraqis. Saddam Hussein's execution made him a martyr in the
Arab world, in the manner in which it was handled. Oil
production is still down below prewar levels. General Petraeus
testified before one of your committees the other day, that
life is a daily struggle to survive in Iraq. And the end of the
year passed and the Iraqi Government hasn't met--still hasn't
met any of these benchmarks. These benchmarks are all agreed
upon, they've been known for months, but still have not met
those benchmarks. What's happening? Why are they not acting to
meet those benchmarks? And weeks have passed since our report
came out. And, of course, the American people, the polls show
very clearly they continue to sour on this war. So, the trend
lines are not positive with regard to Iraq since the report
came out. They continue to be negative.
Senator Dodd. But to go back to the first question I asked:
As a practical matter, given the number of troops we're going
to place on the ground in Baghdad, given the size of that city,
the number of militias operating, given your strong
recommendations here, the two strong recommendations, how does
that in any way contribute to achieving the goals that you two
have outlined, along with your colleagues, in this report in
December?
Mr. Hamilton. Well, it----
Senator Dodd. Putting 17,000 kids----
Mr. Hamilton. I know----
Senator Dodd [continuing]. In a cauldron like Baghdad.
Mr. Hamilton. I understand. It is possible, Senator, that
the infusion of 20,000 additional troops will bring about--as
the Generals said to us, and they didn't recommend it, it is
possible, if you put in a lot of additional troops into a
fairly localized area, you can bring about a temporary
improvement in the situation there. That could happen with the
surge. We hope it does happen. But--I'm not predicting it, but
it could happen.
Senator Dodd. But even if it does succeed, don't you run
the risk of keeping the Shia and Sunni further apart, given the
policing role they'll function, which runs directly contrary to
exactly what we're trying to achieve here, and that is
political reconciliation.
Mr. Baker. I don't think so, Senator. I don't think you run
the risk of--you can't--you couldn't get them much further
apart today than they are in Baghdad. And let me say, one more
time, everybody we talk to says that, ``As Baghdad goes, so
goes Iraq.'' And one of our first tentative conclusions was
that we needed to put even more forces into Baghdad, but we
concluded we didn't have them available. Now, that was not a
conclusion of the Iraq Study Group, it was an informal
discussion we had among ourselves.
So, I guess the bottom line--my bottom line on the surge
is, look, the President's plan ought to be given a chance. Give
it a chance. Because we heard all of this. The general that you
confirmed, 81 to nothing, day before yesterday, this is his
idea. He's the supporter of it. He's now the commander on the
ground in Iraq. Give it a chance.
The Chairman [presiding]. Senator Sununu.
Senator Sununu. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, to both of you. Congressman Hamilton, I well
remember serving in the House with you, and, while I'm sure you
don't remember it--there's no reason that you should--I always
found it extremely helpful, whether I was voting with you or
against you, to ask you why you were voting the way you were.
And it always seemed to be revealing of some aspect of the
debate that I didn't have the opportunity to consider. So, I
very much appreciate you both being here.
And I enjoyed, to the extent that anyone could, reading the
Study Group Report, and I will make the observation, as I've
made to a number of people who asked me about it, some of them
being in the press, it was very clearly written. I mean, it
wasn't--it was a dark assessment, in many ways, but it was
clear, it was direct, and it was to the point, which makes it
especially ironic that, over the last 3 or 4 weeks, everyone
has looked at that report and walked away with it perceiving,
in some ways, what they wanted to perceive, that they used it
to reinforce preconceptions rather than to engage in a
discussion of how best to implement as many of the
recommendations in the report, the vast majority of which I
agree with. And, in fact, to that end, some of my colleagues
probably read the benchmarks that come out every week about
what's happening, and, you know, we've mentioned electricity
and the performance--our performance and the Iraqi performance
on electricity has been an absolute disaster. But I noted that,
last week, the oil output, the exports of oil, plummeted, I
mean, to the lowest level, perhaps, in 3 or 4 years. And,
fortunately--I didn't have to make too much of a commotion--
there was a footnote; the reason for that was that they finally
installed meters. They went to the port, and they installed
meters, so that they could actually measure throughput, which
is, you know, one of the recommendations, in the oil sector,
that you made. And it is a shame, in some ways, that it's taken
so long. I've talked a great deal in this committee about the
importance of distribution of oil revenues and actually
measuring economic performance, because you want to enfranchise
people economically, and that's the way to do it. So, there is
a recommendation that I think we've made progress on.
Unfortunately, in other areas, perhaps not so much.
Secretary Baker, I want to ask a question about
conditionality. You mentioned conditionality. First, what
specific conditions should we look at and consider most
strongly? And, second, on conditions, or on encouraging Iraqis
to take the various steps, measures that we've encouraged them
to do on oil and elections and in reconciliation, are there
other methods to facilitate their active engagement on these
issues, or are hard conditions the best way to do it?
Mr. Baker. Well, we--Senator, we call for, in our report,
additional benchmarks to be worked out with the Iraqi
Government, in addition to those benchmarks that the
administration has already come up with. We suggest that they
be tied to specific dates. We do not--we do not spell out, in
exquisite detail, the conditionality, but we have that one
sentence that I read in my part of the prepared statement that
says if they don't meet these benchmarks, the United States
should either make it clear or reduce--I guess we said ``should
reduce its political, military, or economic support.'' And we
wrote it that way intentionally. It's general, it's a bit
vague, but the administration would then have, we think, all
the flexibility they need to say, ``If you don't do this, we're
going to take this away or do this. If you don't do that, we're
going to take that away or do that.'' I mean, there's a lot of
flexibility in there, but we make it very clear that there
ought to be conditionality.
Senator Sununu. Understood that you don't want to be more
specific. Let me ask you a question, though, about approaching
the Iraqis on conditions. Simply put, there are two ways to do
it. You can do it publicly and make it known what you expect
them to do, and, in return, what conditions you're going to
impose on it. Or you can ask--or you can make the point
privately.
Mr. Baker. Well, let me just----
Senator Sununu. Two questions. One, which is more
effective? And, or two, what do you--what factors do you use to
determine whether you're private in your setting conditions----
Mr. Baker. I was just whispering----
Senator Sununu [continuing]. Or public?
Mr. Baker. I was just whispering to Lee, this is the very
debate that we had, on any many occasions, in--during the
preparation of this report, because Lee wanted us to be--to say
that the President should lay it all out there publicly, and,
in effect, make a public statement or a threat. And maybe it
was because I was a former Secretary of State, I thought it
might be better done privately.
Senator Sununu. I'm sorry to have driven such a sharp
wedge----
Mr. Baker. Well----
Senator Sununu [continuing]. Between the two of you.
Mr. Baker [continuing]. You didn't--no; you didn't. The
wedge was there, but we worked it out. And I think sometimes
publicly it might work better. Generally speaking, I think that
it--sometimes when you do it publicly, you put a government in
a position to where it can't take the action you want them to
take.
Mr. Hamilton. Senator, first of all, I want to say that
neither Jim nor I can claim credit for the clear writing. The
people that did it are sitting behind us here----
Mr. Baker. That's right.
Mr. Hamilton. Chris Kojm and John Williams and Ben Rhodes.
They're the gentlemen who deserve the credit for that.
I was amused by your comment that everybody reads the
report and sees something in it they can support. I suppose
that's the result of a bipartisan effort. And there isn't any
doubt that we tried to deal pragmatically and realistically
with the political situation in two countries--Baghdad and
Washington--and to reach an agreement--and, as you know, that's
not easy to do.
I think Jim's expressed my view on conditionality. I--quite
frankly, I've lost my patience with Maliki. He has known what
he needs to do for a long time. I would give preference to an
approach that deals with it privately, but we've used that
approach for better than a half a year now, and it hasn't
worked. And I think we've got to put the screws on this fellow.
Senator Sununu. I want to ask a question, next, about
discussions, not necessarily negotiations, but involved
discussions with those in the region--in particular, Syria and
Iran--but it could apply to any adversary. When those countries
come up, there are two specific concerns that are raised, or at
least that I've heard raised over again. And I want you to
respond to both of them. One concern is that we're reluctant to
engage in discussions because the counterpart might insist on
something that we're not prepared to agree to or that we may
find unacceptable. The second concern that's often raised, or
point that's often made, is that the adversary understands what
they need to do and what we want them to do, so there's no
point in speaking with them. Can you address both of those
concerns?
Mr. Hamilton. Well, on the first point, if they will insist
on us doing something that we object to, we just tell them no.
Do we have no confidence in American diplomats? Do we assume
that, if the American diplomats sit down at the table with
them, they're just going to agree to everything? My goodness,
no. So, all you've got to do is say no. And, believe you me,
there would be plenty of things they'd ask us to do that we'd
say no to.
On the second point, the adversaries----
Senator Sununu. That they know everything they need----
Mr. Hamilton. They know----
Senator Sununu [continuing]. To do, we've already
instructed or----
Mr. Hamilton. Well, look----
Senator Sununu [continuing]. Given an indication of what
our objectives are.
Mr. Hamilton. It's very easy to sit in Washington and
speculate about the intentions and the motivations of the other
side. And you can--you know, every op-ed is filled with these
guesses. They're guesses. We don't really know. Now, we can
make an educated guess, but we don't really know. The only way
you really know is to put them down at the table and test them.
And you may not get it the first time, either, but you may get
it the 50th time when you talk to them.
I just find rather disconcerting the speculation that we
enter into about the intent of the other side with such
assurance. Now, we may be right, and we may also be wrong.
Senator Sununu. Thank you both very much.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, and Congressman Hamilton, who I had the
privilege of serving with in the House and under your
leadership as the chairman of the International Relations
Committee, I appreciate both of your work. And I appreciate a
lot of what you put in the Iraq Study Report.
My sense--and I've tried to pursue this with Secretary Rice
when she was here earlier today with Ambassador Negroponte in
his confirmation hearing--is that, while our focus has been,
obviously on the President's escalation, it seems to me that
everything I read from your report, the whole assessment part
of it, for starters, speaks volumes on the urgency of the
moment. And second, that that urgency is overwhelmingly in the
context of having a diplomatic surge. When I look at the
assessments that you made about how Iraq has an elected
government that acts in a sectarian context; at the corruption
that is involved; at the lack of capacity that is involved, by
virtue of de-Baathification; of an Iraqi Army where the equal-
number divisions sign up only to serve in certain parts of the
country, unwilling to respond to a national context, and a
whole host of other things--it just seems to me that when I see
the President's response, which I personally disagree with, I
don't understand how we have not seen a surge in all of the
diplomacy and the actions necessary to achieve all those other
elements that are really about success. When we speak about
success in Iraq, in my mind that's what success is.
So, my question is: Is there not a real sense of urgency?
Has much changed since you issued your report, in the context
of that assessment? Third, you refer to benchmarks in the
report, but is it not necessary to have benchmarks with some
form of conditionality? Whether it is timeframe or
consequential, or for not meeting in some way? Because we've
had benchmarks, and those benchmarks have, many times, not been
achieved. So, at the end of the day, benchmarks without
consequences are aspirations, nothing else. I'd like to hear
some of your responses in those three areas: Sense of urgency,
a sense of having the surge be more diplomatic than anything
else, and the consequences--the necessity to have benchmarks
with real consequences, combination deadlines and/or actual
consequences that are invoked for not meeting them, when we
believe that they're not being met.
Mr. Baker. Senator, we just had a--we just had a colloquy
here about conditionality on the benchmarks, and we think there
should be conditionality. There should be consequences. I don't
want to speak for Lee, but I believe he would agree with the
statement that I think there's a sense of urgency here in our
report with respect to all of our recommendations because of
the grave and deteriorating situation we found in Iraq as we
studied this problem. And so, I don't know that you can say
that there's no sense of urgency with respect to military, but
there is with respect to diplomatic--I think there's a sense of
urgency with respect to both.
Do you want to add anything?
Mr. Hamilton. Well, Senator, as you correctly note, in the
report there is a sense of urgency almost with every
recommendation, whether it's diplomatic or changing the mission
of American forces or conditionality, or other aspects of the
report. So, the urgency is clearly there. We do not believe we
have a lot of time. We've got to get this right, and we've got
to get it right pretty quickly, because events are continuing
to move against us. I spelled out those events a moment ago, I
think before you were in the room, that are moving against us
since we issued our report. And so, all of us have a great
sense of urgency.
And with regard to the surge, we say in the report that we
can support a surge but that is in the context of doing a lot
of other things at the same time, including political,
diplomatic, and economic action.
Senator Menendez. But, with all due respect----
Mr. Hamilton. You have to integrate all of these things.
Senator Menendez. With all due respect, do you sense that
this administration has captured that same sense of urgency on
these other matters?
Mr. Hamilton. No; I do not. I think that, for example, on
the conditionality question, the President's approach has been,
``I must try to give Mr. Maliki confidence.'' And he has been
unwilling to be critical of Mr. Maliki. Now, maybe that's the
approach by which you would begin. I think you're at a point
now where you have to bear down on the Maliki government
because of their nonperformance over a period of time. And if
they don't perform, and if they don't perform pretty quickly,
then we will lose it. I don't care how many troops you put in
there, we're going to lose it. They must begin to perform, and
they must begin to perform promptly.
Senator Menendez. We've heard about the escalation of the
war, and what we've heard, starting with Secretary Rice and
others, is that the Iraqis will be at the forefront of this and
we'll be assisting them. And then we've heard testimony quite
to the contrary of that. I looked at your report, and clearly,
based upon that report's assessment of Iraqi troop strength,
capability, preparedness, and willingness to fight in a
national context, and surge is just simply not there at this
time.
Mr. Hamilton. Well, you're correct. The surge is not a new
idea. We've had several surges there. And what has been very
clear is that the Iraqi forces have not performed. They didn't
show up, on some occasions, or they showed up much fewer in
strength than we had anticipated. Now, the argument is made
that things have changed, that they're ready to go. I hope
that's the case. But we certainly haven't seen solid evidence
of that up to this point.
Senator Menendez. Well, it seems to me we're rolling the
dice on putting 20-some-odd-thousand extra troops up first, in
the hope and expectation of a quantity that has been proven to
date not to meet the obligations that we would want to see, and
that, therefore, if the troop strength isn't there, their
ability to fight in a national context isn't there. If we're
told that that's what's necessary and they're going to lead the
way and we're going to follow them, and if all of the
diplomatic efforts necessary, and conditionality on benchmarks
necessary are not being pursued with the urgency that is
needed, I don't understand how we are moving forward, in this
context, to success.
Mr. Hamilton. What we said was, ``If you do the things we
recommend, we have a chance, and we----
Senator Menendez. But the clock is ticking.
Mr. Hamilton [continuing]. ``And we believe there is a
chance, at this point.'' In other words, we did not, in the
Iraq Study Group Report, come to the conclusion that it was
hopeless, and, therefore, we should just pull out immediately.
We believe, if a lot of things happen, quickly, there is a
chance we can succeed. Now, you can get into some dispute as to
definitions of ``success,'' but we can reasonably succeed. But
we recognize that that is a very, very daunting challenge, and
we recognize that you've got to get at it with a great sense of
urgency.
The questions you are raising relate to the competence of
the Iraqi Government. Can they perform? There isn't any doubt,
in the President's proposals and in ours, that we are depending
on--very heavily--an improvement in the performance of the
Iraqi Government. Will it happen? I don't know. If it doesn't
happen, then the result will be very, very bad. But if we can
put this together, there's a chance we can reasonably succeed.
We do believe that we have a lot of interests in this
region that need to be protected, and we think that we have to
behave very carefully and very responsibly in order to protect
those interests. And we, therefore, rejected the idea of just
pulling out immediately.
But it does make you uneasy--there is no doubt it--it makes
you uneasy when you have to depend on this government, which,
as you say, hasn't performed very well in the past. But what
other alternative do you have?
Mr. Baker. One of the purposes----
Mr. Hamilton. You can't go out on the street of Baghdad and
pick 10 people and put your confidence in them. This is a duly
elected government, it is a democratically elected government.
It has a lot of problems, but it does have a basic legitimacy.
Therefore, you have to deal with it.
Mr. Baker. Senator, one of the purposes of the surge, as
I'm sure you heard from General Petraeus when you confirmed
him, is to give the Iraqi Government a little more running room
in order to help it achieve national reconciliation by tamping
down the violence, or pacifying, if you will, Baghdad.
Let me, if I might, Mr. Chairman, read from the report with
respect to this issue of a surge, because there are only two
conditions upon our support for a surge. One is that it be
short term, and the other is that it be--is that it be called
for by the commander in Iraq. President Bush said this is not
an open-ended commitment. Secretary Gates said this is a
temporary surge. And, of course, General Petraeus is the guy
that's to carry it out, and he was the person that originally
recommended it. This is the--this is the language, and all of
the language, of the report with respect to a surge, ``We
could, however, support a short-term redeployment or surge of
American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad or to speed up the
training-and-equipping mission if the United States commander
in Iraq determines that such steps would be effective.'' The
only two conditions are: Short term, commander in Iraq
determines it would be effective. Both of those conditions have
been met, unless you disbelieve the President and his National
Security Advisor and General Petraeus.
Mr. Hamilton. I do think, Senator, in addition to what
Secretary Baker said, is that we recommended the surge but we
believe that that surge has to take place in the context of a
lot of other things happening, including political action,
diplomatic action, and economic action. And that sentence that
is quoted about the surge--that sentence that is quoted in the
report--is in a section that talks about the importance of
national reconciliation.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. I just would
note that giving the Iraqis running room suggests that they're
ready to run the race. And, second, I know the temporary
nature, Mr. Secretary, that you cited in the report. A problem
is that, as presented to us, there's no timeframe here
whatsoever. So, it may be suggested that it is temporary, but
there's no clear timeframe as to how long these troops would be
committed.
Mr. Baker. The Secretary of Defense says it's going to be a
temporary surge, and the President says it's not going to be
open-ended, and then there have been some suggestions from some
quarters--and, again, I don't know whether this came up in
General Petraeus's hearing in the--before Armed Services--but
there were some suggestions that we would pretty well know
whether this works by the summer or early fall. I don't know
exactly who said it, but I know it's out there.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I want to make it clear what I
read--your statement--was the appendix 1 on your July 11, 2007,
statement that you and----
Mr. Baker. You mean January 11?
The Chairman. January 11, 2007. It says ``Statement of Co-
Chairs, January 11, 2007, Appendix 1, James Baker, Lee
Hamilton.'' I'm not in any way contradicting what you're
saying. I wanted you to understand where I got the phrase----
Mr. Baker. Yes; I see it there.
The Chairman. The phrase I got was ``complemented by''--it
says ``The Iraq Study Group indicated it could support a short-
term redeployment or surge of American combat forces to
stabilize Baghdad complemented by comprehensive political,
economic, and diplomatic----
Mr. Baker. That's right.
The Chairman [continuing]. ``Efforts.'' I assume that's the
context that----
Mr. Baker. That's the----
The Chairman [continuing]. Secretary Baker----
Mr. Baker [continuing]. Context.
The Chairman [continuing]. Was talking about. I didn't mean
to imply, if you thought I did, that the actual page 72 said
that.
Mr. Baker. Thank you.
The Chairman. Now, everyone's being very generous. The
ranking member is here, as is Senator Coleman, and they both
had indicated that, since Senator Voinovich has been here, they
would be prepared to yield to him to go next.
I want to make it clear, I'm going to be stepping out of
the room, and, in my absence, I'd ask Senator Dodd to chair
this, but we're going to promise, we're going to try to get you
out of here around 3 o'clock. So, lots of luck in your senior
year. But, at any rate, all kidding aside, I appreciate your
patience.
Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank both of you for your service to your
country. Lee, you have been involved in numerous public service
projects and committees. And, Secretary Baker, we are fortunate
to have you contribute your insight and best judgment on the
Iraq issue. You have certainly been through the mill over the
years.
When the President's new plan for a troop surge in Iraq was
announced, I indicated that I was skeptical of it because,
first of all, Generals Casey and Abizaid--whom we have long
relied upon-- were not enthusiastic about it, and many other
experts and witnesses believed a surge might exacerbate the
situation and make America a greater target for attacks in
Iraq.
I also considered the hearings that we had earlier in the
war. And, Mr. Chairman, at that time, we were given the
impression that certain critical activities needed to accompany
our invasion. We discussed political issues, security,
infrastructure, economy, and we believed the administration was
sufficiently planning for these things. Jay Garner was sent to
Iraq as the post-war administrator and had begun to implement
some of his plans, but then suddenly Garner was replaced by L.
Paul Bremer, who pulled the plug on much of the progress and
existing structure in the Iraqi society. So, my confidence in
the fastidiousness necessary to our current work is a little
low.
You said that you support both the surge and
``comprehensive political, economic, and diplomatic efforts.''
Deputy Secretary Negroponte was here today and we asked him
whether or not the diplomatic issue had been carried as far as
possible. Of course, Secretary Rice has been out talking with
other nations, but it seems to me that at this stage of the
game I don't think that we have made the diplomatic efforts
that we need to make. I'd like your comment on that.
Second, concerning economic issues, some officials were
here discussing Provisional Reconstruction Teams, and we found
out that they have about $11 billion in their treasury but
don't know how to spend it properly.
So it seems these conditions that you laid out as part of
the surge have not been met. I would like your opinion on that.
You also mentioned that America's commitment is not open-
ended, but when does it end? What does that mean? How do you
determine that? Are there measures in place that we can use to
determine whether conditions warranting America's continued
support have actually been met?
I'd like you to comment on that.
Mr. Baker. Senator, I'll comment on the first part, because
it was the same discussion we just had with the chairman.
The diplomatic, economic, and so forth, complementary
issues are not conditions to the surge. The surge is
conditioned--our approval of a surge is conditioned only by the
fact that it be short term and, second, that it be approved by
the commander in Iraq.
Senator Voinovich. When you said ``short term,'' what do
you mean?
Mr. Baker. Yes; OK. ``Short term,'' I've already set out
the--you have to look at Secretary Gates's comment, ``this is a
temporary surge.'' Now, does that mean 2 months? Does that mean
12 months? I can't answer that. The President said it's not
going to be open-ended. Now, has there been a specific date put
on there? No; there hasn't. The commander on the ground, we
think--and I think the President obviously feels--has to have
the flexibility to conduct the surge in the best manner
possible to pacify Baghdad, so you don't have a date put on it.
But the language that you read is context language as to--as
Chairman Hamilton has indicated. Those are not conditions to
our approval of a surge.
Mr. Hamilton. Well, Senator, I agree with your observation.
The diplomatic effort has not been full enough. I said,
earlier, that I thought Secretary Rice's trip was a positive
step. But if you look at the recommendations we make, we really
make recommendations for a very, very comprehensive diplomatic
offensive in which we engage all of the countries in the
region, the Perm 5, the Arab League, and a lot of others, not
all at once, but in stages. And we see that diplomatic effort
as a very important reinforcing mechanism, along with the other
steps you take internally in Iraq, in order to bring stability
to Iraq. And we think there is a real urgency to that
diplomatic effort, that we cannot proceed with ``business as
usual'' here. We think it's terribly important----
Senator Voinovich. But do you think it would be easier to
begin that urgent diplomatic effort in the region now or later?
Do you think that now is the time to clearly state that
ultimately we are leaving Iraq?
Mr. Hamilton. Look, I think things in Iraq continue to go
down. We don't have the time to wait on any of the
recommendations we made. I feel a real sense of urgency on all
of these recommendations. We recommended that the diplomatic
offensive that we spell out start in December 2006. And here we
are, almost February 2007, and a very modest step, I think, has
been taken.
Senator Voinovich. Well I----
Mr. Hamilton. Now, on the----
Senator Voinovich [continuing]. I think that the American
people probably would feel a whole lot better if we had already
started the diplomatic effort recommended by the Iraq Study
Group or had announced that we are aggressively going to do it,
or at least if we got Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki to say that
he needs help from his neighbors and then have him convene
them.
Mr. Hamilton. I agree with that. You asked about ``not an
open-ended commitment.'' We're quite specific here about what
the Iraqis must do, and we are demanding that they make, in the
phrase of the report, ``substantial progress'' toward very
specific goals that are broadly agreed upon, and that if they
do not make substantial progress, then we are going to reduce
our commitment. Now, how much time do you give them to make
substantial progress? Well, I guess people would vary in their
judgment about that, and, at the end of the day, it's going to
be the President's call what constitutes ``substantial
progress,'' and how quickly. The point we make is that you set
out these benchmarks, they have to make substantial progress in
hitting those benchmarks pretty soon, in our judgment, or we're
going to reduce our commitment. If you do not get a bona fide
effort by the Iraqi Government to perform--in governance, in
national reconciliation, and in carrying their share of the
load on security, recognizing they're going to need some United
States help--then there is no way that the United States is
going to succeed there, no matter what we do. The Iraqi
Government has to perform.
Mr. Baker. Senator, if you look at the President's speech
of January 10--and I mentioned this in my opening remarks--he
says--he talks about increasing the number of American advisors
embedded in Iraqi Army units, ``with the goal that the Iraqi
Government will assume control of security in all provinces in
Iraq by November 2007.'' Now, that's further out than the
summer that I mentioned in my answer to Senator Menendez.
Mr. Hamilton. I might just say, on this surge question,
that there isn't any doubt in my mind that the United States
forces are going to win every battle. That's not the problem.
I'm not suggesting that it's easy, but it's not the problem. We
can clear out any neighborhood we want to clear out. We did it,
last summer. The question is: Can you hold it, and can you
build it after you've cleared it out? And that has to be
primarily, it seems to me, up to the Iraqis, not up to us to do
that. And, to date, no one can claim that their performance has
been very good.
I want to point out, on this surge question, which keeps
coming up here, the surge was not one of our 79
recommendations; it was a part of a discussion of the military
options that are available to us there; and we continued to say
throughout the report, that the primary mission of U.S. forces,
as I said earlier in the testimony, should be to train Iraqis.
The question in my mind, frankly, is not whether you should
train Iraqis, but when. We're going to have to do it. We've
been working at it for several years. We didn't do a very good
job of it, to be blunt about it, for several years. I think
we've improved. I think we're much better today at training the
Iraqis than we were 3 or 4 years ago. But we've still got a
long way to go. And I think that has to be the primary mission,
and it has to be accelerated. And the more you talk about the
surge and the details of the surge, the less likely it is that
you are to focus on what we consider the primary mission, which
is training those Iraqis. If you want to get out of Iraq, the
best way, most feasible way, to get out of Iraq is to train
those forces.
Senator Dodd [presiding]. Thank you.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Secretary Baker and Congressman Hamilton, I
want to thank both of you for your service.
The Iraq Study Group was created by Congress to help us and
the American people better understand our options in Iraq. Now,
I'm going to be--as you probably know, I voted against the war
4 years ago--I want us to win in Iraq. I want us to succeed in
our mission. And, Congressman Hamilton, I appreciate the manner
in which you have presented the options that we have
available--and Secretary Baker.
My concern is--I go back to the original justification for
entering Iraq. The President talked about the attack on our
country on September 11, talked about weapons of mass
destruction. And now I'm trying to figure out the justification
for the escalation of our military presence as the President
talks about benchmarks and talks about diplomatic efforts. And
I'm concerned that that's liable to get lost in the President's
desire to win a military victory in Iraq, where, as your report
underscores, a military victory in Iraq is not possible, that
it needs to be--it needs to have the diplomacy and the economic
reforms and all the other issues that are spelled out in your
report.
So, I guess my question to you, particularly to Congressman
Hamilton--you served this Nation with great distinction, not as
a Member of Congress, but in the 9/11 Commission. And the thing
that impressed me the most is that, when that commission issued
its report, it didn't go out of existence. Some may have
thought it would, but it didn't. And it's helped us, and
assisted us, to stay on track to try to accomplish an objective
to make this Nation safer.
I would like to solicit your help, as we go forward in
Iraq, as to whether, in fact, we have effective and enforceable
benchmarks. I must tell you, I am somewhat confused as to what
the benchmarks are. I've listened to the Secretary of State,
I've listened to the President, I've heard what they've said
about the Iraqis standing up and taking responsibility for
their own country and doing all these other things. But I also
could find that, a couple of months from now, the President
said, ``Well, they're doing better here, they're doing--
there,'' and that the benchmarks are certainly not very
definitive as to what they have to do by certain dates, and the
consequences if they don't.
As far as diplomatic efforts are concerned, I've listened
very carefully to this administration, and I have yet to see
them engage all-out effort in the region or internationally for
effective diplomacy. It still appears to be America, rather
than looking at the region and an international community for
an effective solution to the political problems in Iraq and the
region.
So, I welcome your thoughts as to whether--going forward. I
certainly hope the President will change his policies in Iraq,
but I do think that this Study Group Report and your
recommendations gives us a comprehensive plan that could
succeed in Iraq. And I think it would be very helpful to us to
get your continued involvement as to--you pointed out, in the
last 2\1/2\ months, very little has happened, and your report
talked about the urgency of the situation--but I would find it
helpful if you would continue to give your views as to whether
the recommendations that have been made by the Study Group are,
in fact, being followed by the players.
Mr. Hamilton. Senator, I think our view is that many of the
recommendations have been partially accepted, not totally
accepted. Some have been totally accepted. One or two, three
maybe, have been outright rejected. But there isn't the view,
in the Iraq Study Group, to engage in the kind of a followup
effort that we had in the 9/11 Commission.
Now, I am doing quite a bit of testifying and speaking with
regard to the Iraq Study Group. I think other members of the
Iraq Study Group, including Secretary Baker, are doing
likewise. But it is not--we no longer meet, we're out of
existence, and there isn't any followup taking place as a
group. There is followup on an individual basis. I have seen
statements, for example, by several of the members of the Study
Group as they have spoken to press around the country and to
groups around the country.
I do want to say a word about these benchmarks. I think the
benchmarks, where we're asking the Iraqi Government to perform,
are very clear. And we're asking them to be more inclusive in
that constitution, to include the Sunnis. We're asking them to
put in a program of de-Baathification that requires the
reintegration of the Baathists, except those at the very top
level of Saddam Hussein's regime, to get them into the national
life of the country. We're asking for an oil revenue-sharing
program that is fair.
Senator Cardin. But oil revenue, I think we've seen some
action. But on the other----
Mr. Hamilton. Well, not much.
Senator Cardin. Are you comfortable that there's a
reasonable timeframe that would have consequences?
Mr. Hamilton. Well--no, I'm not comfortable on the
timeframe. I think these things need to be done urgently. And
I'm very impatient.
Senator Cardin. Well, I--let me put it a different way. Are
you--do you believe that the Iraqis are under the impression--
the current government--of consequences and a timeframe in
which they have to perform?
Mr. Hamilton. I do not believe they are sufficiently alert
to that. Now, I think our administration has talked to them
about it. I think they've agreed on benchmarks. I think they
even now have dates. We've put out a lot of the dates in our
report. They have to achieve certain things by certain dates.
But these dates have slipped in the past, and they are not
performing on time, in my judgment about it.
How do you change that? Well, you change it, I think, by
putting more leverage on Maliki through conditionality, and
perhaps some opportunities would arise on the diplomatic track,
as well. It is not an easy thing to do. But it is key.
Mr. Baker. Senator Cardin, I think they are much more aware
of it today, let's say, than they were 4 or 5 months ago. And I
think that--without doing it publicly, that the President and
the administration have made it pretty clear to that government
that we need to see performance on these benchmarks. Now, I
can't tell you that for a fact, because I wasn't in any of the
meetings or anything else, but I think--I think they're much
more focused on it today than they have been in the past.
Just here, the other day, they arrested 40--as I
understand, 40 followers of Muqtada al-Sadr. That--they got an
oil law. They've done a few other things like that, that looked
like things are finally beginning, maybe, to happen. Time will
tell. We'll just have to see. But I think the President--and I
don't know this for a fact, and I don't mean to be suggesting
that I do know it for a fact, but I'm--I think he had to come
to you-know-what meeting with the Prime Minister when he last
met with him--pretty well made it clear that--you know, and
he--as he said in his speech, the patience of the American
people is not unending, ``If you don't perform, you're going to
lose the support of the American people,'' and if you read that
carefully, I think that means you'll lose the support of the
administration.
Senator Cardin. I just want to compliment the bipartisan
leadership of our committee and Congress, because I think it's
also helped get the message out. We'll see whether there is
accountability.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Senator Cardin.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thanks very much for coming. I'm going to
make a comment, and I would like for your reflections on this
idea.
Secretary Rice has recently outlined what appears to be a
shift in emphasis in United States policy toward countering the
challenges posed by Iran. Under this new approach, the United
States would apparently organize regional players--Saudi
Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, the Gulf States, and others--
behind a program of containing Iran's disruptive agenda in the
region. Such a realignment has relevance for stabilizing Iraq
and bringing security to other areas of conflict, such as
Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. Moderate states in the
Middle East are concerned by Iran's aggressiveness and the
possibility of sectarian conflict beyond Iraq's borders. They
recognize the United States as indispensable counterweight to
Iran and a source of stability in the region. The United States
has the leverage to enlist greater support for our objectives
inside Iraq and throughout the region.
Now, quite apart from the military-diplomatic surge in Iraq
that's been the focus of our attention, we're now seeing the
outlines of a new United States regional approach, more
assertive stance by our military toward Iranian interference in
Iraq, a renewed diplomatic effort on the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, substantial U.S. security assistance to Palestinian
President Abbas, and a United States-led effort to bolster the
Lebanese Government against Hezbollah.
In the Washington Post today, I noted that the United
States should recalibrate our reference points on Iraq. We
should not see the President's current Iraq plan as an endgame,
but rather as one element in a larger Middle East struggle that
is in the early stages.
The President's Baghdad strategy is still aimed at an
optimal outcome, the creation of a democratic pluralist society
that would cooperate with us to achieve regional security. But,
at this state, that is a goal we're pursuing, but our strategy
in Iraq must be flexible enough to allow for changing
circumstances. And even as the President's Baghdad strategy
proceeds, we need to be preparing for how we will array U.S.
forces in the region to defend oil assets, target terrorist
enclaves, deter adventures by Iran, provide a buffer against
regional sectarian conflict, and generally reassure friendly
governments the United States is committed to the Middle East
security.
Such a redeployment might well involve bases inside Iraq
that would allow us to continue training Iraqi troops and
delivering economic assistance, but would not require us to
interpose American soldiers between Iraqi sectarian factions.
One of the ironies of the highly contentious debate over
President Bush's new Iraq plan is that it is focused on the
strategically narrow issue of what United States troops do in a
limited number of multiethnic neighborhoods in Baghdad that
contain only about 7 percent of the Iraqi population, what GEN
Jack Keane has called the ``key terrain.'' Undoubtedly, what
happens in those Baghdad neighborhoods is important, but it is
unlikely that this mission will determine our fate in the
Middle East. And, remaking Iraq, in and of itself, does not
constitute a strategic objective. The risk is that we will
define success and failure in Iraq so rigidly that our Iraq
policy will become disconnected or even contradictory to
broader regional goals.
Do either of you have a comment on that outlook?
Mr. Baker. I don't think anything that I heard in there,
Senator--and I don't--you read it fairly quickly, but nothing
that I heard in there is inconsistent in any way with the call
we made in the Iraq Study Group Report for a new diplomatic
offensive and an international Iraqi support group. I think
it's complementary of it. What we suggest would be
complementary of those efforts, and vice versa.
Mr. Hamilton. Senator, I think the diplomatic initiatives
that you mentioned are all worthy. I guess I'm a little
impatient. I want to see them proceed more quickly and with a
greater sense of urgency than I have, thus far, seen.
But what really interested me about your excellent piece
this morning in the Post was the so-called plan B. We were
urged, on occasion, in the Iraq Study Group, to go beyond what
we recommended and develop a plan B. We rejected that idea,
because we reasoned that if you're going to make a proposal,
you ought to advocate it and ought not to immediately begin
thinking about a second plan. But there is, very clearly, need
for policymakers, including yourself, to be thinking about a
plan B. And you call for a redeployment of forces in the region
to defend the oil and target the terrorist enclaves, deter
adventurism. We would certainly agree to all of that.
So, I react positively to your statements here, with the
caveat, I guess, that full speed ahead is necessary on the
diplomatic side.
Mr. Baker. And may I add to that, Senator Lugar, that when
Lee says ``we were urged to take a look at a plan B,'' I
suppose I was the primary urger, because I was, and still am,
interested in the proposal that Senator Biden and Les Gelb put
forward with respect to the idea that ultimately you may end up
with three autonomous regions in Iraq, because I was worried
that there's--that there are indications that that might be
happening, in fact, on the ground anyway, and, if it is, we
ought to be prepared to try and manage the situation. So, we
have a sentence in our report that says, ``If events were to
move irreversibly in this direction, the United States should
manage the situation to ameliorate humanitarian consequences,
contain the violence, and minimize regional stability.''
That's, of course, with respect to the Biden-Gelb proposal.
But, again, let me repeat, there's nothing in your proposal
that I heard that would be in any way inconsistent with, and
would, in fact, be complementary of, the new diplomatic
offensive that we call for in the Iraq Study Group Report.
Senator Lugar. Well, the reason I shamelessly cite the
Washington Post editorial I wrote for this morning's paper, and
repeat it here, is that I hear, both on the Republican and
Democratic sides, that people are formulating resolutions that
they might offer next week in our debate. They are using such
terms as ``last chance.'' In other words, a number of people
are saying the surge is the last chance, or, second, that there
have to be rigid benchmarks, or that we've got to tell the
Iraqis, ``By golly, this is your last chance. Either you pass
the oil law, you get the devolution of authority or the
provinces done, or all the rest of it, or,'' the thought is,
``we're out of there.''
Now, that is my worry. In other words, if we come into a
debate in which we--I characterize the situation today in
football terms--this is like 3rd down and 20, and you call a
draw play. Well, it turns out you can get 6 yards, and you punt
on 4th down. It is in the first quarter, and so you are now in
more favorable territory to try another strategy. What I fear
we are heading toward, on both sides, is a situation in which
we say, we are either tired of it, stop the funds, bring home
the troops, or, maybe some on the Republican side are saying
this is it, this is the surge, these are the benchmarks. An
interesting pretense, when, in my judgment, there's not a
scintilla of hope that the Iraq Government, could fulfill all
of this. And so, then you--as suggested, I think, by Senator
Cardin--get some fudging, ``Well, there was progress made,''
and we note a little headway here and there, and, once again,
we're back into the same debate.
What I would hope is that the diplomatic side, which I
think Secretary Rice is now beginning to put together, offers
several years of evolving activities not only focused on Iraq,
but, likewise, involving the entire Middle East.
Thank you, Mr.----
Mr. Baker. You didn't ask this question, Senator, but I--
and I don't mean to speak for my cochairman--I think we're
going to be there a long, long time, and that's why, in my
formal remarks, I mentioned the continuing presence--large,
substantial, robust presence--of the U.S. military in the
region, in the area.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
Senator Dodd. Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Baker, Chairman Hamilton, this is my first
opportunity to publicly thank you for the work that you did on
this Iraq Study Group. It's been enormously valuable to the
country, for people who have had strong concerns. And everybody
said all this to you before, but I want you to know that you've
set an example here for a lot of people, showing that we can
work across party divides and other divides, and try to come to
some sort of a solution.
I want to associate myself with the views that both of you
expressed with respect to Syria. We tend to focus on Iran, and
rightly so, but, as you've said, as I've tried to say a number
of times, Iran and Syria are not natural allies, and it's very
much in our strategy interest that we should be dealing with
these two countries rather than causing them to be working
together largely because they're on the other side of the
diplomatic fence. I can't say it any more clearly than the two
of you did. I think it's vitally important that we do that.
With respect to this discussion now about the surge and,
quite frankly, how this is going to be used in our debate that
will be coming up on the floor, I would like to start off,
first, by saying we had Admiral Fallon at a confirmation
hearing this morning on the Armed Services Committee, and he
gave some very nuanced answers, which encouraged me a great
deal. One of the points that he made was that it's not
particularly the number of troops that are involved in any of
these endeavors, it's how they're used. And one of the concerns
that I have had with where we are right now is that I don't see
anything that's been proposed over the last month as truly a
change in strategy, I see it as more an adjustment, a tactical
adjustment, without changing our national strategy. And, in
that respect, what we're doing is moving forward on one area
without having implemented the other key recommendations in
your Iraq Study Group. There is not a robust diplomatic effort
that, as Chairman Hamilton has mentioned several times, should
have begun a month or so ago.
And so, the down side of that, from people like myself who
have a concern about how our Army and Marine Corps have been
used on the ground there, is that we may end up, just through
momentum, continuing the same practices, which is going to have
an impact on the force-structure issues in the Army and the
Marine Corps, on troop rotations and these sorts of things,
without a change in strategy.
And, just for the record, I want to say that I voted for
General Petraeus. I listened to him in the Armed Services
Committee hearings, and I did not vote on him because I believe
in his strategy, I voted for him because I believe he is a
person who is eminently capable of assuming that command. And
he has told us, in clear terms, that he is going to be candid
with us about his operational matters as they go forward.
What I really have a concern on here--and this is a great
opportunity for me, just sitting, listening--I know it's never
particularly fun to testify like this, as has been intimated a
few times, but it's a great opportunity for me to sit and
listen to your views. And the question I really have is: How do
we get to the end of this? You know? And that's a substantive
question that we've been kicking around. But, Secretary Baker,
you've got as much experience as anyone in the country, in
terms of dealing with these issues in a procedural way, and I
know there are a broad range of diplomatic efforts that are
mentioned in your report, but what would be the best procedural
format for us to be able to create this international support
structure that we've been talking about? How do we get there
from here?
Mr. Baker. Well, Senator, we--we're fairly specific in the
diplomatic portion of our report, in laying out the steps we
think need to be taken. We call for a new diplomatic offensive.
We call for the creation of an international Iraq support
group. We call for the convening of various meetings. We
mentioned the countries we think ought to be in that
international support group, including all of Iraq's neighbors,
which, of course, would include Iran and Syria. We go further
with respect to Syria, because we see that as a distinctly
different case than Iran, and that it has--it has fundamental
application with respect to the issue of Arab-Israeli peace.
So, it's pretty much all laid out there.
You say: How do we get to the end of this? Let me make--let
me throw something out here that maybe nobody will stand up and
salute, and I haven't talked to anybody downtown about this,
and I don't speak for the administration, and--but, look,
neither the administration nor the Congress has adopted all of
the recommendations of our report, or all of the conclusions of
our report. The administration has--as Lee put it earlier,
has--and as you've just put it, Senator--has not gone as far,
diplomatically, as we proposed. The Congress is not in favor--
or at least it looks like there may be a majority of the
Congress that is opposed to the surge and is preparing to vote
a resolution of disapproval.
Back in 1983, when I was Ronald Reagan's Chief of Staff, we
decided we wanted to try to do something with Social Security,
if we could. Social Security was the third rail of American
politics, and still is today, in my view. We concluded we
weren't going to ever be able to do anything with Social
Security unless we got the leadership of both parties together.
And they sat down--I'm talking, now, about--at the level of the
Senate majority leader and the Speaker of the House and the
President of the United States--and they sit down, and they
decide, ``This problem is of such fundamental importance to our
country that we need to take it out of politics, we need to
give each other cover in a way that would permit us to deal
with this and to move forward.''
And I know the chairman is, I guess, gone to another
appointment, but I have to tell you, I look at this situation
today a little bit in those same terms. And we were able, in
1983, to come up with a--with an agreed solution, a bipartisan
solution, Republicans and Democrats, that made Social Security
whole for at least 30 years. And this issue of Iraq is every
bit as emotional, and certainly every bit as important to the
country, as what we were dealing with back then.
So, I guess what I would like to throw out here for people
to consider is whether or not there couldn't be some sort of a
grand negotiation between the executive and the legislative
branches of our Government to come together on a way forward in
Iraq. There are things that the majority up here on the Hill
think should be undertaken by the administration that are laid
out in this report, and there are things that the President, as
Commander in Chief, and his military advisors, think ought to
be done; specifically, the surge. Why not get together and
agree that both sides are going to do some or all of those
things so we can move forward together on Iraq in a bipartisan
way? Wouldn't that be better than what we have now?
Again, that's not something I've even ever discussed with
my cochairman. He may disagree with me on that. But it ought--
we ought to be able to work across party lines on something as
important as this. So, how about at least giving it some
thought? That's, maybe, not really a direct answer to your
question, Senator.
Senator Webb. If I may clarify, procedurally, here. I mean,
this is--and I--by the way, I think that's what you all have
been doing--you know, that's what your Study Group has been
doing, is a first step in that direction.
Procedurally, the United States has lost so much esteem in
that part of the world as a result of this Iraq endeavor. It
would be an awkward thing for the United States to step forward
and say, ``OK, we are going to convene an Iraq Study Group, and
we want Iran and Syria to the table.'' Procedurally, how do
we--where do we go to get that issue on the table? It doesn't
have to be a long answer. I've--it's a question I've had for
some time.
Mr. Hamilton. We put the responsibility on the President
and the Secretary of State. They've got to take the action.
Senator Webb. Wouldn't you think that the United Nations--
--
Mr. Hamilton. Well, OK, the----
Senator Webb [continuing]. Would be----
Mr. Hamilton [continuing]. They have to launch this effort.
We were not all that specific as how to launch it, but you are
dealing with a sovereign country here--Iraq. You are dealing in
an environment where the United States has lost standing and
prestige. But, at the same time, there is a recognition that
nothing is going to happen in that region if the United States
doesn't lead. So, I think we have to step forward. And we
recommend a very, very comprehensive effort, multilaterally,
bilaterally, with the establishment of the support group as a
principal objective, and involving many, many countries in the
region and outside the region. We can't tell exactly how that
would proceed. I'm hoping that's what Secretary Rice was doing
while she was out there.
Senator Webb. Well, my time is expired, but--Mr. Chairman,
just if I can nail this down. From my perspective, this is the
key issue here, because, on the one hand, we have lost so much
standing in the region, and, on the other, this administration
refuses to negotiate with Iran and Syria, and yet, there has to
be a vehicle in order to bring this forward. And that's the
concern that I have. And I'll----
Mr. Baker. Well, Senator Webb, there is--the administration
has, ongoing, the compact for Iraq, which is essentially a
collection of the same countries. That was organized,
procedurally, by Iraq and the United Nations. It was called for
by Iraq. It contains Iran, it contains Syria. We attend, and
they attend. And so, something like that. But we did
specifically, as Lee said, avoid the difficult question of
exactly how to call this, leaving it up to the President. And
we didn't have a specific suggestion on that point, but that
you could do it the way the administration did the compact for
Iraq.
Senator Webb. Well, I would hope they would consider doing
that. I appreciate your testimony.
Mr. Hamilton. Senator, I'll make one other comment here.
You folks are headed for some rough patches in your
relationship with the executive branch. And they probably begin
next week, if I understand your schedule. My hope is that, as
you go through this process--and I don't think it'll be an easy
one for you--resolutions that are nonbinding, a supplemental,
then the appropriation bills, down the line--you're going to
have all kinds of amendments and clashes in that process. And,
maybe it's being a little Pollyannaish, I hope not, but, in
that process, I hope, at the end of the day, we come to a
little better unity of effort in this country on Iraq.
I wouldn't, for a minute, think it'll be unanimous. I think
the divisions are just too deep. But everybody in this room
understands the importance of unity of effort in foreign policy
if you're going to have an effective foreign policy. So, it's
not an easy process for you, and you're going to have some
tough debates, and there are going to be some hard edges to it,
and maybe some bad feelings now and then, but it is the process
we have to work toward a greater unity of effort.
Senator Dodd. Let me just say, Jim Baker--before I turn to
Senator Coleman--the case you cited, the Social Security case--
I remember another case. I remember you walking into my office
in 1989 and saying to me, ``We're not going to spend all day in
the White House debating Central America. We're going to sit
down and figure what has to be done on this. We're going to
come up with some common answers.'' We went through some
difficult negotiations back and forth, but, under your
leadership, we came up with a common plan and a common idea
that got us out of the daily quagmire of dealing, in Central
America, with all the other issues we had to grapple with.
The point I want to make is, I think the United States has
to lead, but leadership in this country begins at the executive
branch. Asking 535 Members of Congress with disparate districts
and constituencies to lead on this issue is--we can play an
important role--and we will, in a vacuum, otherwise--but the
real leadership has to come from the President and that office.
That's what you did, and I'll never forget it. Because you
said, ``Enough of this stuff, we're going to work together and
find some answers here.'' That has to start at the White House.
Mr. Baker. In those days, Senator, you remember very well,
that the war in Central America was the Holy Grail of the left
in this country and the Holy Grail----
Senator Dodd. Right.
Mr. Baker [continuing]. Of the right in this country. And I
tell people, even to this day, many years later, that my first
serious negotiation as Secretary of State was not with a
foreign power----
Senator Dodd. No.
Mr. Baker [continuing]. It was with the Congress of the
United States. And we got it done.
Senator Dodd. Got it done.
Mr. Baker. And I'm--and all I'm saying is, we ought to be
thinking about something like that here. This--these issues are
tough, as Lee says, and they're very emotional, as I mentioned
in my opening comments, but there are some things here that you
oppose that the President wants, and there are some things here
that you want that the President opposes, and rather than just
doing this for a couple of years, why don't we see if there's
not a way--the country has a huge interest in a successful
conclusion of this problem.
Senator Dodd. Well, again----
Mr. Baker. Why not find out if there's not a way to do it?
And----
Senator Dodd. Again, I'll make the point, it was the guy
who was going through a confirmation process to be Secretary of
the State, who took the leadership--with the approval and
support of the President, I might add----
Mr. Baker. Yes, yes.
Senator Dodd [continuing]. To get that ball moving. And
that's missing today, I must tell you, must in candor, in this
hearing room.
Senator Coleman.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would say, first of all, gentlemen, thank you for your
service. Thank you for your service on this and so many other
issues. We're certainly very, very appreciative.
Mr. Congressman--I don't think there is any lack of
appetite for clashing with the executive in both parties right
now. I think there is a common understanding that a lot of
things have gone wrong in Iraq. I think the real challenge is
not about a willingness to clash with the executive, but I
would like to share at least two concerns that I have as we
move forward. The most important one is the impact of our
actions on the troops on the ground. Things that we do and we
say have consequences. They are young men and women in harm's
way. Many of us have visited them on a number of occasions.
We've been to Walter Reed.
The second concern I'll share--where perhaps there isn't a
common ground right now, and maybe we have to get to that
point--is regarding an understanding of the long-term
consequences of failure in Iraq. The ISG report itself, on page
37 as I recall, discusses the consequences of failure. And
we've had a number of hearings that have discussed the near-
term results associated with a precipitous withdrawal from
Iraq. The report uses words such as ``precipitate'' and
``premature.''
Mr. Hamilton. Yes.
Senator Coleman. I'm going to ask, in a second, what you
mean by the terms used in the report. Talk about the
significant power vacuum, greater human suffering, regional
destabilization, and the threat to the global economy; talk
about al-Qaeda declaring our withdrawal as a victory, Iraq
descending into chaos, and how the long-term consequences could
eventually require the United States to return.
And as we've had a number of hearings, I have observed that
people have different perspectives on the consequences of
failure. Some folks have said, ``Well, Iraq's a mess.'' They
say so as if it can't get any worse. My sense is that it could
get worse if we take the wrong steps.
Mr. Hamilton. Yes. It clearly is. And we think that the
emphasis you're making in your second point, on the
consequences of failure, are terribly important to focus on. We
want to try to avoid the expansion of Iranian influence in the
region. We don't want to jeopardize the energy resources. We
don't want to abandon our Arab friends, the so-called
moderates. We don't want America to have a strategic defeat in
the region. We don't want to have the stability of Iraq
jeopardized. We don't want to see Sunni and Shia clashes across
the region. We don't want to see chaos in the region. We don't
want to see terrorism grow, and al-Qaeda. There are a lot of
very, very important consequences here, that people who favor a
precipitate withdrawal just, I don't think, have encountered.
On the first point, incidentally, the impact on U.S.
troops, you brought us to the right point there, I believe. The
section in our report about restoring U.S. military is in a
very important section. It begins on page 76. And we are deeply
concerned about resetting the American military as a result of
the drain in Iraq.
Senator Coleman. And I think the one area on which there is
a bipartisan vision is on that issue----
Mr. Hamilton. Yes; I think so, too.
Senator Coleman [continuing]. And I think----
Mr. Hamilton. Yes.
Senator Coleman [continuing]. That's a good thing.
The other issue where I see a divergence of views--and I'm
trying to figure out if we can reconcile them--is on the issue
of the loss of esteem of the United States in connection to its
actions in Iraq. We tend to reflect mainly upon the loss of
esteem for the United States that is related to what we
currently see in Iraq. On the other hand, I look at this issue
of consequences of failure again. The President has talked
about this. If we were to withdraw precipitously, if we were to
leave without finishing the mission, what does that do to the
esteem of America abroad? Mr. Secretary, you've been in this
business a long time. What does that do?
Mr. Baker. It destroys--well, it would destroy our
credibility, not just in the region, but around the world. And,
of course, as Lee pointed out, we are strongly against a
precipitate withdrawal. I mean, we think the consequences, as
we say, would be severe. I think they would be catastrophic.
You'd see a regional war in the Middle East.
Senator Coleman. OK, I'm going to try to tie these
different perspectives together in the time I have remaining.
Mr. Secretary, you reflected that we're going to be in Iraq a
long time.
Mr. Baker. Yes; we are.
Senator Coleman. We're going to be there a long time. On
the other hand, Mr. Congressman, you used the phrase that
``nothing's going to happen'' in the Middle East, until we
leave. Can you help me understand the seeming discrepancy
between these statements? Is there a difference in views
between the two of you?
Mr. Baker. I don't think so.
Senator Coleman. Can you please help me reconcile the idea
that we're going to be in Iraq a long time with the idea that
we can't get things moving forward until we leave?
Mr. Baker. Well, let me explain what I meant when I said
we're going to be there a long time. In addition to being in
Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar to protect our interests in the
region, we're going to have a fairly large residual presence in
Iraq itself, as our report says. We don't spell out the
numbers. They're going to be significant. We talk about leaving
special operations forces. We talk about leaving rapid-reaction
forces to go after al-Qaeda and for other missions that the
commander on the ground thinks is important, particularly with
respect to the war on terror. And we talk about force
protection units that would be left there.
So, when I say we're going to have a presence for a long
time in the region, we're going to have a presence in Iraq, for
those purposes, and in the region, in my opinion, for a long
time.
Mr. Hamilton. I'd simply emphasize, Senator, in response,
that I just don't think things will happen in that region
unless the United States leaves.
Senator Coleman. Does your use of the term ``leave'' have a
different sense than the way the Secretary has used it?
Mr. Hamilton. Well, he's talking about a military presence
in Iraq, but also a military presence in the region. We're
going to have a large military presence in that region for a
very, very long time to come. I agree with that part of it.
Will we have a large military presence in Iraq? I don't know.
But I can certainly see, if you're going to be embedding
troops, if you're going to be training troops, if you're going
to be going after al-Qaeda, if you're going to be protecting
the United States troops who are embedded with the Iraqi
troops, you're going to have to have substantial American
combat power in Iraq for a period of time. I don't know how
long that is, but it's an extended period of time. But in the
region itself, there has to be--will be for a long, long time
to come--substantial American military and diplomatic and
political presence.
Senator Coleman. If I can, I'd like to ask two other
questions.
One question is that some of us see a qualitative
difference between the battle that's being waged, in, let's
say, the Anbar province--against al-Qaeda, against the foreign
fighters, against the insurgents--and what we've seen in
Baghdad, where there is a sectarian battle going on between the
Sunni extremists and the Shia extremists--and I was there about
a month ago. And the concern I have is, at this point, putting
Americans in the center of the sectarian battle in Baghdad
before the Iraqis have met the benchmarks that you've talked
about, and that some of us here in Congress have talked about.
Did you at all, either in the Study Group Report or through
your own reflections, see that kind of distinction between the
type of violence that is seen in places like Anbar versus that
which is seen in Baghdad?
Mr. Baker. We did see that difference, when we were there.
I think it's valid. I think there is a difference.
Mr. Hamilton. Yes; I agree with Jim on it. We did not make
any recommendation with regard to Anbar province. We did, as
Jim has pointed out, with regard to Baghdad, but we did not
make it with regard to Anbar.
Senator Coleman. Senator Nelson----
Mr. Baker. But the difference in function of our troops is
something we recognized.
Mr. Hamilton. Oh, yes. Al-Qaeda has much more of a presence
there.
Mr. Baker. That's right. And sectarian violence in Baghdad.
Senator Coleman. Very last question, then. Mr. Secretary,
you talked about your experience in addressing the Social
Security issue and about resolving things here with the
Congress, and the chairman talked about leadership. But, on
this issue, it's the American public that clearly does not have
any sense of confidence of where we're at in Iraq. The American
public has clearly lost the appetite for the long-term
commitment in Iraq, of whatever level, particularly if we
continue to suffer loss of life. How do you get the American
public to understand the consequences of failure?
Mr. Baker. If you have----
Senator Coleman. How do we do that?
Mr. Baker [continuing]. If you have a truly bipartisan
policy, and you have the executive branch and the legislative
branch pulling together on the same oar, I dare say you're
going to see the numbers on the public perception change.
Senator Dodd. Officer.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Pause.]
Senator Dodd. Senator Coleman.
Senator Coleman. I think my time is up, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you very much.
Senator Coleman. Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm the last questioner, and I know that's good news to
both of you. And I'll stay within my time.
I want to focus and try to direct your attention to a very
important aspect of what you've already testified to. And, of
course, before doing that, I want to thank you for your
contribution, your public service already, prior to this work,
your ongoing scholarship and work that has gone into this, and
the questions you've been asked and the way you've dealt with
them. We're in your debt for that. And I'm certainly grateful,
as a first-year Senator.
I want to direct your attention at the training aspect of
what you testified to today. And I think both of you, in one
way or another, said that training is the primary mission, or
must be the primary mission. And I think we've heard about
training for a long time now--many, many years, since 2003,
when this engagement started. And we've heard it over and over
again, how important it is. I appreciate the fact that you
highlighted it today as the primary mission. I think,
Congressman Hamilton, you not only have it in the report, but
you've enunciated it as the foundation of how we get American
sons and daughters home from Iraq.
Here's the question. What, in your judgment, based upon
what you know up to this moment, the work that went into the
Iraq Study Group conclusions, all of the testimony you've
heard, everything you've read--based upon all of that, what do
you think is the problem with this mission of training of these
Iraqi security forces? What's the----
Mr. Hamilton. I think the problem, Senator, is, we just
haven't given it enough priority. And--or, to put it another
way--and I don't mean to disparage anyone here, but we have not
put our best people into training. If you look at it in terms
of a career path in the military, that's not the way you get to
be a general. That mindset has to change. And we have to
understand, in this situation we're confronted with in Iraq,
that we have to put our very best people in there to train
these forces. So, it's a question of resources. It's also a
question of priorities.
Now, I want to repeat what I said earlier. I think we
didn't do a very good job of this for about 3 years because of
that. And I really do think there's been improvement in the
training of the Iraqi Army--I have a lot of doubt, still, about
the police--but the training of the Iraqi Army is better. And
we are saying that the military priorities in Iraq must change.
That's one of the recommendations. They must change. And we
have to give highest priority to this effort.
Senator Casey. So that those who are training have elevated
status. Is that what you mean? In other words, they're
recognized as important as any other----
Mr. Hamilton. The Iraqi----
Senator Casey [continuing]. Military----
Mr. Hamilton. I'm no expert on all the incentives that can
be offered. Maybe it's financial. But I think, more important
even than the financial, is status and a career path for
promotion within the services, because these people all are
ambitious, and we encourage that.
Mr. Baker. Senator Casey, the President's plan calls for
doubling the number of troops we have embedded with Iraqi
forces and engaged in training, as I understand it. And the
President himself said that training is the essential mission
of our forces. And I think it was Steve Hadley's op-ed piece
yesterday in which he said that training and supporting Iraqi
troops will remain our military's essential and primary
mission.
So, at least--I mean, there's not a lot of daylight between
what we call for in this report and where the President--where
the President's plan is, assuming that those comments are true.
And I, for one, take them at their word.
Senator Casey. Well, I appreciate that highlight of his
plan. But, I'll tell you, in your report, very early in your
report, first of all, you talk about the Iraqi Army, and said
the police are a lot worse. But when you're----
Mr. Baker. They are.
Senator Casey [continuing]. Talking about the army, you're
saying they lack leadership, equipment, personnel, logistics,
and support.
Mr. Baker. Yes; well, that's what Lee said, that we--that
we did a bad job for a number of years.
Senator Casey. Well, it's been going on for several years,
and I'm glad you pointed it out, but when you--here's my
problem. All right? I come from a State--we lost 140 lives
already. You know that. I mean, we're third on the death toll.
Hundreds and hundreds of kids have lost their lives there. And
we've been hearing about this for years now. And it should
never have taken the administration all these years--and it,
frankly, should not have taken your report for them to get the
message about training. They've had this problem for years.
People have had it up to here. Their patience is gone,
virtually, on this, because of the sacrifices they've made.
And then, you pick up the New York Times, last week--and
this is a predicate of the whole escalation--you pick up the
New York Times, and they talk about the main mission, they call
it a miniature version of what the troops will be doing in the
so-called surge, ``As the sun rose, many of the Iraqi Army
units, who were supposed to do the actual searches of the
buildings, did not arrive on time, forcing the Americans to
start to doing the job on their own. When the Iraqi units
finally did show up, it was the air of a class outing, cheering
and laughing as the Americans blew locks off the doors with
shotguns. An American soldier is shot in the head.'' And then,
it goes on later, ``Many of the Iraqi units that showed up late
never seemed to take the task seriously. At one point, Iraqis
completely disappeared, leaving the American units working with
them flabbergasted.'' It goes on and on and on.
So, my question is--and you've done the hard work already.
I just wish the President would read and internalize and act
upon what you have already found is a major problem. But he
doesn't seem to want to do that. And so, you pick up the paper,
and you read that, and families out there, who--every one of
those families who lost someone in Iraq, I think, today would
stand up and say, ``We support this mission. We support this
President.'' Most of them would say that. But they have the
right to expect that, when American sons and daughters are
going into those dangerous neighborhoods, that some of what you
have pointed out becomes a real priority. I have seen no
evidence of that. And the whole escalation is based upon the
fact that these Iraqi Army units and soldiers are going to be
up to a certain level to take the lead. And there's no evidence
that I can see that that is happening. It's more commentary
than question, but there doesn't seem to be any evidence, in
your report and in recent reporting right on the ground in real
time, that this thing is getting any better when it comes to
training. And I leave that for----
Mr. Hamilton. Senator----
Senator Casey [continuing]. For comment.
Mr. Hamilton. Well, one thing, in the Iraq Study Group we
did not look back----
Senator Dodd. Please.
[Pause.]
Senator Dodd. The hearing will come to order.
Congressman.
Mr. Hamilton. We did not look back, and we did not
criticize mistakes that have been made. That was one point. But
the second point you make, I personally agree with. In other
words, I see some positive movement in Steve Hadley's statement
here, where he says that training and supporting will remain
our military's essential and primary mission. I do not yet see
enough action to support that. And I am concerned about it. I
am pleased that Mr. Hadley has recognized training as a primary
mission. The President did not mention that as a primary
mission in the State of the Union Address, he did not use the
word ``primary'' in his comments in his speech on Iraq. But the
National Security Advisor's statement is encouraging. I hope
the President repeats it. And I hope that we are now in a
position to really put the highest priority on training. Now,
one of the risks of a surge is that you lose emphasis and
priority on the training mission. You've got to keep them both,
I guess.
Senator Casey. Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Baker. I would agree with that. I--well, but let me
just say, I take the President at his word when he said, in
that speech, that this will be ``the essential mission.'' I
don't see the difference between if it's ``the essential'' and
``primary.'' He didn't say ``one essential mission,'' he didn't
say ``an essential mission,'' he said training will be ``the
essential mission.'' That means, to me, that it'll be the
primary mission. He didn't use the word ``primary.'' Lee's
right about that. But Steve Hadley has.
Senator Casey. I think that's progress. Let me make one
more point. Not enough progress, but they're moving in the
right direction. But they've got a long way to go.
I was heartened by--and I want to commend you, not only for
your report and your testimony today, but this statement on
January 11, which I didn't focus on at the time. I'm glad you
included it. What you talked about here with regard to what the
President had said, in respect to his policy, you say the
following, in the third paragraph--you say--and I quote from
the January 11 statement--``The President did not suggest the
possibility of a transition that could enable U.S. combat
forces to begin to leave Iraq.'' That's No. 1. ``The President
did not state that political, military, or economic support for
Iraq would be conditional on the Iraqi Government's ability to
meet benchmarks.'' No. 2 thing; he didn't say. And third, you
say, ``Within the region, the President did not announce an
international support group for Iraq,'' and it goes on from
there.
And I appreciate the fact that you carefully examined what
he said, and highlighted that, because I think that kind of
accountability, or oversight, in a sense, has been missing for
the last couple of years.
Thank you very much.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Senator Casey.
I just have a couple of quick points.
I was impressed, in the report, on page 39, the--paragraph
4, the devolution into three regions, which the commission, or
the committee, the group, was pretty firm, in pretty good
language, I thought--and a position I share with you--about
trying to keep this country together, not--the idea of
spreading it up into three loose federated states--may end up
there, but it should be our position to do what's possible to
keep this country together.
I was disturbed to hear, the other day, that there was
apparently a secret meeting of the Turkish Parliament, debating
whether or not to send Turkish troops into northern Iraq--on
the border with northern Iraq. One of the points you raise in
concern--why this ought to concern all of us--Secretary Baker,
I--in talking about the proposal has been made by some, to
actually have this become a part of policy. I'll be curious as
to whether or not you're in any way retreating from the
recommendations here in the report, in light of--that was
December, this is almost February. Are there events now that
would cause you to feel less certain about that conclusion?
Mr. Baker. No.
Senator Dodd. OK.
Mr. Baker. We stand by the report, and particularly that
conclusion. I mentioned, earlier, Senator Dodd, the sentence on
that page 39 that says, ``If events were to move irreversibly
in this direction, we ought to jump in there and manage it.''
Senator Dodd. And it----
Mr. Baker. But, no, we still feel that there's serious
questions about that approach, having to do with such things
as: Where do you draw the boundaries between Sunni areas and
Shia areas? What do you do about the major cities? Wouldn't
this encourage regional players to come in to begin to protect
their interests more so than they're even doing today, if they
thought there were going to be three semiautonomous regions, or
three autonomous regions?
Senator Dodd. So, your concerns expressed then are the same
today. In fact----
Mr. Baker. Same today as they were----
Senator Dodd. Do you agree with that, Lee?
Mr. Baker. Yes.
Mr. Hamilton. I do agree with it. I think our concerns
about that devolution plan is that it goes against a unified
Iraq----
Senator Dodd. I agree with that.
Mr. Hamilton [continuing]. Fundamentally. And then, for the
other reasons we state in the report.
Senator Dodd. Let me ask you two other quick questions, if
I can.
One is on--and I'm picking up with Jim Webb's questions
here in the--I think Dick Lugar raised the--in his points,
too--we've talked a lot about Syria and Iran, and I think many
of us here agree with the points that have been raised by the--
both of you this afternoon, as well as the comments made by our
colleagues here about how we ought to approach those two. But
you point out, as well, that there's almost as much of an
emphasis on the so-called moderate Arab States. Answer, if you
can, the question--I've been surprised there hasn't been at
least more of an expression of concern from the moderate Arab
States about events in Iraq and the growing concerns of Iranian
influence. And there are a lot of ways of doing this. I realize
they're not societies that have a lot of forums such as we're
having here today, but this has gone on now for 4 years, where
they have some very immediate threats. I know there are things
going on quietly, but I'm a little mystified as to why there
has not been a more outspoken support for the efforts to
achieve some success in Iraq and bring about some stability,
given the immediately implications to many of these countries,
if this situation continues to crater, as it is. We, obviously,
are concerned about it, for all the reasons you've outlined.
But if I were sitting in Riyadh or sitting in a Amman, Jordan,
or Cairo or Beirut, I'd be a lot more concerned, in the shorter
term, about my conditions and what's apt to happen here as a
result of what goes on. Why aren't we hearing more from these
countries? Why doesn't there seem to be more of a willingness
to participate in some solution here, despite the outcry from
you and others about being involved in a political-diplomatic
solution here?
Mr. Hamilton. Well, first of all, we share your concern. I
think one of the things that has marked the response of these
regimes is passivity, in all respects. They haven't helped us
on the money side, with resources, and they haven't been very
helpful diplomatically. They've done some training, they've
done some things that are mildly helpful, but they haven't
really been engaged on it.
I'm not sure I know the answer to your question, except I
think they're still waiting to see how this thing comes out.
Senator Dodd. Well, doesn't it--I mean, that's kind of a--
``wait til you see how it comes out.''
Mr. Hamilton. They're hanging back. There is a strong
feeling in the region there that America is losing and that
Iran may emerge as the winner.
Senator Dodd. I've also heard the concern----
Mr. Hamilton. If that's the case----
Senator Dodd [continuing]. Expressed there that----
Mr. Hamilton [continuing]. That's a very different
environment. Now, I'm----
Senator Dodd [continuing]. I'm going to be----
Mr. Hamilton. Let me be----
Senator Dodd [continuing]. One head of state----
Mr. Hamilton [continuing]. Clear here, I'm speculating. I
don't know this.
Senator Dodd. One head of state said to me--and I'm going
back about 4 or 5 months ago, when I was there--said, ``My
great concern is that the United States is going to cut its own
deal with Iran at our expense.''
Mr. Hamilton. Yes. Yes.
Mr. Baker. There is concern about that. There is concern
about that on the part of these countries. I mentioned--if
you'll look on page 44, Senator, we mention the efforts under--
with the ``Gulf-plus-Two''----
Senator Dodd. Yes.
Mr. Baker [continuing]. That the Secretary of State is--has
been engaged in. These are very beneficial, in my opinion. We
indicated in our report that it didn't--maybe it didn't go as
far as it should, in terms of creating an Iraq international
support group. But nothing but positive, I don't think, can
come from those efforts. So, it's a good thing to be doing, but
that maybe that it would be good to fold those into a broader
effort.
Senator Dodd. Uh-huh.
Mr. Baker. Same with the compact for Iraq. These countries
do participate in the compact for Iraq.
Senator Dodd. Uh-huh.
Mr. Baker. The countries you're talking about, the Gulf-
plus-Two.
Senator Dodd. Last, at some point, you might want to
expound on this further. And, Secretary Baker, you've had years
of experience dealing very directly with some of these folks as
to why there isn't a more aggressive approach on being active
in the diplomatic front.
One of the problems I hear all the time from people--and it
sort of underscores the point that my colleague from
Pennsylvania has raised here this afternoon. I don't know how
accurate, again, polling data is in these matters. I'm not sure
how you do a good poll in a place like Iraq today, given the
circumstances. The number we hear bandied around quite a bit
is: Something in the neighborhood of 60 percent of the Iraqi
people are hostile to the notion of us even being there. One
number has 61 percent suggesting that they were not opposed to
attacks on American forces in Iraq. It's a pretty difficult
deal to explain to anyone why you're here sending your sons and
daughters to this situation, when a majority--not an
insignificant majority of these people, if these numbers are
even remotely close--are hostile to the very presence of the
people who are there for the purposes of providing them a
better opportunity. How do you make a case when people here--
Could I please just finish the thought here? Thank you.
[Pause.]
Senator Dodd. My point being, here, is it's one thing about
the polling data here--and there's, obviously, numbers that
think we ought to be removing troops--but the polling data in
Iraq suggesting that they're opposed and hostile to use being
there makes it very difficult for us to sustain the kind of
support in this country and elsewhere, if, in fact, people are
cheering when American soldiers are being shot at, wounded, or
killed. I don't know how we sustain a policy with that kind of
activity going on in a country where we talk about giving them
some hope for the future.
Mr. Baker. Very true. I can't quarrel with the conclusion.
It makes it very difficult. That doesn't mean we ought not to
try. We have a lot at stake. We've talked here today about the
consequences of failure. And they're severe. Catastrophic, in
my view.
Senator Dodd. Lee, any final point on that?
Mr. Hamilton. Well, the perceptions that we have of what
we're trying to do, and the perceptions they have of what we're
trying to do, are just miles and miles apart. And bridging
those perceptions will just be exceedingly difficult to do,
but, you know, these people today are living a miserable life.
And anybody who visits Baghdad gets a sense of the hopelessness
of life there for these people. And when you're in that
circumstance, you blame somebody. And we happen to be the
foreign power that's present, and I guess a lot of them blame
us.
Senator Dodd. Well, I thank you both. We've kept you a
little longer than we promised, and I apologize to that.
Do any of my colleagues have any final comments?
We've kept you beyond 3 o'clock. Again, I think all of us
have deep appreciation for the amount of effort you've put into
your staffs--they were here, as well, should be recognized, and
other members of the group. So, we thank you immensely for your
effort.
Senator Dodd. Thank you for your presence, and this
committee will stand adjourned until further call of the Chair.
[Whereupon, at 3:43 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Statement Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Hon. Richard G. Lugar, U.S. Senator From Indiana
I thank Senator Biden for holding this hearing, and I welcome two
good friends to the committee. It is a privilege to have the benefit of
their long experience and the impressive study that went into their
report.
This hearing is timely because the Iraq Study Group Report
represents the only comprehensive policy prescription for Iraq
undertaken by a bipartisan group of experienced decisionmakers under
time pressure. The process that led to its conclusions, therefore,
bears some resemblance to the task before the President and Congress.
For this reason, as well as the insight of the group's members, the
report is especially relevant to our own decisionmaking process.
Although the report offered many recommendations, it underscored
that there are no foolproof options in Iraq. It stated: ``During the
past 9 months, we have considered a full range of approaches for moving
forward. All have flaws.'' Our experience on this committee during the
last 3 weeks of hearings has been similar. We are seeking the best
course, while knowing that we are choosing from among imperfect
options.
A key point that requires much greater clarification is how
expanded, continued, or reduced U.S. military presence can be used to
stimulate Iraqi political reconciliation. There is wide, though not
unanimous, agreement that our military presence in Iraq represents
leverage either because it can be expanded or because it can be
withdrawn. But there is little clarity on how to translate this
leverage into action by the Iraqi Government. Many commentators talk of
``creating space'' for the Iraqi Government to establish itself, but it
is far from clar that the government can or will take advantage of such
space.
Thus, as the administration increases troops, it becomes even more
imperative to develop a backup plan and aggressively seek a framework
for a political solution. It is not enough to set benchmarks to measure
the progress of the Iraqi Government. If the Iraqi Government has
different timetables and objectives than us, such benchmarks will not
be met in a way that transforms the politics of the nation.
If we undertake the tremendous investment that sending more
American soldiers to Iraq represents, it should be in support of a
clear strategy for achieving a negotiated reconciliation. We should not
depend on theories or hopes that something good may happen if we dampen
violence in Baghdad.
The Iraq Study Group has been one of the most definitive advocates
for a broader regional dialog accompanying our efforts inside Iraq. We
need frank policy discussions in this country about our vital interests
in the region. The difficulties we have had in Iraq make a strong
presence in the Middle East more imperative, not less. Our nation must
understand that if and when withdrawal or redeployment from Iraq
occurs, it will not mean that our interests in the Middle East have
diminished. In fact, it may mean that we will need to bolster our
military, diplomatic, and economic presence elsewhere in the Middle
East.
I have urged the Bush administration to be aggressive and creative
in pursuing a regional dialog that is not limited to our friends. If we
lack the flexibility to communicate with unfriendly regimes, we
increase the chances of miscalculations, undercut our ability to take
advantage of any favorable situations, and potentially limit the
regional leverage with which we can confront Iran and Syria.
Again, I welcome our distinguished guests and look forward to a
thoughtful hearing.
IRAQ IN THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT,
SESSION 1
----------
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 31, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden,
Jr. (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Kerry, Feingold, Boxer, Bill
Nelson, Obama, Menendez, Casey, Lugar, Coleman, Corker,
Voinovich, Murkowski, and Isakson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
The Chairman. The hearing will please come to order.
This morning, we are privileged to have with us former
Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, whose name is
synonymous with effective diplomacy, effective American
diplomacy, and, I think few would argue with the fact, one of
the best strategic minds in the country.
Before we begin, I'd like to take a moment to present some
of the key findings, in my view, that we've found in the last 4
weeks, where there is consensus. While no unanimous
prescription has emerged thus far from our hearings, there is
remarkably broad consensus, in my view, on three points. First,
our troops can't stop the sectarian warfare in Iraq, only a
political settlement can do that. Second, we should be engaging
in intensive regional diplomacy to support such a settlement
among the Iraqis. And third, the United States military should
focus on combating terrorist--i.e., jihadists and al-Qaeda;
keeping Iraq's neighbors honest, and training Iraqis, not
policing a civil war. Indeed, combat troops should start to
redeploy, and redeploy soon.
Since a political settlement is so critical, we've examined
some of the likely components. We've discussed the benchmarks
the President has proposed--the oil law, de-Baathification
reform, constitutional reform, and provincial elections. But
the divisions are so deep and the passions are so high within
Iraq that I believe that we are well past the point of
implementing such modest measures in order to make a meaningful
difference in stabilizing Iraq. I believe some bolder moves are
necessary.
A colleague of our witness and our next witness, the former
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Les Gelb, put forward
such a proposal with me 9 months ago. It is premised on our
conviction that the heart of the administration's strategy--
building a strong central government--cannot succeed. There is
not enough trust within the government, no trust of the
government by the people, and no capacity of the present
government to deliver services and security. Instead, we must
bring Iraqis' problems and the responsibilities for managing
them, in our view, down to the local and regional level, where
it can help the Iraqis build trust and capacity more quickly
and more efficiently.
We have proposed that Iraqis create three or more regions,
consistent with what their Constitution calls for, and we call
for oil to be shared equitably, with a guaranteed share going
to the Sunnis enshrined in their Constitution. We also call for
aggressive diplomacy and the creation of a contact group
consisting of Iraqis' neighbors--Iraq's neighbors and the other
major powers necessary for a political settlement, not unlike
we did, I might add, when we went into Afghanistan.
We believe that we can redeploy most, if not all, of our
troops in Iraq within 18 months under this plan, leaving behind
a small force in the region to strike at terrorists and keep
the neighbors honest while training Iraqis. I believe this plan
is more relevant than ever. It takes into account the harsh
realities of self-sustaining sectarian violence. I believe it's
consistent--I know it's consistent with the Iraqi Constitution.
And it can help produce, I hope, a soft landing for Iraq and
prevent a full-blown civil war that tears the country apart and
spreads beyond the region.
I found it interesting that one of the leading columnists
in the New York Times, David Brooks, referred to it as ``soft
partition.'' I never thought of it. His words, not mine.
It may be too late for our plan, or any other plan, to
work, I have to acknowledge. Iraqis may be too blinded by their
sectarian hatred and revenge to see their own self-interest.
And if that's the case, then we need to consider, more rapidly,
how we disengage and contain the war within Iraq. And that will
not be easy. But we have--we don't have the luxury--we don't
have the luxury, as you've heard the chairman and others say,
of walking away. Confining the violence to Iraq and preventing
a regional war, proxies or otherwise, is going to require an
awful lot of heavy lifting if we don't get it right inside
Iraq.
I hope that you will share with us what you think we need
to be doing now to put in place such a strategy, if you agree
that that may come to pass, Mr. Secretary--and I'm not
suggesting you do--if all our efforts within Iraq fail. One of
the things I've noticed in my long years of having an
opportunity to learn from you is, we should always have
alternative plans. Whether they're announced or not, we should
always be prepared to deal with the possibility that the
present strategy may not work. And I am absolutely convinced
that the present strategy of this administration is not going
to work.
So, I'm eager to hear your testimony, Mr. Secretary. Again,
I know you had to go way out of your way to be here. You're
kind to do this. You will find a receptive and friendly
audience here. We're anxious to hear what you have to say. And
I now yield to my colleague, Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, I thank Chairman Biden for holding
this hearing. I welcome our distinguished former Secretaries of
State.
The United States has vital and enduring interests in the
Middle East, including preventing terrorism and proliferation,
protecting the free flow of oil and commerce, ensuring the
security of our friends and our allies. Our intervention in
Iraq has dramatically changed the geopolitical landscape of the
Middle East, with unpredictable consequences. Today, we'll
explore our strategic options for advancing our interests in
this evolving region.
Secretary Rice has recently outlined what appears to be a
shift in emphasis in United States policy toward countering the
challenges posed by Iran. Under this new approach, the United
States would organize regional players--Saudi Arabia, Jordan,
Egypt, Turkey, the Gulf States, and others--behind a program of
containing Iran's disruptive agenda in the region.
Such a realignment has relevance for stabilizing Iraq and
bringing security to other areas of conflict in the region,
such as Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. Moderate
states in the Middle East are concerned by Iran's
aggressiveness and by the possibility of sectarian conflict
beyond Iraq's borders. They recognize the United States is an
indispensable counterweight to Iran and a source of stability
in the region. The United States has leverage to enlist greater
support for our objectives inside Iraq and throughout the
Middle East.
Quite apart from the military-diplomatic ``surge'' in Iraq
that has been the focus of so much attention, we are now seeing
the outlines of a new, United States regional approach: A more
assertive stance by our military toward Iranian interference in
Iraq, a renewed diplomatic effort on the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, substantial United States security assistance to
Palestinian President Abbas, and a United States-led effort to
bolster the Lebanese Government against Hezbollah.
Writing in the Washington Post yesterday, I noted that the
United States should recalibrate our reference points on Iraq.
We should not see the President's current Iraq plan as an
endgame, but rather as one element in a larger Middle East
struggle that is in early stages. The President's Baghdad
strategy is still aimed at an optimal outcome: The creation of
a democratic pluralist society that will cooperate with us in
achieving regional stability. At this stage, that is a goal
worth pursuing, but our strategy in Iraq must be flexible
enough to allow for changing circumstances.
Even as the President's Baghdad strategy proceeds, we need
to be preparing for how we will array United States forces in
the region to defend oil assets, target terrorist enclaves,
deter adventurism by Iran, provide a buffer against regional
sectarian conflict, and generally reassure friendly governments
that the United States is committed to Middle East security.
Such a redeployment might well involve bases inside Iraq that
would allow us to continue training Iraqi troops and delivering
economic assistance, but would not require us to interpose
American soldiers between Iraqi sectarian factions.
One of the ironies of the highly contentious debate over
President Bush's new Iraq plan is that it's focused on the
strategically narrow issue of what United States troops do in a
limited number of multiethnic neighborhoods in Baghdad that
contain only about 7 percent of the Iraqi population, what
General Jack Keane has called the ``key terrain.'' Undoubtedly,
what happens in those Baghdad neighborhoods is important, but
it's unlikely that this mission will determine our fate in the
Middle East. Remaking Iraq, in and of itself, does not
constitute a strategic objective. The risk is that we will
define success and failure in Iraq so rigidly that our Iraq
policy will become disconnected, or even contradictory, to
broader regional goals.
It is important that the Congress and the public fully
understand any strategic shift in our policy. The President
should be reaching out to the Congress in an effort to
construct a consensus on how we will protect our broader
strategic interests, regardless of what happens in Baghdad
during the next several months.
The worst outcome would be a wholesale exit from vital
areas and missions in the Middle East precipitated by United
States domestic political conflict and, simply, fatigue over an
unsustainable Iraq policy.
We look forward, Dr. Kissinger, to your thoughts on these
questions, your advice and counsel on the best way forward for
the United States in this important part of the world.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary----
Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, if I could just have 1 minute,
I'd appreciate it.
The Chairman. Just 1 minute, Senator, or we'll have
everybody else----
Senator Kerry. Oh, no, no, no, I just wanted to make my
excuses to the Secretary----
The Chairman. Oh----
Senator Kerry [continuing]. Because I have----
The Chairman [continuing]. Please.
Senator Kerry [continuing]. To go chair another hearing,
and I wanted to apologize for not being able to be here to
listen to your testimony. I'm going to take it with me, read
it. I hope to get back before the end of it, but I just wanted
to welcome you here and thank you for taking time to be with
us, and we really look forward to the advice and counsel you'll
give us.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator, that's----
Dr. Kissinger. Thank you.
The Chairman [continuing]. That is necessary. And I--in a
moment, Mr. Secretary, I will--I'll wait until your testimony
is finished. Senator Hagel is not here, because he's attending
the funeral of a young lieutenant who was recently killed in
Iraq, whom he appointed to the Academy, and whose younger
brother is at the Academy. But I want to honor the young man, I
want his name in the record. It is Army First Lieutenant Jacob
Fritz of Verdon, Nebraska, Senator Lugar wanted me to express
his apologies as to why he is not here.
Please proceed, Mr. Secretary.
STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. KISSINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF
STATE; CHAIRMAN, KISSINGER McLARTY ASSOCIATES, NEW YORK, NY
Dr. Kissinger. Mr. Chairman, I have submitted an article I
wrote a week ago in lieu of a statement. But I will make a few
extemporaneous remarks to begin this discussion.
The fundamental issue in the region is not the tactical
issue that we--that's received so much of attention--namely,
the specific deployments inside Baghdad; the fundamental issue
is the one that has been identified by you and by Senator Lugar
about the long-term role of the United States in the region and
the basic challenges that it faces.
The United States has been involved in military actions in
the region now since the 1950s--in Lebanon in 1958; in the
alert over Jordan in 1970; an alert over the Middle East war,
or the conclusion of the Middle East war, in 1973; over the
evacuation of Lebanon in 1975; in the--with a military force in
Lebanon in the 1980s; military action over Iraq and Kuwait in
1991; in several air attacks on Iraq in the late 1990s; and
then again in the war in which we face. This must reflect the
judgment of a succession of Presidents of the vital importance
of Middle East--the Middle East, and of stability in the Middle
East, to the United States.
Now, the current situation in the Middle East has some
features that are relatively unique. Most of the crises that I
described earlier were between states and arose out of the
conflict of states or out of the Palestinian issue. The current
crisis arises out of the fact that the state, which we take for
granted as the organization of international affairs, is
weakening all over the region, because in most countries it is
a product of the post-World War I period that was introduced
into the area by Western nations. And, in many countries, it is
not tied to the nation as it is in Europe, the United States,
and many other parts of the world. The borders were
artificially drawn. And, indeed, this is one of the dilemmas of
Iraq, that Iraq was created out of three provinces of the
Ottoman Empire in order to provide a strategic buffer between
French and British zones that, themselves, were artificially
created. So, the disintegration of that system is one of the
factors of the region.
One of the attributes of such a disintegration is that
ideologies trump traditional loyalties, and so that the Islamic
religion, and the radical aspect of the Islamic religion, is--
goes across borders. One result is the existence--on the
territory of what we consider sovereign states and what
international law has considered sovereign states--of units
that have the character of states but are not really states,
like the Hezbollah, like the Hamas, like the Mahdi Army in
Baghdad, organizations that, on the one hand, participate in
the government, but, on the other, are tied to loyalties that
go beyond the national borders, and whose outcome is--cannot be
defined by national interests as it has been, heretofore,
conceived. So, we are dealing with an upheaval that goes across
the whole region.
And, given the fact that much of it receives its impetus
from the Islamic religion and from the attempt to restore the
significance of the Islamic methods, the impact of what occurs
in that region will be not confined to the region, it will go
from Indonesia, which is a Muslim--which is the largest Muslim
state, to Malaysia, to India, which has--it's the second
largest Muslim state, even though its 160 million Muslims are a
minority, to the suburbs of Paris, where there are large
Islamic populations. So, this is what is at stake in that
region and in terms of which the impact must be considered.
Now, the United States has been attempting, for 50 years,
to contribute to stability and progress and peace in the region
by leading negotiations, by intervening militarily. And it's in
this context, Mr. Chairman, that I look at what we are now
facing in Iraq.
Major mistakes have been made. We have reached a very
difficult situation, because we have not found it easy to bring
the--some traditional American premises in line with cultural
and regional realities. But I will confine myself to where we
are--where we are today.
In Iraq, we face a number of only partially connected
problems. We face the impact of neighbors from across the
border: Iran, with respect to the Shia south; Turkey,
indirectly, with respect to the Kurdish north; Syria, with
respect to the Sunni west; and others that have an interest,
partly because Iraq is also the tipping point for a Shia-Sunni
confrontation that is taking its most acute form precisely on
the territory of Iraq.
Second, we have the insurrection of the Sunni population
against the shift in power from its traditional dominance to a
democratic principle of majority rule, which empowers the
Shiites and the--and, to some extent, the Kurds.
Third, we have the al-Qaeda influence that--it's a cross-
border assault, but--not on a national basis, but on an
ideological basis. And then, we have the Shia-Sunni conflict.
And they're all merging together in a sort of amorphous
explosion of violence. The American interest is in preventing
the radical Islamic element from achieving a domination that
will then infect the other regions that I have already
discussed. The--America has no interest in the outcome of a
Sunni-Shia rivalry, as long as it is not achieved by ethnic
cleansing and genocidal practices.
So, I would say that if we are talking about long-range
strategy, we should move into a position from which our forces
can intervene against the threats to the regional security that
I have identified and becomes a lesser and lesser element in
the purely Shia-Sunni struggle.
The only--the principal relevance of the current debate
about Baghdad is the judgment whether suppressing the militias
in Baghdad can make a contribution to this process. And this is
where opinions divide. I lean toward the fact that they--that
it is something that should be attempted.
There will be two possible outcomes: That it succeeds, in
which case, the government could pursue preferred policies of
reconciliation, if it is able to, and we concentrate in the
strategic issues that I have mentioned before. If it fails, our
strategic mission will still be the same, except we will then
have to take care to separate ourselves from the sectarian
civil war that will emerge.
Now, all this needs to be conducted within the framework of
a diplomacy that permits other nations to participate
increasingly in the political future of the region. And I
would--I have to define my perception of diplomacy, which is
not always identical with others.
I very often hear the statement that something should be
left to a political solution rather than a military solution.
In my view, diplomacy is an amalgam of penalties and rewards,
and it cannot be segmented into a political phase, into a
military phase. But, by the same token, the military actions--
just as the political actions require some understanding of the
military element, so the military element has to be geared to a
possible political outcome.
There has been much discussion about whether to negotiate
with Iran and Syria. I would separate those two countries. The
Iranian issue is--the Syrian concern is primarily one of
national interest. Its primary concern is Lebanon and the
Golan, and its influence in Iraq is relatively marginal. The
Iranian problem is one that will beset us for many
administrations, because it is not only the strongest country
in the region, but it is also, at this precise moment,
developing nuclear weapons, in defiance of the Security Council
plus Germany. And if one--if an outcome emerges in which Iran
has nuclear weapons and a vacuum in front of it in Iraq, that
would be a potentially disastrous outcome for the peace in the
region.
I have always had the view that the issue of whether one
should negotiate is--should not be a central issue. We should
always be prepared to negotiate. The fundamental issue is what
to negotiate about and what the purpose of the negotiation
should be. I see little incentive Iran has to help us solve the
Iraqi problem unless it occurs in a constellation in which
there can also--in which they cannot achieve their maximum
objective by themselves. And, therefore, a diplomacy has to
include, as Senator Lugar pointed out, a creation of a group of
states that have their own interest in preventing Iranian
domination. And, to make the matter more complex, all of this
has to be in the context of a willingness to talk to Iran.
Now--but that has to take into--but that has to be based,
in my opinion, on the following theme. I don't think Iran will
help us in Iraq, as such. And, therefore, we cannot avoid
creating conditions in Iran that make it unattractive for them.
But the challenge that Iraqi leaders will have--Iranian leaders
will have to face at some point is this: We have no quarrel
with Iran as a nation. We can respect Iran as a major player in
the region with a significant role in the region. What we
cannot accept is an Iran that seeks to dominate the region on
the basis of a religious ideology and using the Shia base in
other countries to undermine stability in a region on which the
economic well-being of such a large part of the world depends.
Under the previous Iranian Government, the United States
had excellent relations with Iran. And they were not tied to
the personality of the ruler, but to the importance of the
country. So, the question before our diplomacy and before the
Iranian diplomacy is: Can we define objectives that bring peace
and progress to the region? And that gets me to my final point.
If all of what I've said is correct, or most of it is
correct, then the United States must be present in the region
for a foreseeable future. It cannot be ended in one
administration, because even total withdrawal will have
consequences that the next administration will have to live
with.
This is--so, the key question is: What kind of a presence,
in what manner, and for what outcome, in Iraq? And it's in this
spirit, Mr. Chairman, that I've taken the liberty of stating
some semiphilosophical points, in anticipation of your
questions.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Kissinger follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Henry Kissinger, Former Secretary of State;
Chairman, Kissinger McLarty Associates, New York, NY
[From the International Herald Tribune, Jan. 18, 2007]
Withdrawal Is Not An Option
(By Henry A. Kissinger)
President Bush's bold decision to order a ``surge'' of some 20,000
American troops for Iraq has brought the debate over the war to a
defining stage. There will not be an opportunity for another
reassessment.
The Baker-Hamilton commission powerfully described the impasse on
the ground. It is the result of cumulative choices--some enumerated by
the President--in which worthy objectives and fundamental American
values clashed with regional and cultural realities.
The important goal of modernizing U.S. Armed Forces led to
inadequate troop levels for the military occupation of Iraq. The
reliance on early elections as the key to political evolution, in a
country lacking a sense of national identity, caused the newly
enfranchised to vote almost exclusively for sectarian parties,
deepening historic divisions into chasms. The understandable--but, in
retrospect, premature--strategy of replacing American troops with
indigenous forces deflected U.S. forces from a military mission, and it
could not deal with the most flagrant shortcoming of Iraqi forces,
which is to define what the Iraqi forces are supposed to fight for and
under what banner.
These circumstances have merged into an almost perfect storm of
mutually reinforcing crises: Within Iraq, the sectarian militias are
engaged in civil war or something so close to it as to make little
practical difference. The conflict between Shiites and Sunnis goes back
1,400 years. In most Middle Eastern countries, Shiite minorities
coexist precariously with Sunni majorities. The civil war in Iraq
threatens to usher in a cycle of domestic upheavals and a war between
Shiite and Sunni states, with a high potential of drawing in countries
from outside the region. In addition, Iraqi Kurds seek full autonomy
from Sunnis and Shiites; their independence would raise the prospect of
intervention from Turkey and Iran.
The war in Iraq is part of another war that cuts across the Shiite-
Sunni issue: The assault on the international order conducted by
radical groups in both Islamic sects. Functioning as states within
states and by brutal demonstrations of the inability of established
governments to protect their populations, such organizations as
Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Mahdi Army in Iraq, and the al-Qaeda groups
all over the Middle East seek to reassert an Islamic identity
submerged, in their view, by Western values. Any enhancement of radical
Islamist self-confidence, therefore, threatens all the traditional
states of the region, as well as others with significant Islamic
populations, from Indonesia through India to Western Europe. The most
important target is the United States, as the most powerful Western
country and the indispensable component of any attempt to build a new
world order.
The disenchantment of the American public with the burdens it has
borne largely alone for nearly 4 years has generated growing demands
for some type of unilateral withdrawal, usually expressed as benchmarks
to be put to the Baghdad government that, if not fulfilled in specific
timeframes, would trigger American disengagement.
But under present conditions, withdrawal is not an option. American
forces are indispensable. They are in Iraq not as a favor to its
government or as a reward for its conduct. They are there as an
expression of the American national interest to prevent the Iranian
combination of imperialism and fundamentalist ideology from dominating
a region on which the energy supplies of the industrial democracies
depend. An abrupt American departure would greatly complicate efforts
to stem the terrorist tide far beyond Iraq; fragile governments from
Lebanon to the Persian Gulf would be tempted into preemptive
concessions. It might drive the sectarian conflict in Iraq to genocidal
dimensions beyond levels that impelled U.S. intervention in the
Balkans. Graduated withdrawal would not ease these dangers until a
different strategy was in place and showed progress. For now, it would
be treated within Iraq and in the region as the forerunner of a total
withdrawal, and all parties would make their dispositions on that
basis.
President Bush's decision should, therefore, not be debated in
terms of the ``stay the course'' strategy he has repeatedly disavowed
in recent days. Rather, it should be seen as the first step toward a
new grand strategy relating power to diplomacy for the entire region,
ideally on a nonpartisan basis.
The purpose of the new strategy should be to demonstrate that the
United States is determined to remain relevant to the outcome in the
region; to adjust American military deployments and numbers to emerging
realities; and to provide the maneuvering room for a major diplomatic
effort to stabilize the Middle East.
Of the current security threats in Iraq--the intervention of
outside countries, the presence of al-Qaeda fighters, an
extraordinarily large criminal element, the sectarian conflict--the
United States has a national interest in defeating the first two; it
must not involve itself in the sectarian conflict for any extended
period, much less let itself be used by one side for its sectarian
goals.
The sectarian conflict confines the Iraqi Government's unchallenged
writ to the sector of Baghdad defined as the Green Zone. In many areas
the militias exceed the strength of the Iraqi national army. Appeals to
the Iraqi Government to undertake reconciliation and economic reforms
are not implemented, partly because the will to do so is absent but
essentially because it lacks the power to put such policies in place,
even if the will to do so could suddenly be mobilized. If the influence
of the militias could be eliminated--or greatly reduced--the Baghdad
government would have a better opportunity to pursue a national policy.
The new strategy has begun with attempts to clear the
insurrectional Sunni parts of Baghdad. But it must not turn into ethnic
cleansing or the emergence of another tyrannical state, only with a
different sectarian allegiance. Side by side with disarming the Sunni
militias and death squads, the Baghdad government must show comparable
willingness to disarm Shiite militias and death squads. American policy
should not deviate from the goal of a civil state whose political
process is available to all citizens.
As the comprehensive strategy evolves, a repositioning of American
forces from the cities into enclaves should be undertaken so that they
can separate themselves from the civil war and concentrate on the
threats to international security described above. The principal
mission would be to protect the borders against infiltration and to
prevent the establishment of terrorist training areas or Taliban-type
control over significant regions. At that point, too, significant
reductions of U.S. forces should be possible. Such a strategy would
make withdrawals depend on conditions on the ground instead of the
other way around. It could also provide the time to elaborate a
cooperative diplomacy for rebuilding the region, including progress
toward a settlement of the Palestine issue.
For such a strategy, it is not possible to jettison the military
instrument and rely, as some argue, on purely political means. A free-
standing diplomacy is an ancient American illusion. History offers few
examples of it. The attempt to separate diplomacy and power results in
power-lacking direction and diplomacy being deprived of incentives.
Diplomacy is the attempt to persuade another party to pursue a
course compatible with a society's strategic interests. Obviously this
involves the ability to create a calculus that impels or rewards the
desired direction. The outcome, by definition, is rarely the ability to
impose one's will but a compromise that gives each party a stake in
maintaining it.
Few diplomatic challenges are as complex as that surrounding Iraq.
Diplomacy must mediate between Iraqi sects that, though in many
respects mortal enemies, are assembled in a common governmental
structure. It needs to relate that process to an international concept
involving Iraq's neighbors and other countries that have a significant
interest in the outcome.
Two levels of diplomatic effort are necessary:
A contact group should be created, assembling neighboring
countries whose interests are directly affected and which rely
on American support. This group should include Turkey, Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan. Its function should be to advise on
ending the internal conflict and to create a united front
against outside domination.
Parallel negotiations should be conducted with Syria and
Iran, which now appear as adversaries, to give them an
opportunity to participate in a peaceful regional order. Both
categories of consultations should lead to an international
conference including all countries that have to play a
stabilizing role in the outcome, specifically the permanent
members of the U.N. Security Council as well as such countries
as Indonesia, India, and Pakistan.
Too much of the current discussion focuses on the procedural aspect
of starting a dialogue with adversaries. In fact, a balance of risks
and opportunities needs to be created so that Iran is obliged to choose
between a significant but not dominant role or riding the crest of
Shiite fundamentalism. In the latter case, it must pay a serious, not
rhetorical, price for choosing the militant option. An outcome in which
Iran is approaching nuclear status because of hesitant and timid
nonproliferation policies in the Security Council, coupled with a
political vacuum in the region, must lead to catastrophic consequences.
Similar principles apply to the prospects for settlement in
Palestine.
Moderates in Israel and the neighboring Arab countries are evolving
compromises unimaginable a decade ago. But if the necessary outcomes
are perceived as the result of panic by moderates and an exit from the
region by the United States, radicals could raise unfulfillable demands
and turn the peace process against the moderates.
In all this, the United States cannot indefinitely bear alone the
burden for both the military outcome and the political structure. At
some point, Iraq has to be restored to the international community, and
other countries must be prepared to share responsibilities for regional
peace. Some of America's allies and other countries seek to escape the
upheavals around them by disassociating from the United States. But
just as it is impossible for America to deal with these trends
unilaterally, sooner or later a common effort to rebuild the
international order will be imposed on all the potential targets. The
time has come for an effort to define the shoals within which diplomacy
is obliged to navigate and to anchor any outcome in some broader
understanding that accommodates the interests of the affected parties.
______
[From the Washington Post, Nov. 24, 2006]
Deal With Tehran, Not Its Crusade
(By Henry A. Kissinger)
Iran's nuclear program and considerable resources enable it to
strive for strategic dominance in its region. With the impetus of a
radical Shiite ideology and the symbolism of defiance of the U.N.
Security Council's resolution, Iran challenges the established order in
the Middle East and perhaps wherever Islamic populations face dominant,
non-Islamic majorities.
The appeal for diplomacy to overcome these dangers has so far
proved futile. The negotiating forum the world has put in place for the
nuclear issue is heading for a deadlock. Divisions among the
negotiating partners inhibit a clear sense of direction.
The five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany--
known as the ``Six''--have submitted a package of incentives to get
Tehran to end enrichment of uranium as a key step toward putting an end
to the weapons program. They have threatened sanctions if their
proposal is rejected. Iran has insisted on its ``right'' to proceed
with enrichment, triggering an allied debate about the nature of the
sanctions to which the Six have committed themselves. Even the minimal
sanctions proposed by Europe's ``E3'' (Britain, France, and Germany)
have been rejected by Russia.
Reluctant to negotiate directly with a member of the ``axis of
evil,'' the United States has not participated in the negotiations. But
recently Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, has announced a reversal
of policy. The United States--and she herself--will participate in the
nuclear talks, provided Iran suspends its enrichment program while
discussions take place.
Tehran, however, has so far shown no interest in negotiating with
the United States, either in the multilateral forum or separately. This
is because Iran sees no compelling national interest in giving up its
claim to nuclear power status, and strong domestic political reasons to
persist. Pursuing the nuclear weapons program is a way of appealing to
national pride, and it shores up otherwise shaky domestic support. The
proposed incentives, even if they were believed, would increase Iran's
dependence on the international system that Iran's current leaders
reject.
The European negotiators accept the importance of preventing the
spread of nuclear weapons. But they govern societies increasingly loath
to make immediate sacrifices for the sake of the future--witness the
difficulty of passing legislation on domestic reform. Europe's leaders
know that their publics wouldn't support military action against Iran
and would probably prove very shaky in a prolonged political crisis
over sanctions.
America's European allies have decided to opt for minimum sanctions
because they hope that the mere fact of united action by the Six will
give Iran's leaders pause. The conviction expressed by some European
diplomats that Iran will not wish to be a pariah nation indefinitely,
and will, therefore, come to an agreement, is probably wishful
thinking. As this becomes apparent, the European allies will probably
move reluctantly toward escalation of sanctions, up to a point where
Iran undertakes a confrontational response. Then they will have to
choose between the immediate crisis and the permanent crisis of letting
the Iranian nuclear program run free.
The dilemma is inherent in any gradual escalation. If initial steps
are minimal, they are presumably endurable (and are indeed chosen for
that reason). The adversary may be tempted to wait for the next
increment. Thus gradualism may, in the end, promote escalation and make
inevitable the very decision being evaded.
Russia's position is more complex. Probably no country--not even
the United States--fears an Iranian nuclear capability more than
Russia, whose large Islamic population lies just north of the Iranian
border. No country is more exposed to the seepage of Iranian nuclear
capabilities into terrorist hands or to the jihadist ideological wave
that the Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, encourages. For that
reason, Russia does not want to unleash Iranian hostility on itself
without a prospect of probable success.
In addition, Russian attitudes toward the United States have
undergone a significant change. There is a lessened commitment to
strategic partnership. Suspicion has grown on both sides. The United
States fears that Russia is striving to rebuild its imperial influence
in what Russia calls the ``near-abroad''; Russia believes that America
is seeking to pressure the Kremlin to change its domestic policies and
to reduce Russia's international influence.
Because of its conviction that Iran will be a formidable adversary
and its low assessment of the American effort in Iraq, the Kremlin
doubts that the United States has the staying power for a prolonged
confrontation with Iran and chooses to avoid manning barricades on
which it might be left alone. In consequence, Moscow has shifted its
emphasis toward Europe and, on Iran, shares Europe's hesitation. The
difference is that if matters reach a final crunch, Russia is more
likely to take a stand, especially when an Iranian nuclear capability
begins to look inevitable and even more so when it emerges as imminent.
The nuclear negotiations with Iran are moving toward an
inconclusive outcome. The Six eventually will have to choose either
effective sanctions or the consequences of an Iranian military nuclear
capability and the world of proliferation that implies. Military action
by the United States is extremely improbable in the final 2 years of a
presidency facing a hostile Congress--though it may be taken more
seriously in Tehran. Tehran surely cannot ignore the possibility of a
unilateral Israeli strike if all negotiation options close.
More likely, the nuclear issue will be absorbed into a more
comprehensive negotiation based on geopolitical factors. It is
important, however, to be clear as to what this increasingly
fashionable term implies. The argument has become widespread that Iran
(and Syria) should be drawn into a negotiating process in the hope of
bringing about a change of their attitudes, as happened, for example,
in the opening to China a generation ago. This, it is said, would
facilitate a retreat by the United States to more strategically
sustainable positions.
A diplomacy that excludes adversaries is a contradiction in terms.
But the argument on behalf of negotiating focuses too often on the
opening of talks rather than on their substance. The fact of talks is
assumed to represent a psychological breakthrough. However, the relief
supplied by a change of atmosphere is bound to be temporary.
Diplomacy--especially with an adversary--can succeed only if it brings
about a balance of interests. Failing that, it runs the risk of turning
into an alibi for procrastination or a palliative to ease the process
of defeat without, however, eliminating the consequences of defeat.
The opening to China was facilitated by Soviet military pressures
on China's northern borders; rapprochement between the United States
and China implemented an existing common interest in preventing Soviet
hegemony. Similarly, the shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East made
progress because it was built on a preexisting equilibrium that neither
side was able to alter unilaterally.
To the extent that talk becomes its own objective, there will
emerge forums without progress and incentives for stonewalling. If, at
the end of such a diplomacy, stands an Iranian nuclear capability and a
political vacuum being filled by Iran, the impact on order in the
Middle East will be catastrophic.
Understanding the way Tehran views the world is crucial in
assessing the prospects of a dialogue. The school of thought
represented by President Ahmadinejad may well perceive Iranian
prospects as more promising than they have been in centuries. Iraq has
collapsed as a counterweight; within Iraq, Shiite forces are led by men
who were trained in Tehran and spent decades there. Democratic
institutions in Iraq favor dominance by the majority Shiite groups. In
Lebanon, Hezbollah, trained and guided by Iran, is the strongest
military force.
In the face of this looming Shiite belt and its appeal to the
Shiite population in northeast Saudi Arabia and along the Persian Gulf,
attitudes in the Sunni states--Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia--and the
Gulf States range from unease to incipient panic. This may explain
Ahmadinejad's insolent behavior during his visit to New York. His theme
seemed to be: ``Don't talk to me about your world order, whose rules we
did not participate in making and which we disdain. From now on, jihad
will define the rules or at least participate in shaping them.''
These attitudes will not be changed simply for the opportunity of
talking to the United States. The self-confident Iranian leaders may
facilitate a local American retreat but, in their present mood, only
for the purpose of turning it into a long-term rout. The argument that
Iran has an interest in negotiating over Iraq to avoid chaos along its
borders is valid only as long as the United States retains a capacity
to help control the chaos. There are only two incentives for Iran to
negotiate: The emergence of a regional structure that makes imperialist
policies unattractive and the concern that, if matters are pushed too
far, America might yet strike out.
So long as Iran views itself as a crusade rather than a nation, a
common interest will not emerge from negotiations. To evoke a more
balanced view should be an important goal for U.S. diplomacy. Iran may
come to understand sooner or later that, for the foreseeable future, it
is a relatively poor developing country in no position to challenge all
the industrialized nations. But such an evolution presupposes the
development of a precise and concrete strategic and negotiating program
by the United States and its associates.
With the Sunni states of the region terrified by the Shiite wave,
negotiation between Iran and the United States could generate a
stampede toward preemptive concessions, unless preceded, or at least
accompanied, by a significant effort to rally those states to a policy
of equilibrium. In such a policy, Iran must find a respected, but not
dominant, place. A restarted Palestinian peace process should play a
significant role in that design, which presupposes close cooperation
among the United States, Europe, and the moderate Arab States. What
must not happen is to trade relief from geopolitical pressures for
acquiescence in an Iranian military nuclear program. That would
mortgage the future, not only for the region but for the entire global
order.
Iran needs to be encouraged to act as a nation, not a cause. It has
no incentive to appear as a deus ex machina to enable America to escape
its embarrassments, unless the United States retains an ability to fill
the vacuum or at least be a factor in filling it. America will need to
reposition its strategic deployments, but if such actions are viewed as
the prelude to an exit from the region, a collapse of existing
structures is probable.
A purposeful and creative diplomacy toward Iran is important for
building a more promising region--but only if Iran does not, in the
process, come to believe that it is able to shape the future on its own
or if the potential building blocks of a new order disintegrate while
America sorts out its purposes.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. Quite
frankly, that's the very reason why we wanted you and Secretary
Albright and two former National Security Advisors to close
this first, initial set of hearings.
Mr. Secretary, I had the opportunity to speak to you in
private over the last couple of months, and you've always been
available to all of us, I know, for your counsel. And it seems
to me that the case you make is a fairly compelling philosophic
case, as well as a reality check of what's happened on the
ground. You have, essentially, a nontraditional state, where
ideology is the dominant competing unifying element within it--
that is, it's causing it to split the country, as well. You
point out that, in Iraq, the impact of the neighbors, the Sunni
insurrection they're dealing with, their lack of dominance, the
al-Qaeda, ideologically driven nonstate actors; and the Shia
difficulty in coming to grips with their now being in the
ascendancy. And you said these all merge together, and the
greatest concern is, they create an explosion that could result
in radical domination, a radical notion dominating the region,
and it's then spreading.
What that adds up to, to me--and I don't disagree with what
you've said, and I also don't disagree that there is a need
that there--military force is necessary, but not sufficient, to
solve this, and we're going to have to be in the region a long
time. That leads me--if I understood you correctly--to this
question. A number of witnesses have testified that in
nontraditional states that are infected by this ideology and
this competition, one of two things works. You either have a
strongman or a dominant power, an imperial power, dominating,
or you have federation, where, in order to keep these--this
country intact, although it was an artificial construct, you
have to give breathing room to those elements that you've
outlined--Sunni, Shia, et cetera--to prevent the very
explosion.
So, why is it--why does it not make sense, consistent with
our military presence, to be accommodating what history seems
to dictate, as well as what their Constitution calls for, and
that is allowing more local control over the physical security
and safety of their ideologically defined and/or tribally
defined areas, while, at the same time, promoting a central
government that has broad responsibilities, instead of
insisting on a strong central government, which seems to me to
be, to use a slang expression, like pushing a rope right now?
Dr. Kissinger. I'm sympathetic to an outcome that permits
large regional autonomy. In fact, I think it is very likely
that this will emerge out of the conflict that we are now
witnessing. Now, the conventional wisdom of many experts in the
region is that we must not be perceived as bringing that about,
because doing so would have--would inflame the Shia community
and enhance Iranian influence, and also because of the danger
of Turkish intervention in the Kurdish area. And I think that's
an opinion we should take seriously.
I neglected to mention one thought I have, which--actually,
I think it's fairly central; I got carried away, I didn't get
to it--which is this: Somewhere along this process in which
we're now engaged, there is the need for an international
conference on Iraq, because Iraq has to be reintegrated into
the international system, and because other nations have to be
brought into assuming the responsibility for the political
future of the region. It may be premature at this moment, but
in the process that we foresee over, say, the rest of this
year, there should be some such concept. And, in my view, that
should include the neighbors, the Security Council, and
countries like Indonesia, India, possibly Pakistan. And that
would be a rather large and unwieldy body that could then form
subgroups for certain regional issues.
But the importance is that only in such a framework can you
really deal with the issue of autonomy, because you have then
to create a wider legitimacy for what is emerging and against
intervention from outside countries.
The Chairman. I would argue it's the only thing that will
lead the bordering countries to conclude that intervention is
not in their interest. But I fully agree with you.
I have a minute left of my time, but I will yield to my
friend, Senator Lugar.
I thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Kissinger, I appreciate your opening comments
about the importance of the region, the continuity, in a way,
of American foreign policy, and its interest in the area over a
long period of time, and now your suggestion that there be an
international conference, is something, in my judgment, that
would strengthen Secretary Rice's attempts to make certain that
other countries know of our continuing interest in the area and
might be prepared, under various circumstances, to work with
us. For the moment, out of fear of Iranian domination of Iraq,
but, more importantly, because there are conflicting interests
among the group, and we have been a stabilizer.
With regard to the current situation in Iraq, what are the
possibilities for the Iraqi Parliament, or its government, as
constituted now, to reach an oil agreement that, in essence
parses out the revenues and the development rights? And,
secondarily, what are the possibilities for autonomous regions;
for that idea to proceed, there may be some agreement among
Shiite to come together; likewise, the Kurds, who have moved
out strongly to set up their region, will there be an
acceptance then by the Sunnis? Is that predicated on their
sharing the oil wealth? I ask those two questions, because very
frequently, as Senators and Members of the House discuss this
problem, they talk about so-called benchmarks for Prime
Minister, Mr. Maliki, or his government. The suggestion is that
they need to get on with this rather swiftly, that the United
States is losing patience in their inability to come together,
to get a quorum in the Parliament, for example, and to act. But
as a practical political matter, what is your prediction on the
potential for their making these solutions? And, even if they
make them, how does that fit into the overall testimony you
have given about Iraq being reintegrated with the rest of the
countries in the region?
Dr. Kissinger. The difficulty of the democratic process in
multiethnic societies is that the democratic process is
predicated on the possibility of a minority becoming a
majority; and, therefore, the minority can accept the decisions
of the majority, in the hope of reversing it later on. The
essence of multiethnic societies is that minorities are
permanent and that, therefore, the democratic process, to the
minority, appears like a--like just another form of domination.
Therefore, it is, first, difficult to come to an agreement;
and, second, difficult to implement the agreement, even if it
should be made, because the Parliament does not have the same
legitimate quality in the whole country that the American
Congress or British Parliament have in our country or in
Britain. That is the inherent problem.
Usually, civil wars are ended with the victory of one side
or the other, or with exhaustion. I know no civil war that has
been ended--well, I may be wrong--by a--it's, in any rate, very
rare, or it takes a dominating figure like Mandela in South
Africa, who rises to spiritual heights.
I'm not very optimistic, even if this is achieved in Iraq
as a parliament. It's a worthy goal. We are right to support
it. It would be the best outcome, if it could be achieved.
But--there may be a thousand years of history against it, but
it has to be our objective.
Senator Lugar. You are somewhat pessimistic about this
outcome. What I fear in the current argument some of us are
having is that some would say if this is not achieved, if
certain benchmarks are not arrived at by the current
government, then this is the last chance; we're out of there.
This is one reason why I appreciate so much your statement this
morning. And I've made an opening comment which indicates that
we are--we cannot be in a situation in which we say we're out
of there. Rather, we are talking about 50 years of history in
which we have been in there. Maybe not in Baghdad, in nine
police districts, but in the region where we could be effective
in terms of American security and American interest.
In talking about the war against terrorism, it's very
important to be effective and to be working with these other
nations who, otherwise, might have some terrorist tendencies of
their own or be subverted by such persons. So, I think we're on
the same page, but I just take advantage of your testimony to
make these comments and to ask for your comment.
Dr. Kissinger. I believe very strongly that we cannot
withdraw from the region, and we should not conduct a debate
with the expectation of a total withdrawal of American forces
from the region. We can discuss, and should discuss, the
deployment of our forces in such a way that it can serve the
strategic objectives that we have discussed earlier, or other
strategic objectives that might be defined.
And with respect to the Government in Iraq, I think one
should distinguish two aspects. Is it as efficient as it can be
within its capabilities? Probably not. But will its
capabilities ever be up to, in the foreseeable future, for what
we would consider adequate, by American standards? Also
probably not, because it is, after all, a collection of
ministers. The Prime Minister doesn't have a militia of his
own. Others have access to militias. So, it's a balance of
forces without the authority that we associate with government.
And, therefore, one has to have some understanding for what it
is possible to do.
But, to sum up my answer, I do not believe we should set
benchmarks, the penalty for which is our withdrawal. There may
be other penalties, but withdrawal should not be one of them.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
The Chairman. The committee will stand in recess until the
police please remove the demonstrator.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. The committee will come back to order.
I'd just like to ask one point of clarification in taking
advantage of the minute I didn't use. Do you make a distinction
between the region and Iraq, Mr. Secretary? Can you picture the
circumstance where we may have to have most of our troops out
of Iraq, but still in the region? Or do you make that
distinction?
Dr. Kissinger. I would have difficulty defining exactly
where in the region they could be in substantial numbers,
especially if we withdraw from Iraq in a way that is considered
a major withdrawal. But I would put this in relation to time.
There's certainly no magic number of American forces that must
be in Iraq forever or for a long period. We should be flexible
about this.
The Chairman. Almost every plan that's been put forward
contemplates some American forces being left in Iraq, in a
totally different--with a totally different mission. But I
thank you.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
And, Dr. Kissinger, it's always good to hear your views.
I want to, sort of, follow on what both Senator Lugar and
the chairman were getting at, this question of not so much
whether we withdraw from the region--I certainly agree with you
that we cannot disengage from the region--but what about
redeployment from Iraq? Leaving aside the question of whether
it's a good idea, whether--when it should begin or end, maybe
you can help us with, what are some of the key diplomatic steps
in the region that we have to do to ensure that Iraq's
neighbors are sufficiently engaged to deal with Iraq's
challenges, and how can we best prepare that aspect of whatever
kind of withdrawal we will ultimately engage in?
Dr. Kissinger. Of course, an important step would be if the
militias in Iraq could be eliminated or sharply reduced,
because they constrict the ability of the government to take
actions that we have identified with government. Second, the
development of a national Iraqi Army that can deal with some of
the problems that I have described, like cross-border
incursions, acts by al-Qaeda. Third, the development of--we
have, up to now, carried the political responsibility for the
future of Iraq, entirely by ourselves. I believe the time has
come to engage the international community, to some degree, and
to an increasing degree, in the political future of Iraq,
without raising the question of what participation they might
have in military actions.
And, therefore, I believe that a diplomacy should start,
and probably it's been started, to begin consultation on the
manner in which this--it can be brought about in such a
framework.
Of course, significant American forces can be withdrawn.
What we should avoid is a redeployment of a nature that creates
the perception that America separates itself from the region
and from its interests that we have defined here. And so, the
staging of these measures is of great importance.
Senator Feingold. I understand the answer with regard to
the international community, as a whole. What I was especially
interested in is Iraq's neighbors. How do we engage Jordan,
Kuwait, others, in a more serious way in the steps that need to
occur?
Dr. Kissinger. Of course, one of the great dangers when we
talk about Iran's neighbors is that--Iraq's neighbors--is that
Iran pursues its objectives, and that then the Sunni states
will organize to create a counterweight, and then we'll see a
reoccurrence of the Sunni-Shia wars, traditional Sunni-Shia
wars, on Iraqi soil, and that would have extraordinary
consequences for the whole region.
So, it's--but, the question of how to engage Iran, one of
the unfortunate aspects of a concentration on Iraq is that the
issue of proliferation of nuclear weapons to Iran is sort of
being swept under the table, and yet, for the peace of the
world, nuclear proliferation to Iran could be an--much
greater--of an even greater significance, because it may really
be the country which will then trigger a whole series of other
countries. And, after that, the calculations of deterrence, as
we have known it, will no longer be operational.
Senator Feingold. Well, Dr. Kissinger, that really relates
to my next question. What you've just, sort of, indicated, a
problem with a great emphasis on Iraq, vis-a-vis our attention
to Iran--a lot--many observers, in my view, even some very good
ones, tend to make the mistake of looking at Iraq in isolation.
Obviously, this doesn't apply to you. But many will say, ``What
will happen to Iraq if we redeploy our troops?'' But I don't
hear them asking, very often, ``What will happen in Somalia or
Afghanistan or many other trouble spots in the world, if we
remain bogged down in Iraq?'' Do you share my concern that
we're devoting too many of our resources to Iraq and not enough
to other areas, or to the, clearly, global fight against al-
Qaeda?
Dr. Kissinger. We should not be bogged down in an
inconclusive operation in Iraq. I supported the original
decision. It has taken forms that went beyond many
expectations. But we should deal with that new situation in a
way that does not accentuate the dangers that you mention,
because we have to balance our presence in Iraq against the
impetus to radical self-confidence that might be achieved if we
suddenly withdrew from Iraq. So, a staged withdrawal geared to
specific criteria, along the lines we have discussed here--that
is, a strengthening of the central government, some
relationship to the outside world--would, of course, be
helpful.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Coleman.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.
The Chairman. And, again, I want to emphasize--excuse me;
don't start the clock yet--that it was very important to
Senator Hagel that you know that it's--that this young man,
First Lieutenant Fritz, who was killed in the Karbala action
recently, he is flying to his home State to attend the funeral.
I thank you for the interruption.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A key point, Mr. Secretary, that you keep referring to is
the danger of Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon. We could tie in
that point with another point where I think there's bipartisan
agreement, which is that what we do in Iraq has an impact not
just on Iraq, but upon the region. And you used the phrase
``radical self-confidence.'' People talk a lot about American
standing and how it's being impacted by what we're doing in
Iraq. Is it your belief that a precipitate withdrawal, which
the Iraq Study Group warned against, and that would generate a
radical self-confidence would have a greater negative long-term
impact on the U.S. standing in the region and peace and
stability in the region?
Dr. Kissinger. That is my conviction. A withdrawal geared
to American internal debates and not to the local situation
would have some of these consequences.
Senator Coleman. I'd like to raise another issue so I can
get a clear understanding of it, and maybe, again, it is one
where there is some agreement. There is a lot of talk about
redeployment. And my understanding of what I heard the chairman
say is that redeployment doesn't mean moving all of our troops
outside of Iraq, but perhaps reposition them in a way that
doesn't lead them into the middle of sectarian civil wars. My
question, just so I can be clear, relates to a statement made
by Secretary Baker yesterday--he said that we're going to be in
Iraq for a long time. Is it your belief that we're going to be
in Iraq--not just in the region, but in Iraq, in some capacity,
for a long time?
Dr. Kissinger. I agree with Senator Baker--with Secretary
Baker.
Senator Coleman. And another issue where I think there is
agreement on is reintegrating Iraq into the international
community, but here's my question. One way to phrase it might
be, ``What is Iraq?'' In other words, if Iraq is seen as simply
being a tool for protecting the Shia militia--rather than a
civic Iraqi State encompassing all groups, but instead as a
religious state dominated by the Shia majority--my sense is
that countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia and others, where
the Sunni population is dominant, will have less of an interest
in being involved in an ultimate solution, because of their
fear that the Iranians are really in control. So my question
is: Does there have to be a clear sense from the Iraqi
Government that it represents an inclusive national government
that is not being directed by Iran, or dictated to by Muqtada
al-Sadr, in order to get anything out of this international
conference on Iraq that you've talked about?
Dr. Kissinger. The best outcome would, of course, be if the
Shia government that is now dominant in Baghdad created a truly
national government, and if the Sunni part of the population
felt that there is such a thing as an Iraqi nationality and
they are being dealt with fairly. And when you look at what
Mandela has done in South Africa, something along that line
would, of course, be--with all the shortcomings that one might
see in South Africa, would be an--very desirable outcome. The
likelihood of this is not great, but we should certainly
encourage it. And it may come about if the Shia realize that
they will not be able, by themselves, to impose a theocratic
state over the whole country. And if we do not participate in
an effort to create a theocratic state, we have to walk a fine
line. On the one hand, there is the danger you describe, that
we do not want to demoralize our Sunni potential allies, and we
want to have them in a position where they are willing--where
they want to resist Iranian domination. On the other hand, we
want to leave open the possibility of an ultimate settlement
with Iran if it can put its nuclear program into some framework
that the international community can accept, and if it confines
itself to objectives of a national state. So, we have to
maneuver between those two extremes. The Sunni states must know
that we will back them against Iranian domination, but not on a
jihad of their own. And the same is true for the theocratic
Shia part.
Senator Coleman. But if the Iraqis themselves are either
not ready, or not able, to do that right now, what is it that
we can do that we're not doing? This whole discussion of
benchmarks, I think, is to say to the Iraqis, ``We need you to
show us that you're doing this,'' because of the consequences
we're talking about.
Dr. Kissinger. I do not believe that American withdrawal is
a way of enforcing benchmarks. There may be--there must be
other ways of the degree of aid we give, and it may be that
there is nothing we can do, beyond a certain point. From some
of the verbal things that I've seen, it seems to me that the
Iraqi Prime Minister at least has taken aboard some of the
principles that we have put forward. We have, now, to see
whether he will execute them.
Senator Coleman. We have talked about a regional conference
for Iraq. Should there be a regional conference about Iran? In
other words, if we don't deal with the Iran issue, how will we
achieve stability in that part of the world?
Dr. Kissinger. In a way, there is a regional conference.
There's an international conference about the nuclear program
of Iran. And I believe that if that ever makes progress, as it
should, it could merge into a discussion of the political role
of Iran in the region, because if Iran is really interested in
security, and not in fulfilling old imperial order that it
dreams, then this ought to be an element of the discussion with
respect to nuclear weapons.
Senator Coleman. And the consequence of Iran getting a
nuclear weapon would be disastrous, not just for the region,
but for the world.
Dr. Kissinger. The consequence of Iran getting nuclear
weapons is disastrous, and we must keep the diplomacy focused
on that.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, welcome. And I do agree with your call for a
regional conference. It's long overdue. And I think one of the
most disappointing things for me is that the Iraq Study Group
was so clear in their call. They issued an urgent call, they
said by the end of last year, right now. And it never happened.
And what happened is, the American people went to the polls,
they voted for, in my opinion, a new strategy to end the war in
Iraq--to end the war in Iraq--and, instead, what they're
getting is a military strategy to have a surge. And many
Americans believe--and I agree with them--that it's time for a
political solution.
Now, I want to probe what you said to my chairman, because
if I heard you right--I want to make sure I heard you right,
because it's hard to hear you. So, tell me if I heard you
right. Senator----
Dr. Kissinger. Which one?
Senator Boxer [continuing]. Biden has been working--the
chairman of the committee, Senator Biden--is working with
Leslie Gelb, and they have come up with a proposal, which has
been out there for quite a while now, to have semiautonomous
regions--Kurds, Shia, Sunni--and a--not three separate
countries, but one country with semiautonomous regions, to
essentially separate the warring parties, and have a--still
have, of course, a national government be involved in
redistributing the oil, and tax policy, and other very
important functions. Now, when he asked you about it--I think I
heard you say this, so please tell me if I heard you right--
``that may well be the outcome, at the end of the day.'' Is
that approximately what you said?
Dr. Kissinger. That's correct.
Senator Boxer. OK. Now--but then, you went on to say, ``But
we shouldn't be perceived as pushing this forward.'' Is that
correct?
Dr. Kissinger. That's correct.
Senator Boxer. OK. Well, I'd like to challenge that,
because, as I see it, you know, every option has its drawbacks,
but it seems to me either we're in the middle of a solution or
in--we're in the middle of a civil war. And what Senator Biden,
I think, has been pushing is, yes; let's get in the middle of a
political solution and out of the civil war. So, I know that
diplomats--because I've been around here a long time, and, as
you know, I could never be a diplomat----
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Oh, don't say----
Senator Boxer. Admit it.
The Chairman. Madam Chairman, I'm not sure----
Senator Boxer. I admit it.
The Chairman [continuing]. That's true. [Laughter.]
Senator Boxer. I----
The Chairman. You got Fritz Hollings to want you on this
committee.
Senator Boxer. Right.
The Chairman. You surely could be a diplomat.
Senator Boxer. Well, all I could tell you is, I
respectfully admit that.
But I think what happens is, sometimes diplomats get stuck
in a kind of a ``think.'' And their ``think'' is, ``Well, we
have to be careful, we have to sit back in this case, not go
out there with a political solution.'' I think, given events on
the ground--and I would urge you--you don't have to even
respond to this, but I want to urge you to please break free
from this diplomatic ``think.'' Because I think, at this stage,
all you have to do is read the details of what's coming out of
Iraq on the ground, for our beautiful men and women thrust in
the middle of a civil war, I don't think anyone who voted for
that resolution--and I thank God, every day, I didn't--ever
dreamed that that would be the end result, that our troops
would be in the middle of this civil war, there would be 3,080
dead, 22,000 wounded, half of those never come back to the
military again, many, many more with post-traumatic stress and
all these problems. And so, it seems to me, at this stage of
what a lot of people are saying have been a failure, including
people in this administration admitting it, that we shouldn't
worry so much that we may be perceived as pushing one political
solution or another. And I think if just one establishment
diplomat came out and said, ``You know, normally I wouldn't say
this, but, given where we are''--I hope you'll think about
that.
Mr. Secretary, you said--you were quoted in State of Denial
here--and I'm assuming it's an accurate quote; it's in
quotation marks--``In early September 2005, Mike Gerson went to
see Kissinger in New York. `Why did you support the Iraq war?'
Gerson asked him. `Because Afghanistan wasn't enough,'
Kissinger answered. `In the conflict with radical Islam,' he
said, `they want to humiliate us, and we need to humiliate
them.' '' And that's a quote.
Now, a year before that, Peter Bergen, CNN analyst, said,
``What we have done in Iraq is what bin Laden could not have
hoped for in his wildest dreams. We invaded an oil-rich Muslim
nation in the heart of the Middle East, the very type of
imperial adventure that bin Laden had long predicted was the
United States long-term goal in the region. We deposed the
secular socialist Saddam, whom bin Laden had long despised,
ignited Sunni and Shia fundamentalist fervor in Iraq, and have
now provoked a defensive jihad that has galvanized jihad-minded
Muslims around the world.'' And this is what he said, ``It's
hard to imagine a set of policies better designed to sabotage
the war on terrorism.''
So, I juxtapose these things. This is terrorist--terrorism
analyst Peter Bergen in 2004. And in 2005, you say you
supported the war in Iraq because we need to humiliate radical
Islam.
So, could you please--I mean, I think what we see here is--
what Peter Bergen said looks to be happening. And I wonder if
you could comment on: Who do you think is right, at the end of
the day, at this stage?
Dr. Kissinger. Well, it's alleged quotation. It's a kind of
journalism that uses a quotation that somebody may have made,
and then spins a whole theory about--around it. It grew out of
a conversation I had with Mr. Gerson, a speechwriter of
President Bush, who then reported his version of the
conversation to Woodward. I've written a lot of articles on the
subject, and I've never said anything like this.
Senator Boxer. OK.
Dr. Kissinger. And so, whether phrases like this floated
through the conversation--I wrote an article in August 2002,
prior to the war, in which I stated my view on the subject. I
did believe there was a geostrategic reason for doing it, based
on the fact that here was a country, with the second largest
oil revenues, that had violated the U.N. cease-fire 16 times,
that was believed to have weapons of mass destruction. And I
thought, if those resources would be put at the service of a
terrorist, or even of a regime that was undermining our
interests, it would be too dangerous, and the American Senate
had voted for regime change. But what I also said in that
article was that if we did it, we should move it to
international control as quickly as possible, and not try to
run it on a unilateral basis. So, those two have to be put
together. And those are my views, not what Woodward reports
having heard from Mr. Gerson, even if fragments of the--of such
sentences floated through a conversation. I've only met Mr.
Gerson once, for less than half an hour.
The Chairman. Last time you'll help him write a speech,
huh? [Laughter.]
Dr. Kissinger. He wrote a good speech on it. [Laughter.]
If I may make a point on your first thing--your first
observation, which--I mean, it's an important observation. The
hesitancy one has in pushing for the solution is that one has
to think of the impact on Turkey of a Kurdish independent
state----
Senator Boxer. Undependent? On an independent state.
Dr. Kissinger [continuing]. On the temptation it may create
for an Iranian push into--so, one has to stage it in such a way
that a significant Iraqi support for it exists, and where we
are not perceived as doing this in order to break up an Arab
State for our own purposes. But if the Iraqis cannot solve the
problems that have been described, I've told the chairman
privately that I thought that this was a possible outcome, and,
at the right moment, we should work in the direction that--for
maximum stability and for maximum chances of peace. But it's--
unfortunately, everything in that region is so fraught with
implications that one has to move with care and thoughtfulness.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up. Could I
have just 10 seconds to wrap up?
What I think we heard here is good, because I think that
when you look at what our chairman is talking about, it's not
three separate countries, it's semiautonomous regions within
Iraq. So, I think that he and Mr. Gelb have looked at that. But
I do appreciate--because I think even what you just said now
moves us a little bit more toward maybe pushing harder for a
specific diplomatic solution.
Thank you.
Dr. Kissinger. I also think it would occur more naturally
if part of an international conference----
The Chairman. That was the point.
Senator Boxer. Yes.
Dr. Kissinger [continuing]. Than as an American national
policy.
Senator Boxer. I think you're right
The Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I apologize for speaking, since
the plan has been discussed over--I'm glad this--the Secretary
added the last point of our private conversations. I think if
there were--and that's what we call for, an international
conference--that if it's in the context of that, it doesn't
appear to be us enforcing it. I think we should start to call
this the Boxer Plan, because you're more articulate than I am
about pushing it. And I really----
Senator Boxer. I'm not the diplomat.
The Chairman. No, no, well, you're doing pretty well. I--
and I thank you for it.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Senator.
Senator Corker. Mr. Secretary, thank you for your
testimony. And I think what I'm seeing here is someone
testifying, and almost everyone on this committee agreeing with
much of what you have to say. And it's an interesting thing to
watch here.
You've talked a lot about the long-term issues that we're
going to be dealing with, the fact that we've been there for 50
years, and that we're going to be there for many more years
down the road.
One of the concerns that I hear debated a lot privately is
that so much focus has been placed on this surge, which is
really not a strategy, but a tactic, something that you said
you even lean toward. But the fact that we've focused so much
on this surge that many people, who do believe we're going to
be in Iraq for many, many years, and in the Middle East for
many years, are concerned that, with so much focus on it, so
much discussion on it, that if nothing good comes out of that
in the next 5 or 6 months, that what's going to happen is going
to be a reaction, an adverse reaction, if you will, that really
does affect our actions in the Middle East for many, many years
down the road. And I think there's a concern that if
something--if no positive comes out of this, there's going to
be a greater push, if you will, to withdraw from the region--
and I wonder if you could respond to that--in ways that would
not be beneficial to our national interests down the road.
Dr. Kissinger. Well, under present conditions, as I have
said, I would--I think the surge is the better option, but we
have to keep in mind that at whatever point we decide whether
it has succeeded or failed, we--it's a tactical move to give us
the maneuvering room to move to the strategy on which, it seems
to me, a considerable consensus has emerged, to me, out of what
I have heard in front of this committee and of what I believe
needs to be done.
I do not believe we can withdraw from Iraq. That is the key
question. We can discuss the kind of deployment, size of the
deployment, but it should be done in relation to the conditions
on the ground and to our national objectives, and not to
abstract timetables.
Senator Corker. This may not be the kind of question to ask
someone coming before our committee, but, because you do feel
sort of a consensus around much of your testimony, and because
you see a sense of the Senate wanting to express itself out of
frustration, and because you have said that you don't think
benchmarks predicated on not being met, or benchmarks not being
met, causing withdrawal, that that's the penalty, what would be
a resolution, if one has to be--if the Senate has to express
itself on this matter--what would be some of the components of
a resolution that you think might be sensible?
Dr. Kissinger. I'm very flattered. That's not the sort of
question I'm usually asked. And I would think that a resolution
that states a concept of national objectives, that's not
ambiguous, but indicates a direction around which the country
could rally, I think would be important, because I don't think
we can go on with the appearance of such basic divisions,
because whichever way it is interpreted abroad, it's not
helpful. And so, if it were possible to--I would not have
recommended it to begin with, but I think a resolution that
states a direction, which hopefully the administration would
join, too, would then create a benchmark for everybody.
And on the substance, when we--if we separate the surge
from it--on where to go afterward, I think there is a--more of
a coming together than there is on the surge option itself, at
least from what I've read. But it's my strong view that it
cannot include a time limit for withdrawal or a withdrawal
geared to our domestic calendar.
Senator Corker. Would you state the last phrase again? Or--
withdrawal based on?
Dr. Kissinger. Our domestic calendar.
Senator Corker. Would you want to expand a little bit on
who the audience really is as it relates to these resolutions,
the audience that really matters most as it relates to these
resolutions?
Dr. Kissinger. Well, of course, you all are running for
election at some point. Some of you know your audiences well,
at least those of you who are here. But I would say, of course,
a principal audience has to be the American people, and one has
to keep in mind there, not only what the American people think
today, but what they will think 2 years, 3 years from now, when
the consequences of some decisions become apparent, and when it
could happen that they will not approve of decisions, even if
those decisions seem to reflect the mood of a moment, which has
happened before. So, of course one has to think of the American
people first, but one also has to think of the actors
internationally who gear their action to their expectation of
an American performance, and how they interpret actions in
terms of their own judgments. And that, I think, is a major
responsibility, as well, in drafting a resolution.
Senator Corker. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Obama.
Senator Obama. I'm going to defer to----
The Chairman. You're going to yield to Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also
thank my colleague from Illinois. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate
your testimony, and I just want to explore some areas with you.
Let me ask you: Would you agree that every course of action, at
this point of time, every alternative, carries with it some
rather grave risks and the potential for even deeper and wider
strife?
Dr. Kissinger. Absolutely.
Senator Menendez. Would you also agree that success--or,
should I say not success but that each of those alternatives
for success depends far more on what others are going to do, or
can do, than what we can do by ourselves?
Dr. Kissinger. I'm not sure I would agree completely with
that. I think it depends on what others can do. But that will
be heavily influenced by our----
Senator Menendez. Well----
Dr. Kissinger [continuing]. Actions.
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Listening to Secretary Baker
and Congressman Hamilton yesterday, among others, and listening
to the administration talk about how the Iraqis themselves have
to make some hard choices, compromises, negotiations for a
government of national unity, security forces have to be built
up in a way that they can respond and stand up for their own
country, the context of regional partners and some of your own
testimony, it seems to me that, while we may lead, at the end
of the day success in Iraq depends, to a great deal, upon what
others--the Maliki government, the Iraqis, the regional
partners--will or will not do than what we will do just by
ourselves.
Dr. Kissinger. I would turn it around. We cannot do it all
by ourselves, but we can act in such a way as to evoke actions
from others that create the maximum chance for success.
Senator Menendez. Now, let me ask you--you say, in the
testimony, that the United States, ``must not involve itself in
the sectarian conflict for any extended period, much less let
itself be used by one side for its own sectarian goals.''
Dr. Kissinger. Right.
Senator Menendez. Now, I listen to that, and I say, isn't
that, in essence, what we're doing? Aren't we largely involved
in a sectarian conflict? The Sunnis want us to protect them
from the Shiites. The Shiites want us on the sidelines so they
can consolidate power. Both are divided among themselves. I've
heard some of my colleagues here talk about the escalation and
sending a very significant amount into Anbar province, where
the Sunnis and the concerns about al-Qaeda are. But it seems to
me that we, and I've heard other testimony from other witnesses
who suggest similarily, need to break the back of the Sunnis so
that they stop their insurgency and come to a realization that
they need a political process. At the end of the day, though,
isn't that taking sides?
Dr. Kissinger. Well, of course we're taking sides against
some of the groups that I have mentioned. And, to some extent,
what you say is quite valid, in the sense that if the
government is a primarily Shia government, and it wants to
extend its authority, that will not be appreciated by the
Sunnis. So, what we should attempt to do, and what I think we
are attempting to do, is to make this attempt to break the back
or reduce the impact of the militias, both the Sunni militias
and the Shia militias. Now, at that point, the national
government could then perform the police functions with its own
forces, and our effort will be directed against terrorism and
outside forces, recognizing that the dividing line is not
absolute. If the effort does not succeed in reducing the
militias, then we have to draw the dividing line between
sectarian violence and the American participation much more
sharply, because--and then, our deployments should reflect
that.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Secretary, let me ask you this. I've
listened to you talk about withdrawal. But is there not a
difference between withdrawal from Iraq at a certain point of
time, taking in consideration even under your own statement
that we cannot involve ourselves in a sectarian conflict for an
extended period--and a withdrawal from the region? One can,
over time, withdraw from Iraq, but not withdraw from the
region, if it doesn't go in a certain way that we believe that
our success there would not be better transformed by having a
phased withdrawal. And how do we get the Iraqis to come to the
conclusion that they have to make the hard choices,
compromises, and negotiations necessary, if it's possible, for
a government of national unity, if they believe that we are
there in an open-ended commitment? And, last, how do we get the
regional partners, and I appreciate you yourself describing
this as desirable to participate in, when, in fact--there's no
real incentive from some of them? We know that an unstable Iraq
is an incentive, but there's been some testimony here that it
hasn't gotten so bad that other regional partners are willing
to participate at this time because they believe that, in fact,
we will continue to stay there with our blood and our national
treasure. And, therefore, it's not necessary for them, at this
time to engage. How would you respond to that?
Dr. Kissinger. With respect to your first point, of course,
the danger is that withdrawal from Iraq of a certain type could
trigger withdrawal from the region, because everybody will then
accommodate, or might--may accommodate to the dominant trends.
In addition, it's not easy to see where one would deploy in the
region after a debacle--after a debacle in Iraq.
Now, I've forgotten your second point.
Senator Menendez. How do we get the Iraqis----
Dr. Kissinger. Oh, how do we get--yeah.
Senator Menendez [continuing]. And the regional partners to
understand that they have to move----
Dr. Kissinger. Now----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. In a different direction;
and move, in the case of the regional partners?
Dr. Kissinger. Much of the discussion around the table here
is of a regional conference. I differ somewhat with--I prefer
an international conference in which countries that have
broader interests, and that ought to have a direct experience
of the Islamic challenge, participate, because if you take the
countries of the region only, they are either threatened, some
of them, or aggressive, some of them, or potentially
aggressive, some of them, so their conflicting interests may be
so great that it is difficult to distill them into some kind of
consensus, while I think a wider international conference might
create some criteria which then can be guideposts to the more
immediately involved countries. But that, of course, would
require careful exploration by the Secretary of State and
others. But, how do we get them to do it? That's, of course,
our challenge.
The Chairman. Senator, I apologize, but we promised this--
the Secretary that we'd have him out of here by 11:30, because
he's got to catch a flight, and if we do it, we can----
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman [continuing]. We can try to get that done,
I'd--try to keep----
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. Secretary Kissinger, I would like to say
that the testimony you have submitted for this hearing is the
best paper that I have seen in all of the hearings the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee has had with various people that
have come before us. It is concise, relevant, comprehensive,
and it explains how important the state of Iraq is to world
peace, to peace in the region, and to our national and economic
security. What I really like is that although we have been
talking about a plan B, we have not really defined what plan B
is, but your paper does.
Starting on page 2 of your paper, you state, ``The purpose
of the new strategy should be to demonstrate that the United
States is determined to remain relevant to the outcome in the
region, to adjust American military deployments and numbers to
emerging realities, and provide the maneuvering room for a
major diplomatic effort to stabilize the Middle East.'' That
effectively summarizes the plan.
I would like you to comment on two things. First of all, do
you believe that the President of the United States has done a
sufficient job explaining to the American people how strategic
our involvement in the Middle East is to our national security
and to our economic security? Second, if you were the Secretary
of State or the President, how would you go about speaking to
the Arab League, to the U.N. Security Council, or the
international community, to say, ``Here are the important
reasons why you should be interested in what has happened in
Iraq, and why it is in your best interest to come together to
help us try to stabilize that region?''
Dr. Kissinger. I've seen the President on television, on
many talk shows on which one normally hasn't seen Presidents
before, in recent weeks, making a major attempt to explain his
position to the American public. And I don't--I think it would
be presumptuous for me to tell somebody who's been elected
twice by the American public in what form he should present his
case. He's certainly doing it in a dedicated and serious
manner, and he should be listened to carefully.
Senator Voinovich. Pardon me, but would you agree that we
have not done an adequate job talking about plan B, in concert
with what we are now doing in Baghdad and the surge, putting it
in context with the big picture about how we would like to
proceed in the region?
Dr. Kissinger. I think the focus has been on the surge. My
focus, it's the other way around, to explain the surge in terms
of the strategy to which we should go. Whatever we--happens in
the surge, I look at the surge as giving us maneuvering room to
go do what you call plan B and what I call the necessary
strategy.
Senator Voinovich. How would you convince other nations to
attend an international conference or regional conference? What
would you say to the Saudis?
Dr. Kissinger. Well, I think the Secretary of State is
extremely articulate, and she should certainly--I mean, once
the concept is established, I have every confidence in her
being able to do this.
Senator Voinovich. When would we engage these other
nations? Lee Hamilton was here before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee yesterday with the Iraq Task Force. The
task force said that we should begin diplomacy and engage our
partners in the region immediately. When will we do this?
Tomorrow? Next week? Six months from now?
Dr. Kissinger. No; now.
Senator Voinovich. Well----
Dr. Kissinger. I think you cannot segment policy. If you
have a concept where to go, you ought to start preparing the
ground for it as soon as you have agreed on what you're going
to do.
Senator Voinovich. I think we have a big public relations
problem with the American people, because I don't think we are
effectively communicating what we are really doing in Iraq and
how important the entire region is to our future. I think that
is part of the reason why so many people are taking the
position that we should pull our troops out of Iraq. For
example, I don't think we have made it clear that we have been
protecting American oil interests in that area for years. I did
not know, until I joined this committee how many billions of
dollars we spend every year to protect American oil interests
in the region, which are crucial to the economic security of
the United States. This starts back from President Roosevelt's
administration. I did not know that prior to serving on the
Foreign Relations Committee, and many Americans are not aware
of that. We have been spending money in the Middle East for
years to protect oil. If Iraq and the region disintegrate, our
economy could come to its knees.
Dr. Kissinger. We have permanent interests there. The
situation is changing rapidly in directions which are
unfamiliar to Americans, because we are not used to dealing
with people who are willing to kill themselves for--in this
manner. And we have to understand conditions in this area and
not act impulsively at a moment that will affect the next
decade.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Obama.
Senator Obama. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for your testimony. I have to ask
just a couple of questions based on, sort of, the interaction
here, because I--from what I understand, the implication of
your testimony and some of the responses to your questions is
that you think the only way to express our understanding that
there are permanent interests in the Middle East is to maintain
our troop levels in Iraq or, in fact, increase them, and that
if we did not maintain current troop levels or increase them,
that somehow that would be abdicating responsibility and
suggesting that we didn't have permanent interests in the
region. Is that my understanding of your testimony, or did I
misunderstand it?
Dr. Kissinger. No; I believe that, at this moment, if the
option proposed by the administration is the best way to get
the maneuvering room to the changes in deployment and strategy
that will be required by the evolving situation. At that point,
we can decide what levels we should have and in what mix. But
it should not be debated, in terms of, ``Are you for withdrawal
or for an increase in the present situation?'' You have
correctly characterized my view, but not as a permanent view of
that.
Senator Obama. Well, let's focus on this. I mean, the--
because I completely agree with you that the argument about an
additional 20,000 troops, in and of itself, is not the central
issue. The central issue: What is this grand strategy in Iraq?
Dr. Kissinger. Right.
Senator Obama. Now, you suggest that this is a precursor to
a grand strategy. You indicate that this will provide us
maneuvering room to pursue this strategy. Do you know what the
strategy is? Has the President articulated what this strategy
is, this grand new strategy? Because, as far as I can tell,
nobody on this committee knows what this grand strategy is.
Dr. Kissinger. No; I'm speaking here----
Senator Obama. And the American public doesn't seem to
understand what it is. So----
Dr. Kissinger. I'm speaking here on my own behalf.
Senator Obama. No; I understand, but I'm--it was--I just
want to establish, for the record, is there--because the notion
is, is that this is a precursor--this lays the groundwork, the
foundation provides us the maneuvering room, for a grand
strategy that will stabilize the situation there. Is there any
place that you're familiar with where the administration has
articulated this strategy?
Dr. Kissinger. I don't know anyplace where the
administration has articulated this particular strategy. From
my acquaintance with some of the people, I think it is possible
that they will come to this strategy, but I'm not here as their
spokesman.
Senator Obama. Well, I understand. But I think it's
important, I guess. Obviously, Mr. Secretary, you know, you
have enormous experience in this field, and are very well
respected. What I gather, then, is you're presuming that
there's a grand strategy in which--would justify the escalation
of troop levels, or at least preclude withdrawal. And yet, what
I'm hearing is, is that, in fact, there is no articulation of
that strategy, that you're aware of right now, and you're
presuming that somebody, somewhere, must have one.
Dr. Kissinger. No; I'm making two points. I'm saying that
if we now act out of frustration----
Senator Obama. Right.
Dr. Kissinger [continuing]. We may set--we may start a
process that prevents a grand strategy and that will drive us
into an outcome that nobody wants. If we do this, we should do
it in the expectation of a grand strategy. And, as I've said
before, I would not object to a statement that outlines a grand
strategy that--especially if it were done on a bipartisan basis
the----
Senator Obama. Well, let me suggest that, within your----
Dr. Kissinger [continuing]. Administration would then join.
Senator Obama. I'm sorry. Let me suggest that, within
your--the papers that you provided us, I think your approach,
in terms of a regional diplomatic strategy makes perfect sense.
I think that the Baker-Hamilton Commission recommended this, as
well. As far as we can see--and I think your interaction with
Senator Voinovich indicates this--the administration doesn't
seem to be embarking on this particular strategy. It's not
clear to me that we could not pursue that strategy, even as we
were initiating a phased redeployment, as opposed to a
precipitous one, and which brings me, I guess, to a critical
point. In your estimation, is there anything that can get the
Iraqi factions to change their behavior, other than ongoing
occupation with perhaps increased forces--U.S. forces for an
indeterminate period of time? What would change the political
dynamic on the ground where the Shia, the Sunni, the Kurds, to
a lesser extent, have a different set of calculations that they
would be making?
Dr. Kissinger. I--look, the Sunni-Shia conflict has lasted
1,400 years----
Senator Obama. Right.
Dr. Kissinger [continuing]. And has been bloody and brutal.
So, one should not pretend that one can solve it----
Senator Obama. It won't be----
Dr. Kissinger [continuing]. In any----
Senator Obama [continuing]. Be easy in any event, right.
Dr. Kissinger. For any American polity or quickly. We can
only do what we think is right and most likely to produce a
desirable result. Now, it is clear that there is a limit to
what the American public can support, or will support. And all
of these issues that we're discussing are based on assessments
you cannot prove when you make them. That's what makes them so
difficult. My assessment is that the debate of this--about the
surge exaggerates an essentially tactical move. The real issue
is the long-term roll of the United States. I agree with
Secretary Baker that we are likely to be in Iraq for a long
period. But that does not mean it has to be, or should be, at
the present level or in the present deployment.
This is what our next discussion should be about. And
whatever happens, it will go on for the next few
administrations, the impact of what we are deciding now. It
can't end with one administration, no matter what we do. I
think that the best course is to attempt to deal with the
militias, and whatever else happens--whatever happens in that;
and while that happens, prepare ourselves for what I describe
as the grand strategy. I hope that it's done in accord between
the executive and the Congress, because that will be best for
the long-term health of the American public, no matter what
happens in the future.
Senator Obama. Mr. Chairman----
Dr. Kissinger. And that is what I'm trying to contribute
to--I cannot--I can't speak for the administration, but I would
be disappointed and surprised if they did not accept some of
the elements of what has been discussed here.
Senator Obama. Well, but--let me just close--and I know I'm
out of time----
The Chairman. That's OK, you're making a very salient point
here.
Senator Obama [continuing]. By simply saying this. I think
the American people are disappointed. I'm disappointed with the
manner in which, over the last several years, we have proceeded
in Iraq. And I just--I want to dispute this notion, somehow,
that the American people aren't clear about interests in the
Middle East. I think the majority of the American people
understand that we have significant interests there. That is
the reason that they were willing to authorize--or at least a
number of the Members of the Senate were willing to authorize
going in. I think they perfectly understand the severity of the
Islamic threat. What they don't understand is how, after all
the commitments that we have made, all the lives that have been
lost, and the billions of dollars that have been sent, the
situation seems to deteriorate, and we are actually less safe,
and the region is less stable, and we have less leverage with
the players in the region. That's what they don't understand.
That's what they're frustrated with, is the fact that they've
made an enormous investment in blood and treasure, and the
outcome is worse than when we started.
And so, I just think it's important, Mr. Chairman, for the
record to indicate that if, in fact--I completely agree with
the Secretary that the surge, or escalation, whatever you want
to call it, in and of itself, is not the salient issue. The
issue is: Is there a strategy to stabilize Iraq that prevents
us from establishing a permanent occupation in that region that
further destabilizes it and further inflames anti-American
sentiment? And that strategy has not been forthcoming from this
administration.
And I don't--I understand, Mr. Secretary, you don't speak
for the administration, but I--to the extent that you are
suggesting that they have some secret strategy that we have not
been made privy to, and that's why we should not speak out
against it, I would strongly differ with you, recognizing that
you have far more experience in this field than I do.
Dr. Kissinger. Well, I think----
The Chairman. Senator----
Dr. Kissinger. I'm not saying you shouldn't speak out on
behalf of the strategy that should be pursued.
Senator Obama. Well, I think the concern you expressed
was----
Dr. Kissinger. I'm hoping----
Senator Obama [continuing]. Is that we should not--that
there should be some sense of cooperation between the
administration and Congress so that we don't send a message
that we are divided to the world. I completely agree with that.
We had the opportunity to do that with the Baker-Hamilton
Commission, which has essentially been ignored by this
administration. And so, the frustrations that many of us have
is, if we have an administration that does not seem willing to
listen, and we have a strategy that, to all eyes, is not
working, at some point we have to make some decisions, in terms
of getting it on track.
I'm way over time, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Obama. Thank you for----
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Some are--I let that go, because I think it's such an
important exchange.
The problem, Mr. Secretary, is, in a nutshell, that most of
us view the President's projection of forces as his strategy,
and he's explicitly rejected the strategic suggestions you and
others have made. It's been explicit. But having said that, let
me yield now to Senator Isakson----
Senator Isakson. And I will----
The Chairman [continuing]. And then we'll be finished.
Senator Isakson. I will be quick.
Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for your years of
service to the United States. And I really only have one
question, which relates to the most recent exchanges. And so,
I'll state this question and then allow you to respond. But
thank you so much for your service and for this paper.
My memory is that the United States of America went into
Iraq and had three specific goals. The first was to enforce
U.N. Resolution 1441, because the entire world, 176 countries,
thought there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and
there was no confusion on that, and Hussein gave us no comfort
that that wasn't true. The second goal was to allow the Iraqi
people to hold free elections and write a constitution. Now, we
accomplished both of the first two goals. The third-stated goal
by the President of the United States in his speech prior to
our vote was that we would train the Iraqi military in order
for them to keep the peace and allow that fledgling government
to survive. I believe I'm right that those--those are not the
same words, but those are the specific goals.
The strategy to accomplish those was a military strategy,
because it took a military strategy to accomplish goals one,
two, and three. Our current dilemma is our failure in No. 3,
which has come about because of the rise of sectarian violence,
in addition to all the other violence that is precipitated by
other interests in the region and al-Qaeda.
Here's the question. You state, in your--where Senator
Voinovich was--``It should be seen as''--``it,'' meaning the
current move by the President, in terms of Anbar and Baghdad--
``It should be seen as the first step toward a new grand
strategy relating power to diplomacy for the entire region,
ideally on a nonpartisan basis.'' And then, in the next
paragraph, the last conjunction in that sentence says ``and to
provide the maneuvering room for a major diplomatic effort to
stabilize the Middle East.''
That's a lot, I'm sorry, but my question is this. My hope
for the President's strategy, currently, is that it will
produce enough stability in the current violent neighborhoods
where the sectarian violence is going on, where some
reconciliation can take place and you can begin diplomacy. Am I
wrong in the--in that hope?
Dr. Kissinger. I believe that the objectives that I have
stated, and the objectives you have stated, are compatible with
what the President is attempting to do. And certainly mistakes
have been made. Some of these mistakes derived from an
overestimation of the ability to apply American domestic
experiences to the Iraqi situation. In our country, elections
are a way of shifting responsibilities. In Iraq, they were a
way of deepening ethnic rivalries. That's hard for Americans to
absorb right away.
I am convinced, but I cannot base it on any necessary
evidence right now, that the President will want to move toward
a bipartisan consensus, and that the things I have said here
are not incompatible with his convictions. And I have
confidence that he will attempt to do this.
It's, of course, your responsibility to determine to what
extent that has been done by the administration. I cannot--but
I think that to spend the last 2 years of an administration in
a sort of civil war between the executive and the legislative
should be avoided by both sides. And we should be able to
evolve a position on which so much depends for such a long time
as a joint national enterprise. That's my plea. But if I were
before the President, I'd say the same thing to him.
Senator Isakson. Well, I appreciate the answer, because
that, too, is my goal.
You know, Mr. Chairman, every one of us prefers a
diplomatic solution to a military solution. But we can't
forget, those three goals, which I--nobody disputed what I
said--that we went into Iraq--went into Iraq, because diplomacy
had failed, worldwide diplomacy at the United Nations had
failed, in terms of Iraq refusing to comply with those
resolutions. That meant the strategy had to go to a military
one or a look the other way, and if you ever look the other way
when you're telling people there are going to be consequences,
then you have no diplomacy. So, I think it's very dangerous for
us to be talking about a circumstance in which there would be
no consideration of diplomacy. We are there because diplomacy
failed, and what will ultimately succeed will be diplomacy. But
my belief in this is that quelling the sectarian violence and
stabilizing the conditions long enough for the beginning of
reconciliation can be the first step toward regional
negotiation and diplomacy working.
And I won't make any more speeches, but I want to thank the
Secretary again. He's given me a lot of good lines for the
remarks I'm going to have to make on the floor in a few days,
and I appreciate it a lot.
The Chairman. Thank you----
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator.
Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for being here. I want
to make it clear to you, we're waiting for the invitation from
the President to discuss this. We have tried. I have tried, and
I'd respectfully suggest a lot of people here have tried. We're
also waiting for a strategy. The President has explicitly
rejected international involvement and has--the disagreements
we have with them is no international involvement and the
definition of the Iraqi mission.
But I want to make it clear, I stand ready, as just one of
100 Senators, to work with this President. I have privately
told him that--publicly told him that--and we're waiting for
both an invitation and a wholesome discussion, a fulsome
discussion, about what the strategy should be. What is the
strategy?
And everyone I have talked to, thus far--there may be
exceptions--from his former Secretary of State to you to
Democrats involved, to the best of my knowledge, no one can
come forward and say how we can get from here to there absent
engaging the international community, and that's been flatly
rejected. Flatly rejected. Involving the United Nations,
involving the Permanent Five, involving a larger construct of
Muslim nations, as you suggested, has been, every time, flatly
rejected.
So, I'm not quite sure, Johnny, I'm ready to work. I am--
and I'm sure everyone is. And so, again, I don't want you to
leave, Mr. Secretary, thinking that we're looking for a fight
with the President. We're looking for the President to engage
us. Not Democrats--Democrats and Republicans looking for him to
engage us.
And I'll conclude by saying, Mr. Secretary, I suggested,
and others suggested the same thing on the Republican side,
that what the President should have done after the last
election--invite those of us on both sides that he thinks have
some modicum of influence here, to Camp David--no staff, no
telephones, no nothing--just to sit down and have a real
discussion.
I have found, at least in my experience thus far, there is
not, really, a desire to do that. I think it's best for the
country, I think it's best for the region, I think it's best to
respond to the American people that way. But, in the meantime,
this is all about responding to a tactic masquerading as a
strategy that changes a mission that many of us think is not
able to be accomplished by what he's suggesting.
But, again, your contribution is significant. It always has
been. I thank you very much, and I hope you'll remain available
to us, both publicly and privately.
Dr. Kissinger. Thank you for the spirit in which this
session has been conducted.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. You're well
respected by everyone on this committee.
OK. I thank you, Mr. Secretary. Our next witness is an
equally distinguished former Secretary of State, and I
understand she is in the anteroom and will--I'll--we'll get her
and escort her in.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. The hearing will come back to order.
And, again, I want to thank Secretary Kissinger, but
welcome enthusiastically, as well, Secretary Albright.
Staff has pointed out to me I should make a clarification
so no one misunderstands. There has been an invitation to the
White House to work on a group called the Lieberman--or, not
called--the Lieberman, and others, Antiterrorism Group, but
that is not the invitation I'm talking about, so I don't want
anybody to misunderstand. The White House is always generous in
their invitations for us to come down and talk, but I think we
need to have a real sense of where they want to go.
At any rate, having said that, Madam Secretary, welcome.
It's a great honor having you here. And I want to publicly
thank you for your continued involvement, in a very detailed
way, in engaging with your former colleagues--Foreign
Ministers--and you've put together a group of--talk about
bipartisan, it's multinational, as well as sharing every
ideological stripe, and you've kept that group together. It is
a very influential group of individuals you continue to meet
with, and the collective input is, I'm sure, as welcomed in
other capitals as it is here. So, I thank you.
I made an opening statement earlier, so I'm not going to go
any further, other than to say you're very welcome here, as you
know, Madam Secretary, and we're anxious to hear what you have
to say.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. I'd simply follow you, Mr. Chairman, and
we're looking forward to hearing the Secretary's testimony.
The Chairman. The floor is yours, Madam Secretary.
STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, FORMER SECRETARY OF
STATE; PRINCIPAL, THE ALBRIGHT GROUP LLC, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Albright. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator
Lugar and members of the committee.
I am delighted to be here and to return to these very
familiar surroundings and to have the opportunity to testify.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for saying what you did about my
former Foreign Ministers group. It grows by virtue of what it
is. And so, we have a lot of interesting discussions and good
hopes that some of our words will be taken seriously.
I am very glad to testify, and I will speak both plainly
and bluntly. There are no good options. If there were, many of
us, including many of you, would not have been issuing such
urgent warnings for the past 4 years. Those warnings were
ignored. The result is that every available alternative now
carries with it grave risks. Each raises moral and practical
questions about our responsibilities. And each depends for
success far more on what others do than on what we do, which is
another way of saying that, despite our power, we have lost
control of the most important U.S. national security initiative
of this decade.
I desperately want General Petraeus and our forces to
succeed. Those troops are the finest in the world and will
accomplish any mission that is within their power, but it is
the responsibility of civilian authorities to assign the
missions that make sense. Instead, we have put our forces in
the absurd position of trying to prevent violence by all sides
against all sides. The Sunnis want us to protect them from the
Shiites. The Shiites want us on the sidelines so that they can
consolidate their power. Both are divided among themselves. Al-
Qaeda is using the turmoil to recruit the bin Ladens of
tomorrow. And Iran's regional influence is greater now than it
has been in centuries. If I were a soldier on patrol in
Baghdad, I wouldn't know whom to shoot at until I was shot at,
which is untenable.
I agree with the President that it would be a disaster for
us to leave Iraq under the present circumstances, but it may
also be a disaster for us to stay. And if our troops are not in
a position to make a decisive difference, we have an overriding
duty to bring them home.
The Iraq Study Group recommended a more limited role for
the United States troops. Their view, which I share, is that
Iraqis must take responsibility for their own security,
because, although we can assist, we cannot do the job for them.
We do not have enough people, we do not speak the language, we
do not know the culture well enough, and, quite frankly, we do
not have the recognized legal and moral authority to go into
Iraqi homes and compel obedience. Each time we do, we lose as
much ground politically as we might hope to gain militarily,
and that's why the President's current policy should be viewed
less as a serious plan than as a prayer. It is not about
reality, it is about hope. But hope is not a strategy.
The truth is that Iraqis will continue to act in their own
best interests, as they perceive them; and we must act in ours.
Today in Iraq, three nightmares come to mind. First, an Iraq
that serves as a training and recruiting ground for al-Qaeda.
Second, an Iraq that is subservient to Iran. Third, an Iraq so
torn by conflict that it ignites a regionwide war. We may well
end up with one, or all three, of these nightmares. There is no
easy exit. And I expect this year to be brutal.
Accordingly, I offer my recommendations with genuine
humility, for they are designed simply to make the best of a
truly bad situation.
First, we should do all we can to encourage a political
settlement that would reduce the violence. Americans are united
on this. We favor an arrangement that would recognize the Shia
majority, protect the Sunni minority, and allow the Kurds a
high degree of autonomy. In recent days, there has been some
movement in the right direction. The overall violence, however,
remains at a record level, and the prospects for a real
breakthrough are tenuous, at best.
My second recommendation supports the first, which is to
increase diplomatic activity. Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, we both know that we can talk to governments without
endorsing them or overlooking past actions. Talking to
governments about hard problems is why diplomacy matters. It's
actually what diplomats do.
The case for talking to Syria is strong, if only to warn
its government about the dangers of supporting violent
elements, either in Iraq or Lebanon. Further, we have
cooperated with Syria in the past on some issues, including
Iraq, and might well be able to do so now.
As for Iran, there are many serious people with whom one
might talk. The problem is that President Ahmadinejad is not
one of them. We should do nothing that might bolster his
standing, but we should indicate our desire over the long term
to have good relations with Iran's people. More broadly, United
States efforts to put diplomatic pressure in Iraq with regard
to its nuclear program deserve the support of every member of
this committee, and those efforts may still work.
I do, however, urge the committee to ask detailed questions
about every aspect of the administration's intentions toward
Iran, and to demand credible answers. I--it would be
interesting to know why the statements have gotten more
bellicose. It would be interesting to know why there are
aircraft carriers in the region. It would just be interesting
to know where they're going. We have learned the hard way what
happens when this administration decides on a policy without
putting its assumptions to the test of legislative scrutiny and
informed debate.
Third, we should do all we can to revive a meaningful Arab-
Israeli peace process. This is important for the Israelis and
Palestinians themselves, but I also say this because United
States prestige in the region has suffered due to our
inactivity these past 6 years, but, more important, because
peace is the right goal to pursue.
As shown by her recent trip, Secretary Rice has begun to
engage. I only worry that it is too little, too late. Middle
East diplomacy is a full-time job, and a roadmap does no good
if it is never taken out of the glove compartment.
Fourth, both in Iraq and in the region, we must avoid the
temptation to take sides in the millennium-old Sunni-Shiite
split. We must be mindful of the interests of all factions and
willing to talk to every side, but our message should not vary.
We should pledge support to all who observe territorial
borders, honor human rights, obey the rule of law, respect holy
places, and seek to live in peace.
Fifth, Congress should continue to support efforts to build
democratic institutions in Iraq. As chair of the National
Democratic Institute, I'm not neutral about this, but it was
always unrealistic to believe that a full-fledged democracy
could be created in Iraq overnight. It is, however, equally
unrealistic to think that a stable Iraq will ever be created if
democratic principles are not part of the equation.
One of my great fears is that our Nation's experience in
Iraq will cause Americans to abandon efforts to build democracy
over the long term. That would be a mistake. There are wise and
unwise ways to go about the task. But the goal of supporting
democracy is the right one. It is intimately connected to
America's role in the world, both historically and in the
future. And if we give up on democracy, we give up not only on
Iraq, but also on America.
Sixth, we should make one more effort to encourage others,
especially our NATO allies, to expand their training of Iraq's
military and police. Every country in Europe has a stake in
Iraq's future. Every country should do what it can to help.
Finally, we should call on religious leaders from all
factions to take a stand against the violence in Iraq. Everyone
is so convinced they have God on their side, we should at least
make the case that God is on the side of peace.
At the same time, we should reiterate our own pledge, on
moral grounds, to minimize harm to civilians and guarantee
humane treatment of prisoners. And element of confession in
this would not hurt.
The bottom line is that there must be an evolution in the
political situation in Iraq that will curb sectarian violence
and reduce the level of insecurity to something that can be
managed. With a settlement, we could withdraw gradually, with
nightmares avoided. Without a settlement, our troops cannot
make a decisive difference, and might as well begin to
redeploy.
Mr. Chairman, America's own war between the States lasted
about as long as the current war in Iraq, and it went on so
long that Abraham Lincoln said, in frustration, that the
heavens were hung in black. We might say the same today.
I see profound problems ahead, but I have confidence in the
resilience of our Nation. We can, in time, regain our balance,
restore our reputation, and all that is required is that we
respond creatively to change, live up to our own principles,
and ensure that America becomes America again.
Thank you very much, and now I look forward to responding
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Albright follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Madeleine K. Albright, Former Secretary of
State; Principal, The Albright Group LLC, Washington, DC
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I am
pleased to return to these familiar surroundings and to have the
opportunity to testify regarding U.S. policy toward Iraq. To maximize
time for discussion, I will speak both plainly and bluntly. There are
no good options.
If there were, many of us--including many of you--would not have
been issuing such urgent warnings these past 4 years. Those warnings
were ignored. The result is that every alternative now carries with it
grave risks and the potential for even deeper and wider strife.
Each raises moral and practical questions about our
responsibilities--to the people of Iraq, to our troops, and to our
collective future.
Each depends for success far more on what others do than on what we
do, which is another way of saying that--despite our power--we have
lost control of the most important U.S. national security initiative of
this decade.
I desperately want General Petraeus and our forces in Iraq to
succeed. Those troops are the finest in the world and will accomplish
any mission that is within their power, but it is the responsibility of
our civilian authorities to assign them missions that make sense.
Even with all that has gone wrong, I could have supported an
increase in troops if that increase had been tied to a clear,
important, and achievable mission--and if we were guaranteed that our
forces would have the best training and equipment.
Instead, we have put our fighting men and women in the absurd
position of trying to prevent violence by all sides against all sides.
The Sunnis want us to protect them from the Shiites. The Shiites want
us on the sidelines so they can consolidate their power. Both are
divided among themselves.
Al-Qaeda is using the turmoil to recruit the Zarqawis and bin
Ladens of tomorrow. Violent criminals operate with impunity. And as a
direct result of our actions, Iran's regional influence is greater now
than it has been in centuries.
If I were a soldier on patrol in Baghdad, I wouldn't know whom to
shoot at until I was shot at, which is untenable.
To quote 1stSgt Marc Biletski while under sniper fire in the
capital last week, ``Who the hell is shooting at us? Who's shooting at
us? Do we know who they are?'' Or to quote Specialist Terry Wilson, a
soldier on that same patrol, ``The thing is--we wear uniforms, they
don't.''
I agree with the President that it would be a disaster for us to
leave Iraq under the present circumstances. But it may also be a
disaster for us to stay--and if our troops are not in a position to
make a decisive difference, we have an overriding duty to bring them
home sooner rather than later.
James Baker and Lee Hamilton recommended a more limited role for
U.S. troops--with an emphasis on training, working in tandem, and
providing a backup rapid reaction capability.
Their view, which I share, is that Iraqis must take responsibility
for their own security--because although we can assist--we cannot do
the job for them. We do not have enough people; we do not speak the
language; we do not know the culture well enough and, quite frankly, we
do not have the recognized legal and moral authority to go into Iraqi
homes and compel obedience. Each time we do, we lose as much ground
politically, as we might hope to gain militarily.
This is crucial because, if there is to be a solution in Iraq, it
will come about through political means. This has been obvious for
years. An arrangement must be worked out that will give each side more
than they can obtain through continued violence.
If Iraq's leaders finally begin to move in this direction, we would
likely see progress on the security front. And I think the American
people would be more patient about the continued presence of our
troops.
But from the evidence thus far, this is neither a likely outcome,
nor one we can dictate. For better or worse, Iraqis appear to think
they know their own society and their own interests better than we do.
They have responsibilities to each other that they must meet, but no
reason, based on the ``thousands of mistakes'' Secretary Rice admits we
have made, to take our advice.
They have no appetite, after Abu Ghraib and Haditha, to listen to
our lectures about human rights. And they know that President Bush has
ruled out leaving, so where is our leverage? That is why the
President's current policy should be viewed less as a serious plan than
as a prayer. It is not about reality. It is about hope. But hope is not
a strategy.
The truth is that Iraqis will continue to act in their own best
interests as they perceive them. We must act in ours.
Today, in Iraq, three nightmares come to mind.
First, an Iraq that serves as a training and recruiting ground for
al-Qaeda. Second, an Iraq that is subservient to Iran. Third, an Iraq
so torn by conflict that it ignites a regionwide war. We may end up
with one of these nightmares; we could end up with all of them. There
is no easy exit.
Ordinarily, civil wars end in one of three ways: One side defeats
the other; an outside force intervenes to compel peace; or the sides
exhaust themselves through violence. The first outcome is unlikely in
Iraq and the second unrealistic.
I expect this year to be brutal. Accordingly, I offer my
recommendations with genuine humility, for they provide no magic
answers; they are designed simply to make the best of a truly bad
situation.
First, we should do all we can to encourage a political settlement
that would reduce the violence. Americans are united on this. We favor
an arrangement that would recognize the Shia majority, protect the
Sunni minority, and allow the Kurds a high degree of autonomy. Such an
arrangement would share oil revenues fairly, ensure the protection of
basic infrastructure, and spur economic reconstruction.
In recent days, there has been some movement in the right
direction.
For example, there has been progress toward approval of a national
oil law and some evidence of restraint--both voluntary and otherwise--
on the part of the largest Shia militias. The overall violence,
however, remains at a record level--and the prospects for a real
breakthrough are tenuous at best.
My second recommendation supports the first, which is to increase
diplomatic activity throughout the region. This was proposed by the
Iraq Study Group and ignored by the administration with respect to
Syria and Iran.
Mr. Chairman, we both know that we can talk to governments without
in any way endorsing them or overlooking past actions. Talking to
governments about hard problems is why diplomacy matters; it is what
diplomats do. Iraq's neighbors are relevant to Iraq and anyone who is
relevant to Iraq is relevant to the security and mission of American
troops.
The case for talking to Syria is strong, if only to warn its
government about the dangers of supporting violent elements either in
Iraq or Lebanon. Further, we have cooperated with Syria in the past on
some issues, including Iraq, and might well be able to do so now.
As for Iran, there are many serious people with whom one might
talk; the problem is that President Ahmadinejad is not one of them. We
should do nothing that might bolster his standing, but we should
indicate our desire over the long term to have good relations with
Iran's people. Iran's influence in Iraq is, of course, inevitable given
its closeness and shared religion. It is not possible to exclude Iran
from Iraq.
However, we should bear in mind that no Arab population will take
orders from Tehran if it has an alternative. Iran will dominate Iraq
only if Iraq's Shiite population feels it must turn in that direction
for protection.
More broadly, U.S. efforts to put diplomatic pressure on Iran with
regard to its nuclear program deserve the support of every member of
this committee; those efforts may still work.
I do, however, urge the committee to ask detailed questions about
every aspect of the administration's intentions toward Iran and to
demand detailed and credible answers. We have learned the hard way what
happens when this administration decides on a policy without putting
its assumptions to the test of rigorous legislative scrutiny and
informed public debate.
Third, we should do all we can to revive a meaningful Arab-Israeli
peace process. I say this because U.S. prestige in the region has
suffered due to our inactivity these past 6 years, but more important,
because peace is the right goal to pursue. This is true politically,
militarily, and morally for Arabs and Israelis alike.
Secretary Rice appears to understand this and, as shown by her
recent trip, has begun to engage. A meeting of the quartet is scheduled
for Friday. I only worry that it is too little, too late. Middle East
diplomacy is a full-time job. It requires a willingness to be blunt and
the resources and prestige to encourage real compromise. A roadmap does
no good if it is never taken out of the glove compartment.
After all that has happened, the prospects for peace may seem dim,
but the logic of peace has never been more compelling. Although we
should focus first on Israel and the Palestinians, the question of a
comprehensive settlement should also be addressed provided Syria
changes course and begins to play a positive regional role. The basic
outlines of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East are well known.
America's urgent commitment to such an agreement must also be clearly
understood.
Fourth, both in Iraq and in the region, we must avoid the
temptation to take sides in the millennium old Sunni-Shiite split. It
would be an error to align ourselves with the Shiites (because Saddam
Hussein's loyalists and al-Qaeda are Sunni) or the Sunnis (because
Iraq's worst militias and Hezbollah are Shia). We must be mindful of
the interests of all factions and willing to talk to every side, but
our message should not vary.
We should pledge support to all--Sunni, Shia, Christian, Druze,
Jew, Arab, Kurd, Persian--who observe territorial borders, honor human
rights, obey the rule of law, respect holy places, and seek to live in
peace.
Fifth, Congress should continue to support efforts to build
democratic institutions in Iraq including the next step--provincial
elections. Though the odds seem long, the best news coming out of Iraq
these past few years have been the rounds of balloting, the approval of
a constitution, the convening of a national parliament, and the
beginning of a multiparty system. Given where Iraq began, these events
have occurred with startling rapidity. As chair of the National
Democratic Institute (NDI), I am not neutral about this but neither is
America. It was always unrealistic to believe that a full-fledged
democracy could be created in Iraq even in a decade. But it is equally
unrealistic to think that a stable and peaceful Iraq will ever be
created if democratic principles and institutions are not part of the
equation.
I must add that, 2 weeks ago, an employee of NDI was killed in an
attack on a convoy in which she was riding. Three dedicated security
personnel were also killed. I said then that there is no more sacred
roll of honor than those who have given their last full measure in
support of freedom. Andrea Parhamovich was from Ohio, a constituent of
Senator Voinovich on this committee. According to her family, ``Andi's
desire to help strangers in such a dangerous environment thousands of
miles away might be difficult for others to understand, but to us, it
epitomized Andi's natural curiosity and unwavering commitment. She was
passionate, bold, and caring, as exemplified by her work to improve the
lives of all Iraqis.''
One of my great fears is that our Nation's experience in Iraq will
cause Americans to abandon efforts to build democracy over the long
term. That would be a mistake. Obviously, security issues have to be
taken into account in particular cases, and in every case, there are
wise and unwise ways to go about the task; but the goal of supporting
democracy is the right one. It is intimately connected to America's
role in the world, both historically and in the future. If we give up
on democracy, we give up not only on Iraq, but also on America.
Sixth, we should make one more effort to encourage others,
especially our NATO allies, to increase their training of Iraq's
military and police. Every country in Europe has a stake in Iraq's
future; every country should do what it can to help. In the Balkans, we
used a diplomatic contact group of interested nations to coordinate
policy, generate resources, and take steps to improve security on a
regional basis. Something similar should have been established for Iraq
immediately after the invasion; it remains a useful idea.
Finally, we should call on religious leaders from all factions and
faiths to take a stand against the violence in Iraq. Given our own lack
of credibility, we can't get too close to this initiative without
poisoning it--but there are figures of respect--Mustafa Ceric (Grand
Mufti of Sarajevo), Mohammed Khatami (former President of Iran), King
Abdullah of Jordan, Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi,
Ayatollah Sistani--who might be willing and able to articulate the
religious case for reconciliation in Iraq. It's worth a try. Everyone
is so convinced they have God on their side; we should at least make
the case that God is on the side of peace.
At the same time, we should reiterate our own pledge--on moral
grounds--to minimize harm to civilians and guarantee humane treatment
to prisoners. An element of confession in this would not hurt.
The bottom line is that there must be an evolution in the political
situation in Iraq that will curb sectarian violence and reduce the
level of insecurity to something that can be managed. With a
settlement, we could withdraw gradually, with nightmares avoided.
Without a settlement, our troops cannot make a decisive difference and
might as well begin to redeploy. In that case, we should do all we can
to help the Iraqis who have taken risks to support us these past few
years.
Ordinarily, I am an optimist, but in this case I am not optimistic.
I do, however, oppose efforts at this point to cut off funds for
military operations in Iraq. As many members of this committee are in
the process of showing, there are more constructive ways to express
concern about administration policies.
Mr. Chairman, America's own war between the States lasted about as
long as the current war in Iraq. It went on so long that Abraham
Lincoln said in frustration that the heavens were hung in black. We
might say the same today.
I see profound problems ahead, but I have confidence in the
resilience of our Nation. We can, in time, regain our balance and
restore our reputation. All that is required is that America become
America again.
We must respond creatively to change. We must use the full array of
our national security tools. We must live up to our own democratic
principles. We must, in the words of John Kennedy, pursue peace as the
necessary rational end of rational man.
And we must honor the men and women of our Armed Forces by ensuring
that they have the right equipment, the right leadership, and the right
missions.
The Chairman. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
I'm going to yield to Senator Boxer and then I'll go last
in this round.
Senator Boxer. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I so
appreciate it.
Madam Secretary, thank you very much for your clarity. And
I think you're the first person in a long time that came before
us and used the word ``peace'' a few times. And I like that,
because it's a vision. And I remember, during the darkest days
of the Vietnam war, there was a bumper sticker that appeared,
Mr. Chairman, on some cars, and it said, ``Imagine peace.'' And
at first I looked at it, because where I was, definitely in the
antiwar camp, and saying, ``What does that mean?'' And then I
realized that we had almost gotten to a point where we couldn't
imagine what it would be like not to turn on the TV and see
dead soldiers, Americans, as we're seeing now every day. So, we
need to always think ahead to the day when we will have that.
And we need to have action now to get to that place.
And here's where I'm worried. I see paralysis setting in,
in the political sector of our own country. And it's almost--
it's a fear of what's happening now, but a fear of how it could
look, ``It could be worse.'' And I think when you get into that
place, where you're fearful of what's happening now, but you
fear the unknown of what could be worse, you're stuck. And I
think we're stuck, and I think we need to start talking about a
vision. We have to think diplomacy and talk about diplomacy. We
have to think about peace and talk about peace. We have to
challenge al-Maliki, who--and now, if--I apologize to him in
advance--I have never heard the man stand up in a speech and
say, ``I am calling for a cease-fire in my country that I love
so much.'' I haven't heard that. I want to hear that.
And it's one thing to talk about the American civil war,
where Americans versus Americans; it's another thing to have an
Iraqi civil war, where Americans are paying a huge price. And
you quoted, in your written statement, your longer version, of
a soldier--and you name him--that was from the New York Times
story--who said, ``Who the hell is shooting at me?'' They don't
know. And, to this, we're going to escort another 21,000 of our
beautiful children, and some of them are fathers and mothers.
We're putting them into that hell.
So, I'm glad that you're using the words ``peace,'' and I
want to talk to you about something I've been pushing, and my
chairman knows I am, because I said most people are paralyzed,
not everyone. Our chairman has come forward with a vision of
how this thing can end up in a place where people will stop
killing each other and yet keep together the country of Iraq to
do the things a country has to do, including making sure the
oil is shared in a fair way. It's not three separate countries.
He's gotten a rap on that. Never was. Always semiautonomous,
policing by your own people, trust built up in that kind of--
it's just what's happening in Kurdistan.
Now, today we had a breakthrough, I think, with Dr.
Kissinger. Dr. Kissinger said, essentially--and I am being fair
in what he said--he said, ``You know, I think that's where it's
going,'' he said, in answer to my question, ``it's going to the
Biden plan. It's moving that way, but we have to be careful not
to put the American stamp on it, because that wouldn't be
good,'' to which I said, ``I'd rather have us in the middle of
a diplomatic solution than in the middle of a civil war.''
And I'm asking you the same question. And I'm not asking
you to endorse the Biden-Gelb plan, or the Gelb-Biden plan,
however it is, but isn't it time now to think--not only think
diplomacy, but act as if that is where we're going? The
American people voted to get us out of there, in my opinion.
Yes; they're cautious. None of our plan--I'm on the Feingold
bill, Feingold-Boxer--we say it's going to take 6 months, and
we're going to leave antiterror forces there, we're going to
leave training forces there. Not one plan says we're walking
away from the region. But the American people want us to get
out, want our soldiers to stop dying, want a diplomatic
solution. What did the President give them? A military
strategy, a battle plan, for 21,000 troops.
So, I'm asking you, because I get frustrated sometimes with
diplomats, of which I readily admitted before, I'm not one, you
know that--because I'm afraid that diplomats sometimes, by
nature, are cautious in what they say, because that's your job,
that--you have to keep everybody moving, and you can't shut off
any ideas. And I get it. But if we could agree that now is the
time to think diplomacy, rather than keep talking about surges
and so on, is it not time for, maybe, a consensus to develop
around this notion of a meeting, whether it be regional,
international, where everyone comes to the table with their
plans?
You know, yesterday, I had an all-day hearing on global
warming. It was the most interesting thing. And, Mr. Chairman,
I missed you desperately. You were here. But we had--a third of
the Senate came--a quarter in person, the rest wrote. What was
that--why was it important to do that? Because we want to see
where everybody is, and we want to envision not the catastrophe
of global warming, but how we're going to solve it. And so, we
came together as a U.S. Senate yesterday. It was a fascinating
thing. And I think we are way past the time where we have to be
much more aggressive about demanding a kind of a conference
where the ideas to solve this problem all come on the table.
And I'm wondering if you feel that sense of urgency for
diplomacy and specific solutions.
Ms. Albright. Thank you, Senator. And I think that I have
sometimes been known for being fairly blunt while I have been
trying to be diplomatic.
I think we need a surge in diplomacy. That is what is
essential here. And what has troubled me is that there has not
been any kind of a comprehensive diplomatic approach to what is
happening--in the Middle East, specifically; but generally.
Comprehensive diplomatic planning is not a hallmark of this
administration. And I think that that has been very much
missing.
So, I would agree that what has to happen is a big
diplomatic push. I was interested in what Dr. Kissinger had to
say. I think--he and I obviously talk fairly frequently, and we
have talked about the idea of a regional diplomatic approach,
where, in fact, you actually talk to everybody, where you might
begin by having a contact group of the immediate powers, the
Permanent Five of the Security Council and then the regional
countries. But I believe that what is happening in the region
is in the national interest of a number of different countries,
and they should be at the table. So, I think that there needs
to be a very comprehensive diplomatic approach.
On the idea of what happens to Iraq, I think that--I do
think it's essential to talk about the territorial integrity of
Iraq, which both you and Chairman Biden have talked about. What
I am troubled by is that this administration failed, after the
invasion, to discuss with the political people in Iraq the
concept of federalism--that is something we happen to know
something about--when they were searching for particular ways
to run a country that clearly is composed of a variety of
different sects, groups, and religious approaches. And so, I
think the idea of the--as the Constitution of Iraq is written,
which allows for--and mandates, in fact--a great deal of
regional autonomy, is appropriate. I think there are certain
central powers that a government needs. Some of it has to do
with the oil revenue and various other parts. So, without
endorsing any plan, I do think reality here sets in that there
will be regional autonomy. I do think we have to be very
careful not to pursue or precipitate a breakup of Iraq as a
country, because I think, as all of you have described, it
would have a dangerous impact on the rest of the region. But it
is time for us to have a surge in diplomacy.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman, can I just finish, in 30
seconds? Thank you.
Senator Biden's plan never called for breaking up the
country into separate countries, so I have to say that a
hundred times. Never, ever did. It's always been the type of
system that is allowed in the Iraqi Constitution. I just think
sometimes, you know--no one, that I know of, is suggesting it,
at least not in the Senate. So, I wanted to clear the point on
that.
But I just want to thank you very much. I don't know how
many people saw--in the news this weekend, there was a
conversation with the people who were close to al-Sadr. And
what al-Sadr said is, as soon as the American troops are ready
to go after him, he's gone away. And he and his boys are going
to other parts of Iraq to increase their organization. They're
not going to stand out there and be killed. And so, while we're
surging, he's going to expand his influence in the rest of the
country. So, how this surge, in the long run, is going to help
us resolve things is beyond me, and the only way is what you
say, a diplomatic surge, an idea such as the chairman's and
others, on the table to give hope to the people that there is a
peaceful way out of this nightmare. And I just want to thank
you for continuing to come forward, because it's very charged,
and it's very hard, and I thank you for your words today.
Ms. Albright. Thank you. If I might just comment, I have--
when asked about Senator Biden's plan, I have said that, in
fact, it is an attempt to keep the country together----
Senator Boxer. Good.
Ms. Albright [continuing]. Which I do believe is what it is
about. I'm just talking about, in the long run, what might
happen that we do have to watch out for. But I think it is very
clear, from my reading of the plan, that it is done in order to
keep the country together, and I do think that is an essential
point.
I also think that a point that you make is, our troops are
in a very difficult position. They are there, their presence is
necessary for security, but their presence is also a flypaper
attracting everybody who hates us. So, there are no simple
solutions here, which is why I think that we have to have a
discussion, such as you all are initiating.
Next, on Iran, I would like to know what is going on with
our Government's policy toward Iran.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. So would I, Madam Secretary.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, let me ask you a question based upon your
longtime extraordinary leadership with the National Democratic
Institute and your interest in democracy, generally. We had a
panel, the other day, which included a witness who had been
working for the National Endowment for Democracy, but also
included the son of President Talibani, and two other persons
with roots in Iraq. What I took away from that panel was a
description of Iraq after our military operations were
concluded; in a word: Anarchy. They described how there was
very little policing in most of the areas of the country. As a
result, bandits, common criminals, preyed upon people, not
simply in Baghdad, but really throughout the country. And,
therefore, the thing people care about most there, quite apart
from our interest in democracy for the country, or some central
government, was simply protection for themselves, for their
property, and so forth.
From this desire for security, they suggested, grew many
militia, not simply the well-known ones that involve thousands
of persons, or those identified with sectarian causes, but
local groups of people who exercise some political authority.
Out of the midst of this, the United States worked with
some authorities in Iraq to have elections, elections with
regard to people in Parliament, one with regard to the
Constitution, but some of our witnesses said these elections
confirmed about the number of Sunnis there are in the country,
how many Shiites, likewise, and how many Kurds. So, it is as if
we took a census. The Shiites, as the most numerous group
predictably got more representatives than the others.
Secretary Kissinger, this morning, made the point that in a
situation in which there are not well-established institutions
which recognize minority rights, which have these checks and
balances and human rights and so forth, in essence, democratic
votes may simply confirm that one side is dominant and there is
a sectarian feeling that dominance may then be enforced by a
government which comes from all of this.
I'm asking your view--was our pursuit of democracy, the
stages that occurred there, appropriate? If it was not, was
there, at any point, an opportunity for these institutions that
buttress democracy to grow? Or, in the sectarian situation, is
there going to be a sense, for a while, of minority rights,
rather than winner-take-all? And, finally, if, in this current
situation, the Maliki government, the Shiite government, feels
that somehow it is being undermined and seeks assistance from
Iran so that it preserves at least the Shiite side of it, as
well as maybe some civil authority in Iraq, how are we to
respond to that?
Ms. Albright. Well, we've hit on my favorite subject, so--
but I think that the issue here is that I think we're all
alike, and people want to be able to make decisions about their
own lives. Therefore, I do believe that democracy is not just a
Western whim, but something that does fit across the world. But
you cannot impose democracy. Imposing democracy is an oxymoron.
And what the National Democratic Institute had done in various
places--we're in over 60 countries now--is to support democracy
in various places where there are ideas and people want to
participate in their own government.
I think that many mistakes were made early on in Iraq, in
terms of not understanding what had to be done with the
political structure. We talked about the federalism issue.
Also, that elections would, in fact, make clear that the Shia
were the majority population. But it is possible to have
elections in which the majority is elected, while minority
rights are also honored.
And I think that we have learned that democracy is not an
event, democracy is a process. And there have been, I think,
positive feelings about democracy in Iraq. I do think, when we
saw the purple fingers and everything, it was a legitimate
movement, there were people who took great risks to go out and
vote at that time. NDI has been on the ground, we have been
training a lot of people. Very sadly, we lost a person last
week, Andrea Parhamovich--from Ohio--who was a wonderful young
woman.
But the truth is that we can't give up on Iraq. We will not
have a functioning Jeffersonian democracy, or Jacksonian or any
other, for the time being. But I do believe in the idea of
democracy support. I do not believe in the possibility of
imposing democracy on Iraq, which I think was really part of
what was happening there.
Senator Lugar. I offer my sincere condolences to the entire
NDI family on the death of Ms. Parhamovich. But, let me ask one
question you've raised that Iran brings into this international
context. There are fears on the part of some of the Sunni
nations surrounding Iraq that the Shiite government might ally
with Iran. What are the dangers there?
Ms. Albright. Well, I think that we have to be very careful
about a long-range trend in the region which is an Arab-Persian
war--Sunni-Shia, if you want to describe it that way. And I
think that it is of great concern. And we should try, in many
ways, to hope that we're not in the middle of it, and also to
do everything to try to mitigate such a possibility. That is
not done, frankly, by deciding that we're never going to talk
to Iranians. And the relationship between the Shia in Iraq and
the Iranians exists, that's there. And I do think that our main
problem is trying to figure out how to develop an area within
the Middle East where these shifts can be absorbed peacefully,
where we are part of some kind of a new security framework and
are able to deal with what I think could be a disaster, which
is a Persian-Arab war.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
your courtesy, as well, throughout the hearing.
And, Madam Secretary, it's great to see you again, and we
appreciate your service. And I want to thank you for your
candor.
You know, I read your testimony before Secretary Kissinger
finished his, and used some of it to ask questions, so there's
some degree of unanimity on one or two of these issues. Part of
your testimony talks about that there are no good options, just
the best of what exists. And the result is that every
alternative now carries with it great risk and the potential
for even deeper and wider strife. Secretary Kissinger agreed
with that.
But then, you go on to say, ``Each depends,'' talking about
the alternatives, ``for success far more than what others--on
what others do than on what we do,'' This is another way of
saying that, despite our power, we have lost control of the
most important U.S. national security initiative of this
decade. And Dr. Kissinger had a little bit of a different view
of that. He felt that we could still drive the effort by our
leadership to try to get others, who are critical to achieving
success, to do what we would help them to do to achieve that.
How do you see that? At this point, how do you see us being
able to drive, or to change that dynamic, so that, while we may
have lost control, as you say, of the most important U.S.
national security initiative of the decade, we seek to regain
some of that control? In another part of your written
statement, you say, ``An arrangement must be worked out that
will give each side more than they can obtain through continued
violence.'' The question is: How do we get to that set of
circumstances? How do we make, in other words, Iraqis love
their children more than they hate their neighbors?
Ms. Albright. It's going to be very difficult for me to say
what I'm about to say, which is that I am very troubled by
America's reputation, at this point. I very much thought, and
continued to say, often, when I was Secretary, that the United
States was the indispensable nation. I have fully believed
that, and I have thought and believed in the goodness of
American power. I continue to believe in the goodness of the
American people and our overall direction, but, rather than
being in a position where we can drive something now, when we
get involved in something, people are very suspicious about it.
I just came back from West Africa and East Africa, where
people were saying, ``Well, you know, America's position on
Sudan is really basically some kind of a reaction to what
they're not doing in the Middle East.'' And everything is
viewed with suspicion. And that troubles me incredibly, because
the world needs America to have ideas, to put bridging
proposals on the table, and yet, at the moment, our motives are
suspect everywhere.
Therefore, I think that what is essential is for us to
begin to use the diplomatic tool much more, which is why I
thought that working through some kind of a contact group would
be a good idea, also trying to see the Middle East as a
regional issue. Secretary Kissinger spoke at length about
history, and I think--feel very strongly that people need to
look at the Middle East in a historical way. President Clinton
told me to read one particular book, called ``The Peace to End
all Peace,'' which provides a history of how the modern Middle
East was created after the end of the First World War. And the
short version was that it happened because the British and
French bureaucracies were lying to each other. When the British
left the area, the United States became the, kind of, governing
power.
And what is viewed in the Middle East now is that we are
all colonial powers, and there is a massive shift going on in
the region. I think we have to recognize that. We have to be
there to support those who want to live in peace and live in
countries that make sense. But I'm sorry to say that, at this
moment, it's a little hard for the United States to put down a
plan and say, ``Salute,'' because our motives are suspect. That
is the reason that there has to be very active diplomacy, a
regional plan.
And I also would say the following. We have to be
protective of our national interest. The United States did not
begin World War I or World War II, but, when we saw that it
affected our national interest, we went in there and fought.
The Europeans and others who did not favor this war and have
criticized it, need to understand that what is going on in the
Middle East affects their national interest, and they need to
get in there and help. They have to help in the training of a
lot of the Iraqis, they have to help in a lot of the
reconstruction. It means we have to share the contracts a bit.
But they need to understand that they also have a national
interest in this. And, therefore, internationalizing this
issue, understanding the shifts in the Middle East, is where I
think we need to go.
But I don't want anybody to misunderstand me in terms of my
respect for what our troops have done, the support that the
American people have given, and the necessity that ultimately
America continues to play a vital role in the world. But, at
the moment, our moral authority is seriously damaged.
Senator Menendez. Under the heading of the part of your
statement that says, ``An arrangement must be worked out that
would give each side more than they can obtain through
continued violence''--what would you envision some of that
being?
Ms. Albright. Well, I think that the violence is just--I
can't visualize what it's like to live in Baghdad or Basra or
places where people are terrified to go to meetings. Violence
is getting them nowhere. And I think that what needs to be done
is to really work on--as everybody has said, there have to be
political solutions to this; there are no purely military
solutions. A political solution will provide majority rule,
but, as many people here have learned, minority rights are also
very important. And so, there has to be a structure which
permits that, which recognizes the differences among the
various groups in Iraq, where they gain by not killing each
other, but in sharing the wealth of what is a pretty resource-
rich country. And I think, also, that the religious leaders
need to play an important part in this search for common
ground. None of it is easy, believe me. And it has been
exacerbated by the fact that, as others have described, there
is routine killing and gangs. But they can gain more by a
political solution in which minority rights are recognized and
resources are shared.
Senator Menendez. One very last question. Lee Hamilton was
here with Secretary Baker and he basically said he has little
faith in Prime Minister Maliki, in terms of having a series of
benchmarks, chances to meet them, and not achieving them.
What's your assessment of that?
Ms. Albright. Well, I don't know Prime Minister Maliki. I
think that it is very hard for us to say they're a sovereign
government and then expect them to do exactly as we want them
to. On the other hand, if our forces are there, helping, then
we do have the right to advocate certain--``benchmarks'' is the
best word, not a timetable, but--benchmarks, in terms of what
they need to achieve in moving forward on getting the oil
legislation passed or in working together on developing some of
the political institutions.
We cannot leave this as open-ended. I think that's an
essential part. We also have to make clear that we don't want
to have permanent bases there. And we have to make clear that
we need to see some progress. So, I would agree with the
general thrust of the Iraq Study Group on this, and some others
who have testified.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lugar [presiding]. The Chair has asked me to
recognize Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, thank you for your public service and your
levelheaded approach to foreign affairs. And thank you for your
great accomplishments while heading up our diplomatic efforts.
The Iraq Study Commission said, we ought to open up to
Syria. Now, I understand you've already discussed this issue
here earlier today. I went to Syria. We saw a little crack in
the door after a very sharp exchange between myself and
President Assad on things that we disagree on. But he did open
the door, as he did 3 years ago, to cooperation with the
Americans on better control of the border. And he followed
through on that over the last 3 years; albeit sporadic, there
was cooperation, and then the cooperation precipitously stopped
a couple of months after the assassination of Rafik Hariri. Now
President Assad has opened the door again. What would be your
advice to us in order to continue this dialog if the executive
branch refuses to engage in it?
Ms. Albright. Well, first of all, my general belief is that
one gains by communication with countries with whom we
disagree. In fact, it is even more important, because we need
to know what's going on and what their thinking is. And I
certainly met with people that I didn't agree with--Milosevic
or Kim Jong Il. But I think that it is a way to learn a lot and
to deliver some pretty tough messages.
I think that we need to take advantage of openings that
President Assad provides, for a number of reasons. One, we need
their--we need Syria's help, in terms of the way you have
talked about the border issues, but also I think it would be
very useful to somehow separate, a bit, this kind of peculiar
alliance or relationship between Iran and Syria. I also,
without breaking any laws, in terms of negotiations, I think
that there are ways for various parliamentarians to meet, for
dialog through private channels, track-two diplomacy, and a way
to try to indicate that Americans are interested in learning
what is going on in Syria.
We also learned, through the newspapers, that there were
some attempts to restart the Israel-Syria talks. So, there are
any number of avenues, I think, where it would not hurt, and I
think it would be in U.S. national interests, to try to find
out more what President Assad is thinking, which in no way
would lessen our interest or our desire to find out what
happened on the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri. I think
we're able to do both things at the same time.
Senator Bill Nelson. I raised the issue of Iran with
President Assad, in the way of, ``Would you not realize, Mr.
President, that, down the line, your interests are opposite
those of Iran, and that Iran ultimately wants Persian
domination of the Arab countries in the region? And yet, you're
establishing a relationship right now that ultimately is going
to haunt you.'' He disputed that. What would you, as someone
who is extraordinarily experienced in these matters of
diplomacy, advise us as an avenue to convince Syria--
specifically, Assad--that Iran is really not his friend?
Ms. Albright. Well, I think you've pointed out the whole
value of having these kinds of conversations, because there are
not a lot of people around President Assad who, I think, are
willing to challenge a lot of his thinking. And, therefore, it
is important for people with historical background and
understanding of the long-term problems to sit there with him
and point up what you have said you did. It doesn't mean he's
going to agree with you overnight, but if enough people deliver
the same message--I dealt with President Assad, and--having
also dealt with his father, before that--and I think that
repetition works and that it is important. And that's the
reason to open up a variety of channels to be able to point up
what is happening in the whole Middle East, that Syria can, in
fact, ultimately take its position within the Arab world, but
that it has to behave responsibly and it has to understand what
the threats to its national interests are, too. And that's why
an outsider that can point these things up, I think, is very
useful.
Senator Bill Nelson. Given the fact that there is a schism
in Iran--we've seen it in the local elections recently, we've
seen other evidence that Ahmadinejad is being reined in--would
you advise that this is an opening for the United States? Could
some kind of dialog ultimately bring about more moderation in
the extremist kind of statements and views expressed by the
President of Iran?
Ms. Albright. Well, let me start out by saying none of this
is easy. Iran is a very complex place. Our history with Iran is
equally complex. And during the Clinton administration, we
tried a number of ways to push. This is when President Khatami
was in office, and one had to be very careful. They, in fact,
did not respond, and I have it on pretty good authority that
some of them are sorry that they didn't. But, again, I do think
the statements that President Ahmadinejad has been making are
preposterous and do not deserve a face-to-face meeting, then,
with an American official leader. But there are a number of
different groups in Iran. We do know--I found Tom Friedman's
column, this morning, very interesting, where he points up how
many people are educated in Iran, what the problems are, in
terms of dissent, the fact that people feel that they are not
getting a reward for the richness of Iran's oil wealth. And I
think that there, again, are ways that there can be track-two
diplomacy and that there are other people in Iran that can be
spoken to by Americans, as well as non-Americans. And so, for
the same reason, I would try to parse that situation and make
it--it's interesting to me that, in fact, there has been
criticism of Ahmadinejad in Iran for the statements that he's
made, both on the nuclear issue and others. And I think we need
to be able to work within that, through a variety of other
groups and track-two diplomacy, as well as official contacts.
The Chairman [presiding]. Do you have any--you want to
follow up with anything, Senator? You're welcome----
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, I'm so shocked.
The Chairman. Well, you're here, and, even more shocking, I
haven't asked any questions yet, so I'm going to--the Secretary
has been very gracious with her time, and the good news is,
there's not a lot of people left here, at this moment, and----
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, I would like to ask one more
question.
The Chairman. Please. You go right ahead.
Senator Bill Nelson. I went to Saudi Arabia specifically at
the request of General Hayden, the head of the CIA, because
there hadn't been a lot of congressional delegations going to
Saudi Arabia. And personal relationships are important in that
part of the world. So, again, this idea of dialog, building the
relationships, and so forth. But, as I pushed, in my talk with
the King, and then a number of his nephews with whom I met, who
were responsible in the various ministries for the different
functions of the government, I didn't get the straight feeling
that they would really get involved in Iraq and help us through
their Sunni tribal contacts as I was requesting. From the Saudi
point of view, clearly a more stable Iraq is in their
interest--but I didn't get the warm feeling that they were
really foursquare going to get in and do it. And that's not
even to bring up the issue of: Would they help fund some of the
reconstruction of Iraq? Can you give me an insight into the
Saudi mind as to why? And does that portend it will be very,
very difficult to get all the rest of those neighboring
countries to come together and help move Iraq toward political
compromise?
Ms. Albright. Well, I think one of the more difficult
things, even when one has access to all the intelligence, is to
know exactly what's on the Saudi mind. And when we were in
office, I found, actually, that often the Saudis were more
helpful than the public ever knew. So, I don't know whether
that's going on now or not. I do think that they are very
concerned--I know King Abdullah pretty well from when he was
Crown Prince, and I do think that they are concerned about
changes within their own country, and--as you point out, a
number of different sects and divisions there, and a slowness
to reform. And, obviously, that is their major concern.
I think that it would be good, also, for them to try to
help in what is going on in Iraq. On the other hand, I don't
think we want to start seeing stories in the papers, ``All of a
sudden the Saudis are going into Iraq,'' and there's a kind of
a concern that that will broaden everything.
So, the question is how to get their help, in terms of
understanding that the Sunnis should be a part of the entire
system, and that they also need to help, ultimately, with the
large funds that they have. And that all the countries, with
the Saudis in the lead, would benefit if there were not such
turmoil in the region.
But that, again, is part of what the job of diplomacy is.
You can't just, kind of, all of a sudden decide that the Vice
President is going to Saudi Arabia. You need to have very
constant contact, you need to know what is on the Saudi mind.
As I read, there's about to be a new Saudi Ambassador here. And
I think, again, it is very important for all of you, and many
of us, to go to Saudi Arabia on a regular basis and talk about
things with them. I find my trips there always very
enlightening. And we need to know more about Saudi Arabia and
about Jordan and Egypt and all the countries, because, as I
said earlier, there is a massive shift going on in the region,
and it behooves us to understand that we are in the middle of a
systemic change and that our role there will be different.
And I hope that we think more about some kind of an overall
security system for the region, which is why I talked, earlier,
about a comprehensive diplomatic approach to this area.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do you think, after 1,327 years of
hatred between Sunnis and Shiites, that we have a chance of
bringing those two together----
Ms. Albright. Well----
Senator Bill Nelson [continuing]. In the midst of this
sectarian violence?
Ms. Albright [continuing]. I don't think we do, because
most people don't even know the difference between them. I do
think, however, that we should be in a position that we can--to
encourage. And I never--I wrote a book about the role of God
and religion in foreign policy--got a good title, ``The Mighty
and the Almighty.'' And what I--I had trouble, even there,
trying to figure out the adjectives and the nouns, and to say
``moderate Muslims,'' because moderate Muslims don't believe
moderately. So, I think that moderates need to be passionate
about what they believe in. But I think that there are elements
within Islam that are more capable of helping in this than we
are. And that is one of the reasons that I believe that it's
essential to get religious leaders involved in this.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Casey. And then I'll wait until the end here.
Senator Casey. My----
The Chairman. Unless you want some time, Senator.
Senator Casey. No; my timing is better than it normally is.
Madam Secretary, thank you very much for your testimony
today and for being with us, and for your public service.
Remarkable public service at, then, a difficult time in our
Nation's history and, I think, today, as well.
One of the areas that I've tried to focus on in the midst
of the great panels that Chairman Biden and Senator Lugar have
put together for us that come from the perspective of military
strategy and the questions that surround that, the political
and governmental challenges that we face in Iraq, and that they
face, of course. But I've tried to focus, as many of us have,
on diplomacy, and sometimes, in my judgment, the lack thereof,
or the lack of a strategic commitment to diplomacy. And I know
you may have covered this today, but I wanted to get your
thoughts, in terms of (a) what's gone before us since 2003, in
terms of what I think is a lack of a strategy on diplomacy, and
(b) and, I guess, more importantly, what we should be doing,
what our Government should be doing--the President, the State
Department, and certainly this committee and the Congress, in
its oversight role--to foster a strategic diplomatic surge, if
you will, as opposed to what I seem to see as a--kind of,
tactical in responding to changes on the ground or public
pressure, as opposed to a strategy effort that's sustained, and
there's--kind of a sustained engagement over time. I don't know
if you can answer that, in terms of what's gone before us and
what's ahead, if you had the ability to directly impact it.
Ms. Albright. Let me just say this, there's nothing easier
than to be on the outside and criticize those that are
currently involved in American diplomacy, especially when they
criticized what we had been doing in American diplomacy. But I
will try to contain myself.
I do think that what has not happened is to have any kind
of a comprehensive approach to diplomatic solutions. To a great
extent, one of the most interesting things that's happened in--
from the perspective, now, of a professor--of the struggles
between the State Department and the Defense Department is:
What is the role of diplomacy? To what extent is there a real
partnership between force and diplomacy? It is one of the
things that was very much on my mind when we were dealing with
the issues of Kosovo. Chairman Biden mentioned this Foreign
Ministers group that I've pulled together. We are the people
that worked all together through Kosovo, which is how we began
to understand how force and diplomacy work together. And I
don't see that happening, particularly, here. Diplomacy really
is taking very much of a back seat. To the extent that one has
seen it, a lot of it is ad hoc, rather than being part of a
larger comprehensive plan.
I believe that it is absolutely essential to begin to see
the issues of Iraq within the region and to understand that
diplomatic efforts have to also involve the other countries in
the region and then other countries in the world, because what
is happening in Iraq is definitely affecting their national
interests.
People often talk about diplomacy as a chess game between
two people. It's not a chess game. In chess, you have a lot of
time, you sit there between moves, and it's relatively quiet. I
think it's more like a game of pool, where, in fact, there are
balls on a table. You pick up a cue stick, you hope very much
you can get the ball into the pocket on the other side, but, on
the way, you hit a lot of other balls. And that's what's
happening. And we are not considering enough the horizontal
aspect of diplomacy and getting enough players involved in it.
I think, also, we need to consider, for instance, that it
isn't just the issues in the region. As we talk about Iran and
what they're doing on their nuclear program, or not doing on
their nuclear program, you can just bet that Kim Jong Il, in
Pyongyang, is listening also. So, I think we have to understand
much more the interaction of all of this and to understand that
diplomacy is not appeasement, that it is the vehicle for
delivering some pretty tough messages, and to get the help of
others in trying to resolve some of these problems. So, I'm
very glad that you are focusing on that, also very glad to see
you here.
Senator Casey. Thank you.
And I was thinking, as well, about the--I think it helps
those of us in government--and you've dealt with a lot of us
over the years, and we're better if we have lists that are very
specific. And I'm just wondering whether there's a--and you may
have covered this earlier, and I had one of those five-
different-hearings-in-one-morning days, so--it's not an excuse,
it's just an explanation for where we've been today--but I
guess if you were thinking of the next--maybe not even 6
months, but 3 to 6 months, if you had a short list of things we
should do diplomatically, very specific steps, what would they
be? If you can----
Ms. Albright. Well----
Senator Casey. Boiling it down.
Ms. Albright [continuing]. I think that one which has to be
done, for its own sake, as well as, obviously, the effect in
the region, is for very strong concentration on the Israeli-
Palestinian issue. I know that there are those who want to make
it central to resolving what's happening in the Middle East,
and I think that linkage is not correct, because it's important
to understand that issues there have to be dealt with for their
own sake, but they have to be dealt with. And so, I was very
glad to see Secretary Rice go to the region. I understand the
Quartet is going to be meeting in Washington on Friday, so that
there is some activation of that. And I think that would help
not only the immediate issue, but also show American interest
that has been lacking.
I, then, also would work on trying to pull together this
contact group of countries that have an interest in the region,
the Permanent Five of the Security Council, plus the countries
that surround Iraq, and--we did that when we were dealing with
the Balkans, and it creates kind of an executive committee or a
group that deals with this issue on a day-to-day basis, and
then they are able, each one, as a part of that, to broaden the
circle by having relationships with other countries. So, that
would be one thing.
I also would try, through diplomacy, to get other countries
to help in the reconstruction of Iraq and in the training of
Iraqis, because the only way that we're going to get out of
there, which I believe we have to do, is if the security
situation is dealt with, and the only way the security
situation will be dealt with is if the Iraqis themselves begin
to deal with it.
So, I could make a longer list, but, I think, if they did
that much, that would be a big step forward.
The Chairman. It would keep them occupied for a while.
Senator Casey. Three is a good list for the Congress, I
know that.
That's--but I know my time is almost expired, and I just
want to reiterate our thanks to you for your public service and
for your continuing public service in addition to which your
testimony today gives us a lot of food for thought, and I'm
grateful.
Ms. Albright. Good. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Casey. Thank you.
The Chairman. Well, Madam Secretary, thank you. It's kind
of like the old days. I get to sit down with you alone, and I,
quite frankly, miss your energy and your insight.
Madam Secretary, I just want to make a couple of things
clear. I believe that, had the President come up to the
Congress and to the leadership here in both parties and said,
``Look, I have a comprehensive plan, which includes the need to
temporarily alter force in Iraq, but here's the whole plan,''
he may have gotten a very different reception.
The problem with the President's plan: It's the tactic.
It's a tactical change in mission, inserting our troops in the
midst of a civil war, in the single most white-hot portion of
that civil war, a city of 6.3 million, in the middle of
Baghdad. And so, that's what most of us are reacting to. And
now, as Senator Lugar has said, we share the view that the
concern is that you have friends like my good friend Senator
McCain, who supports this, saying, ``This is the last chance.''
Now, what I'm worried--and you and I have had discussions
about this--my great worry is, as this administration continues
to mishandle Iraq, the American people are not going to be
prepared to act even in those areas where there is an
overwhelming rationale to need to have forward-based forces,
have forces engaged in certain circumstances. So, I'm worried
the President's proposal here is not only going to fail, but,
in its failure, the American people will walk away from
whatever everybody acknowledges, from Senator Boxer to Senator
Isakson, which says that we have interest in the region.
And so, that takes me to the next point that I want to
discuss with you. I realize that--I was warned, by many very
smart people you and I both know, not to put forward a specific
plan, months ago. It's been the only specific plan out there.
It's not because I'm so smart. There's a lot of very, very
important people. But it's a dangerous thing to put out a
specific plan, as we know, in this town. And--but I was so
convinced, from my experience in Bosnia--as you and I well
know--I don't think it's an exaggeration to suggest, Madam
Secretary--other than you, from the outside, I was the most
consistent pounding voice to get us engaged in Bosnia and to
stop the genocide, and in Kosovo. But it was your leadership--
your leadership inside that got that done. And I learned a lot
of lessons from Bosnia.
The sectarian violence in Bosnia and in the Balkans
overall, for 800 years, from Vlad the Impaler on, equals
anything that we've seen in Iraq. And I noticed what you did. I
noticed what--at least with a little nudging and a little bit
of help from the outside by me, what--it would be an
exaggeration--what we did--you did it. But I was--I was rooting
you on and making every bit of--using every bit of influence I
could to move.
But what did you do? You had Dayton. And what did you do in
Dayton? You not only brought in the regional players, you
brought in Russia, you brought in all the major players. And
you locked everybody in a room, and you came up with something
far, on paper, more divisive than anything I've suggested with
regard to Iraq. You set up the Republika Srpska, with a
separate President. You set up Bosnia, with two Presidents, one
Croat and one Bosniak, a Muslim. And you were right. Because
the only way there was any possibility to keep that country
from shattering, even though all of your interlocutors, from
France to England--I need not remind you, I know--said, ``No,
no, no, no, no, no. No.'' Well, where are we today? The
genocide has stopped. They're working like the devil to unite
the country under a different constitution. Things are not all,
as they say, ``hunky-dory'' in Kosovo, but--guess what?--
they're not killing each other, and there's hope.
Now, what I have been amazed at is why everyone thinks,
when I took the Iraqi Constitution--I was there that day, and
put my finger in the ink, and I read the Constitution that we
helped write. It calls for, it sets out explicitly that
Kurdistan is a republic, is what they call a region. They
define what powers regions have, what the powers of the central
government are. I met, in my seven trips, with as many people
as anybody in this government has, I suspect. I have been to
Basrah. I've been to Fallujah. I've been even out into Al Asad
Air Force Base, in the middle of God knows where. And guess
what I found out? If you're going to keep this country
together, you'd better give it some breathing room. The idea
you're going to take a country, with all due respect to
everyone, that has been a construct of the postwar era, World
War I, that put together groups of personages who would never
have been together as a unified country, and say, ``By the way,
now Saddam's gone. The wicked witch is dead. You're going to
have a strong central government,'' is beyond my comprehension.
Beyond my comprehension.
And so, now we're down to a situation that the only two
plans being debated are the Biden-Gelb plan and the President's
nonplan. Nobody else has a plan. If you look at the Iraq Study
Group, God love them, they have proposals, but what do they
say? They say national reconciliation, ``U.S. forces can help
provide stability, but they cannot stop violence, they cannot
contain it. The Iraqi Government must send a clear signal to
the Sunnis,'' and it makes recommendations that are totally
consistent with what I laid out 9 months ago.
But what I can't understand is why this administration will
not do what you and every one of us has suggested. A year ago,
I wrote an op-ed piece, you did, Secretary Schultz, Secretary
Kissinger, calling for an international conference. Not just
the regional powers. What you did in Dayton. And so, what we
call for here is to get the Islamic countries involved. Get
Iran involved, but also get France, Germany, the Permanent
Five--Germany is not one--the Permanent Five of the United
Nations. Bring in Indonesia, possibly even Pakistan, India.
Bring them in. Create a circumstance where there is incredible
pressure to accept a system arrived at by the Iraqis that will
be honored by the immediate neighbors. And so, what I don't
understand is: Why do we continue to talk about something that
I've not found a single solitary person thinks can happen in
your lifetime or mine, and that is a strong united central
government in Baghdad whose purpose is to rule the country and
have the ability to get trust from all the warring factions to
trust they'll distribute the revenues fairly, to trust that
everyone will be treated equally? It's not going to happen.
I've been around as long as you, Madam Secretary. It is not
going to happen in anyone's lifetime in this room.
So, I appreciate you suggesting that my plan--our plan--is
to hold Iraq together, but I'd like to ask the central
question. Do you see any possibility--and if you would, would
you outline for me--within the next 10 years, of a strong
central government without constitutional guarantees relating
to energy and guarantees relating to local protecting security
forces? I ask this question to everyone, which is: Can anyone
picture the possibility of the Iraqi national police force--
that's what it is now--ever patrolling the streets of Fallujah?
Can anyone imagine that happening? You know and I know, you're
not even allowed--those forces are not even allowed to set foot
in the Kurdish area, under the Constitution, without their
permission. What is it that makes anybody think we're going to
get a strong central government that will allow our troops to
come home and not continue to be sacrificed to a sectarian
cycle of revenge?
Ms. Albright. Mr. Chairman, I agree with what you have
said, in terms of the actual impossibility, I think, at this
point, to get a kind of dominant centralized government. And if
it comes, it will come at great expense of all minority rights,
and, therefore, will continue the fighting.
I appreciate all your kind words about the Balkans, and I
do think we developed a great partnership. And we did manage to
get all those people--we had to lock them at Dayton, but we did
manage to get something done.
Every situation is slightly different, but I do think that
the concept of having an international conference where others
participate in the solution is what is necessary. And I must
say I regret the extent to which your ideas were misinterpreted
up front, because some people just talked about it as a
partition. It is not a partition. And I agree, also, with you,
that there has to be breathing space for the various regions.
I do think there is a problem, in that some of the
neighboring countries might then take advantage of it, and
there also might be elements within some of these regions who
would then move for some kind of independence. But the bottom
line is, that is not the necessary outcome of it.
I think the reason that it is not--that an international
conference is not being considered is that this administration
is not exactly big into international conferences or
partnerships or trying to work a problem out. And it is an
issue, because, as powerful as we are, the issues that are out
there cannot be dealt with by the United States alone, and it
is not a derogation of our responsibilities in order for us to
share this problem with other countries.
Which leads me to say what you started out with. I am
deeply concerned that when this war is over--and it will be
over--that the American people will basically say, ``We've had
it. We have enough problems in this country.'' And we do. It's
what I call the ``Katrina Effect.'' If you can't pay attention
to what's happening at home, then people are not eager to help
abroad. But we have to be engaged. The world could not exist
without American engagement. And I hope that we do not allow
that to happen.
And further, Mr. Chairman, I'm very troubled about what has
happened to the word ``democratic.'' This administration,
because of--it has militarized democracy in Iraq--is giving
democracy a bad name. And the United States cannot be the
United States if we do not understand that we are better off if
other countries are democratic, if we support democratic
movements. We can't impose them. But I hope very much that we
all do not turn away from the concept that democracy is the
best form of government.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Well, Madam Secretary, I appreciate your
testimony. The reason I waited to go last was to be able to
raise that broad context with you. And you and I, as I said, go
back a long way. And I appreciate your input and response to my
larger question.
I'll conclude by saying that it's about time we
acknowledged the reality which is happening on the ground. It's
about time we get specific about a political solution, not just
calling for one--suggesting one. And it's about time we get the
international community, who I believe is ready to embrace it.
And I assure you, in my view--if the Kurds understand, which
they do in my discussions, that a disintegration of Iraq, which
may happen, putting them in the position where they're de facto
independent, is the very thing that will bring the Turks in.
The only way to keep the Kurds safe and not have that
expression they have, ``the mountains are their only friends,''
is to make sure there is a united Iraq, loosely federated.
Absent that, we have a war on our hands, in my humble opinion.
But I believe this is becoming inevitable. I think we'll
find a lot of people coming around to, if not exactly what Les
Gelb and I proposed--something closer to it, because the
reality is 3.5 million people have already fled Iraq. The
cleansing is well underway. And the rest of the concerns we
have are: Iran is getting involved, the Syrians are indirectly
involved, the Saudis are threatening to become more involved.
So, the question is: How do you stop the thing that we're all
saying we don't want to have happen? And I would respectfully
suggest, if not the only way, one of the ways is as I've
suggested.
And I mean what I said about your leadership on Bosnia and
your leadership in Kosovo. It saved a serious, serious, serious
dislocation, and not just in the Balkans, but all of Europe,
and you--in my view, your tenure will go down in history for
having avoided that.
I thank you very much. We are adjourned. Excuse me for my--
--
Ms. Albright. Mr. Chairman, could I just thank you----
The Chairman. Sure.
Ms. Albright [continuing]. For having these hearings? I
have very carefully followed and read the transcripts. I think
you have, in fact, provided a forum for a truly serious
discussion of the issues in Iraq, and I hope, Mr. Chairman,
that you do the same for Iran.
The Chairman. I will.
Ms. Albright. You made very clear that the President does
not have authority to expand the war into Iraq, and I hope very
much that, as chairman of this committee, that you will also
proceed to give this kind of a discussion on that.
Thank you so----
The Chairman. Be sure I----
Ms. Albright [continuing]. Much for asking me to come.
The Chairman [continuing]. Madam Secretary. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 1:02 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
IRAQ IN THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT,
SESSION 2
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:23 a.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden,
Jr. (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Bill Nelson, Menendez, Cardin,
Casey, Webb, Lugar, Hagel, Coleman, Sununu, and Voinovich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
Mr. Chairman, before we begin the hearing, I'd like to make
a very brief comment on Senator Warner's resolution on Iraq.
Three weeks ago before this committee, Secretary Rice
presented the President's plan for Iraq. It's main feature is
to send more American troops into Baghdad in the middle of what
I believe is a sectarian war. The reaction on this committee,
from Republicans to Democrats alike, ranged from profound
skepticism to outright opposition. And that pretty much
reflected the reaction across the country.
Senators Hagel, Levin, Snowe, and I wrote a resolution to
give Senators a way to vote what their voices were saying. I
believe that was the quickest, most effective way to get the
President to reconsider the course he's on and to demonstrate
to him that his policy has little support across the board in
this body.
After we introduced our resolution, Senator Warner came
forward with his. The bottom line of our resolution is the same
as Senator Warner's: ``Mr. President, don't send more troops
into the middle of a civil war.''
There was one critical difference. As originally written,
Senator Warner's resolution left open the possibility of
increasing the overall number of troops in Baghdad, as well as
in Iraq. We believed--the sponsors of our resolution--that that
would send the wrong message. We ought to be drawing down and
redeploying within Iraq, rather than ramping up, to make clear
to the Iraqi leaders that they must begin to make the hard
compromises necessary for the political solution virtually
everyone acknowledged is needed to bring this conflict to a
somewhat successful end.
We approached Senator Warner, my cosponsors and I, several
times, to try to work out our differences, and I am very
pleased that last night we succeeded in doing just that. The
language that Senator Warner removed from his resolution
removed the possibility that it can be read as calling for more
troops in Iraq. With that change, I am pleased to support
Senator Warner's resolution.
When I first spoke out against the President's planned
surge before the new year, I made it clear that I hoped to
build a bipartisan opposition to his plan, because this was the
best way to have him reconsider. And that's exactly what we
have done. We'll see what happens on the floor. But this is
exactly what we have done with the Biden, Levin, Hagel, Snowe,
and the Warner, Nelson, et cetera, resolution now, all of us
joining Senator Warner, as amended.
Now, we have a real opportunity for the Senate to speak
clearly. Every Senator will be given a chance to vote on
whether he or she supports or disagrees with the President's
plan, as outlined by Secretary Rice. If the President does not
listen to the--and assuming that the majority is where I
believe it is, with Senator Warner and myself and others--if
the majority of the Congress and the majority of the American
people speak loudly, it's very difficult, I think, for the
President to totally dismiss that. But this is an important
first step.
Before we begin, let me make clear that the purpose, from
the outset, was to get as much consensus as we could on the
President's overall plan, and that's why I am delighted to join
and work off of Senator Warner's resolution, which, quite
frankly, is even a more powerful statement than ``a Biden
resolution'' coming from one of the leading Republicans in the
U.S. Senate.
And today marks the final day of our initial series of
hearings. I remind our members what they already know, that
this committee will, as under my friend and former chairman and
future chairman of this committee, because we've been here for
an awful lot of changes back and forth over the years--that we
will continue to engage in aggressive oversight in the coming
weeks, in the coming months, and throughout this year.
We are joined this morning by two very distinguished former
National Security Advisors. First, we'll hear from GEN Brent
Scowcroft, and later we'll hear from Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski.
They are among the best strategic thinkers in America, and
we're honored that they're here to join us.
And without further ado, since I did not know we would have
worked out a compromise with Senator Warner last night--rather
than read the remainder of my statement, I'll ask unanimous
consent that it be placed in the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., U.S. Senator From
Delaware
Before we begin, let me make a brief comment on Senator Warner's
resolution on Iraq.
Three weeks ago, before this committee, Secretary of State Rice
presented the President's plan for Iraq. Its main feature is to send
more American troops into Baghdad, in the middle of a sectarian civil
war.
The reaction on this committee, from Republicans and Democrats
alike, ranged from skepticism to prfound skepticism to outright
opposition. And that pretty much reflected the reaction across the
country.
Senator Hagel, Senator Levin, Senator Snowe, and I wrote a
resolution to give Senators a way to vote what their voices were
saying.
We believe that the quickest, most effective way to get the
President to change course is to demonstrate to him that his policy has
little or no support across the board.
After we introduced our resolution, Senator Warner came forward
with his. The bottom line of our resolutions is the same: Mr.
President, don't send more Americans into the middle of civil war.
The was one critical difference. As originally written, Senator
Warner's resolution left open the possibility of increasing the overall
number of American troops in Iraq.
We believed that would send the wrong message. We ought to be
drawing down, not ramping up, and redeploying our forces that remain in
Iraq. That's the best way to make it clear to the Iraqi leaders that
they must begin to make the hard compromises necessary for the
political solution virtually everyone agrees is necessary.
We approached Senator Warner several times to try to work out the
differences. I am very pleased that last night, we succeeded in doing
just that.
The language Senator Warner removed from his resolution removed the
possibility that it can be read as calling for more U.S. troops in
Iraq.
With that change, I am pleased to support his resolution.
When I first spoke out against the President's planned surge before
the new year, I made it clear that I hoped to build bipartisan
opposition to his plan because that was the best way to turn him
around. And that is exactly what we have done.
Now, we have a real opportunity for the Senate to speak clearly.
Every Senator will be given a chance to vote whether he or she supports
or disagrees with the President's plan to send more troops into the
middle of a civil war.
If the President does not listen to the majority of Congress and
the majority of the American people, we will look at other ways to
change the policy.
But this is an important first step.
The Chairman. And welcome to you, General. It's truly an
honor to have you here. You're one of the most respected men in
this country.
And I will now yield to my colleague, Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I thank you for holding this hearing, and I welcome our
distinguished former National Security Advisors.
This is, by our count, the 14th meeting of this committee
on Iraq since the committee began its series of hearings, on
January 9. And, just parenthetically, Mr. Chairman, I
congratulate you, and your staff working so well with our
staff, in a bipartisan way, on bringing before the committee,
and, therefore, before the Senate and the American people, a
galaxy of remarkable people, both American and Iraqi, who have
addressed this issue, with profit to all of us.
These bipartisan hearings have given us the opportunity to
engage administration officials, intelligence analysts,
academic experts, former national security leaders, Iraqi
representatives, and retired military generals on strategy in
Iraq and the broader Middle East. And this process has provided
members a foundation for oversight, as well as an opportunity
to dialog with each other.
On Tuesday, our committee hosted Secretary of State James
Baker and Representative Lee Hamilton, the cochairs of the Iraq
Study Group. Both witnesses voiced the need to move Iraq policy
beyond the politics of the moment. Even if Congress and the
President cannot agree on a policy in Iraq in the coming
months, we have to find a way to reach a consensus on the
United States role in the Middle East.
Yesterday, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger recalled a
half-century of U.S. involvement in the Middle East. He argued
that this history was not accidental. We have been heavily
involved in the region because we have enduring interests at
stake, and these are interests that are vital to our country.
Protecting those interests cannot be relegated to a political
timeline. We may make tactical decisions about the deployment
or withdrawal of forces in Iraq, but we must plan for a strong
strategic posture in the region for years to come.
Both the President and Congress must be thinking about what
follows our current dispute over the President's troop surge.
Many Members have expressed frustration with White House
consultations on Iraq. I've counseled the President that his
administration must put much more effort into consulting with
Congress on Iraq, on the Middle East, on national security
issues, in general. Congress has responsibility in this
process. We don't owe the President our unquestioning
agreement, but we do owe him, and the American people, our
constructive engagement.
I appreciate that the administration wants a chance to make
its Baghdad strategy work, and, therefore, is not enthusiastic
about talking about plan B. Similarly, opponents in Congress
are intensely focused on expressing disapproval of the
President's plan through nonbinding resolutions. But when the
current dispute over the President's Baghdad plan has reached a
conclusion, we will still have to come to grips with how we are
to sustain our position in the Middle East.
At yesterday's hearing, I noted that Secretary Rice had
taken steps that shift the emphasis of U.S. Middle East policy
toward countering the challenges posed by Iran. Under this new
approach, the United States would organize regional players--
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, the Gulf States and
others--behind a program of containing Iran's disruptive agenda
in the region. This would be one of the most consequential
regional alignments in recent diplomatic history. Such a
realignment has relevance for stabilizing Iraq and bringing
security to other areas of conflict in the region, including
Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. Moderate states in the
Middle East are concerned by Iran's aggressiveness and by the
possibility of sectarian conflict beyond Iraq's borders. They
recognize the United States is an indispensable counterweight
to Iran and a source of stability. The United States has
growing leverage to enlist greater support for our objectives
inside Iraq and throughout the region. In this context, the
President's current Iraq plan should not be seen as an endgame,
but, rather, as one element in a larger Middle East struggle
that is in its early stages.
The President should be reaching out to the Congress in an
effort to construct a consensus on how we will protect our
broader strategic interests, regardless of what happens in
Baghdad in the next several months. Without such preparation, I
am concerned that our domestic political disputes or
frustration over the failure of the Iraq Government to meet
benchmarks will precipitate an exit from vital areas and
missions in the Middle East. We need to be preparing for how we
will array United States forces in the region to defend oil
assets, target terrorist enclaves, deter adventurism by Iran,
provide a buffer against regional sectarian conflict, and
generally reassure friendly governments the United States is
committed to Middle East security.
We look forward to the insights that will be brought to us
by our distinguished witnesses this morning on the strategic
and political dynamics involved in our Middle East policy.
I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator.
General, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF LTG BRENT SCOWCROFT, USAF (RET.), FORMER NATIONAL
SECURITY ADVISOR; PRESIDENT, THE SCOWCROFT GROUP, WASHINGTON,
DC
General Scowcroft. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to commend you, Senator Lugar, and the committee,
for undertaking this series of hearings. By any measure, the
United States finds itself in a most difficult situation in
Iraq. If there were an easy solution to our difficulties, we
would have found it before now.
In our search for resolution, we must, above all, keep our
focus on the U.S. national interest. It is with this in mind
that I would like, this morning, to look at Iraq in a regional
context.
The conflict in Iraq has brought to the surface a number of
seemingly disparate tensions, issues, and conflicts which have
stirred various parts of the Mideast region in a way in which
they have now become interrelated, yet we still generally tend
to consider Iraq as if it were in a regional vacuum. For
example, the costs of staying in Iraq are brutally apparent to
us, daily--troops killed, hundreds of millions of dollars
spent--but the costs of leaving Iraq are almost never
mentioned. It is almost as if pulling out our troops and
leaving Iraq were cost-free. Even those who do not support
pulling out assert that our patience is not unlimited or that
President Maliki must step up to his responsibilities, or else.
Or else what?
In fact, however, the costs for U.S. withdrawal before a
stable Iraq emerges are enormous. Our friends would feel
abandoned, left to cope by themselves with a debacle we had
created. Our opponents would be emboldened and encouraged to
take the offensive. Terrorists everywhere would trumpet the
driving of the Great Satan from the region. Moderates in the
region, who are our great hope, would be demoralized and run
for cover. I could go on, but the almost inevitable result
would be a region in chaos, our friends in disarray, radicalism
on the march, and U.S. credibility in the region, and the world
at large, seriously damaged.
But just as the region would suffer if we abandoned Iraq,
the region can help us deal with Iraq. It is clearly in the
interests of the countries of the region to help. After all,
countries of the region provided troops and money for the 1991
gulf war. Even Syria joined us in that conflict. But since
then, it has come to be seen by our friends to be dangerous to
be identified with the United States. We need a diplomatic
initiative to change that; one which involves the entire
region. That means Syria, Iran, and the Arab-Israeli peace
process.
A vigorously renewed effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli
conflict could change both the dynamics in the region and the
strategic calculus of key leaders. Hezbollah and Hamas would
be--would lose much of their rallying appeal. American allies,
like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, would feel liberated
to assist in stabilizing Iraq. And Iraq would finally be seen
by all as a key country that had to be set right in pursuit of
regional stability.
Resuming the peace process is not a matter of forcing
concessions from either side. Most of the elements of a
settlement are already agreed as a result of negotiations in
2000 and the roadmap of 2002. What is required is to summon the
will of Arab and Israeli leaders, led by a determined American
President, to forge the various elements into a conclusion that
all parties have publicly accepted, in principle. As for Syria
and Iran, we should not be fearful of opening channels of
communication, but neither should we rush to engage them as
negotiating partners. Moreover, they should be dealt with
separately. Their interests, their concerns, are different, and
we should not treat them as a duo. Syria cannot be comfortable
in the sole embrace of Iran. It also has much to gain from a
settlement with Israel, and it may be even more eager if it
sees the peace process moving forward without it.
Iran is a different matter. Nuclear issues, first of all,
should be dealt with on the U.N. track, not as a part of a
regional forum. In its present state of euphoria, Iran has
little interest in making things easier for the United States.
However, if the peace process makes progress, and other
regional states become more interested or engaged in
stabilization in Iraq, Iran may be more inclined to negotiate
seriously.
In Iraq itself, we should continue to encourage moves
toward reconciliation and a unified government. With respect to
the surge, I consider it a tactic rather than a strategic move.
If it is successful in stabilizing Baghdad, that could begin to
change the climate and bring a new self-confidence to Iraqi
forces, which could be important. But it will not end the
problem. As I say, it is a tactic rather than a strategy.
As a general proposition, I believe American troops should
gradually be deployed away from intervening in sectarian
conflict. That must be done by Iraqi troops, however well or
badly they are able to do it. Our troops should concentrate on
training the Iraqi Army, providing support and backup to that
army, combating insurgents, attenuating outside intervention,
and assisting in major infrastructure protection. That does not
mean that the American presence should be reduced. That should
follow success in our efforts, not the calendar or the
performance of others.
As I said at the outset, there are no easy answers to the
problems we face. As we move ahead, we will not find
impatience, a quick fix, or seeking partisan advantage a friend
to U.S. national interests over the long run. It is going to be
hard to make a bad situation better. It will be easy to make it
worse.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of General Scowcroft follows:]
Prepared Statement of LTG Brent Scowcroft, USAF (Ret.), Former National
Security Advisor; President, The Scowcroft Group, Washington, DC
[From the New York Times, Jan. 4, 2007]
Getting the Middle East Back on Our Side
(By Brent Scowcroft)
Washington.--The Iraq Study Group report was released into a sea of
unrealistic expectations. Inevitably, it disappointed hopes for a clear
path through the morass of Iraq, because there is no ``silver bullet''
solution to the difficulties in which we find ourselves.
But the report accomplished a great deal. It brought together some
of America's best minds across party lines, and it outlined with
clarity and precision the key factors at issue in Iraq. In doing so, it
helped catalyze the debate about our Iraq policy and crystallize the
choices we face. Above all, it emphasized the importance of focusing on
American national interests, not only in Iraq but in the region.
However, the report, which calls the situation in Iraq ``grave and
deteriorating,'' does not focus on what could be the most likely
outcome of its analysis. Should the Iraqis be unable or unwilling to
play the role required of them, the report implies that we would have
no choice but to withdraw, and then blame our withdrawal on Iraqi
failures. But here the report essentially stops.
An American withdrawal before Iraq can, in the words of the
President, ``govern itself, sustain itself, and defend itself'' would
be a strategic defeat for American interests, with potentially
catastrophic consequences both in the region and beyond. Our opponents
would be hugely emboldened, our friends deeply demoralized.
Iran, heady with the withdrawal of its principal adversary, would
expand its influence through Hezbollah and Hamas more deeply into
Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, and Jordan. Our Arab
friends would rightly feel we had abandoned them to face alone a
radicalism that has been greatly inflamed by American actions in the
region and which could pose a serious threat to their own governments.
The effects would not be confined to Iraq and the Middle East.
Energy resources and transit choke points vital to the global economy
would be subjected to greatly increased risk. Terrorists and extremists
elsewhere would be emboldened. And the perception, worldwide, would be
that the American colossus had stumbled, was losing its resolve and
could no longer be considered a reliable ally or friend or the
guarantor of peace and stability in this critical region.
To avoid these dire consequences, we need to secure the support of
the countries of the region themselves. It is greatly in their self-
interest to give that support, just as they did in the 1991 Persian
Gulf conflict. Unfortunately, in recent years they have come to see it
as dangerous to identify with the United States, and so they have
largely stood on the sidelines.
A vigorously renewed effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict
could fundamentally change both the dynamics in the region and the
strategic calculus of key leaders. Real progress would push Iran into a
more defensive posture. Hezbollah and Hamas would lose their rallying
principle. American allies like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf
States would be liberated to assist in stabilizing Iraq. And Iraq would
finally be seen by all as a key country that had to be set right in the
pursuit of regional security.
Arab leaders are now keen to resolve the 50-year-old dispute. Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert of Israel may be as well. His nation's long-term
security can only be assured by resolving this issue once and for all.
However, only the American President can bring them to the same table.
Resuming the Arab-Israeli peace process is not a matter of forcing
concessions from Israel or dragooning the Palestinians into surrender.
Most of the elements of a settlement are already agreed as a result of
the negotiations of 2000 and the ``roadmap'' of 2002. What is required
is to summon the will of Arab and Israeli leaders, led by a determined
American President, to forge the various elements into a conclusion
that all parties have already publicly accepted in principle.
As for Syria and Iran, we should not be afraid of opening channels
of communication, but neither should we rush to engage them as
negotiating ``partners.'' Moreover, these two countries have differing
interests, expectations, and points of leverage and should not be
treated as though they are indistinguishable.
Syria cannot be comfortable clutched solely in the embrace of Iran,
and thus prying it away may be possible. Syria also has much to gain
from a settlement with Israel and internal problems that such a deal
might greatly ease. If we can make progress on the Palestinian front
before adding Syria to the mix, it would both avoid overloading
Israel's negotiating capacity and increase the incentives for Damascus
to negotiate seriously.
Iran is different. It may not be wise to make Iran integral to the
regional strategy at the outset. And the nuclear issue should be dealt
with on a separate track. In its present state of euphoria, Iran has
little interest in making things easier for us. If, however, we make
clear our determination, and if the other regional states become more
engaged in stabilizing Iraq, the Iranians might grow more inclined to
negotiate seriously.
While negotiations on the Arab-Israel peace process are under way,
we should establish some political parameters inside Iraq that
encourage moves toward reconciliation and unified government in Iraq.
Other suggested options, such as an ``80 percent solution'' that
excludes the Sunnis, or the division of the country into three parts,
are not only inconsistent with reconciliation but would almost
certainly pave the way to broader regional conflict and must be
avoided.
American combat troops should be gradually redeployed away from
intervening in sectarian conflict. That necessarily is a task for Iraqi
troops, however poorly prepared they may be. Our troops should be
redirected toward training the Iraqi Army, providing support and
backup, combating insurgents, attenuating outside intervention, and
assisting in major infrastructure protection.
That does not mean the American presence should be reduced. Indeed,
in the immediate future, the opposite may be true, though any increase
in troop strength should be directed at accomplishing specific, defined
missions. A generalized increase would be unlikely to demonstrably
change the situation and, consequently, could result in increased
clamor for withdrawal. But the central point is that withdrawing combat
forces should not be a policy objective, but rather, the result of
changes in our strategy and success in our efforts.
As we work our way through this seemingly intractable problem in
Iraq, we must constantly remember that this is not just a troublesome
issue from which we can walk away if it seems too costly to continue.
What is at stake is not only Iraq and the stability of the Middle East,
but the global perception of the reliability of the United States as a
partner in a deeply troubled world. We cannot afford to fail that test.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, General.
We'll have 7-minute rounds with these two witnesses, all
right?
General, thank you for your testimony. It's quite clear, as
I understand it, we can't win in Iraq--succeed in Iraq--without
a political settlement; we can't leave Iraq, because of the
regional and global consequences if we did, absent a
settlement. We need regional cooperation, but our friends are
reluctant to be associated with us in this present atmosphere,
so it's unlikely to get regional cooperation, but one way to
get it would be if we demonstrated a sincere effort to get the
Israeli-Palestinian peace process back on track.
Let me ask you, specifically, whether you believe that the
Israelis see a benefit in getting the peace process back on
track.
General Scowcroft. I don't know, Mr. Chairman, exactly what
the Israelis are thinking now. Their government is in a very
difficult situation, as popularity is near zero. A tough
response for the Prime Minister is very difficult. It seems to
me, in his inner heart, he must feel that this could be his
salvation. It, after all, is Israel's salvation. Israel cannot
permanently live surrounded by hostile forces. And so, a
solution to this problem is very much in Israel's interest,
just as our leaving the region would be the worst possible
outcome for Israel.
The Chairman. My instinct is that Prime Minister Olmert
understands that. What I get fed back from different and
disparate sources in Israel is--well, let me characterize it a
different way. Were you the National Security Advisor today,
would you be pushing the President--any President--to have a
much more focused and clear attempt to get this peace process
back on track?
General Scowcroft. Yes; I would. I believe the
administration, at least from all appearances, is moving in
that direction. But----
The Chairman. One of the things that perplexes me, anyway,
is how long it took the administration to engage the Israelis
and be public in any utterances with regard to the war in
Lebanon, how--I mean, we just don't seem to have anybody of
real consequence on the ground full time that the Israeli
leadership knows has the ear of the President of the United
States. This is a risk, I know. I've been here for seven
Presidents, and every President, I know, calculates the risk of
getting himself deeply involved in trying to resolve this
crisis. But I guess what I'm asking you is: Isn't it necessary
for the President to get deeply involved in--not telling Israel
what to do, but making it clear that we are willing to take
risks along with them to get this process underway?
General Scowcroft. I think it is critical for the President
to be involved, because the states of the region are very
nervous, they're worried about the spread of radicalism. If you
noted, at the time of the Lebanese incursion, the first word
from the Arab governments was ``condemnation of Hezbollah''----
The Chairman. Yeah.
General Scowcroft [continuing]. For kidnaping the soldiers.
That turned, in about 3 days----
The Chairman. Yeah.
General Scowcroft [continuing]. To ``condemnation''----
The Chairman. Seems to me----
General Scowcroft [continuing]. ``Of Israel.''
The Chairman [continuing]. We missed a significant
opportunity to--I see a common interest with the Sunni states
and Israel right now. In my dialogs with leaders in the leading
Sunni states, from Egypt to Saudi Arabia, they seem much more
concerned about this--they refer to the Shia Crescent. It seems
to me there is a mutuality of interest here. It seems to me
they're in the position where they may be prepared to be much
more responsible than they have in the past--excluding Egypt; I
think they've been responsible, by and large--to actually be a
proactive player in bringing about a positive settlement
between Israel and the Palestinians. From my perspective, it
even looks as though Syria is in an unholy alliance with a
country that they don't have a real shot for a long-term future
with: Iran. So, I happen to agree with your assessment that
there's an opportunity here for, really, some solid diplomacy.
Let me conclude by asking you this: Many of our witnesses
we've had have laid out, in, sort of, historical terms, that
when you deal with a country that was literally the consequence
of a diplomat's pen on a map, like the Balkans, like Syria--we
could name other places in Africa, as well--that one of two
formulas seem to work. Either you have a strongman take hold to
hold that country together, or, two, you have some form of a
loosely federated system with a central government, with some
significant authority in the regions, particularly over their
own security. That's what happened in Dayton, that's what
happened other places.
Can you comment briefly on what you see down the road as
the outlines of a political settlement that might hold that
country together--Iraq--where it's not a threat to its
neighbors, where it's not a haven for terror, and where we can
be a positive influence in providing assistance for both of
those things?
General Scowcroft. I believe that it's possible to have a
centralized Iraqi State, but it won't be easy, and it may take
a long time to resolve itself. It is similar, in some respects,
to Yugoslavia. The difference, however--loosely federated or
even independent states in Yugoslavia has worked reasonably
well. Although if our troops left Kosovo, or our troops--or the
troops that are still in Bosnia left, I fear we'd find it was
not over.
But Iraq happens to be surrounded by powerful neighbors,
relatively powerful neighbors, with intense interests in the
future of Iraq. I think a loosely federated system would be an
invitation to meddling and would perhaps even hasten the
regionalization of a conflict.
The Chairman. Well, if there's a second round, I will come
back and talk a little bit about the Iraqi Constitution, which
is explicit in setting out Kurdistan as one of those loosely
federated areas, by definition, and lays out where any of the
18 other governates can conclude they have local control over
their security. I'd like to talk with you, but my time is up.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Scowcroft, I would just like you to think aloud
about Iraq in this sense. We've had testimony from Iraqis that
as our military forces obtained military victory over Saddam
Hussein, the Iraqi Armed Forces essentially disintegrated,
people fled, leaving their uniforms and their arms, and were no
longer identified with the military force. In addition to that,
we heard that the police forces, various other coercive
elements, also dissipated to a point that we had not only the
celebrated sacking of the museums in Baghdad, and looting of a
tremendous scale but back in the provinces, people who were
robbers, thieves, and ne'er-do-wells really terrorized people.
Now, the question that was raised by these Iraqis comes down to
this. We have worked--that is the United States and our
allies--with some Iraqi politicians to bring about a
constitution, even elections, a Parliament--which seems to be
meeting on occasion--ministers, and a Prime Minister. But at
this point the whole country lacks what at least these Iraqis
said were coercive elements, not in the sense of torture and
debilitating the people, but simply keeping some degree of
order, law and order, so that ordinary people could go about
without being hit by predators. We hear, too, that some people
have formed militias, not the celebrated ones with thousands of
people, but simply groups to protect themselves.
It's not clear, at least to me, as I've listened to all of
this, how order comes to this situation and whether our
aspirations--by that, I mean Iraq becoming a model example of
democracy in the Middle East--works, really, in this situation.
Can you share with us some of the thought you have given to
this with respect to Yugoslavia and other nations that have
struggled to build institutions and such capacities following
conflict. And what sort of prognosis can you give of what would
be a reasonable government situation in Iraq that would fit
with the rest of the surrounding territories and fit with our
strategy, perhaps, of withdrawal from sectarian violence, but
providing sufficient presence to batten down the hatches with
regard to terrorists or those that would be totally disruptive
of borders?
General Scowcroft. You have asked a very difficult
question, Senator. And I think, for the United States, Iraq is
perhaps sui generis. You know, we've had heavy involvements in
Korea, heavy involvements in Vietnam, and so on; but there, we
participated alongside a government which was constituted,
which was operating, which had people who knew how to run a
government. Iraq has none of those. It is destroyed. It's a
blank slate, seething with the sectarian, religious, ethnic
tensions that resulted from it being an artificial state. So,
we have to put the whole thing together. And it's not as if
Maliki were part of a government firmly in power and so on;
we're trying to set up a government. The situation is much more
like Somalia, for example, than it is like Vietnam.
And I don't know how we end this up. I think we have to
push for reconciliation. We have to try to train--not just
train the Iraqi Army, but convince them what they're fighting
for, who they're fighting for. Is it a sect? Is it a religion?
Is it an ethnic group? Or is it the symbol of the state of
Iraq? And I don't think we're there yet. We're apparently
closer in the army than we are in the police, which is badly
infiltrated by these, let's call them, private forces. To me,
that's going to take time. And it's going to take patience. And
it's going to take a presence; hopefully, over time, a
decreasing presence, as they start to learn how to govern
themselves. Most of the people in the government now have never
held any kind of office. You can't expect an instantaneous
democracy to emerge. You may have to go through strongman
phases and so on. But hopefully we can be increasingly a Big
Brother, offering a helpful hand, admonishing here, helping
there. As we and, if we're successful in the region, as the
regional partners of Iraq begin to play a role, we can succeed.
But it's--there is no magic wand, and it's a daunting task.
Senator Lugar. What you've described is something perhaps
like South American democracy that arose--this is a broad
characterization--but the army was the powerful group, and it
provided some order, and then, in due course, it said, ``We're
tired of governing. We want to invite some civilians in to
participate and provide some elements of democracy.'' And
sometimes when the civilians don't do well, the army returns,
dismisses the civilians, tries again. Is this roughly what
you're talking about?
General Scowcroft. Well, there are a number of models of
democracy--the Latin American model, the Turkish model. There
are a lot of them. And each culture has to figure out its own.
But we have a heavy responsibility now in Iraq figuring out its
own, without plunging the entire region into turmoil with all
those consequences.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator, welcome. And----
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
The Chairman [continuing]. It's nice not to have to wait
all this time, isn't it? [Laughter.]
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Scowcroft, thank you very much for your service to
our country and for being here. We very much appreciate your
advice.
I'm having some difficulty reconciling the additional
troops being sent into Baghdad with your advice that we should
be redeploying troops away from the sectarian violence as part
of our strategy. It seems to me that the President's
announcements move in the wrong direction there, but also
signal to the Iraqis that we intend to keep our troops where
sectarian violence is the worst.
I want to concentrate on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
because I think you've raised some very valid concerns. We've
been talking about this for a long time, but the framework for
resolving the conflict between the Israelis and the
Palestinians is fairly well defined. And I don't believe time
works to the advantage of resolving the issue. I think there is
an opportunity. We should be taking advantage of that
opportunity, and it requires a very strong presence from the
United States--as the chairman said, not to dictate the terms
of the peace, but to be the force for keeping the parties at
the table to resolve their differences and to implement a peace
plan.
So, if you were to give the President advice as to how we
could elevate and move forward with the Israeli-Palestinian
peace process, could you share with us how you would see the
President elevating that issue? And, second, how would you
advise Congress to try to move forward with the Israeli-
Palestinian peace effort?
General Scowcroft. Certainly, Senator. I think a strong
sense of Presidential leadership is essential in order to give
heart to our friends in the region who--most of whom have been
vocal in wanting to pursue the peace process, but are afraid to
get out in front of the United States. If the President shows
some determination that he wants to press forward, I think he
will find a lot of help. And a lot of help is needed. One of
the conventional arguments is that Israel now has a government
under siege and is not in a position to negotiate. And, on the
Palestinian side, there is a struggle between Fatah and Hamas,
and there is no negotiator. I believe those problems are
fixable.
The more difficult one probably is the Palestinian issue.
But, even there, there's some movement. The Hamas external
leader in Damascus recently said that, ``Israel is a reality.
There will remain a state called Israel. This is a matter of
fact.'' Now, that's not recognizing Israel, which we have
demanded of Hamas, but it's a--certainly a step, a big step
away from driving Israel into the sea. So, there's something
there we can work with. And the Egyptians are working hard to
resolve that problem.
So, those are the things I think we need to pay attention
to originally, to get the negotiators ready to talk at the
table. As you say, if they sit down, most of the issues have
already been agreed, and those that haven't, the outlines of an
agreement are still there. It will take tough negotiating, but
I think it is there.
Senator Cardin. Is there a specific positive role that you
envision for the U.S. Congress in this regard?
General Scowcroft. I think the Congress should be
supportive of that kind of effort. I certainly am not prepared
to tell the Congress what it ought to do. On your first point,
about the surge, there's no question that the surge go--is in
contradiction to my general statement, ``We need to get out of
sectarian conflict.'' But there is a particular problem right
now in Baghdad, and if Baghdad should become a single-sect
city, we would have a new and different kind of a problem for
the whole of Iraq. So, I think there is a rationale for trying
to stabilize the situation in Baghdad, which violates the
general rule that we shouldn't do that.
Senator Cardin. I would point out that there are, right now
in Iraq, so many displaced individuals as a result of sectarian
violence. I understand the importance of Baghdad to maintain
ethnic diversity, but it seems like Iraq has moved in the wrong
direction now for a period of time.
General Scowcroft. Well, I wouldn't disagree with that.
And, as I say, on the surge--the President has decided he wants
to surge. I think that the Congress role here is unlikely to be
helpful in the direction that it's going, in the sense that
what you send is signals abroad that if they just push a little
harder, then the President may have to change his mind.
Senator Cardin. Of course, I would argue that if the
President would work with Congress and listen to our hearings
here, there could be much more unity in our position in Iraq.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for----
General Scowcroft. My guess is the President is listening
attentively right now.
The Chairman. I hope so.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Welcome, General Scowcroft. It's always pleasant,
enlightening, informative to have you before us, and we always
appreciate your thoughts.
I have just a quick response to a point you made, and then
I want to go back to a comment in your testimony and ask a
question.
We all appreciate, I think, that there are no clear
comparisons of past conflicts the United States has been
involved in, with Iraq. You noted that Somalia may be, in many
regards, closer to a comparison with Iraq than Vietnam. But,
because you have served as National Security Advisor to two
Presidents and your entire career has been about national
security, very few understand it as well as you do. But I would
make this observation. I do think there is one clear comparison
with Vietnam where we are in Iraq, and that is that we continue
to get bogged down more and more. When the President's talking
about sending 22,000 more U.S. troops, you can define that in
any way you want, but that's an increase in our involvement,
our military involvement. The President will soon be coming
before the Congress for another $100 billion emergency
supplemental, most all of that for Iraq. That is certainly an
additional amount of involvement. We have the largest Embassy--
U.S. Embassy in the world, by far, in Iraq, and we continue to
keep building up that Embassy. That's certainly a significant
increase in our involvement. So, rather than going the other
way, we continue to bog ourselves down, and our country. And
the consequences of that, you being a career professional
military man, certainly are aware, just as the Washington Post
noted a couple of days ago, what this is doing to our force
structure, specifically our equipment, that we will not have
enough equipment. And I had the Secretary of the Army in my
office, 2 days ago, asking him about that. The rotation
patterns, all the consequences that most people don't
understand. You do. So, it's my observation that that is the
one clear comparison, just like Vietnam, ``Just send more
troops, send more money, send more involvement, give us more
time.'' And I don't think there's any way you can escape that
reality.
Now, that leads me into a question that was prompted by a
comment you made. And you, I think, said something to the--I
don't have your testimony, so I can't quote exactly, but
something to the effect that our withdrawal, or decrease of
involvement, should follow--not timelines or any other
definitions--but it should follow, I believe, in your words,
should follow success in our efforts. Well, next month, it'll
be 4 years that we have been there. We are nearing 3,100
deaths. And I was just at a funeral of a Nebraska Army
lieutenant who was one of those abducted in Karbala. We are
over 23,000 wounded. And I can recite all the other numbers,
which you're familiar with. So, after 4 years, then, based on
what you said, we should base any withdrawal or plans for
decreasing our involvement--that should follow success in our
efforts.
My question is: What do you define ``success'' as being?
And the other question picks up a little bit on your exchange
with the distinguished Senator from Maryland. Do you believe
the Congress has a role in this? You mentioned something about
resolutions sending wrong signals. Do you believe that Congress
has a constitutional responsibility and role in war? What is
that? And I'd like you to define that, if you would, and answer
that question. So, two questions, General. And thank you.
General Scowcroft. Absolutely. To answer the last one
first; of course I think Congress has a role. One of the
distinguished constitutional jurists, whose name I can't recall
now, said, ``In matters of war and international relations, the
Constitution is an invitation to struggle between the executive
and the legislature.'' And I'll just leave it there.
Do I think Congress has a role? Absolutely. And the
ultimate role that Congress has in the making of war is the
power of the purse. There's no question about that.
Senator Hagel. I appreciate that. And, of course, there are
more definition of our role, which is heavy in precedent over
the last 230 years, as well, not just the power of the purse,
as you well know. But we're not here before the Judiciary
Committee, so--
But, please, sir, thank you, if you would answer the other
question, as well, I appreciate your comments.
General Scowcroft. Now, the other question?
Senator Hagel. The other question was based on your
testimony when you said that U.S. withdrawal or----
General Scowcroft. Oh, yes.
Senator Hagel [continuing]. Any efforts to move out should
be----
General Scowcroft. Right.
Senator Hagel [continuing]. Your words, should follow
success in our efforts. Now, after 4 years and all that we've
put in, and we're continuing to put more in, what is your
measurement of success? You said this should--this may go on
for years and years, we may go through strongmen. Well, what is
our responsibility?
General Scowcroft. I think----
Senator Hagel. And what is that measurement of success?
General Scowcroft. I think our responsibility is a state
which is stable enough to be a force for stability in the
region, not for disruption in the region. And our goal, I
think, has to be the region itself now. And I think we cannot
afford chaos in the Middle East.
Senator Hagel. Well, that's not my question. We----
General Scowcroft. I----
Senator Hagel [continuing]. All agree with that. But what
is your--we hear a lot of rhetoric, General----
General Scowcroft. It----
Senator Hagel [continuing]. From the President----
General Scowcroft. I----
Senator Hagel [continuing]. And others, saying, ``Well, we
ought to have a measurement. We ought to know when--we're going
to threaten and we're going to pull out and we're going to have
benchmarks.'' Well, when is that measurement of some precision
so that you know? Or is it beyond----
General Scowcroft. I don't----
Senator Hagel [continuing]. Our control?
General Scowcroft. I don't know what the precision is. We
have troops in Korea 50 years after that war----
Senator Hagel. But you're surely----
General Scowcroft [continuing]. Was over.
Senator Hagel [continuing]. Not making a comparison to
Korea.
General Scowcroft. No; I'm not making a comparison to
Korea. But I don't know when you can let the hand--when you're
training your child with training wheels on the bicycle, how do
you know when to take the training wheels off?
Senator Hagel. Well, again, I wouldn't use----
General Scowcroft. I don't know.
Senator Hagel [continuing]. That analogy, either. And when
you've got----
General Scowcroft. But----
Senator Hagel [continuing]. Seventy percent or more of the
Iraqi people who don't want us there, and over 60 percent say
it's OK to kill Americans, and we're going to put a number of
new troops in Baghdad, which you have just noted that you
don't, I guess, to some extent, agree with--you've noted it's
sectarian--those are sectarian issues. So, then, isn't there
some jumble in all this? And when you say we ought to have, as
your--in your words, ``a success in our efforts,'' well, how do
you measure----
General Scowcroft. Well----
Senator Hagel [continuing]. Success in----
General Scowcroft. It would be----
Senator Hagel [continuing]. Your efforts?
General Scowcroft. It would be nice to be precise and to
have all these benchmarks that everybody can see and so on.
This is not that kind of a problem. We're in a mess, and we've
got to work our way out of it.
Senator Hagel. Well, that's----
General Scowcroft. And----
Senator Hagel [continuing]. That's true, but how----
General Scowcroft. And we've----
Senator Hagel [continuing]. To do that?
General Scowcroft [continuing]. Got to work our way out of
it, not into a bigger mess, a regional mess, where one of the
results will make $60 oil look like a bargain.
Senator Hagel. You do that by continuing to put more troops
in Baghdad?
General Scowcroft. I did not say put more troops in.
Senator Hagel. Well, how do you work your way out of the
mess?
General Scowcroft. Well, I can repeat what I said. You
focus on training, you focus on backing up the army, you focus
on lines of communication, you focus on infrastructure, you
focus on keeping the outsiders from intervening, and you
encourage reconciliation and consolidation of the government.
Senator Hagel. Then how do you measure that?
General Scowcroft. The way you measure anything.
Senator Hagel. Would you give us a good grade, over the
last 4 years, of measuring success? Are things getting better?
General Scowcroft. No.
Senator Hagel. So, another 4 years, we take another look,
and maybe the Congress should look at a resolution, and maybe
it shouldn't?
General Scowcroft. I think this problem is not going to be
over inside a decade.
Senator Hagel. Does that mean more American troops----
General Scowcroft. No.
Senator Hagel [continuing]. Get fed into the grinder and--
--
General Scowcroft. I do not believe we need more American
troops.
Senator Hagel. My time's up. Thank you, General. Thank you
very much.
General Scowcroft. Because I want to get out from in
between the sectarian violence.
The Chairman. Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much. Senator Menendez has
graciously allowed me to jump ahead.
General, I'm grateful for your presence here and your
service to the Nation.
And I'm going to ask a--maybe two questions about Iraq,
specifically, but, before I do that, I wanted to ask a question
which I think is on the minds of a lot of people when the
American people think about Iraq, and they think about the
sacrifice that both you and Senator Hagel were just reviewing,
in terms of the loss of life. In my State, the State I
represent along with Senator Specter, we've lost the third
highest number. So, we're cognizant of that. I think a lot of
Americans are concerned about what happens next, not just with
regard to Iraq, but what happens next with regard to Iran.
Someone that I respect greatly--I won't use his name, but--
many months ago, said to me--made the assertion, and I'll
paraphrase, that if this Government were to strike Iran, one of
the immediate and direct consequences of that would be the
slaughter of GIs, hundreds, if not thousands, right away. And I
don't know if that's correct or not, but I wanted to ask you
that question, based upon your experience as a national
security expert, your experience in war, and what you've seen
and read and analyzed with regard to what's happening now in
the Middle East as it pertains to Iran. Do you think--and let
me just put it plainly to you--do you think that if there is a
military strike by this Government on Iran--do you think it is
highly likely, or unlikely, maybe--maybe you have a third
option--that a large number of American GIs would be
slaughtered in Iraq?
General Scowcroft. Well, Senator, I can't really tell you,
there. I must say that the utility, at this point, of a strike
on Iran escapes me, so I haven't pursued what the consequences
will be. It seems to me that there are many other options open
with Iran--there being a very difficult person in the
Presidency at the present time--both their general sectarian
threats and the nuclear issue, but I think we have maneuvering
room with them, and time with them. I don't think that the
Iranian structure is quite as unified and monolithic as it
appears to some and, with some very careful diplomacy, we might
be able to uncover more fissures there. And I would certainly
pursue diplomacy.
Iran didn't just rise yesterday from the ashes to be a
threat. Iran's been there for a long time. We've had problems
with them since the fall of the Shah. But I see no reason that
those problems suddenly have become overwhelmingly menacing.
Senator Casey. But can you assess the question I just asked
about American troops in Iraq?
General Scowcroft. Well, if I were--if I were an Iranian
leader, having been struck by a United States air attack, for
example, having no means to retaliate directly on the United
States, I would do whatever I could to take it out on United
States interests, where I could reach them.
Senator Casey. I also wanted to point to--and I appreciate
your statement today, some of which was contained in a New York
Times op-ed on January 4--and I was struck by a number of--a
number of statements in your op-ed. One was that--I want to
read, in part--when you're speaking of Iran, you talked about
failure in Iraq or withdrawal being the catalyst for an
expansion of Iranian influence in the region, and then you go
on to say, and ``Our''--this is in the context of some kind of
withdrawal--``Our Arab friends would rightly feel we had
abandoned them to face, alone, Iraq radicalism that has been
greatly inflamed by American actions in the region and which
could pose a serious threat to their own governments.''
I was struck by the juxtaposition of the sense that you
would have that they would--our Arab friends would feel
abandoned, but also your assertion that radicalism in the
region has been greatly inflamed by American actions in that
region. I just wanted to have you talk about that, in terms of
what actions have inflamed that radicalism in the region.
General Scowcroft. Well, I think the situation in Iraq has
inflamed it. It has exacerbated the century-old tension between
Sunnis and Shias. And it has brought to the fore conflicts--
again, historic, but quiescent--between Persians and Arabs. And
all of those now are surfaced and are boiling. And I think that
the Iraq developments have helped to create that kind of a
situation.
Senator Casey. I almost am out of time, General. Let me
just see if I can get one more in.
Again, on the question of Iran, you assert, with regard to
the reaction that Iran would have if our forces were to be
withdrawn or largely redeployed--just specifically--I know we
only have a few seconds, but--what do you think the Iranian
reaction would be to a total withdrawal of U.S. forces?
General Scowcroft. Well, that's very speculative, Senator.
I don't know. I think--in some respects, they may be dismayed,
but, in other respects, I think they would be very encouraged,
because they could see the way open for the expansion of
Iranian or Shia influence throughout the region, with us having
vacated. And I think that would probably be the predominant.
They would think they had won a victory.
Senator Casey. Thank you, General.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Before I move to Senator Menendez, I have to make a point
that we're going to be having three votes in a row, I'm told,
around noon, and we have need for a business meeting to pass
out a resolution to the committee, which is pro forma, but it
sets out the budget for the committee for the 110th Congress.
So, I'm going to suggest to my colleagues, between the first
and second vote on the floor, we go down to our Foreign
Relations Committee meeting room in the Senate on the first
floor, S-116, and we'll take 30 seconds to vote out the
resolution.
With that--excuse me--oh, I'm sorry. Senator Coleman. I beg
your pardon.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Following up on Senator Casey's comment about the Iranian
reaction to the withdrawal of our forces, in the New York Times
article you talked about withdrawal, and to describe the
consequences you used a phrase, ``Our opponents would be hugely
emboldened, our friends would be deeply demoralized.'' That
statement resonates with what we've heard throughout the 50
hours of hearings that we have had here in the Foreign
Relations Committee on Iraq, as well as numerous briefings and
markups--the committee really has done an extraordinary job of
examining this issue. The one obvious thing is that this is a
complex issue. There's not a silver bullet here. And there are
consequences to the things that we do. Understanding that Iraq
is a mess today, it could be much worse tomorrow. Is that a
fair statement? If we withdraw precipitously, as the Iraqi
Study Group talked about--and I think your New York Times piece
also touched on this--al-Qaeda would be emboldened, and our
allies would be left with long-term doubt about American
reliability. Those who have stepped up to the front in Iraq
alongside us would probably be slaughtered. And so, there are
great consequences to withdrawal.
One of the issues that we have talked about here is the
perception of America in the global arena. If we do the wrong
thing in Iraq, if we simply abandon Iraq, that perception could
be worse. Would that be a fair statement?
General Scowcroft. I believe that's a fair statement,
Senator. I think we would be perceived in the world, ``Well
America's lost it,'' you know, we're a force of the past, we're
fading, we're not up to the challenges. I think that would be
wrong, but I think that would be the perception.
Senator Coleman. What are the consequences of that
perception?
General Scowcroft. Well, it would be--it would be a subtle
shifting of where you want to put your confidence. Who do you
want to stand with, who do you want to be careful about, and so
on, and so forth? And I think it would be significantly
deleterious.
Senator Coleman. There are some of us who understand the
consequences of failure--and, again, it's laid out in the Iraqi
Study Group, Secretary Kissinger talked about it yesterday, and
Secretary Baker talked about it when he testified before the
committee. They also pointed out that they believe that we're
going to be in Iraq for a long time--hopefully, though, not in
the middle of a sectarian civil war. But it is important to let
our allies know, and to let the Iranians know, that we're not
abandoning Iraq. We must let al-Qaeda know we're not walking
out on Iraq, but we don't want American troops to be in the
middle of the sectarian battle that is engulfing parts of it.
General Scowcroft, you have military experience and can
offer us a certain perspective. We have debates in the Senate.
We pass resolutions. In the case of our Iraq policy, the
Senate's discussion involves a resolution that may challenge an
aspect of the President's policy. Can you help me understand if
this debate we're having has an impact on the folks on the
ground? Does the nature of the debate that is taking place here
in Congress on our Iraq policy embolden our enemies? Or do
people simply think: This is the way the United States works,
it's the way the Congress works, and folks understand that?
General Scowcroft. I think it--I don't think it has much
effect on the troops. Troops know what they're doing. They're
following their orders. They're doing their damnedest. And I
don't think the Congress voting a nonconcurrence or something
in what the President has done will affect their attitudes or
anything. I don't know how it will affect those who are
opposing us over there if they would think, ``Well, look, you
know, we've got the President on the run now. If we just push a
little harder, he'll cave.'' I don't know that. That's pure
speculation.
Senator Coleman. As I approach this issue, I don't want to
do anything to undermine the resolve of the folks on the
ground. I want them to know we support them. We may disagree
with an aspect of what the President is doing, but in the end
we still want to see--or at least I want to see--success,
however it's defined. Success in Iraq would perhaps be defined
by some stability, by al-Qaeda not having a base in Iraq from
which to sow greater uncertainty and instability in the region.
On the other hand, here in the Senate we have this--I believe--
constitutional responsibility to represent what our citizens
are saying about U.S. policy. If we're troubled by something
that the President is doing, we have to say it. But it's an
important question. I appreciate the response.
Let me ask you about benchmarks. Yesterday Secretary
Kissinger said that he was concerned about this idea of
benchmarks and the consequences of holding Iraqis accountable
if they don't achieve them. I believe in your article in the
Times you also talked about benchmarks--if the Iraqis fail to
meet the benchmarks, what do we do about it? And part of the
problem--and I hope the debate here in the United States helps
on this front--is that the Iraqis have to understand that our
patience is not infinite. Maybe we'll leave them to kill each
other in Baghdad and move American troops to other areas where
they can focus on missions such as keeping the Iranians out of
Iraq. I don't know whether the Iraqis are tired of killing each
other. I don't know whether they're exhausted from that yet.
How do we insist, or let the Iraqis know, that they've got to
actually do some things that we've agreed to for us to continue
with the sacrifice of blood and treasure?
General Scowcroft. Well, one of my problems with benchmarks
is that it sort of presupposes that the government is not doing
its best; the Iraqi Government. Well, by our lights, they're
not doing their best, but it's not that they are disinterested
and just sitting on their hands. They believe passionately, but
not all in the same direction, and they're killing each other
for their beliefs. And what we're trying to do is to put
together a government which can draw together these disparate
elements in some kind of a unified approach that you could call
Iraq. The problem with benchmarks is, as this government
struggles, if they don't meet the first benchmark, we drawdown
some support almost making certain they can't meet the second
benchmark. And so, it begins to look like a recipe for
withdrawal and blaming the Iraqi Government. Is the Iraqi
Government what we would wish? No. But it's--we're trying to
set up a government from zero. There is no government in Iraq.
When we destroyed Saddam Hussein and the Baathists, there was
nobody left who had any experience in governing. And so, all of
the tensions, all of the sectarian and religious tensions boil
up, and you put in a bunch of people and you write a
constitution quickly, and you hope that it's going to work. But
it's going to take time.
Senator Coleman. I see that my time is expired. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you for your service to our country. Thank
you for your testimony.
I have a couple of questions that I hope you could be
helpful with. You know, many of our colleagues who are
concerned about challenging our present course of action all
want to achieve success. The question is: How does one do that?
And some who challenge this and say the consequences of
failure make that a linkage in the case for escalation, but,
overwhelmingly, the testimony that we have heard here,
including from experts who come from both sides of the
political divide, have said, largely, that you cannot achieve
victory here through a classic military context. And so, you
know, I don't quite buy the escalation aspect as the pivotal
issue as to whether we have success or failure in Iraq.
But that goes to the broader question. Isn't, in essence,
what we are doing here with our troops a role of nation-
building? Is that an appropriate mission for the U.S. military?
General Scowcroft. It is an appropriate role for the United
States military in a situation where conflict is a predominant
fact of the nation, yes. Hopefully, we can gradually get out of
that, but right now, without the military, there would be--
there would be no hope.
Senator Menendez. Well, I asked you that question because
when I served in the House of Representatives, for a long time
I heard my colleagues on the other side of the aisle rail
against the context of nation-building and having the military
be an integral part of nation-building. But it seems to me
that's very much what we're doing.
But to further go down this line, I looked at your January
op-ed piece, and I read it with great interest. There are a
couple of things that you said that concerns me with our
present course of action. You said, ``American combat troops
should be gradually redeployed away from intervening in the
sectarian conflict.'' And you also said that controlling the
sectarian conflict, ``is a task for Iraqi troops, however
poorly prepared they may be.'' And that's where I want to take
off the next line of questioning with you.
Everything we hear from the administration suggests, or
tries to suggest, to the American people, and to the Congress,
that it is Iraqis who are leading this effort, that it is
Iraqis who are going to be on point, and that we are there,
filling in, in the background along the way, and being helpful,
and talking about embedding. But when I look at some of the
most recent news reports from the front lines, I see an
incredible lack of troop strength and training of Iraqi forces
and the confusion that comes along with having them take the
lead. Here's one quote from an article, ``As the sun rose, many
of the Iraqi Army units who were supposed to do the actual
searches of the building did not arrive on time, forcing the
Americans to start the job on their own. When the Iraqi units
finally did show up, it was with the air of a class outing,
cheering and laughing as the Americans blew locks off doors
with shotguns. Many of the Iraqi units that showed up late
never seemed to take the task seriously, searching haphazardly,
breaking dishes, rifling through personal CD collections in the
apartments.'' In the article, a lieutenant colonel of the 3d
Stryker Brigade combat talked about the difficulty of
conducting such operations. He said, ``This was an Iraqi-led
effort, and with that comes challenges and risks. It can be
organized chaos.''
Twenty-some-odd-thousand more troops into that scenario? I
don't understand that.
And then, balancing that and your answer, how do we, in
such a scenario, send 20-more-thousand troops? You say that, at
some point, no matter how poorly prepared they may be, they
should lead in this effort. I probably agree with you, they
need to stand up, at some point, on their own, particularly in
a sectarian conflict. And why is it that, notwithstanding your
recommendations and the recommendations of so many others, we
do not seem to have an administration willing to engage in a
very vigorous way, as so many members in a nonpartisan effort
here have called for, in the regional summits and the high
level of engagement of other countries in the region, which you
yourself call for, as a significant comprehensive part of this
plan? Why is there such a reticence, from your perception of
the administration, to do that? If you could pursue those two
lines, I'd appreciate it.
General Scowcroft. Well, I think, as to the surge, as I
said, I describe the surge as a tactical maneuver, not as a
strategic move. The reason for it, that I would adduce, is that
Baghdad is a special case, and if one can stabilize Baghdad,
then it would have a great psychological impact in the country
and also might give the Iraqi forces a greater sense of self-
confidence than the article that you read indicates that they
have.
But it won't change the situation, fundamentally, in Iraq.
It might be a blip, it might be a positive blip, but it won't.
And, as Senator Hagel said, you know, we've got a long, hard
slog here, and this is--it might be helpful. If it doesn't
work, it'll--it might be harmful. But it's--you know, I didn't
focus on it, because it's a decision that the President has
made, and it is being implemented, even as we--even as we
speak.
Now, I think the administration is moving to greater
regional involvement. And I think that Secretary Rice's last
trip, where she spoke some, and listened a lot, will encourage
them to move further. What I worry about is that it's going to
take not just gradual movement, it's going to take visible
determination in order to rally our friends behind us.
Senator Menendez. My time is up, but Lee Hamilton and Jim
Baker were here, and I think it was Lee Hamilton specifically
who said that the sense of urgency--and, on the diplomatic
side, I don't get the sense of intensity and urgency that is
necessary in order to achieve our goals. But I hope both these
sets of hearings and the vote that will soon take place will
have the administration understand the sense of urgency,
certainly on the diplomatic side.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lugar [presiding]. Well, thank you very much,
Senator Menendez.
The chairman has been called to the floor for a moment. The
thought is that we will recess the hearing and wait for Dr.
Brzezinski's appearance, which should be in a few minutes.
Let me just ask, before I take that action, whether there
are members who have additional questions of General Scowcroft.
[No response.]
Senator Lugar. Seeing no further questions, we thank you
very much for coming, once again, to be part of a very
important hearing. You've made a wonderful contribution, and we
look forward to seeing you again soon.
General Scowcroft. I thank you all for your listening to
me. Thank you very much.
Senator Lugar. For the moment, the committee is recessed,
and we will wait for Dr. Brzezinski's appearance.
[Recess.]
Senator Lugar. The committee is called to order.
We welcome Dr. Brzezinski, a wonderful friend of the
committee, for this very important appearance today.
We have asked Dr. Brzezinski to present an opening
statement, and he will do that, and then we'll proceed to
questions. I think Senators know that we are heading toward
rollcall votes at noon or shortly thereafter. Therefore, we'll
begin immediately, given the chairman's instructions.
Dr. Brzezinski, we're delighted to have you, and would you
please proceed?
STATEMENT OF DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISOR; COUNSELOR AND TRUSTEE, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Brzezinski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, indeed.
Your hearings come at a critical juncture in the United States
war of choice in Iraq, and I commend you and Senator Biden for
scheduling them.
In my view, it is time for the White House to come to terms
with two central realities. First, the war in Iraq is a
historic, strategic, and moral calamity. Undertaken under false
assumptions, it is undermining America's global legitimacy. Its
collateral civilian casualties, as well as some abuses, are
tarnishing America's moral credentials. Driven by Manichean
impulses and imperial hubris, it is intensifying regional
instability.
Second, only a political strategy that is historically
relevant, rather than reminiscent of colonial tutelage, can
provide the needed framework for a tolerable resolution of both
the war in Iraq and intensifying regional tensions.
If the United States continues to be bogged down in a
protracted, bloody involvement in Iraq--and I emphasize what
I'm about to say--the final destination on this downhill track
is likely to be a head-on conflict with Iran and with much of
the world of Islam at large. A plausible scenario for a
military collision with Iran involves Iraqi failure to meet the
benchmarks, followed by accusations of Iranian responsibility
for the failure, then by some provocation in Iraq or a
terrorist act in the United States, blamed on Iran, culminating
in a, ``defensive'' United States military action against Iran
that plunges a lonely America into a spreading and deepening
quagmire eventually ranging across Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and
Pakistan.
Indeed, a mythical historical narrative to justify the case
for such a protracted and potential expanding war is already
being articulated. Initially justified by false claims about
WMDs in Iraq, the war is now being redefined as the decisive
ideological struggle of our time, reminiscent of the earlier
collisions with Nazism and Stalinism. In that context, Islamist
extremism and al-Qaeda are presented as the equivalents of the
threat posed by Nazi Germany and then Soviet Russia, and 9/11
as the equivalent of the Pearl Harbor attack which precipitated
America's involvement in World War II. This simplistic and
demagogic narrative overlooks the fact that Nazism was based on
the military power of the industrially most advanced European
state and that Stalinism was able to mobilize not only the
resources of the victorious and militarily powerful Soviet
Union, but also had worldwide appeal through its Marxist
doctrine.
In contrast, most Muslims are not embracing Islamic
fundamentalism, al-Qaeda is an isolated fundamentalist Islamist
aberration, most Iraqis are engaged in strife because of the
American occupation which destroyed the Iraqi State, while
Iran, though gaining in regional influence, is, itself,
politically divided, economically and militarily weak. To argue
that America is already at war in a region, with a wider
Islamic threat of which Iran is the epicenter, is to promote a
self-fulfilling prophecy.
I then go on, Mr. Chairman, to compare the posture of the
United States, insofar as negotiations are concerned as, in
some ways, reminiscent of the moralist self-ostracism that the
United States practiced in the early 1950s toward Communist
China. But, for the sake of time, I'll not read that passage.
Let me end this introductory remark before advocating some
policy by noting that practically no country in the world--no
country in the world--shares the Manichean delusions that the
administration so passionately articulates, and the result, sad
to say, is growing political isolation of, and pervasive
political--or popular antagonism toward the U.S. global
posture.
I think it is obvious, therefore, that the American
national interest calls for a significant change of direction.
There is, in fact, consensus in America in favor of a change, a
consensus that the war was a mistake. It is a fact that leading
Republicans have spoken up and expressed profound reservations
regarding the administration's policy. I can simply invoke here
the views of former President Gerald Ford, former Secretary of
State Baker, former National Security Advisor Scowcroft, and
several of your colleagues, Mr. Chairman, including Warner,
Hagel, Smith, among others. And hence, the urgent need today is
for a strategy that seeks to create a political framework for a
resolution of the problems posed both by the United States
occupation of Iraq and by the ensuing civil and sectarian
conflict. Ending the occupation and shaping a regional security
dialog should be the mutually reinforcing goals of such a
strategy, but both goals will take time to be accomplished and
require a genuinely serious U.S. commitment.
The quest to achieve these goals should involve four steps:
First, the United States should reaffirm explicitly and
unambiguously its determination to leave Iraq in a reasonably
short period of time. Let me comment. Ambiguity regarding the
duration of the occupation, in fact, encourages unwillingness
to compromise and intensifies the ongoing civil strife.
Moreover, such a public declaration is needed to allay fears in
the Middle East of a new and enduring American imperial
hegemony. Right or wrong, many view the establishment of such a
hegemony as the primary reason for the American intervention in
a region only recently free of colonial domination. That
perception should be discredited from the highest U.S. level.
Perhaps the U.S. Congress could do so by a joint resolution.
Second, the United States should announce that it is
undertaking talks with the Iraqi leaders to jointly set with
them a date by which U.S. military disengagement should be
completed, and the resulting setting of such a date should be
announced as a joint decision. In the meantime, the United
States should avoid military escalation.
Comment briefly. It is necessary to engage all Iraqi
leaders, including those who do not reside within the Green
Zone, in a serious discussion regarding the proposed and
jointly defined date for United States military disengagement,
because the very dialog itself will help to identify the
authentic Iraqi leaders with the self-confidence and capacity
to stand on their own legs without United States military
protection. Only Iraqi leaders who can exercise real power
beyond the Green Zone can eventually reach a genuine Iraqi
accommodation. The painful reality is that much of this current
Iraqi regime, characterized by the administration as
representative of the Iraqi people, defines itself largely by
its physical location, the 4-square-miles-large United States
fortress within Baghdad, protected by a wall, in places 15 feet
thick, manned by heavily armed United States military,
popularly known as the Green Zone.
Third, the United States should issue, jointly, with
appropriate Iraqi leaders, or perhaps let the Iraqi leaders
issue, an invitation to all neighbors of Iraq, and perhaps some
other Muslim countries, such as Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, and
Pakistan, to engage in a dialog regarding how best to enhance
stability in Iraq in conjunction with United States military
disengagement, and to participate eventually in a conference
regarding regional stability.
Brief comment. The United States and the Iraqi leadership
need to engage Iraq's neighbors in a serious discussion
regarding the region's security problems, but such discussions
cannot be undertaken while the United States is perceived as an
occupier for an indefinite duration. In fact, I would argue,
Mr. Chairman, that the setting of a date for departure would
trigger a much higher probability of an effective regional
dialog, because all of the countries in the region do not want
to see an escalating disintegration in the region as a whole.
Iran and Syria have no reason, however, to help the United
States consolidate a permanent regional hegemony. It is ironic,
however, that both Iran and Syria have lately called for a
regional dialog, exploiting thereby the self-defeating
character of the largely passive--and mainly sloganeering--
United States diplomacy. A serious regional dialog promoted
directly or indirectly by the United States could be buttressed
at some point by a wider circle of consultations involving
other powers with a stake in the region's stability, such as
the EU, China, Japan, India, and Russia. Members of this
committee might consider exploring informally, with the states
mentioned, their potential interest in such a wider dialog.
Fourth and finally, concurrently the United States should
activate a credible and energetic effort to finally reach an
Israeli-Palestinian peace, making it clear in the process as to
what the basic parameters of such a final accommodation ought
to involve.
Brief comment. The United States needs to convince the
region that the United States is committed both to Israel's
enduring security and to fairness for the Palestinians who have
waited for more than 40 years now for their own separate state.
Only an external and activist intervention can promote the
long-delayed settlement, for the record shows that the Israelis
and the Palestinians will never do so on their own. Without
such a settlement, both nationalist and fundamentalist passions
in the region will, in the longer run, doom any Arab regime
which is perceived as supportive of U.S. regional hegemony.
After World War II, the United States prevailed in the
defense of democracy in Europe because it successfully pursued
a long-term political strategy of uniting its friends and
dividing its enemies instead of dividing our friends and
uniting our enemies, of soberly deterring aggression without
initiating hostilities, all the while also exploring the
possibility of negotiating arrangements. Today, America's
global leadership is being tested in the Middle East. A
similarly wise strategy of genuinely constructive political
engagement is now urgently needed. It is time for the Congress
to assert itself.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Brzezinski follows:]
Prepared Statement of Zbigniew Brzezinski, Former National Security
Advisor; Counselor and Trustee, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, your hearings come at a critical juncture in the U.S.
war of choice in Iraq, and I commend you and Senator Lugar for
scheduling them.
It is time for the White House to come to terms with two central
realities:
1. The war in Iraq is a historic, strategic, and moral
calamity. Undertaken under false assumptions, it is undermining
America's global legitimacy. Its collateral civilian casualties
as well as some abuses are tarnishing America's moral
credentials. Driven by Manichean impulses and imperial hubris,
it is intensifying regional instability.
2. Only a political strategy that is historically relevant
rather than reminiscent of colonial tutelage can provide the
needed framework for a tolerable resolution of both the war in
Iraq and the intensifying regional tensions.
If the United States continues to be bogged down in a protracted
bloody involvement in Iraq, the final destination on this downhill
track is likely to be a head-on conflict with Iran and with much of the
world of Islam at large. A plausible scenario for a military collision
with Iran involves Iraqi failure to meet the benchmarks; followed by
accusations of Iranian responsibility for the failure; then by some
provocation in Iraq or a terrorist act in the United States blamed on
Iran; culminating in a ``defensive'' U.S. military action against Iran
that plunges a lonely America into a spreading and deepening quagmire
eventually ranging across Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
A mythical historical narrative to justify the case for such a
protracted and potentially expanding war is already being articulated.
Initially justified by false claims about WMD's in Iraq, the war is now
being redefined as the ``decisive ideological struggle'' of our time,
reminiscent of the earlier collisions with Nazism and Stalinism. In
that context, Islamist extremism and al-Qaeda are presented as the
equivalents of the threat posed by Nazi Germany and then Soviet Russia,
and
9/11 as the equivalent of the Pearl Harbor attack which precipitated
America's involvement in World War II.
This simplistic and demagogic narrative overlooks the fact that
Nazism was based on the military power of the industrially most
advanced European state; and that Stalinism was able to mobilize not
only the resources of the victorious and militarily powerful Soviet
Union but also had worldwide appeal through its Marxist doctrine. In
contrast, most Muslims are not embracing Islamic fundamentalism; al-
Qaeda is an isolated fundamentalist Islamist aberration; most Iraqis
are engaged in strife because the American occupation of Iraq destroyed
the Iraqi State; while Iran--though gaining in regional influence--is
itself politically divided, economically and militarily weak. To argue
that America is already at war in the region with a wider Islamic
threat, of which Iran is the epicenter, is to promote a self-fulfilling
prophecy.
Deplorably, the administration's foreign policy in the Middle East
region has lately relied almost entirely on such sloganeering. Vague
and inflammatory talk about ``a new strategic context'' which is based
on ``clarity'' and which prompts ``the birth pangs of a new Middle
East'' is breeding intensifying anti-Americanism and is increasing the
danger of a long-term collision between the United States and the
Islamic world. Those in charge of U.S. diplomacy have also adopted a
posture of moralistic self-ostracism toward Iran strongly reminiscent
of John Foster Dulles's attitude of the early 1950s toward Chinese
Communist leaders (resulting among other things in the well-known
episode of the refused handshake). It took some two decades and a half
before another Republican President was finally able to undo that
legacy.
One should note here also that practically no country in the world
shares the Manichean delusions that the administration so passionately
articulates. The result is growing political isolation of, and
pervasive popular antagonism toward the U.S. global posture.
It is obvious by now that the American national interest calls for
a significant change of direction. There is, in fact, a dominant
consensus in favor of a change: American public opinion now holds that
the war was a mistake; that it should not be escalated, that a regional
political process should be explored; and that an Israeli-Palestinian
accommodation is an essential element of the needed policy alteration
and should be actively pursued. It is noteworthy that profound
reservations regarding the administration's policy have been voiced by
a number of leading Republicans. One need only invoke here the
expressed views of the much admired President Gerald Ford, former
Secretary of State James Baker, former National Security Advisor Brent
Scowcroft, and several leading Republican Senators, John Warner, Chuck
Hagel, and Gordon Smith among others.
The urgent need today is for a strategy that seeks to create a
political framework for a resolution of the problems posed both by the
U.S. occupation of Iraq and by the ensuing civil and sectarian
conflict. Ending the occupation and shaping a regional security dialog
should be the mutually reinforcing goals of such a strategy, but both
goals will take time and require a genuinely serious U.S. commitment.
The quest for a political solution for the growing chaos in Iraq
should involve four steps:
1. The United States should reaffirm explicitly and unambiguously
its determination to leave Iraq in a reasonably short period of time.
Ambiguity regarding the duration of the occupation in fact
encourages unwillingness to compromise and intensifies the on-going
civil strife. Moreover, such a public declaration is needed to allay
fears in the Middle East of a new and enduring American imperial
hegemony. Right or wrong, many view the establishment of such a
hegemony as the primary reason for the American intervention in a
region only recently free of colonial domination. That perception
should be discredited from the highest U.S. level. Perhaps the U.S.
Congress could do so by a joint resolution.
2. The United States should announce that it is undertaking talks
with the Iraqi leaders to jointly set with them a date by which U.S.
military disengagement should be completed, and the resulting setting
of such a date should be announced as a joint decision. In the
meantime, the United States should avoid military escalation.
It is necessary to engage all Iraqi leaders--including those who do
not reside within ``the Green Zone''--in a serious discussion regarding
the proposed and jointly defined date for U.S. military disengagement
because the very dialog itself will help identify the authentic Iraqi
leaders with the self-confidence and capacity to stand on their own
legs without U.S. military protection. Only Iraqi leaders who can
exercise real power beyond ``the Green Zone'' can eventually reach a
genuine Iraqi accommodation. The painful reality is that much of the
current Iraqi regime, characterized by the Bush administration as
``representative of the Iraqi people,'' defines itself largely by its
physical location: The 4-square-miles-large U.S. fortress within
Baghdad, protected by a wall in places 15 feet thick, manned by heavily
armed U.S. military, popularly known as ``the Green Zone.''
3. The United States should issue jointly with appropriate Iraqi
leaders, or perhaps let the Iraqi leaders issue, an invitation to all
neighbors of Iraq (and perhaps some other Muslim countries such as
Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, and Pakistan) to engage in a dialog regarding
how best to enhance stability in Iraq in conjunction with U.S. military
disengagement and to participate eventually in a conference regarding
regional stability.
The United States and the Iraqi leadership need to engage Iraq's
neighbors in serious discussion regarding the region's security
problems, but such discussions cannot be undertaken while the United
States is perceived as an occupier for an indefinite duration. Iran and
Syria have no reason to help the United States consolidate a permanent
regional hegemony. It is ironic, however, that both Iran and Syria have
lately called for a regional dialog, exploiting, thereby, the self-
defeating character of the largely passive--and mainly sloganeering--
U.S. diplomacy.
A serious regional dialog, promoted directly or indirectly by the
United States, could be buttressed at some point by a wider circle of
consultations involving other powers with a stake in the region's
stability, such as the EU, China, Japan, India, and Russia. Members of
this committee might consider exploring, informally with the states
mentioned, their potential interest in such a wider dialog.
4. Concurrently, the United States should activate a credible and
energetic effort to finally reach an Israeli-Palestinian peace, making
it clear in the process as to what the basic parameters of such a final
accommodation ought to involve.
The United States needs to convince the region that the United
States is committed both to Israel's enduring security and to fairness
for the Palestinians who have waited for more than 40 years now for
their own separate state. Only an external and activist intervention
can promote the long-delayed settlement for the record shows that the
Israelis and the Palestinians will never do so on their own. Without
such a settlement, both nationalist and fundamentalist passions in the
region will, in the longer run, doom any Arab regime which is perceived
as supportive of U.S. regional hegemony.
After World War II, the United States prevailed in the defense of
democracy in Europe because it successfully pursued a long-term
political strategy of uniting its friends and dividing its enemies, of
soberly deterring aggression without initiating hostilities, all the
while also exploring the possibility of negotiated arrangements. Today,
America's global leadership is being tested in the Middle East. A
similarly wise strategy of genuinely constructive political engagement
is now urgently needed.
It is also time for the Congress to assert itself.
The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you very much----
Dr. Brzezinski. And welcome, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I read, as I commended your testimony, this
morning, to my colleague, who was about to read it, and has
read it. I apologize for being absent for a moment. I had to be
on the floor.
As usual, you are direct, cogent, and insightful. I
appreciate your availability to the committee and, also, your
availability to a number of us individually to seek your
advice.
We just heard from a man we all regard well, one of your
successors, who cautioned that if we were to ``leave,'' Iraq,
there would be these dire consequences. I read, with incredible
interest, your paragraph on page one of your testimony, saying,
``If the United States continues to be bogged down in a
protracted, bloody involvement in Iraq, the final destination
on this downhill track is likely to be a head-on conflict with
Iran and much of the world of Islam at large.''
Now, the argument the President is making is: The conflict
with Islam intensifies if we withdraw. You're making the
argument that continuing to be bogged down here is more likely
to result in that outcome. Could you expand on that for me?
Dr. Brzezinski. Conflict, by its very nature, is not self-
containable. It either diminishes, because one side has
prevailed or because there is an accommodation, or it
escalates. If we could prevail militarily and in a decisive
fashion, even though I oppose the war, there would be a strong
case to be made for it. But I think we know by now that to
prevail we would need to have 500,000 troops in Iraq, wage the
war with unlimited brutality, and altogether crush that
society, because it would intensify, probably, its resistance.
So, that's a no-starter.
Escalating the war as a consequence of protracting it, is
hardly an attractive option for the United States, because,
before too long, as I say in my statement, we could be facing a
20-year-long involvement, not only in Iraq, but Iran,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan. And think how precarious Pakistan
is, and how uncertain the situation in Afghanistan is becoming.
So, it's in our interest to isolate the conflicts and to
terminate them. And we have to exploit, at least try to
exploit, the political possibility, the political option.
Now, in the end, I cannot dogmatically argue that it is
certain to succeed. But if we don't try, we know we'll never
have had the chance.
The Chairman. You seem to be arguing that if we stay on the
particular course we're on now, it will not succeed. You're
confident the present course will not succeed?
Dr. Brzezinski. Well, I think every indicator over the last
3 or so years indicates that. The situation is worsening.
Hostility toward the United States is intensifying. Our
isolation worldwide is both being perpetuated in some respects,
becoming more culturally grounded. Look at the public opinion
polls.
I think we have to take a hard look at what the options
are. Now, I realize there are risks in a strategy in which the
goal is to find an alternative outcome than a military victory.
But, at the same time, we shouldn't become prisoners of
apocalyptic and horrific scenarios, in some respects
reminiscent of those which were described and drawn in the
latter phases of the Vietnamese war, and which did not take
place. I'm not sure that if we were to disengage from Iraq,
that the consequence is this kind of horrific set of dominoes
falling all over the Middle East. Moreover--and please notice
carefully, in my statement I'm not saying we should
unilaterally disengage.
The Chairman. I understand that.
Dr. Brzezinski. I'm saying we should work with the Iraqis
on setting a date, and use that as a trigger for an
international conference of Iraq's neighbors. Because I don't
believe, if you look carefully at the interests of Saudi Arabia
or Jordan or Syria or Iran, that they have a stake, an
interest, in making the explosion get out of hand. They're----
The Chairman. Well, quite frankly----
Dr. Brzezinski [continuing]. Vulnerable regimes.
The Chairman. Unless I'm missing something, that was pretty
much the consensus of most of the witnesses we've had in the
last 4 weeks, and that is, they have an interest in it not
exploding.
You echo the comments made yesterday and the day before and
throughout this hearing process about Iran when you say Iran
is, ``politically divided and economically and militarily
weak.'' Now, the question is: If that is true--and I think we
overlook how politically divided it is and overlook how
economically weak it is. We seem to be building it up to be,
you know, 20 feet tall, and that this is the new superpower in
the region. Matter of fact, some have used that phrase. Give me
your assessment of the present threat that Iran poses in the
region and what you think a continued protracted American
presence in Iraq will do to impact whether they grow weaker,
stronger, et cetera.
Dr. Brzezinski. I think some form of American presence in
Iraq is going to be a fact, assuming even a political
settlement. But it will not be the same as a military
occupation and a political hegemony imposed by a militarily
successful campaign. I think that kind of presence, Iran has no
choice but----
The Chairman. Do you think that was the objective of this
administration, initially?
Dr. Brzezinski. I have no idea what its initial objective
was, because the motives it provided for the action proved to
be entirely erroneous. And if they were the real motives, then
the whole campaign was based on false assumptions.
The Chairman. It's unfair to ask you to be a soothsayer,
I----
Dr. Brzezinski. Yeah.
The Chairman [continuing]. Apologize.
Dr. Brzezinski. Now, if there were hidden motives--I can
imagine, potentially, several. One would be to gain American
domination over the region's oil, to put it very
simplistically. Another, it could be to help maximize Israel's
security by removing a powerful Arab State. Another one could
have been to simply get rid of an obnoxious regime with which
the United States had accounts to settle, going back to 1991
and the alleged assassination attempt against President Bush
senior. There could be a variety of motives. But the official
motives were WMDs.
The Chairman. Can you expand slightly on the notion--
because I interrupted you--that Iran is politically divided,
economically and militarily weak?
Dr. Brzezinski. It is economically weak, because it is an
economy that hasn't been thriving and it's one-dimensional, and
it's relatively isolated. It's politically divided, in the
sense that, in my judgment, the mullahs are Iran's past, and
not its future, and that its fundamentalist regime is not very
popular with the masses, and particularly with the younger
generation, much of which is very pro-American. But, sadly, it
is also more united, nationalistically, in part because of our
attitude toward Iran, which has been extremely hostile and
which has gelled together a kind of residual national
sentiment, particularly in support of the nuclear program. And
I think our policy has unintentionally--I hope,
unintentionally--maybe it was devilishly clever--but I think
unintentionally helped Ahmadinejad consolidate himself in power
and exercise a degree of influence, which actually his position
doesn't justify. You know, most Americans, when they say
``President Ahmadinejad,'' they think he is the equivalent of
President Bush. He's not. He's roughly a third-level official
who doesn't even control the military resources of the country.
The Chairman. That's an important point to make. I think
the vast majority of Americans would think he controls the----
Dr. Brzezinski. Yeah.
The Chairman [continuing]. Security apparatus.
Dr. Brzezinski. And he doesn't.
The Chairman. Well, I thank you very much.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Brzezinski, just to follow through on that questioning
of the chairman, you've called for U.S. military disengagement
on a schedule to be jointly set with the Iraq leadership. Now,
as I just heard you speaking, could this mean that in these
talks with the Iraqi leaders, they decide that there should be
some United States military presence in Iraq for an indefinite
future. Would that be a contingency of these talks? But what
I'm wondering is, as we engage in the talks with the Iraqi
leadership, if it would not come, at least into their minds,
that they do not want the United States to depart altogether
from Iraq, nor, in fact, if we were to get into the second part
of your thought, and that is, having entered into these talks,
or even begun to discuss a date or a timeframe, the other
countries might very well come to a conclusion that an American
presence in Iraq of some sort, of some quantity, was a very
important issue for them. Are these potential consequences of
these talks that you've prescribed?
Dr. Brzezinski. Absolutely. I have drafted the statement
very carefully to take into account the existing situation. I
have felt, some time ago, that we should have indicated a
deadline for our departure, and, roughly a year or more ago, I
said we should aim at a year. But I'm also aware of the fact
that, during the intervening period of time, the situation has
deteriorated and the consequences of our departure are probably
going to be more difficult than had we done it a year or a year
and a half ago. And time is not working in our favor.
Nonetheless, having said this, I would personally use these
discussions with the Iraq leaders--not only the ones in the
Green Zone, I emphasize--to identify those Iraqi leaders who
have the sense of confidence to stand on their own feet, and
then set with them a date. I would still advocate roughly a
year. But I would certainly consider favorably any Iraqi desire
for residual American presence. And I can envisage it occurring
in a variety of ways. For example, the Kurdish leaders might
say that they would welcome some residual American presence,
because they are understandably fearful that either the
Iranians or the Turks could use our departure as an excuse for
dealing with what they view as a Kurdish irridenta directed
against them. I can envisage some situation in which we will
want to retain a military presence, perhaps, in Kuwait; and,
thereby, in the immediate proximity. Theoretically, one could
envisage some residual American presence in some remote base in
Iraq, if that was the wish of the Iraqi leaders. And I think
these are the kinds of things we can discuss with them with a
deadline in mind, and then negotiate a mutually satisfactory
deadline. And then, that deadline, I think, would make it
easier to trigger a serious negotiating process with all of the
neighbors regarding stability in Iraq and their stake in that
stability.
Senator Lugar. Well, that very nuanced and thoughtful
suggestion, I think, is important to make a part of the record,
because, frequently in these debates, Senators or the general
public end up with the idea of everybody in, everybody out.
There aren't too many nuances in this, sort of a rush--the
image of the evacuation of the Vietnam Embassy is given as
symbol--the photo of the helicopter lifting the last persons
out. Now, this is obviously not what we're talking about here,
particularly in the context of Afghanistan, nearby, in which
the counsel right now of our NATO allies, quite apart from our
situation, is that probably we should do more. Now, that comes,
then, into some conflict with our military's ability to stretch
to do a number of things at the same time, but--
Now, let me just ask--furthermore, you say, things may have
deteriorated. Indeed, Secretary Rice has made the rounds.
That's certainly what she seems to have found from some of the
parties. So, this would lead those countries that have Sunni
affinity to hope, at least for the time being, that the United
States was not in a rush for the borders. And that sort of
conference that you're suggesting, of the neighbors, which I
think is an excellent idea, would bring together all of these
parties that we're dealing with bilaterally, but increasingly
appear to have some common themes, which includes a U.S.
presence of some sort as a stabilizing factor.
I laboriously want to trace through what I think are
excellent suggestions to make sure that the nuances of this are
understood by Senators, and by the public that may take
seriously your testimony, as we do.
Now, I want to ask, finally--given the fact that the amount
of government anywhere in Iraq is, in some cases almost de
minimis at this point--one of the effects of our invasion and
military operations, as we've seen, was not only the army
disintegrated, so did the police force, so did what some Iraqis
have said, almost any coercive ability to bring about order.
The period of rebuilding is likely to be very long, and it's
not really clear who helps do this rebuilding, aside from us.
And I--I'm troubled by that, because we've had testimony from
Iraqis that the problem is not just insurgents and militia and
sectarian violence--just common criminals, thousands of them,
preying upon Iraqis who do not have much protection, wherever
they may be in the country. We have some responsibility for
that, and, at the same time, it's not really clear how you
fulfill a rebuilding of Iraq, at least in that comprehensive
sense. That--and I hope maybe that might be a part of this
leadership parley between the Iraqi leaders and ourselves.
Maybe the United States doesn't do all of the nation-building,
but, very clearly, someone will have to try to help restore
some fabric in the provinces, in addition to the Baghdad
situation that we've visited about.
Dr. Brzezinski. I very much agree with what you say,
Senator Lugar. Let me just add one preliminary point and then
address specifically the points you have just raised.
My horror scenario is not a repetition of Saigon, the
helicopters on top of the Embassy, and the flight out of the
country. My horror scenario is that by not having a plan--and I
understand that my friend, yesterday, discussed perhaps the
possibility of a secret plan that the administration has--what
I fear is that the secret plan is that there is no secret plan.
My horror----
The Chairman. That's a good bet.
Dr. Brzezinski [continuing]. Scenario is that we'll simply
stay put, this will continue, and then the dynamic of the
conflict will produce an escalating situation in which Iraqi
failure to meet the benchmarks will be blamed on the Iranians.
There will be, then, some clashes, collisions, and the war
expands.
Now, as far as dealing with the rebuilding of Iraq in a
setting in which we commit ourselves to disengage, and the
commitment to engage, set jointly, becomes a trigger for an
international conference, I think a great deal depends not on
us engaging in nation-building, but on the surfacing of a
genuine Iraqi motivation. I personally view with great
skepticism all this talk about us creating an Iraqi national
army, creating a nation, building--nation-building, and so
forth. The problem is, we have smashed this state. We have
given an enormous opportunity for narrow sectarian interests
and passions to rise. What is needed, again, is a sense of
Iraqi nationalism. And that residualist still exists. But to
make it possible, it has to be led by Iraqi leaders who are
viewed by their country as authentic. And I'm sorry to say, but
the leadership, sitting in an American fortress, which doesn't
venture outside is not very authentic. The authentic leaders
are those who have their own bodyguards--indeed, their own
militias--and their own capacity to assert their power. They
have to be engaged in a dialog, and then in the solution, a
political solution. And that's what we very badly need.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Brzezinski, thank you for your testimony.
Let me ask you--we've had other witnesses here who have
said that, in their opinion, that the biggest winner from our
engagement in Iraq, as a result of our policies there, to date,
at least--has been Iran. Would you agree with that?
Dr. Brzezinski. Yes. I wouldn't use the word ``winner,''
but I would say geopolitical beneficiary. Yes; they have
benefited a great deal.
Senator Menendez. You started off your statement today
saying that, ``If the United States continues to be bogged down
in a protracted, bloody involvement in Iraq, the final
destination on this downhill track is likely to be a head-on
conflict with Iran and with much of the world of Islam at
large.'' That's a pretty dire assessment. Could you take us
through what you see happening if we don't change the course of
events?
Dr. Brzezinski. Well, I have alluded to it, but you cannot
be precise, because the future is always so full of
contingencies that, simply, there is no way of picking out
which ones you think really will happen. But, basically,
escalation, accusations, some incidents--there have already
been some incidents between us and the Iranians--there are some
allegations that the Iranians are responsible for certain acts;
allegations, but not facts--and that would spark, simply, a
collision. It could even be, in some fashion, provoked.
Let me draw your attention to something that your staff
should give you and, I think, that might be of interest to some
other members of this committee, and that's a report in the New
York Times, dated March 27, 2006. It's a long report on a
private meeting between the President and Prime Minister Blair
2 months before the war, based on a memorandum of conversation
prepared by the British official present at this meeting. And
in it, according to this account, the President is cited as
saying that he's concerned that there may not be weapons of
mass destruction found in Iraq, and that there must be some
consideration given to finding a different basis for
undertaking the military action. And I'll just read you what
this memo allegedly says, according to the New York Times.
The memo states, that, ``The President and Prime Minister
acknowledged that no unconditioned--no unconventional weapons
had been found inside Iraq.'' This is 2 months before the war.
``Faced with the possibility of not finding any before the
planned invasion, Mr. Bush talked about several ways to provoke
a confrontation.'' And he described, then, several ways in
which this could be done. And I won't go into that. I don't
know how accurate these ways were. They're quite sensational,
at least one of them. And if one is of the view that one is
dealing with an implacable enemy that has to be removed, that
course of action may, under certain circumstances, be
appealing. I am afraid that the situation in Iraq continues
deteriorating. And if Iran is perceived as, in some fashion,
involved or responsible, or the potential beneficiary thereof,
that temptation could arise.
Senator Menendez. If the Iranians are training Shiite
militias, as I think there's a general perception that they
are--isn't the administration also, despite all of its recent
statements about how it's going to deal with Iranian personnel
in Iraq and the carrier group that went into the gulf--isn't it
equally as important to tell Prime Minister Maliki that he has
to be as forceful in demanding that Maliki cut ties to these
groups, and clear about the consequences if he refuses? Isn't
that equally as important as the messages we're sending to the
Iranians?
Dr. Brzezinski. The problem here is that we have destroyed
the Iraqi State. The Iraqi so-called national army is composed
of people with very strong sectarian loyalties, and that the
militias that exist are, in some respect, the real expressions
of existing residual political power in Iraq. If Maliki
undertakes an assault on some of these militias--and some are
said to be well armed and as large as 60,000 men--he's going to
be further isolated and further weakened. So, in a sense, he's
being asked to undertake an impossible assignment. A political
settlement has to aim at drawing in those elements in the Iraqi
political spectrum, which is now very volatile and very
confused, that have a long-term interest in the existence of an
Iraqi State.
Senator Menendez. Well, let me ask you, then, on that
point. If the people we need to be engaged with are the people
who are beyond the Green Zone and have power by virtue of the
militias and the political backing of elements of Iraqi
society, what is the catalyst that gets them to the table to
move them in the direction to achieve the goal, if it's
possible--if it's possible--of a government of national unity?
That's the first question.
And the second question, in the remaining time that I have,
is, it seems to me that with Iraq's neighbors, while they
should have a stake, it has not gotten to a point sufficiently
bad to catalyze a change in the behavior of Iraq's neighbors.
They haven't seemed to be incentivized as long as they believe
that we will shed our blood and our national treasure. They
are, I believe, reticent to do anything. We have not led a real
effort to get them engaged in any significant way. It seems to
me that sometimes, and there are other witnesses here who have
said that, things have to get worse before they, in fact, can
cross the threshold of understanding what their interests are.
So, I'd like your perceptions on those two things. What is
it that catalyzes these groups that you suggest are the
essential elements to try to achieve some success in a
political context? And how do we get these other countries
engaged, who--we believe have a stake, and they probably think
they have a stake, but don't believe that it's time for them to
pull the trigger yet?
Dr. Brzezinski. Well, actually, my answer is the same to
both questions. Namely, the realization that the United States
is not there indefinitely, and that, within a reasonable period
of time, with a jointly set date, the United States will
disengage. That will have the effect of forcing, first of all,
the various Iraqi parties to think of the consequences of
American departure. Right now, in a curious way, the
occupation, even though resented by most Iraqis, is an umbrella
for internal intransigence. Nobody really feels any incentive
to compromise, because ultimately they know the situation is
being kept more or less afloat by our occupation, though most
Iraqis dislike it.
And, as far as the neighbors are concerned, they don't fear
any real explosion in Iraq, because we're there. And hence,
they may have different interests--the Saudis certainly have
different interests than the Iranians--but they know that there
is a kind of enduring volatile status quo, at our expense, but
which doesn't confront them with any real choices. But if we
were to set, jointly--and I keep emphasizing ``jointly''--the
date with Iraqis for our departure, it would have the effect of
forcing all of the governments around Iraq to ask themselves,
How do we deal with the problem of stability in Iraq? Do we
really want to have a regional war among ourselves? The Saudis
and the Jordanians, theoretically against the Iranians, and the
Syrians in between, is that really appealing to anybody in the
region? Most of the regimes in the region know that that kind
of a war could spread and destroy them. And hence, we are far
more likely to mobilize some degree of responsible interest in
an accommodation that reinforces Iraqi stability if we do what
I am advocating, a conjunction of the two actions, one
triggering the other.
And I deliberately included in my suggestions countries
like Pakistan, Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, because they may have
some military resources that could be available for helping an
Iraqi Government stabilize and police internal arrangements and
develop a national army, a national army that's not developed
by an occupier that's alien--namely, us--but by fellow Muslims.
They may be willing to do that. And I would like to see other
countries involved, countries that have a stake in that
region's stability because of their dependence on energy, and
they could be helpful particularly in a massive international
recovery program for Iraq, which would be triggered by those
two steps that I've advocated.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Doctor, thank you for your testimony and for
your great public service to the Nation, continuing to this
very moment, because I believe what you're doing here is very
important to helping the Congress play the role it must play
when it comes to Iraq and our national security generally.
I want to try to ask some very brief questions, and try to
get at least three, but I want you to take your time in
answering them as thoroughly as you think they warrant.
You made one assertion, during your testimony, about troop
levels, saying that any kind of success in Iraq means, by
definition, an American commitment of 500,000 troops. I wanted
to have you expound on that, or just indicate that that's--is
that--that's an accurate assessment of what you've testified
to, the--that number?
Dr. Brzezinski. Oh, you want me to answer each----
Senator Casey. Yes.
Dr. Brzezinski. Fine. Look, that figure is illustrative of
a larger proposition; namely, to win this kind of a war, you
have to have an overwhelming force. I'm not going to fight to
the death for 500. It could be 550, it could be 480, or it
could be 600. My point is, we're no longer trying to crush a
regime with a traditional army in the field, often led by
corrupt officers without much loyalty in the rank and file to
the cause on the other side. We're fighting, increasingly, the
kind of chaotic, amorphous, sectarian, ethnic, religious
resistance that's more pervasive. And we're discovering the
same thing that the Russians discovered in Afghanistan, that
the Israelis recently discovered in Lebanon, that that kind of
a popular war requires a far higher commitment of resources on
the part of the external power that has come in, in order to
win. And, therefore, our military effort would simply have to
be immeasurably greater. And that's the purpose of the 500,000.
Senator Casey. Certainly greater than what we have there
now, even----
Dr. Brzezinski. Considerably----
Senator Casey [continuing]. With----
Dr. Brzezinski [continuing]. Greater.
Senator Casey. Right.
Dr. Brzezinski. Not 21,500 greater.
Senator Casey. I'd ask you to evaluate, or critique, in any
way that you think is appropriate, two basic assertions, among
many, but two basic assertions by President Bush and his
administration that we hear over and over and over again. One,
the most recent assertion, that any kind of engagement with
Iran and Syria would be, ``extortion.'' Secretary Rice said
that in her testimony. We've heard that. That's No. 1. And not
in any order, necessarily. No. 2, the assertion, ongoing now
for several years, that the war in Iraq is the central front on
the--with regard to the war on terror, or the most important
front with regard to the war on terror. I guess both of those
assertions, if you can respond to both of them.
Dr. Brzezinski. Well, engagement equals extortion, that's a
very curious way of defining diplomacy. In other words,
diplomacy only makes sense if the other side, in advance,
concedes our desires and indicates its willingness to accept
them.
The Chairman. I think you got it right. I think you've
defined it.
Dr. Brzezinski. Diplomacy that way is very one-sided and
unlikely to be seriously practiced. So, this is what I meant,
that we are sloganeering rather than strategizing in our
democracy.
We negotiated with the Soviets at a time when they could
have destroyed us almost instantly. The threat we face here is
not even remotely comparable. I was responsible, for 4 years,
for actually informing the President of a nuclear attack on the
United States. I had 4 minutes in which to present the basic
facts to the President. Excuse me, I had 3 minutes to present
the basic facts to the President. The President had 4 minutes
in which to make a decision as to how to respond. Twenty-eight
minutes later, there would be nuclear exchange. Six hours
later, 150 people--150 million people might have been dead.
That is the kind of threat we faced, and yet we negotiated. In
fact, negotiations were very important in marginally
stabilizing that relationship.
We should negotiate with Iran. It won't be easy. We have
conflicting interests. There are conflicts outside of the
region that we have with Iran, like the nuclear problem. But
certainly, attempting a diplomacy is essential. And freezing
oneself in ostracism is reminiscent, as I said in my testimony,
of the position maintained by John Foster Dulles toward China
in the early fifties.
On the second point, the central front--well, if it is the
central front, it certainly is self-created, because the ``war
on terror,'' started 2 years earlier, or a year and a half
earlier. And we had the problem with terror. I would never call
it a ``war,'' anyway. But we have had, and continue to have, a
serious problem with the threat of terrorism. But the war in
Iraq has, to me, the most elusive connection with the war on
terror. The Iraqi regime, abhorrent though it was, was not
engaged in terrorist activity against us. And I do not see the
argument that, if we were not to continue the military campaign
in Iraq, somehow or other, those who are opposing us in
Fallujah or in Ramadi or in Najaf will swim across the Atlantic
and engage in terrorist acts in the United States. It just
strains credulity to hear arguments like that.
Senator Casey. One final question. I only have a minute
left. And I asked General Scowcroft this question this morning.
It's been asserted by some--and I heard it from one individual
for whom I have a lot of respect--that any military strike by
the United States on Iran would obviously have a lot of
ramifications, but one direct and immediate and unmistakable
consequence of that would be the slaughter of American GIs
currently in Iraq, probably mostly in Baghdad, almost like a--
President Kennedy, years ago, talked about a nuclear sort of
Damocles, in a--in the context of Iran and Iraq, a sort of
Damocles over the head of American GIs that would be an
immediate consequence.
I just want to get your assessment of that, quickly, in the
context of highly likely or unlikely, and then whatever you can
do to amplify that.
Dr. Brzezinski. I would say, speculatively--I'm not certain
of my answer, but I would say, instinctively, it's not very
likely.
Senator Casey. Not very likely.
Dr. Brzezinski. Not very likely. I think the resistance
against us in Iraq is largely indigenous, and, more or less, it
expresses itself in terms of its current capability. In other
words, there is no sort of hidden residual capability that
could suddenly be unleashed because Iran has been attacked.
The fact is, you know, that most Iraqi Shiites fought
pretty well against Iran during the 8-year-long war. It's a
kind of simplistic generalization that many people employ, to
the effect that the Shiites in Iraq are, somehow or other,
beholden entirely to Iran. There are affinities and
connections, undeniably, but there is an Iraqi identity, and
the Shiites fought very well against the Iranians.
The Iranians can do a lot of other things if we attack
Iran, but that one, I think, is unlikely.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Doctor.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The Senator from Florida, Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Good morning----
Dr. Brzezinski. Good morning.
Senator Bill Nelson [continuing]. Dr. Brzezinski.
Dr. Brzezinski. Hi.
Senator Bill Nelson. In your statement, I am drawn to the
paragraph about calling for an international conference
regarding regional stability. And I quote you, ``a serious
regional dialog promoted, directly or indirectly, by the United
States could be buttressed at some point by a wider circle of
consultations.'' I certainly agree with you. Would you expand
on that?
Dr. Brzezinski. Yes, Senator. It seems to me that--and I'm,
to some extent, repeating myself--that we have not yet tapped,
in a constructive fashion, the underlying interest of the
states adjoining Iraq, and we haven't tapped sufficiently their
underlying fear regarding their future by engaging them in a
process in which they're only likely to be engaged if they
think the American occupation is coming to an end; namely,
Syria's discussions, among themselves, but also with the Iraqi
authorities, whoever they are, and with us, about how regional
stability ought to be preserved and how regional stability
within Iraq ought to be consolidated. And we can't do that
until and unless we, one, create the preconditions for it by
the decision to leave, and, two, by engaging them in an effort
which involves discussions.
Now, you don't go to a conference simply out from the cold,
all of a sudden. You engage in previous discussions. That's
what we hire a Secretary of State for, not to sit there and
proclaim categorical statements, but to engage in the process.
And the process itself, over time, can generate some degree of
responsiveness, it can identify irreconcilable issues, as well
as issues in which there is some shared stake. That is the
purpose of diplomacy. Diplomacy isn't the answer to everything,
but it is an important component of resolving issues and
avoiding conflict.
Senator Bill Nelson. And those who say that we should not
talk to, for example, Syria are ignoring the fact that, in the
past when we talked to Syria, there was some consultation and
progress with regard to the closing of the border, cooperation,
albeit sporadic, that precipitously cut off after the
assassination of Rafik Hariri. As you have pointed out,
circumstances change, and, for the first time, Syria and Iraq
have now opened diplomatic relations with each other.
And thank you for your comments.
And, Mr. Chairman, I know we're getting close to a vote, so
I will stop so that one of our other Senators can go ahead.
Senator Lugar [presiding]. The Chair recognizes Senator
Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you--procedural note, do I call you
``Mr. Chairman,'' Senator?
The Chairman. Why not?
Senator Webb. Is it ``Mr. Ranking Member''?
Senator Bill Nelson. Why not? [Laughter.]
Senator Webb. Dr. Brzezinski, I certainly appreciate being
able to hear your views. And, you know, I've read your articles
over the years, and agree with a great bit of it, and
appreciate having your wisdom at the table.
I will--also in light of the fact there's going to be a
vote, I want to ask you two fairly specific questions, one of
which is--we've been trying to sort out options, you know, if
the administration were to take those options, or if the
Government were, regarding how to get to this, you know,
diplomatic conference or the forum where we can, sort of, start
resolving this--issues and increase the stability of the region
while we pull out our troops. And from the way that you have
constructed your testimony, it--and from what you just said--
you're basically saying that we should first announce that
there will be a substantial withdrawal, and then arrange for a
conference to be called. Is that correct? Or is it--you're
saying this should happen concurrently or----
Dr. Brzezinski. No, no; let me just clarify what we should
say, or what we should do. But first let me remind you, I'm
your constituent. [Laughter.]
And it's good to see you here.
Senator Webb. You have been the deciding vote. [Laughter.]
Dr. Brzezinski. No; it's----
Senator Webb. I'm--well, I'm assuming----
Dr. Brzezinski. Probably was. [Laughter.]
What we should make clear is that there's a finite date to
our presence, set jointly with the Iraqis. And that finite date
should not be too far removed. And use that at the same time as
a trigger for convening this regional event, this regional
undertaking, because, as long as there is uncertainty about the
duration of our stay, I don't think the adjoining states are
likely to be engaged in helping us create regional stability,
even though they are fearful of regional instability. So, these
two things are interrelated, and that is why it is a strategic
package, what I'm arguing for.
Senator Webb. Thank you.
The second question is: I'm wondering if you see any
circumstances under which this administration would open up
some sort of serious dialog with Iran and Syria? And, if so,
what they would be. I--to me, that's just the ultimate sticking
point in the strategy that they--the so-called strategy that
they have just announced.
Dr. Brzezinski. Well, I think, unfortunately, the
administration has used rhetoric terminology regarding Iran
that has played into the hands of people like Ahmadinejad,
thereby creating, in a sense, a process in which a dialog--a
serious responsible dialog, not only regarding Iraq, but
regarding nuclear weapons, the nuclear program--has become more
difficult. That has to be reversed. I have no way of knowing
whether the administration is prepared to undertake that
reversal. I am perplexed by the fact that major strategic
decisions seem to be made within a very narrow circle of
individuals, just a few, probably a handful, perhaps not more
than the fingers in one hand. And these are the individuals,
all of whom but one, made the original decision to go to war
and used the original justifications for going to war. So,
they, unavoidably, are in a situation in which they are
reluctant to undertake actions which would imply a significant
reversal of policy. That's, from a human point of view,
understandable, but, from a political point of view, troubling.
Senator Webb. And it--and, from our--well, at least from
the perspective, I think, of the people who are concerned about
where we are, it is the conundrum that we face hearing the
preponderance of testimony from people like yourselves, reading
the Iraq Study Group reports where the recommendations are
concurrent, that there should be some sort of military--
continuation of military action to try to assist the present
government, but, at the same time, that there should be
diplomatic action. And the overwhelming recommendation is that
this include opening up dialog with Syria and Iran. And yet, if
this administration refuses, or consciously avoids that step,
then what you have, in the Baker-Hamilton report is a complete
stoppage of half of what the recommendations consist of. And
Chairman Hamilton mentioned, the other day when I asked him,
that this step forward, this procedural step forward, should,
arguably, come from the President and the Secretary of State,
and I don't think we're likely to see it. Would you comment?
Dr. Brzezinski. I think you're right in your last comment.
And, in a sense, that constitutes a kind of constitutional
stalemate, which can only be broken, in my judgment, given the
circumstances and given the stakes involved, by congressional
leadership--and, hopefully, bipartisan congressional
leadership--because at stake, truly, is the future of this
country and its role in the world. And if we get bogged down
into something very messy and expanding, American global
leadership will be in the gravest of jeopardy. It already is
largely delegitimated worldwide.
So, congressional leadership here is important, and that
joint leadership can only emerge, particularly the President's
own party, if the leadership of the President's party, out of
patriotic concerns, becomes convinced, itself, that the
President has to be faced with the reality that much of the
Nation--and the Congress, specifically--has a very different
view of what is needed, and has a very different assessment of
what is happening.
Senator Webb. Thank you very much.
Dr. Brzezinski. That's a very major challenge.
Senator Webb. Thank you for your testimony. Thank you for
being here today.
The Chairman [presiding]. That's what we're, I might add,
attempting to do. Whether it will work or not--it's a first
step. If you have any--I'm not being facetious here--any
additional ideas as to how to do that, with specificity, they'd
be welcome.
But we have a vote----
Dr. Brzezinski. Just one point----
The Chairman. Please.
Dr. Brzezinski [continuing]. I'd propose in response to
just that.
The Chairman. Please.
Dr. Brzezinski. I think a clear congressional resolution on
the fact that the United States does not intend to stay in Iraq
for an indefinite period of time would be very helpful.
The Chairman. We have passed, I might add, on, I think, two
occasions, ``no permanent basis.'' It's not the same thing,
you're saying.
Dr. Brzezinski. No, it's different----
The Chairman. It is different. And we could not even get
that through.
But, having said that, let me yield to the Senator from----
Senator Cardin. Mr. Chairman, I just really----
The Chairman [continuing]. Maryland.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just wanted to thank you, Dr. Brzezinski, for your
testimony. I am in agreement with pretty much everything you've
said. There's only one thing that disappoints me, and that is
you're a resident of Virginia rather than Maryland. [Laughter.]
Other than that, I think we're in full agreement.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, again, I want to thank you so much, Dr.
Brzezinski. As I said, you're always so clearheaded in your
recommendations. There's no doubt about what you're proposing.
I, for what it's worth, agree with you, in large part,
particularly as it relates to what I believe to be, not only
the hyping of the circumstance for going in, but the hyping of
the threat, and so on. I'll conclude by saying I agree with
your worst-case scenario as the one I worry about most, as
well, that as this becomes protracted, it gets--my dad used to
have an expression I've not used often, but when people talk
about war, he'd say, ``The only war worse than one that's
intended is one that's unintended.'' And I worry that if we
stand on the--your phrase is ``slope''--that that's where we
could end up, and that would be a disaster.
But I thank you very, very much, and thank you for being
available to us. It is the intention of the committee to hold
hearings on Iran in a timely way, and I would ask you to
consider, ahead of time, whether you'd be willing to come back
and talk about Iran.
Dr. Brzezinski. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It's
been a privilege to be here.
The Chairman. Thank you.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Letter from Nechirvan Barzani, Prime Minister, Kurdistan Regional
Government of Iraq, Erbil, Kurdistan-Iraq
January 23, 2007.
Hon. Joseph Biden, Chairman,
Hon. Richard Lugar, Ranking Member,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Biden and Senator Lugar: I convey the greetings and
friendship of the Kurdish people to the United States. I am following
with great interest your important hearings on the situation in Iraq.
The Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq (KRG) has been a full partner
with the United States and our fellow Iraqis in trying to build a
democratic Iraq. We understand America's frustration with the situation
in Iraq and we, too, are frustrated, disappointed, and saddened by the
continuing instability, violence, and loss of life.
It is our deeply held view that the only viable long-term solution
is a federal structure for Iraq that recognizes and empowers regional
governments in the north, south, and center of the country. The Kurds
are committed to a voluntary union within a federal system and have no
plans to secede from Iraq.
A program for reconciliation in Iraq must offer a ground-breaking
approach to both the decentralization of authority and the distribution
of resources. In that context, I would like to take this opportunity to
offer some clarification regarding the discussion of the Kurdish
position on the Iraqi oil law that came up during Secretary Rice's
appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Thursday,
January 11, 2007, and in subsequent press accounts of the negotiations
over the law.
I have personally led the intensive negotiations about the Iraqi
oil law in Baghdad on behalf of the Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG). The KRG has proposed a historic plan for the development of
Iraqi oil resources and the distribution of oil revenues that is
consistent with the interim Iraqi Constitution, also known as the
Transitional Administrative Law. In accordance with article 112 of the
Constitution, the federal government and the government of the oil
producing regions will jointly manage production from existing fields.
Regional governments have exclusive control over new fields, including
the right to sign contracts with foreign companies. The law will follow
article 142 of the Constitution in recognizing as valid the contracts
the KRG has signed with foreign oil companies.
There is agreement that oil revenues will be distributed to Iraq's
regions based on population, thus assuring the Sunni Arabs their
proportionate share of oil wealth. And, while not constitutionally
required to do so, the KRG has agreed that this sharing will include
revenues from new fields as well as existing fields, including Kirkuk.
Finally, the Kurdistan Regional Government will enact its own petroleum
law to implement in our region what has been agreed with the federal
government.
In order to assure transparency in contracting, the KRG will permit
a newly created Federal Oil Council to audit all future contracts and
to object to those that do not meet agreed standards.
As far as the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is concerned, the
oil law has not yet been finalized, although there have been recent
statements and press accounts to the contrary. The last draft that the
KRG was in agreement with was presented to Prime Minister al-Maliki for
his review on December 17, 2006, and the details of that draft is what
I have described. Any further material changes to that draft will
require the KRG's consent. Although the process of drafting the oil law
is nearing completion, the important annexes to the law are still
pending. Also, there are three associated laws (the revenue-sharing
law, the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) charter law, and a law to
define the Oil Ministry's new role) which must be drafted and agreed
upon before the whole package can be regarded as being final.
Let me conclude with a word about Kirkuk. As you know, Saddam
Hussein's regime carried out a brutal policy of ``Arabization''--that
is the forced migration of Kurds from Kirkuk, and Arabs to Kirkuk--to
alter the Kurdish and demographic character of the city. Turcomen
citizens also suffered under this policy. Although the consequences of
Saddam's crimes are still with us, there will be a historic referendum
in Kirkuk later this year. It should go without saying that the status
of Kirkuk is a Kurdish and an Iraqi issue. It is not the business of
any other country, including Turkey, which should not interfere in the
affairs of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
I am personally committed to deepening Kurdish and Iraqi ties with
Turkey, and my record speaks to that commitment. Turkish investment in,
and trade with, the Kurdistan Region has been decisive in our economic
stability and growth. An open and friendly border with Turkey is a top
priority for the Kurds and for Iraq. However, we urge Turkey to avoid
any statements or actions that could set back its relations with the
KRG and further destabilize the situation in Iraq.
I hope this letter offers some clarification on the position of the
Kurdistan Regional Government and that you would consider it for
submission as part of the official record for your hearings on Iraq.
I plan to come to Washington in February and would welcome the
opportunity to meet with you then. KRG Minister and Director of Foreign
Relations Falah M. Bakir will soon visit Washington and will be
available for consultations on the oil law or on any other questions
you may have.
I would like to convey my personal invitation to you and your
Senate colleagues to visit the Kurdistan Region of Iraq during your
next visit to the region.
Sincerely yours,
Nechirvan Barzani,
Prime Minister.
______
Prepared Statement of Dr. Jonathan Morrow, Senior Legal Adviser to the
Ministry of Natural Resources, Kurdistan Regional Government; Former
Senior Adviser to the U.S. Institute of Peace
iraq oil and revenue sharing agreements: necessary but not sufficient
for stability
Summary
Hopes in the United States that oil and revenue-sharing legislation
will bring stability to Iraq are exaggerated. No belligerent in Iraq's
civil war is stating its aims in terms of oil rights and revenues. In
parts of Iraq outside the Kurdistan region, petroleum development will
remain hampered by security problems for the foreseeable future.
However the hopes are not entirely misplaced. Intergovernmental oil
and revenue-sharing agreements--likely to be concluded between the Iraq
Federal Government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in
coming weeks, and reflected in national legislation--are an essential,
if not sufficient, condition for prosperity and stability. The
agreements may form the basis of a modus vivendi for what is already a
highly regionalized, confederal, if not partitioned Iraq. As with other
new-born federations, Iraq may find that it is the logic of economics
and trade, if nothing else, that encourages cordial relations among the
federal and regional governments.
Significantly, the agreements to date reflect real Iraqi interests,
and have not been imposed by the U.S. administration. They reflect the
reality of a very decentralized Iraq. In doing so they strike a careful
balance between, on the one hand, the need for Iraq-wide consistency of
petroleum policy, and on the other, the legitimate interests of
regions, including the Kurdistan region, in administering petroleum
operations in their territory. Largely at the insistence of the KRG,
the Iraq oil law will conform with international best practice in the
petroleum industry, incorporating the possibility, if federal and
regional ministers so choose, of using private sector exploration and
development under risked contracts. The revenue-sharing law will seek
to maintain a viable if not strong federal government, with the
remainder of revenues shared throughout Iraq on a per capita basis,
including proportionate shares to the oil-deprived Sunni Arab areas of
Iraq.
The U.S. administration should maintain its current practice of
encouraging, but not orchestrating, these intergovernmental agreements.
The United States should increasingly defer to the IMF and other
multilateral organizations to provide technical assistance on these
agreements.
Introductory Remarks
I offer this written testimony on my own behalf, and at the request
of the office of the chairman of the committee. For the past 3 years I
have been an observer and participant in Iraq's constitutional and
petroleum negotiations, and have a personal interest in the prospects
that those negotiations might have for stemming the flow of blood in
Iraq. As a former U.N. official I have experience advising post-
conflict governments in petroleum law matters, particularly in the case
of East Timor, now a successful oil-producing state. I am an Australian
citizen-resident in Washington, DC.
I am currently acting as legal adviser to one of the Iraqi
negotiating parties, the KRG. In presenting these remarks I draw on my
2 years experience working on the Iraq Constitution and legal system as
a senior adviser at the United States Institute of Peace, and as an
occasional senior adviser to the United Nations in Iraq. I have made 12
trips to Iraq over the course of the last 3 years. I have not cleared
this testimony with the KRG or with any other party.
Background
In recent weeks, Iraqi negotiators have made progress in agreeing
the terms of two critical pieces of Iraqi legislation: A law for the
exploration and development of oil and gas (commonly referred to as the
``Hydrocarbons Law''), and a law for Iraq-wide petroleum revenue
sharing (the ``Revenue Sharing Law'').
The negotiations are essentially bilateral, as between the two
existing governments in Iraq: The federal government and the KRG. The
venue for negotiations is the ``Iraq Oil Committee,'' an ad hoc
intergovernmental committee, chaired by Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister
Barham Salih, that meets occasionally in the Baghdad International
Zone. The principal negotiators representing each party are Dr. Thamir
Gadhban, adviser to Prime Minister Maliki, and himself a former Oil
Minister in the Allawi Government of 2004-2005; and Dr. Ashti Abdullah
Hawrami, Minister of Natural Resources in the KRG and a long-time
petroleum consultant based in London, and not aligned with either of
the two Kurdistan political parties. Dr. Gadhban, though himself a
secular Shiite and now aligned with the Shiite-dominated Maliki
government, carries the support of important sections of Iraq's Sunni
Arab leadership.
These negotiations take place at a point in time when the emergence
of a second and predominantly Shia region, in the south of Iraq, seems
possible. To date, and notwithstanding the centralist preferences of
Prime Minister Maliki, the prevailing political forces in Shia Iraq are
regionalist in nature; this was evident in the 2005 constitutional
negotiations, and in the passage of the Law of the Executive Procedures
Regarding the Formation of Regions in November last year.
The State of Play--Hydrocarbons Law
A draft of the Hydrocarbons Law was agreed on December 17, 2006,
between Dr. Gadhban and Dr. Hawrami. Though representing very different
interests in Iraq, those two individuals have developed a good--and in
Iraq, rare--rapport. They are each very experienced in the petroleum
industry, and have relationship of considerable trust.
In point form, the essential terms of the agreement reflected in
that draft are as follows.
1. New intergovernmental oil body.--A new supreme petroleum
regulatory body will be created: A Federal Council for Oil and Gas. The
critical feature of this institution is that it is an intergovernmental
entity with direct representation of the federal government, the KRG,
and any other subnational government that may come into existence.
Important decisions will be made jointly by the governments. As Iraq
comes increasingly to resemble a confederal or even international
entity--analogous to the European Union, for instance--these
intergovernmental entities will be increasingly important.
2. Risk and reward contracting.--Significantly, the Federal Council
for Oil and Gas, the Iraq Oil Ministry, and the KRG, will have the
ability to resort to risk and reward contracting with the private
sector, including production sharing agreements. The level of political
commitment to production sharing varies within Iraq. The KRG has
endorsed a heavily private sector oriented approach in its own
territory, which contains approximately 10-15 percent of Iraq's
petroleum. The KRG has already concluded two such contracts, with
Norwegian and Turkish companies, in circumstances where significant oil
discoveries have since been made; the KRG plans to execute several more
in the near future. Such an investor-friendly approach is much less
popular in Baghdad, where unrisked service and buy-back contract models
are likely to be the norm.
3. Intergovernmental cooperation, with right of arbitration.--
Consistent with the Iraq Constitution, the KRG will retain the right to
license petroleum activities in the Kurdistan region. Under the Iraq
Constitution, petroleum administration is not an exclusive power of the
federal government (art. 110) and therefore regional law is paramount
(art. 115). Existing KRG contracts are grandfathered (art. 141).
However, in keeping with the constitutional requirements of
intergovernmental cooperation (art. 112), the KRG will review existing
KRG petroleum contracts to ensure that they are consistent with the
policy criteria agreed in the Federal Council for Oil and Gas, and will
forward future KRG contracts to the Federal Council for Oil and Gas
which in turn may, as a last resort, submit those contracts to
independent arbitrators if they perceive that they are inconsistent
with those criteria.
As of today's date, some senior Iraq Federal Government officials
have resisted the cooperation and arbitration approach as agreed on
December 17, and are insisting that the federal government have a
blanket right of approval over KRG contracts. This new stance is at
odds with the Iraq Constitution and the principles of cooperation that
it contains. This is the principal cause of delay in negotiations and
is the obstacle preventing the draft Hydrocarbons Law going to Cabinet
and Parliament.
It is unlikely that the KRG will accept this reversal of attitude
on the part of some in the federal government. First, the Constitution
of Iraq supports the KRG view. Moreover, the KRG is aware that many
oil-producing federations, including the United States, Canada,
Australia, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates, give power to manage
petroleum production to subnational governments. Most importantly,
there is an overwhelming anxiety in the Kurdistan region that a future
Iraq Federal Government might deliberately, and for political reasons,
prevent the Kurdistan's oil from being produced, to the economic
detriment of the region. In the past, successive Iraq Governments,
including of course Saddam Hussein's, have done so. This is why there
is hostility in the Kurdistan region to any assertion of an extra-
constitutional right of approval by Baghdad for KRG petroleum
activities. The December 17 compromise position--including the
arbitration mechanism--is sensible, represents a serious concession by
the KRG from its rights under the Constitution, and accommodates any
reasonable federal government requirement for Iraq-wide cooperation and
uniformity.
In addition to this outstanding political issue, some technical
work remains to be concluded on the draft law, including the completion
of annexes setting out model contracts.
The State of Play--Revenue Sharing Law
The Revenue Sharing Law is less well advanced. The draft
Hydrocarbons Law sets out some general revenue sharing principles, but
quite properly leaves the details to a separate piece of legislation.
The general principles so far agreed for the Revenue Sharing Law are as
follows:
1. All oil and gas revenues will be deposited in an ``Oil Revenues
Fund,'' under the oversight of a Council of Trustees. The Council will,
like the Federal Council for Oil and Gas, be an intergovernmental
institution, with direct representation of the federal government and
the KRG.
2. There will be an initial regular allocation to a ``Future
Fund,'' perhaps analogous to the Kuwait Fund.
3. There will be second regular allocation to the federal
government.
4. There will be a third regular allocation to the regions and
governorates according to population. Where the federal government
currently carries out essential government activities within region or
governorate, the cost of those activities will be deducted from the
allocation of that region or governorate.
It is noteworthy that in agreeing to these principles, the KRG is
waiving its right under the Constitution to retain revenues from oil
and gas fields that were not in production at the time the Constitution
entered into force--the so-called ``future fields'' (implied in art.
112). The KRG position is that it is ready to pool revenues from all
petroleum fields--both current and future--into a common account
provided certain obvious safeguards are in place. Those safeguards
include a transparent and credible revenue sharing mechanism in place
in Baghdad that guarantees no superfluous or wasteful federal
government spending, and that guarantees that, after the federal
government allocation, the Kurdistan region will receive its per capita
entitlement (approximately 17 percent on the most reliable population
figures). The other safeguard the KRG requires is that there be a
modern and investor-friendly petroleum legal regime throughout Iraq in
the form of the Hydrocarbons Law--so that the KRG is not the only part
of Iraq generating and sharing new petroleum revenues.
These four agreed principles still leave some matters to be
resolved in the draft Revenue Sharing Law. Perhaps the most important
of those outstanding matters are:
1. Establishing the proper scope of the federal government. The
Constitution gives the federal government very limited exclusive
powers. Those powers include defense and foreign affairs, but do not
include, for instance, taxation or petroleum operations or criminal and
family law. However there is a large range of nonexclusive powers that
no other level of government in Iraq is capable of exercising: Health
services in Kerbala, for instance, or education in Anbar, or the
justice system in Baghdad. All these activities need, for the time
being, to be funded by the federal government.
However the federal government should not receive a blank check.
The regions and governorates have a right to limit the scope of federal
government spending so that there will be significant remainder for
division amongst competent regions and governorates (including the
Kurdistan region) on a per capita basis, consistent with the
Constitution. This will require a careful negotiation on the functions
of the federal government and careful drafting of the negotiation
results.
2. Establishing the criteria by which an existing governorate, or
any new region that may be created, will be considered competent to
receive a direct allocation. These criteria will presumably include the
practical ability of that governorate or region to receive funds and
spend them on government services. Perhaps those criteria should
include the need for an elected government to be in place.
At this point in time, the KRG has been invited by the federal
government to table the first draft of the Revenue Sharing Law for
negotiations. The KRG has now done so. I note that the KRG views the
Hydrocarbons Law and the Revenue Sharing Law as parts of a single
package of legislation that should be passed by the Iraq Parliament
simultaneously. I also note, however, that the Iraq Parliament has been
struggling to reach a quorum since December 2006 and early passage of
either law, however desirable, seems unlikely.
Prospects for Peace
The progress on the hydrocarbons and revenue-sharing agreements is
encouraging. The laws that give effect to these agreements, when they
are in place, can help ensure the fiscal viability of the Iraq Federal
Government as well as the proper constitutional integrity and autonomy
of the regions. The laws will, in particular, relieve tensions between
the federal government and the KRG. The Hydrocarbons Law will,
incidentally, confirm the implication in the Constitution that the
administration of Kirkuk petroleum fields will remain under the joint
control of the federal government regardless of the outcome of the
Kirkuk referendum; similarly, all revenue from Kirkuk petroleum will be
pooled nationally. In this way, the Hydrocarbons Law will work to
reduce (but not eliminate) Arab-Kurd tensions over the future of
Kirkuk.
The chances that these laws will alleviate the central conflict in
Iraq--between Sunni Arabs and Shia Arabs--are slim. Contrary to some
suggestions, including Recommendation 28 of the Iraq Study Group
Report, oil laws are unlikely to provide the venue for ``national
reconciliation.'' It has often been suggested that one catalyst for the
export of terrorist activity from the Sunni parts of Iraq is a Sunni
Arab fear of the consequences of a partition of Iraq in circumstances
where they lack oil resources. Any initiative--such as the imminent
Revenue Sharing Law--that might guarantee those parts of Iraq their per
capita share of petroleum revenues could eliminate that anxiety, and
thus reduce violence. If revenue is being shared, the prospects of
regionalization in Iraq become less threatening.
This argument is not convincing, at least in the short term. Since
2003, no representative of Iraq's Sunni Arabs has come forward with
demands for a per capita share of Iraq's petroleum revenues. The Sunni
Arab negotiating strategy has hitherto been wholly directed at
strengthening the federal government, and has been unwilling to adopt a
regionalist strategy; or, as the recent National Intelligence Estimate
put it, they have been ``unwilling to accept their minority status.''
The near- and medium-term prospects for the appearance of an
economically savvy Sunni regional administration seem remote.
However, the emergence of Sunni regional political entities is
inevitable, since at some point the Sunni Arabs will be forced, by
necessity, to abandon their ambitions for restored national hegemony.
The only alternative for them will be to concentrate on securing their
own regional prosperity. When that day arrives, the emerging Sunni Arab
region will need the ability to access a full per capita share of
national petroleum revenues. An impoverished Sunni region will likely
be further radicalized. On the other hand, a sustainable Sunni region,
that can provide its own security and other government services, can be
free from the fear of majoritarian rule from Baghdad, and can assert
control through regional security forces over criminal elements now at
large in the Sunni triangle. At the very least, the Revenue Sharing Law
offers this hope.
Constitutional Amendment
Efforts to permanently recentralize oil management and dismantle
the constitutional revenue-sharing requirements by amending the
Constitution are very unlikely to succeed. While regional interests
including the KRG are prepared in legislation to step down from the
Constitution and agree to sharing mechanisms, they will likely wish to
retain the constitutional default position--namely regional
administration of petroleum fields and the right to retain ``future
fields'' revenue.
Within Iraq, the only constituency for a constitutional amendment
initiative on oil is in the Sunni nationalist camp, representing
approximately 20 percent of Iraq's population. The requirement in the
Constitution (art. 142) that any amendment pass a three-governorate
veto test means that no such proposed amendment will succeed, since at
the very least the KRG would move its constituency in any proposed
referendum to block the recentralization of oil powers. It is unlikely,
of course, that any such initiative would reach referendum. The
chairmanship of the Iraq Parliament's Constitution Review Committee is
held by the major Shia regionalist party, SCIRI. International
commentators on the matter are often unaware that the schema of
decentralization set out in the Constitution was very deliberate. I
have written on these matters in greater detail in USIP Report 168,
``Weak Viability: The Iraqi Federal State and the Constitution
Amendment Process,'' July 2006, www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/
sr168.pdf.
Moreover, efforts to amend these provisions of the Constitution are
often grounded in the belief that a decentralized petroleum industry is
less capable of succeeding than a centralized one. Given the number of
successful oil producing federations in which regions control petroleum
production, this belief is questionable.
It does seem possible and desirable, however, that there be some
constitutional amendments on these subject matters. In particular, a
broad constituency could be found to reflect at least some of the
agreements in the Hydrocarbons Law and Revenue Sharing Law in
constitutional language, giving greater permanency and clarity to the
principles of joint decisionmaking between federal and regional
governments. Later this month, the United Nations Assistance Mission in
Iraq will be convening the Iraq Parliament's Constitution Review
Committee to consider these matters; the federal government and KRG oil
negotiators will also attend the meeting.
Another possible amendment will the entrenchment in the
Constitution of an Upper House of Parliament, to regions and
governorates direct representation in that body. Surprisingly enough,
there is no permanent venue in Iraq for regional and governorate
representation at the federal level.
Recommendations for the U.S. Administration
The United States has played a minor but helpful facilitating role
in the oil and revenue sharing discussions so far. This role is an
appropriate one and should not be amplified. International
misperceptions of U.S. interference in the drafting of an Iraq oil law
are likely to endure.
The United States should encourage the IMF to take a greater role
in the preparation of these laws, and in particular the Revenue Sharing
Law and associated institutions. The IMF is uniquely equipped to
provide the specialist technical advice in this area.
The United States should work to assist the establishment of a
Sunni region in Iraq, with an elected leadership capable of receiving
and spending a per capita allocation of petroleum revenues. The United
States should not attempt to prevent the emergence of a southern
(predominantly Shia) federal region if the people in that part of Iraq
so choose.
______
Perspective of Iraq Draft Petroleum Law by Tariq Shafiq, Director,
Petrolog & Associates, London, UK; Chair, Fertile Crescent Oil Company,
Baghdad, Iraq
IRAQ DRAFT PETROLEUM LAW: AN INDEPENDENT PERSPECTIVE
1.0 Introduction
1.1 Iraq may prove to have one of the greatest endowed petroleum
resource bases in the world, with oil potential reserves in excess of
215 billion barrels (bnb) and proven reserves in the region of 115bnb,
which puts it on par with Saudi Arabia. Moreover, its finding and
development costs are low--amongst the lowest in the Middle East.
However, its historical maximum production rate in any one year has not
exceeded 3.5mn b/d, although its exploration and development history
has stretched almost for eight decades. Iraq's oil production level
historically has lagged behind its oil reserve capability and has
neither reflected its low extraction costs.
Present Iraq proven reserves can support a production plateau of 10
million barrels per day (mbpd) and maintain it for a decade. As such,
priority should go to rehabilitation and production capacity build-up
and not to exploration for a few years to come.
Planning oil field development for production capacity growth ought
to be carried out on a composite master plan, which examines the
capacities of the discovered and producing fields (including each and
every producing formation within each field) from a technical and
economic feasibility point of view. In the mean time, it should take
into consideration Iraq's economic development plans and needs. This
necessitates a centralisation of policy and planning.
1.2 Finding cost per barrel of oil is estimated at: < US Cent 0.5.
Development cost per barrel of oil is estimated at: US$0.5-1.0. This
puts capital investment cost per 1 million barrels production capacity
at US$3 billion for expansion of existing production facilities and
US$6 billion, at the oil field boundary. These figures may go to US$4.5
and US$9 billion to account for security requirements and recent high
oil equipment inflation cost. Operating cost per barrel is US$1-2.
1.3 Today, Iraq's production facilities are either dilapidated,
looted, sabotaged, or war-torn to the extent that in September 2003,
the country's production rate sank to around 1mbpd in comparison to a
pre-war level of March 2003 of some 2.8mbpd. Thus far, at the beginning
of 2007, Iraq is producing around 2mbpd and exports around 1.5mbpd,
which is declining.
Iraq's oil industry has been governed by the concession oil
agreements until the early seventies, and decrees and regulations since
then. It is about time Iraq has a petroleum law that sets out clear
terms and conditions for good oil and gas industry exploitation plans,
policy, and execution.
2.0 The Draft Petroleum Law
2.1 On the invitation of the Iraqi Minister of Oil, Dr. Hussain
Shahrestani, the Iraqi draft petroleum law was researched and drafted
by a team of three independent Iraqi oil technocrats (including
myself), who together have international, Middle East and Iraqi oil
industry experience amounting to some 120 years. Invited to join the
team was the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Minister of Oil, but
that did not materialize.
2.2 The overall objective of the draft petroleum law is to
optimize Iraq's oil and gas exploitation, maximize return, and unite
the country and nation.
The draft petroleum law seeks uniformity of plans and policy
throughout the country. It requires the Ministry of Oil's (MoO)
consultation and participation with the provinces. Supervision of oil
and gas operations is shared between the provinces and the central
Ministry. The decisionmaking process has built in checks and balances
to enhance transparency and anticorruption practices.
A summary of the key points of the second draft of the Petroleum
Law is presented in Appendix I--Iraq Draft Petroleum Law: A Summary of
Key Points.
2.3 The law is investment friendly. It encourages private
enterprise and welcomes the international oil companies (IOCs) to work
in partnership with the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC). They have a
recognized role to play in the transfer of up-to-date state-of-the-art
technology, technical and managerial training of Iraqis, and in
investment capital. Selection from among prequalified companies will be
made through tendering in a transparent and accountable process.
Contract negotiations and decisions will be tasked to a high-level
Federal Commission assisted by a negotiating entity and a think tank.
Authority for final signature is vested with the Council of Ministers.
INOC will be an independent holding company, with affiliated
regional operating companies with an interrelated directorship, to
ensure proper communication and management as well as the participation
of the provinces. All discovered fields will be earmarked to INOC.
The central Ministry will be tasked with the supervisory and
regulatory role, in addition to the preparation of plans and policy in
cooperation and participation with the provinces.
2.4 The law is based on Articles 111 and 112 of the new Iraqi
Constitution, seen in the light of Articles 2, 49, 109, and 110, which
broadly define the authorities and responsibilities of the Federal and
Provincial authorities within the Petroleum sector.
In order to clarify the imprecise nature of these articles and to
work on the basis of a fair and sound interpretation, an objective and
independent legal consultancy was sought, a copy of which is presented
in Appendix II--Interpretation of Iraq's Constitutional Articles
Governing Oil & Gas by an Independent Legal Firm.
In the forthcoming review of the Constitution it is expected that a
large sector of the nation and in particular the large majority of
Iraqi oil technocrats, will vote for modification of these critical
Articles 111 and 112 governing the ownership of oil and gas and
management of production, plans and strategic policy, respectively, in
light of the legal interpretation attached below. However, the draft
petroleum law has been written on the basis of this legal
interpretation irrespective of whether the review takes place.
3.0 Ongoing negotiations
3.1 As highlighted above, the overall objective of the draft
petroleum law is to optimize oil and gas exploitation, maximize return,
and unite the country. As such, the draft law was written in the
interest of the nation state as a whole, to apply equally to all parts
of the country, with no margin for negotiation between the federal
government and any one region or governorate or among the ethnic and
sectarian divide.
3.2 The petroleum draft prepared by the drafting team has been
adopted by the MoO without modification.
However, with differences between rival sectarian and ethnic
parties at its peak, negotiations between the major parties have become
the rule, in advance of democratic debate among the members of the
Council of Representatives (the Parliament). The case of the draft
petroleum law is no exception.
Hard negotiations have been taking place, essentially, between KRG
representatives and the rest of the members of the Ministerial
Committee, which was set up to examine and make recommendations on
draft petroleum law to the Council of Ministers. Once approved by the
Council, the law would be passed to the Council of Representatives for
ratification.
The KRG position, expressed in their published Draft Petroleum Law,
was based on a radical interpretation of the pivotal Article 111,
allowing for the oil and gas in the Kurdistan as the property of the
people of Kurdistan, not the whole Iraqi nation, as an undivided asset.
Their petroleum law is so designed as to contain terms and conditions
vis-a-vis the Federal draft petroleum law, with a large margin for
negotiation as demonstrated in the past.
It is my view that a material change in the second draft petroleum
law that increases the powers of the provinces, could compromise the
interests of the nation as a whole. From the KRG perspective, a
compromise made by them is part of their negotiating strategy.
Examining the Temporary Law for Administration (TAL), issued by the
CPA, shows that consultation or cooperation in the management of oil
and gas resources by the federal government with the regions and
governorates was the only requirement, conditional on an agreed fair
distribution of revenue.
The Constitution, however, requires more than consultation and
cooperation in the management of resources. The draft federal petroleum
law goes beyond that in sharing with the regions and governorates
management and decisionmaking. It has been drafted for the interests of
the nation-state as a whole and to apply equally to all parts of the
nation, with no built-in margin for negotiations between the federal
government and any one region or governorate.
The third and finalized draft petroleum law will in addition
contain agreed principles governing Revenue Sharing and Reserved Fund.
Each of the two will be entrusted independent administrative bodies.
The former shall be based on equal population basis.
3.3 The negotiations did not start in earnest until the revenue-
sharing issue was settled.
The negotiations were slow, proceeding in a stop and go fashion
over the last 5 months. An important breakthrough occurred when a
senior KRG Minister stated in an oil conference in London on 8 December
2006, that, following a recent definitive agreement between KRG and
federal government negotiators over an acceptable scheme of oil revenue
sharing, the KRG position on the interpretation of Articles 111 and 112
had changed and come into line with that of the central government. He
added that in due course, following the building of mutual confidence,
the KRG might consent to the redrafting of relevant constitutional
articles. This was regarded by those Iraqis present as a genuine
gesture by the Iraqi Kurdish nation acting in the common interests of
the Iraqi nation.
Despite this declaration, however, the KRG appears to maintain its
earlier position of authority to negotiate contracts with companies
independently of the Federal Petroleum Commission and without the
requirement for its approval.
Another sticky issue is the KRG's half a dozen PSA contracts with
small oil companies. These provide windfall profits well above and
multiples of the norm reasonably required by the current draft
petroleum law, in the order of an internal discounted rate of return of
60-100 percent. The central Ministry has decreed them as unacceptable
and without legal base. Whether they are to be cancelled or reviewed to
be brought into line with the terms of the Federal petroleum law is
another issue which yet to be settled.
One possible explanation for the KRG to maintain its position on
these two issues is that there might be a lack of consensus among its
leadership, or again its desire to maintain a bargaining position.
In my opinion, if the KRG maintain this position it would amount to
a de facto rejection of Articles 111, 112, and other relevant articles
of the Constitution, which task the federal government with the
responsibility for the proper management of oil and gas resources. It
would leave the door open for other regions and governorates to follow
suit and set a damaging precedence. It could lead to diversified
contract terms and conditions which lack transparency, accountability,
and the checks and balances built into the federal law.
However, as of today I understand that a compromise solution has
been reached on these two issues within the Negotiating Committee, that
would allow the KRG to negotiate contracts with companies in the
presence of a representative from the central MoO and subject to the
approval of the Federal Petroleum Commission (FPC); and allow the KRG
themselves to renegotiate their existing PSA contracts to bring them in
conformity with the Federal Petroleum Law but validity is subject to
the approval of the FPC. The wording is chosen diplomatically to meet
the Kurd's sensitivity.
I understand also that the Negotiating Committee has agreed on a
third version of the Draft Petroleum Law, as of today. However, I
understand that approval from the KRG top decisionmakers has not yet
been received. The further delay could be because of disenchantment of
the KRG leadership with the compromise solutions.
The third and finalized draft, which I have received today, is
disappointing and weak in the critical changes that have been made to
the two principle articles of competence of authorities and grant of
rights, as a result of negotiations and bargaining.
The critical items that have been removed from the original draft
are fundamental in the context of professionalism and transparency and
weaken the checks and balances built into the original draft. The
principles are still there but the mechanisms for enforcing them under
Iraq's prevailing situation have been skillfully removed or
circumvented to make the outcome purely cosmetic.
The role of the professional think tank has been considerably
weakened. Its former scope to examine all issues has been reduced to
only those selected by the FPC. The requirement to publish their annual
report has been removed. Membership appointment is reduced to one year
from five, and requires the unanimity of all the members of the FPC.
The appointments of the think tank and FPC have been made to
conform to Iraq's sectarian and ethnic divide, an alarming indication
of political interference at a time when sound professional management
is badly needed.
The FPC has been enlarged up to 20 or 30 members which makes it
more fit for a debating society than trusties tasked with a vital
decisionmaking role, whilst its role has been considerably weakened.
The negotiating role of the FPC has been removed and given to the
regions (i.e., KRG). The FPC in the new setup may be used to provide
legitimacy to the product rather than scrutinize the process and ensure
its conformance with the principles which were so carefully put in the
first draft.
The resultant checks and balances are now insufficient to cope with
Iraq's internal political complications, and are more of a facade,
leaving the competence of authorities and the processes of the grant of
rights fully open to manipulation by the political forces that prevail.
Further and critically for the future of Iraq's oil and gas industry,
the balance of power in the management of Iraq's oil and gas resources
has shifted from the central federal government to the regions.
4.0 Concluding Remarks
4.1 Without a central unified policy there will be disharmony and
competition between INOC (operating on production and marketing its
export oil to provide the state's income) and the regions and
governorates (operating on exploration for unrequired additional
reserves for many years to come), and among the various regions and
governorates, with disharmony and envy between the haves and have-nots.
This would cause instability, with damaging consequences
contributing to further fragmentation, instead of promoting the unity
of the nation and country.
The Constitution has tasked the federal government with the job of
management of the oil and gas resource management, not any one village,
governorate, or region.
4.2 Instability would lead to an unhealthy oil industry and would
discourage the serious IOCs, who have the required knowledge, capital,
and markets. Iraq would then find itself accepting speculators with
more promises than they can deliver, and the minor companies which do
not have the capability to develop Iraq's giant oil fields.
4.3 IOCs, in my view, are advised to aim for urgently needed
rehabilitation of the infrastructure, expansion of production capacity
of partially developed fields, improving damaged reservoir performance,
and to develop the many discovered but not yet delineated oil fields,
rather than going for exploration for unnecessary new oil. A rush for
exploration and development contracts would be viewed as mortgaging the
reserves of future generations. It would provide fuel to the view that
the war was for oil.
4.4 There are today a number of damaging trends of ``tsunami''
dimensions, engulfing Iraq. There is a widespread lack of security and
law and order, widespread killing for reasons of identity, ethnicity,
sect, or for no reason other than criminal ends.
4.5 There is widespread lack of efficiency in government
organizations and a near absence of institutional performance or sound
management at the centre and, especially in the provinces, in addition
to a lack of investment and extremely high unemployment.
4.6 Action to reverse these damaging trends ought to be all
embracing in nature, coordinated and united in approach, and having the
welfare of country and nation at heart above all considerations. A
healthy and robust oil industry would provide the revenue necessary for
social and economic reform and the right environment for easing much of
the above trends.
appendix i--iraq draft petroleum law: a summary of key points
The draft Petroleum Law aims at uniformity of plans and policy
throughout the country. It provides prior consultation with the
provinces. Decisions taken at the centre involves provincial
participation.
Supervision of oil and gas operations is shared between the
provinces and Ministry. The decisionmaking process has checks and
balances to enhance transparency and anticorruption practices.
Its overall objective is to optimize oil and gas exploitation and
maximize return, and unite the country. It is based on Articles 111 and
112 seen in the light of Articles 2, 49, 109 and 110 of the
Constitution which broadly define the authorities and responsibilities
of the Federal and Provincial authorities within the Petroleum sector.
1.0 Competence of Authorities
1.1 The Council of Representatives
The Council of Representatives shall enact all Federal legislation
on Petroleum Operations. It shall also approve all agreements made in
connection with Petroleum Operations that extend outside Iraqi
territory.
1.2 The Council of Ministers
1.2.1 The Council of Ministers shall:
Be responsible for recommending proposed legislation on the
development of the country's Petroleum resources for introduction into
the Council of Representatives.
Be the competent authority to formulate Federal Petroleum policy
and supervise its implementation. It also administers overall Petroleum
Operations, including the formulation of Federal policy on all matters
within the scope of this law including i.a. Exploration, Production,
Transportation, Marketing, the proposal of Petroleum legislation, and
the approval of such regulations as may be necessary from time to time
on said matters. It shall submit proposals on legislation to the
Council of Representatives.
Be the competent authority to approve and sign Exploration and
Production contracts granting rights for conducting Petroleum
Operations and the amendments thereto, in so far as they concern
territory inside Iraq.
1.2.2 It shall have the following administrative entities:
A. The Federal Petroleum Commission
Assists the Council of Ministers: In matters related to the
approval of Petroleum plans and policy which are prepared by the
Ministry, and in granting Exploration and Production rights. It is
chaired by the Prime Minister with the Secretariat of the Minister of
Oil.
B. The Negotiation Committee
An entity for planning and executing the process leading to the
allocation of Exploration and Production rights.
It consists of specially trained members of the Ministry, INOC and
related entities with appropriate skills and experience.
For specific negotiations the committee shall be supplemented by
representatives from the region or the governorate where the particular
acreage is located.
C. The Petroleum Advisory Council
A think tank to examine and provide comments and recommendations,
as a consultative entity, on overall Petroleum plans and strategic
policy, licensing contracts, overall Development policy, as well as key
projects and any other relevant matters referred to it by the Federal
Petroleum Commission or the Ministry.
It consists of nine technocrats, three of whom are from the regions
and governorates whose deliberations are published and nonbinding.
1.3 The Ministry of Oil
A. The Ministry is the competent authority for proposing federal
policy and legislation as well as issuing regulations and guidelines
and undertaking the necessary monitoring, supervisory, regulatory, and
administrative actions required to ensure the proper implementation
thereof.
B. The Ministry shall in consultation with the provincial
authorities draw up federal policies and plans on Exploration,
Development, and Production on an annual or as needed basis.
The geographical distribution and timing of exploration and
production programs shall be optimised on the basis of proposals from
the provinces and producing governorates.
C. The Ministry, or a special entity under it, shall have the
responsibility of monitoring Petroleum Operations to ensure adherence
to legislation, regulations, and contractual terms.
The same entity shall through inspection, technical audits, and
other appropriate actions verify conformance with legislation,
regulations, contractual terms, and internationally recognized
practices.
1.4 Iraq National Oil Company, INOC
The Council of Ministers shall submit a proposal for a law to
establish the Iraqi National Oil Company (INOC), as an upstream holding
company fully owned by the government, and be earmarked all discovered
fields. Fields which are either undeveloped or partially developed may
be developed in cooperation with reputable oil companies.
1.4.1 INOC shall:
Be authorised to carry out Exploration and Production Operations
inside Iraq on behalf of the government.
Establish Affiliated Operating Companies to carry out Petroleum
Operations in the provinces and producing governorates on the basis of
contracted management fees. Such fees shall cover costs and a
reasonable profit margin to allow a healthy development of operations.
The share option for the provinces and governorates in such operating
companies can be up to 50 percent.
Be the operator and is authorized to enter directly into Service
and Management Contracts with appropriate oil or service companies if
required.
1.5 The Provincial Authorities shall:
Propose to the Federal authorities activities and plans for the
province to be included in the country's plan for Petroleum Operations.
They shall further assist and participate with the Federal authorities
in discussions leading to the finalization of the Federal plan as
required.
Participate in the licensing process regarding activities within
their respective province.
Participate as part of the Commission's negotiation team in
licensing preparations, evaluations, and negotiations regarding areas
within the province.
Be represented in the activities carried out by the Petroleum
Commission and Petroleum Council.
Undertake the monitoring, regulation, and administration of
Petroleum Operations to ensure adherence to legislation, regulations,
guidelines, and the specific terms of the relevant Exploration and
Production Contracts. Such functions shall be carried out in close
coordination and harmonization with the Ministry to ensure uniform and
consistent implementation throughout the Republic of Iraq. The Ministry
shall also provide professional support to the Provincial Petroleum
entity.
INOC's operational activities in the province shall be carried out
by affiliated companies where the provincial authorities have an option
to participate up to 50 percent through ownership in the respective
affiliates.
2.0 The Licensing Code
2.1 The licensing process shall be based on transparent and
accountable tendering and shall take into account recognized practices
by the international petroleum industry. It shall adhere to the
following principles and procedures:
Competitive licensing rounds--The contractual terms offered to
applicants shall be specified in model contracts.
The form and terms of the model contract shall take account of the
specific characteristics and requirements of the individual area.
2.2. All model contracts shall be formulated to honor the
following objectives and criteria:
National control
Ownership of the resources
Optimum economic rent to the country
Appropriate return on investment to the investor
Reasonable incentives to the investor for ensuring solutions
which are optimal to the country in the long-term related to,
i.a:
Improved and enhanced recovery
Technology transfer
Training and development of Iraqi personnel
Optimal utilization of the infrastructure
Environmentally friendly solutions and plans
2.3 The Model Contracts may be based upon Service Contract, Buy-
back Contract, and Production Sharing Contract (PSC).
Only prequalified companies shall be considered in any licensing
round.
Evaluation of prequalified applicants shall aim at establishing a
short list of successful candidates for negotiations.
The selection and ranking of successful applicants shall be on the
basis of the quality and relevance of the proposed work plan and the
anticipated economic rent to the nation.
The overall allocation of Exploration and Production rights
throughout the Republic of Iraq shall aim at achieving variety among
oil companies and operators with different background, expertise,
experience, and approach so as to enhance efficiency through positive
competition, benchmarking of performance and transparency. The
possibility of using consortia of selected companies, particularly in
large fields, shall be considered.
Not later than 2 months after the endorsement of Exploration and
Production contracts by the Council of Ministers the text of the
contract shall be made public.
APPENDIX II--INTERPRETATION OF IRAQ'S CONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLES GOVERNING
OIL AND GAS BY AN INDEPENDENT LEGAL FIRM
There are two specific articles and a governing article in the
Federal Constitution relating to oil and gas resources.
Ownership of Oil Resources
Article 111 is unequivocal that all oil and gas are owned by ``all
the people of Iraq in all regions and governorates.'' (Emphasis added.)
The language on its face does not admit to the ownership of any
particular resource by any particular group or geographical or
political region. In effect it gives all citizens of Iraq, wherever
resident, an undivided interest in all of the oil and gas resources of
the country. Notably it does not vest oil and gas resources in the
``state'' nor does it allocate the resources to particular regions or
governorates. The regions and governorates are addressed solely in the
collective form. Moreover it refers to all of the oil and gas resources
and does not use the limiting language of ``current fields'' included
in Article 112 First.
Given that oil and gas is the property of the ``people'' as a
whole, any power to alienate the resource by sale or other disposition
lies with the ``people.'' In this regard it is worth noting that the
only political entity representing all of the people of Iraq is the
Council of Representatives. Article 49, First.
Management of Oil Resources
Article 112 First provides that the federal government, with the
``producing'' governorates and regional governments, shall manage oil
and gas ``extracted from present fields'' subject to a revenue
distribution formula. ``Management'' in Article 112 is not defined nor
is it subject to any words of limitation. Thus management should be
read in the ordinary sense of conducting or supervising all of the
business aspects relating to oil and gas extracted from present fields,
e.g., production, transport, refining, disposition.
Article 112 Second provides that the federal government, again with
the producing regional and governorate governments, shall establish the
strategic policies for the development of oil and gas in accordance
with certain standards. Article 112 Second does not contain the
limiting words ``extracted from present fields.''
Thus Article 112 provides a general structure for the oil and gas
sector in which strategic policies are set on a unified basis for all
of the oil and gas resources of the country and then the implementation
of those policies is managed in one case (oil and gas extracted from
existing fields) by the federal government with the producing
governorates and regional governments and in the second case (oil and
gas not extracted from existing fields) by the regions or the
governorates. In the second case the regions and governorates assume
their power to manage by virtue of Article 115.
The word ``extracted'' does not connote a limitation in this
management authority but rather should be read as defining what oil and
gas resources are subject to the management authority of Article 112
First, i.e., oil and gas ``extracted from present fields.'' Article 112
envisions two functions: The establishment of oil and gas policies and
management of the oil and gas resource. Nothing suggests a tripartite
definition in which ``extraction'' would not be subject to either the
strategic policies or the management function.
Authority of Region Under Article 112
Article 112 First provides that the ``federal government, with the
producing governorates and regions'' shall undertake the management of
the designated resources. Article 112 Second provides that the
``federal government, with the producing regional and governorate
governments,'' shall formulate the necessary strategic policies.
Article 112 First provides at the end of the section for the
matters addressed in the section to be regulated by a law. The same
provision for regulation by a law is not included in Article 112 Second
dealing with the formulation of strategic policies. Perhaps, the
drafters did not view ``policies'' as requiring legislation, and that
the required law governing management would reflect the policies.
The precise nature of the interaction of the federal government and
the regions and governorates under Article 112 is not clear and may
have been left deliberately ambiguous. Article 112 by its language and
its separation from Article 110 (the exclusive authorities of the
federal government) and Article 114 (the shared competencies) is
evidently something more than a shared competency but something less
than an exclusive competency. Some sort of collaborative or
consultative process is required. Two items, however, point to the
leadership of the federal government in the process. In both the first
and second sections, the federal government is the subject of the
sentences and is commanded to act, albeit with the producing regions
and governorates. Second, in Article 112 First the activity subject too
the section is to be regulated by ``a law.'' The unitary reference to
``a law'' as elsewhere in the Constitution refers to federal
legislation. Thus whatever the form of collaboration between the
governmental units, the final action is to be determined by the federal
legislative council.
The leadership of the federal government in Article 112 is further
reinforced by Article 110 which sets out those areas where the federal
government has exclusive authority. Among the exclusive authorities of
the federal government are ``formulating foreign sovereign economic and
trade policy''; and ``regulating commercial policy across regional and
governorate boundaries in Iraq.'' Thus, the shared authority of Section
112 is cabined by the power of the federal government to prescribe and
set policies whenever trade or investment crosses national, regional,
or governorate boundaries or involves trade or investment moving in and
out of Iraq. Regional action in violation of such policies would be
unconstitutional as it infringes upon areas committed to the exclusive
authority of the federal government.
Even if one reads Article 112 Second as it relates to the
formulation of strategic policies in the oil and gas sector as being an
exception to the exclusive power of the federal government, virtually
all ancillary implementing action would be subject to those policies
that the federal government has the exclusive authority to establish.
Only activity taking place exclusively within a governorate would be
exempt, a very limited area indeed.
Limitation on Present Fields
The principal negotiators of Article 112 First appear to agree that
the management authority provided by the section does not apply to all
gas and oil resources. Rather it extends to oil and gas ``extracted
from present fields.'' The phrase needs to be broken up into its
component parts. Nothing in the Constitution suggests that ``field''
should be given anything but its ordinary understanding in the
petroleum industry and in Iraq. The Society of Petroleum Engineers
defines field as follows:
Field--An area consisting of a single reservoir or multiple
reservoirs all grouped on, or related to, the same individual
geological structural feature or stratigraphic condition. The field
name refers to the surface area, although it may refer to both the
surface and the underground productive formations.
In Iraq various areas and structures have historically been
identified as fields, e.g., the Rumaila field, the Kirkuk field.
Rather the controversy surrounds the qualifier ``present.'' Some
including certain Kurdish authorities have construed ``present'' as
meaning ``presently producing'' or ``presently capable of being
produced.'' The difference is not trivial. In the absence of other
limiting language, however, ``present'' should have its ordinary
meaning of ``existing.'' There is still the issue of present when? Most
people seem to believe that it meant existing at the time of the
compromise or perhaps more precisely when the Constitution came into
effect.
Regional Power To Nullify Decisions Pursuant to Article 112
The Constitution does give the regions and the governorates certain
powers to modify or nullify federal legislation, but neither can be
reasonably read to apply to Article 112. Article 115 provides:
All powers not stipulated in the exclusive powers of the federal
government belong to the authorities of the regions and governorates
that are not organized in a region. With regard to other powers shared
between the federal government and the regional government, priority
shall be given to the law of the regions and governorates not organized
in a region in case of dispute.
Since the powers in Article 112 do not appear in the list of
exclusive powers of Article 110, the first sentence in Article 115
could be read to give the regions and governorates authority in the
areas covered by Article 112. This construction, however, would make
Article 112 a nullity and thus cannot stand. The second sentence of
Article 115 applies by its terms to the ``shared'' powers of the
regional government and the federal government. The shared powers are
specifically dealt with in Article 114 and this reference should be
limited accordingly to the powers set out there.
Article 121 Second also gives the regions certain powers. That
Article provides: In case of a contradiction between regional and
national legislation in respect to a matter outside the exclusive
authorities of the federal government, the regional power shall have
the right to amend the application of the national legislation within
that region.
Nevertheless, this article does not apply to the activities of
Article 112 as this is not an area where the regional government has
authority to adopt legislation. This section only applies to those
areas where the federal and regional governments have shared
competency. These areas are set out in Article 114, and it is in these
areas where there is conjoint legislative authority that the regional
government pursuant to Article 121 has the limited authority to modify
the federal legislation operative in its region. To hold otherwise
would again make Article 112 a nullity, not only nullifying the federal
authority but also the rights of the other producing governorates and
regions to participate in the policy formation provided for by Article
112.
Validity of Existing Kurdistan Contracts
Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, the Kurdistan Government
entered into certain oil exploration or development contracts with
foreign companies. The contracts have not been made public and their
scope and the fields to which they apply are unknown.
In support of its authority to enter into these contracts Kurdistan
representatives point to Article 141 of the Constitution which
preserves the validity of certain actions of the region of Kurdistan
taken since 1992.
That article provides:
Legislation enacted in the region of Kurdistan since 1992 shall
remain in force, and decisions issued by the government of the region
of Kurdistan, including court decisions and contracts, shall be
considered valid unless they are amended or annulled pursuant to the
laws of the region of Kurdistan by the competent entity in the region,
providing that they do not contradict with the Constitution.
Although the savings clause is very broadly drafted, it is subject
to the last limiting clause that any such legislation, court decisions,
or contracts do not conflict with the Constitution. Any existing
contract could conflict with Article 112 of the Constitution to the
extent that it derogates the authority given to the federal and
regional governments with respect to the management of production from
existing oil fields or to the extent that it conflicts with the
strategic policies that are to be adopted pursuant to Article 112. If
such contracts purport to exercise authority within the areas committed
by Article 110 exclusively to the federal government (e.g., foreign
sovereign economic and trade policy), the contracts may also be invalid
or subject to modification with respect to activity taking place after
the Constitution became effective. Any more definitive analysis would
require review of the contracts and might also have to await decisions
regarding management and policy pursuant to Article 112.